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From amity to enmity: the breakdown in Sino-Japanese relations

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From amity to enmity: the breakdown in Sino-Japanese relations

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From Amity to Enmity: the Breakdown in Sino-Japanese Relations

BY
YUXIN ANTHONY ZHANG

THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts in
East Asian Area Studies

University of Southern California
August 2014

1
Table of Content
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 2
Sino-Japan Amity ................................................................................................................ 8
China Takes Initiative ....................................................................................................... 15
Japan: Over shoes, over boots ........................................................................................... 24
China’s Ambitions ............................................................................................................ 28
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 32
References ......................................................................................................................... 34

2
Introduction
In November 2013, China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the
East China Sea that includes Japan’s administered Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In the
previous year, millions of protesters flooded across more than eighty cities in China,
damaging and destroying Japanese property in response to the former Governor of Tokyo
Shintaro Ishihara’s purchase and the then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s
nationalization of these islands. Opinion polls subsequently confirmed a mutual enmity
among more than 90 percent of Chinese and Japanese citizens. (See Figure 1 below.)

Figure 1:
Japanese Favorability towards the United States, the People’s Republic of China, and the
Republic of Korea from August 1978 to October 2013.

3

Source: http://www2.ttcn.ne.jp/~honkawa/7900.html

In January 2014, Shinzo Abe surprisingly compared the Sino-Japanese relations with
those between the United Kingdom and Germany before 1914 when the world stood on
the brink of the World War I. However, Abe remained cautious until December 26, 2013
when he paid an official visit to the Yasukuni shrine. Gerald L. Curtis suggests, “since
taking office, Abe has focused his attention on reviving Japan’s stagnant economy. He
has pushed his hawkish and revisionist views to the sidelines.”
1
Abe did not invite a crisis

1
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136063/gerald-l-curtis/japans-cautious-hawks

4
in the relations with China and Japan until his Yasukuni visit. The Chinese media and
ambassadors strongly condemned the visit. Notwithstanding the infuriation, both sides
remained prudent, trying to avoid any military conflicts, or even frictions.
On the first day of 2014, PLA Daily published an article, evaluating Japan’s
military power and its capacity to develop nuclear weapons. The author suggests, as data
shows, an annual output of weapon-grade plutonium could reach 9 tons at six nuclear fuel
reprocessing plants in Japan, manufacturing 2,000 nuclear weapons. This means that
Japan’s manufacturing capability is no lower than the United States. Also, some Chinese
experts believe Japan is manufacturing 2-5 nuclear explosion devices of 500,000-
1,000,000 valent weights, whose number and power far outweigh North Korea and Iran.
2

This article concludes with a similar calling that Abe made at the World Economic
Forum,
“We must restrain military expansion in Asia, which could otherwise go
unchecked. … We should create a mechanism for crisis management. … Japan has sworn
an oath, never again to wedge a war. We have never stopped and will continue to be
wishing for the world to be apace.”
3

Albeit the Sino-Japanese relations hit worst in record, compared to the years
between 1978 and 1994, which I describe as the “Golden Age” in the PRC-Japan

2
Source: http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2014-01/4714420.html. Translation.
Originally printed in Chinese: 「数据表明，日本 6 个所核燃料后处理厂年产钚量能够
提取 9 吨武器级钚，足够制造 2000 枚核武器，这一产能不比美国低。有专家认为
，目前日本可能已秘密生产或正在生产 2~5 枚 50~100 万吨当量的核爆炸装置，不
但在数量上、而且在威力上都远远超过朝鲜和伊朗。」（[ 中] 『解放軍報』，2014
年 1 月 1 日。）
3
Citing from the speech given by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at 2014 Davos World
Economic Forum.

5
diplomatic relations, there is no sign showing either side would voluntarily resort to force
and warfare.
Concerning China’s increasing military expenditure, Japan renewed its defense
programs in 2010, reverting to the “fundamental defense plan” of the Cold War pattern
and establishing a “Dynamic Defense Force” of mobility and adaptability.
4
The Izumo-
class helicopter destroyer DDH-183 was officially unveiled at Yokohama in August 2013.
These developments can find their origin in what John H. Herz calls a security dilemma,
“a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security
needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets
its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening.” (Herz
1950, 157) China and Japan, at this moment, provide a good example of the security
dilemma. Japan’s rightward lean is relevant to its perception of threat from China, and
vice versa.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was recognized by the United Nations as the legal
government of China in 1971 while Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) withdrew from
the UN. Japan soon ended its diplomatic relations with ROC and on the same day
established formal relations with the PRC after the issuance of the Joint Communiqué of

4
Translation. Originally printed in Japanese. 「政府は、安全保障会議と閣議を開き、
新たな「防衛計画の大綱( 防衛大綱) 」を決定した。中国の国防費増大や東シナ海
などでの活動を「懸念事項」と位置づけ、南西諸島防衛力の強化を打ち出したほ
か、自衛隊部隊を全国に均等配置する冷戦型の「基盤的防衛力構想」を転換、機
動性・即応性重視の「動的防衛力」の構築を打ち出した。武器輸出３原則見直し
は、菅政権が連携を模索する社民党に配慮し、明記を避けた。」（[ 日] 『読売新
聞』，2010 年 12 月 17 日。）

6
the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
5
In
addition, the two countries signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and
the People’s Republic of China in 1978 for the pursuit of “considerable progress”.
6

Accordingly, it ushered in greater political mutual understanding and respect, economic
interdependence and cultural communication. Almost 80 percent of Japanese held
favorable impression towards China at the onset of 1980. The trend continued, with the
percentage staying around 70 percent throughout the decade, until the second half of
1989 when the Tian’anmen Massacre made a strong negative impact on Japanese’s
sentiment towards China. The bilateral relations started to deteriorate fast since 1994, and
Japan’s favorability rate to China dropped below 50 percent by 1996.

Many Chinese scholars have analyzed the breakdown in relations with Japan. Some
assert that Japan is responsible because of its intransigence on the historical issues, such
as negating the Nanjing Massacre and Comfort Women as well as officials visiting
Yasukuni Shrine. Some also blame the continued U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan’s
intervention in China’s internal affairs (e.g., providing political support to Taiwan) for
the breakdown. For instance, Jiangyong Liu ( 劉江永), a professor of International
Relations at Tsinghua University, posits that the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative
Committee (2+2) regards the Taiwan Issue as a “Mutual Global Strategic Bond.” Such a
practice not only seriously intervenes in China’s international affairs, but also

5
Known as 「日中共同声明」in Japanese and 「中日聯合聲明」in Chinese.
6
Known as 「日中平和友好条約」in Japanese and 「中日和平友好條約」in Chinese.
Translation. Originally printed in Japanese: 「大きな発展」and Chinese 「大發展」.

7
demonstrates their pursuit of the joint hegemony in the Asian-Pacific region.
7
(Liu 2007,
38)
Not surprisingly, Chinese scholars have been increasingly concerned about
Japan’s disposition as a military power after the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines were
revised in 1997. However, some European and American scholars like Claude Meyer and
Thomas U. Berger interpret this revised guideline as Japan’s attempts to “normalize” its
political and military power. They argue that because it is economically strong but
politically dwarfed, Japan is expected to assume a more critical international role in
humanitarian and UN peacekeeping operations.

I side with Meyer and Berger because Japan’s re-armament is more a result of the
“security dilemma” mentioned above. In the 1990s, Japan had to face the rise of China,
threatened by China’s assertiveness in the East China Sea and its growing military
buildup in the East Asia region. Without considering the breakdown of bilateral relations
institutionally, the Chinese scholars’ perspectives are less compelling and more
embedded with nationalism.
Therefore, this article examines the shifts in the domestic and international affairs
that China and Japan experienced and argues that it is the Chinese government that first
triggered the deterioration of the bilateral relations. However, the Japanese government
also bears some of the blame since it decided to fan the flames of conflict, instead of

7
Translation. Originally printed in Chinese. 「2005 年日美『2+2 』會議聯合聲明中首
次把台灣問題作為日美兩國的『共同國際戰略目標』寫入其中。這不僅是對中國內
政的嚴重干涉，也暴露出日美合霸亞太的戰略圖謀，勢必對中日關係的健康發展構
成新的障礙。」

8
repairing the relations. Using Japan’s reaction as a pretext, China continued the
downward spiral driving towards the intense situation we see today.

In following sections, I will first present the accounts that explain the amicable Sino-
Japanese relations before 1994. Then I turn to examine the factors that broke down the
bilateral relations and CCP’s motivations, together with its political gains and costs, in
setting an anti-Japan agenda. I will also examine Japan’s negative reaction towards
China’s challenges on the relations. Finally, I will present China’s continued efforts in
bringing down the Sino-Japanese relations and China’s ambitions – taking advantage of a
declining Japan to re-arrange the order in the East Asian region.
Sino-Japan Amity
Regarding China and Japan’s blitz marriage and their honeymoon period, Chinese
literature gives full credit to the leaders of both sides: Masayoshi Ohira and Kakuei
Tanaka on Japan’s side and Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping on China’s
side. Professor Liu, for instance, describes these leaders’ “heroic achievements and
outstanding service” without reservation in Twenty Lectures on Sino-Japanese Relations.
8

However, this book downplays the political situations both at home and abroad that
China and Japan were facing during that era. In addition, Professor Liu might have been
more cautious if he had known that Masayoshi Ohira visited Yasukuni Shrine three times
in his term in 1979-80.

8
Translation. Originally published in Chinese. Title: 「中日關係二十講」（北京：中
國人民大學出版社. 2007 年出版.)

9
I here present three main factors – Japan’s public opinion, especially that of the
business community, the troubled U.S.-Japan relations, and Japan’s Official
Development Assistance (ODA) to China – that facilitated the development of the Sino-
Japan amity.
The first factor was the shifting public opinion in Japan, which was greatly
influenced by international developments. Japanese people began to show a sudden
warming toward China, known as “China boom” in 1971. This shifting development was
initiated by the 1969 Nixon Doctrine that suggested the U.S. intention to establish formal
diplomatic relations with the PRC. This was evidenced by Nixon’s announcement on July
15, 1971 that he would visit Beijing in the following February. Three months later, the
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 was passed, recognizing the People’s
Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China in the United Nations
and ousting the Republic of China from China’s seat on the security council. Following
this, numerous countries shifted their diplomatic relations from ROC to PRC. This also
eased “Japanese psychological inhibitions about making a decision against the ROC.”
(Scalapino 1977, 130) There was already a rise in the Japanese public support for
“breaking relations with Taipei so that an early rapprochement with Beijing would be
possible” (while the majority showed a strong support for the Two-China arrangement).
On September 29, 1972 Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Beijing, ending Japan’s
official relations with the ROC and establishing relations with the PRC with the
conclusion of an agreement. Over half of the Japanese people answered, “It was the only
possible thing to do.” (Scalapino 1977, 130)

10
Amongst the active pursuers who called for rapprochement with Beijing and later
contributed to the Sino-Japanese economic cooperation is the business community in
Japan. Though lacking political relations, Japan had become China’s primary trading
partner by 1970. “Individual Gyokai and corporations, while retaining their business ties
with Taiwan, attempted to promote business in China by setting up dummy friendly firms
and participating in the L-T trade.”
9
(Scalapino 1977, 185)
Wako Koeki, the dummy firm of Marudeni Iida, is a good example. Its President
Kokubu Katsunori “expressed his political belief that it was ‘necessary to fight for the
resignation of the Sato government
10
in order to improve the Japan-China relations.’”
(Scalapino 1977, 188) Moreover, at the fifteenth general meeting of the Japan-Republic
of China Cooperation Committee, the Pro-Beijing business community “denounced the
Japan-Republic of China Cooperation Committee and particularly branding Mitsubishi,
Mitsui, Itochu, and Marubeni Iida for serving as the ‘economic nucleus of revived
Japanese militarism.’”
11
On July 3, 1970, seven organizations connected with Japan-
China ‘friendly trade’ held a national meeting to denounce the Japan-Republic of China
Cooperation Committee, and declared that any business organization that attended the
fifteenth general assembly would be regarded as in violation of the basic rule of Japan-
China trade and would be cut off from the China market.”
12

Interestingly, these pro-PRC industries are based in Japan’s Kansai Area ( 関西地
方). Deriving from a strong nostalgia for prewar success in China’s market, “they

9
The business community is usually comprised of three layers of business groups: zaikai
(or 財界, the leaders of major economic organizations), gyokai (or 業界, the industrial
interests), and kigyo (or 企業, the individual corporations). (Scalapino 1977, 175)
10
The Sato administration insisted on a continued official relation with the ROC.
11
Nitchu Boeki Sokushin Giin Renmei, Shiryo geppo 36 (July 1970).
12
Nihon Keizai Shinbun ( 日本経済新聞, or Japan Economic Times), July 4, 1970.

11
frequently attributed the decline of Kansai business to the loss of the China market and
hoped that revival of the China trade would allow them to recover the lost ground.”
13

Besides, the leaders for the Kansai business community possessed a more independent
sense to the business-government relations. “The Kansai business leaders believed that
business should not be hampered by political differences, and they have a stronger
initiative in promoting East-West trade than have the Tokyo leaders.” (Scalapino 1977,
190) The nostalgia for the China market and political liberalism motivated the Kansai
faction to seek an active breakthrough in relations with the PRC.

The U.S.-Japan alliance was in trouble and the anti-American sentiment began to swell in
Japan in the 1970s. “As doubts concerning the relationship with Americans emerged, the
Japanese public showed a proclivity for restoration of closer ties with China, another
nation that has profoundly affected Japanese culture at various points in the history of the
Japanese people.” (Scalapino 1977, 402) Professor Robert A. Scalapino further indicates
that economic and political trends “blurred the basis on which the old superior-inferior
relationship had rested. The sense of need also declined—on the political-security front
for Japan and in economic matters for America.” (Scalapino 1977, 403)
Tensions in the U.S.-Japan bilateral economic relationship hit high point during
this period. Since 1965, Japan has enjoyed a trade surplus with the United States. “That
year Japanese exports to the United States, worth $2.4 billion, first exceeded American

13
Interview with Hasegawa Kaneshige, conducted by source author.

12
exports to Japan, worth $2.1 billion.”
14
Facing rising imports from Japan, the U.S.
demanded Japanese reciprocity in free trade and objected to Japan’s protectionism. Not
only did Washington charge Japan with dumping and selling cheap products, Washington
was also annoyed by Tokyo’s defense of an unrealistic yen-dollar exchange rate, which
Washington assumed was the major reason of trade imbalance.
Due to a variety of reasons, the Nixon administration “suddenly took steps in
August 1971 to adjust the position, ending the fixed exchange rate between the dollar and
other currencies, as well as the dollar’s fixed relationship to gold, and imposing a
temporary surcharge of 10 percent on imports.” (Beasley 2000, 263) The U.S. anticipated
these countermeasures to make an impact on Japan.

The 1973 Oil Crisis continued to exacerbate the U.S.-Japan trade friction as Japan’s fuel-
thrifty automobiles won high favor amongst the American customers. It doubled Japan’s
exports to the U.S. from $9 billion to $18.6 billion by 1977. More importantly, the 1973
Oil Crisis triggered a political disparity internationally and drove Japan to maintain good
relations with the Arabic countries. The Arab-imposed oil embargo made Japan consider
disassociating itself from the U.S. policy in the Middle East. When the United States
remained staunchly committed to backing Israel, Japan decided to shift from pro-Israel to
more pro-Arab policies in response to 25 percent oil cut in production. (Paust and
Blaustein 1974, 411)

14
Source:
salempress.com/store/samples/american_business/american_business_japanese.htm
(Retrieved on November 24, 2013).

13
The Japanese government officially stated, “Israel should withdraw from all of the
1967 territories, advocating Palestinian self-determination, and threatening to reconsider
its policy toward Israel if Israel refused to accept these conditions.” (Licklider 1988, 214)
The Japanese policymakers put Japan and the U.S. at variance since they refused to meet
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s demand to support the American position.
Fresh from their humiliation over Kissinger’s secret visit to China, however,
Japanese policymakers were in no mood to listen, and insisted that Japan had to be seen
as separate from the U.S. Kissinger recounts how Tanaka and foreign minister Ohira
insisted that Tokyo had no interest whatsoever in taking sides in a political struggle over
the fate of Palestine; rather, it was just doing the minimum it could to ensure its supply of
oil. (Covarrubias and Lansford 2007, 102)
Therefore, Japan’s foreign policy became more independent during this Oil Crisis,
blurring the traditional dominant-subordinate roles between the United States and Japan.
At the same time, Washington clearly perceived this slow but incremental change in
Japan’s foreign policy.

In this context, Japan hoped to use matters of credit and investment in China in order to
draw substantial economic benefits from China’s development process. China was a
willing partner. “[The] intensified Sino-Soviet conflict [in the 1960s]
15
forced the PRC to
turn more toward trade with Japan, despite the serious political problems separating the
two countries.” (Scalapino 1977, 178) This ideological departure even led to military
conflict on China’s northeast border with the Soviet Union in 1969. Simultaneously,

15
In 1962, the PRC and USSR broke bilateral relations.

14
China’s foreign trade within the Soviet Union-led Communist Camp fell yet increased
with the Western Camp. Japan was already the largest trade partner of PRC at the time.
After the Sino-Soviet split, the PRC was thirsty for capital and technology for its
own economic development in order to compete with the Soviet Union. The Chinese
Communist Party realized that normalized bilateral relations with Japan could equip
China with both, with additional credits to its ruling legitimacy. Therefore, China sought
opportunities to sweeten relations with Japan, as evidenced by Premier Zhou Enlai’s
flexibility over Japan’s “normalization” on the stage of global politics.

Japan also kept its promise to China, helping modernize the country by providing both
capital and technology. The Japanese government engineered the Official Development
Assistance (ODA) to the People’s Republic since 1979. The ODA projects in China
included such large-scale economic infrastructure projects as the building of roads,
airports and power stations, as well as infrastructure projects in medical and
environmental areas. According to the statistics form Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
approximately 3.1311 trillion yen in loan aid, 145.7 billion yen in grant aid, and 144.6
billion yen in technical cooperation had been implemented by 2007.
These projects have played a significant role in the realization of China’s current
economic growth. Therefore, there can be no doubt that Sino-Japanese relations achieved
great success and benefited both before getting deteriorated. Everything suggested that
the bilateral relations were developing in what Deng Xiaoping expressed as “amity from
generation to generation ( 世世代代友好下去).” However, China developed a new

15
agenda for Japan at this moment, and the transition together with its embedded factors
will be examined in the following sections.
China Takes Initiative
Most Chinese literature attributes the transition in the Sino-Japanese relations to Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s policies and visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Such an
argument is problematic because first, polls indicate an earlier worsened relations since
the middle 1990s. Koizumi did not take office until 2001 and made his first visit to
Yasukuni Shrine in August of that year – a seven-year lag after 1994 when Japan’s
favorability toward China started to drop critically, according to the poll.
Thus, it was not Koizumi’s policy that first damaged the relations, and Japan bore no
agenda to ruin the bilateral relations. Even though the Japanese government was upset by
the Tian’anmen Massacre in 1989, and people lost almost 20 percent of favorability to
China, the Japanese government was still the first nation to lift economic sanctions and
re-start its loans to China for the latter’s economic development and reform.
In addition, the then-Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu visited Beijing in August 1991,
seeking a policy of re-engaging China. It was soon followed by Emperor Akihito’s visit
to China and Kaifu’s successor Tomiichi Murayama’s official apology as Japan’s Prime
Minister to China and other Asian countries on August 15, 1995, the fifty year
anniversary of Japan’s surrender in the World War II.
Second, even though the Yasukuni visits are blameworthy, Michael Green
suggests, “Just stopping (the) Yasukuni (visits) because China says stop is not the

16
solution to this problem because the Chinese side may have another complaint.”
16
China
uses this issue to undercut Japan’s bid for the permanent membership of the UN Security
Council. The PRC government can always find other issues, if not the Yasukuni dispute,
to thwart the rebirth of a strong Japan that is able to compete with China for dominance
in East Asia. A strong Japan jeopardizes China’s national interest and more importantly,
CCP’s political interest.

China started to become more assertive in the mid-1990s. It carried out a nuclear test on
August 17, 1995; two days after Japan made its apology for WW II atrocities. And this
was China’s second test in that year, despite its participation in the comprehensive test
ban treaty (CTBT). Besides, when he made an official visit to Japan in 1998, the then-
President Jiang Zemin refused to accept Obuchi’s apology because of his personal
experience.
Richard C. Bush indicates in his book Perils of Proximity that Jiang’s memory of
the Japanese occupation in East China led him to place greater emphasis on history issues
than many observers did and made it hard for him to appreciate Japan’s apology fatigue.
Before Jiang arrived, there was some expectation in Japan that China might take Prime
Minister Keizo Obuchi’s statement as the “final word” since Obuchi was more explicit
than his predecessors in expressing regrets for past aggression.
17
Yet Jiang was not
prepared to accept the approach that Obuchi took toward Korea, and he stridently

16
Source: http://callcenterinfo.tmcnet.com/news/2006/02/04/1342508.htm (Retrieved on
January 30, 2014).
17
It is evidenced by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi’s official apology to the Republic of
Korea in the Japan-South Korea Joint Declaration A New Japan-South Korea
Partnership towards the Twenty-First Century on October 8, 1998.

17
lectured a Japanese leadership already worn down by “apology fatigue” on history issues.
(Bush 2010, 18) China is determined to play on historical issues because it intends to
utilize Japan’s historical burden for two purposes: first, to veto Japan’s entry into the
Security Council of the United Nations and second, to use Japan as a scapegoat for its
own internal crises of governance – a lesson from the June 4 Incident.

China’s refusal of Japan’s admission to the U.N. Security Council is a result of its own
pursuit of dominance in the East Asian region. The Yoshida Doctrine enables Japan to
emerge as a strong economic power but weak political dwarf. It leaves Japan’s military
defense to the United States. Japan’s foreign policies are subject to the U.S. political
agenda, considering the U.S.-Japan mutual defense, U.S.-Japan Security Pact, and the
U.S. military bases in Japan. For China, Japan’s admission to the Security Council would
serve as a mere voting apparatus for the U.S. in the U.N., sharing the increasing burden
of the “containment” section of the U.S. “congagement” policy.
18
Therefore, China feels
more pressure to seek dominance in the region to counter the stronger U.S.-Japan
alliance. And as the alliance grows stronger, China is more prone to assertiveness,
especially to Japan who “might try to seek more independently-secured national interests,
encouraging the U.S. to make more efforts to keep its alliance solid, stable, and (more
importantly) steerable.”
19
Apart from the assistant role, Japan may also compete with
China to claim dominance within East Asia after obtaining its permanent seat in the
Security Council. A former vice minister of Foreign Affairs indicates a possibility for the

18
“Containment and Engagement.” Proposed by Professor Aaron Friedberg in his book A
Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia.
19
Source: http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/china-will-have-to-face-a-stronger-us-japan-
alliance/ (Retrieved on February 26, 2014).

18
Japan Self-Defense Force to use force in the U.N. Collective Security Operations. The
use of force will largely increase military buildup, surpassing 1 percent of Japan’s GDP.
To head off any opportunities for Japan to compete for dominance of the East Asian
region, China continues to play on these historical issues, reminding the world of an
insecure Japan, ineligible to enter the Security Council.

Back at home, the Tian’anmen crisis alerted the Chinese Communist Party that its
legitimacy to rule the mainland was under threat by the Chinese people; therefore, it was
imperative to strengthen its relations with its own people. To win over trust and support
from the Chinese public, one effective way is to target a common enemy. This can be
observed from (1) Andrew J. Nathan’s Authoritarian Resilience, in which he proposes
four aspects of the regime’s institutionalization and (2) CCP’s lowered standards to admit
new CCP members following the crisis, attempting to bond itself with the young
generation more tightly. Despite the lowered threshold, the CCP engineered the
nationwide Patriotic Education Campaign (PEC) in the post-Tian’anmen period. The
campaign was more of a selective historical teaching program, highlighting the invasion
and the cruelty of the imperialists in China’s modern history, victimizing the Chinese
people – in particular the youth whose angry energies were an immediate threat to the
Communist government – and the CCP as a whole, and therefore diluting or even
negating the CCP’s atrocities and errors.
“Since the victory over imperialism and the closure this brought to the ‘century of
humiliation’ were crucial parts of the justification of Communist rule in China, these
individuals ‘had to be reintroduced to the imperialist past, to re-experience its bitterness

19
and shame.’ In this way, the history education campaign was used to re-legitimize the
Communist government.” (Wang 2012, 100) The Campaign aimed to call attention to the
positive changes led by the Communists, and thereby consolidating CCP’s rule by
breeding an anti-Western, or anti-imperialistic nationalism within China. Japan is the
most ideal target thanks to the past suffering imposed on the Chinese people. A call for
the collective memories will automatically and easily put the Chinese at CCP’s side.

Accompanying the PEC was the massive production of anti-Japanese TV dramas in the
1990s. In the dramas, Japanese were usually depicted as villains. Chinese media serves to
fan the anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the Chinese people, and the political tensions
between the two nations did nothing but increase the popularity of the dramas. However,
Haiyun Wu wrote in Phoenix Weekly that the stories were not “recorded history.” The
Chinese public – directors, producers, actors and audience of these dramas – was merely
obsessed with the self-invented “anti-Japanese sentiment” rather than reflection. After
disparaging the Japanese, the Chinese people were able to gain self-esteem and
confidence and more inclined to giving credits to the CCP for China’s current
development. The CCP was seizing the Chinese appeal for “national rejuvenation” to
convince Chinese of its legitimacy of governance that “only the Communist Party of
China can lead the Chinese people in making the country prosperous and strong and
improving the people’s well-being.” (Wang 2012, 128) When the country was facing
threats from “the outside,” implicitly pointing to Japan and the United States, “only the
Communist Party of China can lead the Chinese people in achieving victories of national
independence and safeguarding national sovereignty.” (Wang 2012, 128)

20

Raising historical issues and demonizing Japan, the Chinese Communist Party hopes to
consolidate its ruling status in China. It hopes to convince the Chinese public that its
achievements will lead China on a path of becoming a great power (or even superpower),
waking up Chinese national pride. It also reminds Chinese people of their national
humiliation. The goal of China’s strategy – playing on Japan’s past war crimes is to show
the powerful strength of the CCP regime and its capability to build a strong China.
However, China’s assertive strategies have not only intensified Sino-Japanese
relations negatively, but also threatened the situation in the Taiwan Strait, as the PLA
conducted a series of missile tests in waters surrounding Taiwan from July 1995 to March
1996. If the CCP gained political leverage in China’s domestic politics by playing the
historical game, it paid its political cost in foreign policies, by creating stronger support
for Taiwan from the U.S.-Japan alliance and strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance as
unintended consequences. Stronger Taiwan-Japan-U.S. triangle and U.S.-Japan relations
are disadvantageous to China’s (1) reunification policy towards Taiwan and (2)
estrangement policy towards U.S.-Japan alliance.

The Republic of China on Taiwan conducted its first direct presidential election in 1996,
which marked Taiwan’s entry into full democracy. Following this, Shin Kawashima
notes a considerable change in Japan’s relation with Taiwan, as the people took the lead
in forging closer ties. Also, a democratized Taiwan is more easily justified as an
American ally by conservative Republicans, suspicious of communist China.

21
Thomas S. Wilkins explains that since both Taiwan and Japan were feeling the
pressure of a rising China, they had every incentive to deepen their relations in the face of
shared challenges. In short, Japan’s Taiwan policy has been a result of China’s policy
toward Japan. The 1996 missile crisis concerned Tokyo not only because of a shared
perception with Taiwan of an assertive China but also because of China’s impact on
Japan’s vital sea-lanes that further threaten Japan’s trade relations with Taiwan. But
“Japan has insufficient resources to ensure cross-strait stability. The United States is the
only country with the resources to provide a modicum of stability in the Taiwan Strait.”
(Auer and Kotani 2005, 59) Therefore, “Prime Minister Hashimoto prepared a
contingency plan, which included Japan’s logistic and other non-direct support for U.S.
combat troops.” Following the missile crisis, “the revised 1997 Guidelines called for
broader bilateral cooperation, including Japanese rear-area support for contingencies in
areas surrounding Japan.” (Yang 2006, 65) Tokyo’s support for U.S. military intervention
in the Taiwan Strait crisis explicitly demonstrated a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance.

The Taiwan-Japan-U.S. triangle and stronger U.S.-Japan alliance cost the CCP’s political
leverage both in China’s first and second security rings.
20
The CCP has long been
wishfully considering the dispute over Taiwan’s sovereignty as a domestic affair. But
CCP’s missile test in the Taiwan Strait had the effect of pushing Taiwan outwards,
farther away from China’s first ring. The two missiles further legitimized the U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan for Taiwan’s national defense reasons, based on the Taiwan Relations
Act.

20
See Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell’s book China’s Search for Security.

22
Japan is more than pleased to support Taiwan because of China’s increasing
assertiveness on historical issues. Besides, Japan is not challenging China in an overt
manner. Instead, its support to Taiwan is indirect, following the U.S. leadership in the
Taiwan Strait. Japan has never enacted a Tokyo’s version of “Taiwan Relations Act” that
would create strong relations with Taiwan independent of those with Beijing, neither has
Japan expressed its stance on the Taiwan issue. (Kamphausen 2005, 9) Japan is
successfully relying on the U.S. to deal with China’s previous provocations. In general,
the U.S.-Japan relations are virtually strengthened – adverse to CCP’s consistent policy to
estrange the U.S.-Japan alliance in the pursuit of its dominance in East Asia.

Additionally, people need to be aware that Japan’s domestic political change also led to
China’s misinterpretation, and therefore, aggression. After the split from the Takeshita
Faction, the newly formed Haneda/Ozawa Faction opposed to the mainstream Takeshita
Faction as the Old Guard, called for economic and political reforms. As mentioned earlier
in this article, the U.S.-Japan alliance was getting underfoot during the 1973 Oil Crisis,
which put Japan’s policy-making at variance with the United States. Tokyo once more
felt at odds with Washington’s policy during the 1990 Persian Gulf War, declining the
latter’s repeated request to provide on-the-ground support for the U.S.-led coalition
forces in Kuwait.
Ozawa called Japan’s “politics of indecision” into question and advocated a
revision of the rudderless postwar system. His goal was to reform an-economically-
strong-but-politically-weak Japan into an “independent” country that can master its own
fate and protect its national interests. In 1993, Ozawa published Blueprint for New Japan:

23
the rethinking of a nation, which proposed neo-liberal economic reforms and a two-party
system evolution at home and a more active political role internationally.
21

As Richard Samuels suggests, Ozawa and his anti-LDP mainstream allies became
more determined than ever to take control from the weak-kneed mainstream and the
Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB, or 内閣法制局). Specifically, they vowed to end the
1955 system that had bogged Japan down just when action was most urgently needed.
(Samuels 2007, 67) In terms of foreign policy, Ozawa intended to develop Japan into a
“normal” country and to “reverse the country’s reluctance to play a larger role in world
affairs.” The book made a considerable impact on Japan’s politics. “The Diet late last
year approved legislation to permit the use of military planes to rescue Japanese nationals
in crisis situations abroad, for example.”
22

Japan soon negotiated with the U.S. to work out “an agreement on military acquisitions
and cross-servicing, similar to those of NATO allies … and deployment of the Japan's
self-defense forces on noncombat U.N. missions is now routine.”
23
Added to Japan’s
military force was Japan’s Self-Defense Agency’s pursuit of two high-priority projects
that further the independence of Japanese defenses. All these efforts were leading Japan
to a more articulate, assertive and independent stance. In other words, China perceived
Japan’s move as a potential threat to its national interests, considering its growing
national comprehensive power. Out of the need to secure its legitimacy of governance

21
Japanese Name: 「日本改造計画」講談社、1993 年 5 月 20 日。
22
Source: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51405/edward-w-desmond/ichiro-
ozawa-reformer-at-bay (Retrieved on November 25, 2013).
23
Source: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51405/edward-w-desmond/ichiro-
ozawa-reformer-at-bay (Retrieved on November 25, 2013).

24
and China’s “forthcoming” dominant position in the region, the CCP decided to pursue
an “anti-Japan” policy.
Japan: Over shoes, over boots
On October 17, 1978 at the Aki-matsuri of the Yasukuni Shrine, 14 convicted Japanese
class-A war criminals were enshrined. Since then, Japanese prime ministers Takeo
Fukuda, Masayoshi Ohira, Zenko Suzuki, and Yasuhiro Nakasone paid visits to the
Yasukuni Shrine. But these visits received no response from China mainly because the
visits were private, except for Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone who declared his tenth
visit on August 15, 1985 official.
In the following decade, no Japanese prime minister visited the Yasukuni Shrine
until July 29, 1996 when Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto did so on his birthday. This
marks the first official visit by a Japanese Prime Minister, followed by Hashimoto’s
successor Junichiro Koizumi’s frequent visits after he took office. Nakasone and
Koizumi’s visits are considered as the most significant political and diplomatic collisions
from the perspective of the Chinese government.

In Japan, the rightist camp, or Uyoku Dantai ( 右翼団体), plays an active role in
encouraging Japanese prime ministers to visit the Yasukuni Shrine. Almost all of these
rightist pressure organizations have a close relationship with the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP).
24
Some organizations send representatives to parliament as
LDP politicians, and the organizations accept LDP members as their chairpersons.

24
Known as 自由民主党 or 自民党 in Japan.

25
(Samuels 2007, 200) It should be noted that in March 1981, LDP politicians established
the Association of Members of Parliament to Visit the Yasukuni Shrine Together
(AMPVYST, or みんなで靖国神社に参拝する国会議員の会). Professor Daiki
Shibuichi suggests that prime ministers of the LDP are susceptible to institutional
pressures from within and without government.
The LDP’s close ties to right-wing groups mean that its leaders are vulnerable to
demands for official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.” (Shibuichi 2005, 201) If one takes a
look at the record of Yasukuni Shrine visits, he/she will be surprised to see a sudden rise
in the number of visits after the inauguration of prime minster Zenko Suzuki. Compared
to his predecessors Ohira Masayoshi and Takeo Fukuda, who visited Yasukuni Shrine
three times and four times respectively in their terms, Suzuki visited nine times in the
same time period, followed by Nakasone’s ten times. Most noticeably, Nakasone’s
declaration as an official at the tenth visit in 1985 needs further examination.

Prime Minister Nakasone’s official visit in August 1985 was more intended to establish
the identity of the nation-state (expressed in Sengo-Seiji-no-Sokessan, or 戦後政治の総
決算), to demonstrate the link between Shinto tradition and the state. Nakasone also
suffered strong pressure from the JABF (Japan War-Bereaved Association, or 日本遺族
会), one of the most politically powerful rightist pressure groups whose members
demanded him to make an official visit by resorting to large-scale hunger strike. He even
received threats such as assassination from JABF and similar organizations after
changing his mind.

26
He finally decided to maintain “brotherly” relations with the reformist CCP
Secretary Hu Yaobang, considering Japan’s security interests from the de facto “Sino-
Japanese alliance” against the Soviet Union as well as Hu’s personal favorability to Japan.
Another reason is that Nakasone had to follow Tanaka’s wish to maintain good relations
with the PRC in exchange for the support of the Tanaka faction within the LDP to
compete for prime minister.

Japan’s actions on the Yasukuni Shrine issue did not seem to affect Chinese
leaders until 2001 when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi started frequent official visits.
Koizumi’s shrine visits fanned the flame that had already been ignited by China in the
middle 1990s, leading the development of the Sino-Japanese relations into a vicious
downward spiral.
25
The following section examines why Koizumi was determined to
“throw the handle after the blade”, instead of repairing the rift in the bilateral relations.
Also, since the LDP politicians had also made informal efforts to quell China’s anger
when Nakasone paid the visit, why were they not sympathetic to China’s displeasure and
protest any more?

In a stark contrast with Nakasone, Koizumi did not keep ties with right-wing activists in
the JABF or alike. That is to say, Koizumi faced less pressure from the rightists to visit
the Yasukuni Shrine. A reasonable account here that explains Koizumi’s agenda goes to
his individual background. The LDP is infamous for competitions among its factions ( 派),
and Junichiro Koizumi emerged from Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyukai (or 清和政策研究会・

25
Actually Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi visited Yasukuni Shrine in 1992 but it was
kept secret until 1996. Kiichi’s successor Hashimoto made another official visit but it did
not deteriorate the Sino-Japanese relations because the visit was short and Hashimoto
decided not to visit the shrine upon the reception of criticism from China.

27
清和会), a pro-classical economics, nationalist and conservative faction.
26
The
worldview of the members in this faction tends to encompass only Western countries, as
they emphasize “liberalism” and “democracy” in the basic principles of the faction.
27

Such a worldview finds its origin in the post-war period when the U.S. occupation and
the U.S.-Japan alliance diffused these western thoughts.

Plus, different from Nakasone who served as a naval officer in the Imperial Navy during
the World War II and therefore had concerns and sympathy for China and other Asian
countries, the post-war generation bears less of Japan’s historical burden because this
generation lacks personal experiences and receives exculpatory accounts of Japan’s past
due to the 1955 system. Japan’s conservative leadership was “stressing the defensive
motives behind the expansion of the empire and largely neglecting the issue of Japanese
wartime atrocities.” These conservative leaders believed that “restoring the population’s
sense of pride in the nation’s past was vital if Japan was to become a true nation.” (Kim
2006, 185)
Therefore, the conservative politicians who were in power bore the responsibility
for Japan’s collective avoidance of guilt and defense of Japan’s militarists’ honor. Under
this political climate, it is not hard to understand why the post-war generation like
Koizumi would address to the public that “I wish to express gratitude and respect to the
war dead. The peace and prosperity of postwar Japan is based on their self-sacrifice.”

26
Source: http://www.seiwaken.jp/seiwaken/seiwaken.html#03 (Retrieved on November
25, 2013). The Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the time of writing belongs to this faction
too, and his father Shintaro Abe was an ex-leader from 1986 to 1991.
27
Translation. Originally printed in Japanese. 「本会は、自由主義・民主主義を基調
とした勇気ある平和国家を目指し、その実現をはかることを目的とする。」

28
(Nobumasa 2001) The post-war generation emerges unexpectedly as strong nationalists.
And it becomes more understandable why this Japanese nationalist had a calling to
defend his country in a radical way when he perceived menace and hostility from the
People’s Republic in the late 1990s.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 also changed Japan’s attitude. During the
Cold War, Japan considered USSR as a security threat and China might be an ally for
Japan’s security concern. Therefore, Nakasone was trying to avoid any major quarrel
with China. However, since the threat of entanglement in an East-West war was gone,
Japan had less concern for the previous “de facto Sino-Japanese alliance” in the Cold
War.
Kiichi Miyazawa started to visit Yasukuni shrine in 1992, followed visits by
seven Murayama cabinet members in 1994, eight Hashimoto cabinet members in 1995,
Hashimoto in 1996, and 223 members of AMPVYST in 1997, etc. It is clear that Japan
was ready to face China’s provocation in the 1990s when the threat of Soviet Union and
caution in dealing with China faded away. Junichiro Koizumi was more than happy to fan
the flame because of his strong patriotism and the unprecedented popularity he was
enjoying among the Japanese public at home.
China’s Ambitions
Japan’s “counterattack” accelerated China’s drawing of big plans, paralleled by a
simultaneous transition in national power. The 21
st
century has seen a rising China and a
declining Japan—in particular in economy. In the Lost Decade ( 失われた 10 年),

29
Japan’s asset price bubble came into being since the second half of the 1980s.
28
At the
close of 1989, the Tokyo stock market hit record high: on the last market day, the Nikkei
Index ended with 38,916. Three months later, however, the Nikkei dropped over a 25%
range. By October 1990, the Nikkei Index dropped below 20,000 – a 48% drop in 10
months. Entering 1991, the discount rate was reduced three times, from 4.5 % in 1991, to
3.25% in 1992, to 1.75% in 1993. By September 1995, it was lowered to 0.5 %; this
further brought down the stock index. (Meyer 2010, 190)
The Nikkei Index dropped to 14,309 on August 18, 1992 – a record low since
1985. The stock trading volume also decreased over 60% since 1991. (Meyer 2010, 192)
Japan’s property price also experienced a plummet in the 1990s. The price of trade
estates fell most, on an average of 27% nationwide. Tokyo’s real estate price dropped
42%; while Osaka, 63%. (193) The crisis in the stock market hit hard on the Japanese
stockbrokers, whose revenue finds its origin in commission and trading volume. All of
the largest four securities companies – Nomura, SMBC NIKKO, Daiwa, and Yamaichi –
suffered great deficit by 1994. They lost dominance on the issuance of international bond
in London and Luxembourg. In 1997, Yamaichi started voluntary liquidation,
accompanied by Sanyo’s and Hokkaido Takushoku’s bankruptcy, both triggering shock
wave to the Japanese financial system.
It never rains but it pours. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis further frustrated the
Japanese economy, bringing down Japan’s urban land price index, stock market value,
etc. The Japanese Yen experienced a sharp appreciation in 1995 from USD/JPY 1:145 to

28
The term originally refers to the years 1991 to 2000, but recently the decade from 2001
to 2010 is also included. (Kihara 2012)

30
USD/JPY 1:175
29
, pushing Japan into deflation. The 1998 capital injection – 1.8 trillion
yen for 21 banks – failed to stabilize the market because of its small volume. The
profitability of Japanese Banking Sector table shows a growth in Loan Loss (LL) over the
period from 1993 to 2003 and a negative Net Operating Profit (NOP) at the same time.
Despite a slight economic recovery since 2003, Japan was still bogged down in
economic slump in the next five years and hit hard again by the 2007-8 Global Financial
Crisis. The Nikkei Index fell over approximately 50% between June 2007 and December
2008. “The Japanese yen soared in value during the latter half of 2008 as international
governments dropped interest rates, undermining the profitability of the ‘carry trade’
through which many investors had bet on interest rate disparities.”
30
Therefore, the two
decades were named by the Japanese people as the Lost Twenty Years ( 失われた 20 年),
indicating the nation’s weakened economy. “Recession” ([ 経済] 不景気) and “Difficult
Employment” ( 就職難), two of the mostly heard words in the Japanese society, mark the
first two decades of the Heisei period (平成年代).
31

In contrast, China experienced impressive economic boom during the past two decades.
In the 1990s, China’s annual growth rate was at an average rate of 10% per year. The
1997 Asian Financial Crisis did not make a harsh impact on China by virtue of its large
reserves and capital flows for long-term investment. The GDP growth rate climbed a little
more slowly but still kept increasing. Its financial and banking systems and

29
At the time of writing, 1 US Dollar equals 103.19 Japanese Yen. (December 13, 2013)
30
Source: http://www.cfr.org/japan/issue-guide-japan-global-financial-crisis/p19519
(Retrieved on December 1, 2013).
31
The Heisei period started on 8 January 1989, the first day Emperor Akihito succeeded
to the throne.

31
unemployment – especially the large layoffs stemming from the state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) reforms at the conclusion of the last century – were concerning the CCP but
China somehow minimized their impacts and continued to drive the nation’s economy.
China’s state-led Economic Stimulus Plan (known as 「擴大內需十項措施」in
Chinese) during the 2007-8 Global Financial Crisis encouraged public infrastructure
development, post-earthquake reconstruction works in Sichuan, rural development and
technology advancement programs, sustainable development, educational, cultural and
family planning programs, etc. According to a report from the World Bank, China’s
growth rate rose from the estimated 6.5% to 7.2% in 2009, suggesting a better economy.
Entering 2010, China’s economic growth was sustained by the stimulus program, which
also drove employment in the sectors of manufacturing, steel, cement and other sectors.
32

China even began to assist some neighboring states in their economy recovery.
33

Because China has experienced an economic miracle in the two decades and Japan was
declining at the same period, Beijing was ambitious to take the opportunity re-arrange the
order of politics in the East Asian region. Although Deng Xiaoping promised in 1974 at
the UN General Assembly that China would never seek the path to be a hegemonic
superpower, today’s China is targeting not only Japan but also the United States – to

32
In the article of Wall Street Journal, “China’s Looming Real-Estate Bubble,” a massive
Keynesian spending program has misallocated capital and set the stage for a crisis.
Source:
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704407804575425600708056076
(Retrieved on December 2, 2013).
33
Source:
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703882304575464842437541292
(Retrieved on December 1, 2013)

32
replace Japan in the East Asian region first, and then the United States in the world, as
most Chinese people believe.
A more appalling thought among Chinese might be “Tian Xia.”
34
With this
concept, China may intend to promote the “Chinese model of world order that is
universally valid.” Never forgetting the national humiliation imposed by the westerners in
the past century and feeling proud of its four thousand years of rich civilization together
with two millennia of Chinese empirical history, China may be getting ready to re-
establish a Sino-centric order – this time, not a regional order but a world order that
includes western countries. Boasting slogans like “peaceful rise” or “harmonious
society”, China is practicing what Aaron Friedberg calls a “hiding-its-capabilities-and-
advancing-incrementally” strategy.
Conclusion
This article argues that the breakdown in the Sino-Japanese relations is unavoidable as
China chose to pursue an ultimate goal of becoming a world superpower. The shifting
conditions both in China and Japan, together with the international developments,
provide explanations to this breakdown. China treated Japan as a friend until the mid-
1990s because China sincerely liked Japan, especially after Tokyo initiated generous
ODA programs to help Beijing develop its economy. The Japanese favorability towards
the People’s Republic finds its origin in the then-international development and business
purposes. The troubled U.S.-Japanese relations in the 1970s also made Japan gauge its
unbalanced relations with China. The amicable relations were sustained until China
decided to break up. The CCP played on Japan’s historical burden to secure its ruling

34
Tianxia or 天下, meaning All-under-Heaven.

33
legitimacy after the Tian’anmen Incident, successfully transforming a domestic
government-people crisis into an international people-people one. Facing the provocation,
Japan did not make efforts to repair the relations but further fanned the flame. Then
China made a decision to compete against and finally substitute a declining Japan, as its
ambition to claim hegemony incubated.

In terms of China’s efforts in bringing down Sino-Japanese relations, the reasons stem
from its one-party system. The Chinese Communist Party has a good knowledge of how
to secure its legitimacy in China. Since public resentment toward the ruling party is
somewhat seething in China, CCP can only keep its job and earn credits from the Chinese
people by sustaining China’s economic growth and developing their “motherland” into a
strong power. To sum up, this breakdown in the Sino-Japanese relations demonstrates the
continuity and discontinuity of international relations. The shift in the Sino-Japanese
relations sheds light on the articulation between domestic governance and international
political opportunity structure (IPOS) to which current literature pays little attention.
Historical and societal complexes provide an explanation of changes in international
relations.

34
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Bush, Richard. 2010. Perils of Proximity: Sino-Japan Security Relations.
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Asset Metadata

Creator Zhang, Yuxin Anthony (author)

Core Title From amity to enmity: the breakdown in Sino-Japanese relations

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publication Date 06/05/2014

Defense Date 06/05/2014

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag breakdown,domestic affairs,international affairs,OAI-PMH Harvest,Sino-Japanese relations

Format application/pdf (imt)

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Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Lynch, Daniel C. (committee chair), Cooper, Eugene (committee member), Rosen, Stanley (committee member)

Creator Email yuhsin.a.chang@gmail.com,yuxinz@usc.edu

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Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA