University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Executive spending power: Flexibility in obligation and outlay timing as a measure of federal budgetary and policy control

(USC Thesis Other)

Executive spending power: Flexibility in obligation and outlay timing as a measure of federal budgetary and policy control

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content EXECUTIVE SPENDING POWER: FLEXIBILITY IN OBLIGATION AND OUTLAY TIMING AS A MEASURE OF FEDERAL BUDGETARY AND POLICY CONTROL by Shelly McAllister A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND DEVELOPMENT UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION May 2003 Copyright 2003 Shelly McAllister Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 3103945 Copyright 2003 by McAllister, Shelly Alane All rights reserved. ® UMI UMI Microform 3103945 Copyright 2003 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90089 This dissertation, written by Shelly Alane McAllister under the direction o f her..,. Dissertation Committee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Faculty of the School of Public Administration in partial fulfillment o f requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION Dean DISSERTATION COMMITTEE n Chairperson Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My sincerest appreciation and admiration go to those diehards who kept the learning community and spirit of the Washington Public Affairs Center going long after the lights went out. Without them, I would never have finished. A special thanks goes to Dr. Memphis Norman who unintentionally opened a whole new7 professional world to me simply by his clear writing style. And no words can adequately thank Professor Newiand for all Ms work, both on this project and with other students, agencies, and governments. He is an icon and national treasure worthy of Mount Rushmore, if he will ever slow down! But without a doubt, my greatest debts are owed to my Mother, who always encouraged me to reach higher and further, and to my Sweetheart Peter, who was always there to talk big ideas or help with the mundane tasks. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S ................ ii LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................... vii LIST OF FIGURES............................................................................................ viii ABSTRACT ................................................................................................. xl Chapter I. INTRODUCTION.................. 1 II. CONTEXT AND LITERATURE ...................................................... 4 Organization of Chapter and Literature Integration..................... 4 Spending Power in Practice: The Federal Budget ................ 5 The Rise of Presidential P ow er.................................................... 6 An Overview......................................................................... 6 Personality and Public Appeal .............................................. 11 Executive Arrangements ...................................................... 15 Presidential-Congressional Relations ................................... 19 Foreign Policy....................................................................... 25 Constant Crises in an Age of Anxiety................................... 29 Transitioning to Spending P ow er.......................................... 30 The Rise of Spending Pow er........................................................ 32 Founding-1921 ..................................................................... 34 1922-1975 ............................................................................. 41 1976-Present......................................................................... 50 Analysis of Major Budget Laws .................................................. 57 Antideficiency A c t................................................................. 58 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 ...................................................... 62 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 ............................................ 65 ill Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 ......................................... 67 Line Item Veto Act of 1996 .............. .................. ................ 71 Congressional Control and the Budget Process in Practice ........ 72 Congressional Behavior and Oversight...................... 73 Executive Branch Budget Formulation Process ........ .. 83 Congressional Budget and Appropriation Processes............ 84 Executive Branch Budget Implementation........................... 87 III METHODOLOGIES........................................................................... 92 Research Design........................................................................... 92 Data Sources ................ 95 Data Collection............................................................................. 99 Sampling.................. 100 Data Analysis............................................................................... 104 IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION .................................... 106 An Overview ................................................................................ 106 Department of Commerce............................................................. 107 Account Distribution by Account Type ............................... 107 Dollar Distribution by Account T y p e .................................... 108 Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability......................... 108 Distribution of No-Year Accounts........................................ 109 Department of Interior ................................................................. 117 Account Distribution by Account Type ................................ 117 Dollar Distribution by Account T y p e ................................... 117 Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability......................... 118 Distribution of No-Year Accounts........................................ 119 Department of Veterans Affairs.................................................... 127 Account Distribution by Account Type ............................... 127 Dollar Distribution by Account T y p e.................................... 127 Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability ................... 128 Distribution of No-Year Accounts........................................ 128 General Services Administration.................................................. 136 Account Distribution by Account Type ................................ 136 Dollar Distribution by Account T y p e .................................... 137 Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability......................... 137 Distribution of No-Year Accounts........................................ 137 iv Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. National Aeronautics and Space Administration............ ............ 146 Account Distribution by Account Type 146 Dollar Distribution by Account T y p e................................... 146 Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability......................... 147 Distribution of No-Year Accounts........................... 147 Department of Education ............................................................ 156 Account Distribution by Account Type ................ 156 Dollar Distribution by Account T y p e................................... 156 Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability........................ 157 Distribution of No-Year Accounts........................................ 158 Department of Labor ..................................... 166 Account Distribution by Account Type ............................... 166 Dollar Distribution by Account Type .......... 166 Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability......................... 167 Distribution of No-Year Accounts........................................ 167 Small Business Administration .................................................... 176 Account Distribution by Account Type ............................... 176 Dollar Distribution by Account T y p e................................... 176 Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability......................... 177 Distribution of No-Year Accounts........................................ 177 V. FINDINGS .......................................................................................... 186 Summary of Agency Findings...................................................... 186 Department of Commerce ................................................ 186 Department of Interior........................................................... 187 Department of Veterans Affairs............................................ 187 General Services Administration .......................................... 187 National Aeronautics and Space Administration................... 188 Department of Education...................................................... 188 Department of L abor............................................................. 188 Small Business Administration.............................................. 188 Major Findings.............................................................................. 189 Implications for Presidential Oversight ........................................ 192 VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.............................. 195 Relationship to Existing Theories ................................................ 195 Recommendations for Congressional Oversight........................... 200 Contributions of this Study............................. 202 Future Research............................................................. 203 v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 205 APPENDICES A. Department of Commerce Source Data 216 B. Department of Interior Source Data .......................... 236 C. Department of Veterans Affairs Source Data ......... 276 D. General Services Administration Source D a ta ............................. 284 E. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Source Data . . . 292 F. Department of Education Source Data ....................................... 296 G. Department of Labor Source Data ............................................. 308 H. Small Business Administration Source Data ............................... 316 vi Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF TABLES 1. Agencies and the Corresponding Number of Treasury Accounts .......... 103 2. Department of Commerce Summary Table................................ 116 3. Department of Interior Summary Table ........................................ 126 4. Department of Veterans Affairs Summary Table ................................... 135 5. General Services Administration Summary Table................................... 145 6. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Summary T ab le 155 7. Department of Education Summary Table ............................................. 165 8. Department of Labor Summary Table ................................................... 175 9. Small Business Administration Summary Table ..................................... 185 10. Summary of All Researched Accounts.................................................... 190 vii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF FIGURES 1. Federal Debt and Deficit ........................................................................ 52 2. Department of Commerce Account Distribution by Account Type . . . . 110 3. Department of Commerce Percent Distribution by Account Type. Ill 4. Department of Commerce Dollar Distribution by Account Type............. 112 5. Department of Commerce Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability ....................................... 113 6. Department of Commerce Distribution of No-Year Accounts...... 114 7. Department of Commerce Percent Distribution of No-Year Accounts . 115 8. Department of Interior Account Distribution by Account Type ............ 120 9. Department of Interior Percent Distribution by Account T y p e.... 121 10. Department of Interior Dollar Distribution by Account Type ................ 122 11. Department of Interior Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability . . . 123 12. Department of Interior Distribution of No-Year Accounts.......... 124 13. Department of Interior Percent Distribution of No-Year Accounts .... 125 14. Department of Veterans Affairs Account Distribution by Account Type ................................................................................................ 129 15. Department of Veterans Affairs Percent Distribution by Account Type ................................................................................................. 130 16. Department of Veterans Affairs Dollar Distribution by Account Type ....................... 131 viii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17. Department of Veterans Affairs Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability. , . , .................... 132 18. Department of Veterans Affairs Distribution of No-Year Accounts . . . 133 19. Department of Veterans Affairs Percent Distribution ofNo-Y ear Accounts.................................................................. 134 20. General Services Administration Account Distribution by Account Type .................. . 139 21. General Services Administration Percent Distribution by Account Type ................................................................................................ 140 22. General Services Administration Dollar Distribution by Account Type ........................................................ 141 23. General Services Administration Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability........................................................................................ 142 24. General Services Administration Distribution of No-Year Accounts . . . 143 25. General Services Administration Percent Distribution of No-Year Accounts .............................................................. 144 26. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Account Distribution by Account T y p e.......................................................... 149 27. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Percent Distribution by Account T y p e.............................................................................. 150 28. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Dollar Distribution by Account T y p e.............. 151 29. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability................................................................... 152 30. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Distribution of No-Year Accounts..................................................................... 153 31. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Percent Distribution of No-Year Accounts ........................... 154 ix Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 32. Department of Education Account Distribution by Account Type .... 159 33. Department of Education Percent Distribution by Account T y p e .......... 160 34. Department of Education Dollar Distribution by Account Type .......... 161 3 5. Department of Education Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability .................................................... 162 36. Department of Education Distribution of No-Year Accounts...... 163 37. Department of Education Percent Distribution of No-Year Accounts .. 164 38. Department of Labor Account Distribution by Account Type............... 169 39. Department of Labor Percent Distribution by Account Type ............... 170 40. Department of Labor Dollar Distribution by Account Type .................. 171 41. Department of Labor Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability .... 172 42. Department of Labor Distribution of No-Year Accounts ................... 173 43. Department of Labor Percent Distribution of No-Year Accounts 174 44. Small Business Administration Account Distribution by Account Type ................................... 179 45. Small Business Administration Percent Distribution by Account Type ................................................................................................ 180 46. Small Business Administration Dollar Distribution by Account Type ...................... 181 47. Small Business Administration Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability.......................................................... 182 48. Small Business Administration Distribution of No-Year Accounts .... 183 49. Small Business Administration Percent Distribution of No-Year Accounts.................. 184 x Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT The examination of power in . federal budgeting typically focuses on fimding levels, pet policy initiatives, pork barrel spending, or the budget process itself. However, one important, though little-observed, indicator of power is called period of availability. This refers to the amount of time in fiscal years that the executive branch has to obligate funds. The availability construct has a direct relationship to the most fundamental theories of political science, public administration, and budgeting. Separation of powers with checks and balances calls for Congressional decision making and executive implementation with reasonable controls and oversight. Obligation and outlay flexibility provides the executive discretion to use its expertise in program implementation (effectiveness) and administrative management (economy and efficiency). Scholars are concerned, however, about the rise of executive power, including relatively unknown power tools available to presidents such as executive orders, memoranda, proclamations, national security directives, and signing statements. Executive powers previously associated with international operations are now becoming part of America’s domestic defense, and increases in law enforcement and intelligence gathering have quickly furthered executive power in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. overt and covert matters. Executive aggrandizement grows, with no foreseeable end in sight. This research uses time series to examine several hundred accounts in eight federal agencies over a 30-year period. Specifically, it measures changes in period of availability and in account characteristics. The analysis provides a model for describing the change in the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. This research uses a large database to analyze and describe historical trends that many previous researchers typically address using case studies and other qualitative approaches. This research demonstrates that Congress is still very interested in controlling the executive by controlling the purpose of accounts and that the executive branch is gaining policy and budgetary power through increased flexibility in obligation and outlay timing. These findings will help researchers and practitioners to understand better how changes in funding control mechanisms impact the valued checks and balances between Congress and the executive. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The examination of controls in federal budgeting and appropriations generally focus on assessments of funding levels (what was increased and what was cut), pet policy initiatives, pork barrel spending, or the budget process itself. However, several other factors besides dollar amounts are equally important control mechanisms. Through these, Congress either gives to or takes away from the executive branch resources and flexibility to implement laws and policies. In addition to the wide assortment of oversight and control mechanisms in permanent law, the laws resulting from the annual appropriations process also provide a whole host of control mechanisms. They include: the detail of report language, line itemization and earmarking, provisos, substantive policy changes (that really should be in authorization bills), and a little-observed factor called “period of availability.” Period of availability refers to the amount of time in fiscal years that the executive branch/agencies have to obligate funds. For every dollar Congress appropriates, the specific law, or in its absence a general law (31 USC 1301) provides for how many fiscal years the money is available. Amounts that have not been obligated by the end of the stated period are essentially lost to the agency (thus 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the expression “use or lose” that has created the “end of year buying” sprees in which some agencies have engaged). Congress gives more flexibility to the President when funds are available for a longer time (e.g., five years) than when they are available for a shorter time (e.g., one year). A longer time period allows the executive more time to create implementing regulations, to develop and award procurement contracts, to monitor the progress of grantees under a progress payment approach, or alternatively, to delay action on programs the executive does not favor (without violating the Antideficiency Act). A long period of availability is needed when the government is contracting to build large capital projects (e.g., buildings, ships, space exploration equipment). A shorter period of availability is appropriate for routine operating expenses (e.g., salaries, office supplies, travel expenses). This control mechanism, though seldom analyzed, has a long, colorful history dating back to the founding of the country. This research measures the movement of budgetary and policy control from Congress to the executive branch via period of availability. By examining the period of availability in federal appropriations, it helps researchers and practitioners better understand how changes in this non-monetary statutory funding control mechanism impacts the valued checks and balances between Congress and the executive branch and how the “power of the purse” may be shifting from Congress to the President. These changes in turn can affect the balance of power for implementing budgetary and policy outcomes. Specifically, this research examines changes in budgetary 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. account structures and executive flexibility relative to the timing of budgetary obligations for selected federal agencies. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER H CONTEXT AND LITERATURE Organization of Chapter and Literature Integration This section presents the relevant history, context, and literature. Following a very brief overview of federal spending and the federal budget, it then proceeds to the four most substantial sections: the rise of presidential power, the rise of spending power, an analysis of major budget laws, and a discussion of Congressional control in the budget process. The presidential power section describes how the power of the president has increased and how different scholars describe this trend. The spending power and budget laws sections analyze how spending power, as a type of power, has increased since the founding of this country and how different control mechanisms and reforms have been attempted to resolve some of the same problems still faced today. The Congressional control section provides a discussion of Congressional behavior relative to reforms and control mechanisms, as well as a description of budget planning and implementation practices of both the executive and legislative branches. This research is primarily concerned with power and power sharing between Congress and the executive branch. But absent the presentation of a rich, relevant 4 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. context, a discussion of power is quite theoretical in its underpinnings and academic in its application. Applying lames Q. Wilson’s (1973) approach, a researcher must examine constraints, requirements, and internal processes to understand behavior. To make this research relevant to both the author, readers, and the field, the literature review straddles two areas, federal budgeting and legislative-executive branch power relationships. Thus, while the crux is power, this research addresses the budgeting field, in which the author is a practitioner. For that reason, more time and space is devoted to budgeting/appropriations literature and processes than might otherwise be deemed necessary to understand and support the thesis of this research. Several scholars have criticized the budget field as being low on theory. TWs researcher can support those sentiments by her own observations. On the one hand, budgeting, as experienced by most career public administrators, is very much a practitioner activity, possibly most closely related to accounting and financial management. On the other hand, budgeting, as experienced by those closest to top level decision makers, is truly the essence of power, though admittedly cloaked in frequently arcane rales and esoteric practices. This section will hopefully convey the researcher’s excitement about the field and the colorful story it has to tell. Spending Power in Practice: The Federal Budget More and more, virtually no aspect of public or private life is free of concerns about the federal budget. Whether the concern is related to spending (e.g., salary, contracts, transfer payments) or revenues (e.g., income taxes, filing fees, park 5 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. entrance fees), escaping the reach of the federal government and the federal budget is impossible. For at least the previous 15 years, ordinary newspaper readers have had a constant dose of high-stakes budget battles. Some of these battles have been between parties, some between individual policy officials, some between the two houses of Congress, but mostly between the Congress and the President. The federal budget is a constant fact of life now, and there is no reason to expect that to change any time soon. White and Wildavsky began their 1989 work, The Deficit and the Public Interest: The Search fo r Responsible Budgeting in the 1980s, with the following: Now we are living in an era of the budget. The budget has been to our era what civil rights, communism, the depression, industrialization, and slavery were at other times. Nor does the day of the budget show signs of ending, (p. xv) That is an appropriate way to begin this dissertation as well. The Rise of Presidential Power An Overview A look back over the two hundred plus years of this country’s political development reveals considerable dynamism on the one hand and long periods of stability on the other. The country has grown from a mere colonial outpost to arguably the most advanced/developed country socially, economically, and politically. All this growth has both caused and required changes in political arrangements. At the same time, however, much progress can be attributed to 6 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. stability (e.g., absence of internal revolutionary conflicts). The bottom line is that the nation usually works out reasonable solutions to sustain momentum In generally positive ways. But there are growing reasons for concern. Executive aggrandizement grows, with no foreseeable end in sight. Reflecting on current events, Newland observes the rapid Increase in security measures at public places and critical sites and the public willingness to routinely endure the garrison state, as well as pay the bill for it. But in addition to increased physical security, Increases in law enforcement and intelligence gathering have quickly furthered executive power in overt and covert matters. Executive powers previously associated with international operations are now becoming part of America’s domestic, homeland defense. Numerous respected newspapers have also been covering the recent efforts to increase presidential power in law enforcement and war making, all in the context of combating terrorism overseas and protecting the homeland (Sanger, 2002; Byrd, 2002; Rosen, 2002; Feldman & Richey, 2002). Cooper’s By Order o f the President: The Use and Abuse o f Executive Direct Action (2002) provides an in-depth look at the relatively unknown power tools available to Presidents: executive orders, memoranda, proclamations, national security directives, and signing statements. These tools do not require Congressional action, public notice, or even discussion among all parties involved prior to their issuance. Mayer’s With the Stroke o f a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Power (2001) provides further documentation, of the considerable legal, though quiet, power presidents possess. DeConde’s Presidential Machismo: Executive Authority, Military Intervention, and Foreign. Relations (2000) provides a similar view, focusing on defense and foreign relations. Nov/ more than ever it is essential to involve the American public, the legal community, and political leaders from all levels of government in the public debate. Without openness, debate, and reasonableness, the stability and prosperity that defines this country cannot survive. The above paragraph hints to both subtle and large changes that have occurred in the balance of power between Congress and the President. This analysis examines one aspect of that change, the relative increase in executive spending power. Before getting to that discussion, however, this section examines the tension between these two branches and the rise of presidential power. It begins with a general overview, then examines the increase from several perspectives, including foreign affairs and structural arrangements. It concludes with some background information about how spending power, in particular, became such a critical source of power and provides a transition to the section specifically about spending power. Madison believed that a system where conflict was institutionalized within constitutional limits would be more energetic, creative, and competent. Thus, while Individual members might disagree on resulting policy decisions, at least they would agree on the processes by which decisions would be reached. Moe (1971) summarized this in terms of two dominant themes of the Constitution: institutions 8 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sharing powers and agreement on equitable processes. Taken together, they are the prerequisites to political freedom and enlightened policy (p. 1). This notion was generally endorsed until the late Nineteenth Century. One of the earliest and perhaps the most prominent critic of Madisonian theory1 was Woodrow Wilson. In Congressional Government (1885), he noted that Congress was the dominant branch and that the president was largely a formalistic position that responded to the duties of the system. Wilson’s 1908 work, Constitutional Government in the United States, however, noted a shift in the dominant role. President Theodore Roosevelt’s (1901-1909) strong personality and leadership style seemed to have swayed the tide, and Wilson applauded this as hopefully a permanent change. Wilson and other scholars of the Progressive Era advocated an activist government to protect and promote societal well being; a strong, aggressive executive with presidential preeminence over Congress; and an increased role In government of citizens rather than political parties. They saw the proper Congressional role as one of legitimizing presidential decisions, amending proposals sent from the president (rather than Initiating), and serving constituent needs. These Ideals of the Progressive Era got a huge boost when Wilson himself was elected president (1913-1921), followed soon by Franklin Roosevelt (1933-1945). Current expectations for presidential leadership can be traced to the Progressive Era (Moe, 1971, p. 2; Seligman & Covington, 1996, p. 67). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Tulls finds that the modem presidency is governed by two constitutions: the first is the formal Constitution, the second is a reflection of the Woodrow Wilson, modem era: presidential activism, public image, and continuous popular support (Tulis, 2000, p. 94). Citing the various difficulties of recent presidents when they relied too heavily on the second constitution, at the sacrifice of the first, Tulis cautions: The second constitution promises energy, which is said to be inadequately provided by the first. This suggests that the two constitutions fit together to form a more complete whole. Unfortunately, over the long run, the tendency of the second constitution to make extraordinary power routine undermines, rather than completes, the logic of the original Constitution. (p. H7) Support for the rise of the dominant presidency in the Progressive and New Deal eras came, in Moe’s words, from the “liberal intellectual community.” Historically, some intellectuals distrusted democratic legislative bodies and the ability of individuals to manage their own affairs. Seeing themselves as elite, they thought that they would have more influence by working through the executive branch than the legislative. With this baggage, the study of institutional theory was tainted because much of the intellectual community agenda was driven by the desire for certain public policy outcomes. According to Moe (1971, p. 3), most scholars were not interested in political theory and American institutions; they were interested in justifying a system where a strong president meant their objectives were more likely to be achieved. 10 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Scholars have addressed this evolution in several ways. Some focus on the Presidency, others on Congress. Several interesting approaches include: Presidential personality traits and public appeal; expanding impact of the mass media; proliferation of political interest groups; increasingly corporate character of the presidency; growing demands placed on the presidency; the President gains power as Congress loses it; centralization and decentralization of power in Congress; changing impact and the declining role of political parties; the rise of foreign policy; and American society in a constant state of crises. Other eminent scholars (Fisher) use a chronological approach and present the shift of legislative power to executive officials in three steps: 1774 to 1787, “when functions were transferred from committees to boards and finally to single executives”; creation of the Presidency in 1787 as a separate branch; and all following decades where “Federal regulation required the delegation of new authority to the executive branch” (Fisher, 1972, p. 85). In reality, each of these approaches no doubt contributes somewhat to understanding of the evolution. The following paragraphs briefly explore several of these groupings individually. It is important to note that none is mutually exclusive and that many overlap. Personality and Public Appeal For the press and the public alike, it is much easier and more interesting to focus on one person, the president, than on Congress as a body or individual members (except for when one is caught in a compromising situation). In many 11 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. respects, the American public desires a royalty figure, a father figure, one person to whom people can give credit or biame: one great man whether they like him or not. These whimsical preferences have been, reflected in how Congress and the president, in actuality, relate to each other and the outcomes of policy debates. Some scholars have also chosen to focus on the personality and public appeal of the presidency. Schleslnger (1973, p. 218) wrote that “Every President reconstructs the Presidency to meet M s own psychological needs.” Though he immediately references Nixon, tMs holds for other presidents as well. Schiesinger describes the presidency as a “peculiarly personal institution” that changes shape, intensity, and ethos according to the man in charge. The President’s temperament, character, values, standards, style, habits, expectations, idiosyncrasies, compulsions, and phobias define the White House and the entire government beyond (p. 212). Of special importance to this dissertation, he asserts: Above all, the way each President understood it as Ms personal obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to the nation and posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened the constitutional order, (p. 213) For Wildavsky (1969, p. x), “the presidential role is largely defined by the expectations that others have developed about the man and the office.” The personality and characteristics of presidents impact presidential leadership (Preston, 2001). 12 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Perhaps the best known for using M s mass appeal to the electorate was Franklin Deiano Roosevelt. Through the new technology of radio and the economic/political conditions of the country at that time, he used his personality to promote Ms policy proposals. At the same time, the influence of the media was growing rapidly. Roosevelt made good press both in photographs and on radio (Moe, 1971, p. 2). These formed a braid around which the notion of the dominant presidency became accepted and indeed expected. In TugwelFs (I960, p. 448) analysis, “credit to Roosevelt as an enlarger of the Presidency rests partly on Ms experimentation with devices for better administration but more on Ms extraordinary achievements as a leader.” Tandy and Milkis (2000) define great presidents as those that took the opportunity to engage the nation in a struggle for its constitutional sou!. In their ranking, Roosevelt was the last great president. Among other things, their assessment of Ms greatness rests upon Ms creation of the administrative state, placing public administration of public goods and services above the historical political system. Ironically, this shift, along with media changes and the sMft away from political party dependence, has greatly contributed to the change in the nature of presidential relations with parties and the public. It has created the tendency toward more populist approaches to presidential governing, thus making it more difficult for presidents to pursue broader national reform in modern times. 13 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Perhaps no president enjoyed the notion of the “imperial presidency” more than Richard Nixon. Schiesinger (1973) writes that “Nixon displayed more monarchical yearnings than any of his predecessors. He plainly reveled in the ritual of the office, only regretting that it could not be more elaborate” (p. 218). Nixon's term began at an especially vulnerable time when foreign policy and domestic turbulence combined to place many powers and expectations in the presidency. Schiesinger describes this as a time when “the Presidency, as enlarged by international delusions and domestic propulsions, found a President whose inner mix of vulnerability and ambition impelled him to push the historical logic to its extremity” (p. 216). In addition to Ms snooping on the opposing political party’s activities, he also had a psychological drive to consolidate considerable powers into the White House itself, not just the executive branch (p. 217). Viewed from tMs approach, it is interesting to note that two of the most significant turning points were with Presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Richard Nixon. In the former case, America experienced an exponential increase in the roles of the federal government brought about by an appealing president in trying times. In the latter, the nation experienced a resurgence in the Congressional role (Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act) as a result of actions under a president whose personality much ofWashington had good reason not to trust. 14 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Executive Arrangements Fisher (1972, p. 30) identifies three sources of Presidential power: power expressly granted by the Constitution; power implied or considered to be inherent in the office; and power exercised by means of administrative legislation. For Fisher, the increase in presidential power is not because of strong personalities or many of the other factors described in this section. Increased presidential power is because of the characteristics of the executive office, including “continuity in office, flexibility of timing, acting as channel of communication with other nations, serving as national representative, and executive duties during domestic emergencies or during time of war” (p. 55). Operational arrangements that allow the president such power include having a relatively large staff devoted to protecting and promoting the presidency, regardless of who the president is, while at the same time pressing for implementation of each president’s particular policies. These activities are carried out by a combination of political appointees and career staff, both in the agencies and the Executive Office of the President. Congress has no similar body working on its behalf, plus it has 535 chief executives so that unity of command is impossible. Several significant arrangements include civil service reform, increased staff and organizational sophistication, and creation of the Bureau of the Budget/Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with budget oversight and central, legislative clearance. 15 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Within the Executive Office of the President, the OMB is the primary career staff organization that monitors encroachments on presidential authority and, when reasonable, seeks opportunities to increase it. OMB plays this role as it coordinates spending and policy for the president. In “Central Legislative Clearance: A Revised Perspective,” Gflmour (1971, p. 109) states that central “legislative clearance in the Executive Branch is widely regarded as one of the most powerful tools of the President.” Neustadt (1971) described legislative clearance as “by far the oldest, best intrenched, most thoroughly institutionalized of the President’s coordinative instraments-always excepting the budget itself’ (Gilmour, 1971, p. 109). Prior to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, federal agencies submitted their budget requests to the Secretary of the Treasury who, with little change, compiled them into the Book of Estimates and sent them to Congress. Little attempt was made to coordinate the executive branch requests, and the President played a very limited role. Then, with the increasing size of government and deficits from 1904 to 1910, President Taft’s Commission on Economy and Efficiency recommended a national executive budget (Berman, 1979, p. 3). TMs study effort eventually evolved into the Act of 1921 that created, among other things, the Bureau of the Budget. W. F. Willoughby, a primary author of the Act of 1921, saw it as “the greatest change in the character of the office of the President since the first organization of the government” (Tugweli, 1960, p. 396). 16 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. When the Bureau was created, organizationally it resided in Treasury but the head was appointed by the President. In 1939, following the Brownlow Report, the Executive Office of the President was created, and the Bureau of the Budget was transferred in from Treasury. Along with its change in organizational structure, it also took on a stronger advisory role to the President (Berman, 1979, p. 13). In 1969, Nixon established the Advisory Council on Executive Organization chaired by businessman Roy Ash (p. 105). Among other recommendations, the Bureau would become part of a larger organization whose job was to serve the President in executive branch management as well as budget (p. 107). The plan also called for the Bureau, in its new organization, to include political appointees from the newly created Domestic Policy Council in internal budget reviews and for distancing it from access to the President. While the debate carried on, Bureau staff used their substantial influence to defeat the proposal. According to Berman, Bureau staff even misplaced the Ash Council’s budget request so that the Council was forced either to forgo funding or to risk a veto by having a special line item request to Congress (p. 109). Eventually, in 1970, the Bureau was named the Office of Management and Budget. During Director Shultz’s tenure, rather than sitting in the Old Executive Office Building, he sat in the White House to be nearer to President Nixon (Berman, 1979, p. 117). TMs furthered OMB’s image as a personal, political arm of the President. Also during tMs time political appointees replaced careerists in several 17 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. significant positions (p. 118). and Congress passed a law requiring Senate confirmation of both the director and deputy director (Mosher, 1985, p. 131). This was also the time of the Nixon impoundments, implemented primarily by OMB. It was also during this time that the physical office space housing OMB became divided: career staff moved across Pennsylvania Avenue to a newer office building while the political staff remained in the historic office building closest to the president (p. 96). As President Nixon and Ms aides were preoccupied with Watergate, the OMB is credited with running the executive branch. So as the Nixon years began with the Bureau fighting for its organizational stature, they ended with OMB more powerful than ever before but fighting harder than ever for its credibility with Congress and the agencies (Berman, 1979, p. 121). Many scholars have focused on the increasing politicization of OMB, especially at tMs time. Mosher (1985, p. 134) states this well in A Tale of Two Agencies: Some observers felt, and still feel, that the close political ties between the presidential staff and the noncareer staff of OMB during the Watergate period seriously damaged the reputation and effectiveness of that agency. It is good to be close to a president, but not too close, especially to one as controversial as Richard Nixon. Despite the criticism, both from within OMB and from outside, it continues to serve as the primary coordinator of budget and policy for the executive branch and the president. Recognizing the increasing demands on the president and the need for 18 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. presidential support, Louis Brownlow wrote in his 1949 work, The President and the Presidency. As time goes on we shall probably depend upon . t e r n even more than we have in the past to be our principal servant. We may even persuade ourselves to give him the tools he needs if he is to do what we want him to do: to manage the government; to engineer the national economy; to reflect our opinions as Americans; and to lead the nation—even to lead the world. With each passing year, this statement becomes more true. Presidential-Congressional Relations Another approach focuses on presidential and Congressional relations. In describing this historical shift, perhaps Rexford Tugwell (1960) provided the most illustrative term, “enlargement of the Presidency.” Other scholars have placed this trend in the context of a zero sum contest between Congress and the President, where there is a power struggle and it is between the two branches, with most of the power flowing to the President. When thinking about Congress, the following quote from David Truman (1971, p. 433) should be kept in mind: The political process rarely, if ever, involves a conflict between the legislature and the executive viewed as two monolithic and unified institutions. The actual competing structures on each side are made up of elements in the legislature and in the executive, reflecting and supported by organized and unorganized interests. With such a variety of interests and actors, the relations can indeed be complex. Just as Congress is composed of numerous permutations of interests, the executive branch 19 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. is too. This swing has had several impacts on Congress. While some argue it has weakened Congress, others think that Congress has had to change its oversight role. Thurber (1996, p. 3) identifies seven causes for the rivalry between Congress and the president: constitutional design, different constituencies, varying terms of office, weak political parties, divided party control of government, ongoing competition for power, and pluralism. Huntington attributes the loss of Congressional power in the Twentieth Century to three aspects of how it deals with society: its isolation from societal change, its structure which disperses power, and the change from being a body that legislates to one that oversees a growing bureaucracy. Moe and Teel (1971, p. 32) clarify that the relative power, not the absolute power, of Congress compared to the president has declined in the Twentieth Century, beginning at the turn of the century and accelerated by the New Deal, the Second World War, and technological revolution. They set out to quantify this belief by examining major pieces of legislation. Building upon an extensive study conducted by Chamberlain, they examined major legislation from 1940 to 1967. They examined closely the relative contribution provided by Congress and the president and thus who should get credit for a particular piece of legislation. For example, they examined closely the distinction between initiative and influence on the substance of legislation versus influence on the eventual passage of the legislation. They also acknowledged the public relations advantage the President has over Congress. For 20 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. example, the President’s annual legislative submission gamers extensive press coverage, and any ideas in that document are assumed by most to have originated with the executive (p. 49). Their findings challenged the belief that Congress was in decline and could not legislate. To the contrary, they found that Congress is indeed innovative and capable of legislating. The decentralized committee structure is a strength, rather than a weakness as asserted by some, that allows Congress to use an inductive policy making process, a process described by Charles Lindblom’s branch method as a continuous process of building upon what members know with small changes along the way where changes tend to be corrective and supplemental (p. 51). Other scholars (Roger Davidson, David Kovenock, and Michael O’Leary) analyzed Congressional decline by grouping the literature into one of three theories focused on the proper functions of a legislative body. These three theories are: literary theory, executive force theory, and party-govemment theory. If placed on a continuum, the literary theory would be placed farthest left, executive force theory to the right, and party-govemment theory in the middle. Literary theory means a literal reading of the Constitution where blended and coordinated powers are found. For the most part, proponents of this theory believe Congress should retain its historical powers and regain those that have been lost. The decline and fall of Congress, according to this theory, can be attributed to three developments: the sprawling welfare state makes the executive branch the purveyor of many governmental services; the compelling public image of the President portrayed by the press; and 21 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. inaction by Congress to protect its prerogatives in a useful fashion rather than resorting to petty exhortations (Davidson, Kovenock, & O’Leary, 1971, p. 136). The executive force theory stresses policy leadership initiated by the President and the bureaucracy. To the extent the President has gained more power over the years, they believe this power helps the President act as an initiator and Congress to act as a ratifier, thus making the system work (p. 143). The age of permanent semicrisis calls for a strong President. The party-govemment theory emphasizes that Congress should be responsive to the national party constituency. Proponents of this theory support major reform in the party system. They see Congress as a collection of legislators representing parochial interests, which in itself makes it impossible for Congress to address national and international issues in an intelligent manner (p. 148). They would reform many aspects of the party system, how committees and subcommittees are selected and operate, and how party leaders are selected (p. 149). In the end, though, the authors conclude that the differences In the theories are largely differences of emphasis about who should do more or less of what (p. 151). Schiesinger (1973) is less academic and more direct in his analysis of Presidential-Congressional relations following World War II. Congress . . . had given off the impression that it was the helpless victim of the insensate power drive of a succession of Presidents. The sad fact was that it had been, a good deal of the time, the enthusiastic creator of its own impotence. The Presidency had become the great alibi for members of Congress who preferred to avoid accountability for national decisions lest they lose the support of one or another faction of true believers back home. (p. 327) 22 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TugwelTs (1960) analysis is gentler but reaches the same conclusion. He notes that most extensions of presidential power have been made at the expense of the legislative branch and that once power is delegated or authorized, it is seldom returned to the legislature. He notes that Congress has frequently, looking to the President for rescue, given him powers. Each of these Congressional actions has set a precedent, and the power remains with the president. Over time, the president has acquired many duties and the power to carry them out, many of which are not constitutional enumerations. Tugwell says that “the Constitution is a narrow authorizing charter, broadened by experience and filled out by presidential initiative” (p. 23). Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz (1996) prepared an overview of empirical findings on Presidential-Congressional relations. They found that research on the presidency tends to be less quantitative than research on other political institutions and that most researchers prefer to use the case study approach because the personality and character of the President are so key in understanding the politics of that particular administration. In addition, the small number of persons ever serving as President may hinder the sample size in statistical analysis (p. 103). These researchers organize the quantitative literature on Presidential-Congressional relations using the policy making chronology: agenda setting, committee action, floor decision making, and vetoes. They also examine the differences between presidential influence versus success in dealing with Congress. Researchers have a hard time standardizing on 23 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. definitions and metrics. Measures must be consistent across Presidents. They state four features for an acceptable empirical measure of presidential legislative success: the measure must be reliable (i.e. , “decision rules must be clear and precise so that different researchers will come to the same conclusion about whether to score a case as a success or failure”) (p. 106); the measure must be valid (i.e., “the activity observed must bear a close relation to what is ordinarily meant by legislative success and it should accurately reflect the major components of decision making in Congress”); the “sample must be representative of Presidential-Congressional relations in general, and there must be enough cases of presidential success and failure to generalize the findings”; and fourth, “the measure should differentiate between more important and less important issues, as well as between different types of policies” and “the measures should permit the researcher to analyze the behavior of different types of members to determine sources of presidential support and opposition in Congress” (p. 107). In reviewing the research, these authors found three major measures of legislative success. First are presidential box scores (percentage of presidential proposals enacted by Congress during a defined period of time). Second is the presidential support score (“the percentage of time during a specified period of time that each member of Congress votes in agreement with the president’s position when he expresses one”) (Bond, Fleisher, & Krutz, 1996, p. 109). To compare these first two, “box scores indicate something about the president’s programmatic success” but 24 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. “presidential support scores indicate the president’s relative success in attracting votes from individuals in Congress over a specified period” (p. 109). And third is success on winning roll-call votes (“the percentage of the time that the president’s publicly stated preference prevails on floor votes”) (p. 111). Foreign Policy In dealing with matters of foreign policy, Tocqueville enumerated the necessary qualities of steadfastness, perseverance, efficiency, prudence, patience, and secrecy, qualities he found generally lacking in a democracy but more likely if power was concentrated in the executive. As the United States entered the Cold War with the increased need for expert foreign policy, Schiesinger asserts others must have been thinking Tocqueville’s thoughts, and thus began development of the modem Presidency with all its pretensions and its powers. This concentration of power led to what he aptly termed the “imperial presidency” (Schiesinger, 1973, p. 126). As discussed above, scholars can point to numerous instances where Congress has acceded power to the President. This trend is especially important in foreign policy. In The Imperial Presidency, Schiesinger addresses the “shift in the constitutional balance with, that is, the appropriation by the Presidency, and particularly by the contemporary Presidency, of powers reserved by the Constitution and by long historical practice to Congress” (Schiesinger, 1973, p. viii). Because of an increasingly perilous world and an increasingly interdependent economy and society, the electorate wanted an increased concentration of authority in the 25 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Presidency. Schiesinger does not see the “shift” as a conscious power grab by the President, either as an individual or the presidency as an institution, but rather as a result of global foreign policy and the placement of the country’s most vital decision, the decision to go to war, in the hands of one person-the President (p. ix). Similar thoughts are echoed by J. William Fulbright, former Senator and key foreign policy maker. Looking back on Ms Congressional role, he expressed regrets that members of Congress, himself included, sometimes showed “excessive regard for Executive freedom of action” but that the increase in presidential power was brought about mostly by an era of foreign policy crises. The era required informed, urgent decision making, the type of decision making only the President is capable of making, not the Congress (Fulbright, 1971, p. 198). Congressional power to oversee international agreements and to send military forces into war greatly declined as the United States’ interest in global issues increased. In ScMesinger’s (1973, p. 206) words: “As the American Presidency came to conceive itself the appointed savior of a world whose interests and dangers demanded rapid and incessant deployment of men, arms and decisions, new power, reverence and awe flowed into the White House.” The combination of foreign policy and societal emotions, including fear of communism, belief in the duty and the right of the United States to intervene swiftly in every part of the world, and, especially interesting, belief in permanent and universal crisis, brought about unprecedented foreign policy power centralization in the Presidency. 26 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. During this time, Schiesinger (1973) also finds a corresponding centralization of domestic policy power (p. 208). Calling this an “ ‘extraordinary historical moment, when foreign and domestic lines of force converged, much depended on whether the occupant of the White House was moved to ride the new tendencies of power or to resist them” (p. 212). In Aaron Wildavsky’s “The Two Presidencies” (1971, p. 121), he asserts: “The United States has one President, but it has two presidencies; one presidency is for domestic affairs, and the other is concerned with defense and foreign policy.” Reveley (1971) sees the growth of presidential power over foreign relations as a result of historical developments, such as the ever-increasing rate of change and complexity; institutional aspects of the presidency which make it more responsive than Congress; and the greater willingness of presidents, rather than Congress, to exercise constitutional powers. To cope with modem society, rapid, decisive decision-making is required with flexible leadership that is always ready to respond (pp. 231-232). Further supporting the argument that presidential power has grown, Fisher (1972) identifies three factors that have increased the President’s power: responsibility to protect American life and property abroad; expansion of the time period during which he has legitimate war powers; and changes in the type of threat, such as nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles. Fisher describes the political environment beginning with the Cold War as “a twilight zone that is neither war nor 27 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. peace.” Uncertainty, coupled with increased expectations from Congress and the public, has given the President new power and responsibility not specifically granted in the Constitution or envisioned by the founders (p. 175). Despite several Congressional attempts to reassert its prerogatives, the interpretation of presidential war power has continued to grow. Fisher attributes this to increasingly generous interpretations of inherent and implied powers in treaties, vague Congressional resolutions, and the constitutional responsibility to repel sudden attacks and wage defensive war (p. 193), More recently, Fisher (1994) added to that list the increasing use of authority from the United Nations Security Council (p. 739). Concerning war and spending powers, Fisher (2000) asserts that Congress “has not acted with confidence, self-respect, or institutional courage” (p. 162). Another interesting perspective is provided by Erwin Hargrove. Though lie does not specifically address the sources of presidential power in foreign affairs, he does observe that presidents can strengthen their domestic political position by how they handle foreign affairs, but not vice versa. Writing in 1974, he asserts that the country is more likely to be unified by actions taken abroad rather than domestically because nationalism is stronger and more likely to succeed than domestic policy that always angers someone. Compared to domestic affairs, in foreign affairs the President has relative autonomy, outcomes are more controllable, issues of war and peace are of the greatest importance, and success in the world arena means success in world history. Hargrove cautions this can translate into political capital the President 28 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. cleverly uses when domestic affairs are suffering. Presidential recognition of tMs value encourages Presidents to protect and promote their autonomy in foreign affairs (p. 101). Constant Crises in an Age of Anxiety Other scholars characterize the increase in presidential power as a result of ever-increasing crises in an age of anxiety, “the focus of the anxious crowd of the age.” Building upon the foreign policy issues described above, the United States has evolved into a world leader, and the American public demands government action on a whole host of issues. Especially in military situations, the “bigger the war, the larger the shift of power from Congress to the presidency, and the longer the period required for partial recovery.” Once power is relinquished to the presidency, it seldom returns from where it came. Each crisis can mean increased functions for the government, meaning more programs, more staff, more resources, and more discretion for the executive branch. The presidency, therefore, is almost always a permanent beneficiary of crises (DeGrazia, 1971, pp. 100-101). James MacGregor Bums (1971) concludes in “The Politics of the Presidency” that, because of the constant state of crisis, America cannot maintain an effective and equal sharing of power between the two branches. To do so would mean the sapping of national authority in an era when the federal government must be strong enough to meet domestic and international emergencies. He concludes that presidential ascendancy is not due to Presidential usurpation or by chance. It is, rather, the result 29 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of Congressional abdication, obstruction, and failures to act swiftly in the national interest (p. 290). For Bums, the key element for democracy’s survival is responsible leadership. The presidency became the dynamic and creative part of American government because the President can act swiftly on the basis of informed judgment and helps overcome the “concealment of political responsibility” (pp. 292-293). In Tugwell’s (1960) analysis, “the whole of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations were passed in a state of emergency.” Coupled with this was a dramatic increase in defense spending, tension, and mutual suspicion. All these combined made “permanent more and more delegations to the President.” But for Eisenhower’s personality traits, the times provided an ideal opportunity to develop a presidency much like a dictatorship (p. 464). Transitioning to Spending Power The Twentieth Century saw a considerable increase in presidential power. Sometimes this power shift was a zero-sum game with Congress, in others it was the explicit and implicit creation of new powers by or for the President. The paragraphs above discuss several of the major reasons why this happened. Also during this time, the importance of money, or rather the power that accompanies it, grew. The importance of the budget and things monetary grew considerably under FDR. In addition to the country expanding and becoming more complex, FDR had grand plans that would require coordination in terms of revenue, borrowing, defense, emergency requirements, and domestic policy. With the general 30 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. conditions of the country and his ambitious plans, he wanted to reorganize the executive branch. He created the Committee on Administrative Management. The Committee, composed of several notables, including Louis Brownlow and Luther E. Gulick, proposed, among other things, to increase staff available to the President. Moe (1971) sees this trend of power shifting to the President turning quickly with the Vietnam conflict and the many societal problems associated with it. Congress began to regain power and prestige while the president lost it. Questions about the proper distribution of power between Congress and the President, between state and federal governments, were once again openly debated. Richard Nixon’s “New Federalism” gave a boost to the decentralization of federal power by creating certain incentives for local governments rather than dictating specific actions through federal grant programs. While Nixon’s decentralization surely helped swing the balance of power pendulum, his Watergate scandal assured the lowering of presidential esteem (p. 4). The Congressional backlash is discussed more folly in a later section describing the Impoundment Control Act. The Ronald Reagan presidency was also a time celebrated as decentralizing power. While a portion of this is true because of the dominance of block grants and some regulatory flexibility, in fact the federal government continued to gain more power, especially the President, and especially the President in terms of spending power. Contrary to the above discussion, not all researchers agree with the findings. For example, Genovese views presidential power as constrained, both historically 31 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and as a result of the decline in party support, weakness of Congressional leadership, and the decline of U.S. power in general (Genovese, 2001, p. 193). Presidential leadership is weak by design, with presidents serving as mere office holders (2000, p. 427). For Genovese, these are not necessarily problems because they are the result of separation of powers and offer opportunities to continuously reinvigorate other deficiencies in the system (2001, p. 198). With all this focus on the president and the presidency, it is important to remember the introductory words of Charles O. Jones’s The Presidency in a Separated System, (1994, p. 1): “The president is not the presidency. The presidency is not the government. Ours is not a presidential system.” Though Jones, too, highlights some of the factors addressed above, his emphasis is the balanced participation in policy making of all branches and the realization by presidents that their proper role is to find their place within the separated system (p. 297). The Rise of Spending Power The previous sections documented and described the rise in presidential power. This section will talk about that power specifically in terms of spending power. One can ask the “chicken or the egg” question about whether the importance of spending power increased first or whether presidential power increased first. The wise response would be that the two have fed off each other: the president has become more powerful because of spending power and spending power has become more important because of centralization both with the President and Congress. 32 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Schick observes that, over time, the political role of the federal budget has increased while its use as an administrative tool has decreased. One way to examine this is to look at how the dollars are spent. In the 1950s the majority of the budget was for salaries and administrative expenses of federal agencies. But by the 1980s, only about one third of the budget was for administrative expenses; the remainder went to state and local governments and social benefit recipients. For Schick (1987), such “fundamental changes in the composition of the budget have inevitably affected the organization of the budget process and the theoretical basis of budgeting” (p. 9). This section will talk about the history and evolution of spending power. It will detail Congressional and executive reorganizations, changes to public law (i.e., “reforms”), processes that control the budgeting/appropriations processes, and how leading researchers view the budget field. Once again, this is a story of human behavior, not the physical sciences, which makes the presentation process quite difficult. There are numerous interesting, creative ways to present the information, but because much of it builds upon what came before, this researcher will use a chronological approach, dividing the historical presentation into three periods: founding-1921, 1922-1975, and 1976-present. Many researchers also use this approach. An observation by Harris (1964, p. 46) is appropriate here: In all democratic countries the power of the purse is the cornerstone of legislative control of administration. The Congress of the United States, however, far outdoes the legislatures of other democracies in subjecting executive budgets to detailed, strict review and extensive revision and in relating financial control continuously and pervasively to the policies, programs, and 33 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. activities of executive agencies. TMs predominance had its origin in the sweeping fiscal powers and responsibilities vested exclusively in Congress by the Constitution, but it has been greatly augmented by later developments in legislative practice-notably among them, the standing committee system. Founding-1921 This section discusses the challenges and solutions arising from the founding of the country to the first major financial reform, the Budget and Accounting Act. The major issues of this era pertain to how Congress would organize itself to address financial matters, roles and responsibilities of the Treasury Department, the proper degree of specificity for appropriations, reaching agreement with agency staff on the use of balances, and how to deal with deficiencies. Many of these issues from yesteryear are still issues today. Wilmerding (1943, p. 13) called this “a period of laxity in the control of government spending during which the Executive discovered so many legal or quasi- legal means of varying the appropriation of public money that it almost never found itself compelled to resort to an admittedly illegal means.” During the times of increased enforcement, he found that when “urgent cases could not be met by stretching the law they were met by breaking it” (p. 15). Wallace (1960, p. 9) found that the “degree of circumvention of these controls depended upon the strength and prestige of the President and Ms administrative officials.” More recently, Fisher (1972, p. 110) wrote: 34 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. It is a mistake to regard executive spending discretion as essentially a Twentieth Century phenomenon, originating with the Budget and Accounting Act. Administrative discretion over the expenditure of public funds has been a fact of life since the first Administration. Then, as now, organization matters. In the hot summer days of 1789, the House chamber of the newly formed Congress debated how to organize itself and the treasury department and what the respective roils would be. On one side, the republicans advocated tight Congressional control of the executive branch and the purse strings. On the other side, the federalists advocated expansive structures and authorities that would make both branches stronger and more centralized than the republicans wanted. The House appointed a temporary Committee on Ways and Means, chaired by republican Elbridge Gerry, to prepare a budget for the year (Harris, 1964, p. 48). Several weeks later, the treasury department was created. Despite republican control of the House at that time, many of the federalist preferences prevailed initially. Rather than a board of three commissioners, as advocated by the republicans to control potentially ambitious executive officials that might attempt to infringe upon legislative powers, a single head, Alexander Hamilton, was appointed to “prepare and report estimates of the public revenue, and the public expenditures.” Within weeks, Gerry’s committee was terminated and its responsibilities were given to Hamilton (Harris, 1964, p. 48). 35 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. For the next several years, Congress enacted appropriations language based primarily on Hamilton’s recommendations. Hamilton’s increasing influence was a source of friction between the Republicans and Federalists. One of the first arguments to arise concerned the degree to which Congress should use appropriations language to direct the executive branch in its operations. The terminology here is usually “lump sum” versus “specific itemization.” Hamilton recommended lump sum appropriations (Harris, 1964, p. 48). An outspoken advocate of federalism, he advocated giving maximum discretion to the executive (White, 1948, pp. 323-334). Hamilton . . . apparently conceded congressional “power over the purse” as a ‘most complete and effective weapon,’ and Ms success in the formulation of financial policies resulted from his abilities and adroitness in persuading Congress to Ms point of view rather than from the specific powers officially delegated to him by Congress. (Wallace, 1960, p. 8) Congressional preferences tended to even greater specificity and Congressional control as the Republicans gained a House majority and Hamilton resigned in 1795 (Harris, 1964, p. 49). Also in 1795, Congress provided specific direction to the executive branch concerning how to handle appropriated amounts that were not completely used in the same year Congress appropriated them. By this time, Congress had already articulated that, generally speaking, it expected the executive to completely use the amounts appropriated to it for the purposes stated in the law and that only amounts appropriated for a particular fiscal year were to be used in that year. To the extent that amounts remained at the end of the fiscal year, 36 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Congress established the surplus fond into which unused amounts would be collected. Despite a deliberate, conscious effort by Congress to control executive spending actions, the executive branch sought ways to increase its discretion (Wilmerding, 1943, p. 83). Sometimes this discretion was sought in order to implement substantive policy outcomes the way the executive officials wanted them done; in others it was probably more a matter of seeking administrative reasonableness. One documented example is Treasury Secretary Wolcott’ s 1798 letter to Hamilton complaining that: The management of the Treasury becomes more and more difficult. The Legislature will not pass laws in gross. Their appropriations are minute; Gallatin, to whom they yield, is evidently intending to break down this department, by charging it with an impracticable detail. (Harris, 1964, p. 50) In 1801, Thomas Jefferson became president and appointed Gallatin, the former congressman and staunch advocate of the specific appropriations approach, to be secretary of the treasury. Jefferson, based on Gallatin’s recommendation, requested that Congress appropriate “specific sums to every specific purpose susceptible to definition, that transfers of funds from one purpose to another be prohibited and contingency funds reduced” (Harris, 1964, p. 50). This narrowing was a result of Republican objections to how the Federalist administration administered funds. For despite Congressional specificity, executive branch officials, especially Hamilton, transferred amounts to different purposes not authorized by Congress and increasingly found themselves needing additional 37 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. appropriations, frequently referred to as “deficiency” requests, before year-end (Wallace, 1960, p. 9). To control this, the House sought an internal organizational fix by making Ways and Means a standing committee with jurisdiction over revenue and appropriation bills, public debt, and agency expenditures and economy. With this committee overburdened and still not gaming agency spending compliance, the House created another committee, Public Expenditure, in 1814 (Harris, 1964, pp. 51- 52). Shortly thereafter, six additional committees were created specifically to examine agency expenditures on a post-audit basis (Wallace, 1960, p. 9). From this time up through the Civil War, Congress enacted legislation specifically designed to control the agency practice of transferring amounts from one purpose to another purpose in violation of the appropriations law; agency use of unobligated amounts in the surplus fund; and agencies incurring obligations that exceeded or were not provided for in appropriations acts, thus essentially holding the Congress hostage to making deficiency appropriations (Wilmerding, 1943, p. 96). Harris characterizes the Congressional executive struggle as “chaotic” and places some blame on the “increasingly splintered appropriations and increasingly rigid and complicated legislation” on the Congressional side as well as the agency use of “loopholes” that became so much the norm that Congress was forced to accept it (Harris, 1964, p. 52; Wallace, 1960, p. 9). During this time, Congressional attempts at control “swung back and forth confusingly between relaxation and re-enforcement of the laws” 38 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (Harris, 1964, p. 52). Commenting on the progress and problems of this period, Wilmerding describes the years 1820 through 1868 as ending in the same condition “as it had begun with the complete collapse of the system of specific appropriation. Law and practice once more stood in opposition, the one prescribing the extreme of rigor, the other permitting the extreme of laxity” (Wilmerding, 