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Participating in your own survival: a gap analysis study of the implementation of active shooter preparedness programs in mid-to-large size organizations

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Participating in your own survival: a gap analysis study of the implementation of active shooter preparedness programs in mid-to-large size organizations

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Participating in Your Own Survival: A Gap Analysis Study of the Implementation of
Active Shooter Preparedness Programs in Mid-to-Large Size Organizations

Cory Hanson

Rossier School of Education
University of Southern California
A dissertation submitted to the faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Education

May 2023

© Copyright by Cory Hanson 2023
All Rights Reserved

The Committee for Cory Hanson certifies the approval of this Dissertation

Susanne Foulk
Robert Filback
Adrian Donato, Committee Chair

Rossier School of Education
University of Southern California
2023

iv
Abstract
Active shooter incidents are increasing at exponential rates having more than doubled from 2017
to 2021. More than half of the active shooter incidents take place inside a building and almost
three quarters of the incidents conclude prior to the arrival of first responders. When examined
together, these three facts serve to indicate a less than favorable outcome for anyone who finds
themselves in an active shooter incident. However, there are options that organizations and
individuals can do to prepare themselves and mitigate the risk. Unfortunately, only a small
percentage of organizations have a plan in place to help their employees participate in their own
survival. The overarching focus of this research was to understand the knowledge, motivation,
and organizational resources required to help an organization’s senior security executive in
implementation of an active shooter preparedness plan. The study participants included 36 senior
security executives from various industries who have successfully implemented an active shooter
preparedness plan. The mixed methods research study included a survey and interviews. It was
identified that senior security executives require training in organizational policy implementation
and change management skills as well as support from executives and organizational leadership.
Keywords: senior security executive; active shooter incident; Prevention, Preparedness,
Policy implementation; change management

v
Dedication
To my family. My wife, Kristen, for her continuous, loving support and all the single parenting
she did while I pursued this goal. To my kids, Grayson, Eastyn, Owen, and Cameron, watching
you grow, be curious, and learn is what pushes me to set and achieve ambitious goals. I wanted
you all to know that you can do anything you set your mind to, and if you are going to dream,
dream big.

To my parents, who, through their example, instilled in me a love of learning and an unflinching
work ethic. I would not be who I am, or where I am, without my parents as my role models.
Thank you.

To every friend, colleague, educator, and family member who has encouraged and supported me
in this endeavor and all others, I am forever grateful. I consider myself lucky to be surrounded by
those who lift me up and fill me with energy and joy.

vi
Acknowledgements
I would like to gratefully and humbly acknowledge the support and guidance from my
committee members; my chair, Dr. Adrian Donato; my dissertation advisor, Dr. Susanne Foulk;
and Dr. Robert Filback. I am thankful for the time, attention, and care provided to me and my
work throughout this process.
From the start of this program, my goal was to select a focus for my study that would be
impactful. I had the opportunity to participate in active shooter response training at my own
organization, and that was when the lightbulb went off for me. Studying active shooter training
would provide me the opportunity to teach others in my industry how to raise their level of safety
and security in their workplace, thus keeping people safe. As soon as I selected my topic, I
became more aware of the issue, and it seemed that every day there was a headline that served as
a reminder that this is an important topic and provided fuel for my journey. I am grateful for all
the industry colleagues who volunteered to help in many ways. I would not have been able to
complete this study without their help. I hope I was able to contribute to the strengthening of our
field and help organizations fulfill their sacred duty of keeping people safe.

vii
Table of Contents
Dedication ........................................................................................................................................v
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ vi
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. xi
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................xv
Chapter One: Introduction ...............................................................................................................1
Field Context and Mission ...................................................................................................1
Field Performance Status .....................................................................................................3
Related Literature.................................................................................................................3
Importance of Addressing the Problem ...............................................................................5
Global Field SMART Goal ..................................................................................................5
Description of Stakeholder Groups ......................................................................................6
Stakeholder Group of Focus and Performance Goal for the Study .....................................7
Purpose of the Project and Questions ..................................................................................9
Overview of the Conceptual and Methodological Framework ........................................................9
Definitions..........................................................................................................................10
Organization of the Project ................................................................................................11
Chapter Two: Review of the Literature .........................................................................................12
Influences on the Problem of Practice ...............................................................................12
Conceptual Framework ......................................................................................................36
Stakeholder Knowledge, Motivation, and Organizational Influences ...............................37
Summary ............................................................................................................................57
Chapter Three: Methods ................................................................................................................59
Conceptual and Methodological Framework .....................................................................59
Overview of Design ...........................................................................................................61

viii
Participating Stakeholders .................................................................................................62
Data Collection and Instrumentation .................................................................................66
Data Analysis .....................................................................................................................68
Credibility and Trustworthiness .........................................................................................68
Validity and Reliability ......................................................................................................69
Ethics..................................................................................................................................70
Role of Investigator............................................................................................................72
Limitations and Delimitations ............................................................................................73
Chapter Four: Results and Findings ...............................................................................................74
Participating Stakeholders .................................................................................................75
Determination of Assets and Needs ...................................................................................80
Results and Findings for Knowledge Causes.....................................................................81
Results and Findings for Motivation Causes ...................................................................115
Results and Findings for Organization Causes ................................................................132
Summary of Validated Influences ...................................................................................152
Chapter Five: Solutions and Integrated Implementation and Evaluation Plan ............................156
Discussion ........................................................................................................................156
Field Context and Mission ...............................................................................................157
Global Field SMART Goal ..............................................................................................158
Description of Stakeholder Groups ..................................................................................159
Goal of the Stakeholder Group for the Study ..................................................................160
Purpose of the Project and Questions ..............................................................................161
Overview ..........................................................................................................................162
Recommendations for Practice to Address KMO Influences ..........................................163
Integrated Implementation and Evaluation Plan ..............................................................185

ix
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Approach ....................................................................198
Limitations and Delimitations ..........................................................................................199
Future Research ...............................................................................................................200
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................201
References ....................................................................................................................................203
Appendix A: Pre-interview Recruiting Communications ............................................................225
Pre-interview: Initial Email to Request Study Participation ............................................225
Pre-interview: Email to Confirm Participation for Study ................................................226
Appendix B: Information Sheet for Exempt Research ................................................................227
Appendix C: KMO Survey Crosswalk ........................................................................................229
Appendix D: KMO Survey Protocol............................................................................................232
Appendix E: KMO Interview Crosswalk .....................................................................................242
Appendix F: KMO Interview Protocol ........................................................................................246
Background/Demographic ...............................................................................................246
Knowledge: Factual .........................................................................................................246
Knowledge: Conceptual ...................................................................................................247
Knowledge: Procedural ....................................................................................................247
Knowledge: Metacognitive ..............................................................................................249
Motivation: Utility Value .................................................................................................249
Motivation: Individual Self-efficacy................................................................................249
Motivation: Collective Self-efficacy................................................................................249
Motivation: Expectancy Value ........................................................................................249
Motivation: Attribution ....................................................................................................250
Organizational Resources: Time ......................................................................................250
Organizational Resources: Funding .................................................................................250

x
Organizational Resources: Policies and Procedures ........................................................250
Organizational Resources: Culture ..................................................................................250
Organizational Resources: Authority ...............................................................................251
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................251
Appendix G Immediate Reaction Evaluation Tool ......................................................................252
Appendix H: Delayed Reaction Evaluation Tool ........................................................................254

xi
List of Tables
Table 1 Organizational Mission, Organizational Performance Goal, and Aligned Stakeholder
Performance Goal 8
Table 2 Summary of Assumed Knowledge Influences on SSE’s Ability to Implement Active
Shooter Preparedness Training 45
Table 3 Summary of Assumed Motivation Influences on SSE’s Ability to Implement Active
Shooter Preparedness Training 51
Table 4 Summary of Assumed Organization Influences on SSE’s Ability to Implement Active
Shooter Preparedness Training 57
Table 5 Data Sources 62
Table 6 Participating Stakeholder Demographics 63
Table 7 Industries Represented by Survey Participants 76
Table 8 Demographic Information of Interview Participants 79
Table 9 SSE Reported Facts Related to Active Shooter Incidents 82
Table 10 SSE Reported Duration of Active Shooter Incidents 83
Table 11 Terms Used Regarding Source of Factual Knowledge of Active Shooter Incidents 85
Table 12 SSE Reported Organizational Policy Implementation Key Ideas 86
Table 13 Themes Around Organizational Policy Implementation from Interview Participants 88
Table 14 SSE Reported Identification of Drivers That Lead to Employees’ Perception of Safety
and Security in the Workplace 89
Table 15 Themes Around Drivers of Employee Perception of Safety and Security From
Interview Participants 90
Table 16 Reported Modality and Frequency of Active Shooter Response Training Plan
Components 92
Table 17 Components of Training Mentioned During Interviews 94
Table 18 SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Facilitating Change Management 95
Table 19 SSE Accuracy in Ordering Change Management Steps 96
Table 20 Themes Around Facilitating Change Management from Interview Participants 98

xii
Table 21 SSE Reported Connection of Relationship of Active Shooter Training to Perception of
Safety and Security in the Workplace 99
Table 22 Themes Around Relationship Between Active Shooter Training and Employee
Performance from Interview Participants 100
Table 23 SSE Reported Agreement with Statement on Organizational Decision-Making Process
102
Table 24 SSE Accuracy in Ordering Decision-Making Process Steps 102
Table 25 Themes Around the Decision-Making Process from Interview Participants 104
Table 26 SSE Reported Agreement with Statement on Policy Implementation 105
Table 27 SSE Accuracy in Ordering Policy Implementation Steps 106
Table 28 Themes Around Organizational Policy Implementation Experience from Interview
Participants 108
Table 29 SSE Suggestions to Reduce Stress and Anxiety in Active Shooter Response Training
110
Table 30 SSE Suggestions to Mitigate Potential of Trauma in Active Shooter Response Training
112
Table 31 Themes Around Approaches to Mitigate Trauma from Training from Interview
Participants 113
Table 32 SSE Reported Beliefs About the Value of Active Shooter Response Training 116
Table 33 Themes Around Utility Value Theory from Interview Participants 118
Table 34 SSE Reported Self-Efficacy Regarding Active Shooter Policy Implementation 120
Table 35 Themes Around Self-Efficacy of Implementing Active Shooter Response Training
From Interview Participants 121
Table 36 SSE Reported Collective Efficacy Regarding Active Shooter Policy Implementation 123
Table 37 Themes Around Collective Efficacy From Interview Participants 125
Table 38 SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Active Shooter Training Raising
Perception of Safety 127
Table 39 Themes Around Motivation and Expectancy Value From Interview Participants 128
Table 40 SSE Reported Agreement With Attribution of Increased Personal Wellness 130

xiii
Table 41 Themes Around Personal Wellness From Interview Participants 131
Table 42 SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Time 133
Table 43 Themes Around Time for Due Diligence and Implementation From Interview
Participants 134
Table 44 SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Funding 136
Table 45 Themes Around Funding of Training From Interview Participants 137
Table 46 SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Existence of Policies and Procedures 139
Table 47 SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Exercising Policies and Procedures 139
Table 48 Themes Around Processes, Policies, and Procedures From Interview Participants 142
Table 49 SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Culture of Security 143
Table 50 SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Stakeholder Involvement 144
Table 51 SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Receptiveness to Active Shooter Training
145
Table 52 Themes Around a Culture of Security and Executive Support From Interview
Participants 148
Table 53 SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Authority to Implement Active Shooter
Training 150
Table 54 Themes Around Authority to Implement Active Shooter Training From Interview
Participants 152
Table 55 Knowledge Assets as Determined by the Data 153
Table 56 Motivation Assets As Determined by the Data 154
Table 57 Organization Assets As Determined by the Data 155
Table 58 Summary of Knowledge Influences and Recommendations 164
Table 59 Summary of Motivation Influences and Recommendations 174
Table 60 Summary of Organization Influences and Recommendations 180
Table 61 Outcomes, Metrics, and Methods for External and Internal Outcomes 188
Table 62 Critical Behaviors, Metrics, Methods, and Timing for Evaluation 189

xiv
Table 63 Required Drivers to Support Critical Behaviors 191
Table 64 Evaluation of the Components of Learning for the Program. 195
Table 65 Components to Measure Reactions to the Program. 196
Appendix C: KMO Survey Crosswalk 229
Appendix E: KMO Interview Crosswalk 242
Table G1 Immediate Evaluation Tool 252
Table H1 Delayed Reaction Evaluation Tool 254

xv
List of Figures
Figure 1 Active Shooter Incidents From 2016–2020 13
Figure 2 Active Shooter Incident Map 2000–2019 14
Figure 3 Active Shooter Incident Locations 2000–2019 15
Figure 4 Conceptual Framework 60
Figure 5 Level of Anxiety Around Active Shooter Incidents Reported by SSEs 77
Figure 6 Organizational Preparedness for an Active Shooter Incident 78

1

Chapter One: Introduction
Despite the widespread closures of businesses, schools, and public places due to
coronavirus safety measures, the United States recorded 40 active shooter incidents in 2020,
which represented an increase of 33% over the previous year and a 100% increase in the last 4
years (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2021). More than 60% of these incidents take place
inside a building, 70% have a duration of less than 5 minutes, and 60% conclude prior to the
arrival of law enforcement or first responders (Zhu et al., 2022). The high uncertainty and limited
response times display the need to implement measures to mitigate the risk to life safety. Despite
the documented increased risk related to these incidents, a survey commissioned by emergency
management service Everbridge (2016) found that 79% of organizations reported not being fully
prepared for these incidents. Organizations without preparedness programs risk running afoul of
governmental policies and legislation, as well as exposing employees to heightened stress and
uncertainty, which could diminish organizational outcomes.
Field Context and Mission
The field of security management is a discipline within the greater industrial security
arena tasked with the physical security and life safety of employees and assets within an
organization. Security management programs provide customized, layered approaches to
enterprise security risk management encompassing access control, alarm monitoring, closed
circuit surveillance, force protection operations, emergency management, and business
continuity. The mission of security management is to develop, maintain, and direct the programs,
technologies, and competencies that are crucial to the active protection of an organization and
the effective response to a dynamic and evolving threat environment (American Society for
Industrial Security [ASIS], 2021). A successful model for organizations to safeguard against risk
2

is to have a designated point of accountability at the senior executive level tasked with the
responsibility of crafting, influencing, and directing an organization-wide security strategy.
Within the context of the larger organization’s hierarchical structure, it is strongly recommended
that the senior security executive (SSE) report to a key senior-level executive to form a strong
liaison relationship with the leadership bodies, such as the board of directors, who will be
making decisions regarding the assumption or mitigation of risk. The SSE should enjoy full
partner responsibilities within the organization’s governance infrastructure. At the core of an
effective security management program’s operations and policy development are positive
working relationships among the organization’s stakeholders and client groups. In keeping with
the ASIS’s enterprise security risk management standards, the duty of safeguarding
organizational assets is the responsibility of the leadership of the individual business units with
the organization’s security management function providing risk assessment, policy, consultation,
and supporting infrastructure (ASIS, 2019). The SSE should be considered the organization’s
authority as it concerns security and/or risk-related matters. Due to the breadth of the security
management field, expertise in all areas is not expected from the SSE; however, the security
management business unit must leverage its members’ competencies, experience, and advanced
knowledge of security management application and protocols. An effective model for the
composition of a security management business unit is a hybrid design that incorporates
leadership talent, communication ability, business acumen, and management skills from the
security management leadership team surrounded with subject matter expertise in the multiple
domains that account for the organization’s multi-faceted security program.

3

Field Performance Status
The field performance problem at the root of this study is the failure of mid-size
organizations (500+ employees) to implement active shooter preparedness programs. Per the
general duty clause, Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, workers
have a right to a safe workplace, and employers are required to provide a workplace free of
known health and safety hazards that are likely to cause death or serious physical harm
(Occupational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA], 1970). The duty of care for
employers, as described in the general duty clause, is a legal obligation to ensure that individuals
on their premises, or within the immediate vicinity, have a reasonable expectation of protection
from harm. In 2016, Everbridge, an emergency management and safety solution service firm,
surveyed over 880 organizations with at least 500 employees regarding their safety plans and
ability to manage an active shooter situation. In response, 79% of those surveyed replied that
their companies were not fully prepared for such an incident (Everbridge, 2016). Furthermore,
61% reported that their organizations do not run any preparedness drills at all (Everbridge,
2016). To fulfill the mission of security management for their organizations and uphold the
general duty clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, it is imperative that
senior security executives implement active shooter preparedness programs at their
organizations. Failure to do so can result in an inadequate response to a life-threatening situation,
leading to many employees at risk for injury or harm up to and including loss of life.
Related Literature
Studies have shown that the prevalence of active shooter incidents has increased at a
rapid rate in recent decades (FBI, 2018, 2020; U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS],
2008; Zhu et al., 2020). From 2000 to 2019, the FBI reported that the number of these incidents
4

in the United States was 333 (FBI, 2020). Of those 333 incidents, 76% (254) occurred in a
location that could be described as a workplace: businesses, both open and closed to pedestrians,
malls, schools, government properties, and healthcare facilities (FBI, 2020). Sixty-nine percent
of organizations have identified an active shooter incident as the top threat for potential
workplace violence (Everbridge, 2016). Despite the rise in these incidents in the workplace, the
literature suggests that organizations are not taking steps to increase their level of preparedness
(Cintas Corporation, 2019; Fiel, 2021; Renschler et al., 2015; Wallace, 2020). Studies have
discovered that more than 70% of organizations surveyed indicated that the right thing to do for
employee safety was to implement an active shooter preparedness plan (Alvarez, 2019; Wallace,
2020). Nonetheless, research by Everbridge (2016) found that 79% of organizations reported
they were not fully prepared for an active shooter situation, 61% reported that they do not run
any drills at all, and the Cintas Corporation (2019) suggested that 35% of employed Americans
are not confident they would know what to do in the event of an incident at their workplace.
The continued increase in active shooter incidents calls for an appropriate organizational
response plan for a variety of reasons (Arteaga & Park, 2020). First, the presence, or lack
thereof, of active-shooter-related workplace violence has a positive correlation with employee
engagement, organizational outcomes, self-efficacy, and perceptions of preparedness (Saleem et
al., 2020; Wallace, 2020). Additionally, businesses now must publicly disclose the potential
impacts of targeted violence in the workplace (Fiel, 2021). Organizations are also required to
continue to satisfy the general duty clause, Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety
Act of 1970 (OSHA, 1970). In response to the active shooter incident at Columbine High School
in 1999, multiple law enforcement and security management departments across the United
States developed and adopted response training protocols (Martaindale & Blair, 2019). In 2013,
5

the FBI named the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Center the
national standard (FBI, 2013). Despite the FBI naming the ALERRT Center the national
standard, there is continued debate surrounding the most effective preparedness program (Fiel,
2021). Research suggests, however, that while there are many available options for preparedness
programs, employers that commit to the implementation of a preparedness program report
employees who perceive a greater level of preparedness from their organization and, in turn,
report higher levels of employee engagement and a healthier workplace (Saleem et al., 2020).
Importance of Addressing the Problem
The problem of organizations failing to implement active shooter preparedness programs
is important to solve because, compared with other types of emergencies that occur in the
workplace, these incidents threaten both public and life safety (Zhu et al., 2020). Studies show
that 86% of the 277 incidents from 2000 to 2018 happened in a building or other enclosed space
(FBI, 2018). Additionally, the majority of these incidents have concluded by the time first
responders arrive (FBI, 2013), and as such, it is imperative to implement active shooter
preparedness for employee safety (Sanchez et al., 2018). Employees who work for organizations
that take more preparedness actions report higher self-efficacy and an increased perception of
preparedness (Wallace, 2020). Mitigating the devastating impact of workplace violence on
employee well-being and organizational effectiveness is challenging for organizations, with
failure to do so leading to insecurity and disengagement at work (Saleem et al., 2020).
Global Field SMART Goal
The ASIS goal is that all member organizations that implement active shooter
preparedness programs will do so in 100% compliance with all applicable legal, regulatory, and
contractual obligations. The steering committee for the ASIS workplace violence and active
6

assailant – prevention, intervention, and response standards and guidelines established this goal
during the creation of the document in 2020 after being established due to the continued rise in
workplace violence and active assailant data compiled annually by the FBI (ASIS, 2020). The
achievement of the ASIS steering committee’s goal in this matter will be measured by the results
of scheduled surveys sent to member organizations annually to be reviewed at board meetings
and shared at the annual ASIS Global Security Exchange conference in host cities around the
United States. It is important to evaluate the membership organizations’ performance in relation
to the performance goal of 100% compliance with applicable regulations for various reasons. If
the member organizations are not compliant, the security management business unit puts
employees’ well-being and safety at risk and exposes the organization to potential financial risk
due to an active shooter incident. Evaluating the member organizations’ performance will enable
ASIS and associated stakeholders to gather formative data that can be used to identify promising
implementation practices to be shared in alignment with their mission of advancing security
worldwide (ASIS, 2022) in an effort to positively impact safety and security within the
workplace.
Description of Stakeholder Groups
The stakeholders associated with implementing an active shooter preparedness program
by an organization’s security management business unit are wide-ranging and varied, both
internal and external to the organization. The internal stakeholders, as it pertains to program
implementation, are the board of directors or organizational leadership, the security management
leadership and staff, and all staff and management at the organization. In the role of senior
leadership, the board of directors, or organizational leadership, is responsible for the direction
and allocation of resources to be dedicated to employee safety. By allocating resources for
7

employee safety, the organization’s leadership exhibits their commitment to ensuring employees
are provided with a safe, secure workplace in which to work in support of the organization’s
mission. The security management leadership and staff are responsible for assuming overall
responsibility for the organization’s enterprise security risk landscape. With respect to
implementing an active shooter preparedness plan, the security management leadership and staff
will be regarded as the subject matter experts tasked with researching, selecting, and
implementing a program best fit to meet the organization’s objectives. The staff and management
within the organization are responsible for completing the daily work in pursuit of the
organization’s goals and objectives. As such, working for an organization that values employee
safety and in an environment that makes employees feel secure is motivation to engage in safety
and security programs and initiatives. The internal stakeholders all depend on each other for
successful program implementation.
External stakeholders, including law enforcement and professional affiliation
associations, provide a different perspective and are the recipients of potential outputs from the
program. Law enforcement agencies and professional affiliation associations, such as the FBI
and ASIS, contribute to and benefit from preparedness program implementation. Their
contributions and benefits are cyclical in that each agency can supply data for education and
program formation as well as disseminate lessons learned/best practices from experience, but
only after gathering data and lessons learned from successfully implemented programs.
Stakeholder Group of Focus and Performance Goal for the Study
While the combined efforts of all stakeholders will contribute to the achievement of the
overall organizational goal of increasing the number of mid-size organizations that have
implemented active shooter preparedness training by 10% compared to the previous year, it is
8

critical to explore the SSEs’ current knowledge, motivation and command/allocation of
organizational resources with regard to implementing a preparedness program at their
organizations. Therefore, the stakeholders of focus for this study were SSEs at mid-size
organizations in the United States. The stakeholders’ goal, supported by the security
management field at large, is that by 2025, 10% of senior security executives will implement
active shooter preparedness programs within their organizations compared to the previous year.
Failure to accomplish this goal will lead to continued exposure to enhanced risk. Non-
implementation will hinder the organization’s ability to respond to these situations, which
prevents the organization from providing a workplace free of known health and safety hazards
that lead to death or serious physical harm (OSHA, 1970). The goal exists, but the security
management field needs to determine to what degrees the goal is being met and identify ways to
improve that performance. The gap in current performance is unknown (Table 1).

Table 1
Organizational Mission, Organizational Performance Goal, and Aligned Stakeholder
Performance Goal
Organizational mission
The mission of security management is to develop, maintain, and direct the programs,
technologies, and competencies that are crucial to the active protection of an organization
and the effective response to a dynamic and evolving threat environment (ASIS, 2020).
Global SMART goal
By December 2026, security management business units within the United States will
increase implementation of active shooter preparedness training by 10% compared to the
previous year.
Senior security executives’ SMART goal
By December 2025, senior security executives within mid-to-large size organizations (500+
employees) in the United States will increase implementation of active shooter preparedness
programs by 10% compared to the previous year.

9

Purpose of the Project and Questions
The purpose of this evaluative field study was to conduct a gap analysis to examine the
root causes of the organizational problem of underperformance in active shooter preparedness.
While a complete gap analysis would focus on all stakeholders, for practical purposes, the
stakeholders of focus were SSEs. The analysis focused on causes for this problem due to gaps in
the areas of SSE knowledge and skill, motivation, and organizational resources. The analysis
began by generating a list of possible or assumed influences that were examined systematically
to focus on actual or validated causes. Two questions guided this study:
RQ1: What are the knowledge and skills, motivation, and organizational needs and assets
related to SSEs within mid-to-large-size organizations implementing active shooter preparedness
programs?
RQ2: What are the recommended knowledge and skills, motivation, and organizational
needs and assets for SSEs within mid-to-large-size organizations to successfully implement
active shooter preparedness programs?
Overview of the Conceptual and Methodological Framework
Clark and Estes’ (2008) gap analysis, a systematic, analytical method that helps to clarify
organizational goals and identify the knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences, was
adapted to an evaluation model and implemented as the conceptual framework. The gap analysis
is a systemic, analytical method that helps to clarify organizational goals and identify potential
gaps (Clark & Estes, 2008). The basic tenet of the gap analysis is that, once an organization’s
desired result or end state has been clarified and potential gaps identified, gaps can be assigned
to three areas: knowledge, motivation, and organizational resources. Each of these three areas
can be applied to individuals, groups, or organizations as a whole. Assumed knowledge,
10

motivation, and organizational influences that impact SSEs’ ability to successfully implement
active shooter preparedness programs will be generated based on context-specific research as
well as general learning and motivation theory. The methodological framework is a mixed-
methods case study consisting of individual interviews and surveys. The mixed-methods
approach is defined as “a procedure for collecting, analyzing, and ‘mixing’ both quantitative and
qualitative research and methods in a single study to understand a research problem” (Creswell
& Creswell, 2018, p. 213). This research design aligns with the purpose of the study because
quantitative and qualitative data together provide a better understanding of the implementation of
preparedness programs and their results than using either type of data independently.
Definitions
Active shooter refers to an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill
people in a populated area (FBI, 2022).
American Society for Industrial Security International (ASIS) is the professional
organization dedicated to establishing standards and guidelines to shepherd the field and
practitioners of security management.
Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 is the United States legislation that was
enacted to establish workplace standards protecting employees from hazards that compromise
their health and safety (OSHA, 1970).
Security management refers to the development, maintenance, and direction of the
programs, technologies, and competencies that are crucial to the active protection of an
organization and the effective response to a dynamic and evolving threat environment (ASIS,
2022).
11

Workplace violence is defined in the ASIS (2020) workplace violence and active
assailant-prevention, intervention, and response standards and guidelines as
A spectrum of behaviors, including overt acts of violence, threats, and other conduct that
generates a reasonable concern for safety from violence, where a nexus exists between
the behavior and the physical safety of employees from any internal or external
relationship. (p. 1)
Organization of the Project
Five chapters are used to organize this study. This chapter provided the reader with the
key concepts and terminology commonly found in a discussion about active shooter incidents
and the need to implement response training. The field’s mission, goals, and stakeholders, as
well as the initial concepts of a gap analysis, were introduced. Chapter Two provides a review of
the literature surrounding the scope of the study and details the assumed influences. Topics of the
historical context and prevalence of these incidents, gun culture in the United States, available
training solutions, federal legislation and regulations, and industry-specific support,
interventions, and policies will be addressed. Chapter Three will describe the study's
methodology related to the choice of participants, survey items and interview protocol for data
collection and analysis, and issues of validity, reliability, and mitigation of potential bias. In
Chapter Four, the data and results are assessed and analyzed. Chapter Five provides solutions,
based on data and literature, for closing the perceived gaps as well as the formulation of an
integrated implementation and evaluation plan for the solutions.

12

Chapter Two: Review of the Literature
Since 2000, there have been almost 400 active shooter incidents in the United States,
accounting for more than 3,000 casualties across 43 states (FBI, 2021). Though the body of
research focused specifically on places of commerce is small relative to schools and institutions
of higher learning, the workplace is not immune from the threat of an active shooter (Martaindale
et al., 2017). In this chapter, I will first review the history of these incidents, gun culture in the
United States, and the culture of preparedness at organizations. Next, I will examine the school
of thought regarding active shooter research and perceptions of preparedness, review relevant
legislation, regulations, and industry initiatives, and cover current training available to the public.
Following that, I will to SSEs’ knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences and
complete the chapter by presenting the conceptual framework.
Influences on the Problem of Practice
The following section is an overview of active shooter incident and training related
literature from a national perspective. These sections begin by examining the historical context
of active shooter incidents and move on to cover a broad range of topics including legislation,
industry standards, and currently available active shooter response preparedness programs.
Historical Context
Active shooters and active shooter incidents are not new phenomena, but research
indicates that the increase in incidents in the last 20 years is unprecedented (Duron, 2021; FBI,
2021; Martaindale & Blair, 2019). According to data compiled annually by the FBI (2021), the
year 2020 saw a 33% increase in these incidents compared to 2019, and their number in 2020
represented a 100% increase from 2016 (Figure 1). As Figure 2 shows, these incidents are not
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limited to specific geographic locations, as evidenced by the 347 occurrences across 43 states
and the District of Columbia (FBI, 2020).

Figure 1
Active Shooter Incidents From 2016–2020

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Figure 2
Active Shooter Incident Map 2000–2019

In addition to the various geographic locations, another significant fact to remember is
that they can take place across a broad spectrum of physical locations as well. In the last 22
years, these incidents have been spread across 12 different location types (Figure 3), ranging
from publicly accessible businesses and schools to healthcare facilities and houses of worship
(FBI, 2020).

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Figure 3
Active Shooter Incident Locations 2000–2019

It is important to note the difference between active shooter incidents and mass
shootings/mass killings. Active shooter incidents are not synonymous with mass shootings
(Martaindale & Blair, 2019). Mass shootings and/or mass murders generally require a minimum
number of people to be shot or killed, whereas active shooter events do not have that same
requirement (Fox & DeLateur, 2014). Active shooter incidents can be thought of as attempted
mass murders, as there are some instances where many people are injured or killed and other
incidents where very few, or zero, people are injured or killed (Martaindale & Blair, 2019).
Studying both high and low-casualty events is important, as there are lessons learned from each
scenario that can inform policy, procedure, and training (Duron, 2021).
Executive Summary of Active Shooter Incidents
The next section will provide an executive summary of active shooter incidents from the
last 25 years. As previously noted, there have been more than 350 of these incidents since 2000
(FBI, 2021), and, as such, an exhaustive list would add little to this research other than to
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demonstrate the volume of incidents. The following will highlight well-known incidents or
incidents that proved significant with respect to legislation, emergency management, and training
as it relates to active shooter preparedness.
Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority Rail Yard
On May 26, 2021, in San Jose, California, a 57-year-old White male killed nine people in
the deadliest active shooter incident in the San Francisco Bay Area (ALERRT, 2022). The
attacker, a disgruntled employee of the Valley Transportation Authority (VTA) armed with three
handguns, arrived at the rail yard during a shift change and targeted fellow VTA employees
(Fuller et al., 2021). The incident lasted less than 10 minutes, ending when the attacker died by
suicide as law enforcement was closing in on his location. In addition to the shooting scene, the
attacker set his home on fire prior to traveling to the rail yard (Hanna et al., 2021). When
authorities searched the attacker’s home after the incident, several memo books were found filled
with notes of hatred about the VTA regarding perceived unfair work assignments, Customs and
Border Protection, and terrorism (Hanna et al., 2021).
FedEx Ground Facility
On April 15, 2021, in Indianapolis, Indiana, a 19-year-old White male killed 8 people and
wounded 7 more (ALERRT, 2022). The attacker, a former FedEx employee, arrived at the
facility during a shift change and briefly spoke with security before returning to his vehicle,
retrieving a rifle, and beginning his assault. The incident lasted less than 4 minutes and ended
with the attacker turning the gun on himself. Response time for law enforcement to the incident
was hindered due to a strict no-phone policy at the facility (Mansell et al., 2021). Additionally,
despite several of the victims being members of the Sikh community and the attacker’s history of
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browsing White supremacist websites, it was determined that the attacker was not racially
motivated but was instead looking to prove his masculinity (DePompei, 2021).
Naval Yard, D.C.
On September 16, 2013, in Washington, D.C., a 34-year-old African American male
killed 12 people and injured three others (ALERRT, 2022). The attacker began working on a
contract at the Naval Yard approximately a week before the shooting. On the day of the incident,
the attacker arrived at work armed with a disassembled weapon in his backpack. He then
assembled the sawed-off Remington 870 shotgun in the bathroom before exiting and beginning
his attack (ALERRT, 2022). Over the next hour, the attacker moved from floor-to-floor shooting
at unarmed co-workers and engaging in gun battles with armed security and naval police.
Approximately an hour after the attacker began shooting, he was shot and killed by a law
enforcement officer responding to the scene. It was later made known that the attacker had a
history of mental illness and had been removed from a contract by his employers a month before
the shooting due to delusional statements about being controlled by electromagnetic waves
(Flynn et al., 2021).
United States Army Garrison Fort Hood
On November 5, 2009, in Fort Hood, Texas, a 39-year-old Middle Eastern male killed 13
people and wounded 29 others in the deadliest active shooter incident on a military base
(ALERRT, 2022). The attacker, an active-duty Army psychiatrist armed with a handgun, opened
fire in a crowded Soldier Processing Center where soldiers received medical screenings upon
deployment and redeployment. The attack lasted approximately 10 minutes and was stopped
only when the attacker was shot, wounded, and taken into custody by military police (ALERRT,
2022). The attacker was left paralyzed from the waist down and was eventually found guilty and
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sentenced to death for the shootings. Reviews conducted by both the Pentagon and the United
States Senate found that the attacker’s superior officers had continued to promote the attacker
despite concerns that his behavior had become potentially radical and statements of alignment
with violent Islamic extremist ideologies (Farrell & Littlefield, 2012).
Columbine High School
On April 20, 1999, in Littleton, Colorado, a 17-year-old White male and an 18-year-old
White male killed 13 people and wounded 23 others during an active shooter event that would
prompt a national debate on gun control and school safety (Martaindale & Blair, 2019). The
attackers originally planned for two bombs to detonate in the school cafeteria to prompt
survivors to run outside toward the waiting shooters. When the bombs failed to detonate, the
attackers adjusted their plans and began shooting outside before moving into the school to
continue their attack. Approximately 40 minutes after the first shots were fired, the gunmen
turned their weapons on themselves and died by suicide before first responders could make an
attempt to enter the building (ALERRT, 2022).
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
On April 16, 2007, in Blacksburg, Virginia, a 23-year-old Asian male killed 32 people
and wounded 17 others during the third-deadliest active shooter incident in modern history
(ALERRT, 2022). The attacker, armed with two handguns, began the shooting in a dormitory,
killing two students, before moving to a classroom building. At the second building, he chained
the doors shut and moved methodically from classroom to classroom, shooting students and
faculty trapped inside (Blair & Schweit, 2014). Nine minutes after he entered the classroom
building, the attacker had killed or wounded almost 50 people and then took his own life as first
responders attempted to enter the building.
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Sandy Hook Elementary School
On December 14, 2012, in Newtown, Connecticut, a 20-year-old White male killed 27
people, including 20 children, in the fourth-deadliest active shooter incident in the United States.
The attacker began his rampage earlier in the morning by shooting and killing his mother at the
home they shared before arriving at the elementary school he attended armed with a rifle and two
handguns (ALERRT, 2022). In less than 10 minutes, the attacker shot through a plate glass
window to enter the school and then entered two first-grade classrooms killing multiple teachers
and students in each room. The attacker then turned the weapon on himself and died by suicide
as first responders were arriving to the scene (Martaindale & Blair, 2019).
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
On February 14, 2018, in Parkland, Florida, a 19-year-old White male killed 17 people
and wounded 17 others in the deadliest active shooter incident at a high school in the United
States (ALERRT, 2022). The attacker, a previously expelled former student armed with an AR-
15 semiautomatic rifle, took an Uber to the school in the early afternoon to carry out his
rampage. The attacker entered the freshman building and was spotted by a student assembling
his rifle. The student sought out a faculty member who rushed him to safety before returning to
assess the situation. The attacker began shooting on the first floor, killing 11 and wounding 13
others in under 2 minutes, then moved to the second floor for less than a minute but killed no one
before finally moving to the third floor and killing six and wounding four more students
(ALERRT, 2022). The shooting lasted less than 4 minutes from start to finish, and the attacker
was in the school for 7 minutes (ALERRT, 2022). The attacker then exited the school blending
in with students but was apprehended a short time later. This incident prompted a review of the
law enforcement response, with the officer assigned to the school eventually facing charges for
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neglect of a child and culpable negligence. Several students became activists for gun safety and
helped to organize the March for Our Lives (Meyer, 2018).
Route 91 Harvest Festival
On October 1, 2017, in Las Vegas, Nevada, a 64-year-old White male killed 58 people
and wounded more than 800 others in what was the deadliest mass shooting in the United States
at that time (ALERRT, 2022). The attacker, armed with 23 guns, opened fire on the crowd from
his 32nd-story hotel room and fired more than 1,100 rounds in 10 minutes (Campion et al.,
2017). With the help of hotel security, law enforcement responded to the incident and prepared
to enter the attacker’s hotel room 12 minutes after the shooting started. However, the SWAT
team did not breach the room for another hour, and when they entered, the attacker was located
dead by an apparent self-inflicted gunshot (ALERRT, 2022).
Pulse Night Club
On June 12, 2016, in Orlando, Florida, a 29-year-old Middle Eastern male killed 49
people and wounded more than 50 others in what was the deadliest active shooter incident up to
that time (ALERRT, 2022). The attacker was previously identified as a ‘person of interest’ by
the FBI due to statements made surrounding ties to al-Qaeda and Hezbollah. Armed with an AR-
15 rifle and a handgun, the attacker entered the Pulse Night Club, one of the most popular hot
spots for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer community in Orlando. He
immediately opened fire and overwhelmed the armed security with superior firepower. First
responders and a SWAT team arrived 10 minutes after the first shot, and the attacker barricaded
himself in the bathroom and relayed bomb threats, as well as the fact that he was wearing an
explosive vest (Valcore & Buckler, 2020). Three hours after firing the first shot, law
enforcement conducted controlled detonations to gain access into the building and free the
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patrons who had been stuck inside as hostages. The attacker engaged in a gun battle with law
enforcement and was killed before he could inflict additional casualties. Upon investigation, it
was determined that the attacker was not wearing an explosive vest and had not planted any
explosives (ALERRT, 2022).
Century 16 Movie Theater
On July 20, 2012, in Aurora, Colorado, a 24-year-old White male killed 12 people and
wounded 70 others in the deadliest active shooter incident in Colorado since the Columbine High
School shooting (ALERRT, 2022). The attacker bought a ticket to The Dark Knight Rises,
entered the theater, and then exited, ensuring he left the exit door propped open. He returned
armed with a rifle, a shotgun, and a handgun, as well as tear gas canisters. The attacker tossed a
canister into the theater and then began shooting in the ensuing chaos as movie-goers were
attempting to leave the theater (Kellner, 2012). The attacker was apprehended, without incident,
behind the theater, where he told police that he had booby-trapped his home with explosives. A
search of his home revealed no explosive devices, but a search of this vehicle in the theater
parking lot turned up another handgun and tactical clothing and equipment (ALERRT, 2022).
Gun Culture
Gun culture encompasses how both individuals and institutions interact with firearms in
the United States, which, as a nation, must attempt a balance between disproportionately high
levels of gun violence and the constitutional right to bear arms espoused in the second
amendment. (Abdalla et al., 2020; Boine et al., 2020; Yamane, 2017). Despite the United States
not having or requiring a national registry of guns, a 2017 survey found that there are an
estimated 270 million civilian-owned firearms and that, when added to the collection of
government-owned firearms, at that time, there was nearly one gun for every man, woman, and
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child in the United States (Yamane, 2017). The high number of legally owned guns, coupled
with the unknown number of illegally owned and ghost guns in the United States, contribute to a
gun homicide rate roughly 25 times higher than in other high-income countries (Branas et al.,
2021). To understand the desire for the high number of legally owned firearms, Warner and
Thrash (2020) found that the fear of crime and perceived risk were generally unrelated to gun
ownership; however, Avdija (2019) found that protection and fear of crime ranked second among
reasons Americans owned guns.
Gun culture and if Americans should be allowed to purchase and own guns is a
controversial topic, and with every such topic, there are two sides to the story. On both sides of
the conversation, there are legitimate arguments and reasons to hold specific beliefs. Ultimately,
though, owning a gun in the United States is a constitutional right and, as such, remains and will
be defended if challenged. The pro-gun control argument revolves around the volume of gun
violence and the casualties wrought upon the United States because of the gun culture, while the
pro-Second Amendment argument centers on responsible gun ownership, constitutionally
protected rights, and freedom from potential governmental tyranny (DeFoster & Swalve, 2018;
Matson et al., 2019).
Culture of Preparedness
To counter the potential violence embedded in the gun culture of the United States, an
organization must build resiliency by creating a culture of preparedness on their campus and
within their workforce (Howard, 2015; Johnson et al., 2016; Kapucu & Khosa, 2013; Zidarski,
2016). A recurring theme from the research indicated that the institution of wide-ranging
emergency management plans is critical in developing a culture of preparedness to react to an
active shooter incident within an organization (FBI, 2018; Jenkins & Goodman, 2015; Pitts,
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2018; Zidarski, 2016, Morris, 2014). In conjunction with comprehensive emergency
management plans, an organization builds resiliency and creates a culture of preparedness
through conducting periodic risk assessments, developing strong partnerships with external
stakeholders such as law enforcement and first responders, practicing the execution of their
emergency management plans via exercises and regularly scheduled drills, ensuring wide
dissemination of procedures and evacuation plans, using an interconnected system of
surveillance cameras and physical security measures, such as electronic access control, and
providing training to employees expected to physically work on site for any length of time (DHS,
2021; Duncan et al., 2013; ASIS, 2020; Kapucu & Khosa, 2013; Office of Safe and Drug-Free
Schools, 2010).
A framework developed and endorsed by the United States government to build
resilience within an organization through a culture of preparedness is the DHS’s threat and
hazard identification and risk assessment (THIRA)/stakeholder preparedness review (SPR)
process. The THIRA/SPR process is a six-step process that helps to inform the national
preparedness plan which the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is tasked to
maintain for the United States (DHS, 2021). FEMA (2020) explained the benefit of the
THIRA/SPR process:
With each subsequent update cycle, there are opportunities for alignment to better
understand threats and hazards, assess risks, build and sustain capabilities, reduce
vulnerability, identify ways to increase resilience, and avoid duplication of effort.
(FEMA, 2020, p. 1)
Adapting the THIRA/SPR process to build resiliency and a culture of preparedness within the
organization while including active shooter training could help to make the training pertinent to
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the workforce. Engaging employees in relevant training, regardless of the type of crisis incident,
increases perceptions of safety and builds resilience within the organization (Howard, 2015;
Zidarski, 2016).
Preparedness and Perceptions in Active Shooter Training Research
Although much has been written regarding crisis response and emergency preparedness
plans with respect to law enforcement and first responders and educational and healthcare
institutions, there is limited information regarding active shooter training and preparedness
research focused on the corporate environment (Martaindale & Blair, 2019). Much of the
research is focused on either educational institutions (Ford & Frei, 2016; Fox & Savage, 2009;
Snyder, 2014; Zidarski, 2016) or healthcare settings (Kotora et al., 2014; Sanchez et al., 2018;
Wallace, 2020). Violence and the threat of an incident are not relegated to those two settings and
can occur within any industry. The violence wrought upon an organization by an incident often
occurs without warning and evolves rapidly (ALICE Training Institute, 2020; DHS, 2022;
Martaindale & Blair, 2019). The body of literature surrounding active shooter preparedness
programs indicates a lack of training and a problem with the perception of preparedness among
employees across organizations (Feitel, 2021; Ford & Frei, 2016; Martaindale & Blair, 2019).
Despite the setting of the research not focusing on the corporate workplace, the lessons
learned regarding training and preparedness are transferable and helpful, nonetheless. The
literature on these incidents reveals insufficient training provided by organizations. Several
studies examined the effects that training, or a lack of training, had on study participants’
preparedness and/or perception of preparedness (Ellies, 2015; Ford & Frei, 2016; Myers, 2016;
Pitrowski, 2014; Snyder, 2014)
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Prior to participating in active shooter training, employees must be made aware that their
organization provides training. Ford and Frei (2016) studied messaging medium and
characteristics and the related effect on motivation to participate in training. The study consisted
of approximately 242 undergraduate students receiving an email, text message, or Twitter
message, with either a fear-based or information-based frame, inviting the subjects to watch a
short (5-minute) active shooter training video. The subjects were invited to take a pretest and
post-test, accordingly with the video. The study’s results indicated that the subjects who received
the fear-based email were the most likely to watch the video, and the subjects who watched the
video, regardless of method of invitation, scored higher on the post-test and reported a higher
perception of safety awareness.
Participation in emergency incident response training increases employees’ perception of
safety and security in the workplace. Snyder (2014) examined the effects of this training on
perceptions of safety. Snyder’s study included splitting participants into four groups and then
sending two groups through different active shooter training sessions, a third group through both
training sessions, and a fourth group through none. Research by Pitrowski (2014) focused on a
similar theme and was conducted nearly identically to Snyder’s (2014) study. However,
Pitrowski expanded his preparedness and safety training seminars beyond active shooter and
included hurricane and hazardous materials training as well. The results of the studies by Snyder
and Pitrowski showed that the three groups who completed at least one crisis training seminar
(active shooter, hurricane, or hazardous materials) reported a greater perception of safety and
resilience compared to the groups that received no training (Pitrowski, 2014; Snyder, 2014).
Ellies (2015) study examined the effectiveness of active shooter training. Similar to Ford and
Frei’s (2016) study, a pretest and post-test were developed and deployed to study participants
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before and after attending this training. Ellies found that participants scored higher on the post-
test after completing the training than on the pretest (Ellies, 2015). The findings from Snyder
(2014), Pitrowski (2014), and Ellies (2015) support the literature suggesting that organizations
and employees who participate in this training have increased levels of perceived preparedness
(Martaindale & Blair, 2019; Myers, 2016).
Active Shooter Training Legislation, Federal Regulations, and Industry Initiatives
Legislation on crisis management, safety, and security, including specific call-outs for
active shooter training, highlights the importance of preparedness; however, legislation does not
exist for organizations beyond educational institutions (Martaindale & Blair, 2019; Thomason et
al., 2020; Wallace, 2020;). Federal regulations, such as OSHA’s general duty clause stating that
employers have a legal and moral obligation to ensure employees have a reasonable expectation
of a safe and healthy workplace (OSHA, 1970), are in place; however, evidence, in the form of
near-daily breaking news reports and statistics, prove that efforts are falling short. At the state
level, there has been success with legislatures passing legally enforceable standards mandating
workplace violence preparedness and prevention plans, but nothing yet exists on the federal level
(Thomason et al., 2020). Though nothing is yet codified in legislation, there has been work
ongoing since 2016 for a federally enforceable workplace violence prevention standard
maintained and overseen by OSHA (Thomason et al., 2020). This section will briefly cover
federal legislation related to emergency/crisis management and campus safety, non-legally
enforceable federal regulations and guidance, and industry initiatives focused on combatting
active shooter incidents.

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Federal Legislation
The next section provides an overview and context of the existing federal legislation
related to active shooter incidents which mainly focuses on educational institutions.
Clery Act. The first piece of federal legislation related to the threat of violence on
campus was the Clery Act which was signed into law in 1990 as an amendment to the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (Clery Center for Campus Security, 2022). The Clery Act states that
institutions of higher learning, both public and private, must provide timely warnings to students
and employees about crimes or criminal activity that may pose a danger to the campus, must
disclose security policies, and report all crime-related statistics (Clery Center for Campus
Security, 2022; Foster & Lipka, 2007). The Clery Act came about in response to the 1986 rape
and murder of Jeanne Clery on the campus of Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania
(Clery Center for Campus Security, 2022). Clery’s parents sued the university, claiming it was
negligent by failing to protect their daughter from foreseeable danger (Clery Center for Campus
Security, 2022; Pitts, 2018).
Campus Security Act of 1990. The Campus Security Act of 1990 was passed in
conjunction with the Clery Act and served to standardize the expectation that institutions of
higher learning have formal emergency response and crisis management plans (Clery Center for
Campus Security, 2022; U.S. Department of Education, 2014). Similar to the Clery Act, the
Campus Security Act of 1990 also required institutions to disclose threats to the campus
community to all personnel in a timely manner (Pitts, 2018). Research spurred by additional
incidents of active shooters on campuses revealed that despite federal legislation mandating
emergency response plans and the rapid communication of threats, many institutions of higher
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learning were not compliant some 15 years later (Clery Center for Campus Security, 2022; Pitts,
2018; U.S. Department of Education, 2014).
Higher Education Act of 2008. The Higher Education Act of 2008 was a response to the
active shooter incident at Virginia Tech in 2007 (Pitts, 2018; U.S. Department of Education,
2014). The U.S. Department of Education conducted a formal investigation into the incident and
concluded that the university was negligent regarding its compliance with campus safety and
security legislation (Layton, 2014; U.S. Department of Education, 2014). The Higher Education
Act of 2008 expanded upon the Clery Act and the Campus Security Act of 1990 in that it
required that in addition to having emergency management and crisis response plans, institutions
of higher learning must disclose those plans to all students and employees on an annual basis
(Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, 2010; Pitts, 2018). The Higher Education Act of 2008
also allocated grant money to assist the institutions with the financial burden of emergency
response plans, help bring additional institutions into compliance with federal legislation, and
improve campus safety and security (Layton, 2014; Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, 2010;
Pitts, 2018).
OSHA Regulations
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is the federal government’s
entity tasked with creating, maintaining, and overseeing all occupational health regulations in the
United States (OSHA, 2022). A 2016 report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics found that the
incident of an armed intruder is 30 times more likely than a fire, 60 times more likely than a
climatic event, and over 125 times more likely than a chemical spill (BLS, 2016). Currently,
there is no specific guidance for active shooter incidents, which according to OSHA
documentation, fall under workplace violence (OSHA, 2022). While OSHA does not set forth
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specific guidance for active shooter training, the administration has recognized the necessity of
employers to prepare employees for the potential threat and maintains that obligation on
employers falls under the general duty clause (eSafety, 2018). In 2017 OSHA released a
directive to OSHA inspectors entitled “Enforcement Procedures and Scheduling for
Occupational Exposure to Workplace Violence,” which was meant as a forcing function for
employers to start putting plans and training programs into place to aid employees in
understanding how to react to a violent situation in the workplace (eSafety, 2018; OSHA, 2022).
Despite a formal regulation, OSHA maintains a webpage that cites and points employers to
resources from the DHS (OSHA, 2022). The resources focus mainly on the planning and
evacuation portions of a response plan. The general duty clause from OSHA stipulates that a
successful safety program must account for all hazards, including the threat of an incident, and,
as such, in the absence of legally enforceable standards, OSHA provided access to resources to
help organizations be prepared.
Industry Initiatives
At the national level in the United States, the industrial security industry has two
prominent organizations, the ASIS and the Security Industry Association (SIA). These two
organizations issue a majority of the industry standards and recommendations. Both
organizations have published active shooter training, prevention, and response guidance and
resources for members and non-members alike (ASIS, 2022; SIA, 2022).
American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS). ASIS was founded in 1955 and is the
largest membership organization for security management professionals in the world (ASIS,
2022). ASIS exists as a network of professionals to ensure that a vast array of knowledge,
expertise, and experience is available to members in a central location. According to the ‘What
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We Do’ section of the ASIS webpage, they offer educational programs, publications, and hosted
events to help security professionals at every stage of their careers (ASIS, 2022). Specific to
active shooter incidents, there are almost 900 resources available (ASIS, 2022). The official
ASIS standard for response and training is contained in its 2020 publication Workplace Violence
and Active Assailant – Prevention, Intervention, and Response. Similar to the guidance from
OSHA, ASIS makes clear that organizations have a responsibility to protect employees and that
the ASIS standard is a collection of processes, procedures, and protocols that organizations can
adopt to aid in preventing and responding to these incidents. ASIS creates, publishes, and refines
standards and guidelines through technical committees of industry professionals involving both
public and private sector leaders and in conjunction with subject matter experts in security,
human resources, law enforcement, government, emergency management, fire safety, healthcare,
legal studies, psychology, and academia (ASIS, 2022). The ASIS standard is intended to be all-
encompassing and includes sections dedicated to defining the reach of prevention and
intervention, establishing multidisciplinary involvement, planning a prevention and intervention
program, implementing the program, responding to threats and management of incidents, the role
of law enforcement, accounting for external actors such as employees’ intimate partners into the
response strategy, and post-incident management (ASIS, 2020).
Security Industry Association (SIA). The SIA was founded in 1969 as a trade
association representing electronic and physical security solution providers (SIA, 2022). SIA’s
mission is to advocate and protect the interests of its members and member organizations
through pro-industry policies and state and federal legislation, creating industry standards for
successful integration among members, fostering collaboration, and advancing members’ careers
through education and training (SIA, 2022). Unlike ASIS or OSHA, SIA has not published
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guidance from the organization in relation to active shooter incidents. The SIA published a
website with links to resources from across the security and law enforcement industries,
including links to the ASIS standard and the FBI’s active shooter resources page. Additionally,
the SIA website contains a repository of keynote speeches, videos, and articles related to
preparedness best practices and lessons learned for members to use to further their education.
Active Shooter Training Solutions
Emergency preparedness plans are rooted in processes and procedures that individuals
can revert to in times of crisis. Research indicates that most active shooter incidents have
concluded prior to the arrival of law enforcement or first responders (ALICE Training Institute,
2020; FBI, 2018). As such, one of the most important components of preparedness is effective
training. There are currently several programs that organizations can collaborate with to address
the need for training. Some of the most common, nationally known programs are Alert,
Lockdown, Inform, Counter, and Evacuate (ALICE); run-hide-fight; ALERRT; training from the
National Incident Management System (NIMS); and active violence emergency response
training (AVERT). The programs have the similar goal of increasing an organization’s
preparedness levels, but the methods of delivery and courses of action differ. The following
section will present an overview of the most common active shooter training solutions.
ALICE Training
ALICE training is an active shooter preparedness training course focused on proactive
measures featuring option-based strategies if facing an incident (ALICE Training Institute,
2020). Training employees in effective ways to respond helps to ensure safety and limits an
organization’s liability (ALICE Training Institute, 2020). Many organizations’ corporate
campuses or footprints are complex, multistory, or multi-building areas with a combination of
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restricted and open access space. As such, an aggressive, proactive training plan is the ideal
solution to provide a secure environment and foster a culture of preparedness within the
organization (ALICE Training Institute, 2020).
ALICE active shooter training utilizes a hybrid asynchronous class paired with a 2-day
in-person course to train the trainer. Once an organization has successfully trained internal
trainers, the rest of the organization goes through an online course and 1-day in-person scenario-
based training. The ability of an organization to train its own trainers can help to limit cost, build
in flexibility in when training can be offered, and allows for customization to the organization’s
specific needs (Martaindale & Blair, 2019).
Run-Hide-Fight
Run, hide, fight is an approach originally developed by the Public Safety and Homeland
Security Office for the city of Houston and was later endorsed by the federal government and
adapted by the FBI (FBI, 2018). The approach to instruction for this method of training is
straightforward and contained within the title: run, hide, fight. The approach to training is taught
through a series of videos freely available to anyone with access to the FBI website. As the name
implies, the first step for an individual who experiences an incident is to run or remove
themselves from the situation, if possible. If the individual cannot safely distance themselves, the
next step of the training instructs the person to, at a minimum, hide themselves from view, but
ideally, attempt to use readily available objects to barricade themselves. Finally, if the individual
does not have the option to run or hide, the training encourages the individual to confront the
shooter with force in an attempt to bring the incident to a conclusion. Run-Hide-Fight is
straightforward and easy to remember, but its simplicity can be deceptive in that an incident is a
complex situation with multiple branches and sequels likely to occur (O’Regan, 2019).
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Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training
The ALERRT Center was formed in response to the active shooter incident at Columbine
High School and, by 2013, had been named by the FBI as the national standard in training (Blair
et al., 2013). The increasing frequency of these incidents, specifically in schools, highlighted the
increased need for training tactics for first responders. ALERRT is unique in the active shooter
training space in that there is a research division tasked with examining responses by law
enforcement and first responders, employees, faculty, and students (Martaindale & Blair, 2019).
The research team specifically studies first responder reaction time, tactics, and techniques for
improvement for all parties confronted with an incident, and thorough post-incident
examinations of active shooter events in different settings (ALERRT, 2022). As part of a 2019
study completed within the ALERRT research division, Martaindale and Blair (2109) concluded
that “Specific events can identify needed changes, but time is needed to both develop training
and allow mindsets to change to appreciate the need for different tactics” (p. 344). Active shooter
training will continue to evolve due to lessons learned as more incidents take place in the coming
years.
National Incident Management System Training
The NIMS, developed in 2004 by the DHS, lays out a standard for proactive emergency
response capabilities to allow for collaboration between government and private sector entities to
protect against, respond to, and mitigate the effects of incidents that occur (Fazzini, 2009). The
stated mission of NIMS on the dedicated DHS site is that “the NIMS provides uniformity that
assists emergency responders from diverse communities in cooperating effectively and
efficiently in responding to the same critical incident” (DHS, 2022, p. 1). NIMS provides
organizations the necessary method of coordinating response and protection to an incident in an
34

effort to reduce the loss of life and preserve the organization’s assets and property. The four
main areas of planning and response within NIMS include planning, operations, logistics, and
administration/finance (DHS, 2022).
Active Violence Emergency Response Training
Professionals in law enforcement, private security, and medicine developed AVERT with
the goal of teaching skills once reserved for first responders to the public (Health & Safety
Institute, 2022). AVERT is offered by the Health and Safety Institute (HSI), an industry leader in
environmental, health and safety, and workforce development software, training, and compliance
solutions. AVERT operates on either a train-the-trainer model or through instructor-led training
classes with an online course required prior to in-person conclusion for both training options.
AVERT differentiates itself from other active shooter training solutions by including basic first
aid and stop-the-bleed training (AVERT, 2022). In addition to offering online and in-person
training, HSI has training kits and materials prepacked for organizations to conduct their own
training and drill and prepare for real-life incidents.
Active Shooter Incident Leadership
Leadership during an active shooter incident is full spectrum, with resiliency on display
in conjunction with strong leadership and poor leadership leading to additional risks and
casualties (Duron, 2021; Van et al., 2018). Leaders within the industrial security and safety
industries can affect the motivation of their organizations to maintain a culture of preparedness
through preparation for an incident, assuming command in the event of an incident, and showing
strength and compassion in the aftermath (Van Stralen et al., 2018). Each incident provides an
opportunity for leaders to reflect, learn, and adapt operational and leadership responses to better
the organization’s preparation, response, and recovery for potential future events.
35

Before an Active Shooter Incident
A review of after-action reports of active shooter incidents indicated that all included a
recommendation related to improved planning before the event (Duron, 2021). Leaders plan not
just for themselves but for their entire organization. Literature indicates that the best preparation
for an incident is for an organization to implement training (Sanchez et al., 2018; Wallace, 2020;
Awada et al., 2021). In addition to improved planning, another theme from Duron’s (2021)
review of multiple after-action reports for active shooter incidents indicated that leaders among
the various responding organizations must be able to effectively collaborate and understand who
is fulfilling the disparate roles. Developing an emergency response plan is an organizational
responsibility, yet there are individual skills that will be expected from leadership during a
response to an emergency. Leaders must be able to communicate both internally with their
organization and externally with collaborating responding agencies (Van Stralen et al., 2018). An
understanding and ability to use both the incident command system and the NIMS standard of
operations are critical for both security leaders and first responders.
During an Active Shooter Incident
Extreme incidents significantly burden organizational leadership and call for crisis
leadership to coordinate a strong, timely, and organized response (Veenema et al., 2017).
Drawing from the experiences of veterans with combat leadership, a study found five activities
that allow for effective leadership during an active shooter incident: synchronicity, hyper-focus,
reciprocity, sense of duty, and instinctive reaction training (Dixon et al., 2017):
• Leaders must use synchronicity in their decision-making process to assess what has
happened, what is currently happening, and what needs to happen to respond to the
incident.
36

• Leaders must remain focused and regulate their emotions to make effective decisions.
• Leaders must maintain self-awareness and make decisions in their desire and
willingness to help others.
• Leaders must practice reciprocity through actively sharing information.
• Leaders must train until behavior is automatic.
The goal of a leader when responding to an incident should be to achieve unity of command
which supports information flow and avoids disruptions to strategy and response which can
result in life-threatening delays in ending the incident and seeking medical care for potential
victims (Duron, 2021).
After an Active Shooter Incident
The literature indicates that a leader’s role both in preparing their organization for an
extreme incident and in assuming command and control during the incident is well accepted, yet
there appears to be less consensus on the necessary leadership skills in the aftermath of the
incident (Van Stralen et al., 2018). Dr. Kathy Platoni, a clinical psychologist and retired U.S.
Army colonel with combat deployments in Operation Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
and Operation Enduring Freedom, used her military experiences to study leadership after a
critical incident. Dr. Platoni and colleagues noted that how individuals are treated by leadership
after traumatic events determines how well they recover from the trauma (Jones et al., 2013).
Poor leadership after a critical incident can cause lasting harm and lead to productivity losses
that can cost millions of dollars per year (Van Stralen et al., 2018).
Conceptual Framework
A conceptual framework serves as the lens through which a researcher examines a
problem (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The conceptual framework chosen for this study was Clark
37

and Estes’s (2008) knowledge, motivation, and organization (KMO) gap analysis, which allows
for a stakeholder or organization to identify gaps in organizational performance that must be
changed, or accounted for, to achieve the desired end state (Clark & Estes, 2008). The gap
analysis allows for understanding the stakeholder’s goal in relation to the larger organizational
goal and identifying assumed performance KMO influences based on general theory, related
literature, and the researcher’s knowledge of the field.
The conceptual framework guided my theory of how the KMO influences interact with
each other and how outside influences, federal regulations and industry initiatives interact in
relation to the stakeholder’s goal. For this study, Clark and Estes’s (2008) framework was
adapted as a promising practice field study examining how the KMO influences affect the SSEs’
implementation of an active shooter preparedness plan. The next portion of this chapter will
explore the stakeholder-specific KMO assumed influences.
Stakeholder Knowledge, Motivation, and Organizational Influences
Clark and Estes’ (2008) Gay Analysis framework is appropriate to examine stakeholder
performance within an organization. One of the main facets of Clark and Estes’ method is to
identify areas of knowledge, motivation, and organization that may be affecting the performance
of the stakeholder. The following sections examine the specific knowledge, motivation, and
organizational influences as they relate to senior security executives and their ability to
implement active shooter response training programs within their organizations.
Knowledge and Skills
In revising Bloom’s taxonomy, Krathwohl (2002) asserted that individuals, stakeholders
in this case, who endeavor to execute an organizational change must be equipped with factual
knowledge and must then possess a command of the conceptual, procedural, and metacognitive
38

knowledge required for the implementation and execution of the desired change. Clark and Estes
(2008) asserted that knowledge is a necessary component when individuals or organizations
attempt to achieve a goal. Identifying, assessing, and addressing knowledge gaps is crucial to
successfully implementing organizational change. The following section focuses on the literature
for knowledge-related influences on SSEs’ ability to successfully implement active shooter
preparedness training.
Factual Knowledge Influences
The first knowledge type to be examined is factual knowledge, the what that the
stakeholder must understand to achieve their goal. Factual knowledge is declarative and refers to
what is being learned or what must be known as discrete, isolated content. Factual knowledge is
the basic information that serves as the foundation for the other types of knowledge (Krathwohl,
2002). The following sections explore the factual knowledge influences for SSEs as they attempt
to implement active shooter preparedness training.
Active Shooter Incidents. To implement training throughout their organizations, SSEs
must know basic facts and appropriate knowledge surrounding active shooter incidents.
Requisite planning for these incidents must consider factors like time of day, the building’s
layout, the number of shooters, weapons type, and the average duration of these incidents (de
Jager et al., 2018; FBI, 2018, 2021). It is also important for SSEs to be familiar with derivative
active shooter incidents like hybrid targeted violence, which would require subtle changes to the
incident response (Frazzano & Snyder, 2014). Senior security executives must have sufficient
knowledge related to the key elements of an active shooting and must know where to find the
resources to help drive their organization’s plan (Martaindale & Blair, 2019; Zhu et al., 2020).
39

Key Ideas of Organizational Policy Implementation. To successfully implement
training, SSEs need to understand the key ideas related to organizational policy implementation.
A study conducted in the aftermath of the incident at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
found that the majority of school districts in Florida implemented active shooter training in
alignment with best practices established by the National Association of School Psychologists
and the National Association of School Resource Officers (Howard et al., 2022). Implementing
training policy has been shown to receive greater reception and be more effective, as measured
through pre-and-post-tests with a shorter implementation timeline from introduction to
compliance (Clark, 2019; Kusulas et al., 2022). Lastly, studies from Argintaru et al. (2022) and
Doherty (2016) found that policy implementation saw greater knowledge retention when the
training was designed specifically for the trainees’ organization.
Identify Drivers for Perception of Safety in the Workplace. Senior security executives
need to identify the drivers that lead to employee perception of safety and security at work. A
2019 survey of more than 700 workers in Pennsylvania found that 60% of employees indicated
that regularly conducting safety and security drills increased their perceptions of safety at their
workplaces (Wallace, 2020). A similar result was reported in a study of faculty and
undergraduate students when participants were asked to take part in a study that tested response
time and decision making when facing a virtual active shooter situation; those who went through
training prior to the virtual scenario showed a faster response and expressed more concern for
others’ safety as opposed to focuses on themselves (Zhu et al., 2022). Beyond faster response
times and better decision making, Saleem et al. (2020) found that employees reported greater
levels of engagement and a more supportive work environment in organizations that prioritized
40

the security and safety of employees through comprehensive emergency response plans and
drills.
Conceptual Knowledge: Components of Active Shooter Preparedness
The second of the stakeholders’ four types of knowledge to be examined is conceptual
knowledge, the why that the stakeholder must understand to achieve their goal. Conceptual
knowledge refers to the interrelations between basic elements of a larger structure that allows the
elements to function together by highlighting the connections between concepts and helping to
regroup understandings and the corresponding relationships among them (Krathwohl, 2002).
Conceptual knowledge includes the cognitive process dimensions of analyze and create, which
are essential for SSEs as they seek to implement active shooter training within their organization.
For successful implementation of active shooter preparedness plans, SSEs need to know
the components that comprise the plans. SSEs must understand the theory that underlies the plan
and acquaint themselves with the organizational structures that allow them to function properly
(FBI, 2013; Martaindale & Blair, 2019). Research suggests that SSEs need to consider the
factors that increase the likelihood of an attack and plan specific components for mitigation in a
plan (Frazzano & Snyder, 2014). Once SSEs have familiarized themselves with the components
of an active shooter training plan geared toward prevention, they can better create policies,
procedures, and systems to educate the organization on response and implement their plan (FBI,
2021; Jacobs et al., 2014; Martaindale & Blair, 2019).
Procedural Knowledge
The third of the stakeholders’ four types of knowledge to be examined is procedural
knowledge, the how that the stakeholder must understand to achieve their goal. Procedural
knowledge refers to how to perform a skill and is knowledge related to methods, procedures, and
41

standards for using skills, techniques, and methods (Krathwohl, 2002). Procedural knowledge
can also be referred to as implicit knowledge or the know-how to get something done. The
following sections explore the procedural knowledge influences related to SSEs as they seek to
implement an active shooter preparedness plan within their organization.
Facilitating Change. Senior security executives need to know how to facilitate change
management across their organizations. It is well documented that almost 70% of all plans and
programs that require people to adapt to a new way of doing things fail (Kotter, 1996). As with
all attempts to facilitate change, SSEs must have a plan to introduce active shooter training
within their organization (Kordahi, 2022; Smith & Mourier, 1999). The SSEs must also be able
to articulate the need for the change and articulate expected obstacles or challenges to the plan
(Aghalari et al., 2021; Clark, et al., 2019).
Connect Training to Employee Performance. Senior security executives need to know
how to connect the relationships of training implementation to employee performance and
perception of a safe work environment. Training provides opportunities for employees to take
part in observational learning and practice the proper response in the event of an active shooter
(Ford & Frei, 2016). A study of one such training within an emergency department of
approximately 200 employees found that 92% of staff reported feeling more prepared to respond
after training, and 70% found that they felt they could better serve the patients with the
confidence they gained through training (Sanchez et al., 2018). An additional study of over 250
healthcare providers found that the reported level of employee preparedness to perform within
their organization’s response plan more than doubled after training, with a 44% preparedness
response prior to and an 89% preparedness response after training (Jones et al., 2014).
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Navigate Organizational Decision-Making Process. To move from concept to
implementation, SSEs need to be able to navigate their organizational decision-making
processes. Decision making within an organization is an important tool that either determines or
helps to determine what gets accomplished (Brenner, 1993; Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2018).
SSEs must develop the skills and expertise to garner the effective decisions they need to produce
their intended results: implementing active shooter training (Gunn et al., 2017; Tierney, 2008).
Successfully Implement Policies Across an Organization. Senior security executives
need to know how to follow the techniques involved in successfully implementing policies
across their organizations. For SSEs to implement a training plan, the policy must have effective
planning and be of good design (Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Pyle et al., 2019). The SSEs must also
ensure that the training policy is clear and consistent with other organizational safety and
security policies (Kim et al., 2021). Lastly, successful policy implementation can be aided by the
support of executives and strategically placed intermediaries within different parts of the
organization (Bullock & Lavis, 2019)
Metacognitive Knowledge
Finally, the last of the stakeholders’ four types of knowledge to be examined is
metacognitive knowledge, the understanding of what the stakeholder must know about
themselves and others to achieve their goal. Metacognitive knowledge refers to an individual’s
awareness of what they do or do not know about their own abilities (Krathwohl, 2002). It
includes knowing strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in knowledge. Examining the metacognitive
knowledge influences on SSEs as they attempt to implement active shooter preparedness training
is important because they will need to consider the learners’ cognitive abilities to learn and cope
with the subject matter.
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Appropriate Styles of Instruction. Senior security executives need to plan the most
appropriate way to teach this training without inducing undue stress and/or anxiety within
employees. Active shooter incidents, by their nature, induce stress, anxiety, and negative
emotions that can overwhelm individuals and affect decision making (Martaindale & Blair,
2019). Unfortunately, the training has the potential to do the same. The SSEs must replicate the
physical and emotional response of an incident during training without causing more harm than
benefit. A 2020 study of 815 14- to 24-year-old participants found that over 60% reported that
active shooter drills make them feel “scared and hopeless,” yet the same study noted that 56%
agreed that drills “teach people what to do” (Moore-Petinak et al., 2020, p. 509). Recent
technological advancements and the rise in virtual reality created the possibility that virtual
reality situations could be used to prepare employees and first responders for active shooter
incidents (Awada et al., 2021). As technology advances, a virtual reality simulation has the
potential to replace the need for in-person drills, which have been associated with reported
negative health effects (Moore-Petinak et al., 2020).
Mitigating Risk of Trauma. The SSEs need to plan their approach to mitigate the risk of
inducing unintended trauma by teaching about violent subjects. Research indicates that there are
a number of considerations for SSEs to help mitigate the risk of trauma during the
implementation of this training (Howard et al., 2022; McAllister et al., 2020; Osborne &
Capellan, 2017; Sacks & Masiakos, 2020;). Organizations that conduct this training must focus
the drills on feelings of empowerment rather than fear and anxiety (ALICE Training Institute,
2020). Before conducting any drills requiring physical activity, discussion-based drills can help
to prepare participants for what to expect (Sacks & Masiakos, 2020). Additionally, having on-
site mental health practitioners during the training and drills can help participants cope with any
44

past trauma that resurfaces (Howard et al., 2020). Despite requiring the training, SSEs must
allow for a participant who believes that the risk of the training to their mental health will
outweigh the benefit to opt out (ALICE Training Institute, 2020).
Table 2 shows the stakeholder’s influences and the related literature.

