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The political economy of Turkish Islamism and secularism: The role of preference falsification in the establishment of Kemalist secularism and the polarization of Turkish public opinion on the pu...

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The political economy of Turkish Islamism and secularism: The role of preference falsification in the establishment of Kemalist secularism and the polarization of Turkish public opinion on the pu...

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Content THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TURKISH ISLAMISM AND SECULARISM: THE ROLE OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF KEMALIST SECULARISM AND THE POLARIZATION OF TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION ON THE PUBLIC ROLE OF RELIGION by Tolga Koker A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (POLITICAL ECONOMY & PUBLIC POLICY) August 2004 Copyright 2004 Tolga Koker Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 3145220 Copyright 2004 by Koker, Tolga All rights reserved. INFORMATION TO USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. ® UMI UMI Microform 3145220 Copyright 2004 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Dedication To my first teacher, my mother Afi Alev Akgasoy-Kdker who taught me to stand up against any oppression Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table of Contents Dedication........................................................................................................................ii List o f Tables....................................................................................................................v List o f Figures ..... ..................... vi Abstract ................. vii I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................1 Turkey’s Swinging Pendulum...................................................1 An Overview of Islamism and Turkish Secularism................5 An Approach to the Study of Islamism and Secularism in Turkey................................................. 20 Methodology of the Thesis ................................................... 25 Challenges Ahead.................................................... 33 II. ISLAMISM AND SECULARISM..........................................36 Contending Worldviews.............................................................. 41 Islamic Worldview.................................................................. 43 Core Assumptions............... 44 Islamic Way of L ife.......................................................48 Islamist Daily Life.......................................................... 51 Secular/Modem Worldview....................................................57 Core Assumptions.......................................................... 57 Secularism.......................................................................60 Secularist Daily L ife......................................................64 The Consequences of Contending Worldviews in Turkey ..67 Responses to the Collision of Islamism and Secularism Exit, Sincere Voice, and Preference Falsification 76 Preference Falsification in Turkey......................................... 78 III. A TORN COUNTRY.................................................................85 Between Secularist Modernism and Islamism........................... 87 Islam Meets Secularist Modernity ....................................88 Islamism, Secularism and Turkish Nationalism....................97 The Opportunity: M. Kemal in Power.................................102 The Distortion of Collective Decisions ...................104 The Secularization of the State........................... 120 The Proclamation of the Republic..................... 120 iii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Abolition of the Caliphate........................ 126 Secularization of the Codes ..... 132 State Control of Official Islam.............................................. 137 Reforming Popular Islam.......................................................147 Captioning Kemalist Secularism...................... 156 IV. A DUAL PREFERENCE M ODEL.................... 160 Dual Preference M odel.................................................. 163 Individual’s Utilities From Revealing a Preference............167 Intrinsic Utility.............................................................. 167 Reputational Utility.......................................................170 Expressive Utility..........................................................178 An Application of Dual Preference M odel.......................... 184 Case I................................................................... 185 Case I I ..... 186 Case III............................................................... 187 Exit........................................................................188 Sincere Voice.......................................................192 Pro-secularist Preference Falsification..............195 Case IV...........................................................................198 Exit........................................................................198 Sincere Voice...................................................... 202 Pro-Islamist Preference Falsification................204 Tying It All Together.............................................................205 Taking a Side.......................................................................... 209 Public Opinion versus Private Opinion................................ 211 Equilibrium.............................................................................214 Implications of the Dual Preference Model for Turkey 222 Multiple Equilibrium: Polarization of the Public Opinion.......................................................................... 222 Comer Equilibrium I: Complete Secularization 232 Comer Equilibrium II: Complete Islamization 234 Peaceful Co-Existence ..... ...237 V. EXPERIMENTS ON PREFERENCE FALCIFICATION: EVIDENCE FROM TU RK EY......................................... 241 Field Experiment I ...... 248 Purpose...........................................................................248 M ethod.................................................................248 iv Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Participants. .............. 248 Design ........................ 249 Material................................................................249 Procedure.......................................................................250 Manipulation Check..................................................... 251 Results......................... ..251 Manipulation Check ................. 251 More Results and Discussion................................... ...257 Field Experiment II................................................................271 Purpose.......................................................................... 272 Method.................................................................273 Participants.......................................................... 273 Design..................................................................273 Material.............................. 273 Procedure..................................................... 275 Manipulation Check..................................................... 275 Results........................................................................... 275 Manipulation Check............................................275 Discussion.................... 284 General Discussion.................................................................286 VI. CONCLUSION.......................................................................288 Major Findings of the Thesis ............................................289 Discussion on the Main Implications of the Thesis........... 293 The Possibility of Complete Islamization..................295 The Possibility of Complete Secularization.............. 300 The Possibility of Peaceful Co-existance...................304 Civil Society, Democracy, and Preference Falsification ...305 POSTSCRIPT....................................................................................316 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................ 319 APPENDIXES.......................... ....340 Appendix A: Experiment I: English Translation o f Survey Questionnaire...............................................................................341 Appendix B: Experiment II: English Translation o f Survey Questionnaire ..... 344 v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. List of Tables Table 2.1: Preferences and Worldviews.....................................................................81 Table 4.1: Preferences and Worldviews...................................................................184 Table 5.1: Experiment I: Personal Characteristics of Participants.......................252 Table 5.2: Authority, Dependence, Religiosity, Islamic Piety and Secularity as a Function of Type of Outfit..........................................254 Table 5.3: Intercorrelations Between Dependent Variables..................................256 Table 5.4: Indicators of Authority..............................................................................257 Table 5.5: Indicator of Dependence...........................................................................259 Table 5.6: Indicators of Religiosity............................................................................261 Table 5:7. Indicators of Secularity.............................................................................264 Table 5.8. Indicator of Islamic Self-Identification................................................. 265 Table 5.9: Indicator of Islamic Practice I.................................. 267 Table 5.10: Indicator of Islamic Practice I I .............................................................. 268 Table 5.11: Experiment II: Personal Characteristics of Participants.................... 276 Table 5.12: TV Questions...........................................................................................278 Table 5.13: Newspaper Questions.............................................................................. 280 Table 5.14: Indicators of Preference Falsification......................................... 282 Table 5.15: Self-identification and Perception of the Interviewers as a Function of Type of Outfit...................................................................283 Table 6.1: Possible Outcomes....................................................................................294 vi Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. List of Figures Figure 4.1: Decision Tree ................ .206 Figure 4.2: Polarized Public Opinion.........................................................................213 Figure 4.3: The individual’s Political Threshold......................................................215 Figure 4.4: Interior Equilibrium................................................................................. 219 Figure 4.5: Comer Equilibrium.................................................................................. 221 Figure 4.6: Multiple Equilibria.................................................................................. 230 Figure 4.7: Comer Equilibrium I ............................................................................... 233 Figure 4:8: Comer Equilibrium II.............................................................................. 235 Figure 4:9: Infinite Multiple Equilibria ....................................................................239 vii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Abstract In Turkey, Islamists and secularists have long battled to control public opinion. Secularists have attempted to lock religion into the private sphere. For their part, Islamists have struggled to gain and maintain public visibility. On each side, activists have exerted pressures on the non-activist majority, trying to make ordinary individuals falsify their preferences by acting as if they are committed to an extreme position. To investigate the consequences of the resulting distortions in public discourse, this dissertation applies Timur Kuran’s theory of preference falsification to the interplay of Islamism and secularism in Turkey. Chapter 1 identifies two kinds of preference falsification: pro-Islamist (misrepresentation of secular preferences under Islamist pressures) and pro-secularist (misrepresentation of Islamic preferences under secularist pressures). To uncover motives for preference falsification, Chapter 2 investigates the competing Islamist and secularist social projects. Chapter 3 examines the historical discourse on the construction of the secular public sphere in Turkey. Using archival data, it documents that Kemalist secularism triumphed partly as a result of pro-secularist preference falsification. Chapter 4 depicts a dual preference model that pinpoints three possible responses to perceived social pressures: exit, sincere voice, and preference falsification. It further investigates the repercussions of pro-Islamist and pro-secularist preference falsification in public discourse on the social role of Islam. Chapter 5 presents a field survey involving 300 respondents. It displays empirical evidence on the forms of preference falsification that have polarized Turkish public viii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. opinion, with Islamists at one end and secularists at the other. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation with thoughts on whether greater democratization and a strengthened civil society may unleash a new social consensus involving greater tolerance for competing political viewpoints. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Vien retro a me, e lascia dir le genii Dante Turkey’s Swinging Pendulum December 24th, 1995, was one of the turning points in the history of modem Turkey. It was the election day on which the Welfare Party (RP), an Islamist party, was victorious. On that day, for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, an openly Islamist party emerged as the leading political institution. Following the elections, The “secular” coalition of two center-right parties, the True Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP), with the open support of the two center- left parties, the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the People’s Republican Party (CHP), whose main raison d ’ etre was to keep the RP from coming to power, did not last long. Finally, another coalition between the RP and the DYP, with the RP as the senior partner, obtained a vote of confidence from the newly elected parliament. + “Follow me, let the people talk.” Dante, Divina Commedia, Purtatorio, “Canto V,” line 13. 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Those full of wishful thinking that the secular parties would prevent the RP from coming to power were shocked to see Necmettin Erbakan, the R P’s leader, as the first Islamist Premier of the Turkish Republic established on the founding principle of secularism by its founder M. Kemal Ataturk. After the triumph of Turkish secularism in the 1920s and 1930s, no one would have dreamed that Islamists would be major players in Turkish politics and that one day Turkey would have an Islamist premier. In one way or another, these developments caught almost everyone off guard. Even more surprising was the fact that, the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Tayyip Erdogan would win the national election on November 3, 2002 with an overwhelming majority to become the first Islamist party to form a government without a coalition partner. The election results reflected the grievances of the Turkish society, in particular, its disillusionment and frustration with the secularist politicians in ending poverty, corruption and the economic crisis of 2001. The astonishing rise of AKP to power highlighted the growing influence of Islam on the Turkish society through its claim to be the legitimate representative of the disadvantaged despite the secularist establishment which fought hard to keep the political Islam out of the public realm. To better illustrate the dynamics behind political Islam in Turkey, one needs to gain a historical perspective on its development within the context of the secular Turkish Republic. After fifty years of secularist domination in the Turkish political scene, the National Salvation Party (MSP) was the first explicitly Islamist party 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. allowed running in elections. When it entered the 1973 elections as the party of the “silent Muslim majority,” the MSP received 11.8 percent of the votes.1 Afterwards when the Kemalist CHP formed a coalition with the MSP, the secularist establishment tacitly recognized Islam as a legitimate political force among Turkish masses. This was one of the first unwilling concessions extended by the Turkish secularists to political Islam that rose in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s, resulting in the victory of the AKP in the most recent general elections. Soon after 1995, the Islamist ministers cautiously started pursuing a policy of Islamization in economic, social and cultural areas. The secularist establishment perceived such policies as a challenge to the secularist foundations of the Republic and called for a rapid containment to avert further Islamization of the society. The Islamist mayors elected in the 1994 local elections have been implementing several Islamization policies with a direct influence on the organization of daily life in their localities. As these efforts have clashed with the past secularist reforms, public discourse on several issues has become increasingly polarized between secularists and Islamists, crystallizing the opposing views of each camp. The constant struggle to drive each other out of the public sphere led both secularists and Islamists to turn to public opinion for support. Their opposing views were brought to the public agenda as in the case of veiling which became the most controversial and confrontational topic in the Turkish society. With each side continually seeking support from the public, non-activist bystanders were forced to take sides. In 1 Bixmaz Toprak, Islam and the Political Development in Turkey (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981), 96-97. 3 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. response to social pressures, ordinary citizens in Turkey have been continually put in a position to fit within this growing segmentation of the society, seeking alternatives to cope with the Islamist and secularist pressure groups. They changed publicly displayed preferences like chameleons in the face of perceived pressures from the two camps. Such misrepresentations of preferences made it difficult to predict political outcomes. A comparison of the public opinion polls held prior to the recent elections can best elucidate this difficulty. For example, most public polls and many experts on Turkish politics failed to predict either the 1994 local or the 1999 general election results.2 In the former, the RP emerged as the leading party by polling 18.4 percent of the votes as the MHP doubled its votes by winning 18 percent in the latter.3 Under extreme Islamist and secularist pressures, voters surprised the pollsters. Secret ballot elections are designed to allow citizens to reveal their genuine preferences. If we accept that voters do not change their opinions in the last few 2 According to the British/Gallop, in the March 27, 1994 municipal elections, the Social Democratic Party’s (SHP) candidates would win the mayorships of the three biggest cities, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. The British/Gallop predicted that the RP candidate would finish in third place in Istanbul and fifth in Ankara. Seven veteran columnists predicted that the RP candidates would not win either in Istanbul or Ankara, placing the RP candidates in third place. However, in the 1994 elections, twenty- nine other major cities, including Turkey’s biggest two cities, Istanbul and Ankara, and 400 smaller towns elected Islamist mayors. The newly reelected incumbent mayor of Izmir, the third largest city, was also very well known for his open Islamist inclinations though he was a member of the DYP. For the poll results and expert predictions, see Mehmet Ali Soydan, Turkiye’nin Refah Gergegi [Turkey’s Refah Reality] (Erzurum: Birey Yaymcilik, 1994), 337-345. In the April 18, 1999 elections three polls, Strategy/Mori, Verso and Parametre, respectively predicted that the Islamist RP’s successor, FP would receive 18 percent, 19.3 percent and 21 percent. On the contrary, the FP received only 15.4 percent. The MHP won 18 percent, although the same polls respectively had predicted that the MHP would take 12 percent, 10.4 percent and 10 percent with a 2.5% margin o f error. Hurriyet, 20 April 1999. 3 For the March 27, 1994 municipal election results see Milliyet, 28 March 1994; for those of the April 18, 1999 general elections see Hurriyet, 20 April 1999. 4 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. days, if there is any discrepancy (a bigger than usual margin or error) between the polls and the election results, it means that some voters are not comfortable with revealing their preferences in public polls, despite the anonymity clause. In other words, Turkish voters acted like chameleons. Being subjected to Islamist and secularist pressures, many felt very uncomfortable revealing their genuine thoughts about especially sensitive topics like Islam’s place in social and political life and whether they support Islamist or secularist parties. An Overview of Islamism and Turkish Secularism One of the most ambitious objectives of the newly independent Kemalist state in Turkey was to institute secularism as an important step in the modernization of the country. This was not an easy task since Islam had been a basic source of guidance and legitimacy for almost every aspect of social and everyday life. The recent election results showed both secularists and Islamists still exist in Turkey. One of the most intriguing challenges for scholars of Turkey is to explain the constant struggle between secularist and Islamist discourses. Another is to expose the mutual attempts of Islamists and secularists to force each other to go underground and eventually disappear. The first puzzle we face here is how and why the some Turks became secular while others became Islamist. The second puzzle is how the secular camp has sustained itself over time as the number of Islamists grew. How can one identify mechanisms that explain both the rise of Turkish secularism and the rise of Islamist movement? 5 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The emergence of religious movements, including Turkish Islamism,4 has been a global phenomenon. At the dawn of the twenty-first century Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Judaism, and Islamism, were all on the rise. Yet, the social sciences did not predict the rise of religious movements. One o f the most widely accepted hypotheses of modem social sciences was the secularization thesis, stating that religion would inevitably wither away. The new religious movements challenged this key assumption of the modernization theories. The emergence of religious movements as rich, diverse and different from one another across the homogenizing forces of global modernization has posed a paradox that has attracted the interest of many researchers in the social sciences. The Fundamentalism Project that produced five companion volumes is one of the most comprehensive academic attempts to assess the rise of these religious traditions in the world. The series examined “contemporary militant and political religious movements which have organized in reaction to the prevailing patterns of modernization in their respective societies.”5 The first volume, Fundamentalisms Observed (1991) focused on “family resemblances” among fourteen religiously inspired movements, observing how they reacted to the recent global modernization and secularization. The next two volumes, Fundamentalisms and Society and 41 use the term Islamism referring to the set of guidelines based on a belief that Islam must be the sole guidance for both public and private life. For more on Islamism, see the later pages in this Chapter and Chapter 2, 3, and 6. 5 Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, “Introduction” in idem, (eds.) Fundamentalism Comprehended, The Fundamentalism Project, Vol. V (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 1. 6 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Fundamentalisms and the State, came out simultaneously in 1993, investigating how these rising religious movements had challenged the foundations of several spheres of “modem” life such as politics, law, constitutionalism to “reorder scientific inquiry, to claim the patterns of ‘traditional’ family life and interpersonal relations, and to reshape the educational and communications systems.”6 The fourth volume, Accounting for Fundamentalism (1994) focused on the commonalities in the ideological and behavioral patterns in these movements, “resulting in either a greater or lesser engagement with people and forces outside the group or movement.”7 The last volume, Fundamentalism Comprehended (1995) aimed to embrace “a variety of movements in one inclusive statement,” presenting their contending worldviews that challenged the perspective of Western secular modernity.8 Hence, with its seventy-nine expert participants, the Fundamentalism Project has extensively contributed to the field, especially to the study of Islamic movements. The project has thirty-one articles focusing on Islam, mostly about Iran, Egypt, and Pakistan. Strangely, however, such a big project has only one article specifically on Turkey, where political Islam was about to come to power.9 Like 6 Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, “Introduction” in idem, (eds.) Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education, The Fundamentalism Project, Vol. II (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 2. 7 Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, “Introduction” in idem, (eds.) Fundamentalism Comprehended, 3. 8 Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, “Introduction,” 3. 9 The article in question is §erif Mar din’s “The Naksibendi Order of Turkey.” See the article in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, (eds.) Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militancy, The Fundamentalism Project, Vol. I ll (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993): 204-234. 7 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. many other scholars of the Middle Eastern studies, the organizers and participants of the Fundamentalism Project presumed that political Islam would pose no threat to the secular regime in Turkey. As a result of this presumption, as exemplified by the Fundamentalism Project, the study of Islamism in modem Turkey (with only a couple of exceptions) was long a neglected topic in academia until the rise of the Islamist party to power in 1995. There are, however, many excellent studies on the modernization of Turkey in general and the roots of Turkish secularism in particular. Niyazi Berkes’ The Development o f Secularism in Turkey (1964), Bernard Lewis’ The Emergence o f Modem Turkey (1961), and §erif Mardin’s The Genesis o f Young Ottoman Thought (1962) are only a few that immediately come to mind. Mardin’s work naturally does not extend its scope to the Kemalist period. Lewis’ classic book has a well-written chapter on “Religion and Culture,” focusing mostly on the Kemalist reforms aimed at the disestablishment of Islam. However, it does not examine how the reforms were intended to work. Berkes' seminal volume is a good example of studies centered on historical roots and causes of secularism. It has only a short concluding chapter on Kemalist secularism. By focusing on the period in which the secularist movement in Turkey reached its zenith, one can build on these three scholars’ studies, which have become quite outdated. Berkes’ works are also good examples of modernist literature on secularism in Turkey. Like most authors of the Fundamentalism Project, Berkes viewed history as a clash between traditionalist and modem forces through which modem ones 8 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. would eventually win. But, Berkes does not explain how Kemalism as a premier modernist movement suppressed traditional Islamic institutions. Since he took the rise o f secularism as a pre-determined end he assumed that Islam like any other religion would vanish as a result of the secularization process. Berkes’ deterministic conclusion is, as also noted by Nuray Mert, based on a very secularist assumption.1 0 The differentiation of realms into public and private in social life was in place, especially during the time of the Ottoman Empire. In his search for the roots of secularism in Turkey, Berkes had to presuppose that there had been certain public realms outside the control of religion. According to Berkes, Turkish secularism emerged from these other realms. By pointing out the opaque line between public and private realms, new studies may introduce an alternative perspective to re-evaluate the previous academic works, especially those written by modernist authors like Berkes. Scholars studying secularism in Turkey usually focus on the Kemalist period (1920-1938) and earlier periods to look for the roots of secularism. They fail to focus on how secularism was institutionalized in Turkey during this period and how its institutionalization was sustained. For example, £etin Ozek, in his book The State and Religion, took an historical approach in exploring relations between the state and religion (including both Christianity and Islam). He also accounted for the 1 0 See Nuray Mert, Laiklik Tartiqmasina Kavramsal Bir Baki$: Cumhuriyet Kurulurken Laik Dii§unce [A Conceptual View on Secularism Debate: Secular Thought During the Establishment of the Republic] (Ankara: Baglam Yayincilik, 1994), 48. 9 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. legal institutionalization of secularism in Turkey after the 1950s without investigating to what extent Kemalist westernization was successful. One can contribute to the literature on the topic by explaining how secular institutions helped convert the masses from Islamic lifestyle to the modem/secular one. By claiming that the Kemalist reforms succeeded in instituting secularism in Turkey, one enters into a prominent debate among the Turkish intellectuals on the controversy over whether modernization (read: westernization), and hence secularization, imposed from the “top” by the Kemalist state through reforms, worked. In my view, this was actually how the Kemalist regime instituted secularism: From the “top.” It was successful to a large extent but with significant repercussions on the Turkish society. More specifically, the modernist discourse of the Kemalist regime led many people to adopt a secular lifestyle while leaving some others adhering to Islamist way of life. In other words, the secularist reforms of the 1920s and 1930s are now an integral part of the Turkish society and only a few challenge some aspects of the reforms. One scholar who believes that Kemalist reforms succeeded in secularizing Turkey is Metin Heper. According to Heper, “[t]he “Cultural Revolution” in Turkey has been more successful than is usually presumed.”1 1 However, Heper does not focus on how and why the Kemalist reforms changed the religious characteristics of Turkey. 1 1 Metin Heper, “Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective,” Middle East Journal, 35 (Summer 1981): 362. 10 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. On the other side of the debate on the success of the Kemalist reforms and their societal ramifications, there are other scholars like §erif Mardin. Mardin was one o f the first scholars who noticed that Islam had constituted a “root paradigm” for the masses in conducting their everyday lives. In his book Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case o f Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (1989), Mardin investigates how one of these brotherhoods nourished by the Islamic “root paradigm” survived under the Kemalist State, albeit underground. He observed what most pro secularist scholars and the Kemalist leaders of Turkey had missed: “[In] a country pervaded by Islamic culture, the popular use of Islam as a means of coming to terms with the everyday world provided individuals with facilities for adaptation that the Republican regime could not fill.”1 2 For this reason, Islam easily survived, especially through underground brotherhoods among rural masses as a part of their lifestyle. This was the case until the 1950s. The enormous migration to the major cities changed the Turkish landscape to a great extent. As migrants continued to carry their Islamic lifestyle to the cities, their Islamic symbols increasingly appeared in the public realm. The Islamic symbols such as the veil and long prayer beads made their ways to the centers of the cities as the lower-paid workers from the shantytowns were going to their jobs in downtown districts. Besides §erif Mardin, Binnaz Toprak was one of the few scholars who argued that Islam had been on the rise in Turkey. In her book, Islam and Political Development in Turkey (1981), she observed that Islam played an important role in 1 2 Serif Mardin, “The Just and the Unjust,” Deadalus, 120 (Summer 1991): 127. 11 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the expansion of political participation to the masses.1 3 Toprak also identified a trend “towards the blending of socio-economic grievances with religious concerns.”1 4 In order to politically mobilize the agitated masses against the mainstream secular parties, the Islamist activists constantly criticized certain secularist policies that allegedly contradict Islam. As a result, the veiling issue, for example, became politicized. Niliifer Gole’s Forbidden Modern (1997) specifically focuses on the veil controversy in Turkey. Viewing Islam and modernity as providing diametrically opposed cultural definitions, she dwells upon female gender roles and women’s social positions in Turkish society.1 5 In doing so, however, as Sencer Ayata indicates, Gole minimizes “the extent to which Islam has been accommodated by, rather than excluded from, the political arena over the past three decades.”1 6 Furthermore, Ayata points out that Gole downplays “the ways in which “Islam” and “modernity” have become interwoven at the level of daily life, thereby yielding the multiplicity of ‘hybrid’ 1 "j form and experiences.” The juxtaposition of Islam and modernity (and also its corollary, secularism) can be explained by introducing a mechanism that shows how 1 3 See Binnaz Toprak, Islam and the Political Development in Turkey, especially Chap. 4. 1 4 Binnaz Toprak, Islam and the Political Development in Turkey, 123. 1 5 For more everyday examples in which Islamism rejects the dominant features of western modernity see Niliifer Gole “Snapshots of Islamic Modernities,” Daedalus (Winter 2000): 91-117. Besides stories about veiled students, Gole gives several other snapshots about an Islamic writer, the sex scandal in a religious order, an Islamic hotel for summer vacation and a Muslim sociologist. She further explains how each case reveals the encounter of Islamist policies with the western modernity. 1 6 Sencer Ayata, “Continuity and Change in Turkish Culture: Some Critical Remarks on M odem Mahrem,” New Perspectives on Turkey, 9 (Fall 1993): 139. 1 7 Sencer Ayata, “Some Critical Remarks on Modem Mahrem," 139. 12 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Islam has been accommodated in political and in daily life. Such a mechanism can also explain to what extent Islam and secularism peacefully co-exist. Investigating individual responses to the collision of Islamism and Turkish secularism in Turkish daily life sheds light on why such ‘hybrid’ forms are not fully represented in the public sphere. In doing so, one can bring more empirical perspectives to relevant theoretical studies. §erif Mardin points out an urgent need in contemporary Turkish social science for studies which acknowledge “micro” components of social dynamics by focusing on “life-world” or everyday life.1 8 As Mardin notes, the conception of daily life as routines, first promoted by Michel de Certeau, attracted the interests of many towering figures in social sciences, including Anthony Giddens, Norbert Elias, Jurgen Habermas and Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose concerns for the constitution of society converge on the role of life-world and its cultural foundations. By recognizing that most Turkish researchers whose works are based on “macro” approaches have long ignored studying “micro” aspects of daily life, Mardin suggests that investigating the interstices of the “everyday” will enable one to “recapture the many dimensions of a subtler analysis” and shed “more light on the functioning of the Ottoman Empire and on present-day Turkish society.”1 9 The approach specifically focusing on everyday life will enrich previous studies, which had originated from a Western mechanistic-positivistic or 1 8 §erif Mardin, “Projects as Methodology: Some Thoughts on Modem Turkish Social Science,” in Sibel Bozdogan and Re§at Kasaba (eds.) Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), especially see 77. 1 9 $erif Mardin, “Projects as Methodology,” 73. 13 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. functionalist view of society. This is mainly because the previous studies that exclusively examined “macro” structures provided little understanding on how the individual thinks, and hence, behaves in her private life and whether her private considerations have any effect on the public life of the society. This is especially important in studying the role of Islam(ism) and secularism in Turkey, both of which have considerable effects in shaping both private and public life. “Micro” level studies will introduce newer and much needed perspectives on the subject. In noting 90 that studies focusing on everyday practices are very rare, Mardin also claims that it will take some time for Turkish studies to provide such academic pieces. In bringing more empirical evidence to academia by investigating everyday responses to the collision of Islamism and secularism in Turkey, this dissertation certainly responds to Mardin’s call.2 1 As shown above, previous academic works about the topic almost exclusively focus on either the roots of secularism or those of Islamism in Turkey. Thus, they analyze either the development of secularism as social change or the rise of Islamism 2 0 Mardin cites the work of Ay§e Saktanber as an exception: Ay§e Saktanber, “Islamic Revitalization in Turkey: An Urban Model of a ‘Counter Society’” (Ph. D. diss., Middle East Technical University, 1995). See also her earlier published article, “Becoming the ‘Other’ as a Muslim in Turkey: Turkish Women vs. Islamist Women.” New Perspectives on Turkey, 11 (Fall 1994): 99-134. Recently, some academic works on the everyday life in Turkey appeared. See for example, Deniz Kandiyoti and Ay$e Saktanber (eds.), Fragments o f Culture: The Everyday o f M odem Turkey (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002). This edited volume includes several interesting articles, each examining different aspects of everyday life in Turkey. 2 1 Mardin’s article became available to me in September 1997, as it appeared in an edited book cited above. However, a close friend of mine who had read my Ph. D. proposal of April 1995 and who also happened to attend the conference held at Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1994 where §erif Mardin presented this article informed me, later in Summer 1995, that my dissertation would very well fit with what Mardin suggested in the conference. 14 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. as continuity.2 2 Although a huge literature on the consequences of secularist developments exists, there are only a few serious academic studies dwelling on ramifications of Kemalist secularist policies. Most books, articles and pamphlets on the topic carry “Islamist” tones, heavily criticizing, sometimes bashing Kemalist secularism for being an ideological taboo.2 3 The writings of M. Hakan Yavuz are among the few academic studies. Yavuz points out that Kemalism, including Kemalist secularism turned into a religious dogma of its own, making its principles 24 almost impossible to discuss in the Turkish public domam. With a strong 2 2 I must here say that this literature review covers mostly writings of scholars with international reputation. As Metin Heper rightly pointed out, those scholars outside the “internationalized set” presents a scholarship “did not unfold according to its own internal dynamics.” Metin Heper, “Political Studies in Turkey,” Turkish Studies 1 (Autumn 2000): 125. Heper borrows the term “internationalizes set” from Ay§e Oncii, “Academics: The West in the Discourse of University Reform,” in Metin Heper, Ay§e Oncii and Heinz Kramer (eds.) Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identites (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 171. 2 3 For examples of such literature, see Ali Bulac, Nuh ’ un Gemisine Binmek [Getting on board to the Noah’s Arc], 2t h ed. (Istanbul: Beyan Yaymlari, 1992); idem, Islam ve Demokrasi: Teokrasi - Totaliterizm [Islam and Democracy: Theocracy - Totalitarianism] (Istanbul: Beyan Yayinlan, 1993); idem, Islam Diinyasinda Diiyiince Sorunlari [Some Philosophical Matters in the World of Islam] 4t h ed. (Istanbul: Beyan Yayinlan, 1993); idem, Bir Aydin Sapmasi: Sag ve Sol Akimlar [An Intellectual Deviation: Leftist and Rightist Movements], 3r d ed. (Istanbul: Beyan Yaymlan, 1993); idem, Insamn Ozgurluk Arayqi [Human Beings Quest for Freedom] (Istanbul: Beyan Yaymlan, 1993); idem, Modernizm, irtica ve Sivillepne. [Modernity, Reactionism and Demilitarization] (Istanbul: iz Yaymcilik, 1995); Abdurrahman Dilipak, Cumhuriyete Giden Yol [Road to the Republic], 7th ed. (Istanbul: Beyan Yaymlan, 1989?); idem, Ihtilaller Donemi [Era of the Coups d’Etat], 3r d ed. (Istanbul: Beyan Yaymlan, 1991); idem, Yagmalanan Ulke [Plundered Country], 7th ed. (Istanbul: Beyan Yaymlan, 1992); Mehmet D. Dogan, Batilila.pna Ihaneti [Treason o f Westernization], 2n d ed. (Ankara: Rehber Yaymcilik, 1976); Rasim Ozdenoren, Yumurtayi Hangi Ucundan Kirmali. [Which Side Should We Break the Egg], 2n d ed. (istanbul: iz Yaymcilik, 1990); idem, Muslumanca Yaqamak [Living as a Muslim], 4t h ed. (istanbul: iz Yaymcilik. 1994); idem, Kafa Kan^tiran Kelimeler [Thought Provoking Words], 4th ed. (istanbul: iz Yaymcilik, 1994). Since they are not academic studies, I do not review them in detail here. Depending upon the context, Chapter 3,5 and 6 give many citations from such works. A reader must note that there are also other Islamist literature in the form of short articles and pamphlets that derogatorily bashing Kemalist secularism, which I do not include here. 2 4 M. Hakan Yavuz was not the first scholar who made this point. For example, Ernest Gellner elegantly demonstrated the similarities between Kemalism and religious dogma, including Islam. See Ernest Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1994; reprint, 1995), 81-91, especially 83-85, (page references are to reprint edition). 15 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. commitment to secularist modernization and its intolerance to the representations of the different identities in the public sphere, Kemalism, for Yavuz, lies at the core of » * • the contemporary social crises in Turkey. While severely criticizing Kemalism and Kemalist secularism, Yavuz, however, fails to explain how Kemalism, particularly its secularist stance, became a social rigidity, preventing its public discussions. Although new academic works appeared, there is still a need for new studies on contemporary Turkish secularism.2 6 Since the Islamist victory in the municipal elections of 1994 and the general elections of 1995, many books, academic as well as journalistic, have appeared on Islam(ism) in Turkey.2 7 These books generally focus on the same “factual” developments, but are marred by weak theoretical frameworks with the exception of a few academic books that mainly examine the emergence of Turkish Islamism within the context of cultural and identity politics 2 8 In explaining the success of Islamist mobilization in istanbul, Jenny White, for example, points to the importance 2 5 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkey’s Fault Lines and the Crises of Kemalism,” Current History, 99 (January 2000), 34. 2 6 Some new and old books on Turkish secularism have recently (re)appeared, such as Andrew Davison’s Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), which focuses more on early formative Republican years; and a reprint of Niyazi Berkes’ seminal work of 1964, The. Development o f Secularism in Turkey (New York: Routledge, 1998). As reviewed above, it ends with a short chapter on Kemalist secularism. 2 7 For instance, see David Shankland’s Islam and Society in Turkey (London: The Eothen Press, 1999). For journalistic works, see Marvine Howe’s Turkey Today: A Nation Divided over Islam ’ s ’ Revival (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), and Stephen Kinzer’s Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds (New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 2001). 2 8 For example, see Deniz Kandiyoti and Ay§e Saktenber (Eds.), Fragments o f Culture: The Everyday o f Modem Turkey (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002) as one of the few exceptions. Many articles in this volume go beyond repeating “factual” developments. However, being an edited book, it also lacks a common coherent theoretical framework. 16 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of local networks on everyday life.2 9 She rightly points out the importance o f “process(es)” in elucidating the rise of Islamism in Turkey. White investigates Islamist movement by focusing on “a value-centered political process rooted in local culture, interpersonal relations, and community networks, yet connected through civic organizations to national party politics” which she calls “vernacular politics.”3 0 However, she falls short in offering a mechanism that can explain why secularists failed in mobilizing the masses while the Islamists succeeded. As Banu N. Uygun also notes, White takes the local cultural values as granted, ready to be exploited by T1 any political agenda. Then, viewing the outcome of the Islamist movement as a success she looks at the process ex post. This, of course, makes her approach functionalist, suitably matching up the details of the Islamist success into her framework, leaving the secularist failure unexplained. In order to avoid the traps of functionalism, one has to focus on processes that will shape the outcomes in the future without knowing the outcome ex ante. In other words, we can lay out what process or mechanism will determine the future outcome. 2 9 Jenny White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), see esp. Chapter 2. 3 0 Jenny White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey, 27. 3 1 Banu N. Uygun, review of Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacidar Politics, by Jenny B. White, in H-Turk, H-Net Reviews, April, 2003 .URL: http://www2.h- net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=l 83201053364833. 3 2 As Hirschman points out, Amartya Sen made a considerable contribution to this sort of inquires in social sciences. In the Darwin Lecture of 1992, Sen showed how the idea of natural selection helps us understand the social evolution by “concentrat[ing] on adapting the species rather than adjusting the environment in which the species lead their life.” As quoted in Albert O. Hirschman, “The Rhetoric o f Reaction— Two Years Later,” in idem, A Propensity to Self-Subversion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 48. See The London Review o f Books, 14:21 (November 1992). Hirschman’s essay was originally published in Government and Opposition, 28 (Summer 1993): 292- 314. 17 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Overall, there is only one single academic study that simultaneously focuses on the consequences of the development of Turkish secularism and the rise of Islamism.3 3 In her book Faces o f the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey, Yael Navora-Yashin attempted to provide a comprehensive account o f the (re)production of “the political,” especially regarding the secularism debate in Istanbul’s public life of the 1990s from a radical constructivist perspective.3 4 Navora-Yashin’s book reveals many “expressions” of micro power entanglements of state/society, but it fails to unmask many “intrigues” of public life in Turkey, especially tailored misrepresentations by many, be they of Islamist or secularist coloring. Without any historical discourse analysis, Navora-Y ashin ’ s book lacks providing social mechanisms through which the current definitions of Islamism and secularism sustain themselves in the public sphere, and hence it mostly analyzes snapshots of public life in the mid-1990s. For example, Navaro-Yashin shows how Istanbulites have striven to cope with the changing power milieu while facing enormous pressures from either the secularist state or Islamist groups. Navaro- Yashin’s work is very informative, especially on why the secularist/Islamist lifestyles turned into an intractable predicament for the residents of istanbul. Unfortunately, it does not say much about how istanbulites cope with demands of Islamist/secularist public settings. Similarly, in examining the cult of Atatiirk that is 3 3 There are some other books that attempt to cover both Islam and secularism in the Middle East but they do not focus on Turkey per se. See, for example, John L. Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (eds.), Islam and Secularism in the Middle East (New York: New York University Press, 2000). 3 4 Yael Navaro-Yashin, Faces o f the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), 13. 18 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. probably the most important tool for (re)producing Kemalist secularism by assuring that critiquing Atatiirk’s persona remains a taboo, Navaro-Yashin rightly points out that Atatilrk fetishism permeates many levels of society, although she gives no i f explanation as to how it emerged and sustained itself m the public life. Both Navora-Yashin and White focuses on istanbul, instead of Turkey, which limits the scope of their studies. In short, until the mid-1990s, most academics presumed that Turkey has been an already secularized country where Islamism would pose no threat to the secular regime. While their presuppositions kept the literature on the subject undeveloped this resulted in a huge gap in the discipline. After the Islamists came to power, the topic became hot in academia and only recently some academic studies appeared. Moreover, the topic itself touches too many taboos, which makes the study of Islamism and secularism too risky for anyone, especially for native scholars in Muslim countries who aspire to a peaceful academic life. Fazlur Rahman is only one, though well-known, example of academics that had to flee from his native country.3 6 This is also the case in Turkey.3 7 Especially after 1961, Turkish academia 3 5 For further review of Navaro-Yashin’s book, see my book review. Tolga Koker, review of Faces o f the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey, by Yael Navaro-Yashin, in N ew Perspectives on Turkey 27 (Fall 2003): 159-164. 3 6 For more on Fazlur Rahman’s ordeal, see Ebrahim Moose’s introduction to Fazlur Rahman’s posthumously published book. Fazlur Rahman, Revival and Reform in Islam: A Study o f Islamic Fundamentalism, ed. Ebrahim Moose (Oxford, UK: Oneworld Publications, 2000), 2-3. 3 7 Turkey has long a history of restricting academic freedom. Because their works touched upon social taboos and contradicted the political milieu of the time many academics in Turkey faced several punishments, including refusals to promotion, suspension, even getting fired. For specific cases and more on the academic freedom in Turkey especially in the 1960s, see Walter F. Weiker, “Academic Freedom and Problems of Higher Education in Turkey,” Middle East Journal 16 (Summer 1962): 280-284. Chapter 3, 4, and 6 also includes many such examples. 19 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. had experienced severe ideological fragmentation. Three main group emerged Kemalists, leftists and rightist into closed communities with almost no dialogue among them. “There was strong communal pressure on members of each group not to deviate.”3 8 In this ideologically divided environment, mainly dominated by the leftist scholars, for decades, most Turkish social scientists have dealt with the question of “ideal models” at the expense of how Turkish society functions at the daily level with its own social, economic and cultural dynamics. All these have also contributed to the deficit. There is an urgent need to fill this intellectual gap. An Approach to the Study of Islamism and Secularism in Turkey Compte, Durkheim, Freud, and many other scholars4 0 take it granted that there is an “internal” conflict between religion and emerging Western modernity and religion would disappear as the society has progressed. John Rawls, for example, thinks that liberal western democracy was bom against religion, namely Christianity.4 1 He considers not only Christian fundamentalism but also Christianity itself as the underlying problem for the emergence of liberal modem West. For him, far from being regrettable, the gradual disappearance of certain religious beliefs 3 8 Metin Heper, “Political Science in Turkey,” 129. We will see in a moment how social pressures play a crucial role in determining social outcomes. 3 9 Metin Heper, “Political Science in Turkey,” 129-130. 4 0 The list extends to David Hume, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Max Weber, Theodor Adomo, Max Horkheimer (until his old age), Jurgen Habermas and so on with the possible exceptions of Alexis de Tocqueville, Vilfredo Pareto, and others. 4 1 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993): xxii-xxvi. 20 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. cleared the way for modem liberalism.4 2 Embedded in Rawls’s works is the assumption that there is a conflict between traditional religious beliefs and modem citizenship 4 3 Regarding Islam, Rawls carries the same assumption: there exists an underlying clash between secular institutions of liberal Western modernism and those of Islamic society.4 4 As shown in previous pages, the very same assumption is also embedded in several works of other scholars.4 5 Most academic works on Islam and Turkish secularism, though each has its own qualms about the subject, also have begun from this common assumption. The locus primia assumption taken from Weber is that two contending types of society exist; traditional and modem. Subsequently, most considered that the new religious movements, including Islamism, which they associated with traditional society, were reactions to modernity. In examining religious movements, most researchers looked at religion from a perspective of secular modernity, while some looked at secular modernity from a religious perspective. Such polarization (i.e., religion on the one hand, modernity advocating secularism on the other) is nothing new. Secular modernity first 4 2 Timothy Samuel Shah, “Making the Christian World Safe For Liberalism: From Grotius to Rawls” in David Marquand and Ronald L. Netter (eds.) Religion and Democracy (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2000): 133. 4 3 Timothy Samuel Shah, “Making the Christian World Safe For Liberalism,” 133-134. 4 4 See his discussion of an idealized Islamic state he named “Kazanistan” through which Rawls discusses how such institutions can be made compatible in a “decent” way. John Rawls, The Law o f the People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999): 75-78. 4 5 See especially Chapter 2 and 3. 21 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. confronted Christianity and then other religions, including Islam.4 6 The thinking processes in social sciences also usually reflect such polarizations. Consequently, academicians examining these polarizations tend to examine them comparatively and their comparative studies methodologically tilt towards one side. I contend that there is a third avenue which opens up several new perspectives through which we can assess secular modernity and religion in general, Islamism and secularism in particular at a distance. Ernest Gellner’s simple taxonomy captures the essence of my perspective underlying the writing of this dissertation. Gellner succinctly points out that today there exist three roughly equidistant positions that cannot be reducible to each other. These are religious fundamentalism, Enlightenment rationalism and relativism.4 7 The first two positions, religious fundamentalism including Islamism and Enlightenment rationalism (which I call Western modernism), including secularism uphold the idea of a unique truth. However, the proponents of each position claim that the unique truth is the one advocated by their own position. Islamists, for example, presuppose that Islam per se owns the unique truth; and secular modernists endorse that there is a unique truth (though different than the one Islamists maintain), though they deny that any particular group or thought can ever possess it indefinitely. Islamist conception of unique truth originates from the faith in revelations of the Qur’an 4 6 On Max Weber’s views how Islam contradicts with modernity and the critiques of Weber’s approach see Wolfgang Schluchter, “Hindrances to Modernity: Max Weber on Islam” in Toby E. Huff and Wolfgang Schluchter (eds.), Max Weber and Islam (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999): 53-138. 4 7 See Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (London: Routledge, 1992), 1-2. 22 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. while that of secularism stems from the faith in reason. The third position i.e., relativism, currently exemplified by post-modernist movement, abandons the notion of unique truth and treats truth(s) as relative to the worldviewer in question. This study takes two of these positions as its core subject matter and assesses them from the viewpoints of the other. Particularly, it examines the discourses of the first two positions in the context of a specific country from a relativist viewpoint. It focuses on the political economy of Islamism and secularism in Turkey. It investigates both the rise of Turkish secularism and of Turkish Islamism within a single framework in which the contending “truths” of Islamists and secularists are treated as relative to each other. More specifically I observe that a clash exists between prevailing interpretations of Islamism and secularism. Some studies assume that they can be compatible. I do not say otherwise. Yet, the ideal worldviews of Islamism and secularist modernity, as advocated by activist Islamists and secularists, of the 1990s and the early 2000s portray two contending lifestyles. Hence, my argumentation in this study is based on the perspective of the actors under analysis.4 8 I examine the definition of the worldview given by the agents embodied in that particular worldview. In other words, I focus on their self-image and their perception about the 4 8 The dissertation takes the discourses of Islamism and secularism as social constructs whose current definitions by and large are contending to each other. Positioning the author as a third party observer in relatively examining the topic from a distance is one of ways of conducting research in social science. For more information, see, for example, Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations o f Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 23 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. other worldview. Most members see the worldviews as contentious. The conflictual position of the worldviews will be clearer in due course.4 9 Those who claim that Islam and secular modernity can be compatible are very critical of studying social change and continuity on the basis of dichotomies. One of their concerns, which I share, is that the dichotomy drawn between tradition and modernity in general, Islamism and secularism in particular, might give rise to culturally biased studies. In such studies, social change, or “progress,” is defined as a movement from one end of the spectrum (i.e., tradition/religious life) to the other (i.e., modemity/secular modernity) often explicitly assuming the superiority of modernity and often implicitly the superiority of secularism.5 0 To avoid the trap of cultural bias, this dissertation neither explicitly nor implicitly assumes the superiority of secular modernity over Islam or vice versa. To this effect, in this thesis, I examine Islamist and secularist worldviews from a relativist perspective by 4 9 As explained later in detail, I consider both secularism and Islamism as social constructs, implying that I do not take them as unchangeable entities. I shall later theorize on the unintended consequences of their current antagonism often unknown to social agents and unwilled by them. Their worldviews will remain antagonistic as long as the current definitions of concepts and their self-image remained unchanged. The only way to eliminate their conflicting positions towards each other is to re-interpret, and hence, re-define the basic concepts on which both worldviews rely. I investigate such a possibility in the concluding chapter. 5 0 Such studies define social change as a desired good, as the progressive elimination of the traditional or Islamic worldview eventually leads to development. The works of modernization theorists, popular in academia especially from the early 1950s until the mid 1970s, are good examples of this sort. One of the best known works in this regard is The Passing o f Traditional Society (1958) written by a prominent modernization theorist, Daniel Lemer. One case study investigated in the book is Turkey. After identifying the dichotomy in the Middle Eastern countries, Lemer wrote, “The top policy problem, for three generations of Middle Eastern leaders, has been whether one must choose between ‘Mecca or mechanization’ ....” He does not rule out the possibility of “whether one can make them compatible.” For him, however, “[t]he crux of the matter has been, not whether, but how one should move from traditional ways towards modem lifestyle.” See Daniel Lemer, The Passing o f Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (London: The Free Press of Glencoe Collier-MacMillen Limited, 1958). The quotations are from page 405, italics in original. 24 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. avoiding a treatment of Islamism through either a secular modernist and/or a religious lens or a treatment of secular modernity through an Islamist and/or modernist lens. In using lenses that do not belong to either of the worldviews, this study avoids imposing one’s judgments on the other. It applies the same criterion to both the rise of Turkish secularism and Islamism. Hence, the dissertation’s approach avoids being judgmental, culturally biased and dogmatic. The dissertation considers both Islamism and secularism as promoting distinctive worldviews at odds with each other and desiring to suppress one another. We cannot understand their ongoing struggle unless we focus on the mechanisms through which each worldview is constantly vies for power, creating winners and losers, and shaping the evolution of human knowledge. I dwell upon one mechanism, which explains how the specific discourses of Islamism and secularism in Turkey evolve within a unified framework. Methodology of the Thesis The dual preference model introduced by Timur Kuran in his book, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences o f Preference Falsification5 1 provides an excellent framework to study Islamism and secularism in Turkey.5 2 The crux of 5 1 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences o f Preference Falsification (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). 5 2 For the applications of the dual preference model to several different contexts, see Timur Kuran, “The East European Revolution of 1989: Is it surprising that we were surprised?" American Economic Review, 81 (May 1991): 121-125; idem, "Now out of never: The element of surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," World Politics, 44 (October 1991): 7-48; idem, "Seeds of Racial Explosion," Society, 30 (September/October 1993): 55-67; idem, "Ethnic Dissimilation and its International Diffusion," in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds.), The International Spread o f 25 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 53 the argument is based on the concept of preference falsification. More specifically, Kuran begins by introducing a distinction between private and public preferences. Each o f us has a genuine preference over available political options, that is, what we call a private preference. For example, a person in private may genuinely prefer Islamism to secularism. Public preferences, by contrast, are the preferences conveyed to others. If the same person goes to work in a public office wearing a pin signaling secularism, then he makes others believe that he is one of them to avoid social pressures. In choosing a preference that differs from the underlying private preference, one engages in preference falsification. Thus, preference falsification is the act o f misrepresenting genuine preferences in response to perceived social pressures.5 4 Originating from that point, this dissertation’s basic thesis is that preference falsification played a major role in both the rise of Turkish secularism and Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998): 35-60; idem, "Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades Journal o f Legal Studies, 27 (Summer 1998, pt. 2): 623-659. Kuran’s book also includes another case study on the cast system in India. See Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, Chapter 8 and 12. 5 3 Kuran has written extensively on the concept of preference falsification. See, for example, Timur Kuran, "Chameleon Voters and Public Choice," Public Choice, 53 (1987): 53-78; idem, "Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Collective Conservatism," Economic Journal, 97 (September 1987): 642-665; idem, "The Tenacious Past: Theories of personal and Collective Conservatism," Journal o f Economic Behavior and Organization, 10 (September 1988): 143-171; idem, "Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution," Public Choice, 61 (April 1989): 41-74; idem, "The Role of Deception in Political Competition," in A. Breton, G. Galeotti, P. Salmon, and R. Wintrobe (eds.), The Competitive State (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1990): 71-95; idem, "Private and Public Preferences," Economics and Philosophy, 6 (April 1990): 1-26; idem, "Mitigating the Tyranny of Public Opinion: Anonymous Discourse and the Ethic of Sincerity," Constitutional Political Economy, 3 (Winter 1993): 41-74; idem, "The Unthinkable and the Unthought," Rationality and Society, 5 (October 1993): 473-505; idem, "The Inevitability of Future Revolutionary Surprises," American Journal o f Sociology, 100 (May 1995): 1528-1551; idem, "Insincere Deliberation and Democratic Failure," Critical Review, 12 (Fall 1998): 529-544. Since Kuran’s book concisely presents the concept of preference falsification, I will more often refer to it in the remaining pages. 5 4 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 3-5, 17. 26 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of Islamism in Turkey, leading to the polarization of Turkish society, secularists on the one hand, Islamists on the other. Preference falsification in response to social pressures prevents one from deriving satisfaction out of the substantive outcome. Islamists claim that in contemporary Turkey Muslims have a difficult time practicing their religion. Female employees in the public sector wishing to veil are not allowed to do so. Veiling is forbidden in schools, other than religious ones. However, the act of preference falsification provides reputational benefits, in the form of rewards from other members of society. For example, some Turkish women who unwillingly decide to veil enjoy the approval of the Islamist community. The veil also protects them from harassment. Meanwhile, to the extent that one displays self-assertiveness, she enjoys or sacrifices her expressive needs. The unwillingly veiled women relinquish their rights to dress as they desire. Likewise, the compulsorily non-veiled students relinquish their rights to practice that aspect of their religion. A few words are in order to clarify how the concept of preference falsification applies to the study of Islamism and secularism in Turkey. Preference falsification refers neither to a simple lie in a conversation nor a simple unsubstantiated support for a certain lifestyle. It is “living a lie” in the sense that one misrepresents her preference as she continually participates in activities such as conversing, smiling with a nod of approval, wearing certain symbols in an attempt to 27 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. endorse certain views, thereby publicly consenting to a certain position.5 5 Thus, preference falsification simultaneously covers both one’s speech and action and it “aims specifically at manipulating the perceptions others hold about one’s motivations or dispositions,”5 6 as one unwillingly (un)veils herself and/or declares that she is secularist or Islamist to make the others think that she shares their view. Preference falsification thus depicts a framework in which an individual has multiple sources of happiness: economic, social, and psychological. Based on the divided-self construct, the lost benefits from the outcome highlight homo economicus, “a self-controlled, calculating utility machine;” the reputational concerns characterize homo sociologus, “the product of social stimuli ruled by social demand;” and the expressive needs identify homo psychologies, “an impulsive and tormented soul, struggling, seldom successfully to escape from his conscience.”5 7 The divided-selves act on the basis of the understandings that support their preferences (i.e., their private knowledge whether secularly inclined or Islamist oriented). As they are conveyed to others, they become public knowledge that forms discourses. Conveying knowledge at odds with a private preference is to engage in knowledge falsification, which eventually helps to shape public discourse. The distributions of private and public preferences accordingly form private and public opinion. By definition, private opinion is hidden from view. That is why the results 5 5 For further clarification on how the concept of preference falsification differs from a simple lie (speech) or a preference manipulation (action) see Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 4-5. 5 6 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 4. 5 7 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 43. 28 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of elections conducted by secret ballot can surprise us. And that is why the growth of unorganized social movements can catch us off guard. Some clear-cut definitions are in order. Islam is the name of the religion that introduces a set of beliefs for its believers whom we call Muslims. Turkey has a predominantly Muslim population. Modernity, a product of the Western world, promotes a lifestyle in which the role of religion is marginalized. Secularism is the doctrine by which modernity advocates the withdrawal of religion from worldly affairs, especially from the public realm. Islamism is the set of guidelines based on a belief that Islam must be the sole guidance for both public and private life. Hence, I consider both secularism and Islamism as “social constructs,” each advocating a particular worldview representing a distinct ideal social project. Most secularist and Islamist proponents define their distinct social projects as quite contradictory. The two terms, Secularism and Islamism, need more clarification at this point. I use the term Islamism intentionally rather than terms such as Islamic fundamentalism or political Islam. Fundamentalism, though it is widely used in media, originates from a Protestant movement claiming that the Bible should be understood literally. Thus, it has nothing to do with Islam. Political Islam is too a narrow term that excludes other areas of life such as economic and social realms, which Islamism aims to encompass. Islamism fits well with the framework o f this thesis, frequently referring to all the realms of life. I must also note that Islamism covers all the viewpoints of Islamists, some of which express willingness to 29 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. compromise with the secularist social project. Thus, there is a diversity of social, political, and economic programs. A range of viewpoints exists among Islamists as to whether the modem/secular, the culturally Western in particular, may be allowed to continue to exist and, if so, what boundaries it should have. No total convergence among Islamists reigns, any more than does one among modernists/secularists. Of course, not all secularists are modernist. For example, some secularists lived and wrote in ancient and medieval times as well as in modem and contemporary societies. And some proponents of modernity are not secularists. Some religious leaders, for instance, such as Calvin and Luther in the Protestant Reformation, expressly characterized their religious beliefs and practices as “modem,” a view shared by such scholars as Max Weber and Richard Tawney. In contemporary Turkey, however, Islamists typically support the domination of an Islamic way of life over public and private realms whereas advocates of secular modernity, notably the Kemalists since the 1920s, have advocated secularism as one (among other) means of fostering modernization. This will be clearer in due course.5 8 The proponents of secularism and Islamism attempt to dominate the public sphere by winning a large number of supporters so as to create a majority in favor of their worldview. In support for their worldview, by definition, activists are the ones who deliberately attempt to recruit others to their camp by exerting social pressures 5 8 For more on secularism and Islamism, see Chapter 2, 3, and 6. 30 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in the form of penalties and/or rewards. The rest are considered non-activist. If a retired colonel reads a secularist daily Cumhuriyet in a local cafe and while talking to his friends he openly supports Kemalist secularism, he is a secularist non-activist. When he joins a secularist organization to impose his beliefs on others, in particular, on Islamist sympathizers, then he becomes a secularist activist. Activists work towards greater visibility for their particular lifestyles and worldviews to promote their cause among the non-activists. Just as a staunchly secular retired colonel who favors complete domination of secularism in the public realm may remain a non-activist, a devout Muslim grandmother who wishes that all females should be veiled in public may refrain from imposing her will on her unveiled neighbors. On the other hand, if Islamist university student who believes that Islam orders all women, including his classmates to veil join the protest against the ban on veiling in the universities to actively promote the freedom to veil in the public realm he is an Islamist activist. His act of protest is an attempt to influence the public opinion, in particular of those non-activists feeling threatened by the presence of veiled students, and tacitly consenting to the veil ban in schools. Thus, Islamist activists push non-activists for an Islamization of both public and private lives. By contrast, secularists advocate secularization of the public realm to lock religion into the private sphere. By definition, activists’ public and private preferences do not differ from each other and they are least likely to be susceptible to the act of preference falsification. By contrast, a non-activist may engage in the act of preference 31 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. falsification in response to pressures from either Islamists or secularists. A non activist Islamist may proclaim support for the secularist worldview, political orientation and lifestyle in public while remaining an Islamist at heart. For example, she may be pressured to unveil in order to find a job in a state institution. Similarly, a non-activist secularist shopkeeper may refrain from having lunch during Ramadan at his shop in an Islamist neighborhood for fear of losing clients. Thus, if a secularist non-activist like the shopkeeper reveals an Islamist preference in response to Islamist pressures, he engages in pro-Islamist preference falsification. When a devout Muslim non-activist behaves as if she is secularist in response to secularist pressures she engages in pro-secularist preference falsification. This dissertation is concerned with how preference falsification distorts the public discourse and the social behavior that signal a particular worldview falling in broad terms into secularist or Islamist camps in Turkey. This dissertation contributes to the literature in there ways. First, it accounts for the rise of Turkish secularism since 1924 and the subsequent rise of Turkish Islamism within a single framework. It simultaneously explains both social change and continuity. Secondly, by focusing on the consequences of Kemalist secularism, it fills a gap that exists in the scholarly literature. Finally, in examining both the causes and consequences of the emergence of Islamism, it contributes to the existing body of knowledge on the topic. 32 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Challenges Ahead In order to claim that preference falsification explains both the establishment of Kemalist secularism and the polarization of Turkish society along the Islamist versus secularist spectrum, I first show the motives for preference falsification in the Turkish context. Thus, Chapter 2 tackles the commonness o f both pro-Islamist and pro-secularist preference falsification. It starts with the brief presentation of ideal worldviews, both Islamism and secularism, from the viewpoints of each worldview’s activists. It further illustrates that the prevailing interpretations of Islamism and those of secularism collide with each other, leading to two kinds of preference falsification: pro-secularist and pro-Islamist. Chapter 3 investigates the evaluation of an institutional framework that ascertains the scope and extent of preference falsification in Turkey. Specifically, it focuses on the early Republican period in which today’s institutional structure was shaped through reform laws. It examines the role of preference falsification in the institutionalization of Turkish secularism. This chapter details social change through mechanisms by which social opportunities shape choices, leading to the formation of a new value in Turkey, secularism. Following two chapters that elucidate the intermingling of Turkish Islamism and Kemalist secularism, Chapter 4 outlines the dual preference model and investigates the unintended consequences of preference falsification on both Islamist and secularist discourses. The dual preference model examines the responses of the non-activists to the contending positions of Islamist and secularist pressure groups. 33 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The activists push for the non-activist disguise. Islamists want all members of society to behave as if they were all Islamists, and secularists force them to be secular citizens who reveal no religious preference in public and carry out religion exclusively in their private lives. This creates several problems for each individual, whether she be practicing or non-practicing Muslim, secular citizen or atheist. Chapter 4 focuses on the three possible choices for the individual: exit, sincere voice, and preference falsification. Chapter 5 presents a field study conducted in Turkey with the participation of 300 respondents. It indicates that preference falsification is very common. In two field experiments, a pair of interviewers carried out interviews in sets of three, administering them identically, except for the types of accessories used by the interviewers. In other words, the interviewers asked the same questions under three different conditions. In one interview, the interviewers carried widely known Islamist symbols and dressed as if they were Islamists. The male interviewer had a silver ring with no tie, and the female interviewer was veiled. In the other, prominently displayed secular symbols were used, and both interviewers carried Kemalist pins. Lastly, in the neutral interview, the interviewers had no symbols at all. The results showed that the symbols of Islamism and secularism produced overwhelming shifts in the participants’ expressed opinions, leading to the polarization of Turkish society as well as the prevalence of past inherited dichotomy between Islamism and secularism. 34 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Chapter 6 concludes this study. It focuses on unintended consequences of pro-Islamist and pro-secularist preference falsification and portrays the current discourse about Islamism and secularism in Turkey: There exists a swinging pendulum — secularists at the one extreme, Islamists on the other, and a large number of people wavering in-between. This implies that the people o f Turkey are at a crossroads defining the future role of both Islamism and secularism in their lives. There are four possible outcomes. First, the status quo may persist with widespread preference falsification. The second is the possibility of complete secularization. Another army takeover may attempt complete secularization by trying to disestablish Islamism. The third is the possibility of complete Islamization. The Islamists party in power may attempt to entirely Islamize Turkey. The fourth is the possibility of peaceful co-existence through first recognizing each other’s rights to exist, and later, compromising on values by redefining Turkish secularism and Turkish Islamism. The last chapter thus specifically discusses how exit, sincere voice, and preference falsification will influence the future of Turkish secularism and Islamism. For the rest of the dissertation the reader should obey Dante’s words: “Fz'en retro a me, e lascia dir le genti (Follow me, let the people talk).” 35 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 2 ISLAMISM AND SECULARISM No believing men and women have any choice in a matter after God and His Apostle have decided it. Al Qur’ an+ God is dead. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche A wedding is supposed to be the happiest day—at least one o f the happiest days— for a couple. It is supposed to signify a new beginning for both bride and groom. In many Turkish circles, however, this is not the usual case. Most Middle Eastern cultures, especially Turkish ones, are collectivist in nature. What this says about weddings is that marriages are not only between two persons but also between two extended families. Moreover, it also implies that almost all relatives of both bride and groom have their own strong opinions on how a wedding is supposed to be, and they are very eager to meddle with the wedding form. I have often observed the tension couples experience during their weddings, especially if either groom or bride or both have had relatives with opposing views of Islamism and secularism. + Al Qur’an (33:36) See Al-Qur’ an: A Contemporary Translation by Ahmed Ali (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 358. 36 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I was once invited to a Turkish wedding that provided a salient example of the uneasy coexistence of Islamism and secular modernity. The groom came from a very religious family, the bride from a secularly oriented one. The bride’s relatives wanted a ceremony that included alcoholic beverages. Men and women would dance together while an orchestra played Western tunes. If the mayor of the town could participate in the wedding and perform a formal secular marriage ceremony, it would be even better. In short, the bride’s side wanted a ceremony free of Islamic overtones. The groom’s side, by contrast, wanted a ceremony that strictly observed all the Islamic rituals throughout: a ceremony with no alcoholic beverage, no dancing, and no mixing of men and women. The formal secular marriage contract enforced by state was just paperwork that could be carried out informally at the office. The groom’s family had in mind a religious ceremony with veiled women, religious songs chanted, and the Qur’anic verses cited. They insisted on a ceremony in which men and women gathered in separate rooms to enjoy the wedding feast. In the end, the couple’s marriage would be consummated by a cleric. The marriage would be a “clerical marriage (imam nikahi).” Such opposing visions of the wedding created tension between the families negatively affecting the bride and groom. Informal negotiations about the form of the wedding failed. In the end, an interim solution was found: two ceremonies, one “religious” and one “modem.” Invitations went out for both. Most secular guests did not go the religious ceremony, but the close relatives of the secular bride’s family had to participate in the Islamic wedding. Some female relatives of the bride veiled 37 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. themselves only for the ceremony. The mother of the bride got upset when the men of the groom’s side did not shake her hand. The groom’s family frowned at her when she frequently entered the male room. She did not like seeing her daughter veiled. Likewise, most of the pious Muslim guests refused to attend the modem wedding. The close relatives of the groom came only to the second ceremony. Their women were veiled. No relative of the groom danced. Sitting at one comer of the hall, they just speculated over whether their son could convince his wife to veil herself in the future. A month later, scanning the photo album with the newly wedded couple, I realized that they almost had no picture in which they seemed to be having “the happiest day of their life.” I spoke of this experience to my close friends. Each said that s/he also had had similar experiences. One related how her brother and his wife refused to have an imam nikahi. However, the bride’s family forced them to accept the Islamic delegation to the bride’s brother and one of her male cousins so that the iman could perform a religious nikah in absentia. Another friend spoke of twofold weddings in which the groom excluded his religious relatives from the secular ceremony while the bride did not invite her secular relatives to the religious one in order to avoid any tension between the families. However, once the relatives realized that there were two separate invitation lists, one for secular relatives and one for religious ones, they all were offended. This friend of mine, a medical doctor said that it is very common for couples to take sedatives before the wedding ceremonies to cope with such stressful ramifications. 38 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Weddings reflect only a slice of everyday life in Turkey many couples experience when they are squeezed between the worlds of Islam and secular modernity. Turkish literature is full of novels, short stories and poems, each exemplifying the entrapped position of their protagonists. Peyami Safa’s Fatih- Harbiye, for example, tells the story of Neriman, a young woman between the world of the Muslim East and of the West, during the early Republican years in Turkey. Fatih and Harbiye, two Istanbul neighborhoods, symbolize the existence of the two worlds: Fatih is a district full of devout Muslims. Harbiye is one with a Western secular lifestyle. Living in Fatih and attending school in Harbiye, Neriman is caught at great pains between Islam and secular modernity.1 The uneasy coexistence of Islam(ism) and western modernity in Turkey forces people to become chameleons between the two worldviews. It forces them to be homo Islamicus at times and homo modernicus at others. This is not to say that they have only one Islamist worldview within which homo modernicus flourishes at times, nor that the worldview is a secular modem one within which homo Islamicus breathes. They have to cope with two contending worldviews, each leading them to a different preference. In some cases, homo Islamicus appears in public and in others, homo modernicus takes the stage. Thus, the traditional Islamic/Islamist worldview directs homo Islamicus, just as the modem/secular worldview guides homo modernicus. 1 Peyami Safa, Fatih-Harbiye, 17t h ed. (istanbul: Otuken Ne§riyat, 1999). 39 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. N o pathology is involved in such cases. Turkish people do not reveal any symptoms of multiple personality disorder. They behave as most other people would under the same conditions. Their brains work like computer hardware. Computers process information with the help of software. Likewise people comprehend the world through worldviews that function like software. Two conflicting software programs may stop computers from operating, while the two contending worldviews cannot prevent us from handling our lives. Indeed, we humans are quite successful in managing such cases. In short, we may have two or more conflicting software programs functioning simultaneously. Every time the worldviews collide, we may witness a specific response I shall discuss at the end of this chapter. The rest of the dissertation uncovers the Turkish case in detail. Before delving into the specifics of the Turkish experience, we need to look at the larger picture that portrays Islamist and secularist worldviews. So, to set the context for preference falsification for the following chapters, I shall now present these two worldviews and sketch, in detail, their contending positions as seen by the proponents of each worldview. I portray the ideal types of each worldview in the eyes of Islamists and modernist/secularists. This chapter also provides simplified models of the “ideal social reality” that the activist Islamists and secularists would like to construct. Though the construction of these ideal worldviews is an end itself for the activists, for this study, as Max Weber put it, “The construction of abstract 40 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ideal Types recommends itself not as an end but as a means.”2 It permits us to clearly see the contending positions of the normative Islamist and modem worldviews. Needless to say, I refrain from judging the worldviews normatively. I should note that there is neither a single Islamist worldview nor a modem/secularist one. Many conflicting interpretations of both Islam and modernity exist. There are, for example, differences among Turkish Islam, Pakistani Islam, and Saudi Islam. Modernity has also taken different forms in different countries. One can talk about the differences between Turkish modernity and British modernity. There exists, however, a more or less consistent set of assumptions from which secularist and Islamist worldviews derive their way of looking at life. Thus, I investigate the loosely defined single worldview as presented by its activists be they • 3 secularists or Islamists, keeping in mind subtle differences m each worldview. Contending Worldviews A worldview is a vision for reality. We comprehend reality through lens-like visions. Since worldviews are visions telling us how the world should work, they are imperative to normatively determine our basic attitude towards life. Each worldview introduces a set of its basic concepts derived from its core assumptions. With the help of the conceptual outlook of a worldview that we carry 2 As quoted in Rolf E. Rogers, Max Weber’ s Ideal Type Theory (New York: Philosophical Library Inc., 1969), 88. The idea of ideal types was not unknown to Plato. Dividing the world into two realms;— the realm of forms and the realm of ideas— , he claims that we are living in the former and try to approximate the latter, the ideal world. See Plato, Republic trans. F. M. Comford (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1945) and Gerald Runkle, A History o f Western Political Theory (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1968), 3-18. 3 This will become clearer as I later explore their reflections in real life, particularly in Turkey. 41 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in our heads, we approach the details of daily life. Every time we are faced with a situation that demands a decision we first recall the related concept from our worldview and then apply it to clarify our attitude. If unable to find an applicable concept, we return to the assumptions of our worldview to formulate a new one.4 Therefore, a priori assumptions have utmost importance in composing a worldview via concepts, which, in return, determine the way we handle our daily lives. We may have more than one worldview to apply to different realms, but the worldviews we have in our minds are not necessarily compatible. They would avoid direct conflict to the extent that their core assumptions are not contradicting. To the degree that their assumptions are contradictory, they have conflicting concepts that can bring tension to decision making. To the extent the worldviews have conflicting concepts and are clearly mutually exclusive, the activists for each worldview often attempt to suppress the other. Here I would like to emphasize once more that I investigate the worldview’s definition through the agents embodied in that particular worldview. In other words, I also focus on their self-image and their perception about the other worldview. Most activists see the worldviews as contending. Islamists consider secularism detrimental to their Islamic worldview. By the same token, secularists see Islamism as a barrier to the ideal modem world. Their worldviews will remain antagonistic as long as the current definitions of concepts and their self-image remain unchanged. The only way to eliminate the conflicting 4 In practice we do not have to know the initial assumptions. And, we do not usually formulate a new concept immediately, and we just react. However, this does not mean that there is no initial assumption or a new concept developing at hand. We may not just know. A good basketball player does not have to understand the laws of physics in order to able to shoot the ball at a certain speed. 42 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. positions of their worldviews against one another is to reinterpret and, hence, redefine the basic concepts on which both worldviews rely.5 However, as of 2004, it seems that their contending views of each other reign supreme in Turkey. An approach with three levels of abstraction helps us see why the activists consider the worldviews as contradictory. At the highest level, there exists a set of philosophical/behavioral assumptions as the core of each worldview. In the middle, their basic concepts, derived from the assumptions, enter into the scene. Secularism as the subset of the modem worldview and the worldly role of Islam as the subset of the traditional/Islamic worldview constitute our two main sets of concepts here. At the lowest level, I focus on their reflections on daily life. Examining the reflections of worldviews in Turkey, Turkish Islamism, and modernization o f Turkey in particular, elucidates the basic setting for the upcoming chapters. Though very abstract to begin with, this very deductive approach that simplifies these two complex worldviews for the sake of analysis, is quite helpful for understanding positions of Islamists and secularists against each other and comprehending the complexities of Turkey, which, indeed, have a few essentials. Islamic Worldview Islam is, above all, a religion.6 It is, however, a religion in the sense of the Arabic word, din. Though the word din is usually translated into English as 51 comment further on such a possibility in the concluding chapter. 6 Ali Bula?, Qagdaq Kavramlar ve Duzenler [Modem Concepts and Orders], (Istanbul: Beyan Yayinlan, 1993), especially see the section on “Islam as a Religion,” 289-297. He wrote that among several other definitions, “[bjefore everything, Islam, in general sense, is a religion.” 290. 43 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. religion,7 Islam is more than a religion; it is a way of life. Thus, Islam as a din tells Muslims “not only what to believe about God, angels, and the afterlife, but also how to live on earth in such a way as to find favor with God. Within the principles of social justice, communal peace, and individual dignity, Islam lays down rules O governing daily life, commerce, the family and society,” which constitute a worldview. The basic features of the traditional/Islamic worldview were consolidated around the mid-ninth century and certainly by the twelfth.9 After that its main lines remained unchanged and unquestioned until the advent of modernity starting in the seventeenth century. The easiest way to understand this traditional worldview as advocated by many Islamists is to look at its core assumptions, which epitomize its ontological, epistemological and methodological foundations.1 0 Core Assumptions Al Din in the Islamic view has three dimensions, each proceeding from one of the Islam’s core assumptions. Tawhid (unity, tevhid in Turkish) requires islam (submission) as the basis for Islamic ontology. Iman (Faith) is the way of knowing 7 Din literally means in Arabic method, custom, or way while religion in English comes from Latin religare, its literal meaning is “to connect.” Din in Islamic theology, as explained later in detail, refers to the way of God leading to salvation in both this and afterlife through islam (submission), iman (faith) and ihsan (doing what is beautiful). Religio in Latin, hence religion in English, according to St. Augustine, refers to “be loyal to God out of fear and respect.” Niyazi Oktem, “Dinler ve Laiklik,” [Religions and Secularism], Cogito, 1 (Summer 1994): 45. 8 Thomas W. Lippman, Understanding Islam: An Introduction to the Moslem World (New York: New American Library Inc., 1982), 72. 9 W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity (London: Routledge, 1988), 2. 1 0 An approach that stresses assumptions may also help to develop more profound understanding of the different worldviews that will hopefully improve their tolerance towards each other. 44 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in Islamic epistemology. And, Islamic methodology appears in ihsan (doing what is beautiful).1 1 (1) The ontological assumption of Islam is tawhid (unity). Though the meaning and implications of tawhid have undergone several revisions, especially with the recent rise of radical Islamism, tawhid is the idee fixe of Islamic doctrine. It refers to the absolute monotheism of Islam coined in its first pillar, shahadah (witnessing, §ahadet in Turkish). The first part of shahadah reads, “I am bearing witness that there is no god but One God.” In Fazlur Rahman’s words, “Belief in One God stands at the apex of the Muslim system of belief derived from the I “ 7 » Qur’an.” This core assumption has five corollary assumptions: The first is belief in angels, especially the four major ones: Gabriel, the messenger of revelation; Azrael, the messenger of death; Michael, the provider of nourishment for bodies and souls; and Seraphiel, the messenger of the Day o f Judgment. The belief in the Day of Reckoning is the second corollary. The third is the belief in all previous Prophets and the prophecy of Muhammad as the last one. The fourth is the belief in the Books sent by God, and especially the Qur’an. All the previous books of God (e.g., the Torah and the New Testament), Muslims believe, were adulterated; the Qur’an, however, encompasses the words of God recorded without a single alteration. The last one is faith in “measuring out, both its good and its evil.” It is only Allah that measures out limited good and evil inseparable from each other. “Measuring out” 1 1 In referring to the Islamic terminology I always use Arabic originals, along with English and then in Turkish transliterations in parenthesis unless the term is written the same in both Arabic and Turkish. 1 2 Fazlur Rahman, History o f Religion: Islam (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), 36. 45 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. shows how Allah interferes with creation. Allah is the sole source of all good and evil, and there is no unlimited source of good besides Him on earth. In short, tawhid refers to the existence of a sole God and subsequently connotes that human existence, as everything else on earth, depends on His existence for Muslims’ reality.1 3 The reason for their existence requires humans to submit themselves to God, which is the meaning and essence of Islam. Thus, if God is the sole reason of existence and Islam is the final din He revealed to humanity, Muslims believe Islam is all-encompassing, self-sufficient, and hence, universal as well as timeless, God’s way of life. (2) The shahadah lays down the epistemological assumption of Islam that is iman (faith). The full shahadah reads: “I bear witness that there is no god but the One God, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God.” It refers to iman meaning confidence in truth that is really true, not a supposed truth. In an epistemological sense, iman implies that “I know so since I have faith in Allah and His messenger Muhammad.” The Prophet explains iman: “Faith is a knowledge in the heart, a voicing with the tongue and an activity with the limbs.”1 4 Hence, iman embraces knowing, speaking, and doing. 1 3 The verse 59:22-23 in the Qur’an reads as: “He is the God, other than Whom, there is none; He is the knower of the unseen and the seen, the Merciful, the Compassionate. He is the God other than Whom there is none, the Sovereign, the Holy, the One with peace and integrity, the Keeper o f the Faith, the Protector, the Mighty, the one Whose Will is Power, the Most Supreme!” See Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes o f Qur’ an (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980), 5, Rahman’s translation. 1 4 As quoted in Sachiko Murata and William C. Chittick, The Vision o f Islam (New York: Paragon House, 1994), 37. 46 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (3) Islam also shows how to do what is beautiful (ihsan). Thus, ihsan introduces the methodological assumption of Islam. The Qur’an itself and the sunna (siinnet in Turkish) direct Muslims to carry out ihsan through ibada (worship, ibadet in Turkish). Ibada includes more than observing the five pillars of Islam. It also refers to following the sunna, the path of Prophet and the shariah, {§eriat in Turkish) the direct path (of Allah to good life), both o f which specify the way to govern all the activity of humanity in this worldly life. The way Islam follows in determining human activity is based on methodological holism. Methodological holism defines individuals in terms of society and also considers society as a “whole” which is more than its parts. In claiming that society affects the individual’s aim, methodological holism presupposes collectivism. Therefore, it is social organization that determines individual behavior. Methodological holism, assuming the existence of “wholes,” proposes that the “wholes” have also distinct aims and interests o f their own.1 5 Relying on methodological holism, Islam operates on a societal rather than individual level. These constitute the three basic assumptions of the Islamic worldview. From these core assumptions one can derive several key concepts that constitute the three basic dimensions of Islam: faith, submission and doing what is beautiful.1 6 Amana 1 5 On the assumptions of methodological holism see Joseph Agassi, “Methodological Individualism,” in John O’Neil (ed.), Modes of Individualism and Collectivism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), 186. 1 6 For more information on the three dimensions of Islam see Sachiko Murata and William C. Chittick, Islam, especially xxxii-xxxiv. 47 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (trust, emin in Turkish), fitra (the original human nature as created by God), halal (permissible, helal in Turkish), haram (forbidden), jihad (struggle in the path of God, cihad in Turkish), kafir (truth-concealer), qadar (measuring out, kader in Turkish), shariah (corpus of sacred laws) are some examples of the key Islamic concepts. Though the assumptions are immutable, one may re-interpret them and hence, one may also derive new concepts from them. This implies that concepts are not unchangeable. On the contrary, concepts are subject to change through reinterpretation. History shows that reinterpretations often occur. My concern here, however, is with the concepts underpinning Islam’s approach to this world. In other words, I address the theological aspects of Islam only to the extent that they influence the worldliness of Islam. In short, I shall mainly look upon the Islamic way of life. Islamic Way of Life Islam traditionally covered all aspects of public and private life. The Qur’an, the sunna and the shariah, lay down the main guidelines of Islamic lifestyle according to which all pious Muslims are supposed to regulate their lives. The Qur’an, the sacred book of Islam, as it calls itself “guidance for mankind,” is precisely aimed at man and his behavior, not God.1 7 Following from the premise that everything including the entirety of nature and human beings, excluding God Himself, is contingent upon the all-merciful God, not only a proper 1 7 See the verse 2: 185 and numerous elsewhere. I was led to this verse by Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes o f Qur 'an, 1. 48 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. relation between God and the human race but also a proper relationship among humans, should reflect His will. “By a natural necessity, as it were, these normative relationships entail the law of judgment upon man both as individual and in his 1 8 collective or social existence.” Thus, the Qur’an, the very word o f Allah, must indeed direct humans by being the main source of law among them. This implies that all laws regulating human conduct are inherently religious in essence. The first applications of the Qur’an to life took place, o f course, during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad. Therefore, it is quite natural for Muslims to follow the examples Muhammad set for the umma (ummet in Turkish), the Muslim community. For this reason the practice of the Prophet, his model behavior called sunna (i.e., precedent, cumulative tradition), Muslims believe, must also lead to certain good conduct in life. Inevitably, the hadith (hadis in Turkish), the stories of particular occurrences composing the sunna of the Prophet, have guiding importance in the Islamic worldview. The Qur’an and the sunna constitute the base and always binding source of shariah, the corpus of Muslim sacred law, that shows the way to the very sources of life. Specifically, shariah refers to: The Way, ordained by God, wherein man is to conduct his life in order to realize the Divine Will. It is a practical concept having to do with conduct as such. But it includes all behaviour - spiritual, mental, practical and physical. Thus, it comprehends both faith and practice: assent to or belief in one God is a part of the Shari’a just as are the religious duties of prayer and fasting, etc. Further, all legal and social 1 8 Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes o f Qur’ an, 3. 49 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. transactions, as well as all personal behaviour, is subsumed under the Shari’a as the comprehensive principle of the total way o f life}9 As Muslims have faced new situations that need a decision, they turn to the learned of the community. Based on two material sources, the Qur’an and the sunna, the learned men of Islam initiate additional rules to the shariah two ways: The first is ijma (consensus, icma in Turkish) that means ruling through agreement among the learned men. The other is qiyas (analogical reasoning, kvyas in Turkish) (i.e., concluding from the principles of material sources that a new case is similar to this 70 principle or falls under that precedent). Thus, the shariah, formulated out of the Qur’an and the sunna as well as through ijma and qiyas whenever necessary, is supposed to regulate all human actions in the Islamic worldview. Islamic law classifies all human actions into five categories: (1) fard (strictly obligatory, farz in Turkish), (2) mandub (recommended, miibah in Turkish), (3) ja ’ iz (permissible or indifferent, caiz in Turkish), (4) makruh (reprehensible, mekruh in Turkish), (5) haram (strictly forbidden). As seen, the classification is mutually exclusive and entirely exhaustive. This also indicates the totalitarian nature of shariah embracing all human activity in its sovereign domain.2 1 Through such an approach, the literature of furu al-fiqh (fikih in Turkish), the branches of law in Islam, aims to govern all areas not only o f both individual and 1 9 Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 101, italics in original. 2 0 For more information see Fazlur Rahman, Islam, chap. 4 and Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Outline o f Muhammadan Law, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 17-23. 2 1 Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Muhammadan Law, 16. 50 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. community rituals, but also of both private and public life. Believing all pious Muslim should regulate their daily lives in accordance with Islamic law, Islamists constantly pressure other Muslim to obey all the shariah mles. For Islamists, a Muslim should perform all fards and should attempt to carry out miibahs while refraining from all harams and avoiding makruhs. Islamist Daily Life22 Islam prescribes the ideal daily life through the shariah which, topic by topic, cites two major groups as the duties of every Muslim: The first is ibada, duties to God, that contains ritual observances, mainly the five pillars of Islam. The second is mu ’ amalat (muamele in Turkish), duties to others in social relations. These duties constitute standard practices that unify Muslims around common ideals. For Islam, “correct practice follows upon correct belief.”2 3 Indeed, correct practices are what make people Muslims.2 4 Therefore, in addition to faith in Allah, a pious Muslim has to carry out certain rituals and follow a certain catechism. Correct practices are critical for Islamic piety. The five pillars of Islam, namely the shahadah (the witnessing, qehadet in Turkish), salat (prayers, namaz in Turkish), zakat (almsgiving, zekat in Turkish), 2 2 To entirely picture ideal Islamist daily life (or secular modem one) exceeds the limits of this study. Here, as in the section on modem secular daily life, I only portray the ideal daily life from each perspective in a limited way that hopefully helps the reader to comprehend the forces of preference falsification in everyday life as I examine them in later sections. 2 3 Sachiko Murata and William C. Chittick, The Vision o f Islam (New York: Paragon House, 1994), 9. 2 4 Sachiko Murata and William C. Chittick, Islam, 9. 51 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. siyam (fasting, orug in Turkish), and the hajj (pilgrimage, hac in Turkish)2 5 are all fard on every Muslim. Islamic lifestyle starts with the first pillar, the shahadah. In order to be a Muslim, one has to publicly declare the oneness o f God and Prophecy of Muhammad as His Messenger by verbally acknowledging it in Arabic in front of at least two witnesses. Newborns’ fathers whisper the shahadah into the ears at birth. Each Muslim is required to utter the shadadah at least once in this world. Since it is incorporated into daily prayers, Muslims recite it quite often. In practice, professing the faith as reciting the shadadah in public is customary. The cornerstone of Islamic daily life is the second pillar, salat, prayers. The very first thing Muslims hear each day is the adhan (ezan in Turkish) the call for salat, announcing: “God is the greatest and salat is better than sleep.”2 6 Before the salat, Muslims carry out purification rites they learn as chores of daily grooming. And, the traditional Muslim day begins with a morning salat at dawn. During the salat, all Muslims face Mecca and recall certain verses from the Qur’an, reinforcing “a sense of belonging to a single worldwide community of believers.”2 7 Ideal Muslims repeat the salat ritual five times a day: daybreak, noon, mid-afternoon, sunset and evening. The required daily salat, though they can be performed individually, are preferred to be held collectively. 2 5 For more complete information besides given in the following pages on the five pillars of Islam, see Sachiko Murata and William C. Chittick, Islam, chap. 1. 2 6 The first sentence is the beginning of adhan. The complete adhan contains six sentences. Only the morning adhan repeats the second part; “The salat is better than sleep.” 2 7 John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 91. 52 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Muslim community, umma, is knitted together by salat required to be held communally. The Friday prayer is the most important one, in which each male is obliged to participate, preferably in the central mosque. Females may attend as well but only in a separate area of the mosque. During the prayer, a learned man of Islam preaches a special sermon called khutbah (hutbe in Turkish) through which he discusses a popular topic of the day, teaching Muslims the Islamic perspective about the issue. The Muslim community is also required to carry out Feast prayers twice a year and death prayers whenever one of its members dies. All eligible Muslims are bound to pay zakat, almsgiving, which is the third pillar of Islam. Based on a holistic view, Islam teaches each Muslim a set of communal obligations. Zakat is an annual payment of an alms tax to the needy for easing economic inequalities. The Islamic state is in charge of collecting alms tax and redistributing it to the poor. Ideal Muslims, through their payment of zakat, contribute to social welfare. The payment of zakat imparts “a sense of communal identity and responsibility” to Islamic life. The month of Ramadan in the Islamic calendar is a month of fasting. Fasting constitutes the fourth pillar of Islam; it is required of all adult Muslims. It specifically refers to abstention from eating, drinking, smoking and sexual activity from sunrise to sunset. In a traditional Islamic community each Muslim carefully observes the fast in public. Since every Muslim is supposed to be fasting, all places of eating are closed during daylight hours. Ramadan is a time to highlight the rules 2 8 John L. Esposito, Islam, 92. 53 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of right conduct not only for ibada but also for mu ’ amalat. The Prophet is reputed to have said lying, backbiting, slander, ungodly oaths, and looking with lust are among the things that break the fast.2 9 The pilgrimage season begins just after Ramadan. The pilgrimage to Mecca, called the hajj, is the fifth pillar; every financially able Muslim is expected to carry it out at least once during her/his lifetime. At the end of the pilgrimage, Muslims celebrate the Feast of Sacrifice. Their sacrifice of animals symbolizes God’s substitution of Abraham’s son with a ram after God had tested Abraham on his willingness to sacrifice the most important thing for him in order to serve his God. By sacrificing animals, Muslims, like Abraham, show their willingness to sacrifice whatever is most important to them for God. The meat is distributed among themselves and the needy. Muslims are also supposed to first defend and then struggle for Islam. Named jihad, the duty is sometimes referred as the sixth pillar of Islam. Jihad generally means “obligation encumbent on all Muslims, as individuals and as a community, to exert themselves to realize God’s will, to lead a virtuous life, and to extend the Islamic community through preaching, education, and so on.”3 0 Islam constitutes its ideal worldview not only through ibada but also through mu ’ amalat, the rules of social conduct. Islam prescribes its ideal daily life in detail by setting the rules one by one about almost everything: “[MJarriage, divorce, 2 9 Sachiko Murata and William C. Chittick, M am ,11. 3 0 John L. Esposito, Mam, 95. 54 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. inheritance; rules of buying, selling, lending, hire, gift, testamentary bequest, agency, deposit and so on; crimes, torts, penalties, and compensations for injury; judicial practice and procedure; rules relating to slaves, land ownership and holdings, contractual partnership, slaughter of animals for food, oaths and their effects, and more.”3 1 Besides penal and commercial codes, family law in Islam has a special place. It regulates the place of man, woman and children in the ideal Islamic society. Specifically, it lays down the rules of polygamy, veiling, divorce, seclusion of women, and so on. A man is allowed to marry up to four women. Though discouraged, man has an unilateral right to divorce his wife or wives just by announcing three times “I divorce you.” Women are secluded mainly through veiling and by not being allowed to worship publicly in the mosque. Since the mosque is the center of community life, such seclusion cuts women off from some social activities.3 2 With the help of ibada and mu ’ amalat Islam sets its ideal rules about public ethics and collective morals that the public is to obey collectively and that are to be overseen authoritatively. Along with public morals, Islam is also keen to set the right rules of conduct in the private sphere. For example, the ideal sexual life is quite well described by Islam, which discourages masturbation, prohibits premarital sex, outlaws sodomy, requires ablution after having sex and menstruating, and so on. 3 1 Norman Calder, “Law,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia o f the M odem Islamic W orld, vol. 1, 452. 3 2 John L. Esposito, Islam, 101. 55 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In case Muslims have a dispute they cannot handle through existing Islamic law, muftis, educated men of religion, issue a fatwa (fetva in Turkish), a reasoned Islamic response. Thus, the learned men of religion have the responsibility for resolving disputes and assuring Muslims of the compatibility of new practices to Islam. And, it is customary for each Muslim to follow the new interpretation. In short, the Muslim day starts with morning salat at daybreak and ends with evening salat. The life of a Muslim begins as his/her father whispers the shadadah at birth and ends with a salat announcing his/her death. In general, a Muslim’s life is regulated from beginning to end. This is, of course, an ideal way of life for a Muslim. What percentage of Muslims conducts their lives according to the ideal Islamic lifestyle is another question. The point here is that Islamist activists strive for having such an ideal way of life. And along the way they constantly pressure other Muslims to have this ideal life of Islam, or at least, to create a sense as if the ideal Islamic way of life is dominant in the Muslim community. As Phillip Hitti put it in 1970, “No modem Muslim thinker of stature has, so far, publicly challenged the oneness of God, the prophethood of Muhammad, the holiness of the Koran, the immortality of the soul, or the resurrection of the body. No one has preached that ‘God is dead.’”3 3 Let us move now the other camp, that of the secularists. We shall see that they do not differ much from Islamists in this sense. Their activists, too, are ardent 3 3 Philip Hitti, Islam: A Way o f Life (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), 183, my emphasis. 56 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. supporters of their own ideal worldview. As we shall see, they also seek the dominance of their own worldview. Secular/Modern Worldview The secular/modem worldview has its roots in the Age o f Enlightenment. It specifically started to flourish around the mid-fifteenth century in Europe and its basic characteristics had evolved by the end of the eighteenth century. The Enlightenment defined modernity by looking at the Middle Ages throughout which the Church had had authority over all realms of life. In contrast to the medieval Christian Church, the Enlightenment thinkers introduced a new worldview in which the will of God no longer dominated the ethics, politics, language and culture of the day. As William E. Connolly put it, “God lived in a culture in which assumptions about nature, knowledge, self, the past and language made room for him to be.”3 4 There was a different world out there, from the Age of Enlightenment on, with a view of different assumptions, new concepts and toute nouvelle lifestyle. Core Assumptions (1) Although there is more than one ontological assumption of modernity, most have a common origin. Most assumptions start with the premise that “God is dead.”3 5 It was exactly this dictum that gave way to the ontology of modernity. God 3 4 William E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), 7. j5 The dictum popularized by Nietzsche is also used by other thinkers in different forms. For example, Durkheim spoke of old gods as they are “growing old or already dead.” Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms o f the Religious Life (New York: Free Press, 1965), 475, quoted in Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the M odem World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 18. 57 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. is considered to be dead: “Not in the sense that it is impossible for individuals to have faith in God, but in the sense that a common faith anchored in a common set of experiences can no longer secure and protect itself from widespread revisions, skepticism, doubt and unbelief.”3 6 To cite Nietzsche, the earth from then on was “unchained ... from its sun.”3 7 The ontological message this paraphrase carries on is that the human race needs a solution to its homesickness that became all the more obvious by the death of God. The new source of ontological meaning is reason embodied in nature. Descartes declared, “I think, therefore I am.” The early modem thinkers attempted to make room for God by transplanting Him into reason, or nature, or Spirit or the subject: Hobbes asks for faith in reason and its God; Rousseau idealizes nature and its God; Hegel rationalizes faith.3 8 Our focus here is as follows: Modernity replaced God with nature and reason as a new source to human ontology by reducing God to a mere individual belief. The position of modernity with regard to religion has quite sharp ramifications. God is no longer the source of legitimacy and knowledge. It is reason that should be guiding human progress, since reason is objective and universal; by contrast, faith is subjective and culture-specific. Thus, modernity declares its universality. 3 6 William E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), 9. 3 7 See William E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, 10. 3 8 All such attempts have their own internal problems, which I do not elaborate here. Hobbes could not come up with a formulation to install a common faith. Rousseau’s nature could not recapture its purity in a will that should be both general and singular. And, there is no way to show the truth in Hegel’s spirit. See William E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, 137. 58 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (2) The epistemological assumption of modernity appeared in natural science. It may be considered as “I know so since I have faith in my reason that proves so.” This assumption is the backbone of positivism and empiricism in science that revealed their ultimate aim in Karl Popper’s falsification theory. (3) The methodological assumption of modernity draws on individualism as a mitigator of collectivism. Methodological individualism defines society in terms of atomistic members and also claims that only individuals have aims and interests. The individual, according to this viewpoint, behaves rationally in a way adequate to her aim given the circumstances. This refers to the rationality assumption of modernity. Methodological individualism also proposes that the social set-up is subject to change as a result of individual action. Assuming non-existence of “wholes,” for methodological individualism, the “wholes” cannot have distinct aims and interest of their own.3 9 The methodology of modernity puts more emphasis on the supremacy of the individual over society as opposed to other societies that have a weak individual stand. Even the source of morality is individualistic in the ideal modem worldview. From these assumptions, a new worldview, the one I label the secular/modem worldview, arose. Modernity is its basic umbrella concept supported by a variety of 3 9 On the assumptions of methodological individualism see Joseph Agassi, “Methodological Individualism,” in John O’Neil (ed.), Modes o f Individualism and Collectivism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), 186. Hayek, one of the most prominent proponents of methodological individualism concludes his essay on the methodology of modem social science with a motto of old Greek philosopher Democritus: “Man is what is known to all.” For more on methodological individualism see Frederic von Hayek, “Scienticism and the Study of Society,” in John O’Neil (ed.), Modes of Individualism and Collectivism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), 67. 59 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. additional ideas/processes. For example, rationalization, industrialization, urbanization, bureaucratization and economic development all contribute a different aspect of modernity as does science and application of technology to industry. As one o f them, secularism denotes one of modernity’s basic foundations in defining itself. Using exclusion as a way of definition, modernity through secularism eliminates religion from the public realm and confines it to the private realm. Secularism deliberately aims at abolishing religious institutions and reducing religion to a mere belief. Secularism Like modernity, secularism is a product of the Enlightenment. The rationale behind secularism is inferred as follows: If God is dead, everything that originates from Him must go. This is the basic corollary of the widely accepted, and (until recently) rarely questioned secularization thesis. As pointed before, Compte, Durkheim, Freud, and many others4 0 took this thesis for granted. As Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge point out, “At least since the Enlightenment, most Western intellectuals have anticipated the death of religion. ... The most illustrious figures in sociology, anthropology, and psychology have unanimously expressed confidence that their children, or surely their grandchildren, would live to see the dawn of a new era in which, to paraphrase 4 0 The list includes to David Hume, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Max Weber, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer (until his old age), Jurgen Habermas and so on. Some possible exceptions are Alexis de Tocqueville, Vilfredo Pareto, and others. 60 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Freud, the infantile illusions of religion would be outgrown.”4 1 Thus, influential thinkers identified secularism as one of the main pillars in modernity’s program, which refers to an ideology seeking “to minimize, if not to eliminate, the role of religion in social affairs” as secularization describes “a process of social change in which religion loses social significance.”4 2 Talcott Parsons sums up the dominant view of this process in three short sentences: Once the world filled with the sacred - in thought, practice and institutional form. After the Reformation and the Renaissance, the forces of modernization swept across the globe and secularization, a corollary historical process, loosened the dominance of the sacred. In due course, the sacred shall disappear altogether except, possibly, in the private realm.4 3 Referred to as an historical process by Parsons, secularization constitutes the basic conceptual framework through which modernity views its ideal relationship with religion. Within this framework, modernity reinforces the ideology of secularism and the process of secularization with its three propositions:4 4 At first, 4 1 William Sims Bainbridge and Rodney Stark, The Future o f Religion (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985), 1, quoted in Jeffry K. Hadden, “Towards Desacralizing Secularization Theory,” Social Forces, 63 (March, 1987): 587. 4 2 Bryan R. Wilson, “Reflections on a Many Sided Controversy,” in Steve Bruce (ed.), Religion and Modernization (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1992), 209. Wilson defines secularization more elegantly elsewhere as “the process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance.” See Bryan R. Wilson, Religion in a Secular Society (London: Watts, 1966), 27. Secularism and secularization as concepts are both multidimensionally loaded with a wide range of meanings. However, as Ernest Krausz notes, the definition offered by Wilson can hardly be improved later. Krausz asserts that “[tjhis definition is acceptable so long as it is remembered that this [secularization] process is not necessarily inevitable or irreversible.” See Ernest Krausz, “Religion and Secularization: A Matter of Definitions,” Social Compass, 18 (1971/2): 212. This study shares his view. 4 3 Talcott Parsons, The Social System, trans. C. Wright Mills (New York: Free Press, 1959), 32-33, quoted in Jeffry K. Hadden, “Towards Desacralizing Secularization Theory,” 587. 4 4 For more information on the three propositions of secularization thesis, see Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the M odem World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 17-39. Though 61 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. secularization requires the separation of the public sphere from the religious sphere that includes religious institutions and norms. Secondly, secularization will lead to a decline in religious belief and practices. As a result, finally, modernity, with the help of secularization, would marginalize religion into the private sphere. Secularization is no exception to the general theories of differentiation which modernity has been introducing to our lives. In pre-modem times, there already existed, more or less, a dualism in most religions between “this world” and “the other world.”4 5 Modernity furthered this with a new differentiation: It claimed there exists a dualism within “this world” between a “religious” and a “secular” sphere. Leaving speculating on “the other world” to the authority of religion, modernity focuses on defining what should be considered as “religious” and “secular” along with another differentiation it proposes between “public” and “private.” The public sphere is a realm in which the individual has face-to-face communications with others and engages in discussions with the others.4 6 By Casanova sees these three propositions “very different, uneven and unintegrated” so that their validity needs to be examined and tested independently of each other (211), I claim that they are all integrated parts of a program within modernity. A person could not examine one without taking the other two into consideration. This will he clear as I investigate secularization in Muslim Turkey. 4 5 However, most monetheistic religions, especially Islam, treat this dualism as more of a continuum: Ibada (worship) in Islam covers not only five pillars but also making a living according to an Islamic way of life that will hopefully result in happiness in the other world. 4 6 Robert C. Holup, Jurgen Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere (London: Routledge, 1991), 5. Jurgen Habermas extensively wrote on the concept of the public sphere. See especially his Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category o f Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederic Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989; first German ed., 1962). For his view of the concept thirty years later, see Jurgen Habermas, “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,” in Craig Calhoun (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 421-461. For several articles in Turkish about the public sphere and some applications of the concept into Turkish context, see Dogu Bati 5, special issue on Pubic Sphere (November, December, January, 1989-9): 127. 62 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. definition, the private sphere covers all other realms of life where the individual has no communication, thus, no participation in discussion with the others. The most effective way to marginalize and eventually trivialize anything for modernity is to claim that IT (whatever it is) is a private matter so that it has no place in the public sphere.4 7 Once it is accepted that IT belongs to the private sphere, IT is automatically excluded from the public realm. Accordingly, secularism marginalizes anything related to this world over which religion has a claim just by pushing IT into the private sphere. Secularism in the West, while making such a differentiation, of course, thinks of religion as Christendom and drives all its generalizations about other religions from the Western Judeo-Christian experience. After the Reformation with the rise of Protestantism that stresses more “interior dimensions of faith and ... conscience,”4 8 religion became privatized. The first differentiation between the secular and religious was based on the saying of Christ in Matthew 22:21. Jesus Christ reveals in this famous passage: “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s.” This revelation made possible a separation between the Church and State. The notion that anything related to the 4 7 As a believer of the secularization thesis, Habermas ignored the role of religion, specifically the role of Christianity after the Reformation in the early formation of the public sphere during the rise of the Enlightenment around the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See Craig Calhoun, “Introduction,” in Craig Calhoun (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 35-36. For religion and the public sphere in England, see David Zaret, “Religion, Science and Printing in the Public Spheres in Seventeenth-Century England,” in Craig Calhoun (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 212-235. 4 8 David Zaret, “Religion, Science and Printing in the Public Spheres in Seventeenth-Century England,” 221. 63 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. State must be secular (i.e., the Church has no saying over State affairs) was later extended as saeculum, that public affairs have nothing to do with religious dogma.4 9 It treats religion as belonging to the private sphere. As we shall see in Chapter 3, Kemalists in Turkey adopted this strict view of secularism. In other words, religion has a minimal role to play in the public sphere. Such an understanding naturally forces religion almost to disappear from the public realm. Starting from communal religious practices, and proceedings to individual religious beliefs, anything that is obviously religious is to be withdrawn from the public eye. Religious institutions, beliefs and practices, as modernity expects, start to lose their social significance. Now, the first two steps of the secularization process are completed. The only place religion can thriven perhaps even survive in the modem secular worldview is, hence, inside a private sphere where modernity has no claim over regulating the individual’s religious affairs. So, by locking religion into the private sphere, modernity defines its relationship with religion and names it the secularization thesis. This conceals modernity’s ultimate momentum: one day, religion will vanish. Secularist Daily Life Webster’s definition of secularism helps us visualize the ideal modem daily life. According to Webster, secularism provides “a view of life or of any particular matter based on the premise that religion and religious considerations should be 4 9 Saeculum is a Latin word from which the word secular originates. Seaculum in Latin means generation, century, age, or world. 64 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ignored or purposely excluded.”5 0 More specifically, secularism is “a system of social ethics based on a doctrine that ethical standards and conduct should be determined exclusively with reference to the present life and social well-being without reference to religion.”5 1 Therefore, secular modem life operates with the help o f the guidelines and principles that flourish through consulting anything but religion. No religious book, law or tradition interferes with daily public life. After all, modernity based on methodological individualism teaches us that religion is a personal matter one has to resolve by herself/himself. Think of an ideal modem man. Whether a government official, a worker, a farmer, or a self-employed businessman, he wakes up early, washes his face and shaves before having breakfast. Then, he goes to work. From then on, he is in the public eye. He is expected to do his job. In doing so, if anything comes up that relates to his religious beliefs, he is supposed to deliberately repress or conceal his beliefs and exclude his religious application to his job. In an ideal secularist worldview, he cannot mix his religious belief and his job. For example, a Catholic doctor is supposed not to hesitate to perform abortion operations, even if he believes that God forbids abortion. A Muslim banker would have to charge interest, even though Islam is said to shun interest. A Jewish deli-owner is to sell ham, even though Judaism forbids pork from kosher diets. 5 0 Webster’ s Third New International Dictionary o f the English Language Unabridged,, 1986 ed., s. v. “Secularism,” 2053. 3 1 Webster, 2053. 65 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. All are modem men who behave as if they are convinced that their religion has little or nothing to do with their public life. Their areligious mentality, not their religious beliefs, dictates what they should do in order to survive in the modem world. After working hard all day long, they will have some private moments in their home. They may pray if they wish before going to bed. Their urge to pray prevails in case they have a problem they cannot solve by secularist means. Our focus here has been on how the secularist’ perception of Islam and the Islamic perception of Western modernism took their roots. Both perceived that secular modernity and Islam were at odds with each other. This mutually accepted understanding generally or at least often persists. The frictional interaction of Islam and secularism helped the proponents of both worldviews in the world as well as in Turkey to better define their discourses. In time mutual interaction led to the clarification of borderlines. In brief, the radical Islamists claim that one and only one worldview, evidently the Islamic one, is sufficient for humanity to be applied in every aspect of life. Consequently, there is no need or room for another worldview to spread through different realms such as public and private. The secularists, however, advocate a strict differentiation of life into the public and private realms. They insist that secularism, as a worldview, must dominate the public realm while in the private realm the individual must be left free to choose among lifestyles, religious or modem. Thus, as the Islamic worldview has a claim over both public and private realms the secular one has its own exclusive claim on public life leaving religion room only in the private realm, if desired. 66 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The contending positions of Islam and secularity to each other will be clearer in examining both in an overlapping context in the next chapter. Turkey is a case in point. Depending upon the social setting people may manage to live with the inconsistencies while experiencing inner tension. It is now time to introduce the ways in which the people of Turkey manage the inconsistencies explained before. This will help us better understand the Turkish case later. The Consequences of Contending Worldviews in Turkey As in any other Muslim country, Islam and secularism overlap in Turkey. Their uneasy coexistence creates several problems for individual members of Turkish society, whether they be practicing or non-practicing Muslims, secular citizens or atheists. Islam emphasizes orthoproxy rather than orthodoxy. The rules, especially those of the shariah rather than theology, are “the central religious discipline and locus for defining the path of Islam and preserving its way of life.”5 2 Islam is hard to fully practice under the conditions of secularity, which offers a contending lifestyle to the Islamic one. Contemporary Turkey has been designed for the citizens of Turkey, not for the members of an umma, Islamic community.5 3 Philip Hitti commented on this in his rightly titled book, Islam: A Way o f Life, back in 1970. On 5 2 John L. Esposito, “Islam: An Overview,” The Oxford Encyclopedia o f the Modern Islamic World, vol. 2, 245. On how the Republican Turkey was designed to be compatible with the Western modem lifestyle, see chapter 3. 67 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the concluding page, he wrote, “Formal prayer five times a day, fasting during a whole month, paying alms, pilgrimage to the holy cities - all became in varying degrees incompatible with the demands of a modernized society. Secularization ■S4 affected more practice than beliefs.” Other than the self-employed, practicing Muslims such as workers and government officials are not supposed to perform prayers during the day in Turkey. Daylight savings time, a common application in the contemporary world to preserve energy, does not allow Muslims to pray even on their lunch break since the lunch break does not coincide with the praying time. The clock running in Turkey since 1926 is the Western one counting hours from midnight. The old religious clock reminding the times of prayers as starting from sunrise is no longer even remembered. Daylight savings time, when in use, does not permit most Muslims to go to mosques to carry out the Friday prayer required to be held collectively.5 5 Jewish Turkish citizens may go to synagogue on Saturdays, and Christian Turkish citizens may go to church on Sundays. However, Muslim ones have difficulty carrying out the holy Friday prayers, because Jewish Saturday and Christian Sunday, not Muslim Friday, are the weekly holidays in modem Turkey. 5 4 Philip Hitti, Islam, 183. 5 5 When Turkey along with the European countries shifted to daylight savings time, Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Islamist Welfare Party, expressed his regrets to such modem ritual on the basis that it would prevent Muslims from carrying out communal Friday prayers since its time would no longer coincide with lunch break. Milliyet, 1 April 1996. The Welfare Party introduced a bill that would reschedule the Friday lunch break to coincide with the Friday prayers. The secular parties immediately criticized the so-called prayers bill on the ground that it undermined secular principles. Hikmet Cetin, the Republican People’s Party leader, state minister, deputy prime minister of the time, declared, “This is a matter of aligning the state administration with religious mles — an act that would seriously undermine secularism.” “Cetin: Prayer Bill Undermines Secular Principles” (Ankara, TRT Television Network, in Turkish, 19 May 1995) inFBIS-WEU, 23 May 1995, 42. 68 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In case their schedule permits devout Muslims to pray privately, they are forced to do purification rituals most likely in a restroom where no facility is available to wash one’s feet. They have to stretch their legs to use the sink designed for secular men. This creates problems for both Muslims and non-religious others. The purification act may result in several physical problems for Muslims and sanitary problems for all.5 6 Fasting also became difficult for the contemporary Muslims who are used to working sometimes over twelve hours a day. Most Muslims did not have to work during Ramadan before the Atattirk reforms of the 1920s. The month of Ramadan, the ninth month of the Islamic calendar, was an official holiday for many. Not so any longer. The Gregorian Solar calendar, which was perfected by Pope George XIII, and not the Islamic lunar calendar, is in use in Turkey. Pilgrimage begins on the eighth and ends the thirteenth day of the last lunar month called DhuT-Hijja (the Month of the Hajj). Since the lunar calendar has 355 days a year, DhuT-Hijja moves forward about eleven days every year in the solar calendar. Every 33 years, these eleven days accumulate into a solar year. Thus, pilgrimage sometimes falls in winter, and sometimes in summer. This makes pilgrimage difficult for some Muslims. For pilgrimage, a Muslim needs at least two weeks vacation. Most employees, such as teachers and others in education, are permitted to have their vacations during the summer time. This means that they 5 6 When I was living in the dormitory during my undergraduate education I personally witnessed several clashes between Islamists and secularist students on whether these sinks could be used for purification or not. 69 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. might have to wait decades to go on a pilgrimage. In years when pilgrimage period covers days other than usual vacation time, Muslim employees will not be able to go on to the pilgrimage. Almsgiving means double taxation. The idea behind the almsgiving is to purify wealth by giving a certain share back to the community, especially to the needy. Therefore, fully practicing Muslims pay an alms tax. Alms, however, is not considered a tax in secular Turkey, resulting in double taxation for Muslims who give alms. It is even hard to profess one’s faith in the public realm. Attempting to lock religion into the private realm secularity marginalizes the Islamic elements in public discourse. The secularist reforms of the 1920s and 1930s aimed to exclude Islam from the public realm. The pressures from secularist discourse in Turkey discourage Muslims even from declaring their faith, which is the very first pillar of Islam. For the reasons, Akbar Ahmed observed, “So severe was the suppression of Islam that even today Turks speak of their affinity to Islam with caution. To be Islamic in Turkey invited the abuse yobaz, backward, fanatic.”5 7 One can find many more irritating incompatibilities between prevailing interpretations of both Islam and secularism, leading to more troubles for devout Muslims in Turkey. Here I have illustrated only the incompatibilities originating from the observance of the ibada, Islamic duties to God in Turkey. Practicing 5 7 Akbar S. Ahmed, Living Islam: From Samarkand to Stornoway (New York: Facts on File, 1994), 101, italics in original. 70 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Muslims encounter difficulties in trying to follow the mu ’ amalat, the Islamic rules of social conduct. They are always forced to obey secular laws, mostly disregarding Islam. Some examples of this sort later appear to make the same point: Practicing Islam in contemporary life is becoming more and more difficult. To the extent that Muslims give up practicing Islam in the public realm secularist discourse may enjoy more recognition in the public eye. On the other hand, it is also hard for a non-religious person to disregard Islam in Muslim Turkey. As stated before, Islam is a social religion aiming to regulate the c o practice of daily life, especially the details of family life. Thus, the religious choice is, for Islam, not a matter of personal choice, but a way o f life fo r the society as a whole. For this purpose, Islam attaches a great deal of importance to public ethics and the collective enforcement of public morals. As a matter of principle, Islam tolerates no religious dissimulation. Its claim of universality makes Islam intolerant to dissimulation.5 9 Think of a newcomer to a city. He has immediate access to the networks based on kinship and hometown origin. These networks can readily offer him a place to reside in the shantytowns. But, his relatives do not have much to offer since the residents of the shantytowns themselves tend to be poor, inexperienced with urban life, and politically powerless. Nor does he have proper education to penetrate 5 8 Nazih Ayubi presents an excellent discussion of Islam from this perspective. See Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991), 35-47. 5 9 There is an exception to this principle. It is called as doctrine of taqiya introduced into Islam by Shiism. I examine the place of taqiya in Turkish Islam through a concept of pro-secularist preference falsification later. 71 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. into the most lucrative networks. Thus, the Islamic community is his second best alternative to make a living. To find a job he urgently needs to establish business ties with those who fully observe Islam. Now he becomes more sensitive to social pressures. As he wants to contact anyone who can find a job for him, the best place to meet them is a local mosque, which fully observant Muslims attend five times a day. In order to benefit from the reputation of the Islamic community, he starts praying, he grows a thick beard, and takes to holding long rosaries. If an Islamic establishment employs him, he will be further pressured to attend communal prayers such as the Friday and Feast prayers, and to fast during Ramadan.6 0 The increasing numbers of newcomers to the cities such as the students who come to attend colleges or high schools are also subject to Islamic pressures. Especially those with very limited means try to look like one of the faithful in order to be able to stay in one of the dormitories funded by the Islamists.6 1 A merchant or an owner of a grocery store decorates the walls of his store with Qur’anic verses and also closes his store during the time of prayers for usually going home for lunch, but on Fridays, instead of having lunch, attends the communal prayer. He pretends that he is a devout observer of the faith so that he benefits from 6 0 Timur Kuran, "Islamism and Economics: Policy Implications for a Free Society," in Sohrab Behdad and Farhad Nomani (eds.), Islam and Public Policy [.International Review o f Comparative Public Policy, vol. 9] (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1997), 75. 6 1 I was personally invited to such places more than twice in my college years. Also during my educational life in Turkey even in the US, I have witnessed the students with lower income pretend to fast during Ramadan just to eat iftar meal (dinner) offered by the Islamist establishments. 72 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Islamic sub-economy.6 2 Many merchants subscribe to religious newspapers, magazines, and periodicals to avoid the possibility of being stigmatized so they become sensitive to Islamic discourse. Many who drink alcoholic beverages refrain from drinking and even smoking in public places, especially during Ramadan.6 3 Many working in Islamic estabhshments feel that they are compelled to go to public prayers, especially to the Feast prayers. All these impositions stem from the fact that Islam and secularism overlap in Turkey. A solution that posits the division of life into public and private realms does not work well in Muslim Turkey. Specifically, the secularist worldview attempts to lock religion into the private realm through the exclusion of Islam from the public realm while Islamism persistently aims at regulating both realms. The secularists of Turkey fix upon the complete withdrawal of Islam from the public sphere. This is evident in an indictment of the Supreme Court of Appeals Chief Public Prosecutor of the Republic to abolish the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) in July 1997. The indictment that led to the verdict of the Constitutional Court regarding the closure of the Islamist party in January 1998 defines secularism within the framework of 1982 Constitution and decisions of the Constitutional Court as follows: In essence, secularism is not a religious but a legal concept. From the legal point, secularism, in short and in general, is a regime, that separates religious and worldly affairs. What is meant by this 6 2 For information on the Islamic sub-economy see Timur Kuran, “Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy,” Journal o f Economic Perspectives 9 (Fall 1995), especially 167-197. On how individuals benefit from the Islamic sub-economy, see Timur Kuran "Islamism and Economics: Policy Implications for a Free Society," 72-102. 6 3 Smoking is not permitted while fasting. Drinking is, of course, forbidden in fasting. Drinking alcoholic beverages is considered as highly disrespectful during Ramadan. 73 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. expression is not only the separation of concerned authorities on religious and world affairs within the state, [but] it is also to determine that such aspects o f social life as education, family, economy, law, principles etiquette, attire, etc., are separated from religious principles, and that they should be established in accordance with the levies and obligations and necessities of course o f life. If thought otherwise, we understand a regime that unites the religious affairs and worldly affairs.6 4 Following this secularist indictment, the verdict of the Constitutional Court also recognized secularism as “the regulator of political, social, cultural modern life.”6 5 As Miimtaz’er Turkone rightly points out, the secularist conception of secularism has two presumptions: First, as this chapter repeatedly portrays, there exists a secularist worldview pressing for a distinct “modem” lifestyle. Second, the secularists also assume that a secularist social life covering education, family, economy, law, principles, etiquette, attire, etc., can be engineered.6 6 Based on social engineering, as the ardent supporters of the modernization project, Turkish secularists aim to construct an ideal world in which Islam has no place in social life. Not surprisingly, the mirror images of these two presumptions are those of Islamist activists in Turkey. As this chapter has made clear, they also believe that Islam has its own worldview urging a distinct lifestyle. Several Islamist intellectuals, including Ali Bulap, Abdurrahman Dilipak, Kasim Ozdenoren, ismet 6 4 Miimtaz’er Turkone, “Cumhuriyet’in Kamusal Alani [The Republics’ Public Sphere],” Dogu Bati 5, special issue on Pubic Sphere (November, December, January, 1998-9): 126, my translation, my emphasis. One can also see the indictment in English, http://www.refah.org/home-english.htm [25 March 1999]. 6 5 See Official Gazette o f Turkey, 22 February 1998, 225-226, my emphasis. 6 6 Miimtaz’er Turkone, “Cumhuriyet’in Kamusal Alam [The Republics’ Public Sphere],” 127. 74 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ozel and others, repeatedly state that Islam is a way of life. And, though in varying degrees, they all agree that the worldviews of Islam and secularity are in contention. Hence, they all have numerous objections to secularist policies that, they believe, harm or destroy the Islamic way of life. In treating Islam and secularity as incompatible, Bula? advocates that modernity needs to be changed and adapted to Islam rather than vice versa.6 7 Dilipak warns Muslims against “a secularized Islam,”6 8 and he states that Islam requires everyone to act in strict accordance with his religion.6 9 As another Islamist put it very clearly in the title of one of his articles, “A person who says he is ‘secular’ can not stay Muslim, [and] a person who says he 7 0 is a Muslim, too, can not be secular!” The clash of the exclusivist worldviews of Islamism and secularism demands representing one of the worldviews. Here is the list of the choices for individuals living in Muslim community under the Kemalist state: Exit, sincere voice and preference falsification.7 1 6 7 Ali Bula? candidly expressed his thoughts on Islam and modernity in a discussion with the paper presenters in a conference. See Avrupa ’ da Etik, Din ve Laiklik [Ethics, Religion and Secularism in Europe]/ Proceedings o f the Conference in Ankara Turkey. 26 April 1994 by The French Cultural Center and Metis Yaymlan (Istanbul: Metis Yayinlan, 1995), 42. 6 8 Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Sizi Allah ve Kuran ile Aldatmasmlar [They Do Not Deceive You with Allah and the Qur’an],” Akit, 6 February 1997. For the Islamist views of Dilipak, see his other articles in Islamist newspaper Akit. I was led to this article of Dilipak by Nur Serter, Dinde Siyasal Islam Tekeli [The Monopoly of Political Islam in Religion] (Istanbul: Sarmal Yayinevi, 1997), 71. 6 9 Abdurrahman Dilipak, Laisim [Secularism] (Istanbul: Beyan Yaymlan, 1991), 63. 7 0 Mehmet Dogan, “Ben iaik’im diyen ki§i muslumanhkta kalamaz ben muslumanrm diyen ki§i de laik olamaz!.. [A person who says he is ‘secular’ can not stay Muslim, a person who says he is a Muslim too can not be secular!..],” Cuma, 1:18 (26 October-lNovember 1990), 46, as quoted in l§tar Tarhanli, Musluman Toplum, “laik" Devlet: Turkiye’ de Diyanet i$leri Ba$kanligi [Muslim Society, “secular” State: The Presidency of Religious Affairs] (Istanbul: Afa Yaymcilik, 1993), 148, n. 462. 7 ! I was inspired for the first two mechanisms by Albert O. Hirschman’s seminal book, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 75 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Responses to the Collision of Islamism and Secularism: Exit, Sincere Voice, and Preference Falsification Exit simply means leaving Turkey. A Muslim who believes that a decent Islamic life under a secular state is impossible may leave Turkey for an Islamic country. Exit is a legitimate option for Islam since it has a precedent in the Prophet’s tradition, sunnah. In the early days of Islam, as its believers were threatened in Mecca, Muhammad and two hundred of his followers emigrated, in 622, to Yathrib (later named Medina) where they were welcomed by the inhabitants. This migration, called the Hijra, justified exit for a Muslim. One of the famous examples of later exits was set by Mehmet Akif (Ersoy), an ardent Islamist and the poet of the words of the Turkish national anthem. After the War of Independence, he became upset about the way the Kemalists set out to modernize Turkey by suppressing Islam. So, following to the footsteps of the Prophet, he went to Egypt for the summers from 1923 to 1926. Moreover, as the Kemalists initiated full-scale Western modernist reforms in 1926, he decided not to return to Turkey. He lived in Egypt during the heyday of the Kemalist reforms between 1926 and 1933. He became sick and returned to his country a few months before he died in 1936.7 2 University Press, 1970). The last one, preference falsification that is the crux of the argument by Timur Kuran in his Private Truths, Public Lies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). 7 2 For a short biography of Mehmet Akif Ersoy and a selection of his writings see Ismail Kara (ed.), Tiirkiye’ de Islamcihk Dii$uncesi: Metinler/Kigiler [The Islamist Thought in Turkey: Essays/Authors], 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Risale, 1987), vol. 1, 309-406. 76 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Similarly, an atheist who does not want to be subject to the pressures from the Islamist community may settle in a predominantly non-Muslim country, ilhan Arsel, a self-declared atheist and anti-religious professor of Ankara Law Faculty, decided to live in the United States as a result of several death threats from radical Islamists in Turkey. Exit is a viable option to the extent that two conditions obtain. The fugitive must have a satisfactory lifestyle abroad, and he must face intense pressure from some group. The stronger the pressures, such as life threats and assaults, the more likely for an individual to choose to exit. Mehmet Akif Ersoy and ilhan Arsel are just two examples of individuals able to earn a living outside Turkey. However, the exit option is not available for the majority in Turkey. It is too costly, if not impossible, for an ordinary citizen to pack up and leave the country. It would be very hard for many to find a new job. Moreover, without a source of income most could not even dare to try this option. Sincere voice is expression of dissatisfaction as an individual encounters the worldview that she is not willing to be part of. A female doctor may refuse to examine a male patient in the belief that Islam requires her not to touch any male other than close kin and husband. Or, a veiled student may complain about the president of a state university prohibiting veiled students from entering into classrooms. Or, a high school student may protest the Ministry of National Education forcing him to have at least a passing grade from the compulsory religious course each year. 77 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Speaking one’s mind sincerely can be a personally costly option. The Ministry of Health could fire the female doctor on the grounds that she is not doing her job. The veiled students could drop out from the university since they violate the compulsory attendance rule. Such cases are not fictitious in Turkey. For instance, when two high school students in Izmir refused to memorize certain Qur’anic verses, they were first beaten by the teacher, and then, given failing grades that might have led them to repeat all the course work for a year. Thus, sincere voice as well involves certain unbearable costs, which many try to avoid. It remains viable only for those who can afford exit. This means that for many voice is as unattractive an option as exit. Another possible option, preference falsification, often dominates the others. Exit is not available for many, and voice may involve a huge cost. Defined before as revealing preferences that are distinct from genuine ones, preference falsification for the majority emerges as the least costly and hence most available response to the coexistence of two contending worldviews. In short, it is a very plausible perhaps most likely response to the collision of Islam and secularism in Turkey. Preference Falsification in Turkey The veiling issue illustrates why preference falsification is widespread in Turkey. Veiling, though never outlawed in public, has long been discouraged by the state in Turkey. No female government employee is allowed to veil at work. 7 3 I personally witnessed this case while I was a student at Izmir Ataturk Highschool in 1984. The teachers’ committee in which science and mathematics teachers were in majority used its authority in favor of the students and gave them a passing grade. 78 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Several regulations forbid students from veiling in schools. No veiled woman is allowed to participate in official ceremonies. As a result of such policies, public discourse on veiling has become polarized. The Islamists argue that the freedom to veil is one of the basic human rights. It is no one else’s business if a woman covers her head in the public realm. Most Islamists hope that as the number of veiled women in public settings increases, the peer pressure on the unveiled women may lead to the resumption of an ostensible religious law, requiring all the unveiled women of today to falsify their preference by veiling. Being aware of this, the secularists claim that freedom to veil is self-negating. Therefore, the issue is not the choice “between freedom and compulsion but, rather, between one kind of compulsion and another.”7 4 The secularist believe that social JJT pressures on them will likely become irresistible if they allow the freedom to veil. As a result, the secularists are fervently against this freedom. They believe that once veiling is permitted in the public realm such as schools, government offices, etc., it will encourage Islam’s social power, eventually leading to the suppression of their secularist worldview. On the other hand, the Islamists also justifiably complain that it is impossible for Muslims in Turkey to enjoy life in accordance with their own sacred worldview. For this reason, they fight for the reversal of the legal regulations preventing women 7 4 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 9. 7 5 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 9. 79 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. from veiling in public settings. They, too, are adamantly against such regulations, forcing those women wishing to veil to engage in preference falsification. There is no single society, Muslim or non-Muslim, in which the possibility of preference falsification is totally absent. Yet, the possibility of preference falsification is especially high in Muslim societies. Among Muslim societies, such possibility is the highest in Turkey since the Turkish state is the only one in the Muslim world that constitutionally defines itself as secular. The reason for such a high possibility is because the essentialist and exclusivist worldview of both public and private life advocated by Islamists forces any secular state with a Muslim majority to define all the freedoms in relative terms. By in relative terms, I mean that the existence of one requires the elimination of the other. The same goes for the ardent Islamists. The essentialist and exclusivist worldview of secularists forces Islamists to view secularism as leaving no room for Islam. This implies that the expansion of freedoms, permitting one to live an Islamic way of life or a secular way of life as a whole society, will outlive the freedoms that characterize liberal or Islamic society. As a result, the freedom to veil and the freedom not to veil, for instance, are defined as two diametrically opposing compulsions. Thus, choosing one necessitates the suppression of the other. The veiling controversy, indeed, reflects a tiny piece of the whole picture in Turkey where Islamism and secular modernity continually confront each other. This confrontation results in clashes between the Islamist and the secularist discourses through which the price of preventing one form of preference falsification leads to 80 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. another form. Two forms of preference falsification appear in response to the overlapping contending worldviews of Islamism and secularity in Turkey: Islamism in contemporary Turkey leads to pro-Islamist preference falsification as secularism in Muslim Turkey results in pro-secularist preference falsification. Table 2.1: Preferences and Worldviews PREFERENCES PUBLIC W ORLDVIEW S ISLAMIST SECULARIST PRIVATE ISLAMIST T raditional/Islamic lifestyle with no preference falsification Pro-secularist preference falsification in secularist settings SECULARIST Pro-Islamist preference falsification in Islamic settings Western secularist lifestyle with no preference falsification Table 2.1 neatly summarizes this chapter. There exist two main worldviews: Islamist and secularist corresponding to the preferences of Turks. Two kinds of preferences held by people are private and public. The private preferences are genuine ones. The preferences they convey to others are the public preferences. “By definition, preference falsification is the selection of a public preference that differs from one’s private preference.”7 6 No preference falsification occurs if one genuinely has an Islamic worldview that he reflects through his public preferences. This was the case in the ideal 76 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 17. 81 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. traditional/Islamic lifestyle Islamist activists would like to institute into the society. In the same vein, no preference falsification takes place if one has a modem worldview that appears in her/his public preferences. This refers to the ideal Western secular modem lifestyle that secularist activists urge. However, the phenomenon of preference falsification exists if one conveys a public preference derived from a worldview that one does not genuinely hold. In cases where a person with Islamic private preferences conveys public preferences coming out of the modem/secular worldview in response to the pressures from those who have a secular outlook, she engages in what I call pro-secularist preference falsification in secular settings. To illustrate, a devout Muslim who is ashamed to do purification by using sinks in the restrooms; a government employee who opts not to pray during the day and does not go to mosque for public prayers on Fridays; a worker who cannot fast since he has to work longer hours; a teacher who cannot go to pilgrimage except for summer; a merchant who does not save extra money for an alms tax; a Muslim who does not profess her/his faith in response to pressures from secular public discourse—the individuals falsify their preferences. All are the parts of pro-secularist preference falsification in secular modem settings. Similarly, if one has private preferences based on the secular worldview, but he conveys Islamist preferences to others in response to the pressures from those who have this Islamic worldview, he engages in what I call the pro-Islamist preference falsification in Islamic settings. For example, an owner of a grocery store who refuses to stock liquor so as not to be stigmatized as ir- or anti-religious; a 82 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. newcomer to a city who behaves as if he is a devout Muslim to find a job; a student who pretends that he is a practicing Muslim to stay in a dormitory funded by the Islamists— all these individuals are falsifying their preferences in favor o f the Islamist behavioral code. Therefore, all are the part of pro-Islamist preference falsification in Islamic settings. In this chapter, I first portrayed the “ideal” Islamisc worldview and Islamism as presented by the activists of this particular worldview. Then, I presented “ideal” secularism as presented by Turkish secularists. In contrasting their contending positions, I turned to Turkey where both worldviews overlap. I focused not only on the role of Islam in modem Turkey but also on secularism in the Muslim community. I showed how the coexistence of contending worldviews of both Islam and Western secularism continually force the people of Turkey to engage in preference falsification. The two forms of preference falsification, which I define here, are pro secularist and pro-Islamist. This chapter has set the stage for the next two chapters. First, in clarifying the “ideal” worldviews of both Islamist activists and secularist activists, the chapter identified the sources of group pressures on non-activists in running their daily lives. It further introduced the possible options the non-activists may choose from. Therefore, it sets a stage for a dual preference model through which I can further explore the responses of individuals to the collision of Islamic and secular life in Turkey. Chapter 4 takes up this challenge. Such responses, however, do not occur in a vacuum. They are responses to a certain institutional framework that evolved in 83 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. time. To better understand the position of the Turkish people across Islam and secularism, one has to investigate the historical processes resulting in the institutional context in which individuals operate. Thus, it is time to explore the historical processes that created this institutional framework. Chapter 3 explains the evolution of the institutional framework in which Islam and secularism have intermingled. It also extends the foregoing discussion on why individuals have been forced to engage in both pro-Islamist and pro-secularist preference falsifications. 84 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 3 A TORN COUNTRY Religion sh ou ld be resp ected by the State as long as it rem ains in the sph ere o f conscience. M ahm ut E sa d B ey M in ister o f Justice, 1926 Today, it is commonplace for the people of Turkey to count the hours of the day from midnight and wake up accordingly. On the way to work, no one is surprised if some are not wearing headgear. For those who have some headgear, it is a hat. The proper way for them to salute their acquaintances is by raising it or by bowing. They feel obligated to take their hats off at work, especially in the presence of their superiors. All literate people-by now the vast majority of the population- sign their surnames with Latin letters. A couple may meet near a statue at the center of any city, which will be probably Ataturk’s statue. Few people hesitate to go to a full day’s work during Ramadan. Few expect to officially have a day off on the Prophet’s birthday. Working people rest Sundays. This is a slice of life from the beginning of the 21st century Turkey. In the early Republican Turkey of the 1920s, this was not the case, however. The day was counted from sunrise in accordance with the hours of prayers. A Muslim used to consider it undignified for a man to be bareheaded; accordingly he wore in public a fez signifying Islam’s superiority. Some used to sign in Arabic 85 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. script with their religious and traditional titles of §eyh, haci, hoca, pasa, bey, etc. There was no statue whereby some could meet because of Islam’s dislike of the representation of a human form. Prior to 1925, during the fast of Ramadan, no civil servant was obliged to work a full day, yet they had to work on the first day of the Gregorian solar calendar, which has since become an official holiday. To rest they waited for Muslim Fridays instead of Christian Sundays. Comparing the above two slices of daily life of the 1920s and of the 2000s elucidates that Turkey has undergone radical changes. Is Turkey a Mohammedan 1 2 Country?, The Passing o f Islam in Turkey , The Near East Marches on: Infidels at Homey’ and Allah Dethroned^ are the titles of some articles and books written just after the formative years of the Republic about previously unthinkable radical changes. All writings of the early Republican period repeatedly reveal their authors’ surprise about this transformation. The secularization process captures the placement of Turkey’s existence between two worlds; Islam and western modernity. This chapter focuses on this process, particularly the establishment of Kemalist secularism that made the modem/secular project a way of life in today’s Turkey. Before investigating all the 1 Pierre Crabites, “Is Turkey a Mohammedan Country?” Moslem World, 20 (April 1930): 125-137. 2 C. D. Capt. Brunton, “The Passing of Islam in Turkey,” English Review, 50 (May 1930): 592-599. 3 Michael Langley, “The Near East Marches on: Infidels at Home,” Living Age, 349 (December 1935): 339-342. 4 Lilo Linke, Allah Dethroned: A Journey Through Modern Turkey (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1937). 86 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. radical changes Mustafa Kemal (later Atattirk) initiated, the chapter briefly discusses the pre-Republican period to examine the background to Kemalist reforms. To better explain Turkey’s position between Islam and western modernity in general, and the polarization of Turkish society along the spectrum of Islamists on the one hand and secularists on the other, this chapter explores the role of preference falsification in the secularization of Turkey. By distorting collective decisions, and public discourse, preference falsification played a major role in establishing Turkish secularism. The distortion of collective decisions resulted in the separation of Islam from the state. The Kemalists then attempted to put religion under state control. Their reforms created an institutional framework that bolstered pro-secularist preference falsification. One of the by-products of these reforms was the distortion of public discourse, which, in turn, induced a change in religious private preferences. In other words, the mechanisms of social change resulted in the formation of new values, namely those of Kemalist secularism. The chapter thus explains how the secularist camp emerged in Turkey today, from deeply religious masses before the foundation of the Republic in 1923. Specifically, it explores the formation of an institutional structure that led to the cleavage in Turkish society between Islamism and secularity. Between Secularist Modernism and Islamism In last two centuries at least, Turkey has been the country most tom between Western modernism and Islamic civilization. Located at the eastern edge of the West and the western edge of the East, Turkey has not only geographically but also 87 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. historically pursued an ongoing attempt to become a member of the “modem” West with its predominantly non-Western Islamic culture. Turkey’s position as the leading tom country originates from the coexistence of two contending worldviews: secularist and Islamist. The coexistence of mutually exclusive worldviews, both of which claim to be universal, in and of themselves results in a dilemma the people of Turkey face in their everyday lives with increasing force in the beginning of the 21st century. Of course, life always contains contradictions; but life in Turkey is full of them because of overlapping contending worldviews. Bernard Lewis points out that the mingling of two historically different civilizations is more likely to produce clashes at their fringes.5 The courtship of Islam and the West per se has been an “unsuccessful marriage.” Preference falsification offers part of the explanation on how the citizens of Turkey, the children of an “unsuccessful marriage,” have carried on with life in a tom country. Let us turn, then, to the marriage of Islam and modernity in order to account for the institutional framework through which we can better understand why the individual members of Turkish society are forced to engage in preference falsification. Islam Meets Secularist Modernity From the seventeenth century on, Muslims increasingly began to confront Western modernity. As the traditional Islamic worldview continually interacted with modernity, some Muslim thinkers recognized that “Islam is a worldview that covers 5 See Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3-43. 88 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. virtually the whole of life.” In the early twentieth century, Ahmet Ha§im, a conservative writer, succinctly observed the changing Islamic lifestyle in the late nineteenth century as follows. It is worth quoting at length: The most secret and influential invasion that surprises the inhabitants o f Istanbul while renovating the city is the introduction o f foreign clocks in our life. By “clock,” we do not mean the tool that measures time, but the time itself. In the past, there existed a way of life, and of thinking, and folklore of our own from which we derived pleasure, flowering from religion [Islam], race and tradition, in accordance with that lifestyle there existed our “hours” and “days.” The beginning of the Muslim day was the lights of dawn, and the lights of dusk pointed its end. ... We had a day, starting and ending with light, total of twelve hours, short and aloof, and easy to live.6 He continued to tell how the existing lifestyle was confronted with modernity and later subdued by it: The incoming foreigners tore up our life and re-arranged it according to an unknown principle, and they turned our life into something unrecognizable to our souls. Like an earthquake, the new “clock” [of the day] destroyed all the dimensions of the old “day” by darkening the views of time around us, and later, it formed a new “day,” less happy, more patient, long and gloomy, mixing up day and nighttime. ... Now, we are the ones that are lost in time like those lost in desert.7 The existence of two different worldviews became more evident as Western thought clashed with Islam. As a result, public discourse has split in two sub discourses in Turkey: secular modernist and Islamist. In Hilmi Ziya Ulken’s words, 6 Ahmet Ha§im, “Miisliiman Saati [The Muslim Clock],” in Inci Engunin and Zeynep Kerman (eds.), Ahmet Ha§im: Butiln Eserleri [Ahmet Ha$im: All His Essays], vol. 3 (Istanbul: Dergah Yaymlan, 1991; repr., Dergah 1 (May 16, 1337 Rumi [May 16, 1921 A.D.])), 15, my translation. I was led to this source while interviewing Ismail Kara. 7 Ahmet Ha?im, “Musliiman Saati [The Muslim Clock].” 89 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the modernization movement of Selim III, Mahmut II, and Abdtilmecid could not yield any synthesis of Western modernism and Islam. It produced compromises on o the surface that led to a mere “existence of two different worldviews side by side.” The history of these two sub-discourses, in fact, constitutes the crux of Turkey’s history in the last two centuries. Generally, secular modernist thought suppressed Islamist thought and led to Westernizing reforms; only rarely did Islamic discourse prevail and prevent further Westernization. Consequently, their interaction resulted in hybrid sub-discourses, two of which form our main concern: The Islamist sub-discourse which promotes Islamism and the modernist sub-discourse which supports secularism. Both discourses are extensions of the two discrete grand discourses, which are distinct and irreducible to each other. In practice, these two sub-discourses constitute a continuum: complete secular modernization (read: Westernization) at one extreme and ideal Islamism at another. The modernization movement first gained momentum with the emergence of the Young Ottomans and then the Young Turks. It reached its zenith in the Kemalist revolution. To examine the history of Turkey’s modernization in depth is not within the scope of this study.9 My aim is simply to look at the ramifications of the 8 H. Ziya Ulken, Tiirkiye’ de Cage/a^ Dipiince Tarihi [The History of Modem Thought in Turkey], 4th ed. (Istanbul: Ulken Yaymlan, 1994), 21, my translation. 9 There are excellent studies on the modernization of Turkey. See in particular Niyazi Berkes, The Development o f Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964; reprint, with a new introduction by Feroz Ahmad, New York: Routledge, 1998); Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1961); §erif Mardin, The Genesis Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962); and, Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, History o f the Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise o f Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 90 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. modernization movement with regard to secularism and Islamism in Turkey. Therefore, I mainly focus on how both the modem secularists and Islamists perceived each other and how they reacted to discourses other than their own. I also examine how their interaction crystallized their own viewpoints. In fact, all the modernization movements in Turkey started with the assumption that reforms were urgently inevitable. More specifically, the Islamic worldview had to desirably turn into a secular modem one. On the other hand, most reforms meant eliminating the religious worldview. Thus, the public discourse focused on whether or not reforms were desirable. Niyazi Berkes well captured this clash between the modernists, who claimed that change was inevitable and the traditionalists who were opposed to change.1 0 Generally secularization, sometimes de-secularization (i.e., Islamization), processes have been the continuous core of Turkey’s agenda since the late seventeenth century. As most of the other non-Westem countries, Turkey experienced modernization as Westernization.1 1 Gibb put this bluntly: “The plain truth of the matter is that ‘modernization’ means ‘Westernization. ”’1 2 At first, modernizing 10 Niyazi Berkes, a prominent Turkish modernizer, based his seminal book, The Development o f Secularism in Turkey on this ongoing confrontation between “progressive” modernists and conservative traditionalists. Indeed, for him, as well for this study, a wider interpretation of secularization in Turkey grasps this clash. See Niyazi Berkes, Development o f Secularism in Turkey, especially 1-17. The page references from this source refer to the original edition. The secularization of Turkey, which is, for him, inevitable and irreversible historical process is the proof of modernism’s victory over Islam. This study, however, considers that secularization is neither inevitable nor irreversible. I also claim that de-secularization is possible. 11 Nuray Mert, “Laiklik Tarti$masi ve Siyasal Islam [The Debate of Secularism and Political Islam],” Cogito, 1 (Summer 1994): 97. 12 Hamilton A. R. Gibb, “The Reaction in the Middle East against the Western Culture,” delivered in 1951 in Paris, Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk (eds.), Studies on the Civilization o f Islam 91 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. reforms initiating technical innovations, especially military ones, inevitably, affected social institutions as well. For example, the printing press came to the Ottomans in 1727, two hundred years after its invention in Europe, when a fatwa and an imperial decree permitted Ibrahim Muteferrika, an ex-Calvinist from Hungary, to establish it on the condition that no religious book would be printed. “In this the religious authority made a fateful decision: It recognized an important area of culture as being outside the sway of the religion. It thus narrowed the limit of its authority over the whole.”1 3 The western ideas and lifestyle introduced by modernization brought in cultural Westernization.1 4 As the process of modernity began to cover more realms of life most Muslim thinkers perceived secularist modernization as Westernization. The fatwa permitting the printing press also signaled that religious authority was “unwilling to make modifications in its traditional outlook.”1 5 In reaction to the expanding secular worldview, Islamist thinkers turned Islam into Islamism.1 6 By Islamism, I mean a worldview “that holds that the realm of Islam should encompass all human action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, 1962), 331. I was led to this source by Nur Yalman, “Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Islam,” Daedalus, 102 (Winter 1973): 140. 13 Niyazi Berkes, “Historical Background of Turkish Secularism,” in Richard N. Frye (ed.), Islam and the West: Proceedings o f the Harvard Summer School Conference on the Middle East, July 25-27, 1955, (The Hague, the Netherlands: Mouton & Co., 1957), p. 51. 14 On Ottoman adoption of Western ideas see Fatma Miige Gocek, Rise o f Bourgeoisie, Demise o f Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 125-134. She also presents a sound discussion of the development of “civilization” concept in chap. 4, which we will encounter later. 15 Niyazi Berkes, “Historical Background of Turkish Secularism,” 51. 161 prefer to use the term Islamism rather than using the terms such as Islamic fundamentalism or political Islam. I explained why I prefer Islamism in Introduction. On the emergence of Islamism, see Miimtaz’er Tiirkone, Siyasi Ideoloji Olarak Islamciligin Dogugu [The Emergence of Islamism as Political Ideology] (Istanbul: Ileti§im Yaymlan, 1991). 92 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and that is willing to act upon this belief in order to erase the boundaries between the temporal and religious.”1 7 Many Muslim thinkers offered several solutions to the confrontation between Islam and secular Western civilization. In late-nineteenth century Turkey, the most influential Islamist movement was Pan-Islamism promoted by Sultan Abdiilhamit II. He adopted the idea of Pan- Islamism that was already popular among Muslim intellectuals. Jamal Al-Din Al- Afghani and Namik Kemal in particular defended Islam against Ernest Renan’s claims that by itself Islam was antagonistic to science and philosophy.1 8 Abdulhamid II put special emphasis on the Islamic character of the state, strengthening the institutions and symbols of the Caliphate. Pensions and salaries to the ulema (the learned men of religion) were increased. The state repaired mosques and other religious monuments. The secular schools began to teach lessons about Islam and in Arabic. The Sultan himself selected the kadis (Islamic judges), teachers, and other ulema to be sent to Egypt, Cyprus, the Crimea, Bosnia and Bulgaria.1 9 “By according special attention to Muslims around the world as well as within the Empire he hoped both to acquire a political advantage in his dealing with European powers and to foster loyalty and support for his regime at home.”2 0 Islamism for many, including Abdulhamid II, was a strategically chosen ideology 17 John Ruedy, “Introduction,” in John Ruedy (ed.), Islamism and Secularism in North Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), xv. 18 See Ernest Renan, “L’Islamisme et la Science [Islamism and Science],” delivered in Paris, in March 29, 1883, (Paris: Calmann Levy, 1883). 19 For more information on Pan-Islamic reforms, see Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, History o f the Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise o f Modem Turkey, 1808-1975 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 259-260. 20 David Kushner, The Rise o f Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908 (London: Cass Press, 1977), 4. 93 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that would serve as a counterforce against nationalism originating from the modem West and leading to disintegration of the Empire. The Sultan had some strong nationalistic feelings even though he was the chief promoter of Islamism advocating brotherhood of all the Muslims in the world by de-emphasizing their ethnic or national origins. However, “he seems not to have 0 1 reiterated it in public.” Indeed, as David Kushner points out, Abdiilhamit II viewed himself as a Turk. In a discussion with the Grand Vezir, Hayrettin Pa§a, in 1879, the Sultan said “Pa§a, I am a Turk, and I shall remain a Turk.”2 2 This points to an example of preference falsification on the part of Abdulhamid II. Preference falsification was, in fact, not uncommon in the Ottoman House. Even the last Caliph Abdulmecid Efendi enjoyed painting portraits in his private life even though Islam forbids drawing human form. Islamism, Secularism and Turkish Nationalism The clash between traditional Islamic society and the impact of Western modernity represents a crisis in values. Such a crisis was aggravated as the Ottoman society, based on collective morals, faith in religious ideals, encountered the reforms whose rationale came from values such as individual freedom, rationalism in science and humanistic ideals. The coexistence of contending values originating from 21 See David Kushner, The Rise o f Turkish Nationalism, 21. 22 Mahmut Kemal Inal, Osmanli Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar [The Last Grand Vezirs in the Ottoman Era], vol. 4 (Istanbul, 1953), 923, quoted in David Kushner, The Rise o f Turkish Nationalism, 105, n. 10. 94 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. different worldviews inevitably resulted in social chaos.2 3 By the beginning of the 20th century, it was clear that the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of collapse. The opening of Pandora’s box in the spring of the Second Constitutional Era in 1908 led to the crystallization of ideas regarding the decline of the Empire. Three schools of thought emerged: The first was the Western secularist modernists who believed Islam created an intellectual barrier that prevented Muslims from comprehending not only their defects but also Western modernism. For them, “the domination of the Seriat over all departments of life was at the base of all the backwardness. ”2 4 The second was the Islamists who saw the decline was neither because of Islam nor of the §eriat’ s influence. On the contrary, “the Seriat was not applied and had not been made to cover every department and detail of life.”2 5 The third was the Turkists for whom the causes of the decline lay not in Islam per se but in Islam’s neglect of new conditions and “the loss of national culture through Islam’s tendency to superimpose itself as a civilization at the expense of national cultures.”2 6 All the schools agreed that the Western technology was superior to indigenous technologies so that it had to be adopted. However, they differed over the remedies for social decadence. The first school’s remedy for the decline was Westernization, the second’s Islamization and the third’s Turkification. 23 Indeed, many Turkish novels, starting from the very first ones, took their themes from these double standards. See for example, Peyami Safa, Fatih-Harbiye, 17t h ed. (Istanbul: Ottiken Nejriyat, 1999). 24 Niyazi Berkes, Development o f Secularism, 348. 25 Niyazi Berkes, Development o f Secularism, 349. 26 Niyazi Berkes, Development o f Secularism, 351. 95 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Westemists claimed that Western civilization with its technology and culture constitutes a monolithic whole into which Turkey had to immerse itself as quickly as possible. Tevfik Fikret advocated that humanistic morality replace Islamic morality. Dr. Abdullah Cevdet advised Turks to convert en masse to Western civilization. He advocated changing everything, except the language, into 97 something Western. The Islamists were rigidly opposed to Western civilization, especially its cultural aspects. Assuming technology could be extracted from civilization, the Islamists preferred to keep Islamic civilization that included Islamic culture while selectively adopting modem technology. Mehmet Akif claimed that Islam posed no obstacle to technical progress. In order to overcome the West, all Muslims had to turn their eyes to the Golden Age of Islam when the Prophet and the rightly-chosen four Caliphs led people to a perfect Islamic society. Said Nursi asserted that the Islamic state had to again fully enforce all the provisions of the §eriat, including muamele and ukubat, and punishment in accordance with the §eriat. The Turkists shared some views of both the Islamists and the Western modernists while rejecting others. Relying on a definite separation between culture and civilization, in the early 1900s they recommended that Turkey had to join the only international civilization, the Western one, by taking its universal technology on the way towards a consolidation of its own national culture. Ziya Gokalp, the 27 For Dr. Abdullah Cevdet and his political thoughts, see §ukru Hanioglu, Bir Siyasal Du§iinur Olarak Doktor Apdullah Cevdet ve Donemi [As a Political Thinker Dr. Apdullah Cevdet and his Period] (Istanbul: T A pd al Ne§riyat, 1981). 96 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ideologue of the Turkist Young Turks movement, summed up the ‘social ideal:’ “We are of the Turkish nation, of the Islamic religious community, of Western civilization.”2 8 Assuming Islam and Western modernism could be integrated into each other under the umbrella of Turkish nationalism, he attempted to arrive at a new synthesis in which the Turkish nation enjoyed Western technology in its right while fortifying Turkish cultural life based on Islamic moral values. In fact, Gokalp called for the nationalization of Islam for which he advanced the proposal of a new theory of the §eriat to reform Islam. Leaving ibadet aside, he recalled the distinction among the sources of the §eriat: the base sources (the Qur’an and the siinnet) called nusus (nass in singular) and orf (customary law), which includes hyas and igma. The muamele regulating social relations was, for him, derived from the latter even obligations to the others originating from the base sources, so that orf might replace 9Q nass. Thus, he inferred that orf could be nationalized and could be religion. He demanded a secular religion, or a particular secularization of traditional Islam through nationalism. In other words, he suggested that secularized Islam could be blended into Turkish nationalism. In short, all three schools offered different remedies for the clash of Islamism and modernity: The Islamists asked for a complete re-Islamization in all areas of life 28 Ziya Gokalp, “Garba Dogru [Towards the West],” in Tiirkgulugiin Esaslari [The Principles of Turkism] (Istanbul, 1976), p. 65, quoted in Taha Parla, The Social and Political Thought o f Ziya Gokalp, 1876-1924 (Leiden, the Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1985), 25. 29 Taha Parla, The Social and Political Thought o f Ziya Gokalp, 1876-1924 (Leiden, the Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1985), 39. 97 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. by preventing further secularization. The Westemists and the Turkists rejected further Islamization and agreed on secularism, but they differed on the secularization process. The Westemists favored secularization via Westernization as the Turkists •2 A urged secularization via Turkification. While the Young Turks were in power, they gradually introduced several reforms that led to the further secularization of Turkey. The reforms eventually aimed at changes in old religious institutions that constituted the very fabric of social life. For the secular modernists, these religious institutions were the major obstacles to modernization. For that reason, secularism has been one of their major ideological guides in re-shaping the social structure. Thus, secularism in Islamic context emerged as “the acceptance of laws and other social and political institutions without reference to Islam, without being derived from, or organically linked with, the T1 principles of the Qur’an and the Sunna.” On the way towards modernizing Turkey, which is also its secularization through reforms, the modernist administrators basically followed two complementary strategies. First, they broke up traditional religious institutions, which allow them to claim that some parts had no Islamic character. Thus, reforming them would become easier. In cases where they could not separate them from religion since the stakes would be quite high they applied a second strategy: Provide an Islamic rationale that would justify the chosen reform. 30 Niyazi Berkes, Development o f Secularism, 366. 31 Fazlur Rahman, “Islamic Modernism: Its Scope, Method, and Alternatives,” International Journal o f Middle East Studies, 1 (October 1970): 331, italics in original. 98 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The secularizing reforms carried out through the first strategy in the Young Turks era were directed at separating religion from daily affairs, especially from those of the state. The §eyhulislam (Minister of Religious Affairs) was eliminated from the cabinet, and his authority over the administration of the evkaf (pious foundations) was withdrawn. A new ministry began to manage evkaf, along with the finances of all other religious institutions such as mosques and medreses (higher schools of Islamic learning). The Ministry of Justice took control of §eriat Courts and the Ministry of Education took over medreses from the hands of the §eyhulislam. Thus, as Gokalp proposed in 1915, the seculanst reformers were on their way to limiting the office of the §eyhulislam to purely religious functions as secular modernist has advocated since the Age of the Enlightenment. The second strategy appeared with the introduction of a Family Code for the first time in a Muslim country. The new code declared marriage a secular contract. Though the code accepted the religious provisions of Islam, Christianity and Judaism, the State took control of an important segment of life over which previously the §eriat and the Church had extended their monopolistic authority.3 3 Several other reforms aimed at emancipating women through secular education that would give them a chance to participate in economic life and the professions.3 4 3 2 For further information on these reforms, see Niyazi Berkes, Development o f Secularism, 411-423. 3 3 Niyazi Berkes, Development o f Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 419. See also Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, History o f the Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise o f Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 307. 3 4 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, History o f the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic, 307. 99 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Another bold step towards Western modernism was introducing a modified Western calendar (solar calendar with the origin of Islamic lunar one) while keeping the pure • * 35 Islamic one strictly for religious activities. Along with others,3 6 these reforms laid down the bases for Mustafa Kemal to completely secularize the state after Turkey emerged as a national state out of the Ottoman Empire. Relative to Gokalp, Mustafa Kemal had a more radical vision for the new state.3 7 Indeed, his ideas were more aligned with those of Dr. Abdullah Cevdet.3 8 A separation between culture and civilization was unrealistic for him. Mustafa Kemal wanted to free Turkish nationalism from Islam to anchor Turkey within the West.3 9 In response to Gokalp’s approach, Mustafa Kemal said, There are people who give different definitions for civilization. I think it is difficult and unnecessary to differentiate civilization from culture. In order to explain my view, let me define what culture is: it is the accumulation of achievements of a human society in the areas of: A - State affairs, B - the sphere of thought, namely science, sociology and fine arts, C - economic affairs, namely, agriculture, crafts, trade and commerce, and highways, sea and air transportation. ... In summary, civilization is nothing but culture.4 0 35 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, History o f the Ottoman Empire and M odem Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic, 308. 36 For other reforms see Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, History o f the Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic, 305-310. 37 Sevket S. Aydemir notified that Mustafa Kemal in his private conversations showed no affinity to the ideas of Ziya Gokalp. Aydemir further claimed that there was no evidence that would prove Mustafa Kemal was affected by the Gokalp’s ideas. See §evket, S. Aydemir, TekAdam [The Unique Man], vol. 4, 2nd ed.(Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1966), 178. 38 §evket S. Aydemir wrote that during the Second Constitutional era Mustafa Kemal followed the Igtihat [Struggle] periodical published by Dr. Abdullah Cevdet. §evket S. Aydemir, Tek Adam [The Unique Man], vol. 4,2nd ed., 117. 39 Indeed, Samuel Huntington in his book on international affairs categorizes this particular response (i.e., modernization via total Westernization) to the Western civilization as Kemalism. See Samuel Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f World Order, 73-78. 40 Afet Inan, Ataturk Hakkinda Hatiralar ve Belgeler [The Memoirs and Documents on Ataturk] (Ankara: I? Bankasi Kiiltiir Yaymlari, 1968), 278-279, quoted in Emre Kongar, “Turkey’s Cultural 100 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Mustafa Kemal had the opportunity to put his Enlightenment ideas into practice, especially Comte’s positivism and Durkheim’s solidarism4 1 when he became the sole de facto ruler of new Turkey. He indeed became the first Westernizing practitioner who welcomed Westernization as “a positive and desirable good rather than submitting to it regretfully as a necessary evil.”4 2 As Huntington writes, Kemal’s response to the West is “Toynbee’s Herodianism, to embrace both modernization and Westernization” with the assumption “that modernization is desirable and necessary, that the indigenous culture is incompatible with modernization and must be abandoned or abolished, and that society must fully Westernize in order to successfully modernize.”4 3 To further quote Arnold Toynbee, he set for the nation “a maximum instead of a minimum program.”4 4 This maximum program included Turkey’s complete secularization. Indeed, “[b]oth secularization and Westernization in the Modem Turkish Republic reached beyond the limits envisaged by the Turkists.”4 5 I discuss in a moment how and to what extent Mustafa Kemal established secularism and its Transformation,” in Giinsel Renda and C. Max Kortepeter (eds.) The Transformation o f Turkish Culture: The Ataturk Legacy (Princeton, New Jersey: Kingston Press, 1986), 53-54, Kongar’s translation. 41 Paul Dumont, “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology,” in Jacob M. Landau (ed.), Ataturk and the Modernization o f Turkey (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), 41. 42 Arnold J. Toynbee, “Mustafa Kemal,” in Men o f Turmoil: Biographies by Leading Authorities o f the Dominating Personalities o f Our Day (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), 176. 44 Samuel Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f World Order, 73. 44 Arnold J. Toynbee, “Mustafa Kemal,” 176. 45 David Kushner, The Rise o f Turkish Nationalism, 102. 101 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. institutionalization in Turkey in detail. And then, I further examine the Islamic reaction to secularism in Turkey. The Opportunity: M. Kemal in Power Turkey was the first state in the Muslim world to attempt to resolve the problem of the “inability” of Islamic thought and institutions to deal with many aspects of the “modem” world. In an attempt to keep step with the West, Turkey adopted a radical formula. It chose to abandon the principle that Islam is the basic source of guidance and legitimacy to all aspects of life. Kemalism constituted a decisive blow to this principle. To be able to disseminate religion’s supremacy over daily life, the Kemalists needed to be in power with no opposition. The Ottoman Empire entered the First World War with the Entente countries against the Allied powers in November 11, 1914. After the Allies defeated the Ottomans, they started to occupy the Ottoman heartland, Anatolia. The National Struggle Movement organized in the central Anatolia, however, succeeded in overcoming the Allied occupation. M. Kemal emerged as the leader during the campaign. The Mudanya Armistice Treaty on October 11, 1922 de jure declared that the war in Anatolia was over. By this time the old polity and system of values had been disintegrating, but the reconstruction process had barely begun. At this critical juncture of history for Turkey, M. Kemal seized the opportunity to reshape and consolidate, if not reform, a social value, namely secularism. For him, Islam was one of the major obstacles, if not the one, preventing Turkey from modernization, which meant Westernization. He believed that Islam 102 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. harbors no concept of development. It was, in his mind, incompatible with the only existing civilization (i.e., Western civilization). He summarized the ultimate aim for Turkey as follows: “For centuries the Turks have been moving in the same direction. Always from the east to west. There are many countries but one civilization. National progress means participation in this civilization.”4 6 Thus, Kemalism set positivistic ideals on the way to civilize and modernize (read: westernize) the country as a whole. Within these ideals, Islam had no place. In fact, a kind of secularism that would force religion to withdraw from daily life by curbing it was essential for catching up to and reaching beyond the contemporary level of western civilization. In his last state of the union address to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on November 1, 1937, he repeated the great goal: “to raise our national life to the highest level of civilization and prosperity which a nation can attain.”4 7 Back in the early 1920s M. Kemal wanted to have full control in order to realize such an ideal. He spoke his mind once as follows: “Let the people leave the politics alone for the present. Let them [find] interest in agriculture and commerce. For ten or fifteen years more I must rule. After that perhaps I may be able to let them speak openly.”4 8 46 As quoted by Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy o f Turkey (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 1. 47 As quoted in Donald E. Webster, “State Control of Social Change in Republican Turkey,” American Sociological Review, 4 (April, 1939), 247. 48 As quoted in E.W.F. Tomlin, Turkey: The M odem M iracle (London: Watts & Co., 1940), 42. 103 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Distortion of Collective Decisions Only as a result of preference falsification a radical group in power take revolutionary measures and have them approved by a predominantly conservative parliament. The conservatives must not speak their mind, even maintain silence. They must participate in decisions in a way proposed by the radicals. An immediate consequence of preference falsification is, thus, the distortion of collective decisions. This was exactly what happened in the early TGNA, especially in the First Assembly of 1920 -1923 in Turkey. Before the years of peace close to the final victory, M. Kemal anticipated the internal power struggles that would take place in Turkey. To Halide Edip who said, “After you take Izmir, Pa§a, you will rest, you have struggled so hard,” he replied, “Rest? What rest? After the Greeks, we will fight each other, we will eat each other.” When Halide Edip asked, ’’Why should we?” M. Kemal answered with a question, “What about the men who have opposed me?” She said, “Well, it was natural in a National Assembly.” With vengeful eyes in a smiling face, M. Kemal spoke, “I will [have] those [referring especially two of his political enemies] lynched by the people. No, we will not rest, we will kill each other .... When the struggle ends it will be dull; we must find some other excitement, Hanum Efendi.”4 9 He was anxious for the opportunity to take power to construct the Turkey he had envisioned. 49 Lord Kinross [Patrick Balfour], Ataturk: A Biography o f Mustafa Kemal, Father o f Modem Turkey (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1978; orig. ed., 1964), 357. 104 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Though M. Kemal emerged as the leader, he was “the first among equals.” It was a small core group of officials and civilians that led to victory. Besides M. Kemal, Rauf Bey, the commander of the Navy, Kazim Karabekir Pa?a, hero of the Eastern front, Ali Fuat Pa§a, the first Ambassador to Moscow, Refet Pa?a, the War time Defense Minister, and ismet Pa§a, the commander of the Western front, were some of the key officials. The noted civilians were two: Halide Edip and Dr. Adnan. Together they were de facto in power. Rauf Bey had religious and traditional loyalties. Kazim Karabekir Pa§a and Ali Fuat Pa§a were too conservative for the future Turkey in M. Kemal’s mind. Halide Edip and Dr. Adnan were naive about power politics and idealistic about American-style democracy, ismet Pa§a was the only one M. Kemal could rely upon to cooperate.5 0 The first task after the Armistice was to sign a peace treaty. The opportune moment for M. Kemal to take the first crucial step in reconstructing Turkey arrived. British diplomats invited the Ankara Government and the Sultan’s Government in istanbul to Lausanne to negotiate. The istanbul Government accepted the invitation. Yet, two-headed representation was unacceptable for M. Kemal. He decided to terminate the political power of the Throne forever. The practical formula he came up with was to separate the Sultanate and the Caliphate and abolish the former.5 1 so ismet’s collaboration would be more useful, especially after M. Kemal had a heart attack in late 1923. 51 After the Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Selim invaded Egypt in 1517 he took the title of the Caliph (successor to Prophet Muhammed). Thereupon the Ottoman Sultans had claimed the title. 105 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. However, this was not easy to accomplish. It had to be approved by the Assembly. The First TGNA that carried the nation to victory was composed of a variety of people “ranging from a number of bigoted individuals who wore fez to Kurds and Circassians wrapped up in their national costumes, astrakhan-wearing nationalists, the doctor, pharmacist, commander, ulema, judge, dervish, sheikh, lawyer, telegraph official - pasha, bey, efendi, aga, haci, hoca, of every sort, from every occupation, all the types of a society.” In such a setting, cliques and fractions were quick to form. Back in May, 1921, M. Kemal led the formation of a unifying parliamentary party called the Defense of Right Group (also named as the First Group), which would later turn into the People’s Party. In response to the Kemalists, some of the opposition began to organize under the name of the Second Group. According to Frederic W. Frey’s classic book on The Turkish Political Elite, the First Group had 197 members, the Second Group had 118, the remaining 122 deputies had no affiliation with either group.5 3 Another more recent study on the First Assembly by Ahmet Demirel claims that the First Group consisted of 202 deputies, that the Second Group had only 63, and that the number of non-affiliates was 90.5 4 Although 52 Ali K1I 19, Kihg Ali Hatiralarmi Anlatiyor, [K1I19 Ali Presents His Reminiscences] (Istanbul: Sel Yaymlari, 1955), 67. It was also quoted partly as above in Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, Mass: M. I. T. Press, 1965), 306. 53 Frederic W. Frey, Turkish Political Elite, 307. 54 Demirel wrote that 82 deputies were already left out from the First Assembly before the formation of the Groups. Therefore, he claims that Frey’s classification is grossly misleading. For the comparison of the classifications in Frey’s study and his, see Table 3 in Ahmet Demirel, Birinci M eclis’te Muhalefet: Ikinci Grup [Opposition in the First Assembly: the Second Group], 2n d ed. (Istanbul: IletijimYayinlan, 1995; first ed., 1994), 134. 106 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the First and the Second Groups had almost equal numbers of clerics, the Second Group tended to be more conservative.5 5 Frey wrote, “The symbolic expression of the Kemalists’ opposition to the Second group and to provincials focused on religion.”5 6 For Demirel, however, the raison d ’ etre behind the formation of the Second Group was the Kemalist tendency to circumvent the Assembly in ruling the country. Therefore, the Second Group was formed in opposition to “anti-democratic Kemalist rule” and it aimed at preventing the concentration of power in M. Kemal’s hands. One way or another, M. Kemal had many obstacles to the way he wanted to abolish the Sultanate. M. Kemal’s overall concern was, therefore, threefold. From the most important to the least, the first worry came from his close but moderate associates and clergy among the First Group; the second from the Committees such as that of §eriat controlled by the ulema, and the third from the Second Group deputies plus the non-affiliated ones, among whom were many men of religion and conservative deputies.5 7 55 Secularist, Islamist and Marxist writers shared this commonly accepted opinion about the First and the Second Group in the First Assembly. Ahmet Demirel agrees with neither. For his explanation on why and how such an opinion was constructed, see Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis ’ te Muhalefet: Ikinci Grup [Opposition in the First Assembly: the Second Group], especially, 18-24. For his own explanation about the formation of the Second Group see below. 56 §erif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” Daedalus, 102 (1973): 169- 190, 181. 57 The 13% of the First Group was clerics whereas the Second Group had 15% and the non-affiliates had 29%. Frederic W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, Mass: M. I. T. Press, 1965), 311-312. According to Demirel’s classification, the First Group had 9.9% clerics, only 3.2% made up the clergy in the Second Group while 21.1% of non-affiliates was also clerics. 107 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In three separate stages, each of which exemplifies several incidents of preference falsification, M. Kemal was able to produce enough pressure to force his opponents to falsify their preferences. These three incidents of preference falsification led to the distortion of collective decisions. The decisions that M. Kemal wanted were achieved through preference falsification. Let us see how the Kemalists carefully handled each stage. The rumors about a proposal being drafted to abolish the Sultanate irritated some deputies, even the leading figures of the nationalist movement. Rauf Bey invited M. Kemal to dinner in Refet Pa§a’s home at Kefioren, a district of Ankara. At the dinner, Refet and Ali Fuat were also present. In Kemal’s words, Rauf Bey said, “The Assembly is grieved to observe that the aim of the abolition of the Throne and, perhaps, even the Caliphate is being pursued. They distrust you and the attitude you will adopt in the future. I am, therefore, of the opinion that you ought to CO reassure the Assembly and thereby national public opinion.” In return, M. Kemal asked Raufs personal opinion. Rauf Bey replied, “I am devoted with my heart and soul to the Throne and Caliphate ... It is my duty to remain loyal to the Padi§ah [Sultan], Regarding my attachment to the Caliphate, it is 58 M. Kemal [Ataturk], Nutuk/Sdylev [Speech], vol 2, 3r d ed. (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1989), 910. English reader may also see M. Kemal [Ataturk], A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler Press, 1927), 572. M. Kemal made a six-day long speech to the deputies of the Republican Peoples’ Party in October, 1927, just before the fifth anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic. This Speech called Nutuk in Turkish summarized the Turkish National Struggle and its afterwards by M. Kemal. It appeared in English as M. Kemal [Ataturk], A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal cited above. But, some parts of Nutuk are missing in the English edition, which is also full of typological errors. I prefer to use the original Nutuk published in Turkish. All quotations from Nutuk will be my translation. I will also give references to the English version for the English reader, except in the cases of passages published only in Nutuk. 108 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. imposed upon me by my education. ... The abolition of this dignity [the Sultanate and the Caliphate together] and attempts to replace it with a body o f a different character would lead to disappointment and disaster. This is not to be thought of.”5 9 Refet’s reply to Kemal’s inquiry was the same as Raufs. “I entirely share Rauf Bey’s opinion. In fact, no other form of Government can come into question for us than that of the Sultanate and Caliphate.”6 0 Ali Fuat hesitated to say anything. Recently back from Moscow, he said he had no opinion about the public sentiment as yet. The discussion went on until the morning during which M. Kemal appeased them by evading answers. This was an example of preference falsification on Kemal’s part, but to achieve his aim M. Kemal needed his entourage to engage in preference falsification in favor of abolishing the Sultanate.6 1 A few days later, however, M. Kemal decided that the moment to act had come. He invited Rauf Bey to his room in the Chamber. Pretending not to recall anything from the previous nightlong discussion, he demanded, “We shall separate the Caliphate from the Sultanate and abolish the Sultanate. You will make a declaration from the tribune to the effect that you approve of this fact.”6 2 M. Kemal 59 M. Kemal [Ataturk], Nutuk/Sdylev vol. 2, 912, and M. Kemal [Ataturk], Speech, 573. 6 0 M. Kemal [Ataturk], Nutuk/Sdylev vol. 2, 912, and M. Kemal [Ataturk], Speech, 573. 61 Rauf Bey and many other deputies were right to be suspicious about the hidden intention of M. Kemal to abolish both the Throne and the Caliphate. In engaging a tactical preference falsification, M. Kemal at the time (October-November, 1922) stated that he aimed only to abolish the Throne but not the Caliphate. He was not sincere when he made a speech about the importance of the Caliphate before the Assembly voted for the abolition of the Throne. He later wrote in his famous Speech that: “When I decided to separate the Throne form the Caliphate and first abolish the Throne ...” {Nutuk, 914, my emphasis). As having said that he first intended to abolish the Sultanate, he overtly implied that he had already had the intention of abolishing the Caliphate later. 62 M. Kemal [Ataturk], Nutuk/Sdylev vol. 2, 914, and M. Kemal [Ataturk], Speech, 574. 109 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. demanded that Kazim Karabekir express himself the same way. Both Rauf and Kazim well perceived the Kemalists’ pressure. In fact, on the same day, Rauf Bey made a public declaration from the tribune supporting the draft as the Kemalists requested. He even suggested that the day on which the Sultanate would be abolished should be commemorated as a public holiday.6 3 This was, of course, [not] surprising to M. Kemal. In The Nutuk, M. Kemal wrote, Here, one point might be puzzling in minds. Rauf Bey regarded it to be his duty to remain loyal to the Padi§ah [Sultan] and had spoken of the fatal consequences which might follow an attempt to replace the Sultanate by a body of quite different description. This same Rauf Bey had now succumbed to my new resolution after it had been brought to his knowledge, and he even yielded to my proposal and my decision so far as to advocate the abolition of the Sultanate, without having expressed in any way his own opinion on the subject. How can such a proceeding be explained?6 4 Here is an explanation: Rauf Bey engaged in preference falsification. So did Kazim Karabekir. So did Refet.6 5 So did the others. They all manipulated public perceptions and especially those the other deputies held about the opinion of influential war heroes. In doing so, they distorted collective decisions in giving the deputies and the public the impression that the Kemalists were a unified majority. 63 See M. Kemal [Ataturk], Nutuk/Sdylev vol. 2, 914, and Rauf Orbay, Cehennem Degirmeni: Siyasi Hatiralarim [The Wheel of Hell: My Political Memoirs], vol. 2 (istanbul: Emre Yayinlari, 1993), 111. In his memoirs, Rauf Orbay did not refer to the meeting at Kefioren. 6 4 M. Kemal [Ataturk], Nutuk/Soylev vol. 2, 914, and M. Kemal [Ataturk], Speech, 574. 65 This became obvious later as all three favored an Islamic state, specifically a constitutional monarchy under the Caliph. It became clear from their reactions to the proclamation of the Republic, the abolition of the Caliphate and the following reforms. They would later constitute the main pillars of the Progressive Republican Party, which was founded in 1924 in opposition to the KemaTs Republican People Party. 110 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The eighty deputies under the leadership of M. Kemal drafted a Constitutional Act terminating the Ottoman Throne and confirming the sovereign rights as belonging to the people. As soon as the draft came to the floor in October 30, 1922, it created a hot debate in the third session of the Assembly over which M. Kemal himself presided. The First Group wanted it to be approved as soon as possible. Among others, Rauf Bey, Kazim Karabekir Pa§a, Ali Fuat Pa§a, and ismet Pa§a made speeches in support of the draft. Some Second Group deputies also made supportive speeches. The more religious deputies, however, wanted to make speeches claiming they had some questions about the procedure. Some wanted to be assured about the future of the Caliphate. Hakki Hami Bey and Haci Mustafa Efendi asked to address the Assembly about the procedure. Salahaddin Bey, Ziya Hur$it Bey and some others were vocally opposed to the draft. However, whenever they wanted to address the Assembly, either the Kemalist deputies or the President M. Kemal himself suppressed these attempts. Mostly, the First Group deputies shouted at the dissident voices. The President did not let them come to the podium. Presiding over the session M. Kemal demanded open balloting so that each deputy’s position would be easily known by others, ismail §ukrii Efendi uttered, “There cannot be voting by force.” Yet, the voting procedure continued. Some deputies, mostly from the Second Group, walked out. The name of each absentee was called one by one. While casting continued, another decree immediately passed by just raising hands requiring the deduction of the daily wage from the absentees’ salaries. When the casting was over, President M. Kemal announced the result: 132 deputies 111 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. voted for the draft, two were against, and three had abstained.6 6 There had to be 25 more votes for the enactment of the draft. Thus, M. Kemal closed the session by saying, “The procedure is incomplete, we will continue [later].”6 7 There was no meeting on October 31, 1920. M. Kemal made a speech in the group meeting of the Defense of Rights urging the abolition of the Sultanate as soon as possible. When the Assembly convened again on November 1, 1922, M. Kemal decided to push forward the draft more adamantly. He made a long speech that provided an “Islamic” justification for the draft.6 8 The deputies supporting the draft asked to send the draft to the Committee of Constitutional Act. The opposing deputies wanted to send it to the Committee of §eriat. As a result of hot debates, the Assembly decided to send the draft to a mixed committee of three; the Committee of Constitutional Act, of §eriat, and of Justice. 6 f i For the name of the deputies who participated into the voting, and the color of their votes see, TBMM-ZC (Tiirkiye Biiyiik Millet Meclisi-Zabit Ceridesi [The Turkish Grand National Assembly- Records Journal]), (30 October 1338 [1922]), vol. 24, 297-298. 67 TBMM-ZC, vol. 24 (30 October 1338 [1920]), 297. 68 See TBMM-ZC, vol. 24 (1 November 1338 [1920]), 305-311 for the full transcript of his speech. It is known that M. Kemal, by himself, studied the early history of Islam in the summer of 1920. Indeed it was one of his tactics to utilize his knowledge to impress the clerics. See Dankward A. Rustow, “Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955,” in Islam and the West: Proceeding o f the Harvard Summer School Conference on the Middle East, July 25-27, 1955, ed. Richard N. Frye (The Hague, the Netherlands: Mouton & Co., 1957), 73, and Halide Edip [Adivar], Turkish Ordeal (New York: Century Press, 1929), 168. Hasan H. Ceylan claims that M. Kemal lacked in-depth knowledge on Islamic history. By quoting Na?id Hakki Ulug, Hasan H. Ceylan writes that Prof. Seyyid Bey, an expert on Islamic law helped prepare Kemal’s statement that provided an Islamic justification for the abolition of the Sultanate. See Na§id Hakki Ulug, Ug Biiyiik Devrim [Three Great Revolutions](istanbul: Ak Yaymlan, 1973), p. 95, and Hasan H. Ceylan, Cumhuriyet Ddnemi Din/Devlet ili§kileri [Republican Era Religion/State Relations], vol. 1 (Ankara: Rehber Yaymcilik, [1991?]), 57. 112 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The mixed committee began to discuss the motion. Here is what happened then in M. Kemal’s own words. It shows how the deputies falsified their preferences in response to pressure from Kemalists, especially M. Kemal himself. These three committees met in one room. After electing Hoca Miifid Efendi as chairman, they began to deliberate. Based on sophistry known by everyone, the gentlemen of the Hocas belonging to the Committee of §eriat put forward the point of view that the Caliphate could not be separated from the Sultanate. ... We followed the debates from a comer of the crowded room. It is evident that it would have been of no avail to expect a settlement of the question in the direction at which we are aiming from such a debate at [sic] this. We were perfectly certain about that. Finally, I asked the chairman of the mixed Committee for permission to speak. I got on the bench in front of me, I made this statement in a loud voice: “Gentlemen” I declared, “neither the sovereignty nor the right to govern can be transferred by one person to anybody else by an academic debate. Sovereignty is acquired by force, by power and by violence. It was by violence that the sons of Osman acquired the power to rule over the Turkish nation and to maintain their rule for more than six centuries. It is now the nation that revolts against these usurpers, puts them in their right place and actually carries on their sovereignty. This is an actual fact. It is no longer a question of knowing whether we want to leave this sovereignty in the hands of the nation or not. It is simply a question of stating an actuality, something which is already an accomplished fact and which must be accepted unconditionally as such. And this will be done at any price. If those who are assembled here, the Assembly and everybody else would find this quite natural, it would be very appropriate from my point o f view. Conversely, the reality will nevertheless be manifested in the necessary form, but in the event it is possible that some heads will be chopped off.6 9 While uttering “some heads will be chopped off,” M. Kemal was pointing to the neck of Hoca Mustafa Efendi, an influential clergy and swung one of his hand 69 M. Kemal [Ataturk], Nutuk/Sdylev vol. 2, 920, and M. Kemal [Ataturk], Speech, 577-578, my italics. 113 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. like a sword.7 0 M. Kemal was able to put enough overt pressure upon the deputies.7 1 Now, it was up to them to declare their preferences.7 2 The first response came from Hoca Mustafa Efendi, deputy for Ankara: “Pardon me, we regarded the question in another light. Now we are informed.”7 3 By this response all the ulema in the Assembly approved that, contrary to Islamic Law, which they had studied for almost all their lives, sovereignty belonged to the nation, not to the Sultan, the shadow of Allah on the Earth. On the same day, the draft settled in the mixed Committee was rushed to bring it to the second sitting of the Assembly.7 4 The Chair did not let any deputy talk about the draft again, even though four deputies asked to address to the Assembly. A motion to proceed to voting by name-calling came to the agenda. M. Kemal was well aware that this procedure had not worked two days earlier, and he also knew that many had been engaging in preference falsification. In name-calling voting the opposing activists might affect the silent majority and generate a snowballing of 70 Hasan H. Ceylan, Cumhuriyet Donemi Din/Devlet tliqkileri [Republican Era Religion/State Relations], vol. 1, 59. §evket S. Aydemir reports M. Kemal jumped to a desk announcing as he pointed a cleric deputy who had questioned the draft: “Let it be so, or some heads would be decapitated!” Aydemir added that one of Kemal’s hands swung in the air like a sword. See §evket S. Aydemir, TekAdam [The Unique Man], vol. 3, 2nd ed. (istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1966), 58. 71 In the Speech, M. Kemal told the rest: ‘“With regard to the theological aspect of the matter, the anxieties and the alarm ... are quite unjustified. I will explain this to you,” I said then I made a long statement” M. Kemal [Ataturk], Nutuk/Sdylev vol. 2, 920, andM. Kemal [Ataturk], Speech, 578. 72 Some may think that his long statement might have persuaded the mixed Committee, contradicting my explanation. I must say here that persuasion is the least, if not impossible, case scenario given that the mix Committee included the Committee of §eriat whose members devoted all their lives to studying Islamic law so that they were much more knowledgeable than M. Kemal on Islamic theology. The rush to vote the draft is another reason for ruling out the possibility of persuasion. 73 M. Kemal [Ataturk], Nutuk/Sdylev vol. 2, 920, and M. Kemal [Ataturk], Speech, 578. 74 For the records of the second sitting of the Assembly see TBMM-ZC, vol. 24 (1 November 1338 [1920]), 313-316. 114 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. unfavorable votes. He mounted the tribune and declared: “This procedure is useless. I believe that the High Assembly will unanimously adopt the principles which are 7 c destined to preserve the independence of the nation and the country for all time.” It worked. “Let’s Vote!” “Let’s Vote!” shouts arose. The chairman rushed to put the motion to the vote by hand raising and announced: “It is unanimously agreed to.” A single voice of “I am against it”7 6 was surpassed by the cries of “Silence!”7 7 Thus, at least three incidents of preference falsification played a critical role in abolishing the Ottoman Sultanate, which ended the rule of God’s shadow over temporal affairs. First, Rauf Bey helped to signal that the core group was united under the leadership of M. Kemal, even though the group was actually divided. Second, the clerics in the mixed Committee agreed that Islam had no reservation about the separation of the Sultanate and Caliphate, and the abolition o f the former. In fact, they were about to rule otherwise before M. Kemal made his famous intimidating speech, implying some of the committee members might be killed. Third, the open voting resulted in turning the draft into a law through an almost unanimous vote. It was the “unanimous” decision of an Assembly o f which fully one-fifth of the members were clerics — among them 14 muftiis and 8 leading members of the various religious orders.7 8 Not only could clerics and the other 75 TBMM-ZC, vol 24 (1 November 1338 [1920]), 314. See also M. Kemal [Ataturk], Nutuk/Sdylev vol. 2, 920, and M. Kemal [Ataturk], Speech, 578. 76 This only objection came from Ziya Hurjit Bey, who was, later, hanged with some others in 1926 due to his alleged involvement in the assassination attempt of M. Kemal in Izmir. 77 TBMM-ZC, vol 24 (1 November 1338 [1922]), 315. See also M. Kemal [Ataturk], Nutuk/Sdylev vol. 2, 920, and M. Kemal [Ataturk], Speech, 578. 78 Dankward A. Rustow, “Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955,” 73. 115 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. conservative members from the Second Group not speak, neither could the First Group deputies or non-affiliated ones.7 9 It is evident that preference falsification in response to coercion distorted the Assembly’s collective decision. It worked in favor of the Kemalists who effectively intimated all opposing groups. Law No. 308 passed on November 1, 1922, and officially had two articles:8 0 The first abolished the sovereignty of the Sultanate retroactively, starting from March 16, 1920. The second required the Assembly to choose a Caliph from the Ottoman House. The next day, the Assembly deposed Sultan Mehmed VI and appointed his cousin Abdiilmecid as the new Caliph. On April 1, 1923, the first GNA dissolved itself to prepare for the first 8 1 elections. M. Kemal and his supporters were aware that their victories had relied on coercion and intimitation within the First Assembly. Along the way to the transformation of Turkey, the Kemalists eliminated any possible overt or covert opposition that might jeopardize or delay the reforms. Indeed, M. Kemal needed an Assembly that would devote itself to Turkey’s radical reconstruction. Along the way, a political party would be useful in leading to such an Assembly. The Defense of Rights Group (i.e., the First Group) had been already turned into the People’s Party back in December, 1922. M. Kemal wrote its first and veiled 79 Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis ’ te Muhalefet: ikinci Grup [Opposition in the First Assembly: the Second Group], 2n d ed. 483. 80 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modem Turkey, 253-254. 81 The date is given as April 16 in Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f M odem Turkey, 255. I rely on M. Kemal [Atatiirk], Speech, 606 for the date, April 1. 116 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. program called Principles on April 8, 1923. The Principles had only nine articles focusing on popular sovereignty, representative government and the abolition of the Sultanate and some trivial reform proposals. M. Kemal later admitted that he * • 82 concealed the intended major reforms of the future so as not to irritate the public. No other party was allowed to exist at that time. Before the one-party elections were held in two-stages for a new Assembly in June 1923, M. Kemal said, “ I occupied myself with the new elections. ... It was my task to present the list of the candidates and to publish their names at a given time in the name of the party. ... I had chosen this procedure [two-stage elections] because I knew that there were many people with different aims in view while the elections were in preparation who were working to have themselves elected deputies by deceiving the people.”8 3 M. Kemal attempted to weed out almost all the Second Group and the non affiliated, and some conservative deputies in the First Group from the Assembly through the two-stage election procedure. In the first stage, he himself vetted the foreseen opposition.8 4 He targeted especially the men of religion and local 82 In the Nutuk, M. Kemal wrote, “There were, however, certain important and fundamental questions that were not included in the programme, such as the proclamation of the Republic, the abolition of the Caliphate, the suppression of the Ministry of Seriat, the closing of the medreses and tekkes, the introduction of the hat. ... I did not think it right, by prematurely introducing these questions into the program, to give the ignorant and reactionary the opportunity to poison the whole nation.” M. Kemal [Atatiirk], Nutuk/Soylev vol. 2, 956. See also Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modem Turkey, 254- 255. It is significant that M. Kemal himself regarded all the fundamental questions of the day to be religious in nature. This exemplifies that secularism is the backbone of the Turkish Revolution. 83 M. Kemal [Atatiirk], Nutuk/Soylev, vol. 2, 970, and M. Kemal [Atatiirk], Speech, 606. 84 Eric J. Ziircher, Turkey: Modem History (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993), 167 117 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. merchants, who tended to be religious, even the ones in the First Group.8 5 He kept only ten tame hocas “who were used to make more palatable this bitter but salutary dose of [coming] laicism and to take the sting out of the predictable charges o f a ‘godless regime.’”8 6 Thus, the pre-screened candidates were put forward to the “approval of the people” instead of free elections in which any candidate could run to “be elected by the people.”8 7 As a result, less than one third of the First Assembly (1920-1923) continued into the Second.8 8 The position of the clerics in the Assemblies fell from the second largest element, with at least 17% in the First Assembly, to the smallest occupational group, constituting only 1% of the later Assemblies.8 9 Between the Fourth to Seventh Assemblies, for fifteen years from 1931 to 1946, not one new cleric was elected to the GNA as deputy.9 0 Until the Eighth Assembly (1946-1950), during all the Assemblies, especially the Second through the Sixth (1923 - 1938), covering the Presidency of M. Kemal, an average of 72.5% incumbents were reelected.9 1 Thus, M. Kemal “personally removed its more unreliable, obstreperous, and dissident elements in order to form the cohesive 83 Bernard Lewis explains the reason why the local merchants tended to be religious: “By the eighteenth century the brotherhoods [tarikats] had established themselves in almost every town and village in Turkey. Through their close links with the guilds and corporations, they were able to dominate the professional and social, as well as religious life the artisan and much of the merchant classes.” See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 401. 86 Frederic W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, 126. 87 Hifzi Veldet Velidedeoglu, Ilk Meclis, Milli Mucadele ’ de Anadolu [The First Assembly, Anatolia during National Struggle] (Istanbul: Qagda§Yaymlan, 1990), 246, as quoted in Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis ‘te Muhalefet: Ikinci Grup [Opposition in the First Assembly: the Second Group], 2n d ed. 574-575. 88 Frederic W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, 167. 89 Frederic W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, 183. 90 Frederic W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, 126. 91 The reelection rate is calculated lfom a table in Frederic W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, 164. 118 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. legislative group that was to see the great Kemalist reforms through to completion.”9 2 The abolition of the Sultanate terminated the political power of the Throne that had ruled Turkey in the name of God for six centuries. The Kemalists were half way through in secularizing the state. For the completion of the task, they had to establish a secular regime and then disestablish the old official institutions of Islam, starting with the Caliphate. In proclaiming the Republic and abolishing the Caliphate, too, the Kemalists benefited from the results of preference falsification, though they were no longer in desperate need of votes to initiate the reforms. Supposedly reflecting all the opinion in the society, the Assembly unanimously moved to secularize the state first and daily life later. Thus, the remaining opposition continually engaged in preference falsification in response to pressures from the new Kemalist majority in the Assembly. It also led to continual distortion of collective decisions. I now turn to examine how the Kemalists secured the secularization of the state by means of preference falsification. I later focus on how they attempted to put Islam under the control of the secularized state aided by collective decision making mechanisms distorted by falsified preferences. 92 Frederic W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, 167. 119 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Secularization of the State In its classical definition, secularization refers to the separation of religion and the state. Separating Islam and the state was not easy.9 3 The first stage that led to the establishment of Kemalist secularism was the separation of religion from the state (i.e., the secularization of the state in Turkey). Secularization o f the state is taking religion out of state affairs. The effect of religion in the administration of the state ceased to exist. This did not imply, however, that the state retained no role in regulating religious affairs.9 4 Hence, the game was to secularize the state. The first crucial step was already undertaken by abolishing the Sultanate. The rest was to form a new regime based on the sovereignty of the people rather than divine rights of kings. The Proclamation of the Republic Only the Ankara Government represented Turkey at the Lausanne Peace Conference. Following the Conference, the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923 de jure announced Turkey’s independence. One of the first legislature acts of the new Assembly was ratifying the Treaty. The next issue, then, was naming the regime type. The TGNA had to name the state. The possibility of the Sultanate as a constitutional monarchy had been already ruled out. The clear alternatives that 93 This point was developed at full length in Chapter 2. 94 “Under careful scrutiny the formal separation between religion and the state in Turkey fades into vagueness in practice,” writes Howard A. Reed. See his “Secularism and Islam in Turkish Politics,” Current History, 32 (June 1957): 333. This vagueness stems from state control of Islam, which I will focus on in a few pages. 120 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. remained were an Islamic state or a secular republic.9 5 The personal differences among the core group that led to the victory soon began to proliferate.9 6 The TGNA started to polarize. After 1923, the only remaining vocal opposition to the Kemalists was from the First Group (i.e., influential former associates of the core group that led Turkey to victory and the remaining deputies from the Second Group who M. Kemal was unable to eliminate). Some were elected as independents. Contrary to M. Kemal’s expectations about having “a tamed Assembly,” the opposition to the Kemalists in the second Assembly did not vanish at all.9 7 Later, in 1924 they formed the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi), the first opposition party of Turkey. They included Rauf, Kazim Karabekir, Ali Fuat, Refet, Cafer Tayyar, Dr. Adnan and Bekir Sami. Most favored a constitutional monarchy under the Caliph, and they supported gradual and evolutionary change while conforming as much as possible to old customs and traditions. When the opportunity rung again, M. Kemal did not hesitate to eliminate his one-time close comrades from politics, but the new regime type was the first item on his agenda. 95 Niyazi Berkes, Development o f Secularism in Turkey, 455. 96 Michael M. Finefrock shows how a small group of military leaders conducted the nationalist movement under the circumstances of power vacuum created by the decay and collapse of traditional institutions. And later, in the period of political revolution he examines in detail how the violent controversy broke up among them over issues of political change. See Michael M. Finefrock, “From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924,” (Ph. D. diss., Princeton University, 1976), especially chapter 14. 97 Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis ’te Muhalefet: Ikinci Grup [Opposition in the First Assembly: the Second Group], 589-599. 121 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The opportune moment for M. Kemal to take the crucial step in completing the first phase of secularizing the state had arrived. Ankara was declared the permanent capital of the state. The lack of perfect agreement in this matter underlying the personal differences brought a Cabinet crisis in late October, 1923. Rauf Bey resigned from the Prime Ministry and went to istanbul. Ali Fuat and Kazim Karabekir left their seats in the Assembly to accept commands of the First and Second armies after they were forced to choose between politics and the army. Kazim Karabekir began to reside in Konya, headquarters of the Second Army. Halide Edip had no seat in the Assembly, since women were not yet allowed to serve. Dr. Adnan was in istanbul for some reason. Thus, the most likely ones who were capable of opposing the Kemalists were not in the capital. For M. Kemal, they were the most capable of precluding the radical reforms. In addition, ismet had just returned to Ankara from Lausanne. He was the only one who would support M. Kemal’s radical measures. The last obstacle for Kemal to overcome was the possible reaction from the remaining opposition in the Assembly. When the People’s Party could not agree on the constituency of a new ministry, as the head of the Party M. Kemal requested the entire Cabinet resign in order to resolve the issue through Constitutional change.9 8 M. Kemal invited a few friends, including ismet and Fethi, whom he trusted, to dinner on October 28, 1923. 98 Donald E. Webster, The Turkey o f Ataturk: Social Process in the Turkish Transformation (New York: AMS Press, 1939), 105. 122 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. During the dinner, he declared, “Tomorrow, we shall proclaim the Republic.” After the meal, all but ismet left. M. Kemal and ismet prepared a draft Constitution." On October 29, 1923, M. Kemal spoke to the People’s Party caucus about the “necessary changes” for the Constitution, ismet read the draft. The Ministry of Justice, M. Kemal’s ally, stated that there existed no procedural matter that might delay the changes. Some murmurs arose from the conservatives and the Islamist factions that identified the republican form of government with atheism and communism.1 0 0 A heated debate broke out in the caucus from 10:00 to 18:00. At 20:30, as a result of a voting by raising hands, the Assembly unanimously proclaimed the form of the State a Republic.1 0 1 Fifteen minutes later, M. Kemal was also elected as the first President of the Republic by the same unanimous 158 votes in an Assembly from which 130 deputies were absent. “By a masterly technique of timing, surprise tactics, and veiled intimidation, Kemal had assumed paramount 109 power over the country.” 1 fH The basic articles of the new constitution were as follows: Article 1: The Turkish State is a Republic. 99 Lord Kinross [Patrick Balfour], Ataturk, 433. 100 Niyazi Berkes, Development o f Secularism in Turkey, 455. 101 TBMM-ZC, vol 3 (29 October 1339 [1923]), 96. 102 Lord Kinross [Patrick Balfour], Ataturk, 434. 103 Law No. 364 covered all the following changes in the Constitution. See TBMM Kavanin Mecmuasi [TGNA Laws Journal], vol 2 2n d ed. (Ankara: TBMM Matbaasi, 1942), 125. Based on the Constitutional changes of October, 29, 1923, a new full Constitution was approved in April, 1924 in the Assembly. For a full text in English, see Appendix D in Donald E. Webster, The Turkey o f Ataturk, 297-306. The Constitution of 1924 legally consolidated the Kemalist power base by laying “the groundwork for the stable and powerful government Turkey needed in order to achieve rapid social, cultural, and economic development.” See Vakur Versan, “The Kemalist Reform of Turkish Law and Its Impact,” in Ataturk and the Modernization o f Turkey, ed. Jacob M. Landau (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), 248. 123 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Article 2: The religion of the Turkish State is Islam;1 0 4 the official language is Turkish; the seat of the government is Ankara. Article 3: Sovereignty belongs without restriction to the nation. Article 4: The Grand National Assembly of Turkey is the sole lawful representative of the nation, and exercises its sovereignty in the name of nation. As A. Toynbee stated1 0 5 if a strictly orthodox Muslim Assembly, without M. Kemal, had drafted the Constitution, the articles would have been as follows: Article 1: Islam is a theocratic community. Article 2: The incumbent of the Islamic Caliphate is the Ottoman Padi^ah; the language of Islam is Arabic; the holy places of Islam are Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. Article 3: Sovereignty belongs without hesitation to Allah. Article 4: The Caliph as the Holy representative of Allah exercises His sovereignty in the name of Allah.1 0 6 The new constitution gave the President the right to choose a Prime Minister, who would, in turn, form the Cabinet accountable to the Assembly. However, as Robert Ergang asserts, “Although the government was theoretically managed by a written constitution and an elected assembly, it was not the rule of many but one. 1 07 All power m the state was concentrated in Kemal’s hand.” Indeed, M. Kemal became “a President in triplicate - head of the State, effective head of the Cabinet and the Parliament, head of the only party.”1 0 8 All these mean he was an almighty 104 This phrase was eliminated later from the Constitution of 1924 in 1928. See below. 105 Arnold J. Toynbee, “Abolition of Ottoman Caliphate,” in Survey o f International Affairs, ed. Arnold J. Toynbee (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), 6 8 . 106 The last two imaginary articles are my addition. 107 Robert Ergang, Europe in Our Time; 1914 to the Present (New York: Health Press, 1958), 302- 303. Karl Kruger stresses the same point. He wrote, “While the Turkish Parliament retains its theoretical responsibility, the executive power rests with the Ghazi [M. Kemal] and his immediate entourage.” See Karl Kruger, Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1932), 73. 108 Lord Kinross [Patrick Balfour], Ataturk, 434. 124 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. leader in power. When an admiring friend, Tevfik §ukrii, equated him with the Holy Trinity itself, “Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,” M. Kemal responded with a glint in his eyes, “It is true. But don’t tell anyone.”1 0 9 All knew, but under such circumstances they maintained silence. In accepting the failure of the attempt to establish an Islamic state under the Caliph, the other four fathers of the War— Rauf, Kazim Karabekir, Refet, and Ali Fuat— after their first negative reactions, all publicly declared their support for the Republic. From then on, for the next fifteen years, neither M. Kemal nor anyone else openly questioned that he was the sole ruler of the Republic, which he and his supporters had created. Controlling political power was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the reconstruction of Turkey through reforms. The sufficient condition was the participation of those involved in the process. The reforms provided the institutional framework that forced first the elite and then the masses to engage in preference falsification. Before moving on, let me show how the reforms were realized through distorted collective decision mechanisms. I then discuss how the reforms effectively established Kemalist secularism with the step-by-step involvement of the masses in the proposed public discourse. 109 Lord Kinross [Patrick Balfour], Ataturk, 434. 125 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Abolition of the Caliphate M . Kemal did not wait long to take radical measures to dislodge Islam as a means o f changing the traditional/religious way of life. A masterful pragmatist, he first began to dissolve the old official Islamic institutions. Then, he put Islam under state control. The process of disestablishing old religious institutions and that of introducing the new ones went hand in hand. In order to prevent the old ones from being revitalized, the new ones had to be in place immediately. The following section first discusses disestablishing Islam and then attempting to put what was left under supervision. As Bernard Lewis has pointed out, “Turkish Islam had always functioned on two levels; the formal, legal, dogmatic religion of the State, the schools and the hierarchy; and popular, mystical intuitive faith of the masses ....”11 0 Official Islam was a direct threat to a new regime and up-coming reforms. “The potentially effective ruling-class opposition to Mustafa Kemal, and the effective leadership which that opposition might give the peasantry, were concentrated precisely in those high Moslem vestigial institutions which clustered about the Caliphate and the brotherhoods.”1 1 1 Thus, official Islam could activate popular Islam that might have jeopardized the new regime. 110 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modem Turkey, 398-399. 111 Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, The United States and Turkey an d Iran (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), 75. I was led to that quotation by Walter F. Weiker, Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and Its Aftermath (Leiden: E. J. Brill Press, 1973), 12. 126 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. More important, for M. Kemal, the state ought not to serve Islam. On the contrary, Islam ought to serve the state. The main item in Kemal’s agenda was the following: The old institutions at the service of Islam had to be abolished and replaced by new (religious or non-religious) ones that would reform popular Islam. In time, as §erif Mardin noted, “By replacing the official religion [whose most important function is to provide a legitimating framework for the religion of the lower classes] with the principle of laicisme, Ataturk erased the possibilities of legitimization offered by the framework. The Tittle man’s’ religion was thus placed in an ambiguous situation tolerated but not secured. It was this tension that Ataturk hoped would work in favor of secularization in the. long-run.”1 1 2 The first and foremost religious institution at the top of official Islam that had to disappear immediately was the Caliphate. M. Kemal ironically became the elected president of a state recognizing both the temporal and spiritual authority of a Caliph over his population. M. Kemal was very well aware of the fact that he could not secularize the state as long as a Caliph remained in Turkey. As usual, he was quick to see and reshape the opportunities to eliminate the Caliphate. Two incidents provided the basis for him to take action. The first arose when a letter from Indian dignitaries, the Agha Khan and Ameer Ali, urging “imminent necessity for maintaining the religious and moral solidarity of Islam by placing the Caliph-Imamate on a basis which would command 112 Serif Mardin, “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution,” International Journal o f Middle East Studies, 2 (July 1971): 208-209. Laicisme is a French term for secularism. 127 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the confidence and esteem of the Muslim nations,”1 1 3 appeared in the istanbul press in late November, 1923, before it officially arrived in Ankara. On the basis of this letter the Kemalists claimed that the Caliph might interfere with the Republic’s temporal relations with the Muslim world. It was clear to them that the role of the Caliph could not only be spiritual. The second incident arose when M. Kemal was informed that Caliph Abdtilmecid, had requested an increase in the Caliphal Treasury from the state budget. M. Kemal first asked whether such a Treasury existed. In the telegram he sent from Izmir to the Prime Minister ismet in Ankara on January 22, 1924, he clearly stated, “the Caliphate does not and could not have a Treasury.”1 1 4 He immediately ordered cut all state financial funds that might go to the Caliphate. While in izmir, M. Kemal prepared the grounds for curbing any possible reaction from the public by announcing, in advance, the intention of abolishing the Caliphate to a conference of journalists, and exhorting them not to treat it as a “controversial” issue.1 1 5 The final blow to the Caliphate came on the very first day the Assembly started its fourth annual session in March 1, 1924. In his state of the union address, President M. Kemal said, “It has now become plainly evident truth that it is necessary to liberate and to elevate the Islamic religion ... from its position of being a 113 As quoted in Niyazi Berkes, Development o f Secularism, 458. 114 §evket S. Aydemir, Tek Adam [The Unique Man], vol 3, 2nd ed. 168. 115 Arnold J. Toynbee, “Abolition of Ottoman Caliphate,” in Survey o f International Relations, ed. Arnold J. Toynbee (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), 61, n. 7. 128 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. tool of politics.” 1 1 6 In other words, Islam had to be withdrawn from politics, a cmcial sphere of daily life. Two religious deputies, §eyh Saffet and Halil Hulki • 1 IV Efendi, with the fifty other deputies prepared the draft on abolishing the Caliphate. The only two deputies who criticized the draft were Halit Bey and Zeki Bey. The strong opposition came from Zeki [Kadirbeyoglu] Bey, one of the few independent deputies outside the only existing party, the People’s Party.1 1 8 Strong opposition might have come from the only remaining opposition elements in the Assembly, namely the conservative wing of the core group. However, neither Rauf, nor Dr. Adnan, nor Kazim Karabekir was in the capital. Rauf and Dr. Adnan were in istanbul at the time. Kazim Karabekir was in Konya. There was no active and influential deputy in the Assembly who could speak out against the draft laws, and hence, could activate the remaining opposition members and undecided ones. Following the long speeches, one in support of the draft, the other against it, the Assembly decided upon open voting for each item of the draft. Regarding the first article that abolished the Caliphate, the President asked, “Those who accept, 116 As quoted in Lord Kinross [Patrick Balfour], Ataturk, 438. 117 Dankward A. Rustow, “Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955,” 73, n. 5. Both deputies were among ten tame clerics elected by the M. Kemal’s approval. 118 Zeki Bey was not on the list of Kemal’s prescreened deputies. The people in Giimu§hane overwhelmingly wanted to elect Zeki Bey as an independent deputy. But, the civil and army officials in the district intervened to election. Consequently, M. Kemal was informed about the unrest. Zeki Bey got elected only after M. Kemal instructed the army officials as “Get back! Let the elections [there] be free. There cannot put more pressure on the people dedicated to such extent.” Mahir lz quotes this incident from unpublished memoirs of Zeki [Kadirbeyoglu], See, Mahir lz Yillarm Izi [The Trace of Years], 2n d ed. (istanbul: Kitabevi Yaymlan, [1990?]), 319. I was led to this source by Ahmet Demirel, Birinci M eclis’te Muhalefet: Ikinci Grup [Opposition in the First Assembly: the Second Group], 2n d ed. 577. 129 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. please raise [your] hand.” And, he asked again for “those who do not accept, raise [your] hand.” As he declared the result “the first article was accepted,” the cries of some deputies “unanimously” rose.1 1 9 As M. Finefrock also noticed, “Mustafa Kemal’s strategy of waiting until all predominant figures associated with the Opposition were absent from the capital, so advantageous at the time of the 120 Republic’s proclamation, proved effective once again.” Kemalists took immediate measures against possible public outbursts. The day after the abolition of the Caliphate, the Government closed down the newspaper Turan printed in Izmir because of a previously published article on why the Government could not abolish the Caliphate.1 2 1 The Government also immediately decreed that the prayers in all the hutbes had to be for the sake and salvation of the 1 9 9 nation and the Republic without mentioning the name of any person. The public generally showed outward indifference as the name of the Caliph was replaced by that of the Republican Turkey in the hutbes all over the country with a few exceptions. However, a riot did break out in Silifke, Mersin. But, the government forces crushed it and its leader, Askeri Hoca, was placed under arrest.1 2 3 Moreover, some other disturbances in Re^adiye, Bursa and Adapazan also took place following 119 TBMM-ZC, vol 7 (3 March 1340 [1924]), 65. It is not clear from the records o f the Assembly whether Zeki Bey and Halid Bey voted for or against the abolition of Caliphate. The records imply that they too should have been voted for the draft. 120 Michael M. Finefrock, “From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924,” 293. 121 ABK (Ankara Bakanlar Kurulu [Ankara Cabinet Minsters]), Karamame [Decree], 315, 5 March 1340 [1924]: CA (Cumhuriyet Ar§ivi [Archives of the Republic] Ankara) 030/18/01/01/ and 09/15/12. 122 ABK, Karamame 316, 5 March 1340 [1924]: CA (Ankara) 030/18/01/01/ and 09/15/13. 123 ABK, Karamame 1693, 5 March 1341 [1925]: CA (Ankara) 030/18/01/01/ and 013/18/4. The Independence Tribunal later sentenced Askeri Hoca to death. See below. 130 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the abolition of the Caliphate.1 2 4 All were crushed decisively. As a possible result of M. Kemal’s precautions and the remoteness of official Islam to the masses, the abolition of the Caliphate and the expulsion of the last Caliph, Abdiilmecid, and the other surviving male members from the Ottoman mling family, did not cause any major disturbance that might have prevented the Kemalists from secularizing the new Republic. The Caliphate represented the link between Islam and the past. Its abolition broke the link and crippled the entrenched forces of Islamic orthodoxy. Official Islam based on Islamic orthodoxy played a crucial role in the Ottoman Empire. Faith in God as the sole legitimate source of all power and law was “the official credo of the established political and social order.”1 2 6 The abolition of the Sultanate first and of the Caliphate thereafter shattered this credo. It also “implied the abolition of the §eriat as a law of the State because once the traditional temporal and political power had been rejected, its legal basis and structure was bound to fall too.”1 2 7 It was time for the Kemalists to replace the shards of the Holy Laws (embracing constitutional, civil, and criminal as well as ritual and doctrinal rules) with modem, secular, Western codes. 124 Qetin Qzek, Devlet ve Din [State and Religion] (istanbul: Ada Yayinlan, [1982?]), 478. 125 Arnold J. Toynbee wrote that no disturbances broke out. See Arnold J. Toynbee, “Abolition of Ottoman Caliphate,” 61-62. 126 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 259. 127 Niyazi Berkes, Development o f Secularism in Turkey, 467. 131 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Secularization of the Codes In an address on the presentation of the new Turkish code o f civil law on February 26, 1926, Mahmut Esad Bey, Minister of Justice, cited the position of the Kemalists in power: exclude religion from laws. He said, “We must never forget that the Turkish nation has decided to accept modem civilization and its principles without any condition or reservation. The most conspicuous and living practice of this is our Revolution itself. If these are features of contemporary civilization which do not seem adaptable to Turkish society, this is not because o f Turkish incapacity, but because of our medieval organization and religious codes and institutions.”1 2 8 Thus, all codes rooted in Islam had to be removed from state administration. Once done, the Kemalists completed the disestablishment of official Islam. A state in the service of enforcing these Islamic codes could not be, for Kemalists, secular. Nor could such a state modernize the country. The secularization of the state, especially the Codes, the civil code in particular, eventually had immense ramifications for daily social life. Let us first examine the secularization of the codes. I will then evaluate its ramifications. Turkey started adopting Western secular law during the Ottoman era. The codes adopted between 1839 and 1923 were as follows: French commercial law in 1850; French criminal law in part in 1858; Maritime law in 1864 combined from the laws of France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Prussia; the code of civil 128 Mahmut Esad Bey, “The Turkish Government’s New Civil Code: Address by Mahmoud Essad Bey, Minister of Justice, on the Presentation of the New Turkish Code of Civil Law to Ismet Pasha, Prime Minister, February, 1926,” Current History, 24 (July 1926): 580. 132 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. procedure in 1858 and, out of the French legislature that of criminal procedure in 1880.1 2 9 These were mainly laws on technical subjects. Though there had been limited attempts to modify family law before, the laws on family life, succession and land mainly retained their religious characteristics. Such laws, especially family law considered sacred by Islam, were taboos and no modernist Ottoman reformer could dare fully reform them. For example, the codification of civil code in Mecelle during 1870 - 1877 and the Land Code of 1858 had many Islamic elements. The new Western-oriented technical laws necessitated the establishment of lay courts, but, the §eriat Courts remained untouched in administering justice in most social areas. With immense concentration of power in their hands, only Kemalists were able to complete the secularization of all the codes in Turkey where the §eriat Courts had regulated social affairs for six hundred years. The Ministry of §eriat was also abolished with the Caliphate. Under the control of Kemalists, the Assembly terminated the §eriat courts through which the theologian-judges had implemented the Holy Law for centuries. By the Constitution of 1924, the Assembly delegated to the independent courts the exercise of judicial authority in the name of the nation. To function, the secular courts then needed secular codes. The new codes had to be unified under one legal system untouched by the spirit of Muslim law schools. Such a system could be compiled from Western 129 For further information on the reception of foreign law in Turkey, see several article in the Part I of International Social Science Bulletin, 9 (1957). 133 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. secular codes. Just before the abolition o f the Caliphate on March 1, 1924, M. Kemal asserted, “The direction to be followed in civil and family law should be nothing but that of Western civilization.”1 3 0 Following his advice, the Assembly rejected a civil code draft carrying over the spirit of §eriat.ul On another occasion at the opening of a Faculty of Law on October 5, 1925, he proposed secularizing the codes. “This nation,” he said, “has ... accepted the principle that all of its laws should be based on secular grounds only, on a secular mentality that accepts the continuous change in accordance with the change and developments of life 1 T 9 conditions and its law.” Just a year later, the Assembly took over en bloc, though by way of selection, an entire system of Western law. No deputy in the Assembly disputed the new codes.1 3 3 After endorsing speeches, the President put forward the draft for voting en bloc, contrary to the traditional way of making laws, which required voting for each item in the draft. It was again open voting by raising hands, and all the deputies unanimously approved the new codes adopted from Western secular counterparts.1 3 4 Turkey borrowed the civil code, the code of obligation, the code of civil procedure, bankruptcy law, and other measures with regard to individual rights from 130 As quoted in Niyazi Berkes, Development o f Secularism,. 470. 131 For further information on this draft, see Niyazi Berkes, Development o f Secularism in Turkey, 468-469. 132 Niyazi Berkes, Development o f Secularism in Turkey, 470. 133 See TBMM-ZC, vol. 25 (17 February 1926), 229-234. An openly Islamist deputy of the time, Zeki Bey who was adamantly against the abolition of the Caliphate was excused from his duty for one and half months because of family matters by the unanimous votes of the other deputies in the same session of the Assembly. See TBMM-ZC vol 25 (17 February 1926), 229. 134 TBMM-ZC, vol 25 (17 February 1926), 234. 134 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Switzerland. A new Turkish commercial code was compiled from the French, Swiss 1 i f and German codes. The penal code was transplanted from Italy. The codes of taxation and land, too, were reformed. In the wording of the new Codes, any possible future influence of §eriat in reading the laws was minimized. For example, Article 1 of the Swiss Civil Code authorized judges to rule in accordance with social tradition and precedents in the absence of laws applicable to the case. In such cases the Turkish Code, however, required the judge to examine the related scientific data and proceedings only. Thus, the Turkish code deliberately refrained from referring to social traditions, which might have included Islamic elements.. It prevented the §eriat rules from being reactivated by allowing traditions to play a role in judicial proceedings.1 3 6 The code of taxation annulled the a§ar, a lump-sum tax corresponding to one-tenth of the agricultural produce. The a§ar originated from the understanding that one-tenth was Allah’s right. The state refused to collect this religious tax and replaced it with a different tax at a lower rate.1 3 7 The new codes were based on the Kemalists’ beliefs rather than on existing social customs and mores and religious principles. They reflected how the Kemalists wanted to see Turkey. In presenting the new Turkish civil code to the Assembly, Mahmut Esad Bey, the Minister of Justice, claimed, “The Turkish nation will be saved from the false beliefs, traditions, and fluctuations which have encumbered it 135 Vakur Versan, “The Kemalist Reform of Turkish Law and Its Impact,” 249. 136 Gothard Jaschke, Yerti Turkiye’ de Islamlik [Islam in Modem Turkey], trans. Hayrullah Ors (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1972; orig. German ed., 1951), 24. 137 Gothard Jaschke, Yeni Turkiye’ de Islamlik [Islam in Modem Turkey], 26. 135 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. during thirteen centuries past [referring to all Islamic history from the six century to the nineteenth]; it will close the doors to the old civilization, and it will enter into the contemporary world of life and progress”1 3 8 starting from the day the new code is in effect. The new secular codes, especially the civil code regulating marriage, divorce, succession, etc., have played an important role in Turkey’s social life. They constituted an institutional framework that supports the secularization process. The reception of secular codes almost completed the secularization of the state. The time came to formally assert and guarantee secular characteristics of the state. In his famous six-day-long Nutuk/Speech of October, 1927, just before the fifth anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic, President M. Kemal suggested that the “superfluous expressions which are incompatible with the modem character of the new Turkish state, and our republican regime, contained in Articles 2 and 26 of the Act, constitute compromises to which the revolution and the Republic ought to have agreed, as to satisfy the exigencies of the time. When the first opportunity arises, the nation must eliminate these superfluities from our Constitution Act.”1 3 9 Article 2 included the phrase, “the religion of the state is Islam.” Article 26 stated that the §eriat had to be respected in making laws. The part, “the religion of the state is Islam” in Article 2 and all the wording of Article 26 were dropped from the Constitution on April 10, 1928. Furthermore, Article 16 was modified so that the 138 Mahmut Esad Bey, “The Turkish Government’s New Civil Code: Address by Mahmoud Essad Bey, Minister of Justice, on the Presentation of the New Turkish Code of Civil Law to Ismet Pasha, Prime Minister, February, 1926,” 582. 139 M. Kemal [Ataturk], Nutuk/Soylev vol. 2, 956 and M. Kemal [Ataturk], Speech, 598. 136 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Assembly would no longer open after Friday prayers with sermons, and deputies would be sworn in on a man’s honor, not in the name of Allah.1 4 0 Thus, even the word Allah was heard less and less in the Assembly. All oaths in the Army, too, took on an areligious form. In criminal courts, the oaths were taken on honor and conscience. Only in civil courts were witnesses required to swear in the names of both God and honor.1 4 1 Hence, religion practically disappeared from state institutions, and Islamic symbols mostly disappeared from the realm of the state, with the exception of the crescent in the national flag. The secularization of the state was formally completed in 1937, just a year before M. Kemal died. The Turkish Grand National Assembly voted for several constitutional changes including Article 2’s addition that the Turkish State was a secular state. I now examine how these Constitutional changes passed in the Assembly, and also how Kemalists placed Islam under state control to set up the institutional framework for Turkish secularism. State Control of Official Islam On the same day the Caliphate was abolished (March 3, 1924), two other laws were also unanimously passed in the Assembly by a show of hands.1 4 2 These two laws were the harbingers of a coming reform period through which the establishment of Kemalist secularism would be written in stone. This reform period, 140 S. A. Morrison, “Religious Liberty in Turkey,” International Review o f Missions, 24 (October 1935): 453-454. 141 Gothard Jaschke, Yeni TiXrkiye ’ de islamlik [Islam in New Turkey], 25-26. 142 TBMM-ZC, vol 7 (3 March 1340 [1924]), 24. 137 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in fact, constituted the second stage of establishing Kemalist secularism through which the Kemalists attempted to place Islam under state control. The first was Law No. 429 abolishing the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations and establishing the two separate Directorates instead. One was Directorate-General of Pious Foundations, and the other was the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Both were put under the supervision of the Prime Ministry. Through this new law, the status of religion in the state was decreased from a cabinet ministry to a directorate level. Furthermore, the direct financial link between the Pious Foundations (Evkaf) and Religious Affairs was dissolved, and the private funds available for the state religious apparatus began to be audited by state controllers.1 4 3 The Prime Minister determined the budget of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. The Directorate of Foundations was charged with direct administration of all remaining religious institutions, particularly the supervision of private pious organizations (vahfs), with the remuneration of clerics and, after 1931, the physical maintanence of mosques.1 4 4 The authority of the Religious Affairs Directorate was strictly defined: to license preachers, to supervise the content o f their sermons, to appoint all the miiftus in the provinces arid provincial towns as well as all the staff to 143 “It is estimated that when the Republic inhereted the vakif administration from the Empire, 15 percent of land in Turkey was enclosed by vakifs and the remained out of the market economy.” See Dogu Ergil, “Turkish Reform Movement and Beyond, 1923-1938,” Islamic Studies, 14 (Winter 1975): 250. The income from the property of the tarikats remained as available private funds for the unofficial religious personnel. The tarikats were closed and their property was confisticated two years later. Only available private funds, to my knowledge, were the contributions of private citizens. 144 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955,” 82-83. 138 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the mosques, and to render, if asked, an occasional opinion on canon law.1 4 5 With the approval of President M. Kemal, Prime Minister ismet appointed Borekfizade Mehmet Rifat to the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Mehmet Rifat was the Miiftu of Ankara who gave the counter fetva of May 5, 1920, outlawing the Sultan’s fetva which denounced the Kemalists as infidels during the War. Because of the counter fetva, the Sultan sentenced Mehmet Rifat to death on May 6, 1920. Rifat stayed in office until his death on March 1941.1 4 6 The second law was Law No. 430 on Unifying Instmction and Education that severed the final traditional tie between religion and education. At the time, religious and secular schools coexisted. This new law placed all schools under the control of the secular Ministry of Education. Religious schools were closed, and the religion courses in other schools were restricted in time and substance. I return to religion and education later in examining the reforms directed at popular Islam, but here I dwell on the education of religious personnel employed by the state. Article 4 of Law No. 430 authorized the Ministry of Education to close all medreses and establish some religious secondary schools, and form a faculty of religion.1 4 7 Twenty-nine religious schools in several cities were opened to educate 145 Later, the Law No. 1827 of June 8 , 1931 restricted the authority of the Directorate in the administration of the mosques and gave the authority to appoint the mosque janitors to the Directorate of Foundations. For the duties of the Directorate today, see l§tar Tarhanli, Musluman Toplum, “laik ” Devlet: Turkiye’ de Diyanet i§leri Ba$kanhgi [Muslim Society, “secular” State: The Directorate of Religious Affairs] (Istanbul: Afa Yaymcilik, 1993), 70-102 146 Gothard Jaschke, Yeni Tiirkiye ’ de Islamlik [Islam in New Turkey], 58. 147 For further information see Gothard Jaschke, Yeni Tiirkiye ’ de Islamlik [Islam in New Turkey], 74- 75. The following statistics are also from the same source. 139 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. future imams. The curriculum in these schools covered not only religious courses but also a number of scientific ones. They opened in 1924 with 2,258 students under more than 300 instmctors. Very low levels of enrollment forced eighteen o f the schools to close down in 1926. By 1932 only two of them, one in istanbul and one in Konya, survived. Then, even these could not find sufficient students to enroll and closed their doors. The centuries old Medrese of Siileymaniye, the Al-Azhar of Turkey, was turned into a Faculty of Religion attached to state-governed Istanbul University. Its curriculum changed, offering fewer old Islamic courses taught in Arabic and Persian, more science courses with less emphasis on religion, and no language requirement. The new curriculum basically centered on philosophy, 1 4 8 psychology and matters of antiquarian interest, rather than on Islamic theology. In 1933, insufficient enrollment forced the school to be replaced by an Islamic Research Institute under the Faculty of Letters. The very low demand for a religious education suggests that parents saw little value in religious education for the future of their children. They might also have been afraid of being stigmatized as religious. Some devout Muslim parents might have seen the new schools as irreligious. Either way, an almost nonexistent demand for religious education helped spread secularism. In the Institute, practically no training of theology was provided.1 4 9 Thus, until 1949 mosque schools were the only places left for educating new imams. The Directorate of Religious Affairs, not the Ministry of Education, 148 S. A. Morrison, “Religious Liberty in Turkey,” 452. 149 S. A. Morrison, “Religious Liberty in Turkey,” 452. 140 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. regulated these seminars. By the beginning of the 1940s, there were 56 seminars with 56 religious instructors (some employed by the state), teaching over a thousand students, but only 12 of them took a certificate to be an imam eligible for state employment.1 5 0 Though the number of these seminars increased over time, up to the 1950s Turkey did not have enough imams to preach in the mosques. Several institutions reopened to educate religious personnel only after Turkey entered into its multi-party period in 1946. Thus, through these two Directorates directly attached to the Prime Minister’s office, the state would be able to “control all training for religious offices as well as the salaries and appointments of all religious officials.”1 5 1 The great secularizing reforms of 1924 and subsequent arrangements completed the disestablishment of old, official Islam and placed it under strict state control. Along with the secularization of the state and state control of official Islam, the Kemalists also aimed at reforming popular Islam, especially some of its cultural aspects. This constitutes the last stage of establishing Kemalist secularism in Turkey. The first two stages were relatively easy to accomplish. As Bernard Lewis neatly writes, “The Ulema, long accustomed to wielding the authority of the state, • « * 1 S'? were unpracticed in opposing it.” The real challenge for the Kemalists was ahead: To secularize the masses through reforms. The §eyh Said Rebellion of 1925 had 150 Gothard Jaschke, Yeni Turkiye ’ de tslamlik [Islam in New Turkey], 76. 151 Serif Mardin, “Turkey: Islam and Westernization,” in Religions and Societies: Asia and the Middle East, ed. Carlo Caldarola (Berlin: Mouton Publishers, 1982): 179. 152 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modem Turkey, 403. 141 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. signaled that it was from the dervishes, the backbones of popular Islam, not the ulema any more, which the strongest resistance to secularism would come. Let me now examine how the Kemalists viewed the Rebellion and, later, how M. Kemal used it as an excuse to entirely eliminate the first opposition party in the Assembly. Following this section, I discuss the Kemalists’ rush to reforms and the way they handled the reform process. Mounting religious opposition to ongoing Westernizing reforms came together with the instigation of Kurdish nationalism by British clandestine activities over the unsettled border issue of southeast Turkey. Mostly in the Kurdish provinces, the dervish dynasties rebelled against the state on February 8, 1925. §eyh Said, the hereditary chief of the Nakfibendi dervishes, was the Kurdish leader of the rebels. As the rebels demanded the restoration of §eriat and the Caliphate, the Kemalists defined the rebellion as a religious reaction to secularizing reforms.1 5 3 As such, it provided another opportunity for M. Kemal to eliminate the opposition organized under the Progressive Republican Party established three months earlier on November 17, 1924. It also bolstered the Kemalists, allowing them to accelerate and intensify secularizing reforms. 153 For further information on the rebellion, see Metin Toker, §eyh Sait ve Isyam [§eyh Sait and His Rebellion], 2n d ed. (Istanbul: Bilgi Yaymevi, 1994; first ed., 1968), especially 15-27 and Robert Olson, The Emergence o f Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), especially chapter 5 and conclusion. Both sources assert that the Kemalists saw the rebellion as religious reaction, but Robert Olson claims that the genuine characteristic of the rebellion was ethnic in nature. 142 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. News of the rebellion reached the Assembly on February 25, 1925. The Premier Fethi, a moderate, who M. Kemal positioned to appease the opposition, asked the Progressive Party leaders to disband the party voluntarily.1 5 4 Expressing their support for the government, they refused to do so. A week later, Fethi was forced to resign as he lost a vote of confidence in the Assembly. With the support of M. Kemal, the hard-liners called ismet to become premier again. As the rebellion spread all over the Southeast, the Assembly, upon the very first request of the new Cabinet, passed the Law on Maintenance of Order on March 4, 1925. It authorized the government to ban, at its discretion, any organization or publication for the sake of law and order. The two Independence Tribunals, one in the east and one in the capital, were empowered to prosecute those who would “disturb the order.” With an addition to High Treason Laws modified in the very first day o f ismet’s return to power, supporting religion as a political weapon against the Republic was categorized as an act of treason punishable by death. “As Ali Fuat later acknowledged in his memoirs, ... once the High Treason Law had been modified, it became impossible for anyone to attack the Gazi [M. Kemal] directly.”1 5 5 As the army mobilized to put down the rebellion, the Ankara Independence Tribunal terminated the publication of three Istanbul dailies generally critical of the Government, namely Tehvid-i Efkar, Son Telgraf and Istiklal. On the same day, March 12, 1925, it also outlawed the publication of two periodicals, the Marxist 154 Erik J. Ziircher, Turkey: Modem History (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993), 179. 155 Michael M. Finefrock, “From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924,” (Ph. D. diss., Princeton University, 1976), 301. 143 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Aydinlik and the religious Sebiliirregat.1 5 6 Sebilurre^at was the most prominent Islamic publication of the day.1 5 7 Thus, only two dailies continued to be published, Cumhuriyet, the Kemalist Istanbul daily, and Hakime-i Milliye, the Official Gazette in Ankara. In order to keep the Islamic press out of public discourse, the Government continued to prohibit publications and distribution of several religious books throughout the reform period.1 5 8 It even prevented the importation of some Islamic books and pamphlets printed abroad. For example, the Syrian-published book titled Namazda Mikdan Kiraat [The Amount of Citing in Salat] was not allowed to be brought into Turkey on the ground that it had some “harmful” parts.1 5 9 The government not only blocked the import of books printed in neighboring countries, but also pamphlets printed on other continents. The Islamic booklets published by Elcamiatul islamiyetiil Aleviye [Alavite Islamic Society] in Buenos Aires, Argentina were also seen as “harmful” if read by domestic readers.1 6 0 156 Sevket S. Aydemir, Tek Adam [The Unique Man], vol. 3, 2n d ed. (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1966), 228. 157 Sebilurre^at was the continuation of the influential Islamic journal Sirat-i Mustakim and became one of the prominent Islamic journals in the Second Constitutional Era. It used to publish monthly announcements of §eyhulislam before the publication of the official journal by the office of §eyhulislam, named Ceride-i ilmiye in 1914. See Gothard Jaschke, Yeni Turkiye ’ de Islamlik [Islam in New Turkey], 57. 158 Even after the reforms ended the Government continued to prohibit certain religious publications, e.g., Mustafa Kocaba?, Din Klavuzu [Religion Guide] (Istanbul: Bozkurt Matbaasi, [193?]). See ABK, Karamame 2/6157, 15 March 1937: CA (Ankara), no archive No. given. 159 ABK, Karamame 2/9904, 15 November 1938: CA (Ankara) 030/18/01/02/ and 85/97/17. 160 ABK, Karamame 2/5949, 27 January 1937: CA (Ankara), 030/18/01/02 and ??/??/?? (no further Archive No. given). 144 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The state severely crashed the §eyh Said rebellion in late May 1925. Before the execution of its leaders on June 29, in accordance with the order of the Independence Tribunal in Diyarbakir, the Tribunal in Ankara closed down the Progressive Party at the request of the Government on the grounds that it had exploited religion for political purposes. The Independence Tribunals also served to crash all sorts of reactions against reforms. The Government usually sent the dissidents to these Tribunals, which regularly sentenced “religious reactionaries” to heavy prison terms and sometimes to death. Askeri Hoca of Silifke and Sadi Efendi of Mersin were only a few among other Islamists sent to the Tribunals.1 6 1 As a 1 fiO leader of an Islamic riot, Askeri Hoca was sentenced to death by hanging. Sadi Efendi was accused of expressing support for “religious reactionaries” in a drinking party. Such incidents, of course, have led bystanders to think twice about expressing their opinions in public. People habitually made efforts to avoid revealing private preferences likely to stigmatize themselves as being opposed to the reforms. To prevent snowballing Islamic opposition to the reforms, the Government issued top-secret Decree No. 2536 on September 8, 1925 in addition to Decree No. 2086 of June 17, 1925.1 6 3 These decrees ordered the formation of a Special Investigation Committee to prepare a report on “religious reactionaries.” The 161 The Government issued decrees that sent these individuals to the Independence Tribunals for trial. For Askeri Hoca, see ABK, Karamame 1693, 25 March 1341 [1925]: CA (Ankara), 030/18/01/01 and 013/18/04; for Sadi Efendi, see ABK, Karamame 1691, 25 March 1341 [1925]: CA (Ankara), 030/ 18 /01/01 and 013/18/02. 162 £etin Ozek, Devlet ve Din [State and Religion] (Istanbul: Ada Yayinlan, [1982?]), 478. 163 ABK, Karamame 2236, 8 September 1341 [1925]: CA (Ankara), 030/18/01/01 and 016/60/12. 145 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Committee consisted of four members: the Interior Minister Cemil, the Justice Minister Mahmut Esad, Kangin [Qankiri] deputy Mustafa Abdtilhalik and the Second Chief of Staff. The Committee was also responsible for integrating the previous reports of the Interior Minister Cemil and Mustafa Abdtilhalik who had already investigated the troubled areas and included them in the report. The Decree specifically asked for the Committee’s written opinion on possible preventive measures within fifteen days. Later, the Government continued to send more Islamists to the Independence Tribunals for trial. Dagistanli §eyh §eraffeddin of Re§adiye, Bursa, and Yemenli Yusuf of Karesi [Balikesir] were two additional Islamists accused of propagating Islam and opposing the Republic.1 6 4 In accordance with the Government’s request, the Tribunals terrorized all the Islamists by using capital punishment and heavy prison terms. The opposition was largely silenced but not eliminated. However, the outbreak of the izmir conspiracy on June 26, 1926 provided justification to the Kemalists for its complete elimination. A plot designed by some deputies to assassinate M. Kemal in Izmir was uncovered. The Ankara Independence Tribunal sat in izmir, ordering the arrests of former Progressive Party members (except for Rauf and Dr. Adnan who were abroad) and all the prominent surviving members of the old Union and Progress Party, accusing them also of planning a coup d ’ etat. The Tribunal sentenced a total of 18 to death. The war heroes, including Kazim 164 For Dagistanli §eyh §erafeddin, see ABK, Karamame 2644, 11 October 1341 [1925]: CA (Ankara), 030/18/01/01 and 016/65/19; for Yemenli Yusuf, see ABK, Karamame 2631, 11 October 1341 [1925]: CA (Ankara), 030/18/01/01 and 016/65/6. 146 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Karabekir, Ali Fuat, Refet and Cafer Tayyar, were released in response to discontent among the public and possibly in the army.1 6 5 However, they lost their position in politics permanently. Thus began the party dictatorship period o f M Kemal [Atatiirk] and Ismet [inonii], during which “it was impossible to air any direct opposition to the government’s secularizing and Westernizing policies.” 1 6 6 The §eyh Said Rebellion led the Kemalists to realize that the secularization of Turkey could not be secured without reforming popular Islam. The attempt to secularize social life by reforming popular Islam, however, was the most difficult task the Kemalists assigned to themselves. The total elimination of any organized opposition in the capital and of the press in istanbul consolidated the Kemalists’ power base. They were ready to undertake this difficult task.1 6 7 Reforming Popular Islam In introducing the new civil code in 1926, Mahmut Esad Bey, Minister of Justice, succinctly expressed the basic principle in secularizing social life in Turkey: “Religion should be respected as long as it remains in the sphere of conscience.”1 6 8 As ardent modernists Kemalists wanted to keep religion only in the private sphere. 165 Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: Modem History (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993), 182. 166 Dankward A. Rustow, “Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955,” in Islam and the West: Proceeding o f the Harvard Summer School Conference on the Middle East, July 25-27, 1955, ed. Richard N. Frye (The Hague, the Netherlands: Mouton & Co., 1957), 8 6 . 167 Metin Toker, §eyh Sait ve tsyam [§eyh Sait and His Rebellion], 2n d ed. (istanbul: Bilgi Yaymevi, 1994; first ed., 1968), 97. 168 Mahmut Esad Bey, “The Turkish Government’s New Civil Code: Address by Mahmoud Essad Bey, Minister of Justice, on the Presentation of the New Turkish Code of Civil Law to Ismet Pasha, Prime Minister, February, 1926,” Current History, 24 (July 1926): 582. 147 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Thus, the game was to secularize the masses. The players were the Kemalist elite versus the “uneducated” masses. The ground was the entire country. The Kemalists followed the same strategy in reforming popular Islam as they utilized in the secularization of the state and the control of religion by the state. They first attempted to disestablish the organized portion of popular Islam, and then present a new institutional framework for religion in the society. On November 30, 1925, the Assembly unanimously issued another law by open voting through raising hands.1 6 9 Law No. 677 constituted the most effective move in breaking the backbone 1 70 of popular Islam (i.e., the tarikats or religious orders). It nullified all religious orders and closed their tekkes (dervish convents), zaviyes (religious cells) and tiirbes (religious shrines). It further forbade any citizen to be a member o f orders, wear their costumes, or bear the associated titles. It also closed all the mescids (chapels) attached to tekkes and tiirbes. It finally abolished the custodian office of such establishments and confiscated their property.1 7 1 As a result o f the effective implementation of Law No. 677, huge numbers of people in Turkey were forced to engage in preference falsification perpetually. “To a large extent, the tarikats simply 169 TBMM-ZC, vol. 19 (30 November 1341 [1925]), 288-289. Toynbee wrote that the Government also issued an administrative decree on September 2, 1925 to close down the religious institutions. See Arnold J. Toynbee, “Abolition of Ottoman Caliphate,” in Survey o f International Relations, ed. Arnold J. Toynbee (London: Oxford University Press, 1927) 72-73. 170 Bernard Lewis explains why the tarikats were the backbones of popular Islam: “By the eighteenth century the brotherhoods [tarikats] had established themselves in almost every town and village in Turkey. ... they were able to dominate the professional and social, as well as religious life.” See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f M odem Turkey, 401. 171 Dogu Ergil, “Turkish Reform Movement and Beyond, 1923-1938,” 250. 148 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. went underground.”1 7 2 Their acts of preference falsification, meantime, distorted public discourse. It came to seem that the tarikats had disappeared. This law reinforced the distortion of public discourse that Government Decree No. 2413 had already started on September 2, 1923.1 7 3 This decree categorized the persons to be reckoned as ulema and their dress and forbade anyone to wear such religious costumes other than authorized persons. The only persons allowed to wear them were religious personnel, mainly imams. They were also encouraged to wear civilian clothes outside their religious duties. Anyone other than religious personnel was prohibited from wearing such dress. Such deeds were considered criminal acts punishable up to a year in prison.1 7 4 The decree required all public servants, excluding those who needed to be in special uniform, to dress in “ordinary clothes in use among the civilized nations of the world,”1 7 5 including hats. It also required them to uncover their heads indoors and to take their hats off outdoors when saluting. In celebration of Republic Day, all hats were to be taken off as a sign of respect. Later, for functionaries at official ceremonies, tailcoats and top hats were prescribed.1 7 6 On November 25, 1925, just five days before the closure of all the tekkes, zaviyes and tiirbes and the ban on all religious garb, again as a result of open voting 172 Eric J. Zurcher, Turkey, 200. 173 Arnold J. Toynbee, “Abolition of Ottoman Caliphate,” 72-73. 174 Gothard Jaschke, Yeni Turkiye ’ de islamhk [Islam in New Turkey], 29. 175 Arnold J. Toynbee, “Abolition of Ottoman Caliphate,” 73. 176 See Ritter von Krai August, Kamal Ataturk Land: The Evolution o f Modern Turkey, trans. Kenneth Berton (Leipzig: Wilhelm Braumuller, 1938), 33. 149 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. by just raising hands, the Assembly outlawed the fez and replaced it with a European hat.1 7 7 The only opposition in the Assembly to the Law came the next day from Nureddin Pa?a, an independent deputy from Bursa and one of the victorious generals in the War of Independence. He forwarded a motion declaring that making the hat compulsory violated Articles of 68, 70, 71, 73, 74 and 103 o f the Constitution on the subject of individual liberty. The Assembly, nevertheless, refused even to consider his motion on the grounds that the hat worn by all civilized people did not infringe upon the related Articles.1 7 8 The Hat Law No. 671 read: “The common head-gear of [the] Turkish nation is the hat, and the government ceased the continuation of the 170 tradition against it.” Before the Hat Law, Government Decree No. 2413 of September 2, 1925 had already obligated all public employees to wear hats. For a novice to Middle Eastern politics, and to Turkish history in particular, the Law and Decree might seem to have only symbolic value. Nevertheless, they had real social and political importance. In the Ottoman Empire, distinctive headgear was used to show traditional outward marks of differences in nationality, • 180 occupation and religion. Though the fez was originally a Greek headdress, after its introduction to the Muslims by Sultan Mahmut II in 1826,1 8 1 in time it became a 177 TBMM-ZC, vol. 19 (25 November 1341 [1925]), 231. 178 For the motion see TBMM-ZC, vol. 19 (25 November 1341 [1925]), 222; for the refusal of the motion through open voting see TBMM-ZC, vol. 19 (25 November 1341 [1925]), 231. And, see also C. D. Brunton, “The Passing of Islam in Turkey,” 595. 179 TBMM-ZC (25 November 1341 [1925]), vol. 19, p. 231, and Gothard Jaschke, Yeni Tilrkiye’ de islamlik [Islam in Modem Turkey], 29. 180 Arnold J. Toynbee, “Abolition of Ottoman Caliphate,” 73. 181 The fez is a red felt brimless hat. It is known to have originated in Greece, but Zurcher claims it has its origin in Morocco. See Eric J. Zurcher, Turkey, 51. 150 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. symbol of Islam. By the 1920s, it signified Muslim solidarity and the superiority of Islam over the other faiths in Turkey.1 8 2 The reason Muslims preferred fezes was indeed very practical. They did not have to remove this brimless headgear while praying; their forehead could touch to the ground, even if they were wearing it. Pious Muslims disliked Western hats with brims because they could not pray with them. Such meddling with personal and religious life was likely to create severe disturbances. Thus, “[t]he measures, accompanied by the ban on the fez and turban [rural head-gear], ... [created] widespread resistance - far more than had the deposition of the Caliph and the repeal of the Seriat.”1 8 3 The bureaucracy, as paid employees of the state expected to obey the new laws and regulations easily, revealed no overt resistance to the Law whereas the clergy and conservative small town notables, including religious merchants who enjoyed the status of wearing religious apparel distinguishing them from common people, reacted furiously.1 8 4 The strong reaction was not unexpected by M. Kemal who by himself came up with the idea of introducing the hat. It was probably why he chose Kastomonu, an extremely conservative town, to introduce it. Everybody who saw M. Kemal wearing a panama hat was stunned. A few who saw M. Kemal with a hat before coming to town took off their fezes. The ignorant local police arrested them, but once informed, the police released them. A crowd wearing hats welcomed M. Kemal upon his return to 182 Ritter von Krai August, Kamal AtaturkLand, 33. 183 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 405. 184 Dogu Ergil, “Turkish Reform Movement and Beyond, 1923-1938,” 251. 151 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the capital. From that day onwards, members of the state bureaucracy and all people in Ankara either wore hats outdoors or were bareheaded. Some serious disturbances ■ 1 8 S took place in heavily conservative towns such as Sivas, Erzurum, Rize, and Mara§. The Government viewed them as organized reaction movements, and it took severe measures to crush them. The Independence Tribunal accordingly sentenced eighteen people to death1 8 6 on the grounds that they exploited religion for political purposes, though the maximum penalty to wear a fez was a month in prison. Even those I on wearing berets, a headgear similar to a fez, were arrested. Through ruthless implementation of the Hat Law, the fez, an important symbol of Islam, disappeared from the public eye. Next to the fez, the other target of the Kemalist passion for Westernization was the veil. M. Kemal knew that the veil issue had utmost sensitivity among the masses.1 8 8 Therefore, the Government never attempted to impose a total ban, though it continually discouraged it. For example, students and wives of the official servants were permanently prohibited from wearing the veil in public. No veiled 185 For further information on the disturbances from an Islamist view, see Hasan H. Ceylan, Cumhuriyet Ddneminde Din/Develet ili$kileri [Republican Era: The State/Religion Relations], vol. 2, 42-57. 186 See C. D. Brunton, “The Passing of Islam in Turkey,” 595. 187 Fitzroy Maclean, “The Eastern Question in Modem Dress,” Foreign Affairs, 29 (January 1951): 239. 188 Hasan Riza Soyak, M. Kemal’s Presidential Secretary General wrote in his memoirs that when M. Kemal heard about the Afghan King’s prohibition of the veil in his country he said it was a big strategic mistake. In fact, M. Kemal personally advised him not to ban the veil when the King visited Turkey. As soon as M. Kemal heard the news about the decree of the King to prohibit the veil in Afghanistan, he said: “Pity we will loose the man; I have insistently told him not to take this issue, it is a pity.” M. Kemal was right in predicting that the King would be overthrown following the prohibition. Hasan Riza Soyak, Ataturk’ ten Hatiralar [Memoirs from Ataturk], vol. 1 (Ankara, 1957), 278 as quoted in Dogu Ergil, “Turkish Reform Movement and Beyond, 1923-1938,” 260, n. 6 . 152 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. women were allowed to attend public meetings.1 8 9 As the officials were encouraged to participate in ceremonies with their wives by their side, the number of unveiled women in public increased dramatically. The ban on the veil came to the agenda of the People’s Party in its annual meeting in 1935, but the Party left the issue to the discretion of the local municipalities.1 9 0 Some municipalities (e.g. in Trabzon) tried to implement the ban, yet as a result of immediate reaction, they did not force it. Measures other than a strict ban worked. Those women who had previously veiled themselves in response to immediate Islamic pressures felt free to take their veil off. Donald Webster well described changing public discourse: “As late as 1931, veiled women were not uncommon in Izmir, which is second only to Istanbul in size and cosmopolitan composition. By 1936, one might go about Izmir for a week without seeing a single woman with her face covered.”1 9 1 The last act to suppress religious dress came on December 3, 1935. Again through open voting, the Assembly issued Law No. 2596. Once more, all deputies raised their hands to forbid the wearing of religious garb in public.1 9 2 The only persons authorized to wear the religious attire outside mosque grounds in public were the heads of the religious communities, adding up to eight individuals.1 9 3 This 189 DoguErgil, “Turkish Reform Movement and Beyond, 1923-1938,” 251-252. 190 Gothard Jaschke, Yeni Tiirkiye 'de tslamlik [Islam in New Turkey], 29. 191 Donald Webster, “State Control of Social Change in Republican Turkey,” 253. But, it must be noted that Izmir aka. “infidel Izmir” has been one of the most liberal, if not the one, cities in Turkey where religious conservatives have played a minor role in determing the public discourse. 192 TBMM-ZC, vol. 25 (3 December 1934), 77. 193 Gothard Jaschke, Yeni Tiirkiye ’ de Islamlik [Islam in New Turkey], 29. 153 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. meant that the public could see one and only one person in Muslim religious grab; he was the President of Religious Affairs. Other Kemalist reforms contributed to driving Islam out of the public realm. The adoption of the Western clock and calendar in 1926 stopped the Islamic time that had been running in Anatolia since the beginning of the last millennium. The people of Turkey ceased to count the hours of the day according to prayer times. The origin of their calendar would no longer be related to their Prophet. The new Turkish calendar had no Islamic element any more. The adoption of Western numerals in 1928 and of Western weights and measures in 1931 by giving up Arabic ones and the introduction of family names in 1934 further pushed Turkish society away from the Islamic to western civilization. The most important reform that attempted, in the long run, to break Turkey’s ties with its Islamic past was the introduction of the Latin alphabet. The Ottoman Turks had used Arabic script; Arabic and Persian words made up three-quarters of the late written Ottoman language. As the printing press penetrated daily life, some Ottoman modernizers, starting with Munif Pa§a in 1862, and Azeri playwright Ahunzade Mirza Fethali in 1863, proposed a Latin orthography for Turkish.1 9 4 Then, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet and some others in the Young Turk era also advocated a change of alphabet from the Ottoman version of Arabic script to a Latin one, but it was M. 194 Zurcher cites Munif Paja’s attempt in 1862. Eric J. Zurcher, Turkey, 196. Trix cites Fethali’s proposal in 1863. Frances Trix, “The Stambol Alphabet of Shemseddin Sami Bey. Precursor to Turkish Script Reform,” International Journal o f Middle Eastern Studies, 31:2 (May 1999): 255. 154 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Kemal who put the idea into practice with impressive speed.1 9 5 Under his personal guidance, a new Latin script for Turkish was prepared. On November 1, 1928, by raising their hands the deputies in Assembly unanimously approved the adoption of the new Script.1 9 6 Law No. 1353 also made use of the Latin letters compulsory in all public communications within three months. Starting January 1, 1929, the number of public documents written in the old Arabic Script started to decline in the public realm. As Eric J. Zurcher also emphasizes, the adoption of the Latin alphabet was just “another way to cut off Turkish society from its Ottoman and Middle Eastern Islamic traditions and reorientate it towards the west.”1 9 7 The Directorate of Religious Affairs and other state agencies under the strict control of Kemalists helped institutionalize reforms. The Directorate prepared a selection of several pre-screened hutbes that touched upon the only aspects of Islam the Kemalists tolerated. A collection of these hutbes appeared in a book sent to imams licensed and was mostly paid for by the state. No imam was allowed to preach on a topic that was not in this hutbe book. No unlicensed man o f religion was allowed to preach in any mosque. The governors asked provincial muftiis to report the list of the pre-screened imams with their passport photos to Police 195 There was another previous attempt in Ottoman land to adopt a Latin-based alphabet with the inclusion of Greek and Cyrillic characters by Albanians in 1879. This so-called “Stamboul [istanbul] Alphabet” introduced by Shemseddin Sami Bey was short-lived and disappeared during the First World War. Trix claims that the Stamboul Alphabet was a precursor to Turkish script reform. See Frances Trix, “The Stambol Alphabet of Shemseddin Sami Bey: Precursor to Turkish Script Reform,” especially 267-269. 196 TBMM-ZC, vol. 5 (1 November 1928), 10-11. 197 Eric J . Zurcher, Turkey, 197. 155 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Departments.1 9 8 The Police Departments put mosques under scrutiny. If needed, the Police asked provincial mtiftus to instruct imams to warn mosque-goers not to utter anything against the Kemalist Government or its reforms while praying.1 9 9 These measures created enough pressure for many to engage in pro-secularist preference falsification. The larger the number of people practicing pro-secularist preference falsification the more secular the public discourse became. Thus, such preference falsification was both effect and cause of a distorted public discourse. Captioning Kemalist Secularism In the 1937 Assembly debates about the Constitutional changes, §ukrii Kaya, the Minister of the Interior at the time, clearly defined what was meant by Turkish secularism. It is “to make sure that religion has no role and effect in the affairs of the country.” Stressing that “religions should stay in [people’s] conscience and in their temples,” he continued to frame secularism as keeping religion “out of material life and worldly affairs.” As an ardent Kemalist, he coined the motto of Turkish secularism by saying “We do not let this happen” and “We will not let this happen.”2 0 0 After several other deputies made similar speeches, all the present deputies, then 321 in total, together raised their hands for the enactment of a new Article 2 in the Constitution.2 0 1 This enactment legally asserted the full 198 For example, see KEM [Konya Emniyet Mudiirliigii (Konya Police Department)], Yazi [Memo] KI/446,27 February 1934: CA (Ankara), 051/V42 andl2/101/18. 199 For example, see KEM, Yazi KI/212, 17 February 1938: CA (Ankara) 051/V42 andl2/102/13. 200 For the excerpts fromKaya’s speech, see TBMM-ZC, vol. 16 (5 November 1937), 61. 201 For the specific voting for Article 2 see TBMM-ZC, vol. 16 (5 November 1937), 74, for official results and the name of the deputies who voted for the Constitutional changes see TBMM-ZC, vol. 16 (5 November 1937), 81-83. 156 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. establishment of Kemalist secularism. The Constitutions of both 1960 and 1982 in Turkey had the same wording. In stating the characteristics of the Republic, Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution as of 2003 reads: “The Republic o f Turkey is a ... secular State ... loyal to the nationalism of Atatiirk ... .” Article 4 puts the secular characteristic of the Republic as an irrevocable provision by declaring “the provisions in Article 2 on the characteristics of the Republic, ... shall not be amended, nor shall their amendment be proposed.” The Turkish Constitution further asserts its stand on secularism by setting constitutional safeguards against all possible attempts to reverse the reform laws that set the institutional framework for Turkish secularism. Article 174 is very specific about the preservation of reform laws. It simply affirms that: No provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the Reform Laws indicated below, which aim to raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilization and to safeguard the secular character of the Republic, and which were in force on the date of the adoption by referendum of the Constitution of Turkey. 1. Act No. 430 of 3 March 1340 (1924) on the Unification of the Educational System; 2. Act No. 671 of 25 November 1341 (1925) on the Wearing of Hats; 3. Act No. 677 of 30 November 1341 (1925) on the Closure of Dervish Convents and Tombs, the Abolition of the Office of Keeper of Tombs and the Abolition and Prohibition of Certain Titles; 4. The principle of civil marriage according to which the marriage act shall be concluded in the presence of the competent official, adopted with the Turkish Civil Code No. 743 of 17 February 1926, and Article 110 of the Code; 5. Act No. 1288 of 20 May 1928 on the Adoption of International Numerals; Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6. Act No. 1353 of 1 November 1928 on the Adoption and Application of the Turkish Alphabet; 7. Act No. 2590 of 26 November 1934 on the Abolition of Titles and Appellations such as Efendi, Bey or Pa§a; 8. Act No. 2596 of 3 December 1934 on the Prohibition of the Wearing of Certain Garments. Together with the abolition of the Caliphate, these are the laws that constitute the backbone of Kemalist secularism. They simply set out the institutional framework for Turkish secularism. By radically injecting a heavy dose of secularization, which was stubbornly resisted by conservative elements in the underlying population these reform laws with their applications and supporting decrees, regulations, etc., put Turkey in between Islam and modernity. In time there emerged two camps reflecting Turkey’s dual character: secularist and Islamist. Each and every one of these laws was passed unanimously through open voting. Each time, all members in the Assembly simply raised their hands in unison to turn the secularizing draft into law. Assembly records show that only one deputy voted against abolishing the Sultanate. This was the only case where the Assembly issued a secularizing law without a unanimous vote. All other reforms that disestablished Islam, including the proclamation of the Republic and the abolition of the Caliphate, were approved in the Assembly by open voting through raised hands. Only few a times did some deputies openly argue against the reform laws. In the end, even they voted to enact reform. When the Presidents of the Assembly asked the deputies to raise their hands “to approve” or “not to approve” the reform law in question, all the deputies, without any sign of opposition, raised their hands to issue a 158 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. new reform that contributed to secularizing Turkey. Preference falsification obviously played a major role in the establishment of Kemalist secularism. Only a few conservative deputies dared to express opposition to the Kemalists determined to disestablish Islam and westernize the county once and for all. The opposition to the Kemalists generally maintained its silence throughout this nearly eighteen-year reform period in which the centuries-old Islamic institutions disappeared from the public realm. Yet Turkish Islam did not vanish. It simply went underground, waiting for a fertile time to resurface. However, after the Kemalist reform period Islam has had to operate within the framework Turkish secularists instituted through the distortion of collective decision-making. As a result of threats and intimidation in distorting the collective decision in favor of secular policies, pro-secularist preference falsification helped establish Kemalist secularism. When M. Kemal embarked upon his quest to “reaching the level of modem civilization,” he sought to incorporate Western modernity into Turkey and to incorporate Turkey into the West, initiating one of the most visible cleavages in Turkey: Secularist /Islamist divide. Kemalism initiated the process that tore apart a predominantly Muslim society in Turkey. It created a large group of secularist activists who have sworn to protect the Kemalist legacy at any cost. The triumph of secularists who are adamantly opposed to any Islamic interference in the public realm dialectically encountered after the 1950s emerging Islamists who would like to see Islamist routinization in worldly affairs. In attempts 159 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. to control public discourse, the activists on the both sides see the other as enemies. The existence of two camps with their own taboos puts pressure on non-activists to confirm. Islamists force bystanders to act like “pious Muslims”, while secularists demand that they behave as citizens of the Republic in which religion plays no role. The next chapter introduces a dual preference model that explains the position of a non-activist majority across Islamist and secularist demands. It is time to investigate how preference falsification led to the polarization of Turkish society along the spectrum of secularism versus Islamism. 160 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 4 A DUAL PREFERENCE MODEL Bende sigar iki cihan ben bu cihana sigmazam (Two worlds squeeze into me, but I cannot squeeze into this world) Nesimi On New Year’s Eve, watching the National Lottery live on TV for its largest pot is quite common among the Turkish people. As New Year’s Eve of 1996 was approaching, however, the High Council of Religion, the highest official authority on Islam in Turkey, issued a fatwa denouncing the national lottery as un-Islamic on the ground that Islam prohibits all sorts of gambling, including lotteries. The fatwa specifically asked pious Muslims not to buy a ticket. As the fatwa appeared in the media, some journalists came up with a canny plot to test the sincerity of the Council members: While recording, the journalists called each member, asking whether he would be willing to accept a prize he just won as a result of some lottery: Three members of the High Council of Religion, including its president immediately said 161 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. “YES.” Out of four, only one member declined the prize because of his religious beliefs. The journalists could not reach the remaining six members.1 This clever "investigative reporting" exemplifies that people may reveal different preferences, sometimes quite contradictory, depending on external incentives. As public personas of pious Muslims, the High Council members all authoritatively ruled, that purchasing a lottery ticket violates Islamic rules. Yet, the journalists’ plot exposed that some members were indeed ready to grab a lottery prize, indicating they were not sincere about observing their ruling. By signing the fatwa, they simply falsified their genuine preferences.2 As previous chapters show, this is a very common occurrence in Turkey, which asks for further detailed analysis. This chapter presents a revised version of the dual preference model formulated by Timur Kuran in his book, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences o f Preference Falsification (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995). Specifically, it integrates Kuran’s model on the phenomenon of preference falsification into the analysis of Islamism and secularism in Turkey. 1 Aktiiel, 21-27 December 1995, 20-24. 2 Preference falsification is just one of the explanations to the behavior of the Council members. For any given phenomenon in social science there can be more than one explanation. Another explanation to the phenomenon cited above can be mental compartmentalization referring to conflicting values that are at war in each member’s psyche. This explanation states that the members behaved inconsistently because they have conflicting values, i.e., Islamic value of not gambling vs. having a rewards from gambling. 3 For the full treatment of the model see Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, especially chapters 1-6; 10-11; and 15. No further citation about the model will be given in this chapter unless it is a direct quotation. 162 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Dual Preference Model Let us take a hot public issue on which two rival pressure groups advocate diametrically opposing policies and carry out a heated debate to win public opinion to their side as a source of political power: The issue could be veiling, liquor licensing, the prohibition of alcohol, regulation of prostitution in the state designated areas or the ban on interest. On the one extreme, a devout Islamist would advocate and desire to pursue a lifestyle in which no alcohol is consumed, prostitution is banned along with interest-earning bank accounts and all women are veiled in public places. Accordingly, she would never drink alcohol, shake hands with men, and visit male doctors. She would strongly disapprove men who visit brothels, place her savings in Islamic banks which claim to offer no-interest bearing, but profit sharing alternatives, and ask her daughters, relatives and acquaintances to veil. She will strictly adhere to the Islamist worldview; organize her lifestyle in accordance with the teachings of Qur’an. Not surprisingly, this person would side with the extreme Islamist groups and potentially vote for political parties, supporting such Islamist policies. A moderate Islamist female may choose to veil in public places but continue to keep her savings in a regular bank account. She may take off her veil in attending a university entrance exam and substitute a wig for her headscarf. She does not casually socialize with unveiled females. A staunch secularist would adopt a strictly opposite lifestyle to a devout Islamist, strongly disapprove veiled women in public places including universities and the parliament and always consider veiling as a symbol of “backwardness.” A moderate secularist may refuse to veil herself but 163 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. still tolerate alternative lifestyles including veiled women in public places. She may wear a headscarf in funerals to observe customs. Each member in society one way or another has at least some opinion on these topics, and accordingly organizes her lifestyles through speech and action. But in a polarized public environment, especially the moderate members may find it difficult to adhere to their unique private preferences on these issues and may be forced to reveal a public preference that is different from their own private beliefs. Let me specifically focus on the issue of veiling, a subject of an increasingly confrontational debate in Turkey since the 1980s, as groundwork for the dual preference model on preference falsification. As Ay§e Kadioglu points out, women’s public visibility has occupied a central place in defining the boundaries of Western modernity and traditional Islam since the early years of the Republic.4 In time, as Niliifer Gole documented, the social role of women in general, and particularly veiling became the focal point in the confrontation between Islam(ism) and modernity in Turkey.5 Reflective of this confrontation, in the mid-1990s, a 4 Ay§e Kadioglu, “Women’s Subordination in Turkey: Is Islam Really the Villain?” Middle East Journal, 48 (Autumn 1994): 646. 5 See Niliifer Gole, Modern Mahrem: Medeniyet ve Ortiinme [Modem Mahrem: Civilization and the Veiling] 4th ed. (Istanbul: Metis Yaymlari, 1993), esp. pp. 39-47. This book is also available in English: Niliifer Gole, The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996). 164 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. debate televised between an “Islamlst-feminist” and “Kemalist-feminist” took high national audience ratings.6 Islamists adamantly encourage veiling in an attempt to regulate the public domain, while secularists intently discourage the practice of veiling taken as the most visible symbol of Islamism and its revelation in the public domain. In attempting the control the public sphere, as secularists overwhelmingly and persistently discourage veiling they have long marked as the symbol of “backwardness” and “underdevelopment,” Islamists see the veil as a prevailing symbol of Islamic way of life and where all women are veiled in public places, Islam truly reigns. In no other predominantly Muslim country, the rivalry between these polar worldviews in the public domain is as intense, due to the uneasy coexistence of both veiled and unveiled females, as in Turkey. For instance, in Iran and pre-war Afghanistan, it is impossible to see such a debate. Largely because of the Ottoman legacy and the Republican history, the people of Turkey are in a unique position to rethink the assumptions and doctrines of both secular modernism and Islamism in accounting for this dramatic coexistence. Some females in the countryside as well as in the cities who regularly wear loose headscarves are thought of as representatives of traditional way of life. However, veiled women with tied up headscarves are consistently perceived as Islamist, moderate or extreme, and unveiled females feel 6 Ay§e Oncu, “Packaging Islam: Cultural Politics on the Landscape of Turkish Commercial Television,” New Perspectives on Turkey, 10 (Spring 1994): 28. 165 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. threatened by the spread of veiled women. Although veiling in the public domain, free o f secularist state’s control, is permitted and mostly tolerated by the secularists, it is strictly forbidden in the parliament, the universities and the state apparatus. Such practices are welcome by the staunch secularists fearful of the dominance of Islamism in the society, but protested by the Islamists as undemocratic. The intense debate on veiling reveals that the public sphere in Turkey is still not resilient and pluralistic enough to embrace a peaceful coexistence of alternative worldviews. The secularists worried about the potential Islamist subjugation of the social life through various forms of group pressure, including veiling so as to win political support and establish an “Islamist” state. Similarly, unveiled women may constitute a threat to the very existence of Islamist way of life by pressurizing women to unveil, weakening the Islamist lifestyle as a source of political power in the society. Just as there are diverse private opinions ranging from extreme Islamist to extreme secularist, there are also diverse political parties and pressure groups with their unique positions, displaying different levels of intensity and degree of support for Islamist and secularist lifestyles. Keeping in mind that both camps are far from being monolithic and, at the cost of simplicity, one can consider mainly two opposing camps, broadly representing the Islamist and secularist worldviews on a number of issues, including veiling. Hence, each individual in the society first must decide by herself on her genuine opinion regarding these lifestyles. This constitutes her private preference that is only known to her. Then, she must decide which group to support and to what degree, through speech and action, by declaring a public 166 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. preference. This distinction is crucial for understanding the process of preference falsification in the public domain in response to perceived social pressure. There is no guarantee that an individual will display identical preferences in private and in public, forming the basis of the dual preference model on preference falsification. Individual’s Utilities From Revealing a Preference First think of an individual who must make a decision by herself, e.g., veiling in schools and public offices. If she is a pious Muslim who believes that Islam requires all women to veil she will prefer to veil. Or, if she believes that the veil degrades women and she does not want her daughter and herself to be subject to Islamist pressures from the veiled students in the schools, and in other public areas such as markets etc., then she may prefer to not to veil. Obviously, on the debate between Islamism and secularism, including veiling, Turkish society displays diverse private preferences, most of which are much more moderate than I have assumed so far in order to ease the exposition of the model. Intrinsic Utility A typical individual pursues a lifestyle that provides her with the greatest intrinsic utility. Her choice regarding veiling signaling a particular lifestyle will become public if she veils herself in the public sphere. In other words, she reveals her private preference on veiling to others. If she faces no social pressure, she can be true to herself and maximize her intrinsic utility by veiling herself. In such a case, her private preference will be no different from what she reveals to others in public. 167 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. However, in the presence of social pressure, she may refrain from pursuing a lifestyle in accordance with her private preferences and may attempt to conform to the social norms of “acceptable” lifestyles by misrepresenting her private preference in public at the cost of some discomfort. Hence, if she seeks social approval by misrepresenting her private preference, she will gain reputational benefits, which will be later discussed under reputational utility. Meanwhile, this will also generate some psychological discomfort and will reduce her total utility as she pursues a lifestyle more in line with society’s requirements than her own private preference. Such discomfort due to social pressure will be also captured later under the expressive utility. Thus, intrinsic utility, by definition, is independent of what the individual does under social pressure and it depends on her private preference, which can be represented by I = I (x), where x represents her private preference towards veiling ™ the preference that the individual has in her heart I(x) is assumed to be concave, and the private preference, x* maximizes the intrinsic utility for the individual such that the individual generates the highest intrinsic utility when she is true to herself. Regarding veiling in particular, Islamism and secularism in general, her private preference inclines either to be Islamist or secularist depending on the issue in question. By veiling herself, a pious Muslim woman derives utmost inner satisfaction as she knows that she is pleasing Allah. An unveiled woman, a strong 168 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. believer in Kemalist reforms on the secular dress code, enjoys intrinsic utility from being secular. Their values range from 0 (extreme Islamist, veiled) to 100 (extreme secularist, unveiled) such that x * e [0 ,100]. Thus the individual private preferences constitute a continuum between complete veiling of women in both public and private domains on the one extreme and complete unveiling on the other. Alternatively, a private preference of 0 may be viewed as an extreme Islamist position and a preference of 100 an extreme secularist position on all social issues these worldviews and lifestyles rely on. Intrinsic utility function is, at its maximum, denoted by I (x*) and is fixed for every individual at I such that I = l(x*=0) = ... = I(x*=100) for all x* e[0, 100]. By assumption, each individual preference leans towards either the Islamic side or the secular side on the issue of veiling along with others such that no neutral person reveals a preference of x*=50. Although private preferences may change over time, the pace of change is very likely to be slow so that we can treat preferences as fixed in the short run. If the individual derives only intrinsic utility from pursuing a certain lifestyle as in the case of veiling, then she will clearly set her public and private preferences equal to each other to maximize her utility. However, “no man is an island” and each individual will seek social approval by displaying a public preference over lifestyles, which fits with the society’s choice. Let us define society’s choice to be yH where H stands for “home.” Closer she gets in terms of her public preference to 169 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the society’s choice, she will gain some reputational benefits at the cost of some loss in expressive utility whenever there is a mismatch between her private preference, x* and publicly revealed preference, y*. This brings us to the other sources of utility, i.e., reputational and expressive utilities, for an individual who enters the public realm: Let us first examine reputational utility. Reputational Utility If an individual prefers not to eat meat, her preference of being a vegetarian is a non-issue since it is considered a matter of personal choice. However, this is not the case for veiling. The activity of veiling itself becomes a political matter if it is a matter of social concern as in Turkey where most Islamists and secularists view the act of veiling as a political statement in the public sphere. Both groups take it as a signal of a political orientation or a preference towards a particular lifestyle and either reward or punish those who veil in the public sphere by displaying various forms of social acceptance or disapproval. As in the act of veiling, we routinely state our opinions about most social issues by making our preferences known to others through actions, words, gestures and even through the way we dress in the public sphere. Moreover, we are routinely conscious about the impact of our behaviors and lifestyles on others. At times, we behave hypocritically in the public sphere in our attempt to win social approval or to avoid social seclusion. If teacher Hasan drinks beer on his balcony during summer nights, it is obvious that he disregards Islam’s prohibition on alcohol and may be 170 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. taken as someone against Islamist lifestyle. However, if he refrains from drinking alcohol during Ramadan in the religious quarters, clearly, he is concerned about the social pressure or disapproval of his defiant behavior. If barber Ali refrains from smoking only during the daytime in Ramadan in the presence of his clients who fast in line with Islamic requirements, he may be misrepresenting his private preferences, not to lose customers. When a woman steps out of her house veiled, she makes others know her public preference on an Islamic way of life. She may be privately against veiling herself, but may choose to veil in the public to avoid social seclusion and gain access to certain social circles for spiritual and material gain. Hence, a veiled woman may receive the support of Islamists while being ostracized by secularists. Similarly, Islamists will frown upon unveiled woman while secularists reward her. These examples demonstrate that our deeds in social life are rewarded or criticized, even penalized by others, making us highly conscious about our social behavior. Therefore, we are selective in displaying our private preferences because of concerns over social acceptance, that is, our reputation in the public sphere. The preferences we make known to others are our public preferences, y. The net payoff we receive from the various responses to a public preference is our reputational utility - utility from the reputation of harboring that particular 171 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. preference.7 To the extent that our public preferences match others’ expectations in conformity with the accepted social norms and opinions, we are rewarded by their approval and respect. Hence, the closer our public preferences represented by y* gets to society’s choice, yn, the more we feel gratified in the public sphere. When we convey preferences at odds with others’, we feel the fear of isolation and loneliness. Simply put, we try to fit into the society we live in and we usually conform. Homo Sapiens have long been identified as social animals. “Man needs other men for survival” is an accepted fact for most of us. An individual must fit into society in one way or another. This urge to fit in makes an individual subject to social influence and conformity. The position of an individual in society has long been a major topic in social sciences. Social psychologists especially have puzzled over individuals’ responses in different social settings. The body of experimental research in the area of conformity exploded thanks to Muzafer Sherif s pioneering research in 1935. Sherif showed that individuals with different initial assessments tended to come to o agreement when placed in a group situation. Sherif referred to this as the formation of social norms through an internalized and shared frame o f reference. More important for our purpose, Sherif later proposed: 7 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 30. 8 Muzafer Sherif, “A Study of Some Social Factors in Perception,” Archives o f Psychology, 27 (July, 1933): especially 41. Ill Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The individual in an intense group situation acts as a member of the group; the group situation demands conformity. Whether the individual would like to conform or not, when once he is the [sz'c] part of the situation, it imposes conformity on him. ... Conformity permeates his emotions, his thinking, and his tempo of his action, bringing group members to a common level, pulling down the sharp intellects of the more distinguished members and possibly elevating the intellect of others into the group. All these modifications may be summed up as the leveling effect of the group.9 Following Sherif s footsteps, social psychologists were quick to document the close link between social influence and conformity,1 0 especially in situations where a social group already has a well-established norm accepted as “correct behavior.” Furthermore, the group tends to exert pressures upon defiant members to bring them back in line. Subsequent research in the area demonstrated that several variables such as group size, fear, unanimity, group cohesiveness, and status in the group play a role in pushing deviant individual towards the previously established group norms in response to social pressure.1 1 9 Muzafer Sherif The Psychology o f Social Norms (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1936): 70-71. 10 Solomon Asch provided an illuminating experimental design which exposed these conformity pressures. When asked to decide by himself individually, the subject made no error in predicting the lengths of lines. When asked to decide about the same line lengths in facing a group of the researcher’s confederates who were deliberately making unanimously incorrect judgments, however, the participants tended to conform on average to approximately 33 percent of the manipulated group judgment. One-third of the subjects went along with the wrong group judgment in 50 percent or more of the trials. Considering that the line lengths were simple and unambiguous judgments, the discrepancy clearly highlighted the immense power of the group on individual decision-making. See Solomon E. Asch, “Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgment,” in Groups, Leadership and Men ed. Harold Guetzkow (Pittsburgh: The Carnegie Press, 19.51) and for more comprehensive treatment, Solomon E. Asch, Social Psychology (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1987: first ed. 1952), especially chapter 16. Also see John Turner, “Social Influence,” in The Blackwell Encyclopedia o f Social Psychology, in 1st ed., 563. 11 Robert S. Baron, et.al. “The Forgotten Variable in Conformity Research: Impact of Task Importance on Social Influence,” Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 71 (November 1996): 915. 173 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In societies where Islamist and secularist orientations and lifestyles coexist, depending on the setting, an individual may display conformity with one or the other group like a chameleon in order to maximize her social rewards and minimize punishments. The individuals’ acts of preference falsification as in the examples of barber Ali and teacher Hasan are motivated by the same desire to fit in and conform to the social setting despite their genuine private preferences on alcohol consumption and fasting. They exemplify the individuals’ dilemma between two contending worldviews and their attempt to tolerate the other by suppressing, though only in the public sphere, his true preferences on a particular social issue to enhance one’s own reputational utility through social conformity. The following function relates reputational utility of an individual to her public preference y capturing the effect of net social rewards or punishments in response to her revealed public preference to determine the net payoff from reputational considerations: R= R(y), where R(y) is concave in y and ye[0, 100]. Public preference y is continuous between 0 (extreme Islamist, veiled) and 100 (extreme secularist, unveiled). R(y) is maximized at y*=0 when a completely Islamist society adopts strictly Islamist policies such that yn=0. If the individual exhibits a public preference of y*=100 in a strictly Islamic society where yH =0, her reputational utility will be zero as she will be ostracized by all members of the society or even sentenced to prison if she takes 174 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. off her veil as in Iran and Saudi Arabia. On the other extreme, R(y) is maximized at y*-100 when the society is extremely secularist with y e - 100. She will gain acceptance in social circles by unveiling herself in the public. If the individual exhibits a public preference of y*=0 in a secular society with yH=100, and veils herself, her reputational utility will be zero as she will be banned from work in public offices, and be disapproved in social contexts. Note that as long as she strictly pursues a lifestyle in accordance with society’s preferences, she will maximize her reputational utility at a particular y* where y*= yn and R(0)=....=R(100) at their maximum. As such, R(y) is the magnitude of reputational utility individual expects to get from pursuing a lifestyle in conformity with the society’s preferences as in the case of veiling in particular, or from belonging to one of the two camps, Islamists or secularists in general. Depending on the strength of the pressure group in a particular social setting, the individual’s closeness to the pressure group and the size of the group, i.e. the number of people that supports a particular public preference yH , her reputational benefits from displaying a certain public preference y, identical to yn, tend to increase. Strength captures the net salience, power, importance, or intensity o f the pressure group which forces an individual to side with a particular public preference on the topic of veiling, or alternatively, a particular political position on Islamism versus secularism. Strength results from such factors as age, socio-economic status, ability, or motivation. It is an umbrella term whose magnitude covers the fear of ending up alone; the status individual enjoys in the group; and group cohesiveness. 175 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The more individual feels the strength of the group pressure demanding her to publicly align with the common preference yn, the more likely she is to side with a particular public preference. As the power of the pressure group increases, the individual is more likely to adopt publicly the preference of the group. Immediacy is another factor affecting the level of conformity. It refers to closeness in space and time and lack of intervening obstacles between the individual and the group.1 2 The closer the individual gets to the pressure group, the greater the influence of the group upon the individual.1 3 Here, closeness refers not only to strict physical proximity but also to the social network the individual finds herself.1 4 The last component affecting the reputational utility is the number of people who publicly advocate yn. As the group size increases, an individual, a product of social stimuli trying to fit into a society feels more pressured to conform to the group’s preference. The more members of a society approve the individual’s public 12 Ricard Nisbett and Lee Ross succinctly demonstrate that people weight information more in proportion to its vividness. They define vividness as “the emotional interest of information, the concreteness and imaginability of information, and the sensory, spatial, and temporal proximity of information.” They also add, “though these factors are covary, they independently influence the inferential impact of information.” See Ricard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings o f Social Judgment (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1980), especially chapter 3. The quotations are from page 62. 13 Bibb Latane, et al. “Distance Matters: Psychical Space and Social Impact,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 21 (1995): 795-805. 14 Latane and L’Herrou also show that the pressure groups can exert influence on the individual if the individual interacts with them through e-mails. Bibb Latane and T. L’Herrou “Spatial Clustering in the Conformity Game: Dynamic Social Impact in Electronic Groups,” Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology 70 (1996): 1218-1230. 176 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. preference y, such that it matches the group’s preference yn, the more individual will enjoy reputational utility. In a nutshell, the social impact of the group on the individual’s public preference is such that the individual enjoys greater reputational utility from revealing a particular public preference, the greater the social pressure imposed on her. Hence, while holding a particular private preference on an issue provides intrinsic utility, conforming to group’s norms and preferences offer reputational utility for the individual. By veiling herself, a Muslim woman will get the satisfaction o f conducting her life in accordance with Islamic teachings, and therefore, she feels in her heart that she is pleasing Allah. This is the basis of her intrinsic utility. Her reputational utility, on the other hand, stems from the rewards and punishments resulting from others’ attitude towards her practice of veiling. If her publicly revealed preference, y* matches the society’s choice, yn, then she will gain the maximum reputational utility. However, as indicated before, an individual’s private preference may not match her publicly revealed preference on a given issue. Reputational concerns may outweigh the psychological cost associated with revealing a public preference different from one’s very own. Individuals also value their autonomy and self assertiveness. To the extent that one asserts one’s individuality, her utility from satisfying her expressive needs will be at a maximum. By contrast, if individual compromises her self-assertiveness to fit into the society, such that there is a clash 177 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. between her private and public preferences, then, there is a psychic cost incurred by the individual associated with this loss in individual autonomy, which will be the basis for the expressive utility taken up in the section below. Expressive Utility We exercise our individual autonomy through expressing ourselves. We derive pleasure from revealing our inner thoughts and enjoy being genuine about our inner preferences in the public domain to protect our individuality, integrity and dignity. We, human beings, have this need for individual autonomy and self assertiveness and “derive self-esteem from resisting social pressures”.1 5 Several towering figures in psychology, including Freud, Allport, Fromm, and Maslow recognized the need for the individual to express himself.1 6 They all claim that suppression of this need, especially through social pressures, can even lead to mental disorders. Clearly, to the extent that we sacrifice our integrity and refrain from expressing our genuine preferences, we incur a psychic cost. Thus, conformity due to yielding to social pressure is not an automatic and a blind response, but has the potential to create excruciating inner struggles within 15 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 31. 16 Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Worton, 1961: first German ed., 1923); Gordon W. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (New York: Henry Holt, 1937), 464; Erich Fromm, Man fo r Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology o f Ethics (New York: Fawcett Premier, 1975; first ed., 1947); and Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 3r d ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1987; first ed., 1954) especially chapter 11. I was led to these sources by Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 33, n. 25. 178 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. individuals. The Asch and Milgram experiments pointed out this emotional struggle among those who obeyed orders by others to receive social acceptance.1 7 Thus, individuals potentially experience internal emotional strife when they compromise their individual autonomy in return for social approval. Expressive utility captures the pleasure we derive from being self-assertive as we do when we speak up our minds and the psychic cost we incur when we conform to public pressure. The more we suppress our inner thoughts and beliefs, and yield to social pressures, the greater will be the discrepancy between our private and public preferences such that our x* will be different from y* as our public preference y* gets closer to society’s choice yn. Both barber Ali and teacher Hasan incur such psychic costs and experience emotional strife when they conform the Islamic requirements to avoid being social outcasts. Alternatively, they could have behaved in accordance with their private beliefs and could have chosen to smoke or drink in the month of Ramadan to generate the greatest expressive utility. Similarly, a veiled woman with an Islamist orientation who goes to work in a state institution unveiled to keep her job must also compromise her expressive utility as she is pressured to behave against her own individual preferences in line with Islamic requirements. In all these three examples, individuals yield to public pressure to generate reputational 17 Milgram observed many subjects harbored intense emotional dissonance in continuing to carry out every request of the experimenter and honored them to the end. One of Milgram participants was initially smiling businessman turned, in 2 0 minutes, into a twitching, stuttering wreck about to approach a point of nervous collapse. Stanley Milgram, “Behavioral Study o f Obedience,” Journal o f Abnormal and Social Psychology, (67): 337. 179 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. utility at the expense of their expressive utility where the difference between their public and private preferences and hence, the psychic cost incurred is the greatest. The following function captures this aspect of expressive utility: E = s E (100 - |y - x|) where (100 - |y - x|) simply determines the proximity of the individual’s public preference to her private preference for a given society’s choice, yn- The function E (100 - |y - x|) is assumed to be increasing in 100-|y - x| and concave over the bounds [0, E(100)]. If her public preference y* and her private preference x* are identical, she will have the maximum expressive utility from revealing her true self. The individual specific parameter s captures how much the individual values her integrity, or her drive for self-assertiveness in terms of her lifestyle and political orientation. The higher s is, the more an individual cares about expressing her own views and the more she enjoys exercising her own autonomy. Notice that the drive for genuine self-assertiveness varies greatly across individuals and e scales the expressive utility upwards or downwards depending on its individual specific value. The expressive utility is maximized when x* = y* such that E = e E (100). This is the case when teacher Hasan and barber Ali assert their individuality by disregarding the Islamist social pressure. Note also that when the discrepancy between y* and x* is at a maximum, then the expressive utility E = s E(0) = 0 is at a minimum. As an example, a veiled woman compelled to remove her scarf in a university or in the parliament must suffer from a complete loss of her expressive utility by giving in to 180 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the rules of the secular state. By contrast, she may assert her individuality and her worldview by attending such public institutions completely veiled as in the example of Merve Kavakxpi to make her preference known to the public in complete defiance of the principles of the secular Turkish state.1 8 In every society, there exists a group of activists a with a very high value of s, who sticks to their genuine private preferences at any cost, such as, Hallaj, Seyh Bedrettin, Pir Sultan Abdal, and Aziz Nesin. Because of his unorthodox views, Mancur al-Hallaj (858-922) was brutally tortured to death in Baghdad by a Sunni majority while a large crowd watched.1 9 §eyh Bedrettin and Pir Sultan Abdal were other two examples from the Turkish history who were hanged because they refused to retreat from their “heretical” views.2 0 Being an Alawite, a member of a hereditary sect, Pir Sultan Abdal rebelled against the Sunni orthodox Ottoman state like §eyh Bedrettin. The Sultan’s army executed both on the spot. There are also more recent examples in contemporary Turkey. Aziz Nesin constitutes a case in point. He narrowly escaped from burning alive in 1993 when an angry mob arsoned his hotel because he was a self-declared atheist.2 1 For each of these people, the value of integrity and assertiveness, s, must take a rather large value. 18 For details of the “Merve incident,” see Chapter 6 . 19 For detailed information about al-Hallaj, see The New Encyclopedia Britannica, micropaedia, 15th ed., s.v. “Hallaj.” 20 For detailed information about Bedrettin see The New Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Bedreddin.” For Pir Sultan Abdal, see The Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Islamic Arts.” 21 For more on the case of Aziz Nesin, see Chapter 6 . 181 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Thus, the s for Hallaj, §eyh Bedrettin, Pir Sultan Abdal, and Aziz Nesin was so high that their expressive utility overrode their reputational concerns such that s E (100) at x* = y* exceeded their maximum reputational utility, say, R (y’) where y’ is any public preference different from private preference x* but equal to society’s choice yH - Hence, I assume s to be very large for such people that some of them behaved as activists in order to win public support for their worldviews. Merve Kavakpi, an elected deputy in the 1999 elections, who entered the Turkish Parliament wearing a headscarf despite the strict secular dress code, m ay be viewed as another example for such an activism. Merve Kavakci was not only sticking to her private preferences in terms of veiling but also was making a political statement in a secularist establishment such as the parliament to win support for her worldview among the masses. Ironically, the chameleon majority of non-activists adamantly admire the self-assertiveness of the few under any condition. Every culture has its own heroes and heroines who resist subordination at any cost: This simply shows that most people want to identify themselves with the uncompromising heroes or heroines since such a trait is the exception, not the rule in human history. For this precise reason, e, an individual-specific parameter takes a small value for the majority of people that. I call non-activists. A non-activist Islamist or secularist may have a sufficiently large expressive utility from asserting their individuality so as to exceed 22 For more on the case of Merve Kavakfi, see Chapter 6 . 182 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. reputational rewards and choose not to compromise their privately held beliefs in the face of public pressure. Hence, they may refrain from preference falsification to the extent possible. Yet, they may do so without deliberately attempting to win others to their side like the activists. Thus, the dual preference model presented here depicts a framework in which an individual has multiple sources of happiness: economic, social, and psychological. That is to say, it is based on the divided-self constmct that provides valuable insights into human behavior. Specifically, it is the claim that Homo sapiens are composed of homo economicus, homo sociologicus, and homo psychologicus. The intrinsic utility highlights homo economicus, “a self-controlled, calculating utility machine;” the reputational utility characterizes homo sociologicus, “the product of social stimuli ruled by social demand;” and the expressive utility identifies homo psychologicus, “an impulsive and tormented soul, struggling, seldom successfully to escape from his conscience.”2 3 Hence, the total utility of an individual may be represented as the sum of these utilities in the following form: U (x, y) = I (x) + R (y) + £ E (100- |y - x|). 23 T. Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 43. 183 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Application of the Dual Preference Model to Islamism and Secularism in Turkey Let me reproduce Table 2.1 as Table 4.1 here. Table 4.1 shows four different cases. In Cases I and II, no difference between public and private preferences exists while in Cases III and IV private preference differs from public preference under which there are three distinct responses, i.e., exit, sincere voice, and preference falsification to Islamism and secular modernity, as explained in Chapter 2. Table 4.1: Preferences and Worldviews PREFERENCES PUBLIC WORLDVIEWS ISLAMIST SECULARIST PRIVATE ISLAMIST CASE I CASE III SECULARIST CASE IV CASE II Also recall that both public and private preferences, x and y, take on a value between 0 (extreme Islamist, veiled) and 100 (extreme secularist, unveiled) such that x* and y*e[0, 100]. A private preference of x*=0 refers to an extreme Islamist position of an individual and a preference of x*=100 an extreme secularist position on all social issues regarding these contending worldviews and lifestyles. Similarly, a public preference of y*=0 indicates that the individual publicly pursues an extreme 184 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Islamist lifestyle and reveals a political orientation, lending support to the extreme Islamists which could differ from her own private preference x*. Case I Case I refers to an Islamist setting in which individuals have public and private preferences identical to each other such that x* = y* and x*, y* and yn e [0, 50) where 50 represents a neutral position relative to both secularist and Islamist worldviews and lifestyles. yH stands for the society’s choice at home. In such a setting, the dual preference model, in fact, turns into a single preference model in which the individual faces no public pressure to express a preference different than her own genuine private choice. For example, a devout Muslim woman with a private preference of 15 who prefers to veil will experience no public pressure to unveil herself. On the contrary, the public approves her act of veiling and grants her several reputational rewards as she lives in complete conformity with the Islamist society as long as society’s preference, yn matches y*=15. This means that in addition to generating a maximum amount of intrinsic utility, she will enjoy the greatest reputational benefits such that R(15) is at its maximum with y*= yH-15. Furthermore, since she lives in complete harmony with the society, the individual will experience no emotional strife or intrinsic discomfort from being untrue to her inner self by revealing a different public preference than her own such that both her intrinsic and expressive utilities will be at a maximum. Hence, she will also enjoy 185 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the maximum amount of intrinsic utility, I and expressive utility, s E(100). Thus, her total utility under the “ideal” Islamist world can be written as, i(15) + R(15)+s E(100), generating the largest utility possible that a practicing Muslim will entertain under Case I. This case also depicts the position of a Muslim living in Iran or Saudi Arabia under the Shariat rule or another Muslim society with less extreme Islamist policies provided that individuals’ inner preferences match those of the society. Case II The second case refers to a secularist lifestyle in which both public and private preferences coincide such that x* = y* and x*, y* and yn e(50, 100]. Since no individual with Islamic preferences exists in this setting, each member of society has both private and public preferences, which are secular. In this setting, no woman is willing to or pressured to veil as there exists no Islamic lifestyles. The individuals’ secular private preferences completely match those of the society and hence, they can unhesitatingly be tme to themselves in public. Case II also yields the largest possible utility for the individual with a secular private preference of 80 provided that the society’s preference, yn is also 80. In the absence of explicit or implicit social pressures, the individual will enjoy the highest reputational utility such that R(80) is at its maximum with y*= yn =80. Furthermore, since the individual will experience no emotional strife from being untrue to her inner self, she 186 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. will also enjoy the maximum amount of expressive utility at s E(100). Hence, her total utility under the “ideal” secular world will be equal to 1(80) + R(80)+s E(100), generating the largest utility possible that a secularist will entertain under Case II. In both Case I and Case II, the individual does not face conflicting worldviews of Islamism and secularism and there is no room or need for preference falsification. However, the crux of this dissertation is to examine the contending co existence of Islamism and secularism in Turkey where individuals continually find themselves in social settings, which contradict their genuine private preferences. Cases III and IV specify two such possible settings. In the coming sections, the dual preference model will help formalize three possible responses: The first is exit, i.e., leaving the disturbing setting. The second is sincere voice, i.e., expressing dissatisfaction with the setting. The third is preference falsification, i.e., conveying a public preference that differs from private preference to seek public’s approval or to minimize social ostracism in environments with restricted forms of individual liberty and little or no tolerance towards “the other.” Case III Case III deals with the responses of a practicing Muslim to secular settings. In conducting her daily life structured by some principles of secular modernity, a practicing Muslim confronts many obstacles to carrying out the duties that Islam demands from her. Secular principles, norms, and behavioral patterns introduced by 187 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the state and adopted by the majority in the public domain put her in a position in which she has to endure several contradictions between her privately held beliefs and behaviors in the public sphere. For instance, if an Islamist woman wants to veil, but she refrains from covering up to satisfy her secularist employers, she will feel very uncomfortable. Similarly, if she cannot perform her religious duties by praying at the workplace, she will feel she is not doing enough to please Allah. Hence, working in a secularist establishment will compromise her individual autonomy and expressive needs while leading to inner feelings of discomfort on the part of this individual. However, if she adheres to her private preferences in the public domain and chooses to veil to satisfy her expressive needs, then she w ill withstand a reputational cost secularists impose on her. At the extreme, she may even lose her job if she insists on coming to work wearing a headscarf. In deciding whether she has to run her life in accordance with her religious beliefs or to fit into a secularist lifestyle in the public setting, she has the following three options. Clearly, she chooses the option with the highest amount of total utility. Exit Exit simply means leaving the secular setting. When she realizes that it is impossible to run her life according to Islamic rules under the secular social structures, a devout Muslim may desert the secular setting. Take the example of a veiled female student attending a state university that imposes a secular dress code with an Islamist private preference of 15 in a secular setting with a public preference 188 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of 80 w here yH =80. In this setting, neither the veiled female student nor the society is extremist. But the society (or the setting) displays a secularist worldview while tolerating some forms of Islamism and the female student is veiled but may have more moderate private views and interpretations of Islam. In order to continue her education in Turkey she must take off her scarf before attending classes and display a public preference which conforms to that of the secular setting at 80. If this student is unwilling to compromise her position, and refuses to unveil, then apparently, only other option for her to get higher education is to leave the secular setting and migrate to another Islamic country or transfer to a pluralistic Western European university which protects her individual liberty to veil while attending classes. Let us assume that she transfers to a university in an Islamic country where society’s stance, yE matches her private preference, x* at 15 such that yE stands for the society’s choice abroad (exit case). In this new setting, she will continue to enjoy her maximum intrinsic utility from behaving in accordance with her Islamist worldview such that 1(15) is at a maximum. She will also have the highest expressive utility of being true to herself in the public, i.e., s E(100). Most importantly, since she reveals Islamic preferences in accordance with that of the society at 15, she will take advantage of the reputational benefits the Islamist setting provides her. Hence, a devout Muslim will exit the secular setting if the total utility (where each component is at a maximum in our example) she will get in this new setting net of the cost of the exit exceeds the total utility she will gain in the secular setting if she behaves in conformity with the society’s choice at yH =80 or if she speaks out her mind and 189 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. follows her genuine preferences. Symbolically, one will exit from Case III to Case I if her total utility from revealing an identical public and private preference of 15 in the foreign country exceeds or is equal to the total utility of revealing a public preference in conformity with the society’s choice, yH~80 plus the exit cost C such that i(15) + eE(100-|15-15|) + RE (15) Sd(15) + sE(100-|80-15|) + RH (80) + C s E(100) + Re(15) >s E(35) + RH (80) + C then s {E(100) - E(35)} >{RH (8 0 )-R E (15)} +C where C stands for the net cost of exit and RE (15) is at maximum since individual public preference y* is equal to the foreign society’s yE at 15 when she exits to an Islamic setting abroad. Similarly, when she stays and conforms, then her public preference, y is equal to the society’s at yn =80 such that she again maximizes her reputational gains through conformity. Let us assume that Rh(80) = RE (15) for simplicity. The above condition becomes s {E(100) - E(35)} >C. C captures both the indirect costs the individual incurs such as loss of jobs, business ties, relationships and social network and the direct cost of financing the exit. Yet, exit may also generate significant benefits in the form of a more desirable lifestyle abroad, escaping social ostracism and even, danger of losing one’s life, possibly resulting in a substantially low cost of exit which should be netted out. In this case, exit is even more viable option because low net cost of exit increases the 190 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. likelihood that the expressive utility exceeds the sum of the reputational gain from conformity and the cost of exit. Therefore, the necessary condition for exit is that the individual has the financial means to afford this option (case where C is positive but small). The sufficient condition for exit is that the fugitive must have a desirable lifestyle abroad (case where C turns negative). Hence, exit option will be chosen by this individual so long as exit cost is less than the net expressive utility where C <e {E(100)-E(35)}. Alternatively, if her total utility of exit, net of exit costs, exceeds or is equal to her total utility from speaking out and behaving in accordance with her genuine preferences in a secular setting with yn =80, then 1(15) + sE(100-|15-15|) + Re(15) >1(15) + sE(100-|15-15|) + RH (15) + C hence, Re(15)>R h(15)+C. Note that Rh(15) represents her public preference of y*=15 in a secular setting with yH =80 which is less than its maximum value while Re(15) is her maximum reputational utility when she exits to an Islamic setting abroad with ye =15. If both of these conditions are satisfied, then the individual will exit the secularist setting rather than speaking out or conforming. One of the famous examples of exit was Mehmet Akif [Ersoy], an ardent Islamist and the poet of the Turkish national anthem. After the Independence War, he despised the Kemalist reforms suppressing Islam. He left for Egypt during the summers from 1923 to 1926. As the Kemalists initiated full-scale secularist reforms 191 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in 1926, he decided not to return to Turkey. He lived in Egypt during the heyday o f the Kemalist secularism between 1926 and 1933. He returned to Turkey in 1936 as his health deteriorated and he died a few months later.2 4 However, the exit option is not available for the majority in Turkey. Cost o f exit is prohibitively high for many, making it impossible for an ordinary citizen to desert the country. Due to severe financial constraints and limited options for immigration, many would eventually have to stay and face the consequences o f revealing their private preferences. Hence, for such an individual with a net exit cost of C such that C> s {E(100) - E(35)} or Re(15)< Rh(15) + C, sincere voice or preference falsification are other possible options. Sincere Voice Sincere voice is to express dissatisfaction to the secularists by revealing one’s Islamist private preferences. As an individual encounters the worldview from which she would like to detach herself, she may sincerely voice her opposition. A female doctor may refuse to examine a male patient, since she believes that Islam forbids her to touch any male other than husband or close kin. A veiled student may complain about the president of a state university for preventing veiled students from 24 For a short biography of Mehmet Akif Ersoy and a selection of his writings, see Ismail Kara (ed.), Turkiye ’ de Islamcihk Dusjiincesi: Metinler/Kiqiler [The Islamist Thought in Turkey: Essays/Authors], vol 1, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Risale, 1987), 309-406. 192 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. entering classrooms. If she has a high level of expressive utility, she becomes an activist to participate pro-veiling protests, demanding the right to veil on campus. Once exit is not an option, the individual will resist the secularist pressures if her total utility from sincere voice in which she reveals an identical public and private preference of 15, exceeds the total utility of revealing a public preference in conformity with the society’s secularist setting at 80. Symbolically, the condition for sincere voice in such a secular setting can be represented by t(15) + e E(100-|15- 15[) + R(15)>i(15) + s E(100-|80- 15|) + R(80) s {E(100)-E(35)} >R(80)-R(15) and if Re(15) < Rh(15) + C such that sincere voice is preferred to conformity and exit when these two conditions are satisfied. Note that the condition for sincere voice is satisfied when the sum of the net expressive utility from self-assertiveness and the net intrinsic utility from being true to oneself is large enough to exceed the net reputational utility from conformity and when the total utility of sincere voice is greater than the total utility of exit. The option of sincere voice covers both the Islamist activists and the non activists with the large enough expressive utilities to override reputational concerns in a secular setting. But among those who engage in sincere voice, the Islamist activists will fight forcefully against secularist pressures while attempting to exert some pressures on non-activist individuals to join them. These activists have 193 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. relatively large individual specific parameter e, which increases the intensity of their desire to defend their private preferences to the point of imposing their own worldview on others while lambasting the secular setting. Jubilantly cherishing their integrity, intellectuals have large s values corresponding to higher expressive utility. Indeed, many Islamist intellectuals bash secularist pressures by writing articles, making public speeches, organizing protest meetings. Necip Fazil Kisakiirek, Cemil Meri? and ismet Ozel are among the intellectuals who have spoken against secularist discourse. They also published books to clarify their position on the issue by making it public.2 6 2 5 For Necip Fazil Kisakiirek’s life and publications see §erif Mardin, “Culture, Change and the Intellectual: A Study of the Effects of Secularization in Modem Turkey, Necip Fazil and the Naksibendi” in idem, (ed.) Cultural Transitions in the Middle East (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994): 189- 213; and M. Orhan Okay, Necip Fazil Kisakiirek (Ankara: Kiiltiir ve Turizm Bakanligi, 1987). For Cemil Meric, see Cemil Merif “Cemil Meric ile Sohbetler (Interviews with Cemil Merip),” interview by Halil Afikgoz, Cemil Meriq ile Sohbetler [Interviews with Cemil Meri?] (Istanbul: Seyran Iktisadi Isletmesi, 1993). For Ismet Ozel, see Micheal E. Meeker, “The Muslim Intellectual and His Audience: A New Configuration of Writer and Reader Among Believers in the Republic of Turkey” in §erif Mardin (ed.) Cultural Transitions in the Middle East (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994): 153-188; and Ozel’s autobiographical book, Waldo Sen Neden Burada Degilsin [Waldo Why Are You Not Here] 5t h ed. (Istanbul: Qidam Yayinlan, 1988). 2 6 Among many books by these intellectuals, one can see Necip Fazil Kisakiirek, Ben ve O, 3r d ed. (Istanbul: Biiyiik Dogu Yayinlan, 1978); Cemil Merif Bu Ulke [This Country] (Istanbul: OtiikenYaymevi, 1974); ismet Ozel, Uq Mesele: Teknik Medeniyet, Yabancila$ma [Three Problems: Technology, Civilization, Alienation] (Istanbul: Dergah Yaymlari, 1978) and Ismet Ozel, Zor Zamanda Konuqmak [To Speak in Difficult Times] (Istanbul: Risale Yayinlan, 1984). 194 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Pro-secularist Preference Falsification Pro-secularist preference falsification occurs when a religious person hides her Islamic preferences and publicly conveys a secularist preference in response to secularist pressures. In other words, pro-secularist preference falsification is an act of misrepresenting one’s genuine religious beliefs under the secularist pressures. This is a legitimate option within Islam. The Shi ’ ite doctrine of taqiya justifies certain religious dissimulation. The doctrine originated in the late seventh century as the Ummayyad dynasty ruling the Arab Empire began to persecute Shi’ ites for their heterodoxy. The leading Shi’ ite theologians formulated the taqiya doctrine grounded in three Qur’anic verses. The first verse (III, 28) bids Muslims to guard against the infidels. The full verse (III, 28) reads: “Those who believe should not take unbelievers as their friends in preference to those who believe - and whoever does so should have no (expectations) of God - unless to safeguard yourselves against them.” The second verse was believed to refer to the case of Arnmar Ibn Yasir, whom the infidels tortured to worship idols. Yet, he escaped and fled in distress and penitence to Muhammed at Medina. He told the Prophet he had hold onto his faith. Following the incident, this Qur’anic verse was revealed, “save him who is forced to thereto and is still content with Faith” (XVI, 106). The major justification is, however, based on the third verse: “Whether ye conceal what it is in your hearts or reveal it, Allah knows it” (III, 27). Thus, the doctrine of taqiya allows 195 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. devout Muslims to dissimulate their religious orientations by hiding their particular religious rites and ritual practices,2 7 legitimizing preference falsification. Illustrations of such preference falsification in response to secularist pressures include: a Muslim who is ashamed to use sinks in restrooms to do his purification rituals; a government employee who cannot pray during the day and can not go to mosque for public prayers on Fridays; a worker who is prevented from fasting since he has to work long hours; a teacher who cannot go on the pilgrimage except in summer; a merchant who cannot save extra money for an alms tax; a Muslim who fears professing his faith as well as all the others who pretend they are secularly oriented in response to secularist public discourse. The condition for pro-secularist preference falsification is satisfied when a female with an Islamist private preference of 15 and a desire to veil takes off her scarf in public in conformity with the secular public setting of 80 to generate reputational gains. That is, she engages in a pro-secularist preference falsification if her total utility under sincere voice and exit conditions are both less than the total utility of revealing a public preference in conformity with the society’s secularist setting at 80. Symbolically, the condition for this case follows; 2 7 I was drawn to the verses by P. Zagorin, Ways o f Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution, and Conformity in Early Modem Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 4-5. In translation of the first Qur’anic verse, I use Al-Qur'an: A Contemporary Translation by Ahmed Ali, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 54. The second verse is as quoted in Zagorin, Ways of Lying, 4. The last verse is widely quoted. See, for example, G. E. von Grunebaum, M edieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation. 2nd ed. (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1953), 191. 196 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1(15) + s E(100-|15-15|) + R(15) < 1(15) + s E(100-|80-15|) + R(80) then s {E(100) - E(35)} < R(80) - R(15) such that conformity in the form of preference falsification is preferred to sincere voice and it is also preferred to exit when s {E(100) - E(35)} < C. Each ordinary person easily senses that her opinion will have no effect upon the secularist majority since she is only one among many. Rather than going against secularist groups, she may enjoy their approval by pretending to be secular at the cost of being untrue to herself. Obviously, she values reputational rewards more highly than her integrity. For example, a veiled female student may choose to take off her scarf in order to get admitted to a Turkish university, which imposes a secular dress code. Hence, a veiled student may yield in conformity to this secularist pressure in order to achieve her goal of receiving a university degree. Clearly, the existence of a strictly secularist administration stands for the strength of the secularist group pressure which raises her reputational utility from unveiling along with the urgency for the student to attend classes to pass her exams. For this student, net expressive utility from veiling is less than the rewards she will receive in the secularist setting by unveiling herself. Therefore, she misrepresents her private preferences by engaging in pro-secularist preference falsification. By contrast, an Islamist who attends a secular reception where alcohol is served and men and women regularly shake hands and even kiss each other needs not engage in preference 197 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. falsification as long as he does not engage himself in such acts and refuse to drink alcohol as prime minister Tayyip Erdogan does in state receptions. Note that under Case III, out of three possible choices, i.e., exit, sincere voice and pro-secularist preference falsification, considering all options simultaneously, the individual will choose the option that maximizes her utility. Case IV Case IV frames the responses of a secular citizen to Islamic settings. In conducting her daily life within a Muslim culture, a secular citizen has a difficult time in avoiding the Islamist pressures. Many Islamist social norms and behavioral patterns oblige her to withstand several contradictions. She is continually caught between running her life in accordance with secularist quests and fitting into Muslim culture. She again has three options: Exit, sincere voice and preference falsification. A secular citizen will choose an option that produces for her the highest total utility, depending upon her individual specific parameters. Exit Exit is to leave the Islamist setting. An atheist who can not endure pressures from the Muslim community may settle in a predominantly non-Muslim country. Ilhan Arsel, a self-declared atheist and anti-religious professor of the Ankara School of Law, decided to live in the United States as a result of several death threats from 198 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. radical Islamists in Turkey.2 8 Ironically, the secularist establishment also persecuted him due to his leftist views, ilhan Arsel’s private preference o f atheism was completely at odds with radical Islamist views in Turkey. Moreover, he was an activist intellectual with a large s who had the means to influence masses with his atheist teachings. Radical Islamist groups threatened to take his life to silence his activism. Another academician, critical of Islamic economics, received several death threats after a newspaper had popularized his research. He had to withdraw his article from publication in a prestigious Middle Eastern journal. He quit his tenured position at a Turkish University and resumed his career in the United States.2 9 Obviously, these are some extreme examples of how some Turkish intellectuals who valued their self-assertiveness highly used the exit option as they refused to compromise either with the secularist or with the Islamist groups. For them, cost of exit must have turned negative as he escaped to another country to save his life or the benefits of exit more than compensated for the direct and indirect costs of exit. On the other hand, his leftist views were also at odds with the secularist establishment. As long as an individual’s expressive utility from defending a particular private preference, say 99 with a very strong secular orientation to the point of atheism exceeds the net reputational benefits from conforming to either to a 2 8 For his anti-Islamic writings see ilhan Arsel, §eriat ve Kadin [§eriat and Woman] 13th ed. (Istanbul: Dilek Ofset, 1995) and ilhan Arsel, Toplumsal Geriliklerimizin Sorumlulan: D in Adamlari ve Aydinlar [Those Responsible for Our Social Backwardness: Men of Religion and Intellectuals] (Ankara: Dogan Basimevi, 1977). 2 9 Personal correspondence, 15 October 1999. I keep his name secret to protect his privacy. 199 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. moderate secularist public preference at 80 or to a radical Islamist preference at 5 plus the cost of exit, he, like Arsel, may choose the exit option. Taking a more moderate example from the daily life of an ordinary female with a secularist orientation at 80 living in an Islamist setting in Saudi Arabia with a public’s preference of 10, it can be shown that this female with the financial means and opportunities to make a living abroad can choose to exit from Case IV to Case II if her expressive utility exceeds the reputational benefits the Islamist setting provides to her. She may value her secularist lifestyle which offers her individual liberties such as unveiling and driving a car without a male present in the car much more than conforming to the Islamist worldview which pressures her to veil and suppresses her freedom of action. Symbolically, she will exit from Case IV to Case II if her total utility from revealing an identical public and private preference of 80 net of exit cost C exceeds the total utility of revealing a public preference in conformity with the society’s preference yE at 10 such that 1(80) + eE(100-|80-80|) + RE (80) > 1(80) + sE(100-|10-80|) + RH (10) + C s E(100) + Re(80) > 8 E(30) + Rh(10) + C then s {E(100) - E(30)} > {RH (10) - RE (80)} + C. Again, when we impose that RH (10) = RE (80), we can rewrite this condition as s {E(100) - E(30)} > C. Hence, exit is preferred to conformity given this condition. But for exit to be a preferred course of action, her total utility under exit 200 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. should also be greater than her utility from sincere voice and behaving in accordance with her genuine preferences in an Islamic setting, that is, conformity. Thus, individual will choose to exit over sincere voice given the following condition: 1(80) + sE(100-|80-80|) + RE (80) > 1(80) + sE(100-|80-80|) + RH(80) + C, thus Re(80) > Rh(80) + C. Note that Rh(80) refers to her public preference of y*=80 in an Islamic setting with yH =10 which is less than its maximum value of Re(80) when she exits to a secularist setting abroad with yE =80. If both of these conditions are satisfied, then the individual will exit the Islamist setting rather than speaking out or conforming. The stricter the penalties on females who appear in public unveiled or who drive a car alone, the more likely an individual will exit as its cost turns negative. For example, Niyazi Berkes, a pro-secularist scholar, after being beaten by pro- Islamist activists, left Turkey in 1949 for Canada, where he was able to resume his career. Ilhan Arsel and Niyazi Berkes are two examples of individuals who were also persecuted by the secularist establishment for their leftist views who could afford the exit option. Yet, the majority has no available means to successfully exit. Hence, for such an individual with large exit costs such that C> e {E(100) - E(30)} or RE (80)< 30 For a biography of Niyazi Berkes, see Feroz Ahmet’s intodcution to Niyazi Berkes, The Development o f Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964; reprint, with a new introduction by Feroz Ahmad, New York: Routledge, 1998): xv-xxxii. 201 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Rh(80) + C, sincere voice or preference falsification are the remaining possible alternative courses of action. Sincere Voice Sincere voice is the expression of dissatisfaction with the Islamist setting by declaring secular private preferences. A high school student may protest against the Ministry of National Education that compels her to take a religion course each year. A hotel owner will speak out against Islamists who want to close topless beaches to avoid losing customers who enjoy topless sunbathing. A secular person will criticize the Islamic setting and assert her secular lifestyle when she follows the sincere voice option. This is the case for an individual who refuses to compromise her private preference at 80 in an Islamist setting which rewards her public preference at a maximum if it matches the society’s setting, yn at 10 such that R(10) represents the maximum amount of reputational gains under the Islamic setting. The condition for sincere voice in an Islamist setting emerges when the individual’s total utility under sincere voice exceeds her total utility from conforming to the Islamic setting. This can be symbolically written as: 1(80) + s E(100-1 80- 80|) + R(80) > 1(80) + s E(100-|10-80|) + R(10) then s |E(100) - E(30)}> R(10) - R(80) and sincere voice is preferred to conformity and if Re(80)< Rh(80) + C is satisfied, sincere voice is also preferred to exit. 202 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Secularist activists whose expressive satisfaction surpasses the reputational benefits they might get from conforming to the Islamist worldview will, for example, lambast all Islamists. Among those who could afford the exit option, some activist individuals with a large s may choose to fight against the Islamist worldview to protect their autonomy and those of the non-activists with a secularist orientation. Sincerely speaking up in public can be costly for an individual and might even be fatal. For instance, Bahriye Uqok, Muhammer Aksoy, Ugur Mumcu, Cretin Emep, and Turan Dursun, all five strongly secularist intellectuals, were probably assassinated by illegal radical Islamist organizations. The case of Turan Dursun was the most striking example. Dursun himself was once an esteemed mufti, the highest rank for a provincial imam. When he turned into a self-declared atheist, he publicly condemned the Islamist worldview. “I do not want to be squeezed between what I live and what I think,” said Dursun in one of his late interviews.3 1 He resigned from his religious post and applied to be a garbage collector. He later produced anti- religious TV shows and writing several books through which he attacked the original texts of Islam.3 2 He was one of the most outspoken secularist and anti-Islamist before he was assassinated on September 4, 1990. 31 Turan Dursun. “Turan Dursun Hayatmi Anlatiyor (Turan Dursun Tells His Life Story),” interview by §ule Perinfek, Turan Dursun Hayatmi Anlatiyor [Turan Dursun Tells His Life Story] (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlan, 1992): 36. 32 For hi anti-Islamic essay collections published after his death, see Turan Dursun Tabu Can Cekiyor: Din Bu [Taboo is Dying: This is Religion] 4 vols. (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlan, 1990-1993) and Turan Dursun, Allah [God] (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlan, 1991). 203 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Although the cases above are extreme, voice may still bring some undesirable consequences. In less dramatic cases, individuals may fear losing their old business ties, relationships and the social network within which they have lived for years. In addition, they may be fearful of possible social ostracism. Hence, most people are more likely to engage in pro-Islamist preference falsification. Thus, sincere voice may involve certain costs that many will try to avoid as an unattractive option. To the extent that sincere voice loses its attractiveness, preference falsification seems a more likely outcome to the pressures from Islamists and secularists in Turkey. Pro-Islamist Preference Falsification If one has private preferences supportive of the secularist worldview, but she misrepresents these preferences under Islamist pressures, she engages in pro-Islamist preference falsification. For example, a shopkeeper who decorates his shop with religious symbols falsifies his secular private preferences so as not to be stigmatized as anti-religious; a newcomer to a city who behaves as if he is a devout Muslim to find a job; a student who pretends to practice Islam to stay in a dormitory funded by the Islamists - all succumb to Islamic pressures are falsifying their preferences. The condition for pro-Islamist preference falsification is that the reputational benefits from behaving as a devout Muslim override one’s expressive needs to be secular. Symbolically, the condition for pro-Islamist preference falsification is 1(80) + s E(100-|80- 801) + Rh(80) < 1(80) + 8 E(100-|10-80|) + R(10) then £ {E(100) - E(30)}< R(10) - R(80) 204 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. such that preference falsification is preferred to sincere voice and recall that it is also preferred to exit when s {E(100) - E(30)} < C. For many, this appears to be the case. These individuals perceive that their opinion will have no influence upon the setting. Rather than standing up the Islamists, one may enjoy their social approval by pretending to be a pious Muslim at the cost of being untrue to herself. To illustrate, after years of being exposed to secularist ideas during her education in secular schools, a young female student might believe that Islam has no respect for woman’s rights and might object to the practice of veiling. Yet, she may feel obliged to wear a headscarf when she visits her conservative hometown during summer vacations, fearing her relatives criticize her for disregarding the Islamic dress code. Note that under Case IV, similar to Case III, out of possible three choices, i.e., exit, sincere voice and pro-Islamist preference falsification, individuals will have more than one option to decide on, and the individual will choose the option that maximizes her utility. It is time to see how pro-secularist and pro-Islamist preference falsifications are the dominant responses to the clash of the contending worldviews in different public settings in the context of contemporary Turkey. Tying It All Together The following figure summarizes all the possible responses to the collision of Islamism and secularism in Turkey. As any individual enters into a new setting she readily observes its general characteristics, pointing to pro-secularist or pro-Islamist 205 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. settings. She will become self-aware of the others’ outfits, especially any religious or secularist symbols. Veiled women, men with silver wedding rings, with distinctive beard styles, or long rosaries are the common signals of Islamist settings. In contrast, presence of M. Kemal Atatiirk in the form of pictures, rosettes, or statue generally signals a strong pro-secularist orientation. Of course, even an Islamist activist such as Erbakan may have a picture of Atatiirk in his office, but this is an act of pro-secularist preference falsification or taqiya on his part to gain the support of Islamist-nationalistic sympathizers who love Atatiirk. Certain words also give clues about Islamist or secularist tendencies. CASE I CASE in CASE IV CASE II Sincere Sincere Voice Voice Pro-secularist Preference Falsification Pro-Islamist Preference Falsification Figure 4.1: Decision Tree 206 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. If the individual’s private preference coincides with the setting, then she will have no difficulty in expressing her own preference on the several controversial issues to the group members. In cases where her private preference differs from the others’ public preferences she will immediately sense that she will face social pressures that will produce a reputational loss. In short, any individual in Turkey inevitably finds herself either in Case III or Case IV, which leaves individuals with two options: to stay or to move to a setting that matches her private preferences. A devout Muslim may immigrate to another country where she may conduct her life in accordance with Islamic rules. A secular individual may settle in a country where she can avoid Islamist pressures. Since the exit option is beyond the financial capabilities o f many, most individuals would stay. Such individuals have two options: First, she may not hesitate to reveal her private preference despite the social oppositional pressures, and freely speak up her mind. Said-i Nursi criticized secular reforms in Turkey, even though he spent several years in jail. Turan Dursun has written many anti-Islamic books before his assassination on September 4, 1990. Prime Minister Erdogan banned serving alcohol in state receptions and many secularist state officials perceive this act as an Islamist political statement. Second, the individual may engage in preference falsification by adapting herself to the social milieu. If an Islamist state-employee working for the State Alcoholic Beverage Monopoly (TEKEL) reluctantly receives free product samples 207 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. for a fear of losing his job rather than informing his supervisors about his religious preferences, he engages in pro-secularist preference falsification. Similarly, a bank manager in a small provincial town who wants to maintain good business ties with the Islamic community for the sake of his position may send his son to the mosque school that all the other boys in town regularly attend during the summer. This is not because he has a strong faith in God nor he would like his son to have a solid religious education. Rather, he wants to avoid Islamist pressures from his customers as well as his neighbors. Although he now looks like one of the ordinary town residents, a pious Muslim he never encourages his son to practice Islam, advising him not to tell others about it. As explained above, exit is not available for many, and sincere voice incurs a huge cost. Only a few will prefer not to engage in preference falsification under any circumstances: By resigning from his position as mufti after bashing his colleagues, Turan Dursun refused to engage in pro-Islamist preference falsification, ismet Ozel also refused to be part of pro-secularist preference falsification. He criticized secularism after denouncing Marxism. But, Dursun and Ozel are the exceptions. In order to avoid social pressures and unwanted consequences, individuals are likely to engage in pro-Islamist or pro-secularist preference falsification since preference falsification for the majority is the least costly compared to exit and sincere voice 208 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. options. Hence, it is the most often selected response to the collision of Islamism T ” 3 and secularism in Turkey. Taking a Side Islamists and secularists constitute two competing pressure groups in Turkey. Each camp has an inner core of activists with an outer ring of non-activists. By definition, activists do not mind revealing their private preferences in public, deliberately propagating their views in order to win mass support for their particular worldview. Regardless of the social setting, a secularist activist will always support her right to consume alcohol and an Islamist female activist will always refuse to unveil herself. In non-activists’ support for their cause, Islamists want more women veiled in the public sphere while secularists demand fewer Islamist symbols. The resulting collectivity, including activists as well as non-activists professing support for a specific cause, forms a pressure group. The Islamist pressure group is composed of the ardent supporters of Islamism and other practicing Muslims, including the members of the Islamist Parties, Nak^ibendi religious order, and Islamist Nurcu community and veiled students, all vacuously revealing their Islamist preferences in public. Likewise, the ardent supporters of secularism and the secular citizens opposing any Islamist policies make up the secularist pressure group. The members of the Society for Atatiirkist Thought 33 The rest of this chapter presents concepts and figures heavily drawn from Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, chapters 3-4, 11 and 15. 209 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (Ataturkfti Dii§unce Demegi) and the Society to Support Modem Life Style (£agda§ Ya§ami Destekleme Demegi) take their place in this pressure group. In order to succeed in their common goal, like-minded activists seek support of non-activists. The more the non-activists profess their support for the activists’ goals, activists enjoy more power as their popularity increases. More veiled women in the public sphere indicate greater Islamization. More protestors against Islamist policies signal the power of the secularist establishment. Exactly for this reason, the pressure groups offer substantial benefits to their supporters while imposing considerable penalties on their challengers. Therefore, the prevailing reputational incentives play a cmcial role in determining non-activists’ public preferences. To illustrate, let me turn to the veiling example. Depending on the social setting, Islamic dress, including the veil has certain social rewards and/or punishments. The veiled women in the conservative neighborhoods reap the social rewards. They “maneuver without harassment in public.”3 4 They are offered seats in the overcrowded public transportation. They are given discounts in the traditional bazaars. The unveiled women, by contrast, face several social punishments in the Islamic quarters: They are always subject to especially verbal and physical harassment. Conservative shopkeepers will rarely offer them discounts. Ironically, 34 I borrow this phrase from Valerie J. Hoffman-Ladd. She explains in Cairo, Egypt how the hicap (Islamic dress) enables women to “maneuver without harassment in public.” Valerie. J. Hoffman- Ladd, “Polemics on the Modesty and Segregation of Women in Contemporary Egypt,” International Journal o f Middle East Studies 19 (1987): 44. Some quarters of Turkey resemble Cairo, Egypt. 210 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the veiled women suffer the same kind of social punishments in the secular quarters while the unveiled ones enjoy certain social rewards. Muslim women in the Islamic dress are always subject to secularist humiliations. The strictly-secular minded professionals, e.g. lawyers, medical doctors, teachers harshly criticize their lifestyle, sometimes give priority to the unveiled women in their professional services and avoid the veiled ones whenever possible. Public schools forbid veiling on campuses. In a polarized political environment where two pressure groups like Islamists and secularists routinely push non-activists to take a side it is extremely difficult for each non-activist to place herself in a neutral position. The non-activist individual will notice that staying on neutral grounds leads to an isolation from both groups, and prevents her from getting potential benefits, and leaves her vulnerable to reputational loss. Given their weak expressive needs, non-activists will incline to one side, depending on their proximity to the pressure group. A new bride will veil herself to get along with her husband’s conservative family even if she dislikes Islamist dress. A female freshman will take her veil off when she enrolls into a state university. One way or another, each non-activist tries to fit into her social setting. Public Opinion versus Private Opinion Not all public differences will have the same effect in forming public opinion on a specific issue. A public statement of a religious leader on the veil controversy or an interview with an army general on reconverting Hagia Sophia Museum into a mosque will probably have a greater impact than the similar declaration by a non- 211 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. activist. To keep the model simple, let us ignore the differences in personal influence and treat each individual’s impact as the same and investigate the distribution of public and private preferences. In the absence of any pro-secularist and pro-Islamist preference falsification, each individual will place herself somewhere between complete Islamization on the one extreme and complete secularization on the other. It is impossible to know the exact distribution of private preferences along the Islamization/secularization spectrum. Yet, it is reasonable to assume that many moderate views in the Turkish society with many different interpretations of Islam and secularism along the range of [0, 100] exist in this model. Moderates may form the majority and the distribution of private preferences would surface as a normal distribution. Even though the normal distribution would be the closest proximity to the reality, let us assume that private preferences are more or less evenly distributed. Let Y be the arithmetic mean of all private preferences. Figure 4.2 shows the uniform distribution of private preferences between 0, i.e., complete Islamization and 100, i.e. complete secularization. Note that X appears as 50. 212 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Density * .Distribution Distribution 0 7 . o f private o f public preferences preferences o.6- 0.5- 0.4- 0.3- 0.2 - I I I I 01 ■ 40 50 X 60 70 80 90 100 Y I 1 --------- 1 --------- 1----------P references Figure 4.2: Polarized Public Opinion Source: Taken from Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 57, figure 3.1 The distribution of public preferences, on the other hand, will depend on the reputational incentives. As explained before, each individual, one way or another, must pick a side between two pressure groups, namely Islamists and secularists. On the issue of veiling among many others, these two sides have contrasting views. The percentage of the population supporting a particular side will vary according to relative strength of one group over the other. Depending on the pressure group’s control over the public sphere, the number of its supporters will increase. Let Y be the corresponding arithmetic mean of all public preferences. Also assume that secularists are stronger than Islamists and offer more reputational benefits. It is expected that non-activists will publicly support secularist causes such as unveiling of the women in the public sphere. Figure 4.2 shows that 70 percent of the 213 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. population supports an extreme secularist position at 100, and hence unveiling of all women in all public settings while the remaining 30 percent favor extreme Islamism at 0, and hence veiling. The distributions of private and public preferences accordingly form private and public opinion. It will be easy to see that reputational concerns lead to a polarized public opinion even if private opinion is not polarized. In this scenario, while private opinion remains hidden, each pressure group will push harder for a favorable public opinion closer to their ultimate position. For this reason, Islamists will offer more reputational benefits for their supporters while imposing more costs on their adversaries. Secularist will do the same. Thus, both opposing sides will battle over public opinion. Equilibrium In the battle over public opinion, both Islamists and secularists intend to increase the number of the non-activists professing support for their cause as in the context of veiling issue. Islamists attempt to raise the number of veiled women in the public sphere by offering benefits to those women who are veiled and by imposing costs on those who are not. On the other hand, secularists reward unveiled women in the public spheres and try to keep the number of unveiled women as high as possible. The veiled women will face clear reputational losses from secularists. A female non-activist has a fixed private preference. This means that she decides based on the nature of her relationship with God. Accordingly, she drives an 214 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. intrinsic utility, which is also fixed at I. As a single member of Turkish society, she has a trivial ability to influence the collective decisions on Islamism and Turkish secularism. When she steps into the public sphere, assuming her intrinsic utility to be negligibly small, her decision to convey a religious private preference will depend on the tradeoff between her expressive needs and the reputational incentives. Given that it is impractical for her to exit the Turkish public sphere, she has to take a side between 0 i.e., extreme Islamists and 100 i.e., extreme secularists. Her reputational utility depends on favorable public opinion, more precisely the mean of the public opinion, Y which is calculated as (0.30*0+0.70* 100)=70 as in Figure 4.2. Suppose her private declaration x* is close to 0, i.e., Islamists. However, the public opinion Y at 70 is very favorable to 100, i.e., secularists. Under this case, at one point she would better off supporting secularism by unveiling herself due to her reputational gains. The switchover point refers to her political threshold point t which is indicated as 50 in Figure 4.3. Individual Individual supports 0 supports 100 Mean _ ^ ^ c 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ^ “H O n Figure 4.3: The individual’s Political Threshold Source: Taken from Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 64, figure 4.1 215 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. She will support secularism if the mean of the public opinion is greater than her threshold, i.e., Y > t=50. Otherwise, if the mean of the public opinion is less than her threshold, i.e., Y < t=50, she would support Islamism. It is very reasonable to expect that there are a variety of private preferences between Islamism and secularism as well as between veiling and unveiling among the Turkish people. Also, political thresholds vary across individuals stemming from different personality characteristics. Thus, there can be a variety of different distributions of thresholds among the public, and hence different cumulative distributions of thresholds. Plotting a cumulative distribution of thresholds for each Y between 0, i.e., Islamism (veiling) and 100, i.e., secularism (unveiling), gives a curve that shows the propagation of preference falsification. In short, Kuran calls such curves propagation curves. Each member of the Turkish society will form some expectations about the future mean public opinion on the issue of veiling as a result of the interplay of Islamism and secularism in the Turkish society. Let Ye be the expected public opinion which is same for everyone; the prevailing propagation curve will result in a realization of public opinion. hi Figure 4.4, the expected public opinion between Islamism (veiling) and secularism (unveiling) is situated on the horizontal lower axis Ye and the realization of public opinion is placed on the left vertical axis Y. Figure 4.4 depicts the position of propagation curve with respect to Ye and Y. Figure 4.4 also entails 45° line that displays all possible equilibrium points where Y6 - Y . Suppose that expected public 216 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. opinion is at 50 where the individual is at an equal distance from both Islamism and secularism. The propagation curve shows that 55 percent of the population with a threshold at or below 50 supports 100, i.e., secularism and the remaining 45 percent gives its public support to 0, i.e., Islamism. This means that an expectation of 50 yields public opinion of 55 in favor of secularism. Yet, this underestimated initial expectation of 50 will soon be revised and any expectation below 90 will generate further revision until the expected public opinion will be self-fulfilling and self- reproducing at 90. A unique equilibrium will occur where the propagation curve intersects the 45° line (the diagonal) where the expected public opinion is simply realized at 90, i.e., Y — Y = 90. At this point, there exists a single self-fulfilling expectation. In other words, the actual public opinion will match individuals’ expectations only when they are correct in predicting where the actual public opinion stands on the issue of veiling. Note that in Figure 4.4, 10 percent of the population has a political threshold of 0 such that for any public opinion greater than 0, Y>t=0, these individuals will support secularism. I call these people hardcore secularists, or secularist activists. On the other hand, 5 percent of the population has a political threshold of 100 such that for any public opinion up to 100, these individuals will support Islamism. I call these people hardcore Islamists, or Islamist activists. The remaining 85 percent of the population are non -activists with thresholds between 0 and 100 that may lean towards either side, depending upon the strength of the pressure groups, and the stance of public opinion. 217 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The threshold of an individual which we take as 50 may change due to several factors: Holding all else constant, a rise in his private preference, say from x*=30 to 40 towards secularism, will reduce the expressive disadvantage to supporting secularism, thus lowering the threshold. Similarly, if the secularist pressure group becomes more effective in exerting a social impact on nonactivists, then the reputational benefits of supporting secularism for the individual increases, which reduces her threshold. An increase in expressive needs as captured by e, however, will increase the threshold of the individual, making it less likely to support secularism if her private preference significantly differs from this public preference. The propagation curve in Figure 4.4 will clearly shift down when the share of hardcore secularists declines while the share of hardcore Islamists increases, leading to a new interior equilibrium lower than 90. The curve will shift up when the share of secularist core goes up while the share of Islamist core goes down, increasing the interior equilibrium beyond 90. This refers to the case explained in Chapter 3: during the heydays of Kemalist secularism in Turkey in the mid-1930s, the secularist core was able to exert immense pressures on the nonactivists, raising the reputational benefits from joining the bandwagon of secularism. Consequently, the public opinion shifted increasingly towards support for complete secularization. Not only secularists were increasing in numbers, and as a share of the population but also their social impact as a group, were at a maximum. 218 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Share of H ardcore Islamists (A) Share of Individuals w ith a threshold at or below 50 Share of H ardcore Secularists (B) Figure 4.4: The Propagation Curve with an Interior Equilibrium Source: Taken from Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 64, figure 4.3. Panel B of the Figure 4.4 depicts the topographic metaphor, a valley with a lowest point at 90. A ball placed anywhere in this valley metaphorically shows movements of public opinion. It will roll towards the nadir at 90 and will remain at rest indefinitely, i.e., equilibrium point. Note that this single equilibrium point in Figure 4.4 lies inside the spectrum of possible expectations. So, it constitutes an interior equilibrium. It clearly states 219 Actual public opinion (> ) r 100 80- Propagation curve 7 0 - j 60 J 40-1 3 0 1 20 Expected public opinion (Ye) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that 90 percent of the population overtly support secularism and advocate complete unveiling of all women in the public sphere while only 10 percent support Islamism and publicly advocate complete Islamization, including veiling of all women. In the battle over public opinion, this equilibrium is not sufficient enough to serve th e ultimate aim of either Islamists or secularists. Both pressure groups work to shift this equilibrium to a new one at which all the individuals publicly support the group’s position. Islamists work for complete Islamization and veiling while secularists go for complete secularization and unveiling. Complete Islamization calls for an equilibrium at 0 whereas complete secularization for an equilibrium at 100. An equilibrium that may occur at either extreme refers to a comer equilibrium where the threshold curve meets the diagonal at 0 or 100. Figure 4.5 illustrates one possible comer equilibrium where any expectation below 100 will produce self-corrections leading to a self-fulfilling and self-producing equilibrium at the upper left comer for the secularist position. 2 2 0 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Actual public opinion (Y) (A) (B) 90- 80- Propagation euprn 701 501 40- Expected public x - r Figure 4.5: Comer Equilibrium Source: Taken from Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 6 8 , figure 4.4. Since “the establishment of a comer equilibrium entails the demise of one core of O ff activists” within the context of the dissertation complete secularization means the disappearance of Islamism and all veiled women from the public sphere and complete Islamization calls for the extinction of secularism and unveiled women. If .35 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 67. 221 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. only a few activists remain in the opposition either case will appear as a near-comer equilibrium. I will discuss the possibility of total Islamist domination over Turkish secularism or vice versa in the following section. It is now time to examine the implications of pro-Islamist and pro-secularist preference falsification. Implications of the Dual Preference Model for Turkey Regarding Islamism and secularism in general and the veiling issue in particular, the dual preference model has significant relevance for the Turkish case. In the next sections, I will theoretically analyze the possible outcomes for Turkey.3 6 Chapter 5 will provide empirical support for the widespread existence of preference falsification based on the field experiments. Concluding Chapter 6 will discuss the potential implications of this theoretical framework for the future of Islamism and secularism in Turkey. 1. Multiple Equilibrium: Polarization of the Public Opinion Preference falsification may lead to multiple equilibria, indicating a polarized public opinion between two activists groups: secularists versus Islamists and leaving the majority wavering in between. There are several examples from Turkish political scene on this battle to influence the public and win support for either of these worldviews for purpose of their ultimate goals. The unwavering confrontation 36 For M l treatment of all the consequences of preference falsification see Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, especially chapters 6 , 10-11, and 15. My treatment of the consequences here is very limited and it only refers to the basic points covered in this dissertation. 222 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. between Islamists and secularists divided the public opinion leading to dichotomous expectations among the masses with respect to the two camps. It is time to use real life examples to show how the Islamists and the secularists attempt to use social pressures to their advantage. Islamists adopted several policies in the recent past to create more Islamist pressures. For instance, Islamist mayors, including §ehitkamil, Gaziantep and Kayseri, attempted to ban alcohol through the denial of permits to serve alcoholic 'X 'l beverages in restaurants. Meanwhile, others, including the Islamist mayors of Istanbul, Ankara and Bolvadin of Afyon, aimed at Islamizing the landscape by removing public statues on the ground that Islam prohibits statues, considering them idols. Another Islamist mayor, Zeki Ba§aran of Agri, refused to issue operating licenses to certain television stations, based on a claim that they broadcast “immoral programs.” He also removed the antennas from the municipality building for allegedly transmitting such programs.3 8 State-regulated brothels and the national lottery were two other targets Islamist mayors attempted to restrict in their localities. Islamist deputies and ministers in the eve of taking office took action to introduce measures to Islamize certain areas of life. For example, during the 1996 37 Ugur Akinci, “The Welfare Party’s Municipal Track Record: Evaluating Islamist Municipal Activism in Turkey,” The Middle East Journal 53:1 (Winter 1999): 84-85. The permit itself had been instituted in the 1970s when the Interior Minister was Oguzhan Asilturk of the Islamist National Salvation Party (MSP), previously an influential deputy from the MSP’s successor FP. Metin Heper, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Towards a Reconciliation?” The Middle East Journal 51:1 (Winter 1997): 37. Also quoted by Ugur Akinci, “The Welfare Party’s Municipal Track Record,” 84. 38 Ugur Akinci, “The Welfare Party’s Municipal Track Record,” 85. 223 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. budget negotiations, Islamist Zeki Unal, asked for sex-segregated coastal beaches where males and females sunbathe separately.3 9 After Minister o f Finance Abdtillatif §ener’s proposal the parliament established an Islamic Development Bank and an Islamic Export-Credit Insurance Foundation, while rejecting his Islamist economic plan, including interest limits and a ban on deducting the interest payments as business expenses. Minister of Justice §evket Kazan asked for a government decree permitting female state employees to veil at work. He also proposed a law that might allow releasing convicts memorizing half of the Qur’an. Minister of Culture Ismail Kahraman ordered the Directorate of the Bodrum Museum to stop selling alcoholic beverages to visitors.4 0 In addition to these relatively less noticed acts, the campaign for the re conversion of the Ayasofya (Haghia Sofia)4 1 Museum into a mosque and the building of a new congregational mosque in Taksim Square in istanbul attracted much public attention, since both issues had great symbolic significance in the eyes of Turkish secularists and Islamists. Islamists saw its conversion into a mosque as a symbol of Islamic victory.4 2 Likewise, for secularists its conversion into a museum 39 Cumhuriyet, 9 April 1996. 40 For more on the such Islamization policies see Aryeh Shmuelevits, Turkey’ s Experiment in Islamist Government, 1996-1997, especially 10-16. 41 Ayasofya, originally built as a church in 537, was converted into a mosque after Byzantium fell to the Ottomans in 1453. 42 Turning churches into mosques was a long lasting tradition in Islamic history that also continued during the Ottoman Era. Although this practice was banned after the foundation of the Republic, Muhittin Aksak, the RP mayor of Yakutiye, Erzurum, converted an orthodox church in the locality (used as a warehouse before) into a mosque in January 1998. FBIS-WEU, 15 January 1998. 224 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. after the establishment of the Republic symbolized the triumph of Kemalist secularism. Taksim Square, with its Monument of the Republic and Independence and the Atatiirk Cultural Center, also symbolizes Kemalist secularization. For many Islamists, a newly built mosque in Taksim Square would represent the ultimate triumph o f Islam over Turkish secularism. In response to mounting Islamist confrontation, the National Security Council (NSC) adopted an eighteen items decree on February 28, 1997 in order to curb the influence of Islamism in the public sphere and to reassert secularist domination by reversing many Islamization policies adopted in the 1990s. Among these eighteen items adopted at the NSC meeting of February 28, 1997, the introduction of eight years of uninterrupted compulsory education became a major point of contention. This educational reform aimed at combining primary and secondary schools, including religious Imam-Hatip Schools.4 3 In other words, it would thus turn frnam- Hatips into standard vocational schools with secular curricula so that the young generations would not be exposed to Islamic teachings in schools. Not only the military, but also the secularist press, trade unions, big business and civil service have increasingly supported the eight years of uninterrupted. A parliamentary 43 On secular education, the NSC specifically required that private schools under the control of Sufi- orders be administered by the Ministry of National Education, immediately limiting the number of students admitted by the religious Imam-Hatip schools and extending five years of compulsory education to eight. 225 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. commission approved the draft in August 1997,4 4 and the bill subsequently passed the Assembly. Another item was enforcing a dress code that strictly banned the Islamic attire in all public institutions. The infiltration of “fundamentalists” into public institutions, the bureaucracy and the judiciary had to be prevented by the same measures the military used to cleanse its ranks of the “fundamentalists.” No tolerance would be permitted for violating of the Law on Crimes Committed Against Atatiirk or for displays of disrespect to him. All legal and administrative means were to be used to block the replacement of the concept “millet” (referring to secular nation in Turkish) by that of “cemaaf ’ (referring to religious community in Turkish). Separatist terrorist groups implying Turkish Hizbullah founded on this principle were to be suppressed. “Abuses o f religion” for political ends had to be stopped. The secularist establishment, including the army, many civil organizations and the majority of the press always saw the Islamist RP as the main source of Turkish Islamism. Relying on the claim that the RP had become “the center of the activities against the secularism principle of the Constitution,” Vural Sava§, Chief Prosecutor of the Republic made a case for “permanently” closing down the RP in May 21, 1997. In response to increasing pressures from the establishment, in June 16 1997 the Islamist Premier Erbakan “voluntarily” resigned from his post with the 44 Financial Times, 13 August 1997. 226 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. hope that he would return to power with a larger majority following the elections scheduled for April 18, 1999. Before the elections, however, on January 16, 1999, the Constitutional Court ordered the closure of the RP and banned some of its influential members, including its leader Necmettin Erbakan, from politics for five years.4 5 Immediately thereafter another Islamist Party with the name of the FP (Virtue Party) was established on January 17, 1998.4 6 After the crackdown of the Turkish Hizbullah (Party of Allah), an illegal clandestine organization pursuing the institution of the §eriat law, the Chief of Staff pointed to Islamism as “the number one threat” to the secular Turkish Republic. It was very indicative of how the secularist establishment in Turkey perceived the Islamists. The Chief of Staffs speech also noted that there would be no backing down from the principle of secularism. The last statement once more confirmed President Demirel’s speech of late 1999: “The process of the February 28 [referring to the declaration and implementation of the eighteen items package] does not end [yet.]”4 7 On the third anniversary of the February 28 package, Demirel put the secularization process in Turkey into a wider historical perspective: “"February 28” represents a process. It is a continuing process that started with the establishment of 45 New York Times, 17 January 1998. 46 A week later, the former deputies of the RP joined the new party en masse. Washington Post, 18 January 1998. 47 Sabah, 26 December 1999 and Cumhuriyet, 26 Decemberl999. 227 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Republic. It will continue.”4 8 The newly elected President, Ahmet Sezer also confirmed this view. In response to the elimination of the ban on veil in schools, he stated that he was against the lifting of the ban and he said: “Secularism is a basic and unamendable principle of the [Turkish] Constitution.”4 9 As a result of November 2002 elections, only two parties were represented in the Turkish parliament: the staunchly secularist Peoples’ Republican Party (CHP) as a minority and the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) as a majority. These elections shifted political spectrum more on secularist/Islamist divide, putting Islamism and secularism in the public agenda. The AKP government took some actions to revere so-called February 28 process, creating tension between the government and the secularist military. The Islamist ministers reluctantly approved with reservation the dishonorable discharges due to “reactionary religious activities”.5 0 The military cautions the Islamist ministers to oblige with the existing secularist procedures. However, the government still takes some counter secularist measures such as reappointing the bureaucrats removed from office after the February 28 decision for alleged Islamist activities5 1 and the re-introduction of mosque schools for year-round education contrary to the February 28 regulations.5 2 48 Sabah, 29 February 2000. 49 Sabah, 28 March 2001 and Hilrriyet, 28 March 2001. 50 Milliyet, 5 December 2003. 51 Radikal, 16 September 2003. 52 Hilrriyet, 5 December 2003. 228 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The animosity between the Islamist deputies and the secularist establishment reached another climax when the secularist President, Ahmet Sezer did not invite certain veiled wives of the Islamist deputies to the reception on the 2003 Independence Day by reasserting the secularist dictum: “The Presidential Palace is a public space where veiling is forbidden.”5 3 These examples from the recent developments in Turkish politics reveal the growing polarization of the Turkish society along these two camps, mainly because of the attempts of both groups to influence public opinion by increasing their domination, visibility and control in the public sphere with the ultimate goal of instituting either complete Islamization or complete secularization. Assume that there exists a secularist core with a share of 15 percent and an Islamist core with a 10 percent share in the population, each trying to tilt the balance of political power to their side. They would keep trying to drive each other’s worldview out of the public realm by forcing non-activist majority to take sides. Theoretically, such polarization may entail multiple equilibria: one unstable and two stable equilibria. The two stable equilibria, generated at YA =20 and Yc =80, refer to the opposing positions of Islamists and secularists respectively, each insisting on its position with little or no compromise. Islamist equilibrium occurs at 20, where activist Islamists permits only certain women to unveil such as foreign 5 3 Milliyet, 22 October 2003. 229 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. females and female tourists in Turkey. The secularist equilibrium exists at 80, where secularist activists only permit veiling at the religious Imam-Hatip schools. Actual public opinion (T) 100 - 90 80 - i Propagation curve 70 4 60 4 (A) 40 h 30- 1 0 - / I i I Expected - I ......— < ..... T - — ..— T -— -.r-...---------^ public 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 opinion (4 Figure 4.6: Multiple Equilibria Source: Taken from Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 70, figure 4.5. The unstable equilibrium at YB =70 implies that even the smallest gains in term s of pressure group efficiency may lead to different expectations that can generate adjustments towards one of the stable equilibria in both directions. This 23 0 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. may be taken to represent the current situation in Turkey with 70 percent in favor of the secularists and 30 percent in favor of the Islamists who want to see a more Islamized Turkey. Figure 4.6 represents such an unstable equilibrium at B.In panel B of Figure 4.6 there exist two stable interior equilibria: one at 20 i.e., the Islamist equilibrium and the other at 80, i.e., the secularist equilibrium. The existing unstable equilibrium appears at 70 as a hilltop. The ball on the hilltop may eventually move towards either more Islamization (denoted here as 20) or towards more secularization (80) to achieve a single stable equilibrium. The clash between two activist groups puts the majority of people in the middle. Because of the pressures from activists, the wavering non-activist majority continually engages in extensive preference falsification. Among Islamists, a non-activist bystander will often engage in pro- Islamist preference falsification. Among secularists, he will engage in pro-secularist preference falsification. In Chapters 5 ,1 will provide empirical evidence in detail. It is important to note that event small events which look trivial on the surface can change the thresholds of individuals, shifting the public opinion in an entirely different direction. As an example from the current Turkish politics, when Prime Minister Ecevit who champions the secularist cause experienced serious health problems in June 2002, the secularist center-left core started to crumble due to the vacuum created in leadership. This created an initial bias in the public opinion in favor of the Islamists, raising the political support for the Islamist Justice and Development Party. Prevailing public opinion will eventually play a crucial role in unleashing long-term forces that will shape the majority’s private preferences. 231 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Therefore, it may ultimately determine the future of the co-mingling of Islamism and secularism in Turkey. The existence of unstable equilibrium implies that preference falsification may lead to social discontinuities. Once individuals with low thresholds for speaking out against the status quo trigger the others with high thresholds, a social movement may break out leading to a social change. Unanticipated social movements may emerge from widespread preference falsification, leading to three other possibilities in the inteiplay of Islamism and secularism in Turkey. The complete domination of one camp over the other accounts for two of the possibilities. The secularists may completely suppress Islamism until it vanishes from the public realm, i.e., possibility of complete secularization, or vice versa, i.e., complete Islamization of Turkish society. Each entails a distinct comer equilibrium solution to the ongoing struggle between Islamists and secularists. Leaving the third possibility, i.e., peaceful coexistence of Islamism and secularism to the last, let us focus on the first two, generating comer equilibria. 2. Corner Equilibrium I: Complete Secularization Pro-secularist preference falsification may result in complete secularization, the ultimate secularist goal, by completely disestablishing Islam. In other words, the secularization thesis may work in practice and all religions, including Islam, may disappear. Within the context of this dissertation, complete secularization refers to a comer equilibrium shown in Figure 4.7. 232 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Actual public opinion (F ) 100 90- I 8 0 -< Propagation cu; 70-i 60-1 50- 40- 30-t 201 10 Expected public T opinion (Xe) \ s Figure 4:7: Comer Equilibrium I Source: Taken from Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 6 8 , figure 4.4. Complete secularization can occur when secularists totally suppress Islamists. In other words, the establishment of a comer equilibrium (i.e., complete secularization) necessitates the demise of the core of Islamist activists. Such equilibrium will be achieved if the propagation curve moves up to 100. As we see in Figure 4.7, it will destroy the preexisting unstable equilibrium B at 70 and the stable equilibrium A at 20 shown in Figure 4.6. There is now a unique equilibrium at 100, 233 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. where widespread pro-secularist preference falsification will sustain the appearance of a unified secular Turkey. If very few Islamist activists still publicly oppose, the equilibrium will be near a comer, accounting for the remaining w eak opposition, questioning the legitimacy of Turkish secularism or its implementation. Chapter 3 shows this case in detail: In its heydays in the early 1930, Kemalist core exerted enormous pressures on masses, increasingly shifting the public opinion towards support for complete secularization. As an example from current Turkish politics, one can speculate that if the Islamists, represented by the Justice and Development Party, attempt to discard the secular constitution after winning the elections held on November 3rd , 2002, the Kemalist military may consider a coup to reinstitute strict Turkish secularism, suppressing the Islamist hard core, and abolishing democratic parliamentary representation. Under a military regime, no Islamist pressure group will be able to openly challenge the secularist position, and its demise may take the form of its hard core activists’ going underground. 3. Corner Equilibrium II: Complete Islamization Pro-Islamist preference falsification may result in complete Islamization. Within the framework of this dissertation complete Islamization refers to a comer equilibrium solution as depicted by Figure 4.8. 234 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Actual public opinion (F) 1.00 Propagation curve 80 - 70- 60 4 (A) 40 4 30 4 20 10 ^ Expected public 3 opinion (! ! (B) Figure 4.8: Comer Equilibrium II Source: Taken from Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 6 8 , figure 4.4. If the Islamists one day succeed in their stated goal, it will lead to a suppression of all secularist public opinion, including the secularist hard core represented by 15 percent of the population whose thresholds are near zero. Thus, the propagation curve will intersect the diagonal at 0 referring to complete Islamization. Since the propagation curve shifts downward, destroying the existing unstable equilibrium at 70 as well as the equilibrium at 80, the result will be a new 235 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. comer equilibrium at 0 (complete Islamization). Therefore, the only remaining public expectation that is eventually self-sustaining is unanimous support for complete Islamization. Such comer equilibrium captures the role of pro-Islamist preference falsification in sustaining an appearance of unified Turkey under the Islamist rule, where Turkish secularism disappears from the public sphere. If very few secularist activists remain in open opposition, still questioning the Islamist rule, the equilibrium will be near comer until the demise of the secularist core. In the Islamic sense, complete Islamization refers to the domination of Dar-ul Islam (House of Islam) over Dar-ul Harb (House of War) (i.e., the non-Islamic world). The Islamic principles of jihad (holy war) captures the essence of the compete Islamization. Through jihad and their claims of superiority of Islam, Islamists aim to impose their own worldview on the others. The most radical attempt for complete Islamization has taken place in Iran following the Islamic revolution in 1979. As soon as the Islamists came to power in Iran, a Revolutionary Council, including many ulema (learned men of religion), guided the Islamization policies regarding the political, economic, social and cultural spheres of life. The government banned non-religious art, literature, and secular forms of entertainment. The Council for Cultural Revolution established an Islamic University system with new Islamic curricula and textbooks, including the Islamization of economics 236 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. courses.5 4 To legitimacy Islamization, high-school textbooks were rewritten reflecting an Islamic worldview. “The integration of politics and religion is a theme repeated in every grade in all social-science and history books.” A pervasive theme in textbooks is that the submission to God’s will — the literal meaning of the word islam - as manifested in Islamic law and as interpreted by religious leaders, is the only possible way to create an “ideal” society.5 5 Following the Iranian example through democratic means, the Turkish Islamists, led by the Justice and Development Party, may attempt to dismantle the secular establishment after taking office in 2002, suppressing the secularist hard core. Even under these two extreme cases, the defeated camp will not demise and will continue to exist under suppressed conditions. The activist core may simply go underground or move out of the country and try to fight for their cause relying on global networks and communication technology. 4. Peaceful Co-Existence The disappearance of widespread preference falsification may result in peaceful coexistence between Islamism and secularism in a pluralistic society where each worldview receives more or less equal respect in the public sphere. Preference 54 Sohrab Behdad, “Islamization of Economics in Iranian Universities,” International JoUmal o f Middle Eastern Studies 27:2 (May 1995): 193-217. 55 Susan Siavoshi, “Regime Legitimacy and High-school Textbooks,” in Saeed Rahnema and Sohrab Behdad (eds.) Iran After the Revolution: Crises o f an Islamic State (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995), 205. 237 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. falsification distorts public discourse and private knowledge. It cripples the emergence of new thoughts. It limits open discussions and candid exchange of views in the public sphere. Turkey’s constrained democracy with authoritarian overtones as of 2003 makes this possibility less plausible. A truly democratic regime that necessitates a strengthening of her relatively weak civil society may increase the likelihood of this case. Only under truly democratic conditions, people will have an opportunity not to engage in preference falsification and will freely speak their minds in the public sphere regarding Islam and secularism. Peaceful coexistence requires established democratic rights: There are basically two ways to assure such rights: One is to “devise institutions that protect to right to speak” and the other is “to indoctrinate individuals with respect for expressive diversity.”5 6 The latter requires the establishment of a perfect ethic of tolerance in a society where individual liberties and freedom of expression are fully respected by each and every member of the society. This, of course, refers to a utopia where even the most democratic countries such as the United States find it difficult to sustain. ’ Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 100. 238 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Actual public opinion (F) 100 + 7 0 - 60 1 Propagation curve (A) 3 0 , 2 0 - 1 0 - | E xacted public 00 opinion (' 0 0 0 .0 O O Q O O I v-, N f - x ' — / S | Figure 4.9: Infinite Multiple Equilibria with Peaceful Coexistence Source: Taken from Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 70, figure 4.5. The disappearance of pro-secularist and pro-Islamist preference falsification presents itself as an “ideal” case in which the expected public opinion totally converges with the actual public opinion. In this ideal case, shown in Figure 4.9, the propagation curve will overlap with the 45 degree diagonal, which means that no individual feels pressured to conceal his private preferences regarding Islam and 239 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. secularism. Notice that on the 45 degree diagonal, there exist an infinite number of multiple equilibria. That implies, at any given time, genuine preferences will dictate the outcome of the public discourse. We need now rigorous empirical studies to test the implications of the dual preference model. The following chapter takes this challenge. This will help us better understand Islamism and secularism in Turkey today and to have a sense about their potential for all the possibilities discussed above. Based on empirical evidence about these possible outcomes for Turkey, Chapter 6 evaluates the probability of all the possibilities, including how reducing preference falsification m ay assist the development of a unique synthesis of Islamism and secularism in Turkey compatible with each other. 2 4 0 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTERS EXPERIMENTS ON PREFERENCE FALSICATTON: EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY B iz hepim iz ortam ciyiz. (W e a ll g o w ith the m ilieu.) Bazen Islam ciyiz bazen laik. (W e are som etim es Islam ists an d som etim es secular.) E xcerpts fro m th e fie ld su rvey conducted in Turkey in D ecem ber 19 9 7 a n d in January 1998 A hidden camera is often an effective instrument for detecting incidences of preference falsification. An undercover agent may also document, to a lesser extent, whether people continually falsify their preferences. Unfortunately, neither method is available for academic research. Therefore, the best way for academicians to study preference falsification is to conduct field surveys and empirical experiments. Depending on the context, memoirs, dairies, confessions, and other written materials may be available for academics to explore past incidences of preference falsification. People keeping dairies usually enjoy recording their genuine thoughts, feelings, and hesitations. Presupposing privacy, they have little motivation to hide their genuine preferences. Likewise, most people do not hesitate to express that they have concealed certain preferences under social pressures as the ramifications of such pressures fade away. Memoirs are usually full of confessions rationalizing the 241 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. acts o f preference falsifications on the part of the writers. As a case in point, Riza Nur, a deputy in Ottoman parliament, later in the first Turkish Grand National Assembly, was considered the spokesperson of the conservative Islamists of his time. Most Islamists, then and now, have seen him as the ideological answer to the Kemalist secularist reforms. However, Riza Nur, in his later published memoirs, candidly tells us that “he is a man without religion.”1 Another way that shows the writer has a distinct aim other than the one appearing on the surface is by an acrostic— a literary composition in which prearranged letters, when taken together, spell out words pointing to the authentic purpose. By means of an acrostic, ilhan Selquk, a leftist columnist, for example, was able to prove that the confessions he wrote with his handwritings under arrest during the martial rule of 1971-1973 in Turkey were, indeed, a fabrication he produced to avoid further torture and intimidation by the secret police. All became obvious as the rival newspaper Terciiman later published his confessions. The coded words he infused into the text read as “there is torture....”. Other forms of double writing (or writing “between the lines”), or double speaking that set examples of preference falsification are also common in Muslim countries. Fazlur Rahman points out that: “In Islam, the tradition of such cultivated duplicity runs quite strong and deep!”3 Avicenna, Al-Ghazali, and Muhammad Iqbal 1 Nur Yalxnan, “Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey,” Daedalus, 102 (Winter 1973): 153. 2 Ilhan Selguk, Ziverbey Kd§ku [Ziverbey Mansion] (istanbul: Qagda§ Yaymlan, 1987), p. 38. 3 Fazlur Rahman, “Islamic Modernism: Its Scope, Method and Alternatives,” International Journal o f Middle East Studies, 1 (October 1970): 324. 242 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. were only a few who concealed their heretical views and justified this with a “ sound” principle: “You should talk to people at the level of their understanding.” Fazlur Rahman further shows that such duplicity continued to exist. Quite a few intellectuals in Muslim countries conceal their support for modem views that go against Islamic public opinion through duplicity. Hence double writing and double speaking have become one form of the intellectual responses by Muslim intelligentsia to modernity.4 As this practice has spread out through Muslim lands, pro-Islamist preference falsification is almost institutionalized in Muslim countries like Turkey. Anecdotal evidence about such institutionalized past incidences of preference falsification, especially in Muslim communities ruled mostly by autocratic governments is abundant. However, to go beyond anecdotal evidence in studying preference falsification, one has to employ additional tools of academic' research such as field surveys and experimental designs. Field surveys provide opportunities to ascertain prevailing cases of preference falsification. In living with a community for a while and especially after gaining trust of its members, a trained researcher can observe the community’s public life as well as the private lives of its members. As the researcher’s watchful eyes easily capture the repeating differences between public life on stage and private life off stage, the specific incidences of preference falsification will begin to be documented. 4 Rahman, “Islamic Modernism,” 323-324. 243 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. A hidden camera will record the cases of preference falsification all the time; an undercover agent will catch them most of the time; and a field researcher will observe them usually. For example, consider a bank manager in a small provincial town who wants to maintain good business ties with the Islamic community for the sake of his position. He sends his son to the mosque school that the boys in the town regularly attend during the summer. But, it is not because he wants his son to have a solid religious education. He himself does not even have faith in Allah, and he would like to raise his son like himself. However, a bank manager knows that he will be subject to pressures from his customers as well as his neighbors if his son, unlike other boys, does not go to the mosque school. To avoid such pressures he registers his son in the summer courses. He now looks like one of the ordinary town residents, a pious Muslim. It is not impossible to uncover the mask of the bank manager. A hidden camera will be quick at recording that he never practices Islam in his private life. An undercover agent will notify that he never encourages his son to practice Islam either. He even advises his son to forget what he would learn in the mosque. Immediately, he further urges his son not to tell about his advice to the others. A confidential field researcher, after observing him for a while, will easily conclude that the bank manager is one of the chameleon atheists who is in disguise in order to make a living in a small Muslim town. Empirical experiments also help us to observe the current instances of preference falsification. The simplest design that comes to mind to detect such instances is to keep asking specific questions about the preference one has just 244 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. revealed. The ones engaging in preference falsification will have a hard time in responding to the questions. Sooner or later, they will fail to provide consistent answers. Think of a merchant doing business with the Islamic community. He subscribes to an Islamist newspaper to avoid the stigma of being considered non religious. He further hopes to enhance his business by looking like a devout Muslim. When asked specific questions on the contents of the articles in the last issue he would not be able to answer precisely. Likewise, a cadet with strong religious preferences in military academy acts as if he likes a pro-secularist radio show just to enjoy the recognition of his peers and especially his superiors. Neither would he be able to recall the specific features of the shows. The more complicated design of field experiments to detect the current incidences of preference falsification is to conduct follow-up studies through which a researcher tests the same participants by changing the manipulated variable, i.e., varying sources of social pressures, at different times. Such follow-up studies, of course, require more academic rigor, time, and financial support. Real-life applications (academic or non-academic) of such empirical experiments and qualitative field surveys are indeed available. James C. Scott set a good example of the latter in a Malaysian village. He recognized preference falsification, especially on the part of subordinated groups. He observed that “[ejach 245 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. subordinated group creates, out of its ordeal, a ‘hidden transcript’ that represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant.”5 Some fieldwork in Turkey also identified the scope and extent of preference falsification. For example, Yilmaz Qetiner, a pro-secularist journalist, spent a month undercover during 1964 among the members of a pro-Islamist Nurcu movement. He was able to observe several instances of both pro-secularist and pro-Islamist preference falsification: He met a mufti who wore a European hat, not because he wanted to, but because he was obliged by the government decree. The same mufti also said that he unwillingly put the portrait of Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk on the wall of his office. Refiner also met a doctor, a dentist and a pharmacist who all seemed to be members of the movement just to attract more customers, especially those from the movement. The undercover journalist was further advised to conceal his religious orientation by one of the Nurcu leaders. The leader confessed that the best response to the pressures from the central government was to “behave accordingly,” which meant pretending as if they were not religious “by doing whatever is necessary, without revealing any opposition.”6 Several experimental designs to empirically measure preference falsification have already been introduced. The two-stage train test, the parking space test, and 5 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts o f Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), xii. See also James C. Scott, Weapons o f the Weak: Everyday Forms o f Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). 6 See Yilmaz Qetiner, Inang Somuruculeri Nurcular Arasinda Bir Ay [A Month Among the Nurcus, Exploiters of Religion] (Istanbul: Varlik Yayinlan, 1964), especially 47, 63-64, and the quotations from page 25, my translation. 246 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 the pen experiment are of some good examples. The Allensbach Institute in Germany has developed the first two. Through the implementation of the tests the researchers in the institute successfully captured the differences between public opinion polls and the results of the upcoming secret ballot elections. The tests indirectly determined that people conveyed preferences in favor of the dominant strands o f prevailing public opinion, and in secret ballot elections they revealed their previously concealed preferences. The pen experiment conducted by Katherine Bischoping and Howard Schuman also captured this tendency exemplifying a form of preference falsification. They ran three separate public opinion polls during the pre-election period in February 1992 in Nicaragua. In two public opinion polls, a pen with the symbol of a political party was used in recording participants’ revealed preferences. In the last one poll, a pen with no symbol was used. Bischoping and Schuman observed that the respondents changed their opinion and supported the party when its symbol appeared on the pen used for recording pools. This chapter presents two field experiments run in Turkey. The experiments were similar in design to the ones mentioned above. They specifically aimed at identifying the scope and the extent of two kinds of preference falsification defined 7 For further information on both the two-stage train and the parking space tests see E. Noelle- Neumann, The Spiral o f Silence— Our Social Skin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984; first German ed., 1980), 16-22, and 55-56. For the pen experiment see K. Bischoping and H. Schuman, “Pens and Polls in Nicaragua: An Analysis of the 1990 Preelection Surveys,” American Journal o f Political Science, 36 (May, 1992): 331-350. I was led to both references by Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 339-341. 247 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in Chapter 4: pro-secularist and pro-Islamist. As Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 focused on the forces of preference falsification, this chapter provides evidence for preference falsification. Field Experiment I Purpose Field experiment I aimed at detecting both pro-secularist and pro-Islamist preference falsification in Turkey. It was expected that preference falsification in Turkey was very common. Taboos concerning both Islamism and secularism are very widespread. People are very hesitant about expressing their truthful opinions in public, especially about Islamism and secularism. Method Participants: The target sample size of 150 respondents was drawn from the population of Izmir, Ankara and istanbul with quotas based on location. The locations selected in each city were the centers of the cities around which the possible participants constituted a good representation of the population: (1) The entrance to the Kemeralti District in the Konak Square in Izmir (15 respondents in each experimental condition; 45 in total); (2) the Kizilay square in Ankara (15 respondents in each experimental condition; 45 in total); (3) the Kadikoy Square in the Asian part of istanbul (10 respondents in each experimental condition; 30 in total); and (4) the Eminonu-Sirkeci District in the European part, (10 respondents in each experimental condition; 30 in total). 248 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Design In each location respondents were picked in accordance with stratified sampling i.e., every third person that passed a previously marked point. The single independent variable, type of outfit, had three levels, secularist, neutral and Islamist. The dependent measures were as follows: Authority, dependence, religiosity, Islamic piety, secularity, and two indicators of Islamic practice. Material An English translation of the designated questionnaire appears in Appendix A. It contained two sets of items as well as a set of standard background questions regarding age, sex, place of origin (i.e., the type of environment in which the respondent was raised such as metropolitan, provincial city, town or village), occupation, education and monthly household income. The first set included seven Likert-scaled items to determine five attributes: authority, dependence, and religiosity, Islamic piety and secularity. The first two items were designed as the indicators of authoritarianism; the third as the indicator of dependence; the fourth and fifth as the indicators of religiosity, the sixth as the indicator of Islamic piety, and the last one as the indicator of secularity. The first five questions out of seven were the same questions Bianchi used in his 1973 questionnaire in Turkey.8 8 Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), Appendix B, 409-411. 249 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The second set covered specifically designed detailed questions about the content of the revealed preferences to determine whether respondents are practicing Muslims. There were two questions in this section: the first was about the content of the sermon in the Friday prayer of the week the questionnaire was conducted and asked only of male participants. The second question was about the time of the evening call to prayers (adhan in Arabic; ezan in Turkish) on the previous day. Procedure Three experimental treatments were allocated across the sample of 150 participants determined by using a mixed probability and quota method. A pair of interviewers (a male and a female) carried out interviews in sets of three (i.e., 50 respondents in each experimental condition), administering them identically, except for the type of the accessories used by the interviewers. In one condition the interviewers carried widely known Islamic symbols. The male interviewer had a silver engagement ring while the female interviewer was veiled. In another condition both interviewers carried Kemalist and anti-religious symbols: a button of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk on each one’s jacket. Lastly, in the neutral interview, the interviewers had no symbols at all. The interviewers did not make any claims about their personal preferences. It was up to respondents to draw inferences from the appearance of the interviewers. It was impossible to make the interviewers blind to experimental conditions. For this reason, the trained interviewers, both graduate students at the time, carried out a rigorous experiment in a nonpartisan manner. The male interviewer asked the 250 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. questions in Turkish while the female one recorded the answers. Though they were not blind to experimental conditions, in recording the responses the female interviewer was blind to expected results arid predictions. The female interviewer also recorded participants' reactions to the experiment as well as her own personal observations about participants' reactions. In order to guarantee the randomization of the three separate experimental conditions, the same two interviewers conducted all three of them in the manner stated above. Manipulation Check At the end, the interviewers asked each participant an additional question in each experimental condition to test the manipulation check to determine how the participants perceived the manipulated variable, i.e., type of accessories. Specifically, the manipulation check question was: “How do you perceive us (i.e., the interviewers) (a) neutral, (b) secularist, (c) Islamists? Results Manipulation Check The responses to the manipulation check question indicated that participants perceived the interviewers in each condition as intended, % 2 (2, N = 149) = 9.40, p < .01. More specifically, participants perceived the interviewers in the neutral condition more as neutral than as secularist or Islamists. In addition, they perceived the interviewers in the secularist condition more as secularists than as neutral or 251 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Islamists. Participants also perceived the interviewers in the Islamist condition more as Islamist than as neutral or secularists. Table 5.1. summarize the major personal characteristics of the participants. Table 5.1: Experiment I: Personal Characteristics of Participants Participants “Islamist” (%) Condition “Neutral” (%) “Secularist” (%) TOTAL (%) AGE Under 30 36.0 46.0 40.0 40.7 30-49 48.0 40.0 40.0 42.6 50 and older 16.0 14.0 2 0 . 0 16.7 SEX Male 70.0 58.0 6 6 . 0 64.7 Female 28.3 39.6 32.1 35.3 ORIGIN Village 1 2 .0 8 .0 16.0 1 2 .0 Small Town 6 . 0 16.0 1 2 .0 11.3 Provincial Capital 34.0 18.0 2 2 . 0 24.7 Metropolitan 48.0 58.0 50.0 52.0 EDUCATION None — — 4.0 1.3 Primary 2 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 28.0 22.7 Highschool 58.0 56.0 42.0 52.0 College & Higher 2 2 . 0 24.0 26.0 24.0 OCCUPATION Unemployed & Housewife 1 0 .0 6 . 0 14.0 1 0 .0 Student 16.0 6 .0 8 .0 1 0 .0 Civil Servant 1 2 .0 1 2 .0 8 .0 10.7 Worker 4.0 4.0 1 2 .0 6.7 Professional I 44.0 50.0 32.0 42.0 Professional II 2 0 . 0 16.0 8 . 0 10.0 Retired 8 .0 6 . 0 18.0 10.7 MONTHLY INCOME 0 - 50 M TL 32.0 16.0 36.0 28.0 ($ 0 - 250) 51 -100 M TL 38.0 42.0 32.0 37.3 ($ 251-500) 101 -200M T L 26.0 28.0 2 0 . 0 24.7 ($ 501 - 1000) 201 M TL or Higher 4.0 14.0 1 2 .0 1 0 .0 ($ 1001 or Higher) (N -50) (N=50) (N=50) (N=150) 252 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In order to ensure that respondents in the three conditions were essentially identical with regard to major background factors, the three experimental conditions against place of origin, occupation, education and income, as well as age and sex, were cross-tabulated. There was no difference between the experimental conditions for all groups (p > .05). The seven items in the second part of the questionnaire help us to determine participants’ revealed preferences under perceived social pressure about authoritarianism, dependence, religiosity, Islamic piety and secularity. The first two items labeled as Authority I and Authority II, respectively, were taken as the indicators of authoritarianism. Similarly, the third item was labeled as Dependence and taken as the indicator of dependence. The fourth and fifth named as Religiosity I and Religiosity II, respectively, were the indicators of religiosity. Religiosity I inquired about participants’ level of personal attitudes towards religion while Religiosity II measured participants’ level of seeing religion as a stabilizing social force. The sixth, called here Islamic piety, aimed at how participants identified themselves in each experimental condition, while the seventh item referred to below as Secularity determines participants’ revealed preferences towards secularism. Table 5.2 shows the responses in the first stage of the experiment that produced the key results: whether the experimental conditions i.e., the type of the accessories used by the interviewers, had a significant effect on respondents’ preferences with regard to authority, dependence, religiosity, Islamic piety and secularity. 253 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 5.2: Authority, Dependence, Religiosity, Islamic Piety and Secularity as a Function of Type o f Outfit ____________ Condition “Neutral” “Islamist” ‘Secularist” 1. AUTHORITY I M SD n 2. AUTHORITY II M SD n 3. DEPENDENCE M SD n 4. RELIGIOSITY I M SD n 5. RELIGIOSITY II M SD n 6 . DEVOTED MUSLIM M SD n 7. SECULARITY M SD n 1.98 0.38 50 2.65 0.56 49 1.94 0.59 49 2.61a 0.67 49 1.87, 0.61 47 1.86, 0.58 49 2.30a 0.66 47 2.04 0.67 50 2.64 0.63 50 2.04 0.49 50 2.04b 0.60 50 2.41b 0.64 50 2.10b 0.58 50 1.82b 0.52 50 2.10 0.54 50 2.74 0.60 50 1.92 0.70 50 2.16b 0.62 49 2.49b 0.58 49 2.12b 0.59 50 1.70b 0.46 50 Note: A four-point scale was used. Means that do not share a common subscript within a column reliably (p<.05) differ from each other. Higher scores indicate high authority, high dependence, high personal religiosity, low level of seeing religion as a stabilizing social force, low level of Islamic piety, and low level of secularity. 254 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. As shown in Table 5.2, the results indicated that the experimental condition i.e., the manipulation of the interviewers’ outfits produced a significant effect on participants’ revealed preferences about religiosity, Islamic piety and secularity while the outfits had no significant effect on authority and dependence. The level of Islamic piety differed as a function of type of outfit, F(2, 148) - 3.10, g < .05. According to Tukey-a test, participants’ level of Islamic piety was lower under the secularist and neutral conditions than under the Islamist condition (p < .05). The effect of outfit type on Religiosity I, Religiosity II and Secularity yielded more statistically significant results at the alpha level of g < .0001. Specifically, for Religiosity I, the type of outfit led to significant difference, F (2,147) = 11.13, g < .0001. Tukey a tests also showed that participants' level of personal religiosity decreased under the secular and neutral conditions than under the Islamist condition (p < .05). For Religiosity II, an ANOVA indicated that the type of outfit again was significant, F (2,144) = 14.28, g < .0001. The level of endorsing religion as a social stabilizing factor increased under the Islamist condition than under the neutral and secularist conditions (p < .05). The level of secularity also differed as a function of outfit type, F (2,146) = 15.84, g < .0001. Participants’ level of secularity rose higher under the neutral and secularist conditions than under the Islamist condition (p < .05). Thus, Tukey a tests showed that while there was no group difference under the secularist, neutral, and Islamist conditions for Authority I, Authority II and Dependence, the significant group differences emerged under the three experimental conditions with regard to Religiosity I, Religiosity II, Islamic Piety and Secularity. 255 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 5.3 indicates the intercorrelations between the independent measures. Authority I was significantly correlated with Religiosity II (r = .24, p < .01), Islamic Piety (r = .25, p < .01), and Secularity (r = .05, p < .10). There were highly significant negative correlations between Religiosity I and Religiosity II (r = -.34, p < .001) as well as between Religiosity I and Islamic Piety (r = -.18, p < .05) whereas a highly significant positive correlation (r = .35, p < .0001) between Religiosity I and Secularity emerged. Religiosity II was highly negatively correlated with Islamic Piety (r = -.38, p < .001), while it was highly correlated but positively to Secularity (r = .38, p < .001). Table 5.3: Intercorrelations Between Dependent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1. Authority I -.04 .07 - . 1 2 .24** .25** .05 (149) (149) (148) (145) (149) (147) 2. Authority II - .06 -.09 - .0 1 - .0 1 -.08 (148) (147) (147) (144) (146) 3. Dependence - .03 .08 .1 0 .09 (148) (145) (149) (147) 4. Religiosity I — _ 3 4 *** (144) -.18* (148) 35*** (146) 5. Religiosity II -- ^g*** (145) _ (143) 6 . D. Muslimness — -.09 (147) 7. Secularity Note: *g<.05. **£<.01. ***p<.001. 256 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. More Results and Discussion Analyzing each item reveals more about participants’ attitudes towards authoritarianism, dependence, religiosity, secularity, and Islamic piety. It also sheds more light on Islamism and secularism in Turkey. With regard to authorianism, the results came out as expected. Table 5.4 indicates the responses to the questions designed to measure authoritarianism. Table 5.4: Indicators of Authority Indicators of Authority Condition “Islamists” (%) “Neutral” (%) “Secularist” (%) 1. Discipline and respect for authority are the most important values a child has to learn. (N=50) (N=50) (N=50) STRONGLY AGREE 8 18 8 AGREE 8 6 62 76 DISAGREE 6 18 14 STRONGLY DISAGREE -- 2 2 2. In a heated debate I am generally so preoccupied with what I am going to say next that I forget to listen to what others say. (N=50) (N=50) (N=50) STRONGLY AGREE 2 ~ - AGREE 32.7 44 34 DISAGREE 63.3 48 58 STRONGLY DISAGREE 2 8 8 2 57 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The percentage of the responses under each condition did not differ from each other. But, overall, the answers clearly pointed out that all the participants were very much authoritarian in attitude. The responses to the first question that aimed to measure family authoritarianism revealed the authoritarian tendency poignantly: Regardless of the experimental condition, only 14%, in total, answered the first questions in a way that indicated they disapproved of family authoritarianism. The remaining 86% solidly supported the notion that the respect for authority and discipline are the most important values children must have. All the participants endorsed the statement with near unanimity. The experimental conditions produced no statistically significant difference at the alpha level of .05. Stronger acceptance, however, came from the participants under the Islamist condition: No one under the Islamist condition strongly disagreed with the statement and only 6% expressed their disapproval. This rate almost triples under the neutral condition (16%) and more than triples under the secularist condition (20%). The second indicator of authoritarianism, Authority II, refers to personal authoritarianism. Again, the experimental condition made no statistically significant difference for Authority II. All the respondents, 62% on average, expressed their willingness to enter into dialogue with the others. In other words, they were willing to express their view as they listened to the other opinions. An interesting tendency emerges when compared to the responses under the neutral conditions on the one hand, and to the responses under both Islamist and secularist conditions on the other. Under the neutral condition, 44% of the participants were opposed to entering into 258 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. dialogue with others, while 34% of the participants under Islamist and secularist conditions felt implicitly pressured to be opposed to any dialogue. This 10% difference means that some participants became more sensitive and showed less sign of personal authoritarianism when the interviewers had overtly revealed preferences. They just wanted to get along with the interviewers. On the other hand, we know that individuals also have a need for autonomy exercised as self-expression and self-reliance. The third item named here as Dependence was designed to see respondents' attitude towards self-reliance. Table 5.5 summarizes the results. Table 5.5: Indicator of Dependence Indicator of Dependence Condition “Islamists” (%) “Neutral” (%) “Secularist” (%) If you want something to be done you should try to do it yourself rather than waiting for help from others. (N— 49) (N=50) (N -50) STRONGLY AGREE 18.4 10.0 26.0 AGREE 71.4 76.0 58.0 DISAGREE 8.2 14.0 14.0 STRONGLY DISAGREE 2 - 2.0 2 59 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Regardless of the experimental condition, all the participants strongly endorsed the notion of self-reliance. On average, almost 87% stated that self-reliance is better than depending on help from others. From the first three items, the general conclusion emerges as follows: Regardless of the experimental condition, all the participants were more authoritarian towards their siblings, although they showed less personal authoritarianism towards the others’ views and they also sharply recognized the importance of being less dependent on others. The questions about authoritarianism and dependence do not constitute taboos in Turkey. But, the questions on Islamism and secularism certainly do. The remaining four items in the first part of the questionnaire were aimed to identify the attitudes of participants with regard to religion, Islam per se, and secularism. To determine the participants' attitude on religiosity, two items were put into the questionnaire. Table 5.6 shows the responses to these two items labeled before as Religiosity I and Religiosity II. 2 60 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 5.6: Indicators of Religiosity Indicators of Religiosity Condition “Islamists” (%) “Neutral” (%) “Secularist” (%) 1. A person can lead a good life even if he doesn’t have strong religious beliefs. (N=49) (19=50) (N=49) STRONGLY AGREE 4.1 14 8 .2 AGREE 36.7 70 71.4 DISAGREE 53.1 14 16.3 STRONGLY DISAGREE 6.1 2 4.1 2. Religion is an indispensable force for stability and social harmony. (N— 4 7) (N=49) (N=49) STRONGLY AGREE 25.5 4.1 - AGREE 61.7 55.1 55.1 DISAGREE 1 2 .8 36.7 40.8 STRONGLY DISAGREE — 4.1 4.1 The first item inquiring whether religion is a personal matter gives us important clues about secularism in Turkey. As explained in Chapter 2, one of the basic propositions of secularism is that religion is a personal choice that can be only practiced in one’s private realm. Secularism adamantly argues that religion has no place in the public realm and one can even live his private life without referring to religion as opposed to Islam according to which Allah explains the very existence of the individual and one cannot have a good life without Islam. In the neutral 261 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. condition, 84 % of the participants regarded religious opinions basically as a personal matter as secularism proposes. The remaining 16% thought otherwise. There is no significant change, though the proportion declines a little, in the responses to the same item under the secularist condition. Almost 80% were for and 20% against. This shows that respondents perceived not much difference between neutral and secularist conditions. The perception of the Islamist interviewers, on the contrary, was quite different. The manipulated variable, i.e., Islamist symbols, resulted in a significant change in the responses to Religiosity I. Under this condition, only 40.8% endorsed religious tolerance while 59.2% rejected it. Thus, the majority of the respondents expressed their unwillingness to allow religious tolerance when they were put under perceived social pressures by the Islamist- looking interviewers. The shift from the secularist to the Islamist side by participants was also evident in the responses to the fifth question, labeled here as Religiosity II. This item was expected to determine whether participants see religion as a stabilizing social force. Religious tolerance and regarding religion as a stabilizing force were negatively correlated as expected. Participants' level of religious tolerance declined as they assigned a more important role to religion to stabilize the society. Also, stability seekers emerged as more authoritarian towards their youngsters. Significantly, under the secularist condition, no participant recognized religion as a stabilizing force; and under the Islamist condition none solidly rejected the stabilizing role of religion. Specifically, 77.2% of the participants under the Islamist 262 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. condition strongly endorsed religion as a stabilizing force. This ratio fell to 40.8% under the neutral condition and 44.9% under the secularist condition. Here, too, one can easily observe the existence of preference falsification with regard to Islamism and secularism in Turkey: Participants strongly endorsed religious views under the Islamist condition, and they overwhelmingly endorsed secularist standpoints under the secularist condition. Under the neutral condition, the participants obviously aligned with the secularist side. This outcome suggests that under the neutral condition, the participants perceived the setting as pro-secularist. The polarization generated by preference falsification is even more apparent in the next item displayed in Table 5.7. When participants were asked whether they considered themselves secular, the difference between the conditions reached its zenith. Under the secularist condition no respondent revealed that he was not a secular citizen. Without exception, all participants, i.e., 100%, confirmed that they were secular. No respondent strongly denied his objection to secularity under the neutral condition. Only 6% percent wanted to be identified as non-secular under the neutral condition; the remaining 92% identified themselves as secular. The objection to be identified as secular, however, rose to 32% under the Islamist condition. Thus, Table 5.7 is very indicative of the fact that questioning one’s secularity is one of the taboos in Turkey. 263 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 5.7: Indicators of Secularity Indicator of Secularity Condition “Islamists” (%) “Neutral” (%) “Secularist” (%) lam a secular citizen. (N=49') (N=50) (N=50) STRONGLY AGREE 24.0 24.0 30.0 AGREE 61.7 70.0 70.0 DISAGREE 27.7 6 .0 -- STRONGLY 4.3 _ _ DISAGREE Moreover, secularity and religious tolerance were highly positively correlated. Participants' level of religious tolerance increased as their level of secularity rose. Also, the more secular participants were the less value they attached to religion as a stabilizing force. These findings further support one of the basic stands of this dissertation: Islamism and secularism, as investigated in Chapter 2, have contradictory claims about the organization of the society. Islamism and secularism try to drive one another out of worldly affairs of social life. Table 5.8 shows that questioning one’s identity as being a devout Muslim, too, is one of the taboos in Turkey. When asked whether respondents consider themselves devout Muslims, they all confirmed that they thought themselves as devout Muslims. 26 4 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 5.8: Indicator of Islamic Self-Identification Indicator of Islamic Self- Identification Condition “Islamists” (%) “Neutral” (%) “Secularist” (%) I am a devoted Muslim. (N=49) (N=50) (N=50) STRONGLY AGREE 24.5 1 2 .0 1 2 .0 AGREE 65.3 6 6 . 0 64.4 DISAGREE 1 0 .2 2 2 . 0 24.0 STRONGLY DISAGREE — - - No one under any conditions claimed that he would strongly denounce Islam. Most participants, around 65%, endorsed that they were devout Muslims regardless of the experimental condition. The experimental condition made a difference only in the extremes: The percentages of those who rejected being identified as devoted Muslims under the Islamist condition (10.2%) more than doubled under the secularist condition (24%) and the neutral condition (22%). The same goes for those who strongly wanted to be identified as devoted Muslims under the Islamist condition (24.5%) in comparison to those under the neutral and secularist conditions (12%). Thus, the majority of the participants identified themselves as devoted Muslims. The more participants saw themselves as devout Muslims, the more they regarded religion as a stabilizing force in the society and they became less tolerant of a more secular idea that one can also lead a good life without religion. Furthermore, participants' level of family authoritarianism increased with their level of Islamic 265 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. piety. This means the more one considers himself as a devoted Muslim, the less tolerant he becomes towards his family with regard to their religious preferences. He is more likely to pressure his siblings if they argue against Islamic values. In order to test the self-declarations of the participants on Islamic piety, the interviewers asked two specific questions: The first was directed only to male participants and inquired whether participants knew the content of the Friday sermon of the week. The second question directed to all participants asked about the time of the evening adhan of the day before the interviews. As explained in Chapter 2 Friday communal praying and evening salat are the two ibada each Muslim has to perform according to Islamic catechism. The testing of whether experimental conditions and the indicators of Islamic practice are related revealed interesting results. The "Accurate" or "Inaccurate" (including '"No Answers" as "Inaccurate") responses to the content of Friday Sermon came up unrelated with the experimental conditions % 2 (X, 2 = 97) = 2.23, p > .05. The experimental conditions and participants' responses to the time of evening adhan as “Accurate" or "Inaccurate" (including "No Answers" as "Inaccurate") are also independent from each other, % 2 (2, N = 149) = 1.87, p > .05. This means that the experimental condition had no significant effect on the indicators of Islamic practice. In other words, the participants across the experimental condition were quite uniform in terms of being (non)practicing Muslims. Given that all the participants were quite identical in terms of (non)practicing Islam, as the previous ANAVOs showed, they revealed significantly different preferences on the questions about secularism and 266 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Islamism. This is also a strong indication of the existence of preference falsification in Turkey. Table 5.9 summarizes the results for the Friday sermon as Table 5.10 portrays the answers for the evening adhan. Since participants’ responses to the questions of Islamic practice and the experimental conditions are independent from each other, we can proceed to analyze Experiment I by focusing on the total sample that gives more rigorous estimates about the general population. Table 5.9 Indicator of Islamic Practice I Indicator of Islamic Practice I “Islamists” (%) Condition “Neutral” (%) “Secularist” (%) Average What was the sermon about in the last Friday prayer? (Asked to male participants only.) (N=35) (N=29) (N=33) (N— 97) ACCURATE 2 0 . 0 6.9 15.1 14.4 INACCURATE 14.3 3.4 6 .1 7.3 NO IDEA 65.7 89.7 78.8 78.3 Therefore, regardless of the experimental condition, only 14.4%, on average, knew the content of the Friday sermon. The remaining 85.6% gave either inaccurate answers or reported that they had no idea about the content of the sermon. In fact, the majority of the respondents, precisely 78.3%, on average, had no idea what the sermon was about. 267 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 5.10 Indicator or Islamic Practice II Indicator of Islamic Practice II “Islamists” (%) Condition “Neutral” (%) “Secularist” (%) Average When was the evening adhan yesterday? (N=49) (N=50) (N— 50) (N=149) ACCURATE 28.6 18.0 28.0 24.8 INACCURATE 22.4 18.0 2 2 . 0 2 0 . 8 NO IDEA 49.0 64.0 50.0 54.4 About one fourth of the participants, 24.8%, on average, knew the time of the evening adhan within half an hour (more or less) error margin. One fifth of the respondents, 20.8% gave inaccurate answers in predicting the time of the evening adhan. The incorrect answers lay outside the range of one-hour error margin. A few inaccurate answers were off the target by as much as four hours. More than one-half of the participants, 54.4%, on average, had no idea about the time of the evening adhan. It can be assumed that all practicing Muslims know the time of the evening adhan, and those who know the time of the evening adhan are not necessarily practicing Muslims. It also is possible that they have this specific information for a variety of reasons (such as someone else in their family prays regularly) other than being practicing Muslims. It is obvious that only less than one-fourth of the participants were practicing Muslims. The results of Tukey a tests that determine whether the groups in each experimental condition differ from each other at significance level of .05 sheds light on the crux of this dissertation that focuses on Islamism and secularism in Turkey. 268 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. For the responses to Authority I, Authority II, Dependence and Islamic Piety, no two groups are significantly different. On the other hand, for Religiosity I and Religiosity II and Secularity, significant group differences were present. For all three variables, the responses under the Islamist condition significantly differ from those under both neutral and secularist conditions. No significant group difference was observed between the neutral and the secularist conditions. This is a clear indication of the polarization in Turkish society: Islamists on the one hand, secularists on the other. This also shows that the participants perceived the interview under neutral condition as secularly oriented. Such a result is not unexpected. In the time frame of the field experiment, late 1997, the media were stressing anti-Islamist and pro-secularist themes. Moreover, the Islamist Refah Party was out of power, and the Constitutional Court of Turkey was about to announce its decision to close the party. The reasons that account for the alignment of the responses in the neutral interview with those in the secularist interview will receive more attention later. In short, Experiment I indicated that people have a strong inclination to reveal socially dominant preferences. In conducting the experiment, the interviewers exerted no explicit pressures on participants. They did not openly advocate any preference. The participants were free to draw any inferences about the interviewers’ opinions. Thus, the interviewers just implicitly signaled they might have some opposing preferences. Even facing implicitly drawing inferences about the interviewers’ position on Islamism and secularism in Turkey, the participants had the tendency to accommodate the pressures they perceived. They do so by hiding 269 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. their genuine preferences if these do not match those of the group from which they believe that they are subject to be pressured. The qualitative data gathered.during the field experiment also support this conclusion. Consider the female participant who, though a rank-and-file public employee, happened to be veiled during the weekend that Experiment I was conducted. She suddenly quit the interview as soon as the interviewers started asking questions regarding Islam and secularism. Like many other participants, she showed extreme signs of emotional distress during the field survey. It is very possible that if the interviewers had asked her name and address in recording her personal characteristics she would have panicked more. Consider that the interviewers first identify her name and where she works, implicating they know her personally, so that they put her under explicit pressures and demand her to answer the questions about Islam and secularism. It is very likely that she would have experienced more extreme distress. Another participant asked three times whether they would go to the precinct after the interview. After responding to the manipulation check, quite a few participants candidly suggested that they could well be concealing information from the interviewers. As one respondent put it: “Your outfit signaled you were ‘this,’ but it is very hard to know what is in someone’s heart.” The field experiment also qualitatively documented that people are very well aware of pervasiveness of preference falsification with regard to the subject of Islamism and secularism. On this basis, they evidently carried two preferences themselves: a genuine one and another that they publicly conveyed to others. 270 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The next experiment outlines more evidence in support of the dual preference model. As such, it sheds some light on why and how people frequently engage in preference falsification concerning Islamism and secularism in Turkey. Field Experiment II An excellent opportunity arose to further document the preference falsification in Turkey when the first day of Ramadan, 1417 in Islamic lunar calendar coincided with the New Year’s Eve of 1997 in the Gregorian calendar. As explained before, the Islamic year has 355 days a year, as against the 366 days of year. Each year Islamic calendar moves eleven days further. This difference explains the coincidence of the first day of Ramadan with the New Year’s Eve. Since 1926, when Turkey adopted the Western Gregorian calendar as a part of its modernization project, the first day of the New Year has been a national holiday. Accordingly, celebrating the coming year has become part of national culture, especially among the elite, but increasingly also among the masses. Having parties, playing bingo, drawing the highest pot in National Lottery, and sending Happy New Year cards are among many activities that make up Turkey’s New Year celebrations. The special entertainment programs for New Year’s Eve airing in almost all the TV channels are also a new tradition in Republican Turkey. Belly dancer shows around mid-night are a common way of celebrating the coming year. New Year celebrations, on the other hand, are severely criticized by many Islamists. Seen as celebrating the birth of Jesus Christ, such activities are condemned on the ground that they constitute Christian traditions that are 271 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. incompatible with the Islamic way of life.9 Accordingly, most Islamists urge Muslims to avoid the New Year celebrations. They specifically ask people not to watch the shows that feature belly dancing claiming that it is un-Islamic to let women dance in public in front of men with revealing certain body parts. Towards the New Year Eve of 1994, for example, Islamists posted flyers asking “Hey Muslim, why are you living according to Christian customs?”1 0 Some Islamists tried to persuade their moderate relatives “not to watch the ... New Year Eve’s shows on television when the country is entertained by famous singers and belly dancers.”1 1 Watching such shows in the very first day of Ramadan, Islamists proposed, would be a particularly grave violation of Islamic catechism. Purpose The purpose of Experiment II was very similar to that of Experiment I: to determine the existence and nature of preference falsification in Turkey. It was expected that people would form their revealed preferences in accordance with the implicit pressure exerted by the interviewers’ outfit. In other words, the experimental manipulation, i.e., the change in the interviewers’ outfit signaling whether they are either secularists, or Islamists, or neutral would produce statistically 9 For a discussion of this sort see §aban Sitemb61iikba§i, Tilrkiye’ de Islam ’in Yeniden inkiqafi (1950- 1950) [The Reconstruction of Islam in Turkey (1950-1960)] (Ankara: Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi Yayinlari, 1995), 155-158. He also cites many articles from several Islamist periodicals making the same argument. 10 Ru^en Qakir, Ne §eriat Ne Demokrasi: Refah Partisini Anlamak [Neither §eriat Nor Democracy: Understating Prosperity Party], 2n d ed. (Istanbul: Metis Yayinlan, 1994; first ed., 1994), 207. 11 Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: A History o f Modern Turkey (New York: The Overlook Press, 1998), 330. 272 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. significant results in the respondents’ answers to the interview questions. Experiment II was expected to further clarify the scope and extent of preference falsification. Method Participants. The target sample size of 144 respondents was drawn from the population of Izmir, Ankara, istanbul, and Kocaeli with quotas based on location. The city centers, around which the possible participants offer an unbiased sample of the population, were selected as locations: The entrance to the Kemeralti District in the Konak Square in Izmir (10 respondents in each experimental condition; 30 in total); the Kizilay and Ulus squares in Ankara (8 in Kizilay and 7 in Ulus; 15 respondents in each experimental condition; 45 in total); the Kadikoy Square in the Asian part of istanbul (7 respondents in each experimental condition; 21 in total); the Bakirkoy Bus-stop District in the European part, (10 respondents in each experimental condition; 30 in total), and Kocaeli Bazaar entrance ( 5 respondents in each experimental condition; 15 in total). Design. The design of Experiment II was identical to that of Experiment I except for the independent variables. Independent variables in Experiment II were as follows: most watched TV channel, watched iftar program on any TV channel, watched New Year entertainment program, newspaper read, naming a columnist in the newspaper read, self-identification, and perception of the interviewers. Material. An English translation of the designated questionnaire appears in Appendix B. It contains three sets of items besides a set of standard background 273 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. questions of age, sex, place of origin (i.e., the type of environment in which the respondent was raised such as metropolitan, provincial city, town or village), occupation, education, and monthly household income. The initial set included three questions about the choice of TV channel the respondent preferred to watch on New Year’s Eve. The first asked about the most watched channel on New Year's Eve. The second inquired whether respondent watched an iftar program, and if so, on what channel. The third specifically asked whether the respondent watched a New Year entertainment program, and if so, on what channel. The first item was designed to determine whether any TV channel was watched. The second item was considered as the indicator of religiosity, while the third was the indicator for the violation of Islamic catechism. The second set covered two questions: one about the type of newspaper read, and another about the content of the revealed preferences in order to determine the respondent’s sincerity. It asked the respondent to name a columnist in the newspaper read. The third part contained two questions as well. The first question asked about how the respondent identified herself, activist Islamist, non-activist Muslim, non-activist secular Muslim, non-activist secular, or activist secularist. The last question asked how the participant perceived the interviewers: again, activist Islamist, non-activist Muslim, non-activist secular Muslim, non-activist secular, or activist secularist. 274 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Procedure The procedure of Experiment II was identical to that of Experiment I. Manipulation Check At the end of each interview, the interviewers asked the participant to explain how he perceived the manipulated variable, i.e., type of outfit. Specifically, the question that also served as a manipulation check was the last question in the third part: “How do you perceive us (i.e., the interviewers)?" Results Manipulation Check The level of perception of the interviewers differed as a function of type of outfit, F (2,142) = 23.99, p < .0001. Tukey-a test showed that all three groups under the Islamist, neutral and secularist conditions differed from each other at the significance level of .05 as seen in Table 5.15 below. Thus, the responses to this question indicated that the participants perceived the interviewers in the neutral condition more as neutral than either as secularist or Islamists. In addition, they perceived the interviewers in the secularist condition more as secularists than either as neutral or Islamists. The participants also perceived the interviewers in the Islamist condition more as Islamist than either as neutral or secularist. In short, participants perceived the interviewers in each condition as intended. Table 5.11 summarizes the major personal characteristics of the participants. 275 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 5.11 Experiment II: Personal Characteristics of Participants Personal Characteristics of Participants “Islamist” (%) Condition “Neutral” (%) “Secularist” (%) TOTAL (%) AGE Under 30 47.9 52.0 43.8 47.9 30-49 31.1 33.4 37.7 34.0 50 and older 2 0 . 8 14.6 18.7 18.1 SEX Male 64.6 6 8 .8 64.6 66.7 Female 35.4 31.3 35.5 33.3 ORIGIN Village 12.5 12.5 4.2 9.7 Small Town 6.3 2 .1 10.4 6.3 Provincial Capital 33.3 25.0 33.3 30.6 Metropolitan 47.9 60.4 52.1 53.5 EDUCATION None 2 .1 6.3 — 2 .8 Primary 12.5 29.2 25.0 2 2 . 2 Highschool 66.7 39.6 50.0 52.1 College & Higher 18.8 25.5 25.0 22.9 PROFESSION Unemployed & 14.6 12.5 10.4 12.5 Housewife Student 16.7 14.6 14.6 15.3 Civil Servant 14.6 4.2 16.7 1 1 .8 Worker 33.3 8.3 4.2 6.3 Professional I 39.6 47.9 33.3 40.3 Professional II 2 .1 2 .1 2 .1 2.1 Retired 6.3 10.4 18.8 1 1 .8 MONTHLY INCOME 0 - 50 M TL 35.4 33.3 22.9 30.6 ($ 0 - 250) 51 - 100 M T 27.1 27.1 33.3 29.9 ($ 251-500) 101 -2 00M T L 29.2 31.3 33.3 31.3 ($ 501 - 999) 201 M TL or 8.3 8.3 10.4 9.0 Higher ($ 1000 or Higher) (N~48) (N=48) (N=48) (N=144) In order to ensure that respondents in the three conditions were quite identical with regard to major background factors, the three experimental conditions against Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. place o f origin, occupation, education and income, as well as age and sex were cross tabulated. No statistical difference among the groups was found (p > .05). Before analyzing the results of Experiment II, 50 randomly selected people with no relation to the field study were asked to group TV channels and newspapers into three categories: neutral, secular and Islamist. Only two channels, Kanal 6 and Krai TV (music channel only) were considered to be neutral. The following channels were identified as secular: ATV, Kanal D, Show TV, Star, TRT 1. The channels regarded as Islamist were TGRT, Samanyolu and Kanal 7. Concerning newspapers, interestingly, no daily newspaper was considered to be neutral. Cumhuriyet, Radikal, Hurriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, and Yeni Yiizyil were identified as secular while Ak§am, Tiirkiye, Zaman, Milli Gazete, and Akit were classified as Islamist. Table 5.12 shows the results of the TV questions. Out of 144 participants in Experiment II, only 1.38% (two participants) declared under the secularist condition that they watched a neutral TV channel while only 0.69% (one participant) told that under the Islamist condition he did not watch TV at all. The experimental conditions of neutral, secularist, and Islamist were not related to the remaining 97.92% (141 participants) of the responses to the general question of most watched TV channel, secular or Islamist x2 (2, N = 141) = 1.54, p > .05. The manipulation variable also had no relation to whether participants watched any iftar program on (either secular or Islamist) TV channel or not, % 2 (2, N = 143) = 7.20, p > .05. Only 1.38 % (one 277 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. participant) under the secularist condition said she watched an iftar program on a neutral channel. Table 5.12 TV Questions TV Questions Condition “Islamists” (%) “Neutral” (%) “Secularist” (%) MOST WATCHED TV CHANNEL (N=48) (N=48) (N=48) Not Watched 2.1 - - Islamist 10.4 4.2 6.3 Neutral - -- 4.2 Secular 87.5 95.8 89.6 IFTAR PROGRAM (N=48) (N=48) (N=48) Not Watched 35.4 47.9 60.4 Islamist 31.3 2 0 . 8 14.6 Neutral -- - 2 .1 Secular 33.3 31.3 22.9 ENTERTAINMENT PROGRAM (N=48) (N=48) (N=48) Not Watched 27.1 8.3 4.2 Islamist 2 .1 - - Neutral - 2 .1 2 .1 Secular 70.8 89.6 93.8 Concerning entertainment programs, on the other hand, participants' responses revealed interesting results. To the question of whether they watched any 278 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. entertainment program on any neutral, secular or Islamist TV channel, only 2.1% (one respondent) under the neutral condition and 2.1% (one respondent) under the secularist condition said they watched entertainment programs in a neutral channel. Also, only 2.1% (one participant) under the Islamist condition said he watched entertainment programs on an Islamist channel. Out of the remaining 141 participants, 122 of them, (86.5%) declared that they watched entertainment programs on secular channels, while 19 of them (13.4%) said they preferred not to watch TV. Out of 48 respondents, the percentage of respondents who said they did not watch any entertainment program was 4.2% (two respondents) under the secularist condition, and 8.3% (four participants) under the neutral condition. It sharply increased to 27.1% (13 respondents) under the Islamist condition. The manipulation variable, i.e., the experimental conditions came up significantly related to participants' responses of whether they watched entertainment program or not, % 2 (2, N = 144) = 12.49, p < .01. Participants' revealed preferences about the choice of secular or Islamist newspapers depend on the experimental conditions, % 2 (2, N = 116) = 9.62, p < .01. However, the experimental conditions are independent from naming a columnist as "Accurate" or "Inaccurate" (including "No Answers" as "Inaccurate"), % 2 (2, N = 116) = 1.41, p > .05. Table 5.13 indicates the results of the newspaper questions. Only 5.4% under the neutral condition and 5.1% under the secularist condition revealed that they read Islamist newspapers. Under the Islamist conditions, the 279 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. percentage that said they read Islamist newspapers rose to 25%— almost five times more than the previous ratios. Table 5.13 Newspaper Questions Newspaper Questions Condition ____________ _____ “Islamists” (%) “Neutral” (%) “Secularist” (%) NEWSPAPER READ (N=40) (N=37) (N=39) Islamist 25.0 5.4 5.1 Secular 75.0 94.6 94.9 NAMING A COLUMNIST (N=40) (N=37) (N=39) Accurate 45.0 56.8 56.4 Inaccurate & No Answer 55.0 43.2 43.6 Table 5.14 summarizes the last portion of the study. To the self- identification question, 43.8% of the participants under both neutral and secularist condition said they were secular, but Muslim non-activists. Under the neutral condition, 12.5% identified themselves as non-activist Muslims and 6.3% as activist Islamists, while 25% under the same condition regarded themselves as secular non activists and 12.5% as activist secularist. These ratios shifted considerably against the Islamist end of spectrum under the secularist condition. Only 2.1% (one participant) under the secularist condition revealed that he was an activist Islamist while only 2.1% (one participant) under the secularist condition again declared that she was a non-activist Muslim. Almost half of the participants' revealed self- 280 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. identifications were aligned with the secularist end of the spectrum: 21.7% said they considered themselves as secular non-activists and 25% said they were decisive supporters of secularism, i.e., secular activists. Under the Islamist condition, interestingly only 2.1% (one participant) declared that he is an ardent supporter of secularism. Only 10.6% regarded themselves as secular citizens, i.e., secular non activists. Those who considered themselves as secular Muslims constituted 53.2% under the Islamist condition. The percentage of self-identifications as non-activist Muslims under this condition was 21.3%, and as activist Islamists the percentage was 12.8%. 281 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 5.14 Indicators of Preference Falsification Indicators of Preference Falsification Condition ______ “Islamist” “Neutral” “Secularist” _______ (%) (%) (%) • What identifies you best? (N=47) (N=48) (N=48) ACTIVIST ISLAMIST 12.8 6.3 2.1 NON-ACTIVIST MUSLIM 21.3 12.5 2.1 NON-ACTIVIST SECULAR MUSLIM 53.2 43.8 43.8 NON-ACTIVIST SECULAR 10.6 25.0 27.1 ACTIVIST SECULARIST 2.1 12.5 25.0 • What identifies the interviewers best? (N=42) (N=48) (N=47) ACTIVIST ISLAMIST 33.3 6.3 4.3 NON-ACTIVIST MUSLIM 19.9 12.5 4.3 NON-ACTIVIST SECULAR MUSLIM 42.9 45.8 36.2 NON-ACTIVIST SECULAR 2.4 29.2 29.8 ACTIVIST SECULARIST 2.4 6.3 25.5 The responses to perception of the interviewers produced similar result with more clear-cut boundaries. The percentage of those who perceived the others as secular Muslim were lower for all the conditions compared to the percentages in the 282 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. same category for self-identification. Under the Islamist condition more participants perceived the interviewers as non-activist Muslims and Islamist activists. Under the secularist condition, again, more participants perceived the interviewers as secular non-activist and activist secularists. Table 5.15 presents more rigorous tests that highlight the group differences as a function of the manipulated variable of outfit type. Table 5.15: Self-identification and Perception of the Interviewers as a Function of Type of Outfit “Islamist” Condition “Neutral” “Secularist” • SELF-IDENTIFICATION M 2 .6 8 a 3.25b 3.71b SD 0.91 1.04 0.94 • PERCEPTION OF THE INTERVIEWERS M 2 . 2 l a 3.17b 3.69c SD 1.03 0.95 1.05 (N=48) (1 V=48) 0v=48) Note: A five-point scale was used. Means that do not share a common subscript within a column reliably (p<.05) differ from each other. Higher scores indicate higher secularity. As shown in Table 5.15, the level of self identification differed as a function of type of outfit, F (2, 142) = 13.42, p < .0001. Tukey-a test showed that no group difference existed between the neutral and secularist conditions at the alpha level of .05 while there existed a difference between the Islamist and secularist conditions as well as between the Islamist and neutral conditions. The level of perception of the interviewers also differed as a function of type of outfit, F (2,142) = 23.99, p < .0001. Furthermore, all three groups under the Islamist, neutral and secularist conditions differed from each other at the significance level of .05. The self- 283 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. identification and the perception of the interviewers was significantly correlated, r = .76, p < .0001. Discussion The participants’ responses to the perception of the interviewers indicated that the pins of Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk with "modem" western attire are readily recognizable symbols of secularism. Likewise, the silver ring and the veil are easily recognized symbols of Islamism. Such symbols (along with several others including mustache type, beard type, and certain gestures like Islamic greetings), convey information about one’s position towards Islamism and secularism in Turkey. Participants were quick at picking up these symbols. They were also quick at tailoring their self-identification accordingly. The very high positive correlation between self-identification and perception of the interviewers showed that participants tended to identify themselves with the others. In other words, they tended to avoid presenting themselves in a way contradictory to their interviewers’ perceived inclinations. Since participants' choices of most watched TV channels and the experimental conditions were unrelated, we can infer that in Turkey there is no stigma attached to watching TV. The experimental conditions and watching an iftar program also came up unrelated, implying that there is no stigma attached to watching an iftar program. In other words, participants did not feel pressured by either Islamist-looking or secularist-looking interviewers about watching an iftar program. On the other hand, the experimental conditions and watching a New 284 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Year’s entertainment program on mostly secular channels, were related; the descriptive statistics showed that participants felt the social pressure implicitly induced by the interviewers. In other words, the manipulation variable produced a significant difference on whether they watched entertainment programs on mostly secular channels or they preferred not to watch such shows. Specifically, under the secularist condition, participants said that they watched New Year entertainment programs on secular and neutral channels while participants under Islamist conditions said they refrained from watching such programs. This was also the case about the newspaper questions. The type of outfit was related to participants' choices of newspaper read, whether secular or Islamist. Specifically, under the secularist condition they declared that they read secular newspapers more than Islamist newspapers. Also under the Islamist condition participants responded in a way that they read Islamist dailies more than they read secular newspapers. In short, the manipulation variable produced a difference in participants' revealed choices about newspapers. However, more than half of the participants, regardless of the outfit type, failed to name a columnist in the newspapers they said they preferred to read. This is a powerful finding, in that it reveals the commonness of preference falsification. The qualitative data recorded by the female interviewer indicated that almost all the participants experienced extreme emotional distress. Especially after the self- identification question, most participants hesitated to answer the question of how they perceived the interviewers. Their facial expressions betrayed fear and anxiety. 285 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The female interviewer observed that participants in both experiments had similar emotional reactions. Such observations also point to the ramifications of having two contradictory preferences as the dual preference model in Chapter 4 showed. General Discussion In general, both Field Experiment I and Field Experiment II strongly supported the dual preference model depicted in Chapter 4. The field survey in Turkey clearly showed that people carry two sets of preferences: private and public, regarding Islamism and secularism. The experiments also clearly pointed out that most people convey in public a preference in line with the others’ implicit preferences and also in line with the setting’s demand. This results either in pro secularist or pro-Islamist preference falsification depending upon how they perceived the implicit pressures. Both Field Experiments also showed the polarization of Turkish society during the late 1990s: secularists versus Islamists. The classification of TV channels in such a manner that only one channel emerged as neutral while all the others were considered either secular or Islamist indicates such polarization as well. Furthermore, the classification of newspapers as a result of which no newspaper was considered neutral and each one fell either under the secular or Islamist category poignantly supports this conclusion. Being aware of such polarization, participants obviously had an idea about the characteristics of public opinion, and in particular, the degree to which it favors secularism or Islamism. The polarization of Turkish society along the spectrum of 286 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. secularism and Islamism inevitably put individuals in a difficult position, demanding from them to align with one side, depending upon the social context. In particular, both secularist and Islamist activists pressure by-standers to align with their side so that they can claim public opinion strengthens their position on such controversial issues as veiling, religious schools, etc. The alignment of the neutral condition with the secularist condition made it clear that participants had clearly identified the prevailing public opinion in Turkey of the late 1990s as secular. In other words, if an individual is in a particular setting, asking him to take a side about an issue that Islamists and secularists have opposing views, and if there is not enough clue to clearly read the setting as either Islamist or secularist, chances are that the setting is secular rather than Islamist. Given that the likelihood of encountering secular others is greater than the likelihood of encountering Islamist others, it is rational for an individual to behave as if he is secular. This, of course, puts Islamist activists in most settings in a seemingly minority position, which requires from them exercising more pressures on non-activists to behave as if they are Islamists. Secularist activists had the advantage of being in an apparent majority position during the time of the field survey (the beginning of 1998). The next chapter concludes this dissertation by focusing on the implications and unintended consequences of preference falsification, with special reference to Turkey. It also specifically examines the recent developments on the uneasy co existence of Turkish Islamism and Turkish secularism. 287 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION insanlar hangi diinyaya kulak kesm iqse oburune sa g irf (people a ll ears to one w o rld are d e a f to the other) Ism et O zel When two veiled candidates, Merve Kavakqi of the Islamist Virtue Party (FP) and Nesrin Unal of the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP) were elected deputies in the April 18, 1999 elections, public discourse focused on the question of allowing them to enter the Turkish Grand National Assembly veiled. In May 2 1999, when Merve Kavakqi attended the swearing in ceremony veiled FP deputies applauded her, Democratic Left party (DSP) deputies protested her action by shouting “Out!” The MHP and Motherland Party (ANAP) deputies kept silent. Newly appointed Premier Btilent Ecevit seized the floor at once: “In Turkey, in private life, no one interferes with the women’s attire and veil. But, here [in the National Assembly] is not a sphere of private life. Those [deputies] serving here have to obey the traditions t Ismet Ozel, Erbain: Kirk Yilin §iirleri, “ifimden §u Zalim §iipheyi Kalclir, Ya Sen Gel Ya da Beni Oraya Aldir,” lines 22-23. 288 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and rules of the State. Here is not a place to challenge the State.” In response to the reactions, the veiled deputy left the Assembly without being sworn in.1 The moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power following the November 3, 2002 national elections. The veiling issue became a hot topic in the public opinion after the newly elected Islamist President of the Parliament, Biilent Ann?, attended a state ceremony to meet the President of Turkey, Ahmet Sezer with his veiled wife.2 Sezer politely kept calm during the ceremony but two days later he publicly stated: “Veiling can not be permitted in the public sphere.” Major Findings of the Thesis As these incidents reveal, Turkish Islamism and secularism seem to be incompatible. When secularism dominates the public discourse it excludes Islamism from the public realm. Relying on public/private distinction of spheres, Biilent Ecevit’s and Ahmet Sezer’s statements indicate secularist worldview: individuals are free to practice any religion in private, but in the public sphere no religion should be represented or advocated. Thus, any religion, including Islam, is a private matter. However, Islamists believe that Islam should govern all human affairs, both public and private. Many, including Merve Kavak?i, believe that Allah ordered women to veil in public, including the National Assembly. President Suleyman Demirel, however, 1 Merve Kavakfi later refused to unveil herself while Nesrin Unal was sworn in unveiled and attended the Assembly without her Islamic headscarf. Hurriyet, 3 May 1999. 2 Milliyet, 20 November 2002. 3 Zaman, 25 November 2002. 289 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. perceived “[the Merve’s action] as a symbol of Islamic fundamentalism. Over time, [Islamists] carried this symbol from the streets, schools and universities to the parliament.”4 Like many others, including the soon-to-be elected new President Ahmet Sezer, an ardent secularist, and Biilent Arm?, an Islamist deputy perceived this as an act of political Islam.5 In short, Islamists and secularists battle to exclusively dominate the public sphere. Activists attempt to increase the presence of certain symbols to shape public discourse to promote their own worldviews. Chapter 2 investigated the contending worldviews of Islamism and secularism as presented by their ardent proponents: both Islamists and secularists define their worldview as at odds with each other. Each group enthusiastically calls for the institutionalization of their worldview by driving the other’s out of the public realm first, possibly out of the private realm later. For this reason, they attempt to impose their own worldview on the non-activists. Between these two poles, people often engage in at least one kind of preference falsification in response to social pressures: pro-Islamist or pro-secularist, depending on the context. Chapter 3 explained the rise of Turkish secularism as a result of pro-secularist preference falsification. All the 1920s reform laws that institutionalized Kemalist 4 Milliyet, 5 May 1999. 5 On veiling Sezer told: “There was no veiling problem before, it became a political issue and a political symbol in time.” Hurriyet, 31 March 2001. On this matter, Biilent Arm? told: “Of course, Kavakfi wears veil as a political symbol.” Milliyet, 11 November 2002. Jenny B. White also notes that female Islamist activists “consciously use veiling as a central political symbol.” See Jenny B. White, “The Islamist Paradox” in Deniz Kandiyoti and Ay§e Saktanber (eds.), Fragments o f Culture: The Everyday o f Modern Turkey (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 194. 290 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. secularism were unanimously passed using open ballots in a parliament with deeply religious deputies. Kemalist structure suppressed Islamist elements, forcing them out of the public realm to underground. Waves of urban immigration after the 1950s helped Islamic lifestyle to resurface in cities. The reemergence of Islamic symbols in the public sphere demanded recognition within the secularist regime. Socio-economic grievances voiced through Islamist discourse, overtly challenging the secularist worldview. Repeated clashes between distinct lifestyles gradually led to the emergence of two activist pressure groups, Islamist and secularists, aiming to negate the existence of the other in the public sphere. While secularists called for a secularized public sphere, Islamists fought back by asserting their distinct lifestyle in daily routine. The social pressures from these two camps forced the non-activists to lean towards the camp with a tighter grip on the public realm. Chapter 4 depicted a dual preference model that outlines the non-activists’ possible responses to Islamist and secularist pressures. It investigated the theoretical basis of preference falsification in Turkey with its unintended consequences. Besides the “Merve incident,” several other episodes have demonstrated the polarized public discourse, sometimes in favor of secularist policies and sometimes against them.6 6 In February 1997 in Ankara and in March 1997 in Istanbul, demonstrators protested the Islamist Premier Erbakan for reintroducing elements of §eriat law. New York Times, 16 February 1997, and Financial Times, 4 March 1997. At the funerals of Muhammer Aksoy, Turan Dursun, Qetin Eme?, Taner Ki§lali, Ugur Mumcu, and Bahriye Ufok, all of whom were allegedly assassinated by radical Islamists, secularist crowds shouted: “Turkey is secular and will stay secular.” When the Premier Erbakan attend the Premier’s Cup soccer match in March 1997, thousands of spectators welcomed him with the same motto: Briefing, 17 March 1997. As quoted in Aryeh Shmuelevits, Turkey’ s Experiment in Islamist Government, 1996-1997 (Tel Aviv, Israel: Moshe Dayan Center, 1999), 28. In Malatya, a mob protested the Inonii University for banning on veil. Washington Post, 5 May 1999. The police in 291 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Chapter 5 added empirical to the anecdotal evidence — based on two field experiments ~ for the widespread existence of both pro-secularist and pro-Islamist preference falsification. Both experiments tested whether people tailored their publicly revealed preferences in response to perceived social pressures. The symbols of Islamism and secularism yielded overwhelming shifts in the participants’ expressed opinion. When faced with the slightest social pressure, participants demonstrated a strong inclination to support the socially dominant worldview. The likelihood of a participant not engaged in either pro-secularist or pro-Islamist preference falsification was less than 0.1 percent. In other words, 99.9 percent of the time the participants engaged in at least one form of preference falsification. The experiments also showed that people reveal public preferences in accordance with the demands of the setting i.e. the prevailing public opinion. The possibility of large swings in the prevailing public opinion prevents a stable social equilibrium. As long as two opposing camps force the non-activists to engage in preference falsification, the existing status quo in Turkey on the uneasiness between Islamism and secularism may perpetuate. Yet, it is hard to predict the future. This dissertation ends with the discussion of its implications on the future of Turkey. Istanbul and Bingol crushed similar demonstrations on April 18, 1998, see FBIS-WEU, 21 April 1998. On one occasion, an Islamist hijacked a plane to protest the ban on veil at the universities. Washington Post, 15 September 1998. Such issues can take on much more serious forms. Once, a husband murdered his own wife for not veiling. New York Times, 3 August 1995. 292 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Discussion on the Main Implications of the Thesis Kuran explains why it is hard to predict the future: Although one may have an idea about the existing public opinion, the distribution of private opinions is unrevealed due to a combination of two factors: First, individual public preferences are interdependent to each other, and second, these interdependencies are imperfectly observable.7 This does not mean that the future is unpredictable. We can focus on process(es) that will shape the future outcomes without knowing them ex ante. In other words, we can lay out mechanism(s) that will determine the future outcome. Chapter 4 offers a model with three such mechanisms, (exit, sincere voice, preference falsification), contemplating on the future interplay of Turkish Islamism and secularism. Individuals differ in their private preferences, expressive needs, and reputational concerns. Such heterogeneity implies that each member of society will have a different political threshold. The activists attempt to create more social pressures that will make more individuals lean on to their side. The more the activists increase the number of their supporters in the public sphere, the more people will think that the activists’ worldview is the dominant political milieu in the country. Knowing individual choices are interdependent to each other, the activists try to form a bandwagon to achieve their goals, as explained in detail in Chapter 4. ' Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences o f Preference Falsification (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 332. 293 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Along the spectrum of complete Islamization and complete secularization, Islamist and secularist activists attempt to impose their own “ideal ” worldview over the other. Islamists strive for complete Islamization while secularists aim for complete secularization. In their interaction, as Chapter 4 theoretically explained, besides the existing status quo, possible outcomes are complete Islamization, complete secularization, and peaceful co-existence. For each possibility, all the individual responses (i.e., exit, sincere voice and preference falsification) to the Islamist and secularist pressures will play a role, but one or a combination of two distinct responses will be dominant m shaping each possibility. Table 6.1 shows what responses will be more effective for generating each possible outcome. Table 6.1: Possible Outcomes Possibility Dominant Response(s) Status Quo Pro-Islamist and Pro-secularist Preference Falsification Complete Islamization Exit and Pro-Islamist Preference Falsification Complete Secularization Exit and Pro-secularist Preference Falsification Peaceful Co-existence Exit and Sincere Voice 8 Albert O. Hirschman inspired me on this point in showing combinations of such responses, namely exit and voice, lead to social change in the former East Germany. See Albert O. Hirschman, “Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic” in idem, A Propensity to Self-Subversion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995): 9-44. The essay was originally published in World Politics, 45 (January 1993): 173-202. 294 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This dissertation has already discussed the importance of both pro-Islamist and pro-secularist preference falsification to sustain the existing status quo in Turkey. Leaving this aside, following pages discuss other possibilities, for which exit is a common response to all. However, as also pointed out in Chapter 4, the recent developments in global communication technologies almost eliminate the possibility of complete exit from social networks. Keeping in mind that exit will play a lesser role, let us examine how other responses will be instrumental in shaping the future interplay of Islamism and secularism in Turkey. 1. The Possibility of Complete Islamization In the Islamic sense, complete Islamization means that Dar-ul Islam (House of Islam) will conquer Dar-ul Harb (House of War) (i.e., the non-Islamic world). In Islam, the expansion of the House of Islam over the House of War is called jihad (holy war). With their claims over the unique truth, Islamists aim to expand their own worldview in the world. Other than partial attempts at complete Islamization in Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan, Sudan and some other Muslim countries, the most radical attempt has taken place in Iran following the Islamic revolution in 1979. The Islamists in Iran carried out extensive Islamization policies related to the political, economic, social and cultural spheres of life.9 These developments have influenced Turkish Islamists who proposed their own Islamization policies. Chapter 4 includes many examples of such polices at both 9 For more information, see Chapter 4. 295 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. local and national level, promoting an Islamic lifestyle.1 0 At the local level, the Islamist mayors have taken diverse actions, to varying degrees, to ban serving alcoholic beverages in restraints, removing public statues considered as “idols” by Islam, limiting the broadcasting of allegedly “immoral” TV programs.1 1 At the national level, Turkish Islamists proposed the Islamization of the economy by banning interest and creating an “Islamic NATO” for a joint Muslim security alliance, the sex segregation of the coastal beaches, lifting the ban on veil at government offices, even releasing convicts for memorizing half of the Qur’an. The parliament also established Islamic financial institutions when the RP (Welfare Party) as the senior partner and the DYP (True Path Party) formed a coalition in July 1996. Such Islamization policies exerted more social pressures, reducing the sincere voice option for non-activists and increasing the possibility of both pro-Islamist preference falsification and exit. Holding the political power, Islamists attempted to dominate the public realm by winning a large number of individuals to their side so as to create an “apparent” majority in support of more Islamization so that they can pursue their goals through democratic means. Tayyip Erdogan, a RP member then the leader of the AKP, said: “Thank Allah! We are pro-§eriat (Islamic Law).”1 2 “My point of reference is Islam. 10 The Islamist RP had an opportunity to pursue such policies following the 1994 local elections in which twenty-nine major cities, including Istanbul and Ankara, as well as 400 smaller towns, elected Islamist mayors, putting nearly two-thirds of the population under the Islamist municipalities. 11 For more information on specific actions of the Islamist mayors, see Chapter 4. 12 Milliyet, 21 November 1994 296 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Democracy is not a goal but a means [to it.]”1 3 Such public speeches and the following public demonstrations bolstered the possibility of complete Islamization “by any means possible.” For example, in early February 1997, the Islamist mayor of Sincan (a town near Ankara), with the approval of his party, organized festivities for a “Jerusalem night” with the participation of the Iranian Ambassador Muhammed Reza Baghri as the guest of honor. The participants shouted the similar slogans such as “The foundation of the §eriat will be laid here.” Back in 1994, Erbakan, the leader o f the RP, remarked that “[the] RP will bring a ‘ just order’ but I do not know whether the transition period will be easy [peaceful] or bloody.”1 4 The following outbreak of religious terror created more pressures on non-activists to side with the Islamist views. The numerous cases in which Islamist militants resorted to violence have led to more pro-Islamist preference falsification. In the 1990s, Islamist militants assassinated certain intellectuals with strong commitments to strict secularism, such as £etin Eme?, the chief editor of the daily Hurriyet, preceding the alleged assassinations of Muammer Aksoy, a secularist professor of law, Turan Dursun, Qx-muftii of Sivas and self-declared atheist, Bahriye U<?ok, another secularist professor, Ugur Mumcu, a secularist journalist, Onat Kutlar, a 13 Tayyip Erdogan later backed off from this particular comment by saying, “I have absorbed and internalized democracy.” See Derya Sazak, “Din ve Siyaset [Religion and Politics],” Milliyet, 2 February 2000. Sazak sees Erdogan’s latter comments as a welcome development provided he is not engaging in takiye, a form of pro-secularist preference falsification. On takiye, see Chapter 4. 14 Erbakan was in his group meeting of the RP deputies at the Assembly in April 13, 1994. His speech later was extensively quoted. See, for example, Derya Sazak’s article quoted above. “Just order” was the RP’s party program with many Islamist elements. For an English text of “Just Order,” see “Turkey: Welfare Party Explains Its “Just Order”” FBIS-WEU, Supplement, 5 December 1995, 1-15. 297 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. columnist for the secularist daily Cumhuriyet, and most recently Ahmet Taner Ki§lali, one of the founders of Society for Atatiirkist Thought in support of secularism. The most notorious Islamist attack took place on July 2, 1993, when an angry mob attacked a hotel in Sivas, a city in central Anatolia, where a group of intellectuals under the leadership of Aziz Nesin, a famous atheist writer, had come to honor a folk hero, Pir Sultan. Shouting “Aziz is Satan! Islam is the only way! Down with secularism! Long Live §eriat\,” the mob set the hotel on fire, killing 37.1 5 This was the first incident in Turkey in which people were killed en masse by Islamist terror as later imitated by the Turkish Hizbullah (Party of Allah). The following investigations revealed that the Hizbullah might have been responsible for some 3000 murders by unknown assailants and the police also recovered a blacklist of 1500 people, including prominent businessmen, journalists, moderate Muslim leaders and several entertainers, soon to be assassinated.1 6 These assassinations aim to increase the social pressures to a point where no individual could openly criticizes attempts at complete Islamization. The moderate Islamist Party (AKP) won a decisive victory in the November 3, 2002 national elections, and came to power without a coalition partner.1 7 Considering this a potential challenge to Kemalism, secularists feared that the AKP would carry 15 The “Sivas Incident” created a huge public outrage. After the incident the criminal court sentenced to death 33 of those involved. However, the Court of Appeal overturned the decision based on a technicality in December 24, 1998. See Sabah, 25 December 1998. The slogans were quoted by Hasan Cemal, “Irkgilik Hayaleti... [The Ghost of Racism...],” Sabah, 2 April 1997. 16 Hurriyet, 21 January 2000. 17 The experts described this victory as a result of the public outrage over the inability of the secularist parties in dealing with economic crises and the political corruption. 298 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. out more Islamization policies despite earlier assurances by Tayyip Erdogan, the leader o f AKP that “We do not aim at an Islamic State.”1 8 Throughout the election campaign, AKP presented an image of moderation, (along with efficiency, transparency, and accountability), while distancing itself from its predecessor, the boldly pro-Islamist RP. Noticing this deviation, the secularly oriented media began questioning AKP deputies’ sincerity, wondering whether they engage in pro-secularist preference falsification hiding their genuine agenda. As explained in Chapter 4, the AKP’s future Islamiziation policies can create an Islamist bandwagon that may lead to complete Islamization in which the perfect pro-Islamist preference falsification reigns. Table 6.1 indicates that exit may also help Islamist activists to reach their goal. In addition to pro-Islamist preference falsification, they can use exit to reduce sincere voice with some degree.1 9 The mass exodus of the secularist activists will reduce secularist representation in the Turkish public sphere, even though the secularists could fight for their causes relying on global networks made possible by the advancement of communication technologies. The secularist activists abroad could only exert limited social pressures on the non-activists, indirectly boosting pro- Islamist preference falsification. Such combination will facilitate the 18 Hilrriyet, 26 August 2001. 19 One historical precedence to this possibility was in Cuba. Fidel Castro intentionally let the dissidents to leave Cuba en mass to further strengthen his regime. Albert O. Hirschman, “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Further Reflections and a Survey of Recent Contribution,” in idem, Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 227. The essay was originally published in Social Science Information, 13 (1974): 7-26. But, the Cuban exiles form an interest group to exert pressures on the Castro regime, especially through US foreign policy. 299 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. institutionalization of Islamism in the public realm, resulting in a near comer equilibrium explained in Chapter 4. Therefore, Islamist bandwagon could carry Turkey in the direction of Iran. It is too early to determine the real intentions of the AKP government. Even if the AKP pursues complete Islamization, the secularists will surely fight back for delslamization. 2. The Possibility of Complete Secularization Another implication of the model depicted in Chapter 4 is the possibility of complete secularization. A Kemalist bandwagon, similar to an Islamist bandwagon, may repress Islamist expressions in the public sphere by increasing pro-secularist preference falsification and/or the Islamists’ exit from the country. Since the mid- 1990s, in response to the Islamization policies of the RP, the secularist establishment organized a counter strategy to strengthen the existing secularist policies. The Turkish military, self-proclaimed guardian of Kemalism has played a cmcial role in this de-Islamization process. It has increasingly discharged staff for 00 their “reactionary activities,” a euphemism for Islamist activities. The military had also rolled tanks through Sincan following the “Jerusalem Night.”2 1 The major 20 In 1996, 13 officers were dishonorably discharged for alleged involvement in “reactionary activities.” Financial Times, 6 August 1996. In 1997, the armed forces discharged 147 of 300 men for having ties with Islamists. Milliyet 17 June 1998. The Financial Times reported that the number of discharges was 73. Financial Times, 5 August 1997. In 1998, some 109 officers and 58 non-commissioned officers, a total of 167, a record high number compared to the previous discharges, were expelled on the basis of their involvement in radical Islamist organizations. Financial Times, 17 June 1998. Contrary to the Financial Times, Milliyet reported that out of 167, 58 officers and 109 non-commissioned officers only 159 were expelled due to their “reactionary activities.” Milliyet, 17 June 1998. 21 New York Times, 13 February 1997. 300 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. response to Islamization came after the National Security Council’s (Milli Gtlvenlik Kurulu) meeting on February 28, 1998.2 2 After suppressing all the Islamists within National Security Council (NSC), the Turkish military led the so-called “February 28 process” through which the secularists initiated detailed delslamization measures ranging from preserving secularism at all costs, to preventing the public re-hiring of dishonorably discharged staff for Islamist activities. One measure, introduction of eight-year uninterrupted compulsory education became a major contention point by turning religious Imam-Hatips into standard vocational schools with secular curricula. Secularist press, trade unions, big business and civil service have constantly supported ■yj the military in pressuring the parliament to pass the bill on secular education. The Judiciary later banned religious school attendance without eight-year secular education.2 4 In 1997, 135 “pro-§eriaf’ public school teachers, hired by the Islamist RP were fired.2 5 On February 28th, 2000, President Demirel put the secularization process into a broader perspective: “It is a continuing process that started with the 22 The NSC includes the president, the premier, the ministers of interior, foreign affairs and defense, the chief of the general staff, the commanders of the army, the navy, the air force, the gendarme forces and the secretary-general of the NSC (a high-ranking army officer). Since its decisions are constitutionally binding, it enables the military to monitor the affairs of government and intervene in the democratic process if deemed necessary. After a three-day delay the Islamist Premier Erbakan also signed this package. The Islamist Erbakan himself engaged in pro-secularist preference falsification. 23 Financial Times, 13 August 1997. 24 New York Times, 2 February 1998. 2 5 FBIS-WEU, 9 September 1998. 301 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. establishment of the Republic. It will continue.”2 6 The current President Sezer 77 affirmed this: “Secularism is a basic and unamendable principle of the Constitution.” The military labeled Islamism as “the number one threat” to the secular Republic. Relying on the claim that the RP had become “the center of the activities against the secularist Constitution,” the Constitutional Court closed the RP and banned its influential members, including its leader Necmettin Erbakan, from politics for five years. Immediately thereafter another Islamist Party with the name of the FP (Virtue Party) was established on January 17, 1998.2 9 In June 22, 2001, the Constitutional Court also closed the FP for attempting to replace secular laws with Islamic §eriat. Soon, Contentment Party (SP) with hardcore Islamists and Justice and Development Party (AKP) by moderate reformist Islamists appeared.3 0 Before the AKP came to power on November 3 2002, the Chief Prosecutor filed a case to close the AKP for having members banned from politics.3 1 While this case is still pending, the secularist watchdog groups have scrutinized the AKP government for undermining secularism. Despite the AKP’s rhetoric of change and moderation, the Generals are still suspicious of its “genuine” agenda: “We don’t believe that [the AKP] changed. The 26 Sabah, 29 February 2000. 27 Sabah, 28 March 2001 and Hurriyet, 28 March 2001. 28 New York Times, 17 January 1998. 29 Washington Post, 18 January 1998. 30 For details, see Hurriyet, 24 March 2001. I will later discuss the ramifications of the FP’s closure. For the establishment of the Contentment Party (SP), see Hurriyet, 20 July 2001. 31 Milliyet, 23 October 2002. 302 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. process of February 28 will last at least another thousand years,”3 2 pointing to the possibility of another army takeover in case of a perceived challenge to Kemalist secularism. A coup d ’ etat against Islamism would force more people to extensively engage in pro-secularist preference falsification. Chapter 4 showed that a secularist bandwagon could result in compete secularization. As shown in Table 6.1, exit may also help secularists to succeed in their aim. Islamist activists with available means may leave the country, erasing Islamist symbols from the public realm to a greater extent. Yet, the flight of Islamist activists may not totally eliminate the Islamist pressures on the non-activists since the activists could continue to exert social pressures in Turkey through global communication networks. Today’s level of globalization and information technology decreases the effectiveness of exit, making neither of these extreme outcomes, (i.e., complete Islamization nor complete secularization) likely to succeed in the destruction of the other worldview. Thus, both Islamists and secularists try in vain for this, ignoring these global constraints on such extreme scenarios. Since Turkey like any other country is open to external influences, the deported core activists can exert influence through global networks and international institutions. For example, the European 32 Radikal, 24 April 2002. 33 For example, Turkish Islamists and secularists abroad wage a cyber war against each other. The two publicly known examples are http: //ww w. infidels .ore that aims to popularize the anti-Islamist works of Ilhan Arsel and http://www.mustafakemal.de through which Cemallettin Kaplan and his followers, an extreme Turkish Islamist group in Germany attempt to discredit Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk. One can also visit http://www.ilhanarsel.org/ in order to see Arsel’s anti-Islamic writings. 303 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Union (EU) required political reforms extending individual liberties and religious expression from the Turkish government for EU admission.3 4 4. The Possibility of Peaceful Coexistence While admitting to the drawbacks of Turkey’s semi-democracy with an outsized role of the military in politics forcing governments out of office in 1960, 1971, 1980 (and 1997), cases of censorship and Islamist terror, and also instances of state torture, Turkey still has the potential to create a unique model of Muslim democracy where Islamism and secularism can peacefully coexist. Chapter 2 and 4 reviewed in detail what Etyen Mahqupyan noticed: both secularists and Islamists has long perceived politics as a power game against a self-constructed “enemy” loosely defined in monolithic terms, preventing sincere communications.3 5 Chapter 3 historically and Chapter 4 theoretically demonstrated that Islamist and secularist pressures prevent the participation of more agents into collective decisions. Chapter 5 provided empirical evidence on how the activists’ uncompromising positions, so far, have produced widespread pro-secularist and pro-Islamist preference falsification that distorts collective decisions by disguising nuances in the process. Table 6.1 shows that the exit of the hardcore activists, secularists and Islamists, from Turkey may decrease excessive social pressures, increasing the possibility of the peaceful coexistence. Nonetheless, neither the Turkish Army nor the Islamist AKP in power is 34 Hurriyet, 23 June 2001. 3 5 Etyen Mahqupyan, “Hizbullah Uzerinden Siyaset (3) (Politics Over Hizbullah (3)),” Radikal, 2 February 2000. 304 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. likely to leave the country. This leaves us whether sincere voice may help the emergence of more “peaceful” coexistence. The possibility of preference falsification declines and that of sincere voice increases if democratic rights were established. To accomplish this, as Kuran points out, there are two ways: The first is to “devise institutions that protect to right to speak” and the second is “to indoctrinate individuals with respect for expressive diversity.”3 6 The first solution calls for extensive revisions in the current institutional structure as the latter asks for a perfect ethic of tolerance where individual liberties and freedom of expression are fully respected by each member of the society. Neither task is too easy to accomplish especially in Turkey where the imperfect democratic institutions are mingled with an authoritarian political culture. The following section concludes this dissertation by discussing whether more inclusive public sphere for both Islamists and secularists as a result of greater democratization and a growing civil society can mitigate the unwanted ramifications of preference falsification and facilitate a peaceful coexistence. Civil Society, Democracy, and Preference Falsification Initiating what Orhan Pamuk calls a “process of normalization” in which Islamist and secularist pressures fade away, decreasing the need for preference falsification so that non-activists can reveal their genuine opinions, reconstructing 36 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 100. 305 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. secularism and Islamism whose representations do not agitate peoples’ daily lives.3 7 This process of normalization refers to, indeed, what many social scientists, including Bernard Crick, Dankwart Rustow and Albert Hirschman have long stressed: democracy emerged in time not because people agree on “basic values,” but because “various groups had been at each other’s throat for a long time and finally come to recognize their mutual inability to gain dominance and the need for some accommodation.”3 8 Such accommodation between secularists and Islamists calls for a perceptional change that mutually recognizing each other’s rights in the public sphere may yield a greater social good. Upon coming to power, the first public statement made by the leader of AKP, Erdogan, pointed to this: “We will not interfere with any one else’s lifestyle.”3 9 Greater democratization may increase the likelihood of sincere voice in an expanded public sphere supported by a strong civil society. Emerging 37 On the role of Islam and secularism in the Turkish society during the Republican years, Orhan Pamuk, a leading novelist and intellectual in Turkey commented: “Both modernizers [including secularists] and traditionalists [including Islamists] of the generation before us are [defeated] ... because the Republic initiated a radical modernization project and shattered the previous culture with its urge for quick modernization. All [the previous generations] were inflicted with [and hence crippled by] the wounds of inferiority complex. But, my generation and posterity will be less disappointed and will be more optimistic for seeing ... the East-West struggle as a lifestyle [choice] and consequently for giving up such radical Islamist and modernist projects.” Orhan Pamuk, “Kafasi Kan?ik Olanlara Bor?luyum: Orhan Pamuk Kendi Penceresinden Cumhuriyet’e ve 75 yillik Turk Edebiyatma Baktyor [I am indebted to those with mixed thoughts: Orhan Pamuk looks, from his own window, at the Republic and the Turkish literature of the last 75 years,” interview by Niliifer Kuya§, Milliyet, 10 October 1998. 38 Albert O. Hirschman, “Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Society, “ in idem, A Propensity to Self-Subversion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 239. The essay was originally published in Political Theory, 22 (May 1994): 203-218. Hirschman cites: Bernard Crick, In Defense o f Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 24 and Dankwart Rustow, “Transition to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model” Comparative Politics, (April 1970), 337-364. 39 Hurriyet, 4 November 2002. 306 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. diverse everyday manifestations of Islamism and secularism eventually withers away the ongoing struggle this dissertation focuses on. The previous chapters showed that both camps created an illusion of choice between secularism and Islamism. In reality, the choice is between a state-centered authoritarian democracy and a civil society-oriented liberal democracy.4 0 Thus, the problem is: “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”4 1 A civil society as “the locus of both democratic legitimacy and rights, composed of private but also of politically relevant public and social spheres in which individuals speak, assemble, associate, and reason together on matters of public concern and act in concert in order to influence political society and, indirectly, decision making”4 2 can make this possible. If the power struggle between Islamists and secularists, in particular the military and the Islamist AKP in power evolves in this context, the nature of their co-existence may be more peaceful. In this power struggle, however, as of 2003, the current Turkish political structure favors secularists due to several constraints and huge legal pressures on the Islamists’ freedom of expression. For this reason, the AKP government has skillfully distanced itself from controversial issues. Its leaders avoided attending state protocol 40 Heinz Kramer stresses on the same point. See Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 56. 41 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Colombia University Press, 1993), xxv. 42 Jean L Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 564. 307 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. with their veiled wives. Meanwhile, the military cancelled several occasions to avoid a direct contact with the veiled entourage.4 3 This signifies that the military still refuses even to discuss any representation of Islamism in the public realm, fostering pro secularist preference falsification. President Sezer often remarks that the current Turkish Constitution restricts revising the prohibitive laws on veiling.4 4 Besides veiling, Turkey still has legal loopholes on freedom of thought and expression. The Penal Code limits the exercise of these fundamental human rights 4 5 Article 312 still allows prosecution of those who openly discuss Islamism and secularism for “inciting to racial and ethnic and religious enmity.” This Article was used for convicting many leading Islamist figures, including Tayyip Erdogan and Erol Yarar, an influential Islamist businessman, for promoting “religious enmity,” Necmettin Erbakan for a public speech4 6 and two Islamist deputies, Nazli Ilicak and Bekir Sobaci, for the speeches in the Parliament that allegedly violated the secular 43 Milliyet,21 November 2002. 44 Milliyet, 24 November 2002. 45 Although the current Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and the press and the Penal Code Articles 141, 142 and 163 prohibiting propaganda for communism and using religion for political purposes were recently abolished, Articles 6 8 and 69 of the Constitution with Articles 101 and 103 of the Law on Political Parties No 2820 limit to free political expression of religious views. Articles 60 and 159 of the Code on insulting the Republic, the Parliament, the military, and the judiciary limit criticisms of public institutions. Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law on separatist propaganda and Article 16 of the Press Law also restrict the freedom of speech and the press. Zaman, 23 June 2001. 46 Radikal, 7 July 2000. 308 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. basis o f the Turkish Constitution.4 7 In numerous other incidents, Islamists, other 48 activists and many bystanders were put on trail when they spoke their mmds. The Chief Prosecutor has openly stressed the importance of Article 312 for bringing stability to the Turkish society: “If this were also abolished certain groups [including Islamist and extreme anti-religious atheists and minority sects such as Alewites] would choke each other.”4 9 This implies that the restrictions, increasing the extent of preference falsification lead to social stability. This is a valid point in the context of this dissertation. Ironically, while preventing the peaceful coexistence of Islamism and secularism, the acts of preference falsification provide social stability, at least for the time being. If Merve Kavakpi had unveiled herself in the parliament, no veiling crises would have broken out. By attending the commencement with wigs totally covering their hair, female students circumvent the ban on veil at schools without confronting the administration.5 0 Thus, pro-secularist and/or pro-Islamist preference falsification prevents the frictions, and to some extent, temporarily cements the society together. Yet, it also feeds the potential for unrest, waiting for a spark to explode. On the contrary, the potential for widespread violence is low when there 47 Hiirriyet, 23 June 2001. 4 8 For the cases of Tayyip Erdogan and Erol Yarar, and for many others see The 1999 Country R eports on Human R ight P ractices: Turkey. 25 February 2000. By the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 23-28. The previous reports by the same agency also included many examples. See especially 1998. One can also find many other examples in several Turkey: Human Rights Reports. By Human Rights Foundation of Turkey. Ankara: HRFT Publications. Especially see 1995 R eport, 313-369. 49 Cumhuriyet, 16 March 1999. 50 Milliyet, 23 June 2003. 309 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. exists “a public sphere backed by a free communications system [that] is vital to the life o f a civil society.”5 1 Therefore, stronger civil society with established democratic rights, mitigating social pressure, and hence, reducing preference falsification may provide permanent social stability in Turkey. As noted before, the secularist establishment has more voice while the Islamists have limited access to the public sphere. In a pluralistic society, mutually inclusive public sphere may foster candid discussions, revealing some existing compromises between opposing activists. For example, an Islamist writer, Abdurrahman Dilipak and an atheist human rights activist, $anar Yurdatapan co authored a book, tackling some of the touchiest issues such as “Is there a God? What is the role of women?” Yurdatapan expressed the necessity o f sincere voice: “opposites can put their ideas together without trying to kill or silence each other.”5 2 Civil society organizations integrate wider sections of the society into the political system, carrying their concerns in the public realm.5 3 Neither secularists nor Islamists represent monolithic camps. In fact, they embody a variety of opinions, revealing different kinds of Islam(ism) and secularism. Including Islamists in the public sphere may help question the orientalist approach to Islam(ism), i.e. the 51 John Keane, Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions (Oxford, UK: Polity Press, 1998), 157. 52 New York Times, 26 November 2002. 53 For more on the transition from bureaucratic authoritarian rule to liberal democracy via civil society, see Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986). For the critique of this view, see Jean L Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994): 48-58. 310 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. totalizing view of Islam(ism) by Turkish secularist.5 4 The Turkish civil society has grown tremendously in the past two decades and many Islamist civil society organizations have already highly functional in daily life, waiting to be fully integrated into the public realm.5 5 These organizations have demonstrated the pluralistic nature of Islamic civil society that dynamically engages in a sincere dialogue for self- criticism of the unique practices,5 6 probably seeding new interpretations compatible with a secular democracy in Turkey.5 7. Faced with intense criticism of their past practices, some the AKP leaders unconditionally pledged their allegiance to the existing Parliamentary system by publicly denouncing their goal of instituting §eriat CO rule. Tayyip Erdogan stated, “I certainly internalized democracy.” However, the 54 Orientalism is a term coined by Edward Said referring to the totalizing view of Islam by western scholarship. See Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). 55 In the late 1980s Turkey had only one public TV channel and three public radios. After the press liberalization, the number of private TV channels and radios reached 20 national, 15 regional and 230 local TV channels with 36 national, 108 regional, and 1,044 local radio stations by January 2000. The 1999 Country Reports on Human Right Practices: Turkey. 25 February 2000. By the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 23. The list excludes unregistered TV and radio stations. In late 1990s, Turkey has about 2,700 foundations, 50,000 large scale associations and 1,200 unions, cooperatives, and business chambers. Heinz Kramer, Changing Turkey, 18. The Islamist civil society organizations include 70,000 Islamic associations; 4,000 religious vaktfs: 5,000 educational facilities and 2,500 dormitories; 905 private schools and 200 radio and television stations in a year increased from 11.Milliyet, 17 June 1998. The Islamist civil society also includes 19 newspapers, 110 magazines, 2,500 clubs, 1,000 companies, and Qur’an courses serving about 1,605,000 students. Briefing, 16 June 1997. As quoted in Aryeh Shmuelevits, Turkey’s Experiment in Islamist Government, 1996-1997, 37. 56 Dale F. Eickelman points out the emergence of such a trend on more open discussions in Muslim countries, including Turkey. See Dale F. Eickelman, “Islam and the Languages of Modernity,” Daedalus 129 (Winter 2000): 119-135. 57 International summits also provide free forums to discuss Islam and secularism. The declaration of the Euro-Asian Islamic Meetings for 2000 urged modem interpretations of the Qur’an and more tolerance for the different practices of Islam. Sabah, 29 July 2000. Several ulema called for an Islamic renaissance. Sabah, 18 July 2000. 58 Also Biilent Ann? claimed that “[pjolitical Islam can no longer find supporters as it used to have.” Hurriyet, “Siyasal Islam Yol Ayrimmda [Political Islam at Crossroad]” 8 February 2000. Abdullah Gul declared that he personally preferred to “live either in the USA or in England or Europe rather than Iran 311 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Islamist practices still show mixed results ranging from a killing of a barman for allegedly insulting Islam with his tattoo of Allah script in Arabic, to keeping the AKP’s cafeteria open during Ramadan for non-practicing Muslims.5 9 As a part of the EU admission pledge, Turkey start revising many of its laws, including the ones limiting free speech, to make them compatible with the EU’s more democratic laws.6 0 Greater democratization may lead to more sincere voice in the public domain. Strong and flexible political institutions, particularly political parties are necessary to overcome a country’s social divisions or provide the political cohesion and “Civil society actively alone” could not achieve this.6 1 Unless political institutions that protect dissenters and a political ethic that prizes outspokenness are in place,6 2 even strong civil society does not guarantee sincere deliberations. There will be always some obstacles to candid discussions even in more democratic Turkey. As a result of preference falsification, elegantly demonstrated by Kuran, social pressures may clog the democratic process even in today’s most democratic states with strong civil society.6 3 or Libya.” He also claimed that the supporters of §eriat are in a minority, and it is better to embrace the changing milieu within the best rule, which is democracy. Milliyet, 9 February 2000. The photograph of another FP deputy, Ertan Yiilek praying in short golf pants showed the public that the Islamist group harbors many different views of Islam and Islamic practices which seems to be compatible with democracy and modernity. Sabah, 22 January 2000. 59 Washington Post, 11 November 2002. 60 Hurriyet, 3 August 2002. 61 Sheri Berman convincingly presents a similar argument in the case of Weimar Republic’s collapse in Germany. See Sheri Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic” World Politics, 49 (April 1997): 426. 62 Timur Kuran, “Insincere Deliberation and Democratic Failure,” Critical Review (Fall 1998): 529-544. 6 3 Timur Kuran, “Insincere Deliberation,” 542. 312 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The longstanding patron-client relations in Turkey supported by religious orders, kinship networks and ethnic background may reproduce the same Islamist and/or secularist social pressures, decreasing sincere voice. The secularist state supports Kemalist civil society organizations to create more pressures on non-activists while the Islamist parties sponsor certain national newspapers such as Milli Gazate and Zaman for the same purpose. Certain newspapers and some civil society organizations such as the Society for Atatiirkist Thought and the Islamist Nurcu Foundations for the Private Highschools, then turn to be mere extensions of the secularists/Islamists divide, perpetuating the existing polarization in everyday life.6 4 For example, the Islamist oriented daily, Yeni §afak blamed the secularist oriented Hurriyet and Milliyet newspapers for fabricating a controversy about the presence of a veiled woman in a public institution with a strict secular dress code.6 5 Even such accusation of mutual yellow journalism prolongs the secularist/Islamist divide. It remains to be seen whether a new synthesis of Turkish Islamism compatible with secularism is in the making. More opportunities, if become available, for open discourse, may lead to their peaceful coexistence. As §erif Mardin highlighted more than a quarter-century ago, the essential problematique is providing opportunities to 64 Yael Navaro-Yashin, Faces o f the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), especially 130-137 and Yael Navaro-Yashin, “Uses and Abuses of “State and Civil Society” in Contemporary Turkey,” New Perspectives on Turkey (Spring 1998): 1-22. 65 Yeni §afak, 19 May 2004. For an editorial response, see Milliyet, 20 May 2004. 313 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the masses in finding indigenous solutions within their own culture.6 6 Genuine solutions may come from peoples’ creative daily practices if elitist activists trust them. As such daily practices became more prevalent in the public domain, it will be more evident that neither Islamism nor secularism is not a changing entity. On the contrary, they evolve in time in response to the social milieu. A more peaceful public discourse on Islamism and secularism may provide a lasting social consensus as the public opinion provide feedbacks for the private understandings of the current, more importantly, future generations. As Kuran laid out, the feedbacks from public discourse and public opinion induce change in private preferences, especially of those of the future generations.6 7 Once the non-activists take the positive feedbacks from the public discourse on the compatibility of Islamism and secularism as granted they adjust their private understandings on the issue and the newcomers would form their private preferences on the basis of a given social consensus. In other words, social consensus is a possibility as long as the public discourse highlights the evolving nature secularism and Islamism in Turkey, especially their compromising characteristics, vying for non-confrontational interactions in the public domain. 6 6 §erif Mardin, “Tiirkiye’de “Kitle Kultiirii” Sorunu [The Problem of “Mass Culture” in Turkey],” Ozgur Insan 16 (Nisan 1974): 58-61. The article was also reprinted in §erif Mardin: Siyasal ve Sosyal Bilimler: Makaleler 2 [§erif Mardin: Political and Social Sciences: Articles, 2], Mumtaz’er Tiirkone and Tuncay Onder eds. (Istanbul: iletisim Yaymlan, 1990): 126-132. 6 7 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, 297-300. 314 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In conclusion, it is hard to predict the future. However, the elimination of pro- Islamist and pro- secularists preference falsification will surely help develop a unique Turkish Islam and Turkish secularism, compatible with each other. This dissertation clearly showed that Turkish society has long suffered from being trapped between two radical social projects of Islamism and secularism. To the extent that secular modernism and Islamism stop creating pressures, generating anxieties, guilt and cognitive dissonances, making preference falsification inconsequential, the Turkish posterity will free itself from the chains of the schizophrenic past. 315 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. POSTSCRIPT During the course of writing this dissertation in 2001, Turkey was hit by the worst economic crisis in its republican history. Enormous number of bankruptcies, intolerably high unemployment and diminishing living standards created an economic and political instability. Disappointed by the inability of the secularly oriented parties to deal with the economics crisis, the 34 percent of the Turkish voters voted for the newly formed AKP in the November 3, 2002 elections, leading to the first openly Islamist administration without a coalition partner in the history of the secular republic.1 The financial crisis shifted the public opinion on how to alleviate the repercussions of the economic decay, putting the existing controversies between secularists and Islamists off the public agenda, at least for a while. The AKP government implemented stabilizing financial policies that eradicated the residues of the severe economic crises. Without denying its religious roots the ruling party has skillfully avoided any Islamist policy that may shake the secular establishment. The AKP’s success, especially in economic stabilization secured its place in Turkish politics. In the local elections of the March 28, 2004, the AKP expanded its legitimacy by receiving 42 percent of the entire vote cast.2 Recent local elections brought nearly 55 percent of all cities, including 57 of 81 provinces, under the leadership of Islamist-rooted AKP party mayors. 1 For election results, see Zaman, 5 November 2002. 2 For election results, see Yeniqafak, 30 March 2004. 316 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. It is too early to tell whether the AKP mayors will carry out at the local what the AKP did at the national level, i.e., to avoid any confrontation with the secular establishment without enraging Islamization policies in their dealings with everyday life. Until recently, the AKP’s party leadership has tried very hard to prevent its supporters from engaging in confrontational dialogue with the secularists in the public opinion. This does mean that the secularism and Islamism in Turkey is passe. The veiling controversy, for one, simmers on the sidelines of political and social debate. The May 19 Youth and Sport festivities witnessed the resurface of the subdued clashes between Islamists and secularist establishment. The Generals did not applaud the « ^ speech given by a graduate of a religious school. The veiled spectators were removed from the ceremonies both in the capital and the other provinces while the AKP entourage was watching.4 The latest harbinger of the confrontation between Islamists and secularists in Turkey was the new higher education law. In May 2004, the AKP government passed a controversial draft in the parliament with the overwhelming approval of its deputies in spite of a strong opposition from the military and the faculties in the universities. The General Staff Hilmi Ozkok stated that the new law is against secularism and the military would guard the secular republic in the future as it did in the past.5 The new law permits the graduates of the religious high schools to peruse a higher education in 3 Milliyet, 19 May 2004. 4 Milliyet, 19 May 2004. 5 Milliyet, 9 May 2004. 317 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. other fields and the secularists claim that it creates further incentives for the early religious education. The secularist President Ahmet Sezer immediately vetoed the law on the ground that it contradicts with the secularism principle of the Constitution.6 Premier Tayyip Erdogan’s unfavorable reaction signaled a possible shift in the AKP’s policy of non-confrontation with the secular establishment. These are only the glimpses of the current frictions between Islamists and secularists while many others are due in the future. 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Tauris & Co Ltd., 1993. 339 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Appendixes Appendix A: Experiment I: English Translation o f Survey Questionnaire Appendix B: Experiment I: English Translation o f Survey Questionnaire 340 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Appendix A: Experiment I: English Translation o f Survey Questionnaire Part I: Background Questions Age Profession _____________________ Sex ( ) Male ( ) Female Education ( ) None ( ) Primary School ( ) Secondary School ( ) High School ( ) University ( ) Graduate School In what type environment did you grow up? ( ) Village ( ) Small town under 100,000 ( ) Small City under one million ( ) Big city over one million ( ) Izmir, Ankara, Istanbul What is your monthly household income? ( ) Less that 20 million TL ( ) Between 20 and 50 million TL ( ) Between 50 and 100 million TL ( ) Between 100 and 150 million TL ( ) Between 150 and 200 million TL ( ) Over 200 million TL 341 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Part II: 1 . Discipline and respect for authority are the most important values a child has to learn. ( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 2. In a heated debate I am generally so preoccupied with what I am going to say next that I forget to listen what others say. ( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 3. If you want something to be done, you should try to do it yourself than waiting for help from others. ( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 4. A person can lead a good life even if he does not have strong religious beliefs. ( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 5. Religion is an indispensable force for stability and social harmony. ( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 6 . I consider myself a devout Muslim. ( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 7. I consider myself a secular citizen. ( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 342 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Part JH: 9. What was the sermon in the last Friday prayer about? 10. At what time was the evening salat last night? 11. What do you think about us? (a) We are secularists. (b) We are Islamists. (c) No idea. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * For official use only Place ______________ Experimental condition ( ) Secularist Date ( ) Islamist ( ) Neutral Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Appendix B: Experiment II: English Translation o f Survey Questionnaire Part I: Background Questions Age Profession _____________________ Sex ( ) Male ( ) Female Education ( ) None ( ) Primary School ( ) Secondary School ( ) High School ( ) University ( ) Graduate School In what type environment did you grow up? ( ) Village ( ) Small town under 100,000 ( ) Small City under one million ( ) Big city over one million ( ) Izmir, Ankara, istanbul What is your monthly household income? ( ) Less that 20 million TL ( ) Between 20 and 50 million TL ( ) Between 50 and 100 million TL ( ) Between 100 and 150 million TL ( ) Between 150 and 200 million TL ( ) Over 200 million TL 344 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Part H: 1 . Did you watch TV in the night of December 31, 1996? If so, what TV channel did you watched most? (No) (ATV) (Kanal D) (Krai TV) (Show TV) (Star) (Kanal 6) (TGRT) (Samanyolu) Other ___ 2. Did you watch any iftar program on TV in December 31, 1996? If so, on what channel? (No) (ATV) (Kanal D) (Krai TV) (Show TV) (Star) (Kanal 6) (TGRT) (Samanyolu) Other____ 3. Did you watch any New Year's Eve entertainment program on TV in December 31, 1996? If so, on what channel? (No) (ATV) (Kanal D) (Krai TV) (Show TV) (Star) (Kanal 6) (TGRT) (Samanyolu) Other____ Part HI: 4. Do you read a daily newspaper? If so, which ones? (No) (Cumhuriyet) (Radikal) (Milliyet) (Sabah) (Yeni Yuzyil) (Hurriyet) (Ak§am) (Turkiye) (Zaman) (Milli Gazete) (Akit) Other ____________ _ 5. In your daily, who is your most favorite columnist? Please name him or her. 345 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Part IV: 6. What identifies you best? (a) I am an Islamist. (b) I am Muslim but not an Islamist. (c) I am both Muslim and secular. (d) I am a secular citizen. (e) I am a decisive supporter of secularism. 7. What identifies us (i.e., the interviewers) best? (a) We (they) are Islamists. (b) We (they) are Muslim but not Islamists. (c) We (they) are both Muslim and secular. (d) We (they) are secular citizens. (e) We (they) are decisive supporters of secularism. For official use only Place ______ Experimental condition ( ) Secularist 346 Date ( ) Islamist ( ) Neutral Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

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Creator Koker, Tolga (author)

Core Title The political economy of Turkish Islamism and secularism: The role of preference falsification in the establishment of Kemalist secularism and the polarization of Turkish public opinion on the pu...

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Economy and Public Policy

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Economics, General,OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, general,Sociology, general

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-407801

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Document Type Dissertation

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