1943, p. 117). Despite these problems, by 1860, the House Ways and Means Committee had become the most powerful body in Congress, often rejecting funding requests from other members for funds. But the Civil War placed such burdens on the committee that in 1865 the House created the Appropriations Committee whose responsibility it was to review agency requests and draft appropriations bills. The Senate soon followed with a similar organization (Harris, 1964, pp. 52-53). Just as fighting the Civil War called for one type of organization, its end and Reconstruction resulted in another one. By 1885, the relatively young Appropriations Committees had lost appropriations power over several significant functions, including armed forces, foreign affairs, rivers and harbors, and farm programs, to other committees (Wallace, 1960, p. 10). Wilmerding (1943, pp. 142-143) described this fragmentation as the “gradual disintegration of the Congressional machinery of appropriation” with the result being “instead of one road into the Treasury—and that a thorny one—there were seven or eight primrose paths.” Fisher (1972) found that much of the spending power was delegated to the President because the committee system was fragmented 39 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and Congress could not resist increased spending. “As a result, it was the President, not Congress, who assumed the role ‘protector of the purse’” (p. 68). Throughout the period, agencies had sometimes put Congress in the tough position of having to make deficiency appropriations during the year in order to cover governmental commitments made by the agencies. Wilmerding (1943, p. 140) describes executive branch mentality for the years 1880 through 1905: Disregard of Congressional action upon their estimates became habitual and finally came to be taken as a matter of course. Soon it could be said that the departments had become the appropriating authorities and that Congress had sunk to be the mere register of their determinations. To restrict, some of this agency behavior. Congress enacted several controls, enumerated in a following section about the Antideficiency Act. Congress also appropriated funds for President Taft to study the organization and operations of the executive branch in 1910. President Taft established the Commission on Economy and Efficiency (working 1910-1913) to study and recommend improvements at the federal level. The Commission included several notable Progressives (Frederick Cleveland, W. F. Willoughby, and Frank Goodnow), and their highest priority recommendation was for budget reform. One Commission observation was: The legislative branch has not only assumed to settle questions of policy but also, through appropriations and minuteness . . . has deprived the executive branch (the administration) of the exercise of discretion. . . . While the purpose has been to prevent the misuse of power, the effect has been to relieve administrative officers of responsibility. . . . (Wilmerding 1943, p. 150) 40 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Immediate results were not to follow, but Commission recommendations as well as a growing concern from Congress did lead to yet another reform in law, the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. This law assigned back to the Appropriations Committees sole responsibility for considering spending measures and assigned responsibility for substantive legislation to various authorizing committees; neither type of committee was to venture into the other’s jurisdiction. It also provided some technical assistance for Congress by creating the General Accounting Office whose responsibility it was to review executive spending transactions for legal compliance. For the executive, it required the President to prepare and submit to Congress an annual federal budget. To assist the President, the law created the Bureau of the Budget (predecessor to the Office of Management and Budget) within the Department of Treasury to “assemble, correlate, revise, reduce, or increase the estimates of the several departments and establishments” (Wallace, 1960, p. 10). This reform was generally viewed as “probably the most important fiscal reform of the present century” (p. 18). 1922-1975 The preceding section chronicled the spending power struggle between the legislative and executive branches, concluding with the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. It highlighted the numerous Congressional efforts, from the nation’s founding, to exercise control over the public purse and the executive reluctance to have this happen. This section provides more of the same and shows why that 41 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. straggle gains in importance. The highlights during this period include: expansion of the federal government, both in terms of income redistribution and national policy; the rise of budgeting and public administration as professions; and the consequences of presidential impoundments when Congress disagrees with it. So far, this dissertation has spoken of “spending power” and “appropriations,” but the term “budgeting” has been relatively scant. Up to this time, budgets existed but they were viewed more in terms of factual documents rather than national policy agendas and the source of a new profession. Staff that worked on budgetary issues were primarily interested in mechanisms to reduce spending. On the other hand, the Progressive Era ushered in public administration, professionalization, analysis, a drive for efficiency, and a push for organizational arrangements that would achieve these objectives, usually with favoritism to the executive branch. Schick (1987, pp. 2-3) described the budget-administration conflict of the era as follows: Although both were responses to governmental growth, administration and budgeting started with seemingly contradictory purposes. Public administration accepted big government as inevitable and sought to make it more efficient; budgeting saw government as undisciplined and wasteful and sought to retard further expansion. Public administration spoke for the augmentation of executive power, and it thereby provided a practical basis for modern, activist government. . . . Budgeting, however, sought the curtailment of government. Its nascent purpose was to countervail against the extravagances that had occurred before governments were disciplined by budgetary rules and procedures. Under the banner of economy and efficiency, 42 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. budget reform was promoted as a means of retrenching the programs and expenditures of government. This single-minded mission enabled budgeting to ignore the larger purpose to which public spending was directed. But the aims of the progressive movement could not be achieved without bringing control of the budget under the executive (Schick, 1987, p. 3). So as the ideals and practice of public administration took hold throughout the executive branches of the federal, state, and local levels, budgeting was brought under its umbrella and given a new set of clothes: what had been acknowledged as primarily a political activity in the legislative branch would now become a process to improve administration, efficiency, and rationality. Schick finds it especially interesting to note that it was not until ASPA’s 25th anniversary celebration in 1964 that Luther Gulick shared a discussion he had had in 1937 with President Roosevelt. The Social Security program had been recently enacted, requiring that separate accounts be kept for each worker showing contributions and payments even though payments were not directly tied to contributions. Gulick suggested to Roosevelt that the new program could be managed much more efficiently if the government did not have to keep such detailed records for each individual contributor. To that, Roosevelt responded that the purpose of keeping separate accounts was to make it impossible, politically, for the Republicans to abolish the system once Roosevelt was gone because they would never be able to wipe out the accounts of so many workers (p. 8). Despite how the public administrationists placed budgeting, this section shows that funding decisions 43 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. were still decisions of pure power, some by duly elected officials, others by anonymous careerists. During this time the federal government experienced serious growth in terms of both dollars and complexity. Despite previous attempts to strengthen Congressional control over spending matters, some still thought that Congress was ill-equipped to handle the task. In 1945, Congress created the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, known as the LaFollette-Monroney Committee. The committee recommended establishing annual budget totals, improved staffing for the Appropriations Committees, and the elimination of indefinite appropriations and the passage of substantive legislation in appropriations bills. As a result of this work, Congress passed the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (Wallace, 1960, p. 11). Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. These measures were largely a result of the First Hoover Commission. Among other things, it recommended changing the focus of the budget away from the traditional emphasis on objects and organizational units toward functions and activities, what it termed a “performance budget” (Wallace, 1960, p. 11). Despite attempts at discipline, the process was not smooth. Mosher’s 1952 article “The Executive Budget: Empire State Style” compared and contrasted the New York State budget and budget processes to the federal budget and processes. Noting that the two originated from the same ideology, the same movement, and, to some great extent, the same leaders, the contrasts in legislative behavior between the 44 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. two are all the more striking. One specific example is the timeliness relative to the start of the fiscal year: even in 1952 Congress seldom enacted all the appropriations bills on time. The issue of controlling balances was still a problem to those who advocated increased Congressional control. First, there was no commonly accepted definition of an obligated balance. Second, agencies had no incentive to reach a common definition because of the flexibility disagreement afforded them. It was not until 1954 that Congress created a definition in law for an obligation. In that same year, however, Congress muddied the waters again by giving the Department of Defense special authority that conflicted with the earlier clarification. Third, unobligated balances were increasing for those accounts where Congress had provided multi-year or no-year funding. Fourth, because agencies had incentives to report resources obligated when in reality they were not obligated, such reports were often misleading. Another rather sophisticated move was when an agency would carry amounts over as obligated balances, then deobligate the amount, then reobligate the amount for different projects (Fisher, 1975, pp. 133-135). Fifth, conflicts had arisen between Congress and agencies concerning “end of year” buying sprees in which a large portion of their budget authority would be obligated in the final days of the fiscal year: to Congress, this meant the agencies did not really need the resources but also did not want to lose them. Despite explicit Congressional controls that limited 45 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the percentage of budget authority that could be obligated at the end of the year, this practice continued (p. 141). The issue of balances was such a problem that in 1955 the Second Hoover Commission recommended placing the federal budget on an annual accrued expenditures basis: it was and is presently on an annual authority to incur new obligations basis. The Commission thought this would provide better Congressional control over the surplus or deficit because it would create a direct link between the amounts Congress appropriated and the amounts that left the treasury (Fisher, 1975, p. 135; Harris, 1964, pp. 105-127). In 1965, Murray Weidenbaum articulated several suggestions, including improved information and analysis for Congress. One major area for improvement was “fixed charges and other sacred cows.” For fiscal year 1965, of the $73.4 billion requested by the President for domestic civilian programs, only $19.5 billion (or 27%) were actually controllable through the appropriations process. The uncontrollable portion consisted of trust funds, payment of interest on the public debt, payments to retirees and veterans, and additional amounts needed to complete or continue construction projects. Weidenbaum called for a “fresh examination of these statutory requirements,” saying that Congress “has no opportunity to examine the anticipated expenditures during the budget review process and thus determine the continued need for or desirability of these payments” (pp. 6-7). He also advocated considering the long-term costs of decisions so that when new programs or 46 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. expansions are proposed, Congress would know the associated costs. He was also one of the first advocates for keeping a scorecard that would show the effect of individual decisions on the overall budget. Wallace (1960) was one of the few scholars to defend Congressional meddling in what some may call administrative particulars: “Congress, as Congress, interferes with administrative particulars for only one reason: details affect policy” (p. 14). Citing Gulick, who found the governing process to be a “seamless web of discretion and action,” and Bums, who found that great administrators often have their hand in policy making and that successful politicians keep their hand in administrative matters, Wallace (p. 15) concluded: In short, power over policy-making and policy-executing has been irretrievably joined in both President and Congress, as a result of the unity and indivisibility of the governing process and the nature of our political system. The vital question is not whether we can assign different functions to each and insulate those functions in separate compartments. We cannot. The vital question is whether we can gain unity on broad objectives among the chief policy-makers in each branch of government. The question of power and deficit spending came together with President Nixon and his impoundment actions. Nixon’s impoundment actions are usually presented in the context of an especially control-oriented president serving in times of the Imperial Presidency. As a recently reelected president, he saw his proper role as the one who would control government spending where Congress was incapable. This was done by withholding funds from numerous federal programs despite Congressional direction to the contrary (Fisher, 1975, p. 176). Roy Ash (1973, p. 9), 47 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Director of the Office of Management and Budget under Nixon, referred to the impoundments as “the President’s budgetary actions” and presented them as an important step in actually controlling federal spending and showing that spending should not be viewed as being on automatic pilot with little opportunity for control either by the President or Congress. Murray Weidenbaum (1973, p. 12) referred to them as the “administration’s budget strategy” and too seemed to support them as a demonstration to Congress and the public that the budget, both spending and revenues, could be controlled if Congress would “reorder priorities.” He thought Congress, as a whole, had lost its ability to control the budget because much of the spending power had eroded from the appropriations committees to special interest committees that provided special protective funding in permanent law rather than being subject to annual review by the appropriations committees (p. 13). In addition, he asserted that Congress lacked the proper information about cost and revenue when considering legislation. To remedy this, he proposed his suggestion dating back to at least 1965: “. . . put electronic scoreboards on the floor of the House and in the various committees. Every time Congress enacted a tax bill and there was an expenditure authorization or an appropriation, . . . the scoreboards would click” (p. 14). Davenport (1973, p. 19) notes a historical “tacit understanding between legislative and executive branches, recognizing that Congress in its zeal to represent local interests can exceed the boundaries of good judgment.” Fisher (1975, p. 201) 48 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. also notes that while Congress historically gave Presidents some flexibility to transfer funds or delay using funds as long as the reason was not to thwart Congressional intent, the Nixon actions were such that Congress responded by introducing rigidity and controls into a system previously based on comity, trust, and non-statutory controls. Prior to President Nixon’s impoundments, it was not uncommon for the executive branch to set aside reserves for contingencies or to not use all the funding for the sake of efficiency and savings (1972, p. 106). In addition to the political upheaval of this period, the budgeting field was having its own difficulties for other reasons. V. O. Key’s 1940 article, “The Lack of a Budgetary Theory,” attacked public administration’s approach to budgeting which emphasized budgetary form, presentation, and preparation as a distraction to the fundamental budgeting problem: “on what basis shall it be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B.” Also following this lead, Aaron Wildavsky’s 1964 The Politics o f the Budgetary Process clearly put decisions of a budgetary nature in the political arena. Wildavsky recognized that public administration’s efficiency was heavily value laden and so too was budget reform. Despite this, he did attempt to isolate the normative aspects of the budget and to address the procedural. The result was incrementalism, and it basically stated that budgets vary only incrementally from year to year. So for several years budgeteers had a unifying theory. Some, however, were not so swayed. Schick (1987), for example, said of the theory that it is neither significant nor useful. Noting that much 49 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of life is incremental, Schick found that because incrementalism tried to cover so much, it explained nothing. Schick faulted the current budgetary theory, in general, because it was utopian (and certainly beyond the realm of public administration): as a financial reflection of the government, the budget sought to determine what the government ought to do which, for M m, is the legitimate role of the political process rather than public administrationists. He also faulted it as a budgeting theory because it was based on a notion, of ever increasing resources rather than adjusting to changing economic conditions (pp. 10, 69). 1976-Present The preceding section described the beginnings of the modem era of spending power and foreshadowed the emphasis in the next era, budget crisis. The literature most relevant to this research centers on the search for deficit control and macro budgeting. Toward the end of the section there are also several specific references concerning the pursuit of managerial flexibility through “reinvention” of budget and financial controls. These two seemingly unrelated subjects are pulled together with some unifying thoughts from several scholars who try to integrate these important considerations into the constitutional fabric of our governing system. With Nixon gone and the procedures of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 in place, Congress turned its attention away from executive branch control and toward deficit control. One major reason for this new focus was the percentage of the annual budget pie required to pay interest on the 50 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. debt. Every dollar spent while the budget was in deficit only added to interest payments for the next year, further crowding out other types of spending. While one can reasonably argue that individual members of Congress prefer to maximize spending, especially for their favorite programs and projects, Congress as a body entered an era of reform focused on controlling spending. Given the difficulty of this task, much of the reform was designed to control the internal operations of the Congress itself. Following the Act of 1974, the primary reforms for this period are the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. The discussion of these Congressional reforms and behavior is provided in later sections. This section is, therefore, devoted to exploring what researchers were observing at this time. Figure 1 shows how the Federal debt and deficit changed over the period of this research. Despite attempts at significant budget reform, the Federal debt has continued to rise and the deficit/surplus equation has been in balance only in the most recent years. 51 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Millions o f Dollars Federal Debt and Deficit 7,000,000 6,(X)0,000 5,000,000 4,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000 -1,000,000 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ J ^ / N < # #' ^ Fiscal Years — Surplus/Deficit — Gross Federal Debt Significant Budget Reforms • Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 • Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 • Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 • Line Item Veto Act of 1996 FIGURE 1 FEDERAL DEBT AND DEFICIT Deficit control became the dominant focus. Even though Congress took very little substantive action in the beginning, deficit control was endorsed in word if not deed. Popular attention as well as scholarly attention was directed at the situation. A short list of book titles reveals the emotion in this portion of the literature: On the Brink: Defense, Deficits, and Welfare Spending (Clayton, 1984); Politics and the Budget: The Struggle Between the President and the Congress (Shuman, 1984); How Real is the Federal Deficit? (Eisner, 1986); A Nation in Debt: Economists Debate the Federal Budget Deficit (Fink & High, 1987); On Borrowed Time: How the Growth in Entitlement Spending Threatens America’ s Future (Peterson & Howe, 1988); Broken Purse Strings: Congressional Budgeting 1974-1938 (Penner & Abramson, 1988); Running On Empty: Bush, Congress, and the Politics o f a Bankrupt Government (Haas, 1990); The Culture o f Spending: Why Congress Lives Beyond Our Means (Payne, 1991); The Bankrupting o f America: How the Federal Budget Is Impoverishing the Nation (Calleo, 1992); Facing Tough Choices: Balancing Fiscal and Social Deficits (Eastaugh, 1994); Red Ink: The Budget, Deficit, and Debt o f the U.S. Government (Evans, 1997); and Mirage: Why Neither Democrats Nor Republicans Can Balance the Budget, End the Deficit, and Satisfy the Public (Hager & Pianin, 1997), As a specific example, Leonard’s 1986 Checks Unbalanced: The Quiet Side o f Public Spending provided a thorough examination of “quiet spending”: public pension systems, social security, federal credit activities, federal tax expenditures, tax 53 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. incentives, private use tax-exempt bonds, and public sector leasing. In addition to Ms examination, he also provided several suggestions for raising the profile of such spending: significant accounting reforms, mechanical limits on government spending, and a federal balanced budget amendment. Other works contributed equally analytical and thoughtful research. For example, former Congressman Tim Penny and Steven Schier’s 1996 Payment Due: A Nation in Debt, A Generation in Trouble also addressed the deficit problem but from an intergenerational justice perspective. Aimed primarily at young students of public policy, Penny and Schier build their case for how present policies pay for current consumption by saddling future generations with debt. As a former congressman especially interested in deficit reduction, Penny provides unique insight into the political process, interest group politics, pork barrel spending, and other efforts that form public policy as well as work against deficit reduction. Several authors more closely associated with public administration also contributed to the debate, including Irene Rubin (1990). Since the 1940s, Americans have favored a balanced budget by approximately two to one, including a 1982 survey measuring support for a constitutional amendment. Rubin finds that, because deficits are embarrassing, there is increased pressure to deny the deficit size by obscuring budget numbers. As the real budget picture is obscured, the cycle just worsens until such time as the deficit is out of control (p. 145). Even though some balanced budget proponents advocate balance primarily as a way to limit government 54 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. spending, Rubin views balance as a basic tenant of budgeting: making political choices given constrained resources. Rubin’s specific recommendations to fix the incentives problem are to make deficits public and to find less expensive political resources (p. 240). Rudolph Penner (1986), former director of the Congressional Budget Office, takes a similar view in terms of budget processes. Acknowledging the political nature of budgeting and the political nature of elected officials, he observes that for a budgeting process to succeed, it cannot conflict with political incentives. This is especially difficult because budgeting involves limited resources bat unlimited desires. Schick’s (1986) model is equally straightforward: when the spending environment changes from a growth-orientation to retrenchment, the relationships and processes between “claimants” and “conservers” must change, too (p. 235); and budget processes must be changed “so as to dampen the pressure for expenditure and to strengthen the capacity for restraint” (p. 218). In his 1990 book, The Capacity to Budget, Schick identifies the primary cause for budget process breakdown: the shear size of the federal deficit. By the time deficit reductions were seriously considered, the poor economy, gross miscalculations, and indexed payments, among other factors, had grown a deficit that was out of political control. The budgeting system in place at the time was still based on growth, and politicians and the demanding public had not sufficiently adjusted their expectations. Even after enacting various 55 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. spending controls that removed any political blame from, politicians, such as sequestration, the deficit and debt were still problems. White and Wildavsky, however, are quick to point out that, despite the lingering deficits, many politicians deserve great credit for containing spending and reducing it from its previous trajectory. Their 1989 The Deficit and the Public Interest: The Search fo r Responsible Budgeting in the 1980s demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the deficit, but they advocated a middle ground: the deficit is important but should not be used to drive all other decisions. They describe the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 as “a piece of legislation best described as budgetary terrorism” (p. xvii). As the Republican Revolution and the Contract With America were unfolding on Capitol Hill, the executive branch was especially busy with Reinvention. The two considered together have special implications for this dissertation. The new Republican Congressional majority was committed to deficit reduction, which further increased the importance of the budget process and the outlay estimates it generates. Pressures on decision makers and federal managers to restrain outlays continued to increase. At the same time, the Reinvention effort was recommending ways to create a government that “works better and costs less” and to “cut red tape.” Of their “cut red tape” proposals, streamlining the budget process was top on the list. Describing the federal budget process as one “with its green-eyeshade analysts, complicated 56 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. procedures, Byzantine language, and reams of minutiae” (NPR, 1993, p. 14), they provided several recommendations to free managers of such red tape: minimize the use of apportionment; minimize Congressional restrictions such as line items and earmarks; allow agencies to carry over to the next fiscal year 50 percent of what they do not use on internal operations; increase the President’s power to cut line item spending; creation of agency innovation funds capitalized by unused operating appropriations from which programs could borrow; and increased flexibility to managers in setting fees and in determining how those fees will be spent. Rosenbloom (2000, p. 153) points out that the Congressional reaction to Gore’s recommendations was just the reverse: Congress increased its involvement in executive administration by passing the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. Garvey (1995, p. 101) briefly assessed NPR’s recommendations as “carelessness about the value of control.” Writing specifically about military policy, Banks and Straussman (1999, p. 145) assert that the new public management reforms “fail adequately to take into account the legal, historical, and policy context that frame U.S. participation” in military actions. Analysis of Major Budget Laws The federal budget is a reflection of numerous laws, but several are of such special significance to this dissertation that they merit additional coverage here. The following sections chronologically present these laws: the Antideficiency Act, the 57 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, and the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. Though it is old compared to the others, the Antideficiency Act is essential because it addresses the very detailed accounting-type information addressed in this research—period of availability. The next three laws provide the process that drives decision making with financial as well as substantive policy implications. And the final law, the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, is significant not because of Its impact (the Supreme Court ruled It unconstitutional) but because of its attempt to further push vital decision making powers from Congress to the President. Antidefidency Act The Antidefidency Act Is actually a collection of statutes dealing with the obligation and expenditure of federal government funds. This section will also address several more recent, general controls that work in tandem with the Antidefidency Act. Taken together, they Illustrate the complications Congress faces, then and now, trying to control agency spending behavior. More so than other laws frequently associated with the federal budget, they also illustrate the rather intricate accounting controls Congress has had to enact in order to enforce Its funding decisions. These laws provide several controls of particular significance to this dissertation: expenditures and obligations cannot exceed the amount available; 58 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. contracts and obligations cannot be entered into before an appropriation is made; strict limitations are placed on the acceptance of voluntary services; documentary evidence is required to record an obligation; payments are limited to those obligations incurred during the period of availability unless provided otherwise in law; appropriations must be apportioned in a manner that prevents deficiencies and supplemental appropriations; agency heads must establish fimd control regulations and hold the agency to them; and, appropriations can be used only for the purposes provided in law. As a result of “coercive deficiencies,” in 1870 Congress enacted a government-wide law stating that agencies could not expend or involve the government in any contract that would bind the government to a future payment prior to the appropriation being enacted or exceeding the amount enacted for that year (Manos, 1994, p. 341). This law provided a clear statement of the control mechanism “period of availability.” A further step was taken in 1905 when Congress required agency heads to apportion their appropriations over the entire year so that they would not use all their resources too quickly in the earlier part of the year, then essentially hold Congress hostage for a supplemental amount (Stith, 1988, p. 610). The apportionment requirements, coupled with the relatively detailed line itemization in appropriations acts, did not solve the deficiency problem and created additional administrative burden. This condition held until the massive growth of the New Deal forced Congress to change its approach: line itemization gave way to 59 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. lump-sum appropriations. Because of the additional flexibility, deficiencies declined (Stith, 1988, pp. 610-611). Also around this time, the President gained increased spending powers when the Bureau of the Budget was transferred from Treasury and the apportionment power was transferred from agency heads to the Bureau. The next significant activity was in 1956 when Congress established the accounting practice referred to as “M accounts” and “merged surplus authority.” These authorities allowed agencies to co-mingle obligated and unobligated amounts from their various periods of availability, essentially eviscerating the Antidefidency Act, accounting control, and the period of availability control (Manos, 1994, p. 351). While these authorities gave agencies more flexibility, they are best known for their abuse by the Department of Defense. DOD originally promoted them as a legitimate way to fund valid upward cost adjustments associated with complex defense contracting mechanisms (such as escalation clauses, incentives, and cost reimbursement type contracts). Even the General Accounting Office, who was still responsible for reviewing and certifying obligations at this time, supported this authority. Even though amounts in these accounts were not available for new obligations, enterprising officials managed to fond significant military programs despite Congressional direction to the contrary. For example, in 1989 Congress cut funding for B-1B bombers, but the Air Force spent an additional $1 billion on contract modifications from its M account (Manos, 1994, p. 348). Another negative 60 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. agency practice that arose from this laxity was that rather than obligating an amount that reflected the true estimate of expected costs, DOD program managers would initially obligate a smaller amount, wait for their funds to expire, then record the upward cost adjustment against resources in the much larger, co-mingled, merged account, essentially removing any financial constraints and holding them harmless for the fill! cost (p. 351). Shortly thereafter, Congress changed the law and tightened control over balances. Presently, annual and multi-year appropriations retain their fiscal year identity while they are in a five-year “expired” status (available for only upward and downward adjustments), after which they are “canceled” and are unavailable to the agency for any purpose. Recognizing the practical fact that some programs and procurements are more complicated and take longer than this to properly use their resources, Congress frequently provides no-year funding or provides “extended disbursement authority” which still requires the agency to conform to annual or multi-year provisions for obligations but provides additional disbursement time. Congress also explicitly provided authority to agencies to pay legitimate upward adjustments after their amounts are canceled: they can take it from their current appropriation, to a certain statutory limit. As late as 1994, GAO was still finding billion dollar irregularities in DOD accounts that were required by the 1990 Defense Authorization Act to be cleaned up (GAO, 1994). 61 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 forms the basis of the current budget process. Prior to this Act, there was no Congressional appropriations process per se. Congress did not know how much various spending or revenue proposals cost, and they did not consider the two in tandem. Much of the discipline appropriations committees could exercise was ineffective because many programs were exempted from their control. Other programs were deemed off- budget, thus skewing the true budget picture. More then 50 percent of all federal spending was through “back doors” and about 70 percent of all outlays were “uncontrollable” (Stith 1988, p. 608). With Watergate and Nixon’s Impoundments as a backdrop, Congress sought budgeting powers more equal to those granted to the President through the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (Stith, 1988, p. 616). As enacted, this law consisted of ten titles, nine dealing with budget process, the tenth with impoundment of funds. Each title Is significant in its own right and shows an explicit attempt by Congress to create a budget governing structure. Several are worth detailing here because they provide much of the same framework still used today. Title I created a budget committee in each house and made them responsible for management of a concurrent resolution on the budget and reconciliation measures. It also tasked them, with conducting studies of tax expenditures, analyzing the impact of proposed legislation on outlays, and reviewing the newly created 62 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Congressional Budget Office. It even went so far as to prescribe certain committee assignments within the House (e.g., one majority and one minority member of the House leadership must serve on the committee). Title II created the Congressional Budget Office whose mission was to provide Congress with cost estimates of proposed legislation. Title III set out specific time frames for Congress to act, in an organized fashion, on segments of the budget process. First, Congress would enact a resolution setting initial planning levels for spending and revenues, and all authorizing committees would report (i.e., send committee-approved authorization bills to their respective foil house, whether Senate or House of Representatives) all proposed authorizing legislation by the same date, four months prior to the date set for enactment. This is an especially important provision because it set spending limits for each of the committees and provided a mechanism to hold them accountable. This title also prescribed how many hours the Senate could debate certain items and sought to limit floor action on matters within the Budget Committee’s jurisdiction that had not been reported out by that committee. Title IV required the Congressional Budget Office prepare cost estimates for all proposed legislation and that all proposed legislation fall within the spending limits established in the budget resolution. Title X spelled out procedures the President and Congress would follow when the President determined that, for various reasons, funds appropriated by Congress 63 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. should not be used either for ever (i.e., rescission) or just temporarily (i.e., deferral). The reporting mechanism required the President to notify Congress of any rescission recommendation and established that unless the Congress acts in support of the recommendation, the President is required to use the funds as was originally spelled out in law. Procedures were also provided for the President to report deferrals and for the Comptroller General to report any deferrals the President did not report, to include bringing a civil court action to enforce the law. In practice, one of the most powerful requirements of this law was the non- statutory annual concurrent budget resolution coordinated by the new budget committees and voted on by the entire Congress (Stith, 1988, p. 617; Joyce, 1996, p. 319). The law required the resolution to specify five targets: new budget authority, total annual revenues, total annual outlays, the deficit, and the gross public debt. Following up on the resolution were reconciliation requirements that directed the legislative agenda of specific committees in order to meet targets in the resolution. But despite the attempt at discipline and the new process, Congress did not control spending, the deficit, or its own behavior. Deficits continued to grow, spending that could have been controlled under the new rules was not, and Congress ignored its own procedural requirements (Stith, 1988, p. 618). While there are numerous explanations for this failure, Stith provides one especially interesting one: as scrutiny of all spending increased, “the process required Congress to expend more 64 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. effort on negotiation, logrolling, and the making of alliances. The increased conflict and interdependence among various interest groups and members of Congress merely entrenched existing programs and led Congress to ignore its self-proclaimed aggregates, instructions, and deadlines” (p. 621). The 1974 Act did make significant changes to the process, but the process did not hold. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 Despite the reforms and new capacities provided by the Act of 1974, deficits continued to grow, with no end in sight. Some observers, including some members of Congress, concluded that Congress was unable to contain spending relative to revenues. At the same time, the Act of 1974 moved much of the responsibility to budget away from the President and back to Congress (Stith, 1988, p. 621). Congress needed an extra-legislative mechanism to do for itself what it would not do: reduce spending. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, commonly known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH), further refined the budget process by, among other things, imposing in law a series of specific maximum annual deficit targets enforced by automatic spending reduction triggers (“sequestration”) in order to meet those targets. Because of this reliance on automatic spending cuts rather than the traditional political process, Stith viewed this change as “rewriting our implicit fiscal constitution” (Stith, 1988, p. 624). As originally enacted, the Comptroller 65 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. General would determine when sequestration was needed. But in the 1986 Supreme Court case Bowsher v. Synar, the Court ruled this violated the separation of powers doctrine because it involved the execution of a law, not a legislative function. To correct this, GRH was amended in 1987, giving the responsibility to the Office of Management and Budget. GRH had both intended and unintended consequences. First, it changed the budget process from being policy neutral to one controlling the entire legislative process aimed procedurally and substantively at reducing the deficit to a predetermined level, enforced by automatic across-the-board spending cuts. Deficit reduction became the primary policy. According to Stith, “GRH’s enshrinement of deficits as the talisman of budget making ignores or rejects the lesson of a century of public administration that, in the long term, obligational authority is the only meaningful measure of legislative spending” (Stith, 1988, p. 639). Second, because of the new emphasis on the deficit (that is, revenues minus outlays), the timing relationship between when budget authority is appropriated and when it outlays became especially important. Previously, outlays happened in the regular course of conducting agency business. Under this new emphasis, outlay rates impacted the deficit and thus sequestration. In addition, proposed new programs with slower outlay rates might be preferred over those with quicker outlay rates because they would, essentially, postpone the inevitable. Stith, among others, observed that this new emphasis on outlays increased incentives and opportunities to 66 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. manipulate outlay projections by underestimating total outlays or underestimating the speed with which they would outlay (Stith, 1988, pp. 634-635). The third major change involved the implementation of sequestration at the account level. Because sequestration required funding cuts, someone would have to have discretion to make the decisions about how to reduce particular activities within accounts. In order to protect favored programs from potential disproportionate executive branch decisions if there is a sequester, GRH allows Congress to use committee reports to define programs. The impact is two fold: it reverses the historical trend away from Congressional itemization in appropriations and it elevates the legal status of committee reports, documents that have not been voted on by the entire Congress or presented to the President for signature (Stith, 1988, pp. 644-647). Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 As federal deficits continued to grow, with no end in sight, a new approach was enacted which approached budgetary control in a slightly different manner. Rather than setting specific deficit limits in law, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 and its amendments (BEA) drew an unambiguous distinction between spending attributable to the authorizing committees (i.e., mandatory) versus the appropriations committees (discretionary). The intention was to hold committees accountable for their spending choices. Discretionary spending was further broken down in to various categories (such as defense, mass transit, and conservation), and budget 67 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. authority and outlay limits were placed on each of these for each fiscal year. Whenever the limits were exceeded, the President is required to issue a sequester reducing those programs. For the mandatory side, an approach referred to as “pay- as-you-go” was adopted which required that any legislation that either increased spending or decreased revenue must also provide an offset so that the deficit is not increased. For example, if either the President or Congress proposed to increase benefits to a particular constituency, they would either have to propose an equal decrease in another program or propose a revenue increase. The BEA also provided special arrangements for “emergency” spending. If both Congress and the President agreed certain amounts were for emergency purposes, they would not count against the caps. Needless to say, many questionable activities were funded as “emergencies” because they allowed elected officials to avoid tough political choices. Looking back on the budget process 20 years after the Congressional Budget Act became law, Joyce found a budget process significantly different, sometimes intentionally and sometimes not, than the drafters envisioned in 1974. Three major changes are of particular interest. First, the requirement for reconciliation centralized Congressional power by forcing committees to adhere to pre-determined spending limits and changes to substantive legislation aimed at reaching the revenue and spending targets specified in the resolution. The 1974 Act held committees accountable to Congress as a whole. This centralizing move occurred at a time when 68 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Congressional power, in general, was tending toward decentralization (Joyce, 1996, pp. 319-320). Second, the 1974 Act provided a policy neutral budget process to help Congress focus on priorities. Subsequent budget reforms changed that focus to control of the size of the budget and the deficit. The Act of 1985 changed the budget process to one aimed at reducing the deficit over a period of years, enforced by automatic spending cuts at the account level. The Act of 1990 continued the move away from policy neutrality and away from deficit targets by placing annual limits on various categories of new budget authority and outlays. This new emphasis impacted Congressional behavior in terms of proposing new programs or program expansions and reductions to existing programs, including revenue (Joyce, 1996, p. 320). Third, the “ascendancy of scorekeeping” requires Congress to consider the cost of legislative proposals or suffer the consequences of having spending in other programs automatically reduced when, new spending exceeds certain levels. Even though the Act of 1974 created the Congressional Budget Office, budget committees in each house, and a budget process, enforcement mechanisms became a controlling force only with the 1985 and 1990 Acts because of sequestration for discretionary spending and the forced trade-offs with mandatory spending (Joyce, 1996, p. 321). Fisher (1993, p. 203), on the other hand, finds that the current budget system removes the President from the responsibility and accountability envisioned in the Act of 1921. Fisher (2000) also contends that the budget reform mechanisms 69 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. adopted sifl.ce 1974 have complicated the political process, centralized budget decision making in a few hands, reduced legislative accountability (pp. 175-179), and increased the risk of political deadlock (p. 125). Fisher calls this the “downside of acting comprehensively” (p. 125). Though not providing any specific reform proposals, he does advocate a budget process that draws on the institutional strengths of both President and Congress (993, p. 203). With the increased emphasis on calculating the federal deficit, staff attention in both the legislative and executive branches turned to analyzing outlays. One of the most comprehensive assessments done, and still relevant today, was a 1977 OMB staff paper entitled, Overview o f the Current “ State -of-the A rt” o f Federal Outlay Estimating. The report was written because there was concern that actual outlays were historically less than the estimated outlays, which meant that some proposed spending could not be enacted. The report provided several reasons for the “pervasive and persistent upward bias in the outlay estimating methodology,” including optimistic assumptions by program managers that they will be able to implement programs and obligate funds more rapidly; penalties in the Antideficiency Act for over obligating funds or obligating too quickly; complexities due to demographics, weather, and general economic conditions; and multi-year construction and procurement projects (pp. 2-6). GAO also examined outlay estimates. In a 1999 report entitled “Budget Issues: The Importance of Increased Accuracy in Budget Outlay Estimates,” GAO 70 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. stated: “Budget outlay estimates are critical to decisionmakers when considering program funding needs. The current budgetary environment, which caps discretionary spending, and the emergence of recent management reforms have heightened the significance of accurate budget outlay data” (p. 5). These changes, taken together with the new emphasis on the timing of outlays (and, thus, impacting the annual deficit), changed the debate from the substance of individual policies to the impact of funding decisions. Right or wrong, the budget process presently dominates decision making as both branches struggle to find ways around their self-imposed rules and align substantive choices with procedural constraints. Line Item Veto Act of 1996 In the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Congress greatly increased the President’s power to control spending relative to newly enacted laws. Even though the Supreme Court shortly found the law unconstitutional, it is worthy of elaboration here. According to the legislative history, Congress saw this as yet another opportunity to reduce spending by granting the President power to essentially pick out certain aspects of newly enacted laws for elimination by deleting their funding. Specifically, within five days after a law is enacted the President could send notification to Congress of the intended cancellations with his rationale, limited to a determination that the cancellation would reduce the budget deficit and that it would not impair essential government functions or harm the national interest. 71 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This approach was limited to three major categories: for discretionary spending, cancellations could be proposed only for an entire budget account or for an item, within an account if Congress had singled that item out with an earmark (e.g., specific Corps of Engineers projects where the projects are listed by name and geographic location); for mandatory spending, cancellations could be proposed only for provisions that created new or expanded benefits; and for tax legislation, cancellations could be proposed only for provisions that granted a tax deduction, credit, exclusion or preference to 100 or fewer beneficiaries or granted temporary or permanent relief to ten or fewer beneficiaries. Once submitted by the President, Congress was allowed 30 days to pass a law reversing the President’s cancellation. To further highlight Congress’s interest in using this new tool as a way to lower the deficit, the law provided a “lockbox procedure” whereby any amounts saved by cancellations would be tracked by the budget committees and OMB to ensure the amounts go to deficit reduction. These plans were never implemented though President Clinton did submit several notifications to Congress before the Supreme Court decision. Congressional Control and the Budget Process in Practice Stith (1988, p. 595) describes the current federal budget process as being “shaped largely by an implicit ‘fiscal constitution’ composed of framework statutes and legislative and administrative practice” over 200 years. The framework statutes were presented in the section above. The legislative and administrative practice 72 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. portion of the equation is presented in this section. The budget/appropriations process has several distinct, though interrelated, phases. In general, the executive branch formulates detailed spending and revenue proposals for Congress; Congress sets budget totals and acts on the various proposals, modifying as it desires, resulting in public laws commonly known as appropriations; the executive branch implements the enacted budget proposals; and Congress oversees and provides control mechanisms. Each of these phases is described below with the primary emphasis on Congressional oversight and control because, aside from legal requirements, Congressional behavior is a driver of administrative behavior. Congressional Behavior and Oversight The title of Fisher’s 1978 book, The Constitution Between Friends, conveys the subtle notion that the workings of American national government are not based solely upon the printed word found in our important documents, such as the Constitution and public laws. The workings are also based, to a great extent, on the trust, relationships, respect, and occasionally deference between the parties. When any of these elements is compromised, a reaction of some sort will occur. In the case of relationships between Congress and the President (and the staff that work for them), some type of “reform” legislation and increased oversight is seen as a result of transgression. What follows is the documentation of this. One of the primary functions of Congress is to oversee the implementation of laws, organizations, and programs. While the actual implementation is usually left to 73 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. executive agencies, “legislatures must concern themselves with the how as well as the what of executive action” (Harris, 1964, p. 1). Within the research, a distinction is sometimes drawn between Congressional actions taken prior to agency action, that is “control,” versus Congressional actions taken after agency action, that is “oversight.” More recent work has not drawn this timing distinction, using instead the term “oversight” to include “review of actions of federal departments, agencies, and commissions, and of the programs and policies they administer, including review that takes place during program and policy implementation as well as afterward” (Aberbach, 1990, p. 2). In this dissertation, the two terms may at times be used interchangeably. Congress exercises control and oversight in a variety of ways. These include: prescriptions concerning organizational structure, officers, staffing requirements, and program objectives; limitations and restrictions on specific activities; resource allocations, whether through annual appropriations action or through permanent legislation; investigations; hearings; reporting requirements; legislative veto provisions; and informal dealings between committees or individual members and agencies, such as suggestions and threats. These are implemented in several forms, including public law, public written documents (while not technically law, many agencies act as though they are), and personal interactions. Of these, the resource allocation process is perhaps the most important single control (Harris, 1964, pp. 8-9). 74 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Harris (1964, p. 2) identifies the following as legitimate purposes of legislative oversight: to determine whether legislative policies are being faithfully, effectively, and economically carried out; to determine whether programs are accomplishing their desired objectives and whether further legislation is needed; to ascertain that the laws are being administered in the public interest and to encourage diligence; to discover abuses of discretion, arbitrary actions, or gross errors of judgment by administrative officers; to check on management and controls to determine if they are adequate and effective; and to hold officials accountable for their use of public funds and other resources. To this list, Macmahon (1943, p. 163) adds: To check dishonesty or waste; to guard against unsympathetic or over-zealous attitudes; to provide a check on. the means administrators use by providing a different perspective, and to verify compliance with legislative intent. And Saloma (1971, p. 181) offers achieving a balance between control and discretion or flexibility. Harris (1964) provides seven criteria for evaluating controls: whether it is explicit or implicit in the Constitution and conforms to the basic division of powers between the two branches; whether the controls provide the information Congress needs to determine whether policies are being faithfully, competently, and economically implemented; whether the controls highlight administrative abuses or arbitrary actions; whether controls provide executive officers needed discretion and flexibility while being held responsible for results rather than stifling initiative; whether the controls reflect the policies and wishes of Congress as a whole rather 75 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. than imposing the wishes of individual members; whether the controls tend to strengthen and enforce those responsible for implementation or whether they tend to duplicate and weaken them; and, finally, whether the control is suitable to Congress, such as day to day operations of an agency or items of a personal or provincial nature to a member (pp. 11-13). In Macmahon’s (1943) words, when Congress gets into detail it ceases to be itself, “. . . it acts through a fraction which may be a faction” (p. 414), meaning that individual members and subcommittees are not representative of the entire body. Congressional behavior changes as the environment, incentives, and resource levels change. In terms of Congressional oversight, research has documented a rising level in primary-purpose oversight hearings, short-term authorizations, detailed statutes, and legislative veto provisions (the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha invalidated this in 1983, discussed in greater detail below) (Aberbach, 1990, p. 46). Congressional control has also increased substantially in extent and importance and has taken new forms (Harris, 1964, p. 10). During the Twentieth Century, Congress’ primary role shifted somewhat from one of policy initiation to one of oversight as the executive branch increased its role in policy Initiation, relative to Congress, and the administrative sector grew both in size and complexity (Henderson, 1970, p. 2). Early in the century, Congress ceded much of its control over executive action in the Congressional Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. This, coupled with smooth relations between Congress and 76 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the presidency, made the 1920s a time of “cooperative control” (Aberbach, 1990, p. 21). As Schick says: “The president willingly served Congress because M s interests were closer to those of the legislative branch than to those of the executive agencies. No less than Congress, the White House felt helpless in the face of agency expansion” (Schick, quoted in Aberbach, 1990, p. 21). This comity changed, however, with the New Deal and World War II The role of the president forever changed from one of Congressional agent to one of the president being chief executive in his own right. With the enormous expansion of the federal government and a redistribution of power between the two branches, the oversight relations changed too. Macmahon termed the legislative oversight style, at least up to 1943, as “continuous intervention” because he saw a change in emphasis away from detailed wording in public law and toward continuous involvement in guiding matters of administrative conduct and discretion (pp. 162-163). In 1946, Congress passed the Legislative Reorganization Act. Among other things, it provided for formal Congressional oversight by directing the committees to maintain “continuous watchfulness” over the activities of the executive agencies. Advocates for this reform were concerned about the growing power of the executive, wanted to reassert Congress as a co-equal branch, and thought this could be accomplished by strengthening the committee system (Aberbach, 1990, p. 22). The 1970s marked yet another major era. Allen Schick characterizes this as a time when American politics was transformed from an era of affluence to one of 77 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. scarcity. Because of the economic scarcity, politics became more conflictual; what was a gain for one group became a loss for another. Congressional-Presidential relations reached especially sour levels as the Nixon administration impounded appropriated funds in order to implement its own policies unilaterally. In addition, both Congress and citizenry felt increasingly burdened by the growing size and complexity of government, as well as the complications of Vietnam and Watergate. At the same time, Congress imposed some reforms on itself that altered how it operated, including funding decision making. One result was that creation of new programs became much more difficult so efforts switched to justifying and improving existing programs. All these factors contributed to a dramatic increase in the level of Congressional oversight and the detail of Congressional guidance because members became skeptical about whether the executive branch would execute according to Congressional expectations (Aberbach, 1990, pp. 19, 39). Aberbach’s (1990) model is based on the belief that Congressional oversight behavior is a function of incentives and members’ self interests as determined by the institutional design features in place at a particular period. As the external and internal Congressional environment changes, so too does oversight behavior (p. 170). Aberbach found that most oversight behavior takes place in a general context of advocacy: even though members and staff may be critical of the particulars, they are supportive of the basic goals. 78 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Aberbach (1990, p. 171) also found that the least supportive, which he still rated as neutral, were subcommittees of the House Appropriations Committee. This is especially important to this dissertation because the House Appropriations Committee is the primary drafter of appropriations law and thus has the most likelihood of influencing the period of availability, the subject of this dissertation. Historically, the appropriations committees were seen as “protectors of the purse” who were interested in constraining public spending. Because they had a reputation for being the most neutral, hard hearted, and hard working committees, assignments to these committees were not as desirable as many others, and members were chosen from relatively safe Congressional districts so as not to damage their reelection possibilities. But changes in Congressional organization, Congressional procedures for decision making on funding, as well as other environmental factors, have resulted in members of the appropriations committees behaving more and more like their colleagues on the oversight committees: as advocates, especially for funneling federal dollars to their own districts and to those agencies who influence the member’s special interests (p. 176). Many scholars of Congressional behavior assert that members engage primarily in activities that directly benefit their reelection goal, such as casework and support of legislation that serves their constituents. Oversight is a low priority. Evans found, however, that members sometimes do place non-electoral goals (Fenno’s influence and making of good policy goals) over electoral goals by 79 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. engaging in oversight behavior that promotes good poiicy even if it jeopardizes reelection goals (Evans, 1997, pp. 669-670). Congressional incentives are such that members want to maintain the value of their committee membership. To do this, they protect and promote programs and agencies under their jurisdiction, especially those they helped to shape and which serve as monuments to themselves (Aberbach, 1990, p. 177). It is at this point that members of Congress face a dilemma: on the one hand, they want Congress to be a powerful institution; on the other they find that attempts to strengthen Congress as a whole, such as centralized control of the policy agenda or comprehensive spending procedures, serves to weaken their positions as individual members (p. 207). Davidson and Oleszek note: “The central dilemma of the contemporary Congress is that individual legislators’ careers are separated from the collective product of the institution. Performance is collective but accountability is individual” (Aberbach, 1990, p. 23). Lawrence C. Dodd (1990, p. 23) furthers this analysis of individual interests versus collective interests and finds that because of the dilemma, members will build structural flaws into any centralizing mechanisms in order to protect their own interests and that when the immediate crisis passes that necessitated the centralization, members will exploit these structural flaws as loopholes to reassert their own interests. 80 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Congressional behavior is also influenced by the political appointee and authority delegation system in the executive branch. Despite the power of the presidency and those appointed with responsibility to promote and protect it, Aberbach notes that the upper reaches of the executive have a great unease about the policy influence of career civil servants. Citing that senior civil servants report more frequent contact with Congress than their department head, a mutual dependency is created, with top cabinet officials viewed as obstacles to be circumvented, so that agency careerists and members of Congress can continue their long-term relations. These “durable actors” work together to protect and promote their long-term interests that out live even a two-term president. Because of these relations, top administration officials and the president often view the bureaucracy with suspicion and create control mechanisms to ensure compliance with administration policies (Aberbach, 1990, p. 7). Fisher also observes that the flow of power, though to the executive branch, mostly bypasses the president to an agency head who then subdelegates the power much lower to an agency component that is much more closely allied with a particular Congressional committee than the president or executive budget staff (Fisher, 1972, p. 237). The power of Congressional control and oversight is especially evident in the legislative veto. The legislative veto is a formal mechanism whereby one house of Congress could pass a resolution binding the executive branch to action or inaction, such as proposed regulations or decisions to fond projects in specific geographic 81 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. locations. In 1983, the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha ruled this long-standing practice was unconstitutional because it violated the principle of bicameralism and presentment. A related statutory control mechanism, “report and wait,” requires agencies to report proposed actions to Congress before implementing them in order to give Congress time to ask questions or enact opposing legislation. Following Chadha, the executive branch treats existing and new legislative veto provisions as report and wait provisions rather than rejecting them as unconstitutional, an acknowledgment of the need for accommodation. But before this balance was reached, high level officials in the executive branch immediately viewed the Chadha decision as a major victory for executive branch freedom. Guidance was issued to agencies directing them to disregard directives in committee reports (typically funding earmarks in appropriations bills) on the Chadha principles: bicameralism and presentment. This created such an uproar from Congress and generated threats of even stronger control, that the guidance was quickly rescinded even though it was based on sound legal reasoning (Korn, 1994, p. 883). Over the long-term, Congressional behavior drives reforms. In assessing the effectiveness of the major budget reforms discussed in the section above, scholars are divided, but few find them a panacea. Thurber found these reforms “insulated Congress from accountability and made it difficult to assign responsibility for the growth of the federal budget or the size of the deficit” The current process is more democratic but more conflicted, thus causing gridlock. The current, somewhat 82 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. organized and efficient process is in direct conflict with the pressure members receive from political groups and public preferences generally for increased spending, Thurber clearly states that until voters change their preferences (organized decision making process vs. increased spending for special interests), Congressional behavior will continue to vacillate between centralization and decentralization of authority, between an agreed-upon process and a breakdown in Congressional- Presidential budgeting (Thurber, 1996, p. 210). Executive Branch Budget Formulation Process The President is required by law to submit a budget to Congress not later than the first Monday in February. To meet this deadline, as well as myriad other very specific budget reporting requirements placed by Congress on the executive, serious policy and analytic effort begins about ten months prior to the submission. Each spring, the Office of Management and Budget establishes general funding and policy guidance. The general guidance is then broken down into specific policy directions and aggregate funding levels for each agency. Through the summer and into the fall, agencies work on their budget submissions, which are due to OMB in mid- September. Once the submissions are received, OMB begins an organization-wide exercise to review all the submissions, determine funding levels for specific programs, craft policy proposals (e.g., create new programs, eliminate existing programs, modify program parameters), and to ensure that funding for the entire 83 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. federal government reflects the President’s priorities given the economic outlook (e.g., projections for receipts, interest rates, unemployment, inflation, program beneficiaries). Most issues are resolved between, agencies and OMB. For those that are not, the President or Ms closest policy officials weigh in. By late December, all the big issues have been decided, and the staff of the agencies and OMB are left to produce the analytical and legal material required for production of the set of voluminous documents collectively known as The Budget of the United States Government. In addition to being a political document promoting the President’s agenda, it is also a historical and analytical compilation of the federal government’s financial status and an accountability report to Congress. It provides detailed information over a range of years on many perspectives of the budget. It includes information on staffing, agency performance, program results, and detailed financial activities. Most of the content is prescribed by Congress in law. Even though Congress frequently declares the President’s budget “dead on arrival,” it provides the most complete picture available of the state of the union. Congressional Budget and Appropriation Processes Shortly after Congress receives the President’s budget submission, it begins its own elaborate process. Before taking up action on specific spending proposals, each committee submits its spending and revenue plans to its respective budget committee. The two budget committees, negotiating with the other committees, draft 84 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a budget resolution that, among other things, sets budget aggregates and spells out the resource levels available to each Congressional committee, both authorizing and appropriations. The two appropriations committees further divide their allocations between their thirteen subcommittees. In addition to the committee breakouts, the budget resolution also spells out a crosscutting breakout among twenty broad functions (e.g., agriculture, transportation, national defense); because of the committee structure, the functional breakout, in some cases, cuts across multiple committee jurisdictions. So the budget resolution, coupled with several other budget laws described above, can be viewed as the rules of engagement for Congressional action on every issue throughout the year that impacts, either positively or negatively, directly or indirectly, the federal fisc. Once the budget resolution is adopted (the legally required date is April 15ft, but this date is seldom met), committees begin legislative action. The most obvious legislative action occurs in the appropriations subcommittees. They are the ones responsible for coordinating the funding for virtually all federal programs (though they control only about one third of federal spending). In order to produce comprehensive funding legislation by the beginning of the fiscal year, they must conduct an extensive series of hearings with federal agencies on all manner of topics and degree of detail. Even though the subcommittees are by necessity concerned with aggregate funding levels, their real power derives from their expertise in and control of the specifics: funding levels for particular programs; earmarks that fund 85 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. members’ pet projects; reporting requirements placed on agencies; various limitations placed on administrative expenses; location of federal facilities; purchase of vehicles and uniforms; and other non-monetary controls too numerous to mention. In a nutshell, anything that can be described in written words can be controlled by the appropriations process. Because of the importance of the appropriations process, over the years federal agencies and their subcommittees have developed interesting and symbiotic relationships that are well documented in the literature. The full appropriations committees are responsible for coordinating their various subcommittees, working the appropriations bills through their respective house, resolving differences in conference, and eventually either producing a bill the President will sign or mustering Congressional support to sustain a veto. While the appropriations committees are at work, the authorizing and revenue committees are working too. Because they are also controlled by the Congressional budget process, these committees must conform their agenda, in terms of both time and policy, to the budget limitations placed upon them by the resolution. For example, the budget resolution may call for increased revenue from a particular source or scaled back benefits for a particular class of recipient. In order to meet the budget resolution, the appropriate committee would have to craft such implementing legislation and shepherd it through to enactment. In practice, many of the procedural constraints Congress places on itself are waived and the scheduled deadlines are not met. 86 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The process described above is the result of several pieces of fairly recent legislation: the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. Each of these is described above. Executive Branch Budget Implementation After the various appropriations and authorizing laws are enacted, the burden moves back to the executive branch. Before agency staff can obligate or spend any money, the monies must be apportioned by OMB. The apportionment process dates back to the Antideficiency Act and is a primary control mechanism for both Congress and the President. Congress uses it to control “coercive deficiencies,” and OMB uses it to help ensure the President’s policies are implemented. OMB, Treasury, and the agencies monitor obligations and payments throughout the year. The basic, legal unit of analysis is the Treasury account. Within each Treasury account budgetary resources are controlled by yet another division, periods of availability. For example, a typical account that pays general agency overhead expenses could have at least seven subaccounts as follows: one current account for the most recent annual appropriation that covers obligations for the current year; five expired accounts, one for each of the previous five years that covers upward adjustments to previously incurred obligations; and one no-year account because Congress frequently provides some portion of an appropriation for long-term projects. On a daily basis agencies are required to track their resources, keeping 87 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. these various amounts separate. On a quarterly and annual basis, agencies report to Treasury and OMB according to these divisions. This division is also typically the basis for OMB’s approval of apportionments. Needless to say, this division is a primary control mechanism. Violations are punishable under the Antideficiency Act. Treasury accounts are also classified in the fond categories described below. Each category is based on different general legal characteristics, and each fond within any category has its own legal authority. Though these categories do not serve as control mechanisms of a sort, for this dissertation they are presented as a significant way of looking at funds to understand how they operate. General funds, by far the most numerous type, receive their primary budgetary resources from the general fond of the Treasury. Even though they might receive revenue from outside sources (e.g., other federal accounts or even the general public), their primary funding source is an annual infusion resulting from the appropriations process. Some also have mandatory authority from the authorizing committees, but those are quite small in number though frequently large in dollar volume. Special funds are accounts that receive their budgetary resources from a revenue- generating source earmarked in law. The generating source may or may not be similar in purpose to the spending account; that is beside the point. Most special funds receive annual appropriations language directing a specific dollar amount be made available from the earmarked receipts for the purposes of the program. 