45

Table 2
Summary of Assumed Knowledge Influences on SSE’s Ability to Implement Active Shooter
Preparedness Training
Assumed knowledge influences Research literature
Factual: SSEs need to know the facts
related to active shooter incidents.
de Jager et al., 2018; FBI, 2018, 2021;
Frazzano & Snyder, 2014; Martaindale &
Blair, 2019; Zhu et al., 2020
Factual: SSEs need an understanding of the
key ideas related to organizational policy
implementation.
Argintaru et al., 2021; Clark, 2019; Doherty,
2016; Howard et al., 2022; Kusulas et al.,
2022
Factual SSEs need to identify the drivers
that lead to employees’ perceptions of
safety and security at work.
Saleem et al., 2020; Scott et al., 2021; Wallace,
2020
Conceptual: SSEs need to know the
components of active shooter
preparedness plans
FBI, 2013, 2018, 2021; Frazzano & Snyder,
2014; Jacobs et al., 2013; Martaindale &
Blair, 2019
Procedural: SSEs need to know how to
facilitate change management across their
organization.
Aghalari et al., 2021; Clark, 2019; Kordahi,
2020; Smith & Mourier, 1999; Smith &
Delaney, 2013; Vaherkoski, 2021;
Procedural: SSEs need to know how to
connect the relationships of active
shooter implementation programs to
employee performance and perception of
a safe work environment.
Briggs & Kennedy, 2016; Ford & Frei, 2016;
Jones et al., 2014; Sanchez et al., 2018;
Procedural: Stakeholders need to be able to
follow the steps in their own
organizational decision-making process.
Brenner, 1993; Gunn et al., 2017; Hodgkinson
& Sadler-Smith, 2018; Sanchez et al., 2018;
Tierney, 2008;
Procedural: SSEs need to know how to
follow the techniques involved in
successfully implementing policies
across their organizations.
Becker & Gerhart, 1996; George et al., 2021;
Kim et al., 2021; Kotova et al., 2014; Pyle et
al., 2019
Metacognitive: SSEs need to plan the most
appropriate way to teach/implement
active shooter preparedness plans without
inducing stress and/or anxiety within
employees.
Adashi et al., 2015; Awada et al., 2021; Ford &
Frei, 2016; Greenberg, 2007; Gunter &
Gunter, 2017; Greco, 2021; Moore-Petinak et
al., 2020;
Metacognitive: SSEs need to plan their
approach to mitigate the risk of inducing
unintended trauma by teaching about
violent subjects.
Douglas & Barnett, 2021; Flamm, 2017;
McAllister et al., 2020; Osborne & Capellan,
2017; Sacks & Masiakos, 2020; Wexler &
Snyder, 2014

46

Motivation
The second of the three factors in Clark and Estes’s (2008) gap analysis framework is
motivation. In addition to knowledge about formulating and implementing an active shooter
preparedness plan, SSEs need the motivation to include this plan in their comprehensive security
and safety plan. Motivation is defined by three factors: active choice, persistence, and mental
effort (Clark & Estes, 2008). Active choice is choosing to pursue a goal and then starting to
actively work toward it. Persistence is consistently putting in the work the process requires to
achieve the goal despite barriers or obstacles. Mental effort is the drive to achieve new
knowledge or learning to solve problems in different ways (Clark & Estes, 2008). Motivation is a
key factor in the success of achieving an organization’s goals, as motivation will impact whether
stakeholders start, persist, and ultimately achieve the goal (Rueda, 2011). The next sections will
highlight the motivational influences that are critical for SSEs as they attempt to implement an
active shooter preparedness plan.
Utility Value: Importance to Role
Utility value theory asserts that the perceived usefulness of a task will affect the mental
effort toward achieving a goal (Eccles, 2006). For SSEs to feel motivated to include an active
shooter plan within their current security and safety strategy, they must realize its value in
meeting their overall organizational goal. The ASIS SSE standard lists the primary responsibility
and accountability for the SSE as being “vested with the responsibility for the organization’s
security strategy” (ASIS, 2022, p. 11). The SSE must develop and implement a strategic security
framework to identify, evaluate, and mitigate risk across their organizations (ASIS, 2022). In
their 2016 survey of executive-level security professionals, Everbridge found that an active
shooter incident continually ranked as a top three threat to the organization among those
47

surveyed. Therefore, implementing a training plan to mitigate the threat would be of specific
value to the SSE. The next section will examine the literature on utility value as it relates to
SSEs’ motivation to implement an active shooter preparedness program.
Senior security executives need to see the importance of their job in preparing their
organization for active shooter incidents. Van Stralen et al. (2018) described having a sense of
duty as one of the key attributes of a leader tasked with the security and safety of an
organization. In addition to seeing the significance of their job, SSEs need to be aware of how
implementing a training plan will benefit their specific area of responsibility for the organization
(Wade, 2020). Prevention and risk mitigation to the organization are the priorities of the SSE.
Implementation training is one of the leading strategies for SSEs to mitigate the risk of an active
shooter to the extent possible and/or prevent the incident from becoming worse (Doherty, 2016).
Self-Efficacy
In conjunction with finding value in the creation and implementation of an active shooter
preparedness plan, SSEs must understand how the presence of a plan contributes to their sense of
self-efficacy. Self-efficacy refers to individuals choosing behaviors and motivating themselves to
engage in certain behaviors based on their belief in their own capabilities (Bandura, 1986). The
concept of self-efficacy implies that an individual’s perceived self-efficacy influences
persistence, effort, behavior, and course of action selection (Bandura, 1977, 1986). Bandura
(1986) stated that the stronger an individual’s perceived self-efficacy, the more resolute,
effective, hard-working, and successful the individual will be. An important role in building self-
efficacy is to provide mastery experiences (Bandura, 1977). The next sections will highlight the
literature surrounding individual and collective self-efficacy as it relates to SSEs as they attempt
to implement preparedness plans.
48

Individual Self-Efficacy. Senior security executives need to have confidence in their
ability to implement an active shooter preparedness program. Their perception of their self-
efficacy to implement the program can affect their choice of whether to pursue doing so (Pitts,
2019). Individuals with high self-efficacy will exert more effort, persist, and approach tasks with
a greater level of confidence (Hirabayashi, n.d.). Bandura (1986) stated that vicarious
experiences influence self-efficacy. Regarding training, SSEs must enhance their self-efficacy
for implementation by engaging in observation and networking among peers (Kapucu & Khosa,
2013).
Collective Self-Efficacy. Senior security executives need to believe that their
organization is capable of creating a safe and secure environment through implementation of an
active shooter preparedness program. Collective efficacy is a shared belief in a group’s capability
to organize and execute the required actions to produce the desired results (Bandura, 1977).
Bandura (2000) also stated that with perceived collective efficacy, there is an impact on
performance, commitment, and ability to persist through challenges. Implementing training
requires an ongoing commitment to collaboration across multiple departments at an organization.
As such, collective efficacy is a considerable facet of motivation for SSEs and their
organizations to implement, train, and sustain a training plan (Feitel, 2021).
Expectancy Value
Expectancy value theory is rooted in the idea that motivation can be influenced by beliefs
or expectations of success and values related to a task (DeSimone, 2015; Eccles & Wigfield,
2020; Loh, 2019). Expectancies and values are both strong indicators of performance and
success in the ability of individuals and organizations to meet goals (Eccles, 2006). The next
49

section will highlight the literature surrounding expectancy-value theory as it relates to SSEs’
motivation to implement an active shooter preparedness program.
Training Implementation Will Increase Perception of Safety. Senior security
executives need to believe that by implementing an active shooter training program, they will
raise the perception of safety and security at their organization. Organizational preparedness
efforts are valuable safety and security assets that increase employees’ perception of safety
(Myers, 2016; Wallace, 2020). If SSEs believe they can successfully implement this training and
perceive that implementation will add to the perception of security at the organization, they are
more likely to engage deeper in the task of implementation and persist through challenges to
reach their goal (Huskey & Connell, 2021).
Attribution: Personal Wellness
Attribution theory focuses on understanding how individuals or organizations view the
cause and associated effect in their environments (Anderman & Anderman, 2006). Depending on
their belief of what cause has a specific effect, an individual or organization could decide the
level of control they believe they have over their environment (Weiner, 2018). An easy-to-
understand example would be the belief of personal trainers that their efforts of teaching about
diet and exercise can lead to improved performance and a healthier lifestyle for their clients.
When someone believes they have control over the outcome of a task, their motivation to
complete the task increases (Anderman & Anderman, 2006). The literature surrounding
attribution theory has been largely focused on the social psychology of human behavior, yet
there is a growing call to study attribution theory as it relates to organizational sciences as well
(Martinko & Mackey, 2019). The next section will explore literature relevant to attribution
theory as it relates to SSEs implementing active shooter preparedness plans.
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Senior security executives need to believe that their personal wellness can be affected
through their own engaged participation in the implementation of a preparedness program. The
best defense against an active shooter is to develop constant situational awareness (Johnson et
al., 2016). SSEs are not passive observers in the implementation and execution of training, and,
as such, they stand to benefit from engaged participation in the training. Beyond situational
awareness, training is meant to prepare the individual to actively participate in their own survival
(ALICE Training Institute, 2020).
Table 3 shows the stakeholder’s influences and the related literature.

51

Table 3
Summary of Assumed Motivation Influences on SSE’s Ability to Implement Active Shooter
Preparedness Training
Assumed motivation influences Research literature
Value: SSEs need to see the importance
to their job in preparing their
organization for active shooter
incidents.
Doherty, 2016; Eccles, 2006; Myers, 2017; Patel
& Taylor, 2011, Wallace, 2020; Wade, 2020

Self-efficacy (individual): SSEs need to
have confidence in their ability to
implement an active shooter
preparedness program raising the
confidence of employees related to
safety at the workplace.
Bandura, 2000; Embry-Martin, 2017; Ford &
Frei, 2016; Matthias et al., 2019; Rueda, 2011;
Walden et al., 2021; Wise, 2021; Zhu et al.,
2020;
Self-efficacy (collective): SSEs need to
believe that their organization is
capable of creating a safe and secure
environment through implementation
of active shooter preparedness
programs.
Bandura, 2000; Duggleby et al., 2009; Feitel,
2021; Huskey & Connell, 2021; Landry et al.,
2018; Solema, 2018
Expectancy outcome: SSEs need to
believe that by implementing an active
shooter preparedness program, they
will raise the perception of safety and
security at their organization.
Berellez, 2018; Carr, 2017; DeSimone, 2015;
Eccles & Wigfield, 2020; Gao & Xiang, 2008;
Kellom & Nubani, 2018; Lincke & Khan, 2020;
Loh, 2019; Pitts, 2019; Strachota, 2014;
Wallace, 2021; Wigfield, 1994
Attribution: SSEs need to believe that
personal wellness can be affected
through their own engaged
participation in the implementation of
active shooter preparedness programs.
Ames-Lopez, 2020; Anderman & Anderman,
2006; DeJoy, 1994; Ergebright & Hubbard,
2012; Hewett et al., 2018; Holland, 2019;
Martinko, 1995; Martinko & Mackey, 2018;
Scott et al., 2021; Weiner, 2018; Williams, 2017

Organizational Influence
The last of the three factors in Clark and Estes’s (2008) gap analysis framework is
organizational influence. In using their people-as-cars model, Clark and Estes described
organizational influences as the current road conditions that can make it easier, or more difficult,
to reach the intended destination. Organizations, by their nature, are made up of multiple
52

individuals, which leads to the culture of the organization consisting of a mixture of the
characteristics of the individuals (Erez & Gati, 2004). Schein (1985) described organizational
culture as the way individuals within an organization interact with each other and how they
behave with people outside of the company. Clark and Estes (2008) pointed out that even if an
individual has all of the requisite knowledge, skills, and motivation to accomplish a goal, without
the appropriate processes and materials, the ability to accomplish the goal is reduced
significantly. Senior security executives must consider organizational influences when
attempting to successfully implement an organization-wide active shooter preparedness plan.
The next sections will explore the organizational influences that are important for SSEs as they
attempt to implement such a plan.
Resources
Resources refer to funding, staffing, and all other administrative support required to
complete an organizational initiative (Robbins & Judge, 2010). According to Waters et al.
(2003), the effectiveness of an organization increases when leadership ensures that employees
have the resources needed to achieve. SSEs need to be given appropriate time and funding to
develop and implement active shooter preparedness training. The following sections briefly
explore the research related to the resources SSEs required for training implementation.
Time. The SSEs need to be given ample time to research, select, and implement active
shooter preparedness training. When preparing to implement a program aimed at increasing the
safety and security of the organization, it is important to perform the due diligence required to
ensure the program is the best fit for the organization (Howard et al., 2022). In addition to the
time necessary to select the best program, organizations must afford the SSE time to implement
the program across the organization. Depending on the type of training selected and the method
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of delivery, implementation time can vary greatly. Instructor-led training can take more than a
year to implement, but the timeline can be reduced to months with a blended program of
asynchronous learning and in-person classes taught by internal certified trainers (ALICE
Training Institute, 2020). As it relates to planning, a study of 200 resident physicians at Stanford
University found that training for a new program or initiative should begin between 2 and 8
weeks before the implementation of the desired change (Pantaleoni et al., 2015).
Funding. The SSEs need to be given the appropriate funding to research, select, and
implement active shooter preparedness training. The range of these training programs varies in
cost depending on the course, method of development, and delivery method. A 2016 report from
a large training and development consulting firm found that a basic PowerPoint e-learning can
take up to 49 hours to create, with more intricate, advanced training can take between 75 and 154
hours (Sadler, 2016). Translating hours into dollar amounts shows that developing training
internally can cost an organization between $5,900 and $50,300 (Sadler, 2016). External training
firms, such as ALICE and AVERT, charge organizations for their externally developed e-
learnings, administration of training via a learning management system, and initial and recurring
fees for training, certification, and recertification of instructors (ALICE Training Institute, 2020;
HSI, 2022).
Policies, Processes, and Procedures
Policies, processes, and procedures refer to the course of actions adopted by an
organization, the series of steps taken to achieve a desired end state, and the established way of
accomplishing a task. Clark and Estes (2008) asserted that organizational messaging, policies,
and procedures must align with the goals and values of the institution for change efforts to
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succeed. The following section will explore literature relevant to policies, processes, and
procedures as it relates to SSEs implementing active shooter preparedness plans.
Policies. Senior security executives need policies that prioritize safety and security across
the organization. Traditional policymaking in the United States is based on the rational model,
which assumes decisions regarding policies are made by identifying objectives, predicting the
possible outcomes of alternative solutions, evaluating the solutions, and selecting the solution
that maximizes the organization’s ability to achieve their objective (Abbinante, 2021; Stone,
2012). The rational model, however, ignores the SSE’s emotions, motivation, and life
experience. A study of school shootings by Dumitriu and Hutu (2014) found that when
developing policies regarding active shooter prevention and preparedness, policymakers
indicated that all organizations should be required to include plans for an incident in their
emergency response plans.
Processes and Procedures. Senior security executives need processes and procedures
that induce feedback from all levels of the organization to shape the implementation of new
policies or revision of old policies. Active shooter response policies remain in a state of
evolution (Buerger & Buerger, 2010; Martaindale & Blair, 2019; Wallace, 2020). Prior to the
active shooter incidents at Columbine High School and Virginia Tech, the standard response was
to lock down, which included locking doors, turning off lights, and staying away from doors and
windows (Martaindale & Blair, 2019). In studying the lessons learned, especially after the
Virginia Tech incident, it was apparent that a passive response was not as effective as an active
one (ALICE Training Institute, 2020; Buerger & Buerger, 2010). In addition to processes and
procedures that evolve with best practices, it is important for SSEs to incorporate feedback from
the training participants. Without a method for incorporating feedback, SSEs could cause more
55

harm than good by implementing active shooter preparedness training (Huskey & Connell, 2021;
Schonfeld et al., 2017).
Culture: Executive Support
To prepare for implementing an active shooter preparedness plan, SSEs must consider the
organizational culture within their company. The culture of an organization is a conceptual
model that frames the values, beliefs, and overall thinking within an organization (Schein, 2004).
Clark and Estes (2008) call organizational culture a dominant force in the performance of an
organization. The next sections will explore literature relevant to the organizational culture as it
relates to SSEs implementing these preparedness plans.
The SSEs need to have the support of their organization’s executive leadership to
champion the implementation of an active shooter training program. Executive leadership
support is a rapid path to generating pervasive buy-in across the organization (Kotter, 1996). A
2020 survey of more than 400 employees found that charismatic executive leadership support for
a change initiative positively influenced employee trust, openness to change, and behavioral
support for change (Men et al., 2020). Successful implementation requires a large commitment
from executives and senior-level leadership (Myers, 2021; Pitts, 2019). The executives must
participate, and be seen participating, in the training that other members of the organization are
expected to attend (Heathfield, 2020). In addition to participating in the training, executives must
show their support through the proper allocation of resources (Heathfield, 2020; Mullins et al.,
2019).
Authority: Recognition
For an SSE to begin implementing an active shooter training plan, the organization must
decide if the SSE has the authority to implement programs on the organizational level (Zhu et al.,
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2022). Authority refers to the granting of power to command, order, instruct, or compel others to
complete an act (Dubnick, 2014). It is important for an organization to formally recognize where
authority lies in regard to specific tasks so that one individual, in this case, the SSE, is leading
the organization toward a common goal (Pitts, 2019). The following section explores the
literature on the authority an SSE needs to implement this plan.
The SSEs need to have the authority to prioritize the implementation of an active shooter
preparedness plan at their organization. The inclusion of corporate security departments and an
SSE was a deliberate choice, as organizations need oversight on standards and initiatives related
to security and safety (ASIS, 2022). Accordingly, the SSE should be held accountable for the
successes and failures of safety and security. Being accountable requires the delegation of
authority to the party responsible and including in that authority the ability to implement
standards as they deem necessary (Dubnick, 2014; Emanuel & Emanuel, 1996). However, the
SSE cannot be fully accountable for an outcome if they lack recognition of authority.
Table 4 shows the stakeholder’s influences and the related literature.

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Table 4
Summary of Assumed Organization Influences on SSE’s Ability to Implement Active Shooter
Preparedness Training
Assumed organization influences Research literature
Resources (time): SSEs need to be given
ample time to research, select, and
implement active shooter preparedness
plans.
Kim et al., 2021; Martaindale & Blair, 2013;
Martaindale & Blair, 2019; Rapp et al., 2013;
Salanova et al., 2006
Resources (funding): SSEs need to be
given the appropriate funding to
research, select, and implement active
shooter preparedness plans.
Brunetto et al., 2016; Davis, 2020; Fitting,
2019; Howard et al., 2022; Janair et al., 2021;
Martaindale & Blair, 2019; Mwai et al., 2018
Resources (policies): SSEs need policies
that prioritize safety and security across
the organization.
Abbinante, 2017; Hu et al., 2012; Lacey, 2010;
Martaindale & Sandel, 2017; Mullins et al.,
2019; Nash, 2020; Worthington & Hayes,
2021;
Resources (processes and procedures):
SSEs need processes and procedures
that induce feedback from all levels of
the organization to shape the
implementation of new policies or
revision of old policies.
David & Schonfeld, 2017; Doherty, 2016;
Johnson et al., 2020; Mharapara & Staniland,
2020; Osborne & Capellan, 2017; Ramani et
al., 2018
Authority: SSEs need to have the
authority to prioritize the
implementation of active shooter
preparedness plans across their
organizations.
Anderson et al., 2008; Bourgoin et al., 2020;
Pitts, 2019; Woitaszewski et al., 2020; Young,
2000; Zhu et al., 2022

Summary
Active shooter preparedness within organizations has evolved due to the rise in incidents
over the last 20 years (Martaindale & Blair, 2019). Research regarding active shooter
preparedness suggests that despite the desire to create a culture of preparedness, several
organizations do not have a comprehensive plan and that training must be included in the plan
and increased within the industry. Understanding the KMO influences is critical to achieve
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organizational goals. The purpose of this study was to understand the KMO influences on the
success of SSEs who have implemented this training. This chapter identified KMO influences
that this study sought to confirm. The process of confirmation is described in the next chapter.

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Chapter Three: Methods
The purpose of this evaluative field study was to conduct a gap analysis to examine the
root causes of the organizational problem of underperformance in active shooter preparedness.
While a complete gap analysis would focus on all stakeholders, for practical purposes, the
stakeholders to be focused on in this analysis are SSEs (SSEs). The analysis focused on the
causes of this problem due to gaps in SSE knowledge and skill, motivation, and organizational
resources. The analysis began by generating a list of possible or assumed influences that were
examined systematically to focus on actual or validated causes. Two questions guided this gap
analysis:
RQ1: What are the SSE knowledge and skills, motivation, and organizational influences
related to SSEs within mid-to-large-size organizations implementing active shooter preparedness
programs?
RQ2: What are the recommended knowledge and skills, motivation, and organizational
solutions for SSEs within mid-to-large-size organizations to successfully implement active
shooter preparedness programs?
Conceptual and Methodological Framework
The conceptual framework to explore this problem of practice is Clark and Estes’s (2008)
gap analysis (Figure 4). The gap analysis is described as a systemic, analytical method that helps
to clarify organizational goals and identify potential gaps (Clark & Estes, 2008). The basic tenet
of the gap analysis is that after clarifying an organization’s desired result or end state, gaps can
be assigned to KMO resources (Clark & Estes, 2008). These areas can be applied to individuals,
groups, or entire organizations. Clark and Estes’s gap analysis was appropriate to examine this
problem of practice because it offers a framework to help clarify current and desired states and
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identify the gaps that need to be closed to achieve the desired state. The methodological
framework used was a mixed-methods study. Assumed KMO issues were based on personal
knowledge and the related literature. The issues were assessed using a survey and interviews.

Figure 4
Conceptual Framework

Note. Adapted from Human and Institutional Capacity Development Handbook by USAID,
2010. Copyright 2010 by USAID.

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Overview of Design
Beginning with Clark and Estes’s gap analysis as the baseline foundation, this study
examined active shooter preparedness programs in mid-sized organizations (500+ employees)
within the United States, from research and selection of a program to implementation and
maintenance tactics, techniques, and best practices. The key concepts from the literature
informed the foundational knowledge regarding the existence of, and need for, these
preparedness programs. By examining the KMO resources through the gap analysis framework,
the study sought to identify gaps for implementing new programs and improving existing ones.
The design of this study follows an explanatory sequential mixed methods approach. The
explanatory sequential mixed methods approach is a two-phase data collection approach in
which the researcher conducts the first phase as a quantitative study, analyzes the results, and
then uses those results to inform the plan for the second, qualitative phase (Creswell & Creswell,
2018). The overall intent of the explanatory sequential design is to have the follow-up qualitative
data help add context and explanation for the quantitative (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). This
research design aligns with the purpose of the study because quantitative and qualitative data,
together, provide a better understanding of the implementation of active shooter preparedness
programs and their results than using either type of data independently.
The strategy used for this study was a field study. A field study is a method of data
collection with the aim of observing, interacting, and understanding participants in their natural
settings (Salkind, 2010). The field study methodology aligns with the purpose of this study as it
allowed me to gather context and gain insight into both the existing data and the data discovered
through the inquiry process. Table 5 presents the data sources.
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Table 5
Data Sources
Research questions Survey Interview
What are the SSE knowledge and skills, motivation, and
organizational influences related to SSEs within mid-to-large-
size organizations implementing active shooter preparedness
programs?
X X
What are the recommended knowledge and skills, motivation,
and organizational solutions for SSEs within mid-to-large-size
organizations to successfully implement active shooter
preparedness programs?
X X

Participating Stakeholders
The stakeholder group of focus for this study is SSEs in mid-to-large-sized organizations
in the United States (Table 6). The ASIS SSE standard describes an SSE as the trusted authority
regarding security who collaborates with the organizational leadership to build and maintain a
comprehensive security program and culture that protects the organization and enhances the
organizational mission and strategic objectives (ASIS, 2022). The SSEs were selected as the
stakeholder of focus because they are primarily responsible for the development,
implementation, and maintenance of comprehensive safety and security plans. Additionally,
these SSEs generally bear the responsibility of ensuring that their organizations comply with
OSHA’s general duty clause, Section 5(a)(1) under the OSHA Act of 1970 (OSHA, 1970). This
study used purposive sampling to identify participants from this specific stakeholder group.
Thus, SSEs from multiple industries were interviewed to identify both general trends and
industry-specific nuances that SSEs must navigate to implement an active shooter preparedness
plan as part of their comprehensive safety and security plans.

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Table 6
Participating Stakeholder Demographics
Sits in SSE role
for the
organization.
Mid-sized
organization
(500+ employees)
Organization
located in the
United States
Successful
implementation of
active shooter response
training
Survey Yes Yes Yes No
Interview Yes Yes Yes Yes

Survey Sampling Criteria and Rationale
The following section describes the three criterions for determining the survey sample as
well as discussing the survey sampling recruitment strategy and rationale.
Criterion 1. Job Description
Security professionals can hold different roles with unique responsibilities within their
respective organizations. However, this study focused on participation from the decision-making
authority regarding an organization’s physical security. To ensure adequate representation from
an organization, it was important for the sampling to be based on the job description with the
responsibilities of the SSE, not the job title.
Criterion 2. Size of Organization
Senior security executives are employed at organizations that range in size from local,
small businesses with fewer than 100 employees to global enterprises with tens of thousands of
employees. It was important for the sampling to focus on organizations with 500+ employees to
answer the questions of how SSEs in mid-sized organizations successfully implement active
shooter preparedness training.

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Criterion 3. Location of the Organization
Senior security executives are employed by organizations that span the globe. However,
this study focused on organizations located in the United Sates and subject to compliance with
federal guidelines from OSHA. As such, it was important for the sampling to ensure that
participants worked for an organization based in the United States and subject to federal
guidelines.
Survey Sampling (Recruitment) Strategy and Rationale
This study employed purposive sampling, which is used when the researcher wants to
understand, discover, and gain insight from a particular group and, therefore, must select a
sample from which the most can be learned (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The key reason a
researcher employs sampling in the quantitative portion of a mixed methods study is “to make
accurate generalizations about a population using sample data” (Johnson & Christenson, 2014, p.
249). The quantitative survey data in this study allowed me to generalize about the SSE
population in mid-sized organizations in the United States regarding the KMO influences related
to the implementation of active shooter preparedness training. To gather as large a sample as
possible, I sent the survey to multiple industrial security professional organizations and request
participation from any potential participants that meet the criteria regardless of industry. The
survey was the first step in the data collection process and was used to identify potential
participants for individual interviews.
Interview Sampling Criteria and Rationale
The following section describes the four criterions for determining the interview sample
as well as discussing the interview sampling recruitment strategy and rationale.

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Criterion 1. Job Description
Security professionals can hold different roles with unique responsibilities at their
organizations; however, this study focused on participation from the decision-making authority
regarding an organization’s physical security. To ensure adequate representation from an
organization, it was important for the sampling to be based on the job description with the
responsibilities of the SSE, not the job title.
Criterion 2. Size of Organization
Senior security executives are employed at organizations that range in size from local,
small businesses with less than 100 employees to global enterprises with tens of thousands of
employees. It was important for the sampling to focus on organizations with 500+ employees to
answer the questions of how SSEs in mid-sized organizations successfully implement active
shooter preparedness training.
Criterion 3. Location of the Organization
Senior security executives are employed by organizations that span the globe; however,
this study focuses on organizations located within the United States and subject to compliance
with federal guidelines from OSHA. As such, it is important for the sampling to ensure that
participants worked for organizations based in the United States-based and subject to federal
guidelines.
Criterion 4. History of Successful Implementation of Active Shooter Training
The purpose of this study was to examine the promising practices of SSEs who
successfully implement active shooter training at their organizations. As such, it was critical to
ensure that the interviewees had a history of doing so.

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Interview Sampling (Recruitment) Strategy and Rationale
The target population for the qualitative phase of this explanatory sequential study was
SSEs at mid-to-large-sized organizations in the United States who implemented active shooter
training programs. This population was appropriate for the study because I sought to explain the
KMO resources necessary for successful policy implementation related to these programs. The
sampling strategy was a mixture of purposeful and snowball sampling to attain the target sample
size. The interviews were informed by, and used in conjunction with, the survey in which the
participants were asked whether they implemented active shooter training at their organizations.
A response in the affirmative allowed me to narrow the initial sample from the quantitative phase
and achieve purposeful sampling for the qualitative phase. Additionally, I sought to capitalize on
the SSEs’ professional contacts during the interviews and ask if there were other SSEs in the
participant’s professional network who would add value to the study.
Data Collection and Instrumentation
This study’s data sources were surveys and interviews. These methods provided me with
both quantitative and qualitative data to assess the KMO influences of SSEs related to the
successful implementation of active shooter training at their organizations. The following section
will discuss the methods used to collect data.
Surveys
I administered the survey via an online link through Qualtrics. To solicit participation, the
link for the survey was posted on select, executive-level industrial security professional
networking sites. The survey consisted of 45 demographic questions and survey items: 16 items
assessed knowledge-related influences, six items assessed motivation-related influences, and 12
items assessed organizational resource-related influences. The items were developed to help
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assess perceptions from SSEs that aligned with the interview questions. The survey was expected
to take approximately 25 minutes to complete. To help ensure validity and reliability, I
conducted a survey pretest with a pilot group to determine if the survey items have validity,
measuring what they are intended to measure, and reliability, survey items answered consistently
(Robinson & Firth Leonard, 2019). Appendix D presents the survey protocol.
Interviews
I conducted one interview with each participant identified from the survey data. The
interviews were conducted online via Zoom. The interviews employed a semi-structured
approach which allowed for flexibility while collecting data and control of the interview while
exploring participants’ thoughts, feelings, and beliefs about implementing an active shooter
training program (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The interview
consisted of 29 questions; however, each had several subquestions to probe deeper into particular
topics.
The interview began with several background and knowledge questions to establish a
baseline of what the interviewee knew relative to the subject and then transitioned into questions
relating to opinions, beliefs, and behavior. The framework of the questions was deliberate and
helped me move from RQ2, looking at what SSEs who have successfully implemented programs
know and do, to RQ3, which explores the SSEs’ beliefs regarding KMO resources. I recorded
and transcribed the interviews, with permission from the participants, for use in data analysis. To
help ensure validity and reliability, I employed member-checking and peer-debriefing strategies.
Creswell and Creswell (2018) described member-checking as relaying specific descriptions and
themes to participants and asking for participants’ opinions regarding the accuracy of the
statements. Peer debriefing is using someone other than me to review the study and ask questions
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to check for resonance for individuals other than the person conducting the study (Creswell &
Creswell, 2018). Appendix F presents the interview protocol.
Data Analysis
I conducted data analysis to make meaning from the data (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
This research incorporated both qualitative and quantitative assessments of survey and interview
data. Survey data were analyzed for frequencies, and interview data were analyzed for keywords,
themes, and trends related to the KMO resources related to the successful implementation of an
active shooter training program. The data analysis was conducted in the same manner as the data
collection: sequentially. The survey data were collected and analyzed for positive responses to
questions regarding active shooter training implementation to help me identify participants for
potential interviews. Both interview and survey data were cleaned to ensure the removal of
information that could identify the participants or their employers.
Credibility and Trustworthiness
It was critical to ensure credibility and trustworthiness in this study to limit researcher
bias, as I collected, coded, and then analyzed the data. I used triangulation, reflexivity, and peer
review to ensure that the study findings were credible and trustworthy (Merriam & Tisdell,
2016). To employ triangulation, I contacted SSEs through multiple industry networks and
contacts to capture different views or schools of thought from disparate professional networks
such as the ASIS and the Security Industry of America. The triangulation of collecting data from
multiple sources increased the study’s credibility while limiting researcher bias (Creswell, 2009;
Maxwell, 2013; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
For reflexivity, I ensured that a portion of this chapter was reserved for an explanation of
how my biases, disposition, and assumptions could affect how the research is undertaken
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(Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Additionally, I collaborated through membership in an affinity group
with other young professionals in the security industry whose members performed a peer review
and offered their thoughts and recommendations on the study. Subsequent measures were also
taken to enhance the study’s credibility and trustworthiness. There were verbatim transcripts
created from the interviews, and the interviewees were offered the opportunity to schedule a
follow-up interview to review preliminary results and provide clarification of information, if
necessary.
Assuring participants that their participation and responses would be held in confidence
was vital to developing credibility. Confidentiality increases credibility and trustworthiness as
participants feel more comfortable responding to the survey and in the interview more honestly
and candidly (Creswell, 2014). During data collection, I provided written statements and verbal
reminders about the confidentiality of participants and remained committed to participants’
confidentiality throughout the study. I also explained my biases as a member of the same
industry employed by an organization that implemented an active shooter training program.
Additionally, participants were made aware that they were free to opt out of participation at any
point in the study. Providing the participants with information surrounding researcher-held bias
and the participants’ confidentiality and explicit understanding of voluntary participation leads to
greater credibility and trustworthiness (Rubin & Rubin, 2012).
Validity and Reliability
The sampling method for the survey and the interviews lends validity and reliability to
the study. The survey respondents were selected randomly, via volunteering to take an online
survey posted on a professional networking site, which reduced selection bias, and then
purposefully for interviews based on specific responses in the survey, which increased the
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findings’ reliability (Krueger & Casey, 2009). By concentrating strictly on participants’ opinions,
the survey and interview have increased validity because opinions cannot be wrong (Fink, 2013).
The survey and interviews sought to gather opinions from SSEs about whether the assumed
KMO influences from the literature on active shooter training programs were met. Salkind
(2017) submitted that reliability is increased in surveys that include clear instructions and
questions that can be answered with few-to-no distractions. Peer and research subject matter
expert feedback was used to evaluate the survey instructions and questions for clarity. I included
multiple forms of personal contact information and invited participants to reach out with any
questions or requests for clarification.
I am not currently an SSE, so I did not have rank or authority over the participants and,
therefore, was unlikely to affect how participants responded to the survey or interview. Survey
response rate is a factor in the validity of the data, and the use of incentives has been shown as
one of many ways to increase response rates (Fink, 2013). I did not offer incentives as the study
could be useful to the industry at large, and each participant was offered the option to receive a
copy of the findings when the study was complete. It is possible and acceptable that SSEs may
have chosen not to participate in the survey, but it was the expectation that when offered the
opportunity, SSEs would choose to participate.
Ethics
As the University of Southern California required, I completed a series of computer-
based learning modules on human subject research. Additionally, the university’s institutional
review board reviewed and approved the research proposal before the study began.
The participants gave informed consent via email prior to participating in the survey and
again verbally before interviews. The participants were notified and reminded that participation
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was voluntary and that they could withdraw from participation at any time. All participants were
informed that their information and confidentiality would be maintained and that none of the
information they shared would be linked to their name or organization.
Due to the nature of the study and the inherent interest that participants should have in the
results, targeted participant participation should be easy to gain and not require any form of
compensation other than a promise to share the final findings and report. All participants were in
positions at their organizations superior to me, and as such, coercion was not an issue. I was clear
that the intent of the study was to share best practices and industry knowledge to increase the
likelihood of favorable results at the participants’ organizations should an active shooter incident
occur.
This study serves the interest of SSEs, particularly in mid-size organizations,
organizational leadership teams, employees, and organizations as a whole. The goal was to
discover and disseminate best practices for organizations to implement and maintain programs to
prepare for and mitigate active shooter incidents to keep employees safe. This is not an easy
subject, and asking participants questions about active shooter preparedness could be unsettling
or traumatic. The study’s purpose was to examine best practices for providing a safe
environment for organizations and their employees. However, to provide that information, I
might unintentionally have caused participants to feel less safe and secure. The research
questions were answered from my viewpoint to share best practices for bolstering organizations’
security and safety. I designed the questions and framed the scope; however, there could be value
added by integrating input from subject matter experts to ensure multiple perspectives are
considered. The study’s results will first be shared with interested study participants and then
with interested organizational leadership and the security and safety industry at large.
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Role of Investigator
Prior to engaging in data collection, it was pertinent to acknowledge my positionality and
role of investigator, specifically with regards to how it could inform how this study was
conducted and results were framed (Holmes, 2020; Rowe, 2014). I am a master’s educated,
combat veteran, straight, White, male. I was born, raised, and currently live in the Midwest. I am
also an industrial security professional employed in senior management at an organization with
an active shooter training plan. Due to my salient identities, it is acknowledged that there is a
lack of understanding of what it is like to identify as a race, gender, ethnicity, or with a sexual
orientation that would be categorized as a historically marginalized group. Throughout this
study, I sought opportunities to listen and understand the experience of participants with different
salient identities while acknowledging my inherent privilege and working to keep that privilege
from being the foundation of the understanding of the problem of practice.
In looking at my positionality and how it may have influenced the interviews, a concern
was that most interviewees would identify similarly to me: a white male. SSEs and the industrial
security field trend White and male. I plan to make an effort to interview as diverse a population
as possible, given the constraints of being in the position of an SSE, being located in the United
States, and being at a company with more than 500 employees.
The power dynamic related to the interview should be a non-issue as I am not currently
an SSE, and as such, all the interviewees were sitting in a position with higher authority and
responsibility. The power dynamic of the SSEs within their organizations could have affected
their responses as I asked questions related to reporting structure and executive attitude toward
security-related issues. To help mitigate potential issues, I gave participants multiple assurances
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of confidentiality and explicitly stated that data and trends gleaned through data collection would
be sanitized of identifying information of interviewees and their organizations.
Limitations and Delimitations
There are both limitations and delimitations of which I was cognizant of throughout the
study. Limitations are factors outside of my control, and delimitations are choices I made that
affected the study’s outcome. The limitation inherent to this study is the involvement of human
subjects, which can lead to human error. Other limitations were my dependency on the
participants’ truthfulness and a lack of generalizability because of the small number of
interviewees when contrasted with the number of mid-size organizations in the United States as
well as the organizations’ locations, industries, and footprints, which may not be generalizable to
other organizations. Finally, the study was limited by my and the participants’ knowledge and
experience and the time and number of participants involved. The delimitations were that I chose
specific participation criteria and that data were only collected from SSEs and not from their
teams or direct reports who may have been more involved in program implementation.
Additional delimitations are the selected scope and number of survey and interview questions.
Despite the limitations and delimitations, the study provides insight into KMO resource
influences on the successful implementation of active shooter training programs.

