South Korean presidential power during the process of democratization: Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo, and Kim Young Sam

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Content INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9’ black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. ProQuest Information and Learning 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 800-521-0600 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. South Korean Presidential Power during the Process o f Democratization: Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo, and Kim Young Sam by Jeong-jin Lee A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment o f the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (POLITICAL SCIENCE) August 2000 Copyright 2000 Jeong-jin Lee Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 3041488 ___ ® UMI UMI Microform 3041488 Copyright 2002 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90007 This dissertatiorir written by ............................ under the direction of h. Dissertation Committee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of re quirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Dean of Graduate Studies Date ....■J.y.iy.P.9 .9 . DISSERTATION COMMITTEE Chairperson Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS u List o f Tables .......................................................................................................... iii Abstract iv Chapter I. Introduction ................................................................................. 1 1. Purpose of the S tudy................................................................ 1 2. Literature R eview ...................................................................... 3 3. Concept of P o w er...................................................................... 12 4. Research D esign........................................................................ 19 Chapter II. Democratization o f Korean Politics and the Support o f the People .. 24 Chapter III. Presidential Power in Managing the Real-name Financial System ... 46 Chapter IV. Presidential Power in Supporting the Presidential Candidate of the Government Party ............................................................... 77 Chapter V. Policy toward North Korea and Socialist Countries .................. 123 Chapter VI. Conclusion .......................................................................................... 171 Glossary 179 Chronology ................................................................................................................... 180 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 185 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF TABLES h i 2-1 Major Economic Indicators............................................................................... 28 2-2 Number o f Student Demonstrations (1981-1987)......................................... 30 2-3 Labor Disputes and Wage Increases................................................................. 33 2-4 Number o f Student Demonstrations (1988-1992)......................................... 34 2-5 Polls Evaluating President Roh Tae W oo........................................................ 36 2-6 Polls Evaluating the Early Period o f the 6th R epublic................................ 37 2-7 Polls Evaluating Roh’s Performance during the Whole 6th R epublic 38 2-8 Polls Evaluating President Kim Young S a m ................................................... 39 2-9 Relationship between the Result of a Poll and the Government Policy: Three Years during the Presidency of President Kim and President Roh ... 41 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT iv The purpose o f this study is to examine the changing basis o f presidential power from 1980 to 1997 through three specific issues: the real-name financial system, presidential succession, and the northern policy. The hypothesis is that with the process o f democratization the basis of presidential power has shifted from a reliance on force to a reliance on public support. Although three Presidents tried to implement a Real-name Financial System, Chun and Roh failed to execute this reform due to the resistance o f the business interest groups, on whom they depended for financial support, and conservative politicians. Kim successfully enforced the new financial system on the basis of strong public support in his early presidency, but had to amend the reformed financial system after he lost public support in the later part of his presidency. Chun chose Roh as his successor, training him in various positions, supporting Roh as the candidate for the presidential election, at the same time maintaining his influence even after Roh was selected as the presidential candidate. Roh, through the merger o f three parties, picked and supported Kim Young Sam as the next presidential candidate because he was the only person who could defeat the opposition leader in the presidential election. During Kim’s presidency, public support became a very important power resource for the President and presidential candidates. After Kim lost public support, he lost any influence in selecting the presidential candidate. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Chun and Roh executed a northern policy, utilizing a few persons and the information agency. During Kim’s regime, various actors took part in the northern policy and the influence o f public opinion increased substantially, changing the President’s role to that o f coordinator. These case studies show that pubic support has become an important power resource of the President implying that, with the progress o f democratization, the President or, under the parliamentary system, the Prime Minister can be powerful when they are supported by the people. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Chapter I. Introduction 1 1. Purpose of the Study The purpose o f this study is to examine whether the power o f South Korean Presidents has changed with the democratization process, and if so, how it has changed, from 1980 to 1997, i.e., during the administration o f Chun Doo Hwan (August, 1980 - February, 1988), Roh Tae Woo (February, 1988 - February, 1993), and Kim Young Sam (February, 1993 - February, 1998). South Korea has experienced the progress in democratization since the mid-1980s. In 1980, Chun Doo Hwan was elected the 11th President by indirect election without public support. But in 1987, Roh Tae Woo was elected President by direct election, made possible by the resistance o f the people against the non-democratic electoral system and authoritarian ruling system. This election was more democratic and fair than any former presidential election. In 1992, Kim Young Sam won in a presidential election under even more democratic conditions.1 With the development of democracy, we may infer, arbitrary presidential 1 A premise o f this dissertation is that democracy in South Korea has been advancing since the middle of the 5th Republic (1980-1987). This process will be explained in Chapters II and IV. In addition, the changing electoral system demonstrates the democratization process. Until the 19th century, political scientists had defined democracy in terms o f values, which should be secured by the state, such as the people's liberty and basic rights, social and political equality, and the reflection o f public opinion in policies. As political science has assumed the form o f an empirical science, the most important aspect of democracy has been understood as the institutional procedure o f electing officials by regular elections. The reason they regard election as the most important component o f democracy is that political parties and candidates tend to follow public opinion through the process o f competition to be elected. The government party tries to attain public support by executing polices in favor of the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. power against the rules and interests of other institutions diminishes owing to the reflection o f public opinion through regular and fair electoral system, development of the rule o f law among institutions, and a free press and open criticism by opposition groups and parties. In South Korea, however, many people think that the President, even after democratization, still maintains authoritarian power exercised through non institutionalized procedures, leading to inefficient decision-making. They consider that many policies of President Kim Young Sam, who was elected by democratic electoral procedure and was the first President with a civilian background since 1961,2 were not effective because of his arbitrary exercise o f presidential power. The failure in economic policy is regarded as the reason for bringing in the intervention of the IMF. On the basis of this assumption, three major presidential candidates for 15th President, at the end of 1997, made public promises to consider the parliamentary system should they win the election, because they laid the responsibility of power concentration to the presidential system. people, and the opposition parties criticize government policies and present alternatives to win elections. Lee Kap Yun, Hangukui Seongeowa Miniuiuui (Election and Regionalism o f S. Korea) (Seoul: Oreum Publishing Co., 1997), pp. 11-13. The Korean electoral system has become fairer and more institutionalized with the lapse o f time. In this sense, I define that President Roh’ s regime was more democratic than President Chun's, and President Kim's regime was more democratic than President Roh's. 2 Choi Kyu Ha, who also had civilian background, succeeded the Presidency for eight months after President Park Jung Hee was assassinated. However, Choi was chosen by an indirect election, on the basis o f the constitution o f the 4th Republic, and was forced to resign the presidency by the military. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 However, opinion that the power is still concentrated in the President is based on simple observation and impressionistic evidence. It is not certain whether presidential power has changed or not. Actually, presidential power may vary in accordance with the period and field we observe. For example, President Kim Young Sam, who was powerful enough to implement several reform policies in the early stage, could not exercise much power in the last year o f his presidency. In this research, I am going to examine empirically whether the presidential power has been actually changed or not. The power of three Presidents since 1980, in the context o f the progress o f democratization, will be studied in terms o f their influence on major decisions in the economic, political, and diplomatic fields. On the basis o f these facts, I will infer the reason for change in or continuation o f Presidential power. 2. Literature Review In the old institutionalism literature, formal institutions were regarded as the main factors on which a state and its social and political systems are built. The scholars in this category thought that such institutions can be changed by law, and the state itself is the most important institution. Criticizing the old institutionalism on the basis that Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 formal rule and government structure cannot explain real political process, in the 1960s and 1970s, many scholars of political science tended to portray political phenomena as the aggregate consequences o f individual behavior, and emphasized the importance of informal power distribution, attitude, and political behavior. More recently, however, some scholars added the older concern of institutions to these theoretical elements. The new institutionalism tends to move beyond the descriptive traditions o f the old institutionalism. 3 The scholars of the new institutionalism define political institutions as the rules o f game, including informal rules such as routines, customs, compliance procedure, or even social norms; hence they are interested in not only describing formal structures and constitutions, but also discovering the deep structure and rules of the game which influence political behavior. In the public choice field, the new institutionalism investigates the role o f institutional elements and “raises questions about the way in which institutional factors influence actors’ utilities and preferred solutions to collective action problems.” 4 The new- institutional approach is pertinent not only to the study o f advanced countries such as the U.S., the U.K., and Japan with regard to how well their institutional framework functions, but also for the newly democratized countries in terms of their choice of 3 Vivien Lowndes, "Varieties of New Institutionalism: A Critical Appraisal," Public Administration. Vol. 74 (Summer 1996), p. 183. 4 Ibid.; Elinor Ostrom, “An Agenda for the Study o f Institutions,” Public Choice. Vol. 48, p. 3; Robert E. Goodin and Klingemann, Hans-Eieter, A New Handbook o f Political Science (Oxford Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 146-152. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. political institutions, an important factor in coping with problems such as economic development, political and social integration, and public demand on scarce resources.5 On the one hand, for Latin American countries, the debate over the choice o f institutions is centered around which system o f government is better for democracy, a presidential system or a parliamentary system. Linz and Valenzuela are representative scholars who criticize the Latin American presidential system. Linz argues that the presidential system is not an appropriate system for making democratic progress, compared with parliamentary system, because the presidential system is more rigid and conflictual than parliamentary system. First, both the president and the legislature are elected for fixed terms which are independent from each other, leading to the rigidity o f the presidential system. Second, because both the president and an elected legislature have democratic legitimacy, it is not easy to compromise when there is a conflict between the president and legislature. And third, the control o f the executive in presidential systems is based on the "winner take all" principle, resulting in a tendency to lead to conflict and extreme confrontation.6 On the other hand, the debate over the presidential system in South Korea has been focused on the presidential system as the source of pow er concentration in the 5 R. Kent Weaver and Rockman, Bert A., (eds.) Do Institutions Matter?: Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 1. 6 Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1994), pp. 5-16. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 President. In South Korea, there have been institutional studies o f the electoral system and the system o f government since the 1950s. However, this debate was dormant under the authoritarian regimes o f President Park and Chun from 1960 to the mid 1980s. Before the presidential election in 1987, debates again arose among politicians and scholars about a constitutional amendment for a parliamentary system. They believed that the presidential system had helped to concentrate the power o f the President, yielding many problems and retarding the democratization process. While he was still in office, President Roh Tae Woo expressed a preference for the parliamentary system as the government system to follow his incumbency. During President Kim Young Sam ’s period, many people blamed the presidential system for the fact that the President was still too powerful, and raised the issue o f the parliamentary system as a complement or a replacement of the presidential system. Even the current government was established on the basis o f a promise, between the parties o f Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil prior to the presidential election in 1997, to change the government system to a parliamentary system.7 There have been many scholarly studies on the system of government and concentration o f power in S. Korea, most o f which were based on legal analysis and showed preference for a specific system using the examples of other countries. Myung- nam Lee, in his article, "The Relevance o f Presidentialism to Korea," argues that 7 Kim Jong Pil’s party seceded from the coalition government before the general election for the legislature in April 13, 2000. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 presidentialism is a better system than parliamentarianism in terms o f the separation of the three powers and stability, and prefers the presidential system for S. Korea on the basis of certain Korean political, social, and cultural characteristics, such as frequent realignment o f political parties, non-institutionalized sponsorship between politicians and businessmen, and the existence o f North Korea.8 Chang Suk Kwon, in his article, "The Principle and Value of Parliamentarianism," insists that the presidential system in S. Korea leads to an authoritarian regime and prefers the parliamentary system on the basis of studies o f the parliamentary systems in other countries.9 Lee Jong Sang examines the difference between the Korean presidential system and the American presidential system in terms o f their legal aspects, insisting that the former is not appropriate for the development o f democracy. He insists that the Korean presidential system needs to adopt institutions o f the American presidential system, such as the vice- presidential system, a four-year term permitting one reelection, and a bicameral system.1 0 8 Lee Myong Nam, “Hangukeseo Daetongryeongjeui Jeoksilseong” ("The Relevance of Presidentialism to Korea)", Hankuk Jeongchihakhoebo (Korean Political Science Review), Vol. 30, No. 4, (Korean Political Science Association, 1996), pp. 229-247. 9 Chang Suk Kwon, “Uiwonnaegakjeui Bonjilgwa Gachi” ("The Principle and Value of Parliamentarianism)”, Dangukdae Beobhaknonchong (The Collection of Treatises of the Department o f Law). Vol. 16 (Dankook University Press, 1990), pp. 1-25. 1 0 Lee Chong Sang, "Miguk Deatongryeongjeui Hanguk Heonbeopeui Suyong" ("Adoption o f the American Presidential System into the Korean Constitution"), Miguk Heonbeop Yeongu, Vol. 2, 1991, pp. 131-183. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 Most other studies about the government system indicate that S. Korean Presidents are too powerful owing to the presidential system.1 1 These studies show effectively the differences between the presidential system and parliamentary system and the merits and defects o f both. However, while they assert the superiority o f a parliamentary system on the basis o f the cases o f other countries and try to adapt these aspects to South Korea, or acknowledge that power is concentrated in the President under the South Korean presidential system, their studies lack the support o f empirical verification. In addition, many scholars examine presidential power in general. However, they do not empirically analyze presidential power in relation to other actors and public pressure, but look at presidential leadership style. Kim Byung Moon, in his article, "The Leadership of Korean Presidents and Democratization," examines three Korean Presidents: Lee Seung Man (1948-1960), Park Jung Hee (1963-1979), and Chun Doo 1 1 Kim Ho Jin, "1990ui Jeongbuhyeongtae" ("System of Government in 1990: the Presidential System and the Parliamentary System"), Saneopsahoewa Hangukieongchiui gwaie. (The Korean Political Science Association, 1990), pp. 1-10; Yang Kun, "Jeongbuhyeongtae-e Gwanhan Yeongu" ("A Study o f the System o f Government"), Hanvangdaehakgvo Beophak Nonchong. Vol. 12, 1995, pp. 197-210; Chang Suk Kwon, "Hanguke-isseo Daetongryeongjewa Geu Munjejeome Gwanhan Gochal" ("The Presidential System o f Korea and the Problem"), Dangukdaehakvo Beophak Nonchong. Vol. 17, 1991, pp. 1-22; Kim Chung Nam, “21segireul Hyanghan Daetongryeongje Gaehyeokron" ("Reformation o f Presidential System for 21st Century"), Wolganchosun. May, 1992, pp. 99-113; Koo Byung Sak, "Uiwonnaegakje- haui Haengjeonggwon Tongje" ("Control o f Executive Power under the Parliamentary System: Compared with under the Presidential System"), Wolgan Gosi. Vol. 201, 1990, pp. 14-22; Choi Yohan, "Daetongryeongjewa Naegakjeui Jangdanjeom Bigyo" ("A Comparative Study of the Presidential and Parliamentary System"), Heonieong. Vol. 94, March, 1990, pp. 43-47. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 Hwan( 1980-1988).1 2 He examines their personalities and social backgrounds, and compares their policies on the basis o f their leadership style. He argues that Presidents Park and Chun, who have a military background, relied more on various restrictive laws than President Lee, interrupting the development o f democracy. Similarly, some studies examine President Roh Tae W oo’s leadership style. Most o f these studies concluded that Roh was neither powerful nor effective in policy implementation because he had an indecisive character. Similar studies examining the relationship between leadership style and style o f decision-making or power execution were carried out by Choi Jang Jip, Chung Yun Jae, Chung Chung Woo, and other scholars.1 3 These studies show that leadership style is a factor which influences the decision-making process. However, these studies do not show whether a President was really strong or weak, and the reasons for his strength or weakness on the basis o f his relations with other actors. 1 2 Kim Byung Moon, "Hanguk Deatongryeongui Leadershipgwa Minjuhwa" ("The Leadership of Korean Presidents and Democratization"), Collection o f Treatises in 1996, (The Korean Political Science Association, 1996), pp. 1-22. 1 3 Choi Jang Jip, "Hangukjeongchiui Gwollyeokgujo Munje" ("The Power Structure of Korean Politics: The Consolidation of Democracy and the New Leadership Style"), 97nyeondo Chungcheongjihoe Haksulhoeui (Conference in Chungcheong Province in 1997), (The Korean Political Science Association, 1997), pp. 9-19; Chung Yoon Jae, "Hangukjeongchie Daehan Leadershipjeok Bipan-gwa Cheobang" ("The Critique and Solution of Leadership in Korean Politics"), 97nveondo Chungcheongjihoe Haksulhoeui (Conference in Chungcheong Province in 1997), (The Korean Political Science Association, 1997), pp. 21-34; Chung Chung Woo, Deatongryeongui Gveongje Leadership. (Presidential Leadership in Economic Policy Management), 1995; Koo Kwang Mo, Deatongrveongnon (Presidential Leadership), 1984; Lee Chong Bum, "Deatongryeongui Leadership Teukseonggwa Gukjeonggwalli Yuhyeong" ("Kim Young Sam's Leadership and Govemability"), Korean Public Administration Review, Vol. 28, No. 4, (The Korean Association for Public Administration, 1994), pp. 1127- 1135; Ahn Byung Man, "Yeokdaetongchijaui Leadershipyeongu" ("A Study of Presidential Leadership"), Chungye Haksuldaehoe (Conference in Spring. 1998). (The Korean Association for Public Administration, 1998), pp. 251-277; and etc. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10 There are also recent case studies examining whether power is really concentrated in the President. However, most of them are focused on the presidential influence upon a specific policy area, and it is not appropriate to assume that presidential power as indicated in such a case can be extended to presidential influence on national governance. Chung Chung Kil, in his article, "Presidential Decision making in Economic Policy," looks at President Roh's economic policy-making style, compared with that of President Chun.1 4 He argues that bureaucrats played a more important role in economic policy-making in Roh's period, and that President Roh's influence in managing policy execution became weaker. Chin Kwang Myung studied which actors were involved in the policy-making of "The Real-name Financial System" in the last three Presidential periods.1 3 He concluds that, for the periods o f these three Presidents, political events such as the alignment of political parties resulted in a delay o f the execution o f this financial system, and business groups who were major supporters o f politicians were the biggest opponents of this system. He insists that one o f the reasons that President Kim Young Sam 1 4 Chung Chung Kil, "Deatongryeongui Jeongchaekgyeoljeong" ("Presidential Decision-making in Economic Policy"), KJPA. Vol. 29, No.2, pp. 52-77. 1 3 Chin Kwang Myung, "Yeokdae Jeongbuui Keumyungsilmyeongje Jeongchaek Hyeongseonggwa Sinjeongbuui Jeongchaekgwaje" ("The Policy o f the Real-name Financial System in Each President's Period and the Task of the New Government"), 98nveon Chunavehaksuldaehoe (A Collection of Articles from the Spring Conference in 1998). (The Korean Association for Public Administration, 1998), pp. 1-20. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 succeeded in executing this financial system was that he hired a bureaucrat who was in favor o f this financial system as the leader o f the policy-making team, while President Roh failed in implementing this financial system due to the replacement of the policy-making team leader with a conservative during the preparation process. Regarding the policy toward North Korea and socialist countries, Yoo Ho Yul looked at the policy-making process in President Kim's period.1 6 He found that the role o f the conferences coordinating the opinions o f government institutions became important in policy-making toward North Korea, however. President Kim was inconsistency and was strongly affected by the opinion of the press.1 7 These studies show how critical presidential influence was in a particular policy-making process. However, these cannot show the how powerful a president was in governing the country compared with other presidents. In addition, most o f these studies do not account for all the other actors who had influence on policy-making process, especially the role of public support. 1 6 Yoo Ho Yul, "Hangukui Tongiljeongchaek" (“The Structure and Process of Unification Policy-making in South Korea: 1993-1994"), Segyeiilseoui Bveonhwawa Hanbando Tongil, Vol. 4, (The Korean Political Science Association, 1994), pp. 955- 977. 1 7 There are other case studies of the President's role in policy-making: Kim Jong Lim, "Deatongryeongui Jeongchaekyeokhallon - Irongwa Silje" ("The Role o f the President in Policy-making - Theory and Reality"), Deatongrveonggwa Jeongchaek, (The Korean Association for Public Administration, 1992), pp. 4-23; Kim Kang Nyeong, "Hangukui Tongiljeongchaek" ("An Analysis o f the Kim Young Sam Administration's Reunification Policy"), Segyeiilseoui Bveonhwawa Hanbando Tongil, Vol. 4, (The Korean Political Science Association, 1994), pp. 1005-1024; and etc. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12 These studies of presidential power, which examined the legal aspects o f the presidential system, presidential power in terms o f leadership, and presidential influence in specific policy areas have limitations in measuring presidential power. In this study, I will measure presidential power empirically with respect to relations with all other actors which influence the decision-making process, and examine important policies in which the presidential decision is critical and other important groups take part. Through this process, I will look at the presidential influence on national governance. In addition, I will explain the importance o f public support and the media in democratic regimes, which has not been systematically examined before. 3. Concept o f Power It is not easy to measure power empirically because there are many aspects o f power and many opinions on how to operationalize it. Before looking at measuring power, I will introduce works which define the meaning o f ‘pow er’ and ‘influence.’ Hoogerwerf defines power as “the possibility to influence the behavior o f others in accordance with the actor's own purposes; on the other hand, influence occurs wherever behavior leads to change in the behavior o f others. In his view, power is a potential influence in accordance with the ends o f an actor.” 1 8 Brian Barry suggests that the 18 A. Hoogerwerf, Politicologie, Begrippen en Problemen. (Samson: Alphen aan den Rijn, 1972). Cited from Brian Barry, Power and Political Theory: Some European Perspectives. (New York: John Wiley, 1976), p. 36. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13 characteristic feature o f “power is given by the possibility to restrict or expand freedom o f action, or the capacity to preserve that freedom to a given degree. This can be achieved by the application of force, coercion and sanction, but also through the allocation o f necessary resources. On the other hand, influence can be characterized as the possibility to determine the outcomes o f the behavior o f others, without the restriction or expansion o f their freedom o f action."1 9 According to Dahl, A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.2 0 Dahl defines influence as having nearly the same meaning in his later work. "Influence is a relation among actors in which one actor induces other actors to act in some way they would not otherwise act." In this work, Dahl defines power “as a special case of influence involving severe losses for noncompliance."2 1 In this dissertation, Dahl's definition of'pow er' and 'influence' will apply. Dahl defines five ways o f measuring influence in accordance with three aspects o f influence. One aspect of influence is its strength, which can be measured in three ways. First, influence can be measured by the amount o f change in the position of the actor influenced. This method has weaknesses in that we cannot always know the real initial position o f the actors when they conceal their real position for bargaining and the 1 9 Brian Barry, op. cit., p. 37. 2 0 Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science. 2 (reprinted in Bell, et al., 1969, 79-93), pp. 201-215. Cited from Brian Barry, op. cit., p. 36. 2 1 Robert Dahl, Modem Political Analysis, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970), pp. 17, 32. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14 amount o f change is not always measurable. Second, it can be measured by the costs to the actor o f complying. For example, for a union leader, it would be easier to persuade the members who have savings to vote for a strike than the members without savings. This method cannot always be applied because sometimes we do not know what the actors’ real psychological costs of compliance are. Third, influence can be measured by the amount o f difference in the probability o f compliance. Although 59 out o f 60 Democratic senators vote for a bill proposed by a Democratic President, we must know how many Democratic senators would have voted for the bill anyway, even if the President had taken no position on it at all. However, good estimates of probabilities require either random events or a large number of past occurrences o f equivalent events. A second aspect of influence which should be considered is the differences in the scope of the responses. We need to compare the relative influence o f actors influencing other actors on different kinds of issues. However, sometimes it is not easy to find which of major actors is the most influential over the whole scope o f their influence. A third aspect we can consider is the number o f persons who respond. If A controls 5,000 supporters and B controls 10,000, B may be considered more influential than B. However, this case needs to be considered in the relations with the amount of change because A may be able to induce his supporters to make a greater change in their positions than B can.2 2 2 2 Ibid., pp. 19-25. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 15 Many scholars approach the method o f measuring power in other ways. David Ricci classified the methods o f measuring power in three categories, i.e., reputational, positional, and decision-making approaches, including Dahl’s method in decision making approaches.2 3 First, the reputational approach, used by Floyd Hunter when he examined power in the city o f Atlanta, Georgia, lists persons o f repute and then conducts interviews to validate the list. Second, the positional approach, represented by C. Wright Mills who states that "in our time the pivotal moment ... arises, and at that moment, small circles ... decide or fail to decide," identifies the 'power elite' on the basis o f their position in a corporation, bank, foundation, or the like. And third, Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby distinguish potential and actual power, then insist we must study events, situations in which power is being exercised, that is, decisions. Polsby argues that "identifying ‘who prevails in decision-making’ seems the best way to determine which individuals and groups have more power in social life, because direct conflict between actors presents a situation most closely approximating an experimental test of their capacities to affect outcomes."2 4 Dahl’ s explanation o f his method in Who Governs? is "to determine for each decision which participants had initiated alternatives that were finally adopted, had vetoed alternatives initiated by others, or had proposed alternatives that were turned down. Their actions were then tabulated as individual 2 3 David Ricci, Community Power and Democratic Theory (Random House, 1971), pp. 87-143. 2 4 N.W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven, Conn. and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 3-4. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16 successes or defeats. The participants with the greatest proportion o f success out of the total number o f successes were then considered to be the most influential."2 5 Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz show another view o f power. They emphasize the diffuseness o f power operation, claiming that power has two faces, i.e., a "two-dimensional view.” First, power is embodied and reflected in decisions and decision-making. Second, power exists to the extent that a person or group creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts by non-decision making when decision-making results are not beneficial to the interests o f the decision-maker. Such power, however, only shows up where there is conflict.2 6 Steven Lukes, criticizing the two-dimensional view as being too behavioristic and individualistic, adds one more face o f power in his “three-dimensional view.” He argues that power may be exercised not only with observable conflicts or grievances but also with latent conflicts of interests. He insists that potential issues can be kept out o f politics in many ways, such as through 2 5 Robert Dahl, Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven, Conn. and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1961), p. 336; Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (NY: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1974), pp. 12. 2 6 P. Bachrach and M. S. Baratz, Power and Poverty in Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 7, 8, 44, 49.; Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (NY: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1974), pp. 16-20; Steven Lukes, Moral Conflict and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 135. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17 the operation o f social forces and institutional practices or through individuals' decisions.2 7 This research will measure the Korean Presidents’ general influence in policy making under the presidential system by examining the influence o f different actors aligned on different sides o f different issues. The main actors, including those who initiate, support, or oppose a policy, are different for each issue. In that sense, Dahl's approach to measuring power in decision-making is most appropriate and practicable for this research. Although Dahl’s five measures o f influence help to illuminate important aspects o f influence, each has limitations. Therefore, a valid measure o f relative influence needs to incorporate several measures.2 8 In each chapter, Dahl’s measures adapted to examine that specific issue will be clarified. Dahl’s measure o f influence according to the differences in the scope o f responses is applied in the sense that I will look at the influence o f the Presidents in three issue areas. Dahl’s measures o f influence according to the amount o f change in the actor influenced and according to the number o f persons who respond are applied to all three issues in general. The measures for costs to the 2 7 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (NY: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1974), pp. 21-25; Steven Lukes, Moral Conflict and Politics (Clarendon Press; Oxford, 1991), p. 136; David Held, op. cit., p. 213. 2 8 Robert Dahl, Modem Political Analysis. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970), p. 25. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18 actor of complying and difference in probability of compliance are applied to a few issues. In relation to the analysis o f the change in Presidential power among regimes, I am going to look at whether the power resources of the President have been changed between the authoritarian regime and the democratic regime. We may expect that the major power resource o f the actors in an authoritarian regime which did not have legitimacy would be coercive force supported by government institutions, while, in a democratic society, public support would become a very important source o f power for political actors. Public support for each President Roh and Kim will be measured by the results of the Gallup Korea poll, and that for President Chun will be determined by the analysis o f Chun’s use o f coercive power and the protests o f people against Chun’s regime. There are two aspects o f public support. One is general public support for the president which enables him to exercise more power in whatever area or policy, revealed in high-percentage support rates in the polls. The second is public support for a particular issue, revealed in specific questions in the polls or expressed through the same opinion by most o f the press.2 9 Public support is most significant when these two come together. 2 9 In South Korea, some media tend to be in favor of a certain group, such as capital, conservatives, or labor. However, most o f them have not acknowledged their orientation officially and deny that they are representing the interest o f a particular Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19 4. Research Design For the purpose of this research, I am going to look at the presidential influence on major policy-making processes. However, it is not easy to measure presidential influence in policy-making. First, the President exerts his influence on policy-making in all cases because he has to give final approval o f policies. Second, depending on his leadership style, a President may take an active role in policy-making or commit authority to other actors or institutions. Though a President may be very powerful, he may not show an active influence on a certain policy-making process. Accordingly, the presidential role should be analyzed in relation to other actors, and major policy areas where the President's influence can be measured should be studied. In order to identify the role o f different actors in policy-making, T. J. Pempel examined the aspects o f variation in the policy-making processes in his study o f Japan. He emphasized the variation along four dimensions: the political actors involved, the manner in which they are aligned on a specific question, the intensity o f conflict among them, and the organizational matrix within which that conflict is resolved and through group. In this research, the opinion o f the press will be cited only when most of the press have similar opinion regarding a issue. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20 which the policy is formulated.3 0 In keeping with the method o f Dahl and Pempel, in this research I am going to analyze nine decisions through the following procedure and method. First, for each issue, several actors whose interest is involved will be chosen, for example, the President, presidential aides, the government party, the opposition party, bureaucrats, the military, interest groups, the press, and public opinion. Second, 1 will identify each actor's motivation and interest regarding the issue. Third, each actor's position and role during the decision-making process and their influence on the process will be examined. The interaction o f actors will be focused on main actors’ orientations and other actors’ attitudes toward them. And finally, the outcome as the result of the actors' interaction will be analyzed. When the President exerts an important influence on a decision-making process and obtains the result he intended, the President may be regarded as powerful; and when the President prevails against other actors’ opposition and achieves his intended result, the President can be considered more powerful. The hypothesis o f this research is as follows. The power o f Korean Presidents has changed with the progress of democratization, through a change in the relative importance of power resources. While the power resources o f the authoritarian regime were reward and punishment through the coercive force o f the authoritarian government institutions, as democratization has improved and the electoral system has been institutionalized, public support became an important power resource for the President and other political actors, with a strong influence in the policy-making process. 3 0 T. J. Pempel, Policy-making in Contemporary Japan (Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 272. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21 Three Presidents' periods will be examined in this research: President Chun Doo Hwan (1980-1987), Roh Tae Woo (1988-1992), and Kim Young Sam (1993-1997). In order to measure each President's power, I have chosen three issues in three policy fields, respectively, for each President’s period. The three policy fields are the economy, politics and political parties, and diplomacy and national defense. The issue in each field had to involve important decisions requiring final Presidential approval, and to show the position o f each actor o f the period; and the issues had to be related and have consistency in order to be compared in three periods. The appropriate issue chosen for this research is not only a significant one, but also one in which the motive and position o f the actors have been revealed in the decision making process, and for which enough data and materials are available. For the economic issue, I chose “The Law o f Real-name Financial System.” The banking system o f Korea, similar to Japan’s but different from that o f the U.S., allowed the using of false names or the names o f others instead o f using the account owner’s real name. The people who earned money inappropriately could save money without paying taxes by using false or others' name. In addition, businessmen could give bribes to politicians using this system. Since President Chun's early term, the government tried to make and enforce “The Law o f Real-name Financial System.” However, Presidents Chun and Roh failed in enforcing this financial system because o f the opposition o f other actors, such as big businesses, conservative politicians, etc., resulting in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22 postponing the implementation date. President Kim was able to enforce the Real- name Financial System against the opposition o f the vested interest groups, depending on public opinion, which supported the reform policy in his early presidency. However, when he lost public support owing to the failure in a few policies and the scandal of his son, this financial system was abrogated as the opposition groups wanted. In the political field, the Presidents’ power within the government party has been chosen. In Korea, the President has had great influence in choosing his successor - the next presidential candidate o f the government party. Though this process happens in the later period o f the presidency, we can find how powerful the President was even until the later period o f service by examining the relationship among actors in this process. President Chun had decisive influence on nominating his successor, and maintained his power within the government party even after Roh was determined as the presidential candidate. President Roh had to compromise with Kim Young Sam until Kim was elected as the next presidential candidate. After that, Roh became weaker. President Kim, who lost public support in the later part o f his term, did not have influence on choosing the next presidential candidate o f the government party. An appropriate diplomatic policy o f South Korea which has the same basic purpose and comparability through the three periods is the policy toward North Korea and socialist countries (northern policy). Chun established and implemented the northern policy using mainly the information agency o f the government, and Roh improved the relations with socialist countries and N. Korea, utilizing secret envoys and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23 the information agency. While former two presidents were not much influenced by public opinion regarding northern policy, in Kim’s regime, after democratization, a number of various actors participated in northern policy, representing each social group, and the influence o f public opinion and the press increased. The President’s role in the northern policy was changed from critical decision-making to coordinating the different opinions o f various actors. However, Kim failed to coordinate the positions of various actors’ positions, following the change in public opinion because, on the one hand, he did not have the capability, and on the other hand, he lost public support in his later term. In each chapter, Dahl’s theoretical model applied to that specific issue will be explained; and the study will be focused on the influence and interaction o f major actors, with an examination of the role o f actors aligned on different sides. The extent to which the major power resource has been shifted from coercive force to public opinion during the democratization process will also be examined. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24 Chapter II. Democratization of Korean Politics and the Support of the People As noted in Chapter I, the purpose of this study is to examine the changing basis o f presidential power during the administrations o f President Chun Doo Hvvan (1980- 1987), Roh Tae Woo (1988-1992), and Kim Young Sam (1993-1997). The hypothesis is that with the process o f democratization the basis o f presidential power has shifted from a reliance on force to a reliance on public support. This chapter discusses changes in the reliance on coercive force vs. public support under the three presidents. The subsequent chapters will analyze the relationship between democratization and the changing support base of the presidential power looking at three specific issues: the real-name financial system, presidential succession, and the northern policy. President Chun, who held the reins o f power in 1980 as a result of a coup, ruled through the coercive force of government institutions without legitimacy or the support o f the people. The people accepted the legitimacy o f the subsequent President Roh, who came into power through direct election, but did not give strong support to him throughout the whole 6th Republic. He made progress in democratization, however, and his use of coercive force in ruling was reduced. President Kim was the first President who had had a civilian background since 1961. He began his term with the slogan o f reform o f society, and was fully supported by the people in the early period of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25 his presidency, without using coercive power. After the failure o f economic policies and the resulting national economic crisis, however, he totally lost this support. During the process o f democratization, popular support of the presidents was measured through polls. The official survey o f public opinion regarding the performance o f the President in South Korea was begun by Gallup Korea in 1991. Prior to that time, surveys were executed by private institutions, the press, or the government, mostly regarding voting behavior and other specific issues. In the 5th Republic (President Chun’s period), most newspapers were under the control of the government, hence, even though there were some surveys regarding the government’s performance, they are not reliable. For the early period o f the 6th Republic (President Roh’s period), there were a few reliable surveys executed by private institutions and the press on the performance of the President and the government. Consequently, in this dissertation, public support for the President in the period o f Presidents Roh and Kim will be represented by the results o f polls, and that for President Chun will be determined by analysis based on Chun’s use o f coercive power and the protests o f people against Chun’s regime. Chun Doo Hwan, the chief o f the “Joint Investigation Headquarters” organized to investigate the assassination o f former President Park Jung Hee in 1979, became the actual leader of the army through a coup on December 12, 1979. He established the “Emergency Committee for National Security,” which performed the role o f the government, in May, 1980, and was inaugurated as the chief o f its standing committee, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26 thereby controlling the reigns o f government. He repressed the democratization movement in Kwangju by force in May, sacrificing hundreds o f lives.1 Chun became President in August, 1980, through an indirect election based on the constitution from President Park’s period, and, the following November, he decreed the Special Regulatory Law for Political Reform, restricting the political activity of most politicians.2 President Chun amended the constitution and became President of the 5th Republic through another indirect election in February, 1981.3 Chun’s regime, which did not obtain legitimacy in the electoral process, was no less authoritarian than that o f former President Park during the 4th Republic.4 The government kept watch on opposition parties, the press, universities, and the leaders of the labor movement, restricting freedom o f speech and association. It controlled society 1 Chun declared emergency martial law in all territory of the country, and commanded troops to repress demonstrations in Kwangju, violating the regular chain o f command. He was sentenced for this during Kim Young Sam’s regime. 2 “The Special Regulatory Law for Political Reform” prevented 567 politicians from exercising their right to be a candidate for assemblyman until 1988, including 210 out o f 231 assemblymen and 254 out o f 257 political party officials. They could not run for general election in 1981; however, the ban on most o f them was lifted in 1983-1984, and they ran for general election in 1985. 3 Chun became the President in 1980 at the National Conference for Unification, and became the President in 1981 through the vote of the Electoral College, which was another indirect election, on the basis of the amended constitution. He won 4,755 votes out o f the total 5,278 votes o f the Electoral College. 4 Park Jung Hee, who became President in 1963 after the coup in 1961, had established the authoritarian “Yushin Constitution” in 1972, initiating the 4th Republic, which was sustained by coercive force and authoritarian Emergency Laws, repressing opposition groups and students. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27 through newly established regulation laws such as the Special Regulatory Law for Political Reform and the Social Probation Law,3 as well as enforcing existing laws such as the National Security Law, the Anti-Communist Law, and the Law on Assembly and Demonstration.6 In addition, it strengthened the political investigation aspect of government intelligence bureaus such as the police and the Agency for National Security Planning and the military’s Defense Security Command. The government also intervened in economic policy, even controlling the Chaebol. For example, the seventh biggest Chaebol, Kookje Group, which did not cooperate with the government, was forced to dissolve in 1985.7 The economic policy led by the authoritarian government put emphasis on price stabilization, by freezing the wages of public officials and workers and the price of According to the Social Probation Law, ex-convicts were sometimes arbitrarily re arrested and sent to special education camps run by the military. On the basis of this law, over 40,000 ex-convicts were arrested and sent to military training camps. Hankookilbo. August 27, 1991. 6 Some student movement leaders during the 5th Republic had a socialist ideology, advocating “popular democracy,” a democracy whose subject was the people, excluding the capitalists. They condemned Chun’s regime as fascist and insisted on the withdrawal o f the U.S. Army from S. Korea. The government arrested not only many of these students, but also many other students and intellectuals who advocated democratization o f society, charging them with violation o f the National Security and the Anti-Communist laws. 7 Later, in July, 1993, the Constitutional Court judged that the dissolution of the Kookje Group was against the Constitution because it violated the principle o f a free market economic system, which was secured by the Constitution. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 28 rice.8 As shown in Table 2-1, the inflation rate decreased from 28.7% in 1980 to 2.3% in 1984. In addition, the high exchange rate, low oil prices, and low international interest rate in 1986 supported economic growth.9 Subsequently, the GNP recorded continuous high growth, and the adverse balance o f international payments o f S4.4 billion in 1981 was transformed to a positive balance o f S7.6 billion in 1987. The unemployment rate declined from 4.5% in 1981 to 3.1% in 1987.1 0 <Table 2-l> Major Economic Indicators I9S4 1985 1986 1987 1988 I9S9 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Inflation Rate 2.3 2.4 2.7 3.0 7.1 5.7 S.6 9.3 6.2 4.8 6.2 4.5 GNP Growth Rate 9.3 7.0 12.9 13.0 12.4 6.7 9.3 8.4 4.7 5.S S.4 8.7 International Payments - 1.0 0.0 4.2 7.6 1 1.4 4.5 -2.0 -7.0 -2.1 1.9 -3.1 -4.7 Unemployment Rate 3.8 4.0 3.8 3.1 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.8 2.4 2.0 Every indicator represents percent. The unit o f International Payments represents US billion dollars. Source: The Bureau o f Statistics, Statistical Yearbook (Seoul: The Bureau o f Statistics). Cited from Lee Kap Yun, The Election o f S. Korea and Regionalism (Seoul: Parkyoungsa. 1998), p. 161. A number o f people did not support the Chun regime in spite o f its successful economic accomplishments. Most intellectuals, students, and a substantial portion of the middle-class were critical toward the authoritarian rule o f the government. 8 Chung Chung Kil, “Chundoohwan Gyeonjejeongchaek” (“Economic Policy of Chun Doo Hwan"), Sindonga (October, 1992), p. 230-231, 235. 9 Cho Sung Ryul, “Rohtaewoo Jeongkwonui Gyeongjegaehyeokgwa Gukgajeonryakui Byeonhwa” (“Economic Reform and the Change o f National Strategy in Roh’s Government”), Korean Political Science Review, Vol. 30-2, (Seoul: KPSA, 1996), p. 195. 1 0 Indicators are cited from Table 2-1 and Kim Yong Chul and Moon Jung In, “Hangukui Kyeongjebaljeongwa Minjuhwa” (“The Economic Growth and Democratization o f S. Korea”), Yonseisahoegwahaknonchong (Social Science Papers of Yonsei University) (Yonsei University: Seoul, 1995), Vol. 26. http://www.yonsei.ac.kr Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29 Although Chun’s government, in February, 1983, pardoned 250 people who were banned from political activity in 1980, key opposition members were excluded from the release. Kim Young Sam, who had been confined in his own house, began a fast on May 18, 1983, insisting upon democratization and his liberation as well as that o f other imprisoned members o f the opposition.1 ' Chun’s government released other banned people in February and November, 1984, except top opposition leaders, expecting the released people would not be threatening in the general election in February, 1985.1 2 The newly liberated politicians established the Association for Driving Democratization in May, 1984, and established a new political party, the New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP), in January, 1985. They took part in the general election o f the legislature in February 12, 1985, within one month after the formation o f the new political party. The result o f the general election was the defeat o f the government party and the return of the old politicians who opposed Chun’s authoritarian regime.1 3 1 1 Kim Young Sam maintained his fast until June 9. During the fast, he was released from the confinement, though his other demands were not accepted. Kim Chul, “Dansik Ihu” (“After the Fast”), Sindonga (August, 1983), pp. 79-87; “Nokeum Girok” (“Recorded Dialogue between Kim Young Sam and the Government during the Fast”), Wolganchosun (January, 1996), pp. 338-346. 1 2 Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Pil were released from the ban March 6, 1985. 1 3 The new political party, NKDP, became the main opposition party, and the previously existing opposition party, the Democratic Korean Party (DKP), did not get support from the people. The government party, Democratic Justice Party (DJP), won 47.3% o f the seats (35.3% o f the total votes); the NKDP won 27.1% (29.3%); and the DKP won 14.1% (19.7%). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 30 Throughout the 5th Republic, students allied with intellectuals, church leaders, and workers demonstrated on and off campus against the authoritarian regime. After the government withdrew the police, who had remained on the campuses continually, in December, 1983, as shown in Table 2-2, students began to demonstrate more actively against the government, resulting in stronger government repression again with the mobilization o f the combatant police units. The demonstrations called for the autonomy and democratization o f student activity on campus and the democratization of society, as well as expressing opposition to specific government policies, such as the Campus Security Law in 1985.1 4 <Table 2-2> Number of Student Demonstrations (1981-1987) Year Number o f on-campus and off-campus demonstrations Number o f the combatant police against the demonstration Number of tear gas used 1981 43 32,705 2,726 1982 61 39,706 4.802 1983 143 45,938 8,198 1984 1,499 43,292 91,814 1985 2,138 49,113 204,481 1986 2,001 53,205 313,204 1987 5,581 58,700 -- Source: Ministry o f Home Affairs, Material fo r the Regular Session o f the National Assembly in 1986, (Seoul: Naemubu), July, 1986; “The Casualties of Tear Gas,” Sindonga, pp. 568-581. In 1986, the opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, initiated a movement for a constitutional amendment to permit direct presidential elections, which was supported by students, professors, and civil organizations. Although Chun said, in 1 4 In 1985, the government tried to enact a law which restricted association and demonstrations on campus, and would permit the arrest o f left-wing students without judicial procedure and only with administrative measures. The law was not enacted because o f the strong opposition o f the student and opposition parties. See Chapter IV. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31 April, 1986, that he would consider the constitutional amendment if the government party and opposition party could come to an agreement on the new constitution, the government announced, in April, 1987, that it would not amend the old constitution. Subsequently, m any professors and civil organizations o f the country as well as the students announced their opposition. When the street demonstrations o f the students and opposition parties were at their peak, on June 10, 1987, even middle class citizens and white-collar workers joined the anti-govemment demonstration. Consequently, forced by public opinion, President Chun accepted direct elections and had this announced by the presidential candidate o f the government party, Roh Tae Woo, in June 29, 1987.1 5 President Roh, who won the direct election at the end o f 1997,1 6 took several steps toward democratization. His government (the 6th Republic) released a number of prisoners of conscience, and revised or abolished the laws which had restrained human rights with respect to labor relations, association and demonstrations, and speech. In addition, he implemented the local autonomy system by calling for elections for local assembly in small and large districts and cities.1 7 After the general election for the 1 5 See Chapter [V. 1 6 Roh Tae Woo won 38.6% o f the vote; Kim Young Sam won 28.0%; Kim Dae Jung won 27.1%; and Kim Jong Pil won 8.1%. 1 7 The election for local assembly in small districts was executed in March, 1991, and that for large districts and cities was executed in June, 1991. Though Roh had planned to hold the election for the directors o f local governments during his presidency, it was postponed and executed in June, 1995, during Kim Young Sam ’s presidency. Joongangilbo. March 7, June 21, 1991; June 29, 1995. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 32 legislature in 1988, the government party held less than half o f the seats in the National Assembly, and had trouble passing laws and nominating officials, which had to be approved by the National Assembly. After a negotiation o f several months, Roh’s government party (the Democratic Justice Party: DJP) united with the conservative non government parties o f Kim Young Sam (the Reunification Democratic Party: RDP) and Kim Jong Pil (the New Democratic Republican Party: NDRP), in 1990, with Kim Dae Jung’s party (the Party for Peace and Democracy: PPD) remaining an independent opposition party.1 8 During the 6th Republic, with the progress of democratization, there was a dramatic increase in the number o f demonstrations by interest groups, including strikes and demonstrations by workers. While the number o f labor disputes during the 5th Republic was less than 300 a year, they increased to 3,749 in 1987, after Roh’s declaration on June 29.1 9 The labor disputes raised the wages o f workers, and the rise in 18 Opposition parties were based on regionalism and personality-oriented leadership. It was not easy to create issue-based coalitions among those parties. Roh tried to break through the stalemate by forming a stable conservative ruling coalition, and Kim Young Sam wanted to have an opportunity to become the next President with the coalition. Lee Heng, “Uncertain Promise: Democratic Consolidation in South Korea,” in Edward Friedman (ed.), The Politics o f Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 154. 1 9 See Table 2-3. The loss o f production caused by labor disputes was $337 million in 1987, and increased to $624 million in 1989. The loss of exports caused by labor dispute in 1989 was $13 billion. Hankookilbo. February, 22, 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 33 cost led to price increases.2 0 In addition, foreign countries began to pressure South Korea to open its markets.2 1 As imports began to increase, with the decrease in exchange rates since 1989, the positive balance o f international payments of 57.6 billion in 1987 turned into a negative balance o f S2 billion in 1990, and the inflation rate of 2.7% in 1986 increased to 9.3% in 1991.2 2 Table <2-3> Labor Disputes and Wage Increases 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Number o f Labor Disputes 1 13 265 276 3,749 1.873 1,616 322 234 235 Wage Increase Rate (%) S.7 9.2 8.2 10.1 15.5 21.1 18.8 17.5 15.2 1993 1994 1995 Number o f Labor Disputes 144 121 88 Wage Increase Rate (%) 12.2 12.7 11.2 Source: The Bureau o f Statistics, Statistical Yearbook (Seoul: The Bureau o f Statistics). Cited from Lee Kap Yun, The Election o f S. Korea and Regionalism (Seoul: Parkyoungsa, 1998), p. 161. The process of democratization was also accompanied by a number of student demonstrations, as shown in Table 2-4, around issues such as popular democracy, national unification, the withdrawal of the U.S. Army, and the democratization of 2 0 Nominal wages increased 19.5% a year on average from 1987 to 1992, and real wages increased 8.3% in 1987, 11.7% in 1988, and 18.2% in 1989. Hankookilbo, February 22, 1994. 2 1 While the duty-free import rate o f the manufacturing industry between 1986 and 1988 had been 93.8%, it became 99.8% in 1991. The tariff rate, which had been 17.9% on average between 1986 and 1988, decreased to 9.7% in 1991. Cho Sung Ryul, “Rohtaewoojeonggwonui Gyeongjegaehyeokgwa Gukgajeonryakui Byunhwa” (“Economic Reform and the Change of National Strategy in Roh’s Government”), op. cit., p. 195. 2 2 See Table 2-1. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 34 society and university campuses. However, by the end of President Roh’s period, from 1990, the number o f on-campus and street demonstrations was reduced, and the number of demonstrations using fire-bottles2 3 was also reduced from 284 in 1991 to 102 in 1992.2 4 The reduction and moderation o f student demonstrations can be explained by the collapse o f socialist countries including the USSR in the early 1990s, resulting in the collapse of the ideological base o f left-wing students, and the progress of democratization itself. By this time most citizens were less sympathetic to the street demonstrations by students, which incurred traffic jams, noise, and sometimes tear gas.2 3 In addition, awareness of the economic crisis, which had expanded among the people since 1990, helped to reduce the number o f student demonstrations and labor disputes.2 6 <Table 2-4> Number o f Student Demonstrations (1988-1992) Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Number of Demonstrations 2,524 1,698 1,781 1,261 1,046 Source: Joongangilbo, May 21. 1992; Joongcingilbo. December 7. 1992 2 3 Some students threw small bottles filled with gasoline at the combatant police during their demonstrations. 2 4 Joongangilbo. December 7, 1992. 2 5 Ibid. 2 6 Kim Dae Hwan, “6gong Gyeongjejeongchaek 2nyeonei Pyeonga” (“Evaluation o f the Economic Policy o f the 6th Republic”), Gukhoeioumal. Vol. 26 (August, 1990), p. 101; Chung Chung Kil, “Rohtaewoo Gyeongjejeongchaek” (“Economic Policy o f Roh Tae Woo”), Sindonga (November, 1992), p. 412. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 35 In addition to demonstrations by workers and students, various interest groups such as the Association o f Pharmacists and the Association o f Oriental Medicine Doctors used demonstrations to express their opinions and pursue their interests. However, although there were more demonstrations during the 6th Republic, compared to anti-government demonstrations during the 5th Republic, many o f them were non political manifestations o f interest. According to Table 2-5 and 2-6, although President Roh did not receive strong support from the people during the entire 6th Republic, his achievements in democratization were appreciated. The reason that President Roh’s ruling capability was not evaluated positively (Table 2-6-3; 2-7) can be found in complaints about the unsuccessful economic policy (2-5; 2-6-4), and the instability of daily life which was caused by the large number of conflicts among various interest groups and the demonstrations they carried out (Table 2-5; 2-6-7). Roh’s government did not repress such demonstrations by force, in contrast to Chun’s regime. President Roh subsequently recalled that his presidency was a transition period from authoritarian to democratic society, emphasizing his efforts toward democratization." President Roh’s efforts on behalf o f democracy aside, it was difficult for the government to use authoritarian measures when the people had already experienced political democracy since 1987, and had enjoyed increased living standards as a result of increased GNP per capita.2 8 In addition, Roh, with limited support by the people, could not exercise strong 2 7 “Roetaewoo Hoegorok” (“The Memoirs o f Roh Tae Woo: Secret Story o f Politics”), Wolganchosun (June, 1999), pp. 236-237. 2 8 GNP per capita had increased consistently: 1982 (S 1,834), 1985 ($2,242), 1988 ($4,295), and 1991 ($6,910). The Bureau of Statistics o f S. Korea. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36 power in a democratized political and social environment, in contrast to President Chun, who had maintained power through coercive force without considering the support of the people.2 9 Table <2-5> Polls Evaluating President Roh Tae Woo Question: How do you evaluate President Roh’s performance of his duties? * The number represents percent. * In some surveys, the respondents who answered good or bad was asked specifically what was good or bad. Their answers were spontaneous, not based on pre-set responses. A few items o f their responses are indicated in sequence, according to percentage. Date of Survey Good Normal Bad Do Not Know July. 1988 53.4 Democratization (25.9) Acceptance o f public opinion (13.4) 5.4 24.9 Incomplete punishment o f the crimes during the 5th Republic (22.3) Political and social instability (13.1) 16.3 May, 1989 28.4 Showing sincerity and effort (21.2) Democratization (11.8) 11.5 40.5 Irresolution (17.3) Incomplete punishment o f the crimes during the 5 th Republic (16.8) Political and social instability (13.2) 19.6 Sept., 1990 27.7 Diplomatic policy (13.0) Policy toward N. Korea (11.9) Democratization (10.2) 55.1 Unstable prices o f commodities (34.8) Jan., 1991 12.3 40.5 39.9 Prices (33.3) Unstable public peace and order (18.9) 7.3 Source: Chosunilbo (Joint Survey with Gallup Korea) 2 9 President Chun did respond to public opinion when he lifted the ban on politicians in 1984, withdrew the establishment o f the Campus Security Law in 1985, and permitted direct presidential elections in 1987. Except in those cases, public opinion was not a critical factor for decision-making in the 5th Republic. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table <2-6> Polls Evaluating the Early Period of the 6th Republic 37 1 . What was the influence of the declaration of June 29, 1987, on political development? (percent) 1 ) It was a turning point for political development. 44.1 2) It was a makeshift policy. 48.1 3) It became a hindrance to political development. 5.1 4) Other 2.7 2. What do you think about democratization during the early period of the 6th Republic? 1 ) It has made rapid progress. 12.6 2) It has made some progress. 62.5 3) It has been the same as that of the 5th Republic. 15.9 4) Other 9.1 3. Whose ruling capability do you think is greater. President Roh’s or former President Chun’s? 1) President Roh's ruling capability is greater than that of former President Chun. 37.3 2) President Roh’s ruling capability is the same as that of former President Chun. 43.8 3) President Roh’s ruling capability is less than that of the former President Chun. 14.9 4) Other 3.9 4. What do you think about the economic policy in the early period of the 6th Republic? 1) The basic economic policy is very well organized. 3.0 2) It was successful though there were a few difficulties. 14.4 3) There are difficulties in running businesses and investments for facilities. 23.9 4) There is no consistency in the economic policy. 41.4 5) I do not know. 17.3 5. What do you think about freedom of the press in the early period of the 6th Republic? 1) The press is enjoying enough freedom. 18.2 2) It is better than that o f the 5th Republic. 49.8 3) It is the same as that of the 5th Republic. 9.8 4) It is controlled and repressed in a skillful way. 13.6 5) It is being repressed very much. 2.1 6) I do not know. 6.4 6. What do you think about the independence of the judiciary in the early period of the 6th Republic? 1) The regime prizes the complete autonomy of the judiciary. 12.6 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2) The regime pretends to prize the autonomy of the judiciary. 3) The regime does not want the autonomy of the judiciary. 4) I cannot tell yet. 41.2 10.7 35.4 38 7. What do you think about social life in the early period of the 6th Republic? 1) People enjoy more freedom and social activity. 25.6 2) It is same as that of the 5th Republic. 15.9 3) It is worse than that of the 5th Republic. 6.4 4) People live a very unstable daily life. 49.9 5) I do not know. 2.3 Source: “Yukgonghwakookjeonbankiedaehan Kookminyeronchosa” (“The Survey of Public Opinion about the Early Period of the 6th Republic”), Minjokjisung. Vol. 49 (March, 1990), pp. 26-34. Table <2-7> Polls Evaluating Roh’s Performance during the Whole 6th Republic. Question: Do you think President Roh Tae Woo has accomplished his duties successfully? (Survey on 2/10/93, at the End of President Roh’s Period) (percent) 1. Finished successfully 40.8 2. Half and half 10.4 3. Did not finish successfully 47.0 4. Do not know 1.8 Source: Survey Result of Gallup Korea Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table <2-8> Polls Evaluating President Kim Young Sam 39 Question: How do you evaluate President Kim Young Sam’s performance of his duties? * The number represents percent. * In some surveys, respondents were asked both the above question and what was good and bad. Their answers were spontaneous, not based on pre-set responses. A few items o f their responses are indicated in sequence, according to percentage. Date of Survey Good Normal Bad Do Not Know May, 1993 84.2 9.8 3.4 2.6 Sept., 1993 82.7 7.6 5.9 3.8 Nov., 1994 42.7 Reform / punishment of irregularities and corruption (24.5) Execution o f real-name financial system (13.7) Democratization (6.8) 25.6 25.9 Discontinuance of reform and insufficient punishment of irregularities and corruption (12.9) High prices and economic instability (7.3) Major accidents and inappropriate management of them (6.6) Personnel management (4.0 - seventh item) 5.8 April, 1995 44.9 9.0 41.7 4.5 Sept.. 1995 33.3 Reform / Punishment o f irregularities and corruption (25.7) Execution o f real-name financial system (19.0) Democratization (4.5) 16.2 45.2 High prices and economic instability (18.4) Major accidents and inappropriate management of them (8.4) Political and social instability (6.5) Policy toward N. Korea (3.5 - tenth item) 5.3 Nov., 1996 27.4 Execution o f real-name financial system (16.9) Punishment o f irregularities and corruption (13.0) Punishment o f crimes in former regimes (11.8) 27.7 36.7 Prices and economic instability (44.5) Inconsistent policies (4.9) Social instability (4.8) Policy toward N. Korea (4.5) 8.2 March. 1997 8.8 8.8 73.2 9.2 Source: Survey Result of Gallup Korea Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40 Kim Young Sam, who had been the representative o f the unified government party, won the presidential election with the support of President Roh,3 0 and had the support of 84.2% o f the people in the early part o f his presidency, according to the poll of May, 1993/1 He required high-ranking government officials and government party assemblymen to open their assets to the public, and executed the Real-name Financial System against the interests o f the conservative politicians and businessmen, relying on this public support. However, as shown in Table 2-8, his support rate gradually declined, as these reforms were not followed by the elimination of illegality and official corruption, and also due to dissatisfaction with the unsuccessful policy toward North Korea as well as inadequate responses to a series o f disasters in 1994 and 1995/2 During the period o f President Kim, any interest group, including students, could manifest its own opinion freely. However, protests were not oriented to political democratization, and were less militant and less in number than those in Roh’s period/3 A particular characteristic of Kim’s regime was that public opinion became a very 3 0 In the presidential election of December, 1992, Kim Young Sam won 42.0%, Kim Dae Jung won 33.8%, and Chung Joo Young won 16.3% of the vote. 3 1 See Table 2-8. According to the result of a survey executed by ‘Research & Research’ in July, 1993, the support rate o f the President was 94%. Dongailbo, February 23, 1998. 3 2 Major accidents included the collapse of a big bridge in Seoul (April, 1994), a gas explosion in Taeku (April, 1995), and the collapse o f a big department store building (June, 1995), which caused the death of up to hundreds o f people. 3 3 Kim Ki Dae, “Hang-ui Siwi Munhwawa Chejeneungryeokui Hwakjang” (“Demonstration Culture and the Enlargement o f System Capacity”), Jibangjachi. Vol. 96 (September, 1996), p. 54-55; Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 41 important factor in the government’s decision-making, and the press, including newspapers and journals, executed polls often and announced the results. A research project, which examined the relationship between the results o f polls soliciting opinions about a particular policy issue and the final government policy, shows that the two factors coincided more often during President Kim’s period than during that o f President Roh (Table 2-9).3 4 <Table 2-9> Relationship between the Result o f a Poll and the Government Policy: Three Years during the Presidency o f President Kim and President Roh President Roh’s Period: 1990-1992 President Kim’s Period: 1993-1995 Total Coincidence o f the Two 18 Cases (48.6%) 13 Cases (61.9%) 31 Cases (53.4%) Non-coincidence o f the Two 19 Cases (51.4%) 8 Cases (38.1%) 27 Cases (46.6%) Total 37 Cases (100%) 21 Cases (100%) 58 Cases (100%) Source: Kim Kwang Woong and Lim Dong Wook et al., Chamyuron Barobogi, (Seoul: Nanam Publishing Co.. 1996). Cited from Lim Dong Wook, “Jungchakgyuljungkwa Yeoronyikwangye”(“The Relationship between the Public Opinion and Decision-Making”), Ibbupyungit (Legislation Study), Vol. 246 (August, 1997), p. 164. In the election for local government and assembly in June, 1995, when the support rate for the president had fallen to about 44%, the government party was 3 4 Although these results suggest a stronger relation between poll results and government policy during the Kim’s administration, not all o f the policies indicated required a presidential decision, and the policy issues in the table were not consistently important ones through all the three Presidents’ administrations. For this reason, in order to examine the relationship between presidential power and the public support rate o f the President, I chose three issues which had been important throughout the three Presidents’ periods, and in which the presidential decisions were critical. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 42 defeated.3 5 After the election, claiming the need to punish the persons responsible for wrongdoing in the past, President Kim charged former Presidents Chun and Roh with the coup in December, 1979, the killing o f Kwangju citizens in May, 1980, and with bribery during their respective administrations. Though President Kim’s support rate rose briefly at the end o f 1995,3 6 as the economy began to decline in late 1995,3 7 and with the scandal of the manager o f the Blue House,3 8 the support rate went down again. President Kim needed to recruit persons with good reputations to raise the support rate o f the government party for the general election in April, 1996. He recruited former 3 5 In the election for directors o f local governments and assemblymen o f local assemblies, the opposition parties won in Seoul and other major cities. The government party won 33% of the directors o f local government seats. 36 According to the result o f a survey executed by ‘Research & Research’ at the end of 1995, the support rate for the President was 70%. Dongailbo, February 23, 1998. 5 7 From the end of 1995 until 1999, the economy was depressed, prices increased, and international payments became seriously negative. Scholars indicated a few problems in the Korean economy at that time. First, the export policy depended on a few items made by the Chaebol. Second, banks gave loans to big businesses without strict financial criteria, and some big businesses made improper or over-investments. As the exports and the internal economy became depressed, the financial status o f banks deteriorated. Later, the bankruptcy of big businesses and the failure to control international payments led to the crisis in 1997. Although some officials in Kim Young Sam ’s government blamed over-consumption by the people, their preference for imported goods, and numerous overseas trips as reasons for the crisis, these were less than 5% of the current account. Kwak Jung Soo, “Naungbae Hanseungsooman Anieotseodo” (“The Reason for the Korean Economic Crisis”), Hankvure 21, Vol. 187 (December 18, 1997) - http://www.hani.co.kr/h21/data/past.html; Yoon Young Kwan, “ IMFjindanhan Oegukhakjadeului Hangye” (“The Economic Crisis o f S. Korea”), Sindonga (April, 1998) - http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine/new_donga; Segyeilbo. September 16, 1996; Moonhwailbo. February 25, 1997; Daehanmaeil. November 21, 1998. 3 8 The opposition party disclosed, in March, 1996, that Jang Hak Ro, a manager of the Blue House, took a bribe. After the investigation, he was accused o f bribery by the prosecutor. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 43 Prime Minister, Lee Hoe Chang, who had been dismissed owing to the trouble with the President but had a good reputation, as the Chairman o f the Committee for the General Election of the government party.3 9 There was another event that reduced the reputation o f the President and the government party during the late period of President Kim. In December, 1996, the government party passed the revised Labor Law4 0 and the law of the Agency for National Security Planning without the consent o f the opposition party. The labor unions called for strikes and demonstrations, and civil organizations and public opinion supported the workers.4 1 President Kim, who realized that this was a critical problem, 3 9 See Chapter IV. 4 0 In mid-1996, the government established the Committee for Better Relations between Labor and Capital, with the Prime Minister as the chairperson. There were two labor unions, the Hanguk Union and the Minjoo Union, with the Minjoo Union having not been legally approved until then. Labor insisted on the immediate legalization of these two unions, which were national-level labor organizations, and the subsequent legalization o f company-based unions. Capital asked for the right of dismissal of workers for the purpose of increasing productivity, retrenchment o f the company, and in times of urgent need. The committee drew up a new bill on labor-management relations, which provided a compromise, including the right o f dismissal of workers in times of urgent need for management, and the approval o f two top-level labor unions at the national level. However, in December, 1996, the government party inserted a provision into the Labor Law for the postponement o f “the approval o f the two labor unions” for three years, and passed it in lightening manner in the absence o f the opposition parties. The law of the Agency for National Security Planning, which also had also not been negotiated with the opposition party, was passed at the same time. Chosunilbo. December 26, 27, 28, 1996. 4 1 Even the labor organization of white collars workers, technicians with higher academic degrees, and broadcasting system workers joined the strike. The OECD recommended that Kim’s government revise the labor law, in keeping with the labor laws o f OECD countries. Chosunilbo. January 12, 22, 1997 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 44 ordered a new labor bill, and the new bill, which incorporated the demand o f labor for the two top-level labor unions, was passed in March, 1997. In January, 1997, a Chaebol, Hanbo Steel Inc., was unable to pay its bills, with the result that the credit of creditor banks deteriorated, leading to the crisis o f a number o f subcontracting companies. It was revealed, during the investigation, that a Presidential staff member had been involved in lending a large amount o f money to Hanbo, and the son o f the President had taken bribes for favors given to businessmen.4 2 President Kim made an apology address to the people on February 25. The support rate for the President declined to 8.8% in March. During the summer, another big enterprise, Kia Motor Inc., confronted a crisis o f nonpayment and went under the management of creditor banks in October. In November, the failure in foreign exchange control led the Korean economy, which had been deteriorating due to the failure o f big businesses, to the necessity of borrowing from the IMF. At that point, President Kim, who was blamed for the crisis, lost presidential authority to rule the country. Chun, who lacked legitimacy, executed policies using coercive force throughout his presidency. He implemented democratic politics only when he could not repress public pressure for democratization, maintaining his power until the end o f his term. Roh, governing in the more democratized society, could not use coercive force to 4 2 See Chapter III. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 45 implement policies. He made a coalition with the popular Kim Young Sam to maintain his influence and that o f the DJP. However, because public support for Roh was weak, his influence was not strong and he lost power in the later part o f his term. During Kim Young Sam’s regime, after democratization, public support became a very important resource of presidential power. This was demonstrated both in the effects of Kim’s strong influence in the early part o f his presidency when he enjoyed strong public support, and in the weakness in his authority with the subsequent decline o f public support. The examination o f three issues in the following chapters demonstrates the power o f the three Presidents in decision-making, on the basis o f coercive force and public support. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 46 Chapter III. Presidential Power in Managing the Real-Name Financial System The ‘Real-name Financial System’ is the banking and stock-trading system that uses the real name o f an account holder, prohibiting the use o f a pseudonym or another’s name. In S. Korea, where false or other names had been accepted in banking, the Real-name Financial System was expected to bring underground funds into the open market and make it possible to trace the unacknowledged source o f potential tax revenue, compensating for the disparity in income levels.1 While Presidents Chun and Roh could not execute the Real-name Financial System even though the working plans o f the financial system were completed, President Kim Young Sam carried it into effect successfully. The working plans o f the Real-name Financial System in the periods of each o f the three Presidents were similar in their purpose o f using the account holder’s real names and imposing taxes on income resulting from Financial circulation, with the exception of differences in detail.2 1 Choi Bong Hwan, “Geumyungsilmyeongjeui Uiuiwa Chujinbanghyang” (“The Cause and Direction o f Real System,”) Gukhoebo (National Assembly Bulletin). Vol. 277 (November, 1989), p. 23. 2 There were two major differences in the working plans under the former two Presidents and the law o f the Real-name Financial System under President Kim Young Sam. While, in the working plans under Presidents Chun and Roh, the investigation of the financial source o f the accounts with a pseudonym or another’s name was exempted if the account holder changed the account name to his real name within six months of the law’s execution, the exemption period in President Kim’s period was two months; and while, in the working plans under Presidents Chun and Roh, the ‘General Taxation upon Financial Income’ was to be executed after public hearings, in the law under President Kim, the taxation was to be executed from 1995, 17 months after the execution of the Real-name Financial System. In general, the law o f the Real-name Financial System under President Kim was stricter than the former working plans. Hanguk Gvuneie Sinmoon (Korean Economy Paper). November 13, 1989; Chin Kwang Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47 The actors who participated in managing the Real-name Financial System would be the President, presidential secretaries, members o f the cabinet, bureaucrats, the government party, the opposition parties, the Chaebol and business interest groups, entrepreneurs, professors, the press, and public opinion. Among them, the reform bureaucrats and the Chaebol were the main actors. Although the bureaucrats tried to reform the financial system on the basis of presidential support, the Chaebol, which were important to the South Korean economy and were supporting conservative politicians, including Presidents Chun and Roh, opposed it in order to avoid revealing their sources and use o f funds. For this issue, Dahl’s measures o f influence according to the amount o f change in the actors influenced and number o f persons who respond are applied. The measure based on the cost to the actors o f complying is also applied in the sense that the Chaebol are the group which opposed the reform financial system as most severely detrimental to their interest. In addition, because President Kim was able to implement the reform financial system because of strong public support in spite o f the Chaebol’s opposition, the measure according to the differences in probability of compliance is also considered. Myung, “Yeokdaejeongbuui Geumyungsilmyeongje Jeongchaek Hyeongseonggwa Sinjeongbuui Jeongchaekgwaje” (“The Policy-making o f the Real-name Financial System in Each President’s Period and the Task o f the New Government”), 98nveon Chungyehaksuldaehoe (The Collection o f Papers Presented at the Meeting in Spring. 1998) (Seoul: Korea Public Administration Association), pp. 3-5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48 When economic growth was the main goal o f Korean economic policy in 1960s and 1970s, the government sustained the financial system to encourage savings, avoiding any measure which might hinder the increase o f savings. However, after a massive fraud o f notes committed by Jang Young Ja in May, 1982,3 many people realized the necessity o f the Real-name Financial System, which could create clear financial flow and bring the underground economy into the open market. Most private loan businesses at that time were not under the regulation o f the government, thereby avoiding taxation. The amount o f the underground economy in 1982 was as high as 16.8%-18.0% o f the GNP.4 In the 5th Republic, the Presidential Chief Secretary o f Economy, Kim Jae Ik, was the person who contributed most in drawing up the economic policy o f the Real- name Financial System and achieving the approval of the President. Kim Jae Ik and a few reform bureaucrats, who realized the necessity o f the new financial system due to their professional experience, established the working plan o f the Real-name Financial 3 Jang Young Ja, a private moneylender whose husband had been a ranking government official, issued a lot o f large amount of bills illegally (total amount o f 640,400,000,000 won), causing a massive confusion in the financial market. She earned money during President Park’s period (1963-1979), and ran a private loan business. During President Chun’s period, she could issue a large amount in illegal bills by taking advantage o f her position as a distant relative of President Chun’s wife. The Ministry o f Finance, Geumvungsilmveongje Iliunveon Baekseo (A White Paper on the Real-name Financial System after One-year Execution) (Seoul: The Ministry o f Finance, 1994), pp. 9-10. 4 Baek Yong Ho, et al., Geumvungsilmveongje (The Real-name Financial System) (Seoul: Bibong Publishing Co., 1993), p .10. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 49 System in secrecy. At that time, however, most bureaucrats o f the Ministry of Finance, who were traditionally conservative, did not support the Real-name Financial System. Among the Cabinet economic ministers, the Minister o f Finance, Nah Woong Bae who had been an entrepreneur, and the Deputy Prime M inister (the Chief of Economic Planning Board), Kim Joon Sung, were not in support o f the Real-name Financial System. Consequently, they were excluded from the secret procedure of making the working plan. At the end o f June, Kang Kyung Sik, who was a supporter of the Real-name Financial System, was appointed as the Minister o f Finance. Kim Jae Ik and Kang Kyung Sik led the team drawing up the working plan and achieved the approval o f President Chun. On July 3, the government announced that the Real-name Financial System would be in effect from January 1, 1983, for new accounts, and from July 1, 1983, for existing accounts.? Political parties did not take part in the process o f making the working plan. Even the government party was not consulted by the major actors who worried about the revelation o f the plan. Business interest groups, including the Federation o f Korean Industries0 and the Korean Federation of Small and Medium Businesses, were excluded 5 In addition to the Presidential Chief Secretary o f Economy, Kim Jae Ik, and the Minister o f Finance, Kang Kyung Sik, other major actors, the Director of the Financial Bureau and a Presidential Secretary, who participated in establishing the working plan o f the Real-name Financial System, had been bureaucrats. Shin Sang Min, “Geumyungsilmyeongje Silmyeongui Naemak” (“the Story o f Losing the Real-name Financial System”), Wolganchosun (May. 1990), p. 296. 0 The Federation o f Korean Industries is the association of the CEOs o f the 30 largest business groups o f South Korea, which represents the opinion o f Korean big businesses. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50 from making the plan, and there was no process for public hearings or open discussions by economic professionals such as professors and entrepreneurs. Business interest groups could not officially oppose the Real-name Financial System when it was announced because of a public atmosphere critical toward the Korean financial system due to Jang Young Ja’s economic scandal. A couple o f months later, however, dissident groups began to manifest their opposition. They contended that socio-economic circumstances were not yet conducive to introducing the Real- name Financial System; for example, the stocks of big businesses were not yet completely introduced to the public, and the related rules o f the Real-name Financial System were not yet established. They insisted that the execution o f the Real-name Financial System in such an immature situation would lead to a freeze in private moneylending, the shortage o f funds for businesses, economic stagnation, and a rise in interest rates. The press also pointed out the unprepared condition of the law of taxation on stock trading and the imperfection of the national computerized financial system.7 Criticism of the Real-name Financial System became harsher after August as a number o f account holders began to withdraw money from banks and the stock market, and invest that money in real estate. Opinions against the Real-name Financial System arose even in the government party, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP). The major dissidents in the government party were the secretary general, the floor leader, and the chief o f the policy-making committee. Kim Jong In, a finance committee member of 7 Chosunilbo. July 7, 1982. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51 the party, who was an ex-professor of finance, supported the logic o f the dissidents, and the chairman o f the committee o f the party was also on the side o f the dissidents. The opposition party, the Democratic Korea Party (DKP), which had not clearly expressed its opinion, began to align with the dissident groups against the Real-name Financial System.8 Even among the Presidential Chief Secretaries, the Chief Secretary o f State Affairs, Huh Hwa Pyung, and the Chief Secretary o f Audit and Inspection, Huh Sam Soo, opposed the Real-name Financial System established by the C hief Secretary o f the Economy, Kim Jae Ik. The Minister o f Home Affairs, Roh Tae Woo, and the President o f the Korea Petroleum Development Company were in support o f Huh Hwa Pyung, who manifested his opposition at the joint meeting of the officials o f government and the government party in September. When President Kim Young Sam had high-ranking officials reveal their assets to the public in 1993, the result showed that many politicians who opposed the Real-name Financial System in 1982 were suspected o f making money illegally. Huh Hwa Pyung was skeptical o f the Real-name Financial System as an Assemblyman even in the period o f President Kim Young Sam, in 1993, saying, “Actually, it is difficult to execute the Real-name Financial System until the Korean political tradition, which admits the necessity o f raising extra money beyond legal 8 Between 1981-1985, there were two major political parties in S. Korea: the DJP and the DKP. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52 funds, is changed.”9 Many politicians who needed political funds would have the same opinion in 1982.1 0 There were also different opinions among Cabinet members. While the Minister o f Finance, Kang Kyung Sik, on October 21, 1982. at a meeting o f the Finance Committee o f the National Assembly, expressed his opinion that it would be best to execute the Real-name Financial System starting January 1, 1983, the Deputy Prime Minister, Kim Joon Sung, on the same date, at a meeting o f the Economy and Science Committee o f the National Assembly, admitted that the working plan o f the Real-name Financial System had some problems in terms o f execution time and strictness in application." As the dissidents’ opinion was prevailing, on October 29, 1982, at a joint meeting o f the officials o f government and the government party presided over by the President, it was decided that the working plan o f the Real-name Financial System should be supplemented. Subsequently, on December 2, 1982, the National Assembly approved the Real-name Financial System’s execution on a date, at least five years 9 Kwak Young Kil, “Geumyungsilmyeongjereul Bandaehaneun Saramdeul” (“The People who oppose the Real-name Financial System”), Sindonga (May, 1993), p. 283. 1 0 According to the Law o f Political Funds at that time, a politician was supposed to take money through his legal association with supporters or take money at no cost. (Since November 14, 1997, a politician cannot take money even at no cost, but only through his legal association with supporters.) Because it is not easy to receive a donation without giving interest to the donor, many politicians have thought they need more or secret funds to perform their political affairs. 1 1 Chosunilbo. October 22, 1982. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 53 later, which would be designated by the President.1 2 President Chun Doo Hwan, in the early 1990s, said that, “I did not take any money in the early period of my presidency; then my friends advised me that I may lose my supporters if I am too stubborn.” 1 3 It must not have been easy to introduce the Real-name Financial System in a situation wherein even the President was not free from accepting political funds. President Chun, in June, 1987, accepted the change in the presidential system to direct election, bowing to the pressure o f the people’s demonstrations. All presidential candidates from the four major parties promised the execution of the Real-name Financial System as one of their public commitments.1 4 Roh Tae Woo, a presidential candidate o f the government party, who also committed to the Real-name Financial system on the basis of its morality and fair distribution o f wealth, won the election. However, in the general election o f April, 1988, the opposition parties took more seats in the National Assembly.1 3 In the situation where the opposition parties, which had been officially in favor o f the Real-name Financial System in the campaign for 1 2 The next presidential election was scheduled to be executed at the end o f 1987. Subsequently, it meant that the Real-name Financial System would not be executed during President Chun’s term. 1 3 Kwak Young FC il, op. cit., p. 289. 1 4 There were four major political parties in 1987: the DJP, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP), and the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD). 1 3 In the general election o f 1988, the government party, the DJP, took 38.8% o f the seats (87 out o f 224 seats). The opposition party, the PPD, led by Kim Dae Jung, took 24.1% (54 seats); the RDP led by Kim Young Sam took 20.5% (46 seats); and the NDRP led by Kim Jong Pil took 12.1% (27 seats). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 54 Presidential election, took more seats, the government had no reason to break its commitment. The Deputy Prime Minister (the Chief o f the Economic Planning Board), Nah Woong Bae, on October 15, 1988, announced that the Real-name Financial System should be executed beginning in 1991. On March 31 o f the following year, the Presidential Chief Secretary o f Economy, Moon Hee K.ap, declared that the Real-name Financial System should be executed before 1991; subsequently, on April 11, 1989, the Real-name Financial System Preparatory Corps was organized consisting of the bureaucrats o f the Ministry o f Finance.1 6 Cho Soon, who became the Deputy Prime Minister at the end o f 1988, was also in favor o f executing the Real-name Financial System, and public opinion supported the introduction o f the new financial system. According to a docum ent issued by the Real- name Financial System Preparatory Corps in June, 1989,1 7 the underground economy in 1988 amounted to 19% o f the GNP, which was much higher than that o f other developed capitalist countries such as the U.S. (5.8% o f the GNP) and Japan (12% of the GNP). This document explained that people who earned money illegally were the major supporters o f the underground economy, and indicated that the relationship between politicians and businessmen, who offered political funds in return for support 1 6 The Minister o f Finance, Lee Kyu Sung, and the Vice-minister o f Finance took part in the committee, and a Director o f the Ministry o f Finance became the leader o f the Corps. 1 7 The Ministry o f Finance, “Geumyungsilmyeongje Junbidan Bogoseo” (“A Report of the Real-name Financial System Preparatory Corps”), Sindonga (June, 1990), pp. 329- 340. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 55 for business interests, was an important factor sustaining the underground economy. According to the report, it was not too early to execute the Real-name Financial System because this system had been sufficiently publicized to the people, and 97% of the national financial system was computerized by the end o f 1988. In addition, this report indicated that the underground economy could be made public by the Real-name Financial System followed by the establishment o f other related laws and a decrease in the use o f illegal money. President Roh relied mostly on the Presidential C hief Secretary o f Economy, Moon Hee Kap, in economic policy decision-making.1 8 Like the first working plan, the working plan o f the Real-name Financial System under President Roh was also established by the Presidential Chief Secretary of Economy and bureaucrats. This time, however, it was made public, permitting free debate among bureaucrats, professionals, and other interest groups. Neither the government party nor the three non-government parties opposed the Real-name Financial System, though they were not active in supporting the new financial system. Civil organizations, which were activated after the acceptance of direct presidential elections in a more democratized environment, supported the execution of the new financial system. On April 12, 1989, the President presided at a 1 8 Preparing the Real-name Financial System, President Roh raised the status of the Presidential Chief Secretary o f Economy from vise-minister level to minister level. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56 conference of representatives of various groups, including cabinet members, the chiefs o f business interest groups, workers, farmers, the press, and professors, inducing agreement in executing the Real-name Financial System and the General Taxation on Financial Interest starting January 1, 1991. The press, which became freer in comparison with that in the 5th Republic, played the role of publicizing the Real-name Financial System and introducing various opinions. Business interest groups such as the Federation o f Korean Industries and the Korean Federation of Small and Medium Businesses, though they were not in favor o f the Real-name Financial System,1 9 did not oppose it openly at that time since most people supported it. From the end o f 1989, however, as the economic growth rate declined and the balance o f international payments deteriorated, the Federation o f Korean Industries brought up the problem of the Korean economic crisis, insisting that the Real-name Financial System promoted the stagnation of the stock market and speculative investment in real estate. 1 9 Big businesses, which had been used to making secret funds and were connected with politicians, did not want to reveal their source of funds, and the owners o f small and medium businesses, who also did not want to reveal their financial flow, could have had another problem. In Korea, it was easier for big businesses to obtain bank loans than small and medium enterprises because big businesses already had transactions with banks and had supporters in the government and political parties. Small and medium enterprises which did not have such credit sources and supporters had difficulties in getting loans from banks and, subsequently, were forced to obtain loans from the private sector market which had a higher interest rate. However, under the Real-name Financial System, even these private loan markets could be diminished because the private moneylenders’ funds were more tied into the false name accounts, which could be frozen. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 57 Political parties did not voice their opinions actively in the latter half o f 1989 because, on the one hand, a number o f politicians were in favor o f the new financial system, and on the other hand, they were in the process o f reorganizing the political parties. The government party, which was weak in terms o f the number of seats in the National Assembly, looked for partners for unification. The result was a union of conservative parties on January 22, 1990. The government party, the DJP, united with two opposition parties, the RDP and the NDRP, establishing a large conservative party, the DLP.20 The chief of the policy planning committee of the DLP, Kim Yong Hwan, at a meeting o f the executive committee o f the party on March 21, 1990, stated that a policy promoting investment was needed during the situation o f economic stagnation, and it was desirable to postpone the execution of the Real-name Financial System. The newly-established grand conservative party might have wanted steadiness in the economic situation rather than reform, for the stabilization o f its newly-united party, though the three groups of the party might have had slightly different opinions. In the debate under the auspices of the Korea Development Institution, on March 30, 1990, the opinion o f dissidents, including the representatives o f businesses, banks, and the press, prevailed over the supporters of the Real-name Financial System, that is, a few reformist professors, such as Park Jae Yoon, Lee Kun Sik.2 1 The reformist cabinet 2 0 See Chapter II. The boss and the local constituencies o f the assemblymen, not ideology, were the main criteria which differentiated the four parties. Only the party led by Kim Dae Jung, who was a reformist, was excluded from the unification. 2 1 Kwak Young Kil, op. cit., p. 294. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 58 members, who initiated and propelled, with reform bureaucrats, the Real-name Financial System, were replaced as they lost support from the government party.2 2 Finally, the new cabinet members o f the economic departments pronounced in April, 1990, that the government would enact an economic policy which could revitalize the Korean economy, including the postponement o f the execution of the Real-name Financial System for an indefinite period.2 3 The government contended that the Real-name Financial System was postponed to prevent stagnation o f the stock market, speculative investment in real estate, and the outflow o f capital to foreign countries, which were the same reasons mentioned when the new financial system was postponed in the 5th Republic. Considering that the report o f the Ministry of Finance indicated that the Real-name Financial System would not bring such results, the main reason o f the postponement might have been the opposition of the class with vested interests and the politicians who were supported by them. President Roh, in his interview in 1999, said that he had judged that the Real- name Financial System would incur more negative effects on the economy than the increase in taxation.2 4 However, he admitted that the resistance o f the big businesses 2 2 The Presidential Chief Secretary o f Economy, Moon Hee Kap, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Cho Soon, were replaced on March 17. 2 3 The new cabinet members o f economic departments were composed o f the Deputy Prime Minister, Lee Seung Yoon, the Minister o f Finance, Jeong Young Ui, and the Minister of Trade and Industry, Park Pil Soo. 2 4 “Rotaewoo Hoegorok” (“Memoirs o f Roh Tae Woo: The Reformation o f Chaebol System and the Resistance o f Chaebols”), Wolganchosun (July, 1999), pp. 431-440 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59 (‘Chaebol’) was stubborn, saying, “The Chaebol protested against credit controls and the economic policy o f the government to have each Chaebol concentrate on a few main business items to strengthen competitiveness in the international market. In addition, their organized resistance utilizing a number of professors and the press hindered the economic reform policy.”2 5 Accordingly, we can infer that the Chaebol also resisted the execution o f the Real-name Financial System in a stubborn and organized manner. President Roh, who had committed the establishment o f the Real-name Financial System to the bureaucrats without having a strong conviction o f his own, followed the prevailing opinion of the conservatives who protested against the system in debates and in gathering various opinions. Within the DLP, Kim Young Sam, who was comparatively reformist among the leaders o f the former different parties, became the presidential candidate and won the election in December, 1992. After his inauguration in February, 1993, President Kim Young Sam declared that the most important task of the government was the reform of society, including the elimination o f illegality and corruption. The government planned to make public the assets o f high-ranking government officials and government party assemblymen and execute the Real-name Financial System. The opening o f assets to the public took place first, followed by the dismissal of corrupt officials and punishment 2 5 Moreover, President Roh said, “Because Chaebol had led the Korean economy, they had ‘vested right’ to economic policy. In such a situation, it was not easy to make decisions only on the basis o f the judgment of the government.” Though President Roh’s explanation about a ‘vested right’ is not clear, it could be understood that the Chaebol’s influence on economic policy decision-making was very powerful. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 60 of the politicians who had earned money illegally. According to the asset reports, most politicians had little savings in their own names compared with their total assets. Among 161 government party assemblymen and executive members, 57 (35.4%) reported that they did not have a bank account in their own name. Only 30 reported that they had a bank account with more than 100,000,000 won26. The average amount of reported savings of 161 persons was 57,000,000 won. Considering that the ordinary expenditure per month for a normal government party assemblyman was approximately 30,000,000 won at that time, the average savings o f 57,000,000 was an unbelievably small amount.2 7 Though they did report real estate, these holdings could not be all the assets they had because it was not convenient to change real estate into funds needed in political activity immediately. This indicates that most politicians had accounts with false names which were not reported, for the reason that they did not want their financial flow to be revealed. The government persisted in saying that one of the purposes of the execution of the Real-name Financial System was to complete the revealing o f officials’ assets by tracing their accounts. 2 6 The assets o f government party assemblymen were publicized on March 22, 1993. The exchange rate on March 22, 1993 was 792.90 won to the US dollar. The major opposition party, the Democratic Party (the DP), also made public the assets of assemblymen on April 6, 1993. 2 7 12 persons in the category o f more than 2,000,000,000 won in total assets reported that they had no savings in their own name. 20 persons in the category of more than 1,000,000,000 won in total assets reported that they had no savings. Kwak Young Kil, op.cit., pp. 286-287. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 61 While the government and bureaucrats were preparing reform policies, including the Real-name Financial System, the political parties did not actively support those policies.2 8 A number o f conservative politicians in the government party, such as Huh Hwa Pyung, were not in favor of the Real-name Financial System, and an opposition party, the DP, did not actively raise the issue o f the Real-name Financial System, and the other non-govemment party, the NP, which had been established in 1992, was not ready to make and raise new policies, though all three parties had supported the new financial system in the 1992 presidential campaign. During the presidency o f President Kim Young Sam, compared with the 5th and 6th Republics, the influence o f civil organizations was enlarged. The Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice was the most active group supporting and publicizing the necessity o f the Real-name Financial System. The press supported the new financial system, reasoning that the publicizing of high-ranking officials’ assets could be accomplished by the Real-name Financial System and inspection o f the records. The public, well-educated by the press and civil organizations, expected the success o f the new government’s reform policy and the Real-name Financial System. According to a poll by Gallup Korea in May, 1993, 84.2% of the people responded that the President was performing his work well, and in a poll in September, 1993, one month after the execution of the Real-name Financial System, 82.7% of the people still supported the “ There were three major political parties. In the general election o f 1992, the government party, the DLP, earned 48.9% of the seats, while the DP earned 31.6% and the National Party (the NP) earned 10.1%. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 62 President.2 9 The Federation o f Korean Industries could not oppose the Real-name Financial System because it had shown its support of the system in September, 1992, before the presidential election, whether it really wanted it or not. Korean business at the end o f 1992 was in a slowdown, having a sizable deficit in international transactions account. Considering the economic slowdown, representatives o f financial organizations such as the Bank Association, the Security Business Association, and the Association o f Life Insurance Companies, at a meeting with the President in March 17, 1993, insisted that it was time to stimulate the economy, postponing the execution o f the Real-name Financial System. There were different opinions among the government officials, too. While most conservative economic experts insisted that it would be safe to execute the new financial system after invigorating the economy, reformists persisted in the view that if the new financial system were executed when business was in a depression, the impact on the Korean economy would be minimized. While the Minister o f Finance, Hong Jae Hyung, held the former position, the Deputy Prime Minister (the Chief o f the Economic Planning Board), Lee Kyung Sik, represented the latter position. During the debate, President Kim Young Sam prohibited government officials from publicizing their opinion about the timing and detailed contents of the new 2 9 According to a poll performed 12 days after the execution o f the Real-name Financial System in August, 72.3% o f the people responded that the Real-name Financial System would have a positive influence on the Korean Economy. Chosunilbo. August 24, 1993. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63 financial system for a while, then, in April, 1993, secretly ordered the Deputy Prime Minister to make a working plan for the Real-name Financial System.3 0 The Deputy Prime Minister proceeded to work with researchers of the Korea Development Institute initially.3 1 Beginning in June, the Minister o f Finance, Hong Jae Hyung, joined the team with the bureaucrats o f the Ministry o f Finance.3 3 However, the Presidential Chief Secretary o f Economy, Park Jae Yoon, who preferred the stimulation o f the economy first, was excluded from this process until the announcement o f the new financial system.3 3 Beginning from this policy-making process, the influence o f the Presidential Chief Secretary o f Economy on the economic policy-making process was reduced in Kim Young Sam’s regime, compared with that in the former two Republics. The law o f the Real-name Financial System, which was drawn up in such secrecy, was publicized and executed on August 12, 1993, as an emergency presidential decree. Most people expected that the new financial system could not be initiated until 3 0 Chin Kwang Myung, “Yeokdaejeongbuui Geumyungsilmyeongje Jeongchaek hyeongseonggwa Sinjeongbuui Jeongchaekgwaje” (“The Policy-making of the Real- name Financial System in Each Regime and the Task o f the New Government”), op.cit., p. 13; Hong Kwon Hee, “Silmyeongjereul Mandeun Saramdeul” (“The men who made the Real-name Financial System”), Sindonga (October, 1993), pp. 214-215. 3 1 The leader o f the KDI researchers was Yang Soo Kil. 3 2 Though the Minister o f Finance was excluded at the early stage o f making the working plan because he had contended that economy-invigorating policy should be performed first, the chief o f the departments dealing with taxation could not be excluded from the work for a long time. The leader o f the bureaucrats from the Ministry o f Finance was the chief o f the Tax System Bureau, Kim Yong Jin. 3 3 Chin Kwang Myung, op. cit., p. 13. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64 1994 because they did not know the underground progress. Even the Prime Minister, In-sung Hwang, expected that the Real-name Financial System might not begin until the end o f 1993.3 4 Many people suddenly had to place their false name accounts in their real name, revealing their financial status.3 5 If they had waited two months, they would have been subject to a tax investigation. Before many people had an opportunity to withdraw money from their accounts with false or others’ names, the new financial system was executed. There was no process o f debate in the National Assembly, which approved the emergency presidential decree on August 19, 1993. In his special address on August 12, President Kim Young Sam said, “The Real- name Financial System was prepared secretly because open debate in the National Assembly could bring about agitation in the financial market, economic instability, and other ill effects.” Considering that there were debates among lawyers about whether the decree o f the new financial system fulfilled the condition to be executed as an emergency presidential decree after the announcem ent,3 6 one o f the most important 3 4 Hong Kwon Hee, op. cit., pp. 221. 3 5 Under the Real-name Financial System, a person with an account o f more than fifty million won should be subjected to an inspection o f the source o f his funds when he changed the account to his real name; financial interests which exceeded forty million won should be included in the category o f General Taxation on Financial Interest; and the issuance o f bearer long-term bonds which can conceal the buyer’s name was prohibited. 3 6 According to the constitution, an emergency presidential decree can be executed when there is a disaster, war, or critical economic crisis, and there is no time to wait for the convention of the National Assembly. Chosunilbo, August 15, 1993. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65 reasons for the sudden execution should have been to prevent the opposition of invested interest groups, and to discover their concealed assets. Subsequently, when two former Presidents, Chun and Roh, were accused o f bribery during President Kim Young Sam’s period, the data collected by the Real-name Financial System became critical evidence.3 7 Compared with the new financial systems o f the 5th and 6th Republics which were postponed, submitting to the dissidents, the Real-name Financial System of Kim Young Sam’s period was prepared by a few bureaucrats and executed suddenly without debate in the National Assembly, owing to the President’s strong will and power based on the public support. The people supported K im ’s government because of his legitimacy as the first President who had a civilian background since 1961, and the good image of the government officials who first made their assets public. Another important factor was President Kim’s declaration that he would not receive money during his incumbency, which made him free from accepting illegal political funds,3 8 compared with the two former Presidents who received enormous political funds from Chaebol during their presidency, which increased the influence o f Chaebol and conservative dissidents. 3 7 The two former presidents were sentenced for the collection o f illegal political funds during their incumbency, and the coup d ’[]tat on December 12, 1979, when they were generals o f the Army. ■JO President Kim Young Sam declared, on March 4, 1993, he would close the secret buildings near the Blue House used by former Presidents for illegal or private matters, and would not take any political funds during his incumbency, stopping corrupt relations between businessmen and the President. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66 With the absolute support o f public opinion at the time o f the execution o f the Real-name Financial System, there was no opposition or debate about modification of the Real-name Financial System for two years. However, the public support rate for the President decreased as no more reform policies followed the Real-name Financial System, and as the people recognized that the government’s policy toward North Korea did not have consistency. In addition, there were several big accidents in 1994 and 1995 which caused the death o f tens or hundreds of people. After the opposition parties prevailed in the local government and local assembly elections in June 27, 1995, the conservative members in the government party, the New Korean Party (NKP), raised the problem o f the strictness o f the Real-name Financial System as a reason for their loss in the election, and began to seek a method of bringing the remaining money in the false name accounts into the open market. The discussion about supplementing the Real-name Financial System continued as the Korean economy declined and savings rates decreased at the end o f 1995. The economy entered into a crisis as Hanbo Steel, Inc., the leading company o f the Hanbo Group, failed to pay its bills in January, 1997,3 9 and the reputation of Kim Young Sam’s regime deteriorated seriously with the revelation, in February, that President Kim Young Sam’s son had been involved in politics and took bribes for favors given to businessmen. At the hearings on the failure of Hanbo Steel, Inc., in the National Assembly in April, 1997, and by the investigation 3 9 Hanbo Steel, Inc., which became unable to pay its bills in January, 1997, went under the supervision of the big banks which had lent fUnds to Hanbo Steel, Inc. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67 by the prosecution, the bribery of the President’s son was confirmed. Subsequently, the President’s son was sentenced, and public support for the President and the morality o f the government declined precipitously. According to the results o f the poll by Gallup Korea in March, 1997, 73.2% of the people responded that the President was performing his job poorly. As the depression of the economy became serious, opinions in favor o f supplementing the Real-name Financial System gained strength. The President nominated Kang Kyung Sik, who insisted upon the supplementation, as the Deputy Prime Minister on March 5. On March 18, 1997, the government announced a plan to construct a supplementary law to the Real-name Financial System which would charge a fine but exempt inspection o f the source o f accounts changed to real names, and allow the issuance o f bearer long-term bonds which need not reveal the name of a buyer, bringing underground money to the open market.40 It was known that the President was 4 0 (According to the revised Government Organization Law in December, 1994, the ‘Ministry o f Finance’ and ‘Economic Planning Board’ were merged and the Chief o f the new ‘Ministry o f Finance and Economy’ was positioned as the Deputy Prime Minister.) The new Deputy Prime Minister, Kang Kyung Sik, played a leading role in drawing up the working plan of the Real-name Financial System during the 5th Republic. He excused himself, saying, “the purpose o f creating a new financial system in the 5th Republic was to reform the taxation system, while the current Real-name Financial System focuses on finding the past financial flow o f the account holders. It would be better not to investigate the source o f the accounts in false or others’ names after charging a fine.” “Geumyungsilmyeongje Bowan Jeomgeom” (“Examination of the Supplementation o f the Real-name Financial System”), Economist, Vol. 380, April 1, 1997 - http://economist.joongang.co.kr Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68 not informed o f the detailed contents o f the announcement in advance.4 1 In July, another big enterprise, Kia Motors, Inc. faced a crisis o f non-payment. However, the CEO o f Kia Motors, Inc., Kim Sun Hong, did not make an agreement with the government for three months regarding the future management system o f Kia Motors, Inc., until it went under the management o f creditor banks in October. The failure o f Hanbo Steel, Inc. and Kia Motors, Inc., which had over-borrowed, deteriorated the Korean money market, and entailed the bankruptcy o f related small and medium enterprises, and finally, the failure in foreign exchange control led to borrowing relief funds from the IMF on November 21, 1997. By that time, the President had lost the people’s confidence in his ability and his authority over economic policy-making. The Federation o f Korean Industries asked for the general suspension o f the Real-name Financial System, on November 13, 1997, with the support o f other business interest groups. The press did not oppose the substitution o f the Real-name Financial System in their editorials, providing various opinions about it. All the presidential candidates from the three political parties in the election in December made a public commitment to execute economic policies to invigorate the 4 1 President Kim Young Sam ordered the Deputy Prime M inister not to change the basic frame o f the Real-name Financial System and have enough time to collect various opinions. However, the Deputy Prime Minister announced the supplementary plan without a hearing process, including the basic change o f the financial system. Kang Kyung Sik, though he had admitted the necessity o f reform, he did not insist upon the total suspension o f the Real-name Financial System until he was dismissed in November on the charge o f causing a foreign exchange crisis. Kim Yong Sung, “Daetongryeong-i Sarajeotda”(“There Is No President”), Hankyure 21, Vol. 151. (April 3, 1997) - http://www.hani.co.kr/h21/ Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69 economy, including the reform or suspension o f the Real-name Financial System.4 2 The presidential candidate of the government party, the NKP, Lee Hoe Chang, contended that it would be desirable to supplement the Real-name Financial System to bring underground money into the industrial funds in the open market, and also insisted on permitting the issuance of bearer long-term bonds in which a person could invest without revealing his name.4 3 Until then, the Blue House did not admit the necessity of supplementing the Real-name Financial System, which had been regarded as the most successful policy performed by President Kim Young Sam. Kim Dae Jung, the presidential candidate o f the big opposition party, the NCNP, also mentioned the necessity o f supplementing the Real-name Financial System, and later he insisted on the suspension o f the law during the period under the supervision o f the EMF.4 4 Lee In Je, the presidential candidate of a small opposition party, the NKP, also insisted on the issuance o f bearer long-term bonds to help enterprise and revitalize the economy.4 5 4 2 There were four major political parties: the government party, the NKP; the big opposition party, the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP), led by Kim Dae Jung who retired after the 1992 Presidential election and returned in 1995; the United Liberal Democrats (ULD), led by Kim Jong Pil, which did not put up a presidential candidate, supporting Kim Dae Jung; and the New National Party (NNP) which was newly established in November, 1997, led by Lee In Je. 4 3 Joongangilbo. November 15. During the presidential campaign in October, 1997, Lee Hoe Chang revealed the secret money o f Kim Dea Jung, violating the rule of secrecy assurance o f accounts in the law o f the Real-name Financial System. Lee Hoe Chang, who insisted that he was informed by an anonymous person, was not accused of this revelation. 4 4 The leader o f the NCNP, Kim Dae Jung, who was united with Kim Jong Pil of the ULD, won the presidential election on December 19, 1997. Joongangilbo, November 15, 29. 4 5 Joongangilbo, November 15. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70 President Kim Young Sam, who had resisted the pressure o f political parties to reform the Real-name Financial System, admitted the necessity o f financial reform on November 29, at a meeting o f ministers and a few entrepreneurs on the economic crisis, though he still insisted that the issuance o f bearer long-term bonds would not be needed.4 6 But, whatever the President insisted, he no longer had authority in the decision-making process. Finally, on December 26, the National Assembly approved the new Law o f the Real-name Financial System, substituting the old Emergency Presidential Decree o f the Real-name Financial System. The new law allowed the issuance o f bearer long-term bonds, and suspended the General Taxation on Financial Interest, which had been executed for two years since 1995 as the most important purpose o f the Real-name Financial System, for an indefinite period.4 7 During this process, the Presidential Chief Secretary o f Economy, In-ho Kim, and the bureaucrats o f the Ministry o f Finance and Economy had opposed the total suspension o f the Real-name Financial System. The Ministry o f Finance and Economy, which had established the Real-name Financial System, issued a statement on 4 6 Joongangilbo. November 30. 4 7 In the new law, compared with the old law, the category o f exemption o f the inspection was enlarged for money invested in small and medium enterprises, in the banks which supported small and medium enterprises, and in venture funds; the General Taxation on Financial Interest was totally suspended; and the issuance o f bearer long term bonds was allowed for one year. As a result, the new Real-name Financial System gave enough space to allow a change in the account name without the money source being inspected. Chosunilbo. December 27. 1997. President Kim Dae Jung’s government announced in August, 1999, that the General Taxation on Financial Interest would be executed again beginning in 2002. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71 November 14, 1997, “The position o f the government regarding the insistence o f the Federation o f Korean Industries on the general suspension o f the Real-name Financial System.” In this statement, the Ministry o f Finance and Economy contended that, “The Real-name Financial System, at some social and political cost, has yielded a positive effect for the last four years and is in the stage o f settlement... The general suspension o f the Real-name Financial System means returning to the former dark age o f the financial system, giving up the establishment o f the rule o f clear financial transactions... The total savings rate and savings rate per person are increasing consistently, though a few people, who do not want to reveal their money through deposits in a bank, consume luxuriously. This shows that the Real-name Financial System is not the reason for the economic depression.” 4 8 The Presidential Chief Secretary o f Economy, In-ho Kim, on November 15, told the press, “The suspension o f the Real-name Financial System or the issuance o f bearer long-term bonds would not bring as much money to the industrial funds market as the Federation o f Korean Industries insists. A portion o f underground money is already circulated in the open financial market by the buying o f bills at a discounted rate. The problem is the cash in 4 8 Hankvure. November 14, 1997. Though the Ministry o f Finance and Economy opposed the total suspension o f the Real-name Financial System, it had already submitted the substitution bill o f the Real-name Financial System to the National Assembly, following the Deputy Prime M inister’s announcement o f the plan to construct a supplementary law to the Real-name Financial System on March 18, 1997. According to the government’s bill, the inspection o f the money source would be exempted for funds invested in small and medium enterprises and venture capital. It meant that though the government did not regard the Real-name Financial System as responsible for the economic crisis, it recognized the necessity o f supplementing the law to help small and medium enterprises and venture capital. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72 private safes which is not circulated.”4 4 Civil organizations such as the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice and the Korean House for International Solidarity contended that, “The Real-name Financial System cannot be withdrawn before it is settled. The Chaebol insist on the suspension o f the Real-name Financial System to attribute their fault and responsibility to the law.” In spite o f the opposition of the bureaucrats and Presidential C hief Secretary of Economy, who were not entrusted with power at that time, the main current was the suspension o f the Real-name Financial System. The critics of the Real-name Financial System before its execution contended that the new financial system would bring a depression of the stock market owing to the withdrawal o f big investors, speculative investment in real estate with funds withdrawn from the financial market, the outflow o f money to foreign countries, a decrease in the savings rate due to the General Taxation on Financial Interest, and financial difficulty to small and medium enterprises owing to a reduction in the private loan market. However, most o f these expectations were not realized. The stock market was influenced briefly but recovered soon, and few funds flowed into real estate from the financial market. The total savings rate showed a slow but stable increase. Concerning a reduction in the private loan market, a number o f professionals admitted that the 4 0 Kwak Jung Soo, “Ijimedanghaneun Geumyungsilmyeongje” (“Attack on the Real- name Financial System”), Hankvure 21. Vol. 184 (November 27, 1997). Both the Presidential Chief Secretary o f Economy and the Deputy Prime Minister, however, were replaced on November 19, 1997, charged with causing the foreign exchange crisis. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73 underground funds did not sufficiently support the functioning o f the open financial market, causing financial difficulties to small and medium enterprises.3 0 Regardless o f such facts, the Chaebol blamed the Real-name Financial System for the economic depression. It seems that the wealthy people were basically reluctant to support the Real-name Financial System. According to a private financer, “While the Real-name Financial System is an inconvenient procedure for the common people, it is a big obstacle to financial operation for people who have secret money through evasion 30 There were other professionals who insisted that the Real-name Financial System did not bring a reduction in the private loan market. They contended that the amount of funds in the underground market, which included private moneylenders’ funds, was 11.2% o f the GNP in 1994 and 8.9% in 1995, which was not a small portion. The Report of Finance Research Institute; Yang Jae Chan, “Economic Reform of Kim Young Sam,” Economist, Vol. 317 (December 14, 1995); Kim Bang Hee, “Silmyeongje” (“Real-name Financial System”), Sisaioumal, Vol. 380 (March 20, 1997). Though there is a debate about whether the reduction of the underground market caused financial trouble to small and medium enterprises, it seemed that the owners o f such enterprises saw difficulties in raising funds. The Korea Federation of Small and Medium Businesses conducted research in February, 1997, for 293 small (5- 50 employees) and medium (51-300 employees) enterprises regarding the administrative conditions which changed after the execution o f the Real-name Financial System. According to the data, 6.8% of the total enterprises answered that it became easier to raise funds from banks, and 19.9% of them answered that it became worse, and, among them, 22% o f the small enterprises answered that it became worse. This shows that small enterprises were in a worse situation raising funds than medium enterprises. Regarding raising funds from the private loan market, 9.6% o f medium enterprises answered that it became worse while 47% o f small enterprises answered that it became worse. This result shows that small enterprises which had depended on the private loan market suffered more difficulties raising funds. Chosunilbo, February 6, 1997 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74 o f taxes or political funds.’01 Though, technically, one could save money under another’s name through an agreement with the account owner even under the Real- name Financial System, it was not an easy option for those with a large amount of money because o f the General Taxation on Financial Interest and possible source inspection by the Office o f National Tax Administration. President Chun had the power to execute the Real-name Financial System regardless o f the support o f the people. However, he needed to keep the connection with the Chaebol, who supported secret political funding of his regime. Subsequently, he chose co-prosperity with the conservatives who had vested interests. President Roh, who was less powerful than Chun, opened the issue o f the Real-name Financial System to the public as he had promised during the presidential campaign. Roh did not have the full support o f the people, and the government party had fewer seats than the opposition parties in the National Assembly. In the more democratized society where coercive force was not acceptable, he was forced to unite with two other conservative parties. After the unification, the leaders o f the new government party, including Roh, who did not want the reform policy which could hurt stabilization, accepted the opinion o f the conservatives who opposed the new financial system. President Kim Young Sam, who was free from political funds compared with the two former Presidents, succeeded in executing the Real-name Financial System with the support o f the people. Though he did not use coercive force, the people’s support was the resource of his 3 1 Kwak Jung Soo, “Ijimedanghaneun Geumyungsilmyeongje” (“Attack on the Real- name Financial System”), op. cit. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75 power. However, as the President lost the people’s support by failing in economic policies, the Real-name Financial System was withdrawn as the Chaebol and the conservatives had insisted, with the false charge o f causing the national economic crisis. President Kim Young Sam, in his later period after his son’s scandal and the failure of economic policies, could not take part in the announcement o f the plan to create a supplementary law in March, 1997. Though President Kim had kept his position not to supplement the Real-name Financial System until the end o f November, the government party had a different policy orientation and drove forward the policy regardless o f the President’s opinion. This means that President Kim Young Sam’s influence on the policy-making process in his later period, when he lost the support o f the people, was weaker than that of the former presidents. The change in the financial system in each President’s period clearly shows the extent o f the President’s influence in executing economic policy. The Chaebol and their financial power prevailed under Presidents Chun and Roh, but not in Kim’s presidency. The Chaebol were the major actor who resisted the new financial system for their own interest, and would have opposed it severely even under President Kim but for strong public support. This was indicated when the Chaebol led the opinion for creating a supplementary law o f the Real-name Financial System when President Kim lost his power. On the contrary, people did not oppose the new financial system because it did not have important relevance for them. In this sense, the cost o f actors complying and the difference in the probability o f compliance are well exposed in this issue. The number o f persons who responded was not really relevant in this issue, rather Presidents Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76 had to overcome the resistance o f the Chaebol because o f their importance and power in South Korean economy. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 77 Chapter IV. Presidential Power in Supporting the Presidential Candidate of the Government Party South Korean Presidents, who have been automatically president o f the government party, have attempted to support a person whom they can trust and who has the potential to win the presidential election as the next presidential candidate o f the party. They have regarded this as the best way to maintain their influence in the next regime and to secure themselves from blame for faults committed during their own terms in office. The patterns o f selecting the next presidential candidate were not same among the three Presidents, although they all tried to exert their influence as much as possible. Although the actors who participated in the process o f selecting presidential candidate were different in each regime, the major actors were the President and the selected presidential candidate. As democratization developed and the electoral system was institutionalized, the President had to consider the popularity o f the presidential candidate and the probability of his winning the election. Subsequently, the President had to open the opportunity for candidacy to more actors representing particular groups. The authoritarian national convention o f the government party turned into a competitive and democratic one because people would no longer support a candidate who lacked legitimacy. As a result, the power o f the President in deciding the presidential candidate declined, and the influence o f public opinion and the press increased. Only a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 78 candidate with a strong possibility o f winning in a democratic electoral contest, on the basis o f public support, could be chosen. Dahl’s measures o f influence by the amount of change o f the actor influenced, differences in the scope o f the responses, and number o f persons who respond are applied to this issue. During the 5th Republic, when there were few public polls, and few people could voice opposition opinion to the authoritarian regime, opposition to the regime was indicated by demonstrations by the students and other opposition groups. In this sense, the degree o f support is considered as well as the number of persons who respond. The measure according to the difference in the probability o f compliance is also considered in that the voters in the national convention were influenced by the intervention of the President in the process o f selecting the presidential candidate. During the 5th Republic, President Chun did not establish a democratic electoral system for deciding the presidential candidate of the government party. Instead, he chose one, trained him and nominated him as his successor; then a formal national convention followed. Subsequently, the role of the presidential candidate, other competitive candidates, and the supporters of candidates in the government party was limited. Roh Tae Woo was the chosen successor. Roh had been a close friend o f Chun’s since their Military Academy days. They carried out the coups in 1979 and 1980 together, and Roh supported Chun as President in 1980. After Chun became President in an indirect election in February, 1981, Roh Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 79 was discharged from military service as a full general and became the Second Minister o f State for Political Affairs the following July. This position was newly established involving little work, though nominally it was related to diplomacy and national security. In this position, Roh prepared the plan for Chun’s visit to African countries in 1981, and particularly the plans for the 1988 Olympics in Seoul.1 He became the Minister of Sports in February, 1982, and was transferred to the Minister o f Home Affairs in April, 1982. In July, 1983, he took charge of the Olympics plans again as the Chair o f the Organization for the Olympics. Roh’s career in the government political party began as an assemblyman from the national constituency in the general election in February, 1985.2 In this election, the newly established opposition party, the New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP), became the major opposition party.3 As a strong opposition party emerged after the general election, the persons in the ruling group showed two different attitudes in coping with the opposition group and about the internal decision-making process. The 1 Lee Young Suk, “Dojeonbanneun Roh Chun Mukgye” (“The Promise between Roh and Chun Which Is Being Challenged’’), Wolganioongang (March, 1989), p. 195. 2 An assemblyman elected from the national constituency took the seat allocated to his political party according to the rate of the vote obtained in the regional district. 3 See Chapter II. Chun pardoned, in 1983, a number o f politicians banned from political activity by the Special Regulation in 1980, and pardoned most of the others in 1984. They established the Association for Driving Democratization in May, 1984, and established the new political party, the NKDP, in January, 1985. In the election in February, within one month o f its establishment, the NKDP became the main opposition party in place o f the existing opposition party, the DKP. Opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Pil were liberated in March, 1995. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 80 soft-liners insisted that they had to accept the people’s demands for democratization indicated in the election, i.e., through internal democratization and dialogue with the opposition group, in contrast to the hard-liners who insisted on repressing the opposition group.4 According to an analysis, those in the Blue House and the ANSP maintained a hard-line position. In the government party, which had been led by Chun and the hard-line charter members, most members were hard-liners. A few party members, represented by the floor leader, Lee Jong Chan, raised their voices for soft- line policy. The number o f these soft-liners increased as the people’s pressure for democratization became serious at the end o f the 5th Republic.3 According to Lim Hyuk Baek, this was the first emergence o f soft-liners in the government party after the death o f President Park in 1979. After their position was strengthened by the people’s pressure for democratization in 1987, they could advance democratization through negotiation with the opposition group, which became bigger and stronger.6 Lee Kap Yun suggests that there was not real dissent within the ruling group, though there were different opinions in coping with the opposition group 4 Lee Do Sung, “Minjeongdang Dangnaeminjuhwa Simsangchianta” (“Problems in Democratization o f the DJP”) Sindonga. Vol. 341 (February, 1988), pp. 193-194. 3 Suh Hyung Rae, “Minjeongdang Ganggyeongpaneun Buhwalhalgeosinga” (“Will the Hard-liners o f the DJP resurrect?”), Sindonga. Vol. 349 (October, 1988), pp. 265-272. 6 Lim Hyuk Baek’s analysis was based on the work o f Adam Przeworski, G. O ’Donnell, and P. Schmitter. Lim Hyuk Baek, “Hangukeseoui Minjuhwa Gwajung Bunseok” (“Analysis o f the Democratization Process o f S. Korea”), The Korean Political Science Review (Seoul: The Korean Political Science Association, 1995), Vol. 24-1, pp. 59-60, 65-70. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81 regarding the issue o f the Campus Security Law and constitutional amendments in 1985 and 1986. The differences between the soft and hard-liners were regarding the method o f maintaining power, not in their social background or ideology. He said that the hard-liners, centering around President Chun, had maintained power and initiated negotiation with the opposition group, even in 1987. The hard-liners accepted the people’s demands for direct presidential elections in 1987 because they thought this was the most reasonable way to maintain their power, neutralizing the people’s demonstrations.7 This dissertation accepts Lee Kap Yun’s explanation, i.e., that there were soft-liners and hard-liners who had different attitudes in dealing with the opposition group, but were not differentiated by other categories. During the 5th Republic, Chun and the hard-liners maintained power and made critical decisions, although they followed the soft-liners’ position at the end o f the 5th Republic. Roh, a new member of the National Assembly, was nominated as the representative o f the government party, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), by President Chun 10 days after the general election, and gave an inaugural address, emphasizing the importance o f democratizing the government party and dialogue with the opposition parties, in accordance with the soft-liners o f the party. This was the first 7 Lee Kap Yun and Moon Yong Zik, “Hangukui Minjuhwa: Jeongaegwajeonggwa Seonggwa” (“Democratization o f S. Korea: The Process and Characteristics”), The Korean Political Science Review (Seoul: The Korean Political Science Association, 1995), Vol. 29-2, pp. 217-220, 227-228. 8 The representative o f the government party was the highest position other than the president o f the party, which was held by the President at the same time. For non government parties, the representative o f a party was the president o f the party. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82 clear indication of President Chun’s support for Roh as his successor, and his intention to train Roh in the political arena. Soon after his inauguration as the representative, Roh proposed the liberation o f Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung who had been restrained from political activity since 1980, talcing a moderate attitude toward the opposition parties as opposed to the hard-liners’ position within the government party. However, as Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung resumed political activity, the opposition groups became very active, and the representative o f the NKDP, Min-woo Lee, pushed for the early resignation of President Chun. As the soft-liners’ policy of dialogue with the opposition group was not realized well, the hard-liners maintained a dominant position within the government party. With the increase in number and militancy of student demonstrations after the general election in February, 1985, the government tried to establish a new Campus Security Law which would restrict association and demonstrations on campus, and permit the arrest of leftist students using an administrative measure without judicial procedure. Roh opposed the law along with soft-liners such as the floor leader, Lee Jong Chan, and the chief of the policy planning committee o f the party, Hyun Hong Joo. In August, however, Lee Jong Chan was replaced by a hard-liner, Lee Se Ki, and other hard-liners obtained the positions o f secretary general and chief o f the policy planning Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83 committee. After that, Roh, who lost supporters, followed the opinion o f the Blue House regarding the Campus Security Law without raising his voice.9 Roh’s unstable leadership was exposed in October, 1985, at the regular session o f the National Assembly, where a number of the government party members crossed over in the election for the Vice-Chairmen to vote against the government party policy. One o f the two vice-chairmen was allocated to the non-govemment party. For the position, two assemblymen ran for election from the NKDP. One was the official candidate o f the NKDP, and another put himself as a candidate against the policy o f the NKDP. Although Roh had made a statement before the election that the DJP had decided to support the official candidate o f the NKDP in accordance with the custom, many government party members disobeyed the order o f their representative, resulting 9 This bill was initiated by the hard-liner o f the Blue House, the Presidential Chief Secretary o f State Affairs, Moon-do Huh, excluding the bureaucrats o f the Ministry of Education. Following the opinion o f the Blue House, the chief executives of the government party decided to pass the bill at the special session o f the National Assembly in August, even in the absence of the opposition parties, and informed the members o f the government party to be prepared. As the opposition o f the non government party and public opinion hardened, however, representatives of the government and non-govemment parties had a meeting on August 14, 1985, and agreed to have dialogues regarding the content o f the bill. The next day, President Chun had a meeting with the representative o f the NKDP, Min-woo Lee, and ordered Roh to postpone the passage of the bill. Thus Roh, who had initially opposed the bill but then decided to accept it, was again forced to shift his position. “The Message of the Former U.S. Ambassador to S. Korea, Walker” Hankookilbo. May 11, 1998; Joongangilbo, January 11, 1997; Yang Gun, “Hakwonbeop Jejeong, Wae Munjeinga” (“The Problem of the Campus Security Law”), Sindonga (September, 1985), pp. 136-138; Hangyure, August 31, 1996. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 84 in the defeat o f the official candidate o f the NKDP.1 0 Regarding this event, President Chun warned the government party members that such a thing would not happen again, re-enforcing Roh’s leadership. Still, Roh’s subsequent efforts toward a dialogue with the opposition group did not go smoothly. The NKDP took the offensive, launching the signature-collecting drive for a constitutional revision for direct presidential elections in February, 1986. At the end o f April, President Chun said he would let the government party, not the Blue House, assume the helm o f state affairs, and would consider the constitutional amendment if the government party and opposition party could come to an agreement on the new constitution.1 1 Though Roh tried to induce mutual consent, the NKDP, led by Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, did not agree to a parliamentary system.1 2 The 1 0 Some government party officials decided to show their dislike o f the official opposition candidate by dividing their vote between candidates and thus diluting the vote for the official candidate against Roh’s order, expecting that he would still win. But the tactic misfired and the official candidate lost the election. Lee Do Sung, “Minjeongdangui Gwonryeok Gujohaebu” (“The Analysis o f the Power Structure o f the DJP”), Sindonga (December, 1985), pp. 154-166. 1 1 In the constitution existing at that time, the presidential electoral college was supposed to elect the President. It was not regarded as democratic because a small number o f electoral college members could be easily controlled by the government, in contrast to the advanced electoral system of the U.S. While the government party planned to amend the constitution in favor of the parliamentary system, the opposition party advocated a presidential system and direct presidential elections. Lee Jung Bok, “Je5gonghwaguksidaeui Jeongchijedo” (“The Political System o f the 5th Republic”) in Min Joon Ki et al., Hangukui Jeongchi (Seoul: Nanam Publishing Co., 1996), pp. 93-94. 1 2 When the consultation about the new constitution did not progress well, the representative o f the NKDP, Min-woo Lee, in December, 1986, announced that he would consider a parliamentary system if the government established several conditions first for fair elections. Though his proposal was welcomed by the government party, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 85 apparent failure of Roh’s policy o f dialogue diminished his power, and his position as the successor was weakened, too. At that time, there was a rumor that the Prime Minister, Shin-young Roh, and the Director o f the Agency for National Security Planning, Jang Se Dong, were now being considered as successors.1 3 President Chun supported Roh again at the meeting with chief executives of the government party in March, 1987. stating that he would give Roh the authority to administer the political situation. However, as the opposition group insisted on direct presidential elections, and Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung announced plans for establishing a new opposition party, on April 8, Chun took the initiative again against the opposition group. President Chun confined Kim Dae Jung to his house on April 10, and arbitrarily announced that the old constitution would not be amended on April 13. It was known that the government party did not take part in that decision-making, and Roh was notified officially only one day before the announcement.1 4 Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, the actual leaders o f the NKDP who preferred the presidential system for a complete regime change, rejected it and eventually established a new opposition party in April, 1987, resulting in the collapse of the NKDP. Son Koo Sun, “Bulbalo Ggeunnan Chundoohwan Rohtaewooui Naegakje Gusang” (“The Parliamentary System Which Was Not Realized”), Segyewana. Vol. 38 (December, 1992), p. 111-112. 1 3 The rumor was circulated on the basis o f Roh Shin Young’s having the merit of a civilian background and Jang Se Dong’s having great influence on political affairs. However, there was no indication that such an option was seriously considered. Lee Do Sung, “Rohtaewoo Huboseonchul Ihuui Minjeongdang Jeongchigusang” (“The Plan of DJP after the Selection o f Representative Roh”), Sindonga (July, 1987), pp. 154-155. 1 4 President Chun ordered a draft o f the statement for the preservation of the constitution by a presidential secretary, after he had received a report from the Director o f the Agency for National Security Planning, in the early April, that there would be no Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 86 Opposition groups reacted negatively to the announcement, and public opinion was also negative. Professors from many universities made statements against the preservation o f the constitution. Public opinion against the government hardened when an activist priest group revealed that the number o f police officers held responsible for the death o f a student in January had been reduced.1 3 Reshuffling the cabinet in an effort to appease public opinion, on May 26, 1987, President Chun discharged the Prime Minister, Roh Shin Young, and the Director o f the Agency for National Security Planning, Jang Se Dong, hard-liners who had held important positions for two years, transferring more power to the representative Roh. The newly nominated Prime Minister, Lee Han Ki, was a soft-liner like Roh, and the new Director of the Agency for National Security Planning, Ahn Moo Hyuk, was known to understand Roh’s style well as did the Secretary General o f the government party, Lee Choon Koo, with whom he would work. Dismissing rumors regarding potential successors, the organization o f a possibility o f consultation with the opposition group if the NKDP were dissolved. Kim Young Sam established a new party, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) on May 1. After Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung failed to agree on supporting one o f the two candidates in the presidential election, Kim Dae Jung established the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) on November 12, 1997. Roh Shin Young, “Chundoohwan Jeonggwonbisa” (“Secret Story in Chun’s Regime”), Wolganchosun (October, 1994), p. 166-167; Son Koo Sun, “Bulbalo Ggeunnan Chundoohwan Rohtaewooui Naegakje Gusang” (“Parliamentary System Which Was Not Realized”), op. cit., p. 110.. 1 5 A university student, Park Jong Chul, was dead owing to torture by policemen in January, 1987. A few policemen were prosecuted at that time. On May 18, “The Corps o f Priests for Justice” announced that high-ranking police officers reduced the number o f responsible policemen. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87 new cabinet at the end o f the year was interpreted as a re-enforcement o f Roh’s position as the successor.1 6 President Chun, at a meeting with the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen o f the National Assembly and the chief executives o f the government party at the Blue House on June 2, 1987, recommended Roh as the presidential candidate o f the DJP for the presidential election in December, 1987.1 7 With the approval o f the approximately 30 persons present, Roh was actually nominated as the successor by President Chun. Roh ran for the nomination unopposed and was elected as the presidential candidate at the national convention o f the DJP on June 10, 1987.1 8 However, the people did not tolerate this unofficial nominating procedure, which was supposed to be followed by indirect presidential elections based on the existing constitution. The opposition party and students had initiated demonstrations since June 10, and a lot o f citizens took part in 1 6 “The Secretariat o f the Blue House,” Joongangilbo, September 24, 1993; November 12, 1993; March 25, 1994. 1 7 President Chun said, “For the development o f our country and the success o f the Seoul Olympics... We need a person who has political leadership and the capability to secure the country ... Following the opinion o f party members, after a lot of consultations with respectable persons, I concluded that representative Roh, who devoted himself to saving the country from crisis and has been at the forefront of reform, is the best person for the position. Hence, I recommend representative Roh as the presidential candidate o f the DJP.” He added, “I think unity without division is more important than free com petition... Let’s support the new presidential candidate in unison.” Lee Do Sung, “Rohtaewoo Hubosunchul Ihuui M injeongdang Jeongchi Gusang” (“The Plan o f DJP after the Selection o f Representative Roh”), op. cit., pp. 141-142. I Q Roh won 7260 out o f 7309 votes. The total number o f delegates who had the right to vote was 8646. Ibid., p. 142. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 88 the street demonstrations. When the demonstrations reached a peak on June 19, President Chun even considered ordering military mobilization. 1 9 As the public opposition increased, President Chun and Roh consulted with the former Presidents, the leaders o f the opposition parties, and religious leaders. President Chun decided on a plan to accept presidential direct elections and other demands for democratization. For a dramatic effect, President Chun let Roh announce the plan on June 29, 1987.2 0 This announcement raised Roh’s reputation and his public support, and played a critical role in Roh’s winning in the presidential election. Some hard-liners, represented by the Minister o f the National Unification Board, Huh Moon Do, wanted Chun’s ruling period extended, distrusting the capability o f Roh. 1 9 When the demonstrations in Seoul and Pusan became aggressive with the participation o f ordinary citizens, President Chun called a meeting o f the commanding military generals at the Blue House on the morning o f June 19 and ordered military mobilization to suppress the demonstration. The order was canceled in the afternoon, however, after the U.S. Ambassador to S. Korea, James Lilley, visited President Chun and recommended that he make the political gesture o f advancing the democratization process rather than mobilizing the military, handing him a letter from President Reagan to that effect. Lee Sang Woo, “Chundoohwaneun Newin-eul Ggumggwotda” (“Chun’s Plan to Have Influence on the Next Regime”), Sindonga (June, 1992), pp. 235-237. Some people insist that President Chun did not really want to mobilize the military, apart from the recommendation o f Lilley. They believe that Chun was trying to calm down the demonstrations by raising the possibility of military mobilization to the opposition group leaders who were leading the demonstrations. Kim Dae Gon, “Miguki 629seoneon-e Michin Yeokhal” (“The Role o f the U.S. to the Announcement on June 29”), Sindonga (June, 1992), pp. 249-250. 2 0 In 1999, Roh said that Chun first suggested acceptance o f direct presidential elections on June 24, though he had already decided to do so. He said that Chun and he had a mutual understanding to include presidential direct elections and the release o f Kim Dae Jung from custody in the announcement on June 29. “The Memoirs o f Roh Tae Woo: Secret Story o f Politics,” Wolganchosun (June, 1999), pp. 207-220. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 89 The hard-liners suggested a plan to extend Chun’s term one more year to secure the success o f the Seoul Olympics.2 1 Such a super-constitutional plan could be suggested because Chun had control o f the military until the end o f his term. Though Chun handed over his position to Roh without attempting to extend his term, he did try to maintain his influence even after his retirement. In the new constitution which accepted direct presidential elections, Chun included a provision that, “The President can establish an Advisory Committee of Elder Statesmen to advise him on important policies o f the country.” On the basis o f this provision, Chun assumed office as the Chairman o f the Advisory Committee o f Elder Statesmen one day after his retirement.2 2 It is widely believed that Chun needed to secure his safety after his retirement because he had carried out a coup and had been responsible for killing people in Kwangju. Roh, who had been an old friend and had joined in the coup with Chun, was Chun’s best choice as his successor. Chun trained him by enabling him to gain experience in various government positions, and supported him as the representative of the government party when Roh’s authority was weakened due to dissident members in 2 1 It was known that they had even discussed the declaration o f martial law in case there were serious demonstrations after Roh won the election, on the basis o f the election’s having been unfair. However, nothing happened because most people accepted the result o f the election. “A Document of the State Department o f the U.S. (Seoul 14698: December 17, 1987): A Report from Ambassador Lilley to the Secretary o f State - released to the public in 1995,” Sindonga (December, 1996), pp. 130-151. 2 2 As criticism o f the 5th Republic arose soon after the inauguration of President Roh on February 25, 1988, Chun resigned from the position o f his own accord on April 13, 1988. Park Chan Soo, “Jeonggwon Insuingyeui Makjeonmakhu” (“The Process of Taking over the Regime”). Segyewana, Vol. 41 (March, 1993), pp. 120-121. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 90 the party or uncompromising relations with opposition groups. Chun maintained control o f power mostly as a hard-liner, hence Roh, who tended to be a soft-liner, sometimes had to change his position following Chun’s decisions. However, as people strongly resisted the prospect o f non-democratic succession at the end o f the 5th Republic, Chun accepted the soft-line policy, grooming Roh as its advocate. Because of increasing public pressure, Chun and Roh realized that the party would have to change if it were to continue to govern. Although Chun accepted the people’s demands for direct presidential elections, he maintained power within the government party until the end o f his term, supporting Roh’s campaign. In the general election in the early period of the 6th Republic, the government party won only 34% o f the seats in the National Assembly. When the government party did not have the initiative in politics, the issue was how to arrange the party structure, not the next presidential candidate. The government party, the DJP, merged with two opposition parties, the RDP and the NDRP, into the new government party, the Democratic Liberty Party (DLP), in January, 1990.2 3 The power struggle for the presidential candidacy began after the merger o f the three parties. In the 6th Republic, the presidential candidate was not decided by the President, but possible candidates competed with each other, and popularity became a very important resource in becoming the candidate. Competition for the presidential 2 3 See Chapter II. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 91 candidacy happened mostly between Kim Young Sam, the leader o f the former RDP members, and the dissidents in the government party, most o f whom were former DJP members. Kim Young Sam, on the basis o f his popularity, did not play the role of the second man who was supposed to obey and wait for nomination by the President, but obtained what he wanted by struggle, using the threat o f seceding from the party. President Roh and the former DJP members, who lacked a figure who could compete with Kim Young Sam or Kim Dae Jung in the opposition party, preferred to amend the constitution to a parliamentary system and maintain their power according to their portion in the National Assembly in the next regime. Kim Young Sam, however, wanted to keep the presidential system and to become the presidential candidate of the unified party as soon as possible.2 4 The actors involved in this process were Kim Young Sam; President Roh and his main brain truster, Park Chul Un; other competitors in the party, Roh Jae Bong, Park Tae Joon, and Lee Jong Chan; members o f the party divided by their former affiliation, the DJP (former government party), the RDP (led by Kim Young Sam), and the NDRP (led by Kim Jong Pil); and a newly organized group supporting Kim Young Sam, consisting mostly of the former DJP members. 2 4 It was known that Kim Young Sam was not promised the presidential candidacy at the time o f the merger. The leaders o f the three parties agreed to amend the constitution for the parliamentary system, though Kim Young Sam took a vague position, and to make Kim Young Sam the representative o f the merged party. From the merger in January to the national convention on May 9, 1990, President Roh was the president o f the party, and the leaders o f the former three parties, Park Tae Joon, Kim Young Sam, Kim Jong Pil, became the members o f the supreme council. At the national convention, Kim Young Sam took the position o f representative member of the supreme council (the representative o f the party). Yoon Young Joong, “Naenyeon Samsawolui Byeonhwawa Rohtaewooui Seontaek” (“Expectation o f the Change in the Next Year and Roh’s Choice”), Wolganioongang (June, 1991), pp. 170, 176-177. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 92 Regarding the status o f Kim Young Sam, the Minister o f State for Political Affairs, Park Chul Un,2 5 said in February, 10 days after the merger, “There is no tacit agreement in the world of power. Even if we supposed there was, can it be executed as agreed? The future of Kim Young Sam depends upon the capability he will show from now on.”2 6 For Kim Young Sam, this statement raised doubts as to whether Roh was intending to make use of him for a while and then discard him. Park Chul Un criticized Kim Young Sam again, after they had visited the USSR together in March, 1990,2 7 saying, “ If we (the DJP) had merged with Kim Dae Jung’s party, it would have been much better. We need a second reorganization o f political parties.” 2 8 After this 2 5 Park Chul Un, the husband o f the niece of the President’s wife, had the trust of President Roh and exercised a powerful influence on decision-making with respect to the socialist countries. He visited North Korea and other socialist countries a number of times as a secret envoy o f the President. (See Chapter V) He took part in the confidential merger process of the three parties, representing the former DJP. 2 6 Kwak Byung Chan, “Kimyoungsam Parkchulun Geu Jehyuwa Rival Gwangye” (“The Relationship between Kim Young Sam and Park Chul Un”), Observer, Vol. 4 (April, 1990), p. 208. 2 7 When there was an underground contact between S. Korea and the Soviet Union in 1990, Kim Young Sam asked President Roh to allow him to visit the Soviet Union. Although Roh thought it was not desirable because Kim was not well-versed on the government policy toward socialist countries, Roh agreed since it was Kim’s first request after the merger. During Kim’s visit to the USSR for 10 days beginning March 19, Kim had conflict with Park Chul Un who had been in charge of actual negotiation with the Soviet Union, and met Gorbachev without a prearranged schedule. Lee Jae Wook, “Kimyoungsamgwa Parkchulun” (“Kim Young Sam vs. Park Chul Un”), Dari. Vol. 31 (May, 1990), p.96-97; “Rohtaewoo Hoegorok” (“The Memoirs of Roh Tae Woo: Secret Story of Politics”), Wolganchosun (June, 1999), p 249. ■ ? 8 ' Yoo Jong Pil, “Rohtaewooui Minjeonggyebo Tongchisul” (“Roh’s Control of the Former DJP Members”), Mai, Vol. 48 (June, 1990), pp. 17; Park Sung Won, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 93 statement, Kim Young Sam refused to attend the meeting of the high-ranking officials o f the government and the party on April 6, insisting on the dismissal o f Park Chul Un. Park was dismissed in two weeks, and Kim won his first struggle against his dissidents. When the three parties were merged, Roh and Kim Jong Pil believed that they had agreed on a parliamentary system, but Kim Young Sam took a vague position, saying at the press conference only that they would not exclude discussion on a constitutional amendment creating a parliamentary system. Because Kim had not shown sincerity in discussing the parliamentary system even after the merger, the members o f the former DJP and NDRP planned a memorandum to be signed by the three leaders, the members o f the supreme council, before the national convention on May 9, 1990. They threatened Kim Young Sam, saying that the members o f the former DJP insisted on a free competition for electing the representative rather than assigning the position to Kim Young Sam as previously agreed because Kim Young Sam was opposing the parliamentary system.2 9 Because Kim Young Sam was not sure about the support o f the former DJP members in a free competition, he had to sign the memorandum promising a constitutional amendment in favor of a parliamentary system “Rohtaewoo Taldangui Jinsil” (“The Reason of Roh’s Secession”), Sindonga (March, 1997), p. 159. 2 9 Lee Sang Woo, “Kimyoungsamui Gwollyeok Game” (“Kim Young Sam ’s Power Game”), Segyewana. Vol. 32 (June, 1992), pp. 118-119. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 94 on May 6, 1990, yielding to the united dissidents o f the former DJP and NDRP groups for the first time after the merger.3 0 Regarding the timing o f the amendment, at the meeting o f the President and the three members o f the supreme council, on October 24, 1990, they agreed not to raise the issue in public within the year. However, the memorandum which had been signed in May was exposed to the press and revealed to the public on the day after the meeting. Kim Young Sam insisted that the DJP group revealed it to hurt his morale and pressure him to support the amendment to the parliamentary system.3 1 Kim refused to work and went to a city far from Seoul. Kim Yoon Hwan, a former DJP assemblyman, mediated between the President and Kim, persuading the President that the important thing was not to destroy the party. With this as a momentum, Kim regained the initiative within the DLP. At the meeting with the President which was held a few days later, Kim Young Sam obtained an agreement that the government party would not propel the amendment for a parliamentary system if the people did not want the parliamentary 3 0 Ibid., p. 120. As a result, Kim Young Sam became the representative of the party at the national convention, without competitors. 3 1 The memorandum had been stolen from the office o f the secretary general o f the party in May and was returned a few days later in June. After it was revealed that the leaders had secretly agreed to a parliamentary system regardless o f public opinion, the debate on the parliamentary system within the government party was withdrawn for a while. Park Tae Gyun, “Imbakhan Rohtaewooui Kimyoungsam Jegeojakjeon” (“Roh’s Plan to Discard Kim Young Sam”), Mai, Vol. 54 (December, 1990), p. 19; Lee Young Suk, “Gakseo Padonghu Kimyoungsamui Seungbusu” (“Kim Young Sam’s Plan after the Revelation o f the Memorandum”), Wonganioongang. Vol. 179 (December, 1990), p. 152. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 95 system, and a promise that he would have a regular weekly meeting with the President.3 2 President Roh reorganized the cabinet members and high-ranking officials in December, 1990, bringing in his hard-line staff: the Prime Minister, Roh Jae Bong, the Presidential Chief Secretary, Chung Hae Chang, the Public Prosecutor-General, Chung Koo Young, and the Minister of Sports and Adolescents, Park Chul Un. The Prime Minister, Roh Jae Bong, who had a career as the Presidential Special Assistant for Politics and the Presidential Chief Secretary in the 6th Republic, was a right-wing hard liner who preferred the parliamentary system. Some people said, at that time, that Roh Jae Bong could be the successor of President Roh.j3 Kim Young Sam, who felt it could be a dangerous situation for him, began to attack Roh Jae Bong, insisting that the policy o f the Prime Minister was an authoritarian hard line against democratization. At a prayer meeting in Taeku on April 1, 1991, Kim Young Sam made an agreement with the leader o f the opposition party, Kim Dae Jung, on opposition to the parliamentary system and hard-line policy, adding to the pressure on the Prime Minister.3 4 3 2 Lee Yong Sik, “Kimyoungsamui Minjeong Gonghwagye Jamsik Jeonmo” (“Kim Young Sam’s Encroach upon the Former DJP and DP Members”), Observer. Vol. 20 (August, 1991), p. 125. 3 3 Park Sung Won, “Rohtaewoo Taldangui Jinsil” (“The Reason o f Roh’s Secession”), op. cit., pp. 161. 3 4 Hankookilbo. April 1, 1991. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96 On April 25, 1991, an incident occurred which gave Kim Young Sam a chance to attack the government. A university student who had been arrested during a demonstration was beaten by the police and died. When the opposition party demanded the resignation o f the Prime Minister, charging him with responsibility for the student’s death, Kim Young Sam acted in concert with the opposition party, and asked the President to dismiss the Prime Minister at a regular weekly meeting on May 13. Though President Roh did not want to dismiss Roh Jae Bong, other potential presidential candidates o f the government party, Park Tae Joon and Lee Jong Chan, also agreed with Kim Young Sam’s demand.3 5 Subsequently, Roh Jae Bong resigned on May 16 and faded from the scene, indicating the success o f Kim Young Sam and other potential candidates. The former DJP members, however, still challenged Kim Young Sam, preventing Roh’s nomination of Kim as the successor. On July 26, 1991, the Presidential Special Assistant for Politics, Choi Young Chul, made a statement at a seminar o f the Federation of Korean Industries, noting that the next national convention for electing the presidential candidate would be a free competition and stating, “If Kim Young Sam or Kim Dae Jung, who oppose the parliamentary system, judge that they cannot become the president or a presidential candidate under the current system, they may agree on the amendment in favor of the parliamentary system... In my opinion, 3 : 5 At a meeting o f the executive members o f the party on May 15, the attendants agreed on the resignation o f the Prime Minister, and suggested it to the President. Park Sung Won, “Rohtaewoo Taldangui Jinsil” (“The Reason of Roh’s Secession”), op. cit., pp. 161-162. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97 the parliamentary system is the better system for this country.”3 6 Kim Young Sam thought that the statement reflected the opinion of President Roh and the former DJP group, threatening Kim Young Sam that he might not become the presidential candidate o f the government party because o f his opposition to the parliamentary system. Kim Young Sam insisted that the presidential candidate needed to be decided early in order to prepare for the general election in March, 1992. Kim Jong Pil, the leader o f the former NDRP group, who did not agree, criticized Kim Young Sam and his group, responding that it was too early to talk about the presidential candidate when one and a half years still remained in the term o f the president. On August 10, President Roh, who did not want an early decision on the presidential candidate, and Kim Young Sam, who did not want the reopening o f the debate on the parliamentary system, made an agreement not to discuss either within that year.3 7 However, the active movement o f the opposition leader enforced the position o f Kim Young Sam again. As Kim Dae Jung unified opposition groups, establishing a united opposition party, the Democratic Party (DP), in September, 1991, and declared its policy favoring the presidential system, there rose an opinion within the government party that only Kim Young Sam could compete with Kim Dae Jung.3 8 President Roh 3 6 Jang Jung Soo, “Rohtaewooneun Eonje Kimyoungsameul Beorineunga” (“When Will Roh Tae Woo Discard Kim Young Sam?”), Mai. Vol. 63 (September, 1991), p. 16. 3 7 Ibid., p. 15-16. 7 o Kim Yoon Hwan, a supporter o f Kim Young Sam among the former DJP members, took on the role o f expanding opinion that Kim Young Sam was the only competitor Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98 introduced Kim Young Sam to President George Bush at the summit meeting in New York, in January, 1992. After they came back to S. Korea, Kim Young Sam insisted again on holding a national convention for electing presidential candidate before the general election in March, threatening Roh with a resolution signed by the former RDP members, which showed that they were ready to secede from the party. Compromising with President Roh and the former DJP group, who were opposed to the early weakening o f Presidential power, Kim obtained President Roh’s announcement that Kim would be in charge of the general election on March 24, 1992.3 9 When the general election turned out worse than the government party expected,40 the dissidents against Kim, including a number o f former DJP and NDRP against Kim Dae Jung. Roh Tae Woo said that Kim Yoon Hwan read the President’s will and made the decision to support Kim Young Sam on his own. Roh said that, when the three parties united, he thought that the three Kims (Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Pil) would not retire from politics soon, and Kim Young Sam would be the best person to be the next leader among them. Shin Sung Ho, “Kimyoungsamhubo Dunoejojik” (“The Brain Trust for Kim Young Sam”) Wolganioongang, Vol. 199 (August, 1992), p. 192; “The Memoirs o f Roh Tae Woo: Secret Story o f Politics,” op. cit., pp. 256-257. Though Roh had supported Kim Young Sam, he still tried to amend the constitution to the parliamentary system, and after Kim Young Sam was elected as the presidential candidate of the government party, Roh indicated that he doubted the capability o f Kim Young Sam. Lee Young Suk, “Gakseo Padonghu Kimyoungsamui Seungbusu” (“Kim Young Sam’s Plan after the Revelation o f the Memorandum”,), op. cit., pp. 153-154. 3 9 Lee Sang Woo, “Kimyoungsamui Gwollyeok Game” (“Kim Young Sam’s Power Game”), op. cit., p. 121-122. 4 0 Though the government party, which had initially kept two thirds o f the seats when the three parties had united, expected much more than the half o f the seats, it won only 149 out o f 299 seats in the National Assembly; the DP led by Kim Dae Jung won 97 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 99 members, insisted that representative Kim was responsible for the defeat, while Kim contended that it was the responsibility o f the government which had not been able to control the growth of the National Party (NP) established in January, 1992. Kim Young Sam demanded an early national convention to break the unfavorable situation for him, obtaining a promise that the national convention which had been scheduled in September would be convened in May.4 1 On the next day, Kim declared his candidacy for the nomination o f the party. Initially, Kim Young Sam was worried about free competition because the number of delegates (voters at the national convention) affiliated with the former DJP represented half of the total votes.4 2 However, gradually a number o f members o f the former DJP group, including Kim Yoon Hwan, turned in seats; the NP led by Hyundai owner, Chung Joo Young, won 31; and the others had 22 seats. Chosunilbo, March 25, 1992. 4 1 One of the reasons for holding an early national convention in May was that there would remain enough time after the national convention until the Presidential election in December. Kim Young Sam could threaten that he would secede from the party with his supporters if he should fail in the national convention because of the non-support of the former DJP members. Jang Jung Soo, “5wol Jeondangdaehoe Seungjaneun Nuguinga” (“Who Will Be the Winner o f the National Convention?”), Mai. Vol. 23 (May, 1992), p. 24. 4 2 The rate o f delegates affiliated with the former DJP to DP to RP was 5 to 3 to 2. Out o f a total o f 6,882 delegates, most major positions which were leading the opinion such as district leaders (assemblymen who had won the last election in the district were supposed to hold the position), central committee members, and secretaries, were taken up by the former DJP group. Joongangilbo. May 19, 1992. Approximately half o f the total delegates were nominated by the central party, and half were elected and recommended by each district party chapter. Joongangilbo. April 16, 1992. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 favor o f Kim. In addition, Kim Jong Pil declared his support for Kim Young Sam on April 27, taking the position o f the chair o f Kim Young Sam’s supporting committee.4 3 Though Kim Young Sam still expected President Roh’s support, such as in the form o f a statement supporting him, Roh had wanted the national convention to be competitive, so he did not make a one-sided supporting statement. Accordingly, initially the President did not restrain Park Tae Joon and Lee Jong Chan from running as candidates. As the supporting group for Park Tae Joon, the leader o f the former DJP group, grew stronger, Kim Young Sam asked the President to prevent him from running as a candidate. President Roh, who was supporting Kim Young Sam implicitly, delivered his opinion to Park Tae Joon through the Director of the Agency for National Security Planning, Suh Dong Kwon, and Park Tae Joon gave up running as a candidate.4 4 Unhappy with his renunciation, Park Tae Joon and his supporters shifted their support to Lee Jong Chan, who also was a former DJP member. Lee Jong Chan, who had not had the opportunity to promote his candidacy compared with Kim Young Sam, demanded opportunities to speak in districts with Kim Young Sam and at the national convention. However, his demand was rejected by the secretary general o f the government party and the President, on the basis that the delegates already knew the 4 3 Kim Jong Pil, who had insisted that Kim Young Sam was responsible for the failure in the general election, changed his position in favor o f Kim Young Sam, after he made an agreement on April 8 with Kim Young Sam regarding his position in the next regime. Huh Nam Jin, “Rohtaewooui YS Daekwon Mandeulgi” (“Roh’s Support to Kim Young Sam for the Presidential Candidate”), Wolaanioonuanu. Vol. 196 (May, 1992), pp. 144, 147. 4 4 Ibid., p. 139. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101 candidates well and overheating the national convention was not desirable.4 5 Lee Jong Chan, who thought such an unfair national convention would be meaningless, declared, two days before the national convention, that he would not attend although he had registered as a candidate.46 During the campaign, Kim Yoon Hwan, a leader of the former DJP members, persuaded President Roh to give strong support to Kim Young Sam, and Keum Jin Ho, a former DJP member who was a relative of President Roh, told other assemblymen that Roh was in support o f Kim Young Sam.4 7 In consequence, Roh supported Kim Young Sam, the only one who had a chance to defeat Kim Dae Jung, by delivering his opinion through other persons such as Suh Dong Kwon, Kim Yoon Hwan, and Keum Jin Ho. Kim Young Sam, at the national convention on May 4' Lee Jong Chan felt that the campaign for the national convention was very unfair. Lee Jong Chan said, while there was a lot of support for Kim Young Sam, he could not even contact the delegates because they had been pressured not to meet him. He insisted that even the Presidential Chief Secretary o f Politics called many assemblymen, saying Roh was in favor o f Kim Young Sam. Kim Hyun Jong, “Rohtaewoo-e Bangideun Leejongchan-ui Gyesan” (“Lee Jong Chan’s Plan against Roh”), Wolganioongang, Vol. 197 (June, 1992), p. 237-238; “Minjadang Daetongryeong Hubo Gyeongsungwa Jeongchi Gudo” (“Free Competition for the Presidential Candidate of the DLP and Political Structure - Discussion with Lee Jong Chan”), Sinmun Yeongu. Vol. 53 (June, 1992), p. 257-258. 46 Park Tae Joon and Park Chul Un, who had supported Lee Jong Chan, agreed with the decision not to attend the national convention. Kim Hyun Jong, “Rohtaewoo-e Bangideun Leejongchan-ui Gyesan” (“Lee Jong Chan’s Plan against Roh”), op. cit., pp. 244-245; “The Memoirs o f Lee Jong Chan,” Sindonga (May, 1994), p. 239. 47 Shin Sung Ho, “Kimyoungsam Hubo Dunoe Jojik” (“The Supporters o f Kim Young Sam”), op. cit., p. 193. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 102 19, became the presidential candidate o f the party with the support o f 64.2% o f the voters.4 8 After the national convention, Kim Young Sam had maintained a good relationship with President Roh for a while in order to cope with the disturbed atmosphere o f the party. However, after August he planned to differentiate his policy from that o f Roh, who was not popular at that time, as a strategy for winning the presidential election in December.4 9 When SK, Inc., whose owner was the father-in-law o f the President’s daughter, was chosen as the main administrator o f the mobile phone industry in August, many people suspected it was a special favor. Kim Young Sam worried that such a rumor could be a handicap against him in the presidential election, and strongly urged President Roh to cancel the selection of SK, Inc. Conceding to Kim Young Sam and public opinion, Roh had SK, Inc. return its privilege on August 27.5 0 4 8 It was a lower support rate than expected, considering that President Roh, Kim Jong Pil, and Kim Young Sam had co-operated. Lee Jong Chan, who did not even attend the national convention, won 33.1%. This meant that many delegates affiliated with the former DJP group did not support Kim Young Sam, though most assemblymen and district leaders could not oppose Kim Young Sam because they had to consider the probability o f his winning the presidential election. 4 9 According to the poll of Gallup Korea in January, 1991, 12.3% of the people evaluated Roh’s performance as good, 40.5% answered it was normal, and 39.9% evaluated it as bad. See Table 2-5 in Chapter II. 3 0 Kim Young Sam, after a meeting with President Roh and the members of the supreme council of the party on August 24, made an announcement that SK, Inc. would return the privilege voluntarily. Kim Young Bun, “Jeonggwon lyanggi Rohtaewoo-ui Gosimgwa Hwalo” (“Roh’s Consideration in the Period of Power Transition”), Observer, Vol. 37 (January, 1993), p. 137. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103 On August 25, President Roh transferred the position of the president o f the party to Kim Young Sam. Since then, power began to be concentrated on Kim Young Sam. On August 31, a county magistrate revealed that the government had supported the candidate from the government party in his district in the general election in March. In order to prevent the aggravation of public opinion, Kim Young Sam, at a press conference on September 16, asked that the responsible persons be punished and mentioned the necessity of a cabinet reshuffle and the neutrality o f the government in the presidential election. Kim Young Sam even demanded the change o f the Prime Minister, who was visiting North Korea from September 15 to 18 for the 8th Prime Ministers’ meeting.5 1 President Roh was angry about Kim Young Sam ’s arrogation. Although Kim did not ask to leave the party, Roh declared on September 18, that Roh would secede from the party and maintain a neutral position in the presidential election, after giving notification to Kim Young Sam. It was known that Roh did not provide a considerable sum of secret money, which he had received as bribes during his presidency, to support Kim Young Sam during the presidential election campaign.5 2 5 1 The Prime Minister, Chung Won Sik, was making an agreement on the detailed schedule following the ‘Basic Agreement between South and North Korea’ which had been approved by North and South Korea in February, 1992. Roh believed, after Kim Young Sam demanded the change o f the Prime Minister in such a situation, that Kim Young Sam was more concerned about his popularity than the national interest. Roh said he was very disappointed with Kim and doubted his capability. Kim Young Bun, “918padong W anbyeok Bunseok” (“The Impact of Roh’s Secession on Septempter 18”), Observer. Vol. 34 (October, 1992), p. 120; “The Memoirs o f Roh Tae Woo: Secret Stories o f Politics,” op. cit., pp. 262-263. 5 2 Roh and Kim have not said clearly how much was transferred. During Kim’s presidency, when Roh was sentenced for the coup and bribe during his presidency, it Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104 However, the power had already been transferred to Kim Young Sam, and big businesses were donating funds for the presidential election to Kim Young Sam directly rather than through the President.3 3 Chun had nominated and supported Roh as his successor, and played a leading role even after Roh was elected the presidential candidate, acquiescing to public pressure for direct presidential elections. Roh, through the merger o f the three parties, picked Kim in spite o f all the compromises he was forced to make because Kim was the only option for the government party to win the presidential election. In the more democratized society, public support became an important criterion for a presidential candidate, and a source o f power. If Roh had disregarded Chun’s opinion, in the way that Kim disregarded that o f Roh, Chun would not have supported Roh and would have sought another successor. In contrast, Kim could obtain the presidential candidacy from Roh, who preferred the parliamentary system, using the threat o f seceding from the party. Roh did not have another popular figure and was forced to support him. After Kim was selected as the presidential candidate, Roh, who had a low public support rate, became increasingly weak, and Kim distinguished his policy from Roh’s even during his presidential election campaign. was found that Roh had kept approximately two hundred billion won. Chosunilbo, August 26, 1996. 5 3 Suh Young Seo, “Rohtaewoo Taldange Ddareun Daeseon Pando Byeonhwa” (“Campaign Structure after the Secession o f Roh”), Segyewana, Vol. 38 (December, 1992), p. 107. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105 Compared with the 6th Republic, in Kim Young Sam’s regime popular support was regarded as a more important factor in becoming the presidential candidate o f the government party. Various actors ran for the candidacy on the basis o f public support, and the influence o f the press and the polls increased. The President’s influence in the process of choosing the presidential candidate also varied according to the public support rate of the President. President Kim was very powerful when he had strong popular support in his early period, executing reform policies. However, as he lost public support in his later period, his influence in choosing the presidential candidate diminished substantially, and the candidates competed with each other actively. Actors involved in choosing the presidential candidate were Kim Young Sam; presidential candidates, Lee Hoe Chang and other eight competitors; each candidate’s supporters; the members o f the Conference for Political Development (CPD); the press and the results of polls. Kim Young Sam nominated Lee Hoe Chang, who had been a justice o f the Supreme Court, as the Chairman o f the Board of Audit and Inspection at the beginning of his regime in February, 1993, and made him the Prime Minister in December, 1993. Initially, Lee Hoe Chang performed his role effectively, with the support o f the President. However, gradually, Lee’s rigid character began to result in conflicts with the President and the Secretaries.3 4 When Lee was excluded from the newly established 5 4 Lee Hoe Chang’s rigid image was helpful for the reform policy in Kim Young Sam’s early presidency. Lee, as the Chairman o f the Board o f Audit, inspected the budget usage for national security in the former regimes. Lee inspected a former Minister of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106 “Unification and Security Control Conference” in April, 1994, he protested strongly.5 5 The President dismissed him abruptly on April 22 for raising confusion within the government against the presidential order. There was criticism of the National Security and even required the inspection o f the former Presidents, Chun and Roh, creating conflict with Kim Young Sam. After Lee became the Prime Minister, when the government freed up the import of agricultural products more than it had promised to the people, in accordance with Uruguay Round, the Blue House asked the Prime Minister to make an apology announcement to the people. But Lee refused, insisting that the government did nothing wrong, and made the announcement one day later, persuaded by government officials. Kim Young Sam began to worry that such rigid behavior by Lee could harm Presidential authority. Kwon Bok Ki, “Daekwoni Maeumeul Umjikyeotda” (“Lee Moved Because of the Possibility o f Presidency”), Hankvure 21. Vol. 94 (February 1, 1996), pp. 12-13. 5 5 In order to cope with the nuclear problem of N. Korea, the Blue House composed the committee o f the Director o f the Agency for National Security Planning, the Minister of National Defense, and the Minister o f Foreign Affairs, excluding the Prime Minister for effective decision-making. (See Chapter V.) After the Prime Minister protested against his exclusion, the Blue House let the Chief Secretary o f the Prime Minister attend the committee as an auditor who did not have the right to speak. The Presidential Secretary’s Office complained that the Prime Minister wanted to have too much power under the presidential system. The Prime Minister, who still was not satisfied, said, on April 21, that the purpose o f the Committee without the Prime Minister would be coordination among government institutions, not decisions on policies, thus all the agenda of the committee should be approved by the Prime Minister before its execution. Choo Don Sik, “Kimyoungsam Leehoechangeun Sokgo Sokineun Gwangye” (“The Relations between Kim Young Sam and Lee Hoe Chang”) Chooganchosun, Vol. 1479 (November 27, 1997), p. 34. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 107 President’s imprudent behavior,3 6 and after that the support rate for Kim Young Sam in November, 1994, dropped to 42.7%.3' Kim Jong Pil had taken the position as the representative o f the government party, the New Korean Party (NKP),3 8 at the beginning of Kim Young Sam’s regime, according to the agreement they had made when he had supported Kim Young Sam as the presidential candidate o f the DLP. However, in January, 1995, President Kim asked Kim Jong Pil to resign on the grounds that he was not a proper person to lead the government’s policy o f reform and globalization. President Kim tried to control the government party with a new representative of the party who would follow the President’s opinion gently, without expecting that Kim Jong Pil would secede from the party.3 9 But Kim Jong Pil, after he resigned as the representative o f the party on 5 6 The critics said that because the Prime Minister was endowed with the authority to control all national affairs by the constitution, though it should be limited under the presidential system, the effort o f the Prime Minister to secure his right could be understood. They added that, though there was a conflict with the President, it was not desirable to dismiss the Prime Minister abruptly without having coordinated a procedure within the government. Joongangilbo. April 23, 1994. 5 7 According to the poll o f Gallup Korea in September, 1993, 82.7% of the people believed that the President was performing his job well, and at the poll in November, 1994, 42.7% of the people responded that his performance was good. Respondents answered that personnel management was one of his misbehavior. See Table 2-8 in Chapter II. 5 8 The name o f the government party, the DLP, was changed to the NKP on December 6, 1995. 39 Lee Choon Koo, who did not have his own organization in the party, was nominated as the new representative o f the party. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 108 January 19, seceded from the party with former NDRP members, and established a new party, The United Liberal Democrats (ULD), in March, 1995. Kim Dae Jung, who had declared his retirement from politics after he had lost the presidential election in 1992, returned and established a new party, The National Congress for New Politics (NCNP), in September, 1995. Against those powerful opposition parties, the government party had to be prepared for the next general election in April, 1996. President Kim decided to recruit the persons who were popular and respected in order to increase public support for the government party. That was, at this point, Lee Hoe Chang, who had maintained a good reputation after he had been dismissed from the Prime Minister’s position.6 0 Lee was again recruited and took the position as the Chair o f the Election Campaign Committee, and another reputed person, Park Chan Jong, who had been an assemblyman five times and a candidate for Mayor o f Seoul in 1995, was recruited and nominated as the Chair of the Campaign Committee for Seoul in February, 1996. Though it was contradictory to recruit the person he had dismissed, President Kim had to request Lee Hoe Chang to join the government party to win the election. After the election resulted in favor of the government party, Lee Hoe 6 0 Lee Hoe Chang had tendered his resignation before he received official notification o f dismissal on April 22, 1994. The people respected his behavior because o f his principles when he was a justice of the Supreme Court, the Chairman of the Board of Audit, and the Prime Minister. Chosunilbo, April 23, 1994; Joongangilbo, April 24, 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109 Chang remained as an advisor o f the government party, maintaining his reputation.6 1 However, President Kim did not support him early as the presidential candidate of the government party for the presidential election in December, 1997. At the New Year’s address in 1997, President Kim Young Sam said that, as the president o f the party, he would manifest clearly his opinion about the presidential candidate o f the party, distinguishing himself from former President Roh’s style, and said that it was not desirable to convene the national convention for electing the presidential candidate too early or too late. Until then, though his public support rate was not high, President Kim planned to declare his support for a certain candidate before the national convention, and also to delay the national convention as long as possible, to prevent an early loss of his presidential power.6 2 President Kim, who knew Lee Hoe Chang was a man o f high principles and not easily controlled, initially preferred to choose another reputed person as the presidential candidate, and hoped to continue his influence into the next regime. Lee Hong Koo, who had been the representative of the government party since May, 1996, having a 6 1 The government party won more seats than expected. The government party, NKP, won 47.8% o f the seats; Kim Dae Jung’s NCNP won 26%; and Kim Jong Pil’s ULD won 16.2%. 6 2 A report, drawn up by unofficial Presidential staff and reported to the Blue House in January, also suggested the same plan, examining the process by which Roh was elected. Though this report was revealed to a journal, it is not clear whether it influenced the plan o f the President. “Roetaewoo Yeongu” (“A Report to the Blue House: The Case of Roh Tae Woo”), Wolganchosun (July, 1997), pp. 152-161. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 110 moderate character, was regarded as such a person by the government party members.6 3 However, Lee Hong Koo failed in building a popular reputation during his incumbency. In addition, during the revision o f the Labor Law at the end o f 1996, the government party drew up a bill against the interests o f the workers without the consent o f the opposition party, and Lee Hong Koo executed passage o f the Labor Law in the absence o f the opposition parties, taking on the responsibility.6 4 It was criticized by workers, civil organizations, and public opinion, and subsequently, the government party made a new Labor Law and passed it with the consent o f the opposition parties in March, 1997. During this process, the reputation o f Lee Hong Koo deteriorated.6 3 6 3 According to a survey targeting the government party assemblymen, executed from January 9 to 11, 1997, Lee Hong Koo was the most probable person to be supported as the presidential candidate by the President. Responding to a question about who would be chosen by the President as the presidential candidate among potential candidates o f the party, 22.5% o f the respondents pointed to Lee Hong Koo (first), and 8.8% pointed to Lee Hoe Chang (second). However, to the question of who was the most probable person to win the presidential election, 21.3% o f the respondents answered Lee Hoe Chang (first), and 10% selected Lee Hong Koo (second), reflecting the reputation o f the potential candidates at that time. Chosunilbo, January 16, 1997; Cho Eun Hee, “Leehongkoo Cheje-e Gogaesukin Daesun Hubogun” (“Representative Lee Hong Koo Is the Forerunner”), Newsmaker, Vol. 174 (May 23, 1996), p. 26. 6 4 See Chapter II. Regarding the revision o f the Labor Law, the Committee for Better Relations between Labor and Capital made a bill compromising both opinions o f capital and labor. Then the Presidential C hief Secretary o f Economy insisted upon including a provision which excluded the opinion o f labor. The government party accepted it, and the representative of the government party, Lee Hong Koo, led the party members to pass the bill in the absence o f the opposition parties. Dongailbo. November 19, 26, 1998. 6 5 Yoon Seung Mo, “Daekwonjeonseon Nodongbeop Hanpa” (“The Impact o f Passing Labor Law”), Newsplus. Vol. 69 (January 30, 1997), p. 30; Cho Eun Hee, “Nuga Yong- i Doego Nuga Imugi Doetna” (“W ho Are Emerging, and Who Are Falling?”), Newsmaker. Vol. 211, (February 27, 1997), p. 14. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ill Considering this situation, he announced, in June, that he would not run as a presidential candidate at the national convention. After the failure o f Hanbo Steel, Inc., in January, 1997, and revelation o f the bribery of the President’s son, President Kim made an address o f apology to the people in February.6 6 In an effort to recover support for the government party which had declined radically by January, 1997,6 7 President Kim nominated Lee Hoe Chang as the representative o f the party on March 13. However, President Kim did not support Lee Hoe Chang positively as the presidential candidate of the party. Regarding the date of the national convention, while Lee Hoe Chang preferred an early convention, other candidates wanted to have enough time to prepare against Lee Hoe Chang who had the advantage as the representative o f the party,6 8 and the President did not want an early national convention, either. Subsequently it was arranged for July 2 1.6 9 66 See Chapter II. The support rate for the President declined to 8.8% in March, 1997. 67 The support rate o f the government party, NKP, on January 15, 1997, was 12.8%, while the support rate of the opposition party, NCNP, was 20.7%. The poll o f Hangil Research. 6 8 There were nine persons who were referred to as the presidential candidates: Lee Hoe Chang, Park Chan Jong, Lee Hong Koo, and Lee Soo Sung who were recruited to the NKP in 1996 and 1997; Lee Han Dong and Kim Yun Hwan o f former DJP group; Kim Duk Ryong and Lee In Je of former RDP group; and Choi Byung Ryul who had few supporters. 69 Kim Young Sam had been elected as the presidential candidate in May, 1992, in the 6th Republic. The opposition leader, Kim Dae Jung, was elected as the presidential candidate o f the NCNP with 85% support o f the delegates at the national convention on May 9, 1997. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112 Among the government party candidates, the front runner was Lee Hoe Chang, who was supported by Kim Yoon Hwan, a former DJP member, and evenly by the delegates from every region.7 0 Other hopeful candidates were Lee Soo Sung, who had been the Prime Minister,7 1 and Lee In Je, who had been the governor o f Kyungki province since 1995.7 2 Lee Soo Sung had been evaluated positively by the people as Prime Minister. When he resigned in February, 1997, he was applauded by the 7 0 There was no special criterion to orient the district leaders, because the NKP was the party which had been united and seceded, and several candidates were not clearly affiliated to former political parties. A lot of the assemblymen and district leaders were deciding which candidates to support on the basis of observation. The total number of delegates was approximately 13,000. 85% o f them were decided by the administration committee o f the district party chapters, and 15% were nominated by the central party. However, the support orientation of the district leaders and delegates from each district did not always correspond. Officially, the NKP also prevented the district leaders from coercing the delegates to support a certain candidate. Therefore, during the campaign period for the national convention, the press analyzed the support rate o f the delegates by the region (province) where their district was located. Chosunilbo, May 9, 19, June 19, 22. 7 1 Lee Soo Sung was the Prime Minister from August 1996 to February 1997. 7 2 According to a poll in March which asked, “Who will you vote for at the presidential election, in case the candidate o f the opposition party is unified to Kim Dae Jung?” among the candidates o f the NKP, only Lee Hoe Chang could certainly win Kim Dae Jung of the NCNP. Hankvure 21 (March, 20, 1997), Vol. 149. http://www.hani.co.kr/h21/ According to a survey targeting the delegates of the NKP in May, which asked “Who do you think would win at the national convention?” the result was, in order, Lee Hoe Chang (39.8%), Lee Soo Sung (22.4%), Kim Duk Ryung (14.3%), and Lee Han Dong (9.2%). Hankvure 21 (May 29. 1997), Vol. 159. Lee In Je began to be popular at the open forums o f presidential candidates, which were broadcast over nation-wide networks in May, raising his support rate steadily since then. In July, after the candidates had begun to make speeches to the delegates, Lee In Je was supported by the delegates for the second or third place following Lee Hoe Chang. Joongangilbo. July 9, 10, 1997. It showed that public opinion had significant influence on the delegates’ support rate in Kim’s regime. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 113 opposition party members as well as the government party members at the National Assembly. Lee Soo Song was recruited as an advisor o f the party, and expected the support o f President Kim. There arose a rumor in June that the President was supporting Lee Soo Sung through the Conference for Political Development (CPD), a group within the NKP which consisted o f the assemblymen and district leaders o f the former RDP group.7 3 In fact, there were two groups in the CPD which opposed Lee Hoe Chang, i.e., one group supported Lee Soo Sung, and the other supported Lee In Je.7 4 In order to unify their opinion, the secretary general o f the CPD met President Kim on July 4, asking Kim’s opinion. However, President Kim did not give a clear answer, hence, the CPD concluded that the President was maintaining neutral position.7 3 The members o f the CPD made an agreement by themselves to support Lee Soo Sung on July 5. However, as this agreement o f the CPD was revealed, other candidates severely criticized the President’s influence on the decision o f the CPD. Subsequently, the CPD decided not to unify its opinion, but to allow its members to support either Lee 7 3 The CPD was established officially on June 3, 1997. 7 4 On June 20, the CPD announced that 153 district leaders and assemblymen were on its side, and Lee Hoe Chang announced that 140 district leaders and assemblymen were supporting him. 7 3 It was known that the secretary general asked, “May we support Lee Soo Sung?” President Kim answered, “Why do you ask me that?” On the same day, President Kim sent the Presidential Special Assistant for Politics to the CPD to deliver a message that the President would maintain neutrality. On the next day, the Presidential Chief Secretary announced in public that the President would not do anything which could affect the free competition o f the national convention. Kim Jong Chul, “Kimyoungsam Leehoechang-eul Neomeottryeora” (“Kim Young Sam ’s Decision”), Hangyurei. Vol. 166 (July 17, 1997); Dongailbo. December 10, 1998. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 114 Soo Sung or Lee In Je, and announced, on July 7, that the CPD would be dissolved and the former CPD members would maintain neutrality. In consequence, President Kim’s neutrality, not assisting the CPD which had tried to support a candidate other than Lee Hoe Chang, was helpful for Lee Hoe Chang who was the leading candidate for the national convention. It was shown that President Kim did not support a candidate consistently on the basis o f a clear plan. In some cases, Kim favored Lee Hoe Chang, but in others he did not. As the potential candidates were determined, Lee Soo Sung and other candidates insisted on the early resignation o f Lee Hoe Chang as the representative o f the party, for a fair campaign. Lee Hoe Chang, after the weekly meeting with the President on May 8, announced that the President did not want him to resign as the representative. Lee Soo Sung and the former RDP members (CPD), however, kept on demanding his early resignation. After Lee Hoe Chang complained about the CPD’s opposition to him, at the weekly meeting with the President on June 4, the President demanded that the party members cooperate with the representative. On June 23, the CPD demanded Lee Hoe Chang’s resignation again in public. However, Lee Hoe Chang had kept his position of the representative until July 1, three weeks before the national convention. Though President Kim had not supported Lee Hoe Chang positively, he had restrained the activity o f the CPD against Lee, helping Lee to maintain the position as the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 115 representative.7 6 While President Kim’s role in this case was also helpful for Lee Hoe Chang eventually, it was not in another case. In May, 1997, the opposition parties demanded disclosure of the amount o f President Kim’s campaign funds in the presidential election in 1992, insisting that Kim Young Sam had collected and used more funds than permitted by the Electoral Law. Lee Hoe Chang, after the meeting with the President on May 23, announced officially that it was impossible to disclose the campaign funds because the data and material concerning the funds had been destroyed. However, on May 27, the Blue House announced that the President was considering disclosure o f the campaign funds, embarrassing Lee Hoe Chang.7 7 Though President Kim had said, in his new year’s address, that he would publicize his opinion regarding support for a candidate, after he lost the people’s confidence, he was not in the position to support a certain candidate in public until the date o f the national convention. Even if he had supported a candidate, it was not clear 7 6 Cho Yong Joon, “Leehoechang Daepyo Gosuneun Dae YS Tujaeng” (“Lee Hoe Chang’s Struggle for Maintaining the Position o f the Representative o f the Party”), Newsplus. Vol. 88 (June 19, 1997), p. 18. 7 7 Cho Eun Hee, “YS-ga Igyeonna Leehoechang-i Igyeonna” (“Who won, Kim Young Sam or Lee Hoe Chang?”), Newsmaker, Vol. 228 (June 26, 1997), p. 12. On May 30, 1997, however, the President, in his address to the people, said that he would not disclose the funds. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 116 that the candidate would benefit.7 8 Compared with former President Roh, who had begun to lose power after the presidential candidate had been elected, President Kim’s power began to decline earlier because he had already lost the people’s support due to the failure o f economic policy and the misbehavior of his son. At the national convention on July 21, Lee Hoe Chang won 41.12%, and Lee In Je won 14.72% o f the first vote.7 9 In the second vote, Lee Hoe Chang was elected as the presidential candidate with the support of 60% o f the delegates. Even after the national convention, however. President Kim did not support Lee Hoe Chang openly, because the public support for Lee Hoe Chang declined suddenly after the national convention. At the end o f July, the opposition party raised the issue that Lee Hoe Chang’s two sons had avoided military service, which was the duty o f all men in S. Korea. Lee Hoe Chang presented data showing that they were exempt from the duty because their weight was lower than the criterion. The dissidents insisted that Lee’s two sons had reduced their weight intentionally around the time o f the physical examination in order to avoid the military service. After that, the support rate o f the 78 According to a poll in June, 1997, 30% o f the people agreed that it was desirable for President Kim to resign the presidency before the end o f the term. However, neither the government party nor the opposition parties wanted the early resignation o f the President because, at that time, they did not know how the unstable situation would affect them. Hankvure 21. (June 12, 1997), Vol. 161. 7 9 In the first vote, other candidates Lee Han Dong won 14.68%; Kim Duk Ryong won 13.87%; Lee Soo Sung won 13.65%; and Choi Byung Ryul won 1.96%. Chosunilbo, July 21, 1997. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 117 people for Lee Hoe Chang began to decline.8 0 In contrast to support for the presidential candidate by the former Presidents, Kim’s non-support for Lee Hoe Chang was exceptional. However, when it became evident that there was no possibility for Lee Hoe Chang to become the next President, President Kim had no reason to support him. In the interest o f his own status in the next regime, Kim’s alternative was to support another presidential candidate who could win, or, at least, not to support one who could not win.8 1 80 The public support rate for the presidential candidate from each political party, on July 17, 1997, was Lee Hoe Chang (42.3%), Kim Dae Jung (32.7%), Kim Jong Pil (8.8%). Joongangilbo. July 17, 1997. The support rate had changed with the poll of August 2, just after the issue of Lee Hoe Chang’s sons was raised, showing Lee Hoe Chang (35.7%), Kim Dae Jung (30.7%), and Kim Jong Pil (13.8%). Joongangilbo. August 2, 1997. At the end o f August, assuming Lee In Je’s candidacy in the election, Lee Hoe Chang received a lower support rate than Lee In Je, showing Kim Dae Jung (28.1%), Lee In Je (24.9%), Lee Hoe Chang (20.4%), Cho Soon (14.8%), a candidate o f a small non-government party, and Kim Jong Pil (8.7%). Joongangilbo. August 31, 1997. Lee In Je seceded from the NKP on September 13, and established a new party in November. At the end o f September, after Lee In Je’s running in the presidential election was known to the people, the result o f a poll was that Kim Dae Jung (32.7%), Lee In Je (22.4%), Lee Hoe Chang (17.5%), and Cho Soon (12.7%). This research assumed that Kim Jong Pil would not run for election, supporting Kim Dae Jung. Kim Jong Pil officially declared his support to Kim Dae Jung on October 31. Hankvure 21. (September 25, 1997), Vol. 175. 8 1 President Kim, as the president of the government party, could not support other presidential candidates from non-government political parties. Cho Eun Hee, “Cheongwadae Handdae Pan Dwijipgi Goryeohaetda” (“The Blue House Once Considered the Change o f the Presidential Candidate”), Newsmaker. Vol. 240 (September 25, 1997), p. 18; Kim Chang Ki, “97daesun Kimyoungsam Maeumui Hangro” (“The Movement o f Kim Young Sam ’s Mind at the Presidential Election in 1997”), Wolganchosun (February. 1998), pp. 142-144. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118 Because the President did not actively support the presidential candidate, several conflicts occurred between Kim and Lee. One o f the conflicts between Kim and Lee was regarding the management plan o f the failed Kia Motors, Inc. While Lee Hoe Chang announced that it would be desirable to enable Kia to recover by itself on August 14, 1997, the Presidential Chief Secretary o f Economy and the Deputy Prime Minister announced, on August 24, that the government would support Kia only on the condition o f the CEO’s resignation, and eventually put Kia under the management o f the creditor banks. Regarding the issue of the special pardon of the former Presidents who had been in prison, while Lee Hoe Chang announced that he would propose an early pardon to the President on September 1, President Kim, on September 2, before Lee Hoe Chang proposed officially, rejected the announcement on the basis that it was the President’s decision.8 2 On October 7, Lee Hoe Chang revealed hundreds of bank accounts of Kim Dae Jung, deposited in others’ names, and demanded on investigation about the legality of the money. However, on October 21, the Public Prosecutor General announced that the prosecution would not initiate an investigation of the case.8 3 Finally, on October 21, 82 Park Hong Hwan, “Leehoechang Leeinje Power Game” (“Power Game between Lee Hoe Chang and Lee In Je”), Newspeople. Vol. 285 (September 11, 1997), pp. 14-15. President Kim pardoned the former Presidents on December 22, after Kim Dae Jung was elected as the next President. 8 3 The Public Prosecutor General, Kim Tae Jung, said later in 1999 that he did not investigate the case because, “It was unfair to investigate only the account of Kim Dae Jung without investigating President Kim’s campaign fund in 1992, and if the prosecution had investigated only Kim Dae Jung’s account, there could have been a riot in Cholla Province, the home area o f Kim Dae Jung.” However, considering that the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 119 Lee Hoe Chang asked the President to secede from the party, and President Kim, after refusing, seceded abruptly on November 7. President Kim did not take a clear position on Lee In Je when he did not accept the result o f the national convention. As Lee Hoe Chang’s support rate declined in August, not only the opposition parties, but also the former presidential candidates o f the NKP criticized Lee Hoe Chang. In September, former CPD members who had not supported Lee Hoe Chang at the national convention, even demanded the resignation o f Lee Hoe Chang as the presidential candidate o f the NKP, and Lee In Je seceded from the NKP on September 13, establishing a new party, the New National Party (NNP), on November 4, on the basis o f a higher support rate than Lee Hoe Chang’s. Several former RDP members joined Lee In Je from the NKP, and Lee In Je officially declared that he would run as the presidential candidate o f the NNP. During this process, President Kim did not protect Lee Hoe Chang from the attack o f former CPD members, nor did he actively restrain the secession o f Lee In Je and other former RDP assemblymen, not only because he was not sure o f Lee Hoe Chang’s winning, but also prosecution was under the control o f the President at that time, it would have been impossible to decide not to investigate without the permission o f the President. Kim Tae Jung added, “I felt that President Kim did not want to investigate the case.” “The Interview with Kim Tae Jung.” Wolganchosun (July. 1999), pp. 139-141. Before Lee In Je declared his secession from the party on September 13, President Kim made a phone call and sent the Presidential Chief Secretary for Political Affairs to Lee In Je to persuade him not to secede. Lee In Je did not comply with the President’s advice, and said, at the press conference on September 13, that the President did not restrain him strongly. Other assemblymen who joined the NNP from the NKP were not restrained by the President. Joongangilbo. September 13, 1997; Dongailbo. December 17, 1998. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120 because he was not powerful enough to control Lee In Je as he wanted. In addition, President Kim was not in the position to support a certain candidate openly when he had already lost his authority and the people’s confidence. It was shown in this case that the support rate for Lee In Je declined abruptly after the supporter of Lee Hoe Chang raised the possibility, in mid-November, that President Kim had supported the establishment funds o f the NNP.8 3 Even after the support rate for Lee In Je declined in mid- November, the President, who was blamed for leading the Korean economy into the situation of needing to borrow IMF funds, had no power to persuade Lee In Je to resign from the candidacy of the NNP, eventually helping Kim Dae Jung to become the next President. Chun chose his successor and maintained power even after his successor was elected, by using the coercive force o f government institutions and the loyalty o f the military, regardless of public support. He even attempted to position himself to exert influence in the subsequent regime, although this plan was not realized, since criticism against Chun rose as soon as the 6th Republic began. However, Chun and Roh had to 85 Kim Yoon Hwan, on November 3, raised a question in public that President Kim might have supported the funds for establishing the NNP. Since then, the support rate for Lee In Je declined, and after Cho Soon’s party unified with the NKP in mid- November, supporting Lee Hoe Chang, the support rate for Lee In Je came in third, following Lee Hoe Chang’s. It was analyzed that a number o f the supporters for Lee In Je had previously been supporters of Lee Hoe Chang. As the support rate for Lee In Je declined, Lee Hoe Chang gained more support, while Kim Dae Jung’s support rate did not change much. From mid-November to the election date, the support rates for Kim Dae Jung and Lee Hoe Chang had been similar at the level o f 32-33%, and that o f Lee In Je had been approximately 20%. Chosunilbo. November 4, 24, December 19, 1997 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 121 accept the people’s demands for a direct presidential elections as the way to maintain their ruling power. Roh, as the president o f the government party, the DJP, which did not have a popular figure and had few seats in the National Assembly, had to merge with opposition parties. After the merger, Roh cooperated with Kim Young Sam and had to accept his request to maintain the presidential system because Kim, who was the only figure able to compete with the opposition leader in the presidential election, threatened to secede from the party. Roh, who had not had the active support o f the people, lost power after Kim was selected as the presidential candidate o f the party. Though Roh was not satisfied with Kim as his successor, he supported Kim in the presidential election to maintain his influence and that o f the former DJP members who were affiliated with the DLP. The power and the role of the presidential candidate in the 6th Republic was greater than that in the 5th Republic. Kim, who was fully supported by the people in the first part o f his presidency, also tried to influence the process o f choosing a presidential candidate. In a democratized society, various actors run as the presidential candidate o f the government party, on the basis o f their popularity. However, after Kim lost popular support due to the failure of his economic policy, he lost presidential power and he could not exert significant influence on the selection o f the presidential candidate. Even after the presidential candidate o f the party was chosen, he did not actively support Lee Hoe Chang because, on the one hand, the possibility of Lee’s winning was very slight, and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122 on the other hand, Kim himself was not powerful enough to effectively support a certain candidate. The difference in the influence o f the Presidents affected the status o f the selected presidential candidate o f the government party in the national conventions. Public pressure for direct presidential elections and for democratic selection o f the government party candidate contributed to the democratization of the political system. These cases show the influence o f main actors by the change o f the actors influenced. Presidential influence on the presidential candidate was shown in various ways in each period. President Chun could restrict other potential candidate from running as a candidate in the national convention while President Kim could not. The students’ opposition against Chun’s authoritarian regime was very strong although not many people could raise their voice against the regime. These cases show the difference in the number o f persons who responded and the importance o f the degree o f their support. The difference in the probability o f compliance was indicated as the voters in the national convention showed different behavior according to the influence o f each President. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 123 Chapter V. Policy toward North Korea and Socialist Countries The Korean Peninsula was divided into South and North Korea after World War II, and suffered the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. On the basis o f these experiences, the goal o f South Korea’s policy toward North Korea has been the prevention o f war and making progress toward the unification o f the Korean Peninsula. Its foreign policy with respect to the socialist countries, which could exert influence on North Korea, has been closely related to the prevention o f another war on the Korean Peninsula as well as having political support from and economic interchange with those countries.1 This chapter will focus on South K orea’s relationship with North Korea and two socialist countries, China and the Soviet Union, which have exercised strong influence on North Korea. The northern policy2 has been influenced not only by the change o f internal politics but also by international politics. For the purpose o f examining presidential power in this chapter, I am going to examine mainly the role o f South Korean actors who participated in making the northern policy, and look only at the cases which had a 1 Choi Jong Gi, “Samdangtonghap Jeongchigudowa Bukbangjeongchaek Jeonmang” (“Political Structure after the Merger o f Three Parties and the Prospect o f Northern Politics”), Dari. Vol. 31 (May, 1990), p. 188; Kang Sunk Seung, “Hanguk-ui Bukbangjeongchaek-e Gwanhan Yeongu” (“A Study o f S. K orea’s Northern Policy”), Hvundaisahoe. Vol. 33 (April, 1989), p. 206. 2 The policy toward socialist countries has been called “northern policy” in S. Korea, since the M inister o f Foreign Affairs used the term in 1983. Actually, N. Korea, China, and the Soviet Union are located north o f S. Korea. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 124 significant influence on northern policy. Traditionally the northern policy has been led by the President, special envoys, and the information agency o f the government rather than official government departments in charge o f diplomacy and unification. However, in accordance with democratization, the role o f the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs and the National Unification Board increased, and other actors such as businessmen and sportsmen began to help improve relations. As the policy-making process was democratized and the public support for the President became important during Klim Young Sam ’s regime, the influence o f the press and public opinion on the northern policy increased substantially. The actors involved in the northern policy were the President, the Presidential Chief Secretary o f Diplomacy and Security, the National Unification Board, the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP), the military, the press, and public opinion. Cases in which only the President, secret envoys, and the information agency took part in the process o f making policy toward those countries would be considered examples o f exclusive presidential power in making northern policy. Cases in which various actors, representing each government institution and social group, took part in the northern policy-making process, with the President playing the role o f coordinating their different opinions, would be considered examples o f democratic decision-making and decreased presidential influence on northern policy. In cases in which the President could not maintain a basic principle o f northern policy, but simply followed changing public opinion, or could not play the role o f the coordinator, it would be assumed that the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 125 President had little influence on northern policy. For each President’s period, I will examine the role o f the actors in the process of normalization of relations with China and the Soviet Union, and in the improvement of relations with North Korea. For this issue, Dahl’s measures o f influence according to the amount o f change o f actor influenced, differences in the scope o f the responses, and number o f persons who respond are applied. In this case, the people who have relatives in North Korea might be expected to support the improvement of relations with North Korea more actively than others.3 However, according to a poll in August, 1998, during Kim Dae Jung’s presidency, a slightly higher percentage of the people who have relatives in N. Korea opposed the government’ s “sunshine policy” toward N. Korea than others.4 In this issue, therefore, public support is not divided by the cost to the actors of complying, and the degree of people’s satisfaction/dissatisfaction regarding northern policy is represented by the polls. The opinion o f the press is cited when most o f the press has similar opinions regarding the northern policy in a specific period. 3 In South Korea, there are 1.23 million people who are older than 52 and have their family in North Korea. Including their second and third generations, there are 7.67 million people who are regarded as separated families. Daehanmaeil. April 12, 2000. 4 It is known that the people who left North Korea because they did not like the regime are more conservative regarding the policy toward North Korea than others. Hankookilbo, August 20, 1998. In addition, a number of people who left their family in N. Korea have married again in S. Korea. They expect conflict with the family in N. Korea after the unification of two Koreas. Lim Soon Hee, “Nambukhan Isangajok Jaegyeolhapsi Munjejeomgwa Daechaek” (“The Possible Problems Which Can Be Occurred by the Meeting o f Separated Families and the Countermeasures”), The Institute for National Unification Study. Cited from Segyeilbo, December 15, 1998. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 126 On June 23, 1973, during Park Jung H ee’s presidency, the government declared that S. Korea would open its doors toward all countries regardless o f their ideology and political system,5 in accordance with the international political situation o f detente.6 In spite o f this declaration, there was no progress in S. Korea’s relations with socialist countries during Park’s presidency. Relations with socialist countries began during the 5th Republic in the fields o f sports, academic exchanges, and trade. When Seoul was chosen to host the Olympics in 1988 by an IOC general meeting in 1981, Chun’s government acknowledged the necessity to improve relations with socialist countries for a successful Olympic games. The relations with the Soviet Union and China were especially important because these countries could exert influence on other socialist countries not to boycott the Olympics, and could prevent North Korea from threatening security during the Olym pics.7 Considering this situation, the Minister o f Foreign Affairs, Lee Bum Suk, on June 29, 1983, announced 5 Until then, S. Korea had not had relations with socialist countries which had had relations with North Korea, maintaining the Hallstein Doctrine. This announcement included the following: (1) S. Korea would make efforts to improve relations with N. Korea for the peaceful unification o f the Korea Peninsula, (2) it would not object to the admittance o f South Korea into the United Nations along with North Korea, and (3) it would open its doors to all the nations o f the world on the basis o f the principles o f reciprocity and equality. Kang Suk Seung, “Hanguk-ui Bukbangjeongchaek-e Gwanhan Yeongoo” (“A Research o f S. Korea’s Northern Policy”), op. cit., p. 208. 6 President Nixon visited China in February, 1972, beginning the era o f detente. 7 Lee Kyung Sook, “Bukbangjeongchaekgwa Tongiljeongchaek” (Northern Policy and Unification Policy”), Sukmvungyeodae Tongilnonchong (Seoul: Sukmyung University Press) Vol. 8 (December, 1991), pp. 116-119. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127 a new policy o f Chun’s government, i.e., the “northern policy,” which was established to improve relations with the Soviet Union and China.8 However, the improvement o f relations with the Soviet Union did not progress well. President Chun, who needed the support o f the United States to reinforce his weak legitimacy, had cooperated with the United States in the policy toward the Soviet Union. After the Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan in 1979, a new “cold war” began between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Subsequently, it was difficult for Chun’s government to develop relations with the Soviet Union.9 In addition, the Soviet shooting down o f a Korean Airlines flight, in September, 1983, resulted in a deterioration o f relations between the two countries. After Gorbachev pursued glasnost and perestroika in 1985, however, economic relations between the two countries began to expand gradually.1 0 8 The mam points o f the declaration were first, having active relations with the diplomats o f these countries; second, giving the message o f improving relations through various channels; and third, suggesting ways o f cooperating with these countries. Lee Kyung Sook, op. cit., p. 111. 9 Kim Seo Yong, “Bukbangjeongchaekgwa Hanso Kyeongjekyoryu” (“Northern Policy and Soviet-S. Korean Economic Trade”), Sungkyun Gveongje Vol. 14 (March, 1989), p. 29. 1 0 Soviet-S. Korean trade volume was $118 million in 1986 and $231 million in 1987. Jung Tae Shin, “Daebukhan Gyoyeokui Hyeonhwanggwa Jeonmang” (“Current Situation and Expectation o f the Trade with Northern Countries”), Nara Gveongje Vol. 11 (October, 1991), p. 21. There also were a few non-political relations with the Soviet Union. These included the attendance o f the Vice-director o f the Foreign Department o f the Tass News Agency at the Conference o f Asia-Pacific News Services; the attendance o f the Curator o f the Soviet Cultural Property Museum at the Conference o f World Museums Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 128 There were better relations with China, which was less hostile to the U.S. than the Soviet Union. When a Chinese airliner was hijacked by a few Chinese and landed in S. Korea in May, 1983, Chun’s government contacted the Chinese government officially for the first time, and treated the hijacked Chinese well. In the process o f settling this case, President Chun utilized the ANSP to establish a channel between the Korean Consulate General in Hong Kong and the Chinese Xinhua News Agency branch.1 1 Since then, non-political relations between the two countries began.1 2 The trade volume with China in the 5th Republic was also larger than that with the Soviet Union.1 3 in Seoul; and the visit o f the Soviet Assistant Deputy secretary-general o f EPU for the 70th EPU meeting in Seoul, all in 1992. Kang Suk Seung, op.cit., p. 209. 1 1 It is said that this channel has been used to resolve the accident of the invasion o f a Chinese torpedo boat into Korean territory in 1985, and to obtain the support o f S. Korea for China to become the host country o f the Asian Games in 1990. Park Doo Sik, “Donghae Jakjeoneul Wanseonghara” (“Accomplish the East Sea Operation”), Wolganchosun. (October, 1992), p. 393; Yoon Sang Hyun, “6Gonghwaguk Bukbangjeongchaek” (“Northern Policy in the 6th Republic”), Sindonga, (April, 1995), p. 217. 1 2 These included the attendance of S. Korean government officials at the FAO Marine Products Seminar held in 1983 in China; the attendance o f the S. Korean National Tennis Team at the preliminary match o f the Davis Cup held in China in 1984; the attendance o f the Chinese Basketball Team at the Asian Youth Basketball Match held in Seoul in 1984; the attendance of the Chinese delegation at the Asian-Pacific Electric Communication Association held in Seoul in the same year; the attendance o f the Chinese National Team, consisting of approximately 600 players, at the 10th Asian Games held in Seoul in 1986. Lee Kyung Sook, op. cit., p. 121. 1 3 Sino-S. Korean trade volume stood at $1,288 billion and $1,679 billion in 1986 and 1987 respectively. Jung Tae Shin, op. cit., p. 20. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 129 After the dialogues with North Korea in the early 1970s, there had been no improvement in the relations with North K orea.1 4 President Chun suggested a summit meeting in January, 1981, and North Korea refused it and suggested a “Peace Treaty” with the U.S., a Non-aggression Pact between two Koreas, and the withdrawal o f U.S. troops from S. Korea.1 3 The relations with N. Korea deteriorated with the death o f high-ranking S. Korean officials in Burma in October, 1983, by bombing by N. Korean agents.1 6 N. Korea, which was blamed by international society for the incident, suggested on January 10, 1984, a tripartite meeting o f South and North Korea and the United States. Chun’s government refused and asked for a dialogue between the two Koreas. 1 4 There were talks between the South and North Korean Red Crosses in 1971 about the meeting o f family members who were separated mostly during the Korean War. After the secret reciprocal visit o f the Director o f the ANSP and the Second Deputy Prime Minister o f N. Korea, South and North Korea announced that, on July 4, 1972, they would make efforts for a peaceful unification without the intervention o f other countries, and initiated the South-North Coordinating Committee. In spite o f the announcement, however, each party strengthened its authoritarian system, and their relations did not develop. After the attempted assassination o f President Park by a Korean-Japanese related to North Korea in 1975, the dialogue between the two Koreas was suspended for a long time. Joongangilbo, July 14-24, 1997. 1 5 Yoo Wan Sik, “Jeongbu-ui Nambukdaehwa Jeongchaekgijo” (“The Basic Government Policy for the Dialogue with N. Korea”), Bukhan. Vol. 235 (July, 1991), p. 36. 1 6 During the official visit o f President Chun and high-ranking officials to Burma, at the ceremony in the national cemetery, North Korean espionage groups exploded bombs in an effort to assassinate Chun. Though Chun was not wounded, owing to his late arrival, 17 high-ranking S. Korean officials were killed. Two N. Korean agents were caught by Burma police, sentenced to death, and executed. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 130 When S. Korea suffered a flood disaster in summer, 1984, the N. Korean Red Cross offered aid to S. Korea. Chun’s government accepted it and suggested the resumption o f dialogue between the Red Cross o f the two countries and an economic meeting to which N. Korea consented. Since then, there have been several official contacts between the two Koreas. The Red Cross meetings were held in Seoul in May, and in Pyungyang, the capital o f N. Korea, in August, 1985. As a result o f those meetings, members o f separated families and art performance teams visited each other. Economic meetings were held twice, in 1984 and 1985, without practical progress in economic co-operation. In addition, during the 5th Republic, there were meetings of National Assembly Members and for athletics, also without any practical result. Besides these official contacts, there have been confidential contacts between the two Koreas, beginning in 1984. S. Korean Presidential Secretary for Policy, Park Chul Un,1 7 and the N. Korean Ambassador to the U.N., Han Si Hae, met confidentially through the mediation o f the S. Korean Ambassador to the U.N. in the fall, 1984, to discuss a summit meeting. The two agents met again in August, 1985, at Panmunjeom,1 8 and agreed on the reciprocal visits between the Director o f the ANSP, 1 7 Park Chul Un had been a prosecutor in the field of national security, dealing with political crimes and North Korean espionage. He was assigned as the Special Assistant for the Director of the ANSP, Jang Se Dong, in March, 1985. Kim Il-dong, “Cheongwadae Bukbangjeongchaek Inmaek” (“The People in the Blue House Who Are Related with Northern Policy”), Sindonga (September, 1990), p. 217. 1 8 Panmunjeom is the place for conferences in the demilitarized zone, located in the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 131 Jang Se Dong, and the Chairman o f the Peaceful Unification Committee of N. Korea, Dam Huh, who was in charge o f the practical relations with S. Korea. Dam Huh, with additional officials including Han Si Hae, visited Seoul and met President Chun in September, 1985, and Jang Se Dong, with Park Chul Un, visited Pyungyang and met Kim II Sung the next month to discuss a summit meeting. Although these contacts did not yield concrete results for a summit meeting or unification, the contacts between Park Chul Un and Han Si Hae and between Jang Se Dong and Dam Huh continued until the end o f 1986.1 9 These secret contacts were discontinued at the end o f the 5th Republic. As opposition to C hun’s regime became severe, Kim II Sung judged that it would be better to talk with the next S. Korean President about a summit meeting and unification.2 0 North Korea unilaterally suspended the Red Cross, the Assembly, and the economic talks in the spring, 1986. After that, Chun’s government also could not make efforts for the improvement o f relations with N. Korea because the amendment to the constitution became an important issue o f internal politics, and after the explosion of middle o f the Korean Peninsula. 1 9 Lee Sang Woo, “Nambukhan Bimil Jeopchokseol-ui Jinsang” (“The History of Secret Contacts between Two Koreas”), Sindonga (June, 1988), p. 305. 2 0 Ibid., p„ 306. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 132 KAL Flight 858 on November, 29, 1987,2 1 the relations between the two Koreas again deteriorated. Park Chul Un was assigned as the Special Assistant to the Director of the ANSP, which President Chun ordered to take charge o f unofficial relations with socialist countries in November, 1986, while the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs remained in charge o f official relations. Subsequently, the “Department for Northern Countries” was established within the ANSP, and Park Chul Un became the director.2 2 On the basis o f this experience, he led the northern policy in the 6th Republic with the support o f President Roh. Under President Chun, when the tension o f the “Cold War” was still strong, only the Blue House and the ANSP planned and executed northern policy, and the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs and the National Unification Board supported the official schedule which had been set up by the ANSP.2 3 The press, under strong censorship, 2 1 KAL Flight 858, which had departed Bagdad for Seoul, exploded as a result o f a bomb installed by N. Korean agents, and 115 persons were killed. One o f the agents committed suicide, the other was arrested by the police o f Bahrain, where they escaped, and was sent to S. Korea. 2 2 Park Chul Un, “Nambukgwangye Jeongsanghwa Mueosi Munjeinga” (“The Problem in the Improvement o f Relations between Two Koreas”), Miniokiisung. Vol. 77 (July, 1992), p. 98. 2 3 Lim Dong Won, “Jasingamgwa Poyongjeongchaek-euro Bukhan Ggyeoangi” (“Dealing with North Korea on the Basis o f Confidence and Generosity”), Narauigil. Vol. 33 (July, 1997), p. 110. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 133 could not express its own opinion against the government policy. Scholars and other civil organizations could not suggest different opinions from the authoritarian government, either. An authoritarian President Chun led the northern policy by utilizing only the government information agency, without permitting other actors to take part in it. For President Chun, the degree of public support was not an important factor in establishing northern policy. After President Roh was inaugurated in February, 1988, the government party took less than half of the seats in the National Assembly in the general election in April, 1988. Roh could not take the initiative regarding internal matters, given pressures from the opposition parties and public opinion to open a hearing about the Kwangju Democratization Movement.2 4 In that situation, Roh concentrated on the northern policy, on the one hand, because he had promised to do so during the presidential campaign, and on the other hand, in order to get public support.2 3 The northern policy during the 6th Republic was based on the premise that it would take time to improve relations with N. Korea, and the normalization with China and the Soviet Union would be helpful for the improvement o f relations with N. Korea and the 2 4 During the repression o f the Kwangju Democratization Movement in May, 1980, the military opened fire on Kwangju citizens. Approximately 213 civilians were dead or missing. Hankookilbo. December 26. 1995. 2 5 Choi Jong Ki, “Samdangtonghap Jeongchigudowa Bukbangjeongchaek Jeonmang” (“Political Structure of Three-Party-Merger and the Future Prospect o f Northern Policy”), Dari. Vol. 31 (May, 1990), p. 187. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 134 peaceful unification o f the Korean Peninsula.2 6 This framework for the northern policy o f the 6th Republic was announced on July 7, 1988.2 7 In this announcement, Roh’s government acknowledged N. Korea as the national community, not an enemy, and suggested that rather than competing in the international society they should co operate with each other.2 8 In addition, Roh’s government proclaimed its intention to improve relations with the socialist countries, including China and the Soviet Union, and at the same time, it would not oppose N. Korea’s effort to develop relations with the U.S. and Japan. 2 6 Min Byung Chun, “Hanso Jeopgeungwa Nambukhan Gwangye” (“The Improvement o f Soviet-S. Korea Relations and the Relations between Two Koreas”), Tongil. Vol. 106 (July, 1990), pp. 50-51. 2 7 According to the poll o f Joongang SVP, 31.4% o f the respondents were very satisfied with the declaration; 41.3% were satisfied; and only 4.5% were dissatisfied. Though this support rate was different from the support rate for the President, Roh won the people’s esteem by announcing this declaration. Jung Song, “Rohtaewoo Seongjeokpyo” (“Evaluation o f Roh’s Performance”), Wolganioongang (February, 1989), p. 277. -> g On the basis o f this northern policy, Roh’s government established the unification policy in September, 1989, named the “Han National Community Unification Policy.” In this policy, S. Korea acknowledged N. Korea as a partner in recovering and developing the national community. It was a step-by-step unification policy which pursued, to begin with, reciprocal trust with economic, cultural, and social interchange, on the premise that it would take a long time to reach complete unification. Kim Hak Joon, “Bukbangjeongchaekui Bonjilgwa Tanryeokseong” (“The Base and Flexibility o f Northern Policy”), Heonieong, Vol. 95 (April, 1990), p. 79; Lee Hong Koo, “Hanminjok Gongdongche Tongilbanganui Jeongchaek Gijowa Silcheonbanghyang” (“The Basis o f Han National Community Unification Policy”), The Theoretical Basis o f Han National Community Unification Policy (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1990), pp. 10-15. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 135 Major actors who participated in the normalization process with socialist countries in the early period o f the 6th Republic were President Roh, Presidential Secretary o f Policy, Park Chul Un, Presidential Chief Secretary o f Diplomacy and Security, Kim Jong Hui, and the ANSP. The leaders o f the non-govemment parties, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, also played a role in the northern policy, because the popularity o f improving relations with socialist countries could be helpful for their standing in internal politics, though their efforts were not so effective in making practical improvements. These actors’ activities with the Soviet Union, China, and N. Korea will be examined in both aspects o f official relations and confidential contacts. Since contacts with socialist countries had already begun with the Seoul Olympics in 1988 as momentum, Kim Dae Jung, the leader of the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), which became the major opposition party in the general election in April, 1988, developed his own northern policy. In a keynote speech to the National Assembly in June, 1988, he suggested a non-aggression treaty with N. Korea and an improvement o f relations with China. In February, 1989, by an invitation o f G Arbatov, Director o f the Institute of the U.S. and Canada within the Soviet Academy of Sciences, he visited the Soviet Union and four European countries, including Hungary, but without practical results.2 9 2 9 Yoon Sang Hyun, op.cit., p. 203. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 136 Kim Young Sam, the leader o f the RDP, in a speech to the National Assembly in June, 1988, also insisted that his visit to N. Korea, China, and the Soviet Union would be helpful for the development o f Korean diplomacy and relations with N. Korea. He could not execute his plan initially, however, because he did not have his own concrete northern policy. Later, in June, 1989, by invitation from the Director o f the Institute o f World Economic and International Relations (IMEMO) o f the Soviet Union, E. Primakov, he visited Moscow and met Soviet people at various levels. During his visit to Moscow, he delivered President Roh’s message for improving relations with Soviet officials, and met the Chairman of the Peaceful Unification Committee o f N. Korea, Dam Huh, giving him the message for a summit meeting.3 0 In contrast to Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam consulted with the government before his visit and was supported by the government.3 1 The cooperation o f Kim Young Sam with Roh on the northern policy was connected to the three-party-merger in the following year, while Kim Dae Jung, thereafter, was excluded from participating in the northern policy during the 6th Republic. Between the governments, confidential contacts contributed to the practical improvement o f Soviet-S. Korean relations, and were followed by official diplomacy. 3 0 Kang Suk Young, “Moscow-eseo Dadeumneun Kimyoungsamui Daekwonjeonryak” (“Kim Young Sam ’s Strategy for the Presidency in Moscow”), Observer. Vol. 4 (April, 1990), p. 219 3 1 Chung Hae Koo, “Bukbangjeongchaek Guknaejeongchi-e Eotton Yeonghyungeul Michina” (“The Impact o f Northern Policy on Internal Politics”), Wolganioongang, Vol. 164 (September, 1989), p. 143; Yoon Sang Hyun, op. cit., p. 204 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 137 Early in his Presidency, Roh utilized Park Chul Un and the Presidential Chief Secretary o f Diplomacy and Security, Kim Jong Hui, to develop channels to the Soviet Union.3 2 Park Chul Un contacted government officials in Hungary confidentially, and normalized the relationships with it in February, 1989, the first such normalization with a socialist country.3 3 He also secretly visited Moscow in June, 1988, meeting Soviet officials, and visited again in September, delivering Roh’s message to Gorbachev regarding the improvement o f relations.3 4 Kim Jong Hui also secretly went to the Soviet Union in September, 1988, and met the Deputy Minister o f the Ministry of Diplomacy and the Director o f the Institute of the U.S. and Canada, G Arbatov, suggesting an increase o f contact between the two countries.3 5 Park Chul Un continued to have contact with Arbatov and other Soviet scholars, sending friendly messages. Park also supported Chung Joo Young, the owner o f the Hyundai Group, who visited Moscow in January, 1989, to develop economic ties with the Chairman of the Soviet Chamber o f Commerce, V. Malkevich. They agreed on the establishment 3 2 President Roh said he had Park perform unofficial and secret tasks and let Kim take official initiatives. Kim, however, sometimes performed unofficial jobs, too. Roh Tae Woo, “Hoegorok” (“Memoirs o f the Northern Policy”), Wolganchosun (May, 1999), p. 87. 3 3 Hungary became the first target for normalization among European socialist countries because it was having a lot o f contacts with Western countries, and was in the process o f internal discussion about economic opening and reform. Park Chul Un, “Nambukgwangye Jeongsanghwa Mueosi Munjeinga” (“The Problem in the Improvement o f Relations between Two Koreas”), op. cit., p. 103. 3 4 Ibid, p. 104. 3 5 Moon Jae Chul, “Cheongwadae Bukbangoegyo Bimililji” (“Secret Note o f the Northern Diplomacy o f the Blue House”), Sindonga (March, 1993), p. 229. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 138 o f an economic cooperative committee.3 6 These efforts to develop economic relations with the Soviet Union led to the opening of trade offices in Seoul and Moscow in April and July, 1989, respectively. Kim Jong Hui followed President Roh during Roh’s official visit to W. Germany in November, 1989. During this trip, Kim requested mediation with the Soviet Union by the Secretary for Security o f Helmut Kohl, the German Chancellor, according to Roh’s order to arrange a summit meeting with the Soviet Union. Kim also asked for mediation by Richard Solomon, the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs o f the Department o f State, in early 1990.3 7 Park Chul Un was assigned the Minister o f State for Political Affairs in July, 1989. After three political parties merged, Roh gave Kim Young Sam, the representative of the DLP, the chance to visit Moscow with Park Chul Un. In March, 1990, Kim and Park visited Moscow, and Kim met Gorbachev, asking for normalization and a summit meeting. At that time, the Soviet Union agreed to normalization in principle.3 8 3 6 Chung visited again in August, 1989, and March, 1990, achieving an agreement on joint venture projects in forestry development and the construction o f a petrochemical complex in Siberia. Ahn Byung Joon, “South Korean-Soviet Relations: Issues and Prospects,” Korea and World Affairs. Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter, 1990), pp. 678-679. 3 7 Moon Jae Chul, op. cit., pp. 230-231. ■>o During their visit, Kim and Park, who did not co-operate in internal politics, revealed the competition between them. When they came back to Seoul, Park said Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 139 Park Chul Un resigned as the Minister o f State for Political Affairs in April, 1990, following an attack by Kim Young Sam,3 9 but still played a supporting role in establishing a detailed schedule for the summit meeting. He helped Kim Jong Hui by contacting Dunayev, the Director o f Novosti Press in Tokyo, asking Dunayev to deliver the message to have a Soviet-S. Korean summit meeting during Gorbachev’s visit to the U.S. in June, 1990. Through this channel, Dobrynin, the Soviet Presidential Secretary, secretly visited Seoul in May and met with President Roh and Kim Jong Hui. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was excluded during this process without being notified. Subsequently, the press and public opinion had nothing to do with the Soviet-S. Korean normalization process.4 0 The Soviet Union, which was short of consumer goods, wanted to receive economic support and learn more about the Korean economic development model, and was promised a $3 billion loan in money and goods from S. Korea.4 1 On the basis o f the prepared schedule, in June, 1990, Roh and that the Kim-Gorbachev meeting was not an official one preparing the normalization between the two countries, but a ceremonial reception, adding that the partner o f the party-merger should not have been Kim Young Sam. It was known that the normalization issue was briefly mentioned at the Kim-Gorbachev meeting. Kim Ki Chul, “Kim-Gorbachev Moscow Hoedong, Hoedaminga Myeondaminga” (“Kim- Gorbachev Meeting, Was It a Meeting or Reception?), Wolganchosun (July, 1995), pp. 438-440. 3 9 See Chapter IV. 4 0 Moon Jae Chul, op. cit., p. 234. 4 1 Kim Duk Joong, “Bukbangjeongchaekgwa Bunridoen Saeroun Daebukhanjeongchaek Pilyo” (“A New Policy toward N. Korea, Which Is Seperated from the Current Northern Policy, Is Needed.”), Junmang. Vol. 72 (December, 1992), Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 140 Gorbachev had a summit meeting in San Francisco, and on September 30, 1990, the two countries concluded a friendship treaty. President Roh utilized more actors in the process o f improving relations with China than with the Soviet Union. S. Korean businessmen had contributed to opening channels to the Chinese government.4 2 In April, 1990, Kim Jong Hui delivered a message through Lee Soon Suk, the President o f Sunkyong Corporation, that Roh’s government wanted to establish trade offices in Peking and Seoul, in addition to asking Chinese support for S. Korea’s seat in the United Nations. Park Chul Un, in October, 1990, also met Chinese officials at the Peking Asian Games, and talked about the establishment o f trade offices. As a result o f these efforts, trade offices in Peking and Seoul were established in January and March, 1991, respectively.4 3 China, in comparison with the Soviet Union, did not positively propel pp. 53-54. The amount of Soviet-S. Korean trade was increasing: $290 million in 1988, $600 million in 1989, and $889 million in 1990. Jung Tae Sin, op. cit., p. 21. 4 2 The amount o f the trade with China continued to be larger than that with the Soviet Union: $3,087 billion in 1988, $3,143 billion in 1989, and $3,821 billion in 1990. In 1990, the trade with China became the fourth largest, following trade with the U.S., Japan, and Germany. Jung Tae Sin, op. cit., p. 20. 4 3 Moon Jae Chul, op. cit., p. 245. Kim Bok Dong, Roh’s friend from the Military Academy as well as a brother o f R oh’s wife, was one o f the actors who tried to improve relations with China. As an advisor to the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation, he went to China in June, 1988, to attend a conference to establish a sea route between the two countries. As an advisor of the International Private Economic Council of Korea, he went to China again in March and September, 1989, and negotiated a diplomatic normalization with the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 141 the normalization with S. Korea, insisting that a corresponding improvement o f N. Korea’s relations with the U.S. and Japan was needed.44 After both South and North Korea entered the United Nations in September, 1991, relations with China developed rapidly.4 5 Park Chul Un, during his official visit to Peking as the Minister o f Athletics and Adolescence in September, 1991, and April, 1992, confidentially met Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, asking for diplomatic normalization between the two countries. At the U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP) in April, 1992, Qian Qichen suggested meetings for normalization to Korean Foreign Minister, Sang-ok Lee.4 6 President Roh formed a committee to control the officials o f the China International Trust and Investment Corporation, with the condition o f a $2.5 billion loan to China. The proposal was not accepted by China, and Kim Bok Dong ceased to be involved in the northern policy. Huh Ui Do, “Kimbokdong Parkchulunui Hangeonjuuiwa Heogong-e Geoaek Beorin Milsaoegyo” (“Pursuit of Merits and the Defects of Secret Diplomacy”), Wolganioongang (March, 1993), pp. 559-560. 44 Kim Seo Yong, “Bukbangjeongchaekwa Hanso Gyeongjegyoryu” (“Northern Policy and the Soviet-S. Korean Economic Trade”), op.cit., p. 34. 4 5 The Soviet Union and China, members of the United Nations Security Council, had not supported S. Korea’s entry into the U.N. without N. Korea. However, as their relations with S. Korea improved, they could not maintain that policy. In 1991, the Soviet Union supported S. Korea’s entry into the U.N. alone. The Premier of China, Li Peng, when he visited N. Korea in May, 1991, persuaded N. Korea to have a seat in the U.N. so as not to be behind in international society. Kim Hong Nak, “The Two Koreas’ Entry into the United Nations and the Implications for Inter-Korean Relations,” Korea and World Affairs. Vol. 15, No. 3, (Fall, 1991), pp. 407-408. 4 6 The two parties agreed on maintaining secrecy concerning N. Korea’s position. Park Doo Sik, op. cit., 388. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 142 normalization process, composed o f the Presidential Secretary o f Security and Diplomacy, Foreign Minister, and the Second Deputy Director the the ANSP. This committee appointed several persons, whose leader was an Ambassador awaiting assignment, to take part in the practical meetings with China. After three preliminary meetings and one practical, the two countries concluded a treaty o f friendship on August 24, 1992.4 7 In comparison with the normalization with the Soviet Union, more actors took part in various channels, and the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs took a major role in the confidential practical meetings. It seemed that, after the normalization with the Soviet Union, the existence o f many economic channels with China and common acknowledgment o f the need for normalization made it possible for many actors to participate. Regarding relations with N. Korea, Roh had Park Chul Un established confidential contacts followed by official relations. Park met Han Si Hae, N. Korean Deputy Director o f the Foreign Department o f the Labor Party, in Singapore in January, 1989, regarding the improvement o f relations.4 8 He went to Pyungyang in June, 1989, and met Kim II Sung, the President, and Dam Huh, the Chairman o f the Peaceful 47 Yoon Sang Hyun, op. cit., p. 205, 215-216. IO Park, on the basis o f Roh’s support, even arranged Chung Joo Young’s official visit to Pyungyang in January, 1989, without close consultation with the ANSP, to make an agreement on the joint development project o f Mt. Kumkang. Park Chul Un, “Hanbando Jeongsewa Tongileui Gil” (“The Political Situation o f Korean Peninsula and the Route to Unification”), Miniokiisung. Vol. 62 (April, 1991), pp. 128. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 143 Unification Committee o f N. Korea, with a message to develop the interchange between the two Koreas. In the fall o f the year, Han Si Hae visited Seoul and met President Roh. Although the detailed procedure and entire picture of the confidential contacts have not been made public yet, it is known that there were 42 confidential contacts between high-ranking officials o f the two Koreas during the 6th Republic.4 9 Through these confidential contacts, the contents and the level o f dialogue between the two Koreas were coordinated and followed by official meetings. The first official outcome of these contacts was the meetings o f the Prime Ministers. At the first meeting, in September, 1990, in Seoul, the N. Korean Prime Minister met the S. Korean Prime Minister and the President for the first time since the Korean Peninsula had been divided in 1945. These Prime Ministers met six times either at Seoul or Pyungyang prior to February, 1992. In December, 1991, they formulated “the Agreement on Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea” (hereinafter, “the Basic Agreement”), and agreed on “the Joint Declaration o f the Denuclearization o f the Korean Peninsula,” including reciprocal inspection. These agreements were effectuated through the approval of the National Assemblies in February, 1992. At the 8th meeting in September, 1992, they agreed on setting up Joint Commissions for practical interchange, in accordance with 4 9 Moon Jae Chul, op. cit., p. 222. Park Chul Un disclosed, in his official homepage, that he had been the S. Korean representative for the confidential meetings with N. Korea 42 times, and had visited N. Korea 21 times between 1985 to 1991. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 144 the Basic Agreement. These were treaties, not just announcements, between the two Koreas, and were regarded as the most important agreements between the two Koreas until then.5 0 Proceeding with these official schedules, the two Koreas still maintained secret dialogues to have a summit meeting. After Park Chul Un resigned as the Minister o f State for Political Affairs, the Director o f the ANSP, Suh Dong Kwon, visited Pyungyang in October, 1990, and N. Korean secret envoy, Yoon Ki Bok, visited Seoul in early 1992 to talk about a summit meeting.5 1 Although democracy was more advanced and the level o f popular support for the government was not high during the 6th Republic, President Roh still maintained a decisive role in the northern policy. He could maintain his influence owing to the special characteristics o f the northern policy, which needed a secret process for normalization. When Park Chul Un was the Presidential Secretary for Policy, he took the initiative to plan and manipulate the northern policy, on the basis o f Roh’s support. He contacted socialist countries, utilizing the channels he had developed in the ANSP, and played a major role in normalizing relations with not only the Soviet Union and China but also with East European socialist countries.5 2 He was powerful even in the 5 0 Jung Yong Seok, “6gong Tongil Bukbangjeongchaekui Gonggwa” (“The Merits and Demerits o f the Northern Policy in the 6th Republic”), Javugongron. Vol. 311 (February, 1993), pp. 77-78. 5 1 Although Yoon Ki Bok proposed a summit meeting to President Roh when he visited Seoul in 1992, Roh rejected it because N. Korea suggested the meeting date of April 15, the birthday o f Kim II Sung. RohTae Woo, op. cit., pp. 126-127. 5 2 S. Korea officially concluded a treaty o f amity with Hungry in February, 1989; Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 145 policy-making toward N. Korea as shown in the case o f Chung Joo Young’s visit to Pyungyang in 1989, surpassing the authority o f the ANSP. Roh’s support and his position, in the Blue House and as the Minister o f State for Political Affairs, enabled him to lead the northern policy in the early period o f the 6th Republic. After Park left the Blue House in 1989, Kim Jong Hui, the Presidential Secretary for Security and Diplomacy, played an important role in the normalization with the Soviet Union and China, and took part in the meetings o f the Prime Ministers o f the two Koreas.5 3 As Park’s predominance in the northern policy had resulted in the complaints by other related government institutions, early in Roh’s presidency the government established a few consulting organizations to plan and control northern policy, coordinating the different opinions o f the government institutions. In March, 1989, the Control and Cooperation Committee for the Policy toward N. Korea and Socialist Countries was established as the supreme committee for controlling northern policy, with the Prime Minister as the chairman.3 4 Under this committee, for improving the relations with socialist countries, the Committee for the Development o f Northern Poland in November, 1989; Yugoslavia in December, 1989; Czechoslovakia in March, 1990; Romania in March, 1990; Bulgaria in March. 1990; M ongolia in March, 1990; and Albania in August, 1991. Choi Jong Ki, op. cit., p. 188. 5 3 Moon Jae Chul, op. cit., pp. 229-231. 5 4 The Vice-chairs were the Deputy Prime Minister and the Director o f the ANSP; and other members o f the committee were the Minister o f Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister o f National Unification Board, the Presidential Secretary for Policy, and the Director o f Administrative Control in the Office o f Premier. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 146 Policy was established with the Foreign Minister as the Chairman.5 5 For the relations with N. Korea, the Committee for the Cooperation and Trade between Two Koreas was established, with the Minister o f the National Unification Board as the Chairman.5 6 However, although they met several times a year, these committees did not produce practical policies, but simply approved decisions from the Blue House.5 7 The ANSP, which could access high-level information about socialist countries, took part in establishing northern policy. When Park Chul Un was the Presidential Secretary for Policy, however, Park took the initiative in planning and executing northern policy. After Park left the Blue House in July, 1989, the Director o f the c o ANSP resumed its authority. According to the Government Organization Act, the National Unification Board was supposed to control the policy toward N. Korea, and the status o f the Minister o f the National Unification Board was raised to the level o f Deputy Prime Minister in December, 1990. The Ministry o f Foreign Affairs was officially responsible for the policy toward socialist countries. However, the roles o f 5 5 This committee was composed o f the Deputy-minister o f Foreign Affairs, the Presidential Secretary for Policy, the Director o f Administrative Control in the Office o f Premier, and the Second Deputy-director o f the ANSP. 56 This committee was composed o f the Deputy-minister o f National Unification Board, the Presidential Secretary for Policy, the Director o f Administrative Control in the Office o f Premier, and the First Deputy-director o f the ANSP. 5 7 Kim II Dong, op. cit., p. 213. 5 8 Kim Cha Soo, “Jinsang Parkchulunui Bukhanmilhang” (“Park Chul U n’s Secret Visit to N. Korea”), Sindonga (September, 1989), pp. 235-237. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 147 these two institutions were limited to taking the official part in executing and supporting northern policy.5 9 The military, which had been traditionally conservative, did not accept contentedly the declaration on July 7, 1988, by which N. Korea was acknowledged as a part o f the national community and not as an enemy. Several commanders criticized the northern policy as too radical. However, after those commanders were released from service in 1989, the military was unable to raise its voice with respect to the northern policy during the 6th Republic.6 0 The political parties and the National Assembly could not take part in the process o f making northern policy, but took on the role o f approving official relations afterward. Though the 6th Republic was more democratized, still, little information about socialist countries was released to the political parties, under the secret diplomacy for normalization. As a result, the knowledge o f the National Assembly and political parties about the socialist countries was inferior to that of government 5 9 Hwang Ui Bong, “Nambukdaehwaboda Namnamdaehwa Deo Eoryeopda” (“Coordination between the Government Institutions is More Difficult than That between South and North Korea”), Sindonga (April, 1994), p. 221. 6 0 The Director o f the Military Academy, Min Byung Don, at the commencement ceremony in March, 1989, criticized the northern policy, saying that it was confusing who was an enemy and who was a friend. He was dismissed a few weeks later. Six months later, the Commander o f the Third Army, Ko Myung Seung, blamed the northern policy for the lack of serious public concern regarding security. He was dismissed a few months later, too. Joongangilbo. March 10, 1995. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 148 institutions, hence they were excluded from the process o f making northern policy.6 1 The press, which lacked information about what the secret envoys and the government were doing, could not have influence on the northern policy. The role of the press was limited to reporting the process and result o f the northern policy after it had been officially released. New actors who began to influence the northern policy in the 6th Republic were radical civilians, who had been involved in radical democratization and the unification movement, and businessmen. Radical civilian groups had insisted that expanding communication channels with N. Korea to civilians would bring the unification earlier, contrary to the government policy which permitted only government channels.6 2 Some o f them began to contact N. Korea individually although they knew that they would be imprisoned. A minister, Moon Ik Hwan, who had devoted himself to the democratization movement since Park’s regime, visited Pyungyang and met Kim II Sung in March, 1989, and was imprisoned on a charge of violating the National Security Law after he came back.6 3 The National University 6 1 Cha Sung Duk, “Oegyojeongchaek Gyeoljeonge Isseo Jeongchaekgyeoljeong Chegyeui Yeonghyange Gwanhan Yeongu - Bukbangjeongchaekui Saryereul Jungsimeuro” (“The Influence o f the Decision-making Structure on Foreign Policy: the Case o f the Northern Policy”), Hanguksahoewa Haneiungvonku. Vol. 6 (December, 1995), p. 237. 6 2 Park Hun Ok, “Uriui Daebukjeongchaek Idaero Joeunga” (“Is Current Northern Policy Good?”), Bukhan, Vol. 306 (June, 1997), p. 96.; Chung Hae Koo, op. cit., p. 140. 6 3 The government said M oon’s visit to N. Korea was illegal because he had not had the government’s permission, while Chung Joo Young’s visit to N. Korea in 1989 was Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 149 Conference delegated a student, Lim Soo Kyung, to join the World Youth Festival held in Pyungyang in June, 1989.6 4 A famous novelist, Hwang Suk Young, went to Pyungyang and met Kim II Sung in March, 1989, and came back to S. Korea in 1993 and was imprisoned. Until 1992, the government permitted only Chung Joo Young Chung, among businessmen, to visit N. Korea. Although the government, according to “the Basic Agreement,” was supposed to permit businessmen’s visit to N. Korea if a businessman requested it on the basis o f need, no joint business project was accomplished between the two Koreas during the 6th Republic. There was only trade between the two Koreas, which was carried out through other countries.6 5 permitted by the government on the basis o f the Declaration o f July 7, 1988. Lee Jang Hee, “Bukbanjeongchaekui Guknaebeopsang Gukjebeopsang M unje” (“Northern Policy in Terms o f Internal and International Law”), Tongil. Vol. 99 (December, 1989), pp. 68-69. 6 4 After she came back to Seoul in August, she was imprisoned for 3 years. 6 5 Until then, there had been a few exceptional cases o f direct trade between the two Koreas: one was N. Korea’s support for a flood disaster in 1984 during the 5th Republic, and the other was the exchange o f rice and raw m aterials in 1990 during the 6th Republic, which were led by the governments. The trade through other countries reached $1 million in 1989, and increased to $192 million in 1991. Owing to S. Korea’s import o f raw materials since 1989, S. Korea became N. Korea’s third biggest export market in 1993, following China and Japan. Joongangilbo. June 18, 1992, July 8, 1994; Byun Jae Jin, “Nambukgan Gyeongje Hyeopryeokui Chujin Hyeonhwanggwa Gwaje” (“Current Situation and the Task o f Economic Cooperation between two Koreas”), Nara Gyeongje, Vol. 1 1 (October, 1991), pp. 68-69. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 150 Generally, normalization between two countries whose relations have not been amicable has to be advanced confidentially.6 6 In the 6th Republic, these secret procedures were dominated by a few persons nominated by the President. It showed that the northern policy-making process had not been democratized nor institutionalized, but the presidential influence was still decisive in the procedure. At the end o f the 6th Republic, however, an event occurred which revealed the power conflicts between the government institutions, showing that the presidential influence was reduced. The eighth meeting of Prime Ministers was held at Pyungyang from September 15 to 18 in 1992. While N. Korea’s major demand at the meeting was the repatriation o f an old man, Lee In Mo, who had been a N. Korean soldier during the Korean War,6 7 S. Korea’s main issue was the meeting o f separated family members living in South and North Korea, second, the establishment o f a meeting place in Panmunjeom, and third, the repatriation of the crew o f the ship, Dongjin, which had been captured by N. Korea in 1987. When N. Korean representatives suggested an agreement on the reciprocal demands, except for the repatriation o f the Dongjin crew, a member o f the S. Korean delegation, Dong-won Lim, the Deputy Minister o f National 6 6 The normalization between the U.S. and China in 1972, and the following normalization between Japan and China proceeded secretly. Kim Hak Joon, “Bukbangjeongchaekui Jeongae Sanghwanggwa Bimiljeopchokui Dangwiseong” (“The Development o f Northern Policy and Its Secret Process”), Kookieiungse. Vol. 5 (November, 1989), pp. 19-21. 6 7 Lee, who had been a N. Korean war correspondent during the Korean War, became a guerilla after the War, remaining in S. Korea. He was arrested and imprisoned for 36 years. After he was released in 1988, he still refused to convert from communism. He became known to N. Korea by his essay published in a S. Korean magazine in 1991; thereafter, N. Korea asked for his repatriation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 151 Unification Board, tried to accept the offer. However, another member, Lee Dong Bok, the Special Assistant o f the Director o f the ANSP, stopped the negotiation, insisting that presidential instruction was the realization o f the three demands.6 8 Although this case might have occurred owing to the different judgment o f the representative members regarding whether the N. Korean delegation had agreed on the meeting of separated family members, a number o f related government officials thought that the ANSP had insisted on its own opinion over the Blue House’s and the National Unification Board’s .6 9 Similar conflicts among institutions happened frequently in Kim Young Sam’s regime, as the decision-making process was democratized and more actors took part in the procedure. After the normalization with the Soviet Union and China, the improvement of relations with N. Korea became the main goal o f northern policy in Kim Young Sam’s government. The policy of Kim’s government toward N. Korea had three phases, 6 8 According to the inspection by the Board o f Audit and Inspection in December, 1993, Lee Dong Bok showed a preliminary instruction, made by an ANSP staff member, to the representative members. Preliminary instructions had been written in advance to save time, expecting the contents o f the presidential instruction. But the presidential instruction, which was delivered six hours later, directed the delegation to make an agreement with Lee In Mo if two out of three S. Korean demands were accepted. Lee Dong Bok, when he showed the preliminary instruction, judged that the negotiation was broken off because the N. Korean representatives did not commit to the meeting o f separated family members as well as the repatriation o f the Dongjin crew. Although Lee Dong Bok, later, insisted that his judgm ent was right even if he had followed the real presidential instruction, he was dismissed from his position after this event. Chosunilbo. December 22, 1993; Ilvosinmoon, February 12, 2000, pp. 10- 11. 6 9 Hwang Ui Bong, op. cit., p. 211. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 152 based on the “Han National Community Unification Policy” o f the 6th Republic: first, to settle friendly relationships and to begin cooperation; second, to advance interchange and cooperation, and establish the union o f the two Koreas; and third, to complete the creation of a single nation-state.7 0 President Kim tried to obtain the opinions o f various classes and groups on policy toward N. Korea, based on public support for his government, as he had declared in his inaugural address. Taking a lesson from the 6th Republic, when the government could not obtain public support for the northern policy due to a lack of information and consensus, Kim recruited a number o f intellectuals, including radicals who had been critical to the former regimes’ unification policy, as advisors for unification policy, and as members o f the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy, a presidential advisory institution.7 1 While the northern policy was established by the ANSP secretly during the 5th Republic, and carried out by a limited number o f informed persons and the ANSP during the 6th Republic, in Kim’s government, various actors took part in the northern policy and expressed their opinions regarding the events related to N. Korea. In addition to the government institutions, businessmen, the press, and public opinion had an influence on the northern policy. On the one hand, with many actors taking part in 70 Yoo Ho Yul, “Tongiljeongchaek Gyeoljeonggwajeong Yeongu: Kimyoungsam Jeongbuui Tongil Anbo JeongchaekeuI Jungsimeuro” (“The Structure and Process o f Unification Policy-making in South Korea: 1993-1994”), Segveiilseoui Bveonhwawa Hanbando Tongil (Seoul: The Korean Political Science Association, 1994), Vol. 4, pp. 955. 7 1 Ibid., pp. 957-958. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 153 the northern policy, it was possible to collect various opinions and attempt to create a consensus. On the other hand, the lack o f effective coordination o f various opinions could result in policy inconsistency. When the issue o f inspecting N. Korea’s nuclear facility emerged as an international concern, the S. Korean President’s capability o f coordinating the opinion o f foreign counties as well as that o f the internal actors became very important. As it turned out, however, President Kim was unable to lead northern policy, but wandered between hard and soft-line policies without having his own concrete orientation. The conflict among various actors’ opinions was revealed from the first action toward N. Korea by Kim’s government, i.e., the repatriation o f Lee In Mo. Lee In Mo had not been sent to N. Korea because the two Koreas could not reach an agreement on the conditions o f his repatriation. The M inister o f National Unification Board, Han Wan Sang, decided to send Lee without conditions on humanistic grounds, hoping to improve the relations between the two Koreas which had been frozen owing to the problem o f reciprocal nuclear inspection.7 2 Although the ANSP, the 7 2 N. Korea had agreed on the “Basic Agreement” and “Denuclearization,” including reciprocal inspection at the end o f 1991. However, as N. Korea lost its exclusive alliance with the Soviet Union and China after S. Korea had normalized the relations with those countries, N. Korea tried to find an alternative security system. Subsequently, N. Korea continued to develop nuclear weapons and denied reciprocal inspection in May, 1992. Kim Yong Ho, “Jeongbuui Daebukjeongchaeke Isseo Haekmunjewa Kyeonghyeopui Sangho Yeonkwanseong Gochal” (“The Relationship between the Nuclear Issue and Economic Co-operation in the Government’s Northern Policy”), Hangukgwa Gukieieongchi. Vol. 22 (Kyungnam University Press: 1995), pp. 67-68. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 154 Prosecutor’s Office, and the Prime M inister’s Office opposed the decision, Lee was sent to N. Korea in March 19, 1993.7 3 After N. Korea seceded from the NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) on March 12, 1993,7 4 the debates about interchange and summit meetings between two Koreas have been related to the nuclear issue. Responding to N. Korea’s suggestion to exchange special envoys at the level o f Deputy Prime Ministers, in May, 1993, to prepare for the summit meeting, government institutions expressed split opinions. While the National Unification Board and the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs supported the offer, in the interests o f improving relations and solving nuclear problems at the same time, the ANSP and the Prime M inister’s Office did not support the offer, emphasizing that the nuclear problem should be solved before attempting to improve relations.7 3 Subsequently, without a consensus among institutions, though Kim’s 7 3 They opposed it on the grounds that it was against the principle o f equity with other non-converted ex-convicts; there was no corresponding action by N. Korea; and it would be utilized for political propaganda by N. Korea. Hwang Ui Bong, op. cit., p.217. 7 4 Although N. Korea had signed the NPT in 1985, it postponed making an agreement on the Nuclear Security Act with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), which was supposed to be done within 18 months after signing the NPT, permitting inspection by the IAEA. N. Korea did make an agreement in May, 1992, and was inspected by the IAEA six times from May, 1992, to February, 1993. The results showed that the amount o f extracted plutonium exceeded that reported by N. Korea. As the IAEA pressured N. Korea to accept the inspection o f two non-reported nuclear facilities, N. Korea announced its secession from the NPT. Song Moon Hong, “YS Daebukjeongchaek” (“Northern Policy in Kim’s Government”), Sindonga (January, 1998), p. 347. 7 5 The latter insisted that N. Korea was trying to gain time for developing nuclear Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 155 government exchanged telegrams with N. Korea 13 times, they did not yield any concrete results.7 6 Each government institution preferred a hard-line or soft-line policy according to their tasks. The National Unification Board, which had supported the dialogue with N. Korea, tended to prefer a soft-line. The Ministry o f Foreign Affairs also preferred a solution through dialogue and negotiation. The ANSP and the Ministry o f National Defense, which had been traditionally conservative dealing with national security, took a hard-line position. The Prime Minister’s Office, which had been interested in the meeting o f high-ranking officials where the Prime Minister was the representative, was not in favor o f shifting the dialogue channel to special envoys, from which the Prime Minister would be excluded.7 7 N. Korea had meetings with the U.S. after its secession from the NPT. At the first phase meetings between high-ranking officials in June, 1993, N. Korea agreed with the temporary suspension of the secession.7 8 The government institutions weapons by having meetings on detailed procedure. Lim Dong Won, “Jeonhwangiui Nambuk Gwangyewa Daebukjeongchaek” (“Northern Policy and the Relations between the Two Koreas from 1988 to 1996”) Pveonghwatongil Yeongu (Sejong University Press: 1996), Vol. 2, pp. 82-83. 7 6 The issue o f the summit meeting was reopened by Carter’s mediation in June, 1994, after his visit to the two Koreas. 7 7 Hwang Ui Bong, op. cit., p. 216. 7 8 According to the rule, secession from the NPT comes into effect three months after the secession. In return for the suspension, the U.S. agreed on the non-use of armed forces toward N. Korea, reciprocal respect o f sovereignty, and the fair application o f nuclear security rules to N. Korea. Song Moon Hong, op. cit., p. 347. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 156 expressed different opinions about this agreement. The National Unification Board and the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs accepted the decision affirmatively in terms that avoided a critical moment on the Korean Peninsula, opening the chance for inspection by keeping N. Korea in the NPT. In contrast, the Blue House and the National Unification Board were critical that the United States conceded too much without a clear commitment from N. Korea. The press had also begun to express opinions regarding the northern policy during Kim’s regime. While the press had supported the soft-line policy at the beginning of Kim’s regime, it began to criticize the government’s policy when N. Korea did not cooperate. Regarding the nuclear issue, the press pushed the government to take a hard-line policy.7 9 The press, during Kim’ s regime, did not maintain a consistent position toward N. Korea.8 0 President Kim did not lead public opinion regarding the northern policy, but was influenced by public opinion about N. Korea and the nuclear issue. At the second phase meetings of high-ranking officials in July, 1993, the U.S. agreed to support the construction of a light-water reactor in return for the 7 9 As N. Korea refused nuclear inspection after the favorable repatriation o f Lee In Mo, the press criticized the soft-line policy. There were editorials to this effect in daily newspapers: “Yangboman Haneun Daebukjeongchaek” (“There Is Only Concession in the Northern Policy”), Chosunilbo. March 30, 1993; “M osundoen Saejeongbu Daebuknolli” (“Contradiction in the Northern Policy o f the Government”), Dongailbo. March 29, 1993. Yoo Ho Yul, op. cit., p.958. 80 Jung Chun Goo, “Daebukjeongchaekui Yuyeonseonggwa Ilkwanseongganui Dilemma” (“Dilemma between Consistency and Flexibility in the Northern Policy”), Wolgandonghwa, Vol. 9-1 (January, 1996), p. 70. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 157 resumption o f N. Korea’s dialogue with the IAEA. While there was no progress in executing this agreement, President Kim had a meeting with Clinton on November 23, 1993, in Washington, D.C., at which time, the United States was planning the third phase meetings on the condition that N. Korea accepted the inspection and the beginning o f dialogue with S. Korea. Preparing for the meeting, the United States had a basic strategy, “comprehensive solution,” which proposed negotiating all the issues related with nuclear inspection at the same time. N. Korea, on November 11, 1993, proposed a “package deal,” which was meant to resolve the issue of the IAEA nuclear inspection in return for a package o f issues such as the suspension o f S. Korea- U.S. joint maneuvers, Team Spirit; support for the construction o f the light-water reactor; and the removal o f N. Korea from the list of hostile countries to the U.S. The U.S. did not reject this offer. The S. Korean press, however, insisted that the nuclear inspection should precede concession.8 1 At the meeting with Clinton, Kim insisted on an agreement rejecting the offer of N. Korea, changing the expression “comprehensive solution,” which had been agreed on at the practical preliminary meeting, to “thorough and broad approach,” accepting the opinion o f S. Korean hard-liners and the press. “ O 1 There were a lot o f editorials which opposed the “package deal,” insisting upon the inspection first before giving promises o f other benefits to N. Korea. Those editorials in November, 1993, appeared in Joongangilbo (November 12, 18), Kvunghvangshinmoon (November 9, 18), Dongailbo (November 13), Dongailbo (November 18), and Seoulshinmoon (November 19). Yoo Ho Yul, op. cit., p.961. 8 2 Because “comprehensive solution” could be interpreted as “package deal,” President Kim insisted on “thorough and broad approach,” which included the reciprocal nuclear inspection. In addition, the announcement included that the suspension o f Team Spirit Maneuvers should be decided by S. Korea. Hong Seung Won, “Daebukjeongchaekui Ilkwanseong Gyeolyeo, Hanmi Haek Gongjochejedo Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 158 President Kim, however, had not maintained a hard-line policy consistently from the beginning. It was Kim’s government which suggested the U.S.-N. Korean meeting after N. Korea seceded from the NTP, and Kim’s government agreed that the U.S. would only talk about the nuclear issue with N. Korea. However, when the U.S. was preparing for the meeting with N. Korea, President Kim, in interviews with the BBC and the New York Times in July, 1993, charged that the U.S.-N. Korean meeting was being used by N. Korea to gain time for developing nuclear weapons.8 3 Although the policy o f the Department of Foreign Affairs o f S. Korea corresponded to that o f the U.S., Kim spoke for the hard-liners. Ironically, his insistence on “reciprocal inspection first” at the summit meeting in November further delayed the solution of the nuclear problem.8 4 Busil” (“There Is No Consistency in Northern Policy and Lack of Cooperation with the U.S.”), Miniokjeongron. Vol. 17 (December, 1994), p. 38. 8 3 Song Moon Hong, op. cit., pp. 350-351. 84 Lim Dong Won, “Jeonhwangiui Nambuk Gwangyewa Daebukjeongchaek” (“Northern Policy and the Relations between the Two Koreas from 1988 to 1996”), op. cit., p. 83. In the third phase U.S.-N. Korean meeting in August, 1994, Kim’s government insisted that the light-water reactor, which was to be built in N. Korea, should be in the same style as S. Korean nuclear power plants, while the U.S. thought this was not meaningful because major parts and technology would depend on the U.S. Kim’s government insisted upon this for the purpose o f internal public relations, resulting in a delay of an agreement on the meeting. Kim Young Hwan, “Hanguk Munminjeongbuui Daebukjeongchaek Hangyeseong” (“On the Limitations of the S. Korean Government’s Policy toward North Korea”), Hanguk Dongbukanonchong. Vol. 2, (September, 1996), p. 19. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 159 The IAEA reported to the U.N. Security Council in March, 1994, that it was impossible to confirm whether nuclear material had been used to make military weapons because N. Korea did not permit a detailed inspection. At the request of the Presidential C hief Secretary o f Diplomacy and Security, the Minister o f Foreign Affairs announced the hard-line policy that S. Korea would take sanctions against N. Q C Korea through the U.N. N. Korea began to exchange the nuclear fuel poles of the atomic reactor in May, 1994, and the U.N. Security Council blamed N. Korea.8 6 In addition, N. Korea announced its secession from the IAEA on June 13, leading the crisis o f the Korean Peninsula to its culmination. This crisis was reduced by former President o f the U.S., Jimmy Carter, through his visiting both Koreas and mediating the summit meeting. While President Kim accepted the offer on June 18, and was preparing for the meeting, Kim II Sung died in July, 1994. After Kim II Sung’s death, the third phase o f U.S.-N. Korean meetings opened, with Kim ’s government expressing its opinion through the U.S. At the meeting on August 13, 1994, N. Korea agreed on the inspection and not to exchange 85 Initially, the M inistry o f Foreign Affairs made an announcement expressing concern about the situation. Responding to this announcement, the Presidential Chief Secretary o f Diplomacy and Security asked the Minister o f Foreign Affairs to make a stronger announcement by himself. Kim Cha Soo, “Bukhanjeongchaekui Honseonkwa Galdeung” (“Conflict and Confusion in the Policy toward North Korea”), Sindonga (October. 1994), p. 118. 8 6 N. Korea was not supposed to exchange nuclear fuel poles without the supervision of the IAEA because it could extract plutonium, which can be used for making atomic bombs, during the process o f exchanging fuel poles. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 160 nuclear fuel poles, and in return, the U.S. promised to build a light-water reactor and improve relations by establishing diplomatic missions. Regarding this agreement, President Kim and the hard-liners pressured the U.S. on a reopening o f the dialogue 87 between the two Koreas. Finally, in the Geneva U.S.-N. Korean Nuclear Pact on October 21, 1994, the U.S. obtained N. Korea’s promise to reopen a dialogue with S. Korea.8 8 S. Korea, the U.S., and Japan jointly established in March, 1995, KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) for cooperation in constructing the light-water reactor in N. Korea. In spite o f the agreement in the Geneva Pact, N. Korea did not reopen a dialogue with S. Korea, and after that, with international cooperation on the N. Korean nuclear issue, all that Kim ’s government could obtain were the promise o f S. Korea’s taking a leading role in KEDO and that the nuclear reactor would be built in the Korean style.8 9 Ibid., p. 119; An official o f the U.S. State Department, Kenneth Quinones, who was in charge o f S. Korea, complained that President Kim, following capricious internal public opinion, depended on the U.S. when tension was high, but tried to intervene in U.S.-N. Korean meetings when tension was reduced. Kenneth Quinones, Dupyeong Bbangjipeseo Gveolieongdeon Hanbando Unmveong (North Korea’s Nuclear Threat), (Seoul: Joongang M&B, 2000). Cited from Ilyosinmoon, January 22, 2000, pp. 10-11. 8 8 This Pact was announced as the agreement o f the third phase U.S.-N. Korean meetings. However, the promise to have a dialogue with S. Korea was not executed. 8 9 At the U.S.-N. Korean meeting at Kuala Lumpur in June, 1995, both parties agreed on establishing a Korean-style light-water reactor and a major role for S. Korea in KEDO. Park Young Ho, “Choegeunui Daebuk Hap-ui-e-daehan Pyeongawa Baramjikhan Daebukjeongchaek Banghyang” (“Current Agreement toward N. Korea and a Desirable Policy”), Kukhoebo. Vol. 346 (August, 1995), p. 44. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 161 After the nuclear issue was settled, Kim’s government announced the Policy for Activating Economic Cooperation with N. Korea in November, 1994,9 0 and propelled private economic cooperation with N. Korea. S. Korean big businesses sent an investment examination team to N. Korea and tried to establish a joint project. However, this economic cooperation was not supported by a consistent government policy, and was continually suspended whenever there were events which raised the tension between the two Koreas.4 1 Practical economic cooperation with N. Korea began in Kim Dae Jung’s regime, which has maintained a sunshine policy toward N. Korea, with Hyundai’s Mountain Kumkang Tour Project.4 2 4 0 This policy included permission for a visit by S. Korean entrepreneurs to N. Korea for the purpose o f a meeting seeking cooperation, and examination of the possibility of establishing a private office in N. Korea. Kim’s government, a month later, gave Hyundai, Samsung, Lucky, and Ssangyong groups permission to visit N. Korea. Jung Yong Seok, “Kimyoungsam Jeongbuui Tongiljeongchaek Pyeongga” (“The Unification Policy of Kim’s Government”), Hannamdae Sahoekwahakveongoo. Vol. 6 (December, 1996), pp. 12-13. 4 1 These events were the invasion by a N. Korean submarine in September, 1996, and the political asylum of a N. Korean high-ranking official, Hwang Jang Yeop, in February, 1997. For example, when a N. Korean submarine was detected in S. Korean territory, 24 N. Korean agents were killed in combat against the S. Korean army. N. Korea, initially, charged that S. Korea attacked the crew of a stranded submarine, but later announced its regret for this event. The S. Korean government postponed sending the delegation of the site examination team, which had been established to build the light-water reactor, and temporarily suspended the entrepreneurs’ visit to N. Korea. Jung Chun Goo, “Jamsuham Sageonui Pyeongawa Daebukjeongchaekui Gwaje” (“The Submarine Event and the Policy toward N. Korea”), Tongil, Vol. 185 (February, 1997), p. 82; Chosunilbo. December 30, 1996. 4 2 Although there were approximately 40 enterprises which began economic cooperation with N. Korea during Kim Young Sam ’s regime up until February, 1998, most projects were stalemated at the stage o f making a contract, or did not proceed after the contract was made. For example, although the Korean Land Development Corporation tried to establish a model industrial complex within the Najin-Sunbong Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 162 President Kim also did not maintain a consistent policy on rice support to N. Korea. Kim proposed to offer rice to N. Korea in March, 1995, without first receiving a request from N. Korea, and sent 150,000 tons on June 25. At this rice conference with N. Korea, the Deputy Minister o f Finance and Economy led the meeting, under the direct direction of the Presidential C hief Secretary of Economy, excluding experts from the National Unification Board and the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs.9 3 This was another example o f the inconsistent policy-making o f Kim’s government, revealing a few problems during the process o f offering rice. When the rice was transported, S. Korean ships entered the N. Korean harbor hoisting the N. Korean flag as N. Korea demanded, contrary to the preliminary agreement, and a ship was detained for 1 1 days for the reason that a crew member took a picture, which was prohibited.9 4 Subsequently, the press again criticized the soft-line policy o f the Free Trade Area in N. Korea, it could not obtain a concrete agreement. S. Korean enterprises could not attend the Najin-Sunbong International Investment Forum in November, 1996, because the N. Korean government insisted it would select the companies to attend, which the S. Korean government did not accept. A few companies established their factories in N. Korea during Kim’s presidency. Daewoo established a factory in May, 1995, producing apparel and bags, however, the rate of factory operation was less than 50% until the end o f 1997. In May, 1997, Taechang, Inc. began to develop Kumkang Mountain spring water. Hanhwa and LG also began to establish factories for electronic goods in 1997. Dongailbo. April 11, 1996; Kvunghvangshimoon. November 11, 1996; Chosunilbo, May, 23, 1997; Segyeilbo. October 1, 1998. 9 3 Lee Joo Chun, “Byeorange Seon Daebuk Oegyo” (“The Crisis o f Diplomacy toward N. Korea”), Hanguknondan. Vol. 73 (September, 1995), p. 115. It was known that the government did not arrange the transportation procedure carefully because it hurried to send the rice before the local election, planned on June Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 163 government.9 5 Kim’s government shifted to a hard-line policy after that, and after the flood disaster in N. Korea in September, it appropriated just S50,000 in support.9 6 One o f the characteristics o f the northern policy-making process o f Kim’s government was that there were several conferences where the northern policy was adjusted and decided, compared with the impractical conferences held during the 6th Republic. The Conference o f the Unification-related Ministers was established at first, attended by 17 ministers, with the Minister o f the National Unification Board presiding. Although this conference met 19 times from March, 1993, to the end o f 1995, it was not effective in developing practical policy. Under this conference, the Strategic Conference o f the Unification-Related Ministers was established in March, 1993, to develop policy, which consisted of the Minister o f National Unification Board 27, to achieve public support for the government party. However government party did not do well in the local election. Ibid., p. 117; Yoo Gil Jae, “Ssalhyeopsangeul Tonghae Bon Guknaejeongchiwa Daebukjeongchaek” (“Internal Politics and the Northern Policy in the Case o f Rice Conference”), Junmang. Vol. 104 (August, 1995), pp. 122-123; Joongangilbo June 30, August 14, 1995. 9 5 Kim Yong Ho, op. cit., pp. 75-77. 9 6 This was a small amount compared with the S300 thousand o f Japan, $100 thousand o f Norway, and $70 thousand o f Germany. At the time o f Kobe earthquake, January, 1995, S. Korea provided $1 million to Japan. Lee Hyun Hoon, “Daebuk Ssaljiwon Ihu Uriui Daebukjeongchaek Banghyang” (“The Direction o f Northern Policy after the Rice Support”), Tongil. Vol. 169 (October, 1995), p. 49. The New York Times wrote on November 17, 1996, that the U.S. Officials thought it was more difficult to deal with S. Korea than with N. Korea, and the S. Korean government changed its policy orientation, taking into consideration internal public opinion. Cited from Kim Jung Ki, “Daebukjeongchaeke Daehan Hanmi Gongjoui Munjejeom” (“The Conflict between the U.S. and S. Korea in Northern Policy”), Hanguk Dongbookanonchong. Vol. 3, (December, 1996), p. 293. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 164 who led the conference, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Director of the ANSP, and the Presidential Chief Secretary. This conference, in order to respond to N. Korea’s proposal to exchange special envoys in 1993, was transformed into the High-ranking Strategic Conference for Unification, with the addition o f the Minister of National Defense, the Presidential Chief secretary of Diplomacy and Security, and the Prime Minister presiding. This conference met 14 times from May, 1993, to March, 1994, covering many important policies. As the nuclear problem became more complicated in April, 1994, this conference was transformed into the Unification and Security Control Conference, presided over by the Minister o f National Unification Board, and excluding the Prime Minister, in order to make decisions effectively. Although these conferences were meaningful in terms of democratized policy-making, excluding secret diplomacy, they revealed conflicts among institutions, not being well coordinated by the President.9 7 The actors that maintained a hard-line position on the northern policy in Kim’s government were the ANSP, the military, and the Presidential secretary. The ANSP was a very powerful institution with respect to northern policy during the 5th Republic, and played an important role parallel to secret envoy diplomacy during the 6th Republic. Although the ANSP experienced a reduction in its influence on internal 9 7 In addition, there was the Conference o f Security-related Ministers, which the President presided over 6 times from May, 1993, to May, 1994. Yoo Ho Yul, op. cit., pp. 968-973; Park Sang Sub, “Daebukjeongchaekui Bucheogan Jojeongbangan” (“The Method o f Coordinating Northern Policy among Government Institutions”), Jungchaek Forum. Vol. 17 (March, 1996), pp. 20-26. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 165 politics during Kim’s regime,9 8 it maintained its authority regarding northern policy on the basis o f managing the highest-level of information about N. Korea, though it was not exclusive. Kim also reformed the military, excluding the Hanahoe (One Club) members from important positions.9 9 Subsequently, the influence o f the military on internal politics was remarkably reduced. Regarding the policy toward N. Korea, the military still maintained a hard-line attitude. The Presidential Chief Secretary of Diplomacy and Security had also been recruited from hard-liners.1 0 0 Although they were not as influential as Kim Jong Hui or the Presidential Secretary o f Policy, Park Chul Un, in the 6th Republic, they played an important role in northern policy, representing the hard-line position. The National Unification Board, which was supposed to be the major institution for controlling northern policy, according to the Government Organization President Kim amended the law o f the ANSP to eliminate its intervention in internal politics and to focus on collecting information about N. Korea and foreign countries, reducing the size o f the organization and the number o f local branches. Yoo Ho Yul, op. cit., p. 963; Chosunilbo. June 30, 1993. " Hanahoe was a private organization in the Korean Army, established by Chun Doo Hwan. The members o f this group had led the coups in 1979 and 1980, and had taken an important position in the army, maintaining their pow er in internal politics. Early in Kim’s presidency, most Hanahoe generals were discharged and its field grade officers were excluded from promotion. Lee Sang Woo, “Chundoohwan Rohtaewoowa 80nyeondaeui Gunbu” (“The M ilitary in the 1980s”), Sindonga (December, 1988), pp. 323-324; Joongangilbo, April, 16, 1994. 1 0 0 Jung Jong Wook took the position until the end o f 1994, and was replaced by Yoo Jong Ha who stayed in that position until the end o f 1996. Joongangilbo. December 24, 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 166 Act, could not take the initiative. Compared with the ANSP and the Blue House, this institution was weak in collecting high-level information, and occasionally became the target o f hard-liners’ criticism against its soft-line policy. The first Minister, who had been blamed for the liberal soft-line policy, was replaced in 10 months and his successors were not able to maintain their positions for long.1 0 1 The Ministry o f Foreign Affairs consisted of professional diplomats who took a practical role in dealing with the nuclear problem. Because the N. Korean nuclear issue was also a concern o f other countries and the U.N., the President specially nominated an Ambassador for the Nuclear Problem in November, 1993, and subsequently, this institution took an important role in northern policy.1 0 2 In comparison, political parties and the National Assembly were still excluded from the northern policy-making process. Because these institutions lacked expertise in northern policy, they had difficulty in reaching a consensus, or responding quickly to the changing international environment, when the nuclear issue became critical. It is expected that the role o f these institutions will be increased as relations with N. Korea are developed and institutionalized.1 0 3 1 0 1 President Kim replaced 6 Ministers during the first 36 months of his presidency. Kim failed to nominate and support an appropriate person for this position. Many o f those he selected had not been engaged in the field o f unification, having a background in law, sociology, and the press. Jung Yong Seok, op. cit., p. 21; Chosunilbo, December 22, 1993. 1 0 2 Chosunilbo. November 17, 1993. 1 0 3 Cha Sung Duk, “Oegyojeongchaek Gyeoljeonge Isseo Jeongchaekgyeoljeong Chegyeui Yeonghyange Gwanhan Yeongu - Bukbangjeongchaekui Saryereul Jungsimeuro” (“The Influence o f the Decision-making Structure on Foreign Policy: the Case o f the Northern Policy”), op.cit., pp. 237-239. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 167 While the government permitted businessmen’s visits to N. Korea on the basis of necessity, visits by civilians were still prohibited during Kim Young Sam’s regime. But radical students and civilians kept on visiting N. Korea without the government’s permission. 1 0 4 Given that a number o f S. Korean businessmen and Korean- Americans had already visited N. Korea,1 0 5 their illegal visits to N. Korea did not arouse public attention. The increased influence o f the press toward northern policy was clearly evident during Kim’s presidency. During the early period, the press criticized soft- line government policy when N. Korea seceded from the NPT after Kim’s government had repatriated Lee In Mo. Subsequently, the Minister o f the National Unification Board was attacked by the press and hard-liners, and discharged at the end the year. The President accepted the opinion o f the press and hard-liners at a meeting with Clinton in November, 1993, neglecting an agreement on preliminary meetings. When Kim’s government insisted that the nuclear problem should be solved before other negotiations were undertaken, a number of N. Korean workers in Siberia, Russia, escaped from their work place at the end o f 1993, and appealed to go to S. Korea. 1 0 4 These included illegal visits by student representatives o f a Student Association in June and October, 1994; the asylum of a leader o f a Korean traditional religion, Daejonggyo, in April, 1995; and the visit by two students in August, 1995. These people were prosecuted after they came back to S. Korea. 1 0 5 N. Korea had invited Korean-Americans since 1992 to promote investment. Joongangilbo, January 22, 1992, July 4, 1996. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 168 The press pressured the government to accept them, for humanitarian reasons, and Kim’s government decided to admit them in April, 1994.1 0 6 When the press began to criticize rice support to N. Korea in 1995, when N. Korea did not show reciprocity, the government reduced support to N. Korea. These cases indicate that President Kim not only did not have a long-term northern policy but also could not coordinate the different opinions o f relevant institutions, instead following public opinion led by the press. After Kim II Sung died in 1994, his successor, Kim Jung II, did not promote the improvement o f relations with S. Korea. Except for rice support in 1995, the two Koreas did not have any practical economic and political interchange. In addition, after the N. Korean submarine invasion upon S. Korean territory in September, 1996, and the defection o f Hwang Jang Yup, a high-ranking N. Korean official, taking political asylum in S. Korea in February, 1997, relations between two Koreas deteriorated. After Kim lost public support due to the failure o f his economic policy in 1997, he could not make any effort to improve relations. However, there was a confidential contact between a government party assemblyman, Chung Jae Moon, and the Deputy Chairman o f the Peaceful Unification Committee o f N. Korea, Ahn Byung Soo, in November, 1997. The opposition party revealed it in December, insisting that Chung Jae Moon had given S3.6 million to Ahn Byung Soo, asking for some action 1 0 6 The press reported their miserable life and insisted that the government accept them. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 169 from N. Korea which could be favorable to the presidential candidate of the government party and harm Kim Dae Jung.1 0 7 The inside facts o f this event were not disclosed because Kim Dae Jung’s government did not prosecute this case. Compared with secret diplomacy in the 6th Republic, this event showed that President Kim, in the latter part o f his presidency, could not maintain a secret channel with N. Korea, and that even a non-govemment party could access high-level information about the northern policy. In accordance with the development o f democracy and institutionalization, more actors took part in the northern policy-making process, and the presidential influence on northern policy declined, changing the president’s role from critical decision-making to coordinating the different opinions o f various actors. Also, as was shown in the fields o f economics and internal politics, the President regarded public opinion as very important and reflected it in decisions. President Kim tried to improve relations with N. Korea early in his presidency and propelled economic investment after the Geneva Pact in October, 1994, on the basis o f public support. However, he could not maintain a consistent northern policy and failed to coordinate the different attitudes o f government institutions, following the changes in public opinion and the press. As he lost public support owing to the failure o f economic 1 0 7 Chung Jae Moon acknowledged that he met Ahn Byung Soo, but denied he gave money to him. Joongangilbo, March 25, May 23, 1998. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 170 policy, his influence on northern policy became weaker, and he was unable even to maintain the secrecy of his channel to N. Korea. The change of South Korea’s relations with socialist countries and North Korea in each President’s period shows President’s influence on and the effectiveness o f northern policy. As public opinion and the press became important, the degree of their acceptance in policy-making changed. The influence of Presidents Chun and Roh on northern policy through secret envoys and President Kim’s influence through official government institutions were revealed in various cases o f relations with socialist countries and North Korea. President Kim’s inconsistency in the northern policy, following changing public opinion, was well exposed through various events related with North Korea. As the President’s role in the northern policy-making changed, various actors were able to respond to and influence the northern policy. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Chapter VI. Conclusion 171 South Korea was under authoritarian rule during the presidency of Park Jung Hee (1963-1979). After Park was assassinated, Chun took power through a coup. The democratization process began during Chun’s presidency, developed through Roh’s term and was more fully established in Kim’s presidency. The electoral process also became fairer after 1987, and people accepted the results of elections. Chun (1980- 1987), who did not have legitimacy, ruled the country by using the coercive force of the police and the information agency, on the basis o f the loyalty o f the military. Chun compromised with public pressure a few times when, in 1984, he released the old politicians who had been banned from political activity, and when he abandoned the Campus Security Law in 1985. When he tried to return to a hard-line policy, announcing the maintenance o f the old constitution in April, 1997, this incurred mass demonstrations against the government, and Chun again decided to concede to public pressure as a way to maintain his influence. Roh (1988-1992) became the President by winning a direct presidential election. Although Roh made progress in democratization, people did not support Roh strongly because o f the failure of his economic policy, and social instability. He merged the government party with non-govemment conservative parties in 1990 and continued to compromise with the popular Kim Young Sam, who was the only figure who could compete with the leader o f the opposition party, Kim Dae Jung. After the presidential Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 172 candidate was selected, and public support for Roh had declined, Roh was unable to maintain his influence within the government party or in policy implementation. Kim Young Sam (1993-1997) carried out reform policies in the early part o f his term on the basis o f strong popular support. During Kim’s presidency, public support became a very important resource o f power for the President and presidential candidates. As the public support rate for him gradually declined after 1994, Kim’s influence within the ruling group was weakened, and he frequently shifted his position in making important decisions, following public opinion. After his son’s scandal was revealed with the failure o f Hanbo Steel, Inc., in 1997, and as the South Korean economy went into crisis in the later part o f his presidency, he lost almost all o f his presidential authority. This study analyzed the relationship between democratization and changing presidential power in terms o f its support base looking at three specific issues: the Real- name Financial System, presidential succession, and the northern policy. Although the three Presidents tried to execute the Real-name Financial System, Chun and Roh failed in executing reform policy due to resistance by business interest groups and the conservative politicians. After the massive fraud o f notes by Jang Young Ja, Chun announced in July, 1982, that the Real-name Financial System would be put into effect beginning in 1983. Although the Presidential Chief Secretary o f Economy and reform bureaucrats initiated this new financial system, most bureaucrats and politicians, as well Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 173 as business groups, opposed this system. Since the Chaebol and business owners provided political funds secretly even to the President, it was not easy to reform the financial system against the interests o f capital and conservative politicians. Eventually, Chun decided at the end o f 1982 to postpone the implementation o f the Real-name Financial System. Roh, as he had promised during the presidential campaign, drew up the working plan o f the Real-name Financial System and announced, in 1988, the implementation o f this system beginning in 1991. Reform bureaucrats initiated this new financial system again with the support o f the opposition parties. However, as the economy began to slow down from the end of 1989, business interest groups blamed the Real-name Financial System. After the government party merged with two opposition parties, the newly established, big conservative party preferred stability to executing financial system reform. Roh, who did not have a strong motivation to propel the new financial system, postponed the execution of the new financial system, acquiescing to the opinions o f the Chaebol and the conservatives. In contrast, Kim Young Sam ordered that the working plan o f the Real-name Financial System be prepared secretly, and executed it suddenly without giving false name account owners the chance to escape from revealing their real name. He could execute this reform policy on the basis o f strong public support. However, as the economy declined and savings rates decreased in 1995, opposition o f Chaebols and business owners to this financial system became strong. When the Korean economy entered into a crisis after the failure o f Hanbo Steel, Inc., he could not resist the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 174 opposition, and the government announced a supplementary law to the Real-name Financial System in March, 1997. After Kim lost public support at the end o f 1997, the presidential candidates o f the government and opposition parties insisted on the suspension or amendment o f this financial system, and after Kim Dae Jung was elected the next President, a new law, which permitted the concealing o f the real names and money sources, was approved in the National Assembly in December, 1997. Although Kim Young Sam was very powerful in the early part o f his presidency on the basis o f strong public support, his influence in the policy-making process in his later period, after he lost the support o f the people, was weaker than that o f the former presidents. South Korean Presidents have attempted to support a person they can trust and who has the potential to win the presidential election as the next presidential candidate o f the party, trying to maintain their influence in the next regime and to secure themselves from blame for faults committed during their own terms in office. Chun chose Roh as his successor and trained him in various positions, and supported Roh as the president o f the government party when Roh’s authority was not stable. Chun, who took the initiative in policy-making as a hard-liner, rarely compromising with public pressure for democratization, was finally forced to accept direct presidential elections, grooming Roh as the leader o f the soft-liners. Although Chun had to compromise with strong public pressure in the later part o f his presidency, he still maintained power within the government party and tried to extend his influence during the next regime. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 175 Roh, through the merger o f three parties, picked Kim Young Sam as the next presidential candidate o f the government party because he was the only popular person who could beat the opposition leader in the presidential election. This meant that public support had become an important criterion for a presidential candidate, and a source o f power in the more democratized society. Although Roh and the former DJP members preferred a parliamentary system as the next governmental system in order to maintain their influence, Kim insisted on a presidential system and achieved the presidential candidacy, using the threat o f seceding from the party. After he became the presidential candidate, Kim distinguished his policy from that o f Roh, who was not supported by the people, during his presidential election campaign, and Roh had no option but to support Kim. Kim, who had strong support in the early part o f his presidency, began to lose public support after 1994. In 1996, he recruited Lee Hoe Chang, who had a good reputation, as the Chair o f the Election Campaign Committee to increase support for the government party and to win the general election for the legislature. At that time, when the public support rate was a very important factor for a presidential candidate, the press frequently conducted polls regarding potential candidates and reported the results. After Kim lost public support due to his failure in economic policy, Lee Hoe Chang competed with other candidates and obtained the presidential candidacy in July, 1997, on the basis o f a higher public support rate than the other candidates. When the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 176 public support rate for Lee declined abruptly after he was selected as the presidential candidate, Kim did not support Lee actively, because, on the one hand, the possibility of Lee’s winning was very slight, and on the other hand, Kim him self was not powerful enough to effectively support a certain candidate. The relations with North Korea and the socialist countries have been important in terms of preventing another war on the Korean peninsula as well as having economic and political relations. As the decision-making process was democratized, more government institutions took part in the northern policy and the role of non governmental actors, and especially the influence o f public opinion, increased substantially. During C hun’s presidency, only the Blue House and the ANSP planned and executed northern policy. The effort to improve relations with the Soviet Union and China and the exchange o f secret envoys with North Korea did not yield practical results. For President Chun, when the tension of the “Cold War” was still strong, the degree o f public support was not an important factor in establishing northern policy. Although more actors took part in the northern policy in the 6th Republic, Roh normalized relations with the Soviet Union and China mainly utilizing secret envoys, Park Chul Un and Kim Jong Hui, and the ANSP. The role o f Park Chul Un’s secret contacts, followed by official contacts, was critical in the improvement of relations with North Korea. In a m ore democratized society, President Roh still maintained a decisive role in the northern policy owing to the special characteristics o f the northern policy, which needed a secret process for normalization. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 177 During Kim’s regime, various actors in the government and society took part in the northern policy-making process, and the role of the President changed from critical decision-making to coordinating the different opinions of various actors. Public opinion became very important and significantly influenced policy-making. Although Kim attempted to improve relations with North Korea early in his presidency, he did not coordinate the different opinions o f government institutions efficiently when the North Korean nuclear problem became an international issue. After he lost public support in the later part o f his presidency, his influence on the northern policy became weaker, following changes in public opinion. Kim’s failure in northern policy was due to his incapability in controlling the delicate nuclear problem and his lack o f a long-term orientation. The current South Korean President, Kim Dae Jung, has consistently maintained a “sunshine policy” toward North Korea from early in his presidency, when the public support rate for him was about 70%, to early 2000, with the support rate between 40% to 50%. Presidential power in executing the Real-name Financial System did not decline with democratization. Kim’s success in executing this system early in his presidency and the retreat in the later part of his term shows the importance of public support as a resource o f presidential influence. The change in presidential influence on selecting the next presidential candidates shows the increasing importance o f public support as a power resource o f the President and the presidential candidates. In the process o f Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 178 making northern policy, the role o f public opinion increased substantially. This research clearly shows the process o f democratization o f South Korea and the change o f Presidential influence in three important policy-making processes. During these processes, the important finding was that public support became a very important resource o f presidential power as the society became democratized. On the basis o f this result, we cannot say that the Korean presidential system has helped to concentrate power in the President, hindering the development of democracy. This research shows that democratization has progressed under the presidential system. With the progress of democratization, the President or, under a parliamentary system, the Prime Minister or other actors can have power when they are supported by the people. The presidential or parliamentary system of government is not a crucial factor in affecting democratization. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. GLOSSARY 179 ANSP The Agency for National Security Planning CPD The Conference for Political Development DJP The Democratic Justice Party DKP The Democratic Korean Party DLP The Democratic Liberty Party IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IMF International Monetary Fund KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization NCNP The National Congress for New Politics NDRP New Democratic Republican Party NKDP The New Korean Democratic Party NKP The New Korean Party NNP The New National Party NP National Party NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty PPD Party for Peace and Democracy RDP Reunification Democratic Party ULD The United Liberal Democrats Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHRONOLOGY 180 1979 Oct President Park Jung Hee assassinated. Dec Coup led by Chun Doo Hwan. 1980 Aug Chun Doo Hwan inaugurated as President o f South Korea May Democratization movement in Kwangju Nov Execution o f “Special Regulatory Law for Political Reform,” excluding 567 politicians from political activity 1981 Feb Chun Doo Hwan again inaugurated as President Mar 11th general election for the legislature 1982 May Jang Young Ja’s massive fraud of notes July The government announces that the Real-name Financial System will go into effect beginning in 1983. Dec The National Assembly approves the postponement o f the Real-name Financial System. 1983 Feb First pardon for 250 people who were banned from political activity May Chinese airliner is hijacked and landed in South Korea. May Fast by Kim Young Sam (May 18-June 9) Jun The government announces a new policy toward North Korea and socialist countries, i.e., the “northern policy.” Sep The Soviet Union shoots down a Korean Airlines flight. Oct North Korean agents kill high-ranking South Korean officials through bombing in Burma. 1984 Feb Second pardon for 202 people who were banned from political activity May Released politicians establish the Association for Driving Democratization. Nov Third pardon for 84 people who were banned from political activity Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 181 1985 Jan Released politicians establish the NKDP. Feb 12th general election for the legislature Feb Chun’s government dissolves Kookje Group. Feb Roh Tae Woo becomes the representative of the DJR Mar Pardon for Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Pil May The meetings of two Koreas’ Red Cross held at Seoul for the first time during the 5th Republic. Aug President Chun decides not to pass the Campus Security Law. Sep Dam Huh, a North Korean official, visits Seoul and meets President Chun secretly. Oct Jang Se Dong, the Director of the ANSP, visits Pyungyang and meets Kim II Sung secretly. 1986 Feb The NKDP launches the signature-collecting drive for a constitutional revision to direct presidential election. 1987 Apr The government declares it will maintain old constitution. May Kim Young Sam establishes the RDP. Jun Roh Tae Woo selected as the presidential candidate at the national convention of the DJP. Jun Roh Tae Woo’s announcement of the acceptance o f direct presidential election Nov North Korea agents explode KAL 858. Nov Kim Dae Jung establishes the PPD. Dec Presidential election 1988 Feb Roh Tae Woo inaugurated as President Apr 13th general election for the legislature Jul Roh’s government declares its northern policy to improve the relations with North Korea and socialist countries. Sep Seoul Olympics Oct The government announces that the Real-name Financial System will be executed beginning in 1991. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 182 1989 Feb Normalization of relations with Hungary Feb Kim Dae Jung, as the representative o f the PPD, visits the Soviet Union. Jun Kim Young Sam, as the representative of the RDP, visits the Soviet Union. Jun Park Chul Un visits Pyungyang and meets Kim II Sung secretly to talk about the improvement of relations. Jul Park Chul Un assigned as the M inister of State for Political Affairs. 1990 Jan Merger o f three political parties: DJP, RDP, and NDRJP Mar Kim Young Sam and Park Chul Un visit the Soviet Union. Apr The government announcs the postponement of the Real-name Financial System. Apr Park Chul Un dismissed from the Minister o f State for Political Affairs. May Kim Young Sam becomes the representative of the DLP. Jun Soviet-South Korean summit meeting in the United States Sep Normalization of relations with the Soviet Union Sep The first meeting of two Koreas’ Prime Ministers held at Seoul. Oct The Director of the ANSP, Suh Dong Kwon, visits Pyungyang to talk about summit meeting. 1991 May Roh Jae Bong resigns as Prime Minister. Sep Kim Dae Jung establishes the DP. Sep South and North Korea enter the United Nations. 1992 Jan Chung Joo Young establishes the NP. Feb “The Basic Agreement” between two Koreas approved by the National Assembly. Mar 14th general election for the legislature May Kim Young Sam selected as the presidential candidate at the national convention o f the DLP. Aug Normalization o f relations with China Aug President Roh transfers the position of president o f the party to Kim Young Sam. Sep President Roh secedes from the DLP. Dec Presidential election Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 183 1993 Feb Kim Young Sam inaugurated as President Mar Opening o f the assets o f high-ranking government officials and government party assemblymen Mar North Korea secedes from the NPT. Mar Lee In Mo repatriated to North Korea. Jun U.S.-North Korean first phase meeting about nuclear problem Jul U.S.-North Korean second phase meeting about nuclear problem Aug Execution o f the Real-name Financial System Nov Summit meeting between Presidents Kim Young Sam and Clinton Dec President Kim nominates Lee Hoe Chang as the Prime Minister. 1994 Apr Major accident - collapse o f Sungsoo bridge in Seoul Apr President Kim dismisses Lee Hoe Chang as Prime Minister. Jun North Korea announces its secession from IAEA. Jun Carter visits two Koreas to mediate summit meeting. Jul Death o f Kim II Sung. Aug U.S.-North Korean third phase meeting about nuclear problem Oct Geneva U.S.-North Korean Nuclear Pact Nov Kim’s government announces the Policy for Activating Economic Cooperation with North Korea 1995 Mar Kim Jong Pil establishes the ULD. Mar Establishment o f KEDO Apr Major accident - gas explosion in Taeku Jun Major accident - collapse o f Sampoong department store building Jun Kim’s government sends rice to North Korea. Sep Kim Dae Jung establishes the NCNP. Nov Roh Tae Woo charged with bribery and imprisoned. Dec Chun Doo Hwan charged with coup and imprisoned. 1996 Feb President Kim recruits Lee Hoe Chang into the NKP. Apr 15th general election for the legislature Sep North Korean submarine invades South Korean territory Dec Labor Law passed in the absence o f opposition parties Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 184 1997 Jan Failure o f Hanbo Steel Inc. Feb Hwang Jang Yup, a high-ranking North Korean official, takes political asylum in South Korea. Mar New Labor Law passed on the basis o f agreement with opposition parties Mar President Kim nominates Lee Hoe Chang as the representative of the NKP. Jun The CPD established within the NKP. Jul Crisis of Kia Motor Inc. Jul Lee Hoe Chang selected as presidential candidate at the national convention o f the NKP. Nov Lee In Je establishes the NNP. Nov IMF loan due to economic crisis Dec Meeting between Chung Jae Moon and Ahn Byung Soo in November revealed by the opposition party. Dec Presidential election Dec The National Assembly approves the new Law of the Real-name Financial System. 1998 Feb Kim Dae Jung inaugurated as President Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 185 BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Bachrach, P. and M. S. Baratz, Power and Poverty in Theory and Practice. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. Baek, Yong Ho. et al. Geumyungsilmveongie. (The Real-name Financial System) Seoul: Bibong Publishing Co., 1993. Barry, Brian. Power and Political Theory: Some European Perspectives. New York: John Wiley, 1976. Dahl, Robert. Modem Political Analysis. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970. _________. 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Asset Metadata

Creator Lee, Jeong-Jin (author)

Core Title South Korean presidential power during the process of democratization: Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo, and Kim Young Sam

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Biography,history, Asia, Australia and Oceania,OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, general

Language English

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-130331

Unique identifier UC11334843

Identifier 3041488.pdf (filename),usctheses-c16-130331 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 3041488-0.pdf

Dmrecord 130331

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Lee, Jeong-Jin

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA