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A comparative study of the experiential approach to religious education and some aspects of existentialism

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A comparative study of the experiential approach to religious education and some aspects of existentialism

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Content A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE EXPERIENTIAL
APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND
SOME ASPECTS OF EXISTENTIALISM
by
Richard Stanley Ford
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment or the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Religion)
June 1957
This dissertat/on, written by
........ ............ Richard ... S.t.anley ... Ford ...................... .
under tlz e dire tion o /hi Guido n r' C onunitt :Je
1
and nppro· ed by all its 111ernb rs has b n pre
sented to and II cepted bJ the ~~a ulty r )f th ~
Graduate School, in partial f ulfilln, ~ nt of re
qnirenzents for th e d eg re e of
DOCTOR OF JJHJl.10SOPJ! ,.
Dean
G uid(lnc Cammitt
I
--- .... .. - .. ..., .. - - .. .. .. .. ---- , .. .. - ...
Chairman
.
. . .. . . ! . . :.,$ .... .... .... .. ··· ···
.. .: ... ~ :.. ->- f ./;~ .. ········
TABL OF CONTE TS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTORY PROBLEMS •.••
• • • • • • •
Statement of the problem
Importance oft e study.
• • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • •
ethod of procedure ••
• • • • • • • • •
Rev ·ew of related studies •
• • • • • • •
Organization of the remainder of the
dissertation
• • • • • • • • • • • • •
1
2
4
7
8
25
ART I. A SU VEY OF THE CHARACTE ISTICS AND ASSUMPTIONS
OF E PERIENTIAL CHRISTIAN EDUCATION AlD EXIST ENTIALIS
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIV AND CHARACTERISTICS
OF E PERIENTI L CHRISTIAN EDUCATION •
• •
Tl"1e background of Christian education • •
Characteristics and assumptions of
experiential Cristian education
• • •
The scientific method •••
• • • • • •
The concept of immanence
• • • • • • •
The 'personality-principle" •.
• • • •
an develops in relationship
Learning through ex erience .
• •
• •
• • •
• • •
The ethico-social em hasis
• • • • • •
The functional approach to the Christian
tradition • ...
• • • • • • • •
28
29
37
39
54
66
75
78
84
90
CHAPrER
111
PAGE
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CHARACTERISTICS
IV•
OF EXISTENTIALISM •••
• • • • • • • • •
Historical background ••
• • • • • • • •
Some characteristics and assumptions of
98
98
existentialism • • • • • • • • • • • • 107
Existence is prior to essence. • • • • 109
Existence transcends the rational. • • 113
Existentialism condemns man to be free. 121
Man is anxious in the face of Nothing-
ness
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
125
Existence involves estrangement. • • • 132
The existentialist individual endures
crisis •••••••••••••
• •
137
Existentialism involves a return to
immediacy ••••••
C • e • e • e e
141
Evidences or existentialism within con-
temporary theology • • • • • • • • • • 152
PART II. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MOVEMENTS
THE NATURE OF MAN • • • • • • • • • • • • •
The basic nature of man.
• • • • • • • •
Man•s relation to the world •••••••
Man's relation to society. • • • • • •
he goal of man • • • • • • • • • • • • •
S \lDlDlary • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
176
177
184
189
191
193
iv
CHAPTER PAGE
196
197
202
v.
VI.
VII.
MAN AND THE EDUCATI ONAL PROCESS.
• • • • •
Epistemology and authority ••
• • • • • •
Individual experienc e ••••••••••
Tne function of reason and the scientific
method
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
The problem of communication
• • • • • •
The learning process ••••••••
• •
s tlDllllary • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
• •
VALUE AND THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION •••
• •
The concept of value
• • • • • • • • • •
205
208
213
220
224
225
The nature of religion • • • • • • • • • 228
The role of the Christian tradition. • • 231
The nature of ultimate value • • • • • • 237
Ethical impli cations of the concepts of
value .
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
S ununary • • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • •
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSI ONS ••••
• • • • • •
Swnmary
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Conclusions •
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
240
244
247
247
261
BIBLIOGRAPHY
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
276
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY PROBLEMS
For the la,st three decades there has existed con
siderable ambiguity about the relationship between Christian
education and theology. The uncertainty and conflict w hich
has been evidenced in this relationship continues to the
present. The ease with which Christian education accommo
dated itself to the liberal theological movament at the
turn of the century and, at the same time, to the insights
arising from the empirical approach within secular educa
tion, presented, at first, a simple solution to tha relation
between theology and religious education. However, follow
ing the tragedy of the first World War the liberal
theological concepts were seriously questioned in theologi
cal circles. As a result, religious education has
incr easingly come under attack from theological quarters.
Some educators apparently have resented the raising
of tl1eological questions in the field of education. On the
other hand, a few theologians, including Paul Tillich, have
considered religious education to be nothing more than a
study of practical techniques and therefore outside the
scope of theology proper.
1
A number of theological
1
Paul Tillich, systematic Theolo6~ (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 3.
thinkers have attacked Christian education on the grounds
that it is inseparably tied to either a liberal theology
which is W1realistic, to secular progressive education, or
to both.
2
In more recent ti~es religious educators are
recognizing the need for Christian education to come to
terms with contemporary theology in a more satisfying way.
It is this basic concern which underlies this study.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The philosophy of existentialism which influences
contemporary theology seems to continue the challenge to
2
the basic asswnptions underlying the experiential Christian
education movement. A number of theologians who fall within
the broad category referred to as nao-orthodo"tz have leaned
heavily upon existential philosophy for the framework
within which they have structured their concepts of the
traditional Reformation Christian confessional. It is an
assumption of this study that this theological movement
essentially represents Reformation theological concepts
superimposed upon existentialist philosophical presupposi
tions.
The pres·uppositions of the Christian education move
ment have been examined and criticized by representatives
2
H. Sheldon Smith, Wilfred E. Powell, E.G.
Homrighausen, et al.
--
3
of this contemporary theological movement. However, a
similar examination and critical comparison of the theolo
gian's presupposition~ with those of experiential religious
education has not been undertaken. The problem with which
this study seeks to deal is to examine the relationship of
some of these basic assumptions underlying existentialist
philosophy and the experiential educational movement.
A cursory examination of the two points of view
suggests that they are antithetical. Christian education
affirms the goodness of man, while existentialist theology
calls attention to man•s estrangement from the world, to
his anxiety, and to his basic predicament. Christian edu
cation is characterized by the concept of development, and
by religious growth in an on-going process, while existen
tial theology calls attention to the concepts of crisis,
confrontation, and moments of decision. Education asserts
an objective methodology by which change in persons may be
accomplished. The existentialist calls this another mani
festation of our cultural pattern of treating persons as
objects rather than as ends in themselves.
On the other hand, certain empbatas within this
contemporary theological movement suggest, in a different
vernacular, certain concepts which ara integral to the
Christian education movement. For example, the concern for
existentialist individuality may be closely akin to the
•
4
experientlalist educator
1
s insis~ence upon the uniqueness
or individual personality. Similarly, the concern for a
theology of relationship is suggestive of the educational
interest in the discovery of self within the interactive
social situation. Interes t i n creativity and in the in
sights of dynamic psychology is common to both disciplines.
The problem to which this study is addressed is to
determine whether the hiatus w hich preswuably exists between
experiential Christian education and the existentialist
influence withi n contemporary theology can be bridged at a
number of significant points. The study seeks to examine
and to compare critically some of the basic assumptions of
the two movements in order to delineate these areas of
agreement. The study, of n e cessity, also seeks to clarify
and define those points of radical conflict which may exist
between the basic assumptions of the movements.
IMPORTAN C E OF THE STUDY
The problem of the r elationship of experiential
Christian education and contemporary theology is particular]¥
pressing at this time. Existentialist theology has assumed
a position of maj or import ance in American Protestantism.
If the assertion that belief and method cannot be separated
is true, this shift in theol ogi cal emphasis calls tor a re
examination of the educational methodologies which are to
be used with it. For ex ample, an attempt to use an
5
educational procedure predicated upon assumptions about the
nature of man which are contrary to the theological assump
tions regarding the nature of man can result only in con
fusion and chaos in the practical situation. Therefore a.n
examination of basic asswnptions becomes an imperative if
the goals which any theological system sets for itself are
to be adequately realized.
The failur e to conswnmate adequately this examination
is reflected in the tendency to shunt religious education
off to one side as one means of resolving the obvious in
consistencies. To do this is to fail to recognize the
integral relation of religious education to the whole
Christian commW1ity. The function which religious educa
tion performs in the fellowship of the Church cannot be
ignored even though a particular methodology may be rejected.
Unless an adequate method of performing this function can
be found, the central purpose of the faith community is
vitiated. Therefore the basic assumptions of both theology
and education need to be examined in order to discover a
coherent system which embraces method as well as belief.
Another reason for the importance of this study lies
in the fact that theologians representing the movement
under consideration have challenged the basic asswnptlons
of Christian education a number of times. However, they
have failed to examine their own assumptions as well in
order to discover what, if any, basis there is for
6
establishing an educational point of view upon them. This
study, which examines an educational theory in the light 0£
thase basic assumptions, contributes some implications ~or
the solution ot this problem.
A further reason tor the importance ot this Wlder
taking lies in the ambiguous nature of the term "existen
tialism." It has been defined as almost everything from
pure subjectivitJ to "a clandestine wedding of nordic
melancholy with Parisian pornography."3 It has been used
as an excuse tor rational inconsistency and poor scholar
ship. Or, worse yet, in its name traditional Christian
morality has disintegrated or been declared irrelevant. On
the other hand, many who embrace it have asserted that it
opens new creative potentialities hitherto unrealized. It
is important that such a movement which is making so great
an impact upon contemporary theology be widerstood. While
the writer does not hazard a definition at this time, in
tne c~urse of the study a contribution may be made to the
clarification of the basic nature of existentialism, as
well as its implications 1or an educational procedure.
Finally, one or the major problems in the current
attempts to discuss theology and religious education lies
in the difficulty of adequate commWlication. Tne vernacular
3carl Michalson (ed.), Christianity and the Existen
tialists (New York: cnarles Scrlbnerls Sons, t9-;r;r, p. ~.
7
which the educator uses is unfamiliar to the theologi n and
•
vice versa. hile the religious educator recognizes the
scholarly attainments of the theologian, this feeling is
not always reciprocated. By seeking to go back to the
basic assumptions which underlie both existentialist theol
ogy and experiential Christian education, this study may
make some contribution to his pr blem of communication.
METHOD OF PROCEDURE
This study is essentially a library research pro
ject. The basic sou.res are books, periodicals, and
original research projects in the areas under investigation.
The writings of the major exponents of the experiential
movement in religious education constitute one of the major
sources. Another source is the original writings of
existentialist thinkers and interpretative works about the
philosophical movement. Additional material is drawn from
the writings of those theologians who have taken issue with
the experiential education movement. The fourth major area
of research is the works of those within the contemporary
theological movement who have been influenced by existen
tialism.
The rocedure followed is to delineate the signifi
cant character of experiential education and of existential
ism, after which the two movements are compared upon a
number of significant points with n the three broad
categories of the nature of man, tne nature of the educa
tional process, and the role of the Ch~istian tradition.
At the conclusion of the study the areas or agreement and
of disagreement between the two movements are summarized
8
an the conclusions set forth in terms of the relationship
between the movements, existentialist contributions to edu
cation, and theological implications for educational theory .
REVIEW OF RELATED STUDIES
The problem of the relationship of theology to
religious education has been the topic of n\Ullerous books,
articles, and discussions. However, only a limited amoWlt
of material has been written whi ch deals directly with the
problem of existentialism and its relationship to Christian
education. Acknowledging this limitation, the review of
related studies deals with the major works which have
focused attention upon the theological problem. These
studies show that the issues revolve around certain basic
theological assumptions. They deal with several areas
where there has arisen conflict in interpretation. They
do not, however, deal explicitly with the philosophical
assumptions underlying theology and religious education,
but, for the most part, with the theological aspect of
religious education. The review of studies is introduced
by editorials appearing in ~he International Journal of
------- ---- -
Religious Education by William Clayton Bower and H. Shelton
9
Smith. These editorials show the different points of view
in the interpretation of religious education. The main
studies of Wilfred E. Powell, H. Shelton Smith, Harrison s.
Elliott, Randolph C. Miller, and Lewis J. Sherrill are then
discussed, followed by a resume of periodical literature
and recent dissertations in the area.
The first editorial is by William C. Bower, who in
terprets the significance of H. Shelton Smith's book, Faith
and Nurture.4 Bower suggests that experiential religious
education must come to terms with theology "since religious
education rests as much upon theological assumptions as upon
asswnptions concerning the nature and ends of education."5
But he maintains that Smith attacks Christian education
from the point of view of the "Augustine-Barth-Brunner
Niebuhr tradition, currently known as neo-orthodoxy."6
Bower attacks Smith regarding the latter's discussions
of the Kingdom of God, man and God, and grace and growth.
He asserts that Smith sets God and man over against each
other by his rejection of God's activity in the natural
world. Smith denies that God is concerned with
4H. Shelton Smith, Faith and Nurture (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 19~1).
5w1111am C. Bower, "Has Christian Education Departed
from the Faith?," International Journ_!t f2.!. Religious Educa
tion, 18:3, December, 19~1.
6Loc. cit.
10
Christianizing the social order, relegating social action
to humanitarianism.7 Bower insists that the educational
view finds God and man seeking and finding each other in
actual living experience. He rejects Smith's concept of
grace as Pauline, rather than from Jesus, in whom Bower
sees a concept of grace as natural growth. Finally,
Smith's pessimistic view of manta intelligence and ability
to achieve spiritual insight is contrasted with education
1
s
ai'firmation of this ability.8
Smith's reply is published in the subsequent issue
of the same publication. He denies that his position is
identical with that of the neo-orthodox group, insisting
that he seeks a middle road. Smith contends that progres
sive education fails to give adequate attention to the
objective and transcendent aspects or Goa.9 He denies
setting man and God over against each other, but insists
that man and God are objectively real to each other.
Therefore natural-socialEJ.Tents cannot be identified with
God. He also denies setting grace and growth in contrast-
he merely refuses to equate them. Smith also refutes
7
Loc. cit.
8
Loe. cit.
9H. Shelton Smith, "A Reply to Dr. Bower," Inter
national Journal or Religious Education, 18:3, January,
1942. -
11
Bower's implication that children are "exempted from the
call to repentance.nlO He concludes w th the comment that,
if Bower had not started with the false premise of associ
ating him with neo-orthodoxy, the "one-sided and mislead
ing" co c usions could not have been drawn.
These two articles indicate the nature of the
theological conflict between Christian education and con
temporary theology. Specific is ues emerge from the
following discussion ·the major variant approaches to
the controversy.
Powell initiates the attack. The first work to
appear n book form setting the issues between religious
education and theolog was that of Wilfred Evans Powell,
Education for Life with God, a revision of his doctoral
dissertation.
11
He criticizes religious education on the
basis that it ignores the theological side, which he at
tempts to supply in terms of a mystical, pietistical manner.
The scientific method, social ideals, and socialization are
the major factors in religious education which lead to a
one-sidedness, omitting the "cosmic reference" and charac
ter of God. Most of his criticisms of religious education
10
Loc. cit.
11
wilfred E. Powell, Education for Life with God
(New York: Abingdon Press, 1934J.
ara expressed i n terms or degrees. Apparently the author
was concerned with the question of how tar one can go in
religious education without moving out of the Christian
tradition. His main contention seems to be to keep God
!'rom being identified with the hWJlan and the soci 1. God
mus be more than a symbol; ne must become a metaphysical
reality at the core of the educational procedu.ra.
The ~heological criticism 2,!. Smith. Reference bas
already been made to the work of H. Shelton Smith, Faith
12
and Nurture.12 In this volume appears the sharpest and
most comprehensiTe attack upon modern experiential Chris
tian education. It is a forthright attack upon theological
assumptions. In the preface Smith suggests that religious
education is faced with a crisis which is precipitated by
.its failure to arrive at a eatis!'actory theo],ogical orienta
tion.13 Smith states that there are four elements of
experiential religious education which are inadequate trom
a Christian point of view. These are, the concept or divine
j.mmanence interpreted as the progressive realization of the
Kingdom of God, the concept of growth, a distorted idea of
man as basically good,· and the role of the historical Jesus
in the faith.
12supra, p. 9.
13Smith, ~- cit., pp. vii ff.
13
He sets the liberal doctrine of the Kingdom of God
over against a theocentric vie w. He draw s a dichot omy :
the liberal emphasis upon t he n at ure or man versu~ the
sovereignty of God. Man becomes tne center of the Kingdom
of God and, as a result, feels no dependence upon God.
Smith blam s the scientific movement for this anthropocen
tric view of relig·ous e ucation. Smith further criticizes
religious education for its concern for social experience
and soci 1 values which omit the true Christian point or
view which places the origin of man in the creative word of
God and the enhancement which comes t hrough relationship to
a transc ndental source. Smith continues his criticism by
asserting that it ignores sin and man
1
s ambivale t nature,
fostering an optimistic view of man which vitiates the
theological doctrines of repentance, deliverance, and the
purpos and ru.nction of both the Churc and of Christ.
Furthermore, its relativity of values negates the centrality
of the revelation of Jesus. Finally, by accepting a prag matic, empirical metaphysics, it divorces itself from the
very foundations upon which true Christian nurture must be
carried out.
In this highly critical work, Sm th gives no clear
e position of his ovm point of view other than to oppose
hat he defines as the liberal position. His references to
scripture or to the P~otestant tradition are made in proof text fashion, implying that there is a part·cular
14
"Christian" faith which snould be implemented educationally
through proper d fin tlon and teaching of the doctrines of
the Faith.
The defence,& Elliott. The work of Harrison Sackett
Elliott, Can Religiou~ Ed,1ca.tion ~ Christian?,
1
4 represents
the most incisive and direct attempt by a member of the
experiential Christian education movement to answer the
criticisms which contemporary theology has directed against
it. The cook seeks to clarify the educational philosophy
of religious education and relate it to the theological
problems around which the controversy has centered. It is
of interest to note that this defence by Elliott was never
answered. At tne outset Elliott indicated the nature of
the conflict between that kind of Christian education which
conceives of education as a means of effectively transmit
ting the message of the Church and an educational process
in which the pupil, through educational experience, dis
covers revelation. Followlng a review of the historical
backgro:md of religious education in America, Elliott
directs attentio11 to educational concerns and their theo
logical implications. He lucidly demonstrates the impossi
bility of neo-orthodoxy establish·ng any one authoritative
1
4Harrison s. Elliott, Can Religiou~ ~ducation ~
Christian? (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940).
15
interpretation of the Christian faith.15 There is no one
theology because the "vitality of Chris ian experience
cannot be poured into one theological mold.nl6
Systematically dealing with the problems of the
Bible, the religious tradition, man, the human predicament,
sin and guilt, society, ethics, religious experiences, and
the like, Elli ott sets forth the essential character of
e periential education, compares it with the assumptions or
of nee-orthodoxy, and then indicates the short-comings of
the latter for education. He suggests the basic point of
difference is that nee-orthodoxy insists truth is made
known only through Christ in the New Testament. The stream
of Christian tradition does not represent growth but adap tation to changing conditions. Experiential Christian
education believes that the Christian heritage represents
a process of both adaptation and growth, and the educational
function is to consider problems of life with a view to
discovering what is the Christian course of action and to
make plans to carry it out.
1
7 Thus, in an educational
frame of reference, Elliott systematically treats all the
major theological assumptions over which conflict has
raged.
1
5rbid., p. 86.
16
Loc. cit.
17
Ibid., pp. 310 ff.
16
Miller attemEts bridge. Randolph Crump Miller,
motivated by Smith's book, Faith and Nurture, has sought to
overcome the split between t~e theological emphasis upon
content and the educational emphasis upon method. In Te
Clue to Christian Education, he states:
-- - ----- -----
The clue to Christian education is the rediscovery
or a relevant theology which will bridge the gap be
tween content and method, providing the background and
perspective of Christian truth by which the best methods
and content will be used as tools to bring the learners
into the right relationship with the living God who is
revealed to us in Jesus Christ, using the guidance of
parents and the fellowship of life in the Church as
the env~ronment in which Christian nurture will take
place. 1
Thus Miller attempts to make central and authorita
tive the revelation of Jesus Christ, as he interprets it,
and at the same time retain the best insights into the
learning process, educational psychology and methodology.
In the above-cited book Miller sets forth the various
theological doctrines, then draws attention to the educa
tional insights which can be related to these theological
considerations.
In his next work, Education for Christian Living,
Miller rejects the concept or religion as revaluing values,
asserting that one must operat e in Christian education only
£rom within the tradition and "w·th a degree of theological
18
Randolph C. Miller, The Clue to Christian Educa
tion (New £ork: Charles Scribner's Sons'; 1950): p. 15.
17
responsibility."
1
9 Christian education begins with the
fact of confrontation by the Christian Gospe1.
20
In this
work the author begins to develop a concept or Biblical
theology and a theology of relationship, the latter taken
ostensibly from the Bible, but which appears to be taken
instead from contemporary education and psychology.
In his latest book, Miller develops his doctrine of
Biblical theology, spelling out its implications for Chris
tian education.
21
He asserts in this work that the Bible
1s a drama of the mighty works of God in five acts:
Creation, Covenant, Christ, Community, and Consummation.
The Gospel is brought to the child by means of good educa
tional methodology, and the child brought to the Gospel in
terms of the best understandings of child psychology.
While Miller substitutes a concept of encounter and rela
tionship ror the traditional doctrinal approach, he never
theless develops a new set of "doctrines" which it is the
rwiction of education to transmit to the immature members
of the faith community. A serious question can be raised
whether or not he has succeeded in accomplishing his bridge.
It appears that he is using methodological procedures based
19Randolph c. Miller, Education for Christian Livins
(Englewood Clirfs, New Jersey: Prentice HalI, 1956), p. SJ.
20
Loc. cit.
21
Randolph C. Miller, Biblical Theologz and Christian
Education {New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1°95b).
upon one set of assumptions to deal with a content drawn
from another. Miller acknowledges Biblical authority,yet
seeks to use empirical data as authoritative. He never
resolves this conflict.
18
Sherrill seeks~ synthesis. Lewis J. Sherrill,
writing from within the framework of a reconstructed liberal
orientation, draws upon the findings of dynamic psychology
in an effort to develop a synthesis which acknowledges the
centrality of the Christian faith and, at the same time,
accepts and uses the best insights of empirical studies in
all areas of science. In The Stru.ggl~ of the Soul, he
interprets the psychological development of the individual
in terms of the theological concepts of continuous confron-
tation, judgment, and redemption.22 In The Gift of Power,
-- ---- ---
Sherrill explicitly asserts that the starting place of
Christian education must be within the Christian frame of
reference, but that the insights of education and psychology
must be integrated into this framework.
2
3 He asserts, in
good Wesleyan tradition, that the power to become a self,
to achieve full potentialities of living, can be accom
plished only through a relationship with God. The author
22
Lewis J. Sherrill, The Struggle of the Soul (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1952). -
2
3Lewis J. Sherrill, The Gift of Power (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 195.5), p. x!. -
19
then proceeds to deal with the nature of the hmnan sel. f,
drawing upon dynamic psychology and relating it to theologi
cal concepts. While disavowing the basic assumptions of
existentialism, he embraces the existentialist concept,
common also to contemporary psychology, of a basic anxiety
which is part of the very nature of man. Within the social
situation in which persons are confronted by an encounter
with God in loving relationships, the personality can be
reformed and acquire the power necessary to achieve self
fulfillment .
His concept of a doctrine of revelation which
changes with the culture enables him to embrace a given
revelation of Jesus, yet allow it to b reinterpreted in
accord with educational assumptions. Furth rmore, while
accepting the concept of confrontation basic to neo
orthodoxy, he modifies it to mean continuous confrontation,
thus retaining experientialist concepts of divine immanence
within man and nature. He moves out of the experiential
stream in regard to his interpretation of Biblical theology.
He finds within man certain basic predicaments, existential
questions which continually trouble man. The answers to
these questions are found within certain themes which run
through the Bible: creation, lordship, vocation, judgment ,
redemption, re-creation, providence, and the life of faith.
These themes speak to man's basic condition and thus are
always .. )levant to life. This approach, similar to
20
Tillich's concept of correlation and Miller's divine drama
in five acts, is an endeavor to come to tern1s with the new
emphasis upon Biblical theology. Whether or not this will
be successful is yet to be seen. Sherrill has, however,
definitely contributed toward a solution of the antithesis
between educational methodology and theological content
through the medium of dynamic psychological concepts which
appear to speak to both disciplines equally well.
Periodical literature. In addition to the major
books cited above, numerous articles have been published
directed to the problem of the relationship of theology and
education. Only a few of these are noted here. The extended
bibliography includes additional articles on the subject.
Two articles by George Albert Coe are worthy of note.
Early in 1938 Coe wrote that the crux of the attack upon
liberalism was over the issue of the scientific method,
which experiential education embraced and which neo
ortr1odoxy rejected.
2
4 He develops the thesis that authori
tarianism of all kinds is antithetical to a truly scientific
approach. In a second article, the following year, he
again asserted that religious education is being challenged
at its foundations, and set forth the basic characteristics
2
L~George A. Coe, "Tl1.e Assault Upon Liberalism,"
Reli5ious Education, 34:85-92, April-June, 1939.
21
of the movement which need to be protected from a theologi cal point of view which would deny them. 25
One of the most fruitful discuss ions of the problem
appears in an article by Stewart G. Cole .
26
In this state ment the autl1or sets rorth the point of view of experiential
education, then shows how the new theol ogical movement runs
contrary to its pr esuppositions. After indicating the
values of education which need to be r etained, Cole lists
those areas i n which the mov emen t can profit from the i n
sights of nee-orthodoxy.
In two arti cles, the second accompanied by an
extended discussion, William Claton Bower makes a signifi cant contribution to the problem. He ar ticulates the basic
presuppositions of Christian education, then shows how the
authoritarian theological attitude i s incompatible with
them. He emphasize s t h e assumptions of continuity, process,
creativity, learning through exp er i ence , and functional
religion, contrasting them with t h e theological concepts .
He concludes the s econd article with a r esume of areas in
which education may gain from theology , including the need
2.5aeorge A. Coe , "Religiou. s Educa.~ion is in Peril,''
International Journal of Reli5ious Education , 1.5: 9- 10,
january, 1939. - ·
2
6stewart G. Cole, "Where Religious Education and
Theology Meet," Reli5ious Educat ion, 35: 19- 20, January
March, 1940.
22
for more attention devoted to the concept of transcendence,
a recognition of the tragic in life, a more adequate place
for content, and a need to overcome atomistic educational
procedures.
2
7
Two more articles are worthy of mention. E.G.
Homrighausen suggests a solution to the controversy as a
genuine return to a religion of definite divine content, a
given theological orientation which will be authoritative
for all concernea.28
Clarice Bowman suggests that the basic problem is a
lack cf communication between theologians and religious
educators, and that a cooperative venture should be at
tempted in which the representatives of the two movements
may work hand in hand in an effort to articulate a point
of view which can embrace the best thinking of both move
ments.29
Related dissertations. Charles H. Johnson has made
2
7william C. Bower, "Points of Tension Between Modern
Religious Education and Current Theological and Social
Trends," Rel~fious Education, 34:69-76, April-June, 1939;
and "Points o Tens1on Between Progressive Religious Educa tion and Current Theological Trends," Reli5ious Education,
34:164-171, discussion 172-181, July-September, 1939.
2
8.c... G. Homrigha.usen, "The Real Problem of Religious
?ducat ion," Religious Education, 34: 10-17, January-February,
1939.
2
9clarice Bowman, "What Faith, What Nurture?"
Reli5ious Education, 51:379-388, September-October, 1956.
23
an attempt to integrate the insights of experiential educa-
tion with Tillich's method of correlation in the use of the
Bible. He embraces the insights of existentialism regarding
man•s predicament and suggests a method of' "existential
analysis" by which the basic anxieties of mari can be met
through the answers whlch are found as themes running
through the Bible.JO Johnson's dissertation was a project
carried out under the guidance of Lewis J. Sherrill and
constituted a forerunner of his book, The Gift of Power.
-- -------
It is one of the few works in religious education which
directs attention specifically to existentialist concepts
and endeavors to integrate them into the educational
process.
William C. Moore seeks to get back to the basic
assumptions of religious education by examinin. g the doc
trines of man of Knudson, Wieman, and Reinhold Niebuhr in
order to discover their implications for a cor1cept of
Christian education. He ass erts that the experientialist
educators have an educational point of view which dr ws
upon Wieman and Knudson for its assumptions.3
1
JOcharles H. Johnson, "Implications of the Method of
Correlation for the Use of the Bible in Christian Education;'
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, Teachers• College,
Columbia University, New York, 1955).
3
1
illiem C. Moore, "Christian Education in the
Light of Three Theological Views of Man" (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Boston University, Boston, 19$4).
Finally, Donald Reitz examines Augustinian,
Thomistic, and Liberal doctrines of man in order to estab
lish an adequate foundation for Christian education.3
2
He
concludes that the Christian education movement is not
thoroughly groWlded in a doctrine of man, but that it leans
toward the liberal position which apprec i ates the historical
doctrinal position, but at the same time recognizes empiri
cal studies on man.
The review of related studies has indicated that,
while many books and articles have been directed to the
problem of the basic assumptions of religious education in
the light of neo-orthodox theology, very little has been
done to examine the presuppositions of this theological
movement and compare them with those of religious education.
Practically no mention is made of existentialism and its
presuppositions. The attention has been directed primarily
to theological concepts which conflict with educational con
c epts. The nature of man, the nature of God, the problem
of authority, revelation, and how change in persons take
place seem to be the major areas of concern. These concepts
and others are to be examined following the delineation of
3
2
nonald Beeler Reitz, "Implications of the Doctrine
of Man for Christian Education: An Analysis of Three
Christian Doctrines of Man; A Study of Their Implication for
Christian Education; An Analysis and Evaluation of the Use
of These Doctrines in Christian Education Toda!" (unpub
lished doctoral dissertation, New York Univers ty, New
York, 1955.
25
the basic assumptions and characteristics of the experien
tial education and existentialist philosophy.
ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE DISSERTATION
The study is organized in two parts. Part I, con
sisting of chapters two and three, establishes the basic
asswnptions and characteristics of the two movements under
consideration. Chapter two deals with the experiential
approach to Christian education. After a brief historical
survey of the movement, the writings of George Albert Coe
are examined as the foundational works in the field of
experiential religious education in order to formulate the
basic philosophical and theological presuppositions of the
movement. However, each particular characteristic or
assumption is also discussed in the light of supplemental
works by Harrison Sackett Elliott and Lewis Joseph Sherrill
for the purpose of bringing the movement down to the con
temporary scene.
In the third chapter a similar procedure is followed.
It begins with a brief historical resume of existentialism.
In the absence of any single person who may be considered
representative of the movement, the writings of a number of
existentialist philosophers and theologians are drawn upon
as resources for th structuring of the basic assumptions
and characteristics of existential philosophy. Since this
26
philosophical movement is being examined in terms of its
implications for Christian theology and education, the
chapter concludes with a brief section indicating the nature
of existentialist influences within contemporary theology.
Part II of the study is essentially a comparative
analysis of the implications of the two movements at a
number of common points. The comparison falls into three
general categories: (1) the nature oi- man, (2) the educa
tive process, and (3) the role of the Christian trad i tion.
A chapter is devoted to each of these major subjects. In
each case the comparison is made with regard to a number of
essential aspects.
The study concludes with a final chapter devoted to
a surmnary of the findings in areas of agreement, in areas
of disagreement, and the conclusions which can be drawn
from these findings. The conclusion deals with (1) the
relationship between the two movements, (2) the implica
tions of existentialist thought for religious education,
and (3) the theological implications for educational theory.
PART I
A SURVEY OF THE CHARACTERISTICS AND ASSUMPTIONS
OF EXPERIENTIAL CHRISTIAN EDUCATION
AND EXISTENTIALISM
CHAPTE' :{ II
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND CHARACTERISTICS
OF EXPERIENTIAL CHRISTIAN EDUCATION
The purpose o.f this chapter and of the next is to
prov·de a perspective from which the two movements of
modern Christian education and existential philosophy may
be examined. The procedure followed is to discuss the his
torical roots fro1n which each of the movements has sprung,
followed by an analysis of the significant characteristics
of the movement . In this chapter on Christian education
the point of view represented by George Albert Coe is used
as the basis for stating the characteristics and assump tions. His views, however, are then modified by a further
exrunination of Harrison Sackett Elliott and Lewis Joseph
Sherrill in order to bring the movement down to its con
temporary setting. In the chapter to follow, in which the
philosophical movement of existentialism is examined, a
number of representative figures are drawn upon to indicate
the characteristics of the movements. One further step is
necessary in the examination of existentialism. It is the
incl ·usion o.f a brief survey of existentialist influence
within contemporary theology . While the purpose of this
study is not to compare theological points of view but
rather to examine underlying asswuptions, an examination
of the influence of existentialism within contemporary
theology is of importance in order to obtain proper per
spective.
THE BACKGROUND OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION
29
Christian education is as old as Christianity itself.
The faith communities of first and second century Chris
tianity organized classes of catachumens who were not fully
admitted into the Christian fellowship until they had com
pleted their training .
1
However, for the purposes of this
study it is necessary to limit the historical survey to the
American scene. The early communities of colonial times
were essentially religion-centered societies. The Christian
faith was the central factor determining community behavior,
and the local school served as the instrument of religious
as well as secular education.
2
With the coming of diverse
immigrant peoples representing a multitude of religious
ideologies and institutional loyalties, confusion aroae as
to what religious emphasis should be continued within the
school. Religious groups, desirous of propagating their
own faith, demanded tax fwids to support their parochial
schools. In 1842, after almost twenty years of conflict
1
Lewis J. Sherrill, The Rise of Christian Education
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 191+4), p. 186.
2
stawart G. Cole, "The Dilemma of the Public School
~ducator," Religious Education, 48 :1.58-159, March-April,
1953.
30
over the use of t ax funds to support religious schools, the
Massachusetts State Legislature passed a law which pro
hibited the us e of t ax f unds to support any school in which
any r~ligious sectarian doctrine or tenet should be taught.3
This action was s oon followed by similar actions in the
other states, and after 1858 all states entering the Union,
with the exception of West Virginia, had a provision writ
ten into the i r con stitutions prohibiting state funds to be
used in religious s chools.4
While . r eligious liberty was thus achieved in the
United States, t he coming of religious freedom through the
secularizing of t he public school created a different prob
lem for Protest ant religious education from that whicn had
existed when Christian education was a primary function of
the school. Fac ed with this new concern, the churches
foWld a soluti on in the adoption of the Sunday School. In
Connecticut, as ear ly as 1740, Rev. Joseph Bellamy conducted
classes in religi ous instruction on the Sabbath. However,
1785 is given as the date of the firs t Sunday School organ
ized under the pattern established by Robert Hai es in
Gloucester, Engl and.5
3Harr ison • lliott, Can Religious Education be
Christian? (N ew York : The Macmillan Company, 1940), p. 19.
4
Ibi d., p . 20 .
5
I bid., p . 22.
31
The Sunday School movement grew rapidly. By 1830
denominational boards had been organized, and in 1847 the
first World Sunday School Convention was held.
6
The rise
of the Sunday School movement was not viewed without some
misgivings by many churches and individuals. Not all were
convinced that the brief Sunday program could adequately
carry o·ut the goals of Christian education. Two divergent
approaches were made in mid-nineteenth century. Horace
Bushnell in his famous work, Christian Nurture, argued for
a conception and a practice of Christianity which would
make the family the chief agency for evangelism and reli
gious education.7 However, his plan was not accepted. The
emphasis upon family-centered religious education has just
now, a century later, come to the fore as a possible solu
tion to the problem of adequate religious instruction.
The second alternative to the Sunday School movement
was the development of elementary, secondary, and collegiate
parochial schools. The Presbyterian Church took the lead
in this venture. By 1847, 260 schools had actually been
set up by the General Assembly. But the system soon proved
6
Lew1s J. Sherrill, "A Historical Study of the
Religious Education Movement,n Orientation .!E; Reli~ious
Education, Philip H. Lotz, editor (New York: Aoing on
Cokesbu.ry Press, 1950), p. 21.
7
Ibid., p. 23.
32
to be a failure, and it was abandoned by 1870.
8
Thus the Sunday School came to be the primary instru
ment recognized by most of the denominations for the reli
gious education or their children and youth. The Sunday
School was subject-matter-centered, and the Biblical and
doctrinal approach to religious education was dominant.
The movement was further characterized by an emphasis upon
early adolescence as the age of decision and accountability.
The goal of religious education was the preparation of the
young for this radical conversion experience. The theologi
cal assumptions underlying this attitude were those of
Reformation theology with concern for the depravity of man,
the lost state of the child, and the need for justification
by faith and reconciliation with God through the atoning
work of Christ.9
The implementation of these goals for Christian edu
cation was made easier with the development of the Uniform
Lessons through a committee established at the 1872 conven
tion of the National Sunday School Association. These
lessons sought to provide a general study of the Bible,
alternating between Old and New Testament, with all ages
studying the srune text on any given Sunday. The committee
8
Loe. cit.
9Elliott, .2.E.• cit., p. 25.
33
selected the topic, scripture, and Golden Text for each
Sm1day, while the individual denominations then provided
the specific quarterly content or lesson helps.
10
This
constituted a great advance over the confusion and fragmen
tation of curricul'lllTl within the Sunday School movement
du,ring the previous quarter century. It opened the way for
the greatest progress of the Sunday School movement during
the last decade of the nineteenth century. However, by this
time other forces began to be felt which were to lead to
the redirection of the religious education movement.
The educational theories of Pestalozzi, Froebel, and
Herbert were gaining expression in the curriculum of the
public schools. Leaders in the Sunday School began to take
notice of them. Along with this direct influence of secular
education came new emphases upon historical criticism in the
approach to the Bible, the influence of the scientific move
ment, the doctrine of evolution and its radical impact upon
traditional theology, and the increasing recognition of the
need to re-examine theological concepts in the light of
these developments. At the turn of the century these fac
tors led to a serious conrlict within the Sunday School
movement. Some leaders were quick to sense that Christian
education had to come to terms with this new knowledge in
the fields of education, science, and psychology. Others,
10
Ibid., p. 24.
34
however, insisted upon continued adherence to the tradi
tional approach. It was from within this unsettled situa
tion that the new direction which religious education was
to take began to emerge.
The significant event from which this change can
almost be dated was the formation of the Religious Education
Association in 1903. Over four hundred leaders from the
fields of public education and religion gathered at Chicago,
February 10-12, 1903, to discuss organizational procedures .
At the third convention in Boston two years later the
Association formulated a statement of objectives.
The threefold purpose of the Religious ducation
Association is: to inspire the educational forces of
our country with the religious ideal; to inspire the
religious forc es of our country with the educational
ideal; and to keep before the public mind the ideal of
religious education and the sense of its need and
value.
1
1
With this auspicious beginning the Religious Educa
tion Association was initiated and became the promoter of
progressive religious education. The prominent leaders
within this movement, in accord with the purposes set forth,
were influenced by the educational methods of the philosophy
of experimentalism, fostered the "social gospel" movement,
and utilized the scientific method and the historical
approach to the Scriptures . This movement developed an
educational and religious point of view which was drawn
11
Ibid., p. 2 .
35
from the best scientific and philosophical thinking of the
day. In doing so, it found many of its principles dia
metrically opposed to the traditional Sunday School. The
previous approach to the problems of program and method had
been theological. The concern for education was centered
upon how the message of the Church could be presented most
effectively. In contrast to this, the leaders of the edu
cational movement took a radically different approach to
program and methodology.
Instead of beginning with the beliefs of the churches
and thinking of education as a methodology for the
transmission of Biblical and doctrinal teachings, they
(modern religious educators) have centered their atten
tion upon the children, young people, and adults who
were to be educated. While leaders in religious educa
tion have not been unmindful of the insights regarding
human beings in the Bible and in the doctrines of the
churches, they have believed that program and method
ology should be based upon the best scientific knowl
edge available in regard to the nature of man and the
conditions for his growth.12
Thus the modern Christian education movement became
established upon a belief in scientific method, the inter
active knowing process of pragmatic epistemology, and a
confidence in the possibilities of human beings. The new
educational movement operated upon assumptions which consti
tuted a radical change from the theologically-based assump
tions which controlled religious education previously. This
break constituted the basic point of conflict, as indicated
12
Ibid., pp. 3 f.
36
in the review of relate_ d studies, between contemporary
theology and Christian education. George A. Coe, Harrison
s. Elliott, and Lewis J. Sherrill have been o tstanding
leaders within the Christian education movement who have
articulated the basic characteristics of the approach and
who represent its development during the last half-century .
Coe was one of the founders of the movement. His
creative writing activity ~as carried out during its early
formative period and beyond. Elliott and Sherrill repre
sent further developments of the movement since the time of
Coe•s most active participation within it. Elliott con
tributed greatly at the point of relating new psychological
insights to religious education. Seward Hiltner conunents in
this regard:
Harrison Elliott deserves special mention. More
than any other among the religious educators, he has
kept reminding his colleagues that they must ground
their work more solidly in the growing knowledge of
psychological understanding of religion. He has also
pioneered in the application of the insights of
therapeutic psychology.13
Sherrill also has sought to come to grips with the insights
of dynamic psychology and with the new theological movement.
The basic characteristics and the underlying assump
tions of Christian education now become the focus of
13
seward Hiltner, "The Psychological Understanding
of Religion," Crozer Quarterly, 24:19, January, 1947.
37
attention. The position of Coe is explicated, followed by
its modification in the light of the further work by
Elliott and Sherrill.
CHARACTERISTICS AND ASSUMPTIONS OF
PERIENTIAL CHRISTIAN EDUCATION
It was indicated in the previous section that the
new developments in the fields of education, science, and
psychology at the turn of the century had a profound effect
upon the development of the modern religious education
movement. Before discussing the specific characteristics
of the movement as indicated in the writings of George
Albert Coe, it will be helpful to indicate the trend and
direction of his religious and educational philosophy in
relation to these thought-movements which were converging
upon the American scene at the beginning of the twentieth
century. In the preface of Coe•s, The Religion 2.f ~ Mature
Mind, there is recognition of these current radical changes
in thinking which he accepted as significant in his inter pretation of religious education.
These movements I shall not undertake to defend .
For, however much remains to be done with respect to
their logical grounds, boundaries, and affinities,
their essential justice may be said to be already
established. I refer particularly to the following
group of ideas and tendencies : the demand that the
sciettific method be employed in the study of religious
as well as other facts; the application of the theory
of evolution to the whole of man's nature; belief in
the immanence of God in nature and in man; the employ-
ment of literary and historical methods in the study
38
of the Scriptures; the increasing emphasis upon love as
the supreme quality of the divine character; finally,
the recognition of likeness to Jesus, irrespective of
dogmatic affinities, as the adequate and only test of
Christian discipleship. If these conceptions be true,
we must prepare ourselves not only for revising much
of our theology, but also for reconstructing almost the
whole of Christian living.14
Coe recognized that these concepts already were mak
ing an impact upon Christianity and that the Church would
have to come to terms with them if it was to continue to
serve adequately in the age of empiricism. Therefore he
sought to deal with them in terms of their implications for
Christian education. The assumptions of the experiential
Christian education movement as it has developed histori cally in this century are rooted in the acceptance of the
scientific method. The movement cannot be understood apart
from this connection. In examining the characteristics of
Christian education, seven major areas need to be con
sidered: (1) the dependence upon scientific method and the
epistemology of pragmatism; (2) the concept of the immanence
of God both in nature and in man; (3) the "personality
principleu with its concern for the infinite worth of per
sons and its optimistic view of human capabilities; (4) the
emergence of personality or of the "self" within the inter
active social process; (5} the concept of learning through
1
4oeorge A. Coe, The Religion of a Mature Mind
{Chicago: Fleming H. Revel! Company, 1'90~), p. 8.
39
experience; (6) the ethical-social emphasis with its concern
for the reconstruction of society; and (7) the concept of a
functional approach to the Christian tradition.
(1) The scientific method. The experiential ap
proach to Christian education acknowledges a debt to the
scientific method. The nature of this dependence is indi
cated in the following discussion under a number of sub
headings .
(a) Science_!!!!! approach to religion. Christian
education is committed to the procedures of empirical
thought, and it seeks to come to an understanding of the
nature and function of religion through objective scien
tific research. Coe uses the scientific method throughout
his professional career. In his first book, The SEiritual
Life,he approaches religious experience and phenomena as
objectively as psychologists and sociologists approach
their materials. He considers religion as something which
could be known empirically. In many of his works a direct
statement is made regarding "the scientific spirit in mat
ters of' religion." In characterizing modern science, Coe
says that it is its "spirit of self abnegation and devotion
to ideal good," rather than its "wondrous insight into the
constitution of the universe," that gives it its gr eatest
value. In What is Christian ducation, he develops the
-
thesis that the scientific method must become a tool of
40
Christian education because, by its very nature, it is
personality-fulfilling, hence religious.
At the beginning of this chapter we noted tnat re
ligion is an exercise of intelligence. From this it
follows that the method of intelligence properly is a
method of religion. The principles of scientific method
we perceived to be inherent in intelligence as such,
therefore necessary in the expression of personality,
and consequently a particularly vital part of a religion.
that emphasizes the worth o persons. In the present
s ction we have called upon ourselves, so to say , to
utilize in our religious life and work the scientific
attitude and procedure, which rightfully belon to us.
We find, in fact, that our purposes must largely fail
to reach their oal unless they have scientific guidance
thereto; that we cannot even mak our will good unless
we have scientific help in defining our alternatives;
that historic continuity and growth of our religion
from within itself depend upon the scientific approach
to our past in its documents; that we cannot expand
into a universal religion except upon the basis of a
fellowship of intelligence, which must be scientific;
an that the necessary interest of our religion in
nature can fulfill itself religiously only through
scientific attitudes.
Christianity's concern for the spiritual, which can
mean nothing more or less than the personal, has seemed
to many to be a reason for shyness toward the scientific
method; but instead of being a reason for shyness it is
a compelling reason for making the scientific attitudes
a part of the Christian consciousness itself.15
Coe defines the sc_entific method in terms of six
propositions. First, it is intellectual co-operation.
Secondly, it is genuine democratic participation free from
special privileges, classes, or hierarchical prerogatives.
Further, it has a spirit which is an eagerness to learn.
It is characterized by the use of hypothesis, experiment,
1
5George A. Coe, What is Christian Education? (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons-;-1929), pp. 150 f.
41
and mathematical analysis for the purpose of extending and
refining direct observation. The scientific method is
reliant upon the observable phenomena, though it makes use
of every type of logical procedure. And, finally, the
scientific method, in so far as it is true to its own prin
ciples, proceeds from no obligatory proposition or
orthodoxy.
16
This scientific method as described by Coe not only
is accepted as the legitimate source of knowledge in the
fields of the natural and social sciences, but it is also
a method which must become an instrwnent by which Christian
education shall proceed. For Coe the scientific method
provjdes Christian education with data which are applicable
in the field of religious education. The insights of
psychology, sociology, biology, and anthropology are
relevant in coming to an adequate understanding of man and
his world. However, he goes further, asserting that this
method of experimentation is itself a means of apprehending
religious truth.
Experimentation directed toward increased self
realization or enfranchisement of persons, then is the
method of apprehending the divine presence.17
And still more recently he states:
16
Ibid., pp. 137 f£.
l?Ibid., p. 285.
Religion, in order to understand itself and its
functions, must ·unceasingly employ empirical methods
42
of inquiry with respect even to itselr •••• Every
purpose, every conviction, every attitude that deserves
to be called religious should include inquiry as one of
its ingredients. One reason why inquiry ls everlast
ingly necessary is that~ in experience, values and
facts are inseparable.lo
This emphasis upon the scientific approach as in
herently a religious approach is not shared with Coe by all
religious educators. Stewart G. Cole, one of the outstand
ing leaders in the Christian education movement for three
decades, states that while religious education has rightly
sought the lead of science to find out the nature of hwnan
personality and has acquired, as a result, a rich fund of
materials describing the pre-conditions of personality, the
laws of self-functioning, the way human values emerge in
the interdependence of man and hls world, and means for
imple. menting man
1
s search for the good life, nevertheless
the method of science itself is inadequate to furnish moti
vation and atmosphere for religion.
1
9 Similarly, F. Ernest
Johnson warns that while religious education should and
does accept an empirical philosophy and a scientific psy
chology, it tends to fall into a mechanistic account of
18oeorge A. Coe, "The Religious Education Movement-
A Retrospect," Religious Education, 39:222, July-August,
1944.
1
9stewart G. Cole, "Where Religious Education and
Theology Meet," Religious Education, 35:24, January-March,
1940.
43
experience which is out of harmony with the ideas of growth
and creative free activity. 20 Cole and Johnson do agree
with Coe, however, that value emerges in and through
experience and that this value may have religious signifi-
cance.
Harrison Elliott shares Coe•s point of view that
scientific knowledge is of vital significance in the under
standing of religion and in the functioning of the religious
education process.
The religious educator is convinced of the pertinence
of hwnan knowledge to the educational process by which
the Christian faith is interpreted by any individual
or any generation ••• • Natu al knowledge is of help
in understanding the experiences of the Bibl e and in
revising the interpretations wh re they have been
inf luenced by inadequate or false conceptions of man,
of nature or of God's relation to human life. It is
important for the enrichment of Christian faith through
the manifestat ions of God which have become known
through the larger knowledge of man, of nature, and of
the universe.21
Thus Elliott agrees with Coe that the religious
education movement draws its presupposition from two
sources: the Christian heritage and the insights of science,
education, and psychology.22
Lewis Sherrill, in recent years, has moved from this
2
°F. Ernest Johnson, "Religious Education and the
Theological Trend," Religious Education, 33:86, January
February, 1938.
21
Elliott, _22. cit., p. 135.
2
2
rbid., chaps. III and IV, pp. 34-89.
44
basic point of view o what has been characteristic of the
Christian education movement to a modified position. He
is willing, though, to accept the insights and knowledge
which may be developed through the use of the scientific
method in disciplines other than religious education. For
example, his most recent books, The Struggle .2f the Soul
and The Gift of Power, draw eavily upon the findings of
-- ---- ---
the field of psychology for the basic data for interpreting
man and hls situation. However, he rejects the point of
view that the Christian education moveme: nt starts from the
asswnptions of empirical philosophy borrowed from the
field of general education. Instead, he takes as his basic
assumptions those which inhere within the Christian faith.
The new philosophy of Christian education must come
to the subject of education from within the Jewish
Christian tradition, not from outside it . More
specifically, it must draw its inspiration from the
peculiar genius of the Christian community and of the
Christian faith rather than from any form of secular
society or secular education. This does not mean that
we have nothing to learn from such sources. On the
contrary, very much is to be learned, and we shall
repeatedly acknowledge the debt. But in the end the
W1ique nature of Christian education derives from the
unique nature of the Christian community and Christian
faith.23
{b) Continuitz and comprehensibility. Recognizing
the departure of Sherrill from the main stream of Christian
education at this point, it remains necessary to examine
2
3Lewis J . Sherrill, The Gift of Power (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1955), p. xi . -
45
the philosophical assumptions which underlie the movement
as it has developed prior to the recent tangents of differ
ing degrees represented by Sherrill, Randolph c. Miller and
A. Victor Murray. Foremost among the basic premises upon
which science and the empirical method rest is the proposi
tion that that which confronts man is characterized by
continuity. Reality as it is perceived by man presents
dependable uniformities of existence reducible to mathe
matical probability. Upon these uniformities are erected
all the sciences, and it is out of the extension of this
generalization through imagination and hypothesis that
modern mind has arrived at the conception of a universe.
This proposition of continuity cannot stand alone,
however. It is acceptable only in relation to a second
assumption, namely , comprehensibility. It is asswned that
the natural continuity is comprehensible. Furthermore,
this assumpt or hi ge s upon the acceptance of a third, that
man possesse the adequacy to comprehend. In the words of
Coe,
Science by its presuppositions dignifies man, assumes
that .tiumanity may be trusted to learn, through its own
experiments, its own successes and its errors, to use
as it will the enormous power over nature that research
makes possible .24
This is the assumption of the adequacy of man to discover
2
4Georg e A. Coe, "The ssault Upon Liberalism,"
Religious Education, 34: 86-87, April-June, 1939.
46
truth. Thus science assumes the continuity of nature, its
comprehensibility, and man's capacity to comprehend.
(c) Process and £redictability. Two further asstUUp
tions widergird the experiential approach to Christian
education drawn from empiricism. First, there is the con
cept of process. Fundamental to the scientific movement is
this concept in which reality is conceived to be character
ized by continuity which is inseparably united with change.
Reality does not refer to a single mechan stic evolution,
but rather it is understood to be an organization of innu
merable processes interacting with each other in a dynamic
situation which constitutes a complex but consistent whole .
The second ass'lllllption is closely related to the concept of
process. These processes which describe the functioning
of that which is real are sufficiently continuous to enable
man to predict and to control them at least to some degree.
However, it is generally recognized that man is limited in
his ability to predict and to control them by two factors:
(1) his own limitations of knowledge and capacity, and (2)
the apparent continuous emergence of new elements within the
processes.
2
5 Within these limitations man is considered to
be able to determine his own destiny at least in part by
2
.5i~1lliam C. Bower, "Points of Tension Between Pro
gressive Religiou Education and Current Theological Trends,"
Religious ducation, 34:166, July-September, 1939.
47
prediction and control of his environment .
(d) Concepts 2.£. truth and knowledge. Another frmda
mental issue which occurs in the discussion of religious
education and the scientific method involves the nature of
knowledge and truth. The Christian education movement has
developed by and large in accord with the concepts of
secular education of a pragmatic epistemology and of an
experiential locus of authority. In harmony with the as
swnption of process, the key to the underlying epistemology
lies in interaction . Knowing the real is not mere passive
reception of the imprint of reality upon the mind. The
senses are not gateways to the mind through wnich knowledge
of the external world passes. Instead, sensations and
perceptions are patterns of activity by which the individual
interacts with the total environment.
26
It should be noted
that at this point the pra~ gmatists within secular education,
by whom the religious educators have been influenced, have
departed from a strict scientific empiricism which would
af.firm that the senses are avenues by which the mind re
ceives the imprint of the outside world and that the compi
lation of facts constitutes knowledge. The concept of
sense perception as interaction lends itself to the new
26
J. Donald Butler, Four PhilosoFhies an~ rhelr
Practice in Education and Religion (New York: Harper and
Brotliers,-"I95l), p. ~6.
48
insights of dynamic psychology which are discussed in a sub-
sequent section.27 Knowledge as such is both experiential
and experimental in Christian education. It is the former
in the sense that, instead of being an accumulation of
facts, it is knowledge for the person only in so far as it
is related to and becomes a part of the individual's own
experience. It is experimental in the sense that it is the
basis for the formulation of' "working hypotheses" by which
the knowledge itself is tested in experience and further
activity is carried out.
(e) The locus~ authority. The nature oft uth or
the locus of authority is a major issue within the current
theological-educational controversy. In light of the above
discussion of epistemology, insights about any particular
aspect of reality in religious education, including in
sights of religious revelation, may be true readings of the
nature of reality, but they do not have validity as truth
for the individual until they take on meaning in terms of
his own experience . Therefore, the locus of authority for
experiential religi ous education resides in experience
where insights can be self- validating. Authority is an
active acknowledgment of an authentic key which brings to
one the reality and character of the whole, which otherwise
2
7rnfra, PP- 82 ff.
one would know just enough about to know that he didn•t
know it. The key is the sense of relatedness to what is
most important; thus authority is based upon ev dances of
49
adjustedness, of being geared in with the whole. The
authority of any aspect of knowledge lies in the experience
of integration of the individual as he applies the insight
to his own situation. Trutn is thus that which experience
'Verifies, and the ultimate criterion of truth is shared
experience, c -operatively tested and interpretea.28
Before proceeding to the second characteristic of
the Christian educat1011 movement, it is necessary to indi
cate the positions of Coe, Elliott, and Sherrill regarding
knowledge and authority. George Albert Coe expresses basic
agreement witt1 these assumptions in his insistence upon tn.e
inseparability of knowledge and belief from the enterprise
of living.29 Coe deals with these problems in his early
work,! Social !heor1 .2.f Religious Education, within tne
context of the "social gospel" of the liberalism of that
day. His methodology a.f'firms that the locus of authority
is within experience; however, he assumes also the a
priori validity or the social movement of liberal
28
nonald H. Rhoades, "Philosophical Bases of Reli
gion" (unpublished lectures, School of Religion, University
of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1950).
2
9aeorge A. Coe, A Social Theory of Religious Educa tion (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,L 9!7), pp. 68 ff.
50
Protestantism. Therefore he acknowledges, first an external
authority, the social gospel, and secondly, that this
authority in reality only becomes authoritative for the
individual as it becomes a significant basis for action
within his own experience. This knowledge asswnes its
authority as knowledge only through the pupilts interaction
with his environment , particularly the social environment.3°
He thoroughly rejects the use of external authority to im
pose beliefs of knowledge upon individuals.3
1
In a lat r book Coe explicitly states his concept of
knowledge and of authority .
The growth of personality is checked whenever, in stead of the sorting of experiences in
1
my own' way, I
rubber- stamp my name upon that which I have not made
my own. The learner must not passively conform;
instead, he must be a co-determiner of any authority
that he r ecogni zes . This principle, confessedly, makes
difficulties for Christian educators, and not least for
those who are intensely benevolent-minded.
1
Good-will
surely should have its way,' we reason. Yes, but good
will may conceal a subtle conceit of wisdom, or a subtle
desire to have one's own way, or the kind of unfaith
that insists that there must be short cuts in the
spiritual l ife . Every attempt, moreover, to secure
conformity by sugar-coating a truth, or camouflaging a
difficulty, or inducing fear, offends against the first
and basic law of personal growth.
What, t hen , is the positive function of authority
in the development of the free person? Not at all to
determine, in advance, apart from his own self-activity ,
what he shall t hink or what he shall value, but to
stimulate him to take notice of facts, distinctions,
30ibid., pp. 50 ff .
Jlibid., pp . 42 ff.
51
and issues that he might overlook, and to make clear-
not to make persuasive--the reasonings and valuations
of his neighbors and his predecessors. 32
That Harrison Elliott shares Coe
1
s point of view is
suggested by the previous reference to Elliott•s contention
that modern Christian education is allied with general edu
cation.33 Elliott contends that knowledge is not something
which is separate from experience . On the contrary, he
states that it "arises within ex erience," and that it has
"its origin in the activities of individuals and groups,
an its motivation in the .furthering of their activities.
0
34
He departs from a concept of empirical knowledge as the
accillllulation of facts to the pragmatist position cited
above, namely, "that the primary function of information is
to enable individuals and groups to understand their experi
ence and to control it.
0
35 For Elliott, factual data are
clearly instrumental, becoming knowledge only as the in
dividual relates them to his own experience and makes use
of them in .further activity.
In regard to authority, Elliott also concurs with the
3
2
Geor e A. Coe, What is Christian Education? (New
York: Charles Scribner ' s Sons-;-1929), p. 17.
33 lliott, .2.E· cit., pp. 3 f .
34rbid . , p. 58 .
35Loc. cit.
52
position delineated above. Discussing the definition of
authority in relation to Christian education and the Chris tian tradition , Elliott insists that there must not be a
separation between knowing and doing, between Christian
doctrine nd Christian experience . 36 He rejects the four
tr ditional appeals to eJ~ternal authority wit in the Chris tian tradition: authoritative cripture, authoritat·v·
inter retation in creedal formulations, authoritative
b shops, and authoritative legislation by cou.ncils . 3
7
After
establishing a case denying the existence of any one
authoritativ Christian view, he points out hat authority
itself lies ultimatel y within the experience of the indi
vidual and becomes valid for the individual only hen it
t kes on meaning for him w·thin his own particular situa tion . Therefore the Christian tradition itself undergoes
transformation in the educat anal experience. He declares
that :
Central within the education approach is the original
car inal principle of the eformation that if the
possibilities of Christian education are to be realized,
there must be opportunity not only for each generation
but also for all groups and individuals to come tQ
their own interpretation of the Christian faith.3~
3
6
rbid.,
p.
53 .
37
Ibid., p.
83.
38Ibid.,
p . 88.
53
Lew s Sherrill has sought to reinterpret Christian
e ucation n a manner which would make it consistent w·th
th.e theolo ical empha is upon the ambivalent r1 tu.re of man,
including demonic tendencies. In doing so, he has expressly
rejected any starting point other than fro1n within the
Jewish-Christian trad·tion.39 In the development of his
educational point of view, however, he comes very close to
maintaining a position parallel to that of Coe regarding
epistemology and authority. As Coe postulated the soci 1
gospel as the external authority, or a priori assmnption,
and illiott the framework of the changing Christian tradi
tion, so Sherrill insists upon the "fact of revelation" and
the reports of revelation as contained within the Scriptures
as a priori starting poi ts. In a manner similar to that
of Elliott, herill develops the thes s that the reports of
revelation, as attempts to commun·cate experiences, are
always subject to critical examination in an effort to
determine their auth nticity and relevance for the contem
porary scene. Xhis critical procedure is based upon a
doctrine of revelation which is not a report of revelation,
but consists of propositions about revelation, a body of
changing generalizations. W her e new knowledge throws new
light upon the nature of original revelatory experiences,
39sherrill, The Gift of Power, p. xi .
----
54
the generalizations and the interpretations change. O Thus
implied in this discussion of revelation is a recognition
of authority residing, not in a given revelation, but in
its relevance in terms of experience. This is further sub
stantiated in the emphasis which Sherrill places upon self
etermination and self-affirmation. He rejects, as others
have within the Christian education movement, education
which leads to information as such. The goal of education
leads "to actual experience of the Person and the events
with wh.ich the information deals.
11
4
1
Thus Sherrill
1
s con
cern for revelation and confrontation finds its solution
within individual experience. The individual does not know
apart from i nteractive e perience with man and with God.
It has been shown that these three men are in essen
tial agreement about epistemology and authority. It is now
proper to proceed to an examination of the next major charac
teristic of experiential religious education.
(2) The concept of immanence. In metaphysics the
Christian education movement has departed from the pragma
tism of general education as exemplified in John Dewe-y4
2
40ibid., pp. 66 ff.
libid., p. 91.
4
2
see John Dewey, The Quest for Certaintf {New York:
Minton , Balch & Company, 1929}; and A Common Fa tl1 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1934).-
55
and John L. Childs.43 Experiential Christian education has
p ralleled liberal theology rather than secular education
in establishing a concept of the nature of reality and o
God. evin Harner has succinctly stated the three ap
proaches to the relationship of God to the educational
process: {l) God is the educational process, (2) God is in
- -
the educational process, and (3) God is above the educa
tional process.44 The alternatives could be expressed in
th ological terms as (1) God purely immanent, existing only
in experience, (2) God both immanent and transcendent,
eJpressing hlmself within experience but transcending
experience as well, and (3) God "wholly other," transcending
experience. The Christian education movement has been
attacked on the grounds that it adheres to the first of
these three alternatives thus rendering only a partial
reading of Divine Reality.45 While this complaint is not
without some justification, the posit on which has charac
terized most expressions of the position of modern religious
education is that of the middle ground. God is both
43see John L. Childs, Education and the Philoso!hy
of ExEerimentalism (New York: The Century Company, 193 ),
c'Iiap. III.
44Nevin C. Harner, "Three ays to Think of God,"
eligio1;!,~ Education, 34:216-221, October-December, 1939.
45
upra, pp. 12 ff.
immanent and transcendent, b·ut knowledge of him, whethe
interpreted as divine self-disclosure or as discovery by
human efforts, is obtained through human experience.
56
The relationship of a concept of immanence to educa
tion is threefold: (1) the concept of God operating within
natural processes such as evolutionary theories, (2) the
concept of growth of individual personality, and {3) the
Divine Presence functioning through social interaction.
George Albert Coe, in his earliest work in religious educa
tion, clearly indicates his position in regard to Divine
Immanence and evolution.
What then? Shall we thin~ that, because education
is natural, God is not a factor in it? Rather, let us
say that, just because evolution has provided a basis
upon hich our spiritual building can be erected, just
because the movement of life has been upward toward the
capacity and the impulse of love toward God, therefore
we discover God in evolution and conclude that the
ultimate source of education as respects nature, the
child, and the educator--all three--is He in whom
1
we
live, and move, and have our being.• This way of re
garding nature is completed in the universally received
doctrine of the immanence, or abiding presence, of God.
This means, among other things, that material atoms
are forms of divine activity; that the laws of nature
are simply the orderly methods of his rational will,
which is in complete control of itself; that evolution
does not suffer any break when man, a self-conscious
and moral being, appears, because the whole of evolu
tion is, in reality, a process of realizing a moral
purpose, ••• and that, in our work as educ tors, God
is working through our reason and will to carry forward
the universal plan.46
4
6
George A. Coe, Education in Reli~ion and Morals
(Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company," !909, pp~2 ff.
57
Coe finds within the theory of evolution evidences
of God's activity within the world functioning through
natural processes. This conce t Coe carries over into his
analysis of the human situat on and how persons g ow.
I to the constellation of every one of us God has
wrought his plan for human life. In every genuine
human utterance of the religious impulse there is mani
fested
1
prevenient race,' the divine empowering and
insp ration that •come before' our human acts and give
them effect. Thus, at every step in religious educa
tion God himself--the present, living God, the Word
that enlighteneth every man coming into the world--1s
the supreme factor.47
He accepts the point of view of Horace Bushnell re
gardi g the nature of the child to be such that he may
"gro up a Christian, and never know himself as being
otherwise." Coe interprets this to mean that the Holy
Spirit (Divine Immanence) is continually present in the
heart of man from the beginning of conscience, giving rise
to what may be called a "religious impulse." This positive
religious nature implies that the child has a positive
spiritual nature that goes forth in search of God, that
nothi g short of union with God can bring a human being to
himself, and that the successive phases of growth of the
child's personality may be, and normally are, so many phases
of a growing consciousness of the divine meaning of life.48
In his last major work in religious education Coe restates
7Ibid., pp. 38 ff.
4 Ibid., pp. 62 ff.
58
this conviction.
11 that is affirmed concernin God is that he i s
immanent in all choices of ours that make us personal
and still more pers onal ; and this immanence, having the
form of a choice within our choices, is that of a per sonal being; and that th·s being, n that he realizes
himself by promoting our self- realization in a society
of persons, is ethical in the profoundest sense.49
Thus God is active within the human heart, promoting
the growth that leads to personality fulfillment, and which
may be defined as continuous ethicalcreation.5°
The third implication of the concept of immanence is
in the nature of social nteraction. The definitive charac
ter of Coe
1
s major ork, & Social Theory of Religious Edu cation, lies in the basic concern of the writer for the
manifestation of God within the contex of social relation ships. It may be said that at this point he anticipated
the insights of a culturally oriented dynamic psychology by
forty years. For Coe the central fact of the educative
process is "a growing Christian experience in and through
the pupil
1
s social interactions." This concept is rooted
in the conviction that "where love is, God is," and that in
and through the social process where persons participate in
experiences of loving relationship God is clearly man fest.
The theory of curriculum is to be based squarely
upon the idea of incarnation- -that God makes himself
49coe, What is Christian Education?, p. 94.
--------
50Loc. cit.
59
known to us in concrete human life; that e obey him
and commune with him in any and every brotherly atti
tude that we take toward any of his children, and that
this experience of God does not occyr only once or
twice in history, but continuously.~
1
Harrison Elliott concurs with this viewpoint of Coe.
He makes an interesting comparison of Coe with Tillich in
this regard.
Tillich ••• and Coe ••• both say that God be
comes apprehended and experienced only in the concrete
situations of life where he is realized in the crucial
act of decision. Both would seem to agree that this
is defeated when attention is turned directly to a God
so beyond and unrelated to the human scene that rela
tionship to him is irrelevant to mundane affairs or
where through authoritative creed or church he is used
as the rationalization of some present beliefs that
decision is unnecessary. A socialized form of religious
education would seem to be of fundamental importance if
God is to be dynamically and creatively experienced in
human life.52
The concept of immanence as found within the Chris
tian education movement is shared by Elliott. He takes
issue with the nee-orthodox critics of religious education
who charge that educators project their own ideas upon God,
rather than allowing God to move to man. Elliott points
out that, regardless of how God is conceived, he is known
only through his manifestations in this world and in human
history. "It is through numan experience that ideas of God
ari~e, ••• The human and the divine are integrally
5
1
coe, ! Social Theory of Religious Education, p. 113.
5
2
'lliott, .2£• _£it., p. 275.
60
inter related in any revelation of God.n53 He ugges s
that, while the progressive religious educator would give a
central place to Jesus in Wldersta.nding God, nevertheless,
he would lso give an important place to the continuous
manifestations of God in nature and in human life.
Scientific knowledge, instead of being irrelevant,
furnishes him (the educator) data of importance in
coming to a knowledge of God. He believes that the
revelations of God did not cease with the first century
of the Christian er~ nor are they confined to the
Christian religion.~4
Elliott continues, pointing out the religious impli
cations of this position. The recognition of God manifest
ing himself in the diverse aspects of nature and of history
makes all aspects of l fe sacred. All scientific advance
is dependent upon "given powers and potentialities of the
universe as it impinges upon life."55 These "given powers"
are, for Elliott, manifestations of God within the world.
He carefully delineates the position that the two distinct
approaches, God as transcendent who becomes immanent, and
God as the distinctive and pervading characteristic of the
universe, both allow for the position that the given
potentialities which the world presents to man are
53rbid., p. 132.
54
55
Loc. cit.
61
man f estations of God. For example, wheth r or not life is
besto wed by a transcendent God or is one of t he pervading
characteristics of the universe is not the question; it is
the fact that it is a manifestation of Goa.56
-
Elliott contributes to the understanding of the con
cept of immanence as it is related to individual growth.
He asserts that modern religious education is based upon
the conviction of nurture or growth. The fruiction of re
ligious education is to discover and to meet those condi
tions under which growth in Christian lif e and experience
is possible. "Christian education is a reverent attempt to
discover the divinely ordained process by which individuals
grow into Christlikeness, and to work that process."57
From this standpoint it becomes evident that the life situ
ations of persons are the center of the educational process.
This process is carrie d out in terms of the innate capacity
which persons possess for choice and the growth which takes
place through making choices.
Elliott shares Coe•s concern for the role of social
interaction as the context within which God may manifest
himself . He confirms Coe
1
s basic position with extensive
quotations from his writings .5
8
In the concluding
5
6
Ibid., p. 293 .
57Ibid., p. 313, quoting Harner, The Educational Work
of the Churcn, p. 20.
- -- ----
58rbid., pp. 53 ff, 268 ff.
62
paragraphs of Ellio t
1
s volume he states that the choices
and responsibilities of individuals
••• are intimately bound up with the social groups
of which they are a part. Therefore, the goal is truly
social, for tis that approximation which is possible
to human beings in their social arrangements of the
Kingdom of God in whigh love is manifested in all
social relationships.~9
Lewis J. herrill has sought to come to terms with a
theological concept of r evelation as confrontation by a
Personal Being facing man in an I-Thou relationship. hile
this change of perspective may appear to be a return to a
concept of transcendental deity who is above the educational
process, ~uch is not the case of Sherrill. It is true that
he insists upon divine self-disclosure rather than a
thoroughgoing immanental concept of man discovering God in
the given; nevertheless, he clearly indicates that this
divine self-disclosure is not limited to a single event at
a particular time in history. Using the Bible as a starting
point for God•s self-disclosure, Sherrill suggests that God
is manifested in physical nature, in human nature, in events
in history, as well as, above all, in Jesus Christ.60 He
does not speak directly of evolution nor of other processes
of nature as being manifestations of God within the world;
instead he suggests that particular natural phenomena reveal
59rbid., pp. 319 f.
60
sherrill, The Gift of Power, p. 69.
----
63
ttributes of God such as the dependable nature of the uni
verse revealing God
1
s dependability . He is apparently
attempting to avoid the implication that God may be immanent
in the sense of existing as a pervadin characterist i c of
the universe. He does, however, clearly express a concept
of divine immanence in God
1
s disclosure of himself in
creation through continuing creativity. He refers to "the
continuous creative power of God" continuously at work in
the universe .
61
More clearly yet does Sherrill support the concept
of divine immanence in the second aspect implied for Chris
tian education, that of the concept of growth. In The
Stru5gle _2f the Soul he states that there is within man, as
in other forms of life, an inward compulsion to grow, which
he defines as "to pass through certain stages as one moves
toward the complete fulfillment of li e."6
2
He undertakes
to show that, psychologically understood, this compulsion
to grow is instinctual, a manifestation of "the life
instinct . From the standpoint of Biblical thoug the
refers to it as a gift of God, that it is good, very good.
He goes on to suggest that this may be part of the meaning
61
Ibi ., p. 112.
62
sherrill , The tru6gle .2.f !he oul (New York: The
acmill n Company , 1"952), p. 9.
of thee pression, ima
6
of God.
6
3 In The Gift of Power he
--- -- --- -
re·terates this cone t, but ads to it the idea th t God
"is perceive as pres 1.::nt with n rnan as ape sonal bein,
pres _t within man, but not identical with him."64 Sherrill
f urther comments that, "there is that ln the human self and
in hwnan relationships n which God is present, participant,
and visib e."6.5 Thus Sherrill, while hold ng firm to a
transcendental asp ct of God, still insists th t God not
only implants in man the compulsion to grow, but is directly
and personally pres ent withi n man and his social relation
ships.
The third implication of the concept of immanence
in experiential Christian education is that God manifests
hims lf in the interactive social process. Sherrill makes
a significant contribution to the movement at this particu
lar point. It has already be en noted above that he recog nizes the presence of God in social relationships. In a
manner very simi lar to Coe, Sherrill states :
Thus in the love of a father or mother for a child,
in the love between husband and wife, in the love of
brother for brother or friend for friend, in the break
ing of bread, or in some other simple act which
instantly wipes out a gulf of separateness between man
6
3rbid., pp. 9 f .
6
4sherrill, The a·rt of Power, p. 69.
-
'5
b Ibid., p. 71 .
65
and man, God is no merely sug ested; h ~ is disclosed,
participant and visible to perception.6b
Continuin to deal with the social situation in terms
of revelation, Sherrill states:
The normal scene of revelation is the scene where
fellowship exists •••• In theory God may confront man
and be perceived by men under any circumstances. But
it appe rs that commonly he does confront men in circum
s ances where fellowship between man and man and be tween man and God already exist .67
ere Sherrill perhaps goe s beyond previous insights
is in his interpretation of th self in the light of the
concepts of Gestalt and depth psychology. He indicates
that major changes w i thin the total personality are formed
in relationships; thus the interaction between selves within
the fello wship experience wherein there can be achieved a
eeper and deeper sharing of self, God is present and
active . Within this deepening fellowship experience, "God
in hi s Self-giving is constantly calling the self forward
into newness an toward wholeness.n68 The self is con
rro~ted by the living God as a continuing encounter.
6
9
In all fairness to George Albert Coe, it should be
noted that this viewpoint of Sherrill is essentially a
66
Ibid., p. 72.
6
7Ibid., p . 78.
68
rbid., p. 161.
b9Ibi
. , p. 162.
66
restatement of Coe•s social theory of religious education
in terms of dynamic psychology . In 1904, Coe sad,
The ideal of a completely unified self is an implicit
principle of the whole development •••• The unified
self with which ethics has to do is ••• the social
self, or the self realized in society.70
The examination of this assumption of experiential
Christian education has indicated a theological concept of
the manifestation of God in and through human experience.
In this discussion a number of points have been implied in
regard to human nature and human experience. This topic is
the third major characteri stic of the movement, the next
area for discussion.
(3) The "personalit y-princi;ele." The review of
related studies indicated that one of the major points of
tension between contemporary theological circles and
experiential Christian education lies in the basic assump tions regarding the nature of man. George Albert Coe has
summed up the position of the educational movement through
the use of the term, "personality-principle." Coe
1
s con cept of the nature of man is founded upon two convictions :
(1) that Jesus valued the individual personality as an end
in itself, of inf'inite worth; and (2) that man, as an
offspring of biological evolution, has risen by means of
70coe, ~ducation in Religion and Morals, p. 31.
67
creative intelligence to become the h ghest order of crea
tion with the capacity for yet further growth. Coe very
definitely embraces an optimistic view of the nature of man .
In his early writin she indicates that children are not
evil, but already possess the life-principle of the kingdom
and only require spiritual development. He states that,
"normal child development ••• takes place entirely within
the kingdom of grace.
0
71 This statement could imply a frame
of reference asserting the basic goodness of man. However,
Coe modifies this view in the same work when he further
states,
He (the child) is neither good nor bad; he is merely
becoming one or the other . Some of his impulses, if
they grow unchecked and unregulated, will issue in bad
character; others, if they grow symmetrically, will
result in ood character.72
In Coe•s most definitive work in religious education,
A Social Theory of wwweligious ~ducation, he redefines this
-
ambivalence in terms of the then current psychological con
cept of instincts, following the lead of Edward L. Thorndike.
Interpreting instincts as "any readiness to act in a spe cific way in a particular sort of situation without having
learned to do so," Coe classifies instincts as social and
antisocial. Part of the function of education, according
7libid., p. 46.
72
Ibid., p. 58.
68
to Coe, is thus to suppress the antisocial instincts, let ting th~m wither away, while at the same time nurturing and
training the socially constructive instincts .7 3 Instincts
are thus interpreted from purely a social frame of reference.
Similarly, sin is considered as a social conception. It is
that which hinders or destroys social relations . 74 "Sin is
rooted in instinct, confirmed by habit, and propagated by
informal social education."75
The ambivalence of man in regard to good and evil is
thus a basic premise; the instincts which are antisocial
are as pleasurable as the social ones when fulfilled, and
the laws of habit formation are themselves a neutral
process.
This particular point of view places the religious
educator in a situation which might be solved through the
acceptance of an authoritative concept of revelation as a
basis for Christian education. Coe forestalls this occur rence through an additional assumption . There is a "posi
tive religious nature" in the child. This is to say, a
child has more than a passive capacity for spiritual things.
Nothing short of union with God can really bring a hwnan
73coe, ! Social Theorz .2.f Religious Education,
pp. 119-137.
74
Ibid., p. 164.
-
75Ibid., p. 168.
69
being to himself, and this "emerging consciousness of divine
meaning" in life occurs through normal phases of growth.
This does not mean that the child is right as he is, nor
that he can grow up without divine help. Neither does it
suggest that the life-principle within the child can emerge
apart from relationships with other selves who help in this
process.7
6
The nature of man, then, is as a child of nature, of
infinite worth in the eyes of God, and thus also in the
eyes of man. He is ambivalent in nature with the capacity
for good or evil, but with a special disposition toward the
good life with God. He can grow and develop through the
rational use of his powers of reason as he interacts with
the world in which he finds himself.
This concept of human nature as conceived by Coe is
altered somewhat by Harrison Elliott. Elliott rejects the
concept of human nature as consisting of social and anti
social impulses or instincts which are to be organized and
directed by reason. In the light of the insights of more
recent psychologists, such as Gordon Allport and Karen
Horney, Elliott considers man's original nature to be "a
moral in the sense that there is nothing in nature with
which an individual is born which predetermines whether he
76
coe, Education in Religion and Morals, pp. 60 ff.
70
will be a saint or a devil."77 Man has the capacity for
good or evil, but not in terms of instincts.
Elliott shares the viewpoint of John Bennett that it
is as unrealistic to base a concept ot man upon a theory or
unavoidable progress and hwnan perfectibility as it is to
base it upon a pess1m1stic theological theory.78 Elliott
maintains that the empirical evidence supports neither point
of view but suggests that there are resident within man
possibilities tor good or evil which are exhaustless within
a litetima. He specifically states that "this by no means
1nrers the perfectibility of man because he is always within
the finite limitations or human beings.n79
While Elliott recognizes the role which reason plays
in the growth and development ot man, be is critical or the
over-emphasis upon intellectualism in liberal education.
He stresses the psycho-physical Wlity of the organism and
that the degree to which the intellect and the emotions are
inter-related mu.st be taken into account in all human ac
tions. Coe has recognized this to some degree, but his
great emphasis upon the use of rational processes and the
scientific method tends to obscure it in favor of a
77Ell1ott, 2.2• cit., p. 191.
7
8
rb1d., p. 196, quoting John Bennett, "The Causes or
Social Evil," in Christian Faith and the Common Life (Chi
cago: Willett, Clark and Company, 193F, p. 176.
79Ib1d., p. 197.
71
rationalistic effort to solYe the problems ot man
1
s exist-
ence.
The thinking of Lewis Sherrill otters a new inter
pretation ot human nature as well as a departure from the
main trend in educational thought. Standing in the tradi
tion of Harrison Elliott, his distinctive contribution is
the correlation ot the interpretation of human nature in
terms of dynamic psychology with Biblical theology. His
tendency to move out ot the general pattern or Christian
education lies in the basing of his concept of man upon
Biblical theology, rather than upon the point of view ot
science. It can be argued that he actually begins with a
concept ot man taken from current psychology and then reads
back into this rendering the Scriptural account of man.
In the opening pages of Tne Gitt of Power, Sherrill states
---------
that it we consider man as a total unity of body and self,
one can move back and forth readily between Biblical ac
counts of nwnan nature and current findings or medicine,
psychiatry, and psychology.BO This concept of the total
person being involved in all aspects of life is not new to
religious education. Coe writes of this at the turn of the
century in a discussion of the educational process.
The child himself is a unit •••• The wnole child
is at work in each of his studies, not memory in one,
reasoning in another, perception in a third; and it
80
sherrill, The Gift of Power, p. 3.
-- --- - ---
72
the teacher cannot get the whole child thus engaged the
effort of teaching fails •••• The idea of education,
accordingly, is not that the child acquires first one
thing, then another, but that he is first one thing,
and then he develops into something different . ~l
It was indicated above that Elliott also shares this
point of view. Sherrill adds to this unitary conception of
man two concepts taken from modern psychology and theology.
The first is the concept of the self. The human self is a
self-determining, self-conscious, self- transcending vitality
which strives to achi eve selrhood through drives toward
togetherness an separateness. The human selr is both a
being , or existing self, and a becoming, or a potential
selr .
82
The human self needs to be seen both for what it is
at a given point in time, which is the existing self,
and for what it may become in time, which is the poten
tial self. Without the former we soon lapse i nto
romantic, unrealistic pictures of secular or religious
Utopias dwelt in by supermen and supersain.ts, such as
were never seen and never will be. But without keeping
in view what man may become we readily sink into cyni cism and despair. Of these two extremes, the first was
the temptation of the latter part of the nineteenth
century and the early part of the twentieth century .
The temptation to the second is peculiarly pressing in
t he middle of the twentieth century . 83
At the core of the hwnan self, deeply involved in
intrapsychic dynamics, is the image of the self which the
81
coe, Education 2:_!! Reli.giop. and Ivlorals, p . JO.
8
2
sherrill, The Gift of Pow er, pp. 1-24 .
-- ---- ---
83
Ibid., p. 19.
73
individual olds. If this image is true, and the person is
self-acceptant, he is able to move out towards significant
and meaningful relationships with other selves and with the
Self which is God. On the other hand, if this image is
false or distorted, the individual finds it necessary to
defend himself and thus to cut himself off from these rela
tionships.84
The second point of view which Snerrill introduces
i nto this discussion of the nature of man is taken from
psychology, but more particularly, from existentialist
philosophy and theology. It is the concept that there is
within the existing self a normal basic anxiety which is
different from either neurotic anxiety or anxieties which
arise from particular situations of crisis. Sherrill
follows the lead of Paul Tillich in listing these "existen
tial anxieties" as the anxiety of fate and death, the
anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness, and the anxiety
of guilt and condemnation.85
Sherrill develops the thesis that under the condi
tions of human existence every point in the foundations of
selfhood is un er threat. This is the predicament of normal
anxiety.
84
Ibid., pp. 25-43 .
B5Ibid., p . 20.
74
Here is perhaps the greatest mystery of all being
and becoming: not merely that being is and becoming is
possible, although this mystery itselfis utterly beyond
o comprehension; but the still greater mystery that
the same universe which offers these possibilities
seems also at the same time to oppose them. And we do
not even know how to state truly and fully the nature
of this mystery. But under the conditions of human
existence we experience this mystery as anxiety ••••
And any solution which we can find for the predica
ment of normal anxiety leads sooner or later to a new
predicament. Thus if we seek to live entirely without
anxiety we incur the risk of forfeiting the very marks
of our humanity i self, since it is just these which
make us capable of anxiety. And yet we cannot live in
an unrelieved state of even normal anxiety without
risking the deterioration or the extinction of self
transcendence, self-consciousness, self-determination,
and eventually vitality itself.86
The experiential approach to Christian education has
been given these two new concepts which have yet to be inte
grated into its total philosophy of education. The essen
tial nature of man, as reflected in the works of Coe,
Elliott, and Sherrill, is of a creature, the product of
biological evolution, created in the image of God, ambiva
lent in his nature with potentialities for good and for
evil, and possessing capabilities for growth intellectually
and spiritually as well as physically. Though a rational
creature, he is a unity, acting not only on the basis of
rational thought but upon the intrapsychic dynamics which
may defy rational analysis. And the educational process
focuses upon him as being of infinite worth, never to be
considered anything but an end in himself.
86 4-
Ibid., pp. 1 rr.
75
Only by implication has anything been said as yet
about the development of the self or of the relationship of
the individual self to other selves . This is the topic for
the fourth characteristic of Christian education .
(4) Man develop~ 21! relationship . The title of
Coe
1
s major work in religious education suggests the social
nature of man and the importance of society in the forma-
tion of personality. The basic concept of the book, A
-
Social Theorz .2£ 11eligious ducation, is that religious
education should be organized around social experience be
cause growth in the Christian life comes in and through the
social interactions of the pupil.
ow these two, the formation of a definite self and
the formation of societies, are not in reality separate
processes, nor are the results e.eparate; rather, we
have two phases of a single process, two phases of a
single achievement. For the achievement of self is
possible only in and through recognition of other
selves . And what is distinctly human in society is
precisely the organization of regard for individual
selves as final i ties . 87
In the writings of Coe there is no suggestion of the
deeper changes of self which current psychology believes
are taking place within the interactive processes between
persons. Ho ever, he did recognize that the profoundest
meanings and the genuine ful illment of the ends of the
Christian religion were achieved in and through the social
8
7coe, !}; Social Theory .2£ Relisious ducation, p. 135.
76
process. He emphasized the importance of the teacher-pupil
relationship in the learning process, noting that it was
inevitable that what was significant in the experience was
the sharin of self with self. He defined Christian educa
tion as the "systematic, critical examination and recon
struction of relations between persons, guided by Jesus•
assumption tl1at persons are of infini t worth." 88
This concept of the development of personality
within the interactive social process focuses the attention
of Cnrist an education up on the h ere and now. There is
cone rn for creat i n conditions within the immediate situa
tion in w ich persons may experience Chri stian love mani
feste in a relationship which is conducive for the rowth
of the self. There is inherent in the approach the
assumption, continually being reaff i rmed empir ·cally by
syc ologist and psychiatrists, that self-real·zation, the
achievement of potential selfhood, comes out of those ex pe ience s of relationship with other pers ns which are
characterized by genuine, outgo ng love and mutuality.
The concept that selfhood emerges in and through
elationships is af'fi~ned by Elliott as well as by Coe.
The individual's personality is of social origin.
. • • thoroughgoing recogn·tion of the social ori in
of the self is necessary in any realistic appraisal of
the human problem, and a social approach is essential,
88coe, , hat is Christian Educat ·on?, p. 296 .
---
77
if eduction is to be of positive help.89
That the matrix in which personality dev elop s is the
interactive process going on between selves is incre a s ingly
being recognized by workers in the fields of sociolo y an
psychology. Sherr 11 draws upon the findings of t hese
social scientists in the formulation of his interpre t ation
of this process. In dealing with tha circumstance s under
which changes occur in the self, Sherrill indicat es that
the significant changes are those which involve the de per
aspects of self roote in the unconscious. These can es
occur in the manner in which the human self i s forme •
We have already had occasion to note the generaliza tion which is emerging from both these stre ams (Ges t alt
and depth psychology); namely, that the human self is
formed in relationships; if it is de-for d , i t i s
deformed in relationships; and if it is re-for med , i t
is re-formed in relationships.90
It is evident that the experiential movement in
Christian ed·ucation · s concerned primarily with the indi vidual-in-relationship. This assumption implies the
importance of the social situation for the educational
proces s. It further suggests that individuals must be seen,
not only in terms of their current relationships , but in
terms of their past relationships out of which their
existing self has emer ed , and in terms of the pul l of the
89El l iott, ~• cit., p. 191.
90 herrill, The Gift of Power, p. 157.
-- --- - ---
7
future.
The discussion of the nature of man as a human self discover~d- in- relation- to- other-selves is itself a vital
clue to the nature o the educational process by which
individuals become Christians. It is necessary to articu late explicitly the nature of the learning process and the
assumptions upon which it is based . This aspect of the
Christian education movement is now to be considered.
(5) Learnin5 throu5h experience . The influence of
progressive education upon religious education has alr~ady
been noted . owhare is this infl·uence more apparent in
Christian education than in its concept of the learning
process . Guided by such men as John Dewey and William H.
Kilpatrick, progressive education has been based largely
upon the concept that learning takes place in and through
the experience of individuals as they interact with their
environment. Learning is not the passing on of materials
from teacher to pupil . Rather, learning takes place as the
individual cornes to grips in his own experience with a
problem which is vital and significant for him . Through
the process the individual seeks to discover solutions to
the problem, tests to determine their validity
in further experience.
George Albert Coe followed this point of view . He
felt that it is impossible to transmit ideas and values
79
directly from one person to another. Instead, he empha-
size that people learn by experience, and that experience
alters all interpretat ons of life; hence values and ideas
change with changing experience. He fu ther insisted that
the p ocess of learn n involves critical evaluation of
exper ence, creative experimentation, and continued revision
of workin principles and practices. Following the concept
of Dewey, Coe accepted the problem-project method of teach
ing as an effective way of implementing the scientific
m thod in religious education . In his ear y writings he
operated upon the premise that learning consisted of a
process of unfolding in the tradition of Froebel . However,
he modified this viewpo nt later, indicating that the
"central fact of the educative process is a growing Chris tian experience in and through the pupil's social inter actions.091 Learning thus takes place in and through
interactive experience. In accord with his interpretation
of Christianity in terms of the social gospel, Coe stressed
that in the actual experiences of the child he needs to
have opportunities to come to grips with the direct appli
cation of the ideal of love to the concrete problems of
life. In this way
•• • Instead of attempting to transfer to the child
mind certain truths that we hope will enter into his
experience in a vital manner at some indefinite future
91
Coe,! Social Theory of ~eligious Education p . 80 .
80
time , we help him to define, understand , and improve
someth ng that he is already doing and enjoying . There
is no longer the deadly separation of knowi ng from
doing , or of Christian doctrine from Christian experi ence . 92
For Coe the learning experience is the process in
which the individual becomes involved in seeking a solution
to a problem of his own within his own experience . Chris
tian education, interpreted from this perspective, is "an
experience in being Christian, an experiment through which
the meaning of •Christian' unfolds to us.
11
93
Harrison Elliott further develops the concept of
learnin thro·ugh experience . W.1 ereas Dewey and Coe inter preted the learning process as the problem-solving method
of science which is essentially trial and error, Elliott
incorporated the later developments of the Gestalt psy chologists who held that in the learning process, where the
elements were in a Gestalt or configuration, there was a
capacity to see the relation between means and ends , thus
short-cutting the trial and error method.94 Elliott de
veloped what he called "the life situation approach . "
In this plan, the actual life situation being faced
was described and explored in the group , the possible
alternatives of action were defined, they were compared
on the basis of their probable consequences in the
92
Ibid. p . 82.
9
3coe, What is Christian ~aucation?, p . 21.
- - - ----- - ----
94 lliott, .2E· cit . , p . 49 .
81
situation, if put into effect; they were evaluated on
the basis of points of emphasis in the Bible or other
Christian teaching, and the gro· up was led to make either
individual or group decision as to what to do in the
situation or what attitude to take in the solution of
the problem. Discussion followed on plans for putting
the decision into effect in the life situation. In
this plan, Biblical and other experience was studied
historically in what was in fact a life-situation ap
proach to secure perspective and emphasis for meeting
the present situation.95
lliott makes a strong point that learning in experi ence is basic to the very nature of all learning of mankind .
An experience-centered religious education is far
more than an improved methodology for making a certain
religious interpretation understood so that it may be
appropriated by individuals or groups . It represents
••• the process through which the Christian religion
has developed and through which Christian experience
has been realized. •Learning in and t.hroug. h experience •
is not a pedagogical slogan, invented by progressive
educators . It is rather a statement of the way mankind
has found out everything which is known and has made
whatever progress has been attained . All knowledge has
grown out of man •s experience with nature and with
human beings. All the ideas of mankind ~re conclusions
from and interpretations of experience . 9
••• Religion is no exception to this dependence
upon learning through experience. Everything that man
knows about God has grown out of his experience in the
world and out of his reflections upon the manifestations
of God in nature and in human life.97
To the problem-solving concept of learning Elliott
has added the Gestalt concept of learning through insight
but retained the basic concept that learning takes place in
95Ibid., pp.
50 f.
96
rbid., pp.
310 f.
97rbid.,
p. 311.
82
te ms of life situation of the individual .
Sherrill shares this point of view with Elliott, but
not without maki ng some criticisms of Dewey ' s problem solving approach . He notes that Dewey ' s concepts of the
importance of the individual ' s own experience in the learn ing process and of the importance of sharing experience so
t hat learning is a social experience are worthy contribu t ions . 98 He criticizes Dewey at two points, however.
First, Dewey fails to deal witn the demonic element in
human nature . Secondly, Dewey, in the manner of the logical
positivists, limits "truth" to that which can be kno~ by
t he use of the scientific method . This obscures the possi bil·ty of the conception of truth in the form of a Person
seeking man . 99
Sherrill points out, as did Elliott, the importance
of the concept of insight as emerging from Gestalt psy chology in understanding the learnin process .
100
To the
concepts which Elliott and Coe have developed, Sherrill, as
in the case of other areas under consideration, has added a
more significant ren ering in terms of dynamic psychology.
He indicates quite clearly that the most significant changes
9
8
herrill, Gift of Power, p . 152 .
---
99Ibid., p. 1530
lOOibid., pp. J.54 ff .
83
of the elf nvolve changes deep within the person . These
changes are interpreted in theological terms as coming
about in relationships which include a relationship with
God. Man is continually confronted by God within these
rela ionships. Signif cant learn ng involves significant
changes of the self, which, in turn, mean the involvement
of the whole self in thes e relationsh·ps if change is to
take place. As man responds to God in these c i rcumstances,
the red mptive process which mov es the self toward whole
ness takes place.
101
The theological interpretation which herrill places
upon the process of chan ing the self may not be completely
accepted by all representatives of the experiential Chris
tian education movement. However, the validity of the
psycholo ical insights involved, namely, that the whole
self must be involved for learning to take place and that
the most significant changes or learnings are those which
involve a change within the depths of self, is increasingly
being reflected in the writings of others within the move
ment . 102
The basic assumption of learning through experience,
which is necessarily a social experience, serves as an
101Ibid., pp. 145- 162 .
102 ee works of Frank Wycoff, Randolph Crump Miller,
et al .
--
appropriate introduction to the next characteristic of
experiential Christian education, which is the ethico
social emphasis within the movement.
8
( 6) The etliico-social emphasis. When the Christian
education movement began to emerge and take shape shortly
after the turn of the century, the social gospel emphasis
in liberal theology was also in the ascendency. The
directing of attention in religious education to the socio
logical and ethical rather than to the theological may be
traced, in large part, to this influence of liberalism upon
Christian education.
10
3 The influence of the social gospel
is exemplified nowhere better than in the works of George
Albert Coe. In discussing the aims of education Coe sug
gests that these aims should be the development of. a full
grown, wisely-directed social consciousness. Education
endeavors to.put knowledge and power to right uses, which
is to say, the function of education is "to fit man for his
social role."
1
04 Accordingly, the school should be en
instrument of society for social ends, "a miniature society,
united by the ethical bonds of regard for one another.nl05
lOJF. Ernest Johnson, "Religous Education and tl1e
Theological Trend, n Religious Educatio11, 33: 82-8 3, January
February, 1938.
l04coe, Education in Religion and Morals, p. 16.
105 i 1
Ib d., p. 9 .
85
Through this miniature society the immature individual is
guided toward "social adjustment and efficiency ." Tl1.is
social efficiency is a Christian conscienc e bas ed upon the
concept of love toward all. This should be the guiding
motivation, the directin force, by which all activities
within society are guided.
It would be inaccurate to attribute the emphasis
upon ethical conduct and the social application of Chris
tianity within religio·us education solely to t he social
gospel emphasis of liberal theology . Several of the charac
teristics of experiential education already noted offer
significant bases for this point of view. The concept of
the immanence of God implies his activit3 in and through
society. The nature of human relations , therefore, should
be in accord with what has been discovered of His Will for
men, ethical love. The "personality-principle" wnich re
quires that one respect every individual as of infinite
worth similarly calls for this concern. The development
of the individual within the social situation through inter
action with other selves, as well as the concept of learning
through experience both contribute to this emphasis.
The ethical and social emphases within Christian
education take two directions. The first is in the nature
or the actions or individuals as they learn through their
own experiences . The second is the function of the
86
remaking of society. Coed rects attention to both points.
In! Social Theory of Religious Education, which is ex
plicitly grounded upon the presuppositions of the social
gospel movement, Coe•s major themes involve the above two
concepts. He discusses the nature of the educative process
indicating that learning takes place through social e peri
ence. He then defines the nature of this guided experience
as providing social experiments in which children can
analyze alternatives under guidance, and learn to make
Christian decisions which are based upon the principle of
ethical love. The problems considered by the children are
those which are significant within their own life situations.
He states this in religious terms when he says that,
The only thing we can do for him (God) that he can-
not do for himself is to be brothers one to another.106
••• If it is possible to fuse love and faith, so that
even in childhood the voice of God and the voice of
human need shall be one voice, this is the path that
religious education should by all means choosa.107
Coe moves beyond the life-situation point in which
pupils deal with only their own particular social concerns
to introduce them to the problems which society faces.
These aspects of society must themselves undergo change if
a Christian education program is to achieve all its goals.
Coe indicates that the significant aspect of creative
l06coe, ! Social Theorz £!_ Religious ducation, p. 71.
l07Ibid., p. 83.
87
educa io is the manner in which it places int e position
of primacy a purpose to improve or to reconstruct a culture
or some part of it.
108
In this way religious education
makes an immediate impact upon the ethical problems of
civilization.l09 Coe bases his approach, not in empiricism
at this point, but in social idealism. He states that this
philosophy of life is "the corner-stone of progressive edu
cational theory.nllO The effective religious education
program thus accomplishes two goals, not one. The indi
vidual, in and through his experimentation of trying to
apply Christian alternatives to his problems, comes more
and more to be controlled by the Chri tian value of ethical
love. At the same time, by directing the educational
process to the deficiencies within society, the social
or er itself is remade into a closer approximation of the
Kingdom of God.
Harrison Elliott also exhibits this concern for the
ethical and the social in the eligious education process.
However, he approaches it from a somewhat different per
spective. He suggests that while the indivi ual learns
throu h experience, in our contemporary culture much of the
108
coe, What is Christian Education?, p. 46.
--------
l09George A. Coe, "Religious Education is in Peril,"
International Journal of Religious Education
1
15:9,
January, 1939. -
110
coe, _ Social Theory of eligious ducation, p. 37.
88
experience of children is in social circumstances which are
antithetical to the Christian ideal which, for Elliott, is
love, in the sense of concern for the life and welfare of
the other, even one's enemy.
111
Instead of cooperation,
men are highly competitive. This Elliott attributes, not
to an original bent toward selfishness, but to the social
acculturation which nas taken place during the last four
hundred years. In light of these anti-Christian influences
impinging upon the individual , the solution does not lie in
individual education. Instead, the social nature of the
development of the self is used as a means of accomplishing
change. In a manner now similar to Coe, Elliott would en list individuals in cooperative endeavors which seek to
deal specifically with the social situations of which they
are a part.
112
The major concern is for small groups with
in the church wco will use the Christian ideology as a
basic criticism of contemporary life within the church,
reconstructing it in terms of the ideal. Furthermore, the
church must undertake to wiite with the larger circle of
likeminded groups to actively seek reconstruction of the
greater social situation. The direction toward which
society is to be reconstructed is a cooperative society in
111 lliott, .2E· cit., p. 246 .
112
Ibid., p. 217.
which love is more genuinely operative than in our presen
highly competitive circwnstance.113
Elliott shares with Coe the conclusion that individ
ual character is changed through the reconstruction of the
corporate life of which the individual is a part, and that
individual and social change toward the ideal of aga~ love
are dual results of a single process.
The emphasis upon ethical conduct and social recon
struction has thus sprung from the liberal theological
concern for the social gospel coupled with the educational
concern for exp erience of the here-and-now of individuals
acting in a love relationship.
In the r eview of the works of Lewis Sherrill it was
noted that he represents a shift from the general trend of
religious educators who generally relate themselves to the
liberal tradition in theology. His work has been typified
as an attempt to seek a meeting of the ways between the
contemporary theological emphasis upon Protestant Reforma tion theology and experiential Christian education. hile
Snerrill sti l . shoul be co sidere within the 'reconstruct
ed-liberal' tradition in light of his other assumpti ons, in
the area of the ethical and the soc·a1 this shit in
theological orientation becomes very appar~nt. Througho t
ll3Ibid., pp. 219-232.
his recent books the empha is is up on the individual, or
the in iv"dual- in-relationship . 11
90
While e recogn·zes, at least implicitly, t he !'unc
tion of the r elationship of agape lo e to personality-
f or ation , nowhere oes he eal explicltly with the con
cepts of education n values or social rec nstruct i on.
In tead , relie ·ous ducation i s thought of in terms of the
seeking of means through which right relatio scan be
establi hed with God which result in the find i ng of self
an the achieving of wholeness. Therefore he make no
signifi ant ontr·bution to the ethical- social characteris
tic of experiential Christian education, althou h t .he
concept of education in values is implicit in the idea of
personality growth within the Christian community.
tion.
(7) The functional ap2roach to the Christian tradi
t the beginnlng of this chapter it was indicated
that Coe , ~lliott, and Sherrill, as representat ·ves of the
Christian education movement, all operated from within the
f r amework of the Chri stian r eligion: Coe with an emphasis
upon th social gospel , Elliott firmly within the liberal
tradition, and Sherrill representing a conte1nporary "ne o liberal" theolo ical viewpoint. This point is r eaffirmed
at this time in order to avoid the er ticism which is often
114 ee herrill, The ift of Power and The Struggl
of the So 1.
- -- ---
91
hurled at the experiential Christian education movement,
namely, that the Christian trad·tion is of minor importance
to religious educators, relegated to this inconsequential
role by a concept of generic "religious education." That
the experi ntial Christian education movement has rejected
an authoritarian concept of Christian doctrine is readily
admitted by all three of the representatives whose works
are bein examined. However, they are all functioning
within the context of the Christian faith as they under
stand it . There is a basic approach to Christian tradition
which characterizes the Christian education movement that
has given rise to this charge of generic religious educa
tion. It is the concept of the function of reli ion.
George Albert Coe entered the field of reli gious
education by way of the psychology of religion. It is the
concept of religion which he developed through this psycho lo ical approach w hi ch provides the foundation for the
Wlderstanding of religion a.s function and as structure.
Coe rejected the efforts to identify religious experience
with intellectual processes (Hegel, Tylor, Romanes), or
with an emotional state (Sabatier, Schleiermacher, Tiele),
in favor of a view that the religious attitude is located
in the conative, or end-seeking, activity of dynamic human
beings in their outreaching attempts to find satisfaction
for human needs. eligious experience is thus located in
the area of valuational experiences. This third approach
92
enables the integrat on of the two previous concepts into a
single point of view. The intellectual aspect of religion
is the interpretive and directive factor, while the affec
tive concomitant is the integrative aspect. These are
un ted in undifferentiated involvement of the whole person
·n a search for supremely worth.ful ends.
11
5
Coe shared th s point of view with Aines, King, and
Durkheim. He differed from them, how ver, in that ha
identified religion, not with social values, nor with any
particular value, such as the oetic, aesthetic, mo al, or
economic, but as the revaluation, integration, and ideali
zation of all special zed values into the total meaning an
worth of life.116
Religion, as Coe interprets it, does not introduce
any new value ; it is an operation upon or within all our
appreciations. It is a "revaluation of values that both
makes us individuals and organizes us into society . "117 He
thus sets forth in psychological terms the functional rela
tion of religion to personal eaid social experience .
This concept or the fwiction of religion acting
11
5w111iam c. Bower, "In Memoriam: George Albert
Coe, I, Contributions to the Psychology of Religion,
0
Relisious Education, 47 : 68, March-April, 1952.
116Ibi ., p. 69.
117
Loc. cit .
93
within the human experienc of valuin points toward the
distinction between religion as a function and religion as
structure. The function of religion is the integration and
motivation of life in and through the reorganization of all
values into a meaningful whole. On the other hand, the
structure of religion consists of the theological concepts,
ritualistic forms, and ecclesiastical organizations through
which this universal function finds expression. The inte
grating and idealizing function is a constant aspect of
religious experience, while the theology, cultus, and
ecclesiastical structures continually chan e with the
chan. ing culture of historical periods.
The major implication of this understanding of
religion in functional terms is the attitude toward the
religious heritage in this case, the Christian tradition.
Coe clearly indicates that the structure of religion is
determined in the light of the values an needs of persons
within a given culture. But this structure changes as the
needs and values of the culture change .
Already we see that the old sorts of goodness, the
Christian life of other generations, are inadequate
and sometimes obstructive, and it dawns upon us that
w cannot be Christian unless we take upon ourselves
tE.e burdens and the risks of re-creating in some measure
our Christianity itself •••• Reconstruction, con
tinuous reconstruction, is of the essence of the divine
work in and through the human.118
118
Coe , What is Christian Eu ation?, pp. 32 f.
-- - ----- -----
94
This is the heart of creative Christian education
for Coe. It is an experience of free creativity in which
the experience of becoming a Christian takes place as the
individual reconstructs his Christian heritage in terms of
his own conditions of life.
Harrison Elliott follows essentially the same posi
tion as Coe, developin it from a somewhat different per
spective. He analyzes the historical background of the
Church in order to determin w ether or not it is possible
to discover a single recognized int erpretation of the
Christian faith which could serve as a permanent structure
for Christian education. On the basis of this examinat· or
he points out the impossibility of accompl shing such an
interpr etation.
11
9 He goes on to affirm that
Christianity has been distinctive in the diversity
of its interpretations, not becaus e of the perversity
of human beings in refusing to acc ept true revelation
but because of the vitality of the Christian religion.
It has not been possible to confine the living experi
ence of Christianity within any particular mold.12O
Ell i ott takes care to avo i d the implication that
reli gious education is thus a general searc for truth.
Christian educatio connotes an educ ation which has
its ori entation within t he Christian eligion. That
orientat i on requi res ful l re cognition of the hist oric
origin and continuity of Christianity. The long re
ligious developme t among the Hebrew eo le as r e cored
in what the Christians call the Old Testament forms
the background of the Christian movement. The term
119
lli ott, ~- cit., p. 86.
120
10c. c·t.
95
"Christian" itself implies the centrality of Jesus
Christ in the Christian rellgion. His life and teach
ings are of prime importance in coming to an interpreta
tion of the Christian religion for today.121
lliott indicates that experience-ce tered Christian
education recognizes tl:1e significance of the heritage, but
it also recognizes that the heritage has W1dergone growth
and change, reinterpretation and enrichment, during the
almost two thousand years of the Faith. Therefore this
process continues, and the individual reconstructs the
structure of religion as he participates in the experience
of revaluin life in terms of that which un·tes it into a
meaningful whole. Elliott deals with fnnction and struc
ture concretely in terms of the contemporary controversy
about the authoritativeness of particular Christian revela
tion claims.
As in the previous two section.s, Sherrill also di
gressed here from this central tendency with the reli ious
education movement to differentiate between the function
· and structure of religion. He deals with a concept of a
doctrine of revelation which varies according to cultural
situations. This concept of a changing doctrine of revela
tion allows for an interpretation of religion i n terms of
function and structure. However, the function of religion
is different in Sherrill from that posited by Coe and con
firmed by Elliott. The function of religion is here
121
Ibid., p. 309 .
96
interpreted as a personal encounter between man and God.
Religion thus becomes a distinctive experience, the experi
ence of confrontation. It can be assumed that one then
revalues all other val
1
1es in light of this experience of
encounter of which Sherrill speaks. However, the author
does not address himself to this aspect of the results of
the enc unter. The results of the en ount rare all inter
preted in terms of the chan es w hich take place in the
total self.
122
The discussion of the characteristics and assump tions of the experiential approach to Christian education
has indicated that there are seven major aspects which
denote the movement. There is a recognized dependence upon
the scientific movement and a pragmatic epistemology . The
concept of the immanence of God actively at work in and
through nature and the experience of man is affirmed. Man
is conceived of as a being of infinite worth, a self
conscious organism capable of growth, whose personality
develops and emerges through social interaction, and who
learns best through his own experience and participation.
There is a concern for the ethical, rooted in a belief that
social growth and change is a necessary accompaniment of
individual growth and chan e . Finally, there is a
122
sherrill, Tne Gift of Power, pp. 145-162.
-- --- - ---
97
recognition of the division of religion into its function
as the revaluing of other values and its structure as the
particular theology, ritual, and organization within a
given historical situation. The emphasis is placed upon
the former, suggesting that the structure of the Christian
heritage itself undergoes further interpretation and recon
struction as it is related to the particular needs of
individual experience.
With this perspective in mind, attention is now
turned to the movement with which experiential religious
education is to be compared, existential philosophy. Prior
to the delineation of its significant characteristics a
brief overview is given of its historical background.
CHAPrER III
HISTO ICAL BACKGROUND AN CHARACTE I TICS
OF E ISTENTlALISM
In the manner of the previous chapter on experiential
education , this chapter deals briefly with an historical
survey of the novement of existentialism, followed by a
discussion of the basic ssumptions and characteristics .
An additional section clo es the chapter by presenting
evidences of existentialist influence within contemporary
theology .
HISTORIC LB CKGROUND
The problem of analyzing the historical background
of t he movement within philosophy referred to as existen tialism is complicated by the major difficulty of determin ing what is meant by the term, existentlalism . One can
--------
find almost as many definitions as writers upon tne subject .
However , this is not wiexpected in light of the emphasis
within the movement upon subjectivity . There are certain
common elements wnich indicate the direction which the
movement is taking. These will emerge from time to time
during the brief discussion of its historical roots, and
they will come more clearly into focus in the subsequent
discussion which is a dress directly to them .
While implicat ions suggesting existential thought
99
have been "discovered" in the Scriptures, in classical
tho·ught, in Augustini an and Paulin writings, and in later
philosophical thinkers, it is generally agreed that t he
true father of existentialism ·s the Danish think , Sorn
Kierkegaard (1813-1855), and that the impact of his person
ality and outlook have be en the greatest singl e cultural
influence upon the modern developments. If it were not for
a Kierkegaard, the presence of existential concep t s woul
not have been found in those w ho came before him although
the ideas expressed may have be en genuine readings of the
intentions of these earlier wr ters.
The chief concern of existentialism is wi t h hwnan
existence, not as an abstract general concept, but in ts
individual and concrete manifestations. I t m ay be said
that this movement represents a reaction against the
rationalistic, objective, scientific approach. Hegel , the
last great philosopher prior to the philos ophy of existen tialism, developed the idea that to understand anyt hing
that happens in a person's inner life he ne eds to go to t h
totality which is the self, t enc e to t he larger t ot ality
which is the human speci s, and finally to t he totality
which is the Absolut e I deal. The reality o f t he human
being is found through the pursuit of object ivity and in
relation to the total i ty of t he absolute. This conception
of truth as found through objectivity is the point of
attack by Kierkegaard. He proposed t h notion t hat t r th
100
lies in subjectivity; that true existence is achieved by
intensity of feel·ng. To consider man as merely a part of
a whole is to negate hlm.
1
This concept of existential truth as opposed to the
etached impersonal knowled e is, for Paul Till ch, the
point of departur of existentlalism.2 This existential
truth is a demand for knowledge in which the very ex stance
of the knower himself is involved.
It is not general truth to be accepte by everyone
on the basis of his rational nature. It cannot be
gained by detached analysis and verifiab e hypothesis.
It is particular truth, claiming validity on the basis
of its adequacy to the concrete situ tion. Existential
truth in its many forms has one common trait; it has no
criterion beyond fruitfulness for life. The dismissal
of re son as a guide to truth is the surrender of any
obje tive standard of truth. Consequently the only
basis of decision between contradictory claims to
represent concrete truth is the pragmatic test: the
power of an existential truth to make itself universal,
if need be by force.3
This proposal that truth originates in life, in the
life of the individual as he is totally involved in living,
does not itself give guidance to the nature, if any, of
truth which emerges from these experiences and upon which
1
Jean Wahl, A Short History of Existentialism,
trans. Forrest WillTams and-Stanley Maron (New York:
Phllosophical Library, 1949), pp. 3 f.
2
Paul Tillich, "The World Situation," The Christian
Answer, ed. Henry P. Van Dusen (New York: Charles
Scrioner
1
s Sons, 19 8), pp. JO f.
3
Loc. cit.
101
one can then general·ze . Tillich suggests that the philoso
phies of existence are as different from each other as the
experiences out of which the various philosophers of
existence interpret reality.
It can be the ethical existence of the anxious and
lonely individual concerned about eternity, as with
Sorn Kierkegaard. It can be the revolutionary exist
ence of the disinherited proletariat concerned about
its future, as with Marx. It can be the existence of
the dominating aristocracy concerned about its power
over life, as with Nietzsche. It can be the existence
of the vital intuitionist concerned about the f'ulness
of experience, as with Bergson. It can be the existence
of the experimenting pragmatist, as with James. It can
be the faithful existence of the religious activist, as
with the apostles of the social gospel . In each of
these definitions of existence, truth has a different
content; but in each of them truth is a matter of fate
and decision, not of detached observation or of ulti
mate rational principles. Nevertheless, it is claimed
to be truth, possessing universal validity, though not
general nacessity. It is supposed to be verifiable by
subsequent experience, although not in the fasion of
scientific experimentation.4
Thus existentialism may be characterized first of all
as a revolt against "reason," against the rationalist's
claims of objective truth in which the individual finds him
self to be a part. Th s revolt, however, goes deeper than
a protest a ainst rationalism as a philosophical system.
In the increasing industrialization of society men began to
protest against the apparent world view that considered man
to be nothing but a piece of an all-embracing reality,
whether physical, economic, sociological, or psychological,
4
Ibid., p. 31 f.
102
essentially mechanistic These m n, such as Pascal,
Schelling , Feurebach, Marx , Enge l s, an Kierkegaard, in-
sis ad that man is a being whose essential structure is in
danger of being lost within the complex of the industrial
society. Instea of man, t individual, the person, man
is becoming a thing, a marketable commodity, only a means
to a larger end . Against these conditions existentialism
as a philosophical movement be an to take shape, with Soren
Kierkegaard serving as the greatest creative source for the
new perspective.
Soron Kierke aard as born o May 5, 1813, in
Copenhagen, an there e died on November 4, 1855. His
brief forty- two years were filled with tragedy . His family
life consisted of one violent quarrel after another. Rela tives lapsed into insanity. His father was overwhelmed by
a deep sense of guilt which profoundly influenced young
Kierke aard. He suffered a painful and disappointing love
affair wlth egina Olson . There is ate ptation to dismiss
his writings as those of a disordered mind . Certainly his
mind was sick; however, despite any conclusions which
psychiatrists may wish to dra w about him, his was a crea tive genius, and the profusion with which his works flowed
from his pen, particularly d ring the brief six- year period
from 1843 to 1848 , is nothing short of phenomenal.
It has already been su ested that the basic char c
teristic of Ki erkegaard's writings is reaction against the
103
rationalism of Hegel. The rationalism which Kierkegaard
attacked, however , went beyond speculative philosophy, an
abstract-intellectualism. The rationalism which he rejected
included even that which one would ref r to as common sense
n humane p ri nc s a means of know·ng the true self, the
goal of r eligious knowledge. K·erke aard did not deny the
vali ity of rationalism in other areas of human experience,
but he held that in this quest for a·uthenti self-knowle e
one achieves the goal only through intense subjectivity.
The existent i dividual, for ierkegaard , is the
individual who is in infinite relationship with himself and
who has an infinite interest in himself and his own destiny.
To be "existing" is to be completely immersed in concern
about one'~ ultimate future. econdly, the existent indi-
vi ual a l ays feels himself to be Becoming, with a task
before him. KierKegaard at all times deals wit the exist
ent individual in terms of Christiani ty, and applying this
to Christianity he says :
One snot a Christian--one becomes a Christian. It
is a matter of sustained effort. Next, t he existent
individual is imbued with a passionate thou ht; he is
inspired, he is a kind of incarnation of the infinite
within the finite. This passion which motivates the
existent individual is called
1
the passion of freedom.
1
5
The fourth mark of Kierkegaard's existent individual
5 -a 1, .£E• cit., p . 4, uoting ierkegaard.
10
s the mportance of risk and decision with n this pas ion
for fre dom. The individual feels intens ly his situatio.
It is by his assions that he becomes aware of his existence.
And he is beset by an all- encompassin feeling of uncertainty
and of drea. In this ituation, he is confronted by the
necessity of cho ce, and he takes the leap of faith. I
•
lS
a dee son of All or othing, and h leaps by faith, find
in himself in the leap. Under the influence of thes
passions and decisions, wh ch continually take place , the
individual ceaselessly striv s to simplify himself and to
return to original and authentic experience . 6
This continual spiritual voyage is carried on always
within the Chr stian frame of reference. When finite man
is confronted by the infinite he feels himself a sinner,
particularly conscious of his sin. But through this con frontation, and the intensity of feeling which comes when
one is in contact with the Something which is outside him self, the existent individual is overwhelmingly anxious,
becaus e eternal existence is dependent upon this relation
to God.
It has been sug ested that Kierke aard pointed the
way for the development of a philosophy of existence. He
was not a systematizer nor an organizer. H s ideas do not
610c . cit.
105
boldly stand out and constitute a framework. Rather, they
serve as inspiration for others who, graspin the new in
sights with which the Melancholy Dane struggled, could seek
to integrate and to shape them into a more systematic whole.
The nature of existentialism, with ts basic concern
for individuality, would su est a diversity of pathways
which philosophers would follow. Tillich, as indicated
above refers to such diverse persons as Marx, Berg on,
James, and Nietzsche as existential th nkers. They are
such in the broad sense that all manifest a concern for
truth as apprehended in terms of the immediacy of experi
ence. However, for the purposes of this study only those
who follow more closely the main stream of Kierkegaardian
thought are to be considered in seekin to analyze the
ch racteristics of existentialism.
Although Kierkegaard completed the major portion of
his works before the middle of the ni neteenth century, it
was not until the early part of the wentieth century that
philosophers turned their attention to the predicament of
modern man and made Kierkegaard a contemporary. Witn the
coming of the first World War, the dreams of the assurance
of evolution into perfection, of man's ability to build a
better world in cooperation with God, and of the utopianism
of the social gospel began to collapse. The interest in
the philosophy of man's pred cament increased with tne
occurrence of each new tragedy--a great depression, a
106
second orld War, then uneasiness, uncertainty, and small
undeclared wars. All of these have stimulated serious
t ·nkers to take up the writin s of Kierkegaard and r e examine his insights in the li ht of man
1
s current condi
tion.
The movement of e istentialism has indeed become
diverse , yet there are indications that the representative
figures may be roughly placed upon a continuum which has
es~ential solipsism at one end and essential relatedness at
he other. Among th most significant contributors to the
philosophy of existentialism are, Martin Heidegger, a pro
fessed agnostic, whose emphasis is primarily ontological;
Jean Paul Sartre, the militant French atheist whose solip
sistic position has been expressed through the media of
literature and drama; Karl Jaspers, a liberal Protestant
thinker who places communication, a struggling love with
other persons, at the core of his system; Gabriel Marcel ,
devout Catholic who follows the intuitionist , Bergson;
Martin Buber, Jewish theologian whose concern is the I -Thou
relationshiJ; NicolaB Berdiaev, Greek Orthodox theologian
and 'personalist" philosopher; and Emil Brunner, whose
theology of crisis centers upon the Divine-human encounter.
Each of these twentieth-century philosophers has directed
his attention to man's predicament, his estrangement from
th world, and the need for man to truly find himself in
authentic xistence. The writings of these men provide the
107
chief sources for the development o the followin section
on the characteristics and assumptions of existentialism.
While the part·cular point of view of none of them is
treated separately, the distinctive emphases with which
they concern themselves are implicit within the discussion
of the general character of the philosophic movement.
SOME CHARACTERISTICS AND ASSUMPTIONS OF EXISTENTIALISM
The radical nature of the philosophical movement of
existentialism has already appeared in the historical review
above. Its concern for truth as found with subjectivity,
its emphasis upon meaninglessness, and its primary valua
tion of freedom have appeared in that discussion. Perhaps
the most concise description of this movement, which de
tests objective descriptions, is to note that it has two
basic tendencies : first, the desire to treat human exist
ence in its concrete singularity, and, secondly, the effort
to seize and delineate typical human attitudes, looking for
a clue to existence within the affective moods of human
experience.7 While these are the tendencies oft e existen
tialist philosophers as they write about their philosophy,
the truly significant characteristics of the movement are
those which describe the existential way of livin. It is
7Ronald Grimsley, Existentialist Thought (Cardiff :
University of Wales Press, l955), p. 212.
108
to these that attention is now directed.
It is the conviction of the writer that existential
ism is more than a system of thought. It is a way of life,
a pilgrimage through which the individual must pass on his
journey toward authentic self-ai'firmation. For some exis
tentialists this journey is nihilistic, the end sought is
found purely within one's self. For others, it is found
in community with other selves. An for still oth rs, it
is found within the Divine- human encounter. Yet in each
case existentialism is almost a religious ritual rather
than a philosophic interpretation of life. This assertion
becomes increasingly apparent as the specific characteris
tics of existentialism are examined and placed together to
form a somewhat systematic conceptualization of this pro
gression toward self-affirmation.
Seven asp cts of existentialism are to be examined
as constitutin the most significant characteristics of the
movement. It is recognized that none of them is an entity
in itself. All overlap and involve each other. None can
be spoken of without referrin to a different one as well.
Only one, the f rst, can be called a philosophical assump
tion. The somewhat stilted division into categories would
be resented by some existentialists, but it becomes neces
sary for the purposes of this study. These primary charac
teristics of the movement to be consi ered are: (1)
existenc e is prior to essence; (2) existence transcends the
109
rational; (3) man is condemned to b e free; (4) the basic
characteristic of man is existential anxiety in the fac e of
Nothingness; (5) the realization of existence means es
trangement; (6) the existential individual endures crisis;
and (7) existence means a return to immediacy.
Each of these characteristis is treated separately.
At the close of the discussion an endeavor is made to
swnmarize and to inte rate t he several asp ects into the
"religious pilgrimage" suggested above .
(1) Existenc e i s prior!£ essence. Te classical
position in philosophy has been that essence precedes
existence. This has been f o·widationa.l. xistential phi-
losophers have ups et this basic assumption by insisting
that existence is prior to essence . Furthermore , the term,
existence is redef ined as a particular quality hu.rnan beings
alone possess.
The question of essence is, what a thin
•
is. The
question of existence is that a thing is. Or inarily
existenc~ is taken for grant ed , an attention is directed
to the complex problem of · et ermining and defining the
essence of that w hich is. On the other hand , when t he
question of existence ~s r aised , it allows for only two
alternatives. ither a thing is , or it i s not . I t has
- ---
exlstence , or it oes not have existence . I t i s f r om th"s
eit · er-or c ar cter istic of ex ste ce that 1 art · n H i eg er
110
develops his philosophy. While Heidegger denies that he is
an existentialist, he begins his thought with the question
of existence because it is the proper introduction to
ontology. He maintains that the question or existence is
fundamentally the question of Being, which is the ontologi
cal concern. 8 Paul Tillich also shares this poi nt of yiew.9
Heidegger's argument runs that in order to determine
an adequate ontology one must begin with the only kind of
Being 111th which we are really in contact, which is the
being of man. He acknowledges that there are other forms
ot being, but only man truly exists.
10
Ordinarily man is
in the common everyday world or "everyman." He is not
truly existing, not consciously aware of his own existence.
Only by traversing certain experiences, like anguish, does
he find himself in the presence of Nothingness from which
true Being erupts. Only then he truly exists.
11
Through this experience of anguish one becomes aware
that he is thrust out into a world which is meaningless,
purposeless, from which he has no recourse or refuge. Man
does not know whJ" he is tlung out into this meaningless
8wahl, ,22. cit., pp. 11 rr.
9
Pau.l Tillich, The Cour!Be !,2 !!! (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1952j.
10
wabJ, loc. cit.
11
Ibid., pp. 12 tt.
111
wold, he merely knows that h is. It is in his own exist
ence through his own decision and choice, throu h this
inescapable freedom, that man himself gives m anin to this
world in which he has been thrust . The implication for the
uestion under consideration is that man's existence pre
cedes his essence. For Heideg er this distinction is not
sufficient. He maintains that man is witho·ut essence ; he
is only existent . sse ces are nere construct i ons from
xistence. One may look for and find essences of material
tnings and implements, but there can be no essence of the
existent indiv ual, man.12
Anoth r ·mplication of existentialism which can be
drawn from the above description by Heidegger is that
existence is both the existent individual as he is thrust
into this world and an achieved condition of man. Existence
is more than mere "being there ." I t is a qualitative
aspect of human beings when they are passionately concerned
about their own existence. Man is not ex~sting in his
everyday going and coming . He truly exists only when he is
animated by an intense spiritual zeal involving his total
person in a total concern about his own being.
1
3 One might
further note that genuine existence is not yet the state of
1210c. cit.
13Helmut Kuhn, ncounter with Nothingness (Hinsdale,
Illinois: Henry Regnery Company, 1949 }, Chap . I , pp. 1-8.
112
the individual who is so inYolYed with his ultimate destiny.
It is a special state which is achieved as one goes through
the experience ot anguish upon being contronted by Nothing
ness and the definiteness ot his own eventual non-ba!ng
thro11gh death, which Heidegger calls "the impossibility of
all possibility."14
Writing ot Heidegger and Sartre as existentialist
thinkers, Paul Tillich describes their concept or man as
tollows:
There is no essential nature of man, except in the
one point that he can make of himself what he wants.
Man creates what he is. Nothing is given to him to
determine his creativity. The essence of his being-
the •should-be,' the •ought-to-be,
1
--1s not something
which he tinds; he makes it. Man is wnat he makes
b1mselt. And the cow-age to be as one-self 1s the
courage to make of oneselt what one wants to be.lS
It co\ll.d be irreYerently suggested that the existence
ot man as he is pictured by the existentialists, and par
ticularly by Heidegger, does not merely precede or super
cede essence, it 1s an essence itself.
It should be noted in connection with the question
ot existence and essence that the ontological question is
closely related. This line of reasoning characterizes most
of the existentialist thinkers, notably Heidegger, Sartre,
l.4wahl, £2• cit., p. J.4.
15 c
Tillich, £2• cit., p. l✓O.
113
and Tillich.16 Berdiaev, on the other hand, rejects all
attempts to build an ontology upon existentialism. Drawing
upon Kierkegaard as the existential thinker who refused to
create an ontology because he believed only in an expression
of existence, Berdiaev asks,
Why is an ontology impossible? Because it is always a
knowledge objectifying existence. In an ontology the
idea of Being is objectified, and an objectification is
already an existence which is alienated in the objecti fication. So that in ontology--in every ontology- existence vanishes. There is no more existence because
existence cannot be objectified. It is precisely in
this respect that I feel myse f rather close to
Kierkegaard, although in other respects I am not at all
partial to him. It is only in subjectivity that one may
know existence, not in objectivity . In my opinion, the
central idea has vanished in the ontology of Heidegger
and Sartre.17
This statement about subjectivity as the way of
knowledge is a fitting notaupon which to move to the second
characteristic of existentialism, its relation to reason .
(2) Existence transcends the rational. In the brief
historical sketch it was observed that one of the most sig nificant aspects of existentialism was that it arose in the
nature of a revolt against reason. The rationalism which
has controlled Western thought from the close of the Middle
16
Although not considered to be a philosopher, Paul
Tillich is included among existentialist thinkers because
of his existential theological methodology and his extensive
wr tings upon existentialist themes.
1
7 ahl, .2.E.· cit., pp . 36 f., reportin a discussion
of Heidegger's thought in which Berdiaev participated .
114
Ages until the present has failed to solve the problems of
man, so the existentialists assert. Therefore, the critical,
rationalistic, scientific, objective approach to an under
standing of reality is rejected in favor of a new perspec
tive which is characterized by subjectivity, possibility,
contingency, and meaninglessness.
Not only has reason failed to yield significant
understanding for man, it has produced a technological
culture in which man himself is being depersonalized,
alienated from himself, forced into an W1authentic existence.
This depersonalization can be overcome only by a return to
reality throu h personal experience. Objectification
destroys existence; rather, it destroys the existence of
the individual. This authentic mode of being can be
realized only through subjectivity. It is this which gives
the clue to reality.
The chief source for the existentialist thought on
subjectivity goes back to the founder of the movement,
Soren Kierkegaard, whose passionate attack upon reason has
already been mentioned. He makes the following indictment
against reason:
The positive in the sphere of thought comes under
the head of certainty in sense-perception, in historical
knowledge, and in speculative results. But all this
positiveness is sheer falsity. The certainty afforded
by sense-perception is a deception, as one may learn
from a study of the Greek skeptics, and from the entire
treatment of this subject in the writing s o modern
idealism, which is very instructive . The positiveness
of historical knowled e is illusory, since it is
115
approximation-knowledge; the speculative r esult is a
delusion. For all this positive knowledge fails to ex
press the situation of the knowing subject in existence.
It concerns rather a fictitious objective subject, and
to confuse oneself with such a subject is to be duped.
Every subject is an existing subject, which should re
ceive an essential expression in all his knowledge •
• • • He moves constantly in a sphere of approximation
knowledge, in his supposed positivity deluding himself
with the semblance of certainty; but certainty can be
had only in the infinite, where he cannot as an existing
subject remain, but only repeatedly arrive.18
The existentialist recognizes the fact that each
person is a singular life, unrepeatable in anyone else,
non-transferabl e to anyone else.
Nothing historical can become infinitely certain for
me except the fact of my own existence (which again
cannot become infinitely certain for any other indi
vidual, who has infinite certainty only of his own
existence), and this is not somethin
6
historical.19
Therefore, to exist is to be unique, and to exist in this
W1iqueness is to seek the mean ng of that which one en counters in the world in terms of one's subjective moods
deep within. This emphasis upon individual experience has
been referred to by some as a new form of empiricism .
20
However, the empirical emphasis upon sense-experience is
replaced by a stress upon the subjective moods which are
l8soren Kierkegaard, Concluding £nscientific Post
script, trans. D vid F . Swenson and Walter Lowrie [Prince
ton: Princeton University Press for the American-Scandin
avian Foundation, 19 1), p. 75.
1
9Loc. cit.
20
Grimsley , _£E. cit., p. 212 .
116
held to be particularly significant manifestations of the
fundamental structure of human reality . These feelin s are
not treated in the objective manner from a psychological
viewpoint . Instead, they are subjected to a phenomenologi
cal analysis wh·ch seeks to elucidate their deeper meanings
by showin how they reveal the ontolo ical structure of
human existence and of the domain of Being to which this
existence is related . Ontological priority is given to
certain moods, such as dread or anguish, which then reveal
the basic nature of reality . In th c of drea,
points to man's encount r with nothingness and the ultimacy
of on •sown non-being.2l Of this more is to be said later .
It is enough to note here the re lacement of objective
rational thought by concern for sub·ectiv moods as t e
clue to understanding reality .
The position of ier egaar can be interpreted from
a statement by H. ichard Niebuhr: "The illusion is that
reality is something that can be known, when indeed t ·s
something live ."
22
For Kierk gaard there s no totality
of human nature which may be directed and systematically
described . There are just human existences, whose inner
21
rbid., pp. 212 ff.
22
H. ic ar iebuhr," oren i er egaard," Christi
anity and the xist entialists, ed . Carl Michalson (New
Yor : Charles Scribner ' s Sons, 1956), p . 30 .
117
quality the subjective thinker can only attempt to communi
cate by the most devious means of indirection. Kierkegaard
tries to interpret the variat i ons of human personality as
they feel to the person himself .
Van Til has pointed out that existentialism replaces
intellectual consistency with meaning as the basic concept,
if rationality no longer is thought of as existing by it
self . 23 This concept of meaning is, however, a purely
·naividualistic meaning . It is meaning for the individual,
and it is discovered as the person looks within himself.
Truth as the disclosure of meaning is not wrested from the
objects of the world which one encounters. Instead of being
objective, the essence of truth must lie in the inner man,
in man ' s veracity and sincerity. Meaning is thus not re
vealed as though it were available in a realm of essence.
Rather, it must be brought into existence; it must be lived.
It is the individual who gives meaning to the world for him
self .
This aspect of tre subjective approach of existen
tiali sm l eads into another irr.plication of the rejection of
reason, namely, that the world ·n which man finds himself
is encompassed by meaninglesness. Reason cannot deal with
2
3cornelius Van Til, The ew Modernism (Philadelphia:
The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1947),
p. 110 .
118
objective truth because t e so-c lle objective worl has
no meaning in itself . It gains meanin for the in ·vidual
only in terms of that which he gives to it, which he creates
through living. The subject matter for the philoso hy of
existence is the felt reality of individual consciousness .
The individual is flung, unw i llingly , into this world which
is meaningless. Only by the fr ee act of the human agent
who takes this or that to b good or bad, b autiful or ugly,
does this otherwis e meaningless worl take on any signifi cance.24
It is in the dichotomy between fact and value, be
tween what merely and irrationally but undeniably is ,
and what we aspir e to, yet w hat as illl eniably is not ,
••• that human gr eatness as well as human ailure
lies •••• The perception of this dichotomy . ~. (is)
the central ·nsight of existential philosophy . 25
But, more generally, what Kierke aard and Existen tialism are concerned wit is the stubbornness of fact
not as data to be understood but as the ne cessity f or
fr ee beings to be just this and not tnat; the impinge
ment of the sheer brute giveness of each person's
history on his aspirations as an individual ; t he extreme
isolation and incommunicability of that conflict in its
sheer immediate qualitative character •••• The novel
emphasis in existential philosophy, in short, is its
attention everywhere to the meaninglessness that con
tinually underlies significance in human life--a sub
stream of nothingness as clearly exhibited in contin gency a s such as in death, the ult imate contingency.26
24Marjorie Grene, Dr eadful Freedom (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1940), p. ll.
2
5Ibid., p . 10 .
26
Ibid., pp. 28 f .
119
art~n Heidegger, the radical existentialist, views
the world as only an instrumental system. The world is an
a priori concept of an instrumental system founded in man•s
practical concern. It is not primarily an objective cosmos,
th laws of which are discovered by the intellectual ac
tivity of science, but a workshop which man, as being-in
the - world, constructs in his own practical concern.27
Understanding in terms of function t kes the place of
rational knowledge.28 The term, "truth about the world,"
implies a meaningful or understandable whole, a cosn10s.
But the world of the existentialist is no longer recognized
as a cosmos, thus truth as the revelation of meaning from
the objective world is unattainable. eanin must be found,
if at all, in the inner man, as
individuai. 29
condition or act of the
Jean aul Sartre, the avowed atheist and leadin
French existentialist, who in the opinion of the writer is
more consistent in his philosophy of existentialism than
most of those who are called existentialists, rejects both
Christianity and traditional metaphysics on this argument
of meanin lessness.30 Both of these disciplines are
York:
27John Mac 'uarrie, An
The Macmillan Company,
28Ibid., p . 56.
29
1 Ku.1: op. c ., pp.
30Grene,~ . cit., p .
Existentialist Theology (New
1955), p. 48.
3 f.
13.
120
predicated upon objective facts, and v lues are rounded
therein . This is inadequate because the objective world
does not have objective meaning; it acquires meaning for
the individual only through his own free hwnan actions .
Therefore to attempt to ground a system in objective facts
is to found it upon meaninglessness.31
xistentialism not only rejects rationality as a
mans of determining the true nature of real i t y, but it also
calls in question the basic determining assumption of con temporary science and "scient fie' philosophy, that the
world which the individual encounters is the real world
about wh ch one can obtain actual knowledge . There is a
world in which one has been thrust. One exists as a being-
n-the-world; but this world in which one finds himself is
itself meaningless; only as one seeks that which lies deep
within himself does the world take on meaning. And this
meaning can never be discover d through reason or thro h
objectivity.
The rejection of reason and emphasis upon meaning
lessness apart from self-produced meaning implies that the
activity, feeling, and thought of the individual is the
mos significant clue to reality. The individual must
therefore be a free self-motivated beipg. It is to the
3
1
Loc . ci •
121
nature of this freedom that attention is now directed.
( 3) xistentialism condemns man to be free. The
--
experience of freedom s central in existentialist thought.
This is indicated by the title of Marjorie Grene
1
s valua
tional treatmen of existentialism, Dreadful Freedom.
Discussin the existentialist concept of man she writes:
Freedom that is total, yet rooted in a determinate,
historical situation; dread in the face of such freedom;
an the concealment of dread in the comforting frauds
of everyday existence--such is the nexus of ideas that
make up the core of the existentialist's conception of
h1.unan life. 32
It has already been suggested that the ex stentialist
f inds the world to be characterized by meaninglessness .
This is due to the question which he asks: y is there
s om thing instead of nothing?" Existence as its antithesis,
nonexistence ; bein has its antithesis, non-being ; and they
are linked with each other by possibil i ty . Things exist ,
but the r existence appears as accidental . They happen to
be , but they might just as well not be. They are stamped
with an all- pervasive contingency .
To live and to act means for man to ive existence
t o t he merely possible . His life is the transformation of
the non-existent as poss i ble into existence . This is a
personal act, a ~ecis ve act which he cannot escape and
3
2
Ibi ., p . 56.
122
which is thus the act of freedom. This does not mean free
dom in the sense of a rational choice guided by pre-existing
norms and impeded both by infirmity of will and dimness of
vision. Rather, it is freedom as the creation of norms out
of nothin.
Viewed from the standpoint of the existentialist
encounter with Nothingness, with the abyss of non-being , this
human freedom is absolute . However, this does not mean that
man is completely free to do whatever he pleases. Obviously
he is limited both by the facts of his situation, in them
selves meaningless save as he gives meaning to them, and by
the facts of meanings previously given and acts previously
performed by the individual. Helmut Kuhn makes the follow ing analysis of this freedom:
Within these limits (the indifferent facts of the
situation) an infinite number of choices can be made .
No essence of law of hwnan nature, no predetermined end
authoritatively prescribes one course of action in
preference to another. In this sense the world offers
itself to t he agent as a boundless field of possibili
ties. The awareness of t his fr eed om is taltarnount to
the discovery of all-engulfing Nought. Te 'abyss' of
freedom is identical with the abyss of Nothingness .
tanding with see·ng eyes at the brink of this abyss
means giddiness--a perverse emotional mixtl1re of dread
(a dread of Nothing) and longing . Becoming fully and
anxiously aware of this desperate situation means to
exist in the doubly sharpened sense of this word--not
only to exist as men must ex st but to exist with a
full consciousness of man's terrible freedom . Exist
ence is an uisn ( n st) . ~n stepp·n fort into a
decision as w 11 we us t (fo 1 are not free n t to
exercise our free om) is n ct of w hich no rational
~c count can be iven . _ ll 1e can say o t h sex erience
i etro pee i either par ox i cal or negat v e . Para-
oxically we may describe choice as 1 · bera ion from the
s erv_tu o free om . Or expressing ·t indi ~ctly by
123
showing wh tit is not, w e may po ·nt out its own ante
cedents--a l eap rather than a velopment, a bre c
rather t han a continuation, a fall or a being li t 0d up
rather than an advanc e . 33
To experience this fr eedom i s to r eco nize that it
is bsolute, that one has to choos e , to make a dee sion,
that there re no fi_ e norms either within the individual
or outside him in w h i ch he can take refu e from this demand
f or decision .
In H ideg
0
e, as well as in most of the existential ist Christians, t here is a provision ade for t a e inauthen tic e istencJ of the in vi u 1 . Thi s is the person w ho
flees into the world of things , refusin to face Nothingnes s
and to make what Heideggep calls 'the resolute decision" to
tak e upon hims e l f his own destiny.34 hile Kierkegaard
refuses to allow for being- ·n-the- world, preferrin abso lute inwardness or subjectivity, he also insists upon the
importance of the passionate decision by the individuai . 35
The worl d is a threat to man
1
s authentic existence , in so
far as he can lose himself in it, and conceal f r om hims elf
the difference between his own being and the being of what
is within the worla.36
33Ku.hn,
££.
cit., p. 6.
Jl.
ahl,
££·
cit . , p . 22.
35Loc .
cit .
J6Mac uarrie , op . cit., p . 50 .
124
Authentic existence is only the result of this free
dom, des ~eformten gestalteten Lebe , the pri ciple of the
self-formed life of Heide er . 37 A life has its fo rm and
configuration within itself, it has the power o~ making
and changin itself, a n it can be conscious of this p ower .
W hen man, in the face of the possibility of non- bein ,
accepts this principle, h e can participat e in authentic
existence which he himself creates .
F. H. Heine1nann considers this emphasis upon freedom
to be one of the major significant contribut·ons of exis t en tialism. Growing out of the multitudinous aspects of
contemporary society w ich tend to de ersonaliz man,
existential philosoph·es are philosop ies of liberation
which seek to set men free from the domination of all ex ternal forc es , of society , of the state, and of dictatorial
power. They try to set man
1
s authentic self free from the
shackles of the inauthentic self w ich can be acco1nplished
only by the individual in t h exercis~ of his own e isten
tial freedorr~. 38
In existe tial · sm man is not privileged to be fre e ,
he is condemned to be free . This freedom is the responsi
bility of the indi vidual to make of his world and of himself
37van Til, .2.E· cit. , pp. 112 ff.
38Frederich H. Heinemann, E ist entialism and the
Modern Predicament (London : darn and Charles Black, I9'53),
P. 167.
125
what he would be. The realization of this responsibility
comes as one is confronted by the abyss of Nothingness out
of which infinite possibilities of decision appear. In the
face of this Nothingness and the realization of one's sole
responsibility for his Oin destiny comes genuine terror,
dread, or anxiety. Man is fr ed from a meaningful and
orderly cosmos which could hed e him in, freed from a con straining moral law bas d upon the nature of t 1in s, freed
from an authoritative God . But he is not free to divest
himself of his freedom. hen he l earns that he must be
free, entirely free, he encounters deep anxiety . This is a
necessary stage throu h whi ch e must pass before thi s
freedom can become truly creative. The nature of this
anxiety now becomes the subject for considerat ion.
(4) Man~ anxious~~ the face of Nothi ngnes~. The
existentialist philosophers have insisted that man face up
to the only thing of which he has any assurance, namely ,
the fact of his own e istence . Man is forced to strip from
himself the illusion of an objective world containing
objective truth. He must go to the edge of the abyss of
Nothingness and there find out the dreadful fact that he
is forced into absolut e fre edom. Facing t his freedom man
is beset by an uneasy an ·ety, the dread of freedom, or the
dread of the nec essity of deciding among in inite possi
bilities, the terror of his own awful respons i bility. It
126
is to this condition that the first existentialist philos
opher, Kierk gaard, speaks in his book, The Concept of
Dread.
Man is co f ronted by the necessity of makin a l eap .
But the conditions of his choice re not etermined by
antecedent psychological factors . There is a qualitat ive
break with his former state and it is this fact which re
veals his freedom and so evokes dread . As man turns inward
subjectively he gradually moves away from the familiar and
secure everyday world until h e sudd nly finds himself pro
fowidly alone. As h e nears that point where he realizes
he must make th leap, h e tries desperat ely to "grasp at
finiteness" in order to protect himself from having to as sume the re sponsibility of making the choice. The feeling
of dread, then , is ultimately the dread of Nothing , or the
possibility w hich Nothing demands . Kierkegaard calls this
the dread of "a nothing vaguely hinted at ." 39
The concept of dread as the dread of nothingness is
especially clear in Heide ger
1
s analysis of personal e ist ence in his concept of Ge worfenheit , the contingency of
human life. Grimsley delineates his position as follows:
In Heidegger's analysis of personal existence ••.
what is dreadful is the awareness of my death as the
i nevitable end toward which my freedom projects i tself .
39 oren Kierkegaard , The Concept of Dread, trans .
Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Unive'rstty Press, 1944),
p. 38 .
127
Death in its utter negation of meanin limits, and so in
the deepest sense determines , whatever resolve I ma to
turn the ineradlcable past into a significant future .
Yet it is only in such a resolve as limited by death-
in the realization of my existence as essentially and
necessarily bein~ to death--that I can rise out of the
distracting and - eceivin cares of my day- by-day exist
ence to become authentically myself. Only in such
recognition of my radical finitude, in the sinkin
dread with which I face my own annihilation, can I es cape the snares of a delusive present, to create in a
free resolve, a genuine future from a enuinely his torical past. 0
It is interesting to note that only at this point,
in the concept of dread, does Heidegger acknowledge any
debt to Kierkegaard in the development of his thought.4
1
The dread of othing in Kierkegaard retains as the object
of dread, Nothin, although Heidegger particularizes this
concept as dread before
A possible personal Existence which goes towards its
own death and which exists for this end. A conscious
ness of the absolute contingency and finitude of exist
ence will give us power to detach ourselves from the
tyranny of death by allowing us to live on without being
deatl1's dupes.42
Dread in the face of fre edom, which in turn was ac quired through an encounter with Nothingness, presents a
pessimistic and gloomy picture if t his is to constitute
the "essence" of the ex stentialist•s "existence ." This is
essentially the express ed vi ewpoint of artre, although he
0
Grimsley, .£I?.· cit ., p . 58 .
4
1
Loc. cit.
2
Ibid., p. 64 .
-
12
replaces Heide ger
1
s dread in the fac e of death with the
Kierkegaardian concept of dread in th face of f r edom it self. The free resolve itself is dreadful, since it carries
with it the awareness that, unjustifiably and absurdly but
inevitably, t he individual must himself create the values
that make his world a world. The nothingness in t he fac e
of which dread arises is a kind of annihilation or negation.
It is th utter disparity between the bare facts t h t
are there and the something els e that is not , but which
without the comfort of divine sandio or material n e ces sity, I in my agonizing liberty must fashion of them.
Man is condemned to be free, that is continually t o
make hims elf other t1an h e is, and de p dre ad accom panies th awareness of that destiny . J
Thus t he determ·ne atheist artre insists t hat we
must com to t er ms with anguish and ot ingness and try to
feel at h ome witn them, for it is t hey w ich const · t u t e
existence.
Sartre's poin of vi ew is not shar ed by all w ho are
calle exist entialists . Perhaps a greater number of them
consider tis de ep anxiety to b e only a part of a progr es sion towards authentic existence, a stage through w hich one
must pass. Freedom s discovered when t he indivi dual en counters Nothingness . But this encounter l eads to deep
anxiet:l and de ir . aul Tilli h has given ontolo ical
pri or ·ty to thi s desp ir which he character izes as
4
3
arene , op . cit ., • 54 .
---- ,. -
129
involving three e ·stential anxieti e s : an.x ety of fate and
death, a threat to antic sel - affirn1 t_. on; anx · ety of
emptiness or meaningless es , a threat to s ·ritual s elf
affirmation; and anxi ety of guilt and condemnation , a
threat to moral sel - affi rmation. 11 three anxi eties,
inherent in the natur e of man, contribute to despair , which
is an ultimat e or "boundary-line" s i tuation w hich on e cannot
o beyond.44 "11 human life can be interprete - as a con
tinuous att empt t o avoid de s air . n45 I n a sim·1ar manner
Kierkegaar analy zes dr ead , r elating it to sin .
6
This de ep despai r is the Verw iflung, the condition
created by the total victory of doubt over certitude .
After doubt has done i ts worst , wrenching the mind com
pletely away from Bein~ and confr ont·ng it with Nothingness,
then despair reigns . 4 7
But this despair is n ot arrived at by rational
process es . It is the result of the meaninglessness and
irrelevancy of the world being discovered by man ir1 the
light of his desperate passi on . This irrelevancy could not
be detected and felt unless passion had its own criterion
4-l+rrillich, The Courage to~' pp . 35 ff .
45rbid . , p . 56.
46Kierkegaard , 2.E.· cit., pp . 96 ff.
47Kuhn, -2.E• cit . , p . 6 .
13
of relevance. In e sp air one dis cov r s hat noth · g w thin
or outside the world can as s uage ass onat e desire ; co se-
quently everythin s irr .le vant . The r e ult of thi
despairing circumstanc e i s a dialec t ic of "unh ppy nd in-
conclusive vacillation between t he poles o restles s
inactivity and lis t l e s s ac t ivity."48 The re sult is
tedium, and boredom.
•
nnui ,
It is at this point o ennui and its meanin that the
continuum upon w hich xi stent ial i s t think r s can be placed
is first to be discerned . The po ition of Sartre has al ready been delineated abov e . He h as found h s home within
this despair. Heidegger forme 1 shar t h i s posit · on .
In recent times, owev er, h e h a s become mor e hopeful, em bracing Holderlin
1
s prophetic promise of the future advent
of the gods or God. i er keg aard and Ja pers can be placed
in a separate category. They sens e the n eces sity of this
stage of tedium and despair as the opening or critical
phase in a dialectic w hi ch culminates i n c ertitud . The
theologians Barth, Brunner, and einhold Ni ebuhr would also
fall into this category .
At the ot her end of the continuum Gabriel Marcel and
Martin Buber may be plac ed . In arc e l ' s mys t ic 1 empiricism
despair and ennui result from an initial er ror. Once t he
48
Ibid. , p . 88 .
er or s el minated, the ennui disappears. The error (o
he whole man) consists in stayin wit in the sphere of
disintereste objectivity. As the ti e of objectivity
131
settles o things an persons, they become alienat from
the livi g concrete man. But if man will enter into con
crete experiences of participatio through which the "I
Thou" r elation is established with others, the self is per
ce ved in its true presence, and finally the presence of
the "Eternal Thou" is realized. He is del vered from the
omain of "having" and rejoins the "inexhaustible plenitude
of Beine ." In the words of Marcel, "To this superabundance
Is all respond with a perpetual encore , which is tn very
o posite of ennu · ."49 Kuhn suggests that Buber and arcel
are only on the perip ery of existentialism in the light of
their rejection of the essential need for the experience of
despair . 5° It is certainly true, at least, that thes e
figures do move rapidly from this point, an it is implied
that despair is not absolutely essential to the process
through which man must go to discover authenti c existence,
although it is often present .
Disregarding for the time being the "solution" to
the problem of desp ai r which Marcel provides, the discussion
49rbid., p. 95, quoting from Journal metaphysique
(Paris, 1927), pp. 275- 280 .
50Loc . cit .
132
at this point has led to the recognition of a deep ontologi
cal anxiety which results from the encollilt er with Nothing ness and the victory of doubt over certitude. It has been
implied that this is a stage in man's progress towards
authentic existence. For the time bein , however, it is
necessary to leave man in this state of total despair in
order to examine the nature of his estrangement. Following
the discussion of estrangement the progression toward self
affirming existence will be taken up again in its aspects of
crisis and illumination.
(5) Existence involves estrangement. The general
position of philosophy has been characterized by an effort
to systematize the signs of reality in order to locate man
1
s
place within a comprehensive and orderly world. The system
of signs is considered to be a structural feature of realit~
and it constitute s the orderliness within which man finds
his place in a homelike and habitable world. It is against
this claim of sins which reveals a comprehensive orderli
ness that existentialism revolts. The existentialist looks
at the world and finds that it is characterized, not by
signs, but by a sens e of alienation and a feeling of
estrang ement which has been growing more apparent in man
during the last hu.n r ed y ears. Existentialism is a phi
losophy of crisis, openly and directly express ed, cent er ed
upon the fact of estrangement.
133
The facts to which alienation objectively refers
are the product of the c anges in human society which have
resulted from the concentration of vast number of persons
in cities where they are cut off from natur , and from the
collectivizin tren w hich is bound up witl the machine a e .
The evidences of alienat on resulting from these changes
are revealed in the different kinds of dissociation, the
break or ruptur e between human beings and their objects,
whether the latter be other persons, the natural world, or
their own creations in art, science, ad society. Subjec
tively there is further manifestation of this estrangement
in the feelings of iseq·uilibriu.m, disturbance, stran ~ eness,
and anxiety which best man.
The existentialist maintain that man is living, not
in an orderly, rational world, but in a world without signs.
This is actually less than a world , for it becomes a mere
congeries of obstrusive existents. In the experience in
which man encounters Nothingness , he becomes estranged, and
the things aroun him which formerly were familiar and
meaningful lose the r meaning and the world becomes oblit
erated. Man's status a.midst reality becomes that of a total
stranger. The classic expression of estrangement appears
in Kierkegaard's Repetition:
One sticks one's finger into the soil to tell by the
smell in what land one is: I stick my finger into ex
istence--it smells of nothing . Where am I? Who am I?
How came I here? hat is this thing called the world?
What does this worl mean? ho is it that has lured me
13
into th thi
O
and now leaves me thee? ••• How did I
come into this world? hy was I not consulte? hy
not ma e acquainte w"th its manne s customs but
w s thrust into the ranks as though I had been bou ht
of a kidnapper, a dealer in souls? How di I obtain an
inter st in this bi enterprise they call reality? hy
should I have an interest in it? Is it not a voluntary
concern? An if I am com elle to tak~ part in it,
where is the ·r ctor? ••• hither s all I turn wit
my co plait? istence is surely a debate--may I beg
ta my view be take into consideration? If one is to
take the world as it is, would it not be better never
to learn what it is?51
One is estranged from the worl . It is rneaningless,
continent , me e ossibil·ty, without any ui eposts which
c n show one how to find any significant r eality . But one
"
s lso st~ange from himsel . In Heidegger ' s Sein und
Zeit man is thrown into the world and he appears as uilty,
not in moral conte t, but as a "being- outside- himself,"
in his "ek-sistence ." In self- alienation man su.rren ers
himself unto a worl d w ich n turn is alien to him. Home
lessness is thus a fundamental aspect of the world, for
which Heiaegger uses the term, Unheimlichkeit . This could
be rendere as an uncanny , insidi usly mysterious 'unhome
li eness . " u.hn interprets this self- estrangement in an
al en world.
Heidegger's worl closes round man like a prison,
an yet it is a self-imprisonment which he suffers .
The for ignness of the world is man
1
s alienation from
himself-- an al enation which is not his accidental
defect but the fun arnental defectiveness of his nature .
5L u.hn, t 3
.£E.• C ., pp .
f . , quotin epetition,
pp . 1 ff .
135
Man p oj cts his own temporality (he is essent ially
time) onto the screen of Nothin ness. Thanks to his
flight an defection from himself, he has world. And
this worl of his interposes itself between hls ego and
othin ness. To it he may clin as to his shelter and
ars enal of tools and call i t home in the cowardly r e fusal to r ec ognize its transparency towards Nou ht .
The illusion of a hom like worl is th anguished fli ght
of the mind from its encounter with othingness towards
which it moves as ts own ineluctable end •••• Del ·v
erance from illusion is to be achieved by the man w o
op ning himself to anguish, resolutely faces Notb.ingness
in anticip tion of his own extinction.52
The estran em nt of man from his world becomes also
estran ement from himself. But this estran em t also
effects man's relationships with other beings. Men under
stan each other throu ha world common to all members
within which mutual understanding takes place. But an es
tran ed world removes the common order which is the basis
of communion ; therefore man is forced into solitude. Sur
face relations between persons continue of course, but there
can be no genu ne communion whic involves the deep sharing
o purpo es into a common accord of living . strangement
thus involves loneliness . "It holds the individual in soli
tary confinement within the impervio·us walls of his indi-
vi uality ."53 Kierkegaard calls this "bein locked up with in oneselr.n54
52
Ibid., p. 34.
53rbi ., p. 36 .
5
Loe. cit.
136
Thus estran ement involves a isintegration of
society . No the herm·t n the frican desert is the syr~ol
of solit ude in an estranged world but
The desert is squeezed in the tube-train next to you,
The desert is in the heart of your brother.55
Jean Paul Sartre, who cannot take man out of his
estrangement, considers the relation of man- to- man to be a
radical conflict.
(It) is recognition that anoth r salf is looking at
one ' s self as an object. The other existence whlch
t hus reveals itself is annih"lation of myself as sub ject--and such an annihilation I am bound to try by
every means in my power to ovarcome. Therefore, be tween myself as subject and the other who sees me as
ob j ect , between my freedom and its destruct on in
another ' s possession of me, there arises a circle of
con licts which constitutes the whole pattern of possi bl e intersubject ve rel ionships . 56
In Sartre all relat ons between persons are, ex s tent i ally , a battle to the death and one ' s reactions to
another are alw ys the reactions of fear, shame, or pride .
Ther e is no concept of the need of human beings for to ether
nes s as a way out of the dilemma of estrangement . Karl
Jaspers counteracts this position of Sartre by tak ng the
exactly opposite point of view. For him authentic existence
is only poss ble in union with another self . He defines
communication as the deep togetherness of two persons who
55rbid., p . 37, quoting T . s. liot, "The ock."
5
6
Grene op . cit., pp. 79 ff.
-
137
strug le jointly to realize, "always precariously, yet
absolutely, the fulfillment of th~ r deepest personal re
ality.'57
The pattern of the pilgrlma e of the existentialist
individual now begins to take some form. It has been shown
that man must come face to face with the terrible fact of
Nothing . His alienation is symptomatic of an unconscious
uneasiness in the face of this coming encounter . When he
meets othin ness, he becomes aware of the dreadful r eality
of his own freedom and is filled with despair . All that
has heretofore been meaningful in his world, in himself, in
his relationships with others, now becomes estranged and
alienate . Is there a way out of this estran ement into
authentic existence? This is the question of which the
e istential answer is now to be sought.
(6) Thee istentialist individual endures cris i s.
---------
The philosophy of existentialism has been called the "phi losophy of crisis," and rightly so from several stand points.5 First, it is concerned with the crisis of the
contemporary world. It has been shown that it has sprung
up as a revolt against the rationalistic approach which has
failed to meet adequately the tragic circumstances which
57rbid . , p. 134.
5
einemann, o. cit., p . 167 .
-
confront twe tieth century man.
138
econ ly, it is a philosophy
of crisis in th tit focuses attention upon t e predicament
of the i i vidual man as he faces the crucial issues of
life . To be an existential individual is to be totally
concerne about one's ult i mate destiny . Finally, existen tialism is a philosophy of crisis in the sense that crisis
is a necess ry st age t rou h which one must pass in order
to re 1·ze one ' s authentic selfhood. It is the nature of
th sin ividual crisis experience which is the concern at
this point .
It was indic t ed previously that the individual,
thro·ugh the prodding of an ont olo i cal anxiety, seeks
deeper an deeper i nto his own subjective moods until,
finally , he is confronted with the fact of non- being ; he
encounters the "reality of Nothing." I n t hi s encounter he
is confronted with his own fr eedom . This fills h m with
dread w1ic deepens into espair . This existential desp air
is what Tillich refers to as a bonndary-line situation
which one cannot go beyona .59 Now the dialectical process
throug which one achieves authentic selfhood continues :
The struggle through the slou h of despondency is
conceive as the first phas e of a dialectical advance .
The na iris reached, and now the upward move is to
start . Despair has done its worst, and w e are now
lookin toward a happy issue from our philosophic
59
Till1 · c' . t 54
, .£E• Cl. •' p . •
139
troubles. piritual death is to reveal itsvlf as a
crisis followed by reb rt .60
In order to fin man's true self and to discover the
true nature of reality man must under o this crisis. One
encounters the extreme situation, is push d to the limits
of his endurance, lives through i t, and emer es as an
authentic person. The exact attern oft e crisis is not
the same in all existential philosophies, nor does it as
sume th same degre of importance. I t is central in the
thought of Kierkegaard, Jaspers and t he theology of
Brunner and Barth. 0 hat ess si n · ficant but still
necessary, ·tap ears in the henomenolo ical system f
Heide ger and Sartre. In the thought of Buber and ~arcel
it is of littl e con equence .
The significant characteristic f the
•
eris is t hat
it requires a decision by the individual . This is primary.
The individual, in the f ce of t his crisis , must make a
choic e which effects him ultimately . Kuhn states that this
choice may concern three aspects of existence. It is not
the choice between alternatives, for this woul posit ob
jects wh· .h woul 1 ·mit man
1
s freedom . Similar y, the
choice cannot be between good ad evil , for such a choic e
requ·res objective standard of truth. In t e deepening
de pair of existent·alism the individual has bee me
60 uhn , EE· cit. , p . 103.
estranged. Objective truth no lon.ger exists as meanin ·ful
for him. The only truth is that which comes with self
authentication, subjectively. Henc e the criterion which
posits choice is intensity or passion. Since man's status
in this estranged world is despair, the first choic e man
makes is to will despair with the maximum intensity. De
spair so willed becomes absolute despair which is "despair
freely accepted and willed, ••• despair triurnphin ov er
itself, growing creative, and thereby ceasing to be de spair."61 Existential analysis thus by destruction of
objective truth "is designed to arm us for actual life as
revealed by an extreme situation . It forces us into Notr1ing
ness, and by sharpening despair to i t s finest point , breaks
it."62
The second form this choice may take is the choice
of freedom as the supreme good. As despair was not a choice
between alternatives, so freedom is not an alternative to
servitude. One is not free not to choose freedom. One is
"free in knowledge about one's freedom" when he is "con
fronted with the nothingness of sheer possibilities .
11
63 As
man is so confronted, he finds t hat he is faced by the
61Ibid., p. 108.
62
10c. cit.
63Ibid., p. 110.
"abyss of his own freedom" and suffers intense, unbearable
anguish and giddiness--he is at the climax of the crisis.
Tne fina l aspect of this choice Kuhn suggests is the
choice of oneself. The self, threatened with disintegra
tion in the face of its existential analysis, chooses it
self with the same degree of intensity with which it willed
despair and fre edom. In the intensity of this choice the
self becomes a unity, which "is th or anizing principle of
selfhood, freedom in action, ••• liberty under commit-
1nent.n64 The exact nature of t his authenticated self is
determined by the existentialist being read. But all a ree
that as this crisis is reached the self "chooses itself and
finds authentic selfhood."
The examination of existentialism has led to a
crisis. Man, filled with despair, drinking deeply of its
wine, finds himself at t he climax of t he crisis--he must
make a choice--a leap--in order to find himself and to
achieve his goal of true knowledge. This leap is a return
to himself and to his own experience, defined in many ways
by the various exponents of exist entialism. To the leap
and its return to immediacy, attention is now directed.
(7) Existentialism involves~ return to immediacI•
The opening discussion of existentialism dealt with the
64
Ibid. , p. 117.
142
nature of the mov ement as a r evolt against reason and it
replacement by personal experience as the means of deter mining authentic knowledge . Existentialism is thus a
return to immedi acy in a dual sense. First, this is the
basic characteristi c or t he movement . Return to immediacy
is the fundamental nature of e istentialism. Secondly,
return to immediacy is also stae · n the istential·st
drama, the f inal stage . Therefore the ensuin discussion
of t h scone t constitutes not only the conclu ing aspec
of existentialist conver ion, but it also serves s a sum
mary of the philosophical approach under consideration .
Exist entialist thinkers are "callin men back to
existence'' in the face of an industrial c vilization and
its philosophies which t end to creat e and to use an analyti
cal rationalism which transforms all things, even man him self, into an object for critical examination and control .
The cultural forc e is a logical or naturalistic mechanism
which threatens to destroy individuality, personal freedom
and decision, and which breaks down genuine community.
Furthermore, t hi s drive in estern civilization is toward a
secularistic humanism which ignores the finitude of man and
his ultimat e dependence for all that he is and has upon the
Creator God, t he source of all existence.
In the light of these t endencies of contemporary
culture, the existent al ts are:
143
Critici zin the identification of ality o Being
with Reality-as-known, with the object of eason or
thou ht . St arting fr om the t raditional distinction
betwe en •ess ence• and •existenc e,' they insist t hat
eal i t y or Be ing in its concret en es s and fullness is
not •essenc e,' is not the obj ect of cognitive experi enc e , but is rather 'exist ence,' i s Reality as immedi at ely exp eri enced with the accent on the inner and
pers onal character of man's immediat e experience. Like
Ber gson, Bradley, James, and Dewey , the •Existentialist•
philosophers are appealing from the conclusions of
'rationalistic' thinking , which equat es eality with the
ob ject of thought, with r elati ons or •essence,' to
Reality as men xp erience it immedi at ely in thei'ractual
livi n . They cons equently take t heir place with all
t hose who have regarded man's 'immediate exper nee'
e.s r eveal i n more cornpletely the nature and traits of
eality t han man's cognitive e perience . Tne philosophy
o ' xistence
1
is hence one version of that widespread
appeal to i l at e e perience whic has been so mar ed
a f eature in recent thought.65
This r e je cti on of t he co nit i ve as the guide to
real i t y is appar ent in the writings of Soren ierkegaar as
he reacts against the Hegelian abstrac t ions which lead to
the Absolute Ideal:
Abstract t hought can grasp reality only by destroy
ing i t , and this destruction of reality consists o
t ransf orming it i nto me r e possibility ..•• The only
real·ty to w hich an individual may have a relation th&t
i s mor e than merely cognitive is his own realit y, the
f act that he exists.66
I t has been suggested e ar l ier that the way by which
t he indivi dual encounters true real ity or being is through
his own experience when it acquires a maximum intensity of
65paul Tillich, "Exist entialist Philosophy," Journal
of l h ~ i st ory of Ideas, 5:44, January, 19 •
66Kier egaar d , Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
pp . 279 f.
144
feeling . The istentialist t ·nker is t he passionate or
intereste t inker ." 67 ier egaar e pr esses this thou ·ht
as t e way of ait . " ... n objective nncerta ·nty held fast
in the mo t passionate personal experience is the truth,
the highes truth attainable for an Existin in ividua1 .
11
68
Thee istential immediacy described abov is the
means of revealing the basic nature of reality . The crisis
ex erience of ex stentialism is fundament ally a means by
which an in ight into Being is
•
C ,U l
•
I t thus leads to
lns i ht bout 1 an
1
s place in the worl .
The i_ in o a pos · tion be ond t e abyss of Noth-
i
0
ness is to nvolve a vision imperviou to that criti
cal {Existent ial) analysis w ich helps to n uc e the
eris s . This invulne able vis·on is •.. to emerge
o , of crisis an i m u s t be seize by the saving act
of cho·ce .
1
To w·11 fr ee om, an to i ll th unveili
of Being-- his s one nd the sam choice .
1
69
Te e t r to ·mme i ac · s thus ti e up to ontologi cal concerns . Tillich states that t his ontological charac
ter of e iste1tial imm iacy goe s beyon the sub ject-obj ct
ichotomy to a ee er stratum in which genuine Being is
encountered .
The thinking o the ~xistential t hinke r is based on
his immediate e sonal an inner experience. I t is
67Tillich, " 7'."l · s t ent·alist Philosophy , " p . 53.
6 Cier ega rd , Concludin~ Unsci entific tost~cri2t,
pp . 279 f .
' our
2: 641
69iuhn , o . cit ., p . 12;, quoting imone e Beauvo·r,
une moral8de l
1
ambiguit e,' Les Temps Moderne s ,
Januar 16, 1947.
145
rooted in an interpretation of Being or Reality which
does not identify Reality with •objective being.• But
it woula be equally misleading to say that it identifies
Reality with •subjective being,' with •consciousness• or
feeling. Such a vie w would still leave the meaning of
•subjective• determined by its contrast with that of
•objective'; and this is contrary to what ~xistential
philosophy is aiming at. Like many other appeals to
immediate experi nee , it is trying to find a level on
which the contrast between
I
s·ubject
I
and ' object ' has
not risen. It aims to cut wider t e 'subject-obj ect
distinction• and to r each that stratum of Being which
Jaspers, for instance, calls the
1
Ursprung
1
or ' Source.•
But in order to penetrate to this stratum we must leave
the sphere of
1
objectiv e
1
things and pass throu h the
corresponding •subjective ' inner exp rience, until we
arrive at the immediate creative experience or •sou1.
1
70
The philosophy of existence maintains tha t thro h
immediate experience one arrives at the true nature of
Being. The r·eturn to immediacy is, however, in t erms of
intensity of feelings. The emotions, then, are not merely
subjective feeling tones, but they have an ontological sig
nificance. Tillich refers to them as "half-symbolic, half realistic indications of the structure of Reality itself . "7
1
One does not discover Reality by systematic thought, nor
even by systematic self-examination . ather, one stumbles
upon true reality unawares through the intensive feelings
of oneself when confronted by total conc ern about one '
ultimate destiny.
But the return to immediacy thus far discussed has
70Tillich, "E ist ntialist Philosophy,'' p . 55 .
7llbid., p. 56.
been in relation to the total philosophi cal position of
existentialism. It is more than this. It is the distinc
tive end, the final stage of thee istential drama of
crisis.
The cont nt of this return to immedi acy, rather, the
nature of immediacy experi enc es, vari e s with the diff er ent
existentialist thinkers. It was indicat ed that the existen
tial crisis eventuated in a climax in which t he indivi dual
was forced to take a leap. The point at which he lands
af'ter this "leap" is not suggested by the drama up to the
point of the crisis. There is here a radical discontinuity
which is interpreted differently by the various existential
ists. In accord with the existentialist approach which
denies reality to being-as-known, a phenon 1enological
analysis in terms of psychological perspectives may serve
to presage the distinctive character of the "leap" for the
different thinkers.
Fron1 t he phenomenology of Husserl, taken and modi
fied by Heidegger, Sartre, and Jaspers, comes a psyc11ologic al
concept which is helpful at this point. It is the concept
of projection. The individual, in the process of relating
himself to a reference or "object" of knowledge, interposes
a construct of his own maki g between himself and the ob
ject. Thus what one p erceive s is not the object, but one's
own perception of t he object in ter1 ns of his own projection
system. Similarly, one perceives himself, n either as he
147
"really" is, nor as others see him. Hem intains an instru
mental construct of himself, which may be confused with the
real self. The individual has to come to terms with his
world as he perceives it, and the projective distortions of
himself of n ecessity result in similar distortions of t he
world around him. This projection system, together with the
demands for rational unity and the demands of inner needs
not consciously defined, determine t e nature of philosophi cal systems and r eligious interpretations of r eality . Since
a common reality is essential for interpersonal relations
to be carried on, a common collectiv projection system is
created upon which the participants agree.7
2
The collectiv e projection system may break down.
Such occurred at the time of the eformation.73 But the
projection system of the individual may also break down.
The nworl d" of the individual, in which he was at horne,
collapses, and he is thrown back upon his own subjectivity.
This breakdown of projection means a return to immediacy.
The return is to the world of the real self, and it is es tranged from that which it formerly knew as its familiar
world. Tne subject is confronted with an irrational, mean
ingless surrounding which becomes what the existentialists
7
2
Donal H. Rhoades, "Essential Varieties of Ex istentialism," The Personalist, 35:32-40, January, 1954.
73Ibid., p. 35 .
148
refer to as the "horrifying encounter with Nothingness."74
The individual cannot remain in this state of pure
Subject without relating himself to some Othern ss. Donald
H. Rhoades suggests that ther e are two ways out of this
situation. The individu 1 may construct a new, narrower
projection-system which has every referend ultimately de termined within the self. Or, the individual, finally
aware of his genuine selfhood, may move int o relationships
with other Subjects, acknowledgin their affirmat·ve being
as selves like unt o himself . Tnese constitute the two
extremes of the basic types of immediacy which may be
acknowledged .75
This r eturn to immediacy is the result of the ex
istentialist leap, and it is interpreted diffe r ently by the
representatives of the movement. Sartre avers that man is
what he makes himself . "Solitude, but with absolute self
responsibility, is the truth of existence."76 Man is free dom, and he must make himself what he is to be . This is
clearly a secondary projection sy stem; although artre
attempts to circumvent the charge , his position s essenti ally solipsistic.
In a similar way Heidegger insists upon the resolute
7
Ibi . ,
75Ibi .,
pp . 34 ff .
. 37.
76
Loc. cit •
149
decision o the individual man who, thrust into an alien
world which is but a projection system, resolutely faces
the impossibility of all possibilities, namely, his own
death, an thus moves into authentic selfhood. Man is in
the-world, limited by death and experienced in anguish; "he
is aware of himself as essentially an ious, burdened by his
own solitude within the horizon of temporality."77 Initi
ally Heidegger, as artre, found no God, nor even concrete,
personal meeting with other selves. In more recent days he
has become enamored w·th the poetry of Rilke and Holderlin
and is lookin, with them, for the gods which are to come.
Similar to Heideg er and Sartre in acknowledging
that the world is only a project constructed by the indi
vidual, Karl Jasp ers moves beyond them in the recognition
of a transcendenc e which is behind no-thing-ness.
Whether it be hwnan drama or in scientific discovery,
we sense that there is something other than ourselves,
something which exceeds us; and we assert ourselves in
our existence in relation with this transcendence.78
This transcendence is the Umgreifend , the 11-enveloping,
the other-than-us which encompasses us. Jaspers also goes
beyond Kierkegaard as well as the aforementioned men in the
recognition of other selves and the possibility of direct
commwiication with them·. ·hile Jaspers holds to the
77wahl, E.E· cit., p. 31 .
7 Ibid., p. 9.
150
centrality of the drama in crisis in which man must be
"shipwrecked to be saved," he finds at the core of his
system the struggling love with other persons ·n communica
tion.
The thoroughly ambiguous, often erratic, Ki erkegaard
can also be placed in a middling position between the ex
tremes of solipsism and relatedness. He is closely al l ied
with Heidegger and Sartre in his e phasis upon extreme
individualism, the solitary, lone p erson seeking authenti
city through personal inwardness. The individual t akes a
risk in each decision, and as he chooses with infinite
passion, his choice is th Infinite. Yet K~erkegaard never · ►
establishes a significant relationship between the indi-
vidual and his God. He moves in this direction, but stops
short. He may be granted a position to the "right" of
Sartre and Heidegger on the basis of his r ecogni tion of God
and his quasi-Christian projection syste1n.
The Catholic theologian Gabri 1 Marcel, follows the
lead of his favorite philosopher, Bergson, in insisting
that the most significant immediacies of experience are the
experiences of relationship with one's fellowmen. The de
spair of the self in its encounter with Nothingness is not
the result of a basic ontological structure of man, but it
is the result of an erro~ which may be corrected. It is
not necessary, therefore, for man to suffer int is way
prior to his findin authenticity in relationship. That
relationship with the eternal T ou is the direct opposite
of the despair of men--it is eternal hopefulness.
Finally, Martin Buber, Jewish theologlan , bases his
entire system upon the I -Thou relationship. This involves
the relation bet we en roan a man, and man an God. When ore
treats another as an I, an end, not as an It , or an object,
and, in turn, one is treated as an I, a relationship is
established in which the true self is authenticated . Bube
makes a fine distincti on between the Real ~elf
..................
nd the false
self which is constructe in order to flee from the unre
li bility of false relationships. This false s~l must be
c st asid e in or er for true I - Thou relations to be estab
lishea.79
Th e essential differences between the various forms
of existentialism thus become a parent inters of the end
of existentialism, the return to immediacy . The posit ons
may vary from t he enie - but-obviou solipsism of Sartre
through the relational position of Bub~r and Marcel which
all but deny the essential character of tha existential
rarna.
2xistentialism, reaction against thought systems and
culture whi ch find i t necessary to maxe man an object,
constitutes a pilgr image through the feelings and subjective
79 d
4 o es, ' sse t · al Varieties of .wxistentialism,"
p. 39 .
152
moos of the indivi ual into he epths of a total desp ·r
~ se ontolo ical charact r
6
iv~s a clue to the uth ntic
natllre of Being and ret·urns him t o t he immed cy of his own
experience n which he fi ds hls true , authent i c, self ood .
This baptis o ~xistentialism has been referred to by the
personal: st , ~ ';.JUITlanuel ounier, as
. •· ·
a return of the religious element into the worl, for
the ex stentialist dialectic swings man from existence
lost throu h despair to exist~nce re ained~ whether
escribed in religious or atheistic terrns . oO
It is now very apparent that this philosophical
system, if such it ay be called, coul have a close af finity with certain types of Christian theology . To estab lish the posltion that these affinities do, in fact, e ist,
is the function of the concluding portion of this chapter .
~VID~NCES OF E ISTE TIALISr WITHIN CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY
Tr1e · nfluence of xistentialism upon certain types
of contemporary theology is so widely acknowledged and
generally accepted th tit seems hardly necessary to comment
upon it . However, for th purposes of this stu dy it is
necessary to make reference to the general character of
this influence and to give some brief examples of ex·sten tiali t th:nking drawn from the wor ks of several contem porary theologians.
80
7mrnanuel l ounier, Exis t ential Ph .. losophies, trans .
~ric Blow (Bristol : ank n Bros., Ltd., 1948), p . I29 .
1.53
That existentialism is making a pro1'ound impact upon
contemporary theology in America is evidenced by the tact
that it ~as the chief topic under consideration at the 1950
meeting of the American Theological Society. In 1953-1954
the lectures in Christian Biography at Drew University were
given under the title, "The Challenge of Christian Existen
tialism." In speaking of these lectures Carl Michalson
writes, "A cultural movement which 1s exercising so great
an influence upon the reformulation of Christian thought
deserves to be appraised."~l
It was suggested earlier that the father or existen
tialist philosophy was the Danish thinker, Soren Kierkegaard.
In his writings are towid the basic concepts which charac
terize this movement. Early in this century a renewed
interest took place in Kierkegaard as a theologian. His
influence upon the thinking of Karl Barth, and other neo
orthodox theologians, in the development of "Dialectical
Theology" or "Crisis Theology" is well known.
The 'Theology of Crisis• developed by Karl Barth,
Karl Heim, and Emil Branner, influential in Europe and
widely known in this cowitry between the two wars, is
based on a similar conceptual framework, has a similar
purpose, and is d~rived from the same source as •exist
ence• philosophy.~2
8lcarl Michalson (ed.), Cnristianitz and the Existen
tialists (Bev York: Charles Scrlbnerls Sons, l95b), p. ·xttt.
82
Herbert L. Searles, "Kierkegaard's Philosophy as a
source or Existentialism," The Personall1t, 29:174, Spring,
1948.
15'
Carl Michalson, writing on "Falth and xlstential
Freedorn" obs rvas that,
It is an intellectual event of major importance that
theology is now turning for its definition of freedom
to existentialism, for there philosophical and theo
logical concerns have come
8
together in a way unprece
dented in Western Thought . 3
Crisis theology , starting with Karl Barth, but now
containing many diverse strands,is generally r eferred to as
"neo-orthodo --1 y." It is exemplified by two elements: (1) a
return to the confessional aspects of Reformation Theology
with its emphasis upon depravity of man and the Grace of
God, and (2) the existentialist concepts of crisis, the
rejection of reason, and the concern for subjectivity. In
the words of Melville Channing-Pearce this type of Christi
anity is conceived of as:
..• a new life reborn from the
1
drea and trembling,'
disaster and death, which is characteristic of the
thought of such as i erkegaard and Karl Barth--the
religion of a terrible and intense candour of spirit
wrought to a diamond-like induration and brilliance by
a poignant inner experience of catastrophe.
For all these thinkers Christianity, in its tradi
tional form, is in the melting-pot; all are acutely
conscious of a common psychol g ·cal climate of crisis
and catastrophe; all alike are striving towards a type
of thought whic may best be termed
1
existential
1
and
a faith which shall be the affirmation, not of any one
faculty, but of the whole man, of which the criterion
is, not lo~ic, but existential reality.84
83carl M ichalson, "Faith and E istential Freedom,"
eligion in Life, 21:513, utumn, 1952.
84Melville Channing-Pearce, The Terrible Crystal
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1939),
p. xi.
155
These existentialist aspect of crisis theology can
be traced to their source in Kierkegaard, whose existential
ist framework was never remov d from his theolo ical affir
mations. It is "Christian existentialism." This assertion
is self-evident in the following summary of ierkegaard
1
s
thought taken from Channing-Pearce.
He (Kierkegaard) affirmed an •existential' mode of
judgment delivared, not by the intellect in i elation,
but by the full consciousness, passing, by a •dialectic'
of its own, from an initial unmitigated 'dread,' in an
•Instant• distinct from historical time, by a
1
leap• of
individual choice independent of the process of logic,
to the affirmation of the fundamental p radox of being
(for Kierkegaard incarnate in Christ) and to a re-birth
of the essential self and a faith engendered by the same
process in the same •Instant.' This reborn spirit-life
involves, for him, a real and absolute dying to an de
tachment from the phenomenal and sensual world and,
therefore •severity,' suffering , a •double danger'
(since both natural and spiritual life are risked),
•separateness• and •martyrdom.• Its matrix is an ex
treme •inwardness,• subjectivity and individualism.
But, although this re-birth is actuated by individual
choice, it is generated and matured by a power other
than human. This reborn spirit-being passes from a
natal •severity,'
1
dread,
1
and wrath to an eventual
'gentleness,' love and peace.e5
Thus the existentialist elements in the thought of
Kierkegaard are inseparably tied to his theology9 This tie
has been acknowledged and used by those theologians upon
whom the writings of Kierkegaard are makin such a profound
impact, particularly in America during the last two decades.
The theologian most readily associated with
85
Ibid., pp. 44 f.
156
Kierkegaard and with the existential concepts within his
theology is arl Barth. Barth himself acknowled es his
debt to Kierkegaard; however he refers to the presence of
existential philosophical concepts within his theology as
only small scraps "floating on tne surfac e ." No man has
done mor e in this century to attack reason as an adequate
means of discerni g t e nature of reality and of God than
Barth. hen he was ch llenged on t he u estion of w hether
or not the Christian faith need be justified int e lan
guage of universal reason an philosophy he r eplied :
Further, ·tis forced down my throat that the
Dogmatic theolo ian is under the obligation t o 'justify '
himself and his utterances before philosophy . To that
my answer is likewise, o. Dogmatics has to justify
itself only before God in Jesus Chr st; concretely,
before Holy Scripture within the Church •••• It cannot
be otherwise than that Do _ matics runs counter to every
philosophy no matter w hat form it may have assumed •
. • • All our activities of thinking and speaking can
have only a secondary significance and, as ac t ivities
of the creature , cannot possibly coinc ide with the
truth of God that is the source of truth in t he world.
The value of what theology has to say is measured by
no standard except that of its obfect •.•• The ques
tion of 'proper ' language of theo ogy is ultimately to
be answ8red only with prayer and the life of faith . 86
Thus Barth by his rejection of reason operat e s under the
basic premise of e istentialism, whether he acknowled es it
or not.
Reason
quotin
A number of thi ers clearly classify Barth as an
86
1 . Harold e ·olf , The eli~iou~ evolt ·gainst
{N eN York : Harper and Brothers, 1949), pp. 23 f.,
Karl Barth, Credo, pp . 185-186.
157
existentialist. Among them is Vergilius Ferm who S'Wnrnarizes
his thin ing in the followi g manner :
nother exponent of Existentialism is the theologian,
arl Barth, who also affirms the bankruptcy of reason
in the face of ultimate reality. Christianity is a
religion set apart from all other religions and rests
upon what God does for man, including self-disclosure
in a supernatural way and not upon man ' s searchi •
The anguish is still there until complete surrender is
made . The
I
Jor of God ' must tak possession . The
ord is in es sence the same as Luther roclaimed in his
Christological emphasis . Thus the reaff~rmation of a
lo1g tradition : man t he ~·nner, man a derelict, who is
bedeviled by h i s t hou hts and ever-helples s until he
be omes possessed by a transrational experience of
oth rness . Biblicis takes the place of even the most
exalted type of ordinary reason and e peri e ce .
Philosophers are playboys, and so ar e all theolog·ans
who do not lit t he pattern . Thus, hail to the major
early Protestant Reform rs and a r eturn to eformation
Theology ( e ven as steeped as it was in mediaeval
Catholic and Augustinian patterns ). True Barth has
87
softe ed . The fad ( existentialism) got out of hand.
For) many years t he name of arl Bart r1 has been linked
with t h t of
7
mil Brunner . The latter wore closely with
Barth and shared his crisis t heology until 1929, when they
broke over some specific issues . everthe l ess , t hey have
continued to t hink alike on many important n1atters . Botl1
are to be considered dialec t ical theolog ans . The dispute
carried on between t hem has indicated that Barth is more
radical in his rejection of r eason . However , Brunner shares
the Barthian rejection of philoso hical r eason as a means
of iscovering God .
87vergilius erm, "The N w Fad · n Philosophy and
Theology , ' Crozer ~uarterly, 27: 196 , July, 1950 .
158
It is perhaps not unfittin to describe the theo
logical movement of the present time as one which is
concerned tot e the Biblical concept of God seriously,
nd by doin so to free it and our whole ·nterpretation
of life from the stranglehold of Greek philosophy, in
which it has been stifled for thousands of years .•••
s all natural human action reveals the sinful heart,
so 11 philosophical speculation, when left to ·tself,
bears witness to the obscuration in the inmost recesses
of our reason. For this cause it is impossible to build
up the Christian proclamation of the Gospel and its
theo~ggy on the basis of a philosophical doctr ne of
God .
ot only does Brunner share with Barth the exi ten
t ialist attitude towar reason, he explicitly acknowled es
thv value of ex stentialism in relation to crisis theology :
••• It was left for the newest for of philosophy,
t e existential , to qu tion the vali ity of the
( objecti it -sub ·ectivity) antit·lesis itself . It is
no accident that the source oft is new thinking is to
be found in the greatest Christian thinker of modern
times, Soren ierkegaard. It is therefore particularly
suggestive for us theologians to attach ourselves to
this philosophy, th entire bent of which seems to
correspond with ours.89
Yet with this r ecognition Brunner cannot acknowledge
that any philosophy, even existentialism, may have a formal,
rational method which is relevant to theology .
Yet we must emphasize again that our cons derations
ar e purely theological , that hence they are not de
pendent upon t e correctness or incorrectness of that
philosophical un ertakin which seems to run parallel-
apparently or really--with our own. There are no pre liminary philosophical judgements which we carry over
8 ~ il Brunner , l an and God, trans. Olive Wyon ( ew
Yor : Ch rles Scribner ' s ons, 1939), pp. 3 ff, as quote
in De olfe o. cit., pp. 25 f .
-
89
il Brunner, The iv·ne-Human ncounter, trans •
• Loos ( hiladelphia: The estminster Press, 1943),
159
t o be a e tot eology; wear conc er e d rather with
s omething sui gen eris, na ely, the correlation between
t he or and faith. The nature of this r elation cannot
be derived from any ge eral philosophical propositions-
w ere they even those of existential philosophy--but must
be understood on the basis of primary knowledge of that
corr elation itself, as only ra·th can have such knowl-
e e.90
lmost from the beginning Brunner maintains that
fai t is one thln, r eason another, and the two cannot be
relat ed in theology . Int i s respect, Brunner parallels
the thinking of the Catholic exist entialists, Gilson and
r i t a· n. Brunner draws a contrast between r eveal ed knowl
edge and rational nowledge. It is only in the encounter
hrough r evelation that man receive s the s vin knowledg e
of d vine eality. Expecially concerned with Biblical
r ev elation, Brunn e r describe s it as "a way of acquiring
nowle ge that is absolutely an essentially--and no~ only
relativ ely--opposite to the usual m e tnod of acquiring knowl
e ge , by eans of obs ervation, research, and thought."9
1
This radical separation between r e ason, conceived of
in terms of philosophical analys·s, and revelation is bas e
upon Bru.nner's distrust of rat i onal approaches to God. It
i s inte r esting to note that he cites oren ierkegaard as
the only t hinker since t he Reformation who has correctly
90Loc. cit.
91,mil Brunner,
yon (Philadelphia: The
eason and evelation, trans. Oliv
estminster Press, 1946), p. 23.
160
observed this.
Since {the eformation) the question, To what e tent
should the relation between reason and revelation be
one of war or peace? has never ceased to occupy Protes
tant theology . Twice the solution of a radical
antithesis has been sug ested, first by Soren Kierkegaard
and secondly, under his i nfluence, in the Dialectical
Theolo ·y.92
In Christianitx nd Civilizat·on, which begins with
the existentialist theme oft e depersonalization of per sons, Brunner gives to Kierkeg a rd the accolade of recap
turing the only true Christianity. Speakin of ierkegaard's
influence in the problem of objectivity-subjectivity he
stat es,
It was he who, more than anyone els e , disclos ed the
unreality of Hegel's i ealistic thoughts, pointing to
the problem of existing man. But what ier egaard con
tributed to European thou ht was nothing but original
Christianity and Christian understandin of truth.93
Vergilius Ferm make s this observation about Brunner,
his existentialist framework, and thos e who follow him:
For some of us all reason is an adventure of faith!
But
1
Brunner
1
s faith' builds its OW7l r easons and you
have rational theology all over again (only sanctified).
Paradox? Certainly. But why worry about paradox when
man is only a finit e an helpless little creature before
naked existence\ uch is current Protestant theological
existentialism o that variety. n
4
d ther e are many
kittens drinking from this s uc r . 9
9
2
Ibid., p . 310.
9
3Emil Brunner, Christianits and Civilization ( ew
York: Charles Scribner's ons, l9~ ), pp. 34 f.
9
4Ferm, loc . cit.
It is readily apparent that the Continental theo
logians Barth and Brunner have been profoundly influence
161
by Kierkegaard and his existential theology. The rejection
of reason, the emphas·s upon despair and crisis, and the
demand for "inwardness" which character i ze their thought
stamps it as an edifice built upon the existentialist
approach. But the influenc e of existentialism is also
wi ely felt wit in contemporary merican theological circles.
Th various facets of existentialism have been appropriated
and us ed in varying degre s by dif f er ent · en . ven w·t in
rec nstructionist or nee-liberal theological c·rcl es th~
e isten.tialist emphas · · s upon anxi ety has co bine w· th a
renJwed interest in depth psychology to call for a re
examination of the co cept of man.
It would be diff icult to suggest an American theo
logian more widely read and discussed than 1einhold i\liebuhr .
His writing s evidence existentialist influence at at least
three points: ( 1) in his concern for man's pred i caraont,
(2) in his emphasis upon an~ iety and its signific nee in
understanding m n aright, and (J) in his attitude toward
reason. ~ ucate in the liberal theological tradition,
1~·iebuhr encountere fir~t hand the effects of cont emporary
industrial society upon the individual as he served his
parish in t he moto city of 1etroit. Out of t his came a
concern for the tr ic aspects of e istence, a focusing
upon man's predicament, an t eolo ical shift t o t e
ri ht into what is r e erre to as neo-ortho oxy.
D. ':t. Davies s·uggests in the preface to his brief
biography of Niebuhr that an existential attitude toward
life is necessary in or er to properly understand him.
162
In many cases the f ailure to understand r. iebuhr
is due, in the f nal analysis, not to inadequate intel
lectual processes, but to a defective attitude to life,
and more especially to reli ion . This attitude may be
described as an insufficient appreciation of the tragic
element in moral experience, and of the abysmal Qlement
in religion, particularly in Christi nity. en to whom
life is essentially simple an c pablJ of a purely ra
tional comprehension will always fin it difficult to
understand men who are bur ene · by the realization of
the ultimat e inscrutability and incalculability of life
and religion. To this latt~r call belongs r. iebuhr .
His awareness of t~e depth beneath the depths makes it
impossible for him to comprehend man
1
s tragic istory
in a neat formula, without tor and ragged ed es. In
the contradictory being o man there is an ulti!l}ate
abyss w ich defies smooth, rational stat e vnt.95
The point at which existentialism ap ears most
cl ea1,,ly within the writings o iebuhr is in regard to the
role which anxiety plays in man
1
s religious life and in his
quest for ultimate meaning. Hans Hofmann goes so far as to
say that "Reinhold Niebuhr's whole understanding of anthro
pology nd theolo y rests on his evaluation of anxiety and
t he role it plays. n96 iebuhr is "not so m ·uch a theologian
as a Christian anthropologist who poses t e existentialist
95D R · ·nh ld . buhr P ht f
•• avies, ei o ie : rog e rom
America (New York: The Macmillan Company, 194), p . fx.
96
Hans Hofmann, The Theology of · einhold Niebuhr,
trans. Louise Pettibone Smith ( ew York : Charles Scr'bn er
1
s
Sons, 1956), p. 187 .
163
question about m n in Ki rkegaar d ' s fashion •••• thus he
has a Kierkegaardian a n t r opology . n97
An.x.iety an esp ir r e absolut 1- necessary for
Niebuhr int e Chr·st i an process . 9
8
an creates the illu-
sion that he will achiev is ideals as amens o protec-
tion for his pride. This pride must be radically brok n
and man reduced to utter despai r . Only then can he receive
God
1
s grac e .
So all history, civi lization , and culture are a
conspiracy to efend man' s pr ide , whic
1
they effect by
the renewal o illusion. ~ow Christianity as ·udgement
is precisely to bring man t o espair , whi ch is real·ty ,
to the acknowle gement of his utter inability ever to
fulfill the i eal . But in t he realizat ion of despair
judgement becomes mercy . Despair becomes t e avenue of
a rebirth of the whole man . And this is the profundity
of the r levance of Chri s t ian fit to every historical
situation. It is to depriv e man of his pride, whi ch
dooms c i vil· zation t o erp etual frustration . Christ i anity as judgement is the point of a new leverage in
historical development.99
This anxiety of man i s due to his freedom, which, of
course, is a premise of exist ential i sm.
100
In this regar
Niebllhr indicates his d pen dence upon ierkegaard .
Modern psychoanalys i s mi ght l earn mucn about t he basic
character of anxiety and its r el ation to hwnan free om
97rbid., pp. 144 f .
9
8
Reinhold i ebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man ,
II (rew York: Charle s cribner's Sons, 1947) , pp . ff .
99 . ·t
Davies,££· c i ., pp . 3 f
lOO einhold Ni ebuhr o . cit ., I , p .
•
164
from t e greatest of Christian psycholo ists, Sore
Kierkegaar, w o devote a profou.n stu y to this prob
l em: Der Besriff der ngst.101
The r elation of anxiety, freedom, and sin as develope in
this work of iebuhr all stem from his interpretation of
Kierke
0
aar 's writings .102
Niebuhl~ al o puts great emphasis upon man's fr e edom
an his capacity for self-transce dence . Ie wr · tes o
an ' s
anxiety w ich results f rom is confrontation by li itles
possibili t ies , uoting Heidegger in this connection.103 He
suggests that the best definition of man by a non-t eologian
·s that of Heide ger
1
s idea of transcendence.104
iebuhr also indicates that self-transcendence im plie s another existentialist conc ept, homelessnes •
Tis essential ho elessness of th human spir tis
thL groun of all religion; for the self which stands
outsid e itself and the world cannot find the meaning of
life in itself or the worl . It cannot identify meaning
with causality in nature; for its fre e om is obviously
s omethin different from the necessary causal linls of
natur . or can it identify the principle of meaning
with rationality, s~nce it transcends its own rational
processes ••• It is this capacity of freedom wh ch
finally prompts great cultures and philosophies to
transcend rationalism and to seek for the meaning of
life in an u.ncon itioned ground of existence ••• Go
lOlib"d., p . 44 n.
l
2
Ibi ., Cf . pp . 2 2 f ., 252 , 2 4, 1 2 n ., 263 ff.
103
Ibid., pp . 1 3,194 ff.
104
1
,.
Dl . , p . 162 .
165
as will and personality, in concepts of Christian
taith, is • •• the only possible grounds of real in
dividuality.105
Thia quotation from Nature and Destiny or Man also
implies an existentialist viewpoint in regard to reason
which is the final area of discussion of Niebuhr's thought.
Biebuhr has a much greater appreciation of philosophical
thought than the Continental theologians cited above, al
though he shares their distrust of reason in approaching
God. DeWolte makes the obserYat1on that he still belongs
1110ng those who are "reYolting against reason."
His own irrat1onalist1c statement s are counter
balanced by a broad dependence on philosophy, much
skilled and cogent reasoning, and frequent concessions
to the claims of rational theology. However, even the
concessions are sometimes accompanied by claims which
seem to deny them flatly, while Niebuhr's love of un
resolved paradoxes and his dramatic attacks on the
depravity ot man's reason certainly have had the
effect, among persons most influenced by him, or weak
ening confidence in rational processes and turning the
edge of every critical objection to theol ogical dogmas,
hovever obscure or inconsistent.106
In the second volume of his Gifford Lectures,
Niebuhr discusses final revelation of Divine Sovereignty in
a manner reminiscent of Kierkegaard, whom he quotes. He
asserts that this revelation is apprehended constantly,
inwardly by faith in a transrational way. It cannot be
105Ib1d., pp. 14 f.
l06DeWolfe, .21?• cit., p. 29.
166
apprehende by reason . l 07 De
1
olfe
1
s criticism of Niebuhr's
appr oach to reason is validate in this e ample tak n fro
the first volume of these 1 ctures .
Thou h the religious faith trough whic God is ap prehende cannot be in contradiction to r eason in the
s nse that the ultimate principle of meanin c nnot be
in contradiction to the subordinate principle of mean ing whicl1 is foun ., in rational coher nc , yet , n the
other hand religious faith cannot be simply subordinate
to r e son or made to stand under ·ts judgment . Then
this is done the r eason which asks the question whet er
the God of religious faith is plausible has alrea y
implied a negative ans w er ·n the question because it has
made itself God and natural y cannot tol er a e nether .
The usual procedur e in purely rat · onal and intellectual
judgments upon r eligion is to find t e God of r eli ~ ious
ra·t essentially ident i cal with the go of reason ,
with th distinct i on that r eli ious faith is regarded
as a somewhat crude form of ap r e e ing what reason
apprehen spur ly •••• The real situation is that an
w o is ade in the image of God is unable precis ely be
caus of thos e qualities in him which re designate
as •image of God,' to be satisfi ed with a god who is
ma e in man• s imag e . 1
This atte npt to r etain r eason and tor ject it at
the same time is typical of his writin s . It can be argu d
wit at l east ome degree of force that Niebuhr's basic
rejection of reason is another parallel with existentialist
thought.
Perhaps the man who has most influenced iebuhr is
the German theologian, Paul Tillich , who served for so long
as a colleague o iebllhr at Union Theological Seminary .
1 7
e old iebuhr, ~- cit., II , p . 57 .
1 Ibid , I, pp . 165 f .
167
Tillich has the distinction of taking a theological pos·
tion which has sought to mediat bet een te e treme points
of view of American empirical liberalis an Conti ent 1
nee-orthodoxy. Unlike many who have sou ht o p erform a
mediative task only to laps e into uncreative restating of
the positions of others, Tillich has emerged as the out
standing creative theological mind of cont porary theology .
Tillich is one of a small number o theologians who
directly acknowledge their debt to existentialism. Tillich
refers to his syst emat i c theology as "ex i s t ential t eology,"
embracing an emphasis upon the whole person involved in the
total situation and w holl y conce r ned with th e ultimat e con
cern.109 He distingu i shes theology from philosophy in that
the former is "existential."
He is i nvolved--with the whole of his existence,
with his finitude and his anxiety, wi th his self- con
tradictions an is despair, with the h ealing forc es
in him and in his social situation. very theological
statement derive s its seriousness from these elements
of existenc e . The theologian, in short, is determined
by his faith.11
Tillich readily acknowledges his dependence upon
existentialism. However, he make s a crit·cal distinction
between t h e philosophical systems which existentialist
thinkers hav e developed and the exist e t i al method. The
l09Paul Till i ch, yst ematic Theologz, II (Chicago:
The University of Chi ca o ress, 1 951), p. 31.
llOibid., p . 23.
---
16
latter e embraces as the very basis for his whole approach
to systematic theology, while h rejects th systems and
the conclusions of the "radical existentialists," as he
calls them .
This existential methodolo y he calls the "method
of correlation . " It is predicated upon the assumption that
th e istential uestions are the result of the impact of
o
1
s asking oft ese u estions . 111
Th answ rs implied i n the event of r velation are
meanin ful only in so far as they are in correlation
wit questions concerning the whole of our existence,
with exi tential questions . Only those who have e -
peri nee the shock of transitoriness, the anxiety in
w ich they are aware of their finitude, the threat of
nonbeing, can understand what the notion of God means .
Only thos e who have experienced the tragi c ambi uities
of our historical existence and have totally questioned
the eaning o existence can understand what the symbol
of the ing dom of God means . evelation answers ques tions which have been asked and always will be asked
because they are
1
we ourselves .• Man is the question
he ass about himself, be f ore any question has been
formulated . 112
Till i ch makes the following obs ervation about the
application of this ethod of correlation to systematic
theology : ''It makes an analysis of the human situation out
of which the existential questions arise, and it demon
strates that the symbols use d in the Christian messag are
the nswers tot ese questions."
11
3 This analysis of the
lllibid., p . 61.
112Ibid., p . 61 f .
113Ibi ., p. 62 .
169
human situati on is an "existential" one .
Whenever man has looke at h i s worl, he has found
himself in it as a part of it. But he also r eal · zed
that he is a stranger int world of objects , unable
to penetrate it beyond a certain level of scientific
analysis. d then he has become aware of the fact
that he himself is the door to the deeper levels of
reality, tat in his own existence he has the only
possible approach to existenc e its elf .••• I t ( me ans)
that t he immediate experience of one's own existing
reveals somethin of the natur e of exist enc e gen erally •
• • • an as existing , representing existence generally
and asking the question implied in his existence, is
one side of the cognitive correlation to whicp Calvin
points, t h e other being the divine majesty.114
This met od of correlation thus lll1it es the existen t·al i st analysis directe d inwar with the Christian r evela
tion which gives the answers which existence asks.
A third point of contact between Tillich and existen
tialism lies in his analysis of the contemporary cultural
scene, w hich he typifies as an age of " t echnical reason" in
which man become s an object, losing his true personhooa.115
This depersonalization of persons was discussed previous ly
as a root of the existentialist mov ement . 116 Tillich
refers to this depersonalization in discussing the n eed for
a n ew norm for syst emat i c theolo y .
It is not an exaggeration to say that today man ex periences his present situation in terms of disruption,
11
4 Loc . c it.
11.5 ee Tillich, "T e v Jorl
other writing s .
116 upra, pp . 10 f .
ituation," pp. 1- , and
170
con lict, s elf-destruction, meaninglessn ss, and
despair in all realms o· li e . This e perienc e is ex
presse in the arts an i literature, conc e tualized
in existential philosophy, actualized in political
cleavages of all 1 ds , and analyze ·n the psychology
oft e unconscious. Ith s given th ology a ne w u.n er standi ng of the demonic-tragic structur es of individual
and social life . The question arising out of this ex perience is ..• of a r eal i ty · n w hich the self-es
trangement of our exist ence is overcome, a reality or
reconciliation and r euni on, of creativity , meanin, and
hop e . e shall call such a r eality t he
1
New Being,'
••• If the Christian essage is unders tood as the
message of the
1
New Bein, , an answer is given to the
question implied in our pr sent situation an in every
hmnan situation.117
Another point of correlation between t he thinking of
Tillich and the basic characteristics of exis t ent ialism
lies in his emphasis upon an analysis of e ist enti a l anxiety.
All existentialist thought implies tha t certain subjective
moods, primarily thos e of dread and anxiety, giv e dis -
tinct i ve clue to the nature of existence . At ti s point
Tillich, wit his un erstan ing of de t ps c ology and
Gestalt psychology, has made dis t inct contribution to
existentialist t hinking . In his book , The C~urage to Be,
presented as t e Terry Lectures of 1950 at Yal e Univers i ty,
Tillich endeavor s to make a psychological analysis of
existential and pathologi c al iety · n order to distinguish
them adequat ely and thus establish ontolo ical priority for
t h former .
Tillich defines exis t ential anxiety as t he state "in
ll 7Tillich , yst ematic Theology, p . L~9 .
171
which a being is awar e of its possible nonbeing ." "Anxiety
is the existential awar·eness of nonbeing ." "Anxiety is
finitude experienced as one's own finitude."11 8 He sug-
ests that there are thre kinds of existential anxiety:
(1) the anxiety of fate and eath, the thr at to ontic
self-affirmation, (2) the anxiety of meaninglessness or
emptiness, th threat to spiritual self-affirmation, and
(3) the anxiety of guilt and condemnation, the threat to
moral self-affirmation . 119
Tillich distinguishes exis t ent ial anxiety from
pathological ·nxiety in that the former has this ontological
character and therefore cannot b e removed but must be
"lived with." athological anxiety is a stat e o existen-
tial anxiety un r the special condition of the person
failing to take his existential anxiety upon himself.120
All three forms of existential a iety contribute
to situation of despair which man must experience prior to
the achievement of true self -affirmation . sin Niebuhr,
1 o probably was i fluenced by Tillich, the whole of hwnan
life is inter r~ted as a cont·nuous attempt to avoid
de s:)air •
121
·yet this despair is the ultimate bolll.1. ary-li e
118Tillich, The CoQrage ~o ~~' p . 35 f .
ll9Ibid., pp . ff .
12
Ibi • , P. 77 .
121
Ibid., p. 56 .
situation which one must approach, in oo
172
xis t ential tra-
dit·on. And the "leap" for Tillich is achi eved by aith,
w hich is th "existential a cc ept an c e of so t hin. tran
sc endin or inary e perience ." 122
It is t h
0
s t a t e of being grasped by the power of
being w ich transcen s everything t hat i s an in ~1ich
everythin that is partic·pates . e w ' o is gr sp ed b y
this power is able to affirm himself because he knows
that he is affirme by t he powe r o bein i ts el f . In
this point mys t i cal experi enc e and per onal encounter
ar identical . In both of t hem faith is the basis of
the courage to be . 23 ... The coura e t o take t he
anxie t y of me anin less upon oneself is t boW1dary
line to which the courage to b v can go . Beyon it is
non-being •••. The courage to b is roote in t he
God who appe rs hen God ha s is P~ eare in the aru lety
o doubt.124
The influence of existentialist conc epts is nowhere
more apparent in contemporary th olog than int e work s
of Paul Tillich . Yet he , amon all t hose so infl· uence ,
bre a s with exis t enti alism at t he p oint of the efficacy of
reason . He delimits the area w ich systei atic theology can
e amine, but h e does no t hesitat e to · use r eason wlthin t h is
province and t o acknowledge the va l idi t y o its us e , t us
creating the paradox o a syst ematic ~xist entialism .
In a somew at similar manner ·els Ferre defends t he
use of re ason an yet affirms the validity of existentialist
122Ibid., p . 173 .
123Loc . ci t .
12
Ibi .,
173
con cepts . In Fait h and _ easo~, Ferre def ends reason and
philosop y ga: nst the att cks o eo-ort o o- y . n t~ e
other hand, he limits rational processe s to philosophy s
the proper me t hodolo y , then considers the method of
theology to be " e istential . "
12
.5 ~ i e insisting upon the
v lidity of both discipl·nes , w e t he different methods
reach contrary conclus i ons he t ens to lean toward theo
logical erist entialis , rather than r e son . 126 This
"objectivity" in philosophy and "subj ect i vity " in t heology
may reflect the infl· uence of ierkegaard , whom Ferre often
quotes, usually with approval.
vidences of existentialist influence with n con temporary theology ar e increasin ly easy to locate. Seldom
does an issue of t he Journal of ~~ligio~ , ~heologi Today ,
or Religio~ :E Lif
a pear w c oes not contain an article
deal i ng with t he subject either directly or i n i rectl y .
J·ulian 1 • Hartt, Carl ichalson, and -:, • L . l len are among
the many vo i ces speaking to t his concern. Howevar , l i ttle
is being heard about the implications of t his cultural
movement upon the field of r elig ·ous education, althou h
herril l accepts some ex ·stenti 1 concepts while rejec t in
125
rels F •• Ferre, F ith an Reason ( ew Yor:
Harper and Brothers , 1946), p . 142 .
126
I bi ., p . 1 f .
174
its basic premise.
12
7
The first task o this study has been to delineate
the characteristics of experiential religious education and
existentialism . It has been consurmnated. The impact of
major proportions of existentialism upon coitemporary
theology has b en indicat ed . Therefore the second and
major function of the stu y ca ow b undertaken . It is
the comparison oft e basic assumptions so delineated in
order to postulat e sue areas of agreement an disagre ment
whi ch may inhere between the t~c ~ovaments. To this task
the study is now directed.
12
7sherrill, The Gift of ower, p . 14.
------
PART II
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MOVEMENTS
-- CHA PT ER IV
T . NATUR11 0
The comp rative examination of experient·a1 educa-
t on and e istentialism falls broa ly into thr e cate cries:
(1) the nature of man , ( 2) the educ ative proc ss, and (3)
the Christi an tradition and the nature of val·ue . In this
sect on a chapter · s devote to each of these major areas .
The section concludes with a final ch pter consisting of a
summary of the fin ins and the conclusions wh ch can be
rawn from these findi gs .
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the two
movements w er consideration in regard to their basic con cepts of the nat·ure of man . Attention is focused upon four
subjects which are examined in terms of the attitudes of
rel gious education an existent·alism towards the . These
subjects ar e : (1) the basic nature of man, {2) his rela tion to t he world, (3) his relation to society, and (4) his
basic goal .
Throughout the disc·ussion, endeavor is made to
emphasize those points upon w h ch the two movements agree
and those upon which t here is radical confl ict of tho11 ht .
The cha ter concludes with a brief summary of the findings .
177
TH ~ ASIC ATU OF
Under this heading four concepts are considered:
{a) the general concept of man, {b) the role of anxiety,
(c) the nature of freedom, and (d) the worth of man. At
tention is now directed to the first of thes e .
The general conc ep~ of man. The experiential move ment in Christian education has continually emphasized an
optimistic v i ew of the natur e of man . This point o~ vi ew
expressed by George Albert Coe is based upon an int erpreta tion of Jesus• appraisal o human nature . The educator
insists that man has a God-given potentiality for growth,
progress, and goodness. The trad·tional concep t of total
depravity is thor oughly rejected.
1
On the other hand, it
was noted in the previous section on human nature in educa
tion that the ambivalent nature of man i s readily acknowl
edged.2 All three of the religious educators cited , Coe,
Elliott, and Sherrill, r ecognize that man has a propensity
for evil as well as fo r ood. At t he s ame time they deny
that by natur man has a tendency to go in either direction.
The capacity for good or evil does not require action
directed in one way or t he other. an is a creature, the
1
George A. Coe, Education in _ eli~ion and Morals
{Chicago: Flem n H. Revell Compariy~ 19 9J, p. 60.
2 upra, pp. 68 ff.
17
product of biolo ical evolution, created in the ima e o
God, ambivalent in nature with potentialities for both ood
and evil, and possessing capabilities for growth mentally,
spiritually, and physically.
Existentialism reflects a point of vi e w which is in
marked contrast with the optimistic, positive, world
affirming concept of Christian education. The central
attitude towards man is that of a profound pessimism. Man
is caught in a dire predicament . He is lost, homeless,
entangled in a matrix which is meaningless. Man must pass
through the depths of existent al despair in order to find
any kind of true existence. For the non-Christian existen
tialist this means th acceptance of one's own freedom, the
resolute decision in the face of a meaningless existence,
and the self-creation of all values of any meaning for the
individual. For the Christian existentialist, this pessi
mistic view of man is fully in accord with Reformation
theological concepts of the total depravity of man and his
inab"lity to h elp hlmself. Hopelessness character i zes
existentialist thought about man, where as in reli ious edu cation, hopefulness is the significant characterist c. The
depths of existential despair of the Christian existential
ist thinker represents the crushin of human pride and
willfulness (Niebuhr) and the full recognition and accept
ance of one's finitud e an helplessness bef e the distant
and transcendent God (Kierke aard). This emphasis upon
179
man•s sin, guilt, limitedness is apparent even in th non-
Christian thought of Heidegger , who insists that all men
are guilty--not in a moral sens e of having sinned against
God--but in the sense of Verfallenheit, bein lost and a
prey to the necessity of existing . "Bein guilty is not
the result of a guilty act, but conversely , the act is
possible only because of an original •bein uilty.
1
" 3
Thus where experiential education fins man in a
hopeful si t ·uation frau h t with poss bili ties for realizin
values , existentialism finds man in a pessimistic, dis couraging predicament, from w hich he can emer e only by
immersing himself in the very depths of espair .
Man and anx.ieti. A major theme of existentialism is
that of existential anxiety, that deep, ev ry-present
anxiety which is a normal stat e of man and which serves to
force him down into the depths from which he emerges in
rreedom. This anxiety is due to a fear of non-being ,
meaninglessness, and condemnation--one or all t hree . It
differs from other moods and affections in that it r eveals
in a peculiar way the true nature of being. The existen tialist insists that this anxiety is inherent in the nature
or man--a,$iven within his make-up .
It was indicated previously that this concept is
3Till ch, "E i st ential P ilosophy," p . 64 .
1 0
accepted by Sherrill.4 It derives a great deal of support
from contemporary psychology. While Coe recognized the
element of anxiety as a characteristic of human life, he
refused to give it the ontological significance which ex
istentialism attaches to it. He interpreted it rather in
terms of an aspect of the cultural circurnstances.S
Uncertainty, contingency, the tragedy of deep opposi
tions of a self to itself and of our institutions to
themselves--these have to be reckoned with in any
Christian education that is t9 avoid self-deceptive
idealization of our religion.b
There is increasin interest in the role of anxiety
in personal growth within the religious education movement;
this interest emerges in relation to new thought in psy
chology and its implications for theology. However, the
necessity of anxiety as a call into despair and as a mood
having ontological priority over other moods is neither
relevant to, nor compatible with the assumptions of experi
ential religious education regarding the nature of man.
The nature of fre edom . The concept of freedom is
-
important to both existentialism and experiential religious
education. In the former, freedom becomes the goal of man,
the means by which one achieve s self-realization. One
4
Supra, p. 73.
5coe, What is Christian Education1,pp. 78 ff.
6
rbid., p. 82.
181
proceeds through the slough of despondency until he is con
fronted by the abyss whi ch shows m n that all is contingent;
he must make the decision i n t he face of limitless possi-
-
bilities. The acc eptan ce of t his freedom is then the
doorway through w hic t he pers on may move on to the ac ieve-
ment of his full selfhood . imilarly, in Christian educa-
tion freedom is a means of a chieving s elfhood. However, it
is freedom in which the pers on can grow, in which he can
become naturally creative .
Paul Tillich r eac t s aga nst this assu.mpt on that man,
given s· uch fre e dom, can be aturally creative. 7 Instead,
he insists that one becomes f r ee and truly creativ only as
a result of the encount er with God . This freedom is possi ble only through exist ential analysis in which one becomes
aware of the ambiguitie s and despair w hich encompass him.
This awareness is t h e neces s ar y step which leads to the
confrontation by the cre ative l ove of God through whom one
finds freedom and life . 8 Cr eat ivity comes from the moment
of decision in the concr et e situations of life in wh ch Go
confronts man. 9
7charles H. Johnson , "Impl cations of the Method of
Correlation for the Us e of the Bibl e in Christian .uducation"
(unpublished doctoral diss ertation , Teacher
1
s College,
Columbia University, New Yor k , 1955) , p . 21 .
8
rbid., pp. 53 f .
9
supra, p. 59 .
1 2
But the religious educator has insiste all along
th t tis natural creativity which springs from the indi
vi ual when he realizes his freedom is not a self-produced
creativity, but is an expression of God at work n the
natural living process . Tillich and Johnson, as exponents
of ex stentialist Christianity, and Coe and Elliott, as
ex erientialis t religious educators, ar e in basic agreement
in the relation of freedom and creativity to the activity
of God . Tne differ ne e lies in the point at w ich God
enters into the process . Thee istentialist , with a
dista t, transcendent God, insists that one must go through
anx·ety and despair before God makes himself known and one
becomes free . The r el i gious educat or, whos e concept of God
inclu es his immanence a t work within all life and living
situ tions finds his expr ession in the natural creativity
of the free in ividual . The point of gr eatest conflict is
the question whether or not the experience of existential
despair is a necessary part oft e process. Experiential
ists would ·nsist th t, wile the experience of despair may
h ve been the means by which some persons have found their
freedom, it is inaccurate to make this experience normative
when others who have never undergone t his traumatic experi
ence have also ac ieve ere tiv fre e om .
f he commen nee ssary w th regard t o freedom
an he n · vidual. For xj "tentialism free om has a dual
role . It s he necessary state ind c e bove which leads
1 3
to self- fu fillm t . But it is also the goal of e isten-
tialism . Its si nificance in this second sense is discussed
in a later chap t r. Fore peri ntial education it remains
essentially amens, rather than an end. It is a necessary
co dition in order for si nificant rowth an the realiza
tion of value to tak e place . Thus e ist entialism and
reli iou ed cation essentially are agreed that freedom is
necessar y cond ·tion for self-realization.
The wor ho man. xistentialism and experiential
-
religious education find anoth r point of close agreement
n reg rd to the v luation place upon the in ividual.
~xistent · lism has com forth as a ph·losophic reaction
a ainst t e depersonalization oft e hwnan personality
with· n t e este n in ustrial society. The loss of true
selfhood through the objectify n g of hwnan existence be
comes the focus of the conc ern of this movement , and its
go 1 is the r ecapturing of authentic selfhood throu ha
redirection of attention inwardly .
Similarly , ex riential religious education has been
person- centered . In fact this has been the target of
criticisms leveled at the movement from certain theological
circles .
10
The claim is made that the conc ern of religious
education for per sons has made the movement too
1
anthropocentric at th expense of a enuine Christian edu-
cation which would be th ocent ic.11 Geor
lbert Coe
insisted that the "personality principle," based upon Jesus'
estimate of the individual as being of infinite worth, must
be the central concept determinin th nature of Chr stian
education.
12
There is enuine a reement between these two move ments that the individual person is of infinite worth an
that the self-realization of individuals shall be the major
concern.
MAN'S REL TI N TO THE O L.
In direct contrast to th previous agreement between
existentialism and r eligious education in placing infinite
value upon the individual is th radical disa reement be
tween them in re ard tom n's r elation to the world. A
major premise of existentialism is that man is estranged
from the world. The natural world is a wilderne,ss, a vast
meaninglessness into which man has been thrust and in which
man is not at home. The state of man in the world is the
11
ee Randolph Crump Miller, The Clue to Christian
Education (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,L950) ; E.G.
Hornrlghausen, "The Salv tion of Christian ducat ion,"
International Journal of Religious Education, 15:12-15, ay ,
l939; H. Shelton Smith-:;-Faith and Nurture ( New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1941), et al.
--
12coe, What is Christian ducation?, p . 23 .
--------
185
Unheimlichkeit, or unhomellkeness.
1
3 Heinemann considers
this alienation trom the world to be the theme which under
lies all existential philosophy.14 But man is not only
estranged trom the world in which he bas unwillingly round
hilltselt, he finds this world to be without meaning except as
he gives meaning to it. Attempts to come to terms with the
objective world result only in objectification of man and
the further loss of a sense of true existence.
In marked contrast to this point of view is that
expressed by the leaders of the experiential Christian edu
cation movement. This is not to say that the religious
educators are not aware of a sense of disillusionment and
estrangement within modern man.
1
5 However, they insist that
it is manta nature to be at home within the world.
The endeavor of all of us as men is to find ourselves
at home in this our world. The practical interest in
controlling nature and the theoretical interest in know
ing her blend into one interest of overcoming the
apparent opposition between the self and its world.
Salt-realization can never be 9omplete except as an
ultimate unity 1s found here.lb
Coe goes so far as to insist that the religious
1
3supra, p. 134.
14Fre1derich H. Heinemann, Existentialism and the
Modern Predicament (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1~),
PP· 9 tr.
1
Ssee Coe, The Motives of Men; Elliott, Can Reli
'ious Education~ Cn.rls£lan?;a?ld Sherrill, The Gift 2.£.
ower.
16
coe, Education.!,!! ~eligion and Morals, pp. 31 t.
mpulse
and with
186
n man s this effort to be at home in the world
imselr.
1
7 In keeping with a co cept of the im-
manence of God, the natural world is a meaningful e pres sion of God ' s creativity, and God is at work in th world.
In the sense of gen ral revelation, God can be found within
nature . Relitious education den es, then, that tne relation
of man to the worl s essentially one of strangement . It
further denies the meaninglessness of the world.
A question can be rais ed with regard to the existen
tialis presupposition about man
1
s estrangement . Is th s
a valid analysis of man
1
s relationship to the world, or is
th show man feels about his relationship? The implication
is that possibly a sub·ective mood of neurotic adjustment
has been made normative.
It should be noted th t within the varieties of
existentialism the position of insistin that the world is
meaningless on the one hand, and that man is estran ed
from it, on the other, poses a contradict on . The assump t on of existentialism that man is estran ed and alienated
f rom the world carries in it the implicit assumption that
the normal state of man is not estrangement but a meaning
ful r elationship to the world. Then the ar urnent that man
imself alone gives meaning to the orld no loner has any
1
7Ibid. p . 201w
validity, for he must interact with a reality which does
h ve meaning . This contradiction is but one of a number
which inhere within existentialism. Others are noted
below as they appear in the discussio .
187
no he conflict between exist entialism and religious
education appears in connection with the world vie ws of the
two movements . Religious education, as indicated previ ously , emphasizes the concepts of evolution and progress
in the natural world and in the nature of man. This is a
nece ssary premise in order to posit an adequate conception
of the growth of human personality .
~xtentialism , however, fins th concept of evolution
and of progress antithetical. 'The idea of
1
progress
1
be-
comes meani less : each generation and every in i vidual in
each gen eration has to face the ssentially identical human
an mor al problems and has t o make his own choices."
18
Kierkegaard explicitly denies that any generatio progresses
in any way beyond any previous one .
1
9 · hile this point of
vie w is certainly consistent with the existentialist concept
of the meaninglessness of t he world and with the emphasis
upon subjectivity as the source of true knowledge , it is
l 8Kurt F . Reinhardt, The Existentiali st Revolt
(Milwaukee : Te Bruce Publishing Company, 19521, pp. 238 f.
19
Loe. cit .
188
thorou hly inconsistent with Heidegger's concept of the
limitation of man's existence occasioned by his contact with
the world.20 Both history and the total environment are
limitations upon the individual
1
s total fre dom. If this
is the case, it does not necessarily follow that pro ress
is impossible . To th contrary, the admission of the fact
that history and environment impinge upon and influence the
individual serves as basis for both positive an negative
change. The individual may build upon the past successes
of previous generations--or he may intensify their evil ways
to yet further degrade an. Or both processes may continue
simultaneously . The admission of the influence of history
upon the individual not only provides a basis for a concept
of the possib.lity of pro ress, but also serves to invali date the claim that history itself is meaningless. Onc e
more an inherent contradiction within existentialism ap
pears.
It has become apparent that the educational and
existential assumptions re ard·ng t he r elati on of man to
the world are irreconcilable and antithetical. Attention
is now directed to t he relation of man to other persons
where, again, there is som evidence of discord.
20
Loe. cit.
1 9
MA
1
S R.wL TIO TO OCIETY
In the analysis of the characteristics of Christian
education it was stressed that the relationship of the
individual to society was crucial in th development of the
mature self. The position of experiential religious educa
tion, bolstered by the latest insights of dynam·c psychology,
is that the individual finds self-realization and true
selfhood only through significant interaction wit other
persons. Sherrill has suggested that in this regard the
Biblical view of man is supported by th latest findin s
of psychologists and sociolo ists.21 The isolated, self
made man does not exist as such. He is always a person-in
relation-to-other persons. His drive for autonomy is al
ways balanced by his drive for homonomy. All growth,
whether toward wholeness and maturity or toward fragmenta
tion and immaturity, takes place as a result of the inter
action of the self with other selves. In psychological
terms, the acceptance of one's self necessary for authentic
existence becomes possible only as one has been accepted
by other selves. The phenomenal self ima e which one
creates is dependent for its consistency with the real self
upon the de ree to which the real self is accepted in
interpersonal relationships. Experiential Christian
21
supra, pp. 71 ff.
190
education functions upon these assumptions. The relation
ship between persons are the most significant single tactors
in the educational process.
Existentialism represents a return1D intense 1nd1-
vidual1em. This is in marked contrast to the above-cited
position ot experiential education. Prior to the existen
tial leap, all existential thinking focuses upon the indi
Yidual as an individual. He does not enter into the depths
ot existential despair hand-in-hand with another. He 1s
alone. The commnntcation ot the feelings ot other.a is not
ot help. It 1s his own personal subjective moods which
indicate the way toward the abyss over which one must leap
to find authentic existence. In this respect, this move
ment is antithetical to the position assumed in experiential
religious education.
This marked distinction between education and ex
istentialism blurs after the existential leap has taken
place. The failure ot existential philosophy to provide
an~ clue, within the process of existential analysis, to
the landing-point after the leap enables existential
thinkers to diverge in terms of their particular concerns.
It 1s suggested that the atheistic existentialists are
somewhat more consistent with the prior emphasis upon in
dividualism when they posit continued individualism
unfettered by social interaction. Heidegger considers
that society may deprive one ot authenticity. Sartre goes
191
further and states that social relations are esaentially
marked by conflict, tor one's own individuality is con
stantly threatened by the individuality ot the other selYes
with whom one comes in contact. Though functioning within
a frame ot reterenc 0£ a Christian theology, Kierkegaard
can never overcome this same intense solitariness at the
expense of all social relationships.
Other existentialists, however, do recognize the
significance of social interaction after the leap has been
made. Jaspers is vitally concerned with the role 0£ com
municating love as man seeks fulfillment. Marcel and Buber
minimize, if they do not entirely eliminate, the leap,
focusing attention upon the I-Thou relationship. The
existential philosophy of "I" becomes the philosophy of
"I-Thou" for them. For this reason they are sometimes
placed upon the periphery of existentialism.22 The think
ing of these men finds common ground with that ot religious
education. However, it must be affirmed that in the main
stream of existentialism there is a lack of interest in
social interaction whicn is thoroughly inconsistent with
the point of view held by religious educators.
THE GOAL OF MAN
While differing at a number ot points with regard to
22
Kuhn, ER· cit., p. 103.
192
t e nature of man, existentialism and experiential Christian
ed·ucation find an area of general accord when the goal of
man is considered. Both movements are interested in the
achievement of an authentic existence by the individual.
Man's goal is the achievement of self-realization, the
fulf llment of his highest potentialities for selfhood.
There are si nificant differences, however, between the two
in regard to the definition of this goal and the way in
which it is achieve •
•
Religious education conceives of the goal of self-
hood in terms of the liberal Christian frame of reference.
It is achieved in cooperation with others, with the world ,
and with Go. The Christian paradox of losing one's life
in order to fin it takes on meaning as the individual
dir ects is concern, not upon himself, but upon the common
goals and purposes of the social group of which he is a
part .
xistentialism conceives of the goal of selfhood in
terms of the achievement of absolute freedom . Self-reali zation is achieved t ou h free o • Only through existen
tial estran ement from externals , throu h detachment from
everyday exper ences and earthly possessions and value
ju gments, does the individual reach genuine freedom in
which he himself makes the decis ons of his life an de-
term · nes t values by which hes all live. hen t
1
is
fr ee o is attained, then he can achieve true selfhood an
1 3
authent ic existence .
Thus the t wo movements agree t hat the goal of man is
t he achievem nt of true authent i c sel fhood , but t hey differ
upon i t s defini tion and upon the means by w hich man achieves
his goal .
SU-Ml RY
The examination of the conc epts of man i mplied by
the basic assumptions of experienti 1 educatio and existen
tial i sm has revealed several points of common accord and a
number of points of distinct disagreement . Both movements
ar e concerned with the role of anxiety in man and consider
i t t o be a major conc ern . Both are desirous of retainin
man's freedom , r ecognizing that it is indi spens able to the
process of s elf-r a z' .t n . Further , the examinati o of
free o i ndicated that both movements r ecognize that he
creative act takes plac e in an act of decision . Christian
ed cation and existontialism also share a concept of the
inf.nit e worth of the individual . For religious education
t his is rooted i n Jesus • conce t of an . Fore istential ism i d·vidual personhood is the raison d
1
etre of the
philosophy, for it originate d as a r eaction agains t t he
eperson li z ng of the i iv dual in our cont empor ary
industrial culture . Fir1ally , existent· a l ism and Chri tian
e ucation find common greemen · n the goal o man , w hich
is the achi v e ent of authe t·c se f ood.
194
Te r eas of isa r eement bet een t e two moveme ts
in their analysis of man ar e m y . I contr st to the
optimistic, out oing, world-arr · rming concept of man '
basic nature in education, e ist ent 1 sm draws attention
to man's predicament i a essimisti manner .
an is es -
tranged, alienatea, homeless, an anxious . It is insisted
that this anxiety has ontolo ical priori over othe moods
as a means of determin·n t he true natur e of
•
Th" s
priority is not ranted to anxiety by r 1 g i u educ tin.
W here as in r el i gious e ucation man see s to cooperate
with the world , finds hi self essent · a11 at home t,
and embraces the possibilities of progr ess ph sicRlly,
mentally, and spiritually with~n it, i e istentialism t h
antithes e s of these concept s appears. Man is estran ed,
alienated, homeless in a world int o w hich heh s beer.
thrust unwillingly. Instead of a plac e for progress, he
finds the worl to be meani l ess save for the meaning
which he hims elf gives to it. Te world is neither good
nor evil--but irre l evant. Though man is lim · ted by its
sheer givenness an has n·s fr eedom thus r estri ct ed , this
givenness is without s ens e or meaning .
In a similar way the two movements find themselves
at opposit e poles in regard to man an h s relat·on to
society. hile experiential education insist s that man
finds his true selfhood only in r elationship with other
like selves, ex stentialism lar ly r · nas ha soc e y s
a t e a t a hindrance to s elfhood, placing al the
emphasis upon the s01·tary in iv dual, althou h certain
t · nker s mor closely parallel educational thought about
social r el tionsh i s.
195
I t was noted t hat both movements share the common
goal f orm n of self r ealization. Yet existentialism de fines this goal as absolute freedom, whereas exp eriential
Christi an education finds it only through r elationships
funct ion n withtn t h Christian frame of re erence.
Desp te th ar e s of common accord between exist en tialism a exper·enti al Christian education , it is diffi cult to acknowl edge t hat t he two are speaki g of the same
creat ure w hen they talk about the nature of man. The con
t r as t s f ar outweigh the limited similarities.
CHAPTER V
MAN AND THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS
One of the assumptions or experiential Christian
education which is indispensable to it 1s the educability
of man. Unless this basic premise is granted, the whole
religious education movement collapses, for it is predi
cated upon the conviction that tbare are certain methods
and procedures through which the individual may be influ
enced and by which he can be changed. Another way of
atating this which is less determinative in implication is
that there are certain circumstances which can be created
which provide the most favorable conditions under which
growth ot the individual can take place. This growth may
be directed, at least 1n part, toward the realization of
values which are held to be significant within the Christian
tradition. Thus the assumption of man's educability im
plies a process ot education. The purpose of this chapter
1a to compare experiential religious education and existen
tialism in regard to those areas which are related to the
learning experience.
There are five major topics which are considered in
relation to the educstional process. These are: (1) t~e
problem of knowledge and of authority; (2) the role of
individual experience in learning; (3) the function of
reason and the scientific method; (4) the problem or
communication, and (5) the learning process. As in the
previous chapter the positions of education and existen
tialism are compared in each of these areas in order to
discover agreements and conflicts.
EPISTEMOLOGY AND AUTHORITY
197
In the comparative study it was noted that the reli
gious education movement has been influenced by the pragma
tism of Dewey and Childs and by contemporary psychology in
the development or its theory of knowledge.l It is of
interest to observe that a number of writ rs have recognized
the similarity of the epistemologies of pragmatism and
existentialism.
2
In both philosophies the epistemology is
essentially a common sense realism. Tillich has shown that
both are concerned with subjective truth, the truth for the
1nd1vidual . 3 In existentialism there is no knowledge
independent of the knowing object. Knowledge is not an end
in itself. It always begins and ends in the question,
"What does this knowledge mean to me, the knower, the
existing thinker?" It is always subjective knowledge, and
1
supra, p. 47.
2
Joach1m H. Seyppel, "A Comparative Study of Truth
in Existentialism and in Pragmatism," The Journal of
Philosophz, $0:229-241, April 9, 1953;.Tlltlch, "Tlie World
sltuat!on," pp. 30 tt; Grene, Dreadful Freedom, pp. 26 rr.
3'.rillich, "The World Situation," pp. 30 rr.
198
its verifiability in general experience in the objective
world is irrelevant. This existential concept of knowledge
is neo-Kantian. The nowr~nal world is never directly appre
hended. One knows only the phenomenal world, the world as
it appears to him, altered by his perceptions.4
Experiential Christian education shares this concept
of knowledge with existentialism. The individual knows
through the process of interaction with the noumenal world.
Knowledge is not passive reception, but an interaction with
the world, as suggested by John Dewey.S Tillich calls this
interaction an aspect of the existential attitude. "In all
existential knowledge both subject and object are trans
formed by the very act of knowing. Knowledge is based on
an encounter in which a new meaning is created and recog
nized."6
Both Christian education and existentialism share
the concern that the whole person is involved in the knowing
process, although it needs to be acknowledged that the
latter movement places much greater emphasis upon this
point. While both movements share the concept of subjective
4oeane w. Rerm, "Two Conflicting Trends in Protestant
Theological Thinking," Religion.!!! Life, 25:SBS, October,
1956.
5
John Dewey, Democracz and Education (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1916) •
6rr11lioh, !he Courage !2 !!, p. 124.
199
knowledge, there is a major distinction between the two in
this regard. For existentialism, the noumenal world 1s
meaningless except as it takes on meaning tor the individual.
The objectivity of the noumenal is not important. Experi
ential education maintains that the objectivity of the
noumenal world 1s relevant, vitally ao, it any communication
betwee selves 1s to take place. It does recogniz that
recent studies in psychology bear out the contention that
individual perceptions are wiique, are phenomenological.
One does not know the noumenal world, he knows only his
perception ot it. The educator would insist, however, that
these perceptions are sufficiently consistent with the
noumenal world so that persons can communicate and that no
radical disjunction appears between the phenomenal and the
noumenal worlds under usual circumstances.
It can be concluded that existentialism and experien
tial education, although approaching the problem of
epistemology from radically different perspectives, have
arrived at a theory of lmovledge which is common to both
in which knowledge is meaningtul only in relation to the
knower. This concept of knowledge contains the essential
basis tor a concept ot authority. It is to this concept
that the discussion is now addressed.
Throughout the discussion of existentialism the
central theme of the signiticance ot the "existential
individual" has appeared. In the problem of authority it
200
retains this central position, tor existentialism holds
firmly to a subjective concept or truth. Therefore the
locus of authoritJ lies, not in anything external, but with
in the experience or the individual. This point ot view is
essentially identical with the concept or authority in
experiential Christian education.7 The locus ot authority
is in individual hwnan experience. Simjlarly, both existen
tialism and experiential education emphasize the tact that
knowledge does not become truth for the individual until it
becomes meaningful within bis own experience.
There is one important distinction, however, between
the concepts ot authority or the two movements. Existen
tialism is not eoncerned with the nature or the objective
world. Its essential validity is not or concern, only its
meaning for the individual. On the other hand, the educa
tional position embraces the objective world of reality as
being valid and insists that truth may be verified within
it. The pragmatic testing of truth within the objective
world is a corollary of the premise that the basis of
authority lies vithin experience.
While the central concern ot this study ls to ex
amine existentialist presuppositions, it does so tor the
purpose or achieving a better understanding of existential
ism within contemporary theology. It is important,
1supra, pp. 48 rt.
201
theretore, to note that Biblical theology, wnich draws
heavily upon existentialism tor its presuppositions, di
gresses radically from the existentialist concept of
authority.
Biblical theology operates under the same neo
Kantian epistemological dualism which characterizes existen
tialism. The phenomenal and noumenal worlds are ditterent
in kind. Therefore, neo-orthodoxy concludes that because
or this dichotomy one can have knowledge of God through no
ordinary channels or knowledge. Instead, it is necessary
to rely upon transrational revelation accepted on faith.
T.b.is stress upon special revelation places the locus of
authority in the Bible. Tne emphasis is upon historical
events, not subject to rational deliberation, through wnich
God acts. That God so acts through tnese events must be
accepted on taith.8 The existentialist leap becomes the
leap of faith in special authoritative revelation. This
theological point or view is one of the central issues in
the conflict betvean experiential education and Biblical
theology today.
The foregoing discussion has revealed several basic
similarities between the two movements under consideration.
Although education and existentialism approach the epistemo
logical question from different perspectives, they are in
8
Ferm,~• cit., pp. 585 tr.
202
essential agreement that knowledge is individual knowledge,
acquiring meaning only in terms of the individual•s own
experience. Agree ent is apparent in regard to the locus
ot authority, which is found to be within human experience.
Biblical theology departs from existential concepts at this
point, insisting upon the premise that authority rests in
special revelation apart from ordinary experience. In this
discussion considerable attention has been devoted to indi
vidual experience. The role of individual experience in the
educational process now becomes the area to be considered.
INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE
It has already been mentioned that existentialism
constitutes a concern for the individual who is being deper
sonalized by the contemporary culture ot industrial produc
tion. This concern is shared by Coe.9 Coe with his
"personality-principle" and existentialism with its "existent
individual" are both concerned about the individual and his
experience. The goal of existentialism has been described
a.a a return to immediacy, the intense personal experience of
existence. Tillich raters to this as a particular form or
empiricism.
10
Experiential education would agree that this
9coe, The Motives ot Men, pp. 47 rt.
---------
lOpaul Tillich, "Existential Pnilosophy," The
Journal .2! the History .2,! Ideas, 5:51-$2, January, 1944.
203
is a torm ot empiricism. Religious education at this point
interprets the process by wnich persons learn as individual
experience. It 1s a "lite-centered" approach, directing
the educational concern to the point where the individual
is participating in a genuine lite situation. It is at
tirmed that learning takes place when an individual begins
to deal with concerns which meet his individual needs.
Thus Christian education, as it is here interpreted, and
existentialism are both interested in the individual in his
experiential situation.
This similarity goes yet further. Existentialism is
not only ~oncerned with the individual as he is in existence,
it 1s concerned with the total person completely involved
in that which concerns him most.
11
Only then is he trul7
existing. In a like manner experiential education insists
that genuine growth and learning are dependent upon the
pupil discovering tor himself in the process ot learning
that with which he is really concerned and in which he is
totally involved.12 Ego-involvement 1s necessary tor
significant growth and change to take place.
Although experiential education has centered atten
tion upon the individual, the claim is made that it falls
llsupra, p. 110.
12Nathaniel Cantor, Dl!!amics ot Learnin5 (Buffalo:
Foster and Steward PublishingCompanT, 1950), p. 90.
204
into the same error as pragmatism in attempting to deal with
the "adjusted" person, which becomes a stereotype and true
existential individuality 1s loat.
1
3 It 1s true that
experiential education has often spoken ot "adjustedness"
as a goal tor the individual. This distinction which
existentialism makes may be a necessary corrective tor it.
In another respect this educational movement is re
lated to pragmatism and criticized by existentialism. The
charge is made that pragmatism settles upon a willingness
to accept the pleasant desire to make things com£ortable.
Sin, death, evil, the ultimate puzzle ot human 1nd1v1du
al1tJ, is passed by on the other side.14 Existentialism,
on the other hand, draws attention to the finitude, es
trangement, and ambiguities which form a part of human
existence.
1
5 While the criticism ot pragmatism may be
valid, it has been noted that Coe calls attention to man•s
predicament and insists that this must be included in any
adequate system ot Christian education.
16
Sherrill and
Elliott also agree in this regard.
1
7 It cannot be deniad,
13orene, .2,2. cit., p. 28.
14Ibid., p. 27.
1
~1111ch, The Courage l2. ~, pp. 12$ r.
16
supra, pp. 66 rr.
1
7supra, pp. 69 rr.
205
however, that much that has gone on in Christian education
has ignored this less-pleasant side of man•s existence, and
existentialism may again serve as a corrective tor this
shortcoming in educational practice.
Although. existentialism does not deal with the edu
cational process, it shares with experiential education a
concern tor individual experience. Where education finds
learning taking place only when the person is totally in
volved, existentialism finds true existence at this same
point. Where experiential education may have tended to
ignore the less-optimistic aspects or man's existence,
existentialism may serve as a reminder that all of the in
dividual's experience must be included in any concern deal
ing with persons. Thus existentialism and education share
additional areas or common agreement. This accord disap
pears, however, as attention is now directed to the role or
reason.
THE FUNCTION OF REASON AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
From Kierkegaard to the present existential
ism has been a revolt against reason.18 It opposes the
rational systems or thought which have developed in Western
industrial society on the grounds that this emphasis upon
18
Supra, pp. 102 f.
206
rationalism leads to a logical or naturalistic mechanism
which destroys individual freedom and decision. This
rationalism transforms everything, including man himself,
into an object ot calculation and controi.
1
9 Instead or
this rationalistic position W'hich concerns itself with
abstract theorizing and vith empirical verification, ex
istentialism is interested in the subjective, the immediate,
the emotional, and the frustrations of anxiety and despair
which permeate the common life.
In direct opposition to the view of existentialism
is the attitude ot experiential religious education toward
reason and the scientific method.20 In any evaluation of
the whole man his powers of reasoning and his ability to
think must be taken into consideration as tully as the
existentialist insistence that the ambiguities of existence
must be acknowledged. Coe suggests that the never-ending
inquisitiveness which is basic to the scientific method is
one of the most significant characteristics which distin
guishes the personal from the impersonal.
21
If man is to
achieve the fullest degree or self-realization w..tl.1.ch is
1
9T1lllch, "Existential Pnilosophy."
20
supra, pp. 39-54.
21
oeorge A. Coe, What is Reli~ion Doing to Our
Consciences? (New York: Charles Serl ner's Sons~l9Ii3),
p. 46.
201
potentially his, he must make tull use ot the capacity to
uae his rational powers. ~hese assist in the understanding
of the nature or Reality, and they are indispensable to the
learning process.
A close parallel can be drawn between the scientific
method, which is predicated upon man•s ability to reason,
and the learning process as it is understood in experiential
religious education. Both require reflective thinking,
evaluation, and validation through experimentation. Start
ing with concrete specific situations, both require analysis
and examination of the data in terms ot possible outcomes.
The situations are interpreted in terms of ini'ormation
derived from past experience, solutions are evaluated, and
the conclusion is then tested within axperience.22 Thus
reason becomes an invaluable aspect ot the learning process.
Its validity is essential if man is to be educable.
Experiential education and existentialism do have one
point in common in regard to reason. Education would share
the exiatentialist affirmation that lite 1s more than think-
ing, and that being is more important than rational processes.
With this one minor exception the two movements radically
diverge in their attitudes toward reason and the scientific
method. Existentialism actively opposes them as threats to
22w1111am c. Bower, Character Through Creative
Experience (Chicago: The University of Cnlcago Presa, 1930),
PP· 12) rt.
208
genuine existence. Religious education embraces them as
necessary means in the learning process which is directed
toward genuine selfhood. This divergence of the main
streams of education and existentialism continues in the
forthcoming comparison of their points of view in regard to
communication.
THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION
The lack of agreement between experiential Christian
" -· ' .... . c • .. • ' t ~· " ◄
education and existentialism in regard to the problem of
communication stems from the inherent difficulty within
existentialism of rigorously holding on to its concept of
existential individuality and, at the same time, making
allowance for the effect upon the individual of interaction
with other selves. The result of this conflict is that
existentialism has difficulty finding an adequate place for
communication. The aforementioned continuum upon which
existentialist thinkers may be placed after the "leap'' ap
plies in this area of communication.23
This problem of communication is reflected in the
position of Soren Kierkegaard when he attempts to deal with
learning and education.
The Existential Thinker cannot have pupils in the
ordinary sense. He cannot communicate any ideas,
2
3supra, pp. 146 rr.
209
because t¥ez are just not the truth he wants to teach.
He can on y create in his pupils by indirect colllIDllnica
tion that
1
Ex1stent1al state• or personal experience
out or which the pupil may think or act ••• the only
possibility of education 1s to bring the pupil by in
direct methods to a personal experience of his own
Existence.24
Communication between persons is of no avail as a
means ot learning for Kierkegaard. "If he would learn it
trom another, ne ~ ipso misunderstands 1t.n25
In contrast with the difficultyax:istentialism has in
coming to terms with the problem or communication, experi
ential religious education consi ers communication not to
be a problem, but as an indispensable condition for growth
to take place, tor education is essentially a matter of
inter-personal relationships. And communication is not
limited to verbal symbols or written materials, it 1s basi
cally a sharing of self with self.
Does the pupil encounter methods as mere tools or
devices? Not at all; what he encounters is a teacher,
and what is called method is a relation between persons.
The problem (of religious education) now is to determine
the nature, the level, '1}d the results of this meeting
of person with person.26
This relationship of other persons to the individual
is a major tactor in the modification of the religion of
24-Tillich, "Existential Philosophy," p. 55 .
2
5.tcierkegaard, ConceE~ .2f Dread, p. 46.
2
6oeor~e A. Coe, "The Religious Education Movement-
A Retrospect, Religious Education, 39:222, July-August,
1944. Lu
210
the individual , according to Coe.
That what the teacher is mingles itself inextricably
with what he says, so t hat the response or tne pupil is
a response to the teacher as well as to the curriculum
that he uses, the Church that commissions him, and the
God on whose behalf the Church speaks through h1m •••
it 1s the emotional situation that does the effective
teaching ••• Pr ecisely in the personal relations
between teacher and pupil the religion of the child
undergoes modi f ication.27
Elliott•s l ife situational approach involving rela
tionships and Sherr111
1
s concept of the self wnich changes
in relationship support this position of Coe. Communication
is thus an indispen1able condition tor learning to take
place.
Existenti alism and experiential education dif£er at
yet another point in r egard to communication. In order tor
genuine communication to take place, there must be a common
world or reality perceived by those who would communicate
in a sufficiently identical manner so that the symbols used
have similar meanings. Education affirms such. a common
world in w.bich mutual understanding can take place.
Existentialism asserts that man and his world are
estranged. The common order which serves as a basis tor
communication breaks down and man is forced into solitude.
Real communication or self with salt no longer is possible.
28
27coe, What is Christian Education?, pp. 23 tr.
--~------
28sl.lJ2r~, pp . 134 f.
211
This suggests a further point ot difference between the two
movements.
In light or this estrangement, existentialism ac
knowledges that surface communication still goes on between
selves, but there is not any slgniticant snaring of the
depths of the self with another person. All communication,
if 1 t 1s "existential," calls ror an affirmation or a rejec
tion by the individual. It it is affirmed, it must be
appropriated by the whole person, existentially. It should
be noted that Buber and Marcel do not share this concept of'
most existentialists.
While education recognizes that a great deal or com
munication between persons within the education process is
purely on the surface, it has already been suggested that
its concern is with the deeper issues of life. The reli
gious educator seeks to create those circumstances under
which there can be a genuine sharing on the deeper levels.
It 1s toward this goal, and in terms of these deeper levels
of communication that the most significant changes and
growth in personality take place.
One further distinction can be made betKeen the two
movements on the problem of communication. The educational
presupposition of the "Personality Principle" which affirms
the infinite worth of the individual cannot be interpreted
except in terms of a social frame of reterence. It is
incomprehensible to conceive of a single individual who is
212
or ini'inite worth to the exclusion of other individuals.
They too must be or infinite worth. The implication 1s
that this principle 1s thus expressed in terms of genuine
respect tor the individuality or other selves. The height
of this expression is in the communication of genuine love
tor the other self. Unless there is communication between
the individuals who are attirmed to have infinite worth,
the concept itself is meaningless.
In contrast to this point of view existentialism
directs itself to the attirmation of the existential indi
vidual in absolute freedom. Theoretically, the assertion
or such absolute individuality lllU8t deny the same individu
ality to other selves or else they will infringe upon the
true selthood of the first person. Yet, on what basis can
this extrema individuality be affirmed for the one while
denying it to the others? Furthermore, it it is the sub
jective moods ot the individual which alone give a real clue
to the nature of reality, are there any grounds at all upon
which communication can be based? It becomes more and more
apparent that these inner contradictions within the philo
sophical movement of existentialism raise serious questions
about its validity as a total viewpoint.
Experiential education tinds communication to be
indispensable tor the educative process, a necessary impli
cation of its concepts or personality and of the world, and
a means ot sharing true self with self. In opposition to
213
the educational view, existentialism finds that communica
tion between selves constitutes a real problem within its
individualistic philosophical frame of reference. It is
inconsistent with its world view, its concept of existen
tial individuality, and its epistemological premise that
subjective moods are the means of discovering true reality.
These problems are recognized by the various representa
tives within the movement, and some make provision tor
communication after the "leap."
Four areas of thought which relate to the educative
process have been considered in this chapter: epistemology,
reason, experience, and communication. While references
have been made which relate these eoncepts to the learning
process, it is necessary at this time to turn attention
directly to the concept of learning which is implied by
the points of view reflected in these discussions.
THE LEARNING PROCESS
The divergence of the points of view of the two
movements under consideration is never greater than with
regard to a theory or learning. It can be said with much
justification that there is no place whatsoever in existen
tialism for a thaor7 ot learning, and that this is due,
primarily, to its concept or individual existence. There
is acknowledgment that there are certain changes which take
place within the individual. The whole scheme of
214
existentialism has been described as a pilgrimage in vhicn
the individual reaches authentic selthood after his subjec~
tive journey through despair. This pilgrimage denotes
change ot the individual trom a state of inauthentic living
to genuine existence. However, this change is not accom
plished through the aid of others, through interaction with
others or with tne world, nor through a learning process.
It is solely the result or a subjective experience or ex
treme crisis.
Experiential Christian education, on the other hand,
considers a theory of learning to be crucial. The only
hope ot achieving the goal of Christian education is founded
upon faith in the God-given capacity of human beings to
grow, change, and learn. The essential character of this
theory of learning 1s that the individual learns through
his own experience in interaction with his total environ
ment.
The dichotomy between existentialism and religious
education becomes clearer as specific aspects ot the learn
ing process are considered. It is to be noted that at some
points there is essential agreement, yet the implications
in terms of an educative process differ markedly.
No concept is more important to an understanding of
experiential education than the premise of the continuity
or hwnan growth, physically, mentally, and spiritually.
Material 1s selected, methods are developed, all in terms
21.5
of the requirements of growth at any given point. In direct
contrast to this concept of gradual growth and development
is the existentialist concern for crisis and the radical
discontinuity or experience. The educational concept ot a
developing religious life is opposed by the theological
movement influenced by existentialism. In its place is
substituted a concept ot "moments or decision," crises,
and thus education becomes preparation tor these radical
experiences which denote an encounter with God. In place
ot growth is supplied crisis; in place of progress--prepar
at1on.29
This distinct cleavage between existential and edu
cational concepts of learning blurs when the learning
situation is considered. Experiential education is con
cerned with the individual as he is found in a life-situa
tion. Education takes place best under this circumstance.
So, too, existentialism is concerned with authentic exist
ence, which takes place only when the individual is totally
involved in the total situation, and is in~initely concerned
with his situation. Christian education insists that the
reason tor dealing with the individual in his lite situation
is that only here do you deal with the individual in terms
of his real needs and concerns. In Tillich's existential
29 ~
Johnson, ER• cit., pp. ~1 t.
216
analysis this same need structure is the £ocus ot concern. J O
Existential analysis concerns itself with the critical
nature of the 1nd1vidual
1
s experience. It is interested in
the ambiguities, despair, meaninglessness of the situation
and asserts that the individual must become aware of this
situation. "such awareness is a necessary step toward the
tinal goal--that the individual find freedom and lite
through the creative love or God as the Source and Ground or
Being itselt."3
1
This existential awareness can be equated
readily with the initial step ot the problem-solving process
which characterizes religious education.3
2
Before learning
can take place it is necessary tor the individual to become
aware ot the problem. This is almost identical with the
existentialist concept, although the latter is restricted
to those specific existentialist moods and concepts. Edu
cation would say that these may or may not be the problems
to be considered.
The life-situation and existential-situation ap
proaches are similar in yet another regard. The existen
tialist is careful to insist that the individual must be
completely caught up in the experience tor self-authenticity
JOibid., pp. 9 t.
3
1
rbid., pp. 53 ft.
32supra, pp. 79 rt.
217
to be achieved. Christian education would agree on the
basis or the insights or dynamic psychology. The most sig
nificant learning is that which involves a change in the
total personality. S\tch a change is possible only when the
individual is ego-involved in the situation; that is, when
he also is completely caught up in the experience.
In the previous sections on epistemology and experi
ence the close identification between existentialist and
educational thought was noted in terms or the role of the
individual. It is here reiterated that both movements con
sider individual experience to be extremely important. In
terms or the learning process, religious education would
assert that all learning is individual learning. Unless
the idea, concept, plan or action, activity, or attitude
becomes part of the experience of the individual, no sig
nificant learning takes place. For this reason this educa
tional approach is often referred to as "experienoe
centered" teaching. In this respect the quotation from
Kierkegaard in the previous section is in agreement with
education.33 One cannot teach by giving a person his own
experience. One must have that experience for himself.
In terms ot this individuality which the movements
share, the concept of freedom previously discussed also
33
Supra, pp. 208-209.
218
enters again. Education, in1'luenced by pragmatism, affirms
that freedom 1s necessary for growth to take place and for
the individual to become creative. Tillich draws a parallel
at this point with existentialism, suggesting that pragma
tism actually would have ended at the same point as Sartre
and Heidegger if it had not been turned aside by the desire
for conformity which charact r1zes American culture. True
freedom which 1s creative discards all norms and build
anew, as 1s evident in Sartre. This pragmatism fails to
do.34 Whether or not this assertion or Tillich's is valid
is open to question. It 1s evident, however, that both
movements do insist upon freedom as a necessary concomitant
tor creativity. Education considers this s a significant
part of the learning process. One must be fre e to make
decisions and choices in order to grow.
Thia claim which Tillich voices, that pragmatism is
beset by conformity, carries over to experiential education
in the form of an assertion by existentialism that an edu
cational movement which seeks to secure changes in persons
through control of environmental circumstances is in reality
a manipulative process by which the true individuality of
the person is replaced by an objectified concept or per
sons.35 Coe would acknowledge that individuals are plastic
.34Tillich, The Courage ~ !!!, pp. 119 f.
35Johnson, .22• cit., p. 76.
219
and are changed by environmental circumstances.3
6
But he
would deny that peraonhood is lost thereby. To the con
trary, the educative process based upon the sacredness of
personality is not control and manipulation, but a shared
experience ot guidance toward more and more freedom.37 In
this manner true individuality is rostered.
The antithetical point ot view cited above is due
largely to the inability of existentialism to deal ade
quately with interpersonal relationships. Experiential
Christian education insists that learning does not take
place as an individualistic endeavor, but always it operates
within a social context. The educative process is essenti
ally a present relationship among living persons. In and
through these relationships changes in self occur and
ganuine learning takes place. It is ot interest to note
that some Biblical theologians have broken with the existen
tialists at this point, recognizing that selfhood is
achieved only in terms of relationships.38 The theological
interest is shifted to the Church, the fellowship community
in which persons ma1 find themselves and their true
36coe, Education_!!! Religion and Morals, p. 40.
37oeorge A. Coe, "Religious Education is !n Peril,"
International Journal of Religious Education, 15:9, January,
1939. ---
38Johnson, .2E.· cit., pp. 76 r, 86 r.
220
relationship to God. This 1s essentially the position or
Christian education, which has consistently emphasized the
importance ot the individual within the community or the
Church.39
Experiential Christian education formulates a theory
of learning which assumes the continuity ot individual
growth, including religious growth. Learning is essentially
an interactive process in whicn relationships between per
sons play the most significant role. As the individual
becomes totally involved in a lite situation he participates
in an experience which is uniquely his, and he learns thus
through his own individual experience.
Existentialism, with its emphasis upon crises and
the discontinuity of experience, has no theory of learning
other than the subjective pilgrimage to the abyss. While
it is similar to experiential education at tne points ot
concern for the total individual within his life situation,
with freedom and the individual character of experience, it
provides no basis for developing an educative proces•~
SUMMARY
The foregoing examination ot existentialism and
experiential Christian education in terms or an educative
39H. Grimes, "Is Religious Education Obsolete?,"
~ligion £.!! Lite, 23:389-392, Summer, 1954.
221
process has revealed some areas or agreement at a few
points. But it has also shown a clear dichotomy between
them on the basic issue or a learning process. The educa
bility of man 1s a basic premise of experiential education.
It is ot little significance to existentialism.
Among the areas of essential agreement is the ques
tion ot epistemology. Although education and existentialism
approach the problem of knowledge from different perspectives,
they are in accord that knowledge is individual knowledge.
It takes on meaning only in terms of the individual• s own
experience. Agreement is also apparent on the issue of
authority. The locus of authority for both movements is
found within human experience. It was observed that Bibli
cal theology departs from the assumptions of existentialism
at this point. Here the epistemological dualism leads to
the conclusion of special revelation in the area of knowl
edge of God.
Another area of accord is the concern the movements
share for individual experience, although existentialism
ignores any implications tor education. Education asserts
that learning takes place only where the individual is ego
involved. Existentialism finds true existence under the
same circumstances . Existentialism tends to prick tne con
science of education in regard to the less-opt1m1st1c
aspects of man•s existence toward which the latter tends to
direct less attention.
222
The accord between the movements is shattered over
the relevance or reason. Witn the exception of agreement
that life is more than mere thinking, there is no agreement
whatsoever. Existentialism grew out or a revolt against
reason, and this opposition continues on the grounds that
rationalism is a threat to genuine existence. Religious
education, on the other hand, embraces reason and the
scientific method as necessary means in the learning pro
cess which is directed toward selt-realization.
This disagreement 1s continued in regard to communi
cation. Experiential education finds communication to be
indispensable for the educative process, a necessary impli
cation of its concepts ot pe~sonality, or the world, and as
a means of sharing true salt with salt in order to achieve
tullest selthood. Contrariwise, existentialism, due to
its extreme emphasis upon absolute individual freedom, finds
communication to be extremely difficult. The world view,
concept or existential individuality, and concern tor sub•
jective moods are all antithetical to the possibility of
communication, although some thinkers make room for it
after the existential leap across the abyss.
Finally, the discord between existentialism and
experientialism reaches a climax over the learning process.
Experiential education formulates a theory of learning
predicated upon the continuity of individual growth,
physical, mental, and spiritual. This learning process is
223
an interactive process in which interpersonal relations play
the major role. It 1s integral, not additive, a remaking ot
experience in which knowing, feeling, and willing tlow
together. Each individual learns best in his own way,
through those experiences in which he is free to create his
own response to the situation in terms of his genuine
interests and needs.
Existentialism, instead of a learning process, has a
pilgrimage through despair to an abyss. While it is similar
to religious education in its concern for the total indi
vidual in his lite situation, with freedom and the individual
character of experience, it fails to provide an adequate
basis for, or to develop, an adequate concept or educational
process.
The nature of man and the nature of the educational
process have been considered in terms of the implications
of existentialism and experiential Christian education.
One further area needs to be studied under the same condi
tions, the nature of value and the role of the Christian
tradition. The ensuing chapter deals with this examination.
CHAPTER VI
The purpose of this chapter is to conclude the com
parative study of the implications or experiential Christian
education and existentialism. The examination of the move
ments is directed toward the problems of value and the role
ot the Christian tradition. The theological nature of the
subject under discussion requires a modification of the
procedure followed heretofore. It was an assumption or
this study that the contemporary movement in theology
commonly referred to as ne~-orthodoxz consists ot Reforma
tion Theology superimposed over existentialist presupposi
tions. In the light or the twofold influence upon this
contemporary theological movement it is necessary in this
chapter to draw attention occasionally to those places at
which the theological movement digresses from existentialism
on the basis of the Reformation theological concepts.
Theretore, the procedure to be follo~ed 1s to refer to
experiential education, then existentialism, and, finally,
neo-ortnodox or Biblical theology where occasion warrants.
Five distinct topics are considered in the above
described manner: (1) the concept of value, (2) the concept
ot religion, (3) the role ot the Christian tradition, (4)
the nature of ultimate value, and (5) the implied ethic.
The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the findings.
225
THE CONCEPT OF VALUE
The experiential approach to Christian education has
·been characterized by a value concept which reflects the
inrluences or the pragmatic-empirical approach ot secular
education and of the 1dealistic-personal1st1c viewpoint of
llberalism.
1
In the tradition of the former, experiential
education acknowledges that values emerge in and through
the experience of 1nd1v1duals.
2
It was recognized that
Christian education is concerned with creativity as an
aspect of the growtn process. Through the creative experi
ences of individuals nev meanings and values emerge and are
realized. These values appear through the interaction ot
the individual with his environment and, while they may be
shared values and may grow out of social experiences, they
take on their valuational quality in terms of the individu
al's own experience. They assume the character of value
tor the individual. This uniqueness of values is consistent
with the epistemology of the movement, which considers
truth to be truth as it is self-validating in the individ
ual's experience. It also enables experiential education
1
will1am c. Moore, "Christian Education in the Light
ot Three Theological Views of Man" (unpublished doctoral
dissertaion, Boston University, 1954); Dissertation Ab
stracts (Ann Arbor, Michig&Q: University M1cror!Iiiis,-Y954).
2
see Dewey, Democrac! and Education, pp. 164 tr.;
Coe, A Social Theorz of Rel giousEaucation, pp. 182 tt.,
and other wrI tlngs. -
226
to assume the ecl ectic position which it takes in regard to
emergent new values and transcendental or idealistic values.
Attention has been drawn a number of times previously
to th~ tact that Coe, El l i ott, and Sherrill all function
trom within the Christian t radition. In doing so, they
acknowledge that there are certain values which inhere ob-
-
jectively in the nature of r eality. Coe explicitly rejects
the naturalism or John Dew ey, embraces idealism, and makes
Jesus• concept of the worth of persons normative for Chris tianitJ.3 Elliott assumes a similar position about the
centrality ot Jesus.4 Sherrill clearly reflects a Neo Platonist point of v1ew. 5 The implication or these posi tions for the subject under consideration is that the
reality ot transcendental values is acknowledged. This
point ot view is oditied, however, by the assertion that,
though these values may inhere in the very nature of
reality, they are values for the individual only when they
are realized by him w i t hin his own experience.
It is interesting to note that existentialism and
Biblical theology both diverge from the position or experi
ential education, but in opposite directions. Existential
ism places man in a meaningless circumstance in which the
3coe, What i s Christian Education?, pp. 89 tr.
------~--
4Elliott, .21?.• cit., pp. 309 tr.
5sherr111, The str~gle .2.! the Soul, pp. 16 tr.
221
only values are those which the individual creates tor him
self. Value emerges from the experience or the individual,
but this is not the interactive experience ot religious edu
cation. It is solitary. Value is that which the individual
makes or worth to himself. Valuational experience does not
precede experience, but the act comes tirst--and value is
the result ot the act. For example, in Heidegger's thought
the tree resolve is ths value, whatever 1s freely resolved
is irrelevant. It it is freely resolved, it 1s value.6
A question can be raised whether this value-through-freedom
in existentialism really ever solves its problem of mean
inglessness. There 1s absolutely no basis for a critique
or value other than the free act itself. And whatever the
act may be, the tact that it was freely made is its value,
with no frame of reference to which to relate it, not even
previous experience.
In contrast with the subjective character of value
in existentialism, Biblical theology affirms, on the basis
of its epistemological dualism, a transcendental concept or
values. These values persist in the supernatural realm and
cannot be realized through ordinary experience. Under
special circumstances and under unusual conditions which
man cannot initiate there is a break-through as the result
6
orene, .2£· cit., pp. 141 tr.
228
ot which values are realized.
The eclectic position ot experiential religious edu
cation finds values emerging in and through experience,
discovered there, yet it acknowledges that values do in.here
in reality which become values for the individual when ap
propriated within his own experience. Existentialism moves
.t'urther into subjectivity, finding values only as the indi
vidual creates them for himself through his acts of freedom.
Biblical theology moves in the opposite direction, insisting
upon transcendental values realizable only through divine
initiation. The disjuncture among these movements becomes
still more acute when the nature of religion is considered
as the next topic.
THE NATURE OF RELIGION
It was suggested earlier that one of the most sig
niticant contributions which George Albert Coe made to the
religious education movement was the interpretation of
religion in v&luational terms.7 Religion functions in the
realm ot values. It is the experience of revaluing all
values in the light ot the total meaning of life. The ·
religious process or revaluation of all other values serves
two functions: the integration of personal and social
229
experience, and the reconstruction ot that experience.
Religion, thought ot in terms or its tunction, is thus a
qualitative aspect of lite. It is a quality that can
attach to any and every aspect ot a manta interaction with
his objective world. Experiential education makes a dis
tinction between this integrative and reconstructive .func
tion which religion performs in human experience and the
concepts, techniques, and structures with which the function
is implemented. The abiding aspect ot r eligion is the
function which it performs in human experience, continuously
reorganizing and reconstructing personality. On the other
hand, the ritual, theology, and institutional organization
or religion change with the changing culture.
Since this evaluational function of religion embrac es
all of life, experiential education, in accord with liberal
theology, would assert that in all experiences of life there
can be divine disclosure. Thus it · would oppose the existen
tialist supposition that the Kierkegaardian premise of a
crisis of despair is a necessary prelude to an encounter
with God. Disclosure can take place in joy as well as in
anguish, in healthy-mindedness as well as in morbid-minded
ness.8
It was asserted in the introductory remarks on
existentialism that, rather than a philosophy, the movement
~erm,~. cit., p. 592.
230
appeared to be a religion concerned with a particular ritual
through which one achieved the "salvation" or true selthood.
In contrast to the twictional concept of experiential edu
cation, existentialism suggests a specific process through
which one is "converted." As one recognizes his own pre
dicament, estranged trom the world, lost 1n a meaningless
existence, he must undergo a process ot negative selt
attirmation and accept his anxiety which leads to deepest
despair. In the crisis in which he encounters the abyss or
nothingness he makes a leap of faith, arriving safely on
the other side headed toward self-affirmation which is avail
able in a number of ways, dependent largely upon the point
of view ot the existentialist tollowed.9 This ritual is
unrelated to the concept of religion as a quality ot life
which may inhere 1n any experience. It is a progression
from predicament to salvation.
For Biblical theology this religious ritual of exis
tentialism appears to be ready-m.ade. Religion is, indeed,
a move trom initial desperation to salvation often defined,
as in the case of the existentialists, in terms of self
realization. The theological point of view takes care to
detine the crisis and leap in terms of its Reformation
theology. The result of the crisis experience and the leap
9
Supra, pp. l4. 8 ff.
231
ot taith is the Divine-human encounter. In this regard, it
is not clear to the writer how the necessity tor undergoing
the experience of despair is reconciled witn the assertion
that man is helpless and is dependent upon purely divine
initiative tor his salvation. Does not the necessity of
despairing carry with it the implication of man's ability
to so-abase himself? Perhaps the theologian's rejection ot
reason is based upon the internal inconsistencies or his
thought as well as upon man•s predicament.
It has been shown that the qualitative, functional
interpretation of religion of experiential Christian educa
tion is incompatible with the existentialist concept of
religion as encounter following negative self-affirmation.
This cleavage becomes a broad hiatus in the ensuing section
dealing with the Christian heritage.
THE ROLE OP THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION
The distinction which experiential education makes
between the function and the structure of religion implies
an interpretation or the Christian tradition which is in
radical disagreement with the interpretation of Biblical
theology. The representatives or the educational movement
recognize the importance of the heritage as that which makes
the religious function C.nr1stian.. If the unification of
values is in terms ot values which inhere within the
232
Christian tradition, the experience b comes Christian. The
religious heritage serves as a resource tor dealing with
existing experience, rather than as an authoritative set of
dogmas to be transmitted. Within individual experience
this heritage performs three functions: it is a basis for
interpretation or experience, it provides standards and
values by which experiential situations may be judged, and
it provides techniques tor Christian living which have
emerged through the religious experience ot those wno came
betore.
10
This functional point of view in regard to the tra
dition is predicated upon a concept of general revelation.
Divine disclosure is not limited to a particular historical
event, but continually takes place through continuing human
experience. This means that theological concepts provide
only part of the basic and controlling ideas for Christian
education. The educative process itself as a living rela
tionship between persons provides additional data which are
relevant to the function or religion.
The experiential Christian education movement recog
nizes the centrality or Jesus within any process of reli
gious edu tion. However, it insists that the structure or
10
see William c. Bower, Christ in Christian Educa
tion (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Presi, 1943), pp. 5:Z-tt.;
Coe, What is Christian Education?, pp. 31 ff.; et al.
-- - ---------- - -
233
religion, consisting ot ritual, organization, and theologi-
cal concepts, changes in terms or the changing culture.
The theologian, instead of saying, "This ls what God
thinks," must say, "This is what theologians think.nll
Theology is a rationalization of religious experience, and
theological concepts a.re not values themselTes, but reflec
tion upon already experienced values with a view to dis
covering upon what conditions tnese values may be realized
anew in experience.
1
2 Yet the structured concepts are
neither revelation itself nor finally authoritative. As
experience changes, the concepts ot the heritage must under
go reinterpretation and reconst:ruction in order to continue
to be relevant to the human scene.
The functional role of the Christian tradition within
Christian education is based upon two other assumptions
which need to be recalled. First, experiential religious
education assumes the validity of use of reason in seeking
knowledge about and relationship with God. Instead ot being
spiritually handicapped at birth, man is equipped with God
given potentialities for growth w.b.icn include his rational
powers. Secondly, in addition to his ability to use reason,
llEdwin E. Aubrey, "A Theology Relevant to Religious
Education," Reli~ious Education, 34:196, October-December,
1939, •eport1ng a discussion Ied by Dr. Coe.
12 8
Ibid., p. 19 •
234
an participates in a proce s of growth, in which his
capacities for religious experience increase as he matures.
This optimistic view of man places man, not a a corrupt
lot individual in a meaningless world, but in a hopeful
circumstance in which he can, through cooperation with God,
realize increasingly more meaningful values in a world in
which he is at home.
The attitude of experientialzeligious education
toward the Christian t r adition could be summarized as repre
senting an appreciation of historical doctrinal positions
and at tne same time recognizing the implications of
empirical studies about man which call for a continuing
reinterpr etation or the doctrinal positions in terms of
contemporary needs.
It is somewhat difficult to evaluate the relation of
existentialism to the Christian tradition in light or the
divergent poi.nts of view of its exponents. Within the
general framework, however, there are several points which
hold implications in this regard. Heidegger's instrumental
concept 0£ the world can be compared with functionalism or
experiential education, although the latter accepts the
objective validity and meaning of the world whereas
Heidegger rejects it. Within existentialism there 1s a
transcendental aspect which is appreciated and used by the
Biblical theologians. This is discussed more fully below.
Finally, within existentialism there 1s an empha is upon the
235
guilt or man as a condition prior to his action. Again,
this 1s of significance for Biblical theology.
The close identity between existential and neo
orthodox concepts of religion has already been noted above.
The existentialist presuppositions constitute a framework
within which Biblical theology can organize its concept of
the Christian tradition. Tne existentialist predicament of
man is the equivalent of man
1
s fallen and deprave:ist ate.
From the concept of the worth of man in religious education
the change is to a doctrine of depravity. The description
of man's "existential situation" is one of finitude in
contrast with the state which is realized only through
activity of a God who is beyond history, existing in a
transcendental realm. Augustinian pessimism regarding man
is the chief char eta 1stic. Man has little hope of par
ticipating in his own salvation.
In light of this predicament of man, there is no
possibility of general revelation whicn religious education
embraces. Instead, from his transcendental realm God en
ters into history in the form of special revelation,
delivering supernaturally-revealed truth once and for all
to the saints. The Christian heritage, primarily the Bible,
is the repository of this divinely revealed truth which
needs to be transmitted to future generations. The func
tion of religious education is thus to transmit the knowl
edge and prepare the individual for personal encounter.
236
In contrast to ~he educational viewpoint of man
capable of using reason and able to grow, this theological
movement based upon existentialism embraces the existential
ist concept of leap. The authoritative revelation is known
only through faith, not through reason. As the individual
accepts his despairing situation, he makes a leap or faith.
Through this transrational experience he participates in an
encounter with God. The concepts of growth, evolution, and
progress are replaced by the crisis experience and the leap
of faith.
The roles of the Christian tradition in experiential
education and in the theological movement based upon exis
tentialism represent antithetical points of view. In the
former, the tradition is considered to be the cumulative
results of historical religious experience, and it is used
fWlctlonally in the reinterpretation, evaluation, and re
direction of contemporary individual and social experience
in which growing persons gradually achieve a religious
adjustment to the present world. Through the process, the
heritage itself undergoes reinterpretation and reconstruc
tion.
In contrast to this role, in Biblical theology the
Christian tradition represents a body of truth divinely
revealed at a particular point in history which is to be
transmitted to the new members of the religious community
and thereupon apprehended, not through reason, but through
237
a leap or ~aith. The attitudes or the two movements toward
revelation, the relation of reason and faith, and the nature
of man represent unbridgeable chasms over which a common
interpretation ot the nature or the Christian tradition can
be constructed only with great dirficulty, if at all.
Another cleavage between experiential education and existen
tialism lies in the nature of ultimate value, which is now
to be considered.
THE NATURE OF ULTIMATE VALUE
Implicit in the foregoing discussion of the Chris
tian tradition is the concept of ultimate value which is
held by the movements under consideration. The conflict
needs to be made explicit. That is the function of this
section.
One of the major characteristics of the experiential
approach to Christian education is the assumption that God
operates both within and beyond the created Wliverse.13
God is immanent within nature and within human experience.
His manifestations are apparent in the emergence of values
and in the growth which takes place within man. A corollary
of this concept of God as being active both within the
238
world and beyond it is the concept of the ultimate value or
the individual and of the growth of personality. The in
finite worth of individual personality is a value judgment
of experiential Christian education rooted in Jesus' concept
of man. The goal of man is self-realization which is
achieved in cooperation with God. Man shares in the re
sponsibility for his own salvation, and he experiences a
discovery of the Divin in the experiences of living.
One of the assertions of religious education is that,
wherever persons experience significant relationships in
which love is expressed, there God is. The presence of God
is not a unique experience set apart from other experiences,
but He is a progress-making God who is involved continuously
in hwnan experience.
Within existentialism the concept of ultimate value
varies markedly. Among the non-theistic existentialist
thinkers ultimate value is the absolute freedom ot the
individual. The individual is seeking selr-affirmation
which he achieves for himself by himself. In a sense,
existentialism of this type parallels educational thought in
the emphasis upon the ultimate value or the individual.
However, the two differ in that existentialism would de~ina
the individual not only as ultimate value, but the only
value, and yet a value in a purely subjective fashion.
There i no provision tor considering another person to be
of infinite worth.
Not all existentialist fall within the ategory
described above. Among the theistic thinkers the usual
concept of ultimate value is in terms of transcendence.
239
This was characteristic of Kierkegaard, and is reflected in
the thinking of his theological followers of today. God is
above experience, beyond the world, unknowable by any
efforts on the part of man. This of course 1s antithetical
to the position of experiential religious education. Within
this ne suparnaturalistic movement God is considered to be
unapproachable from man's perspective. In place of the
assertion of religious education that man cooperates with
Go in the working out of his salvation, God is external to
man, and man derives what he has from God as he chooses to
reveal himself. Instead of cooperation between man and God,
God
1
s relation to man is of master to servant, and man•s
duty is to obey when he is confronted by God. It is inter
esting to note that in much of the theological writing
there is still great emphasis upon the existentialist con
cept ot freedom which the individual achieves after his
crisis experience of confrontation.
Where religious education sees the ultimate ideal of
Christianity realized through a continuous divine-human
process or growth and development that takes place in
ordinary purposeful human experience, existentialism and
its theological counterpart see the realization of selfhood
taking place in extraordinary moments of conrrontation by a
240
distant God who chooses to so reveal himself. Tne imma
nental concept of Christian education is in conflict with
the transcendental emphasis or existential theology, and
the disparity between the two movements continues to grow.
This trend is continued in the concluding section or the
chapter dealing with ethical implications.
E.1THICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTS OF VALUE
The experiential approach to Cnristian education was
shown to contain a major emphasis upon ethical and social
values.14 It was noted that individual growth toward self
hood takes place always within the context of social inter
action. Thus relationships between persons becomes a vital
concern in the educational process, and sucn relationships
are essentially an ethical concern. Influenced by tAe
social concern which is apparent in the progressive educa
tional as well as the liberal theological assumptions
underlying experiential religious education, the movement
1s characterized by a concern for the reconstruction of
society as well as the reconstruction of the individual.
Man is subject to a process of social eYaluati on. fie has
become moral man by virtue of self-determined effort to
improve his lot in functional relationship with the creative
forces which operate through the social situation. He is
in the process ot changing continually nis moral and social
situation, qualified by nature to rise geneticallJ in the
moral scale to increasingly significant relationships with
God.
1
5 This concept of moral progress is particularly
evident in the writings ot Coe, and i t is implied in the
works of Elliott.
16
It was noted, however, that Sherr 11
does not share this ethical and social emphasis.
Christian education represents a viewpoint which is
concerned vitally with the ethical and social implications
of living. Relationships between persons are of major con
cern, based upon a conviction that the individual and
society participate in progressive growth morally and
spiritually, as well as physically.
In contrast to the educational concern for relation
ships, existentialism predicates its ethical approacn upon
existential individuality and freedom. Freedom constitutes
the ethical basis for existentialism. It has already been
indicated that this concept provides no basis for the
establis.nment ot moral values. That one acts is the value.
There are no criteria adequate to serve wAich do not limit
this freedom or the individual. Moral responsibility 1s
not the issue for existentialism. The Kantian question,
l.Sste11art G. Cole, "Where Religious Education and
Theology Meet," Rel1~1ous Education, 35:19-20, January
March, 1940.
16
see Coe, Wnat is C.nristian Education?, A Social
Theory of Religlous Educition; and Eilioit, Can Re!lgious
EQucation be Christian?
------- - ------
242
"Was his act conscious and deliberate?" is replaced by the
existentialist question, "Was his act whole?" This whole
ness is an attribute ot the inner unity and nidden destiny
of personality, rather than rational deliberation.
1
7 This
concept, taken from the existentialist point of view, fails
to deal adequately with the individual-in-relationship.
However, the concept does have this degree of significance
in terms of dyDamic psychology: there are hidden motives,
unconscious tensions and forces, which do effect the objec
tive behavior of the individual, yet are not conscious,
deliberate acts upon his part. These actions are not so
much the concern or ethical judgment as they are questions
of the health or wholeness versus sickness or fragmentation
of individual personality. Non-social behavior may result
from a sick personality rather than from deliberate choice.
This insight has been recognized by religious education as
a call to the. reexamination or the ethical question.18
The relation of Biblical theology to existentialism
is somewhat ambiguous at this point, although it draws upon
the existentialist concepts to some degree. The emphasis
in theology is upon individual salvation akin to
1
7carl Michalson, "Christian Faith and Existential
Freedom," Religion!!! Life, 21:$16-157, Autumn, 1952.
lBElliott, .2.E• cit., pp. 17~ ff; Sherrill, The Gift
of Power, pp. 145 ll.
----
243
existentialist individuality. This is an individual matter,
not determined by relationships witn other persons, but
dependent upon an encounter between self and God. The
s1gn1t1cance of any social values inhering in the process
of society is discounted. Further, since man is incompetent
to effect his own salvation, he is also inadequate to deal
with changes in the existing social order through the
organization of his own intelligenc, and purpose. Again,
the movement opposes experiential edu\~tion in asserting
that man enters the world morally handicapped, rather than
with potentialities for moral and spiritual growth.
Christian education 1s thus once more in an anti
thetical position to existentialism and the theology
influenced by it. Instead of relationships between selves
as the focus for ethical conduct of man capable of individ
ual and social moral growth, existentialism emphasizes
individual freedom which, coupled with the theological con
cept of human frailty and dependence upon external assist
ance leaves little basis for the establishment of an ethic.
The relationship of existentialism and Christian
education to the questions of value and the Christian tra
dition have been examined. The chapter now concludes with
a brief summary of the findings.
244
SUMMARY
Experiential Christian education, existentialism,
and existential theology have been compared in the areas of
value and the Christian tradition. The study has indicated
that the movem ents continue to be in conflict, diverging
sometimes in three separate directions.
Experiential education represents an eclectic point
of view in its concept ot value. It finds values em rging
in and through exper ence, while at the same time acknowl
edging the existence ot values which inhere in reality and
which become meaningful for the individual when appropri
ated within his own experience. These two strains are
separated by existentialism and Biblical theology. The
former accepts the concept of value emerging within indi
vidual experience, but moves further into subjectivity,
finding values as the individual creates them for himself
through acts of rraedom. On the other band, existential
theology moves in the opposite direction, insisting upon
transcendental values realizable through divine initiative.
The divergence between the movements becomes still
more acute at the point of the concept or religion. For
the educational movement religion is a quality of experi ence, the revaluation of all other values in terms of its
total meaning. This fWlctional approach is distinguished
from the structure of religion represented by the ritual,
245
beliefs, and organization which changes with changing cul-
tures. In contrast, the existentialist-theological concept
of religion is of a divine-human encounter which takes
place following a ritual or negative self-affirmation.
Disagreement between the areas under consideration
continues in the analysis ot the role or the Christian tra
dition. In education the Christian heritage consists of
the cumulative results or historical religious experience
which is used functionally in the reinterpretation, evalua
tion, and redirection of contemporary individual and social
experience in which individuals gradually achieve a reli
gious adjustment to the p~esent world. During this process
the heritage undergoes reinterpretation and reconstruction
in terms of the contemporary scene. Antithetical to this
view is the concept of existential theology, which con
siders the Christian tradition to be a body of truth
divinely revealed at a particular point in history. This
content is to be transmitted to the new members of the
religious community who apprehend it, not through the use
or reason, but through a leap of faith.
It was shown that this conflict in viewpoint was due
largely to different assumptions regarding revelation, the
relation of reason and faith, and the nature of man.
The concepts of ultimate value represented still
further discord between experiential education and existen
tialism. Education embraces a concept of God who is both
immanent and transcendent, who acts through a continuous
divine-human process or growth and development in ordinary
human experience. It further insists upon asserting the
ultimacy or individual personality. In place or this
attitude affirming the infinite worth of all persons,
existentialism focuses upon pure individuality, a concept
which has little relevance for an inclusive view or exist
ence. The God of those existentialists who do not make the
individual God, is above and beyond experience, encountering
the individual only in extraordinary, transrational crises
experiences of divine choosing.
Finally, it has been shown that the Christian educa
tion movement, concerned about human relationships, makes
a large place for an ethic of relationship, conceiving of
man as capable, individually and socially, or continuous
growth morally and spiritually, able to reconstruct person
ality and society. Once more existentlalism differs from
its theological counterpart, emphasizing individual freedom
which, related to a concept of human frailty, points in the
direction of helplessness, rather than providing for a
basis upon which an ethic could be established.
With the termination of this comparative examination
of the two movements, attention is directed to the final
portion ot the study, which constitutes a summary of the
findings and the conclusions which are based upon them.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The problem, as stated in the introduction of this
study, was to examine the basic assumptions and character
istics of' experiential Christian education and existential
philosophy in order to determine what, if any, areas of
accord could be found between the two movements, as well as
to define clearly the points of conflict. To this problem
the foregoing discussions have been addressed.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it
seeks to summarize briefly the findings of the study.
Secondly, it states the conclusions which can be drawn from
these findings in terms of (1) the relationship between the
two movements, (2} the implications of existentialism for
Christian education, and (3) some theological considera
tions for education growing out of the study. The first
consideration is the summary of areas of agreement between
the two movements.
SUMMARY
I. AREAS OF AGREEMENT
While the main function of this study was to deter
mine possible areas of agreement between the assumptions and
characteristics of experiential religious education and
existentialism, the results have proved to be largely
248
negative. Howev·. er, a close relationship between the two
disciplines has been noted at a number or minor points, and
at a few of greater significance. In the following brief
swnma.ry these major points are set forth individually,
followed by a statement swnmarizing the other areas or
accord. This same procedure serves in the summary of areas
ot conflict which follows this section.
The worth of man. Experiential Christian education
--------
affirms the worth of individual man as one of its crucial
assumptions. It holds a concept of
11
personal1ty-princlple,"
based upon Jesus• estimate of the individual as being of
infinite worth in the sight of God, and hence in the eyes of
other men also. The Christian education movement is thus
essentially person-centered. Its goal is the development
or the individual in the direction or his fullest potenti
alities for self-realization.
The existentialist movement has emerged essentially
as a revolt against the depersonalization of human life
within Western civilization under the impact or rationalism
and an industrial society which tends to treat persons as
means rather than as ends. This loss of authentic existence
occasioned by the process of objectifying human lite becomes
the center of attention of existentialism, and its goal,
similar to that of Christian education, is the achievement
of true selfhood. Thus the worth of the individual man is
249
a foundational assumption underlying botn movements.
The role£!_ individual experience. The educational
movement under consideration embraces a learning process
which finds the individual involved in a life situation.
Learning which is most significant takes place when this
individual is fully involved, intellectually, physically,
emotionally~ in an experience of vital concern to him. This
learning is essentially an individual experience, one which
cannot be carried on for the individual, but one in which
he himself must fully participate if growth of the total
personality is to take place.
Although existentialism does not concern itself with
a learning process in the manner of experiential education,
nevertheless it places a primary emphasis upon the return
to immediacy of individual experience. It is only through
this experience, which totally involves the individual in
an infini.te concern about the total situation, that the
individual achieves authentic existence. Thus, while exis
tential philosophy and experiential education approach the
function of individual experience from different perspec
tives, nevertheless they share the same basic concern for
individual experience in the achievement of self-realiza
tion.
The 5oal .2f man. The goal or man within both move
ments under consideration is the achievement of authentic
250
self'hood. Th re 1 a difference of opinion about the de.fi
nition 0£ this goal, and about the means of achieving it;
however their mutual assumption about the worth of the
individual leads to a common conviction that man can aspire
to and achieve a quality of existence ~hich permits the
fullest realization of his potentialities.
The necessity .2f freedom. Experiential education
insists that freedom is a necessary condition if the indi
vidual 1s to exercise his natural creativity and growth to
the fullest of his capacities. This concept of the impor-
ance of freedom in the achievement of selfhood is shared
by existentialism. After the crisis experience in which
one is faced with the reality of his own freedom in a moment
of decision, one can achieve selfhood. The acceptance of
this freedom is a vital necessity in order to discover
authenticity. This freedom is essential to both movements
in the process of achieving true self-realization.
It was noted that the existentialist and educational
thinkers share the conviction that the r elation or creati
vity to freedom is inextricably tied to the activity of God.
The two movements differ, however, in this respect: exis
tentialists, holding to a transcendental concept or God,
find creativity only in mom nts or crisis; experient1al1sts,
holding to an immanental as well as transcendental concept
of God, find creativity expre sad in natural processes and
the on-going experiences ot living.
Epistemology J!llS the locus .2£ authority. Experien tial education and existentialism share a similar point of
view in rags.rd to both knowledge and authority. They are
in accord that knowledge is essentially individual knowl
edge, based upon one
1
s perception of the phenomenal world,
rather than upon direct perception of the nownenal. Knowl
edge takes on meaning £or the individual as he interacts
with the world, and this knowledge is a part of his indi
vidual experience.
Similarly, both movements assert that the locus of
authority lies within the experience of the individual,
rather than external to him. Existentialism bases its po~
sition upon its subjective concept of truth; experiential
education bases its position upon the character of individ
ual experience. Attention is called to a distinction which
exists between the two movements in regard to the relation
ship or the individual to the natural world. The objective
world is maauingless to the existentialist, but it is a
valid reality in which truth may be tested for the experi
ent1al1st .
Additional areas or accord. The above areas consti-
-
tute the major points of agreement between experiential
rel gious education and existentialism. It is necessary to
indicate a few additional points of lesser importance upon
•
252
which the movements agree. There is a mutual concern for
the role of anxiety in understanding man; nowevar existen
tialism attaches greater importance to it, giving it onto
logical priority over other emotional states. It was
further noted that, while many existentialist thinkers do
not find a place for significant social relationships, a
few, including Jaspers, Marcel, and Buber, consider rela tionships between persons to be vitally significant in the
achiev·ement of selfhood, a point of view which is basic to
experiential Christian education. Thus for these thinkers
communication is vital, as in education.
Botn movements reject an extreme rationalistic point
or view, insisting that life 1s far more than thinking, that
being is more important than rational processes. The con
cern of existentialism for the total-involvement of the
individual in the total situation can be equated to some
extent with the educator's interest in the life-situation
in which tne needs and concerns of the individual become
the focus of concern. Existential awareness of man's
predicament is very similar t o the initial step of the
educational problem-solving process in which the individual
becomes .t'ully aware or the problem within the situation.
The true existence of existentiali sm is round where the
individual is totally involved. At this same point reli
gious educators tind learning taking place. These, then,
constitute the significant points of agreement between
253
existentialism and experiential education. Far more exten-
sive is the following summary of the areas of disagreement
between the movements.
II~ AREAS OF CONFLICT
A number or the basic assumptions of experiential
religious education and existentialism appear to be anti
thetical. The major points of disagreement are treated
separately, followed by a brief summary of the other points
or les s significance.
The basic nature of man.
-
Experiential religious
education affirms an optimistic, out-going, world-affirming
concept of the nature of man. Man is ambivalent, but he
has God-given potentialities tor growth, progress, and
goodness. In contrast to the optimistic view existential
ism directs attention to man•s predicament. Man is
estranged, homeless, anxious. He must pass through the
depths or despair before he can find himself.
Man•s relation to the world.
---
Experiential education
insists that man's nature ia essentially to be at home
within the world. Since the orld is an expression of
God•s creativity; it is a meaningful world in which progress
and growth take place within man and within nature. Ant 1-
thetic al to this point of view is the existentialist asser
tion that man is estranged, alienated, not at home in the
254
world. Some consider man thrust into this world unwillingly.
Instead of a place of progress, the world is meaningless,
neither good nor evil, but irrelevant, except for the mean
ing which man himself gives to it.
The role of reason and the scientific method. A
-
significant characteristic of experiential education is its
recognition or the role which reason and the s c i t ific
method play in the educative process. Any evaluation of
man must recognize the significance of his powers of reason
ing and his ability to think. Recognition is made of the
similarity between the scientific method and the learning
process. Reason becomes an invaluable part of that process.
Its validity is essential if man is to ba educable, an
assumption basic to the movment.
In opposition to this view which affirms the validity
of reason, existentialism arises as a revolt against reason
and the scientific method which has sprung from rational
philosophy. It asserts that rationalism transforms every
thing, including man himself, into an object of calculation
and control. Instead 0£ abstract theorizing and empirical
verification, existentialism is concerned with the subjec~
tive, the immediate, the emotional, and the frustrations of
anxiety and despair which permeate the common life. Thus,
where experiential education embraces reason as an indis
pensable aspect of manta capacity for growth and learning,
existentialism asserts that it is a threat to genuine
existence.
255
The learnin5 process. Experiential religious educa
tion rormulates a theory of learning which is predicated
upon the continuity or individual growth. This learning
process is an interactive experience in which interpersonal
relationships play the major role. It is integral, a re
making of experience in whicn knowing, feeling, and willing
flow together. Each individual learns best in his own way,
through those experiences in which he is free to create bis
own responses to the situation in terms of his genuine
interests and needs.
Existentialism has no place for the concepts of con
tinuity, progress, and growth which are basic to Christian
education. Instead of a learning process involving meaning
ful interrelationships, existentialism subsitutes a solitary
pilgrimage through despair to an abyss. Though similar to
religious education in its concern for the individual in
his life situation, with freedom and the individual charac
ter of experience, existentialism provides no basis for an
educative process through which individuals may grow and
change.
Continuity and 5rowth. No concept is more important
to experiential education than its assumption about the
continuity of h'Wllan growth, mentally, physically, and
256
spiritually. In place of this concept existentialism sub
stitutes crisis, moments of decision, and the radical dis
continuity of experience, thus undermining the basic
assumption necessary for the concept of a learning process.
Concepts of value. The experiential education move-
- ----
ment, drawing upon progressive education and liberal theolo
gy for its assumptions, holds an eclectic viewpoint toward
value. It finds values emerging in and through experience,
while at the same time acknowledging the existence of values
which inhere in reality and Khich become meaningful for the
individual when appropriated within his own experience.
Existentialism parallels the experiential strain,
finding values within individual experience as the individ
ual, in his subjectivity, creates them. On the other hand,
existential theology insists upon transcendental values
realizable through divine initiative. Thus both philosophi
cally and theol.ogically experiential education differs from
existentialism in its value concepts.
The nature E.£. religion. The educational movement
under consideration interprets religion as a quality of
experience, the revaluation of ~11 other values in terms of
its total meaning. This functional analysis is distin
guished from the structure of religion represented by the
ritual, beliefs, and organi zation which changes with
changing cultures. In contrast, tha existentialist
257
theological concept of religion is of a divine-human en-
counter which takes place following a ritual of negative
self-affirmation brought about by certain moods which have
ontological as well as psychological significance.
The role of the Christian tradition. Tra educational
-- --- - -- ----- -----
approach to the Christian tradition is its recognition ot
it as the cwnulative results of historical religious experi
ence which are to be used functionally in the reinterpreta
tion, evaluation, and redirection or individual and social
experience in which individuals gradually achieve a reli
gious adjustment to life. During this process the structure
of the heritage continues to undergo reinterpretation and
reconstruction in light of the contemporary scene.
In contrast once more, existential theology inter
prets the Christian tradition as a body of divinely-revealed
truth available at a particular point in history. This con
tent is to be transmitted to the new members of the reli
gious community who apprehend it through a leap of faith.
The two movements conf'lict because of essentially antitheti
cal concepts of revelation, of the relation of reason and
faith, and of the nature of man.
Additional areas 2.£. disagreement. The above-men
tioned points serve as the major areas or conflict between
experiential education and existentialism. However, the
following constitute less sign ficant, but no less
258
antithetical points of issue between the movements. Wni e
the movements share a concern for the role or anxiety in
life, existentialism insists upon giving it ontological
significance, a position wnich experiential education has
not yet admitted. However, the educational movement is
giving increasing attention to the problem of anxiety as it
1s considered within contemporary psychology and theology.
The similarity ot the two movements in the emphasis
upon freedom has been previously indicated. It is necessary
to note that existentialism in many of its versions insists
upon freedom as a goal in itself, as well as a means of
achieving self-authentication. This position is not snared
in religious education.
The educational movement finds social interaction to
be a vital necessity if individual selfhood is to be
achiaved. It has already been indicated that some supporters
of existentialism share this viewpoint, but it needs to be
stressed that the basic character of this movement ls of
subjective, individualistic concern, and many of its ex
ponents re:fuse to acknowledge the necessity of relation
ships. For Christian education, self realization is
achieved through relationships functioning within a Chris
tian frame of reference. For much of existentialism this
goal is achieved only through individual freedom.
It is interesting to note that, while existentialism
and experiential education share a similar concept of
2.59
authority, Biblical theology departs from existentiali t
presuppositions at this point, although sharing the
epistemological dualism. On the basis of this dualism it
asserts the necessity of a transrational means of acquiring
knowledge of God; therefore it posits a theory of special
revelation a~prehendable only through the leap of faith.
Existentialism challenges experiential education
directly at several points which need to be taken into ac
count. It asserts that the pragmatic influence upon re
ligious education l eads to a substitution of "adjustedness"
for true individual s elfhood. It further maintains that
this movement ignores the m1pleasant aspects or man•s situ
ation, succumbing to easy optimism. Finally, it questions
whether a learning process such as is characteristic of
experiential education can avoid the manipulation of indi
viduals which objectifies instead of leading into genuine
personalization.
Another area of conflict between the movements lies
in the role of commWlication. Experiential education finds
communication to be indispensable for the educative process,
a necessary implication of its concepts of personality, of
the world, and of interpersonal relationships. On the
other hand, the world view, the concept of existential in
dividuality, and t he concern for s bjective moods makes it
difficult for existent alism to deal adequately with com
munication, although, again, this differs with the
260
relational or solipsistic concept of the return to immediacy
of the various existentialist thinkers.
In the concepts of ultl~ste value experiential educa
tion and existentialism once more diverge. The former em
braces a concept of God who is both immanent and transcend
ent, who acts through a continuous divine-human process of
growth and development in ordinary hwnan experience. It
further embraces a concept of the infinite worth or all
persons; existentialism grasps pure individuality. The God
of those existentialists who do not make the individual a
god is above and beyond experience, encowitering the indi
vidual only in extraordinary transrational crisis experi
ences of divine choosing.
Finally, experiential education is contrasted with
existentialism in regard to the concepts of ethics. Educa
tion indicates a strong concern for an ethic of relation
ship, conceiving of man as capable of moral and spiritual
growth. Solipsistic existentialism makes freedom the abso
lute value, providing no basis upon which to establish an
ethic. Existential theology, emphasizing man
1
s frailty and
helplessness, likewise provides little upon which to estab
lish a practical ethic.
These findings suggest a negative relationship be
tween experiential Cnristian education and existential sm,
in light of the preponderance or areas of disagreement.
The particular nature of this relationship, as well as the
261
educational and theological implications of these findings
are delineated in the conclusions wnich follow.
CONCLUSIONS
The final task of this examination of experiential
Christian education and existentialism is to set forth the
conclusions which can be drawn from the findings of the
study. To this purpose this concluding section 1s directed.
For convenience the conclusions are presented in three
categories: (1) the relationship of existentialism and
experiential education, (2) the implications of existential
ism for Christian education, and (3) some theological impli
cations emerging from the study.
The relationship _2£ experiential education and
existentialism. The primary problem with wnich this stud· y
has been concerned was the quest tor areas of agreement
between the existentialist influence within contemporary
theology and the experiential approach to Christian educa
tion. The findings do not support this search. Rather,
the results have proved to be largely negative. The major
conclusion which can be drawn from the study is that there
is no adequate basis upon which the two movements under
consideration can be synthesized. With the exceptions of
the concepts of the worth of man, of epistemology, and of
the locus of authority, all of the major asswnptions
- -
-
__;... " "" ~
262
underlying the movements are in conflict. Education in
sists upon the concepts of continuity, progress, growth,
reason, and a relevant world view. In every case existen
tialism rejects these basic assumptions.
A significant result or this position of existential
ism is that it thus contains no basis whatsoever upon which
to establish a concept of learning and educational process.
The characteristic of anxiety, basic to existentialism, is
a solitary experience, as are the subjective moods to which
it leads. This experience of necessity must be purely indi
vidual, and its goal, the return to the immediacy of ex
perience, is also only achieved individually, although some
thinkers admit that once immediacy is achieved, it is not
necessarily solipsistic, but may be relational. Therefore,
no external criteria exist for the establishment of an
interactive process by which the individual can move toward
his goal.
or course this point of view is irreconcilable with
that of experiential education, which directs itself toward
the development of conditions within which persons can and
do interact with the bio-socio-physical environment as a
necessary circumstance under wnich gradual growth toward
selfhood takes place.
The recognition of the impasse which exists at any
attempt to find a common ground between existentialism and
religious education does not negate the possibility that
263
the experiential approach to Christian education may gain
from an ex8lll1nation of exist ntialism. At a number of
points the latter may suggest changes for experiential edu
cation which would aid it in the endeavor to deal adequately
with the whole person. The second section of these conclu
sions deals with these possible contributions of existen
tialism to religious education.
Existentialist contributions to education. A major
-------------- - -----
theme of existentialism is the assertion that man is in the
midst of' a dire predicament in which he loses tr\1e self'
identi ty. It was noted that pragmatism, and with it experi
ential religious education, were criticized for failing to
take adequate notice of the tragic aspects of life, giving
way to an easy optimism.
1
In this respect existentialism
may contribute to experiential Christian education. Any
truly empirical approach must of necessity examine all
aspects of the data under c nsideration. Therefore, a more
realistic acknowledgment of the deep tragedy of human ex
perience may be called for in religious education in order
to more accurately follow its own methodology.
This does not mean, however, that religious education
should take over the existentialist presuppositions of
man's estr.angement
1
guilt, and feeling that the world is
meaningless.
264
A question needs to be raised whether man is
-
so estranged, alienated, whether the world 1!, meaningless,
or whether this is merely how man feels. If it can be
established that the forme~ 1s actually the case, then
education will need to be reexamined. If, however, this
reflects man's feelings, this can be dealt with in the edu
cational frame of reference. Furthermore, if the latter 1s
the case, it can be argued strongly that exi·stentialist
philosophy thus creates itself .
A second contribution whi~h existentialism ~ay make
to experiential education is in the recognition that life,
as well as Christian growth, has crises, set-backs, and
times of crucial decision. It is not just a gradual growth
process, but may change suddenly, rapidly. Therefore,
experiential religious education may need to rethink the
place of radical confrontation, crisis, and response in the
developing religious life of children and adults. There is
some recognition of this in the writings of Elliott and
Sherrill which recognize the implications of Gestalt psy
chology and dynamic psychology at this point, but additional
attention could profitably be paid to the relation of growth
to crises.
It was suggested that existentialism and the theology
related to it both have a great concern tor the doctrine of
sin Man is not guilty because or an act, he acts because
of guilt already within him. Religious education may need
265
to take more serio· usly the concept of a doctrine of sin.
The movement has expressed a conviction that man 1s ambiva
lent, a sinner, with potentialities for evil as well as tor
good. However, in actual practice its methodology has
functioned upon a basis of natural growth into goodness.
While still insisting upon the validity of the concepts of
growth, reason, and process, the educational movement may
seek to reexamine its methodology in order to deal more
adequately with the ambivalent nature of man and tha theo
logical doctrines or sin, redemption, and judgment which
stem from man's basic capacity for both good and evil.
A fourth concern of existentialism which is already
beginning to have meaning for the religious education move
ment 1s the interest in the role of anxiety and subjective
moods in the achievement of authentic selfhood. Christian
education has long been characterized by a conviction that
the whole person must be involved in a true learning ex
perience. Harrison Elliott, Lewis Sherrill and others show
a vital concern for the implications of dynamic psychology
for the learning experience and for Christian growth. The
most recent works or Sherrill represent a continuation of
the experiential approach in the Christian education mov·e
ment and, at the same time, a move toward a more signifi
cant understanding of the point ot view of contemporary
theology and its existentialist background. Therefore, he
devotes considerable discussion to the role of anxiety and
266
a psychological analysis of the learning experience. He
depends greatly upon the existentialist concepts in the
writings ot Paul Tillich. This appears to be a fruitful
trend which should be pursued still further.
The theistic existentialists in the main emphasize a
concept or the transcendence of God. There is a conscious
ness ot the "beyond experience" aspect of God which tends
to be ignored in Christian education. The expressed con
cept of God is usually one wnich embraces his immanence and
his transcendence. Functionally, however, the movement tenis
to concentrate upon immanental concerns to the exclusion of
thinking about the transcendental. This is not without
good reason, for logically speaking, one cannot discuss
that which is beyond experience. Yet, the educational
movement perhaps needs to pay more attention to the sense
of awe and mystery which accompanies the realization that
God is beyond experience.
-
At two more points education may profit from the
position of the existentialists. The latter devote con
siderable attention to the concept of self-transcendence.
Although Coe wrote at length about this aspect of human
existence, in recent times not a great deal of attention
has been paid to it. Sherrill, however, does discuss it as
a characteristic of personality and considers it a major
assumption underlying the development of his central thesis
in The Gitt of Power. Finally, experiential education
------
267
reflects a sense of uneasiness due to the fact that it has
not yet learned to live in a world of relative values
rather than absolutes. Existentialism constitutes an at
tempt to do just this. While the particular solution
afforded within existentialism may not prove to be satis
factory to the educational movement, it may serve to call
attention of experiential education to the problem and the
necessity of rethinking it.
These, then, constitute some ways in which experi
ential education may profit from an encounter with existen
tialism while, at the same time, maintaining its basic
assumptions which are antithetical to existentialism. The
discussion, however, is not complete until the numerou
theological implications are observed. The concluding por
tion of the study deals with these implications.
Theolo5ical implications for educational theorz. The
critical issue between experiential Christian education and
contemporary theology has been the problem of agreeing upon
the "how," the "what,n and their relationship in the Chris
tian community. What is the nature of the Christian
religion? How is this nature communicated and shared with
others? In liberal theology the experiential religious
education movement foWld basic assumptions which were in
accord with many of the basic assumptions of empirically
oriented progressive education. The nature ot the faith,
268
as a quality of experience, was readily integrated with the
methodological procedures involving growth, progress, and
process. With the emergence of a different theological
orientation which is related to existentialist presupposi
tions, this relationship has to be reexamined. The impli
cations of this relationship form the concluding portion of
this study.
There are three approaches to the basic nature of
religion. It can be conceived of as a matter of faithful
assent to formalized verbal statements. In this case, the
twiction of religious education 1s the transmission of
these statements. It can be conceived of as a qualitative
aspect of all experience, in which case religious education
becomes a process of helping growing persons acnieve this
quality ot life. Or it can be conceived of as a personal
encounter between man and God. In this case, religious
education becomes preparation for the experience of en
counter, although the encounter, being divinely-initiated,
cannot be induced through any preparation.
The theological movement influenced by existentialism
focuses attention upon the third of these three alternatives.
The existential return to immediacy is the result of the
Divine-human encounter. Several i1nplications for experi
ential education arise from this concept of confrontation.
These may be approached by raising questions. First, is
this confrontation a singular experi~nce, or a continuous
269
process? If it is the £ormer, then religious education
must become merely a means of acquainting persons with the
historical background of the raith and making tnem aware
of the coming encounter experience. If, on the other hand,
this confrontation is conceived of as a continuous experi
ence through which God is continually challenging individu
als to further growth and creativity, the major values and
methods of experiential education can be retained.
Secondly, ls this encounter an end in itself, or an
aspect of growing experience? It the former, the efficacy
of ~xperiential education is qualified; if the latter, it
can become a vital and integrating aspect of the educational
process. The position of experiential religious education
has been that in and through the interactive process dealing
with life situations one finds his significant relationship
to the Divine. It is a qualitative aspect of a growing ex
perience. While this has been interpreted in terms of a
relationship to a personal God, the concept of encounter in
this context has appeared only in the recent writings of
Sherrill. Religious education still needs to clarify the
meaning of the term, encounter, as it is used in this
experiential context. Sherrill
1
s work is suggestive, but
it is still ambiguous. Is there need for religious educa
tion not only to examine encounter in this sense, but also
to direct more attention tot.hose high moments of religious
experience of a mors mystical nature in which the individual
270
experiences what is referred to as a direct encounter with
God?
While some critics of experiential religious educa
tion have chosen to interpret its concept or religion as
the revaluation of values in terms of a naturalistic frame
or reference, leaders in the movement such as Geo1ge Albert
Coe and William Clayton Bower would insist that this revalu
ation of values is a valuational experience in terms of
one
1
s relationship to a Personal God. This functional con
cept of religion affords a significant point of departure
rrom which the concept of encounter may be further clari
fied.
One major problem which exists in trying to resolve
the conflicts between existential theology and experiential
education lies in the insistence of the theological move
ment upon a concept of transcendence. This concept is so
held as to carry with it the assertion of man
1
s inability
to initiate a significant relationship with God. Adherence
to these ideas would require abandonment of the concept
that human nature contains capacities of genuine creativity
and growth; interpersonal relationships would lose their
educational signiiicance; the tap root or a social ethic
concerned with redeeming community life would be cut; and
worship would become merely adoration, confession, and
obedience. The only function of religious education would
be to proclaim the distant God and approach him in worship.
271
Experiential education is not prepared to withdraw to such
a limited perspective.
The theological trend under discussion places at its
center a new emphasis upon the message of the Bible as the
heart of that which must be communicated wi hin the fellow
ship of the church. This emphasis is predicated upon the
conviction that there are certain "existential" questions
inherent in all men, the answers to which can be found run
ning as themes through the Bible. This approach is based
upon certain assumptions about the Bible, rather than upon
the Bible itself. Experiential education recognizes the
significance of the Bible as the peerless source of reli
gious insight, but it would 1nqu5re about the assumptions
underlying such an approach to the Bible. It would suggest
that, since the Bible itself is not recognized as the locus
of authority, the assumptions regarding the Bible must be
arrived at through experience. Therefore the empirical
approach to a:ny study of the Bible would be in order.
This question of Biblical authority and function with
its implications for the use of an empirical approach serves
as a means of opening up two questions of experiential edu
cation and this theology. How can existentialist assump
tions regarding the nature of man be reconciled with the
necessity or retaining man's ability to reason in experien
tial education? How can the educational acknowledgment or
the importance of empirical methodology be reconciled with
272
this theological limitations upon man? These quest ons
remain unresolved in the theological-educational contro
versy.
One of the crucial conflicts between theology and
experiential education lies in the interpretation of the
concept of revelation. It was indicated previously that
existential theology is concerned with a concept of special
revelation, tied to a paradoxical dualistic epistemology.
A possible area of accord might be achieved on the problem
of authority in revelation. The role of the religious edu
cator in the educational process could be to witness, in
the profoundest sense, to his own experience in which the
concept of the revelation as he perceives it is authorita
tive ror him. At the same time, the pupil, in the freedom
of his own search for authentic selfhood, is free to ex
amine and make of this experience what he will for himself.
In a sense this is Kierkegaard's setting a stage in which
the pupil can experience existentially the revelation tor
himself. Two crucial difficulties remain. Is experiential
education ready to settle for a concept of special revela
tion, so interpreted, or is it to insist upon general reve
lation as well? Is it not possible for a revelation
concept which is constantly undergoing reinterpretation in
individual experience to be authoritative? Can both
special revelation and changing revelation concepts be
supported simultaneously?
273
A further implication may be drawn from the encounter
or existential theology and experient1al1sm in regard to
the nature of man. If existential theology is correct in
its evaluation of man as a rather helpless, finite, incapa
ble creature, does not the educational assertion of revalu
ation become a necessity? One•s phenomenological percep
tions even or an absolute special revelation are so limited
and fragmentary that it is necessary continually to revalue
all aspects of experience in terms of this partial under
standing and continually to reexamine this partial percep
tion of the special r evelation itself. Otherwise one may
inadvertently be following a blind alley.
Although existentialist theology suggests several
ways in which experiential education may be reinterpreted
to draw the two points of view closer together, a great
chasm still separates the disciplines. Experiential Chris
tian education seeks to assist growing persons to achieve a
religious quality of experience in terms of the real and
present world. Existentialist theology centers upon a
divinely-initiated experience of encounter between man and
God in a meaningless world.
The examination of existentialism and experiential
education was initiated upon an assumption that existential
ist philosophy serves as a basis for the presuppositions of
the new movement in Biblical t h eol ogy. At this point the
writer wishes to alter that assumption. With the exception
274
ot Martin Buber, the Jewish theologian, all of the existen
tialists, including those who call themselves atheists,
have created concepts which reflect the antithesis ot ex
istence lost-existence regained. Almost all readily admit
to the inrluence of Soren Kierkegaard. In each thought
sy~tem there is evident a crisis experience, usually if not
always, involving despair. The character of existentialism
resembling a religious pilgrimage has been noted. On the
basis ot this evidence, the writer would suggest that exis
tentialism, rather than serving as a basis for theology,
actually is itself rooted in unvoiced assumptions which
have been taken from Reformation theology, primarily
Calvinistic.
In this day in which the individual is undergoing
depersonalization, in which Christianity is recognized to
be on the defensive, in which religion of traditional rorm
is being rejected as being unable to meet the needs of
contemporary man, can a return to religious concepts of the
sixteenth century represent the best that organized reli
gion can offer man? Empirical processes have yielded such
results in so many fields of knowledge that the rejection
of reason in favor of faith would seem to be almost incon
gruous. Contemporary theology is concerned with its rele
vance for the twentieth century. It may well need to be,
ror this current attempt to flee into subjectivity runs so
275
counter to the empirically-oriented thinking of modern man
that its adequacy can be aeziously questioned. Instead or
turning within and toward the past for comfort, perhaps
theology needs to look once more at the objective world
about it to see if, through new ideas and new thought,
particularly in psychology which recognizes the validity
of subjective feelings but in proper perspective, a place
cannot be formd for both the objective and subjective
aspects of experience in a theology which will adequately
serve the human situation.
Experiential Christian educati~n may learn from
existentialism and from the theological movement related
to it, but it must continue to insist upon objective
rationality as well as subjective experience in order to
lead men into the Good Life.
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Allen , E. L. "Existentialism and Chris ian Theology," The
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C. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS
Fo d, Richard S. n An Experimentalist Theory of Christian
Education." Unpublished paper, University of Southern
California, Los AngelesJ 1949.
• "Creativity and Doctrine." Unpublished paper,
--u-n~fversity of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1952.
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Herbert Betts." Unpublished Doctoral dissertation,
University of Souther California, Los Angeles, 1946.
Reitz, Donald B. "Implications of the Doctrine of Man for
Christian ~ducation. An Analysis of Three Christian
Doctrines of Man; A Study of Their Implications for
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Use of These Doctrines In Christian Education Today."
Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, New Yux-K University,
New York, 1955.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Ford, Richard Stanley (author)

Core Title A comparative study of the experiential approach to religious education and some aspects of existentialism

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Religion

Degree Conferral Date 1957-06

Publication Date 05/22/1957

Defense Date 05/22/1957

Publisher Los Angeles, California (original), University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format theses (aat)

Language English

Contributor Digitized from microfilm by the USC Digital Library in 2023 (provenance)

Advisor Irwin, Paul B. (committee member), Peterson, James A. (committee member), Rhoades, Donald H. (committee member), Titus, Eric L. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC113174173

Unique identifier UC113174173

Identifier Ph. D R '57 F711 (call number),etd-FordRichard-1957.pdf (filename)

Legacy Identifier etd-FordRichard-1957

Document Type Dissertation

Format theses (aat)

Rights Ford, Richard Stanley

Internet Media Type application/pdf

Type texts

Source 20230616-usctheses-microfilm-box8 (batch), University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

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