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Chapter Four: Results and Findings
The purpose of this study was to identify the KMO influences affecting SSEs in mid-to-
large-size organizations in selecting, implementing, and maintaining an active shooter response
training plan for their organizations. Clark and Estes’s (2008) gap analysis model was used as the
framework for this study, and, as such, the assumed influences were delineated and categorized
within the KMO domains. As a result of a comprehensive literature review, assumed KMO
influences related to implementing active shooter response training were identified and
presented. The results within this chapter are organized by the identified KMO influences to
maintain alignment throughout the study. However, as this study was designed to help identify
assets, or positive influences, in implementing an active shooter response training plan, the
findings are framed and presented using Ghaye’s (2010) framework of positive reflective
practice. Ghaye asserted that individuals and groups may see better results by assessing change
through a positive lens to determine what has gone right to build off that success. As such, to
achieve the goal of creating a blueprint for SSEs, this study framed the findings by identifying
future assets of SSEs who want to implement training at their organizations.
This study followed a mixed methods explanatory sequential design in which both
qualitative and quantitative data were collected to validate the assumed influences. Specifically,
survey and interview data were collected to understand the KMO influences on SSEs as they
seek to implement active shooter response at their organization. Survey data were collected and
analyzed first to guide the selection of participants for follow-up interviews.
This study assumed 20 influences as assets that might affect an SSE’s ability to
implement a training program. The results and findings validated 14 of those influences. The
validated influences include five knowledge influences: two factual, two procedural, and one
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metacognitive. Additionally, the four motivational influences validated were utility value, self-
efficacy, collective efficacy, and expectancy outcome. Finally, the five organizational influences
validated were two resource-related, one policy and procedure-related, culture, and authority.
Several of the influences validated as assets are related to at least one other influence and
could be considered a portion of the other influence. For example, the findings indicate that SSEs
report strong procedural knowledge of organizational policy implementation while also reporting
strong procedural knowledge of the facilitating of change management. The ability to facilitate
change management is part and parcel with strong organizational policy implementation skills.
Additionally, the reporting of strong procedural knowledge may also contribute to the reporting
of high levels of self-efficacy in the SSEs’ ability to implement policy and training programs.
Two findings that were somewhat unexpected were the relatively low scores related to
factual knowledge and the nearly non-existent positive responses related to attribution theory.
Despite implementing active shooter response training programs, a majority of the SSEs were
unable to identify factual information related to active shooter incidents. The study assumed that
SSEs would need a strong basis of factual knowledge to implement a training program, yet the
data did not support that assumption. Additionally, it was assumed that SSEs who have
implemented a program would have done so in part because they would have attributed a benefit
to their personal wellness through participation. However, the data indicate that none of the SSEs
implemented their programs with their personal well-being in mind.
Participating Stakeholders
As a mixed-methods explanatory sequential study, stakeholders had two opportunities to
participate. The first was in the quantitative survey and the second through selection and
participation in a follow-up interview. Thirty-eight SSEs from across the United States took the
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quantitative survey. Their tenure was evenly distributed, with 24.1% in their role for 1 to 3 years,
24.1% in their roles for 4 to 7 years, 24.1% in their roles for 8 to 10 years, and 27.7% in their
role for more than 10 years. The SSEs represented multiple industries, from banking to
manufacturing and from hospitality to retail. Table 7 identifies the variety of industries
represented within the survey results and the number of respondents from each industry.

Table 7
Industries Represented by Survey Participants
Industry Number of responses
Financial services 4
Insurance 2
Higher education 3
Industrial 1
Manufacturing 1
Logistics 2
Public safety 1
Entertainment/hospitality 3
Mortgage 1
Healthcare 2
Utilities 1
Automotive industry 2
Food and beverage 1
Technology 3
Government 2
Non-profit 1

Note. The organizations represented by the SSEs ranged in size from a minimum of 500–750
employees (10%) to a majority with over 1,000 employees (74%).

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Prior to asking specific questions related to the KMO influence related to implementing
active shooter response training plans, the SSEs were first asked general questions to assess their
thoughts related to active shooter incidents and their organizations’ preparation. When asked to
indicate their level of anxiety related to an active shooter incident at their organization, 42% of
SSEs indicated that they were moderately anxious, followed by 39% reporting that they were
slightly anxious, with the remaining 19% of responses split between very anxious (11%) and not
at all anxious (8%). Figure 5 shows the SSEs’ responses to the survey item on their anxiety
levels about an active shooter incident at their organization.

Figure 5
Level of Anxiety Around Active Shooter Incidents Reported by SSEs

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SSEs were then asked to indicate how prepared they felt their organization was to
respond to an active shooter incident. Forty-three percent of SSEs indicated their organizations
were moderately prepared followed by 25% of SSEs selecting slightly prepared and 21%
responding very prepared. The lowest responses indicated were extremely prepared at 7% and
not at all prepared at 4%. Figure 6 shows the SSEs’ responses.

Figure 6
Organizational Preparedness for an Active Shooter Incident

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From the 38 survey respondents, 19 SSEs volunteered to participate in a follow-up
interview. Of the 19 volunteers, 12 SSEs were selected. Those not selected for a follow-up
interview represented similar, or the same, industry as a selected interviewee. The even spread of
tenure in the SSE role reported from the quantitative survey was given more context in the
qualitative interview as follow-up questions revealed that while some participants were new to
their organization, their years of experience within the security industry varied from 8 years to 29
years with an average of 17.9 years. Table 8 identifies the interviewees’ industry and years of
experience as SSEs.

Table 8
Demographic Information of Interview Participants
ID Industry SSE experience
SSE1 Financial services 16 years
SSE2 Utilities 25 years
SSE3 Mortgage 20 years
SSE4 Technology 14 years
SSE5 Higher education 8 years
SSE6 Retail 18 years
SSE7 Insurance 21 years
SSE8 Non-profit 29 years
SSE9 Automotive industry 14 years
SSE10 Entertainment/hospitality 23 years
SSE11 Government 16 years
SSE12 Healthcare 11 years

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Determination of Assets and Needs
A request for participation graphic and write-up explaining the goal of the study with a
link to the survey was posted in multiple professional networking groups to solicit data from a
variety of sources. A post was made on multiple communication boards with the ASIS to include
both the communication board open to the general membership as well as the chief security
officer circle board, which is open only to members identified as the SSE or deputy SSE for their
organization. The request for participation was also posted on the communication boards for the
SIA. In addition to the professional networking groups, participants were asked in both the
survey and the interview for additional participants who may be interested in taking part in the
study.
Triangulation from the data sources was aided by the intentional design of the study. By
conducting an explanatory sequential study, data from the quantitative survey could be validated
and given credibility by the responses in the qualitative interview. The reverse is also true of
using data from the qualitative interviews to validate and give credibility to the survey data.
While conducting the qualitative interview portion of the study, trends began to emerge after the
first two interviews and repeated responses, although not verbatim, began to become evident by
the 10th, 11th, and 12th interviews. The repeated responses without additional new insight
indicated saturation and signaled a justification to stop the interviews.
Determination of an asset for development varied by type of question and method of data
collection. For Likert-type survey data, the threshold of 60%, or a combined 60% on either the
top two or bottom two responses, was selected to indicate a large majority and determine
whether an asset for development existed. The same threshold of 60%, or a combined 60% in
response values of 8, 9, and 10, was used for questions that prompted a response on scale of 1–
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10. Interview responses and transcripts were reviewed for keywords, trends, and concepts. If
60% or more of the interviewees mentioned a keyword, trend, or concept, it constituted a large
majority and was determined to indicate an asset.
Results and Findings for Knowledge Causes
According to Krathwohl (2002), knowledge includes four distinct areas: knowledge,
conceptual knowledge, procedural knowledge, and metacognitive knowledge. Gaps in these
distinct areas of knowledge must be identified and addressed to increase performance (Clark &
Estes, 2008). Multiple survey and interview questions were asked to assess knowledge influences
related to SSE’s ability to successfully implement active shooter response training. This section
discusses the results from the survey and interviews related to factual, conceptual, procedural,
and metacognitive knowledge influences on the stakeholders’ ability to successfully implement
active shooter response training.
Factual Knowledge Influence 1
The first factual influence was that SSEs need to know the facts related to active shooter
incidents.
Survey Results
To assess the SSEs’ knowledge of the facts related to active shooter incidents,
respondents were asked to select the facts that were applicable to these incidents from a list
provided. Of the eight provided fact statements, five were applicable. None of the eight
statements was selected by a majority of the participants. The answer selected the most was
selected by only 36% (14) of the 38 participants. Additionally, the other applicable answers were
selected by 23% (9), 18% (7), 16% (6), and 16% (6) of respondents. Conversely, two of the
responses not applicable to active shooter incidents were selected by 26% (10) and 13% (5) of
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participants. The lack of consensus indicates that an in-depth knowledge of active shooter
incidents is not a commonality of SSEs (Table 9).

Table 9
SSE Reported Facts Related to Active Shooter Incidents
Survey choice Total percentage of SSEs who identified it as a
fact related to active shooter incidents
A majority of active shooters are male. 36%
Active shooter incidents do not include self-
defense, gang, or drug-related shootings.
23%
A majority of active shooters die by suicide
during the incident.
18%
There has been a 100% increase in active
shooter incidents in the last 4 years.
16%
A majority of active shooters use handguns
as opposed to rifles.
16%

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Stakeholders were also asked to correctly identify the average duration of active shooter
incidents (Table 10). The data showed that 80% (30) correctly identified the average duration.
The remaining 20% (8) selected a time between 5 and 10 minutes longer than the average
duration.

Table 10
SSE Reported Duration of Active Shooter Incidents
Survey choice Total percentage of SSEs who selected specified duration
Less than 5 minutes 80%
Five to 10 minutes 16%
Ten to 15 minutes 4%

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Interview Findings
Several interview questions were asked to assess the SSEs’ knowledge of facts related to
active shooter incidents. As a criterion to participate in the interview, the SSEs had to have
implemented active shooter response training. The findings suggest that SSEs possess general
knowledge of active shooter incidents and are adept at speaking to well-known incidents and/or
incidents of which they have first-hand knowledge, but when probing questions were asked to
test for in-depth knowledge, the SSEs were less able to speak confidently.
Many interviewees had a shared background related to either military service or law
enforcement, which was drawn upon multiple times as evidence of background knowledge of
active shooter incidents. Several stakeholders spoke about recent active shooter incidents, both
locally and nationally, and the lessons learned by the agencies responsible for responding.
Probing questions were asked about specific lessons learned from previous active shooter
incidents that were implemented in the stakeholders’ own programs, but all answers given were
hypothetical.
When asked about strategies to stay current on research and trends related to active
shooter incidents, most SSEs mentioned reading and following articles and stories in print,
online, and broadcast news as well as professional networking sites but failed to mention the
annual report from the FBI and the ALERRT statistics and research database (Table 11). The
SSEs’ lack of in-depth knowledge of the facts related to these incidents did not limit the
implementation of active shooter response training.

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Table 11
Terms Used Regarding Source of Factual Knowledge of Active Shooter Incidents
Term SSE
Professional background SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE10, SSE11
Mainstream media SSE4, SSE5, SSE9
Personal experience SSE2, SSE3, SSE6, SSE8
Professional networks SSE1, SSE4, SSE5, SSE7, SSE12
After-action reports/academic articles SSE1, SSE3

Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs’ knowledge of facts related to active
shooter incidents indicate that this influence is a need. Neither the 60% threshold for survey
questions nor the 60% threshold for themes and keywords in interviews were met, with the most
popular, correct survey option being selected only 36% of the time and only 42% of SSEs
repeating similar keywords and themes in the interviews.
Factual Knowledge Influence 2
The second factual knowledge influence was that SSEs need an understanding of the key
ideas related to organizational policy implementation.
Survey Results
One survey question addressed the SSEs’ understanding of the key ideas related to
organizational policy implementation. Participants were given a list of responses and asked to
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select which of the responses best explained the key ideas of organizational policy
implementation. Eighty-four percent (32) of the participants selected the correct answer, and the
remaining 16% (6) selected what would be considered the next-best answer (Table 12). The
majority of the SSEs selecting the correct response and being familiar with the key ideas of
organizational policy implementation is not surprising, as one of the key responsibilities of an
SSE is to develop, implement, and maintain the organization’s safety and security policies. As
such, it would stand to reason that SSEs would be well-versed in the key ideas related to
organizational policy implementation.

Table 12
SSE Reported Organizational Policy Implementation Key Ideas
Survey choice Total percentage of SSEs who identified
the option as the best response
Policy makers and front-line services need to be
involved in the entire policy process.
0%
Priorities and actions need to be clearly
articulated during the policy development
process.
0%
Policy initiatives tend to be more effective with
direct front-line input.
0%
Practitioners can provide a real-world perspective
on the feasibility of a particular policy.
16%
All of the above. 84%
None of the above. 0%

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Interview Findings
The interviews confirmed much of what was discovered through the survey regarding
SSE knowledge of key ideas relating to organizational policy implementation. Participants were
asked open-ended questions regarding the key ideas or important aspects of policy
implementation, and several of the SSEs proceeded to discuss both the importance of policy
implementation and the accompanying steps. SSE11 stated that they could “give a master class
on policy implementation” and then proceeded to give a miniature lesson on the Polaris policy
process, used by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for public health but adapted for
their organization’s security and safety. Collaboration was a critical focus, with SSE1 stating that
success in implementing a new policy “does not happen without cross-functional collaboration.”
Another key theme was communication, with both SSE8 and SSE12 saying the key to
success is to “communicate, communicate, communicate.” Staying realistic and practical was
another common trend, with SSE3 saying that the policies “have to make sense and be feasible”
and SSE7 saying that the policies have to “work in all situations, not just those with perfect
conditions.” Again, all of the interviewees have successfully implemented active shooter
response training, and the findings suggest that an asset to that successful implementation is a
strong knowledge of the key ideas surrounding organizational policy implementation (Table 13).

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Table 13
Themes Around Organizational Policy Implementation from Interview Participants
Theme SSE
Importance of collaboration with
stakeholders
SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE5, SSE6, SSE10, SSE11
Communication is critical. SSE1, SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE7, SSE8, SSE9,
SSE10, SSE11, SSE12
Listen to/implement feedback. SSE2, SSE3, SSE4, SSE6, SSE8, SSE10, SSE12
Ensure policies are
practical/realistic/pragmatic.
SSE1, SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE7, SSE9, SSE10,
SSE12

Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs’ knowledge of key ideas related to
organizational policy implementation validated the influence as an asset or need. The 60%
thresholds for survey questions and themes and keywords in interviews were met, with 84% of
SSEs indicating the key ideas of organizational policy implementation on the survey and 83% of
SSEs repeating similar keywords and themes in the interviews.
Factual Knowledge Influence 3
The third factual knowledge influence was that SSEs need to identify the drivers that lead
to employees’ perception of safety and security in the workplace.

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Survey Results
When given a list of drivers that lead to employees’ perception of safety and security,
most of the SSEs selected the same three choices. There was unanimous support among SSEs for
two drivers, with all 38 participants selecting Executive support for safety and security initiatives
and Regularly scheduled drills and exercises. The other choice that also received a large majority
of support was Readily accessible safety and security training, which was selected by 84% (32)
of the SSEs. Table 14 shows the choices afforded to the SSEs and the number of times each
choice was selected. The choices were crafted based on trends established during the literature
review, and the data indicate that SSEs who experienced success in implementing active shooter
response training can identify the drivers that lead to employees’ perception of safety and
security in the workplace.

Table 14
SSE Reported Identification of Drivers That Lead to Employees’ Perception of Safety and
Security in the Workplace
Survey choice Total percentage of SSEs who identified it as a driver
of employee perception
Executive support for safety and
security training
100%
Regularly scheduled drills and
exercises
100%
Readily accessible safety and
security training
84%
Annual safety training 54%
Safety signage 8%
Random, unannounced drills and
exercises
2%

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Interview Findings
Interview participants were asked to identify and expound upon what they believed to be
the drivers that lead to employees’ perception of safety and security in the workplace. The
findings suggest that the SSEs have a solid understanding of what drives employees’ perceptions
of safety and security. The SSEs consistently identified and described the drivers of employee
perception of safety and security in alignment with themes uncovered during the literature
review. Several variations of the phrase “it starts at the top” indicated that the SSEs were aware
that executive support for safety and security initiatives is an important factor in employee
perception. SSE10 explained that one of his self-assigned key responsibilities/accountabilities
was to ensure that he and his team maintained an awareness of employee concerns through
regularly scheduled pulse check surveys. A consistent theme in the survey responses was the
importance and appreciation for scheduled drills and exercises. The importance of drills and
exercises was validated by a majority of the SSEs as all but one (92%) spoke, unprompted, to
their drill and exercise schedules to maintain employees’ awareness and readiness in the event of
a safety or security incident (Table 15).

Table 15
Themes Around Drivers of Employee Perception of Safety and Security From Interview
Participants
Theme SSE
Involvement of
executives/leadership
SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE8, SSE9, SSE10,
SSE12
Regular drills/exercises SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE7, SSE8, SSE9,
SSE10, SSE11, SSE12
Easily accessible training SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE6, SSE7, SSE8, SSE9, SSE11,
SSE12
Visual indicators (signs, etc.) SSE2, SSE4, SSE10
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Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs’ ability to identify the drivers of
employees’ perception of safety and security validated the influence as an asset. The 60%
thresholds for survey questions and themes and keywords in interviews were met, with 100% of
SSEs identifying the drivers of employee perception of safety and security on the survey and
92% of SSEs repeating similar keywords and themes in the interviews.
Conceptual Knowledge Influence
The conceptual knowledge influence was that SSEs need to know the components of
active shooter preparedness plans.
Survey Results
The SSEs were asked during the survey to indicate their level of agreement with the
statement, “I know the components of an active shooter response training plan.” Immediately
following that question, SSEs were asked to list the components of an active shooter training
plan as a means to validate their level of agreement indicated in the previous question. As noted
previously, the target population for the study was SSEs who have implemented plans, and, as
such, it is not surprising that a majority, 97% (37), indicated that they either agreed or strongly
agreed that they know the components of an active shooter response training plan. What was
unexpected was that the remaining SSE indicated that they strongly disagreed with the statement
about knowing the components of a plan. However, when analyzing the answers to the follow-on
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question about listing the plan's components, it appeared that there could have, or should have,
been additional SSEs who agreed with the minority answer.
When given the opportunity to validate their level of agreement with knowing the
components of an active shooter training plan by listing the components of their organization’s
plan, many answers were surprising. The answers ranged from the names of the programs to
narratives on the creation of a program to hyperlinks for program websites. In analyzing the
questions, the word “component” may have been confusing for some of the SSEs. The aim of the
question was to look for training trends in terms of in-person, asynchronous, or hybrid and the
frequency in which that training was completed and/or required. Of the SSEs who responded
with the modality and frequency of their training, a majority, 13, indicated that they use a hybrid
modality with an asynchronous course as a prerequisite for the live, in-person training. Eight
SSEs indicated that the course was completed entirely online, and the final three indicated that a
presentation was given during a portion of their organization’s new hire orientation process.
Table 16 shows the modality and frequency of active shooter response training plan components.

Table 16
Reported Modality and Frequency of Active Shooter Response Training Plan Components
Modality Frequency Number of SSEs reporting
Hybrid asynchronous and in-person Annually 13
Asynchronous Annually 8
Presentation at new hire orientation Once 3

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Interview Findings
Given the opportunity to ask clarifying and probing questions during the follow-on
interview, it was discovered that the SSEs who participated in the interviews could speak at
length on the components of an active shooter response training plan. The common themes from
the interviews indicated that the hybrid model with a prerequisite asynchronous module followed
by live, in-person training was the most popular and, in the opinions of the SSEs, effective,
modality. SSE1 indicated the reason their organization selected a hybrid model by saying:
Using a hybrid model allows the employees the ability to apply the concepts from the
online modules when they come to the in-person training, and we can conduct additional
drills to create muscle memory because we don’t have to spend time covering the
fundamentals.
SSE4 indicated that the hybrid model worked best for their organization due to the national
footprint of their organization. The use of an online module allowed employees to complete half
of the training at their assigned location and made the in-person training “more efficient,
effective, and a better use of the time I asked them to be away from their assigned
responsibilities.”
Several of the SSEs displayed in-depth knowledge of the components of their plans
(Table 17), but one SSE in particular stood out for developing an active shooter response training
solution that is now widely implemented across the nation. SSE3 “favored the hybrid model and
used it to create my own training because I felt the online classes better prepared employees to
understand and retain the in-person instruction.” In addition to the asynchronous and in-person
training, SSE3 included in the conversation the component that differentiates this training, which
includes rendering first aid to victims.
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Table 17
Components of Training Mentioned During Interviews
Terms SSE
Hybrid training, including online modules and in-
person scenario training
SSE1, SSE3, SSE5, SSE6, SSE8, SSE9,
SSE10,
Online modules with built-in checks on learning SSE4, SSE7, SSE11
In-person classes offered by external consultants SSE2, SSE12
In-person classes by trained employees SSE1, SSE3

Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The data regarding the SSEs’ knowledge of the components of active shooter training
plans were mixed. The survey failed to meet the 60% threshold to validate the influence as an
asset, with only 36% consensus on plan components. However, the interviews met the 60%
threshold for themes and keywords, with 66% of SSEs repeating keywords and themes in the
interview. Ultimately, this influence is a need.
Procedural Knowledge Influence 1
The first procedural knowledge influence was that SSEs need to know how to facilitate
change management across their organization.
Survey Results
The survey findings indicate that a majority of SSEs reported that they know how to
facilitate change across their organization. Eighty-four percent (32) of SSEs indicated that they
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either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that they know how to facilitate change
management within their organization (Table 18). Similar to the findings on organizational
policy implementation, it makes sense that most SSEs would agree with the statement. Much of
an SSE’s success is driven by the ability to implement changes across the organization to modify
both organizational and employee behaviors to eliminate or mitigate risk.

Table 18
SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Facilitating Change Management
Survey item: I know how to facilitate change
management within my organization.
Total percentage of SSEs who selected
the response
Strongly agree 30%
Agree 54%
Neither agree nor disagree 9%
Disagree 7%
Strongly disagree 0%

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The SSEs further demonstrated their knowledge of change management during a follow-
on question. When given a list of generalized change management steps and asked to place them
in sequential order, the SSEs posted an 89% accuracy rate (Table 19). This result is another
indicator that successful SSEs have a strong knowledge of change management and can bring
that knowledge to bear when implementing an active shooter response training program.

Table 19
SSE Accuracy in Ordering Change Management Steps
SSE accuracy Total percentage of SSEs in each category
Accurate 89%
Not accurate 11%

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Interview Findings
Data from the interviews was intriguing in that it validated the reported knowledge of
change management, but it indicated different pathways to that knowledge. When asked probing
questions about experience and training with change management, there was a 55% to 45% split
between on-the-job change management experience and SSEs who have attended formal change
management training. SSE2 and SSE11 both referenced their military background, one retired
and one current, as on-the-job change management. SSE2 stated that the change management
skills they gained during military service were “critical” to their ability to implement change,
with SSE11 indicating that the ability to learn how to manage change on real-world issues was
“certainly helpful” across all aspects of change management. Two SSEs, SSE1 and SSE3,
indicated they had received formal change management training and referenced John Kotter with
the common theme of building a guiding coalition and growing the “volunteer army.”
Additionally, multiple SSEs spoke about their relationship with their organization’s learning and
development team or human resources and attributed much of their success to their collaboration.
SSE4 said,
Our HR learning and development team are my best friends when it comes to change
management. They have the know-how to create training and tools to help me. Why
wouldn’t I leverage that?
The SSEs were asked about the impact their knowledge of change management had on
their ability to implement an active shooter response training program with the common themes
of “integral” (SSE1, SSE7, and SSE12), “incredibly important” (SSE3, SSE10, and SSE11), and
“critical” (SSE2 and SSE5) emerging (Table 20).

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Table 20
Themes Around Facilitating Change Management from Interview Participants
Theme SSE
Formal change management training SSE2, SSE4, SSE5, SSE8, SSE12
Informal on-the-job training SSE1, SSE3, SSE7, SSE8, SSE9, SSE10, SSE11
Collaboration with other
stakeholders
SSE1, SSE3, SSE4, SSE7, SSE8, SSE9 SSE10,
SSE12

Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs’ ability to facilitate change management
within their organization validated the influence as an asset. The 60% thresholds for survey
questions and themes and keywords in interviews were met, with 84% of SSEs indicating
agreement or strong agreement on knowing how to facilitate change management on the survey
and 66% of SSEs repeating similar keywords and themes in the interviews.
Procedural Knowledge Influence 2
The second procedural knowledge influence was that SSEs need to know how to connect
the relationships of active shooter training programs to employee performance and perception of
a safe work environment.
Survey Results
Findings indicated that SSEs were split on their ability to connect the relationship
between active shooter response training and employee performance and perception of a safe
99

work environment. The SSEs were asked to select the most accurate of a given set of statements
based on themes and trends in the literature review, indicating no connection between active
shooter response training and employee performance/perception, connection to an increase in
one but not the other, and a connection showing increases in both employee performance and
perception related to active shooter response training. Thirty-seven percent (14) selected the
correct answer, which indicated that training increases both performance and perception, while
34% (13) and 28% (11) selected an increase in one but not both (Table 21). In analyzing the
question and the responses, it appears that while the SSEs may not have been able to identify that
implementing the training increases both employee performance and perception of a safe work
environment, all indicated that they believe it affects at least one aspect of the employee
experience, which signifies that implementation is value added to the organization.

Table 21
SSE Reported Connection of Relationship of Active Shooter Training to Perception of Safety and
Security in the Workplace
Statement
Total percentage of SSEs
who selected the
statement
Research has shown that active shooter response training
increases employee performance but has no effect on
employee perception of a safe work environment.
28%
Research has shown that active shooter response training
increases employee perception of a safe work environment
but has no effect on employee performance.
34%
Research has shown that active shooter response training
increases both employee performance and employee
perception of a safe work environment.
37%
Research has shown that there is no connection between active
shooter response training and employee performance and
perception of a safe work environment.
0%

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Interview Findings
The interviewees were asked about the relationship between the implementation of active
shooter response training and employee performance and perception of a safe work environment.
Multiple SSEs stated that they were sure there was a connection between the two, with SSE6
stating, “I’m pretty sure you wouldn’t be asking about it if there wasn’t.” Another interviewee,
SSE10, commented, “I haven’t dug into the research or anything, but I don’t think I have to. It
seems like it would be common sense that those would be related.” There were no trends beyond
a desire to agree that there is, or should be, a relationship between the two and move on to speak
to a different aspect of the training (Table 22). This finding indicates that many of the SSEs
assume the connection but do not feel a need to have evidence of it before implementing a
training program.

Table 22
Themes Around Relationship Between Active Shooter Training and Employee Performance from
Interview Participants
Theme SSE
General agreement SSE1, SSE3, SSE6, SSE7, SSE11
Common sense/logical SSE2, SSE3, SSE4, SSE8, SSE9, SSE10
Acknowledgement and pivot SSE2, SSE5, SSE8, SSE9, SSE10, SSE12

101

Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs’ knowledge of facts related to active
shooter incidents indicate that this influence is a need. Neither the 60% threshold for survey
questions nor the 60% threshold for themes and keywords in interviews were met, with only 37%
of SSEs selecting the correct answer on the survey and 50% of SSEs repeating keywords or
themes in the interviews.
Procedural Knowledge Influence 3
The third procedural knowledge influence was that SSEs need to be able to follow the
steps in their own organizational decision-making process.
Survey Results
Results related to SSEs’ ability to follow their organizational decision-making process
closely mirror similar questions related to policy implementation and change management. When
asked their level of agreement with the statement “I know how to follow the steps of my
organization’s decision-making process,” 81% (31) responded either agree or strongly agree.
The remaining 19% (7) was split between somewhat disagree (4) and strongly disagree (3).
These findings again indicate that a majority of the SSEs self-report a strong understanding of
their organization’s decision-making process, which makes sense given their abilities to guide
the selection and implementation of an active shooter response training program (Table 23).
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Table 23
SSE Reported Agreement with Statement on Organizational Decision-Making Process
Survey item: I know how to follow my
organization’s decision-making process
Total percentage of SSEs who selected
the response
Strongly agree 28%
Agree 53%
Neither agree nor disagree 0%
Disagree 11%
Strongly disagree 8%

Unlike the majority of the SSEs that indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed on
knowing how to follow their organization’s decision-making process, there was not a majority in
agreement on the follow-up question asking them to place generalized decision-making steps in
sequential order. Of all the respondents, only 32% (12) correctly ordered the seven steps. A
majority, 55% (21), only placed one step out of sequence, though which step varied widely. The
findings of the follow-up questions contradict the original question. However, the inability to
properly order a generalized decision-making process does not necessarily indicate an inability to
follow an organization-specific process (Table 24).

Table 24
SSE Accuracy in Ordering Decision-Making Process Steps
SSE accuracy Total percentage of SSEs in each category
Accurate 32%
Not accurate 68%

103

Interview Findings
SSEs were given an opportunity to talk both generally about their organization’s
decision-making process and then specifically about how that process played out in the course of
the implementation of their active shooter response training program. Several SSEs spoke to
their role in the decision-making process, and a theme emerged of the SSE being only one cog of
a larger process that included multiple departments and required significant collaboration. SSE3
indicated that “in an organization with over 1,000 people, … decisions require cooperation and
collaboration with several departments.” SSE12 also spoke to collaboration, specifically in the
healthcare setting, saying, “different departments operate and see patients differently, which
leads them to have their unique inputs on decisions to be made.”
When asked if they felt their experience was unique compared to others across their
organization, the consensus was that their experience was “different,” with SSE4 commenting, “I
don’t mean different ‘bad.’ Just different due to the nature of what we were making a decision
about.” Multiple SSEs stated it was hard to compare their experience to others because, as SSE8
stated, “The decision to replace your HRIS is not life and death, but active shooter training can
be.” SSE10 also pointed to the subject matter of the decisions being different, saying, “I don’t
mean to diminish the work that other departments do for the company, but decisions regarding
safety and security don’t compare to marketing or things that, like, our consequences are just
different.”
Overall, the SSEs were each knowledgeable about their own organization’s processes,
and all agreed that knowing how to navigate the process helped in implementing active shooter
response training (Table 25).
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Table 25
Themes Around the Decision-Making Process from Interview Participants
Theme SSE
Collaboration SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE4, SSE7, SSE8, SSE11, SSE12
Unique experience SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE8, SSE9, SSE10, SSE11
Ad hoc process SSE5, SSE10

Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The data regarding the SSEs’ knowledge of their organizational decision-making process
was mixed. Most 91% SSEs agreed or strongly agreed that they knew their organizational
decision-making process. However, when asked to order the decision-making steps, the SSEs
failed to meet the 60% threshold with only 32% accuracy, which failed to validate the influence
as an asset. The interviews, however, met the 60% threshold for themes and keywords, with 75%
repeating similar keywords and themes in the interviews, validating the influence as an asset.
This influence is an asset.
Procedural Knowledge Influence 4
The fourth procedural knowledge influence was that SSEs need to know how to follow
the techniques involved in successfully implementing policies across their organization.

105

Survey Results
Similar to their responses regarding change management and organizational decision-
making processes, SSEs reported a high degree of confidence in their ability to implement policy
at their organizations. When asked to select the response to indicate their level of agreement
regarding a statement that they understood the key ideas related to organizational policy
implementation, 93% (35) indicated that they either agreed or strongly agreed. The remaining
7% (3) were split between neither agree nor disagree (2) and strongly disagree (1). The findings
indicate, as they did with other process-centered questions, that the SSEs who have succeeded at
implementing active shooter response training have a strong understanding of the theory of
policy implementation and an ability to translate that understanding of theory into application to
get their intended results (Table 26).

Table 26
SSE Reported Agreement with Statement on Policy Implementation
Survey item: I know the techniques involved in
successfully implementing policy in my organization.
Total percentage of SSEs who
selected the response
Strongly agree 24%
Agree 69%
Neither agree nor disagree 5%
Disagree 0%
Strongly disagree 2%

106

To add further evidence that SSEs know and understand the key ideas related to
organizational policy implementation, they were asked to put a set of generalized policy
implementation steps in sequential order. A majority, 78% (29), of SSEs correctly ordered the
steps. The 78% is, obviously, lower than the 93% that indicated agree or strongly agree.
However, the SSEs who incorrectly ordered the steps did so by an average of two steps, with the
most any single SSE missed being one participant who mixed up four of the steps. The ability of
the majority of SSEs to correctly order the steps sequentially indicates that procedural
knowledge of that process is an asset to successfully implementing active shooter response
training (Table 27).

Table 27
SSE Accuracy in Ordering Policy Implementation Steps
SSE accuracy Total percentage of SSEs in each category
Accurate 78%
Not accurate 22%

107

Interview Findings
Given an opportunity to elaborate on organizational policy implementation, many of the
SSEs confirmed the ability indicated through the survey responses. Beyond confirming that they
knew the theory of policy implementation, several of the SSEs spoke directly to the practical
application of policy implementation as it related to their organization’s active shooter response
training. SSE6 indicated that their success in implementing active shooter response is “tangible
evidence that I know how to implement policy.” Likewise, SSE2 and SSE5 stated that
implementing policy is “what I do” and that the active shooter response training is “proof of my
abilities.”
Outside of the example of active shooter response training, multiple SSEs referenced
policy implementation as one of the main aspects of their role as they work to keep their
organizations safe. Trends from the interviews included multiple mentions of “evaluation”
(SSE2, SSE5, SSE8, SSE12) and “consideration of options” (SSE3, SSE5, SSE6, SSE8, SSE11)
when it came to selecting the appropriate training program for their organization. SSE1
mentioned that their organization “really focused on defining the issue we wanted to, and, really,
thought we could solve for” through the implementation of an active shooter response training
policy.
Several SSEs mentioned evaluating the different potential solutions and getting feedback
that allowed the policy decision makers to have a firm understanding of their employees’
attitudes toward implementing a policy geared toward a violent/traumatic subject. SSE2 stated
that a key to their success in implementing policy was “my willingness to not fixate on one
option and be open to feedback,” while SSE12 again mentioned the multiple different disciplines
within healthcare and the “ability to for opinions to be heard through feedback was a big reason I
108

was able to successfully implement policy.” Ultimately, the findings indicated that SSEs who
have had success in implementing training have a strong understanding of organizational policy
implementation (Table 28).

Table 28
Themes Around Organizational Policy Implementation Experience from Interview Participants
Theme SSE
Experience from role requirements SSE1, SSE2, SSE4, SSE5, SSE8, SSE10, SSE12
Examples of application SSE1, SSE3, SSE4, SSE6, SSE7, SSE8, SSE10,
SSE11
Evaluation and feedback SSE2, SSE5, SSE8, SSE12
Importance of assessing multiple
options
SSE3, SSE5, SSE6, SSE8, SSE11

109

Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs’ understanding of organizational policy
implementation validated the influence as an asset. The 60% thresholds for survey questions and
themes and keywords in interviews were met, with 93% of SSEs indicating they know the
techniques for successful policy implementation on the survey and 66% of SSEs repeating
similar keywords and themes in the interviews.
Metacognitive Knowledge: Influence 1
The first metacognitive knowledge influence was that SSEs need to plan the most
appropriate way to teach/implement active shooter preparedness training without inducing stress
and/or anxiety among employees.
Survey Results
When asked to respond to an open-ended question on how best to fine-tune active shooter
response training to mitigate stress and anxiety among employees, there were not any apparent
trends within the suggestions, but very few appeared more than twice. Several responses spoke
broadly to the need for active shooter response training and that mitigating stress and anxiety is a
noble goal, although perhaps not a ‘must’ for planning. One SSE responded, “anything I do
around active shooter training is stressful to both the trainer and the staff, but it has to be done.”
Table 29 highlights some of the responses from SSEs surrounding appropriate ways to
teach/implement active shooter response training without inducing undue stress and/or anxiety.
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Table 29
SSE Suggestions to Reduce Stress and Anxiety in Active Shooter Response Training
Survey item Response
The active shooter response training process you
are implementing in your organization needs
fine-tuning. Write down a few of your
reflections and the potential adjustments you
may make to try to minimize unintended stress
and/or anxiety.
Use mental health services, approach
each training with a customized
approach for the audience.
Train the trainers to spot early indicators
of anxiety in participants.
Once I’ve reviewed/identified potential
issues, I would seek out a peer or
subject matter expert who has
experience dealing with similar issues
for council.
Clearly communicate with the
employees that there will be an
exercise; identify employees with
special needs and accommodate.

The findings indicate that while several options are available, there does not appear to be
at least a 60% agreement of all survey respondents to validate the influence as an asset across the
SSEs who participated in the survey.
Interview Findings
Like the survey results, there were no clear trends in interview responses related to
reducing stress and anxiety during training. The SSEs spoke broadly to the fact that stress and
anxiety are, unfortunately, associated with any violent or traumatic subject. SSE2, who has a
background in military service, spoke to the similarity of active shooter response training and
military basic training, stating that stress “goes with the territory” and is “part of the job
description” of dealing with violent or traumatic subjects. SSE9 indicated that stress and anxiety
can be “unfortunate byproducts” of the training and that there “probably is not” a way to mitigate
those byproducts for everyone to be trained.
111

Several SSEs did mention that the question made them stop and think about the training
in a way that they had not yet considered and, as such, they did not have a response or solution to
offer beyond hypotheticals. SSE1 said that the question “was a good one that made me think”
and that “I may have to re-evaluate the way we support our employees through the training.”
Additionally, SSE8 said that they “had never considered the question in over 20 years of
conducting training” but that “with the focus on mental health in society, it is probably worth
revisiting.” The lack of any emergent trends indicates that a deliberate plan or process to reduce
stress and anxiety is not an indicator of either success or failure for SSEs implementing an active
shooter response training program.
Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
This influence is a need. Neither the 60% threshold for survey questions nor the 60%
threshold for themes and keywords in interviews were met, with no consensus best practice
identified by 60% of SSEs on the survey and keywords and themes from interviews repeated by
only 25% of SSEs.
Metacognitive Knowledge Influence 2
The second metacognitive knowledge influence was SSEs need to plan their approach to
mitigate the risk of inducing unintended trauma by teaching about violent subjects.

112

Survey Results
The findings indicate that, unlike the ability to plan active shooter response training to
reduce stress and anxiety, the ability to plan an approach to mitigate unintended trauma earned a
consensus response. That response was, in some form or fashion, communication. Multiple SSEs
indicated that the key to mitigating trauma is communicating with training participants about
what to expect. Table 30 highlights some of the responses highlighting the trend of
communication.

Table 30
SSE Suggestions to Mitigate Potential of Trauma in Active Shooter Response Training
Survey item Response
Please explain how you planned steps to
mitigate unintended trauma in your approach
to implementing active shooter response
training.
Advise what the training involves and
give team members the opportunity to
excuse themselves.
Ensure proper sequencing of awareness
for all involved: trainers and
participants.
All employees must be aware of the
program and what could possibly
happen within the training program.
Open, honest, and factual communication
with employees
Education and training, awareness for
staff
Develop a communication plan in
conjunction with HR and PR teams.
Clear communication; identify employees
with special needs and accommodations.

113

The responses indicate that SSEs believe that their ability to mitigate trauma from
training is best accomplished through communication and establishing expectation management
for all parties involved in the training.
Interview Findings
Within the interviews, the SSEs had the opportunity to expand on their responses to the
mitigation of trauma and their thoughts on the difference in response between stress and anxiety
versus trauma. A major theme on preparation of training, for any type of safety or security
training, whether traumatic or not, is to communicate (Table 31). SSE1 explained it as such:
If I’m going to impact their normal day-to-day and ask them to do something that puts
them outside their comfort zone, I’m going to communicate it. I take the same approach
when I ask people to evacuate the building for a fire drill, but for active shooter training,
it is communication by a magnitude of 10.

Table 31
Themes Around Approaches to Mitigate Trauma from Training from Interview Participants
Theme SSE
Communication SSE1, SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE7, SSE8, SSE10,
SSE11, SSE12
Controlling the environment SSE2, SSE3, SSE5, SSE6, SSE8, SSE11, SSE12
Inability to affect individual’s emotional
responses
SSE3, SSE5, SSE7, SSE8, SSE12

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When asked about the difference between the ability to mitigate stress and anxiety,
multiple SSEs pointed out that stress and anxiety are very personal emotions that only the
employee can control. SSE5 said that their organization has a multigenerational workforce that
handles experiences and emotions “incredibly differently” than each other, which makes trying
to control employees’ emotional responses “an effort in futility.” SSE8 made the same comment
but added that the workforce of their non-profit also includes employees with developmental
disabilities making controlling employees’ emotional responses “almost a non-starter.” Fifty-
eight percent of the SSEs spoke to the idea of controlling the situation and setting to reduce
potential trauma but being unable to affect how the employees received the training from an
emotional standpoint. SSE6 and SSE12 stated that the outside consultants their organization
brings in to “train the trainer” work specifically on “controlling the environment during training”
and “setting the conditions for ‘helpful’ training.” SSE3 indicated that when they present their
training sessions, they “control as much of the chaos as we can.”
Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs’ ability to plan the training to mitigate
unintended trauma validated the influence as an asset. The 60% thresholds for survey questions
and themes and keywords in interviews were met, with 65% of SSEs identifying communication
as a key to mitigating potential trauma from training on the survey and 75% of SSEs repeating
similar keywords and themes in the interviews.
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Results and Findings for Motivation Causes
As defined by Clark and Estes (2008), motivation includes three elements: the individual
chooses to engage in the activity, is persistent in working toward a goal, and puts mental effort
into the task. These three elements, when combined with the knowledge factors, lead to
increased performance (Clark & Estes, 2008). Multiple survey and interview questions were
asked to assess the motivational influences affecting SSEs’ ability to successfully implement
active shooter response training. This section discusses the results of questions crafted to
measure and explore the SSEs’ thoughts related to utility value theory, self-efficacy, expectancy-
value theory, and attribution theory.
Value Influence
The value influence was that SSEs need to see the importance to their job in preparing
their organization for active shooter incidents.
Survey Results
Two questions were asked on the survey to assess the perceived utility value SSEs place
on active shooter training programs and whether that perceived value played a role in their
motivation to implement training. Ninety-seven percent (37) of SSEs either agreed or strongly
agreed with the statement that implementing active shooter response training was an important
responsibility of their role. The lone dissenting vote was on the opposite end of the spectrum and
indicated that the SSE strongly disagreed that implementing training was important.
Implementing an active shooter response training plan is not an easy task, and as such, it is
unsurprising that a near-unanimous majority of SSEs who have implemented the training
indicated that they felt it was important to their role.
116

The SSEs were also asked how important they believed it was that their organization
require active shooter response training. The important or very important results remained
consistent with the agree/strongly agree results at 97% (37); the lone dissenting vote moved up
from strongly disagree to slightly important. When analyzed together, the findings for these two
questions indicate that SSEs agree that implementing active shooter response training is
important to their role. Additionally, the slight change in the level of disagreement on the second
answer indicates that the perceived utility value of requiring active shooter response training for
their organization is more important to their organization than their role specifically as the SSE.
Table 32 shows the consistency in the response rate of SSEs who agree or strongly agree about
the importance of implementing active shooter response training in their roles and their
organizations.

Table 32
SSE Reported Beliefs About the Value of Active Shooter Response Training
Survey item Total percentage of SSEs who
agree or strongly agree
Implementing active shooter response training is an
important responsibility of my role to the organization.
97%
I believe it is important that my organization requires
active shooter response training.
97%

117

Interview Findings
The emergence of trends and consistent words in the responses indicate that the SSEs o
see the value and importance of implementing active shooter response training to their role at
their organizations. Interview findings were consistent with the survey results with regard to the
utility value of implementing active shooter response training. When asked about their
motivation to implement the training, SSEs consistently answered that their main objective is
developing, implementing, and executing training and programs aimed at creating a more safe
and secure workplace for their organization. SSE1 stated that “people deserve to feel safe at least
two places, if nowhere else, and that’s at work and at home. … It’s my job to create that safe
environment for them at work.” Other words and phrases that emerged as trends were “duty,”
“culture of security,” “common sense,” “strategic,” and “owed it to employees.”
Other SSEs indicated more personal reasons for implementing active shooter response
training. SSE8 spoke to an incident that took place over 20 years ago at another organization he
worked for in which a disgruntled former employee came back to “settle a few scores” and how
that incident has “shaped the way I view the protection of my people ever since.” SSE3 spoke to
a nationally known school shooting that took place approximately eight miles from his
organization’s headquarters and that his organization had employees with children at that school:
“Our leadership was on edge, and our employees were scared for themselves and their families.
I just felt like I needed to do something for them.” He also mentioned that workplace training
does not stop being useful when employees leave the organization’s footprint and that his
motivation for implementing training was to, hopefully, increase his sphere of influence through
the transfer of knowledge and skills to their family members.
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Additionally, two other SSEs mentioned the inherent dangers of employees who work
daily with large amounts of cash and their increased potential of being targeted for violence
(Table 33). They both spoke to their sense of duty to the employees and the employees’ families.
SSE10 said that his organization sees “hundreds of thousands of dollars of cash per day,” which
makes them a “ripe target” for crime and that if he “doesn’t prepare … employees for potential
violence, then I’m not doing my best to ensure they go home at the end of their shift.” SSE6
spoke specifically to the holiday season, which “sees a surge in shopping and spending,” which
coincides with “an increase in desperate activities by criminals who don’t care who they hurt.”

Table 33
Themes Around Utility Value Theory from Interview Participants
Theme SSE
Create a safer workplace SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE4, SSE9, SSE10, SSE11,
Sense of duty SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE5, SSE6, SSE8, SSE11, SSE12
Common sense SSE5, SSE6, SSE10, SSE11
Strategic security SSE1, SSE4, SSE7, SSE8, SSE12
Owed to employees/organization SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE6, SSE8, SSE10, SSE12

119

Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs’ ability to see the importance to their job
in preparing their organization for an active shooter incident validated the influence as an asset.
The 60% thresholds for survey questions and themes and keywords in interviews were met, with
97% of SSEs indicating that implementing active shooter training is an important part of their
role and 66% repeating similar keywords and themes in the interviews.
Self-Efficacy Influence 1
The first self-efficacy influence was that the SSEs need to have confidence in their ability
to implement an active shooter preparedness program raising the confidence of employees
related to safety at the workplace.
Survey Results
When asked to indicate their confidence level in their ability to implement an active
shooter training program at their organization, SSEs reported a high degree of confidence (Table
34). The findings indicate that on a scale of 1 to 100, the maximum score reported was 100%
confidence, the minimum score reported was 65%, and the mean of the responses was 88.53%
confidence. With self-efficacy referring to a person’s belief in their capacity to execute behaviors
required for desired results (Bandura, 1977), the fact that the mean of the self-efficacy scores is
close to 90% confidence is unsurprising. As a criterion for being included in the sample
population, the SSE had to have implemented such a program.
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Table 34
SSE Reported Self-Efficacy Regarding Active Shooter Policy Implementation
Survey item: Please indicate on a scale of 0–100 the degree to which you
are confident with the following statement: “I am confident in my ability to
implement active shooter response training within my organization.”
Relevant
statistics
Maximum score 100
Minimum score 65
Mean 88.53
Standard deviation 11.96

Interview Findings
The interview findings also suggest that SSEs do not lack self-efficacy when discussing
program implementation. Asked to describe their confidence in implementing an active shooter
response training program, three-quarters of the SSEs indicated they felt efficacious in their
abilities. SSE2 indicated that he does not “lack for confidence in [his] abilities,” while SSE4
stated, “Oh, yeah, that’s why I’ve been successful.” Additionally, almost 70% of the SSEs
indicated that they led the effort of implementation but that they relied on their team and/or
consultants to inform their decision surrounding the program, tools, development, and resources
needed for implementation. SSE3 said that “I’m certainly leading the charge, but it doesn’t get
done without help.” The ability to collaborate was a theme for SSE12, who said that “on my
own, I would probably be fine, but when I get to collaborate, I know I can do it.”
When asked if the specific subject of implementing an active shooter response training
program required more confidence than other safety and security-related programs, the response
was somewhat mixed (Table 35). Over half of the interviewees indicated that they approach all
training programs, regardless of subject matter, in the same manner, to project confidence to
their organization. SSE7 stated that approaching all training the same way keeps him from
121

“overthinking and overanalyzing the details,” while SSE11 commented that maintaining a
similar approach “allowed employees to create muscle memory” and not “get too worked up”
over the subject of the training. Two SSEs, however, indicated that they felt the need to convey a
higher level of confidence or assuredness to their organization when introducing a subject that
could be viewed as more controversial than the normal safety and security training like fire and
weather-related drills. SSE1 and SSE3 mentioned that this training is “different” and “required
greater planning, participation, and execution” than other safety and security training.

Table 35
Themes Around Self-Efficacy of Implementing Active Shooter Response Training From Interview
Participants
Theme SSE
Confidence in their abilities SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE6, SSE8,
SSE10, SSE11
Collaboration SSE1, SSE3, SSE5, SSE6, SSE7, SSE8, SSE11,
SSE12
Similar approach to all trainings SSE2, SSE4, SSE5, SSE7, SSE8, SSE11, SSE12
Unique approach to active shooter
training
SSE1, SSE3

122

Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs’ confidence in their ability to implement
an active shooter preparedness program within their organization validated the influence as an
asset. The 60% thresholds for survey questions and themes and keywords in interviews were
met, with 88% of SSEs indicating efficaciousness in their abilities to implement training and
75% of SSEs repeating similar keywords and themes in the interviews.
Self-Efficacy Influence 2
The second self-efficacy influence was that SSEs need to believe that their organization
is capable of creating a safe and secure environment through the implementation of an active
shooter preparedness program.
Survey Results
The survey results were not as positive regarding confidence in the collective efficacy of
organizations to create a more safe and secure environment through the implementation of an
active shooter response training program (Table 36). On a scale of 1 to 100, the maximum
response remained at 100% confidence, yet the minimum response dropped to 30%, a change in
the minimum response of 35%. The mean response also dropped almost 10 percentage points to
78.67% confidence. While the results still indicate that a majority of the SSEs maintain
confidence in the collective efficacy of their organization, the change in both minimum
123

confidence and mean confidence suggests that SSEs may feel less confident speaking on behalf
of what their organization can do as opposed to what they can control individually.

Table 36
SSE Reported Collective Efficacy Regarding Active Shooter Policy Implementation
Survey item: Please indicate on a scale of 0–100 the degree to which you are
confident with the following statement: “I am confident that my organization
is capable of creating a safe and secure environment through implementation
of active shooter response training.”
Relevant
statistics
Maximum score 100
Minimum score 30
Mean 78.67
Standard deviation 20.57

124

Interview Findings
The interview findings again suggest that a majority of SSEs do not lack confidence in
the collective efficacy of their organization to create a more safe and secure environment through
the implementation of training. When asked to describe their confidence in their organizations’
collective efficacy, it became apparent that not all participants understood the concept of
collective efficacy. Once the concept was explained, two-thirds expressed confidence in their
organizations, although some did so with hesitation. SSE1 indicated that his employees were
“security-conscious,” while SSE5 said their organization was “all in on making it a safe place to
be,” and SSE6 expressed confidence due to the quality of their employees, saying, “our people
are great, I know they can accomplish anything.” Asked about the hesitation SSE4 used a
response he “hates to use” and said that it “depends on the situation and the individuals
involved.”
Of the SSEs that understood the concept, a trend emerged that while they still have
confidence in the collective efficacy of their organization, that confidence has waned in the last 3
years. When asked to explain the reason for the drop in confidence, several SSEs pointed out that
the shift to a hybrid work environment with less social interaction between employees made the
establishment and enforcement of informal practices and informal norms more difficult (Table
37). SSE1 said that “most of our training had to be re-created for the new hybrid environment.”
SSE7 indicated that his employees are “almost never in the office anymore,” but when they are,
he “wants them to be prepared just in case.” SSE8 said that the hybrid work environment is
“definitely a challenge” and “never something I thought I would plan for” but that the “resiliency
of the employees and organization is impressive.” While several of the SSEs mentioned their
drop in confidence, a trend emerged that they still had enough confidence in their organization
125

and forecast enough return on investment to maintain their active shooter response training
programs.

Table 37
Themes Around Collective Efficacy From Interview Participants
Theme SSE
Confidence SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE5, SSE6, SSE8, SSE10, SSE11
Confidence with hesitation SSE4, SSE7, SSE12
Hybrid work hesitancy SSE1, SSE3, SSE7, SSE8, SSE9

126

Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs’ confidence in their organization’s ability
to create a more safe and secure environment through the implementation of an active shooter
preparedness program validated the influence as an asset. The 60% thresholds for survey
questions and for themes and keywords in interviews were met, with 78% of SSEs indicating
collective efficaciousness in their organization’s ability to create a safe environment through
training and 66% of SSEs repeating similar keywords and themes in the interviews.
Expectancy Outcome Influence
The expectancy outcome influence was that SSEs need to believe that by implementing
an active shooter preparedness program, they will raise the perception of safety and security at
their organization.
Survey Results
The results indicate that all of the SSEs surveyed believe that the implementation of an
active shooter preparedness program will increase the perception of safety and security at their
organization. When asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statement, I expect that
implementation of an active shooter response training will increase the perception of safety and
security at my organization, all respondents either agreed or strongly agreed (Table 38). The
response to this survey question aligns with the response from an earlier question on the drivers
of employee perception of safety and security at the workplace. On that question, all respondents
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selected regularly scheduled drills and exercises, and 84% selected readily accessible training.
When paired together, the results of these two questions indicate that SSEs can identify the
drivers of employee perception of security and safety and expect that implementation of the
drivers will increase employees’ perception of safety and security at work.

Table 38
SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Active Shooter Training Raising Perception of
Safety
Survey item: I expect the implementation of active shooter
response training will increase the perception of safety and
security at my workplace.
Total percentage of SSEs
who selected the response
Strongly agree 63%
Agree 37%
Neither agree nor disagree 0%
Disagree 0%
Strongly disagree 0%

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Interview Findings
When asked about their motivation and expectations for implementing an active shooter
response training program, the findings indicated that all of the SSEs were motivated to
implement the training with the expectation that employees would feel safer and more secure.
Multiple SSEs indicated that their motivation for implementing training is the same as their
motivation for implementing various other safety and security training: they expect that
employees will feel safer at work (Table 39). SSE1 stated that his “motivation for implementing
training is always the same: keep the employees safe.” SSE8 indicated that he “trains the
employees because I owe it to their families to send them home safely at the end of each day.”
Ten of the SSEs felt as though the question could have easily been rhetorical, with SSE3
responding, “if I didn’t expect my organization would feel safer after the training, why would I
waste my time, my team’s time, or the organization’s resources on the training?” Several of the
same keywords, including “duty” from SSE1, “common sense” from SSE7 and SSE9, and
“strategic” from SSE2, as well as trends such as “the right thing to do” from SSE4 and “owing
the employees a safe workplace” from SSE12 emerged surrounding expectancy value as did
within the question of utility value.

Table 39
Themes Around Motivation and Expectancy Value From Interview Participants
Theme SSE
Employee safety SSE1, SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE7, SSE8, SSE10, SSE11, SSE12
Rhetorical question SSE2, SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE6, SSE7, SSE8, SSE10, SSE11, SSE12
Duty/obligation SSE1, SSE2, SSE4 SSE7, SSE9, SSE12

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Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs’ expectations for increasing the perception
of safety and security through implementing an active shooter preparedness program validated
the influence as an asset. The 60% thresholds for survey questions and themes and keywords in
interviews were met, with all SSEs indicating they expect the implementation of active shooter
response training to lead to an increased perception of a safe workplace within their organization
and 83% of SSEs repeating similar keywords and themes in the interviews.
Attribution Influence
The attribution influence was that SSEs need to believe that their personal wellness can
be affected through their own engaged participation in the implementation of an active shooter
preparedness program.
Survey Results
Results indicated that SSEs did not consider their own personal wellness when deciding
to implement an active shooter preparedness plan (Table 40). When asked to indicate their level
of agreement with a statement about their personal wellness being positively affected through
engaged participation in the implementation and execution of the training, a majority, 71% (27),
indicated that they neither agreed nor disagreed, while the remaining 29% (11) selected
somewhat agree. The findings suggest that the SSE focus more on the well-being of their
organization’s employees, which is supported by several earlier survey and interview question
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responses. In responses to previous questions on both metacognitive knowledge and utility value,
SSEs consistently reported care and concern for the safety and security of their organization’s
employees being paramount as opposed to mentioning anything related to their own well-being.

Table 40
SSE Reported Agreement With Attribution of Increased Personal Wellness
Survey item: My own personal wellness will be positively
affected through engaged participation in the implementation of
active shooter response training.
Total percentage of SSEs
who selected the response
Strongly agree 0%
Agree 29%
Neither agree nor disagree 71%
Disagree 0%
Strongly disagree 0%

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Interview Findings
The interview themes validated the survey question results, as nearly all SSEs sought to
divert attention from themselves and their personal wellness (Table 41). The SSEs consistently
pivoted away from themselves in an effort to focus on how the decision was best for the
organization and the employees. SSE3 responded,
implementing the training had absolutely nothing to do with any concern for my own
safety. … I care more about the moms and dads that come to work and my duty to ensure
they go home to see their families at night.
Another, SSE8, responded that “being in this line of work and being selfish about your own
safety doesn’t generally go hand-in-hand.” While almost three-quarters of the survey respondents
chose the neutral answer, the clear trend from the interviews is that there is no evidence
attributing any part of the decision to implement active shooter response training to a positive
impact on their personal wellness.

Table 41
Themes Around Personal Wellness From Interview Participants
Theme SSE
No connection to personal well-being SSE2, SSE5, SSE7, SSE8, SSE11
Pivot to organizational benefits SSE1, SSE3, SSE4, SSE6, SSE9, SSE10, SSE12

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Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to the SSEs’ belief that implementing an active
shooter preparedness plan can affect their personal wellness did not validate the influence as an
asset but identified it as a need. The 60% threshold for survey questions was not met, with only
29% of SSEs in agreement about the effect on their personal well-being. The 60% threshold for
themes and keywords in interviews was not met either, with no SSEs indicating keywords or
themes agreeing with the influence and 41% of SSEs actively disagreeing with the influence.
Results and Findings for Organization Causes
Organizational culture is the idea that incorporates the generalized beliefs and ways of
thinking within an organization (Schein, 2004). Clark and Estes (2008) argued that placing
organizational culture alongside the knowledge and motivation factors to address them all
simultaneously leads to more successful change efforts. Several survey and interview questions
were asked to assess organizational influences, specifically resources, policy and procedure, and
leadership support. This section discusses the results of questions constructed to measure and
explore the SSEs’ thoughts related to organizational influences on their ability to successfully
implement active shooter response training.
Resources Influence 1
The first resources influence was that SSEs need to be given the time to research, select,
and implement active shooter preparedness training plans.
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Survey Results
The findings indicated that the SSEs agreed that being given the appropriate time to
research, select, and implement active shooter response training is essential to successful
implementation (Table 42). Forty-three percent (16) of SSEs indicated that they strongly agreed
that their organization allocates appropriate time, while another 37% (14) selected that they
agreed with the statement. In contrast, only 20% (8) either somewhat disagreed or strongly
disagreed that their organizations give them the appropriate amount of time to vet and implement
training. Viewing appropriate time as an asset to successful training implementation makes
sense, as ample time allows for a thoughtful and deliberate approach to selection and
implementation, which leads to greater success than a rushed, disorganized, or haphazard
approach. The percentage of SSEs who agree with the statement constitutes a large majority and
surpasses the 60% threshold established as validating the influence as an asset.

Table 42
SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Time
Survey item: My organization allocates appropriate time for
due diligence, selection, and implementation of security
initiatives such as active shooter response training.
Total percentage of SSEs
who selected the response
Strongly agree 43%
Agree 37%
Neither agree nor disagree 0%
Disagree 13%
Strongly disagree 7%

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Interview Findings
When questioned about being given appropriate time in the interview, the findings
aligned very closely with the survey results in validating time as an asset to implementing an
active shooter training plan (Table 43). Two-thirds of the SSEs spoke to a sense of urgency in
getting the training implemented but never a feeling of being rushed. As SSE8 put it, “I knew it
was important because I was constantly being asked about the status, but I was never told to
hurry up and get it done.” SSE1 indicated that his sense of urgency may have been self-induced
because he “felt like I needed to keep forward momentum going to ensure I retained the support
of the leadership. I didn’t want it to drag on.” Another theme was that more than half of the SSEs
spoke to the fact that their leadership gave them ample time because, as SSE5 stated, they
wanted to “get it right for the organization,” while SSE10 indicated that “with this type of
training, you want to ensure that you have crossed your Ts and dotted your Is.” Similar to the
analysis of the survey results, finding that limited time to select and implement training was not
something that a vast majority of the SSEs reported is unsurprising. Many of the SSEs spoke to a
real-world, close-to-home need to implement training and, as such, said they were given the time
necessary to accomplish the objective.

Table 43
Themes Around Time for Due Diligence and Implementation From Interview Participants
Theme SSE
Not rushed, but urgent SSE1, SSE4, SSE6, SSE7, SSE8, SSE9, SSE11, SSE12
Ample time from leadership SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE5, SSE8, SSE10, SSE12

135

Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs being given the appropriate amount of
time to research, select, and implement active shooter preparedness training validated the
influence as an asset. The 60% thresholds for survey questions and for themes and keywords in
interviews were met, with 80% of SSEs indicating they were given appropriate time to research,
select, and implement active shooter response training and 66% of SSEs repeating similar
keywords and themes in the interviews.
Resources Influence 2
The second resources influence was that SSEs need to be given the appropriate amount of
funding to research, select, and implement active shooter preparedness training plans.
Survey Results
The SSEs surveyed agreed they were given the appropriate funding to research, select,
and implement training plans. Findings indicated that 68% (26) either agreed or strongly agreed
that their organizations allocate an appropriate amount of funding. The remaining 32% were split
between neither agreeing nor disagreeing (2%), somewhat disagreeing (18%), and strongly
disagreeing (12%).
A follow-up question found that 98% (37) of the SSEs indicated that their organization
uses budget allocation for funding training, while the remaining 2% (1) indicated that funding
was dependent on grants. When analyzed together, the results of the two questions appear
136

aligned as the allocation of funding in the budget process would indicate that SSEs would be
given at least an opportunity to advocate for funds to cover the training (Table 44). The split of
SSEs either remaining neutral or disagreeing to some level indicates that the organization did not
prioritize the desired amount of funding for training or left the funding up to grants which may or
may not be approved. The percentage of SSEs who agreed or strongly agreed that their
organizations allocate an appropriate level of funding made up a large majority and validated the
influence as an asset by being above the 60% threshold.

Table 44
SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Funding
Survey item: My organization allocates appropriate funding
for safety and security initiatives such as active shooter
response training.
Total percentage of SSEs who
selected the response
Strongly agree 50%
Agree 18%
Neither agree nor disagree 2%
Disagree 18%
Strongly disagree 12%

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Interview Findings
When asked about the allocation of funding for training in the interviews, the findings
confirmed the survey results. More than three-quarters of the interviewees indicated that they
were happy with the funding allocated and felt it indicated a strong commitment by their
organizations’ leadership. SSE10 stated that he “wasn’t given a blank check, but it was close.”
SSE3 expressed a similar sentiment, saying, “I never once was asked about the cost nor told to
keep it within any set of parameters.” Of the SSEs who expressed frustration with the funding,
one, SSE11, indicated that the funding “limited the number of training seats the organization was
able to offer,” and another, SSE9, indicated that their organization was happy to fund “normal
training like first aid and CPR” but that the organization required him to seek out grant funding
to accomplish the “more advanced” training. SSE9, who relies on grant funding, indicated that
securing the funding had not yet been an issue but that it would be their “preference to be able to
secure funding through budget allocation like they do for all their other safety and security
training.” The SSEs all acknowledged that funding is not unlimited but agreed that access to the
appropriate funding for active shooter response training is important for successful
implementation (Table 45).

Table 45
Themes Around Funding of Training From Interview Participants
Theme SSE
No issues with funding SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE6 SSE7, SSE8,
SSE10, SSE12
Budget allocation SSE1, SSE2, SSE5, SSE6, SSE8, SSE10, SSE11, SSE12
Frustration with funding
amount/method
SSE9, SSE11

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Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs being given the appropriate amount of
funding to research, select, and implement active shooter preparedness training validated the
influence as an asset. The 60% thresholds for survey questions and for themes and keywords in
interviews were met, with 68% of SSEs indicating they were given appropriate funding to
implement and maintain active shooter response training and 83% of SSEs repeating similar
keywords and themes in the interviews.
Policies, Processes, and Procedures Influence
The influence related to policies, processes, and procedures was that SSEs need policies
and procedures that prioritize safety and security across the organization.
Survey Results
The survey respondents agreed that their organizations have policies and procedures that
prioritize safety and security across their organizations (Table 46). Findings indicated that 81%
(30) of the SSEs either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement regarding the policies
prioritizing safety and security at their organization. Eight percent (3) neither agreed nor
disagreed, with the remaining 11% split between somewhat disagreeing (3) and strongly
disagreeing (2).

139

Table 46
SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Existence of Policies and Procedures
Survey item: My organization has policies and procedures
in place that prioritize safety and security across the
organization.
Total percentage of SSEs who
selected the response
Strongly agree 43%
Agree 38%
Neither agree nor disagree 8%
Disagree 8%
Strongly disagree 3%

Beyond agreeing that their organizations have safety and security policies and
procedures, the participants also agreed that their organizations regularly exercise those policies
and procedures (Table 47). Findings were nearly identical in indicating that 81% (30) of the
SSEs either agreed or strongly agreed that their organizations regularly exercise their safety and
security processes and procedures, with the remaining 19% (8) again split between 7% (3)
neither agreeing nor disagreeing, 7% (3) somewhat disagreeing, and 5% (2) strongly disagreeing.

Table 47
SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Exercising Policies and Procedures
Survey item: My organization regularly exercises
safety and security processes and procedures.
Total percentage of SSEs who
selected the response
Strongly agree 38%
Agree 43%
Neither agree nor disagree 7%
Disagree 7%
Strongly disagree 5%

140

The findings of these two questions indicate that the majority of the SSEs who
implemented active shooter response training did so within an organization that prioritizes safety
and security policies and regularly exercises them. It makes sense that organizations focused on
the safety and security of their workforce through both policy and action would be more likely to
implement an active shooter response training program than organizations that may have policies
but choose not to prioritize or exercise them.
Interview Findings
The interview findings closely align with the survey results and suggest that the SSEs’
organizations have and exercise policies and procedures that prioritize security and safety. The
SSEs described in-depth security and safety policies covering everything from slips, trips, and
falls to building evacuations to active shooter preparedness. SSE6 indicated that their policies
were “robust” and “probably covered all of the normal stuff that everyone does, too,” while
SSE1 shared their proprietary approach to security policies and procedures based around
“concentric layers intended to mitigate and eliminate risk for the employees and the
organization.” More than two-thirds of the SSEs mentioned regularly conducting fire and
weather drills as well as evacuations to reinforce asynchronous training provided to employees.
SSE8 said that “beyond planning a safety and security strategy, conducting drills is the most
important thing I do for the organization.” SSE12 agreed with the sentiment and said, “I can send
out a million reminders and training graphics, but there is no substitute for a low-threat walk-
through of proper procedures.”
However, when the question of active shooter drills was posed, the number of SSEs who
qualified their drills as “regular” dropped to less than one-third. SSE10 admitted that his
organization “doesn’t do them as often as we should,” while SSE4 said that his organization does
141

them “almost never.” Multiple SSEs spoke to regular refresher training provided to employees,
but it was via videos or asynchronous modules as opposed to live drills. SSE5 indicated that all
employees “watch a video annually just to make sure they’re on the same page.” SSE2 assigns
“required learning modules through our organization’s HR software” but indicated that
employees “can just click through without really learning much.” When asked about the
obstacles to conducting regular active shooter drills, the responses trended toward difficulty with
logistics and the volume of communication that would be necessary both internally and
externally. SSE3 indicated that their organization would “love to do more active shooter drills”
but that “the amount of coordination with departments and local law enforcement is crazy.”
Despite the obstacles, SSEs described training and drills that have been conducted at their
workplaces as well as ideas for exercises that have been shared through their professional
networking circles. SSE1 indicated that their organization opens the training to “all of the
organizations around us that have an interest in sending employees,” and SSE3, who developed a
nationally recognized program, said that he “encourages employees to come check out the
training when I’m presenting it at other locations.” The SSEs all agreed that there is always more
training that can be done, but the common theme was that most SSEs who implemented active
shooter training serve in organizations that prioritize and practice safety and security policies and
procedures (Table 48).

