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POLICIES FOR GENETICALLY MODIFIED
CROPS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS

by

Mara Nielle Bird

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

December 2006

Copyright 2006 Mara N. Bird

ii

Epigraph

In memory of Humberto Peña Taylor, a young Colombia intellect extinguished at
the hands of assassins at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, to the detriment
of the world.

iii

Dedication

To the future: Coco Kiara Brisa Sanabria Bird

iv
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all of those people who shared their knowledge and
opinions through interviews or by providing documentation. My sincere thanks
to: Ajay Parida, N. Seetharama, N. Kameswara Rao, Manoj Pant, Kamaleshwar
Sinha, P.K. Ghosh, S. S. Gosal, Osha Menon, Dr. Balaji, H. S. Shergill, P.I.
Rangi, Rodolfo Braga, V. S. Mahajan, Sabhyata Bhatia, Ashok Chaudhury, K.
Murahari Rao, S. Venkat Reddy, P. Chengal Reddy, P. Partha Sarathy, P.B Subba
Rao, M. Geetha Rani, Kunthala Jayarama, Radha Ramachandran, K.
Sivasubramaniyan, Suman Sahai, J. P. Mishra, Barun Mitra, Vandana Shiva, Dr.
Mruthyunjaya, P. Ananda Kumar, Kailash Bansal, Ramesh Chand, V. L. Chopra,
Attri, Vinayak Rao, Shiv Visvanathan, Asfar H. Jafri, G. Venkatarami, Chandra
Srinivasan, N. Parasuraman, C. Srinivasa Rao, M. S. S. Mohan, G. N. Hariharan,
K. Balasubramanian, P. C. Kesavan, Sudha Nair, M. Navamuniyammal, Cristiane
Amaro da Silveira, Adriano Campolino, Flavia Londres, Jean Dubois, Jean-Pierre
Leroy, Jose Hoffman, Renata Menasche, Silvio Porto, João de S. B. Paes de
Carvalho, Maria Celeste Emerick, Valter Endres, Tatiana de Carvalho, Mariana
Paoli, Alexandra Borges Kolling, Alvaro Bombeiros, Sebastião Pinheiro, Jorge
Rulli, and Carlos A. Vicente. A warm thank you to Dr. and Mrs. Sharma for their
hospitality during my stay in Hyderabad. Thank you to my committee members:
Saori Katada, Nora Hamilton, Nelly Stromquist, and Carol Wise. A special thanks
to my chair, Laurie Brand for her dedication in reading every chapter numerous
times and for her unending support. Thank you to the D-group and friends who

v
also shared their opinions on versions and chapters. Finally, thank you to my
spouse for helping with those all those things that no one else can do but still must
be done from fixing tables to fixing food to fixing my frame of mind.
For the financial assistance which made this dissertation possible, I would
like to express my appreciation to USCs Center for International Studies, to the
Tyler Environmental Fund, and to the Oakley and the Herman families for their
fellowships. Thank you also to my grandparents, George H. and Frances A. Bird,
for their continual support of my education, and to my parents, for instilling in me
a constant curiosity for learning.

vi
Table of Contents

Epigraph ii

Dedication iii

Acknowledgements iv

List of Tables viii

List of Figures xi

Abbreviations xii

Abstract xix

Chapter One 1
Policies for Genetically Modified Crops in Developing
Countries: The Role of Non-State Actors

Chapter Two 53
How International Structures and the NSA Jet Set Affect
State Policies for rDNA Crops

Chapter Three 111
Brazil: NGOs Plant Precaution through the Courts

Chapter Four 194
India: Balancing a Cornucopia of Perspectives

Chapter Five 282
Argentina: Industry and Governmental Actors Beans of
the Same Pod

Chapter Six 348
Cross-case Analysis and Key Findings

Bibliography 383

Appendix A 430
Chronology, Brazil

vii
Appendix B 453
Chronology, India

Appendix C 458
Chronology, Argentina

viii
List of Tables

Table 1. Classification of intellectual property rights (IPRs) 42
for rDNA crops

Table 2. Classification of trade policies for rDNA crops 43

Table 3. Classification of biosafety policies 45

Table 4. Food safety and consumer choice policy classification 47

Table 5. Classification of public research policies for rDNA 49
agriculture

Table 6. Policy options: IPRs 59

Table 7. Policy options: Trade 68

Table 8. Policy options: Biosafety 71

Table 9. Policy options: Food safety and consumer rights 81

Table 10. Policy options: Public research 96

Table 11. CGIAR research allocations 1996-2002 98

Table 12. Non-state actor donations to CGIAR 1998-2002 99

Table 13. Impact of international institutions on policy options 104

Table 14. Non-state actor access to international institutions 105

Table 15. Chronology of intellectual property laws, Brazil 121

Table 16. IPR policies for transgenic crops in Brazil 129

Table 17. Corn imports and exports in thousands of tons 131

Table 18. Distribution of agricultural production for 1995-1996, in % 135

Table 19. Trade policies for transgenic crops in Brazil 149

Table 20. Summary of federal level biosafety legislation 152

ix
Table 21. Biosafety policies for transgenic crops in Brazil 163

Table 22. Summary of federal level food safety and 164
consumer rights legislation

Table 23. State laws regarding transgenics 165

Table 24. Food safety and consumer rights policies for transgenic 174
crops in Brazil (federal level)

Table 25. Public research policies for transgenic crops in Brazil 184

Table 26. Chronology of intellectual property-related laws, India 202

Table 27. IPR policies for transgenic crops in India 217

Table 28. Trade policies for transgenic crops in India 231

Table 29. Chronology of biosafety laws and rules, India 232

Table 30. Biosafety policies for transgenic crops in India 250

Table 31. Food safety and consumer rights policies for transgenic 259
crops in India

Table 32. Expenditures by the DBT in crop biotechnologies, in 260
hundred thousands

Table 33. Public research policies for transgenic crops in India 270

Table 34. Chronology of intellectual property-related laws and 290
resolutions, Argentina

Table 35. IPR policies for transgenic crops in Argentina 296

Table 36. Authorizations for commercial release of transgenic plants 299
in Argentina

Table 37. Trade policies for transgenic crops in Argentina 310

Table 38. Chronology of biosafety-related laws and resolutions 311

Table 39. Biosafety policies for transgenic crops in Argentina 322

x
Table 40. Composition of the CTA of SENASA 324

Table 41. Chronology of GM food safety-related laws and 326
resolutions

Table 42. Food safety and consumer choice policies for transgenic 333
crops in Argentina

Table 43. Public research policies for transgenic crops in Argentina 339

Table 44. Summary of policy changes 1996-2002 349

Table 45. Non-state actor formal access to institutional structures 353
for GM crops

Table 46. Types of strategies utilized 355

Table 47. Summary of policy changes as of 2006 370

xi
List of Figures

Figure 1. Political connections 27

Figure 2. Non-state actor participation in biosafety negotiations 74

Figure 3. Non-state actor participation at CCFL meetings 1996-2004 87

Figure 4. Non-state actor participation at Task Force meetings 88
2000-2003

Figure 5. Institutional context for GM crops in Brazil 117

Figure 6. Regulatory process for GM crops in India 199

Figure 7. Regulatory process for GM crops in Argentina 287

xii
Abbreviations

ABRABI Asociação Brasileira das Empresas de Biotecnologia/
Brazilian Association of Biotechnology Firms

ADELCO Liga de Acción del Consumidor-Acción del Consumidor/
Consumers Action League

AIA advanced informed agreement

ANMAT Administración Nacional de Alimentos, Medicamentos y
Tecnología Médica /National Administration of Food,
Drugs and Medical Technology (Argentina)

ARPOV Asociación de Protección de las Obtenciones Vegetales/
Association for the Protection of Vegetable Varieties)

ASA Asociación Semilleros Argentinos /Association of Agentine
Seed Growers

BSWG Biosafety Working Group

CAC Codex Alimentarius Commission

CAPROVE Cámara Argentina de la Industria de Productos
Veterinarios/ Argentine Chamber of Veterinary Products
Manufacturers

CASAFE Cámara de Sanidad Agropecuaria y Fertilizantes /Argentine
Chamber of Plant Health and Fertilizer Products
Manufacturers

CBD Convention on Biological Diversity

CCFL Codex Committee on Food Labelling

CEDHA Fundación Centro de Derechos Humanos y Ambiente/
Foundation Center for Human Rights and Environment

CEFOBI Centro de Estudios Fotosintéticos y Bioquímicos /Center
for Photosynthetic and Biochemical Studies (Argentina)

CESE Coordenadoria Ecumênica de Serviço/ Ecumenical Service
Coordinator

xiii
CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research

CONABIA Comisión Nacional Asesora de Biotecnología
Agropecuaria/ National Advisory Committee on
Agricultural Biotechnology (Argentina)

CONAMA Consejo Nacional do Meio Ambiente/ National Council on
the Environment (Brazil)

CONASE Comisión Nacional de Semillas /National Seed
Commission (Argentina)

CONBySA Consejo Nacional de Biotecnología y Salud /National
Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and Heath
(Argentina)

CONICET Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y
Técnicas/ National Council of Scientific and Technical
Research (Argentina)

CPB Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

CTA Comité Técnico Asesor / Technical Advisory Committee
(Argentina)

CTNBio Comissão Ténica Nacional de Biossegurança/ National
Technical Commission on Biosecurity (Brazil)

DARE Department of Agricultural Research and Education (India)

DBT Department of Biotechnology (India)

DNMA Dirección Nacional de Mercados Alimentarios /National
Directorate of Agrifood Markets (Argentina)

DSB Dispute Settlement Body

EIA-Rima Estudo de Impacto Ambiental and Relatório de Impacto no
Meio Ambiente/ Environmental Impact Assessments and
Reports

xiv

EMBRAPA Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária /Brazilian
Agricultural Research Corporation

EPA Environmental Protection Act (India)

ESPLAR Esplar Centro de Pesquisa e Assessoria/ Esplar Research
and Help Center

EU European Union

FAA Federación Agraria Argentina/ Argentine Agrarian
Federation

FAB Foro Argentino de Biotecnología /Argentine Biotechnology
Forum

FAO United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GEAC Genetic Engineering Approvals Committee (India)

GIC Global Industry Coalition

GM genetically modified

GMO genetically modified organism

GRR Grupo de Reflexión Rural /Rural Reflection Group

GURT genetic use restriction technology

IBAMA Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos recursos
Naturais Renováveis/ Brazilian Institute of Environment
and Renewable Natural Resources

IBSC Institutional Biosafety Committee (India)

ICAR Indian Council of Agricultural Research

ICCP Intergovernmental Committee for the Cartagena Protocol
(on Biosafety)

xv
ICGEB International Center for Genetic Engineering and
Biotechnology

ICRISAT International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid
Tropics

IDEC Instituto Brasileiro de Defensa do Consumidor/ Brazilian
Institute for the Defense of Consumers

IGO intergovernmental organization

IISc Indian Institute of Sciences

INASE Insituto Nacional de Semillas /National Seeds Institute
(Argentina)

INGEBI Instituto de Investigaciones en Ingeniería Genética y
Biología Molecular /Research Institute in Genetic
Engineering and Molecular Biology (Argentina)

INPI Instituto Nacional de la Propriedad Industrial /National
Institute for Industrial Property (Argentina)

INTA Institute Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria /National
Insitute of Agricultural and Fishery Technology
(Argentina)

IPPC International Plant Protection Convention

IUPGR International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources

IPR intellectual property right

JPC Joint Parliamentary Committee (India)

LMO living modified organism

MAC Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperation (India)

Mahyco Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company

MAPO Movimiento Argentino para la Producción Orgánica/
Argentine Movement for Organic Production

xvi
MEC Monitoring-cum-Evaluation Committee (India)

MMB Mayhco-Monsanto Biotech

MNC multinational company

MoEF Ministry of Environment and Forests (India)

MP medidas provisórias/provisional measures (Brazil)

MP Member of Parliament (India)

MS Mato Grosso do Sul

MSSRF M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation

MST Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra / Landless
Workers Movement (Brazil)

MST Ministry of Science and Technology (India)

N 151 Navbharat 151, the origin of illegal GM cotton seed found
in Gujarat in 2001

NARS national agricultural research system

NGO non-governmental organization

NOVIB Oxfam Netherlands

NSA non-state actor

PBR plant breeders rights

PFA Prevention of Food Adulteration Act of 1954 (India)

PVP plant variety protection

PVPFRA Plant Variety Protection and Farmers Rights Act (India)

RCGM Review Committee on Genetic Manipulation (India)

xvii
rDNA recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid. Used synonymously
with transgenic and GM.

RFSTE Research Foundation for Science, Technology and
Education

RJ Rio de Janeiro (Brazilian state, not city)

RNPC Registro Nacional de la Propiedad de Cultivares / National
Registry for Proprietary Varieties (Argentina)

RR Roundup Ready
®

RS Rio Grande do Sul (southernmost state of Brazil)

SAI Seed Association of India

SAGPyA Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Pesca y Alimentos/
Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food.
Formerly SAGyP (Argentina)

SC Santa Catarina (state in southern Brazil)

SENASA Servicio Nacional de Sanidad y Calidad Agroalimentaria/
National Service for Agrifood Health and Quality
(Argentina)

SINPAF Sindicato Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Pesquisa e
Desenvolvimento Agropecuário /National Union of
Agricultural and Fishery Research and Development
Workers

SP São Paulo (Brazilian state, not city)

SPS Agreement Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures

Task Force Codex Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods
Derived from Biotechnology

TERI Tata Energy Research Institute

xviii
TRIPs Agreement Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNEP United Nations Environment Program

UPOV International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plant

WHO World Health Organization

WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization

WTO World Trade Organization

xix
Abstract

The objective of this study is to address the puzzle of why states in the
developing world with similar concerns and conditions have been slow to adopt
transgenic (recombinant DNA, genetically modified/engineered) crop
technologies, while others were pioneer users and developers of this technology.
The central hypothesis tested here is that the type of involvement, defined as
different strategies and access to institutional structures as well as varying
organizational resources, of non-state actors (NSAs), both non-profit (non-
governmental organizations, NGOs) and for-profit (industry), accounts for these
differences. A second hypothesis is that variation in institutional context accounts
for the differences in policies towards rDNA crops. Differences in institutional
context include which level of government and type of institutions are responsible
for policies for rDNA crops.
Both hypotheses are tested in three case study countries (Brazil, India and
Argentina) at three levels of analysis: international, national/federal and sub-
national (state and local). For each case country, the policy areas related to
transgenic crops --intellectual property rights, trade, biosafety, food safety and
consumer choice, and public researchare examined for the years 1996-2002.
The study reveals that in India and Brazil, NGO strategies were key, while
in Argentina, industry actor access to the institutional structure was most
important. This work also highlights the importance of the institutional context,

xx
which played a role in the policy differences in all three case studies.
Centralization of policy-making tended to lead to more promotional policies for
genetically modified crops, while the inclusion and counter-balancing of a wider
set of actors (whether governmental or non-state actors) resulted in more
precautionary policies.

1
Chapter 1
Policies for Genetically Modified Crops in Developing Countries:
The Role of Non-State Actors

[Agricultural biotechnology] has astounding potential to provide the
world with food thats more nutritious, more delicious, less expensive, and that
can be grown using less land and fewer chemicals. (Fumento 2003, 191).

Biotechnoloy, like the Green Revolution, is a technological solution to
problems of social justice a solution fostered by the very transnational
corporations and banks that created, maintain, and profit from world
maldistribution of food. (Peritore and Galve-Peritore 1995, 30).

Introduction
The introduction and use of genetically modified crops has received mixed
reactions worldwide. Some welcome the use of rDNA technology as the best way
to address nutrition, agricultural and environmental problems, proclaiming it the
next Green Revolution. Others raise concerns that use of rDNA technology may
instead endanger human, animal and environmental health more than
conventional agricultural technologies do. Most of the debate regarding
genetically modified crop technology has focused on the contrasting viewpoints
of the United States and the European Union. However, many arguments are
made for the purported best interests of people in developing countries, positing
that people in developing countries have the most to gain from rDNA crop
technology.
Despite the claims of potential benefits, many developing countries have
been slow to adopt rDNA crop technologies. This is surprising for several
reasons. First, some developing countries have unmet food production needs.

2
Second, developing countries suffer from crop pest and disease problems that
rDNA technology can target. Third, some developing countries slow to adopt
rDNA crop technologies at the same time invest their public research funds in
developing rDNA agricultural technology. Finally, agriculture not only represents
a large part of the gross national product of developing countries, it is also a
primary source of employment, subsistence and basic food security for a majority
of the population.
The objective of this study is to address the puzzle of why some
developing countries have been slow to adopt rDNA technologies while other
developing countries were pioneer users and developers of this technology.
Developing countries that were expected to be early users of rDNA technologies
include Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa,
Thailand, Vietnam and Zimbabwe (Lappé and Bailey 1998).
1
These countries
were projected to be early users because they all had strong national agricultural
research and extension programs,
2
and/or because they grew crops that faced
challenges that rDNA technology directly addresses.
3
The date for projected early
adoption ranged from 1997-2000, with most of these developing countries

1
These projections were done by Monsanto, the leading multinational company in GM crop
technology, for the three main types of transgenic crops: soybeans, corn and cotton.
2
Specifically, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa. All of these are
countries which had a national policy and a research programme, mainly in conventional
biotechnologies, and which had established collaborative linkages in industrialized countries for
the training of scientists and acquisition of new technologies (Sasson 1993, 25).
3
A number of studies were done in the early 1990s that assessed developing countries strengths
and weaknesses with respect to the development and utilization of biotechnologies, and to their
possible socio-economic impact. See for example Sasson 1993 and Persley 1989.

3
projected to start using one or more of the main transgenic crops (soybeans, corn
or cotton) in 1999.
Nevertheless, by 2002, only Argentina, China and South Africa had
moved to wide use of GM crops. Indonesia and Mexico had taken an intermediate
route, with some plantings of GM crops, while India planted transgenic crops
(cotton) for the first time in 2002.
4
That said, Thailand, Vietnam, Brazil and
Zimbabwe still had no GM crops, and Brazil and Zimbabwe had explicit
restrictions on rDNA crops. To explain this puzzle of why similarly placed
countries have adopted differing policies towards rDNA crops, three countries
from the group of expected early users will be examined: Argentina, a country
that did adopt rDNA crop technologies quickly; India, a country that took an
intermediate route; and Brazil, which had not adopted rDNA crop technologies by
2002. Why do states with similar concerns and conditions choose different
policies for rDNA crops? Before addressing this, the central research question, a
brief description of rDNA technology is in order.

4
As of 2002, the United States accounted for 66% of all GM crops with 39 million hectares.
Argentina was the second largest grower of GM crops with 23 % (13.5 million hectares),
followed by Canada with 6% and China with 4%. South Africa accounted for 1% in 2002 with
0.3 million hectares planted with transgenic crops. Both Mexico and India had less than 0.1
million hectares planted in GM crops in 2002 (James, 2002)

4
rDNA Technology
Recombinant DNA (rDNA) crop technologies are a sub-category of a
broad array of biotechnologies.
5
Although genetic modification occurs in all plant
breeding, genetic modification
6
(GM) is the term most widely used to refer to
techniques of recombinant DNA (rDNA) gene insertion. Other terms used for
these techniques or their products include genetic engineering (GE), genetic
manipulation, genetic transformation, transgenic, genetically modified
organisms (GMOs), and living modified organisms
7
(LMOs), among others.
Genetically modified crops differ from what are now called conventional crops
in that they have been altered through laboratory gene transfer.
8
The gene(s)
transferred usually come(s) from a species that is not able to mix with the plant in
nature;
9
that is, cross-species or transgenic crops can be created. The new genes
are then stable; they are expressed in subsequent generations of the plant,
although not always in the same place or way. The rDNA crop technologies

5
Biotechnology is defined as Commercial techniques which use living organisms to make or
modify a product (Ahmed 1992). Examples of biotechnologies include bioconversion, in-vitro
micropropagation, diagnostics, cloning, and rDNA gene transfers. The terms biotechnology and
genetic modification are sometimes used synonymously, especially in early works.
6
Both conventional and rDNA plant breeding techniques cause genetic modification. In spite of
its imprecision, genetic modification continues to be the English language term most widely used
to refer to rDNA techniques. Genetic modification is used to refer to any living organism whose
genetic composition has been changed through the adoption of novel, non-species related genetic
material not otherwise part of the genetic makeup of that organism. Genetically engineered
materials include materials constructed using techniques that alter the molecular or cell biology
of the intended plant or animal by means not possible under natural conditions or processes. These
alterations include, but are not limited to, insertions of novel, non-species identical
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) by any technique, such as cell fusion, micro or macro encapsulation,
or viral or bacterial gene insertions. (Hayden, 2000, SB 1514, draft).
7
This is the term used in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
8
One or more genes can be transferred.
9
In genetic engineering or transgenic methods, genes from any organism in the biosphere can be
used as long as the regulatory sequences are functional in the host plant (National Research
Council 2000, 21).

5
currently on the market are transgenic.
10
(The terms transgenic, genetically
modified (GM) and rDNA will be used synonymously throughout this study.)
Most transgenic crops are grown in the United States, Canada, Argentina
and China.
11
In terms of volume, the main transgenic crops are soybeans, corn and
cotton.
12
Other transgenic crops include tomatoes, papaya, potatoes, squash,
oilseeds, and tobacco. The most common trait for transgenic crops during the
period 1996-2003 was herbicide resistance, while insect resistance was the second
most common trait (James 2003).
The main debates regarding transgenic crops can be divided into three
categories: socioeconomic, human health, and environmental. Those who argue in
favor of the use of transgenic crops suggest socioeconomic benefits such as the
possible expansion of farmland to marginal areas, increased yields, reduced risk
of crop failure, cheaper food, and more marketable food. Those who argue against
the use of transgenic crops posit social and economic concerns such as decreased
farmer welfare, increased farmer dependency, lower employment in agriculture,
increased oligarchic or monopolic control over agricultural markets, unmarketable

10
Another newer application of rDNA technology is to alter a plants existing DNA sequence.
This application is usually referred to as genomics and is based on mapping arrays of gene
expression. This application is not transgenic as it does not bring in any new genetic material.
There are no commercial applications of this type of rDNA technology yet. To date, this type of
modification has not raised the same controversies that transgenic rDNA technologies have.
11
The main producers of genetically modified crops worldwide for 2002 were United States, 66%;
Argentina, 23%; Canada, 6%,;China, 4%; South Africa 1% and others, 1% (James 2002).
12
The main GM crops worldwide for 2003 were soybeans, 41%; corn, 16%; cotton, 7%; and
canola, 4% (James 2003).

6
food, bio-piracy, increased domination of nature, displacement of crucial
developing country crops,
13
and a number of other ethical concerns.
With respect to human health or food safety, opponents examine possible
allergic reactions, increased and/or unexpected toxins or proteins in transgenic
crops, decreased nutritional content or food quality, possible antibiotic resistance,
and increased pesticide use and toxic residuals. Proponents argue that improved
nutritional value and food quality is made possible with the use of rDNA,
including enhancements in flavor and freshness. They also argue that the use of
chemical pesticides and herbicides can be reduced, and that crops and foods
produced using rDNA techniques are as safe as their conventionally produced
counterparts.
With respect to environmental issues, proponents cite decreases in
chemical use, water and soil conservation, and increased genetic variation within
staple crops as benefits. Opponents point to environmental problems like
transgenic contamination, pesticide drift, increases in chemical use, the creation
of super-weeds or super-plagues from gene flow, bio-invasion (ecosystem
disruption), decreased biodiversity (from increased monoculture and genetic
pollution), swifter decline in effectiveness of Bt
14
to fight pests, long-term Bt

13
For example, the replacement of sugar from cane with high-fructose corn syrups, vanilla beans
with vanilla flavorings, and cocoa butter and other tropical oils with rDNA products (Sasson 1993,
29, Dhar 2001, 19, Clark and Juma 1991).
14
Bt, bacillus thuingiensis is a pest repellant that has been used in sprays for four decades. It has
been put into rDNA plants to make them pest-repellant. Widespread use of the same pest repellant
leads to its ineffectiveness in a much shorter time period through natural Darwinian mechanisms.

7
toxin soil residuals, and transgenic Bt crops harm to beneficial or non-target
insects (Roberts 2001, Yoon 1999, Shiva 1997, Sasson 1993).

Research Question and Literature Review
Where should we look for explanations of differing policies for the
adoption of rDNA crops? The experience of the Green Revolution suggests that
the state is a primary actor in this field. However, the role of the state as a
promoter and developer of agricultural technologies has diminished considerably
since the Green Revolution, both nationally and internationally. Moreover, it is
corporate actors that are the providers and owners of most research on GM crop
technologies. Most of the concerns about the use of GM crop technologies have
been raised by environmental and consumer non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).
15
Hence, in identifying the main stakeholders in the debates regarding
genetically modified technologies, attention should focus on civic actors
(environmentalists, consumers and small farmer associations), and corporate
actors (multinational and national agribusiness corporations, agro-chemical
manufacturers, seed producers, food manufacturers), in addition to the state.
As a result of the rise of these non-state actors in domestic and
international politics relating to this area, this dissertation proposes to examine

15
NGOs number in the millions, with the larger ones having more financial resources and
expertise than smaller governments and even some international governmental organizations. We
have less money and fewer resources than Amnesty International, and we are the arm of the U.N.
for human rights, noted Ibrahima Fall, head of the U.N Centre for Human Rights in 1993
(Mathews 2003, 541).

8
closely their role, hypothesizing that it may be what accounts for differential state
policies. The research question is why do states with similar concerns and
conditions choose different policies for rDNA crops? The central hypothesis is
that the type of involvement of both non-profit and for-profit non-state actors
accounts for these differences.
Josselin and Wallace (2001) define non-state actors as organizations that
are:
• largely or entirely autonomous from central government funding and control:
emanating from civil society, or from the market economy, or from political
impulses beyond state control and direction;
• acting in ways which affect political outcomes, either within one or more
states or within international institutions either purposefully or semi-
purposefully, either as their primary objective or as one aspect of their activities
(3-4).
This definition covers both civic and corporate actors, but since these
actors often take opposite approaches to GM crop technologies, a distinction
between them is needed for this study. Although both corporate and civic actors
are non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the commonly accepted definition
of NGOs excludes primarily economic actors
16
(Weiss and Gordenker 1996:29).
Since the main economic actors in the GM debate are multinational corporations
17

(MNCs) and national agribusiness, here the terms non-governmental

16
It also excludes criminal elements, churches, and transnational political parties.
17
Multinational companies are companies based in one state with affiliated branches or
subsidiaries operating in other states (Goldstein 1994).

9
organizations (NGOs) and industry or corporate actors are used to differentiate
between types of non-state actors.
18

While scholarship on non-state actors (both NGOs and corporate actors)
beginning in the 1970s (Huntington 1973, Keohane and Nye 1972) looked at the
question of whether non-state actors mattered in international politics, more
recent scholarship has addressed how non-state actors (NSAs) play a role,
focusing on three main areas. One area is the normative impact of NSAs
(Edwards 1998a, 1998b, Carothers 1999, Lipschutz 1992, Rieff 1999, Sinnar
1995): That is, should transnational civil society play a significant part in societal
and state decision-making? In the field of transgenic agriculture, this question has
been raised by those who view rDNA crop technology in a positive light and who
agree with Paarlbergs (2001) conclusion that NGOs are primarily responsible for
precautionary policies towards rDNA crops.
19
In the early literature on MNCs,
commentators often regarded them as distorting or hampering economic
development, but since the 1990s many have seen them as indispensable agents of
development (Chang 2003, 248). Normative research also raises questions of
whether NSAs are legitimate and accountable to their members, stock holders
and/or populations affected (Florini 2000, Rieff, 1999, Schweitz 1995). For
example, the issues of whether and how corporate actors are held accountable for

18
This does not mean these terms are unproblematic. Farmers are economic actors and are key
stakeholders in the GM debate. Also, NGOs can be non-profit and yet function to support
corporate interests, as is the case for biotechnology industrial associations.
19
This type of question also highlights the problem of putting such a diverse group of actors
business and advocacy - under the same rubric, although it does not usually address that problem.

10
damage caused by their GM crop technologies through loss to biodiversity, gene
flow or pesticide drift have been highlighted and challenged (Altieri 2000,
Steinbrecher 1996). With respect to NGOs, critics have questioned whether their
actions to regulate GM crops harm the welfare of the consumers or small farmers
NGOs supposedly work to represent and how such NGOs are accountable to those
constituencies (Prakash 2000, Leisinger 2000).
The second type of study considers the role of NSAs in the context of
globalization and the supposed decline of the state
20
and includes works on social
movements (Josselin and Wallace 2001). Problems that arise from NGO-state
(domestic and transnational) relationships are discussed widely and include issues
such as decreased NGO autonomy, weakened local governments, lack of
accountability, and diverted agendas (Fisher 1993, Bebbington and Riddell 1995,
Sandberg 1994, Slim 1997). With respect to MNCs, the discussions center on
whether MNCs are becoming less and less tied to a particular state through a
process which UNCTAD (1993) refers to as complex integration. In complex
integration, MNCs treat all activities as if they can be carried out by any affiliate.
The MNC statelessness discussion points to two factors relevant to GM policy
decisions: an MNC can lobby directly for its interests in a host country regardless
of where it is headquartered, and it can work for its interests the bilateral state-to-
state relations of the country where it is headquartered.

20
See Shaw 1994, Arnove and Christina 1998, Charnovitz 1997, Ilon 1998, Clough 1999,
Stromquist 1998, Clark 1995, Peterson 1992 about the importance of states vis-à-vis NGOs.

11
The third area addressed in the literature is that of how NSAs participate
in global governance, and examines international and domestic policy processes.
For example, Risse-Kappen (1995) looks at how transnational actors are able to
influence domestic policy, while Keck and Sikkink (1998) theorize about how
transnational advocacy networks operate across national boundaries to influence
both states and international organizations. Moog Rodrigues (2004) argues that
local non-governmental organization (NGO) participation in these transnational
advocacy networks is key to their effectiveness. Rowlands (2001) examines how
multinational corporations (MNCs) influence environmental policy in the global
arena. Studies like these are mainly process-oriented, asking questions such as
how actors are structured, when and where in the policy process they have access,
how they participate or interact, or how cultural settings matter.
According to the literature reviewed above, types of NSA involvement
vary due to three aspects: strategy, extent of organizational resources, and access
to institutional structures.
21
Risse-Kappen (1995) indicates that the institutional
structure plays an important role in mediating the influence of non-state actors.
He determines that institutional structures of governance at the domestic and
international levels mediate the policy impact of non-state actors and have more
explanatory leverage than theoretical approaches such as geopolitical power or

21
The fourth aspect that the NSA literature points to is to look at different stages and levels for
possible influence. Stages include agenda setting, bill or policy debate, policy implementation,
pre-negotiations, negotiations, and post-negotiation standard setting. Gearing action to a particular
stage might be more important than actor strategy or other factors. This aspect will not be included
in this study because the development of policies for rDNA crops in many developing countries
has not finished complete policy cycles. Case selection would be severely limited if this aspect
were included.

12
domestic politics.
22
If the institutional structure allows for participation of NGOs
but not corporate actors, or vice-versa, this difference in access could contribute
to differences in policy outcomes.
However, variation across the institutional structure, for example, in the
types of organizations involved or in the institutional process, could account for
variation in policies, regardless of differences in NSA access to them. In order to
focus on this possibility, a second hypothesis is needed. The second hypothesis is
that variation in institutional context accounts for the differences in policies
towards rDNA crops. While the first hypothesis addresses access to institutional
structures, the institutional structure or process itself rather than differential
access to those by NSAs might account for policy differences, and the second
hypothesis addresses this. Robinson and Snyder (1965) argue that there are three
main clusters of factors that explain decision outcomes: the occasion for the
decision (in this case, the development of rDNA crop technologies), the actors
(farmers, consumers, MNCs, environmentalists, etc.), and the organizational
context. Both the type of process that produced the policies and which institutions
were involved needs to be analyzed. For example, requiring that non-state actors
form part of regulatory committees or publishing open versus non-disclosed
information about the approval of field trials could lead to differing outcomes.
Whether the technology is developed domestically or imported might also
influence policy outcomes. Finally, which organizations have regulatory authority

22
Risse-Kappen posits that stronger state autonomy from societal control, the less the impact of
transnational actors, regardless of the type of non-state actor.

13
over GM crops (Ministry of Environment, Health, Agriculture, Industry) might
also lead to differences in policies.
The two hypotheses are complementary in several ways. First, they work
together to suggest how different non-state actors have access to institutions or to
the policy process, as well as where in the process, and through which institutions.
The hypotheses suggest explanations for how NSAs acted, what they did at
particular moments of history. Together they provide insights into how the
structure constrained or enabled action and whether and how the actor was able to
act.
Scholars disagree about the relative importance of the institutional context
or structure versus the agency of the actors or units. This disagreement is reflected
in the agent-structure debate, which calls into question Waltzs traditional levels
of analysis used in international relations (system, state, individual) by arguing
that structures and units are mutually constitutive, at least in part (Wendt 1996).
Wendt argues that some properties of one level are fixed or constituted by another
but not reducible to them. Under this logic, non-state actors are other units that
mutually, albeit partially, constitute the structure. This perspective confirms the
importance of studying both the influence of the actors and the structure or
institutional context. Questions relevant to the influence of structure on rDNA
policies choices are whether and how institutional settings vary across cases, and
whether access for different types of NSAs (NGOs and MNCs) varies with them.

14
Douglas North (1994, 60) defines institutions as the humanly devised
constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal
constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of
behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes-of-conduct), and their enforcement
characteristics. Together, they define the incentive structure of societies and
specifically economies. How and why particular regulative and normative
systems arise has been a key question of institutional theory and also squarely
addresses the research question of why there are differences in policy choices for
rDNA crops.
Campbell and Pedersen (2001) identify four main approaches to studying
institutional impacts on policy processes: rational choice institutionalism,
organizational institutionalism, discursive institutionalism and historical
institutionalism. With some overlap, each approach emphasizes a different
problematic, which in turn influences the type of questions to be asked or studied.
If all four approaches were used to study the empirical phenomena of differing
rDNA crop policy choices, they might examine different parts of the policy
process and make other discoveries given the differences in the questions they
tend to ask. Where the approaches unite is on the importance of institutions and of
institutional analysis or human behavior within an institutional context. To
determine which approach would best serve this study a brief description of each
is presented below.

15
Rational choice institutionalism focuses on how institutions address
problems of trade or exchange and the production of collective goods. For
example, it looks at transaction costs, principal-agent, collective action and public
goods problems. Institutions are thought to arise to address these problems.
Rational choice institutionalists emphasize the need to look at preferences or
interests to understand mechanisms for change, along with bargaining and conflict
or struggle. Peoples preferences are taken as given; they are not questioned under
this approach (Scott 1995, 29).
23
For this study, taking preferences as given is
problematic for several reasons. With regards to how to regulate rDNA crop
technologies, interests are not always clear and can shift over time. For example
Brazilian farmers who were ambivalent about rDNA crop technologies for corn
24

became opponents of using the technology when they were able to capture market
share because their corn crops were GM free. Proponents of GM technology also
have conflicting interests in its regulation. Proponents need sufficient oversight of
rDNA technology to inspire public confidence in the technology, but not so much
regulation that the increased costs stifle research and development. Thus, their
preferences for specific types of institutions may be unclear, even to themselves.
Historical institutionalism is concerned with how variations in institutions
shape actors capacities for action, policy-making, and institution building. Like

23
The rational choice approach is often used for comparative politics and neo-institutionalist
economic analyses. Olsons 1971 Logic of Collective Action and Norths 1990 Institutions,
Institutional Change and Economic Performance are key works advancing this approach.
24
They were ambivalent because they didnt use them at the present time but could possibly use
them in the future.

16
rational choice institutionalism, it argues that actors will push for institutional
change when they perceive that it is in their best interest political or economic,
to do so. However, it views preferences as socially constructed, changing, and can
even result from rather than precede choices. Historical institutionalists look at
how the differing logics of institutions exist together and may contradict each
other. These contradictions may also bring about change. Path dependence, the
understanding that current choices and possibilities are constrained and
conditioned by past choices, is a key concept. Besides material interests, historical
institutionalists look at the importance of ideas and ideologies in defining
interests. Like rational choice institutionalists they look at struggle or conflicting
interests as impetuses for change, but also consider trial-and-error, learning and
policy feedback loops. Historical institutionalists stress the indeterminate nature
of both preferences and structures, which allows the creation of differing
structures from the same interests as well as similar structures from differing
interests or choices (Scott 1995).
25

A historical institutional approach is best suited to the research question
addressed here for several reasons. It recognizes that actors have differing types
of interests (not only material/instrumental but also political and ideational) that
better captures the preferences of both for-profit and non-profit non-state actors.
Second, it recognizes and accounts for changes in actors preferences. Third, it
looks at conflicts or contradictions between both actor interests and sets of

25
This approach is often used in comparative politics. March and Olsen (1984 and 1989) and
Theda Skocpol (1985 and 1992) provide informative analyses using this approach.

17
institutions. This captures the contradictions between states obligations to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
(CPB), for example, or between provincial and federal laws that regulate rDNA
crops. Finally the concepts of path dependence and trial-and-error help to explain
actor actions in the face of uncertainty, and can subsume the insights from
organizational institutionalism in this regard.
Three levels of analysis are necessary for an historical institutional
explanation of developing countries choices regarding policies for rDNA crops:
international, national/federal and state/provincial. Institutions that influence or
directly regulate rDNA crop technologies at the international level are the
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) (under
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement) of the WTO), the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) (under the WTO), the CPB (under the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CDB)), and the Codex (under the Codex Alimentarius
Commission). At the federal level, the institutions that regulate or decide policies
for rDNA crops include the President (through decree), the courts, the legislative
bodies, and the ministries of health, agriculture, environment, and science and
technology. All of the case studies have federal systems of domestic governance
under which the state, province, and even municipalities have authority to
legislate on agriculture. Thus state and sub-state level policies for rDNA crops

18
can differ from the national policy. For this reason a third level of analysis is
necessary, the sub-federal level.
An alternative way of organizing the institutional analysis would be to
look at the organizational field
26
of agriculture in each case study country.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define an organizational field as those
organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional
life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and
other organizations that produce similar services or products (143).
27
Fields are
defined in terms of a common regulative system, or by shared cognitive or
normative frameworks.
The problem with this approach is that countries have more than one type
of agricultural system. For example in Brazil, there is a Ministry of Agriculture,
28

which is dedicated mainly to export-oriented farmers, and a Ministry of Rural
Development,
29
which is dedicated to helping subsistence farmers and rural
people living in poverty. Understandings of development and institutional
structures differ for these two agricultural systems. Differences between these

26
Otero, 1995, suggests two other approaches or a combination of them: analysis of global
commodity chains and/or bottom-up linkages.
27
Other authors have developed similar concepts such as Hirschs industry system or Meyer and
Scotts societal sector. This level of analysis was created to examine a set of differentiated,
interdependent organizations.
28
The complete title is the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Provisions (Ministério da
Agricultura,Pecuária e Abastecimento), and its mission is to formulate and implement policies to
development agribusiess, integrating market, technological, organizational and environmental
aspects, to attend to domestic and foreign consumers, to promote food security, the generation of
profits and employment, the reduction of inequalities and social inclusion.
(http://www.agricultura.gov.br/)
29
The mission of this ministry is to create opportunities for rural populations to reach full
citizenship. (http://www.agricultura.gov.br/)

19
agricultural systems are important to capture, because they may have contrasting
policy implications for rDNA crops. For example, protection of traditional
knowledge and biodiversity is central to subsistence farmers, so strong biosafety
policies and a sui generis property rights policy would help them, while export-
oriented farmers could benefit from laxer biosafety policies since they do not
depend directly on biodiversity. In this study, these differences will be captured
using the international/domestic/sub-federal levels of analysis approach.
Furthermore, the three levels of analysis approach facilitates examination of the
roles the range of non-state actors.
Keck and Sikkinks (1998) work on transnational advocacy networks
30

provides insights into how to study NSAs access to institutional structures at the
domestic and international levels. The goal of transnational advocacy networks
(TNAs) is to change the behavior of states and international organizations. Keck
and Sikkink describe the pattern of interaction of states, intergovernmental
organizations and NGOs as follows: First NGOs pressure their own state (A) but
are blocked.
31
They network with NGOs in state B who then pressure their state
(B) to pressure state A and pertinent intergovernmental organizations to make
change. NGOs also pressure the intergovernmental organizations directly. A
similar pattern of interaction can be expected for MNCs or corporate actors if one

30
These networks include those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are
bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and
services (1998:2). The authors differentiate types of transnational networks based on motivations.
For example, transnational companies have mainly instrumental goals, while transnational
advocacy networks are motivated by shared principled ideas or values. (ibid, 30).
31
As Moog Rodriques (2004) notes, these local NGOs are key to overall TNA effectiveness.

20
replaces NGOs with MNCs in the above framework. This framework is useful to
analyze how non-state actors might have influenced policy decisions for rDNA
crops because it shows how NGOs or MNCs might work through another state or
an intergovernmental organization to affect policies in state A (the case study
state). This framework implies that at least two institutional levels of analysis are
needed for looking at how NSAs might influence crop policies: domestic and
international.
32
Specific intergovernmental organizations that could pressure
states with respect to policies for rDNA crops are the World Trade Organization,
the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Codex Alimentarius Commission,
and the UN Food and Agricultural Organization.
In addition to the institutional context, however, are the strategies the
NSAs employ, as Risse-Kappens 1995 study on NSAs demonstrates. Moreover,
he argues that actor strategies are more important for the success or failure of
NSA objectives than the internal organization or resources they command. The
degree of institutionalization and power resources of a non-state actor do matter,
but do not determine success or failure. Thus, the Risse-Kappen study indicates
that the type of strategy used by a non-state actor might be an important factor in
determining the outcome of policy choice for rDNA crops. The Risse-Kappen
study does not examine which type of non-state actor has more influence in a
given state or issue-area nor does it differentiate between types (corporate/MNC
and civic/NGO) of non-state actors. If domestic and international structures

32
Risse-Kappen (1995) also points out the necessity of looking at institutional structures at both
the domestic and international levels.

21
privilege or limit both NGO and corporate actors equally, then the strategies they
employ may become even more crucial.
In one of the few large n studies of environmental NGOs, Dalton, Recchia
and Rohrschneider (2003) found that characteristics of a particular organization,
that is, its resources and ideology,
33
had more influence on which strategies it
utilized than domestic political structures did.
34
However, they also found that the
more resources
35
an organization had, the more likely it was to use every type of
strategy, and the more active it was. This finding indicates that the greater the
resources a non-state actor has, the more active it should be, regardless of the
strategies it uses. This suggests that some NSAs have greater capacity for action
and possibly more influence on policy outcomes due simply to greater resources.
Rowlands (2001) examines how multinational corporations (MNCs)
influence global environmental policy, specifically. Rowlands looks at both
tactics used and stages or levels. He also addresses under what general conditions
MNCs have been more effective. Tactics include lobbying home governments,
lobbying foreign governments, public education, and participating in international
negotiations. With respect to stages or levels, Rowlands concludes that MNCs

33
Although the authors found that ideology shaped organizations choices of strategies the main
difference was a matter of degree. All organizations still utilized all strategies available.
34
The Dalton, Recchia and Rohrschneider (2003) study does not negate Risse-Kappens finding
that the political structure mediates NSA policy influence. [P]olicy success may vary with the
composition of government but not their [ENGO] policy effort. (Dalton, Recchia and
Rohrschneider 2003, 764). The Dalton, Recchia and Rohrschneider (2003) looks at what kinds of
strategy ENGOs use and how often they use each kind. These authors found that every type of
strategy is used across the spectrum of political structures. They found that protest strategies were
used more often in more democratic countries.
35
Resources were measured in terms of number of employees, budget, and membership.

22
may have more influence in the early days of issue formation or agenda setting,
and then again in technical committees which hammer out details of international
negotiations. Also, he notes that when MNCs are united they have more
influence, and that they are more successful in influencing environmental policy
when no formal international negotiations take place.
In short, Risse-Kappen, Keck and Sikkink, Dalton, Recchia and
Rohrschneider and Rowlands all point to the importance of actor strategies in
achieving their objectives. As mentioned above, Risse-Kappen emphasizes that
strategies can be more important than either resources or organization while
Dalton, Recchia and Rohrschneider found that organizational resources do matter
in that the more resources a group has, the more active the group is, regardless of
the strategies they employ.
36
Building from this literature, in order to measure the
non-state actor influence on policy choices for rDNA crops three factors are
looked at: non-state actor access to regulatory institutions and processes, the
strategies that non-state actors employed, and the resources available to NSAs.
In order to track whether actor strategies influenced policy outcomes,
some type of strategy categorization is needed. Keck and Sikkink describe a
typology of four tactics that advocacy networks often use: information politics,
symbolic politics, leverage politics and accountability politics (1998, 16). Dalton,
Recchia and Rohrschneider categorize activities as mobilizing, networking,
conventional and protest. These categorizations do not overlap completely. Each

36
Their study only looks at environmental NGOs.

23
captures insights that the other leaves out. Thus I combine these categorizations
together below, giving a brief description of each category and examples of
concrete actions that they include. Although this categorization allows for
separate noting of strategies, they are usually used concurrently. Organizations
must meet multiple goals simultaneously, such as critiquing governmental policy,
recruiting new members, providing alternative policies, creating alliances, and
maintaining resources. These multiple goals call for the simultaneous use of
different strategies.
The first type of tactic used is informational. This strategy includes
collecting and imparting facts and testimonies, and researching and uncovering
problems. Examples of specific activities include public education, participating
in negotiations, commissions or advisory committees, contacting people in the
alternative and mainstream media, creating newsletters, websites, or other media
outlets, participation in and organization of demonstrations, and direct actions.
Dalton, Recchia and Rohrschneider differentiate between actions that are
conventional and confrontational, or protest. For them, demonstrations, direct
actions and litigation constitute protest or confrontation, while the other activities
are conventional. Other than distinguishing protest activities, their overall
framework is fluid in that tactics can be included in more than one category. For
this reason, the categorization used here is based mainly on Keck and Sikkinks
typology.

24
A second type of tactic is networking. This includes informal meetings
with governmental actors,
37
formal contact with governmental actors, contact with
other similar groups (MNC-MNC, NGO-NGO), and contact with other non-state
actors. Networking is fundamental to transnational advocacy networks, yet a
category that illustrates that this takes place is noticeably absent from the Keck
and Sikkink typology. I have included this category using examples of activities
noted by Dalton, Recchia and Rohrschneider.
The third type of tactic is the use of symbolic politics. This is the
interpretation of events or occurrences to make them meaningful to the wider
public and to use them to guide action. David Snows (1986) concept of frame
alignment falls under this category. This category captures the resonance or
success of the frame and can be classified on a continuum (successful, mixed
reactions, unsuccessful). A frame must fit or resonate within the wider cultural
and historical juncture. For example, researchers at the Center for the
Environment and Technology
38
labeled attempts at creating self-sterilizing seeds
as terminator technology,
39
in reference to a set of popular movies in which
machines overtake planet earth. This is a case of successful framing because not
only did the label catch on quickly and help to mobilize the public, the main
developers of this rDNA technology promised not to commercialize the

37
This category is sometimes refined to distinguish between civil servants, ministers, local
authorities, members of federal committees or national parties, etc.
38
At the time the Center was called the Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI).
39
Another name for this technology is genetic use restriction technology or GURT.

25
technology in response to public demand.
40
In their 1998 study, Keck and Sikkink
found that the success of various campaigns on the part of transnational advocacy
networks depended in part on whether the issue fit within the national discourse
of the state.
A fourth type of tactic is using leverage. This involves linking an issue
with something else of value, such as money, trade, reputation, technology, votes,
or jobs. Patents, compulsory licensing, technology transfer and research
laboratories are examples of tools of leverage that could be used by MNCs.
Conversely, protection of Vavilov centers of origin
41
could be used as a leverage
tool by environmental NGOs. Debt-for-nature swaps are a type of leverage tactic
that has been employed by environmental NGOs in various countries.
The final type of tactics is accountability strategies. Here actors use
existing laws, pronouncements or contracts and attempt to hold states or other
parties to them. Legal recourse through the courts or judicial bodies is a key tactic
used by both MNCs and NGOs in this regard.

40
In a case of unsuccessful framing, the biotechnology industry launched a public relations
campaign in Europe to promote the idea that GM technology would be helpful to people in the
Third World, using pictures of hunger people. Rather than accepting this frame, the campaign had
the counter effect with the public perceiving the industry as unscrupulously utilizing images of
hungry people.
41
Russian scientist N. Vavilov identified nine centers of origin in the world, where key crops
were initially domesticated and evolved (1951). All of the centers of origin are located in
developing countries. Vavilov centers are critical locations for genetic resources of the worlds
crops because of their on-going processes of crop evolution such as gene flow between wild
relatives and cultivated types and decentralized selection by farmers. Diversity in these centers is
abundant and it is valuable because it is needed to fight against future pest and disease. Ex- situ
gene banks do not provide the security of the in-situ diversity of centers of origin because very
little seed is stored in banks, and any stored seed has not adapted to changing environmental
conditions. Also, knowledge about the seeds and plants may be lost.

26
To summarize how both of the hypotheses might look in relation to the
policies for rDNA crops, a few hypothetical situations are outlined below. First,
looking at non-state actor influence, NSA access, strategies and resources are
considered. If access for one type of NSA is privileged over others, one could
expect the preferences of the privileged group to influence policy outcomes. For
example, if industry actors are given access to the institutional structure while
NGO actors are not, one could expect more promotional policies for rDNA crops.
Whether or not access is equal, a particular strategy that industry actors or NGOs
use might swing policy choices toward their preferences. All other things being
equal, the more resources a particular type of non-state actor has, the more likely
it is that that actor will influence policies. With respect to institutional structures,
one could expect international institutions and regulations to constrain the choices
of national governments, when such institutions exist. International institutions
could also influence policy decisions by providing a model to follow. At the
national level, centralizing the regulatory process within one institution should
privilege the preferences of that institution. For example, if the regulatory
processes are predominantly under the department of agriculture, then agricultural
over environmental issues should be privileged in policy outcomes. On the other
hand, if the regulatory processes are primarily under environmental entities,
policies which privilege environmental safety should be noted. Finally, if sub-
national institutions (for example state and municipal governments) make more

27
precautionary laws regarding rDNA crops, then one could expect national laws to
follow a similar trend.
While the works cited above focus on how different types of non-state
actors can influence organs of politics, namely states and intergovernmental
organizations, targets of action also include other non-state actors. Peter Willetts
(2001) has created a diagram that captures the interconnectedness of political
action in terms of both actors and targets. (See Figure 1).

Alternative Explanations
Certainly there are other possible factors that could explain differential
adoption of policies for rDNA crops. One such argument is that policies for rDNA
crops are created according to how governments envision rDNA crops as helping
the national economy. Depending on how the government viewed the use of
rDNA crops as improving or hindering gains, one should expect that government
to create promotional or preventive policies, respectively. Other authors have also
Figure 1. Political connections
Intergovernment
al organizations
Pure INGOS and
hybrid INGOs
Government
NGOSs MNCs
Government
MNCs NGOs

28
argued that a country might initially create a precautionary (but not preventive)
policy environment in order to give national companies or the national public
sector time to develop their own rDNA crop varieties, and then switch to more
promotional policies once those were ready.
There are two ways to confirm or disconfirm these hypotheses. One is to
examine gains and losses in market share looking at crops where GM technology
is available commercially: soybeans, corn, canola, and cotton. Another way is to
examine the policies of a countrys main export partners for those crops. For
example, if a country plans to export most of its soybeans to Japan, and Japan has
a moratorium on GM soybeans, one would expect the exporting country to grow
GM-free soybeans. The general trend (before de-aggregating data by crop)
suggests that the policies of export partners does not have much influence on
developing country policy choices for GM crops. The European Union is the most
important export market for all three case studies (representing approximately
20% of all exports for each case study), followed by the US. The European Union
has the most stringent laws regarding rDNA products, and those laws have tended
to become more comprehensive over time. Of the three case studies, Argentina
has the most dependence on the European Union for its agricultural export
markets, and yet its policies for rDNA crops are furthest from those of the EU.
The case of Mexico also goes against this hypothesis. The US is by far its main
trading partner, representing almost 89% of its total export market, and yet

29
Mexican policies towards rDNA crops have continuously been more restrictive
than those of the US.
42

International indebtedness may also influence why a country adopts
particular policies for rDNA crops. A number of public international lending
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund require
states to implement neoliberal policies in order to receive funds from these
institutions. Neoliberal policies include the creation and enforcement of
intellectual property rights, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the
deregulation of industry. However, this conditionality could help to explain why
indebted developing countries policies might converge, but not why they might
differ.
A second way that international indebtedness might influence policies for
rDNA crops is through the obligations indebtedness creates. Each country must
make payments on its foreign debt using foreign exchange earnings. Agricultural
exports supply part of those earnings, and many developing countries rely heavily
on international agricultural markets. Even in times of declining prices it is
difficult to reorient agriculture to meet domestic needs because of the need for
those foreign exchange earnings. Instead, countries often try to produce even
more, and this further depresses prices through increased supply.
43
Although

42
All data is from 2003. The source is WTO statistics, available on-line at
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/ . Although limiting data further might provide more support for
this hypothesis, the general trend does not indicate that it is worth pursuing.
43
Even though increasing yields may drive down the price, if all others increase yields those that
dont will suffer from both decreased prices and fewer products to sell.

30
international indebtedness spurs to drive to increase agricultural exports,
44
this
constraint by itself it does not determine which type of polices for rDNA crops a
country might adopt.
Another rival explanation for differing policies for rDNA crops is the
influence of the last remaining superpower, the United States. The United
States is an extraordinarily powerful state in terms of military, economic and
political strength. Therefore, one could ask whether or not the United States
government unilaterally influences policy choice with respect to rDNA crops.
Furthermore, US-based multinational companies have virtual monopoly
ownership of all transgenic crops in use commercially. This confluence of
hegemonic governmental and corporate power should lead toward policies
favored by the US and US-based companies. The greatest political and economic
rival to the US and US-based companies is the European Union (EU). Since the
EU policies toward genetically modified crops clearly and greatly differ from
those of the United States, examination of the influence of the US on developing
country policies would be useful more useful than a developed versus
developing country (North-South) analysis.
Hegemonic stability theory (HST) argues that a hegemon, a state with a
preponderance of power in the international system of states, provides some order
for itself and other states. Hegemonic power is often defined in military or

44
Three international markets exist for agricultural exports: a market that accepts all types of
products, a market which gives a premium for GM-free agricultural produce, and a market which
provides a larger premium for organic produce. However in terms of size, the first market is the
biggest and the latter is a small or niche market.

31
economic terms, but also in terms of ideas that are deemed legitimate by the ruled.
If one state is hegemonic, it is able to enforce the rules and norms of a regime
unilaterally, and thus avoid collective goods problems. Those that regard the
hegemon as benevolent argue that what is in the interests of the hegemon is in the
interests of all states. The hegemon bears mosts of the costs of maintaining this
system but also receives most of the gains. Realists, in contrast, see hegemons as
selfish, as pursuing a mercantilist strategy of dominance.
These two approaches would help to explain why developing countries
policies, and indeed use of rDNA crops, could be expected to converge once they
have adopted rDNA crops. The US has developed most rDNA technologies and
holds intellectual property over most rDNA processes and products. It is the
largest producer of rDNA crops. It is able to enforce the intellectual property
rights regime over rDNA crops by limiting use of those crops and technologies in
countries that do not offer property rights protection.
45
The US also enforces the
intellectual property rights regime through the use of its domestic trade law (the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988), often called Super 301.
46

Super 301 requires the United States to retaliate against countries that fail to relax
their major barriers to trade as identified by the United States Trade

45
Conversely, it could decide to promote use of this technology through technology transfer, aid
that includes rDNA seed, or under-pricing rDNA technology and thus help rDNA technology
become the norm rather than a novelty in agricultural production.
46
It is called Super 301 after section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, which allowed the President to
tax Americans purchases of products from countries that had unfair barriers to U.S. exports.

32
Representative (USTR).
47
Although the US has not actually used sanctions with
regard to rDNA crops it has in other situations, so the threat exists. Another way
that the US uses its hegemonic power is promote its safety assessment of rDNA
crops and challenge any other findings of risk. Currently the US has a case against
the EU within the Dispute Resolution Mechanism of the WTO because it views
European regulations on rDNA crops and products as protectionist rather than as
based on scientifically substantiated risks. A third way that the US uses its
hegemonic power with respect to rDNA crops is to oppose measures to protect
biosafety and biodiversity. It is not a member of the Convention on Biological
Diversity nor of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. It works to limit the
effectiveness of these instruments by not being a party.
The HST approach is useful for explaining why policies could be expected
to converge, especially in areas of intellectual property rights, but not why they
would differ. Those countries with greater trade dependence on the US should
have rDNA policies more similar to those of the US.
48
However, as examined
above, this general trend does not hold. The HST explanation also aggregates the
interests of parties to the state level, hiding conflicting interests within them
which might explain policy differences.

47
Super 301 differs from Section 301 in that it limits the presidents discretionary power to
determine whether trade retaliation is in the countrys best interests. On April 1, 1999, a
Presidential order reinstated the Super 301 authority for 3 years. The executive order requires the
USTR to identify a watch list (Priority Foreign Countries, PFC) based on the market access
aspects of the National Trade Estimate. The watch list includes countries which do not have
sufficiently rigorous intellectual property rights laws, or implementation of those laws. It threatens
trade sanctions if countries on the list do not improve.
48
Those countries with more trade reliance on the EU should have policies more in line with the
EU.

33
Immanuel Wallersteins (1974) world-system theory (WST) offers a
second imperialistic
49
explanation for rDNA policy choices. World system theory
argues that world economy is divided into different positions - the core,
semiperiphery and periphery. Capital-intensive industrialized countries with
skilled labor are considered core countries, while monoculture and slave, coerced
or low-paid labor are characteristic of peripheral countries. Semiperipheral
countries are a combination of the two and also serve as a bridge or a protective
barrier. Local or domestic class hierarchies fit into the working of the world-
system in a similar pattern. Under this theory, the United States is a core country
and the case studies are semiperipheral, but these categories are not reified.
Technological advances are seen as one of the ways through which a
semiperipheral country might become a core country. Like HST, however, WST
does more to explain why semiperipheral developing countries
50
might choose
policies that promote rDNA crops, but not why they might create restrictive
policies.
A final alternative explanation that might account for developing
countries policies choices for GM crops is based on their experiences with Green
Revolution technologies. The Green Revolution technology package included the
use of mainly hybrid seeds that increased yields when used with chemical inputs

49
The imperialist aspect of this theory is the incessant drive to accumulate capital, and wealth is
the source of power.
50
Peripheral developing countries cannot be considered among the case studies because they lack
the basic infrastructure and research base needed to adapt rDNA technologies to local climate, soil
and crop conditions. The use of rDNA technology is not an option for them because they have
neither the money to purchase the technology nor the infrastructure to develop it themselves.

34
such as chemical fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides. The Green Revolution
benefited large farmers with access to irrigation, machinery and credit. Small
farmers were harmed coming and going on the input end they could not adopt
the technology package or all the needed components, and on the output end those
few crops that they could produce fetched a lower market price, due to overall
increased yields. Income disparities between rich and poor widened and
landownership conflict intensified. If a country had an overall positive experience
from adapting this technology package and system of agriculture, one could
expect a promotional policies towards GM crops, since GM technology continues
with this type of input-dependent agricultural package. If a country had negative
or mixed positive and negatives outcomes from the use of Green Revolution
technology, one could expect policies for GM crop technology to be more
cautious, as to avoid or divert negative externalities associated with use of GM
technology. Two problems exist with this explanation. One, the Green Revolution
technology package was adopted less in certain countries and areas because the
varieties were not suitable to local conditions or due to other factors, such as the
lack of credit for agriculture. Likewise GM crop technologies became available
for certain crops and regions before others but the countries and regions were
not the same for the two technology packages, making an adequate comparison
difficult. The second problem is that peoples and policy-makers perceptions of
the overall success or failure of the Green Revolution have differed within the
same country.

35
Each of these alternative explanations will be briefly revisited in the
concluding chapter.

Methodology
This examination of why similarly situated developing countries chose
different policies for rDNA crops will use a comparative case study approach.
The selection of developing country cases was based on two criteria:
variation in their policies toward transgenic crop technologies; and variation in
usage of rDNA crop technologies. While cases were selected for specific policy
variation, attempts were made to hold other conditions/variables constant. The
conditions held relatively constant included the potential leadership among or
influence on other developing countries, the level of institutional development,
the type of international institutional obligations, national agricultural research
and extension capabilities, applicability of current GM technology, presence of
both NGOs and MNCs, and similar social-economic standing. These conditions
were held constant in order to help strengthen the validity of the findings.
Language limitations of the researcher were another practical influence on
country choice.
Persley (1989, 1990ab) and the World Bank (1991) divide developing
countries into four main categories: 1) those with an interest but no direct
involvement in rDNA; 2) those with a national policy and research program,
mainly in conventional biotechnologies, which were monitoring international

36
developments; 3) those with a national policy and research program, mainly in
conventional biotechnologies, which had established collaborative linkages with
industrialized countries, and 4) those with a national policy and research program
in rDNA, complemented by strong international linkages in both the public and
private sectors. Most developing countries belonged to the first three categories at
the beginning of the 1990s. For this study, all countries are selected from category
3. Furthermore all three countries were predicted by Monsanto
51
to be early users
of transgenic crop technologies. In spite of these similar starting points, the three
case studies developed varying policy trajectories.
India, Brazil and Argentina are the developing countries selected for
study. Besides leadership in their respective regions, India and Brazil are
important cases for the study of transgenic crop technologies for a number of
reasons. Both countries are centers for biodiversity, and environmental safety is a
key area of concern. Both countries face chronic and widespread food security
and hunger concerns. A large percentage of their populations works in agriculture,
and agriculture plays an important role in both countries' gross domestic products.
India and Brazil have mixed policies toward transgenic crop technologies. While
their usage of rDNA crop technologies varies slightly, it is low for both countries.
Argentina was one of the first countries to use transgenic crop
technologies and is currently one of the main players in the transgenic
marketplace. It provides an important contrast to the Indian and Brazilian cases in

51
Monsanto has consistently been one of the top five global agricultural life sciences companies.

37
this respect and was chosen mainly for this reason. Argentina is the third largest
world exporter of soybeans, and most of its soy is now transgenic. It competes
directly with Brazil, the second largest soy exporter. Both Brazil and Argentina
are members of the Mercosur as well as other international trade, environment
and health agreements.
52
Argentina varies from the other two cases both in terms
of usage of rDNA crop technologies and policies toward them.
While this study offers a comparative analysis of policies for transgenic
crop technologies in specific developing countries, caution should be taken
regarding generalizing conclusions to all or other developing countries. Each of
the case study countries shared the criteria of being a regional leader, having both
NGO and MNC stakeholders, having the infrastructure to use transgenic crop
technologies, and being predicted to be early adopters. Greater variation in
national agricultural research infrastructure, or presence of NGOs and MNCs in
the national context, for example could lead to policy differences in other
countries.
Sources for the study include semi-structured interviews with non-state
actors, information provided by these actors (both corporate and NGO),
government documents, and the mainstream press (newspaper and magazines).
Mainstream press information is also used to provide a check on the information
provided by the non-state actors.

52
Mexico, another regional leader that has used GM crop technologies since 1995, was also
considered. Argentina was selected because it provided greater policy contrast while maintaining
more similarities with the Brazilian case.

38
Structure of the Case Studies
In the case-study chapters, the actual policy choices made from 1996-2002
are examined for Brazil, India and Argentina. The study begins with the year
1996 because transgenic crops were first commercially released in 1995, and one
year was allowed to establish base data. Before beginning the case studies, the
international institutional context for rDNA crops is examined. Each case study
begins with a general introduction and then addresses five policy decision areas
that pertain to rDNA crop technologies. The introductory section of the case
studies includes general information about the country, specific information about
the state of agriculture in each case, and an overview of the national regulatory
structure for GM crops. The five policy decision areas were chosen based on the
debates surrounding rDNA crops that involved policy making. A summary of
evolution of the polices is presented in table format in each section. Event
chronologies for each case study are also included as annexes.
For each case study, four aspects are addressed: the institutional context,
NSA access to the institutional structure, NSA strategies, and organizational
resources. With respect to the institutional context, both the institutional structure
in terms of organizations involved and hierarchy among them is examined, as
well as the process through which rDNA crop policies are made. NSA access is
evaluated in terms of whether NSAs have access, if access is uniform across NSA
type, and conditions that facilitate or constrain access. The strategies of NGOs
and MNCs examined at three levels of analysis: international, federal and sub-

39
state. Organizational resources are considered when analyzing conditions that
facilitate or constrain NSA access.

Classifying Policies for rDNA Crops
The classification used here is based on Paarlbergs (2001) Politics of
Precaution: Genetically Modified Crops in Developing Countries, with some
modifications.
53
Paarlberg classifies governmental policies in terms of whether
they tend to promote or prevent the use of rDNA technology. The scale has four
gradients: promotional, permissive, precautionary and preventive. A promotional
policy is one designed to accelerate the spread of rDNA crop technologies. A
permissive policy attempts to be neutral toward rDNA technology, neither
accelerating nor decelerating. A precautionary policy intends to slow its use for
public good reasons but without banning the technology. A preventive policy tries
to ban or block the use of the technology.
Intellectual Property Rights
The purpose of intellectual property rights is to promote innovations for
the public good. Traditionally, governments did not give intellectual property
rights over crop breeding technologies or the plants or seeds themselves. Property
rights began to be awarded with the creation of hybrids and brought about more

53
Paarlberg looks at 1999-2000 and categorizes the policies of four developing countries during
that time period.

40
private sector research in agriculture. Governmental
54
intellectual property rights
for crops have taken two main forms, patents or plant variety protection. A patent
gives a company or individual the right to exclude others from making, using
selling or importing an invention for a specific period of time.
55
Plant variety
protection allows breeders to commercially control their new varieties for a
specific period of time, but allows others to use those varieties to improve upon
them.
In order for a plant variety to receive intellectual property protection it
must meet the criteria of being distinct, and producing uniform and stable results.
While these criteria are beneficial to large-scale monoculture agriculture, they are
detrimental to small and medium farmers in that they lead to a decrease in the
number of varieties available. This IPR standard also contributes to the loss of
biodiversity planet-wide. Traditionally, small farmers have reduced the risk of
crop loss by planting a combination of varieties that have different water needs
and pest tolerance properties (ActionAid Brasil 2001, 4). In order to avoid this
damage to the public good, issues of biodiversity, traditional knowledge and
sustainable agriculture must be addressed concurrently with IPR stipulations.
For purposes of policy classification, Paarlberg defines promotional
policies as those that extend patent protection and plant variety protection to

54
The private sector has created additional intellectual property rights protections, such as
contracts at the time of purchase or the packaging of technology with additional agreements,
beyond what is stipulated by law.
55
Patent protection can be tempered by compulsory licensing, which allows other companies to
use a patented product or process, albeit for a fee.

41
rDNA varieties. The United States has this type of IPR policies, and it is also the
primary owner and user of rDNA technologies. A permissive policy, on the other
hand, would be one that denies patent protection for life forms, but does give
plant variety protection to rDNA crops under a plant breeders rights system.
56

Most European countries have adopted such policies.
57
A permissive policy
would include creating a domestic law that meets the standards of the 1991
version of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV). An earlier, weaker version of the UPOV from 1978 also exists, and
policies that adhere to its standards are classified as precautionary:
58
The 1978
version explicitly protects farmers right to use, save and exchange --but not sell--
otherwise protected seeds for their own farms. The 1991 UPOV does not
explicitly protect farmers rights and it also allows patent protection on top of
breeders protections, though not as broadly as US patent law.
A preventive policy would be one that does not provide any IPR
protections, to decrease incentives to companies wishing to promote rDNA crops.

56
This type of policy essentially affords rDNA crop technologies the same type of IPR protections
as hybrid crop varieties. In that way it permits the use of rDNA crops put does not give them
greater assistance through stricter IPRs. At the same time, governments have the option of later
deciding to allow additional IPR support for rDNA crops or technologies.
57
Some see this type of policy as protectionist in that a country can help its own companies or
national research in rDNA technology develop in a more lax IPR environment and then later
heighten the IPR standards when they have caught up. For others this is a function of path
dependence in that countries continue to give the same type of protection that they did to older
types of agricultural technologies.
58
This type of policy allows for two types of precautions: 1) protection of small and subsistence
farmers and their traditional and indigenous knowledge through maintaining the status quo in their
rights, and 2) caution in allowing greater private sector, and especially multinational corporate
control, over research in rDNA agricultural technologies. This type of IPR might be a disincentive
to multinational companies to sell its rDNA technologies in a particular country, but at the same
time create a better environment for national public sector research in rDNA crops, which
inherently have greater concern for public sector impacts.

42
Many countries do not offer any intellectual property rights on plants because
most of the breeding, research and seed trade is done by farmers for their own
gain or survival and through the public sector for the collective good. Such
countries may also seek to protect their national indigenous germplasm, whether
natural or created, through farmers widespread and continual in situ research and
breeding. Finally, some countries still do not offer IPRs on plants and animals
because of ethical considerations, as noted above.
A summary of the classification of intellectual property rights policy
gradients follows in Table 1.
Table 1. Classification of intellectual property rights (IPRs) for rDNA crops
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Patent protection
plus plant
breeders rights
(PBR) under
UPOV 1991
PBR under
UPOV 1991
PBR under
UPOV 1978
No IPRs for
plants or animals

Trade Policies Affecting rDNA Crops
The easiest way to promote, or prevent, use or research into rDNA crop
technologies could be to control imports of rDNA seeds and plant materials at the
border. Many policies already exist with respect to agricultural imports and
exports with objectives that vary from protecting national food security, to
increasing market share, to safeguarding animal and plant health. The focus here
is strictly on those policies aimed at the flow of rDNA crops and crop
technologies. A promotional policy would impose no additional screening of

43
rDNA imports, treating them the same as other agricultural imports. A permissive
policy would screen all rDNA imports based on the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
(SPS) Agreement of the WTO, possibly treating them differently but not
regulating them more stringently than non-rDNA crops. A precautionary policy
would require more or different screenings of rDNA imports in comparison with
conventional agricultural imports. These could include additional testing, greater
information requirements, labeling, or prior notification requirements. A
preventive policy would impose a ban or moratorium on the import of rDNA
commodities, products or plant materials. Some countries have even rejected
rDNA food aid. A summary of the classification of trade policy gradients follows
in Table 2.
Table 2. Classification of trade policies for rDNA crops
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
No regulation of
rDNA seeds or
plant materials
Regulate rDNA
seeds and plant
materials in
accordance with
SPS agreement
and no more
tightly than non-
RDNA crops
Regulate rDNA
seeds and plant
materials more
tightly and with
different
screenings or
requirements
Block all rDNA
imports through
ban or moratorium

Biosafety Policies
While biosafety is a new term, the environmental problems it refers to are
not new. Biohazards can come from any type of agricultural crop: GM,
conventional, organic, wild. Types of biohazards include competition with or

44
damage to desirable species, unwanted gene flow, unwanted resistance to
herbicides or insecticides, the creation of new pathogens, and loss in biodiversity.
In developed countries, all agricultural plants are screened for possible unintended
biohazards. Sometimes biosafety and food safety regulations are argued to be
disguised protectionist measures for national economies. At the same time, such
regulation actually legitimizes and enables the trade and production of GM crops
and products through the reduction of safety risks.
For biosafety policies, a promotional policy might include no biosafety
screening for any new crops or only token screening. Field trials could focus on
agronomic performance but little or not at all on biohazard concerns. A
permissive policy would screen new rDNA crops for conventional biosafety risks
and to look for evidence of risks based on their intended use. Conventional crops
would be screened in the same way. A precautionary policy would screen rDNA
crops to avoid both known risks and hypothetical risks based on scientific
uncertainty. This screening process would be stricter than that for conventional
crops. A preventive policy would assume rDNA crops were risk-inherent and be
denied on that principle until further research is conducted. Table 3 summarizes
the policy gradients for biosafety.

45
Table 3. Classification of Biosafety Policies

Food Safety and Consumer Choice
The problem with determining safety of food developed through novel
technologies is that one does not know what to look for problems are novel as
well. One of the ways countries have responded to this environment of
uncertainty is to call for labeling of genetically modified products and to let the
consumer decide. Labeling enables consumers to make decisions about food
safety beyond what governmental policies allow. In countries where GM products
are not labeled, consumers still have the option of choosing organic seed and
food.
59

With respect to policy choices, those governments wishing to promote
rDNA crops could conclude from the record of hazards, that rDNA foods do not
pose novel food safety risks that merit special treatment. Taking that stance,
promotional food safety regulation and labeling would be the same for both rDNA
and conventional crops. Voluntary GM-free labeling is allowed. Labeling of

59
This choice requires a level of consumer awareness and knowledge of food and food production
beyond the appearance, texture, taste, smell and label information at the point of sale.
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
No screening or
token screening
only, or
approval based
on other
countries
approval
Screening for
demonstrated
risk, based on
intended use of
product
Comprehensive
screening for
demonstrated
risks and
scientific
uncertainties
No approval
because risk
assumed

46
rDNA products is required only when the food composition has changed or if it
presents a new health or safety risk.
60
A permissive policy would allow separate
screening processes for rDNA and conventional foods and different label
requirements for rDNA and conventional foods. For example, European Union
countries require labeling of all foods containing detectable rDNA-derived
materials above 1% per ingredient. A precautionary policy would create a higher
standard of screening for rDNA foods, testing for both known risks and
hypothetical hazards. The burden of proof would lie heavily on the product
producer. Labeling could include all rDNA foods, even meat from animals raised
on rDNA feed. This type of labeling would require strict market segregation for
all rDNA and conventional commodities and animal products, from farm to table.
This is a very costly system for countries growing both kinds of crops, yet this is
the system that organic products utilize. A preventive policy could either ban the
sale of rDNA foods or require labeling of all rDNA foods which include
stigmatizing warnings.
61
A total ban may be cheaper than regulation of dual food
production systems. Table 4 summarizes the policy gradients for food safety and
consumer choice.

60
While a food safety issue, levels of screenings for changes in food composition or health and
safety risks are contemplated under the trade section above. The type of screening chosen will
have an impact on the type of food safety policy.
61
Stigmatizing warnings range from those found on infant formula that reiterate that breast milk is
best to those found on tobacco and alcohol products specifying possible damaging consequences.

47
Table 4. Food safety and consumer choice policy classification
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
No distinction
made between
rDNA and
conventional
food for testing
or labeling
Differing
screening
processes for
rDNA and
conventional
foods, labeling of
rDNA based on
detectable content
Differing and
more stringent
screening
processes for
rDNA foods,
comprehensive
labeling of all
rDNA foods
enforced through
market
segregation
Ban sale of rDNA
foods or require
comprehensive
labeling of all
rDNA foods with
warnings

Public Research
Transgenic crop technologies were created by agribusiness, for their
investment interests. They focus on the principle export commodities or on high
value-added crops such as tobacco. In order to make rDNA technologies useful to
the rural poor who make up a large proportion of citizens in most developing
countries, those countries must invest their citizens funds into public research.
The rural poor do not provide a consumer base sought by agribusiness (Otero
1995, Qaim and de Janvry 2003).
Public research funds for agricultural research tend to come from a variety
of sources. They include the public sector international institutions, the
Rockefeller Foundation, and government to government or bilateral assistance,
besides national funding. Overall, approximately twice as much funding comes
from national sources as from foreign donors (Persley 2000).

48
With this knowledge of public funding sources, a country wishing to
create a promotional policy would invest not only donor funding but national
funding in local development of its own transgenic varieties. This would include
funding for specialized training, laboratories, equipment and biosafety
infrastructure. A promotional policy would also allow partnerships with the
international private sector and might encourage this through tax or other
incentive measures. A permissive policy would not invest much in creating new
transgenic crops but rather use conventional breeding techniques to move
transgenic traits into local varieties of the same crops. This policy would still
entail public investment in conventional plant breeding infrastructure and training
as well as in the additional biosafety infrastructure needed. A precautionary policy
would allow donors to conventionally breed transgenic traits into local varieties or
to finance aspects of transgenic research such as training, laboratories or biosafety
infrastructure, but would not invest national funds in transgenic engineering. A
preventive policy would make no investments, donor or national, in transgenic
technology, but instead invest in conventional or sustainable agricultural
technologies.

49
Table 5. Classification of public research policies for rDNA agriculture
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Invest national
and donor funds
into transgenic
technology.
Allow
international
private sector
partnerships
Invest national
and donor funds
into breeding
transgenic crops
into local
varieties
Invest no national
funds into
transgenic
technology but
allow donor
funding of
downstream
transgenic
technology
Invest no national
nor donor funds in
transgenic
technology
One of the criteria for case selection related to public research was that the
country have the capacity to carry out national research on transgenic crops. This
criteria was held constant because the existence (or lack) of indigenous research
and development capacity was likely to have spillover effects on other policy
areas. However, this criterion limits examination of how institutional structures
affect rDNA public research policies in the following ways: A well-developed
institutional framework is likely to push policies towards being promotional
towards rDNA crops, because such policies extend the life and well-being of the
institution and its employees, while precautionary or preventive policies work in
the opposite direction. Path dependence created by institutional standard operating
procedures such as yearly budget requests and research reviews, as well as long
term processes like graduate training, tend to push research along in the same
direction. Simultaneously, alternative areas of research that could provide
possible competition to rDNA crops are disadvantaged by receiving fewer funds
and resources.

50
The preventive category is extreme for every policy area. Since all of the
case studies have national investments in rDNA crop technology research and the
imperatives to safeguard the environment and human health, this case selection
criterion is likely to push policy choices towards the promotional side of the scale.
Although extreme for the cases selected, the preventive category is left in to
illustrate alternative options available and possible reasons for those options.
Other factors pushing towards policy convergence are the degree of institutional
development and international institutional constraints. To control for these
institutional convergence factors, case studies with similar institutional
obligations and degrees of institutional development, but varying policies for and
usage of rDNA crops, were selected. With the exception of the public research
area, for which all three cases had promotional policies, the other policy areas
were mixed.

Expected Contribution
This study will offer greater insight into the forces at work behind
developing countries choices regarding transgenic crop technologies. Who
controls or influences how are crops are grown and in the end what we eat is
always an important concern to which both the historical cases of the Irish
potato and the Indian cotton famines attest, as do the recent and repeated
incidences of mad cow disease and GM gene constructs unapproved for human
consumption turning up in food products around the globe. This dissertation

51
provides needed information on both how GM crops are regulated which
institutions were involved and what the processes entailed, and who influenced
the processes and the overall policies that established them. First and foremost it
will clarify the role of non-state actors in the creation of rDNA policies. It will
establish whether NSAs were key actors in establishing policies, processes and
ultimately the use of GM crop technology, and if so which NSAs corporate
actors or NGOs or both. Second it will examine whether differences in access,
strategies or resources among NSAs was important, and if so which type. Third it
will illustrate how the institutional context constrains or facilitates those actors at
different levels of analysis, and whether the particular institutional configuration
does more to explain resulting policy differences than the actions or strategies of
NSAs. The institutional context could help to explain both whether a particular
type of NSA participates in policy creation and what type of strategy it might
utilize.
This study contributes to empirical research on the role of non-state actors
in global governance, it addresses the agent-structure debate, and it illustrates how
institutions matter in a particular policy arena. In this way it contributes to three
areas of scholarly debate and research. At the same time this study addresses a
pragmatically important question of how developing countries might utilize
policies to shape the evolution of rDNA agriculture. In this early stage of the
development and dispersion of rDNA technologies, uncertainties abound and
grounded research is critical. Ultimately, the findings of this research are

52
important to people all over the world, because the policy decisions for rDNA
crops affect what type of food we all eat and feed to our children, how and where
it is grown, and what type of environmental and health risks are perpetuated or
ameliorated. However, the findings from this study are particularly important to
the people of the developing country case studies, because the majority of those
people depend upon agriculture for their livelihoods and way of life.

53
Chapter 2
How International Structures and the NSA Jet Set Affect
State Policies for rDNA Crops

Introduction
Why do states with similar economic structures, concerns and conditions
choose different policies for rDNA crops? The central hypothesis of this
dissertation is that the type of involvement of both non-profit (non-governmental)
and for-profit (industry) non-state actors (NSAs) accounts for these differences. A
second hypothesis is that variation in institutional context accounts for the
differences in policies towards rDNA crops. These hypotheses require analysis at
multiple levels. This chapter focuses on two questions: how the international
institutional structure
62
affects state actions and how non-state actors participate at
this level.
The chapter is organized into the five policy areas identified in Chapter
One: intellectual property rights, trade, biosafety, food safety and consumer
rights, and public research. For each policy area, first the most relevant
international regulations or institutions are identified and briefly described.
Biosafety and food safety regulations developed concurrently with research and
commercialization of rDNA crops, and therefore, the processes that led to the
creation of those regulations, as well as the institutions and regulations
themselves, are examined. For intellectual property rights, trade, and public
research, on the other hand, the main instruments and institutions which affect

62
The international institutional structure consists of the international regulations and institutions
themselves and the processes through which the regulations came about or the institutions operate.

54
rDNA crops were created prior to their commercialization, and hence, they were
not a main focus of concern during the negotiations. For this reason, the
institutional evolution and non-state actor involvement in those processes is not
examined for intellectual property rights, trade, and public research. Instead, I
explain the existing institutional context and how it affects states range of policy
choices for those three issue areas. Any differing institutional obligations among
the case study countries are noted, as differences at the international level could
lead to policy differences at the national level. Alternative policy options
available are explained for each area. If the institutional structure pushes state
action in a particular direction, this is noted. After the institutional setting is
examined, the biosafety and food safety and consumer rights sections look at the
type of involvement of non-state actors in the different institutions and processes
at this level. Three questions are addressed: Did non-governmental (NGO) and
industry non-state actors access to the institutions differ and if so, how? Did the
type of involvement or strategy of industry and NGO actors differ at this level?
And finally, did organizational resources account for any differences and if so,
how?
After each of the policy areas is examined in relation to both institutional
structure and non-state actor participation, where applicable, a summary is
provided. The summary addresses the hierarchy among the different international
institutions and it includes a table of the strategies NSAs used. At the end of the
chapter a summary across the policy areas is provided. The concluding section

55
provides an analysis of the wider questions of whether institutional structure or
non-state actor participation was more important at this level, whether this varied
across policy areas, and whether non-state actors had an impact at all.

Intellectual Property Rights
Article 27 (paragraph 3 section b)
63
of the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) requires that all member states provide plant variety protection (PVP).
64

The TRIPS agreement came into effect on January 1, 1995 and all developing
countries were supposed to comply by January 2006. Although all of the case
study states, as WTO members, have the obligation to implement the TRIPs
Agreement, the international structure allows for differences in the way that this
obligation is fulfilled.
Specifically, with respect to genetically modified crops, Art. 27.3b states
that members may exclude from patentability: (b) plants and animals other than
microorganisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants
or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. However,

63
This sub- paragraph was so controversial to negotiators during the Uruguay Round that the text
of the Final Act states that it would be subject to review four years after entry into force of the
TRIPS Agreement - as of 1 January 1999 (Grain 1998). While re-examination began in 1998 and
was tabled at the Seattle WTO negotiations, as of 2004 the review had not been concluded. Thus
countries had and have the obligation to implement the section despite the on-going review
process.
64
Empirical evidence has not been able to prove that strong intellectual property rights (IPRs) are
expected to increase investment in the modern seed sector, so although this is the obligation
currently in place, the principle upon which it is based might be missing. (Alker and Heidhues
2002). On a related note, the importance of conventional PVP laws for food security in developing
countries is disputed.

56
members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by
an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof (Oh 1999).
65
One
common way states have met this requirement is to join the International Union
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).
66
Some developed country
WTO members consider the 1991 UPOV to effectively meet the obligations under
TRIPs Art. 27.3b.
67
Other member countries consider the 1978 version of the
UPOV to meet the obligation. The 1991 version of the UPOV differs from the
1978 version in that double IPR protection (both patents and special plant variety
protection) is allowed for the same variety, and farmers rights to save seed and
farmers privilege to exchange seed were restricted and had to be explicitly
allowed in national legislation (Grain 1998, Gaia/Grain 1998).
Prior to TRIPS, the majority of the developing countries did not have any
plant variety protection (PVP) legislation
68
in place at all, because most new
varieties originated from public breeding efforts and were made available as

65
A key word in Article 27.3 is effective because effectiveness became the focal point by which
systems sui generis were judged: how effective or not the system would be in terms of action
against infringement. Also note that the wording of the TRIPS agreement allows for patents, plant
variety protection (PVP), or both. As it stands, a sui generis system simple means a system of
ones own making. African nations, supported by India, have argued for revision of Article 27.3
(b) of the TRIPs agreement to include Farmers Rights to bring the agreement into harmony with
the CBD and the ITPGR. Many developing countries support this suggestion.
66
Even before the final language of the TRIPs Agreement was finalized GATT officials had
identified the UPOV as an effective sui generis system (Dhar 2002, 8).
67
The TRIPS Agreement is silent on what a sui generis system in the context of plant varieties
means. Some people interpret this clause to mean legislation that follows the provisions in the
UPOV Convention, intended to promote PVP throughout the world. Others point out that no
reference is made in the TRIPS Agreement to UPOV, whereas every other IPR convention that
TRIPS binds its members to is explicitly identified in the treaty (Grain 1998). There are also no
parameters for what effective means with regard to the sui generis systems.
68
In 1989, the FAO adopted resolutions acknowledging both plant breeders rights and farmers
rights. Before that plant genetic resources were considered common heritage of humankind and
could be freely exchanged (Blakeney 2002, 52).

57
public goods. (Alker and Heidhues 2002, 66).
69
The UPOV system is tailored to
the needs of the commercial seed sector,
70
and UPOV-style IPR protection is
expected to promote export-oriented and capitalintensive types of agriculture,
and to decrease biodiversity.
71
Furthermore, as Clarke (2002, 55) notes, It is well
known that the Intellectual Property Rights Committee, composed of 13 leading
US corporations (for example, Bristol Myers Squibb, DuPont, Pfizer, Monsanto,
and General Motors) effectively wrote, word for word, the TRIPS agreement that
was adopted at the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations and subsequently
became part of the WTO body of rules."
72
Since the TRIPs system does not
address benefit sharing,
73
increased IPRs are expected to exacerbate rather than
diminish biopiracy.
74
Benefit flows from PVP protection go mainly to developed
countries even though developing countries shelter the earths main centers of
biological diversity. Finally, although PVP may bring GM crops to the national

69
There is a basic contradiction between monopoly rights and free markets. At a practical level
there is little evidence that patents increase investment in R & D (Paul and Steinbrecher 2003, 29).
70
For example, PVP in developed countries did not arise until farm size increased and the number
of farmers drastically decreased, which also led to a decrease in the transaction costs of enforcing
potential IPRs (Srinivasan and Thritle 2002). The commercial seed sector only supplies about 15%
of the total seed requirements in developing countries (Alker and Heidhues 2002, 68).
71
In this way IPRs using a UPOV-style system contravenes states obligations to conserve
biodiversity under the CBD.
72
This first four companies listed as examples in the quote are world leaders in rDNA technology.
73
The CBD does address benefit sharing, and is at odds with the TRIPs in this and other respects.
The TRIPs agreement does not require patent owners to reveal the source of origin nor permission
for use from those with prior knowledge of the patented subject. These aspects are required by the
CBD in order to ensure the equitable sharing of benefits (ActionAid Brasil 2001, 5).
74
Both India and Brazil have submitted written requests to the TRIPs Council that the TRIPS
agreement be amended to require a clear mention of the source of the biological material and of
the country of origin. Brazil has also recommend that article 27.3 (b) include the following
requirements: the traditional knowledge utilized to obtain the material, proof of just and equitable
sharing of the benefits, and proof of consent by the government or community for the exploration
of the material (ActionAid Brasil 2001, 5).

58
markets,
75
this same legislation could hamper their diffusion (Butler 2002, 21-22,
Spillane 2002). While companies might not sell GM seeds in national markets
without IPR or PVP for those seeds, the added cost that IPRs imply make those
seeds more expensive and thus less accessible in the marketplace.
Following the categorization of possible IPR policies for rDNA crops
explained in Chapter One, the pre-existing regulatory framework for plant variety
protection (UPOV) has implications for state policy choices. According to that
categorization, countries which are members of the 1978 UPOV, such as
Argentina and Brazil, have precautionary policies. Since according to UPOV
regulations accession to the 1978 UPOV is now closed, any new members must
accept the 1991 version. Thus, any state which joins the UPOV would have a
promotional policy. India has begun the process of accession to the UPOV. If it
follows these international guidelines, its IPR policies are likely to shift from
preventive to promotional.
76
Table 6 summarizes the impact of the UPOV on
policy options. Impact is classified on a range from open to closed. Open means
that the international institutional obligation has no impact and the policy option

75
The advent of the TRIPs agreement spurred considerable investment in agricultural
biotechnology. A global consolidation or oligopolistic trend in seed and chemical markets is
visible in the years immediately following the TRIPs agreement, and the top companies rushed to
patent rDNA crops and related technologies (Clapp 2003b).
76
Although the TRIPs Agreement effectively sets the rules of the game for most countries in
regard to IPR for rDNA, albeit with a range of options, this aspect of the TRIPs Agreement has
always been and continues to be a subject of debate. There is the possibility that the TRIPs
Agreement could be changed in future negotiations. The Africa group position, tabled at Seattle, is
that plants, animals, micro-organisms and all other living organisms cannot be patented nor can
natural processes that produce them. The US supports more restrictive IPR and is pursuing this
though bilateral agreements as well other arenas. Thus the outcome of the review could move IPR
protection in either direction.

59
is still available or open. Constrained means that the policy option is limited in
some way by the international obligation. Closed signifies that the policy option is
no longer available because of the obligation the state has accepted at the
international level.
77

Table 6. Policy options: IPRs
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Policy
description
Patent
protection
plus plant
breeders
rights (PBR)
under UPOV
1991
PBR under
UPOV 1991

PBR under
UPOV 1978

No IPRs for
plants or
animals

Policy
availability
Open Open Closed or
Constrained
Constrained
Case study
obligations
India Argentina
Brazil

As can be noted from Table 6, the UPOV rules push state policies toward
the promotional end. However, states are not required to adhere to the UPOV
system for plant IPR protection. Due to the sui generis provision in the TRIPs
Agreement, countries can create something entirely different than the UPOV or
they can adapt the rules of 1978 UPOV to their national legislation. As of 2004
only 58 countries were members of the UPOV (UPOV 2004), and most
developing countries had chosen to create sui generis systems (ActionAid Brasil
2001, 5). According to international law, inventions critical to public order or
morality, such as altering of plant, animal or human life, can be excluded from

77
This classification is used for all policy areas.

60
patenting. For practical reasons, the invention of an alternative sui generis that
does not rely on existing practices or regulations such as the UPOV is difficult.
78

Furthermore, any sui generis system is subject to the increased scrutiny of being
reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
79
For these reasons the precautionary and
preventive policy options are categorized as constrained in Table 6.
One of the main differences between the 1978 and 1991 versions of the
UPOV, as mentioned above, is that the later version puts more limitations on
farmers rights and privileges. Notably, farmers rights and privileges have been
elements of all the sui generis PVP laws created. These rights and privileges
protect resource-poor farmers by allowing them to save, use and exchange their
seed. The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources (ITPGR), which
became a legally binding international instrument in 2001,
80
guarantees aspects of
these rights and privileges. The rights enshrined in the ITPGR address equity
(including intergenerational), protection of farmers, and conservation or
promotion of biodiversity. However, the ITPGR places the responsibility for up-
holding these rights upon national governments. If a country created legislation to
follow ITPGR regulations it would be classified as following a precautionary IPR

78
Use of the UPOV model prevents the necessity of reinventing the wheel. Those countries with
sui generis systems have also taken part of the UPOV model. Although sui generis systems vary,
one thing most have in common is protection of farmers rights (Egelyng, 2002, 32).
79
Furthermore international organizations such as the EU, UPOV and the WIPO as well as
particular states are pressuring developing countries to adopt the 1991 UPOV. For example, an aid
accord between the European Union and Bangladesh, a least developed country, contained a
TRIPS Plusclause that required Bangladesh to make efforts to join the 1991 UPOV, even though
Bangladesh had already created a bill for a sui generis system (ActionAid Brasil 2001, 5).
80
The ITPGR came into force 1983, but as a voluntary undertaking rather than the legally binding
convention it was intended to be, because Northern countries refused to ratify it (Grain 2001). It
entered into force as a treaty on June 29, 2004.

61
policy because, like the 1978 UPOV it grants intellectual property rights over
plants but at the same time recognizes farmers rights and privileges.
The issue of farmers rights is also being addressed by the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
81
At its 2000 general assembly
meeting, member states of WIPO agreed to establish an Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore (Blakeney 2002, 57). This Committee addresses access
to genetic resources and benefit sharing, protection of traditional knowledge, and
protection of expressions of folklore. This Committee grew out of a concern, in
part, to explore options for sui generis systems for the protection of property
rights, genetic resources and biodiversity.
82
The Committee has not created any
new regulations.
Plant variety protection systems are very costly to national governments
and the costs of having or implementing such a system might outweigh the
benefits. Egelyng (2002) speculates that PVP systems might become less and less
economically and politically relevant, even before they are fully functional, due to

81
IPR negotiations were moved out of WIPO and into the GATT negotiations thanks to the US,
which was frustrated with the one nation one vote structure of WIPO. WIPO may again become
the dominant international IPR body if the Substantive Patent Law Treaty is adopted, which would
further universalize and tighten patent laws and procedures (Paul and Steinbrecher 2003).
82
At the start of the Uruguay Round negotiations, WIPO, together with almost all developing
countries opposed the idea of negotiating IPR issues within the GATT framework. WIPO has
since been given a subservient role to the WTO, and there is considerable tension between the two
Geneva agencies. Some interpret WIPOs work in this area as a maneuver to reassert its authority
over IPR issues.

62
use of other instruments such as patents
83
for rDNA plant crops or trade secrets,
both of which are permitted by the TRIPs Agreement. Technological
developments such as genetic use restriction technology (GURTs)
84
or
terminator technologies as they are more widely known, might make plant
intellectual property protection obsolete.
85
Terminator technologies produce seeds
that are sterile, necessitating the purchase of new seeds every year.
86
This
technology can also be used to trigger traits when used in conjunction with certain
proprietary chemicals. The technology is aimed at the elimination of loss of
revenue to seed companies owing to the use of farm-saved seed. It is also aimed at
facilitating the joint sale of different types of inputs
87
and price discrimination in
the seed market.(Srinivasan and Thirtle 2002, 160). Industry actors use
terminator technologies and other strategies to lessen their need for plant variety
protection. Other strategies include using direct agreements between company and

83
Two features traditionally distinguished PVP from patents: 1) farmers privilege to use farm-
saved seed, and 2) research exemption to develop new varieties. Both of these features have
tended to disappear. The research exemptions allowed under patent systems are also becoming less
standard and more restrictive in favor of IPR holders (Spillane 2002). Many enabling technologies
or techniques for conducting plant molecular biology research are currently subject to patents,
including all existing plant transformation technologies used to generate transgenic plants. A small
number of companies controls these patents (Spillane 2002).
84
Another name for GURTs are technology protection systems (TPS).
85
Companies could keep the terminator processes as trade secrets that are never required to be
shared. Their only competition would be from copying or development of new varieties. Due to
consolidation in the seed market, even this limited competition might not exist.
86
India has banned the use of this type of technology and the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) has also stated that such technology will not be used in its
research.
87
For example, traits can be engineered to turn on with the application of specific chemicals
produced by the same company, which ensures continued chemical sales for the company.

63
purchaser including purchase contracts;
88
label notices; farmer-MNC agreements
to allow audits (permitted trespassing); contract farming; and technology fees or
premiums included in the price of the seed (Srinivasan and Thirtle 2002, Spillane
2002). Public-sector biotechnology researchers have also sought strategies to
address the implications of the TRIPs Agreement. Their strategies have included
making material or technology transfer agreements (MTAs, TTAs), copylefting
89

and defensive patenting. However, MTAs and TTAs have no standard protocols,
and the cost of the latter two strategies can be prohibitive.
90

Another section of the TRIPs agreement (Art. 34) puts the burden of proof
of innocence on the person accused of the infringement of a process patent. With
respect rDNA crops, this means that if a genetically modified organism (GMO)
cross-pollinates with the unmodified crop of a smallholder farmer and his or her
crop becomes contaminated by genes from the GMO, he or she is assumed to be a
process patent infringer. With the proliferation of trade rules like this one, the
option for countries with limited scientific and technological capabilities to refuse
imports of new technologies or products is limited. Because of this they favored a
strong liability system through the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB).
91
As it

88
These can include agreements to use a certain brand of chemical even though another brand of
the same chemical may be available at a better price.
89
Copylefting uses the existing legal framework to copyright a work but keeps the work and any
derivatives of the work free and open to all.
90
There is no directory of plant rDNA technologies that are freely accessible in the public domain
and no publicly available studies on the current patent situation for key enabling technologies
(Spillane 2002).
91
Industry representatives and some developed countries argued that strong liability,
precautionary principle or socioeconomic analysis through the CBP would make GM technology
too expensive to enter the market and were thus disguised protectionist measures.

64
stands, CBP does not have a strong liability system and the WTO is the only body
with a dispute resolution mechanism, and thus disagreements go to its Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB).
92

To summarize, the principal international obligation that the case study
states have with respect to intellectual property rights is the implementation of
Art. 27 of the TRIPs Agreement. The most common way that fulfill this
obligation is by acceding to the UPOV or deriving a system similar to the UPOV.
The TRIPS agreement is stronger than the ITPGR, WIPO and CPB in that it has
an international dispute settlement body that supersedes national sovereignty. In
this area, it is likely that institutions had much greater influence on state policies
than NSAs do. While all three case studies were WTO members, the existing
international institutional structure constrained these states differently. NSAs
were not involved in this policy area at the international level.

Trade
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement) sets out the basic rules for international food safety
and animal and plant health standards. WTO members are bound by the Sanitary

92
To date with respect to GMOs, Thailand brought a dispute against Egypt for blocking imports of
tuna with soy oil (2003), and Argentina, Canada and the United States have brought a number of
disputes against the European Union for the GM legislation (2003 and 2004). The first case was
settled, the latter are pending. All cases references the SPS Agreement. Those against the EU also
referenced the TBT Agreement, GATT, and other treaties, but the SPS Agreement was referenced
the most often.

65
and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, which entered into force in 1995.
93
The SPS
Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may, directly
or indirectly, affect international trade. Measures for environmental protection,
94

to protect consumer interests, or for the welfare of animals are not covered by the
SPS Agreement. Countries may set their own standards, but national regulations
must be based on science and should be applied only to the extent necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health (WTO 1998).
95
WTO rules explicitly
encourage or require countries to use international standards. The international
standard setting organizations for the SPS Agreement are the WHO/FAO Codex
Alimentarius Commission for food, and the FAOs Secretariat for International
Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) for plant health. The Codex Alimentarius
Commission is addressed below, under the food safety section.
The SPS Agreement allows restrictions of rDNA crops and materials and
conventional agricultural trade based on the scientific assessment of risk. Those
restrictions must be consistent with other governmental policy measures. If
scientific evidence is insufficient to determine risk, provisional restrictions may
be implemented while further information is gathered. The restrictions must be
provisional, not open-ended. International scientific understanding of the risks of

93
The SPS Agreement was negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations and
entered into force with the WTO (WTO 1998).
94
Although SPS standards do help to protect the environment, environmental protection other than
that specifically defined in the agreement is not covered by the SPS agreement.
95
Health risks are the only basis to justify regulations. In contrast, other international agreements
such as the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreement, allows governments to decide that
international standards are not appropriate for other reasons, such as geographical factors,
fundamental technological problems, effectiveness of the standard, for the prevention of deceptive
practices, or to protect national security.

66
GM crops and seeds are chronically uncertain, incomplete and contested. There is
no consensus on how much of which kinds of evidence are either necessary or
sufficient to determine a particular GM crop, seed or food to be acceptably safe or
unacceptably risky (Millstone and van Zwanenberg 2003). This is due to the fact
that not only the technology, but also the science, is at a very early stage of
development and, therefore, the scientific communitys knowledge of how to
identify and assess risks in a reliable manner is rudimentary.
96
Ultimately,
disagreements are to be settled by the WTO DSB, as in the case currently pending
regarding the EUs precautionary legislation for transgenic food and products.
97

Argentina is one of the claimants against the EU and uses the SPS Agreement as a
basis for its arguments.
For both the TRIPs agreement and the SPS agreement, industry
representatives pushed for the use of risk assessment based on sound science
instead of use of the precautionary principle. At the same time, they worked to
undermine the perception of the existence of sound science by attacking
independent researchers who found results contrary to industry views (Smith
2003).
98
Most research on rDNA plants thus far has been conducted by industry,
or paid for by industry, which makes its validity questionable. Furthermore,
governments have cut back agricultural research spending in the 1980s and 1990s,

96
The insurance industry has consistently refused to write policies covering liability for harm
caused by genetically modified organisms.(Rachels Weekly, 2000, 2).
97
Case numbers WT/DS291, WT/DS292 and WT/DS293. Final report pending, possibly Dec.
2005.
98
See Smith 2003 for in-depth information on the attacks on world-renowned expert Arpad
Pusztai, and extensive information on this happening in the US. See also Akre 2001, and Olivieri
1999. For trends see Krimsky et al 1991, Krimsky 1996, Blumenthal et al 1986, 1996 and 1997.

67
so that funding for independent scientific studies is hard to find. Together these
tactics and context help to prevent the creation of strong scientific literature that
speaks to the health or environmental impacts of GMOs. Due to this void, the
regulatory approval process for GM plants in North America
99
has been relatively
swift, but it may be a source of delay for countries which require state testing or
which question the bias of industry-sponsored research.
While the SPS Agreement constrains policy choices, pushing them to be
permissive, countries can also utilize the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB)
under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which endorses use of the
precautionary principal with respect to rDNA crops. The CPB allows for
precautionary import actions and creates additional procedures and institutions
that can be used by importing states to screen or block rDNA imports. Two of the
case countries, Brazil and India, are parties to the CPB, while Argentina has
signed, but not yet ratified, the Protocol. Argentina is a party to the CBD, as are
Brazil and India.
100
While membership in the CPB may alter state policy
decisions, a states policies for rDNA crops may influence its decision to
participate in the protocol. The CPB is addressed more extensively below, under
the biosafety section. Both the CPB and the SPS Agreement have implications for
trade, and the two international agreements are at odds with each other. No
hierarchy exists among the agreements, a discrepancy that is being addressed

99
The US and Canada allow companies to submit their own data for determining risk and for PVP.
The European Union does not. Governmental agencies conduct their own research in the EU. The
precautionary principle is also used in related EU laws.
100
The United States is not a party to either the CPB or CBD.

68
through the WTO.
101
Still, the existence of the CPB does create possible
alternatives in policy choices,
102
which are summarized in Table 7.
Table 7. Policy options: Trade
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Policy
description

No
regulation of
rDNA seeds
or plant
materials

Regulate
rDNA seeds
and plant
materials in
accordance
with SPS
agreement
and no more
tightly than
non-RDNA
crops
Regulate rDNA
seeds and plant
materials more
tightly and with
different
screenings or
requirements

Block all
rDNA
imports
through ban
or
moratorium

The impact
of
international
obligations
on policy
options
Open Open Constrained Constrained
Case study
obligations
Argentina
Brazil
India

In summary, the main international agreement affecting international trade
in rDNA crops to date is the SPS Agreement. The SPS Agreement is not under
negotiation and was completed before the commercialization of transgenic crops.
Standard-setting bodies such as the Codex, the IPPC and the CPB have had the

101
Resolving the discrepancy through the WTO instead of the CPB will likely privilege trade over
environmental considerations.
102
For further discussion of the tension between the SPS Agreement and the CPB see Millstone
and van Zwanenberg, 2003. They also specify how governmental actions are constrained under
each.

69
work of updating or creating international guidelines with respect to rDNA
agricultural products. Discussion of non-state actor access to the processes
through which SPS and CPB rules that concern rDNA crops are created follows
below under the food safety and biosafety sections. There are tensions between
the the SPS Agreement and the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol that have yet to be
resolved. In the interim, a range of policy options remains available for countries
to follow.

Biosafety
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB) applies specifically to
transboundary trade in the products of genetic engineering. It is concerned with
protecting the biodiversity of environments where GM seeds and crops might be
introduced, and is the principal international agreement for biosafety (Millstone
and van Zwanenberg 2003). Prior to the CPB there was no binding international
agreement on cross-border movement of GMOs. The CPB was adopted on
January 29, 2000 and entered into force in 2003. The CPB is under the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and stems from Article 19(3) of the
CBD.
103

103
Article 19(3) of the Convention provides that: The Parties shall consider the need for and
modalities of a protocol setting out appropriate procedures, including, in particular, advance
informed agreement, in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified
organism resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity. (Secretariat 2003, 9).

70
One of the central mechanisms of the CPB is Article 7. Under Art. 7,
importing countries may exclude GM seeds and crops unless they have given
advanced informed agreement (AIA), which can be restricted to a particular
shipment, or can cover an entire crop variety. Countries may decide not to allow
the import of GM seeds or crops, but this decision should be based upon and
supported by scientifically sound risk assessment.
104
The burden of proof of
safety or risk is on the importing country. However, the importing country can
require that the exporters conduct a risk assessment prior to their decision, and
can set parameters for the assessment. For example, the importing country can
require that the studies be conducted in the intended receiving environment. For
those 133 countries which signed the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, all GMO
agricultural exports with 1% of more of genetically modified produce must be
labeled as May contain living genetically modified organisms. (Hayden 2000,
8).
The rules of the CPB leave all policy alternatives available, but make a
preventive policy more difficult by requiring risk assessment. The other three
policy alternatives are equally available under the CPB.

104
See the discussion under food safety, below, regarding the current impossibility of doing a
scientifically sound risk assessment.

71
Table 8. Policy options: Biosafety
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Policy
description
No screening
or token
screening
only, or
approval
based on
other
countries
approval
Screening for
demonstrated
risk, based
on intended
use of
product
Comprehensive
screening for
demonstrated
risks and
scientific
uncertainties
No approval
because risk
assumed
The impact
of
international
obligations
on policy
options
Open Open Open Constrained
Case study
obligations
None None None None

Since the development of the international biosafety regulations for rDNA
crops described above occurred during the timeframe of this research, the process
through which these institutions were created needs to be examined in greater
detail. What follows is a description of the process through which the regulations
were made, followed by an analysis of non-state actor involvement in the process.
Development of international guidelines for biosafety occurred
concomitantly with research on genetically modified organisms. Negotiations for
the Convention on Biological Diversity took place from 1988 to1992, and at the
first Conference of the Parties, members of the CBD established an Open-ended
Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Biosafety, which met in 1995. The first Conference

72
of the Parties laid the foundations for the working group on biosafety under the
CBD.
105
What is now the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was created by the
work of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group on Biosafety of the CBD. This
working group met six times from 1996 to 1999
106
to prepare and negotiate the
initial document that became the CPB. During this process the working group
accepted documents from governments which were then consolidated into the
negotiation document.
107
Between adoption of the CPB in 2000 and the first
meeting of the Conference of the Parties in 2003, a variety of committees and
working groups met to facilitate implementation of various aspects of the CPB,
including the Intergovernmental Committee for the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety (ICCP).
Non-state actor participation was important in both the negotiations for the
CBD and the CPB. An NGO analyst noted
During the negotiations of the Biosafety Protocol, the active commitment
and involvement by some sectors of the public, including non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and scientists helped to introduce
valuable information, ideas and points of view that contributed positively
towards the understanding of biosafety and the development of the
Biosafety ProtocolThe process was also further complicated by the
powerful trade interests of major producers of genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) and associated products. It was effective public
participation that greatly helped to maintain the integrity of the discussion
on scientific, environmental, health and socio-economic issues. (Lin nd,
26)

105
The UNEP Panel of Experts on International Technical Guidelines for Biosafety met in Cairo,
Egypt, from 11-14 December 1995 to adopt a set of international technical guidelines for biosafety
under the aegis of UNEP (UNEP Guidelines). These Guidelines were considered in the
negotiations on the Biosafety Protocol.
106
It had a mandate to complete its work be the end of 1998.
107
All three case study countries submitted text for the CPB, although at different times and
regarding varying points.

73
Private sector advocates also noted their role: Representing over 2,200 firms
from more than 130 countries worldwide specializing in plant and animal
agriculture, food production, human and animal health care, and the environment,
the Global Industry Coalition (GIC) played an active and vital part in the
negotiation of the Biosafety Protocol. (Giddings nd, 28). The Global Industry
Coalition had been formed early in the process to advise countries during the
negotiations leading up to the signing of the Protocol in Montreal in 2000.
Overall, the level of participation in the negotiations increased over time. The
number of participating countries and organizations in the CBD process grew
from 24 governments (at the first meeting) to 96 governments (at the last meeting)
and from 10 (first meeting) to 22 (third and last meeting) organizations in the
CBD process, while the comparable numbers in the CPB process grew from 82
governments and 35 IGOs and NGOs (at BSWG-2) to 138 governments and 75
IGOs and NGOs (at BSWG-6). (Koester nd, 9).
As shown by Figure 2, with the exception of 2 meetings,
108
there were
consistently more NGO than industry participants at the negotiation process.
109

The numbers for NGO representatives include universities and sometimes
members of the media. At times a distinction between NGOs and industry was

108
These two meetings were the 5
th
(1998) and 6
th
(1999) sessions of the working group.
109
Possibly more industry representatives attended these meetings because more actual
negotiation (versus consolidation of documents) was expected to take place.

74
Figure 2. Non-state actor participation in biosafety negotiations
Source: Official reports from the Secretariat on the Convention on Biological Diversity
made in the reports,
110
and other times they were listed together as non-state
observers.
111
As the negotiations continued more lawyers attended the meetings.
Law firms were categorized as members of industry unless they had a clear
affiliation to a public interest organization. After the Protocol was approved
(2000), participation by industry representatives during the ICCP meetings
declined greatly while NGO representation increased in 2002. This is surprising,
since other analysts (Rowlands 2001, Clapp 2003a) have noted that industry

110
These official categorizations were not always consistent, but for the most part they were.
111
When categorizing non-state actors myself, I included a third unknown category for
ambiguous organizations. These are not included in the chart.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1996 1997 1997 1998 1998 1999 1999 2000 2001 2002
Meeting
No. of organizations represen
NGOs Industry

75
participation tends to increase at the implementation stage.
112
Giddings also noted
that
the private sector has been identified as a key stakeholder in Protocol
implementation and a critical player in building the capacities necessary
for countries to implement and comply with the Protocol. It is
surprising, therefore, that some appear committed to circumscribing the
role of the private sector rather than encouraging its active engagement.
This was seen during the ICCP process, for example, when some
governments proposed a limited role for the private sector in capacity
building. (Giddings n.d., 28)

One possible reason for increased NGO representation in 2002 is that the NGOs
were interested in having the CPB implemented quickly.
Besides the ICCP meetings, numerous other specialized meetings were
held during the same time frame to work on particular aspects of the CPB, such as
Meetings of Technical Experts on the Biosafety Clearing House (2000-2002), the
Meeting of Experts on Compliance (2001), Meetings of Experts on Capacity-
Building for the Implementation of the Biosafety Protocol (2001), and Tehcnical
Expert Meetings on Handling, Transport, Packaging and Identification of Living
Modified Organisms (2001, 2002). Workshop, planning and regional meetings
were also held. As at the CPB negotiations and the ICCP meetings, there tended
to be more NGO than industry representatives attending. For example, in the 2001
meeting on capacity building, which was an open meeting held in Cuba, NGOs
out-numbered industry representatives 3 to 1. This data also challenges

112
A study of participation of industry actors in global environmental negotiations in the early
1990s found that 100 transnational companies in both the food and agrochemical industries were
represented, in addition to 104 countries. Over a 2-year period there were 662 industry
representatives as compared to 26 NGO representatives (cited in Lang, 1999, 178).

76
Rowlands (2001) and Clapps (2003a) findings that industry actors tended to be
active in smaller working and technical groups. In some meetings, such as the
technical expert meetings on handling, transport, etc., participation was limited
for both state and non-state actors and representatives had to be nominated. NGO
and industry were represented equally in those meetings.
NSA representatives at the biosafety negotiations and meetings did not
have to be international,
113
and could even represent local groups or interests.
More local or regional organizations than international attended the meetings,
particularly those meetings held in Cartagena. More local or regional NGOs
participated than local industry representatives, but both NGOs and industry
representatives took advantage of the opportunity to some degree.
While access to the negotiation process for NGO and industry actors was
the same, the right to participate at the meetings varied. At early meetings non-
state actors were allowed to speak, and NGO participants did so more often than
industry participants. During the working groups, non-state actor participation
was sometimes restricted and sometimes encouraged. In working group 1 (SWG-
1), non-state actors could participate as observers, but without the right to
intervene, negotiate or speak. They could be removed from meeting rooms at the
request of any government, and were effectively removed at one point.
114
In

113
For a non-state actor to be classified as international it has to have members from at least 2
different countries.
114
As of the 3
rd
meeting in 1997, non-state actor reporters were requested not to name national
delegations in their reports, purportedly to help negotiations. At this sane meeting, non-state

77
contrast, working group 2 (SWG-2)
115
did allow participation of non-state actors.
Representatives of both NGOs and industry were asked to give formal
informational presentations to the entire meeting at the third session (IISD,
1997b). Either way, restriction or encouragement applied equally to NGO and
industry observers. A representative from the NGO observers and one from
industry observers
116
were usually invited to address the delegations at the closing
plenary sessions, and they did so (Convention on Biological Diversity, 1997a,
1997 b, 1998a, 1998b, 1999).
When participation of NSAs was restricted, both NGO and industry
observers lamented this situation. For example, A representative of the Green
Industry Biotechnology Platform (GIBiP/ASSINSEL), expressed his regret that
the working arrangements of SWG-1 prevented his industry from expressing its
views and warned that such an approach may exclude other industries with
necessary technological information from future negotiations. (IISD 1997b, 7).
One observer noted Environmental NGOs were admonished for being overly
passionate, but their posture may have reflected frustration with the Bureaus
decision to restrict participation to brief comments at the beginning of formal
sessions. Even industry representatives noted dissatisfaction at not having more

observers were asked to leave the session of one of the sub working groups that had been
established.
115
SWG-1 and SWG-2 occurred simultaneously during the 3
rd
session of the biosafety protocol
negotiations.
116
These observers were often representatives from Third World Network and Global Industry
Coalition, respectively.

78
informal opportunities to talk with governments in a less-politicized
environment. (IISD 1998, 10).
In the negotiations, the various industry groups took similar positions, and
they tended to favor the positions taken by the Miami Group.
117
The industry
groups did not divide along regional lines,
118
as they had in other negotiations
(Clapp 2003b). Rather than a strategy of presenting a united front, their shared
position appears to derive from an uncoordinated sharing similar economic
interests.
119
Their interest in a biosafety protocol was for an instrument that would
make trade in GMOS more predictable and also help to gain public trust in GMOs
more broadly (Clapp 2003b). NGOs, in contrast, focused issues of liability and
the capacity to address or recall potentially harmful GM products.
In summary, NSA access to the negotiation and implementation process
was the same for both industry and NGOs actors. Restrictions on NSA
participation applied equally to both types of actors. The division between the
interests of these types of actors was noted by governments and both types of
actors were given time to make formal statements to the governmental
representatives. The strategies NSAs pursued within the context of the
negotiations were also similar. Both types of NSAs used informational strategies
(such as speaking at meetings, sending specialized media personnel to record and

117
The Miami Group encompassed countries in favor of GM crops including the US, Canada and
Argentina.
118
In some negotiations industry groups have divided between the US and EU or between the
northern and southern countries.
119
Clapp (2003a) notes that, during global environmental negotiations in general, industry
representatives often meet among themselves in daily strategy meetings.

79
cover the events from their point of view, providing expert information) and
networking strategies (lobbying, meeting with representatives, working with local
and regional organizations). Industry NSAs also tried to use leverage by
threatening to withhold technological information if they were not allowed to
participate in meetings. The strategies used are summarized below in Table 6.
Differences in organizational resources of NSA did not seem to matter. Holding
the meeting in a developing country heightened the possibility that NSA actors
(both NGO and industry) from that region would attend.

Food Safety and Consumer Rights
The Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC)
120
is the principal
international reference for ensuring fair practices in the sale of food, including
GM food, and it is a joint commission of the United Nations Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). Its
task is to develop uniform food standards that can be used by governments
throughout the world. The standards or food code is called the Codex
Alimentarius.
121
The Codex food safety code includes food standards for
commodities, import and export inspection and certification, methods of analysis
and sampling, codes of practice for hygiene and technology, food labeling,

120
The Commission has a structure in place to allow for input on its international standards from
non-state actors.
121
The name comes from a collection of standards and product descriptions developed by the
Austro-Hungarian Empire between 1897-1911 that was called the Codex Alimentarius Austriacus
(Roberts, 2001, 107). Nowadays Codex is used to refer both the written regulations (food safety
code) and the Commission itself.

80
pesticide evaluations and limits for pesticide residues, evaluations of food
additives, guidelines for contaminants, nutrition and special dietary uses, and
evaluations of residues of veterinary drugs. The Codex standards are seen as a
requirement to both protect human health and to facilitate international trade by
providing uniform regulatory standards. As of 1998, 163 countries had accepted
the standards and followed its codes of practice, representing 97% of the people
of the world (FAO/WHO 1999).
The rules of WTO agreements stipulate that all members trading in
agricultural commodities should either set food safety standards in accordance
with the Codex, or be able to provide sufficient scientific evidence to the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body to justify any higher standards.
122
The burden of proof
or persuasion is on the country that has a higher standard. While the range and
scope of risk assessment questions have tended progressively to widen in most
industrialized countries, it would be very costly and difficult for developing
countries to provide sufficient scientific evidence if they chose to adopt a higher
standard, since the international scientific understanding of the risks of GM crops
and seeds are chronically uncertain. This rule is likely to push countries toward
adopting lowest common denominator standards set by the CAC.
The Codex standards leave all four policy alternatives open to national
governments. The Codex draft guidelines allow for differentiation testing of

122
Thus the Codex sets a lowest common denominator standard for food safety, but in theory
allows higher standards.

81
rDNA and conventional foods, which leaves the first three options open. A total
ban on the sale of rDNA foods would be a higher standard than the Codex
guidelines, so a country would have to have the means to justify that policy using
scientific research. In that way, Codex standards constrain national policies from
being preventive. To date there is no international labeling standard for GM
foods. That leaves the second preventive policy option of comprehensive labeling
of all rDNA foods unrestricted by international guidelines. Table 9 summarized
the policy options.
Table 9. Policy options: Food safety and consumer rights
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Policy
description
No
distinction
made
between
rDNA and
conventional
food for
testing or
labeling

Differing
screening
processes
for rDNA
and
conventional
foods,
labeling of
rDNA based
on
detectable
content

Differing and
more stringent
screening
processes for
rDNA foods,
comprehensive
labeling of all
rDNA foods
enforced
through market
segregation
Ban sale of
rDNA foods or
require
comprehensive
labeling of all
rDNA foods
with warnings

The impact
of
international
obligations
on policy
options
Open Open Open Constrained/
Open
Case study
obligations
None None None None

82
Since the development of the international food safety and consumer
rights regulations for rDNA rood described above took place during the time
frame of this research, the process through which these institutions were created is
examined in greater detail. First, the structure and processes for creating the new
standards are described, followed by a discussion of non-state actor involvement
in the process. Since CAC standards evolve continually, the focus will be on the
creation of standards related to rDNA crops for the time period 1996-2002.
The CAC meets as a whole every two years. Each member national
government may send a delegation, which must be headed by a governmental
representative. However, delegations may, and often do, include representatives
of industry, consumers' organizations and academic institutes. In order to be an
observer at the CAC or one of its committees, the group must be an international
organization and preferably have a relationship with the FAO or WHO. A number
of international governmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-state
actors (NGOs and industry representatives) attend CAC meetings in an observer
capacity. Although they are "observers", the tradition of the Codex Alimentarius
Commission allows the IGOs and NSAs to put forward their points of view at
every stage except in the final decision, which is the exclusive prerogative of
member governments (FAO/WHO 1999). While the FAO and WHO have
consistently recommended the inclusion of consumers' representatives and
advocated the need to receive their input on national attitudes towards proposed

83
international food standards, the overwhelming majority of non-state actors at the
Commission meetings represent the interests of particular industries.
Codex committees, which meet every year, prepare draft standards for
submission to the Commission as a whole. The draft standards are generally
adopted by a consensus of those present at the committee meetings.
123
The draft
standards can be commented on through an eight-step process which alternates
between the drafting committees and the Commission as a whole.
124
Both member
countries and observers can submit written comments on the draft documents
before the meetings, and their comments are usually integrated into the working
documents.
125

Two Codex committees are of particular relevance to the discussion of
food safety and genetically modified crops: the Codex Committee on Food
Labeling (CCFL) and the Codex Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods
Derived from Biotechnology (Task Force). Each committees structure and
processes are different.
Since 1996, the Codex Committee on Food Labeling has been discussing
foods derived from biotechnology as an agenda item, and labeling of GM foods

123
Consensus was the standard operating procedure for the meetings related to the subject at hand.
For example The [Codex Ad Hoc Intergovernmental] Task Force [on Foods Derived from
Biotechnology] noted in particular the decision of the Commission amending the Rules of
Procedures of the Codex Alimentarius Commission that every effort should be made to adopt
Codex Standards by consensus (New Rule X.2).(CAC 2001, 1).
124
At Step 5, a draft guideline or standard is presented by the Committee to the Commission as a
whole. Although it passes from Committee to Commission at this point, the document is still open
to written comments and negotiation.
125
If the committee has trouble garnering consensus on a particular issue, it can refer the text to a
working group to advance the discussion before the next meeting. It also uses informal drafting
groups at the committee meetings themselves to work out possible compromise texts during the
course of the meetings.

84
has been an agenda item at every meeting. In 1997 it began creating
recommendations for labeling GM foods. Separate international regulations for
the labeling of organic foods, which are GM-free, were developed at the same
time that labeling for GM foods was discussed. The CCFL does not have a
specific deadline for its work, although all of it is considered urgent. As of 2004,
the recommendations for labeling GM foods were still at the Committee level and
open to comments.
126

The Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods Derived from
Biotechnology (Task Force) met for the first time in March 2000 and had a
timeline of four years to accomplish its work. At its four meetings between 2000-
2003 it created three documents relating to genetically modified foods: 1) Draft
Principles for the Risk Analysis of Foods Derived from Modern Biotechnology,
2) Draft Guideline for the Conduct of Safety Assessment of Foods Derived from
Recombinant-DNA Plants and 3) Draft Guideline for the Conduct of Food Safety
Assessment of Foods Produced Using Recombinant-DNA Microorganisms.
Besides having a limited life-span in terms of its mandate, this Task Force had
three other main differences from the CCFL: it consistently utilized working
groups to advance its agenda between regular meetings; it called upon the
FAO/WHO to provide expert opinion on specific questions; and it tended to

126
At early meetings governments were still drafting their own legislations so they had difficulty
being able to negotiate an international standard, and asked for more time to consult with their
governmental representatives on this issue. In the last few years the lack of progression to further
steps of the process has been from a lack of consensus. Thus work on labeling guidelines for GM
food is still at step 3 of the 8-step process.

85
advance the text in brackets to the Commission as a whole when there was no
consensus on an item. An NGO participant at the second Task Force session
(2001) noted that the press was not allowed into the venue and that participants
were encouraged to take name tags off before leaving the conference site
127

(Bereano 2001). The same observer also noted that the Japanese delegation,
which hosted the Task Force, also chaired the two working groups that prepared
the two main papers for discussion at the second meeting and that the Japanese
delegation was strongly pro-industry (Bereano 2001).
128
Deferential rather than
equitable treatment of the US delegation,
129
which included industry actors, by the
Chair at these meetings likely gave it more impact on the draft guidelines.
130

127
Although the latter recommendation was for security measures, it also made it difficult for the
press outside to identify participants for potential interviews.
128
Codex committees are chaired by the Secretariat of each particular Committee, in this case
Japan. Observers noted that the chair often deferred to representatives from the US as if they were
all-knowing, rather than discussing issues open to debate. All CAC committee meetings are
conducted in English with simultaneous translation into Spanish and French. The documents
themselves which are negotiated and discussed (sometimes word by word) at the meetings are in
English, which gives an obvious advantage to participants that are primarily English speakers. The
Task Force meetings also had simultaneous Japanese translation.
129
At the 2
nd
Task Force meeting 4 of the 15 members of the US delegation were industry non-
state actors, at the first meeting 7 of the 21 members of the US delegation were from industry and
2 were NGO non-state actors.
130
In a report back from the March 2001 meeting, NGO participant Phil Bereano noted: The
meeting Chair often appeared to be partial in his rulings (and at least one delegation complained
to him). Apparently, at the meeting held the preceding year he operated without bias. In this
session, however, privileges were unequally dispensed; under a 2-minute rule when speaking time
was tight, the clock was actually stopped when a US delegate fumbled around while looking for a
specific text portion. The US in particular, as this incident indicates, wielded disproportionate
power. Outside events casting concerns about existing regulatory approaches like the Canadian
Royal Society report, the December article in Science (co-authored by the US Deputy Head of
Delegation at the Montpellier meeting to implement the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol), the report
of the EU/US Biotechnology Consultative Forum seem not to affect the debates. And it is worth
noting that the Japanese delegation, which chaired the 2 Working Groups which prepared the 2
main papers during the intervening year, was strongly pro-industry and oblivious to these real-
world elements. (Bereano 2001, 1).

86
In the meetings of the two committees that discussed guidelines for GM
food, both industry and NGO representatives served on national delegations
131

and participated as independent observers. For both industry and NGOs, the same
actors attended the meetings consistently. In these meetings, the number of
industry participants was much greater than NGO participants. (See Figures 3 &
4).
132

131
Of both developing and developed countries.
132
Sources for both tables are the official meeting reports of the respective committee.

87
Figure 3. Non-state actor participation at CCFL meetings 1996-2004

0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
Number of organizations represented
MNC NGO

88
Figure 4. Non-state actor participation at Task Force meetings 2000-2003
0
5
10
15
20
2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
Number of organizations represented
MNC
NGO

Assuming that having more (or any) participants at the meeting increasing the
likelihood of having one’s view heard and noted (in the formal meetings or
informally), industry actors have the advantage over NGO actors, and developed
countries over developing country representatives. Hosting the meeting also
facilitates more participation from people from that particular country and region,
and all of the meetings were hosted by developed countries.
133
As one participant
observer at the second session of the Codex Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task
Force on Foods Derived from Biotechnology noted, Participation by Third
World countries in the Chiba meeting was minimal only a handful, including

133
The government hosting the Secretariat has to pay for the costs of the Secretariat and the
meetings. This financial obligation is makes it difficult for developing countries to host a
Secretariat. Some working group meetings of the CCFL were hosted by developing countries,
specifically Brazil and India. Task Force working group meetings were hosted by Germany, the
US and Japan. Given the large number of highly specialized Codex meetings, and since most of
them are held in developed countries, most of the participants are from rich, Northern countries.

89
Malaysia, Nigeria, Philippines, Thailand, South Africa, Brazil, India, Argentina,
Mexico, Korea, etc. and these hardly spoke during the debates.(Bereano 2001,
1).
Overall, participation and interest in the CCFL meetings has tended to
increase over time. Both the number of national delegations and the number of
representatives on the national delegations has increased, in addition to the
increase in NSA participation demonstrated in Figure 3.
As noted above, both member governments and observers have the
opportunity to express their views at Codex committee meetings. NSA
participation trends in terms of speaking at the meetings varied between the two
committees. Based on the final reports of the meetings of the Codex Committee
on Food Labeling, with respect to issues surrounding GM foods, industry and
NGO participation was rather equitable, despite the imbalance in terms of the
numbers of participants, noted above.
134
That is to say, NGO and industry
representatives spoke approximately the same numbers of times at the CCFL
meetings. At the Codex Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods Derived
from Biotechnology (Task Force) meetings, among non-state actors,
representatives of NGOs spoke more than MNCs. However, unlike the CCFL
meetings where every interjection was addressed, the NGO comments at the Task

134
With respect to state actors, members of the US delegation participated the most, in proportion
to participation from other national delegations, with the EU observers also making numerous
interjections, though not as many as the US. Representatives of the delegations from Argentina,
Brazil and India made comments at nearly every meeting.

90
Force meetings
135
did not invoke a response. This analysis is based on the
negotiations as documented in final reports from the CCFL and Task Force
meetings. These reports are summaries and do not contain information about the
time ceded to each speaker.
Besides speaking at the meetings, another way that governmental actors
and non-state observers can participate in the process is through submitting
written recommendations, which are then consolidated into draft documents to be
negotiated at the meetings. Having ones preferred language included in the
document to be discussed makes it likely that the same or similar language will be
included in the final text. Again, both industry and NGO participants have utilized
this strategy, as have member governments. In terms of the number of written
recommendations submitted to the secretariats before the meetings, there is no
significant difference among non-state actors. Industry and NGO participants
utilized this strategy equally. For example, from the CCFL meetings from 1996-
2004, MNC participants submitted 18 written comments prior to the meeting
while NGO participants submitted 19. Similarly, for the four Task Force meetings
held from 2000-2003, NGO and MNC participants submitted the same number of
prior written comments: 31 in total for each.
136
Of course, state actors submitted
the bulk of written recommendations: 69% of recommendations for CCFL

135
The US delegation also dominated the intercessions by state actors at the Task Force meetings.
Although almost every comment on the part of the US delegation provoked a response from
another party at the CCFL meetings, many of the comments of the US delegation were accepted
without further discussion at the Task Force meetings.
136
Data culled from the meeting reports of these two committees for the corresponding years.

91
meetings and 75% for the Task Force meetings (Codex Alimentarius Commission
1997a, 1997b, 1999a, 1999b, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c,
2003d, 2004). Ultimately it is the Secretariat of the committee or task force which
decides how to condense the document to be presented for negotiation, giving an
advantage to the preferences of the country of the Secretariat.
A third way that observers or member governments can participate in the
process is to actively serve on working groups that convene between committee
meetings. Working groups are established to consolidate documents or work out
alternative options to present to the committee at large. At each of these meetings,
industry and NGO non-state actors could participate as independent observers, or
as part of a national delegation.
137
For example at the 27
th
session of the CCFL
(April 1999), it was decided that a working group would be established to
continue deliberations in order to combine options to produce a new document for
consideration. Of the non-state actor observers, the ratio of industry to NGO
representatives in these groups was 3 to 1 in terms of number of organizations.
(CAC, 2001b).
Attempts to frame the discussion were made repeatedly at the meetings, by
both representatives of national delegations and observers. Two debates illustrate
this well: one, the discussion of whether to use the term modern biotechnology
versus genetic modification/genetic engineering; and two, whether consumers
have the right to know; that is rights to information about whether their food

137
The Task Force also used Working Groups but its reports do not list the participants.

92
contains genetically modified substances.
138
After the debate, the Task Force
decided to use the term Modern Biotechnology because it is the term used by
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. This debate continues in CCFL meetings,
but the CCFL is using the terms genetic modification/genetic engineering as titles
to the recommendations it is drafting.
Proponents of the term modern biotechnology emphasize that this
terminology is consistent with other, older international documents. Proponents of
the terms genetic modification/genetic engineering, on the other hand, stress that
these are the terms known and utilized by consumers, whereas modern
biotechnology is not. For example, at the 29
th
Session of the CCFL, the
delegation from Norway
139
noted that in a basic internet search, references to
genetic modification\genetic engineering (combined) outnumbered more than 30
times the references to modern biotechnology as related to foods, and that these
terms were more widely used. (CAC 2001, 7). Proponents of the latter
terminology also noted that modern biotechnology is not a clearly defined term.
Regarding the second debate, although the mandate to the CCFL
140
was to
provide guidance on how the fact that a food derived from modern

138
Another example of framing not noted in the session reports but commented on by
observer/participant Phil Bereano regards safety assessment. Dr. Bereano notes: The Principles
[for the Risk Analysis of Foods Derived from Modern Biotechnology] introduce a new concept,
`safety assessment, which is to occur at the beginning of the process (unlike the old term `safety
assessment which occurred at the end and denoted the `level of acceptable risk). It is defined to
identify `whether a hazard, nutritional or other safety concern is present. Although I offered an
amendment to use non-Orwellian language and call this a `hazard assessment, my suggestion
went no where. (Bereano 2001).
139
Which included a representative of Greenpeace.
140
As of 1991. See paragraph 90 ALINORM 91/41.

93
biotechnologies could be made known to the consumers (Codex Alimentarius
Commission 2003, 9), whether and what information consumers have the right to
is still being contested in the Committee meetings. Proponents of greater
information for consumers tend to use the term right to know, while opponents
use the term claims to information.
Occasionally attempts have been made to broaden the scope of the
CCFLs work or to link other issues to the discussion.
141
For example, the need to
include the indirect effects of genetic engineering was brought up repeatedly
(CAC 1997a, 1999b). It was decided that the current guidelines for GM food
under development were limited to foods which have a known safe counterpart.
142

Regarding linkages, at the 28
th
Session of the CCLF, the US delegation stressed
the need to address all the implications of labeling of foods derived from
biotechnology including enforcement, methodology, economic cost, and
consumer perception before taking a decision on mandatory labeling provisions.
The US delegation also pointed out that developing countries would face
technical difficulties in implementing provisions for the labeling of foods derived
from biotechnology (CAC 2001a, 5). If the costs of particular methods or
provisions for enforcement are too expensive they could restrict the ability of a
country to sell its genetically engineered crops to the international market. This
discussion was considered part of the CCFLs work. However, most attempts to

141
Other related issues such as traceability of foods and standards for organically produced foods
were discussed as different agenda items during the same sessions.
142
Indirect effects and regulations for foods without a known safe counterpart were put aside as
possible future work for the CCFL.

94
broaden the scope of the CCFLs agenda by linking other issues to the discussion
were rebuffed or redirected in some way, because widening the scope made the
Committees work more difficult.
In summary, access to the CAC is open to both industry and NGO non-
state actors. The strategies employed were also similar in that both types of non-
state actors submitted written comments, participated verbally at meetings,
attempted to frame the discussion by using specific language, served on working
groups and drafting committees, served on national delegations, and attempted to
hold the document consistent to norms, terms or standards used in other
international instruments. The key difference was that the number of industry
versus NGO participants was much greater, as illustrated by Figures 2 and 3.
Furthermore, those comparisons were made based on the number of organizations
represented. If the number of people actually present had been counted, the trend
would have been the same, only more pronounced. Since access is open to both
industry and NGO participants this suggests that organizational resources
mattered more than access or strategy in this specific context.
143
The networking
strategy was also important in that having the ear of particular state delegations
would give a non-state actor additional advantages.

143
In the regular meetings NGO and industry participants spoke roughly the same amount, which
could indicate that the number of participants did not matter as much as other factors, such as
being a part of a national delegation or persuasive speaking skills. However the amount of
interventions by non-state actors in the working group meetings that decided on draft alternatives
is not recorded and could have made a difference. In these meetings the ratio of industry to NGO
NSA participants was 3 to 1.

95
Public Research
The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
centers are the leading international public sector agricultural research institutes.
CGIAR is an informal association of 58 members
144
that was established in 1971
by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and the World Bank, and the CGIAR
chair is a vice-president of the World Bank (Grain 2001, GM Watch n.d.). The
CGIAR works with national agricultural research systems (NARS), NGOs and the
private sector. Membership in the CGIAR system is voluntary and is open to
governments, international organizations, NGOs and industry. The majority of its
members are states and include Brazil and India, but not Argentina. India also
hosts one of the CGIARs 15 international agricultural research centers, the
International Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT).
CGIAR members make voluntary contributions to the centers and
programs of their choice, allowing funds to be targeted to areas of research and
regions that align with their development priorities. Members must make a yearly
cash contribution to the CGIAR of a minimum of US $500,000. Non-members
may also contribute. The World Bank is the largest contributor.
145
Industrial
countries account for more than two-thirds of CGIAR financing and this is
reflected in its governance structure, which is fundamentally controlled by rich
industrialized countries (GM Watch n.d). For example the US is a major

144
Members include 22 developing countries, 21 developed countries, 4 private foundations, and
12 regional and international organizations.
145
After the World Bank the largest contributors from 1996-2002 were the US, Japan, and the
EC/EU (CGIAR 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002).

96
contributor to the CGIAR system, all four foundations that are members of the
CGIAR are from the US, and the US has more privileges within the World Bank
structure. Each of these factors combines to give actors from the US greater
control over CGIAR governance than actors from other countries.
While the CGIAR system does not create policy obligations, its research
agenda can affect the research and research investment patterns of national
agricultural research.
146
Table 10 summarizes the policy options open to states.
Table 10. Policy options: Public research
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Policy
description
Invest
national and
donor funds
into
transgenic
technology.
Allow
international
private sector
partnerships
Invest
national and
donor funds
into
breeding
transgenic
crops into
local
varieties
Invest no
national funds
into transgenic
technology but
allow donor
funding of
downstream
transgenic
technology
Invest no
national nor
donor funds
in transgenic
technology
The impact of
international
obligations
on policy
options
Open Open Closed/Open? Closed/Open?
Case study
obligations
None None None None

146
The CGIAR also influences policies as a non-state actor. For example, it recommended that
states establish IPR because of the increasing importance of proprietary technology and private
sector research in rDNA crops (Osorio Chaparro 1999, 84-85). Besides strengthening the power of
scientists, in some regards, increased IPR was considered necessary to create further fiscal
incentives for private sector investment in research.

97
The five areas of the CGIAR research agenda have not changed since 1996. They
are increasing productivity, protecting the environment, saving biodiversity,
147

improving policies and strengthening national agricultural research systems
(NARS). There is no specific breakdown for rDNA research in the financial
reports, but since 1997 a breakdown of germplasm enhancement/breeding has
been given, which includes use of rDNA technologies. (See Table 11 below.)
However, every budget category could pertain to the development of rDNA
technologies in some way, such as improvement of biosafety policies and
procedures, or staff training. Moreover, rDNA techniques are only a part of a
much wider process of plant breeding, and all the other aspects of plant breeding
must be maintained to create transgenic crops. That said, the CGIAR website
(www.cgiar.org) notes that currently (2005) about 7% of CGIAR research is
dedicated to exploring biotechnologies, and of that, approximately 3% is
dedicated to the exploration of genetically modified organisms (CGIAR n.d.).
Twelve of the 16 international CGIAR centers have invested research funds in
biotechnology including some genetic engineering. Perhaps more important than
the percentage or actual dollar amount of funding for rDNA research is the fact
that CGIAR scientists do use this research tool. Where enhanced traditional
breeding techniques have not been able to solve a specific problem, such as
improving the vitamin content in rice, CGIAR-supported crop scientists consider

147
This includes conserving germplasm through ex situ gene banks. Most of the germplasm is held
intrust for humankind and is available to researchers worldwide. Intellectual property rights
cannot be given for this material. It costs approximately $6 million annually to maintain the
germplasm collection.

98
that genetically modifying organisms through genetic transformation can be a
valuable option. (CGIAR n.d.). Depending on how segregated the research on
rDNA technologies is, the use of such technologies in these centers could mean
closed precautionary and preventive policy options or it could leave them open.
Table 11. CGIAR research allocations 1996-2002
Area of research 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Increasing Productivity 40% 40% 37% 34% 36% 35% 34%
germplasm
enhancement/breeding
n.d. 19% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%
Protecting the Environment 16% 17% 19% 20% 18% 19% 18%
Saving Biodiversity 11% 11% 11% 10% 10% 9% 10%
Improving Policies 12% 11% 12% 13% 14% 14% 15%
Strengthening NARS 21% 21% 21% 23% 22% 23% 23%
Total budget
(in millions of US dollars)
332 333 337 349 339 355 369
Sources: CGIAR Financial and Annual Reports 1996-2003
Both industry and NGO actors have access to the CGIAR system through
making donations and sharing research. The 2001 Annual Report noted that the
CGIAR is involved in a growing number of public-private partnerships
(CGIAR 2001, 12). Non-CGIAR member donations have made up 4-7% of the
annual budgets from 1998-2002.
148
(See Table 12, below). Such donors include
foundations,
149
the private sector, NGOs, non-member developing countries, and
other UN agencies. Several of the reports note that private sector contributions
primarily include contributions for collaborative work from Latin American

148
Not every annual or financial report includes this breakdown. Similarly, foundation support is
not specified in every report.
149
Industry actors often make donations through their corresponding foundations, whether it be
money or sharing of actual research outcomes.

99
agricultural producers (CGIAR 2000, 2002). Other than the three member
foundations (Rockefeller, Ford and Kellogg), other foundation support has come
from the Eiseleen, Gatsby, Hidalgo, Hilton, Neys-van Hoogs, Nippon,
Novartis,
150
MacArthur, Sasakawa, Sehgal Family, and the Syngenta
Table 12. Non-state actor donations to CGIAR 1998-2002
Donor 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Multi-donor
projects
151

2.3
152

3.7 4.7 5.8 4.9
Foundations 1.8 3.0 4.4 5.1 5.6
Non-member
developing
countries
2.9 2.2 2.7 2.3 1.1
Private sector 0.6 1.3 2.1 2.2 1.7
Common
Fund for
Commodities
1.1 1.3 1.0 1.7 0
UN
organizations
& NGOs
0.4
(0.3/0.1)
1.0
(0.5/0.5)
1.3 2.0 5.7
Other 2.8 2.5 3.0 4.0 7.1
Total 11.9 15.0 19.2 23.1 26.1
Member
Foundations

Rockefeller 3 3.5 4 6.3 7.5
Ford 3 2.6 2.6 2.7 1.3
Kellogg 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 0.3
Total 6.3 6.2 6.6 9.2 9.1
Case study
countries

Brazil 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.9
India 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0

150
Novartis was/is one of the top 5 biotechnology companies worldwide.
151
Includes both members and non-members.
152
In millions of US $.

100
Foundations.
153
The Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture became a
CGIAR member in 2001. Table 12 demonstrates that foundation support and
support from NGOs has become more important to CGIAR operations. The
contributions of Brazil and India are given for comparison.
According to the CGIAR charter, to become a member of the CGIAR
system the organization or government must agree to support the mission and
objectives of CGIAR, participate in CGIAR governance meetings, and make a
minimum annual yearly contribution of US $500,000. Countries and
intergovernmental organizations are accepted as members without further ado.
NGOs and industry actors membership requests are reviewed by the Executive
Committee. However, the Charter, which is a legally non-binding document, was
created in 2004. When the Syngenta Foundation became a CGIAR member in
2001, its addition as a new member was not discussed by the Executive
Committee -which did exist at the time-- nor were any other of the CGIAR
committees even informed of the decision (AgBioIndia 2002).
The acceptance of the Syngenta Foundation as a CGIAR member
provoked severe criticism.
154
Syngenta
155
is the worlds largest biotechnology
company and three of the five seats on the Syngenta Foundations board are
occupied by Syngenta directors. The CGIAR NGO Committee (NGO-C) decided

153
Syngenta was/is another of the top 5 biotechnology companies worldwide.
154
The addition of the new members was not discussed by the Executive Committee. Neither were
any other CGIAR committees informed of the additions as a matter of courtesy (AgBioIndia
2002).
155
In a merger that incorporated Novartis, it became the worlds largest biotech company.

101
to freeze its relationship with the CGIAR pending a review of the CGIAR's
research agenda, commenting that the CGIAR is deviating from [its] mandate
and is adopting a corporate agenda for agricultural research and development.
CGIAR's consideration of Syngenta Foundation's membership is a clear indication
of the trend towards the corporatisation of public agricultural research. (NGO
Committee Statement 2002).
156
Furthermore, possibly as a result of this decision,
the 2002 CGIAR annual meeting
157
was marked by farmers' protests and street
demonstrations against CGIAR's research orientation and lack of accountability to
the third world farmers they are meant to serve.
158
Parallel to the CGIAR annual
meeting a People's Street Conference on agriculture was held by NGOs. Like
the CGIAR NGO-Committee, conference participants also issued a Unity
Statement calling the inclusion of Syngenta Foundation "a prime example of the
privatized approach of the CGIAR" that "sounds the death knell of independent,
responsible public science." (AgBioIndia 2002, ENS 2002). More widely,
criticism for GM-oriented research agendas within public institutions has also
come from UN agencies (GE Information Service 2002).
159
Some NGOs have
called for the dismemberment of the CGIAR and the return of the research centers
to the nations that host them. Others have noted that private sector contributions

156
The NGO-C's freeze meant it would not replace vacant seats on the NGO-C, would not accept
money from the CGIAR, and would not agree to sit on the CGIAR's Executive Council or any
other committees, or participate in CGIAR programmes. (GM Watch n.d.).
157
This was the first meeting held outside Washington DC. It was held in the Philippines.
158
The hundreds of protesting farmers were met with police barricades and water cannons (ENS
2002, GM Watch n.d.).
159
A study by the OECD concluded that biotechnology research has not been closely integrated
with the problems and constraints confronting agriculture, nor has it addressed obstacles to
widespread diffusion, particularly to low-income farmers.

102
to particular CGIAR centers have helped to spread particular agricultural
technologies preferred by these companies. For example, the Syngenta
Foundation gives proprietary GM technology to poor farmers.
160

The strategies used by NGO and industry actors were similar in many
regards. Both used informational and networking tactics. Both tried to sway
public opinion by using symbolic politics (Sygenta Foundation tried to
demonstrate that GM technology was useful to poor farmers and NGO actors held
a parallel street conference to foster the idea that CGIAR was not working for the
people). NGOs attempted to hold CGIAR accountable to its mission of research
for the public interest and in particular for resource-poor farmers. Both types of
actors used leverage (Syngenta Foundation used contributions and technological
knowledge to gain membership; and the NGOs formally froze relations with the
CGIAR).
Organizational resources of industry actors in terms of money and
proprietary ownership of technological knowledge were more important than
other types of organizational resources (such as the age of the organizations or
history of relationships). As both NSA access and strategy-types were similar, the
differences in organizational resources were most the important factor affecting
international public research. The Syngenta Foundation contributed to the CGIAR
at a time when it had been facing chronic budgetary decline in terms of real

160
They provide GM technology even when it does not address the problems facing farmers, or is
not the most appropriate technology (De Grassi 2003).

103
dollars. It is likely that the Syngenta Foundations membership in the CGIAR
system will increase both investment in rDNA research and the proportion of
research related to rDNA technologies.

Summary and Conclusions
The most important international institutions that regulate rDNA crops are
the TRIPs and SPS Agreements (under the WTO), the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety Protocol (CPB) under the Convention on Biological Diversity and the
Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) under the World Health Organization
and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. Membership in the World Trade
Organization has policy implications for states in 3 of the 5 policy areas:
intellectual property rights, trade and food safety/consumer choice. Furthermore,
the WTO has a Dispute Settlement Body whereas alternative dispute settlement
arenas (such as an international court for environmental issues or harm to human
health) do not exist. This structure privileges trade over other concerns. While the
CPB and the WTO instruments have equal international legal status and can both
make regulations and establish mechanisms that pertain to different aspect of
rDNA crops, of these international organizations only the WTO has the teeth of a
Dispute Settlement Body, which gives it functional power over the CPB. The
ambiguity that was purposefully created between these two sets of regulations has
yet to be tested by a dispute.

104
Various concerned international institutions/instruments make certain
policy options more difficult for member states to follow. Table 13 combines the
information presented in each section to summarize the impact international
institutions have on policy alternatives. As can be seen from Table 13, the rules of
Table 13. Impact of international institutions on policy options
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Intellectual
property
rights
Open
India
Open Closed or
Constrained
Argentina
Brazil
Constrained
Trade

Open Open
Argentina
Brazil
India
Constrained Constrained
Biosafety Open Open Open Constrained
Food safety
and
consumers
rights
Open Open Open Constrained/
Open
Public
research
Open Open Closed? Open? Closed?
Open?

international institutions tend to make preventive and precautionary policies
harder to implement than permissive or promotional policies toward rDNA crops.
Furthermore, the combined institutional structure creates multiple obligations for
states. Effective implementation of these obligations may be very costly and
difficult, and implementation of these items may not be among the most pressing
problems for national governments. Bilateral pressure, for example via the US

105
Trade Act (Super 301)
161
or threatening to file a case with the WTO DSB, also
comes into play regarding which of the many obligations states ultimately fulfill.
In terms of non-state actor influence, the chapter looked at access,
strategies and organizational resources for biosafety and food safety and
consumer rights. Table 14 summarizes NSA access according to formal rules for
participation.
Table 14. Non-state actor access to international institutions
NGO non-state actors Industry non-state
actors
Biosafety Local and regional
organizations allowed
Local and regional
organizations allowed
Food safety and
consumersrights
Only international
organizations
Only international
organizations

As can be noted from the table, access for non-state actors varies from
institution to institution, as do the standard operating procedures as to which
NSAs can participate and how. Some institutions even allow local and regional
NSAs where others restrict all NSA participation. At the biosafety meetings, there
were usually, though not always, more NGOs than industry actors present at the
meetings. As noted in the biosafety section, participation by the private sector was
limited by the state actors during the ICCP meetings. However, when
participation was limited, access to NGO and industry actors was the same it
was limited for both. More NGO than industry actor participation in biosafety

161
The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act became known world-wide as Super 301
(for section 301, which was first known as the Gephart amendment). This piece of legislation gave
the US power to unilaterally punish countries for what it deemed unfair trade practices.

106
forums than in food safety forums (and vice-versa) was most likely a choice or
strategy on the part of each of these types of actors. However, the structure of the
biosafety meetings, which allowed the participation of local and regional NGOs,
facilitated their access. In contrast, the CAC requirement that groups must be
international probably constrained greater NGO participation.
A second difference in access between NGO and industry NSAs was in
terms of actual (de facto) practice rather than legal (de jure) access, and pertained
to international instruments under the WTO (SPS Agreement and TRIPs
Agreement). In these two instances, industry actors were privileged over NGO
actors because their concerns were more likely to be defined and accepted as
trade-related.
Overall, most non-state actors participants, from both industry and NGOs,
represent Northern companies or organizations. The location of the meetings and
working language also privilege Northern NSAs over Southern NSAs. Most
meetings are held in developed countries, meetings are conducted in English, and
documents are negotiated in English. Notably, at meetings that were held in
Southern states many more NSA representatives from those states and regions
attended.
162

With regard to strategies utilized, there were few differences. While some
strategies such as lobbying and public information were employed frequently by
both NGOs and industry, other strategies differed by NSA type. For example,

162
This reinforces other findings that among the NGO actor, global imbalances of power are
reiterated. See for example, Batliwala 2004, or Edwards 2000.

107
NGOs tended to use more public action, parallel meetings and protest actions.
Industry tended to develop in-house strategies (such as a new technology or
internal company-user IPR arrangements) to circumvent the need for a particular
regulation. Direct action strategies, which are mainly utilized by NGO actors,
have become increasingly constrained by limited access to the buildings where
meetings are held and to meeting participants, as well as the demonization and de-
legitimization of their actions. Besides state actors, NGOs also pressure different
companies or industries directly through public information campaigns.
163

Finally, organizational resources privileged industry over NGO actors for
two policy areas: food safety and public research. In these areas industry actors
were able to have more people at the meetings, better influence mainstream
media, and actually join the organization (CGIAR) thanks to greater resources.
Differences in organizational resources also come into play here in terms of what
strategies can be utilized. For example, industry actors have more resources
available to allocate to lobbying. A particular company, such as Syngenta, can
have in-house lobbyists, pay a lobbying firm to work on its behalf, and have
lobbying services as a part of industrial associations.
Overall, the international level analysis indicates that the obligations
created by international institutions are likely to have an impact on state policy
choices for the regulation of rDNA crops because of the constraints they create on

163
As the result of such campaigns, several companies that were pioneer developers of terminator
technology (Monsanto and Syngenta) have promised not to commercialize it, but research has
continued in these and other companies (Clapp 2003b).

108
different policy options. With respect to NSA involvement, it suggests that the
key difference at the international level was organizational resources, more so
than strategies or formal access to institutions. For some policy areas
organizational resources allowed more industry non-state actors to attend formal
institutional meetings, for example at the CAC committee meetings. However,
more NGOs tended to attend the CPB meetings, so this was not uniform.
Moreover, despite differences in numbers, spoken and written comments by
NSAs at both the CAC and CPB meetings were fairly equitable
164
so, at least for
the formal parts of the meetings, the number of a particular type of NSA
representative present does not appear to have made a difference. That said,
negotiations analyses have noted that the informal negotiation can be much more
important than the actual formal negotiations. This aspect was not analyzed here,
but could be an area for further research.
A second way that organizational resources might come into play are
control of the mainstream media and economic conflicts of interest (due to
corporate conglomeration) over what type of information is given to the general
public. Fox News failure to televise a report on milk with rBST illustrates the
impact of this type of conflict of interest. At the international institutional
meetings, sometimes the press has not been allowed into all the meetings,
sometimes participants have not been encouraged to give information to reporters,

164
According to the final reports of the related meetings, NGO and industry actors submitted
approximately the same number of written comments and spoke in the meetings the same number
of times. Length of the comments could not be ascertained, nor could the impact of the written
submissions on the negotiation documents.

109
and access to meeting areas has become increasingly restricted. All three of these
elements constrict a free press and might serve to privilege corporate mainstream
media over other reporters, such as specialized NSA reporters. Again, this is an
area that merits further research.
The third way that organizational resources were important was that the
Syngenta Foundation was able to become a member of the CGIAR thanks to its
ability to contribute money and proprietary technology. NGO organizational
resources in terms of a long history of working together and sharing non-
proprietary (public domain) knowledge of farming appeared to be less important.
Considering that the CGIARs mission is to serve the public interest and,
especially, resource-poor farmers this outcome is grave for NGOs and for
farmers. The inequality of organizational resources between NGO and industry
actors is enormous. The resources of industry actors even exceed those of state
actors. As of 2000, 51 of the world's 100 largest economic entities were
corporations and 49 were countries (Anderson and Cavanagh 2000, 1). Besides
the direct use of economic power, industry actors are able to wield influence
through the existence of the mere potential of a threat of relocating jobs to another
country. This influence is sometimes referred to as the regulatory chill
(Neumayer 2001, 71-71). Industry actors dont have to make the threat or even
follow through with such an action to be able to have influence.
In terms of directing state policy choices, it appears that at the
international level, the institutional context may be more important than NSA

110
involvement. However, without NSA involvement, would such international
institutions such as the TRIPs agreement or the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol
even exist? Would labeling even be discussed without consumer demand for it?
Since state actors are the primary participants at the international level, the formal
context through which the institutions were formed may obscure the impact of
NSA involvement.
In the next three chapters, the case studies of Brazil, Argentina and India
are presented. These chapters are organized as this one is. First the institutional
structure is explained, followed by an analysis of non-state actor involvement for
each of the five policy areas. An introductory section provides a picture of the
general socioeconomic standing of the country as well as information about its
agriculture system. Information on the overall structure of the government is also
given in the introductory sector, along with an overview of the regulatory bodies
for GM crops. Institutions and processes that pertain to each policy area are
explained further in the corresponding policy sections as needed.
Since the international institutional context appears to constrain certain
policy options, attention is given to how the case study countries address these
particular international obligations. Chronologies of events within each of the
case countries are included as appendices and serve as evidence of what came
first at the state level actions by non-state actor or institutional obligations.

111
Chapter 3
Brazil: NGOs Plant Precaution through the Courts

Introduction
Why did Brazilian policy for biosafety and food safety/consumer rights
shift from promotional to more precautionary stances while those for the other
policy areas remained statically promotional? Who was responsible for the policy
shifts and who shapes policies more generally for rDNA crops in Brazil? Are
decisions shaped by a vibrant civil society, roaring its voice after years of being
suppressed by military rule? Or do a handful of large, multinational companies
wield a disproportionate amount of influence over policy decisions, to the
detriment of most Brazilians? Do institutional processes and structures balance
the influence of these different types of non-state actors? Or do the same
institutional processes and structures of the state support certain policy positions
regardless of non-state actor influence? In the chapter that follows both the
involvement of non-state actors and the institutional context surrounding the
making of policies for rDNA crops in Brazil is examined. The chapter is
organized around the five policy areas identified in Chapter One: intellectual
property rights, trade, biosafety, food safety and consumer rights, and public
research. For each area, the institutional context is briefly described and then
participation of non-state actors is noted with regard to key events. An event
chronology is included as Appendix A. NSA participation is examined in detail to

112
see if any of the elements identified in Chapter One, namely, access, strategies
and/or resources, were crucial to the NSAs success or failure.
Brazil, the largest and most populous
165
country of South America, is also
its leading economic power.
166
Agriculture
167
plays an important role in Brazils
economy for both development and livelihoods. For example, in 2004, 10.1% of
Brazils GDP came from agriculture and a significant proportion of Brazils labor
force (23.1% in 1998, 20% in 2004) worked in agriculture (UN Report on Human
Development 1998 and CIA Factbook 2005).
Brazils principal agricultural exports are soybeans
168
and coffee (CIA
Factbook 1999). On a global level, Brazil is the second largest soybean producer,
between the US and Argentina (AFD Avila et al 2002, 296). Its position as one of
the top three soy producers in the world, but the only one of the three that doesnt
produce transgenic soy, makes Brazil an interesting case study in and of itself.
Indeed, the use of transgenic crops in Brazil was clearly dictated by policy
choices, not technological development, because transgenic soy varieties suited to
the soil and climate conditions of southern Brazil were already available during
the timeframe of the study.

165
Brazil is the 5th most populous nation in the world, based on estimated 2005 data from the CIA
Factbook. Estimated population for July 2005: 186,112,794.
166
Brazils GDP per capita was $8,100 (PPP) 2004 estimate. Inflation for 2004 was 7.6% and its
current account balance for the same year was $8 billion (CIA Factbook). Its human development
index rank for 2003 was 63 of 177 countries (Human Development Report).
167
Brazils main agricultural products are coffee, soybeans, wheat, rice, corn, sugarcane, cocoa,
citrus and beef.
168
In 1999, for example, soybeans represented 25.63% of Brazils total agricultural exports, and
11.48% of its total agricultural production. Cotton, in contrast, represents only 1.46% of its
exports and 1.25% of its total production (AFD Avila et al 2002, 295).

113
Both industry and NGO actors have played an active role in shaping
policies for the use and non-use of transgenic crops in Brazil. Multinational
companies have virtually monopoly control over transgenic crops in Brazil: 90%
of the field tests in Brazil are done by foreign companies and those 10% that are
done by national companies use genes under patent by transnational industry
(Vigna 2001, 43, citing Silvio Valle). In terms of market share, the Monsanto
Group, (made up of BRASKALB-Agropecuária Brasileria Ltds, Cargill Agrícola
S/A, Sementes Agroceres S.A., Sementes Monsanto Ltda. and Monsanto do
Brasil Ltda.) has clearly dominated. For example it was responsible for 683 out
of the 914 experiments on transgenic crops conducted between 1997 and July
2001 in Brazil, or 75% of the total (Vigna 2001, 33). In terms of land, the
Monsanto Group had 91.72% of the total experimental GM crop acreage in Brazil
(from 1997-2001). Monsanto also has market dominance in other countries and,
as the second largest seed company in the world, is a leading conglomerate at the
international level. Monsantos competitors in Brazil are other MNCs, some
national cooperatives, and a few state research organizations.
169
Besides the
companies themselves, other industry non-state actors are industry trade
associations of which ABRABI, the Brazilian Association of Biotechnology
Firms, (Asociação Brasileira das Empresas de Biotecnologia) is one. Clark and

169
Besides the Monsanto Group, other agrobiotechnology entitites in Brazil include the
Cooperativa Central Agropecuária de Desenvolvimento Tecnológico e Econômico Ltda.
(Coodetec), Cooperativa de Produtos de Cana e Álcool do Estado de São Paulo (Copersucar),
Cyanamid Química do Brasil Ltda., Dinamilho Carol Produtos Agrícolas Ltda., Embrapa Soja,
Hoechst Schering AgrEvo do Brasil Ltda., Instituto Agronômico do Paraná (IAPAR), Novartis
Seeds Ltda., Pioneer Sementes Ltda., Profigen do Brasil Ltda., and Universidades Federal de
Viçosa (UFV) (Vigna 2001, 35).

114
Juma note that ABRABI has been active in all government initiatives related to
biotechnologies (1991, 92) and that ABRABI has organized an industrial
information base, prepared proposals for the development and regulation of the
sector, and participated in the creation of Bio-Rio. (Clark and Juma 1991, 92).
With respect to NGOs, the main actors have been the Brazilian Institute
for the Defense of Consumers (Instituto Brasileiro de Defensa do Consumidor,
IDEC), and Greenpeace - Brazil. In 1999, these organizations joined with other
NGOs to create a National Campaign for a Brazil Free of Transgenics
(Campanha Nacional por um Brasil Livre de Transgênicos).
170
Besides advocating
for research on transgenics with respect to the environment and health, the
campaign
171
also called for development of agroecology, an agricultural system
that is responsible to society as well as the environment. While the work of
particular NGO actors varied, with each emphasizing their specialty, together they
worked for three main goals: 1) that research on transgenic crops be carried out to
ascertain whether transgenics are harmful to health or the environment; 2) that
research follow the national environmental protection laws; and 3) that the public
be informed about the research. The influence of these and other NGO actors is
examined in the policy sections. Before addressing the policy areas, a brief
overview of the national institutional context is given.

170
Other members of the campaign included ESPLAR, ActionAid Brasil, Assessoria e Serviços a
Projetos em Agricultura Atlernative - AS-PTA, Centro de Criação da Imagem Popular - CECIP,
Centro Ecológico de Ipê, Federação dos Órgãos para Assistência Social e Educacional FASE,
and Instituto de Estudos Sócio-Econômicos -INESC.
171
The campaign has received financial support from ActionAid, NOVIB, Oxfam Brazil and
CESE.

115
Institutional Context
The wider institutional context within which non-state actors function is
that of a democratic, federal republic with 26 states. States have legislative
powers in every area except those stipulated in the Constitution,
172
which puts
agricultural issues are under state control.
173
Furthermore, there is separation of
power between states and municipalities, and Brazil has almost 5,000 self-
governing municipalities. This means that both states and municipalities can make
their own laws regarding transgenic crops. State and municipal laws are
complementary or supplemental to federal law. The contents of sub-federal laws
can be stricter, but not laxer than federal regulations for public safety precautions.
Because of this division of power, before research or production of a GM crop
can occur the company or laboratory must have approval from both the federal
and states authorities.
The President has the power to legislate through the use of provisional
measures (Medidas Provisórias, MP), a normative instrument with the force of
law. When provisional measures are utilized at the same time that congress is
drafting legislation in the same area, the MPs, in effect, usurp congressional
legislative power (Vigna 2001, 9). Presidential provisional measures were
repeatedly used to by-pass the legislature for regulation of transgenic crops. The

172
The federal legislature is bicameral. State legislatures are unicameral. Municipalities have
unicameral legislative city councils (Burton and Stevens, citymayors.com).
173
In 2000, a federal deputy proposed an amendment to the constitution with regard to genetically
modified agriculture. His amendment proposed the inclusion of transgenics on the list of areas
under federal control. His proposal was approved to go to the constitutional commission in 2002.
(Londres 2002, Boletim 110 2002.) After some deliberation, the commission voted that the
proposal be permanently archived in 2003.

116
policy sections further below describe how MPs were used with regard to
transgenic crops and the controversy surrounding their use.
The judicial wing has oversight over the other branches of government
and can determine a law, including a provisional measure, to be illegal. The
judicial branch also has the responsibility to monitor the effective enforcement of
laws concerning the protection of health or the environment.
Moving from the wider institutional context to the specific institutions
with oversight of transgenic crops in Brazil, various entities had authority and
need to be briefly explained. The main institutions included the National
Technical Commission for Biosafety (Comissão Ténica Nacional de
Biossegurança CTNBio), the Ministry of Agriculture, and the National
Environmental System (Sistema Nacional do Meio Ambiente-SNMA). Each of
these entities is described briefly below, and disputes over boundaries of authority
are noted. They are referred to in the policy sections that follow. The figure below
created by Pelaez and Albergoni helps to portray the institutional context as a
whole.

117
Source: Pelaez and Albergoni 2004, 224.
As can be noted from Figure 5, the CTNBio has a central role in the
oversight of transgenic crops. It was expressly created to examine the security of
genetically modified organisms by screening GM crops case-by-case for
Biosafety Law
MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Appoints the head of CTNBio
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE
Sanitary inspection (animal and vegetable)
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
Monitoring and surveillance of human health and food
MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT
Environmental protection
BIO-SAFETY NATIONAL
TECHNICAL
COMMISSION (CTNBio)
Issuing technical assessment
over biosafety procedures
concerning GMOS
BIOTECH FIRM PETITIONER
Licenses for research of GMO production
granted by both federal and state
Biosafety Commissions
STATE BIOSAFETY COMMISSIONS
Created by state decrees can supplement the
federal legislation without contradicting it
FEDERAL
LEVEL
STATE
LEVEL
Figure 5. Institutional context for GM crops in Brazil 117

118
demonstrated risk (CTNBio 2002).
174
Presidential decree No. 1752 of 1995 gave
the CTNBio authority over setting the parameters for Environmental Impact
Assessments and Reports (Estudo de Impacto Ambiental and Relatório de
Impacto no Meio Ambiente EIA-RIMA
175
), which are required by the
Constitution. The CTNBios authority over EIA-RIMAs was contested by other
entities.
The Ministry of Environment also ended up playing an important role in
the polemic over the regulation of transgenic crops. The National Council on the
Environment (Consejo Nacional do Meio Ambiente CONAMA) defines or
creates rules or norms related to environmental protection, including how to
conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment for genetically modified crops
(Londres 2002). Thus both the CTNBio and CONAMA claimed responsibility for
deciding how to regulate the environmental impact assessment of transgenics. The
Constitution gives authority over EIA-RIMAs to the Ministry of the
Environment,
176
and in May 1999, the Ministry of the Environment announced
that it would demand an environmental impact assessment and report for all GM
products that were analyzed by the CTNBio.

174
The role of the CTNBio was modified by the new Biosafety Law and as of Oct. 2005 was still
being reorganized.
175
The EIA-RIMA, also written as EIA/Rima, is often translated as environmental impact
assessment. The Report part was emphasized by members of civil society, because without the
report it does not matter whether the study is done or not. The report ensures transparency before
the public eye. It ensures the publics right to know.
176
The Consitution is the supreme law of the land and decrees are second to the last (7
th
) in terms
of hierarchy (Passos, 2002).

119
The Ministry of Agriculture has authority over the import, or exclusion, of
genetically modified products, so cross-border trade in GM crops needs approval
from both the CTNBio and the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1999, the Ministry of
Agriculture asked the CTNBio to define more rigorous criteria for experiments
with GM products.
177
At the same time, the Ministry admitted that it was not able
to supervise and monitor the experimental activities due to the lack of staff. As
noted above, agriculture is primarily a subject governed at the state level, so once
transgenic crops began to come into Brazil in 1997 -- via authorized shipments
and illegally-- the state governments also began to act. For example, in 1998, the
Secretary of Agriculture of Paraná signed a resolution prohibiting the entrance of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the state without authorization by its
Secretary of Agriculture. In May 1999 the 27 state Secretaries present at the
National Forum of Secretaries of Agriculture took the unanimous position that
transgenics should not be released in Brazil until the impact on state budgets and
research uncertainties had been resolved. This critical position on the part of the
Secretaries was reaffirmed in another meeting, in September 1999 at an Agro-
Fishery Trade Show. When illegal planting of GM soy became evident in Rio
Grande do Sul in 1998, which borders on Argentina, the Secretary of Agriculture
acquired rapid test kits to be used to monitor seeds and GM produce in the state.
The Secretary also undertook a public campaign (Transgenics: Dont Plant that

177
Although the CTNBio is responsible for evaluating the risks of GM crops, ultimately its role is
that of supplying information to the Ministries in order for them to be able to make and act on
policy decisions.

120
Idea) to try to stop the use of the illegal crops.
178
Further discussion of the role of
the Ministry of Agriculture and its subordinate state Secretaries of Agriculture is
included in the following policy sections, to which I now turn.

Intellectual Property Rights
Institutional Context
Intellectual property rights in general, and specifically in relation to rDNA
crops, were not developed in Brazil until the 1990s. Table 15 (below) provides a
brief chronology of Brazilian intellectual property laws that relate to transgenic
crops. While small farmers are still the main developers of new plant varieties in
Brazil, their work and knowledge is not part of the protected intellectual property
rights system. The institutional context of IPR laws for breeders and companies,
but not for farmers or biopiracy, reinforces the view of agriculture as an avenue of
development, while ignoring components of food security and livelihood. How
did the institutional context evolve in such a way?

178
Both the federal and the state government took actions to apprehend illegal GM soy in Rio
Grande do Sul. Ultimately, it is the federal governments responsibility to apprehend and charge
people, but the state government assisted by supplying lists of producers whose seeds tested
positive for GM content. Interestingly, when the contaminated seeds were sent to EMBRAPA
(Brasilia) to confirm the GM content, all the samples came back negative. Sources did not indicate
where this discrepancy came from. In another case, when shipments of grain from Argentina were
suspected to be transgenic, samples were sent to the local Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
for testing, and all came back negative for transgenic material. The state Secretary of Agriculture
decided to send samples to a US laboratory, Genetic ID, for more tests. The Ministry of
Agriculture threatened to break relations with the state if they sent sample to the US for testing.
Results of the tests were never revealed (Menasche 2000). Samples from other shipments from
Argentina were sent to testing at the EMBRAPA center in Minas Gerais and tested positive for
transgenics.

121
Table 15. Chronology of intellectual property laws, Brazil
Year Law
1994 Decreto Legislativo No. 1355/1994: Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights
1996 Lei No. 9279/1996: Industrial Property Law allows patents on
transgenic microorganisms
1997 Lei No. 9456/1997: Plant Variety Protection Law
1998 Decreto No. 2553/1998: Inventor Rewards
1998 Portaria MCT, No. 88/1998: Stipulates sharing of profits resulting from
intellectual creation that is protected by intellectual property rights
1999 Decreto No. 3201/1999: Compulsory Licensing of Patents
2001 Lei No. 10,196/2001: Alters and creates new articles to Law 9279/1996
2001 Medida Previsória (MP) No. 2186-16: Regulates access to genetic
resources and traditional knowledge
Sources: Emerick 2002a, 73; Consultor Jurídico 2002; GRAIN n.d.
Prior to 1995, there were no intellectual property rights for
pharmaceuticals or food products in Brazil. In May 1996, a patent law
179
was
approved, and the process for passing a plant variety protection law that applied to
transgenic crops was also begun. Both laws became effective in 1997, before
transgenic crops became an issue. The Plant Variety Protection (PVP) Law
affected trade in that it permitted oligopoly control by GM companies. Although
supported by public sector plant breeders and scientists, the PVP law also had a
serious impact on public research. While it has both patent and PVP laws, Brazil
does not have a law to protect its genetic resources, the basis for genetic
engineering (Vigna 2001, 29). The patent and PVP laws reduced the rights of
farmers who have developed the biodiversity of agricultural plants for 10,000

179
Lei de Patentes.

122
years, by impeding the free access, exchange and sale of agriculture seeds that are
based on all those years of experience and know-how.
The influence of international institutional obligations on Brazilian IPR is
clear: All of Brazilian intellectual property rights were made to conform to the
TRIPs agreement (Emerick 2002a, 73). Intense international pressure was put on
Brazil to force it to accept the TRIPs Agreement.
180
Those countries that did not
sign the TRIPs agreement would suffer economic sanctions, blocks on exports
and limited cooperation in other areas (Emerick 2002a, 72). Such threats were not
rhetorical; they were carried out against both Brazil and India. Against Brazil, the
United States first threatened, then used (from October 1988-June 1990) Section
301 of the US Trade Act.
181
at the behest and on behalf of the American
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.
182
The US also pressured Brazil
through bilateral trade talks, and use of an American Priority Watch List (Sasson
1993, 534, van Wijk 1991). In short, international pressures and international
institutional agreements drove Brazilian IPR legislation, rather than the needs of
Brazilian citizens. The existence of the TRIPs agreement and the fact that IPR
laws were debated while rDNA crops were still at the laboratory stage both

180
Dr. Emerick further noted that Brazil doesnt always know what is best for it. Scientists
participate little in the debate. (2002b). Spillane (2002) also noted that, at the international level,
there has been a relative lack of participation of public sector scientists as observers in
international fora concerning agricultural biotechnology, to the detriment of the public good. For
example, this has meant that important issues such as research exemptions and access to
technology are not dealt with in international agreements.
181
A unilateral commercial sanctioning measure.
182
Brazil challenged the US super 301 sanctions at the GATT talks through a settlement panel.

123
helped to move Brazilian rDNA policy towards the promotional end of the policy
spectrum.
Other contextual elements also helped to establish promotional IPR laws
for transgenic plants. Commercial seed sale was common, and the agro-export
sector was growing. Farmer-to-farmer seed trading and saving was still practiced,
but mainly among small farmers. Limited rights to continue this practice were
allowed by the UPOV 1991 and were incorporated into the PVP law.
Non-State Actor Involvement
Non-state actor participation in the processes that created IPR legislation
in Brazil, and since then, has varied. The main debate about Brazils 1996
Industrial Property Law took place between national and multinational industry
actors in the pharmaceutical sector, and it focused on delaying recognition of
patents on pharmaceutical processes and products, rather than on a different
system or standard of protection. NGOs focused their energies on the issue of
trying to keep medicine accessible. Understandably, potential future risks of GM
crops that were still in the research phase were not an issue at the time. Unlike
NGOs, industry actors and their representatives, such as ABRABI, were involved
in pushing for intellectual property rights that served their specific interests since
the beginning, including during the debate of the Industrial Property Law.
Industry actors continue to lobby for changes in IPR that would afford them more
benefits. Therefore, industry actors were the main NSAs in the development of
the patent law legislation with respect to transgenic crops.

124
With respect to the PVP law, those public sector plant breeders and
national businesses that supplied the seed for commercial sale and export-oriented
agriculture supported having a PVP law, as did MNCs. For NGOs, the central
issue of the debate was whether or not to grant more IPRs, and less about what
type of IPRs. NGOs tend to work with small farmers, landless workers and
indigenous communities whose knowledge is not included in the structure of the
IPR system. Moreover most NGOs exist to provide public goods and services
without profiting from them, and IPRs contradict those goals. Rather than IPRs,
NGOs advocated for recognition and protection of common heritage and
knowledge.
183
This position did not fit within a framework of property that was
developed in coordination with industry actors, to benefit industry, and the views
of these NGOs was disregarded. One central concern of some opponents to the
PVP law was partially addressed by allowing certain low-income farmers to trade
but not sell seed.
Once the IPR laws were put in place, multinational actors had unfair
advantages of access over national actors in that they had experience in using this
type of law. This allowed MNCs to gain more economic and political power than
other types of non-state actors. Two examples of how MNCs either had or were
able to utilize access to IPR mechanisms follow.

183
Regarding Indigenous rights or knowledge, they want it to be common heritage, they want it
to be public. They dont want it to be rights. Their position does not fit within a framework of
intellectual property. Why should the framework be decided by multinational companies? (de
Carvalho and Paoli 2002).

125
Few Brazilians used the IPR laws at first, because it was not part of their
normal practice. As noted by Dr. Maria Celeste Emerick, a researcher at a
leading public institution: The state [federal government] would sign agreements
but didnt then diffuse the information about them within Brazil, especially
among its public organizations that do specific work on issues pertaining to
intellectual property, like FIOCRUZ. (2002b, 1). A culture of use of IPRs had to
be cultivated, and the structure to enable people to use them had to be created. For
example, the starting point for creating an IPR culture was diffusing knowledge
about how patents might be useful to public sector researchers and when to use
them (Rede de Technologia do Rio de Janeiro, et. al 1999 and Unidade Temática
de Ciência & Tecnologia e Capacitação da Rede Mercocidades, et. al 2002).
Research organizations and universities had to hold seminars and working groups
on IPR, and had to create offices and procedures to help employees utilize the
new IPR system (Emerick 2002a, 75). Cultivating an IPR mentality is slow work,
and only the top research institutions and universities in Brazil have a system in
place to use IPR. As of 2002, Dr. Emerick noted that Of 146 universities, only
28 have working intellectual property organizations.(2002b, 2) Local businesses
faced challenges similar to those faced by public researchers. This situation
greatly benefited multinational companies, which did already have experience and
mechanisms for using IPRs.
184

184
Internationally, the bases of intellectual property were created in the late 19
th
Century with the
Paris Convention of 1883 and the Berne Convention in 1886. The first US university to use
intellectual property rights did so in 1930.

126
Second, the new intellectual property rights laws allowed cartel-like
control over modern plant varieties. The processes of the development of IPR and
corporate consolidation of the economy (by mostly foreign firms) were closely
linked because in order to take advantage of the lucrative Brazilian seed market,
multinational firms first needed a law that would guarantee control over seeds by
industry (Wilkinson and Castelli 2000, 13). As of 1997, when plant variety
protection became fully active, 51% of the corn seed market in Brazil was
supplied by foreign companies. Two years later in 1999, 95% of the corn seed
market was in the hands of foreign companies, 60% belonging entirely to
Monsanto
185
(ActionAid Brasil 2001, 7). Monopoly control of the seed market in
Brazil has only worsened since then, and remains in the hands of multinational
companies.
186
Multinational firms have interests that do not coincide with national
borders, but at the same time they control extensive portions of the national
economy, so they have become more influential actors at the national level. In
summary, initial access to IPR mechanisms helped MNCs to gain economic and
political power which they could use to influence policy-makers in any future
developments in IPR regulation.
Strategies employed by industry and NGO actors also differed, and some
of those differences were related to the respective resources of both types of

185
Monsanto also controls 18% of national soybean production (Pelaez and Albergoni 2004, 229).
The corn seed market is more concentrated than the soy market because soy can be saved and
replanted by farmers but most corn seed is hybrid and needs to be re-purchased yearly.
186
This is part of a global trend. As of 2001, approximately 9000 basic agricultural products were
patented, and 44% of those patents were owned by only four multinational companies (ActionAid
Brasil 2001, 2).

127
actors. Industry actors employed two main strategies to influence IPR policies, the
first of which was lobbying for specific legislation, both individually and as part
of wider associations. The second strategy they utilized was business takeovers to
obtain dominance in the national market. As noted above, the second strategy
gave companies a stronger voice regarding future policy developments since they
controlled larger areas of employment and production. Financial resources were
an essential element in the success of the second strategy. For lobbying, the
organizational resource of having current knowledge about the state of transgenic
crop research was also important.
NGOs also used lobbying as a strategy, but they focused on different laws
than did industry actors. For example, they asked the Brazilian government to
press for a revision of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPs agreement along the lines of
the African Group, which forbids patenting of any living being (plant, animal or
microorganism) or its parts, as well as any natural process which produces them.
NGOs also advocated that the articles of the TRIPs agreement be made consistent
with the international convention for the maintenance of patent-free access to the
principal agricultural and fish products for food security (ActionAid Brasil 2001,
7).
187
While changes in the international agreements would necessitate changes in
Brazilian federal legislation, for IPR issues the NGOs focused on the international

187
Some NGOs also asked for support for the development of sui generis systems and that
developing countries not be pressured to adopt the UPOV 1991, although Brazil had already
enacted legislation in this regard (ActionAid Brasil 2001, 2).

128
level.
188
NGOs also called for immediate ratification of the International Treaty
on Plant Genetic Resources and the creation of national legislation for farmers
rights which ratification of that treaty would require. In this instance the NGO
request would require changes at both the national and international levels. In
addition to lobbying, the main strategies NGOs employed to promote these goals
were disseminating information and holding conferences.
Summary
Since the intellectual property rights afforded by Industrial Property Law
9279/1996 and Plant Variety Protection Law 9456/1997 have not changed since
their inception, together these two pieces of legislation created a permissive IPR
environment for transgenic crops in Brazil that has remained in force. There is
only a fine line separating permissive from promotional policies: Brazil does
allow some patenting of GM technology, but allows exclusions for plants, animals
and other living beings. Although this exclusion exists, patents were granted for
GM crops in Brazil, so I categorize their policies as promotional. Table 16
(below) summarizes Brazils position with respect to IPR for transgenic crops for
1996-2002.

188
The focus on the international level is probably due to two considerations: 1) pushing for a
revision of national IPR laws was seen as too risky in that it could afford even greater IPRs rather
than limit them, and 2) NGOs had only limited support for IPRs in that they wanted continued
recognition of farmers rights, to assure that their knowledge and practices continued to be
allowed and protected.

129
Table 16. IPR policies for transgenic crops in Brazil
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Patent
protection plus
plant breeders
rights (PBR)
under UPOV
1991
PBR under
UPOV 1991
PBR under
UPOV 1978
No IPRs for
plants or
animals
1996 Patents are
allowed under
the Industrial
Property
Law.
189

1997 The PVP law is
modeled after
the UPOV.
Patenting of
GM technology
is allowed.

1998 No change.
1999 No change.
2000 No change.
2001 No change.
2002 No change.

Trade
Institutional Context
Brazil was in a position of strategic importance for the diffusion and
consolidation of the world market for GMOs. For the time frame of the study,
Brazil was the second largest soy exporter in the world. Together with the US,
Brazil and Argentina accounted for about 90% of global soy exports. With most

189
Specifically, patenting of transgenic microorganisms was allowed, as required by TRIPs, but
patenting of plants, animals and other biological processes was not. However, Monsanto requested
and received patents on RR soy, (PI 110007-4 and PI 1100006-6, deposited in 1996), so the
hypothetical line limiting patenting of plants has already been crossed.

130
US and Argentine soy production transgenic, Brazil was the main source of
conventional soy on the international market. Brazil was also a major
conventional corn producer, usually ranking 3
rd
in global production. Although
Brazil usually consumed all of its corn production,
190
transgenic vs. GM-free corn
production was an important trade issue because Brazil was the worlds second
largest exporter of chicken
191
(Pelaez and Albergoni 2004, 220), and about 80%
of Brazils corn production went for animal feed, including poultry (Schnept,
Dohlman and Bolling 2001, 49). In 2000, Brazil had a record corn harvest, and
StarLink corn
192
- a transgenic corn grown in the US that was not approved for
human consumption-- was found contaminating numerous human food products
(Schnept, Dohlman and Bolling 2001, 50).
193
As shown in Table 17 (below), from
that year forward Brazil changed from a large scale corn importer to a large scale
corn exporter -- directly taking over market share from US corn exporters
194

because Brazilian farmers offered GM-free corn.
195

190
Brazil often imported corn from Argentina, which grew GM corn.
191
Since EU law regarding GM animal feed and meat has become more stringent, Brazilian
poultry growers have greater reason to prefer GM-free grain for their birds.
192
For more information on the StarLink scandal and StarLinks impact on human health see
Smith 2003, pp. 165-180.
193
Intially StarLink contamination was noted in human food products in the US, but quickly
thereafter was found in foods in other countries including Canada, Japan and Korea. It was later
found in international food aid.
194
In 1998, US corn exports to the EU fell by over 90% owing to the moratorium imposed on GM
corn (Ballenger, Bohman and Gehlhar 2000). Brazilian corn farmers took over part of this market.
195
Since transgenic and conventional crops were not segregated in the US, transgenic varieties
polluted all shipments. This deliberate mixing was a strategy on the part of US actors to attempt to
force acceptance of GM crops in markets throughout the world. Mixing was also due in part to the
high costs that segregating conventional and transgenic crops entailed.

131
Table 17. Corn imports and exports in thousands of tons
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Imports 334 506 1729 822 1771 624 345 798
Exports 351 358 7 8 7 5629 2747 3566
Sources: Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento 2003, 2004.
Brazils GM-free status and its position as an important international
exporter of soy, and of downstream products such as chicken, gave it a strategic
position for both its own agricultural products and for the wider expansion of the
world-wide GM market. If Brazil had switched to transgenic crops, conventional
agricultural products would have become much harder for international buyers to
obtain, and they were likely to become much more costly. In the case of soy, 90%
of world exports would contain some transgenic content. Soy or corn products are
part of almost all processed foods, with corn or soy components in products
ranging from carbonated drinks to baby formula. If Brazil had switched to
transgenic crops it would have become difficult to find processed GM-free food
products in most countries.
196
Vandana Shiva criticized this potential situation as
a nutritional apartheid, in which the rich would be able to afford to eat organic
or conventional foods while the majority of the world would have to eat
transgenic foods with unknown long-term effects on human health and

196
Most processed foods, unless labeled GM-free or organic, are likely to have some GM
components. Organic foods are required to be GM-free and in Europe many retail chains have
promised to provide GM-free products due to consumer demand. A few companies in Brazil have
also promised to find GM-free sources, due to pressure from NGOs like Greenpeace and IDEC
and to consumer preferences. Often a company or chain that supplies GM-free products in one
country still supplies GM-contaminated foods in other countries.

132
reproduction.
197
In the reverse scenario, that is if Brazil had remained GM-free, it
might have been able to gain market share by being the main international
supplier of conventional foods. Other major suppliers might have been forced to
provide crop segregation and documentation to maintain markets. Given the
added costs that segregation would have required, and since GM varieties were
still relatively new, farmers might have opted to continue using conventional
technology.
198
Each of these factors would have undermined and possibly even
reversed the spread of the use of rDNA technology in agriculture.
GM policies in importing countries also factored into whether remaining
GM-free or utilizing GM technology would ultimately help Brazil make gains in
trade. The main consumer markets for grains have consistently been Europe (EU)
and Asia (China and Japan).
199
The EU has stringent regulations on all GM food,
whether for human consumption or animal feed. Japan imposed mandatory
labeling of GM products in 1999 and China, which grows GM crops, has also
required labeling of GM food since 2002 (Jia 2003). Of the three, Brazils top

197
As of November 2005, there were less than 20 published, peer-reviewed animal feed safety
studies and no human clinical trials on the safety of GM foods (Smith 2005). Moreover, a first of
its kind, preliminary study by Irina Ermakova (2005) found that rats which ate GM soy were more
than 40% more likely to die prematurely, and those that survived had stunted growth (Smith
2005).
198
Scott McFarland of the (US) National Corn Growers Associated noted If we see a two-tier
pricing system in the US, you will see a departure from that (GM) technology. (cited in Bell
1999). Bell comments a segregated system could bring the kiss of death to GM crops (1999) and
the largest European bank (Deutsche Bank) advised investors to sell GM stock if a two-tier system
is implemented (Bell 1999).
199
From the 1998/1999 harvest to the 2002/2003 harvest, the principal soy importers have been
the EU, China and Japan. The EU and China are the main markets (MAPA 2003b, 1).

133
export market for soybeans was the European Union (EU)
200
(Smith 2003 W1,
MAPA 2003b, 1). If Brazil hoped to gain market share, it also needed to pay
attention to regulations in other countries (eg. Japan and China, besides the
EU).
201

As conventional grains became less available,
202
farmers who grew them
began to receive a better price for them. Even though only a small part of
Brazilian soy was formally certified as GM-free, EU buyers recognized that
Brazil was one of the main sources of conventional soy exports, and therefore
purchased from it.
203
(During the time-frame for this study, Brazil had no GM
commercial crops except for illegal GM soybeans.) End consumers pay a higher
price for GM-free products, in part because of the need for segregation, which is
costly. Brazils de facto segregation gave Brazilian farmers a competitive
advantage (Mitsch and Mitchell 1999, 16). From 1996-2002, there was no
widespread system for transgenic segregation in Brazil or elsewhere. Should a
segregation system become the only option for guaranteeing GM-free food
products, Brazil would be at a disadvantage because, as former state Secretary of

200
For example for the 2001-2002 harvest, 58% of soy and grain exports, 74% of meal and 82% of
oil went to the EU (MAPA 2003b, cited in Pelaez and Albergoni 2004, 229). For all Brazilian soy
products combined, 63% were sold to the EU and 37% to Asian countries for 2001-2002 (MAPA
2003b).
201
In hindsight, regulations for GM food have tended to become stricter and more comprehensive,
rather than the reverse.
202
Transgenic grains entered the commercial market in 1996 and have become more widely used
every year since then. Although only a small portion of the crops was GM at first, they were
mixed with the conventional crop, contaminating everything. Only farmers who used a strict
segregation system or who grew crops in GM-free countries could get a price premium for
conventional crops.
203
About 50% of the soy consumed in the EU is from countries where the planting of GM soy is
banned (USDA 2001, 1).

134
Agriculture Jose Hoffman noted, If 500 of 5000 bushels have transgenics, all of
it is contaminated. In the future, if the only option for traditional soy was
segregation, buyers would prefer to buy soy from the USA because its institutions
have more credibility in general.(Hoffman 2002, 2-3). This opinion was shared
by US experts: We believe that once testing for GMOs becomes food industry
standard, the market for U.S. GM-free soybeans and corn will explode. (Mitsch
and Mitchell 1999, 16). A segregation system requires separation of seeds,
separation of fields with borders in between, separate storage bins and separate
shipments - if not separate shipping bins altogether. Costs of segregation in Brazil
would likely be very high because transportation and storage issues were already
one of the weakest points in the Brazilian agricultural system.
Brazilian policy makers had to weigh the evolving factors of trade partner
regulations, consumer preferences for GM-free crops, and the costs and feasibility
of segregation systems -- to decide whether Brazil would gain more from
remaining GM-free or from allowing use of GM technology. As with any issue,
not all Brazilians would gain or lose equally. Farmers, the potential users of GM
crop technology, were split. On the one hand, the market for conventional grains
provided motivation for some farmers to remain GM-free. On the other hand,
some soy farmers from southern Brazil favored transgenics, because savings from
the use of transgenic seed outweighed the added premiums for GM-free crops.
This was partially a matter of control because premiums received for conventional
crops by the exporters were not always passed on to the farmers, whereas farmers

135
saved directly by reducing herbicide expenses through cultivating GM seed.
Moreover, soy seed can be obtained through bartering and is self-reproductive.
These elements also gave some measure of control to farmers. While some
farmers supported transgenic technology even if it meant paying higher prices for
seed because of IPRs, the fact that soy can be saved and replanted and the fragility
of the IPR monitoring system were both known to farmers. Only large farms
produce soy for export in Brazil.
204
As shown by Table 18 below, 65% of soy in
Brazil is produced by large farms. Thus, both those farmers pushing for use of
Table 18. Distribution of agricultural production for 1995-1996, in %
Product <10
hectares
205
10-100 100-1,000 1,000-
10,000
>10,000
Soy 1.7 23.4 39.9 20.9 4.2
Corn 8.5 35.9 35.8 17.9 1.8
Cotton 10.1 34.4 33.8 14.6 7.2
Source: Homen de Melo 2001, 16.
GM technology and those interested in cashing in on price premiums for
conventional crops (who supported a precautionary approach toward the use of
GM technology) were mainly large farmers who had some political clout. The
Landless Workers Movement, small farmers, indigenous farmers and the NGOs
that supported them were united in pushing for a precautionary policy for GM
crops. Were GM crop technology to become legal in Brazil, small farmers were
not likely to be able to use it because of the costs involved. The influence that

204
Likewise, only large farms produce corn and cotton for export.
205
One hectare is equal to 2.471 acres. The last three groups are likely all agribusiness farms.

136
particular farmers had on policy decisions is seen better at the state level, and is
discussed further below.
As noted in the introductory section, authority over agricultural issues is
shared between federal and state governments. At the federal level, the main
institutions with authority over trade in transgenic crops were the Ministry of
Agriculture, because it had authority over the import of genetically modified
products, and the National Technical Commission for Biosafety (CTNBio), which
was responsible for making technical assessments on any requests for the release
of GMOs.
206
Although the CTNBio gave its assessment, ultimately it was the
Agricultural Ministrys decision to grant a license for sale.
Non-State Actor Involvement
The seed industry, both in Brazil and internationally, favors the use of
transgenics because GM seeds have to be purchased yearly, and can be sold as
part of a technology package. Changes within the Brazilian seed industry since
1997 have brought the seed sector under domination by multinationals, whose
interests lie with the spread of transgenics on a global scale, rather than with the
premiums that a particular national market might receive for conventional
products. A company usually sells only its brands of seeds and related chemical
inputs.
207
A farmer has the right to plant seeds protected by intellectual property

206
This institution structure was changed in 2005 by the new Biosafety Law but remained in force
during the time frame of this study.
207
In 2000, Monsanto announced that it intended to construct a biotechnology laboratory in in
Minas Gerais and a herbicide factory in Camaçari, Bahia. The factory is intended to produce
RoundupReady
®
herbicide that GM crops use. It would be Monsantos second largest herbicide

137
laws only once, whereas the traditional farming practice has been to buy new soy
seeds approximately every five years. The MNCs that have dominated the
Brazilian seed market since 1997 could choose to sell only protected seed or
eventually only GM seed, should it be approved for marketing, and farmers might
not even be able to find a place to buy traditional and conventional crop varieties.
Company use of technology packages also deepens farmer dependency by
requiring the purchase of all the related inputs, whether the farmer will need them
or not. It also extends a companys control over the purchase of its particular
brand of agricultural inputs, should less-expensive alternatives be available.
208

The evolution of this type of market context creates an overall market bad in
that it threatens the future of food security for the planet because it promotes the
use of limited varieties and destroys biodiversity.
Industry actors lobbied intensively for approval for GM crops mainly at
the federal level of governance. Besides lobbying, industry actors hosted seminars
and conferences and provided papers outlining their position to members of the
government. João de S.B. Paes de Carvalho, executive director of ABRABI noted
that It (ABRABI) is frequently asked for its opinion on biotechnology matters. I

factory in the world. Monsanto received R$285 million in Brazilian tax dollars from the Fund for
Investment in the Northeast (Fundo do Investimento do Nordeste -FINOR) to help build the
factory. This sum corresponded to more than half of FINORs resources for the entire fiscal year.
(Vigna 2001, 83). Congress called for an investigation into this decision following the Monsanto
announcement. In March 2001, the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission on FINOR (CPI do
FINOR), which was created to investigate this decision, approved freezing the bank, fiscal and
telephone accounts of people fiscally and legally involved in the deviation of funds from FINOR.
(Vigna 2001, 85). In other words, wrong-doing occurred in order for the company to receive such
funds.
208
With the exception of marginalized farmers, who still have the right to save seed.

138
have found that if a professional association or business prepares a paper on a new
issue that the government will be facing and passes it to them, often that paper
will become the base text for what is developed. (Paes 2002, 1). Industry actors
also utilized strategies of applying different types of international pressures. For
example, the mainstream media noted that Biotech giant Monsanto, which has
not been able to collect royalties from farmers growing its crop, has been
lobbying hard for approval [of GM crops], with the help of the US government.
(New Scientist 2003, 5).
209
Moreover Monsanto helped to fund a trip to the US for
Workers Party legislators to educate them about the potential benefits of biotech.
The legislators visited Washington and St. Louis, Monsantos headquarters (Karp
and Jordan 2003, A3).

Despite the fact that environmental and consumer safety issues were at the
heart of blocking trade in transgenic crops, industry actors consistently worked
against advances in these areas. NGO commentators noted that: In the four years
that have transpired since the court decision, Monsanto has not undertaken any
environmental studies with regard to the crop release it requested. It is relying on
studies done in the United States in that regard. Many agronomic studies by
Monsanto and companies have been done and continue to be tested (for example,
adaptation to climate, soil, etc.) but none have focused on environmental impact.
At the same time, no guidelines for environmental impact assessment exist in this
field (Londres 2002, 3). Instead, industry actors, with the help of the executive

209
According to one estimate, the ban on the commercialization of GM crops cost Monsanto $100
million a year in lost sales (Margolis 2000, 43).

139
branch, pressured repeatedly to delay the creation of guidelines for environmental
impact assessments.
210

The federal institutional structure for cross-border trade was first put to the
test in 1997, when the first shipment of transgenic soy imports was authorized.
Soy imports were allowed because the high demand for Brazil GM-free soybeans
had reduced its soy stocks. Monsanto and ABIOVE (Brazilian Association of
Vegetable Oils/Associação Brasileira Industrial de Óleos Vegetais) pressured the
Brazilian government to import US soybeans containing at least 15% of
Monsantos Roundup Ready
®
soybeans (GRAIN 1998). Greenpeace blocked the
unloading of those first shipments of GM soybeans, and it went to court to seek to
halt the commercialization of oils made from the GM soy (Menasche 2000). The
6
th
Federal Court (6
a
Vara da Justiça Federal) from Brasilia ruled that ABIOVE
should change its labels for oils made from GM soy, so that they contained
information about the transgenic composition of the oil and its health risks. These
strategies of tracking when and where GMOs were entering the country,
confronting their entry, and utilizing legal action were consistently used by
Greenpeace and other NGOs actors to block trade in GMOs (Greenpeace, 2000).
Two such legal actions by NGO actors resulted in court bans (in 1998 and
2000) on the planting of all GMOs within the country. While the state
governments normally set agricultural policy, the court rulings superceded state
authority and made all commercial transgenic crops in Brazil illegal, pending the

210
For example the federal government repeatedly blocked the vote that would finalize the
environmental impact guidelines created by CONAMA (Londres 2002, 2).

140
outcome of environment impact assessments. (The court rulings are discussed in-
depth below, under the biosafety section).
Even before the court rulings made all transgenic crops illegal
211
in Brazil,
illicit trade in rDNA seed had become an issue. The first evidence of illegal
transgenic soy entering the country was in February 1998, and it soon became a
chronic problem. Who was responsible for bringing transgenic crops to Brazil and
selling or giving them to farmers? While industry actors lost in IPR revenue on
the seeds from illegal crops, ultimately the illegal crops established the use of
transgenics within the territory. Was the promotion of illicit soy seed a strategy on
the part of industry actors?
212
If it was, it proved effective, and might have been
part of a wider strategy or pattern. Reports of accidental contamination by GM
seed were noted in other GM-free areas around the globe, and use of illicit GM
seed occurred in other countries, such as India, as well.
In Brazil, policy analysts noted the illegal expansion of GMO farming in
the country increases the pressure for a definition which is favorable to the release
of these products as the possibility of destruction of thousands, if not millions, of
hectares of farmland compromises the economy of a significant number of
farmers who are strongly represented in the federal government.(Pelaez and
Albergoni 2004, 237.) Former Rio Grande do Sul State Secretary of Agriculture,

211
Experiments with transgenic crops were not illegal as long as they followed the proper
protocols.
212
During field research in Brazil, two people I interviewed confirmed that at least part of the seed
had been sold by industry actors, which they had learned from interviewing the farmers
themselves. However, since the use as well as sale of GM seed was a crime, not enough evidence
was gained for a legal case, and this remains a suspicion rather than a confirmed fact.

141
Jose Hoffman also noted Brazil needs to control contraband, especially on the
border. Because of the contraband it is losing its capacity to be GM-free. Being
GM-free or not is not reversible. There are some suspicions that contraband was
promoted by a Monsanto subsidiary. (Hoffman 2002, 2). In short, industry
actors, although losing out in royalty payments in the short-term because the
seeds were illicit, nonetheless gained because the illegal seeds helped to establish
the existence of GM crops in Brazil as a fact on the ground. Whether or not this
was a strategy on the part of industry actors remains unknown.
Most of farmers that used illicit transgenic seed experienced immediate
gains because they could buy the seeds without any added costs for intellectual
property. Furthermore they didnt have any other contractual obligations that
often come with GM seeds, such as purchasing a particular brand of herbicide or
establishing refuge areas. The advent of the use of illegal soy seed in Brazil
changed the informal institutional context in two regards. First, GM pollution
became widespread in the south.
213
Whether or not farmers knowingly bought
seed that was transgenic, they soon found out about its characteristics. The
southern states have more than one growing cycle per year, and soy production is
best with crop rotation. After they (farmers) planted soy they planted wheat but
some soy still came up by itself. Roundup Ready
®214
didnt kill the soy, so they

213
For the 2002-2003 harvest, the agricultural minister estimated that approximately 10% of the
national production were transgenic (Peleaz and Albergoni 2004, 226).
214
Roundup Ready
®
is Monsantos brand name for its glyphosate-based herbicide. Most GM soy
and corn plants were manipulated not to die when sprayed with this type of herbicide .

142
knew it was transgenic. The only thing that got rid of it was Agent Orange
215

(Hoffman 2002, 3). Second, the presence of illegal transgenic soy changed the
buying patterns of some of Brazils main international grain purchasers. As illegal
GM soy was mixed in with other soybeans, buyers for the European Union market
went to northern Brazilian states for their soy purchases. Demand for non-GM
soy has led to soaring exports to Europe and Japan, at premium prices, since its
main rivals, the US and Argentina, adopted GM.(New Scientist 2003, 5). Thus,
in the medium term, central and more northern Brazilian soy farmers benefited by
capturing both buyers and price premiums, while southern soy farmers lost
markets whether they personally grew GM crops or not. The evolving informal
context gave southern farmers even more reason to prefer that Brazil adopt GM
technology.
Although it fell on state governments to control and monitor the use of
illegal transgenic crops within their states, the federal government was
responsible for patrolling the borders (Smith 2003, W1) and it made only minimal
efforts to control the illicit trade.
216
While some argue rightly that this was due to
the Cardoso administrations (1994-2002) preference to promote the commercial
use of GM crops in Brazil,
217
the reality of continuous, extensive areas of soy

215
Agent Orange, an illegal substance in Brazil, is a highly toxic chemical herbicide and defoliant
that causes many multigenerational human diseases, some of them fatal. It was manufactured by
Dow, Monsanto, Uniroyal and other companies and used widely in the US war against Vietnam.
216
Both President Cardoso and his Minister of Agriculture were strongly in favor of GM crops and
made repeated public statements and other efforts to advance the use of GM crop technology in
the country as quickly as possible.
217
According to a report elaborated by a Special Commission of the Federal Assembly of
Deputies (Ferro et al. 2000), the former federal government [Cardoso administration] was lax in

143
production along the borders would have made this ruling difficult to up-hold
whatever the position of the executive branch.
218
Formally, the separation of
powers and federal institutions did not push Brazil toward any particular course of
action, but the informal context (such as the vast soy fields and the difficulties of
limiting illicit cross-border trade) did. A closer look at the formal and informal
institutions and influence of non-state actors at the state level reveals a similar
pattern.
State Level Institutional Context and Non-State Actor Involvement
As noted in the chapter introduction, state policies for GM crops can be
stricter than federal laws, but not looser. This institutional structure pushed state
and municipal laws towards the preventive side of the policy spectrum. Brazilian
states that had passed legislation on transgenics by 2002 included Pará, Minas
Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Mato Grosso de Sul, Santa Catarina and Rio
Grande do Sul.
The availability of rDNA crop technology varied by geographic region
within Brazil, and is likely to have an influence on policy decisions. For example
for the climate, soil and crop types of the northern state of Pará, where the
farming is not export-oriented and is mostly done by small farmers, GM crops

many respects when it came to carrying out the legal ruling when it came to on-site inspections of
the illegal cultures, the control of experimental production of GMOs, the regulating of fines which
were due according to the bio-safety law and the permissivelness in the importing of transgenic
grains from Argentina and the USA (Pelaez and Schmidt 2004). (Pelaez and Albergoni, 2004,
230).
218
The federal level Minister of the Environment and the Public Minister did not have the same
favorable view of GM technology as the Cardoso administration, but rather advocated a
precautionary approach.

144
were not developed; whereas in the southern-most states of Rio Grande do Sul,
Santa Catarina and Paraná, GM varieties were available. Given this difference in
applicability of GM technology, and in order to try to maintain other contextual
factors similar, I compare the policies of the three southern states rather than
across regions.
The three southern-most states, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and
Paraná, were most affected by illegal seed. All three states share borders with
Argentina, and transgenic crops are legal in Argentina. These three southern states
account for 30% of soy production and 95% of poultry production for the nation
(Pelaez and Albergoni 2004, 220). From 1998 on, these three southern states, due
to their proximity to the GM-soy producing country, had to deal with illicit trade
in transgenic crops. The illegal GM soybeans were planted only in the south
because the GM varieties were not appropriate for the climatic conditions of the
more northern Brazilian states.
These three southern states took varied approaches to dealing with illicit
trade in transgenic crops. Initially (before any action at the federal level) the
citizens and legislatures of all three states tended to have precautionary views
regarding GM crops, but their ultimate policy choices varied between
precautionary and preventive. Santa Catarina put preventive policies into place,
219

219
Santa Catarinas Law 12,128 of 2002 put a 5-year moratorium on the commercial farming of
GMOs in the state and required labeling of all food with GM content. Law 11, 069 of 1998
restricted use of agro-chemicals in the state, which transgenic soy requires (Pelaez and Albergoni
2004, 233-234).

145
and Paraná developed precautionary policies.
220
In 1999 the newly-elected
Workers Party
221
governor of Rio Grande do Suls (RS) tried to implement a
transgenic-free zone for the state (preventive policy), but the legislature, which
was controlled by the political opposition representing large farmers in the state,
worked in the opposite direction. During the impasse, the RS governor worked to
enforce the states 1991 biosafety law and the judicial branchs ban on the
commercial planting of GMOs, which gave RS de facto, though contested,
preventive policies. The opposition passed a law

over the Governors veto
promoting transgenic crops beyond what federal regulations allowed, trying to
make the state an area free for the planting of transgenics. When the Governor
challenged the law passed over his veto, it was deemed unconstitutional by the
courts and revoked, based on the hierarchy among state and federal laws.
222

Non-state actor involvement at the state level of governance differed from
that at the federal level. Industry actors at the state level represented mainly large
farmers/agribusiness in Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná, while Santa Catarina had
mostly small and medium farmers. In RS the large farmers federation spoke in
favor of GM technology, while in Paraná the large farmers federation explicitly

220
State resolution 068 of 1998 banned the entry of GMOs without prior consent, and resolution
029 of 2002 required that all soy passing through or sold in the state be accompanied with a
certificate confirming the absence of GMOs (Pelaez and Albergoni 2004, 234-235).
221
There is a diversity of farmers in Rio Grande do Sul (RS) inclusing small farmers, farming
cooperatives and large farmers. The first two groups voted with the Workers Party which
supported agricultural policies favorable to small farmers. Approximately 80% of agriculture in
RS is done by small farmers (Bell 1999).
222
Municipalities in the state also passed laws either promoting or preventing transgenics. Like the
state law, those municipal laws that were promotional were also found unconstitutional and
revoked. Preventive measures were legal and remained in force.

146
supported governmental efforts to avoid diffusion of illicit transgenic crops in the
state (Pelaez and Albergoni 2004, 231-236). RS was the primary conflict site and
MNCs were involved there in different ways. In 1999 the RS state government
halted all field tests for transgenics in the state due to the lack of environmental
impact assessments required by state law, and even destroyed one MNC test field
for its lack of appropriate safety measures. When the government ran a public
education campaign about transgenics, MNCs placed ads in local press
contradicting the information released by the government and NGOs. As noted
above, illicit seed smuggling was suspected of having been promoted by MNCs.
NGO actors, many of which were involved with small farmers,
participated in the decision-making processes in all three states. In RS,
Greenpeace activists were catalytic in helping to formulate preventive
government policy positions towards transgenics, and figured prominently in the
public education efforts undertaken by the government.
223
Some members of
NGOs worked on the RS governors electoral campaign and later took up roles in
his administration.
Non-state actor access, strategies and resources varied from state to state
and each of these factors came into play at some point. For Rio Grande do Sul,
industry and NGO non-state actors worked with the state executive and
legislature. Although different, NSA access to policymakers was somewhat

223
Greenpeace held a workshop with the state legislative assembly in 1998, and afterwards spoke
with the governor elect, who had not yet taken office (Menasche 2002, 3). In December 1999, in a
public opinion survey on transgenics done by Zero Hora (the leading local newspaper) 25% of
respondents indicated that Greenpeaces position had influenced their opinions.

147
balanced, with NGOs having more voice in the executive and industry actors in
the legislature. Without this balance it is likely that policies for transgenics in RS
would have been more preventive, rather than simply maintaining the federal
status quo. NGO non-state actors supported efforts and policy to create and
monitor a GM-free zone, and assisted in that effort.
224
The large farmers
federation and its members aggressively contested those efforts and confronted
officials who came to test for GM crops.
225
Their actions questioned the
legitimacy of a preventive policy. Strategies of creating linkages and direct action
were ultimately the most effective ones used by NSAs in RS, since legislative
action was circumscribed.
The governments of Santa Catarina and Paraná used longer-term processes
to decide their policies towards transgenics. These included multidisciplinary
working committees, public hearings, and votes. These processes, some of which
were part of the formal institutional structure and some of which were newly
created and more informal, allowed greater access than normal to both industry
and NGO non-state actors.
226
While NGO actors did not have the monetary
resources that industry actors did, one of their strengths was that they were
dispersed throughout the country and active in many states. This NGO resource,
coupled with the more open decision-making processes Santa Catarina and Paraná

224
Notably, the use of incentive measures, such as setting up a voluntary GM-free certification
system, was more successful than coercive measures such as denouncing neighbors.
225
A group of farmers surrounded the car of the state research officials for 12 hours, not allowing
them to leave the vehicle to conduct their tests.
226
The resulting policies in both states were viewed as legitimate and were self-regulating in that
most of the citizens respected them.

148
took, benefited NGO actors. In summary, in Santa Catarina and Paraná, the
institutional processes facilitated access for both types of NSAs. The NGO
resource of being dispersed and active throughout the states helped to promote
their preferred policy position at the state level.
Summary
Brazil started out with a precautionary trade policy towards GM crops in
that transgenic seeds and plant material had to be screened by the CTNBio on a
case-by-case basis. This policy was the result of the Biosafety Law of 1995 and
several presidential decrees relating to that law, not of a single law for trade.
Without the Biosafety Law, the existing institutions for trade would have put
Brazil into the promotional category. A 1998 court ban, instigated by NGO actors,
made the commercial cultivation of GM soy illegal. Since soy sold as grain can
also be planted, trade in transgenic soy also became illegal. A second court ruling
banned all transgenics until they had been properly labeled and studied. These
two judicial rulings gave Brazil a preventive trade policy from 1998 onward. In
2000 the ban was lifted partially and temporarily to allow for transgenic corn to
be imported because of a drought, but the ban on soy remained. It was not the
institutional existence of a separation of powers that resulted in preventive
policies towards rDNA crops, but rather NGOs use of the courts and existing
constitutional law that led to that outcome. Table 19 summarizes the policy
changes for 1996-2002.

149
Table 19. Trade policies for transgenic crops in Brazil
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
No regulation
of rDNA seeds
or plant
materials
Regulate rDNA
seeds and plant
materials in
accordance
with SPS
agreement and
no more tightly
than non-RDNA
crops
Regulate rDNA
seeds and plant
materials more
tightly and with
different
screenings or
requirements
Block all rDNA
imports through
ban or
moratorium
1996 The Ministry of
Agriculture has
authority over
cross-border
trade in GMOs.
CTNBio
provides
opinions on a
case-by-case
basis.

1997 No change.
(First import
approved)

150
Table 19. Trade policies for transgenic crops in Brazil, continued
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
No regulation
of rDNA seeds
or plant
materials
Regulate rDNA
seeds and plant
materials in
accordance
with SPS
agreement and
no more tightly
than non-RDNA
crops
Regulate rDNA
seeds and plant
materials more
tightly and with
different
screenings or
requirements
Block all rDNA
imports through
ban or
moratorium
1998 A court
cautionary
action
227

suspends the
cultivation of
transgenic soy.
A civil public
action, which
covers all
transgenic
crops, suspends
their production
pending
environmental
and health
impact
assessments and
proper labeling
norms.
228

1999 No change.
2000 The court cases
are finalized.
2001 No change.
2002 No change.

227
A cautionary action (ação cautelar) is a specific legal provisional measure.
228
Pelaez and Albergoni 2004, 225; Mattar 2003, 1.

151
Biosafety
Biosafety was one of the most contested policy areas relating to GM crops
in Brazil from 1996 to 2002. NGO actors were particularly vocal in this area,
which is not surprising since some of them work primarily on environmental
issues. Both pressures by non-state actors and existing and evolving institutional
structures influenced biosafety policies in Brazil. This section begins with a
description of the main federal legislation regarding biosafety, then examines the
implementation of such legislation and NSA influence on that process.
Institutional Context
Table 20, below, summarizes developments in federal biosafety
legislation. While state governments also passed considerable legislation in this
area, biosafety regulations at the federal level were so frought with controversy
that this entire section is devoted solely to the federal level. State legislation on
biosafety is instead examined together with state food safety issues in the
following section. In many cases food safety and biosafety legislation at the state
level were combined, which facilitates a joint examination. The mere existence of
numerous federal laws about biosafety attests to the controversy around this
subject. As can be noted from the table, both the executive and legislative
branches created biosafety legislation (provisional measures and decrees, and
laws, respectively). The judicial branch also played a role by upholding and
interpreting existing laws that required environmental impact assessment
guidelines to be created. Besides the judiciary, another aspect of the existing

152
Table 20. Summary of federal level biosafety legislation
Year Law
1991 Lei No. 8171/1991: Agricultural Policy. Gives IBAMA institutional
competence over agricultural industries and agricultural policies.
1995 Lei No. 8974/1995: Biosafety Law.
229
Creates the National Technical
Commission for Biosafety (CTNBio) with the mandate of examining
the security of GMOs. Requires GM crops to be screened on a case-by-
case basis for demonstrated risk.
1995 Decreto No. 1752/1995: Gives CTNBio authority over Environmental
Impact Assessments and Reports concerning transgenic crops. The
Ministry of Agriculture has authority over the import of GMOs.
2000 Medida Previsoria (MP) No. 2137: Changes the Biosafety Law, giving
more powers to the CTNBio.
2001 Medida Previsoria No. 2191-9: Reinforces the authority of the
CTNBio to evaluate environmental risks.
2003 Medida Previsoria No. 113: Allows the commercial use of illegal GM
soy until Jan. 2004.
230

2003 Medida Previsoria No. 131: Allows the planting of transgenic soy
during the 2003/2004 harvest for those farmers with illicit transgenic
seed.
231
Those farmers must sign a terms of responsibility contract and
notify the government. Seeds cannot be transported across state lines
and farmers must pay indemnities for damage to the environment or
consumers health.
2003 Lei 10814/2003: Allows planting and commercialization of GM soy for
2004. This law also regulates the research, planting and
commercialization of GM seed in Brazil, including labeling
stipulations.
232
It creates the National Biosafety Council and
reorganizes the CTNBio. It partially revokes MP 131.
2005 Biosafety Law (11,105): Revokes the 1995 Biosafety Law, the 2001
MP and parts of law 10814. It implements a National Biosafety
Council, restructures the CTNBio, and provides national biosafety
policy. It gives the CTNBio final say over the necessity of
environmental impact assessments and over commercialization to the
National Biosafety Council (Greenpeace 2005b).
Sources: Consultor Juridico 2002, CTNBio 2002, Greenpeace Brasil 2005b, MCT 2003, Vigna
2001, 10.

229
Lei de Biossegurança. The terms biosafety and biosecurity are used synonymously while food
safety refers to food quality and food security refers to access to food.
230
Labeling of transgenic content is required for animal and human consumption (MCT 2003).
231
The Public Ministry filed a case against this measure for unconstitutionality (Greenpeace
2005).
232
This law was introduced by the President (ANUP Pequisa 2004, 1).

153

institutional structure of democracy and separation of powers became important
for biosafety: the Public Ministry, which is part of the executive but is the citizen
watchdog of the government, was called upon repeatedly to exercise its
responsibilities in requiring other offices of the government (at both the federal
and state levels) to follow the laws and uphold the rights of citizens.
As can be seen from Table 20 and as was noted in the introductory section
of this chapter, the National Technical Commission for Biosafety or the CTNBio,
as it is more commonly known, became the focal institution for biosafety
concerns in Brazil. From 1995-2003 the executive branch repeatedly tried to
invest more powers over biosafety in the CTNBio. The decree and provisional
measures constituted a strategy on the part of the executive to try to limit NGO
influence. NGOs demanded implementation of environmental safety legislation,
particularly for rDNA biosafety issues. The CTNBios 18 members were
appointed by the executive branch, (Londres 2002, 1), which gave the executive
another avenue for pushing rDNA policies towards its preference-- one favorable
or promotional towards GM crops. The CTNBios 18 members included
representatives from biotechnology companies and from groups for the defense of
consumer rights and workers health, as well as academic experts, and
representatives from the Ministries of Science and Technology, Agriculture,
Health, Environment, Education and Foreign Relations (Pelaez and Albergoni
2004, 223, Oda 2000). Thus both NGOs and industry actors had direct access to
the CNTBios institutional structures, giving them a potential avenue for

154
influence. While NGOs and industry actors formally had equal access, the
NGO viewpoint was a minority one among the CTNBio members, and in 1997
the consumer NGO representative left in protest over the lack of transparency in
the rules for research assessment (Boletim 39, 2000, 1).
In terms of implementation, biosafety laws began to be put into use in
1997, when the CTNBio gave Monsanto approval for the first field trials of
Roundup Ready
®
soybeans. The first experimental field tests of genetically
modified plants took place amid two protests by civil society (Vigna 2001, 9).
Following the initial approval, the CTNBio went on to approve 50 field tests of
GM crops for 1997. The following year the CTNBio approved 360 field tests of
GM crops, a 620% jump from the year before (Vigna 2001: 11) and provoked
the beginning of debate in society. (Vigna 2001, 58). NGO actors in particular
called for the government to adopt the precautionary principle before continuing
to release experimental crops en masse into the environment. Vigna notes that
these requests were not heeded by the National Congress (2001,58).
In 1998, the year following its first field trials in Brazil, Monsanto asked
the CTNBio to approve the commercial release of its
®
(RR) GM soy -- the first
request for the commercial release of a transgenic crop in Brazil. The CTNBio
approved the request.
233
The CTNBio decided that there was no environmental

233
Thirteen of the fifteen members present at the CTNBio meeting voted for its release. The
consumer representative voted against and the representative from the Ministry of Foreign
Relations abstained. Monsanto representatives were present at the meeting, and members of the
CTNBio asked the Monsanto representative for his or her opinion. No studies regarding human
health risks, from anywhere in the world, were considered at the meeting. (Boletim 169 2003).

155
risk from the planting of RR GM soy, nor food safety risks from its
consumption (Menasche 2000). It therefore did not require an environmental
impact assessment or report (EIA-Rima), nor did it provide the standards for
conducting one should the company so choose. Instead, the CTNBio decided to
rely on company data from US food safety testing for GM crops, even though this
was the precedent-setting, first request.
234

Non-State Actor Involvement
The Institute for Consumer Defense (IDEC) and Greenpeace Brasil filed a
joint suit (cautionary action) against the commercial release of GM soy with the
6th Federal Court of Brasília. Shortly thereafter, IDEC and Greenpeace filed a
civil public action with the same court and the same defendants the Government
of Brazil and Monsanto.
235
The courts, applying the precautionary principle,
236

ruled in favor of IDEC and Greenpeace.
237
They issued a temporary restraining
order prohibiting the Ministry of Agriculture from authorizing the commercial
planting of GM soy until the commercialization of GM products had been
regulated and environmental impact assessments and reports (EIA-Rima) done

234
Katherine Barrett (2000), in an analysis of the risk assessment of the first, precedent-setting
approval of a GM crop for Canada, found significant scientific shortcomings in the data and
plausibility of the conclusions. Like in the Brazilian and US cases, data used in risk assessment
was generated by the developers and most of it is not publicly available.
235
At one point the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources
(Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis - IBAMA) joined
with the claimants IDEC and Greenpeace in the civil public action suit against Monsanto and the
Government of Brasil. This illustrates the controversy over the topic within the executive branch,
which the President tried to suppress.
236
The precautionary principle establishes that when an activity threatens to cause harm to the
environment or human health, precautionary measures should be taken, even if relationships of
cause and effect have not been clearly establish by science.
237
The court sentence is available at
http://www.greenpeace.org/br/transgenicos/pdf/judicial_19990810.pdf. Accessed 6 Oct. 2005.

156
and published, in spite of the CNTBios assessment.
238
The judges ruled that
part of the decree (1752) which permitted the CTNBio to forego the requirement
of an environmental impact assessment and report to be unconstitutional. The
existence of the first ruling
239
and the second related ruling by the same judge, in
effect created a judicial moratorium
240
on the commercialization of GM crops in
Brazil from 1998-2003.
241
The judgment stated: cultivation on a commercial
scale of the product referred to is suspended. (Menasche 2000, 7). The claimants
argued that there were insufficient studies either to prove or to disprove the risks
associated with Roundup Ready
®
soy, and that the CTNBio examination of the
case was thus flawed. A respected third party not involved in the case, the
Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science, had also made public statements
that there was a lack of studies on the GM crop (Pelaez and Albergoni 2004, 225).
The court cited these reasons as the basis for their decision. As the legal dispute
continued through appeals and other measures, the Federal Regional Court
affirmed that the CTNBio had the authority to approve experimental test plots, but

238
In 2005, a federal law (Biosafety Law 11,105) was finally created to address this ruling and as
of Oct. 2005, implementation of the law is still pending. Other measures prior to this law tried to
work around the court ruling.
239
The ruling was appealed by Monsanto and the Government of Brazil, who were defending
parties, and it was reversed. Then claimants (IDEC, and Greenpeace joined by IBAMA) appealed
again and the ruling went back to its original status.
240
Had standards been developed by the legislature and environmental impact assessment been
undertaken, the moratorium would have ended earlier, as was the intention of the judicial branch.
Bills were already in route in the legislature when the ruling was made.
241
In August 2003 Judge Selene Maria de Almeida overturned the earlier decision (Boletim 2003
No. 173).

157
not commercialization of GM crops, the latter of which was under the joint
authority of the Ministries of Health, Agriculture and the Environment.
242

The reporting judge for the appeal,
243
Assuzete Dumont Reis Magalhães,
commented that, in her 12 years of practice, she had never seen so much pressure
from so many sources of the government and from the company itself over a
judicial decision (Menasche 2002).
244
Because of this pressure and because the
Government of Brazil sided with Monsanto in the cases, a public civil
investigation by the Public Defenders
245
office was made into the interests of the
government in the production of GM soy.
Besides defining boundaries of authority for decisions regarding
environmental impact, the courts also ruled that the federal government had to
demand that the CTNBio elaborate standards for food safety, commercialization
and consumption of transgenic foods within 90 days. This sentence impeded the
CTNBio from releasing any conclusive technical opinions on any request for the
freeing of transgenics until it had elaborated such standards. The rulings also
mandated obligatory segregation of transgenic crops in order to properly label
products. If the CTNBio failed to complete the standards within 90 days, it would

242
Following this decision, the CONAMA began discussing procedures and areas of authority to
follow to undertake an environmental impact assessments and reports for transgenics. NGO and
industry representatives participated in the CONAMA working group that was created this
framework.
243
The judges for the appeal unanimously upheld the first decision.
244
In a similar vein, when Federal Court of Brasilia Judge Antonio Prudente issued his ruling, he
commented, I believe that the irresponsible haste in introducing the advances of genetic
engineering is inspired by the greed of economic globalization. (cited in Bija the Seed 1999,
42).
245
The role of the Public Defender it so oversee the rights of the people by monitoring possible
conflicts of interest within government offices. The Attorney General is the main legal advisor for
the government.

158
be fined a penalty of 10 minimum salaries per day after that. Both the ruling
and the time stipulations were efforts on the part of the judicial branch to speed up
the creations of formal norms regarding various aspects of transgenic crops. Both
court rulings were meant to be provisional and temporary. In the meantime, the
rulings cemented the illegality of commercial GM crops in Brazil. Nonetheless,
stipulations for the quick elaboration of standards and fines for delay were not
enforced by the Cardoso administration, instead it successively put off the
regulation of the labeling of transgenic foods until the judicial mandate expired.
Following the second court ruling in 2000, the Cardoso administration
took actions to present a more united position of the federal executive branch on
the controversial issue of GM crops. For example, it distributed an official
memorandum (dated July 6, 2000), signed by the Ministers of the Civil House,
Agriculture, Science and Technology, Justice, Environment, and Health, in which
it defended the adoption of genetically modified organisms in the country.
246
It
also adopted an offensive posture regarding GM crops in the national and
international media, distributing statements that the next Brazilian harvest would
be the last harvest without transgenics. At the same time, arguing that corn was
scarce,
247
the administration issued a stay of action with the Public Ministry for
each load of transgenics that arrived at a Brazilian port. It also altered the

246
As noted above, sections of the Ministry of the Environment had directly opposed the
Government of Brazil in one of the cases, and the Minister of the Environment was outspoken in
preferring a precautionary policy towards GM crops. The memorandum was a device to get this
Minister in particular to toe the official line.
247
It was scarce because drought conditions limited national production.

159
Biosafety Law through another provisional measure (MP 2137/2000), again
giving more powers to the CTNBio (Vigna, 2001:10).
248

The NGO strategy of seeking judicial recourse to up-hold existing
legislation proved to be very effective with regard to environmental and food
safety issues. Once the court rulings had been established, NGOs repeatedly
utilized these rulings to stop shipments of transgenic crops from entering Brazil.
They did this by informing the Public Ministry and the Ministry of Agriculture
when suspected shipments of transgenic crops were due to arrive.
249
The Public
Ministry then worked through the courts to prevent the unloading of those
shipments. NGOs used this strategy at both state and federal levels of governance.
At the same time that they advanced legal strategies, NGOs pursued other
strategies to promote public awareness and debate about GMOs in Brazil more
widely. NGOs made particular efforts to include poor consumers and farmers in
the dialogue about GMOs. One tactic, used by ActionAid Brasil and ESPLAR in
different parts of the country, was to organize citizens juries in which both the
pros and the cons of GM technology were presented to poor citizens from the
area
250
(Toni and Braun, 2001, 2). These citizens, after listening to both sides,
would then make policy recommendations based on the information they had

248
The Judicial branch and NGO actors expressed outrage at the provisional measure as attack
against democracy. Congress created an Monitoring and Control Comission to oversee how the
executive branch was making decisions regarding transgenics (Vigna 2001, 84).
249
These shipments had to come from other countries, usually Argentina and the US, so
Greenpeace had to have used international connections to have known such shipments were
coming.
250
One of the criteria for selection for the juries was that people have no prior knowledge about
GMOs.

160
received. Some of these juries were shown on television or aired via radio, as
well as being reported by alternative media (Campolino 2002).
Like the NGOs, different segments of the Brazilian government, at
federal, state and municipal levels, held public hearings and conferences on
GMOs, though not uniformly throughout the country. One such event was the
First Brazilian Congress on Biosafety in September 1999, an event organized by
the government but paid for in part by industry actors specifically by companies
that produce transgenic seeds (Novartis, AgrEvo, Dupont and Monsanto). IDEC
and Greenpeace, accompanying the representative of the Federal Public Ministry,
were able to enter the meeting. Among other statements, these two NGOs
highlighted that the CTNBio was privileging corporate interests over the public
interest by accepting corporate sponsorship of the event.
Another strategy employed by both NGOs and industry actors was to
conduct or contract research on the subject of transgenic agriculture. Most of this
research was on economic and social elements. As noted above, environmental
impact research was noticeably absent.
Of course, both NGO and industry actors lobbied hard for their views on
transgenics. Their requests diverged for the most part. The NGO lobby argued for
more transparency in the criteria of GMO risk analysis adopted by the CTNBio,
for improvement in federal legislation to maintain this transparency, and for no
release of GMOs without environmental impact assessment.
251
NGOs also argued

251
Greenpeace emphasizes this last point.

161
to protect farmers right to save and reproduce seed. The industry lobby
argued for more industry control over transgenic technology and promoted the
view that their control would lead to more profitable and more productive crops.
Industry actors favored authority being placed in the hands of the CTNBio over
the Ministry of the Environment, while NGO actors preferred the opposite.
The most important strategy on the part of NGOs in influencing outcomes
for biosafety policy was use of the courts. Of course, existing judicial institutions
and environmental legislation had to be in place in order for NGOs to use this
strategy. NGOs also needed knowledge about the court system and existing laws,
which was one of their resources. They further needed monetary resources to
pursue this strategy, which they had. The most important strategy on the part of
industry actors was persuasion of the executive branch to promote their view, a
strategy which relied on their vast monetary resources. Although this strategy was
not effective at the national level, it did afford industry actors some gains at the
international level. Since the executive branch has authority over negotiations in
the international arena, the separation of powers in this instance aided industry
actors. The existing institutional framework of separation of powers did not push
biosafety policy in any particular direction, rather it was non-state actors
interaction with this system that led to particular outcomes.
Summary
Table 21 summarizes the changes in biosafety policy from 1996-2002.
Brazilian biosafety policy began in the permissive category with the Biosafety

162
Law of 1995, which called for screening on a case-by-case basis. The
requirement for screening kept Brazil from having a promotional policy. In 1998,
when the CTNBio approved the commercial release of the first transgenic crop in
Brazil, it relied on approval and data from other countries. Had this decision stood
it would have brought Brazil closer to a promotional policy stance. However,
since the decision was contested, the courts intervened. The judicial branchs
rulings moved Brazilian policy to the precautionary category, in that screenings
for scientific uncertainties (environmental and human health impact) were
required. Brazilian policy was not preventive because transgenic crops were not
assumed to be risk-inherent --rather, this policy was a result of upholding existing
legislation that required environmental impact assessments and reports. Despite
efforts by the executive branch (via provisional measures) to enact changes to lift
the de facto moratorium, and by the judicial branch (via rulings and resolutions)
to speed the creation of an appropriate regulatory framework; the moratorium
continued until 2003, leaving Brazilian biosafety policy in the precautionary
category.

163
Table 21. Biosafety policies for transgenic crops in Brazil
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
No screening or
token screening
only, or
approval based
on other
countries
approval
Screening for
demonstrated
risk, based on
intended use of
product
Comprehensive
screening for
demonstrated
risks and
scientific
uncertainties
No approval
because risk
assumed
1996 1995 Biosafety
Law requires
case-by-case
screening.

1997 No change.
1998 A court
ruling
252

temporarily
suspends the
commercial
planting of GM
soy pending
environmental
impact
assessments and
reports,
initiating a
judicial
moratorium on
GM crops.

1999 No change
2000 Second court
ruling expands
moratorium to
all GM crops
and requires
labeling
legislation.

2001 No change
2002 No change

252
A temporary restraining order.

164
Food Safety and Consumer Rights
Institutional Context

Food safety and consumer rights have been a central issue in the
transgenics debate from the beginning. The first bills that addressed transgenic
products that were presented to Congress in 1997 all addressed the need for their
labeling (Vigna 2001, 53-57). Research and testing were also key concerns that
were mainly addressed as biosafety issues. Table 22 provides a summary of the
main laws addressing food safety and consumers rights to information for
transgenic foods in Brazil. Food safety and consumer rights concerns were also
Table 22. Summary of federal level food safety and consumer rights
legislation
Year Law
1990 Consumer Protection Code
253
8078: Guarantees the right to information
about foods and ingredients for human and animal consumption.
2001 Decreto No. 3871: Determines that products with traces of GMOs in
excess of 4% must be labeled.
2003 Decreto No. 4680 and Resolution 2658: 4680 revokes Decree 3871.
Determines that all products that contain more than 1% of trangenic
content must be labeled and have a special symbol.
Sources: Consultor Jurídico 2002, Greenpeace 2005b, MCT 2003, Vigna 2001, 72.
evident in the state legislatures. Table 23, below, illustrates some of the laws that
were passed on the state level that reflect consumer concerns about transgenics.
Municipal governments have addressed transgenic food safety issues as well. For
example as of March 2001 the city of Amparo, São Paulo, prohibited the
cultivation and sale of transgenic foods within the municipality

253
Código de Defensa do Consumidor

165
Table 23. State laws regarding transgenics
Law/
Year
State Summary of the legislation
Lei
9,453/
91
Rio Grande
do Sul
Requires notification to the state Public Authority of
the areas where research with transgenics is
undertaken. Environmental impact assessments and
reports are also required.
Lei
2,055/
99
Mato Grosso
do Sul
Places a 5 year moratorium on the production of
transgenic food in the state. It calls for the
registration of genetically modified organisms at the
Department of Agro-fishery Inspection and Defense
(state level) and requires the implementation of all
pertinent federal legislation regarding transgenics,
including CONAMAs norms which call for an
environmental impact assessment and report.
Lei
10,467/
99
São Paulo Requires manufacturers to inform on the packaging
of products the existence, if contained, of genetically
modified foods.
254

Lei
3,967/
02
Rio de
Janeiro
Prohibits the commercial planting and sale of
products with GM content that are intended for
human or animal consumption.
Lei
12,182/
02
Santa
Catarina
Prohibits the planting of transgenics for 5 years and
requires labeling of any product with GM content.
Sources: Boletim 2002, 1; Menasche 2000, Vigna 2001.
(Vigna 2001, 85), and since June 2000 the supermarkets of the city of Belo
Horizonte
255
must display placards that state product with transgenic
components on any shelves that contain genetically modified foods (Menasche

254
The following year, Brazilian Association of Food Industries (Associação Brasileira das
Indústrias da Alimentação - ABIA) files a direct action claim of unconstitutionality against this
law with the Federal Supreme Court.
255
Belo Horizonte is the only city in the world that officially recognizes the right of food security
for its inhabitants. Its implementation of that right includes providing supplementary nutrients for
small children and expecting women, publishing the price of produce at different markets,
privileging local farmers with market venues, and low priced food at public cafeterias, amongst
other measures. For more information see Lappé and Lappé 2002.

166
2000). In the state of Paraná alone, more than 10 municipalities have laws in
place, thanks to the efforts of youth and farmer groups (Boletim 2002, 1).
In the national congress, whatever bill is presented first has preference
over all bills that relate to the same subject, which are annexed to it. As time
passed and issues about transgenic crops and products were not debated, more
bills were submitted to congress. By 1999, there were 18 bills addressing the
subject in the Chamber of Deputies, so a Special Commission was created to
synthesize them. According to Vigna, The installation of the Special
Commission is a reaction to pressure from organized civil society and to the
impact that the topic is provoking in the news media. (Vigna 2001: 53). While
most of the bills (15 or 16) focused on three main topics -- moratorium, labels and
changing the Biosafety Law (Vigna 2001: 53, 75-76) -- the substitute bill created
by the Special Commission, in sharp contrast, was favorable to the commercial
freeing of transgenics. However with respect to food safety, the substitute bill also
required labels that cohere with the Consumer Protection Code and required the
use of special shelves, elements which were often addressed in the other bills.
In July 1998, the same month that the federal court decided the oils made
from the first shipments of transgenic soybeans into the country should contain
labeling about its GM content and health risks, members of all political parties
signed a memorandum asking for mandatory labeling of all GM food products in
Brazil. These signatures indicated that a preference for the labeling of transgenic
food was widespread, a fact that has been sustained in public opinion polls. For

167
example in 2002 IBOPE Opinão interviewed 2,000 Brazilians and found that
92% of them preferred obligatory labeling for transgenic ingredients (IBOPE
Opinão 2003).
256

The opinion of the executive contrasted with that of its citizens. At the
Codex Alimentarius Commission meeting in March 2000, the Brazilian
government joined with Australia, New Zealand and the USA in opposing the
labeling of GM food. Brazil did, however, continue to call for the use of the
precautionary principle at that meeting (Menasche 2000, Boletim 13, 2000). The
federal government position was opposed to many Brazilian state governments
regarding food labeling. Menasche noted The federal government is clearly in
favor of MNCs, which explains its international positioning with the United
States, which has the most MNCs in this field. (Menasche 2002, 1). As noted in
previous sections, industry actors focused their lobbying activities on the federal
level and particularly on the executive.
Non-State Actor Involvement
NGO actors were very vocal in calling for attention to food safety and
consumer rights with regards to transgenics. As noted in the introduction, in 1999,
NGO actors formed a national campaign against transgenics, entitled For a
Brazil Free of Transgenics. Members of the campaign included environmental
groups, family farmers, churches and professional associations (Vigna 2001, 81).
The campaign established a goal of placing a moratorium GMOs pending further

256
In public hearings held by the US government, US citizens also overwhelmingly called for
labeling of transgenics, which successive administrations have disregarded.

168
research, using the precautionary principle (Vigna 2001: 13). Brazilian NGO
outcry was part of a growing international trend. For example, disapproval of
transgenics was also a central theme at the 1999 WTO Millenum Round protests
in Seattle. While most NGO participants at Seattle were from Northern countries,
the centrality of the theme indicated a pattern of international consumer outcry
against transgenics. The Landless Workers Movement (MST),
257
a recognized
political actor in Brazil, took a position in 2000 that transgenic crops should be
burned since they were illegal. The MST, while most active in Brazil, is also an
important participant in the international small farmers movement Via
Campesina. Members of the MST upheld their position both nationally and
internationally, and in 2001, some members of the MST destroyed illicit
transgenic crops in Santa Catarina (Vigna 2001, 85).
Besides calling on government representatives to uphold Brazilian law or
create new legislation with respect to food safety and consumers rights, NGOs
also worked to foment changes in company policies and procedures. For example,
Greenpeace and IDEC took samples of 42 food items from Brazilian market
shelves to have them tested for transgenic content. GM material was found in a
number of products, including baby formula.
258
Since these tests were begun in
2002, 48 food companies have pledged to sell transgenic-free products in Brazil

257
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST).
258
For more information on the percentage of the contamination and other products tested see
Menasche 2000 and Greenpeace 2002.

169
(Greenpeace 2005a). Greenpeace maintains on its website a list of the
companies which have pledged to produce GM-free products and the products it
has tested.
Following the first denunciations (made by Greenpeace and IDEC) about
transgenic foods in Brazilian supermarkets, the National Agency of Sanitary
Vigilence (Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária
)259
sent a letter to the 10
companies that manufactured the foods, asking them to recall products suspected
of containing imported transgenics. If the suspicions of GM content were
confirmed and the manufacturers had not already recalled the products, Sanitary
Vigilance indicated that it would apprehend the products at their point of sale
(Menasche 2000). (The sale of transgenic food was illegal [pending labeling
regulations] due to the 2000 court ruling discussed above under the biosafety
section.)
A year after the court ruling on labeling of GM products, the Cardoso
administration issued an executive decree (Decreto No. 3871) on the labeling of
GM foods. As indicated in Table 7 above, the decree called for the labeling of
GM content over 4%. The decree could not be implemented because it gave no
guidelines about how to measure 4% (for example in total or by individual
ingredient) nor how to track the ingredients. Following the decree, the national
campaign For a Brazil Free From Transgenics began a public action suit against
the transgenic labeling decree, because it did not follow the Consumer Protection

259
. It operates under the Ministry of Health.

170
Code (Vigna 2001, 86). NGOs roundly criticized the decree as the deliberate
creation of a rule meant not to be implemented.
The courts also took various measures to push the federal government to
create proper legislation for transgenic food labeling, some of which was detailed
above under the biosafety section. Specifically in relation to consumer rights, in
June 1999, the Ministry of Justice wrote a resolution (minuta de portaria) that
demanded the labeling of all genetically modified foods, including any food that
had a GM component added during industrial processing (Menasche 2000, Vigna
2001). Since no action followed, a year later, in July 2000, the Ministry of Justice
created a special inter-ministerial commission to elaborate standards to regulate
the labeling of transgenic foods, with a mandate of finishing it in 20 days.
Did non-state actor participation and institutional structure influence food
safety and consumer right policies in Brazil? While NGOs were very vocal in
demanding labeling and other aspects of food safety and consumer rights
regarding transgenics, these concerns were also forwarded by government actors,
namely members of the legislature and the judiciary. Ultimately the court cases
initiated by NGOs, which were discussed above under biosafety, pushed Brazilian
policy temporarily to a precautionary, and then a preventive state. In terms of
policy outcomes, it was this strategy rather than coordinated national campaigns
or overwhelming public opinion that moved Brazilian policy. Resources and
access played minor roles although both were necessary for NGOs to utilize the
judicial system.

171
While it turned out that NGO actors influenced food safety and
consumer right policies, the repeated and effective efforts by the Cardoso
administration to delay creation and implementation of such policies is also
noteworthy since most Brazilians, whether citizens or government actors, wanted
precautionary policies. Why were food labeling policies, which allow consumer
choice, repeatedly delayed? Biotech industry actors had the most to lose from
such policies, because such labeling requirements would make GM products more
expensive than their conventional equivalents, and the labels might give GM
products a stigma. Industry strategies, resources and access to policy-makers may
have led the Cardoso administration to delay creating food safety policies, but
ultimately industry actors were only marginally influential in policy outcomes for
this area for the time-frame of the study.
The main federal institution charged with oversight of food safety issues,
the National Agency of Sanitary Vigilence, was not a primary location for policy
implementation or a main player in the controversy. Both NGO actors and
industry actors saw Sanitary Vigilence as being overtaxed in responding to
immediate and known food safety threats, without having to add potentially
hazardous transgenic foods to the mix. The Agencys limited ability to act may
have been one of the motives behind the NGOs decision to pressure companies
directly to ensure that their products were GM-free.

172
Summary
On the federal level, food safety and consumer rights policies for
transgenic crops went from one extreme to another from 1996-2002. The shifts
are summarized in Table 24 (next page). While there was broad-based support
throughout the nation and across political parties for labeling, the first labeling
decree was not made until 2001, and then it was a result of pressure from the
judicial branch. While some state governments enacted and implemented labeling
and other consumer rights laws relating to transgenics, the executive branch
worked in the opposite direction, impeding national legislation for labeling. Since
this was a near-consensus issue on the part of the citizenry, it is likely that the
executive position was a result of industry actor influence.

173
Table 24. Food safety and consumer rights policies for transgenic crops in
Brazil (federal level)
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
No distinction
made between
rDNA and
conventional
food for testing
or labeling
Differing
screening
processes for
rDNA and
conventional
foods, labeling
of rDNA based
on detectable
content
Differing and
more stringent
screening
processes for
rDNA foods,
comprehensive
labeling of all
rDNA foods
enforced
through market
segregation
Ban sale of
rDNA foods or
require
comprehensive
labeling of all
rDNA foods with
warnings

1996
No labeling or
testing
requirements
for transgenic
food.

1997 No change.
1998 Court sentence
requires
obligatory
segregation of
GM plants to
enable proper
labeling.

1999 No change.
2000 Court ruling bans
all transgenic
foods until
proper labeling is
developed.
2001 Presidential
decree
determines that
all food with
4% or more GM
content must be
labeled.

2002 No change.

174
Public Research
As noted in Chapter 1, the selection criterion of a developed national
agricultural research system is likely to push policies in a promotional direction
with respect to public research. This section begins by briefly describing the
institutions conducting public research on rDNA crops, and then examines the
influence of non-state actors in this issue area. Specifically, NSA influence is
examined with regard to three questions: what type of public sector-private sector
linkages were allowed, what type of research was done, and how was rDNA
research funded?
Institutional Context
Research in agricultural biotechnology began in Brazil in the 1990s, under
the Program for Agro-Industrial Competitiveness (PCA). Under this program,
EMBRAPA, the main public agricultural research institution, began emphasizing
scientific and technological capabilities in biotechnologies, genetic engineering,
informatics, agro-ecology and genetic resources (Sasson 1993, 464). Most public
research in transgenic crops in Brazil was being done by EMBRAPA and by state
research institutes and universities, especially those from the state of São Paulo
(Avila et al 2002, 290). Both EMBRAPA
260
and universities work through
networks of affiliates, so their work has national impact. Most of the important
innovations in agricultural biotechnology in Brazil originated in the universities
(Avila et al 2002, 290).

260
EMBRAPA is under the Ministry of Agriculture.

175
While in 2001, EMBRAPA publicly declared itself in favor of the
commercial release of GMOs in Brazil and supported the CNTBios decisions
concerning biosafety issues (Pelaez and Albergoni 2004, 230), in June 2000, the
public researchers union of EMBRAPA had sent out a document entitled
Reasons to say no to transgenics in agriculture, and a few days later, the union
had joined the NGO campaign For a Brazil Free From Transgenics. (Menasche
2000).
261
The union
262
represents 90% of the employees at EMBRAPA. This
statement on the part of the union was particularly significant because by 2000
these same EMBRAPA researchers had already finished developing GM varieties
for 6 different crops, and had been doing research on rDNA crops for a number of
years. The President of SINPAF, Valter Endres, affirmed that there has been no
change of opinion among the workers. EMBRAPAs position represents the
opinion of the directors who are named by political interests. What occurred was
that our position was defeated by economic forces that dominate the political
arena.(Endres 2005).
263

EMBRAPAs mission is to serve the priorities defined by the federal
government, that is, to provide feasible solutions for the sustainable development
of Brazilian agribusiness through knowledge and technology generation and

261
This happened a month before President Cardosos attempt to bring all the ministries into line
with a single promotional- position on transgenics.
262
Sindicato Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Agropecuário (SINPAF
National Union of Workers in Agricultural Research and Development). SINPAF represents
workers at EMBRAPA, and other research institutions such as CODEVASF, PESAGRO, FIPERJ
and EMEPA. (www.sinpaf.org.br.)
263
Contradictions between scientists and official institutional policy have also been noted in
public sector institutions in the US and the UK (Smith 2003).

176
transfer. (EMBRAPA 2005). Note that the focus is agribusiness, not small
farmers, nor Brazils rural poor. According to Avila, the long-term strategic goals
of multinational life science companies is to trigger major structural changes in
the agricultural industry by promoting GMOs (AFD Avila et al 2002, 291).
EMBRAPAs research is following the same projected path as industries, rather
than advancing alternatives to it. Using the demands of the market as a baseline,
PBio
264
represents a dynamic element in national agriculture and aims at
improving cooperation between various scientific institutions and the private
sector. (AFD Avila et al 2002, 291).
EMBRAPAs efforts to improve public-private sector collaboration were
part of a larger national effort in that vein. Cooperation between the public sector
(providing knowledge and research) and private sector (adapting the processes
and developing finished products) was seen as extremely desirable for the
development of agricultural biotechnology. In order for university innovations to
be passed to the private sector, new types of institutions were created, namely
biotechnology pools or science parks and integrated centers of biotechnology
(CIBs).
265
The Rio de Janeiro Biotechnology Pool (Bio-Rio) was one of the most
ambitious in redefining industry-university relations and serves as an example.
Initially the main public research centers, state and federal governments,
266
and

264
EMBRAPAs Biotechnology Program
265
Rio de Janeiro and Santa Catarina established technological parks, and the states of Minas
Gerais, São Paulo, Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul had CIBs (Sasson 1993, 525).
266
The federal government began supporting these efforts from 1985 onward.

177
industry actors
267
represented by ABRABI participated in Bio-Rio. Bio-Rio
was located on a university campus and was given university land. It had a
research center, an administrative center, an incubator for testing and developing
projects, and sites for firms (Clark and Juma 1991, 90). Science parks at other
universities also included infrastructure, production facilities, and mechanisms for
information exchange. Industry actors, as well as scientific and technological
institutions were invited to participate in CIBs. In short, both forms of institutions
included direct collaboration with industry actors.
Close collaboration between private sector and public sector begs the
question of what was driving research corporate interests or the public interest?
Public research institutions including EMBRAPA decided to further work on
MNC-controlled GM technologies by adapting them to local varieties of export
crops (GRAIN 1998).
268
EMBRAPAs policy on research and development has
included the use of rDNA technologies for the development of crop varieties and
technology transfers since 1999 (EMBRAPA 1999). The biotechnology and
genetic resources program has been EMBRAPAs largest program both in terms
of funding and in terms of the number of projects it encompasses.
269
Furthermore,
the type of crops experimented upon, which crops receive the most testing and

267
Initial private firms included Biomatrix and Microbiologia. (Clark and Juma 1991, 90).
268
This also occurred in Argentina.
269
Salaries and benefits make up the bulk of EMBRAPAs budget at 72% of the total. The
biotechnology and genetic resources program had 4% of the budget in 2003, or approximately
36,000,000 reals (EMBRAPA 2004, 60). The biotech program also made up 4% of EMBRAPAs
budget in 2001. (EMBRAPA 2002, 123-125).

178
research, and the type of crop characteristic developed, all point to corporate
interest capture of the public research agenda.
The types of crops being researched in public institutions included soy,
corn, cotton, papaya, black bean, potatoes, rice, eucalyptus, sugar cane and
tobacco, a wider array of crops than corporations studied. According to the
1995/1996 agricultural census of Brazil, five of the crops listed above were
produced by agribusinesses, while two, beans and tobacco,
270
were produced by
family farmers. Transnational companies focused on only three of the crops listed:
corn, soy and cotton. By June 2000 EMBRAPA had finished the development of
various GM varieties including the three most important to MNCs -- soy, corn,
cotton -- but had also finished GM varieties of papaya, black beans and potatoes
(Menasche 2000). The balance between corporate interest and public interest
research was also reflected in the acreage dedicated to different types of
experimental test crops: Corn and soy alone represented 81.7% of all the
experimental areas planted (Vigna 2001, 29).
The three characteristics of transgenic plants being experimented upon in
Brazil (from 1997
271
-2001
272
) were: herbicide-tolerance (487 types of plants),
bioinsecticide-tolerance (392 types), and plants tolerant to both (21 types)
273

270
Family farmers produce tobacco for export but beans are for domestic consumption.
271
Field tests on transgenic crops began in Brazil in 1997.
272
These data go through July 2001. In July 2001 further field tests were restricted by the courts.
273
Other types of transgenic plant experiments were virus resistance (7), antibiotic resistance (1),
confidential (2) and not classified (4). In total 914 experiments were done.

179
(Vigna 2001, 31).
274
This focus replicated the international research trend on
transgenic crops. Notably, none of the experiments were for drought-tolerance,
frost-tolerance or water tolerance (water-logging), which would have addressed
the natural hazards facing Brazil.
275
More than half of the experiments (508) were
for crops that would require the use of associated agro-chemicals, thus ensuring
continued sale of these chemicals by their manufacturers. Unsurprisingly, with
most research focusing on herbicide-resistant crops, Monsanto decided to expand
its glyphosate production capacity in Brazil. This endeavor was discussed above
in the trade section (footnote 43), because of the diversion of public funds to
Monsanto for this purpose.
Non-State Actor Involvement
How specifically were industry actors able to influence the public research
agenda? As mentioned above, industry actors were given privileged access to
public research institutions, while other important agricultural actors, such as
MST, did not have the same access. Besides access, strategies and resources also
had a role. Companies used a strategy of allowing technology transfer so that
public researchers could use their proprietary technologies to create rDNA
varieties. Why might companies have allowed technology transfers? As noted
above in the section on trade, national seed production became more oligopolistic

274
Two tests were classified as confidential, which is illegal under the Brazilian Patent Law. All
research must be open to public scrutiny (Vigna 2001: 33).
275
The main environmental stresses that farmers in the south have to face are flooding and
occasional frost, while recurring droughts are the main natural hazard facing the northeast region
(CIA Factbook).

180
after the plant variety protection law was passed in 1997. While most of the
corn seed market came under the control of multinational companies, EMBRAPA
still controlled 60% of national soy production
276
(Pelaez and Albergoni 2004,
230). Since it was a public research agency, EMBRAPA could not be purchased,
which was the principal strategy for industry to gain control of the national seed
market. Instead, big biotech seed companies like Monsanto and American
Cyanamid began adopting forms of partnering with EMBRAPA. The agreements
with these companies allowed EMBRAPA to use proprietary lines of herbicide-
resistant soybeans to develop new varieties of GM soy adapted more to northern
Brazilian soil and climate conditions (varieties which were not being developed
by private companies).
277
For example, in 2000, Monsanto, holder of the patent on
transgenic soy that is resistant to the toxic agricultural chemical glyphosate, gave
EMBRAPA and the Organization of Cooperatives of Paraná the right to use the
gene of the plant for scientific and commercial purposes (Menasche 2000,4).
EMBRAPA also made partnerships with Cyanamid and Agrevo to produce
transgenic soy resistant to their proprietary herbicides (imazapyr -Clear Field
®
,
and ammonium glyphosinate Liberty Link
®
, respectively) (AFD Avila 2002,
291). Of course, such technology transfers enabled public research institutions to
advance work in areas in which the companies themselves were interested.

276
Prior to increased IPR for plants, industry investment and research on soybeans was limited
because farmers replant the seed from year to year. Besides EMBRAPAs 60%, another 20% was
controlled by the Organization of Cooperatives of Paraná
276
and Monsanto controlled the
remaining 20%. (Menasche 2000, 14).
277
MNCs were not interested in developing seed for this region because it did not have a large
enough market small farms dominate in northern Brazil --but the companies would benefit by
being able to sell their chemicals to those farmers.

181
Industry actor resources were linked to these strategies, both in terms of
purchasing national seed companies and in terms of allowing use of its controlled
property. Both strategies depended upon having these resources available.
EMBRAPA, for its part, began partnering with multinationals because of
increasingly limited funding for public research, and because of the proprietary
nature of both GM plant varieties and basic research tools for rDNA research. To
some extent, if EMBRAPA chose to advance rDNA research it needed to use
research components owned by the private sector.
278
Other public research
institutions also allowed technology transfers. Since the changes in Brazilian IPR
law (see IPR section above), public research agencies, including EMBRAPA,
279

have increasingly used a strategy of financing their activities through royalties
and copyrights over their innovations (Avila et al 2002, Emerick 2002a,
EMBRAPA 1999, 32). In 1996 self-funding accounted for 33% of the budget and
by 2002 it accounted for 75% of its budget (EMBRAPA 2004, 58). This fund-
raising strategy based on royalties is another motive for public researchers to
focus more on corporate interest than on public interest research, independent of
what corporate strategies are.
280

278
While many basic research tools for rDNA research are proprietary, EMBRAPA has developed
and patented its own system for crop transformation (Parlberg 2001, 88).
279
EMBRAPA is one of the few public institutions in Brazil which has developed mechanisms to
protect its intellectual property.
280
From 1996 to 2003 EMBRAPAs reliance on self-funding versus governmental or international
donations has increased steadily. Requests for patents increased from 13 to 35 and for plant variety
protection from 0 to 30 during the same time period (EMBRAPA 2004, 66).The latter statistics are
for all Brazilians, not just EMBRAPA employees.

182
NGOs supported more research on rDNA crops within public research
agencies overall, but especially to determine issues of food safety and biosafety.
Thus NGO actors and industry actors had a basic, common interest in advancing
rDNA research, although they did prefer different focuses for their research and
had differing views of how much research was sufficient before commercial
release. Even NGO which called for moratoria on rDNA crops promoted the need
for more public research.
Since some of the research that NGOs preferred addressed socio-economic
impacts and other research questions not being addressed by public-sponsored
research institutions, NGOs used a strategy and their resources to advance this
type of research themselves. For example, Action Aid Brasil commissioned a
study on the impact of IPRs and biotechnologies on the seed industry in Brazil,
and the Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos (INESC, Institute for Socio-
Economic Studies) carried out research on social and economic impacts of
transgenic crops.
281
Besides contracting studies directly relating to the potential
wider impacts of rDNA crops, NGOs also advanced research in alternative
farming systems that would directly meet the needs of rural poor and small
farmers, such as agro-ecological methods.
Summary
Given the consensus on the need for greater research into rDNA
technologies and the administrations desire to use rDNA crops, it is unsurprising

281
See Wilkonson and Castelli 2000, Vigna 2001, Action Aid Brasil and REBRIP 2001.

183
that federal policy towards public research in transgenic crops has been
promotional throughout the time-frame of the study (see Table 25). Both national
and international funds were invested into transgenic research, and private
partnerships were allowed and encouraged. The relationship with the private
sector (industry actors) was perhaps the most important change. During the time-
frame of the study, private sector partnerships increased and included research
into transgenics. Both the institutional framework and actions by industry actors
helped to promote industry preferences. New institutional arrangements such as
the science parks and the use of IPR have given industry actors a privileged place
in the public research structure.

184
Table 25. Public research policies for transgenic crops in Brazil
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Invest national
and donor
funds into
transgenic
technology.
Allow
international
private sector
partnerships
Invest national
and donor funds
into breeding
transgenic
crops into local
varieties
Invest no
national funds
into transgenic
technology but
allow donor
funding of
downstream
transgenic
technology
Invest no
national nor
donor funds in
transgenic
technology
1996 National
investment in
biotechnology.

1997 No change.
1998 No change.
1999 No change.
2000 International
private sector
partnerships
for GM
technology
begin.

2001 No change.
2002 No change.
282

Summary and Conclusions
Federal Brazilian policies towards genetically modified crops began as a
mixture of promotional, permissive and precautionary policies, and continue to be
a mixed bag. In two policy areas, intellectual property rights and public research,
there have been clear and consistent promotional policies towards transgenic
crops. While food safety policies began as promotional, that policy stance was

282
In 2003, the new law on biosafety also created an Incentive Fund for the Development of
Biosafety and Biotechnology for Family Farmers. (Fundo de Incentivo ao Desenvolvimento da
Biosegurança e da Biotecnologia para Agricultores Familiares FIDBio) (JBOnline 2004).

185
due more to an initial lack of policy than to a particular policy choice or
leaning. Food safety and consumer rights policies have witnessed the most
movement, starting as promotional, then shifting to precautionary, then to
preventive, and finally to permissive.
283
Trade policies started off as precautionary
but moved to be preventive. Similarly biosafety policies started off as permissive
and became more cautious, moving to the precautionary category.
In the two policy areas with consistently promotional policies towards
transgenic crops (IPR and public research), industry actors were involved from
the beginning and remained involved. With regard to public research, the
institutional structure privileged industry actors by making them part of the
science parks, by involving them in research, and by accepting tied research
contributions that directly benefited the industry actors in some way. The trend in
Brazil of increased industry actor ties with public research institutions mirrored
the trend at the international level. NGO actors in Brazil were much less visible in
this field, possibly because they expected public research institutions themselves
to safeguard and advance the public interest in much that same way that NGOs
would. Overall, NGOs have been highly supportive of increased research on
transgenics.
284
The preferences for the research focus into transgenics vary
between industry and NGO actors, but both prefer more research. While there
were some mechanisms to allow public comment on research, this mechanism

283
After 2003, federal food safety policies have shifted back to the precautionary category,
requiring labeling of all foods with 1% or more of GM content.
284
NGOS were not against trasngenics per se, but rather they advocated caution and more testing
prior to their massive release. That is, they supported use of the precautionary principle.

186
was open equally to all types of non-state actors, whereas the institutional
constructs (science parks/pools and integrated centers of biotechnology) described
above were not.
With respect to IPR, industry actors advanced forward-looking strategies
by developing positions on IPR and lobbying for them with state actors. They
have done this consistently to continue pushing changes in IPR in directions that
privilege their interests. NGO actors were not initially involved in IPR policy
making with respect to transgenic crops, and most of their actions have been in
reaction to existing proposals or legislation, rather then proactive, like the
industry actors. Industry actors have a history of creating and utilizing IPRs, while
IPRs are not a principal tool for NGOs. Moreover, particularly in the case of
agricultural knowledge, some NGOs argue that the construct of IPRs is entirely
inappropriate, so they work for alternative systems rather than small reforms in
the overall IPR system. Finally, the international IPR structure privileged industry
actors by pushing a specific IPR system. As noted in the IPR section above, Brazil
implemented IPR legislation after the TRIPs agreement. Once implemented, the
IPR structure privileged industry actors because MNC actors had experience and
mechanisms for capturing IPRs in place, while such a mind-set and supportive
institutional constructs had to be fostered and created from scratch in most
Brazilian entities.
NGO actors focused their efforts on the areas of biosafety, and food safety
and consumer rights. Their actions in these areas had carry over effects on trade

187
policies. Industry actors were also involved in the debates on biosafety and
food safety policies, and the two types of actors preferred differing policy choices
and institutional structures. For example, industry actors preferred that GM food
not be labeled while NGO actors called for strict labeling and segregation
measures. Industry actors preferred that decisions about biosafety be handled by
the CTNBio, while NGO actors preferred that authority lie with the
Environmental Ministry.
Access to biosafety and food safety institutions was formally equal for
both NGO and industry actors. For example, both types of actors had
representatives at the CTNBio and both could participate in the CONAMA
working group that created guidelines for environmental impact assessments for
transgenic crops. The strategy employed by NGO actors of using existing
environmental and food safety legislation proved effective in moving federal
policies for transgenics to be more cautious. The international institutional context
of the SPSS agreement, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the standards
developed by the Codex Alimentarius Commission did not constrain NGOs
ability to use this strategy, nor its ultimate impact. Industry actor strategy of
focusing on lobbying the executive proved partially successful in that the
President issued various decrees trying to reverse the policy direction established
by court rulings, and also in changes Brazils stance in international negotiations
regarding labeling of transgenic products. In particular, with regard to food safety
and consumer rights, a Presidential decree moved the policy from the preventive

188
category two steps back to being permissive. This was done by Presidential
decree despite the courts instructions that it be done by an inter-ministerial group
and despite ample interest and efforts in this area in congress. The institutional
context that included the constitutional requirement of environmental impact
assessments pushed Brazilian policy toward the precautionary category, but
Presidential decrees giving the CTNBio authority over those decisions pushed
Brazilian policy toward the permissive category. Had NGO actors not contested
the CTNBios authority with the courts, it is likely that Brazilian policy would
have remained permissive, despite the Constitution. Thus, although institutional
context was important, ultimately it was actions by NGO actors that were key to
policy outcomes in this area.
Both industry and NGO actors used trade arguments as reasons for
advancing their particular policy preferences for trade, but ultimately the court
decisions in biosafety and food safety stymied development of trade policies for
transgenics. State governments, as noted in the trade section above, did advance
differing policies that affected trade in transgenics, implementing trade policies
for GM crops that safeguarded the interests of citizens of their particular states.
Both industry and NGO actors used the institutional context to their advantage.
While NGOs used the courts, the public ministry and lobbied on the state level,
industry actors concentrated on the executive branch, and achieved some success
with that.

189
Similarly, for food safety and consumer choice, the separation of
powers was important. State governments and even municipal governments
created their own legislation regarding food safety for transgenics (and for other
issues relating to transgenics, already noted above), when the federal government
did not act. The President issued a decree on food labeling in an attempt to
sidestep both legislative and court measures in this direction.
The institutional context limited the implementation though not the
creation of food safety policies. An overtaxed Sanitary Vigilence agency made it
difficult for the institution to monitor and sanction the existence of illegal
transgenics in the food supply. The extreme costs of segregating crops at every
point of the food production chain, and documenting that segregation, further
limited the ability to label transgenic foods. This context, however, did not
eliminate the possibility of Brazils following any of the four policy options. As
with the other policy areas, it was the actions by NGO and industry non-state
actors that led to the particular policy choices that resulted. The court ruling
which resulted from a suit brought by NGO actors established a precautionary
policy and the executive decree, no doubt with input from industry actors, moved
policy back to a permissive stance, allowing a high percentage of GM detectable
content.
In terms of access, industry actors were privileged in two policy areas,
public research and IPR, through the institutional context. With respect to
biosafety, one NGO representative at the CTNBio resigned from the position in

190
protest over what it perceived as an industry bias in the institution, although
access was formally equal.
The resources of non-state actors differed and may have affected their
access to policy makers. For example, the monetary resources of industry actors
were greater than those of NGO actors, and much more concentrated. This
privileged industry actors by enabling them to make substantial political
contributions. Moreover, they controlled extensive market share and thus large
portions of Brazilian internal and external markets. These two traits made it likely
that they could directly and repeatedly lobby for their interests with key policy
makers, rather than indirectly or with lower staff members. While these resources
also meant that industry actors could have had a strong lobby in a number of
Brazilian states, it does not appear that this was a strategy they employed. While
the monetary resources of NGO actors were fewer, NGOs had greater resources in
terms of the number of people and entities involved in campaigns relating to
transgenics, and their wide distribution throughout the country. It appears that the
nature of NGO resources helped NGOs to have an impact on state and local
governments, but not necessarily in lobbying the executive or national congress.
However, a focus on local governments could also have been a deliberate strategy
on the part of NGOs, because alternatively, NGOs could have pooled their
monetary resources to undertake more actions and lobbying the executive in the
capital, had they wanted to. Finally, the institutional context at the state and

191
municipal level which allowed stricter (but not laxer) laws regarding
transgenics could have been another reason NGO were more active at sub-federal
levels.
The strategies employed by non-state actors appear to have had the most
impact on federal policy outcomes in Brazil more so than institutional context
or NSA access or resources, although all of these factors came into play at some
point. In particular, the strategy used by NGO actors of seeking to uphold existing
environmental legislation through the courts significantly affected Brazilian
transgenic policy in three areas: biosafety, trade and food safety and consumer
choice. The impact on the trade area was a spillover effect from the court rulings
that directly referred to biosafety and food safety concerns.
285
The industry actor
strategy of focusing on the executive branch also proved to be effective in that the
President repeatedly took measures that advanced industries interests, at both the
national and international levels.
286
The executive did this despite rulings by the
judicial branch, legislature efforts in the same area, differences of opinion among
his own Ministers, and statements by all of the state secretaries of agriculture
preferring other policies. There are also suspicions that industry actors employed
a strategy of selling illegal transgenic seed in Brazil. Given the reproductive

285
This is an analytical assessment only, not a strategy recommendation. Later NGO actors would
seek to use this same strategy to up-hold existing rules on transgenic crops, but the strategy would
fail due to delays in the courts.
286
For example, issuing Presidential decrees, not up-holding court rulings, issuing a stay of arms
to the Public Ministry, changing Brazils stance on transgenic policy in international forums.

192
nature of soy seed, if such a strategy was used, it was very effective in helping
to establish the cultivation of transgenic crops in Brazil as a fact on the ground.
Though the conclusions from Chapter Two suggested otherwise, the
international institutional context did not have the impact anticipated of
constraining policy choices in trade and food safety --preventive policies were in
place in both policy areas for a time in Brazil. However, the international
institutional context did have an impact in the area of intellectual property rights
in that it helped to establish a promotional IPR policies for transgenics before
field testing of such crops had even begun in Brazil.
287

In the case of public research, the consensus on the need for research was
more important than the institutional context surrounding the research. Still, as
noted in that policy section, changes in the amount and nature of funding, did
have an impact on how and what public research was done, so the institutional
context was important in that regard.
In conclusion, both institutional context and NSAs (both industry and
NGO actors) involvement influenced policies for transgenic crops in Brazil. The
separation of power between branches and levels of government was important.
At the sub-state level this context allowed more precautionary and preventive
policies to be established while constraining promotional efforts. However the
existence of such an institutional context by itself did not push policies for
transgenic crops in any particular direction, rather it was the interaction of NSAs

287
The policy choices in the other two areas did not test international institutional constraints.

193
with the particular contexts and institutions for each policy area that changed
or cemented policy choices. Thus, NSAs were more influential on policy
outcomes than the formal and informal institutional context. The next chapter
examines these same questions for India.

194
Chapter 4
India: Balancing a Cornucopia of Perspectives

Introduction
How were policies for rDNA crops shaped in India? What was the role of
non-state actors? How did the institutional structure filter their influence? This
chapter examines both the involvement of non-state actors and the institutional
context surrounding the making of policies for rDNA crops in India. The chapter
begins by explaining the institutional context for the regulation of rDNA crops in
India. Then the five policy areas identified in Chapter One are examined:
intellectual property rights, trade, biosafety, food safety and consumer rights, and
public research. For each area, institutional constraints and participation of non-
state actors is noted with regard to key events. An event chronology is included as
Appendix B. NSA participation is examined specifically with regard to their
access, strategies and/or resources.
India is the second most populous country in the world,
288
and
approximately a third of the worlds hungry live there. Famine and food security
are chronic and pressing problems,
289
despite food surpluses.
290
As of 1997, the
poorest 10% of the population consumed 3.5% and the highest 10% consumed

288
Based on estimated 2005 data from the CIA Factbook.
289
Living historical memory of the Bengal famine of 1943, when 3.5 million people starved to
death, is present in current generation. During that famine, food exports continued, India supplied
British army with food, and more than 20% of Indias food went for war-time supplies (Shiva,
2000, 5-6). Food was taken from farmers as a form of rent collection. Farmers fought to keep 2/3
of their crops to themselves.
290
In 2000 India had a record food surplus of 44 million tons, which grew to a surplus of 65
million tons by 2002. However, India also has about 320 million people, mostly women and
children suffering from hunger. The surplus is not growing from excess production but because
more and more people are unable to buy the food (Sharma 2004, 11).

195
33.5% of total household income (CIA Factbook 1999).
291
As of 2002, 25% of
the Indian population was below the poverty line. Approximately 30% of Indians,
around 300 million people, suffer from malnutrition, and a disproportionate
number of them are women and children (Sharma, Charak and Ramanaiah 2003,
297). While there was some improvement in social indicators from 1995 to 1998,
this was limited to urban areas. The relative neglect of the agricultural sector
helped to perpetuate rural poverty.
Agriculture is a source of national stability in that it provides employment,
food and livelihood to more than sixty percent of Indias labor force.
292
(CIA
Factbook 1999), and about one-fourth of the GDP comes from agriculture.
293

Indias main agricultural products are rice, wheat, oilseed, cotton, jute, tea,
sugarcane, potatoes, cattle, water buffalo, sheep, goats, poultry and fish. These
agricultural goods are crucial to the people of Indias food security and are not
among Indias main export products.
While the debate about GM crops is obviously important to Indians
because of the importance of agriculture and food security to the country, Indias
decisions also carry symbolic weight, sending powerful messages to other
developing countries. Global interests of industry actors, NGOs and scientific
communities all see India as a site of contestation for the future of GM crops.

291
While Indias GDP per capita is $3,100 (PPP, 2004 est.), its human development index rank as
of 2003 was 127 of 177 countries (hdr.undp.org), which indicates that India has a worse standard
of living than its GDP per capita suggests.
292
Given Indias extensive population, this means that approximately 1 of every 4 farmers in the
world is Indian (Shiva, 2000, 7, Sharma 2004, 11).
293
For example, as of 2002, 23.6% of Indias GDP came from agriculture (CIA Factbook 2004).

196
The main NGO non-state actors working to establish GM policies in
India are the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology
(RFSTE)
294
, Gene Campaign.
295
Another quasi-NGO with significant impact is
the M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation (MSSRF).
296
The MSSRF is one of
the few NGOs in India that does rDNA research.
297

The main industry non-state actors working on GM policies in India are
the companies Mahyco-Monsanto Biotech (MMB - Monsanto),
298
Syngenta, Du
Pont and Aventis. Of these, Monsanto dominates. Besides the companies, the
Seed Association of India (SAI), one of the major seed industry associations,
299
is
an important industry actor representing large to medium foreign and domestic
firms (Seshia nd. 7). It has seats on a number of government committees, and
these seats offer it privileged access to policy-makers. According to an SAI
spokesperson, its suggestions are adopted at least 90 per cent of the time.

294
This NGO is headed by Vandana Shiva, who also founded Navdanya. Navdanya is both an
NGO and a movement. Navdanya the organization does participatory agricultural research on its
organic farm and has its own seed bank. Navdanya the movement has a primary membership of
70,000 farming families and has helped to establish 40 community seed banks throughout India.
295
Gene Campaign is a group of scientists, lawyers, economists, environmentalists, journalists,
farmers representatives and activists dedicated to the protection of genetic resources in the Third
World and the rights of their farmers and people to use them. It is directed by Dr. Suman Sahai.
296
The MSSRF is chaired by Dr. Swaminathan, who is considered a leader of Indias green
revolution. While most of the funding for MSSRF comes from prizes given to Dr. Swaminathan,
the organization also receives funds directly from the government of India and the state of Tamil
Nadu, as well as from foreign donors and corporations. For example it has received funds from the
DBT for its work with mangrove genetic research.
297
They focus on medicinally important plants that are facing extinction.
298
Monsanto operates through three subsidiaries in India: Monsanto India, Monsanto Enterprises
and Monsanto Chemicals. In 1998 Monsanto acquired 26% of the seed company Mahyco
(Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Company Ltd.), which later became Monsanto-Mahyco Biotech Pvt.
Ltd. (MMB), a joint venture. The facilitate reading, MMB is referred to as Monsanto in the text,
and any reference to the US parent company is made explicit.
299
The second major seed association is the Association of the Seed Industry. Dr. Barwale of
Mahyco and D. Attavar of Indo-American Hybrid Seeds sit on the board of that association. While
it supports GM research, SAI has been the more vocal of the two in the debate (Newell 2003, 12).

197
(Newell 2003, 14). The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII)
300
has also had
a prominent role in GM policy arenas. The CII is important in that 80% of
investment in India comes from among its members.
The role that these non-state actor played with regard to GM policies is
examined from three aspects: access, strategies and resources. Analysis is made of
the varying degrees of access NGOs and industry actors had to relevant decision-
makers, of the strategies industry actors and NGOs utilized to try to influence
policy decisions, and finally of the resources they had to help them. Much of this
analysis follows the release of the first test case GM crop in India cotton. The
first GM crops approved for commercial release in India were three varieties of
GM cotton.
Why was cotton, rather than a crop that could directly address Indias food
needs outlined above, the first GM crop released in India? Of the main rDNA
crops in the world (soy, corn, cotton and canola) India produces significant
amounts of only cotton. Put another way, cotton was the most viable commercial
crop of interest to industry actors in the country. Also, actors interested in
promoting the use of GM crops more widely might have thought that it would be
easier to get approval for a primarily non-food crop before advancing other
requests. Some cottonseed is made into an edible oil, but most cotton production,
GM or otherwise, is for manufacturing rather than food purposes. Before turning

300
MNCs can be members of the CII, but do not have voting rights, which limits their voice.

198
to non-state actor involvement in the policy areas, a brief overview of the
institutional context for GM crops is provided next.

Institutional Context
The wider institutional context within which non-state actors function in
India is that of a democratic, federal republic with 25 states and 7 union
territories. As in Brazil, agricultural issues in India are under state control, and
there is a separation of powers between federal and state levels, and between
states and municipalities or villages.
At the federal level, science and technology policy in India, as well as
agricultural policy and most other policy areas, are guided by five-year plans. The
ministries are charged with developing and carrying out the policy plan, with
some Parliamentary oversight. The three main ministries with authority over
research in rDNA crops in India are the Ministry of Science and Technology
(MST), the Ministry of the Environment and Forests (MoEF), and the Ministry of
Agriculture and Cooperation (MAC). Figure 6 (below) helps to illustrate the
relationship between the regulatory institutions.

199
Figure 6. Regulatory process for GM crops in India
Source: Adapted from Sharma, Charak and Ramanaiah 2003, 301.

Review
Committee for
Genetic
Manipulation
RCGM
Genetic
Engineering
Approval
Committee
GEAC
Indian Council on
Agricultural
Research
ICAR
State
Governments

Release for
commercialization
Monitoring
and Evaluation
Committee
MEC

Investigator
or applicant

Institutional
Biosafety
Committee
IBSC
State
Biotechnology
Coordination
Committees
SBCC
District
Level
Committees
DLC

200
The Department of Biotechnology (DBT) under the Ministry of
Science and Technology
301
channels most of the funding for transgenic
agricultural research. The DBT is responsible for coordinating policy on GM
research, such as producing guidelines for research and commercial release of
rDNA crops, and also has regulatory oversight over experiments with GMOs and
rDNA crops. Specifically, the Review Committee for Genetic Manipulation
(RCGM), which is under the DBT, gives approval and then reviews and monitors
all transgenic research and development projects.
The MoEF has authority over the large-scale commercial use and
deployment of transgenic crops (Ghosh 1997, 174). Specifically, the Genetic
Engineering Approvals Committee (GEAC), which is under the MoEF, reviews
field trials and gives recommendations for or against commercial releases of
transgenic crops. The GEAC also regulates the large-scale introduction of GM
drugs or food, including food aid and imports (Jayaraman 2003). The GEAC
makes all its decisions on a case-by-case basis.
Most research on rDNA crops (versus other types of rDNA research) is
done through the Indian Council on Agricultural Research (ICAR) system,
302

which is under the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperation. The federal level
Minister of Agriculture serves both as the President of ICAR and as the Minister

301
Two of the major research institutions under the MST that do research related to rDNA crops
are the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research and the International Center for Genetic
Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB), in New Delhi.
302
More generally, most crop research in India, rDNA or otherwise, is also conducted through the
ICAR system.

201
of Agriculture. Ministers of states for agriculture, and any other related
ministries that work with ICAR, work under the directives of the President of
ICAR, making this a position of power. As noted above, agricultural research and
education is largely the responsibility of the respective states. The ICAR works
with that context by relying on an excellent infrastructure by way of the State
Agricultural Universities (28) and their regional research stations. (ICAR, 1994,
foreward). Besides its work with the state agricultural universities, the ICAR
directly administers a large number of research institutes (49), research centers
(30) and project directorates (9). In contrast with the developed-country trend,
most agricultural research in India (including research on rDNA crops) is still
done by public researchers - not by the private sector.

Intellectual Property Rights
The debate surrounding intellectual property rights was very heated in
India and strongly influenced all policies towards rDNA crops. Unlike in Brazil,
the IPR debate in India focused on issues relating to agriculture and IPRs for
plants from its beginning. Developments in the IPR debate that related directly to
rDNA crops prior to the start date of this study (1996) are included.
Institutional Context
As noted in Chapter One, intellectual property rights for crops have taken
two main forms: patents and/or plant variety protection. First I discuss the patent
option, which was rejected in India, then plant variety protection, which, after

202
considerable debated, was adopted in 2001. Table 26 lists the intellectual
property right laws that pertain to transgenics that were in force during the time
frame of the study.
Table 26. Chronology of intellectual property-related laws, India
Year Law
1966 Seeds Act (No. 54 of 1966)
1970 Patents Act (revised in 2004 and 2005)
1972 Seeds (Amendment) Act (No. 55 of 1972)
2001 Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers Rights Act (Act 53 of 2001)
2002 Biological Diversity Act (No. 18 of 2003)
Source: Compiled by author from the Biodiversity Rights Legislation section of the GRAIN
website. See http://grain.org/brl/.

Discussion of IPR for plants began in the late 1980s, and there was strong
resistance to adopting a patent regime from the beginning. Even some industry
actors agreed that a PVP system would be more appropriate for India. In 1988 the
Government of India drew together scientists, national pharmaceutical industry
representatives, and consumer representatives to create a National Working Group
on Patent Laws. The Working Group found that the existing Indian Patents Law
served Indian interests well and it opposed foreign pressure to change it.
303

Foreign pressure was the main reason revision of the patent law was even
considered.
304
The Working Group recommended no additional patent

303
As the Working Group suggested, changes in patent laws have done little to help Indian
citizens. Data from the United Nations shows that patents granted to residents (per million people)
for 2002 was 0. Similarly, receipts of royalties and license fees (in US $ per person) for 2003 was
nil (Human Development Report 2003).
304
Sell (1999) provides evidence of the way in which key U.S.-based MNCs have strongly
influenced national and international IPR regulations.

203
protection
305
for biotechnologies (which include rDNA crops) and it also
advocated that India not adopt the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs) Agreement (Sasson 1993, 155, van Wijk 1990). During a 1991
visit of the U.S Trade Representative to India, the National Working Group on
Patent Laws issued a press release advocating rejection of TRIPs stating that it
would be a sure recipe for economic and technological subjugation of the
country . Along with the health sector, the smooth development of
indigenous agriculture would be in jeopardy as the new patenting regime
seeks to extend industrial patents to cover agriculture. The chief
beneficiary of the proposed changes would not be the Indian farmer but
the multinational corporations who have started selling patented seeds to
increase their control over the global economy. (cited in Sasson 1993,
155).

The Working Groups position was supported by elected representatives from
every major political party in India. This foreign pressure regarding patents
reinforced NGO messages about attempts at foreign control via MNCs.
Pressure from the US on India to change its IPR laws was both rhetorical
and actual. In 1991 the US threatened that if India failed to change its Patents Act
by February 26, 1992, the US would take retaliatory action.
306
Then, in April
1992, the U.S. Trade Representative announced that the U.S. was withdrawing
preferential trade treatment worth $60 million in Indian imports
307
(Sasson 1993,

305
Under the Indian Patents Act, in the food, pharmaceutical and chemical sectors, only processes
were patentable, not products. Patents were granted for 14 years from date of filing (vs. 17-20 in
most industrialized countries). A patent for a process that could be used in making foodstuffs or
drugs had a duration of 7 years from the date of filing. Also the law granted automatic license of
right to use after three years of sealing the patent for the food, pharmaceutical and chemical
sectors. That means that anyone can use them, without asking permission, but must pay royalties
(Sasson 1993, 154).
306
The U.S. proposed that India adopt the Mexican patent law.
307
They targeted the Indian pharmaceutical and chemical sectors.

204
155, Srinivas 1992). Later, post-Uruguay round (July 1997), a WTO dispute
panel sided with the U.S. against India stating that India had to conform to the
TRIPs Agreement. Meanwhile the U.S. continued to use unilateral pressure
against India to change its IPR laws.
308
For example the U.S. Ambassador to India
announced that certain areas of research and training [would] be closed to
cooperation if India failed to amend its patent laws, thus threatening
approximately 130 scientific projects supported by the U.S.-India Fund. Despite
US and other foreign pressure,
309
the Indian Parliament consistently resisted
changing its national patent law until 2004. NGOs were vociferous in opposing
changes.
Plant variety protection, however, was a different story. The year 1989
marked the beginning of discussions of plant variety protection intellectual
property laws in India. Research on transgenic crops was at the laboratory stage in
India at that point. In 1989, the Government of India commissioned the UN Food
and Agricultural Organization (FAO) to study the desirability and feasibility of
introducing plant breeders rights (PBR) legislation in India. The FAO report
recommended simultaneous and parallel recognition of farmers rights (as
articulated in the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources -

308
The U.S. also worked unilaterally to pressure other countries including Argentina, Pakistan,
Ecuador, Thailand, and Ethiopia, among other, on this issue (Dawkins, 1997, 28-29).
309
Even though foreign actors continuously pushed for change, Sasson notes that from the early
1990s, foreign corporations had easier control of piracy and intellectual property right
infringement in Indian than in other developing countries (Sasson 1993, 110). Conversely,
regulations or control of gene piracy by foreign corporations was non-existent and piracy by said
actors was rampant.

205
IUPGR
310
), and plant breeders rights (PBRs) (as articulated in the UPOV)
(Seshia nd 11, citing FAO 1993).
After the TRIPs Agreement was passed in 1994, this international
agreement became an additional pressure on India to create plant and animal IPR
legislation. From the 1999 version of the plant variety protection (PVP) bill
onward, this pressure can be noted in the text of the bill: WTO obligations were
stated as a reason for the law in the preamble (Sahai 2000, 878).
311
Also, noted
above, a WTO dispute panel had stipulated that India had to conform to the TRIPs
Agreement.
Various versions of a highly debated plant variety protection bill were
submitted to Parliament before one was finally passed in the fall of 2001.
312
For
example, in 1993, a draft PVP law, which was modeled after the International
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) 1978,
313
was
submitted to parliament. This version was criticized by industry actors as being
too weak, while some NGOs argued that it did not protect farmers. Again in 1999,
a new version was brought to parliament for consideration (Rhoe et. al. 2002,
272). The 1999 draft was referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC),
which held public consultations on the bill from January through August 2000.
On August 25, 2000, the JPC submitted a new draft of the bill and its report to

310
See Chapter Two for discussion of farmerss rights under the IUPGR.
311
According to the TRIPs Agreement, India should have some type of PVP law in place by Jan.
2000 (AgBioWorld 2005).
312
Three drafts of a PVP bill were submitted to Parliament: a 1993, 1999 and 2000 version. A
1997 version was drafted by not submitted (Seshia n.d. 2).
313
See Chapter 2, IPR section for the differences between the UPOV 1978 and 1991.

206
Parliament. The 2000 version recognized both plant breeders rights and
farmers rights and became the Plant Variety Protection and Farmers Rights Act
(PVPFRA).
The main difference of the Indian PVPFRA law from international
instruments such as the UPOV, the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic
Resources (IUPGR) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is that
farmers are accorded actual rights along with breeders, not just exemptions or
privileges.
314
Indian lawmakers broke the mold in this regard. The final
PVPFRA contained elements of both the 1978 and 1991 UPOV and included
rDNA plants under its purview. Farmers rights were formalized as follows
(Article 31):
Nothing contained in this act shall affect a farmers traditional right to
save, use, exchange, share or sell his farm produce of a variety protected
under this act except where a sale is for the purpose of reproduction under
a commercial marketing arrangement. (Alker and Heidhues, 2002, 87).

Like the IUPGR, the law also included benefit-sharing arrangements between
breeders and other contributors (farmers and communities) who had contributed
to the genetic material to a protected variety.
315
A National Gene Fund was
established through which royalty fees are to be distributed for benefit sharing and
compensation to farming communities, as well as for conservation and sustainable
use of genetic resources. Another element of farmers rights were specific and

314
Farmers privileges in the IUPGR and CBD are linked to conservation and other goals. While
they recognize farmers knowledge, they do not grant them rights based on that knowledge like
that given to plant breeders. This difference between the international instruments and the Indian
law could stem in part from the rejection of an IPR social order by some communities. Farmers
rights, especially to sell their seed, were a key goal of NGO activities.
315
The burden of proof rests with the claimant, not with the holder of the PVP certificate.

207
detailed provisions to allow communities to register collective rights. It is
because of these stipulations for farmers rights that Indias law is classified as a
precautionary one in the typology used in this study.
As noted in Chapter Two, a key element missing from the UPOV, but
acknowledged in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is geographic
origin of plants and genes. This missing element of the UPOV allows stealing or
piracy of previous knowledge, while the CBD addresses this practice through
benefit-sharing. Piracy has been a particular problem for India, which has
extremely rich knowledge and biodiversity bases,
316
but does not have history of
using IPR to limit their use by others. The farmers rights section of the Indian
law partially addresses this problem by setting up the Gene Fund and granting
farmer and community rights.
317
The Biological Diversity Act of 2002 was also
created in part to address these piracy problems.
318
NGOs put considerable
energies into supporting the development of this law, and also into exposing the
theft of traditional knowledge from India. For example, Gene Campaign, RFSTE,
the Centre for Ecological Sciences, the HoneyBee Network and Beej Bachao

316
Besides the rich genetic diversity throughout India due to both natural habitat and farmer
practices, the numerous cultural groups in India provide a plethora of varied knowledge bases
about the habitat.
317
This concern is not exclusive to India The government of Queensland, Australia, gave IPR to
all the plants and animals found in its territory, as an attempt to prevent piracy over its resources
(Swaminathan 1999). Developing countries have most of the worlds genetic diversity, while
genetic diversity originated in developed countries is limited. Institutionally, developed countries
have a longer and stronger history of using IPR than developing countries.
318
The Act contains stipulations for benefit sharing and controls access to biodiversity research
(Government of India 2002).

208
Aandolan (Save the Seeds Campaign) all set about to document the traditional
knowledge of villagers and tribal peoples (Government of India 2000).
While the international institutional context had some impact on Indian
PVP law, the domestic institutional process through which the law was created
was also important. The early versions of the law were drafted primarily by
Ministry of Agricultural officials. This afforded public researchers great influence
on the bill, as they were consulted regarding technical issues and probable cases
relating to PVP. Representatives from the private sector were also able to
influence the drafting by inserting themselves into the policy network. However,
once the bill went to the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), the dynamic
changed. All the members of the JPC were Members of Parliament (MPs). MPs
were directly accountable to their electorate, who were mostly farmers. The
creation of the JPC benefited NGOs, because NGO strategies focused on MPs.
NGOs lobbied individual MPs, held meetings in their constituencies, produced
briefing notes for them, and produced information kits on the legislation (Seshia
nd 12-13). Industry actors did not have an established working relationship with
the JPC, and were less likely to be active in MP constituent areas.
Non-State Actor Involvement
Prior to the bills being taken up by the JPC, non-state actors utilized other
types of strategies to attempt to influence IPR legislation in India. From 1989,
both industry actors and NGOs began organizing events that led to certain
concepts emerging as central in the debate over plant variety legislation. These

209
concepts, such as use of the UPOV model and the inclusion of farmers rights,
were ultimately included in the Plant Variety and Farmers Rights Act that was
approved in 2001.
In March 1989, the Seed Association of India (SAI), in cooperation with
the Ministry of Agriculture and other public sector research organizations,
organized a 2-day seminar on the pros and cons of plant variety protection.
Representatives from the private-sector seed industry, the Ministry of Agriculture,
the UPOV, and from US multinational seed companies were invited to the
seminar. Several aspects of this meeting helped to forge a consensus among
participants favoring plant breeder IPRs in India. Prior to the seminar, plant
breeding had been done by farmers and public sector researchers who saw PVP as
inimical to their work. In this meeting, however, for the first time public sector
Indian researchers engaged in a discussion of why IPRs might be in their
professional interests. Representatives from the UPOV and the US MNCs were
presented as experts on PBRs, and they were encouraged to provide and share
knowledge and information that privileged and reflected their preferences. The
content of the seminar was organized around the benefits and problems of patent
versus PVP systems, not whether or not IPRs were desirable or appropriate. A
network of contacts was initiated at this seminar which continued to share
expertise.
The work of the network created at that meeting greatly facilitated
introduction of UPOV style PVP legislation into the Indian bill. Later, PVP laws

210
from 15 UPOV member countries were reviewed by the drafters of the Indian
bill some of whom had attended the SAI meeting. Indian officials also relied on
the UPOVs complex technical infrastructure to test varieties. This practical
aspect of infrastructure already in place helped to convince Indian officials to
create UPOV-style legislation (Seshia nd, 9).
The strategy of hosting seminars to create policy networks was also
utilized by NGO actors. In 1994, the MS Swaminathan Research Foundation
(MSSRF) organized and hosted a 4- day Dialogue on Farmers Rights. The
draft bill produced at the MSSRF meeting reinforced the necessity of protecting
farmers rights in any PVP legislation. The MSSRF Dialogue purposely widened
the stakeholders at the meeting to include more NGO representatives. Both the
FAO report commissioned by the Government of India and the MSSRF Dialogue
draft legislation borrowed from the IUPGR conceptualization of farmers rights.
The MSSRF draft expanded upon the IUPGR to include provisions for a
community gene fund and rights to farmer-innovators, which were ultimately
included in the final bill and became part of the Plant Variety and Farmers Rights
Act.
Like the SAI-organized meeting, the MSSRF Dialogue established a
network of contacts. The network created at this meeting linked actors pushing for
farmers rights, but also linked them with people interested in PBRs. The MSSRF
Dialogue meeting also had symbolic importance, because the MSSRF chair (Dr.

211
Swaminathan) is recognized in India and internationally as both a key leader
in the green revolution and as an activist on behalf of the poor and the
environment.
Besides protecting the continued recognition of farmers rights, NGO
efforts regarding IPRs for crops focused on defeating the patent option. Gene
Campaign noted: The government of the day was greatly inclined to accept
patents.It was an aggressive and sustained campaign on the part of the NGO
community that forced the government to change its stand (Gene Campaign
n.d.b). In March, 1993
319
more than 200,000 farmers converged upon the nations
capital to demand no patents on seeds. The demonstration was organized by
Gene Campaign and three farmers organizations: All India Bhartiya Kissan
Union, the Bhartiya Kissan Union of Punjab
320
and the Karnataka Rajya Ryatha
Sangha. The protest was significant not only for its size. It was called a beej/bija
satyagraha (seed truth-seeking), and was articulated as part of an MNC Quit
India campaign. Satyagraha
321
and Quit India were important historical
nationalist strategies, and utilizing this discourse linked their struggle with potent
symbolic references to past forms of colonization and oppression by foreign

319
The first draft of a PVP bill was produced in 1993 by the Ministry of Agriculture (Seshai n.d.,
2).
320
Punjab is considered the heart of the green revolution in India since green revolution
technology packages were widely implemented in that state.
321
Satyagraha is a philosophy of nonviolent, civil resistance which Gandhi utilized to end British
colonialism in India.

212
powers and MNCs.
322
Other similar protests by farmers and NGOs were held
in different parts of the country during 1993 and 1994.
323
Again in March 1999,
an enormous protest of more than 2000 groups renewed the bija satryagraha call
to refuse to accept the colonization of life through patents and perverse
technologies, and the destruction of the food security by free-trade rules of the
W.T.O. (Shiva 1999, 2). Indias decision to establish a PVP law over patents and
the type of PVP law that was created was the result of this on-going struggle by
civil society. As noted above, pressure for patents came primarily from foreign
governments acting in the interest of MNCs. The farmer and NGO protests
throughout the country helped keep the issue of IPRs and farmers rights in the
public eye.
Along with those already mentioned, many India civil society
organizations and farmers groups lobbied against the introduction of intellectual
property rights into agriculture. NGOs articulated three main concerns in the IPR
debate: First that the UPOV 1991 would take away one of farmers basic rights;
that is, the ability to exchange seed with their farm neighbors or to re-use seed for
commercial purposes (Dhar 2001). NGOs argued that the UPOV 1991 inhibited

322
In March 1930 Gandhi declared a salt satyagraha, or refusal to cooperate with unjust laws that
gave Britain a monolopy over salt. The Quit India campaign also echoes a call from Gandhi for
the British to leave India.
323
Many of these demonstrations were against the Draft Final Act of the Uruguay Round (also
known as the Dunkel Draft). The TRIPs Agreement was a part of that draft, and issues of
corporate control and diminished farmers rights were linked in these demonstrations.

213
farmers ability to continue to use and improve their own seed.
324
About 85%
of seeds planted in India still come from farming communities (ActionAid Brasil
2001, 6, Sahai 2000, 879), and the commercial seed market (both public sector
and private sector combined) does not have the ability even to begin to meet the
needs of Indian farmers.
325
Second, NGOs argued that strengthening intellectual
property rights would make it easier for large companies
326
to dominate local seed
markets (Dhar 2001). The same MNCs that forced UPOV to amend in 1991 and
slash the rights of farmers and breeders are the ones that will be holding patent
and sui generis rights on seeds in India. (Gene Campaign n.d.a, 3-4). For
example, Gene Campaign noted that
The UPOV system is far too expensive. The costs of testing, approval and
acquiring a UPOV authorized Breeders Right certificate could be in
thousands, even [hundred thousands of rupees]. Such rates will effectively
preclude the participation of all but the largest seed companies. (Gene
Campaign n.d.d, 3-4).

Besides criticizing versions of the PVP bills and the UPOV system more widely,
NGOs created drafts of alternative legislation and an alternative to the UPOV
system.
327
Third, NGOs argued that scientific research would suffer because

324
This argument is also articulated as diminishing Indias self-reliance in agriculture and food
security. Both self-reliance and food security have been catalytic issues in Indian politics since,
and even pre-dating their independence.
325
Other estimates put farmer seed production at 66% and public sector seed production at 33%.
Private sector seed production is negligible. Public sector seed production is financed by taxes and
often includes testing in farmers fields.
326
This aspect is often articulated as domination by multinational companies, or foreign
companies. This type of argument has resonance among a people who only recently escaped a
colonial system which emphasized foreign economic control and monopolization of local
resources.
327
For example, a Convention of Farmers and Breeders, a draft treaty presented as an alternative
to UPOV was developed (Gene Campaign 1998). With respect to PVP bills, NGOs noted that
farmers rights need to be the focus (versus breeders) as they are the main seed developers. They

214
access to genetic material would be hindered, and free exchange of
information restricted.
328
NGOs also noted that research results might be kept
from the public as trade secrets, and the likelihood that commercial interests
rather than human needs would increasingly guide research (Gene Campaign
n.d.d).
Besides the institutional developments, such as passage of the TRIPs
Agreement, practical developments also influenced the IPR debate. The two most
important practical developments were the creation of rDNA terminator
technology
329
and the arrival of transgenic Bt cotton (Dhar 2001, 19). The advent
of terminator technology did much to cement suspicions of MNCs desire to
control Indian agriculture to the outrage of Indian citizens. The technology,
which produces sterile seeds, was explicitly banned in the resulting PVP law. The
arrival of Bt cotton, on the other hand, received mixed reactions. Bt technology
could immediately address part of the worst problem facing cotton farmers in the
country, but the technology was owned by an MNC that wanted to have IPRs.
Cotton crops had experienced failures across the board since 1997 and a pest
hyper-surge occurred in 2001. Small and marginal farmers were hit particularly
hard by the failing crops, and suicides among those farmers skyrocketed (Shiva,

also argued for other aspects such as articles to encourage the release of more, rather than fewer
varieties, and unrestricted access for public sector scientists and breeders. Gene Campaign helped
to develop a Plant Variety Protection and Farmers Right Act that contained these elements, as did
the MS Swaminathan Research Foundation (Swaminathan 1999, 100). Gene Campaign also
helped to develop the Biological Diversity Act.
328
Public sector scientists working on GM crops confirmed that this was happening.
329
Also known as genetic use restriction technology (GURT) or technology protection systems
(TPS). This rDNA technology alters the reproductive processes of plants so their seeds will not
grow.

215
Emani and Jafri 1999, 7). This scenario may have facilitated the approval of
the PVPRFA. (Bt cotton is addressed further in the next two sections, including
why it received mixed reactions).
The institutional context, activities of non-state actors and practical
realities were interwoven. Initially and overall, industry actors had greater access
to policymakers shaping the PVP bill. As noted above, this changed somewhat
when the bill went to a Joint Parliamentary Committee, which gave NGOs more
access to policy makers. However, Monsanto was invited by the JPC to make an
oral presentation during the public consultations on the PVP bill in 2000, the only
individual company which did so (Seshia nd 7, citing Government of India 2000).
MNCs had access to foreign governments, and used a strategy of
pressuring through them though it was not effective.
330
NGO strategies of direct
action and on-going campaigning in different parts of the country were key in
keeping the debate central to the political agenda. Differences in resources among
non-state actors mattered in that, initially, farmer stakeholders (or their
representatives) were not invited to the discussion or the IPR debate, and it took
consistent pressure to ensure that farmers rights were included in the PVP,
whereas inclusion of breeders rights was a given after the first discussion.
Summary
Prior to 2001, Indian policy forbade IPRs for plants and animals, putting
Indias policy in the preventive category for the first years. With the passage of

330
Changes to the Indian Patent Law in 2004 and 2005 merit attention in this regard but are
beyond the purview of this study.

216
the Plant Variety Protection and Farmers Rights Act (PVPFRA) in 2001, the
policy changed to the precautionary category. Indian law does not fit neatly into
the classification scheme since it differs from the 1978 UPOV in two fundamental
ways: It allows farmers to sell their seed (the UPOV denies farmers that right) and
it gives farmers, as well as breeders, IP rights. Nonetheless among the options, the
PVPFRA fits best under the precautionary category. Table 27 summarizes Indias
position with respect to IPR for transgenic crops for 1996-2002.
An important conclusion that this typology does not capture was the
passage of the Biological Diversity Act in 2002, which was strongly promoted by
NGO actors. This legislation has multiple objectives, one of which is to protect
traditional knowledge, making it a type of IPR law. It addresses predatory
patenting (piracy) by foreign biotechnology companies, a problem facing India
and other developing countries. With respect to preventing or promoting the use
of rDNA crops, this law falls in the middle. Its stipulations for the protection of
local biodiversity would make it precautionary, but not prevent the use of rDNA
technologies. This law also attempts to more equally distribute wealth stemming
from local biodiversity and knowledge, and the rDNA crop technologies that used
them.
331
In this way the Biological Diversity Act addresses key NGO concerns
regarding corporate and foreign domination through the agricultural sector.

331
For example, Article 21(1) states that The National Biodiversity Authority..secures
equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of accessed biological resources, their by-
products, innovations and practices associated with their use and applications and knowledge
relating thereto(Government of India 2002).

217
Table 27. IPR policies for transgenic crops in India
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Patent
protection plus
plant breeders
rights (PBR)
under UPOV
1991
PBR under
UPOV 1991
PBR under
UPOV 1978
No IPRs for
plants or
animals
1996 No patents on
seeds or
animals; no
PVP
1997 No change
1998 No change
1999 No change
2000 No change
2001 Both plant
breeders and
farmers rights
allowed under
PVPFRA

2002 Biological
Diversity Act
gives IPRs for
traditional
knowledge.

Trade
Institutional Context
Overall, North America (US and Canada), Japan and the EU are Indias
three main trade destinations, with the United States consistently the main export
partner.
332
As India is not looking to export rDNA food crops, it does not have to
worry about conflicting regulations for transgenic crops among its trade partners.

332
From 1997-2002 the United States was Indias main export partner, with Hong Kong, the UK,
Japan, Germany and the United Arab Emirate, being the next most important group of export
partners.

218
Indias standing trade policy towards GM products is to follow the regulations
of countries to which their exports go.
Indias trade concerns relating to rDNA crops are more inward-looking.
Issues of within-India trade in GM crops are circumscribed by environmental
policies for all genetically modified organisms. At the national level, rDNA crops
were regulated more heavily than non-rDNA crops by the Environment Protection
Act of 1986 which required transgenic crops to undergo additional environmental
analysis. Although state governments have authority over agricultural issues,
national environmental regulations limited state policies for rDNA crops until the
crops received approval.
333
States could provide commercial and research
incentives to promote the future use of rDNA crops.
334

Commercial-scale production of GM crops in India was not allowed until
2002, and then it was still deemed experimental for more 3 years. Nonetheless,
farmers in at least three states began commercially growing GM crops
clandestinely as early as 1999. In 2001, an unauthorized Bt cotton variety was
found being grown in Gujarat. When the case was examined it was determined
that this clandestine Bt variety had been distributed for at least 3 years. The story
of the discovery and spread of illegal GM cotton helps to shed light on trade
issues relating to GM crops more generally.

333
Non-state actor access to the environmental regulatory structure is discussed in depth in the
next section.
334
The state governments of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu gave explicit support for
biotechnology in 2000. Part of their policies was to facilitate research by industry into rDNA
crops.

219
The use of illegal transgenic crops was initially detected because of a
complaint from Monsanto, the company leading in the race to legally
commercialize rDNA cotton in India (Ramaswami 2005, 15). The illegal crops
335

were flourishing, while the rest of the states cotton crop had succumbed to a
catastrophic bollworm attack, so it would have been hard for anyone with
knowledge about Bt technology not to notice (Jain 2003). The illegal Bt cotton
seeds were traced back to a small Gujarat-based seed company called Navbharat
Seeds Limited, and identified as Navbharat 151 (N-151). Navbharat Seeds Ltd.
was under the direction of a plant breeder
336
and former Mahyco employee named
D.B. Desai (Desai and Jain 2001). Dr. Desai was arrested and charged with
selling an unapproved GM crop. The Bt cotton was not illegal for how it was sold
nor for who was sowing it, but because it contained a transgenic gene that had not
been approved by the environmental safety regulatory institutions.
337

Navbharat Seed Limited (and also the Gujarat Seed Producers
Association
338
) claimed that the N-151 seeds acquired the illegal Bt gene from
cross-pollination pollution from a Monsanto test plot (McGray 2002, Shah, E.
2005). The company argued that it was unaware of the existence of the Bt gene in
its newly developed hybrid seeds and therefore did not apply for necessary

335
About 30% of the cotton crop in Gujarat was of illegal GM seed that year (Jayaraman 2001).
336
Dr. Desai, who holds a Ph.D. in molecular biology from the US, had been doing plant breeding
for at least 20 years.
337
There was no IPR infringement because there was no patents or plant variety protection on
seeds allowed at that time.
338
Initially the Gujarat Seed Producers Association made strong statements against the company
and in favor of destroying the illegal crop. When farmers continued to use it despite the ban
(because of it outperformed conventional hybrids) the Association changed its tune and sided with
Desai.

220
approval from GEAC for transgenic crops. The company maintained that no
genetic engineering technique was applied in the development of its cotton seeds
and furthermore that they had no facilities to undertake such scientifically
complicated tasks (Shah, E. 2005). Whether or not Desai knew of the genetic
content and how it got into his cotton seeds is the crux of the matter for
regulators, but for the farmers that grew and traded the illegal cotton seed that
provided such relief in the pest crisis, keeping their hands on the seed was key.
The large farmers association put their political clout behind Desai, calling him a
biotech Robin Hood.
Upon detection of the illegal GM crop, the GEAC ordered all illicit
transgenic cotton to be burned. When the state government of Gujarat balked due
to the economic hardship it would have created, the state government was instead
allowed to purchase the crop so that the illegal seeds could be separated and
destroyed.
339
Regardless of ensured compensation, many farmers did not sell their
illegal transgenic seed back to the government. They instead continued to
reproduce and use them.
340
It is the responsibility of the state government to
prosecute biosafety violations, but in the face of strong support from local elite
farmers, the government of Gujarat turned a blind eye to these violations. The
illegal seeds were often sold without a company logo or a bill of sale, which made
them difficult to track. Furthermore, Indias seed law does not require registry nor

339
When the government of Gujarat demonstrated that it did not have the funds required, the
federal government promised monetary assistance (Jain 2001 Nov).
340
Cotton seed is self-reproducing and about half of the farmers in India routinely save their
cotton seed.

221
inspection of seed and explicitly allows farmer-to-farmer exchange of seeds
(Ramaswami 2005, 17). These common practices of seed saving and exchange
lay the basis for problems for the continued monitoring of GM seed that is
required by law.
How was the Bt transgenic gene able to be pirated? While direct theft
from the company is a possibility, Monsanto also allowed its Bt cotton to escape
from experimental field trial conditions, as reports from 1998 and 2001 trials
document. A report from five states from 1998 Bt cotton trials noted that produce
from trial plots had been allowed to be directly sold in the open market, and to be
mixed with normal cotton, rather than destroyed (Shiva, Emani, Jafri n.d.).
Similarly, a second independent report on Bt cotton trials in Karnataka in 2001
noted that the Bt crop was allowed to be sold.
341
Some farmers took matters into
their own hands. One case was that of S. Jaipal Reddy, who slowly siphoned off
seeds from his Bt cotton trial plot to plant in the next season (McGray 2002). By
law, the produce and residue from transgenic experimental crops should be
burned at the site. Someone with Desais knowledge and background could have
obtained the seed from the company, from the open market, or from cross-
pollination. Monsanto, for its part, might have been lax regarding the destruction
of test crops because GM contamination served as a strategy to open markets, or
because the participating farmers benefited by having more cotton to sell.

341
In the U.S., Monsanto allowed its experimental Bt cotton field-test crops to be fed to cattle and
thus enter the food supply, rather than destroy the material, as is standard practice (Smith 2006).

222
The timing of Monsantos denunciation of the illegal seed is
noteworthy. Although the illegal crops had been grown for at least three years,
Monsanto made its complaint in 2001, while the GEAC was considering whether
to approve the first commercial release of GM crops in India -- Monsantos Bt
cotton.
342
The discovery of the illegal cotton led to pressures by state governments
for the approval of legal varieties particularly in the face of farmers spreading
the seed by themselves. In 2002 the illegal N-151 cotton was also found in
Maharashtra, Madya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka (Scoones 2003b).
Following the news of illegal cotton being used in his state, the Punjab chief
minister requested that the GEAC approve Bt cotton varieties for the state. The
dismal state of cotton cultivation was another motive for the request: 2001-2002
had brought the seventh consecutive cotton crop failure in Punjab and hundreds of
farmers had committed suicide because of it (Jain 2002). Conventional hybrid
cotton was no longer economically viable in Punjab, and other states faced the
same predicament.
343
This dire situation helped farmers spread the illegal seed
despite distances and linguistic barriers.
How was the illegal seed distributed from one state to multiple states
across the country? The sellers did not have to seek out buyers. Instead buyers

342
The GEAC had just deferred making a final decision about the data from the 2001-2002
planting season when the news broke (Scoones 2003, 17).
343
By the mid to late 1990s, pesticides started to account for 40 to 50 per cent of the total cost of
cotton production. The new brands of pesticides had become exorbitantly costly even for wealthy
farmers. Moreover, nearly half of the countrys total pesticide consumption was used for the
protection of cotton crop. In fact, pests had not only become resistant to pesticides but on the
contrary have been mounting a militant resurgence (technically known as abnormal increase in
pest population) requiring even stronger pesticides (Shah, E. 2005).

223
came looking for a known and trusted source. Historical ties were important in
this relationship. In the wider seed market in India there are 2 types of seed:
certified seed and truthful seed. The first are certified by the government and if
they fail farmers can seek redress. The latter are non-certified and can be sold by
companies or farmers, with or without brands. The name truthful comes from
the relationship of farmers trusting each other (or now the company) that the seed
is good (Shiva, Emani and Jafri nd). Furthermore, seed distributors tend to be the
wealthier local farmers, and they often provide other agricultural inputs such as
fertilizers and pesticides along with the seed, in addition to offering credit to
farmers to enable them to purchase what they need.
344
Thus, established
relationships and credit ties were not unique to the sale of illegal Bt seed, which
was sold as truthful seed. Instead, the sale of illegal cotton seeds followed
established patterns of seed reproduction and distribution by local elites (Shah, E.
2005). Even though Navbahart Seeds Ltd. stopped producing N-151 seeds as of
2001, the company still receives calls requesting them.
Multiplying seeds for pre-contracted sales and selling seed among parties
with established relationships were and are common throughout India, not just in

344
A note on the now infamous farmer suicides in India is in order here, because they are trade-
related and because they have become so prevalent. The farmers usually commit suicide because
they are caught in a debt-trap. The lenders, who overextend credit and charge exorbitant rates, are
also those who sell the farmers seeds and related chemical inputs. If a farmer commits suicide, the
governments policy is to provide payments (of about $2200) to her or his family (Stone 2002, 2).
(This contrasts with the US context, where farmer suicides are carefully staged to be accidental to
ensure payment to family members by insurance companies.) Some industry actors and state
governments have pleaded for the fast approval of GM crops, arguing that their use will stop the
suicides. NGO counter that the use of GM seeds will continue farmer dependency and thus will
not alleviate this problem.

224
Gujarat. Indeed, this was part of a critique leveled against the initial 1998 field
trials of legal Bt cotton. Those farmers who participated in the experiments were
not chosen at random, but had of history of working with Mahyco (Monsantos
local partner) and a relationship of trust with the company (Shiva, Emani and Jafri
1999, 15).
345
An employee from Oriental Biotech in Bangalore also noted our
strategic advantage is that we know the agricultural system and have the political
contact[as well as] 1,500 growers loyal to us that will accept any crops we give
them.(Newell 2003, 7).
346
Similarly, the UN Food and Agriculture
Organizations agricultural research institute based in India (the International
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics -ICRISAT) noted that No
organized efforts to spread the new seeds were needed the words of farmers
were enough. (ICRISAT 1996, 4) for the new varieties of (non-GM) seeds it
developed. The situation for the distribution of illegal GM seed and the
functioning of the Indian seed trade in general illustrate the institutional
difficulties of removing a variety from use once it has been released.
Effectively, the news of the illegal cotton crops, coupled with pressures by
farmers and farmers associations (as well as the traditional supporters of
biotechnology) helped Monsanto to gain approval for legal varieties of Bt cotton
from the GEAC for the next planting season. Farmers indicated that they were

345
The authors note Most of the selected farmers for the trials were either seed distributors or had
long term association with the company. In this selection process it seems there has been some
vested [interests] of the dealer-farmer in terms of getting favour for the dealership of the GE seeds
in [the] future from the company.(Shiva, Emani, Jafri 1999, 14-15).
346
The importance of these relationships is another reason that MNCs have purchased shares or
local companies.

225
planning to grow GM cotton again, approved or not. The robustness of the
illegal Gujarat cotton in contrast to the massive cotton failures helped to convince
farmers, and with them politicians, to try GM cotton.
After Monsanto received approval to commercially cultivate its Bt cotton
in 2002, the cotton seed trade context within India changed somewhat. Since
Monsanto was the only company to have approval for its Bt varieties, it had a
monopoly in what had been a competitive cotton market.
347
Monsanto sold cotton
seed at Rs. 1600 a packet, versus the Rs. 300-500 charged for conventional hybrid
seed.
348
The illegal Bt seeds were sold at Rs. 800-1200 a pack (Ramaswami 2005,
28). Despite the legal monopoly, illegal seeds continued to spread, with more area
consistently grown under illegal than legal Bt seed. Because of the price
differential and the claimed better performance
349
of illegal Bt cotton over legal
varieties, the view of Dr. Desai as the Robin Hood of GM crops spread.
Overall, the advent of Bt cotton (both illegal and legal) led to a market
shake up, with the market leader in Gujarat losing its entire market share and even
hybrids developed by the public sector, which were historically better performing
and less expensive, losing ground. In order to remain in business, firms vied to
secure licenses to distribute Monsantos Bt technology.

347
It was competitive in that no firm dominated the market.
348
Even with the illegal Bt cotton, the MONSANTO rate of return on GM regulatory costs is
estimated at 38% (Ramaswami 2005).
349
The performance discrepancy appears to come from what hybrid the Bt gene construct was put
into, with the legal GM varieties having been put into lower performing hybrids. However while
failures of the legal varieties were trumpeted by NGOs, because of the relationships between the
farmers growing illegal Bt cotton, mentioning poor performance would be stifled as breaking trust.

226
Monsantos new monopoly position resulted not only from Bt
technology, but also from a series of policy changes. In 1987, the nations
industrial policy had been modified to allow, for the first time, large Indian and
multinational companies to invest in the production of hybrid seed and
biotechnology
350
(Seshia nd. 6, Rao 1997, 54). Seed imports had begun to be
permitted in 1988. Both of these policies were undertaken to encourage private
sector seed development for a limited range of crops. These policies brought
about the emergence of large Indian companies, increased collusion between
Indian and foreign companies,
351
and allowed MNCs into the Indian market.
These changes, coupled with the simultaneous conglomeration of major
international agro-chemical companies, resulted in industrial concentration both
worldwide and in India. As in Brazil, Monsanto came to dominate.
Non-State Actor Involvement
Monsantos position also derived from the strategies it used. Buying up
local seed companies, or shares of them in this case, was a strategy that Monsanto
used around the world, including in India. Monsantos purchase of a stake in
Mahyco (the Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company) in 1998 was an astute strategic
move because Mahycos director (Dr. Barwale) was a well-respected member of
Indian agricultural industry and had been honored by the government
352
(Newell

350
In 1986 the public sector began providing private seed companies breeder seed, to enable the
companies to establish their own germplasm collections.
351
In 1988, 6 multinational companies gained access to the Indian seed market (Sasson 1993,
131).
352
He was the winner of the 1998 World Food Prize (Scoones 2003b).

227
2003, 12). Furthermore Dr. Barwale had long-standing personal connections
within the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) and many of the key agencies
involved in biosafety regulations. Monsanto was clever linking up with Mahyco.
It is a big and well established company, and Barwale is well respected.
(Scoones 2003b, 13, interview with IISc official.)
Monsanto also had a regulatory affairs office in New Delhi, which
engaged in routine interactions with government official over policies, and a
government and public affairs department in Mumbai. Besides paying for
newspaper advertisements, video production, public opinion surveys, open days
and workshops, the company also funded speaking opportunities for people in
favor of GM crops in India, such as Chengal Reddy (head of the Andhra Pradesh
Farmers Association) and C.S. Prakash (from Tuskegee University). Monsanto
also encouraged media publicity for such people (Newell 2003, 4, Scoones
2003b). The company had heavy backing from Monsantos head office in St.
Louis, Missouri, both in terms of funding and to provide information geared
toward the general public. Along with the activities mentioned above, Monsanto
also funded NGOs promoting biotechnology, such as the Foundation for
Biotechnology Awareness and Education, in Bangalore.
Another strategy that the company followed was to incorporate patented or
protected technology into the major hybrid varieties in use. As noted in the
previous section, obtaining PVP or patent protection was also a part of the
strategic plan. A fifth strategy was that the company tacitly allowed its technology

228
to be illicitly established in zones where it was prohibited -- until the
technology had become widely established. In some cases it then made retroactive
IP claims (Greenpeace 2005, 2). This could be a trojan horse or guilt by
contamination strategy. Given the reproductive nature of cotton, soy and some
other GM crops, protecting what it considers its property is an inherent problem
for the company. However, as noted above, the company repeatedly did not
destroy its experimental crops, making it an active participant rather than a victim
in the crime.
Tremendous monetary resources were needed in order for the company to
pursue the above strategies. Monsanto has an annual budget of US$ 10 million
dollars and a staff of 75 devoted solely to investigating and prosecuting farmers
(Shah, E. 2005, Center for Food Safety 2004, 4). Overall, Monsantos public
policy positions are determined by the companys headquarters in St. Louis,
Missouri, and the main office sends strategic information and materials to its
branches around the world to support those policies (Newell 2003, 19). The
companies resources come in part from IPR proceeds and in part from its policy
of single world pricing for its rDNA crop technologies. For example, Monsanto
charges the same price for its Bt cotton seed in India as it does in the United
States and Argentina (Greenpeace 2005, 1). Both world pricing and expatriation
of IPR proceeds are seen by critics as methods of surplus extraction from
developing countries.

229
Despite Monsantos domination of the biotech sector in India and
despite the corporate consolidation among agro-chemical and seed companies at
the international level, there is still some important separation of interests among
these types of industry actors in India. This could be noted in part in the illegal
cotton scenario, in which the Gujarat Seed Producers Association first decried
Desais actions, but then supported his case when it became clear that local seed
producer interests were tied to the illegal crop. There were also conflicts of
interests between the biotech sector and the agri-chemical industry, and some
biotech industry actors charged the lobbying by the pesticide companies with
responsibility for delays of approval for GM crops (Jain 2001b, Newell 2003, 8).
Still others insinuated that NGOs were front groups for the chemical industry, in
attempts to discredit both. Even within the biotech sector itself, there has been
discord. Many biotech industry actors have been critical of Monsantos tactics
because they see them as having damaging repercussions for the GM crop sector
as a whole. Other companies were particularly critical of the companys ignoring
public concerns about the technology and of rushing the approval process (Newell
2003, 5).
NGOs, for their part, utilized two main strategies to try to influence trade
in GM crops. First, they followed a strategy of pressuring the government (both
federal and state governments) to act, particularly in the case of responding to the
illegal/escaped Bt cotton. They also provided information to farmers regarding
rDNA more generally. NGOs conducted studies and monitored official Bt

230
experiments to provide farmers with information from the Indian context that
would likely apply to their own farms. Most of the efforts by NGOs focused on
legal GM crops and their regulatory process and are discussed in detail in the next
section.
Summary
Indian trade policy for GMOs and transgenic crops has been a
precautionary one since its inception (See Table 28) because of the existing
environmental legal framework. Environmental legislation requires that all
GMOs be evaluated and the only changes to the rules have made them more
stringent. Within this context, MNCs pursued a strategy of following the
regulatory process, while some local elites flouted the regulatory process and
disseminated Bt cotton. The Indian GM seed market as of 2002 was a contested
space between legal MNC Bt cotton varieties, and illegal Bt cotton varieties
produced by some local industry actors. Other local industry actors, namely
conventional hybrid producers, lost ground because the pest-level had already
made cotton production risk-inherent in India. NGO actors advocated for stronger
implementation of regulations, but in general focused their efforts on other
aspects of GM crops not on the illegal dispersion.

231

Table 28. Trade policies for transgenic crops in India
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
No regulation
of rDNA seeds
or plant
materials
Regulate rDNA
seeds and plant
materials in
accordance
with SPS
agreement and
no more tightly
than non-RDNA
crops
Regulate rDNA
seeds and plant
materials more
tightly and with
different
screenings or
requirements
Block all rDNA
imports through
ban or
moratorium
1996 Environment
Protection Act
of 1986 requires
evaluation of all
GMOs

1997 No change.
1998 No change.
1999 No change.
2000 No change.
2001 No change.
2002 No change.

Biosafety
Institutional Context
The Environmental Protection Act (EPA) of 1986 requires evaluation of
transgenic crops. The first specific rules for biosafety considerations for GMOs
were published by the Ministry of the Environment and Forests (MoEF) in 1989
(Ghosh 1997, 172), and were developed in accordance with the EPA. Table 29
summarizes the main biosafety laws created in India up to 2002.

232
Table 29. Chronology of biosafety laws and rules, India
Year Law or Rules
1986 Environment Protection Act
1989 Rules for the Manufacture, Use, Import, Export and Storage of
Hazardous Microorganisms/Genetically Engineered Organisms or
Cells (issued by MoEF)
353

1990 Recombinant DNA Safety Guidelines (published by DBT)
354

1994 Revised Recombinant-DNA Safety Guidelines (published by DBT)
1998 Revised Guidelines for Research in Transgenic Plants & Guidelines
for Toxicity and Allergenicity Evaluation of Transgenic Seeds, Plants
and Plant Parts (published by DBT)
2002 Seed Policy
355
(published by Ministry of Agriculture)
Sources: Ahuja and Jotwani nd., 5; Department of Biotechnology 1998; Government of India
2002; Sasson 1993, 143; Sharma, Charak and Ramanaiah 2003, 300.

Beyond biosafety, the first rules also covered the manufacture, import,
research and general use of GMOs. The regulatory system was modeled on
similar frameworks from elsewhere in the world (Scoones 2003b, 4). Although
the drafters looked at a number of models from other parts of the world, the
OECD guidelines were particularly influential, and provided a standard format for
the structure of committees and procedures for approval (Scoones 2003b, 4).
Since then, external influences have continued to play a role in the development

353
These rules cover research as well as large scale applications of GMOs or products made from
them.(Government of India 2002).
354
The guidelines covered research with genetically-engineered organisms, genetic transformation
of plants and animals, and large-scale production and handling of recombinant-DNA derived
products. The guidelines gave leeway to the companies concerned and advocated practicing self-
control (Sasson 1993, 148).
355
The Seed Policy requires that all GE crops be tested for environment and biosafety before
commercial release. Import of transgenic seeds can only be done through the National Bureau of
Plant Genetic Resources. Agronomic testing by ICARs All India Coordinated Project Trials must
be done for at least 2 seasons, but can be done concurrently with environmental and biosafety
testing. Transgenic seeds must be registered. Post-commercial release monitoring by the Ministry
of Agriculture is required for at least 3 years (Ahuja and Jotwani nd., 5).

233
and interpretation of the regulations, with visits by key regulators and
scientists from both Europe and the US (Scoones 2003b, 5).
Changes from the first regulatory framework have largely been marginal,
but have become more extensive rather than less rigorous. The changes have
made the regulations stricter, and include calling for assessments of allergenicity
and toxicity, long-term environmental safety, and economic benefits in
comparison with non-GM crops.
India follows a policy of case-by-case approval of transgenic crops.
Implementation of this policy means that each variety of a transgenic crop must
go through a 3-staged process
356
(explained below). During the process, both crop
performance and some environmental safety aspects must be evaluated and
deemed satisfactory to be approved. This extra testing is required not because
transgenics are assumed to be unsafe per se, but due to their novelty. Following
this policy, field tests for transgenic crops
357
in India began in 1995, and as of
2002, only transgenic cotton varieties had completed the entire process.
As explained in the introduction to this chapter, the institutional structure
for biosafety regulation of GM crops in India has multiple levels. A detailed
explanation is included here, to help us understand how non-state actors interacted
with these institutions. The Department of Biotechnology (DBT) under the

356
This is known as a process-based versus a product-based regulatory system. The EU also
follows a processed-based system, where the US uses a product-based system for GM crops
(Newell 2002, 7).
357
The first approval for a field test was given to M/s Pro Agro Ltd for sterile transgenic rape
seed.

234
Ministry of Science and Technology, is responsible for regulatory oversight of
experiments with GMOs and rDNA crops, and the MoEF has authority over the
large-scale commercial use and deployment of transgenic crops (Ghosh 1997,
174). The DBT
358
developed biosafety guidelines for rDNA research and
development in 1990, and later revised them in 1994 and 1998. These rules
require, among other things, that any research laboratory using GMOs have an
Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBSC), which has one member appointed by
the DBT.
The Review Committee for Genetic Manipulation (RCGM), which is
under the DBT, gives approval and then reviews and monitors all transgenic
research and development projects.
359
Based on the recommendations of the
RCGM, the DBT issues test permits.
360
Data for evaluations can come from
abroad as well as from within India; from companies or public research
laboratories. Besides the RCGM and the IBSC, experiments are also monitored by
the concerned State Biotechnology Coordination Committees (SBCC) and District
Level Committees (DLCs) (Ghosh 1997, 175, Government of India 2002). The
RCGM also has a Monitoring-cum-Evaluation Committee (MEC)
361
which is in

358
The DBT developed these guidelines based on recommendations from the Recombinant-DNA
Advisory Committee, which was set up in 1988, and from other available information.
359
The RCGM includes one member from the DBT, one from the Indian Council of Medical
Research, one from the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, one from the Council of
Scientific & Industrial Research, one from the Departments of Science & Technology and three
experts (Department of Biotechnology 1998, 15).
360
For both greenhouse and field tests.
361
This committee should made up of 3-4 people in charge of visiting the test sites (Department of
Biotechnology 1998, 15-16). It appears (from the names on the Monitoring Committee reports

235
charge of directly overseeing field trials. NGOs, having been excluded from
the official monitoring committee, assembled their own monitoring committee
and published their own reports.
362

The large-scale use of GMOs is under the review of the Genetic
Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC), an interministerial committee
composed of subject specialists, which is under the MoEF.
363
The composition of
the main committees has had an impact on their recommendations. Rhoe et al
(2002) notes that the RCGM is more promotional of rDNA technology while the
GEAC is more cautious about approving projects (Rhoe et. al. 2002, 273).
The MoEF gives authorizations for large-scale release of GMOs based on
recommendations from the GEAC. In theory, besides the GEAC, large-scale
releases are monitored by the SBCCs and the DLCs. Scoones notes that, although
there are supposed to be decentralized district biosafety committees (DLCs)
throughout the country, these seem to not actually exist in practice (2003, 5).
DBT officials have conceded that regulatory structures at the state level are

from different states) that there are state-level MECs to enable simultaneous monitoring of
concurrent field tests in multiple states.
362
NGOs noted that the DBT allowed Monsanto to identify and draft members into MECs at the
state level, and that the committees did not include any NGOs or social scientists. The NGO
monitoring and evaluation committee included representatives from AKRSP, CEAD, the Centre
for Sustainable Agriculture, Grameen Vikas Trust, Greenpeace India, Kheti Virasat mission,
MARI, Sarvodaya Youth Organisation, SECURE, VASPS, YUVA, and others. (Monitoring and
Evaluation Committee 2006, 1).
363
The DBT appoints the chair of the GEAC. Other representatives include a person from the
Ministry of Environment and Forests, Ministry of Industrial Development, Department of Science
& Technology, Department of Ocean Development, Department of Biotechology, Ministry of
Agriculture, the directors of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, Indian Council of
Medical Research, Council of Scientific & Industrial Research, Ministry of Health & Family
Welfare, Central Pollution Control Board and three outside experts (Department of Biotechnology
1998, 16-17).

236
lacking in resources and required training. The All India Biotech Association,
also having noted this as a key problem, worked with state administrations to
build capacity for trials (Newell 2003, 16). Despite this lacuna, some industry
actors have called for devolution of regulatory aspects to the state level. NGO
representatives have criticized this strategy as one through which companies
attempt to set-up self-regulation --given the noted lack of state capacity.
After the MoEF gives its approval for the release, authority over further
uses of the GM products goes to the respective administrative ministry (for rDNA
crops, the Ministry of Agriculture). After a transgenic plant is approved by the
MoEF, the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), under the Ministry of
Agriculture, should test it through the normal All India Coordinated Trials (AICT)
before approving it.
364
This is the final stage of the process, as the ICAR trials are
coordinated with state governments. In the case of Bt cotton, Indias first GM
crop, ICAR trials were conducted for only 2 years before commercial approval,
and they were conducted simultaneously with the large-scale studies, that is,
before the MoEF had given its final approval. The spread of illegal GM cotton
was one of the main motives behind condensing the testing period. This
condensed regulatory time-frame was made the new norm under the 2002 Seed
Policy.

364
Ghosh estimated that it would take a minimum of 3 years for a transgenic crop to complete
environmental/biosafety testing and an additional 1-3 years for agricultural testing (Ghosh 1997,
177).

237
Before looking at NSA influence in biosafety issues, a brief summary
of the actual trajectory of the regulation of Bt cotton is in order. Transgenic cotton
entered the national space in 1995, when Monsanto was granted permission to
import Bt cotton seed for research and development. From 1996 onwards
Monsanto began crossing Bt cotton into local varieties and conducting tests on the
crops, including limited field tests. In 2000, the company received approval from
the GEAC to conduct large-scale field tests of Bt cotton. The 2000 data was
considered insufficient for a decision to be made, so a second year of large-scale
field tests was authorized instead.
365
Then, in 2002, the environmental and
agricultural regulatory institutions approved three varieties of Monsanto Bt cotton
for commercialization and large-scale field trials for three years. From the
standpoint of the regulatory institutions, only 3 varieties of one companys
(Monsanto) Bt cotton reached the large-scale field trial and commercialization
stage by 2002.
Non-State Actor Involvement
Non-state actors, both NGO and industry, have been very involved in
biosafety issues and have interacted with and contested decisions throughout the
regulatory process. NGOs have contested both the biosafety evaulations and the
proper functioning of the evaluation committees, using varying strategies

365
Conventional crops are usually tested for at least 2 seasons or 2 years before being
commercially released.

238
including direct actions,
366
demonstrations, conducting their own research
evaluations, and legal challenges through the courts and through other
institutional channels. NGO challenges were on-going and followed the entire
research and evaluation process.
In 1998, field trials for Bt cotton were approved by the RCGM and
supported by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) on the grounds
that they would reduce environmental pollution, increase yields, and lower the
burden of debt on farmers by decreasing pesticide expenditures.
367
Supposedly,
the approval process should have been followed as outlined above. However,
NGOs reported that the process for approving field trials had not been carried out
with transparency, especially in regards to environmental impact or risks of using
transgenic seeds (Dhar 2001). Although NGOs highlighted several problems, a
main one was that farmers had already sown the seeds in their fields before field
trials were approved by the RCGM (Dhar 2001, Shiva, Emani and Jafri 1999, 10).
A case from Karnataka illustrates this situation. On November 28
th
in
1998, at 1:30 in the afternoon, Dr. Nanjundaswamy, the leader of the Karnataka
State Farmers Association (KRRS
368
), a movement which claims a membership of
10 million, arrived at the farm of one of Indias first GM field test sites where

366
Examples include food testing, poster and photo exhibits, marches, protestors chaining
themselves to the fence outside the building where decisions are being made, dressing up as
vegetables, and informational caravans across the country.
367
As of 1998, 40% of the total volume of pesticides used in Indian agriculture went for the
protection of cotton (Dhar 2001).
368
Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangha.

239
Monsanto
369
Bt cotton was being grown. After greeting the owner of the field,
Basanna Hunsole, the two men, other KRRS members, neighbors, and people
from other NGOs ripped up all the transgenic plants and then burned them in the
middle of the field. Within minutes the experimental field crop was ashes
(Kingsnorth 1999). Following the initial cremation, three more test sites were
burned, becoming part of a KRRS Cremate Monsanto campaign (Newell 2003,
5) What led the NGO members and the farmers to burn the experimental crops?
When Basanna Hunsole was approached by Monsanto officials, he wasnt
told that the crop was GM, nor that it was experimental. There were no safeguards
in place; for example, there were no buffer zone around the fields, and
neighboring farmers were not notified. Instead, Basanna Hunsole learned the truth
when the state Minister of Agriculture announced the locations of the test sites
months later. When the state government of Andhra Pradesh ordered Monsanto to
stop the seven field trials it was operating in that state, it cited similar deceptions
and concerns which were brought by farmers and NGO protestors as reasons for
its decision (Kingsnorth 1999). NGO reports were based on research and
monitoring of test sites that they themselves undertook. This strategy of
monitoring official experiments was used repeatedly over the years.
NGOs also protested errors in the regulatory process. For example,
Vandana Shivas group the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and
Ecology (RFSTE), filed a public interest case before the Supreme Court against

369
Monsanto was the only entity to receive approval for this level of field tests as of 1998.

240
Monsanto, Mahyco, the DBT, the MoEF, and the Ministry of Agriculture in
1999. The NGO argued that biosafety regulations
370
had been violated because
RCGM gave approval for the extended field trials of Bt cotton, whereas such a
decision fell under the authority of the GEAC (Bija- The Seed 1999, 41-42).
371

The NGO also noted that the nine states where the field trials were to be
conducted had not been consulted (nor had the sub-federal regulatory institutions
such as the SBCCs and DLCs), even though agriculture is under state-level
governance and state governments were supposed to be informed in advance of
any permissions given (Shiva, Emani and Jafri 1999, 11). Gene Campaign also
filed cases of criminal negligence against the GEAC, one because the state and
local regulatory committees had not been constituted, and a second so that the
field trial data from Monsantos Bt cotton trials would be made public.
372
The
NGO alleged that if the data had been made public, poor performance would
likely have been detected early and thus farmers would have been spared the
losses they incurred (The Hindu 2003). While the cases were heard and resulted in
the submission of vast amounts of data, the late timing of the actual court dates
partially undermined the utility of this strategy.
Another strategy used by a number of NGOs was to conduct independent
studies to corroborate, or not, official studies. Industry actors and the media also

370
Specifically the Rules for the Manufacture, use, Import, Export and Storage of Hazardous
Micro-organisms/Genetically Engineered Organisms or Cells, 1989.
371
The GEAC approved large-scale trials in 2000, before the case was decided (Raghuram 2002).
Since the public interest litigation trial was still pending in 2002 was the decision for
commercialization was made, the RFSTE has claimed that the decision was illegal (Scoones 2003,
29).
372
Requests to make the data public were repeatedly refused.

241
used this strategy, and the Government of India (or state governments)
conducted its own tests. Examples of such studies include the RFSTE study of the
1998 Bt cotton field trials, (Shiva, Emani, Jafri 1999), and Sahai and Rahmans
(of Gene Campaign) study of Bt cotton trials in two states in 2002.
373
Other
independent studies by university and media researchers include Bennetts (et. al.)
study of commercial Bt plots in Maharashtra in 2002 and 2003, Bambawales (et.
al.) study of field trials in Maharashtra in 2002 and 2003, and Naiks (et.al.)
studies of 2002 mixed cotton production in various states. While company reports
lauded positive results, NGOs focused on the failures. State departments of
agriculture tended to have the most even-handed reports. Besides differences
between NSA actor reports, discrepancies between state level and national federal
regulatory reports were noticeable.
The reports made by the national Monitoring Committee versus the
respective state governments were notably contradictory on certain points. For
example, for the state of Maharashtra, the national committee noted that Bt plants
were expected to have higher yields, as Bt plants were noted to be more robust
with larger number of bolls. (Maharashtra Monitoring Committee n.d., 2),
whereas the state department of agriculture reported that non-Bt varieties had

373
When Gene Campaign was presented the results of this study to the media, a group of farmers
logistics paid by Monsanto -- came in to try to disrupt the meeting. Sahai repots they said they
were asked by Monsanto to speak strongly in favor of Bt cotton and to say they were all in support
of Bt cotton.(Sahai 2003). Officials from the company had been invited to the event but failed to
show. The Sahai and Rahman study used a rigorous research design, which may be why the
company was particularly keen not to have its results made public.

242
better yields than Bt varieties.
374
Some of the discrepancy owes to how the
comparisons were made.
375
For example, the national committee compared Bt
cotton to its non-Bt counterpart, whereas the state departments of agriculture
compared Bt cotton to the leading hybrids used in the state, which were not the
same hybrid that contains the Bt gene sequence. However, other glaring
discrepancies not based on methodological differences were also apparent. In
Gujarat, for example, the national committee reported that All farmers have full
appreciation for the technology.(Gujarat Monitoring Committee n.d., 4), whereas
the state agricultural department noted farmers suffered huge economic loss in
the state and therefore requested the Government of India to prevent the sales of
the variety under question in the state during Kharif
376
2003. (Gujarat State
Agriculture Department n.d., 1).
377

When considering the results of large-scale field trials, contradictions
among these reports were key. The regulatory committees had visited some of the
farmers experimental Bt cotton fields in 2002 and determined that the
performance of Bt cotton as compared to its non Bt counterpart [was] satisfactory
in terms of bollworm infestation and reduction in use of pesticides spray.

374
The conventional hybird crops performed better in terms of yield, boll weight, staple length,
and wilting (State Department of Agriculture 2003).
375
Discrepancies due to the study design were also common in comparisons of reports by the
media, industry and NGOs. However, when study design is controlled for, results still vary from
state to state and between type of cotton growers (for example with and without irrigation).
376
Kharif, the Arabic word for autumn, is a term widely used in India to refer to the rainy or
monsoon sowing season.
377
The report of the State Government also pointed out that Navbharat 151 cotton (an
unauthorized Bt cotton) was used highly around the state and had a much better performance and
requested studies into this variety (Gujarat State Agriculture Department n.d., 3-4).

243
However, in view of the numerous adverse newspaper reports regarding the
failure of Bt cotton, the respective State Departments of Agriculture were
requested to submit a detailed report (Government of India 2002, 8). After
analyzing the various reports, the regulatory committees decided that the
performance of Bt cotton could not be established based on one year of data, and
decided to evaluate performance further (Government of India 2002). Even after
the second year of large-scale field trials data was considered limited so
commercial approval was given for only a three-year period.
When the GEAC was considering the 2000 data to decide the commercial
release of Bt cotton in India, the MoEF invited farmers, seed companies and
Greenpeace to a dialogue in June 2001. After this meeting, the GEAC decided to
extend the studies for another year (Jain 2001). Industry actors were perturbed at
what they perceived as undo influence of NGOs on the decision, although the
GEAC insisted that the decision was due to insufficient data. This outcome
suggests that NGO access to the regulatory structures, along with their other
strategy of undertaking studies, were both important.
Turning now to look at industry actors efforts to influence biosafety
policy, a number of different strategies used by these non-state actors can be
noted. Monsanto was the guinea pig company in India in many respects: It was
the first company to request to import GM seed, it was the first to request the
commercial release of a GM crop, and it was the first to go through the regulatory
process. In comparison with all other industry actors, it was by far the most

244
active. As a group, industry actors strategies included attempts to undertake
joint research with government agencies, acquisition of terminator technology,
experimental research, and efforts to collapse regulatory steps.
An early strategy that Monsanto employed was to propose joint research
efforts with the Government of India with respect to GM crop technology.
Monsanto made an initial offer in 1990 that was rejected by the Government of
India on the grounds that technology transfer fees were too high. (Scoones
2003b, 7; Gupta and Chandak 2005, 214). Monsanto also requested to import GM
seed material in 1993 to develop itself, but was denied permission. While these
initial attempts failed, the company was later allowed to set up joint research
facilities with publicly-funded institutes. (Such arrangements are addressed
further in the public research section). Monsanto relied in part on these institutes
(such as the Monsanto Research Centre in Bangalore), to prepare for and present
required biosafety materials to regulators.
Another strategy Monsanto employed as a global company was to acquire
the IPRs to terminator technology from another MNC. This acquisition
coincided with the first Bt cotton trials in India. Terminator technology enables
plants to produce sterile seeds, thus ridding companies of reliance on costly IPR
regimes. The technology also serves as a biosafety measure, in that it reduces
opportunities for unwanted gene escape. The companys acquisition of that
technology was a catalyst for NGOs and farmers groups actions against GM
seeds, as they worried that farmers would no longer be able to save seed and

245
would thus become dependent upon the companies (Dhar 2001). As a result of
NGO and farmer outcry regarding this issue, terminator technology was explicitly
banned in Indian PVP law, and testing for its presence in GM crops is required.
Monsanto recognized that this event critically damaged their relationships with
farmers and found itself forced to issue a public statement in newspapers stating
that it had no plans to use this technology (Newell 2003, 6, Krueger 2001). As
Roger Krueger from Monsanto noted The issue left a lasting impression
especially in developing countriesthat biotechnology companies, rather than
bringing much-needed technology, had potential to exercise undue control over
farmers. (Krueger 2001).
A third strategy used by Monsanto and other companies was to employ the
results from experimental test plots to bolster their claims about the benefits of
biotechnology. Companies involved in transgenic crop development are required
to conduct on-going studies on the GM crops at every stage. Even after
commercial release, biosafety regulations require that they continuously monitor
their GM crops.
A fourth strategy employed by industry actors favorable towards GM
crops has been to push for changes to the regulatory process. Specifically, they
have advocated for the creation of a one-stop approval system that would
consolidate sequential regulatory steps. Such an approach would foreclose
opportunities for broad and multi-level engagement of other stakeholders, just as
it would narrow the type of risks reviewed by regulators (Newell 2002, 19,

246
Jayaraman 2001). Like-minded individuals within the government (such as
Manju Sharma and P.K. Ghosh of the DBT) provided key points of access of
industry-actor lobbyists seeking to shape biotech regulations (Newell 2002,
20).
378

In general, industry actors had greater access to biosafety regulators than
NGOs. For example, each industry actor undertaking research in rDNA crops
must have its own IBSC, which includes a member of the DBT. This structure
gives industry actors an on-going channel of access to at least one DBT official,
and often to more than one. Monsanto had more access to the regulators for other
reasons as well. The director of Mahyco (Monsantos local partner), Dr. B.R.
Barwale, gave presentations to the DBT on behalf of Monsanto as part of the
required regulatory review process, and he also served on DBT committees.
It is important to note that the position of industry actors within India was
not unified. In particular, there has been widespread suspicion of Monsanto and
its role in promoting GM technology. Suspicions emanate from both NGOs and
other industry actors. Scoones suggests that this suspicion started with the
companys disastrous PR tactics during the 1990s and its failure in its initial effort
to undertake joint GM crop research with the government. The news of terminator
technology further ignited severe suspicions about both GM crops in general and
toward Monsanto in particular (AgBioWorld 2005). While Monsanto has
sometimes been criticized for promoting biotechnology, it has also been criticized

378
These two people were bridge-building in that they supported both regulatory aims and the goal
of advancing GM development.

247
for delaying the use of biotechnology in order to maintain its high and
growing chemical pesticide sales. For example, some critics argued that the types
of biotechnology being developed perpetuated the use of chemical inputs. Clearly
the company confronted a general lack of trust. One strategy that Monsanto used
to address the situation was to sell GM cotton seed (once it was approved)
through Mahyco and a number of sub-licensed partners. The use of sub-licensed
partners helped to distance the Monsanto name from the Bt cotton seed.
379

While the use of Bt cotton seed spread quickly, not all farmers benefited
from its use. On the contrary, some experienced devastating losses. The disparity
in crop performance for GM varieties was one of the reasons the GEAC approved
the commercial sale of Bt cotton conditionally, for three only years, and that after
calling for a second-year of large-scale trials. Indeed, in late 2002, the GEAC
outlawed further cultivation of Bt cotton in Andhra Pradesh. The Agriculture
Minister of Andhra Pradesh (K. Raghuveera Reddy) sought compensation from
Monsanto for the failed experimental crops. Specifically, Monsantos Mech-184
Bt-cottonseed was an overwhelming failure in the Warangal cotton district, where
it was sown on about 25,000 acres of land. Hundreds of incensed farmers took the
law into their own hands, raiding shops, imprisoning seed company employees,
and demanding compensation ranging from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 25,000/- per acre

379
Eighty percent of the seed packets sold went to the areas surrounding the trial sites (Scoones
2003, 10). This reinforces other studies that show that farmers make decisions about what to plant
based on information learned from neighbors more than any other source of information, including
government agricultural extension programs and industry advertisements.

248
for the losses incurred from the Bt-cotton that they had sown. In another
district in the state, about two hundred farmers of Phanidam village went to the
extent of taking into custody the District Manager of Monsanto and eight
Agriculture Department officials, demanding compensation (of Rs.15, 000 per
acre for about 20 acres) for the Bt-cotton seed that had failed to germinate
properly leading to poor yield (Das nd.). Monsantos unwillingness to accept
liability for the seed failures further fed its reputation as an irresponsible and
untrustworthy corporate actor.
Summary
Biosafety has been a highly conflictive issue area. Non-state actors
contested the implementation of biosafety policy and rules, rather than the actual
policy for the most part. Industry actors were privileged over NGOs in terms of
direct access to biosafety regulatory structures, but NGOs were not entirely
excluded. Both NGOs and industry actors used varied strategies to try to make
implementation of biosafety policy more or less rigorous, with only limited
successes for both types of actors. The strategy that seemed to have the most
impact was one used by both types of non-state actors: conducting their own
studies and disseminating information about those studies to the public. The
underlying institutional structure of the Environmental Protection Act and rules
for dealing with GMOs circumscribed any actions by non-state actors. This
institutional structure was more influential on policy outcomes than the actions of
non-state actors. The requirement for GM testing in India was key, as were the

249
multiple levels of monitoring and oversight, even though the state and local
level committees were not fully functioning. Because of the institutional structure
and the inability of NSAs to force significant changes upon it, Indias biosafety
policies started and ended as precautionary ones.

250
Table 30. Biosafety policies for transgenic crops in India
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
No screening
or token
screening only,
or approval
based on other
countries
approval
Screening for
demonstrated
risk, based on
intended use of
product
Comprehensive
screening for
demonstrated
risks and
scientific
uncertainties
No approval
because risk
assumed
1996 The
Environmental
Protection Act
and rules for
GMOs require
comprehensive
screening.
380

1997 Screenings
broadened to
include
allergens and
toxins.

1998 No change.
1999 No change.
2000 No change.
2001 No change.
2002 Requirements
for large-scale
field testing
reduced to 2
years. All
transgenic seed
must be
registered.

380
Required screenings for scientific uncertainties and in particular for environmental risks were
limited. Most screenings were done for conventional agronomic purposes and for demonstrated
risks from GM crops. However, the screenings go beyond intended use of the product to include,
for example, effects on non-target insects were studied. For this reason I classify Indian policy as
precautionary. NGOs were particularly vocal in calling for additional environment impact studies.

251
Food Safety and Consumer Rights
Debates regarding food safety and consumer rights issues for GM crops
have not been prominent in India. The most vocal actors in this area have been
NGOs, but food safety has been a marginal issue for them, primarily because no
GM food is grown or regularly imported into India yet.
381
The limited NGO
efforts in this area were proactive, and are likely to intensify if GM food comes to
Indian markets.
Institutional Context
Food safety falls under the same institutional structure as biosafety issues.
That is, GM food crops have to undergo the same process that GM cotton did, but
additional tests for specific food safety concerns are required. Specialized tests for
allergenicity and toxicity are among those safety measures mandated for GM
food. If India is a center of biological diversity
382
for the food crop (such as
mustard), then additional environmental and agricultural research is also required
by law. These tests must be conducted on India soil and cannot rely on data from
abroad.
India has a large, decentralized structure for addressing food safety issues,
but this structure did not act with respect to GM food issues during the time-frame

381
As of 2002, the commercial cultivation of GM food was prohibited pending further research and
import of GM food was limited because all imports had to be first approved by the GEAC on a
case-by-case basis.
382
A center of biodiversity is an area of the world where a particular type of plant developed.
Many wild relatives and varieties of that plant exist in those areas. The wild relatives and diverse
varieties serve as sources of genes for future varieties and as controls against future diseases and
plagues. For those reasons, extra caution is needed not to contaminate those areas and nor to
destroy that diversity.

252
of the study. The principal food safety agency relating to GM food crops is the
Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR). The ICMR acts as an advisory body
for the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, which is responsible for
implementing the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The ICMR (which has a
member on the RCGM and GEAC) decided to establish a post-marketing
surveillance system for GM products (Jayaraman 2003, 368). In order to
implement this system, the DBT first had to create facilities to develop
technologies for GMO detection. As of 2002, no monitoring system was in place.
Labeling policy for GM food has been a mechanism used to protect food
safety in many countries. Through 2002, the sale of GM food in India remained
illegal (Toke 2004, 179), so a labeling requirement or policy was not yet
needed.
383
The Prevention of Food Adulteration (PFA) Act of 1954 was the
prevailing law during the time-frame of the study (Ajuha and Jotwani nd. 6-7).
384

As no GM food crops were produced in the country through 2002, the only GM
food available would have been imported. Under the PFA, specifically the GEAC
was tasked with approving the manufacture, sale, import, and export of all GMOs
or products containing GMOS including foods, food ingredients or food additives
(Ajuha and Jotwani nd. 9). On the international level, India supported strict
mandatory labeling of GM foods.

383
It is likely that labeling requirements will be imposed when the GEAC releases a GM food crop
for commercial planting. Transgenic pharmaceuticals that have been commercialized in India
must be labeled as GM (CropBiotech Net 2006).
384
The Consumer Protection Act of 1986 allows for labeling for consumer information, interests
and education. Hypothetically, GM labeling could fall under this law, but as 2002 it did not
(Advani n.d.).

253
Non-State Actor Involvement
Since GM food safety issues were handled by biosafety institutions
(explained in the last section), non-state actor access to those institutions was the
same for both food safety and biosafety concerns. That is, industry actors had
more direct access to the institutional structure than NGOs, but NGOs were not
completed excluded. Industry actors had a direct relationship with institutional
actors by serving on regulatory committees and by having institutionalized
avenues of access through their Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBSCs), as
well as indirectly through their lobbying efforts. NGOs had indirect access
through their lobbying efforts and occasionally were asked to submit their
opinions to a regulatory committee.
Industry actors and NGOs utilized different strategies relating to food
safety concerns. Pro Agro,
385
the company closest to commercializing a GM food
in India, followed a strategy of keeping a low profile. Pro Agros GM mustard
research program was the first food crop in line for commercialization in India,
but many other types of GM foods were being developed. When the company
applied for biosafety approval, GM mustard had to undergo additional tests
because of its status as a food source,
386
as opposed to a manufacturing input, as
was the case for cotton.

385
Pro Agro is the Indian subsidiary of Bayer.
386
Given the regulatory costs involved, coupled with the potential market size and uncertainty
regarding ultimate approval, the company decided to halt its work in this area in 2003
(Ramaswamni 2005, 18).

254
There are several reasons why the company pursued a low-profile
strategy. First to the misfortune of Pro Agro -- a then-recent, unresolved
scandal involving mustard oil made mustard a particularly sensitive food crop.
Mustard oil supplies had been massively adulterated in 1998, resulting in a dropsy
epidemic. The Government of India subsequently banned all sales of mustard oil
in India and allowed the import of soybeans for soy oil (Shiva 1998, 19). The
nature of the contamination suggested high level organized crime, though the case
was never solved. The ban hurt many farmers and forced indigenous oil
producers, which were mainly family-owned small businesses, to close.
387
This
tragedy put attempts by an MNC to commercialize GM mustard in an even more
tenuous position, because of suspicions that MNCs were behind the poisoning. A
second reason for the low-profile strategy was that Pro Agro had noted the
negative response to Monsantos high-profile strategy, and wanted to avoid those
types of repercussions and linkages. Third, consumer sensitivity to food issues
arising from cultural and ethical concerns were already central to Indian citizens
without bringing GM foods into the picture. Vegetarianism, halal foods and
spiritual links between humans and nature are examples of existing prominent
cultural and religious elements.
388
Due to the transgenic (cross-species) nature of

387
Mustard is a crop grown by many small farmers in India and is used in both cooking and for
animal fodder. Mustard oil is the preferred cooking oil in Northern and Eastern India, and it is
used primarily as a spice in Southern India. Mustard oil is also used by as a pest control and as a
medicine (Shiva 1998, 10, 20).
388
For example, in 2002 the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was amended to require the
labeling of ice-cream as vegetarian or non-vegetarian (Muralidharan 2002).

255
rDNA food crop research, GM foods had the potential of being vehemently
rejected by Indian consumers.
Another strategy that industry actors have used is pushing GM food as
food aid. They have asked US officials to include specific requirements for food
aid that promote the use of GM varieties such as requiring that funds must be
spent on GM food, offering food aid shipments that are deliberately of a mixed
GM and non-GM content, and not allowing certification of GM-free food aid
from the US. This means that US food aid routinely contains GMOs. This form of
corporate welfare uses US taxpayer dollars to buy surplus GM crops
389
and
distribute them through foreign aid programs, helping large corporations penetrate
new markets abroad (Shah, A. 2005). Besides getting the US government to
promote GM crops through USAID food aid and public research programs, US
officials intervened on behalf of the biotech industry by pressuring for acceptance
of such food aid. While some countries have protested this strategy as a violation
of international trade, I include it in this section of food safety because that was
the basis for its rejection by Indian officials.
After a cyclone devastated the east coast of India (Orissa) in 2000, food
aid containing GM food was sent to India from the US. Indian NGOs including
the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Education and Greenpeace
tested the shipments and denounced their GM content. The NGOs called for a ban
on the practice of contaminating food aid with GMOs, and instead advocated for

389
The U.S. donates almost 60% of the worlds food aid, and much of that aid is tied to
procurement from US sources (Shah, A. 2005).

256
the use of available local food sources that would address the shortage while
concurrently strengthening national agriculture.
Their efforts apparently had an effect, because in 2002 when CARE and
Catholic Relief Services requested approval to import food aid from the US, the
GEAC denied permission on the grounds that it might have contained GMOs
hazardous to human health and the environment. Specifically the GEAC was
apprehensive that the shipment might contain Starlink corn, a variety of GM corn
not approved or intended for human consumption that was found polluting US
food supplies in 2000 (Sharma, A. 2003).
390

Most NGO strategies regarding food safety and consumer rights focused
on access to information. Repeatedly NGOs called for release of test data on GM
crops. When such requests were not headed, NGOs then sued for the release of
Monsantos test results regarding GM cotton. NGOs in that suit included the
Forum for Biotechnology and Food Security, chaired by Devinder Sharma, and
the Deccan Development Society of Andhra Pradesh. Sharma, together with Gene
Campaign, also pressured the government to release food and feed safety research
on all GM crops in India (Devraj 2005). Besides the release of test data, NGO
actors forwarded recommendations for additional types of information and
controls for consumers. These included open access to scientific evidence,
transparency and availability of information, regulatory checks and balances,
labeling, testing of the nutritional composition of GM food as well as allergenicity

390
A month earlier, in December 2002, Japan had rejected a shipment of food from the U.S.
because it contained traces of Starlink corn.

257
and toxicity, assessment protocols for biosafety, food safety monitoring, and
ethical codes for experiments (Swaminathan 1999a, 54). In response to NGO
pressure for public access to information, the standard MNC strategy is to claim
that its test information contains confidential business information. Industry actors
have used this tactic both for environmental studies and for food safety studies.
Additionally, they have argued against more testing, claiming that it is
unnecessary and would make rDNA foods too costly to develop.
Besides advocating for access to information, some NGOs utilized direct
action strategies to advance GM food safety concerns. For example, in 2002 when
the MoEF was considering commercialization of Pro Agros GM mustard,
Greenpeace activists chained themselves outside the Ministry. As noted in the
prior section, the GEAC denied permission for commercialization and requested
further information on health grounds.
Differences in resources among NGOs and industry actors played a role
regarding food safety. NGOs did not have the capacity to undertake GM food
safety research, while they could and did undertake research for environmental
and agronomic aspects. Thus, access to governmental and company food safety
data and test methods was more imperative. Having both the knowledge and the
infrastructure to undertake this type of research, and the ability to withhold
information about that research, afforded companies greater control over the
debate about food safety. While NGOs could not conduct food safety testing, they
could and did test for GM content in Indian food supplies. For example, in 2001,

258
Greenpeace India tested food products sold in India and found some GM
contamination (in Pringles potato chips and Isomil baby food). While these results
called into question Indias technically GM-free status and its ability to regulate
GMOs, contamination of these products was not addressed by government
authorities. Overall, the NGO tactic of testing for GM content had limited impact
on the one hand the GEAC refused to import GM contaminated food aid, but on
the other traces of GM ingredients in the processed food sector went unchecked.
Summary
Indias policies for food safety and consumer rights did not include any
labeling provisions for rDNA food. Food safety policies were circumscribed by
environmental safety policies, which gave the GEAC authority over clearance of
the import and marketing of GM food. Officially, the GEAC had not approved
any foods for commercialization as of 2002, although some GM foods were found
in the country by NGOs. In order to receive approval, Indian law required that
GM foods be tested and approved by the GEAC, and no food crops had
completed that process as of 2002, although many were in the works. Therefore,
although there was no GM food in India, it was not because of a ban against GM
food per se, but because none had gone through the regulatory process. Along
with the practicality of the lack of commercialization of GM food crops in the
country, a strong push for specific food safety or consumer rights policies for GM
crops by non-state actors was lacking as well, although NGOs made sure to tie
food safety to other GM issues. The institutional structure had some impact on

259
GM food safety and consumer rights policies in that it bottlenecked GM food
crop approvals with the GEAC and required approval on a case-by-case basis.
Table 31. Food safety and consumer rights policies for transgenic crops in
India

Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
No distinction
made between
rDNA and
conventional
food for testing
or labeling
Differing
screening
processes for
rDNA and
conventional
foods, labeling
of rDNA based
on detectable
content
Differing and
more stringent
screening
processes for
rDNA foods,
comprehensive
labeling of all
rDNA foods
enforced
through market
segregation
Ban sale of
rDNA foods or
require
comprehensive
labeling of all
rDNA foods with
warnings
1996 The EPA
requires
differential
screening for
rDNA foods.
GEAC has
authority over
GM imports
and marketing.
No labels are
required.

1997 Screening
requirements
are broadened.

1998 No change.
1999 No change.
2000 No change.
2001 No change.
2002 No change.

260
Public Research
Institutional Context
The Government of India has provided funding for biotechnologies,
including rDNA crops, since 1982. The Department of Biotechnology (DBT), the
main office responsible for expending public funds for crop transgenic research,
has increased its expenditures in crop biotechnologies in each successive five-year
plan, as Table 32, below, demonstrates. Most of the research on crop
Table 32. Expenditures by the DBT in crop biotechnologies, in hundred
thousands
1992-1997
(8
th
Plan)
1997-2002
(9
th
Plan)
2002-2007
(10
th
Plan est.)
Crop
biotechnology
Rs. 1,916.00 Rs. 2,897.00 Rs. 7,500.00
Source: Sharma, Charak and Ramanaiah 2003, 297.
biotechnologies in India is supported by public funding (Sharma, Charak and
Ramanaiah 2003, 298) for public research institutes spread across the nation.
Indeed, the Indian national agricultural research system (NARS) is one of the
largest in the world with over 1000 institutions, research centers and field stations,
all coordinated by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR). (Hall et.
al. 1998, 52). Research on transgenic crops is done at most of the 31 agricultural
universities and the 204 central and state universities, besides at specialized public
sector research labs (about 500) (CropBiotech Net 2006). Private sector research
is being done by seven companies: Ankur Seeds Ltd., Hybrid Rice International,
Indo-American Hybrid Seeds, Mahyco, Mayco Research Foundation, Pro Agro

261
PGS (India) Ltd., and Syngenta India Ltd.
391
(Sharma, Charak and Ramanaiah
2003, 301).
The DBT has a dual role of both regulating and promoting biotechnology.
Since the DBT is the major funder of biotechnology across the country, the
RCGM is made up of scientists who receive funding from the DBT, creating
inherent conflicts of interest between scientists tasks as researchers and
regulators. To secure funding, being in favor with the DBT is important, and
serving on a committee for the DBT is both necessary and desirable (Scoones
2003b). Regulatory rigor is also constrained by limiting the field of investigation:
almost all of the people on the RCGM have been either molecular biologists or
biochemists, which privileges discussion of their types of concerns to the
exclusion of other scientific issues (Scoones 2003b).
392

Public sector research institutions have been simultaneously pressed on
one side to develop independent means to generate revenues, and on the other side
to act as a check on anti-competitive and monopolistic tendencies within the
private sector (Seshia nd, 9). These two objectives sometimes contradict each
other. During the time frame of the study, the public sector provided improved
varieties and technical support to small breeders at nominal prices in India (Alam
1997, viii). However, the public sector was also beginning to use IPRs as a way to

391
In 1991, reforms amended the Monopolies Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP Act) of
1969 to allow direct foreign investment with up to 51% of foreign equity and up to 51% of the
capital of local corporations (as opposed to the 40% allowed earlier) (Sasson 1993, 105-107).
392
I go to the advisory group meetings at DBT. Everyone has the same view as me. Agreeing is
easy.(Interview conducted by Scoones 2003, 13)

262
generate funds for public research.
393
Increased use of IPRs is harmful
because it restricts the availability of breeding material to small breeders. The
speed and advancement of research and knowledge is also hindered because
information exchange is circumscribed by IPR considerations. For example, the
Central Tobacco Research Institute of ICAR noted in 2000 Work on transgenics
is being continued and no publicity is given for the work in the interest of
overseas markets for the crop.(Nagarajan and Venkateswarlu 2000, 1).
The use of IPRs has even become a problem for large national seed
companies such as Rallis. Rallis and Indo-American have to rent equipment from
public institutions to analyze gene sequences, but when they collaborate on
research with the public sector, they have to act carefully to avoid patent clashes.
IPR considerations have changed both the companies and public institutions
scientific culture of openness and information sharing, and overall access to gene
sequences which are needed for research has been hindered (Newell 2003, 7). IPR
concerns have also made companies cautious about reporting biosafety studies to
government agencies. MNC resources in terms of experience using IPRs and
research capacity have given them advantages over public researchers and over
domestic firms. MNC in-house research and development capacity has also
allowed it to compete with top public sector institutions for the best scientists.
In India, poor linkages between public research and industry and
implementing agencies were considered, in the late 1980s early 1990s, as one of

393
This trend is part of the privatization of public institutes.

263
the basic problems facing the Indian science and technology establishment.
Because of poor linkages, technologies were being developed but not utilized.
The institutional structure for the national agricultural research system (NARS)
was hierarchical (top-down), and faced this linkage problem. Within the NARS
structure, developments were to be passed on to farmers via extension officers.
However when funding for agricultural research became stagnant,
394
extension
services were the first to be cut, further aggravating this problem. Different states
tried varying approaches to replace extension agents, including linkages with
NGOs and the private sector.
Non-State Actor Involvement
In an effort to increase linkages between public sector research and
industrial application, public-private collaboration in transgenic research was
allowed. For example, the Government of India allowed Monsanto to have access
to the Indian Institute of Sciences (IISc) in Bangalore. Monsanto was given
permission to set up a lab there, and the company was also given permission to
use the IISc genetic material and lab facilities to do its own research. NGOs
were particularly critical of that linkage, as it gave the company access to Indias
rich genetic heritage at a time when biopiracy by US companies was already a
repeated problem for India. The connection at IISc also gave the company access
to other public research institutes in India.

394
Public investments in agriculture have been declining consistently in all states since the mid-
seventies. (Sulaiman and van den Ban 2000, 1).

264
Increased linkages between the private and public sector in agricultural
research was regarded with concern for reasons other than biopiracy. Linkages
with the private sector were seen by some to undermine national food security
since the private sector is primarily concerned with commercial crops and has
neglected crops that are the basis of the diet for most farmers and agricultural
workers in India (Dhar 2001, 19). The line between collaboration and high-
jacking of public research agendas by the private sector was not clear-cut.
While allowed by the Government of India, collaboration with public
research institutions was also a specific strategy employed by industry actors.
They pursued this strategy to try to win favor for GM products, besides helping to
advance use of GM technology. Besides the IISc in Bangalore, Monsanto has
tried to create legitimacy for its products by collaborating with other prominent
public sector institutes including the Tata Energy Research Institute (TERI). The
companys connection with TERI was also helpful in that TERI hosted a number
of stakeholder dialogues that brought researchers, NGOs and industry actors
together to discuss regulatory and other issues relating to GM crops. This
connection also afforded Monsanto an indirect channel of access to government
institutes, because TERI is represented on all DBT committees (Newell 2003, 5).
Both connections with the IISc and with TERI were made possible by the
companies extensive monetary resources, and because of its patents and
knowledge of GM technology.

265
Public sector linkages with NGOs included direct contracting of some
extension activities, especially in areas where the public sector has been weak. In
some states, NGOs were allowed to provide technical assistance to farmer Self-
Help Groups and farmer training centers.
395
NGO resources included knowledge
of farmer needs at the village level, and ability to work in remote areas. These
NGO resources did not afford them more access to regulatory or policy structures
at the central decision-making levels, however.
Smaller start-up biotechnology firms in India have more access to policy
circles than their material contribution to the Indian economy would suggest.
Their access to policy circles comes from their ability to attract limited venture
capital and from the belief that they will one day create products and returns to
investment, rather than from their actual contributions as of 2002.
396
These
companies symbolically give the sense that biotechnology can bring commercial
success to India (Newell 2003, 11). Because of this symbolic role as successful
Indian entreprenuers, actors from these companies have been invited to join in
policy and regulatory circles. Of course, their presence in these committees gives
them a greater opportunity to shape policies and rules towards their interests.
MNCs have tried to frustrate further developments by start-up biotech companies
by questioning their product safety and the adequacy of safety tests (the same

395
Self-Help Groups and farmer training centers (Krishi Vigyan Kendras) were 2 other revised
forms of extension services, with the latter being most widely employed (Sulaiman and van den
Ban 2000).
396
Political and media rhetoric (for example slogans from IT to BT) regarding biotechnology
being the next commercial frontier helped these companies attract venture capital (Scoones 2002).
However, thus far these companies have done mainly contracted research and have few products
or IPRs to maintain their businesses.

266
charges MNCs themselves faced from NGOs) (Newell 2003, 12). This
strategy on the part of MNCs fosters disunity among industry actors and gives
fuel to NGO critiques.
Another public-private linkage that was allowed and encouraged was the
contracting of public sector scientists services to private enterprises. This
approach was devised to raise revenues for the public institutions, and to provide
incentives to individual scientists.
397
This approach further facilitated industry
actor access to public sector research and co-opted public sector researchers time.
While the national agricultural research system in India has functioned
principally on a top-down model, studies by Hall (et.al., 1998, 1999) have noted
that knowledge is context dependent and that the NARS can rarely supply the
multiple types of knowledge needed by a farmer at once. Thus, different types of
institutional arrangements have evolved to meet farmers needs for agricultural
research and knowledge. They include commercial NGOs, cooperatives, farmer
associations, linkages between corporate agribusiness and public researchers, and
R & D within corporate entities. Although in varying capacities, all of these types
of institutions have provided some type of research and information to farmers.
Due to their varying degrees of access to public research and the perceived
responsiveness of the public sector to immediate farming problems, some NGOs
have criticized the public sector research agenda as catering more to the needs of
companies than to the poor farmers who are the majority in India. Transgenic

397
Approximately 70% of the contract fee goes to the institution, and 20% to the scientist.

267
research deserves this criticism since the possibility of its being adopted by
poor farmers is minimal, and critics see these efforts as taking public money and
resources away from alternative avenues of research such as organic and
sustainable farming. Despite these criticisms, some NGOs do call for public-
sector research into transgenics, to ensure that the needs of poor farmers are
addressed.
While research dollars for agricultural biotechnology have increased (at a
time when real funding for agricultural research is declining), this expenditure of
public monies does not indicate widespread public support for GM technology in
India. In contrast to the green revolution, when trust in public sector researchers
was high and negative impacts of those technologies were not known, public
sector developers of rDNA technology have operated in a more cautious mode,
and risks and benefits of rDNA technology have been openly disputed.
Throughout there have been much higher levels of skepticism from NGO actors,
and even small seed companies, towards rDNA crops. These actors have seen
rDNA research as the latest fashion and not a miracle technology. Even some of
the farmers who have begun using Bt cotton (both legal and illegal varieties),
398

have acknowledged that pest tolerance and new diseases in GM crops would
probably occur rapidly and would not eliminate the need for external inputs which
are the principal source of farmer indebtedness.

398
The farmers who adopted Bt cotton technology were farmers who, for the most part, had been
through cycles of feast and famine with successive generations of hybrid technology and its
related chemical inputs.

268
NGOs voiced concerns that GM crops, being more costly than other
alternatives, would lead to greater dependence by farmers and to more farmers
being pushed off the land. They spoke to the Gandhian anti-colonialist tradition
among Indian farmers, which applauds self-sufficiency and is rightly suspicious
of western corporate interests seeking to involve themselves in Indian agriculture
(Toke 2004, 183). Besides piracy problems, NGOs cautioned that traditional plant
and animal varieties might be displaced, and that local species of seed crops
would become contaminated. They focused on this genetic erosion as both a
threat to the continued livelihoods of small farmers and also as a food safety issue
(Toke 2004, 181, 184). Small seed companies also questioned the impact of GM
crops on Indias agricultural development, also citing concerns about their
sustainability for Indias ecological conditions and with respect to addressing food
security (Newell 2003, 11-12).
NGOs have also been critical of the types of rDNA research being done.
Much of the research conducted in India focuses on replicating the same
technology in different varieties and crops: inserting Bt into different plants.
Suman Sahai of Gene Campaign noted that more than 42% of Indian biotech
research projects use the Bt gene (Jayaraman, Fox, Jia and Orellana 2005), and
warned that India could face a type of Bt monoculture, with many types of Bt
plants grown next to each other. This type of monoculture situation would likely
hasten insect resistance to Bt technology. The DBTs 1999-2000 Annual Report
reflects a predominance of Bt research, with the introduction of Bt into rice,

269
brassica (mustard), cabbage, cauliflower, broccoli, pigeonpea, and chickpea
plants (Department of Biotechnology 2000).
Finally, NGOs questioned the decision to approve large-scale trials of
Monsanto cotton varieties, when publicly-developed ones were so near release,
and given the inferiority of the hybrid varieties that Monsanto had used to host the
Bt gene. When field trials for Bt cotton were approved in 2000, the Central
Institute for Cotton Research, a publicly-funded agricultural research institute,
had plans to put its own variety of Bt cotton on the market by 2002 (Dhar 2001).
This type of argument emphasizes that Indian NGOs were also concerned with
corporate domination aspects of GM research, not simply GM crop research per
se.
Summary
In short, public-private linkages in public research on transgenic crops
were encouraged in India because of the perception that they were necessary to
further national development. Transgenic crops were a part of that larger picture.
MNCs and even smaller biotechology firms had greater access to policy and
regulatory circles than did NGOs, but neither industry nor NGO actors had
unified opinions on the need for or benefit of transgenic research. While they did
not alter public-private linkages or funding of research for transgenic crops,
criticisms by NGOs and other actors were heeded in that public sector research
was forced to go through clear research protocols.

270
Table 33. Public research policies for transgenic crops in India
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Invest national
and donor funds
into transgenic
technology.
Allow
international
private sector
partnerships
Invest national
and donor funds
into breeding
transgenic
crops into local
varieties
Invest no
national funds
into transgenic
technology but
allow donor
funding of
downstream
transgenic
technology
Invest no
national nor
donor funds in
transgenic
technology
1996 Allows and
participates in
international
research
partnerships.
Allows both
types of
funding.
Permits
transfers of
technology.

1997 Public sector
funding
increases.

1998 No change
1999 No change.
2000 No change.
2001 No change.
2002 Public sector
funding more
than doubles.

Summary and Conclusions
Indian policies for GM crops, though a mixed bag, have remained stable
from 1996 to 2002. On one end of the spectrum, India followed very promotional
policies for public research, beginning as early as 1988. On the other end, it began

271
with preventive policies for intellectual property rights which moved one step
to the left to become precautionary in 2001. This was the only movement in
policy categorizations. Given that farmer innovation and seed saving are still the
dominant current practice, even this step was a big one, and it was one that was
highly contested. Trade policies and biosafety policies began and ended in the
precautionary mode. These two policy categorizations were the result of forward-
looking environmental protection legislation from the late 1980s. Food safety
policies were permissive throughout, but are likely to become more restrictive
once food crops are commercially released.
Industry actors had greater access to policy makers or members of the
institutional framework than did NGOs across the board. While NGOs also had
some access, this tended to be limited and often indirect. For example, industry
actors had direct access to biosafety personnel through the requirement for an
Institutional Biosafety Committee which had to include one representative to the
DBT. Industry actors also sat on committees in governmental offices at both the
federal and state levels. Finally, industry actors were allowed to contract the
services of public sector researchers, who at the same time were responsible for
serving on governmental regulatory committees. Despite these differences in
access, policies remained much the same.
Industry actors had less influence on GM crop policies than might have
been expected because of some collaboration problems. While industry actors had
established relationships with some branches of the government, for example with

272
DBT and ICAR officials, these relationships were contested between biotech
and traditional agricultural-chemical industry actors, which sometimes had
differing interests. Although the main MNCs in biotechnology are vertically
integrated companies that encompass both biotech and agri-chemical products,
there is still significant competition between these sectors in India, particularly
among national companies. Furthermore, industry actors did not have established
relationship with GEAC members, and the GEAC was the gate-keeper regulatory
institute. In spite of their greater resources and access to other channels, industry
actors were not able to gain much over NGOs in terms of establishing
relationships with the GEAC because these committee members were mostly
political appointments who were replaced with changes in
government/administration. Both competition among industry actors and the
structure of the GEAC helped to level the playing field somewhat between NGOs
and industry actors for lobbying their views regarding GM crops.
The resources of non-state actors also differed, and affected their access
to policy makers, as well as which strategies were open to them. The monetary
resources of industry actors were greater than those of NGO actors, and much
more concentrated. The larger industry actors belonged to various industrial
associations and lobbied for their interests on multiple fronts through them (or
chose the appropriate representative), just as they lobbied directly as companies.
Regulatory committee members frequently ask industrial associations for advice,
which affords industry actors the opportunity to frame the rules. While NGO

273
actors were occasionally asked to submit opinions to regulators, this was rare
as compared to industry actors. On an individual level, members of industry and
governmental officials frequent the same elite social clubs, where opinions can be
exchanged more freely. While a resource, the close relationship between
established industry actors and governmental officials may have been one reason
for the delay in the release of Bt cotton, as it went against the interests of pesticide
and chemical companies which had a history of working with the government. On
a broader level, industry actor resources, in terms of the capital mobility that
larger firms enjoy, heighten their influence with governmental actors. MNCs used
this rhetoric of high capital mobility to push along MNC-friendly policies. MNCs
were also able to buy into important segments of national companies, and thus co-
opt the established connections of those companies with governmental officials.
Research capacity and knowledge relating to GM crops was another
resource that industry actors had which they utilized to advance their preferences.
Insider knowledge of GM crop research and capacity to advance that research
within India (or elsewhere) afforded industry actors several types of privileges:
they could provide or withhold information (or research tools) as it suited their
purposes, they could attract the best scientists to their own research, and they
could utilize and integrate knowledge from the public sector into to their
practices.
The principal resource that NGOs had which industry actors lacked was
public trust. Due to the countrys colonial history and subsequent corporate

274
scandals, many Indians are distrustful of large corporations and in particular
of MNCs. The leading company advancing GM crop research in India was a US-
based MNC (Monsanto), and various strategies that it used (such as purchasing
terminator technology and having US government official pressure for its
interests) fueled distrust of its activities. NGOs could also rely on accepted and
respected social practices of (non-violent) protest. Direct actions and protest were
instrumental in keeping the GM crop policy debate on the table. Knowledge
regarding agriculture and Indian farmers was another NGO resource. While very
few NGOs had the capacity to advance GM crop research, many worked on
improving agriculture and helping rural populations throughout the country. This
intimate knowledge of agriculture and rural realities allowed them to counter
industry claims about the supposed effect of GM crops which might otherwise
have been taken as truth.
Non-state actors used many types of strategies to advance their policy
preferences for GM crops. No single strategy by either type of actor was key,
unlike in Brazil. Instead, the sustained use of multiple strategies over time and
attention to the various policy areas was important. The continued contest over
GM crops involved a monetary strain that only the largest corporate actors could
sustain with ease. In that light, continued NGO dedication to the issue is
noteworthy.
Both industry and non-state actors focused their efforts on the same policy
areas: intellectual property rights and biosafety. The intellectual property rights

275
debate was a sustained, heated dispute with the positions of industry actors
and NGOs at polar extremes. The resulting legislation was a mixture of the
preferences of both types of actors. This is not a reflection of the two poles
drawing nearer to build a consensus, but rather of both types of actors insisting on
what they ultimately considered most important: the recognition of plant IPRs (for
industry actors) and the recognition of farmers rights (for NGOs).
Overall, several strategy types were important. For both types of non-state
actors the strategies of networking with policy insiders, and conducting and
disseminating research were important. Both types of NSA organized seminars
with policy-makers and used other networking strategies. Besides open seminars,
industrial associations organized closed workshops with key members of
governmental departments (eg. the DBT) and members of industry. These
seminars gave the companies additional time to lobby their views and also helped
to nurture social networks between these actors. NGOs tended to foster
relationships with members of the GEAC and the MoEF, as they viewed these
officials as the most unbiased parties among regulators. Both industry actors and
NGOs as well as governmental offices conducted research on GM crops, with
particular attention to the first commercial GM crop in India, Bt cotton. Multiple
sources of information helped highlight extreme claims, as well as corroborate
certain points. These competing sources of information demonstrated that there
were both advantages and disadvantages to GM crops, and that more debate and
discussion on the topic was needed. Besides networking and disseminating

276
information, direct action protests and legal challenges were instrumental for
NGOs, while for industry actors, collaboration with public sector research
organizations and buying into national companies were crucial.
Manipulation or dominance over the discourse surrounding GM crops was
also an important strategy. For example for biosafety issues, much of the
informational debate focused on winning the hearts and minds of the public.
NGOs integrated a discourse of corporate domination into their warnings about
GM crops while industry actors wove ideals of development and food security
into their promotion of GM crops. With respect to public research, promotion of
agricultural biotechnology by industry actors as the next knowledge revolution
resonated well in policy circles and aided in generating additional public and
private funding of GM research. The NGO discourse about corporate domination
suffered a blow with farmers avid adoption and dissemination of illegal GM
cotton varieties. Rapid farmer adoption of GM cotton also raised doubts about
NGO arguments concerning the agronomic performance of GM crops. On the
other hand, GM Starlink contamination cemented doubts about industry or
governments ability to effectively control potentially harmful GM crops and its
import into India as food aid strengthened the NGO discourse about the need for
greater regulation of the GM industry.
The international institutional context had the most impact with respect to
IPRs, as was also the case for Brazil. WTO obligations via the TRIPs Agreement
were cited as a reason for Indias plant IPR law, and other international

277
instruments such as the UPOV, IUPGR and CBD also influenced Indian PVP
legislation in some way. In theory, the international institutional context should
have pushed Indias IPR choices to a promotional stance. India started out with
preventive policies and did move in the direction suggested, but only to a
precautionary stance. Indian policy-makers acted outside the box (and the
categories defined here) by acknowledging farmers rights and creating
biodiversity legislation. The international IPR instruments either did not recognize
farmers rights, or saw them as privileges- not rights. Both the
acknowledgement of farmers rights and the creation of the biodiversity act which
protects traditional knowledge were the result of on-going efforts by NGOs and
farmer organizations.
The international public research context also influenced Indian public
research policies in that India decided to participate in international research
projects on GM crop technology. However, the international institutional context
did not appear to have any impact on trade, biosafety or food safety policy
choices. Of these, the most noteworthy are Indias trade policies, which were
expected to be more permissive to comply with international trade requirements.
This is probably due to the fact that thus far, India has only minimal external trade
in GM crop products.
On a national level, the institutional context supported a continuation of
status quo policies which NGOs favored and industry actors did not. Institutional
practices and multiple levels of regulatory institutions seemed to aid continuation

278
of established policies, even when these policies were being utilized for the
first time, as was the case of the regulation of Bt cotton. For example, hierarchical
relationships within the public research sector seemed to aid the continued
funding of laboratory research and research in GM crops even when the utility
and outcomes of such research was in question. Established protocols under the
Ministry of Agriculture, for example, for testing and releasing agricultural crops
in one or a few states at a time (due to differences in soil and climate conditions)
carried over to GM crops.
Both types of actors pressed for the basic structure to be implemented in
tune with their preferences -- that is, industry actors sought a speedy
implementation with minimal testing, while NGOs wanted a cautious
implementation with thorough environmental safety testing. However, in effect,
biosafety regulations made GM regulation in trade, biosafety and food safety a
one-stop window through the GEAC. While industry actors pressed for a one-
stop window, they preferred that the administrators be the industry-friendly DBT
rather than the GEAC under the MoEF. NGO legal challenges regarding the
authority of the RCGM and GEAC and NGO reports on lapses in the regulatory
structure on the state and local levels were influential in that they forced the
institutional structure to become more rigorous. Since biosafety rules were being
implemented and tested for the first time during the time-frame of the study, the
fact that there was no movement on biosafety policy categorizations came more

279
from the direct confrontation by NGOs about how legislation was
implemented than from an established institutional structure.
Separation of powers between the federal and state governments had some
impact on policies towards GM crops, but not as much as the states traditional
oversight of agricultural issues suggests. State-level policies towards GM crops
tended to be promotional toward the biotech industry, but were restricted to
promoting research and development, as commercialization depended on federal
approval. With regard to GM crops, state governments were able to approve or
halt experimental GM test crops within their borders, and they were instrumental
in conducting state-level analyses of the test crops. Both NGO and industry actors
tried to strengthen state and local capacity for oversight of GM crops, although for
different reasons. In Andhra Pradesh, both limited field tests and later
temporarily-commercialized GM crops were drastic failures, and the state
government took measures to intervene on behalf of its citizens, owing to the
clamor of farmers and NGOs. The state government even went as far as suing
Monsanto for restitution for its farmers, but this happened after 2002. In the case
of the illegal production of GM seeds in Gujarat, while not directly defying the
central government and regulatory agencies, the Gujarat state government
dragged its heels enough to allow the spread of the illegal seed. Action on the
part of the state government would have directly impinged on the economic well-
being of constituents who were enjoying a bumper crop after successive cotton
failures.

280
In conclusion, I would like to highlight three key findings from this
chapter. First, while no single strategy was crucial for non-state actor influence on
policies, the on-going use of multiple strategies by both NGO and industry actors
was critical. The lack of movement in the IPR and biosafety policies
categorizations is a reflection of a continued confrontation on these issues not
the absence of activity. Second, the multi-level regulatory structure allowed more
non-state actor access to policymakers. Overall, industry actors were privileged in
this structure over NGO actors. However, this multi-level structure, coupled with
different interests among industry actors helped to keep policies precautionary.
Differences of opinion and interests existed among industry actors from different
sectors (for example biotechnology and agri-chemical), as well as among different
types of industry actors (local versus multinational), and among farmers. Conflicts
of interests among these parties helped policies stay precautionary, a policy also
supported actively by NGOs, who acted in unison. Third and finally, framing was
a salient component in the struggle surrounding GM crop policies in India. How
well strategies resonated with a national discourse was significant for both NGO
and industry actors. For example, state governments focus on local companies
and biotech entreprenuers and their inclusion in policy circles helped to promote a
vision of Indian success at both state and national levels. This framing strategy
was helpful in keeping public research policies promotional and funding levels
high. NGOs efforts to pass a biodiversity act and protect farmers rights stemmed
in part from their strategy of framing these elements as mechanisms to stop piracy

281
and patenting or theft of Indian knowledge. While Indian IPR policy moved
from the preventive to precautionary category in this area, its new IPR regime
attempted to give clear rights to Indian farmers and holders of traditional
knowledge, instead of only rights for (primarily multinational) corporations.

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Chapter 5
Argentina: Industry and Governmental Actors
Beans of the Same Pod

Introduction
In spite of being one of the main producers and exporters of transgenic
crops, Argentinas policies for GM crops were promotional in only two of the five
areas, food safety and public research. Moreover, its policies for trade were the
most precautionary of all its policies for GM crops and not the most
promotional, as could have been expected. How were these policies formulated
and what was the role of non-state actors in these outcomes? How did the
institutional structure effect the policy choices?
As in Brazil and India, agriculture plays an important role in the Argentine
economy. As of 2004, 10.6% of Argentinas GDP came from agriculture, similar
to the 10.1% of Brazils GDP. Argentinas agricultural products are varied and
include sunflower seeds, lemons, soybeans, grapes, corn, tobacco, peanuts, tea,
wheat and livestock. Its main agricultural exports are edible oils, cereals, and
feed, and soybeans are the main source of all three of these products. In sharp
contrast to the other two case studies, Argentine farmers produce about one fourth
of the worlds total transgenic output. From 1996-2002, Argentine farmers grew
commercial GM soy, cotton and corn crops, whereas, as we have seen, soy was
the only GM crop in Brazil and experimental transgenic cotton was the only GM
crop in India. Another difference from the other case studies is that Argentina has
far fewer farmers than does India or Brazil. Only 12% of the population lives in

283
the countryside, and farming is dominated by large landowners and
agribusinesses.
During the time-frame of the study, poverty and hunger were growing
problems in Argentina. As of 1980, 12% of the population lived below the
poverty line. This increased to 30% in 1998, and 51% in 2002, as a result of
savage neoliberal economic policies (Joensen and Semino 2004, 8). Food
security became an increasing problem in urban zones, while rural families were
pushed off the land. Between 1998 and 2002, one fourth of the farms in the
country went out of business (Altieri and Pengue 2006, 14), and in 2002, for the
first time ever in Argentina, widespread hunger stalked the country (Branford
2002, 23).
The economic and food crisis stemmed in part from fiscal policies. Public
debt was 118% of GDP as of 2004. As always, exports were needed to meet debt
service, and soybeans figured prominently among agricultural exports. From 1996
to 2002, soybean production experienced major expansion in Argentina,
displacing other farm production. Production of meat, dairy products and eggs
dropped significantly as soybean production expanded, and the number of
Argentines lacking access to basic nutrition grew from 3.7 million to 8.7 million
(Benbrook 2005). Export subsidies were given for agricultural and industrial
products, while public services declined.
399
As a result, poverty increased,

399
Again this was a result of neoliberal economic policies recommended by international lending
institutions. Export subsidies for agricultural products were allowed to encourage more exports
and export-oriented agriculture, while other public sector services such as healthcare, pensions,

284
national wealth became more concentrated, and there was an overall
degradation in quality of life, as evidenced in a rising infant mortality rate, a
rising incidence of cholera and other measures (Sasson 1993, 553). In 2001-2002
the Argentine economy reached a severe crisis state, and violent public protests
erupted.
In the absence of long-range state planning, the Argentine economy was
shaped by major conglomerates which worked according to the principles of
short-range profit maximization under low-risk conditions.
400
GM crop policies
were created in this context, and industry actors were central to the development
of rDNA crop policies. In the early 1990s, some multinational companies and
Argentine banks began investing in biotechnology research and development (as
venture capitalists), in order to remain competitive on the world market. Most of
these companies had large interests in agro-industry and in the food and chemical
industries. The weakness in local research necessitated a strategy of buying
biotechnology-derived products or making them locally under closed technology
agreements which imposed restrictions on international trading and the usual
payment of royalties (Sasson 1993, 559, Goldstein 1989). Small and medium

education, and agricultural research and extension services were decreased. Examples of export
subsidies include direct export subsidies, export market promotion (or development) programs,
and export credit and credit guarantee programs. The Argentine government spent about US $10
million on agricultural export market promotion in 1995 (Foreign Agricultural Service 2005).
400
In the early 1990s (1990-1995) agricultural institutions were dismantled by the executive, and
those few that remained were weak and centralized. From 1995-2002, agro-industrial and food
issues were centralized in the SAGPyA and natural resource and environmental problems were
abandoned by the federal government. In 2002, after the collapse of the Argentine economy,
issues such as strategic planning, competitive instruments, sustainable production, vertical
integration of the agro-industial complex, food security for the internal market, and rural
development began to be debated and the remaining institutions were strengthened and made more
efficient (Carballo 2004, 28).

285
enterprises copied biotech products, using Argentinas patent laws that
granted patents for processes, but not for products (Sasson 1993, 558). Industry
actors have continued to play a strong role in the development of policies for
rDNA crops and in their use in Argentina, which is documented further in each of
the sections below. The main companies producing GM crop varieties and related
inputs in Argentina were the international companies Monsanto, Dekalb,
Syngenta, Nidera, Bayer and Pioneer Hi-Bred and national companies Don Mario,
La Tijereta and Relmo (Pengue 2001).
On the other hand, NGOs had much less access to policy-makers for
transgenic crops in Argentina than industry actors did. Those NGOs that worked
from the sidelines included Greenpeace Argentina (the most prominent) and local
NGOs like the Grupo de Reflexión Rural
401
(which founded the Red Alerta sobre
Transgenicos REDAST the GMO Alert Network in 1999), the Liga de Acción
del Consumidor (ADELCO Consumer Action League) and the Centro de
Derchos Humanos y Ambiente (CEDHA Center for Human Rights and the
Environment), amongst others.
402
These NGO focused mainly on biosafety and
food safety aspects of GM crops. They used some of the same strategies as NGOs
in Brazil and India, including developing local-level legislation, testing for illegal

401
This group, the Rural Reflection Group, originated as a research team for the Asociación para
la Defensa de la Producción Orgánica (ADPO -Association for the Defense of Organic
Production). It also coordinates the Red por una Latinoamérica Libre de Transgénicos (REDALLT
Network for Latin America Free of GMOs).
402
Other NGOs that worked on this issue include the Centro de Estudios sobre Tecnologías
Apropriadas de la Argentina (CETAAR Research Center for Appropriate Technologies for
Argentina), Fundación RIE (Red Informática Ecologista Ecological Information Network
Foundation), and Red Nacional de Acción Ecológica (RENACE National Network for
Ecological Action).

286
GM content in food, bringing to light plantings of illicit crops, and
undertaking socio-economic research on GM crops.

Institutional Context
Argentinas governmental structure is similar to that of the other two case
studies in that it is also a federal, democratic republic. It has 23 provinces or
states, besides the capital. It has separation of powers between the federal, state
and sub-state levels with legislation possible at the different levels. Like Brazil,
Argentina has a Public Defender who is responsible for protecting the rights of
citizens by overseeing other branches of the government.
Moving from the wider political context to the specific institutions in
charge of regulating rDNA crops in Argentina, various entities have jurisdiction.
The CONABIA - Comisión Nacional Asesora de Biotecnología Agropecuaria
(National Advisory Committee on Agricultural Biotechnology
403
) is the main
regulatory institution for rDNA crops (Flint et. al. 2000). The CONABIA
coordinates all of the regulatory institutes that work under the Secretaría de
Agricultura, Ganadería, Pesca y Alimentos (SAGPyA - Secretary of Agriculture,
Livestock, Fisheries and Food). Figure 7. (next page) helps to illustrate the
regulatory process and institutions involved. The CONABIA was created in 1991
as an advisory and technical support organism for the national Secretaría de

403
This is sometimes referred to in English as the National Advisory Committee on Agricultural
Biosafety, although the term biosafety does not figure in the original title.

287
field tests
inspections by
INASE, SENASA, CONABIA
SENASA
CONABIA
SAGPyA
CONABIA SENASA
flexibilization
CONABIA
DNMA
SAGPyA
INASE
commercial release
applicant
Figure 7. Regulatory process for GM crops in Argentina

288
Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca (Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock, and
Fisheries, SAGyP, now SAGPyA), which issues licenses for GM experiments and
for the commercial release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
Specifically, the CONABIA was charged with designing and managing
regulations for rDNA crops and other materials, and with providing opinions
regarding their release into the environment.
After its creation in 1991, membership in the CONABIA has been
changed twice by SAGPyA resolutions. With each change it has continued to
privilege industry actors over NGO actors. The CONABIA is made up of relevant
members of national institutes
404
and non-state actor representatives all of
whom have full voting rights. Initially there were no NGO representatives in
CONABIA but there were 3 industry actor representatives. A fourth industry actor
was added in 1997,
405
along with the first NGO actor. Representatives of
government offices for Public Health, and Natural Resources and Sustainable
Development were also added in 1997. As of 2002, industry actors outweighed
NGO actors 4 to 1. Industry actors are represented in CONABIA through four
organizations: the Asociación Semilleros Argentinos (ASA Association of
Agentine Seed Growers), Foro Argentino de Biotecnología (Argentine
Biotechnology Forum), the Cámara Argentina de la Industria de Productos

404
The public sector members include representatives from SENASA, INASE, the Secretariat of
Public Health, the Secretariat of Natural Resources and Sustainable Development, and three
national research institutes: INTA, CONICET, and the University of Buenos Aires.
405
CASAFE was added in 1997 because they were involved in the development of GMOs for the
agro-fishery sector. (Resolution No. 328 of 1997 of the SAGPyA).

289
Veterinarios (CAPROVE - Argentine Chamber of Veterinary Products
Manufacturers) and the Cámara de Sanidad Agropecuaria y Fertilizantes
(CASAFE Argentine Chamber of Plant Health and Fertilizer Products
Manufacturers).
406
The Sociedad Argentina de Ecología (Argentine Ecological
Society), was the only other non-state actor represented.
407
Thus the institutional
structure of the CONABIA permits industry actors to self-regulate themselves in
part.
The Insituto Nacional de Semillas (INASE - National Seeds Institute) and
the Servicio Nacional de Sanidad y Calidad Agroalimentaria (SENASA - National
Service for Agrifood Health and Quality) are responsible for monitoring GM field
trials. They conduct on-site verification of compliance with rules and biosafety
measures. They also conduct post-trial visits to look for harvest residues and gene
transfer. Other relevant regulatory institutes include the Instituto Argentino de
Sanidad y Calidad Agricultural y Veterinario (IASCAV Argentine Institute of
Plant Health and Quality), under the SAGPyA, and the Consejo Nacional de
Biotecnología y Salud Sub-comité de Alimentos (CONBySA the National
Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and Health, Subcommittee on Food).
There is no opportunity for broad-based public participation in this
institutional structure, nor are the decisions of the agencies submitted to review by

406
The ASA, the Foro and CASAFE act on the interests of MNCs such as Monsanto, Syngenta,
Pioneer and Bayer CropScience and major national companies (Joensen and Semino 2004, 6). The
main companies are members of all three organizations.
407
The Argentine Ecology Society is no longer functioning (Vicente 2006) and whether its
representatives ever attended the CONABIA meetings is doubtful.

290
independent researchers (Pengue 2004). Further industry and NGO interaction
with these institutions is examined in each of the policy sections below.

Intellectual Property Rights
Institutional Context
The debate regarding intellectual property rights for rDNA crops in
Argentina has been limited to mainly industry and governmental actors. Table 34
(below) lists the Argentine IPR legislation that applies to rDNA crops. Argentina
Table 34. Chronology of intellectual property-related laws and resolutions,
Argentina
Year Law
1973 Law on Seed and Phytogenetic Creations (Ley de Semillas y
Creaciones Fitogenéticas, No. 20,247)
1991 Regulatory Decree to the Law on Seed and Phytogenetic Creations
(Decreto Reglamentario de la Ley de Semillas y Creaciones
Fitogenéticas No. 2183/91)
1991 Decree 2817 Created INASE to manage the Law on Seeds.
1994 Law on Seed modified with accession to the UPOV, 1978 version
(Law No. 24, 376)
1995 Patents for Inventions and Processes (Patentes de Invención y
Modelos de Utilidad (No. 24, 425) No. 24, 481 - enacted 2000)
1996 Regulatory Decree (Reglamentario No. 260) prohibited the
patenting of plants and animals
1999 Law No. 24766 made the registry of confidential trade information
obligatory for agricultural and other products (to avoid fraud)
2000 Law No. 24575 modified the patent law to include pharmaceutical
products.
Source: Compiled from Oficina de Biotecnología 2005.
allows both plant breeders rights and patent protection for rDNA crops. With
regard to plant breeders rights, Argentina is a member of the 1978 version of the
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plant (UPOV), which
upholds farmers right to save seed for their own use. Argentine membership in

291
this international instrument echoed its own Seed Law (as per the 1991 up-
dates) which, like the international law, allowed farmers to save and use seed
from their own harvests (Article 44)
408
(Boletín Oficial 1991). Farmers rights are
limited in that they are not allowed to exchange, share or sell their seed with their
neighbors (GRAIN 1998). The Seed Law penalizes distribution of unregistered
seed (by farmers or corporate actors) with fines and seed confiscation. Although
patenting for rDNA technology was first legislated in 1995 -- gene constructs and
gene alteration processes can be patented -- direct patenting of plants and animals
is prohibited by Decree No. 260 of 1996 (Qaim and Traxler 2005, 75). Though
both plant breeders rights (PBRs) and patents are partially constrained, this
combination of PBRs plus patenting puts Argentinas policies in the permissive
category.
GM crops can be deemed intellectual property under the Patent law or
under the Seed Law. The patent law was amended in 1995 and in 2000 in order to
accommodate TRIPS obligations (Vitagliano and Villalpando 2003, 40). After the
change in 2000, between 2000 and 2002, 480 applications were made relating to
biotechnology. Of those only 21 or 4.4% were from national firms -- all others
were from MNCs, --and more than half of the applications (254) were for rDNA
crops (Vitagliano and Villalpando 2003, 40).
409
As in Brazil and India, reasons for
the disparity in the number of national versus foreign applicants resulted in part

408
The first Seed Law of 1973 did not specifically allow farmers to save or use seed, although this
was the dominant practice.
409
Although Argentina decided to allow patenting, arguments in opposition that it would lead to
surplus extraction through excessive royalty payments soon began to ring true.

292
from the absence of a culture of patenting. The lack of experience with
recognizing or knowing what is patentable, the lack of institutional support for
patenting, as well as its high costs all contributed to the scarcity of national patent
applicants (Vitagliano and Villalpando 2003, 41).
Under the PBRs law, proprietary titles can be given for plant varieties,
which must be registered in the Registro Nacional de la Propiedad de Cultivares
(RNPC National Registry for Proprietary Varieties). From 1991-2000 the
Insituto Nacional de Semillas (INASE - National Seeds Institute) was responsible
for granting such titles.
410
The Asociación de Protección de las Obtenciones
Vegetales
411
(ARPOV - Association for the Protection of Vegetable Varieties) has
charge of administering and monitoring the licenses for the varieties. The
National Seed Commission (CONASE Comisión Nacional de Semillas) and the
National Service for Agrifood Health and Quality (SENASA - Servicio Nacional
de Sanidad y Calidad Agroalimentaria), both under the SAGPyA, implement the
Seed Law. The CONASE is made up of 5 governmental officials and 5 members
from the private sector, including one representative of plant breeders, two
representatives of seed producers and marketers, and two farmer representatives.
Decisions are made by simple majority. This structure purposely gives industry

410
In 2000 the INASEs functions were absorbed by the Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock,
Fisheries and Food (SAGPyA) (because of the economic crisis facing the nation at that time),
which became responsible for the Registry (Vitagliano and Villalpando 2003, 41). The INASE
was reinstated in 2003 (Chudnovsky 2005, 10).
411
This organization includes branches of MNCs, national companies, and public institutions like
the INTA, universities and cooperatives (Vitagliano and Villalpando 2003, 42).

293
actors a large voice in deciding and monitoring how IPR legislation is
implemented.
Non-State Actor Involvement
Although IPRs (both patents and PBRs) are allowed for transgenic crops,
the first GM crop to be used in Argentina, glyphosate-tolerant soybeans, was not
patented under national law because a patent request was not made in a timely
manner. The foreign gene construct for this variety of soybeans (which is patented
in the US and some other countries) was originally imported into Argentina by
Asgrow Argentina, under an agreement between the US headquarter offices of
Asgrow and Monsanto. Later, Asgrow Argentina was acquired by Nidera S.A.,
which widely disseminated a GM variety with the same gene construct after it
was commercially approved. Monsanto requested revalidation of its patent on the
gene construct in 1995, but was refused because the request had not been made
within the time limits allowed by the law in force. Also, the gene construct had
already been released, so it was no longer novel.
412
Monsanto took the case all the
way to the Argentine Supreme Court, which rendered its decision (no
revalidation) in 2001 (Chudnovsky 2005, 11).
Given this situation, Monsanto developed its own GM soy bean varieties
using the glyphosate-resistant gene construct and licensed them to other
companies in Argentina which did agree to pay it royalties. However, since its
patent request was refused, Monsanto was not able to charge a technology fee for

412
Novelty is a standard international requirement for IPRs.

294
those varieties, as it did in other countries. Nor was it able to restrict the use of
seed with the gene by farmers, a strategy it employed in other countries. This
unique IPR situation has resulted in the marketing of GM soybeans by a variety of
companies without patents (Qaim and Alain de Janvry 2003).
413

The history of the GM soybean IPR situation in Argentina is important
because it was the first GM crop and the principal GM crop grown in Argentina
as of 2002. However, its IPR history was an exception, and the trajectory of IPRs
for Bt cotton exhibits the more standard scenario for GM crops in Argentina.
Monsanto has a national patent over Bt cotton technology, and Genética Mandiyú
is the sole licensed provider of Bt cotton seeds (Qaim and Alain de Janvry
2003).
414
In addition to standard IPRs, Genética Mandiyú introduced special
purchase contracts for Bt cotton. These contracts prohibit the use of farm-saved
seeds, specify requirements for non-Bt refuge areas, state that the cotton produced
may be handled only by certain authorized gins, and require permission for field
inspections and monitoring by company employees (Qaim and Alain de Janvry
2003). These requirements are enforced by the companies themselves: since these
stipulations fall outside of national seed law regulations they are not enforced by
public agricultural authorities.

413
Because of this competition, Monsanto withdrew with the Argentine GM soy-seed market in
2004, but continued to supply the agro-chemicals that go with the GM seed (in particular Roundup
Ready
®
glyphosate herbicide, its main profit-making product).
414
Bt cotton seeds were first commercialized in Argentina in 1998 (Qaim and Alain de Janvry
2003).

295
In 2000, the main GM soy seed companies decided to require a similar
type of contract for extended royalty payments in order to capture more profits.
The contracts covered new soy and wheat varieties and required farmers to pay a
fee for farm-saved seeds (Qaim and Traxler 2005, 75). Like the contracts with
cotton farmers, these are private bilateral agreements that limit farmers rights
enshrined in Argentine law. Proceeds from the contracts are shared by the
companies involved (Joensen and Semino 2004, 7). This use of private,
individual-level IPRs is a strategy followed by corporate actors in other countries
as well as Argentina.
GM corn, being a hybrid, has ingrained protection against reproduction
that GM soy and cotton do not.
415
This built-in protection makes it easier for
companies to capture IPR profits from corn. As with the case of GM cotton,
suppliers of GM corn have been able to charge monopoly prices for the GM
varieties,
416
and have had more control over the market.
Summary
Argentinas IPR policies are promotional in that patenting is allowed, as
are PBRs for transgenic crops. However its Seed Law also gives farmers the right
to save seed for their own use, which would give Argentina a precautionary
classification. Since Argentinas policies are a mixture of promotional and

415
Hybrid seeds are hand pollinated using inbred lines. Although hybrid seed can be replanted,
they only produce uniform results the first year. Open-pollinated seeds are pollinated by nature
(wind, bees, etc.) and if replanted they produce the same results year after year. With respect to
rDNA crops, cotton and soy seeds are open-pollinated and while GM corn varieties are hybrid.
Gene escape can occur with both open-pollinated and hybrid plants and is most likely to occur
when closely related plants are nearby.
416
For both GM cotton and GM corn, companies utilized a strategy of global pricing for the seed.

296
precautionary elements of the classification framework, I categorize
Argentinas in the middle category between these two options: that is, as
permissive.
Table 35. IPR policies for transgenic crops in Argentina
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive

Patent
protection plus
plant breeders
rights (PBR)
under UPOV
1991
PBR under
UPOV 1991
PBR under
UPOV 1978
No IPRs for
plants or
animals
1996 Both PBRs and
patents are
allowed for
rDNA crops.
Farmers have
the right to save
seed.

1997 No change.
1998 No change.
1999 No change.
2000 No change.
2001 No change.
2002 No change.

Trade
Institutional Context
Argentina is the third largest soy producer in the world, after the US and
Brazil, and is a main exporter. Only about 2% of the soy grown in Argentina stays
in the country. Most of the rest of the soy (about 70%) is converted at oil-

297
processing plans and exported as oil or meal. As of 2001, Argentina provided
81% of the worlds exported soy oil and 36% of the meal (Pengue 2001).
Argentinas main export partners for the 1996-2002 period were Brazil,
the US, Chile, the EU (in particular Spain) China, and Uruguay. With respect to
soy, most Argentine soy meal goes to the EU (about 80%) (Greenpeace 1996), its
soybeans go to the EU and China, and its soy oil goes primarily to Asia and the
Middle East (Livellara n.d.). For example, in 1999, 40% of soybeans and 60% of
soy pellets went to Europe. In short, the European market for soy is very
important to Argentine exporters.
From 1996 onwards, GM soy figured prominently in Argentine soy
exports as there was no separation between transgenic and conventional soy.
Since it was first grown, GM soybean use has exploded from 1% of all soy
planted in 1996/1997 to over 90% of the 12 million hectares of soy planted in
2001/2002 (Trigo and Cap 2003, 88, Boletim 2000). By 2002, virtually all
soybean production in Argentina was GM.
In 2001, soy exports represented almost 18% of the dollar value of all
Argentine exports, surpassing even the gas and oil export sector, which accounted
for 16% (Livellara n.d).
417
Between 1996 and 2001, soy exports from Argentina
grew by more than 35%, while other cereal exports decreased by 8% (Livellara
n.d). Put differently, between 1997 and 2003, Argentina moved from being a
major food exporter of a variety of crops to a soy republic, strongly dependent

417
Overall, agricultural export products are very important to the Argentine economy, comprising
over 60% of the total exports.

298
on exporting soy. In sum, the advent of GM crops brought about changes in
Argentine trade patterns with GM soy becoming increasingly important.
Trade in GM crops is regulated by the same institutions as traditional
agricultural imports and exports, that is, principally by the SAGPyA. Approval for
GM crops, for both experimentation and commercial trade, is subject to biosafety
and food safety regulations, which are discussed in the relevant sections below.
With respect to trade, SAGPyA Resolution No. 289 of 1997 established a specific
requirement that all GMOs be reviewed by the Dirección Nacional de Mercados
Alimentarios (DNMA - National Directorate of Agrifood Markets) before being
approved for commercialization. The DNMA analyzes the convenience of GM
crops to avoid potential negative affects on Argentine exports (Zamudio 2005).
The DNMA is a sub-unit of the SAGPyA and is made up of governmental
researchers.
From 1996-2002, eight GM varieties were approved for commercial trade
in Argentina (see Table 36). All authorizations mirrored decisions by the
European Union (EU) (Vitagliano and Villalpando 2003, 44) because of the
importance of the EU market for Argentine exports and a desire to keep those
exports markets. However, the actions by some individual EU countries, such as
Italy, prohibiting transgenic crops approved by the EU as a whole, problematized
that strategy (Livellara n.d.).
In general, farming decisions and planning regarding the use of
conventional versus GM crop varieties were left to market forces, that is to the

299
aggregated choices of non-state actors. Like in India, beginning in the early
1990s, Argentina instituted neoliberal policy changes that changed the context for
national agriculture. Such changes included reducing taxes on imports, reducing
Table 36. Authorizations for commercial release of transgenic plants in
Argentina

Year Soy Corn Cotton
1996 Glyphosate-tolerant
transgenic soybeans

1997
1998 • Lepidoptera-
resistant
transgenic corn (2
varieties)
• Glyphosate-
resistant
transgenic corn (2
varieties, T14 and
T25)
Lepidoptera larva-
resistant transgenic
cotton
1999 Authorization for T
14 (glyphosate-
resistant corn)
revoked because its
commercialization
was not allowed in
the EU
418

2000
2001 Lepidoptera-resistant
transgenic corn
Glyphosate-resistant
transgenic cotton
2002
Source: Oficina de Biotecnología 2005, 298-305.
funding for research and agriculture extension activities, closing the state
institutions that provided agricultural credit and assisted the commercialization of

418
The EU denied authorization for this variety due to evidence of its acute oral toxicity in food
safety tests with rats (Kuiper et. al. 2001, 511).

300
agricultural products, closing the agencies that regulated prices for agricultural
products, and liberalizing imports of capital and capital goods as well as the
outflow of remittances (Souza 2004, 2). The implementation of these policies
meant that most subsidies
419
and minimum prices for agricultural products were
eliminated. These policies also opened the door for new actors in Argentine
agriculture, such as sowing and investment pools, and furthered the participation
of vertically integrated MNCs.
420
After those changes, compared to India, the US
and the EU, state programs for agriculture in Argentina were negligible.
Non-State Actor Involvement
Industry actors involvement in trade issues relating to GM crops varied
by industry-actor type and also by the kind of GM crop (soy, corn or cotton).
421

Three groups of industry actors had the most influence: MNCs, national agro-
chemical companies, and large soy growers. Those industry actors opposed to
GM crops included small and organic farmers. Industry actors strategies and
conflicts relating to GM crops are addressed first, followed by efforts by NGOs.

419
New subsidies for exports were created while other types of subsidies ended.
420
These changes led to the domination of foreign-based MNCs in the most dynamic crops, a shift
to international strategies of linking seed, herbicides and fertilizers favored by these companies,
and a reduced relative influence of local-suppliers as they were taken over by MNCs ( Bisang
2003, 7).
421
While 90% of soy grown in Argentina is GM, as of 2002 only about 25% of corn planted was
GM, and about 8% of the cotton was transgenic. The high cost of seed, monopoly conditions, and
uneven harvest results all contributed to the lower rates of adoption of GM corn and cotton. Given
the prominence of GM soy in the Argentine economy, it merits more attention than the other,
lesser used, GM crops.

301
When GM soy was released commercially, severe erosion and weeds
were the top problems facing soy farmers.
422
The GM variety used direct
tilling
423
, which cut down on erosion, and was designed to be resistant to the
herbicide glyphosate, which addressed the weed problem.
424

After GM crops were effectively introduced into Argentina, the happy
marriage of interests between MNCs, national agro-chemical companies, and
large soy growers began to show fissures. The initial expansion of the GM seed
market into Argentina was a specific strategy forwarded by MNCs, as the country
provided an important off-season source of seed production.
425
MNCs also
purchased national seed companies, or licensed their technology to other
companies in order to expand the GM market. For example, Monsantos
purchases of Dekalb and Cargills seed operations put more than half of the
Argentine maize market under its control and it licensed its GM soy technology to
Nidera, which controlled 60% of the national soy seed market (GRAIN 1998).
These strategies gave MNCs access to local germplasm and greater market
access.
426

422
These were the top problems facing the Pampas, a historically important agricultural region in
Argentina where most soy was grown.
423
This is also referred to as direct-tilling, no-tillage and drill-tilling.
424
While decreasing the rate of erosion, the GM direct-till farming has created other problems
including depletion of soil nutrients, emergence of new pests and diseases, and herbicide-resistant
weeds (Pengue 2001).
425
MNCs imported GM technology into Argentina and almost 90% of the field trials permits for
rDNA crops have been given to MNCs, not to the traditional agricultural research community
which was made up of governmental institutions and universities (Burachik and Traylor 2002, 2).
Not surprisingly, all of the varieties that had been commercially released by 2002 were owned by
MNCs.
426
As noted in the earlier chapters, Monsanto used similar strategies in Brazil and India.

302
In the beginning (1996), MNCs made GM soybeans widely and easily
accessible. Since credit was difficult for farmers to obtain, seed and chemical
distributors gave packages of seed and inputs to farmers, who paid after the
harvest.
427
The following year (1997) farmers were rudely surprised by the
demands for a royalty fee (US $13 for 50kg of seed), and a requirement to sign a
contract agreeing not to save seed (GRAIN 1998). The Argentine Farmers
Federation
428
(Federación Agraria Argentina -FAA) contested the contract
requirement and won, since Argentine PBR legislation permits farmers to save
seed (GRAIN 1998). The following year Monsanto created a new contract one
stating that farmers acknowledged the use of Monsantos property in the seed and
that they would abide by industrial patent law- in spite of the fact that Monsanto
did not even hold a patent for the technology in Argentina. Farmers who would
not sign the contact were not sold seed
429
(GRAIN 1998). Monsanto, as the
monopoly supplier of Bt cotton seed, utilized a similar strategy of demanding that
the farmer sign a private contract before selling the seed. Besides forcing the
farmer to give up her or his legal right to save the seed (el productor con la
semilla adquirida realizará una sola siembra the producer of the acquired seed

427
Grain companies also rented land to grow soy (Joensen and Semino 2004, 7). Since 2002, this
practice has been the norm (for most crops) as bank credits dried up (Carballo 2004, 24). By
becoming the main agricultural credit providers, these companies also have the power to control
who grows what.
428
This organization is made up of small farmers.
429
GM soybean seed was sold primarily by Nidera, a national company licensing Monsantos
technology. Monsanto pressured Nidera and other seed companies to enforce the new contract
stipulation.

303
will realize only one planting), the contract obligated the farmer to sell the
entire harvest to only certain ginning factories (Souza 2004, 23).
With these extended royalty contracts, Monsanto requires farmers to pay
US$2.00 plus tax for each 50 kg bag of GM soy seeds that they save from their
own harvests for their own use (GRAIN 2004). Although these contracts violated
the Seed Law the government of Argentina did not object.
430
The extended
royalty contracts were critical to Monsanto in that they enabled the company to
profit from the Roundup Ready
®
soybeans and Round Up
®
herbicide sales for not
only that year but future years as well.
431
In a way, the contracts also allowed the
MNC to control when, where and how crops were grown, an element that is
becoming more critical to control the global food system.
432

430
At that time the government followed a general policy of not interfering in private business,
which could explain a lack of action. The importance of the companies using these contracts
within the agricultural export sector may be another reason the government decided not to act.
431
In 2004 Monsanto announced the suspension of its soybean business in Argentina because it
was not profitable (GRAIN 2004, La Opinión de Rafaela 2004). This happened after soy had
largely replaced other crops. The company blamed its withdrawal from the soy seed sector on the
loss of royalties due to illegal or unbranded seed. Only about 18% of soy seed were certified and
branded as of 2004 in Argentina. The company emphasized that this decision was not to be seen as
pressuring the government (GRAIN 2004, La Opinión de Rafaela 2004). Nonetheless, a few days
later the Secretary of Agriculture announced that the government was considering a global
royalties law that included a technology compensation fund. The law would tax soy farmers upon
the sale of their crops and the tax money would go to Monsanto. Farmers organizations widely
denounced the bill, but the President sent it to some Parliamentary committees, who then
postponed it. Monsanto then undertook a new strategy (as of Aug. 2004 and still attempting as of
2006), of collecting royalties on shipments of Argentine soybeans (or at least delay unloading)
whenever shipments reach a country where Monsantos gene patent is in force. The Government
of Argentina (via the Secretary of Agriculture) denounced the companys new strategy as
extortion and also denounced other Monsanto tactics (of charging royalties on RR soy although
the patent is not recognized) as not taking place through legal, institutional channels (Infobae
2004). After this denunciation, the Secretary then met with representatives from Monsanto and the
major national seed companies and they agreed to push the technology compensation fund through
in 45 days, via a new law or a Ministerial Resolution (GRAIN 2004, Varise 2004).
432
For example, a company could license the use of its seed in another country, say Colombia, but
not allow the product of the seed to be exported. This is not a hypothetical situation, but an
existing practice.

304
Dr. Nestor Vittori, of the Confederación de Asociaciones Rurales de
Santa Fe (CARSFE - Confederation of Rural Associations of Santa Fe), noted that
Monsanto initially brought the GM seed without conditions, and Jorge Rulli of
Grupo de Reflexión Rural pointed out how those initial concessions for
multiplication without patenting helped to both launch and rapidly spread the
massive use of Roundup Ready
®
soy in Argentina (GRR 2005 and Rulli 2006).
Felipe Solá, the Minister of Agriculture in 1996, had initially licensed Roundup
Ready
®
soy with the understanding that Argentine farmers would be exempt from
patent royalties on Monsanto products (Rulli 2004). The initial absence of pricey
IPRs on GM soybeans and the fact that farmers could save their own seed, helped
to push down the price of GM soybean seed.
For both GM corn and cotton varieties, MNCs implemented monopoly
rights over the seeds from the beginning, and the seeds were more expensive than
conventional alternatives. Monsanto charged four times the price of conventional
varieties for transgenic cotton seed (Qaim and Alain de Janvry 2003, 820), and
GM corn seed was 20-35% more expensive than conventional hybrids (Souza
2004, 22).
Later, white bag
433
operations in which seed multipliers sell seed
without authorization from the companies holding IPRs, and without the
assurances of branded seed, also kept the price of GM soybean seed low
(Chudnovsky 2005, 11). White bag operations were strategies used by national

433
White-bagging is usually referred to as brown-bagging in North America. These seeds are
unbranded, that is, they are sold in plain white bags with no certification or guarantees.

305
companies and seed growers to capture greater profits from their respective
activities. White-bagging, or selling saved seed to other farmers of GM soy
continued from 1996 to 2001, when Monsanto began to threaten farmers over the
use of illegal seed, and to demand that the government of Argentina enforce
what it considered its rights. The traditional, legal practice of white-bagging led to
the availability of black market transgenic cotton seed as well.
434
GM corn is
hybrid, which do not breed true, so no parallel market for GM corn seeds
developed.
Another strategy that industry actors (both MNCs and national actors)
used to promote the continued use of GM crops was to link production to national
food aid programs, such as Soja Solidaria (Soy Solidarity) - which involved the
(initially) free distribution of GM soy products to the poorest sectors of the
population (Pengue 2004, 9). Soja Solidaria was started to promote the
consumption of GM soybeans among the poor, especially children. Ironically,
food aid programs were needed in Argentina, a country that previously produced
10 times the amount of food it consumed, in part because of the overwhelming
switch to soy. Pro-GM trade associations promoted these programs together with
NGOs, such as CARITAS. The government of Argentina later reduced its support

434
The use of uncertified, white-bagged seeds is common among all types of cotton growers, and
represented about 40% of all cotton seed used in 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 (Qaim and Alain de
Janvry 2003). White-bagged cotton seed is traditionally traded at the cotton ginning factories
Under the Seed Law farmers can save seed for future harvests. Official Bt seed costs US$103 per
hectare and white-bagged seed costs $35-40 per hectare.

306
for these programs in the face of strong public protest spearheaded by critical
NGOs.
The industry actors who have suffered most in Argentina from the
introduction of GM crops, and in particular soy, have been medium and small-
scale family farms. Rural employment decreased as almost no labor is needed for
direct tilling - which requires enormous machines that only large-scale holdings
can afford to use. About 150,000 farming families were driven off the land and
land holdings became more concentrated, with the GM soy-growing region
experiencing the greatest concentration (Pengue 2001). From 1998-2002 the
number of farms decreased by 21%, while the average farm size increased by
almost 100 hectares (Chudnovsky 2005, 19). Much of the land under soy
cultivation passed into the hands of investors, including foreign tycoons,
agronomists, bankers and medium farmers who leased their land to sowing pools
and lived from the rent. After the currency collapse in December 2001 only export
crops remained profitable, so more land was put under soy production.
The people of small towns neighboring GM fields and farmers of non-GM
crops also suffered from increased herbicide pollution with the use of GM crops.
Toxic agricultural chemicals which are sprayed from airplanes often drift onto
neighbors and contaminate the water supply.
435
While illegal, this has been a
recurring problem.

435
Herbicide-tolerant soy was designed to be used with herbicide, of course. During the yearly
recommended crop rotation, this GM-soy becomes a weed, which needs another, more toxic,
herbicide to kill it.

307
Other losers in the shift to GM soy were the environment and urban
consumers. Besides chemical pollution, the rapid soy expansion has also led to
massive destruction of forests, in particular the Yungas and Chaco forests of
northern Argentina, and other ecosystems.
436
The destruction of the forests
sparked protests by agrarian families desperate to preserve their land and efforts
by environmentally-focused NGOs to stop the soy expansion (Benbook 2005).
For urban populations, the increasingly soy monoculture meant that Argentina
started importing higher priced staple foods, such as milk.
The first NGO efforts in Argentina against trade and commerce in
transgenic crops began in 1997. Overall, NGO strategies in this policy area
included highlighting damages to Argentine export markets and loss of higher
value markets because of the use of GM crops. As use of GM crops expanded
exponentially, they framed the negative consequences in terms of dependency and
neo-colonialism, for example of Argentina becoming a Soya Republic. NGOs
also criticized harms to the national economy, such weakened food security and
the advent of widespread hunger in the country. The strategies of particular
NGOs were related to their resource and knowledge bases. For example, the
Grupo de Reflexión Rural (GRR), an organization which originally did research
on the rural sector, followed a strategy of criticizing the agricultural export model
upon which the use of GM crops is based. As the use of GM soy expanded, the

436
The increase in soy cropland came from deforestation (41%), take over of pastures (27%), and
a conversion of land growing wheat, corn, sunflowers and sorghum (25%) (Benbrook 2005b).

308
GRR also focused its efforts more on demonstrating the negative impacts of
the GM agriculture, particularly on food security and health.
Greenpeace, another of the main NGO actors in Argentina on GM crops,
utilized various strategies. One strategy Greenpeace was to follow Argentine
exports to Europe closely, aided by Greenpeace sister offices abroad. In 2000,
Argentina captured part of the European corn market because it was able to offer
GM-free corn. That same year, Greenpeace denounced the illegal use of
Monsantos GM corn in Argentina. While GM accounted for less than 15% of all
corn produced in Argentina, it was mixed in with conventional corn exports.
When traces of the illegal GM corn variety were found in shipments to Europe,
which prohibited that variety, the shipments were returned. Needless to say, the
illegal dispersion of GM corn jeopardized other Argentine corn sales to Europe.
Although Argentina follows a trade policy of mirroring EU policies precisely for
this reason, the company which had given out the illegal GM corn seed was not
sanctioned. While Greenpeace strategy of monitoring GM shipments did not
results in changes to Argentine policy, it is likely that foreign officials tested
Argentine imports more often after this incident.
Neither industry actors nor NGO actors had direct access to the DNMA,
but industry actors were included in other regulatory entities under the SAGPyA
related to transgenic crops. Most interaction on trade issues between NGOs and
regulatory institutions occurred through the media, but NGO also lobbied and

309
corresponded with the regulatory entities. Industry actors also used the media
but occasionally negotiated directly with governmental actors, as noted above.
Summary
In terms of exports, Argentina does not differentiate between rDNA seeds
or plants with conventional varieties. Conventional and GM varieties are mixed
for the most part, with the exception of higher value-added products, such as
organic produce or premium conventional varieties. Argentinas official policy
was to leave all decisions regarding trade in GM crops up to industry actors, with
the notable exception of approving those GM varieties that had first been
approved in the EU. This exception was made for trade reasons unrelated to the
SPSS agreement. Transgenic seed and plant materials cannot be freely imported --
they must undergo screening by the CONABIA, which is discussed further in the
next section. Thus partially for economic reasons, and partially for biosafety
reasons, Argentinas trade policy fits into the precautionary category. Industry
actors (both MNC and national) followed strategies that promoted the use of GM
crops in Argentina. While NGOs influence on trade in GM crops was much less
than that of industry actors, their efforts led to the rejection of some exports of
GM crops by trade partners.

310
Table 37. Trade policies for transgenic crops in Argentina
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
No regulation
of rDNA seeds
or plant
materials
Regulate rDNA
seeds and plant
materials in
accordance
with SPS
agreement and
no more tightly
than non-RDNA
crops
Regulate rDNA
seeds and plant
materials more
tightly and with
different
screenings or
requirements
Block all rDNA
imports through
ban or
moratorium
1996 Commercializa-
tion and export
of rDNA seeds
and products
limited by
economic
considerations.
Import
restricted for
biosafety
considerations.

1997 No change.
1998 No change.
1999 No change.
2000 No change.
2001 No change.
2002 No change.

Biosafety
Institutional Context
Biosafety and food safety (next section) have been the two main issues
where most opposition to transgenic crops has been voiced. Transgenic crops are
regulated in Argentina, and their producers must obey the general regulations for
agriculture. Table 38 (below) lists both the general regulations for agriculture and

311
Table 38. Chronology of biosafety-related laws and resolutions
Year Law
1966 Decree Law of Agricultural Production Health Defense No. 6704/66
and amendments
1973 Seed and Phytogenetic Creations Law No. 20,247/73 and its regulatory
decree (No. 2183 of 1991)
1991 Resolution No. 124 of the SAGPyA Creates CONABIA
1992 Resolution No. 656 of the SAGPyA Defines conditions of
environmental releases of GMOs.
1993 Resolution No. 669 of the SAGPyA Refines CONABIA
responsibilities.
1993 Resolution No. 837 of the SAGPyA Refines conditions for
environmental releases of GMOs.
1997 Resolution No. 226 of the SAGPyA Addresses GMO experiment
permits (isolation conditions)
1997 Resolution No. 289 of the SAGPyA - Modifies No. 837/93. Stipulates
protections for confidential information and requirements for GMO
commercialization. Establishes SENASAs jurisdiction over GM foods.
Requires DNMA review prior to commercialization.
1997 Resolution No. 328 of the SAGPyA Refines CONABIA
responsibilities.
1998 Resolution No. 131 of the SAGPyA Defines flexibility permits for
GMOS.
1998 Resolution No. 511 of the SAGPyA Defines SENASA GM food
safety review criteria.
1999 Disposition No. 007 SAGPyA
437
Environmental release of stacked
gene GM plants.
1999 Disposition No. 009 SAGPyA Authorizes flexible procedures for the
review of GM crops that have passed the first field test for
environmental approval.
Source: Compiled from Oficina de Biotecnología 2005.
the special regulations for rDNA crops. Biosafety regulations in Argentina call for
the regulation and testing of any product derived from a process of genetic
engineering. This means that all GMOs and transgenic plants must undergo
testing (Field et. al. 2000, 13). Transgenic crops began being field tested in

437
This disposition and No. 009 were issued by the Dirección Nacional de Producción y Economía
Agropecuaria y Forestal (National Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry Production and Economy)
of the SAGPyA.

312
Argentina in 1991, following their screening and case-by-case approval.
Based on this first year of field trials, CONABIA saw the need for specific
biosafety regulations for GMOs and passed a resolution outlining the conditions
for environmental releases of GMOs (which were mainly plants at that point).
Early regulations have since been replaced with Resolution No. 289 of 1997,
which established requirements relating to the commercialization of GMOs
including industry actor-favored protections for confidential information.
Although analyzed on a case-by-case basis, applications for environmental
releases of GMOS are reviewed only with respect to the intended use of the GMO
and its potential impact on the environment, farming or public health in relation to
that use. Information for experimental GM crops can come from Argentine field
tests or from tests done outside the country.
438
Companies are made liable for
unforeseen effects, but company information is accepted in good faith. NGOs
have asked that the burden of proof of risk, which rests with those opposed to GM
technology, be reversed so that instead GM crops must be demonstrated to be safe
(GRAIN 1998).
All experiments with GM crops and any imports of GM plant material
have to have prior approval. The Servicio Nacional de Sanidad y Calidad
Agroalimentaria (SENASA -National Service of Agrifood Health and Quality)

438
The climatic conditions of Argentina are analogous to those of the Northern hemisphere, which
facilitated initial GM experiments and monitoring. Although Argentina does have biodiversity
concerns beyond those of the Northern hemisphere -Argentina is among the 25 most bio-diverse
countries, and is in the top 17 for plants-

the country was not a center for biodiversity for the main
GM crops being developed, as India or Mexico were. Thus, for the first GM seed tested and
commercialized in Argentina, gene flow biosafety concerns were minor and the regulatory
structure reflected that context.

313
administers plant-quarantine, regulations and phytosanitary requirements for
both GM and non-GM seeds and plant materials. The SENASA refers any
transgenic plant or seeds imports to CONABIA for evaluation, and holds any GM
materials in quarantine until they have been approved. CONABIA is responsible
for evaluating the GM material for research before it is allowed to be imported, as
well as for evaluating all field tests of GM crops (Burachik and Tranor 2001, 14).
After the initial application for field tests is approved, inspections by CONABIA,
INASE and SENASA officials are held during the field test time. From 1991-
1996, when the first GM variety was commercially approved, varieties of
transgenic cotton, soybeans, corn, rapeseed (canola), sugarbeet, sunflower, wheat,
and potato were field tested following this process. From 1996-2002, eight GM
varieties of three crops --soy, corn and cotton -- received commercial approval.
While only 8 varieties had received commercial approval by 2002, CONABIA
had evaluated and authorized field tests for 564 varieties between 1991 and 2002
(Vitagliano and Villalpando 2003, 44).
After the variety has been through the initial biosafety approval process
which includes field testing, an applicant may request a flexibility permit for the
crop. Upon receiving a flexibility permit, the applicant needs only to notify
CONABIA of the place and date of sowing and harvest so that CONABIA
officials can perform inspections at the time of harvest and final disposal of the
product. In 1996, GM soybeans and corn were given a flexibility permit. In 1998,

314
6 other types of transgenic corn received these permits and in 1999, GM
cotton received a flexible permit.
Besides a flexibility permit, in order for a GM crop to be given a
commercial permit by the CONABIA, the variety must meet both the standard
requirements of the SENASA and specific requirements for transgenic crops.
439
It
must also pass a technical review by the DNMA, the purpose of which is to avoid
any potential negative impacts on Argentine exports (CONABIA 1998,
Chudnovsky 2005, 4).
440
GM crops that are not destined for export (such as
cotton) do not have to go through this marketing review (Burachik and Traynor
2001, 5).
After a variety receives a commercial permit, it must be registered with
the Registro Nacional de Cultivares (National Plant Registry) and Régimen de
Fiscalización (Inspection System). Registry applicants must comply with all
Insituto Nacional de Semillas (INASE - National Seeds Institute)
441
requirements.
Registry is standard for both conventional and GM crop varieties. However, GM
crops must be registered, while this is optional for conventional varieties. In sum,
the CONABIA evaluates applications for experimental, flexibility and

439
These requirements are laid out in SAGPyA Resolution No. 511/98. SENASA reviews safety
criteria for GMOs that will be used as food or feed for the following: natural toxins, new toxins,
allergens, nutritional changes, and safety for human and animal health (CONABIA 1998).
440
The market assessment is based on a current and prospective analysis of the trade and
regulatory situation in foreign markets currently importing commodities from Argentina. A
rejected application may be resubmitted should market conditions change (Burachik and Traylor
2001, 6).
441
In 2000 the INASE was folded into the SAGPyA. However this downgrading of institutional
status led to reduced efficiency and was thought to facilitate the growth of illegal trade in seeds so
it was reinstated as an autonomous organization in 2003 (Chudnovsky 2005, 10).

315
commercial permits and prepares resolutions regarding such permits. While it
is the SAGPyA which is ultimately responsible for granting authorizations (or
not), through such resolutions the CONABIA is, in effect, the main policy-making
entity for GM crops in Argentina for various policy areas. With the increasing
number of requests for GM field trials and experience in monitoring such trials,
SAGPyA personnel have taken on more of these responsibilities, while
CONABIA members have worked on novel types of requests for GM releases
(Field et. al. 2000, 21). Unlike in the other case studies, the Secretariat of
Environment and Sustainable Development has had only limited involvement in
the biosafety review process, and its involvement began only in 2000, when the
Secretariat was allowed to have one representative on the CONABIA.
In 2002, Argentina began reviewing its biosafety framework in order to
assure that it could meet the requirements of the Biosafety Protocol. Argentina
has adhered to but not ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity, but as a
GM exporting country, it needs to be able to implement the procedures called for
by the Biosafety Protocol. Whenever national legislation is lacking, Argentine
institutes such as the Institute Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA -
National Insitute of Agricultural and Fishery Technology) use a policy of
following the relevant international agreements, where they exist. In this review
process industry actors again had more opportunity to make their voices heard.
Consultations were held at EXPOCHACRA and FERIAGRO
442
to explore what

442
These are the main yearly trade shows/conventions for farm products.

316
agricultural producers who used GM seeds thought about Argentinas
biosafety framework. Consultations were also undertaken in supermarkets in the
capital and surrounding urban areas to record consumers perceptions (Vitagliano
and Villalpando 2003, 53).
Since the Argentine biosafety system is based on resolution guidelines,
and not legislation, legal enforcement is difficult.
443
Compliance with bio-safety
requirements such as maintaining refuge areas has been monitored by industry
actors. Such compliance is highest for cotton (85-90%), which is sold with private
contract agreements, and but only about 68% for corn.
444
There is an official
requirement of 20% refuge area for cotton, and a recommended (but not requried)
refuge area for Bt corn. No refuge area is required for GM soy, which is
herbicide-tolerant, not biopesticidal. White-bagged cotton seed does not carry
information with it about refuge areas, and it is unlikely that purchasers of this
type of seed establish them.
Non-State Actor Involvement
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, industry actors have structured
access to the CONABIA as an institution and their assistance in designing
regulations for GM products is welcomed (Newell 2002, 20). Only those non-
state actors with concrete commercial interests in GM crops were part of the

443
The resolutions provide the rules or guidelines for actions, but do not stipulate sanction
information that legislation normally includes.
444
Industry actors developed both refuge plans under the umbrella of the Argentine Seed Growers
Association (ASA). The percentages cited are based on an ASA monitoring of the plan in 2001
(Burachik and Traynor 2001, 33).

317
regulatory process - non-state actors that worked for the public good or
environment were not initially included. Not surprisingly, companies
unanimously agreed that CONABIA was working well and was doing a good job
(Burachik and Traynor 2001, 33). Industry actors worked for changes in
biosafety policy (such as the flexibility permit) from inside the biosafety structure.
NGO actors such as Greenpeace and GRAIN criticized this situation, noting that
Industry presence outweighs the public sector in CONABIA and there is a
blatant exclusion of the community, consumer and farmer organizations.
(GRAIN 1998). NGOs saw the government and corporate actors as working
toward a common goal of spreading the use of GM technology. For the most part,
this goal was accepted by citizens as part of national development.
Besides direct representation in the CONABIA, industry actors also had
considerable access to CONABIA members in other ways. Representatives from
CONABIA have attended national and international seminars, which were often
hosted by industrial associations, as both speakers and participants. CONABIA
members have also met with NGOs in national and international seminars, and
informally, but NGOs have had only limited formal access to the CONABIA.
445

Since CONABIA advises parliamentary representatives and senators on GM-
related issues, formal participation by industry actors within the CONABIA
affords industry actors far-reaching influence. Although CONABIA is the main

445
As noted in the introduction, there is one NGO on the CONABIA, the Sociedad Argentina de
Ecología, which is made up mainly of public sector researchers. I could not confirm whether or
not this organization continues to function, nor could I find anyone to interview on how its service
on the CONABIA compared to that of other actors, if indeed it was ever actually present.

318
biosafety institution, industry actors also had access to other entities of the
SAGPyA, in much the same way as in CONABIA. One outcome of industry
actorss structured access to and participation in regulatory institutes for GM
crops was the harmonization of Argentine regulatory features, such as
flexibilization, with US standards.
Besides criticizing the structure of the biosafety institutions in Argentina,
NGOs have worked to make sure that biosafety measures are implemented.
Greenpeace has been the main NGO actor in this regard. In 2000, it denounced
cultivation of an illegal transgenic tobacco variety by the US MNC Hail and
Cotton. Federal police seized more than three tons of illegal GM tobacco, but the
company was fined (a paltry) 1000 pesos (approximately US$995), and Argentine
taxpayers ended up paying for the damages to the affected producers (Greenpeace
2002, 3). Again in March 2001, Greenpeace began investigating the use of illegal
transgenic crops in different parts of the country. A few months later the NGO
denounced the illegal use of a transgenic corn variety owned by Monsanto, MAIZ
GA 21. Monsanto had clandestinely distributed the illegal corn variety to growers
of other varieties of its GM corn at EXPOCHACRA 2000 (Greenpeace 2001).
Greenpeace wrote to the Secretary of Agriculture in 2001 to ask that sanctions be
put on Monsanto after their illegal commercialization of transgenic corn
(Greenpeace 2002, 1). When Greenpeace initially asked the SAGPyA to confirm
which varieties were found growing illegally, the SAGPyA denied knowing
anything about it. However, the SAGPyA announced later that day, as

319
subsequently reported by the daily La Nación (10 May 2001) that they had
found and destroyed some illegal crops, and that they were making a report to
sanction the responsible parties. After being stonewalled by the SAGPyA,
Greenpeace went to the Public Defender to request its aid in securing access to
information about the case. The Public Defender replied on June 27, 2001 with
documentation that SENASA had known about the case since January 2001. In
spite these efforts, in July of 2001, SAGPyA officials informed Greenpeace that
they still could not provide further information about the case, as evidence was
being collected. Information about the incident was never disclosed, and no
sanctions were implemented.
In spite of repeated assertions by the SAGPyA that the illegal GM corn
had been destroyed, almost a year later (in March 2002) this same corn variety (of
Argentine origin) was found contaminating food products in the EU. This came to
light through a food safety strategy (of testing products found on supermarket
shelves for GM content) advanced by different Greenpeace offices internationally.
The aforementioned illegal Monsanto variety, MAIZ GA 21, which was not
approved for human consumption in Argentina nor in the EU, was found in
different corn-based food items produced by a Swiss supermarket chain.
Greenpeace activists from different European countries staged a symbolic direct
action of giving the polluted corn products back to Monsanto in front of one of
the Swiss supermarkets.

320
Another type of quasi-industry
446
actor, the Movimiento Argentino
para la Producción Orgánica (MAPO - Argentine Movement for Organic
Production), which represents about 1500 organic farmers, filed a suit against the
SAGPyA in 2001, to demand that it stop approving the use of and suspend all past
authorizations for Bt corn. Organic farmers wanted approval for Bt corn stopped
forever (Jones 2001), as it jeopardizes their production.
447
Organic farmers
received a price three times higher than that of conventional growers, and wanted
to protect their interests.
448
In 2000 MAPO went to the SAGPyA to work on an
urgent resolution (Res. 270 of 2000) to prohibit the use of transgenic seeds and
transgenic animal feed, in conjunction with new EU legislation on the latter.
While this resolution follows in the framework of protecting organic crops for
their export markets,
449
MAPO emphasized that the resolution was important so
that consumers would be able to eat transgenic-free foods. MAPO promoted the
use and maintenance of biodiverse crops by its members and criticized transgenic
crops for the damages they cause to the environment and biodiversity.
Another environment-related GM issue that the Grupo de Reflexión Rural
(GRR Rural Reflection Group) and other NGOs have helped small farmers and
the urban poor to denounce is the aerial spraying of soy fields and neighboring

446
While most of MAPO members are organic farmers, people without direct economic interests
(such as those interested in ecology and sustainable agriculture, and public sector scientists) are
also part of MAPO.
447
Their suit was not successful.
448
As of 2001 there were between 1500 and 1700 organic farmers in Argentina, up from 220 in
1995. Land under organic production also increased from 5,000 hectares in 1993 to about 3
million hectares in 2001 (Jones 2001). While organic farming in Argentina is growing, organic
farmers still only make up about 0.5 percent of Argentine farmers.
449
Most organic farmers in Argentine produce for export (about 90%).

321
lands. Often neighboring farmers crops (which are not resistant to the toxic
herbicide) and their farm animals die from the spraying, while the families
themselves suffer from immediate and long-term health problems. In the words of
one such farmer, Straight away our eyes started smarting. The childrens bare
legs came out in rashes. His wife added Almost all of our crops were badly
damaged. I couldnt believe my eyes. (Branford 2004, 40). Over the following
days and weeks the chickens and pigs died, and sows and goats gave birth to dead
or deformed young. Longer-term consequences such as a much greater incidence
of cancer are also already beginning to appear, as University of Formosa studies
document. In the above case, they and other affected villagers sued the tenant
farmer who had done the spraying and won but new tenants took over the land
and started spraying again. According to Jorge Rulli of GRR, those people who
live along the rivers are also experiencing higher cases of cancers (because the
water is contaminated by agro-chemicals), as are people in port cities where
transgenic grain is stored and shipped (Rulli 2006).
Summary
Argentina follows a case-by-case screening process based on the intended
use of the product, looking at risks associated with GM crops. While it does not
base its approval on other countries approvals, it does allow data from other
countries to be used in the evaluation process, and it does not approve GM
varieties that have not been approved in the EU. The latter is the result of
economic export considerations, and is not a biosafety measure. In other words,

322
Argentina has a permissive biosafety policy that has some promotional
elements to it.
Interestingly, both NGOs and industry actors have used strategies to
promote compliance with biosafety measures.
450
NGO strategies to make
biosafety policies more rigorous were not successful, but in individual cases they
were partially effective. Biotech industry actors were happy with the Argentine
biosafety framework, and they went beyond governmental oversight to promote
compliance with biosafety rules and recommendations.
Table 39. Biosafety policies for transgenic crops in Argentina
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
No screening or
token screening
only, or
approval based
on other
countries
approval
Screening for
demonstrated
risk, based on
intended use of
product
Comprehensive
screening for
demonstrated
risks and
scientific
uncertainties
No approval
because risk
assumed
1996 Case-by case
screening for all
GM plants,
based on the
intended use in
agriculture.

1997 No change.
1998 No change.
1999 No change.
2000 No change.
2001 No change.
2002 No change.

450
Industry actors promoted compliance with biosafety measures because such measures prolong
the efficacy of GM technology and are thus in their collective interest.

323
Food Safety and Consumer Choice
Institutional Context
Within the SAGPyA, the National Service for Agri-food Safety and
Quality (SENASA) has the mandate to regulate food safety and quality, as well as
animal health products and pesticides. SAGPyA Resolution 289 of 1997 gave
SENASA jurisdiction over GMO-derived food specifically (Cohen, Komen and
Verastegui 2001, 5). Later, SAGPyA Resolution No. 1265 of 1999 created a
Comité Técnico Asesor (CTA - Technical Advisory Committee), whose role was
to evaluate GMOs in food and advise the SENASA on this issue. The CTA
included representatives of public and private sector research institutes,
government agencies, industry organizations, farmers associations and one
consumer group (See Table 40 below).
Another entity, the Comisión Nacional de Biotecnología y Salud
(CONBySA National Commission on Biotechnology and Health), was created
in 1993
451
to advise the federal government about biotechnology policies for
health. The CONBySA has 12 members, four from the Secretariat of Health and
four from the Foro Argentino de Biotecnología (FAB, Argentine Biotechnology
Forum)
452
(Vitagliano and Villalpando 2003, 45). However, during the time-frame

451
It was created by Resolution No. 413/1993 of the Administración Nacional de Medicamentos,
Alimentos y Tecnología Médica, (ANMAT - National Administration of Medicine, Food and
Medical Technology, under the Secretariat for Health and Social Action).
452
The FAB is made up of biotechnology industry actors and governmental institutions. Industry
actors (MNC and national) make up the large majority of its members.

324
Table 40. Composition of the CTA of SENASA
Public Sector Private Sector
• Instituto Nacional de Medicamentos
(National Insitute of Medicines, Ministry
of Health)
• Dirección de Calidad Agroalimentaria
(SENASAs Agrifood Quality
Directorate)
• Dirección de Alimentos (SAGPyAs
Directorate of Foods)
• Universidades Nacionales (National
Universities
453
)
• Instituto Nacional de Alimentos (National
Institute of Foods, Ministry of Health)
• Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones
Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET-
National Science and Technology
Research Council)
• ANMAT (National Administration of
Food, Drugs and Medical Technology,
Ministry of Health)
• Dirección Nacional de Alimentos
(National Directorate on Foods Ministry
of Health)
• CONABIA
• Asociación de Semilleros Argentinos
(ASA -Argentine Seed Growers
Association )
• Federación Agraria Argentina (FAA -
Argentine Agrarian Federation, small-
scale farmers)
• Coordinadora de las Industrias de
Productos Alimenticios (COPAL -
Coordination of the Food Products
Industry)
• Confederación Rural Argentina
(Argentine Rural Confederation)
• Confederación Intercooperativa
Agropecuaria (CONINAGRO -
Intercooperative Agrarian Confederation,
medium-scale farmers)
• Sociedad Rural Argentina (Argentine
Rural Society, large-scale farmers)
• Acción en Defensa del Consumidor
(ADELCO -Consumers Action League)
• Cámara Argentina de la Industria
Aceitera
(Argentine Chamber of the Oil Industry)
• Cámara Argentina de Supermercados
(Argentine Chamber of Supermarkets)
Sources: Oficina de Biotecnología n.d. and Burachik and Traynor 2001, 22.
of the study, this Commission focused mainly on GM pharmaceuticals and did not
do any work on food safety.
Although CONABIAs jurisdiction is over environmental and biosafety
risk assessment, it also requires information about toxic or harmful effects to
human or animal health because unauthorized consumption of GMOs is a
possibility. Furthermore it requires applicants to provide specific information
about the GM crop before field testing in other to evaluate compounds that might

453
Specifically (as of 2001) the Faculty of Agronomy, University of Buenos Aires and the Faculty
of Pharmacy and Biochemistray, University of Buenos Aires (Burachik and Traynor 2001, 22).

325
eventually enter the food chain (Burachik and Traynor 2001, 14). In that way,
the CONABIA partially addresses food safety issues relating to GM crops.
Specific guidelines for food-safety approval for GM crops (to be used as
either food or feed) were first established by SAGPyA Resolution 511 of 1998.
The requirements were based on the concept of substantial equivalence
454
and
were established in accord with 1996 FAO and WHO documents, following
Argentinas policy of using existing international agreements. Specific food
safety testing for GM crops include toxicity, changes in nutritional properties,
newly expressed proteins, allergenicity, carcinogenicity and teratrogenicity
(Burachik and Traynor 2001, 19). After the CTA was established in 1999, it
reviewed the existing food safety criteria, using the Codex draft guidelines on
food derived from biotechnology (Cohen, Komen and Verastegui 2001, 5). The
main legislation for all food safety (GM and non-GM) is the Argentine Food
Code, established by Decree No.85 of 1999. GM foods must adhere to this code
but there are no special provisions for them.
Besides food safety evaluation and monitoring, another way some
countries have provided consumer choice is through labeling laws or guidelines.
From 1996-2002 there were no food or feed labeling laws in Argentina for rDNA
crops nor for products containing GMOs (Benbrook 2005, Pengue 2004).

454
Substantial equivalence is a political concept used to affirm that transgenic foods are similar
enough to their conventional counterparts to be considered foods generally recognized as safe
(GRAS). The GRAS category was originally used to classify foods that had been eaten for a long
time and thus did not need to be tested before entering the market. Substantial equivalence is not a
scientific concept based, for example, on the process or components of the actual GM food.
Substantial equivalence is used for food safety and labeling purposes, but ignored for IPR
purposes -which do recognize GM foods as novel, and therefore as available for IP ownership.

326
Voluntary labeling of organic products was allowed. The official national
position rejected the labeling of GM food or products, arguing that it was a non-
tariff barrier (Vitagliano and Villalpando 2003, 53). Table 41 (below) summarizes
Argentine resolutions and legislation pertaining to transgenic food safety.
While most Argentine GM crops were destined for export, some GM
produce remained in Argentina and ended up in processed foods. Since there was
no labeling and GM and non-GM crops were not segregated, many Argentine
consumers were unaware that they might be eating foods containing GMOs.
Table 41. Chronology of GM food safety-related laws and resolutions
Year Law or Resolution
1993 Resolution No. 413 of the ANMAT Creates the CONBySA to
advise on health-related biotech policies.
1997 Resolution No. 289 of the SAGPyA Gives SENASA
jurisdiction over the evaluation of GM food.
1999 Resolution No. 1265 of the SAGPyA - Establishes CTA to advise
SENASA on the use of GMOs in food
1999 Decree 85 Argentine Food Code
1999 Resolution No. 511 of the SAGPyA Approves SENASAs GM
food and feed safety criteria.
2002 Resolution No. 412 of the SAGPyA Approves SENASAs new
(CTA-created) guidelines for the evaluation of GM food.
Source: Compiled from Oficina de Biotecnología 2005.
Indeed, in a national survey conducted in 2004, only 39% of the respondents
knew that GM soy was being grown in Argentina (Diamante and Izquierdo 2004,
60-61).
Non-State Actor Involvement
NGOs, industry actors and the government have all tried to influence how
Argentineans perceive biotechnology and GM crops. There was a consensus

327
among all three types of actors that the support of Argentine society at large,
and in particular among consumers, was crucial for the continued use of rDNA
technology. Consumer support is needed to ensure markets for GM products and
for continued investment in transgenic technology research and development.
With that in mind, before turning to strategies used by industry and NGO actors
regarding food safety and consumer choice, information from a governmental
public opinion survey conducted in 2003 as part of the biosafety review is
provided to show how effective the different actors have been in influencing
public opinion.
When Argentine consumers and farmers were asked about the food safety
of GMOs, 40% of consumers and 18% of farmers responded that risks did exist.
Most of the consumers and about half of the farmers went on to name at least one
risk, such as allergies (Vitagliano and Villalpando 2003, 53-54). When consumers
were asked if they would buy food without GMOs, 51% responded that they
would, even if it were more expensive (Diamante and Izquierdo 2004, 61). Both
Argentine farmers and consumers trusted scientists and the main public research
institution, the Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA - National
Insitute of Agricultural and Fishery Technology) to give them credible
information about transgenic crops, while consumers also noted a high degree of
confidence in information provided by Greenpeace. Notably, consumers did not
trust the legislature. When employees from the food sector were consulted, their
main concerns were the impact of transgenic crops on international trade and the

328
competitiveness of Argentine exports (Vitagliano and Villalpando 2003, 54),
along with monopoly effects or technological dependence throughout the sector -
should GM technology be adopted. Among consumers, 51% in a responded in a
similar fashion with the opinion that large companies gained the most from the
use of GM products while only 12% of consumers thought that GM crops offered
some benefit to the public good (Diamante and Izquierdo 2004, 61-62).
Biotechnology industry actors actively promoted the use of GM crops
within the country, targeting both farmers and urban populations. Governmental
actors, such as the SAGPyA and the INTA also actively promoted the use of GM
crops. For example, REDBIO, using funding from the UN Food and Agricultural
Organization, ran a public education program about biotechnology directly within
schools (at every level, primary, secondary and tertiary) and through the media.
Public education efforts about the benefits of transgenic crops were also a
principal strategy used by industry actors. They targeted both educators and the
general public. For example the Asociación Semilleros de Argentina (ASA-
Argentine Seed Growers Association) ran website called Porqué Biotecnología
(Why Biotechnology) and developed materials for classroom use. The ASA also
contributed articles to the weekly agricultural sections of national newspapers,
emphasizing the benefits of GM crops to farmers and consumers. In 2000, the
ASA launched a public-information campaign to try to convey a positive image of
GMOs. This campaign included coordinating meetings between scientists and the

329
media, materials for school use, and folders on research directions, and had an
annual budget of US $170,000 (Burachik and Traylor 2001, 36).
The Foro Argentino de Biotecnología (FAB- Argentine Forum on
Biotechnology), another prominent industry actor, used a strategy of targeting
mainly governmental leaders at the federal level, in particular high level officials
such as the Minister of Health, Secretary of Agriculture, and Secretary of
Environment (Burachik and Traylor 2001, 36). The FAB also met with
agricultural affairs advisors to parliamentary representatives and parliamentary
representatives themselves. Finally, the FAB engaged members of the food
industry, media, university students, and other industry actors, to promote the use
of rDNA crops. Besides the FAB, industry actors have formed other associations,
such as Grupo Bio, to represent their interests to government officials and to
promote the benefits of GM crops among the public.
NGOs, in contrast, have consistently demanded that the government ban
foods containing GMOs or at least make labeling mandatory, citing health risks.
One repeated NGO strategy has been to push for the creation of laws at different
levels of governance for the labeling of GMOs (Chudnovsky 2005, 21). For
example, Greenpeace, ADELCO and the GRR helped to write a bill that was
presented to the Buenos Aires municipal legislature in 2000, that stipulated that a
list of foods containing GMOs be created and displayed in markets. Again in
2002, the Red de Alerta sobre Transgenicos (REDAST Transgenic Watch
Network) drafted a bill entitled Acceso a Productos Alimenticios Seguros

330
(Access to Safe Food Products) and presented it to the city government of
Buenos Aires. This bill called for GM content warning stickers on food products.
The first transgenic consumer information law that was passed was from
the municipality of San Carlos de Bariloche, in 2001 (Ordenanza No. 1121).
455

Although it was only a municipal law, there was a severe backlash against the
legislation by government and industry actors, since it the first of its kind in the
country. When the Centro de Derechos Humanos y Ambiente (CEDHA Center
for Human Rights and the Environment) demanded its implementation, the fight
went to the provincial Supreme Court, and the case was not settled until 2005.
456

In the meantime, two provinces (Tierra del Fuego and Provincia de Chaco) passed
state-wide consumer information laws on transgenic foods in 2003 (Livellara n.d.
b). Besides redacting and promoting consumer information laws about
transgenics, NGOs also worked to defeat very promotional biotechnology bills
that were presented to the federal Senate, which would have limited consumers
rights to information about transgenics.
Work in the legislative area was only one tactic used by NGOs. Most
NGO actions were focused on public education of both consumers and farmers
about the risks of transgenic crops. They focused on urban populations, university
students, and small farmers. NGOs held conferences, workshops, discussion
groups, film screenings and developed radio shows, besides providing
information via the internet and print publications.

455
It called for a list of foods containing GMOs to be displayed in markets in the municipality.
456
The courts upheld the validity of the law and called for its implementation within 90 days.

331
Greenpeace also undertook a variety of direct actions to promote both
consumer rights and information about transgenic crops in general. For example,
in 2000, Greenpeace activists tested products sold in Argentina for their GM
content. They then took one brand of GM contaminated products (Knorr) off the
shelves and asked that those products be labeled for GM content before being
returned to the shelves (Greenpeace 2000b). In another action they took shopping
carts full of contaminated Pringles potato chips to the Procter & Gamble central
office in Buenos Aires (Greenpeace 2000d). After having Argentine products
tested, Greenpeace also started a cybershelf, that is, a list of 400 foods tested for
transgenic content that could be consulted through the internet, and conducted
public demonstrations of the cybershelf in supermarkets. Greenpeaces direct
actions were covered by both the mainstream and independent media. In general,
however, the mainstream media in Argentina published favorable information
regarding GM crops, while most oppositional information was provided by
NGOs.
Summary
As of 2002, Argentina had specific guidelines for screening both GM
crops and for the evaluation of foods with GM content. For these reasons their
food safety policies are classified as permissive. Food safety criteria were
established only in 1999, although Argentina had commercially grown GM crops
since 1996. GM and conventional crops were mixed from 1996, so GMO were
present in Argentine markets before food safety evaluation criteria were devised.

332
Thus, initially, Argentines grew and ate GM foods without any special
testing
457
and Argentine policies were promotional during that period (1996-
1998). There was no labeling of GM content for food at the federal level, and
furthermore the federal government actively opposed the idea.
Regarding the influence of non-state actors, industry actors had much
greater access to policy makers than NGOs did, although this began to change
slightly after 1999. As industry actors were part and parcel of the regulatory
structure and committees making the guidelines, they were effective in shaping
policies to their preferences. Industry and NGO utilized similar strategies (e.g. of
conducting surveys, preparing and promoting legislation, and public education
campaigns) and both sides influenced public opinion somewhat. While NGOs for
the most part were not effective in making policy changes, their arguments did
reach the public and they were a trusted source of information.

457
GM crops were superficially evaluated as per CONABIA guidelines, since accidental mixing of
crops not primarily destined for food could always occur.

333
Table 42. Food safety and consumer choice policies for transgenic crops
in Argentina
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
No distinction
made between
rDNA and
conventional
food for testing
or labeling
Differing
screening
processes for
rDNA and
conventional
foods, labeling
of rDNA based
on detectable
content
Differing and
more stringent
screening
processes for
rDNA foods,
comprehensive
labeling of all
rDNA foods
enforced
through market
segregation
Ban sale of
rDNA foods or
require
comprehensive
labeling of all
rDNA foods
with warnings
1996 No special
screenings or
labeling.

1997 No change.
1998 No change.
1999 SENASA
creates safety
evaluation
criteria for GM
food and feed.

2000 No change.
2001 No change.
2002 New food
safety criteria
guidelines
based on the
Codex
guidelines for
GM food are
approved.

334
Public Research
Institutional Context

In total, about 27 institutions conducted agricultural biotechnology
research in Argentina, while 41 firms were active in agricultural research and
development, both GM and conventional. The main public sector research
institution in Argentina is the Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria
(INTA - National Insitute of Agricultural and Fishery Technology). The INTA
has historically been biased towards increasing production through hybrids, and
its research work has been concentrated in certain regions rather than spread
equally throughout the country.
Within the INTA, the Instituto de Biotecnología (Biotechnology Institute)
is the most important unit advancing rDNA crop research. The two other most
important pubic sector institutes include the CONICETs Instituto de
Investigaciones en Ingeniería Genética y Biología Molecular (INGEBI - Research
Institute in Genetic Engineering and Molecular Biology) and the Centro de
Estudios Fotosintéticos y Bioquímicos (CEFOBI-Center for Photosynthetic and
Biochemical Studies). Along with these public institutions, various university
labs
458
have also played an important role in conducting rDNA plant research.
Public research funds were cut extensively during the Menem
administration (1989-2000), as were most other public services (Joensen and

458
Particularly the University of Buenos Aires and the National Universities of Córdoba, La Plata,
Mendoza, Nordeste, Cuyo and Rosario (Vitagliano and Villalpando 2003, 46).

335
Semino 2003). These budget cuts left the INTA with only limited resources
and no extension workers as of 2001 (Pengue 2001). As state budgets for
universities also diminished, public sector scientists found themselves compelled
to orient their research toward the interests of their new funders (Joensen 2003).
Non-State Actor Involvement
Until the early 1990s, university professors were not allowed to carry out
other remunerated tasks, and given this regulation, interfaces with industry were
not common. Companies went to university researchers for advice rather than for
carrying out research work (Sasson 1993, 567). However, university regulations
changed at the beginning of the 1990s and the Foro Argentino de Biotecnología
(FAB- Argentine Forum of Biotechnology) in particular took advantage of those
changes. In the early 1990s it began establishing joint research in biotechnology
between public research institutes, universities, hospitals and the private bio-
industry sector (Sasson 1993, 566). This trend spread and joint research and
private funding of (supposedly) public research in agricultural biotechnology
became common. As INTA put it in 2006: INTA has a successful history of
more than 15 years of linking with agricultural industry, praised by hundreds of
client firms in the market.(INTA 2006). The FAB continued to work consistently
in this endeavor, trying to bring together the three fundamental elements that all
technological activities require: public research, private research and state
funding.(FAB 2004, 3). Types of linkages allowed with the private sector

336
included specialized technical assistance, commercial licensing of its research,
co-financing of the development of new products and processes, and incubator
parks.
Despite the extensive budget cuts, and despite the fact that more firms
than public institutes were active in GM research and development, most of the
financing for rDNA crop research still came from public pockets. For example in
2001, the federal government provided approximately 72% of investments in
biotechnology while firms provided 23% (Vitagliano and Villalpando 2003, 47).
Provincial government, private universities and non-profit organizations provided
the remaining 5%. Also, despite the imbalance in the number of firms versus
public research institutes, most GM research was still done in public institutes. On
the other hand, the chemical and rDNA technology packages that were and are
used in Argentina were provided mainly by a handful of MNC affiliates the
same who engaged in little research and development activities within Argentina.
Put differently, research and development for GM technology used in Argentina
was done abroad in MNC labs.
NGOs such as the GRR and GRAIN criticized public research in rDNA
crops arguing that it favors extensive production and export-oriented farming and
that it focuses on crops and traits of interest to MNCs, instead of taking up issues
crucial to the poor or which the private sector does not address. For example,
GRAIN criticized the fact that the experiments in transgenic crops had been very
similar in terms of the types of crops and the technologies used (GRAIN 1998).

337
Public research institutions, such as the CEFOGI, decided to forward MNC-
controlled GM technologies by adapting them to local varieties of export crops,
despite the fact that both MNC and national firms were also advancing this
research. The same situation occurred in Brazil. The Grupo de Reflexión Rural
warned against this research agenda for ethical and nationalist reasons: state
institutions, such as the INTA and the INASE, have made us dependent on
transnational seeds that oblige us to pay the companies that have made a business
out of patenting live beings.(Grupo de Reflexión Rural 2002).
Uniformity in the traits being tested and technologies utilized in research
is the pattern both in Argentina and in South American region. More generally,
maize and soybeans, traditional export crops and the interest of MNCs, were the
main crops tested. Of the early GM experimental field tests in Argentina, only
INTAs virus-resistant potatoes did not involve export commodities (GRAIN
1998). The main trait researched has been herbicide-resistance, which accounted
for more than 60% of field trials in Argentina (GRAIN 1998). With this focus on
MNC-favored research, it is not surprising that Monsanto and other companies
increased their glyphosate production capacities in both Argentina and Brazil,
since this GM research agenda designs crops to use that herbicide. The second
most commonly researched trait was insect-resistance, and almost all of those
experiments used Bt rDNA. NGOs emphasized the negative aspects of such a

338
limited research agenda,
459
citing arguments such as probable faster pest
resistance development to Bt technology, the environmental and economic
vulnerabilities perpetuated by monoculture, and the lack of alternatives in the
event of an agricultural crisis.
Summary
Argentine policy began allowing public-private sector partnerships in
research beginning in the early 1990s and continued this policy through 2002.
While public funds for rDNA research varied over the years, biotechnology was
prioritized as an area for state funding. Sharing financing with the private sector
and obtaining funds from international sources was encouraged. Hence, Argentine
policy is characterized as promotional. Companies and industry associations
engaged in active linkages with the public sector. NGO activities in this area were
limited and did not seem to affect either the type of research undertaken or levels
of public funding.

459
Besides critiquing different aspects of the rDNA crop research agenda, NGOs in Argentina also
undertook and promoted different types of research, such as organic agricultural research and the
studies on negative effects of the use of GM crops.

339
Table 43. Public research policies for transgenic crops in Argentina
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Invest national
and donor funds
into transgenic
technology.
Allow
international
private sector
partnerships
Invest national
and donor funds
into breeding
transgenic
crops into local
varieties
Invest no
national funds
into transgenic
technology but
allow donor
funding of
downstream
transgenic
technology
Invest no
national nor
donor funds in
transgenic
technology
1996 Partnerships
with
international
private sector
allowed, state
provides most
research funds.

1997 No change.
1998 No change.
1999 No change.
2000 No change.
2001 No change.
2002 No change.

Summary and Conclusions
Argentine policies for rDNA crops remained largely stable from 1996 to
2002. Surprisingly, however, for a country so openly trade-dependent on GM
crops, its policies may be classified as promotional in only two of the five areas,
food safety and public research. Furthermore, food safety policies later changed to
become permissive. This was the only movement in policy categorizations. While
the most promotional policy area was public research, even countries with overall
precautionary policies tend to have promotional public research policies, so that

340
result was expected. The most surprising policy categorization finding was for
trade. While Argentina exports 90% of its GM soy and, moreover, is the second
largest exporter of GM soy in the world, its trade policies were not only not
promotional, they were the most precautionary of all policy areas. Precautionary
Argentine trade policies were a result of a desire and a process designed to protect
Argentine export markets in the EU, which had some of the strictest precautionary
policies towards GM crops at the time. The two other policy areas, IPRs and
biosafety, were permissive. The permissive IPR categorization came from a
balancing of rights for farmers and rights for MNCs. MNCs, national companies
and farmers all pushed the gray areas of IPR legislation to their benefit, MNCs
and major national companies by using private IPR contracts, and farmers and
smaller national companies by saving and distributing white-bagged seed.
Interestingly, the permissive biosafety policies came as a result of a consensus
among governmental and industry actors, and NGO actors were not involved in
those choices.
The two areas that were the focus of most of the debate and action
regarding GM crops in Argentina were first, food safety and consumer choice,
and second, biosafety. These two areas saw the most activity, from legal action to
public education to monitoring users to research, on the parts of both industry and
NGO non-state actors. With respect to food safety, both types of actors used
similar strategies, the main one being attempts to influence public opinion. Both
types of actors targeted mainly urban audiences, especially schools, universities

341
and educators. Differences in monetary resources between NGOs and
industry actors, for instance to implement public education campaigns, did not
seem to make any difference in policy outcomes or even in public perception.
Another strategy that some industry actors used was to focus their efforts on
lobbying high-level governmental officials in both the executive and legislative
branches. While this strategy did not appear to effect any policy changes, it is
noteworthy because industry actors (usually the same companies) employed the
same strategy in other countries. NGO actors together with organic farmers had
some success implementing precautionary food safety policies in the provinces,
but this success was delayed by legal battles.
With respect to biosafety, while both industry actors and NGOs were
active in this area, their strategies differed. Industry actors were supportive of the
biosafety entities in Argentina, and worked for changes to that structure from
within, since they were part and parcel of the biosafety entities. NGOs criticized
this structure and in particular their exclusion, without effecting any change. The
second main strategy that NGOs used in this area was to denounce cases of illegal
GM crops within the country - a strategy that had mixed success. In the first case
the crop was seized, but in the latter (which was much more widespread) the
illegal plants were not destroyed and the perpetrator was never sanctioned. For
industry actors, the most noteworthy strategy pursued was that of aiding the
government in biosafety monitoring and actively promoting the implementation
of biosafety measures among national farmers. In contrast, in Brazil and India, it

342
was NGOs that monitored and promoted the implementation of biosafety
measures.
The relative success of industry actors versus NGO actors was due in part
to collaboration problems. For most issue areas, industry actors were united and
worked on a near consensus basis. This collaboration and consensus helped
industry actors to implement policies and to strengthen and prolong the use of a
regulatory structure which they favored. The fact that the rDNA crop sector was
dominated by a few multinational firms with the same goal also facilitated their
influence. The one exception to this collaboration was in the area of IPRs.
National and international industry actors, and different types of national actors
had varying interests in maintaining farmers rights and following existing IPRs
for plants. A significant proportion of farmers saved their seed for future plantings
and tighter implementation of IPRs went directly against their interests. After GM
crops had been established, MNCs the holders of patents on GM technology
used in Argentina were particularly keen to capture increased profits through the
use of tighter IPRs. I emphasize after because the initial take up of GM varieties
was crucial for this MNC strategy and MNCs did not demand IPRs when GM
crops were first released. National firms were divided on this issue because some
gained from licensing an IPR technology (and thus had interests in tight IPRs),
where other firms gained from re-selling (white-bagging) seed from farmers.
These differing interests explain why IPR policies did not become more
promotional.

343
NGOs, in contrast, had much greater collaboration problems than
industry actors did, starting with a lack of consensus on their ultimate objective.
Instead, each NGO emphasized its own particular interest. For example, some
NGOs pressured for changes in the agricultural system while other prioritized the
labeling of GM foods. Furthermore, NGO linkages between different areas of the
country and between the concerns of rural and urban populations were not very
strong. Notably, NGOs had more impact in rural areas of the country where
mega-farms did not dominate, but their success did not carry over to the main
farming areas.
Another problem for NGOs opposed to transgenics was that opposition
among the general public was not widespread. The general context of a primarily
urban population without much first-hand knowledge of agriculture and the lack
of debate about GM policies in the legislative branch also contributed to less
interest in and knowledge about the topic among the wider public. Since the use
of GM crops is so widespread in Argentina, and since soy makes up such a
significant part of Argentine exports, many Argentineans see the production of
soy as beneficial to the country as a whole. Although urban consumers may pay
higher prices for some products, they are also the investors in sowing pools and
received the benefits from taxes on soy exports. They support research and
development into GM technology as a path towards development. While they are
not deaf to the problems wrought by monoculture and dependency, for the most
part Argentineans are on the GM wagon. This attitude is reflected in their

344
concerns about GM: they cite food safety and aspects relating to the economic
interests as main concerns.
Two factors were without a doubt the most important elements in the
resulting policies for GM crops in Argentina: the structure of the regulatory
institutions and industry actor access to that structure. Industry actors have had
access to policy-makers in Argentina since day one, as they were centrally
involved in the institutes regulating different aspects of GM crops. As noted
repeatedly in the different sections, industry actors were voting members of the
regulatory institutions. The institutional context privileged industry actor access to
policy makers and more importantly made them policy makers and implementers,
while excluding or limiting input from actors that might have other views, such as
the Secretariat of Natural Resources and Sustainable Development or consumer or
environmental organizations. Resources also played a role in that only those
industry actors directly and concretely working in business that GM crops would
centrally effect were included in the regulatory entities. The fact that it was a
national or international company did not matter rather it was the type of
business activities the actor undertook. This gave vertically integrated corporate
actors, which had interests in multiple areas, more input. However, not all types
of industry actors with business related to GM crops were included; rather those
that made up the most profitable portions of the GM crop market were privileged
over other corporate actors. For example, organic farmer industry associations
were not included, although their businesses could be directly harmed by GM

345
crops. Moreover, membership in the CONABIA and other committees
changed as different industry actors gained economic power in relation to GM
crops (for instance the CASAFE). Some measures existed to lessen direct
conflicts of interests, for example exclusion from evaluating a product from ones
own company, but since the number of people competent to undertake evaluations
of rDNA crops was limited, conflict of interest was always inherent. Furthermore,
both governmental and industry regulators shared a common goal of promoting
the development of GM crops. Since they shared that objective, decisions were
usually made by consensus. Evaluations were focused on their common concerns
while concerns that would have been voiced by other types of actors often not
included in the regulatory entities, such as environmental entities, were left out.
Within the Argentine regulatory framework there have been no instances
of public participation, such as public hearings (CDA 2002, 22). The only
regulation of GM crops came from the sub-ministry level and there was little open
parliamentary debate about the use of transgenic crops. Since resolutions do not
include the sanction information found in laws, legal action is more difficult to
pursue. For the most part, parliament, NGOs and consumers were excluded from
the policy process from 1996 to 2002. This meant that the development of
regulations for GM crops were several levels removed from the public eye. More
important, it meant that industry actors, as part of the regulatory structure at the
sub-ministry level, were able to regulate themselves with minimal checks and
balances from other sections of the government.

346
The institutional context, both national and international, played a role
in other regards. At the national level, the institutional structure for biosafety
evaluations had been in place since the early 1990s and the first GM crops had
gone through the entire evaluation process before most people even knew they
existed. Although it could be argued that environmental impact evaluations were
limited, they did take place. The existence or absence of biosafety regulations and
institutions to undertake them was a major point of contention in the other two
case studies, but not in Argentina. At the international level, Argentina was
among the first users of GM crops and it kept abreast of and participated in
international institutions and guidelines relating to their use. Whenever specific
laws, guidelines or policies pertaining to GM crops were lacking in Argentina,
governmental officials turned to international law or guidelines where they
existed. This happened throughout the time-frame of the study, not just in the
early years. For example, in 1999 the SENASA Technical Advisory Committee
used the draft guidelines being developed by the Codex Alimentarius on GMOs in
food when revising Argentine food safety evaluation criteria. In general, the
Argentine public had confidence in this approach and in particular in Argentine
scientists to make decisions for the public good.
Since industry actors themselves are policy-makers for GM crops in
Argentina, it is particularly interesting that policies were not promotional, and that
it is the among main world exporters of GM soy and corn. I infer two possible
conclusions from this result: one, that more precaution was actually beneficial for

347
trade in and the promotion of GM crops; or two, that the categorization
framework, which, on the promotional end, was based a great deal on US policies
aimed at promoting the use of rDNA crops, was not an accurate tool. The only
movement or change in policies from 1996-2002 occurred in the food safety area,
and that movement supports the first conclusion. Not only did food safety
evaluation criteria become tighter after 1999, but more types of actors were
included in the regulatory entities. Apparently, industry and governmental actors
decided that including more diverse opinions within the regulatory decision-
making circles would be good for the longer-term market for GM crops. Then
again, the access of other actors including one consumers group could have been
responsible for the policy shift, but the question of why they were invited to
participate (when they were initially excluded) would remain.

348
Chapter 6
Cross-case Analysis and Key Findings

Introduction
Despite being states that initially had similar concerns and conditions that
would have enabled, or possibly obstructed, the use of GM technologies, Brazil,
India and Argentina exhibit considerable differences in policy choices (see Table
44, next page). Two hypotheses were examined to explain these differences. The
central hypothesis for this dissertation was that the involvement of non-state
actors (NSAs), whether businesses or NGOs, accounted for the differences in
policy choices. In order to measure the involvement of non-state actors, three
elements were examined: 1) non-state actors access to institutional structures for
the different policy areas, 2) the strategies NSAs used to try to influence policy
decisions, and 3) the resources they counted on to be able to undertake their
strategies. The second hypothesis was that variation in institutional context
accounted for the differences in policies towards rDNA crops. Institutional
context was examined by looking at the regulations and processes surrounding
GM crops policy areas at three levels of analysis: the international level, the
federal or national level, and the sub-national level (which included both
state/province/departments and municipal governance). Both formal (actual laws,
regulations, negotiation processes, regulatory processes or regulatory entities) and
informal (farmer practices, acceptance of public protest, established relationships,
perceptions or trust of different actors or institutions) contextual factors were
noted, although the focus was on the formal aspects. Each of the aspects (NSA

349
access, strategies and resources, and institutional context at the international
and national levels) is examined briefly below, followed by a synopsis of the most
important factors that appeared to influence policy choices.
Table 44 summarizes the policy positions of the three case study countries
from 1996 to 2002 and notes any changes in position. Most of the movement in
policies happened in Brazil. Policy changes in the other two countries were
Table 44. Summary of policy changes 1996-2002
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Patent
protection plus
plant breeders
rights (PBR)
under UPOV
1991
PBR under
UPOV 1991
PBR under UPOV
1978
No IPRs for
plants or
animals
Intellectual
Property
Rights
Brazil

Argentina

India (2001-2002)

India (1996-
2001)
No regulation of
rDNA seeds or
plant materials
Regulate rDNA
seeds and plant
materials in
accordance
with SPS
agreement and
no more tightly
than non-rDNA
crops
Regulate rDNA
seeds and plant
materials more
tightly and with
different
screenings or
requirements
Block all rDNA
imports through
ban or
moratorium
Trade
Brazil (1996-
1997)
India
Argentina
Brazil (1998-
2002)
No screening or
token screening
only, or
approval based
on other
countries
approval
Screening for
demonstrated
risk, based on
intended use of
product
Comprehensive
screening for
demonstrated
risks and
scientific
uncertainties
No approval
because risk
assumed
Biosafety
Brazil (1996-
1997)

Argentina
Brazil (1998-
2002)
India

350
Table 44. Summary of policy changes 1996-2002, continued

Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
No distinction
made between
rDNA and
conventional
food for testing
or labeling
Differing
screening
processes for
rDNA and
conventional
foods, labeling
of rDNA based
on detectable
content
Differing and
more stringent
screening
processes for
rDNA foods,
comprehensive
labeling of all
rDNA foods
enforced through
market
segregation
Ban sale of
rDNA foods or
require
comprehen-sive
labeling of all
rDNA foods
with warnings
Food Safety
and Consumer
Choice
Brazil (1996-
1997)

Argentina
(1996-1998)
Brazil (2001-
2002)
India
Argentina
(1999-2002)
Brazil (1998-
1999)
Brazil (2000)
Invest national
and donor funds
into transgenic
technology.
Allow
international
private sector
partnerships
Invest national
and donor funds
into breeding
transgenic
crops into local
varieties
Invest no national
funds into
transgenic
technology but
allow donor
funding of
downstream
transgenic
technology
Invest no
national nor
donor funds in
transgenic
technology
Public
Research
Investment
Brazil
India
Argentina

limited to one area each. In India, there was one policy change in intellectual
property rights to become (one step) more promotional towards GM crops,
whereas Argentina made one change in food safety to become (one step) more
precautionary. The most noteworthy trend is that the policies of all three countries
tended toward convergence. There is some indication that these countries were
becoming slightly more precautionary towards GM crops overall, (four policy
changes moved towards the preventive end of the spectrum and change one
moved toward promotional end). However, keep in mind that most of the policy

351
movement stemmed from Brazilian court decisions that were meant to be
temporary. Public research was an outlier in that all three countries were strongly
promotional towards public GM crop research during the entire time-frame of the
study. Moreover, funding for rDNA crop research tended to increase over time in
all three countries.

1. NSA Access
The case studies demonstrated a range of NSA access to institutional
structures. At one extreme, NSAs were formally included in regulatory entities as
voting members. At the other end, the only NSA access was through informal
channels of lobbying, public protest, demonstrations, and seminars or
conferences. Mid-range access included ability to make formal comments in
public negotiations or debate, opportunities for public comment or hearings for
policy decisions, opportunities to participate as observers in policy processes (but
not make comments or vote), and the ability to contract public sector employees.
At the international level, NSA access varied from institution to
institution, but participation for both NGO and industry actors was governed by
the same rules. For example, at the Codex Alimentarius Commission meetings
(which addressed food safety and consumers rights) only NSAs that were
international organizations were allowed to participate. In contrast, for biosafety
meetings (within the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the Convention on

352
Biological Diversity, for example) both local and regional actors as well as
international NSAs were allowed to participate.
At the national level, in Brazil industry actors had more formal and
informal access to policy makers and the institutional structure than NGOs actors
did. For public research, industry actors were invited to define the relationship
with the public sector, and incentives for private-public research relationships
were targeted at industry actors. All types of actors are allowed to make public
comment on the public research agenda, but NGOs were not directly part of
defining the GM research agenda. Informally, industry actors had more access
than NGOs through lobbying, and they tended to target the executive branch,
which paid off in promotional perspectives toward GM crops in international
negotiations. At the sub-national level, access varied from state to state. It
appeared that greater inclusion of both industry actors and NGOs in the policy
debate resulted in more precautionary policies, but further research at the sub-
national level is needed to confirm that finding.
In India, industry actors had greater (formal and informal) access to
members of the institutional framework than did NGOs for every policy area.
While NGOs also had some access, this tended to be limited and often informal.
For example, industry actors had formal access to biosafety personnel through the
requirement for an Institutional Biosafety Committee which had to include one
representative to the Department of Biotechnology. Industry actors also sat on
regulatory committees in different governmental offices. Finally, industry actors

353
were allowed to contract the services of public sector researchers, who at the
same time were responsible for serving on governmental regulatory committees.
In Argentina, industry actors have been centrally involved in the
regulation of GM crops from the beginning, serving as voting members of key
regulatory entities. Vertically integrated corporate actors, which had interests in
multiple areas, had more access to regulatory structures, as did those industry
actors who stood to benefit the most from the use of GM technology. On the other
hand, formal NGO access to the regulatory bodies was minor. In informal
channels of access, again industry actors had much more access than NGO actors
in every policy area.
Table 45. Non-state actor formal access to institutional structures for GM
crops
NGOs
Formal access
Industry actors
Formal access
Intellectual property rights
Trade Argentina
Biosafety Brazil
Argentina
Argentina
India
Food safety and consumersrights Argentina Argentina
Public research Argentina
Brazil
India

Table 45. summarizes industry and NGO access. On the national level,
industry actors had more formal access to the institutional structure than NGOs,
but formal access was not uniform across policies areas, nor across countries.
Those policy areas where industry actors had more formal access (for example

354
public research) also had the most promotional policies. However, even
though industry actors had access to the institutional structure in every policy area
in Argentina, Argentine and Brazilian policy choices are very similar. This
indicates that issues other than access were important for policy choices. For
example, differing interests among industry actors was also important, as was
collaboration by actor type. The strategies NSA actors used helped to reveal these
aspects, and are addressed next.

2. NSA Strategies
Table 46. (below) charts the various strategies
460
that NGO and industry
actors used in the case study countries and at the level of international institutions.
In the aggregate, the strategy types tell us little about if or how they succeeded in
influencing policy. Risse-Kappens 1995 work on non-state actors found that
strategies NSAs utilized were more important to the success of their objectives
than organizational resources or other factors, and the Brazilian case supports his
finding in that a single strategy contesting the use of GM seed through the
judicial system -- was key in moving Brazilian policies to a more precautionary,
and for a time outright preventive, stance in three of the five policy areas. This
strategy was accompanied by other tactics, such as asking companies to provide
GM-free foods, halting shipments of transgenic crops at the ports, and promoting
precautionary legislation at the sub-national level. While all of the efforts worked

460
See Chapter One for explanation of strategy categories.

355
Table 46. Types of strategies utilized
Informational Networking Symbolic Leverage Accountability
NGO Industry NGO Industry NGO Industry NGO Industry NGO Industry
Intellectual
property
rights

India

India

India

India

India

India

India

India

India
Trade Brazil Brazil
India

India
Brazil
India

Biosafety Intl. level
Brazil
India
Intl.level

India
Intl. level

India
Intl. level
Brazil
India
Argnta.

India

India
Argnta.
Intl. level
Brazil
India

Argnta.
Food
safety and
consumers
rights
Intl. level
Brazil
India
Argnta.
Intl. level

Argnta.
Intl. level
Brazil
Intl. level
Brazil
India
Argnta.
Intl. level

India
Intl. level Intl. level
Brazil
India
Intl. level
Public
research
Intl. level

India
Intl. level

India
Argnta.
Intl. level Intl. level Intl. level

India
Intl. level
Brazil
India
Argnta.
Intl. level Intl. level Intl. level

356
together to promote and sustain a more precautionary policy environment towards
GM crops in Brazil, the successful court intervention and maintenance of the
courts position through successive appeals, was the one most effective tool in
terms of policy outcomes.
For industry actors, the single most important strategy was establishing the
use of GM crops as a fact on the ground. This strategy was used by both MNCs
and local industry actors, and by farmers themselves, for those varieties that were
self-reproductive. In Argentina, Monsanto allowed the initial use of GM soy
without royalties, and it was adopted quickly and spread throughout the country.
Later Monsanto gave out samples of an illegal GM corn variety to seed producers,
knowing that it would be nearly impossible to recall the seed once it had been
planted. In Brazil, GM soy was smuggled in from Argentina and then saved and
re-planted by farmers. In India, a local seed company owned by an ex-Monsanto
employee disseminated GM cotton seed without approval from the government.
Despite being illegal and not having completed testing for performance, the use of
illegal GM cotton seed spread quickly across state borders, leading to pressures
by state governments for legal varieties to be approved. Monsanto also allowed
experimental GM seed to escape from test sites in India, rather than destroying it.
Although this strategy did not result in policy changes during the time frame of
the study, it did help GM varieties to obtain commercial approval in India, and
it helped to shorten the time-frame for biosafety testing. In Brazil, on the other

357
hand, after 2002, policies for GM crops were radically changed because of the use
of illegal GM crops in the country.
The India case study did not reveal that any particular NGO strategy was
significant in influencing policy choices, but rather that on-going activities by the
NGO sector were key. The continued use of a varieties of strategies kept the
issues in the public eye and under discussion. Indian NGOs did use litigation
various times, but such cases did not have the repercussions that they did in Brazil
-- due to differences between the two legal systems and in part to congestion in
the India court system. In Argentina, no litigation over federal-level regulation
was used, although otherwise NGOs in Argentina used strategies similar to those
of NGOs in Brazil and India (such as asking companies to provide GM-free
foods, promoting precautionary legislation at the sub-national level, and exposing
cases of biosafety crimes). Unlike in the other two cases, NGO strategies in
Argentina had very little impact on policy choices.
For all three case studies, symbolic politics or the framing of the story of
GM crops was important for both NGO and industry actors and did have some
influence on policy outcomes. This was not a stand-alone strategy, but one that
was used consistently with other efforts, in particular through providing
information. In their study on advocacy networks, Keck and Sikkink (1998) found
that the success of various campaigns depended in part on whether the issue fit
within the national interest discourse of the state. Similarly, in each of the case
studies, the ability of NGOs to credibly frame GM crops as harmful to national

358
development, or of industry actors to convey them as contributing to national
development, helped to move regulatory processes and processes towards their
preferences. NGO framings warned of losses of biodiversity, biopiracy, food
insecurity, and dependency on multinational companies, among other elements
that could be destructive to the national well-being. Industry actors in turn
emphasized increased production, more food for the poor, more exports, and
decreased chemical inputs all avenues that could potentially increase national
welfare.

3. NSA Resources
Dalton, Recchia and Rohrschneiders (2003) study of environmental
NGOs found that the more resources (budget, number of employees and
membership) an organization had, the more active it was and the more likely it
was to use every type of strategy. Contrary to the findings of the Dalton study,
even when they had sufficient monetary resources to do so, NGO and industry
actors did not necessarily utilize every type of strategy available to them. For
example, NGOs did not lobby high-level officials very much, even though they
had the resources to do so. Industry actors, for their part, did not spend much time
trying to influence state level politicians, although they could have. Instead
industry actors chose to focus efforts with the executive branch, and to some
extent with legislative members of committees relating to agricultural issues.
Monsanto, the dominant industry actor in all three case studies, used similar

359
strategies in all three countries. Its strategies and policies as a company were
decided and coordinated primarily by the company headquarters in the US.
Similarly, Greenpeace, a prominent NGO actor in all three case studies, used
similar strategies of testing food products and informing consumers of GM
content in all three countries. In general Greenpeace uses more direct action
strategies, while other NGOs have more experience in other areas (such as
research or litigation) and tend to use strategies related to those strengths.
Financial resources aided industry actors over NGO actors in gaining
access to governmental officials and seats on regulatory committees. For example,
in Argentina, only those industry actors with the most economic interests at stake
were invited to participate on regulatory committees. Similarly in India, those
industry actors that had either established economic interests in agriculture or
potentially important economic interests were favored with access to or seats on
regulatory committees. Therefore, rather than emphasizing links between
resources and strategy types, the connection between resources and access to
regulators seemed to be more important.
461
Different types of NGO resources, for
example, a widespread membership and efforts by multiple NGOs through
different parts of the country, aided NGOs in reaching state and local
governments.

461
This is not to say that there was no relationship between resources and strategy, but rather that
the linkages between resources and access were more significant for policy outcomes. The type of
resources each NSA had (for example for NGOs more membership over money) contributed in
part to their strategy choices.

360
Collaboration issues varied from country to country. In Argentina,
industry actors were largely united and a few companies dominated, while NGOs
did not cohere around a clear objective. In India, industry actors had differing
economic interests with respect to the promotion of GM crops, while NGOs
supporting precautionary policies for GM crops were strongly united in that goal.
These dynamics of collaboration and competition at both the federal and state
levels explain in part why the policies of Argentina were promotional while those
of India were more preventive.
The hegemonic position of a few international non-state actors was also
very important in that these actors had the ability to use their financial,
membership, organizational and knowledge resources in many other countries
around the globe. A single industry actor, Monsanto, was able simultaneously and
prominently to influence the spread of the use of its GM crops technologies in all
three case study countries. Among NGOs, Greenpeace figured prominently and
worked in all three case studies (as well as many other countries), with varying
degrees of success. It was not the dominant actor in the way that Monsanto was,
but it was one of the leaders among NGOs working on GM crops in all three
countries. The ability of both transnational corporate and NGO actors such as
Monsanto and Greenpeace to influence policies across the globe raises questions
about the desirability of such influence both at the national and international
levels, and about what can be done about it.

361
Finally, a non-monetary resource that was important was general public
trust in NGOs over industry actors. Public trust in NGOs was high in all three
case studies, as indicated from different public opinion polls on the issue of GM
crops, whereas public trust in industry actors varied from country to country. In
India, public mistrust of corporations, and particularly of large, foreign companies
was high due to repeated catastrophic damage the Indian people had suffered at
the hands of such companies. The dominant company in India, Monsanto,
exacerbated this already negative perception with some of the strategies it
undertook. In contrast, in Argentina the public trust in industry actors was the
highest of the three countries. This stems in part from a higher distrust of the
government than of corporations during the time frame of the study. Remember
that the Argentine economy was in a state of collapse in 2000 and 2001 and went
through several interim presidents.

Institutional Context International Level
The literature on institutional context suggested that institutional structures
might constrain policy choices or channel policies in a certain direction regardless
of the activities of industry or NGO actors. The conclusions from Chapter Two
(see Table 13 for a summary) suggested that international institutional regulations
and agreements would make it more difficult for countries to implement some of
the more preventive and precautionary policy choices defined in the
categorization, and that those same international regulations and agreements

362
would make it more likely that countries chose certain policies for rDNA crops.
In the fields of both intellectual property rights and trade, the predictions were
completely wrong. In the biosafety and food safety and consumer rights, where
most of the policy choices were still open, actual policy choices fell in the middle,
with the exception of a brief outright preventive food safety policy by Brazil. In
public research, policies remained promotional throughout the period under study.
While investment in public research was considered promotional in that only
public research would make GM technology widely available to medium and poor
farmers, this argument masks other possible reasons for the commitment to public
research in GM technology. For example, within different international trade
agreements, scientific tests are one of the few criteria accepted for establishing
policies which other countries may consider protectionist. In summary, it appears
that international institutions had only marginal influence on policy choices for
GM crops. Furthermore, that influence came more from non-formal aspects such
as relationships and networking between policymakers at the national and
international levels, and from using international instruments as guides when
drafting national regulations, than from formal obligations.
Two established practices at the international level privileged corporate
actors over NGO actors (although access was formally equal), and northern
countries over southern countries especially if there were differences of opinion.
The first practice is that issues that industry actors bring to the institutions are
more likely to be defined as trade-related, and therefore merit being addressed by

363
international organizations than issues NGO actors want to have addressed. The
second practice is the use of English for negotiations and holding most meetings
in developed countries. Both of these non-formal aspects privileged
representatives from Northern states (particularly those states where the meetings
were held) over Southern states.

Institutional Context National and Sub-national Levels
At the national level, four institutional elements (2 formal and 2 informal)
stood out as important. First, the separation of powers between multiple levels of
government (e.g. federal, state and municipal), enabled both NGOs and industry
actors to have some successes at different levels of governance. For example, in
Brazil and Argentina, state and local laws prohibiting the use or necessitating the
labeling of GM products were effective in halting or hampering the use of those
technologies in those areas. These policies were passed because of a confluence
of interests among NGO and local (non-GM) industry actors. In India, the
multiple levels of governance were utilized by both NGOs and industry. For
example, NGOs efforts in Andra Pradesh helped to stop experimental field tests in
that state and later led the state government to seek compensation from Monsanto
for damages. In Gujarat and Karnataka, local industry actors were successful in
getting state governments to allow the use of GM crop technology. For biosafety
and food safety, the separation of powers between levels of governance favored
more precautionary policies because stricter laws could be initiated by state and

364
local governments, whereas more promotional policies were restricted by national
laws.
462

The separation of powers between branches of government (executive,
judicial and legislative) was also important. In Brazil the judicial branch took an
active role in promoting regulations for transgenic crops. Decisions by judicial
actors went beyond the initial petitions of the parties involved to require
segregation and the rapid development of labeling for GM crops. The President
also tried to unitarily mandate GM policy in Brazil by repeatedly issuing
executive decrees. In both Brazil and Argentina, the office of the Public Minister
was utilized by NGO actors as a check on other branches of the government. In
Argentina, most regulations for GM crops came from the executive branch at the
sub-ministry level. This meant that policy-making was several layers removed
from the public eye and also made NGO efforts to sanction offending parties
more difficult.
The second institutional element that was important at the national level
was whether the regulatory structures were centralized or diffused. If they were
centralized, the ministry or entity that held the most authority was key. For
example, in Argentina, regulatory structures for GM crops were centralized in the
Secretary of Agriculture, under the Ministry of Economy and Production. The

462
For trade, public research and intellectual property rights, the separation of levels of
governance did not have an effect one way or the other. In some instances state and local levels of
government created more promotional policies (for example, export incentives, additional public
funding or facilities for GM research) and in others more precautionary policies (such as required
notification for the transport of GM products).

365
bureaucrats employed in these structures tended to prioritize the same issues
while ignoring others, and often worked through consensus on regulatory issues.
In contrast, regulations in India were overseen by the Department of
Biotechnology, under the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Indian Council
on Agricultural Research, under the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Genetic
Engineering Approval Committee, under the Ministry of the Environment. The
scope of concerns addressed by this more complex regulatory structure was wider
and allowed multiple actors to be heard in the regulatory process. Contests over
decision-making authority and greater involvement of the Ministry of the
Environment in the Brazilian structure also allowed for more diverse viewpoints
to be discussed in that country. In all three case studies, both industry and NGO
actors tried to push regulatory structures in a direction that was friendlier to their
views. Indeed, both composition of key regulatory entities and the processes for
policy and decision-making were key points of contention in Brazil and India.
Two informal institutional elements were important. The first was the
spread of the use of GM crops both legal and illegal. With the widespread use of
GM soy in Argentina, the Argentine economy became increasing dependent on
soy exports. The practice of growing GM soy helped to shift preferences for more
support for the use of GM technology as part of national development. In Brazil
and India the illegal spread of the use of GM crops coupled with the extremely
high costs (and difficulties) of eradicating the illegal plants made it harder to
sustain highly precautionary biosafety policies in those two countries.

366
The second informal element was that aspects of the institutional structure
privileged industry actors over NGO actors. For example, with respect to IPRs,
multi-national companies (MNCs) were (informally) privileged over national
actors (both industry and NGO/public sector) in that MNCs were already
experienced with the type of IPR-structure that legislators passed, whereas
national actors had to create a culture, processes and institutions to establish the
use of the new IPRs. This situation was evident in all three case studies. A second
informal privileging of industry actors came from a bias towards GM crops and
GM research among most governmental actors.
463
The majority of officials in
regulatory institutes for GM crops tended to have a promotional viewpoint
towards them and a willingness to advance the use of this type of agriculture.
As a whole, the two most important factors that stood out as influencing
policies for genetically modified crops were formal industry actor access to
regulatory institutions (in the case of Argentina), and sustained efforts by NGOs
(in Brazil and India). Had the institutional structure included more formal NGO
participation in Argentina, or allowed for more public participation in the
regulatory structure, it is likely that Argentina policies would have been more
precautionary. On the other hand, without the sustained efforts on behalf by
NGOs in Brazil and India, it is likely that their respective policies would have
been more promotional, and that the timelines for the approval of GM crops
would have been much shorter. However, both NSA involvement and the

463
Officials from the Ministry of the Environment tended to be the exception to this viewpoint.

367
institutional context accounted in part for differences in policies among the case
studies. In Brazil and India, the institutional structure included wider sets of
governmental actors, while GM regulations were centralized in the Secretary of
Agriculture for Argentina. At the same time, industry actors were formally part of
the regulatory structure in Argentina while access for NSAs in the other two cases
varied. To summarize the weight of these different elements on differences in
policy choices I would say that NSA strategies accounted for 40%, NSA access
for 30%, and institutional context for 30%.

Alternative Explanations
Chapter One outlined three potential counter-explanations for developing
countries policy choices for GM-crops: national economic development,
hegemonic or imperial status of the US, and experience with Green Revolution
crop varieties. Of these three, the hegemonic status of the US appeared to have the
least influence on countries policy choices, probably because the European Union
implemented a viable alternative system of regulating GM crops that directly
competed with the US system. Since there were two regulatory models from key
economic actors/blocs, the US did not actually have hegemonic power in this
issue area. However, as noted above, the hegemonic position of a single US-based
multinational company and its efforts to promote the use of rDNA crops was
important in all three case studies. This suggests that the concept of hegemonic

368
power merits further research beyond the state-based and class-based frameworks
examined in Chapter One, with attention to different types of non-state actors.
Experience with the Green Revolution crop varieties was similar for all
three case studies in that all three adopted about the same percentage of Green
Revolution varieties. Despite starting from a position of similarity in that regard,
the countries implemented different policies and had very different rates of
adoption of GM varieties. Synergies with Green Revolution varieties were not
useful for explaining differences in policy choices with one astounding exception:
those farmers who suffered the most from adoption of the chemical-intensive
agricultural system (these were small-scale India farmers, some of whose
neighbors committed suicides because of the debts they incurred from chemical-
input intensive farming) still clamored to adopt Bt technology or professed that
they would be willing to use other GM varieties if those varieties addressed their
most pressing agricultural problems. In other words, farmers who had become a
part of an agricultural system that relied on credit, purchases of seed,
indebtedness, and producing for cash felt trapped within that system. Similarly in
Argentina, changes in the system of farming associated with GM soy (e.g. the use
of large machinery) made it difficult to withdraw once implemented. In both cases
it was the adoption of methods or a system of agriculture rather than particular
varieties that drove farmer decisions.
Of the three alternative explanations, attempts to implement policies to
protect the national economy provided the next-best explanation, but did not

369
explain as much as a non-state actor perspective did. Diverging economic
interests between different types of local industry actors, between national and
internationally-based biotech industry actors, and between different types of
farmers (in terms of produce and scale of farming) in all three case studies helped
to push policies for GM crops to be more precautionary in various ways. For
example, in Argentina and India, differences of interests between farmers and
other industry actors gave policy-makers reasons to uphold traditional farmer
rights to save seed (which was classified as a precautionary policy). In India and
Brazil, some industry actors worked to protect gains captured by conventional
agricultural sectors (for example farmers growing GE-free soy in Brazil and non-
integrated agri-chemical industry actors in India) against GM industry actors by
pushing for more precautionary biosafety measures, or at least helping to ensure
that biosafety measures were fully implemented. The proposition that developing
countries might instigate precautionary policies as protectionist measures, that is
to give their own companies and public research institutes time to develop
commercially ready GM varieties, was not borne out by the case studies. The
national economy explanation also had some overlap with the institutional context
explanation detailed above, for example, with respect to constraints stemming
from international institutions. What the national economy explanation so
noticeably lacked (that was addressed by the non-state actor approach used here),
was the influence of not-for-profit entities on policy choices. In both Brazil and

370
India, the efforts by non-for-profit (NGO) entities were key to policy decisions
across various policy areas.

Developments since 2002

The political storm raging round GM foods continues to grow in
intensity, largely because the economic stakes rise steadily while scientific debate
remains unresolved. (Bereano and Peacock 2005).

If we fast-forward from 2002 to 2006, where do policies for GM crops for
Brazil, India and Argentina stand? Table 47. summarizes the categorization for
each countrys policies as of 2006, noting the year it was first implemented
(starting with 1996).
Table 47. Summary of policy changes as of 2006
Brazil India Argentina
IPRs 1996-2006
promotional
2001-2006
precautionary
1996-2006
permissive
Trade 2003
precautionary
1996-2006
precautionary
1996-2006
precautionary
Biosafety 2005-2006
precautionary
1996-2006
precautionary
1996-2006
permissive
Food Safety and
consumer rights
2004-2006
permissive
2006
precautionary
2002-2006
permissive
Public research 1996-2006
permissive
1996-2006
permissive
1996-2006
permissive

After 2002, policies categorizations changed in only two instances. In
Brazil, the moratorium on the use of GM crops ended with the temporary
commercial freeing of transgenic soy. Then in 2005, a new biosafety law
ended the temporary nature of the legal commercialization of GM crops. In
India, food safety and consumer choice policies moved from being permissive to

371
a more precautionary stance in 2006, when new labeling requirements for GM
products were created. Although there were some other changes to policies, they
did not change the categorization and were not substantial.
How did the two hypotheses (1, that the involvement of non-state actors
accounted for policy differences, or 2, that variation in institutional context
accounted for the differences in policies towards rDNA crops) fare in the next
four years? NSA strategies continued to play a crucial though different-- role
and the institutional context of the separation of powers also continued to be
important. NSA access remained the relatively the same for the different case
studies. Since not every policy area changed, instead of addressing each issue area
I instead focus on the main areas of debate or activity for each case study, and at
the international level.

International Level
At the international level, there was a landmark decision by the members
of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety pertaining to trade in GM products. The
decision stipulated that any shipments containing GM organisms must state this,
and identify which organisms are present, what their intended use is, and how
they have been modified.(Shanahan 2006). If it is not possible to identify the
GM organisms, shipments must bear a label saying that they "may contain"
modified organisms (Shanahan 2006). As of 2006 the CPB had 134 members,
and more than half the world's population lived in countries that required the

372
labeling of GM foods (Bereano and Peacock 2005). India and Brazil played
important roles in supporting this decision and also worked at the national level to
develop related policies. While Argentina is not a party to the CPB and did not
favor the decision, due to its trade relations with the EU in earlier years it had
already taken steps to be able to respond to such requirements, so no changes in
policy were needed.

Brazil
Beginning in 2003, Brazil changed from being an officially GM-free
country to one where GM commercial crops were temporarily allowed. By 2005
Brazil had become the third largest producer of GM crops after the US and
Argentina. In 2005, the national congress passed a new biosafety law, which had
implications across policy areas. The new biosafety law placed authority over GM
crops with a restructured CTNBio and it established a new entity, a National
Biosafety Council, which can undertake social and economic analysis of GM
crops (if the CTNBio deems this necessary). The new regulatory entities were
made up entirely of governmental actors, but from a broad range of issue areas.
The new law facilitated trade in GM crops and also supported Brazils
promotional public research policies in this area.
NGOs strongly and actively opposed both the temporary freeing of GM
soy and aspects of the new biosafety law. As they had done on earlier
occasions, NGOs took the issue to court, but this time the Supreme Court decided

373
against this, and up-held the new law. NGOs have continued to challenge the new
law in terms of how it is implemented and in defining the jurisdictions of the new
regulatory entities. NGOs also recurred to the Public Ministry over the
implementation of the new biosafety law, but without success. NGOs in Brazil
(and internationally) increased monitoring and reporting of illegal contamination
with GMOs, and through this strategy forced stricter implementation by biosafety
entities.
Opposition to the new law also came from other sections of the executive
branch, namely from the Ministry of the Environment and the Attorney General,
who were parties to the claim that the new law was unconstitutional. The Ministry
of the Environment, which has a vote within the CTNBio, has continually
registered its dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of biosafety evaluations
(Massarani 2005a). The new law gave the CTNBio authority over the Ministries
and also over state and local governments, interrupting the balance of powers that
NGOs and dissenting governmental official had used previously to advance more
precautionary positions towards GM crops.
A second new law that had an impact on GM crops was a labeling law that
was passed in 2004. The new law required that all human and animal food sold in
Brazil that contains more than one per cent genetically modified (GM) ingredients
must be labeled (Massarani, 2004). While some industry actors pressured
(successfully) for delays or exemptions to the law, NGOs worked to make sure
the labeling requirements were implemented. They encouraged monitoring and

374
auditing, and undertook some of these activities themselves. For example, as of
2006 EMBRAPA began monitoring the use of illegal GM crops in Brazil via
satellite after Greenpeace found illegal transgenic corn in Brazil in 2005
(Massarni, 2005b).

India
The same regulatory structure for GM crops remained in India, but not
without continued opposing pressures from NGOs and MNC actors. MNCs, with
the help of the United States have been lobbying for changes in India's intellectual
property laws (the PVFRA and the Biological Diversity Act) to introduce patents
on seeds and genes and to dilute the provisions protecting farmers' rights (Sahai
2006). Despite the Biological Diversity Act, biopiracy continues to be a problem,
as some industry actors look for loopholes in the law in order to export seed (Bala
Ravi 2006). NGOs, for their part, continued to monitor and publish information
regarding GM crop failures, to pressure the government to make public research
reports about GM crops open access, and to implement biosafety laws. Access to
information became an increasingly important issue, and NGOs repeated recurred
to the judicial branch to pressure for its release to the public.
The public research agenda, while always promotional toward GM crop
research, became even friendlier to industry actors. The private sector was
increasingly allowed to direct the research agenda by identifying research
avenues that would lead to rapid commercialization. The US actively supports

375
public research in transgenics that furthers the dominant US model of agriculture,
and India has accepted US funding that co-opts their public research agenda in
this vein. (Argentina is also receiving this type of funding.)
As noted above, the main change in India policies was in the food safety
and consumers choice policy area. A new Food Safety and Standards Act was
signed into law in 2006. The new law allows for specific and different regulations
and testing for genetically modified food and requires that all food be labeled.
Specific labels for GM content were not required by this law. However, in 2006,
the Ministry of Commerce, in its changes to Indias food trade policy, made the
labeling of GM products mandatory (Government of India 2006). This trade
policy provision is scheduled to be implemented in March 2007 (Sharma 2006).
In May 2006, the Ministry of Health had circulated a draft amendment to the
Prevention of Food Adulteration (PFA) rules which included stipulations for
labeling of GM products, and the Ministry of Commerce acted to coordinate trade
policies with those changes. Specifically, the new PFA rules require that all food
and food products containing genetically modified organisms, or produced using
modern biotechnology be labeled before being entering the market (whether
imported or produced domestically). Besides these stipulations, imported GM
food must also include a label indicating that the product has been cleared for
marketing and use in the country of origin. Together, the new food safety rules
moved Indian food safety and consumers rights policies from the permissive to
the precautionary category, as was foreseen in the earlier case study analysis.

376
While the food safety rules were made in part with objective of providing
correct information to consumers, NGOs criticized the rules as a means of
legalizing GM contamination by placing more authority in an already lax
regulatory system, citing repeated biosafety failures. Industry actors criticized the
practical difficulties of labeling in a country in which most food is not packaged,
besides noting increased costs for production and segregation. Due to pressures
from industry actors, in May 2006 the GEAC decided that soy oil from GM
Roundup Ready
®
beans could file for a one-time approval for imports. This
decision fueled NGO critiques and set a precedent for other industry actors that
only those products with detectable GM content would need GEAC approval.
As of 2006 no GM food crop had been commercially released in India,
thanks primarily to intense pressures by NGO actors. For example, direct actions
at the company headquarters (of activists chaining themselves to the fence) led to
the withdrawal of the previously leading company (Pro Agro) from GM food
research.
464
As noted in the case study, transgenic mustard was the first in the
pipeline for approval. Not only was that GM research program scrapped, the
company decided to discontinue all of its GM food crop experiments in India and
to instead to continue advancing its conventional plant breeding programs
(Greenpeace India 2004). Transgenic eggplant is the GM food that is closest to
receiving commercial approval (as of Oct. 2006), and likewise is being met with

464
The institutional context which required more testing for GM food crops also contributed to
this decision.

377
strong resistance. After three days of sustained pressure by activists (dressed as
eggplants and dead animals), the Minister of Agriculture and Food met with the
protestors at his home and assured them that concerns NGOs had outlined in
reports would be taken into account by the GEAC before the approval of large-
scale trials (Greenpeace India 2006).
While the formal institutional structure for GM policies remained much
the same (with the exception of food safety and labeling rules), several
developments in the informal context reinforced NGOs arguments with respect to
GM crops: repeated GM crop failures, information that the main public cotton
research institution had known about problems with GM cotton before its release,
and a report from an environmental NGO (the Center for Science and the
Environment) on pesticide residuals in Pespi and Coca-Cola products far higher
than allowable amounts. While the last report was not directly related to GM
crops, it renewed mistrust in MNCs and in the federal governments ability to
adequately react to and prevent threats to public health.

Argentina
Argentina did not witness any movement in policy categorizations from
2002 to 2006. (The changes to the food safety and consumers choice policy area
in 2002 were noted in the case study.) The government of Argentina continues to
strongly support the use of GM crops, and in 2005 it launched a 10-year plan to
increase agricultural exports through the use of genetic engineering. Part of the

378
program included tax-breaks and loans to encourage private companies to conduct
biotechnology research (De Ambrosio 2005). This perspective prevails despite
increasing negative agricultural, environmental and social externalities of the use
of GM crops that NGOs have continued to reveal (such as superweeds, herbicide
resistance, soil degradation, pesticide contamination, decreased food security,
deforestation and loss of biodiversity) (Altieri and Pengue 2006).
The lack of movement in policy categorizations hides the fact that
Argentina has been involved in continuous IPR and trade disputes surrounding
GM crops since 2003. For example, Argentina was member (with the US and
Canada) to a WTO dispute settlement case seeking to end the EU ban on GM
products. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body decided in 2006 that the EU
moratorium broke trade rules. As of Oct. 2006 the ruling has had little impact on
Argentina for two reasons: first, the EU had already lifted the moratorium in
2004, and second, Argentine regulations call for export market analysis before
approving GM crops.
On the other hand, a dispute between Monsanto (the dominant
biotechnology MNC in all three case studies) and Argentina is having on-going
repercussions for both Argentina and Brazil. Since the dispute began in 2004,
both countries have agreed to pay royalties on Roundup Ready
®
soy seed -despite
the fact that seed saving is legal in both countries. As noted in footnote 431 of
Chapter 5, Argentine officials began negotiating a special technology
compensation fund with Monsanto employees after Monsanto stopped selling its

379
Roundup Ready
®
soy in Argentina. Negotiations over this technology
compensation fund ended abruptly in 2005 when Monsanto began a new strategy
of blocking shipments of Argentine soymeal in EU ports. After testing the
shipments for the presence of the transgenic gene in Roundup Ready
®
soy,
Monsanto initiated court cases against Argentina for the payment of royalties.
465

As of 2006, Monsanto had brought cases against Argentina in Denmark, the UK,
the Netherlands, and Spain (decisions are expected mid-2007) (Balch 2006).
Through these cases, Monsanto is attempting to charge royalties after the harvest
(and after processing) to gain profits from seeds legally or illegally saved and
replanted by farmers. These royalties would be in addition to the IPRs it already
charges for seed. By blocking shipments in European ports, Monsanto is
disrupting Argentinas lucrative soy export sector. Another IPR-related strategy
that Monsanto and other MNCs used was to pressure for an end or weakening of
the international moratorium on terminator technology that is upheld by the CPB.
Those efforts that were defeated by concerted NGO work at the national and
international levels.

Conclusions
In summary, the strategies of non-state actors continued to influence
policy decisions in the case studies. The industry actor strategy of establishing
GM crops as a fact on the ground had long-lasting implications that ultimately

465
While Roundup Ready
®
soy is not patented in Argentina, it is in some European countries.

380
changed Brazil from a GM-free country to the 3
rd
largest exporter of GM crops in
the last decade. The continuing struggle by NGOs actors in India has kept that
countrys policies precautionary in almost every policy area. From 2002-2006 no
single strategy type used by NGOs stood out as particularly influential. After its
initial large-scale success for NGO objectives in Brazil, the strategy of taking
contentious issues to the courts had varying outcomes for both types of NSAs.
Currently, Monsanto is using this strategy against the government (and farmers)
of Argentina. Regardless of the outcome of the legal cases, the strategy serves as a
pressuring mechanism by interrupting Argentine exports.
The institutional structure also remained an important factor in
determining policies. The changes in Brazils regulatory structure are particularly
noteworthy in this regard, as the new biosafety law simultaneously centralized
decision-making power for GM crops in one entity (the CTNBio), limited the
authority of different Ministries, and circumscribed the power of state and local
governments. Each of these institutional elements were identified in the earlier
conclusions as likely to lead to more promotional policies for GM crops.

Directions for Further Research
There are still many unanswered questions regarding the use GM
technology in agriculture. This dissertation has shed light on how policies for GM
crops developed in three countries, and who were the main actors in those
processes. While many areas of research remain, three stand out -- the food safety

381
of GM crops, a comparison of different types of agricultural systems, and the
framing or discourses surrounding the use of GM technology.
Food safety and labeling of GM technology is an issue that will continue
to be relevant to policy-makers and to consumers of both GM foods and
medicines. More research is needed about the national and international processes
for testing and labeling of GM products, and about actors that militate for and
against such processes. Historically, labeling of both food and medicines has not
stemmed from governmental efforts, but rather from concerned citizens
organizing around the harmful consequences of the lack of information. This
trend is being repeated with respect to GM products --although in public hearings
held in the US more than 90% of participants called for the labeling of GM food,
in 2006, a decade after GM foods had been put on US market shelves this
information is still lacking. As a result, many Americans still do not know when
they are consuming foods with rDNA content.
While this dissertation examined the use of one aspect of agriculture,
policies relating to the use of GM crop varieties, the use of GM varieties in
relationship to alternatives (e.g. to the use of conventional hybrid and landraces or
heirloom varieties) is an important consideration for a number of reasons. How
does the use of different varieties affect biodiversity, food quality, variety in the
marketplace, nutritional content? What are the negative (for example toxic
chemical, allergies, lower production) and positive externalities (e.g. more
diversity, higher quality, higher production) associated with the use of each?

382
What are the costs to farmers and consumers? How much water do they use? A
comparison among the available alternatives would help policy-makers,
consumers and farmers decide which agricultural system merits our support.
Since the use of GM crop technology has been framed using the ideas of
benefit or harm to national development and the national economy, and such
framing was important to the successes of both NGO and industry actors, further
research on framing or discourse resonance regarding GM crops would be helpful
to determine the directions of policy choices for other countries. Such research
would be useful not only to public policy scholars, but also to non-state actors.
From a pragmatic viewpoint, for an NGO activist or corporate employee,
knowing which arguments resonated with the public that is which were believed
and which were not -- would help in adjusting her or his discourse accordingly.

383
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430
Appendix A
Chronology, Brazil
466

1971 Patent legislation (under military regime) does not protect processes or
products (Clark and Juma 1991, 63).

1981 National Biotechnology Program (PRONAB) is created under the
Secretary of Planning (Clark and Juma 1991, 64).

1990 Consumer Protection Law 8078 is passed.

1991 Jan. - Lei No. 8171 of 17 Jan.. 1991 is passed giving IBAMA institutional
competence over agricultural industries and agricultural policies.

1995 Jan. - The National Technical Commission for Biosafety (Comissão
Ténica Nacional de Biossegurança - CTNBio) is created by law No. 8974
the Biosafety Law (Lei de Biossegurança) and by decree No. 1752. Its
mission is to examine the security of genetically modified organisms in
Brazil (www.ctnbio.gov.br/ctnbio/default.htm). The Biosafety Law is
passed. According to this law, genetically modified crops should be
screened on a case-by-case basis for demonstrated risk. Decree No.
1752 gives the CTNBio authority over Environmental Impact Assessments
and Reports (Estudo de Impacto Ambiental and Relatório de Impacto no
Meio Ambiente EIA-RIMA
467
) concerning transgenic crops. The
Ministry of Agriculture has authority over the import, or not, of
genetically modified products.

1996 May - Patent law for GM crops is approved.

1996 June - The CTNBio begins operating under the authority of the Ministry of
Science and Technology.

1997 Protection of intellectual property rights is institutionalized at EMBRAPA
through in-depth training.

466
Unless otherwise noted, from January 1995 to July 2000 the information for this chronology
was compiled by Renata Menasche using regional (Rio Grande do Sul) and national newspaper
sources. Citations here are a translation of her work.
467
The EIA-RIMA, also written as EIA/Rima, is often translated as environmental impact
assessment. The Report part was emphasized to me by members of civil society, because without
the report it does not matter whether the study is done or not. The report ensures transparency
before the public eye. It ensures the publics right to know.

431
1997 Consumer backlash against GM crops and products gains strength in
Europe and Japan. NGOs begin pressuring against GMOs in Brazil.

1997 The Plant Variety Protection law becomes fully active. Multinational
enterprises begin takeover of the Brazilian domestic seed industry.

1997 The first bill on transgenics is presented to the Chamber of Deputies
(2905/1997
468
) by Fernando Gabeira (PT/RJ
469
) (Vigna 2001, 53). The bill
is concerned with labeling and consumer information. It is based on the
Code of Consumer Defense (Código de Defensa do Consumidor).

1997 A second bill on transgenics (PL 02908/1997) from Valdeci Oliveira,
(PT/RS) and Fernando Ferro PT/PE) is introduced. It speaks to the
necessity of more scientific data to be able to prove that GMOs are not
harmful to human health or the environment. It prohibits commercial
production of GMOs until they have been proven inoffensive. In the event
that commercial sale is approved, such products must be labeled (Vigna
2001, 55-56). It also gives civil society a role in the monitoring of
experimental test fields, as a condition for the tests approval (ibid.).

1997 A third bill on transgenics (PL 02919/1997 from Sandra Starling PT/MG)
also calls for the labeling of transgenics products as an easier route than
suppressing all activities related to genetic engineering (Vigna 2001,57).

1997 Feb. - The CTNBio gives Monsanto approval for field trials of Roundup
Ready
®
soybeans. Later this year, the first experimental field tests of
genetically modified plants take place in Brazil (Vigna 2001,9) amid two
protests by civil society. In total, 50 field tests of GM crops are approved
in Brazil for the year 1997 (Vigna, 2001,11).

1997 Dec. - Greenpeace blocks the unloading of shipments of GM soybeans
from the United States at the port of São Francisco do Sul (SC), the first
shipment of transgenic soy authorized by the CTNBio.

1997 Greenpeace Brazil sues over imports of GM products.

1998 A bill is presented by Fernando Ferro (PT/PE) PL 4841/1998 to the
Chamber of Deputies which gives the Ministries of Health, Agriculture

468
Bills are numbered in the order with which they are presented, slash, the year. The year is often
presented with two digits.
469
The first abbreviation stands for the party affiliation of the member, slash, the standard
abbreviation for the department she or he represents. In this case it would mean Partido dos
Trabalhadores/Rio de Janeiro.

432
and Environment the authority to establish specific norms to regulate the
cultivation, commercialization, consumption, transport, import, export,
storage and research of transgenic seeds and products in Brazil (Vigna
2001: 58).

1998 Monsanto owns 82% of hybrid seed industry in Brazil.

1998 The trade advantage of GM crops is reversed due to consumer backlash.

1998 Consumers advocate for labeling of GM crops.

1998 Feb. The Federal Police find genetically modified soy seed at the Passo
Fundo (RS) airport after an anonymous tip. The seed is suspected of
coming from Argentina.

1998 April - Celebrating its 25
th
anniversary, EMBRAPA highlights an
agreement signed with Monsanto to make possible the planting of a
variety of GM soy modified to resist a glysophate-based herbicide
produced by Monsanto. Field tests of the soybeans are under way in
Paraná.

1998 April The Secretary of Agriculture of Paraná signs a decree prohibiting
the entrance of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the state
without authorization by the Secretary of Agriculture.

1998 June Monsanto sends a request to the CTNBio asking for the
commercial release of GM soy Roundup Ready
®
(RR). This is the first
request for the commercial release of a transgenic crop in Brazil.

1998 July- The 6
th
Federal Court (6
a
Vara da Justiça Federal) from Brasilia
decides that the Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oils (Associação
Brasileira Industrial de Óleos Vegetais - ABIOVE) should change its
labels for oils made from GM soy, so that said labels contain information
about the transgenic composition of the oil and its health risks. The Court
thus gives a partial opinion to the case started by Greenpeace, which
sought the suspension of commercialization of oils made from GM soy by
Ceval. In August, 1997, the CTNBio gave authorization to Ceval to
commercialize GM soy oil when 1.5 million tons of soy (15% of which
was GM) were imported from the United States.

1998 All political parties sign a memorandum calling for mandatory labeling
of all GM food products in Brazil.

433
1998 Sept. 16 The 11
th
Federal Court of São Paulo, applying the precautionary
principle
470
decides in favor of the Institute for Consumer Defense
(Insituto de Defesa do Consumidor - IDEC) and Greenpeace/Brasil, and
issues a temporary restraining order prohibiting the federal government
from authorizing the commercial planting of GM soy until the
commercialization of GM products has been regulated and environmental
impact assessments and reports (EIA-Rima) have been done and
published.

1998 Sept. The CTNBio approves the commercial release of RR
®
soybeans.
According to the CTNBio, there is no environmental risk from their
planting nor food security risk from their consumption. It did not require
an EIA-Rima, nor provide the standards to do one should the company so
choose. Instead, the CTNBio bases its decision on US food safety testing
for GM crops, including for this, the first request. Thirteen of the fifteen
members present at the CTNBio meeting vote for its release. The
consumer representative votes against and the representative from the
Ministry of Foreign Relations abstains. In spite of the favorable opinion
by the CTNBio, the decision made on September 16 by the Federal Court
does not allow the Ministry of Agriculture to give Monsanto a registration
that would enable the company to begin the commercial production of GM
soy in Brazil.

1998 Nov. In a public hearing over GM plants, promoted by the Commission
of Consumer Defense, Environment and Minorities from the Chamber of
Deputies, the need for labeling of products made from GM organisms is
defended. It is also argued that products that contain GM soy should be
submitted to technical and scientific tests for 5 years. Participants in the
debate include the Ministry of Science and Technology, members of the
CTNBio, consumer defense organizations, producers, and non-
governmental organizations. The recommendations approved in the public
hearing are sent to the Ministries of Health, Agriculture and Justice.

1998 Nov. The September 16 decision that impeded the Federal government
from authorizing the commercial planting of GM soy is defeated under
appeal. The new decision allows planting as long as it is accompanied by
quarterly reports on the quality of the products and as long as segregation
is guaranteed. The requirement for an environmental impact assessment
and report before planting is discarded.

470
The precautionary principle establishes that when an activity threatens to cause harm to the
environment or human health, precautionary measures should be taken, even if relationships of
cause and effect have not been clearly establish by science.

434
1998 Nov. The recently-elected governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Olivio Dutra,
announces that the future government of the department will maintain the
department as a GM-free zone, that is, in relation to agriculture,
fisheries and food, there will be no production, commercialization or
consumption of GMOs.

1998 Nov. - The CTNBio approves field tests for GM rice resistant to the
herbicide Liberty Link
®
, made by AgrEvo. This is the first field test with
GM rice approved by the CTNBio, which had rejected the request in
February. The tests would be carried out on the Experimental Station of
the Instituto Rio Grandense do Arroz (IRGA) in Cachoeirinha. In April of
the following year, the CTNBio decides that the isolation of the area
where the experiment is being undertaken is inadequate and the plants are
burned.

1998 Dec. IDEC and Greenpeace obtain a decision from the 6
th
Federal Court,
Brasilia that establishes the obligatory segregation of GM plants in order
to guarantee labeling for final products.

1999 Feb. The deputy Elvino Bohn Gass (PT) presents to the Legislative
Assembly of Rio Grande do Sul a bill (PL 16/99) proposing the
prohibition, in the department, of the planting and commercialization of
GMOs.

1999 Feb. The Brazilian Institute of the Environment (Instituto Brasileiro do
Meio Ambiente IBAMA), an organism of the Ministry of Environment,
joins the class action suit brought by IDEC and Greenpeace. The suit
defends the necessity of an environmental impact assessment and report as
a precondition for the commercial release of GM soy in the environment.

1999 March The deputies Carlos Minc (PT) and later Carlos Dias (PFL)
present to the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro bills (respectively,
PL 88/99 and PL 98/99) proposing the prohibition, in the department, of
the planting and commercialization of GMOs.

1999 March The deputy Neodi Saretta (PT) presents to the Legislative
Assembly of Santa Catarina a bill (PL 39/99) that requires research, tests,
experiments or other activities in the areas of biotechnology and genetic
engineering.

1999 March The Ministry of Agriculture asks the CTNBio to define more
rigorous criteria for experiments with GM products. The Ministry admits
that they are not able to supervise and monitor experiments due to the lack
of staff.

435

1999 March The governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Olívio Dutra, implementing
department law 9453/91, determines that notification to the state Public
Authority of the areas where research with transgenics is being undertaken
is required and demands the presentation of an environmental impact
assessment and report (Vigna 2001, 80).

1999 April The Minister of Science and Technology, Bresser Pereira, seeking
to unify the discourse of the federal government relating to transgenics,
announces a meeting of the ministries that take part in the CTNBio.

1999 April The deputy Rodrigo Rollemberg (PSB) presents to the Legislative
Assembly of the Federal District a bill (PL 101/99) with requirements
relating to the commercial cultivation and sale of GM products destined
for human or animal consumption.

1999 May At a meeting in Recife, the 27 state Secretaries present at the
National Forum of Secretaries of Agriculture unanimously decide to begin
a motion to take a position on transgenics. The motion proposes that
transgenics not be released in Brazil until the impact on state budgets and
research uncertainties are resolved. The critical position of the Secretaries
over the commercial release of GM crops is reaffirmed in another meeting,
in September 1999 during the Agro-Fishery Trade Show Expointer in
Esteio (RS).

1999 May Monsoy, a subsidiary of Monsanto, sends to the National Service of
Variety Protection requests for the protection and registration of five
varieties of GM soy: M-SOY 6363RR, M-SOY 7777RR, M-SOY
7979RR, M-SOY 8080RR and M-SOY 8888RR.

1999 May - The Ministry of the Environment announces that it will demand an
environmental impact assessment and report for all GM products that are
analyzed by the CTNBio.

1999 May IDEC and Greenpeace enter a suit with the 6
th
Federal Court,
Brasilia, as an addendum to the legal action brought by IDECs first claim,
on September 16, 1998, to impede the authorization to register transgenic
seeds from Monsoy. The provisional registration of protection for those
varieties was announced by the Ministry of Agriculture, but that approval
was insufficient: In order for transgenic seeds to be freed for production
and commercialization such seeds need the approvals of the Ministries
of Health and of the Environmental, which were not in effect. The
Minister of Environment, Sarney Filho, had already manifested a critique
against the freeing of commercial cultivation of genetically modified

436
organisms in the country, a position contrary to that taken by the Minister
of Science and Technology, Bresser Pereira. Defending the freeing of
transgenics for commercial cultivation, the Minister of Agriculture,
Francisco Turra, with the support of the National Confederation of
Agriculture (Confederação Nacional da Agricultura - CNA),
471
proposed
the labeling of products containing genetically modified organisms. Turra,
cautious of the repercussions of debate, decided to postpone the
publication of the definite commercial registrations for Monsantos
varieties of transgenic soy (the list of new plants is normally republished
every other month). Reflecting the internal debate within the government
and the pressures being placed upon it, in the beginning of June, in more
than one instance, the Minister of Agriculture would announce the
liberation of the plants, and then shortly after deny that he had made the
statement. The different ministries pointed out the necessity of a unified
position within the federal government with respect to the topic. Adding to
this polemic, a study published in the British science magazine Nature,
which proved that transgenic Bt corn produces pollen lethal to one species
of butterfly (the monarch) came to public attention.

1999 Brazil changes its position on the Convention on Biological Diversity to a
neutral position.

1999 Monsanto pledges not to commercialize terminator technology.

1999 June The Ministry of Justice elaborates a statement
472
that demands the
labeling of all genetically modified foods and of any food that has some
GM component after processing (Menasche 2000, Vigna 2001). In July of
2000 the Ministry of Justice creates a special commission to return to and
conclude the work initiated a year earlier, but within 20 days. The
commissions task is to elaborate standards to regulate the labeling of
transgenic foods. The inter-ministerial project is concluded in August, but
remains without regulation until October, since it is an object of internal
debate within the government.

1999 June The federal government announces that it will begin creating a
labeling policy for GM products.

1999 June Monsanto, planning to offer seeds for the planting of up to 400
thousand hectares, announces its estimates that Brazil could, in the coming
season, harvest around one million tons of genetically modified soy.

471
A landowner (patronal) organization.
472
Uma minuta de portaria.

437
1999 June The Courts opinion, required in May, rules in favor of IDEC and
Greenpeace, and prohibits the planting and commercialization of Roundup
Ready
®
genetically modified soy until the government has defined rules
for the safety and labeling of genetically modified organisms. Judge
Antonio Souza Prudente requests that Monsanto and Monsoy present
environmental impact assessments and reports. Among other restrictions
established by the judgement is the following: cultivation on a
commercial scale of the product referred to is suspended. The technical
questions brought forth by renowned researchers were not sufficiently
clarified in the course of procedural instruction with respect to possible
flaws presented by the CTNBio in relation to the examination of the
request for deregulation of Roundup Ready
®
soy. (Menasche 2000, 7).
One week earlier the Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science
(Sociedade Brasileira para o Progresso de Ciencia - SBPC) presented at
the seminar Trangenics and Cloning the document Transgenics:
Science, Ethics and Domination, in which they criticized the non-
rigorous attitude of the CTNBio toward the deregulation of transgenic soy.
Monsanto announces its intent to resort to judicial decision, anticipating
obtaining authorizations before November -when the following harvest
would be planted. The Ministries of Science and Technology and of
Agriculture appeal so that the decision is reviewed by the Regional
Federal Tribunal. The federal government also announces intent to seek
judicial decision, a position that provokes a reaction from the Procurator
of the Republic. The Procurators office, taking advantage of a public civil
inquiry already underway, proposes to investigate the interests of the
government in the production of genetically modified soy.

1999 June The National Council on the Environment (Conselho Nacional de
Meio Ambiente - CONAMA) approves the position of the judicial branch,
reaffirming the necessity of environmental licensing and of an
environmental impact assessment and report before permitting transgenics
to be freed into the environment.

1999 July The president of the Regional Federal Tribunal, Plauto Afonso da
Silva Ribeiro, rejects the suit brought by the Monsanto Group, which was
asking for the suspension of the opinion that impeded the cultivation and
the commercialization of transgenic soy (Vigna 2001, 81 and Menasche
2000).
1999 July The Federal Attorney Generals office announces that it also
intends to revisit the decision of 6
th
Federal Court (Brasilia) judge Antonio
Souza Prudente, but that it would wait for the Judiciary to reinitiate
work in August. Therefore, all decisions that refer to transgenic soy
remain suspended until then (Menasche 2000).

438
1999 July Upon assuming office, the new Minister of the Science and
Technology, Ronaldo Sardenberg, declares that he does not yet have a
position on the topic of transgenics and that he favors a re-discussion of
the liberation of genetically modified food. In response, the new Minister
of Agriculture, Marcus Vinícius Pratini de Morais, declares his intent to
follow at risk the directions of the CTNBio (Menasche 2000).

1999 July - In Minas Gerais, deputy Edson Rezende puts forth a bill to the
Legislative Assembly that calls for a 5-year moratorium on the production
of transgenic food.

1999 Aug. The 6
th
Federal Court of Brasilia confirms the sentence that
suspends the planting of transgenic soy within the country until an
environmental impact assessment and report are done. This is a final
decision.

1999 Aug. IDEC promotes public actions against transgenic food in eleven
states.

1999 Sept. - The Brazilian Association of Seed Producers (Associação
Brasileira de Produtores de Sementes ABRASEM)

denounces the
planting of transgenic soy in Rio Grande do Sul from contraband seed
brought from Argentina, to the extent of a million hectacres for the
1999/2000 harvest, almost a third of the area planted with soy in that state.
The state Secretary of Agriculture, José Hermeto Hoffmann, in reaction to
the statement, proposes that the Federal Police investigate the source of
the information that the president of ABRASEM used, commenting that
such declarations have the objective of creating facts so that farmers
believe that the planting of transgenics is irreversible.

1999 Sept. - The government of Rio Grande do Sul announces the acquisition of
rapid test kits for transgenics, which are later utilized to monitor the use of
transgenic seeds and crops in the state. The kits are part of a state
government campaign against transgenics - Transgenics: dont plant that
idea- that also includes the diffusion of similar messages on television
and radio, by pamphlets and posters, and a phone line dial-transgenics to
receive denunciations.

1999 Sept. - The new president of the CTNBio, Leila Oda, states that the
Brazilian population must have more information about transgenics -
leading to public hearings, such as the open event that would be
promoted during the First Brazilian Congress on Biosafety at the end of
September. Said Congress turned into a source of scandal: IDEC and
Greenpeace entered the meeting with the representative of the Federal

439
Public Ministry and made statements against the CTNBio, accusing the
CTNBio of immoral conduct for accepting the patronage of companies
that produce transgenic seeds: Novartis, AgrEvo, Dupont and Monsanto,
in order to carry out the event.

1999 Oct. - In Minas Gerais, at a public hearing, a proposal for a five-year
moratorium on the production of transgenic food is discussed, as called for
in a bill sponsored by deputy Edson Rezende (PSB).

1999 Oct. - The National Federation of Agricultural Workers (Confederação
Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura - CONTAG) makes a
statement on transgenics. They state the concerns that the issue brings up
and recommend that the government hear society before deciding on the
issue.

1999 Oct. - Implementing the prevailing federal court order, the Federal Police
burns 22.5 sacks of transgenic soy apprehended in October 1998 in the
municipality of Júlio de Castilhos, Rio Grande do Sul. It was the first
recorded case of the apprehension of transgenic grains collected in the
national territory and becomes the first in which the responsible parties are
charged for the illegal cultivation of genetically modified soy.

1999 Nov. - Thirteen monitoring teams from the Secretary of Agriculture of Rio
Grande do Sul visit dozens of rural properties in the regions of Cruz Alta,
Palmeira das Missões, Passo Fundo, Erechim, Santa Rosa and
Tupanciretã. They apprehend 3,588 bags of transgenic seeds. With the
rapid test kits, they carry out 700 tests for transgenics, of which 3.5% are
positive. Twenty-four producers are listed as infracting the law by storing
or planting transgenic soy. The list of producers is sent (by the Secretary
of Agriculture) to the Federal Public Ministry, which gives it to the
Federal Police. To undertake judgement, new samples would be collected
so that definitive tests could be carried out by EMBRAPA, with the
support of the National Institute of Criminology. All of the tests carried
out by EMBRAPA were found to be negative.

1999 Nov. A national campaign against transgenics is created in Brasilia. The
campaign, For a Brazil Free of Transgenics is formed by non-
governmental organizations, environmental groups, family farmers,
churches and professional associations (Vigna 2001, 81). The goal of the
campaign is a moratorium on GMOs (Vigna 2001: 13).

1999 Dec. - The federal deputy from Rio Grande do Sul, Darcísio Perondi
(PMDM), presents to the National Congress a bill (PL 2189/99) that
authorizes the production, commercialization, and storage of transgenic

440
seeds in the country. In the Chamber of Deputies, fifteen bills referring to
transgenics would be introduced.
473
With regard to labeling, the following
bills were presented: numbers 2905/97 (from Fernando Gaberia of the
PB/RJ), 2908/97 (from Valdeci Oliveira, of the PT/RS and Fernando Ferro
of the PT/PE), 2919/97 (from Sandra Starling, PT/MG) and 1262/99 (from
Inácio Arruda, PCDO/CE). Other bills addressed moratoria, oversight or
restrictions, including numbers 4841/98 (from Fernando Ferro), 349/99
and 1115/99 (from Pompeo de Mattos, of the PDT/RS), 521/99 (from
Vanessa Graziotin, PCDO/AM), 929/99 (from Bispo Rodrigues, PL/RJ),
1191/99 (from Pedro Wilson PT/GO, and Padre Roque, PT/PR), 1251/99
(from Padre Roque) and 2523/00 (from Marcos Afonso, PT/AC). A bi-
cameral bill (PEC 159/99) from deputy Adão Pretto (PT/RS) proposed the
expropriation of land illegally cultivated with transgenics (Vigna 2001:
64-69).

1999 Dec. - The Government of Mato Grosso do Sul publishes in the Diário
Oficial
474
legislation about transgenics approved by the Legislative
Assembly of that state. The law calls for the registration of genetically
modified organisms at the Department of Agro-fishery Inspection and
Defense of the state and requires the implementation of all pertinent
federal legislation regarding transgenics, including CONAMAs norms
which call for an environmental impact assessment and report.

1999 Dec. - The State of São Paulo approves law No. 10,467/99, which requires
manufacturers to inform on the packaging of products the existence, if
contained, of genetically modified foods.

1999 Dec. - The newspaper Zero Hora publishes a report on research about
opinions on transgenics, in which 418 people were heard in the
Metropolitan Region of Porto Alegre (RS).

1999 Dec. A draft labeling policy for GM products is released for discussion.

1999 Dec. A provisional measure giving the CTNBio authority over GM
production and sale is issued.

2000 PEC 237/00 from deputy Paulo Mourão (PSDB/TO) proposes to put the
topic of transgenics under Federal legislative privilege. Currently
agricultural matters fall under states rights. State legislation can be more
restrictive but not less restrictive than federal law (Vigna 2001: 64-69).

473
For more information on specific bills, see Vigna 2001, 59-64.
474
A daily official newspaper.

441
2000 PL 2523/00 (from Marcos Afonso, PT/AC) proposes a moratorium on
transgenics and adds an article to the Biosecurity Law prohibiting the
commercial cultivation of GMOs until June 30, 2003. It proposes criminal
measures for infractions (Vigna 2001: 64-69).

2000 PL 3348/00 by Fernando Ferro (PT/CE) proposes labeling of processed
foods with GM components. Labels must specify the name of the GM
component and its percentage. The bill also requires warnings for GM
foods served in restaurants and cafeterias (Vigna 2001: 64-69).

2000 PL 3616/00 by Bispo Wanderval (PL/SP) proposes labeling of processed
foods with GM components that specifies the name of the GM component
and its percentage (Vigna 2001: 64-69).

2000 PL 3805/00 by Ricardo Ferraço (PSDB/ES) addresses the labeling of
products not generally packaged, by way of posters at the sight of sale
(Vigna 2001: 64-69).

2000 PL 3849/00 by João Coser (PT/ES) proposes various changes to the
Biosafety Law including issues pertaining to consumers rights and the
prevention and treatment of damages caused by transgenics. It also
prohibits the production and commercialization of products without a label
and packaging, the production of chimeric animals, and requires a license
or EIA/RIMA. It gives civil and criminal punishments for infractions,
including dissolving companies that cause harm (Vigna 2001: 64-69).

2000 Jan. - Monsanto announces that it will construct a biotechnology
laboratory in Minas Gerais and an herbicide factory in Camaçari, Bahia.
For the factory Monsanto will receive R$ 285 million in fiscal incentives.
The sum corresponds to more than half of the resources of the Fund for
Investment in the Northeast (Fundo do Investimento do Nordeste -
FINOR) for the year. This leads two members of the Chamber to call for
an investigation of FINOR.

2000 Jan. - Brazil approves the Biosafety Protocol and supports the
precautionary principle (Vigna 2001, 82). The National Congress approves
the Biosafety Protocol but it is not signed by the President.

2000 Feb. - Greenpeace impedes the unloading of 30 thousand tons of corn
suspected to be transgenic. The load, which came from the USA, belongs
to the company Perdigão, which promises to re-export all of the corn.

2000 Feb. - The conclusion of the first complete gene sequence of a live being
done in the Southern Hemisphere is officially announced. It was done by

442
Brazilian scientists of the bacteria Xylella fastidiosa, which causes
yellowing, a disease that affects citrus plants.

2000 March - The Brazilian Association of Food Industries (Associação
Brasileira das Indústrias da Alimentação - ABIA) files a direct action of
unconstitutionality against a state law in São Paulo (Law no. 10,467/99)
with the Federal Supreme Court. Said law requires the labeling of GM
ingredients on food packing.

2000 March - In a meeting of the Codex Alimentarius, Brazil takes a position
against the labeling of transgenic foods, together with Australia, New
Zealand and the USA. These other three countries also oppose the addition
of the precautionary principle, insisting on the concept of substantial
equivalence according to which there is no basic difference between
transgenic and non-transgenic food from the point of view of safety or
human consumption.

2000 March - In Paraná, large soy grinding companies test crops and find that
plants are not transgenic. The director of the Palotina Agricultural
Cooperative (Cooperative Agrícola de Palotina

) discards the possibility
that clandestine transgenic crops exist in the state, alleging that the
varieties planted in Argentina are not adapted to the climate of the region.
Later that year, in September, a load of 100 sacks of transgenic soy would
be apprehended in the warehouse of a producer in the west of Paraná. The
seeds, which are suspected of having been smuggled in from Argentina,
were being reserved for the 2000/2001 harvest. In October, in the same
region, another load of 100 sacks of transgenic soy would be apprehended
by the Minister of Agriculture. As a result of the blitz carried out by the
Ministry of Agriculture, in October of 2000, 250 kilos of transgenic soy
which illegally entered the country from Ponte da Amizade in Foz do
Iguaçú would be destroyed.

2000 March - The government of Mato Grosso do Sul invests R$ 400 thousand
to implement its Clean Soy program. Analyses are done in all cultivated
products in the state to certify that Mato Grosso do Sul does not have
transgenic materials.

2000 March - The national leader of the Landless Workers Movement
(Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra - MST), João Pedro
Stédile, states that the population should burn transgenic crops, which are
prohibited in Brazil (Boletim 2000c).

2000 April - The Legislative Assembly of Minas Gerais overrides the
governors veto of the bill that proposed the obligatory inclusion of the

443
sentence product made with genetically modified organisms on the
labels of packages of processed foods with transgenic content. Once the
bill becomes law, companies from the food sector will have 90 days to
adopt the processes required regarding the sale of processed products
which contain genetically modified organisms.

2000 April - Monsanto, holder of the patent on transgenic soy that is resistant to
the toxic agricultural chemical glyphosate, gives EMBRAPA and the
Organization of Cooperatives of Paraná (Organização das Cooperativas do
Paraná) the right to use the gene of the plant for scientific and commercial
purposes. Together these organizations represent 80% of national market
for soy seed. Monsanto has 20% of the national soy seed market
(Menasche 2000, 14).

2000 April - The bill by senator Marina Silva (PT) that proposes a 5-year
moratorium for transgenic products receives an unfavorable opinion in the
Commission of Social Issues of the Federal Senate from the reporter
Leomar Quintanilha (PPB). The Commission looks at three bills on
transgenics: PL 188/00 from senator Carlos Patrocínio (PFL) which
establishes the obligation to put different informative labels on transgenic
products for use for humans, animals or plants; PL 422/99 from senator
Romero Jucá (PSDB), which also addresses labeling for transgenics,
requiring producers to stamp their labels with the statement Attention!
Transgenic Product; and PL 216/99, from senator Marina Silva, which
prohibits the cultivation, commercialization and export of transgenics for a
period of 5 years.

2000 April - The Regional Federal Court of the 4
th
Region, with its seat in Porto
Alegre, affirms the power of the CTNBio to authorize the experimental
planting of genetically modified plants. Discussion of the powers of the
CTNBio widened since October 1999, when an opinion from the judicial
consul of the Ministry of Science and Technology gave the CTNBio a
consultative role, establishing the authorization of planting under the
authority of the Ministries of Health, Agriculture and Environment. The
Regional Federal Court affirms, in this decision, the CTNBios power to
authorize experimental cultivation, but not commercial.

2000 April - CONAMA forms a working group to discuss procedures and areas
of authority in the elaboration of the environmental impact assessments
and reports for transgenics.

2000 April - Aventis begins harvesting transgenic rice on its company
experimental farm in Rio Grande (RS). It is the first harvest of genetically
modified rice in Brazil. Rice was planted on 2.3 hectares, 0.8 of a hectare

444
of which was genetically modified. Around 400 kilos of transgenic seed
from the rice will be sent for analysis in research institutions.

2000 May - During the seminar Transgenic Foods: International Alliance for
the Moratorium carried out in Rio de Janeiro, a manifest is launched
which proposes a moratorium on the cultivation and commercialization of
transgenic foods in the country. The signatories, governmental
representatives and NGO representatives, using the Montreal Biosafety
Protocol as a basis, ask for the immediate suspension of any action to
legalize the entrance of genetically modified organisms in Brazil. In
October the collection of signatures of the manifest would intensify, to be
signed by 28 members of the European Parliament.

2000 May - The ship Atticos arrives at the port of Rio Grande (RS), with a
shipment of 20 thousand tons of corn imported from Argentina for Avipal
and Languiru. Greenpeace and the MST denounce the shipment,
suspecting that it contains transgenic content. Acting on their
denunciation, the Federal Public Ministry recommends that the delegation
from the Ministry of Agriculture not authorize the removal or utilization
of the load until a transgenic analysis has been done. Analyses are done on
five samples (by the Department of Phytosanitation of the School of
Agronomy of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul) and attest to
the absence of transgenic material. The Procurator of the Republic,
considering the spectrum of the analyses limited, requests that transgenic
exams be done on 21 samples of the Argentine corn, stored in seven
locales in Porto Alegre, Canoas and Estrela. However, the federal judge
Cândido Alfredo Silva Júnior, of the 5
th
Court of Porto Alegre,
considering the samples analyzed to be sufficient, frees the Argentine corn
to the rest of the country. The state secretary of Agriculture notes that
since October of the year prior samples have been collected from loads of
imported corn arriving to the state. He states his concern about closing the
investigative process on the imported corn until the risk of the presence of
transgenic grains in the shipment has been completely eliminated. He
declares that the state government will send samples collected by
EMATER in the port of Rio Grande to the laboratory Genetic ID, located
in the US. The Minister of Agriculture, opposed to analyses done by the
state government, threatens to break relationships with EMATER, Rio
Grande do Sul. The results of the analyses sent by the state government
are never divulged.

2000 June - Greenpeace denounces the possibility that two shiploads of corn
coming from Argentina are transgenic. Both loads, consisting of 26
thousand tons of corn, were destined for the companies Perdigão and Pena
Branca, and arrived at the Brazilian port of São Francisco de Sul (SC).

445
Greenpeace sends warnings to the companies, the Federal Public Ministry,
and the Ministry of Agriculture, reminding them that the import of
transgenics is illegal. Upon receiving the denunciation, the Federal Public
Ministry enters a preventive action with 3
rd
Federal Court of Joinville
against Perdigão, and another against Pena Branca, obtaining victory in
both actions. The superintendent of the port of Rio Grande (RS) denies
authorization for the ship Wave, which was transporting the cargo
imported by Perdigão, to land to unload the shipment of corn.

2000 June - The Secretary of Agriculture of Espiritu Santo asks Cargill Agrícola
Argentina, for the Association of Bird Breeders (Associação dos
Avicultores), to certify that the Argentine corn received in the port of
Capuaba, Vitória (ES) is transgenic-free, suspecting the product to be
transgenic. The associated farmers had already signed a contract to import
two more loads of corn and sorghum from Cargill.

2000 June - The Ministry of Agriculture spreads the word that genetically
modified products need the approval of the CTNBio to enter the country,
according to law 8,974/95 and to normative instrument 17. Upon request
from the Ministry of Agriculture, the CTNBio must give an opinion, by
the end of the month, on the food safety of corn imported from Argentina
and the United States.

2000 June - The Legislative Assembly of Pará unanimously approves a bill by
Cláudio Almeida (PPS), presented the year before. The new law
establishes a 5-year moratorium for the planting and cultivation of
transgenics for commercial ends and creates a State Technical
Commission on Biosafety, composed by both governmental organisms
and representatives of civil society.

2000 June - Greenpeace sends a letter to the Public Ministry of Pernambuco to
inform them that a load of corn imported from Argentina, which was
acquired by poultry growers from Pernambuco from Cargill Uruguay, is
planning to unload in the port of Recife on the June 15. Given the decision
of the Federal Courts, and the favorable opinion of the preventive action
put forth by the Federal Procurators office upon receiving Greenpeaces
denunciation, the load of 38 thousand tons of corn brought by the ship
Norsul Vitória is impeded upon arrival on June 19, to ascertain whether
transgenic grains exist in the load. A sample of 30 kilos is collected by the
Ministry of Agriculture and sent for analysis to the National Center for
Research on Corn and Sorghum (Centro Nacional de Pesquisa de Milho
e Sorgo), under EMBRAPA, in Sete Lagoas, Minas Gerias. The tests
reveal the presence of transgenic grains in the load, which leads the

446
Secretary of Agro-fishery Defense of the Ministry of Agriculture to
determine that the product should be returned (which did not happen).

2000 June - Aventis sends a request to CTNBio for the commercial cultivation
of transgenic corn Liberty Link
®
, which is tolerant of the herbicide with
the same name.

2000 June - The Officials Union (Sindicato dos Funcionários)

of EMBRAPA
diffuses a document entitled Reasons to say no to transgenics in
agriculture. A few days later, the Union joins the campaign For a Brazil
Free From Transgenics.

2000 June - Greenpeace and IDEC diffuse information about the analyses of 42
foods sold in Brazil. The analyses were done by two entities, in Swiss and
Austrian laboratories, and detected the presence of transgenics in the
following products: infant formula (Nestogeno, from Nestle Brazil and
ProSobee from Bristol-Myers), soy milk (Soy Milk from Ovebra
Industrial), potato chips (Pringles Original, from Proctor & Gamble),
hotdogs (Slaskcha Swift, from Swift Armour), soup (Sopa Knorr, from
Refinações de Milho Brasil and Cup Noodles, from Nissin Ajinomoto),
diet shakes (Cereal Shake Diet, from Olvebra Industrial), bacon bits
(BacOs from Gourmand Alimentos), and soy supplement (Supra Soy
from Jospar).
475
In September, Greenpeace diffuses as new list of
products detected with RR soy and Bt corn 176. After that Greenpeace
lauches a campaign with the slogan Transgenics: Not on my plate!

2000 June - On June 26, a judge of the 6
th
Federal Court, Brasilia, Antônio
Souza Prudente, deciding on the public civil action that refers to any
genetically modified species, pronounces a sentence that obligates the
government to demand that an environmental impact assessment and
report be done before the planting of genetically modified crops can be
freed in the country. The decision favors IDEC, which had taken a civil
public action against the government of Brazil and the company Monsanto
in 1998. The judge considers part of the decree of president Fernando
Henrique, which permitted the CTNBio to forego the requirement of an
environmental impact assessment and report, unconstitutional. The Court
also sentences that the government of Brazil must demand that the
CTNBio elaborate standards for food safety, commercialization and
consumption of transgenic foods within 90 days. This sentence impedes
the CTNBio from emitting any conclusive technical opinions over any
request for the freeing of transgenics until they elaborate such standards.

475
For more information on the percentage of the contamination and other products tested see
Menasche 2000 and Greenpeace Brasil 2002.

447
According to the sentence, regulations regarding the consumption, sale
and safety of transgenics must be done in conformity with the
Constitution, with the Code of Consumer Defense, and with
environmental legislation. Lack of completion of the sentence held a
penalty of 10 minimum salaries per day.

2000 June 27 - The National Agency of Sanitary Vigilence (Agência Nacional
de Vigilância Sanitária

- ANVS) of the Ministry of Health, sends a memo
to 10 companies that manufacture the foods found by NGOs to contain
GM content, asking them to recall products suspected of containing
imported transgenics. The memo notifies the companies that if the
suspicion of transgenic content is confirmed by ANVS and the
manufacturers have not addressed this request, ANVS will apprehend the
products at their point of sale. On June 28, the Municipal Vigilance of the
Secretary of Health of Belo Horizonte determines that, at the supermarkets
of the city, placards that warn product with transgenic components be
placed on the shelves that contain genetically modified foods. The State
Program for Consumer Defense (Programa Estadual de Defesa do
Consumidor - PROCON) from Rio Grande do Sul begins an
administrative process, citing seven industries and distributors for not
having included specific information on the packaging of the products
noting the presence of transgenics.

2000 June - Luiz Antônio Barreto de Castro, the Chief Director of EMBRAPA,
Genetic Resources and Biotechnology (Recursos Genêticos e
Biotenologia)

states, in a workshop in the Legislative Chamber of the
Federal District, that the position of the institution in favor of the
commercial freeing of transgenics is the position of the federal
government. It is the first time that a member of the government publicly
defends this position (Menasche 2000, 19).

2000 June - The Minster of Agriculture, Pratini de Morais, states that the
Brazilian government intends to give absolute flexibility to the
production of transgenics, affirming that the market will determine
whether or not the country should plant and commercialize varieties of
genetically modified organisms.

2000 June - The Regional Federal Tribunal, in Brasilia, meets to judge, a second
time, the appeal by Monsanto and the Union (government of Brazil)
against the judicial decision that prohibits the planting and
commercialization of transgenic soy Roundup Ready
®
without carrying
out an environmental impact assessment and report. In the first instance,
the sentence, emitted in August of 1999, also conditioned the liberation of
transgenics for consumption with the development of standards for

448
biosafety and with the labeling of genetically modified foods. The
reporting judge for the process, Assuzete Dumont Reis Magalhães,
commented that, in her 12 years of practice, she had never seen so much
pressure from so many sources from the government and from the
company itself over a judicial decision. The reporting judge emitted a
favorable opinion regarding maintaining the prohibitions conditioning
transgenics, while another judge, Girair Aran Meguerian, asked to view
the documents of the process. The latter request led to the delay of the
decision until August. In the mean time IBAMA withdrew from the case.
(It had been a party with IDEC and Greenpeace, against the Union and
Monsanto). On August 8, 2000, the Federal Regional Tribunal of the 1
st

Region (Brasilia) decided, unanimously, to maintain the prohibitions on
the production and commercialization of transgenic soy in the country.

2000 June - Affronting the judicial sentence which prohibits the CTNBio from
emitting conclusive technical opinions until standards for food safety, sale
and consumption of transgenic foods have been elaborated, the CTNBio,
acting with a guarantee from the Ministry of Science and Technology,
emits favorable opinions for the importation of 13 varieties of transgenic
corn for use as animal food on June 30.

2000 June - EMBRAPA finishes the development of various GM varieties
including GM soy, corn, cotton, papaya, black beans and potatoes.
Commercial contracts for these products are not complete.

2000 June Greenpeace makes a denunciation to the Public Ministry of Recife,
which in turn embargoes a load of Argentine corn on the ship Norsul that
was bound for the company Cargill. It sends samples of the load to be
analyzed for transgenics (Vigna 2001, 83). The illegal opinions of the
CTNBio are used by the federal government on July 6, to contravene the
Judicial branches suspension of the unloading of 38 thousand tons of
Argentine transgenic corn from the ship - which had been waiting since
the June 20 in the port of Recife for authorization to unload its shipment.

2000 July - On July 6, 2000, the federal government diffuses an official
memorandum, signed by the Ministers of the Civil House, Agriculture,
Science and Technology, Justice, Environment, and Health, in which it
defends the adoption of genetically modified organisms in the country.
This position leads IDEC to propose the installation of a Congressional
Commission of Inquiry to verify the involvement of the federal
government with biotechnology companies. Upon taking this position,
the federal government assumes an offensive posture in the national and
international media, diffusing statements that the next Brazilian harvest
will be the last harvest without transgenics. At the same time, using the

449
argument of the scarcity of corn, it promotes a stay of arms with the Public
Ministry for each load of transgenics that arrives at a Brazilian port.
Moreover, it successively puts off the regulation of the labeling of
transgenic foods, the judicial limitation for which would expire on
October 3, and announces that it will alter the Biosafety Law using a
Provisional Measure (Medida Provisoria - MP), giving more powers to the
CTNBio.

2000 The President publishes MP 2137/00, amplifying the powers of the
CTNBio (Vigna, 2001:10). The Presidential action is repudiated by civil
society and the Judicial branch. Civil society expresses concerns of
corruption and conflict of interest within the government in favor of
multinational agrobiotechnology companies and against the public interest
of most Brazilians. The Judicial branch expresses concerns regarding risks
posed to the environment and human life, and to democratic governance.

2000 July The Brazilian National Academy of Sciences issues a manifest
supporting GM crops and the CTNBios authority. Scientists from other
countries endorse the use of GM crop technology.

2000 July - The state of Pará creates a GM labeling law.

2000 Sept. - A load of 100 sacks of transgenic soy is apprehended in the
warehouse of a producer in the west of Paraná. The seeds, suspected of
having been contrabanded from Argentina, were being reserved for the
planting of the 2000/2001 harvest.

2000 Nov In the Chamber of Deputies, a Parliamentary Commission of
Inquiry over FINOR (Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito do Fundo de
Investimento do Nordeste - CPI do FINOR)

is approved and installed. It
investigates the allocation of R$285 million, more than half of FINORs
annual budget, for the construction of Grupo Monsantos second largest
pesticide laboratory in the world, in Bahia (Vigna 2001, 83).

2000 Nov. The city of Belo Horizonte, MG, approves a municipal law that
prohibits the production and commercialization of transgenic products in
the municipality (Vigna 2001, 83).

2000 Dec. Greenpeace licenses organic products. Greenpeace Brazil
participates in the first intergovernmental meeting on the Cartagena
Biosafety Protocol, which focuses on the international transport of
transgenics. The adoption of the Protocol and the outbreak of mad cow
disease favor Brazilian exports.

450
2000 Dec. The State Program for Consumer Defense of Rio Grande do Sul
fines AVIPAL R$ 500 thousand for not having informed consumers of its
use of Bt corn in its feed for egg-laying poultry (Vigna 2001, 83).

2000 Dec. - Pará becomes the first Brazilian state to decree a moratorium
prohibiting the cultivation of transgenics for commercial ends. The
governor sanctions Law 6328 that regulates the use of GMOs (Vigna
2001, 84).

200 Dec. The Chamber of Deputies approves a proposal from deputy
Fernando Ferro (PT/BA) to create a Monitoring and Control Comission to
monitor the processes adopted by the Executive Power to authorize the
liberation of transgenic crops in the country (Vigna 2001, 84).

2001 PL 2905/01 by deputy Ronaldo Vasconcellos (PL/MG) addresses labeling
and limits the areas in which transgenic products can be tested (Vigna
2001, 69).

2001 PL 4357/01 from deputy Telma de Souza (PT/SP) prohibits the use of
GMOs and GM by-products in schools, hospitals, nurseries/day cares,
orphanages, asylums, retirement/elder care homes, military units and
prisons (Vigna 2001, 70).

2001 Jan. Major retailers from the United Kingdom, Tesco and Asda,
announce that they will not use transgenics in their products. Greenpeace
participates in the first World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, coordinating
an office about transgenics.

2001 Jan. The Judicial Branch declares that IBAMA must monitor localities
where there are GMOS (Liminar No. 10329-1/2001) (Cited in Vigna,
2001: 17).

2001 Feb. In Paraíba a law which regulates the sale of transgenics becomes
active. The law, begun by Ricardo Coutinho (PT) establishes that
transgenic products can only be sold on special shelves that have placards
indicating the transgenic components of the food (Vigna 2001, 84).

2001 Feb. In Belo Horizonte, MG, transgenic products, after being prohibited
in November 2000, return to supermarket shelves. Their return is due to a
favorable opinion received by ABIA from the 3
rd
Court of Municipal
Administration (Vigna 2001, 84).

2001 Feb. - The Agroindustrial Sugar cane Union (União da Agroindústira
Canavieira - UNICA) of São Paulo, which represents sugar cane growers

451
in the Central-Southern region, states that it does not have any commercial
genetically modified sugar cane crops planted anywhere in the country
(Vigna 2001, 84-85).

2001 March - The MST destroys part of a transgenic soy crop in the
municipality of Abelardo Luz, in west Santa Catarina. It is the second time
in less than a month that the MST carries out a similar act in the state
(Vigna 2001, 85).

2001 March The Parliamentary Inquiry Commission on FINOR approves
applying insolvency to the bank, fiscal and telephone accounts of people
fiscally and legally involved in the deviation of funds from FINOR
(Vigna 2001, 85).

2001 March 8 On International Womens Day, rural workers protest against
transgenics in 21 capital cities around the country. In four of the protests, a
McDonalds is chosen as a site for action because the chain is seen as a
symbol of the interventionist policy of large monopolies in Brazil (Vigna
2001, 85).

2001 March - Amparo becomes the first municipality in the State of São Paulo
to prohibit the cultivation and sale of transgenic foods when the Municipal
Chamber of the city approves a law brought by Dimas Marchi (PT) (Vigna
2001, 85).

2001 March Greenpeace does a public activity against transgenics in the
democratic corner in Porto Alegre.

2001 April The First Peoples Tribunal on Transgenics is held in Fortaleza.
The Tribunal unanimously condemns the use of transgenics in agriculture.

2001 May Greenpeace divulges a second North American study that reveals
that transgenic crops use more agro-chemicals.

2001 July 18 - Executive Decree No. 3871 determines that products with traces
of GMOs in excess of 4% must be labeled (Vigna 2001, 72). It does not
specify if that means 4% of the entire product or 4% for each ingredient,
causing some critics to declare that it is a rule created specifically not to be
implemented. The Decree contradicts the Code of Consumer Defense
which stipulates that information on products must be correct, clear,
precise, ostensive and in Portuguese (Vigna 2001, 72 ftnote 30). The
Decree also overrides any legislative action on this issue, weakening the
separation of powers needed for democratic government. The Decree
favors the interests of multinational companies because many highly

452
processed products do not register GM detection at that the 4% level
although they contain GM products. The Executive also announces, while
in the USA, the freeing of Monsantos RR soy for commercial planting.
The national campaign For a Brazil Free From Transgenics holds a
demonstration in front of the Ministry of Agriculture in protest (Vigna
2001, 85).

2001 July - The national campaign For a Brazil Free From Transgenics begins
a suit against the transgenic labeling decree, for not following the Code of
Consumer Defense (Vigna 2001, 86). In Aug. the suit is accepted by the
Federal Court on behalf the Public Ministry and IDEC (Vigna 2001, 85).

2001 Aug. - A Latin-American meeting is held in Quito, Ecuador where the
network For a Latin America Free From Transgenics is launched. The
Brazilian National Campaign joins this continental effort (Vigna 2001,
85).

2001 Aug. The President of the Association of Federal Judges, (Associação
dos Juizes Federais - AJUFE) Flávio Dino, warns that the Minister of
Agriculture could be sued by the Supreme Federal Tribunal for not
complying with judicial sentence, if he signs the order for the freeing of
transgenic soy (Vigna 2001, 85).

2001 Aug. The Minister of Agriculture, Pratini de Moraes, withdraws the
liberation of Monsantos RR soy for commercial planting (Vigna 2001,
85).

2002 CONAMA finalizes the guidelines for environmental impact assessments
of transgenic crops in Brazil.

2002 Contracted by IDEC, IBOPE Opinão interviews 2,000 Brazilians and finds
that 92% of them prefer obligatory labeling for transgenic ingredients
(IBOPE Opinão 2003).

2003 Sept. - By presidential provisional measure, farmers are allowed to plant
GM soy for one year only. Seeds cannot be transported across state lines
and farmers must pay indemnities for damage to the environment or
consumers health.

453
Appendix B
Chronology, India

1966 Seeds Act is passed.

1970 Patents Act is passed.

1972 Seeds (Amendment) Act (New Seed Policy) is passed.

1982 National Biotechnology Board is created, marking the first coordinated
effort for biotechnology in India. (Clark and Juma 1991, 74).

1985 Biotechnology becomes a priority area for the Government of India. (Dhar
2001).

1986 Department of Biotechnology set up in the Ministry of Science and
Technology (Jagadish 1991, Clark and Juma 1991). Scoones (2003b)
notes that this was established in 1985.

1986 Environmental Protection Act of 1986 is passed.

1988 National Working Group on Patent Laws is created.

1988 Seed imports begin to be allowed.

1989 March - The Seed Association of India (SAI), in cooperation with the
Ministry of Agriculture and other public sector research organizations,
organizes a 2-day seminar on the pros and cons of plant variety protection
(Seshia nd).

1989 The Government of India commissions the UN Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO) to study the desirability and feasibility of introducing
plant breeders rights (PBR) legislation in India (Seshia nd).

1989 The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) frames rules for the
regulation of genetically modified organisms (Dhar 2001).

1990 Dec. The Government of India launches the Biotechnology Consortium
of India Limited (BCIL) to promote interactions at the scientific and
commercial level between the institutions/universities and
industry(Jagadish 1991: 18).

1990 Recombinant DNA Guidelines are published by the DBT.

454
1990 Monsanto approaches the Indian government through the DBT about a
transfer of technology agreement for Bt cotton (Scoones 2003b, 7, Gupta
and Chandak 2005, 214).

1991 The US presses India to change its patents law.

1992 The Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangha (KRRS) raids the offices of Cargill
Seeds India and destroys its records and office equipment. KRRS launches
a new Quit India campaign (Sesha nd. 10).

1992 The US withdraws preferential trade because of the patents issue.

1993 Monsanto starts negotiating the technology transfer agreement with
Mahyco for the Bt cotton package (Gupta and Chandak 2005, 214).

1993 Monsanto requests to import GM material (Scoones 2003b).

1993 Monsanto Bt cotton technology offer to the Government of India is
rejected on the basis that technology transfer fees were too high.
(Scoones 2003b, 7, Gupta and Chandak 2005, 214).

1993 A draft Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), modeled after the UPOV
1978, was submitted to parliament. (Rhoe et. al. 2002. 272).

1993 March - More than 200,000 farmers converge upon the nations capital at
the Red Fort to demand no patents on seeds.

1994 The TRIPS Agreement is passed.

1995 Mayhco (Mayhco Monsanto Biotechnology, MMB) receives permission
from DBT to import transgenic cotton seed for R & D (Scoones 2003b,
Gupta and Chandak 2005, 214).

1996 Mayhco begins crossing transgenic Bt cotton into local varieties and
begins tests on the new varieties (through 1998) (Scoones 2003b, Gupta
and Chandak 2005, 214).

1996 A revised PVPA with stronger farmers rights is developed (Rhoe et at.
2002, 272).

1996 A limited field trial (1 location) to assess pollen escape from Bt cotton
is allowed (Government of India 2002).

455
1997 Limited field trails of Bt cotton (in 5 states) to assess pollen escape are
authorized (Gupta and Chandak 2005, 214, Government of India 2002).

1997 July The World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body
determines that India has to conform to the TRIPS Agreement.

1998 Monsanto purchases a 26% stake in Mayhco creating Mayhco-Monsanto
Biotech (MMB) Ltd., which later becomes a 50-50 joint venture (Gupta
and Chandak 2005, 214).

1998 Monsanto begins field trials of Bt cotton (Dhar 2001). RCGM approves 40
field trials in 9 states (4 more states plus the initial 5) (Scoones 2003b, 7).
MMB receives approval from RCGM to conduct countrywide field tests
on 85 hectares and to produce seeds on 150 hectares (Gupta and Chandak
2005, 214).

1998 Farmers protest in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh (Dhar 2001).

1998 Aug. - Revised Guidelines for Research in Transgenic Plants and
Guidelines for Toxicity, Allergenicity Evaluation of Transgenic Seeds,
Plants and Plant Parts are published by the DBT.

1999 Farmers protest again in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh (Dhar 2001).

1999 RCGM requests additional 11 field trials of Bt cotton following a review
of data from the previous year (Government of India 2002).

1999 A revised PVPA is submitted to parliament (Rhoe et al 2002, 272).

1999 The Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Education
(RFSTE) files a public interest petition challenging the legality of the
RCGM to approve field trials, because it is outside its authority and
because no biosafety regulations had been exercised (Gupta and Chandak
2005, 214).

2000 May- The RCGM approves Bt cotton for potential commercial release
(Scoones 2003b).

2000 July The GEAC approves large scale field trials and limited commercial
seed production (Scoones 2003b, Government of India 2002).

2000 Sept. Five Greenpeace activists, costumed as vegetables, are arrested at
the annual meeting of the Asia Pacific Seed Association (Greenpeace
Brasil 2000b).

456

2001 MMB approaches the GEAC for commercial release of Bt cotton varieties
(Gupta and Chandak 2005, 214).

2001 The DBT allows Mahyco to conduct extensive field trials and seed
production at 40 sites in 6 states based on total confidential data from
small-scale trials (Gupta and Chandak 2005, 214).

2001 June - After 1 year of large scale field trials the GEAC does not approve
commercialization. Instead it requests that the Indian Council of
Agricultural Research (ICAR) conduct further trials to provide non-biased
data (Scoones 2003b). The ICAR is to set up a supervisory committee
with representatives from the ICAR, MoEF, DBT, Department of
Agriculture and Cooperation, and Ministry of Health. These trials must
test for impact on human and animal food, spread of the cry protein
resistant boll worm, and impact on non-target soil microflora and other
fauna (Gupta and Chandak 2005, 215, Government of India 2002).

2001 Oct. MMB discovers the commercial cultivation of Bt cotton on over
10,000 acres in Gujarata, and traces the sale of seeds to Hyderabad-based
Navbharat Seeds Pvt Ltd. in Andra Pradesh. MMB also discovers that
Navbharat had been selling the seeds for the previous 3 years and demands
punitive action against the company (Gupta and Chandak 2005, 215).

2001 Oct. The GEAC orders the Gujarat Biotechnology Coordination
Committee to burn all illegal cotton crops. The Gujarat government
protests so the GEAC orders that the illegal cotton be purchased at a
suitable price. However the cotton was already at the open market by the
time the GEAC order came (Gupta and Chandak 2005, 215).

2001 Nov. Navbharat is sued for violating EPA rules (Gupta and Chandak
2005, 215).

2001 A Plant Variety Protection (PVP) bill is approved by Parliament. It enters
into force in 2003 (Sharma, Charak and Ramanaiah 2003, 302).

2002 Jan. - The DBT announces that the latest rounds of Bt cotton field trials
are satisfactory (Gupta and Chandak 2005, 215).

2002 The GEAC approves the first commercial release of a GM crop (Bt cotton)
for a three-year trial period in 6 states (Scoones 2003b, Sharma, Charak
and Ramanaiah 2003, 302, Gupta and Chandak 2005, 215).

2002 The Biological Diversity Act is passed.

457

2002 Aug. The Karnataka government temporarily bans the sale of Bt cotton
seed (Gupta and Chandak 2005, 215).

458
Appendix C
Chronology, Argentina

1973 Law on Seed and Phytogenetic Creations (Ley de Semillas y Creaciones
Fitogenéticas, No. 20,247) is passed.

1991 Regulatory Decree to the Law on Seed and Phytogenetic Creations
(Decreto Reglamentario de la Ley de Semillas y Creaciones Fitogenéticas
No. 2183/91) is issued.

1991 Decree 2817 creates the INASE to manage the Law on Seed.

1991 Resolution No. 124 of the SAGPyA creates the CONABIA.

1992 Resolution No. 656 of the SAGPyA defines the conditions for
environmental releases of GMOs. (These conditions are revised in 1993
and 1997).

1994 The Law on Seed is modified with Argentinas accession to the UPOV,
1978 version (Law No. 24, 376).

1995 The Law on Patents for Inventions and Processes (Patentes de Invención y
Modelos de Utilidad (No. 24, 425) is passed (and later enacted in 2000
with No. 24, 481).

1996 An executive level Regulatory Decree (Reglamentario No. 260) prohibits
the patenting of plants and animals.

1996 March - Commercialization of gyphosate-resistance soybean containing
Monsantos Roundup Ready
®
(RR) gene is approved (GRAIN 1998,
2004) and farmers begin growing GM soy.

1997 Resolution No. 289 of the SAGPyA stipulates protections for confidential
information and requirements for GMO commercialization. It also
establishes SENASAs jurisdiction over GM foods and requires DNMA
review prior to commercialization.

1998 Resolution No. 131 of the SAGPyA defines flexibility permits for GMOs.

1998 Two varieties of Bt corn (lepidoptera-resistant) and one variety of Bt
cotton are commercially approved. Two varieties of herbicide-tolerant
corn (T14 and T25) are commercially approved (Oficina de Biotecnología
2005).

459
1998 Farmers begin commercially growing Bt cotton for the first time (Qaim
and Alain de Janvry 2003).

1999 Authorization for T14 (gyphostate-tolerant corn) is revoked (Oficina de
Biotecnología 2005).

1999 Law No. 24766 makes the registry of confidential trade information
obligatory for agricultural and other products (to avoid fraud).

2000 Monsanto gives seed producers (not yet approved) herbicide-resistant corn
seeds at ExpoChacra 2000 (Greenpeace 2004).

2000 Law No. 24575 modifies the patent law to include pharmaceutical
products.

2000 March 15 - NGOs protest against transgenics on International Consumers
Day (Boletim No. 13, 2000).

2000 July Greenpeace does independent tests for GMOs in food and finds
traces of GM soy and corn (Greenpeace 2000a, d).

2000 Aug. Greenpeace denounces the cultivation of an illegal variety of GM
tobacco in Argentina (by American firm Hail and Cotton), and demands
that it be burned (Greenpeace 2000c).

2001 An herbicide-tolerant variety of cotton and another Bt corn variety are
commercially approved (Oficina de Biotecnología 2005).

2001 May - Greenpeace denounces use of Monsantos illegal herbicide-resistant
corn (Greenpeace 2004, 2001).

2004 Jan. - Monsanto announces it will no longer sell GM soybeans in
Argentina because it is not profitable for them (GRAIN 2004, La Opinión
de Rafaela 2004).

Abstract (if available)

Abstract The objective of this study is to address the puzzle of why states in the developing world with similar concerns and conditions have been slow to adopt transgenic (recombinant DNA, genetically modified/engineered) crop technologies, while others were pioneer users and developers of this technology. The central hypothesis tested here is that the type of involvement, defined as different strategies and access to institutional structures as well as varying organizational resources, of non-state actors (NSAs), both non-profit (non-governmental organizations, NGOs) and for-profit (industry), accounts for these differences. A second hypothesis is that variation in institutional context accounts for the differences in policies towards rDNA crops. Differences in institutional context include which level of government and type of institutions are responsible for policies for rDNA crops.

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Creator Bird, Mara Nielle (author)

Core Title Policies for genetically modified crops in developing countries: the role of non-state actors

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program International Relations

Publication Date 11/16/2006

Defense Date 05/23/2006

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Agriculture,argentina,biotechnology,Brazil,corporations/companies (MNCs),genetic engineering,India,non-governmental organizations (NGOs),OAI-PMH Harvest,transgenic

Language English

Advisor Brand, Laurie A. (committee chair), Hamilton, Nora (committee member), Katada, Saori (committee member)

Creator Email bird@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m155

Unique identifier UC1362104

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Legacy Identifier etd-Bird-20061116.pdf

Dmrecord 35977

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Bird, Mara Nielle

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu