'Losing' Burma: Chinese-Burmese relations in the post-reform era

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‘Losing’ Burma: ChineseBurmese Relations in the PostReform Era

BY
CAITLYN C. STONE

THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts in
East Asian Area Studies

University of Southern California
August 2015

Abstract
China’s objective to expand its influence in Southeast Asia is illustrated by its many high
profile infrastructure projectsfrom oil pipelines to hydropower damsin the region. However,
despite its ascendance as a world power, China’s influence is paradoxically diminishing in places
like Burma; resulting in the halting of certain Chinesesponsored infrastructure projects within its
borders. Before liberal reforms were initiated in 2010, Burma’s relationship to China appeared
similar to that of clientstate, Cambodia. Although China prioritized economic aid and
investment in Burma in the lead up to reforms, Burma is making explicit efforts to signal to
China and the international community that it is not a satellite of China. This distinct change has
Beijing showing unease with Burma’s recent detente with the West, questioning, who lost
Burma? By comparing Burma’s case to another state with historically close diplomatic ties to
China, Cambodia, this paper concludes that the postreform environment in Burma has given rise
to a stronger, more organized civil society capable of pressuring the Burmese government to
suspend major Chinesebacked projects. While securing Burma more options for international
engagement from the West has been instrumental in counterbalancing Chinese influence, this
paper argues that the postreform environment in Burma gave rise to a civil society capable of
placing itself at the center of SinoBurmese power relations. Cambodia’s postreform period, by
contrast, is characterized by a superficial democracy with a less receptive political environment
to civil society’s activities, leaving the Cambodian people illequipped to shape Cambodia’s
relationship with China.

1

Table of Contents

Introduction   3
Literature Review 11
A Change in the Prevailing Wind: SinoBurmese Relations   14
Burma, a “Battleground” for USChinese Influence? 20
Public? What Public? Burma’s Growing Civil Society 23
Civil Society Capacity and Growth in Burma 24
The Role of Civil Society in Shaping SinoBurmese Relations   27
Civil Society in Cambodia 38
Conclusion   43
Bibliography 45
Appendix 52

Note on Naming

Naming conventions in Burma vary. This paper uses the name “Burma” to refer to the
country the previously ruling junta changed to “Myanmar” in 1989. Also, Burmese names
cannot be separated into surname and given names and therefore, must appear together in every
context. For example, the name, Aung San Suu Kyi is not written according to any patronymic or
matronymic system and contains no surname. It must be written as a whole in order to properly
refer to the person in question.

2

Introduction

China’s increasing dominance in the world economy continues to fascinate China scholars
as they ardently attempt to discover how its newfound influence in developing and advanced
economies will impact future relationships in the international system. Recent scholarship about
China’s growing global presence examines the strategies China employs—economic and
otherwise to increase its influence in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
In addition to procuring natural energy resources to fuel its immense growth and expanding
potential markets for Chinese goods, China’s interest in establishing close ties with developing
countries centers on concern for national security, especially in its immediate periphery. China
shares land borders with fourteen sovereign states and faces risks of domestic instability from
civil war to drug trafficking which can spill over and threaten China’s internal security. China
is also concerned with increasing U.S. influence in its immediate periphery. The 2010
U.S.“pivot” toward Asia raised the stakes for China to expand its influence in Southeast Asia, in
order to avoid “containment” within the socalled “first island chain.” Southeast Asia is
becoming more receptive to international pressure from the U.S. since the “rebalance” sent
greater diplomatic, economic, and military efforts to Asia.
China’s strategies to expand its influence in Southeast Asia are similar to how China
operates in other developing regions: offering these countries an alternative path to development
through so called, “nostrings attached” economic aid and concessional loans for infrastructure
projects. Rhetorically, this strategy is consistent with China’s “peaceful rise” it propagates to its
neighbors in order to prevent balancing against its ascendance as a regional or world power. To
demonstrate its intentions, each Chinesesponsored project undertakes abroad is first agreed
3

under a banner of shuangying or “winwin” sentiment to emphasize that China’s efforts to
expand its influence are benign. This rhetoric may be necessary due to the farreaching plans
China has for the region. In 2010, China’s outward direct investment (ODI) to ASEAN countries
reached 4.4 billion USD, a 63.4 percent increase from one year earlier. China’s investment to
these countries increased yet another 34 percent in 2011, reaching 5.9 billion USD. As of 2013,
1
investments in Asia constitute 68 percent of China’s total ODI spending worldwide.
2
Projects sponsored by Chinese companies are often criticized by the West for ignoring
the interests of the people in the respective country. While China’s aid is “nostrings attached” in
that it does not require the recipient to restructure its political or economic system in order to
receive aid, China’s help in developing infrastructure or extraction industries is not free of cost.
China is often criticized for benefiting more from a project than the recipient country by usually
only hiring Chinese labor to complete the project and claiming most of the profits. For example,
in 2013, the completion of an oil pipeline connecting the Indian Ocean port of Switte in Burma
to China’s Yunnan Province provides the majority of its oil to China. China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) will own 50.9% of the pipeline for its first thirty years. Chinese projects
3
are controversial among locals because they bear the social and environmental costssuch as the
displacement of villages and destruction of landwhile China reaps the benefits.
China’s economic aid packages have also been used for political leverage in typical
patronclient state relationships. China continues to be influential in Cambodian politics as a
result of the large amounts of aid. In December 2009, Cambodia’s decision to send 20 Uighurs
1
TUSAID China Business Insight . 2013
2
Salidjanova, Nargiza, and Iacob KochWeser. “China’s Economic Ties with ASEAN: A CountrybyCountry
Analysis.” Staff Research Report. U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 17, 2015.
3
Elizabeth C. Economy and Michael Levi, By All Means Necessary; How China’s Resource Quest is Changing the
World (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 178 .
4

back to China was met with an accord signed the very next day by then, Vice President Xi
Jinping promising Cambodia 1.2 billion USD in economic assistance. The SinoCambodian
4
relationship is highly asymmetrical and China continues to use economic leverage to exert
political influence in Cambodia.
However, in recent years, China’s typical strategy at achieving influence in these
countries has been unsuccessful in Burma. Although an asymmetrical power dynamic exists
between China and Burma, China no longer has the sway it once did in Burmese politics.
President Thein Sein’s 2011 halting of construction of the Myitsone Dam project was a clear
signal to the international community that Burma is not a clientstate of China. Michael Fry and
Erik Goldstein define a clientstate as a state that is:
“...economically, politically and/or military dependent upon another state...The
relationship is bilateral... with mutual, although different, obligation. The client state
tends to be one that is diplomatically isolated, if not an actual 'pariah state...It is often
militarily powerful but economically weak ."
5

Burma’s transition to a civilian government with USDP’s President Thein Sein at the
helm opened opportunities for international engagement beyond China, shedding its pariah
status. Burma’s liberal reforms such as the intermittent release of political prisoners and the
“progressive” association registration law drafted in October 2013 demonstrated the weakening
of the military junta’s grip over the state and society. Cambodia, though emerging from its pariah
status in the 1990s, remains dependent on foreign aid. It is so reliant on foreign assistance, Dr.
Sophal Ear argues that Cambodia’s incentives to consolidate democratic institutions are distorted
4
Sigfrido Burgos and Sophal Ear. “China’s Strategic Interests in Cambodia: Influence and Resources.” Asian
Survey 50, no. 3 (May–June 2010): 615639.
5
Michael G. Fry and Erik Goldstein, Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy . (New York, NY:
Continuum, 2002), 9.
5

and therefore, Cambodia’s government continue to oblige requests from China. Burma, though
6
proclaiming neutrality, has had historically close ties to China, especially since the military’s
ruthless crackdown on Burma’s 1988 democracy movement. Therefore, Burma’s hedging against
Chinese interests appears sudden.
China is Burma’s largest import partner and second largest export partner with Burma’s
trade deficit with China exceeding $4.5 billion in 2013. Whereas China’s ODI to ASEAN
7
countries is trumped by its growing trade with the region, Chinese direct investment in Burma is
quite pronounced. Chinese investment made up over 25% of Burma’s inward flows in 2012.
8
Chinese FDI stock in Burma doubled from $900 million in 2009 to $ 1.9 billion in 2010. In
2013, Chinese FDI stock reached $3.5 billion. China is also Cambodia’s largest import partner
and Cambodia also has a growing trade deficit with China of $2.9 billion in 2013. Interestingly,
however, unlike Burma’s reliance on regional ties for trade, Cambodia’s top five export partners
include the United States, Hong Kong, Singapore, the UK, and Germany. Beijing recently
increased interest in Cambodia has been demonstrated by the increased amount of memorandum
of understandings (MoUs) since 2003. In addition to MoUs committing to upgrade Cambodia’s
military equipment, as of 2012, China has granted Cambodia $ 2.7 billion in aid and loans. 2013
saw a $33 million dollar loan for Cambodian social and development projects.
9
Conventional wisdom dictates that Burma, if only to diversify its friendbase, would
rationally choose to engage the West, rejecting financial investment from China and opening its
6
Ear, Sophal. Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance Undermines Democracy . (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2013).
7
Salidjanova, Nargiza, and Iacob KochWeser. “China’s Economic Ties with ASEAN: A CountrybyCountry
Analysis.” Staff Research Report. U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 17, 2015.
8
Ibid, 33.
9
Ibid.
6

economy to other state actors; that if Burma is a ‘battleground’ for U.S. and Chinese competing
influences, the U.S. ‘won’ and China ‘lost’. Pavin Chachavalpongpun’s article characterizes
Burma as a mere pawn in a game ‘tugofwar’ between China and ASEAN. Burma isn’t
10
completely passive in his analysis (utilizing its ‘China card’ at opportune moments to gain
influence in ASEAN), but Pavin asserts that ASEAN was behind Thein Sein’s motivations of
suspending the Myitsone Dam. However, when placing Burma’s behavior in a comparative
context, comparing it to the behavior of another state where China has strategic interests,
Cambodia, it is not reacting to foreign influence in the same way. Cambodia has a similar history
of having close relations with China and has experienced much engagement from the U.S. Other
similarities include highly prevalent antiChinese sentiment in part due to China supporting
unpopular murderous regimes in each country. Yet, recently, as evidenced by Cambodia’s
willingness to cooperate with Chinese interests from greenlighting hydropower projects to the
extraditing of Uighur refugees back to China, CambodianChinese relations have grown ever
more amicable. If it is just about rational choice, why hasn’t Cambodia hedged against China as
well? One answer is that Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, ruling over a superficial
democracy, is promoting an antiU.S. agenda and would prefer to cooperate with Beijing.
However, Hun Sen’s political agenda fails as an adequate independent variable because as aid
figures demonstrate, Cambodia still receives a large amount of financial support from the United
States. Cambodia is not actively hedging U.S. influence as expected. Influence, thus, cannot be
zerosum, where opening to the West automatically means rejecting influence from China.
Therefore, an answer which merely states that Burma’s recent liberalizing reforms signaled
10
Pavin, Chachavalpongpun. “The Vexing Strategic TugofWar over Naypyidaw: ASEAN’s View of the
Sino–Burmese Ties.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 31, no. 1 (2012): 97–114.
7

Burma’s opening to West and hedging against China is unacceptable. After all, Cambodia shed
its pariah status, opened to the West, and underwent liberalizing reforms in the early 1990s and
still remains an effective clientstate of China. The undergoing of liberal reforms is an
underpredictive independent variable in both Cambodia’s and Burma’s cases.
The answer, this paper argues, is not the reforms themselves which took place in both
countries, but the disparity in what the reforms produced. While Burma’s reforms have led to the
growth of a more active local civil society capable of placing itself at the center of Burma’s
China policy reversal, civil society freedoms in Cambodia are deteriorating, leaving the people
less equipped to shape SinoCambodian relations.
Burma has a rich history of social organization and liberal reforms have only increased
the amount of political sway civil society organizations (CSOs) have in determining Burma’s
future. The definition of civil society is not uncontested. For the purposes of this study, I will
adopt the “nonprescriptive” definition of civil society as:
“...actors, voluntary associations and networks operating in the space between the
family/clan, the state in its various incarnations, and the forprofit market. This includes
but is not limited to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and communitybased
organizations (CBOs).”
11

In the Burmese context, civil society includes villagelevel organizations and religious
networks, such as the Catholic church and the Buddhist voluntary organizations (monkhood)
which are countrywide organizations with over a million members who participate in what are
considered “traditional” activities of providing education, social welfare, and community
projects in conflict areas. Before 2008, many CSOs operated in exile in neighboring Thailand.
12
11
Charles Petrie and Ashley South. “Development of Civil Society in Myanmar.” In Burma/Myanmar: Where Now?
Asia Insights 3. (Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2014), 86.
12
Ibid, 88.
8

Since then, many CSOs began openly cooperating with organizations forming inside Burma.
Most evidence about Burma’s reemerging civil society suggests that it will continue to grow as
the country develops its telecommunication infrastructure and Burma’s growing population of
netizens take to social media to give voice to their causes. An increased number of women taking
up the mantle as key members of civil society to improve the situation of women in Burma is
also a positive indicator that the reach of Burma’s CSOs is expanding.
However, it is important to understand that civil society does not inherently carry
progressive views. As Muthiah Alagappa argues, CSOs have the ability to both expand and
contract democratic space. A recent example of this in Burma is the withdrawal of temporary
13
voting rights of the Rohingya Muslim minority by Thein Sein in February 2015. Due to
14
widespread antiMuslim sentiment and what Matthew Walton calls “exclusionary Buddhist
nationalism,” the Burmese government was compelled to restrict the political rights of Muslims
living in the Rakhine state. This paper aims to explain how CSOs are growing more capable of
15
drawing concessions from the Burmese governmentspecifically regarding Chinese influence in
Burma. The move to restrict political representation of Muslims, despite a liberal government
agenda demonstrates that CSOs in Burma are growing more effective each day. This paper also
does not assume statesociety relations to be zerosum, but rather mutually dependent. While
16
the relationship between the Burmese state and society during the 2007 Saffron Revolution was
13
Alagappa, Muthiah. “Preface.” In Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting
Democratic Space , ix–xv. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.
14
“Myanmar Revokes Rohingya Votes.” BBC , February 11, 2015, sec. Asia
. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldasia31421179 .
15
Walton, Matthew. “Buddhism, Politics, and Political Change.” In Myanmar: The Dynamics of an Evolving Polity ,
edited by David Steinberg, 115–34. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2015.
16
Alagappa, Muthiah. “Civil Society and Political Change: An Analytic Framework.” In Civil Society and Political
Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space , 25–60. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2004.
9

one of outright rejection of the military government, today, it is characterized more by
contestation over specific issues such as whether foreign investment and consequent economic
growth is worth the destruction of Burma’s environment. Because the state’s democratic reform
agenda is contingent on the growth of civil society, the principle of “double autonomy” is
compromised. Whereas CSOs retain much of their autonomy from the state, the state cannot
17
ignore the interests of the public to either protect the rights of its citizens or insulate its
relationship with China. By contrast, civil society in Cambodia, though exhibiting hints of
enthusiasm, has not reached the same level of organization or effectiveness in promoting the
public’s interests.
The disparity in effectiveness can be attributed to differences in the postreform
environment in Burma and Cambodia. Whereas Burma since 2011 is becoming more receptive to
the activities of CSOs, Cambodia’s postreform period lacks several features such as
interfactional power plays and high concentrations of interethnic violence which contributed to
the civil society gaining momentum in Burma beginning after the 2007 Saffron Movement. The
Saffron Movement, though triggered by the military removing subsidies on fuel prices,
reinvigorated civil society networks in Burma especially Buddhist monks calling for democracy.
This movement, in addition to the subsequent changes which brought Thein Sein to power in a
civilian government, created a political environment favorable to CSO growth. Not only does it
exhibit the implementation of institutions and laws which protect CSOs from persecution by the
state, but also gives prominence to a president whose personal agenda of separating himself from
the military junta largely aligns with precluding Chinese influence in Burma. Cambodia’s
17
Post, Robert, and Nancy Rosenblum. “Introduction.” In Civil Society and Government , edited by Robert Post and
Nancy Rosenblum. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. (As cited in Alagappa, 2004; 37).
10

political environment, characterized by an authoritative prime minister with close ties to Beijing,
is not favorable to civil society growth and CSOs remain relatively ineffectual in forestalling
Chinese projects and influence in their country.
Literature Review
This paper aims to answer two fundamental questions. Why has Burma’s relationship
with China changed in recent years? And what is the role of civil society in that change? This
paper intends to bridge two categories of existing literature. First, is the body of literature which
seeks to explain Burma’s changing China policy while accentuating the impact of international
actors. Robert Sutter examines the SinoBurmese relations within a broader international context
of China’s relationships with other Southeast Asian states, concluding that the pitfalls of China’s
Burma policy are the same problems its foreign policy strategies face with other states in the
region. Building off Sutter’s work, I aim to expand on the differences which exist between
18
Burma’s and Cambodia’s China policies. I later address why merely examining international
actors’ impact on Burma’s foreign policy decisions underestimates Burma’s agency in its own
decisionmaking.
The second body of literature is that of analyzing the recent growth of Burma’s civil
society organizations (CSOs). While these are helpful for developing context in which to analyze
CSOs in Burma, they stop short of extrapolating on how these emerging domestic actors can
have a tangible effect on Burma’s China policy. Scholarship in the late 1990s and the early
2000s mostly focuses on the limits of domestic CSOs and potential methods international NGOs
could adopt in order to promote civic movements. Helen James’s book published in 2005 aims to
18
Sutter, Robert. “Myanmar in Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policy Strengthening Common Ground, Managing
Differences.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 31, no. 1 (2012): 29.
11

demonstrate how the international community can strengthen Burma’s civil society by
encouraging democratic institutional development. Other publications, such as Strengthening
19
Civil Society in Burma: Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs , bring together
multiple prominent scholars on Burma to produce a volume purely analyzing how foreign NGOs
could help Burma expand its advocacy sector. International actors became less important to the
20
body of literature dealing with Burma’s civil society as international NGO’s access to Burma
was more restricted after Cyclone Nargis in 2008. David Steinberg, one of the leading experts on
Burma, revises his statements he made in the late 1990s about Burma’s civil society being
“murdered” by the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) in order for his analysis to include
indigenous groups whichas a result of SLORC’s 1988 law relating to Forming Organization
“mushroomed” and functioned autonomously of the state. However, it is important to mention
21
that these civic groups were apolitical and not involved in advocacy. Therefore, these groups
were not deemed a potential threat to the state and allowed to continue their activities.
There are a couple of recent works which can be considered as trying to bridge this gap
between these two bodies of existing literature. Yun Sun’s work convincingly draws on several
factors regarding why SinoBurmese relations have changed in the postreform era. Her factors
include Beijing’s misjudgment of the impact of elections on Burma’s politics, China’s
miscalculation of the longevity of U.S. engagement in Burma, Beijing’s underestimation of
antiChinese sentiment among the Burmese public and therefore, its overestimation of the
19
James, Helen. Governance and Civil Society in Myanmar: Education, Health, and Environment . RoutledgeCurzon
Contemporary Southeast Asia Series 3. New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005.
20
Burma Center Netherlands, and Transnational Institute. Strengthening Civil Society in Burma: Possibilities and
Dilemmas for International NGOs . Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1999.
21
Steinberg, David. Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know . Second. New York: Oxford University Press,
2013.
12

political and economic power it holds in Burma. Min Zin asserts that antiChinese sentiment in
22
Burma is growing and this resurgence of antiChinese sentiment the largest since the 1969 race
riots led to the suspension of the Myitsone hydropower dam project. However, the emphasis
23
previously placed on antiChinese sentiment helps little to explain why Burma is hedging against
Chinese interests and Cambodia is not. There are high levels of antiChinese sentiment among
the native people of both countries. Also, Burma became closest to China under the previous rule
of the military junta which had plenty of antiChinese sentiment because of China’s previous
support for the Burma Communist Party (BCP). Therefore, antiChinese sentiment cannot be the
independent variable which can explain why Burma’s China’s policy is changing rapidly, while
Cambodia maintains a favorable relationship with China. Also, by examining the
Chinesebacked projects in Burma and Cambodia, it is apparent that civil unrest is not simply a
matter of enmity towards the Chinese people, but rather its due to negative effects of the
construction on the people’s livelihoods and surrounding natural environment.
The existing literature on SinoBurmese relations remains too Chinacentric, where the
objectives of each paper are to determine how and why China’s Burma policy has changed. This
paper contributes to the existing literature on postreform Burma by identifying the factors which
led to Burma’s changing relationship with Beijing, placing more emphasis on domestic civic
actors as shapers of Burma’s China policy than previous scholars. I intend to build off these
previous works in order to refocus the understanding of SinoBurmese relations on the ‘budding’
civil society organizations which are driving change.
22
Sun, Yun. “China’s Strategic Misjudgment on Myanmar.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 31, no. 1
(2012): 73.
23
Zin, Min. “Burmese Attitude Toward Chinese: Portrayal of the Chinese in Contemporary Cultural and Media
Works.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 31, no. 1 (2012): 115–31.
13

This paper is divided into multiple sections. First, I examine how exactly the
SinoBurmese relationship has changed, contrasting it with China’s relatively unwavering
relationship with Cambodia. Secondly, I delve into the international factors such as Burma’s
détente with the United States that impacted Burma’s relationship with China. Next, I explore
four case studies where Chinesebacked projects in Burma have drawn hostility from local civil
society groups, (two where CSOs successfully managed to suspend the project and two where
local CSOs were unsuccessful at impacting the outcome). I discover that the reason why
Burmese CSOs are sometimes successful and why Cambodian CSOs are largely unsuccessful is
due to their effectiveness to disseminate information about Chinesebacked projects to locals. I
conclude that Burma’s relationship with China is changing rapidly due to its favorable
postreform political atmosphere where civil society can function more freely and independently
of the state. Cambodia’s postreform environment has not produced civil society groups capable
of pressuring the government to suspend Chinesebacked projects in Cambodia, thus Cambodia’s
relationship with China remains unchanged, if not more amicable than before.

A Change in the Prevailing Wind: SinoBurmese Relations
Since Burma’s independence from the British in 1948, its official bilateral relationship
with China has highlighted, on an official level, the rhetoric of “Pauk Phaw” —meaning kinsfolk
( 胞波 baobo in Chinese). However, since Deng Xiaoping came to power in the late 1970s, the
24
focus for China’s foreign policy shifted from promoting ideology to promoting economic
growth. In 1985, Pan Qi, vice minister of communications wrote an article for government
24
Maung Aung Myoe, In the Name of PaukPhaw: Myanmar’s China Policy Since 1948 . (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), 8.
14

mouthpiece, Beijing Review called “Opening to the Southwest: An Expert Opinion.” It details
China’s aspirations for establishing trade routes for landlocked, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces
through Burma to the Indian Ocean. Three years later on August 6, 1988, two days before the
25
rise and subsequent crackdown of the Burmese democracy movement, China signed its first
border trade agreement with Burma. China became Burma’s largest trade partner and by 1998, it
had supplied Burma with 1.4 billion USD worth of military equipment. Scholars, such as
26
Chishad Liang started describing the shift in relations from a ‘delicate friendship’ to genuine
cooperation.
27
After the 1988 crackdown on democracy activists in Burma, overseas development
assistance (ODA) numbers from Western countries dropped dramatically from $435 million in
1988 to $175 million in 1989. Aid continued to drop; reaching an alltime low of $2.88 per
28
person of ODA in 2006. This was the lowest figure among the world’s fifty poorest countries.
29
However, despite heavy sanctions, the U.S. started paying more attention to Burma after the
brutal crackdown on democracy demonstrators. Marvin Ott an American former CIA analyst
wrote in his 1997 Los Angeles Times article that although “Washington can and should remain
outspokenly critical of abuses in [Burma]…there are security and other national interests to be
served…it is time to think seriously about alternatives.”   In addition to the West, Indian
30
25
Pan Qi “Opening to the Southwest; An Expert Opinion” Beijing Review.( as cited in Linter, 2014), 97.
26
Lintner, Bertil. “The Kyi.to the Great Game East.” In Burma/Myanmar: Where Now? Asia Insights 3.
(Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2014). 98.
27
Liang, Chishad. “Burma’s Relations with People's Republic of China: From Delicate Friendship to Genuine
Cooperation.” In Burma: The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society , edited by Peter Carey, 71–93. (London:
MacMillian Press, 1997).
28
Holliday, Ian. Burma Redux: Global Justice and the Quest for Political Reform in Myanmar . (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2011), 117.
29
Ibid.
30
Ott, Marvin. “Don’t Push Myanmar Into China's Orbit.” Los Angeles Times , June 9, 1997. (as cited in Lintner
2014).
15

scholars such as Mohan Malik started becoming increasingly concerned with Burma’s turn away
from neutralism in favor of becoming China’s “strategic pawn.” China’s efforts to upgrade
31
Burma’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean reinforced these concerns.
The intimate friendship between China and Burma, however, was shortlived. While the
shutting down of the Myitsone Dam project in 2011 is often seen as a critical point in the shift of
Burma’s attitudes towards China, signs of Burma’s hedging against China began earlier. In
October 2004, then prime minister of Burma, Khin Nyunt, was ousted from his position by
conservative elements within the military junta. Khin Nyunt was of Burmese Chinese descent
32
and was seen as close to China. While no negative reactions from China have been released
publicly, some analysts have interpreted his arrest and the subsequent visit of Than Shwe to India
as Burma hedging against its dependence on China. While Khin Nyunt’s arrest was due to
33
trumped up corruption charges, opposition from within the military junta to his closeness to
China was wellknown. The socalled “Roadmap to Democracy” called for the drafting of a new
constitution, elections, and new parliament to select state leaders. This series of steps was
34
covered by media domestically and abroad, praised for its progressiveness. Less publicized, was
the “Master Plan” drawn up around the same time in August 2004, a mere two months before
Khin Nyunt was ousted. The Master Plan reinforced the ‘Roadmap’ by identifying reasons why
35
reengaging with the West was essential for Burma to decrease its dependency on China. Around
31
Malik, J. Mohan. “Myanmar’s Role in Regional Security: Pawn or Pivot?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 19, no. 1
(June 1997): 52–73.
32
BBC . 2004. “Burma’s Prime Minister ‘Arrested’”, October 19, sec. AsiaPacific.
33
“Myanmar: The Shake up and the Fall Out.” Southeast Asia Analysis Group , 9–11,
2004. http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper1161 .
34
Lintner, Bertil. “The Kyi.to the Great Game East.” In Burma/Myanmar: Where Now? Asia Insights 3.
(Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2014). 101.
35
Ibid.
16

that same time, a researcher for Burma’s Defense Services Academy wrote a 346page report
titled “A Study of MyanmarUS Relations.” Aung Kyaw Hla—likely an alias—argued that
Burma’s reliance on China diplomatically and economically “created a ‘national emergency’ that
threatens the country’s independence.” Burma eventually attempted to draw back from China
36
and try to find a more balanced position. The suspension of the Myitsone Dam project in
37
September 2011, followed closely by the snubbing of Beijing by the recently appointed
commanderinchief of Burma’s military, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, (starting out his first foreign
trip in November 2011 by visiting Vietnam), all signaled to China that its relationship with
Burma was less significant than before. Now, Burma is actively rejecting its reliance on China in
both a rhetorical and tangible sense. The military junta had plenty of reason, such as China’s
support of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP), to reject China’s help. However, economic
growth was a priority in order to consolidate its regime. Burma though making economic growth
a priority, is now less willing to cede to China’s interests, tacitly or not.
Burma with its now diversified friendbase confidently deflects Chinese influence in its
internal affairs. However, this move isn’t without its risks. China remains Burma’s largest investor
with a cumulative investment of $14 billion USD. But since 2011, Chinese investment has dropped
38
significantly, especially in strategically important sectors such as oil/gas, transport, and
communication which were previously dominated by Chinese companies. Foreign investment in
39
Burma has decreased because other countries have not yet filled the gap. Less interest by Chinese
36
Ibid.
37
Selth, Andrew. “Working Paper No. 377 Burma’s China Connection and the Indian Ocean Region.” Honolulu,
HI: Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, 2003.
38
“Data and Statistics.” Government of Myanmar. Directorate of Investment and Company Administration ,
Accessed November 15, 2014.
39
Ibid. see figure 1 in Appendix.
17

companies and fewer projects approved by the Burmese government have both contributed to the
decrease in investment.
40
One issue which cannot be skirted in SinoBurmese relations is the ethnic clashes by
separatist insurgent rebel groups in northern Burma creating instability and sending thousands of
Burmese refugees fleeing violence across the Chinese border. A recent outbreak of fighting on
February 9th, 2015 in the Kokang region is an especially difficult situation for SinoBurmese
relations as Beijing has been suspected of selling weapons to ethnic Chinese insurgents in Burma.
41
Suspicions of Beijing selling weapons to ethnic rebels surfaced several times in recent years such as
the 2012 purchase of Chinese made SAMs and armored vehicles by the United Wa State Party
(UWSA), the largest militia in Burma and largest narcotics dealing organization in Southeast Asia.
42
Commander of rebel forces in Kokang, Mr. Peng, who is of Chinese descent, pleaded for money and
support from fellow Chinese through a message widely circulated on social media sites in China.
43
On February 17th, 2015, escalated violence compelled President Thein Sein to declare a state of
emergency and martial law in the Kokang region. The crossborder bombings in March 2015 have
44
only heightened Chinese concern for its citizens. As the Burmese government attempts to handle the
situation, Chinese concerns for violence and refugees flowing into Yunnan Province have have
amounted to the central government sending PLA troops to conduct livefire military exercises along
40
Ibid, see figure 2 in Appendix.
41
Stout, David. “Thousands of Refugees Are Pouring Into China to Escape Fighting in Burma.” Time Magazine ,
February 18, 2015. http://time.com/3712912/burmachinakokangpeaceprocess/ .
42
Davis, Anthony. “State of Wa.” Jane’s Intelligence Review , January 1, 2013, sec. 25.
43
Hornby, Lucy. “Influx of Myanmar’s Refugees Poses Dilemma for China .” Financial Times , February 19,
2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0030c5a4b81211e486bb00144feab7de.html#axzz3SGcJbYDw .
44
“Myanmar Declares State of Emergency in Kokang Region over Armed Clashes .” Xinhua News , February 17,
2015, Asia Pacific edition. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/201502/17/c_134004135.htm .
18

the border. This show of strength serves a dualistic purpose of displaying China’s resolve to protect
45
the its homeland while also signaling its discontent with Burma’s actions.
In contrast, Cambodia’s relationship with China is becoming more amicable. Despite the
fact that ordinary Cambodians dislike Chinese influence, Chinese economic aid and investment in
Cambodia is increasing totaling 9.1 billion USD since 1994. This includes 1.2 billion USD of
46
Chinese aid in 2011. In recent years, Cambodia has significantly increased its military capacity
47
with China’s assistance. “In 2013, Cambodia took delivery of 12 Harbin Z9 helicopters using a
$195 million Chinese loan. The next year, it received a donation of 26 Chinese trucks and 30,000
military uniforms.” Beginning in 2002, China has also financed a military school in Cambodia
48
with around 200 cadets admitted annually to study courses devised by China’s Defense Ministry.
49
In return for their investment, China receives vocal diplomatic support from Cambodia. PM Hun
Sen reiterated Cambodia’s support of the “One China” policy in addition to cutting short debate on
the South China Sea as the 2012 ASEAN Chair. There is no question that China wants Cambodia
to promote its interests in Southeast Asia, the question is why Cambodia hasn’t hedged against
Chinese interests? SinoCambodian relations were definitely strained at times in recent history,
such as when China supported the genocidal Khmer Rouge. Yet, Cambodia exhibits clientstate
behavior from extraditing Uighur asylum seekers to accepting over 850 million USD in military
45
“China Stages Military Exercises Along Myanmar Border.” VOA , June 6, 2015.
http://www.voanews.com/content/chinamilitaryexercisesmyanmarborder/2810409.html .
46
“China Pledges $548 Million in Aid to Ally Cambodia.” Reuters , April 10, 2013.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/10/uscambodiachinaidUSBRE93909D20130410 .
47
Ibid.
48
“Chinese Influence in Cambodia Grows with Army School, Aid.” Reuters , April 2, 2015.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/02/uscambodiachinamilitaryidUSKBN0MT0SW20150402 .
49
Ibid.
19

investment and aid from its patron, China. Why does Cambodia continue to accept growing
50
Chinese influence while Burma is making efforts to deflect it?

Burma, a “Battleground” for U.S.Chinese Influence?

Recent democratic reforms in Burma coincide with changes to Burma’s China policy.
Therefore, it appears that understanding how reforms came about would help determine the
cause of Burma’s changes toward China. With Western scholars proclaiming that Burma’s
political reforms the most significant diplomatic outcome of the U.S. ‘rebalance’ to date, it is
easy to see how increased U.S. influence in Burma not only guided its path of reform, but also
challenged China’s influence in the region; concluding that increasing U.S. influence in Burma is
driving the wedge between China and its previous clientstate. However, while increased
51
international engagement is important to understanding contemporary Burma, the explanation
that relies on interpreting its changes within some “neocold war” international arena
oversimplifies the issue for three reasons. First, China and the U.S. are not the only significant
state actors interacting with Burma. Investment from other states such as Singapore and South
Korea is growing every year. China is still Burma’s largest investor, but Burma is no longer
economically dependent on China. With a diverse set of countries invested in its growth, framing
the issue of Burma’s reversal as a struggle only between two parties is selective and biased.
Second, only analyzing Burma’s reversal within the context of U.S.China rivalry in Southeast
Asia reduces Burma’s agency in its own choices. External factors are important to understanding
50
Ibid.
51
Berteau, David, Michael Green, and Zack Cooper. “Assessing the AsiaPacific Rebalance.” Center of Strategic
International Studies, December 2014.
http://csis.org/files/publication/150105_Berteau_AssessingAsiaPacificRebal_Web.pdf .
20

Burma’s move towards liberalization and away from China; however, it is only a part of Burma’s
complex decisionmaking process. Burma’s agency in decisionmaking stretches beyond
domestic politics to include complex maneuvering on an international scale; providing pushback
towards both U.S. and Chinese influences. Finally, reducing Burma’s agency in its own
decisionmaking also underestimates the contribution domestic politics has in determining
Burma’s foreign policy. Burma’s decisions domestically attempt to turn international politics in
its own favor. Domestic policywhether it is the decision to release political prisoners, expel
NGOs from the country, or initiate further reforms—are essential to defining Burma’s
relationship with China and the West.
The situation is becoming more complex due to the growing number of states involved
economically and diplomatically in Burma. Singapore is the second largest investor in Burma’s
economy; making up over 16% of all investment. Besides Singapore, Hong Kong and South
52
Korea have also made substantial investments in Burma’s economy. Therefore, it is not just
China and the U.S. who have a stake in Burma’s politics. Excluding China, Burma has
companies from 29 other countries investing in its development and they are important to
Burma’s strategy to counterbalance Chinese influence. Burma is not merely responding to U.S.
influence and hedging against Chinese interests. Burma is instead using the leverage it has to
produce the best outcome for itself. For example, the periodic release of political prisoners is a
pawn Burma uses to draw concessions internationally such as the chairmanship of ASEAN for
2014 or the easing of U.S. sanctions. The periodic release of political prisoners have been
criticized by human rights groups as “political opportunism” as evidenced by President Thein
52
Ibid. See figure 3 in Appendix.
21

Sein’s release of several prisoners one month ahead of President Obama’s visit to Burma’s
capital, Naypyidaw. Granting amnesty for political prisoners is a strategy for Burma to bolster its
image internationally, while also playing off the interests of the United States. Burma is aware
that its reforms are the “poster child” of the U.S. “pivot” and that the slowing of its reform
process could potentially embarrass the U.S. Therefore, the pace of reform, just as the periodic
release of political prisoners, is an attempt by Burma to secure U.S. support. In November 2014,
Obama visited Burma and expressed his concern for how liberalizing reforms were slowing in
Burma and how reforms could stop short of consolidating effective democratic institutions. The
full removal of U.S. sanctions on Burma is contingent on the completion of many aspects of
Burma’s reform process, including the release of remaining political prisoners.
53
Pushback against Chinese interests becomes most apparent with the slowing of Chinese
investment in Burma following the 2011 installation of a civilian government. To explore this
decrease in investment, scholars and journalists most often cite Thein Sein’s halting of the
construction on the Myitsone Dam in September 2011. This project was contracted by the China
Power Investment Corporation and the suspension of the project shocked its General Manager,
Lu Qizhou. In an October 2011 interview with China News , Lubesides reciting statistics on
how the region is behind the rest of the world in developing hydropower—wanted to make it
clear that the project was not merely about China’s economic interests, but rather about mutual
interests or shuangying . He emphasized how the suspension of the projectwhich China has
devoted a large amount of time and resources to since starting construction in 2009—actually
53
Martin, Michael. 2013. Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions . R42363. Congress Research Service.
22

hurts both countries’ interests.   Why did Burma recently start actively rejecting Chinese
54
influence while Cambodia has not? If increased interaction and aid from the U.S. is a major
factor influencing Burma to hedge against Chinese interests, then we could expect to see the
same occurrence in Cambodia. However, U.S. aid to Cambodia has almost always been greater
than to Burma and Cambodia’s leader still continues to cultivate closer ties with Beijing.
55
Therefore, there is more to Burma’s decisionmaking process than competing international
influences.

Public? What Public? Burma’s Growing Civil Society
Despite its systemic suppression under military rule until 2011, Burmese civil society
operated underground; surfacing amid rising statesociety tensions such as the August 8, 1988
democracy uprising termed the “8888 movement” and the 2007 Saffron Movement led by
thousands of Buddhist monks against the military junta. The devastation caused by Cyclone
Nargis in 2008 also gave rise to several grassroots organizations providing aid to affected areas.
Although civil society still faces challenges it needs to overcome in order to collectively impact
Burma’s future, several trends such as an increased amount of women involved in civil society
organizations, increasing rates of internet penetration throughout Burma, and the easing of
government controls on media all indicate that civil society organizations in Burma are
becoming a large factor in negotiating statesociety relations. Burmese society remains highly
divided and results in the interests of ethnic and religious minorities being underrepresented in
54
“Zhōngdiàntóu: Zhōng miǎn mì sōng diànzhàn hézuò xiàngmù hùlì shuāngyíng” 中电投: 中缅密松电站合作项
目互利双赢 [CPI: ChinaMyanmar Myitsone Dam Project Cooperation is Winwin], Zhōngguó xīnwén wǎng. 中国
新闻网 China News Network, October 3, 2011. http://www.chinanews.com/ny/2011/1003/3368320.shtml .
55
“Aid(ODA) Commitments to Countries and Regions.” OECD StatExtracts . see Figure 4 in Appendix .
23

emerging CSOs. However, despite these challenges, I argue that the role of civil society is
underestimated in how it can shape Burma’s China policy. By explaining how the power of civil
society in recent years is materializing, I demonstrate why the newfound influence of Burmese
CSOs is a force not only the Burmese government, but one with which Chinese companies also
need to reconcile.
Civil Society Capacity and Growth in Burma

There are an estimated 214,000 CommunityBased Organizations (CBO) operating at a
local village level in central Burma and outer ethnic areas. Cities and larger townships are host
56
to a growing number of local and international NGOs. Because groups are not required to
register with state agencies as of October 2014, estimates on the number of NGOs operating in
Burma vary. There are no official statistics, but one article estimates that there are 10,000 NGOs
in Burma. It is unclear whether this estimate includes Burmese NGOs operating in neighboring
57
Thailand and India. While reliable statistics are currently unavailable, the turnout at the October
2014 Myanmar Civil Society Organizations Forum can give insight into how many groups exist
and are capable of functioning in the majorly populated areas of Burma. More than 650
representatives from 257 organizations and networks attended the three day conference in
Yangon. The conference produced a press statement calling on the Burmese government to
implement a series of recommendations related to ensuring a smooth transition to a country with
a fully operational and powerful civil society sector. The recommendations mostly focused on
how the state can increase the freedom for civil society to operate in Burma, while also adding,
56
“Civil Society Briefs: Myanmar.” Nya Pyi Taw: Asia Development Bank, February 2015.
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/154554/csbmyanmar.pdf .
57
“NGO Law Monitor: Myanmar (Burma).” The International Center for NotForProfit Law , November 4, 2014.
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/Myanmar.html .
24

interestingly, the government’s responsibility “to lay out and implement policies that protect the
people from negative impacts of investment.”
58
There are several indications that Burma’s civil society is growing at an unprecedented
rate. Social media is becoming a key medium through which Burmese social activists interact.
“The immense popularity of Facebook in Burma has turned the social networking site into the
default medium most of Burma’s internet users and with its growing popularity has also come an
increased use of Facebook for social activism…” Ordinary Burmese are using Facebook in
59
order to call attention to social issues such as a person who posted a picture of a 93 yearold
homeless veteran begging at a bridge. The man received an outpouring of support online and
compelled Burma’s Veteran Organization to contact him. Although telecommunication
60
infrastructure remains underdeveloped with an internet penetration rate at 1.2 percent of Burma’s
population (668, 995 internet users out of approximately 55 million people) as of December
2013, cell phone use or specifically, smartphone use incredibly impacts the Burmese people’s
access to the internet. Most Burmese are skipping the “PC phase” altogether and are buying
61
smartphones to get online. As of June 2014, 49 percent of Burma’s internet users only use their
phones to get online, with half of those users coming online in the last 12 months. With 10
62
percent of the population owning cell phones, there is plenty of incentive for smartphone
providers to expand their market share in Burma.
63
58
“Civil Socieities’ Review on Myanmar’s Transition Process: Prospects for 2015 and Beyond.” Yangon, Myanmar,
2014.
59
“In Myanmar, Facebook Increasingly Used for Social Activism.” The Irrawaddy. 12/28/2013.
60
Ibid.
61
“Internet Users in Asia.” Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics .
62
Millward, Steven. 2014. “Myanmar’s New Mobile Internet Users Embrace Android Smartphones, Pick Viber over
Facebook.” Tech in Asia . 6–24.
63
Ibid.
25

Reduced censorship on news media the past three years is also a reason to be optimistic
about Burma’s civil society. Whereas a 2011 Freedom House Report deemed Burma’s internet
regime the second most repressive in the world, 2012 anticensorship legislation provided greater
opportunity for Burmese to connect with others and discuss previously banned content.
64
Although being a reporter in Burma is still dangerous (four journalists have been murdered by
Burma’s military since 1999), the easing of media controls are improving the situation. The
65
killing of freelance activistreporter, Aung Kyaw Naing, by Burma’s army in early October 2014
drew local and international criticism. Aung Kyaw Naing’s death was featured on several NGO
66
websites such as the International Federation for Human Rights, calling for Burma’s government
to guarantee civil liberties for its citizens. Local organizations also took action inside Burma,
such as the Yangonbased Peace and Women Network of which Aung Kyaw Naing’s wife is a
member. His wife was highly active in seeking information from the army and the government
after the reporter disappeared at the end of September. After the news of his death, and that Aung
Kyaw Naing was buried outside a remote village, his family’s decision to go public about this
injustice was pivotal to obtaining condemnation from NGOs and attention in a wide array of
private Burmese and foreign news media. Public outrage compelled the government to
investigate the reporter’s death and exhume his body for transfer to Yangon.
67
The growing presence of women in Burmese key positions is also a promising sign that
civil society is expanding to include more people and issues than before. Burma now has several
countrywide women’s organizations campaigning for a wide range of social injustices from
64
“Myanmar’s Promising Experiment With Internet Freedom.” 2013. Forbes . November 5.
65
“4 Journalists Killed in Burma/Motive Confirmed.” Committee to Protect Journalists .
66
“Slain Burmese Reporter Laid to Rest in Rangoon.” The Irrawaddy. 2014. November 7.
67
Ibid.
26

unequal education opportunities to ethnic conflicts within Burma. Women’s organizations started
to emerge in the late 1990s to early 2000s. However, under military rule, nonstate organizations
were banned and had to operate underground or in exile. By 2008, other organizations for
women were beginning to form inside Burma such as the Women’s Organization Network
(WON), and Gender Equality Network (GEN). Since Burma’s transition to a civilian
68
government, groups operating inside Burma are able to cooperate with CSOs outside Burma. In
September 2013, the WON and the Thailandbased Women’s League of Burma together planned
the first Myanmar Women’s forum on legal protection for women and women’s involvement in
peace process. The ability for domestic organizations to collaborate with Burmese
69
organizations based outside of Burma and other international NGOs positively reflects on the
domestic organizations’ growing resources and ability to fund their activities inside Burma.
Civil society is expanding in the number of organizations and in its capacity to function.
Burma is shifting from being one of the least connected countries in the world, to one of the
fastest growing number of internet users. Free internet and press are both essential to Burma’s
burgeoning civil society, allowing Burmese to publicize and effectively organize around social
causes. As the internet penetration rate increases and censorship of media relaxes, those
underrepresented in Burmese politics can expect to have a larger voice in Burmese society.
The Role of Civil Society in Shaping SinoBurmese Relations
This section examines four cases of Chinabacked infrastructure projects. By comparing
two projects which civil society was more successful at manipulating the SinoBurmese
relationship by forcing the suspension or renegotiation of a project in Burma with where CSOs
68
Ditlevsen, Marie. 2014. “The Situation of Women.” In Burma/Myanmar: Where Now? , edited by Mikael Gravers
and Flemming Ytzen, 135–39. Asia Insights 3. Copenhagen, DK: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press. .
69
Ibid, 136.
27

were less successful, it becomes clear that the key variable determining success in the CSOs’
ability to effectively disseminate information to locals about the Chinabacked project.
Logically, when the project poses a threat to the livelihoods of hundreds or thousands of people,
there is greater concern, effective assembly, and wider media coverage. In such cases, like the
Myitsone Dam project and WanBao’s Letpadaung Copper Mine, CSOs adequately disseminated
their message to locals and successfully garnered enough leverage to force the immediate
shutdown and renegotiation of these projects. The cases where Burmese CSOs were less
successful also coincided with projects which would only detrimentally affect a smaller amount
of people belonging to an ethnic minority. In these cases, the North Mining Investment
Company’s (NMIC) Nickel Mine in the Chin State’s Tedim Township and the Shwe gas field in
Burma’s Rakhine State, CSOs wanting to stop or suspend these projects faced insurmountable
collective action problems. They were not able to effectively disseminate information and
subsequently rally support from locals for two reasons. First, the group of people the project
would negatively affect was too small to build a large enough campaign that the Burmese
government would feel compelled to suspend the project. Secondly, the groups
disproportionately affected by the projects belonged to ethnic minority groups which face
interethnic discrimination and violence in Burma.
Many regional analysts criticize Thein Sein’s statement citing the reasoning behind
suspending construction on the Myitsone Dam as being concerned with “the will of the people;”
claiming that to rebuff China was the only true reason behind shutting down the $3.6 billion
USD project. However, leading up to the halting of construction on the Myitsone Dam in
70
70
Lintner, Bertil. 2014. “The Kyi.to the Great Game East.” In Burma/Myanmar: Where Now? Asia Insights 3.
Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies.
28

September 2011, Burmese environmental groups were actively involved in demonstrating and
lobbying officials to end the project. Societal organizations through public demonstrations and
71
open media sources spread information about the environmental degradation the dam would
cause. The Irrawaddy River is the lifeblood of Burma and its detriment would affect millions.
Burma’s president had legitimate concerns over the environmental degradation and the mass
unrest among the Burmese people, especially those residing in the Kachin state, which
threatened internal stability within a highly divided society.
The strategies Chinese companies employed in Burma also contributed to public
discontent. The reputation of Chinese companies in Burma suffer due to their close relations with
Burmese officials who are perceived to be corrupt. Unlike Korean and Indian businessmen,
72
Chinese companies paid little attention to developing contacts with the public. They have also
73
been accused of not providing social services to the locals or hiring Burmese workers. Chinese
companies’ strategies of solely interacting with the Burmese government while ignoring the
public was a disservice to their plans in Burma. Misinformation given to local residents about the
projects is a major point of contention between Burmese CSOs and Chinese companies.
“ Activists and people living in the area in Chin State’s Tedim Township say the Chineseowned
North Mining Investment Company (NMIC), which began conducting surveys for the [nickel
mining] project in 2012, is not giving concrete information about the impacts mining would
71
Fuller, Thomas. “Myanmar Suspends Construction of Myitsone Dam.” The New York Times , September 30, 2011,
sec. World / Asia Pacific.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/asia/myanmarsuspendsconstructionofcontroversialdam.html .
72
Elizabeth C.Economy and Michael Levi. By All Means Necessary: How China’s Resource Quest Is Changing the
World . (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 113114.
73
Ibid.
29

have.” Although the NMIC sent representatives to fifteen nearby villages to distribute handouts
74
that educate locals about the project, locals still did not perceive the Chinese company as
forthcoming. One reason for this many be because the handouts omitted any mention of possible
negative aspects of the project.
75
Nontransparency was also an issue in April 2013 when hundreds of people residing in
Rakhine state’s Kyaukpyu township protested the construction of the SinoMyanmar oil
pipelines stretching from the Indian Ocean to Yunnan province. Badeidha Moe, a Burmese CSO,
administered a survey to better understand the socioeconomic impact of the pipelines. The
results indicated that the Burmese public did not understand the environmental impact the
pipelines would have before signing contracts to sell their land for the project. Many farmers
76
who only sold a partial amount of their land did so under the pretense that could continue to yield
crops on the land they did not sell. However, they found their livelihoods shattered as the
pipelines’ construction destroyed all of their land. The asymmetry of information favored CNPC
because it only paid a partial amount for the land it used. Despite widespread unrest, the
pipelines were finished in late 2013. What can account for this civil society failure? Whereas
information was scarce prior to the completion of the SinoMyanmar pipelines and NMIC Nickel
Mines, the dissemination of information about the effects the Myitsone Dam project and the
74
“ChineseBacked Nickel Mining Project Draws Concerns in Myanmar’s Chin State.” The Irrawaddy , January 31,
2014.
75
Ibid.
76
Public Opinion Research Report for MyanmarChina Oil and Gas Pipelines (Survey in NgaPhe` Township,
MinBu District, Magway Division and Thipaw Township, Kyauk Mae District, Northern Shan State) . BadeiDha
Moe Civil Society Organization, 2014.

30

Letpadaung Mine were more widespread and effective in provoking the public to assert their
dissatisfaction.
The most convincing evidence to reinforce the importance of civil society in shaping
SinoBurmese relations is the fact that Chinese companies are realizing how strategically
important it is now to consider public perception of their projects. Some Chinese companies such
as Wanbao Mining Ltd, a stateowned weapons manufacturer and subsidiary of China North
Industries Corporation (Norinco), have decided to change the way they interact with the public.
Wanbao’s projects, the Letpadaung copper mine and S&K copper mine, are some of the most
highly contested projects in Burma and face active demonstrations seeking to end the projects.
The public protests at these mines have sometimes grown violent and the mines were initially
shut down in 2012 by the Burmese government due to environmental concerns. Besides severe
77
air and water pollution, major concerns of the local residents include unfair compensation for
land acquisition and damaged crops. In order to improve relations with the locals, Wanbao
78
promised to dedicate one million USD to social spending in the nearby villages, and if the mine
were to be reopened, Wanbao also promised to spend 2 percent of its profits on corporate social
responsibility. In the nearby villages, Wanbao already established a hospital, local schools, and
79
provided the area with electricity. Wanbao also began hiring Burmese workers, with the
company purporting to hire 3 times more Burmese than Chinese. The Wanbao English language
website, though not wellmaintained, is almost completely devoted to this “charm offensive.” It
features Burmese children on the front page with terms such as “harmonious community” and
77
“ 中国企业在缅甸展开魅力攻势.” The Wall Street Journal , 10,
2013. http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20131010/bas113927.asp .
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid.
31

“win win cooperation” in the navigation bar. However, despite this uptick in social spending
80
which provided an estimated 20,000 people with access to medical care, civil society groups
such as Ecodev and Buddhist monks still protest this project.
81
In October 2013, the Letpadaung copper mine resumed operations with Aung San Suu
Kyi’s and the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) support. However, in order to reopen
82
the mine, Wanbao was forced to renegotiate with the Burmese government its portion of the
profits. Originally, Wanbao owned 51 percent of the mine, the militarybacked Union of
Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd owned 45 percent, and the government of Burma owned a
mere 4 percent. However, after renegotiation of the contract, the Burmese government now has a
51 percent stake in the project while Wanbao’s stake was reduced to 30 percent and the Union of
Myanmar Economic Holdings’ stake was reduced to 19 percent. This kind of huge adverse
83
change for Chinese investors is extremely rare. It has likely shaken the confidence of Chinese
84
investors in Burma, leading to a decreased amount of investment from China. It appears that civil
unrest and violent demonstrations gave Burma’s government more leverage when negotiating
with Chinese companies. If it weren’t for civil society groups placing pressure on Chinese
companies, the Burmese government would not have the same strength to renegotiate their
contracts.
80
“Wanbao Mining ,” http://www.wbmining.cn/ .
81
“ 中国企业在缅甸展开魅力攻势.” The Wall Street Journal , 10, 2013.
http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20131010/bas113927.asp .
82
Zarni Mann. “Letpadaung Mine Project Resumes but Fails to Meet Lawmakers’ Requirements.” The Irrawaddy ,
October 14, 2013.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/letpadaungmineprojectresumesfailsmeetlawmakersrequirements.html .
83
Ibid.
84
“ 中国企业在缅甸展开魅力攻势.” The Wall Street Journal , 10,
2013. http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20131010/bas113927.asp .
32

However, while the mine is now controlled by the Burmese government, the people are
still not content with the impact it has on their lives. Early reports indicated that Wanbao had not
yet fulfilled requirements for transparency about the health and environmental impact of the
mine and as a result, protests are growing more violent and disruptive. On December 22, 2014,
police shot live ammunitions into groups of protesters near the Monywabased Wanbao mining
complex, killing a 56 year old man named Khin Win and injuring two other villagers. The
85
death of a local Burmese at a Chinese mine site sent a flurry of unrest throughout the country
with most of the pressure now on the Burmese government to respond on this violence. Dozens
of more farmers were injured after clashing with the police. On December 29, farmers set up a
protest camp at the Letpadaung mine, refusing compensation for fenced off land and demanding
their land be returned instead. Over 60 organizations and political parties made statements
86
calling on the Burmese government to hold Wanbao and local police responsible for their
actions.
87
Burma’s CSOs have an increasingly significant role in manipulating power relations over
Chinesebacked infrastructure and mining projects in Burma. Although this may not be their
initial goal, Burmese CSOs have managed to place themselves at the center of power
negotiations between China and Burma. Out of the four cases presented in this paper, Wanbao’s
copper mine at Letpadaung is the clearest example where civil society demonstrations gave the
Burmese government enough leverage to take ownership of the project. The Myitsone Dam
85
“Troubled Copper Mine a ‘Cautionary Tale’ for Myanmar Investors.” Ucanews.com . Accessed February 10, 2015.
http://www.ucanews.com/news/troubledcoppermineacautionarytaleformyanmarinvestors/72962 .
86
Khin Pyae Son, San Maw Aung, and Tin Aung Khine. “Myanmar Farmers Reject Mining Company Payout For
Ruined Crops.” Translated by Roseanne Gerin. Radio Free Asia , January 2,
2015. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/farmersgetcropcompensation01022015145651.html .
87
Ibid.
33

project is still pending, as its reopening is contingent on the renegotiation of the contract
between China Power Investment Corporation (CPI), Burma’s Asia World Co, and Burma’s
Ministry of Electric Power. However, since CPI has supposedly already invested and spent
88
sixty percent of the 3.6 billion USD project, they are unlikely to agree to a renegotiation of
profits. Therefore, their current strategy is to wait until President Thein Sein’s term ends in late
89
2015 and try to work with a new administration on reopening the project.
In the other two cases, the Shwe gas field and Tedim Township nickel mine, Burmese
CSOs were not successful in placing themselves at the center of power negotiations between
Chinese companies and the Burmese government. The main reason for the variance in these
cases is the ability or inability of CSOs to disseminate information to locals about the
Chinesebacked projects. In both the Shwe gas field and Tedim Township Nickel mine cases,
honest information on the negative externalities of the project was not available to locals until
the project was already underway and farmland was already sold and subsequently destroyed. As
BadeiDha Moe’s poll shows, most locals not only had no idea that the pipeline would destroy
their entire land plots, but also that the pipeline would mostly serve Chinese interests by being
owned by the Chinese corporation for its first thirty years. In the Tedim Township nickel mine
case, the issue at the heart of the problem was nontransparency on the behalf of the Chinese
corporation. The brochures handed out to locals excluded any mention of the negative
consequences such as severe environmental pollution that would result from the mine. So why
were CSOs more successful in disseminating information about the Myitsone Dam and
88
Currently, CPI owns ninety percent of the project and Burma owns ten percent. Some Burmese CSOs want this
changed to fifty percent ownership.
89
“60% of Investment Already Paid for Suspended Myitsone Dam: Chinese Developer.” Accessed April 11,
2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/60ofinvestmentalreadypaidforsuspendedmyitsonedamchinesedevelo
per.html .
34

Letpadaung mine than others? The most obvious reason is the difference in how many people the
project would negatively affect. The Myitsone Dam project would detriment the livelihoods of
thousands, not to mention that damming the Irrawaddy would damage the long perceived
birthplace of Burmese civilization. The Letpadaung mine also is receiving a lot of attention and
media coverage because of its large scale effects along the Chindwin river in central Burma. The
main problem with the Shwe gas fields and the pipeline originating there is that those who
mostly lost their land were residents of the Rakhine state, and members of the marginalized
group of Rohingya Muslims. The largest problem still facing the Rohingya Muslims in Burma is
still their inability to gain citizenship and vote in addition to increasing antiMuslim violence
against their people. The CSOs operating there those which haven’t been banned by the
Burmese government are mostly international NGOs fighting for the human rights of the
Rohingya Muslims. These larger problems can draw attention away from the operations of
Chinese companies in the area. In this case, it is evident that the challenges still facing civil
society mentioned earlier in this paper, such as social divisions, can affect their ability to protect
the of those living in Burma. It appears that Chinese companies are more successful in
implementing projects where these collective action problems exist and the ramifications to the
environment and the livelihoods of the people are more localized. After all, it is small chance, if
any, that Buddhist monks (the largest and most effective civil society networks in Burma) would
ever come to the aid of Rohingya Muslims, the primary victims of their violence.
One potential criticism of this interpretation is that CSOs could be simply an instrument
of the Burmese government in order to gain leverage over Chinese corporations in these projects
and therefore, the activities of Burmese CSOs are just a mere tool Burma is using to hedge
35

against China and fulfill its desire not to be viewed by the international community as China’s
client. While it is difficult to determine whether these civil society movements are exogenous or
endogenous, there is no evidence to suggest that the Burmese government is colluding with
domestic CSOs to encourage demonstrations at the Chinese projects. The groups involved in the
protests are not government operated nongovernmental organizations or GONGOs (this paper
purposely does not examine the activities of GONGOs). The Burmese government is dispatching
police to remove demonstrators from the project sites, sometimes even inciting violence against
them. When locals or members of civil society get hurt as result of police brutality, the blowback
in major metropolitan areas is colossal. For example the abuse monks received by police amid
the Myitsone Dam protests brought Yangon to a standstill as the Buddhist monkhood marched in
the streets. The killing of local Khin Win by police on December 22, 2014 at the Letpadaung
copper mine also led to overt government opposition as the streets flooded with people to
celebrate his life and demand justice. It can be concluded, therefore, that the Burmese
government has no interest in promoting the type of violent protests which cause the suspension
or shutdown of Chinesebacked projects. Evidence suggests that civil society movements
throughout Burma at Chinese project sites are endogenous in nature.
This is not to say that the actions of the Burmese government serve no role in explaining
why CSOs recently have been able to gain enough power to draw concessions from their own
government regarding Chinese projects. The postreform environment in Burma is highly
determined by the political factions in power and their subsequent goals. President Thein Sein of
the USDP, though seen as close to the military in the late 2000s, can recently be seen as trying to
36

distinguish himself from the military junta which had close ties to China. As the suspension of
90
the Myitsone Dam demonstrates, hedging against Chinese interests not only distinguishes him
from the previous junta leaders, but also legitimized Thein Sein’s administration among Kachin
leaders. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine exactly why Thein Sein suspended the
91
Myitsone Dam. Several players had interests in the project including Asia World, a
privatelyowned conglomerate which had widely believed ties to UWSA, a major heroin
trafficking army in Southeast Asia. However, while the reasons may remain unclear, the
92
consequences of the suspension are apparent. Burmese CSOs benefit from Thein Sein’s goals to
distance his administration from the junta because their agenda meets less friction with the
USDP. Evidence to suggest that relations with China is a central component in Burmese
domestic politics is manifold. Aung San Suu Kyi’s June 2015 visit to Beijing proves that the
NLD party perceives good relations with China important to their reach for power in Burma.
93
Although CSO benefit from leadership which similarly aligned goals, to suggest that CSOs are
merely a useful tool for the Burmese government for pressuring Chinese companies is an
overstatement. CSOs in Burma will just as soon place pressure on the Burmese government in
order to achieve their interests. Burma’s civil society, by placing direct pressure on the Chinese
projects and the government, is beginning to effectively shape SinoBurmese relations.

90
“Myanmar’s Thein Sein, Junta Henchman to Radical Reformer.” Reuters , November 15, 2012.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/15/usmyanmartheinseinidUSBRE8AE1RL20121115 .
91
“Kachin Residents Want Myitsone Dam Scrapped.” Radio Free Asia , September 30, 2013.
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myitsone09302013193836.html .
92
“PASSINGS: Lo Hsing Han, Joe Conley.” Los Angeles Times , July 7, 2013.
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/08/local/lamepassings20130709 .
93
Forsythe, Michael. “Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar Meets With Xi Jinping in Beijing.” The New York Times ,
June 11, 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/12/world/asia/aungsansuukyiofmyanmarmeetswithxijinpinginbeijing.htm
l .
37

Civil Society in Cambodia

Civil society in Cambodia has not been as successful at drawing concessions from its
government. From the metrics mentioned above internet penetration rate, freedom of press,
etc it would appear that if Burma’s civil society situation is optimistic, then Cambodia’s
situation should be even more promising. Over six percent of Cambodians have regular access to
the internet and Reporters without Borders ranked Cambodia above Burma. So why is civil
94
society stronger in Burma than Cambodia? Cambodia’s reforms were curtailed by a 1997 coup
during which Prime Minister Hun Sen seized control, establishing an authoritarian regime ruling
over a superficial democracy. The subsequent suppression of civil society movements in
Cambodia have left little opportunity for groups to organize effectively.
Cambodia’s civil society shares several similarities with Burmese CSOs. They include
large scale Buddhist associations, trade unions, media associations, and NGOs. However, the
situation for Cambodian CSOs is deteriorating. As of December 16, 2014, there are 3,492
registered CSOs in Cambodia. However, only an estimated 1,350 organizations remain active.
95
The government has been increasingly criticizing civil society for “incitement” due to their
association with the opposition. A lengthy government registration process present high barriers
to entry for new CSOs. A new series of five laws drafted in October 2014 aim to increase
government oversight over local NGOs in Cambodia. Critics claim that these laws attempt to
silence dissenting voices. “We are worried that this law could be used by the government to
arbitrarily deny registration to organizations that are critical of their policies,”says Sarah Enees
94
“Internet Users in Asia.” Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics . 2013.
95
“ NGO Law Center: Cambodia.” The International Center for NotforProfit Law. , December 16, 2014.
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/cambodia.html .
38

of the International Forum of National NGO Platforms (IFP). Her sentiments are echoed by
96
Tor Hodenfield of advocacy group, Civicus, “On the one hand, Cambodia experienced a robust
election last year, but at the same time the government intimidates activists and is proposing
legislation that would enable it to silence critics.”   As of 2015, these laws remain pending, the
97
silver lining is that with each drafted law, the government is willing to receive comment about
the proposed legislation from local NGOs. However, comments from international NGOs are not
welcome by the government ministries, claiming they have no need to please foreigners. The
98
problem is that the majority of CSOs which are actively opposing the drafted laws are coalitions
of international NGOs which include Forum Asia (a UN body), the Asia Democracy Network,
and Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP).
While the situation for reporters and civil society organizations appears to be improving
in Burma, the civil society situation in Cambodia appears to be worsening. Although Cambodia
is ranked one position higher according to the Reporters without Borders 2014 report on press
freedom, Cambodia’s ranking has dropped several positions in recent years. In 20112012,
99
Cambodia was ranked 117, but dropped 26 places down to 143 in 2013. Burma is improving
100
its press freedom ranking, rising from 174
th
in the world in 2010 to 169 in 20112012, to 151 in
2013.   Twelve journalists have been murdered in Cambodia since 1994. High levels of
101 102
corruption which extend to local officials and police have led to violence against investigative
96
“Cambodian Authorities Drafting New Laws to Curtail Freedom, Groups Say.” Radio Free Asia . Accessed March
29, 2015. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/newlaws10102014182751.html .
97
Ibid.
98
Ibid.
99
World Press Freedom Index 2014 . Reporters without Borders, 2014.
100
Ibid.
101
Ibid.
102
“12 Journalists Killed in Cambodia/Motive Confirmed.” Committee to Protect Journalists .
39

reporters trying to expose them. Whenever a member of civil society or media decide to
investigate the depletion of Cambodia’s forests, for example, several never return. In September
2012, Cambodian journalist Hang Serei Oudom went missing while investigating illegal logging
and was found murdered in the trunk of his car four days later. In what would be his last story,
103
Oudom accused the son of a military police commander of smuggling “luxury” timber logs in
military plated vehicles. In October 2014, another Cambodian reporter, Taing Try, was shot dead
while investigating the illegal timber trade. The suspects included a former soldier, a policeman,
and a military police officer. Illegal activities are thought to be protected by Cambodian officials,
and anyone trying to expose deeply embedded corruption is often risking their life.
Many problems Cambodians face are similar to those in Burma. Environmental activists
and Buddhist monks have gathered on a large scale to protest Chinesebacked hydropower dams
along the Mekong river. The Mekong river is as vital to the Cambodians’ livelihoods as the
Irrawaddy is to the Burmese. Currently, the Chong people have set up an encampment at the base
of the Cardamom mountains in attempt to stop the construction of a hydroelectric dam which
could destroy the forest they hold sacred. The dam would be built by China’s largest
104
hydropower company, Sinohydro. In addition to irreversible damage to the forest, the dam would
flood a large region; displacing approximately 1,500 people. This case is similar to the
105
Myitsone Dam project, yet its construction still began in late 2014.
There is only one documented case where protests of a Chinesebacked dam in Cambodia
have resulted in the halting of the project. In March 2014, it was reported that plans to construct
the Stung Cheay Areng dam in Cambodia’s Koh Kong province were suspended due to public
103
Ibid.
104
Mam, Kalyanee. “‘A Threat to Cambodia’s Sacred Forests’.” The New York Times , July 28, 2014.
105
Ibid.
40

protests blocking the access road to the construction site. The halting of the project came a few
106
months after several CSOs including the NGO Forum on Cambodia, 35 Rivers Protection
Network, and Adhoc sent a letter to PM Hun Sen and government ministries call on them to
shelve the plans and instead turn the area into a ecotourism site. In the months prior to the
107
shutdown of the Stung Cheay Areng dam, the project changed hands three times between
Chinese companies. The first two companies which took on the project, China Southern Grid and
China Guodian pulled out of the project because it was not deemed profitable or financially
feasible. The proposed dam would cost $327 million and only produce 109 megawatts of energy,
a relatively small amount compared other dams such as the 338 megawatt Russey Chrum Krom
hydropower plant recently inaugurated in southwestern Koh Kong province. The construction
108
of the Stung Cheay Areng dam was taken over by Sinohydro Corporation Ltd. in December 2013
but was forced to suspend operations due to forty protesters blocking the access road. Why was
civil society successful here, while Cambodian CSO movements have not been successful at
other construction sites? Perhaps the variable here is not the ability of CSOs to rally enough
support to force a shutdown of the dam project, but rather the lack of willingness for the Chinese
companies to contend against civil society leaders for this project. The project was already
deemed unprofitable by two other Chinese companies and a mere forty villagers is not a
formidable force against Cambodian police. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the Stung
Cheay Areng dam was closed not because of the power of CSOs, but rather for practical,
financial feasibility reasons.
106
Ratana, Uong. “Dam route blocked.” Text. Phnom Penh Post , March 17, 2014.
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/damrouteblocked .
107
Ratana, Uong. “NGOs ask PM to axe Koh Kong dam plans.” Text. Phnom Penh Post , December 20,
2013. http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/ngosaskpmaxekohkongdamplans .
108
Ibid.
41

The land titling campaign underway as of March 2015 in Cambodia also demonstrates
the challenges CSOs face and their limited ability to promote fairness. Despite large amounts of
protesters demonstrating their discontent with the land reform process, powerful urbanites are
still successfully pressuring indigenous communities to sell their land. “These deals fall under
the radar of government and CSO monitoring.”   Most importantly, the land titling campaign
109
gives insight into the uninviting political atmosphere CSOs are operating under. The socalled
“big man power” referring to PM Hun Sen’s ability to spur ordinary citizens into action for his
personal initiatives provides a overwhelming topdown pressure on grassroot movements trying
to resist his political agenda.
110
Although Burma is still dangerous for journalists, increasing press freedom, internet
freedom, and the freedom for civil society organizations to assemble in Burma all signal that the
public increasingly have a presence in shaping policy. On the other hand, Cambodia’s reforms
stalled and Hun Sen’s closeness to Beijing is given precedence over the public’s interests. From
Cambodia’s case, it is apparent that completing the reform process to fully consolidate
democratic institutions is vital to civil society growth. If Burma’s recent slowing of reforms
means an interruption in the consolidation of Burma’s democratic institutions, it could threaten
the progress of civil society development thus far.
Addressing the original puzzle, why are Burmese CSOs able to place themselves at the
center of power negotiations between their government and Chinese companies and Cambodian
companies have not been able to do so? As explored in the previous sections, the reason comes
down to the ability of CSOs to disseminate information to locals. Due to the deteriorating
109
France, Alice Beban. “Time to Sow the Seeds of Land Reform in Cambodia.” East Asia Forum , March 26, 2015.
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/03/26/timetosowtheseedsoflandreformincambodia/ .
110
Ibid.
42

situation for Cambodian media and reporters, CSOs are unable to effectively garner the support
they need initiate change. The restrictions on media and CSOs remain in place due to the
superficial nature of Cambodia’s democracy which undermines statesociety dialogue. Unlike
the situation in Burma where civil society is rising amid factional power plays, the political
environment in Cambodia is less optimized for civil society growth because of the lack of a
political administration which would benefit from hedging against Chinese interests. PM Hun
Sen remains friendly to Chinese interests and CSOs are unable to give other members within the
state the leverage it needs to hedge against Chinese influence in Cambodia.

Conclusion
Burma is a nexus of Asian interaction. Situated between two Asian giants, China and
India, there is little wonder about Burma’s strategic usefulness to several major powers seeking
to exert influence in the region. Burma’s revival of its declared ‘neutrality’ in foreign relations is
marked less by selfreliance than its ability to capitalize on the interests of geopolitical rivals.
Due to recent reforms which promoted the growth of CSOs and their ability to manipulate power
relations between Burma and China, BurmeseChinese relations are changing dramatically.
Burma’s burgeoning civil society has led to a hostile environment for many Chinese activities in
Burma. Public perception is becoming increasingly important to the success of foreign
investment projects in Burma. China must start paying attention to the people, not only in
Burma, but each developing country in which Chinese companies are involved. China’s ‘charm
offensive’ is an uphill battle as its history of supporting unpopular governmental regimes may
have created friendly relations with the governments of these countries, but has left an especially
43

negative impression on the people. AntiChinese sentiment is prevalent in both Burma and
Cambodia, and as access to information about the detrimental effects of Chinabacked projects
becomes more widespread, public perception of Chinese activities will become increasingly
decisive in China’s ability to achieve its design for the region. This raises the question of how to
analyze China’s dynamic relationships with foreign societies. With China’s growing global
presence, how Chinese companies interact with the people will ultimately determine how China
will be able to interact with the state; thus, shaping relationships in the international system.

44

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Appendix

Figure 1: “Data and Statistics.” Government of Myanmar. Directorate of Investment and
Company Administration . 2014.



Figure 2: “Data and Statistics.” Government of Myanmar. Directorate of Investment and
Company Administration . 2014.

52

Figure 3: “Data and Statistics.” Government of Myanmar. Directorate of Investment and
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53

Asset Metadata

Creator Stone, Caitlyn C. (author)

Core Title 'Losing' Burma: Chinese-Burmese relations in the post-reform era

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publication Date 07/14/2015

Defense Date 07/01/2015

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Burmese civil society,Cambodian civil society,Chinese‐Burmese relations,copper mining,hydropower,Myanmar‐China relations,nickel mining,oai:digitallibrary.usc.edu:usctheses,OAI-PMH Harvest,pipelines,post‐reform Myanmar,Sino‐Burmese relations,Sino‐Cambodian relations,southeast Asia

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Advisor Lynch, Daniel C. (committee chair), Cooper, Eugene (committee member), Goldstein, Joshua L. (committee member)

Creator Email caitlyncstone@gmail.com,caitlyns@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-592884

Unique identifier UC11301330

Identifier etd-StoneCaitl-3595.pdf (filename),usctheses-c3-592884 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-StoneCaitl-3595.pdf

Dmrecord 592884

Document Type Thesis

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Stone, Caitlyn C.

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA

Abstract (if available)

Abstract China’s objective to expand its influence in Southeast Asia is illustrated by its many high profile infrastructure projects—from oil pipelines to hydropower dams—in the region. However, despite its ascendance as a world power, China’s influence is paradoxically diminishing in places like Burma