142

Table 48
Themes Around Processes, Policies, and Procedures From Interview Participants
Theme SSE
Regular safety and security
exercises
SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE7, SSE8, SSE10,
SSE11, SSE12
Asynchronous refresher training SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE8, SSE9, SSE12
Less frequent active shooter drills SSE2, SSE3, SSE4, SSE6, SSE8, SSE10, SSE12
Logistics issue in scheduling SSE3, SSE5, SSE6, SSE7, SSE12

Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs’ organization having policies and
procedures that prioritize security and safety validated the influence as an asset. The 60%
thresholds for survey questions and for themes and keywords in interviews were met, with 81%
of SSEs indicating that their organization has policies and procedures that prioritize safety and
security and 83% of SSEs repeating similar keywords and themes in the interviews.
Culture Influence 1
The influence pertaining to culture was that SSEs need to have the support of the board of
directors and/or executives to champion the active shooter preparedness training to generate buy-
in.

143

Survey Results
The survey respondents were asked to respond to three statements to examine the support
of their organization and leadership in their endeavors to implement an active shooter response
training program. The findings indicate that they agreed that their organization and leadership
place importance on a culture of security, are involved in the pursuit of a culture of security and
are receptive to programs aimed toward reaching that goal (Table 49). Sixty-eight percent
indicated that they felt a culture of security was either very important or extremely important to
their executives/leadership/board of directors. In contrast, 13% reported that a culture of security
was only moderately or slightly important and 6% reported that a culture of security was not at
all important.

Table 49
SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Culture of Security
Survey item: How important do you feel a ‘culture of
security’ is to your board of directors/executives/c-suite?
Total percentage of SSEs who
selected the response
Extremely 49%
Very 19%
Moderately 13%
Slightly 13%
Not at all 6%

144

When asked how involved stakeholders outside of security are in the risk mitigation for
their organization, the numbers dropped slightly, with 56% of SSEs reporting either very
involved or extremely involved, while 25% indicated moderate involvement, with 12% and 6%
reporting slightly or not at all involved, respectively (Table 50).

Table 50
SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Stakeholder Involvement
Survey item: How INVOLVED are stakeholders outside
of security in risk mitigation for your organization?
Total percentage of SSEs who
selected the response
Extremely 26%
Very 31%
Moderately 25%
Slightly 12%
Not at all 6%

145

Finally, when asked to indicate how receptive the leadership of their organization was to
active shooter preparedness training, 63% of SSEs reported that their executive leadership was
either very or extremely receptive (Table 51). The remaining 37% of respondents were split
among leadership being moderately receptive (19%), slightly receptive (13%), and not at all
receptive (5%).

Table 51
SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Receptiveness to Active Shooter Training
Survey item: How RECEPTIVE do you feel your board of
directors/ executives/c-suite is to active shooter response
training?
Total percentage of SSEs who
selected the response
Extremely 32%
Very 31%
Moderately 19%
Slightly 13%
Not at all 5%

146

The findings indicate that culture, both at the executive level and with external
stakeholders, can have a large effect on the ability of SSEs to implement active shooter response
training. SSEs agreed at a rate of more than 60% in two of the three survey items regarding the
support and importance of leadership toward building a culture of security through active shooter
preparedness training. The importance of leadership support and a culture of security received
less of a majority of agreement than other influences. However, with two-thirds still above the
60% threshold, the influence is validated as an asset.
Interview Findings
The evidence from the interviews suggests that the SSEs view support from executive
leadership as an asset to generate buy-in for implementing an active shooter response program.
Ten interviewees included a variation of their executive leadership being “completely in
alignment” with their goals for the organization’s security and safety. SSE1 stated that his
executive leadership “trusts him implicitly with the task,” while SSE10 stated that their
organizational leadership was “all in.” SSE3 indicated that there would have “needed to be a
‘critically important’ option” on the survey to quantify the importance his leadership places on
safety and security.
When asked about the culture of security at their organizations, the SSEs readily shared
their visions for their organization and examples of how they are supported by their leadership.
SSE8 indicated that security was “paramount to our leaders and something they are constantly
asking about.” SSE12 said that “increasingly, healthcare is becoming a more dangerous field,”
and because of that, “we are hyper-focused on how to keep providers and patients safe.” A
common theme was consistent communication with executives regarding the state of security for
the organization, along with regular updates on plans to enhance security. When asked to identify
147

ways in which their leadership showed support, common responses delivered included support
for funding and participation in drills/exercises.
Speaking to the involvement of stakeholders outside of security, the interviewees agreed
that the security within their organization is best served when it is a collaborative effort. SSE1
spoke to the ASIS enterprise security risk management model in which security “partners with
the business units who best know their own operations and risks to develop a plan tailored to suit
the needs of that particular discipline.” Three other SSEs (SSE4, SSE8, and SSE10) mentioned a
similar model/method but referred to it as a “consultative” approach as opposed to identifying it
as a best practice recommended by ASIS. Additionally, three-quarters of the interviewees spoke
about the need to involve the stakeholders when researching, vetting, and implementing new
programs. The SSEs gave various reasons for involving outside stakeholders including SSE5
saying the efforts were to “prep the objective,” SSE11 indicating it could help “reduce potential
friction,” and SSE3 saying that it helped to “set the organization up for success.”
The results indicated a clear consensus in that two-thirds of the interviewees stated that
their organization’s executive leadership was receptive to the idea of implementing active
shooter preparedness training. SSE8 expressed surprise at how receptive his leadership was,
stating,
Honestly, I was pleasantly surprised at how receptive they were. I came ready with facts
and stats about why I thought it was important because I assumed they would tell me that
they felt that active shooter response training was a ‘bridge too far.’ That just wasn’t the
case.
As mentioned earlier, SSE3 spoke to their organization’s proximity to an active shooter
incident at a school as the primary motivator for the executive leadership to support
148

implementing the training. SSE3 mentioned that everyone was “on edge” and that the leadership
team wanted to “show their support” for their employees and community through “readiness and
action.”
Current events and the prevalence of media coverage made for a recurring theme when
SSEs spoke about the receptiveness of their executive leadership to active shooter training
programs. Almost half of the interviewees mentioned that they had gathered evidence to present
to their executive leadership to demonstrate the need for training, but their leadership readily
supported the implementation by citing the near-daily news stories about shootings across the
nation (Table 52). SSE4 indicated that their leadership “brought me in to discuss options after
seeing multiple news stories,” and SSE5 said that they “printed out and brought with me a copy
of the FBI’s annual active shooter report for every member of the board.” Regardless of the
reason for the support, a key theme was that support from the executive leadership was a key
driver in the SSEs’ ability to implement active shooter response training.

Table 52
Themes Around a Culture of Security and Executive Support From Interview Participants
Theme SSE
Leadership aligned with security
culture
SSE1, SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE7, SSE8, SSE9, SSE10,
SSE11, SSE12
Leadership receptive to training SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE5, SSE6, SSE8, SSE10, SSE11,
SSE12
Consultative approach SSE1, SSE4, SSE8, SSE10
Data-driven/Evidence-based
decisions
SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE11, SSE12

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Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs’ organizational executive leadership
support for implementing an active shooter response training plan validated the influence as an
asset. The 60% thresholds for survey questions and themes and keywords in interviews were
met, with 68% of SSEs indicating their board of directors/executives/C-suite were supportive of
a culture of security and implementation of active shooter response training and 83% of SSEs
repeating similar keywords and themes in the interviews.
Authority Influence
The authority influence was that SSEs need to have the authority to prioritize the
implementation of active shooter preparedness plans across their organizations.
Survey Results
The SSE participants in the survey agreed that a majority has the authority to prioritize
and implement active shooter response training plans across their organizations (Table 53). A
total of 68% of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that they have the authority to
implement the training as they see fit. In contrast, 18% indicated that they did not have the
authority with the remaining 14% neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the statement. The
percentage of those who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement represented a large
majority and surpassed the threshold of 60% to validate the influence as an asset. Furthermore,
those who strongly agreed made up the largest group of respondents to this survey item.
150

Table 53
SSE Reported Agreement With Statement on Authority to Implement Active Shooter Training
Survey item: I know the techniques involved in
successfully implementing policy in my organization.
Total percentage of SSEs who
selected the response
Strongly agree 26%
Agree 42%
Neither agree nor disagree 14%
Disagree 18%
Strongly disagree 0%

The survey data revealed that most SSEs felt they had the authority at their organization
to implement training. However, the 32% who either remained neutral or disagreed could
represent a lack of clarity with regard to their authority, or it could be the result of the way that
the question was worded. “Prioritize” could be the operative word in which the priority of the
organization could be left to the executive leadership to decide. The interview data in the next
section looked to gain context.
Interview Findings
The interviewees expressed a strong belief in their authority to prioritize and implement
safety and security training within their organization. SSE10 mentioned that without the
authority to implement the training necessary to advance the organization toward their vision of a
safe and secure workplace, the SSE would be “all hat, no cattle.” Of the 12 interviewees, 10
expressed the belief that the authority for implementing training ultimately resided with them.
SSE8 felt so strongly about their authority to implement their vision via training that they
remarked, “If I’m not doing everything in my power to ensure our employees feel safe and
secure in the workplace, then shame on me. I have the authority because that is what I’ve been
charged by the leadership to do.” SSE9 indicated that they are “free to do as I see fit for the
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safety and security of the organization.” SSE3 said that their understanding is that the leadership
“turned me loose with a mission to make this place as safe as possible.” SSE2, one of the SSEs
who indicated that they were unsure if they retained ultimate authority, mentioned that ‘ultimate’
authority is “reserved for the executive leadership.”
A common, although surprising, theme in regard to authority is that perhaps the SSEs’
place in the organizational hierarchy is incorrect. Two-thirds of the SSEs expressed the belief
that the only body that can assume risk for the organization is the executive leadership/ board of
directors; however, about half of those SSEs reported that they did not report directly to the
board. SSE1 expressed frustration in that they “were the subject matter expert on physical
security, but someone can veto my ideas to protect the organization before the leadership even
hears it.” Similarly, SSE8 mentioned that they saw their “greatest success” when reporting
directly to the board of directors, but that “currently isn’t the case.” All indicated that there was
at least one layer between the SSE and the board of directors that was currently, unnecessarily or
erroneously, assuming risk on the board’s behalf.
While the finding of lack of clarity within the organizational hierarchy was an interesting
byproduct of the interviews, it did not have a direct effect on the study. However, it could be
interesting for future research. The interview data did not provide as much context to the split
responses from the survey, but it did reveal a strong enough consensus among SSEs that
validated the influence of the authority to prioritize and implement active shooter response
training as an asset to implementation (Table 54).

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Table 54
Themes Around Authority to Implement Active Shooter Training From Interview Participants
Theme SSE
Ultimate authority for
implementation
SSE1, SSE3, SSE4, SSE5, SSE6, SSE7, SSE8, SSE9,
SSE10, SSE12
Trust of leadership SSE2, SSE3, SSE5, SSE8, SSE9, SSE10, SSE12
Incorrect organizational
alignment
SSE1, SSE2, SSE8, SSE10

Observation
No observations were made for this influence.
Document Analysis
No document analyses were made for this influence.
Summary
The survey and interview data related to SSEs’ authority to prioritize and implement
active shooter response training validated the influence as an asset. The 60% thresholds for
survey questions and themes and keywords in interviews were met, with 68% of SSEs indicating
that they feel they have the authority to prioritize and implement active shooter response training
and 83% of SSEs repeating similar keywords and themes in the interviews.
Summary of Validated Influences
Tables 55, 56, and 57 show the KMO influences for this study and their determination as
assets or needs.

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Table 55
Knowledge Assets as Determined by the Data
Assumed knowledge influence Validated asset
Factual
SSEs need to know the facts related to active shooter incidents.
SSEs need an understanding of the key ideas related to organizational
policy implementation.
X
SSEs need to identify the drivers that lead to employees’ perceptions of
safety and security at work.
X
Conceptual
SSEs need to know the components of active shooter preparedness plans.
Procedural
SSEs need to know how to facilitate change management across their
organization.
X

SSEs need to know how to connect the relationships of active shooter
implementation programs to employee performance and perception of a
safe work environment.

Stakeholders need to be able to follow the steps in their own
organizational decision-making process.

SSEs need to know how to follow the techniques involved in successfully
implementing policies across their organizations.
X
Metacognitive
SSEs need to plan the most appropriate way to teach/implement active
shooter preparedness plans without inducing stress and/or anxiety
within employees.

SSEs need to plan their approach to mitigate the risk of inducing
unintended trauma by teaching about violent subjects.
X

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Table 56
Motivation Assets As Determined by the Data
Assumed motivation influences Validated asset
Value
SSEs need to see the importance to their job in preparing their
organization for active shooter incidents.
X
Self-efficacy
(Individual) SSEs need to have confidence in their ability to implement
an active shooter preparedness program raising the confidence of
employees related to safety at the workplace.
X
(Collective) SSEs need to believe that their organization is capable of
creating a safe and secure environment through implementation of
active shooter preparedness programs.
X
Expectancy outcome
SSEs need to believe that by implementing an active shooter
preparedness program, they will raise the perception of safety and
security at their organization.
X
Attribution
SSEs need to believe that personal wellness can be affected through their
own engaged participation in the implementation of active shooter
preparedness programs.

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Table 57
Organization Assets As Determined by the Data
Assumed organization influences Validated asset
Resources
SSEs need to be given ample time to research, select, and implement
active shooter preparedness plans.
X
SSEs need to be given the appropriate funding to research, select, and
implement active shooter preparedness plans.
X
Policies, processes, & procedures
SSEs need policies that prioritize safety and security across the
organization.
X
Culture
SSEs need to have the support of the board of directors and/or
executives to champion the active shooter preparedness training to
generate buy-in.
X
Authority
SSEs need to have the authority to prioritize the implementation of
active shooter preparedness plans across their organizations.
X

This study assumed 20 influences as assets that could affect an SSE’s ability to
implement active shooter response training. The results and findings of the data collection
validated 14 of those influences. The following chapter will present recommendations for
improved performance based on empirical evidence for gap closure and ongoing behavior
adoption.

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Chapter Five: Solutions and Integrated Implementation and Evaluation Plan
In Chapter Four, stakeholders who met the field’s goal of implementing an active shooter
response training program were analyzed for trends and themes through both a survey and
follow-up interviews, and several continual knowledge-based, motivational, and organizational
influences were identified as affecting the problem of practice. The results and findings from the
previous chapter will act as objectives that drive the selection of evidence-based
recommendations specific to the validated KMO assets. In Chapter Five, the new world
Kirkpatrick model will be utilized to generate an integrated implementation and evaluation plan
to achieve the desired outcomes (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). This chapter begins by
reexamining the mission of the field, performance goals, stakeholders, and research questions
that guided this study to ground the recommendations and integrated implementation and
evaluation plan in the correct context.
Discussion
The rapid acceleration in the number of active shooter incidents in the last 20 years is
well-documented and one of the leading reasons that SSEs have identified an active shooter as a
top concern to their organization’s security and safety. Active shooter response training,
however, remains a scary subject and one that organizations have yet to expend time and
resources implementing. Many SSEs assert that the issue is a top threat to their workforce, yet
they lack a clear strategy to implement a program to mitigate the risk.
This study surveyed and interviewed SSEs in mid-to-large-sized organizations across a
variety of industries. Across the board, the study found that the SSEs who successfully
implemented an active shooter training program have a strong grasp on how to implement
organizational policy and facilitate change management. The study also found that the SSEs see
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the value to their role in implementing the training program and that they reported high levels of
self-efficacy toward the implementation of a program. The study also validated that those SSEs
who successfully implemented a program have the leadership support, authority, and resources
required for sustained success.
One theme that continued to emerge throughout data collection was the firm grasp of the
procedural knowledge required to develop and implement organizational policy. As such, the
implementation and evaluation plan later in this chapter focuses on critical behaviors and
context-specific recommendations that support the growth and development of SSEs' procedural
knowledge of organizational policy implementation, specifically as it relates to active shooter
response training.
Field Context and Mission
The field of security management is a discipline within the greater industrial security
arena tasked with the physical security and life safety of employees and assets within an
organization. Security management programs provide customized, layered approaches to
enterprise security risk management encompassing access control, alarm monitoring, closed
circuit surveillance, force protection operations, emergency management, and business
continuity. The mission of security management is to develop, maintain, and direct the programs,
technologies, and competencies that are crucial to the active protection of an organization and
the effective response to a dynamic and evolving threat environment (ASIS, 2021).
A successful model for organizations to safeguard against risk is to have a designated
point of accountability at the senior executive level tasked with crafting, influencing, and
directing an organization-wide security strategy. In the context of the larger organization’s
hierarchical structure, it is strongly recommended that the SSE report to a key senior-level
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executive to form a strong liaison with the leadership bodies, such as the board of directors, who
will be making decisions regarding the assumption or mitigation of risk. The SSE should enjoy
full partner responsibilities within the organization’s governance infrastructure. Positive working
relationships among the organization's stakeholders and client groups are at the core of an
effective security management program’s operations and policy development. In keeping with
the ASIS’s enterprise security risk management standards, the duty of safeguarding
organizational assets is the responsibility of the leadership of the individual business units with
the organization’s security management function providing risk assessment, policy, consultation,
and supporting infrastructure (ASIS, 2019).
The SSE should be considered the organization’s authority as it concerns security and/or
risk-related matters. Due to the breadth of the security management field, expertise in all areas is
not expected from the SSE. However, the security management business unit must be built to
leverage its members’ competencies, experience, and advanced knowledge of security
management application and protocols. An effective model for the composition of a security
management business unit is a hybrid design that incorporates leadership talent, communication
ability, business acumen, and management skills from the security management leadership team
surrounded with subject matter expertise in the multiple domains that account for the
organization’s multi-faceted security program.
Global Field SMART Goal
The ASIS goal is that all member organizations that implement active shooter
preparedness programs will do so in 100 % compliance with all applicable legal, regulatory, and
contractual obligations. The steering committee for the ASIS standards and guidelines
established this goal due to the continued rise in workplace violence and active assailant data
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compiled annually by the FBI (ASIS, 2020). The achievement of the ASIS steering committee’s
goal will be measured by the results of scheduled surveys sent to member organizations annually
to be reviewed at board meetings and shared at the annual ASIS Global Security Exchange
Conference. It is important to evaluate the membership organizations’ performance in relation to
the performance goal of 100% compliance with applicable regulations for various reasons. If the
member organizations are not compliant with regulations, the security management business unit
puts employees’ well-being and safety at risk. It also exposes the organization to potential
financial risk in the event of an active shooter incident. Evaluating the member organizations’
performance will enable ASIS and associated stakeholders to gather formative data that can be
used to identify promising implementation practices to be shared in alignment with its mission
(ASIS, 2022) in an effort to positively impact safety and security within the workplace.
Description of Stakeholder Groups
The stakeholders associated with implementing an active shooter preparedness program
by an organization’s security management business unit are wide-ranging and varied, both
internal and external to the organization. The internal stakeholders, as it pertains to program
implementation, are the board of directors or organizational leadership, the security management
leadership and staff, and all staff and management. In the role of senior leadership, the board of
directors, or organizational leadership, is responsible for the direction and allocation of resources
to be dedicated to employee safety. By allocating resources for employee safety, the
organization’s leadership exhibits their commitment to ensuring employees are provided with a
safe, secure workplace in which to work in support of the organization’s mission. The security
management leadership and staff are responsible for assuming overall responsibility for the
organization’s enterprise security risk landscape. With respect to the implementation of an active
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shooter preparedness plan, the security management leadership and staff will be regarded as the
subject matter experts tasked with researching, selecting, and implementing a program to best
meet the organization’s objectives. The organization’s staff and management are responsible for
completing the daily work in pursuit of the organization’s goals and objectives. As such, working
for an organization that values employee safety and in an environment that makes employees feel
secure is motivation to engage in safety and security programs and initiatives. The internal
stakeholders are all dependent upon each other for the successful implementation of an active
shooter preparedness program.
External stakeholders, including law enforcement and professional affiliation
associations, provide a different perspective and are the recipients of potential outputs from the
program. Law enforcement agencies and professional affiliation associations contribute to and
benefit from implementing preparedness programs. Their contributions and benefits are cyclical
in that each agency can supply data for education and program formation and disseminate
lessons learned/best practices from experience after gathering data and lessons learned from
successfully implemented programs.
Goal of the Stakeholder Group for the Study
While the combined efforts of all stakeholders will contribute to the achievement of the
overall organizational goal of increasing the number of mid-size organizations that have
implemented active shooter preparedness training by 10% compared to the previous year, it was
critical to explore the SSEs’ current knowledge, motivation and command/allocation of
organizational resources with regard to implementing active shooter preparedness programs
within their organizations. Therefore, the stakeholders of focus for this study were SSEs at mid-
size organizations in the United States. The stakeholders’ goal, supported by the security
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management field at large, is that by 2025, 10% of senior security executives will implement
active shooter preparedness programs within their organizations compared to the previous year.
Failure to accomplish this goal will lead to continued exposure to enhanced risk. Non-
implementation will lead to a loss in the organization’s ability to respond to active shooter
situations, preventing the organization from providing a workplace free of known health and
safety hazards (OSHA, 1970). The goal exists, but the security management field needs to
determine the degree to which the goal is being met and identify ways to improve that
performance. The gap in current performance is unknown.
Purpose of the Project and Questions
The purpose of this evaluative field study was to conduct a gap analysis to examine the
causes of underperformance in active shooter preparedness. The stakeholders of focus in this
analysis were SSEs. The analysis focused on the causes of this problem due to gaps in SSE
knowledge and skill, motivation, and organizational resources. The possible or assumed
influences were examined to focus on actual or validated causes. Two questions guided this
study:
RQ1: What are the knowledge and skills, motivation, and organizational needs and assets
related to SSEs within mid-to-large-size organizations implementing active shooter preparedness
programs?
RQ2: What are the recommended knowledge and skills, motivation, and organizational
needs and assets for SSEs within mid-to-large-size organizations to successfully implement
active shooter preparedness programs?

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Overview
The content of Chapter Four provided insights, derived from the data, into the research
questions guiding this study. The purpose of Chapter Five is to recommend solutions for the
validated KMO influences and create an integrated implementation and evaluation plan for
putting those solutions into practice. In the following sections, each set of validated influences is
aligned with principles from the literature to generate context-specific recommendations. Those
recommendations form the development of a program to be implemented as a research-based
solution to the problem of practice. In this study, the articulated problem of practice is a lack of
active shooter response training programs, so the proposed program will incorporate data and
findings from this study to create a model for implementation that will increase program
implementation aligned with the stated goal.
After the alignment of influences with recommendations, the later sections of this chapter
lay out the development of an integrated implementation and evaluation plan based on the new
world Kirkpatrick model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). The model is based upon the
foundation of the original Kirkpatrick four levels framework but approaches the design by
working backward to ensure that the development of the program begins with the end in mind
(Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). In this chapter, the planning for the program begins with
Level 4 by establishing the leading indicators for attaining the field’s goal. Level 3 then
establishes the stakeholders’ critical behaviors for accomplishing the goal and the factors that
drive the development of those critical behaviors. In Level 2, learning goals are established,
which, along with the context-specific recommendations from the first portion of this chapter,
inform the program's design.
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Concurrently with the backward designing of the program, the implementation
component of the integrated implementation and evaluation plan, metrics, and timelines for
evaluation at all four levels are articulated. The integrated plan finishes with a presentation of
sample survey items and proposals for data collection from key stakeholders. In keeping with the
new world Kirkpatrick model framework, the planning is performed with the end in mind and
evaluation is integrated into implementation.
Recommendations for Practice to Address KMO Influences
The goal of this study was to identify and develop a method to aid senior security
executives in the implementation of active shooter preparedness programs within their
organization. Influences examined during the literature review and then validated in the data
collection and analysis were categorized within the Clark and Estes (2008) gap analysis KMO
framework. Addressing the identified and validated influences within the gap analysis
framework increases the likelihood of meeting the organizational goal (Clark & Estes, 2008).
The following sections present research-based recommendations for practice to address the
knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences that emerged through an analysis of the
data collected.
Knowledge Recommendations
The data from this study validated factual, procedural, and metacognitive knowledge
influences on the problem of practice. In seeking to understand the success of implementing
active shooter response training, SSEs demonstrated procedural knowledge assets related to
facilitating change management and implementing organizational policy. In addition, SSEs
revealed factual knowledge assets related to the key ideas of organizational policy
implementation and identifying the drivers of employees’ perception of safety and security in the
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workplace. Additionally, SSE demonstrated a metacognitive knowledge asset in their ability to
plan an approach to training in a way that mitigates potential trauma to participants.
Given the findings, it is predicted that providing training for the knowledge influences
identified as assets could help SSEs who seek to implement training at their organizations. As
this study is focused on the implementation of training, there are several recommendations
related to procedural knowledge influences. This study’s conceptual framework emphasized the
relationship in the literature between procedural knowledge, self-efficacy, and leadership support
by linking improved training implementation, greater confidence in the ability to facilitate
change, and executive support for those efforts (Bandura, 1986; Bullock & Lavis, 2019;
Heathfield, 2020; Kim et al., 2021; Men et al., 2020; Pitts, 2021). Table 58 presents the summary
of the knowledge influences and recommendations.

Table 58
Summary of Knowledge Influences and Recommendations
Assumed knowledge
influence
Asset
or
need
Priority
Yes or
no
Principle and citation Context-specific
recommendation
SSEs need to know the
facts related to active
shooter incidents. (F)
Need No A good education
provides individuals
with solid but general
conceptual and
analytical knowledge
(Clark & Estes,
2008)

SSEs need an
understanding of the
key ideas related to
organizational policy
implementation. (F)
Asset No To develop mastery,
individuals must
acquire component
skills, practice
integrating them, and
know when to apply
what they have

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Assumed knowledge
influence
Asset
or
need
Priority
Yes or
no
Principle and citation Context-specific
recommendation
learned (Schraw &
McCrudden, 2006).
SSEs need to identify
the drivers that lead
to employees’
perceptions of safety
and security at work.
(F)
Asset Yes A good education
provides individuals
with solid but general
conceptual and
analytical knowledge
(Clark & Estes,
2008)
Creating schemata
helps learners to
organize declarative
knowledge in a
domain (Schraw et
al., 2006).
Provide SSEs with
general conceptual
information on how to
identify the drivers of
employee perception
of a safe and secure
workplace through use
of a concept map
linked to research-
based information on
specific drivers.
SSEs need to know
how to facilitate
change management
across their
organization. (P)
Asset No Social interaction and
cooperative learning
facilitate construction
of new knowledge
(Scott & Palincsar,
2006)

SSEs need to know
how to connect the
relationships of
active shooter
implementation
programs to
employee
performance and
perception of a safe
work environment.
(P)
Need No Information learned
meaningfully and
connected with prior
knowledge is stored
more quickly and
remembered more
accurately because it
is elaborate with
prior learning
(Schraw &
McCrudden, 2006).

Stakeholders need to
be able to follow the
steps in their own
organizational
decision-making
process. (P)
Need No Learning tasks that are
similar to those that
are common to the
individual’s familiar
cultural setting will
promote learning and
transfer (Gallimore &
Goldenberg, 2001).

SSEs need to know
how to follow the
techniques involved
Asset Yes Acquiring skills for
expertise often
begins with learning
Provide the SSEs
training, to include job
aids, that outline the
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Assumed knowledge
influence
Asset
or
need
Priority
Yes or
no
Principle and citation Context-specific
recommendation
in successfully
implementing
policies across their
organizations. (P)
factual knowledge
about procedural
steps (Clark & Estes,
2008)
Feedback and
modeling increase
self-efficacy (Pajares,
2006).
steps for
organizational policy
implementation,
model effective policy
implementation, and
provide constructive
feedback throughout
the training.
SSEs need to plan the
most appropriate way
to teach/implement
active shooter
preparedness plans
without inducing
stress and/or anxiety
within employees.
(M)
Need No A setting that provides
instruction,
modeling, and
opportunities for
metacognitive
reflection could
increase the
occurrence of that
behavior (Rueda,
2011; Tuckman,
2009).

SSEs need to plan their
approach to mitigate
the risk of inducing
unintended trauma by
teaching about
violent subjects. (M)
Asset Yes A setting that provides
instruction,
modeling, and
opportunities for
metacognitive
reflection could
increase the
occurrence of that
behavior (Rueda,
2011; Tuckman,
2009).
Provide training for the
SSEs that
demonstrates
metacognitive thinking
skills and asks the
SSEs to identify
strategies to identify
and overcome the
potential trauma that
could be experienced
by trainees when
learning about a
violent subject.

Factual Knowledge Solutions
The following section explores the factual knowledge solutions identified to help senior
security executives achieve their organizational objective of implementation active shooter
preparedness training.
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General Knowledge of Active Shooter Incidents. Krathwohl (2002) defined factual
knowledge as including facts, concepts, or underlying principles of an area or field. This study’s
results indicate that factual knowledge of active shooter incidents is a developmental need for
SSEs. Clark and Estes (2008) stated that a good education provides people with solid but general
conceptual and analytical knowledge. This suggests that providing SSEs with general education
with respect to these incidents could help close that knowledge gap.
Despite factual knowledge about active shooter incidents being identified as a need for
SSEs, it was not deemed a priority for training. A recommendation was not provided to assist
SSEs in the gathering of facts related to these incidents as the SSEs’ knowledge of them did not
appear to affect their ability to implement training, as was evidenced by the 36% of SSEs who
correctly identified facts on the survey and the 42% of SSEs who repeated common themes in
the interviews.
Knowledge of Organizational Policy Implementation. The study’s data indicate that
SSEs who implemented active shooter response training have a firm grasp on the key ideas of
organizational policy implementation. The survey data indicated that 84% of SSEs correctly
identified the key tenets, while 83% of interviewees repeated similar themes regarding
organizational policy implementation. Schraw and McCrudden (2006) stated that developing
mastery requires component skills, practice integrating them, and knowing when to apply what
was learned. The results indicate that SSEs who already implemented this training are well on
their way to developing mastery.
While knowledge of the key ideas of organizational policy implementation was
determined to be an asset, it was not deemed a priority for training. A context-specific
recommendation was not provided as this influence will be covered, tangentially, in the
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procedural knowledge solution section, and, as such, there was not a need to provide a
recommendation for the same, or similar, findings multiple times.
Ability to Identify Drivers of Employees’ Perceptions. The results and findings of this
study indicated that SSEs who successfully implemented active shooter response training
programs can identify the drivers of employees’ perception of safety and security in the
workplace, with 100% of SSEs identifying the drivers, from the literature, on the survey and
92% of SSEs repeating common themes in the interviews. As such, SSEs who would like to
implement such training would benefit from education about the drivers of employees’
perception of safety and security in the workplace. Clark and Estes (2008) asserted that a good
education provides people with solid but general conceptual and analytical knowledge.
Additionally, Schraw et al. (2009) stated that the creation of schemata aids the ability of learners
to organize factual knowledge. Viewed together, these two theories suggest that providing
general information and then a way of organizing that information, such as concept maps, would
support learning. The recommendation is to provide SSEs with general conceptual information
on how to identify the drivers of employee perception of a safe and secure workplace through a
concept map linked to research-based information on specific drivers.
Yue et al. (2017) examined the idea of concept mapping and its effect on the critical
thinking skills of nursing students. In a study of 24 trials, it was discovered that compared to
traditional teaching methods, concept mapping showed an increase in nurses’ critical thinking
skills as measured by the California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory, the California
Critical Thinking Skills Test, and the Critical Thinking Scale. This study supports the
recommendation of teaching the use of concept maps to aid in the SSE’s abilities to identify the
drivers of employees’ perception of a safe and secure workplace.
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Procedural Knowledge Solutions
The following section explores the procedural knowledge solutions identified to help
senior security executives achieve their organizational objective of implementation active
shooter preparedness training.
Knowledge of Facilitating Change Management. This study’s results and findings
indicate that the procedural knowledge of facilitating change management is an asset for SSEs
who implemented active shooter response training, with 84% of SSEs expressing confidence in
their abilities to facilitate change management. Scott and Palincsar (2006) suggested that social
interaction and cooperative learning facilitate the construction of new knowledge. This indicates
that social cognitive theory could help SSEs who may not yet feel confident facilitating change
management.
Despite procedural knowledge of facilitating change management being determined to be
an asset, it was not deemed a priority for training. A context-specific recommendation was not
provided to assist SSEs in the facilitation of change management because effective
organizational policy implementation is inclusive of change management, as such, there was no
need to provide a recommendation for the same, or similar, findings multiple times.
Connecting Relationships Between Implementation and Employee Performance.
This study’s data indicated that the SSEs’ ability to connect the relationship of implementation to
employee performance and perception is a need, as only 37% of SSEs were able to identify the
correct relationship between the two. Schraw and McCrudden (2006) suggested that information
learned meaningfully and connected with prior knowledge is stored more quickly and
remembered more accurately because it is elaborated with prior learning. This indicates that it
could be beneficial to tie both information sets to previous knowledge to develop SSEs’ ability to
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connect the relationship between the implementation of training and employee performance and
perception.
While the ability to connect the relationship between implementation and employee
performance and perception was determined to be a need, it was not made a priority for training.
As previously mentioned, only 34% of SSEs were able to correctly identify the relationship
between the two, but that knowledge gap did not prevent the SSE from implementing the
training.
Ability to Follow Organizational Decision-Making Processes. This study’s data and
findings indicate that the SSEs’ ability to follow their organizational decision-making process
was an asset, with 91% of SSEs expressing confidence in their abilities. Gallimore and
Goldenberg (2001) stated that learning tasks that are similar to those that are common to the
individual’s familiar cultural setting will promote learning and transfer. This assertion supports
the findings that SSEs could be more familiar with their internal decision-making processes due
to the familiar cultural setting.
Despite identifying the ability to follow their organizational decision-making processes as
an asset, it was not determined to be a priority for training. A context-specific recommendation
was not provided for this influence for much the same reason as the reason that a
recommendation was not provided for facilitating change management in that by focusing on
organizational policy implementation, decision making will be a part of the process.
Ability to Follow Organizational Policy Implementation Procedures. According to
Krathwohl (2002), procedural knowledge is the understanding of the skills and processes
involved with a task and can include methods or techniques. This study’s data indicate that SSEs
who successfully implemented active shooter response training possess the key skills and
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strategies in successful organizational policy implementation, with 93% of SSEs self-reporting
high confidence in their abilities. As such, SSEs who would like to successfully implement this
training at their organization would benefit from training in effective organizational policy
implementation. Acquiring skills for expertise frequently begins with learning factual knowledge
about individual procedural steps (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Additionally, Pajares (2006) asserted that both modeling and feedback can increase the
learner's confidence. Therefore, explaining/training the steps of effective organizational policy
implementation, modeling the steps, and providing feedback should support the SSEs in their
learning. The recommendation is to provide the SSEs training, including job aids, that outline the
steps for organizational policy implementation, model effective policy implementation, and
provide constructive feedback throughout the training.
Stahmer et al. (2014) studied the idea of procedural implementation fidelity with regard
to evidence-based interventions for students with autism. A study of 57 autism support
classrooms in a California school district found that the educators who were provided, and used,
job aids and checklists saw a greater level of procedural implementation fidelity, which led to
greater success with evidence-based interventions for students. This study supports the use of
training and job aids which outline the steps for organizational policy implementation, which
could lead to greater procedural fidelity with SSEs.
Metacognitive Knowledge Solutions
The following section explores the metacognitive knowledge solutions identified to help
senior security executives achieve their organizational objective of implementation active
shooter preparedness training.
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Ability to Plan and Implement Training Without Inducing Stress. The results and
findings from this study suggest that the SSEs’ ability to plan the best way to teach and/or
implement active shooter response training without inducing stress or anxiety is a need, with
only 25% of SSEs coming to a consensus on a best practice approach. The literature indicates
that a setting that provides instruction, modeling, and opportunities for metacognitive reflection
could increase the occurrence of that behavior (Rueda, 2011; Tuckman, 2009). As such,
instruction, practice, and feedback could help to develop the metacognitive thinking skills of the
SSEs.
The need for SSEs to plan the most appropriate way to teach/implement these plans
without inducing stress and/or anxiety within employees was identified as a need. However, it
was not made a priority for training, and, as such, a context-specific recommendation was not
given. Priority was instead directed to the next metacognitive influence due to the generalized
nature of that influence with regards to training and the opportunity to use the metacognitive
skills gained.
Ability to Plan Their Approach to Mitigate Trauma. This study’s data indicate that
SSEs have key skills and strategies in planning their approach to implementing training to
minimize the unintended trauma that can be incurred through learning about a violent subject, as
65% of survey respondents identified communication as key and 75% of interviewees spoke of
common themes. The findings indicate that SSEs who want to implement active shooter response
training must have metacognitive thinking skills. Rueda (2011) stated that metacognitive
thinking skills can be taught, and Tuckman (2009) signaled the importance of identifying and
designing learning for behavioral objectives. The research shows that training designed with
instruction, modeling, and opportunities for metacognition could increase the occurrence of that
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behavior in SSEs. The recommendation is to provide training for the SSEs that demonstrate
metacognitive thinking skills and ask SSEs to identify strategies to identify and overcome the
potential trauma that could be experienced by trainees when learning about a violent subject.
Kuiper and Pesut (2004) studied the promotion of metacognitive reflective reasoning as it
related to nurses and their nursing skills. She did this through a meta-analysis of over 2 decades
worth of English language articles with keywords including metacognition, critical thinking,
reflective practice, and self-regulation. Kuiper determined that the goals of professional
education include learning to learn, handling ambiguity, thinking like a professional, and
developing a sense of responsibility. It was determined that the development of metacognitive
and self-reflective skills leads to better outcomes for nurses when applying their nursing
knowledge and skills. This study supports the recommendation to provide training to SSEs to
increase their metacognitive thinking skills.
Motivation Recommendations
Data analysis for this study indicated motivational influences related to the theories of
utility value, self-efficacy, collective efficacy, and expectancy value. Clark and Estes (2008)
defined motivation by three factors: active choice, persistence, and mental effort. In the context
of SSEs implementing this training at their organizations, all three factors must be involved.
Rueda (2011) asserts that motivation is a key factor in an organization’s ability to achieve its
goals, as motivation impacts if stakeholders start, continue, and ultimately achieve their goal.
Table 59 contains the theoretical principles associated with addressing the four motivational
influences and suggests context-specific recommendations for each. While the data indicate that
all four influences are assets affecting the motivation of SSEs, the literature concludes that an
SSE’s motivation to implement training is directly tied to the perceived utility value of the
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training for the SSE’s role at the organization. (Doherty, 2016; Rueda, 2011; Van Stralen et al.,
2018; Wade, 2020).

Table 59
Summary of Motivation Influences and Recommendations
Assumed motivation
influence
Asset
or
need
Priority
Yes or
no
Principle and
citation
Context-specific
recommendation
SSEs need to see the
importance to their job in
preparing their organization
for active shooter incidents.
(Utility value)
Asset Yes Rationales that
include a
discussion of the
importance and
utility value of
the work or
learning can
help learners
develop positive
values (Eccles,
2006; Pintrich,
2003).
Provide SSEs with
rationales through
training and
discussion about the
importance of
implementing active
shooter response
training.
(Individual) SSEs need to
have confidence in their
ability to implement an
active shooter preparedness
program raising the
confidence of employees
related to safety at the
workplace. (Self-efficacy)
Asset Yes High self-efficacy
can positively
influence
motivation
(Pajares, 2006).

Higher
expectations for
success and
perceptions of
confidence can
positively
influence
learning and
motivation
(Eccles, 2006).
Provide SSEs with an
implementation
environment that
allows for frequent
feedback, follows
similar successful
models, and
celebrates their
success upon
implementation.
(Collective) SSEs need to
believe that their
organization is capable of
creating a safe and secure
environment through
Asset No If there is
perceived
collective
efficacy, there is
an impact on

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Assumed motivation
influence
Asset
or
need
Priority
Yes or
no
Principle and
citation
Context-specific
recommendation
implementation of active
shooter preparedness
programs. (Self-efficacy)
performance,
commitment to
the mission, and
the ability to
deal with
challenges
(Bandura, 2000).
SSEs need to believe that by
implementing an active
shooter preparedness
program, they will raise the
perception of safety and
security at their
organization. (Expectancy
outcome)
Asset Yes Activating
personal interest
through
opportunities for
choice and
control can
increase
motivation
(Eccles, 2006).

Higher
expectations for
success and
perceptions of
confidence can
positively
influence
learning and
motivation
(Eccles, 2006).
Provide SSEs with
implementation
activities and
materials that are
relevant and useful,
connected to their
interest, and based
on real-world tasks.
SSEs need to believe that
personal wellness can be
affected through their own
engaged participation in the
implementation of active
shooter preparedness
programs. (Attribution)
Need No Learning and
motivation are
enhanced when
individuals
attribute success
or failure to
effort rather than
ability
(Anderman &
Anderman,
2006).

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Importance to Their Role
This study’s results and findings indicate that SSEs who implemented active shooter
response training see the importance of their job in preparing their organization for an incident,
as evidenced by the 97% of SSEs who responded positively on the survey and the 66% who
repeated similar themes in interviews. Utility value, defined by Eccles (2006), is the measure of
how well a task fits into an individual’s long-term goals. Rationales that include a discussion of
the importance of the work can help learners develop positive values (Eccles, 2006; Pintrich,
2003). This suggests that engaging SSEs in education, training, and discussions on lessons
learned from previous active shooter incidents and the difference effective response training can
make can increase utility value for the SSEs. The recommendation is to provide SSEs with
rationales through training and discussion about the importance of implementing this training.
Doherty (2016) studied the strategies and tactics for preventing an active shooter
incident. Common roadblocks to prevention were discussed, which included a lack of awareness
about the knowable indicators of a potential attack and a poor understanding of risk and available
mitigation measures. A recommendation was made to enhance an organization’s physical
security by the appointment or hiring of a threat assessment team. Enhancing an SSE’s view of
training through a utility value mindset could help to eliminate the roadblocks to prevention.
Self-Efficacy Solutions
This study’s results and findings indicate that 88% of survey respondents expressed
feeling efficacious about their ability to implement active shooter response training, and 75% of
interviewees repeated similar themes related to high degrees of self-efficacy. A recommendation
rooted in self-efficacy theory was chosen to help develop this asset in SSEs. Pajares (2006)
stated that learning and motivation are enhanced when participants have a positive expectancy of
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success. This implies that SSEs who want to implement this training should focus on the
development of self-efficacy related to training implementation. The recommendation is to
provide SSEs with an implementation environment that allows for frequent feedback, follows
similar successful models, and celebrates their success upon implementation.
Tschannen-Moran and McMaster (2009) studied the relationship between self-efficacy
and the implementation of a new teaching strategy for beginning readers. In a sample of 93
teachers across nine schools, professional development methods for the teachers that included
demonstration, practice, and feedback showed a significantly higher degree of self-efficacy in
their ability to implement the new reading strategy. Enhancing an SSE’s self-efficacy toward the
implementation of a training program could help to increase the rate of successful program
implementations.
Collective Efficacy Solutions
In addition to high self-efficacy, the data from this study found the SSEs reported high
levels of collective efficacy. However, the reported levels of collective efficacy were
approximately 10% lower than those reported for self-efficacy. If there is perceived collective
efficacy, there is an impact on performance, commitment to the mission, and the ability to deal
with challenges (Bandura, 2000). When there is collective efficacy, there is a greater
commitment to achieving the objective. Creating a safer and more secure environment through
the implementation of an active shooter response training program requires buy-in and
collaboration among stakeholders.
While collective efficacy was identified as an asset for SSEs who would like to
implement this training, it was not prioritized for training. A context-specific recommendation
was not made for collective efficacy as priority was given to self-efficacy due to the higher
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confidence scores reported and the greater impact self-efficacy has on implementation as
compared to collective efficacy.
Expectancy Value Theory Solutions
With 100% of survey respondents and 83% of interviewees repeating similar themes, this
study’s results indicate that SSEs expect that an active shooter response training program will
increase the perception of safety and security at their organization. Expectancy value theory is
rooted in the idea that motivation can be influenced by the beliefs or expectations of success of
an individual or organization and their values related to the task (Eccles & Wigfield, 2020; Loh,
2019; DeSimone, 2015). Eccles (2006) asserted that activating personal interest through
opportunities for choice and control as well as higher expectations for success and perceptions of
confidence can positively influence learning and motivation (Eccles, 2006). The
recommendation is to provide SSEs with implementation activities and materials that are
relevant and useful, connected to their interest, and based on real-world tasks.
Zboja et al. (2020) examined expectancy outcome theory as it related to volunteers with
non-profit organizations to understand the recruitment and retention of volunteers. In a sample of
210 volunteers, it was found that the individuals were motivated to volunteer and maintained
their motivation for continued volunteerism through their beliefs and expectation that their
efforts made a difference to those who were served by the non-profit. Enhancing an SSE’s
expectancy, through training and personal connection, that their efforts are achieving the desired
results of increasing the perception of a safe and secure workplace could help to increase the
number of SSEs who successfully implement active shooter response training programs.

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Attribution Theory Solutions
Attribution theory focuses on understanding how individuals and/or organizations frame
the cause and effect within their environment (Anderman & Anderman, 2006). This study found
that attribution was a need for SSEs, as over 71% of those surveyed and interviewed disagreed
with the premise/framing of attribution theory for the implementation of active shooter response
training. The SSEs were unable to connect their personal wellness to engaged participation in the
implementation of training. Anderman and Anderman (2006) suggested that learning and
motivation are enhanced when individuals attribute success or failure to effort rather than ability.
This suggests that training the SSEs to reframe how they attribute success with implementation
could cause additional SSEs to attempt to implement programs.
Despite attribution theory being identified through the data as a need for the SSEs, it was
not prioritized for training. A context-specific recommendation was not given for attribution
theory because the identified gap did not appear to affect the ability of the SSEs to successfully
implement active shooter response training.
Organization Recommendations
This study’s data indicated resources, policies and procedures, culture, and authority as
assets within the sphere of organizational influences related to an SSE’s ability to implement
active shooter response training at their organization. Table 60 highlights the organizational
influences indicated by the data as assets that could potentially be enhanced or adjusted through
context-specific recommendations to affect change within the problem of practice. Strategies for
influencing organizational influences include confronting the current culture by asking questions
and engaging organizational leadership in dialogue related to research-based industry best
practices, as well as adjusting policies and procedures and piloting change initiatives to both
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show what is possible and provide organization-specific anecdotal evidence for implementation
of an organization-wide change (Clark & Estes, 2008; Men et al., 2020; Pitts, 2019; Schein,
2004). Table 60 shows how these theoretical principles could be applied to address
organizational influences that could currently be viewed as obstacles to the implementation of an
active shooter response training program. The table also describes how policies and procedures
could be adjusted to turn perceived gaps, such as participation, into assets.

Table 60
Summary of Organization Influences and Recommendations
Assumed organization
influence
Asset
or
need
Priority
Yes or
no
Principle and
citation

Context-specific
recommendation
SSEs need to be given
ample time to research,
select, and implement
active shooter
preparedness plans.
(Resources)
Asset No Staying current
with the field’s
research and
practice is
correlated with
increased
learning
outcomes
(Waters et al.,
2003).

SSEs need to be given the
appropriate funding to
research, select, and
implement active shooter
preparedness plans.
(Resources)
Asset No Organizational
effectiveness
increases when
leaders ensure
that employees
have the
resources
needed to
achieve the
organization’s
goals (Waters et
al., 2003).

SSEs need policies that
prioritize safety and
security across the
Asset Yes Policies must
reflect the
values and goals
Provide SSEs with
templates of draft
policies and
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Assumed organization
influence
Asset
or
need
Priority
Yes or
no
Principle and
citation

Context-specific
recommendation
organization. (Processes,
Policies, and Procedures)
of the
organization and
are more
successful when
crafted
collaboratively
(Clark & Estes,
2008; Schein,
2004).
procedures to be
proposed and
submitted within their
organization
empowering the SSE
to prioritize security
and safety across their
organization.
SSEs need to have the
support of the board of
directors and/or executives
to champion the active
shooter preparedness
training to generate buy-
in. (Culture)
Asset Yes Effective leaders
are aware of the
power of
influence and its
impact on the
change process
within an
organization
(Conger, 1991;
Denning, 2005;
Lewis, 2011).
Develop messaging and
products that leverage
the influence of the
board of
directors/executives to
generate buy-in.
SSEs need to have the
authority to prioritize the
implementation of active
shooter preparedness plans
across their organizations.
(Authority)
Asset Yes Rules, policies,
standards, and
standard
operating
procedures limit
individual
discretion and
help ensure that
behavior is
predictable and
consistent
(Bolman &
Deal, 2013).
Provide templates of
draft proposals for
SSEs to
request/establish the
authority to implement
active shooter
response training.

Time
This study’s results and findings indicate appropriate time as an asset, with 77% of the
SSE survey respondents expressing their agreement that they have been afforded adequate time
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to successfully research, select, and implement an active shooter response program. This is
aligned with the balanced leadership framework (Waters et al., 2003). Waters et al. (2003) stated
that staying current with the field’s research and practice is correlated with increased learning
outcomes. As such, SSEs who seek to implement a training program could use the balanced
leadership framework to ensure appropriate time is allotted for the necessary steps.
The allocation of appropriate time to research, select, and implement an active shooter
response training program was identified by the data as an asset, but it has not been prioritized
for training. A context-specific recommendation was not made for time, as neither the survey
respondents nor interviewees indicated that timeline to implementation was neither largely
important in their successful implementation nor an obstacle needing to be overcome.
Funding
The study’s data indicates that SSEs feel they are allocated appropriate funding for
training implementation, as was evidenced by the 68% of SSEs in agreement on the survey and
83% of interviewees expressing similar sentiments. Organizational effectiveness increases when
leaders ensure that employees have the resources necessary to achieve the organization’s goals
(Waters et al., 2003). Resources refer to the money, human capital, and other administrative
support needed to accomplish the objectives (Robbins & Judge, 2010). This suggests that SSEs
who receive appropriate resources in the form of funding could be more successful in
implementing active shooter response training.
This study’s data indicated that appropriate funding is an asset for SSEs who
implemented active shooter response training, but it was not prioritized for training. A context-
specific recommendation was not made for securing appropriate funding due to the absence of
SSEs specifically mentioning funding as a roadblock on the path to implementation.
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Policies, Processes, and Procedures
The study’s data suggests that SSEs with policies, processes, and procedures that
prioritize safety and security are able to successfully implement the training, as is evidenced by
the 81% of SSEs surveyed indicating that they had policies and procedures in place and 83%
responding that their organizations regularly exercise those policies and procedures. A
recommendation rooted in the gap analysis (Clark & Estes, 2008) and supplemented by the work
of Schein (2004) is suggested to maintain this asset. Policies must reflect the values and goals of
the organization and are more successful when crafted collaboratively (Clark & Estes, 2008;
Schein, 2004). The recommendation is to provide SSEs with templates of drafts of policies and
procedures to be proposed and submitted at their organization, empowering the SSE to prioritize
security and safety across their organizations.
Siriwardana et al. (2018) studied the effectiveness of policies and procedures to manage
emergencies and natural disasters that occurred in Sri Lanka after a tsunami in 2004. The study
evaluated the effectiveness of managing three natural disasters that occurred in 2016 and 2017,
finding that by implementing and executing policies and procedures, the government was able to
manage a more efficient and effective recovery plan as compared to natural disasters with no
procedures in place. The findings from this study support the use of policies and procedures
prioritizing safety and security as a means to strengthen the SSE’s ability to implement active
shooter response training.
Culture
This study’s results and findings indicate that SSEs who implemented active shooter
response training plans report broad executive support and leadership buy-in as evidenced by
68% of survey respondents and 83% of interviewees agreeing with or speaking to the support of
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their organizational leadership. Effective leaders are aware of the power of influence and its
impact on the change process within an organization (Conger, 1991, Denning, 2005, Lewis,
2011). The recommendation is to develop messaging and products that leverage the influence of
the board of directors/executives to generate buy-in. Leveraging the organizational leaders’
influence could help increase organizational buy-in of an active shooter response training
program.
Ford et al. (2021) studied leadership support related to organizational commitment and
employee buy-in. Data were collected from a state wildlife agency as the organization went
through a major change initiative over 4 years. The study found that as leadership stayed
engaged and supported the change initiative, as opposed to expressing static support at the outset,
employees maintained and, in some cases, increased their engagement with the process. These
findings support the recommendation of developing messaging and products from organizational
leadership to generate buy-in with the implementation of training.
Authority
The study’s data indicated that SSEs felt they had the authority to implement policies,
procedures, and training that prioritized safety and security for their organization, as evidenced
by 83% of interviewees. Authority is the rights or power granted to an entity to command action
and expect that action will be carried out (Robbins & Judge, 2010). Rules, policies, standards,
and standard operating procedures limit individual discretion and help ensure that behavior is
predictable and consistent (Bolman & Deal, 2013). The recommendation is to provide templates
of draft proposals for SSEs to request to establish/maintain the authority to implement active
shooter response training.
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Burgoin et al. (2020) studied the foundational bases of a person’s authority in the
workplace in a post-bureaucratic work environment. Through a 6-month autoethnography
completed during a consulting assignment, the authors discovered that authority was practical,
relational, and in tension between activation or passivation, where relationships are leveraged or
downplayed to shape the situation and steer action. The study indicated that practical authority
bestowed by organizational leadership is still recognized, but the way in which it is asserted is
evolving. The findings of this study support the recommendation of drafting proposals to
establish or maintain the SSE as the authority to implement safety and security policies and
procedures.
Integrated Implementation and Evaluation Plan
Following the identification and validation of knowledge, motivation, and organizational
influences and presentation of research-based recommendations, the next step is the development
of an integrated implementation and evaluation plan that complements the recommendations
made. The following section provides an overview of the implementation and evaluation
framework followed by a detailed implementation and evaluation plan to prepare senior security
executives to implement active shooter response training within their own organizations.
Implementation and Evaluation Framework
The model that guided the development of the following implementation and evaluation
plan is the new world Kirkpatrick model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). In the updated new
world Kirkpatrick model, Kirkpatrick’s original four levels of training were revised for the
modern economy, but the foundation of the evaluation levels remained the same. The main
difference between the two models is that the new world Kirkpatrick model follows a principle
of beginning with the end in mind and, as such, is set up in reverse order, starting with Level 4,
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which is the ultimate goal of the stakeholder group. The reverse order forces the user to think
backward from the ultimate goal (Level 4) to identify the behaviors (Level 3) which may lead to
achieving that goal. Following the identification of the behaviors, the user then must identify
what training (Level 2) would lead to achieving the desired behaviors. Lastly, the user must
identify the reaction (Level 1) surrounding the training that was determined to be delivered. The
new world Kirkpatrick model scaffolds the development of the plan for the user to focus on the
end result, which is the purpose of implementing training in the first place (Kirkpatrick &
Kirkpatrick, 2016).
Organizational Purpose, Need, and Expectations
The mission of the field of security management is to develop, maintain, and direct the
programs, technologies, and competencies that are crucial to the active protection of an
organization and the effective response to a dynamic and evolving threat. This mission is
accomplished through customized, layered approaches to enterprise security risk management,
emergency management, and business continuity. One of the major goals of ASIS is that each
year 10% more of their member organizations will implement active shooter response training in
compliance with all applicable legal, regulatory, and contractual obligations than in the previous
year. Active shooter incidents have been identified as a top three security concern by 70% of
organizations (Wallace, 2020). However, 79% of organizations report they are ill-prepared to
respond to an active shooter incident (Everbridge, 2016).
Due to the internal nature of program implementation, the stakeholder of focus for this
study was the SSE. The SSEs’ goal, supported by the security management field and ASIS, is
that by 2025, 10% of SSEs will implement a preparedness program at their organizations
compared to the previous year. Failure to accomplish this goal will lead to continued exposure to
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enhanced risk. Non-implementation will lead to a loss in the organization’s ability to respond to
these situations, which prevents the organization from providing a workplace free of known
health and safety hazards (OSHA, 1970).
This research examined the KMO factors that may be needed to implement active shooter
response training within an organization. Recommendations based on data from SSEs who
successfully implemented such training were proposed for the KMO factors. The proposed
recommendations, if carried out extensively, should produce the desired outcome of a 10%
increase in SSEs implementing this training compared to the previous year.
Level 4: Results and Leading Indicators
Table 61 shows the proposed Level 4 results and leading indicators in the form of
outcomes, metrics, and methods for both external and internal outcomes for SSEs and their
organizations. The internal observations and measurements refer to information that would
originate within the SSEs’ individual organizations.

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Table 61
Outcomes, Metrics, and Methods for External and Internal Outcomes
Outcome Metrics Methods
External outcomes
Increased public awareness
of active shooter response
training initiatives.
Frequency of active shooter response
training in the press or related media
coverage.
Track frequency of
active shooter
response training
mentions in press
or media.
Improved
relationship/collaboration
between organizations
and law enforcement/first
responders.
Organizational partnership, collaboration,
communication rating.
Annual survey of
local law
enforcement/first
responder
agencies
Increased collaboration for
training courses offered
by accredited
organizations
Number of courses offered annually Track the course
offerings through
an industry
survey
Internal outcomes
Policy developed about
active shooter incident
response.
Published policy Solicit
information/data
from
organizational
employee
handbooks.
Increased understanding on
how to respond to active
shooter incidents.
Number of employees who report
understanding how to respond to an
active shooter
Employee survey
Increased perception of
employee safety and
security in the workplace
Survey results Employee survey

Level 3: Behavior
Level three of the New World Kirkpatrick Model (2016) includes both critical behaviors
and required drivers identified to help support the desired results determined in level four. The
critical behaviors and required drives for the senior security executives are examined below.
Critical Behaviors
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The stakeholder group of focus in this study is SSEs in mid-to-large-sized organizations
in the United States. The first critical behavior identified is that SSEs should develop active
shooter response policies and procedures aligned with their organization’s security strategy. The
second critical behavior is that SSEs should develop or select educational products. The third
critical behavior is that SSEs must demonstrate proficiency in their organizational change
management and policy implementation processes. The specific metrics, methods, and timing for
each behavior appear in Table 62.

Table 62
Critical Behaviors, Metrics, Methods, and Timing for Evaluation
Critical behavior Metrics Methods Timing
1. Develop active shooter
response policies and
procedures.
Number of active
shooter policies
and procedures
developed
SSE will track policies
and procedures
developed.
Ongoing
2. Develop or select
educational products.
Number of active
shooter response
training products
created or
purchased
SSE/HR L&D will
track products
developed or
purchased.
Ongoing
3. Demonstrate
proficiency of
organizational change
management and policy
implementation process.
Number of security
projects/policies
implemented
Post-implementation/
post-change
assessment of
projects or policies
for efficiency and
effectiveness
Semi-annually
for 2 years,
then annually
if proficiency
is displayed

Note. Numbers are used to provide clarity and continuity for Table 63.

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Required Drivers
Required drivers provide an additional level of support and accountability to ensure the
implementation of the recommended solutions through reinforcement, monitoring, and
encouragement (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). The SSEs require the support of their direct
supervisor and the organization to reinforce the new policies and support the implementation of
training as they seek to create a safer, more secure environment for their organization’s
employees. The required drivers will provide support to SSEs and reinforce knowledge gained
during training and encourage them to apply the skills they acquired. Table 63 shows the
required drivers to support the critical behaviors of SSEs who seek to implement an active
shooter response training program.
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Table 63
Required Drivers to Support Critical Behaviors
Methods Timing
Critical
behaviors
supported
Reinforcing
Provide SSEs with general conceptual information on how to
identify the drivers of employee perception of a safe and
secure workplace through use of a concept map linked to
research-based information on specific drivers.
Ongoing 1, 2, 3
Provide the SSEs training, to include job aids, that outline
the steps for organizational policy implementation, model
effective policy implementation, and provide constructive
feedback throughout the training.
Semi-annually 2, 3
Provide training for the SSEs that demonstrates
metacognitive thinking skills and asks the SSEs to identify
strategies to identify and overcome the potential trauma
that could be experienced by trainees when learning about
a violent subject.
Semi-annually 1, 2
Encouraging
Provide SSEs with rationales through training and discussion
about the importance of implementing active shooter
response training.
Ongoing 2, 3
Provide SSEs with implementation activities and materials
that are relevant and useful, connected to their interest, and
based on real-world tasks.
Ongoing 1, 2, 3
Rewarding
Provide SSEs with an implementation environment that
allows for frequent feedback, follows similar successful
models, and celebrates their success upon implementation.
Ongoing 1, 3
Monitoring
Provide SSEs with templates of draft policies and procedures
to be proposed and submitted within their organization
empowering the SSE to prioritize security and safety across
their organization.
Ongoing 1, 3
Develop messaging and products that leverage the influence
of the board of directors/executives to generate buy-in.
Quarterly 2, 3
Provide templates of draft proposals for SSEs to
request/establish the authority to implement active shooter
response training.
Ongoing 1, 3

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Organizational Support
Multiple organizational factors must be accounted for to ensure that the drivers are
implemented regularly. The SSE’s organization must have policies, processes, and procedures
that empower the SSE to prioritize the implementation of active shooter response training across
the organization. Additionally, the SSE’s organization must allocate the appropriate funding to
support the training plan’s implementation. Finally, the SSE must leverage the support of the
organization’s executive leadership through messaging and educational or promotional materials
to generate buy-in. A product, such as a video, will be developed to be embedded in the required
training materials for all employees as a way to exhibit leadership support for the training.
Level 2: Learning
Level two involves the determination of learning goals and training that the senior
security executives require to accomplish their objective of implementing active shooter
response training within their organization.
Learning Goals
The SSEs must possess specific knowledge, skills, and attitudes to support the
performance of Level 3 critical behaviors. Following implementation of the recommended
solutions, SSEs will be able to
• Demonstrate how to develop safety and security development processes. (P)
• Demonstrate how to select educational products to assist in the adoption and
implementation of active shooter plans (P).
• Demonstrate organizational policy implementation processes (P).
• Evaluate the design of active shooter policies and programs based on prior
experiences (M).
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• Have confidence in their ability to make decisions related to the organization’s safety
and security policies and procedures (self-efficacy).
• Have confidence in their ability to lead the implementation of an active shooter
response training plan (self-efficacy).
Program
The learning goals will increase SSEs’ knowledge and motivation and will be achieved
through training and information sharing. To develop SSEs’ knowledge and skills, they will
receive training, information, job aids, and coaching sessions with peers and SSE volunteers who
implemented these training programs. Since SSEs typically stay in their position for several
years, and new SSEs are hired or promoted as necessary, the program will be ongoing. The SSEs
will experience annual training or re-training through a variety of modalities.
The first portion of the program will be asynchronous on-demand training offered year-
round on the ASIS learning management system or through an accredited organization to which
ASIS has engaged as a consultant. This training will comprise 20 hours of instruction divided
into modules on key concepts, definitions, and best practices on developing policies and
procedures, change management, and organizational policy implementation emphasizing active
shooter response training plans. The training will also introduce the key processes and
procedures that will be included in the job aids distributed and used in the in-person training. The
asynchronous training will be a prerequisite for the second, in-person, portion of the training
plan.
The second portion of the program will be in-person training conducted during annual
industry-associated conferences and educational seminars. This training will last approximately
16 hours, divided into two 8-hour blocks. Job-aid familiarization and application will be included
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in these sessions. Job aids will include the key steps and processes of developing and
implementing organizational policy and facilitating change management. The in-person training
will also provide tabletop exercises to evaluate the knowledge and skills learned by SSEs.
Following in-person training, SSEs will receive feedback and encouragement through a network
of industry peers who serve as coaches and advisors to them.
Evaluation of the Components of Learning
According to the new world Kirkpatrick model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016), there
are five components of learning: knowledge, skills, attitude, confidence, and commitment. These
components complement Clark and Estes’s (2008) gap analysis framework. The SSEs must
demonstrate knowledge to perform tasks and must also demonstrate procedural knowledge to
complete the task. The SSEs must also find value in performing the task and feel confident in
their ability to do so. Table 64 identifies the recommended evaluation method and time for each
learning component.

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Table 64
Evaluation of the Components of Learning for the Program.
Methods or activities Timing
Declarative knowledge “I know it.”
Knowledge checks through discussion. During in-person training.
Knowledge checks using multiple choice questions. During asynchronous training.
Procedural skills “I can do it right now.”
Correctly ordering the change management and policy
implementation process.
During asynchronous training.
Demonstrate proficiency in the policy implementation
process.
During in-person training.
Demonstrate proficiency in the policy development
process.
During in-person training.
Attitude “I believe this is worthwhile.”
Pre- and post-training assessments. During and after asynchronous
and in-person training.
Discussing the value of active shooter response training During in-person training.
Confidence “I think I can do it on the job.”
Discussions with peers and mentors. Monthly
Self-efficacy survey After in-person training.
Commitment “I will do it on the job.”
Individually developed action plan for implementation of
an active shooter response training program.
After the in-person training.

Level 1: Reaction
Measuring the reaction of SSEs to training is important. Assessing their reaction is
necessary to determine if they are engaged during training, perceive it as valuable, and consider
it relevant to their job and goal of implementing an active shooter response training program.
Surveys, observation, and brief check-ins with the learners can be used to evaluate engagement,
relevance, and satisfaction, which make up Level 1 evaluation (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick,
2016). Table 65 identifies the methods used to determine reactions by SSEs and their level of
engagement during training.

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Table 65
Components to Measure Reactions to the Program.
Methods or tools Timing
Engagement
Completion of asynchronous training modules measured
through LMS analytics.
Ongoing
In-person training observation. During in-person training
Course evaluation survey After asynchronous and in-
person training
Relevance
Course evaluation survey After asynchronous and in-
person training
Observations from peer mentors After monthly check-ins
Customer satisfaction
Course evaluation survey After asynchronous and in-
person training

Evaluation Immediately Following the Program Implementation
Following asynchronous and in-person training events, participants will complete a
survey (see Appendix G). The survey will indicate the participant’s satisfaction, commitment,
attitude, the degree to which the participant valued the training, and the participant’s level of
confidence in applying what was learned.
Evaluation Delayed for a Period After the Program Implementation
A follow-up evaluation will be administered approximately 90 days after in-person
training (Appendix H). The items include Likert-type responses and short open-ended responses.
The purpose of the follow-up evaluation will be to assess the SSEs’ feelings of training relevance
and confidence in what was learned. The relevance of the training (Level 1) will be evaluated by
asking SSEs whether they feel their understanding of the subject matter improved. Confidence
(Level 2) will be evaluated by asking about their ability to implement a training plan. Behavior
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(Level 3) will be evaluated by asking about their efforts post-training in implementing the
training, their use of job aids, and their experience with researching options and developing
policies. Lastly, an open-ended item asking for feedback on what would help the SSE better
prepare to implement a program is included.
Data Analysis and Reporting
The Level 4 goal of this implementation plan is to provide SSEs the KMO support to
effectively lead the implementation of an active shooter response training program. Multiple
metrics of implementing projects will be used to measure the program’s effectiveness, including
the number of current programs, the number of future programs, the preferred and chosen
implementation/delivery method used for each new program, the resources (funds) allocated to
implement and provide ongoing support, the time to complete the initial implementation, and the
organizational leadership’s satisfaction post-implementation.
Summary
Using the new world Kirkpatrick model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016) provides the
user with a model to conduct training and evaluation in their organization. The model is built on
the foundation of Kirkpatrick’s four levels of training evaluation which are used in reverse order
to design training and evaluation with the end goal in mind. This chapter presented the planning,
implementation, and evaluation recommendations for the field of security management to
achieve its goal. First, the assumed KMO assets and needs, as informed by the data, were
presented along with recommendations supported by theoretical or empirical research. Then, the
purpose and expectations of the field were reviewed, and finally, a plan was presented to
evaluate the successful completion of the stakeholder (SSE) and field goals to include results
(Level 4), behavior (Level 3), learning (Level 2), and reaction (Level 1).
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The new world Kirkpatrick model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016) suggests that
evaluation and intervention should not wait until implementation is complete. Instead, evaluation
should be continuous so that adjustments can be made as soon as needs are identified. Frequent
and repeated data collection allows for exploring the three questions about outcomes at any of
the four Kirkpatrick levels regarding why the outcomes do or do not meet expectations
(Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). Therefore, the expectation for using this evaluation
framework is a targeted analysis of meaningful data on all four levels of evaluation (results,
behavior, learning, and reaction) for the proposed KMO recommendations.
The use of targeted data analysis for evaluating the implementation of a program is
helpful for two reasons. First, the data can help address why something may not be working and
provide support if it is working (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). Second, if the program is
successful, the data can be used to support the publicizing or propagating of the program for
other organizations (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). The ultimate expectation, then, of
evaluating this program is to share an implementation model for organizations that desire a
similar program for employee safety and security.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Approach
Clark and Estes’s (2008) gap analysis model combined with the new world Kirkpatrick
model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016) provided a comprehensive method to identify,
organize, and validate influence gaps and assets as well as to implement and evaluate
recommendations to mitigate, or strengthen, the validated gaps and assets. However, the
structure of the gap analysis model proved difficult in terms of organizing influences when the
assumed influence related to a combination of KMO influences. Additionally, this study
attempted to identify assets to strengthen as opposed to gaps to be mitigated, creating the need
199

for alternate framing of findings than is traditionally used. Furthermore, the gap analysis model
did not easily allow for influences external to the SSE, such as the attitudes and willingness of
employees to engage in the training program. This study operated on the assumption that if the
SSE completes the training as required, the organization will adopt the training without regard to
the KMO influences of the rest of the organization.
Limitations and Delimitations
This study’s limitations and delimitations were first considered in the design of the
methodology, presented in Chapter Three. This study had several limitations, many of which
were apparent during the study's design, while others developed as the study progressed. Five
limitations of the study were known to me:
• There was the potential for participation bias due to self-selection caused by
voluntary participation.
• The respondents’ truthfulness might have been limited regarding their own
organizations.
• The study focused only on corporations and may lack generalizability to other
sectors.
• The study was conducted over a short time and with limited resources, which
prevented a larger sample size.
• Due to the voluntary nature of participation, the study might lack the diversity of
thought and lived experience representative of the field as a whole.
The stakeholder group of focus for this study was selected based on interest expressed
during the study’s recruitment phase. As such, this study may have been affected by participation
bias due to the participants’ self-selection. In general, the participants appeared truthful and
200

transparent when providing answers and insight into the influences at their organizations.
However, some could not speak to organizational influences that may have been rooted in
decisions made prior to their tenure at their organizations. Additional interviews with executives
or other senior-level employees may have provided a better understanding of the organizational
influences. Lastly, my participation as an instrument of data collection and analysis must be
acknowledged as a limitation.
The delimitations, or boundaries established for this study, may also have affected the
results:
• The sample population only included the SSEs and did not include any person who
works in the SSEs’ departments who may be responsible for, or have experience with,
active shooter response training implementation.
• Despite the sample population’s role as their organizational SSEs, they may not have
the ultimate decision-making authority within their organization.
Future Research
Safety and security education and active shooter prevention efforts have grown in the
United States even since the start of this research. This study was specifically dedicated to
determining what factors led to the successful implementation of an active shooter response
training program and which should be strengthened or leveraged so that SSEs who desire to
implement the training may do so. However, throughout the literature review and the data
gathering, one area of future research emerged.
Future research should be performed to assess the mental health effects on participants of
training with violent subject matter. Subjecting employees to potentially traumatic experiences in
an effort to prepare them for an event that may or may not occur could have damaging
201

consequences on their mental health and emotional well-being. It would be valuable to know if
there are best practices to mitigate the risk of trauma or resources an organization should provide
to support employees who may experience trauma due to participation.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to use Clark and Estes’s (2008) gap analysis framework to
determine the KMO influences that support SSEs as they work to successfully implement active
shooter response training programs. The KMO influences were studied and evaluated through a
literature review and then through surveys and interviews with the target population. Based on
the findings, research-supported recommendations were proposed to strengthen the influences
determined as assets to the SSEs in their work toward training implementation. Finally, the new
world Kirkpatrick model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016) was used to develop an
implementation and evaluation plan to incorporate the proposed recommendations.
The key takeaway from this study is that SSEs who succeed in implementing this training
have both a firm grasp on organizational policy implementation and leadership support for
implementation. The knowledge of policy implementation demonstrates the SSE’s ability to
navigate the decision-making process and facilitate change in their organizations. Leadership
support provides both tangible and intangible benefits. Tangible benefits are the proper
allocation of time and funding for implementation, and intangible benefits are organizational
buy-in and employee engagement.
Implementing these training programs is of interest to SSEs and their organizations due
to the exponential increase of active shooter incidents in the United States and the continuing
requirement of OSHA’s general duty clause. Waiting for the federal government or other
industry organizations to develop training and education is not a viable option for SSEs who
202

wish to implement a program on an accelerated timeline. This research will directly benefit SSEs
in developing and implementing their own response training policies and programs and could
also serve as a model for any stakeholder or organization struggling with policy implementation
of any type.
Successfully implementing the recommendations discussed in this study is just one facet
in accomplishing the overall goal of industrial security of keeping both people and assets safe.
Failure to incorporate the recommendations discussed in this study may lead to an SSE’s
inability to implement a successful active shooter response training program which, at best,
leaves employees less safe and, at worst, has deadly consequences.

203

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225

Appendix A: Pre-interview Recruiting Communications
The following email will be sent to senior security executives at mid-sized organizations
(500+ employees) within the United States.
Pre-interview: Initial Email to Request Study Participation
Dear Dr., Ms., or Mr. ___________
My name is Cory Hanson, and I am a doctoral student at the University of Southern
California. I am conducting research on the implementation of active shooter training. My goal
as a student practitioner is to provide insight into our field as to how we might be able to
collaborate to overcome some of the challenges we are facing. Ultimately, it is my hope that this
information will benefit senior security executives and their respective organizations. I assure
you that information acquired will remain anonymous, as will the organization.
I have received IRB approval and am in the stage of my dissertation where I am gathering
data. I am conducting interviews with senior security executives who have successfully
implemented active shooter training. All participant and organizational information will be
completely confidential. While I know how busy you are, it would mean the world to me if you
would consider giving me an hour of your time. I will share the findings of the study with you. It
would be my hope that some of these findings could be of professional value to you.
I would like to schedule an hour with you in the next week at a time and date that is most
convenient to you. Please feel free to reply to this email with some dates and times that work
best. I have also included a link to Calendly [or other electronic calendar] in case it is easier for
you to use this method to schedule an hour block of time to be interviewed: [insert link]. Thank
you very much for your time and consideration.
Best regards,
226

Cory Hanson
Doctoral Candidate
Rossier School of Education
The University of Southern California
Pre-interview: Email to Confirm Participation for Study
Following the scheduling of a participant, the email below will be sent to confirm
interview appointments.
Dear Dr., Ms., or Mr. ___________
Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in my research study concerning the
topic of implementation of active shooter training. You should have received a Zoom link when
you registered for an interview. In case you do not have it, your Zoom link is: [insert link]. As a
reminder your identity will be known only to me, and I am conducting this study for my doctoral
dissertation at the University of Southern California. I am attaching a PDF file to this email
regarding the formal notice of participant rights and the protocol surrounding how the
information you provide will be used and protected. Please reach out to me if you have any
questions about this.
Thank you so very much for taking time out of your schedule to assist me with this
research, and I look forward to our conversation on [insert date and time].
Best regards,
Cory Hanson
Doctoral Candidate
Rossier School of Education
The University of Southern California

227

Appendix B: Information Sheet for Exempt Research
University of Southern California
Rossier School of Education
3470 Trousdale Pkwy Ste 1100, Los Angeles, CA 90089

INFORMATION SHEET FOR EXEMPT RESEARCH

STUDY TITLE: Implementation of Active Shooter Training: A Mixed-Methods Study
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Cory Hanson, Doctoral Candidate
FACULTY ADVISOR: Dr. Adrian J. Donato

You are invited to participate in a research study. Your participation is voluntary. This document
explains information about this study. You should ask questions about anything that is unclear to
you.
PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to examine successful implementation of active shooter training. I
hope to learn the SSE knowledge, motivation, and organizational resources necessary to
implement active shooter training at their organization. You are invited as a participant because
of your specific role within your organization, which fits the defined research population of the
study.
PARTICIPANT INVOLVEMENT
You are asked to participate in a Zoom meeting to be interviewed about the research topic. The
interview is expected to last no more than [insert duration of time]. All interaction for you and
your organization is confidential and anonymous. Neither you nor your organization will be
named or alluded to in a manner that would provide identification.
While it is the desire of the researcher to record the conversation for subsequent confidential and
anonymous transcription so that your responses can be accurately analyzed, such recording is
purely voluntary on your part and is not a condition for participation. The researcher will take
notes as an alternative during the interview as needed.
There is no ‘prework’ necessary for the interview, and it will be held at a time that is to your
convenience and with respect to your schedule and responsibilities.

228

CONFIDENTIALITY
The members of the research team and the University of Southern California Institutional
Review Board (IRB) may access the data. The IRB reviews and monitors research studies to
protect the rights and welfare of research subjects.
When the findings of the research are published or discussed in conferences, no identifiable
information will be used.
Audio recordings, if made, will not have any direct reference to the full name or organization of
the participant and will be used solely for the purpose of analyzing the transcript for relevant
content. The recordings will remain in the sole possession of the research team and will be
destroyed not later than one year from completion and final approval of the study. The study is
expected to be fully completed by [insert your date]. For this study, the research team is the
researcher and the chair of the researcher’s dissertation committee.
Audio recordings, if made, will not be started until the preliminary and identifying remarks of
the participant, and their organization, are concluded. The researcher will refer to the participant
by an arbitrary identification to maintain confidentiality and anonymity. As a part of the research
study the recordings will be transcribed by a bonded academic paper transcription company. If a
participant desires a copy of that transcript will be provided for review, editing, of declination of
participation.
INVESTIGATOR CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have any questions about this study, please contact Cory Hanson: cjhanson@usc.edu or
402-999-3065, or Dr. Adrian J. Donato: adonato@usc.edu
IRB CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the
University of Southern California Institutional Review Board at (323) 442-0114 or email
irb@usc.edu.

USC IRB Information Sheet Template Version Date: 01/30/2021

229

Appendix C: KMO Survey Crosswalk
Appendix C: KMO Survey Crosswalk
Assumed influence Survey item
Knowledge
SSEs need to know the facts related to
active shooter incidents. (K-F)
Please mark the response that best explains the
difference between an active shooter incident and a
mass shooting. (K-F, pick one from a list of
options)
Please pick from the list below the facts that apply to
active shooter incidents. (K-F)

(Pick all that apply from a list)
What is the average length of time of an active
shooter incident? (K-F, pick one from a list of
options)
SSEs need an understanding of the key
ideas related to organizational policy
implementation. (K-F)
Please mark the response that best explains the key
ideas of organizational policy implementation. (K-
F, pick one from a list of options)
SSEs need to identify the drivers that
lead to employees’ perceptions of
safety and security at work. (K-F)
From the list below, please identify the top three
drivers of employees’ perception of safety and
security in the workplace. (K-F, pick three from a
list)
SSEs need to know the components of
active shooter preparedness plans. (K-
C)
I know the components of active shooter response
training. (K-C, 5-point Likert)
Please list the components of active shooter response
training. (K-C, open-Ended Item)
SSEs need to know how to facilitate
change management across their
organization. (K-P)
I know how to facilitate change management within
my organization. (K-P, 5-point Likert)
Please put the change management steps in order.
(K-P, order the list)
SSEs need to know how to connect the
relationships of active shooter
implementation programs to
employee performance and perception
of a safe work environment. (K-P)
Please mark the response that best expresses the
connection between active shooter response
training and employee performed and perception of
a safe work environment. (K-P, pick one from a
list of options)
Stakeholders need to be able to follow
the steps in their own organizational
decision-making process. (K-P)
Please put the decision-making process steps in
order. (K-P, order a list of items)
SSEs need to know how to follow the
techniques involved in successfully
implementing policies across their
organizations. (K-P)
I know the techniques involved in successfully
implementing policies within my organization. (K-
P, 5-point Likert)
Please put the organizational policy implementation
steps in order. (K-P, order a list of items)
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Assumed influence Survey item
SSEs need to plan the most appropriate
way to teach active shooter
preparedness plans without inducing
stress and/or anxiety within
employees. (K-M)
The active shooter response training process you are
implementing in your organization needs fine-
tuning. Write down a few of your reflections and
the potential adjustments you may make to try to
minimize unintended stress and/or anxiety. (K-M,
open-ended item)
SSEs need to plan their approach to
mitigate the risk of inducing
unintended trauma by teaching about
violent subjects. (K-M)
Please explain how you planned steps to mitigate
unintended trauma in your approach to
implementing active shooter response training. (K-
M, open-Ended Item)
Motivation
SSEs need to see the importance to
their job in preparing their
organization for active shooter
incidents. (Utility value)
Implementing active shooter training is an important
responsibility of my role to the organization.
(Utility value, 5-point Likert scale)
How important do you feel it is that your
organization requires active shooter response
training? (Utility value, 5-point Likert scale)
SSEs need to have confidence in their
ability to implement an active shooter
preparedness program raising the
confidence of employees related to
safety at the workplace. (Individual
self-efficacy)
To what degree are you confident in your ability to
implement active shooter response training within
your organization? (Self-efficacy, provide degree
marker for them to check)
SSEs need to believe that their
organization is capable of creating a
safe and secure environment through
implementation of active shooter
preparedness programs. (Collective
self-efficacy)
To what degree are you confident that your
organization is capable of creating a safe and
secure environment through implementation of
active shooter response training? (Collective self-
efficacy, provide degree marker for participant to
check)
SSEs need to believe that by
implementing an active shooter
preparedness program, they will raise
the perception of safety and security
at their organization. (Expectancy
value)
I expect that implementation of active shooter
response training will increase the perception of
safety and security at my organization. (5-point
Likert)
SSEs need to believe that personal
wellness can be affected through their
own engaged participation in the
implementation of active shooter
preparedness programs. (Attribution)
My own personal wellness will be positively
affected through engaged participation in the
implementation of an active shooter training
program. (5-point Likert scale)
Organization
SSEs need to be given ample time to
research, select, and implement active
My organization allocates appropriate time for due
diligence, selection, and implementation of safety
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Assumed influence Survey item
shooter preparedness plans.
(Resources: time)
and security initiatives such as active shooter
response training. (Resources: time, 5-point Likert)
SSEs need to be given the appropriate
funding to research, select, and
implement active shooter
preparedness plans. (Resources:
Funding)
My organization allocates appropriate funding for
safety and security initiatives such as active
shooter response training. (Resources: Funding)
(5-point Likert)
How does your organization fund training
programs? Please select all that apply. (Resources
– Funding) (Budget allocation, Grants, Other:
Please specify)
SSEs need policies that prioritize safety
and security across the organization.
(Policies, processes, and procedures)
My organization has policies and procedures in
place that prioritize safety and security across the
organization. (Resources: policies, processes, and
procedures, 5-point Likert)
If yes to the above, my organization regularly
exercises safety and security processes and
procedures. (Resources: policies, processes, and
procedures, yes/no)
My organization has policies and procedures
specific to active shooter response. (Resources:
policies, processes, and procedures, yes/no)
If yes to the above, my organization regularly
exercises active shooter processes and procedures.
(Resources: policies, processes, and procedures,
yes/no)
SSEs needs to have the support of the
board of directors and/or executives
to champion the active shooter
preparedness training to generate buy-
in. (Culture)
How important do you feel a culture of security is to
your board of directors/executives? (Culture, 5-
point Likert scale)
How involved are stakeholders outside of security in
the risk mitigation for your organization? (Culture)
(5-point Likert)
How receptive do you feel your executive team is to
active shooter preparedness training? (Culture) (5-
point Likert)
SSEs need to have the authority to
prioritize the implementation of active
shooter preparedness plans across
their organizations. (Authority)
I have the authority within my organization to
prioritize the implementation of safety and security
plans. (Authority) (5-point Likert)
I have the authority within my organization to
prioritize the implementation of active shooter
response training. (Authority, 5-point Likert)

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Appendix D: KMO Survey Protocol
The researcher will pose the following questions to all SSE survey respondents through a
Qualtrics online survey. Parenthetical notations represent the tie to the conceptual framework
and research questions guiding the study. The notations are for the researcher and are for the
reader’s awareness only, they will not appear on the survey instrument that will be given to the
participants. The introduction and questions will proceed as follows:
Welcome to the SSE active shooter response training implementation survey. Please take
a few minutes to answer questions regarding active shooter response training in general and
active shooter response training implementation within your organization from your perspective
as the SSE.
Important: Your responses are entirely anonymous and will help develop specific
recommendations to your peers across the security industry about how best to implement active
shooter response training within their own organizations – please answer candidly.
Let’s get started!
For the first portion of the survey, please provide some information about your
organization, tenure, and current programs.
1. How large in your organization?
• 500–750 employees
• 750–1000 employees
• 1000+ employees
2. In what industry would you classify your organization?
3. How long have you been in the SSE role at your organization?
• 1–3 years
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• 4–7 years
• 8–10 years
• 0+ years
4. Does your organization currently use an active shooter response training program?
• Yes
• No
5. If yes to Q4, how does your organization deliver the active shooter response training
program?
• Online
• In-person
• Hybrid online/in-person
6. Do you have previous experience with active shooter response training programs?
• Yes
• No
7. How anxious are you about the possibility of an active shooter incident at your
organization? (Not at all anxious, slightly anxious, moderately anxious, very anxious,
extremely anxious)
8. How likely does it feel that there will be an active shooter incident at your
organization? (Not at all likely, slightly likely, moderately likely, very likely,
extremely likely)
9. How prepared do you feel your organization is to respond to an active shooter? (Not
at all prepared, slightly prepared, moderately prepared, very prepared, extremely
prepared)
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Please answer the following questions surrounding your knowledge, as the SSE,
regarding active shooter incidents, active shooter response training, and change
management/policy implementation.
10. Please mark the response that best explains the difference between an active shooter
incident and a mass shooting. (K-F; pick one from a list of options)
• There is no difference between an active shooter incident and a mass shooting.
• An active shooter incident becomes a mass shooting when the assailant kills
or wounds more than four individuals.
• The term “active shooter incident” refers to what is going on while the event
is happening, and “mass shooting” is how the event is referred to in the past
tense.
11. Please pick from the list below the facts that apply to active shooter incidents. (K-F)
• Active shooter incidents do NOT include self-defense, gang, or drug-related
shootings.
• There has been a 100% increase in active shooter incidents in the past 4 years.
• Active shooter incidents, by definition, require a specified number of victims.
• A majority of active shooters are male.
• A majority of active shooters die by suicide during the incident.
• First responders generally arrive prior to the conclusion of the incident.
• The majority of active shooter incidents take place at an educational
institution.
• A majority of active shooters use handguns as opposed to rifles.
12. What is the average length of time of an active shooter incident? (K-F)
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• less than 5 minutes
• 5 to 10 minutes
• 10 to 15 minutes
• more than 15 minutes
13. Please mark the response that best explains the key ideas of organizational policy
implementation. (K-F)
• Policy makers and front-line services need to be involved in the entire policy
process.
• Priorities and actions need to be clearly articulated during the policy
development process.
• Policy initiatives tend to be more effective with direct front-line input.
• Practitioners can provide a real-world perspective on the feasibility of a
particular policy.
• all of the above
• none of the above
14. From the list below, please identify the three most important drivers of employees’
perception of safety and security in the workplace. (K-F)
• annual safety training
• regularly scheduled drills and exercises
• safety signage
• readily accessible safety and security training
• executive support of safety and security initiatives
• random, unannounced drills and exercises
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15. I know the components of active shooter response training. (K-C; strongly disagree,
disagree, undecided, agree, strongly agree)
16. Please list the components of active shooter response training. (K-C)
17. Please put the change management steps in order. (K-P)
___ Implement the changes.
___ Embed changes within company culture and practices.
___ Review progress and analyze results.
___ Craft a vision and plan for change.
___ Prepared the organization for change.
18. Please mark the response that best expresses the connection between active shooter
response training and employee performance and perception of a safe work
environment. (K-P)
• Research has shown that active shooter response training increases employee
performance but has no effect on employee perception of a safe work
environment.
• Research has shown that active shooter response training increases employee
perception of a safe work environment but has no effect on employee
performance.
• Research has shown that active shooter response training increases both
employee performance and employee perception of a safe work environment.
• Research has shown that there is no connection between active shooter
response training and employee performance and perception of a safe work
environment.
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19. I know how to follow the steps of my organization’s decision-making process. (K-P;
strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree, strongly agree)
20. Please put the decision-making process steps in order. (K-P)
__ Identify alternatives.
__ Review your decision.
__ Gather information.
__ Choose among the alternatives.
__ Identify the decision.
__ Take action.
__ Weigh the evidence.
21. I know the techniques involved in successfully implementing policies within my
organization. (K-P; strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree, strongly agree)
22. Please put the organizational policy implementation steps in order. (K-P)
__ consideration of policy options
__ implementation
__ problem emergence
__ evaluation
__ agenda setting
__ decision-making
23. The active shooter response training process you are implementing in your
organization needs fine-tuning. Write down a few of your reflections and the potential
adjustments you may make to try to minimize unintended stress and/or anxiety. (K-
M)
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24. Please explain how you planned steps to mitigate unintended trauma in your approach
to implementing active shooter response training. (K-M)
Please answer the following questions regarding motivation surrounding the
implementation of active shooter response training from your perspective as the SSE.
25. Implementing active shooter training is an important responsibility of my role to the
organization. (Utility value; strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree, strongly
agree)
26. How important do you believe it is that your organization requires active shooter
response training? (Utility value; 5-point Likert scale; not at all important to very
important)
27. To what degree are you confident in your ability to implement active shooter
response training within your organization? (Self-Efficacy; provide degree marker for
them to check)
28. To what degree are you confident that your organization is capable of creating a safe
and secure environment through implementation of active shooter response training?
(Collective self-efficacy; provide degree marker for participant to check)
29. I expect that implementation of active shooter response training will increase the
perception of safety and security at my organization. (Strongly disagree, disagree,
undecided, agree, strongly agree)
30. My own personal wellness will be positively affected through engaged participation
in the implementation of an active shooter training program. (Strongly disagree,
disagree, undecided, agree, strongly agree)

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Please respond to the following questions about your organizational support for active
shooter response training from your perspective as the SSE.
31. My organization allocates appropriate time for due diligence, selection, and
implementation of safety and security initiatives such as active shooter response
training. (Resources: time; strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree, strongly
agree)
32. My organization allocates appropriate funding for safety and security initiatives such
as active shooter response training. (Resources: funding; strongly disagree, disagree,
undecided, agree, strongly agree)
33. How does your organization fund training programs? Please select all that apply.
(Resources: funding)
• Budget allocation
• Grants
• Other (Please specify):
34. My organization has policies and procedures in place that prioritize safety and
security across the organization. (Resources: policies, processes, and procedures;
35. My organization regularly exercises safety and security processes and procedures.
(Resources: policies, processes, and procedures; strongly disagree, disagree,
undecided, agree, strongly agree)
36. My organization has policies and procedures specific to active shooter response.
(Resources: policies, processes, and procedures)
• yes
• no
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37. If yes to the above, my organization regularly exercises active shooter processes and
procedures. (Resources: policies, processes, and procedures)
• yes
• no
38. How important do you feel a culture of security is to your board of
directors/executives? (Culture; not at all important, slightly important, moderately
important, very important, extremely important)
39. How involved are stakeholders outside of Security in the risk mitigation for your
organization? (Culture; not at all involved, slightly involved, moderately involved,
very involved, extremely involved)
40. How receptive do you feel your executive team is to active shooter preparedness
training? (Culture; not at all receptive, slightly receptive, moderately receptive, very
receptive, extremely receptive)
41. I have the authority within my organization to prioritize the implementation of safety
and security plans. (Authority; strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree, strongly
agree)
42. I have the authority within my organization to prioritize the implementation of active
shooter response training. (Authority; strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree,
strongly agree)
For the final two questions, please feel free to share any pertinent information related to
active shooter response training that you feel has not been addressed.
43. Do you have any best practices to share related to implementation of active shooter
preparedness training?’
241

44. Do you have additional feedback regarding the implementation of active shooter
preparedness training that you would like to include?
Thank you for your participation! I appreciate it and look forward to sharing the results
with you!

242

Appendix E: KMO Interview Crosswalk
Appendix E: KMO Interview Crosswalk
Assumed influence Interview item
Knowledge
SSEs need to know the facts related to active
shooter incidents. (K-F)
Can you talk to me about your background
knowledge of active shooter incidents? (K-F)
Probe: How did you gain this knowledge?
What experience, if any, do you have with
active shooter incidents? (K-F)
Probe: I’d like to hear more, if that’s ok. What
did you learn from this (these)
experience(s)?
SSEs need an understanding of the key ideas
related to organizational policy
implementation. (K-F)
Can you explain to me the key ideas of
implementing organizational policy? (K-F)
Probe: How did you gain this understanding?
Did you have any formal training in policy
implementation?

SSEs need to identify the drivers that lead to
employees’ perceptions of safety and
security at work. (K-F)
Can you talk to me about what you believe
impacts employees’ perception of safety and
security at work? (K-F)
Probe: What do you think increases their
perception of safety and security?
Probe: What do you think decreases their
perception of safety and security?

SSEs need to know the components of active
shooter preparedness plans. (K-C)
Can you tell me about the components of your
organization’s active shooter response
training? (K-C)
Probe: What led you to this training?
Probe: What kind of feedback do you get in
relation to the training?
Probe: Why did your organization decide to
implement training?
SSEs need to know how to facilitate change
management across their organization. (K-
P)
Can you talk to me about the change
management processes and procedures at
your organization?
Probe: Are those specific to security, or does
every business unit follow a similar process?
Did you have any formal training within
your organization to aid in implementing
change?
How would you describe your approach to
change implementation? (K-P)
Probe: How does this compare to others in
your organization?
243

Assumed influence Interview item
Probe: Do you get any feedback/coaching?
Probe: Describe any training, formal or
informal, you have received related to
change management.

SSEs need to know how to connect the
relationships of active shooter
implementation programs to employee
performance and perception of a safe work
environment. (K-P)
Talk to me about how you measure success of
your active shooter training program? (K-P)
Probe: Do you use any specific tools to gather
insights from employees? Are these shared
beyond security? If so, how and with whom?
Stakeholders need to be able to follow the
steps in their own organizational decision-
making process. (K-P)
Can you describe the decision-making process
for your organization? (K-P)
Probe: How would others describe it?
Probe: Can you give me an example of a
decision-making situation you were involved
in?
Probe: What was the situation?
SSEs need to know how to follow the
techniques involved in successfully
implementing policies across their
organizations. (K-P)
Talk to me about policy implementation in
your organization. Can you describe the
process for implementing new policy or
training? (K-P)
Describe the process of vetting and selecting
an active shooter preparedness program. (K-
P)
Probe: How did you end up with your current
solution?
Probe: What feedback did you get? Who gave
you that feedback?
SSEs need to plan the most appropriate way
to teach active shooter preparedness plans
without inducing stress and/or anxiety
within employees. (K-M)
Can you talk to me about your thinking and
approach regarding implementation and
instruction of active shooter training in a
way that minimizes stress and anxiety? (K-
M)
Probe: What does the process look like for an
employee who expresses a desire to opt out
of training?
SSEs need to plan their approach to mitigate
the risk of inducing unintended trauma by
teaching about violent subjects. (K-M)
Talk to me about how you planned and
approached teaching about and training a
response to a potentially traumatic subject
like active shooter incidents. (K-M)
Motivation
SSEs need to see the importance to their job
in preparing their organization for active
shooter incidents. (Utility value)
Can you talk to me about your feelings on the
importance of implementing active shooter
training to your role in the organization?
(Motivation: utility value)
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Assumed influence Interview item
SSEs need to have confidence in their ability
to implement an active shooter preparedness
program raising the confidence of
employees related to safety at the
workplace. (Individual self-efficacy)
Tell me about how confident you are/were in
your ability to implement an active shooter
training program. (Motivation Individual
Self-efficacy)
Probe: How did you gain that confidence?
Would you describe that confidence as
helpful in implementing the training?
SSEs need to believe that their organization is
capable of creating a safe and secure
environment through implementation of
active shooter preparedness programs.
(Collective self-efficacy)
Can you talk to me about your belief in your
organization to implement the active shooter
training? (Motivation: collective self-
efficacy)
SSEs need to believe that by implementing an
active shooter preparedness program, they
will raise the perception of safety and
security at their organization. (Expectancy
value)
Can you tell me about why you decided to
implement the active shooter program?
(Motivation: expectancy value)
Probe: What did you expect to gain from
implementation?
SSEs need to believe that personal wellness
can be affected through their own engaged
participation in the implementation of active
shooter preparedness programs.
(Attribution)
Talk to me about what you, personally,
expected to gain from participation in the
implementation of an active shooter
program. (Motivation: attribution)
Organization
SSEs need to be given ample time to
research, select, and implement active
shooter preparedness plans. (Resources:
Time)
Can you talk to me about what the timeline
looked like for implementation of your
active shooter training program? (Resources:
Time)
SSEs need to be given the appropriate
funding to research, select, and implement
active shooter preparedness plans.
(Resources: funding)
Can you talk to me about the financial impact
of the active shooter training program?
(Resources: Funding)
Probe: What sources were explored, if any, for
funding? Was funding provided internally or
did you seek external funding?
SSEs need policies that prioritize safety and
security across the organization. (Policies,
processes, and procedures)
Tell me about the security policies and
procedures you have in place at your
organization.
Probe: Are there specific policies and
procedures in place for active shooters?
Probe: How/when/why did those policies
come about? How are they communicated?
SSEs needs to have the support of the board
of directors and/or executives to champion
the active shooter preparedness training to
generate buy-in. (Culture)
How would you describe your direct
supervisor’s attitude toward active shooter
preparedness? (Culture)
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Assumed influence Interview item
Probe: What makes you say that? How does
this make you feel? Do you think others see
it the same way?
How would you describe your board of
directors/C-suite’s attitude toward active
shooter preparedness? (Culture)
How would you describe your organization’s
culture toward security? (Culture)
Probe: Why do you say that? What makes you
feel that way? Can you think of an example
of this?
SSEs need to have the authority to prioritize
the implementation of active shooter
preparedness plans across their
organizations. (Authority)
Talk to me about your authority in your role to
implement security policies and training,
such as your active shooter training
program? (Authority)

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Appendix F: KMO Interview Protocol
Good morning/afternoon! Thanks so much for agreeing to meet with me and be
interviewed as part of my research into SSEs implementing active shooter preparedness policies.
I wanted to take some time to ask you about your role and background, your organization’s
current plan and the lead-up/implementation of your plan, and finally, I wanted to talk a little bit
about your personal knowledge/experience with change management/change implementation.
Are you ready to begin?
Background/Demographic
1. How long have you been in your current role?”
2. What did your career progression look like?
3. What is your background?
4. What does your reporting structure look like?
5. What industry best describes your organization?
6. What do you think are the biggest threats to your organization’s safety and security?
• Why do you feel that way?
• Can you give me more detail about why ____ is a top threat?
Knowledge: Factual
1. Can you talk to me about your background knowledge of active shooter incidents?
• How did you gain this knowledge?
• What experience, if any, do you have with active shooter incidents? (Probe:
I’d like to hear more, if that’s ok. What did you learn from this/these
experience/s?)
2. Can you explain to me the key ideas of implementing organizational policy?
247

• How did you gain this understanding?
• Did you have any formal training in policy implementation?
3. Can you talk to me about what you believe impacts employees’ perception of safety
and security at work?
• What do you think increases their perception of safety and security?
• What do you think decreases their perception of safety and security?
Knowledge: Conceptual
Can you tell me about the components of your organization’s active shooter response
training?
• What led you to this training?
• What kind of feedback do you get in relation to the training?
• Why did your organization decide to implement training?
• Describe your organization’s workspace/footprint/campus.
• Did that play any bearing on the selection of your active shooter preparedness plan?
Knowledge: Procedural
1. Describe the process of vetting and selecting an active shooter preparedness
program.”
• How did you end up with your current solution?
• What feedback did you get?
• Who gave you that feedback?
2. Can you talk to me about the change management processes and procedures at your
organization?
248

• Are those specific to security, or does every business unit follow a similar
process?
• Did you have any formal training within your organization to aid in
implementing change?
3. How would you describe your approach to change implementation?
• How does this compare to others in your organization?
• Do you get any feedback/coaching?
• Describe any training, formal or informal, you have received related to change
management?
4. Talk to me about how you measure success of your active shooter training program?”
• Do you use any specific tools to gather insights from employees?
• Are these shared beyond security? If so, how and with whom?
5. Can you describe the decision-making process for your organization?
• How would others describe it?
• Can you give me an example of a decision-making situation you were
involved in?
• What was the situation?”
6. Talk to me about policy implementation in your organization. Can you describe the
process for implementing new policy or training?
7. Tell me about the stakeholders involved in policy implementation at your
organization.
• What kind of feedback do you get?
• How does this compare with other organizations you have been involved in?
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Knowledge: Metacognitive
1. Can you talk to me about your thinking and approach regarding implementation and
instruction of active shooter training in a way that minimizes stress and anxiety?
(Probe: What does the process look like for an employee who expresses a desire to
opt out of training?)
2. Talk to me about how you planned and approached teaching about and training a
response to a potentially traumatic subject like active shooter incidents.
Motivation: Utility Value
1. Can you talk to me about your feelings on the importance of implementing active
shooter training to your role in the organization?”
Motivation: Individual Self-efficacy
Tell me about how confident you are/were in your ability to implement an active shooter
training program.
• How did you gain that confidence?
• Would you describe that confidence as helpful in implementing the training?
Motivation: Collective Self-efficacy
Can you talk to me about your belief in your organization to implement the active shooter
training?
Motivation: Expectancy Value
Can you tell me about why you decided to implement the active shooter program?
(Probe: What did you expect to gain from implementation?)

250

Motivation: Attribution
Talk to me about what you, personally, expected to gain from participation in the
implementation of an active shooter program?”
Organizational Resources: Time
Can you talk to me about what the timeline looked like for implementation of your active
shooter training program?”
Organizational Resources: Funding
Can you talk to me about the financial impact of the active shooter training program?”
• What sources were explored, if any, for funding?
• Was funding provided internally or did you seek external funding?
Organizational Resources: Policies and Procedures
Tell me about the security policies and procedures you have in place at your organization.
• Are there specific policies and procedures in place for active shooters?
• How/when/why did those policies come about?
• How are they communicated?
Organizational Resources: Culture
1. How would you describe your direct supervisor’s attitude toward active shooter
preparedness?
• What makes you say that?
• How does this make you feel?
• Do you think others see it the same way?
2. How would you describe your board of directors/C-suite’s attitude toward active
shooter preparedness?
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3. How would you describe your organization’s culture toward security?
• Why do you say that?
• What makes you feel that way?
• Can you think of an example of this?
Organizational Resources: Authority
Talk to me about your authority in your role to implement security policies and training,
such as your active shooter training program?
Conclusion
Thanks so much for your time. I appreciate it!

252

Appendix G Immediate Reaction Evaluation Tool
The immediate reaction evaluation tool will be completed after asynchronous and in-
person training.
For each question below, circle the response that best characterizes how you feel about
the statement.

Table G1
Immediate Evaluation Tool
Disagree Agree
The training held my interest. 1 2 3 4 5
I found value in the training I received. 1 2 3 4 5
The training clearly related to my role. 1 2 3 4 5
Discussions during training helped me understand how to apply
what I learned.
1 2 3 4 5
I will recommend this training to other senior security
executives.
1 2 3 4 5
I believe it is important for me to incorporate what I’ve learned
in my role.
1 2 3 4 5
The feedback I received has increased my confidence to apply
what I’ve learned in my role.
1 2 3 4 5

253

Please provide feedback for the following questions:
• What part of training was the most beneficial for you?
• What part of training was the least beneficial for you?
• What were the major concepts you learned today?

254

Appendix H: Delayed Reaction Evaluation Tool
The follow-up survey will be delivered 90 days after in-person training.
For each question below, please circle the response that best characterizes how you feel
about the statement.

Table H1
Delayed Reaction Evaluation Tool
Disagree Agree
I have the opportunity to use what I learned in my role. 1 2 3 4 5
I believe the training was a good use of my time. 1 2 3 4 5
After training, I have successfully applied what I learned in my
role.
1 2 3 4 5
I have received support from my leadership to apply what I have
learned in my role.
1 2 3 4 5
I am seeing positive results from the training. 1 2 3 4 5
As a result of the training, I have successfully implemented an
active shooter response training program in my organization.
1 2 3 4 5

255

Please provide feedback for the following questions:
• Describe any challenges you are facing implementing what you have learned.
• Describe possible solutions to overcome the challenges you described.
• How could this training have been improved?

Abstract (if available)

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Asset Metadata

Creator Hanson, Cory John (author)

Core Title Participating in your own survival: a gap analysis study of the implementation of active shooter preparedness programs in mid-to-large size organizations

School Rossier School of Education

Degree Doctor of Education

Degree Program Organizational Change and Leadership (On Line)

Degree Conferral Date 2023-05

Publication Date 05/03/2023

Defense Date 02/28/2023

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag active shooter incident,change management,OAI-PMH Harvest,policy implementation,preparedness,Prevention,senior security executive

Format theses (aat)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Donato, Adrian (committee chair), Filback, Robert (committee member), Foulk, Susanne (committee member)

Creator Email cjhanson@usc.edu,cory.j.hanson10@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC113099361

Unique identifier UC113099361

Identifier etd-HansonCory-11763.pdf (filename)

Legacy Identifier etd-HansonCory-11763

Document Type Dissertation

Format theses (aat)

Rights Hanson, Cory John

Internet Media Type application/pdf

Type texts

Source 20230504-usctheses-batch-1036 (batch), University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

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Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu