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Banking on the commons: An institutional analysis of groundwater banking programs in California's Central Valley
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BANKING ON THE COMMONS: AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
GROUNDWATER BANKING PROGRAMS IN CALIFORNIA’S CENTRAL
VALLEY
by
Nicholas Alan Pinhey
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND
DEVELOPMENT
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
August 2003
Copyright 2003 Nicholas Alan Pinhey
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UMI Number: 3116768
Copyright 2003 by
Pinhey, Nicholas Alan
All rights reserved.
INFORMATION TO USERS
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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90089
This dissertation, written by
N ic h o la r A. P in h e y
under the direction o f his.... Dissertation
Committee, and approved by all its
members, has been presented to and
accepted by the Faculty of the School o f
Public Administration in partial fulfillment
o f requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
f .
Date k d ./S
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
Chairperson
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to extend my appreciation to my dissertation committee:
Dr. Shui Yan-Tang, Dr. Ross Clayton, and Dr. Will Price. I am also grateful
to Dr. Chet Newland for all of his encouragement throughout the years. I
would also like to acknowledge the inspiration provided by my late mother,
Dorothy Pinhey and my father Edward to pursue higher education and
particularly for how they inspired my interest in California’s development of
water resources. I am also grateful to the Natural Heritage Institute and Mr.
Gregory Thomas for providing me the opportunity to conduct research into
groundwater banking programs in California’s Central Valley. I would also
like to acknowledge Jennifer Spaletta for sharing her work on the Arvin-
Edison Water Storage Case. Finally, I never could have completed my
degree without the support and patience of my wife and children, Rene Lytle,
Sara and Nathan Lytle-Pinhey.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii
LIST OF FIGURES iii
LIST OF TABLES iv
ABSTRACT v
Chapter
1 INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 1
2 PUTTING THE RESEARCH QUESTION INTO CONTEXT:
THE THEORECTICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK 35
3 SUCCESSFUL GROUNDWATER BANKING PROGRAMS 81
4 OBSTACLES TO GROUNDWATER BANKING PROGRAMS 156
5 BANKING ON THE COMMONS: INTEGRATING WATER
RESOURCES 224
REFERENCES 277
APPENDIX 287
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LIST OF TABLES
Table
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
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11.0
12.0
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Page
Design Principles Illustrated By Long-Enduring CPR
Institutions 49
Kern Water Bank Chronology 92
KWB Cost and Benefit Allocations 99
Water and Land Uses in the AEWSD Area 148
Identified User Groups of the AEWSD Area 150
Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project
Chronology 1996-1999 172
Identified Uses for the Madera Ranch Groundwater
Bank Area (existing and potential uses) 177
Identified User Groups of the Madera Ranch
Groundwater Bank and the Madera Ranch Area 182
Eastern San Joaquin County/East Bay Municipal
Utility District Groundwater Banking Chronology 207
Identified Uses of the Eastern SJC Groundwater
Basin Area 217
Identified User Groups of the ESJPWA Area 219
Case Comparisons 226
Elements of Institutional Arrangements
Facilitating the Mix of Imported Surface-
Water and Native Groundwater 242
Institutional Arrangements Addressing
Uncertainty When Imported Surface-Water
is Introduced Into a Groundwater Basin 243
Design Principles for Long-Enduring CPR’s
and Groundwater Banks 248
iv
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Nicholas Alan Pinhey Shui Yan-Tang
ABSTRACT
BANKING ON THE COMMONS: AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
GROUNDWATER BANKING PROGRAMS IN CALIFORNIA’S CENTRAL
VALLEY
This dissertation investigates groundwater banking programs in the
Central Valley of California where imported surface-water is mixed with
native groundwater, a common-pool-resource. The research seeks to
determine how the introduction of imported surface-water into a groundwater
basin influences the institutions governing the use of the groundwater basin
in question. The dissertation also investigates the factors that influence the
completion of groundwater banking programs in California’s Central Valley.
Groundwater banking is proposed as a potential component for
addressing California’s water needs, while avoiding a “tragedy of the
commons” by sustaining groundwater resources. The Central Valley of
California is identified as offering an opportunity for groundwater banking due
to its geology and water conveyance systems.
The dissertation uses a modified version of the Institutional Analysis
and Development framework (IAD framework) to accomplish the research
and specifically address groundwater banking. The physical uncertainties of
groundwater basins, coupled with uncertainties related to California water
rights and access, are proposed as significant driving forces in the
development of institutions for groundwater banking. These uncertainties can
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be the driving forces for creating the institutional arrangements needed to
implement a groundwater banking program.
The case studies review two operating groundwater banks, the Kern
Water Bank, and the Arvin-Edison Water Storage District groundwater
banking program. The case studies also review one failed attempt to
establish a groundwater bank, the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank and the
Eastern San Joaquin Parties Water Authority Groundwater Bank #1, a
delayed attempt to implement groundwater banking.
The case studies indicate that institutional arrangements that facilitate
the mix of imported surface-water and the native groundwater in a
groundwater basin are those that reduce uncertainty by protecting the water
rights of overlying users, providing comprehensive monitoring, and providing
local control of the groundwater basin. The case studies also indicate that
the design principles for long-enduring common-pool-resource regimes also
apply to groundwater banks. Trust and the local control of groundwater
banking programs appear to be necessary precursors to a groundwater
banking program in California’s Central Valley. The findings have relevance
for policy makers seeking solutions to California’s water problems.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
“In the whole region, land as mere land is of no value. What is really
valuable is the water privilege”
John Wesley Powell
Background of the Problem
Picture a 42,000 square mile valley overlying an underground basin
capable of storing 207 million acre-feet of water. Now, imagine that this
groundwater is the only significant and reliable supply of water for the dry
valley. Add to this scenario the facts that the groundwater is not regulated by
any single state agency and that it is available to those who own land and
can access it with a well. To complete the picture, assume that the land
within the valley is very fertile and capable of supporting a variety of crops
and agricultural enterprises, but that there is no effective means of accessing
the water that is “locked up” deeply under the ground. The value of the land
is dependent on the availability of water. This was the situation in the
California’s arid Central Valley in the middle to late nineteenth century, prior
to the invention of gasoline and electric driven centrifugal well pumps.
The advent of centrifugal well pump technology in the early twentieth
century allowed access to vast groundwater resources that had been
heretofore locked in underground storage. As might be imagined, the new
pump technology created a boom for agriculture in the Central Valley. This
agricultural boom was dramatic - from less than a million irrigated acres in
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1900, irrigated land expanded to over 3 million acres during the next 40
years thanks to the ability to pump groundwater (Hundley, 1992, p. 235).
Groundwater pumping, coupled with the development of irrigation districts,
enabled California’s Central Valley region to become the largest semi-
contiguous expanse of farmland in the world by the 1920’s.
Unfortunately, the unwanted side effects of the expanding use of
groundwater in the Central Valley were just as dramatic as the agricultural
boom. A declining groundwater water table led to land subsidence, increased
pumping costs, and, by the 1920’s, to the death of native flora and fauna,
including a great number of ancient oak trees due to lowered water tables
(Hundley, 1992, p. 235). At the end of the Great Drought of the 1930’s, the
Central Valley’s groundwater resources were so badly depleted that twenty
thousand acres of land had lost their access to groundwater and had to be
taken out of agricultural production and hundreds of thousands of acres
appeared to face the same fate (Reisner, 1987, p. 336). The groundwater
table was quickly becoming dangerously low and the future of agriculture in
the area appeared to be bleak.
This dire situation was remedied by the construction of two major
public works projects that brought much needed surface-water to major
portions of the Central Valley - the Central Valley Project (CVP) and the
State Water Project (SWP). These projects enabled the importation of
impounded surface-water to the Central Valley starting in 1960 for the CVP
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and in 1968 for the SWP. Initially, the delivery of CVP surface-water
reversed the groundwater depletion. However, the introduction of surface-
water actually encouraged agricultural expansion and worsened the situation
due to the continued reliance on groundwater to expand agriculture and as a
substitute for surface-water during droughts. On the average, groundwater
levels in the Central Valley had dropped sixty feet between 1920 and 1960.
The delivery of surface-water through the CVP in 1960 allowed the
groundwater table to rise twenty feet by 1969, but this positive trend was
reversed and by 1972 groundwater levels had dropped another thirty-three
feet (Reisner, 1987, p. 341). The scenario was similar with the delivery of
SWP surface-water to the Central Valley.
Once again, water users in the Central Valley faced the problem of
groundwater depletion, better known as “overdraft”, and the attendant
problems of land subsidence and groundwater contamination. Essentially,
the situation these water users faced can be defined as a “common-pool-
resource” problem, wherein the groundwater resource has a finite yield and
is accessible to multiple users who have incentives to pump as much as
possible. Thus, the resource is exhausted, with disastrous consequences.
This situation is often described as the “Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin,
1968, pp. 1234).
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Yet, contained within the problem of groundwater overdraft there is a
potential solution. The over-pumping of groundwater can create
underground storage capacity that, when coupled with the introduction of
imported surface-water, allows for the creation of groundwater “banks”,
where the surface-water is stored underground during wet years. These
groundwater banks can be used to conjunctively manage both the surface-
water and groundwater supplies to balance water uses and prevent
overdraft. The concept of groundwater banking seems simple; however,
given the complexities of California water rights and the current systems of
water governance, successful groundwater banking programs require the
development of effective local institutions tailored to site specific needs, and
this can be a difficult process to achieve.
This dissertation examines water storage programs in selected
groundwater basins of the Central Valley of California. Specifically, the
dissertation utilizes institutional analysis to examine the elements of
successful multi-organizational conjunctive use programs that have been
developed for the purpose of storing, or banking, imported surface-water in
groundwater basins. For the purposes of this dissertation, the term
institutions will be defined as “sets of working rules that are used to
determine who is eligible to make decisions in some area, what actions are
allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures
must be followed, what information must or must not be provided, and what
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payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their action” (Ostrom,
1994, p. 4).
The dissertation pays particular attention to how these groundwater
banking programs address the mix of a common-pool-resource (native, or in
situ, groundwater) with a resource held by a proprietary right (imported
surface- water). The dissertation also focuses on the question of how
institutions develop in response to the commingling of these two types of
water resources, specifically analyzing the influence of imported surface-
water on the institutions governing the use of the groundwater basin as a
common-pool-resource.
The dissertation’s research model uses and adapts the Institutional
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework originated by researchers at the
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. The
IAD framework is based on the analytical framework adopted by the Panel on
Common Property Resource Management at the US National Research
Council and is particularly applicable to common-pool-resource case studies.
The use of the IAD framework provides a consistent framework of analysis
and allows for comparisons with other institutional research into common-
pool resources. A multiple case study approach is utilized to provide the
requisite information for the analysis.
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California is facing a potential water crisis in the coming years.
Currently, the understanding of institutional development for groundwater
banking programs is limited. This dissertation provides significant new
knowledge about the development and design of institutions in California to
manage native groundwater as a common-pool-resource (CPR) in
conjunction with the management of imported surface-water resources. This
dissertation also contributes to research into CPR’s with multiple uses. This
knowledge will be valuable for planning, public policy and development in
California.
Statement of the Problem
Throughout California’s history as a state, the issues of water supply,
water use, and water rights have been highly charged, contentious, and
conflict-laden subjects. Compounding this situation are recent reports by a
variety of organizations predicting that California is facing the possibility of a
serious water crisis in the 21s t Century (Association of California Water
Agencies 1999, California Department of Water Resources, Bulletin 160-98).
This projected water crisis is based on forecasts of continued population
growth and increasing water demands in the arid regions of California. Thus,
effective institutions for the management of California’s water resources are
a vital component for avoiding the predicted water crisis.
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Surface-water and groundwater, in many respects, have been
historically treated as physically disconnected resources by California’s water
rights and governance structures. In reality, all water resources are
interconnected, thus it is important to understand institutions developed to
conjunctively manage both surface-water and groundwater.
This dissertation will examine the development of conjunctive use
groundwater banking programs for the efficient and effective management of
water resources in the Central Valley of California. For the purposes of this
dissertation, the Central Valley area will be defined as the Sacramento River,
San Joaquin River, and Tulare Lake Hydrologic Regions (California
Department of Water Resources, Bulletin 160-1998). This area extends
approximately 450 miles from Shasta County in the north to Kern County in
the south and varies between about 40 to 60 miles wide (see figure 1,
following page). At 42,000 square miles, the Central Valley comprises more
than two-fifths of the land area of the state (Umbach, 1997, p. 1).
The focus of this dissertation will be groundwater banking programs
in the central and southern areas of the Central Valley as these are the areas
where groundwater banking has been implemented, or attempted, on a large
scale.
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California's Central Valley
Figure 1. (Umbach, 1997)
Appropriator organizations in the Central Valley with functioning
groundwater banking programs will be the units of analysis in the study.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to define the institutional arrangements
that are essential for the establishment and operation of successful
groundwater banking programs in California where native groundwater is
commingled with imported surface-water. The proposed research will
analyze and define institutional arrangements that are developed by
appropriator organizations at three levels as defined by the IAD framework
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the operational level, the collective-choice level, and the constitutional choice
level. The study will also examine and define the interrelations between the
characteristics of the user community, the physical and technological
attributes of the groundwater bank, incentives for participants, patterns of
interactions between participants, and outcomes.
For the purposes of the study, a successful groundwater banking
program is defined as a program that:
• Is operational and helping to correct or prevent the depletion of the
area groundwater resources.
• Has developed and implemented institutions to recognize and
enforce the rights of multiple surface-water rights owners in
conjunction with the rights of groundwater users.
• Has developed and implemented rules and systems for accounting
for, and managing, the commingling of the native groundwater with
banked imported surface-water.
• Has implemented effective mechanisms for settling disputes and
conflicts between groundwater bank users and between
groundwater bank users and non-participants.
The following sections will provide a brief background on groundwater
as a CPR, imported surface-water, the significance of groundwater to
California and California’s Central Valley, conjunctive use and groundwater
management, and various issues and problems related to conjunctive use
and groundwater banking. This background information will serve to frame
the core research question, provide definitions of terms, and demonstrate the
value of the study’s line of inquiry.
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Groundwater as a Common-Pool-Resource (CPR)
Briefly, a CPR can be defined as a resource that is not owned by an
individual, to which more than one individual has access, and that generates
subtractable yields. These yields are appropriated by the individuals who
have access to the resource (Blomquist, 1987, p. 23). Additionally, CPR’s
are defined as follows:
Common-pool-resources are natural or man-made resources
sufficiently large that it is costly to exclude users from obtaining
resource-units. Two criteria are used to define a CPR: (1) the cost of
achieving physical exclusion from the resource; and (2) the presence
of subtractable resource-units (Gardner, E Ostrom, and Walker, 1994,
p. 335).
Groundwater is typically found in underground basins, which can be
visualized as large underground storage reservoirs. These groundwater
basins underlie large geographic areas and can be accessed by numbers of
individuals who construct wells to extract the groundwater, thus making it
difficult to exclude users. The groundwater stored in these underground
basins produces a subtractable yield. In other words, if an individual uses
more of the groundwater, less is left for others to use. Groundwater fits the
definition of a CPR - it is a jointly accessible resource that can be
appropriated by individuals and the appropriations are rival in nature.
Indeed, groundwater basins as CPR’s have been studied quite extensively in
the context of the institutional arrangements developed to govern their use
(Ostrom, 1994, pp. xiii-xiv, Blomquist, 1992).
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Many scholars have noted the perplexing problem of the commons,
wherein economic analyses predict that when a number of users have
access to a CPR, the total number of units withdrawn from a CPR will exceed
the carrying capacity of the CPR in question (E. Ostrom, 1994). Thus, the
resource is subject to being exhausted by competing users seeking to
maximize their individual benefits. This is certainly the case with
groundwater basins - excessive pumping of a groundwater basin can
overtake the basin’s natural ability to recharge, exhausting the groundwater
supply, and possibly damaging the basin’s aquifers (geologic water storage
zones) beyond repair. There are numerous “real world” examples of the
occurrence of these groundwater/CPR problems in California. Therefore, it is
important to understand the institutional dynamics impacting groundwater
use in order to effectively manage and preserve this resource.
Imported Surface-Water
In the proposed dissertation the term “imported surface-water” will
refer to surface-water originating at a source that is not hydrologically
(naturally) connected to the groundwater basin under study. Thus, imported
surface-water is not normally available to recharge the groundwater basin
without human-made water conveyance facilities.
One must understand California’s natural water systems and water
demands to more fully appreciate the importance of imported surface-water
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in California. Simply put, the majority of California’s precipitation occurs in
the northern portion of the state, therefore, the major river systems also
occur in the northern portion of the state. Conversely, the largest water
demands in California occurs in the arid central and southern portions of the
state due to agricultural needs in the Central Valley and Southern California’s
large population centers. Thus, there is a reliance on major water
conveyance facilities, such as the Central Valley Project and the State Water
Project, to augment the existing water supplies in these areas by importing
surface-water.
Imported surface-water is frequently used in conjunction with native
groundwater (a CPR) in California’s Central Valley. In contrast to the native
groundwater, imported surface-water is usually held by a proprietary right or
contract, and is more akin to a private good than a CPR. Institutions
governing this commingling of native groundwater and imported surface-
water are of particular interest due to the somewhat unique nature of these
systems.
The Significance of Groundwater and Conjunctive Use to California
and California’s Central Valley
Groundwater is an extremely important resource for the state of
California. Currently, California relies on groundwater to supply
approximately 30 to 40 percent of its urban and agricultural water needs in
non-drought years (California Department of Water Resources, Bulletin 160-
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98, McClurg, 1996). In drought years, California’s reliance on groundwater is
estimated to increase to as much as 60 percent of the total water supply for
urban and agricultural uses (per Association of California Water Agencies,
February 1999). Population growth projections for California for the next 20
years, when coupled with projected water demands, indicate increasing
demands for groundwater use. Groundwater is a limited resource - it is
possible to exhaust groundwater supplies, reduce a groundwater basin’s
storage capacity, and contaminate a groundwater basin through overuse and
the lack of proper watershed management. Thus, the prudent management
of groundwater resources conjunctively with surface-water is essential for
meeting California’s present and future water needs.
From a regional perspective, groundwater supplies are also essential
for the continued economic viability of the Central Valley region of California.
California leads the U.S. in agricultural production and the Central Valley
provides an estimated 80 percent of California’s total agricultural production
(Department of Water Resources, Bulletin 160-98). The Central Valley
makes up about 38 percent of the state’s land area and represents nearly 80
percent of California’s irrigated acreage (California Department of Water
Resources, Bulletin 160-98). Agriculture accounts for approximately 90
percent of the groundwater usage in the Central Valley region, thus,
groundwater plays a key role in the continued vitality of California’s
agricultural economy.
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Groundwater also plays a vital role in the continued existence of the
Central Valley’s urban centers. Many cities in the Central Valley rely solely
on groundwater for their water supplies, making groundwater necessary for
their very survival. Groundwater also is a significant component of the water
supply for Central Valley cities that utilize surface-water as their major source
of supply. Groundwater provides the ability for these cities to meet peak
urban water demands, with the groundwater basin serving as a peaking
reservoir.
It can be said that the Central Valley’s current levels of urban and
agricultural development and productivity would not exist without the ability to
use groundwater. The future of both the Central Valley’s urban and
agricultural economies and the quality of life for residents of the region
depend on the continued availability and managed use of groundwater.
Exhausting a CPR - Groundwater Overdraft
Pumping more groundwater from a groundwater basin than can be
replenished is commonly referred to as “overdraft”. Overall, groundwater
resources in California are in a state of overdraft - approximately 1.5 million
more acre-feet of water per year is extracted from California’s groundwater
basins than is replaced in an average year (Association of California Water
Agencies, California Water Facts, 1999, USGS, 1995).
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Besides exhausting a water supply resource, overdraft of a
groundwater basin can lead to the land surface sinking as aquifers collapse
from over-pumping. This phenomenon, better known as land subsidence,
occurs as geologic layers of water-bearing sand and gravel (aquifers)
collapse from the weight of overlying land when an excessive amount of
groundwater is removed from these layers. Land subsidence can damage
infrastructure and hinder land use and, more importantly, permanently
reduce the capability of the groundwater aquifers to store water by
irreversibly compacting geologic strata (Water Education Foundation, 1998,
California Water Issues Briefing).
Overdraft can also lead to groundwater contamination due to the
intrusion of lower quality water, as the higher quality water is over-pumped.
Major instances of groundwater overdraft have occurred in the Central Valley
with the attendant problems of land subsidence and salt water intrusion, most
notably on the west side of the Central Valley and in San Joaquin County
respectively (Water Education Foundation, 1998). Finally, overdraft lowers
groundwater levels leading to increased energy requirements for continued
groundwater extraction.
When considering groundwater banking, it is particularly important to
make note of the overdraft problems of subsidence and groundwater
contamination for two reasons. First, subsidence can destroy the storage
capacity of the groundwater basin by compressing aquifers and thereby
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eliminating the ability to bank surface-water in the groundwater basin.
Secondly, groundwater contamination can severely constrain the ability to
bank surface-water, as the quality of the banked surface-water could be
jeopardized by the contamination.
Based on the value of groundwater resources to California and the
Central Valley and the problems associated with overdraft, it is important to
understand the factors contributing to the development of institutions that
provide for the successful co-management of groundwater resources and
surface-water resources as this will help to preserve groundwater aquifers.
Conjunctive Use, Groundwater Banking, and Groundwater Management
The operation of a groundwater basin in coordination with a surface-
water supply system, referred to as “conjunctive use”, has been
demonstrated as an effective means to manage both groundwater and
surface-water supplies (Water Education Foundation, 1998). Simply defined,
conjunctive use is a balancing process consisting of recharging a
groundwater basin with surface-water in years of above average precipitation
so that more groundwater can be pumped during dry years.
The term conjunctive use can also be applied to situations where
surface-water is used in-lieu of groundwater during wet years. The storing of
excess surface-water in underground basins, or the curtailment of
groundwater extraction through in-lieu water use, recharges the groundwater
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basin and can help to manage and control the problems of overdraft, land
subsidence, and groundwater contamination.
Groundwater banking is a specific form of conjunctive use wherein
surface-water is deposited in a groundwater basin, carefully accounted for
and withdrawn when needed. The surface-water can be imported, local, or a
combination of imported and local surface-waters. This banking can be
accomplished through “active recharge,” where surface-water is percolated
or injected into an aquifer, or through “in-lieu recharge,” where surface-water
is used instead of groundwater, thus allowing the groundwater to recharge
naturally.
Conceptually, groundwater banking is similar to depositing money in
a bank, thus the use of the term “banking.” The normal practice is to leave a
certain percentage of the banked water in the groundwater basin to maintain
water levels within the basin to correct, or prevent, overdraft conditions and
the attendant negative impacts of overdraft.
The Central Valley region is an arid, semi-desert area, dependent on
the vagaries of the weather and imported water for its water needs
(Department of Water Resources, Bulletin 160-98). Drought is a major
problem for the area, and the prolonged drought of the late 1980’s had a
significant impact on the agricultural industry and water users in the Central
Valley (California Department of Water Resources, Bulletin 160-98). The
proper management of conjunctive use systems integrates several facets of
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water resource management and can help overcome many of the problems
associated with water supply reliability in an arid area. It has been
demonstrated that conjunctive use can “increase the efficiency, reliability,
and cost-effectiveness of water use, particularly in regions with spatial or
temporal imbalances of water demands and natural supplies (Mays, 1996,
16.23).”
Conjunctive use, as practiced in Southern California, also “means
integrating imported surface-water supplies with existing groundwater
reserves through sound management (Mays, 1996,16.23).” This is also the
case in the Central Valley, especially south of the Delta, where much of the
imported surface-water is delivered via the canals of the State Water Project,
and the federal Central Valley Project. It has been stated that the more
efficient integrated use of local and imported surface-water resources
through conjunctive use programs could result in an increase in statewide
water supplies of approximately 400,000 acre-feet per year through the
storage of surface-water that is currently not being captured (California
Department of Water Resources, Bulletin 160-98). This is the real key to
managing groundwater for the prevention of depletion and its attendant
problems - augmenting groundwater supplies by storing, or banking, wet
year “excess” surface-water underground and carefully managing
subsequent extraction to balance basin storage levels. This banking
approach offers the twin advantages of providing storage for surface-water
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that might otherwise be lost and helping to prevent or correct overdraft
conditions in the groundwater basin being used as the “bank.”
Some authors maintain that the era of building major dams and
creating large-surface-water reservoirs in the western United States
effectively came to an end in 1979 with the filling of New Melones reservoir
(Reisner, 1987). A growing public environmental awareness, greater
knowledge of the effective life span of reservoirs, and a growing public
disenchantment with financing these costly projects has all but led to the
demise of major dam building projects in California. The need for water
storage, however, persists in drought-prone California and storage is
particularly important to meet growing water demands.
Conjunctive use, specifically groundwater banking, may provide a
good alternative to traditional dam and reservoir projects. California’s
groundwater basins have an estimated usable capacity of 140 million acre
feet of water, which is approximately four times the storage capacity of the
state’s existing aboveground surface-water reservoirs (Hundley, p. 417). As
an additional benefit, the underground storage of surface-water eliminates
water losses due to evaporation - a very real problem for the large
aboveground reservoirs. Thus, groundwater banking may provide a more
“environmentally friendly” means for the future storage of surface-water in
California.
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In summary, conjunctive use, and particularly groundwater banking,
appears to be an effective, efficient means for managing groundwater and
surface-water resources. These approaches appear to offer a potential
solution to part of the problem of water supply reliability in California,
particularly in the Central Valley region.
Problems and Issues Related to Groundwater Banking in California
It is easy to conceive of conjunctive use for groundwater and surface-
water management as beneficial and necessary for the efficient use and
preservation of water resources in California’s Central Valley. Conjunctive
use, and in particular groundwater banking, also appear to be sound
technical answers to the management of groundwater as a CPR; however,
conjunctive use in California has proven to be controversial for several
important reasons as clearly illustrated by a statement by Donald Evenson,
executive vice-president of Montgomery Watson (a major U.S. based water
supply consulting engineering firm):
Technically, people agree that conjunctive use (groundwater banking)
is an economical way to better manage the total water supply. The
problem has to do with institutions and, to a lesser degree, water
rights. There is a lack of trust among water agencies. It becomes an
issue of control, who’s going to decide when you store water, when
you take the water out and who’s going to drill, own and operate the
facilities (McClura. Water Education Foundation, Western Water, Fall
1996, p. 4).
The issues of trust and control are central to implementing a
successful groundwater banking program. These issues are reflected in and,
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some might argue, exacerbated by California’s legal and water rights
systems. In many respects, California’s water rights structure creates a legal
disconnection between surface-water and groundwater. Early California
water law governed surface-water through a system of riparian rights and
prior appropriations, while groundwater was governed by an “absolute
ownership” rule allowing overlying land users to withdraw as much as they
wanted (Thompson, 1996). This legal disconnection was based, in part, on
the old (faulty) concept that surface-water and groundwater were physically
separate resources. While the courts attempted to remedy this situation
during the twentieth century through legal decisions, the legal disconnection
between surface-water and groundwater remains a problem as described in
the following sections (Thompson, 1996).
For the most part, the right to groundwater use in California is
dependent on overlying land ownership and is exercised by extracting and
using the water (Littleworth and Garner, 1995). Thus, multiple numbers of
overlying land owners can access and use groundwater in common in a
given basin. Managing groundwater use is further complicated by
California’s system of appropriative, prescriptive, and correlative water rights
that provide incentives to accelerate groundwater use. This system of rights
can in effect create a “race to the pumps” by establishing adjudicated
extraction rights based on historic levels of groundwater use.
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Surface-water, on the other hand, can be imported to a groundwater
basin and stored, or “banked” in the basin. This stored water is protected
and reserved by law so that it may by recovered by the public agency storing
the water (Littleworth and Garner, 1995). Thus, conjunctive use of imported
surface-water creates a situation wherein a CPR (groundwater) is co-mingled
with the equivalent of a private good (imported surface-water). Preserving
the landowner’s rights to access groundwater, while preserving surface-water
for later extraction can be a complex undertaking. Institutions developed by
user groups to balance these rights and uses, while preserving the CPR are
an area of focus in this dissertation. One key element involves how
ownership rights can be enforced and rules structured to accommodate
groundwater banking, “where there are numerous groundwater rightholders
whose respective rights to pump from the available water supply have not
been determined (Thomas and Kiel, 2002).”
Additionally, unresolved questions regarding rights to the use of
aquifer storage capacity further complicate the picture for institutional
development - Must aquifer space be reserved for normal water level
fluctuations? Do overlying users have a priority for water storage over other
users banking imported surface-water? Can overlying entities charge for
storage capacity (Littleworth and Garner, 1995)? Are private entities able to
engage in groundwater banking operations on the same terms as public
agencies (Thompson, 1996)? How is storage capacity allocated between
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different users and/or agencies? Legal uncertainties such as these create
very real deterrents to groundwater banking (Thompson, 1996).
These types of situations can set the stage for conflict, litigation, and
the adjudication of groundwater basins. Some attorneys maintain that it is
very difficult, if not impossible, for individual groundwater users in California
to successfully coordinate their groundwater use in overdraft conditions
without resorting to litigation. This makes it important to understand how
institutions are cooperatively developed to not only coordinate groundwater
use, but also coordinate groundwater use in conjunction with banked
imported surface-waters. This understanding is critical for the efficient
integrated use of water resources in California.
In addition to potential legal and water right complications, some
authors have commented that the lack of a comprehensive statewide
management code governing groundwater use in California, and the fact that
no single, or central, state authority manages, controls, or coordinates the
development and use of groundwater on a statewide basis, makes the
development of effective conjunctive use programs and groundwater
management programs in general problematic (McClurg, 1996, Nickles,
1998, Leavenworth, 2002). Also, the diverse array of institutions and
organizations managing California’s water resources is often cited as adding
to the problem. Water resource management in the U.S. and in California is
often characterized as being “fragmented”, in the negative sense of the term
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(Deyle, 1995, Grigg, 1993). Also, there are multiple groups and sectors
competing for water from common sources, often exacerbating the issues of
trust, control, and coordination. This characterization, and the significance of
groundwater resources to California, has led to calls for the establishment of
a statewide management program for groundwater regulation and
management in California (Nickles, 1998, Leavenworth, 2002). Thus,
research into the cooperative development of groundwater management and
groundwater banking programs without establishment of a central statewide
authority is critical to our understanding of how local solutions to complex
CPR problems are crafted.
The physical characteristics of groundwater and groundwater basins
can also pose some interesting challenges to processes of organizational
collaboration and institutional development. Groundwater basins can
underlie multiple political and institutional boundaries, creating issues of
control and program participation. Uncertainty regarding the amount of
available storage capacity, sources of natural recharge, and the losses of
water in a given basin, also complicate the picture. The levels of
groundwater in an aquifer must be maintained at optimal levels to avoid
problems associated with too much or too little groundwater in a basin. Also,
it can be difficult for any one organization or user to have the technical
resources to adequately define groundwater resources and reduce the
uncertainty surrounding them. Finally, groundwater resources are limited,
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increasing the potential for conflict and competition between multiple users
(Bingham, 1997).
From a CPR standpoint, the storage and extraction elements of
conjunctive use programs add further complexities and costs to the
development of effective collective choice institutions. For example, the
storage and recharge facilities must be maintained, the storage capacity
must be defined, and the surface-water added to the basin (deposits) must
be closely monitored. Likewise water extraction (withdrawals) must be
carefully monitored, levels must be measured, and flows controlled and
accounted for. Potential water losses must be calculated, quantity
assignments made, and extraction periods and the rules governing these
activities must be carefully defined and enforced.
Despite these complex problems and issues, some water
management user groups have developed institutions to successfully
establish groundwater banking programs in California where imported
surface-water is stored with native groundwater. Interestingly, some
significant and successful groundwater banking programs have developed in
California’s Central Valley. For example, the Kern Water Bank and the
Semitropic Water Storage District’s water banking program are examples of
multi-party efforts that appear to have developed successful local collective
choice arrangements for the conjunctive use of groundwater and imported
surface-water via groundwater banking. It is also noteworthy that these
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programs appear to have developed absent litigation, groundwater basin
adjudication, or the intervention of the California court system.
Formulation of the Research Question
The definition of a CPR distinguishes between the resource system
and the flow of resource-units. A groundwater basin, with its watershed
inflows, is the resource system and the quantities of groundwater being
pumped from the basin would be defined as resource units. Individual users
of the resource units are referred to as appropriators of a CPR. Per Ostrom,
sets of appropriators can form an appropriator organization (AO) when they
share a common understanding regarding:
1. Who is a member of the AO?
2. The type of access to a CPR conveyed by membership or other
grounds for such rights.
3. How decisions are made that affect the development of
coordinated strategies for appropriating or providing for a CPR.
4. How conflicts over these patterns will be resolved.
5. Leadership roles.
6. Membership responsibilities to sustain the AO.
As mentioned in the introduction, the unit of analysis for the proposed
study will be the AO’s who have formed groundwater banks in California’s
Central Valley. For the most part, AO’s who have formed water banks are
either special districts (water districts, water storage districts or irrigation
districts) or authorities made up of public agencies (districts forming Joint
Powers Authorities).
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Several studies have detailed the development of institutions for the
governance of groundwater in Southern California. These studies have
examined groundwater basins as CPR’s and described the AO’s and
institutions that local groundwater users have developed to overcome the
danger of exhausting their common resource. In contrast to these prior
studies, this dissertation will look at the AO’s, other appropriators, and locally
developed institutions governing the use of groundwater basins to store
imported surface-water in California’s Central Valley. Therefore, the major
difference between this dissertation and prior research into California’s
groundwater institutions is the examination of the institutions developed by
functioning groundwater banking AO’s in California’s Central Valley to
address the following problems:
• Correcting the overdraft of the native groundwater (to prevent the
depletion of the CPR).
• Development and implementation of a groundwater banking
program that recognizes and enforces the rights of multiple
surface-water rights owners in conjunction with the rights of
groundwater users whose respective rights to pump from the
available water supply have not been determined (non-adjudicated
groundwater basin).
• Developing rules and systems for accounting for, and managing,
the commingling of the native groundwater (CPR) with banked
surface-water.
The foregoing discussion leads to the formulation of the following
guiding research question:
How does the introduction of imported surface-water into a
groundwater basin influence the institutions governing the use of the
groundwater basin in question?
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Specifically, this dissertation seeks to identify how groundwater
banking programs are structured in California to accommodate the needs of
the AO’s, the banking entities, and individual appropriators, while preserving
groundwater as a CPR. This is no small undertaking as there are multiple
contextual variables that can impact the establishment and outcomes of a
groundwater banking program in California.
The research question assumes that the introduction of imported
surface-water into a groundwater basin will make a difference in how
collective choice arrangements are structured as opposed to institutions
developed for basins with groundwater banking. This research further
assumes that mixing a resource held by proprietary rights with a CPR will
necessitate significant differences in how institutions are structured and how
choices are made to effect outcomes. This assumption is particularly
interesting in the situation of a groundwater basin wherein the users, or
appropriators, may lack specific knowledge of the extent of the basin, the
quantities of native groundwater available, exactly who has access to the
basin, and how much other appropriators are extracting from the basin.
What safeguards can be put in place to protect the imported surface-water,
while respecting the rights of groundwater users, and protecting groundwater
as a CPR?
In order to address the question of the significance of introducing
imported surface-water into a groundwater basin, it will be necessary to
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define and analyze institutions that were in place prior to the introduction of
imported surface-water and establishment of the groundwater bank.
Another assumption pertains to the sustainability of the groundwater
CPR. In this case, it is assumed that introduction of imported surface-water
to the groundwater basin will provide a means to correct, or prevent,
conditions of overdraft. Therefore, it is assumed that continued sustained
use of the CPR depends on the combined use of imported surface-water for
banking and replenishment of the groundwater basin. This dependency
could provide an incentive for overlying users to cooperate in providing
groundwater banking capacity to outside users.
The research question and assumptions trigger the following lines of
inquiry:
• What specific institutions are developed to facilitate the
commingling of imported surface-water with native groundwater?
• How does the current action situation differ from the situation
absent imported surface-water?
• How does the introduction of imported surface-water affect
collaboration and patterns of interaction among appropriators?
• Does imported surface-water create an effective means of
sustaining the groundwater CPR (affect the outcome)?
The research question also leads one to consider how groundwater
banking institutions are developed, how this development process is affected
by the contextual variables, and how AO’s and individual appropriators
respond. Thus, a complex model is needed to understand the relationships
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between rules, participants, the physical characteristics of the CPR, and the
outcomes of a particular groundwater banking program.
Basis for the Research Question
Several functioning groundwater banking systems that utilize imported
surface-water have been established in the Central Valley of California.
Additionally, groundwater banking programs are being proposed in several
parts of California as a solution to the need for additional water storage
required to enhance the reliability of California’s water supplies. Given the
projections for growth in California during the next twenty years and the
corresponding demands that will be placed on California’s limited water
supplies, understanding institutions for the integrated management of water
resources is critical for institutional design.
Governance of groundwater as a CPR has been studied fairly
extensively, but large-scale groundwater banking programs utilizing imported
surface-water are somewhat recent phenomena in California. Also, there is
considerable interest in facilitating groundwater banking in the Central Valley
as evidenced by recent state and federal funding for the establishment of
groundwater banking and storage programs. Thus, this dissertation research
will contribute to our understanding of the broader question of how water
resources, at the supra-watershed level, can be efficiently and effectively
managed.
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It is also important to note that groundwater banking programs have
been successfully developed in the Central Valley by several AO’s without
the presence of a statewide groundwater management program. Thus, it
would appear that collaborative efforts could lead to successful collective
choice arrangements for conjunctive use and groundwater banking at the
local and regional levels. Understanding the processes involved in these
cases may provide insight into how solutions are crafted to area and site
specific problems that do not lend themselves to a statewide management
approach.
Successful multi-organizational groundwater banking programs in
California’s Central Valley have also developed in areas of multiple overlying
users (public AO’s and private land owners). The institutions that have
developed in these areas incorporate solutions that address the issues of
non-contiguous political and physical boundaries. The institutions have also
incorporated mechanisms and operational rules to maintain, monitor use,
define periods of use, and share costs. Most importantly, these conjunctive
use programs have developed rules to manage the added complexity of
commingling imported surface-water and native groundwater and the
subsequent extraction of the banked waters. Research into the development
of these institutions would be valuable for understanding how solutions are
developed to address political and physical issues inherent in conjunctive
use and groundwater management programs.
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Conversely, there are areas within the Central Valley where the
physical, technological and geological conditions exist, in combination with
the appropriate surface-water infrastructure, for the creation of groundwater
banks; however, attempts to establish programs in these areas have failed,
despite tremendous efforts. These cases can provide additional insights into
the dynamics of institutional development related to groundwater banking.
Therefore, this dissertation also examines “failed” groundwater banking
programs in order to build a more complete picture of the issues and action
situations that may impact institutional development related to groundwater
banks.
Motivation for the Research
21s t Century California faces a potential water crisis due to the
increasing demands of growth on a limited resource (Association of
California Water Agencies, 2000). Groundwater banking is one small piece
of a solution to the larger question of how California can best make use of its
water resources to maintain the quality of life for its inhabitants, meet
environmental needs, and meet the projected demands of growth in the
state. My career as a local public works director for Central Valley cities and
as a water resources manager fueled my motivation for this research.
Twenty-five years of working with groundwater and surface-water resources,
conjunctive use, and groundwater banking led me to inquire as to how
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California could better manage its existing water supplies in the face of a
potential crisis. It is my hope that this research sheds some light on how a
piece of the problem might be solved.
Scope of the Study
The dissertation’s research seeks to understand how the introduction
of imported surface-water into a groundwater basin influences the
development of institutions governing the use of the groundwater basin in
question. In this dissertation, I will propose that the introduction of imported-
surface-water creates additional uncertainty for the overlying users of the
groundwater basin.
Uncertainty is a condition where information is lacking for the
purposes of making a decision. Uncertainty can also mean doubt or mistrust.
Uncertainty regarding the physical attributes of a groundwater basin centers
on a lack of information about what is going on underground. Banking
surface-water creates additional uncertainty centering on the control of
groundwater basin and the potential for damages to overlying users and
compounds the existing uncertainties inherent in the physical nature of
groundwater basins. Dealing with a mix of native groundwater and imported
surface-water creates uncertainties regarding monitoring, verification, and
access.
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I further propose that institutional arrangements can be developed to
provide the degree of certainty necessary for a groundwater banking
program to be successfully established, however, trust between AO’s and
overlying users is essential for developing the requisite institutional
arrangements.
Based on the foregoing, the overall research design consists of a
review of the theoretical framework and selected literature pertinent to the
study, the selection of four appropriate groundwater banking programs for
case studies (two successful groundwater banking programs, one
unsuccessful program, and one encountering resistance), the application of
the modified IAD framework to each of the groundwater banking cases,
analyses of the cases, discussion of the analyses and findings, conclusions
and suggestions for future research. The remainder of the dissertation is
organized accordingly.
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CHAPTER 2
PUTTING THE RESEARCH QUESTION INTO CONTEXT: THE
THEORECTICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYTICALFRAMEWORK
Chapter 1 attempts to make the case that groundwater banking
provides a means to solve part of the water supply problem in California by
using underground storage to increase the reliability of surface-water
supplies. Groundwater banking is also proposed as offering a solution to a
common-pool-resource (CPR) problem by preventing the depletion of
groundwater resources due to overuse or “overdraft.” As discussed in the
introduction, this dissertation focuses on groundwater banking programs
where the native groundwater is a common-pool-resource and imported
surface-water is akin to a private good. This mix of waters can be
problematic due to the nature of CPR’s and the perverse incentives created
by the system of California water rights. To better understand these issues,
a brief overview of the classification of goods, Hardin’s “tragedy of the
commons”, California water rights, and a brief review of relevant literature on
CPR’s will help to place the research question in context.
