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Closing the safety gap for airlines in emerging markets using the gap analysis model
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Closing the Safety Gap for Airlines in Emerging Markets Using the Gap Analysis Model
Elaine Doan
Rossier School of Education
University of Southern California
A dissertation submitted to the faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Education
December 2024
© Copyright by Elaine Doan 2024
All Rights Reserved
The Committee for Elaine Doan certifies the approval of this Dissertation
Eric Canny
Carey Regur
Patricia Tobey, Committee Chair
Rossier School of Education
University of Southern California
2024
iv
Abstract
Many airlines operating in today’s emerging markets are still struggling to manage safety risks
and maintain employee engagement in safety management systems (SMS). The purpose of this
study is to examine the capacity of airline senior leaders in managing safety risks, maintaining
employee engagement in SMS and fostering a safety culture. This study focuses on knowledge,
motivation and organizational factors that influence the ability of senior managers in fostering a
safety culture. Clark and Estes’ (2008) gap analysis framework was used to determine whether
senior leaders have adequate knowledge, motivation and organizational support to foster a safety
culture. Qualitative interviews were utilized and 11 retired consultants of airlines in Asia’s
emerging markets were interviewed. Participants have an average of 32 years of working
experience in the aviation industry and have worked closely with airline senior leaders in China,
Indonesia and India. A review of literature was conducted to connect past research. Themes
emerging from the interviews were analyzed and linked to knowledge, motivation, and
organizational influences that impact the ability of senior leaders in fostering a safety culture.
Connections from interviews were utilized to answer the research questions of the study. The
research aimed to provide recommendations for airlines to better aid senior leader in fostering a
safety culture.
Keywords: Safety management systems, airlines in emerging markets, airline safety
culture, gap analysis
v
Dedication
To my family, I could not have achieved this without your continuous support. Thank you for
your patience and understanding.
vi
Acknowledgments
Thank you to my Cohort for your encouragement, constant tag-ups, words of encourage,
and “push” to the finish line. It is amazing the relationships you can build virtually and it has
truly been an honor to walk this path with you.
Thank you to my dissertation committee for your support, knowledge, and guidance.
Thank you to all those participated in this study.
vii
Table of Contents
Abstract.......................................................................................................................................... iv
Dedication....................................................................................................................................... v
Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................................... vi
List of Figures................................................................................................................................. x
Chapter One: Overview of Study.................................................................................................... 1
Background of the Problem ................................................................................................ 2
Importance of Addressing the Problem .............................................................................. 3
Organizational Context and Mission .................................................................................. 4
Organizational Goal............................................................................................................ 5
Stakeholder Group and Stakeholder Performance Goal ..................................................... 5
Purpose of the Study and Research Questions.................................................................... 7
Overview of Conceptual and Methodological Framework................................................. 7
Definition of Terms............................................................................................................. 8
Organization of the Project ................................................................................................. 9
Chapter Two: Review of Literature .............................................................................................. 10
Aviation Safety Policies.................................................................................................... 10
Safety Culture in Aviation Safety Management System .................................................. 11
Aviation in Emerging Markets.......................................................................................... 13
Competencies for Leaders to Foster a Safety Culture ...................................................... 23
Clark and Estes’ (2008) Knowledge, Motivation and Organizational Influences
Framework ........................................................................................................................ 25
Stakeholder Knowledge, Motivation and Organizational Influences............................... 26
Conceptual Framework..................................................................................................... 35
Summary........................................................................................................................... 37
Chapter Three: Methodology........................................................................................................ 39
viii
Research Questions........................................................................................................... 39
Overview of Methodology................................................................................................ 40
Researcher......................................................................................................................... 42
Interviews.......................................................................................................................... 42
Instrumentation ................................................................................................................. 43
Data Collection Procedures............................................................................................... 43
Data Analysis.................................................................................................................... 44
Credibility and Trustworthiness........................................................................................ 44
Ethics................................................................................................................................. 44
Limitations and Delimitations........................................................................................... 45
Chapter Four: Findings................................................................................................................. 46
Participants........................................................................................................................ 46
Summary of Knowledge, Motivation, and Organizational Influences’ Findings............. 65
Chapter Five: Recommendations.................................................................................................. 67
Discussion of Findings...................................................................................................... 67
Research Question 3 ......................................................................................................... 70
Recommendation for Future Research.............................................................................. 85
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 86
References..................................................................................................................................... 88
Appendix A: Interview Protocol................................................................................................... 94
Conclusion to the Interview.............................................................................................. 97
Appendix B: USC IRB Approval Letter....................................................................................... 98
ix
List of Tables
Table 1: Organizational Mission, Organizational Goal and Stakeholder Group’s
Performance Goal 7
Table 2: Leaders’ Competencies to Be Accessed 25
Table 3: Assumed Knowledge Influences and Knowledge Type 29
Table 4: Assumed Motivation Influences 32
Table 5: Assumed Knowledge Influences and Knowledge Type 35
Table 6: Data Sources 40
Table 7: Participant Profile 47
Table 8: Breakdown of Influence Assets and Gaps 66
Table 9: Outcomes, Metrics and Methods 78
Table 10: Critical Behaviors, Metrics, Methods, and Timing for Evaluation for Airline
Senior Managers 80
Table 11: Required Drivers to Support Critical Behaviors of Airline Senior Managers 81
Table 12: Evaluation of the Components of Learning for the Recommended Training
Program 83
Table 13: Components to Measure Reactions 84
Table 14: Projected Implementation Plan Timeline 85
Table A1: Interview Protocols 95
x
List of Figures
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework: Interrelationship of Stakeholder Knowledge,
Motivation, and Organizational Influences 36
Figure 2: The New World Kirkpatrick Model 77
1
Chapter One: Overview of Study
Emerging markets in Asia are experiencing rapid urbanization and economic growth in
the middle class. It was estimated in 2023 that the middle class in Asia’s emerging markets
comprised around 2.7 billion people, accounting for more than half of the world’s middle-class
population (ABL Aviation, 2023). The rise of the middle class, particularly in densely populated
nations like China, India, and Indonesia, drove a significant increase in air travel demand (ABL
Aviation, 2023). High demand coupled with technological advancements in aviation led to an
aviation boom in Asia’s emerging markets. Commercial aviation in regions such as Thailand,
Vietnam, Malaysia, and Philippines are also expected to grow considerably due to the rise of
trade, tourism, and business connectivity (ABL Aviation, 2023). In response to the high demand
for air travel, investments have been made in developing airport infrastructure and for airlines to
grow their fleet and increase routes (ABL Aviation, 2023).
Despite the high potential in the aviation industry of Asia’s emerging markets, many
airlines in this region still struggle to manage safety risks and maintain employee engagement in
SMS. Rapid economic growth leads to production pressures, lack of equipment and facilities,
inadequately trained workers, and government oversight, resulting in increased safety-related
incidents (Barnett, 2010). Moreover, there remains a persistent, culture-based inattention to
safety among airline leaders. Consequently, unaddressed safety issues lead to loss of lives,
capital, and investment (ABL Aviation, 2023). Unaddressed safety issues and repeated aircraft
accidents dissuade investors, highlighting the need for airlines to improve their safety records
(ABL Aviation, 2023).
Fostering a culture that prioritizes safety, and a skilled workforce development is
essential for the sustainable advancement of airlines in emerging markets. The purpose of this
2
study is to explore the capacity of senior airline leaders operating in Asia’s emerging markets to
foster a safety culture. This analysis focuses on knowledge, motivation, and organizational
influences that impact the ability of senior managers to maintain employee engagement in the
safety management system (SMS).
Background of the Problem
In the past three decades, many airlines in this region have experienced recurring safety
related incidents and accidents because leaders are failing to manage safety risks. Safety has yet
to be prioritized due to the pressure of meeting high market demands and maximizing returns on
investment. In India, according to the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), as the
accelerating growth of fleet sizes places more demand on support resources, deficiencies in linemaintenance safety procedures among Indian airlines have increased the risk of serious accidents
and incidents (Mathews, 2023). In the 2018–2022 National Aviation Safety Plan, India’s DGCA
listed causes for errors, including airlines failing to follow published technical data, performing
unauthorized modifications to aircraft, using untrained or uncertified personnel to perform
ground support tasks, and using ground support equipment positioned improperly (Mathews,
2023). According to the former head of operations and safety at an airline in India, safety
guidelines are often not followed due to the poor safety culture and lack of regulatory
supervision (Mathews, 2023).
In Indonesia, there have been 104 civilian airliner accidents, with over 2,305 related
fatalities since 1945, ranking it as the most dangerous place to fly in Asia (Milko, 2021).
Contributing factors include the rapid growth of new airlines, staffed by poorly trained engineers
and pilots, and the lack of supervision by effective regulators (AP, 2015). From 2007 to 2016,
the United States and European Union banned Indonesian carriers from operating in their
3
countries due to deficiency in technical expertise, trained personnel, record-keeping and
inspection procedures (Milko, 2021). Although the United States and European Union have
determined that the country complied with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
safety standards in 2016, many Indonesian airlines continue to be known as least safe today
(Milko, 2021).
In Thailand, ICAO issued a significant safety concern to the country, citing inadequate
safety oversight of its registered international carriers in 2015 (UK Civil Aviation Authority,
2017). Subsequently, the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) downgraded Thailand to Category II
status, restricting Thai carriers from flying into the United States. Other countries soon followed
suit, restricting Thai carriers from flying into Japan, South Korea and China. With over twenty
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) depending on travel and tourism, it is crucial for
Thailand to review international safety concerns and improve its safety oversights (UK Civil
Aviation Authority, 2017).
As economies grow and the airline industries continue to expand in Asia, conditions
change. Leaders failing to manage safety risks will quickly be faced with severe consequences.
Fostering a safety culture, similar to airlines in China, South Korean, and Taiwan, starts with a
leader who has high regard for safety, willing to invest, and is motivated to accomplish culture
change that is just. Additionally, these airline leaders had the willingness to duplicate wellfunctioning systems of rules from outsiders and leverage outside expertise to reduce risks
associated with implementing change.
Importance of Addressing the Problem
Understanding knowledge, motivation, and organizational factors that influence leaders
to foster a safety culture in countries where aviation rules have previously failed to keep up with
4
the expansion of the airline industry helps better formulate strategies. Fostering a safety culture
within an organization means maintaining employees’ engagement in SMS and preventing
employees from making decisions that could lead to unnecessary risk (Sabin et al., 2012).
Unnecessary risks lead to aircraft accidents, loss of revenue, lives and investment (ABL
Aviation, 2023). By fostering a culture that prioritizes safety, airline leaders are strengthening
investor’s confidence in the company and creating a sustainable advancement for their
businesses. Sustainable growth of airlines leads to a thriving aviation sector and positively
impacts the overall economic performance of the emerging country.
Organizational Context and Mission
This field study evaluates airlines operating in Asia’s emerging markets. The general
organizational structure of an airline operating in Asia’s emerging markets include operations,
maintenance, marketing, and finance divisions (Vault, 2018). The flight operations
division manages the day-to-day activities of the airline, overseeing the pilots and flight
attendants, the flight dispatchers, flight scheduling, and ground crews (Vault, 2018).
The maintenance division handles the avionics and mechanics of the airplane, performing daily
inspections and routine repairs and maintenance (Vault, 2018). The marketing department sells
the airline's services as well as creates new programs, services, and advertisements to attract
customers (Vault, 2018). The marketing department also takes ticket reservations and purchases
(Vault, 2018). The finance division is concerned with maintaining a smooth cash flow to ensure
the airline's continued success (Vault, 2018).
For airlines operating in emerging markets with a need to improve their safety records,
their organizational mission is a commitment to delivering top quality products and services. To
5
accomplish this, airlines’ flight operations and maintenance divisions are most impactful in
ensuring a safe operation of aircraft on every flight.
Organizational Goal
The flight operations and maintenance division organization must comply with standards
mandated by ICAO. Aircraft manufacturers offer airlines operating in Asia’s emerging markets
consultant services to help them ensure SMS adequacy. Incorporating all actions recommended
by aircraft manufacturers will help airlines improve the operational efficacy of their aircraft. In
addition, ICAO requires SMS to manage safety risks in air operations and has published safety
management requirements for states to achieve acceptable safety performance (Universal Safety
Oversight Audit Programme, 2024). Failing to meet ICAO standards results in suspension or
revocation of certificates, licenses, approvals, or imposition of financial penalties.
Stakeholder Group and Stakeholder Performance Goal
The focus of this study is on the maintenance division’s leadership team. The
maintenance team performs recommended maintenance actions to improve the operational
efficacy of aircraft. The maintenance leadership team establishes the work statement, leverages
resources, drive daily performance and ensures quality. They are accountable for engaging
employees and driving safety into the value stream. Production pressures and lack of financial
investment from management disrupt the ability of employees to engage in SMS and
dramatically increase safety performance gaps. When maintenance engineering leaders face
issues beyond their control, they are accountable for escalating the issue to their executive
leaders to ensure engagement is not compromised. Maintenance engineering leaders are also
expected to establish clearly defined performance metrics reviewed regularly in employee oneon-one meetings and conduct performance reviews to maintain employee engagement.
6
Maintenance engineering leaders need to create a work environment where employees take
ownership and pride in the quality of products and services they produce. As a result, the
maintenance engineering leader team goal is to foster a safety culture by maintaining employee
engagement of safety management system. When employees are engaged, they report safety
related incidents, and the same issue does not occur again because proper corrective actions have
been taken. Table 1 outlines the desired future state after the implantation of proposed changes.
Table 1
Organizational Mission, Organizational Goal, and Stakeholder Group’s Performance Goal
Organizational mission
To deliver top quality products and services.
Organizational performance goal
To be in-compliant to standards recommended by aircraft manufacturers and mandated by
ICAO.
Maintenance engineering leadership goal
To foster a safety culture by maintaining employee engagement of safety management system.
7
Purpose of the Study and Research Questions
This study aims to explore the capacity of airline senior leaders operating in Asia’s
emerging markets to successfully foster a safety culture. The study focuses on knowledge,
motivation, and organizational influences that impact the ability of senior leaders to foster a
safety culture. Three research questions guided this study:
1. What knowledge and motivation influences enable leaders to foster a safety culture?
2. What are the organizational settings and models available to leaders to prioritize and
foster a safety culture?
3. What is the recommended knowledge, motivation and organizational solutions to
fostering a safety culture?
Overview of Conceptual and Methodological Framework
The Clark and Estes (2008) gap analysis is a systematic process that identifies where an
organization is and wants to be and then develops strategies to bridge the gap between the two.
The three fundamental components of a gap analysis are the current state, desired state, and the
gap. The current state is how business procedures and processes are used (Clark & Estes, 2008).
The desired state is where the company wants to be in the future (Clark & Estes, 2008). The gap
needs to be closed for the move from the current state to the desired state to be successful. The
final component of a gap analysis is identifying the steps necessary for the company to reach its
desired state (Clark and Estes, 2008). This can be done by analyzing each process step and
finding ways to improve it. Once the steps have been identified, they can be put into a plan and
executed. Using the gap analysis framework (Clark & Estes, 2008) in this study demonstrates
one approach airlines operating in emerging markets could use to guide the organization in
reaching its organizational goals. The methodological framework used for this study is a
8
qualitative study utilizing interviews. Eleven interviews were conducted with 11 retired
consultants of airlines operating in India, China and Indonesia.
Definition of Terms
This study utilizes terms within the study that will be important to understand the
meaning of and are as follows:
• Aircraft accident is an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft, which
takes place from the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of
flight until all such persons have disembarked, and in which (a) a person is fatally or
seriously injured, (b) the aircraft sustains significant damage or structural failure, or
(c) the aircraft goes missing or becomes completely inaccessible (National Research
Council, 1998).
• Aircraft incident is an occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the
operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of operation (National
Research Council, 1998).
• Aircraft safety is preventing aircraft accidents and incidents through maintaining
proper aircraft certifications, continued airworthiness and certification of pilots,
mechanics, and others in safety-related positions. It is to follow regulations as
mandated by regulators (Sabin et al., 2012).
• Aviation policies are rules made by the government or authority entity to control how
aircraft are operated (Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme, 2018).
• Commercial aviation is defined as aircraft operation involving the transport of
passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or hire. It includes scheduled and nonscheduled air transport operations (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2010).
9
• Emerging markets refers to an economy experiencing considerable economic
freedom and growth, gradual integration with the Global Marketplace, an expanding
middle class, improving standards of living, social stability and tolerance, as well as
an increase in cooperation with multilateral institutions (Kvint, 2009).
• Leadership capacity is a way of thinking, feeling, behaving, and acting. Leaders can
change how they lead and develop more effective ways to drive results (NASSP,
2018).
• Safety culture is how people behave in relation to safety and risk when no one is
watching. It is how safety is perceived, valued and prioritized by management and
employees in an organization (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2019).
Organization of the Project
Five chapters are used to organize this study. This chapter introduces the organization,
purpose of the study, the importance of the study, the theoretical framework guiding the
dissertation, an overview of the methodology used, and the terminology commonly used.
Chapter Two reviews literature on aviation safety policies, safety culture in aviation SMS,
emerging market that airlines operate in, and leaders’ competency. Chapter Three describes the
research design, the methodology and how the study will be conducted. Chapter Four discusses
the results and findings to the research questions. Tables are used to summarize information and
detailed information is in the appendix. Chapter Five discusses the study’s findings’
implications, interpretation, and recommendations. The implications are for practice as well as
implications for future research.
10
Chapter Two: Review of Literature
Due to the growing demand in the aviation industry, airlines operating in emerging
markets often face common effects of rapid growth, such as production pressures, lack of
equipment, facilities, inadequately trained workers, and government oversight, resulting in safety
negligence (Barnett, 2010). Understanding knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences
that impact the ability of senior leaders to foster a safety culture in countries where aviation rules
have previously failed to keep up with the expansion of the airline industry, allows for better
formulation of strategies to manage safety risks. Leaders play essential roles in promoting an
environment where safety could be a core value ingrained in the company’s culture (Sabin et al.,
2012). To explore the capacity of senior leaders to foster a safety culture, it is essential to review
literature on aviation safety policies, safety culture in aviation SMS, emerging markets that
airlines operate in, and leaders’ competency. This chapter also discusses Clarke and Estes (2008)
gap analysis conceptual framework to examine leaders’ knowledge, motivation and
organizational influences in fostering a safety culture.
Aviation Safety Policies
Under the International Convention on Civil Aviation, each country is responsible for the
safety oversight of its air carriers (Federal Aviation Administration, 2023). Other countries can
only conduct specific surveillance activities, principally involving inspection of required
documents and the physical condition of aircraft (Federal Aviation Administration, 2023). The
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations agency, was created in 1944
by the Chicago Convention to promote the safe and orderly development of civil aviation
worldwide (Federal Aviation Administration, 2023). It sets standards and regulations necessary
for aviation safety, security, efficiency, and regularity, as well as for aviation environmental
11
protection (Federal Aviation Administration, 2023). There are eight ICAO audit parameters that
pertain to safety: legislation, organization, licensing, operations, airworthiness, accident
investigation, air navigation service and aerodromes (Universal Safety Oversight Audit
Programme, 2018).
The FAA’s International Aviation Safety Assessment program, or IASA, assesses and
determines a country's compliance with these international standards on the ICAO's eight critical
elements of effective aviation safety oversight (Federal Aviation Administration, 2023). When
another country's air carrier flies into the United States, or codeshares with a U.S. air carrier,
they must meet safety standards set by the ICAO. Through the IASA program, the FAA focuses
on a country's ability, not the ability of individual air carriers, to adhere to those international
safety standards and recommended practices (Federal Aviation Administration, 2023).
The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is responsible for designing
programs to foster aviation safety development in Europe. The most significant program
implemented by EASA is the Air Safety List. The Air Safety list is a comprehensive compilation
of air carriers that are banned or restricted from entering the airspace of any of its member states.
These airlines do not meet the safety operational standards mandated by ICAO. The process by
which an air carrier is listed is laid out in Regulation 2111/2005 of the European Parliament and
Council (European Commission, 2023). Banned air carriers could be permitted to exercise traffic
rights by using wet-leased aircraft of an air carrier that is not subject to an operating ban,
provided that the relevant safety standards are complied with (European Commission, 2023).
Safety Culture in Aviation Safety Management System
ICAO defines safety as the state in which risks associated with aviation activities, related
to, or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are reduced and controlled to an acceptable
12
level. ICAO defines SMS as a systematic way to identify and control risks. SMS is an assurance
that risk controls remain effective and it is means for evaluating an organization’s safety
management capability. To continually improve on existing levels of commercial air transport
safety amid industry challenges, SMS became mandatory worldwide for specified airlines in
March 2006. ICAO urges each of the world’s airlines to implement a unique SMS fully,
adhering to international standards and recommended practices. As stated in ICAO Doc
9734, Safety Oversight Manual, the characteristics of an effective State safety oversight system
include a robust and effective approach to the management of safety, including the adoption of
SMS in the functional areas of regulation as well as in operation and service provision. A
continually refined SMS enables each airline to reliably achieve one of civil aviation’s key
goals: enhancing safety performance through best practice by moving beyond mere compliance
with regulatory requirements.
Arriving from FAA, Part 121 and EASA, EU-OPS 1.037 requirements, safety culture in
aviation SMS includes safety awareness, safety reporting culture, safety management, safety
promotion, and documentation of data and record keeping. Indicators that an organization has
organizational safety awareness are when leaders clearly define requirements needed to support
active hazard reporting. Employees are receptive, trained to recognize and report hazards and
understand the consequences of hazards. A well-developed hazard reporting culture means that it
is easy for employees to report hazards, employees are willing to report hazards, and employees
learn from their mistakes. Effective safety management includes ensuring safety issues reported
are managed promptly and justly with transparent results. Effective safety promotion is when
management strongly emphasizes hazard identification and employees are rewarded for
13
reporting safety issues. Data and record-keeping documentation ensures that crucial safety data
are correctly registered and safeguarded.
Aviation in Emerging Markets
Today, China is an acclaimed global leader in air safety (Fuller, 2010), South Korea’s air
transport industry is regarded as one of the most efficient industries in the world (Wittmeyer,
2013), and Taiwan’s airlines are ranked as one of the safest in the world (Stanley, 2007).
However, less than 3 decades ago, airlines in China’s, South Korea’s, and Taiwan’s emerging
markets experienced recurring aircraft accidents and several challenges in managing safety risks.
Understanding organizational change strategies implemented by airlines in China, South Korea
and Taiwan, will better help airline leaders in today’s emerging markets foster a safety culture.
Commercial Aviation in China
Commercial aviation in China has expanded dramatically over the last several decades,
driven by rising middle class and ongoing urbanization. In 1990, 11 million passengers traveled
on domestic routes in China. Prior to the global pandemic coronavirus disease, in 2019, 659.93
million passengers traveled on domestic routes in China. Over this same period, China’s middle
class enjoyed rising income levels and in turn gained greater access to air travel. The number of
passengers on international routes has likewise jumped, increasing from 1 million in 1990 to 72
million in 2019. In 2023, aircraft manufacturers forecasted that China will be the biggest
aviation market in the world in the next two decades, needing 8,560 new commercial airplanes
through 2042. This is driven by economic growth well above the global average and increasing
demand for domestic air travel. Government reforms have played a key role in expanding
China’s commercial aviation.
14
Currently, China is an acclaimed global leader in air safety. China’s fatal-accident rates
are lower than America's and Europe's (Pasztor, 2007). The Chinese airline market is currently
dominated by the big three—Air China in Beijing, China Southern in Guangzhou, and China
Eastern in Shanghai (Belmont, 2021). In 2019, China Eastern Airlines carried over 130 million
passengers, ranking eighth worldwide based on the number of passengers carried. China
Southern Airlines carried nearly 140 million passengers, ranking fifth worldwide based on the
number of passengers carried. Air China carried 115 million passengers, ranking tenth
worldwide based on the number of passengers carried.
Reform Era
After facing continued economic failures under centralized administration, Chinese
leaders became more receptive to reform and began rolling out aviation deregulation processes
in the 1980s (Belmont, 2021). Chinese leaders were determined to earn income from the
growing aviation market demand, facilitate continued growth in other sectors of the economy
that depend on the development of transportation, and use the new technology being introduced
via aviation as a technological stimulant in other areas (Uhalley, 1998). In the early years of
aviation reform, China’s leadership took on a decentralist approach to the development of the
airline industry—premised on taking apart the government monopoly and on rapid investment
liberalization—laid the groundwork for a competitive airline market with minimal state
intervention (Belmont, 2021). However, following the Tiananmen crisis in 1989, China’s
leadership turned central policy toward revitalizing state-owned enterprises and building a fleet
of large state-owned enterprise groups. This began the industry restructuring of the industry
around the big three oligopoly—Air China, China Southern, and China Eastern (Belmont, 2021).
15
By 2002, all state-owned airlines were forcibly consolidated into the big three airlines according
to the CAAC’s plan.
Rapid expansion in China’s aviation sector resulted in safety risks and leaders were not
oblivious to these risks, but were willing to accept them (Uhalley, 1998). Rapid transformation
of the industry, airlines’ pressure to meet demand and to maximize incomes, led airlines leaders
to adopting measures that helped them most with recouping investment (Uhalley, 1998). Airlines
relaxed safety processes and directed pilots, mechanics, and flight attendants to work additional
shifts to keep up with increased flights (Uhalley, 1998). There was also a storage of sufficiently
trained and experienced flight and maintenance crew employed by airlines. This situation led to
severe accidents including avoidable controlled flight and terrain crashes (Uhalley, 1998).
Safety Management
Travel within and abroad became more accessible as a result of China’s aviation reform.
However, persistent pilot errors, unreliable maintenance and erratic government oversight led to
fatal crashes between 1990 and 2002 (Pasztor, 2007). In this period, nearly a dozen Chinese
airline deadly accidents occurred due to pilots failing to follow basic rules, such as flying into
violent storms and haphazardly programming autopilots (Pasztor, 2007). In June 1994, an
airplane operated by a Chinese airline crashed a few minutes after takeoff in Xi'an, killing all
160 aboard (Pasztor, 2007). After 6 months of investigation, the root cause of the crash was
found due to five mechanics improperly repairing and re-connecting a part of the autopilot
system, making the airplane impossible to control (Pasztor, 2007). In April 2002, a Chinese
airline slammed into a hillside in South Korea. The crash killed 129 and injured 37 others.
Investigators found pilots had failed to prepare properly for the approach and did not slow
enough as the plane circled to land in unfamiliar, treacherous terrain. Two weeks following this
16
accident, another Chinese airline crashed in Dalian, China with 112 fatalities. The situation in
China is severe enough to attract world attention; the International Airline Passengers
Association rated China the most dangerous place to fly (Pasztor, 2007).
Turnaround
After 2002, China’s air-safety turnaround illustrates the power of following foreign
expert advice and implementing effective rules. Organizations outside of China, such as Boeing,
Airbus, and the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), recognized that China’s
airline sector required serious reform to meet international standards (Fuller, 2010). Boeing and
Airbus knew that unsafe airlines would eventually stall the growth of China’s aviation sector and
slow their sales in the region (Fuller, 2010). The FAA had an incentive to ensure that Chinese
carriers entering the United States met adequate safety standards (Fuller, 2010). Boeing, Airbus,
and the FAA cautiously advised airlines and regulators in the mid-1990s (Fuller, 2010). They
provided free training for pilots, controllers, and flight operations personnel and worked with
regulators (Fuller, 2010). The offer of assistance from the FAA was partly welcomed because
Chinese authorities knew that the FAA might disqualify Chinese airlines from landing in the US
(Fuller, 2010). The authorities also understood that the FAA might pressure US carriers not to
affiliate with Chinese partners with substandard safety records. Despite the Chinese
receptiveness to external expertise, crash-rates in China remained stubbornly high in the late
1990s as the airline industry continued its rapid expansion (Fuller, 2010).
In 2002, the Chinese leadership appointed Yang Yuanyuan as head of the civil aviation
agency, holding him accountable for reaching air-safety goals but giving him wide discretion in
the pursuit (Fuller, 2010). The threat of losing his position and the deadline created by the 2008
Olympics added urgency to his efforts (Fuller, 2010). Armed with the power to shut non-
17
complying airlines or fire ineffective regulators, he completed the regulatory overhaul by
extending China’s relationships with the foreign firms and regulators at the forefront of aviation
safety (Fuller, 2010). Yang set up an exchange program for Chinese airline officials, traffic
control managers, and regulators to learn from their United States and European counterparts
(Fuller, 2010). He established a formal channel for foreign airplane parts manufacturers to
provide technical assistance to Chinese airlines (Fuller, 2010). He also gave foreign investigators
access to Chinese crash sites, ensuring his agency would learn as much as possible about
preventing future crashes (Fuller, 2010). He even allowed an external authority, the International
Air Transport Association (IATA), to audit the safety of Chinese airlines and publish the results
(Fuller, 2010).
For Chinese airlines to transform from worst to first, whose safety record was tarnishing
the country's image, leaders made top-down mandates, aggressive enforcement and took on
foreign expert advice to yield results (Fuller, 2010). Today, China holds one of the highest
aviation safety records worldwide, significantly lower than the average of 0.57 accidents per
million commercial departures, with zero reported in 2021.
Commercial Aviation in South Korea
South Korea's air transport industry is regarded as one of the most efficient industries in
the world. South Korea's international passenger and cargo traffic volumes have steadily
increased over the past twenty years. According to the latest U.S. Department of Commerce data
as of May 2023, South Korea is the United States’ 13th largest market for aerospace exports
such as commercial aircraft, aircraft engines, equipment and parts, as well as military aircraft
and their parts and components. Korean Air largely drives South Korea’s aviation industry.
Korean Air is the country’s largest passenger and cargo carrier company and the largest
18
domestic consumer of aircraft, equipment, parts and components, and services. South Korea’s
second largest airline, Asiana Airlines, is currently being acquired by Korean Air as of May
2023.
Reform Era
In the 1960s, South Korea was one of Asia's poorest countries (Seth, 2016). Air travel
was a luxury that very few people could afford. There was limited international expansion due to
low demand and competition from foreign Japanese carriers. During this time, South Korea was
undergoing political turmoil, had no infrastructure for convenient air travel and its airline lacked
trained professionals such as pilots and mechanics. In the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea’s
economy took off and the aviation sector entered a rapid expansion and growth period (Seth,
2016). This prosperity fueled a demand for business and leisure travel that benefited South
Korea’s national airline. By the 1990s, Korean Air became the first Asian global carrier to
surpass $10 billion in annual revenue.
Safety Management
Despite South Korea’s being one the world’s most advanced economies, its national
carrier, Korean Air was notorious for poor safety records and high rate of fatal crashes due to
inadequate pilot training, language barriers, and maintenance issues (Carley, 1999). In 1999,
Korea's President Kim Dae-jung described the airline's safety record as an embarrassment to the
nation (Carley, 1999). In 2001, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) downgraded South
Korea's aviation safety rating and blocked two South Korean carriers from expanding businesses
in the United States (Wittmeyer, 2013). FAA’s inspection found a lack of objectivity in South
Korea's air crash investigations, unskilled technical staff as well as problems with flight
operation rules and the screening of pilots (Wittmeyer, 2013). The FAA downgrade
19
consequently dissuaded investors’ and prevented South Korea’s two largest airlines from adding
flights to the United States, bidding for new U.S. routes and code-sharing with U.S. airlines
(Wittmeyer, 2013). Korean Air stated the company faced $150 million in annual losses as a
result of the FAA downgrade (Wittmeyer, 2013).
One root cause leading to recurring safety concerns at Korean Air is management’s
emphasis on schedules (Carley, 1999). Pilots are faced with severe consequences such as
suspension or dismissal if they disrupt flight schedules, causing reluctance to cause delays even
when necessary (Carley, 1999). Korea Air flight-operations chief stated that Korean Air pilots
felt they are expected to land at the assigned destination and on time (Carley, 1999). If they did
not land, Korea Air tended to blame the pilots, who consequently had to write lengthy reports to
justify any diversions (Carley, 1999).
Another root cause leading to recurring safety concerns is the hierarchical culture at
airlines (Carley, 1999). Korea Air, once government-owned, has grown substantially and ranked
16th in the world in scheduled passengers carried by 1999 (Carley, 1999). Lack of trained pilots
led Korea Air to recruit from the military (Carley, 1999). Korean military men, especially former
fighter pilots in Korea's air force, quickly dominated, winning promotions and becoming jumbo
jets captains in as little as three or four years (Carley, 1999). At western airlines, entering just
one wrong digit in a flight-management system or a navigation computer can lead to a crash. As
a result, jets are designed for close teamwork, with one pilot continually checking and
confirming the actions of the other. Pilots are expected to challenge the other if mistakes are
suspected. According to Park Jae Hyun, a former captain and Ministry of Transportation flight
inspector, teamwork is nearly impossible at Korea Air. Cockpits are operated under hierarchical
“obey or else” code. Co-pilots are expected not to challenge their superiors nor question the
20
captain's piloting skills (Carley, 1999). For a civilian co-pilot to challenge a military-trained
captain would mean loss of face for the captain (Carley, 1999). Korean Air pilots also speak very
limited English, the official language of air-traffic communications (Carley, 1999). Consultants
from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Florida were brought in to check on Korean Air
pilots' English. Previously, Korea Air’s pilots passed the airline's English tests. However, in two
exams administered by Embry-Riddle, only 8% of Korea Air pilots were found proficient
(Carley, 1999). The Embry-Riddle tests were previously found to be too difficult have since
been dropped by the airline and replaced by easier oral and written exams proficient (Carley,
1999).
Turnaround
Following the FAA downgrade of South Korea’s aviation safety ratings, Korea Air’s
chief of flight operations, Koh Myung Joon acknowledges that the airline was previously too
focused on sales and profits, and now needs to recommit to following safety protocols
(Wittmeyer, 2013). In 2002, Korean Air launched a $200 million program to improve safety,
hiring foreign consultants, investing in installing new technology to upgrade its fleet,
establishing an advanced aviation training center and strengthening oversight of procedures
across all organizations (Wittmeyer, 2013). Korea Air also did not hesitate on canceling flights
due to bad weather. Korea Air turned to foreign support, consultants from Boeing, FlightSafety
and Delta Airlines provided aid in corporate culture change and pilot training (Wittmeyer, 2013).
Simulator training and selecting of new captains are delegated to flight instructors working for a
joint venture of Boeing and FlightSafety (Wittmeyer, 2013). The Delta team has rewritten
Korean Air’s training manuals and some were translated into Korean (Wittmeyer, 2013). With
foreign support, Korea Air established an advanced aviation training center to focus on improved
21
training, coordination and communication between pilots, so that they can overcome language
and cultural barriers (Wittmeyer, 2013). Korean Air also strengthened oversight and auditing
procedures across all organizations, modernizing maintenance operations to align with global
best practices (Wittmeyer, 2013). With transparency and accountability, Korea Air ensured
safety protocols designed after any incident were faithfully implemented in the long term
(Wittmeyer, 2013).
Commercial Aviation in Taiwan
Air transport is crucial to Taiwan’s trade and the movement of its people (Copper, 2024).
The island has a population of 23 million people (Copper, 2024). China Airlines is Taiwan’s flag
carrier and largest airline. EVA is Taiwan’s second-biggest airline and the biggest privately
owned airline, offering only international routes. Both Taiwanese carriers depend on air cargo
for much of their business; China Airlines generates 44% of its revenue from carrying air freight
(Stanley, 2007).
Reform Era
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, many economists regarded Taiwan’s economy with
pessimistically (Copper, 2024). The assessment was based on Taiwan’s unfavorable land-topopulation ratio, lack of natural resources, a shortage of capital, and a discredited government
(Copper, 2024). However, many economists at the time, were proved wrong, as
Taiwan’s economic growth in the mid-1960s was so significant that it became known as an
“economic miracle” (Copper, 2024). Taiwan’s economic boom of the 1960s and several decades
after was generated by growth in the agriculture sector, followed by the country’s
industrialization in the 1970s (Copper, 2024). By the 1980s Taiwan moved to capital-intensive
and knowledge-based industries (Copper, 2024). High rate of savings, rising labor productivity,
22
privatization, astute government planning, foreign investment, and trade all propelled Taiwan’s
rapid economic expansion (Copper, 2024). From 1992 to the present time, Taiwan’s GDP
growth has averaged 4.5%. In 2023, Taiwan was the 14th wealthiest country globally, and 7th
richest country in Asia (Copper, 2024).
Safety Management
Despite Taiwan’s admirable economic developments and standing, the country’s national
carrier, China Airlines remained challenged by repeated aircraft incidents and fatal accidents
through the early 2000s (Landler, 2000). Lowered safety standards, underqualified pilots, and a
strong hierarchical cockpit culture were all contributing factors. In many ways, experts believed
that the problems that troubled China Airlines are typical of Asian companies (Landler, 2000.
China Airlines was founded by retired Taiwan air force officers in 1959, and the airline is
controlled by the China Aviation Development Foundation (Landler, 2000). In the 1990's, China
Airlines was hiring mostly former Taiwan’s Air Force pilots, who received limited training in
flying commercial aircraft (Landler, 2000). The pilot’s connections to the owners of the airline
allowed the pilots to make final decisions at the airline.
In 1994, one of China Airlines’ airplanes crashed upon landing, killing 264 people
(Stanley, 2007). The crash was primarily attributed to crew error for their failure to correct the
controls as well as the airspeed (Stanley, 2007). In 1998, one of China Airlines’ airplanes
crashed into a residential neighborhood and burst into flames, killing all 196 people on board
(Stanley, 2007. A final report released by the Civil Aviation Administration concluded that pilot
error was the cause of the crash, and the report concluded by criticizing China Airlines for
insufficient training and poor management of the resources in the pilot's cabin (Stanley, 2007).
In 2002, one of China Airlines’ airplanes crashed while enroute from Taipei to Hong Kong,
23
killing 225 people (Stanley, 2007). The final investigation report found that the accident was the
result of fatigue cracking caused by inadequate maintenance after a much earlier tail strike
(Stanley, 2007).
Transformation
In 2002, China Airlines changed its pilot recruitment practices and actively recruited
civilian-trained pilots (Stanley, 2007). In addition, the company began recruiting university
graduates as trainees in its own pilot training program. The company also modified its
maintenance and operational procedures (Stanley, 2007). China Airlines hired former executives
from Singapore Airlines and Cathay Pacific Airways, two airlines respected for their
performance and reliability, to advise it on engineering and maintenance (Stanley, 2007).
Changes implemented resulted in the company passing the IATA Operational Safety Audit
(Stanley, 2007). In 2005, China Airlines passed an operational safety audit conducted by the
International Air Transport Association and received recertification February 2007 (Stanley,
2007).
Competencies for Leaders to Foster a Safety Culture
Rapid transformation of the country, pressure to meet demand and to maximize incomes,
cause airline leaders to adopt measures that help them most with recouping investment (Uhalley,
1998). As a result, leaders are willing to relax safety processes and protocols leading to frequent
aircraft accidents, loss of lives, capital, and investment (ABL Aviation, 2023). To foster a safety
culture or maintain employee’s engagement in SMS, a leader must have the ability to
acknowledge a need for change and commit to their organization to safety, relaxing either the
team’s production schedule or overall earnings. In addition, leaders must have willingness to
reproduce well-functioning systems of rules from outsiders and leverage outside expertise
24
(Fuller, 2010). In summary, to effectively foster a safety culture, leaders must have the following
competencies: understand safety excellence, able to establish clear safety expectations and
processes, have a strong sense of commitment to safety, have confidence in their abilities to
foster a safety, able to allocate resources consistent with the concerns being addressed, and able
to create an environment where employees can engage without fear of reprisal (Kelloway, 2017;
Lutchman et al., 2012; Van Rooij & Fine, 2018; Zhao et al., 2018). Table 2 highlights the
competencies that were assessed through this study.
Table 2
Leaders’ Competencies to Be Assessed
Competency Type Literature
Understand safety
excellence.
Knowledge conceptual Lutchman et al., 2012;
Establish clear safety
expectations and
processes.
Knowledge procedural Lutchman et al., 2012;
Have a strong sense of
commitment to
safety.
Motivation expectancy Kelloway, 2017
Have confidence in their
abilities to foster a
safety.
Motivation self-efficacy Kelloway, 2017
Able to allocate
resources consistent
with the concerns
being addressed.
Organizational models Zhao et al., 2018
Able to create an
environment where
employees can
engage without fear
of reprisal.
Organizational settings Van Rooij & Fine, 2018
25
Clark and Estes’ (2008) Knowledge, Motivation and Organizational Influences Framework
This study utilized a gap analysis model as the conceptual framework. Gap analysis
(Clark & Estes, 2008) clearly defines organizational goals and then identifies the cause of gaps
between actual performance and desired performance within the organization. This is done in a
systematic fashion by defining measurable goals, identifying current performance and the gaps
as it relates to the desired performance, determining the possible causes for the gaps and
confirming them, creating solutions and implementing them, and finally evaluating the outcome
(Clark & Estes, 2008). This process is a continuous cyclical process with a goal of constant
closing of performance gaps. Gap analysis focuses on three influence areas which are the
potential causes for performance gaps. Knowledge, motivation and organizational influences are
all studied and identified.
The gap analysis model is utilized to identify gaps with data and research. This is
necessary to avoid developing solutions that will not solve the true symptom of the gap (Clark &
Estes, 2008). Additionally, the information gathered allows for a realistic view of the gap
avoiding inaction due to the possible complexity of solving it. The gap analysis systematic
approach helps avoid these inappropriate solutions which could create additional gaps or
performance problems (Clark & Estes, 2008). The gap analysis process ends with an evaluation
of the implemented solutions. The gap analysis process begins again to determine if additional
gaps exist.
This study is designed as a qualitative study following the gap analysis model. The study
aims to identify gaps that impact successful leadership in fostering a safety culture specifically
for airlines operating in emerging markets. Once the stakeholder goal and competency were
determined, knowledge, motivation and organizational influences that impact stakeholder’s
26
capacity was generated based on context-specific, as well as general learning and motivation
literature. These influences will be presented next.
Stakeholder Knowledge, Motivation and Organizational Influences
This study focused on stakeholders’ knowledge, motivation, and organizational influence
which impact successful leadership in fostering a safety culture. The concepts are reviewed to
understand the needs of leaders and the organization to foster a safety culture. The knowledge,
motivation, and organizational influences are utilized to strengthen leadership in fostering a
safety culture specifically within the maintenance engineering organization of airlines operating
in emerging markets.
Knowledge Influences
Knowledge and skill enhancement are required for job performance when employees do
not know how to complete performance goals or when future challenges require innovative
problem solving (Clark & Estes, 2008). Literature on knowledge-related influences is reviewed
to understand what knowledge and skills leaders need to successfully foster a safety culture.
Clark and Estes (2008) stress the importance of knowing the how, when, what, why, where, and
whom to achieve performance goals. Individuals are often unaware of the lack of knowledge or
are afraid to acknowledge their opportunities (Clark & Estes, 2008). Anderson et al. (2001)
identified four types of knowledge to better understand problems in performance. Those four,
factual, conceptual, procedural, and metacognitive, hold subtypes of knowledge that focus on
concrete knowledge and abstract knowledge. Factual knowledge refers to knowledge of
terminology and specific details and elements (Anderson et al., 2001). Conceptual knowledge
covers knowledge of classifications, categories, principles, theories, models and structures
(Anderson et al., 2001). Procedural knowledge refers to knowledge of subject specific skills,
27
techniques, methods, and criteria for utilizing appropriate procedures (Anderson et al., 2001).
Metacognitive knowledge is strategic knowledge, self-knowledge, and knowledge about
cognitive tasks (Anderson et al., 2001). Categorizing knowledge into these four types is
important to support learning, teaching and assessing the necessary knowledge by utilizing
techniques geared toward those types of knowledge (Anderson et al., 2001). A review of current
scholarly literature in this study highlights conceptual and procedural influences that leaders
must understand to foster a safety culture.
Conceptual Understanding: Leadership and Why a Safety Culture Needs to Be Fostered
Successful leadership in fostering a safety culture will depend on a leader’s ability to
conceptually understand what safety excellence looks like, the company’s safety vulnerabilities
and their role in articulating safety throughout the organization. Conceptual knowledge is
understanding why a safety culture needs to be fostered. Safety practices represent an
organization’s way of fulfilling the ethical and moral obligation of human life. For leaders to be
willing to do the things that are necessary to transform the organization, they must take safety
personally (Lutchman et al., 2012). Naturally, high profits and rewards are strong motivators, but
knowing that safety affects the well-being of people drives successful leadership in fostering a
safety culture. In other words, leaders have to think about stakeholders with the same level of
concern for themselves and their own families (Lutchman et al., 2012).
Maintenance engineering leaders will need to conceptually understand the challenges in
the environment that their organization operates, causes of recent aircraft incidents and
surrounding threats. When leaders have a conceptual understanding of their airlines’ safety
vulnerabilities, it is then they are able to effectively determine corrective and preventive
measures to eliminate the likelihood of future recurrences. Past aircraft incidents provide
28
opportunities for learning and the development of new leadership skills to better foster a safety
culture.
Leaders’ role in shaping a robust safety culture is to lead by example and promote open
communication about safety concerns (Lutchman et al., 2012). When top leaders have the
conceptual knowledge to prioritize safety, the commitment trickles down throughout the
organization, influencing how employees perceive and prioritize safety in their daily activities
(Lutchman et al., 2012). Leaders can participate in safety training, promote open communication
about safety concerns, and recognize employees’ amended behaviors.
Procedural Actions: Leadership and How to Foster a Safety Culture
Successful leadership in fostering a safety culture involves having procedural knowledge.
Procedural knowledge is understanding how and what to do in fostering a safety culture. A
leader with procedural knowledge is able to establish clear safety expectations and processes for
the organization to follow (Lutchman et al., 2012). Procedure knowledge enables leaders to
effectively communicate a comprehensive safety policy that clearly outlines the organization’s
dedication to safety, the obligations of employees at all levels, and the repercussions of failing to
meet safety standards (Roughton et al., 2013). Effective leaders have their expectations
frequently reinforced through employee handbooks, safety meetings, and provide ongoing
communication. When employees have clear expectations and are able to comprehend that safety
is a vital value, they are more likely to successfully incorporate safety practices into their daily
work (Roughton et al., 2013).
29
Table 3
Assumed Knowledge Influences and Knowledge Type
Assumed knowledge influence Knowledge type
Leaders need to have knowledge of concepts
and why it is necessary to foster a safety
culture.
Conceptual
Leaders need to have knowledge of what
actions to take and how to foster a safety
culture.
Procedure
Motivation Influences
Motivation is a second key influence in the Clark and Estes (2008) gap analysis.
Literature focused on motivation-related influences impacting leadership fostering a safety
culture will be reviewed. Motivation influences lead employees to choose to work towards a
goal, persist until it is completed and focus on how much mental effort is invested to get the job
done (Clark and Estes, 2008). Leaders fostering a safety culture will encounter motivation
influences for themselves and their employees. Motivation at work results from experiences and
beliefs regarding ourselves, peers and past experiences which are not always accurate (Clarke
and Estes, 2008). Motivation is important as beliefs and experiences guide successful leadership
in fostering a safety culture. Self-efficacy and expectancy are two motivation theories to be
explored. Self-efficacy is one motivation influence that impacts a leader's ability as perceived
efficacy can affect behavior (Bandura, 1978). A leader’s belief in their ability to foster a safety
culture will impact success or failure. Clark and Estes (2008) reference motivation homicide, a
term indicating leaders who believe motivation cannot be influenced by an outside person or
environment. Leaders who are unable or unwilling to believe the ability exists to motivate others
create a barrier to maximizing motivation in the workplace (Clark and Estes (2008). Expectancy
30
outcome is another motivation influence impacting leadership in fostering a safety culture. A
belief exists that monetary rewards or threats of punishment will force employees to do what the
organization wishes (Clark and Estes, 2008). Furthermore, a person is unmotivated when the
effort to perform well is extreme, the performance needed to obtain the goal is unrealistic, or the
outcome is not valued (Riihimaki & Viskupic, 2020). Leaders may have confidence in
themselves and the employees but if they believe they will be prevented from achieving goals by
organizational barriers they will not be successful (Clark and Estes, 2008).
Self-Efficacy: Leadership and Confidence in Fostering a Safety Culture
Self-efficacy refers to an individual’s self-belief in completing a narrowly defined task
(Elliot et al., 2017). Safety leadership self-efficacy is the extent to which leaders perceive their
capabilities to exemplify and execute courses of action required to attain a good safety
performance. Seeing other leaders take on similar tasks and experience positive outcomes
through applied effort will make leaders more likely to perceive that they can take on and
experience positive outcomes with challenging tasks (Kelloway, 2017). Leaders will be more
influenced by the success or failure of other leaders if the other leaders they are observing are
similar to them in role and background. Mentoring between leaders who have been in their same
roles or consultation feedback from specialized agencies can help leaders see what successful
safety culture looks like and what the pivotal steps are to achieving it. Leaders with a strong
sense of self-efficacy view challenges as tasks to overcome; they develop a more profound
interest and a strong sense of commitment in fostering a safety culture and recovering quickly
from setbacks (Kelloway, 2017).
Expectancy: Leadership and Probability of Fostering a Safety Culture
31
Expectancy is the belief that if an individual raises their efforts, their reward may also
rise. Individuals can be motivated towards goals if they believe that there is a positive correlation
between efforts and performance, the outcome of a favorable performance will result in a
desirable reward, a reward from a performance will satisfy an important need, and the outcome
satisfies their need enough to make the effort worthwhile (Kelloway, 2017). Individuals will be
encouraged to pursue the goal if there are significant difficulties and challenges. Safety
leadership expectancy is the extent to which leaders believe there is a correlation between
successfully fostering a safety culture, preventing aircraft incidents, business longevity and job
security. Leaders will need adequate support and authority from the organization to overcome
challenges in fostering a safety culture (Kelloway, 2017). Positive reinforcement will also
motivate leaders to shape a safety culture (Kelloway, 2017). In positive reinforcement, a
desirable stimulus is added to increase a behavior. For leaders’ positive reinforcement includes
public recognition and from their team. When leaders see that their commitment to safety is
impactful, acknowledged and appreciated, they are more likely to remain vigilant and proactive
in fostering a safety culture (Kelloway, 2017).
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Table 4
Assumed Motivation Influences
Assumed motivation influence Motivation construct
Leaders need to be confident in their ability to
foster a safety culture.
Self-efficacy
Leaders need to believe there are high
rewards and the probability of fostering a
safety culture is high.
Expectancy
Organizational Influences
Organizational influences join knowledge and motivation influences as the key areas for
performance improvement and goal achievement in the Clark and Estes (2008) gap analysis
framework. Literature on organizational-related influences impacting leadership competencies to
foster a safety culture will be reviewed. Organizational barriers, such as lack of tools, inadequate
facilities, or poor processes and procedures can result in poor organizational performance (Clark
and Estes, 2008). The organizational setting is important as leaders should be provided with a
clear vision, goals, performance measurements, knowledge, skills, motivation support, and
structure and processes in order to be successful in times of crisis (Clark and Estes, 2008).
Additionally, the organizational culture is important to organizational success as it can change
organizational innovation and performance (Alshammari, 2020). Organizational culture can take
years to build but it boosts the morale of employees to get maximum output and leads to
improving organizational performance (Alshammari, 2020).
Organizational Settings: Leadership and Resources for Fostering a Safety Culture
Organizations must allocate resources consistent with the concerns being addressed
(Zhao et al., 2018). Organizational resources are sponsored sources of supply and support
33
provided to individuals or groups to help achieve an organizational outcome (Albrecht et al.,
2018). After leaders know where safety risks are impending and have established clear
expectations on how to execute, they should be provided adequate resources such as time and
budget for the safety initiatives. With adequate resources, leaders can provide employees with
necessary equipment, safety tools, and relevant training programs to execute the safety initiatives
(Roughton et al., 2013). It is also essential to provide ongoing safety education and training to
keep employees updated with evolving safety procedures and best practices. Regular training
sessions, workshops, and drills help reinforce the importance of safety and equip employees with
the knowledge and skills they need (Roughton et al., 2013).
Organizational Model: Open Reporting Culture in Fostering a Safety Culture
A safety culture comprises five elements: an informed, reporting, learning, just and
flexible culture (Roughton et al., 2013). Organizations that build a culture of understanding
errors are part of everyday work; fostering acknowledgement and learning from those errors
helps build successful leadership and decision making (Van Rooij & Fine, 2018). Leaders will
fail and be unwilling to comply with organizational rules if organizations foster an unethical
culture and behavior including issuing blame and punishing employees which will increase
anxiety and stress (Van Rooij & Fine, 2018). An open reporting culture is when employees can
detect their errors, admit, communicate, analyze and correct them quickly. To effectively foster a
safety culture, leaders must create an environment where employees can report safety concerns,
near misses, and accidents without fear of reprisal. This open reporting culture allows
organizations to identify and address safety issues, proactively preventing potential incidents
proactively (Van Rooij & Fine, 2018). Leaders should also know to emphasize the importance of
learning from incidents. After an accident or near miss, conducting a thorough investigation to
34
identify the root causes and implementing corrective actions is critical. By demonstrating a
commitment to learning and improvement, leaders set the stage for continuous safety
enhancement.
Organizational Model: Organizational Culture of Trust
A safety culture consists of trust, built on mutual respect, communication, and a shared
commitment to success by both leaders and the organization (IAEA, 2016). Trust in an
organization, and the organization’s trust in their leaders, are important in ensuring success of
fostering a safety culture (IAEA, 2016). Employees trust an organization when they have faith or
confidence in the organization’s capabilities and belief that the organization has their best
interest considered when decisions are made. When employees sense they are trusted by the
organization, they take greater pride and concern for the work they are completing and
contribute toward the success of organizational goals which leads to successful implements of
safety practices (IAEA, 2016). Leaders need to believe their organizations will trust them and
support them. Distrust causes anxiety and insecurity, undermining cooperation and efficiency
(Sutherland, 2017). A key component to successful leadership in fostering a safety culture is
decentralized decision-making that allows authority to individuals rather than upper management
leadership (Sutherland, 2017). Table 5 shows the assumed organizational influences by category
for successful leadership in fostering a safety culture.
35
Table 5
Assumed Knowledge Influences and Knowledge Type
Assumed knowledge influence Knowledge type
The organization needs to provide leaders
with resources to foster a safety culture.
Organization settings
The organization needs to provide autonomy
to leaders to foster a safety culture without
the fear of retribution or discipline.
Organizational models
The organization needs to foster a culture of
trust.
Organizational models
Conceptual Framework
Clark and Estes (2008) stated that to close business gaps and achieve goals organizations
must first determine the cause of the gap and the type of performance improvement program
required. A conceptual framework is the justification for why a study should be conducted
describing the current known knowledge through a literature review, gaps in understanding of
the problem, and an outline of methodology all to understand why the research is essential and
what contributions might the findings make to what is already known (Varpio et al., 2020). A
conceptual framework is a result of a thorough literature review and should be a mental map
connecting various dimensions of the research process including concepts, assumptions,
expectations, beliefs and theories that support the research (van der Waldt, 2020).
Knowledge, motivation and organizational influences must be analyzed collectively to
develop holistic solutions to achieve the goal (Clark and Estes, 2008). Understanding Clark and
Estes (2008) interaction between knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences, the
conceptual framework was influenced by the assumed KMOs previously presented, along with
36
previous research, theory, and newly generated data. The KMO influences and concepts
discussed in this chapter are illustrated in Figure 1 to depict the interrelationships.
Figure 1
Conceptual Framework: Interrelationship of Stakeholder Knowledge, Motivation, and
Organizational Influences
37
Figure 1 explains the conceptual framework and highlights the interaction between
knowledge, motivation and organizational influences. Understanding successful leadership in
fostering a safety culture, the gaps in performance and the interdependency of the influences
leads to analysis and assessment to create the correct solutions. Gap analysis helps determine
whether leaders have the adequate knowledge, motivation and organizational support to achieve
the organizational goals (Clark & Estes, 2008). The conceptual framework is a continuous circle
as the gap analysis process will be cyclical. Once the evaluation is complete, the process can
begin to review any gaps for further performance development. Knowledge, motivation and
organizational influences are at the center of the circle as the entire process will revolve around
identifying, analyzing and assessing those influences. The knowledge influences consist of
conceptual and procedural. The motivation influences consist of self- efficacy and expectancy.
The organizational influences include the organizational setting and the organizational model.
Each is defined by separate bubbles depicting the distinct influence each has, and they are
connected and interconnected to one another indicating all must align for the correct solution to
be created leading to improvement of organizational goals.
Summary
Improving safety culture, managing safety risks better, and maintaining employee
engagement in SMS are crucial to creating a sustainable advancement for airlines operating in
emerging markets. Sustainable growth of airlines leads to a thriving aviation sector and will
positively impact the overall economic performance of the emerging country. The review of
literature on the emerging market that the airline operates in and industry safety standards help
explain sources of knowledge, motivation and organizational factors that influence senior leaders
to foster a safety culture.
38
The knowledge influence focuses on a leader’s conceptual knowledge and procedural
knowledge to understand the concepts of safety and the ability to take action. The motivation
influence focuses on self-efficacy and expectancy related to a leader’s decisions to prioritize
safety. The organizational influences included organizational settings and organizational culture
focused on a leader being provided the resources to successfully foster a safety culture while
having the ability to act autonomously without fear of retribution or discipline. Finally, a
conceptual framework was provided utilizing the Clark and Estes (2008) gap analysis to examine
the assumed knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences impacting the performance
goal. The knowledge, motivation and organizational influences identified in Chapter Two will be
used as a foundation for data collection in Chapter Three.
39
Chapter Three: Methodology
Despite the considerable opportunities in the aviation industry of emerging Asian
markets, many airlines in this region are still struggling to manage safety risks and maintain
employee engagement in SMS. This study aims to explore the capacity of airline senior leaders
operating in Asia’s emerging markets to foster a safety culture. This analysis focuses on
knowledge, motivation, and organizational factors that influence the ability of senior leaders
maintain employee engagement in SMS. The gap analytical framework, developed by Dr.
Richard Clark and Dr. Fred Estes, will be used to assess the organizational performance affected
by gaps in knowledge, motivation, and organizational factors. The methodological framework
used is a qualitative study, utilizing interviews. Chapter Three describes the research design,
methodology and how the study is conducted in detail. The structure of this chapter is as follows:
the next section will discuss research questions, followed by study design, research setting, brief
description of the researcher, method of the research, credibility and trustworthiness, ethical
considerations, and limitations.
Research Questions
This study focused on three research questions:
1. What knowledge and motivation influences enable leaders to foster a safety culture?
2. What are the organizational settings and models available to leaders to prioritize and
foster a safety culture?
3. What is the recommended knowledge, motivation and organizations solutions to
fostering a safety culture?
40
Overview of Methodology
Clark and Estes’ (2008) gap analysis is a systematic analytical method that identifies the
gap between the actual performance level and the preferred performance level within an
organization. For the purposes of this study, the gap analysis framework was used to assess
knowledge, motivation and organizational influences that impact the ability of senior managers
to foster a safety culture. The methodology consisted of interviews to collect data. Merriam and
Tisdell (2016) stated that ‘‘we interview people to find out from them those things we cannot
directly observe. … We cannot observe feelings, thoughts, and intentions’’ (p.108). Data for this
research was collected from interviews with 11 consultants of airlines in emerging markets.
Recommendations of the findings are presented in Chapter Five. Table 6 details the data source
material that was analyzed.
Table 6
Data Sources
Research questions Interview
What knowledge and motivation influences enable
leaders to foster a safety culture?
X
What are the organizational settings and models
available to leaders to prioritize and foster a
safety culture?
X
What is the recommended knowledge, motivation
and organizational solutions to fostering a safety
culture?
X
41
Target Population
The target population was consultants for airlines’ engineering, flight operations and
maintenance organizations. Participants must have experience in the airline support industry and
previously worked with airline senior managers regarding safety management.
Sample Selection
A non-probability purposeful sampling approach was used to select airline consultants to
be interviewed. A non-probability sampling method was most beneficial for interviews in this
study because participants must have a minimum of 25 years working in the airline support
industry, experienced in providing consult services to airlines operating in emerging markets,
knowledge of safety operations, and worked closely with airline senior managers. While this
sample does not necessarily represent all airline’s consultants, it allowed for valuable data to be
collected from individuals who worked directly with airline senior leaders. The former airline
consultants, through their experience, understand airline senior leaders’ knowledge, motivation,
and organizational influences in fostering a safety culture. The study sought 11 participants
retired from former consultant work.
Recruitment
All former consultants to airlines in emerging markets were asked to participate in an
interview on a voluntary basis. This study utilized convenience sampling from the researcher’s
professional network followed by snowball sampling to identify participants (Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016). Interview recruitment was conducted via email or phone call. The request for the
interview was included in the recruitment email or verbally asked.
42
Researcher
Good researchers are continually aware of their positionality, their bias, conscious of
their ethical center and remain as neutral as possible (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). My current
work is to aid airlines in ensuring aircraft operational efficacy and improving their aircraft’s
reliability. In the case of this study, my industry experience and regular interactions with airlines
aids me in better understanding the problem of practice. However, previous interactions with
airlines and perceptions may cause bias or overlooking issues. The researcher must remain
neutral throughout the process (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Before each interview, I assessed any
biases that may impact the interview, ensuring I did not compel any answers to the interview
questions and did not lead the participants to conclusions. I presented University of Southern
California Institutional Review Board, ethics, and HR documentation with a signed
confidentiality clause to mitigate participant hesitation. Approval letter provided by the
institutional review board is specified in Appendix B.
Interviews
The method used in this research was semi-structured interview, which relies on asking
questions to collect data. Semi-structured interviews are often open-ended, allowing for
flexibility, but following a predetermined thematic framework, giving a sense of order (Merriam
& Tisdell, 2016). Interviewing is necessary when behavior, feelings, or understanding of others
interpret the world cannot be observed (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Interviewing is also necessary
when researchers are interested in past events where it is impossible to replicate identical
conditions of the past event (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The primary purpose of the interviews
was to gather data on a deeper level to understand the conceptual and procedural knowledge,
self-efficacy and expectancy motivation, and organizational settings and organizational culture
43
that influence leadership to foster a safety culture. Gaining an understanding of these influences
leads to the ability to identify performance gaps and create solutions for implementation.
Instrumentation
The interview protocol, listed as Appendix A, provides the open-ended questions to
understand the gaps in the knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences of airlines
operating in Asia’s emerging markets. The interview questions focused on gaining participant’s
insights on how knowledge, motivation and organizational influences impact senior leaders in
fostering a safety culture.
The conceptual framework in this research highlighted the need for identifying
performance gaps in achieving the stakeholder goal of fostering a safety culture by
understanding the knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences. Interviews allowed for
in-depth discussion with the participants to better understand, analyze, and assess the data to lead
to solutions. The interview protocol in Appendix A references the protocol questions, the
research questions, the data support, and key concepts addressed by the questions.
Data Collection Procedures
Following University of Southern California Institutional Review Board approval,
participants were solicited by email or phone call, followed another email to schedule the
interview. Eleven participants were interviewed through phone calls or audio-conferencing
applications. Each interview was approximately 60 minutes in duration. A summary of each
interview response was read back to the participants to confirm that data were captured correctly.
At the end of the interviews, participants were provided with a summary of the interview and
asked to add any additional information.
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Data Analysis
Data analysis for qualitative research, such as interviews, is a preferred method of
analyzing data simultaneously with data collection (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). This allowed
focused data to be collected that is not repetitious or of an overwhelming volume to be processed
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The themes emerging from the interviews were analyzed and linked
to knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences associated with leadership in fostering a
safety culture. The connections to those influences were utilized to answer the research questions
listed in the study.
Credibility and Trustworthiness
Merriam and Tisdell (2016) defined trustworthiness as a study that is valid and reliable
where there is some rigor in carrying out the study. Credibility is defined as a study that has been
conducted ethically, with the study being explicit about the researcher’s role, their relationship to
those studied, detailing why the topic of study is essential, being transparent about how the study
was conducted, and providing a convincing presentation of the findings (Merriam & Tisdell,
2016). Member checking, also known as participant validation, is a technique for exploring the
credibility of results. Results were returned to participants to check for accuracy and resonance
with their experiences. Participants were provided a summary of the interview and asked if the
correct intentions have been captured and if additional information needs to be included.
Ethics
Involvement in the research study was voluntary. Participants were informed that the
researcher’s goals were to learn more about leaders’ knowledge, motivation and organizational
influences to foster a safety culture. Participants were welcomed to ask questions regarding the
research. Participants were asked approximately 14 questions and were told that the interview
45
would take approximately one hour. All information was kept anonymous and confidential.
Participant names do not appear anywhere and no one except for the researcher knows about the
participants’ responses. Any articles written or presentations given, a made-up name was used
for each participant. Details and personal information specific to each participant was not
revealed. Participants was informed that the benefit of research is helping the researcher
understand airlines safety cultures and how it can be improved.
Limitations and Delimitations
A limitation of this research is that it does not allow for conclusions that can be
generalized to other populations. This research focused on 11 individual participants’
experiences and their experiences over a specific period within the organization. The experiences
of the 11 individual participants may not represent the experiences of every consultant for all
airlines in emerging markets, which may also differ at different periods while working with the
airlines. Although gap analysis is a valuable tool, it has certain restrictions. The success of gap
analysis depends highly on the persistence and knowledge of people involved in the process.
Gap analysis is subjective and sensitive to the prejudices and preconceptions of the analyst. As a
result, the analyses’ efficacy may be compromised by erroneous assessments of the planned
future state and the existing condition.
46
Chapter Four: Findings
This qualitative study collected data from 11 interviews. The findings for research
questions one and two are found in Chapter Four, and research question three is found in Chapter
Five, recommendations. The limited sample size requires that the threshold exceed 50% to be
significant, requiring a minimum of six participants to identify the asset or gap in the influence
of leaders in fostering a safety culture. The research was conducted to understand the assets and
gaps in senior managers’ knowledge, motivation, and organizational models and settings to
maintain employee engagement in SMS.
As described in Chapter Two, Clark and Estes’s (2008) gap analysis framework was used
to explore the assumed influences. The gap analysis framework provided the context for
understanding the capacity of airline senior leaders’ knowledge, motivation, and organizational
influences related to fostering a safety culture. The data was collected during in-person or virtual
interviews through a phone call. The 14-question interview consistently averaged 60 minutes.
All transcriptions were performed manually, scrubbed of identifying information, and validated
for accuracy with the participant.
Participants
A non-probability purposeful sampling approach was used to select former airline
consultants to be interviewed. Participants have a minimum of 25 years of working experience
within the aviation industry, have experience providing consult services to airlines operating in
emerging markets, have knowledge of safety operations, and worked closely with airline senior
managers of the engineering and maintenance organizations. While this sample is not necessarily
representative of all airline’s consultants, it allowed for valuable data to be collected from
individuals who worked directly with airline senior leaders. Former airline consultants, through
47
their experience, understand the knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences that
impact the ability of senior leaders to foster a safety culture. Eleven former airline consultants
operating in emerging markets were interviewed. Participants have experience supporting
emerging markets in Indonesia, China, or India. Participants have an average of thirty-two years
of working experience in the aviation industry. Eight male and three female former consultants
were interviewed. Table 7 details the emerging market, years of industry experience and gender
makeup of the participants.
Table 7
Participate Profile
Participant Emerging market supported Years of industry experience Gender
1 Indonesia 30 M
2 Indonesia 40 M
3 Indonesia 31 F
4 China, Indonesia, India 27 F
5 Indonesia 41 M
6 China 28 M
7 China 32 M
8 India 25 M
9 India 30 M
10 Indonesia 27 F
11 Indonesia 44 M
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Research Question 1
Research Question 1 focused on the knowledge and motivation influences that enable
leaders to foster a safety culture. The knowledge and motivation influences identified
demonstrate either an asset or a gap. To be coded as an asset or gap, a minimum of six
participants need to identify the asset or gap in the influence of senior leaders to foster a safety
culture. Recommendations for identified gaps are provided in Chapter Five for consideration.
The findings for the assumed knowledge influences, followed by the assumed motivation
influences, are presented below.
Knowledge Influences’ Findings
Knowledge influences were explored to identify strengths and potential gaps for leaders
of airlines in emerging markets to foster a safety culture. The study evaluated the stakeholders’
conceptual and procedural knowledge competencies. Clark and Estes (2008) gap analysis
framework provided the structure for analyzing knowledge influences. The framework seeks to
answer the degree to which there are gaps in the following: understanding of safety and SMS
and understanding how to manage safety risks and how to foster a safety culture.
Conceptual Knowledge: Senior Leaders Understand Safety and SMS
Conceptual knowledge of safety is understanding the concepts of safety and safety
management, including definition and purpose. Understanding safety is critical to managing
employee engagement to foster a safety culture. Data evaluation identified that airlines’ senior
managers understand the concepts of safety and safety management systems. Their conceptual
knowledge comes from requirements defined by regulators, and engagement with OEM and
suppliers.
49
Interview Findings. Participants were asked whether airlines’ engineering and
maintenance senior managers have a conceptual understanding of safety, safety management,
and safety culture. In all 11 interviews, participants agreed that airlines’senior leaders
understand safety, safety management, and safety culture. Senior leader’s conceptual
understanding comes from training and interactions with local civil aviation authority (CAA). In
their required training on safety, senior leaders are provided with resources and references to
concepts of safety and safety culture. For example, Participant 7 stated:
Safety management mitigates safety risks and ensure that airlines comply with safety
laws and regulations. Safety management is a CAAC requirement, and airlines are
regularly audited. Senior leaders must have a clear understanding of safety and SMS.
They are required to take annual training on SMS. In their required safety training, senior
leaders are referred to ICAO Annex 19 and ICAO Doc 9859. These ICAO documents
and documents provided by CAAC serve as resources that outline the concepts and
requirement for SMS.
As referenced by Participant 7, ICAO Annex 19 emphasizes the importance of safety
management, promotes the implementation of SMS and stresses the concept of overall safety
performance in all aviation domains (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2019). While
ICAO Safety Management Manual Doc 9859 explains safety management foundations, safety
intelligence development, and safety management implementation in detail to ensure that airlines
implement SMS in accordance with ICAO Annex 19 (International Civil Aviation Organization,
2019). These regulatory documents serve to define the concepts and purpose of safety and safety
management for aviation organizations and airline senior leaders.
50
In addition to training and interactions with local CAA, participants stated that senior
leader’s gain conceptual knowledge from interactions with OEM. According to Participant 10,
100% senior leaders understand the concepts of safety and SMS. Senior managers are
hired and hold their management positions because they have received relevant
education, understand and have experience in managing safety risks. In their education
and experience, senior leaders should have received training on the concepts and purpose
of safety culture. For instance, in the past, my team have trained airline organizations,
including senior managers to identify of safety risks, create a management system to
enhance safety, access resources required for safe operations, communicate safety issues,
and continue to assess for improvement.
Summary. Participants confirmed that engineering and maintenance senior managers
understand the concepts and purpose of safety, SMS, and safety culture. SMS is a requirement
by ICAO and is regulated by each country’s aviation authority. As a result, safety and SMS are
concepts that airline leaders receive regular training on. Senior leaders are hired and hold their
positions due to their knowledge and experience in managing safety risks. Some participants
stated that their team, as an airline’s OEM, has provided airline organizations, including senior
managers training on concepts and the purpose of maintaining a safety culture. The next question
is if leaders have the procedural knowledge to implement the concepts.
Procedural Knowledge: Senior Leaders Understand Safety Processes and Know How to
Manage Safety Risks
Procedural knowledge of safety is understanding how to manage safety and
understanding safety processes. The data evaluation identified that airline senior managers know
how to manage safety risks and understand safety related processes. Understanding how to
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manage safety and safety processes is critical to maintaining employee engagement in fostering a
safety culture.
Interview Findings. Participants were asked whether airline engineering and
maintenance senior leaders knew how to manage safety or have procedural knowledge of safety.
Eleven participants agreed that senior leaders have procedural knowledge of safety and know
how to manage safety risks. For instance, according to Participant 9, when airlines pass detailed
safety audits conducted by the CAA, senior leaders have demonstrated procedural knowledge of
safety and SMS. Participant 9 stated:
In this industry, no airline leaders could be ignorant of how to manage safety risks.
Senior leaders manage the production of their products or services, while receiving safety
audits and feedback from regulators. Airline’s CAA conduct audits around a 36-month
cycle. During audits, CAA check if safety regulations are followed, and if airline safety
processes and procedures, documented in manuals are carried out as described. CAA
auditors ask substantive questions to the responsible people, including engineering and
maintenance senior managers to verify if the airline organizations know how to apply
safety requirements, processes and procedures in practice. It would be difficult for
airlines to pass such audits with their senior managers lacking the understanding of safety
processes and procedures.
Conversely, Participant 8, 6 and 4, stated that airlines in India, China and Indonesia,
respectively, have created a safety quality assurance team to engage different department leaders,
such as engineering and maintenance senior leaders to ensure safety processes are followed
within their teams. The SMS quality assurance team serve as internal auditors to airline
engineering and maintenance teams. As a result, it is apparent to Participant 8, 6 and 4 that
52
senior leaders have procedural knowledge of safety and know how to manage safety risks, given
their regular engagement with the airline’s safety quality assurance team. Participant 8 stated that
in India,
Regulators have many set SMS requirements for airlines to follow. As a result, airlines
created a SMS quality assurance team to engage department leaders and ensure that their
team’s processes align with DGCA’s safety regulations. For example, regulators require
airlines to promote SMS. The SMS quality assurance team will ensure that senior leaders
take part in promoting SMS through frequent communication with employees via
newsletters and emails.
Participant 6 stated that similarly, in China,
During peak travel season, spring and summer, there will be higher occurrences of safety
related issues, as a result, department leaders will have an increased number of
engagements with the airline’s safety review team. Engagements include internal audits,
supervision, safety reviews meetings, training, reminders.
Similarly, Participant 4 stated that in Indonesia, “CEO created the safety quality team,
responsible for engaging senior managers on DGCA’s requirements, especially if there has been
updates in the policies. They are responsible for reporting safety metrics of each department to
the CEO.”
Next, to understand if senior managers have procedural knowledge of safety culture,
participants were asked how airline senior leaders engage employees and ensure that employees
are following safety processes. Participants 8, 7, and 3 stated a similar process that senior
managers at airlines in India, China and Indonesia implement to engage employees. Participant 8
indicated that senior managers engage employees by frequently discussing safety prioritization
53
in staff meetings and dedicating additional team meetings when necessary to discuss lessons
learned and safety risk prevention. According to Participant 8, “Senior managers frequently
emphasize safety in staff meetings especially following a safety incident. Senior managers will
have additional team meetings dedicated to discussing what happened, root cause findings,
resolution, and next steps to prevent similar incidents from reoccurring.” In addition to engaging
employees, senior managers ensure that employees are following safety processes, by reviewing
metrics and employees’ feedback on a regular basis. For example, Participant 7 stated:
Senior managers review metrics data showing amount of safety quality escapes reported.
A decline in quality escapes reported may mean the SMS is working and employees are
following safety processes. Senior managers may review how many safety incidents
reported are similar. High volume of similar recurring incidents mean root cause has not
been addressed and employees are not following the safety processes.
When senior managers find that employees are not following safety processes, they will seek to
understand why change has not been implemented. Senior managers will engage with employees
to obtain feedback. According to Participant 3 stated, “Senior managers will follow-up with
employees to obtain feedback, asking how they have implemented the corrective actions, if they
think the safety system is working, and if they have a clearer understanding of day-to-day
operations, errors, threats and mismanagement.”
Summary. Through interviewing, the study found that airline engineering and
maintenance senior managers understand how to manage safety and have procedural knowledge
of safety. When airlines pass comprehensive regulator’s safety audits, an assumption made by
participants is that senior managers understand and are properly implementing safety processes.
In addition, by having regular mandatory engagement with the safety assurance team and
54
passing airline internal audits, department leaders have demonstrated procedural knowledge of
safety and safety management. Participants revealed that airline senior leaders have procedural
knowledge, demonstrated by discussing safety prioritization in staff meetings, dedicating
additional team meetings to discuss safety, and reviewing metrics and employees’ feedback. In
addition, when senior managers find that employees are not following safety processes, they will
seek to understand why change has not been implemented.
Motivation Influences’ Findings
Motivation influences were explored to identify strengths and potential gaps for airline
senior leaders to foster a safety culture. The study evaluated the stakeholders’ motivation relating
to self-efficacy and expectation. Clark and Estes (2008) gap analysis framework provided the
structure for analyzing motivation influences.
Self-Efficacy: Senior Leaders Believe That They Can Foster a Safety Culture When They
Have Support From Their Top Leadership, and When They Have a Good Relationship With
Regulators and OEM
Self-efficacy is believing in oneself to accomplish a task-specific outcome. The data
evaluation identified that airlines’ senior managers know they can foster a safety culture because
they received positive feedback support from their top leadership. Senior Leaders are also
confident that they can foster a safety culture because they have a good relationship with
regulators, OEM, and other airlines.
Interview Findings. Participants were asked how senior leaders know they can foster a
safety culture. Participants 11, 4, 10 and 5 stated that at airlines in Indonesia, senior managers
knew they could foster a safety culture because their initiatives received approval and positive
feedback from top management. Senior managers receiving positive feedback for fostering a
55
safety culture, persuaded them to believe that they can succeed. For instance, Participant 11
stated, “Executives’ supported senior managers by making appearances in their team safety
discussions and speaking in approval of senior manager’s safety projects, made them believe
they can foster a safety culture.” In addition, Participant 4 stated, “Based on the feedback senior
managers received on their implemented efforts, they were able to evaluate the effectiveness and
performance of their efforts. Because the feedback were positive, senior managers knew that
they could foster a safety culture.” Approval, support and positive feedback from top
management were also provided in form of additional resources for senior manager to execute.
Participant 10 stated,
Senior managers knew that they could foster a safety culture when recommended
changes from safety review meetings for their teams were financially supported by
executive leadership. This included executive leadership making investments in training
employees, maintaining spare parts inventory and other day-to-day technical support.
Additionally, Participant 5 stated, “Top leadership’s willingness to invest in safety and
supporting senior leaders with resources they needed to execute, gave senior leaders the
confidence and motivation to foster a safety culture.”
At airlines in China, participants stated that senior leaders knew they could foster a safety
because they had close working relationships with CAAC, OEM, and other airlines under the
same parent company. By working closely with experienced entities and industry experts, senior
leaders are acquiring necessary knowledge, acceptance and avoiding unproductive efforts. Thus,
giving senior managers more confidence that they can foster a safety culture. According to
Participant 6,
56
In China, most airlines are state owned, including the three major airlines. Being state
owned, leaders from these three major airlines work very closely with the CAAC on
implementation of SMS. … Also, because these major Chinese airlines have large
purchase orders of aircraft and parts, they receive abundant training services from OEM,
including safety operations. … Leaders from the subsidiary airlines of these three major
airlines will receive lessons learned and best practices on SMS implementation.
Summary. Leaders are motivated to foster a safety culture when they know that they can
foster a safety culture. The study found that senior leaders knew they could foster a safety
culture because they received support and positive feedback from their management. When
senior leaders have support from their management, they are supported with resources such as
staffing, employee training, equipment, and tools for their safety projects. The study also found
that leaders knew they can foster a safety culture because they have a close relationship with
regulators, OEM and other airlines. When senior leaders have a good relationship with
regulators, OEM and other airlines, they are equipped with guidelines, training and best practices
to foster a safety culture. The next question is if leaders have the motivational expectancy to
foster a safety culture.
Expectancy: Senior Leaders Believe Fostering a Safety Culture Will Advance Their Careers
Expectancy is when an individual performs a task because they expect or believe the
effort will help them achieve a goal or receive a reward. The data evaluation identified that
airlines’ senior managers are motivated to foster safety because they are rewarded with a positive
reputation, job stability, career advancements and large bonuses. When leaders fail to foster a
safety culture, the airline will be fined by regulators and leaders are at risk of losing their jobs.
57
Leaders also believe fostering a safety culture is ethnically the “right thing to do” and they are
expected to do what is morally right.
Interview Findings. Participants were asked why senior managers want to foster a safety
culture and what rewards senior managers receive for fostering a safety culture. Participants 7, 1,
and 4 stated that senior managers want to foster a safety culture because they want to maintain
business longevity. Senior managers expect to have long stable careers, to be promoted and
receive large bonuses for successfully fostering a safety culture. When a safety culture is
fostered, airlines will gain public trust and customers, leading to increased profits and market
growth. For example, according to Participant 7,
Airlines want to maintain the quality and high standards of their businesses. When an
airline is safe, customers will trust the airline and use the airline’s services more,
resulting in increased profits and market growth. When the airline has increased profits,
senior leaders will gain recognition, get promoted and receive big bonuses.
When a safety culture is fostered, airlines will gain investors, leading to increased business
growth and sustainability. For example, according to Participant 1, “Leader’s want to foster a
safety culture and comply with international safety standards because international standards are
held high. International acknowledgement of an airline increases investor’s trust, and this is tied
to business growth and sustainability.” When a safety culture is fostered, airlines will gain from
cost savings associated with safety related accidents and incidents. For example, according to
participant 4 stated:
When there is a good safety culture, employees will not be reluctant to report issues,
leaders will be able to identify challenges earlier on and problems will be addressed
proactivity. A fostered safety culture leads to employee’s better performance,
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compliance, and quality of work. The airline will benefit from saving costs associated
with safety accidents and incidents. Senior leaders will benefit from getting promoted,
having stable careers and receiving large bonuses.
Alternatively, Participants 1, 6 and 9 stated that failing to foster a safety culture puts a
cost to the airline’s reputation, financials, and leaders at risk of being demoted or dismissed. For
example, Participant 9 stated,
Leaders will look at short term benefits versus long term benefits. These senior leaders
know that when they don’t invest in the long-term, take proper actions, the long-term
costs will be big. When problems are left unaddressed, it could potentially become
serious, leading to safety issues that stops production.
Additionally, Participant 1 stated that in Indonesia, “Leaders want to foster a safety
culture because they feel that as a leader of an airline, it is their responsibility for carrying
passengers safely to their destination. Safety incidents is a cost to the airlines and leader’s
reputation.” In addition, Participant 6 stated that in China:
Following safety protocols is a requirement that is often reinforced by regulators. Senior
leaders that do not follow the law put the airline at risk of being fined and themselves at
risk of being replaced. When an airline has regular incidents or accidents, no passengers
will want to risk their lives flying with the airline. Safety reputation of an airline is
extremely important because it directly relates to revenue and profits.
Summary. Leaders are motivated to foster a safety culture because when employees are
safe and produce high quality products and services, the airline will gain a positive reputation.
This leads to an increase of investors, passengers, profits and stock price. Airlines can maintain
business longevity. Senior leaders are rewarded with a positive reputation, job stability, career
59
advancements and large bonuses. When leaders fail to foster a safety culture, the airline will be
fined by regulators, forced to stop production and senior leaders are at risk of losing their jobs.
The next section will turn to Research Question 2.
Research Question 2
Research Question 2 focused on the organizational settings and models available for
leaders to foster a safety culture. The organizational influences identified in the findings
demonstrate either an asset or a gap where recommendations are offered for consideration. To be
coded as an asset or gap, a minimum of six participants needs to identify the asset or gap in the
influence of leaders in fostering a safety culture. Recommendations for identified gaps are
provided in Chapter Five for consideration. The findings for the assumed organizational
influences are presented below.
Organizational Influences’ Findings
Two assumed organizational influences were explored to identify strengths and potential
gaps for airlines’ senior managers in fostering a safety culture. The first influence explored is if
airlines organizations provided senior managers with adequate resources and tools to foster a
safety culture. The second influence explored is if airline organizations provided a culture that is
just and empowers, allowing senior managers to engage their employees without fear of
retribution. Both organizational influences define senior managers’ level of success in engaging
their employees.
Airlines Do Not Provide Adequate Resources and Tools for Senior Managers to Maintain
Employee Engagement in Fostering a Safety Culture
The data evaluation identified that airlines do not provide senior leaders with adequate
resources and tools to engage their employees in fostering a safety culture. Organizational
60
support such as training, time, equipment and resources is critical for leaders to keep engaged
employees and successfully foster a safety culture. The study uncovered the degree to which
resources were enough in allowing senior managers to foster a safety culture and engage
employees.
Interview Findings. Participants were asked if engineering and maintenance senior
leaders are provided with adequate resources to maintain employee engagement in managing
safety risks and fostering a safety culture. Participants agreed that in recent years, airlines
leadership have been more open to feedback and are more willing to invest in ensuring safety.
Airlines have implemented SMS and required regular safety review meetings to engage different
departments and to obtain employee feedback. Airlines have implemented improvements such as
safety training, provided more time and new tools needed for employees complete a task safely.
However, resources provided are still not adequate for senior managers to effectively foster a
safety culture. Tools and equipment remain limited for engineering and maintenance teams to
work safely. Participates 9, 7, and 10 stated at airlines in India, China and Indonesia
respectively, employees often perform workarounds in absence of tools and equipment, resulting
in high safety risks and safety related incidents. At an airline in India, Participant 9 states that
lack of resources is the main reason for their lack of safety culture. Participant 9 states, “Proper
equipment and tools are limited or unavailable for employees to perform their everyday
workload, as a result, employees end up performing workarounds and using unapproved tools
and equipment.” Additionally, at an airline in China, Participant 7 stated:
In recent years, airlines have put more effort in training employees on latest technology,
composites and human factors. However, some airlines that are not able to obtain tools
and equipment due to high costs, will manufacture the tools and equipment themselves.
61
When tools and equipment are not made to certain aerospace standards, they fail
prematurely and can cause safety issues.
Similarly, at an airline in Indonesia, Participant 10 stated:
Cash flow to maintain spare parts is not available. When a mechanic needs to replace a
faulty part on one airplane, they will need to rob a good part from another airplane. In
doing this, they are rotating the bad part onto the other airplane. Mechanics that do not
properly track the bad parts, are putting the aircraft at high potential safety risks.
In other instances, time is a limited resource for engineering and maintenance teams to work
safely, and the rate of production continue to limit senior leaders from fostering a safety culture.
Regarding airlines in China, Participant 7 stated, “Airlines acquire new aircraft and expand too
quickly, leading to limited availability of trained staff, tools and equipment. Then with the
pressure to meet demand, managers are forced to make compromises with quality and safety.”
Like the issue Participant 7 described, Participant 4 shared a specific example that occurred at an
airline in India:
When an employee report to their manager that they do not feel well and cannot complete
a task, the manager does not have enough skilled resources to back up the fatigue
employee. To meet production schedule, the manager would ask the fatigue employee to
complete their task, disregarding any potential risks. In the long term, employees feel
discouraged to report issues, knowing that their concerns will be disregarded.
According to the participants, when employees report an issue and it gets escalated to the
airline’s top management, no corrective actions are taken due to limited resources such as time
and trained staff to remove the roadblock. Airlines choosing to disregard an employee’s safety
62
report not only put the project at high potential safety risk, but also discourages employee from
future engagement.
Summary. Today, airlines in emerging markets are more willing to invest in resources to
foster a safety culture. Airlines are providing employees with training, tools and equipment to
work safely. However, resources provided are still inadequate for senior leadership to foster a
safety culture. Limited investment in maintaining spare parts, tools and equipment lead
employees to use unapproved tools and perform unsafe workarounds. Some airlines in emerging
markets expand rapidly in a short period, leading to limited trained staff, tools and equipment to
support their operations. In these instances, lack of time and production pressure is the main
impact on their safety culture. Employees are discouraged from engaging in SMS and reporting
safety problems because limited resources are available to resolve the problem that they
reported.
Airline Senior Managers Do Not Have an Environment That Empowers Employee
Engagement Without Fear of Retribution
The data evaluation identified that airlines do allow for an environment that empowers
employee engagement in fostering a safety culture without fear of retribution. A just and nonpunitive organizational model is critical for senior leaders to engage employees and successfully
foster a safety culture. The study uncovered the degree to which a just environment is available
to help senior managers engage employees and foster a safety culture.
Interview Findings. Participants were asked to describe the safety culture of the airline
engineering and maintenance organizations. Participants stated that “punitive” best described
airline safety cultures in China and Indonesia. Participants stated that because of regulators,
negative media attention, and airlines’ need for investors to expand their businesses, airlines in
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emerging markets must demonstrate that they have implemented SMS. However, airlines are
still struggling to obtain employee engagement in SMS due to punitive practices that still exists
in the organization. For example, regarding an airline in China, Participant 4 stated:
Investigation of safety related incidents is to identify “who” rather than “why.” There is
no investigation to determine contributing factors to employee’s error and implementing
strategies to improve the system to eliminate the contributing factors. Leadership
determines who caused the incident and punishes them with a dismissal or demotion. For
airlines in China, punishment is a form of accountability, it is important to determine
who is responsible for the error and punish them as a close loop action for others to learn
from.
Airline organizations tend to focus on who to blame, and investigations begin with the intent to
blame and discipline which leads to adversarial relationships between management and
employees in the long term. For example, Participant 6 stated:
Airlines promote non-punitive and just culture, but employees still do not trust of the
reporting system. Safety is mandated by the law and when people violate the law, they
will be punished. When airline employees make mistakes that are safety violations, they
will be heavily penalized such as getting their pay deducted. If safety violations are
repeated, the employee will get dismissed.
Airlines aim to eliminate undesirable behavior by focusing on punishing employees for mistakes,
which may drive results. However, punishing employees for mistakes creates fear where
employees are less likely to report issues or admit errors due to potential for severe
consequences. At airlines in Indonesia, Participants 1, 2 and 5 shared that leaders do not
encourage a just culture, where employees can learn from their mistakes. According to
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participants, employees are not empowered to admitting their mistakes due to the fear of
retaliation, being blamed and punished for errors produced. According to Participant 1, “During
a routine inspection, a mechanic found corrosion damage on the aircraft and did not report this
finding due to the fear of being blamed for slowing down the aircraft’s flight schedule. Instead,
they performed a repair workaround. In other cases, mechanics will ignore the findings.”
Participant 2 further described the culture as unjust when reports are made, “If you report
something, you would be blamed for slowing down production and putting someone else out of a
job.” Similarly, Participant 5 stated:
Airline lacked a just culture. Mechanics and flight crew are afraid to provide any
negative input due to the fear of losing their jobs or causing others to lose their jobs.
When an assistant mechanic striped panel from refuel panel and did not report this issue
to get it properly addressed, due to fear of being dismissed. He instead did a workaround
by applying sealant in attempt to repair the panel.
In other instances, hierarchical culture is deeply rooted at airlines in India, impacting the
way employees communicate safety issues and engage in SMS. According to Participant 9,
Indian society is very hierarchical, and this also describes the organizational structure at
its airlines. Employees will not bring stuff up different in opinion from their bosses,
fearing retaliation from their managers losing face. This includes making safety reports,
if the safety issue is due to their boss’s mismanagement. When employees do make
safety reports, they will have to report to this first line manager, who will go to his
manager, and so on. The hierarchical organizational structure results in slow resolutions
of problems and discourages employees from making safety reports.
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Summary. At airlines in China, Indonesia and India, investigating a safety incident to
determine root cause, performing close loop action, and developing strategies to prevent the
incident from reoccurring is still minimal. Airlines still believe that punishing employees is the
only way to prevent the same incident from reoccurring. Airlines struggle to encourage
employees to report issues and to follow safety protocols without using punishment and scare
tactics. As a result, employees are not empowered to engage in SMS because they fear
punishment and retaliation.
Summary of Knowledge, Motivation, and Organizational Influences’ Findings
The interview research found that senior airline leaders have the required knowledge and
motivation to foster a safety culture. Senior managers understand concepts and procedures of
safety, managing safety risks, and maintaining employee engagement. Senior managers have
confidence in themselves and expected to be rewarded for fostering a safety culture. On the
contrary, senior leaders did not have the required organizational setting and model to foster a
safety culture. Airline organizations did not provide senior leaders with adequate resources,
leading senior leader to make decisions that discouraged employees from engaging in SMS.
Employees did not communicate safety problems because organizations made minimal
investments in resources to address the issues they reported. Additionally, employees were not
empowered to engage in SMS because the reporting system was not just. Table 8 summarizes
the findings from each of the influences. The table establishes the asset or gap related to each
knowledge, motivation, and organizational finding. Identified gaps will form the basis for
recommendations in Chapter Five.
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Table 8
Breakdown of Influence Assets and Gaps
Influence Type Asset Gap
Senior managers need to understand the concepts
necessary to maintain employee engagement in
fostering a safety culture.
Knowledge
conceptual
X
Senior managers need to know how to manage safety
risks while maintaining employee engagement.
Knowledge
procedural
X
Senior managers need confidence in their abilities to
engage employees in fostering a safety culture.
Motivation
self-efficacy
X
Senior managers need confidence in their abilities to
make decisions when engaging employees in
fostering a safety culture.
Motivation
expectancy
X
The organization needs to provide the necessary
resources and tools to support senior managers in
maintaining employee engagement.
Organizational
settings
X
The organization needs to support an environment that
allows senior managers to empower employees’
engagement without fear of retribution.
Organizational
models
X
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Chapter Five: Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to explore the capacity of airline senior leaders operating
in Asia’s emerging markets to foster a safety culture. This analysis focuses on this leader’s
knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences regarding maintaining employee
engagement in SMS. Clark and Estes’ (2008) gap analysis framework was used to determine
whether leaders have the adequate knowledge, motivation and organizational support to foster a
safety culture. Three research questions guided this study:
1. What knowledge and motivation influences enable leaders to foster a safety culture?
2. What are the organizational settings and models available to leaders to prioritize and
foster a safety culture?
3. What is the recommended knowledge, motivation and organizational solutions to
fostering a safety culture?
This chapter focuses on research question three, discusses findings from the research, and
provides recommendations for consideration to mitigate the identified gaps in organizational
influences. This study did not identify gaps in the knowledge and motivation influences.
Discussion of Findings
This qualitative study obtained data from structured interviews. The interview protocol
can be found in Appendix A. Eleven former consultants of airlines operating in emerging
markets were interviewed. Participants have an average of 32 years of working experience in the
aviation industry and have experience providing consultant services to airlines in Indonesia,
China, or India. Eight male and three female former consultants were interviewed. Knowledge,
motivation, and organizational influences learned from the literature review were explored to
identify the degree to which airline’s senior managers can maintain employee engagement to
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foster a safety culture (Clark & Estes, 2008). To be coded as an asset or gap, a minimum of six
participants need to identify the asset or gap in the influence of leaders in fostering a safety
culture. The study identified two gaps, and the following three recommendations focus on gap
closure. The first gap identified was that senior managers lack necessary resources to maintain
employee engagement in fostering a safety culture. The second gap identified was that senior
managers do not have an environment that empowers employee engagement without fear of
retribution.
Discussion of Knowledge and Motivation Findings: Research Question 1
Research Question 1 focused on the knowledge and motivation that enable airline senior
leaders operating in Asia’s emerging markets to foster a safety culture. Successful leadership in
fostering a safety culture begins with a leader’s ability to conceptually understand safety
excellence, the company’s safety vulnerabilities and their role in articulating safety throughout
the organization (Lutchman et al., 2012). Procedural knowledge is understanding how to foster a
safety culture. A leader with procedural knowledge is able to establish clear safety expectations
and processes for the organization to follow (Lutchman et al., 2012). The first part of Research
Question 1 aims to uncover the level of competency airline senior managers have in
understanding concepts and procedures of safety, managing safety risks, and maintaining
employee engagement. This was to understand the competencies needed to foster a safety culture
identified in Table 2 (Chapter Two) and whether the senior leaders of airlines operating in
emerging markets possessed those competencies. Based on all interviews, airline senior leaders
have the required conceptual and procedural understanding of safety management to foster a
safety culture.
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The second part of Research Question 1 aims to uncover the level of motivation airline
senior managers have in fostering a safety culture. Leaders with a strong sense of self-efficacy
view challenges as tasks to overcome; they develop a more profound interest and a strong sense
of commitment in fostering a safety culture and recovering quickly from setbacks (Kelloway,
2017). Individuals can be motivated towards goals if they believe that there is a positive
correlation between efforts and performance, the outcome of a favorable performance will result
in a desirable reward (Kelloway, 2017). Based on all interviews, airline leaders have the required
motivation, self-efficacy and expectancy to maintain employee engagement in safety
management systems. Senior managers had confidence in themselves and expected to be
rewarded for fostering a safety culture.
Discussion of Organizational Findings: Research Question 2
Research Question 2 focused on organizational settings and models available to senior
managers to maintain employee engagement in fostering a safety culture. It is essential for
organizations to allocate resources consistent with the concerns being addressed (Zhao et al.,
2018). Also, to effectively foster a safety culture, organizations must create an environment
where employees can report safety concerns, near misses, and accidents without fear of reprisal.
A just and open reporting culture allows organizations to identify and address safety issues,
proactively preventing potential incidents (Van Rooij & Fine, 2018). The study explored
whether resources are available to airline senior managers, and if airlines organizations provided
an environment that is just and empowering, allowing senior managers to engage their
employees without fear of retribution. The findings identified gaps in both assumed
organizational influences.
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It was found through the interview research that airlines in emerging markets expanded
rapidly in a short period, leading to limited trained staff, tools and equipment to support their
operations. In other instances, to save costs, airlines made limited investment in maintaining
spare parts, tools and equipment, leading to employees using unapproved tools and performing
unsafe workarounds. Production pressure and time was another limited resource that influenced
senior managers to making decisions that compromised fostering a safety culture. Employees felt
discouraged to engage in SMS and communicate safety problems because there was little that
organizations did to address the issues they reported.
The interview research further found that airlines’ SMS are not just, and employees are
not empowered to engage. Airlines struggle to encourage employees to report safety issues, learn
from their mistakes, and to follow safety protocols without using punishment and scare tactics.
Employees are not empowered to engage in SMS because the reporting system was not just, and
employees feared punishment.
Research Question 3
Research Question 3 focused on the recommended knowledge, motivation and
organizational solutions for senior leaders to foster a safety culture. Gaps were identified in the
organizational influences. Recommendations for identified organizational gaps are provided for
consideration below.
Recommendation for Practice
Efforts for fostering a safety culture must be supported, resourced, and reinforced by
airline executives. It is important for airline executives to first understand that fostering a safety
culture requires long-term investment and commitment to drive effective organizational change
(Albrecht et al., 2018). This study informed three recommendations of practice for airlines
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executives to aid senior managers in being more impactful, when engaging employees in safety
management systems. The recommendations address organizational gaps found through
interviews conducted with 11 former consultants of airlines operating in emerging markets. The
first recommendation is for airline organizations to provide senior managers with resources such
as time, tools, equipment, and budget to train, incentivize and retain skilled employees.
Recommendation 2 is for airline organizations to allow a just and learning culture, where
employees feel supported and empowered to learn from their mistakes, rather than feeling
blamed. Recommendation 3 is for airline organizations to allow senior managers to collaborate
with other airline leaders on safety management lessons learned and best practices. Collaboration
allows for learning, sharing, and continuous improvement in creating robust and affordable
safety management systems. All three recommendations could be integrated into one
implementation plan, to provide a training program. Training programs aid senior managers in
identifying where and when to allocate resources, introduce a just and learning culture, and
continuously improving implementation of SMS. This study utilizes the new world Kirkpatrick
model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016) as the training framework for implementation and
evaluation.
Recommendation 1: Airlines Need to Provide Senior Managers With Resources Such As Time,
Tools, Equipment, and Budget to Train, Incentivize and Retain Skilled Employees
Leaders will need adequate support and authority from the organization to overcome
challenges in fostering a safety culture (Kelloway, 2017). With adequate resources, leaders can
provide employees with time, equipment, tools, and relevant training programs to execute safety
initiatives (Roughton et al., 2013). Proper software, tools and equipment prevent employees
from performing workarounds that result in safety risks. Training and learning aid employees in
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adapting to organizational change effectively and help leaders minimize cost associated with
team’s misalignment (Roughton et al., 2013). Rewards and recognition are positive
reinforcement that help incentivize employees in meeting organizational goals as well as retain
skilled employees (Kelloway, 2017). A training program is necessary to aid senior managers in
identifying where and when to allocate resource.
Participants were asked what recommendations they had for senior leaders to foster a
safety culture. Participants 10, 9, 7 and 4 advised organizations to invest and provide adequate
resources to senior managers so that they could execute safety initiatives, overcome challenges,
and maintain employee engagement. According to the participants, equipment and tools are
necessities for employees to work productivity and safely. For example, Participant 10 stated:
Unlike the airlines in Indonesia, Middle Eastern airlines invest in maintaining spare parts,
equipment and tools, reducing the likelihood of mechanics needing to perform
workarounds. The technical expertise, knowledge and skills of Indonesian airline
employees are not necessary lacking compared to Middle Eastern airline employees, but
when a part is determined to be faulty, Middle Eastern airlines mechanics have the proper
parts and tools available to put the aircraft back into service.
Participant 10 recommended airline organizations to minimize risks associated with employees
performing workarounds, by making proper investment in maintaining adequate spare parts,
tools, and equipment.
Employees engagement improves when they are aware and understand the safety
policies, understand leadership’s expectations of them, and how to implement safety practices.
Airlines investing in training, provides employees with awareness of regulator’s approved
practices and airline’s safety expectations. According to Participant 9,
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Workshops and training enhance the skills employees need to perform their work as well
as minimize errors generated by the lack of knowledge. Training is important because it
provides awareness and understanding of safety risks and how to identify, report, and
control them.
Participant 9 recommended airline organizations to invest in employee’s safety engagement by
providing training courses as well as allowing them time away from work to focus on safety
training, demonstrates the organization’s commitment to safety.
Employees are empowered to engage when they are rewarded or recognized for safe
behaviors and reporting incidents. Currently, airlines are focused on reacting to negative
outcomes: accidents that happen and employees who fail to follow the rules. For example,
Participant 7 recommended:
Leaders need to first determine incentives that motivates employees whether it is
additional paid time off, raises, bonuses or public recognition. Using positive
reinforcement to incentivize and thanking employees for acting correctly have shown to
increase employee’s engagement, motivation, and productivity. At an airline in
Singapore, known for high employee engagement in SMS, leaders publicly recognize
employees, providing gifts such as cash rewards. This is a way for leaders to inspire
employees to follow the behaviors that are being celebrated.
Participant 7 recommended airline organizations to invest in employee’s safety engagement by
providing positive reinforcement.
In the airline industry, where safety errors can be deadly, investing in retaining skilled
employees good is very crucial. Skilled airline technical employees reduce the likelihood of
safety incidents. For example, Participant 4 recommended, “At airlines in Indonesia, after
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employees are trained and certified on SMS, they would leave to higher paying opportunities at
airlines in the Middle East. Airlines need to focus on employee retention if they want stability in
safety engagement.” It is recommended that airline organizations invest in retaining skilled
employees to reduce disruptions in safety engagement.
Recommendation 2: Airlines Need to Allow for a Just and Learning Culture, Where
Employees Feel Supported and Empowered to Learn From Their Mistakes, Rather Than
Feeling Blamed
A just and learning culture encourages a process where mistakes do not result in
automatic punishment, but a process to determine the source of the error (Reason, 1997). A just
and learning culture relies on holding individuals accountable for their behaviors and
investigating the behavior that led to the error (Reason, 1997). If errors are generated due to atrisk behaviors, managers are to coach, provide training, and increase situational awareness to the
team (Reason, 1997). If there is an increase of error reporting, then managers are to consider
revisions in the process or SMS, allowing for safer products and services for customers, as well
as giving employees a sense of ownership in the process. The aim of a just and learning culture
is to eliminate both system risks and behavioral risks (Reason, 1997). A training program is
necessary to aid senior leaders in introducing a just and learning culture.
Participants were asked what recommendations they had for senior leaders to foster a
safety culture. Participants 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 advised organizations to allow for a just and
learning culture that empowers employees to report safety concerns, learn from their mistakes,
and without fear of reprisal. For instance, Participant 4 recommended:
From a human factor’s perspective, it’s important for leaders to understand the root cause
behind employees’ unsafe behavior and why they deviated from the process. Employees
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may have deviated from the process because there is an issue with the process itself, or
because employees lack training, tools, and other resources. Understanding and resolving
these underlying issues will ensure that employees are empowered to commit to safety.
Similarly, Participant 1 recommended:
Employees are empowered when they know the culture is just, that as an organization,
we can learn from our mistakes, and that the organization does not highlight their
incompetence. Employees are empowered to admitting that they made a mistake
knowing that they will not get punished as a result. Instead, they will receive proper
training, or can improve the process, and can take part in helping others prevent similar
mistakes. It is important to include employees in solving the problem versus putting
blame that they are the problem.
Ultimately, Participants 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 recommended airlines to incorporate a just and
learning culture because it reduces reluctance among employees in reporting mistakes, it focuses
on creating equitable relationships between employees and leadership that guarantee improved
safety and quality systems.
Recommendation 3: Allow for Continuous Improvement of SMS by Collaborating on Lessons
Learned and Best Practices. This Allows for Learning, Sharing, and Developing Robust and
Affordable Safety Management Systems
Collaboration allows airline senior managers to cooperate and therefore benefit from
each other’s experiences, trial-and-errors, and successes. This allows airline senior managers to
leverage the experience of other leaders in the industry, assisting them in building a robust SMS
that allows for high employee engagement. Shared experience, utilized as a tool, allows for
exploring leadership, learning from experiences, and understanding how leaders can develop
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going forward in a safe environment (Shelton et al., 2020). Information, which is useful for
employees who do not need help practicing in applying information, helps to reduce uncertainty
about how to achieve a performance goal (Clark & Estes, 2008). Knowledge sharing, sharing
experiences, and sharing insights help to improve the decision-making process and allows
leaders and organizations to develop strategies that are efficient (DeSisto et al., 2020). A training
program is necessary to aid senior leaders in continuously improve implementation of SMS.
Participants were asked what recommendations they had for senior leaders to foster a
safety culture. Participants 1, 3, 8, and 11 advised organizations to continue improving its SMS
by constantly evaluating the SMS and seeking feedback from regulators, OEM and other airline
operators. For instance, Participant 11 recommended, “Senior leaders need to expand their
exposure to safety. Leaders can get mentored and learn from OEM, regulators, and other airlines
on successful experiences. Data sharing is very important.” Similarly, Participant 8
recommended senior leaders to, “stay open minded and listen to the success stories and lessons
learned from other airlines.” More specifically, Participant 3 recommended:
Senior leaders at airlines from Indonesia can learn from senior managers at other airlines
in Southeast Asia such as Malaysia or Singapore. These other airlines in Southeast Asia
operate airplanes in a similar environment and culture. Senior managers at these airlines
are able to share relevant experience of SMS implementation, maintaining employee
engagement and fostering a safety culture.
Collaboration allows senior leader to share lessons learned, areas of opportunity to improve on,
and what they have done right to protect the organization’s brand, reputation, finances, and
people. Inexperienced leaders will be able to accept this shared learning and feel more
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comfortable understanding past success and failures and how they would need to lead in a
similar situation.
Measurement and Evaluation
All three recommendations could be integrated into one implementation plan, to provide
a training program. The new world Kirkpatrick model evaluates the effectiveness of training
programs through four levels of assessment: reaction, learning, behavior, and results
(Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). Starting with level four, desired training results that align
with organizational purpose are established. Level three focuses on behavioral changes of
participants based on completing the training. Level two focuses on the learning that participants
gained from the training. Lastly, level one focuses on participant’s reactions, to what degree they
found the training to be engaging and relevant (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). Figure 2
shows the new world Kirkpatrick model through four levels of assessment.
Figure 2
The New World Kirkpatrick Model
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Level 4: Results
The fourth level of the new world Kirkpatrick model focuses on the reason why training
is performed and evaluates the overall success of the training (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016).
Leading indicators, which are short-term observations and measurements, are utilized to suggest
critical behaviors are on track to positively impact the desired results of the training. Table 9
provides the outcomes, metrics, and methods to measure the results of training.
Table 9
Outcomes, Metrics and Methods
Outcome Metric(s) Method(s)
Airline maintains an
engaged engineering
and maintenance
workforce (internal
outcome).
Employees engagement scores Employee surveys
Airline operates safely
and is in compliance
with ICAO (internal
outcome).
Regulator’s audit rating/scores Regulator’s audit
Airline achieves positive
brand recognition
(external outcome).
Customer satisfaction scores Customer surveys
Airline maintains a
competitive advantage
(internal outcome).
Profitability compared to
competitor benchmarks
Financial results
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Level 3: Behavior
The third level of the new world Kirkpatrick model articulates the degree to which
training participants apply what they learned back to their jobs (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick,
2016). According to Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, behavior is the most important level and the
most disruptive to traditional training evaluation practices. The first desired behavior is airline
senior managers leading and educating department leaders on implementations of a just and
learning culture. The second desired behavior is airline SMS senior manager leading and
educating engineering department leaders on implementations of industry lessons learned and
best practices in fostering a safety culture. The third desired behavior is airline senior managers
providing employees with clear communication on safety updates, expectations, findings, and
training. Table 10 outlines critical behaviors airline senior leaders must be able to demonstrate to
foster a safety culture, and metrics, methods and timing to evaluate the critical behaviors.
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Table 10
Critical Behaviors, Metrics, Methods, and Timing for Evaluation for Airline Senior Managers
Critical behavior Metric(s) Method(s) Timing
Senior managers will
lead, educate and
implement a just and
learning culture.
Number of meetings
held relating to just
and learning
culture.
Recurring training with
assessment to identify
gaps in knowledge.
Quarterly
Senior managers
lead, educate and
implement industry
lessons learned and
best practices in
fostering a safety
culture.
Number of trainings
held relating to
industry lessons
learned and best
practices.
Senior leaders
participate in the
training and then
provide it to their
direct reports.
Quarterly
Senior managers will
provide employees
with resources such
as time, training,
tools, equipment
and incentives to
foster a safety
culture.
Number/amount of
resources
provided.
Recurring feedback
surveys from
employees.
Monthly
Required drivers are the systems and processes that reinforce, monitor, encourage, and
reward the performance of the Level 3 behavioral attributes through support or accountability
(Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). It will be important for other stakeholders, such as the
executive leadership, safety quality team, and facilitators to support senior leaders in being
successful at driving behavior changes. These additional stakeholders are critical to providing
the support, knowledge, and finances in allowing the recommendations to be implemented.
These stakeholders will also be critical in providing the motivation to implement these changes
as well as an understanding of the positive impact of implementing the changes. Table 11
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describes the motivation and organizational influences necessary for reinforcing, encouraging,
rewarding, and monitoring airline’s organizational outcomes.
Table 11
Required Drivers to Support Critical Behaviors of Airline Senior Managers
Method(s) Timing Critical behaviors supported
Safety quality team to provide a
reminder at the beginning of
each quarter to complete
training of employees
(reinforce).
Ongoing 1, 2
Facilitators/consultants to provide
senior managers coaching and
feedback on area to improve in
training (encourage).
Ongoing 1, 2, 3
Executive leaders provide public
recognition for senior leaders
who achieve goals of training,
educating, and meeting monthly
engagement scores (reward).
Ongoing 1, 2, 3
Safety quality team to monitor and
track progress of training
provided (monitor).
Ongoing 1, 2, 3
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Level 2: Learning
Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick’s (2016) Level 2 assesses how much participants have
acquired the intended knowledge, skills, attitude, confidence, and commitment as a result of the
training. Bloom’s Taxonomy applies a framework that conveys progressive steps from concrete
to abstract knowledge utilizing measurable verbs tied to learning objectives to demonstrate
learning (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001). The following learning goals explicitly state what the
learner must do to demonstrate learning of the implemented program:
1. Utilize a prioritization framework to determine which SMS needs are critical and
where to prioritize resources based on urgency, impact, and cost-effectiveness.
2. Encourage open dialogue and feedback with employees regarding SMS resource
needs, adequacy and potential adjustments.
3. Describe and discuss just and learning culture as it applies to an effective SMS.
4. Conduct analysis using just and learning culture to determine root cause.
5. Create an atmosphere of trust within the organization, where employees are.
encouraged to report safety issues.
6. Participate in shared experiences to help identify strengths and opportunities in SMS,
employee engagement in SMS and fostering a safety culture.
Program. To achieve the learning goals listed above, the recommended program will
deep dive into SMS resource management and just culture. The recommended program is
endorsed by airlines executives and is designed for airline senior leaders in engineering and
maintenance departments. The training is led by SMS experts, specializing in commercial
aviation. The training aligns with FAA and EASA provisions. The training requires four courses;
two courses relating to just and learning culture, and two courses relating to SMS resource
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management. Each course takes approximately three hours to complete and could be completed
virtually. The training includes case studies of SMS implementation, role playing exercise and
group discussions. During each course, there will be ample time for questions and answers with
the instructor along with teamwork breakout sessions with peers.
Evaluation of the Components of Learning. Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2016) share
the importance of evaluating Level 2 learning through a series of learning components:
declarative knowledge, procedure skill, attitude, confidence, and commitment. Table 12 provides
an overview of activity(ies) to achieve the key learning components along with the timing on
when this will be conducted or displayed the recommended training program.
Table 12
Evaluation of the Components of Learning for the Recommended Training Program
Method(s) or activity(ies) Timing
Knowledge check through discussions with
instructors (declarative knowledge).
Before, during and after training
Survey questions on understanding (declarative
knowledge).
After training is complete
Role plays and simulation with peers
(procedural skills).
After training
Discussion with peers and instructor (attitude). After training
Pre and post examinations on the level of
confidence (confidence).
During and after training
Sign letter of commitment to safety
(commitment).
After training
Application of commitment from learner
(commitment).
After training
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Level 1: Reaction
Level 1 reaction measures the reaction of learners to the training and the degree to which
learners found the training engaging, relevant, and favorable (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016).
Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick emphasize relevance to be the most critical reaction in Level 1
because it measures whether participants are able to apply the training to their everyday work.
Table 13 shares methods by which the learner’s Engagement, Relevance, and Customer
Satisfaction could be measured in relation to the training program. Table 14 shows the project
implementation timeline to close the gap identified and achieve the organizational goal.
Table 13
Components to Measure Reactions
Method(s) Timing
Attendance (engagement) Each session
Participation during training (engagement) Each session
Participant surveys to check if training content is still
applicable (relevance).
Mid and after program
Training and instructor evaluation (customer satisfaction) Mid and after program
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Table 14
Projected Implementation Plan Timeline
Method(s) Current performance Target performance Timing to achieve
target
Just and learning
culture building
10% 95% 12 months
Senior managers peer
training
20% 95% 12 months
Summary
This study proposed three recommendations for consideration to improve employee
engagement in fostering a safety culture. The recommendations were integrated to one
implementation and evaluation plan using the new world Kirkpatrick model. The model is
structured to identify the desired result and work backward through critical behaviors, learning,
and reactions, to achieve the desired result of training. The new world Kirkpatrick model is also
designed to have evaluation points at each level to identify the outcome of the training and the
progression of the participant. The new world Kirkpatrick model will support airline senior
leaders in maintaining employee engagement in SMS, continuously improve implementation of
SMS, and foster a safety culture.
Recommendation for Future Research
The limitation of this study creates opportunities for future research. One
recommendation for future research is to expand the target population to collect data for
additional findings. This study focused on 11 former airline consultants, future research could
include current airline consultants, former airline leaders as well as current airline leaders.
86
Another recommendation for future research is to examine the gaps of senior leaders in fostering
a safety culture for airlines in emerging markets, outside of Asia. This study also focused on
senior leaders as the stakeholder group; future research could include other stakeholders, such as
executive leadership. This study utilized Clark and Estes (2008) Gap Analysis as the framework.
One additional recommendation for future research is to utilize a different framework to study
the same problem of practice for additional recommendations.
Conclusion
Effective leadership in fostering a safety culture creates a competitive advantage for
airlines in strengthening investor’s confidence in the company and creating a sustainable
advancement for their businesses. Poor management of safety leads to risks such as aircraft
accidents, loss of revenue, lives and investment (ABL Aviation, 2023). Organizational support
of airline senior managers is crucial for maintaining employee engagement and fostering a safety
culture. The purpose of this study is to explore the capacity of airline senior leaders operating in
Asia’s emerging markets to foster a safety culture. This analysis focuses on this leader’s
knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences regarding maintaining employee
engagement in the SMS. Using the Clark and Estes (2008) gap analysis framework, assumed
knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences were studied and evaluated through a
literature review and participant interviews. Based on the findings and themes that emerged,
recommendations were proposed to close two organizational gaps: airlines not providing support
and resources, and airlines not providing an environment that empowers employees to engage
without fear of retribution. These gaps lead to lack of employee’s engagement and impact airline
senior leaders’ ability to foster a safety culture.
The new world Kirkpatrick model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016) was used as a
87
framework to develop an integrated training plan to implement three recommendations. The new
world Kirkpatrick model approach also facilitates the evaluation of outcomes from the training
to close the knowledge, motivation, and organizational gaps. Airlines that provide its senior
leaders with necessary support and resources will not only get the best out of its leaders in
engaging employees, but they will also maintain a culture of safety and quality.
88
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol
My name is Elaine Doan, and I am a doctorate student at USC. I am inviting you to
participate in a research study. Involvement in the study is voluntary. Please do not hesitate to
ask any questions that you may have about the research; I will be happy to explain anything in
greater detail. I am interested in learning more about the capacity of airline senior leaders in
managing safety risks, maintaining employee engagement in SMS and fostering a safety culture.
You will be asked 14 questions and this will take approximately 1 hour of your time. All
information will be kept anonymous and confidential. This means that your name will not appear
anywhere and no one except me will know about your specific answers. In any articles I write or
any presentations that I make, I will use a made-up name for you, and I will not reveal details or
I will change details and any personal information about you. The benefit of this research is that
you will be helping us understand the knowledge, motivation and organizational factors that
influence the ability of senior managers to foster a safety culture.
95
Table A1
Interview Protocols
Interview questions Potential probes RQ
addressed
Key concept
addressed
Share a little about
yourself, your
experience and former
consultant role.
— — —
Describe the safety culture
of the engineering and
maintenance
organization of airlines
in emerging markets.
Do employees feel comfortable
with reporting safety related
incidents?
How do employees report
safety related incidents?
How do employees take
corrective actions?
What is the discipline system?
Is the discipline system just?
Provide examples.
2 Organizational
setting, model
Why do leaders want to
foster a safety culture?
What motivate leaders to put
emphasis on safety?
1 Motivation
expectancy
Do senior leaders have an
understanding of safety,
SMS and safety
culture? Do leaders
know why a safety
culture should be
fostered?
Describe leader’s experience
with safety, SMS and safety
culture? Are leaders offered
safety training? Are leaders
aware of international safety
standards and requirements?
1 Knowledge
conceptual
Do leaders know how to
foster a safety culture?
What processes do
leaders use to foster a
safety culture?
How often are the safety
processes audited? Who does
the auditing?
What processes do leaders use
to communicate their safety
vision, values and
commitment to the team?
What is the frequency of
communication?
1 Knowledge
procedural
How do leaders ensure
that employees are
following safety
processes and
protocols? (How do
leaders assess and
ensure quality?)
Are there any feedback
systems?
Are there regular audits/quality
checks?
How detailed are the
audits/quality checks?
1 Knowledge
procedural
96
Interview questions Potential probes RQ
addressed
Key concept
addressed
What rewards do leaders
get from successfully
fostering a safety
culture?
What punishments do leaders
get from failing to foster a
safety culture?
1 Motivation
expectancy
Why/how do leaders
believe they can foster
a safety culture?
What type of help do they
receive?
How do leaders assess risks?
How do they mitigate risks?
1 Motivation
self-efficacy
Does the organization
provide/support an
environment that where
employees can engage
in SMS without
reprisal?
Is the SMS just? 2 Organizational
setting
Does the organization
provide their leaders
with adequate resources
such as training, time,
equipment, tools and
relevant programs to
execute?
What kind of resources are
provided? What resources do
employees lack?
2 Organizational
model
What do you view as
limitations or
challenges for leaders
in fostering a safety
culture?
1, 2 Knowledge,
motivation,
organizational
What factors do you feel
most influence leaders’
ability to foster a safety
culture?
Provide specific examples. 1, 2 Knowledge,
motivation,
organizational
What kind of support do
leaders receive from
their higher
organization to foster a
safety culture?
Provide specific examples. 2 Organizational
setting, model
What recommendations
do you have for senior
leaders to better foster a
safety culture?
Tell me more. 3 Knowledge,
motivation,
organizational
97
Conclusion to the Interview
This concludes the interview. Thank you for taking time out of your busy day to meet
with me. It was great getting to learn more about your industry experiences and the influences
that impact the ability of senior leaders to foster a safety culture. Your responses will remain
confidential, and you will only be identified in the study as a numbered participant. Please do not
hesitate to contact me with any additional questions.
98
Appendix B: USC IRB Approval Letter
99
Abstract (if available)
Abstract
Many airlines operating in today’s emerging markets are still struggling to manage safety risks and maintain employee engagement in safety management systems (SMS). The purpose of this study is to examine the capacity of airline senior leaders in managing safety risks, maintaining employee engagement in SMS and fostering a safety culture. This study focuses on knowledge, motivation and organizational factors that influence the ability of senior managers in fostering a safety culture. Clark and Estes’ (2008) gap analysis framework was used to determine whether senior leaders have adequate knowledge, motivation and organizational support to foster a safety culture. Qualitative interviews were utilized and 11 retired consultants of airlines in Asia’s emerging markets were interviewed. Participants have an average of 32 years of working experience in the aviation industry and have worked closely with airline senior leaders in China, Indonesia and India. A review of literature was conducted to connect past research. Themes emerging from the interviews were analyzed and linked to knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences that impact the ability of senior leaders in fostering a safety culture. Connections from interviews were utilized to answer the research questions of the study. The research aimed to provide recommendations for airlines to better aid senior leader in fostering a safety culture.
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Closing the safety gap for airlines in emerging markets using the gap analysis model
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Degree Conferral Date
2024-12
Publication Date
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