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Can ideologically relevant threat shift group-oriented values? Relevant threatening tweets cause Progressives to be as prejudiced as Conservatives
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Can ideologically relevant threat shift group-oriented values? Relevant threatening tweets cause Progressives to be as prejudiced as Conservatives
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Content
Can Ideologically Relevant Threat Shift Group-Oriented Values?
Relevant Threatening Tweets Cause Progressives to be as Prejudiced as Conservatives
by
Jackson Phillip Trager
A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC DORNSIFE COLLEGE OF LETTERS, ARTS, & SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(PSYCHOLOGY)
December 2023
Copyright 2023 Jackson Phillip Trager
Table of Contents
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Chapter One: Intro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Threat and Conservatism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Threat and Progressivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Politics and Prejudice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Current Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Chapter Two: Study 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Stimuli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Analytic Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Brief Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Chapter Three: Study 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Stimuli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
ii
Analytic Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Brief Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Chapter Four: Study 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Stimuli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Analytic Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Brief Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Chapter Five: General Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Future Studies and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Supplementary Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Additional Analyses, Tables, and Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Study 1 SM Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Study 2 SM Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Study 3 SM Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Study 1 Stimuli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Study 2 Stimuli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Study 3 Stimuli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
MFQ2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
iii
List of Tables
1 Output of four linear models showing the main effects of type of threat and
their interaction with conservatism predicting our various outcome variables
(listed along the top of table) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Output of five linear models showing the main effects of type of threatening
tweets and their interaction with conservatism, predicting our various outcome
variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Output of six linear models showing the main effects of type of real-world
event and their interaction with conservatism, predicting our various outcome
variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
S1 Output of six linear models showing the main effects of type of threatening
tweets and their interaction with conservatism, predicting the six moral foundations individually. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
iv
List of Figures
1 The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), perception of topic threat (yaxis), and type of threat condition (colored lines). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), perception of topic threat (yaxis), and type of threatening Tweet (colored lines). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3 The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), perception of ideological threat
(y-axis), and type of threatening Tweet (colored lines). . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4 The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), endorsement of outgroup
prejudice (EBEP) (y-axis), and type of threatening Tweet (colored lines). . . 16
5 The relationship between type of threatening Tweet (progressive or conservative) and endorsement of outgroup prejudice, moderated by level of conservatism, and mediated by perception of ideological threat. . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6 The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), perception of topic threat (yaxis), and type of real world threatening events (colored lines). . . . . . . . . 21
7 The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), perception of ideological threat
(y-axis), and type of real world threatening events (colored lines). . . . . . . 22
8 The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), endorsement of outgroup
prejudice (EBEP) (y-axis), and type of real world threatening events (colored lines). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9 The relationship between type of threatening real world event (progressive or
conservative) and the endorsement of outgroup prejudice, moderated by level
of conservatism, and mediated by perception of ideological threat. . . . . . . 24
S1 The relationship between type of threat (progressive or conservative) and
perception of topic threat, moderated by level of conservatism. . . . . . . . . 43
S2 The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), perception of topic threat (yaxis), and type of threatening Tweet with all four conditions (colored lines). 45
v
S3 The relationship between type of threatening Tweet (progressive or conservative) and perception of topic threat, moderated by level of conservatism. . . 45
S4 The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), perception of ideological threat
(y-axis), and type of threatening Tweet with all four conditions (colored lines). 46
S5 The relationship between type of threatening Tweet (progressive or conservative) and perception of ideological threat, moderated by level of conservatism. 46
S6 The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), endorsement of outgroup
prejudice (y-axis), and type of threatening Tweet with all four conditions
(colored lines). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
S7 The relationship between type of threatening Tweet (progressive or conservative) and endorsement of outgroup prejudice, moderated by level of conservatism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
S8 The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), endorsement of the binding
foundations (y-axis), and type of threatening Tweet with all four conditions
(colored lines). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
S9 The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), endorsement of the individualizing foundations (y-axis), and type of threatening Tweet with all four
conditions (colored lines). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
S10 The relationship between type of threatening real world event (progressive or
conservative) and perception of topic threat, moderated by level of conservatism. 49
S11 The relationship between type of threatening real world event (progressive
or conservative) and perception of ideological threat, moderated by level of
conservatism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
S12 The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), Affective Polarization(AP)
(y-axis), and type of real world threatening events (colored lines). . . . . . . 50
S13 The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), outgroup warmth (y-axis),
and type of real world threatening events (colored lines). . . . . . . . . . . . 51
vi
S14 The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), ingroup warmth (y-axis), and
type of real world threatening events (colored lines). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
S15 The relationship between type of threatening real world event (progressive or
conservative) and endorsement of outgroup prejudice, moderated by level of
conservatism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
S16 Below is the stimuli for a conservative oriented threat concerning abortion. . 57
S17 Below is the stimuli for a progressive oriented threat concerning abortion. . . 58
S18 Below is the stimuli for a conservative oriented threat concerning election
integrity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
S19 Below is the stimuli for a progressive oriented threat concerning election integrity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
S20 Below is the stimuli for a conservative oriented threat concerning immigration. 61
S21 Below is the stimuli for a progressive oriented threat concerning immigration. 62
S22 Below is the stimuli for a non-ideologically oriented threat of crop disease. . 63
S23 Below is the stimuli for a non-ideologically oriented threat of earthquake. . . 64
S24 Below is the stimuli for a non-ideologically oriented threat of emergency services. 65
S25 Below is the stimuli for a non-threatening control stimuli about pickleball. . 66
S26 Below is the stimuli for a non-threatening control stimuli about flowers. . . . 67
S27 Below is the stimuli for a non-threatening control stimuli about scooters. . . 68
vii
Abstract
How does ideologically relevant threat influence people from different political
ideologies? Prior work on political ideology, threat, and morality primarily focus on the
conservative-threat dynamic [e.g. motivated social cognition (Jost & Amodio, 2012)] but
less is known about the progressive-threat dynamic and how progressive moral concerns
can be influenced by threats progressives actually care about. Through multiple studies,
this project explores how exposing US Progressives and Conservatives to ideologically
relevant threats can differentially influence their moral concerns and out-group prejudice.
Our studies support the notion that Progressives and Conservatives are threatened by
different topics and show experimentally that exposure to these ideologically relevant
threats increase the endorsement of out-group prejudice. Preliminary results have
implications toward the moral underpinnings of polarization, the dangers of social media,
and provide novel evidence for how threat can be moderated by political ideology.
viii
Chapter One: Intro
A Liberal is a Conservative that hasnt been mugged yet. A Conservative is a
Liberal who got mugged the night before.
Frank Rizzo, Mayor of Philadelphia
Humans become more group-oriented when confronted with threat; our groups keep
us safe. On the positive side, exposure to a variety of threats is linked to an increase of
group behaviors in the form of charity donations (Zheng et al., 2021), protest behavior
(Eisinger, 1973), and voting in elections (Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014). On the negative
side, exposure and perception of threat have been shown to increase hate in the form of
outgroup hostility and prejudice including the acceptability of harassing online hate speech,
unequal treatment under the law, and violence (Bahns, 2017; Hoover et al., 2021; Obaidi
et al., 2018). This dynamic of threat leading to group-oriented values may serve as a
feedback loop in the increase of political polarization in the US (Brandt et al., 2021). The
more one becomes positively biased towards their ingroup and negatively biased towards
their outgroup in response to threat, the more likely they will behave in ways that threaten
their outgroup, and so the conflict spiral continues (Brandt & Bakker, 2022). A political
anxiety attack. The political-threat dynamic in the US has thus seen ample attention, with
recent important developments highlighting a more nuanced phenomena.
Threat and Conservatism
There is a rich literature linking the concept of threat to conservative ideology and
morality at the individual and societal level (Jost & Amodio, 2012). At the societal level,
the more salient threat is in an environment the more conservative people in that area tend
to be. For example, research has shown that the level of pathogen prevalence, or threat
from diseases, positively predicts the level of conservatism in that society (Tybur et al.,
2016; Van Leeuwen et al., 2012). Other objectively threatening circumstances such as
terrorist attacks, governmental warnings, and shifts in cultural demography have been
1
shown to contribute to significant conservative shifts in the relevant societies (Iyengar
et al., 2019). At the individual level, the higher one merely perceives certain societal
threats (e.g. the Belief in a Dangerous World Scale), whether the threat is real or not, the
more likely they are to be conservative (Jost & Amodio, 2012).
The relationship between threat and conservatism has been understood from a
model of political ideology known as Motivated Social Cognition (MSC)(Jost & Amodio,
2012) This theory suggests that chronically and temporarily activated needs to reduce
uncertainty, ambiguity, threat, and disgust are positively associated with conservatism (or
negatively associated with liberalism). The authors argue that Conservative’s higher
endorsement of group-oriented beliefs and behaviors (e.g. ingroup loyalty, authoritarianism,
and purity concerns) are strategies motivated to deal with the heightened perception of
uncertainty and threats.
The relationship between conservatism and group-centered beliefs have been
understood through the lens of Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) as the positive
correlation between conservatism and the so called binding foundations of loyalty,
authority and purity, aptly named for their role in binding groups together (Atari, 2021;
Choi et al., 2021; Graham et al., 2013; Van Leeuwen et al., 2014)1
. These binding moral
foundations have subsequently been linked experimentally and historically to outgroup
prejudice in the form of the endorsement of Extreme Behavioral Expressions of Prejudice
(EBEPs) (Hoover et al., 2021) and entire movements centered on group-based hate
(Kennedy et al., 2022). From the perspective of MSC, both the binding foundations and
the acceptance of prejudice toward outgroup members could serve as potential strategies to
help cope with high levels of threat. Taken together, groups under threat may benefit
psychologically and pragmatically from valuing loyalty, authority, purity, and the
acceptance of outgroup prejudice as they reduce uncertainty and anxiety.
1 This is mainly driven by Liberals having lower values instead of Conservatives having higher values.
Within Conservatives there is no prioritization of binding over individualizing
2
Threat and Progressivism
MFT, MSC, and other approaches to understanding the role of threat in political
ideology often do not pay equal attention to the dynamics of threat within progressive
ideology. This may give the wrong impression that all threats are the same and are
primarily linked to Conservatives. While conservative morality and ideology have
repeatedly been linked to the broad category of threat, recent research indicates
Progressives feel and are influenced by threat as well, just their own kind (Jost et al.,
2017). The rival parties in the United States2 were found to be fearful of different topics in
their societies. Conservatives in the US tended to report feeling threatened by the topics of
gun control, illegal immigration, and government corruption whereas Progressives tended
to report more fear of climate change, overpopulation, and restrictive healthcare access.
Given these different ideologically relevant threats, certain threats have been shown
to cause Progressives to become more conservative while others have had the opposite
effect, actually increasing progressivism in Progressives. In reference to the first point, a
review from Duckitt et al. (2010) shows that threat to society broadly increases the
conservative psychological constructs of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and Social
Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994), both of which have been shown to be
associated with the MFT binding foundations of loyalty, authority, and purity (Duckitt &
Sibley, 2009). Conversely, according to experimental studies run by Eadeh and Chang
(2019), priming progressive participants with the progressive oriented threats of restricted
healthcare access (i.e. abortion), pollution, and corporate misconduct, influenced them to
endorse more support for these same progressive oriented causes. As opposed to the
conservative shift hypothesis, these results support the extremity shift hypothesis in which
people affirm their beliefs when faced with threatening and unexpected events (Burke
et al., 2013; Jonas et al., 2014; Proulx et al., 2012; Randles et al., 2017). This work
2 Recent research shows that Progressives and Conservatives are threatened by different topics around the
world (Brandt et al., 2021)
3
suggests that Progressives and Conservatives are both influenced by threat and that while
threat may be more related to conservatism generally, Progressives are nonetheless
threatened and influenced by their own concerns.
Politics and Prejudice
Group-oriented values in politics can get ugly when it manifests as outgroup
prejudice, discrimination, and violence. These negative phenomena of hate have typically
been associated asymmetrically between political parties in the United States (Sibley &
Duckitt, 2008). The prejudice gap refers to how Conservatives tend to be more prejudiced
towards outgroup members than Progressives or how conservatism positively predicts
prejudice. This gap has been found in terms of Conservatives showing greater explicit and
implicit prejudice towards African Americans (Sears & Henry, 2003), Homosexuals
(Terrizzi Jr et al., 2010), Immigrants (Pettigrew et al., 1997), Arabs (Echebarria-Echabe &
Guede, 2007), and Muslims (Hoover et al., 2021). Similar to the myopic threat research
that pay little attention to progressive threats, much of the research on prejudice do not
test for groups that Progressives are less favorable of (i.e. conservative groups).
Progressives have been shown to hold negative sentiments about a various groups
associated with conservatism including Christian fundamentalists and business people
(Brandt et al., 2014). This animosity between people of different political parties has been
shown to be stronger than racial, religious, regional and linguistic social cleavages across
cultures (Westwood et al., 2018).
Pew, Gallup, ANES and other major public opinion institutions have measured
feelings Americans hold toward their political other overtime. Questions about warmth,
friendliness, willingness to have lunch, or approval of your children marrying across
political party lines have fluctuated over time, somewhat symmetrically between parties,
and have been increasing over the last decade (Iyengar et al., 2019). Why and how these
feelings of affective polarization in the US rise and fall is heavily debated.
4
Current Studies
This work conducts three main experimental studies exploring how exposing
American Progressives and Conservatives to ideologically relevant threats can differentially
influence their moral concerns and outgroup prejudice. We predict that (a) people perceive
higher threat against their ideological values and groups when exposed to ideologically
relevant threats and (b) people endorse more group-oriented values, including outgroup
prejudice, when exposed to ideologically relevant threats. Study 1 primed participants with
ideologically threatening vignettes and measured moral concerns using MFQ2. Study 2
used ideological threatening stimuli in the form of quote Tweets and measured participants’
group moral values and outgroup prejudice. Study 3 had participants reflect on real-world
ideologically threatening events and then measured their outgroup prejudice and affective
polarization.
5
Chapter Two: Study 1
Our first study examined whether Conservatives and Progressives were threatened
by different topics and whether exposure to these different topics influenced their perceived
ideological threat and moral values. We predicted that (a) ideologically relevant threats
will be more threatening than ideologically irrelevant threat, (b) exposure to ideologically
relevant threat will be positively associated with the perception of current ideological
threat, and (c) the endorsement of the group-oriented binding foundations.
Method
Participants
300 participants were sourced using Prolific surveys and balanced on political
ideology (150 Progressives and 150 Conservatives) and sex (50% female).
Stimuli
The stimuli were in the form of three news vignettes (conservative oriented
threatening news vignette, progressive oriented threatening news vignette, and a control
non-threatening news vignette) equal in length. The conservative oriented threatening
news vignette focused on topics such as gun control, illegal immigration, and government
corruption. The progressive oriented threatening news vignette included topics such as
climate change and restrictive healthcare access. The non-threatening control news
vignette had topics around technology in the food industry which were rated
non-threatening by both ideologies. See Study 1 Stimuli in the Supplementary Materials
for an overview of study materials.
Procedure
This study followed a between-subjects design where participants who varied in
ideology were exposed to one of our three stimuli. First, all participants answered
6
demographic questions including age, sex, and political ideology. Participants then read
one of the three randomly assigned news vignettes. Third, participants completed the
Moral Foundations Questionnaire 2 (Atari et al., 2022) and were asked a series of questions
about ideological threat.
Measures
All participants completed the 36-item Moral Foundations Questionnaire-2 (MFQ-2;
Atari et al., 2022), which consists of contextualized items that can gauge moral judgments
related to the six moral foundations (i.e., care, equality, proportionality, loyalty, authority,
and purity). Items are rated along a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Does not
describe me at all) to 5 (Describes me extremely well) for care, equality, proportionality,
loyalty, authority, and purity, respectively. The order of questions was randomized.
Political ideology was measured using a 7-point Likert scale of conservatism ranging from 1
(very progressive) to 7 (very conservative). Two aspects of ideological threat were
measured (1) Perception of threat in topics of the stimuli, which is measured with a single
item asking ”On a scale of 1-10, how threatening did you find the topics covered in the
news vignette you read?”, and (2) Ideological values threat perception which is measured
with a single item asking ”On a scale of 1-10, how much do you think your ideological
values (progressive or conservative) are currently under threat?”, matched to their self
reported ideology. See Supplementary Materials for full measures.
Analytic Strategy
We fitted 4 multiple-linear regression models to predict 4 dependent variables
(ideological topics threat, ideological threat perception, binding foundations, and
individualizing foundations) given our two independent variables (type of ideological threat
exposure and level of conservatism and their interaction). In order for our hypotheses to be
supported, the progressive threat condition should have a significant negative relationship
with conservatism (the more progressive, the more threatening and impactful this
7
condition is), the conservative threat should have a significant positive relationship with
conservatism (the more conservative, the more threatening and impactful this condition is),
and their interaction between these two conditions should be significant. All r code scripts
and data used for these analyses can be found at our OSF page.
Results
Our results showed that participants found ideologically relevant threatening
conditions significantly more threatening than the non-threatening condition. See Table 1
for an overview of all model results for our hypotheses.
Table 1
Output of four linear models showing the main effects of type of threat and their interaction
with conservatism predicting our various outcome variables (listed along the top of table)
1.Topic Threat 2.Ideological Threat 3.Binding 4.Indiv
1. Progressive Threat (PT) 9.06∗∗∗ 4.97∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ 4.22∗∗∗
2. Conservative Threat (CT) 0.52 3.66∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗ 4.08∗∗∗
3. NonThreat (NT) 1.60∗∗ 3.71∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 4.19∗∗∗
4. Conservatism −1.08∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗
5. NT:Conservatism 1.23∗∗∗ 0.11 −0.03 0.02
6. CT:Conservatism 2.11∗∗∗ 0.25 −0.01 0.02
R2 0.72 0.81 0.94 0.95
Adj. R2 0.72 0.80 0.94 0.95
Num. obs. 288 288 288 288
∗∗∗p < 0.001;
∗∗p < 0.01;
∗p < 0.05
Note: The top three rows are the intercepts for each condition at the 0-level of conservatism. The fourth
row represents the effect for conservatism on our reference condition of progressive threat. The fifth and
sixth lines represent the interactions of the other threat conditions and conservatism. Importantly, the
significant interaction of conservatism and the conservative compared to the progressive threat condition
(row 6; CT:Conservatism) indicates the distinct impacts of ideologically relevant threat.
Our first model found that participants rated topics significantly more threatening if
topics were aligned with their ideology, supporting our first hypothesis (see Figure 1).
After controlling for the main effects of conservatism and ideological threat condition, the
interaction between condition (conservative threat vs. progressive threat) and conservatism
was statistically significant, with a regression coefficient of 2.11 (SE = 0.17, p < 0.001),
indicating that the effect of conservatism on the perception of topic threat differed
significantly between conservative and progressive threat (see Figure S1). This suggests
8
that the effect of type of threat on perception of topic threat is moderated by the level of
conservatism, such that the relationship between exposure to threat and perception of
threat in the topics is stronger for topics that match the participants ideology.
Figure 1
The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), perception of topic threat (y-axis), and
type of threat condition (colored lines).
Note: The effect of conservatism on perception of topic threat is B = -1.08 in the progressive threat
condition, B = 1.03 in the conservative threat condition, and B = 0.15 in the control non-threat condition.
Shaded areas around the lines represent the 95-percent confidence interval (+/- 1.96 Standard Error)
Our second model found no significant difference in the level of perceived ideological
threat from exposure to ideological relevant threat, failing to find support for our second
hypothesis. After controlling for the main effects of conservatism and ideological threat
condition, the interaction between condition (conservative threat vs. progressive threat)
and conservatism was not statistically significant, with a regression coefficient of 0.25 (SE
= 0.19, p = 0.197). This indicates that the effect of conservatism on the perception of
ideological threat did not differ significantly between the conditions of conservative threat
and progressive threat.
Our third and fourth model found no significant difference in moral foundational
endorsements in respect to conservatism and ideological threat condition, failing to support
9
our third hypothesis. After controlling for the main effects of conservatism and ideological
threat condition, the interaction between condition (conservative threat vs. progressive
threat) and conservatism was not statistically significant, with a regression coefficient of
-0.01 (SE = 0.04, p = 0.812) for binding and 0.02 (SE = 0.05, p = 0.682) for
individualizing. This indicates that the effect of conservatism on the binding and
individualizing foundations did not differ significantly between the conditions of
conservative and progressive threat.
Brief Discussion
Our results suggest that while participants found the topics relevant to their
ideology more threatening, exposure to fake threatening news vignettes did not significantly
affect the feelings of ideological threat or the endorsement of group moral values. There are
many possible reasons for these results. We hypothesize that two potential explanations
include the anomalous nature of our stimuli and the rigidity of the group oriented values as
operationalized by MFT. We aimed to address these shortcomings in Study 2.
10
Chapter Three: Study 2
Our second study asked whether exposure to ideologically relevant threats in the
form of morally outraged Tweets about threatening news stories influenced a participants
ideological threat perception, group moral values, and outgroup prejudice. This study
addresses study 1’s shortcomings by creating more naturalistic stimuli in the form of
morally outraged Tweets and by including outgroup prejudice as a group moral value that
may be more susceptible to the influence of ideological threat. We predicted that (1)
ideologically relevant threatening Tweets will be perceived more threatening than
non-relevant Tweets, (2) will be positively associated with the perception of ideological
threat, (3) the endorsement of the outgroup prejudice, and (4) the endorsement of the
binding foundations.
Method
Participants
400 participants were gathered using Prolific surveys and balanced on ideology (200
Progressives and 200 Conservatives) and sex (50% female).
Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of four sets of quote Tweets commenting on fictional Pew news
reports made to look as if they were originally posted by @pewresearch; (1) Conservative
oriented threatening Tweets, (2) Progressive oriented threatening Tweets, (3) non-political
threatening Tweets, (4) non-threatening Tweets. We included non-political threat in study
2 to test whether geenral threat had an influence disctinct from ideological threat. Each set
consisted of three quote Tweets commenting on three fictional Pew News Report Tweets
with stock images and anonymized accounts of the quote Tweet commenter (e.g. name and
image hidden). To minimize mismatches between types of threat (e.g. climate change vs
gun control have more fundamental differences beyond mere ideological perspectives), the
11
Conservative and Progressive sets consisted of the three topics that are threatening to both
ideological groups; (A) abortion, (B) immigration, and (C) voter-fraud, framed from their
respective perspectives (e.g. pro-choice vs anti-abortion). The non-political threatening
Tweet set included three non-political news reports on the existential threat of natural
disasters3 The non-threatening Tweet set included non-threatening non-political news
reports on trends (e.g. electric scooters and pickleball)(See Supplementary Materials for
full list of stimuli).
Procedure
This study followed a between-subjects design where participants who varied in
ideology were randomly exposed to one of our four sets of quote Tweets. To start, all
participants answered demographic questions including age, sex, and political ideology.
Participants were then instructed to read through one of the four sets of quote Tweets,
reflect for a few moments, and then briefly comment in writing on how the Tweets made
them feel. Thirdly, participants completed the remainder of our dependent variable
measurements including ideological threat perception, outgroup prejudice, moral values,
and topic threat.
Measures
MFQ-2, political ideology, and ideological threat were all measured in the same
manner as study 1. Outgroup prejudice was measured by using the Extreme Behavioral
Expressions of Prejudice Scale (EBEPS) Hoover et al., 2021, which measures endorsement
of various acts of extreme prejudice toward outgroup members. We adapted this scale to
represent conservatives/progressives as the respective outgroup members (i.e. conservatives
were asked about prejudice acts towards progressives, and vice versa). Full measures are
listed in the Supplementary Materials.
3 Note. Climate change related natural disasters were avoided to minimize politicization.
12
Analytic Strategy
We fitted 5 multiple-linear regression models to predict our 5 dependent variables
(topics threat, ideological threat perception, outgroup prejudice, binding foundations,
individualizing foundations) given our two independent variables (type of ideological threat
exposure and level of conservatism), and most importantly their interaction (See Table 2).
In order for our hypotheses to be supported, the progressive threat condition should have a
significant negative relationship with conservatism (the more progressive, the more
threatening and impactful this condition is), the conservative threat should have a
significant positive relationship with conservatism (the more conservative, the more
threatening and impactful this condition is), and the interaction between conservatism and
these two conditions should be significant. We also ran multiple mediation models to
analyze variable interactions. All r code scripts and data used for these analyses can be
found at our OSF page.
Results
Table 2
Output of five linear models showing the main effects of type of threatening tweets and their
interaction with conservatism, predicting our various outcome variables
1.Topic Threat 2.Ideological Threat 3.EBEP 4.Binding 5.Indiv
Progressive Threat (PT) 7.21∗∗∗ 6.18∗∗∗ 2.41∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 4.19∗∗∗
Non-Threat (NT) 0.62 3.18∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗ 1.71∗∗∗ 4.12∗∗∗
Conservative Threat (CT) 2.25∗∗∗ 3.18∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗ 3.92∗∗∗
Non-political Threat (NPT) 5.92∗∗∗ 5.74∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 4.02∗∗∗
Conservatism −0.55∗∗∗ 0.22 −0.08∗ 0.41∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗
NT:Conservatism 0.61∗∗∗ 0.27 0.17∗∗ −0.10∗ −0.01
CT:Conservatism 1.03∗∗∗ 0.39∗ 0.18∗∗∗ −0.06 0.02
NPT:Conservatism 0.28 −0.02 0.12∗ −0.15∗∗∗ −0.01
R2 0.73 0.84 0.85 0.95 0.96
Adj. R2 0.72 0.84 0.85 0.95 0.96
Num. obs. 406 406 406 406 406
∗∗∗p < 0.001;
∗∗p < 0.01;
∗p < 0.05
Note: The top four rows are the intercepts for each condition at the 0-level of conservatism. The fifth row
represents the effect for conservatism on our reference condition of progressive threat. The sixth, seventh,
and eighth row represent the interactions of the other conditions and conservatism. Most important is to
focus on the significant interactions on line seven (CT:Conservatism) which represents the different effects
conservatism has between the progressive and conservative conditions.
13
Our first model found that participants rated topics significantly more threatening if
they were threats that were aligned with their ideology, supporting our first hypothesis and
replicating the results from Study 1 (See Figure 2). Furthermore, the interaction between
threat condition (conservative vs. progressive) and conservatism was statistically
significant, with a regression coefficient of 1.03 (SE = 0.16, p < 0.001). This indicates that
conservative and progressive topics differentially threaten Conservatives and Progressives
(See Figure S3).
Figure 2
The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), perception of topic threat (y-axis), and
type of threatening Tweet (colored lines).
Note: The effect of conservatism on perception of topic threat is B = -0.55 in the progressive condition
and B = 0.48 in the conservative condition. Shaded areas around the lines represent the 95-percent
confidence interval (+/- 1.96 Standard Error)
Our second model found that participants rated that their ideological values were
currently significantly more under threat if they were exposed to threats that were aligned
with their ideology, supporting our second hypothesis and differing from the results of
study 1 (See Figure 3). After controlling for the main effects of conservatism and
ideological threat condition, the interaction between condition (conservative threat vs.
14
progressive threat) and conservatism was statistically significant, with a regression
coefficient of 0.39 (SE = 0.16, p = 0.018), indicating that the effect of conservatism on the
perception of ideological value threat differed significantly between conservative and
progressive threat (See Figure S5).
Figure 3
The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), perception of ideological threat (y-axis),
and type of threatening Tweet (colored lines).
Note: The effect of conservatism on perception of ideological threat is B = 0.22 in the progressive
condition and B = 0.60 in the conservative condition. Shaded areas around the lines represent the
95-percent confidence interval (+/- 1.96 Standard Error).
Our third model found that participants endorsed more outgroup prejudice if they
were exposed to threats that were aligned with their ideology, supporting our third
hypothesis (See Figure 4). After controlling for the main effects of conservatism and
ideological threat condition, the interaction between condition (conservative threat vs.
progressive threat) and conservatism was statistically significant, with a regression
coefficient of 0.18 (SE = 0.05, p < 0.001), indicating that the effect of conservatism on the
endorsement of outgroup prejudice differed significantly between conservative and
progressive threat (See Figure S7).
Our fourth and fifth model found no significance for moral foundational
15
Figure 4
The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), endorsement of outgroup prejudice
(EBEP) (y-axis), and type of threatening Tweet (colored lines).
Note: The effect of conservatism on the endorsement of outgroup prejudice is B = -0.08 in the progressive
condition and B = 0.10 in the conservative condition. Shaded areas around the lines represent the
95-percent confidence interval (+/- 1.96 Standard Error).
endorsements in respect to conservatism and ideological threat condition, which does not
support our fourth and fifth hypotheses. After controlling for the main effects of
conservatism and ideological threat condition, the interaction between condition
(conservative threat vs. progressive threat) and conservatism was not statistically
significant, with a regression coefficient of 0.06 (SE = 0.04, p = 0.105) for binding and 0.02
(SE = 0.04, p = 0.710) for individualizing. This indicates that the effect of conservatism on
the binding and individualizing foundations did not differ significantly between the
conditions of conservative and progressive threat.
In exploratory analysis, we assessed whether conservatism moderates the indirect
effect of type of threat on outgroup prejudice through perceived ideological value threat, by
conducting a moderated mediation analysis (Muller et al., 2005). This analysis first
revealed that conservatism moderates the effect of the threat condition on endorsement of
outgroup prejudice, t(200) = 2.47, p = .014. It also revealed that the effect of perceived
16
ideological threat for a mean level of conservatism, while controlling for both the effect of
the threat condition and for the moderation of the condition by conservatism, still
significantly predicted outgroup prejudice, t(198) = 2.20, p = .029. This pattern reveals
the existence of a moderated mediation. We also computed the first stage moderated
mediation index consistent with our joint-significant analysis and it confirmed the
moderated mediation, 0.0516, CI 95% [0.00141; 0.127] (Monte Carlo simulation, 5000
simulations; Yzerbyt et al., 2018). In a sixth model we included the perception of
ideological threat into model 3 which eliminated the previously observed direct effect (from
p < .001 to p = 0.082), again showing full moderated mediation (See Figure 5).
Figure 5
The relationship between type of threatening Tweet (progressive or conservative) and
endorsement of outgroup prejudice, moderated by level of conservatism, and mediated by
perception of ideological threat.
Brief Discussion
Study 2 showed that exposure to ideologically relevant threatening Tweets led to
higher perception of ideological threat, which in turn led to greater endorsement of of
outgroup prejudice. Other aspects of group oriented morality as operationalized by the
binding foundations of MFT continued to be non-significantly influenced by the exposure
to ideological threat.
17
Chapter Four: Study 3
Our third study asked whether reflecting on real-world examples of ideologically
threatening events influences ideological threat perception, group values and outgroup
prejudice. This study addresses study 2’s shortcomings by using real-world events that go
beyond Tweets of fictional news stories, includes 2 new stimuli categories that evoke
political identity but are non-threatening, and includes warmth as a measure of affective
polarization which is a more common tool to assess fluctuating group psychology (Iyengar
et al., 2019) (as opposed to MFQ-2). We predicted that (1) ideologically relevant
threatening events will be perceived more threatening than non-relevant events, (2)
reflecting on ideologically relevant threatening events will be positively associated with the
perception of ideological threat, (3) the endorsement of the outgroup prejudice, and (4)
affective polarization.
Method
Participants
600 participants were gathered using Prolific surveys and balanced on ideology (300
Progressives and 300 Conservatives) and along sex (50% female).
Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of 6 vignettes about real-world events that varied in their level
and type of ideological threat (1) events that threatened conservative ideology (e.g. Dylan
Mulvaney Bud Light Campaign) (2) events that threatened progressive ideology (e.g.
overturning of Roe v Wade), and for controls (3) events that were threatening but not
politically leaning (e.g. rising cancer rates) (4) events that were not threatening (e.g.
scientific discoveries) (5) events that prime Conservatives as a group but are not
threatening (e.g. conservative caucus tours the White House) and (6) events that prime
Progressives as a group but are not threatening (e.g. progressive caucus tours the White
18
House). Each vignette covered three real-world events related to its framing. The
categories of stimuli are the same as study 2 with the addition of vignette 5 and 6 which
are meant to prime political group identity without ideological threat. (See Supplementary
Materials for study 3 stimuli)
Procedure
This study followed a between-subjects design where participants who varied in
ideology were exposed to one of our six vignettes. To start, participants were given one of
the six vignettes and asked to take a few minutes to reflect and write a few sentences on
how they felt during these events. Thirdly, participants completed the remainder of our
dependent variable measurements including ideological threat perception, outgroup
prejudice, warmth towards political groups, and topic threat. Participants then answered
basic demographic questions including age, sex, and political ideology.
Measures
EBEPS, political ideology, and ideological threat were all measured in the same
manner as study 2. Warmth towards both political groups were measured with a classic
feeling thermometer. Full measures are listed in the Supplementary Materials.
Analytic Strategy
We conducted 4 multiple-linear regression models to predict our 4 dependent
variables (topics threat, ideological threat perception, outgroup prejudice, affective
polarization) given our two independent variables (type of ideological threat exposure and
level of conservatism), and most importantly their interactions. In order for our hypotheses
to be supported, the progressive threat condition should have a significant negative
relationship with conservatism (the more progressive, the more threatening and impactful
this condition is), the conservative threat should have a significant positive relationship
with conservatism (the more conservative, the more threatening and impactful this
19
condition is), and their interaction between these two conditions should be significant. We
also conducted 2 additional multiple-linear regression models of exploratory analysis
predicting warmth towards ingroup and outgroup (See Table 3). Additionally, we ran
multiple mediation models to analyze variable interactions. All r code scripts and data
used for these analyses can be found at our OSF page.
Results
Table 3
Output of six linear models showing the main effects of type of real-world event and their
interaction with conservatism, predicting our various outcome variables
1.Topic Threat 2.Ideological Threat 3.EBEP 4.AP 5.Ingroup 6.Outgroup
Progressive Threat 104.53∗∗∗ 87.51∗∗∗ 2.82∗∗∗ 69.81∗∗∗ 76.07∗∗∗ 11.08∗
Conservative Threat 7.35 47.75∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗ 59.22∗∗∗ 68.28∗∗∗ 7.37
Conservative Non-Threat 39.02∗∗∗ 68.40∗∗∗ 2.39∗∗∗ 62.18∗∗∗ 66.88∗∗∗ 12.47∗∗
Progressive Non-Threat 1.32 53.17∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗ 54.55∗∗∗ 64.69∗∗∗ 12.18∗∗
Non-Political Threat 70.66∗∗∗ 65.64∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗ 58.86∗∗∗ 71.47∗∗∗ 13.60∗∗
Non-Threat 4.54 63.77∗∗∗ 2.08∗∗∗ 68.26∗∗∗ 71.10∗∗∗ 4.62
Conservatism −11.16∗∗∗ −2.74∗ −0.08∗ −3.84∗∗ −0.68 2.28∗
CT:Conservatism 20.82∗∗∗ 7.51∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 2.59 1.97 0.56
CNT:Conservatism 7.43∗∗∗ 3.42 0.08 2.44 1.75 −0.51
PNT:Conservatism 17.93∗∗∗ 5.52∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 1.50 1.98 1.63
NPT:Conservatism 11.58∗∗∗ 3.50∗ 0.17∗∗ 1.46 0.62 0.12
NT:Conservatism 15.13∗∗∗ 2.10 0.09 −2.78 0.46 4.21∗∗
R2 0.79 0.85 0.87 0.73 0.92 0.56
Adj. R2 0.79 0.85 0.87 0.72 0.92 0.55
Num. obs. 576 576 576 487 576 576
∗∗∗p < 0.001;
∗∗p < 0.01;
∗p < 0.05
Note. The top six rows are the intercepts for each condition at the 0-level of conservatism. The seventh
row represents the effect for conservatism on our reference condition of progressive threat. The eighth
through twelfth row represent the interactions of the other conditions and conservatism. Most important is
to focus on the significant interactions on line 8 (CT:Conservatism) which represents the different effects
conservatism has between the progressive and conservative conditions.
Our first model found that participants rated topics significantly more threatening if
they were threats that were aligned with their ideology, supporting our first hypothesis and
replicating the results from study 1 and 2 (See Figure 6). After controlling for the main
effects of conservatism and ideological threat condition, the interaction between condition
(conservative threat vs. progressive threat) and conservatism was statistically significant,
with a regression coefficient of 20.82 (SE = 1.504, p < 0.001), indicating that the effect of
20
conservatism on the perception of topic threat differed significantly between conservative
and progressive threat (See Figure S10).
Figure 6
The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), perception of topic threat (y-axis), and
type of real world threatening events (colored lines).
Note: The effect of conservatism on perception of topic threat is B = -11.16 in the progressive condition
and B = 9.66 in the conservative condition. Shaded areas around the lines represent the 95-percent
confidence interval (+/- 1.96 Standard Error).
Our second model found that participants rated that their ideological values were
currently under threat significantly more if they were exposed to threats that were aligned
with their ideology, supporting our second hypothesis and replicating the results of study 2
(See Figure 7). After controlling for the main effects of conservatism and ideological threat
condition, the interaction between condition (conservative threat vs. progressive threat)
and conservatism was statistically significant, with a regression coefficient of 7.51 (SE =
1.704 , p < 0.001), indicating that the effect of conservatism on the perception of
ideological value threat differed significantly between conservative and progressive threat.
(See Figure S11). This suggests that the effect of type of threat on perception of ideological
threat is moderated by the level of conservatism, such that the relationship between
exposure to threat and perception of ideological value threat, is stronger for topics that
21
match the participants ideology, in particular for very progressive participants (See left side
of Figure 7).
Figure 7
The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), perception of ideological threat (y-axis),
and type of real world threatening events (colored lines).
Note: The effect of conservatism on perception of ideological threat is B = -2.74 in the progressive
condition and B = 4.77 in the conservative condition. Shaded areas around the lines represent the
95-percent confidence interval (+/- 1.96 Standard Error).
Our third model found that participants endorsed more extreme expressions of
outgroup prejudice if they were exposed to threats that were aligned with their ideology,
supporting our third hypothesis (See Figure 8). After controlling for the main effects of
conservatism and ideological threat condition, the interaction between condition
(conservative threat vs. progressive threat) and conservatism was statistically significant,
with a regression coefficient of 0.19 (SE = 0.051, p < 0.001), indicating that the effect of
conservatism on the endorsement of outgroup prejudice differed significantly between
conservative and progressive threat (See Figure S15). This suggests that the effect of type
of threat on outgroup prejudice is moderated by the level of conservatism, such that the
relationship between exposure to threat and the endorsement of outgroup prejudice is
stronger for topics that match the participants ideology, in particular for progressives. Our
22
control conditions showed that exposure to non-political threat and progressive non-threat
also had significant interactions with conservatism in relation to our reference condition of
progressive threat. This matches previous research on the conservative relationship with
mortality threat and may point to how seemingly mundane political behavior may be seen
as threatening to conservatives.
Figure 8
The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), endorsement of outgroup prejudice
(EBEP) (y-axis), and type of real world threatening events (colored lines).
Note: The effect of conservatism on the endorsement of outgroup prejudice is B = -0.08 in the progressive
condition and B = 0.11 in the conservative condition. Shaded areas around the lines represent the
95-percent confidence interval (+/- 1.96 Standard Error).
Our fourth model, found that progressives had higher affective polarization overall,
but that AP did not differ between conditions depending on conservatism. After
controlling for the main effects of condition and conservatism, the interaction between type
of real world threatening event (conservative threat vs. progressive threat) and
conservatism was not statistically significant with a regression coefficient of 2.59 (SE =
2.02, p = 0.201). This indicates that the effect of conservatism on affective polarization did
not differ significantly between the conditions of conservative and progressive threat.
In exploratory analysis we ran two additional models predicting warmth towards
23
ingroup and warmth towards outgroup. We found a main effect for warmth towards
outgroup in which the more conservative you were, the warmer you felt towards your
outgroup, but no interaction effects (see Figure S13). There were also no significant effects
for warmth towards ingroup (See Figure S14).
Additional exploratory analysis assessed whether conservatism moderates the
indirect effect of type of threat on outgroup prejudice through perceived ideological threat,
by conducting a moderated mediation analysis (Muller et al., 2005). This analysis first
revealed that conservatism moderates the effect of condition on endorsement of outgroup
prejudice, t(202) = 4.45, p < .001. It also revealed that the effect of perceived ideological
value threat for a mean level of conservatism, and controlling for both the effect of the
threat condition and for the moderation of the condition by conservatism, still significantly
predicted outgroup prejudice, t(200) = 6.62, p < .001. This pattern reveals the existence of
a moderated mediation. We also computed the first stage moderated mediation index
consistent with our joint-significant analysis and it confirmed the moderated mediation,
0.251, CI 95% [0.129; 0.388] (Monte Carlo simulation, 5000 simulations; Yzerbyt et al.,
2018). In a sixth model we included the perception of ideological threat into model 3 which
eliminated the previously observed direct effect (from p < .001 to p = 0.002), again
showing partial moderated mediation (See Figure 9).
Figure 9
The relationship between type of threatening real world event (progressive or conservative)
and the endorsement of outgroup prejudice, moderated by level of conservatism, and
mediated by perception of ideological threat.
24
Brief Discussion
Study 3 showed that reflecting on ideologically threatening real world events led to
higher perception of ideological threat, which in turn led to greater endorsement of of
outgroup prejudice. Affective polarization had a mixed influence via the exposure to
ideological threat.
25
Chapter Five: General Discussion
You come for our reproductive rights, we come for your head.
Olivia Juliana, Texan Progressive Activist
More threat does not necessarily mean more conservative. Our results run counter
to our opening epigraph from Frank Rizzo and the traditional correlation between threat
and conservatism, showing that Progressives can essentially become more anti-conservative
from exposure to ideologically relevant threats on Twitter and in the real world. This
provides experimental evidence for Brandt’s work which has shown that the relationship
between threat and partisanship is not direct and is mediated by ideology and type of
threat (Brandt & Bakker, 2022).
More conservative does not necessarily mean more prejudice. Our results run
counter to the traditional understanding of the prejudice gap, showing that reading
relevant threatening Tweets and reflecting on real-world ideologically threatening events
can cause Progressives to be as prejudiced as Conservatives, in respect to out-group
political prejudice. This provides further experimental evidence for Chamber’s Value
Conflict Hypotheses which emphasizes the importance of political ideology when it comes
to prejudice, and provides a potential mechanism for shifts in ideological prejudice -
relevant ideological threat (Chambers et al., 2013). While there is still a large prejudice
gap in terms of Conservative’s higher prejudice towards many minority groups, Chamber’s
and Brandt’s work argue this may also be influenced by the perceived political ideology of
these groups.
These findings have implications for social media sites like Twitter, where (a) the
majority of people get their news (Tandoc Jr & Johnson, 2016), (b) the content is very
political (Bestvater et al., 2022), (c) toxic negativity spreads like wildfire (Brady et al.,
2017), and (d) and partisan outgroup animosity posts spread particularly well (Rathje
et al., 2021). News reports famously use titles with doomsday threats aimed at the
26
ideology of their audience to attract attention and clicks. They often commemorate the
anniversaries of ideologically threatening events, in the spirit of ”never again”. Social media
posts that express moral outrage have been shown to spread faster and further and can
create threatening online ideological echo chambers (Conover et al., 2011). Thus, places
like Twitter have the potential to become ideological threat exposure machines, which
given our results, may lead to increased outgroup ideological prejudice, and contribute to
US political polarization.
Partisan animosity is worth our attention. While affective polarization may lead to
more political participation (Groenendyk & Banks, 2014) this may in truth be unhealthy
participation that threatens democracy (Huddy et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2023). Affective
polarization has been shown to undermine citizens support for key democratic norms, such
as electoral accountability (Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018; Iyengar et al., 2019), legislative
bipartisanship (Finkel et al., 2020), and support for checks and balance (Kingzette et al.,
2021). Those with high affective polarization are less likely to support equal rights for
opposing partisans, including their right to speak freely, vote, or protest resulting in
political intolerance that degrades the democratic process (Kingzette et al., 2021).
Future Studies and Limitations
Given our results, we encourage future studies to explore relevant research on topics
including ideological threat beyond US politics, intersectional political prejudice,
progressive oriented group morality, and various avenues to test for the underlying
mechanisms responsible for the relationship between ideological threat and prejudice.
While our project focused on group prejudice and ideological threat in relation to
the political climate in the United States between Conservatives and Progressives, it is
possible that this relevant ideological threat - outgroup prejudice dynamic can potentially
play a role in ideological conflicts beyond US politics. Previous research has shown that
across multiple nations (United Kingdom, Spain, and Belgium) partisan animosity between
27
conservatives and liberals is the ”tie that divides”, showing that partisan animosity is
stronger than racial, religious, regional and linguistic social cleavages (Westwood et al.,
2018). Future work should explore how opposing groups in various ideological conflicts
conceptualize their ideological threats and then measure the relationship those threats have
with outgroup prejudice. Potential directions could look at violent state conflicts such as
Israel-Palestine or the Northern Irish Conflict, other within culture conflicts such as race in
the US, or apply our framework to conflicts in online communities (e.g. between Reddit
communities see Osborne et al 2023).
There is literature criticizing the straightforward methods of studying political
outgroup prejudice by asking about feelings towards members of different political groups
(Kane et al., 2021). The criticism focuses on the categorical error participants make when
they envision members of political parties. While researchers assume that participants
conceptualize outgroup political members by their policy positions, in reality, participants
use generally accurate yet exaggerated stereotypes when envisioning members of the
opposite political party. Progressive participants believed that Conservatives were old, rich,
evangelical Christians while conservative participants reported that Progressives were
young, urban, minorities - when in reality the modal members of both parties are white,
non-evangelical Christians. Conservatives believed Progressives were made up of 4 times as
many union members than reality and Progressives believe Conservatives were significantly
richer than they actually were (Ahler & Sood, 2018). In order to tease out this
categorization issue, future research should explore the relevant ideological threat - outgroup
prejudice dynamic in relation to intersectional prejudice. For example, our studies can be
replicated with questions about prejudice towards individuals with intersecting political,
racial, and socio-economic identities. Alternatively, our study could be replicated using the
conservative and progressive oriented groups used in previous studies (Brandt et al., 2014;
Chambers et al., 2013)(e.g. Labor unionists vs Business people).
Another relevant direction of research would be to explore progressive group
28
morality. Our study utilized the binding foundations from Moral Foundations Theory to
operationalize group morality, which has been criticized for being overly politicized (Gray
& Keeney, 2015a). The origin of MFT is rooted in Haidt’s attempt to understand and
explain conservative morality to progressive researchers (Haidt, 2008). In this respect,
MFT successfully showed that you can measure the different moral underpinnings of
Progressives and Conservatives with their questionnaire via the differential endorsement of
the binding foundations (Graham et al., 2013). However, the survey questions to test
binding foundations are inherently conservative (e.g. they ask about loyalty to country,
respect for traditional authority and values, and conservative items of purity) (Gray &
Keeney, 2015b). While this successfully showed differences between Progressives and
Conservatives, it seems to ignore progressive group-oriented values and assumes
Progressives are much less group-oriented. We hypothesize that our results showing no
increase in progressive group-oriented values (as hypothesized by the Reactive Liberal
Hypothesis Nail et al., 2009) may be due to this blindspot. We suggest future research
explore group-oriented values, not with the motivation to understand the moral concerns
for Conservatives but to more directly capture group-oriented values for both ideologies.
For example, future research could explore groups that Progressives are loyal to (e.g. racial
groups as opposed to country), authority and traditions Progressives feel are important
(individual liberty and Left wing authoritarianism), and progressive oriented purity (e.g.
the sanctity of the LGBTQ+ rainbow flag as opposed to the American flag). Further
research could then utilize these progressive oriented group moral values in respect to the
influence of ideologically relevant threats.
Finally, future work should explore the potential psychological mechanisms that
underlie this relevant ideologically threat - outgroup prejudice dynamic including the
strength of partisan identification (Riek et al., 2006), sensitivity to threatening content
(Azriel et al., 2022), or emotional responses such as anger (Webster et al., 2022). While we
showed how endorsement of outgroup political prejudice in relation to exposure to relevant
29
ideological threat was moderated by level of conservatism and mediated by perception of
ideological threat, there may be other underlying psychological measures that would help
explain what mediates the relationship between relevant threat and perception of threat.
Are some individuals more or less sensitive to threatening tweets beyond political ideology?
Earlier research indicates that the degree of identification moderates the link between
threat and intergroup bias, suggesting that individuals who strongly identify with a group
are the ones most inclined to respond to group threats, as the ingroup holds significant
importance within their sense of identity (Branscombe et al., 1999; Riek et al., 2006).
Alternatively, research on measuring sensitivity to threat in the form of attention
bias to threat (Azriel et al., 2022), social-anxiety (Heimberg et al., 1999), and social threat
sensitivity (Calleja & Rapee, 2020) all point to possible factors. Beyond self-report,
implicit measures including cardiovascular responses (Scheepers & Derks, 2016), cortisol
levels (Scheepers & Derks, 2016), startle eye response (Phelps et al., 2000), eye-tracking
studies (Mogg & Bradley, 2016), EEG (Amodio et al., 2006), and fMRI studies (Schmid
et al., 2015) can all be used as bio markers to measure sensitivity to ideologically relevant
threat and the potential relationship to prejudice. However, research has shown that
exposure to symbolic threat, which is similar to ideological threat 4
, makes people scared,
anxious, and angry, but only threat induced anger led to more political outgroup prejudice
(Renström & Bäck, 2021; Renström et al., n.d.).
Conclusion
More threat does not necessarily mean more conservative, more conservative does
not necessarily mean more prejudice, and relevant ideological threat can promote the
endorsement of outgroup prejudice. As affective polarization continues to rise and exposure
to threat becomes more salient in our online environments, clarifying this nuanced dynamic
4 While symbolic threat is related to ideological threat, symoblic threat still leans conservative by focusing
on how immigrants threaten traditional values in various cultures. To see whether this distinction is
justified, future research should explore whether Conservatives are less threatened by conservative
immigrants and if progressives are more hostile towards them.
30
of threat, ideology, and prejudice is vital if we want to successfully grapple with our
fractionating cultural world.
31
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Supplementary Materials
Additional Analyses, Tables, and Graphs
Study 1 SM Figures
Figure S1
The relationship between type of threat (progressive or conservative) and perception of
topic threat, moderated by level of conservatism.
Study 2 SM Figures
In order to clarify our results of study 2, we show additional analyses, tables, and
graphs including models predicting the individual moral foundations (see Table S1) and
graphs that show all four tweet conditions for study 2 (See figures S2 through S9). The
non-threat and non-political threat were not included in the main text for clarity of the
images. We have also provided all of our stimuli.
43
Table S1
Output of six linear models showing the main effects of type of threatening tweets and their
interaction with conservatism, predicting the six moral foundations individually.
Care Equality Proportionality Loyalty Authority Purity
Progressive Threat (PT) 4.49∗∗∗ 3.89∗∗∗ 3.16∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗
Non-Threat (NT) 4.43∗∗∗ 3.80∗∗∗ 3.12∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗
Conservative Threat (CT) 4.17∗∗∗ 3.67∗∗∗ 3.02∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗
Non-political Threat (NPT) 4.32∗∗∗ 3.72∗∗∗ 3.18∗∗∗ 2.09∗∗∗ 2.09∗∗∗ 1.54∗∗∗
Conservatism −0.08∗ −0.29∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
NT:Conservatism 0.01 −0.03 0.05 −0.11∗ −0.11∗ −0.07
CT:Conservatism 0.01 0.02 0.02 −0.06 −0.11∗ −0.02
NPT:Conservatism −0.01 −0.01 0.01 −0.14∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.13∗
R
2 0.96 0.89 0.96 0.93 0.95 0.91
Adj. R2 0.96 0.89 0.96 0.93 0.94 0.91
Num. obs. 406 406 406 406 406 406
∗∗∗p < 0.001;
∗∗p < 0.01;
∗p < 0.05
Note:The top four rows are the intercepts for each condition. The fifth row represents the
effect for conservatism on our reference condition of progressive threat. The sixth, seventh,
and eighth row represent the interactions of the other conditions and conservatism. Most
important is to focus on the significant interactions on line 7 (CT:Conservatism) which
represents the different effects conservatism has between the progressive and conservative
conditions.
44
Figure S2
The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), perception of topic threat (y-axis), and
type of threatening Tweet with all four conditions (colored lines).
Note: The effect of conservatism on perception of topic threat is B = -0.55 in the progressive condition, B
= 0.48 in the conservative condition, B = 0.06 in the non threat condition, and B = -0.27 in the
nonpolitical threat condition. Shaded areas around the lines represent the 95-percent confidence interval
(+/- 1.96 Standard Error)
Figure S3
The relationship between type of threatening Tweet (progressive or conservative) and
perception of topic threat, moderated by level of conservatism.
45
Figure S4
The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), perception of ideological threat (y-axis),
and type of threatening Tweet with all four conditions (colored lines).
Note: The effect of conservatism on perception of ideological threat is B = 0.22 in the progressive
condition, B = 0.60 in the conservative condition, B = 0.47 in the non threat condition, and B = 0.20 in
the nonpolitical threat condition. Shaded areas around the lines represent the 95-percent confidence
interval (+/- 1.96 Standard Error).
Figure S5
The relationship between type of threatening Tweet (progressive or conservative) and
perception of ideological threat, moderated by level of conservatism.
46
Figure S6
The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), endorsement of outgroup prejudice
(y-axis), and type of threatening Tweet with all four conditions (colored lines).
Note: The effect of conservatism on the endorsement of outgroup prejudice is B = -0.08 in the progressive
condition, B = 0.10 in the conservative condition, B = 0.09 in the non threat condition, and B = 0.04 in
the nonpolitical threat condition. Shaded areas around the lines represent the 95-percent confidence
interval (+/- 1.96 Standard Error).
Figure S7
The relationship between type of threatening Tweet (progressive or conservative) and
endorsement of outgroup prejudice, moderated by level of conservatism.
47
Figure S8
The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), endorsement of the binding foundations
(y-axis), and type of threatening Tweet with all four conditions (colored lines).
Note: The effect of conservatism on the endorsement of the binding foundations is B = 0.41 in the
progressive condition, B = 0.35 in the conservative condition, B = 0.31 in the non threat condition, and B
= 0.26 in the nonpolitical threat condition. Shaded areas around the lines represent the 95-percent
confidence interval (+/- 1.96 Standard Error).
48
Figure S9
The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), endorsement of the individualizing
foundations (y-axis), and type of threatening Tweet with all four conditions (colored lines).
Note: The effect of conservatism on the endorsement of the individualizing foundations is B = -0.19 in the
progressive condition, B = -0.17 in the conservative condition, B = -0.20 in the non threat condition, and
B = -0.20 in the nonpolitical threat condition. Shaded areas around the lines represent the 95-percent
confidence interval (+/- 1.96 Standard Error).
Study 3 SM Figures
In order to clarify our results of study 3, we show additional analyses, tables, and
graphs.
Figure S10
The relationship between type of threatening real world event (progressive or conservative)
and perception of topic threat, moderated by level of conservatism.
49
Figure S11
The relationship between type of threatening real world event (progressive or conservative)
and perception of ideological threat, moderated by level of conservatism.
Figure S12
The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), Affective Polarization(AP) (y-axis), and
type of real world threatening events (colored lines).
Note: The effect of conservatism on the endorsement of outgroup prejudice is B = -3.84 in the progressive
condition and B = -1.25 in the conservative condition. Shaded areas around the lines represent the
95-percent confidence interval (+/- 1.96 Standard Error).
50
Figure S13
The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), outgroup warmth (y-axis), and type of real
world threatening events (colored lines).
Note: The effect of conservatism on outgroup warmth is B = 2.28 in the progressive condition and B =
2.84 in the conservative condition. Shaded areas around the lines represent the 95-percent confidence
interval (+/- 1.96 Standard Error).
51
Figure S14
The relationship between conservatism (x-axis), ingroup warmth (y-axis), and type of real
world threatening events (colored lines).
Note: The effect of conservatism ingroup warmth is B = -0.68 in the progressive condition and B = 1.29
in the conservative condition. Shaded areas around the lines represent the 95-percent confidence interval
(+/- 1.96 Standard Error).
Figure S15
The relationship between type of threatening real world event (progressive or conservative)
and endorsement of outgroup prejudice, moderated by level of conservatism.
52
Study 1 Stimuli
According to Jost et al., 2017, Progressives and Conservatives feel fearful from
different threats in their environment. Conservatives tended to report feeling threatened by
gun control, illegal immigration, and government corruption, whereas liberals tended to
report more fear of climate change, pollution, and overpopulation. According to
experimental studies run by Eadeh and Change 2019, threats of restricted healthcare
access (abortion), pollution, and corporate misconduct increase a liberals support for these
causes. A review from Duckitt and Sibley 2009, show that threat to society broadly
increases RWA whereas increase of a competitive environment is associated with increase
SDO Duckitt and Sibley, 2009.
Left Threats: climate change, pollution, overpopulation, corporate misconduct, restricted
health care access. (For example Texas abortion laws, climate change worse and
protections revoked, Big tech, big pharma, Fossil Fuel giants, Oil Spills)
Right Threats: Gun control, illegal immigration, government corruption. threat to
society generally. (For example, New gun control efforts, caravans at the border, Hunter
Biden government corruption, Fauci gov corruption)
Liberal Threat Stimuli: New reports show that the recent years of Donald
Trump, a conservative congress, and new conservative Supreme Court justices have caused
irreparable damage to our efforts to address climate change, pollution, corporate
misconduct, and healthcare access. Vital environmental regulations were cut, oil spills and
wildfires continue to ravage our environment, with Fossil Fuel companies escaping blame.
Big Tech companies have grown to criminal levels of power and corruption with the
government not having a clue of how to handle it. Legislation such as the Texas abortion
ban has stolen healthcare access for woman across the country. More alarmingly, political
scientists predict that if current trends continue, a true liberal will not win the presidency
53
and the congress will increasingly become more conservative for at least the next two
decades. Many liberals have moved to more liberal cities but this political sorting actually
makes matters worse at the national level. Progressive values are threatened at an all time
high at a crucial moment for our culture.
Conservative Threat Stimuli: New reports show that the recent years of Joe
Biden, a Democratic Congress, and left leaning Supreme Court have caused irreparable
damage to our country. Gun control efforts, government corruption and illegal immigration
are all surging at unseen levels. The Biden administration’s incompetent view on gun
control has led to infringement of the second amendment rights across the country, with
aims at more. Government corruption has become synonymous with the government itself,
from Hunter Biden’s shady deals to Anthony Fauci’s history of deceit. Migrant caravans
have become the new normal nightmare at our borders with dangerous illegal immigrants
pouring in. More alarmingly, political scientists predict that if recent trends continue, a
true conservative will not win the presidency and the congress will increasingly become
more liberal for at least the next two decades. Many Conservatives have moved to more
Conservative states but this political sorting has actually made matters worse at the
national level. Conservative values are threatened at an all time high at a crucial moment
for our culture.
Neutral Control Stimuli: New reports show that over the last decade, the food
industry has shifted in a number of dramatic ways. Technological developments have led to
huge growth in the domains of both what we eat and how we get our food. Scientists have
answered the call from nutritionists and developed alternatives to meat, dairy, gluten, nuts,
sugar and other potentially harmful products and these alternatives have quickly filled our
grocery store shelves. Advancements in supply chain management and online resources
have led to a revolution in food access to homes and neighborhoods around the country.
Phone application delivery services have brought both restaurants and grocery stores to
your door at the click of a button. Interestingly, food business scientists predict that this
54
trend will only increase as automation becomes more mainstream in the upcoming decade.
This is an evolutionary moment for our countries relationship with food.
55
Study 2 Stimuli
According to Jost and Colleagues(2017) Jost et al., 2017, Progressives and
conservatives feel fearful from different threats in their environment. Conservatives tended
to report feeling threatened by gun control, illegal immigration, and government
corruption, whereas Progressives tended to report more fear of climate change, pollution,
and overpopulation. According to experimental studies run by Eadeh and Change 2019,
threats of restricted healthcare access (abortion), pollution, and corporate misconduct
increase a progressives support for these causes. A review from Duckitt and Sibley 2009,
show that threat to society broadly increases RWA whereas increase of a competitive
environment is associated with increase SDO Duckitt and Sibley, 2009.
Left Threats: climate change, pollution, overpopulation, corporate misconduct, restricted
health care access. (For example Texas abortion laws, climate change worse and
protections revoked, Big tech, big pharma, Fossil Fuel giants, Oil Spills)
Right Threats: Gun control, illegal immigration, government corruption. threat to
society generally. (For example, New gun control efforts, caravans at the border, Hunter
Biden government corruption, Fauci gov corruption)
In order to form these threats into balanced and natural stimuli, we decided to take
three categories that threaten both ideologies from different angles (Abortion, Immigration,
and Election Integrity), include a non ideologically relevant threat category (earthquakes,
emergency services, and crop disease), and a non threatening control (flowers, scooters, and
pickleball) all in the manner of a quote tweet. Below you will find the stimuli.
56
Figure S16
Below is the stimuli for a conservative oriented threat concerning abortion.
57
Figure S17
Below is the stimuli for a progressive oriented threat concerning abortion.
58
Figure S18
Below is the stimuli for a conservative oriented threat concerning election integrity.
59
Figure S19
Below is the stimuli for a progressive oriented threat concerning election integrity.
60
Figure S20
Below is the stimuli for a conservative oriented threat concerning immigration.
61
Figure S21
Below is the stimuli for a progressive oriented threat concerning immigration.
62
Figure S22
Below is the stimuli for a non-ideologically oriented threat of crop disease.
63
Figure S23
Below is the stimuli for a non-ideologically oriented threat of earthquake.
64
Figure S24
Below is the stimuli for a non-ideologically oriented threat of emergency services.
65
Figure S25
Below is the stimuli for a non-threatening control stimuli about pickleball.
66
Figure S26
Below is the stimuli for a non-threatening control stimuli about flowers.
67
Figure S27
Below is the stimuli for a non-threatening control stimuli about scooters.
68
Study 3 Stimuli
Progressive Threat: Recently, a number of events have threatened progressive
values. The US supreme court made the decision to overturn Roe v Wade - immediately
cutting abortion access in many states and endangering abortion access for all.
Additionally, the election, presidency, and potential reelection of Donald Trump have
instilled fear of creating a future United States where progressive values are not safe.
Conservative Threat: Recently, a number of events have threatened conservative
values. The Bud Light campaign of Trans activist Dylan Mulvaney and the participation of
various corporations in PRIDE month have endangered basic traditional values.
Additionally, the Defund the Police movement and Trump impeachment proceedings have
instilled fear of creating a future United States where conservative values are not safe.
Non-Threat: Recently, a number of events have led to groundbreaking scientific
discoveries. A collection of scientists worked together to take the first image of a black hole
- giving insight to physics and energy transfer that will change technology. Additionally,
the detailed analysis of Pluto, has reclassified the mass as a dwarf planet, restructuring our
solar system as we know it.
Non-Political Threat: Recently, a number of studies have documented a steady
rise in cancer rates, posing a significant global health challenge. This increase has been
found in both the older and younger populations and includes breast cancer, lung cancer,
pancreatic cancer, and Leukemia. Efforts to combat these rising rates by developing
effective prevention strategies and treatments is vital to help all those that are endangered.
Progressive Non-Threat: Recently, progressive politicians and voters have been
involved in a number of community social events. These include participating in
community volunteer days, where Democratic Party members joined local organizations to
contribute to their communities. Additionally, the new members of the progressive caucus
had the opportunity to tour the White House and other capital buildings, where the
Democratic Party then held a public Town Hall addressing Veteran Services.
69
Conservative Non-Threat: Recently, conservative politicians and voters have
been involved in a number of community social events. These include participating in
community volunteer days, where Republican party members joined local organizations to
contribute to their communities. Additionally, the new members of the conservative caucus
had the opportunity to tour the White House and other capital buildings, where the
Republican Party then held a public Town Hall addressing Veteran Services.
MFQ2
Moral Foundations Questionnaire-2 (MFQ-2) For each of the statements below,
please indicate how well each statement describes you or your opinions. Response options:
Does not describe me at all (1); Slightly describes me (2); Moderately describes me (3);
Describes me fairly well (4); Describes me extremely well (5).
1. Caring for people who have suffered is an important virtue.
2. The world would be a better place if everyone made the same amount of money.
3. I think people who are more hard-working should end up with more money.
4. I think children should be taught to be loyal to their country.
5. I think it is important for societies to cherish their traditional values.
6. I think the human body should be treated like a temple, housing something sacred
within.
7. I believe that compassion for those who are suffering is one of the most crucial
virtues.
8. Our society would have fewer problems if people had the same income.
9. I think people should be rewarded in proportion to what they contribute.
10. It upsets me when people have no loyalty to their country.
11. I feel that most traditions serve a valuable function in keeping society orderly.
12. I believe chastity is an important virtue.
13. We should all care for people who are in emotional pain.
14. I believe that everyone should be given the same quantity of resources in life.
15. The effort a worker puts into a job ought to be reflected in the size of a raise they
receive.
16. Everyone should love their own community.
70
17. I think obedience to parents is an important virtue.
18. It upsets me when people use foul language like it is nothing.
19. I am empathetic toward those people who have suffered in their lives.
20. I believe it would be ideal if everyone in society wound up with roughly the same
amount of money.
21. It makes me happy when people are recognized on their merits.
22. Everyone should defend their country, if called upon.
23. We all need to learn from our elders.
24. If I found out that an acquaintance had an unusual but harmless sexual fetish I
would feel uneasy about them.
25. Everyone should try to comfort people who are going through something hard.
26. When people work together toward a common goal, they should share the rewards
equally, even if some worked harder on it.
27. In a fair society, those who work hard should live with higher standards of living.
28. Everyone should feel proud when a person in their community wins in an
international competition.
29. I believe that one of the most important values to teach children is to have respect
for authority.
30. People should try to use natural medicines rather than chemically identical
human-made ones.
31. It pains me when I see someone ignoring the needs of another human being.
32. I get upset when some people have a lot more money than others in my country.
33. I feel good when I see cheaters get caught and punished.
34. I believe the strength of a sports team comes from the loyalty of its members to each
other.
35. I think having a strong leader is good for society.
36. I admire people who keep their virginity until marriage.
Scoring: Average each of the following items to get six scores corresponding with the
six foundations. Care = 1, 7, 13, 19, 25, 31 Equality = 2, 8, 14, 20, 26, 32 Proportionality
= 3, 9, 15, 21, 27, 33 Loyalty = 4, 10, 16, 22, 28, 34 Authority = 5, 11, 17, 23, 29, 35
Purity = 6, 12, 18, 24, 30, 36
71
Abstract (if available)
Abstract
How does ideologically relevant threat influence people from different political ideologies? Prior work on political ideology, threat, and morality primarily focus on the conservative-threat dynamic [e.g. motivated social cognition (Jost & Amodio, 2012)] but less is known about the progressive-threat dynamic and how progressive moral concerns can be influenced by threats progressives actually care about. Through multiple studies, this project explores how exposing US Progressives and Conservatives to ideologically relevant threats can differentially influence their moral concerns and out-group prejudice. Our studies support the notion that Progressives and Conservatives are threatened by different topics and show experimentally that exposure to these ideologically relevant threats increase the endorsement of out-group prejudice. Preliminary results have implications toward the moral underpinnings of polarization, the dangers of social media, and provide novel evidence for how threat can be moderated by political ideology.
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Asset Metadata
Creator
Trager, Jackson Phillip
(author)
Core Title
Can ideologically relevant threat shift group-oriented values? Relevant threatening tweets cause Progressives to be as prejudiced as Conservatives
School
College of Letters, Arts and Sciences
Degree
Master of Arts
Degree Program
Psychology
Degree Conferral Date
2023-12
Publication Date
12/14/2023
Defense Date
12/13/2023
Publisher
Los Angeles, California
(original),
University of Southern California
(original),
University of Southern California. Libraries
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Tag
moral psychology,OAI-PMH Harvest,polarization,political psychology,Prejudice,social media studies,threat
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theses
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Language
English
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Electronically uploaded by the author
(provenance)
Advisor
Dehghani, Morteza (
committee chair
), Hackel, Leor (
committee member
), (
Oyserman, Daphna
)
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jackptrager@gmail.com,jptrager@usc.edu
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Tags
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