The General Classification of Goods
Goods can be generally classified according to their attributes of
subtractability and exclusion (or, conversely, the ease of accessibility).
Subtractability refers to the consumption of a good wherein one user’s
consumption leaves that much less of the good in question for other users.
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When the subtractability of a good is high, the consumption of the good by
users is said to be rival in nature. Subtractability, then, is the degree to
which an appropriator’s use of a resource diminishes the ability of other
appropriators to use the resource. Exclusion refers to the ability to create a
physical or institutional barrier to limit the use of a good. For example, the
ability fence in or package a good would create a barrier to its use (Ostrom,
Gardner, & Walker, 1994, p. 6). Excludability, simply put, is the degree of
control that can be exercised over a resource.
Figure 2 illustrates the four broad or general categories of goods.
These categories are private goods, public goods, toll or club goods, and
common-pool goods or resources.
Figure 2.0 General Classification of Goods
(from Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994, p. 7)
Difficult
Exclusion
Easy
Low
Subtractability
High
Public Goods Common-Pool
Resources
Toll Goods Private Goods
Public goods are characterized by their low subtractability and the
difficulty inherent in excluding users. Because use does not appreciably
deplete public goods and because they are openly accessible, public goods
are sometimes referred to as “free goods”, or “non-consumptive goods.”
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Examples of public goods include air, radio broadcasts, national
defense, and the often-cited service provided by lighthouses. For the most
part, users of public goods are not likely to care about others use of the
goods due to the non-consumptive nature of the goods. Additionally, all
users benefit from the maintenance of public goods.
Toll, or club goods are similar to public goods in that one user’s
consumption of the good does not significantly subtract from another user’s
enjoyment of the good. However, the use of a toll good can be limited and
controlled through fees or membership. An example of a toll good is a
national park with entrance fees.
Private goods are subtractable in nature; and it is easy to exclude
users through physical, economic, and legal mechanisms. Private goods are
the subjects of most economic analyses.
In the case of imported surface-water, one finds that aqueducts or
canals are used in California to convey it to its point of use. These
conveyance structures create physical barriers to use and provide for
monitoring the use of surface-water, making it easy to exclude and control
users. Most importantly, the majority of the imported surface-water used for
the groundwater banking operations in this dissertation is provided to users
through legally binding contracts which condition the amount used, place of
use, price for use, and the time of use. These contracts also confer the right
to use and access the surface-water and condition the conveyance of the
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surface-water. Finally, surface-water is by nature subtractable. Thus
imported-surface-water is in effect a private, or quasi-private good.
Common-pool goods, or resources are characterized as having
subtractable resource units and by being difficult to exclude users from.
Typical examples include fisheries, forests, public parks, and groundwater
basins. In the case of groundwater basins, the native groundwater is a CPR.
In groundwater basins, the consumption of units of groundwater by one user
leaves less for the other users who are pumping from the same basin. By
virtue of the physical extent and configuration of groundwater basins, it can
be very difficult to exclude and monitor overlying users of the basin.
Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons
As previously noted, the over-consumption of groundwater, beyond
the groundwater basin’s natural capacity for recharge, is referred to as
“overdraft.” The prolonged overdraft of groundwater can permanently
degrade the groundwater basin and damage the CPR, so it is important to
understand how this can occur when considering institutions designed to
preserve groundwater resources. On the other hand, moderate overuse of a
groundwater basin can create capacity for groundwater banking, providing
the overuse does not damage the aquifer through land subsidence or water
quality degradation.
Garrett Hardin’s famous "tragedy of the commons" (1968) provides a
useful means to visualize how CPR problems can arise due to subtractability,
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open-access, and overuse. This helps to explain in part how a groundwater
basin can be subjected to overdraft by basin users.
In his 1968 article on the population problem, Hardin uses the image
of a pasture "open to all” where shepherds graze animals on a common
ground. The shepherds are self-interested "rational actors,” motivated to add
to their flocks to increase their individual wealth. Each time a shepherd adds
an animal to his herd, he reaps all of the benefits. However, each animal
that is added will deplete the commons by a small amount. The depletion
caused by each additional animal is small in comparison to the increase in
wealth for each shepherd and all the shepherds share the costs equally.
This creates a system that “compels” each shepherd to increase his herd
without limit ultimately depleting the commons to the point of destruction -
thus the “tragedy of the commons.”
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels
him to increase his herd without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin
is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all (Hardin, 1968).
Hardin also maintains that those who have a conscience and restrain
their use of the commons will lose out economically in comparison to those
who pursue unrestrained use. This reinforces the incentive to practice
unrestrained use of the commons.
It is important to note that Hardin’s scenario of the “tragedy of the
commons” assumes an unrestrained open-access situation where property
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rights are poorly defined. Indeed, a tragedy can be the outcome where there
is a combination of unrestrained open-access, subtractability, and the ability
to overuse a CPR. The analogy between the pasture and the groundwater
basin is direct - users simply install wells to access the groundwater, and
they can increase their pumping incrementally to meet increasing demands
for water (for agricultural, municipal or industrial needs). The increased
pumping exceeds the natural recharge capacity and eventually leads to
overdraft. Indeed, there are examples in California of groundwater basins
that are experiencing overdraft and degradation as a consequence of
subtractability, ease of access, and the ability to overuse groundwater. The
Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Basin is an example of this situation
(California Department of Water Resources, Bulletin 160-98).
There are additional factors in California that can contribute to the
ability to overuse groundwater. The California water rights system needs to
be briefly considered as it facilitates access to groundwater and presents, in
some cases, an incentive to overuse groundwater, thereby making it difficult
to exclude users and reinforcing the subtractability of the CPR.
California Groundwater Rights and the Tragedy of the Commons
Chapter 1 touched briefly on the system of California water rights and
how it could create a situation leading to the exhaustion of groundwater
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resources. This section provides some additional detail on the relationship of
California’s water rights to potential “tragedies” of the groundwater commons.
Article XIV of the California Constitution of 1879 denies the ownership
of bodies of water to individuals - water is the property of the people. In
California, water rights refer to a user’s right to use water, not the right to own
water - it is a “usufructuary” right. The right to use groundwater in California
can be broadly categorized as overlying, appropriative. or prescriptive.
These categories of rights are defined as follows (from Eastern Municipal
Water District, 2002):
Overlying Rights - All landowners above a common aquifer possess a
mutual right to the reasonable and beneficial use of a groundwater
resource on land overlying the aquifer from which the water is taken.
Overlying rights are correlative (related to each other) and overlying
users of a common water source must share the resource on a pro
rata basis in times of shortage. A proper overlying use of groundwater
takes precedence over all non-overlying uses.
Appropriative Rights - Groundwater that is surplus to the reasonable
needs of overlying users may be appropriated, or diverted for use at a
specific location. Non-overlying uses and public uses, such as
municipal uses, are called appropriative uses. Among groundwater
appropriators the "first in time, first in right" priority system applies.
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Appropriative users are entitled to use the surplus groundwater
available only after the overlying user’s rights are satisfied.
Prescriptive Rights - Prescriptive rights are gained by trespass or an
unauthorized taking that it is allowed to continue longer than the five-
year statute of limitations. Prescriptive rights can only be obtained
against private entities. Claim of a prescriptive water right to non
surplus water by an appropriator must be supported by many specific
conditions which include a showing that the pumping was actual, open
and notorious, hostile, adverse to the overlying user, continuous and
uninterrupted for five years, and under a claim of right.
It is important to note that the right to pump groundwater in California
can be limited by court adjudications. It should also be noted that the
California Supreme Court has established the doctrine of “mutual
prescription” whereby groundwater rights to a quantity of groundwater are
based on the highest continuous amount of pumping during the five years
following the commencement of the overdraft of a groundwater basin.
Unfortunately, the doctrine of mutual prescription, wherein groundwater users
acquire prescriptive groundwater rights against each other, can result in a
“race to the pump house” to maximize each users right to pump (Littleworth
and Garner, 1995, pg, 54). Mutual prescription provides a powerful
incentive to maintain high groundwater consumption levels to prevent the
loss of groundwater rights to other users, even when the CPR is jeopardized.
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In general, the system of overlying rights and appropriative rights
combined with the doctrine of mutual prescription provide both access to the
groundwater CPR and an incentive to overuse the CPR. In cases where the
groundwater basin has not been adjudicated, the overlying rights,
appropriative rights, and prescriptive rights facilitate access, while mutual
prescription can create an incentive for an artificial overuse of the resource
prior to adjudication.
The Legal Disconnection Between Groundwater and Surface-Water in
California
Surface-water naturally recharges groundwater basins through
percolation and seepage. Therefore, it stands to reason that managing the
introduction of additional surface-water into a groundwater basin through
conjunctive use is one means to avoid problems due to overuse (through
supply-side measures). Another means for managing a groundwater basin
is through the control of groundwater extraction, or production (by demand-
side measures).
While groundwater and surface-water are connected physically in the
environment, groundwater and surface-water rights are somewhat legally
disconnected in California. Historically, California has had two separate
systems of water rights and rules for groundwater and surface-water. To
further complicate the picture, unlike surface-water, there is no statewide
permitting system for the regulation of groundwater in California (Littleworth
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and Garner, 1995, p. 47). For the most part, overlying landowners can
simply drill a well and begin to extract groundwater. On the other hand, the
State Water Resources Control Board regulates most surface-water use.
This has led some policy makers to conclude that surface-water and
groundwater are inadequately coordinated from a legal perspective
(Thompson, 1996).
The distinctions and definitions of the physical connections between
groundwater and surface-water can be problematic in California. Conflicts
between surface-water and groundwater use may be settled by the State
Water Resources Control Board, or not, depending on whether the
groundwater is defined as a “subterranean stream” flowing through known
channels (and thus is a form of surface-water which the Board has
jurisdiction over) or “percolating waters” (which the Board has no jurisdiction
over). To further complicate matters, the interpretations of subterranean
stream and percolating waters can be ambiguous and subject to challenge,
blurring the jurisdictional question.
In short, there is no central authority overseeing groundwater use in
California and coordinating it with surface-water use. As a result, some
policy makers think that groundwater is not being managed properly in most
places in California and that local groundwater management is not the ideal
given the physical interconnectedness of groundwater and surface-water
(Kidman, 2002).
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Groundwater Banking - Legislation, Judicial Decisions and Uncertainty
Regarding groundwater banking in California, existing legislation and
judicial decisions tend to support the underground storage of surface-water.
In fact, it is the State’s adopted policy to encourage this type of storage
(California Water Code § 1011.5) and imported water may be stored in
underground basins (City of Los Angeles v. San Fernando, pp. 251-259).
Title to imported water may be retained even when it is commingled with
native groundwater (Littleworth and Garner, 1995, p. 51). Also, public
entities are entitled to store water in aquifers within their own geographic
jurisdiction and enjoy the exclusive right to recapture the stored water
(Thompson, 1996).
Since there is no existing state permit system for underground storage
of water, legal issues regarding storage are dealt with by the courts on a
case-by-case basis. Legal uncertainty can be a deterrent to groundwater
banking even with supportive legislation and supportive judicial decisions.
For example, opportunities to store water underground in California are
hindered by uncertainties concerning the rights to banked groundwater
(Thompson, 1996). Questions remain; for example: Must space be reserved
for the normal water level fluctuations during wet or dry cycles? What
happens if the imported surface-water degrades the quality of the native
groundwater? How is storage capacity to be divided between different
entities who store imported water in the same aquifer? Do overlying entities
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have priority over storage and use of water for outside entities if storage
capacity is limited? Must a governmental entity storing water pay
compensation to overlying landowners? Can local agencies regulate the use
of aquifer storage capacity? How should a banking entity address potential
storage impacts to overlying users? All of these questions are important
when considering the development of institutions for groundwater banking.
Despite the legal uncertainties and lack of comprehensive statewide
oversight, groundwater banking programs are successfully implemented in
California. As pointed out by Barton Thompson (1996), local regulation and
contractual agreements can provide storage projects with the requisite
certainty and structure needed for successful implementation. This fact is
important for this dissertation as its focal point is locally developed
institutional arrangements for groundwater banking.
Two Prescriptions for Preventing the Tragedy
It appears that the combination of the CPR attributes of groundwater
and the water rights system in California are the precursors to a “tragedy of
the commons” for many groundwater basins in the state. What can be done
to remedy this situation? Hardin’s prescription for avoiding the “tragedy of
the commons” is restraint through “mutually agreed upon” coercion. This is
interpreted in many cases as the centralized authoritarian control of a
resource by a government agency, implying that local governments and
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nongovernmental organizations cannot develop effective ways to prevent or
remedy situations that lead to tragedy. In California, this often takes the form
of recommendations for state intervention to impose controls on consumption
and access to groundwater (Edmondson, 2003). Another possible solution
that is often proposed is the privatization of the CPR, where the CPR is
essentially made private property.
However, both the centralized and privatization approaches are not
guaranteed to prevent a tragedy for a CPR. Centralization risks large-scale
allocation errors and may be resisted by users at the local level. Centralized
authority also tends to impose uniform rules, rather than site-specific rules, to
manage CPRs and the “one size fits all” solution may not be appropriate to
each local situation. Privatization also requires outside intervention and the
“force of law to defend the rights of private enterprises to manage the
commons as they see fit. (De Young, 1999).” Finally, privatization does not
always ensure sustainability for a CPR due to the temptation to
“exhaustively” harvest a resource for profit (De Young, 1999).
The bureaucratic and privatization approaches are not the only
approaches to addressing the tragedy of the commons. There is a wealth of
literature on the governance of CPR’s that clearly demonstrates that these
two approaches are not the only solutions to the problem.
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Relevant CPR Literature
Extensive research into CPR’s demonstrates that the end users of the
CPR can develop highly successful institutions for collective action without
external intervention. These studies show that mutually agreed upon
coercion and privatization are not the only means of preventing the tragedy
of the commons. In fact, they demonstrate that local governments and
informal or non-governmental groups can develop effective institutions for
governing groundwater use.
Elinor Ostrom, in Governing the Commons (1994), presents analyses
of long-enduring, self-organized, and self-governing CPRs that demonstrate
that the users of a CPR can successfully develop long standing institutions to
collectively govern and manage the CPR. Her cases address a variety of
CPRs, including fisheries, irrigation systems, grazing systems, forestry
systems, and groundwater basins.
There are four key observations presented in Ostrom’s book related to
the case studies of long-enduring, self-governing CPRs. Firstly, unlike the
predictions in Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, the prisoner’s dilemma
game, and Mancur Olson’s logic of collective action, CPR users can and will
cooperate to achieve collective benefits under certain conditions. Secondly,
the resource systems do not become private property and direct regulation
by a central authority is not present (Ostrom, 1994, p. 182). Thirdly, Ostrom
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finds that there is a set of essential conditions or design principles that
contribute to the success and endurance of institutions developed by users.
These design principles are illustrated in Table 1.0 on the following page.
Table 1.0 Design Principles Illustrated by Long-Enduring CPR Institutions
1. Clearly defined boundaries - Individuals or households who have rights to
withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must
the boundaries of the CPR itself.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local
conditions - Rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of
resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules
requiring labor, materials, and/or money.
2. Collective-choice arrangements - Most individuals affected by the
operational rules can participate in modifying these operational rules.
3. Monitoring - Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator
behaviors, are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
5. Graduated sanctions - Appropriators who violate operational rules are
likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness
and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable
to these appropriators, or by both.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms - Appropriators and their officials have
rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among
appropriators or between appropriators and officials
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize - The rights of appropriators to
devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental
authorities.
For CPRs that are part of larger systems:
8. Nested enterprises - Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement,
conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple
layers of nested enterprises.
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One would expect to find elements of Ostrom’s institutional design
principles present in groundwater banking institutions due to the presence of
the groundwater CPR.
Fourthly, Ostrom emphasizes the importance of using frameworks as
an important part of policy analysis. Frameworks, per Ostrom, indicate the
key sets of variables and the relationships among variables that need to be
examined when conducting any theoretical or empirical study of a particular
type of phenomenon (Ostrom, 1994, p.192). Frameworks are tools to derive
the questions needed in order to clarify the structure of a situation and the
incentives facing individuals. A framework can also identify sets of variables
that are most likely to affect decisions about continuing or changing rules
(Ostrom, 1994, p. 192).
Following Ostrom’s recommendation for the use of frameworks, this
dissertation makes use of the Institutional Analysis and Development
framework (described in detail in subsequent sections). The Institutional
Analysis and Development framework is useful for identifying design
principles for sustainable CPR resource management, so this framework will
identify the presence, or absence, in the case studies of Ostrom’s design
principles for long enduring CPR institutions.
In Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern California
(1992), William Blomquist provides an institutional analysis of the evolution of
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self- governance for eight groundwater basins in southern California (one of
the seven cases is an unsuccessful attempt at establishing a basin
governance system). As with Ostrom’s cases, Blomquist finds that efficient
controlled use of a CPR can be established without a central, or statewide,
authority overseeing the CPR. Significantly, Blomquist finds that there is no
one “formula” for developing successful governance structures for
groundwater basins as opposed to a bureaucratic “standardized” approach.
Rather, institution development is an evolutionary process of deliberate
choice within constraints, following the normal course of economic and
political life (Blomquist, 1992, p. 331). In some cases, groundwater users
adapt existing arrangements to their needs, and/or develop new
arrangements to fit specific needs. In other cases, water users craft new
types of governmental and non-governmental organizations, such as water
associations, to facilitate governance.
Blomquist utilizes Kiser and Ostrom’s concept of “levels of action”, to
describe the institutional arrangements wherein individuals operate
collectively. These levels are identified as the operational level, the collective
choice level, and the constitutional level (Blomquist, 1992, p. 334). The
levels of action are essentially defined by the decision- making arrangements
(rules) at each level that facilitate cooperation. For example, the actions that
take place at the operational level for groundwater basin operations
encompass activities such as monitoring, enforcement, and production.
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Actions at the collective choice level involve management and making
collective decisions about the operational rules. Governance and the
development of collective choice rules take place at the constitutional level.
These levels of action are an important part of the Institutional
Analysis and Development Framework as they allow the researcher to clearly
understand the development of institutional arrangements as a deliberate
process. The levels of action recognize that rules for coordinating behavior
are nested within rules that specify how those rules may be changed. Thus,
they tie back to Ostom’s observations of collective choice arrangements and
are an essential part of the framework used in this dissertation.
Ronald Oakerson, in Analyzing the Commons: A Framework (Bromley
et al., 1992, pp. 41-59), presents the basic Institutional Analysis and
Development Framework that serves as the basis for addressing this
dissertation’s research question. Oakerson’s framework is essentially a
“bare-bones representation of the commons in its essentials” and it identifies
the four sets of attributes that can be used to describe a commons. This
framework and the attributes apply to groundwater banking due to the
groundwater basin being a CPR. These attributes and the framework are
presented in more detail in the section of this chapter devoted to the
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework.
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Elinor Ostrom, in the article entitled “A Behavioral Approach to the
Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American
Political Science Association (1997), discusses the central roles of
communication and trust in solving social dilemmas. Ostrom identifies three
core relationships that are essential for cooperation between individuals
seeking to solve a social dilemma. These core relationships are reciprocity,
reputation, and trust. Trust, reciprocity, and reputation feed one another to
increase levels of cooperation. Of the three, trust is the necessary ingredient
for mutually productive interactions. A person’s rational actions are governed
by expectations of how others will behave and trust is the “specific
expectation that another’s actions will be beneficial rather than detrimental”
(Kramer and Tyler, 1996, p. 17).
Ostrom points out that communication, especially repeated face-to-
face communication, is essential for establishing trust in the reliability of
others. This follows the theory that cooperation among groups and
individuals is substantially increased by sustained contact, regular
communication, and constant monitoring by peers to ensure reciprocity
(Kramer and Tyler, 1996, p. 63). Thus, Ostrom points out that we can expect
many groups to fail to achieve mutually productive benefits due to their lack
of trust in each other, or to the lack of arenas for communication, institutional
innovation, and the creation of monitoring and sanctioning rules (Ostrom,
1997, p. 16).
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The groundwater basins in this dissertation are faced with the problem
of exhaustion via overdraft, thus the social dilemma involves developing
institutions that prevent this problem while allowing the uses of the basin to
continue. Trust is assumed to be essential for successfully developing these
institutions. Indeed, the issue of trust is multifaceted and seems to be the
key to a successful groundwater banking program as pointed out by
McClurg: “Some issues may prove more difficult to resolve than others.
Perhaps the biggest challenge - although a somewhat intangible issue - is
the question of trust. Trust in the technical information regarding an asset
that is highly valued, but hidden. Trust in the idea that water artificially
recharged in a groundwater basin will not contaminate the native water.
Trust in that the groundwater overlying users have relied on for years will be
there - even as others extract the new water (Western Water, July/August
2001, pg. 3).
Finally, Yan Tang, in Institutions and Collective Action: Self-
Governance in Irrigation (1992), presents analyses of local, self-governing
organizations and irrigation development. Two aspects of Tang’s study are
closely related to this dissertation: the cases in both studies involve irrigation
and farming communities and the Institutional Analysis and Development
Framework is applied to identify the key attributes impacting collective action.
Tang’s study makes several points that are important to this
dissertation’s research. First, institutional arrangements are conceptualized
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as rules that structure repetitive interdependent relationships among
individuals and create stability of expectations. Second, uncertainty is a
major obstacle to cooperation; therefore, institutional arrangements that help
reduce uncertainty help motivate individuals to develop long-term
commitments to cooperate. Third, individuals will support institutional
change if they believe the benefits to them of the new arrangements
outweigh their potential costs. Fourth, just as it is incorrect to assume that
bureaucratic governance can solve all collective action problems, one cannot
assume that individuals at the local level can solve all the collective actions
they face without drawing on external resources (Tang, 1992, p. 125). Thus,
multiple collective choice entities, often related to each other hierarchically
(nested), are needed to solve collective choice problems of varying scopes.
For example, bureaucratic agencies play an important role in governing
water production and distribution facilities while farmer’s organizations may
develop and enforce rules governing maintenance and allocation (operational
rules).
Significantly, Tang’s study points out that most collective action
activities occur in situations where water is barely sufficient, or moderately
scarce, and farmers believe that collective action can secure a more reliable
water supply (Tang, 1992, p. 22).
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Putting the Research Question into Context - Assumptions
This dissertation’s research question seeks to determine how the
introduction of imported surface-water into a groundwater basin influences
the institutions governing the use of the groundwater basin in question. The
introduction of imported surface-water into a groundwater basin for
groundwater banking can help to manage and preserve the CPR. However,
while there is legislative and judicial support for groundwater banking,
uncertainties remain regarding the rights to banked water and storage. The
introduction of imported-surface-water into the groundwater basin is
assumed to compound existing uncertainties and create new uncertainty.
Trust and control of the groundwater basin are expected to be major issues
for any groundwater banking operation involving multiple users. For the
purposes of this dissertation, it is assumed that these uncertainties and
issues can hinder opportunities to establish groundwater banks.
Based on CPR research, it is also assumed that local users can
develop institutional arrangements for collective choice that structure
repetitive interdependent relationships between AO’s. These arrangements
are assumed to create stability of expectations and help reduce uncertainty
when banking imported surface-water. Further, it is assumed that the
institutional arrangements will vary depending on the situation and the needs
of the users.
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Trust between the AO’s and the overlying users is assumed to be
necessary to facilitate the successful development of the institutional
arrangements. The presence of an effective communication forum for the
AO’s and other users is assumed in situations where one finds successful
multi-user groundwater banking programs.
It is also assumed that the development of a groundwater bank and the
requisite collective choice arrangements will be supported if the benefits of
the new arrangements to the users outweigh the potential costs.
In terms of the institutions, it is assumed that the institutional
arrangements for collective action for a successful multi-user groundwater
bank, where imported-surface-water is being stored, should be expected to:
1) Be similar to institutional arrangements for governing
groundwater basins where imported surface-water is not
banked (i.e. one should find the elements of Ostrom’s design
principles for long-enduring CPR’s). This is assumed to be the
case due to the presence of the native groundwater CPR.
2) Incorporate specific rules for addressing the uncertainties
identified as issues for groundwater banking in California.
3) Incorporate rules that address control and trust issues.
4) Be nested, or concentric.
Do the institutional arrangements developed for groundwater banking
address the uncertainties inherent in the mix of imported surface-water and
native groundwater? To ascertain this, it is necessary to look at the cases
with a common framework for evaluation and comparison.
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Framework for Institutional Analysis and Development (the IAD
framework)
This dissertation’s research seeks to analyze the institutional
arrangements, or the set of rights and rules, used by AO’s to organize the
governance and management of groundwater banking programs where
imported surface-water is introduced into the groundwater basin. The
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework originated by
researchers at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at
Indiana University provides the basic theoretical framework for the research.
The IAD framework was adopted by the panel on Common Property
Resource Management organized by the Board on Science and Technology
for International Development (BOSTID) at the National Research Council in
1985 (Oakerson, 1992). For the purposes of this dissertation, the IAD
framework is modified to account for the variables, attributes, and
interactions inherent in a multiple-use groundwater CPR. A brief review of
the IAD framework is necessary before discussing these modifications.
The IAD framework is based on the original framework developed by
Ronald J. Oakerson for analyzing CPR’s (Oakerson, 1992). Oakerson’s
framework is simple, general, and provides the researcher with four sets of
variables, or attributes, used to define and analyze a CPR. These variables
are: 1) the physical characteristics of the CPR and technological solutions to
the resource constraints; 2) the decision-making arrangements governing the
use of the CPR; 3) the patterns of interaction between users, and; 4)
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outcomes and consequences. Each set of variables is described briefly in
the following paragraphs. Figure 3.0 illustrates Oakerson’s basic analytical
framework.
Figure 3.0 A Framework for Analyzing the Commons
c
Physical Attributes and
Technology
Patterns of
Interaction
Outcomes
Decision-Making
Arrangements
Source: Oakerson
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Per Oakerson, the category of physical and technological attributes of
a specific resource is formulated from three considerations: 1) the capacity of
the resource to support multiple users at the same time without one
interfering with another or diminishing the yield available to the group of
users; 2) the degree to which the CPR permits the exclusion of individual
users (limiting access); 3) the physical boundaries of the CPR, which
determine the scale for coordination (Oakerson, 1992, p. 43).
Decision-making arrangements (organization and rules) that govern
relationships between users and relevant others are defined by authority
relationships specifying who decides what in relationship to whom
(Oakerson, 1992). Decision-making arrangements are divided into the
following three levels: 1) “operational arrangements” that limit day-to-day
CPR user behavior (interactions of users) in the interest of preserving the
CPR. Rules at this level may include access rules, withdrawal rules,
allocation rules, penalty rules, and input rules. Operational arrangements are
derived from the collective choice level; 2) “collective-choice arrangements”
are rules that allow a group of appropriators to coordinate their actions to
manage the CPR. These arrangements include enforcement rules and rules
for determining alternative operational arrangements. Rules at the collective
choice level are derived from the constitutional arrangements level: 3)
“constitutional” arrangements, which are decision-making arrangements,
external or internal (or both), to the community of users. Constitutional
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arrangements are rules for determining who is eligible to participate in the
system and they establish the process and rules by which collective-choice
rules are created, enforced and modified.
Given the set of physical and technological attributes attached to a
particular CPR and the decision-making arrangements that are in place,
individual users will make choices from different strategies regarding the
CPR and each other. From these choices, patterns of interaction among
users will develop.
Finally, physical outcomes or consequences are the results of the
interactions between users. These outcomes of collective action can be
evaluated using the criteria of efficiency and effectiveness related to the use
of the CPR.
As illustrated in Figure 3, the lines between the attributes depict the
relationships between the four attributes of a commons. Per Oakerson,
“Both physical and technological attributes of the commons and the decision
making arrangements affect patterns of interaction which combine with
physical and technological attributes to produce outcomes.” (Oakerson,
1992, p. 52). The decision-making arrangements, or institutions, are “soft
constraints” as they have no effect on outcomes independent of human
choice and interaction (Oakerson, 1992, p. 52). Conversely, the physical and
technological attributes are “hard constraints” and can impact outcomes
independent of human choice. Thus, lines a and b are weak causal
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connections and lines c and d represent stronger relationships. Dashed line
e represents the “noncausal association” between the decision making
arrangements and the physical/technological attributes of a CPR (Oakerson,
1992, p. 55). A mismatch between these two attributes can lead to perverse
incentives that generate undesirable outcomes.
The rationale for using the IAD framework as the basis for the study’s
model is fivefold: First, the IAD framework is designed to collect information
about CPR’s and “is specific enough to offer guidance in the field, yet general
enough to permit application to widely variable situations.” (Oakerson, 1992,
p. 42) Thus, the framework can be applied to a variety of cases which
facilitates the proposed multiple case study approach.
Secondly, the IAD framework is useful because it distinguishes and
captures the four essential attributes, or variables, that can be used to fully
describe a commons and its users (in this case, a groundwater basin and its
AO). The framework provides a convenient means to array the variables into
meaningful sets allowing the researcher to examine the relevant relationships
for a particular case and determine “what is going on.” (Oakerson, 1992, p.
57). Since the study seeks to determine the effects of imported surface-
water on the institutions required to facilitate the establishment of
groundwater banking programs in California, the IAD framework will serve to
not only identify the target institutions, but also to identify the
interrelationships between the physical environment, the appropriators, and
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the outcomes of particular collective choice strategies related to those
institutions, thereby providing richer case analyses.
Thirdly, the IAD framework allows for a consistent way to compare
separate case studies. It provides a logical and convenient way to analyze
CPR’s, observe regularities across cases, and integrate study findings into a
larger body of work to build knowledge.
Fourthly, the IAD framework is a flexible analytic tool. It can be used
as descriptive tool, a diagnostic tool, and to address questions of institutional
design. By working backward through the framework, one can diagnose
problematic conditions. By working forward through the framework, one can
consider how modifications to institutions and patterns of action can affect
outcomes. This allows for institutional design analysis - a key element of the
proposed research effort. In terms of model flexibility, the IAD framework
lends itself to modification and adjustment based on experience.
Finally, the IAD framework allows the researcher to easily identify and
separate the rights and rules (institutions) from the strategy of the
participants. The IAD framework also illustrates how institutional
arrangements can impact user behavior and incentives to coordinate,
cooperate and contribute in the formulation, implementation and enforcement
of groundwater banking management regimes.
Based on the foregoing, the IAD framework offers the appropriate
analytical framework for addressing groundwater as a CPR; however, the
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basic framework as developed by Oakerson should be modified to more
thoroughly address groundwater banking programs and the introduction of
imported surface-water into a groundwater basin as discussed in the
following section.
Adapting the Framework - Modifications to the IAD Framework
As previously noted, the IAD framework can be modified or adjusted
based on experience. As pointed out by Edwards and Steins in their work on
multiple-use commons, much of the research into CPR’s tends to focus on
single-use commons, where the resource system is used for the extraction of
single resource-units. However, research into CPR's illustrates that the
persistence of CPR’s with multiple uses and multiple management structures
will become increasingly relevant (Edwards and Steins, 1998). Thus, an IAD
framework that accounts for multiple-use common-pools is needed to more
fully address groundwater basins being used for the extraction of native
groundwater and for the storage of imported surface-waters.
Per Edwards and Steins, the basic analytic framework developed by
Oakerson is too limited in scope for effectively analyzing multiple-use CPR’s.
These researchers propose several changes to the basic IAD framework to
address the additional complexities found in the multiple-use CPR situation.
The multiple uses create the need to analyze the physical and technological
characteristics as they relate to the different uses. Also, the framework
needs to incorporate rule categories at a different level of analysis to account
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for the multiple uses and users. Decision-making arrangements must be
analyzed to account for different uses of the CPR.
Figure 4.0 (following page) illustrates Edwards and Steins’s
refinements to the basic IAD framework for the purpose of analyzing multiple-
use commons. Edwards and Steins follow other scholars, notably Tang
(1992) and Singh (1994), by broadening the IAD framework to include the
“characteristics of the community of users” which includes not only CPR
users, but others who may affect, or be affected by the management of the
multiple-use CPR. Successful negotiation to coordinate the development of
institutions depends to a large degree on the responses of individual actors
within the user community, making them an important element of analysis.
Edwards and Steins’ framework and definition of the user community
recognize the presence and importance of other stakeholders who have an
influence over, or are influenced by the institutional arrangements of the CPR
either directly or indirectly (Edwards and Steins, 1998).
Edwards and Steins also add the category of “contextual factors” to
the framework. Contextual factors, as defined by Edwards and Steins,
consist of dynamic forces based remotely from the resource management
regime and are usually beyond the control of the user community. For
example, water rights decisions, drought year reductions in water allocations
by state and federal agencies, new water quality regulations, the ability to
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fund infrastructure, and new legislation pertaining to water use are examples
of contextual factors that can impact groundwater banks.
Figure 4.0 A Framework for Analyzing Muitiple-Use Commons
Contextual Factors
Physical Technological
Characteristics - the
potential market for
goods and services
Use Use Use Use Use
Decision-Making Rules
>ction Strategies
of Individuals
Patterns of
Interaction
Outcomes
Constitutional
Collective-Choice
Operational
Characteristics of the
User Community
Source: Edwards and Steins
User
Group
User
Group
User
Group
User
Group
User
Group
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The multiple-use commons framework, as developed by Edwards and
Steins, is applicable to the proposed research in several respects. First, and
foremost, the groundwater banking programs to be studied in this
dissertation are multiple-use commons with multiple users, albeit more
limited in scope than the examples given by Edwards and Steins. In the case
of groundwater banks, the banks function as normal groundwater CPR
systems for overlying users and appropriative users who have historically
relied on the aquifer to provide native groundwater for their use. These
historic users can range from individual property owners, to public agencies
and private conglomerates who continue to utilize the groundwater basin as
in the past. Groundwater banking, however, adds multiple users from
outside of the physical and political boundaries of the groundwater basin.
Thus, inclusion of the attributes of multiple communities of users becomes
essential to the analysis of groundwater banking.
Secondly, multiple uses for the stored and extracted waters exist in
the groundwater banking situation. The waters are used to support
municipal, agricultural, and environmental needs in the area of the
groundwater basin and, most importantly, these uses outside of the basin.
Broadening the scope of uses to those outside of the basin’s boundaries,
sometimes across regions, increases the size of the user community and the
institutional complexities. Edwards and Steins’ model accounts for and
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allows for not only the analysis of multiple user groups, but also multiple
markets or uses, making it particularly valuable for analyzing groundwater
banks.
Finally, groundwater banking programs in California are impacted by a
variety of contextual factors as mentioned earlier. The multiple-use
commons framework allows the researcher to account for these factors when
studying the programs in question.
The multiple-use commons framework would work well for this
dissertation, however, some minor modifications are called for in order to
appropriately utilize Edwards and Steins’ adaptation of the IAD framework.
One proposed modification to Edwards and Steins’ framework, specific to
this dissertation, is inclusion of attributes of the groundwater CPR and the
surface-water systems.
Most importantly, it is necessary to account for the fact that there are
two or more systems present with different physical and technological
attributes - the groundwater basin and the imported surface-water systems.
The groundwater basin may or may not have capacity for storage; it may
have areas of contamination, leakage, or limits to pumping lifts. The surface-
water systems may have delivery constraints, require major capital
investments, and incur major expense to operate. The systems for the
“deposits” and “withdrawals” of water (“put” and “take”) also fit into this
category of attributes.
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Second, it is important to consider what incentives are present for
multiple users to cooperate and coordinate their use of the groundwater
basin. This is essential in understanding patterns of interaction and
outcomes. The refinements to the IAD framework are illustrated in Figure
5.0. In summary, Figure 5.0 shows the research framework for analyzing
groundwater banks that is used for the dissertation.
Figure 5.0 Proposed Framework for Analyzing Groundwater Banks
C ontextual Factors
Physical & Technological
Attributes of the
Groundwater Basin and
Surface Water Systems
Use Use Use Use Use
Institutional
Arrangements
Incentives to
Cooperate &
Coordinate
Action
Situation
Patterns of
Interactions
Outcomes
Constitutional
Collective-Choice
Operational
Characteristics of the
User Community (AO's
Individ.Users, Agencies)
User
Group
User
Group
User
Group
User
Group
User
Group
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Application of the IAD Framework to Groundwater Banking
The following section provides the details of the specific attributes that
are used when applying the modified IAD framework to groundwater banking
in the Central Valley.
The Physical and Technological Attributes of the Groundwater Basin
and Suriface-Water Systems
The physical and technological attributes of a CPR can influence
outcomes directly and independently of institutional arrangements. Physical
and technological attributes can also affect action situations and the
development of institutional arrangements. The IAD framework illustrated in
Figure 5 shows the linkage and importance of the physical and technological
attributes to the outcomes, the action situation, and institutional
arrangements.
Certain physical and technological attributes of the groundwater and
surface-water systems must be present for the development of a
groundwater bank. For example, the groundwater basin must have the
proper geology and capacity for recharge, the technology must exist to
access banked water, and the necessary surface-water conveyance and
distribution systems must be in place to facilitate recharge and recovery
operations. Per Oakerson, these are the “hard constraints” that can impact
outcomes independent of human choice. Groundwater banking cannot be
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considered without the existence of these key physical and technological
attributes. These attributes are described as follows:
• Basin Characteristics
Basin characteristics refer specifically to the geological unit known as
the groundwater basin, its ability to store water, and the natural
movement water into or out of the basin. The basin also acts to define
the boundary of the CPR.
• Surface-Water Systems
The surface-water systems are those natural and human-made
systems that convey surface-water into the basin area.
• Technological Attributes
The technologies used to pump water, meter/measure water, and
bank water are the key technological attributes of a groundwater bank.
Institutional Arrangements
Institutional, or decision-making, arrangements represent “soft
constraints” because, unlike the physical and technological attributes, they
do not impact outcomes independent of human choice and interaction. The
physical and technological attributes create the setting in which the AO’s
interact. Institutional arrangements provide the rules, or constraints, needed
by the AO’s to manage the uncertainty that is created by the physical and
technological attributes, water rights, and other contextual factors. Finally,
institutional arrangements can facilitate cooperation among the various water
users.
The IAD framework divides decision-making arrangements into the
three following action levels - Constitutional, collective-choice, and
operational:
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• Constitutional Arrangements
Constitutional arrangements consist of rules for determining who is
eligible to participate in the system. These rules can be internal or
external (or both) to the community of users and they establish the
process and rules by which collective-choice rules are created,
enforced, and modified.
• Collective-Choice Arrangements
Collective-choice arrangements provide the means to determine,
enforce, and modify operational rules. Most importantly, collective-
choice arrangements establish the means to adjudicate conflicts and
disputes between participants by structuring the processes by which
disputes may be settled.
• Operational Arrangements
Operational arrangements are the rules placing limits on the behaviors
of participants by defining what participants may or may not do. Limits
may be placed on use (duration and type of use) and on the amounts
of resources that may be withdrawn (allocation rules). Operational
rules take into account the boundaries of the resource (who is entitled
to use the resource) and the inputs required of participants to maintain
the resource. Penalties for lack of compliance with the operational
arrangement may also be embodied at this level.
Multiple Uses for the CPR
Multiple uses for a CPR create the need to analyze decision making
arrangements related to different uses of the CPR. In the case of a
groundwater bank, multiple uses refer to uses of the groundwater (as a
CPR), the groundwater basin (storage), and the uses for land overlying the
groundwater bank.
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Characteristics of the User Community
The successful negotiation and development of institutions depends to
a large degree upon the response of individuals within the user community.
Thus, it is essential to understand the groups and individuals who use the
groundwater in the study area if we are to understand the development of
institutions governing the use of the groundwater bank. The communications
forums and levels of trust are also of interest.
Action Situation
The “action situation” refers to the situational variables that help to
drive patterns of interaction. The action situation is the “local” setting that is
considered by the various members of the user community as they interact to
facilitate outcomes. The action situation is internal, or local, as opposed to
the contextual factors, which are dynamic forces remote from the local
management of the CPR.
Contextual Factors
Examples of contextual factors include water rights decisions, drought
year reductions in water allocations by state and federal agencies, new water
quality regulations, the ability to fund infrastructure (state funding), and new
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legislation pertaining to water use are examples of contextual factors that can
impact groundwater banks.
Incentives to Cooperate and Coordinate
There are three major factors that may provide users with incentives to
cooperate and collaborate. Water supply reliability, ensuring plentiful water
supplies, and the local control of water supplies represent significant
concerns for water users in California’s Central Valley. The cost of banking
water is also cited as an incentive for collaboration at the local level.
Ensuring reliability, ensuring water quantity, and maintaining local control are
discussed below:
• Ensuring Water Supply Reliability and Quantity
Essentially, water users expect a certain amount of benefits to accrue
before considering collective action. In most cases, water users will
view a plentiful and reliable water supply as the primary benefits of
collective action. In California, quantity of supply and reliability are very
important factors due to the arid nature of the state, the lack of water
storage (in comparison to water demands), and the unpredictability of
precipitation.
• Local Control of Groundwater Supplies
Maintaining the local control of water supplies, particularly groundwater,
is a significant issue for the agriculturally based user groups in
California’s Central Valley. In contrast to surface-water, there is no
statewide permit system for groundwater use in California -
groundwater use is mainly the right of the overlying property owner.
However, the complicated nature of water rights in California can create
uncertainties and conflicts between water users.
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Patterns of Interaction
Given the physical and technological attributes of the resources in
question, the institutional arrangements that are available, the action
situation and incentives, groups of individuals make strategy choices for
relating to one another. These choices result in patterns of interaction, which
in turn produce outcomes.
The levels of trust in the user community, availability of communication
forums, the ability to address uncertainties inherent in groundwater basins
and California water rights all influence the patterns of interaction in a given
groundwater banking situation.
Outcomes
There are several key positive outcomes for the participants and non
participants in a groundwater banking program related to the function of the
storage operation. These outcomes include:
• The groundwater bank stores enough water to increase the reliability
of the water supplies for the participants.
• The groundwater banking operations cause no harm to participants
and non-participants.
• Participants follow the rules of the groundwater banking program.
• The groundwater banking operation causes no harm to the CPR (i.e.
corrects overdraft, no negative impacts to the basin).
• The groundwater bank preserves the participant’s and non
participant’s water rights and right of access.
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Uncertainty as a Driving Force for Institutional Development
As stated in Chapter 1, uncertainty is a condition where information is
lacking for purposes of making a decision. One cannot readily “see” or
directly observe what is happening underground; therefore groundwater
basins physically create a condition of uncertainty. This physical uncertainty
manifests itself as a lack of information regarding how much water is stored
in the basin, lack of information about the storage capacity of the basin, and
the movement of underground water within the basin. Water rights further
complicate the picture by creating uncertainties pertaining to access to
groundwater, ownership of storage capacity, and rights to withdraw
groundwater.
While case law demonstrates that the proprietary right to stored
surface-water stays with the entity banking the water, the introduction of
imported surface-water creates additional uncertainties. Banking entities
need to be able to enforce their rights to extract banked water (against
unauthorized extraction by overlying users) and overlying users need to be
certain that native groundwater is not being extracted by banking entities.
The physical uncertainties of the groundwater basin, coupled with these
uncertainties related to rights and access are significant driving forces in the
development of institutions for groundwater banking. In fact, these
uncertainties can be the driving forces for creating institutions that raise the
participants level of certainty enough to go forward with a groundwater
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banking program. Conversely, these uncertainties, if not adequately
addressed, can create conditions that forestall, or destine a proposed
program to fail.
Uncertainty, therefore, plays a major role in the patterns of interactions
between players. Institutions must be developed, based on the physical and
technological attributes of a given groundwater bank, to raise the degree of
certainty at the level of interaction. This proposition will be expanded upon in
the course of this dissertation.
Selection of Groundwater Banking Programs for Study
The core element of this dissertation is the study of successful multi-
organizational conjunctive use programs that have developed for the purpose
of storing, or banking, imported surface-water in groundwater basins.
Therefore, it is necessary to select and study groundwater banking programs
that can be defined as “successful.” As previously mentioned in the
introduction, a successful groundwater banking program is defined as a
program that:
• Is operational and is correcting or preventing the depletion of the area
groundwater resources.
• Has developed and implemented institutions to recognize and enforce
the rights of multiple surface-water rights owners in conjunction with
the rights of groundwater users whose respective rights to pump from
the available water supply have not been determined (non-adjudicated
groundwater basin).
• Has developed and implemented rules and systems for accounting
for, and managing, the commingling of the native groundwater with
banked imported surface-water.
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• Has implemented effective mechanisms for settling disputes and
conflicts between groundwater bank users and between groundwater
bank users and non-participants.
Additionally, these groundwater banking programs can be made up of
participating appropriator organizations (AO’s) who share a common
understanding regarding:
1. Who is a member of the AO.
2. The type of access to a CPR conveyed by membership or other
grounds for such rights.
3. How decisions are made that affect the development of
coordinated strategies for appropriating or providing for a CPR.
4. How conflicts over these patterns will be resolved.
5. Leadership roles.
6. Membership responsibilities to sustain the AO.
It should also be noted that a key element for the selection of
groundwater banking programs is the inclusion of imported surface-water for
storage. Thus, the groundwater basin under study must be hydrologically
disconnected from the majority of the surface-water being banked.
Based on the forgoing criteria, two groundwater banking programs in
the southern portion of the Central Valley were selected for study: the Kern
Water Bank and the Arvin Edison Water Storage District Groundwater
Banking Program. These two programs meet the definition for successful
groundwater banking programs, are composed of multiple AO’s, and utilize
imported surface-water to accomplish the banking. Both programs are
appropriate for addressing the core question of how the introduction of
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imported surface-water into a groundwater basin influences the institutions
governing the use of the groundwater basin.
Additionally, two proposed groundwater banking programs were
selected as case studies of programs that were not successfully
implemented: the Madera Ranch Groundwater bank Project and the East
San Joaquin Parties Water Authority Conjunctive Use Program. These two
proposed programs are included to illustrate some of the issues and
problems inherent in establishing groundwater banking programs in
California. These programs serve as instructive counterpoints to the
institutional analyses of successful programs.
The case studies are grouped by their outcomes. The Kern Water
Bank (KWB) and the Arvin-Edison Water Storage District (AEWSD) are
grouped in this chapter (Chapter 3) as successful groundwater bank
programs. The Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Program and the East
San Joaquin Parties Water Authority (ESJPWA) Conjunctive Use Program
are grouped in Chapter 4. The KWB and Madera Ranch cases have full
narrative IAD analyses and the remaining cases are provided with summary
IAD analyses for brevity.
Research Methodology
The fieldwork for the case studies was conducted from February 2000
through August 2001 with some follow-up fieldwork occurring in mid-
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November 2002. Much of the initial fieldwork and data collection were
completed by the writer as part of a project for the National Heritage Institute
(NHI, 2001). Primary data were collected through interviews and informal
conversations with participants in the AO’s, consultants to the AO’s and
individual overlying users. Secondary data were gathered from legal
documents, governance documents, environmental documents, published
and unpublished project reports, newspaper articles, and agency documents.
A matrix approach was used to gather data for critical areas defining the
attributes of water systems; the institutional arrangements, and
characteristics of the user communities are arrayed to ensure consistency in
data collection.
Approach to Case Studies
Each case study will be analyzed using the modified IAD framework
described in this chapter. The IAD framework will be used to identify and
categorize the attributes for each case study. The results of these analyses
will then be used to identify the attributes in case that address the research
question, the assumptions, and the issues of uncertainty and trust pertaining
to groundwater banking. A discussion of the analyses and the results will be
presented in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 3
SUCCESSFUL GROUNDWATER BANKING PROGRAMS
Introduction
Chapter 2 provides the reader with a review of the classification of
goods, CPR’s, and Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons.” This review is
designed to help place in context the question of how the introduction of
imported surface-water into a groundwater basin affects the institutional
arrangements governing the groundwater basin. Chapter 2 also
discusses how the California water rights system can exacerbate
groundwater CPR problems and the legal disconnection between surface-
water and groundwater in California.
There are two prescriptions for preventing a tragedy of the commons
that are frequently proposed as solutions; the centralized authoritarian
control of the CPR in question and/or the privatization of the CPR. CPR
research, however, demonstrates that there is another effective means of
preventing a CPR tragedy; the development of institutional arrangements
by the end users, or appropriators, of a CPR. I propose that this is the
case with successful groundwater banking programs in the Central Valley
of California. The development of a successful groundwater bank by
local appropriators or appropriator organizations (AO’s) should prevent
the exhaustion of the groundwater CPR while increasing the reliability of
the water supply.
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It should be noted that the formation of an AO in and of itself is a
major undertaking requiring the collaboration of area water users. The
research in this dissertation examines groundwater banking where AO’s
pre-exist the groundwater banking programs.
This chapter provides an overview and history of the two cases
studies of successful groundwater banks - the Kern Water Bank and the
Arvin-Edison Water Storage District/Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California Groundwater Bank Program - to address the central
research question of how the introduction of imported surface-water
influences the institutional arrangements governing a groundwater basin
and how these institutional arrangements address uncertainty and trust.
After each case is described, they are analyzed by their attributes using
the modified institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework.
The Kern Water Bank
The Kern Water Bank (KWB) meets all of the criteria for a successful
groundwater banking program and is often cited as an example of a model
program. The KWB program is well established and has been able to bank
approximately 1,000,000 acre-feet of water, or the maximum estimated
storage capacity for the KWB.
The following sections review the Kern Water Bank (KWB) history
and provide an overview of this water bank’s development to present the
background for the IAD framework analysis of the KWB case.
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KWB Project History
The KWB is located on 19,883 acres (31 square miles) of land in Kern
County, California, at the southern end of the San Joaquin Valley. The KWB
is on the lower part of the Kern River Fan in what is referred to as the Kern
River Valley Basin (Keltzing, 1998). The Kern River Valley Basin is naturally
recharged by the Kern River. Prior to the development of the centrifugal well
pump and the development of irrigated agriculture, the water balance in the
Kern River Valley Basin was very different than it is today. In dry years,
when the Kern River flows were low, the basin contained enough water to
keep much of the overlying area green. During dry years, there was enough
water in the basin to spill out into two surface lakes: Kern Lake and Buena
Vista Lake (Dale & Wilson, p.2). During wet years, the excess water in the
basin would overtop the barrier to the north and drain into the San Joaquin
River.
The advent of efficient well pumps and pump drivers, coupled with
agricultural expansion, changed the water balance in the basin. Up to 1946,
the pumping of groundwater in the Kern River Valley Basin was in balance
with the surface-water recharge from the Kern River. Starting in 1946,
however, groundwater pumping for agricultural irrigation began to outstrip the
recharge rate, creating a significant overdraft of the Kern River Valley Basin.
By 1964, 2,000,000 acre-feet of groundwater per year were being pumped
out of the basin, groundwater levels were declining significantly, and
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groundwater banking was being proposed as a possible solution to the
overdraft problem (Dale & Wilson, p.2).
The overdraft peaked at approximately 600,000 acre-feet per year,
prior to the delivery of SWP surface-water to the Kern River Basin in 1968
(Kletzing, 1998). The State project surface-water helped to correct the
overdraft; however, the entire SWP was not completed as planned and
authorized. Furthermore, water rights decisions by the State Water
Resources Control Board, coupled with the operational policies of the
Department of Water Resources (DWR), decreased the quantities of SWP
water available to Kern County (Associated Engineering, 1988, p.1). These
decreases in imported surface-water, coupled with increases in agricultural
water usage, led experts in the early 1980’s to predict that the groundwater
overdraft could return to the 600,000 acre-foot per year levels by 1989 (the
overdraft actually reached approximately 400,000 acre-feet per year -
Associated Engineering, 1988, pp. 8-9).
The original project proposal to bank water in the KWB lands dates to
the 1970s when Tenneco West, Inc., the owner of the land where the KWB is
now located, and the Wheeler Ridge-Maricopa WSD entered into an
agreement to explore banking water on the 46,000 acre Tenneco West
parcel. Wheeler Ridge-Maricopa WSD recognized that the scope of the
proposed project was of a magnitude that would require the participation of
other entities and began to solicit potential partners in the Kern County area.
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However, most districts and entities in the Kern County area looked to the
completion of the State Water Project (SWP) for additional water supplies
and, therefore, chose not to participate in the Wheeler Ridge-
Maricopa/Tenneco West project (William Taube, 2000). As a result, Tenneco
West eventually terminated the agreement with Wheeler Ridge-Maricopa
WSD. Subsequently in 1988, Tenneco West sold the future KWB land to the
California Department of Water Resources (DWR), as discussed below
(Bonesteel & Taylor, pp. 18-19 - Pyle and Iger, 1989, p. 185).
By the early 1980’s, it became apparent that the SWP would not be
completed as anticipated. Two factors contributing to its delay were: (1) the
changing water ethic with respect to how the project could be operated and
(2) the fact that project facilities were still being constructed. In years of short
water supplies in the SWP, water contractors in Kern County received
substantially less water than their SWP surface-water entitlements allowed,
and surface-water allocations for agriculture were reduced to zero in 1991
(California Department of Water Resources, 1986, p.15). As a result, a
groundwater overdraft of approximately 250,000 to 300,000 acre-feet per
year persisted in Kern County through the 1980’s.
Key technical studies, such as “Water Resources Management in the
Southern San Joaquin Valley California (1979)” and the “Report on the
Investigation of Optimization and Enhancement of the Water Supplies of
Kern County (1983),’’highlighted opportunities to integrate additional imported
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surface-water into conjunctive use and groundwater banking operations”.
DWR reports, such as the Kern Fan Technical Report (1987), are site-
specific to the KWB and provided a basis for initiating the project. The
reports also underscored the adverse impacts of continued groundwater
overdraft in Kern County. These factors, combined with the opportunity to
increase SWP water supply reliability during dry years, provided the incentive
for DWR to re-initiate the KWB project in 1988 with the purchase of 19,883
acres of the Tenneco West property.
After acquisition of the Tenneco West property, DWR elected to phase
out farming leases on the KWB land. In 1991-1992, the California
Department of Fish and Game identified endangered species on the fallow
land, and the land became subject to Endangered Species Act requirements
(McClurg, 1996, pp. 10-11). Subsequently, DWR’s process of developing the
KWB project stalled due to high costs, habitat regulations, complicated
negotiations over local use of the bank and uncertainty over the volume of
imported surface-water that could be diverted from the delta for storage
(McClurg, 1996, pp 10-11, Bonesteel & Taylor, pp. 18-19). Over $28 million
was spent on proposal studies without any physical project development.
The estimated cost of banked water in the KWB was approximately $400 to
$450 per acre-foot, which was unacceptably high for local users (William
Taube, 2000).
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In 1990, the Kern County Future Water Supply Committee was formed
to bring together local entities to discuss and evaluate future water supply
options. The Committee consisted of district managers of area appropriator
organizations and was an outgrowth of a Wheeler Ridge-Maricopa WSD
concept to identify the steps it would take to reasonably implement
groundwater banking in the southern Kern area (Taube, 2000). The
formation of the Committee was spurred on by the prolonged drought from
1987 to 1992, which resulted in significant impacts to SWP water users in
Kern County. Reductions in SWP allocations and major increases in
groundwater pumping, including groundwater exported out of the Kern area
basin in 1990-1991, underscored the need for the KWB project.
The Kern County Water Association also provided a forum for
dialogue and education regarding water resource management. The
Committee hosted a series of breakfast meetings that discussed both legal
and technical topics related to groundwater, water rights, and water banking
such as the Niles Sand and Gravel Co. v. Alameda County Water District
(1974) case, the City of Los Angeles v. the City of San Fernando (1975)
judgment and groundwater management in the Owens Valley.
The Future Water Supply Committee and Kern County Water
Association meetings provided AO’s the information and communication
base necessary to move forward with discussions for the development of a
Memorandum of Understanding that would govern the operation of the KWB
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project. In 1992, an Issues Resolution Committee of AO’s was appointed to
identify solutions to issues surrounding the monitoring and operation of a
joint water bank project. The Adjoining Entities had six concerns regarding
the KWB that needed to be resolved before an agreement to proceed could
be reached. These issues were as follows (Iger, March 2000, Conant, March
2000):
• The level of authority of an oversight committee (Project Participants
viewed the committee function as an informational forum and for
record keeping; Adjoining Entities proposed that the oversight
committee have power to modify programs for compliance with
groundwater management plans).
• The right to reserve the recharge capacity of the basin for local water
supplies (avoidance of reduction in the capability of the basin to
recharge both imported and native water).
• Recognition of the possible benefits to the basin (groundwater
bankers desired recognition of enhancements to the basin due to
banking).
• Recognition of mitigation credit for fallowed land (adjoining entities
proposed no credit, while Project Participants proposed a credit).
• Definition of adverse impacts that would prevent recovery of banked
water.
• Definition of banked water migration losses.
The local water users’ fear of adjudication of the groundwater basin
was cited as an incentive to develop an agreement to resolve these six major
issues. Adjudication is a court determination of overlying users’ rights to
groundwater in response to lawsuits initiated by one or more of the overlying
users. Litigation is a lengthy and very expensive process, and the
adjudication limits the access to groundwater (limits the pumped quantity by
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each user). Also, the adjudicated rights are “mutually prescriptive” in nature;
therefore, user rights will be based on the amounts of groundwater recently
pumped by each user. This can create a “race to the pump house” situation
where each user seeks to maximize their share of the groundwater basin by
pumping as much groundwater as possible. The “race to the pump house”
can obviously be detrimental to the CPR.
A sixty-day negotiation process, based on the desire to avoid
adjudication, resulted in the execution of a “Memorandum of Understanding
Regarding Operation and Monitoring of the Kern Water Bank Groundwater
Banking Program (MOU)” between the Project Participants and the Adjoining
Entities. This MOU addresses the six concerns (described in more detail in
Section 3 of this Chapter).
The committee process of providing information and identifying issues
helped prepare local Kern SWP water users for the subsequent 1993-1994
Monterey Agreement negotiations with DWR. The Issues Resolution
Committee produced a draft set of rules for the joint operation of the KWB
and identified the remaining issues in need of resolution. With this basis of
understanding, the concept of transferring DWR lands to Kern County water
interests was developed and proposed to DWR in August of 1994.
The existing KWB project (under the Kern Water Bank Authority) was
initiated on August 4, 1994, when DWR staff, Kern County Water Agency
staff, and representatives of the Westside Mutual Water Company met to
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discuss the potential for transferring the KWB property from DWR to Kern
County interests in exchange for 40,000 acre-feet of SWP annual
entitlement. Subsequently, the representatives of the State Water
Contractors and DWR executed the Monterey Agreement (“Statement of
Principles for Potential Amendments to the State Water Supply Contracts”)
on December 4, 1994.
The Monterey Agreement between the DWR and SWP water
contractors established principles for making changes in the SWP water
supply contracts by modifying each contractor’s SWP contract (California
Department of Water Resources Bulletin 160-98, p. 2-7). The Agreement
allowed for an amendment to local SWP contracts that facilitated the
exchange of the KWB lands from DWR to the Kern County Water Agency
and the Dudley Ridge Water District in return for 45,000 acre-feet of SWP
annual surface-water entitlement (Kern Water Bank Authority, 2000).
Subsequently, DWR agreed to allow the KWB project participants, under the
Kern County Water Agency, to use the KWB in April of 1995.
After the execution of the Monterey Agreement, Kern County Water
Agency, Dudley Ridge WD, Semitropic WSD, Wheeler Ridge-Maricopa WSD
and the Westside Mutual Water Company agreed to a Statement of
Principles for the Development, Operation and Maintenance of the Kern Fan
Element of the KWB. This group of AO’s, with the addition of the Talon-
Castaic Water District, became known as the “Project Participants.”
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By the end of 1995, the Project Participants had formed the Kern
Water Bank Authority (KWBA), executed the “Memorandum of
Understanding Regarding Operation and Maintenance of the Kern Water
Bank Groundwater Banking Program,” established a Monitoring Committee
with non-participating districts adjoining the KWB to ensure avoidance or
mitigation of potential adverse impacts resulting from KWB operations, and
executed a transfer and exchange agreement for the transfer of the KWB
from the Kern County Water Agency to the Kern Water Bank Authority.
Thus, in 1995, the KWB officially became a locally operated project under a
joint powers authority (JPA) formed for the purposes of recharge, storage,
and recovery of water to supplement State Water Project surface-water
supplies to agricultural and urban communities within Kern County (Kern
Water Bank Authority, 2000).
On August 9, 1996, the KWB property was officially transferred from
the Kern County Water Agency to the Kern Water Bank Authority. In 1997,
the KWBA filed a CEQA Notice of Determination and completed the 75-year
KWB Habitat Conservation Plan/Natural Community Conservation Plan.
Construction of Master Plan Facilities, consisting of a six mile long, two-way
conveyance canal connecting the SWP and the Kern River to the KWB, turn
out facilities on the SWP and Kern River, 60 new extraction wells,
approximately 21 miles of transmission pipeline, and metering structures,
commenced in 1999. During the 1995-2000 period, the KWBA recharged a
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total of 871,502 acre-feet of water into the KWB, nearly reaching the
1,000,000 acre-feet of estimated banking capacity.
The chronology of significant KWB project events, up to and following
the Monterey Agreement, is summarized in Table 2.0:
Table 2.0 Kern Water Bank Chronology
1986 — DWR begins to explore the possibility of developing a Kern Water Bank for the
purpose of augmenting the SWP.
May 1986 — DWR issues a draft program Environmental Impact Report (EIR) on the
proposed KWB.
December 1986 — DWR issues the Final Program EIR.
March 1987 — DWR enters into a memorandum of understanding with the KCWA to
develop and operate the KWB.
April 1987 — DWR issues a Preliminary Technical Report describing the features,
facilities, costs, and operation of a direct recharge program.
August 1987 — dwr accepts a report from a consultant evaluating toxics in
the area of the Kern River Fan.
September 1987 — DWR makes an offer to Tenneco West, Inc., to purchase
approximately 24,000 acres of Tenneco West land for the purposes of establishing
the KWB.
May 1988 — DWR contracts with the Kern County Water Agency to assist in the
development of the KWB. DWR and the Water Agency solicit proposals from local
districts to participate in the KWB. Seven local districts express interest in
participating; DWR and the Water Agency analyze the proposals.
August 31.1988 — escrow closes on the purchase of 19,833 acres of Tenneco West
land by DWR. The land is purchased by DWR for $31,115,168.74 (approximately
$1,565 per acre).
1989 — DWR installs monitoring wells and implements water level and water quality
monitoring program. DWR starts the five-year phase out of 20 agricultural leases on
approximately 16,000 acres of the KWB land. Planning activities for the KWB are
implemented by DWR. Land management activities are started as is the clean up of
contaminated soils.
1989 through 1994 — DWR spends approximately $28-$30 million on studies.
Endangered Species Act issues emerge. Participants note
that the cost of banked water is increasing to around $400 to $450 per acre-foot
already with no physical banking project yet in place.
1990 — Kern County Future Water Supply Committee is established and provides the
forum for discussion of operating criteria for banking projects in Kern County.
1991 — drought impacts begin to underscore the need to move ahead with the KWB.
Agricultural allocations of water from the SWP are reduced to zero acre-feet, and
municipal and industrial users are reduced to 35 percent of their allocation.
Exportation of groundwater out of the Kern area basin accelerates.
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Table 2.0 Kern Water Bank Chronology (continued)
1991 — due to lack of water, 101,400 acres in the entire San Joaquin portion of Kern
County are fallowed; 9,700 acres are abandoned after crops (primarily, cotton and
almonds) are planted; and 101,700 acres of crops suffer reduced yields.
August 1992 — Kern County Future Water Supply Committee appoints an Issues
Resolution Committee for the purpose of identifying resolutions to issues
surrounding the monitoring and operations of a joint water bank project.
1993 — SWP contractors and the DWR enter into negotiations to resolve dry year water
allocation issues.
August 4.1994 — DWR staff, Kern County Water Agency Staff and representatives of
the Westside Mutual Water Company meet to discuss the potential for transferring
the KWB property from DWR to Kern County interests in exchange for 40,000 acre-
feet of SWP annual entitlement.
August 22.1994 — the Issues Resolution Committee issues its Draft Groundwater
Management Rules. The Attorneys Committee begins to investigate the formation
of a Joint Powers Authority to operate the KWB.
October 6. 1994 — the Issues Resolution Committee issues a memorandum describing
six major areas where disagreements remain regarding the Groundwater
Management Rules for banking projects.
December 1994 — the Monterey Agreement between the DWR and the SWP water
contractors is executed to resolve dry year allocation issues. This agreement sets
forth principles for making changes in SWP water contracts, which would be
implemented by amendment. The Monterey Agreement allows for an amendment to
the Project Participants contracts to allow the title to the Kern Water Bank to be
transferred to local SWP contractors in exchange for 45,000 acre-feet
of their annual SWP entitlements. The Kern County Water Agency is to assume
operation of the bank.
March 1995 — the Kern County Water Agency, Dudley Ridge Water District, Semitropic
Water Storage District, Wheeler Ridge-Maricopa Water Storage District and the
Westside Mutual Water Company agree to a Statement of Principles for the
Development, Operation and Maintenance of the Kern Fan Element of the Kern
Water Bank.
April 13.1995 — DWR agrees to allow KWB participant’s use of the Kern Water Bank
for water banking, with the Kern County Water Agency managing operations until
the Kern Water Bank Authority is officially chartered in October 1995.
May 16.1995 — California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) issues a 2081 Permit
for the interim operation of the Kern Water Bank.
May 22. 1995 — U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) issues a Section 7 Permit for
Stage 2 1995 Interim Operation of the Kern Water Bank.
May 1995 — the KWB Project Participants start recharging water at the KWB.
June 27.1995 — USFWS and CDFG meet with KWB participants regarding the outline
for the Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) and to discuss master permit and NCCP
issues.
October 16. 1995 — Project Participants officially form the Kern Water Bank Authority,
which incorporates prior participant agreements.
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Table 2.0 Kern Water Bank Chronology (continued)
October 26. 1995 — a Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Operation and
Maintenance of the Kern Water Bank Groundwater Banking Program (MOU) is
entered into between the Project Participants in the KWB and the Adjoining Entities
(agencies not participating in the KWB). This MOU addresses and resolves the six
major issues identified by the Issues Resolution Committee. The Monitoring
Committee is established.
December 13.1995 — the Transfer and Exchange Agreement between the Kern County
Water Agency and the Kern Water Bank Authority is executed. Upon close of
escrow, this agreement will allow the transfer of the KWB property from the Water
Agency to the Kern Water Bank Authority.
December 31.1995 — a total of 222,377 acre-feet of water is recharged into the KWB.
August 9.1996 — the KWB property is transferred from Kern County Water Agency to
the Kern Water Bank Authority.
June 4.1997 — Kern Water Bank Authority posts CEQA Notice of Determination.
October 2. 1997 — signing ceremony takes place for the completion of the KWB Habitat
Conservation Plan.
August 30.1999 — construction is started on the KWB Master Plan Facilities, including
a two-way canal, 72,000 feet of transmission pipeline, a pump station, and new
extraction wells to allow an estimated recovery of 236,430 acre-feet of water per
year.
April 2000 — 871,502 acre-feet of water is recharged into the KWB.
August 2000 — most of the Master Plan Facility construction is complete. Installation of
new extraction wells and distribution piping are the major facilities remaining to be
completed.
KWB User Priorities
The KWB mission is to ensure a reliable water supply to the southern
San Joaquin Valley while providing for exceptional upland and wetland
habitat (KWBA Presentation Document, 2000). A primary objective of the
KWB is to enhance the water supplies for KWB project participants, SWP
contractors and Improvement District 4, which encompasses incidental
beneficiaries such as the City of Bakersfield located immediately east of the
KWB site, the Rosedale-Rio Bravo WSD immediately north of the site, and
the Kern Delta WD to the south. Similar to native groundwater use in the
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area, the majority of the end uses for the banked surface-water are
agricultural. It should be noted that the KWB project priority is to enhance
water supplies for the KWB project participants and SWP contractor needs
(when possible). Kern County Water Agency (KCWA) member units and the
KCWA have a second priority (secondary to the Project Participants).
Addressing Issues, Risks and Uncertainties
Hydrogeologic risks are addressed in the 1995 “Memorandum of
Understanding Regarding Operation and Monitoring of the Kern Water Bank
Groundwater Banking Program (MOU).” This MOU creates a Monitoring
Committee made up of one representative from each of the Adjoining Entities
and one representative from each of the Project Participants. The Monitoring
Committee oversees a comprehensive monitoring program to determine
groundwater levels and water quality under project and non-project
conditions. The Monitoring Committee has the authority to retain an
independent expert consultant to assist in the data collection and perform
analyses necessary for monitoring the banking operation. The Monitoring
Committee, assisted by the consultant, prepares a monitoring plan, maps
well locations, and specifies the requirement for additional monitoring wells,
as needed, for a monitoring network. The consultant prepares annual water
balance studies, develops criteria to define excessive groundwater
mounding, and develops recommended KWB Project operating criteria for
the purpose of avoiding significant adverse impacts. The Monitoring
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Committee deals with all neighboring groundwater banking projects operating
in the Kern Fan Area and is the body charged with resolving disputes
regarding the KWB Project operations. Meetings of the Monitoring
Committee are held monthly or at regular intervals as deemed necessary.
The KWB MOU states that the KWB banking project will be operated
by the “Golden Rule,” meaning that, unless acceptable mitigation is provided,
the banker may not operate so as to create conditions that are worse than
would have prevailed absent the banking project. Also, the MOU states,
“operators of projects in the Kern Fan area will avoid operating recharge
projects in such a fashion as to significantly diminish the natural, normal and
unavoidable recharge of water native to the Kern Fan Area as it existed in a
pre-project condition (KWBA Memorandum of Understanding Regarding
Operation and Monitoring of the Kern Water Bank Groundwater Banking
Program, 1995, p. 6).” Per the MOU, mitigation measures for hydrogeologic
risks include the following:
• A spread-out recovery area and the provision of adequate well
spacing (to reduce localized groundwater depressions).
• Buffer areas between recovery (extraction) wells and neighboring
overlying users.
• Limits on the monthly, seasonal, and/or annual water recovery rates.
• Provision of sufficient recovery wells to allow for the rotation of
recovery wells.
• Adjustment to pumping rates and/or termination of pumping to reduce
impacts.
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• Time restrictions between recharge and extraction to allow for
downward percolation of water to the aquifer.
• Provision of water that would not otherwise be available to recharge
the Kern Fan Basin.
• Lowering of well pump bowls or deepening of wells owned by
impacted overlying users (neighboring land owners).
• Provision of alternative water supplies to impacted overlying users.
• Financial compensation to impacted overlying users.
The MOU assigns losses of water during the recharge process at 6%
for evapotranspiration, and 4% for migration. Thus, the assigned loss rates
help to dedicate banked surface-water to the basin for overdraft correction.
The 1995 “Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Operation and
Monitoring of the Kern Water Bank Groundwater Banking Program” also
provides for water quality monitoring and has specific requirements for the
operation of the KWB to enhance water quality. Recharge water must be of
high quality and cannot degrade the groundwater basin. Finally, the
operation of the recharge basins is deliberately designed to create
intermittent wetlands to provide habitat for waterfowl.
Program Costs
The expenses for the operation and maintenance of the KWB for FY
2000-2001 were budgeted at $1,645,100. These expenses include the cost
of monitoring, operation and maintenance, land management and
administration. Income to the Kern Water Bank Authority from banking
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operation assessments, mitigation credit sales, grazing, third party banking
and interest earnings is estimated to balance with the budgeted expenses
(KWBA, Year 2000 Budget).
Monitoring costs via the KWB Monitoring Committee are shared
equally between the KWB Project Participants and the Adjoining Entities
(KWBA Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Operation and Monitoring
of the Kern Water Bank Groundwater Banking Program, 1995, p. 11). Costs
for construction of monitoring wells are borne by the project participants.
Each of the parties is responsible for the personnel costs of their
representatives who participate in the KWB Monitoring Committee (KWBA
Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Operation and Monitoring of the
Kern Water Bank Groundwater Banking Program, 1995, p.11).
The KWB project uses the market value of water to establish the base
value of the water put into storage (Iger, March 2000). Thus, in 2000, the
value of the water was approximately $138 per acre-foot, based on recent
transactions with the USBR and Westlands Water District (Hamilton, June
2000). However, it should be noted that the value of water is dependent on
the hydrologic cycle, and the cost of $138 per acre-foot would be more
typical of the minimum cost or “value” of KWB banked water. The price of
banked water to third parties outside of Kern County could be in the range of
$350 to $400 per acre-foot, depending on variable costs (Hamilton, June
2000).
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The costs of operation and maintenance for the KWB are recovered
by the Kern Water Bank Authority through assessments levied against the
Project Participants per their base share of the project (KWBA Joint Powers
Agreement, 1995). Financing for the construction of facilities for the KWB is
also allocated by the percentage of base shares of Project Participants.
Using the base share formula, the costs are allocated as follows:
Table 3.0 KWB Cost and Benefit Allocations
Participating Appropriator
Organization
Percentage Share of Costs and Benefits
Based on Entitlement Contributed
Kern County Water Agency 9.62%
Dudley Ridge 9.62%
Semitropic 6.67%
Tejon-Castaic 2.00%
Westside 48.06%
Wheeler Ridge 24.03%
IAD Analysis of the Kern Water Bank
To begin to analyze the KWB case, it is helpful to examine the project
attributes and variables using the IAD framework for groundwater banks.
The following sections discuss each of the critical factors.
Physical and Technological Attributes of the Groundwater Basin and
Surface-Water Systems
The physical and technological attributes of a CPR can affect
outcomes directly and independently of institutional arrangements.
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Physical and technological attributes can also affect action situations and the
development of institutional arrangements. Per Oakerson, these are the
“hard constraints” that can impact outcomes independent of human choice.
For groundwater banks, it is essential to consider the physical characteristics
of the groundwater basin, the surface-water systems, and the technologies
available for groundwater banking. If the technology is too costly, or the
basin lacks storage capacity, or the basin water quality is bad, it may not be
possible to even consider groundwater banking.
Overall, the physical and technological attributes of the KWB make it
an ideal site for a groundwater bank. There are no real physical or
technological impediments to banking imported-surface-water as can been
seen in the following narration.
• Basin Characteristics
As mentioned earlier, the KWB is on the lower part of the Kern River
Fan in what is referred to as the Kern River Valley Basin (Keltzing, 1998).
The Kern River is located within the southeastern portion of the KWB site: it
flows from the northeast to the southwest. The Kern River Valley Basin is a
closed groundwater basin, surrounded on three sides by mountains that are
impermeable to groundwater flows. The northern boundary of the basin,
roughly at the Kern County/Kings County line, is also relatively impermeable
due to clay layers. Thus, there is no basin outflow of groundwater and the
recharge of the basin occurs primarily through the Kern River, which carries
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approximately 700,000 acre-feet of water into the area each year (Dale &
Wilson, 1964). The closed basin creates a clear boundary for the CPR.
The Kern River Valley Basin is part of the Tulare Lake Hydrologic
Region, which has an aquifer system with the ability to store an estimated
50,000,000 acre-feet of water (Iger, March 2000). As a sub-section of the
Tulare Hydrologic Region, the 19,883-acre KWB site is located on highly
permeable Kern River Fan sediments of the Kern River Valley Basin. This
gives the KWB the ability to store an estimated 1,000,000 acre-feet of water
with an estimated annual recharge capacity of 450,000 acre-feet per year
(KWBA Presentation Document, 2000). The recovery capacity is estimated to
be 240,000 acre-feet per year at project completion (KWBA Presentation
Document, 2000).
Groundwater pumping in the area serves both agricultural and
municipal uses. Median groundwater use for irrigation is 1,200,000 acre-feet
per year while drought year use increases to 1,900,000 acre-feet per year.
In 1998-1999, the City of Bakersfield (adjacent to the KWB) used
approximately 59,511 acre-feet of groundwater per year to meet its annual
water demand of 73,500 acre-feet (the balance of its demands are met by
treated surface-water supplied by Kern County Water Association) (KCWA)
(California Water Service Company, 1999). Groundwater quality is such that
it is suitable for agriculture and municipal uses with a minimum of treatment.
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In summary, the combination of the closed Kern River Valley Basin,
the highly permeable soil profile, and the basin recharge capacity provide an
ideal physical situation for groundwater banking.
• Surface-Water Systems
The Kern River (winter floodwaters) and the SWP are the major
sources of banked surface-water for the KWB. The location of the KWB also
allows for delivery of water from the Friant-Kern Canal. Construction of a six-
mile long, two-way conveyance canal connecting the SWP and the Kern
River to the KWB was initiated in August 1999 as part of the KWB expansion
and construction of the Master Plan Facilities (Hamilton, June 2000). The
KWB is situated in a unique location within the State, which enables it to take
advantage of surface-water deliveries from three sources—the Kern River,
the California Aqueduct (SWP), and the Friant-Kern Canal (Bonesteel &
Taylor, p. 18).
The Kern River and the SWP converge near the KWB, and the Kern
River is the terminus of the Friant-Kern Canal, which is a facility of the federal
Central Valley Project (CVP) (Bonesteel & Taylor, p. 18). The unique
combination of surface-water supply, delivery infrastructure and geology
places the KWB in an ideal location for groundwater banking.
As mentioned previously, the surface-water is banked in what is
known as the Kern Fan Element (KFE). This river fan consists of sandy soil
created by a million years of alluvial deposits. KFE sediments are capable of
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recharge of up to six inches of water per day via the percolation basins.
Recharge is accomplished utilizing 800 cubic feet per second (cfs) flow of
surface-water from the Kern River and 750 (cfs) from the SWP (California
Aqueduct). This water is spread onto the percolation basins to recharge the
groundwater.
Banked surface-water is recovered by thirty existing extraction wells
located on the site, and an additional thirty wells are proposed as part of the
KWB Master Plan. Other Master Plan Facilities include: a two-way canal
connecting the KWB and the SWP; an earthen canal connecting the Kern
River to the SWP aqueduct; approximately 21 miles of transmission pipeline;
turn-outs from the Kern River and SWP; and a 545 cubic feet per second
(cfs) pump station and meter structures. As of the end of 2000, the two-way
canal, turn-outs, pipeline and meter structures were complete (Melville,
August 2000). The new two-way canal has a capacity of 800 cfs. Drilling
started on thirty new extraction wells during 2000 and eighteen existing wells
were slated for rehabilitation (KWBA Habitat Conservation Plan, 2000, p. 32).
Recovery is anticipated to be 630 cfs (460,000 acre-feet per year) to the
SWP (KWBA Presentation Materials, 2000).
With respect to surface-water, the KWB has the advantage of being
able to utilize water from a diverse variety of sources. Additionally, the
surface-water conveyance facilities that are located in the area provide a
relatively easy means to bank and withdraw water stored in the KWB. These
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attributes, in combination with the groundwater basin characteristics create
the necessary physical conditions that are precursors for a successful
groundwater banking program. In the KWB case, these attributes also create
a situation where imported surface-water is co-mingled with native
groundwater. Therefore, the KWB case can be used to directly address the
core research question of this dissertation.
• Technological Attributes
From a technological standpoint, groundwater banking in the KWB is
fairly easy to accomplish. Surface-water can be stored in the KWB by
allowing the water to simply percolate underground through spreading basins
(as opposed to injecting water underground). This method requires enough
available land and suitable geology for success - both the land and suitable
geology are present in the KWB case.
The “low tech” percolation method requires less energy and
maintenance than the direct injection of water into underground aquifers and,
in the KWB case, this method allows for the creation of habitat areas.
However, percolation does have the disadvantage of losing water to
evaporation and, potentially exposing the water to contamination. Water
losses due to evaporation need to be calculated and accounted for in this
type of groundwater banking operation.
Another essential technological attribute is the presence of surface-
water conveyance facilities to allow for the “put and take” operations of the
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groundwater bank. The KWB is located in the vicinity of three surface-water
aqueduct systems, allowing for a great deal of flexibility for conveying water
to and from the KWB site. Additionally, tie-ins to these conveyance systems
also allow for water measurement through various metering and pumping
structures.
Finally, standard water well technology is used to recover, or pump
water out of the groundwater bank for use. The types of water wells used to
pump water from the KWB are of the type commonly used for irrigation of
area farms, and the local appropriators have an excellent understanding of
the technology. The use of multiple water wells also allows for the design of
a well field with a spatial distribution that will minimize impacts to neighboring
groundwater users and groundwater banking operations.
KWB Area Uses
Multiple uses for a CPR create the need to analyze decision-making
arrangements related to different uses of the CPR. The KWB area supports
multiple uses; therefore, these uses must be identified and accounted for in
the analysis. The KWB basin area provides a groundwater supply for several
overlying uses. The area is used for groundwater banks, and it provides a
natural habitat area. These various uses of the KWB are compatible,
inasmuch as there are agreed upon rules governing these uses. The
following sections describe the KWB uses in more detail.
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• Agricultural Use
The primary land use in the vicinity of the KWB is agriculture.
Approximately 835,000 acres of irrigated farmland exists in Kern County
(California Department of Water Resources, Bulletin 160-98, p.8-3, Iger,
March 2000). Most of the overlying farm operations within the vicinity of the
KWB rely on groundwater for a major portion of their irrigation - especially in
dry years when surface-water supplies are curtailed. The farmers in area
have three major concerns; that the groundwater supply remains readily
available for their use, that the basin is not overdrafted, and that groundwater
banking operations do not interfere with their use of the groundwater or
farming operations.
• Municipal Use
The City of Bakersfield is the only major municipal water user in the
KWB area. With a population of over 212,000, Bakersfield’s water usage is
about 73,500 acre-feet per year (California Water Service Company, 1999).
The City of Bakersfield relies on surface-water and groundwater for its
municipal uses, and the City maintains a 2,800-acre groundwater recharge
facility adjacent to the Kern River. The Bakersfield groundwater recharge
(banking) facility is centrally located within the KWB property, and follows the
path of the Kern River through three-quarters of the KWB site. In addition,
the Kern County Water Agency Pioneer Project recharge areas (North
Pioneer, Central Pioneer and South Pioneer) are adjacent to the KWB on the
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east and northeast. Similar to area farmers, the City of Bakersfield and the
neighboring districts are concerned that the groundwater supply is sustained
for their various uses. Likewise, due to the proximity of their groundwater
banking operations, the City is interested in ensuring that the two operations
are compatible.
• Natural Habitat
Approximately half of the 19,883 acres of the KWB project area have
been set aside for natural habitat as part of the KWB Habitat Conservation
Plan. Roughly 5,600 acres of habitat exists between the recharge basins on
the KWB site. These acres form habitat areas that are compatible with the
banking operations. The banking recharge process has created intermittent
wetlands, resulting in growth of willow trees and sedges. The management
of the recharge basins allows for the preservation of the wetlands, thus
providing habitat for a variety of waterfowl (KWB Background, 2000, p 2).
More than forty species of birds have been sighted at the KWB, including the
Caspian tern, white-faced ibis, and freshwater pelicans (KWB Background,
2000, p. 2). In addition, the Endangered Species Act listed species found on
the KWB site including the San Joaquin kit fox (Vulpes macrotis mutica),
Stephen’s kangaroo rat (Dipodomys stephensi), and the blunt-nosed leopard
lizard (Gambelia sila) (California Department of Water Resources, Bulletin
160-98, p. 8-21).
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Use of the KWB site as a habitat necessitated setting aside a large
portion of land that could have been used for recharge facilities. However,
as noted above, both the groundwater banking operations and the design of
the areas between recharge basins creates the opportunity for compatible
uses that benefit both the CPR and the area flora and fauna. This is an
attribute that should be carefully noted for the design of groundwater banking
programs in California’s Central Valley.
• Groundwater Banking
Approximately 7,000 to 7,200 acres of the 19,883 acre KWB are used
as active recharge basins (Iger, March 2000). There are 61 shallow (2 feet
deep) recharge basins at the site, with approximately 63 miles of levees
(KWBA, Background Materials, 2000). As previously mentioned, the areas
between the recharge basins form habitat areas used to regenerate native
grasses and plants such as willows and tules.
Institutional Arrangements
Institutional, or decision-making, arrangements represent “soft
constraints” because, unlike the physical and technological attributes, they
do not impact outcomes independent of human choice and interaction.
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Institutional arrangements provide the rules, or the constraints,
needed by the AO are to manage the uncertainty that is created by the
physical and technological attributes and contextual factors.
The collective action arrangements for the KWB are discussed in the
following sections at each of the three action levels:
• Constitutional Arrangements
Constitutional arrangements consist of rules for determining who is
eligible to participate in the system. These rules can be internal or external
(or both) to the community of users, and they establish the process and rules
by which collective-choice rules are created, enforced, and modified.
In the KWB case, the external rules consist of the Government Code
of the State of California (Article 1, Chapter 5, Division 7), which enables the
formation of a joint powers authority (JPA). A JPA allows for two or more
public agencies to jointly exercise governmental powers common to both of
them, under the provisions of California Government Code 6500. A separate
public agency may be formed pursuant to a joint exercise of powers
agreement. JPA’s also have the power to issue revenue bonds for financing
projects within their jurisdiction. The Government Code facilitated the
formation of the Kern Water Bank Authority as a JPA.
• Collective-Choice Arrangements
Collective-choice arrangements provide the means to determine,
enforce, and modify operational rules. Most importantly, collective-choice
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arrangements establish the means to adjudicate conflicts and disputes
between participants by structuring the processes by which disputes may be
settled.
The collective choice arrangements for the KWB are embodied in the
joint powers agreement between the participating parties (Member Entities)
known as the “Joint Powers Agreement for the Kern Water Bank Authority
(1995).” This agreement creates the Kern Water Bank Authority (KWBA) and
sets up a governing board composed of one director per Member Entity.
Per the JPA, the KWBA is empowered to do the following:
1. Incur indebtedness.
2. Sell, exchange, or transfer real property exceeding
$100,000 in value.
3. Enter in agreements with other agencies, persons, or
entities other than a Member Entity to bank, sell, convey,
transfer, or otherwise dispose of water.
4. Modify or amend the KWB master plan or base project.
5. Enter into contracts to manage the project.
6. Adopt, amend or repeal bylaws, operating rules and
regulations for the KWB.
7. As a debtor, file for bankruptcy.
8. Admit new Members Entities to the KWBA.
9. Initiate litigation, judicial arbitration, or administrative actions
for claims exceeding $500,000. Also settle claims against
the KWBA exceeding $500,000.
10. Levy assessments against Member Entities for costs within
the adopted KWBA budgets.
• Operational Arrangements
Operational arrangements are the rules placing limits on the behaviors
of participants by defining what participants may or may not do. Limits may
be placed on use (duration and type of use) and on the amounts of resources
that may be withdrawn (allocation rules). Operational rules take into account
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the boundaries of the resource (who is entitled to use the resource) and the
inputs required of participants to maintain the resource. Penalties for lack of
compliance with the operational arrangement may also be embodied at this
level.
The Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Operation and
Monitoring of the Kern Water Bank Program (1995) embodies the operational
arrangements for the KWB. This document (MOU) is a legally binding
agreement between the KWB Project Participants (Participating AO’s) and
the Adjoining Entities (Non-participating AO’s).
The MOU establishes a Monitoring Committee composed of one
representative from each of the Adjoining Entities (initially five
representatives) and one representative from each of the Project Participants
(initially six representatives). This Monitoring Committee is the main
communication forum between the Adjoining Entities and the Project
Participants regarding the operations of the KWB, and it is responsible for
determining water level and quality conditions under project and non-project
conditions. The Monitoring Committee is also the dispute resolution body for
the Adjoining Entities and the Project Participants and overlying users,
providing recommended resolutions to impacts caused by the groundwater
banking operation.
The Monitoring Committee is responsible for engaging the services of
a professional groundwater specialist to develop and implement a monitoring
plan and provide regular monitoring reports for the KWB. Per the MOU, The
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Monitoring Committee, which meets and confers monthly to further the
monitoring program, is responsible for establishing monitoring criteria and
operational criteria and procedures to avoid, eliminate, or mitigate the
creation of adverse impacts or imbalances due to groundwater banking. The
Adjoining Entities provide the Monitoring Committee with groundwater
monitoring data on their respective areas. In turn, the KWBA compiles an
annual report of all banking activities in the KWB.
The MOU sets forth the following operating objectives and
mitigations:
1) The KWB is to be operated to maintain and, when possible,
enhance the quality of groundwater within the Kern Fan Area.
This means that:
a) If supplies of recharge water exceed recharge
capacity, recharge priority should be given to the
purest or best quality water
b) Recovery operations should extract the poorest
quality groundwater when practicable.
c) All pumping operations should control the
migration of poorer quality water by limiting
extractions that draw poorer quality water into
useable water areas; increasing extractions in
areas that generate a beneficial reverse gradient;
increase recharge to promote favorable
groundwater gradients.
2) The recovery of banked water is subject to the “golden rule”
where the banking operation may not operate to create
conditions that are worse than would have prevailed absent the
project.
3) The KWB is to be developed with mitigation measures in place.
These mitigations include provision of buffer areas between
extraction wells and neighboring overlying users, provision of a
sufficient number of extraction wells spread out so as to allow
rotation of wells (to avoid impact to neighboring users due to
concentrated pumping), provision of time restrictions between
recharge and extraction.
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4) The KWB will provide financial compensation to overlying users
for adverse impacts due to banking operation. The KWB
provides mitigations to overlying users, such as lowering of
their well pumps or deepening their wells (if the extraction
lowers the water in the aquifer). The KWB will provide
alternative water supplies to overlying users to mitigate adverse
impacts.
Most importantly, the amount of banked surface-water put into the
KWB by participants has 4% deducted for losses and overdraft correction.
Similarly, any surface-water that is banked for out-of-county entities, or sold
to out-of-county entities, is assessed an additional 5% for losses and
overdraft correction. Water that is deducted is considered “non-bankable”
and cannot be extracted or recovered by participants (i.e. it stays in the
bank).
Characteristics of the User Community
The successful negotiation and development of institutions depend to
a large degree upon the response of individuals within the user community.
Thus, it is essential to understand the groups and individuals who use the
groundwater in the KWB area if we are to understand the development of
institutions governing the use of the KWB.
The KWB user community consists of the following groups of water
users briefly described as follows:
1. Participating AO’s - Known as Project Participants; these AO’s
consist of water Districts, Irrigation Districts, Water Storage
Districts
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2. Participating AO’s - Private Organizations (Farming
Companies)
3. Non-participating AO’s - Known as Adjoining Entities, these
AO’s consist of neighboring Water Districts, Irrigation Districts
4. Overlying Users - Individual Land Owners, Farmers
5. Overlying Users - Municipal (City of Bakersfield)
Participating AO’s in the KWB (referred to as Project Participants)
include: Dudley Ridge Water District, Kern County Water Agency, Semitropic
Water Storage District, Tejon-Castaic Water District, Westside Mutual Water
Company and Wheeler Ridge-Maricopa Water Storage District. These
Project Participants entered into a formal Joint Powers Agreement to form
the KWBA. These AO’s have boards of directors who are elected from the
community of water users within the AO’s district boundaries. These boards
represent the interests of the local user community (farming) at the board
level and are responsible for setting policy for these AO’s. The local AO’s
also have responsibility for the delivery of surface-water to the users in their
districts and are responsible for some groundwater banking (Semitropic
Water Storage District for example).
The Project Participants provide water for agriculture in the area;
therefore, they support the goals of ensuring that the groundwater supply
remains readily available for farming use, that the groundwater basin is not
overdrafted, and that groundwater banking operations do not interfere with
their constituents’ use of the groundwater or farming operations.
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Paramount Farming Co., a major landowner and farming operation in
the area, is another participating AO. It should be noted that Paramount
Farming Co. played a key role in working with DWR and the participants to
facilitate the transfer of the KWB land from DWR to the Kern Water Bank
Authority (Taube, July 2000). The Kern County Water Agency acted as the
intermediary in the transfer of the KWB land to the Kern Water Bank
Authority.
Additional local non-participating appropriator organizations (AO’s)
include: Rosedale-Rio Bravo Water Storage District, the Buena Vista Water
Storage District, the Henry Miller Water District, the West Kern Water District
and the Kern Delta Water District. These agencies are not participants in the
KWB, but, due to the proximity of their agency boundaries to the KWB, they
are “stakeholder” AO’s. The special districts listed above (referred to as
“Adjoining Entities”) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the
KWBA regarding the operation and maintenance of the KWB so as to
prevent significant adverse impacts and to create a monitoring committee
and forum for dispute resolution. As with the participating AO’s, the non
participating AO’s are districts governed by boards of local water users within
each district. The non-participating AO’s goals are similar, if not identical, to
the Project Participants.
Individual overlying groundwater users in the KWB area mainly use
groundwater for irrigation of farmland, with a minor amount being used for
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domestic purposes. The majority of these users are also within the
boundaries of water and irrigation districts that supply surface-water to their
farms. Thus, these users make up the constituencies of the AO’s.
The City of Bakersfield is an overlying groundwater user and is also
involved in groundwater banking operations adjacent to the KWB site. Thus,
the City of Bakersfield is a significant appropriator whose uses of the basin
needed to be addressed during the institutional development for the KWB.
The City of Bakersfield, unlike the other groundwater users in the
KWB, uses groundwater for what is termed municipal and industrial uses.
Thus, the groundwater provides drinking water for residential demands,
water for landscape irrigation, water for commercial needs and water for
industrial uses within the corporate limits of the City of Bakersfield.
• Level of Trust
All of the users, with the exception of the City of Bakersfield, share
many common characteristics. The majority of the members of the AO’s,
both participating and non-participating, are farmers who rely on agriculture
for their livelihoods. The participating and non-participating AO’s consist of
water districts, water storage districts, or irrigation districts dedicated mainly
to supporting agricultural water needs.
The KWB is locally controlled. Outside entities can purchase KWB
banked water from Project Participants per the JPA. The JPA contains a
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“right of first refusal” clause, wherein a Project Participant proposing to
transfer (sell) water must first notify the other Participants of the offer and
allow them the opportunity to purchase before selling to a third party
(Hamilton, June 2000, KWBA JPA, 1995, pp. 16-18). The KWB recently
concluded one-year sales of water to USBR for 70,000 acre-feet and the
Westlands Water District for 45,000 acre-feet of water.
Per KWB participants, the fact that the majority of the AO’s are
agriculturally based districts who have common memberships in associations
(Kern County Water Association, Association of California Water Agencies)
helps to foster communications and trust (Taube, 2000). Also, the majority of
the Project Participants are members of the Kern County Water Agency
which serves as an umbrella agency for AO’s using SWP surface-water
(SWP contractors). This relationship also fosters communication between
AO’s. The level of trust between area users was enhanced by the committee
process where local AO’s came together to discuss mutual needs and water
supply options (Kern County Future Water Supply Committee, Issues
Resolution Committee). The committee process helped facilitate the
development of the agreements needed to proceed with the KWB.
Action Situation and Contextual Factors
The “action situation” refers to the situational variables that help to
drive patterns of interaction. The action situation is the “local” setting that is
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considered by the various members of the user community as they interact to
facilitate outcomes. The action situation is internal, or local, as opposed to
the contextual factors, which are dynamic forces remote from the local
management of the CPR.
For the KWB, the contextual factors directly impact the action situation by
creating a scarcity of water, both surface-water and groundwater. In
summary the significant contextual factors are as follows:
• A severe drought in the early 1990’s significantly reduces available
surface-water supplies for California.
• The passage of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA)
in 1992 reduces the surface-water available in the CVP for meeting
contracted uses. The CVPIA reallocated 800,000 acre-feet per year
of CVP surface-water (600,000 in dry years) from Central Valley
farmers toward the restoration of Central Valley fisheries.
• Imported surface-water deliveries in the Kern County area were
reduced to zero acre-feet during the drought period of the early
1990’s. Long-term deliveries of surface-water to the Kern area from
the SWP were curtailed in the early 1990’s to meet environmental
needs and due to water rights decisions.
• The State of California’s failure to complete the SWP as projected.
The action situation for the KWB area consists of local conditions that
were occurring prior to the establishment of the KWB. Most of these
conditions were the result of the contextual factors and are summarized as
follows:
• A persistent overdraft of 250,000 to 300,000 acre-feet per year of
groundwater from the Kern Fan Element during the 1980’s.
• Projections of the overdraft reaching the 600,000 acre-feet per year
(crisis for the CPR).
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• Reductions in surface-water deliveries to the Kern area resulting in
farmland being fallowed.
• State attempts to create a water bank in the Kern Fan Element are
ineffective and the cost of water from a state-run water bank is
unacceptably high to area water users.
Essentially, the action situation for the KWB area consisted of a
serious threat to the groundwater supply due to overdraft, reductions in
surface-water deliveries to the area due to physical and institutional
constraints, and resulted in the need to take farmland out of production. This
combination of events created the shared belief between AO’s that action
needed to be taken to correct the overall water supply deficits in order to
preserve the local economy. A proposed solution, the creation of a state-run
water bank, appeared to be failing both from an implementation standpoint
and due to high costs. Thus, the pending local area water crisis, combined
with the failure to implement a state-run water bank, provided the setting to
consider local action for the development of a groundwater bank.
Incentives to Cooperate and Coordinate
There are three major factors that may provide users with incentives to
cooperate and collaborate. Water supply reliability, ensuring plentiful water
supplies, and the local control of water supplies represent significant
concerns for water users in California’s Central Valley. The cost of banking
water is also cited as an incentive for collaboration at the local level.
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All of these incentives, as they relate to the KWB, are discussed in more
detail as follows.
• Ensuring Water Supply Reliability and Quantity
Essentially, water users expect a certain amount of benefits to accrue
before considering collective action. In most cases, water users will view a
plentiful and reliable water supply as the primary benefit of collective action.
In California, quantity of supply and reliability are very important factors due
to the arid nature of the state, the lack of water storage (in comparison to
water demands), and the unpredictability of precipitation.
As previously noted, the majority of the members of the user
community in the KWB area are farmers who depend on groundwater and
surface-water supplies for their livelihoods. Thus, the development of a more
plentiful and reliable supply of water would appear to be a significant
incentive for the water users in the Kern area to pursue collective action.
The KWB mission bears out this assumption. As stated, the mission of the
KWB is to ensure a reliable water supply to the southern San Joaquin Valley
while providing for exceptional upland and wetland habitat (KWBA
Presentation Document, 2000).
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The primary objective of the KWB is to enhance the water supplies for
KWB project participants, SWP contractors and Improvement District 4,
which encompasses incidental beneficiaries such as the City of Bakersfield
located immediately east of the KWB site, the Rosedale-Rio Bravo WSD
immediately north of the site, and the Kern Delta WD to the south.
Enhancing the water supplies for KWB participants by groundwater
banking also means providing a means to correct the overdraft in the Kern
Fan Element, which helps protect users during dry years by providing a “full
basin” as insurance against drought.
As noted with irrigation systems, cooperation and collective action
among farmers is facilitated by a situation of moderate water scarcity (Tang,
p. 22). Per Tang, most collective action activities will occur in situations
where the water supply is barely sufficient and the end users believe their
collective efforts can improve water supply reliability. This moderate scarcity
also appears to be the case in the action situation that faced AO’s in the Kern
Fan Element area.
• Local Control of Groundwater Supplies
Maintaining the local control of water supplies, particularly groundwater,
is a significant issue for the agriculturally based user groups in California’s
Central Valley. In contrast to surface-water, there is no statewide permit
system for groundwater use in California - groundwater use is mainly the
right of the overlying property owner. Local control can essentially mean four
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things to users of groundwater basin. First, local control means preservation
of the overlying right to access the groundwater basin by overlying users.
Secondly, local control means that the basin is not adjudicated by the courts;
in other words overlying use is not constrained by court ordered limits.
Thirdly, local control is understood as some ability to develop institutional
arrangements to govern water supplies at the local level. Fourthly and
finally, local control can refer to the ability to control outside access to the
groundwater basin (control access to the CPR). These varied
understandings, when combined with the complexity of the California water
rights system, can lead to conflicts and increased uncertainty regarding water
supplies.
In some cases, the conflicts can be settled administratively through the
State Water Resources Control Board, but the Board has jurisdiction over
only a subset of the conflicts that can occur, and certain groundwater
conflicts are outside of the Board’s jurisdiction (Thompson, pg 5). In these
cases where the conflict is between groundwater users (and not under the
Board’s jurisdiction), court adjudication of the groundwater basin can take
place. Through litigation and court adjudication groundwater rights can be
determined, and the groundwater pumping by various users is then
subsequently limited by the court decision (Littleworth and Garner, pg 53).
For the KWB user community, adjudication places constraints on their
use of groundwater, and this can be considered a negative impact to their
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ability to utilize groundwater to augment available surface-water supplies
during dry years. Thus, adjudication represents a loss of control to many
groundwater users. Additionally, the process of adjudication is lengthy and
expensive. Thus, one finds that “the expense and time involved in judicial
relief deter many water users from turning to the courts (Thompson, pp. 4-5).
Few water users can afford to litigate, and judicial cases are infrequent
(Thompson, p. 5).
One alternative to groundwater litigation may be found in the formation
of local districts (AO’s). California state law allows for the formation of a
variety of water districts with jurisdiction over groundwater. Water
replenishment districts, water conservation districts, and county water
districts are examples of local districts that can be formed via the California
Water Code (Water Code § 60,000 et seq, Water Code § 30,000 et seq,
Water Code § 71,000 et seq). These districts can engage in groundwater
replenishment activities, protect groundwater quality, and impose
assessments on groundwater pumping to provide funds for water
replenishment programs (California Water, p. 56). More importantly, these
local districts can integrate surface-water and groundwater uses and resolve
conflicts through negotiation and contacts (Thompson, p. 7). Thus, the
formation of local districts can help to ensure that local control of water
supplies, particularly groundwater, is maintained. As noted by Thompson,
“Unless conflicts are resolved through local means, groundwater users are
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likely to find that the Board, as well as the federal government, will assert
increased jurisdiction over pumping in future years (Thompson, p. 7).
Another alternative to litigation is for water districts to band together
and form a joint powers authority to address regional groundwater issues.
This is what was done to form the KWB. As noted in this study, the local
water users’ fear of adjudication of the groundwater basin was an incentive to
develop an agreement to resolve issues surrounding the formation of the
KWB authority. Likewise, the AO’s believed they could join together to
implement the project far more effectively at the local level and maintain local
control of area water supplies.
Cost
Effective implementation at the local level also carries an economic
incentive through reduced banked water costs to the end water users. The
estimated cost of banked water to end-users for the original state proposed
KWB was approximately $400 to $450 per acre-foot as compared to
approximately $138 per acre-foot for the locally controlled program. Thus,
the participants cite cost as an incentive for implementing the program
locally.
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Patterns of Interaction
Given the physical and technological attributes of the resources in
question, the institutional arrangements that are available, the action
situation and incentives, groups of individuals make strategy choices for
relating to one another. These choices result in patterns of interaction, which
in turn produce outcomes.
In the KWB case, the area AO’s recognized that groundwater banking
was a feasible solution to the overdraft problem and surface-water supply
reliability problems. The groundwater banking solution was identified and
discussed in technical studies and publications going back to the 1960’s, so
groundwater banking in the Kern Fan Element was generally recognized as
means to enhance local water supplies. Both a local AO and the State
Department of Water Resources (DWR) had recognized the value of
groundwater banking in the Kern Fan Element and both had attempted to
implement a Kern Water Bank project at different times.
Initially, one finds the local AO’s are willing to collaborate with the
DWR in its attempt to establish the KWB (1986 to 1994). This willingness to
collaborate is based on the local AO’s recognition of the value of the KWB to
enhancing the reliability of the SWP water supply to the area, plus the fact
that a local AO had initially proposed the project (Taube, 2000). During this
same time period, the local AO’s also formed the Kern County Future Water
Supply Committee to discuss groundwater banking operational criteria and
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area water banking options. So education and communication regarding
groundwater banking was on-going through the 1990 through 1994 time
frame.
The combination of the rising cost for the DWR sponsored KWB
project, delays in DWR implementation of the project, and significant drought
impacts to water allocations in the Kern County area provide the impetus for
the local AO’s to make the strategic choice to negotiate to take over the KWB
project at the local level (Taube, 2000). The KWB is a multi-user
groundwater banking program that evolved from a locally conceived and
proposed project, to a state project, then back to local project.
Outcomes
There are several key positive outcomes for the participants and non
participants in a groundwater banking program related to the function of the
storage operation. These outcomes correlate to the performance of the
groundwater bank and they include the following performance criteria:
• The groundwater bank stores enough water to increase the reliability
of the water supplies for the participants as projected.
• The groundwater banking operations cause no harm to participants
and non-participants.
• Participants follow the rules of the groundwater banking program.
• The groundwater banking operation causes no harm to the CPR
(corrects overdraft).
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• The groundwater bank preserves the participants’ and non
participants’ water rights and right of access.
Logically, the opposite outcomes to those listed above would be negative
outcomes for a groundwater banking program.
The implementation of the KWB resulted in 1,000,000 acre-feet of
surface-water being stored in the KFE within five years of program start up.
This has produced the following outcomes:
• The reliability of the area water supply is enhanced and increased for
KWB participants.
• The overdraft in the immediate KFE area is corrected.
• Participants are following the rules of the program (adhering to the
MOU and oversight committee process).
• No harm has been caused to the program participants and non
participants.
• No negative water quality impacts have occurred to the groundwater
basin as a result of the KWB banking operation.
Thus, the KWB meets the performance criteria for a successful
groundwater banking program using imported surface-water.
The Arvin-Edison Water Storage District/Metropolitan Water District
Groundwater Bank Program
This case study is based primarily on the case study work performed
for the Natural Heritage Institute’s conjunctive use study (Thomas et al, NHI,
2001). The writer is indebted to Jennifer L. Spaletta of the firm of Herum
Crabtree & Brown for providing much of the background information and
material for this case study as part of the Natural Heritage Institute project.
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Description of the AEWSD Area
The AEWSD-Edison Water Storage District (AEWSD) is located in the
southeastern corner of the San Joaquin Valley and is entirely within Kern
County. AEWSD contains approximately 132,000 acres of highly productive
agricultural land about 20 miles south of the City of Bakersfield (National
Academies Press, 1997, p. 140, Thomas et al, NHI, 2001). AEWSD is
bordered by the foothills of the Sierra Nevada on the east and the Tehachapi
Mountains on the southeast.
Development of the AEWSD area took place in the early 1900s. The
AEWSD area is now known for its high quality soils and high value crops
such as grapes, citrus, potatoes, carrots, cotton, orchard fruit and truck crops
(AEWSD-Edison Water Storage District, The AEWSD-Edison Water Storage
District Water Resources Management Program, November 1999, Thomas
et al, NHI, 2001). The area is almost entirely agricultural, with only small
areas of urban development. The annual value of agriculture in the area is
approximately $300 million (National Academies Press, 1997, p. 140)
No major streams or rivers are located within the AEWSD area and
the region is arid, receiving only an average of 8.2 to 8.3 inches of rain per
year (National Academies Press, 1997 p. 140, Thomas et al, NHI, 2001).
Historically, farmers in the AEWSD relied primarily on groundwater,
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supplemented by small erratic flows from minor streams to cultivate the
region (National Academies Press, 1997, p. 140).
The district’s groundwater basin can be divided into three distinct
areas—a large central area and two smaller areas to the northeast and
southeast. Two faults running through the district affect the movement of
groundwater and create the three areas. However, in practice, the district is
regarded as one groundwater management area (Bookman-Edmonston,
1996).
Groundwater overdraft problems started appearing as early as the
1930s. Between 1950 and 1965, groundwater levels fell from an average
depth of 250 feet to 450 feet and the depth to groundwater exceeded 600
feet in certain areas of the district (National Academies Press 1997, p. 140,
Thomas et al NHI, 2001). By 1965, the average annual overdraft in the
AEWSD area was 200,000 acre-feet, or almost half of the water applied for
irrigation district-wide (National Academies Press, 1997, p. 140).
The receding water table also influenced the subsurface movement of
water with high boron concentrations from the east moving into the aquifers
underlying the district (Thomas et al, NHI, 2001). Boron concentrations in
water of 1 part per million and greater can be toxic to certain crops, so the
combination of overdraft and increasing boron threatened the economic base
of the AEWSD area.
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AEWSD Program History
The AEWSD was organized in 1942 to obtain supplemental surface-
water supplies for the area to correct the groundwater overdraft. The district
secured Federal water contracts from the Central Valley Project (CVP) in the
1960s and received imported surface-water from the Friant-Kern Canal
starting in 1966 (Thomas et al, NHI, 2001, National Academies Press, 1997,
p. 141). Agricultural operations expanded in the AEWSD expanded to
100,000 irrigated acres by the mid-1960s (Thomas et al, NHI, 2001).
In 1966 AEWSD received a federal loan which enabled it to construct
the AEWSD-Edison Canal (which conveys water from the terminus of the
Friant-Kern Canal into the district), 1,000 acres of spreading works, and 55
recovery wells. Thus, the district was able to store surface-water
underground via recharge ponds or by delivering surface-water to
landowners in lieu of their customary use of groundwater. To achieve
economies of scale with the infrastructure, the district concentrated its
surface-water delivery facilities to serve 52,000 acres of the district with the
poorest quality groundwater at the greatest depths. Thus, much of the
district (about 80,000 acres) is still totally dependent on groundwater but has
benefited from the district’s programs in the form of reduced depth to
groundwater (and associated reductions in pumping costs) and higher quality
groundwater (Bookman-Edmonston, 1996).
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The introduction of imported surface-water did not completely solve
the areas’ water supply problems. The district’s water supply contract
allowed for the importation of 40,000 acre-feet of firm (guaranteed) surface-
water per year and up to 311,675 acre-feet of interruptible or non-firm supply
(National Academies Press, 1997, p. 141). This created variability in the
water supply to AEWSD so that the actual deliveries of water during the
period of 1966 to 1994 ranged from 30,000 acre-feet per year to almost
270,000 acre-feet per year (National Academies Press, 1997, p. 141).
Average demand for surface-water in the district (exclusive of demand for
groundwater) is 160,000 acre-feet per year (Thomas et al, NHI, 2001).
Starting In the 1970s, the district entered into exchange programs with
other CVP contractors on the Friant-Kern Canal in an effort to “firm up” its
surface-water supplies. Through an exchange agreement, six exchange
agencies located along the Friant-Kern Canal on the east side of the San
Joaquin Valley receive up to 70,984 acre-feet per year of the district’s non
firm (Class 1) Friant water. In exchange, the district receives up to 66,096
acre-feet of non-Friant CVP water from the California Aqueduct (west of the
district) on an irrigation demand schedule. The water that AEWSD receives
via this exchange is available almost every year, as opposed to the district’s
much less reliable Class 1 Friant water. Delivery of water to the district via
the California Aqueduct is made possible by the Cross Valley Canal, which
connects the AEWSD-Edison Canal to the Aqueduct (Thomas et al, NHI,
2001).
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In the mid-1980s, the district sought financing for additional water
banking facilities that would allow further regulation of its erratic surface-
water supply and increased water availability to district landowners. These
additional facilities would allow AEWSD to take more of its Class 2 CVP
water, when available, and store the supply in the underground aquifer for
subsequent recovery during high demand/low supply periods. This banked
water would serve as a “buffer” when the surface-water supplies are low. To
accomplish this, the district sought a partner that would provide financial
assistance for these additional facilities in exchange for temporary storage of
water in the groundwater basin underlying the district. By the late 1980s, a
tentative agreement had been reached with Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California (MWD). Although this initial agreement was never
implemented, the concept resurfaced again in 1995, and a twenty-five year
agreement for a Water Management Program between AEWSD and MWD
was executed in 1997 (Bookman-Edmonston, 1996).
Under the twenty-five year agreement with MWD, substantial new
groundwater banking facilities were constructed in the district including 500
additional acres of spreading ponds, 15 new groundwater wells, and a 4.5-
mile bi-directional intertie pipeline connecting the terminus of the district’s
canal with the California Aqueduct (Thomas et al, NHI, 2001). The facilities
cost approximately $25 million to design and construct. It is anticipated that
MWD will store a minimum of 250,000 acre-feet of water in AEWSD within
the first seven years. Maximum storage levels over the life of the program
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are not specified, but MWD cannot store more than 350,000 acre-feet of
water in the district at any one time without amendment of the agreement by
both parties. The new spreading grounds constructed for the project have
the capacity to recharge 45,000 acre-feet per year. The recovery capacity of
the project ranges from 40,000 to 75,000 acre-feet per year (Kern County
Water Agency Presentation, 1997). The agreement characterizes AEWSD
as holding MWD’s water in “trust” while the water is stored in the district
(AEWSD/MWD Agreement, 1997).
Currently, imported surface-water for the banking program includes
only MWD water from its SWP contract and other sources. However, the
Agreement contemplates acquisition by AEWSD of up to 150,000 acre-feet
of Friant flood flows and subsequent transfer to MWD (AEWSD/MWD
Agreement, 1997
The districts formed the program through contractual arrangements
between the two districts themselves and between the two districts and the
Department of Water Resources. Negotiated principles with local interest
groups have been used to overcome initial apprehension about controversial
aspects of the program. For example, the contract between MWD and
AEWSD incorporates the Principles of Agreement between the district,
MWD, the Friant Water Users Authority and the Central Valley Water
Coalition. The contract between MWD and the district also requires certain
monitoring activities and rules that are designed to protect local groundwater
users.
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Program Costs
As noted above, the district’s original facilities were constructed with a
federal loan, which has since been repaid. The AEWSD/MWD agreement
provides that the $25 million to construct the facilities for the project will come
from fees charged by AEWSD to MWD for banking its water. AEWSD will
also recoup all of its costs through operation and maintenance fees, energy
cost fees and conveyance facility use fees. The bottom-line cost to MWD is
about $250 per acre-foot (Kern County Water Agency Presentation,
September 1998).
To finance construction of the necessary facilities, MWD advanced the
district $12 million in fees. To recoup this investment, MWD will pay
proportionately reduced rates per acre-foot when it stores and extracts
water—in effect creating a $12 million interest-free loan from MWD to
AEWSD (Kern County Water Agency Presentation, September 1998).
AEWSD is further protected financially because the agreement with
MWD requires a minimum of 277,778 acre-feet of water to be stored by
MWD in the district within seven years. This minimum level is tied to the
estimated cost of facilities to be constructed so that the fees paid at this level
will generate sufficient funds to pay for the cost of the necessary facilities.
The Agreement contemplates that additional water may be stored by MWD,
up to 350,000 acre-feet at any one time, upon mutual agreement of the
parties. The parties may also amend the agreement to exceed this limit
(Thomas et al, NHI, 2001).
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AEWSD’s cash flow position in constructing the project is further
protected in that MWD has agreed to advance additional funds to AEWSD
under certain conditions. Specifically, if at any time AEWSD has expended
$3 million more in constructing the necessary facilities than it has earned in
water management fees, MWD will advance additional funds so that AEWSD
is never more than $3 million “upside down (Thomas et al, NHI, 2001,
interview with Howard Frick).”
The facilities constructed for the project are owned and operated by
AEWSD and allow the district the benefit of being able to increase its dry
year supplies, expand its surface-water delivery capabilities to additional
acreage and increase its overall operational flexibility. Notably, the additional
facilities that AEWSD will own as a result of its banking program with MWD
will allow the district to conserve about 8,000 to 10,000 acre-feet of its own
contract entitlement per year. However, at an estimated cost of $25 million, it
never would have been cost effective for AEWSD to build these same
facilities without the financing of a banking partner such as MWD (Thomas et
al, NHI, 2001, interview with Howard Frick). MWD’s use of the facilities will
always be subject to AEWSD’s superior right to use the facilities for its own
benefit. However, MWD will have a first priority to use a certain capacity of
the new facilities in front of other bankers that enter the program in the future
(AEWSD, Agreement between AEWSD and MWD, 1997).
MWD is responsible for dealing with DWR to schedule deliveries of
returned water from AEWSD to MWD via the California Aqueduct. Thus,
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MWD must incur the costs of these arrangements and meet the water quality
standards necessary to put the returned water into the aqueduct (AEWSD,
Agreement between AEWSD and MWD, 1997).
The financial risk that the project will not succeed has been primarily
placed on MWD. There are several reasons why it could become impossible
for AEWSD to return stored water to MWD, including changes in water
quality or water quality standards or other reasons beyond its control. If this
were to happen, AEWSD could buy the water that MWD has stored. The
purchase would be arranged so that AEWSD would buy the water from MWD
for an amount equal to the costs that AEWSD would have incurred to
purchase the same amount of water as Class 2 supplies from the Friant-Kern
Canal, under its contract with USBR in the year that the water was delivered
to storage by MWD (AEWSD, Agreement between AEWSD and MWD,
1997).
Project Opposition and Issues
• AEWSD’s local benefit program
Opposition to AEWSD’s internal groundwater banking program has
been non-existent. Notably, AEWSD is a district that was originally formed to
conduct conjunctive use operations for the benefit of its own landowners.
Thus, the concept of conjunctive use and/or groundwater banking was never
new or foreign to landowners in the district. Rather, those landowners
surrounding the district’s original spreading ponds and collection wells
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historically have experienced fluctuating pump lifts due to the district’s
operations (Thomas et al, NHI, 2001, interviews with Howard Frick and
Ernest Conant). Political opposition to AEWSD’s new groundwater banking
program with MWD has come primarily from outside of the district and has
not prevented implementation of the program (Thomas et al, NHI, 2001,
interview with Gene McMurtry).
• AEWSD’s Groundwater Banking Program for Outside Interests
When MWD and AEWSD first began negotiating a banking program in
the 1980s, the district’s consultants, attorneys and board members
anticipated political opposition to any program that included pumping
groundwater from the valley and conveying it to MWD (Thomas et al, NHI
2001, interviews with Howard Frick and Ernest Conant). Therefore, the
program was structured so that MWD would receive its banked water only via
exchanges on the California Aqueduct and never through a direct pumpback
from the district. As originally envisioned, the proposal would have worked
as follows:
■ MWD would bank water in AEWSD by delivering surplus water
under its State Water Project (SWP) contract to AEWSD for either
direct recharge or delivery to farmers in lieu of groundwater
pumping. MWD would accrue a like amount of groundwater
credits.
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■ Recovery of banked water by MWD would involve transfer by
AEWSD of a portion of its Delta-CVP water received via the
California Aqueduct (from the exchange agreement with the Cross
Valley Contractors) to MWD. MWD would take delivery of water
from the California Aqueduct that would otherwise be diverted at
the Cross Valley Canal for use by AEWSD. Farmers in AEWSD
would pump groundwater in place of the CVP surface-water they
would normally receive. MWD banking credits in AEWSD would
be reduced accordingly (Thomas et al, NHI, 2001, EIP Associates).
In this original proposal, the AEWSD/MWD program required approval
by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) for the
transfer/exchange of the Delta-CVP water to MWD; by the California
Department of Water Resources (DWR) for use of the California Aqueduct to
wheel CVP water to MWD under MWD’s SWP contract and by the State
Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) for amendment to USBR’s Delta-
CVP water rights permits to include portions of MWD’s service area as a
permitted place of use and for changed points of diversion. Originally, the
CVP Water Users’ Association opposed the concept of amending the Delta-
CVP water rights permits. However, AEWSD and MWD were able to resolve
issues through negotiation with other Delta-CVP users and by agreeing to
seek a very limited permit amendment that would facilitate only the proposed
project (Thomas et al, NHI, 2001, interview with Gene McMurtry).
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Subsequent environmental concerns resulted in this project concept being
“shelved.”
After shelving the original banking program concept with AEWSD,
MWD negotiated and entered into a banking agreement with Semitropic
Water Storage District that included a direct pumpback component. The
Semitropic/MWD program addressed the concerns of neighboring
landowners through an agreement that placed operational criteria on the
project to limit third party impacts and required a formal groundwater
monitoring committee (Thomas et al, NHI, 2001, interview with Gene
McMurtry).
In light of the success of the neighboring Semitropic/MWD
groundwater banking program, AEWSD and MWD reinitiated discussions
and developed a project that included a pumpback component. Under this
arrangement, MWD would deliver its SWP water to AEWSD for subsurface
storage. At some future date, AEWSD would recover the water and deliver it
to MWD via a new 4.5-mile pipeline intertie between the AEWSD-Edison
Canal and the California Aqueduct (Thomas et al, NHI, 2001, interview with
Howard Frick).
The restructuring of the project eliminated the need for USBR to
approve the transfer, as AEWSD’s CVP water was no longer involved.
Without USBR involvement, NEPA compliance was not required, and the
project had only to comply with CEQA. After the Monterey Agreement, the
water rights held by the State of California for the State Water Project
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allowed off-stream storage. Thus, the proposed project was already an
approved use under project partners’ SWP contracts and only required
ministerial approval by DWR for changes in points of diversion. The parties
adopted a Mitigated Negative Declaration in July of 1996, and the project
was approved without substantial public or agency controversy. The
agreement between AEWSD and MWD for a Water Management Program
was signed December 19, 1997 (Thomas et al, NHI, 2001, interview with
Howard Frick).
The AEWSD/MWD agreement also contemplates acquisition and
banking of 150,000 acre-feet (over twenty-five years) of Friant flood flows as
an additional source of water for MWD (AEWSD/MWD Agreement, 1997).
This aspect of the AEWSD/MWD program was sought by MWD as an
incentive to invest the many millions needed to construct the additional
conjunctive use facilities in AEWSD. It was also the most controversial part
of the program (Upton, July 17, 1997, p. B5).
Friant flood flows are currently available to all Friant contractors.
However, because they are available in times of very low demand and most
districts do not have the facilities to capture and store the water, flood flows
are not often utilized. The AEWSD/MWD Agreement provides for flood flow
purchase by AEWSD for storage and transfer to MWD. Theoretically, this
transfer would have required that the Friant CVP water right permits be
amended to add portions of MWD to the permitted service area. Other Friant
water users and districts adamantly opposed the idea of expanding the
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permitted place of use to include MWD, fearing that MWD’s domestic water
uses would take priority over the needs of east side farms in times of
shortage in the Friant system (Thomas et al, NHI, interview with Ernest
Conant, 2000).
This opposition led to negotiations between the Friant Water Users
Authority, the Central Valley Water Coalition, MWD and AEWSD (Thomas et
al, NHI, interview with Howard Frick, 2000). The result of these negotiations
was an agreement between the four groups that allows MWD to capture
150,000 acre-feet of additional water supply without the need to amend the
Friant CVP permits. This agreement allows AEWSD to purchase flood flows
in the form of “Conservation Credits.” AEWSD can transfer these flood flows
to Kern County Water Agency (KCWA) in exchange for a like amount of
KCWA’s SWP water which, in turn, can be sold to MWD and stored in
AEWSD’s underground aquifer. MWD can request return of its stored water
and the SWP water would be pumped back to MWD via the California
Aqueduct (AEWSD/MWD Agreement, 1997).
The concerns of the Friant Water Users and Central Valley Water
Coalition were addressed by imposing specific operational criteria on when
“Conservation Credits” may accrue and when water may subsequently be
delivered to MWD. Under the Principles of Agreement, Conservation Credits
accrue to the extent that AEWSD’s new water banking facilities can conserve
additional water supplies at times and under conditions that do not adversely
affect other Friant Water Users. Thus, if AEWSD shows that its new facilities
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can conserve up to 45,000 acre-feet of water per year, AEWSD accrues
45,000 acre-feet of Conservation Credits and may transfer up to 45,000 acre-
feet of non-CVP water to MWD.
The Principles of Agreement also explains that Conservation Credits
can only be accrued if the following conditions are met:
1) Water is being released from Friant Dam for flood control and can be
diverted without unreasonably affecting downstream water quality
requirements;
2) Capacity exists in the Friant-Kern Canal, above all other demands for
water delivery which will be used in the San Joaquin Valley, to deliver
the water to AEWSD; and
3) The new water banking facilities in AEWSD are recharging water
(AEWSD/MWD Agreement, 1997).
The Principles of Agreement also requires that no land be fallowed for
the purpose of transferring water outside of the San Joaquin Valley. These
requirements provide protection to other Friant water users.
The agreement expressly prohibits AEWSD from delivering CVP water
directly to MWD, which would have necessitated adding MWD as a place of
use under the CVP water right permits. Thus, to put this component of the
program into place, the additional exchange described above is required.
MWD has also agreed that it will not pursue any future program involving
Friant Division contract supplies that is inconsistent with the Principles of
Agreement without the prior written approval of the Friant Water Users
Authority.
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Hydrological Uncertainties and Concerns
The overlying users and an adjoining AO in the AEWSD area
expressed concerns about the typical uncertainties regarding the
groundwater CPR such as depletion of groundwater due to banking
operations and access to the groundwater by outside users. The concerns of
adjoining landowners were addressed rather easily in the AEWSD case. The
only adjoining AO affected at all by AEWSD’s manipulation of the
groundwater table is Kern-Delta Water District, located to the west of
AEWSD. None of AEWSD’s recharge ponds or wells are located near the
boundary with Kern-Delta, and thus groundwater levels in the neighboring
district are not affected by AEWSD’s operations. However, there is a slight
gradient of groundwater movement west to east from Kern-Delta to AEWSD,
with groundwater levels higher in Kern-Delta. Over the long term, it is
conceivable that Kern Delta’s water levels could be affected by a
concentration of pump-back operations in AEWSD over a multiple year
period. To alleviate this concern, AEWSD worked with Kern-Delta to adopt
groundwater monitoring and operational criteria that became provisions of
the contract with MWD.
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Although these criteria do not establish a contract between Kern-Delta
and AEWSD and/or MWD, they do set up project operating parameters that
are acceptable to Kern-Delta and that protect landowners within AEWSD
(Thomas et al, NHI, interview with Gene McMurtry, 2000).
The contract between AEWSD and MWD also provides the following
protections for the basin:
• MWD may only request return of water to the extent that there is
water in its account balance.
• A 10% loss is imposed on all water banked under the program; i.e.,
to recover 250,000 acre-feet of banked water, MWD must deliver
277,778 acre-feet to the district.
• Return of regulated water by the district to MWD must not interfere
with deliveries to the district’s contract users or other “normal and
customary uses” by the district of its available supplies. Water will
generally be returned to MWD “off-peak” and will not compete with
AEWSD’s need for dry year water.
• AEWSD will reduce or terminate groundwater pumping for
purposes of returning water to MWD as necessary to comply with
the groundwater monitoring program and operating criteria
discussed above.
Environmental Concerns
As originally envisioned, some parties were concerned that the
AEWSD/MWD project would cause increased diversions from the delta at
times that would injure fish or water quality (Thomas et al, NHI, EIP
Associates, 1992). Restructuring the project to include a pumpback rather
than an exchange alleviated these concerns. Endangered species concerns
were raised with regard to construction of the 500 new acres of spreading
ponds and ancillary facilities necessary to operate the project, however,
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these concerns were addressed through mitigation or otherwise resolved
through the CEQA process (Thomas et al, NHI, interview with Ernest Conant,
2000). No natural stream systems were utilized as part of the project, and
the isolation of the AEWSD groundwater basin makes hydrologic interaction
a minor issue (Thomas et al, NHI, interview with Gene McMurtry, 2000).
The groundwater produced in the district currently meets the state
standards necessary for water to be pumped into the California Aqueduct for
transport to MWD. The agreement also requires that water delivered to
AEWSD by MWD for storage meet specific quality criteria AEWSD/MWD
Agreement, 1997). The project has raised groundwater levels, which has
reduced the migration of boron concentrations from the eastern hills
surrounding the district (Thomas et al, NHI, interview with Gene McMurtry,
2000). Should any water quality problem arise, the Agreement puts the
burden on MWD to solve the problem with DWR.
Outcomes and Conclusions
The AEWSD/MWD project has to date only operated to bank MWD’s
SWP water in AEWSD. The recovery aspect of the project has yet to be
tested. The other components of the project, including the use of Friant
water and/or exchanges with CVP water, have also yet to be finalized
because of outstanding cost issues associated with implication of the CVPIA.
AEWSD has not experienced any adverse third party impacts as a
result of its own conjunctive use programs or as a result of banking water for
MWD. This is so even though AEWSD resorted to significant groundwater
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pumping for its own use during the late 1970s and early 1990s (Thomas et
al, NHI, interview with Gene McMurtry, 1997).
AEWSD’s own conjunctive use program appears to have been
extremely successful since its implementation in 1966 for the following
reasons:
• The soils in the region are excellent for recharge ponds and have
never had subsidence problems.
• Nearly half of all supplies banked in AEWSD-Edison have
remained to mitigate groundwater overdraft, and half have been
extracted during critically dry periods.
• The program has had years of extreme pumping that greatly
mitigated drought conditions without resulting in extreme impacts
on pump lifts for surrounding landowners.
• The basin is relatively isolated geographically and does not interact
specifically with surrounding basins or districts.
• History has shown that the program has resulted in a reduction in
annual overdraft and much more plentiful and regulated supply of
water for the landowners in the district.
AEWSD’s project to bank water for MWD also appears to have been
implemented in a rather painless fashion because of the following factors:
• The program will not hydrologically affect a significant number of
surrounding overlying users, if any.
• The landowners (overlying users) in the district are already familiar
with conjunctive use and have seen it operate successfully in their
district for almost fifty years.
• A board elected by the members whose votes are in proportion to
their land holdings governs the district. Thus, the larger
landowners in the district are either represented on the board or
trust those landowners who are board members.
• The landowners in the district all have a common interest, as the
district is primarily agricultural.
• The district has been in charge of the project since its inception,
and its control makes the landowners within and adjoining the
district comfortable.
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• USBR did not need to be involved in the project as currently
approved.
• The project only had to comply with CEQA, not NEPA, and was
able to be implemented with an Initial Study and Negative
Declaration instead of an EIR or EIS.
• MWD was willing to make the project essentially cost and risk free
for AEWSD, while providing the district with numerous benefits.
Arvin-Edison Water Storage District IAD Analysis Summary
Physical and Technological Attributes of the Groundwater Basin and
Surface-Water Systems
• Basin Characteristics
o Permeable sediments allow for excellent percolation recharge with
surface-water.
o The basin is divided into three areas by geologic faults- a large
central area and two smaller areas to the northeast and southeast.
The basin boundaries are distinct and it can be considered a closed
basin.
o The groundwater basin was overdrafted in the 1950s at an average of
200,000 acre-feet per year; prior to the MWD program, the overdraft
averaged 5,000 to 10,000 acre-feet per year.
o 1,500 to 2,000 acres of overlying land was available in the AEWSD
area for recharging the groundwater basin via percolation.
o The MWD portion of the project can recharge the basin at a rate of
approximately 50,000 acre-feet per year. The AEWSD portion can
recharge at approximately 90,000 acre-feet per year (average
recharge was 55,000 acre-feet per year from 1966 to 1994, net aquifer
recharge with imported surface-water was 372,000 acre-feet).
• Surface-Water Systems
o The Friant-Kern Canal delivers 40,000 acre-feet of firm (guaranteed)
imported surface-water per year from the federal Central Valley
Project to AEWSD.
o The Friant-Kern Canal delivers 311,675 acre-feet of interruptible
imported surface-water per year from the federal Central Valley
Project to AEWSD.
o The SWP can deliver water to AEWSD utilizing a 4.5 mile pipeline
intertie between the SWP and the Friant-Kern Canal.
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o The district’s canal system allows for the distribution of water to area
growers.
• Technological Attributes
o Surface-water can be stored in AEWSD by allowing surface-water
to percolate into the basin via spreading basins (as opposed to
injection)
o Using spreading basins is a lower cost alternative as land is
available and the geology of the area allows for rapid percolation,
o Stored (banked) water is recovered using standard well pump
technology.
o Stored water can be metered (measured) as applied to the
spreading basins,
o Recovered water is metered as it is pumped out
o Imported surface-water is available via two aqueduct systems,
o The aqueduct systems also allow for conveyance of recovered
water out of the basin.
Identified Uses of the AEWSD Groundwater Basin Area
Table 4.0 Water and Land Uses in the AEWSD Area
Use 1 Native groundwater used for agricultural and domestic supplies (individual
overlying users).
Use 2 Groundwater basin used for banking imported surface-water
Use 3 Overlying area is mainly agricultural. Principal crops include grapes, cotton,
citrus, carrots, and deciduous fruit.
Use 4 Water used for municipal use - the City of Arvin (population 13,000) relies on
groundwater for its needs.
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Institutional Arrangements
• Constitutional
Water Code Section 39000. California Water Storage District Law. This
allows the district to acquire, improve, and operate the necessary works for
the storage and distribution of water. The Water Code also allows the district
to enter into contracts for the following purposes:
a) Construction, acquisition, purchase, extension, operation, or
maintenance of works for irrigation, drainage, storage, flood
control, generation and distribution of hydroelectric energy
incidental thereto, or any of these.
b) Obtaining water supplies.
c) Assumption as principal or guarantor of indebtedness to the state,
the department, any other district, or the United States.
d) To carry out the terms of any contract between the district and the
state, the department, any other district, or the United States.
Thus, the Water Code enables the collective choice and operational
arrangements which are essentially contracts.
Monterey Agreement - allows for the off-stream storage of state water. In
essence, allows for the banking of MWD’s water in AEWSD.
• Collective Choice
The AEWSD board of directors is enabled to make decisions for the AEWSD
based on the district provisions of the Water Code.
Likewise, the MWD board of directors is enabled to make decisions for the
MWD based on the provisions of the Water Code.
The Principles o f Agreement between the district. MWD. the Friant Water
Users Authority and the Central Valiev Water Coalition - This agreement
provides the ability for input to AEWSD by the AO’s who may be impacted by
AEWSD’s groundwater banking operation with MWD. It sets up the
protections for other CVP users when AEWSD uses Friant flood waters.
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• Operational
The AEWSD contract with MWD - provides the following operational
parameters:
a) MWD cannot bank more than 350,000 acre-feet of water in
AEWSD at any time.
b) A minimum of 277,778 acre-feet of water must be banked in
AEWSD within seven years of the execution of the agreement.
c) MWD must schedule deliveries of returned water with DWR.
d) MWD must meet DWR water quality standards.
e) Allows flood flow purchase and transfers.
f) Specifies monitoring and operational criteria to protect neighboring
AO and overlying users.
g) MWD may only request return of water to the extent that there is
water in its account balance.
h) A 10% loss is imposed on all water banked under the program; i.e.,
to recover 250,000 acre-feet of banked water, MWD must deliver
277,778 acre-feet to the district. This helps to correct overdraft.
i) Return of regulated water by the district to MWD must not interfere
with deliveries to the district’s contract users or other “normal and
customary uses” by the district of its available supplies. Water will
generally be returned to MWD “off-peak” and will not compete with
AEWSD’s need for dry year water.
j) AEWSD will reduce or terminate groundwater pumping for
purposes of returning water to MWD as necessary to comply with
the groundwater monitoring program and operating criteria.
Characteristics of the User Community
Table 5.0 Identified User Groups of the AEWSD Area
Group 1 Participating AO - Arvin-Edison Water Storage District
Group 2 Non-participating Area AO’s - Friant Users Authority, Central Valley Water
Coalition (landowners), Kern-Delta Water District
Group 3 Outside Participating AO - Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California
Group 4 Municipal Users - City of Arvin
Group 5 Overlying Users - Individual property owners using groundwater for
farming and domestic purposes.
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• Participating AO - Water District
o AEWSD - a special district formed to provide water supplies for
the irrigation of agriculture.
o AEWSD is governed by a board of directors elected by the district
land owners whose votes are in proportion to their land holdings.
Thus, the larger landowners in the district are either represented
on the board or trust those landowners who are board members.
o The board of directors is made up of area growers (farmers) who
are the major water users in the area.
o The district serves the major water users in the area.
• Non-Participating AO’s - Water Districts
o Most are special districts formed to provide water supplies for
irrigation of agriculture,
o Are governed by representative boards of directors elected from
the individual users in each district.
• Outside Participating AO
o The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California is a
consortium of 26 cities and water districts that provides drinking
water to nearly 17 million people in parts of Los Angeles, Orange,
San Diego, Riverside, San Bernardino and Ventura counties. The
mission of MWD is to provide its service area with adequate and
reliable supplies of high-quality water to meet present and future
needs in an environmentally and economically responsible way.
• Municipal Users
o The City of Arvin has a population of approximately 13,000 and
uses groundwater for its entire water supply. Typical uses are
domestic and commercial. The water consumed is approximately
3,000 acre-feet of water per year,
o Most of the residents’ work is related to agriculture or services
supporting agriculture.
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• Overlying Users - Individuals
o Majority are farmers,
o Live within the AEWSD area,
o Many participate in local farm bureau,
o Utilize approximately 400,000 acre-feet of water per year (50
percent groundwater, 50 percent imported surface-water),
o Approximately 80 percent are connected to the AEWSD surface-
water distribution system; the remaining 20 percent rely on
groundwater.
• Levels of Trust
The level of trust in the AO (AEWSD) by the overlying users can
be characterized as high for the following reasons:
• The AO has a long history of successful water banking and
overdraft correction.
• The AO is governed by a board elected by the water users within
the district whose votes are in proportion to their land holdings.
• The landowners in the district all have a common interest, as the
district is primarily agricultural.
• The district has been in charge of the project since its inception
and its control makes the landowners within and adjoining the
district comfortable.
Action Situation
• Overdraft of the AEWSD area basin reaches an annual average of
200,000 in the 1960’s (crisis for the common-pool-resource).
• AEWSD’s formation brings surface-water into the area, but the
supply is not reliable, some overdraft remains, and boron
contamination is an issue.
• MWD needs additional storage capacity to provide reliability for its
supplies due to continued growth in its service area and potential
curtailment of the Colorado River water supply.
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Incentives to Cooperate and Coordinate
• Groundwater banking provides increased water supply reliability
for both MWD and AEWSD.
• AEWSD gets improved water recharge and conveyance
infrastructure at essentially no cost to AEWSD.
• AEWSD gets additional water to correct the overdraft and boron
problems at essentially no cost to AEWSD.
• MWD gets the use of AEWSD groundwater basin storage capacity.
Patterns of Interactions
• AEWSD operates a locally controlled groundwater bank starting in
the late 1960’s.
• AEWSD seeks out a partner to expand its program and increase
water supplies to its area users.
• MWD and AEWSD enter into negotiations in the 1980’s and reach
an agreement, however, opposition to the use of CVP water and
environmental concerns cause MWD to reconsider the project as
proposed.
• The project is restructured without the CVP component to reduce
opposition and environmental issues.
• An agreement is also negotiated with non-participating AO’s for the
use of Friant flood waters.
Outcomes
• Groundwater bank is successfully implemented by AEWSD and MWD.
• Overdraft is reduced and boron contamination is reduced
• AEWSD obtains new facilities and additional water.
Conclusions
The KWB and AEWSD/MWD cases provide the reader with two
studies of successful groundwater banking programs in the southern part of
California’s Central Valley.
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These cases clearly demonstrate that institutional arrangements can be
developed by local AO’s to address the mix of imported surface-water and
native groundwater while successfully increasing water availability and
reliability.
The two cases are different in that the KWB case describes the
development of institutions by six AO’s working with non-participating AO’s,
while the AEWSD/MWD case describes the development of institutional
arrangements that facilitate groundwater banking between two AO’s.
Additionally, the KWB case is different from the AEWSD/MWD case in that it
is an example of how institutional arrangements can be developed through a
process of education and negotiation via local water associations and
committees. This process was necessary to build trust and to address
issues between the AO’s participating in the KWB and the non-participants.
The KWB case, while making provisions for outside participants, does not
include them at this phase of the program. In contrast, the AEWSD/MWD
case illustrates the process where a local groundwater banking program is
established long before the inclusion of an outside banking partner.
Despite these differences, similar institutional arrangements are
developed in both cases to address the uncertainties inherent in utilizing
groundwater basins for banking imported surface-water. For example,
institutional arrangements in both cases base their operational rules on a
“Golden Rule” principle that sets the foundation for groundwater banking i.e.
not worsening conditions in the basin through groundwater banking
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operations. Similarly, both groundwater bank programs develop institutional
arrangements to address the concerns of overlying users (individual
appropriators) and protect overlying rights to access groundwater, and
institutions for monitoring to reduce uncertainty. Key to the programs are the
operational rules for preventing overdraft of the basin by requiring some
banked water to remain in the basin. The details of these institutional
arrangements that address the research question are more fully discussed in
Chapter 5.
It is important to note that both cases also demonstrate that depletion
of the groundwater resources can be avoided without having to resort to the
two prescriptions frequently offered in response to potential “tragedies of the
commons” - centralized control of the groundwater basins by a state
authority or privatization.
Both cases demonstrate that groundwater banking can be
accomplished without resorting to adjudication, or the court-ordered
allocation of groundwater resources between users. The KWB and
AEWSD/MWD cases clearly show that the tragedy of the commons can be
avoided through locally developed groundwater banking programs.
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CHAPTER 4
OBSTACLES TO GROUNDWATER BANKING PROGRAMS
Introduction
Chapter 3 provides the reader with two case studies that demonstrate
that institutions can be developed to address the mix of native groundwater
and imported surface water. These institutions address uncertainty and
allow for the local development of groundwater banks. The KWB and
AEWSD/MWD case studies address the central research question by
providing examples of key institutional arrangements for addressing a
groundwater CPR where imported surface water is “mixed” into the
underground aquifer for purposes of storage.
This chapter takes a different approach from Chapter 3. Rather than
analyzing successful groundwater banking programs, Chapter 4 provides the
reader with a look at two case studies of groundwater banking programs that
were not implemented as planned. These cases are referred to as
“unsuccessful” because a groundwater banking program was not established
in each as planned, therefore they do not meet the performance criteria listed
for the KWB and AEWSD/MWD cases. One case, the San Joaquin County
case, is an example of a groundwater bank that is “stalled” due to significant
obstacles (but may be implemented in the future). In both of the following
cases there are significant attributes that are very similar to attributes in the
two successful cases reviewed in Chapter 3. The purpose of this chapter is
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to examine the cases and draw some conclusions as to why the groundwater
banking programs were not established and made operational. One
hypothesis is that these groundwater banks were not implemented due to
the inability of the program proponents to adequately address uncertainties;
however, key issues related to trust and incentives appear to be instrumental
in preventing the development of institutional arrangements for addressing
uncertainty and preventing or forestalling the establishment of groundwater
banks in the two following cases.
The Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project
This first case study reviews the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank
Project as proposed by Mr. Heber Perrett and the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation (USBR) prior to the purchase of the Madera Ranch property by
the Azurix Madera Corporation in 1999. As the subsequent analysis will
demonstrate, the proposed Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank project has
several physical and technological similarities to the KWB, however, unlike
the KWB, the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank was not a successful
project. The following sections provide a history of the proposed Madera
Ranch Groundwater Bank Project and an IAD analysis of the proposed
project.
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Description of the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Site
Madera Ranch is a 13,600-acre property in Madera County,
approximately eight to ten miles southwest of the City of Madera.
Approximately 1,000 acres of the Madera Ranch property are irrigated, and
the balance (12,600 acres) is used either for dryland farming or grasslands.
The project site is located on the lower alluvial floodplain of the San Joaquin
and Fresno Rivers in the southernmost portion of the San Joaquin River
Hydrologic Region. The Madera Ranch property overlies what is commonly
referred to as the Madera Groundwater Basin.
The project site is situated in an unincorporated portion of Madera
County. Madera Irrigation District overlies two sections (1,497 acres) on the
eastern edge of the Madera Ranch property and is also directly north of and
adjacent to the project site. Gravelly Ford Water District overlies two
sections (1,282 acres) along the southeastern edge of the property.
Ongoing monitoring and studies demonstrate that the Madera
Groundwater Basin, including the groundwater table underlying the ranch, is
in a state of overdraft that was exacerbated by the drought periods of 1976-
1977 and 1987-1992 (Boyle Engineering, 1999, p. 23). Groundwater levels
in the Madera Basin dropped from 10 to 120 feet from 1960 to 1990 and the
approximate average annual decline in static groundwater levels within the
Madera Irrigation District is 1.25 feet per year (Fresno Bee, November 8,
1998, p. A18, Boyle Enginering, 1999, p. 23). Currently, the depth of
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groundwater in the Madera Basin is, on the average, 40 feet below pre
drought levels; thus, there should be space in the basin for groundwater
recharge and banking (Fresno Bee, 1998).
Groundwater pumping in the Madera Basin is estimated to supply
about one half of Madera County’s irrigation needs. The Madera Irrigation
District provides surface-water deliveries to a 128,294 acre service area
adjacent to the Madera Ranch site. The ten-year average of surface-water
deliveries to the Madera Irrigation District Service area is 95,557 acre-feet
per year (Boyle Engineering, 1999, p, 23).
Similar to the KWB, the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project site
is ideally located to take advantage of existing water project facilities for the
conveyance of recharge water to the site. The Madera Ranch site is situated
near the southern portion of the Delta-Mendota Canal and Mendota Pool,
potentially enabling surplus federal Central Valley Project (CVP) surface-
water to be conveyed to the project site—with the construction of minimal
facilities—for percolation into the basin. Additionally, the project site location
could also allow for the conveyance of water from the San Joaquin River via
an improved Gravelly Ford, a canal facility that currently can deliver water
from the San Joaquin River to lands adjacent to the Madera Ranch site.
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The location of the Madera Ranch property above the Madera
Groundwater Basin, its proximity to existing surface-water project
conveyance features, and the fact that the property is one of the last large
unfarmed pieces of privately held land in the San Joaquin Valley made it a
logical site to investigate for a potential groundwater banking project.
Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project - History and Background
The original Madera Ranch project concept involved conveying
surplus CVP surface-water from the Delta to the Mendota Pool and then
diverting this imported surface-water to the Madera Ranch Project site. This
could be augmented by additional imported surface-water pumped under the
joint point of diversion as part of a water reserve account proposed by USBR
(USBR Toolbox, n.d.). The CVP can only pump 4,200 cubic feet per second
(CFS) of surface-water from the San Joaquin River Delta due to conveyance
capacity constraints downstream from the Tracy Pumping Plant. By utilizing
the joint point of diversion, the 400 cfs not pumped by the CVP due to the
constraints can be pumped by the State Water Project (SWP) at the Bank’s
Pumping Plant and delivered for CVP uses, such as groundwater banking.
Additional sources might include surface water purchased by the USBR as
part of its Land Retirement Program and surface-water from non-federal
water users.
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Flood flows diverted from the Chowchilla Bypass flood channel were also
considered for the project, but this source was rejected because the
operation would produce an average annual increase in yield of less than
3,000 acre-feet, and the cost of the requisite additional facilities could not be
justified (USBR, 1998, p.9).
A gravity turnout and a two-way canal with pumping plants were
proposed to convey the surface-water from the Mendota Pool to the Madera
Ranch Project site where it would be percolated using recharge wetland
ponds. Water extracted from the bank would be reconveyed to the Mendota
Pool for delivery to end-users.
On August 13, 1996, Mr. Heber Perrett, the owner of the Madera
Ranch site at that time, presented the original Madera Ranch Groundwater
Bank Project proposal to the USBR. The Bureau was interested in the
Project to store water reserve account surface-water. This reserve account
is designed to assist the USBR in meeting the stream flow requirements of
the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA), improving CVP
operations, and for drought year reserve water supplies. An estimated
maximum of 390,000 acre-feet of surface-water was proposed for storage in
the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project, with 100,000 acre-feet
reserved for critically dry, or drought, years (USBR, 1998, p.3).
The property owner’s offer prompted the USBR to undertake a
preliminary investigation to determine if fatal flaws existed in the Madera
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Ranch project proposal. The San Luis-Delta Mendota Water Authority
(SLDMWA) and the Santa Clara Valley Water District (SCVWD), as potential
groundwater bank partners, provided the information needed to model
delivery and extraction operations at the project site. This preliminary
investigation was also designed to evaluate the physical suitability of the
Madera Ranch site for banking water.
The preliminary investigation, completed in July 1997, found no
obvious fatal flaws and recommended a phased evaluation of the proposed
banking project (USBR, 1998, pp. 5-7). The first phase was initiated in July
1997 and completed in April 1998. The Phase 1 Investigation included the
results of a geologic and hydrologic study prepared by the consulting firm of
Bookman-Edmonston for Heber Perrett (February 1998).
The investigation also provided a brief review of local issues,
environmental concerns, operational concerns and financial issues. This
preliminary investigation culminated in a Phase 1 Report that found that the
Madera Ranch site has potential for groundwater banking development and
is worth further investigation. However, it also pledged that further pursuit of
the project would be halted if any fatal flaw, with no remedy, was revealed at
any time by the Phase 2 Investigation (USBR 1998, p. 26). The Phase 1
Report recommended proceeding with a more detailed Phase 2 Investigation
of two project alternatives: a multi-year commitment by USBR to lease
facilities and services developed by Mr. Perrett or an option for USBR to
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purchase the Madera Ranch Property for development of the project by
USBR (California Department of Water Resources, Bulletin 160-98, p. 8-38).
The Phase 2 Investigation was also intended to make recommendations on
permit applications, public involvement, environmental compliance
development under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), necessary negotiated
agreements and congressional authorizations (USBR, 1998, p.7).
After completion of the Phase 1 Report, opposition by the Madera
County Board of Supervisors, the Madera City Council, the Madera Ranch
Oversight Committee, area farmers, regional water districts and local
stakeholders caused USBR to reconsider the project planning process
(Fresno Bee, October 27, 1999, p. B-1). The project timeline was extended
an additional 18 to 24 months to give the Bureau time to address local
stakeholder concerns (Fresno Bee, 1999, p. B-1). A request by USBR to
CALFED for $14.5 million in funding for the purchase of the property was
rejected because of the local opposition, and CALFED indicated it would not
reconsider the project until local concerns had been adequately addressed
(Sacramento Bee, April 29, 1999, p. B-7).
Subsequently, the USBR abandoned the project and the Madera
Ranch property was sold to Azurix Madera Corporation (a Texas-based
water development corporation owned in part by the Enron Corporation) in
October of 1999 for a reported $31.5 million (California Water Law and Policy
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Reporter, March 2000, p. 136, Fresno Bee, February 12, 2000). Azurix
began pursuing the development of the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank
Project with the objective of providing banking participants with storage
space for their water (California Water Law and Policy Reporter, 2000).
Azurix “believed it could accomplish what Perrett and the Bureau could not:
to develop, own and operate a water bank (Public Citizens Critical Mass
Energy and Environment Program, 2000, p. 13)“. However, despite Azurix’s
efforts, “local farmers opposed to the project got their way. Madera Ranch
became Azurix’s (another) failed investment ( Liquid Assets, Public Citizen’s
2000, p. 14).”
Project Stakeholders
The proposed Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project sponsors
and participants included Mr. Heber Perrett (owner), the USBR, SLDMWA,
and SCVWD. Stakeholders included: local farmers and adjacent property
owners; adjacent AO’s (water and irrigation districts - Aliso WD, Gravelly
Ford WD, Madera ID, Chowchilla WD); Madera County; City of Madera;
California State Farm Bureau; Nisei Farmers League; Families Protecting the
Valley; Tehipiti Chapter of the Sierra Club; Friant Water Users Authority; and
the Regional Council of Rural Communities (Fresno Bee, July 2, 2000).
The Phase 1 Report recommended that the choice between the two
options that were under consideration—a multi-year lease of services and
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facilities or the purchase of the land and development of the facilities by
USBR—be based on stakeholder consensus, partnership agreements, costs,
contract negotiations and other factors (USBR, 1998, p.26). However, no
contractual arrangements for the use of the project were ever developed
because the proposed Madera Groundwater Bank Project was not
implemented beyond the Phase 1 Report recommendations.
As originally proposed, the water would be used to meet Central
Valley Project (CVP) contract deliveries to agricultural water (irrigation)
districts, as well as requirements to reduce pumping demands on the Delta to
benefit wildlife refuges. USBR also proposed using the bank to implement a
100,000 acre-foot reserve account for drought relief in critically dry years.
The non-federal project partners, the SLDMWA and SCVWD, participated in
the project investigation to determine if possible banking opportunities
existed for their agencies. Other potential uses included meeting unforeseen
environmental needs and meeting general storage needs south of the Delta
during certain critical periods.
Project Participants
According to stakeholder interviews, the Phase 1 Report, and other
documentation, stakeholder participation during the preliminary investigation
stage and the Phase 1 Investigation was limited to the USBR, the property
owner and the participating agencies (SLDMWA and SCVWD).
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USBR issued a press release at the start of the Phase 1 Investigation
to inform the public and identify interested stakeholders (USBR, 1998, p. 21).
The press release was followed by the distribution of an information package
to interested parties. Two public briefings were held, and a list of interested
parties compiled based on the telephone response to the press release and
attendance at the public briefings.
Project Opposition and Issues
The Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project drew opposition from a
variety of sources, most notably area farmers, local AO’s (irrigation and water
districts), Madera County and the City of Madera. The issues that triggered
local concerns are summarized below:
1) Incomplete Information — opponents of the project characterize it
as an example of USBR “getting the cart before the horse.” Local
stakeholders felt that the technical studies were very preliminary and
incomplete, and thus the feasibility of the proposed project was not
demonstrated sufficiently for policymakers to commit public funds to
the project (Fresno Bee, July 2000, Madera County Groundwater
Oversight Committee, April 2000). Some felt that the property
owner’s deadline for USBR action forced a premature commitment by
the agency to move forward on the purchase of the property
(Ottomoeller, April 2000). Project opponents and Representative
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George Radanovich filed a Freedom of Information Act request for
project information in 1998 (Madera County Groundwater Oversight
Committee, 2000, Sacramento Bee, March 15, 1999, p. B4). This
request produced USBR internal documents and documents from
other federal agencies that indicate potential flaws in the project as
proposed.
2) Lack of Effective Public Involvement — due to the nature of the
proposal, it was felt that USBR’s public outreach came too late in the
process and that local experts should have been consulted before, or
at least during, the preliminary investigation. Utilizing local knowledge
of the geography, aquifer response and historic water levels could
have been beneficial to the evaluation. Additionally, CALFED officials
and DWR Bulletin 160-98 characterized the project as feasible and
beneficial before the technical studies were completed. As a result,
the project was championed in several political arenas prematurely.
This reinforced local concerns that the proposed project was political
rather than technical in nature and a “top-down” driven project.
Community relations for the proposed Madera Ranch Groundwater
Bank Project were a significant problem and local opposition is cited
as the major factor in USBR’s decision to abandon the project
(Sacramento Bee, April 29, 2000, Fresno Bee, July 2, 2000).
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3) Location near surface-waters — the Madera Ranch Groundwater
Bank Project site is in close proximity to the San Joaquin River, and
adjacent property owners have observed immediate impacts to the
unconfined aquifer based on fluctuations in the river levels. A 31.9-
foot rise in water levels was observed over a twelve-month period that
included flooding and continuous river flows (Madera County
Groundwater Oversight Committee, Pistoresi and Prosperi, April
2000). Based on these observations, local opponents to the project
questioned the estimated storage capacity of the aquifer in the
Madera Ranch area. Finally, the gradient and proximity to the river
also raised concerns about a “topped off” aquifer and the outflow of
stored water to the river.
4) Root Zone Flooding — local farmers adjacent to the Madera Ranch
site calculated that the area directly under the project site could only
store a maximum of 130,000 acre-feet of water based on their
observations of the variation of water levels in adjacent wells. Based
on this calculation, the project’s proposed storage of a maximum of
390,000 acre-feet would require about 10 square miles of surface
area. Thus, local opponents believe stored water could move off of
the project site, creating root zone flooding problems for neighboring
orchards and other sensitive crops (Madera County Groundwater
Oversight Committee, April 2000).
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5) Water Quality — Water quality consequences of groundwater banking
were a concern for local farmers and adjacent landowners and were
identified in the Phase 1 Report as an issue to be studied in the Phase
2 Investigation. Local farmers state that the salinity of the Mendota
Pool is approximately six times that of area groundwater; thus, the
introduction of Mendota Pool water might degrade water quality in the
aquifer. This, coupled with the potential for stored water to move off-
site, is a concern for farmers with wells and crops adjacent to the
Madera Ranch site (Madera County Groundwater Oversight
Committee, April 2000). These concerns were echoed in comments
by other agencies reviewing the preliminary studies, as evidenced in
documents that were obtained by the Madera Ranch Oversight
Committee through the Freedom of Information Act request
referenced previously (USBR Memorandum, Turner, 1998).
6) Hvdroloqic Uncertainties and Impacts on Groundwater Users —
Proposed project well sites were up gradient of the infiltration basins
and close enough to the City of Madera wells that there was
significant likelihood that water extracted may not be the water that
was placed in storage. There was concern that the project could
“exchange” lower quality banked water for higher quality native
groundwater through the extraction process (Madera County
Groundwater Oversight Committee, April 2000). Additionally, area
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landowners were concerned about the accurate monitoring of the
proposed project and it’s potential for extracting native groundwater in
addition to the banked water (more “take” than “put). It should be
noted that these hydrologic issues were expressed in communications
by USBR staff, as evidenced in the Freedom of Information Act
documents (USBR Memorandum, Turner, 1998).
7) Potential Loss of Local Control — the proposed project could present
a means for outside interests to gain access to native groundwater
and potentially other surface-water entitlements (for example Friant
water). In essence, local interests were concerned that the project
represented a means for an outside entity to establish a foothold, or
“pipeline,” into the local water supply Ottemoeller, April 2000, Madera
County Oversight Committee, April 2000, Friant “Waterline”, n.d.).
Potential Project Costs
The options of leasing or purchasing the Madera Ranch were
considered by USBR. The estimated cost of the proposed lease
arrangement with Mr. Perrett was $14.8 million per year for a twenty-year
term. The option of purchasing the land was purported to cost from $43
million to $53 million (Sacramento Bee, March 15, 1999, p. B-4).
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USBR estimated the annual cost for operations and maintenance of
the facilities at $400,000. While the financing options were not fully
developed, USBR did approach CALFED for $14.5 million to supplement the
cost of purchasing the Madera Ranch site (California Futures, Winter 2000).
The Phase 1 Report identifies costs, cost allocations and repayment as items
to be analyzed in the Phase 2 Investigation. Based on the term of the lease,
the estimated value of the water produced was $226 per acre-foot at an
annual yield of 70,000 acre-feet. The estimated value of the water, under the
scenario in which USBR would own and operate the facility, is not available.
Summary of Project History
News articles and interviews with participants identify the lack of early
stakeholder involvement and a clear public participation process, failure to
incorporate the critiques of other federal agencies into the public process, the
lack of sufficient technical analyses, hydrological uncertainties, the issue of
local control, and the landowner-imposed deadline for USBR action as the
key factors in galvanizing local opposition to the Perrett/USBR Madera
Ranch Groundwater Bank Project.
In order to better analyze these factors and their impacts, it is helpful
to review the chronology of critical project events and then examine each
factor identified as problematic for the project.
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Table 6.0 displays the chronology of the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank
Project from 1996 to 1999.
Table 6.0 Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project Chronology
1996 to 1999
EVENT DATE
Mr. Heber Perrett purchases the Madera Ranch property May 1991
USBR receives Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project Proposal August 1996
Preliminary evaluation is completed (fatal flaws analysis, capacity
analysis)
July 1997
Agreement for two-phase investigation is made November 1997
Phase 1 Investigation starts December 1997
USBR issues press release and holds two public briefings January 1998
Bookman-Edmonston provides study results to Perrett and USBR February 1998
Phase 1 Report completed (field tests, technical issues identified) April 1998
Overlying owners and local AO’s become aware of the proposed
groundwater bank
April 1998
Perrett conducts on-site tour of Madera Ranch for local landowners
(overlying users)
May 1998
Area farmers and representatives of local water districts form
grassroots Madera Ranch Oversight Committee to monitor project
August 1998
Oversight Committee gathers information and makes presentations
opposing the project
September 1998-
March 1999
USBR releases Bookman-Edmonston study to the general public September 1998
Emergency congressional appropriation attempts to fund land
acquisition of Madera Ranch
September 1998
Various local agencies voice concerns and opposition to land
acquisition prior to the completion of comprehensive studies
September/Oct 1998
CALFED rejects $14.5 million funding request by USBR due to local
opposition
October 1998
USBR extends project timeline by 18 to 24 months due to local
opposition
October 1998
USBR meets with Friant Users Authority and Oversight Committee October 1998
Freedom of Information Act request is filed for USBR documents December 1998
Madera County Supervisors pass groundwater ordinance and
resolution opposing project
March 1999
Landowner sets deadline for USBR action 1999
USBR abandons the project. Azurix purchases Madera Ranch site
from landowner
October 1999
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Public and Stakeholder Involvement
The Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project chronology above
indicates that the USBR took a logical approach to responding to the
landowner’s proposal by performing a preliminary analysis for potential fatal
flaws. This step provided the Bureau with an indication of whether or not the
project concept was worth pursuing further. The Phase 1 Investigation and
Report were the next logical “due diligence” steps for the USBR.
The Phase 1 Report states that it is the USBR’s policy to include
public participation in decision processes that lead to federal actions, and it
outlines a basic public involvement plan that includes identifying USBR and
stakeholder roles, defining decision processes, holding briefing events,
issuing a call for project partners and producing project status reports
(USBR, 1998, p. 25). This process appears to comply with the USBR’s
Directives and Standards for public involvement in Reclamation activities
(USBR Directives CMP 04-01, 2000). If this is correct, then why is
public/stakeholder involvement identified as a significant problem for the
Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project?
As one commentator has noted: “a public interaction program, or the
lack thereof, is often the sole or major reason for the failure to implement a
water program (Walesh, 1999, p. 537).” Establishing and maintaining early,
continuous—and most importantly, two-way—communications between the
public, stakeholders and the water agency, preferably starting on “Day 1” of
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the project, is an essential element for building trust, consensus and a
successful program (USBR Directives, CMP 04-01, 2000, Walesh, 1999, p.
540). Based on comments by the local stakeholders that they would have
preferred that USBR had consulted with them about the project at the
conceptual stage, it appears that defining and communicating with potential
stakeholders during the preliminary evaluation period would have been
helpful to the overall process.
Keeping the process open and transparent by keeping all information
“on the table” to the extent possible (outside of privileged negotiations) is
another important element for gaining public trust and for effective
communications. This appears to have been a problem for the Madera
Ranch Groundwater Bank Project, based on the documented concerns of
other federal agencies obtained through the Freedom of Information Act
request by stakeholders.
IAD Analysis of The Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project
1. Physical and Technological Attributes of the Groundwater Basin
and Surface-Water Systems
Basin Characteristics
The Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank site overlays the Madera
Groundwater Basin. This groundwater basin is composed of highly
permeable, alluvial sediments, allowing for rapid percolation recharge with
surface-water. The groundwater basin is closed, being bounded on the
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south by the San Joaquin River, on the west by the eastern boundary of the
Columbia Canal Service area, on the north by the south boundary of the
Chowchilla Basin, and on the east by the Sierra Nevada foothills. Major
streams in the area include the San Joaquin and Fresno Rivers.
As noted, the Madera Groundwater Basin is similar in many respects to the
KWB’s basin.
The Madera Groundwater Basin is estimated to have a total water
storage capacity of 2,814,000 acre-feet (DWR, 1995). However, the
groundwater basin is overdrafted at an estimated rate of 30,000 acre-feet per
year (DWR, 1995). Groundwater levels dropped from 10 feet below the
surface to 120 feet below the surface during the last 30 years, with an annual
average decline in groundwater levels of 1.25 feet per year.
The groundwater basin supplies approximately 50 percent of the water
used for agriculture in Madera County at a rate of 550,000 acre-feet per year.
The City of Madera relies on groundwater from the basin for 100 percent of
its water supply and pumps approximately 15,000 acre-feet per year (DWR,
1995).
Like the KWB, the Madera Ranch site appears to be a good candidate
for groundwater banking. Approximately 13,600 acres of the overlying land
is available for recharging the basin via percolation basins and the water
storage capacity under the site for banking is estimated to be 390,000 acre-
feet.
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• Surface-Water Systems
In terms of imported surface-water, the project site is located near the
southern end of Delta-Mendota Canal (CVP). Surplus CVP imported
surface-water from the Mendota Pool could easily be delivered to the project
site with minimal facilities. Also, surface-water from the San Joaquin River
could be delivered to the site via the Gravelly Ford canal. Local floodwaters
could also be banked at the site via the Chowchilla Bypass flood channel.
The project proposed to bank 390,000 acre-feet of surplus water from the
CVP.
• Technological Attributes
Similar to the KWB, surface-water could be stored in the Madera
Ranch Groundwater Bank by simply allowing surface-water to percolate into
the basin via spreading basins (as opposed to injection). As with the KWB,
the banked (stored) surface-water was proposed to be recovered using
standard well pump technology. The banked surface-water would be
metered (measured) as applied to the spreading basins and metered as it
was pumped out of storage.
Imported surface-water is available to the Madera Ranch site via two
aqueduct/canal systems. These aqueduct systems also allow for
conveyance of recovered water out of the groundwater bank and basin.
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From a technological standpoint, the Madera Ranch Groundwater
Bank project is very much like the KWB. Both would use the same method
for banking surface-waters and take advantage of nearby aqueduct systems
for the delivery and transport of surface-water. Both the KWB and proposed
Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank would utilize similar extraction
technologies (wells on a spaced extraction well field).
Madera Ranch Area Uses
The Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project area existing and
potential uses are essentially the same. Both Kern and Madera Counties are
rural, with agriculture being the predominant pursuit. Table 5.0 below
presents the exiting and potential land uses within the Madera Ranch area:
TABLE 7.0 Identified Uses for the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Area
(existing and potential uses)
Use
1
Native groundwater used for agricultural and municipal supplies (area is
predominately used for agriculture)
Use
2
Groundwater bank site could be used for habitat conservation area (natural habitat)
Use
3
Groundwater basin could be used for banking imported surface-water (CVP)
Use
4
Groundwater basin could be used for banking local surface-water (Chowchilla
Bypass)
Use
5
Overlying land used for dry farming and grasslands (project site)
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• Agricultural Use
Madera County is an agricultural county. The county land area totals
1,378,170 acres of which 778,218 acres are farmland and 22,242 are urban,
with the balance of the acreage classified as other uses (Calif. Department of
Conservation, 2000, p. 39). Agriculture in Madera County accounts for
approximately 550,000 acre-feet of groundwater use per year (DWR, Bulletin
118, 1995).
Project opponents raised concerns regarding the conflicts between the
groundwater bank and neighboring agricultural uses. A major concern was
the potential for the groundwater bank to raise groundwater levels into the
root zone of neighboring crops (killing crops). The potential of taking native
groundwater supplies used for irrigation was also a concern.
• Municipal Use
The City of Madera is the closest municipal and industrial water user
in the Madera Ranch Area. With a population of 45,871, the City of Madera
consumes approximately 11,800 acre-feet of groundwater per year. The only
other incorporated City, the City of Chowchilla, uses approximately 3,200
acre-feet of groundwater per year.
The City of Madera relies on groundwater for its entire water supply.
The City’s water well field is northeast of the Madera Ranch site and roughly
up gradient from Madera Ranch (groundwater flows toward the Madera
Ranch site). Opponents of the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project
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pointed out that the proposed project extraction wells might actually extract,
or capture, native groundwater used by the City of Madera, rather than
banked surface-water. This was identified as a potential conflict between
area uses that needed to be addressed by the physical design of the
recharge and extraction facilities and through operational and collective
choice arrangements.
• Natural Habitat
The unfarmed area of Madera Ranch is identified as “Priority 1”
habitat “where actions must be taken to prevent the extinction or to prevent a
species from declining irreversibly in the foreseeable future (USBR, 1998,
p. 15).” A survey of the site revealed the presence of vernal pools and the
presence of sensitive terrestrial plant communities. Based on these findings
and environmental mitigation requirements, use of the site as a natural
habitat would be required to be preserved. The groundwater could be
designed in a similar fashion to the KWB creating facilities that allow
compatible banking and natural habitat uses.
• Groundwater Banking
The Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project was proposed as a
means to store imported surface-water from the federal Delta-Mendota Canal
(DMC).
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According to the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Phase I Report (USBR,
1998, p. 9), this imported surface-water would be federal (Central Valley
Project Water), “acquired” surface-water (water purchased specifically for
storage, and water belonging to non-federal partners) (water districts outside
of Madera County).
The groundwater bank was estimated to be able to store 390,000
acre-feet of water, of which an annual average of 70,000 acre-feet of year
could be withdrawn to help meet CVP water needs. The majority of CVP
water is used for agricultural needs thus, the Madera Ranch Groundwater
Project was proposed to create operational reliability and flexibility for the
CVP and non-federal project partners. Essentially, water would be stored in
a groundwater bank during the winter and spring, and withdrawn in summer
months to meet irrigation demands.
Diversion of local floodwaters to the groundwater bank was proposed
as an additional source of surface-water. However, the small amount of
floodwater and the cost of additional facilities did not justify this proposal
(USBR, 1998, p. 9).
• Dry Farming and Grasslands
Approximately 12,600 acres of the 13,600-acre Madera Ranch is used
for dryland farming or grasslands.
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Dryland farming relies on precipitation for crop irrigation and it optimizes the
techniques of ploughing, discing and summer fallowing so as to capture and
conserve every bit of precipitation. Wheat and oats are the usual crops
grown in a dry farming operation. Grasslands refer to the natural vegetation
found in the Central Valley.
The groundwater banking operation would displace the dry farming
and grasslands, depending on how much land would be needed for recharge
basins and conveyance facilities.
Institutional Arrangements
The Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project was not implemented;
therefore, there are no project level institutional arrangements to analyze.
Essentially, the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank project could have utilized
similar constitutional arrangements as the KWB, had it gone forward.
It should be noted that Madera County developed and implemented
the Madera County Groundwater Ordinance in 1999 to prohibit the export of
groundwater without obtaining a County permit. This effectively places
Madera County in a position to control (approve, condition, deny) any
groundwater banking project within Madera County that proposed the export
of groundwater (Madera Co. Ordinance No. 573B, amended 2001).
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Therefore, the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project would have been
subject to the County permitting process as it involved the export of banked
water.
Characteristics of the User Community
Table 8.0 illustrates the user groups in the Madera Ranch area. Note
that the list identifies the current users of the land and groundwater basin, as
well as the potential, or proposed, users of the groundwater basin (for
banking).
TABLE 8.0 Identified User Groups of the Madera Ranch Groundwater
Bank and the Madera Ranch Area
Group
1
Participating AO’s outside of area - Water Districts, Irrigation Districts
Group
2
Non-participating adjacent AO’s - Water Districts, Irrigation Districts
Group
3
Project Land Owner
Group
4
Overlying Users - Individuals
Group
5
Overlying Users - Municipal - City of Madera
Group
6
Agencies - Bureau of Reclamation, Madera County
• Participating AO’s Outside of the Madera Ranch Area
The San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority (SLDMWA) consists
of 32 water agencies representing approximately 2,100,000 acres of federal
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and exchange water service contractors within the western San Joaquin
Valley, San Benito and Santa Clara counties. The governing body of the
Authority consists of a 19-member Board of Directors classified into five
divisions with directors selected from within each division. Each Director,
and respective Alternate Director, is a member of the governing body or an
appointed staff member of his or her agency. With the exception of one
agency, the SLDMWA member agencies provide water for agricultural
irrigation.
The SLDMWA member agencies contract with the USBR for federal
water thus, the agency (SLDMWA) is interested in storage for increased
water supply reliability. It should be noted that the proposed Madera Ranch
Groundwater Bank Project is outside of the SLDMWA boundaries.
The Santa Clara Valley Water District (SCVWD) is the primary water
resources agency for Santa Clara County. It acts as the county's water
wholesaler. SCVWD was created by an act of the California Legislature and
operates as a state of California Special District, with jurisdiction throughout
Santa Clara County. The district is governed by an elected/appointed board
of directors, which sets the policy direction of the district.
SCVWD serves drinking water to a population of 1.6 million residents
and a 1,300 square mile service area that encompasses 15 cities. SCVWD
sells wholesale treated water and groundwater to 13 public and investor-
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owned water retailers that serve Santa Clara County (California Urban Water
Agencies, 2002).
SCVWD’s imported surface-water comes from the Sierra Nevada
mountains via the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta. This water is
delivered by both the SWP, the federal CVP and the City of San Francisco’s
Hetch Hetchy Project. As with the SLDMWA, the SCVWD is interested in
water storage to enhance water supply reliability and the proposed Madera
Ranch Groundwater Bank Project is outside of the SCVWD boundaries.
Both the SLDMWA and SCVWD participated in the Madera Ranch
Groundwater Bank Phase I study.
• Non-participating AO’s - Water Districts
The non-participating AO’s in the vicinity of the proposed Madera
Ranch Groundwater Bank Project include the Madera Irrigation District and
the Gravelly Ford Water District. Two sections (1,497 acres) of the Madera
Ranch site are in the Madera Irrigation District and 1,282 acres of the site are
within the boundaries of the Gravelly Ford Water District. Approximately
1,000 acres of the Madera Ranch receives irrigation water from these
districts.
Both districts are special districts formed to provide water supplies for
agricultural irrigation. These water districts are legal government entities
created by acts of the state legislature. The Madera Irrigation district was
formed in 1920, as authorized by the Wright Act of 1887. The Wright Act is
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the state legislature's first comprehensive enabling act for water district
organization. Voting for directors in irrigation districts is based on one vote for
each registered voter. The Gravelly Ford Water District was formed under
the California Water District Act of 1913. In districts authorized by this act,
voting is weighted by property; one vote for each dollar's worth of land.
Representative boards of directors either elected from the individual users in
each district area or elected by property owners govern both districts.
Farmers on the east side of the Central Valley in the Madera area get
their water from the San Joaquin River sources through the CVP's Friant-
Kern and Madera canals, while Westside farmers get theirs from the San
Joaquin Delta via the Delta-Mendota Canal. Both the Madera Irrigation
District and the Gravelly Ford Water District are bound contractually to the
CVP for federal water, but are on the CVP’s Friant-Kern and Madera system.
So, while both districts are CVP contractors, they would not be direct
participants in the proposed Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project. This
is an important point as members of the boards of both districts actively
opposed the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project.
The Madera Irrigation District is the most significant AO in the vicinity
of the proposed project. Interestingly, the Madera Irrigation District supports
and practices groundwater recharge and storage through the operation of
eight recharge basins similar to the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank
Project proposal (Boyle Engineering, 1999, p. 32). Madera Irrigation District
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also works actively with the local resource conservation district to continue to
locate sites suitable for groundwater recharge (Madera Resource
Conservation District Long Range Plan, 1996).
• Project Land Owner
The project landowner at the time of the original proposal was Mr.
Heber Perrett. Unlike the KWB operation, Mr. Perrett originally proposed to
construct, own, and operate the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank, leasing
the use of the facilities to the USBR.
• Overlying Users - Individuals
The majority of the overlying users in the vicinity of the proposed
Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project are farmers with the average farm
size in the area being 439 acres (National Agricultural Statistics Service,
Census of Agriculture, 1997 and 1992). Most of the overlying users are
within the boundaries of local AO’s (Madera I.D. and Gravelly Ford W.D.),
and use a combination of surface-water and groundwater for irrigation.
These overlying users rely on groundwater for irrigation in times of drought
when surface-water supplies are scarce. Some users, who are neighbors to
the proposed project, serve on the board of directors for local AO’s (irrigation
districts).
In respect to individual overlying users, the demographics are very
similar to the KWB area.
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• Overlying Users - Municipal - City of Madera
The City of Madera, with a population of 45,871, is the single largest
municipal user of groundwater in the area. As a municipal user, the City of
Madera exercises its right as an appropriative user of groundwater to supply
its citizens. The City depends on groundwater for one hundred percent of its
water supply and pumps approximately 11,800 acre-feet of groundwater per
year. The City is located east of the Madera Ranch site and there was
concern about potential project inference with the City’s wells.
• Agencies - Bureau of Reclamation, Madera County
The Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) is a federal agency charged with
the construction of dams, power plants, and canals. The USBR is the largest
water wholesaler in the U.S. and financed the CVP through contracts with
water users. The USBR’s interest in the Madera Ranch project stems from
the potential to store surplus surface-water in the groundwater bank, thus
creating a more reliable water supply for dry years. The timing and amount
of pumping from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is controlled to protect
the Delta’s ecosystem. These controls reduce the flexibility and reliability of
the CVP to meet water demands on the system. The proposed Madera
Ranch Groundwater Bank Project could help to restore some reliability and
flexibility to the CVP system (USBR, 1998, p. 3).
Madera County is a separate legal and political jurisdiction. Madera
County is a general law county and operates in accordance with the
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guidelines set forth by the State of California. The County currently
administers a groundwater ordinance that prohibits the export of groundwater
outside of the County, except by permit. Also, the County Board of
Supervisors passed a resolution opposing the Madera Ranch Groundwater
Bank Project.
Level of Trust
The overlying users and local AO’s in Madera are for the most part
farmers or provide water for agriculture. Like their counterparts in Kern
County, they tend to belong to water associations and farm associations
(Association of California Water Agencies, Farm Bureau) that provide
common forums for communication. The opposition to the Madera Ranch
Groundwater Banking Project was extensive, and included local AO’s,
Madera County, the City of Madera, and overlying users (Madera County
Groundwater Oversight Committee, 2000). This indicates the strength of the
ties within the local community.
Unlike the KWB case, overlying users and members of the local AO’s
specifically stated that they did not trust the USBR, and later Azurix, in
attempting to establish the proposed Madera Ranch Groundwater Banking
Project (Madera County Groundwater Oversight Committee, April 2000).
Overlying owners and members of the local AO’s felt that local control of
area water supplies would be jeopardized by the proposed project.
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Action Situation and Contextual Factors
The action situation that triggered the review of the Madera Ranch
Groundwater Bank Project by the USBR consisted of the following elements:
• Ongoing monitoring and studies demonstrate that the Madera
Groundwater Basin is in a state of overdraft for over 30 years.
• Ongoing monitoring and studies indicate that capacity exists in the
basin for water banking.
• The USBR must comply with provisions of the Central Valley Project
Improvement Act (CVPIA), reducing the surface-water available for
meeting contracted uses. The CVPIA reallocated 800,000 acre feet of
CVP surface-water (600,000 in dry years) from Central Valley farmers
toward the restoration of Central Valley fisheries.
• The drought in the early 1990’s forced significant reductions in
deliveries of surface water from the CVP by USBR (during the drought
period).
• The Madera Ranch property owner recognizes potential for the site as
a groundwater bank and makes a proposal to the USBR.
• Site is located near CVP facilities and could easily be used to bank
CVP supplies.
Based on this situation, the USBR undertook the preliminary evaluation
and investigation of the Madera Ranch site for use as a groundwater bank.
The following elements were the driving forces for the local users and
AO’s who opposed the Madera Groundwater Bank Project:
• The proposed project was unveiled and championed prior to local user
involvement.
• CALFED officials and DWR Bulletin 160-98 characterized the project
as feasible and beneficial before the technical studies were
completed.
• Local users felt the project was being implemented based on
preliminary and incomplete information.
• Local users’ experience related to groundwater in the project’s vicinity
was not taken into account.
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• Local users feared groundwater quality degradation could result from
the introduction of poorer quality imported surface-water to the
groundwater basin.
• Local users were concerned about negative hydrologic impacts due to
the project.
• Local users feared the loss of local control as outside interests could
gain access to the groundwater basin. Native groundwater could be
extracted along with banked surface-water.
These local user concerns “galvanized” opposition to the project in
Madera County.
Incentives to Cooperate and Coordinate
There are two levels of incentives for cooperation and coordination
between users in the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project case:
incentives for the participating AO’s and agencies and incentives for the non
participating AO’s, users, and agencies
The participating AO’s and agencies have the incentive of increased
water supply reliability and flexibility that added storage would provide to the
DMC portion of the CVP system. Increased reliability and flexibility were the
key incentives for the participation and cooperation between the USBR, the
SLDMWA, and the SCVWD.
Non-participating AO’s, local users, and agencies could view the
project as a potential means of correcting some of the overdraft in the
Madera Groundwater Basin. However, the concerns and issues listed under
the Action Situation section acted as disincentives to cooperate and
coordinate with USBR and the participating AO’s, overriding any potential
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incentives for cooperation. These concerns and issues were, in effect the
incentive to cooperate and coordinate opposition at the local level.
Patterns of Interactions
Essentially, the pattern of interactions can be characterized as those
typical top-down “DAD” project - Decide, Announce, Defend (Walesh, 1997).
The DAD acronym is used to describe the bureaucratic approach to projects,
where public agency staff decides on the merits of a project with almost no
interaction with the public who will use, or be impacted by the project. In
essence, a problem is identified; a project is decided on by staff to address
the problem, and then the project is announced to the public. This DAD
approach results in resistance and the agency staff find themselves
defending the project to the public and elected officials.
Lack of trust by local users for the outside agencies made the
interactions more problematic. The potential introduction of imported
surface-water was viewed as a possible means to gain control over local
groundwater and possibly local surface-water by agencies outside of Madera
County (Madera County Groundwater Oversight Committee, Pistoresi and
Prosperi, April 2000). The introduction of imported surface-water was also
viewed as a potential threat to groundwater quality and crops.
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The DAD approach compounded the mistrust of outside agencies’ motives
by adding to the perception that the project was conceived “behind closed
doors.” In the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project case, the
interactions can be summarized as follows:
• Local AO’s and users learned of the proposed project after the
preliminary study and when it is announced as a feasible project in
DWR publications and at a statewide water conference.
• Local AO’s and users characterized USBR actions as “top down.” The
lack of public involvement in the project development is cited as a
problem.
• The proposed Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank is published and
announced as a project prior to the actual approval and funding of the
project. This reinforces the “top down” perception with the overlying
users and local AO’s.
• Concern about water quality, loss of local control, and hydrologic
impacts to local users arise.
• Local AO’s and overlying users strongly oppose the Madera Ranch
Groundwater Bank Project. Local political opposition by AO’s, local
agencies and groups develops.
• Local users and AO’s form an oversight committee to monitor the
project.
Outcomes
The USBR decided not to pursue the Madera Ranch Groundwater
Banking Project citing public opposition and the inability to secure funding as
primary reasons for abandoning the project. In summary the outcomes can
be described as follows:
• USBR funding attempts for the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank
Project fail (Congressional appropriation and CALFED funding) due to
opposition.
• Madera County enacts a groundwater export ordinance and permit
process.
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• Madera County passes a resolution opposing the Madera Ranch
Groundwater Bank Project.
• USBR drops project and the groundwater bank is not established.
• The Madera Ranch Property is sold to Azurix Madera Corporation.
The East Bay Municipal Utilities District And Eastern San Joaquin
Parties Water Authority Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Bank #1
Project
Introduction
This case study reviews the efforts by the East Bay Municipal Utility
District (EBMUD) and the East San Joaquin Parties Water Authority
(ESJWPA) to jointly bank groundwater in Eastern San Joaquin County. It
should be noted that EBMUD’s involvement in San Joaquin County actually
starts in 1925 when the district obtained permits for the use of Mokelumne
River from the California Division of Water Rights (Elkind, 1998, p. 141). The
use of Mokelumne River by EBMUD sparked resistance from farmers in the
north eastern part of San Joaquin County who feared that the expansion of
EBMUD’s water system would interfere with agriculture in the area (Elkind,
1998 p. 143). This marked the beginning of an anti-urban and anti
development sentiment in the area by agricultural interests; a feeling that has
continued to the present, as demonstrated in the following case study.
Background
San Joaquin County is located at the northern end of the San Joaquin
Valley, between the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta and the Sierra
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Nevada foothills. Eastern San Joaquin County is bounded by Sacramento
County in the north; Amador, Calaveras and Stanislaus counties in the east;
the Stanislaus River in the south; and the San Joaquin River and the San
Joaquin River Delta in the west (Brown and Caldwell, 1985, p. 2).
San Joaquin County encompasses a total of 912,599 acres with about
600,000 acres of this area considered “Eastern San Joaquin County
(California Dept, of Conservation, 1994, pp. 20-21).” The majority of the land
use in Eastern San Joaquin County is agricultural, and about six percent of
the area is urban (Brown and Caldwell, 1985, p.2). The major urban areas of
Eastern San Joaquin County include the City of Stockton, City of Lodi, City of
Manteca, Lathrop, Escalon and some unincorporated towns such as
Lockeford, Clements and Thornton.
Water suppliers in Eastern San Joaquin County include the
Woodbridge Irrigation District, the Stockton East Water District (SEWD), the
North San Joaquin Water Conservation District, the Central San Joaquin
Water Conservation District, the South San Joaquin Irrigation District, and
the Oakdale Irrigation District. Additionally, San Joaquin County’s Flood
Control & Water Conservation District overlies the area.
Eastern San Joaquin County is traversed by the Mokelumne River in
the north, the Calaveras River in the middle, and the Stanislaus River in the
south at the San Joaquin/Stanislaus County line. Additionally, several small
creeks cross the area. These include Dry Creek, Little Johns Creek, Lone
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Tree Creek, Duck Creek, Bear Creek, Mormon Slough, and Mosher Creek.
Finally, six surface-water reservoirs are operated within close proximity to the
area: Camanche, Pardee, New Melones, New Hogan, Farmington, and
Woodward Reservoirs (Brown and Caldwell, 1985, p. 4).
San Joaquin County is within the northern portion of the San Joaquin
River Hydrologic Region, as defined by the USGS, and overlies two
groundwater basins—the Eastern San Joaquin County Groundwater Basin
and the Tracy Groundwater Basin. The Eastern San Joaquin County
Groundwater Basin is located east of the San Joaquin River and the delta
and the Tracy Basin is west of the San Joaquin River. Sediments in the area
are highly permeable.
Total agricultural consumption of water in San Joaquin County
averages approximately 1,120,000 acre-feet per year. The municipal and
industrial (urban) water demand is about 111,000 acre-feet per year (US
Army Corps of Engineers, 1998, p. 11-10). Due to the relative lack of
sufficient dry-year surface-water rights in San Joaquin County, the County
has relied heavily on groundwater throughout its history. As a result,
groundwater supplies approximately seventy percent of San Joaquin
County’s water needs (Baseline Consulting, 1992). The total groundwater
usage in the county is estimated to be approximately 731,000 acre-feet per
year, which exceeds the estimated safe yield of 618,000 acre-feet per year
(US Army Corps of Engineers, 1998, p. II-9).
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The “mining” of groundwater results in an estimated groundwater overdraft
of 113,000 acre-feet per year.
Technical studies demonstrate that a groundwater overdraft problem
has existed in Eastern San Joaquin County for several decades (Brown and
Caldwell, 1985, p. 4). Two pronounced groundwater- pumping depressions
were observed in the region during the late 1940s and early 1950s. The
largest of the two depressions is located in northeastern San Joaquin County
between the Mokelumne and Stanislaus Rivers and is centered in the
Stockton area. Here, groundwater levels are greater than seventy feet below
sea level and as much as one hundred and fifty feet below pre-development
levels (California Department of Water Resources Bulletin 160-98, p. 8-29,
Stockton East Water District/US Army Corps of Engineers, 1998). One study
indicates that the rate of groundwater withdrawal has exceeded recharge for
at least fifty years. The overdraft has resulted in the intrusion of saline water
into the aquifer below Stockton, with some studies indicating that the saline
water front is advancing at a rate of 140 to 150 lateral feet per year (US Army
Corps of Engineers, 1998, p. 1-1, Stockton East Water District, 2001). If the
groundwater overdraft continues in the Stockton area, the saline migration
will expand, resulting in a significant loss of Eastern San Joaquin County’s
groundwater resources. The estimated overdraft for the northeastern part of
the county is about 70,000 acre-feet per year, and a recent study shows that
approximately 183,000 acre-feet per year is needed to overcome the impacts
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of the groundwater overdraft (Stockton East Water District, US Army Corps
of Engineers, 2000, p. 1). As a result, the ongoing overdraft has dewatered
an estimated three million acre-feet and created considerable storage
capacity in the Eastern San Joaquin County groundwater basin (ESJPWA,
n.d., p. 5).
The East Bay Municipal Utility District’s 1993 Water Supply
Management Program describes groundwater use as a key element of
EBMUD’s water supply reliability strategy. The District’s engineering and
environmental work clearly demonstrates the technical feasibility of
recharging and extracting surface-water in the Eastern San Joaquin County
Groundwater Basin. The EBMUD literature also points out that, while it is
technically feasible to bank water in the area, institutional issues need to be
resolved before a project can move forward (East Bay Municipal Utilities
District, 1996, p. 4). The following discussion provides a brief history of
EBMUD’s involvement in water banking in Eastern San Joaquin County.
Project History
Water officials and the public have been aware of the groundwater
overdraft problem in Eastern San Joaquin for many years. In 1971, the
serious nature of the situation prompted the California State Legislature to
take special action.
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In recognizing the problem, the Legislature stated:
The water supplies in the underground basin in the area of
Stockton East Water District are insufficient to meet the water
demands of the area, and, because of the geologic conditions
peculiar to the area and because excessive pumping has
seriously depleted the underground water storage, there has
been an intrusion of saline waters into the underground water
basin causing serious water quality deterioration and the
destruction of the usefulness of a portion of the underground
water basin. Further excessive pumping, without proper
management of the underground water basin is certain to
destroy the usefulness of a major portion of the underground
water basin and endanger the health of and welfare of the
district (EBMUD, 1996).
The Legislature found that the overdraft problem was broad and
complex and that neither the urban nor the agricultural interests could solve
the problem by themselves, but instead must make a joint effort to reach a
solution. Policymakers have recognized the overdraft problem in other
forums as well. For example, Section 1011.5 of the Water Code mandates
that the overdraft in the Eastern San Joaquin County Groundwater Basin be
halted by 2007 as a condition for exportation of groundwater. And, the
California Department of Water Resources (DWR) in Bulletin 118-80
identified the groundwater underlying Eastern San Joaquin County as subject
to critical conditions of overdraft.
The recognition of the overdraft problem in Eastern San Joaquin
County led to a number of proposals for dealing with the situation. Several
options have been explored, including the re-operation of Farmington
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Reservoir to provide recharge water and a regional canal connecting the
Folsom South Canal to the lower Farmington Canal to make use of water
from the Calaveras and Stanislaus Rivers. One of the proposals involves
participating in a conjunctive use project with EBMUD, where, during certain
years, a portion of EBMUD’s Mokelumne River Water or its CVP water would
be banked in the Eastern San Joaquin County Groundwater Basin prior to
being diverted into the Mokelumne Aqueduct (California Department of Water
Resources, Bulletin 160-98, p. 8-29). This proposal was discussed in the
EBMUD 1993 Water Supply Management Program (WSMP) and is the focus
of this case study (EBMUD, 1996, pp. 3-4, DWR, Bulletin 160-98, p. 8-29).
EBMUD’s involvement in Eastern San Joaquin County groundwater
issues can be traced back to 1937 when concerns were raised about
Mokelumne River diversions and groundwater in the Lodi area. EBMUD
currently monitors groundwater levels as a part of an agreement with the City
of Lodi. In 1981, the San Joaquin County Flood Control and Water
Conservation District retained the firm of Brown and Caldwell to study
groundwater conditions in Eastern San Joaquin County (Brown and Caldwell
Study). The Eastern San Joaquin Water Users Association—composed of
the North San Joaquin Water Conservation District, the Woodbridge Irrigation
District, the Stockton East Water District, the Central San Joaquin Water
Conservation District, the County Flood Control and Water Conservation
District, and the Woodbridge Water Users Conservation District —supported
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the need for this study. Participants in the study Policy Advisory Committee
included the City of Stockton, City of Lodi, California Water Service
Company, and EBMUD. The members of the Eastern San Joaquin Water
Users Association, with the Cities of Lodi and Stockton (and the California
Water Service Company as a non-voting member), eventually formed the
East San Joaquin Parties Water Authority (ESJPWA) for the purpose of
negotiating a groundwater recharge project with EBMUD.
The goal of the Brown and Caldwell Study was to determine the
relative effects of various water supply alternatives on the Eastern San
Joaquin County groundwater basin. Completed in 1985, the study found that
development of a plan to optimize the use of surface-water and groundwater
supplies was technically feasible and economically attractive. However, the
study notes that much technical, legal, economic, and institutional work
would need to be completed before a conjunctive use program could be
considered (Brown and Caldwell, 1985, p. 13).
The prolonged drought of 1987-1992 caused the groundwater levels
in San Joaquin County to decline sharply (San Joaquin County Flood Control
and Conservation District, 1999). This allowed the saline waterfront to
encroach further eastward, degrading the quality of the groundwater in the
eastern part of the county (Fall 1993 Groundwater Report). The drought also
induced area landowners to install wells in the southwest area of San
Joaquin County for groundwater export via the adjacent CVP aqueduct
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facilities (the Delta Mendota Canal). These events, plus growth in the
county, underscored the need to move forward with some form of
supplemental water program.
The idea to actively pursue a recharge project for Eastern San
Joaquin County originated with Stockton East Water District (Personal
communications with Ms. Jeanne Zolezzi, SEWD Counsel, May 17, 2000).
As a major water agency within Eastern San Joaquin County responsible for
providing supplemental surface-water supplies, SEWD recognized the
seriousness of the overdraft problem and the need to explore regional
solutions. The district’s initiative, coupled with some active leadership within
San Joaquin County and the development of EBMUD’s Water Supply
Management Program, led to negotiations between Eastern San Joaquin
County water interests and EBMUD in 1994 (Personal communications with
Mr. Fran Forkas, City of Lodi, August, 2000, Williamson, Mark S., 1995, p.
72).
In 1995-96, the Eastern San Joaquin County water interests,
consisting of the San Joaquin County Flood Control and Water Conservation
District, the Cities of Stockton and Lodi, SEWD, Central San Joaquin Water
Conservation District, Woodbridge Irrigation District, North San Joaquin
Water Conservation District, and the California Water Service Company (as
an associate member), formed the East San Joaquin Parties Water Authority
(ESJPWA), a joint powers authority (Personal communications with Mr. John
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Pulver, June 2000). The stated purpose of the ESJPWA was to plan a
project or projects to meet the water deficiencies of Eastern San Joaquin
County, either alone or in conjunction with EBMUD and/or other public
entities (ESJPA, 1995, Article I, Section 1.02).
The ESJPWA negotiations with EBMUD resulted in a 1995 agreement
to pursue jointly funded technical studies (Williamson, p. 72). The technical
studies were completed in 1996 and found that a mutually beneficial program
would entail recharging 40,000 acre-feet per year in about half of all years
into the basin, while extracting about 50,000 acre-feet of water in one out of
four years (Williamson, p. 75). The study looked at in lieu conjunctive use
and injection/extraction as options. It concluded that the least expensive
option would be to use dual-purpose aquifer storage and recovery wells
located near EBMUD’s Mokelumne River Aqueduct (MRA). Capital facilities
for this option were estimated to cost $25 million, as opposed to $90 million
for in lieu recharge facilities (Willamson, p. 75). The MRA injection/extraction
option would allow EBMUD to take advantage of normal weather and wet
weather flows from the Mokelumne River.
The findings of the 1996 technical studies led to the execution of a
1997 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between ESJPWA and EBMUD to
demonstrate the feasibility of the injection and extraction of surface-water
into the Eastern San Joaquin County Groundwater Basin (Amended
EBMUD/ESJPWA MOA, 1997). The purpose of the proposed project was to
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test the reaction of the aquifer to injection and extraction, the water quality
impacts and optimal rates of injection and extraction. The data generated by
this pilot project would provide the necessary information for the design of
full-scale injection/extraction facilities.
The proposed project, which became the Beckman Test
Injection/Extraction Project (Beckman Test Project), was designed to inject
3,000 acre-feet of Mokelumne River Water from the MRA into a site adjacent
to the MRA. Per the MOA, EBMUD would sell the water to ESJPWA;
EBMUD would have the ability to recover up to fifty percent of the injected
water (1500 acre-feet). The project was operated for a nine-month period
during 1997-1998 and demonstrated the feasibility of injecting up to 500
gallons per minute (Boyle, pp. 1-10). While the project performed as
expected, the Beckman Test Project created an institutional controversy
within San Joaquin County as a result of EBMUD filing an application for the
export of water extracted from the project.
In 1996, in partial response to the groundwater overdraft in the
southwest portion of the County that occurred during the drought, San
Joaquin County adopted an ordinance establishing a permit process for
exportation of groundwater. In 1997, EBMUD became the first entity to apply
for a permit when it requested a permit for export of water from the Beckman
Test Project site via the MRA (Stockton Record, February 13, 2000). Per the
requirements of the County ordinance, the Advisory Water Commission of
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the San Joaquin County Flood Control and Water Conservation District
reviewed the permit. The permit process includes the opportunity for public
comment at the Commission review. Significant opposition to the permit
application was voiced by the overlying farmer/landowners, including the San
Joaquin Farm Bureau Federation, which was concerned about granting
EBMUD access to the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Basin (Hannah,
2000). As a result, only three of the nineteen Commission members present
(out of a total twenty-two members) voted to support the permit (Pulver,
2000, personal communication with Richard Prima, July 2000). Thus, the
permit was denied and no water was exported from the Beckman Test
Project.
The application triggered nearly two of years of review of the
protections afforded by the 1996 Ordinance. The ordinance was amended in
June 2000 to incorporate measures to ensure that local groundwater users
have enough water. The amendments adopted portions of the Kern Water
Bank operating rules, modified to meet the needs of San Joaquin County.
The amendment requires the submission of more detailed project
information, the installation of at least three monitoring wells, a limit on the
amount of water that can be exported to assure a net gain in usable water
underlying the project, requirements for the spacing of extraction wells and
buffer zones, limits on extraction times and periods, the formation of a
monitoring committee, and a provision that the project shall not create
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conditions that aro worse than conditions in the absence of the project (the
so-called “Golden Rule”). The permit approval is made by the County Board
of Supervisors. However, before approving any permit application, the Board
of Supervisors must find that the proposed project will not operate to the
injury of the reasonable and beneficial uses of the overlying groundwater
users (Ordinance Amending Division 8 to Title 5 of the Ordinance Code of
San Joaquin County Regarding the Extraction and Exportation of
Groundwater from San Joaquin County, Chapter 3, Section 5-8335 to
Section 5-8340).
With the adoption of the amended ordinance and the completion of the
Beckman Test Project, ESJPWA and EBMUD proposed to move ahead with
the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Bank #1 Project. This project would
use both in lieu pumping and groundwater injection methods to bank
Mokelumne River water. Injection/extraction wells would be constructed near
the MRA in the North San Joaquin Water Conservation District area. The
Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Bank #1 Project proposed to recharge an
average of 7,000 acre-feet per year and extract an annual average of 3,500
acre-feet of water per year. The estimated cost for this project was $25
million (Saracino, August 9, 2000).
ESJPWA began soliciting partners to provide water and/or funds to
assist in advancing the project.
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This triggered the opposition of local interests who feared the encroachment
of outside agencies into the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Basin, even
with the protections provided by the amended County ordinance in place.
As of September 2000, the ESJPWA intended to move forward with
the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Project, utilizing the lessons learned
from the Beckman Test Project. The ESJPWA representatives believed,
based on the ordinance revision process, that they understood what level of
information is required to satisfy the Advisory Water Commission needs, and
ESJPWA planned to develop the project along these lines. Also, ESJPWA
intended to incorporate an ongoing public outreach effort regarding the
project (Saracino, August 2000). ESJPWA and EBMUD stated that they
could work within the requirements of the amended County Groundwater
Extraction and Exportation Ordinance. Eastern San Joaquin Parties Water
Authority disbanded on June 30, 2000 as the JPA had a “sunset” provision.
Subsequently, the members of the ESJPWA formed Northeastern San
Joaquin County Groundwater Banking Authority to continue the effort to
pursue and implement a groundwater bank in San Joaquin County.
Table 9.0 (next page) presents a summarized chronology of the
ESJPWA/EBMUD groundwater banking efforts.
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Table 9.0 Eastern San Joaquin County/East Bay Municipal Utility District
Groundwater Banking Project Chronology
EVENT DATE
Brown and Caldwell are retained by San Joaquin County Flood Control & W ater
Conservation District to study groundwater conditions in Eastern San Joaquin County—
EBMUD is a study participant.
1981
Brown and Caldwell study is completed. Study finds 200,000 af per year of surface-
water needed to stabilize groundwater basin, recommends Folsom South Canal option
and/or New Melones be used as water source.
1985
Prolonged drought—farmers in Tracy area install wells for groundwater export.
1987-1992
San Joaquin County Flood Control & Water Conservation District groundwater
monitoring demonstrates that saline front has encroached farther east towards
Stockton (drought impact).
1993
Active negotiations begin between Eastern San Joaquin County water
producers and EBMUD regarding a joint conjunctive use project.
1994
East San Joaquin Parties enter into an agreement with EBMUD to evaluate a
joint groundwater storage conjunctive use program. Montgomery Watson, in
conjunction with CH2M Hill, is selected to perform the study.
1995
East San Joaquin Parties Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement is executed.
ESJWPA’s stated purpose is to plan projects to meet water deficiencies of
Eastern San Joaquin County.
1996
San Joaquin County adopts a groundwater extraction and export ordinance. 1996
Montgomery Watson issues Mokelumne Aquifer Recharge and Storage Project Final
Report. Stanislaus & American River injection and in lieu options are presented.
Folsom Canal South option plus Mokelumne River options are also presented.
1996
EBMUD and ESJW PA enter into a Memorandum of Agreement to demonstrate the
feasibility of injection and extraction of surface-water into the Eastern San Joaquin
County Groundwater Basin. EBMUD will provide 3000 af of water to ESJW PA for $1/af.
EBMUD can extract up 50% of the stored water.
1997
EBMUD files for an export permit pursuant to Division 7 of Title 5 of the Groundwater
Extraction and Exportation Ordinance of San Joaquin County. Local interests strongly
oppose issuing the permit. The Advisory W ater Commission (AWC) approves
environmental documentation, but the permit application subsequently fails.
1998
Beckman Test Injection/Extraction Project constructed and operated. Boyle Engineering
Corp. is project consultant. Mokelumne River Aqueduct is used to supply water. 1997-1998
Boyle Engineering releases final report on Beckman Project. Report concludes that
injection rates of 500 gallons per minute, or more, per well are feasible. Extraction rates
were as projected.
1999
After a series of extensive reviews, the San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors
approves an amendment to the Groundwater Extraction and Exportation Ordinance that
limits groundwater exports, creates a monitoring committee for projects and requires
qroundwater banking projects to provide a net increase in qroundwater in the basin.
May 2000
ESJW PA presents proposed Groundwater Bank No. 1 Project (“10 Well Project”).
Information from the Beckman Project will be used for design. EBMUD will participate
and Mokelumne River water is the proposed supply source. ESJW PA solicits partners
for project.
August
2000
San Joaquin Farm Bureau Federation publicly opposes participation by outside
interests in any groundwater banking/extraction project within San Joaquin
County. SJFB states opposition to ESJWPA soliciting outside partners.
August
2000
ESJW PA charter formally expired June 2000— this is not recognized until November
2000.
November
2000
Members of former ESJWPA form Northeastern San Joaquin County Groundwater
Banking Authority.
February
2001
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The proposed source of the banked water was the Mokelumne River
and, potentially, water diverted from the Sacramento River. EBMUD has
rights to 360,000 acre-feet per year of Mokelumne River water, but the
district has inadequate storage and the Mokelumne River flows are highly
variable, ranging from 80,000 to 1.8 million acre-feet per year (Williamson,
p.72).
The Beckman Test Injection/Extraction Project was sited on land
owned by Mr. Charles Beckman, near the Mokelumne River Aqueduct (MRA)
to minimize conveyance costs. Similarly, the proposed Eastern San Joaquin
County Groundwater Bank No.1 will be located near the MRA within the
North San Joaquin Water Conservation District, in order to minimize costs of
pipes for distribution and extraction. The proposal is for an aquifer storage
and recovery (ASR) project, where banking would be accomplished by
approximately ten injection/extraction wells. Water would then be conveyed
to end-users via the Mokelumne River Aqueduct. Water remaining in the
basin would be used for overdraft correction.
The project includes two groups of intended beneficiaries—EBMUD
and the ESJPWA members. EBMUD will benefit by the addition of water
storage to improve the reliability of its Mokelumne River supply. EBMUD is a
participant due to its Mokelumne River rights and the proximity of its facilities
(MRA) to Eastern San Joaquin County. The ESJWPA represents agencies
in the Eastern San Joaquin County area that are most affected by the
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groundwater overdraft. Incidental beneficiaries will consist of overlying
landowners who are groundwater users; groundwater users in Eastern San
Joaquin County would benefit from the improved groundwater levels. The
stored water would help to correct the overdraft created by agricultural
pumping and municipal and industrial demands in Eastern San Joaquin
County.
Project Opposition - Trust and Local Control
For the most part, project opposition consisted of the San Joaquin
Farm Bureau and Central Delta Water Agency. Their major concern was that
it was too risky to bring in an outside agency and give that agency access to
the local groundwater basin. Outside agencies were viewed as predatory
organizations that would take the water when they needed it, without
considering San Joaquin County’s needs (San Joaquin Farm Bureau News,
2000). The opposition also feared a loss of water rights if these agencies put
a “straw in the aquifer.” Paul Sanguinetti, Past SJ Farm Bureau President,
member of the SEWD board and Stockton area farmer, expressed the
essence of the local fears by stating that dealing with EBMUD was like
“playing with a loaded gun” and that once the area experienced several dry
years in a row, “there’s no way we’re going to stop them from exporting that
water out of the county. No way. We’ll have to stop pumping here ( Nickles,
1998, p. A4).” The San Joaquin Farm Bureau Federation, representing the
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local farming interests, elaborated these concerns in public forums. The
Executive Director, Russ Matthews, stated “everyone is in favor of recharging
groundwater—as long as that water remains in the area and is not exported
out of the county (San Joaquin Farm Bureau News, February 2000).”
In response to the ESJPWA call for partners, the San Joaquin Farm
Bureau Federation interviewed local political leaders and Farm Bureau
officers and members regarding the proposal. The Farm Bureau elicited
responses to the effect that: solicitation of partners was premature until an
export permit was obtained; banking by a local agency was preferable
because “they’d have a stake in the groundwater situation and would work
for both themselves and the area,” overlooking the fact that the ESJPWA
was comprised wholly of local agencies; San Joaquin County’s needs should
come first; “our” water rights might be lost; and the County should undertake
groundwater banking itself for local control and benefit. It was also believed
that, once involved, it would be expensive to get outside municipal water
agencies (AO’s) out of the aquifer (invoking the Owens Valley episode where
MWD purchased overlying lands in order to appropriate the groundwater).
In an earlier article, the San Joaquin Farm Bureau Federation
discussed the SEWD technical study of recharging the Eastern San Joaquin
County Groundwater Basin with winter run-off through percolation ponds.
The article showed that local interests were supportive of the project due to
the fact that a local San Joaquin County agency would be in charge, rather
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than an outside agency. The two articles, plus the statements of individuals
interviewed for this study, indicated that the major issue was the fear of an
outside entity gaining control of groundwater in San Joaquin County. As an
example of the response to this concern, the Farm Bureau supported an
amended water export ordinance that provided greater groundwater access
protections for overlying landowners.
The opposition to EBMUD’s access to the groundwater basin is easier
to understand when one considers the history of EBMUD and the farming
interests in San Joaquin County. EBMUD’s 1925 project to divert
Mokelumne River water from the region “inspired a new form of
antiurbanism” and heightened the competition for limited water resources
between agriculture and urban interests (Elkind, 1998, p. 160). This of
development, in effect, was viewed as infringing on the local control over
natural resources. Thus the extension of EBMUD’s access to the
groundwater basin would be viewed as a threat to the local control of the
area’s groundwater resource.
For the most part, public participation regarding the project took place
at the Advisory Water Commission level and at the ESJPWA Board
meetings. ESJPWA members reported project information back to their
respective Boards and Councils. The ESJWPA Board was composed of the
majority of the agency stakeholders in the northern portion of Eastern San
Joaquin County (the southern agencies, such as the cities of Manteca,
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Lathrop, Escalon and the South San Joaquin Irrigation District are
participating in a regional plan to use the District’s surface-water). Overlying
landowners and other agencies could voice their concerns regarding the
project through the San Joaquin County Water Advisory Commission and the
Board of Supervisors. San Joaquin County is currently conducting a
stakeholder/consensus building effort for the development of a countywide
Water Master Plan. This effort includes all of the stakeholders that are
affected by the proposed groundwater banking project. The
stakeholder/consensus building process will be essential to building the level
of trust necessary to move forward with a groundwater banking project in
eastern San Joaquin County that involves outside entities.
Technical Studies
There was no dispute regarding the various technical studies
describing the overdraft problem in Eastern San Joaquin County. The
Beckman Test Injection/Extraction Project Final Report prepared by Boyle
Engineering Corporation was a very thorough and well-documented study.
According to ESJWPA participants and published reports, the issue was not
the thoroughness or validity of the technical studies—it was the distrust of an
outside agency. The concern was that an outside agency could become
overly reliant on the Eastern San Joaquin County groundwater basin,
draining the region of its groundwater resources (Prima, personal
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communication, July 2000). The issue is not a technical one; it is an
institutional and political issue, and local interests must be assured that the
potential third party impacts are mitigated before a project can move forward
(Zolezzi, personal communication, May 2000).
Test Project Monitoring Program
The Beckman Test Project incorporated a thorough monitoring
program to check groundwater levels and water quality impacts. Staff
members of the ESJPWA performed daily monitoring of the Beckman Test
Project. The Beckman Test Project also incorporated careful monitoring to
determine if water quality problems might be encountered by injecting MRA
water. The Technical Advisory Committee for the Beckman Test Project
adopted a turbidity limit of 2.0 NTU to avoid well plugging. The project Final
Report showed no water quality issues and recommended that the injection
of surface-water be suspended when MRA turbidities exceeded 2.0 NTUs.
The 2000 amendment to the San Joaquin County Groundwater
Extraction and Export Ordinance required the establishment of a five-
member monitoring committee for any permitted groundwater-banking
project within San Joaquin County. This requirement for a monitoring
committee was modeled after the Kern Water Bank monitoring committee
requirements and applies to any permitted project in San Joaquin County.
Thus, the proposed San Joaquin County Groundwater Bank No. 1 will
require the establishment of such a monitoring committee.
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Per the ordinance, the monitoring committee will consist of
representatives from the following agencies and stakeholder interests:
County Public Works; County Public Health Services; the permittee; the local
agency providing water within the project service area; and owners of land
within two miles of the project location. The monitoring committee will set
criteria to determine if there is well interference caused by the project, and it
can engage the services of a professional groundwater specialist to provide
assistance. The committee will also maintain records of the recharge and
recovery activities related to the project and make recommendations to the
San Joaquin County Advisory Water Commission for project modifications
based on evaluation of monitoring data (Ordinance Amending Division 8 to
Title 5 of the Ordinance Code of San Joaquin County Regarding the
Extraction and Exportation of Groundwater from San Joaquin County,
Chapter 3, Section 5-8345).
Program Costs
The proposed San Joaquin County Groundwater Bank No. 1 would
cost an estimated $25 million (personal communication with Mr. Anthony
Saracino, August 2000). The cost shares are yet to be determined. The
value of the water produced is estimated at $400 to $485 per acre-foot
(Stockton Record, 1998). This cost was described as too much for too little
water.
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Hydrologic Uncertainties and Risks
As there was no full-scale project on line, hydrologic risks (e.g., aquifer
leakage, pumping limitations, reduced infiltration) cannot be completely
addressed. However, it should be noted that the San Joaquin County
Groundwater Extraction and Exportation Ordinance does address these
uncertainties and risks as follows:
• Extraction for export is limited to an amount that ensures that the project
will result in a net addition to the usable groundwater underlying the
project.
• Extraction wells may be spaced to limit impacts and an appropriate
number of wells required to allow rotation.
• Buffer areas may be required between extraction wells and neighboring
users.
• Annual, seasonal, or monthly limits and time restrictions can be placed on
extraction rates.
• Pumping rates can be adjusted or terminated to reduce impacts.
• Exportation cannot result in lowering the average static water level in the
project area by more than fifteen feet.
• A monitoring committee is required for each project.
• The project cannot create conditions that are worse than conditions
absent the project.
• Lowering neighboring pump bowls to accommodate lower groundwater
levels may be required to mitigate unavoidable adverse impacts.
• The cost of providing alternative water supplies to an impacted overlying
user may be required of the project owner/operator.
Financial compensation may be provided to an impacted overlying user by
the project owner/operator.
The conditions and mitigation measures listed above are to be imposed
by the County Board of Supervisors per the amended ordinance.
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IAD Analysis Of The EBMUD and ESJPWA Eastern San Joaquin
Groundwater Bank #1 Project
Physical and Technological Attributes of the Groundwater Basin and
Surface-Water Systems
• Basin Characteristics
o San Joaquin County has two main groundwater basins (or a basin and
a sub-basin). The Eastern SJC Groundwater Basin is not closed (it is
open to the Delta),
o Permeable sediments allow for good percolation recharge with
surface-water.
o The Eastern SJC Groundwater Basin is in a state of overdraft and has
been for several decades,
o Groundwater supplies approximately 70 percent of the areas water
needs.
o The average estimated overdraft is 113,000 acre-feet per year and an
estimated 183,000 acre-feet of water is needed to overcome the
effects of overdraft in the Eastern SJC Basin,
o There is an estimated 3 million acre-feet of storage capacity in the
Eastern SJC Basin,
o Saline water intrusion is encroaching into the Eastern SJC Basin.
• Surface-Water Systems
o Eastern SJC lacks sufficient dry year surface-water supplies to meet
demands, thus the area relies heavily on groundwater,
o Water from Farmington Reservoir can be made available for banking
through the re-operation of the reservoir to make use of excess water
in wet years.
o Potential exists to make use of Calaveras River and Stanislaus River
waters through the construction of a regional canal,
o EBMUD’s Mokelumne River aqueduct could be used as a source of
surface-water for groundwater banking,
o Four rivers and several small creeks cross the area,
o Six surface-water reservoirs are operated in the area,
o Transport or diversion of water from the Sacramento area by EBMUD
is a potential source of imported surface-water for the area.
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• Technological Attributes
o Surface-water can be stored in the Eastern SJC Groundwater
Basin by either allowing surface-water to percolate into the basin
via spreading basins, or through injection,
o Injection using Aquifer Storage and Recovery (ASR) wells was
found to be a good technology for the area,
o Stored (banked) water is recovered using well pump technology,
o Stored water can be metered (measured) as it is injected into the
aquifer.
o Recovered water can be metered as it is pumped out.
o Imported surface-water is available via the EBMUD aqueduct
system.
o The aqueduct systems also allow for conveyance of recovered
water out of the basin area.
Identified Uses of the Eastern SJC Groundwater Basin Area
Table 10.0 Identified Uses of the Eastern SJC Groundwater Basin Area
Use
1
Native groundwater used for agricultural and domestic supplies (individual
overlying users).
Use
2
Groundwater basin can be used for banking imported surface-water.
Use
3
Overlying area is mainly agricultural (94 percent of land use is agricultural).
Use
4
Water used for municipal use - the Cities of Stockton and Lodi utilize
groundwater for municipal/industrial uses.
Institutional Arrangements
• Constitutional
o Government Code of the State of California (Article 1, Chapter 5,
Division 7), which enables the formation of a joint powers authority
(JPA).
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Collective Choice
o The ESJPWA board of directors was enabled to make decisions for
the ESJPWA based on the district provisions of the Government
Code.
o Likewise, the EBMUD board of directors is enabled to make decisions
for the EBMUD based on the provisions of the Water Code.
o The MOU between EBMUD and ESJPWA specified the rules for
participation in the Beckman Test Project.
• Operational
San Joaquin County Groundwater Extraction and Exportation
Ordinance provides the operational rules necessary for the operation of any
groundwater bank in San Joaquin County. These rules are modeled on the
KWB rules and include the following provisions:
o Extraction for export is limited to an amount that ensures that the
project will result in a net addition to the usable groundwater
underlying the project.
o Extraction wells may be spaced to limit impacts and an appropriate
number of wells required to allow rotation.
o Buffer areas may be required between extraction wells and
neighboring users.
o Annual, seasonal, or monthly limits and time restrictions can be placed
on extraction rates.
o Pumping rates can be adjusted or terminated to reduce impacts.
o Exportation cannot result in lowering the average static water level in
the project area by more than fifteen feet.
o A monitoring committee is required for each project.
o The project cannot create conditions that are worse than conditions
absent in the project.
o Lowering neighboring pump bowls to accommodate lower
groundwater levels may be required to mitigate unavoidable adverse
impacts.
o The cost of providing alternative water supplies to an impacted
overlying user may be required of the project owner/operator.
o Financial compensation may be provided to an impacted overlying
user by the project owner/operator.
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Characteristics of the User Community
Table 11.0 Identified User Groups of the ESJPWA Area
Group
1
Participating AO - ESJPWA consisting of a County agency, two cities, four
districts, and one water company.
Group
2
Non-participating Area AO’s - south county cities and districts not relying
on the eastern basin.
Group
3
Outside Participating AO - EBMUD (Bay Area)
Group
4*
Municipal Users - the cities of Stockton and Lodi.
Group
5
Overlying Users - Individual property owners using groundwater for
farming and domestic purposes.
Group
6*
Water, irrigation and conservation districts - districts providing water for
agricultural and some municipal purposes.
* these users participate in the ESJPWA
• Participating AO - ESJPWA
o ESJPWA - a Joint Powers Authority made up of multiple AO’s formed
to plan and finance a project or projects to meet the water deficiencies
of Eastern San Joaquin County, either alone, or in conjunction with
EBMUD and/or other public entities.
o ESJPWA consisted of the San Joaquin County Flood Control and
Water Conservation District, the Cities of Stockton and Lodi, SEWD,
Central San Joaquin Water Conservation District, Woodbridge
Irrigation District, North San Joaquin Water Conservation District, and
the California Water Service Company (providing water services to
part of the City of Stockton). These entities are the major water AO’s
in the eastern groundwater basin area.
o The entities making up the JPA are governed by representative
boards of directors and city councils elected from the individual users,
or landowners, in each district and city (with the exception of the
California Water Service Company).
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• Non-Participating AO’s - Water Districts
o Most are special districts and cities in the south and western part of
San Joaquin County,
o Are governed by representative boards of directors and city councils
elected from the individual users, or landowners in each district,
o The south County cities of Manteca, Tracy, Lathrop and Escalon
participate in a regional water project with the South San Joaquin
Irrigation District, consequently these agencies do not have a
significant stake in the ESJPWA projects.
• Outside Participating AO
o The East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) supplies water and
provides wastewater treatment for parts of Alameda and Contra Costa
counties on the eastern side of San Francisco Bay in northern
California. Approximately 1.3 million people are served by EBMUD's
water system in a 325-square-mile area extending from Crockett on
the north, southward to San Lorenzo (encompassing the major cities
of Oakland and Berkeley), eastward from San Francisco Bay to
Walnut Creek, and south through the San Ramon Valley.
• Municipal Users
o In 1998, the City of Stockton Water Utility delivered over 7.4 billion
gallons of water (22,711 acre-feet) to over 105,000 customers residing
in north and south Stockton. Approximately 7,500 acre-feet of the
water supplied to the system came from City-owned groundwater
wells, with the remainder supplied by the Stockton East Water District
(SEWD).
o The City of Lodi utilizes approximately 16,700 acre-feet of
groundwater per year to serve a population of about 57,000.
o Both cities represent the major urban development and urban use of
water in the northeastern area.
• Overlying Users - Individuals
o Majority are farmers or involved with agriculture.
o Live within the ESJPWA area.
o Many participate in local farm bureau.
o Utilize approximately 731,000 acre-feet of groundwater per year for
agricultural purposes (countywide).
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Levels of Trust
Water districts participating the program serve the agricultural
community, yet the largest segment of opposition to EBMUD banking
surface-water in the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Basin came from
area farmers. The issues contributing to this lack of trust included:
o Fears that there would be no effective control over EBMUD’s pumping
operations during a series of dry years. Thus, EBMUD could export
native groundwater out of San Joaquin County,
o The opinion that the proposed project would not bring in enough
surface-water to correct the overdraft. Thus, it would not be worth the
risk of letting EBMUD into the basin,
o Historical divisiveness between water agencies in the county, leasing
to divisions between the Delta Water Agencies and the ESJPWA.
o Historical animosity towards EBMUD by San Joaquin County
agricultural interests.
Action Situation/Contextual Factors
• Overdraft in the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Basin was
recognized as a serious problem in the 1970’s. Cones of depression
(specifically lowered groundwater levels) occur in the area of Stockton
between the Mokelumne and Stanislaus Rivers.
• Overdraft of the area basin reaches an annual average of 70,000
acre-feet per year in the 1990’s.
• Saline water intrudes into the groundwater basin jeopardizing the
aquifer system with potentially irreversible damage due to
contamination.
• Technical studies show approximately 183,000 acre-feet per year of
supplemental water is needed to correct the overdraft.
• Local users on the Westside install wells to export groundwater from
San Joaquin County during the drought of 1987-92 triggering a County
ordinance to control groundwater exports.
• EBMUD’s Water Supply Management Program identifies the need for
additional storage to increase water supply reliability.
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Incentives to Cooperate and Coordinate
• Groundwater banking provides increased water supply reliability for
EBMUD.
• ESJPWA could obtain additional water to help correct the Eastern San
Joaquin Groundwater Basin overdraft.
Patterns of Interactions
• Stockton East Water District (SEWD) initiates the idea of a regional
program to recharge groundwater with surface-water.
• The Eastern San Joaquin County AO’s (includes SEWD) form a joint
powers authority group (ESJPWA) specifically to plan and implement
projects to meet the water needs in eastern San Joaquin County.
• ESJPWA and EBMUD negotiate and agree to jointly fund technical
studies.
• EBMUD and ESJPWA enter into a Memorandum of Agreement to test
the injection of surface-water into the groundwater basin.
• EBMUD files for permit to export banked groundwater.
• Local users oppose the permit application, and the application fails at
the Advisory Water Commission level.
• The San Joaquin Farm Bureau and others strongly oppose
groundwater banking by interests outside of San Joaquin County.
Outcomes
• A groundwater bank test project is successfully implemented by
ESJPWA and EBMUD.
• The feasibility of groundwater banking is verified by the test project.
• San Joaquin County amends its groundwater export ordinance to
incorporate provisions similar to the KWB operating rules.
• A full-scale groundwater bank is not implemented due to opposition.
Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn from the Madera Ranch and Eastern
San Joaquin cases? These case studies demonstrate that while the physical
and technological attributes of a given CPR/Groundwater bank situation are
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essential for the feasibility of the groundwater bank, it is the patterns of
interactions, affected by the issue of local control and trust, that can
determine the outcome of a groundwater banking program.
The case studies of the two unsuccessful groundwater banks indicate
that local control and trust are precursors to a successful groundwater
program. Local control can be defined as: 1) overlying groundwater users
retaining overlying rights to access groundwater without outside interference;
2) the development and control of groundwater projects at the local level (as
opposed to state programs), 3) the control of access to the groundwater CPR
by local overlying groundwater users. Trust is necessary for mutually
productive interactions. Mistrust of outside agencies gaining access to the
groundwater basin is a major issue and is closely linked to the issue of local
control.
The Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank demonstrates that an outside
agency developing the program independent of the local appropriator
organizations and overlying users will be faced with significant problems
related to trust and local control. Likewise, the ESJPWA/EBMUSD case
indicates that the mistrust of outside municipal AO’s is a critical factor based
on the issue of local control.
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CHAPTER 5
BANKING ON THE COMMONS: INTEGRATING WATER RESOURCES
Introduction
In this chapter, I will attempt to synthesize the information from the
case studies to reach some conclusions regarding research question and the
significant variables that may impact groundwater banking programs in
California’s Central Valley. I will provide the reader with a case comparison
summary, an evaluation of the KWB and AEWSD groundwater banking
programs, an evaluation of the Madera Ranch and ESJPWA cases, a review
of the modified IAD framework, and the conclusions that can be drawn from
the research.
Interpreting and Evaluating the Cases
Chapters 3 and 4 present the reader with four different case studies of
groundwater banking with imported surface-water in California’s Central
Valley. The KWB and AEWSD cases can be cited as examples of
successful groundwater banking programs, while the Madera Ranch
Groundwater Bank is a failed attempt at establishing a groundwater bank.
The fourth case, the EBMUD/ESJWPA case, can be viewed as part of an
ongoing effort to establish a groundwater banking program that has been
unsuccessful to-date.
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What immediately stands out to the reader is the similarity of the
physical and technological attributes in all four cases. Likewise, the
commonality of the area uses, the similarity between user groups in the four
cases and the similarities between the action situations are immediately
discerned. The similarity is logical because the cases are located within a
portion of California that is fairly homogenous in terms of geology,
population, land use, and access to water. What is unexpected is the
variation in the outcomes and the patterns of interactions. Table 12.0 (on
the following page) illustrates a summary of the similarities and differences
that are apparent in the IAD analyses.
The Table 12.0 summary illustrates that the same basic physical and
technological attributes, or “hard constraints” (Oakerson, 1992, p. 52), are
present in three out of four of the cases (KWB, Madera Ranch, AEWSD).
The physical and technological attributes for the EBMUD/ESJPWA are
somewhat similar to the other cases and the differences are not significant
enough to preclude groundwater banking. Technical studies for all four
cases demonstrated that groundwater banking is feasible and desirable in
each area. The physical and technological attributes present in the cases
are necessary precursors to a groundwater bank in the Central Valley, but
they are obviously not the only controlling attributes in the four cases under
study.
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The IAD analysis helps to sort the attributes and it quickly shifts the focus for
determining “what is going on” to the attributes of trust and the patterns of
interaction.
Table 12.0 Case Comparisons
Attributes & Factors KWB AEWSD Madera Ranch EBMUD/ESJWPA
Similar Attributes?
Yes/No/Somewhat
/////////////////// //////////////////// ////////////////// lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
Groundwater Basin Yes Yes Yes No
(1)
Surface-water
systems
Yes Yes Yes Somewhat (2)
Technology Yes
(percolation)
Yes (percolation) Yes
(percolation)
Somewhat (injection) (3)
Area Uses Yes
(predominately
agricultural)
Yes
(predominately
agricultural)
Yes
(predominately
agricultural)
Yes
(More urban use in area)
Is Groundwater
Banking Feasible?
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institutional
Arrangements -
Constitutional
State Law for
the Formation of
a JPA
State Legislative
Act/Law for
Formation of a
District
State Law for
JPA or District
State Law for Formation
of a JPA
Institutional
Arrangements -
Collective Choice
JPA Water Storage
District
Not Developed JPA
Institutional
Arrangements -
Operational
MOU Contractual
Agreement
Not Developed Contractual/County
Ordinance (4)
Characteristics of
User Groups
Yes Yes Yes Yes
(More urbanized area)
Level of Trust
Between Local
AO’s/Local Users
High High High Low
Level Of Trust Local
AO’s/Users and
Outside AO’s
Moderate to
High
Moderate to High Low Mixed
(5)
Action Situation Yes No Yes Somewhat
Contextual Factors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incentives to
Cooperate &
Coordinate
Yes Yes Somewhat
(6)
Yes
Patterns of
Interaction
Not similar to
thr other cases
Not similar to the
other cases
Not Similar to
the other cases
Not Similar to the other
cases
Outcomes Successful
Program
Successful
Program
No Program No Program
(1) Th e Eastern SJC groundwater basin is not geologically closed (unlike the other cases).
(2) The proposed bank area does not have nearby S W P or CV P facilities to utilize, but is close to EBM UD facilities.
(3) The test and proposed bank were designed for injection rather than percolation, but uses well pump
technologies for recovery with similar metering to m easure water.
(4) The contractual arrangements were for the pilot test only and short-tern in nature. If a program were
developed, the San Joaquin County Ordinance incorporates m any KWB operational rules making them a
requirement for a groundwater banking program.
(5) Most local A O ’s were willing to work with outside interests to facilitate banking, but a number of individual users
and A O ’s outside of the JPA were hesitant.
(6) Incentives are similar (overdraft correction, increased reliability), but were outweighed by disincentives
perceived by overlying users and local A O ’s.
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How does one interpret and evaluate these cases with respect to the
core research question and the issues of trust, uncertainty, and the patterns
of interactions? The interpretation can be best accomplished on two levels.
First, the cases are neatly divided between the successful, or implemented
groundwater banking programs, and those groundwater banking programs
that were not implemented. So, the KWB and AEWSD cases will be used for
purposes of addressing the core research question of how imported-surface
water affects institutional arrangements in a groundwater basin. Secondly,
the IAD framework also helps identify the variables that impact the programs
that were not successfully implemented, or forestalled. These variables will
be addressed separately from the core question of how the introduction of
imported surface-water affects the institutions governing the use of a
groundwater basin.
The IAD framework effectively sorts out and identifies the variables
that may impact the overall success of a groundwater banking program in the
Central Valley. So in order to interpret and evaluate the cases, the
information derived from the IAD analyses will be used to address the
following questions pertaining to the research question as it relates to the
successful cases:
• What specific institutions are developed to facilitate the commingling
of imported surface-water with native groundwater?
• How does the current action situation differ from the situation absent
imported surface-water?
• How does the introduction of imported surface-water affect
collaboration and patterns of interaction among appropriators?
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• Does imported surface-water create an effective means of sustaining
the groundwater CPR (affect the outcome)?
Additionally, the analyses will be used in this chapter to address the
assumptions regarding uncertainty. Specifically, this chapter will examine
how the rules for the two successful programs address the following:
• Available storage capacity in the groundwater basin.
• Losses of stored surface-water due to migration, pumping, and other
factors.
• Maintaining groundwater optimum levels to correct overdraft and avoid
negative impacts to overlying users.
• Ability to define the existing groundwater resources.
• Protecting the rights of overlying groundwater users (safeguards)
• Potential impacts to overlying users.
The IAD analyses provide some insights into the assumptions related to
action situations and the incentives to cooperate and coordinate. For
example, one should ask the following questions related to successful
groundwater banking programs to test the key assumptions.
• Is the water supply moderately scarce?
• Do the program benefits outweigh costs?
• Do user associations exist and what role do they play?
It is also assumed that the institutional arrangements for collective
action in a successful multi-user groundwater bank are likely to:
• Be similar to institutional arrangements for governing groundwater
basins where imported surface-water is not banked (i.e. one should
find the elements of Ostrom’s design principles for long-enduring
CPR’s). This is assumed to be the case due to the presence of the
native groundwater CPR.
• Incorporate specific rules for addressing the uncertainties identified as
issues for groundwater banking in California.
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• Incorporate rules that address control and trust issues.
• Be nested, or concentric.
Finally, it is assumed that the IAD analyses will identify the key variables
that may impact, or hinder, the implementation of a groundwater banking
program in California’s Central Valley.
The Kern Water Bank (KWB) and the AEWSD Groundwater Bank
Program
Institutions that Facilitate Groundwater Banking with Imported Surface-
Water - What Does it Take?
A successful groundwater banking program is a program that is correcting
or preventing the depletion of the area groundwater resources. Both the
KWB and AEWSD cases clearly present examples of how institutions can be
developed to address the mixing of imported-surface water and the native
groundwater in a closed groundwater basin while correcting the depletion of
a groundwater CPR. The following discussion highlights the major
institutional elements that were developed to facilitate groundwater banking
with imported surface-water in the KWB and AEWSD cases.
1. Facilitation of Constitutional Arrangements
Given the complexities of California’s water rights system, state-level
institutions are needed to facilitate the formation of local bodies for the
governance of groundwater banks.
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The two cases demonstrate that state laws and legislation allowing the
formation of joint powers authorities and water storage districts can be
utilized to provide the constitutional level structures needed to develop
collective choice and operational arrangements for groundwater banking with
imported surface-water.
These joint powers authorities (JPA’s) and districts have the ability to
enter into agreements and contractual arrangements that are essential for
the development of a groundwater bank. JPA’s and districts can also levy
assessments and charges to fund operations and finance the capital
improvements needed for a groundwater bank.
Once the necessary joint powers authority or district is formed, the
question of how imported surface-water affects the development of
institutions can be answered. The most significant rules for addressing this
mix appear at the operational level in the form of monitoring programs, loss
percentage rules, and rules for protecting the overlying users of a
groundwater basin.
2. Monitoring Criteria and Monitoring - Addressing Uncertainties
Related to the Condition of the Basin
A necessary step in establishing a groundwater banking program is
distinguishing between the imported-surface water and the native
groundwater by developing institutions that define monitoring criteria and the
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monitoring process. This is essential for operating a groundwater bank
because the banks’ basic function is accounting for amounts of water put into
and taken out of the groundwater basin. Also, monitoring provides needed
on-going information on the condition and capacity of the groundwater basin,
thereby helping to reduce uncertainties as to what is happening
underground. Monitoring also allows for the determination of groundwater
basin conditions in banking and non-banking situations, allowing for the
establishment of operating criteria to protect overlying users (NHI, 2001, p.
14). Monitoring criteria and physical monitoring are essential for keeping
track of the native groundwater and imported surface-water, enforcing
operating rules and criteria, determining the impact of the imported-surface
water on groundwater quality and quantity, gauging the overall success of
the banking operation in correcting overdraft, and providing assurances to
overlying users and neighboring AO’s.
In the KWB case, the guiding operational principle is that the KWB will be
operated in such a way that it will not create conditions for the basin that are
worse than conditions that would have prevailed absent the project - the so
called “Golden Rule.” Thus the key monitoring criteria stemming from the
Golden Rule address the dedication of water to correct overdraft (discussed
in more detail in section c, below), the priority use of higher quality surface-
water to improve the overall water quality of the basin, the movement of
water underground, the excessive “mounding” of stored water, the excessive
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withdrawal of water, and the measurement of water in and out of the KWB in
general (Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Operations and
Monitoring of the Kern Water Bank Groundwater Banking Program, 1995).
To ensure the monitoring criteria are adhered to, the KWB operations are
reviewed by a monitoring committee made up of representatives from each
basin district (both bank participants and non-participants). To carry out the
physical monitoring, the KWB monitoring committee is empowered to retain
an independent professional groundwater specialist (a consultant) to collect
monitoring data, interpret the data, and report to the monitoring committee on
the performance of the banking operation and the impacts to the
groundwater basin. The independent groundwater specialist also provides
professional advice to the monitoring committee on the operation of the
groundwater bank. The KWB monitoring committee also uses the Kern Fan
Element Groundwater Model to estimate impacts of banking (Memorandum
of Understanding Regarding the Operations and Monitoring of the Kern
Water Bank Groundwater Banking Program, 1995, p. 9). The groundwater
reports and monitoring records are made public to ensure all users can be
informed of the KWB’s performance with respect to groundwater basin
impacts.
The KWB monitoring committee is also responsible for the periodic review
of the calibration of water measurement devices used meter recharge water
to the groundwater bank, keeping records of all recharge and water recovery
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activities, and verifying the accuracy reported information on the operations
of the water bank. This is done to ensure that the appropriate amounts of
banked surface-waters are accurately returned to the users and it also
ensures that no “mining” of native groundwater takes place by the banking
operation.
Monitoring wells, which are wells that are not equipped with pumps and
motors for water extraction, are used to physically measure water levels and
sample groundwater to monitor both water quantity and quality. Monitoring
wells can also be used to determine the lateral movement (direction of
movement) of groundwater if they are laid out in a properly designed
network. The monitoring committee is responsible, with the groundwater
specialist’s help, for developing and overseeing a KWB monitoring plan that
addresses the number, the spacing, and sampling intervals for these
monitoring wells (KWB, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the
Operation and Monitoring of the Kern Water Bank Groundwater Banking
Program, 1995, pp. 9-10). The monitoring plan is developed by the
groundwater specialist for the monitoring committee’s approval and adoption.
The monitoring plan and monitoring activities cannot function effectively and
properly without the installation of these monitoring wells in the proper
location around the groundwater bank, thus they are an essential physical
feature for any monitoring program - they are in effect a “window” into what
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is happening underground and necessary for reducing uncertainties about
groundwater banking operations.
The AEWSD case is slightly different from the KWB case in that there
is only one local AO operating the groundwater bank as opposed to six AO’s
partnering in the KWB operations. Because it is a single AO operation with
an outside AO banking “customer”, the AEWSD as a district monitors its
banking operations instead of having to use a committee structure.
Nonetheless, the AEWSD has very clear operational criteria for the AEWSD
groundwater bank operations. For example, MWD may only request the
return of banked water to the extent it has water in its “bank account” and the
return of banked water cannot interfere with deliveries of water to in-District
water users. AEWSD is in control of the return pumping operations, so if
District monitoring indicates a violation of the criteria, AEWSD can terminate
pumping to MWD (Arvin-Edison Water Storage District Agreement between
Arvin-Edison Water Storage District and the Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California for a Water Management Program, 1997, p. 9).
Like KWB program, the physical monitoring and metering of water is
essential to AEWSD for a successful groundwater banking program and
reducing uncertainties regarding the impact of groundwater banking and the
condition of the groundwater basin. AEWSD also entered into a monitoring
program with the neighboring water agency that incorporates specific criteria
designed to avoid negative impacts to the neighboring AO.
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The AEWSD/MWD monitoring program also incorporates the use and
review of a groundwater model for monitoring. This model was developed to
predict the movement and levels of groundwater in the AEWSD basin and is
part of the AEWSD/MWD agreement (Arvin-Edison Water Storage District,
Agreement Between Arvin-Edison Water Storage District and the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California for a Water Management
Program, 1997, Exhibit” B” Operating and Monitoring Criteria). The model is
reviewed periodically and new monitoring data are added to it to calibrate the
model to ensure accuracy. The model is particularly useful for forecasting
impacts due to banking storage and extraction operations, thus helping
prevent any negative impacts to the AEWSD groundwater basin and its
users.
Based on the two case studies, monitoring programs for groundwater
banks serve the following purposes:
• Monitoring defines the physical baseline condition of the
groundwater basin. This baseline condition can be used to identify
changes in the basin due to banking operations.
• Monitoring accounts for the water being stored in the groundwater
basin.
• Monitoring provides a means to ensure that the banking operation
is in compliance with the operating rules and criteria.
• Monitoring provides data needed to forecast impacts (modeling).
• Monitoring is a means to provide information to overlying users to
alleviate concerns and uncertainty regarding the banking
operation.
Per the two case studies a comprehensive monitoring program may
incorporate the following elements:
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• Use of a professional groundwater expert’s services to assist in
developing the monitoring program and for independent
monitoring/auditing.
• Physical monitoring facilities designed to obtain information about
the groundwater basin being used (monitoring well network,
meters for measuring water).
• Use of groundwater modeling to predict the effects of groundwater
banking.
• Defined criteria for groundwater banking (criteria for water levels,
water movement, water quality, storage capacity).
• Use of a monitoring committee made up of participating entities (in
cases where multiple entities are involved).
• Periodic monitoring reports available to all affected users.
The “Percentage Loss” Rule - Sustaining the CPR and Protecting
Overlying Users
In the KWB and AEWSD/MWD case one finds that the more significant
operating rules designed to protect the groundwater CPR are the
“percentage loss” rules, sometimes referred to as “volumetric rules” (NHI,
2001, p. 13). These rules are possibly the most significant operational rules
because they provide for the overall success of the groundwater bank not
only in terms of addressing overdraft, but also in terms of providing
protections for the overlying users. So the percentage loss rules can satisfy
two major goals for a groundwater bank.
In the KWB case, one finds a percentage loss rule requiring that four
percent of the banked imported surface-water to be left in the groundwater
basin for overdraft correction and to account for water losses. What this
does, in effect, is provide a safeguard for the quantity of native groundwater
in the groundwater basin and augment the native groundwater supply
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through the groundwater bank recharge process. So, using the KWB four
percent loss rule, if 1,000,000 acre-feet of surface-water is banked then the
groundwater basin will gain slightly less than 40,000 acre-feet of new water it
otherwise would not have access to (depending on water losses that occur
due to evaporation during percolation). The KWB four percent rule applies to
banked surface water that will be used in Kern County. Imported surface-
water that is banked for export out of the basin is required to leave five
percent of the total water banked in the basin, with the additional one percent
accounting for conveyance losses and acting as a “tariff” for export.
Similar to the KWB percentage loss rules, the AEWSD/MWD operational
rules require a ten percent loss rate to be imposed on all banked imported
surface-water.
The effect of these “percentage of loss” operating rules used by the KWB
and AEWSD are simple - they ensure that supplemental water is added to
the groundwater basin for overdraft correction, or overdraft prevention, and
they ensure that the quantities of native groundwater that are stored in the
groundwater basin are protected by limiting the extraction of banked surface-
water to an amount that is less than what was actually supplied for banking.
Additionally, the percentage loss rules also have the effect of protecting
the overlying users as these users are “guaranteed” that the amount of native
groundwater in the basin that would have existed in pre-banking conditions
remains available, plus the amount of “lost” or added imported surface-water.
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This helps to alleviate fears and uncertainties that the groundwater banking
operation may utilize native groundwater that is rightfully the overlying users’
to make use of. Embodied in contracts and binding agreements, the
percentage loss rules create the necessary institutional separation between
the imported surface-water and the native groundwater required to provide
needed certainty that overlying user and banker water rights will not be
abused.
It should be noted that the KWB operating rules differentiate between the
underground water losses that could occur due to migration and other factors
and the losses that occur due to evaporation during the recharge operations.
When water is placed in large spreading basins to percolate underground, a
certain amount will be lost to evaporation. The KWB program accounts for
this loss by deducting a percentage of the applied recharge water. The
AEWSD ten percent loss rule aggregates the water losses into a lump sum
percentage (does not distinguish between types of loss). Nonetheless, the
percentage loss rules form the operational cornerstone for the successful
groundwater banking cases.
Rules for Preventing Conflicts with Overlying Users and Protecting
Overlying Users
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the California water rights systems can
create a situation where the banking of imported surface-water can create
conflicts with overlying uses of the native groundwater.
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Conflicts can arise between the banking operation and overlying groundwater
users due to the following situations:
• Too much surface-water is being banked, creating an excessive rise in
the level of groundwater and flooding root-zones in neighboring lands.
Root zone flooding negatively impacts the ability to grow crops.
• Too much water is extracted by the bank recovery operations. This
can lower the groundwater levels in overlying user’s wells, increasing
their cost for pumping (greater lifts) and reducing the amount of water
available to these users. This also can create a situation where native
groundwater is being extracted after all of the banked surface-water is
used.
• Too much imported surface-water is banked using up the effective
storage capacity of the groundwater basin. In this situation, local
surface-water (non-imported surface-water) would not be able to be
stored in the basin.
• The banked surface-water is of a lower quality than the native
groundwater. This could degrade the quality of the native
groundwater being used by overlying users.
Given the potential for conflict between overlying groundwater users and
AO’s banking surface-water in the same groundwater basin, a groundwater
banking program should develop institutional arrangements to avoid conflict
and protect the overlying users right to use the native groundwater. The
KWB operating rules directly address all of the impacts listed above. As
previously discussed, the percentage loss rule helps to prevent the extraction
of too much banked water, thereby preserving the native groundwater and
protecting it from banking extraction operations. KWB has specific rules to
protect the quality of the native groundwater and the area overlying users.
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For example the KWB operations incorporate the following rules (KWB,
2000):
• If supplies of imported surface-water for recharge exceed the defined
recharge capacity, recharge priority is given to the highest quality
surface-water for recharge. This is done to protect and enhance the
quality of the native groundwater.
• Recovery operations are required to extract the poorest quality
groundwater when practicable. This is based on the idea that the
higher quality surface-waters will eventually create improved water
quality conditions in the groundwater basin.
• All pumping operations should be designed to control the migration of
poorer quality water by limiting extractions that draw poorer quality
water into useable water areas; increasing extractions in areas that
generate a beneficial reverse gradient; increase recharge to promote
favorable groundwater gradients.
• Buffer areas are required between extraction wells and neighboring
overlying users, as is the provision of a sufficient number of extraction
wells spread out so as to allow rotation of wells (to avoid impact to
neighboring overlying users due to concentrated pumping), and the
provision of operational time restrictions between recharge and
extraction (to avoid mounding and over-extraction impacts).
• The KWB rules provide for financial compensation to overlying users
for adverse impacts due to the banking operation.
• The KWB rules allow for the provision of mitigations to overlying
users, such as lowering of their well pumps or deepening their wells (if
the extraction lowers the water levels in the aquifer).
• The KWB rules allow for the provision of alternative water supplies to
overlying users to mitigate adverse impacts due to the KWB banking
operations.
In some respects, the AEWSD/MWD operating rules are less detailed
than the KWB operating rules as they involve only two participants, however,
the AEWSD/MWD rules address the major points that could create conflicts.
For example:
• The AEWSD/MWD agreement is based on a “Golden Rule” of the
banking operation creating no harm to the groundwater basin and
its users.
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• The percentage loss rule protects the native groundwater supply
from depletion.
• Under the AEWSD program, MWD cannot store more than
350.000 acre-feet of water in the district at any one time without
amending the agreement between the two agencies. This
maximum storage limit in effect prevents overuse of basin
capacity.
• Under the AEWSD program, MWD will store a minimum of
250.000 acre-feet of water in AEWSD within the first seven years.
This minimum amount, coupled with the percentage loss
requirement, provides enough additional water to avoid over
extraction impacts.
• AEWSD will reduce or terminate groundwater pumping for
purposes of returning water to MWD as necessary to comply with
the AEWSD groundwater monitoring program and operating
criteria.
• The AEWSD/MWD agreement incorporates a “Groundwater Rule
Matrix” which decreases the amounts of water that can be
extracted by MWD from the groundwater bank over time. This
helps to prevent depletion of groundwater levels that could impact
the district or overlying users.
The groundwater quality in the AEWSD basin is being improved by the
banking of imported surface-water and there is only one source, or outside
banker providing water, therefore, the rules regarding the recharge and
withdrawal of water from the groundwater bank are not developed to the
degree that they are for the KWB. However, the AEWSD/MWD agreement
does make MWD responsible for water quality issues related to the extracted
or returned water. Thus AEWSD and area users are protected from
problems related to the degradation of stored surface water quality.
Table 13.0, on the following page, presents a compilation of the
institutional arrangements from the KWB and AEWSD cases that facilitate
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the mix of imported surface-water and native groundwater. Table 14.0
illustrates how these institutional arrangements address the uncertainties
inherent in groundwater basins and uncertainties resulting from groundwater
banking.
Table 13.0 Elements of Institutional Arrangements Facilitating the Mix of
Imported Surface-Water and Native Groundwater
INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENT
KERN WATER BANK ARVIN EDISON WATER STORAGE
DISTRICT
Number of
Appropriator
Organizations
Six (with ability to bank for additional
outside AO’s)
Two
Constitutional Joint Powers Authority Law Allows
Creation of Authority (Government
Code)
District Formation Law Allows
Creation Of Districts (Special
Legislation, W ater Code)
Collective Choice Memorandum of Understanding Contractual
Operational
Arrangements Foundational Criteria
v' “Golden Rule” (no harm to
basin and users)
Monitoring Arrangements
v' Monitoring Committee
v' Monitoring Wells
V Retention of Professional
Monitoring Consultant
v' Groundwater Model
v' Annual Reporting
Rules Protecting CPR & Users
s Percentage Loss Rule
V W ater Quality Rules (for
recharge water and
extracted water)
v' Buffer Zones (limits on
placement of extraction
wells)
S Extraction Well Rotation
v' Financial Compensation for
Adverse Impacts to
Overlying Users
v' Mitigations for Overlying
Users (deepen wells)
s Alternative W ater Supplies
for Impacted Overlying
Users (replace lost water)
Time limits on recharge
and extractions
Foundational Criteria
v' “Golden Rule” (no harm to
basin and users)
Monitoring Arrangements
S Monitoring Wells
S Retention of Professional
Monitoring Consultant
v' Groundwater Model
v” Periodic Reporting
Rules Protecting CPR & Users
v' Percentage Loss Rule
J W ater Quality Rule (for
extracted water)
v' Groundwater Rule Matrix
(pumping reductions over
time)
s Storage Limits
v' Extraction Pumping
Controlled by AEW SD
v' Curtailment of Extraction
Pumping by AEW SD (if
monitoring show negative
impacts)
v' AEW SD Service Area Needs
Take Priority Over MW D
Extraction of Banked W ater
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Table 14.0 Institutional Arrangements Addressing Uncertainty When
Imported Surface-Water Is Introduced Into A Groundwater
Basin
In s titu tio n /^
/ " ^ Uncertainty
Access
toCPR
Local
Control
Protection
of Water
Quality
Gwater
Move
ment
Protection of
Overlying
Rights/Use
Protection
of Banked
Water
Basin
Capacity
Quantity of
Groundwater
(How
much?)
Quantity
of Ground
Water -
Overdraft
correction
JPA or District
(Constitutional)
Water
Rights/Case
Law
Memo of
Understanding/
Contract
(Collective
Choice)
“Golden Rule”
(No harm to the
basin by banking
program)
S /
Comprehensive
Monitoring
Program
(Operational)
S S
Percentage Loss
Rule
(Operational)
S
Storage Limits
(Operational)
V
Extraction
Pumping Rules
(Operational)
s
Water Quality
Rules
(Operational)
s
Mitigation Rules
for Impacts to
Overlying Users
(Operational)
Table 14.0 provides insights into the importance of specific
institutional arrangements for protecting the rights of overlying users and
institutional arrangements for the monitoring of a groundwater banking
program. These two types of institutional arrangements appear to be critical
elements for successful groundwater banking program as they address
significant issues of trust and uncertainty identified by overlying users and
AO’s.
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Table 14.0 also illustrates that institutions for the control of access to the
CPR (institutions that maintain local control of the CPR) are significant for
alleviating uncertainty.
Additionally, the table points out the importance and the utility of the
“Golden Rule” (no harm to the groundwater basin from any banking
operations) for establishing and maintaining the KWB and AEWSD
groundwater banking programs. This is the “foundational” principle for the
programs and is cited as such in the preambles to the agreements. Agreeing
to the “Golden Rule” was instrumental for bringing together the KWB
participating parties and non-participating parties in formulating the operating
agreement for the KWB (Taube, 2000).
Table 14.0 also indicates that while the percentage loss rules are
significant for establishing a groundwater banking program and preserving
the groundwater CPR, the institutions for monitoring, protecting overlying
users, and the institutions for protecting access or local control are essential
for establishing and maintaining a successful program. These sets of
institutions address the issues of trust and control by providing a means to
guarantee that the groundwater bank will not serve as an outsiders “straw”
into the groundwater basin. Based on the two case studies, the Golden Rule
and the institutions for protecting overlying users, access/local control, and
monitoring should be considered necessary precursors to the other operating
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institutions such at the percentage loss rules, water quality rules, and rules
related to overdraft protection.
The Action Situation and Contextual Factors Before and After -
Sustaining the CPR by Banking on the Commons
The action situation helps to drive the patterns of interaction to certain
outcomes. Essentially, for purposes of comparison, the action situation is the
“before” and the outcomes are the “after” when looking at how a groundwater
bank might change conditions for a groundwater basin CPR.
In both cases, the KWB and AEWSD action situations and contextual
factors indicate that the areas are suffering from persistent overdraft
conditions and additional surface-water supplies are needed to avoid crises
conditions for both CPR’s. In the KWB case, the shortage of water is severe
enough for farmland to be fallowed due to the contextual factors of drought
and water reallocations. Similarly, the AEWSD area was impacted by the
drought of the early 1990’s and faced potential damage to the farming
operations in the overlying area due to increasing boron levels in the native
groundwater supply.
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The action situation between the two cases does differ in that the
KWB had the opportunity to take over a foundering state-run groundwater
banking project, while AEWSD took the opportunity to seek out groundwater
banking partners for the expansion of its existing facilities (to make use of
water available to the district) and to bank imported surface-water in the
district area.
In terms of the “after” situation, in both cases one finds that the
addition of imported surface-water helps to sustain the groundwater CPR. In
the KWB case, the bank was filled to its estimated storage capacity within
five years of the start of operation, ending the overdraft in the KWB area. For
AEWSD, the percentage loss rule provides the basin with approximately
27,000 acre-feet of additional water or enough water to provide for five years
of overdraft correction (at the average pre-program overdraft rate of 5,000
acre-feet per year). The potential for overdraft correction is greater when
one considers the maximum banking rate that is available to MWD (350,000
acre-feet yielding approximately 35,000 acre-feet of water to the AEWSD
groundwater basin). Finally, the AEWSD/MWD groundwater banking
operation appears to help correct groundwater quality problems related to
boron (NHI, 2001).
Interestingly, it appears that the “trigger” point for groundwater
banking in these action situations is moderate to severe water scarcity that
creates an identified threat to the farming economy of the area. The water
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scarcity in these cases at the time of action had not created irreversible
damage to the groundwater basin or water supply, but was severe enough to
threaten the local agricultural economy. For AO’s and overlying users in
Kern County, this was significant factor as evidenced by statements of the
participants. It is also worth noting that fear of groundwater basin
adjudication is cited as a factor in helping to facilitate the banking effort in the
KWB case.
Finally, it should be noted that cost also appears to play a role in moving
forward with the implementation of a groundwater bank, however, cost can
play different roles in providing incentives for groundwater banking. For
example, in the KWB case, the potentially high cost of banked water from the
state proposed factor is cited as one reason to consider groundwater banking
under the auspices of local AO’s. In the AEWSD/MWD case, AEWSD
needed a way to finance expansion of its banking facilities and MWD offers a
solution through their participation with AEWSD via groundwater banking. In
the AEWSD/MWD case, it was not the cost of the water, rather the cost of
the capital facilities for expanding groundwater banking that helped to
facilitate the banking of imported surface-water.
Design Principles for Long-enduring CPR’s and Groundwater Banks
Due to the fact that the a groundwater bank utilizes a CPR for its
storage, it can be assumed that many of Ostrom’s design principles for long-
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enduring CPR’s will be present in the KWB and AEWSD cases. Or, does the
implementation of a groundwater banking program with imported surface-
water make a difference in design?
Ostrom notes that robust institutions and sustainable CPR resource
systems share certain design principles, or common conditions and elements
which account for the long-term success these institutions have for
sustaining the CPR (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 89-90). Per Ostrom, the rules based
on these design principles help the appropriators to deal with uncertainty
caused by the physical environments, so it can be assumed that these deign
principles would also help address the uncertainty present in groundwater
banking programs.
Ostrom’s eight design principles are listed in Table 15.0 and the KWB
and AEWSD cases are arrayed to indicate the presence or absence of these
design principles in each case.
Table 15.0 Design Principles for Long-Enduring CPR’s and Groundwater
Banks (Kern Water Bank and Arvin Edison)
CPR Design Principles (Per Ostrom) Present in Bank? KWB AEWSD
Clearly defined boundaries Yes Yes
Congruence between appropriation &
provision rules & local conditions
Yes Yes
Collective-choice arrangements Yes Yes
Monitoring Yes Yes
Graduated sanctions No No
Conflict-resolution mechanisms Yes Yes
Minimal recognition of rights to organize Yes Yes
Nested enterprises Yes Yes
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Each design principle illustrated in Figure 15.0 and its relationship to the
KWB and AEWSD cases are briefly discussed as follows:
Clearly defined boundaries - Per Ostrom, “clearly defined
boundaries” are the defined sets of rights of individuals or groups to withdraw
resource units from the CPR. The term also applies to the physical barriers
of the CPR. Overlying and appropriative users are defined for both the KWB
and AEWSD groundwater basins and they withdraw water per the California
water rights system, therefore the rights boundaries are clearly defined.
Additionally, each groundwater basin is “closed” with defined physical
boundaries, so the CPR’s present in the KWB and AEWSD cases fit the
criteria for clearly defined boundaries.
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local
conditions - This design principle refers to the rules restricting the time,
place, and technologies for appropriating resource units being tailored to
local conditions. Clearly the rules for the two groundwater banking
operations that limit pumping times and quantities of water to be extracted,
described as rules protecting the overlying users, are tailored to the local
conditions (see Table 13.0). Rules for the rotation of extraction wells and
percolation basins are also congruent with local conditions. What is
interesting is that these rules serve dual purposes. They are developed
specifically for the groundwater banking operations while serving to protect
the CPR and its users.
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Collective choice arrangements - Per Ostrom, collective choice
arrangements refer to institutional arrangements where most individuals
affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational
rules (Ostrom, 1990, p. 93). Indeed, the MOU and contract for the two cases
provide the means for the participating parties (AO’s) to modify the operating
rules should they need to be changed.
Monitoring - Monitoring as a design principle for long-enduring
CPR’s involves the oversight and auditing of the CPR and appropriator
activities by the appropriators who use the CPR (as opposed to monitoring
by outside governmental agencies). Both KWB and AEWSD undertake the
necessary monitoring for oversight and auditing of the physical condition of
the basin and for operational compliance. The monitoring committee system
used by KWB allows for the participation of all groundwater bank users, thus
the appropriators conduct the monitoring through the committee structure.
The AEWSD case is different in that AEWSD carries out the monitoring and
modeling for monitoring. However, as the AO using the groundwater basin,
the AEWSD example fits the definition of the monitoring design principle.
Graduated sanctions - Appropriators who violate rules are most
likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness of
the violation) by appropriators, or appropriators officials, charged with
enforcing the rules. Graduated sanctions are not clearly present in the
operating arrangements for the KWB or AEWSD/MWD cases. This can be
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attributed to the contractual nature of the agreements between the
appropriators where sanctions are tied to equitable relief according to state
law. So, while sanctions are present, they are in the form of contract terms
tied to legal actions.
Conflict resolution mechanisms - Per Ostrom’s design principles,
long-enduring CPR institutions have conflict-resolution mechanisms that are
readily accessible to appropriators and officials. These conflict-resolution
mechanisms are described as low-cost arenas for solving conflicts between
appropriators and appropriators and officials.
The KWB uses the monitoring committee to review disputes and
formulate recommendations for resolution. If the monitoring committee fails
to resolve the dispute, the MOU calls for arbitration using a neutral arbitrator
with a background in engineering and groundwater hydrology. If these
methods of conflict resolution fail, the dispute may be pursued through the
courts.
The AEWSD/MWD agreement creates a system where conflicts are
settled by the hiring of a mutually acceptable neutral consultant to provide a
recommended resolution. If this does not work, the agreement provides for
arbitration using a three member panel composed of a representative of
AEWSD, a representative of MWD, and third member selected by the two
other members.
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The orders of this panel are judicially enforceable (Arvin-Edison Water
Storage District Agreement between Arvin-Edison Water Storage District and
the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California for a Water
Management Program, 1997, pp. 44-46).
Minimal recognition of rights to organize - This design principle
refers to appropriators having the ability to devise their own institutions
without being challenged by external authorities. Ostrom’s definition is
directed to appropriators developing rules without creating formal
governmental jurisdictions and it is pointed out that governmental entities
must provide some recognition of the legitimacy of these rules. In the broad
sense, it can be said that the KWB and the AEWSD/MWD cases are
examples where the appropriators create their own institutions without being
challenged by the state (as the external authority). Indeed, the state
provides the KWB and AEWSD the necessary tools to devise groundwater
banking institutions through the ability of JPA’s and districts to form and enter
into agreements and contracts. While it is true that these tools lead to the
formation of formal governmental jurisdictions (Kern Water Bank Authority for
example), the local appropriators within these organizations did devise the
rules for the groundwater banks without challenge by the state.
Nested enterprises - Complex enduring CPR institutions have their
governance, appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, and conflict
resolution organized in multiple layers. In both cases, the rules are nested
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within layers that are embedded in state law and the water rights systems,
with MOU’s and JPA’s, districts, state, and federal agencies participating in
the groundwater banking programs.
Lessons from the KWB and AEWSD/MWD Cases - Addressing the
Central Research Question
The KWB and AEWSD/MWD cases provide several pieces of key
information of how institutions can be designed to accommodate
groundwater banking in California’s Central Valley. Based on the analyses
of the two cases, it appears that Ostrom’s institutional design principles for
long-enduring CPR’s (with the possible exception of graduated sanctions)
apply to groundwater banking programs where imported surface-water is
banked in a groundwater basin. Additionally, institutional arrangements for
protecting the groundwater basin (the Golden Rule), protecting the rights of
overlying users, for controlling access to the CPR and maintaining local
control, and for comprehensive monitoring appear to be the essential
arrangements necessary for a groundwater banking program in the Central
Valley. These essential institutional arrangements are necessary for
addressing the uncertainties inherent in groundwater banking with imported
surface-water.
The information from the analyses of the KWB and AEWSD/MWD
cases, however, applies to groundwater banks that were implemented and
are successful in meeting the desired outcomes for such a program. This
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leaves the question of why these programs are implemented while other
similar proposed groundwater baking programs in the Central Valley are not.
The next section will review the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank and East
Bay Municipal Utilities District/Eastern San Joaquin Parties Groundwater
Bank #1 Project to determine what variables may impact the establishment of
a groundwater bank utilizing imported surface-water.
The Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank and the East Bay Municipal
Utilities District/Eastern San Joaquin Parties Groundwater Bank #1
Project
Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank
The Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank is an interesting case because the
physical, technical, and use characteristics are very similar to the KWB case.
This makes the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank case a good case to
compare to the KWB as it offers the possibility of addressing the question of
what factors influence the success of a groundwater bank in the Central
Valley. In this case, mistrust of outside AO’s and local control of the
groundwater CPR surface as significant issues for the proposed groundwater
bank project.
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The Importance of Trust
Trust is recognized as an important element for the solving CPR
problems and specifically for the development of a groundwater bank where
imported surface-water is stored. As discussed in Chapter 2, Ostrom
identifies the three core relationships of reciprocity, reputation, and trust as
essential for cooperation between individuals seeking to solve a social
dilemma such as a CPR problem. Of the three relationships identified by
Ostrom, trust is necessary for mutually productive interactions (Ostrom,
1997). A person’s rational actions are governed by expectations of how
others will behave and trust is the “specific expectation that another’s actions
will be beneficial rather than detrimental” (Kramer and Tyler, 1996, p. 17).
As discussed in Chapter 1, trust is a major issue for groundwater
users and groundwater banks in California and the issue of trust can be
exacerbated by the California water rights system. This is problem is clearly
noted in the following quote by Donald Evenson, a water consultant
executive:
Technically, people agree that conjunctive use (groundwater banking)
is an economical way to better manage the total water supply. The
problem has to do with institutions and, to a lesser degree, water
rights. There is a lack of trust among water agencies. It becomes an
issue of control, who’s going to decide when you store water, when
you take the water out and who’s going to drill, own and operate the
facilities (WEF. Western Water, Fall 1996, p. 4).
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Thus, while a groundwater banking project may be technically feasible
and something that people agree is necessary (in concept), the issues of
trust and local control can be more significant than the physical ability to
bank water. Sue McClug of the Water Education Foundation expands on the
significance of trust in relation to groundwater banks by stating:
Some issues may prove more difficult to resolve than others. Perhaps
the biggest challenge - although a somewhat intangible issue - is the
question of trust. Trust in the technical information regarding an asset
that is highly valued, but hidden. Trust in the idea that water artificially
recharged in a groundwater basin will not contaminate the native
water. Trust in that the groundwater overlying users have relied on for
years will be there - even as others extract the new water (Western
Water, July/August 2001, pg. 3).
McClurg’s statement touches on trust as it relates to the three key
elements of monitoring, impacts to overlying users, and access. As
evidenced in the KWB and AEWSD/MWD cases, these three elements need
to be addressed effectively by institutional arrangements in order to develop
a successful groundwater banking operation in the Central Valley. Given
these assertions of the significance of trust for solving social dilemmas and
for establishing groundwater banks, what can we learn from the Madera
Ranch Groundwater Bank Project?
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I propose that if the issue of trust is not addressed and local control is not
present, a proposed groundwater bank (in California’s Central Valley)
utilizing imported-surface with outside participants will most likely fail to be
implemented, even if the necessary physical and technical attributes are in
place for a successful groundwater banking operation,
Local Control and Trust - Madera Ranch
Many irrigation districts (AO’s) in the central, southern and eastern
parts of the San Joaquin Valley have established effective groundwater
banking programs in which surface-water from wet years is stored in
underground aquifers for dry year use (National Academy of Sciences, 2000,
p. 216). These conjunctive use programs are widely viewed as an effective
means for extending water storage in California. In fact, Madera County
water users have stated that they support groundwater banking as a means
of ensuring greater water supply reliability (Fresno Bee, November 4, 1998,
p. B4, Fresno Bee, July 2, 2000). This poses the question of why the Madera
Ranch Groundwater Bank Project met with such significant local opposition.
The Madera area overlying users and Madera AO’s identified several
problematic issues related to the proposed Madera Ranch groundwater
bank. In addition to the issues of insufficient public and stakeholder
involvement and the need for more technical studies, the issue of local
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control, or the potential lack of local control of the project, appears to be a
major factor in the opposition to the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank
Project. This is an issue for overlying users who fear their water rights to the
groundwater CPR could be jeopardized.
The issue of local control can be exacerbated by the California water
rights system. As described in earlier chapters, California’s system of water
rights does not require filing and licensing or quantification to establish rights
to groundwater. A user only needs to begin use by drilling a well and making
sure that the groundwater use is continuous (National Academy of Sciences,
2000, p.220). Therefore, the concept of connecting the local groundwater
basin to the rest of the California water system through extraction wells and a
canal greatly enhances the fears of local overlying users and AO’s that local
control could be taken away by outside interests in the future. This fear,
combined with the question of monitoring the quantities of banked imported-
surface water, makes it evident that a new, major non-local user of native
groundwater (in this case, USBR) would be viewed with suspicion, especially
if that outside user were proposing a major extraction well field overlying the
groundwater CPR.
Based on the Madera Ranch situation, it can be assumed that local
interests would view local groundwater projects, controlled by local district
boards (AO’s) and providing benefits to the immediate community, more
favorably than proposals by outside interests.
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Indeed, this appears to be the case as the Madera Irrigation District
groundwater banking program is acceptable to the local water users
(Ottemoeller, 2000).
Local water users lacked trust in the motives of the outside
AO’s/agencies proposing the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Project and
this made interactions between local users and outside AO’s very
problematic. The potential introduction of imported surface-water was
viewed as a means to gain access to and control over the local groundwater
CPR and possibly local surface water supplies by AO’s outside of Madera
County (Madera County Groundwater Oversight Committee, Pistoresi and
Prosperi, April 2000).
The introduction of imported surface-water was also viewed as a
potential threat to area crops due to water quality concerns. The imported
surface-water was potentially lower quality than the native groundwater, so
there was a fear that the imported surface-water could negatively impact the
groundwater basin and outside users could, in effect, substitute lower quality
imported surface-water for native groundwater, pumping out the higher
quality groundwater as part of the groundwater bank extraction operation
(Madera County Groundwater Oversight Committee, Pistoresi and Prosperi,
April 2000).
As noted by Ostrom, communication, especially repeated face-to-face
communication, is essential for establishing trust in the reliability of others.
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This follows the theory that cooperation among groups is substantially
increased by sustained contact, regular communication, and constant
monitoring by peers (Kramer and Tyler, 1996, p. 63). The “Decide,
Announce, Defend (DAD - Walesh, 1997)” approach used by USBR
exacerbated the issues of trust and local control by limiting communication
and involvement of the local water users in the proposed groundwater bank.
The DAD “top down” approach does not provide a forum for communications
with local users and in the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank case, it helped
to create, or reinforce, the perception that the outside AO’s had hidden
motives for pursuing the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank, such as
obtaining access to the local groundwater CPR and exchanging lower quality
imported surface-water for higher quality local groundwater (Madera County
Groundwater Oversight Committee, Pistoresi and Prosperi, April 2000).
It also appears that outside access to the CPR blurs the physical
boundaries of the CPR and this makes local control of the groundwater bank
very important for addressing concerns about protecting the rights of
overlying users. Having local AO’s controlling the groundwater banking
program would also help to address the issue of trust. In this situation, the
governing boards of the local AO’s, made up of representatives of the
overlying users, are responsible for developing and negotiating the
institutional arrangements for the groundwater bank.
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This would help alleviate “Owens Valley” concerns about an outside entity
taking the local water supply (referring to the City of Los Angeles
surreptiously acquiring the Owens Valley water supply in the early 20th
century).
Based on the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank and KWB cases, it
appears that local control of a groundwater banking program by districts or
authorities must be in place before the development of collective choice and
operational arrangements that address uncertainty can proceed. These
districts and authorities should be structured so that they provide the
communication forum for the local water users. The KWB case indicates that
the formation of committees and associations to discuss and develop
groundwater banking programs is effective for multiple AO’s forming a
groundwater water bank. However, it should be noted that the KWB case
seems to bear out the assertion that it takes sustained regular
communication (based on the extensive multi-year KWB committee process
facilitated by the Kern water groups).
ESJPWA/EBMUD - Local Control and Trust
The ESJPWA/EBMUD experience in San Joaquin County is similar to
Madera Ranch in that the issues of local control of groundwater and the
protection of overlying landowner rights to groundwater are a common
theme. While some of the physical attributes in the ESJPWA/EBMUD case
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are different, parallels can be drawn between this case and the Madera
Ranch/USBR experience. Similarities between the two cases include:
• A groundwater basin in a state of overdraft, with potential capacity for
recharge.
• Proximity to surface water conveyance features, providing for convenient
put and take operations.
• An outside agency (AO) willing to consider banking within the county.
• Significant overlying landowner opposition to the proposed project.
• Agriculture as the dominant economic base for the local area.
While the two cases are similar in many respects, there are significant
differences. The differences can be summarized as follows:
• The presence in San Joaquin County of a groundwater extraction and
exportation ordinance pre-dating the ESJPWA/EBMUD project with
ordinance amendments developed concurrent with, and in response to,
the initial project proposal.
• The presence in San Joaquin County of a water advisory commission
with authority to condition/approve/disapprove permits to extract and
export groundwater. This commission also provides a forum for the
multiple water interests within San Joaquin County, including agencies
outside of the groundwater basin (this did not exist in Madera County).
This commission pre-dated the project.
• The presence in San Joaquin of a joint powers authority (JPA) made up
of AO’s in the area of overdraft, serving as the project proponents.
• The lack, in San Joaquin County, of a property transaction and time limit
for purchase (pending land sale) to make the project workable.
• Multiple local AO’s investigating significant local groundwater banking
projects within San Joaquin County (SEWD, San Luis Delta Mendota
Water Users Authority, City of Tracy).
• An historical animosity between the agricultural community in san Joaquin
County and EBMUD beginning with the District’s 1925 Mokelumne River
dam and aqueduct project (Elkind, 1998).
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These differences create a slightly different pattern of interaction in
San Joaquin County than in the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank case.
The most significant difference is the fact that one finds several local AO’s
joining together in a Joint Powers Authority (JPA) to facilitate the
development of a groundwater banking program, as opposed to the Madera
example of several non-local AO’s joining together to facilitate groundwater
banking. One might expect that a groundwater banking project proposed
and controlled by local district boards (AO’s) and providing benefits to the
community, would be viewed favorably (similar to the KWB). However, the
ESJPWA project met with significant local opposition.
The common concern in the ESJPWA and Madera Ranch cases is the
issue of an outside agency gaining access to the local groundwater CPR. As
in the case of the Madera Ranch Groundwater Banking Project, the ESJPWA
Groundwater bank Project #1 raised fears that an outside water agency
would gain access to the local groundwater basin and be able to pump the
native groundwater with little to no local control. The local Farm Bureau
Federation and others expressed these fears and it would appear that there
may be a divide between agricultural users and municipal users in the county
where municipal users (who make up a significant portion of the ESJPWA)
are more trusting of EBMUD than the agriculturally based AO’s and overlying
users. This divide between the agricultural and municipal users is similar to
the historic anti-urbanism expressed by area agricultural interests in
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response to EBMUD’s Mokelumne River project in the 1920’s. This division
appears to be borne out by AO’s within San Joaquin County that raised
objections to the proposed project due to the issue of EBMUD gaining
access to local groundwater.
Based on statements by area overlying users, it becomes clear that a
locally controlled groundwater-banking project that does not include an
outside AO or entity would be acceptable in San Joaquin County as it limits
outside access to the local groundwater CPR (Saracino, 2000). Thus
projects such as the Stockton East Water District Groundwater Bank, where
the local district banks local water, are acceptable to the majority of the
community of overlying users. This is essentially the same situation one
finds with the Madera Irrigation District’s groundwater banking projects.
However, it should be noted that there may be a deeper reason than the
issue of local control for resisting groundwater banking in the San Joaquin
County case. Groundwater banking is a means for increasing water supply
reliability and the introduction of an additional surface-water supply to the
groundwater basin could increase the ability of the area to further develop
economically. Development of uses in the area, other than agricultural uses,
can displace agriculture, thus agricultural interests can create permitting
challenges to groundwater banking that can be difficult or impossible to
overcome. Groundwater banking in the KWB and AEWSD/MWD cases is
viewed as essential for the preservation of agriculture in the Kern County
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area because land was actually taken out of agricultural production due to
water shortages. In contrast to the KWB and AEWSD/MWD cases,
groundwater banking is viewed by the agricultural sector in San Joaquin
County being more necessary for urban growth or industrial development.
Indeed, this concern regarding development has been expressed at the San
Joaquin Water Advisory Commission.
The ESJPWA Groundwater bank Project #1 was a test project that
demonstrated that groundwater banking in San Joaquin County is technically
feasible, but challenging when it comes to the issues of trust and uncertainty.
Unlike the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank case, the parties in eastern
San Joaquin County are still working towards the implementation of full-scale
groundwater banking programs. San Joaquin County recently completed a
Water Management Plan through a collaborative effort between
representatives of 29 local, state, and federal organizations (San Joaquin
County Water Management Plan, May 2002). This effort may be the first
step in raising the levels of communication and trust in the area to enable the
banking of imported surface-water within San Joaquin County. As noted in
the KWB case, extensive networking through county-wide water associations
and forums was necessary in order to get to the point where the KWB could
become a reality as a local program.
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This process of using collaborative forums and associations enabled the
participating and non-participating AO’s in Kern County to arrive at the
necessary arrangements to implement the KWB. This may also be the future
direction in San Joaquin County based on the collaborative water planning
efforts that are underway.
The Importance of Local Site-Specific Knowledge
During the case study process, it became apparent that the
development of a successful groundwater bank requires the involvement of
the local water users, overlying users, and local AO’s for the development of
institutional arrangements. This became most apparent during discussions
of incorporating local site-specific knowledge into the institutional
arrangements, particularly in the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank case.
The subject of local site-specific knowledge is closely aligned with the
issue of local control of water resources. Recent water policy research
points out the need to integrate local site-specific knowledge with more
generalized scientific understanding of hydrology in order to successfully
address what one commentator calls “wicked water problems (Freeman,
2000, p.483).” The involvement of people who work with and know the
important local site-specific factors that can impact a project must be
effectively integrated into groundwater banking project proposals. This need
is clearly highlighted by the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank Case.
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Some experienced California water experts at the state level
recognize the importance of site-specific knowledge and local control for the
success of groundwater banking projects in the Central Valley. For example,
in reviewing the potential for a regional groundwater bank in the northern
portion of the Central Valley, a member of the California Department of
Water Resources (DWR) commented that based on his experience, the role
of DWR should be to provide the local AO’s and individual users with good
scientific information and knowledge of their groundwater basin, integrating
the users local knowledge with the regional knowledge acquired through
DWR’s studies (Toccoy Dudley, 2002).
The next step in the process is for the local AO’s and overlying users
to define desired outcomes and impacts, and then develop operating
constraints and operating agreements that are designed to achieve these
desired outcomes. As noted by the DWR commentator, local AO’s represent
local communities, or localities, with common interests and “Each locality
should establish their own operating rules for a groundwater bank (Toccoy
Dudley, 2002).” DWR would then act as an information resource to facilitate
local development of a groundwater bank by local users. This “bottom up”
approach is closely aligned with the findings of the value of nested
enterprises and that of local AO’s being able to effectively develop their own
programs to manage groundwater CPR’s. This approach is also the
opposite of the top-down “DAD” approach which drew so much local criticism
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in the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank case. This supports the concept
that state or national authorities should serve to facilitate solutions to CPR
dilemmas by providing the appropriators of the CPR with support, such as
good technical information and knowledge, so that the appropriators can craft
local CPR based solutions.
Essentially, the integration of site specific knowledge needs to be part
of an overall stakeholder consensus building approach to groundwater
banking. Stakeholders are those who have a “stake" in the outcome of a
particular activity, or may be impacted by the activity. The KWB case is a
good example of local stakeholders building consensus through forming
committees and utilizing associations to disseminate information and reach
agreements on the ownership and operation of the KWB. This approach
reduces the risk of future disputes and problems.
The Modified IAD Framework - How Well Does it Work?
As discussed in Chapter 2, this dissertation makes use of a multiple-
use commons Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD
framework) for the analyses of the case studies. The multiple-use commons
IAD framework use in this dissertation is based on a refinement of the
framework used by Edwards and Steins used to analyze long-enduring
multiple-use CPR’s such as the forest commons in England (Edwards and
Steins, 1998).
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As applied in this dissertation, the IAD framework is modified to
address the physical and technical attributes of the surface-water and
groundwater resources found in groundwater banks. The modified IAD
framework for groundwater banking also includes the description of the
“incentives to cooperate and coordinate.”
The modified IAD framework is applied to three different situations in
this dissertation: successful groundwater banks, a failed attempt to develop
a groundwater bank, and an attempt to establish a groundwater bank where
the attempt met with enough resistance to effectively stop the project in the
short term. Each of these situations is discussed in the following sections.
IAD Framework and Successful Groundwater Banks
Overall, the modified IAD framework works well to sort out the
characteristics and attributes of the groundwater basin, the institutions, and
actors involved in the groundwater banking cases. The modified IAD
framework allows for the description and analysis of the CPR and its
attributes coupled with the groundwater banking situation in a uniform
manner that is consistent with past IAD research. It also enables one to
distinguish the essential operational arrangements that will be useful for
institutional design, particularly the arrangements that address uncertainty,
local control, and trust.
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The modified IAD framework for analyzing groundwater banks has the
added feature of describing multiple uses of the water systems. While the
ability to categorize and describe the multiple uses of the groundwater CPR
is instructive, it does not appear to be as useful when compared to Edwards
and Steins studies. This is because the resource units from the groundwater
CPR are limited to water, so the multiple uses then are “end uses” of the
water as opposed to multiple resource types. The review of end uses is still
useful because it provides insights into the interactions of the user
community (for example agricultural use versus municipal use of water) to
augment the analysis of the “characteristics of the user community.”
The Modified IAD Framework and Unsuccessful Groundwater Banks
The IAD framework points out that the while the physical and
technological attributes of a given CPR/Groundwater bank situation are
essential for the feasibility of the groundwater bank, it is the patterns of
interactions, affected by the issue of local control and trust, that can
determine the outcome of the whether a groundwater bank is successful.
So, the conclusion can be drawn that the IAD framework is useful for the
analysis of the operational groundwater banks, however, failed attempts
should be viewed from a slightly different perspective.
In the Central Valley cases of failed or attempted groundwater banks, the
institutional arrangements for banking imported surface-water and native
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groundwater will most likely either not exist, or there will be precursors to
these arrangements, such as county ordinances directed at water exports. In
the Madera Ranch case, one finds that the institutional arrangements for
groundwater banking are not developed because the proposed bank is never
implemented. In the ESJPWA/EBMUD case some of the institutional
arrangements exist as a component of the county ordinance, but are not
applied, as the groundwater bank is not established as planned.
In these cases, the IAD framework shows that the physical/technological
attributes, the contextual factors, action situations, and the characteristics of
the user community are very similar to the successful cases. The patterns of
interactions, however, seem to determine the success of the groundwater
bank. The Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank shows that an outside agency
developing the program independent of the local AO’s and overlying users
will be faced with significant problems related to trust and local control.
Likewise, the ESJPWA/EBMUSD case indicates that mistrust of outside
municipal AO’s is a critical factor based on the issue of local control.
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So, the modified IAD framework is useful for analyzing unsuccessful
cases, but the framework should show that: 1) the institutional arrangements
for the bank do not exist - rather there are institutional arrangements that
may preclude banking or create incentives that tend to impede groundwater
banking (such as the California system of correlative and prescriptive water
rights, or local ordinances); 2) the pattern of interaction leading to an
outcome can be significantly influenced by the how the concept of
groundwater bank is originated.
Implications for Theory
As noted by Ostrom and others, social scientists often use models to
analyze CPR problems that “have the effect of supporting increased
centralization of political authority” for solving CPR problems (Ostrom, 1990,
p. 216). These models tend to view individuals faced with a CPR problem as
being in a trap that they cannot get out of without an external authority
imposing a solution. These models also tend to treat the institutions
developed by these individuals as being insufficient to address the CPR
problem at hand (Ostrom, 1990, p. 216). However, extensive research
indicates that individuals can cooperate to develop institutions to effectively
address CPR problems, with groundwater institutions being a good example
(Ostrom, 1990, Blomquist, 1992).
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What does this dissertation’s research say about groundwater banks and
theory related to groundwater CPR’s? As might be expected, institutional
theory for CPR’s applies to groundwater banks even with the introduction of
surface water that is akin to a private good. For example, the majority of
Ostrom’s Design Principles for Long-Enduring CPR’s are found in the
successful groundwater bank cases. The findings that local CPR users can
craft successful institutions to manage their CPR problems also apply to
groundwater banks using imported surface-water. The research also
identifies the institutional arrangements that are significant for
accommodating the mix of native groundwater and imported surface-water.
In summary these institutional arrangements consist of:
• State legislation and regulations enabling the formation of Joint
Powers Authorities and Special Districts (formation of AO’s).
• Memorandums of Understanding and contractual arrangements
between the AO’s and banking participants.
• Foundational “no harm criteria as a basis for operational
arrangements (“Golden Rule” criteria).
• Comprehensive monitoring arrangements for physical
monitoring and for collective action related to monitoring
(monitoring committees).
• Operating rules for protecting the CPR and overlying users
(percentage loss rules, compensation for overlying users).
Most importantly, a high level of trust and the need for local control of the
groundwater bank appear to be necessary precursors to the development of
a groundwater bank in the Central Valley of California. The issue of local
control of the groundwater bank seems to profoundly impact the pattern of
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interaction between the user communities due in part to the nature of
California water rights and past historical experience in California (the Owens
Valley/City of Los Angeles example) raising the level of distrust for the
motives of water users outside of the CPR’s boundaries.
Groundwater banking is one part of the overall solution for California’s
water supply problem. The potential for new groundwater banks exists in
portions of California’s Central Valley, particularly in the Northern
Sacramento Valley area, and in areas of Southern California. The research
for this dissertation was conducted in areas of California’s Central Valley with
similar physical attributes, technological attributes, similar user community
attributes, and similar action situations. This allowed for some instructive
comparisons between similar settings.
Further research into the institutional arrangements and barriers to
groundwater banking will be useful for designing and implementing
groundwater banks. In particular, research into groundwater banks where
there are different appropriator organizational arrangements and different
multi-organizational collaborative processes that serve a wider variety of user
groups (urban, agriculture, environmental), would be useful for understanding
how groundwater banks can be developed to address California’s
multifaceted water needs.
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Conclusion
The core research question for this dissertation asks how the
introduction of imported surface-water into a groundwater basin influences
the institutional arrangements governing the use of the groundwater basin in
question. This is an important question because it seeks to understand how
two types of water resources that are physically disconnected and legally
disconnected can be integrated. This integration of the two types of water
resources is one element needed for solving the problems of water supply
availability, water supply reliability, and water supply sustainability in
California.
This dissertation’s research shows that the introduction of imported
surface-water into a groundwater basin can be accomplished through the
development of institutional arrangements by appropriators that are
essentially the same as the institutional arrangements that have been
developed for long-enduring CPR’s. So, the introduction of imported surface-
water in the KWB and AEWSD/MWD cases does not significantly alter the
development of institutional arrangements from what is found for the more
traditional long-enduring CPR’s. This is encouraging in that it shows that the
integration of imported surface-water and native groundwater can be
accomplished to meet the goals of reliability and sustainability and it
indicates that these institutional arrangements should be robust and
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long-lasting. This dissertation’s research also indicates the importance of
trust and local control to the success of a groundwater banking program.
This dissertation started out by describing a picture of California’s arid
Central Valley and how agriculture flourished with the development of water
resources for the valley. The introduction also described the problem of
water supply sustainability and how the Central Valley’s supply of
groundwater could be overextended to the point of exhaustion. The
introduction proposes that this actually presents an opportunity for utilizing
the capacity of a groundwater basin for storage of excess surface water
supplies. Indeed, the KWB and AEWSD/MWD cases are examples of
appropriator organizations taking advantage of this opportunity. Importantly,
the two cases are also examples of how groundwater banking can serve to
bridge the gap between agricultural needs and urban needs for water as the
two groundwater banks have provisions for storing water needed for both
uses. This balance of water use will be increasingly important for California’s
future and to avoid a water crisis.
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APPENDIX
GLOSSARY
acre-foot (pi. acre-feet) aka AF, a-f: The volume of water necessary to
cover one acre to a depth of one foot. Equal to 43,560 cubic feet or 325,851
gallons or 1,233 cubic meters.
adjudication: A court proceeding to determine all rights to the use of water
on a particular stream system or groundwater basin.
anadromous: Pertaining to fish that spend a part of their life cycle in the sea
and return to freshwater streams to spawn.
AO: Appropriator Organization - Sets of appropriators who form an
appropriator organization (AO) sharing a common understanding regarding:
1. Who is a member of the AO.
2. The type of access to a CPR conveyed by membership or other
grounds for such rights.
3. How decisions are made that affect the development of
coordinated strategies for appropriating or providing for a CPR.
4. How conflicts over these patterns will be resolved.
5. Leadership roles.
6. Membership responsibilities to sustain the AO.
appropriation: The right to use water for a beneficial use or the acquisition
of such a right gained through the process of diverting surface water and
putting it to a beneficial use.
appropriative rights: Appropriative water rights, generally found in western
states, are created by diversion of water and putting it to beneficial use.
Appropriative water rights have a priority based on the date of first usage. In
times of shortage, junior appropriators are cut off, while senior
appropriators receive their full allotment.
appropriators: Individual users of the resource units generated by a CPR
are referred to as appropriators of a CPR.
Aquifer Storage and Recovery (ASR): Involves injecting water into an
aquifer through wells or by surface spreading and infiltration and then
pumping it out when needed. The aquifer essentially functions as a water
bank. Deposits are made in times of surplus, typically during the rainy
season, and withdrawals occur when available water falls short of demand.
288
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aquifer: One or more geologic formations containing sufficient saturated
porous and permeable material to transmit water at a rate sufficient to feed a
spring or for economic extraction by a well. Combination of two Latin words,
aqua or water, and ferre, to bring; literally, something that brings water.
artificial recharge: The deliberate act of adding water to a groundwater
aquifer by means of a recharge project; also, the water so added. Artificial
recharge can be accomplished via injection wells, spreading basins, or in-
stream projects.
AEWSD: Arvin-Edison Water Storage District.
closed basin: A basin whose topography prevents surface outflow of water.
It is considered to be hydrologically closed if neither surface nor underground
outflow of water can occur.
conjunctive use: The operation of a ground water basin in combination with
a surface water storage and conveyance system. Water is stored in the
ground water basin for later use by intentionally recharging the basin during
years of above-average water supply.
CPR: Common-Pooi-Resource
CVP: Central Valley Project
CVPIA: Central Valley Project Improvement Act - This act mandates
changes in management of the Central Valley Project, particularly for the
protection, restoration, and enhancement of fish and wildlife. Ten major
areas of change include: 800,000 acre-feet of water dedicated to fish and
wildlife annually; tiered water pricing applicable to new and renewed
contracts; water transfers provision, including sale of water to users outside
the CVP service area; special efforts to restore anadromous fish population
by 2002; restoration fund financed by water and power users for habitat
restoration and enhancement and water and land acquisitions; no new water
contracts until fish and wildlife goals achieve; no contract renewals until
completion of a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement; terms of
contracts reduced from 40 to 25 years with renewal at the discretion of the
Secretary of the Interior; installation of the temperature control device at
Shasta Dam; implementation of fish passage measures at Red Bluff
Diversion Dam; firm water supplies for Central Valley wildlife refuges; and
development of a plan to increase CVP yield.
DWR: California Department of Water Resources
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ESA: Endangered Species Act
groundwater: Subsurface water body in the zone of saturation, OR (more
commonly, available groundwater is defined as :) That portion of the water
beneath the surface of the earth that can be collected with wells, tunnels, or
drainage galleries, or that flows naturally to the earth's surface via seeps or
springs.
groundwater basin: A hydrologic unit of groundwater storage defined as an
area more or less separate from neighboring groundwater storage areas.
imported surface-water: Surface water originating from a source not
hydrologically connected to the groundwater banking site
KCWA: Kern County Water Agency
KFE: Kern Fan Element
KWBA: Kern Water Bank Authority. Joint powers authority operating the
Kern Water Bank.
KWB: Kern Water Bank
maf: million acre-feet
MWD: Metropolitan Water District of Southern California.
overdraft: Pumping of groundwater for consumptive use in excess of safe
yield. The condition of a groundwater basin in which the amount of water
withdrawn by pumping exceeds the amount of water that recharges the basin
over a period of years during which water supply conditions approximate
average.
recharge basin: A surface facility, often a large pond, used to increase the
percolation of surface water into a ground water basin.
riparian: Of, or pertaining to, rivers and their banks.
safe yield: Rate of surface water diversion or groundwater extraction from a
basin for consumptive use over an indefinite period of time that can be
maintained without producing negative effects.
SCVWD: Santa Clara Valley Water District
290
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subsidence: Downward movement of the land surface associated with
groundwater pumping, especially where such pumping exceeds safe yield
and the water table has dropped. Uneven rates of subsidence over an area
can lead to differential subsidence, which can cause lateral movement of the
land surface, and cracks and fissures to appear. This is more likely to occur
in areas where the aquifer varies in thickness, such as near the edges of
groundwater basins. Subsidence is an essentially irreversible process, not
greatly ameliorated by later raising the water table.
surface-water: Water on the earth’s surface exposed to the atmosphere,
e.g., rivers, lakes, streams, oceans, ponds, reservoirs, etc.
SWP: State Water Project
USBR: Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Department of the Interior. The Bureau
of Reclamation is best known for the dams, powerplants, and canals it
constructed in the 17 western states. The Bureau is the nation’s largest
wholesaler of water.
water right: A legally protected right to take possession of water occurring in
a natural waterway and to divert that water for beneficial use.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Pinhey, Nicholas Alan
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Banking on the commons: An institutional analysis of groundwater banking programs in California's Central Valley
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