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Toxic leadership and U.S. Army special forces: a qualitative, phenomenological Study

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Toxic leadership and U.S. Army special forces: a qualitative, phenomenological Study

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Content Toxic Leadership and U.S. Army Special Forces: A Qualitative, Phenomenological Study
Nathaniel W. Motley
Rossier School of Education
University of Southern California
A dissertation submitted to the faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Education
December 2023

© Copyright by Nathaniel W. Motley 2023
All Rights Reserved

The Committee for Nathaniel W. Motley certifies the approval of this Dissertation
Maria G. Ott
Alison K. Muraszewski
Briana Hinga, Committee Chair
Rossier School of Education
University of Southern California
2023

iv
Abstract
Although studies confirm that toxic leadership is detrimental to organizational effectiveness and
an identified problem in militaries around the world, little research exists examining this problem
of practice specifically within U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) or the special operations
community. The available literature suggests that toxic leaders are common throughout the
military and negatively affect the civility of the organization, reduce individual welfare, and
ultimately create less cohesive and more self-destructive military units (Gallus et al., 2013). To
examine toxic leadership in SF, this study applied Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological model as a
theoretical framework and a qualitative, phenomenological research methodology. Data
collection consisted of semi-structured interviews with seven participants. Participants were noncommissioned and commissioned officers with experience in various SF units. The study’s
qualitative data analysis was informed by grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2015) and Tesch’s
(1990) eight-step model. For the first research question, “How do SF soldiers perceive toxic
leadership?”, the study found three themes: (a) an emergent description of toxic leadership in SF,
(b) a systemic problem, and (c) ineffective versus toxic leadership. For the second research
question, “How does toxic leadership affect the welfare of SF soldiers?”, two themes emerged
from the participants’ experiences: (a) harm to individual welfare and (b) harm to interpersonal
relationships. Finally, for the third research question, “How does toxic leadership affect SF as an
organization?”, the study found that toxic leaders hurt retention and recruitment, cause harmful
effects that are unique to SF, and create exponential organizational detriment.

v
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I would like to thank the study participants who shared their time and
experiences with me and informed this study’s findings. I would also like to thank my
dissertation committee chair, Dr. Briana Hinga, for her support and guidance in helping me
complete this study as well as the University of Southern California Rossier School of Education
faculty and staff. Specifically, I would like to thank Drs. Bryant Adibe, Erin Marsano, Alison
Muraszewski, and Maria Ott for their personal support of this study and my research process.
This study was researcher-funded, and I have no conflicts of interest to disclose.
Correspondence concerning this study should be addressed to Nate Motley at email:
nmotley@usc.edu.

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Table of Contents
Abstract.......................................................................................................................................... iv
Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................... v
List of Tables.................................................................................................................................. ix
List of Figures................................................................................................................................. x
Chapter One: Introduction to the Study.......................................................................................... 1
Context and Background of the Problem............................................................................ 2
Purpose of the Study and Research Questions.................................................................... 3
Importance of the Study...................................................................................................... 4
Overview of Theoretical Framework and Methodology .................................................... 5
Definitions........................................................................................................................... 6
Organization of the Dissertation ......................................................................................... 8
Chapter Two: Literature Review..................................................................................................... 9
Traditional Army Leadership Theory.................................................................................. 9
Toxic Leadership Themes................................................................................................. 11
Conceptual Framework..................................................................................................... 25
Literature Review Summary............................................................................................. 31
Chapter Three: Methodology........................................................................................................ 33
Research Questions........................................................................................................... 34
Methodology..................................................................................................................... 34
Research Setting................................................................................................................ 34
The Researcher.................................................................................................................. 35
Data Source: Interviews.................................................................................................... 36
Data Analysis.................................................................................................................... 41
Credibility and Trustworthiness........................................................................................ 43

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Ethics................................................................................................................................. 44
Chapter Four: Findings................................................................................................................. 45
Participant Overview ........................................................................................................ 45
Research Question 1: How Do SF Soldiers Perceive Toxic Leadership?......................... 48
Research Question 2: How Does Toxic Leadership Affect the Welfare of SF
Soldiers?............................................................................................................................ 61
Research Question 3: How Does Toxic Leadership Affect SF as an Organization? ........ 71
Findings Summary............................................................................................................ 79
Chapter Five: Discussion and Recommendations......................................................................... 80
Discussion of Findings...................................................................................................... 80
Definition of Toxic Leadership......................................................................................... 84
Recommendations for Practice ......................................................................................... 85
Limitations and Delimitations........................................................................................... 96
Recommendations for Future Research............................................................................ 99
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 100
References................................................................................................................................... 101
Appendix A: Interview Instrument ............................................................................................. 121
Interview Question 1....................................................................................................... 121
Interview Question 2....................................................................................................... 121
Interview Question 3....................................................................................................... 122
Interview Question 4....................................................................................................... 122
Interview Question 5....................................................................................................... 122
Interview Question 6....................................................................................................... 123
Interview Question 7....................................................................................................... 123
Interview Question 8....................................................................................................... 123
Interview Question 9....................................................................................................... 124

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Appendix B: Informed Consent Form ........................................................................................ 125
Title of Study .................................................................................................................. 125
Principal Investigator...................................................................................................... 125
Purpose of Study............................................................................................................. 125
Study Procedures ............................................................................................................ 125
Risks................................................................................................................................ 126
Benefits........................................................................................................................... 126
Confidentiality ................................................................................................................ 127
Contact Information........................................................................................................ 128
Voluntary Participation ................................................................................................... 128
Consent ........................................................................................................................... 128

ix
List of Tables
Table 1. Study Participants ........................................................................................................... 47

x
List of Figures
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework ................................................................................................. 30

1
Chapter One: Introduction to the Study
This study addresses the problem of toxic leadership within the U.S. Army Special Forces
(SF). This destructive style of leadership is typified by actions that are erratic, narcissistic, selfserving, and harmful to both the individuals suffering beneath it and the organization’s
effectiveness (Gallus et al., 2013). The available research suggests that toxic leaders are common
throughout the military and negatively affect the civility of the organization, reduce job
satisfaction, and ultimately create less cohesive and more self-destructive military units (Gallus
et al., 2013). Studies also highlight that toxic leadership is a problem that begins early in a
service member’s career, increasing organizational cynicism before one has even finished their
initial military training (Dobbs & Do, 2019). This early negativity may be especially harmful
because it poisons young service members’ views of the military for their entire military careers.
In addition, in a study involving 174 senior military officers from across the service branches,
Reed and Bullis (2009) found that toxic leadership experiences are likely to continue throughout
one’s entire military service; 57% of the senior officers surveyed responded that they had
considered leaving the armed forces within the previous 5 years because of mistreatment by a
leader.
This problem of practice is important to address because toxic leadership erodes an
organization’s culture and reduces its effectiveness. In addition, those suffering under toxic
leaders think less positively about their military unit or workplace, do not trust the organization’s
values, and display higher rates of anti-organizational beliefs (Bennett, 2000; McGurk et al.,
2014; van Prooijen & de Vries, 2016). These factors—combined with the self-serving and
emotionally unstable actions of the toxic leader—create teams that are less cohesive along with
unhealthy climates that reduce organizational capacity and effectiveness (Lipman-Blumen, 2005;

2
McGurk et al., 2014; Sadler et al., 2017; Schaubroeck et al., 2007). Destructive leaders also
increase performance malaise among their subordinates (Creech, 2020; Monteith et al., 2019) as
well as pessimism about and hatred toward the organization (Dobbs, 2014; Dobbs & Do, 2019).
Although studies confirm that toxic leadership is detrimental to organizational effectiveness and
an identified problem in the U.S. military, little research exists examining this problem of
practice specifically within SF.
Context and Background of the Problem
U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers are guerilla warfare experts that use unconventional
tactics and approaches to achieve their mission in support of national security objectives.
Commonly referred to as “Green Berets” because of their distinctive headwear, they are
“legendary for taking on the most sensitive missions in the Army” (U.S. Army, n.d.) and played
key roles in the Vietnam War, the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the 20-year
long Global War on Terror. Originally created in 1952, SF’s key missions include
counterinsurgency, direct action, foreign internal defense, and special reconnaissance. However,
the unit’s “cornerstone” is unconventional warfare, or “activities conducted to enable a resistance
group or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by
operating through or with [local indigenous forces] in a denied area” (U.S. Army Airborne &
Special Operations Museum, n.d.). Because many of these SF operations are conducted by small
teams, in denied areas, and without broader military support, leadership is a critical
countervailing component of the inherent risk assumed by the military and the nation in these
missions.
Leadership is also a U.S. Army value and critical element of success for SF and the
broader Special Operations Forces (SOF) community; however, recent events highlight a

3
potential problem in SOF related to improper leadership. The SOF community includes SF and
the array of other special operations units in the U.S. military, including Navy SEALs, Army
Rangers and Psychological Operations soldiers, Air Force Special Warfare airmen, and other
unique and specially trained units. One recent SF officer cited official Army Human Resources
Command survey data to suggest that a poor leadership structure may be central to SF’s
relatively low retention rate of less than 50% of junior officers (Schneider, 2022).
Other examples of destructive and/or criminal actions by leaders within SF and SOF have
occupied headlines recently. After multiple official investigations and ongoing allegations
surrounding his allegedly toxic leadership and berating of subordinates, an SF senior leader and
commander at nearly every level was arrested for felony harassment, kidnapping, and assault
(Rempfer, 2021). In addition, the high-profile cases of both an SF captain and a Navy SEAL
accused of murder and other war crimes made national headlines, sparking broad public debate
about the use of SOF and the public’s trust in the SOF enterprise (Vanden Brook, 2021). Other
senior SF leaders, including the most senior enlisted soldier within SF and an SF officer slated
for command of a specialized SF unit, were accused, indicted, and/or convicted and retired
because of sexual impropriety, assault, and other charges stemming from incidents at the 7th
Special Forces Group (Airborne) in the mid-2010s (Myers, 2019a, 2019b). These events called
into question the efficacy of and trust in SF by U.S. senior leaders and the public. Furthermore,
they suggest that broader leadership and cultural problems may exist throughout the
organization.
Purpose of the Study and Research Questions
The purpose of this study was to explore the phenomenon of SF soldiers’ lived
experiences with toxic leadership. Through these lived experiences, the study explored how toxic

4
leadership is perceived, how it affects individual welfare, and how it affects the organization. The
study findings also add context to broader organizational questions in areas such as retention
rates, promotion, and job satisfaction. The findings were also used to make recommendations to
help alleviate the problem of toxic leadership in SF, improve organizational efficacy, and better
the lives of SF soldiers. These recommendations are detailed in Chapter Five. The study findings
also contribute to the academic body of knowledge on toxic leadership and its organizational
effects. The research questions used to achieve this purpose are as follows:
1. How do SF soldiers perceive toxic leadership?
2. How does toxic leadership affect the welfare of SF soldiers?
3. How does toxic leadership affect SF as an organization?
Importance of the Study
This study is important for three primary reasons. First, and the reason centered in this
study, toxic leaders harm the people they are entrusted to lead. They negatively affect the mental,
physical, and emotional welfare of those in the organization (Haggard et al., 2011; Kamarck,
2019; LeardMann et al., 2013; Monteith al., 2019; Tepper, 2007). They cause undue harm that
diminishes the individual to the leader’s own personal or professional benefit. Second,
destructive leadership is detrimental to the organizational effectiveness of SF and creates
potentially unseen risks to unit efficacy. Toxic leadership can spread exponentially, infecting the
minds and leadership views of those who experience it (Dobbs & Do, 2019), ultimately reducing
the cohesion and morale necessary for the military to succeed in its mission (Gallus et al., 2013).
It also causes issues related to recruitment and retention because it causes employees to speak ill
of the organization to potential recruits or to leave the organization themselves. This recruitment
issue is especially significant at the Army’s inflection point in 2023 because senior leaders within

5
SF and the Army found that a personal connection to an SF soldier is the number one recruiting
success metric within Army SOF (U.S. Army Special Operations Command, personal
communication, March 19, 2023). Toxic leaders reduce the viability of that success metric
because they cause current SF soldiers to drive potential future soldiers away from the career
when they recount experiences with toxic leadership.
Finally, if the high-profile types of criminal and leadership failures highlighted above
continue, SF risks losing the public’s trust and confidence. This, in turn, may reduce the U.S.’s
ability to pursue national security objectives using a uniquely capable military unit. Given the
importance of SF’s mission set, national significance, and increased use in the 21st century
(Byman & Merritt, 2018), this risk to unit efficacy could be especially hazardous to ignore.
Although the academic research on toxic leadership in business and the broader military is
relatively vast, the phenomenon is minimally addressed specifically within SOF. This study
sought to fill a small part of this gap and to provide insight into how toxic leadership can affect
those serving in an elite and unique military organization.
Overview of Theoretical Framework and Methodology
Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological model served as the theoretical framework for this
study. The ecological model explains the ecology of individual development through the
interactions between the individual and the cascading system of structures in their immediate and
extended surroundings (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). These structures begin with the self at the center
and expand outward to include one’s immediate setting, the links between settings such as family
and coworkers, broader cultural influences, and the effects of time. When viewed as a whole, the
ecological model suggests that human behavior and development must be examined with
attention to all these structures to properly frame the phenomenon. This framework is uniquely

6
applicable to the study of toxic leadership because a leader’s actions both affect and are affected
by these cascading structures such as the broader military culture or one’s family. For example,
an SF leader’s deleterious actions may be influenced by the broader cultural context of
hypermasculinity within the military (Matos et al., 2018), and his berating of a subordinate may
affect not only that subordinate but also the subordinate’s family and coworkers.
This study applied a qualitative, phenomenological research methodology to answer the
research questions. Data were collected using semi-structured interviews with seven participants
who had experience in active-duty and National Guard SF units. The data were analyzed using
the commercially available software Atlas.ti to create meaning from the participant’s
experiences, and recommendations were provided based on this analysis. To ensure study
credibility and trustworthiness, purposeful sampling techniques, member checking, peer review,
thick description, and peer debriefing were used.
Definitions
This section defines and contextualizes key terms within this study.
Special Forces (SF) are U.S. Army units composed primarily of Special Forces–qualified
soldiers who conduct SF-related missions.
Special Forces Soldiers (SF Soldiers) are Special Forces–qualified soldiers who have
graduated from the Special Forces Qualification Course and have been awarded the Green Beret
and Special Forces tab.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the conglomerated special operations units within
all branches of the U.S. military including SF, Army Rangers, Navy SEALs, Air Force Special
Warfare airmen, and others.

7
Note: Although related and often conflated in public and academic discourse, important
distinctions exist between SF and SOF. Special Forces (SF) is a proper noun applicable only to
SF-qualified soldiers and their specific units within the U.S. Army. SOF is an umbrella term that
includes SF and all other special operations units within the military under the special operations
hierarchy. In public discourse, the colloquial term “Green Beret” is often used in place of SF or
SF soldiers to avoid this confusion.
Special Forces Groups (SFGs) are the brigade-equivalent SF formations that are
commanded by an SF colonel. Each SFG has a specific regional, cultural, and linguistic focus
such as Latin America, the Indo-Pacific, or Africa. There are five active-duty SFGs and two
SFGs in the Army National Guard.
Toxic leadership is a destructive leadership style that is harmful to both individuals and
an organization, characterized by actions that are narcissistic, erratic, abusive, and self-serving
(Gallus et al., 2013).
Note: Other terms are used synonymously or semi-synonymously with toxic leadership
throughout the literature. These terms include “dark leadership,” “harmful leadership,”
“destructive leadership,” and “petty tyranny” (Ashforth, 1994; Conger, 1990; Goldsmith, 2008;
Mehta & Maheshwari, 2014; Milosevic et al., 2019; Shabir et al., 2014). In its professional
literature and doctrine, the Army uses the term “counterproductive leadership.” Each of these
terms has value in specific studies as the diction elicits varying emotions and connotations,
depending on the study’s purpose. The term “toxicity” is intentionally used in this study because
it clearly conveys the corrosive, dangerous, and harmful effects of the leadership style.

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Organization of the Dissertation
The first chapter of this study introduces the problem of practice, study purpose, context,
and background of toxic leadership in SF. Chapter Two reviews the relevant literature, identifies
common themes in that literature, and introduces the study’s conceptual framework. Chapter
Three describes the study’s methodology, qualitative research design, data collection, and data
analysis techniques. Chapter Four provides and synthesizes the study’s findings and, finally,
Chapter Five discusses these findings and provides specific recommendations to help solve the
problem of practice.

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Chapter Two: Literature Review
This literature review proceeds in four parts and examines the current research on toxic
leadership. First, a review of traditional Army leadership theory contextualizes the espoused
leadership values and beliefs of the Army in contrast to the problem of practice. Second, a
thematic analysis of the available academic literature on toxic leadership identifies five themes
that connect the existing research. These themes are (a) self-serving nature, (b) individual
wellbeing, (c) organizational climate, (d) made and sustained, and (e) exponential detriment.
Third, existing strategies to mitigate toxic leadership are reviewed, and a gap in the research is
identified specific to SOF. Finally, the literature review concludes with a description of this
study’s conceptual framework, which combines elements of Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model
and Bandura’s social cognitive theory (SCT).
Traditional Army Leadership Theory
The U.S. Army’s organizational relationship with leadership is unique from other nonmilitary sectors. In contrast to the following review of toxic leadership within the academic
literature, this Army-centric review is framed through official Army publications rather than
academic sources to offer a review of the Army’s espoused leadership paradigm. The Army’s
mission is to “fight and win our nation’s wars” (U.S. Army, n.d.), which denotes a special
relationship between the organization and the application of violence on behalf of the state
(Huntington, 1957). In short, Army leaders—unlike many other sectors (the remaining military
branches notwithstanding)—must be able and willing to manage the application of violence
manifested by the people they lead. When the situation demands it, they must also be able and
willing to make decisions that lead to the death of those same soldiers. In addition, the Army’s
leader development system requires that a leader either be promoted or leave the organization

10
(Fallesen et al., 2011). This “up or out” system requires leaders to constantly strive for promotion
and greater rank, otherwise risking being forced out of the institution. Finally, the Army builds its
leaders from within the organization and, with few exceptions, does not hire leaders from outside
organizations. Rather, senior ranks are filled by those who have successfully navigated the “up or
out” promotion system over the course of decades (Fallesen et al., 2011). These unique
contextual aspects of Army leadership shape the organization’s leadership beliefs and place
unique stressors on Army leaders to succeed.
The Army’s traditional leadership theory centers on two concepts that are taught in
various ways throughout one’s military career. The first of these concepts is the Army’s
definition of leadership: “The activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and
motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization” (Department of the Army
Headquarters, 2019, pp. 1–3). This definition frames the construct of leadership for the soldier
and is defined in greater depth in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6–22: Leadership and the
Profession (U.S. Army, 2019) and other official publications. It goes on to describe, in detail,
how leaders are expected to persuade and influence others to accomplish the mission while
providing purpose and direction to a shared goal. It defines how leaders should act at the
different levels of the Army, whether directly, organizationally, or strategically. However, as
important as this focus on mission accomplishment is for the organization, the publications leave
little room for improving or sustaining the welfare of those who are led. Notably, although ADP
6–22 is the organization’s premier leadership publication, it devotes fewer than two of its 132
pages to toxic or counterproductive leadership. Moreover, until recently, this Army leadership
publication did not mention counterproductive or toxic leadership at all (Reed, 2015). This gap in
official Army literature is also present in the Army’s leader development training, illuminating a

11
shortcoming in the organization’s leadership education and instructional model (U.S. Army
Combined Arms Center, n.d.).
The second important concept is the Army Ethic. This ethic is composed of the ethical
values, belief systems, laws, and norms that build Army culture and ensure that the organization
can conduct its mission (U.S. Army, 2019). Notable more for their sheer quantity than for a
concise narrative, the items that compose the ethic include disparate concepts such as the
Declaration of Independence, Just War Tradition, the Army Values, oaths of service, and esprit de
corps. Functioning as a sort of moral and ethical backstop, the ethic is designed to guide an
Army leader in the often uncertain conduct of their duties; however, recent high-profile failings
of both broader Army and SF leadership—along with soldier misconduct—suggest that these
concepts may not be functioning as intended (Allen, 2015; Muñoz, 2018; Winkie, 2022). For
example, the years-long environment of toxicity, belittling, and harassment created by a senior
SF commander (Winkie, 2022) violated concepts of the Army Ethic such as the Army Values,
esprit de corps, and the expectation of honorable service. Perhaps more illustrative of the issue, if
it were not for that same commander’s criminal actions and standoff with police (an Ethic
violation on its own), he would have likely progressed to higher and greater positions of
leadership where his violation of the Army Ethic could cause even more damage (Winkie, 2022).
This example highlights one thread in the broader fabric of toxic leadership themes examined in
the available research.
Toxic Leadership Themes
An examination of the existing empirical research highlighted five important themes
related to toxic leadership in the workplace: (a) self-serving nature, (b) individual wellbeing, (c)
organizational climate, (d) made and sustained, and (e) exponential detriment. These themes

12
contextualize the problem of practice, synthesize the literature, and place the individual studies
in conversation with one another.
Self-Serving Nature
Research has suggested that a leader’s self-serving nature is a defining aspect of toxic
leadership. That is, toxic leaders act in a manner that benefits themselves at the expense of their
subordinates and the organization (Conger, 1990). Authors such as Bennett (2000) found that
toxic leaders are often genial, or even pleasant, to their superiors but destructive toward their
subordinates. This dichotomy creates an inaccurate and insidious facade of healthy leadership
when viewed from above that belies the organizational corrosion experienced within the
organization. Problematically, these leaders can often produce short-term organizational results
that help the toxic leader appear effective while masking the long-term damage they do to their
organizations (Thoroughgood et al., 2018; Ulmer, 2012). Others found that toxic leaders are
unwilling to take any personal blame or share organizational success, often applying the term
“petty tyrant” to these types of leaders (Ashforth, 1994; Conger, 1990; Goldsmith, 2008; Mehta
& Maheshwari, 2014; Milosevic et al., 2019; Shabir et al., 2014). Within the Army specifically,
this self-serving nature manifests in a variety of ways, including brutal behavior and an
organization that fails to develop others (Hinds & Steele, 2012). A related literary thread within
this theme is that of leader narcissism.
Leader narcissism is prevalent across the literature, and the research suggests that it is
one of the more common subcomponents of a leader’s self-serving nature. It is defined by
holding oneself in exceptionally high esteem, being self-absorbed, and being prone to selfaggrandizing behavior. Although authors have illuminated this theme primarily quantitatively
(Akca, 2017; Hadadian & Zarei, 2017; Lavoie-Tremblay et al., 2016; Paltu & Brouwers, 2020;

13
Schaefer et al., 2021; Sosik et al., 2014; Uysal, 2019), others have confirmed the negative effects
of leader narcissism through qualitative and mixed methods studies (Bullis & Reed, 2004;
Thoroughgood et al., 2018). Perhaps because of this narcissism, toxic leaders use destructive
tactics such as interpersonal dominance and coercion rather than healthy leadership acts such as
influence and commitment (Watkins & Walker, 2021) because they are focused on personal goals
rather than the organization’s health.
Studies also found that toxic leaders serve themselves by achieving their own short-term
organizational goals or those of their superiors at the expense of those they lead (Goldsmith,
2008; Sutton, 2007). As a result, toxic leaders can appeal to their superiors—and therefore their
own careers—by directing their negative and belittling actions toward less powerful individuals,
forcing short-term successes that obscure the long-term damage the leaders can cause (Reed,
2015; Sutton, 2007). Although it is likely that most leaders are disliked by some of their
subordinates at times, researchers have found that toxic leaders become entrenched in this
destructive and self-serving manner of leading as a way to force compliance from their
subordinates. They do so in pursuit of fleeting workplace success and at the expense of
individual welfare and long-term organizational health (Goldsmith, 2008; Lipman-Blumen,
2005; Sutton, 2007).
These leaders often develop an unhealthy relationship with technical or fiscal
achievement for its own sake rather than in a broader context of organizational success (LipmanBlumen, 2005; Pauchant et al., 1995). In this way, “achievement” becomes a sort of social
currency for the toxic leader, demonstrating their value to both themselves and their superiors;
meanwhile, their destructive interpersonal leadership style erodes long-term culture (Doty &
Fenlason, 2013; Erickson et al., 2015; Labrague et al., 2020; Pelletier, 2010). These short-sighted

14
and toxic leaders can also exacerbate other organizational issues, such as racial discrimination,
because of their narrow focus on results that are readily apparent to their superiors (Antecol &
Cobb-Clark, 2009). Although some leaders may naturally lead this way, researchers have warned
that any leader may be susceptible to learning this detrimental achievement-focused behavior
when faced with organizational stressors such as increased workplace pressure, lack of sleep, and
rewarding short-term results (Harland, 1996; Olsen et al., 2016).
Individual Wellbeing
Potentially correlated to their self-serving nature, toxic leaders also negatively affect the
individual wellbeing of their employees (Matos et al., 2018). Studies found that destructive
leaders can induce problems with alcohol and substance abuse in their subordinates (Bamberger
& Bacharach, 2016), diminish employee attitudes toward the organization (Matos et al., 2018),
create emotional fatigue (Harvey et al., 2007; Khan, 2015; Kiewitz et al., 2012), exacerbate or
cause depression (Haggard et al., 2011; Kamarck, 2019; LeardMann et al., 2013; Monteith al.,
2019; Tepper, 2007), and lead to reduced life satisfaction (Bowling & Michel, 2011; Khan, 2015;
Lin et al., 2013). This detrimental effect on individual wellbeing leads to reduced job
satisfaction, increased suicide risk, and higher rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Studies also reported a relationship between toxic leaders and decreased employee job
satisfaction (Bowling & Michel, 2011; Gonzales, 2014; Kernan et al., 2011; Khan, 2015;
Schaubroeck et al., 2007), which can increase anxiety (Schaubroeck et al., 2007). Destructive
leaders also reduce a subordinate’s family satisfaction (Carlson et al., 2011) and these leaders
were further found to be associated with decreased health and increased stress among their
subordinates (Koya et al., 2016). Fors Brandebo et al. (2019) found that constructive leadership
habits such as inspiration and motivation are the best predictors of employee job satisfaction and

15
that, conversely, destructive leadership habits erode employees’ feelings of meaningfulness at
work.
Recent research also highlighted a relationship between toxic leadership and suicide. This
relationship is particularly well documented in the military, where the suicide rate has increased
continually since 2004; in 2022, the Army’s suicide rate was at its highest point in the past
century, with 36.18 suicides per 100,000 soldiers (Bryan at al., 2018; Haupton, 2022; Kime,
2022; Stanley & Larsen, 2019). In 2020, the military’s suicide rate was more than twice as high
as the rate among civilians of a similar age (Haupton, 2022). Within the military services, the
Army and Marine Corps (who are responsible for most major ground combat operations within
the military) have seen marked increases in suicide rates compared to the other services (Harrell
& Berglass, 2011). Elements of hypermasculinity or a “masculinity contest culture” (MCC) may
contribute to this phenomenon (Braswell & Kushner, 2012; Szayna et al., 2019; Williams, 2018).
Notably, David Matsuda’s (2010) examination of military suicide found that 100% of suicides or
suicide attempts studied identified toxic leadership as a contributing factor (as cited in Erickson
et al., 2015). Service members in studies examining the effects of toxic leaders on suicide often
addressed the destructive impact that a leader can have on mental health and the will to live:
“And I just had, like, feelings, like, that nothing’s ever going to change. I’m going to get
[expletive] every day, and I just don’t want this anymore. And I just felt like I wanted to kill
myself” (study participant, as quoted in Zwerdling, 2014). These authors highlighted the fact that
Army leaders know how critical of an issue toxic leadership is, referring to it as a form of cancer
in the organization (Walter Ulmer, as cited in Zwerdling, 2014); however, despite these
acknowledgments and efforts to ameliorate the issue, the problem remains endemic to the
organization. This effect can be specifically exacerbated in the military because combat

16
deployments and job stressors already increase dangerous alcohol consumption and interpersonal
violence, which are known catalysts for suicidal ideations (Hunt et al., 2014).
Other important links between suicide and toxic leadership are seen within the literature
on PTSD stigma and help-seeking. Elrond et al. (2018) found that healthy leadership and
decision-making habits by leaders can have a countervailing effect on PTSD in service members
following combat deployments. Authors have shown that after the beginning of hostilities and
war, the PTSD rate in the military can increase more than 700% (Cameron et al., 2019). Others
illuminated the fact that healthy leaders are critical to curtailing the military suicide rate. They
act as a key component in educating service members on available resources and interventions
necessary to reduce suicide rates as well as help reduce stigma and encourage help-seeking (May
et al., 2018). Contrarily, service members who experience harmful leadership were found to be
less likely to seek help and were at greater risk of PTSD (McGuffin et al., 2021). Beyond their
effects on individual mental health, toxic leaders also have broader effects on an organization’s
climate.
Organizational Climate
The climate of an organization is damaged by destructive leaders in several ways. The
first is through employees’ diminished view of the workplace and the organization’s values,
which, in turn, reduces organizational efficacy (Smith & Fredricks-Lowman, 2020).
Subordinates suffering under a harmful leader think less of their profession and workplace, have
less trust in its values, and display higher rates of anti-organizational beliefs (Bennett, 2000;
McGurk et al., 2014; van Prooijen & de Vries, 2016). This creates a less cohesive and
unhealthier workplace with a less effective climate (Lipman-Blumen, 2005; McGurk et al., 2014;
Sadler et al., 2017; Schaubroeck et al., 2007). Authors found that this phenomenon can manifest

17
as malaise (Creech, 2020; Monteith et al., 2019), organizational cynicism (Dobbs, 2014), and
hatred toward the organization (Dobbs & Do, 2019). Conversely, others found relationships
between ethical leadership and healthy employee behavior that contribute to superior
organizational results and climate (Reiley & Jacobs, 2016).
The diminished organizational climate caused by toxic leaders can be especially harmful
within the military because of the organization’s relationship with warfare, violence, and the
associated unique stressors of those phenomena. Szayna et al. (2019) found that poor leaders can
significantly increase distrust within U.S. SOF, a finding confirmed in other studies across the
public and private sectors (Bies & Tipp, 1996; Creech, 2020; Labrague et al., 2020; Larsson et
al., 2012; Proojien & de Vries, 2016). Furthermore, authors demonstrated that abusive military
leaders erode both the moral courage and personal identification with organizational values
among service members and that these dangers often go undetected and do not elicit an
organizational response (Hannah et al., 2013; Reed, 2010). Authors also found that when toxic
environments persist in the military, they can lead to widespread organizational failings,
catastrophic accidents, and death (Kern, 1995). In extreme cases, toxic military leaders’ actions
can be classified as “leadership crimes” and lead to war crimes (Mohamed et al., 2017).
Another way toxic leaders affect the climate is by increasing employee turnover. In a
quantitative study focused on factory workers, researchers found that nearly every element of
employee turnover is correlated with leader toxicity, including turnover intention, reduced job
satisfaction, and a lack of commitment to the organization’s mission (Paltu & Brouwers, 2020).
These leaders cause employees to leave the organization for other industries (Akca, 2017), retire
prematurely (Reid et al., 2018), and avoid the workplace altogether (Too & Harvey, 2012);
furthermore, they create enmity in those they have forced out (Webster et al., 2016). This hatred

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affects the narratives internalized by former employees, which function as warnings to those they
speak with—hindering future recruitment and hiring efforts (Akca, 2017). When employees do
not or cannot quit or retire, they often cope with toxic leaders by avoiding them through lack of
contact, increased time off, social shrugging, and other methods harmful to organizational
success (Porath & Pearson, 2013; Webster et al., 2016). The toxic leaders who create these
diminished organizational climates do not exist in a vacuum; rather, they are encouraged by the
organization that makes and sustains them.
Made and Sustained
Made and sustained refers to the ways in which toxic leaders are created and the ways in
which organizations sustain their harmful habits. To properly frame a toxic phenomenon,
Mulvaney and Padilla (2010) demonstrated that one must begin with how leaders are made. To
build toxic leaders, a toxic environment must be present (Kusy & Holloway, 2009). Kusy and
Holloway (2009) found that organizations create toxic leaders by ignoring, rewarding, or
remaining aloof to harmful behavior—a theme echoed throughout the literature.
Others have pointed to the unique roles of gender and the MCC in creating toxic leaders
(Matos et al., 2018; O’Neill & Rothbard, 2017; Reid et al., 2018), highlighting the link between
hypermasculinity and toxicity. These organizations grow young leaders in a “dog-eat-dog” and
zero-sum hierarchy that outwardly purports to encourage healthy competition; however, studies
have found that this culture often leads to systemic and destructive leadership habits (Matos et
al., 2018; Reid, 2018; Schaefer et al., 2021; Swain & Korenman, 2018). Ultimately, the MCC is
counterproductive to both organizational effectiveness and unit culture (Schaefer et al., 2021). A
possible exacerbating aspect of the MCC is the lower promotion and continuation rate for
women in the armed forces compared to men (Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 2008;

19
Riccucci, 2009; Riccucci & Ryzin, 2017). This phenomenon leads to male-dominated senior
ranks; the data suggest that this likely increases the negative effects of the MCC and may be
particularly impactful in combat job positions where, within the U.S. military, women were not
allowed to serve until 2015 and men remain dominant in the field (Segal et al., 2016; Streeter,
2014). However, authors have found that toxic female leaders may be even more harmful than
their male counterparts because they are perceived by their employees to be more aversive
(Thoroughgood et al., 2011).
Once toxic leaders are made, they must be sustained through promotion, motivation, and
job selection. In other words, the organization must motivate leaders to act in a toxic manner and
then promote those leaders to higher positions of authority. The theme of self-serving nature
offers insight into how toxic leaders are promoted. Through harsh and belittling coercion, they
can often achieve short-term results that please their supervisors at the expense of long-term
organizational health (Doty & Fenlason, 2013; Erickson et al., 2015; Labrague, 2020; Pelletier,
2010). Therefore, leaders willing to overwork and abuse their subordinates are often selected for
positions of higher responsibility because of technical achievements. This is especially
dangerous in the Army’s leadership structure, where one is evaluated based on only 1 or 2 years
of time in a position. In this time-constrained leadership structure, toxic leaders can push an
organization up to and past the point of burnout in the interest of short-term success, distracting
from the deep damage it causes to the individual and organizational climate (Matos et al., 2018;
O’Neill & Rothbard, 2017; Reid et al., 2018). Sustaining these leaders not only allows them to
further harm the organization, but it can also create exponential organizational detriment.

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Exponential Detriment
Because negative events cause greater impact than positive events, toxic leaders can
create exponential organizational detriment even when they are less common or in the minority
within the organization (Baumeister et al., 2001). This “bad is stronger than good” (Baumeister
et al., 2001) phenomenon is found across quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods studies of
toxic leadership (Baloyi, 2020; Fosse et al., 2019; Itzkovich et al., 2020; Schilling & Schyns,
2014). Often, remarks by a single or small number of toxic leaders—and the psychological
effects they cause—can linger for years within the psyche of subordinates (Matos et al., 2018;
O’Neill & Rothbard, 2017; Reid et al., 2018). These findings suggest that although toxicity is
always harmful, it may be especially so at the beginning of one’s career because there is a longer
period for it to affect one’s state of mind and shape one’s leadership and organizational values
(Fallesen et al., 2011). Longitudinal studies support these findings and highlight the outsized
harm that destructive leaders exert on an organization over time (Robert & Vandenberghe, 2021).
Subthemes of inconsistency and crises are also present within this theme. Chenard-Poirier
et al. (2022) found that the detrimental effects of toxic leaders may be even greater when a leader
does not demonstrate consistent leadership values but vacillates between a positive and
destructive style. Researchers found a relationship between toxic leadership in everyday
decisions and during times of crisis (Fors Brandebo, 2021); Fors Brandebo (2021) added that
toxicity during crises can be especially dangerous because crises often have significant and longlasting harmful effects on organizations. Situations involving sexual assault allegations are a
particular crisis moment in which healthy leadership seems to be especially important. Data in
the literature suggest that harmful or careless leaders do not process these allegations properly,
do not support victims, and reduce organizational performance (Jackson et al., 2014).

21
Exponential detriment is also connected to problems surrounding retention and
recruitment. As evidenced above, toxic leaders cause subordinates to leave organizations at a
significantly higher rate through premature retirement, seeking employment elsewhere, or other
forms of early departure (Akca, 2017; Paltu & Brouwers, 2020). The binary and final nature of
this turnover phenomenon—an employee either stays or does not—not only reduces the
workplace by one qualified employee, but it also removes their potential productivity for the
remaining years or decades of potential service. Other researchers demonstrated that toxic
leaders reduce group cohesion, causing a decrease in employee satisfaction and retention
(Schmidt, 2014). This aspect of the problem of practice is difficult to quantify and, perhaps
concomitantly, underexplored in the research; nevertheless, it exacerbates the outsized detriment
that toxic leaders can have on an organization.
The harm caused to retention and recruitment is especially significant to the Army given
its current recruiting challenges in the 2020s. As of 2023, only 23% of young U.S. citizens are
eligible to serve, and the Army is facing all-time low rates in recruitment and in the propensity of
young people to serve (Army Recruiting Challenge, 2023). SF may be especially vulnerable to
the recruitment-related exponential detriment caused by toxic leaders who drive their
subordinates to speak ill of the profession. In an organization-wide 2023 email presenting themes
related to the recruiting challenges, U.S. Army Special Operations Command stated that the
number one SOF recruitment success metric is a potential soldier “knowing a member of Army
SOF that engaged” that potential soldier about a career in special operations (U.S. Army Special
Operations Command, personal communication, March 19, 2023). To help alleviate the welldocumented and exponential detriment caused by toxic leadership, several mitigation strategies
are explored in the literature.

22
Mitigation Strategies
Several strategies are illuminated in the literature that organizations and individuals use
to mitigate the negative effects of toxic leadership. The first strategy is inversely related to the
“made and sustained” theme; organizations seek to both create and promote healthy leaders. This
manifests as healthy leadership training strategies, employee reviews such as 360-degree
evaluations that seek to obtain a more detailed view of an employee, and promotion selection
focused on positive leader attributes (Fallesen et al., 2011; Larsson et al., 2012; Reed & Bullis,
2009). However, these techniques do not appear to be sufficient for military leadership; when
these systems do exist, studies have found that either service members do not see their benefits
or these benefits are diminished because of lack of senior-leader awareness and an inattentive
focus on long-term goals (Reed & Bullis, 2003; Reed & Bullis, 2009).
A subtheme within this literary thread is that of emotional control and self-reflection. A
potential military-specific strategy to create healthier leaders is to teach, select for, and promote
emotional control and regulation (Matos et al., 2018; Stanley & Larsen, 2021). This is likely an
especially important mitigation strategy given service members’ unique stressors of real or
potential violence and the military’s leadership structure (Stanley & Larsen, 2021). An intriguing
but underexplored strategy within the toxic military leadership research is that of leader
reflection. A proper and codified reflection process could help contextualize issues and promote
healthy leader growth (Barley, 2012; Ghaye, 2010; Rodgers, 2002). The data suggest that this
reflection process would be helpful for leaders at all levels, should include reflection-on-thefuture, and can be more impactful than organizational experience (Ferry et al., 1998, Wilson,
2008). Authors also demonstrated the need for a leader to be motivated to learn to self-reflect,
lead properly, and take responsibility for their actions (Dembo & Eaton, 2000). Others found that

23
reflection and selection for healthy leadership habits may not be sufficient, arguing that this
model is too narrow and does not acknowledge the various stakeholder groups to which leaders
are responsible (Mumford & Fried, 2014).
Those suffering under a toxic leader also create their own mitigation strategies by
learning to cope with the negative situation. Hornstein (1996) and others demonstrated that these
strategies are often inefficient and potentially harmful in and of themselves because they
erroneously shift the responsibility to a subordinate who has reduced social power in the
workplace hierarchy (Goldman, 2008; Reed, 2015). Coping strategies for leadership-centric
issues largely align with four categories: direct communication, support seeking, avoidance of
contact, and reframing (Webster et al., 2016). When the workplace environment is inelastic—as
is common under toxic leaders and within the military as a whole—employees are likely to cope
through avoidance-focused strategies that are detrimental to both the individual and the
organization (O’Driscoll et al., 2009; Webster et al., 2016; Yagil et al., 2011). In addition, the
dynamics among the individual environment, leader, and followers may create wholly unique
coping strategies or affect those strategies already in use (Thoroughgood et al., 2012; Webster et
al., 2016). Coping can also manifest in more destructive habits such as increased problematic
drinking and other unhealthy behaviors (Bamberger & Bacharach, 2016; Richman et al., 1996).
In contrast to these harmful individual coping strategies, community-based coping
strategies appear to offer benefits to an organization wounded by a toxic leader. A sympathetic
and supportive organizational climate, beneath and surrounding the harmful leader, can also have
a countervailing effect on a toxic leader’s impact (Cacciatore, 2015). Others found that a
deliberate process of moral recovery can help heal the individuals and organizations wounded by
toxic leaders (Cullen, 2022). Moral injuries are suffered by those who experience a violation of

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their moral values, whether by their own actions or those of their leaders (Shay, 2014). Moral
recovery uses community-based practices and actions to aid in the recovery from unethical acts
and destructive leaders (Cullen, 2022).
Researchers also highlighted the need to decenter the leader from the retention and
promotion system to mitigate toxic leadership (Labrague et al., 2020). Supervisor-centric rating
systems are common and, taken at face value, may appear logical to assess the abilities of one in
a position of authority. However, as evidenced in the discussion of self-serving nature, leaders
often successfully abuse their subordinates to impress their superiors and advance their own
careers (Doty & Fenlason, 2013; Erickson et al., 2015; Labrague et al., 2020; Pelletier, 2010).
The Army has several ways to gauge subordinate feedback, including command climate surveys
and 360-degree evaluations, but the results often terminate with the individual supervisor and are
not incorporated into the broader performance review system. Therefore, the promotion system
remains leader centric. Furthermore, the power of these assessments is reduced when they
involve toxic leaders. When receiving negative results about their leadership habits from a
command climate survey, a healthy leader may be inspired to improve, whereas a destructive
leader might, at best, ignore the results or, at worst, retaliate for the perceived act of defiance
(Reed, 2015).
A final avenue to decenter the supervisor is to focus more on their interpersonal skills and
relationship building and less on strict quantitative definitions of results (Ulmer, 2012). In so
doing, traits more associated with long-term organizational health would gain significance in the
promotion system rather than those associated with short-term results such as might be achieved
through petty tyranny. Box (2012) suggests a similar solution that uses a specially designed

25
advisory committee of senior general officers made to promote healthy leader character and
candor; this could help alleviate the problem within the Army.
Although this literature review uncovers broad themes related to toxic leadership and rich
data describing how the phenomenon affects the military, there is a gap in the literature relating
to how the phenomenon specifically affects the special operations community. SOF organizations
are specially selected, trained, educated, and offered unique resources to accomplish many of the
military’s more challenging missions; SOF was intimately involved in the overthrow of the
Taliban after 9/11, the campaign to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and other highprofile national missions. An increased use of and reliance on SOF is likely to continue and may
become “the new American way of war” (Byman & Merritt, 2018). Given these circumstances
and the detrimental effects of toxic leadership highlighted above, it is critical to begin to close
this research gap and understand how toxic leadership is perceived by SOF service members,
how it affects their wellbeing, and how it affects SOF organizationally.
Conceptual Framework
This study’s conceptual framework is synthesized from Bronfenbrenner’s (1979)
ecological model and Bandura’s (2002) social cognitive theory (SCT). Applying elements from
each theory allowed a more thorough understanding of the problem of practice and the concepts
described within the literature review. The conceptual framework guides this study’s purpose,
methodology, interview instrument, and data analysis (Grant & Osanloo, 2014).
Ecological Model
Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological model offers a holistic lens through which to
examine individual development. For this study, the model was applied specifically to SF
soldiers and how they are shaped and educated throughout their career. In contrast to more

26
individually focused theories of development, this model stresses the reciprocal nature of various
systems and the ways in which development is entrenched in important interactions throughout
one’s life. The ecological model examines human development within five interconnected
systems (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). These systems are conceptualized as a series of concentric
circles that expand outward as a “set of nested structures, each inside the next, like a set of
Russian dolls” (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p. 3).
At the center of this model is the SF soldier. The first layer surrounding the soldier is the
microsystem, which consists of their immediate setting; for example, this setting may include the
home, the small military unit they serve in, and their coworkers and peers (Bronfenbrenner,
1979). Next, immediately surrounding the microsystem is the mesosystem, which consists of
links between one’s microsystem; these links may include the connections between an SF
leader’s family and unit (such as a soldier and family readiness group), adjacent units that work
alongside the small unit, and the soldier’s social groups (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). Beyond this is
the exosystem, which includes structures that affect the individual by influencing the
microsystem rather than directly affecting the individual (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). Examples of
these structures are the spouse’s workplace, their boss’s operational and leadership experience,
and mass media. The macrosystem is in the penultimate layer of the model. This is the system of
culture, ideology, and social identity within one’s personal subculture or environment, including
concepts such as socioeconomic status, SF culture, and political views (Bronfenbrenner, 1979).
Lastly, the chronosystem encompasses environmental changes over time such as promotions,
changing units, and age. Together, these five frames suggest that human development must be
examined through broader social and cultural lenses rather than by viewing the individual alone
(Bronfenbrenner, 1979).

27
The ecological model is an appropriate framework through which to examine this
problem of practice because toxic leadership, like Bronfenbrenner’s theory, spans a spectrum
from the individual to broader culture. For example, toxic leaders have a negative impact on unit
cohesion and one’s personal relationships and marriage, affecting one’s microsystem (Gallus et
al., 2013). One’s exosystem is also affected because toxic leaders create a cycle of destructive
leadership in which toxic senior leaders act as poor models for their subordinates who then
perpetuate the cycle to impact those around them (Gallus et al., 2013). Finally, toxic leadership
reverberates throughout broader military and SF culture—elements of the macrosystem—
suggesting that the problem may be systemic (Gallus et al., 2013). Ultimately, the structures in
the ecological model were used to cognitively bin aspects of the toxic leadership phenomenon
and to stratify and develop aspects of the methodology.
Social Cognitive Theory
To complete the conceptual framework, Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model was linked
with Bandura’s SCT (2002). SCT offers that one learns from their social environment and that
human behavior is affected by three reciprocal types of influences: personal, behavioral, and
environmental (Schunk & Usher, 2019). In the context of this study, this means that an SF soldier
themself, their behavior, and their environment are all two-way interactions that reciprocally
affect one another. A leader’s personal factors, such as self-efficacy, can affect their environment
and behavior (such as choosing a leadership style they are comfortable with over an unfamiliar
one), and their environment can in turn influence the person and behavior (Schunk & Usher,
2019). Self-efficacy, or one’s belief in their ability to perform tasks and accomplish goals, is
especially relevant to toxic leadership. If a leader believes that they can lead in a healthier

28
manner and that such actions would lead to superior results, as the literature review suggests,
toxic leadership could likely be curtailed.
Other aspects of SCT also make it especially appropriate for examining the problem of
practice. According to SCT, an individual learns about customs and norms, appropriateness, and
repercussions from their interactions with others in their environment (Schunk & Usher, 2019).
In this way, it is likely that toxic SF leaders have learned from and had their behavior reinforced
through their career experience, their understanding of SF cultural norms, and the repercussions
(or lack thereof) from their superiors. Furthermore, an important concept in the theory is that
learning occurs in two ways. The first way—enactive learning—occurs through the actual doing
of tasks; the second—vicarious learning—occurs by observing models (Bandura, 2002). This
concept informed the study’s methodology, specifically around the role of leader modeling.
SCT is also a uniquely useful lens through which to investigate this problem of practice
because it encourages an examination of leadership knowledge and skills specifically focused on
the role of models. According to SCT, toxic or destructive leadership styles are learned and
reinforced through one’s social environment and through both enactive and vicarious learning.
This phenomenon is referred to as the “falling dominoes effect” and refers to the cycle of toxic
leadership learned by junior leaders and then taught to their future subordinates (Pearce & Manz,
2011). An examination of an SF soldier’s leader models and experience for appropriateness,
soundness, and leadership style would offer insights into how toxic leaders develop and how
these models and experiences affect their perceptions of leadership.
In addition, this theory facilitates an analysis of initial entry training—received
immediately upon joining a military branch—for model competency and congruency with
organizational values. In this way, one might determine if toxic leadership traits are learned from

29
models and socially reinforced when one’s career is still in its infancy. Research suggests that
this harm from an early toxic leader may manifest as a detriment to individual wellbeing, less
faith in the organization, or an early exit from the organization (Baloyi, 2020; Fosse et al., 2019;
Itzkovich et al., 2020).
The Ecological Model and SCT Combined
Together, these two theories form the conceptual framework of this study and help shape
its purpose, methodology, and understanding of the problem of practice. The theories were
combined to benefit from the advantages of both; on one hand, the ecological model factored in
how toxic leadership may affect and be affected by the links between oneself and one’s family,
workplace, and culture. On the other hand, SCT offered advantages related to leader modeling
and the reciprocal nature of the self, behavior, and the broader environment and the potential
risks if these links are broken or misaligned. Conceptually, the SF soldier is at the center of the
framework, with the ecological model’s concentric circles of the microsystem, mesosystem,
exosystem, macrosystem, and chronosystem encircling the soldier. These systems—
operationalized in this study as the environmental factors of SCT and the SF soldier’s behavioral
factors—combine to reciprocally affect the soldier themself. An original graphic depiction of the
interplay between these systems was developed for and used in this study and is shown in Figure
1.

30
Figure 1
Conceptual Framework
Note. Adapted from “Social Cognitive Theory in Cultural Context,” by A. Bandura, 2002,
Applied Psychology, 51(2), p. 269-290. Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological
Association; and The Ecology of Human Development: Experiments by Nature and Design (p.
16-42), by U. Bronfenbrenner, 1979, Harvard University press. Copyright 1979 by Harvard
University Press.

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Literature Review Summary
This literature review supports an understanding of toxic leadership by examining
traditional Army leadership theory, uncovering five important themes related to toxic leadership
(self-serving nature, individual wellbeing, organizational climate, made and sustained, and
exponential detriment), reviewing existing mitigation strategies for countering the effects of
toxic leadership, and presenting the study’s conceptual framework. The Army leadership theory
review and five toxic leadership themes frame the problem of practice within both the profession
and the relevant academic literature, defining the problem’s key aspects. The existing mitigation
strategies help illuminate how organizations alleviate (or fail to alleviate) a toxic leader’s impact
on an organization, along with the harmful impact that coping strategies can have on an
individual when an organization does not address a destructive leader. A conceptual framework
that links Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model (1979) with Bandura’s SCT (2002) drives an
understanding of the study’s purpose, methodology, and problem of practice by framing the SF
leader in a way that considers the impact of their broader environmental systems alongside the
reciprocal interplay of the self, one’s behavior, and the environment.
A notable gap in the literature on this phenomenon exists relating to toxic leadership’s
effects specifically within the U.S. SOF. This gap is important because SOF is increasingly used
in U.S. military operations (Byman & Merritt, 2018) and because SOF faces increasing demands
from elected decision makers and greater risks to themselves and to the national defense strategy
(Hennigan, 2017). As a first step toward closing this gap, this research examines the effects of
toxic leadership on members of the U.S. Army Special Forces—colloquially known as SF
soldiers or Green Berets—through the lens of three research questions (RQs):
1. How do SF soldiers perceive toxic leadership?

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2. How does toxic leadership affect the welfare of SF soldiers?
3. How does toxic leadership affect SF as an organization?
Using a qualitative, phenomenological research methodology, this study helps illuminate
concrete and hitherto undocumented effects caused by destructive leaders on one of the nation’s
premier special operations elements.

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Chapter Three: Methodology
The purpose of this qualitative, phenomenological study is to explore the phenomenon of
SF soldiers’ lived experiences with toxic leadership. It explores how SF soldiers perceive toxic
leadership, how it has affected their individual welfare, and how it has affected the organization.
The findings of this study contribute to the academic body of knowledge on toxic leadership
within the workplace and, more specifically, within the military; in addition, and more pointedly,
results can be used to provide tailored recommendations to stakeholders within the military to
better the lives of its service members and improve unit efficacy. This chapter begins by
outlining the research questions, methodology, research setting, and information about the
researcher. It then describes the data sources, data collection, instrumentation, and analysis used
in the study as well as the techniques used to ensure credibility and trustworthiness. Finally, the
chapter concludes with an ethical review.
This study’s qualitative research design supports its purpose because it is the best avenue
to examine, dissect, and analyze the effects of toxic leadership and how it is perceived in SF.
Qualitative research began in the fields of cultural anthropology and sociology, later advancing
to education and the other social sciences (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). It is designed to
understand a particular social situation, phenomenon, or interaction (Borg & Gall, 1989;
Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Locke et al., 1987). Rather than quantitatively interpreting numbers
that represent a phenomenon in the abstract, qualitative researchers enter “the informants’ world
and through ongoing interaction, seek the informants’ perspectives and meanings” (Creswell &
Creswell, 2018, p. 204). This style of research suits this study because it allows the researcher to
create a deeper and more thorough understanding of what it is like to personally experience, live
through, and serve under a toxic leader in one of the nation’s premier SOF organizations. Where

34
quantitative methods, such as a survey, may help describe the broad rate of toxic leadership, the
qualitative inquiry of this study seeks to better understand the effect of the social phenomenon on
the individuals who, when viewed in the aggregate, embody the SF regiment.
Research Questions
The following research questions guided the study:
1. How do SF soldiers perceive toxic leadership?
2. How does toxic leadership affect the welfare of SF soldiers?
3. How does toxic leadership affect SF as an organization?
Methodology
This study used a qualitative, phenomenological research approach consisting of semistructured interviews (interview instrument detailed in Appendix A). Data were collected from
seven participants. Semi-structured interviews were used to benefit from the depth of response,
rich descriptions, and long-form format of the interviews. Data analysis was informed by
grounded theory and Tesch’s (1990) eight-step model.
Research Setting
The research setting was virtual. The interviews were conducted via video and/or audio
call on Zoom or telephone and recorded using two types of instruments: Zoom video recording
and audio recording on an external electronic device. Six interviews were conducted using
Zoom, and one interview was conducted using a video call on a commercially available cell
phone app. The video-call setting was most appropriate for data collection because the format
allowed for richer data analysis—such as body language analysis—than audio-only calls. The
format also reduced logistical friction that may have been incurred by the geographic distance
between the researcher and participants residing around the world.

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The Researcher
Within this study, the two most relevant aspects of my positionality are that of an SF
soldier and social scientist. As of this study’s publication, I am a mid-level SF officer and have
served in various capacities in the SF regiment for over a decade and in the Army for 15 years.
Having personally experienced both toxic and outstanding leadership, I can attest anecdotally to
the tremendous effects a leader can have on the individual and the organization. As such, I am
not and cannot be wholly unbiased in this subject matter; on the contrary, it was a drive to better
the lives of the individuals in the SF regiment that initially sparked this research.
Despite this professional bias, as a social scientist and researcher, I know that to ensure
credibility in one’s research and findings, to engender trust from the reader, and to create lasting
effects, research and analysis must be as unbiased and trustworthy as possible (Creswell &
Creswell, 2018). In the following sections, I provide clear descriptions of the array of techniques
used to reduce bias and increase research credibility and trustworthiness. These techniques
include purposeful sampling techniques, member checking, peer review, thick description, and
peer debriefing. From my positionality as a social scientist, I am passionate about evidencebased science and about qualitative methods because they allow the researcher to enter the
investigation without a priori assumptions or hypotheses and, as such, help further reduce bias.
My central position as the researcher in this study is that of observer-participant; any
affiliation with SF or the Army is secondary (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Questions or
assumptions about researcher bias can be further assuaged by my central positionality in this
study as a social scientist above that as a professional soldier and by the detailed peer-reviewed
steps to ensure study neutrality and credibility. Findings and recommendations emerged from the
data collected and not with regard to my career or role within the SF profession.

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Data Source: Interviews
The data source of this study was semi-structured interviews with seven participants. The
participants had experience in all five active-duty Special Forces Groups (SFGs), SF training and
education units such as the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, and
one SFG in the SF National Guard. An SFG is the proper-noun name of the SF organization
commanded by an SF colonel and, for active-duty SFGs, the structure level that denotes their
regional, language, and cultural area of expertise. The SFGs are regionally aligned to geographic
and cultural areas of the world such as Latin America or the Indo-Pacific. As part of their SF
qualification, SF soldiers learn a foreign language and receive cultural training specific to this
regional alignment and, to capitalize on this tailored skillset, tend to remain in one SFG for most
of or their entire career. Interviews were particularly well suited to this inquiry because they
allowed the generation of a rich data set and a thick description of the social phenomenon,
inductive-then-deductive data analysis, and a focus on participants’ meanings rather than the
meanings that the researcher may begin with (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Ryle (1968) defines a
“thick description” as a human phenomenon that adds depth and social context to physical
behaviors and events.
Interviews were particularly apt for this study. First, they help create thick descriptions by
allowing long-form responses that generate rich data sets. As opposed to quantitative surveying,
interviews also allow a researcher to collect non-verbal data such as body language, the use of
humor, and participant hesitation and therefore support a richer understanding of the participant’s
experience. Second, interviews allow guided follow-on inquiry by the researcher to elicit aspects
of the lived experiences of the participants and social context that may be missed in quantitative
data collection (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The semi-structured framework of the interviews is

37
important because it allows for increased flexibility, the ability to ask clarifying questions, and
the option to pursue avenues broached by the participant that a structured interview may miss
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Third, interviews support an inductive-then-deductive approach to
data analysis. Inductively, patterns, themes, and linking concepts are created from the raw data
collected; this synthesis is then systematically and deductively analyzed to draw conclusions and
determine if more data analysis can support these conclusions. Finally, the centrality of
participants’ meanings is supported by interviewing. Allowing participants’ narratives and stories
to drive the interviews places their experiences at the center of the analysis over the researcher’s
predetermined, and potentially biased, concepts or conclusions (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).
Together, these aspects supported qualitative, semi-structured interviews as the most apt data
collection technique.
Participants and Sampling
Seven participants were interviewed for this study. Participants were gathered using two
purposeful sampling techniques: snowball and criterion-based sampling. All purposeful sampling
is nonprobability sampling, and it is the most common technique in qualitative research.
Purposeful sampling is the most effective technique to answer qualitative questions such as
“what did one experience” as opposed to quantitative questions such as “how much” or “how
often” (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Snowball sampling involves communicating with or
interviewing a few participants who meet the study’s criteria and asking them to refer the
researcher to other potential candidates, building an ever-bigger “snowball” of participant
volunteers (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). I conducted snowball sampling by distributing a digital
flyer for the study to several of my professional contacts within SF to share with their colleagues
and on social media pages designed for SF soldiers. The study flyer included items such as the

38
study purpose, time required of a participant, and anonymity details. I then compiled all those
who responded to the flyer as potential participants.
From this group of potential participants, I applied criterion-based sampling to choose the
study’s participants and to advance the study’s credibility and trustworthiness. In criterion-based
sampling, the researcher purposefully selects for certain attributes in participants to support the
study’s purpose and findings. In this study, I applied criterion-based sampling to ensure that the
participants had significant experience in all five active-duty SFGs as well as experience in the
SF training and education units and the National Guard SFGs. In this study, “significant
experience” is defined as at least one full term of military service in that SFG. Furthermore,
criterion-based sampling ensured that the participants were a blend of non-commissioned and
commissioned officers to reduce bias that may arise from collecting data from only one of these
rank subgroups.
There is a third rank subgroup within the Army and SF—warrant officers—that was not
included in this study because of lack of participant volunteers. No warrant officers volunteered
for this study; however, this does not present a significant gap in the data because warrant
officers are, by definition, prior non-commissioned or commissioned officers who transitioned
into a warrant officer role as a technical expert. Therefore, one can deduce that the data collected
about the lived experience of the non-commissioned and commissioned officer participants
reasonably reflect that of a warrant officer as well.
I chose to interview seven participants for two reasons. First, this set of participants
completed the criterion-based sampling technique requirements mentioned above. The set
included a mix of non-commissioned and commissioned officers as well as significant
experience from every active-duty SFG as well as additional experience in the training and

39
National Guard SFGs. By ensuring a breadth of experience and service in the various SFGs, the
study’s sampling technique helped reduce the potential bias that may have occurred if
participants were interviewed from a less representative cross-section of the SF population.
Second, after seven interviews, the study reached “saturation.” Saturation is the point at which
continued data collection no longer reveals novel insights or findings (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
Although each of the participant’s experiences was meaningful and unique, the seven interviews
revealed shared themes that were rich and robust enough to answer the study’s research
questions.
As mentioned in the literature review, toxic leaders are potentially volatile, and the
subject is inherently linked to potential personal or professional reprisal. Because of this,
participant anonymity was a foundational aspect of this study. Participants and the units where
they have served are referred to only by pseudonyms to protect anonymity. To further ensure
participant confidentiality, any potentially identifiable personal information—such as the specific
location or date when an event occurred—was anonymized or redacted when included in the
study.
Instrumentation
The interview protocol used a semi-structured interview instrument (Appendix A)
consisting of nine primary questions synthesized from the study’s literature review and
conceptual framework. Question sub-categories based on the literature review were self-serving
nature, individual wellbeing, organizational climate, made and sustained, and exponential
detriment. Sub-categories relating to the study’s conceptual framework were the six categories of
Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model and the triangular reciprocity of Bandura’s SCT. Appendix A
outlines the interview instrument and categorization of each question. Semi-structured interviews

40
supported the research design because they allowed the interview instrument to act as a guide for
the inquiry compared to a more structured interview format or quantitative design that might
restrict the exploratory nature of the study (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The semi-structured
format also enables the researcher to adapt the interview to participants’ responses in real time
and probe further as relevant data are provided, supporting a thick description of the
phenomenon. As a result of this semi-structured format, the interviews ebbed between the
questions in the interview instrument and the concepts and experiences presented by the
participants.
Data Collection Procedures
The study’s data collection technique was recorded video and/or audio call. Six of the
interviews were conducted using Zoom, and one was conducted on a video call using a
commercially available cell phone app. Six of the seven interviews were video calls, and one call
was audio only at the participant’s request. Before the interview, participants were given an
informed consent form outlining the study’s purpose, its voluntary nature, and disclosure that the
interview can be stopped at any time. The informed consent form is included as Appendix B. The
form also made clear to participants that the calls would be recorded and that study participation
can be withdrawn at any time up until study publication. At the beginning of each interview, I
reviewed the information in the informed consent form and requested a final verbal approval to
ensure that the participant understood the study details and consented to call recording.
Interviews were recorded using the Zoom call recording feature and/or an external audio
recording device. This format enabled me to conduct interviews with current and former SF
soldiers across the world, collect rich information, and adjust the line of questioning as needed
(Creswell & Creswell, 2018).

41
All data, including recordings and interview notes, were stored and encrypted using
Google’s Advanced Encryption Standard and secondarily secured using two-factor
authentication; data will be destroyed no later than 1 year after study publication.
Data Analysis
The qualitative data analysis in this study made sense of the data collected. This was done
through a deliberate coding and analysis process. Qualitative data analysis in this study applied
simultaneous procedures, winnowing of data, and computer software assistance (Creswell &
Creswell, 2018). First, data analysis occurred simultaneously with further data collection and the
writing of findings. As interviews were ongoing, I began to analyze the existing data. Second,
although qualitative interviewing generates thick descriptions and provides a rich data set, it also
produces a large amount of extraneous data that are often not of value to the study. To assuage
this, the data were “winnowed,” or pared down, during analysis to remove extraneous data and to
unearth the pith of the data set relevant to the study. Finally, Atlas.ti—a commercially available
computer coding software—was used to organize, sort, and code the data collected. The software
enabled a more thorough and efficient analysis compared to coding by hand.
The data analysis technique in this study was informed by grounded theory (Corbin &
Strauss, 2015) and Tesch’s (1990) eight-step model. Grounded theory’s central goal is to produce
novel findings that are grounded in the data collected rather than to test a hypothesis created
beforehand by the researcher. This study used, in order, open, axial, and finally selective coding.
Coding is the fundamental core of most qualitative research. It is the analytical process of
organizing textual data into segments that represent themes or concepts and applying labels to
these textual data. These labels, or “codes,” allow the researcher to further analyze the data and
identify shared categories and conclusions (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).

42
The three stages of open, axial, and selective coding generated the study’s findings. Open
coding is a method of coding that allows codes to emerge during data analysis rather than
assigning them beforehand or a priori (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). As opposed to a priori coding,
which may be better suited for testing a preexisting theory, this study’s open coding sought to
create codes and meaning grounded in and emerging from the data. The second stage of
coding—axial coding—moved beyond the descriptive and began grouping like items together.
Axial coding involves deliberate reflection and consideration and groups related concepts from
open coding together. As an illustrative example, in this study the open codes of “harm to unit
culture” and “the snowball effect” were grouped together and included in the axial code of
“exponential detriment” because they each contribute to the exponential detriment phenomenon.
Finally, in selective coding, one creates a central category (or categories) that ties together the
outputs from axial coding and, ultimately, tells a novel story. In this study, selective coding
produced the thematic outputs in Chapter Four that answer the study’s three research questions.
Whereas grounded theory informed the style of data analysis, Tesch’s (1990) eight-step
model provided the process framework for data analysis. Tesch’s model begins by gaining a
sense of the entirety of the data and then broadly coding one document (1990). These initial open
codes are used to analyze the remaining data, and the codes are edited, changed, added, or
deleted as needed to make sense of the data set. Finally, these codes are analyzed together and
reviewed for completeness (Tesch, 1990). The process is repeated as appropriate until a complete
understanding of the data set is generated. Embedded in this analysis is a process unique to
phenomenological data analysis that seeks to understand the essence of the problem. To
understand the problem of practice, phenomenological research analyzes the data for powerful

43
statements, textual units of significant meaning, and the development of an essence description
(Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Moustakas, 1994).
Credibility and Trustworthiness
Credibility and trustworthiness are critical to the study’s purpose and, as such, are
evidenced in several ways. First, as part of the dissertation process at the University of Southern
California, experts in the field peer reviewed the study. The study proposal was formally
approved by a three-person dissertation committee before data collection began. In addition, the
dissertation committee peer reviewed the study prior to publication, helping to further enhance
credibility and trustworthiness. The interview instrument was peer reviewed, pilot tested, and
adjusted based on feedback from pilot test participants (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Pilot test
participants were from both the military and the civilian workplace to ensure a more holistic
view of the interview instrument’s efficacy. Thick descriptions were also used to further enhance
study credibility. Thick descriptions are rich, deep vignettes that help describe the complex social
and cultural meanings beyond the observable experience.
Elements of the study were member checked at two stages to ensure credibility and
alignment with participants’ meanings. The first member check occurred before the interviews
were conducted to ensure that the interview questions reflected the study’s purpose and are
aligned with the research questions. This member check was conducted by a non-participant
colleague of mine from the SF population. The second member check occurred after data
analysis was complete when participants were given an advance copy of the study’s findings to
review the analysis for alignment with their lived experiences. Participants reviewed the findings
and offered clarifying comments or important details that the original analysis may have missed
or overlooked. This second member check ensured that the study’s analysis and interpretation of

44
the participants’ data rang true for them and was representative of their experiences. Finally, a
peer debrief of the entire study was conducted to enhance its accuracy. The debriefer reviewed
the study’s purpose and methodology, asking questions about the study alignment to ensure that
it made sense and provided context to the reader.
Ethics
The ethical considerations related to participants and their wellbeing were paramount to
this study beyond even the study’s purpose. Interview participants were identified only by
pseudonym, anonymized SF group, and rank subgroup to remove potential personal
identification. Participants’ responses were also fully anonymized. Specific names, places, or
dates were stripped to further protect anonymity. The voluntary nature of the study was
emphasized at two distinct points: in the informed consent form that each participant signed
before participating and before the interview itself began. The written informed consent sheet
provided to participants before the interviews included the Institutional Review Board (IRB)
approval number, researcher name and contact information, the study’s purpose, and other
pertinent details.

45
Chapter Four: Findings
This chapter begins by describing the study’s seven participants and the techniques used
to ensure their anonymity. It then covers, in order, the individual findings that answer each
research question. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings for all research
questions.
The findings of this study answered the study’s three research questions. For Research
Question 1 (How do SF soldiers perceive toxic leadership?), I found three themes in the data that
helped answer the question: (a) an emergent description of toxic leadership in SF, (b) a systemic
problem, and (c) ineffective versus toxic leadership. For Research Question 2 (How does toxic
leadership affect the welfare of SF soldiers?), the study found two themes: harm to individual
welfare and harm to interpersonal relationships. Finally, for Research Question 3 (How does
toxic leadership affect SF as an organization?), the study found three themes: (a) retention and
recruitment, (b) the unique effects of toxicity within SF, and (c) exponential detriment. Within
each of these research question findings, subthemes based on the participant’s experiences
helped frame and place the concepts in conversation with one another. These research-question
finding subthemes are described in further detail in their respective sections of Chapter Four. The
findings did not suggest unique patterns aligned to specific SFGs; rather, the themes discussed in
this chapter were generally shared across the experience of the SF-soldier participants.
Participant Overview
The seven participants in this study offered a significant breadth and depth of experience
in SF. Among the participants, they have served in all five active-duty SFGs, one National Guard
SFG, and various SF training and education units. They represent over 80 years of service in SF
and over 100 total years of service in the Army. The depth of their experience across rank, duty

46
position, and years of service along with the breadth of their experience working in most every
SF unit, to include every active-duty SFG, helped ensure that the study reached thematic
saturation. This thematic saturation was confirmed during the study because, although each
participant’s experience was unique, the participants’ experiences revealed several shared and
relevant themes. All participants were either senior non-commissioned officers (SNCOs) in the
rank of sergeant first class and above or mid-grade commissioned officers (MGOs) in the rank of
captain or major. Participants were either currently serving on active duty or National Guard
SFGs or were recently separated from military service. “Recently separated” denotes military
separation within 2 years of the participant’s interview date. No further potentially personally
identifiable information is included in the study to protect participant anonymity.
Pseudonyms were created for each participant and for the SFGs where the participants
have served to further protect anonymity. Participant pseudonyms were created using a webbased random name generator, and there is no relation among the pseudonym, the participant’s
identity, their military service, or their background. To further protect participant anonymity, the
names of the SFGs were also anonymized. Rather than identify the SFGs by their official
numbered names, each SFG—including the National Guard and SF training and education
groups—was randomly assigned a pseudonym letter. When referenced, the SFG is referred to by
this letter-based pseudonym such as SFG A, SFG B, SFG C, and so on. There is no relation
between the SFG’s official numbered name and its pseudonym letter. Because of the relatively
small community within SF and the potential impacts of this study, this step further shields
participants from identification and/or reprisal. Lastly, certain quotes or experiences described in
this chapter are attributed to “a participant” rather than to a specific pseudonym. This prevents

47
the potential identification of a participant by the aggregation of certain experiences that may
suggest service in a specific unit or time, further ensuring anonymity.
Table 1 lists the study participants. It provides the participants’ pseudonyms and their SF
experience. This experience includes their current military status, whether still serving or
recently separated; their rank subgroup, either SNCO or MGO; and their experience in the
various SFGs.
Table 1
Study Participants
Participant Military status Rank SFG experience
Scott Currently serving SNCO SFG F
Greg Currently serving SNCO SFG F
David Recently separated MGO SFG A
Charles Currently serving SNCO SFGs E and G
Samuel Currently serving SNCO SFGs E, F, and G
John Recently separated SNCO SFGs B and C
Ryan Currently serving MGO SFGs D and G

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Research Question 1: How Do SF Soldiers Perceive Toxic Leadership?
This study found three themes that answer this research question. The first theme is the
emergent description of toxic leadership in SF that arose from data analysis. This description
explains the specific ways that the participants believed a toxic leader acts and what that leader’s
perceived effects are on the organization. The second theme is the view of toxic leadership as a
systemic problem. This theme describes how the problem of practice is seen as widespread
throughout the whole of the organization and systematically embedded in the organization’s
systems and processes. The final theme is the comparison and contrast between ineffective and
toxic leadership styles. Participants seemed to view incompetency less harshly than more overt
toxic leadership but only to a certain point; after that point, incompetency broke the threshold of
toxicity and was perceived in a similarly negative manner as more traditional toxic leadership.
Emergent Description of Toxic Leadership in SF
Based on the participants’ lived experiences, a unique description of toxic leadership
within SF emerged from the data and centered on six total themes. Three of these themes are
traits of the toxic leader: self-serving actions, arrogance, and incompetency; three of the themes
are effects created by the toxic leader: trust erosion, harm to the individual, and harm to the
organization. Together, the themes help answer the research question “How do SF soldiers
perceive toxic leadership?” The themes explain how the participants perceived the toxic leader to
be and to act as well as the effects those leaders create. Participants described toxic leaders as
characterized by self-serving actions, arrogance, and incompetency. The data further showed that
toxic leaders eroded trust and were harmful to the individual and to the organization. The themes
of erosion of trust, self-serving actions, arrogance, and incompetency are discussed in this
section. The findings on harm to the individual and to the organization are reported in the

49
subsequent sections of this chapter that cover Research Questions 2 and 3, respectively. The
themes in this emergent description were synthesized from participants’ answers to interview
questions and were greatly informed by the questions about what toxic leadership meant to them
personally; however, responses to all interview questions contributed to the description in this
section. Among the six themes, the erosion of trust was the most significant in the data.
Trust Erosion
All seven participants described meaningful experiences with toxic leaders related to trust
erosion. Participants described this breakdown in trust as both an inability to trust their leaders
and an inability to be honest with their leaders because their leader’s actions did not support
candor. This was apparent when Scott disclosed, “[Toxic leaders] lie through their teeth like right
to my face. And then sometimes I know about it beforehand and I’m just like, okay.” Scott
described an interaction with one of his most senior leaders in which he was unable to be truthful
about his professional aspirations because of the toxic environment created by that leader and
their lack of trust:
Of course, when I’m talking to [the toxic leader] about this job opportunity … [the toxic
leader says] “you’re not gonna just go over there [to your new assignment] and
disappear?” [Scott replied], “No, no, no, no. No, man. 36 months and then … I wanna
come back here and take a company. I really wanna come back.”
Scott’s reply was ingenuine and he described this conversation as feeling as though he was lying
“through my teeth because I can’t trust that those dudes would follow through.” These
experiences helped describe how participants perceived toxic leaders as eroding trust within their
organization. This erosion of trust appeared to affect not only interpersonal relationships but also
one’s relationship with the organization.

50
Participants also noted a lack of trust with the broader SF organization because of their
experience with toxic leaders and environments. John expanded on this when he spoke about his
lack of trust in the system to do what is right for the individual while describing his perceptions
when one is accused—justly or unjustly—of misconduct:
[In my experience] you’re guilty until you’re proven guilty for something else. You might
not have done that one thing, but the fact that you got arrested, [even though] it’s not your
fault … is good enough to get you [punished and a reduction in pay]. It’s really bad.
That’s just what we do.
This experience clearly outlined how John did not perceive the organization as one that would
support or trust him when in need. Likewise, Ryan described feelings of despair and loss of trust
in the broader organization when his unit waited an extended period for their toxic commander to
be removed after that leader’s toxicity was uncovered in a command climate survey; however,
the toxic commander was never removed and received only minor and inconsequential
repercussions for the negative command climate survey. Further exacerbating this loss of trust,
Ryan described how the commander used the command climate survey to intimidate the
formation, using the results of the survey to commit acts of reprisal against those he felt had
wronged him. The leader also bullied his subordinates, Ryan noted, for reporting the leader’s
destructive leadership style. Potentially further eroding trust, the second most significant theme
in the emergent description of toxic leadership is the self-serving leader.
Self-Serving Actions
Six of the seven participants described a leader’s self-serving actions as at or near the
core of their experiences with toxic leadership. A self-serving nature is a leader’s words,
decisions, and actions that are or are perceived to be in his or her own personal benefit rather

51
than in the interest of his or her subordinates and/or the organization (Johns, 1999). Participants
expressed this leader self-interest in several ways. Greg stated that when dealing with toxic
leaders, “It was always [the toxic leader putting themself] first, whether it was an officer or
sergeant major.” Charles centered the self-serving nature in his view of toxicity: “The way I look
at toxic leadership is someone who has a self-interest, rather than an interest in the greater good.”
These views of the self-serving leader framed the participants’ perception of what a toxic leader
is and how they act. Others expressed the possibility that their toxic leaders may have been
organizationally encouraged to act in a self-serving manner because of the Army’s and SF’s
promotion and evaluation structure. David defined toxic leaders as those corrupted by the Army’s
career system:
[Toxic leaders are those] who have basically been given no other option to succeed in this
regiment, but to perpetuate a flawed system. And they just do whatever they have to do to
get to the next level … oftentimes that’s to put themselves before their men.
In this description, David specifically noted the toxic leader’s self-serving tendency to put their
own welfare above that of their subordinates’ and, by suggesting that those leaders had no choice
but to act that way, also alluded to the systemic problem theme discussed later in this chapter.
Participants further described their toxic leaders as selfish, unwilling to share achievements with
peers or subordinates, and adversarial. This environment caused David to feel that, within this
organizational climate, one must “look out for yourself and your own interests … that is a perfect
environment to make a no-trust, low-trust environment.” Experiences such as these supported the
theme of self-serving actions and inform the next theme, leader arrogance. When describing a
leader’s self-serving decisions, leader arrogance appeared to be a correlated phenomenon.
Arrogance

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Leader arrogance was another prominent subtheme in participants’ lived experience with
toxic leaders. In the context of toxic leadership, arrogance is defined as a view of oneself as
better than their subordinates and an exaggerated sense of importance or of one’s own abilities
(Taylor, 2018). One participant described a toxic senior leader’s arrogance who, when apprised
of a systemic lack of mentorship and toxic leadership in SF, said that if soldiers do not like the
current system, those soldiers can leave the Army. This arrogant leader demonstrated his view of
subordinates as inferior by demonstrating a clear lack of concern for their suffering or careers.
Moreover, John used arrogance to describe toxic leadership as a phenomenon in SF:
Complete ignorance or arrogance I think would probably be the best way to [describe
toxic leaders in SF]. Where it’s like, “My way is the only way.” … yea, arrogance, failure
to allow anything else to occur within their bubble that they don’t approve of.
This description specifically defined the toxic leader as arrogant and links it with leader
incompetency, a theme discussed further in this chapter. John and Ryan also illustrated how
arrogant leaders affected both the individual and the unit’s mission. John described feeling
annoyed and frustrated in a situation in which an arrogant leader employed him in a role far
outside and below his assigned duties and experience. He used John—an experienced and senior
non-commissioned officer—as an administrative clerk to laminate the leader’s papers and
conduct other menial tasks. Recounting the experience, John said, “You can laminate your own
paper. Don’t be an [expletive]. … I don’t like being used for something that’s not my job.” Ryan
expressed how dangerous an arrogant and toxic leader can be during combat: “The [leader’s
paranoia related to his negative command climate survey] added to the narcissism and, in a
combat environment, that is a very negative thing. Decisions were either not made on time or
they were, without going into details, very, very miscalculated or wrong.” For John and Ryan,

53
these arrogant leader actions were specific memories recalled when asked to describe a toxic
leader and suggested that it is a significant aspect of how they perceive the problem. Participants
also identified further leader attributes related to arrogance such as a lack of humility and
incompetency.
Incompetency
All participants described aspects of incompetency in their toxic leaders. They described
examples of incompetency such as a leader’s inability to lead in combat, inability to perform
physically, and general lack of professional knowledge. Scott described a leader in a combat
situation who “tactically doesn’t know what the [expletive] he’s talking about” and that, “We
knew it was gonna be pretty kinetic and [the toxic leader] totally [expletive] the bed, put us in a
bunch of terrible positions.” He further described this leader as “fat, out of shape, tactically
unsound, self-serving.” These views of incompetency, tactically and physically, informed Scott’s
experience with that leader. David spoke at length about the lack of general professional
knowledge in his experiences with toxic leaders. He described how, although these leaders may
have been capable at a previous rank, he believed that they were incapable of conducting their
duties at their current level of responsibility:
So we had a lot of majors who could not [do their job] … and they were literally trying to
relive their glory days … they were virtually incapable of doing all the things they need
to do to support the team leaders … we also had issues where we had majors who just
completely didn’t know how to do their job as a major … my commander literally just
had no idea what was going on 95% of the time.
David’s experiences with incompetent leaders such as these appeared to inform his framing and
view of leadership in SF. Samuel and Ryan further described the relationship between

54
incompetency and toxicity. On one hand, Samuel expressed how one type of toxic leader is those
that are potentially unaware that they are incompetent: “the [type of] person that … really had no
business being in that position. He didn’t have the skills, the wherewithal, the tactical
knowledge, or ability.” Ryan, on the other hand, described his experience with a leader that
appeared cognizant of his incompetency but was either unwilling or unable to rectify it:
[The toxic leader] had a constant struggle to want to be in control. And if anyone tried to
take that control away, he would get absolutely furious … he [said] in an angry rage one
time, “I don’t know what I’m doing, just leave me alone.” And we would go, “Oh, okay.”
Both these experiences demonstrated the way in which incompetency is a central theme in how
toxic leadership was perceived by these SF soldiers.
This study found that trust erosion, self-serving actions, arrogance, and incompetency
were significant themes describing toxic leadership as perceived by SF soldiers. It also found
themes of harm to the individual and harm to the organization that are covered in subsequent
sections of this chapter. Beyond this description of toxic leadership, this study also found that the
participants believed the phenomenon of toxic leadership to be a systemic problem and a theme
related to ineffective vs. toxic leadership.
A Systemic Problem
The data supported three themes that define the participants’ perception that toxic
leadership in SF is a systemic problem: the evaluation and promotion system, careerism, and the
rate of toxicity. Although perhaps all the themes discussed in this chapter contribute in some way
to the problem’s systemic nature, these three themes most strongly support and demonstrate the
phenomenon. Within this study, a systemic problem is a situation that is unsatisfactory or
troublesome and that is experienced by most, if not all, of the organization and supported by its

55
organizational mechanisms and/or processes (Praslova, 2023). David alluded to this systemic
problem when he described his view that most toxic leaders do not lead that way intentionally
but rather are encouraged to act that way because of organizational cultural or constraints: “The
widespread nature of the issue leads me to believe it is a systemic failure and most leaders do not
wake up wanting to be toxic.” In this way, he went on to note, toxic leaders in SF are “victims of
the system.” The first and most significant of the systemic problem themes is the performance
evaluation and promotion system and how it supports and encourages toxic leadership habits.
The Evaluation and Promotion System
Six of the seven participants reported at length about how they perceive the SF
performance evaluation and promotion system to be systemically problematic and linked to toxic
leadership. Broadly, this perception refers to the Army’s system that uses evaluation reports and
promotion boards to select and advance leaders to higher ranks and positions of importance. One
especially harmful aspect of this problem, highlighted in the data, was the use of performance
evaluations by toxic leaders to intimidate their subordinates. Charles shared that he believed that
the evaluations serve as an instrument for toxic leaders to coerce action from their subordinates:
I think [the evaluations] are utilized as tools and lever points with … toxic leaders, kind
of hanging it over people’s heads like “Hey, if you don’t get in line, I’m the guy who’s
going to decide whether or not you get a career [or an opportunity].” I don’t think
[there’s] too much oversight. There’s not a lot of checks and balances.
Charles’s experiences highlighted an especially dangerous aspect of the performance evaluation
system. Participants also frequently referred to the evaluation system in a dismissive manner
such as “a game, more than it is an actual evaluation” and expressed a lack of trust in the system
to advance the best and most healthy leaders.

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Participants perceived the promotion system to be as equally flawed as the performance
evaluation system. Ryan pointed to how he and others perceived the promotion system to be a
failure because of how it placed especially toxic leaders in command:
[Our toxic leader] had already got fired for some less than moral type of [conduct] … it
appeared to many people in the battalion there were multiple times where this individual
could have been stopped … time and time again, it seemed like [he] kept going. And he
was our commander now.
Ryan’s recounting of this experience demonstrated how he and his peers viewed the Army’s
failure to identify and remove this toxic leader to be systemic within the Army’s promotion
system. Another significant finding that emerged from the data was that participants perceived
the promotion system to be “rigged.” That is, that those deemed to be promoted with the highest
marks were decided upon before they even had the opportunity to perform their job because of
political or familial connections or because of reputation: “Before you even show up to a Special
Forces Group … they’re already got a board in the [deputy commander’s] office that says who
their chosen” ones are. David continues, recounting a conversation with his commander
explaining how the promotion system is predetermined: “They’ve already pre-selected [who
will] be company commanders and beyond. They’re already grooming them. They’ve already
chosen who their winners are” before they arrive or perform. David’s experiences with this
rigged system helped describe his view of the structural flaws in a system that promotes based on
connection or reputation rather than on performance or evaluated potential.
This rigged promotion system appeared to reduce organizational commitment in those
who learn about it and to inspire feelings of powerlessness. That is, participants described feeling
like there was nothing they could do to affect a system that is predetermined. Moreover, Greg

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shared how the belief in the predetermined nature of the promotion system reduces morale not
only in the leaders evaluated but across the formation. The soldiers serving in a unit commanded
by an officer not predetermined for success, Greg explained, are bright enough to figure out that
fact and, in turn, believe that their higher command does not have trust, faith, or confidence in
their unit. Several participants related the flawed evaluation and promotion system to the
phenomenon of careerism: “I think our professional development model … kind of feeds into
this careerism thing.”
Careerism
In this study, careerism is defined as a leader’s tendency to advance their own career or
professional status at the expense of the people they lead and their organization (Hauser, 1984).
This phenomenon is related to the above theme of a leader’s self-serving actions but specifically
focuses on decisions that advance his or her career goals. At times, participants recounted how
toxic leaders behaved in a careerist way out of professional fear: “[Our commanders] didn’t give
one [expletive] about me or my guys and, in fact, stood in the way of them getting proper
treatment [after sustaining wounds in combat] and care because [those commanders] didn’t want
to look bad.” Charles noted that his most significant experience with a toxic leader was because
of that leader’s careerism—“that person was definitely interested in their own career”—and that
his leaders abused their power and position for professional gain. Samuel described these leaders
as “politically driven” and prone to maintain the status quo as to not be seen at fault. Another
participant shared sentiments that reinforced this concept of toxic leaders refusing to act for fear
of their actions being viewed poorly:
They also subscribed to what I call a no-decision type leadership. There is a cohort of
officers [who practice] “the best decision is no decision,” type of leadership. And that was

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a self-preservation tactic … where, “I can’t be accountable for making no decisions,” and
if something were to go wrong, the blame was pushed as far down the chain as possible
to protect careers.
Together these experiences detail how participants viewed and understood careerism and its links
to toxic leadership. Toxic leaders refusing to approve awards and other favorable administrative
actions were also noted by the participants: “They [expletive] us on all of our awards … it didn’t
take long to figure out they cared more about their image” than about the care and treatment of
wounded soldiers. These experiences with careerist toxic leaders appeared to directly reduce
organizational commitment. This careerist mindset may contribute to the high rate of toxic
leadership described by participants.
The Rate of Toxicity
Four of the seven participants perceived the rate of toxicity among SF leaders as
generally high. Although this study did not endeavor to describe the actual rate of toxic
leadership in SF, this finding buttresses the view of toxic leadership as a systemic and
widespread problem in SF because it suggests that it may be experienced by many if not most SF
soldiers. Participants described the rate of toxic leadership in a variety of ways but, broadly, the
rate of perceived toxicity was between 50% and 90%. Scott described his experience with
leadership in SF as “like 90% toxic.” Another participant perceived the organization as around
60% toxic. When asked about his experience with destructive leaders, Greg stated, “I will say
that I’ve seen a crap ton.” These assessments support the assertion that the rate of toxic
leadership was perceived to be relatively high, informing the participants’ overall perception of
the problem of practice.

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There were, however, positive comments in participants’ responses indicating hope that
the relatively high perceived rate of toxicity expressed by some participants could be reduced.
One participant expressed that his experience with one toxic leader, though challenging, was the
exception in his career and that he has experienced mostly great leaders in SF. He reiterated this
during his member check of the findings in this study because of the significance that his positive
experiences in SF have had for him. Greg expressed that he viewed around 55% of his SF leaders
as toxic but that, “You could easily [reduce that number by] 30% with some very minor things”
such as improved leader authenticity and accountability. Charles expressed that, although toxic
leadership was relatively common in the first half of his career, “Now, I would say it’s more
rare.” A phenomenon that may help explain this relatively high rate of toxicity is the participants’
views of ineffective and toxic leadership styles.
Ineffective Versus Toxic Leadership
The comparison between and interplay of ineffective versus toxic leadership was another
theme present in the participants’ view of the problem of practice. In this study, ineffective
leadership is defined as a leadership style that does not create organizational value, provide
clarity or direction to subordinates, or motivate or inspire and is often characterized by technical
incompetence (Aboyassin & Abood, 20123). However, in contrast to toxic leadership, it is not
necessarily characterized by arrogance, self-serving actions, or narcissism and does not
inherently cause an erosion of trust or harm to individual welfare. The findings were
inconclusive with two competing subthemes within the data. The first subtheme was that
ineffectiveness can be so harmful as to create toxicity on its own. Three participants used words
such as “incompetency” or “ineffective” as their first word in the definition of toxic leadership.
John described an experience in which an otherwise excellent and caring leader was promoted

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past his point of competency and, once in that position of elevated authority, “He didn’t have the
knowledge to do it” and inadvertently created a toxic environment because of his ineffectiveness.
David pointed out how much stress and pain his leader’s ineffectiveness caused because others
had to do their own work and that of their leader. He, like two other participants, alluded to the
potential for a leader to get promoted past his or her point of technical competency: “From what
I heard he was a generally decent [junior leader], but he had never been evaluated and never
seemed to have any capability as a [more senior leader].” In contrast to this perspective, other
participants expressed how an ineffective leader is potentially quite different from, and less
harmful than, a toxic one.
Participants also described how ineffective leaders were, at times, less harmful than more
outright toxic leaders. Greg described experiences with caring but ineffective leaders relatively
positively: “They were phenomenal people and they genuinely cared. They just didn’t
[understand] the organization … I don’t necessarily [think that it is a bad thing].” He contrasted
these ineffective but caring leaders with toxic but technically competent leaders to explain how
the toxic leaders created more harm despite their competency. Others were generally accepting of
ineffective leaders. Charles described how he believed that ineffective leaders can be taught and
mentored to be better, although toxic ones are often unwilling to change.
These findings suggest a potential thematic conclusion that ineffective leadership may
have a tipping point past which it is no longer viewed as acceptable. An ineffective leader was
accepted by the participants but only up to a certain point. When a leader’s ineffectiveness hit
and went past that tipping point, their ineffectiveness was perceived to cross into toxicity and
was no longer accepted by the organization.

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Research Question 1: Summary
This section answers the research question “How do SF soldiers perceive toxic
leadership?” by offering an emergent description of toxic leadership within SF, describing how
participants viewed toxic leadership as a systemic problem, and analyzing ineffective versus
toxic leadership. The emergent description of toxic leadership is centered on six themes: selfserving actions, arrogance, incompetency, trust erosion, harm to the individual, and harm to the
organization. Among these themes, trust erosion was the most significant. Three themes were
outlined that describe how toxic leadership is perceived to be a systemic problem: the evaluation
and promotion system, careerism, and the rate of toxicity. Finally, the findings for ineffective
versus toxic leadership were inconclusive; some participants believed that ineffectiveness was at
the core of toxicity; others were more forgiving of ineffective leaders and perceived them as less
harmful to the organization. A potential reason for this incongruency is that participants accepted
ineffective leaders until their ineffectiveness crossed a certain tipping point of harm to the unit
and their ineffective leadership became toxic. Part of the emergent description of toxic leadership
that was not covered in this section was the harm done to the individual. This concept is
discussed in the following section on soldier welfare.
Research Question 2: How Does Toxic Leadership Affect the Welfare of SF Soldiers?
There were two themes found in the data that describe how toxic leadership affects the
welfare of SF soldiers. Harm to individual welfare—the first theme—focuses on the direct
effects of toxic leadership on the soldier. The second theme is harm to interpersonal relationships
and describes how toxic leaders can detrimentally affect their subordinates’ relationships at home
and with their families.

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Harm to Individual Welfare: Stress, Burnout, and Disillusionment
This study found that toxic leaders cause harm to individual welfare in three ways: they
increase individual stress, they create burnout, and they cause disillusionment with one’s career
and with SF. These effects reduce individual welfare because they have negative consequences
on mental, physical, and emotional health and they diminish one’s perceptions of a profession
they have devoted a significant portion of themselves and their lives to. Stress, burnout, and
disillusionment harm the individual by causing physical fatigue, insomnia, sadness or mood
swings, alcohol or substance abuse, a variety of medical conditions, and diminished overall
mental health (Mayo Clinic Staff, 2023). Among these factors, stress was the most prominent in
the data.
Stress
Six of the seven participants reported significantly increased stress caused by toxic
leadership. David noted that when dealing with the environment caused by his absent and toxic
leader, “For me, it was very stressful, of course. More stressful than it had to be.” Scott described
how the interplay of toxic leaders and toxic environments can lead to stress, alcohol abuse, and
even suicide:
You bring [stress and feelings of unhappiness] home, you make your family miserable,
they make you miserable in turn, and then there’s just gonna be a breaking point, right?
… It’s like [expletive], now I have nothing. And for them it’s like a bottle of pills or a
[expletive] bullet seems like a decent way out … it starts off as toxic leadership and
[eventually] causes suicide.
Charles described his stress and frustration caused by trying to work around a toxic leader: “[I
was] extremely stressed out, because I was focused on how to defeat the toxic leader … the

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stress became so much, and it became almost kind of like the center of gravity for my thoughts.”
The data suggested that the negative outcomes of this stress lasted beyond the individual toxic
experience and lingered for the participants.
Participants described the lasting effects that stress related to toxic leadership had on their
lives. John described that, after separating from the military and moving to the civilian
workforce, he continued to feel the negative impacts of toxicity:
[I felt] very anxious. I have the anxiety thing, where I’m just like “Oh no, I got to do this
thing, or somebody’s going to get mad at me … or yell at me” even though realistically,
it’s not like that at all. Nothing bad is going to happen. Nobody’s going to hit me [in the
civilian workforce]. No one’s going to do anything. It’s something that I now have.
Samuel shared that the cumulative stress of dealing with toxic leadership for over two decades
made his dream job in SF a struggle:
[Being in SF was] the most stressful job I’ve ever had … I always made it a goal to put
[the men] first … trying to be the umbrella [for them] from a lot of the stuff that I was
feeling was definitely stressful.
These stressful events appeared to build upon one another and create harm that was greater than
the sum of its parts.
The effects of stress may also be exacerbated by the fear of reprisal from a toxic leader if
one speaks out about the leader’s actions. Five participants described instances in which they
either experienced or witnessed a leader threaten or harm a subordinate’s career because that
subordinate spoke up about the leader’s misconduct. John detailed one instance in which his
toxic leader threatened him in an illegal or procedurally disallowed manner, then walked that
threat back to protect himself once John had complied and the harm was already done.

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Furthermore, three participants expressed concerns or desire for reassurance related to this
study’s anonymity policies, suggesting that this fear of reprisal is long lasting and still a concern.
Two participants withheld details or declined to elaborate when describing a specific encounter
with a toxic leader, possibly to prevent that leader’s ability to identify them and act against the
participant in the future. These experiences detail how the concern of reprisal contributed to the
increased stress of the participants. This cumulative effect of stress also appeared to contribute to
burnout.
Burnout
Participants cited burnout as another common effect of their experience with toxic
leadership. David explained, “I could say on behalf of [the entire team and unit], virtually
everybody was just completely burned out.” He went on to note that by the time they began a
challenging combat deployment, they were so burnt out from toxic leadership that they were a
less effective fighting force, increasing their risk to themselves and to the mission in combat.
John described how a toxic leader’s obsession with individual accolades, achieved by pushing
the unit past healthy limits, created burnout. Those leaders’ desire for individual career
achievement caused “us to make those terrible decisions that are causing those people to burn
out.” He further noted that burnout engendered feelings of hate and anger from and toward his
leadership. Lastly, Ryan pointed out that—despite his deep commitment to the Army from a
young age—dealing with a toxic leader induced hardship, burn out, and exhaustion for the first
time in his 15-year career: “I’ve been Army property since I was 17 years old. I love it … [and
yet] I was coming home every night, not worn out from the job, but worn out from dealing
mentally and emotionally with this command team.” These feelings of burnout are one factor
correlated with the disillusionment also noted in the data analysis.

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Disillusionment
Disillusionment with SF was a prominent theme associated with all seven participants’
toxic leadership experiences. In this study, disillusionment is defined as a realization that the SF
profession is not as fulfilling, worthwhile, or meaningful as one believed it to be.
Disillusionment with a profession that one previously held in high esteem can harm individual
welfare because it creates feelings of betrayal; loss of interest; negative emotions such as anger,
frustration, and sadness; and reduces one’s personal sense of meaning (McDonald, 2021). Ryan
expressed that his ongoing experience with a toxic leader made him question the value of a
continued career in SF: “I was really disenfranchised to the point of, man, if this [toxic leader] is
going to be in charge of people, and [that leader’s job] is the one I’m looking at in probably 3 or
4 years, what the heck?” Scott, when offered a promotion and position of higher responsibility in
SF, noted that, “To me … I don’t want anything to do with this [place]. This place is toxic as
[expletive]”; he turned down the position.
A notable thread through many of the participants’ experience with disillusionment was
hypocrisy. Participants described how toxic leaders professed a high level of care for soldiers and
families but did not demonstrate that care in their actions. Greg noted this hypocrisy in his
experience with one of the most senior enlisted soldiers in his SFG: “You guys are preaching all
this stuff about families” but refuse to help soldiers and their families when you have the
opportunity. He recounted various experiences in which his command promised to support him
and his family but reneged on these promises, creating feelings of resent and disillusionment.
David described his frustration with leaders who did not seem to care for David’s soldiers and
repeatedly failed to provide for his soldiers after they were wounded in combat. Ultimately, he

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noted, “For a lot of people like me, that was a deal breaker” and a contributing factor to why he
eventually left SF and the Army.
Charles described how this disillusionment phenomenon can happen before one even
officially serves in SF, beginning with soldiers’ experiences with toxic leadership in the SF
Qualification Course. The SF Qualification Course is the training pipeline that qualifies one to be
an SF soldier and, for most, their initial experience with SF leadership. Charles noted that the
toxic leadership he and others experienced in the SF Qualification Course was so detrimental—
and so destructive to their concept of SF as a worthwhile profession—that many otherwise good
candidates left the course rather than endure the toxicity:
Charles: I have a good friend who was part of the officer cohort who left. And …
he did very well [elsewhere], he’s still doing extremely well in the
military, in Special Operations.
Interviewer: And he left because of some of those [toxic] leadership experiences [in the
SF Qualification Course]?
Charles: One hundred percent. And I will say he’s [gone on to serve] at some of the
top positions within SOF.
These early experiences with toxic leadership contributed to Charles’ professional
disillusionment before he served his first official day as an SF soldier.
The participants used a variety of experiences to describe their diminished view of SF.
They stated that, “At an early point in my career I just became a cynic” and, “I’m not really
proud to say that I’m a part of the organization anymore” because the organization is so
misaligned with the values it claims to represent. Succinctly summarizing this phenomenon,
Charles stated that, “Special Forces is not as special as we like to think we are.” Another

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participant with over 20 years of service in the Army noted how, “The day I walk away … I’ll
walk away and support all veterans, but I’m not going to be overly biased to [SF] or really even
want to associate myself [with it].” Another participant described how his experience with toxic
leaders “pushed me away so far that I’m no longer part of the regiment … at all, in any way,
shape, or form.” Ryan described how he thinks the U.S. public does not expect the problem of
toxic leadership to exist within SF because of the organization’s elite reputation: “I think toxic
leadership is something that the American taxpayer and citizen doesn’t expect us to do because
they think, and rightfully so, that we should be above. Unfortunately, we’re not.” The data in this
study found that these harmful effects can move beyond the soldier to harm a soldier’s spouse
and family directly and indirectly.
Harm to Interpersonal Relationships: Increased Stress and Direct Harm
Experiences with toxic leaders also significantly affected the interpersonal relationships
of the participants. Toxic leaders increased stress on the participant’s family and familial
relationships and caused direct harm to the soldiers’ families. Of these two effects, the most
significant harm was that done to the relationship between a participant and their spouse and
children because of the participant’s increased stress.
Increased Stress
Five of the seven participants described adverse effects because of stress on their families
caused by toxic leaders. Greg, recalling a conversation with his wife about this study’s purpose,
said that “I was talking to my wife and she’s ranting and raving because” of Greg’s experiences
with toxic leadership. Similarly, Scott described his and a peer’s inability to leave the stressors of
toxic leadership at work: “You’re dragging it home one way or another” and, “Maybe that’s why
our divorce rates are so sky high [in SF].” Furthermore, Scott also described the potentially

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cyclical nature of this phenomenon: “You go home to your wife, you’re miserable, then she
becomes miserable, and then she makes you miserable and … it feeds on itself.” David
expressed how the incompetency of a toxic leader can also create unpredictability and stress:
“Without the predictability, you don’t have quality time with family, you can’t plan big trips. The
time you do have with your family … it’s tainted.” Ryan described the dichotomy between stress
from combat or hard work, which he and his family handled relatively well, and the stress of
dealing with a toxic leader:
As a staff officer in garrison [dealing with a toxic leader], I was coming home, and I was
just angry. I was upset, and I found myself, for the first time in my career, bringing my
work home. I don’t mean actually working at home, but I mean … talking about [work],
complaining, and sharing stuff with my family that I had never really shared before from
any other military experiences, war stories be damned. [My wife] was really worried. She
was like, “Hey, you are not happy. You are frustrated. [The kids and I] are seeing this.”
David recalled how his parents were worried about the toxicity and incompetency of his
workplace. After describing his experiences, his parents asked, “Where the hell are you working
at? That’s completely unacceptable … this isn’t normal.” This parental worry for their son
further highlighted the increased stress that a toxic leader can place upon a soldier and on their
family.
Related to the theme of increased stress, one participant shared how his experience
dealing with overbearing toxic leadership caused such high levels of stress that he struggled with
sexual intimacy in his marriage. He described how the stress of a toxic environment was “bad
enough to where it gave me physical issues where I couldn’t [physically participate in sexual
intimacy] for a while. It was bad.” Effects such as this one could potentially further exacerbate

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an already stressful family dynamic weighed down by the burdens of a military career and toxic
leadership.
Direct Harm
Another theme in the data was how toxic leadership can directly harm a soldier’s family
members when a toxic leader makes decisions that negatively affect that family member
specifically. Five participants described experiencing this direct harm to a family member. Scott
recounted an experience in which a leader refused to be with and support his own family at a
funeral because of a careerist mindset and conflicting professional aspirations. Not only did this
leader fail to support his family in a time of need, but, as Scott described, the leader’s modeling
also suggested to his subordinates that it was inappropriate for them to support their own families
in similar times of need.
Other participants described how toxic leaders hurt the participants’spouses through
willful disregard for the spouse’s career. Greg recounted how his leaders promised him a duty
location that would support his wife’s professional career and 4-year degree. However, when it
came time to begin the position, his leaders recanted and forced him to a location completely
unsupportive of his wife’s career. When told of this detrimental change to his duty location, Greg
described the conversation with his toxic leader:
“But you literally said [you could get me the position that supports my wife’s career].”
And it goes back to the authenticity part. You’re not preaching what you’re doing here.
[The toxic leader then said], “Hey, we’ll get her a job.” I kid you not, [he said] “we’ll get
her a job stocking shelves at the [grocery store] at night.” And I [said], “Oh, I have an
idea … why don’t you go [expletive] yourself” and hung up.

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John furthered this theme of disregard for a spouse’s career when told of a mandatory move to a
new duty location:
I told them I would go to [the new location]; however, I could not take my family … I
have a wife, she has a job … a career. I don’t want to do that to her. It’s not fair to her.
To balance the needs of the Army as well as those of his family, John offered to serve a shorter
tour in the new location because he would have to move without his wife and family. The toxic
leader replied, “absolutely not” and, John recalled, the toxic leader “told me that my wife made a
decision when she decided to marry me, that she chose this life as a Special Forces spouse, so
there should be no reason why she couldn’t” give up her career and move.
This direct harm to the family can continue even after a soldier dies or is killed in service
to the nation. Scott highlighted this direct harm to a soldier’s family when he described a toxic
and self-serving leader’s decisions after one of Scott’s teammates was killed in action: “It was
the team and the [deceased teammate’s] mother’s wishes to have a memorial back at home
station with [our team, the deceased’s closest colleagues] present.” Despite these wishes, the
toxic leader chose to have the memorial for the deceased soldier without Scott and his team
present because, if they waited until they returned from their deployment, the toxic leader would
not personally have been present for the memorial. In addition, Scott noted, the military valor
award for the deceased’s actions in combat was rushed through the approval process and
therefore resulted in a potentially less prestigious award than what Scott believed the deceased
deserved based on his actions. These decisions by Scott’s leaders in a time of loss further
describe how a toxic leader can cause direct harm to one’s family, even after a soldier has passed.

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Research Question 2: Summary
Toxic leaders affected the individual welfare of the participants in two primary ways.
First, they detrimentally affected the soldiers’ mental, physical, and emotional welfare by
increasing stress, creating burnout, and causing disillusionment with the SF profession. Second,
they damaged the participants’ interpersonal relationships by increasing stress between and
among the participants’ families and by making decisions that directly hurt a spouse or family
member. These individual effects potentially exacerbate the already significant and harmful
effects that toxic leaders create organizationally.
Research Question 3: How Does Toxic Leadership Affect SF as an Organization?
Data analysis uncovered three themes that describe how toxic leadership harms SF as an
organization: (a) retention and recruitment, (b) the unique effects of toxicity within SF, and (c)
exponential detriment. These effects are long term and build upon one another, suggesting that
the problem of practice exists not only in the present moment but also will worsen over time and
reduce the organization’s effectiveness for years to come. The first and most prominent theme
was the harmful effect that a toxic leader has on the ability of their unit to retain qualified talent
and the broader organization’s ability to recruit future SF soldiers.
Retention and Recruitment
This study found that toxic leadership negatively affects retention and recruitment in
several ways. It reduces retention of an elite and specially trained workforce, hinders future
recruitment efforts, and damages the organization’s reputation. Participants—most of whom had
10 to 20 years of service—described how their experiences with toxic leaders caused them to
either leave SF or consider doing so, reducing organizational retention. All seven participants
described meaningful lived experiences with destructive leaders that made them at least consider

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leaving the organization. They described how dealing with toxic leaders caused them to seek
employment opportunities elsewhere in the Army. David shared how, before his experiences with
toxic leadership, being in SF was a major career goal but, after experiencing toxicity, his views
changed:
Even me as somebody who wanted this more than most things, even I who had been an
honor grad of virtually every course I’ve ever been to … I realized this outfit wasn’t for
me anymore. And I was a person that wanted [to be SF] more than most people ever
wanted anything.
Charles shared how his peers, that he believed to be the best and brightest, were forced out of the
organization because of negative experiences with leaders. He noted how toxic leaders may have
an especially negative impact on soldiers during the natural career inflection points where they
consider staying in or getting out of the military. Samuel described how, even when he attained a
position of seniority and influence, “I was counting the days until that job was done.” John left
one SFG for another because of toxic leadership but, finding the situation no better, he decided to
leave the Army altogether: “Those incidences [with toxic leaders], the way I was treated, got me
out.” These leaders not only erode the talented pool of current SF soldiers, but they also appear
to reduce the organization’s ability to recruit new talent.
Four participants agreed that they would likely not recommend SF to others, at least
partially because of their experience with toxic leadership. This phenomenon, when widespread,
may act as a countervailing effect to recruitment efforts and reduce the number or quality of
soldiers who join SF. One participant commented that, when asked if he would want a child of
his to join SF, he would unequivocally say no “because they’re not going to be treated with any
dignity … they’re disposable. If something happens to them … they’re going to be discarded the

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next day.” Charles shared that he would caution any potential SF candidate to the risks of the
organization because, “It’s not what you think [it is] in movies.” He also shared that SF misses
out on “rock star” candidates because disgruntled current SF soldiers speak poorly of the
organization. When considering whether he would recommend SF to someone he cared about,
Samuel described that he would feel dishonest if he described it as a great organization: “I guess
I would almost feel bad [recommending it] …” adding the caveat that, “Yeah, there’s definitely
some not so good people in Special Forces.” Suggesting a potentially less negative experience,
John stated that he would recommend SF to anyone who was young and wanted to learn to solve
challenging problems; however, he would recommend that they leave quickly and not make it a
career: “Once your first term is done, just get out.” In contrast, one participant—Ryan—
mentioned that he would recommend SF to others and highlighted how the “overwhelming
majority” of his experiences in SF had been positive: “I love what we do, I just think we got
some issues.” The toxicity that caused this detriment to retention and recruitment appears to be
unique, and potentially worse, in SF than in other career fields.
Unique Effects of Toxicity Within SF
The participants’ experiences suggested that toxicity may be especially harmful in SF
relative to both the civilian workforce and to the wider military. Relative to the civilian
workforce, toxic leadership may be especially harmful because of SF’s role in combat
operations. Participants noted that destructive leaders often did more damage in deployed
environments when the risks to one’s life and to sensitive missions were higher. One participant
shared that, “I think [toxic leadership] is dangerous, to be honest, in the environment that we
work in. A lot of the time when we go somewhere, it’s just us. You have to trust the guy to your
left and right.” Ryan further described this elevated risk created by toxic leaders in combat:

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“We’re in the business of doing dangerous, stressful work, and if someone is a toxic leader …
that’s going to directly create an environment where people aren’t working their best.” These
aspects create a workplace more susceptible and vulnerable to toxicity than in civilian careers.
Relative to the broader military, toxicity may be especially harmful in SF because
soldiers stay in the same unit—the SFG—surrounded by the same people and leaders for longer
periods of time than service members tend to in the conventional military. Where a conventional
soldier may change units and therefore geographic locations and leaders every few years, an SF
soldier may work in the same unit for 10 or 20 years. This extended length of service is because
of the SFG’s regional alignment, such as to Latin America or Europe, and the specialized training
that SF soldiers undergo to support that regional alignment. For example, to serve in the SFG
regionally aligned to Latin America, an SF soldier will spend 6 months in language school
learning Spanish or Brazilian Portuguese and receive unique cultural training to both understand
and operate in that region of the world. As a result of this specialized training, SF soldiers tend to
stay in one SFG for their entire career to capitalize on their foreign language training and cultural
experience.
This specialization and extended length of service creates tremendous organizational
value for the SFGs because they retain soldiers with rich and deep experience related to the
SFG’s geographic alignment; however, it exposes soldiers to unique risks because they are
surrounded by the same, potentially toxic, leaders for extended periods of time. John described
this phenomenon in his experience in his SFG:
[In SF] we’re much closer, ‘cause we stay with each other the whole time … everybody
in [this SFG] just knows everybody else. Since we know each other for so long, and that

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is our environment, we decide that our best way to get something out of somebody is to
intimidate them.
Greg described how one negative interaction with a toxic senior leader—pseudonym Mark—
continued to affect his career because, by virtue of the above-mentioned SFG construct, they
both stayed in the same professional community for years. After multiple toxic interactions with
Mark over the years, Greg described how Mark lied to him and refused to support Greg’s
nomination for a professional opportunity:
[A friend with knowledge of the situation told me] “apparently your [application for that
opportunity] needed Mark’s endorsement. It had the [other required signature], but Mark
did not … and so that’s why you didn’t make it”. … I’m just cracking up because at that
point I dug myself a little bit of that hole by not keeping my mouth shut [when interacting
with Mark].
These harmful events over a decade or more would not be likely in a conventional military unit
because conventional service members do not remain in the small unit and community for that
length of time.
Participants also noted that toxicity may be especially harmful or common in SF because
of unique personal aspects of the leaders that SF selects. Greg expressed that toxic leaders may
lash out more strongly or often in SF because SF soldiers, by virtue of the selection and
education process, are nonconformists who resist rigid oversight. Charles echoed this sentiment
and shared that in SF, “We’re constantly questioning what is going on. So, I think that’s where
toxic leadership will spread, the negative effects spread quicker, because we are naturally
inclined to ask why all the way down to the lowest level” and, therefore, discover toxicity more

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quickly than in other military organizations. John further described this concept as he described
how his desire to “know why” often led to conflict with toxic leaders.
The participants also illuminated how they believed the unique aspects of SF’s selection
process and organizational structure may also exacerbate the effects of toxicity. Charles shared
his perception that the SF selection process that assesses for the best and brightest may also make
toxic leaders more effectively destructive:
In the regular Army, [leaders] were toxic but they weren’t [deliberate about it] and they
didn’t boast about it … the ones in Special Forces were, I would say had a higher intellect
… a higher drive. They were better at applying their toxic principles.
Samuel described how the SF team structure may contribute to ineffective, and eventually toxic,
leaders because it affords less opportunity for leadership experience overall: “In SF, we’re kind
of unique, really the first time you’re leading guys is when you’re a [master sergeant with 10–15
years of experience]. They’re like, ‘Here’s 12 A type personalities; go ahead.’” Together, these
unique effects within SF help contribute to the exponential detriment that toxic leadership can
cause.
Exponential Detriment
The findings of this study suggest that toxic leadership in SF has an outsized and
exponential effect when compared to healthy leadership. This “bad is stronger than good”
(Baumeister et al., 2001) phenomenon is present in the data in three ways. First, participants
described how toxic leadership caused otherwise successful and qualified SF soldiers to leave the
organization and speak ill of it to others. This phenomenon is outlined in the above section on
retention and recruitment. Second, the participants described toxic leadership experiences that
relate to the “snowball effect.” The snowball effect is defined as the process by which the

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actions, decisions, and words of toxic leaders start from a state of low significance and build
upon themselves to a larger, and more harmful, state of organizational harm.
One way that this effect manifests is the outsized harm done by toxic leadership
experienced early in one’s career. This effect is outsized because it shapes one’s perception for a
longer period of time than experiences later in one’s career. Charles described feeling
disheartened when he first joined SF because he immediately encountered toxicity. He also
expressed how the level of toxicity he experienced in the SF qualification course, before
officially serving in SF, shaped and affected him.
Another organizationally harmful aspect of the snowball effect is that toxic leaders act as
dangerous role models for their subordinates, creating a cycle of toxicity. By acting in a toxic
manner while serving in a position of authority, as one participant shared, “You’re creating [new]
toxic leaders.” John described how this cycle of toxicity can be challenging to escape:
You’re stuck in that position [with your toxic leaders]. You’re going through the ranks the
same way you saw the guy before you do the same thing, ‘cause that’s all you have for
reference. Once you get to that rank, that’s all you know; because you were beat down
[all you know how to do] is to inflict that into somebody else.
Another participant shared how one can subconsciously learn to lead in a toxic manner when it is
what is modeled in their careers: “Some populations … will mimic those toxic leadership traits,
either because they have self-interest of their own or they don’t understand that it’s toxic … so
now you’re perpetuating the issue.” These effects create a snowball effect that gathers speed and
mass as toxicity continues.
Finally, the third form of exponential detriment is harm done to organizational culture. As
evidenced in the literature review, this harm to culture exacerbates the detriment of toxic

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leadership because it reduces organizational commitment, increases unethical behavior, increases
employee turnover and stress, and ultimately hinders an organization’s effectiveness. Scott
expressed that toxic leaders do not foster healthy work environments; they create situations
“where it’s everybody for themselves” and, when a toxic leader is in charge, “You need an e-tool
to find morale.”1 Charles, when asked how a toxic leader affected morale in his unit, responded
that the leader “pretty much ruined it all as a whole, the esprit de corps, everything.” Ryan,
replying to the same question, stated that the toxic leader affected the unit’s culture “absolutely
negatively … it was, man, how do we survive this guy? And why is no one removing him?” Greg
described how a leader’s inconsistent views on alcohol hindered morale and organizational
culture: “What climate do you have where you [encourage drinking], then the DUI happens?”
These experiences with deteriorated organizational culture support the theme of exponential
detriment and suggest that the problem of practice grows both rapidly and broadly as it is
allowed to continue.
One finding that presented a potential countervailing effect to this exponential detriment
was the participants’ generally positive views of the Army’s recently implemented Battalion
Commander Assessment Program (BCAP). The BCAP, announced in 2019, is a week-long
assessment in which future battalion commanders are evaluated on their physical, cognitive, and
non-cognitive performance and potential for command (Army Talent Management Task Force,
2019). Included in this assessment process are reviews of the leader completed by several of the
leader’s previous subordinates. All participants who are aware of the BCAP perceived it
generally positively. The participants perceived the inclusion of subordinate feedback especially
favorably. David expressed how the BCAP “is a great start. Hopefully they can introduce [an
1 An entrenching tool or “e-tool” is a small folding shovel carried by most soldiers while in the field and
used to dig holes.

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assessment process] at every level [because] you should have some type of an assessment before
entering those higher levels of responsibility.” Another participant described how a toxic leader
of his bragged about becoming a battalion commander before BCAP—and its subordinate
feedback process—was instilled. That experience caused the participant to think less of the
leader and to view the BCAP more positively. The BCAP—and particularly its inclusion of
subordinate feedback—is a potential opportunity for future research and to capitalize on to
reduce the harm done by toxic leaders.
Findings Summary
This chapter details the study participants and answers the study’s three research
questions with findings and themes generated from the data. For the first research question (How
do SF soldiers perceive toxic leadership?), the study found three themes: (a) an emergent
description of toxic leadership in SF, (b) a systemic problem, and (c) ineffective versus toxic
leadership. For the second research question (How does toxic leadership affect the welfare of SF
soldiers?), two themes emerged from the participants’ experiences: harm to individual welfare
and harm to interpersonal relationships. Finally, for the third research question (How does toxic
leadership affect SF as an organization?), the study found that toxic leaders hurt retention and
recruitment, cause harmful effects that are unique to SF, and create exponential organizational
detriment. These findings help fill the gap in the literature of how toxic leadership affects elite
military organizations. The next chapter discusses these findings in concert with the literature
review and conceptual framework and offers three specific and tailored recommendations to
address this problem of practice.

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Chapter Five: Discussion and Recommendations
This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, it offers a synthesis and discussion of the
study’s findings in relation to current literature. Second, it outlines three recommendations that
address the problem of practice. These recommendations are as follows: (a) Establish a system of
moral recovery, (b) embed education on toxic leadership, and (c) align the evaluation and
promotion system. In the discussion and recommendations, the study is placed in conversation
with the available literature on toxic leadership and with the study’s conceptual framework.
These sections identify areas in which current research is supported and advanced by the study
findings and how the findings and recommendations were informed by the ecological model and
SCT. Finally, the chapter describes limitations and delimitations of the study, provides
recommendations for future research, and offers study conclusions.
Discussion of Findings
This study analyzed toxic leadership in SF using a qualitative, phenomenological
research design. In the literature, toxic leadership is described as a destructive leadership style
that is detrimental to both individuals and organizational effectiveness and is typified by leader
narcissism and actions that are abusive and self-serving (Dobbs & Do, 2019; Gallus et al., 2013).
There is relatively substantial literature available on toxic leadership and its effects in the
conventional military and civilian sectors; however, this study sought to fill a gap in the literature
examining toxic leadership in SOF. This study is important, most significantly, because toxic
leaders are harmful to the welfare of those they are entrusted to lead. Individual welfare of the SF
soldier is at the core of this study and, therefore, this risk to personal welfare is most salient.
Secondarily, toxic leadership is detrimental to organizational effectiveness and risks losing the
public’s trust, faith, and confidence in a military perceived to have disordered and destructive

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leadership that is linked to high-profile public failings (Dobbs & Do, 2019). Although this study
found that the rate of toxic leadership in SF is perceived to be relatively high, toxic leadership is
still a significant problem of practice even in organizations in which the rate of toxicity is
relatively low. As a result of the exponential detriment that toxic leadership can cause even when
those leaders are in the minority, toxic leadership is a problem that must be addressed regardless
of the rate.
Study findings emerged from the systematic, thematic analysis of textual data collected
from semi-structured interviews with participants who have significant experience across the
organization, including all five active-duty SFGs. The purpose of the study was to explore how
SF soldiers experience toxic leadership. To that end, the study’s findings were framed around
three research questions:
1. How do SF soldiers perceive toxic leadership?
2. How does toxic leadership affect the welfare of SF soldiers?
3. How does toxic leadership affect SF as an organization?
Data analysis produced themes that answered these research questions by examining the
participants’ collective experiences with toxic leadership in SF. For the first research question, an
emergent description of toxic leadership in SF characterizes the toxic leader as self-serving,
arrogant, and incompetent and found that they cause trust erosion, harm to the individual, and
harm to the organization. This emergent description contributes to the broader literature by
offering a definition grounded in an analysis of U.S. SOF. It supports the findings of Gallus et al.
(2013) and others that highlight arrogance and self-serving actions in toxic leaders (Bennett,
2000; Conger, 1990; Ulmer, 2012). Consistent with the made and sustained theme in the
literature review (Kusy & Holloway, 2009; Mulvaney & Padilla, 2010), the study also found that

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participants viewed toxic leadership to be a systemic problem embedded in the organization’s
systems and processes, specifically the performance evaluation and promotion system.
Furthermore, the study presented meaningful findings examining the relationship between
ineffective and toxic leadership. Ineffective leadership appeared to be accepted up to a certain
point until that ineffectiveness became corrosive and was deemed toxic.
The study also presented findings related to the perceived rate of toxic leadership in SF.
Because of the study’s purpose and methodology, it did not endeavor to describe the effective
rate of toxicity in SF. However, it does suggest that the perceived rate of toxicity is relatively
high according to findings drawn from the participants’ combined 80+ years of service in SF. A
quantitative research design to ascertain this actual rate of toxicity and better understand the
depth of impact that toxic leadership has on the organization is suggested in the later section on
future research.
For the second research question, the study found that toxic leaders were harmful to both
the individuals they led and to the interpersonal relationships of those individuals. Harm to
individuals occurred through induced stress, burnout, and disillusionment that deteriorated the
physical, mental, and emotional welfare of the soldiers. Harm to interpersonal relationships
occurred because of deteriorated relationships with one’s families as a result of that increased
stress or through more direct harm to a subordinate’s family induced by the toxic leader’s neglect
or intentionally harmful decisions. These findings were consistent with the available literature
highlighting that toxic leadership causes harm to individual wellbeing (Khan, 2015; Matos et al.,
2018; Tepper, 2007) and suggest that SF is neither immune nor especially resistant to that
harmful phenomenon.

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To answer the third research question, this study found three themes that detail how toxic
leaders negatively affect the organization: (a) retention and recruitment, (b) the unique effects of
toxicity within SF, and (c) exponential detriment. Retention and recruitment describe how toxic
leaders reduce the organizational effectiveness of SF by reducing soldier retention, hindering
recruitment efforts, and damaging the organization’s reputation by soldiers’ warning others not to
join. This detriment to recruiting is especially salient in the early 2020s because SF is struggling
to recruit SF soldiers at a sufficient rate to keep up with the demands of the regiment. In 2023,
enlisted SF soldiers are the number one priority for Army special operations recruiting efforts
because of insufficient volunteers (U.S. Army Special Operations Command, personal
communication, March 19, 2023). Furthermore, the Army believes that its greatest ambassadors
to future soldiers are those currently serving and “that could not be more true within” Army SOF
(U.S. Army Special Operations Command, personal communication, March 19, 2023). These
factors suggest that allowing toxic leaders to continue to serve not only affects SF’s current
capability but also reduces its long-term effectiveness by hindering recruitment efforts.
The second and third themes further explain how toxic leaders erode the organization.
The unique effects of toxicity outlined how toxic leadership may be especially harmful in SF
because of the organization’s employment during potentially lethal combat operations and the
relatively long period of time soldiers serve in one unit compared to the conventional military.
Exponential detriment, or the “bad is stronger than good” phenomenon (Baumeister et al., 2001),
appeared in the data in several ways. The first way is through the harm done to recruitment and
retention detailed above. The second way is from the snowball effect, or the process by which
seemingly smaller detrimental actions compile over time to cause larger detrimental effects.

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This study’s findings supported the snowball effect’s connection to toxic leadership.
Dobbs and Do (2019) describe that another way the snowball effect may occur is through
increased organizational cynicism—a phenomenon supported by this study. Participants also
described how early experiences of toxicity shaped and negatively affected their view of SF over
their careers. An additional example found in this study is the cascading harm a leader can have
by acting as a toxic role model for their subordinates who, in turn, pass toxicity on to those they
lead in the future. These findings support the work of Baumeister et al. (2001), Baloyi (2020),
Matos et al. (2018), and others who highlighted the exponential detriment that toxic leadership
induces in an organization.
Finally, toxic leaders were found to erode an organization’s culture, reducing
organizational commitment and effectiveness. This finding buttresses the work of Smith and
Fredricks-Lowman (2020) and others who found that toxic leaders cause a diminished view of
the workplace, reduce commitment to the organization’s values, and hinder organizational
effectiveness. In this study, Scott’s description of SF as a culture “where it’s everybody for
themselves” exemplifies the negative cultural effects of destructive, self-serving leaders in SF,
furthering the available research on how toxic leadership deteriorates workplace culture (Creech,
2020).
Definition of Toxic Leadership
Research on detrimental leadership styles describes the phenomenon using a variety of
terms such as “toxic leadership,” “harmful leadership,” “dark leadership,” “petty tyranny,” and
others (Ashforth, 1994; Conger, 1990; Goldsmith, 2008; Mehta & Maheshwari, 2014; Milosevic
et al., 2019; Shabir et al., 2014). In addition, there is no singular definition of how a toxic leader
acts and therefore how the leadership style should be defined. Informed by the literature review

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and the findings in Chapter Four, this study offers the following novel definition of toxic
leadership:
A leadership style that is detrimental to both individuals and to an organization, often
characterized by actions that are abusive, arrogant, incompetent, and/or self-serving.
This definition is useful to advance the conversation on the problem of practice because it is both
parsimonious and descriptive. It is parsimonious because it includes only two requirements to
identify toxic leadership: harm to the individual and to the organization. These two elements of
the phenomenon are the most salient across the whole of the literature and within this study. It is
descriptive because it also includes a list of the most common ways for a toxic leader to act;
however, not all these elements need to be present for a leader to be considered toxic. If the
leader’s action or inaction causes harm to those around them and to the organization, their
leadership is toxic. This is true whether the leader acts in this way knowingly or by mistake; it is
the corrosive effect on the individual and on the organization that defines toxicity, not intent.
This is further evidenced by this study’s findings on incompetence as an aspect of toxic
leadership. Lastly, for toxic leadership to be an organizational problem, a toxic environment and
culture must also be present to promote—or at least accept—toxicity in its leaders. In contrast,
within a healthy organizational culture, the individual toxic leader would be retrained or
removed, preventing the problem from becoming systemic. To begin to address this problem of
practice, the organization should begin by taking the concrete actions detailed in the following
recommendations.
Recommendations for Practice
This section provides three recommendations to address the problem of toxic leadership
within SF. The recommendations are aligned with the study’s conceptual framework, purpose,

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and findings and therefore specifically with SF; however, they are informed by a literature
review on toxic leadership across a variety of military and non-military organizations. Therefore,
the recommendations are likely to be beneficial across the military and civilian organizations
looking to alleviate the individual and organizational burdens created by toxic leaders.
Although the recommendations overlap and support one another, each recommendation is
designed to primarily target and address one focus area drawn from the research. These three
focus areas are people, culture, and organization. People, culture, and organization represent an
ecology of concepts from the study’s conceptual framework and findings. Concepts represented
include SCT’s triangular reciprocity, the cascading effects of systems upon the individual in the
ecological model, and this study’s findings on harm to the individual. Together, the
recommendations also include mechanisms to support short-term, medium- to long-term, and
long-term change, ensuring that the organizational and culture improvements are enduring. Each
recommendation is informed by the study’s conceptual framework—detailed in Chapter Two—
that blends the ecological model with SCT and centers on the SF soldier.
The first recommendation is to establish a deliberate system of moral recovery for the
individuals and organizations left wounded by toxic leaders. This recommendation addresses the
first focus area of “people.” A system of moral recovery will create immediate benefits in the
short term by helping alleviate the individual suffering of those harmed by toxic leaders. The
second recommendation—aligned with the focus area of “culture”—is to embed training on toxic
leadership and its risks within the organization’s professional education system. This
recommendation will create benefits in the medium-to-long term because it better trains and
educates SF leaders on desirable leadership traits, improving organizational culture over time.
Finally, the last recommendation—addressing the focus area of “organization”—is to align the

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performance evaluation and promotion system with healthy leadership metrics by including
subordinate feedback in performance evaluation reports. This recommendation will help ensure
that the solutions are long term and lasting because it will structurally embed a selector for
healthy leadership in the organization through the Army’s evaluation and promotion system.
Recommendation 1: Establish a System of Moral Recovery (Focus Area: People)
The first recommendation is to establish a system of moral recovery to counteract moral
injuries and begin to heal individuals harmed by toxic leaders. Moral injuries emerge when one
acts or experiences actions that gravely violate their values and character (Shay, 2014). Cullen
(2022) described moral recovery as an “ethical leadership process that begins in moral failure,
but enables eventual personal, organizational, and social change” (p. 485). It helps undo the harm
to individuals caused by moral injuries through restorative community-based practices and,
importantly, through addressing and engaging with the cause of the moral injury (Cullen, 2022).
This addresses the focus area of “people” because it supports and centers the individuals who
suffer under a toxic leader. By providing a deliberate system of moral recovery, people are
centered in the framework of toxic leadership recovery and their worth, in and of themselves, is
reinforced. In other words, the goal is to better the welfare of the individuals because they are
inherently valuable as people, not as cogs that enable organizational effectiveness. The findings
of this study and the participants’ experiences are consistent with the literature that describes and
defines moral injuries and suggest that toxic leaders in SF are likely to induce moral injury in
their subordinates.
Moral injuries appear to be a common outcome of toxic leadership in SF. Participants had
their organizational commitment to SF and belief in their own careers damaged by toxic leaders.
This may be an especially harmful injury because it shatters a potentially powerful view of

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oneself associated with the profession. In this way, one’s moral injuries could cause or contribute
to cognitive and psychological burdens and cause extraneous cognitive load and cognitive
dissonance. All participants expressed feelings and experiences consistent with the theory of
moral injury. In addition, three participants described feelings consistent with moral injury when
recounting the significantly inappropriate actions of their leaders such as racism, alcohol abuse,
and sexual harassment. Without an avenue to address these inappropriate actions, the participants
suffered further moral injury by following the orders and being subject to the authority of these
toxic leaders.
Within this study’s conceptual framework, this recommendation was informed by
concepts in the ecological model. An SF soldier experiencing moral injury represents the effects
of the microsystem upon the individual. The toxic leader—an element of the microsystem—
affects the soldier personally, and that soldier may negatively affect the other aspects of their
microsystem because of that increased stress. Furthermore, over a longer period (the
chronosystem), the soldier may negatively affect the broader organization (the mesosystem) by
warning others not to join SF and diminishing the organization’s credibility when sharing their
experiences with toxic leadership.
This recommendation should be implemented using a modified command climate survey
and a system of moral recovery. First, SF units should complete an anonymous and modified
version of the Army’s command climate survey after a company-level leader or above departs the
organization. This survey should specifically address the salient themes presented in this study’s
literature review and findings such as harm to individual welfare, trust erosion, and
organizational culture. The outcomes of this survey should drive a tailored moral recovery plan
aligned with the potential breadth and depth of harm done by the departed toxic leader.

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Importantly, the primary purpose of this survey and the moral recovery system should be to
better the welfare of the soldiers within the organization and not to create administrative or
career reprisal against the departed leader. This will ensure that the process remains centered on
individual recovery and meaning making of the toxic leadership experience, elements key to
effective moral recovery (Cullen, 2022). A secondary purpose may be to evaluate the departed
leader more holistically within the organization; however, this purpose is acutely addressed in
Recommendation 3, and it should not be the focus of moral recovery.
The second step is to create community-based practices (CBPs) aligned with the survey
results described above. Moral recovery is best achieved through “restorative communal actions”
and should bring the members of the organization together rather than rely on more individualbased techniques such as one-on-one therapy (Cullen, 2022). Shay (2002) described how
recovery from moral injury can happen only as a community. The CBPs should focus on
personally connecting the individuals in the unit who may have been alienated from one another
or suffered on their own under the toxic leader. Through the CBPs, individuals will be able to
share and describe their experiences and speak openly about their ideals and ambitions moving
forward (Shay, 2002).
These CBPs may differ between units or SFGs and should be tailored and led by the
organization’s mental health practitioners. A potential practice within the moral recovery system
are moral recovery therapy groups led by the unit’s mental health practitioners. These moral
recovery CBPs may also benefit from using acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT), an
efficacious technique to recover from moral harm noted in the literature. ACT is a therapeutic
approach that helps assuage moral injury by helping one identify their intrinsically held values
before or after emotional pain such as one might experience from toxic leadership (Farnsworth et

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al., 2017). Lastly, and critically, these CBPs must be conducted under full anonymity. The
findings of this study and the literature review suggest that the fear of potential reprisal from the
toxic leader often prevents people from speaking openly about experiences with toxic leadership;
anonymity will help address this reticence and encourage successful moral recovery. The second
recommendation will ensure that the need for moral recovery is lessened over time because it
better educates SF leaders on both healthy and destructive leadership, reducing the likelihood of
moral injury.
Recommendation 2: Embed Education and Training on Toxic Leadership (Focus Area:
Culture)
To address toxic leadership before it can cause widespread harm to individual welfare in
the future, the second recommendation is to embed training on toxic leadership and its risks in
SF’s and the Army’s professional education model. This recommendation addresses the focus
area of “culture” by supporting, educating, and empowering SF leaders with a better
understanding of healthy versus toxic leadership, driving the organizational culture in a healthier
direction over time. Education and training programs are, in essence, attempts to improve
organizational culture (Clark & Estes, 2008; Dorrance, 2023). As a result, SF leaders will better
understand toxic leadership and its risks, reducing self-efficacy in toxic leadership as a viable
leadership style and, eventually, its prevalence in the organization. Eventually, this reduction in
toxic leadership is likely to contribute to a healthier organizational culture (Sadler et al., 2017;
Schaubroeck et al., 2007).
This recommendation is informed by SCT, an element of this study’s conceptual
framework. SCT describes how a personal factor such as self-efficacy can affect those around
them and their behavior (Schunk & Usher, 2019). By reducing the leader’s self-efficacy in toxic

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leadership through education on its risks and its misalignment with organizational values, this
recommendation will improve the culture of the organization. SCT further informs this
recommendation with its framing of how one learns and has their actions reinforced. According
to SCT, individuals learn about norms and what is appropriate through their interactions with
others in an environment (Schunk & Usher, 2019). This learning occurs by enactive learning, or
the actual doing of tasks, and vicarious learning done by observing leader models (Bandura,
2002). Both learning types should be included in the embedded education on toxic leadership.
The need to address the professional education system is further supported by the
literature review and this study’s findings. As identified in the literature review, the Army’s
doctrine and professional education frame leadership largely as a pathway to generate
organizational results and less so as a relationship between leader and follower that can
potentially turn harmful (Department of the Army Headquarters, 2019; Reed, 2015). This
framing is hazardous in several ways detailed in this study. For example, toxic leaders can abuse
their subordinates to generate short-term organizational results (Thoroughgood et al., 2018;
Ulmer, 2012), and toxic leadership is uniquely dangerous in the Army’s rigid hierarchy in which
one must follow orders and—because of military service contracts—cannot leave a workplace
that is detrimental to their welfare. The findings of this study suggest that it may be even more
harmful in SF as described in the findings section detailing the unique effects of toxicity within
SF. If SF leaders are not properly educated on healthy and toxic leadership, they can cause
outsized harm in the relatively small SF community where they can affect soldiers for years and
decades. Two study findings particularly relevant to this recommendation are the emergent
definition of toxic leadership and the perceived rate of toxicity.

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The emergent definition of toxicity in this study, unique to SF, should be used to frame
the educational reforms embedded in the military’s professional education system. Participants
described toxic leaders in SF as self-serving, arrogant, and incompetent and the most significant
effects of these leaders as trust erosion, harm to the individual, and harm to the organization.
Most study participants also noted a relatively high rate of toxicity, describing between 50% and
90% of their leaders as toxic. This suggests that the problem is not experienced as a fluke event
but is a potentially significant gap in the training and educational model.
Education of Army and SF leaders on what toxic leadership is and its risks to those they
lead as well as the risks to the organization will need to be embedded as a core element of all
levels of professional military education. In so doing, the culture will gradually but noticeably
shift toward healthy leadership styles and away from toxicity (Clark & Estes, 2008). This
education and training model must include enactive and vicarious learning, and toxic
leadership—as a problem of practice in SF—must be confronted openly and honestly. As part of
this educational reform and to reinforce the commitment of the organization toward solving this
problem of practice, senior leaders should describe their own experiences with toxic leadership,
what it has meant to them, and its effects during key educational inflection points in the SF
career model (Schein, 2017). Finally, the model should clearly outline how toxic leadership is
misaligned with the organization’s stated values and mission. This recommendation will better
educate future SF leaders on how to lead; however, it lacks a structural reinforcing mechanism to
ensure that the change is a lasting one. That structural reinforcing mechanism is outlined in
Recommendation 3.

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Recommendation 3: Properly Align the Performance Evaluation and Promotion System
(Focus Area: Organization)
The final recommendation is to align the performance evaluation and promotion system
with healthy leadership metrics. The goal of this recommendation is to embed incentives and
organizational drivers that promote healthy leadership and reduce toxic leadership. Specifically,
this will be done by including subordinate feedback in a leader’s performance evaluation reports.
These reports ultimately drive Army promotions and, as a result, a leader’s career advancement.
As a result, the subordinate feedback now linked to Army promotion will create an incentive for
leaders to act appropriately and avoid toxicity because subordinates will be able to formally hold
their leaders accountable. This is beneficial because properly aligned incentives are correlated
with improved performance in line with those incentives (Kim et al., 2022. Add to BIB). This
recommendation addresses the focus area of organization by structurally embedding a
reinforcing mechanism to dissuade toxic leadership in the organization’s promotion system,
disincentivizing destructive leadership and reducing it within SF over time.
The Army’s evaluation and promotion system is inherently and problematically flawed
because it primarily evaluates the leader as a follower. A leader’s performance evaluation is
written by the leader’s next two superiors in the chain of command. However, these superiors
spend little, if any, time evaluating or observing how the evaluated leader interacts with and
leads their organization. This creates an incomplete and potentially misleading evaluation of
leadership, a primary inward and subordinate-facing phenomenon, by evaluating them on their
outward and superior-facing performance. As outlined in the literature review and study findings,
this contributes to an environment in which one can mistreat their subordinates to generate shortterm gains or to impress with their superiors at the expense of individual welfare and long-term

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organizational burnout. SCT helped inform and frame this recommendation. This shortcoming in
the leadership evaluation process represents a misaligned aspect of SCT’s triangular reciprocity
among oneself, one’s behavior, and the environment. Without a formal mechanism to hold one’s
leader accountable, the connection between oneself and one’s environment is deteriorated. This
recommendation is further informed by the theory of epistemological accountability.
Hentschke and Wohlstetter (2004) offer a useful lens to understand epistemological
accountability within the problem of practice that centers around the accountability binary. The
accountability binary is defined by the director-provider relationship. In this relationship, the
“provider” of a good or service is held to account through a social or formal contract with the
“director” who can affect the provider through positive and negative feedback (Hentschke &
Wohlstetter, 2004). Within SF, the director is the SF follower (or subordinate unit), and the
provider is the SF leader. The leader provides the director(s) with the service of leadership.
However, in the current system, because of weak incentives, the follower cannot properly hold
the leader to account. Weak incentives occur when a director cannot affect the provider
sufficiently to cause the provider to work in the director’s interest (Hentschke & Wohlstetter,
2004). There is currently little to no accountability of SF leaders to those they lead.
Subordinates—the accountability directors—have no formal or organizational mechanism to
hold their leaders—the accountability providers—to account and ensure that those leaders act in
a manner that is healthy, supports the mission, and is in the subordinate’s best interest
(Hentschke & Wohlstetter, 2004). Instead, as outlined above, the SF performance evaluation and
promotion model rates a leader solely on the opinions of their two immediate supervisors. The
current system risks rewarding toxic leaders who abuse and overwork their subordinates to
achieve short-term gains at the expense of the organization’s long-term health.

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This inability for subordinates to demand answers and hold their leaders accountable is
problematic and counter to SF’s mission and philosophy. Dubnick (2003) offered that an
important aspect of accountability is answerability in which a provider is expected to respond to
the questions and needs of their director upon demand. Inherent in this form of accountability is
the director’s ability to judge the provider’s actions taken on the director’s behalf and act if they
are not in alignment with the director’s expectations (Dubnick, 2003). This aspect of
accountability does not formally exist within the SF leader-follower relationship and is not
currently supported by any organizational mechanism. Including subordinate feedback in the
evaluation and promotion model addresses this gap in SF’s accountability binary and supports
the organization’s health and efficacy.
This recommendation is further supported by this study’s findings on trust erosion and
the belief that the promotion system is predetermined or “rigged.” Participants strongly identified
feelings of eroded trust because of toxic leadership, partially because they felt powerless and like
they had no recourse to address their grievances. Formally incorporating their feedback into their
leader’s evaluations will help address this problem and feeling of powerlessness. Participants
also described a perception that toxic leadership is structurally embedded within SF’s evaluation
and promotion model. This recommendation will also help reduce the feeling that the promotion
system is rigged and that success is predetermined without consideration of how a leader
performs and how they affect their subordinates.
This recommendation should be implemented in three ways. First, anonymous
subordinate feedback should be formally included in the leader’s annual performance evaluation
at the company level and above. An effective solution could be to model the subordinate
feedback after the subordinate feedback surveys in the BCAP process that are currently in place

96
to help better select healthy leaders for battalion command across the Army. Study participants
reported general favorable feelings toward BCAP and its use of subordinate surveys to help
evaluate a leader. By implementing similar surveys beyond the battalion commander level in SF,
subordinates will be empowered to hold their leaders accountable through a formal
organizational mechanism.
Second, the subordinate feedback results must be included in the organization’s
evaluation report process. The results of the subordinate feedback should be provided to a
leader’s rater and senior rater—the two individuals who write their performance review—to
better holistically assess the leader they are rating. In addition, the feedback should also be
officially recorded in the organization’s performance evaluation reports using a system such as
an ordinal ranking of one’s leadership style from healthy to toxic.
Finally, to ensure that this subordinate feedback properly affects the promotion model,
the subordinate feedback included in the evaluation report process must also be codified as an
included variable at promotion boards. At an Army promotion board, one is assessed for their
capacity and potential to serve at the next highest grade or rank, largely based on their ratings in
their performance evaluation reports. Following these steps will ensure that subordinates can
properly hold their leaders accountable and that this organizational driver toward healthy
leadership is embedded in the Army’s promotion system.
Limitations and Delimitations
Although this study’s methodology endeavored to create a rich understanding of the
phenomenon, limitations and delimitations still exist. Limitations are the factors that a researcher
cannot control in a study through methodology or design, such as the truthfulness of participants.

97
Delimitations are the aspects that a researcher can affect that have implications for the study,
such as the questions asked in interviews (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
This study had two primary limitations. The first—and potentially most significant—
limitation of this study was participants’ fear of reprisal, which may have impacted their
truthfulness or comfort level when responding. As outlined in the literature review and supported
by the study’s findings, this phenomenon is particularly relevant in studying toxic leadership.
This limitation was addressed and reduced, although not fully eliminated, through the techniques
described in Chapter Three related to ethics and confidentiality; these techniques included giving
participants a written information sheet clearly stating how their identities would be anonymized,
how their data would be protected, and how they were able to withdraw consent before, during,
or after the interviews. I also verbally and specifically addressed the protection of their identities
and the anonymization of their data at the beginning of each interview to further assuage
remaining worries. Despite these efforts, this limitation persisted. Four participants expressed
concerns or asked further questions about anonymity beyond what was provided or did not wish
to elaborate on certain experiences that a currently serving toxic leader may be able to identify
and use against the participant.
A second potential limitation was the inherent psychology and nature of the group being
studied. SF soldiers are specially selected, trained, and educated to accomplish an array of
challenging missions that require one to maintain a positive mental attitude, endure hardship, and
persevere through adversity. These qualities make excellent SF soldiers; however, they also
potentially confound the participants’ views and experiences with harmful leadership. That is, a
toxic or destructive leader may be viewed as less harmful by a participant because of the

98
exceptionally high degree to which that the population is able to endure—or even expect—
harmful adversity.
The two most prominent delimitations of this study are participants’ identities beyond
their military service and the study’s sample size. The first delimitation concerned the identities
and positionalities of participants beyond their service in SF. This study accounted for military
factors such as SFG, rank, and military experience, but it had delimitations surrounding broader
socioeconomic and identity subgroups outside the scope of this study such as race, gender, sex,
class, religion, and education. This methodological choice does not imply a reduced importance
of these factors or ignore their significance. Rather, I specifically chose this research design to
provide a broader description of the phenomenon within the SF regiment that future researchers
can then analyze through more specific lenses in future research.
The second delimitation was the study’s sample size. As outlined in Chapter Three, I
chose to interview seven participants for two reasons. First, the purposeful sampling of seven
participants met the sampling criteria to include rank subgroups, significant experience in SF,
and service across all active-duty SFGs. Second, after seven interviews, the study reached
saturation or the point in qualitative research at which novel significant findings no longer
emerge from the data. These participants represented a wealth of experience and generated a rich
set of data. They have served in the Army for over a century and in SF for over 80 years
combined. When transcribed and formatted in the same manner as this study, the interviews
produced over 200 pages of data that described the participants’ experiences with toxic
leadership. Nevertheless, this purposeful choice regarding sample size remains a study
delimitation.

99
Recommendations for Future Research
The most prominent potential future research question begged by this study and its
findings is “What is the rate of toxic leadership in SF?” This research question could be studied
through a quantitative, survey-based research methodology that spans the SFGs. To generate rich
data and assuage concerns related to anonymity, it should be conducted by an independent
researcher, and it must be anonymous.
Another potential study is one that addresses this study’s delimitations and analyzes how
experiences with toxic leadership in SF or SOF differ by socioeconomic status (SES) such as
race, gender, age, and sex. To center the participants and their lived experiences at the
intersection of a salient SES and career in SOF, the study would benefit from a qualitative
research approach that helps generate meaning from the phenomenon studied. A final potential
study that emerged from the participants’ experiences is a longitudinal study of toxic leadership
experiences beginning in the SF Qualification Course to assess how these early experiences
affect one throughout their career.
Finally, this study does not analyze why toxic leaders choose to lead in that manner or, if
it is done unknowingly, why they fail to identify their toxicity or the harm it creates. Further
research in this area could help illuminate why leaders choose or unknowingly embrace a
destructive leadership style and could help better scope the recommendations for practice—
particularly the recommendation to improve the professional educational model. This research
would likely be qualitative and would require a sample of leaders willing to openly discuss their
faults and missteps as potentially harmful leaders.

100
Conclusion
Toxic leadership is a destructive style of leadership that, by definition, damages
individuals and the organization. It can be seductive and especially pernicious because an
ambitious toxic leader can abuse their organization to achieve short-term results to advance their
own career or goals at the expense of the individuals experiencing the abuse and the
organization’s long-term health. As a result, toxic leaders can appear successful to their superiors
who can observe the short-term results but cannot see the corrosive effects of the leader’s
toxicity. Whether because of the leader’s careerism, incompetence, or another driver, toxic
leaders increase stress and burnout, cause damage to the personal lives and relationships of their
subordinates, induce challenges in employee retention and recruitment, and create less cohesive
and less healthy organizational cultures.
This study found that elite military organizations can be vulnerable to toxic leadership
and that it causes significant harm to SF soldiers and reduces organizational effectiveness.
Reducing toxic leadership within SF will improve the organizational culture and effectiveness of
one of the nation’s premier military forces that is uniquely tasked with unconventional warfare.
Furthermore, if SF continues to see increased use in the 21st century as authors have suggested
(Byman & Merritt, 2018), a reduction in toxic leadership will also contribute to national security
objectives by providing a more capable and healthy force to accomplish those objectives. More
importantly, addressing this problem will better the lives of the SF soldiers who suffer under a
toxic leader, reducing the harm to their mental, physical, and emotional welfare. The nation and
military ask much of its Special Forces soldiers. Enacting the tailored recommendations provided
in this study will reduce an additional and unnecessary burden on those soldiers incurred as a
result of toxic leadership.

101
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Appendix A: Interview Instrument
This appendix provides the semi-structured interview instrument used to conduct data
collection in this study. The instrument contains 9 primary questions with several probing
questions as potential follow-ons for each primary question. Questions were developed in
alignment with the study’s literature review and conceptual framework. Question sub-categories
based on the literature review were self-serving nature, individual wellbeing, organizational
climate, made and sustained, and exponential detriment. Sub-categories relating to the study’s
conceptual framework were the six categories of Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model and the
triangular reciprocity of Bandura’s SCT. The interview instrument was pilot tested on volunteers
unassociated with this study, revised, and peer-reviewed before use in this study.
Interview Question 1
I’d like to begin by discussing the term “toxic leadership.” What does the term “toxic
leadership” mean to you?
Potential probing questions: Do you think it’s a useful term? Why or why not? If there is
a term you think is more appropriate, could you tell me a bit about that? What key traits or
concepts do you feel define toxic leadership? Why?
Interview Question 2
Let’s talk about your personal experience with toxic leadership. Please describe your
experience with toxic leadership in SF. Start wherever you’d like and share as many details as
you’d like.
Potential probing questions: How has your experience with toxic leadership differed in
SF as opposed to other jobs or areas of the Army? How would you compare or contrast your
experience with or the rate of toxic leadership in SF versus these other fields? Do you think toxic

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leadership is a problem that needs to be solved in SF? If so, why? Do you have any ideas how we
might begin to do so?
Interview Question 3
How did/do these toxic leaders in SF affect you personally?
Potential probing questions: How have they affected your welfare such as your physical
or mental health? How have they affected your emotional wellbeing? Can you tell me about the
effects these leaders have had on your life and relationships outside of the Army such as with
friends, family, or loved ones? How did your experiences with these leaders make you feel? Are
there other important ways they affected you personally that you think I should know about but
didn’t ask?
Interview Question 4
If it’s okay with you, can you recall a particularly harmful or significant interaction with a
toxic leader? Start wherever you’d like in the context of the interaction and describe it for me.
Potential probing questions: Can you talk me through how the environment felt, please?
What did you see, hear, smell? What made this experience so significant? Why do you think the
leader acted in this way? What motivated them? What was the outcome of this experience for
you personally? How about professionally?
Interview Question 5
I’d like to talk a bit about how your experiences with toxic leaders affected your views of
SF and your view of yourself within the organization. Can you start by describing how you feel
about SF in general?
Potential probing questions: How has your experience with toxic leadership affected
these feelings about SF? Would you say these experiences have changed your views of SF? If so,

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how? How have these experiences affected your desire to stay in SF and the Army? Is there a
difference between how you would describe SF to others now and how you might have before
these toxic experiences? Can you tell me a bit about how you might or might not recommend SF
to someone you know or care about based on these experiences?
Interview Question 6
In your experience, how would you describe the rate of toxic leadership within SF?
Potential probing questions: Do you think it’s better, worse, or about the same as other
jobs you’ve had in or out of the Army? Why do you think that is?
Interview Question 7
How does toxic leadership affect the climate, morale, esprit de corps, or welfare of the
unit?
Potential probing questions: Is there a difference between how a toxic leader affects you
personally and how they affect the unit? If so, in what ways? What issues do or have your units
faced because of toxic leadership? How have they responded to these issues? In what ways have
toxic leaders affected your unit’s ability to grow and retain productive SF soldiers? How does it
affect the unit’s ability to retain its best and brightest? Have you seen a healthy or positive leader
follow a toxic leader (or the reverse)? If so, what effect did this have on the unit?
Interview Question 8
Can you describe how you feel SF—as a profession, regiment, and community—deals
with or handles toxic leaders?
Potential probing questions: Do you think they are recognized as harmful and corrected
by the Army or SF? If so, in what ways? How do you feel their toxic actions affect their

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promotions and future job opportunities? What could SF do to better identify, correct, and/or
reduce these destructive leaders?
Interview Question 9
Is there anything else you’d like to share or think I should know about this subject?

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Appendix B: Informed Consent Form
This informed consent form was provided to all participants before participation in the
study. Participants were afforded the opportunity to review the form and ask questions and all
participants signed and returned the form before their interview. The form outlines the study’s
details, purpose, its voluntary nature, and disclosure that the interview can be stopped by the
participant at any time.
Title of Study
UP-22-00903 Toxic Leadership in U.S. Army Special Forces
Principal Investigator
Investigator’s name, military rank and organization, and contact information was
included in this section.
Purpose of Study
You are being asked to take part in a research study. Before you decide to participate in
this study, it is important that you understand why the research is being done and what it will
involve. Please read the following information carefully. Please ask the researcher if there is
anything that is not clear or if you need more information.
The purpose of this study is to explore the phenomenon of SF soldiers’ lived experiences
with toxic leadership, including how it affects both their individual welfare and organizational
effectiveness. The results will be used to provide specific and tailored recommendations to better
understand the lives of SF soldiers and improve unit effectiveness.
Study Procedures
This study will gather data from participants via Zoom video call interviews. Each
interview will be scheduled for one hour; however, you can adjust this time lower or higher as it

126
fits your schedule. The interviews will be recorded via two methods (primary Zoom recording
and audio recording on secondary cell phone) to ensure the proper capture of your information.
Following the interview, the recordings will be transcribed by the researcher, and, following
transcription, both video recordings will be permanently deleted.
The transcription of each interview will be analyzed individually and together to make
meaning of your experience and create the study results.
The stories and experience you choose to share with me are your own and it is important
to me to capture them correctly. To that end, and to ensure the results accurately capture your
experience, you will have the opportunity to review the study findings before publication to
make recommendations and/or alter or withdraw the use of any part or all of your personal
experience.
Risks
The risks to participants are minimal. You may decline to answer any or all questions and
you may terminate your involvement at any time if you choose to up until study publication. This
means that even after the interview is complete, you can withdraw your participation at any point
before the results are published. If you do so, no penalty will be incurred, and your information
will be deleted entirely.
Benefits
There will likely be no direct benefit to you as an individual in this study. However, I
hope that the information and results of this study will benefit the lives of those in our regiment
and make things better for those that choose to follow you as SF soldiers in the future. It is my
hope that the study findings will help Special Forces train, select for, and promote those that

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demonstrate healthy leadership habits and better educate or move on from leaders that lead in a
destructive manner.
Confidentiality
Your participation in this research study and all comments will be anonymous.
Maintaining your confidentiality is a priority of this study. Every effort will be made by the
researcher to preserve your confidentiality including the following:
Code names/numbers will be assigned for participants that will be used on all research
notes and documents.
Any potentially identifying information such as specific dates or locations of events
shared in the interview will be stripped and/or anonymized.
Your specific rank will not be included in any research note or document. The only rankidentifying terms used will be (a) junior enlisted; (b) senior enlisted; (c) junior officer; and (d)
senior officer.
All research notes and documents will be stored in a Google Drive account encrypted
using Google’s Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm that only the researcher has
access to. This account, including all interview information, will only be accessed from the
researcher’s home computer, and is not linked to any professional or DOD network or resource.
All video recordings will be deleted after they are fully transcribed.
All transcripts and other data will be deleted or destroyed no later than one year after the
study’s publication.
Participant data will be kept confidential except in cases where the researcher is legally
obligated to report specific incidents. These incidents include, but may not be limited to,
incidents of abuse and suicide risk.

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Contact Information
If you have questions at any time about this study, or you experience adverse effects as
the result of participating in this study, you may contact the researcher whose contact
information is provided on the first page of this form. If you have questions regarding your rights
as a research participant, or if problems arise which you do not feel you can discuss with the
Primary Investigator, please contact the Institutional Review Board at [phone number provided].
Voluntary Participation
Your participation in this study is voluntary. It is up to you to decide whether or not to
take part in this study. If you decide to take part in this study, you will be asked to sign this
consent form. After you sign the consent form below, you are still free to withdraw at any time
and without giving a reason. Withdrawing from this study will not affect the relationship you
have, if any, with the researcher. If you withdraw from the study before study publication, your
data will be returned to you or destroyed.
Consent
I have read and I understand the provided information and have had the opportunity to
ask questions. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at
any time, without giving a reason and without cost. I understand that I will be given a copy of
this consent form. I voluntarily agree to take part in this study.
Participant's signature ______________________________ Date __________
Investigator's signature _____________________________ Date: _________

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Asset Metadata

Creator Motley, Nathaniel William (author)

Core Title Toxic leadership and U.S. Army special forces: a qualitative, phenomenological Study

School Rossier School of Education

Degree Doctor of Education

Degree Program Organizational Change and Leadership (On Line)

Degree Conferral Date 2023-12

Publication Date 01/16/2024

Defense Date 04/27/2023

Publisher Los Angeles, California (original), University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag accountability binary,counterproductive leadership,destructive leadership,green berets,harmful leadership,OAI-PMH Harvest,petty tyranny,special forces,special operations forces,Toxic leadership,U.S. Army

Format theses (aat)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Hinga, Briana (committee chair), Muraszewski, Alison K. (committee member), Ott, Maria G. (committee member)

Creator Email nate.motley@gmail.com,nmotley@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC113804859

Unique identifier UC113804859

Identifier etd-MotleyNath-12601.pdf (filename)

Legacy Identifier etd-MotleyNath-12601

Document Type Dissertation

Format theses (aat)

Rights Motley, Nathaniel William

Internet Media Type application/pdf

Type texts

Source 20240118-usctheses-batch-1120 (batch), University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the author, as the original true and official version of the work, but does not grant the reader permission to use the work if the desired use is covered by copyright. It is the author, as rights holder, who must provide use permission if such use is covered by copyright.

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu