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Going offshore: studies of the maritime zone in East Asia from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries

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Going offshore: studies of the maritime zone in East Asia from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries

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Content i
GOING OFFSHORE:
STUDIES OF THE MARITIME ZONE IN EAST ASIA FROM THE ELEVENTH TO THE
FIFTEENTH CENTURIES
by
Lina Nie
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(HISTORY)
August 2024
Copyright [2024] [Lina Nie]

ii
DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to my grandparents, who taught me the joy of learning no matter
which life stage we are at.
And for my husband and daughter, for so many things.

iii
Acknowledgments
This dissertation would not be possible without the tremendous support, both mentally
and intellectually, of many people. First, I would like to thank Joan Piggott and Josh Goldstein,
my advisors at the University of Southern California, as well as Peter Bol, my MA advisor at
Harvard University, and Hui Chun-hing, my college advisor at the University of Hong Kong.
Joan and Josh read every chapter of my dissertation, providing carefully edited comments; but
even before that, they gave me plentiful feedback via email communication, daily chats, and
seminars throughout my PhD study. Peter is always happy to read my papers and hear my latest
updates. His work habits, efficiency, and attitude as a serious scholar are always my model.
Chun-hing is the mentor who opened up the fascinating world of history to me when I first
attended college. His kindness, patience, and support have accompanied me from Hong Kong to
United States all these many years, long after I graduated from college. Thank you. All of you
have shown me that it is possible to become both a great person and a good scholar. You are the
best advisors.
I also want to extend my sincere gratitude to my committee members. Richard Von
Glahn’s seminars and summer reading courses gave me great opportunities to explore fascinating
aspects of Chinese history, while making lots of friends at UCLA, both essential elements for my
successful completion of this dissertation. Lori Meek’s knowledge of Japanese premodern
history and Buddhist history expanded my horizons. Sixiang Wang, although not on my
committee for administrative reasons, has devoted much time reading my seminar papers,
discussing research ideas, and offering tremendous support in my academic development. I am
really, really grateful to have you all as my most valued friends and mentors.

iv
My research project would not have been possible without the support of scholars across
a variety of fields. In particular, I am sincerely grateful to Don Wyatt, Bettina Gramlich-Oka,
Edward Drott, Thomas Conlan, David Robinson, Michael Szonyi, Sarah Schneewind, Bin Wong,
Nicolas Tackett, Christopher Atwood, John Duncan, David Kang, Jan Goodwin, Valerie Hansen,
Sonya Lee, David Howell, Wen Xin, Patricia Ebrey, Hilde De Weerdt, and Mengxiao Wang who
kindly read my work, organized seminars, conferences, or provided email help when I
encountered questions on Chinese, Japanese, or Korean history. I also want to thank Li Tang,
Rebecca Corbett, and Kim Joy, our Chinese, Japanese, and Korean librarians for their support.
My research year at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies
(Nichibunken) was crucial to the development of my dissertation project. My host advisor
Professor Enomoto Wataru offered detailed feedback on my paper and project. Professor Iiyama
Tomoyasu of Waseda University and Takahiro Sasaki of Keio University kindly introduced me
many resources to study diplomatic history. Professor Kin Bunkyo, whom I had the pleasure to
know when I was in Kyoto University during a college year studying abroad, provided
continuous support and courage to embark this journey. Thank you.
My home department is my strongest support. In particular, I would like to thank Paul
Lerner and Jay Rubenstein, who were the graduate director and department chair when I was in
the most difficult phase of my PhD study. Their kindness to support helped me overcome
seemingly impossible obstacles, allowing me to get where I am now. I am also grateful to Lori
Rogers and Jennifer Hernandez, Sandra Hopwood, Simone Bessant, Melissa Calderon, and many
other staff who provided support through the PhD process.
My dissertation studies and research were generously supported by the USC-Huntington
Early Modern Studies Institute Dissertation Fellowship, USC ACE-Nikaido Japanese Studies

v
Fellowship, grants from Korean Studies Institute, Shinso Ito Center, East Asian Studies Center,
PhD Academy, Center of Transpacific Studies at USC as well as Yale Middle Period Conference
Grants. Without them my project would not been completed.
I am extremely fortunate to have friends who supported me on this journey. Yuanheng
Mao, Patrick Tung, Yitian Li, Penghao Sun, and Haiwei Liu are wonderful colleagues in our
monthly Chinese history group. Ari Daniel Levine, Zuo Ya, Xu Man, Li Yiwen, Mark Halperin,
Lucille Chia, Ping Foong, Michael Fuller, Naomi Standen, Charles Hartman, Paul Jakov Smith
and Douglas Skonicki warmly welcomed me to The Society for Song, Yuan, and Conquest
Dynasties Studies, and patiently helped me walk through as a nervous student representative.
Their kindness and humor greatly eased my nervousness and encouraged me to explore a wider
world. Nadia Kanagawa, Sachiko Kawai, Michelle Damian, Jillian Barndt, Jesse Drian, Lisa
Kochinski, Kristina Buhrman, and Yumi Kodama have been warm friends and study mates in
Japanese studies. Yuanchong Wang, Shoufu Yin, King Kwong Wong, and Sunkyu Lee, as great
seonbae, have shown me the fascinating aspects of studying maritime and transnational history.
Zhang Ling, Duan Xiaolin, Yong Cho, Ted Hui, Ruiyi Li, Meiying Li, Yiming Ha, Xiaowen
Hao, Greg Sattler, Lang Chao, Benjamin Gallant, Joomi Lee, Di Wang, Katherine Lam, Hanyu
Zhao, and Xiaoling Fang are great friends and supporters; our friendships extend beyond the
boundaries of institution, discipline, and periodization.
Finally, I am eternally grateful to my grandparents YZ, SP, and my aunt Ying, who not
only give me warm support but also showed me that studying is a life-long journey, and it is
never too late to begin. I also am very lucky to have Patrick as my husband who always admires
and values my work so much; and our daughter Lindsay. Thank you.

vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dedication …………………………………………………………………… ii
Acknowledgements …………………………………………………………………… iii
List of Tables …………………………………………………………………… vii
List of Figures …………………………………………………………………… viii
Abstract …………………………………………………………………… ix
Introduction …………………………………………………………………… 1
Chapter 1 The East Asian Maritime Zone in the Late Eleventh Century of
Koryŏ Korea, Heian Japan, and Song China …………………… 18
Chapter 2 Before the Storm: An Examination of Diplomatic Exchanges
between Mongols, Korea, and Japan Before the 1274 Bun'ei
Campaign ……………………………………………………… 55
Chapter 3 Multiple Diplomatic Centers: The Maritime Zone between Japan
and Ming China in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries …… 90
Chapter 4 Shifting Meanings: Pirates in the East Asian Maritime Zone in the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries……………………………… 130
Coda …………………………………………………………………… 164
Bibliography …………………………………………………………………… 168

vii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Frequency of Exchanges Between Mongol Yuan and Southeast Asia in Yuanshi 64
Table 2 Requests for the Tripitaka between Chosŏn and Japan,1388–1408 …………… 146

viii
LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 1 Map of the 1281 Kōan Campaign……………………………………………… 59
Fig. 2 A gold helmet from Yuan China ……………………………………………… 60
Fig. 3 Gunpowder recipe and gunpowder weapons from Compendium of Military
Techniques (Wuzongjingyao) ………………………………………………… 61
Fig. 4 Khubilai’s letter to the Japanese monarch, 1266 ……………………………… 66
Fig. 5 “A list of suspicious points in the Koryŏ document” 高麗牒状不審条々, by
Tokyo University Historiographical Institute ………………………………… 81
Fig. 6 New shugo posts controlled by the main line of the Hōjō after 1274 ………… 87
Fig. 7 Maguro Market which says, “Welcome tourists who came to visit Japan” …… 164

ix
Abstract
By taking a cross-border approach to examine regional, transrealm (rather than realmbased) exchange in China, Japan, and Korea over four hundred years, c. 1000–1400 C.E., I seek
to reconceptualize the history of East Asian seas, thereby challenging narratives that focus on
one regime at a time. I argue that the complexity of each individual regime cannot be adequately
understood outside the context of their interactions with other regimes and cultures. Moreover,
different regimes often leave highly dissimilar historical records regarding the same events,
making cross-referencing of primary sources in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean necessary. In
addition, I compare and connect the trajectories and dynamics in the maritime zone with landbased history during this period so as to highlight that East Asian seas were a zone of contest
wherein different state policies and other sorts of differences existed. This framework – which
emphasizes multilayered, multilingual, and multilateral exchanges between China, Japan, and
Korea – strives to link domestic political change with a broader regional network, to describe
changes in commercial and religious organizations, and to include participants such as emperors,
ministers, warrior leaders, monks, merchants, and pirates. My point is not to undermine
traditional Chinese, Japanese, or Korean approaches to historical analysis, as they form the
bedrock for scholarship. Instead, building upon that research, I aim to foster a meaningful
dialogue between Chinese, Japanese, and Korean scholarship that will broaden and deepen what
we can know about these histories.
In Chapter One, I examine Koryŏ King Munjong's (Wang Hui 王徽 1019-1083, r.1046-
1083) medical appeals to Song China and Heian Japan during the 1070s to 1080s. It underscores
how distinct responses were influenced by shifting inter-state dynamics. The overlooked medical
embassy emerges as a pivotal diplomatic conduit for Koryŏ, aiming to align with Song against

x
Liao. In contrast, Heian Japan's seemingly disinterested stance masks a deliberate strategy to
avoid integration into the Song-centered international order. By analyzing medical envoys, this
study illuminates how complex inter-state relationships generated varied diplomatic outcomes in
eleventh-century East Asia.
In Chapter Two I study pre-1274 diplomatic negotiations before the Mongol invasions of
Japan. The 1274 and 1281 Mongol invasions have been extensively studied. The preceding
negotiation process, involving Khubilai Khan, Chinese advisors, the Koryŏ king, the Kamakura
shogunate, and the Japanese imperial court, has yet to be thoroughly explored. Drawing from
Mongol, Korean, and Japanese primary sources, this chapter argues that a focus solely on the
Mongols and Japan is inadequate to grasp the invasion’s intricacies. Adopting a transnational and
maritime lens integrates the event within a wider geographic context. Furthermore, diverse
strategies by different regimes dealing with the Mongols offer fresh interpretations of the
medieval maritime world, beyond the conventional Mongol empire-centric narrative. This article
shifts attention to how varied players reacted in negotiations. I aim to transcend political realm
confines to explore this pivotal East Asian and global historical event.
In Chapter Three, I explore how inter-state relationships profoundly shaped the definition
of pirates and policies toward piracy in the fourteenth-century maritime zone. Raiding activities
caused disruptions along the coasts of Ming China, Koryŏ, and later Chosŏn Korea, but defining
the identity of pirates, selecting communication partners, and determining solutions were
consistently influenced by each regime's broader objectives. Moreover, these objectives were
intricately interconnected within a wider framework of inter-state relations. Ming rulers,
including Zhu Yuanzhang, Zhu Yunwen, and Zhu Di suppressed piracy to showcase Ming's
dominance. Chosŏn rulers utilized pirates to forge trade links with the Sō and Ōuchi clans. They

xi
also leveraged piracy to seek resources from or decline Ming's requests. Japanese figures like
Ashikaga Yoshimitsu and Ōuchi Yoshihiro used anti-piracy efforts to consolidate their power
and outmaneuver rivals. This chapter employs piracy as a case study to exemplify how a multilayered inter-state network consistently influenced the piracy issue.
In Chapter Four, I investigate medieval Japan's diplomatic interactions with Ming China,
accentuating the persistent challenges that Prince Kaneyoshi, Go-Enyū Tennō, and Kyushu
warrior leaders posed to Yoshimitsu. This challenges the traditional linear narrative of
Yoshimitsu's seamless ascent to power. Furthermore, the vibrant diplomatic exchanges between
Kyushu and the continent reveal the existence of multiple diplomatic hubs in late medieval
Japan, aside from Kyoto. This observation underscores the prevalence of conflicting interests
within each realm. By scrutinizing diplomatic history through a micro, local history lens, this
chapter reinforces the imperative of moving beyond political boundaries and embracing a
transregional perspective to study the premodern maritime world.
Studying overseas exchange in East Asia from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries
presents specific challenges. The primary sources regarding these exchanges are dispersed
geographically and they are written in multiple languages. Besides, overseas exchanges were
interconnected with domestic circumstances that must be studied as well. To enable a deep,
multilateral analysis, I compared sources from China, Korea, Japan, and the Mongols. I also link
domestic history to overseas policies, to connect disparate threads in the analysis. Of course,
conflicts, differences, and disagreements abounded, and no single definitive narrative can be
written. Indeed, the varied stances of different players are important, as they in turn highlight the
need to go beyond single-realm narratives to examine East Asian history from a multilingual,
multilayered, and multilateral perspective.

Introduction
For some time, Koryŏ king Munjong (Wang Hui 王徽 1019–1083, r. 1046–1083) had
been suffering from severe headaches.1 When these recurred in the eleventh month of 1079, he
dispatched envoys to both Song China and Heian Japan asking for medical assistance. The Song
emperor Shenzong (Zhao Xu 趙頊, 1048–1085, r. 1067–1085) responded to Munjong’s request
with great enthusiasm, sending several missions laden with expensive medicines and skilled
physicians to Korea.2 By contrast, after several rounds of discussion, the Japanese court not only
refused Munjong’s requests but accused Koryŏ of violating several diplomatic protocols in its
missives.3
How should historians interpret such extremely different responses? This is the subject I
explore in Chapter One of this dissertation. One challenge these events present is that Koryŏ
ofifcials did not inform their Song and Heian counterparts that it sought help elsewhere – the
letters and exchanges were entirely discrete, so a historian using bilateral diplomatic analysis
might not even consider looking at these interactions together.
In this dissertation I look at all three regimes because I think this approach reveals
comparisons, interconnections, and historical complexities that have been missed in previous
studies. As I show in Chapter One, political dynamics and events unfolding in regimes
thousands of miles away influenced and contributed to the differing responses to King
Munjong’s pleas for help. Read in isolation, these exchanges could be interpreted as bearing out
1 Koryŏsa (Chongqing: Xinan shifandaxue, 2014), vol.4, 115.
2 Li Tao 李焘, Xu zizhitongjian changbian 續資治通鑒長編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004), vol. 250 – vol.293,
6080–7156.
3
“Kōrai reihinshō chō” 高麗禮賓省牒, in Chōya gunsai 朝野群載, comp. Miyoshi no Tameyasu 三善為康
(Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1964), vol. 20, 455.
1

2
narratives about two very different regimes with completely different attitudes toward foreign
policy. However, the larger context reveals threads that go well beyond that interpretation.
The concept of a maritime zone as a borderland reflects dynamic interplay of multiscale
practices and involves diverse stakeholders across social classes. Haneda Masashi’s 羽田正
description of maritime-zone dynamics offers insight. He aptly characterizes these dynamics not
only as horizontal process but also as vertical ones, thus underlining the multidimensional nature
of territories. A maritime zone is “a space where a dense matrix of multiple people, goods, and
information circulated and moved around.”4
In his research, overseas exchanges have had two
aspects: horizontally, there have been exchanges at the state level, while vertically, players such
as courts, local governments, merchants, Buddhist monks, doctors, and pirates have shaped
cultural, religious, and commercial developments. Sometimes these players interacted and
cooperated; at other times there were conflicts of interest. Similarly, for Harriet Zundorfer the
maritime zone serves as a crucial arena for multilateral, multilayered, and multilingual
exchanges, occurring not only between states and governments but also involving individuals
and regional groups.5
Transborder interactions in maritime zones require a nuanced understanding of
multilateral context, as well as deep appreciation of relevant domestic issues impacting the
participating territorial entities. On the one hand, the allure of overseas profits and abundant
resources drove rulers to obtain more sea control. Conversely, flourishing maritime economy and
4 Haneda Masashi, Umi kara mita rekishi 海から見た歴史 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku shuppanka, 2013), 7; in
English, see Bruce Batten, To the Ends of Japan: Premodern Frontiers, Boundaries, and Interactions (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii, 2003).
5 Harriet Zurndorfer, “Oceans of History, Seas of Change: Recent Revisionist Writing in Western Languages About
China and East Asian Maritime History During the Period 1500–1630,” International Journal of Asian Studies,
(2016), 62.

3
trade empowered regional agents to extend influence beyond their territorial boundaries. This
expansion, occurring off the coast, often clashed with attempts by land-based authorities to
govern the seas. Moreover, I argue that overseas exchanges offered opportunities and flexibility
for regimes to expand their territories and potential influence beyond actual geographic
boundaries. Taking a transrealm maritime perspective sheds new light on questions of
sovereignty, territory, and nationalism.6
This project therefore has two goals that I approach sequentially but which in fact are
interdependent. By taking a cross-border approach to examine regional, transrealm (rather than
realm-based) exchange over four hundred years, c. 1000–1400 C.E., I seek to reconceptualize the
history of East Asian seas, thereby challenging narratives that focus on one regime at a time. The
complexity of each individual regime cannot be adequately understood outside the context of
their interactions with other regimes and cultures. Moreover, different regimes often leave highly
dissimilar historical records regarding the same events, making cross-referencing of primary
sources in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean necessary. Second, I compare and connect the
trajectories and dynamics in the maritime zone with land-based history during this period so as to
highlight that East Asian seas were a zone of contest wherein different state policies and other
sorts of differences existed. This framework – which emphasizes multilayered, multilingual, and
multilateral exchanges between China, Japan, and Korea – strives to link domestic political
change with a broader regional network, to describe changes in commercial and religious
organizations, and to include participants such as emperors, ministers, warrior leaders, monks,
merchants, and pirates. My point is not to undermine traditional Chinese, Japanese, or Korean
approaches to historical analysis, as they form the bedrock for subsequent scholarship. Instead,
6 Nicolas Tackett, The Origins of the Chinese Nation: Song China and the Forging of an East Asian World Order,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

4
building upon that research, I aim to foster a meaningful dialogue between Chinese, Japanese,
and Korean that will broaden and deepen what we can know about these histories.
Methodology: A Multilateral Approach to Integrate East Asian History
The earlier historical approach to East Asian seas was influenced by the long-dominant
state-centric and land-focused scholarship that prioritized China and its role in the so-called
tribute trade system, which John Fairbank defined as “the Chinese world order.”7
In this
framework, China occupied a central position in creating and maintaining this world order with
other regimes. From the late 1980s onward, however, scholars began to rethink the limits of the
Sino-centric tribute system model, and to explore the “autonomous” historiography and agency
of regimes in Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and Champa. For example, in studies of Korean-Chinese
relations, scholars analyzed the wisdom, strategies, and innovations that Korean rulers used to
deal with demands from China.8 Likewise, in studies of Japanese-Chinese exchanges, Brian
Steininger and Yasunori Arano, from very different fields of study, have demonstrated how
Japan made selective use of Chinese practices and maintained its own agency and autonomy.9
Taken as a whole, this body of work rejects a central claim of China-centered
historiography – namely that Japan, Korea, Champa, etc. lacked agency. Nevertheless, attention
to agency and difference can obscure ways in which these seemingly autonomous histories
shared fundamental connections and commonalities. It risks a slide towards isolated and
7
John Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1968).
8 David Robinson, Empire’s Twilight: Northeast Asia Under the Mongols (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia
Center, 2009).
9 Brian Steininger, Chinese Literary Forms in Heian Japan: Poetics and Practice (Cambridge: Harvard University
Asia Center, 2017), 5; Yasunori Arano, “The Formation of a Japanese-centric World Order,” International Journal
of Asian Studies (July 2005), 185–216.

5
nationalist narratives, and prevents conversations among scholars of Chinese, Korean, and
Japanese histories. The new assumption becomes, “Everyone is different.”
More recently, the centrality of the tribute system has been brought back into discussions
of East Asian diplomatic history through the field of political science. David Kang argues that
from the 14th through 19th centuries the tribute system provided a framework of hierarchy, status,
and hegemony that enabled East Asia to maintain relative stability and prosperous
development.10 While Kang critiques Fairbank’s portrayal of the tribute system as a set of
arbitrary conventions used to justify trade, he argues that the tribute system is still essential for
understanding East Asian relations, especially China’s role as hegemon dominating and
influencing other regimes.11 Building on his research, Ji-young Lee argues that other East Asian
regimes responded to Chinese hegemony in complex ways that derived from their own domestic
political concerns. Far from being passive, they shaped the tribute system to their own ends.12
My dissertation provides a critical historical prequel to this reconsideration of the tribute
system. It is important to note that Kang’s understanding of what he calls the tribute system is
very much based on Ming diplomatic practices. As Wang Sixiang has noted, building a long
durée model for East Asian diplomacy from such a singular historical example raises several
problems and questions.13 Among these issues is whether and how the tribute system confirms
China’s hegemonic status. Was actual geo-political power at stake, or was tribute more about
prestige? In many cases, Chinese rulers lacked real power to induce other regimes to pay tribute,
and while sometimes military threats were used, military action was rarely taken. Second, the
10 David Kang, East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Cambridge University,
2014), preface and 24.
11 David Kang, East Asia before the West, 25.
12 Lee Ji-Young, China's Hegemony: Four Hundred Years of East Asian Domination (New York: Columbia
University, 2017), 58.
13 Sixiang Wang, Boundless Winds of Empire: Rhetoric and Ritual in Early Chosŏn Diplomacy with Ming China
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2023).

6
notion that the tribute system was really a “system” at all, that there were set rules that remained
inviolate across dynasties, is challenged when put in larger historical context. For example, this
dissertation makes clear that, compared with Song or Ming rulers, Yuan demands for tribute
were often much more substantial and costly, triggering many complaints from other regimes.
This difference was of course backed up by the Mongol empire’s military power, but it also
demonstrates that Yuan understanding and practice of tribute differed substantially from other
Chinese dynasties.
To foster a more interconnected understanding of historical narratives within East Asia,
instead of using the tribute system, which leans heavily towards assumptions of China’s
centrality and rigidity, I propose a multipolar perspective. This “multipolar” approach, to borrow
a term coined by Wang Zhenping, results in a more nuanced and open-ended historiography that
fosters comparison and conversation. For instance, Wang’s study of Tang-Japan interactions
emphasizes the agency of both Tang China and Japan in diplomatic communication,
demonstrating how mutual self-interest served as a fundamental motive for bilateral
conversation.14 In a similar vein, Morris Rossabi’s “China among equals” argument highlights
the various motives Song China and its neighbors – such as Liao, Xixia, and Jin – had for
adopting flexible attitudes in their diplomatic exchanges.15
Building on the virtues of this multipolar approach, I have written this dissertation to
expand the study of maritime exchange in several ways. First, while earlier historiography has
focused on interactions between two regimes such as China and Japan, or Korea and Japan,
much more work remains to be done to consider how a broader multilateral network influenced
14 Wang Zhenping, Ambassadors from the Island of Immortals: China-Japan Relations in the Han-Tang Period
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 223.
15 Morris Rossabi, China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and its Neighbors, 10th–14th Centuries (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1983).

7
the stances and policies of each regime. Take relations between Song China and Koryŏ Korea,
for example. Their relations were profoundly shaped by a broader multilateral interstate network,
given their changing relations with Xixia, Liao, and Japan.16 Second, and by extension from the
previous point, although maritime exchange in East Asia was multipolar, that does not
necessarily imply an evenly distributed balance of power.17 When Wang Zhenping introduced
the multipolar framework, he did not define a precise method for measuring this multipolarity. It
is important to note that the degree to which one regime could influence another varied
significantly in specific historical contexts. This influence could change over time. Crucially, a
multipolar framework does not mean that everyone has equal power, but it also does not mean
that China is always the hegemon.
Time: Periodizing East Asian History from a New Scope
This dissertation purposefully begins its story in the eleventh century and ends in the
fifteenth century. To date, studies of the period following the Tang empire’s collapse in 907 –
when Japan ceased formal diplomatic relations with the continent – have focused on how
commercial, religious, and cultural exchanges continued between Japan and China.18 I will argue
in this dissertation, however, that although large-scale official exchanges waned, in fact
diplomacy continued and took new forms. Working with officials, players such as physicians,
16 For example, see Li Huarui, “Song Xia yu Liao de sanjiao guanxi” 宋夏與遼的三角關係, in Song Xia guanxishi
宋夏關係史 (Beijing: Renmindaxue chunbanshe, 2010), 260–290.
17 David Kang, “Hierarchy without Hegemony: Measuring war and other conflict in the East Asian International
Order, 918–1368,” ORCID: 0000-0002-5685-3841 (working paper, not published yet). Xue Chen also argues that,
depending on context, different regimes tended to have varying ideas about rulership and how power should be
divided. See Xue Chen, “Age of Emperors: Divisible Imperial Authority and the Formation of a Liao World Order
in Continental East Asia, 900–1250,” Journal of Song Yuan Studies (2020), 45–83.
18 Li Yiwen, Networks of Faith and Profit: Monks, Merchants, and Exchanges between China and Japan, 839–1403
CE (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2023).

8
merchants, and monks broadened the definition of diplomacy and complicated political
communications. I chose the fifteenth century as the ending point because when European
adventurers discovered sea routes into Asia and began moving into Southeast Asia and East Asia
in the late fifteenth century, overseas exchange in East Asia changed. It began to include
newcomers who introduced new dynamics. Notable too is the fact that while much work has
been done to examine the encounter between East and West, the period before European arrival
needs more careful analysis.19 In this project, instead of portraying the East as a passive entity
awaiting Western “stimulation,” I show that well before Westerners arrived, a highly
sophisticated and lively diplomatic network spanned East Asia and a broader world.
As Richard Von Glahn has argued, all history writing begins with periodization, whether
implicit or explicit.20
In bringing into conversation Chinese, Japanese and Korean histories, my
project explores how applying an East Asian maritime lens can shed new light on questions of
periodization across and connecting their three histories.
In the Chinese history field, the idea of a Song-Yuan-Ming transition is an influential
paradigm from which this project takes inspiration.21 The idea of an extended transition across
three quite different dynasties calls into question earlier claims that the shift from the Song to the
Yuan marked a great and sudden historical rupture, from a militarily weak and inward-looking
Song to an aggressive and expanding Mongol empire. My dissertation does not aim to
completely contradict this observation, but it does show this contrast to be overly stark and
19 For example, see Tremml-Werner, Birgit. Spain, China, and Japan in Manila, 1571–1644 (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2015) and John Wills, ed., China and Maritime Europe, 1500–1800 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
20 Richard Von Glahn, "Imagining Premodern China," in Paul Jakov Smith and Richard Von Glahn ed., The SongYuan-Ming Transition in Chinese History (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2003), 35.
21 Paul Jakov Smith and Richard Von Glahn ed., The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition in Chinese History (Cambridge:
Harvard University, 2003).

9
simplified in both the Song and Yuan cases. For example, in Chapter One I show that when it
came to overseas exchange among Song, Koryŏ Korea, and Heian Japan, the Song emperor
Shenzong (1048-1085, r.1067-1085) strove to portray his regime as a grand power whose
influence reached beyond Song’s actual territory. Conversely, Chapter Two reveals that Mongol
empire-building was not solely about military conquest and territorial expansion. Khubilai, in his
interactions with Kamakura Japan and Koryŏ Korea (as well as with Southeast Asian regimes
such as Champa and Java) often opted for diplomatic negotiations rather than war.
In Japanese studies, the transition from the classical to medieval period is a topic of
heated discussion. In his influential article, “Provincial Administration in Early Japan: From
Ritsuryō kokka to Ōchō kokka,” Bruce Batten argues that in the tenth century Japanese
bureaucratic patterns were transformed from those of a centralized court to those of a more
decentralized district and township rule (“ritsuryō kokka to ōchō kokka”).22 Following this trend,
Sasaki Muneo and Mikael Adolphson demonstrate that in the twelfth century, new participants,
such as warrior leaders and religious institutions, came to share power.23 My findings align with
these scholars’ observations of a shifting diversity and decentralization of power holding,
showing that during Japan’s so-called "medieval” stage, the Kamakura and Ashikaga shogunate
modes of warrior rule were far from uniform.
Finally, in Korean studies the historical transition from Koryŏ to the Chosŏn era is often
portrayed as involving a radical break in ruling ideology, with Buddhism being replaced by
Confucianism. My findings, however, align more with those of John Duncan, who argues in The
22 Bruce Batten, “Provincial Administration in Early Japan: From Ritsuryō kokka to Ōchō kokka,” Harvard Journal
of Asiatic Studies (1993, no.1), 105.
23 Sasaki Muneo, “The Court Centered Polity,” in Joan Piggott ed., Capital and countryside in Japan, 300-1180:
Japanese historians in English (Ithaca: Cornell University Press East Asia Program, 2006), 238; Michael
Adolphson, The Gates of Power: Monks, Courtiers, and Warriors in Premodern Japan (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii, 2009), 19.

10
Origins of the Chosŏn Dynasty for a less radical break. Duncan notes that the composition of the
bureaucracy between late Koryŏ and Chosŏn remained largely the same, and that Koryŏ
intellectual traditions, such as Buddhism, continued to play an important role. 24
Along these
lines, my sources reveal that during the Chosŏn era central and local governments actively used
the Buddhist cannon, Tripitaka, to establish friendly relations with Japanese warrior leaders of
Ashikaga shogunate and the Ōuchi family in Kyushu. Chosŏn elites clearly recognized the allure
and value that Korean printings of the Buddhist cannon held for Japanese leaders, so, at the very
least, from the perspective of maritime zone diplomacy Buddhism remained vital well into the
Chosŏn period.
In sum, my study of the East Asian maritime zone highlights that the regimes
participating in overseas exchanges were constantly changing and adjusting over the centuries
under study. Hence, while I do not dwell directly on these issues in the chapters that follow, I
would argue that overall this dissertation points to the need to always re-evaluate claims of
cultural uniqueness or consistent and coherent national identities. For example, the Heian period
has been long described as a period when Japan began to develop its own culture and exhibit
more distinctive features that belonged to Japan, a phenomenon Obara Hitoshi termed “ourrealm consciousness” honchō.
25 More recent work by Brian Steininger makes a similar argument
that in the mid to late Heian period there are hints of an increased awareness of the limitations of
merely relying on classical Chinese canonical texts to run the government. Many officials began
to rely more on new practical knowledge such as daily ritual practices and administrative
precedents, thus demonstrating that the script and knowledge imported from China eventually
24 John Duncan, The Origins of the Chosŏn Dynasty (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 99, 263.
25 Obara Hitoshi 小原仁, “Sekkan Inseiki ni okeru Honchō ishiki no kōzō” 摂関·院政期における本朝意識の構
造, in Saeki Arikiyo 佐伯有清 ed., Nihon kodai chūseishi ronkō 日本古代中世史論考(Tokyo: Yoshikawa
kōbunkan, 1987), 270.

11
became a self-contained tradition in Japan.26 I do not completely disagree with these
observations. In fact, Brian Steininger himself also admits that the distinctions between writing
in “Chinese” and vernacular literature in Heian Japan were a calculated and fragile conceit.27
What has been largely overlooked in Japanese studies is that China was also constantly
changing, that its institutions and cultural, political, and social practices were not petrified and
rigid but also constantly in flux.28 Instead of portraying a static, unchanging image of China as a
foil so as to prove that Japan or Korea developed their own unique cultures and identities, my
dissertation proposes that it is more productive to bring the three fields of study into a
conversation. The study of overseas diplomacy provides a great opportunity to closely observe
how different regimes, with different participants, high to low, actively adapted, adjusted, and
responded based on their own considerations. In other words, the study of interstate diplomacy
enables us to realize that no historical entity remains unchanged, and that regional exchange took
place in a dynamic and mutually influencing manner.
Space: The Complex Geographies of Maritime East Asia
It perhaps should go without saying that an understanding of the complex geographies of
the vast East Asia maritime zone depends as much on appreciating local histories as it does upon
taking up a broad regional lens. Indeed, numerous scholars of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean
history have highlighted the importance of local histories for understanding maritime East Asia.
26 Brian Steininger, Chinese Literary Forms in Heian Japan: Poetics and Practices (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2017), 5.
27 Brian Steininger, Chinese Literary Forms in Heian Japan, 17.
28 The problem of making China an unchanging entity to prove Japan’s uniqueness or its own way was also obvious
in some work studying the ritsuryō system, where, many times, Tang codes were read superficially as an unchanging
entity to characterize the legal practices in China. For a detailed discussion between law and legal practices and their
gaps, see Fan Zhongxin 范忠信 ed., Qing li fa yu zhongguo ren 情理法與中國人 (Beijing: Beijing daxue
chubanshe, 2011).

12
Richard Von Glahn and Sukhee Lee emphasized Ningbo’s importance as a port city in overseas
trade.29 Angelea Schottenhammer and John Chaffee highlight the importance of Quanzhou as an
international trading hub.30 In the field of Japanese history, Luke Roberts uses Tosa as a case
study to examine the links between Japan and the wider Asian and Pacific world in the Edo
period while Charlotte von Verschuer and Bruce Batten have elaborated on the importance of
Kyushu in Sino-Japanese exchanges. 31 In Korean history, James Lewis has highlighted Pusan’s
importance in diplomatic exchanges.32 Benefiting from their pioneering work, I also explore how
a variety of less-central localities – in addition to political capitals such as Beijing, Nanjing,
Kyoto, and Kaesŏng – played important roles in overseas exchanges from the eleventh to the
fifteenth centuries.
During these centuries the East Asian maritime world saw the development of multiple
diplomatic centers. In the eleventh century, the Shandong peninsula and later Ningbo played a
crucial role in transmitting information from Koryŏ Korea to Song China. In the late fifteenth
century, warrior leaders of medieval Japan, such as those of the Sō and Ōuchi, used Tsushima
and Kyushu as their bases from which to dispatch envoys to Ming and Chosŏn. There were
multiple diplomatic centers in addition to Kyoto.
29 Richard Von Glahn “The Ningbo-Hakata Merchant Network and the Reorientation of East Asian Maritime Trade,
1150–1350,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies (2014), 249–279; Sukhee Lee, Negotiated Power: The State, Elites,
and Local Governance in Twelfth- to Fourteenth-Century China (Cambridge MA: Harvard Asia Center, 2014).
30 Angela Schottenhammer, The Emporium of the World: Maritime Quanzhou, 1000–1400 (Leiden & Boston: Brill,
2001); John Chaffee, The Muslim Merchants of Premodern China: The History of a Maritime Asian Trade
Diaspora, 750–1400 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
31 Luke Roberts, “Shipwrecks and Flotsam: The Foreign World in Edo-Period Tosa,” Monumenta Nipponica 70, no.
1 (2015): 83–122; Bruce Batten, Gateway to Japan: Hakata in War and Peace, 500–1300 (Honolulu: University of
Hawai’i Press, 2005); Charlotte von Verschuer, Across the Perilous Sea: Japanese Trade with China and Korea
from the Seventh to the Sixteenth Centuries (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2006).
32 James Lewis, Frontier Contact between Choson Korea and Tokugawa Japan (Routledge, 2003).

13
In addition to attending to the local, my approach also demands that I apply a much
wider, “trans-realm” lens to my case studies. In her foundational work Before European
Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350, Janet Abu-Lughod argues that a world system
had existed since very early on, well before European hegemony.33 Her insights into a nonEurocentric world system were pathbreaking. Still, her vision of Asia’s role in the world system
focused heavily on China proper and largely neglected the roles of Japan, Korea, or Southeast
Asia. But later scholars have furnished a variety of insightful correctives. For example, Nicola Di
Cosmo, coming from the direction of the central Eurasian steppe, argues that historians’ reliance
on Chinese sources has often skewed their histories to favor Sino-centric historical narratives and
he challenges claims of a rigid distinction between Chinese/ non-Chinese, civilized/ barbarian. 34
Coming from another direction, Haneda Masashi focuses on the maritime zone as a frontier
which offers scholars a valuable opportunity to go beyond nation-state-centered perspectives to
examine the interactions and material exchanges of different regions. 35 Both Di Cosmo and
Haneda's approaches have profoundly influenced my research, and in my case studies,
particularly in Chapters One and Two, I explore moments of connection between central
Eurasian and maritime-zone diplomacy.
While there are many other insightful works in this area, Li Yiwen’s recently published
Networks of Faith and Profit: Monks, Merchants, and Exchanges between China and Japan,
849-1403 deserves discussion as it comes close in both time period and topic to my work here.
Li Yiwen demonstrates that from the 800s to the 1400s, although official diplomatic exchanges
33 Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-135 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989), 367.
34 Nicola Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 299.
35 Haneda Masashi, A Maritime History of East Asia (Melbourne: Transpacific Press, 2019),13.

14
between China and Japan had been cut off, merchants and Buddhist monks played an important
role in Sino-Japanese exchanges, with their multilayered and fluid identities forming a networks
of mutual collaboration.36 My approach differs from Li Yiwen’s. First, I apply a broader
definition of diplomacy. It is true that from the 900s to 1400s, government-appointed envoys
were not sent on a regular basis between Japan and China. This does not mean, however, that the
rulers of China, Japan, or Korea gave up on sending envoys and conveying messages. Diverse
and lively diplomacy still took place. For example, in Chapter One I argue that medical
exchanges between Song China, Koryŏ Korea, and Heian Japan created new leverage and
possibilities for rulers to assert their political legitimacy in a broader geographic space while also
allowing information to flow and circulate on a more flexible manner compared with
conventional diplomatic channels. Second, while Li Yiwen focuses on bilateral diplomacy
between China and Japan, my project argues for the benefits of examining multilateral relations
among multiple players. In particular, in Chapter Three and Chapter Four, I argue that Korea
played an important role in shaping Sino-Japanese communication.
Structure of the Dissertation
My case studies are selected to focus on crucial historical moments when encounters and
clashes among different regimes were intense and significant. The limitations and advantages of
this approach are obvious. It has permitted close analysis of exchanges and a better
understanding of actors in decision-making processes, which is often missing or omitted from the
big picture. This “screenshot” storytelling, however, runs the risk of lacking background
information. To solve this problem, I begin each chapter with a brief overview of the interstate
36 Li Yiwen, Networks of Faith and Profit. Monks, Merchants, and Exchanges between China and Japan, 849-1403
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2023), 182.

15
situation at the time. Beginning in the eleventh century, the following chapters capture important
diplomatic interactions between the continent, the peninsula, and the archipelago, using a crossborder approach. The dissertation ends in 1418, when the newly founded Chosŏn dynasty
invaded Tsushima Island, at which point the maritime network involved new players.
Chapter One examines an instance of what might be called medical diplomacy between
Song China, Koryŏ Korea, and Heian Japan. It begins with the Koryŏ king Munjong’s (Wang
Hwi 王徽 1019–1083, r. 1046–1083) appeals to Song China and Heian Japan during the 1070s
and 1080s. This embassy, which has not to my knowledge been carefully studied, emerged as an
important diplomatic opportunity for Koryŏ to align with Song against the Liao. In contrast,
Heian Japan’s seemingly disinterested stance masked a deliberate strategy to avoid integration
into the Song-centered international order. The study illuminates how complex interstate
relationships generated varied diplomatic outcomes in the eleventh-century maritime world.
Chapter Two delves into diplomacy under the Mongol Empire, with a focus on pre-1274
maritime exchanges that led up to the Mongol invasions of Japan. The 1274 and 1281 Mongol
invasions have been extensively studied, but the negotiation process before them – which
involved Khubilai Khan, Chinese advisors, the Koryŏ king, the Kamakura shogunate, the
Japanese court, Buddhist monks, and merchants – has not been thoroughly researched.
Employing Mongol, Korean, and Japanese sources, this chapter argues that focusing only on the
Mongols and Japan is inadequate to grasp the invasion’s broader context; rather, a multilateral
approach is needed. Furthermore, looking at diverse strategies taken by different regimes dealing
with the Mongols offers fresh interpretations of the premodern East Asian maritime world.
Chapter Three investigates Japan’s interactions with Ming China and Chosŏn Korea in
the fourteenth century. It highlights how various players such as Prince Kaneyoshi, Go-Enyū,

16
and Kyushu warrior leaders participated in overseas exchanges. These stories add new layers to
previous scholarship, which concentrate on Yoshimitsu’s tally trade. Moreover, the lively
diplomatic exchanges between Kyushu and the continent confirm the existence of multiple
diplomatic centers beyond Kyoto. By scrutinizing maritime exchange through micro-historical
and local lenses, this chapter reinforces the need to move beyond political and territorial
boundaries to consider the East Asian maritime world in a connected and regional perspective.
Chapter Four examines how issues of piracy – including such questions as who were
pirates, how to define piracy, and how pirates might or might not be controlled – provided an
opportunity for the regimes that ruled Ming China, Chosŏn Korea, and Ashikaga Japan to claim
political legitimacy and assert status in the international order.
Rather than a chronological record of how overseas relations and exchanges developed
over time, this dissertation is a collection of case studies. I decided to take this approach as the
best way to present my research, especially given the nature of the primary sources. Overseas
communications did not take place with the same frequency as domestic events. Gaps and
seeming inconsistencies abound. Certain years saw an increase in overseas negotiations and
encounters, while at other times the records report little exchange. Moreover, various players
from different social groups participated, making it quite difficult to knit together a coherent
narrative summarizing overseas exchanges from the eleventh to fifteenth centuries. Nevertheless,
this incoherence matters. Recognizing and seeking explanations provides opportunities to
broaden the scope of transrealm studies.
Another advantage of case studies is that they enable us to examine events and
interactions at a greater level of detail and complexity. For example, the exchanges among Song
China, Koryŏ Korea, and Heian Japan in the first chapter demonstrate that when Song was

17
discussing issues concerning territories and interstate influence beyond Liao and Xixia, the
emperor and ministers exhibited more flexibility and space to create a China-centered narrative.
The second case study of diplomatic envoys dispatched by Khubilai Khan to Kamakura Japan
shows the complexity of Mongol strategies in empire building while also challenging
stereotypical portrayals of Mongol diplomacy as solely opting for militarily aggression and
invasion. The third case study discusses how Ashikaga Japan had multiple diplomatic centers in
which different players such as warrior leaders in Kyushu, Buddhist monks, and monarchs
actively participated in overseas exchanges with the Ming. Such lively communications explain
the preconditions for tally trade. The competition among different powers and divided interests
pushed every party to maximize their interests and attempt to monopolize overseas trade.
Moreover, Zhu Yuanzhang’s flexible policies and careful examination of overseas envoys
demonstrate that early Ming’s overseas policies cannot be summarized simply as conservative
and inward-looking. Instead, they show a high degree of openness and variation in the conduct of
overseas affairs. Finally, the fourth case focuses on how piracy problems provided the rulers of
Ming, Chosŏn, and Ashikaga Japan a means to assert their legitimacy. This finding is only
possible after scrutinizing everyday practice and cross-referencing sources in different
languages.
Now let us embark on a journey to revisit the ailment that troubled Koryo king Wang
Hwi and understand how his illness connects all the complicated relationships between the Song,
Liao, Xixia, Koryŏ, and Heian Japan.

18
Chapter 1
The East Asian Maritime Zone in the Late Eleventh Century of Koryŏ Korea, Heian
Japan, and Song China
Introduction
For some time, the Koryŏ king Munjong had been suffering from severe headaches.
When these recurred in the eleventh month of 1079, he sought medical assistance from Japan. He
ordered his Ministry of Ritual (禮賓省) to compose a request for help, and asked the Song
merchant Wang Zezhen 王則貞 to travel to the Dazaifu, officials at the Japan’s headquarter in
Kyushu, to ask if the Japanese had highly skilled doctors to treat his illness.37 Upon receiving the
letter, Dazaifu transferred the letter to the court in Kyoto. After several rounds of discussion, the
court decided to refuse Munjong’s requests. In its reply to Munjong, the court accused Koryŏ of
violating several diplomatic codes in this conversation.38
This event is referred to as “the incident of requesting a doctor” 医師要請事件 by later
scholars and has received some lively discussion.39 In particular, this project has greatly
benefitted from the work done by Shinosaki Atsushi 篠崎敦史 and Watanabe Makoto 渡辺誠,
37 “Kōrai reihinshō chō” 高麗禮賓省牒, in Chōya gunsai 朝野群載, ed. Miyoshi no Tameyasu 三善為康 (Tokyo:
Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1964), vol. 20, 455. For a more recent work discussing merchants and monks in SinoJapanese exchange, see Li Yiwen, Networks of Faith and Profit: Monks, Merchants, and Exchanges Between China
and Japan, 839–1403 CE (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2023).
38 “Ninhon koku Dazaifu chō” 日本國太宰府牒, in Chōya gunsai, vol. 20, 457.
39 Although the themes and time frames are not exactly the same, this paper has benefited tremendously from
research by Keith Pratt, Eunmi Go, Remco Breuker, and Wang Zhenping on the diplomatic history of China, Korea,
and Japan. See Keith Pratt, “Sung Hui Tsung’s Musical Diplomacy and the Korean Response,” Bulletin of the
School of Oriental and African Studies (1981), 509–521; Eunmi Go, “A Shift in Song Tribute Policy and the
Emergence of the Terms ‘Koryŏ Merchants’ and ‘Japanese Merchants’,” Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies
(2018), 85–103; Remco Breuker, Establishing a Pluralist Society in Medieval Korea, 918–1170: History, Ideology,
and Identity in the Koryŏ Dynasty (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010); and Wang Zhenping, Ambassadors from the Islands
of Immortals: China-Japan Relations in the Han-Tang Period (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i, 2005).

19
who have closely examined the Korean-Japanese exchanges and discussed the features of Heian
diplomacy.40 Shinosaki argues that based on the writing style and format of Koryŏ’s letter, it is
hard to conclude Koryŏ aimed to assert its superiority in diplomatic exchanges with Japan.
Instead, based on the format of the letter that Koryŏ sent to Japan, it is a document between
equals (平行文書).41 Watanabe argues that Japan’s accusation of Koryŏ’s misconduct was
largely pretense, and that the actual reason for its reluctance to engage with Korea requires more
thorough study.42
Indeed, this 1079 incident needs further exploration, especially by considering the
incident in a broader East Asian context. In fact, from 1074, six years before Munjong’s request
to Dazaifu, he had sent several rounds of envoys to Song China with the same request for highly
skilled doctors.43 What is striking is that Song emperor Shenzong responded to Munjong’s
request with great enthusiasm. He regularly dispatched not only skilled physicians but also
expensive and rare medical materials to the Koryŏ court from the 1070s until Munjong’s death in
1083.
By comparing Munjong’s requests to Japan with those he sent to Song and examining the
respective responses, this chapter views “the incident of requesting a doctor” in a broader East
Asian context. The major primary sources I examine include records from Songshi, Liaoshi, and
40 Shinosaki Atsushi 篠崎敦史, “Kōrai ō Bunsō no ishi yōsei jiken to Nihon” 高麗王文宗の「医師要請事件」と
日本, Hisutoria ヒストリア 248 (2015, no. 2): 1–21.
41 Shinosaki Atsushi, “Kōrai ō Bunsō no ishi yōsei jiken to Nihon,” 15.
42 Watanabe Makoto 渡辺誠, “Heian kizoku no taigai ishiki to ikoku chōjō mondai” 平安貴族の対外意識と異国
牒状問題, Rekishigaku kenkyū 歴史学研究 (2007, no. 1): 1–17.
43 Li Tao 李焘, Xu zizhitongjian changbian 續資治通鑒長編 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2004), vol. 250–293,
6080–7156.

20
Xu zizhitongjian changbian, Heian courtier journals, and the Koryŏsa.
44 Such cross-referencing
is essential to understanding how constantly changing interstate relations shaped diplomatic
stances – both directly and indirectly – and it also sheds new light on diplomatic gestures that
Song China, Heian Japan, and Koryŏ Korea employed in the eleventh century.
In this chapter, I make three major arguments. First, I highlight how Koryŏ used its
monarch’s medical needs as an important channel to open relations with other regimes, to
exchange officials and information with different regimes. Koryŏ’s medical requests gave it new
leverage and space to engage with various regimes than would have been possible through
conventional channels. Second, I argue that Shenzong’s enthusiasm and passionate response to
Munjong’s request were closely related to his grand strategy of military activism.45 On the one
hand, such military activism was closely related to Song’s previous military losses. As Paul
Smith has pointed out, Shenzong saw himself as heir to the Song founders’ dreams of recovering
the sixteen prefectures of Yan-Yun lost to Liao in the north, and Lingzhou to the Xixia in 1001.46
On the other hand, in his interactions with Koryŏ, Shenzong’s ambitions went beyond the actual
geographic boundaries of sixteen prefectures, and bolstered a wider range of influence than Song
was able to exert. Therefore, under the rule of Shenzong, who was one of the most famous Song
44 Many excellent works have been published analyzing the nature and features of these sources. For example, see
Charles Hartman, The Making of Song Dynasty History: Sources and Narratives, 960–1279 CE (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2021); and Chang, Tong-ik 張東翼 ed., Ilbon kojungse Koryŏ charyo yŏn’gu 日本古
中世高麗資料硏究 (Seoul: Sŏul Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'anbu, 2004).
45 Shenzong’s ambitions for taking the northern territories should be analyzed in the broader context of Song-Liao
territory disputes. Among various battles, the 979 Gaolianghe battle 高粱河 marked a big failure when Song
Taizong 宋太宗 (939–997, r. 976–997) was not able to take northern lands from Liao. After him, several Song
emperors prioritized reclaiming the northern lands. For details, see Zeng Ruilong 曾瑞龍, Jinglue Youyan: Song
Liao zhanzheng junshizainan de zhanlue fenxi 經略幽燕：宋遼戰爭軍事災難的戰略分析 (Beijing: Beijing Daxue,
2012).
46 Paul Smith, “Shen-tsung’s Reign and the New Policies of Wang An-shih, 1067–1085” in Cambridge History of
China, vol. 5. Part One: The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors, 907–1279 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2009), 353.

21
emperors, we can re-evaluate whether Shenzong’s overseas policies can be summarized as
alternative nationalism, as Nicolas Tackett argues.47 Third, I argue that Koryŏ’s positive
interactions with Song and, by contrast, Heian Japan’s cautious attitudes were both grounded in
their contrasting evaluations of the international situation at the time. Koryŏ’s closeness to the
Song was much more than a simple admiration of Chinese culture. Rather, it was based on
Koryŏ’s realistic considerations of economic and political profits to be gained by working with
Song against the Liao. Meanwhile, Heian indifference did not mean the Japanese court had little
interest in overseas affairs. In fact, the frequent lengthy meetings Heian courtiers held over the
medical request illustrate a high degree of attentiveness to overseas affairs. As we will see the
ultimate decision to not dispatch physicians was based on careful calculation. In this light, I will
argue that all three realms -- Koryŏ Korea, Heian Japan, and Song China -- actively participated
in reshaping the international order based on their different agendas.
I will first examine how Munjong’s medical requests were perceived by Shenzong and
his ministers, and how the response was shaped by Shenzong’s overall military strategy against
Xixia and Liao. I will then discuss how Munjong’s requests were interpreted by Kyoto’s
courtiers, and how Japan’s reluctance to dispatch doctors was based on such important factors as
Koryŏ-Japan overseas relations, the circulation and transmission of knowledge, and the rise of
Japan-centered consciousness at the Heian court.
Munjong and Shenzong in the Eleventh Century Maritime Zone
47 Nicolas Tackett, The Origins of the Chinese Nation: Song China and the Forging of an East Asian World Order
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 279.

22
Munjong’s desire for closer relations with Song China began shortly after he took the
throne, and it should be seen in the context of the multilayered network of Song-Liao-Koryŏ
relations. In general, Koryŏ’s relations with Song and Liao can be divided into three phases:
mid-ninth century to 1022, 1022 to 1064, and 1064 to the 1100s. Before 1022, Koryŏ had
relatively close relations with Song. The Korean monarchs actively dispatched diplomatic
envoys to Song, used Song’s era and calendars, and sent students to study at national academies
in Song.48 Nevertheless, the two regimes never formed a strong military alliance. For example,
when Song Taizu (927–976, r. 960–976) planned to invade Liao in 985 and asked Koryŏ for
assistance, Koryŏ did not send military troops.49 Friendly exchanges between Koryŏ and Song
were interrupted by the rise of Liao in the 990s. From that point, Liao began its military
expansion to the east and eventually brought Koryŏ under its control in 1022, when the Koryŏ
monarch was forced to cut off diplomatic exchanges with Song and began to use Liao era-names
as a gesture of submission.50 From 1022 to the 1060s, there is no record of official exchanges
between Koryŏ and Song. At the same time, Liao regularly sent envoys to confer titles on
Korean monarchs to confirm its superior position.51 Still, the submissive posture that Koryŏ took
was not the entire story. Clashes between Koryŏ and Liao over the borderlands, as well as Liao’s
constant demands, contributed to Koryŏ’s willingness to risk danger: it began to reestablish
relations with Song from the early 1060s onward.
Munjong, as the eleventh monarch of the Koryŏ dynasty, lived at this crucial transition
point, trying to restore diplomatic exchanges with the Song while keeping their efforts
48 Jiang Jizhong 姜吉仲, Gaoli yu Song Jin waijiao jingmao guanxi shilun 高麗與宋金外交經貿關係史論 (Taibei:
Wenjin chuban, 2004), 98.
49 Songshi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977), vol. 487, 14037; Liaoshi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2017), vol. 11, 128.
50 Koryŏsa (Chongqing: Xinan shifandaxue, 2014), vol. 4, 115.
51 Koryŏsa, vol. 7, 198.

23
undetected by the Liao. During Munjong’s reign, Liao sent diplomatic envoys regularly on
various diplomatic occasions, such as congratulating Munjong on his succession, announcing the
deaths of Liao’s royal family members, and sending notice of the Liao monarch’s succession.52
These visits emphasized the legitimacy and superiority of Liao over Koryŏ.53 For example, in the
first month of 1049, Liao sent officials Xiao Weide 蕭惟德 and Wang Shoudao 王守道 to confer
the title of king to Munjong. In the message, Liao Xingzong (耶律宗真, 1016–1055, r. 1031–
1055) is reported saying, “I took the throne because my ancestors had virtues and achievement.
For the sake of state building, strong people become monarchs while weak people are subjects …
Now I have conferred the title of loyal servant on you (Koryŏ king) … Never forget to serve our
great regime (Liao) sincerely.”54 Similar expressions highlighting Liao’s superiority and
reminding Koryŏ of its subordinate status reoccurred in the letters that Liao sent in 1055, 1057,
and 1064.55 In addition to such written statements, Liao troops reportedly crossed the border to
encroach on Koryŏ land, elevating Koryŏ’s hostility and vigilance. For example, in the seventh
month of 1055, a supervisor of the Koryŏ militia reported that they had observed Liao armies
crossing the Yalu River and building castles, bridges, and postal stations in Koryŏ’s territory. As
a response, Munjong sent letters asking Liao Xingzong to destroy their structures and retreat
back to the Liao boundary.56
52 Koryŏsa, vol. 7, 196–268.
53 Xue Chen argues that due to steppe traditions of divisible qaghanship, Liao did not pursue complete superiority or
control over other regimes such as Song, Koryŏ, or Xixia. See Xue Chen, “Age of Emperors: Divisible Imperial
Authority and the Formation of a Liao World Order in Continental East Asia, 900–1250,” Journal of Song Yuan
Studies (2020), 69–70.
54 Koryŏsa, vol. 7, 188–189.
55 Koryŏsa, vol. 7–8, 204–229.
56 Koryŏsa, vol. 7, 204–205.

24
To counterbalance Liao’s strength, Munjong turned his eyes to Song. He exhibited a
strong interest in Song culture and promoted Song literati. During his reign, he recruited many
literati versed in Confucian classics and literature as high officials and gave official posts to
Song immigrants. For example, in the sixth month of 1052 and ninth month of 1060, Munjong
promoted Zhang Tinglai 張廷來 and Lu Yin 廬寅 – both degree holders from the Song – as
editors of the Palace Library 秘書省校書郎.
57 Another Song immigrant, Zhou Hang 周沆, was
recruited as a recorder in the Ministry of Rituals 禮賓省注簿 for his literary talent, although he
was later dismissed due to corruption.58 Such actions, which are conventionally interpreted as
Koryŏ’s desire to Chinese civilization and culture, need to be examined in light of Munjong’s
specific situation at the time. It is highly likely that, given the constant demands and harassment
from Liao, Munjong saw Song China as a potential ally.
Munjong’s agenda seeking alliance and elevating Koryŏ’s status can be further illustrated
by his ambivalent attitude toward Liao. On the one hand, Munjong accepted Liao’s investiture as
a gesture of submission; but he also contested Liao’s authority on various occasions. For
example, in the fifth month of 1052, Munjong issued a decree generously rewarding the military
official Pak Sŏm 朴暹 for his bravery and loyalty when Liao invaded in the 1020s.59
Furthermore, in the ninth month of 1055, when Liao sent an envoy to announce the death of Liao
Xingzong.60 Koryŏsa records that to observe practices of mourning, Munjong began cutting
regular meals, suspending music performances, and prohibiting hunting and butchering only
after he received the news that Liao envoys had crossed the Yalu River (王聞嗣復過鴨綠江，
57 Koryŏsa, vol. 7, 197; Koryŏsa, vol. 8, 222.
58 Koryŏsa, vol. 8, 239.
59 Koryŏsa, vol. 7, 196.
60 Koryŏsa, vol. 7, 206.

25
減常膳，輟音樂，禁屠宰，斷戈獵).61 These seemingly incidental details illustrate subtle
tensions between Koryŏ and Liao.
Having analyzed the complicated international situation facing Munjong, I will turn to
the circumstances that Shenzong faced. From early in his reign, he had expressed great interest in
military acts and recovering the northern territories. For example, Xixia and Liao were often
engaged in disputes with Song over the borderlands and local populations. However, Shenzong’s
strategies in dealing with the two regimes were not exactly the same. Since Liao and Song signed
the Chanyuan Treaty in 1005, there had been no major military clashes during Shenzong’s
reign.62 Instead, when disputes occurred, Song and Liao ministers opted to use diplomatic
conversations to settle them.63 As a result, there was a rapid growth of maps and documentation
detailing Liao-Song boundaries and populations. This demonstrates that both sides favored
diplomatic negotiation, although in many cases such negotiations could evolve into tense
quarrels.64 In the third month of 1075, diplomat Shen Kuo 沈括 (1032–1096) noticed that Liao
had encroached on more than thirty li of Song territories, which included the old Great Wall. He
collected the evidence and reported it to Shenzong.65 Later, when the Liao envoy Xiao Xi 萧禧
61 Koryŏsa, vol. 7, 206.
62 Much work has been done to analyze the significance of the Chanyuan Treaty and the international order it
created in East Asia. For example, see Tao Jinsheng 陶晉生, “Song Liaojian de pingdeng waijiao guanxi: Chanyun
mengyue de diding jiqi yingxiang” 宋遼間的平等外交關係：澶淵盟約的締定及其影響, in Song Liao guanxishi
yanjiu 宋遼關係史研究 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2008), 11–31; Endō Satoshi, Iiyama Tomoyasu, Itō Kazuma,
Mori Eisuke, “Recent Japanese Scholarship on the Multi-State Order in East Eurasia from the Tenth to Thirteenth
Centuries,” Journal of Song Yuan Studies (2017–2018), 193–205.
63 For English scholarship about Song-Liao relations, see Nicolas Tackett, The Origins of the Chinese Nation: Song
China and the Forging of an East Asian World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
64 Tao Jinsheng 陶晉生, Song Liao guanxishi yanjiu 宋遼關係史研究 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2008), 138.
65 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 261, 6367. For a discussion about Song-Liao boundary disputes, see Christian
Lamouroux, “Geography and Politics: The Song-Liao Border Dispute of 1074/1075,” in Sabine Debringhaus and
Roderich Ptak, eds., China and Her Neighbors: Borders, Visions of the Other, Foreign Policy 10th to 19th Century
(Wiesbaden; Harrassowitz Verlag, 1997), 10–28.

26
arrived, the officials of the two countries quarreled over the boundary issue until midnight, and
the Liao envoys stayed in Bianjing for almost one month (爭論或至夜分，留京師幾一月).66
When diplomatic conversation did not work, Shenzong considered military action,
though it should be noted that, Song was much more cautious in military acts against Liao than
against Xixia in most cases.
67 Following unsettled disputes over the Song-Liao boundary in the
fourth month of 1074, Shenzong asked ministers Han Qi 韩琦 (1008–1075), Fu Bi 富弼 (1004–
1083), Wen Yanbo 文彥博 (1006–1097), and Zeng Gongliang 曾公亮 (999–1078) to discuss the
possibility of attacking Liao. From their conversation, we have a glimpse into the complex
international situation and the strategic importance of Koryŏ.68 Shenzong argued that if the Song
could persuade Koryŏ to form an alliance, it could help pose a threat to and thereby control Liao.
Ministers such as Han Qi, however, opposed forming an alliance with Koryŏ for several reasons.
Koryŏ had been under the control of the Liao for generations and had stopped paying tribute to
the Song for a long time (高麗臣屬契丹，于朝廷久絕朝貢), and therefore their trustworthiness
needed further consideration.
69 In addition, ministers worried that – considering the radical
power difference between Koryŏ and Liao – even if the Song managed to persuade Koryŏ to
form an alliance, Koryŏ might not be able to resist the strong Liao (且高麗小邦，豈能當契丹
之盛).70 Lastly, the Song ministers worried it would deepen Liao’s suspicion if Liao discovered
any conspiracy between the Song and Koryŏ (契丹知之，謂朝廷以圖我，此契丹之疑也).71
66 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 262, 6379.
67 For a detailed analysis of Song-Xixia relations, see Li Huarui 李華瑞, Song Xia guanxishi 宋夏關係史 (Beijing:
Renmindaxue Chunbanshe, 2010).
68 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 262, 6387–6393.
69 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 262, 6387.
70 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 262, 6387.
71 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 262, 6387.

27
Eventually, Shenzong gave up the idea of invading Liao.72 However, the emperor and his
ministers reached a consensus, agreeing that Koryŏ occupied an essential position in containing
the Liao, despite a lack of close alliance in 1074.
Similarly, Song and Xixia relations must be examined within a broader interstate
network. Unlike Song-Liao relations, wherein conflicts were usually settled by diplomatic
negotiation, Song-Xixia disputes during the mid–eleventh century frequently evolved into
military conflicts.73 The conflicts between Song and Xixia intensified when Xixia ruler Li
Yuanhao 李元昊 (1003–1048) and his successors actively competed with the Song to expand
their influence.74 From the time Shenzong took the throne in 1067, the two regimes were
embroiled in war. The most famous battle occurred in 1081, when Shenzong sent troops to
eliminate Xixia when a domestic coup split its regime.75 However, it would be an
oversimplification to regard Song-Xixia’s relations as just a political power struggle. Liao and
Koryŏ profoundly influenced how Shenzong dealt with Xixia and other regimes. To create a
Liao-centered international order, Liao rulers strove to emphasize their role in protecting Xixia
and Koryŏ, and they actively mediated the conflicts between different regimes.76 Such
assistance, of course, came at a price. Xixia and Koryŏ were often asked to submit expensive
tribute goods and to write letters expressing their loyalty to Liao.77 Moreover, according to Tao
Jinsheng’s research, when relations between Xixia and Song deteriorated in the late eleventh
century, Liao served as a third party, purchasing Song’s silk and reselling it to Xixia at
72 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 262, 6387.
73 Li Huarui, Song Xia guanxishi, 268.
74 Li Huarui, Song Xia guanxishi, 35.
75 For details, see Lina Nie, “A Grand Strategy or a Military Operation? Reconsideration of the Lingzhou Campaign
of 1081,” Journal of Song Yuan Studies 45 (2017): 371–385.
76 A relevant work about Liao’s international order is Xue Chen, “Age of Emperors,” 45–83.
77 Tao Jinsheng, Song Liao guanxishi yanjiu, 143.

28
tremendous profit.78 Song was aware of the dangers of the Liao-Xixia alliance. As early as in
Song Renzong’s reign (1010–1063, r. 1022–1063), Fu Bi expressed his concern that a Xixia-Liao
alliance would pose a threat to Song. “If we attack the west, the north will help them. If the north
is quiet, the west will move (cause troubles) (西伐則北助，北靜則西動).”79 This situation
continued into the late eleventh century. For example, in the second month of 1074, well before
the 1081 Lingzhou campaign, Shenzong eagerly discussed with his ministers the possibility of
invading Xixia.80 However, minister Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021–1086) urged caution: if Xixia
asked for assistance from Liao, Liao would likely agree due to geographic proximity and
marriage alliances, and Song would have little chance of winning.81 Under Wang Anshi’s
influence, Shenzong halted his military plan.
It should be noted that Wang Anshi and Shenzong never reached full agreement
regarding war and the conquest of Xixia. As Paul Smith argues, Wang Anshi generally insisted
that economic and political reform should be prioritized ahead of launching expensive battles
against foreign enemies, while Shenzong felt greater urgency to pursue his ambitions to recover
78 Tao Jinsheng, Song Liao guanxishi yanjiu, 39.
79 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 150, 庆历四年六月戊午富弼.
80 While during Shenzong’s reign military conflicts with Xixia were frequent, trade and religious exchanges
continued. In particular, salt, livestock, and Buddhist canonical texts were major goods in Song-Tangut exchange.
For details, see Li Huarui, “Song Xia maoyi yu Song Xia zhanzheng de guanxi” 宋夏貿易與宋夏戰爭的關係, in Li
Huarui, Song Xia guanxishi 宋夏關係史, 242, 255.
81 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 250, 6104. Xixia and Liao’s alliance was not always stable despite the fact that
Liao married their imperial princesses several times into Xixia imperial families. One major clash between the two
regimes, for example, occurred in the 1040s, when Liao invaded Xixia twice. The triggering factors were
complicated, but historians have demonstrated that conflicts were closely related to the fact that the Liao princess
Xingping 興平公主 (?–1038) was poorly treated by her husband, Xixia ruler Li Yuanhao 李元昊 (1003–1048), and
Xixia disobeyed Liao’s order to stop attacking Song. For a comprehensive analysis of the event, see Li Huarui,
“Song Xia yu Liao de sanjiao guanxi” 宋夏與遼的三角關係, in Song Xia guanxishi, 260–290.

29
the northern territories.82 As a result, when Wang Anshi was removed from the political center
for the second time in 1076, the ambitious and energetic twenty-eight-year-old emperor felt less
constrained and could openly work with Korea to contain Xixia and Liao.83
When Song sent troops against Xixia in 1081, Shenzong expressed concern that other
regimes, such as Liao and Tibet, would send military support to Xixia. For example, in the
seventh month of 1081, Shenzong sent a letter to a frontier general saying that since Liao and
Xixia had sophisticated channels to exchange information, he was very worried that if Xixia
were driven to desperation, it would ask Liao for assistance (契丹夏人交通孔道，今大兵進
討，深慮賊勢窮蹙，遣使求援).84 In the fourth month of 1082, in a letter that Shenzong sent to
frontier general Li Xian 李宪 (1042–1092), he urged Li Xian to take action to stop Tibet from
following Liao’s orders to assist Xixia (令董氈 1032–1083, a ruler of Tsongkha kingdom 勿聽
契丹言於夏和).85 And following a similar pattern in the 1080s, Song undertook several rounds
82 Paul Smith, “Shen-tsung’s Reign and the New Policies of Wang An-shih, 1067–1085” in Cambridge History of
China vol. 5, 469. Tao Jinsheng notices that, compared with Wang Anshi’s strategies during his early career as chief
councilor, he hardened his attitude towards Xixia when reappointed in 1075. This disparity was related to the
changing interstate relations with Liao, the effects of military reform, and Shenzong’s military ambitions. For
details, see Tao Jinsheng, Song Liao guanxishi yanjiu, 123.
83 For a detailed discussion of post–Wang Anshi politics, see Paul Smith, “Shen-tsung’s Reign and the New Policies
of Wang An-shih, 1067–1085,” in Cambridge History of China, vol. 5, 454–483. In particular, Smith notices that in
contrast to Shenzong’s treatment of Wang Anshi as a genuine friend and respected mentor, Shenzong publicly
humiliated Cai Que 蔡確 (1037–1093), his new chief chancellor.
84 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 314, 7603.
85 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 325, 7820. For a detailed analysis of Li Xian and other military leaders in
northern Song, see He Guanhuan 何冠環, Tuodi xiangdi: Beisong zhongye neichen mingjiang Li Xian yanjiu 拓地降
敵：北宋中葉內臣名將李憲研究 (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 2023); Zeng Ruilong, “Bei yiwang de
tuobian zhanyi: Zhao Qi Zhong taiweichuan suojian de liubuzong zhiyi” 被遺忘的拓邊戰役：趙起《種太尉傳》
所見的六逋宗之役 in Tuobian xibei: Beisong zhonghouqi duixia zhanzheng yanjiu 拓邊西北：北宋中後期對夏戰
爭研究 (Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 2006), 79–123.

30
of negotiations with Liao and Tibet to persuade them not to intervene in battles between Song
and Xixia.86
Interestingly, scholars have often overlooked the fact that exchanges between Song and
Koryŏ reached their peak during the 1070s and 1080s, when Shenzong showed unprecedented
warmth and friendliness to Koryŏ. As we will discuss in detail below, Shenzong dispatched
skilled physicians to treat Munjong’s illness, delivered expensive gifts, elevated diplomatic
treatment of Koryŏ over other regimes, and actively exchanged correspondence with Munjong
inquiring about his illness. Given these interstate dynamics, we can see that Koryŏ was very
important in Shenzong’s military strategy. Shenzong strove to use Koryŏ to contain Liao, so Liao
had to be very cautious when it decided whether or not to assist the Xixia against the Song.
Munjong’s Requests to Song China in Medical Help
The exchanges between Munjong and Shenzong can be divided into three phases: 1058–
1077 as the testing phase; 1078–1083, when the exchanges reached a peak, and medical requests
were the dominant theme; and from 1083 onward, when Song’s exchanges with Koryŏ declined
after the death of Munjong.
In the first phase, official contact between the two was sporadic, and the major
participants were middle and low officials. In the eighth month of 1058, Song merchant Huang
Wenjing 黄文景 visited Munjong and submitted local tribute items. Seizing the opportunity,
Munjong ordered Tamna 耽羅 and Yŏngam 靈巖 to cut trees to build large ships to sail to Song,
to resume diplomacy with the Song.87 However, officials from the Department of the
86 See the eighth month of 1082, in Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 329, 7923; the seventh month of 1083, Xu
zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 338, 8139; tenth month of 1083, Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 314, 8205–8207.
87 Koryŏsa, vol. 8, 218.

31
Chancellery 內史門下省 opposed Munjong’s plan for several reasons. First, if the Liao
discovered their act, Koryŏ could be severely condemned and might be attacked. Second, it
would be a huge financial burden to Tamna Island, and the residents might rebel (今又重困，恐
生他變).88 Third, since the Song merchants had satisfied the court’s needs for treasures, there
was no need to risk the danger inherent in reestablishing diplomatic connections with the Song,
unless Koryŏ intended to break its alliance with Liao completely (如非永絕契丹，不宜通使宋
朝).89 Here the Chancellery pointed out the dilemma that Koryŏ faced. On the one hand,
Munjong was motivated to connect with Song for various strategic reasons as analyzed above.
On the other hand, he worried about Liao’s reaction. Failing to come up with a good solution,
Munjong paused his plan to contact the Song.90
Ten years later, in 1068, Song took the initiative by contacting Koryŏ. Based on the
Koryŏsa, in the seventh year of 1068 the Song subject Huang Shen reportedly came to visit
Munjong and said,
“Shenzong summoned Luo Zheng (1016-1080), the supervisory and supply
commissioner of Jianghuai liangzhe jinghu nanbei region, and said, ‘Koryŏ was referred
to as a regime of gentlemen in the past. Since the time of our ancestors, Koryŏ diligently
paid tribute to us. Later, connections were interrupted for a long time. Now I hear that the
Koryŏ king is a wise and virtuous king. Therefore we should send envoys to instruct
them.’ Therefore, Luo Zheng sent Huang Shen to convey the emperor’s intentions.” 皇帝
召江淮兩浙荊湖南北路都大制置發運使羅拯曰：「高麗古稱君子之國，自祖宗之
世，輸款甚勤，暨後阻絕久矣。今聞其國主，賢王也，可遣人諭之。」於是拯奏遣
慎等來傳天子之意。91
88 Koryŏsa, vol. 8, 218.
89 Koryŏsa, vol. 8, 218.
90 Koryŏsa, vol. 8, 218.
91 Koryŏsa, vol. 8, 235.

32
Based on Koryŏsa, it seems that Munjong was overjoyed to see the arrival of Song envoys, and
he treated them very well (王悦，館待甚厚).92 After that, Luo Zheng sent Huang Shen to revisit
Koryŏ in the eighth month of 1070.93 In response to Song’s kindness, in the third month of 1071
Munjong dispatched civil attendant 民官侍郎 Kim Che 金悌 to take a letter and gifts to Song via
Dengzhou 登州, on today’s Shandong peninsula.94 Kim Che also appears in the records on the
Song side. According to Xu zizhitongjian changbian, in the eighth month of 1071, the Song court
welcomed Kim Che with the same diplomatic treatment as it had granted Xixia. (高麗使入見，
欲依夏國例).95 And then in the second month of 1074, Munjong asked if Song could send
skilled experts in medicine, painting, and architecture to Koryŏ. In response, Shenzong asked
Luo Zheng to find appropriate and willing candidates and send them to Koryŏ.96
During this first phase of diplomatic conversation between Song and Koryŏ, there were
important changes over time. First, the Koryŏ ambassadors’ routes changed. In 1073, Koryŏ
abandoned the old route, entering Song via Dengzhou, and chose Mingzhou 明州 as the new
port.97 Li Tao, author of Xu zizhitongjian changbian, comments that this was because Mingzhou
was farther from Liao (高麗自國初皆由登州來朝，近歲常取道明州，蓋遠于遼故也) 98 In
other words, the existence of Liao profoundly influenced communications between Song and
Koryŏ. Such cautiousness was not groundless: back in 1010, Liao rulers sent a missive scolding
92 Koryŏsa, vol. 8, 235.
93 Koryŏsa, vol. 8, 237.
94 Koryŏsa, vol. 8, 238.
95 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 226, 5504.
96 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 250, 6095.
97 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 247, 6029.
98 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 247, 6029.

33
Koryŏ rulers for secretly communicating with Jurchens in the east and Song in the west (契丹問
罪書云：東結構與女真，西往來於宋國，是欲何謀?).99
Secondly, the Song elevated diplomatic treatment of Koryŏ over time. As mentioned
before, when the Koryŏ envoys first arrived in 1071, the Song court used the same protocals
which they treated Xixia envoys to welcome them. However, in the tenth month of 1076, Koryŏ
envoys received warm greetings from both the chief administrator of prefecture 知州 and the
controller-general 通判. Such treatment surpassed even Song’s treatment of Liao (其禮反重於
契丹).100 As Tao Jinsheng’s research shows, among all alien regimes, Liao usually enjoyed the
best treatment from the Song.101 Li Huarui’s work also notes this difference when Song met
Xixia envoys.102 Shenzong’s decision to elevate Koryŏ’s treatment was therefore unusual, clearly
reflecting his efforts to form good relations with Korea.
The diplomatic exchange reached a peak in the second phase, from 1078 to 1083, when
medical requests played a central role in connecting the two regimes and Shenzong began to
participate in the conversation with Munjong more directly. For example, the two exchanged at
least three rounds of envoys in the year 1078. In the first month of 1078, Shenzong appointed his
trusted minister An Tao 安燾 (1034–1108) to visit Koryŏ.103 In the fourth month of 1078,
Mingzhou officials informed Munjong that Shenzong would send an envoy to visit him.104
According to Koryŏsa, Munjong replied,
“Having heard that the great dynasty (Song) would send envoys to a foreign territory, I
am joyful and surprised. All the officials should fulfill their obligations, and the treatment
99 Tao Jinsheng, Song Liao guanxishi yanjiu, 145.
100 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 278, 6800.
101 Tao Jinsheng, Song Liao guanxishi yanjiu, 26.
102 Li Huarui, Song Xia guanxishi, 359–361.
103 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 287, 7020.
104 Koryŏsa, vol. 9, 254.

34
of Song envoys cannot be lacking.” 敢期大朝降使外域，寡人一喜一驚。凡百執事，
各揚爾職，館待之事，罔有闕遺。105
In the sixth month of 1078, An Tao and his emissary arrived.106 At this point, Munjong’s
headache was so severe that he had to rely on others to support him to receive Shenzong’s
imperial decree (王適不豫，使左右扶出受詔).107 Despite his deteriorating health, Munjong
sent almost every head of every bureau and department to welcome the Song envoys.108 In the
seventh month when An Tao went home, Munjong wrote a letter to Shenzong to express his
gratitude to Song. In the letter, he also asked if Song could dispatch skilled physicians to treat his
illness.109 Upon receiving his request, Shenzong sent three imperial physicians to Koryŏ (詔遣翰
林醫官邢慥邵化及秦玠醫高麗國王王徽) in the tenth month of 1078.110 And in the seventh
month of 1079, Shenzong sent another group of eighty-eight people, including many skilled
physicians and other officials, to treat Munjong’s illness.111 Following that, in the third month of
1080, Shenzong sent another message to Munjong to inquire if he felt better.112
For Song, expressions of friendliness with Koryŏ by no means admitted equal status.
Throughout the communications, Shenzong strove to assert his superiority over Munjong. For
example, in the imperial decree Shenzong sent to Munjong in the sixth month of 1078, Shenzong
said “(You Koryŏ king) have sincerely cultivated respect and submissive demeanor, therefore
you deserve to be praised” (載修恭順之誠，宜被褒嘉之錫).113 In the seventh month of 1079,
105 Koryŏsa, vol. 9, 254.
106 Koryŏsa, vol. 9, 254.
107 Koryŏsa, vol. 9, 254.
108 Koryŏsa, vol. 9, 254.
109 Koryŏsa, vol. 9, 256–257.
110 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 293, 7156.
111 Koryŏsa, vol. 9, 258.
112 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 303, 7368.
113 Koryŏsa, vol. 9, 255.

35
Shenzong sent a second group of physicians to treat Munjong’s headache.114 In the
accompanying decree, Shenzong praised Munjong for yearning for central China and constantly
practicing the rituals for submitting tribute (乃心中夏修頻年底貢之儀).115 To reward his loyal
service, Shenzong dispatched physicians to treat Munjong, and they brought one hundred kinds
of medicine.116 Intriguingly, in this decree, Shenzong provided a detailed list of medicines and
their origins. Here is an excerpt of the medicine list:
“Agarwood from Qiongzhou, Saussurea costus of Guangzhou, iron powder from
Kangning, clove from Guangzhou, lead power from Dongjing, native copper from
Yizhou, dragon blood from Guangzhou, realgar from Jiezhou, realgar from Xirong,
gypsum from Bingzhou, Gastrodia elata from Yunzhou, benzoin from Xirong,
Dendrobium of Shouzhou, Achyranthes bidentata of Huaizhou … bupleurum from
Yinzhou, and Cistanche from Xiazhou….” 瓊州沈香，廣州木香，康寧府鐵粉，廣州
丁香，東京鈆霜，邑州自然銅，廣州血竭，階州雄黃，西戎天竺黃，並州石膏，
鄆州天麻，西戎安息香，壽州石斛，懷州牛膝……銀州柴胡，夏州肉蓯蓉…117
It should be noted that not every medicine listed here was effective for curing headaches,
and not every place of origin was under Song’s control. For example, native copper was mostly
used for treating bone fractures, and benzoin was mostly used for respiratory and skin diseases.
Xirong, which Shenzong mentioned twice in the medical list, was usually referred to as Xixia.118
Here, the very decision to list them as gifts for Munjong, along with their foreign origins, created
an image of a rich and prosperous sovereign of Song, an image Shenzong was anxious for
Munjong to see.119
114 Koryŏsa, vol. 9, 258.
115 Koryŏsa, vol. 9, 258. For a detailed examination of rituals between Koryŏ and Song, see Toyoshima Yuka 豊島
悠果, Kōrai ōchō no girei to Chūgoku 高麗王朝の儀礼と中国 (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 2017).
116 Koryŏsa, vol. 9, 258.
117 Koryŏsa, vol. 9, 258–259.
118 For example, Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037–1101) said that both Xirong (Xixia) and Beihu (Khitan) posed a threat to the
Chinese regime （夫西戎、北胡，皆為中國之患). In Su Shi, “Ceduan zhong” 策斷中, in Su Shi, Dongpo quanji
東坡全集 (Sikuquanshuben), vol. 84, 1–12.
119 This project draws much inspiration from Yang Shaoyun’s work. See The Way of the Barbarians: Redrawing
Ethnic Boundaries in Tang and Song China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2019).

36
Moreover, here I also want to raise a point that is slightly different from Nicolas
Tackett’s reading of Song’s ruling ideology. In his book The Origins of the Chinese Nation,
Tackett wrote that Song emperors and ministers had to frequently deal with the Liao regarding
territory disputes. In this process, the political elites of Song began to conceptualize their state as
having “ a clearly defined national territory and Han ethnocultural identity.”120 Tackett’s
observation is valid if we merely look at Song-Liao interactions. However, if we add those with
Koryŏ into the picture, we will see some different features in Song ruling ideology. In the case of
the medical list Shenzong gave to Munjong, he was clearly not discussing Song’s actual territory
boundaries. Instead he was showing Koryŏ that Song was able to obtain precious medicines from
beyond Chinese territories, reaching all the way to Xixia, in order to treat Munjong’s headache.
When talking to Liao, Song focused on territorial disputes and the sixteen prefectures. When
talking to Koryŏ, however, Shenzong and his ministers were less restrained and discussed
something broader. Such flexibilities illustrate the fluidity of ruling ideology and images of
territorial influence that Song elites adopted in different contexts.
Although Shenzong aimed to impress Munjong as a rich and benevolent emperor, there
were still unsettling incidents. According to Koryŏsa, in the seventh month of 1078 An Tao and
Chen Mu 陳睦 reached Koryŏ and received rich gifts from the Koryŏ court. When they were
about to depart, they realized their ship was too small to load all the gifts. Therefore, they
requested that the Koryŏ court convert the gifts into silver (將還，舟不勝載，請以所得物件貿
銀).121 Moreover, Koryŏsa commented that An Tao and Chen Mu were greedy in nature, so
during their stay they had reduced their daily supplies and meals in exchange for large quantities
120 Tackett, The Origins of the Chinese Nation, 210.
121 Koryŏsa, vol. 9, 257.

37
of silver (燾、睦性貪婪，日減供億之饌，折價貿銀甚多).122 Such behavior of course
challenged the glorious image that Shenzong tried to demonstrate to Munjong. Later soon after
An Tao and Chen Mu returned, in the eleventh month of 1078, their behavior was reported by
the remonstrating censor He Zhengchen 何正臣.
123 In the letter, He Zhengchen declared that
their practice of exchanging goods for silver and demanding properties from Koryŏ corrupted the
missions and triggered the humiliation of Song by foreign countries (害義辱命，啟辱外夷).124
In general, Koryŏ showed a high degree of cooperation while participating in these
diplomatic conversations.125 For example, when Shenzong’s grandmother, Grand Empress
Dowager Cao (1016–1079), died in 1079,126 Koryŏ envoys offered to wear a dark belt (墨帶)
and mourn for her.127 Shenzong replied that since the mourning period had already passed, this
was not necessary.128 Nevertheless, at the ritual of sending the coffin, Koryŏ envoys asked to
burn incense for Cao while wearing dark belts as if they were Song officials. Shenzong
eventually approved their request (高麗使柳洪等乞遇奉慰入寺觀燒香，比群臣服墨帶。從
之，仍以帶賜之).129 Later, Shenzong praised Munjong: “The Koryŏ monarch knows rituals and
righteousness very well. Although he lives far away, he serves our dynasty with great respect and
diligence.” (其國主頗識禮義，雖遠在海外，尊事中朝，未嘗少懈).130 On Munjong’s part,
122 Koryŏsa, vol. 9, 257.
123 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 294, 7171.
124 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 294, 7171.
125 Lee Jinhan notices that Koryŏ’s diplomacy with Song, Yuan, and Ming China went through significant changes.
For details, see Lee Jinhan, “The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade with Ming in the Last Years of
the Koryŏ Dynasty,” International Journal of Korean History (2006), vol. 10, 1–24.
126 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 302, 7348.
127 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 302, 7348.
128 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 302, 7348.
129 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 302, 7351.
130 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 323, 7785.

38
such a high degree of deference was much more than an aspiration to practice Chinese culture. It
illustrates how he masterfully used requests for medical to win Shenzong’s favor.
Tensions and conflicts nonetheless lurked under the surface of friendly exchanges. In
contrast to Mori Katsumi’s 森克己 argument that Song overseas relations were relaxed and
received little government control,131 in fact the Song government closely controlled overseas
trade and diplomatic exchanges.132 These acts not only reflected state activism during
Shenzong’s reign. They also demonstrate that Song did not completely trust Koryŏ. When Koryŏ
envoys came to Song, their personnel, identities, traveling routes, and those whom they were
allowed to contact were all under Song’s close surveillance. For example, in the tenth month of
1073, Shenzong ordered his officials to check and report to him if they discovered any Liao spies
disguised as Koryŏ envoys (又詔引伴，禮賓副使王謹初等與知明州李綖訪進奉入貢三節人
中有無燕人以聞).133 In the tenth month of 1076, Shenzong issued a decree to Mingzhou
officials blaming them for giving free rein to Koryŏ envoys to tour local places (高麗使至明州
已久，慮引伴使臣縱其國人所過遊觀).134 And he instructed officials to urge Koryŏ envoys not
to linger.135 Song also made great efforts to control whom Koryŏ envoys could contact. For
example, in the eleventh month of 1079, Mingzhou officials reported to Shenzong that a district
defender called Zhang Zhong 張中 exchanged poems with Koryŏ ambassadors without
permission (又言明州象山縣尉張中嘗以詩遣高麗貢使), and the court decided to dismiss
131 Mori Katsumi 森克巳, Nissō bōeki no kenkyū 日宋貿易の研究 (Tokyo: Kokusho kankōkai, 1975), vol. 1–3.
132 For similar observations, see Yamauchi Shinji 山内晋次, “Nissō bōeki no tenkai” 日宋貿易の展開, in Sekkan
seiji to ōchō bunka 摂関政治と王朝文化, ed. Katō Tomoyasu 加藤友康 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2002),
289.
133Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 247, 6030.
134 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 278, 6793.
135 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 278, 6793.

39
Zhang Zhong for misconduct (詔中衝替).136 It was not until Koryŏ ambassadors spoke up for
Zhang Zhong – claiming he’d saved their lives when their ships encountered a strong wind – that
the Song court forgave him.137 This not only illustrates the close control the Song court exercised
over diplomatic exchanges, but also its distrust of and vigilance with regard to Koryŏ.138
After Munjong died in 1083 and Song ended its large-scale campaigns against Xixia,
Song-Koryŏ relations gradually cooled down, and both the frequency of contact and quality of
diplomatic treatment declined. Rather than making multiple visits every year, Koryŏ envoys only
appeared once between 1083 and 1085. In particular, after Shenzong died in the third month of
1085, power fell into the hands of conservative parties such as Grand Empress Dowager Gao
(1032–1093) and minister Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019–1086).139 Conciliation and vacillation
became the guiding principles in dealing with Liao and Xixia, although some disagreement
existed within conservative parties.140 Subsequently, Song enthusiasm and passion for continuing
relations with Koryŏ further waned.141 In the eleventh month of 1095, just eight months after
Shenzong’s death, Sima Guang suggested the court stop admitting Koryŏ envoys, and the two
countries’ interactions were limited to commercial exchanges in the Liangzhe region, so as not to
disturb the court (又乞止絕高麗朝貢，只許就兩浙互市，不必煩擾朝廷).142 Sima Guang’s
opposition was closely related to his concerns that close ties could trigger Liao’s suspicion.
136 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 301, 7323.
137 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 303, 7379.
138 Nicolas Tackett makes a very similar comparison in his study of how ambassadors of Song and Liao participated
in social activities. See Nicolas Tackett, The Origins of the Chinese Nation, 72.
139 For a comprehensive analysis of Song’s foreign policies in the Yuanyou 元祐 period (1086–1094), see Ari
Daniel Levine, “Che-Tsung’s Reign (1085–1100) and the Age of Faction,” in Cambridge History of China, vol.5
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 484–514.
140 Paul Smith, “Shen-tsung’s Reign and the New Policies of Wang An-shih, 1067–1085,” in Cambridge History of
China, vol. 5, 505.
141 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 360, 8622.
142 Xu zizhitongjian changbian, vol. 360, 8622.

40
Although he did not mention that concern directly in 1095, he had repeatedly submitted missives
to Shenzhong in which he opposed conflict with Xixia and Liao, fearing that such military
conflicts would be endless,143 Sima Guang’s Koryŏ policies clearly arose from this broader
consideration of Song-Liao-Xixia relations.
Munjong and the Heian Court in the Eleventh Century Maritime Zone
On the Japan side, the Heian court’s indifference to Koryŏ’s requests was rooted in both
its previous diplomatic traditions and the broader context of Song-Koryŏ-Japan relations. In
general, the diplomatic exchanges between the two were mostly initiated by Koryŏ, and Japanese
replies were few. According to Nihon Kiryaku 日本記略, the first Koryŏ ambassadors came to
Japan in 937, one year after the Korean peninsula was unified and the Koryŏ kingdom
established. Their visits served to inform the Japanese of the unification and to legitimize
Koryŏ’s rule.144 Following the 937 visits, Koryŏ dispatched several more envoys but did not
receive answers from Japan.145 In 997, the Koryŏ court sent three letters to Tsushima and the
Japanese court, but according to courtier journals such as the Shōyūki 小右記, the tone of the
letters was considered rude, causing a sense of shame on the Japan side. Therefore, after
discussion, the Japanese minister council and the monarch decided not to reply, and Tsushima
was ordered to strengthen military defenses (高麗国牒三通……大略不可遣返牒，又警固要
143 During Shenzong’s reign, Sima Guang constantly submitted memorials opposing Shenzong’s military actions
towards Xixia and Liao. See Songshi, vol. 336, 10757.
144 Kondō Gō 近藤剛, Nihon Kōrai Kankeishi 日本高麗関係史 (Tokyo: Yagi shoten, 2019), 2.
145 Fujiwara no Tadahira 藤原忠平, Teishinkōki 貞信公記, 2.15, 6.21, 6.23, 6.24 of 天慶二年 (939), in Dai Nihon
kokiroku 大日本古記録 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1956), vol. 8, 184–190.

41
害……有令恥日本国之文).146 Moreover, Minister of the Right Fujiwara no Akimitsu 藤原顕光
(944–1021) and General of the Left Fujiwara no Kinsue 藤原公季 (957–1029) worried that the
style of the letter did not resemble the Koryŏ style. They suspected that Song was secretly aiding
Koryŏ in some sort of plotting (但見件牒、不似高麗国牒、是若大宋国謀略歟).147 Therefore,
the court commanded that Song subjects living in Echizen 越前 and Chinzei 鎮西 be returned to
China.148
Japan’s distrust of Korea had historical roots. According to the research of Hamada
Kumiko 浜田久美子, Funya no Mitatamaro 文室宮田麻呂, a provincial official in Chikuzen,
had attempted to conspire with Silla in 841.149 As a result, the Heian court’s distrust toward Silla
grew, and it became more difficult to enter Japan. This trend continued throughout and after the
Jōwa era (834–848).150 Moreover, the rulers’ reluctance to meet foreign envoys also has history.
tradition. As Uda Tennō (866–931, r. 887–897) reminded Daigo Tennō (885-930, r. 897-930) in
Kanpyō no goyuikai 寛平御遺誡 in his testament in 897:
If it is necessary to meet foreign people, the monarch should see them from behind a
curtain and not face them directly. When I saw Li Huan [a Tang diplomat visiting Japan
in 891], I made a mistake. You should be cautious about it.「外藩之人必可召見者，在
簾中見之。不可直對耳，李環朕已失之，慎之」151
In addition to this cautious attitude toward envoys, “following precedent” (先例主義) was
another guiding principle that shaped foreign policy in Heian Japan. Scholars Sakaue Yasutoshi
146 Fujiwara no Sanesuke 藤原実資, Shōyūki 小右記, 6.13 of 997, in Dai Nihon kokiroku (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten,
1959–1986), vol. 2, 35.
147 Shōyūki, 6.13 of 997, vol. 2, 35.
148 Shōyūki, 6.13 of 997, vol. 2, 35.
149 Hamada Kumiko 浜田久美子, Nihon kodai no gaikō girei to Bokkai 日本古代の外交儀礼と渤海 (Tokyo:
Dōseisha, 2011), 131.
150 Hamada Kumiko, Nihon kodai no gaikō girei to Bokkai, 132.
151 Zoku Gunsho ruijū 続群書類従 27 (Tokyo: Yagi shoten, 2013), vol. 475, 133.

42
坂上康俊 and Saeki Kōji 佐伯弘次 have noticed that in both the classical and medieval periods,
courtiers traditionally used precedent as a basis for overseas policies, even if the precedent was
hundreds of years old.152 Such attitudes strongly influenced Japan’s treatment of the Song regime
and the Yuan empire. And we will see that Heian courtiers also took this approach in dealing
with Korea in the eleventh century.
Another reason for Japan’s indifference to Koryŏ was Japan’s rapidly developing idea of
“our realm”, honchō consciousness during the tenth and eleventh centuries.
153 “Our realm”
consciousness has been defined by Obara Hitoshi as a process of absorbing aspects of foreign
cultures – such as Chinese culture – and transforming them into Japanese ways.
154 As discussed
above, Koryŏ resumed sending diplomats to China in the 1060s, and the exchanges between the
two were frequent. In the process, Shenzong tried to impose Song’s superiority over Koryŏ.
Considering how frequently Song merchants and monks traveled to Japan, we can speculate that
Heian Japan was well aware of these exchanges.155 Therefore, when Koryŏ approached Japan,
the Heian court likely suspected that Song was involved and planning to bring Japan into a Songcentered international order.156 Contemporary scholars have debated whether Japan’s idea of
“our realm” was largely based on contesting the Sino-centric tributary system or other
152 Sakaue Yasutoshi 坂上康俊, Sekkan seiji to chihō shakai 摂関政治と地方社会 (Tōkyō: Yoshikawa kōbunkan,
2015), 5; Saeki Kōji 佐伯弘次, “Mōko shūrai igo no Nihon no tai Kōrei kankei” 蒙古襲来以後の日本の対高麗関
係, Shien 史淵 (2016. 3, vol. 153), 25.
153 For a detailed discussion, see Obara Hitoshi 小原仁, “Sekkan Inseiki ni okeru Honchō ishiki no kōzō” 摂関·院
政期における本朝意識の構造, in Nihon kodai chūseishi ronkō 日本古代中世史論考, ed. Saeki Arikiyo 佐伯有
清 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1987), 270.
154 Obara Hitoshi, “Sekkan Inseiki ni okeru Honchō ishiki no kōzō”, 270.
155 Robert Borgen examines how monks traveled and actively exchanged information between Song China and
Heian Japan. See Robert Borgen, “Jōjin’s Travels from Center to Center,” in Heian Japan, Centers and Peripheries,
ed. Mikael Adolphson (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i, 2007), 411.
156 Ishii, Masatoshi, 石井正敏, Higashi Ajia sekai to kodai no Nihon 東アジア世界と古代の日本 (Tokyo:
Yamakawa shuppansha, 2003), 56.

43
concerns,157 but regardless, we can see that, like Koryŏ, Heian courtiers were ready to contest
Song assertions of authority.
Their worries were not groundless. Throughout Shenzong’s reign, he made great efforts
to reestablish connections with Japan on various occasions. In the tenth month of 1072, the
Japanese monk Jōjin 成尋 (1011–1081) traveled with the Song merchant Sun Zhong 孫忠 to
visit China. Shenzong welcomed Jōjin with great enthusiasm.158 During their conversation,
Shenzong asked a series of questions about the political structure, traditions, and religious
practices of Japan. He also asked why Japan had long stopped dispatching any diplomatic
missions to China, to which Jōjin answered that the distance was too far, and that therefore few
people were willing to come (日本自來為甚不通中國入唐進奉。答云滄波萬里。人皆固辭。
國之久絕也).159 Such a response did not satisfy Shenzong. The next year when Jōjin had his
disciples return to Japan, Shenzong issued a diplomatic letter and asked them to take it to the
Heian court.160 After a long discussion, the court eventually sent another monk, Nakagai 仲回, to
travel with Sun Zhong to see Shenzong. Overjoyed, Shenzong conferred the title of “great master
who aspires to civilization and virtue” 慕化懷德大師 on Nakagai, and had him take another
letter back to Japan, addressing it, “Sent to Fujiwara no Tsunehira (1014–1091), Japan’s official
at the Dazaifu” (賜日本国太宰府令藤原経平).161 These titles granted to Japanese monks as
well as the writing style of their diplomatic letters indeed demonstrate Shenzong’s ambitions to
157 Charles Holcombe, The Genesis of East Asia, 221 B.C.–A.D. 907 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001),
193.
158 Jōjin, Wang Liping, ed., 10.14 of 1072, Xinjiao can tiantai wutaishan ji 新校參天台五臺山記 (Shanghai:
Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2009), 282.
159 Jōjin, 10.14 of 1072, Xinjiao can tiantai wutaishan ji, 282.
160 Jōjin, 1.25 of 1073, 516.
161Zuikei Shūhō 瑞渓周鳳, Zenrin kokuhōki: Shintei Zoku Zenrin kokuhōki 善隣国宝記; 新訂続善隣国宝記
(Tokyo: Shūeisha, 1995), 70.

44
incorporate Japan into a Song-centered international order. The Heian court was not happy about
this. The memory remained decades later, inscribed in the journal Gyokuyō 玉葉, when its author
Fujiwara no Kanezane 藤原兼実 (1149–1207) mentioned that elites of the time had criticized
Song’s wording (時人謗之).162 In the end, there were few responses to Shenzong’s diplomatic
overtures, despite his persistence.
Although the Heian court rarely replied to Koryŏ, the two governments had other
channels of interaction. From the late tenth to eleventh centuries, the two countries exchanged
refugees who had lost their way and landed in each other’s territories. For example, on the
nineteenth day of second month of 1031, officials at the Dazaifu reported that they had
discovered Tamna refugees (大宰府解文ヲ上リテ、耽羅人漂著ノ事ヲ奏ス).163 One week
later, the court ordered Dazaifu to provide them with food and send them back (漂著ノ耽羅人ニ
糧ヲ賜ヒ、本国ニ歸ラシム).164 In the ninth month of 1049, Japan returned Koryŏ refugees
who had landed in Tsushima.165 On the Koryŏ side, records state that Munjong often bestowed
gifts on the Japanese officials who sent refugees back.166
Although sending refugees home served as a positive diplomatic interaction, problems
with pirates contributed to tensions between Koryŏ and Japan. Much work has been done to
analyze East Asian pirates in the fourteenth to sixteen centuries, but less research has been done
for earlier periods.167 In the tenth and eleventh centuries, piracy was a common phenomenon and
162 Fujiwara no Kanezane 藤原兼実, 9.21 of 1172, Gyokuyō 玉葉 (Tokyo: Kokusho kankōkai, 1907), vol.10, 226.
163 Tokyo daigaku shiryō hensanjo ed., Shiryō sōran 史料綜覧 (Tokyo: Shiryō hensanjo, 1964), vol. 2, 61.
164 Shiryō sōran, vol. 2, 61.
165 Shiryō sōran, vol. 2, 162.
166 Koryŏsa, vol. 7, 191; vol. 8, 221.
167 Peter Shapinsky, Lords of the Sea: Pirates, Violence, and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2014).

45
it involved people of various ethnic and geographic backgrounds. For example, on the first day
of tenth month of 997, the Dazaifu sent an urgent report to Kyoto claiming that Koryŏ people
had looted Tsushima and Iki, and now they had landed in Hizen and once to loot again (大宰飛
驛到來云、高麗国人擄掠対馬、壱岐嶋、又着肥前國欲擄領云々).168 Astonished (上下驚
駭), the court ordered Dazaifu to send armed forces and strengthen military defenses.
169
The tension between Koryŏ and Japan caused by pirates reached a peak in 1019, when a
group of Jurchens landed on Tsushima Island and plundered it on a large scale.170 The incident is
often referred to as the “Toi (Jurchen) invasion (刀伊入寇)”.171 At the time, however, Kyoto
nobles suspected that Jurchens were not the only ones who participated in the plunder. They
thought that people from Koryŏ might have participated as well. A comprehensive examination
of the incident and its aftermath is crucial for understanding Kyoto’s indifference to Munjong’s
plea for help in 1079.
On the seventeenth day of the fourth month of 1019, the court in Kyoto, received a report
saying that Toi (Jurchens) had sailed on fifty ships and landed in Tsushima, where they
plundered and killed local residents.172 In response, Minister of the Right Fujiwara no Sukehira
藤原資平 (986–1068) presided at a Council of State discussion, and the nobles decided to order
the Dazaifu to strengthen its defenses and reward the brave soldiers who fought against the
Toi.173 Soon afterward, the court received news that the pirate group had included Silla people
168 Shōyūki, 10.1 of 997, 41.
169 Shōyūki, 10.1 of 997, 41.
170 Shōyūki, 4.17 of 1019, 135.
171 Sakaue Yasutoshi 坂上康俊, Sekkan seiji to chihō shakai 摂関政治と地方社会 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan
2015), 166.
172 Shōyūki,4.17 of 1019, 135. The Japanese side used 刀伊 while Koryŏ used 女真 to refer to the pirates. See 9.23
of 1019, Shōyū ki mokuroku, 199.
173 Shōyūki, 4.18 of 1019, 135.

46
(刀伊國人中有新羅国人等云).174 As analyzed below, Silla meant Koryŏ, and the decision to
use this term indicated the Kyoto nobles’ distaste for and suspicion about Korea. Pirates from
Silla had plundered Kyushu in 894. On the third day of fifth month of 1019, the left controller
sent a command to Dazaifu, asking them to apply lessons they learned from suppressing Silla
pirates in 894 (去寬平五年閏五月三日敕符云追討新羅海賊事).175 Similarly, on the twentyninth day of sixth month of 1019, Fujiwara no Sukehira referred back to precedents from 894,
including those for rewarding soldiers.176
After several months of fighting, the Toi people retreated by the end of the sixth month.
Nevertheless, when the Kyoto court began to check the enemy captives, their suspicion toward
Koryŏ escalated to a new level. Many Koryŏ people were found to have joined the Toi pirates
(賊徒之中，多有高麗國人者…抑異国賊徒来候之恐、不可不慎).177 Therefore, Fujiwara no
Sukehira suggested that it was likely that Koryŏ had planned to invade Japan, and the court had
to be very careful.178 On the other hand, for those who were captured by the Toi and were now
saved by Japan, Fujiwara no Sukehira argued that although they were not Toi, they had stayed
with Toi on the same ship for many days (縦雖非刀伊國之人同船送数日之間盍見其案內).179
He therefore suggested investigating the captured Koryŏ people thoroughly to ascertain their
allegiance.
180 The Kyoto court’s suspicion toward Koryŏ peaked when Koryŏ returned a
Japanese refugee. According to her testimony, when she was saved by Koryŏ armies from Toi
pirates, her rescuers served her generously with rice, dried fish, and wine (人別白米参斗、干
174 Shōyūki, 4.25 of 1019, 140.
175 Shōyūki mokuroku, 5.3 of 1019, 56.
176 Shōyūki, 6.29 of 1019, 159.
177 Shōyūki, 6.29 of 1019, 160.
178 Shōyūki, 6.29 of 1019, 160.
179 Shōyūki, 6.29 of 1019, 160.
180 Shōyūki, 6.29 of 1019, 160.

47
魚卅隻、兼給酒食 ),181 all in silver containers (毎駅以銀器供給、其労尤豊).182 Nevertheless,
officials at the Dazaifu wrote,
As for the Toi bandits, the suspicions about Koryŏ have not been cleared up yet. Now
since Koryŏ was attacked (by Toi), we know the piracy was not the fault of Koryŏ.
However, Silla was our old enemy. Although now they have changed the name (to
Koryŏ), their wild ambitions might linger. We should not be overjoyed even if they
returned captured people, because they could use it as an opportunity to boast of their
victories and pretend to be friendly with us.183 「異国賊徒刀伊高麗其疑未決今以刀
伊之被襲知不高麗之所為但新羅者元敵国也雖有国號之改猶嫌野心之残縱送虜
民不可為悅若誇勝戦之勢偽通成好之便」
In response, Fujiwara no Sukehira ordered Tsushima to provide the Koryŏ soldiers who returned
Japanese refugees with silk cloth and rice as reward, based on the precedents of how they dealt
with Silla earlier, and he then dispatched them back to Koryŏ.184
In sum, by the time Munjong sent his request asking Japan to recommend skilled
physicians, Koryŏ-Japan relations had been rocky and complicated for more than a century. The
unpleasant encounters with Silla pirates in 894 and Toi pirates in 1019 had destroyed Heian
courtiers’ confidence about entering into close contact with Koryŏ. Moreover, the heavy
emphasis on “following precedent” made them take a conservative and cautious approach to
dealing with overseas diplomacy. Moreover, in the eleventh century Japanese nobles relied on
commercial trade to obtain their desired goods. Formal, sensitive, and official diplomacy seemed
less necessary.185 Last but not least, Japan’s concern that the Song might be using Koryŏ to lure
181 Shōyūki, 8.3 of 1019, 180.
182 Shōyūki, 8.3 of 1019, 180.
183 Shōyūki, 8.3 of 1019, 179
184 Shōyūki, 9.22 of 1019, 198.
185 Charlette von Verschuer, Across the Perilous Sea: Japanese Trade with China and Korea from the Seventh to the
Sixteenth Centuries (Ithaca: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2006), 48.

48
Japan into a Song-centered international order contributed to the Heian court’s eventual denial of
Munjong’s request.
Munjong’s Requests to Heian Japan for Medical Help
According to scholarship by Shinosaki Atsushi, Munjong’s request for doctors from
Japan likely served as an alternative in case Song denied him aid.186 However, historic
unpleasant encounters between Japan and Korea shaped Japan’s response to Korea in 1079. In
general, Japan’s attitude toward Munjong’s request went through three stages: from an
inclination to say yes, to an ambivalent no, and eventually a firm no. A close examination of how
and why these changes took place came about sheds new light on Heian Japan’s diplomacy and
complex interstate relations in the eleventh century.
In the eleventh month of 1079, the Ministry of Rituals asked Song merchant Wang
Zezhen to deliver a letter to Dazaifu in Japan as follows:
From the Ministry of Rituals of Koryŏ to the Dazaifu of Japan. The Ministry has received
the royal edict, which states: “I heard that your state has physicians who are able to treat
stroke. Since the merchant Wang Zezhen would return to Japan, we informed Wang
about the issue of treating headaches. We kindly request you select first-class physicians
and dispatch them in the early spring of next year. If the treatment is effective, the
rewards will not be insignificant. For now we first send ten bolts of large and middle
damask silk and ten doses of musk scent, ordering Wang Zezhen to carry them to
Dazaifu. He serves as a messenger to deliver the gifts.” The royal edict has been issued
thus. We therefore request that if the Dazaifu has any good physicians who can treat a
stroke, please send them over. As advance payment, please keep the bolts of silk and the
musk scent. The above was respectfully reported as stated here.
Written in the year of Kimi, eleventh month, on the (unknown) day.
Vice Minister Im Kae
Saeng
Minister Ch’oe
Minister Chŏng
186 Shinosaki Atsushi, “Kōrai ō Bunsō no ishi yōsei jiken to Nihon”, 15.

49
高麗國禮賓省牒大日本國太宰府
當省伏奉聖旨訪聞貴國有能理療風疾醫人今因商客王則貞廻歸次仰因便通牒及於
王則貞處說示風疾緣由請彼處選擇上等醫人於來年早春發送到來理療風疾若有
功効定不輕酬者今先送花錦及大綾中綾各一十段麝香一十臍分附王則貞賚持將去
知大宰府官員處且充信儀到可收領者牒具如前當省所奉聖旨備錄在前請貴府若
有端的能療風疾好醫人許容發遣前來仍收領疋段麝香者謹牒
己未年十一月日牒
小卿林槩
生
卿崔
卿鄭187
Minamoto no Toshifusa 源俊房 (1035–1121), the author of the courtier journal Suisaki 水左記,
records that on 2.16, the court received the missive.
188 On 4.19 of 1080, Consultant Captain 宰相
中将 Fujiwara no Morotada 藤原師忠 presided over a meeting of ministers to discuss the issue.
At the meeting, people’s opinions were divided. While some argued that it might be a failure to
observe righteousness if they were to refuse the request (若不被遣似無其義), others raised the
issue that the trip was far and would take a long time (而往還程遠日月…過).189 Four months
later, the court held several more meetings. At the meeting of 8.5 of 1080, the majority agreed to
send a physician but did not come up with a specific candidate to send (又高麗國送牒申請医
人、可遣否、若可遣者誰人乎), though Minamoto no Toshifusa suggested that Tanba no
Masatada 丹波雅忠 (1021–1088) and Koremune no Toshimichi 惟宗俊通 would be two good
187 “Kōrai reihinshō chō” 高麗禮賓省牒, in Chōya gunsai, vol, 20, 455.
188 Minamoto no Toshifusa 源俊房, Suisaki 水左記, in Ilbon kojungse Koryŏ charyo yŏn’gu 日本古中世高麗資料
硏究, ed., Chang, Tong-ik 張東翼 (Seoul: Sŏul Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'anbu, 2004), 99. Please note that entries of 2.13
and 4.19 of 1080 were not included in the printed version but appear in the version of Yanagiwarake bon 柳原家本,
collected by the palace archives and Mausolea Department 宮内庁書陵部. For details, see Chang, 101.
189 Minamoto no Toshifusa, 4.19 of 1080, Suisaki, cited in Ilbon kojungse Koryŏ charyo yŏngu, 100.

50
candidates.190 Nevertheless, on 8.14 of 1080, the situation changed. The head of the right gate
guards 右兵衛督 Minamoto no Toshisane 源俊実 listed several concerns regarding the dispatch
of physicians. To begin with, Tanba no Masatada was a “pillar of the state” (国之棟樑), so if
Japan sent him, it would be problematic if the court needed him.191 However, if Japan sent
someone of less import than Tanba and that physician failed to cure Munjong’s headache, it
would cause shame for the court (若不得其療治之驗者，為朝尤可為恥辱者).192 Therefore,
Minamoto no Toshisane suggested not dispatching anyone (不被差遣何事之有乎).193
Minamoto no Toshifusa disagreed. He argued that even if Tanba no Masatada was too important
to be sent out, Japan could still appoint Koremune no Toshimichi or Tanba no Masatada’s son,
Tanba no Tadayasu 丹波忠康.
194 In the end, the ministers decided to ask Tanba no Masatada for
his opinion before making a decision.
Why was Tanba no Masatada too important to send abroad? This is intriguing and
deserves some discussion. As Peter Kornicki argues in The Book in Japan, although printing
technology was introduced to Japan in the eighth century, it was not substantially utilized in
Japan until much later.195 As a result, only a few families monopolized the transmission of
knowledge in any given field in Heian Japan, such as medicine, literature, and politics. The
Tanba family is a good example. Both Tanba no Masatada’s grandfather and father were famous
physicians who had served the Heian court, as did he and his son. Masatada’s grandfather, Tanba
190 Minamoto no Toshifusa, intercalary 8.5 of 1080, Suisaki, in Zōho shiryō taisei 増補史料大成 (Kyoto: Rinsen
shoten, 1965), vol.8, 113.
191 Minamoto no Toshifusa, intercalary 8.14 of 1080, Suisaki, 115.
192 Minamoto no Toshifusa, intercalary 8.14 of 1080, Suisaki, 115.
193 Minamoto no Toshifusa, intercalary 8.14 of 1080, Suisaki, 115.
194 Minamoto no Toshifusa, intercalary 8.14 of 1080, Suisaki, 116.
195 Peter Kornicki, The Book in Japan: A Cultural History from the Beginnings to the Nineteenth Century (Honolulu:
University of Hawai’i, 2001), 112.

51
no Yasuyori 丹波康頼 (912–995), was responsible for compiling Ishinpō, a thirty-volume
monograph, one of the most important medical classics in Heian Japan.196 Considering this
legacy, it becomes understandable why Tanba no Masatada was considered too important to be
sent abroad.
On 8.23 of 1080, Minister of the Left Fujiwara no Morozane 藤原師実 (1042–1101)
visited Tanba’s residence. Masatada refused to travel to Koryŏ, and further he opposed sending
any doctors to Korea because there was no precedent for doing so (此朝未承如此之事).197
Fujiwara no Morozane claimed that when he returned home that day, he’d dreamed that his late
father Fujiwara no Yorimichi 藤原頼通 (992–1074) came to him and instructed him not to
dispatch doctors. So the next day, on 8.24 of 1080, the court reached the final decision not to
send physicians.198
Now the real challenge was how to write a reply delaying Koryŏ’s requests. The previous
arguments – that Tanba no Masatada was important to the court, and that failure to treat the
illness would make Japan look bad – disappeared in the formal diplomatic correspondence.
Instead, the Minister of the Left Fujiwara no Morozane summoned the literaratus Ōe no
Masafusa 大江匡房 (1041–1111) to compose the reply, in which Koryŏ was accused of
violating multiple diplomatic codes such that their request could not be granted. Here is the text
from the Dazaifu to the Ministry of Rituals in Koryŏ:
We received your missive, which says,
‘Respectfully, following the royal order, please keep the bolts of silk and the musk scent’.
196 For relevant detailed studies, see Andrew Goble, Confluences of Medicine in Medieval Japan: Buddhist
Healing, Chinese Knowledge, Islamic Formulas, and Wounds of War (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press,
2011).
197 Minamoto no Toshifusa, intercalary 8.23 of 1080, Suisaki, 117.
198 Minamoto no Toshifusa, intercalary 8.23 of 1080, Suisaki, 117–118.

52
Your state suffers from the illness in the inner chamber of your king and he seeks medical
treatment from overseas. Seeing the wind and thinking about it, how can we not cherish
it? However, the phrasing of your missive greatly deviates from old practices. You
changed royal order to imperial edict, which is not an appropriate expression for a ruler
of a vassal state to use. You reside in a remote place and yet overstep the supreme state.
You should obey the norm of human relations and restrain your joy. How could you
depend on a merchant to travel and deliver your message? This is surprising. And the
formal envoy who holds ceremonial jade tablets did not arrive. The protocol of letter
correspondence has been violated. A couple of fishes find it difficult to arrive at the moon
of the phoenix pool. How could Doctor Bian Que enter the land of Korea? We, therefore,
return the gifts you sent, and all your demands are rejected. Now with this missive, we
notified that we received this missive. Thus, this is the reply.”
In the fourth year of Jōryaku, (unknown) month, (unknown) day.199
日本國太宰府牒高麗國禮賓省
却廻方物等事
牒得彼省牒稱當省伏奉聖旨云仍收領疋段麝香者如牒者貴國犯霧露於燕寢之中
求醫療於鼇波之外望風懷想能不依之抑牒狀之詞頗睽故事改處分而曰聖旨
非藩王可稱宅遐陬而跨上邦誠彛倫收懌歝況亦話商人之旅艇寄
奇殊俗之單書執圭之使不至封函之禮旣虧双魚猶難達鳳池之月
扁鵲何得入鷄林之雲凡厥方物皆從却廻
今以狀牒到准狀故牒
承曆四年月日
The content of the letter and its historical context are intriguing for several reasons. To
begin with, the letter reflects Kyoto nobles’ sensibility with regard to the international order.
Second, the very act of having a Song merchant deliver the Koryŏ king’s request and the
inappropriate wording of the diplomatic letter deepened Japan’s suspicion that the Song might be
involved.200 Finally, around the same time that Munjong’s message arrived in Japan, Shenzong
dispatched a group of merchants to Japan asking to establish diplomatic conversations.201 These
factors worked together to lead the Japanese court to doubt the real motive for Koryŏ’s request.
199 “Nihon Dazaifu chō,” in Chōya gunsa, vol. 20, 457.
200 Minamoto no Toshifusa, Suisaki, 9.4 of 1080, 112–113.
201 Minamoto no Toshifusa, Suisaki, 9.4 of 1080, 112–113.

53
Japan’s ultimate refusal to dispatch doctors was the cumulative result of several
intertwining factors. The tradition of avoiding direct encounters with foreign envoys had long
been established, and following precedents was considered crucial. When Ōe no Masafusa was
preparing a reply to Koryŏ, his draft cited previous responses that Japan had made in the eras of
Chōtoku (995–999), Jōhei (931–938), Tengyō (938–947), and Eishō (1046–1053) (引載長徳承
平天慶永承等返牒所進可載高麗返牒雜事文).202 Second, the development of the idea of “our
realm,” along with the close contact between Munjong and Shenzong deepened Kyoto nobles’
distrust of Korea. Third, the conflicts and clashes between Silla, and later Koryŏ, with Japan over
piracy issues also influenced Japan’s attitude.
Conclusion
By closely examining the different ways in which Song Shenzong and the Heian court
responded to the Koryŏ king’s medical requests, I have illustrated the complex interstate
relations among Song, Liao, Xixia, Koryŏ, and Japan in the eleventh century. Dissatisfied with
Liao’s constant demands and exploitations, the Koryŏ ruler Munjong decided to reach out to the
Song to establish an overseas alliance. Such an alliance aligned with Shenzong’s ambitions at the
time to invade Xixia and contain the Liao. Seeing Koryŏ as a potential ally, Shenzong
enthusiastically answered Munjong’s medical requests and masterfully used medical treatment as
a convenient reason to open a conversation.203 Moreover, I argue that the interactions with Koryŏ
gave Song a new way to make international influence visible.
202 Minamoto no Tsunenobu 源経信, Sochiki 帥記, 9.2 of 1080, in Zōho shiryō taisei 増補史料大成 (Kyoto:
Rinsen shoten, 1965), vol.5, 72.
203 Koryŏ was not the only ally that Song looked to in order to contain Xixia and Liao. The tribal leaders of Tibet
and Dangxiang were two other groups in which the Song court invested resources against Xixia and Liao. See Li

54
By contrast, the Heian court of Japan had little interest in reopening diplomatic
conversations with foreign regimes. Moreover, due to the nature of knowledge transmission,
physicians in Heian Japan came from hereditary lineages. Therefore, their expertise and
knowledge were too dear for the court to dispatch overseas. Meanwhile, the Heian court was also
concerned that Song was behind Koryŏ’s request, trying to lure Japan into a China-centered
world order. All these factors led the Heian to court to deny Munjong’s medical requests.
To sum up, this chapter shows how the different regimes of Song, Koryŏ, Liao, and Japan
made changes into their diplomatic programs based on shifting agendas and conditions. In the
following chapters, we will see how other players such as Buddhist monks, fishermen, and
merchants continued to participate in diplomatic missions in the East Asian maritime zone, thus
further demonstrating the limitations of using political and territorial identifiers to characterize
their various agendas.
204
Huarui, “Song Xia dui Tubo Dangxiang zhuzu de zhengduo” 宋夏對吐蕃、黨項諸族的爭奪, 291–327; and Paul
Smith, “Shen-tsung’s Reign and the New Policies of Wang An-shih, 1067–1085,” in Cambridge History of China,
vol. 5, 466–468.
204 Yamauchi Shinji used “Kaishō chōkō taisei”海商朝貢体制 to describe premodern Sino-Japanese exchanges.
See Yamauchi Shinji, “Higashi Ajia kaiiki ni okeru kaishō to kokka” 東アジア海域における海商と国家 , in
Kyōkai no Nihon shi 境界の日本史, ed. Murai Shōsuke 村井章介 (Tokyo: Kamakawa shuppansha, 1997), 70.

55
Chapter 2
Before the Storm: An Examination of Diplomatic Exchanges between Mongols, Korea, and
Japan Before the 1274 Bun'ei Campaign
Introduction
By the 1260s, Khubilai Khan, grandson of Genghis Khan, had led the Mongol tribes in
building an expansive empire encompassing a large portion of Eurasia. Between 1274 and 1281,
Khubilai launched two major military campaigns in an attempt to conquer Japan, but his armies
met with unexpected defeat. The work of Morris Rossabi, Thomas Conlan, Charlotte von
Verschuer, Randall Sasaki, and others has resulted in a better understanding of Khubilai and the
Mongol invasion.205 In particular, von Verschuer did pioneering work to highlight the
importance of studying diplomatic negotiations and the “central role” that Korea played in the
Mongol invasion.206 Building on their research, this chapter considers the complicated
diplomatic pre-battle negotiations that led to the ultimate attacks.
205 This chapter has been adapted and published in Monumenta Nipponica. See Lina Nie, “Before the Storm: A
Transrealm History of the Decades Leading Up to the First Mongol Invasion of Japan,” Monumenta Nipponica
(2023, no. 2), 157–187. For other works on Mongol Empires, see Morris Rossabi, Khubilai Khan: His Life and
Times (London: The Folio Society, 2005); Thomas Conlan, In Little Need of Divine Intervention: Takezaki
Suenaga’s Scrolls of the Mongol Invasions of Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2001); Randall Sasaki, The Origins
of the Lost Fleet of the Mongol Empire (College Station: Texas A&M University, 2015).
206 Charlotte von Verschuer, “Japan’s Foreign Relations 1200 to 1393 A.D.: A Translation from ‘Zenrin
Kokuhōki’,” Monumenta Nipponica (2002), no. 4, 414.

56
Fig. 1: Map of the 1281 Kōan Campaign
In the previous chapter, we looked into medical exchanges between Koryŏ Korea, Heian
Japan, and Song China in the eleventh century. This chapter will examine the Mongol Empire’s
exchanges with Koryŏ Korea and Kamakura Japan in the thirteenth century, using a similar
multilingual approach. The four parts of this chapter are organized both chronologically and
thematically. First, I begin with a brief introduction to the geopolitics in thirteenth-century East
Asia. Next, I discuss several reasons why Khubilai aimed to establish contact with Japan in the
1260s and how his agendas were closely tied to trade and diplomatic considerations. Then I
examine the different roles and considerations held by Mongol envoys, Chinese advisors, Koryŏ
kings, Sambyŏlcho, the Kamakura shogunate, and the Kyoto court in the negotiation process. I
conclude that the Mongol invasion of Japan should not be taken for granted as an inevitable
consequence of the Mongol Empire’s expansion; rather, the military confrontation occurred as
the outcome of a series of complex and intriguing diplomatic exchanges.

57
The Rise of the Mongols: From Chinggis Khan to Khubilai Khan
The first mention of the ethnonym “Mongols” is found in the Tang histories (618–907).
Their major bases were located near the Kerulen and Onan rivers – that is, just to the north of the
Tartars. According to The Secret History of the Mongols, the Mongol tribes achieved temporary
unity under chiefs Khabul, Ambaghai, and Khutula in the early twelfth century, although such
unity lacked a high degree of internal cohesion.207 As Temujin (r. 1206–1227) came to power, he
formed an alliance with Ong Khan after his father Yesugei was poisoned by the Tartars. After
several years of military conquests, Temujin held the political gathering khuriltai in 1206, which
granted him the title of Chinggis Khan, usually interpreted to mean “oceanic ruler” – that is,
universal sovereign.208 From 1205 to 1227, Chinggis Khan received submissions from Xi Xia,
Jin, Islam Khwarazm, and several forest tribes of Southern Siberia. Not all surrender was
achieved by armed force. For example, in 1207, Chinggis Khan dispatched emissaries to
Southern Siberia, where the Kirgiz of Upper Yenisei, the Oyirad, and other forest peoples
surrendered, presenting tributes of furs, falcons, and horses to their new sovereign.209
After a violent quarrel between his two leading successors, Jochi and Chaghadai,
Chinggis Khan turned to Ögödei, his third son, as the next khan. During his rule, Ögödei used
Yelü Chucai to reform and improve the tax farming situation in the Mongol Empire. From the
1220s to 1230s, Ögödei also renewed expansion on the Qipchaq steppes, the Russian
principalities, Korea, and Jin.
207 Paul Kahn ed., The Secret History of the Mongols: The Origin of Chinggis Khan (Boston: Cheng and Tsui
Company, 1988), 9–10.
208 Thomas Allsen, “The Rise of the Mongolian Empire and Mongolian Ruler in North China,” in Herbert Franke
and Denis Twitchett, eds., Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), vol. 6,
343.
209 Thomas Allsen, “The Rise of the Mongolian Empire and Mongolian Ruler in North China,” 348.

58
In northeast Asia, Ögödei mounted a sizable campaign against Korea. The Mongols had
first entered the peninsula in 1218 during their conquest of Manchuria. Unable to withstand the
invading force, the Koryŏ court agreed to pay an annual tribute in return for the withdrawal of
the Mongolian army. Upon receipt of the first installment of tribute, the Mongols agreed and
departed. In 1225, however, the Mongols’ chief tax collector died under mysterious
circumstances, and Ögödei used this incident to justify launching a new attack on Korea in
autumn of 1231. By the winter of 1231, Mongolian troops had surrounded Kaegyŏng 開京, the
capital, forcing the Korean king to offer his submission. Mongolian demands on their new
subjects were onerous and unending, and in the summer of 1232, the Koreans revolted, killing
the Mongolian agents stationed in the north of the country. The Korean ruler, realizing that
Mongolian retaliation would not be long delayed, abandoned Kaegyŏng for the safety of
Kanghwa, an island just off the coast in the Yellow Sea. In response to these challenges, the
Mongols launched another series of campaigns to compel Korean acceptance of their
domination. With the exception of a truce between 1241 and 1247, the struggle went on until
1259, when the Koreans finally acquiesced.210
After Ögödei died, his second wife, Töregene, eagerly filled the resulting political
vacuum. She soon consolidated her authority and tried to secure Ögödei’s son Güyük (1206–
1248, r. 1246–1248) the khan position. Nevertheless, more disparities and conflicts occurred. In
particular, Güyük had made powerful enemies among his fellow princes, the most important of
whom was Batu (1205–1255), the khan of the Golden Horde and acknowledged leader of the
210 Yuanshi 元史太宗窩闊台四年, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976), vol. 2, 31.

59
Jochids.211 After a series of lengthy disputes and competition, Khubilai was able to control part
of the Mongol Empire’s territories and claimed himself as a khan in 1260.
Kamakura Japan in the Wake of Mongol Invasion
From the 1250s onwards, having taken control of a large portion of Chinese territory,
Khubilai next sought to assert his hegemony in a broader East Asia. In 1259, under constant
military pressure, the Koryŏ court surrendered to the Mongols and acknowledged Khubilai’s
supreme rulership. Around the same time, the Mongols were also fighting against Southern Song
armies. The constant warfare and subsequent financial and logistical burden pushed Khubilai to
have a diplomatic conversation with Japan before sending troops overseas to open a new
battlefield.
Japan was rich in gold, pearls, and sulfur, and these resources triggered Khubilai’s
interest. Gold and pearls played an essential role in steppe society: Thomas Allsen has shown
that Mongol rulers often rewarded their military officials, civil servants, and foreign rulers with
gold tallies and pearls.212 Gold was also commonly used in clothing and helmets.213
211 Thomas Allsen, “The Rise of the Mongolian empire and Mongolian ruler in North China,” 384.
212 Thomas Allsen, The Steppe and the Sea: Pearls in the Mongol Empire (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2019), 76.
213 For a more detailed discussion of gold, pearls, and their application in Mongol society, see Eiren Shea, Mongol
Court Dress, Identity Formation, and Global Exchange (New York: Routledge, 2020); James Watt, The World of
Khubilai Khan: Chinese Art in the Yuan Dynasty (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2010); and Adam
Kessler, Empires Beyond the Great Wall: the Heritage of Genghis Khan (Los Angeles: Natural History Museum of
Los Angeles County, 1993); and Linda Komaroff and Carboni Stefano, eds., The Legacy of Genghis Khan: Courtly
Art and Culture in Western Asia, 1256–1353 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

60
Fig. 2: A gold helmet in Yuan China214
Japan had a long history of exporting gold and pearls to China. Beginning in the ninth century, a
large quantity of gold from northeast Honshu began to be exported and was widely used in
commercial exchanges.215 Marco Polo also attested to Japan’s reputation as a country rich in
gold and pearls. In his book, he mentioned that “Japan has gold in great abundance, because it is
found there in measureless quantities.” He also wrote: “All the chambers, of which there are
many, are likewise paved with fine gold to a depth of more than two fingers breadth,” and “They
have pearls in abundance, red in color, very beautiful, large and round.”216 Marco Polo never
traveled to Japan, and his descriptions contained many exaggerations. Nevertheless, his
comments illustrate how Marco Polo and those who shared such information with him –
including Mongol nobles such as Khubilai – perceived Japan.
Meanwhile, sulfur not only had economic value but was also an essential ingredient in
gunpowder. As early as the Song period, people had discovered that mixing nitrate, sulfur, and
charcoal in certain proportions would create a compound with enough reactivity and
effectiveness to be weaponized and began applying the technology to the battlefield.217 For
214 Online catalogue of Metropolitan Museum of Art: https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/26917.
215 Richard Von Glahn, “The Ningbo-Hakata Merchant Network and the Reorientation of East Asian Maritime
Trade, 1150–1350,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies (2014): 249–279.
216 Marco Polo, The Travels, translated by Ronald Latham (New York: Penguin Books, 1958), 244.
217 Tonio Andrade, The Gunpower Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History (New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016), 30.

61
example, both Song and Jin armies used gunpowder-based weapons such as “thunder crash
bombs” and fire lances on the battlefield. Although not very accurate, such devices could launch
an arrow to a range of several hundred yards.218 When the Mongols invaded Jin and Song, they
quickly learned about gunpowder and incorporated it into their arsenal.
Fig. 3: Gunpowder recipe and gunpowder weapons from Compendium of Military Techniques
(Wuzongjingyao)
219
After the Mongol armies overthrew the Jin dynasty and conquered North China in the
1230s, defeating the Southern Song became Khubilai’s priority. It was at this time that Khubilai
started to pay close attention to Japan. In fact, from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, Japan
had been one of the largest sulfur providers to the Song. Although Shanxi and Shaanxi produced
some sulfur, the amount was far from adequate. Japan’s volcanoes, however, produced a large
quantity of sulfur. Iōgashima (also called “Sulfur Island” 硫黄島), off the southern tip of
218 Timothy May, The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System (Barnsley, South
Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2007), 113.
219 Zeng Gongliang 曾公亮, Wujingzongyao 武經總要 (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987).

62
Kyushu, was one of its largest sulfur-production bases.220 The sulfur from Iōgashima was first
transported to Hakata, where it was purchased on consignment by visiting Song merchants. In
1084, the Song government sent merchants to Japan, and they bought 500,000 jin (a traditional
Chinese unit of mass) of sulfur for military purposes.221 If Khubilai could establish a diplomatic
relationship with Japan, he could sever trade links between Song and Japan, thus weakening the
Song both economically and militarily.
In addition to acquiring gold, pearls, and sulfur, Khubilai's desire to establish ties with
Japan was coupled with the demand that Japanese send envoys to visit him as the Great Khan
and confirm his legitimacy. Having only recently been declared the Great Khan in 1260,
Khubilai’s rule was anything but stable. His younger brother Ariq Böke (1219–1266) was the
first to challenge his election. In addition, conservative Mongol nobles, who were suspicious of
his apparent identification with China, and native Chinese, who detested alien rule, also refused
to acknowledge him as the Great Khan and Emperor of China.222
Khubilai sought to gain as many allies as possible. To consolidate his rule, Khubilai
generously sponsored Buddhist temples, Daoist shrines, and recruited many Confucian scholars
as advisors. He also sent envoys abroad in order to cultivate a positive overseas image. As
Herbert Franke has summarized, “For them [Mongol rulers], different modes of legitimation
were like so many different garments which they could wear according to what seemed
appropriate for the particular occasion.”223
220 Yamauchi Shinji 山内晋次, The Trade Between Japan and Song China: The Sulfur Roads 日宋貿易と「硫黄の
道」(Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 2009), 15. Yamauchi’s work offers many new perspectives and much new
information for scholars to understand the maritime and economic history between Song China and Japan.
221 Yamauchi Shinji, The Sulfur Roads, 17.
222 Morris Rossabi, Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times, 51.
223 Herbert Franke, ed., “From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor and God: The Legitimation of the Yuan
Dynasty,” in China Under Mongol Rule (Abingdon: Routledge, 1994), 76.

63
Japan in Khubilai’s Grand Strategy
Japan was not the only regime from which Khubilai sought legitimacy as universal
emperor; he also sent envoys to Korea and Southeast Asia for this purpose. In 1259, Koryŏ king
Wang Chŏn was on his way to visit Möngke Khan 蒙哥 (r. 1250–1259). However, Möngke died
during his campaign in Sichuan before Wang Chŏn arrived. At the crucial moment, Wang Chŏn
made a brave decision: instead of meeting Ariq Böke, who was geographically closer and
enjoyed more popularity among conservative Mongol nobles, Wang Chŏn traveled south to
Khubilai. The gesture greatly pleased Khubilai, and he believed it to be an auspicious omen
confirming his legitimacy.224 With this act, Korea allied itself with the Mongols while at the
same time maintaining a certain degree of autonomy.225
For very similar reasons, after Koryŏ’s acknowledgement, Khubilai sent envoys to
Southeast Asia hoping to establish an interstate diplomatic and commercial network, inviting
Vietnam, Java, and Champa to join. This interaction is illustrated in Table 1. As can be seen
from the chart, an active diplomatic exchange took place. Since unofficial trading was not
included in the official records, this chart does not include commercial activities. However,
based on studies by Momoki Shiro 桃木至朗 and Gao Rongsheng 高榮盛, we know that the
unofficial commercial activities in East Asia and Southeast Asia were highly lively in the
224 皇弟 (Khubilai) 驚喜曰:高麗萬里之國，自唐太宗親征而不能服，今其世子自來歸我，此天意也. See
“Biography of Emperor Wŏnjong” 世家元宗 in Jeong In-ji 郑麟趾 ed., Koryŏsa 高麗史 (Chongqing: Xinan shifan
daxue, 2014), vol. 25, 787. For detailed analysis, see Sixiang Wang, “What Tang Taizong Could Not Do: The
Korean Surrender of 1259 and the Imperial Tradition,” T’oung Pao 104 (2018), 338–383.
225 David Robinson, Empire’s Twilight: Northeast Asia Under the Mongols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Yenching
Institute, 2009), 34.

64
thirteenth century.226 By comparison, although many historical accounts depicted violent military
confrontations in great detail, their actual occurrence was less frequent.227
Table 1: Frequency of Exchanges Between Mongol Yuan and Southeast Asia in Yuanshi,
Counts are based on Yuanshi, vol. 209 and 210.
Japan was not an exception to the Mongols’ grand strategy of building a Yuan-centered
diplomatic and commercial network. In his first letter to Japan in 1266, Khubilai expressed his
willingness to negotiate via diplomatic means and to establish a trading partnership. At the time,
directly sending troops to invade Japan and Southeast Asian countries would have been costly
and risky. The Mongols had only begun to develop their own navy, so sailing overseas and
launching a grand naval expedition meant great danger, and their supply lines would be under
constant threat. Khubilai did not give up diplomatic attempts even after the Mongols invaded
226 Matsuura Akira 松浦章, “Chūgoku hansen niyoru tōajia kaiiki kōryu,” 中國帆船による東アジア海域交流, in
Shūen no bunka koshōgaku shiriizu 周縁の文化交渉学シリーズ, 1–20; Gao Rongsheng 高榮盛, Yuandai haiwai
maoyiyanjiu 元代海外貿易研究 (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1998).
227 Many reasons have been given for the warfare between the Mongols and Southeast Asian countries. Yokkaichi
Hiroyasu 四日市博康 believed Mongol’s ambitions to dominate the major maritime routes in the South China Sea
played a big part. See Yokkaichi Hiroyasu, “Zuowei menggu chongji yihuan de menggu laixi” 作為蒙古衝擊一環
的蒙古來, in SGRA Report (2017), no. 82, 15.
0
20
40
60
80
Vietnam Java Champa
Frequency of Exchanges Between Mongol
Yuan and Southeast Asia in Yuanshi
Yuan Embassies South East Asian Embassies Military Attack

65
Japan in 1274.228 In the second month of 1275, several months after the attack began, Khubilai
sent high officials Du Shizhong 杜世忠 (1242–1275) and He Wenzhu 何文著 (?–1275) to Japan
to negotiate. The warrior leader Hōjō Tokimune 北条時宗 (1251–1284) decided to kill these
emissaries and firmly shut down diplomatic negotiations.229 Despite this affront, when Japanese
merchants came to Ningbo in 1277 offering to trade gold for coins, Khubilai granted their
requests.230231 The war’s influence on trade was temporary. Commercial activity between Japan
and the continent continued in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This illustrates the diverse
strategies that the Mongols used in empire expansion, where military, diplomacy, and trade often
worked together.
Why, then, did the Mongol Empire end up going to war with Japan? To solve this puzzle,
we must historicize the diplomatic exchanges between the Mongols, Korea, and Japan in the
thirteenth century.
The First Phase of Diplomatic Exchanges (1266–1269)
The first formal diplomatic encounter between the Mongols and the Japanese started with
a rumor. In 1265, the Koryŏ official, Cho Ŭi 趙彝, informed Khubilai that Korea and Japan were
maintaining secret contact with each other. In the eighth month of 1266, Khubilai ordered Qï-ti
228 Sometimes the Kyoto court would come up with a reply, but the shogunate turned it down, as we will examine in
detail in the following pages.
229 Yuanshi, vol. 208, 4628.
230 Yuanshi, vol. 208, 4628.
231 Japanese historian Kondō Shigekazu 近藤成一 comments that, considering Japan’s recalcitrant attitude, “the
Mongols’ attitude could be said to be lenient” (元の姿勢は、ずいぶん寛大であったともいえる), see Kondō
Shigekazu 近藤成一, Monguru no shūrai モンゴルの襲来 (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2003), 20.

66
黒的 (Ch. Heidi; n.d.), vice president of military personnel, and Yin Hong 殷弘, Vice President
of Ritual Personnel (礼部侍郎), to lead an official visit to Japan.232
To express his good intentions as well as determination, Khubilai employed a carrot-andstick style of diplomacy in this letter.233 He asked Japan to “cut off contact with the Southern
Song” and “become friends with the Mongols,” while at the same time, he warned Japan that “no
one will like the idea of a military confrontation.”234
Fig. 4: Khubilai’s letter to the Japanese monarch, 1266
232 “Koryŏ, Tamna, Nippon,” 高麗耽羅日本 in Yuanshi 元史 vol. 208 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976), 4625.
233 The earliest available copy of the 1266 letter is from Tōdaiji Sonshō-in monjo 東大寺尊勝院文書. Kamakura
Ibun has a printed version based on Tōdaiji Sonshō-in’s copy. It preserves the original format but omits the kundoku
and punctuation. See “Mongoru kokuchō’an” 蒙古国牒案, Kamakura Ibun 鎌倉遺文 9564; vol. 13, 199. The
complete original text and translations are in Appendix.
234 “Mongoru kokuchō’an”, Kamakura Ibun 9564; vol. 13, 199.

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It took two years for the first Mongol envoys to land in Japan, and Koryŏ played a role in
contributing to the lag. When emissaries Qï-ti and Yin Hong reached Korea, Koryŏ king Wang
Chŏn 王倎 (r. 1260–1274) and prime minister Yi Changyong 李藏用 welcomed them, but
delayed their departure. In the first month of 1267, given Khubilai’s constant urging, Wang Chŏn
eventually sent Song Kunpi 宋君斐, Kim Ch’an 金贊, and the Mongol envoys off to Japan.
When they arrived at Kŏje 巨濟 Prefecture, however, bad weather forced them to return to
Korea. Wang Chŏn wrote a report to update Khubilai. In the report, he said that the wind and
waves were too strong for a safe trip. Moreover, Wang Chŏn had heard that the Japanese were
uncivilized and prone to violence, so he worried that the Japanese might harm the ambassadors.
Wang Chŏn also denied that Korea had official contact with Japan, arguing that it was not
necessary for the Mongols to waste time and money to establish diplomacy with Japan.235
Beneath the surface, what worried Koryŏ was something more urgent. Having only
recently ended decades of war against the Mongols, the defeated Koryŏ were struggling both
financially and politically. Nevertheless, the Mongols frequently asked Korea to provide soldiers,
food, ships, and a variety of tributes. The situation did not improve significantly even after Wang
Chŏn became the Koryŏ king and built a more friendly relationship with Khubilai. In 1262, the
Mongol court demanded 200,000 jin of copper from Korea. Wang Chŏn submitted a letter
cautiously complaining about costs, but only received Khubilai’s condemnation.236 In 1263, the
Mongols asked Koryŏ to conduct a census so that Koryŏ could provide soldiers and food to the
Mongol armies in a more systematic way. Having just been reprimanded by Khubilai, Wang
235 Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 815.
236 Koryŏsa, vol. 25, 799.

68
Chŏn had to submit another letter explaining his difficulties.237 In this context, supporting
Khubilai’s efforts at diplomacy with Japan meant another costly burden to Koryŏ that would
drain its already depleted treasury.
Khubilai recognized Korea’s difficulties and reluctance, but his priorities differed
significantly from those of Wang Chŏn and Koryŏ officials, so he insisted on pushing forward.
In the sixth month of 1267, Khubilai sent another letter to Wang Chŏn, insisting he fulfill the
task (以必得其要領為期). In the ninth month, Wang Chŏn appointed Imperial Diary Drafter Pan
Pu 潘阜 (반부, 1230-?) as lead diplomat and sent him to Japan.238 What the Koreans and
Japanese knew but Khubilai did not was that Pan Pu not only carried Khubilai’s letter, but also a
secret missive to Japan from Korea.239
In it, Wang Chŏn stated that he respected the Mongols as legitimate rulers, but also
indicated that he was being forced to send envoys Japan: “Khubilai’s tone was very urgent and
demanding, so I have no choice.”240 David Robinson notes that each Koryŏ king was both “a
servitor of the Yuan emperor and monarch of his kingdom.”241 Therefore, many chose to take
flexible and pragmatic approaches to dealing with the Mongols rather than unconditional
attachment. In this case, stuck between the Mongols and the Japanese, Wang Chŏn attempted to
appease the Mongols while signaling to the Japanese that he was not doing so willingly.
237 Koryŏsa, vol. 25,.803. The affective language and emotional articulations did not always fail. The Koryŏ kings
often manipulated these “emotional regimes” as an effective tool in political negotiations. See Wang Sixiang,
Boundless Winds of Empire: Rhetoric and Ritual in Early Chosŏn Diplomacy with Ming China (New York:
Columbia University, 2023).
238 Yuanshi, vol. 208, 4626; Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 814.
239 “Kōrai koku shō an” 高麗国書案, Kamakura Ibun 9770; vol. 13, 285. The complete original text and translations
are in Appendix.
240 “Kōrai koku shō an,” Kamakura Ibun 9770, vol. 13, 285.
241 David Robinson, “Rethinking the Late Koryŏ in an International Context,” Korean Studies (2017), vol. 41, 77.

69
Japan’s reaction to the Koryŏ court’s letter was slow and divided. In the late Heian to
Kamakura periods, Japanese nobles and warrior leaders were not eager to reopen diplomatic
relations with foreign countries in general. Their needs for luxury goods, information, and
political leverage against domestic rivals were primarily satisfied by traveling merchants, monks,
and pirates.242 In the second month of 1268, the local provincial governor of Dazaifu, Shōni
Sukeyoshi 少弐資能 (1198–1281), received the two letters from the Mongols and Korea. He
immediately sent these letters to Kamakura, but the authorities there (the Hōjō regent and staff)
decided to pass this responsibility on to the Kyoto court. After several months, however, the
court and Kamakura still could not reach a consensus, so Pan Pu had to return to Korea emptyhanded.243
Meanwhile, shogunate leaders began to prepare for self-defense, as they believed the
Mongol invasion would happen very shortly. On the twenty-seventh day of the second month in
1269, the regent of shogunate (執権) Hōjō Tokimune (北条時宗, 1251–1284) issued an order
asking Kantō warriors to begin preparations in case of a Mongol invasion. In the letter,
Tokimune described the Mongols as “harboring evil intentions, and trying to find opportunities
to test us.”244 At the same time, Buddhist monks began to perform various rituals praying for
Japan’s victory.245
242 Bruce Batten, Gateway to Japan: Hakata in War and Peace, 500–1300 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
2005), 79–80.
243 Sugiyama Masaaki 杉山正明, “Mongoru jidai no Apuro Yūrashia to Nipon,” モンゴル時代のアフロ・ユーラ
シアと日本, in Kondō Shigekazu 近藤成一 ed., Mongoru no shūrai モンゴルの襲来 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa
kōbunkan, 2003), 36–38.
244
“蒙古人挿凶心、可伺本朝之由、近日所進牒使也、早可用心之旨,” see “Kantō migyōsho shin shikimoku”
関東御教書新式目, Kamakura Ibun 9883, vol. 13, 344.
245 “Nichiren shojō” 日蓮書状, Kamakura Ibun 9911; vol. 13, 354.

70
Given that Khubilai was busy fighting the Southern Song in the 1260s, and his plans were
not to attack Japan, one might ask why it was that the shogunate and the Kyoto court perceived
the Mongols as a threat when Mongol envoys first arrived.
Japan’s hostility toward Mongols was closely related to their information sources. After
Japan cut off its official contact with the Chinese continent in 838, traveling monks and
merchants became the primary conduits of information between regions.246 When the Mongols
invaded the Jin and Song regimes, many Chinese fled to Japan seeking protection. Naturally,
these refugees’ experiences and stories profoundly shaped how warrior leaders perceived the
Mongols. The monks Lanxi Daolong 蘭溪道隆 (1213–1278) and Wuxue Zuyuan 無學祖元
(1226–1286) were two such typical refugees. Originally from Sichuan, Lanxi Daolong traveled
to Japan in 1246, fleeing the Mongol invasion. As a Zen master, he established a close
relationship with the regent of the Kamakura shogunate, Hōjō Tokiyori 北条時頼 (1227–1263).
Thanks to Hōjō Tokiyori’s support, Lanxi Daolong became the head of Kenchōji.247 Wuxue
Zuyuan fled to Japan in 1278, when the Mongols were completing their conquest of Southern
Song China. He befriended Hōjō Tokimune and encouraged him to stand firm and fight against
Mongols.248 All the stories of unprecedented violence that Song monks shared must have left a
deep impression on the Hōjō rulers of Kamakura, which contributed to their reluctance to
respond to the Mongols when the envoys first arrived.
246 Li Yiwen, Networks of Faith and Profit: Monks, Merchants, and Exchanges between China and Japan, 839–
1403 CE (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2023).
247 Zuikei Shuho and Charlotte von Verschuer, “Japan’s Foreign Relations 1200 to 1302 A.D: A Translation from
Zenrin Kokuhōki,” 421; Saeki Kōji 佐伯弘次, Mongoru shūrai no shōgeki モンゴル襲来の衝撃 (Tokyo:
Chūōkoron-Shinsha, 2003), 86.
248 Saeki Kōji, Mongol Invasion and Its Legacies, 86.

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In addition, the shared rule by court and shogunate in the Kamakura period also played a
role in slowing down the administrative pace and increasing the cost of diplomatic exchanges.
Studies by Jeffery Mass, Cameron Hust, and Ethan Segal have demonstrated how the power
struggle between the Kyoto court and Kamakura shogunate – as well as factional struggles
within the two groups – influenced domestic politics and economic and cultural development.249
The comings and goings between Kyoto and Kamakura when faced with the Mongols’ request is
another case exemplifying how dual polities often failed to make an immediate response in an
emergency. Failing to receive any reply from Japan, the Koryŏ king Wang Chŏn faced an urgent
problem: how could he deliver the bad news to Khubilai while at the same time protecting
Koryŏ? In the seventh month of 1268, Wang Chŏn sent Pan Pu to the capital of the Mongol
Empire under Khubilai, Dadu, to celebrate a Mongol festival. Using this visit as an opportunity,
Wang Chŏn submitted a report to Khubilai and shifted the blame to the Japanese government. He
complained that since the envoys had arrived at Hakata, the Japanese court forced them to stay in
Dazaifu for five months and never invited them to the capital, treated them poorly, and refused to
respond to Khubilai's edict. (Of course, the report did not say a word about the letter Wang Chŏn
sent to the Japanese monarch). At the end of the report, Korean officials reiterated the central
theme: they had tried very hard to negotiate with local officials, but the Japanese “forced them to
return” (逼而送之).250
Khubilai was not persuaded. In the eleventh month of 1268, Khubilai asked Qï-ti to
contact Wang Chŏn. In this edict, Khubilai gave an overview of Koryŏ’s various evasive
249 Jeffery Mass, Yoritomo and the Founding of the Kamakura Bakufu (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1995);
Cameron Hurst, “The Kobu Polity” in Mass, ed., Court and Bakufu: Essays in Kamakura History (Stanford:
Stanford University Press), 3–28; Ethan Segal, Coins, Trade, and the State: Economic Growth in Early Medieval
Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011).
250 Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 820.

72
maneuvers. “At first, you kept finding excuses and did not want to go. Then in 1267, you told me
that the wind and waves were too strong to visit Japan. Then how come Pan Pu arrived in Japan
in 1268? This time, you told me the Japanese forced you to return, but I no longer trust you.”
In the ninth month of 1268, Khubilai appointed Qï-ti and Yin Hong to travel to Japan
again.251 However, this time the Mongols did not even make it to Hakata. When they arrived at
Tsushima Island, the local government refused to let them land on Kyushu. The Kyoto court
proposed writing a reply to explain that Japan was not interested in establishing a diplomatic
relationship with the Mongols. However, the Kamakura shogunate thought a response was not
necessary, so they let the Mongol ambassadors stay on Tsushima Island for months.252 Having
already failed repeatedly, the envoys knew very well they could not return empty-handed this
time. They made a bold decision: they kidnapped two local commoners from Tsushima and
brought them back to China, presenting them to Khubilai as official envoys from Japan.253
Koryŏsa offers some clues as to why Qï-ti and Yin Hong kidnapped these commoners,
and how they managed and/or failed to complete the sophisticated (and fake) diplomatic mission.
Khubilai was overjoyed to welcome them. He first praised Koreans for their accomplishment.
Then he told the two imposters “Welcome! I have been waiting for a long time for your country
to send a tribute envoy to visit me. I do not want to force you. I wish to achieve a good
reputation that will live on in the future.” (今朕欲爾國之來朝、非以逼汝也、但欲垂名於後
耳)
254 Khubilai invited his guests to attend various banquets and showed them his newly built
palace. According to the Koryŏsa, the imposters responded positively to Khubilai’s friendliness.
251 Yuanshi, vol. 208, 4614; Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 821.
252 “Mongoru raishi kiroku,” 蒙古来使記録, Kamakura Ibun 10380; vol. 14, 15.
253 Yuanshi, vol. 208, 4626.
254 Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 824.

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They spoke highly of Khubilai’s palaces. “We subjects heard about the grand Buddhist temples
of paradise. Your palace is just like this.” (臣等聞有天堂佛剎，正謂是也)
255 Khubilai was
very satisfied with this response, so he let them visit several more palaces he had recently built.
The interchanges between Khubilai and the Japanese “envoys” exemplify the power
dynamics in thirteenth-century East Asian politics. Yuanshi only mentions that Qï-ti and Yin
Hong took two Tsushima commoners and brought them to China. But Koryŏsa vividly describes
how Khubilai welcomed the two commoners as if they were official envoys sent by Japan. Little
is known about who participated in disguising the two as official diplomats. It is not clear
whether Khubilai knew the true identities of these “envoys” at the time, but he clearly became
aware of it eventually.
It is highly likely that the ruse was not the work of a single group. Several groups, such as
the Koryŏ court, the Mongol ambassadors, the Japanese commoners as well as Khubilai himself
had adequate motivation to participate in this diplomatic performance. For ambassadors Qï-ti and
Yin Hong, it was the third time they had been sent to visit Japan. Had they failed again, their
careers would have been severely affected. We do not know if they decided to disguise the two
commoners as official messengers when they first kidnapped them, but such a decision clearly
shows their desperation to at least bring representatives from Japan to answer Khubilai’s
demands. For Koryŏ’s king Wang Chŏn, gaining Khubilai’s trust was important, but he also
wanted to protect Korea from being exploited. If these captured commoners could satisfy
Khubilai's diplomatic demands, it would prove an efficient and economical solution. There is no
record of the two commoners speaking themselves, so it is difficult to know whether they
claimed to be “subjects,” or whether someone chose that word to translate for Khubilai.
255 Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 824.

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Following the visit of the 1269 “envoys,” Khubilai continued his efforts to connect with
Japan. At the end of that year, he asked the Korean official Kim Yusŏng 金有成 (d. 1307) to
return the two Tsushima natives and deliver another diplomatic letter to the Kyoto court.256 Just
as Pan Pu had delivered two missives in 1267 – one communicating Khubilai’s formal demands
and the other Wang Chŏn’s secret complaints – Kim Yusŏng bore both the official letter of the
Mongols and also furtively gave Dazaifu a letter from the surveillance commissioner (Kr.
anch’alsa 按察使) of Kyŏngsang 慶尚 Province. This unofficial missive echoes Koryŏ’s 1267
complaint that the Mongols were stubborn and made many demands.257 Moreover, it refers to the
Mongols not as “the Great Mongol Empire” (Kr. Tae Monggoguk 大蒙古国) – the expression
that had been used by Koryŏ in 1267 – but as the “northern regime” (Kr. pukcho 北朝),
indicating even further disrespect.
The content of the 1269 letter from the Mongols is absent from Yuanshi, Koryŏsa, and
Kamakura ibun, but a copy was recently discovered in the library of the Faculty of Letters at
Kyoto University and the National Archives of Japan (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan 国立公文書館),
in the sixteenth-century diplomatic compilation Ikoku shukkei.
258 Below I paraphrase the major
highlights of this lengthy missive, which, in comparison with the 1266 letter, is harsher and more
threatening in tone. It also goes into greater detail about prior interactions between the Mongols
and Japan.
This letter, issued by the Central Secretariat (Zhongshu sheng 中書省), begins by saying
that the Mongol Empire has achieved great unity through military conquest and that many
256 Yuanshi, vol. 15 (juan 208), 4625.
257 Chang, Ilbon kojungse Koryŏ charyo yŏn’gu, Zhiyuan 至元 6 (1269).8, 206.
258 Chang, “1269 nen,” 59. This article makes important contributions to the usage of Ikoku shukkei to study
medieval Japan-Koryŏ relations; it remains unclear, however, who compiled the letter.

75
countries have come to pay tribute to express their respect.259 However, it continues, since Japan
repeatedly failed to send diplomatic missions, Mongol diplomats had no alternative but to
capture two Japanese to bring back. Now the Mongols have decided to return these individuals
and ask that Japan speedily dispatch official envoys. Before closing, the letter reiterates the
possibility of using military confrontation if Japan continues to disobey the Mongol Empire’s
orders.260 In response, in the first month of 1270 the Japanese court decided to let the scholar and
court official Sugawara no Naganari 菅原長成 (1205–1281) – who was versed in Confucian
classics and had served as a teacher of the sovereigns Gofukakusa 後深草 (1243–1304; r. 1246–
1259) and Kameyama 亀山 (1249–1305; r. 1259–1274) – draft appropriate separate replies to the
Mongols and the Koreans.261 In the letter to the Mongols, Naganari began with an overview of
Japan’s previous interactions with East Asia and emphasized that Japan had cut off direct contact
with the continent long ago.262 Thus the arrival of Mongol envoys and their demands were
unexpected and confusing. Moreover, Naganari pointed out that Japan was a land of gods and
thus possessed of a power that neither intellectual competition nor military force could vie
with.263
In contrast to his letter to the Mongols, Naganari’s letter to the Koryŏ court was more
subtle and nuanced, reading more like a “friendly warning” to an old acquaintance. Naganari first
thanked Koryŏ for sending the Japanese commoners home, saying such an action demonstrated
that the alliance between Korea and Japan was deep and true.264 He then added the warning that
259 Chang, Ilbon kojungse Koryŏ charyo yŏn’gu, Zhiyuan 6, (1269).6, 202.
260 Chang, Ilbon kojungse Koryŏ charyo yŏn’gu, Zhiyuan 6 (1269).6, 203.
261 “Dazaifu shugoshochō” 大宰府守護所牒 (1270); see Kamakura ibun 10588, Bun’ei 7 (1270).2 (vol. 14, 127).
“Nihon koku dajōkanchō” 日本国太政官牒 (1270); see Kamakura ibun 10571, Bun’ei 7 (1270).1 (vol. 14, 117).
262 “Nihon koku dajōkanchō.” Kamakura ibun 10571, Bun’ei 7 (1270).1 (vol. 14, 117).
263 Nihon koku dajōkanchō.” Kamakura ibun 10571, Bun’ei 7 (1270).1 (vol. 14, 117).
264
“Dazaifu shugoshochō.” Kamakura ibun 10588, Bun’ei 7 (1270).2 (vol. 14, 127).

76
if Koryŏ were to betray its friendship with Japan, it would be harshly punished.265 Although
ultimately the Kamakura shogunate did not deliver these two letters, the decision to write to the
Mongols and Koreans separately, using different styles of diplomatic language in each case,
illustrates that the Japanese fully understood the internal differences between the Mongols and
Koryŏ. It shows, moreover, that they did not intend to treat the two alike despite the fact that
Koryŏ was under Mongol rule.
During this first phase, then, there were two rounds of secret missives from Koryŏ to
Japan. The first, which occurred in 1267, is notable for Wang Chŏn’s furtive complaints to the
Japanese about Khubilai’s forceful insistence that he dispatch an emissary. The second, in 1269,
is notable in that it prompted the Kyoto court to seriously consider reestablishing cordial
relations with its Koryŏ counterpart.
Another incident involving secret communications followed in 1272 – this time
triggering a harsh response. When the Mongols learned of this round, they expressed their
displeasure by killing Kyŏngsang’s military commissioner (Kr. anmusa 按撫使) Cho Chail 曹子
一 (n.d.). We next turn to the events leading up to that episode.
The Second Phase of Diplomatic Exchange (1269–1273)
In 1269, Koryŏ was shaken by a series of military coups. Following these watershed
events, the Mongols began to negotiate directly with Japan, and the Koreans retreated to a minor
role. In the sixth month of 1269, military general Im Yŏn (林衍 임연, ?–1270) launched a
political coup, demoting Wang Chŏn and instating his brother Wang Chang (王淐 왕창,1223–
265
“Dazaifu shugoshochō.” Kamakura ibun 10588, Bun’ei 7 (1270).2 (vol. 14, 127).

77
1274) as the new king.266 Im Yŏn sent numerous expensive gifts to Dadu, hoping to gain the
Mongol court’s recognition. To counter these efforts, Wang Chŏn contacted his son Wang Sim
(王谌 왕심, 1236–1308), who was a hostage in Dadu, requesting that he ask Khubilai for
assistance. After careful examination and consideration, Khubilai decided to support his old ally
Wang Chŏn. In the eighth month of 1269, he ordered 3,000 soldiers to assist Wang Chŏn. In the
eleventh month of 1269, the rebellion was temporarily put down, and Wang Chŏn was restored
to the throne.267
Khubilai’s assistance came at a price: although Wang Chŏn insisted that the coup was
simply an “accident,” Khubilai did not want to miss such a valuable chance to expand his
power.268 In 1270, Khubilai designated Darughachi 達魯花赤 to supervise Koryŏ’s taxation and
administrative affairs. He also sent 7,000 soldiers to Korea and had them build military agrocolonies.269 In the twelfth month of 1270, Khubilai sent a letter to Wang Chŏn listing the various
favors and military assistance that the Mongols had provided Wang Chŏn over the past few
years. “Now it is time to repay the favor,” he wrote. “From now on, if I need your help to deal
with Southern Song or Japan, do not delay and prepare in advance.”270 Despite this request,
Korea failed to repay the debt as quickly as Khublai had hoped. Although Im Yŏn’s coup was
defeated, several other rebellions followed. The famous revolt led by several military generals
and their armed forces Sambyŏlcho 三別抄 (삼별초) lasted several years before being
266 Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 823.
267 Yuanshi, vol. 208, 4616; Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 827. For a detailed study about military generals in Koryŏ polities, see
Edward Shultz, Generals and Scholars: Military Rule in Medieval Korea (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press,
2000).
268 Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 829.
269 Yuanshi, vol. 208, 4618–4619.
270 自茲以往，或南宋，或日本若有事，則兵馬戰艦資糧宜早措置, see Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 835.

78
suppressed by Korean and Mongol joint forces.271 Consequently, Koryŏ left many diplomatic
tasks unfinished.
Khubilai’s patience and confidence in diplomatic means waned, although he did not
completely give up. Since the imperial families in Koryŏ were busy dealing with their own
problems, Khubilai had to rely on officials in Dadu to deal with diplomatic matters. Koryŏ then
retreated to a more supplementary role, such as providing food and lodging for Mongol
ambassadors. For example, during this stage (1269–1273), Zhao Liangbi 赵良弼 (1217–1286), a
Jurchen literatus versed in Confucian classics, replaced previous Mongol officials and became
the lead diplomat.272
As a well-established official who had served Khubilai for years, Zhao Liangbi was
already fifty-two years old when he volunteered to visit Japan. The question of why he wanted
this difficult job thus arises. Although the earlier Mongol rulers took little interest in adopting
Chinese-style institutions, Khubilai recruited many Chinese literati such as Hao Jing 郝經
(1223–1275), Wang E 王鄂 (1191–1274), and Zhao Liangbi as advisors. Many of them were
degree holders and former Jin officials. These advisors actively sought to frame Mongol rule,
both in rhetoric and in practice, in accord with Han, Tang, and Jin models. As Hao Jing
commented, “If we can uphold a civilized order in addition to extending military expansion, we
will achieve good fortune for subjects, unify the realm under Heaven, and ensure the prosperity
of the state.”273
271 For a more detailed study, see Lo Jung-pang, China as a Sea Power, 1127–1368: A Preliminary Survey of the
Maritime Expansion and Naval Exploits of the Chinese People During the Southern Song and Yuan Periods
(Singapore: National University Press, 2012), 250–252.
272 Kim Gu 金坵, “A Memorial to the King,” 告奏表, in Chi P'ochip 止浦集, vol. 2, Han’guk munjip ch’onggan 韓
國文集叢刊 (Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe, 1991).
273 在於耀武萬里之外，而可以文致太平，豈惟生民之幸天下可一而社稷之福也, from “Sizhilun,” 思治論, in
Haowenzhonggong lingchuanwenji 郝文忠公陵川文集 (Taiyuan: Shanxi renminchubanshe, 2006), vol. 18, 642.

79
Zhao Liangbi also tried to maintain a balance between satisfying Khubilai’s aggressive
foreign policies and upholding this civilized order. When Wang Chŏn’s father Wang Ch’ŏl 王㬚
(왕철 r. 1213–1259) died, Zhao Liangbi suggested Khubilai take the opportunity to form a
political alliance with Wang Chŏn. This way, the Mongols could control Korea “without losing a
single soldier.”274 Zhao also criticized the practice of constantly asking Korea for goods and
tributes. When he visited Korea in 1273, the Mongol Darughachi Li Yi 李益 sent Zhao Liangbi
some expensive gifts. Zhao refused, saying, “I cannot take them. These gifts were obtained by
exploiting Koreans.”275 Zhao applauded Korea’s decision to continue civil service exams. In
1271, Zhao Liangbi and Jiao Tianyi 焦天翼 went to Korea and watched the release of the exam
results. He said, “We have heard about Korean civil exams for a long time, and today we have
the chance to see. That the court could uphold the civil order in such an unstable time is truly
praiseworthy.”276 For many former Jin officials such as Zhao, Korea’s civil exam system had a
specific meaning: the Mongols had abolished the civil service exams in China, and thus Korea’s
exam system represented a civilized order that they hoped to revive.
Zhao Liangbi also emphasized ceremony and diplomacy rather than military
confrontation in his visits to Japan. In the ninth month of 1271, when Zhao Liangbi arrived at
Dazaifu, local officials asked him to show them Khubilai's letter. Zhao insisted on conveying the
message directly to the Japanese monarch, as this was the protocol China and Japan had followed
since the Tang dynasty. Eventually, both sides made compromises. Zhao allowed the provincial
274 Wang Sixiang offers a detailed examination of how Khubilai’s Chinese advisors cooperated with Koryŏ officials
to promote a more Confucian and civilized ruling order. See Wang Sixiang, “What Tang Taizong Could Not Do:
The Korean Surrender of 1259 and the Imperial Tradition,” T’oung Pao 104 (2018), 338–383.
275 Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 864.
276 Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 847.

80
governor – who was also the provincial constable of the Dazaifu – to make a copy, while he kept
the original document.277
The actual effect of Zhao’s efforts was small. Before his arrival in Japan, the shogunate
and the Kyoto court had received a mysterious letter from Korea, which deepened their distrust
toward the Mongols. According to Kyoto noble Yoshida Tsunenaga’s 吉田経長 (1239–1309)
diary Kitsuzokuki 吉続記, the Koryŏ court had always referred to Mongols as legitimate supreme
rulers in previous letters. However, in this letter, the Koreans called the Mongols barbarians
(weimao 韋毳 – whose literal meaning is “skins and furs”) and no longer used Mongol-era
names to show respect. In addition, the Koreans begged Japan for military assistance against the
Mongols.278 Masatoshi Ishii 石井正敏 argues the letter was actually written by the rebellious
armed force Sambyŏlcho.
279 Regardless of the real author, Japanese leaders’ distrust of the
Mongols grew as they observed the Koreans’ unusual and alarming abrupt change in attitude.
277 “Zhao Liangbi zhuan,” 趙良弼傳, in Yuanshi, vol. 159, 3743–3746; “Mongoru shi Chō Ryō-hitsu,” 蒙古使趙良
弼書状 (山城東福寺文書), Kamakura Ibun 10884; vol. 14, 306.
278 See a detailed discussion in Saeki Kōji, Mongol Invasion and Its Legacies, 76–80.
279 Ishii Masatoshi 石井正敏, “Bun'ei hachinen rainichi no koryushi ni tsuite: Sanbetsushō no Nihon kōtsu shiryō no
shōkai”文永八年来日の高麗使について: 三別抄の日本通交史料の紹介, in Tokyo daigaku shiryō hensanjō hō
東京大学史料編纂所報(1977) :1-7.

81
Fig. 5: “A list of suspicious points in the Koryŏ document” 高麗牒状不審条々, by Tokyo
University Historiographical Institute 280
Having received Sambyŏlcho’s letter, Japan accelerated its preparation for impending
invasions. On the thirteenth day of the ninth month of 1271, warrior leaders Hōjō Tokimune and
Hōjō Masamura 北条政村 (1205–1273) issued two documents to Hizen and Satsuma provinces,
respectively. In the letters, they asked shogunate housemen to prepare for the Mongol invasion
and to suppress akutō (evil bands) activities.281
Temples in Japan also participated actively in the anti-Mongol preparations. In the ninth
month of 1271, Tōgan E’an 東巌慧安 (1225–1277), the head of famous Zen temple Shōdenji in
Kyoto, held a well-attended ceremony and prayed Japan could defeat the Mongols. In the prayer
280 “Korai chōjō fushin jōjō,” 高麗牒状不審条々, in Tōkyō daigaku shiryō hensanjo daisanjyū rokkai tenrankai: Tō
Ajia to nipon, sekai to nipon 東京大学史料編纂所第三六回史料展覧会: 東アジアと日本世界と日本 (Tokyo:
Tokyo University Historiographical Institute, 2013), 6.
281 “Kantō Migyōsho” 関東御教書 (肥後小代文書, Kamakura Ibun 10873; vol. 14, 300; “Kantō Migyōsho,” 関
東御教書(薩摩二階堂文書, Kamakura Ibun 10874; vol. 14, 301. For detailed analysis of akutō, see Morten
Oxenboell, Akutō and Rural Conflict in Medieval Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2022).

82
message, he described Japan as a divine land protected by sacred spirits.282 He claimed that
Japanese soldiers and weapons were superior and undefeatable. Therefore, if the Japanese met
the Mongols on the battlefield, Japanese warriors would be like “lions [the Japanese] facing cats
[the Mongols].”283
Moreover, by saying that “The Koryŏ was half-heartedly disobeying the Mongols while
actually favoring the Japanese” (高麗半違背蒙古、随順本朝), Tōgan E’an’s comments
captured the long-accumulated tensions between the Koreans and the Mongols.284 During their
eight-year-long diplomatic interaction with Japan, the Koryŏ court often failed to meet
Khubilai’s demands and expectations. Their hesitant and indecisive stance did not change even
after the Mongols provided military assistance to help the Koryŏ court suppress domestic
rebellions. In the second month of 1272, just six months after Khubilai sent troops aiding Wang
Chŏn to restore his throne, his son Wang Sim took his officials’ suggestions and planned to
return to Korea and subsequently break from Khubilai’s control. Before Wang Sim found the
opportunity to do so, Khubilai stripped Wang Sim’s officials of their power and confiscated their
properties as a warning.285
After this event, the Koreans became even more reluctant to provide military assistance
for an attack on Japan. In the fourth month of 1272, Wang Chŏn asked Grand Master of
Remonstrance Kwak Yŏpil 郭汝弼 (곽여필) to submit a letter to Khubilai. In the letter, Kwak
Yŏpil provided a detailed list of the amount of food, seeds, rice, horses, and forage that Korea
282 “Tōgan E’an ganmon” 東巌慧安願文(山城正伝寺文書), Kamakura Ibun 10880; vol. 14, 303.
283 “Tōgan E’an ganmon” 東巌慧安願文(山城正伝寺文書), Kamakura Ibun 10880; vol. 14, 303.
284 “Tōgan E’an ganmon” 東巌慧安願文(山城正伝寺文書), Kamakura Ibun 10880; vol. 14, 303.
285 Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 854–855.

83
had provided to the Mongols that year. At the end of the letter, Kwak asked Khubilai to refrain
from demanding further resources from Korea.286
Japan understood the divided interests and internal conflicts between the Mongols and
Koreans and decided to utilize the opportunity to enhance Japan’s position. In the seventh month
of 1272, Japan covertly sent a ship to Korea, hoping to obtain some inside information about the
Mongols. Kyŏngsang-do’s provincial governor Cho Chail 曹子一 (조자일) worried that the
Mongols would discover the visit, so he hurried to send the ship back. Unfortunately, Hong
Ch’agu 洪茶丘 (1244–1291), an official of Koryŏ origin who was loyal to the Mongols, became
aware of the situation. Hong immediately arrested Cho Chail and tortured him. A few days later,
Hong executed Cho for betraying the Mongols.287
In the last two years of negotiations (1272–1274), Khubilai gradually lost interest and
confidence in establishing a diplomatic relationship with Japan, although Zhao Liangbi did not
abandon his efforts to build connections. In the second month of 1272, Zhao Liangbi managed to
bring twelve Japanese envoys to visit Khubilai, but several high officials suspected the envoys
were foreign spies sent by the Japanese government. Khubilai decided to cancel the meeting and
send them back.288 In the fifth month of 1273, Zhao Liangbi traveled to Japan for the last time.
He was stopped at Dazaifu and had to return empty-handed. Despite all the diplomatic failures,
Zhao persisted in his efforts to persuade Khubilai not to attack Japan, arguing that as Japan was
mountainous and had few flat farmlands, it was subject to strong winds. If Mongols invaded,
Zhao advised, the navy might suffer. Yuanshi records that Khubilai took Zhao’s advice, but this
286 Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 856–857.
287 Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 860–861.
288 Yuanshi, vol. 208, 4627; Koryŏsa, vol. 26, 854.

84
did not last long.289 Several months later, Wang Sim married Khubilai’s daughter Borjigin
Qutugh Kelmysh 忽都魯揭里迷失 (1259–1297), significantly strengthening the MongolKorean alliance.290 In the same year, Khubilai invaded Japan.
Conclusion
In the fifth month of 1274, the same month that Khubilai dispatched his invasion
force, Wang Chŏn’s son Wang Sim married Khubilai’s daughter, Qutugh-Kelmysh, thereby
transforming Koryŏ from a typical regime under Mongol control to a country ruled by Khubilai’s
son-in-law.291 Wang Chŏn died in the sixth month of that year, and Wang Sim took the throne.292
These political changes brought new developments to interregime relations between Koryŏ,
Yuan, and Japan. Although diplomatic negotiations and exchanges continued in 1274 and in the
run-up to and aftermath of the Mongols’ second invasion attempt in 1281, they reflected a new
set of political realities and complexities that are beyond the scope of this chapter.
The Mongol invasions of Japan are rightly regarded as a watershed moment in
Japanese history and in the history of East Asia more generally. What has been less
appreciated, however, are the effects that Mongol engagement – both military and
289 “Zhao Liangbi zhuan,” in Yuanshi, vol. 159, 3746.
290 Lee Myung-mi 이명미, “Koryŏe haga haeon Monggolgongjudŭr ŭi chŏngch'ijŏng wich'i wa Koryŏ-Monggol
kwan'gye: Cheguktaejanggongju ŭi sarye rŭl chungshimŭro”고려에 下嫁해 온 몽골공주들의 정치적 위치와
고려-몽골 관계: 齊國大長公主의 사례를 중심으로”, Hwa sahak yŏn'gu, 2017 (54), 33–69.
291 Marriage alliances between Koryŏ and Yuan were common and had a profound influence on
the political, economic, and social life of Koryŏ. For two detailed studies, see Wuyun Gaowa 烏雲高娃. Yuanchao
yu Gaoli guanxi yanjiu 元朝與高麗關係研究 (Lanzhou: Lanzhou daxue chuabnshe, 2012), 136–69; Wong King
Kwong. “All Are the Ruler’s Domain, but All Are Different: Mongol Yuan Rule and Koryŏ Sovereignty in the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries,” Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 34:1 (2021), 1–30.
292 Chŏng, Koryŏsa, vol. 32, 871–72.

85
diplomatic – prior to the first invasion had on the region before a single battleship had been
launched in the direction of the Japanese archipelago. The exchanges
described above are an indication of the ways in which Khubilai’s diplomacy and other actions
prior to the first invasion of Japan profoundly influenced both institutions and individuals in
China, Korea, and Japan.
Mongol pressures on Japan and other states in the maritime sphere served, for example,
as a catalyst and an opportunity for monks, literati, and scholars – particularly those from China
– to spread their teachings and ideas. Following the Mongol invasion of the Jin and Song in the
thirteenth century, many Chinese monks sailed to Japan seeking protection. Often these clerics
received a warm welcome from the Hōjō and were able to settle in Kamakura.293 Additionally,
Confucian scholars found that Khubilai’s diplomatic overtures vis-à-vis Japan gave them a venue
for promoting their ideas, making proposals, and pursuing their political ambitions. For Zhao and
Hao, interactions with Japan signified the possibility of balancing the expansion of an empire
with the perpetuation of a civilized order.
Khubilai’s approach to Japan impacted the Koryŏ court at several levels. First, his
demands imposed heavy burdens both in terms of finances and corvée labor.
293 Other religious groups in Japan also found the Mongols’ approach to be a great opportunity to
expand their influence. For example, in 1268, Nichiren 日蓮 (1222–1282) wrote a treatise discussing various
inauspicious events that had occurred in Japan in recent years, including earthquakes,
floods, and famine, as well as the great danger of a potential Mongol invasion. He argued that to
solve such problems and save the country, people should respect the Lotus Sutra as the fundamental law. Otherwise,
he warned, people would regret their negligence in the near future. “Nichiren shojō” 日蓮書状 (1268); see
Kamakura ibun 9911, Bun’ei 5 (1268).4.5 (vol. 13, 354). To take one further example, in the ninth month of 1271,
Tōgan E’an 東巌慧安 (1225–1277), abbot of the famous Zen temple Shōdenji 正伝寺 in Kyoto, held a wellattended ceremony to pray preemptively for Japan’s victory over the Mongols. The votive prayer described Japan as
a divine land protected by sacred spirits. It also claimed that Japanese soldiers and their weapons were superior and
undefeatable. Therefore, if the Japanese were to meet the Mongols on the battlefield, Japanese warriors would be
like “lions [the Japanese] confronting cats [the Mongols].” “Tōgan E’an ganmon” 東巌慧安願文 (Yamashiro
Shōdenji monjo 山城正伝寺文書); see Kamakura ibun 10880, Bun’ei 8 (1271).9 (vol. 14, 303).

86
Moreover, the task of conducting diplomatic missions pushed the Koreans into the
awkward situation of having to communicate Khubilai’s wishes to Japan. The Koryŏ
court's delay tactics, in turn, strained its relations with the Mongol regime.
The challenges and pressures that Khubilai’s diplomacy brought to medieval Japanese
structures of governance were equally profound. It is commonly accepted that the Mongol
invasions temporarily empowered the Kamakura bakufu, who took the lead in organizing the
national defense. But in the decades prior, the envoys sent by the Mongol court provided the
warrior government – particularly the main line of the Hōjō – with a means to further enhance its
power, a goal they had been pursuing since the early thirteenth century. The threat of Mongol
invasions provided the main line of the Hōjō with a rationale for replacing officials in militarily
and economically significant provinces in Kyushu with individuals from among its own house or
from houses with which the Hōjō had formed alliances through marriage. For example, before
Khubilai’s attempts at diplomacy, the provincial constables of Chikuzen, Hizen, and Buzen came
from the Shōni 少弐 house, those of Bungo and Chikugo from the Ōtomo 大友 house, and those
of Satsuma from the Shimazu 島津 house.294 However, once the Mongol envoys arrived,
Kamakura began defensive military preparations. Ōtomo Yoriyasu 大友頼泰 (1222–1300) was
asked to transfer his constable position in Chikugo to Hōjō Yoshimasa 北条義政 (ca. 1242–
1282). Shōni Sukeyoshi was asked to hand over his post as Higo constable to Adachi Yasumori
安達泰盛 (1231–1285). And Nikaidō Yukitada 二階堂行忠 (1220–1290) was asked to give up
his control of Kanmon 関門 Strait to Hōjō Tokimune’s brother Muneyori 宗頼 (1259–1279).295
294 Kakehi Masahiro 筧雅博, Mōko shūrai to tokuseirei 蒙古襲来と徳政令 (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2009),
95–96.
295 Kakehi, Mōko shūrai to tokuseirei, 95–96.

87
Fig. 6: New shugo posts controlled by the main line of the Hōjō after 1274
Conversely, the imperial court saw much of its authority decline after the mid-thirteenth
century, although the process was much more complicated. Imperial power had already been
severely challenged by the Jōkyū 承久 Rebellion of 1221 and the Palace Disturbance (Miya
Sōdō 宮騒動) of 1246. Nevertheless, the imperial court managed to preserve some degree of
autonomy and continued to share power with the Kamakura shogunate. For example, although he
had been put in place by the Hōjō and remained somewhat beholden to them, in 1246 Emperor
Gosaga established the Board of Councillors of the Retired Monarch (In no Hyōjōshū 院の評定
衆) to expand his power and deal with courtly affairs.296 Also, after Hōjō Tokiyori issued sixtyone new formularies of the Kanto (Kantō shinsei jōjō 関東新制条々) in 1261, which announced
296 Hashimoto Yoshihiko 橋本義彦, “In no hyōjōsei ni tsuite” 院評定制について, in Nihon rekishi 日本歴史 261
(1970), 12.

88
tax relief for the common people, the royal court of Gosaga issued twenty-one tokusei 徳政 (debt
relief) edicts in the same year as a political statement to emphasize its authority.297 Thus the
imperial court did not completely lose its rights in the early thirteenth century.
However, as analyzed above, Mongol diplomacy enabled the warrior government to
exercise more power in political affairs and in taxation decisions and other administrative duties.
When the Mongol diplomatic mission came in 1270, the court ordered Sugawara no Naganari to
draft replies to the Mongols and Koreans, but the Kamakura shogunate eventually disapproved of
sending out those replies.298 The different approaches to the question of whether or not to
respond to the Mongols reflected the tension and power struggles between the court and
shogunate. Moreover, due to internal divisions over succession and the political instability that
followed, the imperial court gradually lost its ability to form a strong power bloc to resist the
Kamakura shogunate.299 Although the shogunate asked the Kyoto court for its opinion regarding
the Mongol envoys, the final decision was made by the warrior government.300
By placing Khubilai’s interactions with Japan within a broader East Asian and Southeast
Asian maritime frame, we see that in addition to warfare, the Mongol Empire also flexibly used
other strategies such as diplomatic negotiations and trade in its quest to expand. To fully
understand the reasons for the Mongol invasions, we need to go beyond the conventional focus
on military forays and investigate the ways in which diplomacy and trade interconnected with
297 Yanagiwara Norimitsu 柳原紀光, Zokushigushō 続史愚抄, Bun’ō 文応 2 (1261).5.11 (Tokyo: Yoshikaga
kōbunkan), vol. 13, 15.
298 Nam Kihak/Nan Kikaku 南基鶴, Mōko shūrai to Kamakura bakufu 蒙古襲来と鎌倉幕府 (Kyoto: Rinsen
shoten, 1996), 14–15.
299 Andrew Goble, Kenmu: Go-Daigo’s Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1996), 4–5.
300 Yoshida Tsunenaga 吉田経長, Kichizokuki 吉続記, in vol. 23 of Shiryō Taisei 史料大成, ed. Sasakawa Taneo
笹川種郎. Kyoto: Naigai shoseki, 1935, Bun’ei 8 (1271).9.1–9.7 (293–95).

89
efforts at forcible conquest. Tracing the conflicting interests and power dynamics that were
involved, we have seen how different sources from China, Japan, and Korea portrayed and
interpreted Khubilai’s diplomacy, often at variance with one another. We have seen, too, how the
frictions and conflicting viewpoints evident in the historical record point to the limits of Mongol
hegemony. Furthermore, miscommunications, subterfuge, and passive resistance on the part of a
multitude of actors in the maritime sphere all played a part in the repeated failures of Mongol
diplomacy. Needless to say, the story of Khubilai’s diplomatic maneuvers and invasions is just
one chapter in a long and complex narrative, and additional work needs to be done in order to
more fully understand Japan’s interrelationship with the continent in the premodern maritime
world.

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Chapter 3
Multiple Diplomatic Centers: The Maritime Zone between Japan and Ming China in the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries
Introduction
Diplomatic interactions between shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu 足利義満 (1358–1408)
and the Ming Yongle emperor Zhu Di (1360–1424, r. 1402–1424), together with the MingJapanese tally trade have received lively scholarly discussion.301 During Yoshimitsu’s rule, the
shogunal government received tally sticks (kangō 勘合) from the Ming, granting the right to
participate in commercial trade with China. In earlier scholarship, Hongō Keiko 本郷恵子 has
demonstrated the significant role of Buddhist monks in aiding Yoshimitsu’s diplomatic
endeavors with the Ming.302 Kenneth Grossberg has argued that the tally trade with the Ming
helped Yoshimitsu obtain tremendous economic returns and political influence.303 While
Grossberg and Hongō Keiko focus on what might be considered formal central state relations,
other scholars – including Thomas Conlan, Charlotte von Verschuer, and Peter Shapinsky – have
drawn attention to the fact that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, diplomatic and overseas
exchanges transcended formal interstate relations and expanded beyond the central
administration of the shogunate in Kyoto. They have noted that exchanges were also prevalent in
301 Much excellent research work about the tally trade has been done. For example, see Tanaka Takeo 田中健夫,
Wakō to kangō bōeki 倭寇と勘合貿易 (Tōkyō: Shibundō, 1961); Hashimoto Yū 橋本雄, Nihon kokuō to kangō
bōeki “日本国王”と勘合貿易 (Tokyo: NHK, 2013). Yutani Minoru has compiled primary sources about MingJapan tally trade. See Yutani Minoru 湯谷稔, 日明勘合貿易史料 Nichi-Min kangō bōeki shiryō (Tokyo: Kokusho
kankōkai), 1983.
302 Hongō Keiko 本郷恵子, Ashikaga Shōgun no kenri 室町将軍の権力 (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun shuppan, 2020)
303 Kenneth A. Grossberg, “From Feudal Chieftain to Secular Monarch. The Development of Shogunal Power in
Early Muromachi Japan,” Monumenta Nipponica (1976), 46; Kenneth A. Grossberg, Japan’s Renaissance: The
Politics of the Muromachi Bakufu (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2001), 36–39.

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other regions, such as Kyushu and the Inland sea, emphasizing the existence of a complex, multinodal network encompassing cultural and commercial activities and the exchange of
information.
304 Building on this pioneering research, this chapter examines such questions as
how civil war in Japan influenced diplomatic relations, how no single government spoke for
Japan, and how a multilayered diplomatic network complicates our understanding of Japan’s
position in a broader East Asian sphere.305
In this chapter, I make three major arguments. First, I argue that the study of the tally
trade and Yoshimitsu alone are not adequate for capturing the diversity and complexity of MingAshikaga diplomatic relations. For example, Prince Kaneyoshi 懷良 (1329–1383) played an
important role in shaping these relations.306 Although the duration of his control over MingJapanese diplomacy only lasted a few years, his influence endured for much longer.307 And even
after Prince Kaneyoshi lost control of Kyushu, the local shugo (provincial constables) of Kyushu
and the northern court continued to use his name in their diplomatic communications with the
Ming. Second, different parties such as Go-Enyū Tennō (1359–1393, r. 1371–1382), Imagawa
Sadayo 今川貞世 (1326–1420), and various Buddhist institutions had diverging considerations
and interests.308 And third, even though Zhu Di granted Yoshimitsu the title “king of Japan” and
304 Thomas Conlan, Kings in All but Name: the Lost History of Ōuchi Rule in Japan 1350–1569 (New York: Oxford,
2024); Charlotte von Verschuer, Across the Perilous Sea: Japanese Trade with China and Korea from the Seventh
to the Sixteenth Centuries (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2006); Peter Shapinsky, Lords of the Sea: Pirates, Violence,
and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2014).
305 Mikael Adolphson, Edward Kamens, and Stacie Matsumoto, eds., Heian Japan: Centers and Peripheries
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007).
306 According to Mori Shigeaki’s study, Prince Kaneyoshi was the sixth son of Go-Daigō. For a detailed genealogy
see Mori Shigeaki 森茂暁, Kōjitachi no Nanbokuchō: Godaigo Tennō no bunshin 皇子たちの南北朝: 後醍醐天皇
の分身 (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1988), 197–223.
307 Andrew Goble, Kenmu: Go-Daigo’s Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard Asian Center, 1996), 270.
308 A classic written about Imagawa Sadayo is Kawazoe Shōji 川添昭二, Imagawa Ryōshun (Tokyo: Yoshikawa
kōbunkan, 1964).

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gave him tallies for trade in 1405, Yoshimitsu did not manage to monopolize overseas trade or
diplomacy.309 Other parties, such as the Ōuchi and Sō, continued to exercise great influence
along Kyushu shores.
Understanding the dynamics and multiple players involved in Sino-Japanese diplomatic
exchanges is important for several reasons. First, it sheds new light on the political structure of
the Yoshimitsu shogunate. Much work has been done to analyze how Yoshimitsu used his kingly
title to assert and centralize his power, but this chapter calls attention to how other parties
challenged or shared his power, inside and outside the shogunate.310 Second, by examining how
local shugo from Kyushu interacted with the Ming and other regimes, this chapter provides new
evidence and perspectives to consider the multiple diplomatic centers in Japan. As this chapter
demonstrates, from the 1360s to the 1380s most diplomacy was centered in Kyushu rather than
in Kyoto, confirming the existence of multiple centers of diplomatic exchange in late medieval
Japan. And third, this chapter offers a useful case study to show how overseas exchange and
maritime history should be studied in connection with domestic issues, as Hashimoto Yū has
urged, to encourage a broader conversation between historical fields.311
309 Dai Nihon shiryō. 7–7 (1405, 5.1), 195.
310 The most recent research work examining how different players contested Ashikaga shogunate’s authority
include Mori, Shigeaki 森茂暁, Kaneyoshi Shinnō: hi ni soete nokaren to nomi omou mi ni 懐良親王: 日にそへて
のかれんとのみ思ふ身に (Kyōto: Mineruva shobō, 2019); Suda, Makiko 须田牧子, Chūsei Nitchō kankei to
Ōuchi-shi 中世日朝関係と大内氏 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2011); Hirase, Naoki 平瀨直樹 Ōuchi
Yoshihiro: tenmei o uketamawari bōran o utsu 大內義弘: 天命を奉り暴亂を討つ (Kyōto: Mineruva shobō,
2017).
311 Hashimoto Yū, “Taimin taichōsen bōeki to Ashikaga bakufu shugo taisei” 対明・対朝鮮貿易と室町幕府-守護
体制, in Arano Yasunori 荒野泰典, Ishii Masatoshi 石井正敏, Murai Shōsuke 村井章介 ed., Nihon no taigai
kankei 4, Wakō to “Nihon Kokuō” 日本の対外関係 4 倭寇と「日本国王」(Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2010),
107–133.

93
Since this chapter will include many historical figures, here is a brief introduction. On the
Ming side, Zhu Yuanzhang (1328–1398, r. 1368–1398) – the founder of the Ming dynasty – his
son Zhu Di, and the famous scholar Song Lian 宋濂 (1310–1381) played key roles in shaping
diplomacy with Japan. Between Zhu Yuanzhang and Zhu Di, the second Ming ruler Zhu
Yunwen (1377–?, r. 1398–1402) appears briefly in our discussion. However, due to the political
coup Zhu Di launched against Zhu Yunwen, many historical descriptions of Zhu Yunwen were
largely erased or rewritten. As for the Japanese side, the main players form three main groups:
Prince Kaneyoshi and his supporters of the southern court; Go-Enyu Tennō of the northern court;
Yoshimitsu; Yoshimitsu’s officials Hosokawa Yoriyuki 細川頼之 (1326–1392) and Shiba
Yoshimasa 斯波義将 (1350–1410), who later replaced Yoriyuki as the new shogunal chancellor;
the Kyushu tandai (an official title that had authority over shugo and to govern Kyushu)
Imagawa Sadayo; and powerful warrior leaders in Kyushu such as Shōni Fuyusuke 少弐冬資
(1337– 1375), Shimazu Ujihisa 島津氏久 (1328–1387), and Ōtomo Chikayo 大友親世 (?–
1418). Buddhist monks from both Ming China and Ashikaga Japan – such as Zhongyou Zuchan
仲猷祖闡, Shunoku Myōha 春屋妙葩 (1312–1388), and Kenchū Keimitsu 堅中圭密 – also
played important roles.
312 We will see many of them shift their stances dynamically with
changing situations, contributing to a lively international network of tensions, conflicts, and
competition.
312 In the Muromachi period, many Zen Buddhist monks traveled to China and had close cultural exchanges with
Ming monks. Among the records of this period, Gosan 五山 literature stands out. For a comprehensive analysis of
Zen Buddhism in medieval Japan and its connection with the continent, see classics written by Haga Kōshirō 芳賀
幸四郎, Chūsei zenrin no gakumon oyobi bungaku ni kansuru kenkyū 中世禪林の學問および文學に關する硏究
(Tokyo: Nihon gakujutsu shinkōkai, 1956).

94
This chapter consists of three major parts. In the first, I will examine how Zhu
Yuanzhang tried to establish diplomatic relations with Japanese monarchs but instead formed an
alliance with Prince Kaneyoshi from 1368–1374. A deep distrust and suspicion between them
existed from their initial encounter, but the two eventually opted to establish diplomatic relations
based on different needs. Andrew Goble argues that 1361 to 1371 was a period in which
Kaneyoshi controlled most of Japan’s contact with the Ming. What has not been much discussed
– the focus of part two herein – is that even after Kaneyoshi lost his power bases to Ashikaga’s
troops, his influence lingered in that he continued to serve as an important symbol in Ming-Japan
diplomacy from 1375–1386.313Consequently, members from the northern court and local
Kyushu warrior families often disguised their envoys as Prince Kaneyoshi’s personnel and
dispatched them to visit Ming. Such behavior confused the Ming and motivated them to actively
collect information about Japan’s domestic situation and to seek a new ally. In the third part, I
will examine how Yoshimitsu opened diplomacy with the Ming. Although Yoshimitsu managed
to persuade Zhu Di to confer kingly titles to him, Yoshimitsu was not the only player in overseas
diplomacy. Local warrior leaders of the Ōuchi and Sō families continued their overseas activities
along the Kyushu shore, in particular with Chosŏn.
The primary sources I use include Mingshilu, Dai Nihon shiryō, Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok,
and literati collections. The Mingshilu (the Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty), is a
comprehensive compilation including events under each emperor’s reign from 1368 to 1644.
Most of the records were assembled right after each ruler’s death, so they were regarded as
containing the most up-to-date sources. However, many distortions were introduced when
dealing with politically sensitive issues – especially in the transition period from Zhu Yunwen to
313 Andrew Goble, Kenmu: Go-Daigo’s Revolution, 270.

95
Zhu Di, which will also be analyzed in this chapter.314 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok follows the same
chronological method to record political events and important figures in Korea. It includes the
reigns of twenty-seven kings, from King T’aejo (太祖, r. 1392‑1398) to King Sunjong (純宗, r.
1907‑1910).315 Dai Nihon shiryō is a curated compilation of primary sources compiled by the
Historiographical Institute of the University of Tokyo from 1901 and it is still in progress. It is a
highly useful source reference as a starting point, although it needs to be combined with other
records to ensure more comprehensive coverage.316
Zhu Yuanzhang’s Overtures to Prince Kaneyoshi, 1368–1374
Zhu Yuanzhang’s desire to establish diplomatic relations was closely intertwined with his
greater agenda of having other regimes acknowledge his rulership. As soon as he claimed the
founding of the Ming dynasty in 1368, Zhu Yuanzhang dispatched envoys to Koryŏ, Japan,
Tibet, Annam, Chamba, Ryukyu, Java, and many other places. In addition to spreading the news
that the Ming dynasty had replaced the Yuan, those envoys also delivered Ming calendars and
gifts.317 However, there were subtle but important differences in his approaches. For example,
Zhu Yuanzhang sent the first envoys to Koryŏ, demonstrating Koryŏ’s distinct importance to the
Ming compared with other regimes.318
314 For a more detailed introduction to Mingshilu, see Edward Farmer, Romeyn Taylor, and Ann Waltner, eds., Ming
History: An Introductory Guide to Research (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1994), 81–89.
315 For a complete introduction to Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, see the encyclopedia entry written by Hur Nam-lin,
“Veritable Records (Sillok) of the Chosŏn Dynasty,” in Kim Sidŏk, ed., Encyclopédie des Historiographies:
Afriques, Amériques, Asies (Paris: Presses de l’Inalco, 2019), 1918–1931.
316 Studies of the Kyushu tandai, for example, Kawazoe Shōji 川添昭二 compiled a list of various primary sources
in addition to Dai Nihon shiryō. See Kawazoe Shōji, “Kyushu tandai kankei bunken mokuroku” 九州探題関係文献
目録 https://www.city.dazaifu.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/12264.pdf (accessed March 4, 2024).
317 Mingshilu, vol. 37, 1368.12, 750–752; vol. 38–39, 1369.1–1369.2, 775–787.
318 David Robinson’s research is important for understanding Yuan-Ming relations with Koryŏ. See David
Robinson, Empire’s Twilight: Northeast Asia under the Mongols (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).

96
Japan’s acknowledgement was also important to Zhu Yuanzhang for strategic reasons. In
the fifth month of 1368, Zhu Yuanzhang defeated his rival Fang Guozhen 方國珍 (1319–1374).
Fang was previously a salt trader and one of the first to rebel against the Mongols. Later, he and
Zhu competed against each other for power bases along coastal China. Upon his defeat, Fang
Guozhen fled to nearby sea islands to hide.319 Zhu Yuanzhang realized the potential threat these
sea islands – including Japan and Southeast Asia – could pose to his newly founded regime.
Therefore, as soon as he founded the new dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang hurriedly sent out envoys
proclaiming his legitimate rulership.320
Suppressing pirates was another motivation for Zhu Yuanzhang to establish ties with
Japan. Some research has examined the social origins and components of pirates, and their
ambiguous national identities.321 In particular, Ma Guang 馬光 argues that piracy problems
dominated Zhu Yuanzhang’s interaction with Japan. He therefore calls early Ming diplomacy
with Japan “pirate diplomacy” (倭寇外交).322 One intriguing fact is though it is not been given
adequate analysis, Zhu Yuanzhang’s understanding of pirates went through a profound change in
the early Ming. Zhu Yuanzhang switched between using the terms wokou 倭寇 and wobing 倭兵
to refer to pirates. There is a rich historiography about the term “wo 倭” (Jp. wa); here I would
like to focus on the “kou” and “bing.”323 Wokou can be roughly translated as “pirates not related
319 Mingshilu, 1368.5–7, vol. 32, 559; Mingshi, juan 91, Bingzhi san 兵志三 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), 2243.
320 Murai Shōsuke 村井章介 argues that Zhu Yuanzhang’s sea-ban policies were also closely related to his concerns
that his rivals might work with coastal regions or overseas regimes. See Murai Shōsuke, Bunretsu suru ōken to
shakai 分裂する王権と社会 (Tokyo: Chūō kōron shinsha, 2003), 182.
321 Peter Shapinsky, Lords of the Sea is a good example.
322 Ma Guang, “Mianzi yu lizi: Ming Hongwushiqi zhongri wokou waijiao kaolun” 面子與裡子明洪武時期中日倭
寇外交考論, Wenshizhe 文史哲 (2019.5), 42.
323 Murai Shōsuke, Wakō to “Nihon kokuō”, 107-133.

97
to government,” while wobing means “Japanese soldiers,” which indicates government
command. In the letter that Zhu Yuanzhang sent to Japan in the second month of 1369, he wrote,
Recently I received a report from Shandong that Japanese soldiers often
plundered shores, forced people to separate from their wives and children, and
harmed lives. Therefore, I intentionally write this letter to inform you [Japan]
about our legitimacy, as well as to remind you to prevent Japanese soldiers from
crossing the sea. When this imperial decree arrives, if you submit to it, you should
send a declaration of submission and visit our court. If you choose not to submit
to my authority, you should train your soldiers and strengthen self-protection, in
order to protect your land, to respond to heavenly rewards [punishment]. If you
are determined to become pirates, I will order sea forces to depart and arrive at
various islands, capture those gangsters, directly arrive at your land, and capture
the monarch. In such a way, am I not representing heaven to punish malevolent
people? I hope you can think about it.”
間者山東來奏倭兵數寇海邊,生離人妻子,損傷物命,故修書特報正統之事,
兼諭倭兵越海之由,詔書到日,如臣奉表來庭,不臣則修兵自固,永安境土,以
應天休,如必為寇盜,朕當命舟師揚帆諸島,捕絕其徒,直抵其國,縛其王,豈不
代天伐不仁者哉?惟王圖之324
Upon receiving this threatening decree, Prince Kaneyoshi killed most of the envoys and sent
only the leading envoy – Yang Zai 楊載 and Wu Wenhua 吳文華 back.325
The fact that Zhu Yuanzhang thought pirates were related to the Japanese government
explains the tensions and distrust between Ming and Japan. According to Mingshi, Prince
Kaneyoshi was directly responsible for disobeying Zhu Yuanzhang’s order and had pirates
plunder coastal China (日本王良懷不奉命，復寇山東，轉掠溫、台、明州旁海民，遂寇福
建沿海郡).326 Moreover, Yamada Kuniaki’s 山田邦明 study shows that before the 1369 envoys,
Zhu Yuanzhang had sent an envoy to Japan in 1368, but they were murdered by pirates on the
324 Mingshilu, 1369.2, vol. 39, 787. For questions of how the Ming government organized military battalions in
Shandong peninsula against pirates, see Ma Guang, Rupture, Evolution, and Continuity: The Shandong Peninsula in
East Asian Maritime History During the Yuan-Ming Transition (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2021).
325 Yamada Kuniaki, Muromachi no heiwa, 82.
326 Mingshi, vol. 322, Waiguo san-riben 外國三日本 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), 8342.

98
way to Japan.327 Suspecting the murder was planned by the Japanese government, Zhu
Yuanzhang was already on high alert and held a deep distrust toward the Japanese monarch.
Although Zhu Yuanzhang’s decree was addressed to the Japanese tennō, neither Chōkei
Tennō 長慶天皇 (1343–1394, r. 1368–1383) from the southern court nor Go-Kōgon Tennō 後光
厳天皇 (1338–1374, r. 1352–1371) of the northern court received this letter. Instead, the envoys
carried it to Dazaifu, which was under the control of Prince Kaneyoshi.328 Thus Ming-Japan
diplomacy entered a decades-long period dominated by Prince Kaneyoshi.
Shortly afterward, Zhu Yuanzhang sent another embassy led by Zhao Zhi 趙秩 to visit
Prince Kaneyoshi in the third month of 1370.329 The encounter was tense. At the beginning of the
meeting, Prince Kaneyoshi emphasized Japan’s greatness by reminding Zhao that even the
Mongols had failed to conquer Japan, which had cut off contact with the continent for decades
(已環列於海岸,賴天地之靈, 一時雷霆風波漂覆,幾無遺類, 自是不與通者數十年).
330 Then he
asked Zhao Zhi if he was a relative of a previous Mongol diplomat whose surname was also
Zhao (天使亦姓趙,豈昔蒙古使者之雲).331 I believe here the Zhao diplomat Kaneyoshi was
referring to is Zhao Liangbi 趙良弼 (1216–1286), a Jurchen literati who played an important role
in Yuan-Kamakura diplomacy.332 Suspecting both Zhao Zhi’s identity and intentions, Kaneyoshi
327 Yamada Kuniaki 山田邦明, Muromachi no heiwa 室町の平和 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2009), 82.
328 Prince Kaneyoshi’s control of Kyushu was part of Go-Daigo Tennō’s grand strategy, in which he ordered four
princes to travel to Kantō, Ōshū, Hokuriku, and Kyushu so as to control the entire realm. For details, see Mori
Shigeaki, Kōjitachi no Nanbokuchō, 71–89.
329 Mingshilu, 1370.3, vol. 50, 988. Ma Guang wrote an article discussing Zhao Zhi’s interactions with Japan in
detail. See Ma Guang, “Mingchu Zhao Zhi shiri wenti xintan” 明初趙秩使日問題新探, Jianghai xuekan 江海學刊
(2020) 173–183.
330 Mingshilu, 1371.10.14, vol. 69, 1281.
331 Mingshilu, 1371.10.14, vol. 69, 1281–1282.
332 Lina Nie, “Before the Storm: A Transrealm History of the Decades Leading Up to the First Mongol Invasion of
Japan,” Monumenta Nipponica (2023.2), 157–187.

99
ordered soldiers to kill him (命左右將刃之).
333 Zhao Zhi calmly responded to Prince
Kaneyoshi’s threats. He denied he was the offspring of a Yuan diplomat (我為使者非蒙古使者
後爾) and asserted that Zhu Yuanzhang’s Ming regime far surpassed that of the Mongols (帝華
夏非蒙古比).334 According to Mingshilu, Prince Kaneyoshi was impressed by Zhao Zhi’s
courage and came to treat him with great respect.335
Mingshilu is written by the Ming side, so its pro-Ming tone is not surprising. However, if
we closely examine the historical conditions that Prince Kaneyoshi faced at the time, it becomes
clear that although Zhao Zhi’s bravery played a role, eventual cooperation was possible thanks to
many other factors. In a decree that Zhu Yuanzhang sent to Japan in 1370, he acknowledged that
he had made a mistake in the 1369 decree by wrongly accusing the Japanese monarch (here he
referred to Prince Kaneyoshi) of being responsible for disturbing Ming subjects (朕疑王使之故,
擾我民).336 Later, Zhu Yuanzhang was informed that the pirates were not dispatched by the
Japanese monarch (俄聞被寇者來歸,始知前日之寇非王之意).337 Moreover, according to Ma
Yunchao’s research, before this visit the Koryŏ court had dispatched envoys to visit Zhu
Yuanzhang in 1369 to show their loyalty, thus reassuring Zhu Yuanzhang that Koryŏ would not
openly assist the defeated Mongol armies.338 Consequently, Zhu Yuanzhang’s tone towards
Japan in the 1370 decree significantly softened and exhibited a greater willingness to enter
diplomatic conversation. Second, on Prince Kaneyoshi’s side, although he controlled some parts
333 Mingshilu, 1371.10.14, vol.69, 1281.
334 Mingshilu, 1371.10.14, vol.69, 1282.
335 Mingshilu, 1371.10.14, vol.69, 1282.
336 Mingshilu, 1370.3, vol.50, 988.
337 Mingshilu, 1370.3, vol.50, 988.
338 Ma Yunchao, “Hongwu chunian de mingri waijiao yu zhengce tiaozheng,” 洪武初年的明日外交與政策調整,
Yuanshi ji minzuyu bianjiang yanjiu jikan 元史及民族与边疆研究集刊 (2020), 85.

100
of Kyushu, the southern court he represented faced an increasing threat posed by approaching
forces from Yoshimitsu’s generals. At the time, most northern court affairs were under the
command of Hosokawa Yoriyuki, who was helping young Yoshimitsu run the government.339 In
the third month of 1369, in the name of Yoshimitsu, the shogunate ordered the newly
surrendered general Kusunoki Masanori 楠木正儀 (1333–1389) to attack the southern court.340
In the seventh month of 1370, Yoshimitsu appointed Imagawa Sadayo as Kyushu tandai and had
him attack Prince Kaneyoshi’s power base.341 By the seventh month of 1371, Sadayo’s armies
had taken Bungo 豊後 and Hizen 肥前, and they approached Aki 安芸 and Suō 周防.
342
Under such circumstances, Prince Kaneyoshi opted to show friendliness toward Ming, as
Ming could be a possible ally against Yoshimitsu’s forces. In the tenth month of 1371, Prince
Kaneyoshi ordered the Buddhist monk Zulai (Sorai in Japanese) 祖來 to visit Ming, and returned
seventy Ming subjects who had been rescued from pirates.343 However, Prince Kaneyoshi was
attacked by Yoshimitsu’s forces before he could form an alliance with the Ming. In the eighth
month of 1372, Imagawa Sadayo took the Kyushu headquarters at Dazaifu, forcing Prince
Kaneyoshi to retreat to Mount Kōra 高良山.
344 It should be noted that – according to Kawazoe
Shōji’s and Miura Tatsuaki 三浦竜昭’s research – such a retreat was not a decisive loss, as the
339 Yamada Kuniaki, Muromachi no heiwa, 49.
340 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–31 (1369, 3.16), 386.
341 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–32 (1370, 7.1), 175. Sadayo’s accounts of his journey to Kyushu in 1371 have been
translated by Royall Tyler. See Royall Tyler, Thomas Conlan, and Shunzo Uyenaka, From Baishōron to
Nantaiheiki, Fourteen Century Voices II (Blue-Tongue Books, 2016).
342 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–33 (1371, 7), 208, 284.
343 Mingshilu, 1371.10.14, vol. 69, 1282.
344 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–35 (1372, 8.12), 44.

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remaining forces of the southern court continued their resistance in the Kyushu region through
the 1380s.345
In the midst of these battles, Zhu Yuanzhang’s third party of envoys, led by monks
Zhongyou Zuchan and Wuyi Keqin 無逸克勤 (1321–1397), arrived in Hakata in the fifth month
of 1372.346 Research by Murai Shōsuke and Li Yiwen has shown that Buddhist monks played
important roles in diplomatic affairs in medieval Japan and the continent.347 According to Wuyi
Keqin’s letter to a friend, the trip was smooth and they did not encounter any severe wind or
currents thanks to the blessing of Buddha.348 However, shortly after they arrived, they were
captured by Imagawa Sadayo’s army and transferred to Kyoto, where they were placed in a
temple as hostages in the sixth month of 1373.349 According to Zuchan and Keqin’s descriptions,
they were kept for a long time and poorly treated, and sixty of the envoys nearly starved to death
(重秋複暑，衣敝食竭，六十餘人凍餒將死).350 Eventually, in the sixth month of 1373,
Yoshimitsu visited them and dispatched them back to China in the eighth month of 1373.351
Several facets of the diplomatic conversation between Prince Kaneyoshi and Zhu
Yuanzhang require consideration. First, the conventional view usually frames Zhu Yuanzhang’s
345 Kawazoe Shōji, Imagawa Ryōshun, 144–146; Miura Tatsuaki 三浦竜昭, Seisei Shōgunfu no kenkyū 征西将軍府
の研究 (Tokyo: Seishi shuppan, 2009), 97.
346 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–37 (1373, 6.29), 348.
347 For example, Murai Shōsuke 村井章介 uses Gozan zensō denki shūsei 五山禪僧伝記集成 as a major primary
source to examine Shunoku Myōha’s poetry exchanges with Ming and Koryŏ envoys. See Murai Shōsuke, Ajia no
naka no chūsei nihon アジアの中の中世日本 (Tokyo: Azekura Shobō, 1988), 301; Li Yiwen, Networks of Faith
and Profit: Monks, Merchants, and Exchanges between China and Japan, 839–1403 CE (New York: Cambridge
University, 2023).
348 Wuyi Keqian 無逸克勤, “Zhi yanlisi zuozhu shu bing biefu” 致延曆寺座主書並別幅, in Linjiao zhengshu 鄰交
征書 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2007), 226.
349 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–38 (1372, 8.29), 98.
350 “Mingguoshu bing mingshi zhongyou wuyi chidu” 明國書併明使仲猷無逸尺牘, in Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–37
(1373), 349–351.
351 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–35 (1372, 6.29), 348.

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diplomatic policies as conservative, heavily ritual-based, and lacking flexibility. This is based on
his maritime policy, including his closing of the Maritime Trade Office.352 For example, in 1395,
Yuanzhang made a list of fifteen countries that “Ming should not invade” (不征諸夷國),
including Chosŏn, Japan, Ryukyu, and Annam and other Southeast Asian countries.353 This list
seems to support the conservative and ritual-based image of Zhu Yuanzhang at first glance. Still
there was another side at Zhu Yuanzhang’s diplomacy, as revealed in a statement of 1371 “As
for overseas barbarians, if they pose a threat to China, we have to invade them. If they do not
pose any threat to us, we should not carelessly launch military campaigns” (海外蠻夷之國有為
患於中國者,不可不討,不為中國患者,不可輙自興兵).354 In other words, the decision whether
to invade other countries was not based on a fixed rule, and Zhu Yuanzhang suggested that rulers
should avoid unnecessary military expansions. They should instead stay flexible and adjust based
on the actual situation.
It is essential to take into consideration Zhu Yuanzhang’s flexibility and openness when
analyzing his dealings with Prince Kaneyoshi. After all, Prince Kaneyoshi was not a tennō. He
was a prince appointed by Go-Daigo to supervise local affairs in Kyushu. So why was he
selected by the Ming ruler as the de facto king to represent Japan? Here I propose two possible
explanations. First, Zhu Yuanzhang chose Prince Kaneyoshi because he was well-situated
geographically to help control pirates. As mentioned above, piracy and its dangers posed a great
threat to Zhu Yuanzhang’s newly founded regime. According to Mingshilu, the pirates plundered
many coastal regions of China, ranging from Shandong in the north to Zhejiang and Fujian in the
352 John D. Langlois, “The Hung-wu Reign, 1368–1398,” in Mote, Frederick and Twitchett, Denis, eds., Cambridge
History of China, vol.7, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008),
168–169.
353 Zhu Yuanzhang, Huangmingzuxun 皇明祖訓 (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 2002).
354 Mingshilu, 1371.9.16, vol. 68, 1278.

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south.355 By the 1370s, Prince Kaneyoshi controlled much of Kyushu’s coastal regions, where
most pirates were based. Moreover, Murai Shōsuke’s and Mori Shigeaki’s 森茂暁 research
shows that Prince Kaneyoshi managed to establish an independent reign that enjoyed a high
degree of autonomy before Yoshimitsu launched his invasion in the 1370s.356 Considering
Kaneyoshi’s influence and strategic geographic location, it is highly plausible that Zhu
Yuanzhang was willing to accept a prince as a diplomatic partner.
One could also hypothesize that Zhu Yuanzhang was not well aware of Japan’s domestic
situation in the early stages of diplomacy, only gradually becoming better informed as
conversation continued. Some scholars have argued that by 1372 Zhu Yuanzhang already
understood Japan’s situation and had intended to establish ties with the northern court.357 This
view is largely based on the letter Zhongyou Zuchan and Wuyi Keqin wrote when they were
detained as hostages in Kyoto. In the ninth month of 1372, Zuchan and Keqin wrote to the
Tendai 天台 abott head Prince Shōin 承胤法親王 (1317–1377) for assistance. In this letter, they
mentioned that when Zhu Yuanzhang had dispatched envoys to Kyushu over the past two years,
they always met Prince Kaneyoshi (蓋前兩年，皇帝凡三命使者，日本關西親王皆自納之).358
However, they wrote that it was not Zhu Yuanzhang’s intention (今關西之來，非朕本意).
Rather, Zhu Yuanzhang had always wanted them to meet the tennō of the northern court (朕三遣
使于日本者，意在見其持明天皇).359 This interpretation is possible, but we must consider the
timing and historical context in which this was written. Considering that Prince Kaneyoshi had
355 Mingshilu, 1369.4.24, vol. 41, 825; 1370.6, vol. 53, 1050.
356 Murai Shōsuke, Bunretsu suru ōken to shakai, 116–120; Mori, Shigeaki, Kaneyoshi.
357 Wang Laite 王來特, “Ming Hongwu chunian furi shizhe zhi waijiao huodong” 明洪武初年赴日使者之外交活
動, Shixueyuekan 史學月刊 (2016.5), 132–133.
358 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–36 (1372, 9.1), 157.
359 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–36 (1372, 9.1), 157.

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already been defeated by the northern court, and that the two monks were in the hands of the
northern court, it is plausible that such claims were false.
360
The envoys’ interception by Imagawa Sadayo in 1372, in addition to Prince Kaneyoshi’s
failure in 1372 against the northern court’s army, marked a new era of Ming-Japan diplomacy.
After this, Prince Kaneyoshi ceased to have direct contact with Ming envoys. Nevertheless, at
the same time, his influence and the use of his name for diplomatic purposes remained essential
for a long period. In the next section we will examine how northern court members and Kyushu
local warrior families used Kaneyoshi’s name and its historical significance.
In the Name of Prince Kaneyoshi 懷良: Fake Diplomats from Kyushu and Kyoto 1375–
1398
The year 1372 was an auspicious one for Shōgun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu. Imagawa
Sadayo’s capture of the Dazaifu, Prince Kaneyoshi’s retreat to Mount Kōra, and the capture of
the Ming envoys Zhongyou Zuchan and Wuyi Keqin are a testament to the success of his
influence. However, if we closely examine what happened to the envoys next, we can see that
many different groups in addition to Yoshimitsu, and that were outside Kyoto, such as monks
and warriors in Kyushu, actively participated in the overseas exchange.
To begin with, Buddhist monks played a crucial role in contesting Yoshimitsu’s
authority. While being kept hostage, Zuchan and Keqin worked together with Zhao Zhi to write
to leading Japanese monks for assistance. The people they contacted included in addition to
Tendai head abbot Prince Shōin, Tenryūji head Seikei Tsuutetsu 清溪通徹 (1300–1385), and
360 Ma Yunchao conducted a detailed study of how Zhu Yuanzang changed his understanding of the domestic
situation in Japan. See Ma Yunchao, “Mingchao chuqi de duiri renzhi yu riben guowang huailiang minghao” 明朝
初期的對日認知與日本國王懷良名號, Haijiaoshiyanjiu 海交史研究 (2022), 22–24.

105
Shunoku Myōha.361 Little is known about whether Shōin or Seikei Tsuutetsu provided assistance
to the Ming envoys, but it is certain that Shunoku Myōha, who was highly valued by Yoshimitsu,
gave them generous support.362 In the letter Zhao Zhi wrote to Shunoku Myōha, he made it clear
that ever since the Ming envoys had been captured and then transferred to be the jurisdiction of
the shogunal chancellor Hokokawa Yoriyuki, they’d endured constant poor conditions (管領留
待來春，但因於歲窮).363 Fortunately, thanks to Myōha’s gifts of clothes and money, they were
able to survive until their release by Yoshimitsu in 1374.364 Shunoku Myōha’s friendship with
the Ming envoys continued, and he passed his interest in Chinese culture down to his disciples.
In 1404, Myōha’s disciple Shōzen 昌繕 visited temple head Zufang Daolian 祖芳道聯 of Jingcisi 淨慈寺 in Hangzhou. Zufang Daolian wrote a preface praising Myōha’s knowledge of Chinese
cultures and the contributions he had made to spreading Buddhist teachings.365
The correspondence between Chinese and Japanese monks – and their willingness to ask
for and offer assistance – provides fascinating cultural and political insights. Buddhist monks in
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries held a flexible attitude toward geographical and political
boundaries.366 As Itō Kōji’s 伊藤幸司 study of the correspondence between Myōha and Zuchan
and Keqin shows, a shared sense of Buddhist religious community and a mutual interest in
361 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–36 (1372), 155; Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–38 (1373), 213.
362 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–38 (1373), 213.
363 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–38 (1373), 371.
364 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–38 (1373), 371.
365 Shunoku Myōha, Chikaku fumyō kokushi goroku 智覺普明國師語錄, vol. 8, in Ren Ping, Duoyuan wenhua
shenfen de chanzhe, 65.
366 The friendship between Japanese and Chinese monks does not mean the two groups did not have tensions.
Rivalry in literary work and interpretations of Buddhist teachings was frequent, although in many cases this could
not be defined based on realm boundaries. For example, see Ren Ping, Duoyuan wenhua shenfen de chanzhe, 110–
111 and Sasaki Yōdō 佐々木容道, Kunchū, Musō Kokushi goroku 訓註・夢窓国師語錄 (Tokyo: Shunjūsha,
2000).

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poetry created a shared identity that served as a strong binding force.367 For example, in the letter
Zuchan and Keqin wrote to Tendai head Prince Shōin, they claimed that Tendai Buddhism in
China and Japan shared the same origin.368 Moreover, disciples of Tendai should not only help
spread Buddhist teachings but also help rulers to transform the realm (天台之徒，非獨廣佛之
教利及有情，亦有以助王之化).369 The decision to write a message asking for help on the basis
of shared religious belief clearly illustrates Buddhism’s potential for overcoming political
disagreement or strife.370
The situation in each individual player also needs consideration. Take Shunoku Myōha as
an example. Right before the Ming envoys were sent to be watched by Hosokawa Yoriyuki,
there were rumors that Myōha and Yoriyuki did not get along (春屋與頼之朝臣不快之故云
々).371 Later, Myōha terminated his relations with Hosokawa and went away to Tango in a
gesture of protest. The disagreement between Myōha and Yoriyuki was so severe that
367 Itō Kōji 伊藤幸司, Chūsei Nihon no gaikō to Zenshū 中世日本の外交と禅宗 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan,
2002).
368 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–36 (1372), 156.
369 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–36 (1372), 156. Keqin’s letter alludes to the fact that many Zen monks in medieval Japan
emphasized Buddhism’s power to protect the realm in exchange for warrior leaders’ patronage. For example, during
the Mongol invasions, Wuxue Zuyuan 無學祖元 (1226–1286) claimed that Buddhist words could be transformed
into divine soldiers and aid Japan to victory. For analysis of monks and their involvement in the Mongol invasions,
see Lina Nie, “Before the Storm: A Transrealm History of the Decades Leading Up to the First Mongol Invasion of
Japan,” Monumenta Nipponica (2023, issue 2), 157–187, and Wuxue Zuyuan, Foguang guoshi yulu 佛光國師語錄,
in Dazheng xinxiu dazangjingben 大正新修大藏經本, vol. 3.
370 In prefaces that Chinese monks wrote for Zekkai Chūshin’s poem and essay collection Shōkenkō 蕉堅藁, they
made it clear that the Zen Buddhist master held the important social responsibility of transforming customs and
spreading teachings. For details, see Kageki Hideo, Shōkenkō zenchū 蕉堅藁全注 (Osaka: Seibundō, 1998), 1–4;
257–259.
371 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–36 (1371.11.21), 319–320. Later Hosokawa Yoriyuki was dismissed and lost power in 1379.
See Kinoshita Satoshi 木下聡, Kanrei Shibashi 管領斯波氏 (Tōkyō: Ebisu Kōshō shuppan, 2015).

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Yoshimitsu had to ask Tenryūji head Seikei Tsuutetsu to mediate.372 Therefore, Myōha’s support
of the Ming envoys can be read as a protest against Yoriyuki’s poor treatment of them.
Meanwhile, Myōha’s assistance to the captured envoys was not a big concern to
Yoshimitsu at the time. He was primarily focused on how to effectively replace Prince
Kaneyoshi and establish diplomacy with Ming China. In the fourth month of 1374, Yoshimitsu
ordered the monk Senmonkei 宣聞溪 to accompany the Ming envoys back to China, in the hope
of winning Zhu Yuanzhang’s acknowledgment.373 However, according to Mingshilu, because
Senmonkei did not present a formal diplomatic letter (無表文) on arrival, Zhu Yuanzhang denied
his visit.374 Moreover, Zhu Yuanzhang condemned Yoshimitsu for keeping the Ming envoys
hostage for two years (豈意使者至彼拘留二載).375 Zhu Yuanzhang further criticized
Yoshimitsu for taking power from the monarch, resulting in internal struggles and islanders
turning to piracy (幼君在位，臣擅國權，傲慢無禮，致使骨肉並吞，島民為盜).376 Here Zhu
Yuanzhang used piracy problems as a reason to question the political legitimacy of Yoshimitsu
and, at the same time, to emphasize Ming’s superiority.
The warrior family leader Shimazu Ujihisa in Kyushu also took the opportunity to send
his own envoys to China, led by Youqian 尤虔. To express his sincerity, Ujuisa prepared horses,
tea, clothes, swords, and fans as gifts.377 Zhu Yuanzhang declined Ujihisa’s visit on the grounds
that he used the Japanese calendar and ignored hierarchy by directly contacting the Ming
372 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–36 (1371.11), 319.
373 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–40 (1373.4.11), 366.
374 Mingshilu, 1374.6, vol. 90, 1582.
375 Mingshilu, 1374.6, vol. 90, 1582.
376 Mingshilu, 1374.6, vol. 90, 1582.
377 Mingshilu, 1374.6, vol. 90, 1583.

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government.378 Interestingly, as we will see later in this chapter, although Ujihisa’s first attempt
to contact Ming was denied, he did not give up his efforts.
Indeed, after Prince Kaneyoshi was defeated, Kyushu did not entirely fall into the hands
of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu. Instead, powerful local families such as the Shōni and the Shimazu
remained influential both financially and politically.379 Under these circumstances, Imagawa
Sadayo, as Yoshimitsu’s appointed official, accelerated his efforts to obtain more power. On the
eleventh day of the eighth month of 1375, Sadayo invited Shōni Fuyusuke, Shimazu Ujihisa, and
Ōtomo Chikayo to attend a meeting on Mizushima Island in Higo to discuss possible
collaboration.380 However, at the party, Sadayo murdered Fuyusuke.381 This so-called Mizushima
Incident severely harmed relations and trust between the Ashikaga shogunate and local Kyushu
warrior families. Although Yoshimitsu granted Shimazu Ujihisa the shugo post of Chikugo 筑後
to soothe him, Shimazu later joined the southern court to fight against Imagawa Sadayo’s camp
shortly afterward.382
At the same time, within the northern court, conflicts of interests abounded. Go-Enyū
Tennō (1359–1393, r. 1371–1382), for example, actively tried to win more power, although his
efforts did not produce significant results. In contrast to his father Go-Kōgon Tennō’s low
profile, Go-Enyū actively participated in political affairs – such as discussions of state taxes,
378 Mingshilu, 1374.6, vol. 90, 1583.
379 Thomas Conlan, “Largesse and the Limits of Loyalty in the Fourteenth Century,” in Jefferey Mass, ed., The
Origins of Japan’s Medieval World: Courtiers, Clerics, Warriors and Peasants in the Fourteenth Century (Stanford:
Stanford University, 1997), 49–65. In addition, Seno Sei-ichirō’s work reveals the tenuous nature of Ashikaga’s
control of Kyushu. See Seno Sei-ichirō 瀬野精一郎, Ashikaga Tadafuyu 足利直冬 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan,
2005).
380 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–44 (1375.8.11), 120.
381 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–44 (1375.8.11), 120. For a more detailed and comprehensive analysis of the event and how
warriors had divided interests in medieval Kyushu, see Thomas Conlan, “Largesse and the Limits of Loyalty in the
Fourteenth Century,” 49–65.
382 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–44 (1375.8.28), 130; Kawazoe Shōji, Imagawa Ryōshun, 111.

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natural disaster relief, the appointment of governorships (kokushi posts) and temple headships,
temple disputes, court banquets, and so on – as soon as he took the throne.383 Some scholars,
such as Itō Kiyoshi 伊藤喜良, have noticed that Go-Enyū Tennō and Yoshimitsu fiercely
clashed in 1383 after Go-Enyū Tennō suspected his wife Sanjō Izuko 三条厳子 (1351–1407) of
an affair with Yoshimitsu, leading him to beat her harshly right after she gave birth to a prince.
Later, when he heard a rumor that Yoshimitsu would dethrone him as a punishment for this
beating, Go-Enyū attempted suicide.384
A close examination of primary sources reveals that tensions between monarch and
shōgun had already accumulated long before the 1382 incident. The first big clash between GoEnyū Tennō and Yoshimitsu occurred in the year 1376, which demonstrates that even in Kyoto,
Yoshimitsu’s major power base, his shogunal authority was not uncontested in a telling incident.
On the twenty-first day of the fourth month, Go-Enyū issued a decree taxing Sagami, Musashi,
and Kazusa to cover the cost of repairing a royal Hachimangu shrine.385 Such a decree was
unusual. As Hisamizu Toshikazu 久水俊和 and Ishihara Hiiro 石原比伊吕 have both noted,
from the early fourteenth century, due to constant political coups and battles, the shogunate had
initiated economic policies such as half-taxing policies, hanzeirei 半済令, which authorized
shugo to earmark half of a province’s revenue for military provisions.386 Accordingly, the court
383 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–37 (1373. leap 10.4) 242; 6–41 (1374.10.7), 169; 6–41 (1374.11.28), 310–311; to 6–44
(1375.6.13), 24.
384 Itō Kiyoshi 伊藤喜良, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu: hōō e no yume o otta karei na shōgai 足利義満:法皇への夢を追
った華麗な生涯 (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha 2010), 39.
385 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–46 (1376.4.21), 282.
386 Thomas Conlan notes that hanzei policies were used as a means to allow warriors to control enough cash to
support their armies, therefore solving the problem of inadequate supplies and enhancing shugo’s economic and
military power. For details, see Thomas Conlan, State of War: The Violent Order of Fourteenth-Century Japan (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan, 2003), 85 and 106.

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lost say in controlling state income.387 When Go-Kōgon Tennō planned to retire and transfer the
throne to Go-Enyū in 1370, he had to ask Yoshimitsu for financial support in order to cover the
fees of retirement and succession rituals (後光厳天皇、僧正光済ヲ幕府ニ遣シ、密ニ譲位ノ
日時、料所、料足及ビ御所等ノコトヲ諮ラシメ給ウ).388 Therefore, Go-Enyū Tennō’s
attempt to tax provinces illustrates his ambition to win some financial autonomy from the
shogunate.
Go-Enyū Tennō’s ambitions also extended to diplomacy, although whether his endeavors
posed any actual challenge to Yoshimitsu is open for discussion. On the third day of the fifth
month in 1376, Go-Enyū summoned his trusted minister Konoe Michitsugu 近衛道嗣 (1333–
1387) to discuss the complaint the court had recently received from Koryŏ regarding suppressing
pirates.389 During their conversation, Konoe Michitsugu said, “The shogunate has already made a
reply; what should we do?” (武家執進之申詞等如此、何様可有沙汰者乎)
390 Interestingly,
although Go-Enyū did not take action regarding the Koryŏ matter, he tried to establish
diplomacy with the Ming. In 1376, Go-Enyū, together with Yoshimitsu, dispatched head monk
Wengui Tingyong 文珪廷用 (圭庭用 in Mingshilu) of Tempōrinji 轉法輪寺 to visit Zhu
Yuanzhang.391 Although Zhu Yuanzhang rejected Yoshimitsu’s diplomatic requests because he
387 Hisamizu, Toshikazu 久水俊和 and Ishihara, Hiiro 石原比伊吕, Muromachi, Sengoku, tennō retsuden: Godaigo
Tennō kara Goyōzei Tennō made 室町戦国天皇列伝 (Tokyo: Ebisu Kōshō shuppan, 2020), 186. However, it
should be noted that the detailed implementation of half-taxing often changed based on specific families and
situations. See Kenneth A. Grossberg, Laws of Muromachi bakufu: Kemmu shikimoku (1336) & Muromachi Bakufu
tsuikahō (Tokyo: Monumenta Nipponica, Sophia University, 1981).
388 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–32 (1370.9.4), 260.
389 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–46 (1376.5.3), 296.
390 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–46 (1376.5.3), 296.
391 Mingshilu, 1376.4, vol. 105, 1755–1756; Murai Shōsuke convincingly argues that Wengui Tingyong and Gui
Tingyong were the same person. See Murai Shōsuke, Ajia no naka no chūsei nihon アジアの中の中世日本
(Tokyo: Azekura Shobō, 1988), 86–87.

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found the missive lacked sincerity,392 he granted Go-Enyū’s request for a copy of Tripitaka.
393
The Buddhist canon played an important role in Japan-Korean diplomacy, as analyzed by
Thomas Conlan in his study of Ōuchi Moriakira.394 In addition, Ming high official Song Lian
wrote a lengthy essay to celebrate the reconstruction of Tempōrinji, as a gesture of Ming
regard.395
In the record of this 1376 visit, Mingshilu referred to Wengui Tingyong as an envoy
dispatched by the Japanese king Lianghuai 日本國王良懷遣沙門 (Prince Kaneyoshi).396
Furthermore, when Song Lian quoted Tingyong in his record of the meeting, both used the
northern court’s era name Ōan 応安 instead of the southern court’s Kentoku 建徳 in their
conversation, indicating that they viewed the northern court as the legitimate regime.397
Tingyong also mentioned that shortly after the third year of Ōan (1370), the ruling monarch had
retired and took religious vows.
398 This matches Go-Kōgon Tennō’s timeline, who retired in
1371. At the southern court during this time, Chōkei Tennō remained on the throne until 1383.
Murai Shōsuke’s work shows that Wengui Tingyong was very likely dispatched by Go-Enyū
using the name of Kaneyoshi as an imposter envoy to the Ming.399
Why do Mingshilu and other Ming sources constantly refer to Prince Kaneyoshi, even
though he was no longer directly involved with Ming diplomacy? Scholar Lin Xuanyu 林炫羽
proposes that when Mingshilu compilers began to assemble the information about Zhu
392 Mingshilu, 1376.4, vol. 105, 1755–1756.
393 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–47 (1376), 341.
394 Thomas Conlan, Kings in All but Name, 116–119.
395 Song Lian, “Riben ruilongshan chongjian zhuanfalunzang chansi ji” 日本瑞龍山重建轉法輪藏禪寺記, in
Songxueshiwenji 宋學士文集 (Sikucongkanben), vol. 4, 1011–1018.
396 Mingshilu, 1376.4, vol. 105, 1755.
397 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–47 (1376), 342.
398 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–47 (1376), 342.
399 Murai Shōsuke, Nanbokuchō no dōran 南北朝の動乱 (Tokyo:Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2003), 107.

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Yuanzhang’s reign, they lacked adequate knowledge of the situation. Consequently, Prince
Kaneyoshi was inserted into anachronic events in order to make a coherent story.400 Building on
Lin’s hypothesis, it is also likely that from 1372, when Prince Kaneyoshi retreated, to 1402,
when Yoshimitsu was finally accepted by Zhu Yunwen as king of Japan, Ming-Japan diplomacy
was in a transition period. The Ming rulers were trying to determine who was the most powerful
figure in Japan, but could not easily decide due to the slow circulation of information and
political chaos in Japan. Consequently, Prince Kaneyoshi remained an important and convenient
political symbol for Ming rulers over a long period.
Moreover, since Prince Kaneyoshi’s title continued to be widely accepted by the Ming
government in overseas affairs, various parties who aspired to contact Ming China chose to
disguise themselves as Kaneyoshi’s envoys. For example, in the fifth leap month of 1379, a
group of envoys claiming to be Prince Kaneyoshi’s envoys visited China and submitted horses,
swords, and sulfur to the Ming court (丁未日本國王良懷遣其臣劉宗秩.通事尤虔,俞豐等上表
貢馬,及刀甲硫黃等物).401 Based on the fact that the same You Qian had appeared in the 1374
group of envoys that Shimazu Ujihisa had sent to the Ming, we can surmise that at this time in
1379 the envoy referred to as Kaneyoshi’s assembly was actually under Ujihisa’s order. The
Ming court granted the group fine clothes and many other gifts in return.402
The usefulness of Prince Kaneyoshi’s title as well as the profits to be gained from
diplomacy with the Ming further encouraged diplomatic disguises and commercial exchange.403
400 Lin Xuanyu 林炫羽, “Riben guowang lianghuai de minghao yu weishiwenti” 日本國王良懷的名號與偽使問題,
Haijiaoshi yanjiu 海交史研究 (2018), 68–81.
401 Mingshilu, 1379.leap 5.12, vol. 125, 1997.
402 Ebara Masaharu 榎原雅治, Ikki no jidai 一揆の時代 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2003), 107; Ma Wenchao,
“Mingchao chuqi de duiri renzhi,” 30; Mingshilu, 1379.leap 5.12, vol. 125, 1997.
403 For discussions about diplomatic identity with pragmatic and performative features in East Asian seas, see Ueda
Makoto 上田信, Shina kaiiki shinkirō ōkoku no kōbō シナ海域蜃気楼王国の興亡 (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2013).

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In the fifth month of 1380, a group of envoys led by a monk, Keiyu 慶有, arrived at the Ming
court and submitted horses, sulfur, swords, and fans in exchange for rewards. However, since
they could not provide official documents, Zhu Yuanzhang suspected their true identities and
denied their tribute.404 Likewise, in the seventh month of 1381, a group of envoys led by the
monk Joyō 如瑶 visited Ming but was also denied.405 And in the eleventh month of 1386, a
group of envoys led by Monk Sōshi 宗嗣 visited China but was turned down.406 During this
period, Zhu Yuanzhang ordered the Ministry of Rituals to compose a letter harshly condemning
fake envoys. In the letter, Zhu Yuanzhang pointed out that he was well aware that many fake
envoys came to visit China in the hope of economic returns. “This spring, Monk Joyō came, but
his words were false. Our officials said he must have come greedily seeking profits” (今年秋僧
如瑤來乃陳情飾非.群臣言是必貪利為諜者).407
As all this shows, establishing and maintaining diplomatic relations with the Ming could
not only enhance political authority but bring economic profits. Therefore, not only Japan but
many other foreign envoys carried commercial goods to trade in China. Take Ming-Korea
diplomacy as an example. Ma Guang has estimated that from 1369 to 1398, the Korean court
sent envoys to visit Ming more than three times each year on average. This frequency increased
to seven times from 1392 to 1450. Governments appointed envoys who carried clothes, horses,
gold, and sea products to trade. They then purchased medicine, books, iron, and weapons such as
arrows from Ming.408 Officials from regimes in Southeast Asia were also active in trading
404 Mingshilu, 1380.5.28, vol. 131, 2092.
405 Mingshilu, 1381.7.15, vol. 138, 2174.
406 Mingshilu, 1380.10.20, vol. 134, 2124.
407 Mingshilu, 1381.7.15, vol. 138, 2174.
408 Ma Guang, “Chaogong zhiwai: Mingdai chaoxian fuhua shichen de siren maoyi” 朝貢之外:明代朝鮮赴華使臣
的私人貿易, Nanjing daxue xuebao 南京大學學報 (2020), 135; 137.

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activities with the Ming. For example, in the tenth month of 1380, the Java king Badanabanawu
八達那巴那務 dispatched a group of envoys to China. The assembly stayed in Nanjing for
several months. Eventually, Zhu Yuanzhang wrote the Java king a letter sharply pointing out that
he was well aware that Java came for profits although they claimed to be submitting tribute (爾
邦僻居海島頃,嘗遣使中國,雖云脩貢,實則慕利).409
Conversely, the Ming also showed a keen interest in overseas goods. During Zhu
Yuanzhang’s reign, the Ming government issued several rounds of sea-ban policies which
restricted private overseas trades. According to Danjō Hiroshi’s 檀上寬 study, Zhu Yuanzhang’s
sea-ban worked hand-in-hand with his diplomatic policies to centralize control over overseas
affairs in the emperor’s hands.
410
In the first month of 1388, a resident from Wenzhou was arrested because he purchased
spices from a Siam diplomat.411 The surveillance officials proposed the death penalty, but Zhu
Yuanzhang expressed a high degree of empathy toward the Wenzhou resident. He commented
that since Wenzhou was a must-pass point for entering China, unofficial trade between Siam and
Wenzhou must be common. Therefore Zhu Yuanzhang ordered the resident’s release (上曰永嘉
乃暹羅所經之地,因其經過與之貿易,此常情耳,非交通外夷之比也,釋之).412 Tribute visits
clearly had various purposes and implications for Ming and other regimes. Zhu Yuanzhang
acknowledged these differences and showed a high degree of openness and flexibility, putting
into question the traditional view of early Ming overseas diplomacy as fixed and rigid.
409 Mingshilu, 1386.11.9, vol. 179, 2713.
410 Danjō Hiroshi 檀上寬, Mindai kaikin=chōkō shisutemu to kai chitsujo 明代海禁=朝貢システムと華夷秩序
(Kyoto: Kyoto Daigaku gakujutsu shuppankai, 2013).
411 Mingshilu, 1388.1.16, vol. 188, 2815.
412 Mingshilu, 1388.1.16, vol. 188, 2815.

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It should be noted, however, that although Zhu Yuanzhang was willing to be lenient
sometimes, not every regime received the same treatment. While Java and Siam often received
Zhu Yuanzhang’s favor, Japanese envoys, whether real or imposters, were firmly rejected after
1380. These rejections demonstrate how maritime and diplomatic relations were closely
connected to domestic issues. For instance, in 1380, Zhu Yuanzhang accused prime minister Hu
Weiyong 胡惟庸 (?-1380) of corruption, murder, and treason. Among these crimes, the
accusation of treason is particularly striking. According to Zhu Yuanzhang’s accusation, Hu
Weiyong sent the Mingzhou military official 明州卫指挥使 Lin Xian 林贤 to Japan to recruit
armed forces, planning to have Japanese soldiers disguise themselves as envoys paying tribute to
Ming when their actual purpose was to assist Hu Weiyong in rebelling (胡惟庸暗差庐州人充中
书宣使李旺者，私往日本取回，就借日本国王兵，假作进贡来朝，意在作乱).413
Moreover, Zhu Yuanzhang suspected that the monk Joyō was a key figure helping Hu Weiyong
conspire with Japan.414 There is little valid historical evidence to confirm these accusations. It
was more likely part of Zhu Yuanzhang’s strategy to consolidate and centralize power, while it
also demonstrated his deep distrust of Japan. Until Zhu Yuanzhang’s death in 1398, almost all
envoys dispatched from Japan were rejected.
To sum up, although Prince Kaneyoshi was defeated by Imagawa Sadayo’s forces in
1372, his delegated title as “king of Japan” continued to serve as an essential symbol in MingJapan diplomacy until around 1380. This observation has two important implications. First, on
the Japanese side, Yoshimitsu was not the sole player in overseas diplomacy. The northern
imperial court and warrior families in Kyushu as well as Buddhist monks all interacted with the
413 Yang Yifan 楊一凡, Ming Dagao yanjiu 明大誥研究 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian zhubanshe, 2016), 282.
414 Yang Yifan, Ming Dagao yanjiu, 282.

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Ming, resulting in many conflicts of interest. Second, in contrast to conventional descriptions
that portray early Ming overseas diplomacy policies as conservative and rigid, I argue that Zhu
Yuanzhang was quite engaged in diplomacy with Japan in an open-minded way. He closely
examined every diplomatic and trading request from Prince Kaneyoshi, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu,
and Shimazu Ujihisa, trying to figure out identities and intentions, and responding accordingly.
Moreover, Zhu Yuanzhang’s denial to establish relations with Yoshimitsu does not mean
Yoshimitsu’s diplomatic efforts were entirely a failure. During their ongoing diplomatic
conversations, the Ming ruler gradually became aware of Yoshimitsu’s political influence.
Although his efforts were disrupted by Hu Weiyong’s treason in 1380, Yoshimitsu eventually
gained success when the second and third emperors, Zhu Yunwen and Zhu Di, took the throne.
Yoshimitsu’s Golden Age Encounters with Zhu Yunwen and Zhu Di 1398–1408
Zhu Yuanzhang died in 1398. The next ruler Zhu Yunwen, as well as the third emperor
Zhu Di, took a more welcoming attitude toward Yoshimitsu’s efforts to establish diplomacy with
Ming China. This change was due to both Yoshimitsu’s growing influence as well as the
strategic considerations of Ming rulers.
Yoshimitsu’s influence grew from the 1380s to the early 1400s, not only in Kyoto but
also in the Kyushu region. This was accomplished in several steps. In 1379, Yoshimitsu
dismissed Hosokawa Yoriyuki and replaced him with Shiba Yoshimasa as the shogunal
chancellor, which helped Yoshimitsu enhance his power.415 In 1392, Yoshimitsu’s generals
completed the conquest of Kyushu, and the northern and southern courts were merged.416 In
415 Thomas Conlan, From Sovereignty to Symbol: An Age of Ritual Determinism in Fourteenth-Century Japan (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 169.
416 Murai Shōsuke, Bunretsu suru ōken to shakai, 10.

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1393, Go-Enyu Tennō died, and the newly enthroned northern monarch Go-Komatsu Tennō 後
小松天皇 (1377–1433, r. 1382–1412) had a close relationship with Yoshimitsu.417 In the eighth
month of 1395, Yoshimitsu dismissed Imagawa Sadayo from his Kyushu tandai (deputy) post,
assuming direct control of Kyushu.418 Sensing the approaching pressure, Ōuchi Yoshihiro
rebelled, but his forces were quickly defeated by Yoshimitsu at the part of Sakai. Consequently,
Ōuchi’s shugoship in Izumi and Ki was taken away by the shogunate.419420 In addition to these
political maneuvers, Yoshimitsu actively explored new possibilities to expand his power. For
instance, he relied more on religion as a tool. In the twelfth month of 1394, Yoshimitsu resigned
from the shogunal post and transferred it to his son Yoshimochi 義持 (1386–1428).421 In the
sixth month of 1395, Yoshimitsu resigned from the office of premier minister (daijōdaijin) and
took religious vows.
422 At the same time, he was busy overseeing the construction of the 109-
meter-tall Shōkokuji Pagoda. Having received Zen monk Gidō Shūshin’s 義堂周信 (1325–1388)
417 Hisamizu Toshikazu and Ishihara Hiiro, Muromachi, sengoku tennō, 232.
418 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–2 (1395.8), 99–100. Kawazoe notes that Sadayo’s dismissal as Kyushu tandai was closely
related to the changing situation in 1392, when the southern and northern courts were merged. The Kyushu tandai’s
responsibility evolved from a military position to an administrative one. See Kawazoe Shōji, Imagawa Ryōshun,
209.
419 Hirase Naoki, Ōuchi Yoshihiro, 170. The reasons why Yoshihiro rebelled were complicated, according to Hirase
Naoki’s research. Possible triggers included Yoshimitsu confiscating Izumi and Kii from Yoshihiro, the fact that
Yoshimitsu did not reward his later brother’s son with enough land, and so on. (146). Satō Shinichi also discusses
the accumulated tensions between Ōuchi Yoshihiro and Ashikaga Yoshimitsu in great detail. See Satō Shinichi 佐藤
進一, Nambokuchō no dōran 南北朝の動乱 (Tōkyō: Chūo kōransha, 1965), 463–464.
420 Recent work done by Thomas Conlan gives a more detailed analysis of the Ōuchi family. See Thomas Conlan,
Kings in All but Name.
421 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–1 (1394.12), 753.
422 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–2 (1395.6), 55.

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support423 in the third month of 1401, the shogunate declared Shōkokuji to be its premier temple,
ahead of the leading five Zen temples (五山第一剎).424
In 1395, Yoshimitsu obtained the title of jusangū 准三宮 (equivalent to the three queens)
from the court.425 Based on Hashimoto Yū’s research, getting this title marked a new peak in
Yoshimitsu’s influence. He now transcended conventional boundaries in the official system,
having a status of royal family members, equivalent to a grand dowager queen.
426 Upon
receiving this title, Yoshimitsu once again renewed his diplomatic efforts with Ming China, but
with great caution. In the eighth month of 1402, he ordered the Satsuma shugo Shimazu
Korehisa 島津伊久 (1347–1407) to suppress Kyushu pirates (故幕府賜久哲公書曰：近聞鎮
西海賊屢侵明國，果有此輩，遣兵誅之), thus demonstrating his alliance with the Ming.427
This strategy won him favor from the new emperor Zhu Yunwen, who was only twenty-one
years old when he took the throne. The new Ming emperor faced constant challenges and disdain
from his uncles, many of them tough commanders who had been fighting on the frontier for
many years. He was in urgent need of foreign acknowledgement and new tributes to confirm his
rulership. In the ninth month of 1402, Zhu Yunwen’s envoys led by monks Daoyi Tianlun 道彝
天倫 and Yi’an Yi’ru 一庵一如 (1352–1425) arrived at Yoshimitsu’s Kitayama residence,
carrying Zhu Yunwen’s message conferring the title “king of Japan” on Yoshimitsu (日本国王
423 Kageki Hideo 蔭木英雄, Kunchū Kūge nichiyō kufū ryakushū: chūsei zensō no seikatsu to bungaku 訓注空華日
用工夫略集: 中世禅僧の生活と文学 (Kyoto: Shibunkaku shuppan, 1982), 347.
424 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–5 (1401.3.5), 934. Matthew Stavros and Tomishima Yoshiyuki did a detailed study
examining how Yoshimitsu used the Shōkoku Pagoda to build and assert his power. See Matthew Stavros and
Tomishima Yoshiyuki, “The Shōkokuji Pagoda: Building the Infrastructure of Buddhist Kingship in Medieval
Japan,” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies (2018), 125–144.
425 Thomas Conlan wrote a chapter comprehensively analyzing how Yoshimitsu built his sovereign power. See
Thomas Conlan, “The Ashikaga Emperor,” in From Sovereignty to Symbol, 171–186.
426 Hashimoto Yū, Nihon kokuō to kangō bōeki, 73.
427 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–5 (1402.8.17), 634.

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源道義).428 In this imperial decree, Zhu Yunwen praised Yoshimitsu for following the ritual
protocols and paying tribute to China.429 He further emphasized that since he had taken the
throne, hundreds of tribe leaders had come to visit him (朕自嗣大位，四夷君長朝獻者，以十
百計).430 We must note, however, that since Zhu Yunwen was overthrown by Zhu Di shortly
thereafter, his historical records were either erased or rewritten, so we lack evidence for this
claim. In any event, it demonstrates the strategic importance of foreign tribute to Zhu Yunwen’s
efforts to confirm his legitimacy.
Much work has been done to analyze the ceremonial as well as the historical implications
of the 1402 meeting. For example, in Ashikaga Yoshimitsu: kōbu ni kunrin shita Muromachi
shōgun 足利義満公武に君臨した室町将軍, Ogawa Takeo 小川剛生 has noted that the
meeting included only about ten nobles and that it was held in Yoshimitsu’s private mansion.
The Ming side used greatly simplified rituals. Ogawa argues, therefore, that the process of
making Yoshimitsu into a king did not pose a direct threat to the tennō’s authority.431 Hashimoto
Yū has also argued that Yoshimitsu’s active contact with the Ming should be seen as an effort to
merge warriors and nobles into an integrated entity rather than to replace the latter with the
former (公武の融合·一体化).432 Here I do not intend to discuss what Yoshimitsu’s real
intentions were. I think that what is significant is that the same ritual or diplomatic encounter
could mean different things to different participants. To make diplomatic relations possible, both
428 Zuikei Shūhō 瑞渓周鳳, Zenrin kokuhōki; Shintei Zoku Zenrin kokuhōki 善隣国宝記; 新訂続善隣国宝記
(Tokyo: Shūeisha, 1995), 108–110.
429 Zuikei Shūhō, Zenrin kokuhōki, 108–110.
430 Zuikei Shūhō, Zenrin kokuhōki, 108–110.
431 Ogawa Takeo 小川剛生, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu: kōbu ni kunrin shita Muromachi shogun 足利義満公武に君
臨した室町将軍 (Tokyo: Chūō kōron shinsha, 2012), 226.
432 Hashimoto Yū, Nihon kokuō to kangō bōeki, 76.

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sides often have to make compromises and adjustments rather than sticking to a fixed set of
rules. In this case, Zhu Yunwen’s priority was to have as many foreign rulers as possible
acknowledge his rulership. To facilitate that, he took a more welcoming and relaxed attitude. To
Yoshimitsu, having resigned from his court and shogunal offices, accepting Ming’s conferring
rituals enabled him to explore new possibilities for expanding his influence.
Yoshimitsu sent the Ming envoys home in the second month of 1403, ordering the
Tenryūji head monk Kenchū Keimitsu to accompany them.433 When they arrived in Ningbo in
the ninth month of 1403, Japanese envoys received the news that Zhu Di had defeated and
replaced Zhu Yunwen as the new Ming emperor. Since Daoyi Tianlun and Yiru Yi’an were Zhu
Yunwen’s envoys, they were forbidden to enter the capital.434 However, Kenchū Keimitsu was
allowed to meet Zhu Di to celebrate his succession (堅中號賀新主之使).435 With a rushed
change of salutation from Zhu Yunwen to the newly enthroned Zhu Di, the Japanese envoy
submitted the revised letter written by the famous Zen monk Zekkai Chūshin 絶海中津 (1334–
1405), together with gifts of horses, sulfur, swords, fans, and other treasures.436
At both the beginning and end of the letter, Yoshimitsu referred to himself as “king of
Japan” and as a “subject” (日本國王臣源表) when speaking to the Ming emperor.437 He then
praised the Ming emperor for being able to pacify chaos and establish a prosperous reign. In the
433 According to Itō Kōji’s research, Kenchū Keimitsu, Shunoku Myōha, and Zekkai Chūshin were all disciples of
different students under Wuxue Zuyuan 無學祖元 (1226–1286). For a detailed lineage, see Itō Kōji, “Kenminsen ni
notta hitobito” 遣明船に乗った人々, in Murai Shōsuke, ed., Nichi-Min kankeishi kenkyū nyūmon: Ajia no naka no
kenminsen 日明関係史研究入門: アジアのなかの遣明船 (Tokyo, Bensei shuppan, 2015), 130.
434 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–6 (1403.2.19), 49.
435 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–6 (1403.2.19), 49.
436 Zekkai Chūshin was famous for his poetry and Buddhist knowledge. For details of his encounters with Zhu
Yuanzhang and Song Lian, see Ren Ping 任萍, Duoyuan wenhua shenfen de chanzhe: Riben zhongshi wushan seng
Juehai zhongjin yanjiu 多元文化身份的禪者：日本中世五山僧絕海中津研究 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang daxue
chubanshe, 2015), 146–150.
437 Zuikei Shūhō, Zenrin kokuhōki, 110.

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second half of the letter, Yoshimitsu listed the gifts that he had prepared for the Ming emperor,
to show his respect.438 According to the fifteen century Zen scholar Zuikei Shūhō (1392-1473),
Yoshimitsu’s use of a kingly title to refer to himself was merely accepting the title used by the
Ming (今表中自称王、則此用彼国之封也). The Ming thought that in Japan it was common
practice to confer a royal title on a shogun to show respect, so it was not inappropriate (彼國以
吾國將相為王，蓋推尊之義，不必厭之).439 Zuikei Shūhō’s observation, however, is not
completely accurate. According to Hashimoto Yū’s research, the kingly title was claimed by
tennō and retired monarchs. Indeed, Yoshimitsu rarely used it when addressing a domestic
audience.440 In addition, although we have little evidence to verify how much political
knowledge Ming had of medieval Japan, it is known that in Chinese political tradition, kingly
titles were often reserved for the highest rulers in non-Ming realms who visited Ming China.441
Zuikei Shūhō further tries to emphasize that Yoshimitsu’s usage of 臣 did not necessarily
indicate submission to the Ming. He notes in his Zenrin kokuhōki that in Japanese practice, court
nobles frequently used “ason” 朝臣, meaning subject, to refer to themselves after their names (日
本國之下，如常當書官位，其下氏與諱之間，書朝臣二字可乎，蓋此方公卿恆例).442
Nevertheless, Yoshimitsu was likely aware that the Ming used 國王 and 臣 to assert Ming’s
superiority over him and the Japanese realm. Yoshimitsu did not openly deny or confront such a
possibility. I would argue that together with Zhu Di permitting Japanese envoys to bring swords
and other goods to trade with China, these events demonstrate the openness and flexibility of
438 Zuikei Shūhō, Zenrin kokuhōki, 112.
439 Zuikei Shūhō, Zenrin kokuhōki, 115–116.
440 Hashimoto Yū 橋本雄, Nihon kokuō to kangō bōeki, 79.
441 Iwai Shigeki, Chōkō, kaikin, goshi, 60–62.
442 Zuikei Shūhō, Zenrin kokuhōki, 115–116; also in Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–6 (1403.2.19), 49.

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both the Ming rulers and the Ashikaga shogunate. The compromises involved allowed each side
to exercise their agency and achieve their different goals. Seen in this light, we can speculate
how a diplomatic gesture can carry different meanings and be used flexibly by different parties.
Why did Yoshimitsu wish to contact Ming at this point? Competing against Prince
Kaneyoshi to take the title of king of Japan for himself was a primary reason. Another strong
motive was to gain trade profits. As soon as Yoshimitsu’s envoys were allowed to enter China in
1403, they brought swords and many other goods to trade there.443 Having discovered this,
officials from the Ministry of Rituals suggested confiscating the weapons, because selling
weapons in China was illegal (凡番使入中國，不得私載兵器刀槊之類鬻於民). In response,
Zhu Di ordered the government to purchase the swords, waiving the penalty so as to preserve the
Ming court’s lenient image and not discourage faraway people from visiting China (上曰:無所鬻
則官為凖中國之直市之,毋拘法禁以失朝廷寬大之意,且阻遠人歸慕之心).444
Zhu Di and Yoshimitsu’s friendly exchanges continued for the next several years. In the
fifth month of 1405, Zhu Di’s three hundred envoys arrived in Kyoto, bearing nine pattern robes
九章冕服 (as befitting a Ming prince) to give to Jusangū Yoshimitsu. They also rewarded him
with hundreds of tallies and other expensive gifts.445 In response, Yoshimitsu sent captured
pirates to the Ming to demonstrate his friendship.
446
Nevertheless, beneath the surface of these friendly exchanges, Zhu Di and Yoshimitsu
had different agendas. In the sixth month of 1406, Zhu Di dispatched envoys to visit Yoshimitsu
again. This time, in addition to praising Yoshimitsu’s hard work in helping to suppress pirates,
443 Mingshilu, 1403.9.24, vol. 23, 427–428.
444 Mingshilu, 1403.9.24, vol. 23, 427–428.
445 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–7 (1405.5.1), 195.
446 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–7 (1405.5.1), 195.

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Zhu Di named the mountains of Japan as “mountains of longevity that protect the realm” (又封
其國之山，曰壽安鎮國之山).447 As Iwai Shigeki’s 岩井茂樹 research shows, ceremonial
acknowledgment of this sort played an important part in a Ming-centered diplomatic network.448
In the inscription, Zhu Di praised Yoshimitsu for diligently submitting tribute, and therefore “the
four directions (everywhere) are just the same” (是猶四方之所同也). This was diplomatic
rhetoric meaning that Chinese civilization extended to Japan.449 Furthermore, Zhu Di’s very
action of conferring titles on Japan’s mountains could be seen as a political claim, he was
carrying on Zhu Yuanzhang’s legacy as his legitimate heir.
Indeed this practice had been well-established during Zhu Yuanzhang’s rule. In the
twelfth month of 1369, Zhu Yuanzhang had issued an imperial decree to the Ministry of Rituals,
saying that as Annam and Koryŏ had submitted to the Ming, their domestic mountains and rivers
should be worshipped together with Chinese mountains and rivers (上謂中書及禮官曰今安南
高麗皆臣附,其國內山川宜與中國一體致祭).450 Later, in 1373 Ming added Ryukyu’s
mountains and rivers to this list for worship (戊申太常司言外夷琉球諸國已入朝貢,其國山川
之神禮宜通祀,上可之).451 In the second month of 1385, Zhu Yuanzhang suspended the ritual of
worshiping mountains and rivers on a central government level, delegating the project to local
provinces.452 Faced with a growing list, the Ministry of Rituals made increasingly detailed
regulations. They suggested dividing foreign mountains and rivers into different groups, based
447 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–8 (1406.6.11), 56.
448 Iwai Shigeki 岩井茂樹, “Mindai Chūgoku no reisei haken shugi to Higashi Ajia no chitsujo” 明代中国の礼制覇
権主義と東アジアの秩序, Tōyō bunka 東洋文化 (2005, No. 85), 121–160.
449 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–8 (1406.6.11), 56.
450 Mingshilu, 1369.12.21, vol. 47, 939.
451 Mingshilu, 1369.12.21, vol. 47, 1424.
452 Mingshilu, 1375.2.2, vol. 97, 1658–1660.

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on their geographic proximity to different provinces of China. For example, Guangxi province
should worship mountains and rivers of Annam, Java, Siam, and other Southeast Asian regimes.
Fujian should worship mountains in Japan, Ryukyu, and Boni.453 According to Iwai Shigeki’s 岩
井茂樹 research, worshiping foreign mountains and rivers – together with Zhu Yuanzhang’s
other strategies such as delegating kingly titles to other realms and holding new year meetings –
supported a Ming-centered international network.454
So, following Zhu Yuanzhang’s expansionist ideology, Zhu Di chose to add Japan to the
list and he ordered an inscription to witness this event. Such an act could be seen as another
strategy emphasizing himself as the legitimate heir, in place of Zhu Yunwen, who was also
capable of inheriting Zhu Yuanzhang’s legacies to worship foreign mountains and rivers.
On his side, Yoshimitsu had his own agenda. In the tenth month of 1407, he invited Ming
envoys to appreciate the red maples at Jōzaikō temple 常在光院 in Kyoto.455 Remarkably,
Yoshimitsu was dressed in Chinese clothes, and he sat in a Chinese sedan chair (即唐人裝束之
躰ニテ唐與ニメサレ).456 Why did this “cosplay” happen, and how should we interpret it? The
most recent research done by Hashimoto Yū 橋本雄 in his book 中華幻想 Chūka gensō
provides some hints.457 According to Hashimoto, by making a deliberate selection of Ming
elements and adding his own imagination and interpretations of Chinese culture, Yoshimitsu was
creating an imagined space that went beyond conventional constraints to boost his power.458
453 Mingshilu, 1375.2.2, vol. 97, 1658–1660.
454 Iwai Shigeki, Chōkō, kaikin, goshi: kinsei Higashi Ajia no bōeki to chitsujo 朝貢・海禁・互市 : 近世東アジ
アの貿易と秩序 (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2020), 52–53.
455 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–9 (1407.10.20), 196.
456 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–9 (1406.10.20), 196.
457 Hashimoto Yū 橋本雄, Chūka gensō: karamono to gaikō no Muromachi jidaishi 中華幻想唐物と外交の室町
時代史 (Tokyo: Bensei shuppan, 2011).
458 Hashimoto Yū, Chūka gensō, 21.

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Likewise, Yoshimitsu received elephants and other precious animals from Chosŏn, Ryukyu, and
other places, and he kept them in his residence, signaling his admiration for these cultures.459
Building on Hashimoto’s argument, I see Yoshimitsu’s actions as transcending two constraints:
one prescribed by the medieval court society of Japan, and the second by the traditions and
cultures of China. Irrespective of the circumstances, both Zhu Di and Yoshimitsu made flexible
use of diplomatic conventions to achieve their aims, opening their conversation to various
interpretations and possibilities. My research aligns with the observations made by Charlotte von
Verschuer that Japanese authorities adopted a pragmatic approach in their interactions with other
countries, demonstrating a willingness to strategically manipulate rules to their own
advantage.460
Yoshimitsu eventually received Zhu Di’s acknowledgment and replaced Kaneyoshi as the
king of Japan. Meanwhile, many other players continued to actively communicate with the
continent and peninsula. Shifting our eyes back to Kyushu, local warrior leaders continued to
actively contact overseas regimes for various purposes.461 Roughly speaking, after the influence
of the Shimazu family gradually declined in the Kyushu region in the late 1390s to 1400s, the
importance of the Ōuchi and Sō increased.462 It should be noted, however, that even within
Tsushima Island, Sō authority did not develop unconstrained, as the Kyushu tandai Imagawa
Sadayo held authority over the island before being dismissed by Yoshimitsu in 1395.463 In the
459 Momosaki Yūichirō 桃崎有一郎, Muromachi no hasha Ashikaga Yoshimitsu: chōtei to bakufu wa ika ni
tōitsusareta ka 室町の覇者足利義満: 朝廷と幕府はいかに統一されたか (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2020), 204.
460 Charlotte von Verschuer, Across the Perilous Sea, 166.
461 Bruce Batten has noticed that as early as the tenth century, piracy problems in Kyushu challenged the capital’s
authority and contributed to the growth of local autonomy in Kyushu. See Batten, Gateway to Japan, 101.
462 The most recent study of the Ōuchi family in a broader East Asian network was done by Thomas Conlan. See
Thomas Conlan, Kings in All but Name.
463 For a comprehensive analysis of pirates and Tsushima, see Seki Shūichi, Tsushima to Wakō: kyōkai ni ikiru
chūseibito 対馬と倭寇: 境界に生きる中世びと (Tokyo: Koshi shoin, 2012).

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early 1400s, the shugo daimyo (provincial lord) of Tsushima, Sō Sadashige 宗貞茂 (?–1418), as
well as the shugo of Suō, Ōuchi Moriakira 盛見, sent tribute to Chosŏn on a regular basis.464
Moreover, according to Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, the two often sent captured pirates to Chosŏn,
showing their abilities and willingness to help Korea suppress pirates.465 Such actions often took
place without notifying Kyoto, demonstrating the significant autonomy of Kyushu warrior
families. For example, according to Chosŏn Sillok, the king of Japan Yoshimitsu (日本國王源道
義) and Tsushima shugo Sō Sadashige dispatched their envoys separately to visit the Chosŏn
court in 1404 and 1405.466 In other words, although Yoshimitsu controlled the official channels
to the Ming, local Kyushu families used their geographic proximity to their unbeatable advantage
to conduct diplomacy with Chosŏn.
We must note too that Korean-Japan diplomacy did not operate on the same rules as
Ming-Japan diplomacy.467 As Tanaka Takeo’s study shows, Ming-Japan diplomacy largely took
place at the level of ruler-to-ruler, while Chosŏn-Japan diplomacy took a more diverse and
pluralistic form in which rulers, generals, and local officials all participated.468 Since Korean464 There is some debate about how to pronounce 盛見: Moriharu, Moriakira, or Morimi all seem plausible. Thomas
Conlan’s study of Ōuchi’s genealogy (大内系図) of the sixteenth century posits one of the most possible
pronunciations as Moriakira, as “アキラ” has been added next to the character “見” in the text. See Thomas Conlan,
“Shiryō shōkai: Yoshida Kanemigi ga utsushita Ōuchi keizu,” 史料紹介吉田兼右が写した大内系図 Yamaguchi
kenshi kenkyū 山口県史研究 (2013.21): 65–70. For a more general discussion about male and female names in
medieval Japan, read Jeffrey Mass, “Identity, Personal Names, and Kamakura Society,” in Antiquity and Anarchism
in Japanese History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 91–127.
465 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–6 (1403) 417, (1404) 874; 7–7 (1405), 584; 7–8 (1406), 332; 7–9 (1407), 404.
466 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–6 (1404) 874; 7–7 (1405), 583–584.
467 For studies about premodern Korean-Japanese diplomacy and its features, see Etsuko Kang, Diplomacy and
Ideology in Japanese Korean Relations: From the Fifteenth Century to the Eighteenth Century (New York:
MacMillan Press, 1997); Seki, Shūichi 関周一, Nitchō kankeishi 日朝関係史 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbun, 2017).
For a more recent work discussing Ming-Chosŏn diplomacy, see Sixiang Wang, Boundless Wind of Empire:
Rhetoric and Ritual in Early Chosŏn Diplomacy with Ming China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2023).
468 Tanaka Takeo, Taigai kankei to bunka kōryū 対外関係と文化交流 (Kyoto: Shibunkaku shuppan, 1982), 25.

127
Japanese diplomacy is not the main focus of this chapter, I will not discuss it in detail.
Nevertheless, here are two brief examples illustrating active diplomacy between Kyushu warrior
families and the newly founded Chosŏn dynasty.469 In the fourth month of 1407, Ōuchi
Moriakira dispatched diplomats to visit Chosŏn, return captured hostages, and ask for a copy of
the Tripitaka.
470 Chosŏn diplomat Ch’oe Chaejŏn 崔在田（최재전）, who had just returned
from Kyushu, reported to the court that Ōuchi Moriakira was a very powerful figure in Kyushu,
his lands were rich, and his soldiers strong. Those nearby all submitted to him (臣至日本觀其形
勢，大內殿當一面巨鎮，土富兵強，諸酋長皆畏服).471 Therefore, he suggested that the
Chosŏn court offer Ōuchi’s envoys special treatment (今來使臣，不可以他例支待) and fulfill
his request for the Tripitaka canon.472 Suppressing pirates seemed to have been one factor
motivating the Chosŏn court to treat Kyushu warrior leaders with great warmth. At the time, the
Chosŏn coastal regions were under constant attack, so those who had the most resources and
were geographically best positioned to deal with them were well treated by the Chosŏn court.473
Another hotspot for overseas exchange was Tsushima, where the Sō family had a
longstanding relationship with the Korean peninsula.474 In the third month of 1407, due to
internal strife and power instabilities, Sō Sadashige contacted the Chosŏn court asking
permission to migrate to Korea, bringing his followers with him (貞茂請茂陵島欲率其眾落徙
469 For Koryŏ and Chosŏn’s political and diplomatic transformations, see David Robinson, Empire’s Twilight and
John Duncan, The Origins of the Chosŏn Dynasty (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000).
470 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–8 (1407), 915–916.
471 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, vol. 15 (1408.5.22), 影印本, 441.
472 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, vol. 15 (1408.5.22), 影印本, 441.
473 Suda Makiko meticulously analyzes the diplomatic practices of the Ōuchi group in their interactions with Chosŏn
across multiple generations, spanning from Yoshihiro and Mochiyo to Norihiro and Yoshitaka. See Suda Makiko,
Chūsei Nitchō kankei to Ōuchi-shi, 51–78.
474 Seki Shūichi, Tsushima to Wakō: kyōkai ni ikiru chūseibito.

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居).475 Chosŏn ruler Yi Pang-wŏn 李芳遠 (1367–1422, r. 1400–1418) turned down Sadashige’s
request because he did not want to openly irritate Yoshimitsu (若許之，則日本國王謂我招納
叛人).476 However, shortly afterwards in the seventh month of 1407, Yi Pang-wŏn ordered
financial support for newly surrendered Japanese who had recently migrated to Kyŏngsang-do 慶
尚道 and Chŏlla-do (賜銀帶，道全日本人之投化者也).477 Scholar Kenneth Robinson has done
much work to examine surrendered Japanese from Tsushima.478 Interestingly, there is no direct
evidence proving that those newly surrendered Japanese were the same ones that Sadashige
wished to bring to Korea. However, considering the timing and geographic proximity of
Tsushima to Kyŏngsang-do and Chŏlla-do, it is possible that the two incidents were related. So
while the Chosŏn court ostensibly turned down Sadashige’s request as a gesture of respect to
Yoshimitsu, in practice they likely reached a deal and took in immigrants from the Sō of
Tsushima. This example further illustrates a premodern multilayered overseas network, in which
multiple places such as Kyoto, Kyushu, and Tsushima, and multiple players such as Yoshimitsu,
local warrior families, and Buddhist monks were all intertwined in diplomatic exchange.
Conclusion
By examining how different players in medieval Japan conducted diplomatic
conversations with Ming China, this chapter argues that in addition to Yoshimitsu, multiple
players inside and outside the shogunate were actively involved in overseas exchanges with the
475 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, vol. 13 (1407.3.16), 388.
476 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, vol. 13 (1407.3.16), 388.
477 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, vol. 14 (1407.7.15), 405.
478 Kenneth Robinson, “An Island’s Place in History: Tsushima in Japan and in Chosŏn, 1392–1592,” Korean
Studies, vol. 30 (2006), 40–66.

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Ming. The important roles that Prince Kaneyoshi and local warrior leaders played shows that
Kyoto was not the sole center for Japan’s diplomatic affairs. Understanding the story requires
reevaluating essential premises such as how civil war influenced diplomatic relations; how no
single political regime represented the whole of Japan; the complicated relations between the
northern and southern courts; and how local perspectives challenged a coherent realm-wide
narrative.
Another shift we can see during this period concerns how Zen Buddhist monks began to
get more directly involved in formal diplomatic affairs. In eleventh-century Japan, most
diplomatic affairs such as visiting foreign countries and composing diplomatic correspondence
were undertaken by the Heian courtiers. By contrast, in the late fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, many such tasks were undertaken by Buddhist monks. Such a change not only reflects
a transition of power from the Kyoto court to the shogunate over time, but the very fact that local
warrior leaders also dispatched monks as envoys reflects the segmented power structure in
fifteenth-century Japan.
In this chapter, I argue for contextualizing Japan in the broader East Asian maritime zone.
During diplomatic negotiations, Ming emperors, Prince Kaneyoshi, Kyushu warrior leaders,
Yoshimitsu, Chosŏn rulers, and other participants frequently made deliberate compromises and
adjustments to achieve their individual agendas. By examining these processes, we have
glimpsed how information circulated (accurately or inaccurately) in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, and how diplomacy was conducted by different parties under different circumstances.
Grasping this dynamic network of exchanges is the foundation needed to understand the
premodern maritime world.

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Chapter 4
Shifting Meanings: Pirates in the East Asian Maritime Zone in the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Centuries
Introduction
In recent years, questions about pirates in the premodern East Asian maritime
zone have received increasing scholarly discussion. Peter Shapinsky, for example, argues that the
history of pirates illustrates the commercialization of maritime violence in Japan. Pirates
masterfully used documents and conventions that had their origins in land-based society to
transform their control over the seas, gaining status, wealth, and property in the process.
479
Robert Anthony argues that the complexity and variety of piratical activities in Asian waters
need to be understood by cross-referencing multiple sources in Chinese, Portuguese, Dutch,
English, and Japanese.480 While most work focuses on the peak of pirate activity in the sixteenth
century and beyond, little has been done to closely examine its early stages.481 Considerable
479 Peter Shapinsky, Lords of the Sea: Pirates, Violence, and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, Center for Japanese Studies), 2014.
480 For the most recent work on the subject, see Robert Antony, The Golden Age of Piracy in China, 1520–1810: A
Short History with Documents (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield), 2022.
481 Scholars from China, Korea, and Japan have made great contributions to the study of pirates, laying the
foundation for more research. See Tanaka Takeo 田中健夫, Wakō: Umi no rekishi 倭寇：海の歴史(Tokyo:
Kyōikusha, 1982); Murai Shōsuke 村井章介 Nihon Chūsei kyōkai shiron 日本中世境界史論 (Tokyo: Iwanami
shoten, 2013); Liu Xiaodong 劉曉東, Wokou yu Mingdai de dongya zhixu 倭寇與明代的東亞秩序(Beijing:

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research has been dedicated to analyzing the identities and social origins of pirates, while the
question of how different governments viewed them under various circumstances remains to be
explored. Building upon foundational research by earlier scholars, this chapter delves into the
various roles and significance of pirates in overseas diplomatic interactions involving Ming
China, Koryŏ and later Chosŏn Korea, and Ashikaga Japan.
This chapter has two major arguments. First, shifting interstate relations continually
shaped how pirates were defined and dealt with. Much work has been done to examine how
pirates influenced interstate relations, but this paper calls for attention to the reverse side:
namely, how various states used the issue of pirates to achieve their diplomatic ends. Second, I
argue that we should go beyond the usual bilateral framework to consider multilayered, interstate
networks in which Ming, Ashikaga, Chosŏn, Ryūkyū, and Southeast Asian regimes all
participated together in shaping each others’ perceptions and portrayals of pirates.
It is important to contextualize pirates in multilayered diplomatic conversations and
understand how pirates were interpreted differently therein, and why. First, it challenges the
conventional narrative of a Sino-centered world order. As we will see below, Ming and other
regimes continually made adjustments in policy and sought different alliances to deal with
pirates. Second, a focus on pirates as active participants in the maritime zone provides alternative
perspectives on the political structures of the Ming, Ashikaga, and Chosŏn regimes. The
maritime perspective in conjunction with domestic issues enriches our understanding of both
domestic and transregional history. Third, we will encounter many players who had conflicts of
interest with the regime from which they came. Understanding these conflicts and disagreements
Zhonghua shuju, 2019); Yi, Yŏng 이 영, Waegu, Koryŏ ro pŏnjin Ilbon ŭi naeran: Nam-Pukcho naeran kwa Koryŏ
mal waegu 왜구, 고려 로 번진 일본 의 내란: 남북조 내란 과 고려 말 왜구 (P'aju: Pogosa 2020).

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helps transcend realm-based narratives of history. Last but not least, as analyzed below, many
diplomatic visits and negotiations took place in coastal regions such as Kyushu, Ningbo, and
Kyŏngsang-do, at considerable distance from political centers. Local and borderland perspectives
provoke discussion of important questions such as how to define center and periphery, the extent
of state control, the agency and wisdom of local officials, and so on.
This chapter will include many historical figures, so a brief introduction will be helpful.
On the Ming side, Zhu Yuanzhang (1328–1398. r. 1368–1398), Zhu Yunwen (1377–?, r. 1398–
1402), and Zhu Di (1360–1424, r. 1402–1424) have already become familiar: they were the first
three Ming monarchs. On the Japanese side, Shōgun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (1358–1408) had
Ashikaga Yoshimochi (1386–1428) as his successor. Concurrently, influential warrior leaders in
western Japan were those of the Ōuchi and Sō families. On the Korean side, the reigns of Koryŏ
monarchs, including figures such as Wang Chŏn 王顓 (1330–1374, r. 1351–1374) and Wang U
王禑 (1365–1389, r. 1374–1388), gradually grew briefer. Due to internal financial constraints
and instability, Koryŏ mainly relied on the Ashikaga shogunate and Kyushu warrior leaders to
suppress piracy. When the military general Yi Sŏng-gye 李成桂 (1335–1408, r. 1392–1398)
overthrew the Koryŏ dynasty and established the Chosŏn regime, his overseas policy was much
more aggressive. This was a deliberate maneuver to stabilize the newly founded regime –
specifically by using piracy as an excuse. By addressing piracy, Yi was able to open
conversations with Ming China and Ashikaga Japan, demanding that they acknowledge his rule
so that he could obtain more resources from China and Japan. This expansionist stance reached a
peak in 1419, when the third ruler of Chosŏn, Yi Pang-wŏn 李芳遠 (1367–1422, r. 1400–1418),
who was the retired monarch at the time, invaded Tsushima in the name of suppressing pirates
(Jp. 応永の外寇, Kr. 기해동정).

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I divide my discussion of piracy and diplomacy from 1368 to 1419 into three rough time
periods. The first period spans 1368 to 1392, when Zhu Yuanzhang founded the Ming dynasty
and actively sought alliances – such as with Koryŏ – to deal with pirates. During this period,
suppressing pirates was part of Zhu Yuanzhang’s overall agenda of suppressing rebellious forces
and eliminating potential resistance overseas. His suggestions were sometimes accepted by
Koryŏ but more often neglected– Koryŏ’s monarchs and ruling families were seriously divided,
and they shifted their loyalty between the Mongols and the newly founded Ming dynasty.
The second period spans 1392 to 1408, when Ashikaga Yoshimitsu and his shogunate
played an increasingly important role in working with Ming and Chosŏn to suppress pirates.
Meanwhile, Yi Sŏng-gye founded the Chosŏn dynasty and actively used various means to
control pirates. In contrast to Koryŏ's passive approach, Yi actively employed measures such as
conferring official titles and land on pirates, granting them trading rights, and using surrendered
pirates not only to quell but also to integrate them into Chosŏn society as submissive subjects.
Meanwhile, in Ming China, when Zhu Yuanzhang died in 1398, Zhu Yunwen and Zhu Di
expressed enthusiasm for establishing diplomatic relations with Yoshimitsu to stabilize their rule.
During this period, the issue of suppressing pirates frequently appeared in intragovernmental
diplomatic documents, marking a golden age of interstate collaboration and interaction. This
period ended in 1408, largely due to Yoshimitsu’s death.
In the third period, from 1408 to 1419, Shōgun Ashikaga Yoshimochi took a more
conservative and passive attitude than Yoshimitsu toward overseas diplomacy, retreating from
joint campaigns with Ming and Chosŏn. As discussed below, this aroused Zhu Di’s great
dissatisfaction, and he threatened to punish Yoshimochi with military action. Interestingly, while
Zhu Di did not invade Japan, his message had a profound influence on how the Chosŏn court

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treated Kyushu and Ashikaga envoys. Concerns that Ming might find out that Chosŏn had close
contact with Japan, and therefore ask Chosŏn for military support in a potential attack on Japan,
eventually pushed the Chosŏn monarchs to harden their relations with Japan, I argue too that this
likely influenced the decision to attack Tsushima in 1419. In sum, the Tsushima invasions
represented an eruption of accumulated tensions between Ming China, Chosŏn Korea, and
various factions in Tsushima, Kyushu, and Kyoto.
The primary sources here used include Mingshilu, Dai Nihon shiryō, Zenrin kokuhōki,
and Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok.
482 Cross-referencing and comparing primary sources is essential for a
comprehensive understanding and awareness of the biases and strengths of each source.
A Weak Joint Alliance Between Ming and Koryŏ against Pirates, 1368–1392
Zhu Yuanzhang's perception of pirates underwent a significant transformation between
1368 and 1370. As the reader will recall from Chapter Three, at the outset of his reign, Zhu
Yuanzhang believed that pirates who were pillaging Shandong in the late 1360s were actually
military groups recruited by the Japanese government. He therefore sent a threatening letter to
the Japanese monarch (賜日本國王璽書) warning that he would invade Japan and capture the
monarch if this disorder continued.483
Likewise, Mingshi also records that Prince Kaneyoshi
(1329–1383) was responsible for plundering coastal China (日本王良懷不奉命，復寇山東，
轉掠溫、台、明州旁海民，遂寇福建沿海郡).484 As interactions with Prince Kaneyoshi
continued, however, Zhu Yuanzhang was persuaded that pirates did not actually have a direct
connection with Japanese authorities. Therefore, in the third month of 1370, Zhu Yuanzhang
482 For a detailed analysis of each source, see introduction in Chapter Three.
483 Mingshilu, 1369.2, vol. 39, 787.
484 Mingshi, vol. 322, Waiguo san-riben 外國三日本 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1974), 8342.

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asked diplomat Zhao Zhi 趙秩 to visit Prince Kaneyoshi. In the letter, he said, “Those ignorant
wo barbarians were active in coastal regions and engaged in acts of piracy. I already sent envoys
to inquire about it. However, since I did not hear a reply for a long time, I suspected it was your
monarch’s fault for disturbing my subjects” (蠢爾倭夷出沒海濱為寇,己嘗遣人往問,久而不答,
朕疑王使之故,擾我民).485 Zhu Yuanzhang went on to say that when he was preparing to invade
Japan, those who were attacked by pirates had returned and informed him that the pirates had not
been sent out by Prince Kanyeyoshi (俄聞被寇者來歸,始知前日之寇非王之意).486 Therefore,
he decided to halt his plans for military action.
In fact, relationships between government officials and pirates in Japan were
complicated. Sometimes they colluded, while officials publicly condemned the pirates. If we
compare the size, frequency, and harmfulness of attacks that pirates inflicted on Ming China
during Zhu Yuanzhang’s reign versus in later periods such as the Yongle (1402–1424) or Jiajing
reigns (1521–1567), the scale in the former was usually much smaller.487 So why did Zhu
Yuanzhang pay so much attention to piracy, constantly mentioning it in diplomatic letters sent to
Japan?
One hypothesis holds that Zhu Yuanzhang used combating piracy as a pretext to forge
diplomatic ties with Japan and Koryŏ, thereby eliminating the potential resistance and dangers
posed by such rivals as the Mongols and Fang Guozhen 方國珍 (1319–1374). For example, as
mentioned in Chapter Three, historian Murai Shōsuke argues that Fang Guozhen’s attempt to
hide out on nearby sea islands after Zhu defeated him in 1368 alerted Zhu to the dangers such
485 Mingshilu, 1370.3, vol. 50, 988.
486 Mingshilu, 1370.3, vol. 50, 988.
487 Lin Xuanyu, “Shisi Shiwu shiji Mingchao yu Chaoxian wohuan de liandong xiaoying” 14–15 世紀明朝與朝鮮
倭患的聯動效應, Waiguo wenti yanjiu 外國問題研究 (2022), 4–12.

136
islands could pose. Murai asserts that was also the impetus behind Zhu’s energetically
dispatching envoys overseas to announce his rule.488
But these are not the only examples of Zhu’s tying issues related to piracy to other
diplomatic concerns. His use of piracy to win other regimes’ acknowledgement and to test their
political loyalty is also illustrated by his interaction with Koryŏ. In the tenth month of 1369, Zhu
Yuanzhang wrote to Wang Chŏn in Korea, proposing a joint defense against Japanese pirates and
Mongol military forces.489 Although the letter was written with a seeming attitude of deep
concern for Wang Chŏn’s vulnerability to pirates (言嘗為倭奴所擾，果若是，深為王慮之),
attention to the larger geopolitical context as well as the wording of Zhu’s messages indicate that
pirates represented only one factor in his thinking. It is crucial to note that Zhu’s letter was sent
shortly after the Yuan had been overthrown and while the Koryŏ court was still shifting their
loyalty between the Mongols and Zhu Yuanzhang. By swiftly claiming that the Mongol regime
had already met its end and claiming to be the universal ruler (今胡運既終), Zhu Yuanzhang
was asserting that his suggestions to Wang Chŏn should be taken as commands from a superior
sovereign to a vassal state. (朕雖德薄為天下主，王已稱臣,備貢事合古禮凡諸侯之國，勢將
近危，故持危保國之道不可不諭).490 To reinforce his image as a caring superior ruler, in the
sixth month of 1372 Zhu Yuanzhang ordered Ming armies to return to Koryŏ three Korean
hostages they’d rescued from pirates.491
488 Mingshilu, 1368.5–7, vol. 32, 559. Murai Shōsuke 村井章介 argues that Zhu Yuanzhang’s sea-ban policies were
closely related to his concerns that his rivals might flee to coastal regions and work with overseas regimes. See
Murai Shōsuke, Bunretsu suru ōken to shakai 分裂する王権と社会 (Tokyo: Chūō kōron shinsha, 2003), 182.
489 Mingshilu, 1369.10, vol. 46, 908.
490 Mingshilu, 1369.10, vol. 46, 908–909.
491 Mingshilu, 1372.6.28, vol. 74, 1370.

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As David Robinson has pointed out, in the late fourteenth century the alliance between
Koryŏ and Ming was highly unstable and full of distrust.492 Consequently, when Koryŏ
monarchs contacted the Ming asking for military support to pacify pirates, Zhu Yuanzhang was
suspicious and reluctant to grant their requests. For example, in the eleventh month of 1373,
Wang Chŏn contacted the Secretariat of Ming asking for weapons, gunpowder, niter, and sulfur
to defend against pirates (倭賊作耗…其船上合用器械，火藥，硫磺，焰硝等物，無從可
辦，議合申達朝廷，頒降以濟用度).493 Although the Ming court was initially not willing to
provide those supplies, in the fifth month of 1384, Zhu Yuanzhang granted the request.494
During this period, the Koryŏ court’s policies toward piracy were largely passive. They
sent troops to patrol coastal regions, but they did not dispatch naval forces to pursue pirates (自
來本國沿海州郡關隘去處，止是調兵守禦，不行下海追捕).495 In addition, Koryŏ rulers tried
to reduce the burden of suppressing pirates by reaching out to Yoshimitsu and Kyushu warrior
leaders for assistance. For example, in the eleventh month of 1375, the newly enthroned Koryŏ
king Wang U sent the diplomat Na Heung-yu 羅興儒 (나흥유) to visit Yoshimitsu to ask for
help against the pirates.496
Such demands did not always result in an active response from the Japanese side. For
example, in 1377, Wang U dispatched diplomat An Kil-sang 安吉常 (안길상) to visit the
Kyushu tandai (deputy) Imagawa Sadayo 今川貞世 (1326–1420), asking for help in suppressing
492 David Robinson, Korea and the Fall of the Mongol Empire Alliance, Upheaval, and the Rise of a New East Asian
Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022).
493 Koryŏsa, 世家四十四恭憨王七 (Chongqing: Xinan shifan daxue chubanshe, 2014), 1339.
494 Koryŏsa, 世家四十四恭憨王七, 1347.
495 Koryŏsa, 世家四十四恭憨王七 1339.
496 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–44 (1375.11.6), 290.

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pirates. In reply, Sadayo instructed a monk named Shinkō 信弘 to draft a response indicating
that the pirates were noncompliant fugitives, thus making it a formidable challenge to halt their
actions. (草竊之賊是逋逃輩，不遵我令，未易禁焉).497
Faced with constrained financial and military support on the one hand and increasingly
severe pirate attacks on the other, Koryŏ officials sometimes opted to lure pirates into surrender,
but this risked disastrous results. For example, in 1375 the military general of Chŏlla-do, Kim
Sŏn-ch’i 金先致 (김선치), set up a banquet aimed to murder pirate leader Fuji no Tsunemitsu
(誘殺藤經光).498 However, the plan was leaked and Fuji no Tsunemitsu fled.499 As revenge,
thereafter Koryŏ coastal region suffered even more severe piracy.500
Likewise, Zhu Yuanzhang himself did not launch large-scale campaigns against piracy.
During his reign, major anti-piracy policies relied on diplomatic negotiations and strengthening
coastal defenses. Based on Ma Guang’s research, we know that Zhu Yuanzhang relied on such
policies to prevent Ming subjects from interacting with pirates and becoming either victims or
accomplices.501 Moreover, piracy problems were used as a useful justification for diplomatic
dialogue. For Zhu Yuanzhang, the piracy problem could be invoked to accuse a regime of
negligence and illegitimacy. At other times, piracy could be used as a way to build a friendly
relationship. For example, in the sixth month of 1374, Zhu Yuanzhang sent a letter to the
northern court in Japan accusing Yoshimitsu of illegitimately seizing power and causing political
upheaval. This upheaval, in turn, contributed to islanders resorting to piracy and causing harm to
497 Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–50 (1377), 183.
498 高麗史節要 in Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–45 (1375), 43.
499 高麗史節要 in Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–45 (1375), 43.
500 高麗史節要 in Dai Nihon shiryō, 6–45 (1375), 43.
501 Ma Guang 馬光, “Mianzi yu lizi: Ming Hongwushiqi zhongri wokou waijiao kaolun” 面子與裡子明洪武時期
中日倭寇外交考論, Wenshizhe 文史哲 (2019.5), 41–55.

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innocent civilians.502 By blaming the piracy problem on Yoshimitsu, Zhu Yuanzhang had an
excuse to question Yoshimitsu’s legitimacy while asserting Ming’s superiority.503
Zhu Yuanzhang’s finger-pointing was quite concerning to Yoshimitsu. As discussed in
the previous chapter, given Yoshimitsu’s defeat of Prince Kaneyoshi in 1372 and his expansion
of power in Kyushu, he was eager to establish good relations with the Ming as a way to increase
control of overseas diplomacy and elevate his influence within Japan. Unsurprisingly then,
Yoshimitsu promptly acted to placate Zhu Yuanzhang: on the twenty-fourth day of the sixth
month of 1374, Mingshilu records that Japan (日本國) returned 109 rescued Chinese.504
Despite Yoshimitsu’s diligent efforts at taking Prince Kaneyoshi’s place and gaining Zhu
Yuanzhang’s recognition, he remained unsuccessful. If the years between 1372 and 1380 marked
a transition period when Zhu Yuanzhang was collecting information so as to decide on an
appropriate diplomatic strategy in Japan, those efforts were largely nullfied by the events of
1380, specifically Hu Weiyong’s treason, about which see Chapter Three. Zhu Yuanzhang
suspected that the Japanese northern court had covertly provided support for Hu Weiyong’s
actions.505 Zhu Yuanzhang’s distrust of Yoshimitsu was fully demonstrated in a diplomatic letter
written in 1381. In the seventh month of 1381, Yoshimitsu dispatched Joyō 如瑶 as an emissary
to visit Ming, but Zhu Yuanzhang declined their visit.506 And in a letter, Zhu Yuanzhang
revisited his earlier stance from 1369, attributing blame to the Japanese government for allowing
502 Mingshilu, 1374.6.1, vol. 90, 1582.
503 Mingshilu, 1374.6.1, vol. 90, 1582.
504 Mingshilu, 1374.6.24, vol. 90, 1586.
505 Yang Yifan 楊一凡, Ming Dagao yanjiu 明大誥研究 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian zhubanshe, 2016), 282.
506 Mingshilu, 1381.7.15, vol. 138, 2175. Mingshilu records that Monk Joyō was dispatched by Prince Kaneyoshi,
but close examination and contextualization of the event indicates that the visit was initiated by Yoshimitsu. For a
detailed study of why Mingshilu systemically labeled Yoshimitsu’s envoys under the name of Kaneyoshi, see
Chapter Three, “In the Name of Prince Kaneyoshi 懷良: Fake Diplomats from Kyushu and Kyoto 1375–1398.”

140
its people to turn to piracy that harmed neighboring nations (今日本邇年以來自誇強盛.縱民為
盜賊害鄰邦).507 At the end of the letter, Zhu Yuanzhang again threatened military action against
Yoshimitsu (害鄰邦若必欲較勝負見是非辯強弱恐非將軍之利也.將軍審之).508 Zhu
Yuanzhang did not actually invade Japan: the threatening message served more as a diplomatic
warning to Yoshimitsu to control pirates.
Controlling pirates was also an important theme in diplomatic conversations between
Ming and Koryŏ. In 1388, Ming and Koryŏ relations grew tense due to territorial disputes in the
Tieling 鐵嶺 area.509 In 1389, Yi Sŏng-gye launched a political coup and installed Wang Yo 王
瑤 (1345–1394, r. 1388–1392) as the new Koryŏ king.510 This aroused Zhu Yuanzhang’s
wariness, as he informed his Ministry of Rituals: “Koryŏ is far away from us, with mountains
and seas (between us). The people are cunning. I think [installing a new king] must be done by
the powerful regent (Yi Sŏng-gye), as we now see.” (高麗限山隔海其人多詐…意必執國政者
所為. 今其情見矣).511 Confronted with Ming’s vigilance, Yi Sŏng-gye prioritized gaining Zhu
Yuanzhang’s favor while preventing Ming from interfering in Koryŏ’s affairs. Pirate control
served as a convenient pretext for opening discussions. In the eighth month of 1391, Yi Sŏnggye had Wang Yo send Zhu Yuanzhang 1,500 horses by way of Liaodong to help suppress
pirates. In the accompanying letter, he said,
“Ever since King Kongmin died, there have been constant changes of personnel. I
feel deeply ashamed that I was not able to exhaust my sincerity to serve the great.
Since I began to rule the country, I wish to serve the Ming and ancestral shrines
so I can protect and benefit the people. Now, receiving imperial decree, how dare
I not try my best? But our horses are small so I am afraid they cannot fulfil the
507 Mingshilu, 1381.7.15, vol. 138, 2177.
508 Mingshilu, 1381.7.15, vol. 138, 2177.
509 Mingshilu, 1388.4.15, vol. 190, 2868; vol. 193, 2896.
510 Mingshilu, 1389, vol. 198, 2979.
511 Mingshilu, 1390.1.19, vol. 199, 2985.

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mission. However, they are good for fighting against Japanese pirates, as they can
travel far, carry heavy loads, and bear the cold. Therefore, our small realm dares
to send them to you as tribute” 本國自恭愍王薨逝姦,人更迭用事.奉上之禮.
不能盡誠.深懷愧憤.自臣權國思欲上事朝廷,下奉宗社以保惠其民.今奉綸音
敢不竭力,但比年所產之馬.軀幹短小,懼無以副命,然禦倭致遠負重耐寒小邦
賴之敢先以獻.
512
Having received this tribute, Zhu Yuanzhang accepted the horses and approved an embassy’s
visit.
513 In such a manner, Koryŏ monarch and Yi Sŏng-gye used the suppression of pirates as a
diplomatic means to initiate dialogue and alleviate strained relations with the Ming.
To sum up, during this first period of 1368–1392, Ming and Koryŏ did not institute largescale campaigns against pirates. While Yoshimitsu returned rescued residents to the Ming to
show his friendliness and earnest desire to replace Prince Kaneyoshi as the recognized authority
in Japan, Zhu Yuanzhang’s mistrust– especially after the 1380 prosecution of Hu Weiyong’s
treason – contributed to the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations until Zhu Yuanzhang’s death
in 1398. And on the peninsular side, lacking any other joint activities or collaboration, Ming and
Koryŏ’s two most frequently used strategies to open diplomatic conversation was discussion of
strengthening their defense facilities and quelling pirates. Zhu Yuanzhang used piracy
suppression as a pretext to demand that Koryŏ acknowledge his rule. Yi Sŏng-gye strategically
employed piracy as a diplomatic tool to establish communication with Ming, alleviating strained
relations and solidifying his authority. The complex implications of piracy for the interstate
network were made even clearer in the late 1390s when Ming, Chosŏn, and Ashikaga Japan
initiated more direct collaboration.
512 Mingshilu, 1391.8.14, vol. 211, 3136.
513 Mingshilu, 1391.8.14, vol. 211, 3136.

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Conversation and Collaboration among Ming, Chosŏn, and Japan, 1392–1408
In 1392, Yi Sŏng-gye dethroned Wang Yo and founded the Chosŏn dynasty. In contrast
to Koryŏ’s passive attitude toward piracy, Yi Sŏng-gye actively incorporated pacifying and
controlling piracy to consolidate his rule. Broadly speaking, his policies included conciliatory
measures and collaborative initiatives.
Pacification mainly comprised granting surrendered pirates food, farmland, and official
titles. For example, in the second month of 1397 the Chosŏn court granted surrendered pirate
leader Ra Kaon 羅可溫 the title head of surveillance 司正, and Kon Jira 昆時羅 the title vicehead of surveillance 副司正.
514 In the fifth month of 1398, the royal court awarded another
group of surrendered pirates clothes and food, and accommodated them in local counties.515
When pacification proved effective, it yielded cumulative benefits, drawing in more pirates to
submit to Chosŏn’s governance. For example, in the eleventh month of 1399, the court
dispatched a group of previously surrendered pirates to visit newly incoming pirates in Sŏnju (宣
州), to persuade them to submit.
516
Nevertheless, pacification did not always work, as pirates and the Chosŏn court barely
trusted each other. In the fourth month of 1397, for example, military officer Pak Cha-an 朴子安
(박자안) of Milyang 密陽 planned to murder surrendered pirates instead of pacifying them, so
as to receive rewards from the court. However, the scheme was soon uncovered, leading the
pirates to flee.517
514 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1397.2.10, vol. 3–11, 2b.
515 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1398.5.25, vol. 3–14, 5b.
516 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1399.11.8, vol. 1–2, 16b.
517 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1397.4.6, vol. 3–11, 9a.

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The Chosŏn court’s more aggressive stance in controlling pirates also opened up
opportunities for misconduct by local officials. For example, in the sixth month of 1397 the court
discovered that military officer Ch’oe Wŏn-ch’ung 崔原忠 (최원충) had murdered Japanese
envoys, confiscating their gifts, and distributed them to other soldiers. He also falsely reported
that the envoys were pirates to gain court rewards.518
Since pacification did not always work, the Chosŏn court also used diplomatic means to
seek allies in this endeavor. Allies included not only Yoshimitsu but also local officials such as
the Kyushu tandai (deputy)九州探題 Imagawa Sadayo and Shibukawa Mitsuyori 渋川満頼
(1372–1446), as well as Tsushima and Kyushu warrior leaders such as Sō Sadashige 宗貞茂 (?–
1418), Ōuchi Yoshihiro 大内義弘 (1356–1400), and Ōuchi Moriakira 大内盛見 (1377–1431).
As a result, a decentralized but energetic overseas network spanning Chosŏn and western Japan
was well established in the late fourteenth to early fifteenth centuries. For example, in the tenth
month of 1394 and the seventh month of 1395, the Kyoto court dispatched envoys to visit
Imagawa Sadayo (referred to as Won Ryo-jun 源了俊 in Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok) and thank him
for rescuing and returning Koreans.519 And in the fifth month of 1397, the Chosŏn court
composed a letter addressed to the Sō family in Tsushima, requesting military aid in suppressing
piracy and the return of officials abducted by pirates.520
In the process, Japan was not the only party that Chosŏn actively worked with to deal
with the piracy problem. As studies of Zhang Jinkui 張金奎 and Lin Xuanyu have demonstrated,
pirates in the fifteenth century often kidnapped residents from coastal China and Chosŏn and
518 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1397.6.29, vol. 3–11, 17b.
519 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1394.10.11, vol. 2–6, 20b; 1395. 7.10, vol. 2–8, 2a.
520 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1397.5.6, vol. 3–11, 14a.

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traded them overseas, forming a transnational human trafficking highway.521 Building on their
work, I have noticed that beyond Japan, Chosŏn, and Ming, other realms were involved in
human trafficking. Notably, Ryūkyū was an important site where captured residents were
transported and traded. In the eighth month of 1397, the monarch of the middle kingdom of
Ryūkyū 琉球國中山王, Cha Du 察度 (1321–1395, r. 1350–1395), returned nine Chosŏn
residents who had been captured by pirates to demonstrate his goodwill toward the Chosŏn
court.522
Naturally, interstate collaboration did not always work smoothly. At times, exaggerating
and borrowing external authority became essential to compel others into taking action. In the
twelfth month of 1397, Yi Sŏng-gye reached out to Ōuchi Yoshihiro, urging him to put more
effort into suppressing pirates. In this letter, Yi Sŏng-gye first highlights the harm that pirates
caused, as they not only disturbed “our land” but also traveled further to Chinese territory,
leading to universal hatred of pirates.523 The Chosŏn navy was filled with a sense of anger and
pity, frequently advising the court to ready battleships and launch an invasion of Iki and
Tsushima with the aim of eradicating pirates entirely (故我水軍將士，靡不憤惋，再三申請，
大備戰艦，將欲往問厥罪，掃淸海島，永絶亂源).524 However, since the Ming emperor did
not want to launch military action, and Japan was also in discussions with Chosŏn about pirate
control, the Chosŏn court agreed to halt the invasion momentarily (聖上欲以文德綏遠，而貴國
亦遣使來聘，諭以禁賊，故姑寢其事).525 By portraying piracy as an interstate phenomenon
521 Zhang Jinkui, “Mingchu wokou haishang sanjiao maoyi luelun” 明處海上三角貿易略論, Qiushixuekan 求是學
刊 (2014), 151–160; Lin Xuanyu, “Shisi Shiwu shiji Mingchao yu Chaoxian wohuan de liandong xiaoying,” 4–12.
522 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1397.8.6, vol. 3–12, 4a.
523 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1397.12.25, vol. 3–12, 12a.
524 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1397.12.25, vol. 3–12, 12a.
525 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1397.12.25, vol. 3–12, 12a.

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from which both Chosŏn and Ming suffered, Yi Sŏng-gye invoked the Ming perspective to
pressure Yoshimitsu and Kyushu warrior leaders to deal with pirates.
On the Japanese side, a highly divided and unstable regime gave different warrior leaders
space to blame piracy problems on warrior rivals. For example, in the seventh month of 1399, Sō
Sadashige contacted Chosŏn with the request to resume overseas trade. In this letter, he
attributed previous pirate attacks to the southern court: “The stubborn subjects in Kansai refused
to submit to (the northern) court, and they recruited lawless soldiers. Consequently, a state of
lawlessness prevailed both at sea and on land. Borderland inhabitants, annually embarking on
ships, pillaged the coastal regions of your nation. They set fire to Buddhist temples and people’s
homes. These actions were not due to our government’s orders.” (蓋以關西强臣，拒朝命，用
縱橫之兵，海陸無官法，邊民每歲，縱放賊船，虜掠貴國沿海男女，燒殘佛寺人屋，此非
國朝所使也。)
526
Suppressing pirates – and rescuing and returning residents from the hands of pirates –
required tremendous resources, but the economic, religious, and political returns were also great.
For example, according to research by Seki Shūichi 関周一 and Suda Makiko 須田牧子, the
Ashikaga shogunate and Kyushu families were generously rewarded by the Chosŏn court with
copies of the Buddhist canon Tripitaka for suppressing pirates.527
Requests for Tripitaka between Chosŏn and Japan,1388–1408528
Time Request sent from Result
526 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1399.7.1, vol. 1–2, 1a.
527 Seki Shuichi 関周一, “Mei teikoku to Nihon” 明帝国と日本, in Enohara Masaharu 榎原雅治, ed., Ikki no jidai
一揆の時代 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2003), 117; Suda Makiko 須田牧子, Chūsei Nitchō kankei to Ōuchishi 中世日朝関係と大内氏 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku shuppankai, 2011), 139–200.
528 Based on Suda Makiko, Chūsei Nitchō kankei to Ōuchi-shi, 145.

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1388.7 Imagawa Sadayo ?
1394.12 Imagawa Sadayo Approved
1396.3 Ōuchi Yoshihiro Approved
1397.12 Shibukawa Mitsuyori ?
1398.12 Ōuchi Yoshihiro ?
1399.7 Ashikaga Yoshimitsu ?
1406.2 Ashikaga Yoshimitsu ?
1407.2 Ōuchi Moriakira Approved
1408.7 Ōuchi Moriakira Approved
Table 2: Requests for the Tripitaka between Chosŏn and Japan,1388–1408
And when Sō Sadashige contacted the Chosŏn court in 1399 to express his determination to
suppress pirates, he took the opportunity to ask the Chosŏn government to resume overseas trade
(今後貴國人船，來往無礙，沿海寺宇人家，依舊經營，則陪臣心願也).529 As for political
benefits, suppressing pirates gave warrior leaders a chance to forge alliances abroad and counter
their rivals. In 1399, Ōuchi Yoshihiro rebelled against Yoshimitsu in order to protect his power
base from being confiscated. In the middle of the battle, the Chosŏn court received a rather
peculiar letter from Yoshihiro. In the missive, Yoshihiro began by summarizing the substantial
contributions he had previously made to help Chosŏn to control pirates. Then he said: “I am
actually an offspring of Baekje. The Japanese people do not know my genealogy and my
surname. Therefore, please give me a document (to prove it).” Yoshihiro also asked the Chosŏn
529 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1399.7.1, vol. 1-2, 1a.

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monarch 李芳果 Yi Pang-kwa (1357–1419, r. 1398–1400) to grant him land (義弘請云：“我是
百濟之後也。日本國人不知吾之世系與吾姓氏，請具書賜之。”又請百濟土田).530
Placed within the broader context of his quarrels with Yoshimitsu, Yoshihiro’s appeal
takes on a broader significance. It becomes evident that he was leveraging his past efforts in
suppressing pirates as a negotiating chip, seeking political support from the Chosŏn court.
Unfortunately, although Yi Pang-kwa was at first inclined to grant Yoshihiro’s request, after
lengthy discussion the court eventually decided to reward Yoshihiro with only fine clothes and
the Tripitaka, and turned down his request for land.531 During the discussion, Cavalier Attendant
of the Left 左散騎常侍 Pak Sŏng-myŏng 朴錫命 (박석명) expressed his concerns. In the letter,
he said, “Those who are not of our kind, their minds must differ from ours…Japan is located east
of our country, and they have caused disturbances on borderlands for generations. [Their relation
to us] is just like that of barbarians to China” (以其非我族類，其心必異…日本在我國東，世
爲邊境之患，若中國之有戎狄也).532 Such a comment illustrates how, beneath the surface of
collaboration, distrust and suspicion abounded in Japan-Korean diplomacy.
Sō Sadashige’s request to resume trade, Ōuchi Yoshihiro’s request to obtain Chosŏn land,
and Pak Sŏng-myŏng’s comments demonstrate that when different sides discussed pirates, their
considerations and agenda went well beyond military activity. Economic gains, religious
concerns, political issues – all these were considerations. Furthermore, the discourse reveals that
many parties were aware of each other’s motivations, potential strategic advantages, and
530 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1399.7.10, vol. 1-2, 1b.
531 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1399.7.10, vol. 1–2, 1b.
532 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1399.7.10, vol. 1–2, 1b.

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drawbacks. Lies, suspicions, and tensions abounded, creating a dynamic network in which piracy
had multifaceted implications and presented various angles for negotiation.
Unlike Chosŏn, which actively sought multiple allies from the Japan archipelago to deal
with pirates, Zhu Yunwen and Zhu Di chose Yoshimitsu as their sole diplomatic partner.533 Their
decisions were made with the shared goal of confirming their newly established rulership and
expanding their influence across the region. For example, Mingshilu records that Yoshimitsu
frequently dispatched envoys to visit Ming and to turn over captured pirates in 1405, 1406, and
1407.534 Although the total number of captured pirates was few, such gestures won Zhu Di’s
heart, and he often praised Yoshimitsu for his sincerity, rewarding him with gifts and precious
metals.535
Here, an intriguing question emerges: if the quantity of captured pirates was not the
primary concern, what held significance? One possibility is that Zhu Di’s foremost focus was
obtaining signs of overseas countries’ submission in order to consolidate his power. What
Yoshimitsu strove to attain was Ming’s acknowledgement, in order to elevate his own
geopolitical prestige. Suppressing pirates became the binding force between the two sides. By
submitting captured pirates to Ming, Yoshimitsu fulfilled Zhu Di’s ambition to praise
Yoshimitsu as an overseas ruler who would “follow my orders, eliminate pirates, and be loyal to
our court” (源道義能朕命.咸殄滅之.屹為保障.誓心朝廷).536 By receiving Zhu Di’s praise,
533 This is largely because Korean-Japanese diplomacy did not operate based on the same rules as Ming-Japanese
diplomacy. For a detailed analysis, see Etsuko Kang, Diplomacy and Ideology in Japanese-Korean Relations: From
the Fifteenth Century to the Eighteenth Century (New York: MacMillan Press, 1997); Seki, Shūichi 関周一, Nitchō
kankeishi 日朝関係史 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbun, 2017). The most recent work discussing Ming-Chosŏn diplomacy
is Sixiang Wang, Boundless Wind of Empire: Rhetoric And Ritual in Early Chosŏn Diplomacy with Ming China
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2023).
534 Mingshilu, 1405.11.9, vol. 48, 733; 1406.1.18, vol. 50, 752; 1407.5.26, 941.
535 Mingshilu, 1405.11.9, vol. 48, 733; 1406.1.18, vol. 50, 752; 1407.5.26, 941.
536 Mingshilu, 1406.1.18, vol. 50, 752.

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Yoshimitsu was able to replace Prince Kaneyoshi and become the sole diplomatic figure
recognized by the Ming court.537 In this scenario where both sides had various considerations
and agendas, the actual impact of pirate suppression was of lesser significance.
The relative unimportance of number of pirates is further demonstrated by how pirates
were defined. One interesting change between the reigns of Zhu Yuanzhang and Zhu Di was that
from 1398 to 1408, instead of using the term wokou 倭寇 (wakō) to refer to Japanese pirates,
Zhu Di gradually began to use the more ambiguous word, sea pirates, or haikou 海寇 (kaikō),
when discussing piracy problems with Yoshimitsu. For example, on the eighteenth day of the
first month of 1406 and the fifth day of the fifth month of 1408, Mingshilu referred to pirates
submitted by Yoshimitsu as haikou.
538 Although the word wokou did not completely disappear
during this period, the very decision to use haikou to replace the old expression demonstrates
Zhu Di’s deliberate efforts not to offend Yoshimitsu. After all, when Yoshimitsu represented the
Japanese government while turning over pirates to Zhu Di, there was no need to assert that those
pirates were Japanese in origin. After Yoshimitsu died in 1408 and Yoshimochi succeeded, he
stopped sending envoys to visit Zhu Di, and the old term wokou came back into use. While
haikou largely disappeared.539 The question of how to label pirates was shaped by complex
interstate relations.
As Yoshimitsu actively engaged with both Ming and Chosŏn, direct relations between
Ming and Chosŏn were limited. This does not imply that piracy as a topic of discussion had lost
537 For a detailed discussion of how Yoshimitsu used Ming authority and transformed Ming cultural elements into
symbols of his power, see Chapter Three, “Yoshimitsu’s Golden Age: Encounters with Zhu Yunwen and Zhu Di
1398–1408.”
538 Mingshilu, 1406.1.18, vol. 50, 752; 1408.5.5, vol. 79, 1062.
539 Liu Xiaodong undertakes a comprehensive study of how pirates were named and defined in official records in
Ming China. See Liu Xiaodong 刘晓東, “Mingdai guanfang yujing zhong de wokou yu riben” 明代官方語境中的
倭寇與日本, Zhongguoshi yanjiu 中國史研究 (2014), 175–191.

150
its value. In the ninth month of 1401, Zhu Yunwen contacted Chosŏn to request ten thousand
horses good for battle.540 Considering the historical context, it is highly likely that Zhu Yunwen
asked for those horses at this specific moment to fight against Zhu Di and his forces. Perhaps
sensing the potential risks of granting such a request, Chosŏn monarch Yi Pang-wŏn only
provided Zhu Yunwen with five thousand horses. In the reply, he said, “Our country originally
did not produce a lot of horses. Moreover, three sides of our country are surrounded by the sea,
so if pirates invade, we have to send cavalry for defense. As a result, it is hard to prepare ten
thousand (mounts). We are only able to provide five thousand horses” (上答曰：“我國本非多
産馬匹。且三面濱海，倭寇來往，必使騎兵守禦，故難備萬匹，僅可辦五千匹耳。)
541 In
practice, cavalry was not as important as a navy in combating pirates, where the main battlefield
was the ocean. However, Yi Pang-wŏn strategically employed the pretext of suppressing pirates
to decline Zhu Yunwen’s demands for horses.
Lastly, it is crucial to note that interactions between pirates and political authorities were
often ambiguous. Defining who was a pirate was a complex undertaking.542 For example,
Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok records that in the eighth month of 1406 the Chosŏn government received
a report from Java diplomat Chen Yanxiang 陳彥祥, who said his ship had fallen prey to pirate
raids.543 The pirates stole gifts such as turkeys, peacocks, and parrots, as well as medical
materials including agarwood, borneol, black pepper, sappan, wood, and clothes (船中所載火
雞、孔雀、鸚鵡、鸚哥、沈香、龍腦、胡椒、蘇木、(香)〔木香〕等諸般藥材、蕃布，盡
540 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1401.9, vol. 1–2, 10a.
541 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1401.10, vol. 1–2, 15a.
542 Peter Shapinsky, Lords of the Sea, 61.
543 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1406.8.11, vol. 4–12, 15b.

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被刦奪).544 Subsequently, just one month later, Tsushima shugo Sō Sadashige sent sappan, black
pepper, and peacocks to the Chosŏn court as a gift (對馬島守護宗貞茂，遣使獻土物蘇木胡椒
及孔雀。).545 And Sadashige’s envoys frankly admitted that those gifts had been obtained by
looting a ship belonging to southern barbarians (使者自言掠南蕃船所得).546 Considering the
likely provenance of these tributes, the Chosŏn court ultimately rejected them. However, the case
demonstrates the fluid definition of piracy.
To sum up, from 1392 when Yi Sŏng-gye founded the Chosŏn dynasty, he took a more
active stance to control pirates. Around the same time, to expand his influence and gain interstate
acknowledgment, Yoshimitsu communicated with both Zhu Di and Yi Sŏng-gye, demonstrating
eagerness to form alliances. The suppression of pirates emerged as a convenient diplomatic
pretext enabling each side to express their respective concerns and intentions. Consequently, the
definition of and policies towards pirates were shaped by interstate relations. Suppressing pirates
was about far more than military defense. It involved multilayered, complex diplomatic and
domestic considerations.
From Golden Age to Military Confrontation: Shōgun Ashikaga Yoshimochi’s Overseas
Diplomacy and Chosŏn’s Invasion of Tsushima, 1408–1419
When Yoshimitsu died in 1408 and his son Yoshimochi took power, the diplomatic
dynamics between the Ashikaga government and Ming, as well as those between Japan and
Chosŏn, underwent significant transformations. Building on the work done by Murai Shōsuke
544 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1406.8.11, vol. 4–12, 15b.
545 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1406.9.26, vol. 4–12, 29b.
546 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1406.9.26, vol. 4–12, 29b.

152
and Yamada Kuniaki 山田邦明, I argue that understanding Japan-Korea relations also requires
consideration of the evolving interactions between Ming and Japan. In other words, it was not a
bilateral but rather a multilateral dynamic that shaped each regime’s overseas policies. For
example, in the early fifteenth century, the Chosŏn government astutely grasped that the
changing relations between the Ming and Japan should influence how they treated Japan.547 I
will first discuss how Yoshimochi’s interactions with the Ming changed, and how that influenced
Ming’s piracy policies. Then I will discuss how that change influenced Chosŏn-Ashikaga
relations.
In general, compared with Yoshimitsu’s active diplomacy with Ming, Yoshimochi’s era
marked a significant retreat. Yoshimochi expressed little interest in establishing diplomacy with
Ming. In the twelfth month of 1408, Yoshimochi informed Zhu Di of his father’s death. Upon
receiving the news, Zhu Di conferred the kingly title on Yoshimochi.548 Of course, validation
came at a price. In the imperial decree, Zhu Di asked Yoshimochi to continue his father’s
legacies and assist Ming in eliminating pirates (今海盜復作,王宜繼承父志,發兵捕戮,以光恭獻
王之功).549 Yoshimochi was not interested in this proposal. In the ninth month of 1411, a group
of Ming envoys who traveled to Japan to mourn Yoshimitsu’s death arrived in Hyōgo,
whereupon Yoshimochi refused to admit them to Kyoto. The envoys returned with their mission
incomplete.550
547 Murai Shōsuke, Bunretsu suru ōken to shakai, 252; Yamada Kuniaki 山田邦明, Muromachi no heiwa 室町の平
和 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2009), 121.
548 Mingshilu, 1408.12.15, vol. 86, 1141.
549 Mingshilu, 1408.12.15, vol. 86, 1147.
550 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–14 (1411, 9.9), 503.

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At the same time, the Ming coastal regions experienced a surge in pirate activities. In the
first month of 1413, over three thousand pirates looted Zhejiang.551 In the fifth month of 1416,
another group of pirates of more than three thousand approached Liaodong and Shandong, trying
to plunder coastal regions.552 While various factors contributed to the increase in piracy, Zhu Di
appeared to view Yoshimochi's diplomatic retreat as a significant factor. In the tenth month of
1417, Zhu Di sent Lü Yuan 呂淵 to Japan, trying to resume joint activities against piracy. In his
imperial decree, Zhu Di blamed Yoshimochi for violating the principle of “serving the great” (豈
事大之道), given that since he had taken power, Yoshimochi had abandoned his father ways: he
had failed to pay tribute, and continually caused disturbances on the borderlands (爾嗣位反父之
行,朝貢不供,屢為邊患).553
According to Mingshilu, Yoshimochi quickly sent diplomats to apologize and said his
delays were caused by pirates blocking the maritime highway (比因倭寇旁午遮,遏海道朝貢之
使不能上達).554 Primary sources from the Japanese side tell a quite different story, however. In
the 1419 letter Yoshimochi sent to Zhu Di, Yoshimochi’s tone was firm and harsh, showing little
interest in befriending the Ming. Yoshimochi stated that since the state was established, all
decisions had been made by the gods, kami (本國開闢以來，百皆聽諸神).555 Japan was a
sacred realm but Yoshimitsu had violated kami’s will and accepted the calendar and seal (of
Ming China). As a result, Yoshimitsu became sick as divine punishment (先君之得病也，卜
551 Mingshilu, 1413.1.21, vol. 136, 1658.
552 Mingshilu, 1416.5.26, vol. 176, 1928.
553 Mingshilu, 1417.10.2, vol. 193, 2036.
554 Mingshilu, 1418.4.25, vol. 199, 2080.
555 Zenrin kokuhōki (Tokyo: Shūeisha, 1995), 138.

154
云，諸神為祟…比者變前聖王之為，受曆受印，而不卻之，是乃所以招病也).556
Yoshimochi therefore firmly refused Zhu Di’s order to visit Ming and to pay tributes, and
insisted instead that China and Japan should guard their own territories and cease their relations
(彼不來，此不往，各保封疆).557
Yoshimochi’s divergence from Yoshimitsu’s overseas diplomacy deserves some
discussion. Momosaki Yūichirō 桃崎有一郎 argues that Yoshimitsu and Yoshimochi were
markedly distinct in personality and ideology. Yoshimitsu aspired to royalty, as evidenced by his
acceptance of Ming’s recognition as king of Japan, treating Yoshimochi’s coming-of-age ritual
as that of a prince’s, and having his wife become the adopted mother of Go-shōmatsu Tennō.558
By contrast, Yoshimochi displayed less interest in royal status or vying for royal authority. This
was evident in his choice to reside in the Sanjō bōmon complex 三条坊門殿, which was distant
from the royal palace in Kitayama, showing his disinterest in meddling in royal family affairs.
559
Nevertheless, more recent work done by Ishihara Hiiro 石原比伊吕 suggests that the disparities
between Yoshimochi and Yoshimitsu might not have been as significant as previously thought.
Ishihara asserts that Yoshimochi, like Yoshimitsu, actively engaged in royal succession rituals
and participated in court discussions.560
Ishihara’s view regarding this issue seems more reasonable. Yoshimochi’s withdrawal
from Ming diplomacy does not necessarily signify a relinquishment of power but rather a
556 Zenrin kokuhōki, 140.
557 Zenrin kokuhōki, 142.
558Momosaki Yūichirō 桃崎有一郎, Muromachi no hasha Ashikaga Yoshimitsu: chōtei to bakufu wa ika ni
tōitsusareta ka 室町の覇者足利義満: 朝廷と幕府はいかに統一されたか (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2020), 234.
559 Momosaki Yūichirō, Muromachi no hasha Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, 252–260.
560 Ishihara Hiiro 石原比伊吕, Ashikaga Shōgun to Muromachi Bakufu: jidai ga motometa rīdā-zō 足利将軍と室
町幕府:時代が求めたリーダー像 (Tōkyō: Ebisu Kōshō shuppan, 2018), 90–103.

155
strategic step taken after his authority and political position had already been firmly established.
This achievement owed much to his father Yoshimitsu’s efforts, including his diplomacy with
the Ming. During his rule, Yoshimitsu had had to cope with constant competition and challenges
from the southern court and Kyushu warrior leaders. By contrast, when Yoshimochi’s time came,
the northern and southern courts had been merged, and most of the powerful Kyushu warrior
leaders had been defeated and weakened. Hence, Yoshimochi’s political stature as a shogun was
well established with little resistance. Under these circumstances, it became less urgent or
necessary to spend large sums of money or deplete human resources to visit Ming China. On a
personal level, Hashimoto Yū’s 橋本雄 research notes that Yoshimochi did not share the same
passion for Chinese culture that Yoshimitsu did.561 Consequently, he exhibited less enthusiasm
for keeping up ties with Ming.
Whatever Yoshimochi’s real intentions, Zhu Di was unhappy with the change. His
displeasure was clear not only to those in Japan but also to the Chosŏn court. For example, in the
third month of 1409, military officers in Kyŏngsang-do apprehended a pirate vessel laden with
Chinese goods.562 While some officials suggested sending the goods back to Ming, some
expressed their concern that Ming might take it as an opportunity to propose a joint military
attack against Japan (大臣以爲: 中國若曰: ‘倭奴，亦爾所惡也。我遣舟師以攻之，汝其助
之’，則其將何以).563Consequently, the court decided not to report the case to the Ming.564 The
case shows that by this time, the Chosŏn court had already noticed hidden tensions between
Ming and Japan, and decided to take a cautious stance.
561 Hashimoto Yū 橋本雄, Chūka gensō: karamono to gaikō no Muromachi jidaishi 中華幻想唐物と外交の室町
時代史 (Tokyo: Bensei shuppan, 2011).
562 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1409.3.16, vol. 7–17, 14b.
563 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1409.3.16, vol. 7–17, 14b.
564 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1409.3.16, vol. 7–17, 14b.

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The reasons the Chosŏn court paid close attention to Ming’s attitude toward Japan are
complicated and had historical roots. At the time, the Chosŏn government had already received
several orders from the Ming demanding various resources. For example, from 1408 to the
1410s, Zhu Di dispatched his trusted eunuch Huang Yan 黃儼 (?–1425) to visit Chosŏn several
times to select consorts for him. During these visits, Huang Yan pressed Chosŏn officials for a
variety of valuable commodities, thus creating a heavy financial burden and triggering numerous
complaints.565 In addition, when Zhu Di was preparing to attack the Mongols in 1410, he asked
Chosŏn to present ten thousand horses to assist his campaign.566 To some extent, the situation
Chosŏn monarchs were in was similar to that of the 1370s, when Khubilai constantly demanded
various resources from Koryŏ.567
Zhu Di’s dissatisfaction with Yoshimochi intensified and reached a peak in 1413, when
he directly contacted Chosŏn and formally announced his plan to invade Japan (朕欲發船萬艘
討之，爾朝鮮宜預知之).568 Although Zhu Di did not ultimately invade Japan, his message had
a profound impact on Chosŏn’s diplomatic policies with Japan. Upon receiving the news, Yi
Pang-wŏn summoned ministers for an extended meeting.569 Discussions included strategies such
as preparations of military forces and food supplies, ensuring the news would remain concealed
from Japan, dispatching envoys to Ming as a demonstration of support, and so on.570
565 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1409.4.12, vol. 7–17, 26a; 1409.11.8, vol. 7–18, 43b; 1417.8.3, vol. 15–34, 8b.
566 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1410.2.13, vol. 8–19, 13a.
567 For detailed analysis of Khubilai’s diplomacy with Koryŏ and Kamakura Japan before the 1274 invasion, see
Lina Nie, “Before the Storm: A Transrealm History of the Decades Leading Up to the First Mongol Invasion of
Japan,” Monumenta Nipponica (2023.2), 157–187.
568 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1413.3.20, vol. 11–25, 16b.
569 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1413.3.20, vol. 11–25, 16b.
570 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1413.3.20, vol. 11–25, 16b.

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From 1413 onwards, the Chosŏn court gradually hardened its attitude toward official
envoys from Japan, although on the surface the exchanges between the two parties did not come
to a complete halt. In 1413, the Japanese diplomat Hira no Dōzen 平道全 received the news that
Ming might attack Japan, so he visited the Chosŏn minister Ha Ryun’s 河崙 (하륜) residence to
inquire about the report.571 Ha Ryun tried to comfort him by saying the news was false.
Meanwhile, the Chosŏn court began slowly diminishing its ties with Japan. In the second month
of 1414, Yi Pang-wŏn ordered his ministers to stop sending Chosŏn envoys to Japan.572 In the
seventh month of 1414, when Yoshimochi sent monks to Chosŏn asking for a Tripitaka copy
again, instead of welcoming them as before, Yi Pang-wŏn expressed his dissatisfaction to Hira
no Dōzen regarding the discourteous behavior exhibited by Japanese envoys (今奉使僧不知禮
義，怒形于色，爾其詳言之).573 Moreover, Yi Pang-wŏn blamed Yoshimochi for failing to
effectively control the archipelago and suppress pirates (日本國王不能使威行諸島，以戢寇
竊).574 In the eighth month of 1414, Yi Pang-wŏn sent officials to condemn Sō Sadashige for
failing to pay due respect to Korea, and further decided to limit the number of Japanese
diplomats visiting Chosŏn.575 At the same time, the court asked local military officials to build
battleships.576
Likewise, envoys from Ōuchi Moriakira’s side also sensed a cooling of attitude in the
Chosŏn court. In contrast to prior hospitality and special treatment, in the eighth month of 1414,
the Chosŏn court alleged that Japanese envoys’ behavior was aggressive and discourteous. The
571 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1413.3.20, vol. 11–25, 17a.
572 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1414.2.1, vol. 12–27, 7b.
573 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1414.7.11, vol. 12–28, 3b.
574 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1414.7.11, vol. 12–28, 3b.
575 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1414.8.7, vol. 12–28, 10b.
576 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1414.8.7, vol. 12–28, 10b.

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court further claimed that the envoys had made threats against Korean officials. Consequently,
the court subjected them to corporal punishment and returned them to Japan.577 If we compare
this treatment with how Ōuchi Moriakira enjoyed special treatment by the Chosŏn court in 1407,
we can see a clear shift of attitude on the Chosŏn side.578
In preparation for the upcoming battle, the Chosŏn court relocated numerous Japanese
immigrants and maintained strict information control. For instance, in 1416, the Chosŏn court
transferred surrendered pirates, who had been concentrated in the capital, to remote regions.579 In
the third month of 1418, Japanese residents who lived in Kyŏngsang-do were asked by the
Chosŏn court to relocate to prevent the premature disclosure of invasion plans.580 Similarly, in
the eighth month of 1418, Kyŏngsang-do issued orders prohibiting residents of Geoje 巨濟 and
Namhae 南海 islands from departing the area.581
When military preparation was underway in the fifth month of 1419, the Chosŏn court
received the news that more than fifty ships of pirates had plundered Toduŭmgot 都豆音串
(도두음곶) in Pi’in 庇仁縣 (비인) county.582 Seizing the opportunity, the Chosŏn court ordered
the armed forces to invade Tsushima.583 Much research has been done to closely examine the
1419 campaigns against Tsushima.584 My reading is that suppressing piracy was an important
577 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1414.8.29, vol. 12–28, 18a.
578 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7-8 (1407.4), 915–916.
579 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1416.8.23, vol. 14–32, 14a.
580 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1418.3.2, vol. 16–35, 19a.
581 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1418.8.19, vol. 1–1, 7a.
582 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1419.5.7, vol. 2–4, 1b.
583 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1419.8.19, vol. 1–1, 7a.
584 Il Hwan Kim 김일환, “Sejongdae taemadojŏngbŏrŭi kunsajŏng chŏn'gaegwajŏng” 세종대 대마도정벌의
군사적 전개과정, Sunch'ŏnhyang inmun'gwahangnonch'ong 순천향 인문과학논총 (2012) 92–139; Kang, Chaeŏn 강재언, “Katakyushu (Northern Kyushu) esŏ bon Han-il kyoryu-e daehan kochal” 카타규슈(北九州)에서 본
한ㆍ일교류에 대한 고찰, Dongbuk Asia Munhwahakhoe Gukje Haksul Daehoe 동북아시아문화학회
국제학술대회 (2002), 3–6.

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pretext used by the Chosŏn court to justify the invasion. In the fifth month of 1419, when Yi
Pang-wŏn summoned ministers to discuss whether they should invade Tsushima Island, Yi used
the issue of pirates to support the invasion. He argued that if no action was taken, Chosŏn would
continually suffer from pirate raids.585 Such a fate, he said, would be akin to how the Han empire
was humiliated by Xiongnu nomads (若不掃除，而每被侵擾，則可異於漢之見辱於凶奴
乎？).586
Although the Chosŏn forces invaded Tsushima, little evidence shows that they planned to
launch any full-scale campaign against Japan. Neither did they want to confront Yoshimochi, or
other Kyushu warrior leaders, directly. For example, in the sixth month of 1419, the Chosŏn
court dispatched envoys to visit the Kyushu tandai (deputy) Shibukawa Mitsuyori to inform him
that this invasion had no connection with Kyushu (九州節度使不知國家征對馬島本意，必致
疑惑。我國兵船發行後，遣還九州使船，諭以不干九州之意).587 Nevertheless, the message
did not convince Yoshimochi. He quickly ordered Shibukawa to send military assistance to
Tsushima.588 In the seventh month, running out of supplies and morale, the Chosŏn armies
retreated.589
Having analyzed the shift in the Chosŏn court's stance towards Japan following Zhu Di's
message about invading Japan in 1413, it is intriguing to delve into the motivations behind
Chosŏn’s decision to invade Tsushima before any action from Ming. One reason for Chosŏn’s
initiative could have been to show political loyalty to win Zhu Di’s favor. In the seventh month
585 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1419.5.14, vol. 2–4, 4b.
586 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1419.5.14, vol. 2–4, 4b.
587 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1419.6.6, vol. 2–4, 13a.
588 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–34 (1419, 6), 311.
589 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1419.7.9, vol. 2–4, 21b.

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of 1419, right after the campaign ended, the newly enthroned Chosŏn king 李祹 Yi Do (1397–
1450, r. 1418–1450) quickly arranged to return Chinese officials rescued in Tsushima back to the
Ming, as a gesture of fulfilling its obligations to “serve the great” (以全事大之禮).590 The
constant threat of pirates in Chosŏn’s coastal regions was another important reason to take
military action. Due to its geographic position, Chosŏn was particularly vulnerable to pirates. In
particular, a severe famine occurred in Western Japan and Eastern Chosŏn in 1416, making life
even harder for islanders. Pirate activities surged.591 The situation pushed Yi Pang-wŏn to harden
his stance. Furthermore, the choice to invade Tsushima rather than wait for further instructions
from Zhu Di can be interpreted as a strategy to preemptively avoid potential future demands that
Ming might impose on Chosŏn. Having provided Ming with consorts, horses, and various gifts,
many officials complained about Ming officials’ constant demands.592 If Chosŏn had passively
waited for Zhu Di’s instructions, Zhu Di might have suspected Chosŏn had secret agreements
with Japan, and demanded even more resources from Chosŏn to prove its loyalty. After all, only
one century had passed since Khubilai asked Koryŏ to provide soldiers, build ships, and install
Mongol officials in Korean territory. The specter of Khubilai’s past influence very likely
weighed on the minds of Chosŏn officials. As noted by Wu Daxin 吳大昕, Chosŏn officials
likely sought to avoid a situation similar to that of Koryŏ during the Mongol invasions of Japan.
Consequently, they took preemptive action as a means of self-protection.593
In fact, Mongol’s shadow not only lingered in Korean minds, but also shaped how Japan
perceived the 1419 invasion. For example, when Chosŏn ships arrived in Tsushima, the head of
590 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1419.7.22, vol. 2–4, 26b.
591 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1416.3.2, vol. 14–31, 29b.
592 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1410.2.13, vol. 8–19, 213a.
593 Wu Daxin 吳大昕, “Chaoxian Jihai dongzheng yu Mingchao Wanghaiguo zhiyi” 朝鮮己亥東征與明朝望海埚
之役, Waiguowenti yanjiu 外國問題研究 (2017), 51.

161
Daigoji 醍醐寺 Mansai 満済 (1378–1435), in his journal Mansai Jugō nikki 満済准后日記,
described the ships as having been dispatched by the Mongols (蒙古舟先陣五百餘艘押寄對馬
津).594 When Shibukawa Mitsuyori’s forces managed to drive Chosŏn forces away, the compiler
of Kōdai ryakki 皇代略記 wrote, “The Mongols all retreated” (蒙古悉退散).595 Given
Yoshimitsu’s interactions with the Ming, it is unlikely that the aforementioned authors did not
know that the Yuan dynasty had been overthrown long before. Their decision to invoke the
Mongols when describing Chosŏn’s invading armies shows that in the Ashikaga period, the
Mongols still held symbolic power and evoked specific emotions in the historical narratives of
the time.
Conclusion
By examining how different sides used pirates and their suppression as a pretext for
diplomatic conversations, this chapter illustrates how interstate relations shaped the way pirates
were defined and managed in fourteenth and fifteenth-century maritime East Asia, and in turn
how pirates shaped political dynamics. It is true that plundering activities caused great harm and
disruption to coastal regions of Ming China and Koryŏ/Chosŏn Korea, but the problems of how
to define pirates, how to deal with them were intertwined with each regime’s broader agendas
and embedded in interstate dynamics. Ming monarchs Zhu Yuanzhang, Zhu Yunwen, and Zhu
Di used the pretext of suppressing pirates to demand that Korea and Japan acknowledge Ming’s
superior status. Chosŏn rulers strategically leveraged pirates to forge trade networks with the Sō
594 Gunsho ruijū hoi 群書類従補遺, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, 1928), 157–158, also in Dai
Nihon shiryō, 7–34 (1419), 308.
595 Dai Nihon shiryō, 7–34 (1419), 311.

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and Ōuchi families. They also occasionally employed piracy as a pretext to seek resources from
Ming or to decline Ming’s requests. Japanese authorities such as Ashikaga Yoshimitsu and
Ōuchi Yoshihiro used the rhetoric of combating piracy to vie against political competitors in
order to solidify their power and influence.
While this chapter has made an effort to include analysis of primary sources from various
languages and diverse perspectives, it is important to acknowledge limitations. Almost all the
sources are official records, so the voices of pirates themselves are largely missing. Important
stories – such as why people ended up as pirates, and the hardships and difficulties they
experienced before turning to plunder – have been largely omitted. In this regard, I would like to
take this opportunity to share one rare account that reveals challenges faced by ordinary people
on Tsushima Island during the fifteenth century.
In the fifth month of 1419, military officials from Chungchŏng-do apprehended a pirate
originating from Tsushima. The captured pirate confessed that he’d resorted to plunder driven by
a shortage of food (島中飢饉).596 His statement was not groundless. In the decree that Chosŏn
monarch Yi Do issued in the fifth month of 1419, he mentioned that as the islands often suffered
from famine, residents often begged the officials of Chosŏn for food.597 Moreover, when Chosŏn
armies invaded Tsushima, Chosŏn officials and soldiers directly witnessed the dire poverty
suffered on the island. Some Chinese residents whom they’d rescued from pirates told them that
on Tsushima Island, even rich households had only one or two dou of grains for food. (知島中飢
甚且倉卒，雖富者不過持糧一二斗).598
596 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1419.5.10, vol. 2–4, 3a.
597 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1419.5.15, vol. 2–4, 5a.
598 Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok, 1419.6.20, vol. 2–4, 17b.

163
This source vividly illustrates how piracy had underlying causes intertwined with such
factors as natural resources, state policies, and interstate relations. This observation in no way
justifies the violence perpetrated by pirates upon coastal regions, nor the suffering and distress
that ordinary people endured due to their destructive actions. However, one must approach each
primary source judiciously, acknowledging the possible biases inherent therein, bearing in mind
the neglected narratives of the challenges, struggles, and harsh living circumstances endured by
ordinary people. By highlighting these rare extant official records, the aim is to offer alternative,
albert limit viewpoints that contribute to a more nuanced understanding of pirates and their
historical significance.

164
Coda
It was in late September 2023 when I traveled to Seoul, Tokyo, and Kyoto to conduct
another round of fieldwork for this dissertation. At the time, news reports from China were
focused on berating the Japanese government for its decision to release radioactive water from
the Fukushima nuclear plant directly into the ocean. At the same time, Japanese newspapers such
as NHK were presenting unflattering analysis of China’s slowing economic growth and declining
housing market. On the other hand, as I passed a shopping mall in Kyoto, I noticed that inside,
many brands had posted advertisements along with a greeting in Chinese: “Happy National
Day!” (歡度國慶). I stopped at the sign and wondered, which national day does this refer to?
Why did the shopping mall put up such a sign? Who is the audience? Later, while I was walking
in Ueno, Tokyo, I saw a famous Japanese restaurant had put up another sign in Chinese that said,
“A Big welcome to tourists who have come to visit Japan!” (熱烈歡迎赴日旅客).
Fig. 7: Maguro Market, which proclaims “Welcome tourists who have come to visit
Japan” (Photo by the author, 2023 September, Tokyo)

165
All this made me think about the complexity of overseas relations, as well as the deep
economic, cultural, and linguistic ties China and Japan have had over time. In addition to open
arguments between the Chinese and Japanese governments in the social media, many others –
merchants, tourists, and students like me – participate in overseas communications all the time,
with different agendas and opinions. These inconsistencies, incoherencies, and conflicts together
highlight the limitations of singular national histories.
Although I have not come up with a “golden principle” that summarizes this entire
dissertation, I can point to some important general historic shifts deriving from these case
studies. First, from the eleventh to fifteenth centuries, Buddhist monks, though they had for
centuries been involved in regional exchange and diplomacy, seem to have gained more
prominence specifically in the processes of formal diplomatic exchange. In Chapter One, the
Song, Koryŏ, and Heian governments still largely relied on their officials to prepare diplomatic
documents and participate in diplomatic communications. This gradually changed during and
after the Mongol invasions, when many Chinese monks fled to Kamakura seeking political
protection and received warm treatment from the Hōjō shogunal regents. Figures such as Lanxi
Daolong and Wuxue Zuyuan used their personal connections with the Kamakura shogunate to
influence Japan’s policies with the continent, as the second chapter demonstrates.599 This trend
continued in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when Zen Buddhist monks began to be more
directly involved in such diplomatic activities as visiting foreign countries and preparing
diplomatic correspondence, as discussed in Chapters Three and Four. In eleventh-century Japan,
such tasks had been largely taken on by court officials, but in the fifteenth century, they were
599 For recent work discussing monks’ overseas connections and religious roles, see Elizabeth Kochinski, “Saving
the Myriad Spirits: The Development and Diversification of the Segaki Ghost-feeding Ritual in Medieval Japan”
(doctoral dissertation, Department of Religions, University of Southern California, 2024).

166
often assigned to monks. Over these same centuries we also see evidence of the power transition
from court to shogunate.
Another shift over the course of this period involves how different regimes addressed the
challenges and opportunities of the maritime zone. East Asian seas were lively and contradictory
spaces, simultaneously serving as zones of connection and exchange but also as obstacles where
travel was difficult and dangerous. In the process, governments had to invent policies to protect
their interests and assert political legitimacy at sea. From this perspective, I argue that oceans
were a frontier where central authorities encountered resistance and challenges. As Chapters One
and Two demonstrate, the Song and Yuan governments largely regarded oceans as a profitable
arena from which revenues and taxes could be drawn to support their rule, while Chapters Three
and Four demonstrate how the Ming government gradually began to emphasize border security
while sacrificing economic returns.600 On the Japanese side, we see the center of gravity for
overseas trade shift from Dazaifu in Kyushu, where the imperial government was able to
monopolize overseas exchange during the Heian period, to the area of Hakata during the
Kamakura and Ashikaga periods.601
Of course, this project, which uses a regional framework to connect and integrate history
beyond national boundaries, has its limits. Due to the subject matter and the limited sources from
this time period, most of the primary sources consulted derive from official records such as
Yuanshi, Mingshi, court diaries, Koryŏsa, and Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok. The views of ordinary
people, such as merchants, monks, or low-level officials, were either omitted or conveyed
through those more official voices. As I continue my research in this field, I aim to incorporate
600 Ma Guang notices that in the early Ming, there was a gradual shift from trading zones to military bases in the
coastal regions of Ming China. See Ma Guang, Rupture, Evolution, and Continuity: The Shandong Peninsula in East
Asian Maritime History During the Yuan-Ming Transition (Harrassowitz Verlag, 2021), 166.
601 Masashi Haneda, A Maritime History of East Asia (Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2013), 73.

167
more sources such as the traveling diaries of Buddhist monks, the legal testimonies of captured
fishermen, and correspondences between merchants in order to add a more bottom-up
perspective to this picture when possible. Li Yiwen has done some excellent work on this and I
have begun collecting sources such as Shaken nichiroku 蔗軒日錄, Mōrōki 盲聾記, Daijōin
geisha zōjiki 大乘院寺社雜事記, and Ribenguo value 日本國考略. Hopefully, by reading such
sources together with official records I will be able to offer a more comprehensive picture of how
overseas exchanges were conducted and interpreted by different parties.
Finally, as I hope this dissertation amply demonstrates, no regime functions in isolation
from its context, and I believe this is also just as true on a regional level. While the present work
only occasionally makes mention of regimes in Southeast Asia, I admire the work of historians
like Victor Lieberman and Anthony Reid in their efforts to bring Southeast Asian studies into
conversation with East Asia.602
Piecing all this important work together, I would like to
emphasize the great debt I owe to the work of so many scholars who have forged and continue to
shape this rapidly developing field.
602 Victor Lieberman, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, 800-1830 (New York: Cambridge
University, 2003); Wade, Geoff. and Li, Tana eds., Anthony Reid, and Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce,
1450-1680 (New Haven: Yale University, 1988). In addition to Southeast Asian studies, I also acknowledge that
Tansen Sen has made important contributions to connecting China with India, which is beyond my expertise in
making detailed comments. See Tansen Sen, India, China, and the World: A Connected History (Lanham,
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).

168
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Abstract (if available)

Abstract By taking a cross-border approach to examine regional, transrealm (rather than realm-based) exchange in China, Japan, and Korea over four hundred years, c. 1000–1400 C.E., I seek to reconceptualize the history of East Asian seas, thereby challenging narratives that focus on one regime at a time. I argue that the complexity of each individual regime cannot be adequately understood outside the context of their interactions with other regimes and cultures. Moreover, different regimes often leave highly dissimilar historical records regarding the same events, making cross-referencing of primary sources in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean necessary. In addition, I compare and connect the trajectories and dynamics in the maritime zone with land-based history during this period so as to highlight that East Asian seas were a zone of contest wherein different state policies and other sorts of differences existed. This framework – which emphasizes multilayered, multilingual, and multilateral exchanges between China, Japan, and Korea – strives to link domestic political change with a broader regional network, to describe changes in commercial and religious organizations, and to include participants such as emperors, ministers, warrior leaders, monks, merchants, and pirates. My point is not to undermine traditional Chinese, Japanese, or Korean approaches to historical analysis, as they form the bedrock for scholarship. Instead, building upon that research, I aim to foster a meaningful dialogue between Chinese, Japanese, and Korean scholarship that will broaden and deepen what we can know about these histories.

In Chapter One, I examine Koryŏ King Munjong's (Wang Hui 王徽1019-1083, r.1046-1083) medical appeals to Song China and Heian Japan during the 1070s to 1080s. It underscores how distinct responses were influenced by shifting inter-state dynamics. The overlooked medical embassy emerges as a pivotal diplomatic conduit for Koryŏ, aiming to align with Song against Liao. In contrast, Heian Japan's seemingly disinterested stance masks a deliberate strategy to avoid integration into the Song-centered international order. By analyzing medical envoys, this study illuminates how complex inter-state relationships generated varied diplomatic outcomes in eleventh-century East Asia.

In Chapter Two I study pre-1274 diplomatic negotiations before the Mongol invasions of Japan. The 1274 and 1281 Mongol invasions have been extensively studied. The preceding negotiation process, involving Khubilai Khan, Chinese advisors, the Koryŏ king, the Kamakura shogunate, and the Japanese imperial court, has yet to be thoroughly explored. Drawing from Mongol, Korean, and Japanese primary sources, this chapter argues that a focus solely on the Mongols and Japan is inadequate to grasp the invasion’s intricacies. Adopting a transnational and maritime lens integrates the event within a wider geographic context. Furthermore, diverse strategies by different regimes dealing with the Mongols offer fresh interpretations of the medieval maritime world, beyond the conventional Mongol empire-centric narrative. This article shifts attention to how varied players reacted in negotiations. I aim to transcend political realm confines to explore this pivotal East Asian and global historical event.

In Chapter Three, I explore how inter-state relationships profoundly shaped the definition of pirates and policies toward piracy in the fourteenth-century maritime zone. Raiding activities caused disruptions along the coasts of Ming China, Koryŏ, and later Chosŏn Korea, but defining the identity of pirates, selecting communication partners, and determining solutions were consistently influenced by each regime's broader objectives. Moreover, these objectives were intricately interconnected within a wider framework of inter-state relations. Ming rulers, including Zhu Yuanzhang, Zhu Yunwen, and Zhu Di suppressed piracy to showcase Ming's dominance. Chosŏn rulers utilized pirates to forge trade links with the Sō and Ōuchi clans. They also leveraged piracy to seek resources from or decline Ming's requests. Japanese figures like Ashikaga Yoshimitsu and Ōuchi Yoshihiro used anti-piracy efforts to consolidate their power and outmaneuver rivals. This chapter employs piracy as a case study to exemplify how a multi-layered inter-state network consistently influenced the piracy issue.

In Chapter Four, I investigate medieval Japan's diplomatic interactions with Ming China, accentuating the persistent challenges that Prince Kaneyoshi, Go-Enyū Tennō, and Kyushu warrior leaders posed to Yoshimitsu. This challenges the traditional linear narrative of Yoshimitsu's seamless ascent to power. Furthermore, the vibrant diplomatic exchanges between Kyushu and the continent reveal the existence of multiple diplomatic hubs in late medieval Japan, aside from Kyoto. This observation underscores the prevalence of conflicting interests within each realm. By scrutinizing diplomatic history through a micro, local history lens, this chapter reinforces the imperative of moving beyond political boundaries and embracing a transregional perspective to study the premodern maritime world.

Studying overseas exchange in East Asia from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries presents specific challenges. The primary sources regarding these exchanges are dispersed geographically and they are written in multiple languages. Besides, overseas exchanges were interconnected with domestic circumstances that must be studied as well. To enable a deep, multilateral analysis, I compared sources from China, Korea, Japan, and the Mongols. I also link domestic history to overseas policies, to connect disparate threads in the analysis. Of course, conflicts, differences, and disagreements abounded, and no single definitive narrative can be written. Indeed, the varied stances of different players are important, as they in turn highlight the need to go beyond single-realm narratives to examine East Asian history from a multilingual, multilayered, and multilateral perspective.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Nie, Lina (author)

Core Title Going offshore: studies of the maritime zone in East Asia from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program History

Degree Conferral Date 2024-08

Publication Date 07/17/2024

Defense Date 06/25/2024

Publisher Los Angeles, California (original), University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag connected history,diplomacy,East Asia,maritime,multilingual primary sources,OAI-PMH Harvest,transnational

Format theses (aat)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Goldstein, Joshua (committee chair), Meeks, Lori (committee member), Piggott, Joan (committee member), Von Glahn, Richard (committee member)

Creator Email linanie@tamu.edu,linanie@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC113997X8T

Unique identifier UC113997X8T

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Legacy Identifier etd-NieLina-13258

Document Type Dissertation

Format theses (aat)

Rights Nie, Lina

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