88 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Revolving fends are accounts that essentially carry on a cycle of business: they buy goods and services that are then sold to federal and noix-federal customers, which in turn generates more revenue to buy more goods and sendees. They are designed to cover their costs and thus seldom need an appropriation from Congress. Budgetary resources entering a revolving fend become no-year money. Working fends and management fends are accounts that essentially consolidate or coordinate the resources from several accounts in order to procure or produce a good or service needed by the contributing accounts. Their authority is much more limited than the revolving fends, and the period of availability of resources entering the account remains the same as what Congress provided. Trust fends are very similar to special fends in that they have an earmarked revenue generator. They do, however, have the feel-good word “trust” attached to them by Congress in the authorizing legislation and receive special accounting and budgetary treatments. Unless a trust fend has permanent authority to expend budgetary resources, it is still dependent upon annual appropriations actions by Congress, and any features of the legislation can be changed at any time by an act of Congress. Federal government trust fends should not be confused with the notion of trust fends as used in common language or private sector financial management. As Patashnik (1997, p. 432) notes in . “Unfolding Promises: Trust Funds and the Politics of Precommitment“policy makers deliberately and purposely create trust fends in order to make their promises more durable.” Similar to President Roosevelt’s 89 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. political rationale for creating the Social Security Trust Fund referenced earlier, policy makers know the term “trust fund” creates expectations and beliefs In parties promised benefits from trust funds. Despite the fact that these beliefs have no legal basis, they do have political Implications and thus Impact the federal budget. While the number of trust funds is relatively small, their share of federal spending Is relatively great, mostly due to retirement and medical care programs for senior citizens. Noting the desirability of long-term policy commitments but the constraints they place on policy makers, Patashnik observes a “tension between credibility and flexibility, In which the present straggles with the future and with the past” (p. 431). Occasionally, a member of Congress requests GAO’s opinion on how agencies are managing their accounts. For example, in 1978 GAO conducted a thorough review of the Department of Agriculture’s unobligated balances and the advisability of continued no-year funding in various accounts. GAO found a significant accumulation of unobligated balances but was generally able to support the agency’s justification even though their estimates needed improvements. GAO could not, however, find clear reasons for Congress to continue granting no-year authority for a significant number of accounts. Other than citing the standard benefits of increased timing flexibility for program management and increased efficiency for financial management, no-year funding should be supported by clear evidence that it is required to address peculiarities of the particular account. Comptroller General Elmer Staats wrote: “In making its decision, the Congress 90 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. should weigh the advantages and disadvantages of no-year funding, financial management, and program effectiveness against the risk of reduced Congressional, control as the result of no-year funding” (GAO, 1978, p. 12). In another interesting case, GAO examined the Agency for International Development’s management of no-year funding authority. Unlike other agencies, AID has special authority called “deobligation/reobligation” or “no-year if obligated.” Under this authority, certain amounts originally appropriated as one-year or multi-year can be automatically changed to no-year if AID obligates them before the initial period of availability expires. After they are obligated, they can be deobligated and then become part of the no-year balance. This authority is a hybrid that Congress designed to address the need for additional flexibility in dealing with foreign countries or contractors working in foreign countries. Despite potential improvements AID could make in program management due to this authority, GAO found little use made of it (GAO, 1992). In a 1998 GAO report closely related to this research, GAO examined year- end obligation patterns and possible violations. Among other findings, GAO identified an increasing trend for appropriators to provide funds for more than one year. At the same time, the nature of federal obligations is changing. More and more, federal obligations are for transfer payments rather than operating expenses (GAO, 1998, pp. 5-6). 91 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER III METHODOLOGIES Quantitative research methods describe changes in presidential spending power as measured by changes in period of availability over time. This section describes the research design, data sources, data collection, sampling, and data analysis methodologies. Research Design This research uses time series data analysis techniques to examine several hundred accounts over a 30-year period. Specifically, it measures (1) the relative change in period of availability by dollar amounts and (2) the change in number of accounts by type of account. The first item is the primary focus and thrust of the research. From these changes, one can construct a model for describing the change in the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. This research does not seek causation but rather investigates and describes, based on quantitative data, historical trends that many previous political scientists and policy analysts typically address using case studies and other qualitative approaches. Simply put, time series is a set of statistical observations collected at regular intervals and arranged in chronological order. Time is the independent variable, and 92 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. researchers typically use graphs to quickly and clearly communicate findings to readers or clients. Using the most fundamental statistical tools, time series assists researchers to describe past trends, record present trends, and forecast future trends (Monahan, 2001). Mathematically, time series can be quite complex, employing advanced econometric and forecasting techniques and models aimed at forecasting, planning, and control (Kendall, 1973; Monahan, 2001). However, because this far exceeds the needs of many researchers and their research projects, especially in the social sciences, there is also a “classical” time series design used primarily for historical description (Hamburg, 1987, p. 484). The classical time series design, referred to in this dissertation as simple time series, is appropriate when the researcher wants to describe changes over time, document trends, and forecast future trends (O’Sullivan & Rassel, 1989, p. 26). That is specifically the aim of this research. Most of the references available on time series are highly complex and thus not useful for many practitioners and social science students. Kendall (1973) expresses a similar critique, noting, however, that advances in computer technology have removed many of the barriers to time series analysis due to complex calculations. Hamburg, O’Sullivan, Porter (2000), and Tal (2001) are useful resources for simple time series studies. The time series design provides researchers with information on four types of variations: long-term trends, cyclical variations, seasonal variations, and irregular fluctuations. Time series is used in many commercial, as well as governmental, 93 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. applications, including the measurement of agricultural yields, weather, investment and spending, transportation, case management, consumer behavior, social sendee provision, and the calculation of significant economic measures such as unemployment and crime rates. Time series is useful both for the immediate information it provides about history as well as its ability to form a basis for prediction and highly sophisticated analytical models. Time series can also highlight areas where further research, such as case studies, might be useful. For example, time series allows medical researchers to create several large groups of people with similar characteristics, such as gender or race, and measure the incidence of certain diseases over a period of time. From that, further analyses can be performed to suggest causation and thus interventions (Cleveland, 1993). Time series analysis is especially useful to study political behavior. For example, Edwards and Wood (1999) used time series methods to conduct an extensive analysis of presidential, media, and Congressional attention to five major public policy areas. In general, they sought information about whether the president is a proactive actor who tends to focus the attention of the media and Congress or whether the president is reactive, responding instead to the media and Congress. Using key word searches, they counted the number of paragraphs in public presidential documents, minutes of network news airtime, and Congressional hearing days devoted to each public policy area each week over a ten-year period. The first portion of their time series analysis provided the statistical basis for a useful 94 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. historical description of presidential, media, and Congressional behavior in agenda setting. As a further step, they used auto regression methods to explore causal direction (who influences whom?) and time dynamics (how long does influence take?). This research closely resembles the first portion of the Edwards and Wood research. This research looks at long-term trends because the purpose is to describe a possible gradual movement of power toward the executive branch. Cyclical variations (i.e., cycles of one to five year intervals) might be interesting and be a possible future research topic, if one were interested in describing changes brought about due to divided government (e.g.. Republican Congress and Democratic President versus Democratic Congress and Democratic President). Seasonal variations are not applicable here because each observation (i.e., budgetary resource entering an account) represents an annual total, not a periodic phenomenon (e.g., holiday, weather). Irregular fluctuations, which can be random or nonrandom, are of little interest here because any final conclusions will be based on 30 years of observations, not snapshot years. Data Sources For each dollar appropriated by Congress, a corresponding period of availability is set in law and is tracked by agency financial systems and the Department of Treasury. All of the data for this research is obtained from the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Annual Report Appendix, hereafter referred to as the TAR 95 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Appendix. This is an official, publicly available report prepared by Treasury’s Financial Management Service to meet certain legal reporting requirements placed on the Secretary of Treasury by Congress. It details, by agency and by account, all federal agency accounts, including start of year balance, new resources added (the primary focus here), transfers, outlays, and end of year balances. The period of availability for each account is clearly shown. The data used for this research is secondary data. O’Sullivan and Rassel define secondary data as “existing data that investigators collected for a purpose other than the given research study” (O’Sullivan & Rassel, 1989, p. 219). They caution researchers to address five specific concerns when evaluating a database from which secondary data will be extracted. Their concerns are enumerated and addressed for this particular research as follows: • What constituted the sample? This research uses data compiled in the TAR Appendix, a complete accounting of all federal government accounts. • What was the population? The population and the sample are the same. • What was the sampling frame? Data reflects activity on a fiscal year basis. • What sampling strategy was used? The sample is the population. • What was the response rate? Because Treasury (rather than the agencies) controls the flow of dollars into accounts (which is the key data element 96 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in this research), Treasury is not dependent on an outside source to provide responses. Therefore, to the extent that Treasury’s internal processes and automated systems are functioning properly, the response rate is 100 percent. • When were the data collected? As Treasury makes dollars available to an account throughout the year, these transactions are recorded. The TAR Appendix is a year-end summary report of all those transactions by account. • How were the data collected? Data in the TAR Appendix are derived from an. automated system maintained by Treasury. The data column for this research is provided directly by Treasury accounting systems. Treasury analysts are assigned a group of accounts for which they are responsible for recording the dollar amounts and corresponding period of availability from appropriations language and processing accounting warrants. Other data in the TAR Appendix (e.g., beginning and ending balances, accounts payable) are provided by agencies. The only data used for this research are provided by Treasury. • How were the data coded and edited? Coding, as the term is generally used in research discussions, is not an issue here. However, in the broader sense, data for this research are coded by dollar amounts (found in annual appropriations language for discretionary amounts, which is the 97 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. majority of cases, and in authorizing language for most mandatory amounts) and the corresponding period of availability (a year date). Interpreting both entries is a very simple, objective process. The researcher does not know what editing controls Treasury places on this data coding process. However, considering that these amounts are closely tied to agency audited financial statements, OMB apportionment actions, and agency budget requests, the researcher has strong reason to believe this is a rigorous process. The preface to the TAR Appendix states: This statement is recognized as the official publication of the details of receipts and outlays with which all other reports containing similar data must be in agreement. It is used by the Congressional Budget Office in serving the needs of Congress; the Office of Management and Budget in reviewing the President’s Budget programs; the General Accounting Office in performing its audit activities; the various departments and agencies of the Government in reconciling their accounts; and the general public in continually reviewing the operations of their Government. (Treasury Annual Report, 1970-2000, p. 1) • What are the operational definitions of measures? The three key concepts here are account, period of availability, and dollar amount. Accounts are identified by a unique Treasury-assigned number and the name provided, usually explicitly, in law. The period of availability is the time period specified in the appropriations language for the account. And the dollar amount is the funding level stated in dollar terms provided in the appropriations language; the TAR Appendix labels the data column 98 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. as “Appropriations and other obligational authority” and defines it: “The amounts in this column., unless otherwise footnoted, represent appropriations, increases and rescissions in borrowing authority or new contract authority” (Treasury Annual Report, 1997, p. 4; O’Sullivan 1989, p. 225). Data Collection Data were collected from the TAR Appendix on alternating years beginning in fiscal year 1970 and ending in fiscal year 2000. Data were collected for eight agencies (representing several hundred accounts) and entered on an Excel spreadsheet from which various analyses were performed. Dollar amounts were rounded to the nearest thousand. A research assistant (recently graduated with a Masters degree in Public Administration) was hired at the rate of $10 per hour to enter the data in the spreadsheets. The researcher provided the assistant with photocopies of the relevant pages from the TAR Appendix. The assistant entered the data in an Excel spreadsheet provided on a diskette. The data entry process was simply re-keying one column of numeric data, for each selected year, into three columns of the spreadsheet (each column reflects a particular period of availability: annual, multiyear, no year) on the row that corresponds to the appropriate account number. The only discretion required of the assistant was rounding whole dollar amounts to thousands of dollars. The data collection is displayed in Appendices A through H. 99 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Sampling The unit of analysis for this research is the “Treasury account.” Each Treasury' account has a legal basis in public law, requiring explicit or implicit Congressional authority to create. When Congress appropriates budgetary resources to agencies, it does so by specifying the amount and conditions under very specific account names; these names correspond directly to Treasury account numbers. In addition, when the Office of Management and Budget apportions, it does so based on Treasury accounts. So, the Treasury account construct is a primary oversight, management, and financial identification and reporting mechanism. Treasury accounts can be classified into the following fund categories: • General funds, by far the most numerous type, receive their primary budgetary resources from the general fund of the Treasury. Even though they might receive revenue from outside sources (e.g., other federal accounts or even the general public), their primary funding source is an annual infusion resulting from the appropriations process. (Note: some also have permanent authority (mandatory) but they are quite small in number though frequently large in dollar volume.) • Special funds are accounts that receive their budgetary resources from a revenue- generating source earmarked in law. The generating source may or may not be similar in purpose to the spending account; that is beside the point. Most special funds receive annual appropriations language 100 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. directing a specific dollar amount be made available from the earmarked receipts for the purposes of the program. • Revolving funds are accounts that essentially carry on a cycle of business: they buy goods and services that are then sold to federal and non-federal customers, which in torn generates more revenue to buy more goods and services. They are designed to cover their costs and thus seldom need an appropriation from Congress. Budgetary' resources entering a revolving fund due to customer payments become no-year money, are not considered an appropriation by Treasury, and therefore are not counted in this study. • Working funds and management funds are accounts that essentially consolidate or coordinate the resources from several accounts in order to procure or produce a good or service needed by the contributing accounts. Their authority is much more limited than the revolving funds, and the period of availability of resources entering the account remains the same as what Congress provided. • Trust funds are very similar to special funds (i.e., earmarked revenue generator). They do, however, have the feel-good word “trust” attached to them by Congress and receive special accounting and budgetary treatments. They should not be confused with the notion of a trust fund as used in common language or private sector financial management. 101 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Unless a trust fond has permanent authority to expend budgetary resources, it is dependent upon annual appropriations actions by Congress. For this research, these five types are collapsed into three categories: general fond, special fond (combining special, revolving, and working funds), and trust funds. In most cases, neither revolving nor working funds display specific data because amounts going to them are processed through purchase-type transactions between accounts, and the resources are thus recorded with the originating account. They are, however, useful to include in this study because one can examine the extent to which the number of this type of account has increased or decreased over the years of the study. For background information, Table 1 displays a sample of agencies and the corresponding number of Treasury accounts, by type, comparing 1978 and 2000 102 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 1 AGENCIES AND THE CORRESPONDING NUMBER OF TREASURY ACCOUNTS Agency Number of Treasury Accounts by Type General Special Trust Total 1978 2000 1978 2000 1978 2000 1978 2000 Veterans Affairs 13 23 2 6 4 10 19 39 Commerce 27 25 4 7 11 1 42 33 Labor 13 15 0 4 5 6 18 25 Interior 42 39 42 70 13 10 97 119 Education 23 39 2 0 1 2 26 41 SBA 1 7 4 1 0 0 5 8 NASA 3 8 0 0 2 3 5 11 GSA 13 4 2 4 1 0 16 8 Total 135 160 56 92 37 32 228 284 The purpose of this table is simply to provide some idea of how many accounts of the various types exist within agencies. Over time, the quantity and type of accounts changes for various reasons, as will be seen in the research data. The research sample is not random. First, the selected agencies were chosen because of the researcher’s perception that they are fairly stable (e.g., it would not 103 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. make sense to include the small agencies referred to generally as “Other Independent Agencies” because many are created then discontinued after their rather limited missions are accomplished), and thus selected agencies represent a reasonably large portion of the federal budget in dollar terms (except for defense, social security, and large programs for the elderly), and they fairly represent both authorization and appropriation committee jurisdictions. The Department of Defense was specifically not chosen primarily because of its long history of violating fundamental reporting and accounting practices (discussed in earlier analyses). Likewise, the Department of State and the various international accounts were not chosen, primarily because legal authorities outside the scope of this research provide the President wider latitude than is granted to other accounts. The researcher selected eight organizations for this study: the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Commerce, Labor, Interior, and Education and several smaller, non-cabinet agencies, the Small Business Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and General Sendees Administration. Data Analysis This research seeks to identify and explain historical trends in order to describe how the quantity and type of accounts have changed and to describe how the periods of availability for these accounts have changed over the test period. Statistical analyses are performed for each agency to describe these changes. Each agency in the sample is analyzed and compared both to the other agencies and to 104 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. itself. A written summary using narrative description and statisticai measures describes how each agency’s accounts have changed over the years of this study. Visual presentations of the data is used heavily. Because Excel spreadsheets are used to collect the data, the graphics capabilities of that program are used extensively. After the data was entered and appropriate totals were derived, a summary spreadsheet was prepared for each agency to present the summary data in the exact format required to use the graphics capabilities. Line charts compare the three types of accounts with the three categories of periods of availability. Dollar amounts are shown as a percentage of the entire agency resources rather than attempting to use an economic infiator to adjust for decreases in the value of a dollar over time (and thus increases in the amounts Congress makes available). 105 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER IV DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION An Overview The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyze the study data by agency. The agency data are presented as responses to four research questions, each described below. The purpose of the questions was to measure: (1) the change in quantity and composition of accounts by account type and (2) the change in period of availability over the 30-year period. Research questions #1 and #2 address this first issue. Questions #3 and #4 address the second issue. Each agency section is accompanied by six figures and a summary table in this chapter. Detailed spreadsheets for each of the eight agencies are presented in Appendices A through H. The following questions are examined for each agency: • Research Question #1: How did the number of accounts change by account type over the test period? • Research Question #2: How did the dollar distribution change by account type over the test period? 106 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Research Question #3: How did the dollar distribution change by period of availability over the test period? • Research Question #4: How did the number of no-year accounts change over the test period? In any profession, terminology is key to clarity and precision. In the federal budget profession, several words used in common language have wholly different meanings when applied to the federal budget, and vice versa. To avoid confusion, in this section “account type” is used to refer to the three fond types: genera! fends, special funds, and trust funds. (See Chapter 3 for descriptions of fund types.) “Dollars” refers to the amount of new budget authority provided to accounts. Department of Commerce Account Distribution by Account Type Research Question #1: How did the number of accounts change by account type over the test period? Answer: Commerce consistently received dollars in a combination of general, special, and trust accounts. In 1970, new dollars were provided to 34 general accounts (79 percent), zero special accounts, and nine trust accounts (21 percent). Throughout the test period, the number of special accounts receiving new dollars increased from zero to seven, reaching a high of nine in 1996. This is a change from zero percent to 21 percent. Combining special and trust accounts, the combined 107 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. percentage increased from 21 percent of accounts to 24 percent, with several interim years showing a larger increase. Despite these increases, general accounts were clearly more numerous, accounting for at least 51 percent and as much as 79 percent. This is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Dollar Distribution by Account Type Research Question #2: How did the dollar distribution change by account type over the test period? Answer: Despite the growing number of special and trust accounts reported above, their contribution, measured in dollars, was very low. The general accounts consistently received over 90 percent of new dollars. Specifically, in 1970, general accounts received 98 percent of all new dollars, dipped to their lowest point in 1986 at 91 percent, and ended the study period at 100 percent. This is illustrated in Figure 4. Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability Research Question #3: How did the dollar distribution change by period of availability over the test period? Answer: In 1970, 55 percent of new agency dollars were designated as annual, 17 percent were naulti-year, and 28 percent were no-year. By 2000, only 2 percent were annual, 2 . percent were multi-year, and 96 percent were no-year. This is illustrated in Figure 5. 108 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Distribution of No-Year Accounts Research Question #4: How did the number of no-year accounts change over the test period? Answer: In 1970, 18 accounts received no-year dollars: nine were general accounts and nine were trust accounts. After 1982, the trust accounts declined to four or fewer accounts in any given year, and the special accounts increased slightly, reaching nine (38 percent) in 1996 but then dipping down to seven (32 percent) by the end of the test period. The general accounts increased from nine (50 percent) in 1970, to a high of 21 (68 percent) in 1994, and down to 14 (64 percent) in 2000. This is illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. 109 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. o sjunooov 10 jequinN < s o S 110 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DEPARTMENT O F COMMERCE ACCOUNT DISTRIBUTION B Y ACCOUNT TYPE O O O O O O O Q O O O O 0 > e 0 N -< 0 t f } ^ t C 0 C M v - 1 — I 15 I c o + 2 0 ) c 0 ) C D sjunooov I© lueojsd Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 3 8 o o o q o q o o o 0)fl 0 N © l O ^ O ( MT - o S 2 0 ) > - s j b ||o q m @ n p l u e a i e d r- o S 112 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DEPARTMENT O F COMMERCE DOLLAR DISTRIBUTION B Y ACCOUNT TYPE Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 Fiscal Years No-Year Multi-Year Annual FIGURE 5 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE DOLLAR DISTRIBUTION BY PERIOD OF AVAILABILITY o i O © £ 8 > I siunoooy jo jaquuriN 1 i- + ra C O + O E Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DEPARTMENT O F COMMERCE DISTRIBUTION O F NO-YEAR ACCOUNTS siunooov J Q luaojej Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DEPARTMENT O F COMMERCE PERCENT DISTRIBUTION O F NO-YEAR ACCOUNTS Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 2 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE SUMMARY TABLE 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 Question #1: Number of accounts by type General 34 37 25 24 27 24 Special 0 3 7 5 4 6 Trust 9 11 10 11 11 11 Percent of accounts by type General 79 73 60 60 64 59 Special 0 6 17 13 10 15 Trust 21 22 24 28 26 27 Question #2: Dollar distribution by account type (in percent) General 98 97 97 95 91 97 Special 0 1 1 1 5 0 Trust 2 2 3 4 3 3 Question #3: Dollar distribution by period of availability (in percent) Annual 55 46 23 22 30 25 Multi-Year 17 1 1 13 0 1 No-Year 28 53 76 64 70 74 Question #4: Number of no-year accounts General 9 14 11 14 14 13 Special 0 2 4 4 3 5 Trust 9 10 10 11 11 11 Percent of no-year accounts General 50 54 44 48 50 45 > - * Special 0 8 16 14 11 17 a\ Trust 50 38 40 38 39 38 182 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 18 19 18 17 20 26 34 25 22 25 6 6 6 5 6 5 8 9 8 7 11 4 1 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 51 66 72 71 69 76 77 71 71 76 17 21 24 21 21 15 18 26 26 21 31 14 4 8 10 9 5 3 3 3 94 96 91 96 98 95 97 97 99 100 2 2 7 2 0 3 3 3 1 0 3 2 1 2 2 - 2 0 0 0 0 18 21 17 15 12 15 14 15 13 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 82 79 83 85 88 85 82 83 85 96 10 12 10 10 10 16 21 14 11 14 5 5 6 5 6 5 8 9 8 7 11 4 1 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 38 57 59 59 53 67 68 58 55 64 19 24 35 29 32 21 26 38 40 32 42 19 6 12 16 13 6 4 5 5 Department of Interior Account Distribution by Account Type Research Question #1; How did the number of accounts change by account type over the test period? Answer: Interior had a relatively stable mix of general, special, and trust accounts. In 1970, new dollars were provided to 55 general accounts (50 percent), 40 special accounts (36 percent), and 16 trust accounts (14 percent). Throughout the test period, the number of special accounts receiving new dollars increased from 40 in 1970 (36 percent) to 70 in 2000 (59 percent). The most dramatic increase occurred between. 1992 and 1994 when special accounts increased from 50 to 61. Combining special and trust accounts, the combined percentage increased from 50 percent of accounts to 67 percent. Beginning in 1972, the combined number of special and trust accounts exceeded the number of general accounts. This is illustrated in Figures 8 and 9. Dollar Distribution by Account Type Research Question #2: How did the dollar distribution change by account type over the test period? Answer: As measured in dollars, the distribution between general, special, and trust accounts remained remarkably constant over the test period. General accounts consistently accounted for the majority of dollars. The high of 76 percent 117 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. was reached In 1970, and that rate trailed off only slightly, ending with 61 percent in 2000. Special accounts varied only slightly, with a low of 20 percent In 1974 and a high of 36 percent in 2000. Trust accounts varied a bit, beginning the study period at 1 percent, reached highs of 19 percent and 15 percent in two years, but otherwise remained in the 6 percent to 9 percent range for most years. This is illustrated is Figure 10. Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability Research Question #3: How did the dollar distribution change by period of availability over the test period? Answer: The distribution between annual, multi-year, and no-year remained virtually constant over the test period until 1998 when the annual and multi-year trend lines crossed over. Between 1994 and 1996, the percent of multi-year dollars increased from 6 percent to 14 percent, and those percentages continued to increase to 25 percent in 1998 and 24 percent in 2000. At the same time, the percent of annual dollars decreased from 45 percent in 1994, 33 percent in 1996, 21 percent in 1998, and finally down to 16 percent in 2000. Throughout this time, the percent of dollars designated as no-year held fairly constant and exceeded 50 percent for most years. The lowest amount was 45 percent In 1986. If these trends continue, the no year designation will continue to dominate and the multi-year designation will continue to grow in importance. This is Illustrated In Figure 11. 118 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Distribution of No-Year Accounts Research Question. #4: How did the number of no-year accounts change over the test period? Answer: In 1970, 73 accounts received no-year dollars: 26 were general accounts (33 percent), 37 were special accounts (47 percent), and 15 were trust accounts (19 percent). The total number of accounts remained fairly constant until 1988 when the total began to increase from 83 to around 100 in 1994 through 2000. The majority of this increase was in the special fond category. In 1970, 37 accounts were special accounts (47 percent). The number of special accounts increased gradually until 1986 when the total increased to 45 (61 percent) and continued to increase through 2000 when the total reached 67 accounts (63 percent). At the same time, genera! accounts remained fairly constant, but trust accounts, as a percent of the total, declined from 19 percent in 1970 down to 9 percent by 2000. This is illustrated in Figures 12 and 13. 119 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 § 8 g g 8 § 8 8 spnooov jo iU 0 O J© d 120 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DEPARTMENT O F INTERIOR ACCOUNT DISTRIBUTION B Y ACCOUNT TYPE Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 80 < ■ 5 1 E 3 Z 30 20 10 A - * - I....... V " ' T" "-""T N c f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Fiscal Years ■ General ■ Special •Trust FIGURE 9 DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR PERCENT DISTRIBUTION BY ACCOUNT TYPE Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 go ■ CD ao - 8 70 ■ 60 - z 50 ■ • s 40 t: 30 ® 20 CL 10 - 0 - 4 —A—i ^ Ti—A— , " .p — — , r ...... .........r r Fiscal Years ■General ■ Special -Trust FIGURE 10 DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR DOLLAR DISTRIBUTION BY ACCOUNT TYPE 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 ( 0 © > - 3 + C \ o te * fa SJByOQ MSN P lUSOJSd 123 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. % % 1 8 s?unoD3V P jsquunN oe H 124 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sjunoooy |0 jueojad Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DEPARTMENT O F INTERIOR PERCENT DISTRIBUTION O F NO-YEAR ACCOUNTS Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 3 DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR SUMMARY TABLE 170 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 i by type 55 51 46 42 42 39 39 40 41 42 48 57 62 54 49 39 40 40 42 43 42 42 39 43 47 49 52 50 61 64 64 70 16 15 16 14 13 10 10 12 11 13 13 16 18 18 14 10 by type 50 48 44 42 43 43 44 42 41 40 42 46 44 40 39 33 36 38 40 43 43 46 44 45 47 47 46 41 43 47 50 59 14 14 15 14 13 11 11 13 11 13 12 13 13 13 11 8 t account type (in percent) 76 64 61 66 61 59 65 60 68 67 65 66 70 71 69 61 23 35 20 27 33 26 26 34 26 25 26 26 24 22 24 36 1 1 19 7 6 15 9 6 6 7 9 8 6 7 7 3 Question #1: Number of acc General Special Trust Percent of acci General Special Trust Question #2: Dollar distributi General Special Trust Question #3: Dollar distribution by period of availability (in percent) Annual 31 42 46 33 42 40 46 42 50 50 38 42 45 33 21 16 Multi-Year 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 5 5 1 3 5 6 14 25 24 No-Year 69 58 54 67 57 58 52 53 45 49 59 53 49 53 54 60 N ) O n Question #4: Number of no-year accounts General 26 27 Special 37 38 Trust 15 15 Percent of no-year accounts General 33 34 Special 47 48 Trust 19 19 25 25 21 20 18 20 18 23 25 27 30 30 29 30 39 43 39 39 37 40 45 47 49 47 59 62 60 67 16 14 13 10 10 12 11 13 13 16 18 18 14 10 31 30 29 i 29 28 28 24 28 29 30 28 27 28 28 49 52 53 57 57 56 61 57 56 52 55 56 58 63 20 17 18 14 15 17 15 16 15 18 17 16 14 9 Department of Veterans Affairs Account Distribution by Account Type Research Question #1: How did the number of accounts change by account type over the test period? Answer: The majority of Veterans Affairs accounts that received new dollars were general accounts. In 1970, new dollars were provided to 10 general accounts (71 percent), one special account (7 percent), and 3 trust accounts (21 percent). Throughout the test period, the relative distribution remained fairly constant except for a noticeable increase in 1992 when the number of general accounts increased sharply from 13 {65 percent) in 1990 to 24 accounts (75 percent) in 1992, 27 (77 percent) in 1994, and then decreased to 20 (69 percent) in 1998, and 23 (59 percent) In 2000. This is Illustrated In Figures 14 and 15. Dollar Distribution by Account Type Research Question #2: How did the dollar distribution change by account type over the test period? Answer: Despite the finding that general fund accounts historically accounted for approximately 70 percent of all accounts, their contribution, as measured in dollars, consistently exceeded 90 percent of new dollars. Special accounts received between zero and 3 percent while trust accounts received between zero and 8 percent. This is illustrated in Figure 16. 127 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability Research Question #3: How did the dollar distribution change by period of availability over the test period? Answer: From 1970 through 1988, the relative distribution of new dollars entering annual, multi-year, and no-year accounts remained fairly constant. The amount of new dollars entering multi-year accounts increased beginning in 1980. Throughout the test period, the amount of no-year funding has gradually increased, while annual has declined. This is illustrated in Figure 17. Distribution of No-Year Accounts Research Question #4: How did the number of no-year accounts change over the test period? Answer: In 1970, nine accounts received no-year dollars: five (56 percent) were general accounts, one (11 percent) was a special account, and three (33 percent) were trust accounts. This distribution remained fairly constant until 1990 when the total number of accounts receiving no-year dollars increased from 12 in 1990 to 15 in 1992. Between 1992 and 2000, the number of accounts receiving no-year dollars ranged between 14 and 18 accounts. This is illustrated in Figures 18 and 19. 128 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. m c 3 8 o < « » — o f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ K # ^ ^ ^ ^ Fiscal Years -General -Special -Trust FIGURE 14 DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS ACCOUNT DISTRIBUTION BY ACCOUNT TYPE Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 90 m c B O 3 70 8 fiO < H - S O o c 40 8 30 © Q. 20 10 0 # ^ ^ ^ N # ^ N # # ^ Fiscal Years ■General ■Special -Trust FIG U R E 15 DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS PERCENT DISTRIBUTION BY ACCOUNT TYPE o Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. e J5 8 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 a Q a * V a V jfb A ^ b & .o S & & 0 a. Fiscal Years ■ General •Special •Trust FIGURE 16 DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS DOLLAR DISTRIBUTION BY ACCOUNT TYPE Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. S 2 J§ 8 I z c 8 L . 0 CL 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 ^ ^ .< & .<# .<# « i v ' S C I V Fiscal Years -Annual ■ Multi-Year ■ No-Year FIGURE 17 DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS DOLLAR DISTRIBUTION BY PERIOD OF AVAILABILITY U J ts > o CO CO o C M £ 0 ) sjunoooy jo jsquinssl i h- + ra + 9 8 133 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DEPARTMENT O F VETERANS AFFAIRS DISTRIBUTION O F NO-YEAR ACCOUNTS Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. B c 3 < * 4 — 0 1 < J > CL 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 ^ .dP .c# -c# A & Y V 4^ o ? > o T l ' Q & Q & J^) v . o > .d A .< V .O k' „ C F .O P .O P .O P .O P Fiscal Years ■ General ■ Special -Trust FIGURE 19 DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF NO-YEAR ACCOUNTS U ) TABLE 4 € M C O C D O 0 5 t O C D C M t O - r - C M NON 0 5 o> m* c o s o O C O t o C D N * 0 0 T " I f ) r- ( M » m m w 8 © M " t O 0 5 N - C M C D r - t - • s — C M C O ID N 00 0 4 6 s - t“ * C D t - C O 05 C D O C O 0 5 r» c m u a o © s 0) N - C M C O N » C O I s - C M I s - , r “ < 0 © M F 05 C M C M 3 o C M C O C O C O C M 0 5 0 5 C O t O l O 0 5 C D C M h * ' r - 8 0 o & o 0 5 M * M * to t o N . C O t O 0 5 C O C M to t o O t o t - C O t - C M C O C M t o 0 5 0 5 C O O C D 8 0 C M 8 0 C M I s - C M t- M * 6@ 69 0 5 C M M " l O C M M i " C D v - C M 0 5 C O C D C D C O C O C D tO C M M F I D C O C O ■ * s f * v - C O C £ 5 m 0 5 C O C M C O C M N * » C M C O 05 C O t o C O C O C O C D to s 0 5 ^ r* I s - C M M * © C D 05 C O C O to C D 8 0 M " O O O l O ' M * C M 6 3 05 to O to c m to O to 05 05 CD 1 0 0 4 0 0 4 to o €9 05 C O © 4 0 0 4 C M M " O C D 05 O CO o N- 0 0 4 O O O C D M F 6 9 0 1 C D N 05 C M fe a K 0 5 CO C M M * CO C M C O C M CO tD £ •r- C M C M 05 CD CO 05 I s - T ~ 09 C 3 • C O a. & > * * - n r ^ C M 8 & £ 3 O ® 5 k • £ * E g z § I t © •» ® C L 2 O to h S <0 « g 1 = 0 i n o i n S o o o t- CD g C M S'- Q. C C M O 00 =C-CM r - < D O "t a» ® a. M " O CD • 0 5 < 9 5 CL C M C M CO v-C M O O ^ W O N — ^ -------- ^ 0 9 £ 3 8 O C O >* .£2 £ O «3 C M O 60 05 s I I | CO I— - : T 3 t'l m n k i2 £ ° O Q (3 a> 3 a & < o £ 3 « 0 M(- i a § C O O S o & S > . •Q £ O *45 3 — -O C O E 3 =8 i ? < - ^ J2 S o . 2 Q 1® a> 3 a O f** o CD Is- O 05 N* C O L 0 9 S s V - ^ < 2 ? 1 * ^ z Is *- C M "Sf 4 W f t o T " C O N- C M C O t o css CO t o C M CO 0 0 I s - to t o '5 — C M O O O to C M C O £ 3 8 8 w C O £ > O £ o o o 03 IO C M CO C 3 SO CD CD to CO CO C D 05 >» C O C O •. a> 1 i o z to «u 3 O 2 1 g _ „ it os,; ® o is £ ® § O S ® 3 ® a. 2 “ ® a, 2 0 CO I - c 0 tO K - § C D Q. 135 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. General Services Administration Account Distribution by Account Type Research Question #1: How did the number of accounts change by account type over the test period? Answer: Over the test period, over 90 percent of GSA’s accounts were either general or special accounts. In 1970, 12 accounts (80 percent) were genera! accounts, two accounts (13 percent) were special accounts, and one (7 percent) was a trust account. After 1984, no new dollars went to the trust category, and the remaining percentage distribution remained fairly constant between general and special accounts. In 1984, however, the total number of accounts dropped from a range of between 15 and 21 each year, to 14, then down to nine in 1988. In 1990 through 1994, the number increased back to between 12 and 13 accounts, then fell back down in 1996 to seven, followed by eight in the following two years. Despite the declining number of total accounts, the percentage of special accounts increased. For example, in 1982, 20 percent of the accounts were special accounts. The following year, the percentage increased to 29 percent, then 50 percent in 1986. The high of 63 percent was reached in 1998. This switch between general and special accounts occurred gradually but consistently. This is illustrated in Figures 20 and 21. 136 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Dollar Distribution by Account Type Research Question #2: How did the dollar distribution change by account type over the test period? Answer: Between 1970 and 1990, the percentage distribution of new dollars between general and special accounts remained fairly stable, ranging from 87 to 98 percent for general accounts and from 2 percent to 19 percent for special accounts. After 1990, the relative distributions varied so much that no patterns or trends are observable. In 1970 through 1984, small dollar amounts (1 percent or less) were deposited to trust accounts but were not significant. This is illustrated in Figure 22. Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability Research Question #3: How did the dollar distribution change by period of availability over the test period? Answer: From 1970 to 1988, between 62 and 99 percent of the new dollars were annual amounts. Most of the remainder was no-year. After 1988, however, the distribution varied considerably, with no-year accounting for about 50 percent in some years. After 1986, no multi-year authority was provided. This is illustrated in Figure 23. Distribution of No-Year Accounts Research Question #4: How did the number of no-year accounts change over the test period? 137 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Answer: In 1970, five accounts received no-year dollars: four were general accounts and one was a trust account. Over the test period several special accounts began receiving dollars, and the trust ceased receiving dollars. Throughout the period, the total number of accounts receiving new no-year dollars remained relatively constant for most years, typically at four or five. This is illustrated in Figures 24 and 25. 138 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sjunooov P J®qujnN o n O £ 139 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNT DISTRIBUTION B Y ACCOUNT TYPE Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Fiscal Years Trust FIGURE 21 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION PERCENT DISTRIBUTION BY ACCOUNT TYPE e (0 > 2 m sz m 3 8 — Q CO + a C D c ( D 0 \ o S SJB||0Q M9N 10 lU0OJ0d 141 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION DOLLAR DISTRIBUTION B Y ACCOUNT TYPE 8 8 § ° § S ° 8 O O 2 I § I i 3 s + ( 0 3 C o £ SJB||O Q M 0 N J.0 JU S O JSd 142 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. <o CO o > - I E l siunooov p jequjnN I CO + E 0 ) e 0 } 0 I < S O £ 143 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION DISTRIBUTION O F NO-YEAR ACCOUNTS % % sjunoosv 10 JU90J9d If} O 144 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION PERCENT DISTRIBUTION O F NO-YEAR ACCOUNTS Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 5 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION SUMMARY TABLE 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1988 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Question #1: Number of accounts by type General 12 13 18 14 13 17 14 9 6 5 9 9 8 3 3 4 Special 2 2 2 3 2 3 4 4 6 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 Trust 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Percent of accounts by type General 80 81 86 78 81 81 70 64 50 56 69 69 67 43 38 50 Special 13 13 10 17 13 14 20 29 50 44 31 31 33 57 63 50 Trust 7 6 5 6 6 5 10 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Question #2: Dollar distribution by account type General 95 96 (in 95 percent) 89 98 98 88 95 87 87 81 40 53 78 34 86 Special 5 4 5 11 2 2 12 4 13 13 19 60 47 22 66 14 Trust 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 ■ 0 0 0 0 0 Question #3: Dollar distribution by period of availability (in percent) Annual 83 62 90 90 99 98 85 93 86 97 81 41 51 87 38 84 Multi-Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 5 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 No-Year 17 38 10 10 1 2 2 2 8 3 19 59 49 13 62 16 Question #4: Number of no-year accounts General 4 5 4 2 2 2 1 1 0 1 3 3 2 0 0 1 Special 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 Trust 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Percent of no-year accounts General 80 83 80 50 67 50 25 25 0 50 60 60 50 0 0 33 Special 0 0 0 25 0 25 25 50 100 50 40 40 50 100 100 67 Trust 20 17 20 25 33 25 50 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Account Distribution by Account Type Research Question #1: How did the number of accounts change by account type over the test period? Answer: NASA had a small number of accounts relative to other federal agencies. In 1970, the total number of accounts that received new dollars was four: three general accounts (75 percent) and one trust account (25 percent). Throughout the test period, each year typically had between four and six accounts, with that number increasing to eight in 1990 and 1996, to nine in 1996, and to 11 in 1994 and 2000. By the end of the test period, NASA had eight general accounts (73 percent) and three trust accounts (27 percent). NASA had zero special accounts. In general, this percentage distribution remained constant throughout the test period. This is illustrated in Figures 26 and 27. Dollar Distribution by Account Type Research Question #2: How did the dollar distribution change by account type over the test period? Answer: As measured in dollars, the distribution between general and trust accounts remained remarkably constant over the test period with general accounts receiving over 99 percent of the dollars. Even though trust accounts did receive 146 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. dollars, the amount, compared to general accounts, was so small it rounded to zero. This is illustrated in Figure 28. Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability Research Question #3: How did the dollar distribution, change by period of availability over the test period? Answer: The distribution between annual, multi-year, and no-year dollars remained fairly constant from 1970 through 1976. The percent of annual dollars varied between 19 percent and 24 percent, multi-year dollars varied between 2 percent and 3 percent, and no-year dollars accounted for between 72 percent and 81 percent. This mix changed drastically, however, in 1978. In 1978, the percentage of multi-year and no-year flipped so that no-year dollars dropped from 75 percent in 1976 to zero percent in 1978. Multi-year dollars increased from 2 percent in 1976 to 78 percent in 1978. This shows a definite policy shift. Following the 1978 shift, the relative distribution between periods of availability remained fairly constant throughout the test period. Annual dollars varied between 11 percent and 20 percent, multi-year between 77 percent and 89 percent, and no-year at between zero percent and 5 percent. This is illustrated in Figure 29. Distribution of No-Year Accounts Research Question #4: How did the number of no-year accounts change over the test period? 147 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Answer: In 1970, three accounts (75 percent) received no-year dollars: two (67 percent) were general accounts and one (33 percent) was a trust account. Between 1970 and 1976, between two and three accounts received no-year dollars each year. However, due to the drastic shift in distribution of multi-year and no-year dollars described immediately above, an analysis of NASA no-year dollars is virtually irrelevant. As described above, beginning in 1978 the percentage of no-year NASA dollars dropped from 75 percent in 1976 to approximately zero percent in 1978. From 1980 through the end of the test period, no-year dollars, as a percent of total new dollars, varied between 1 and 5 percent. This small amount of dollars was consistently distributed to between one and four different accounts (except for 1994 and 2000 when it was six), sometimes a mix of general and trust accounts, and other times just one or the other. The small number of accounts involved makes the percentages fluctuate considerably. This is illustrated in Figures 30 and 31. 148 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Number o f Accounts 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 ^ Fiscal Years General Special — A—Trust FIGURE 26 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNT DISTRIBUTION BY ACCOUNT TYPE Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 < n — O c S 0 ) Q . ^ ^ A* .< & .< & .c# Fiscal Years General — ■ —Special A—Trust FIGURE 27 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION PERCENT DISTRIBUTION BY ACCOUNT TYPE o i 8 8 § g § 8 ? S S ? ° sje||OQ m@n P luaoj®d % t S n % X X X X E (0 m X w > X E X X X X X X X s 5 H I m I C O + 0 £ 151 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NATIONAL AERONAUTICS A N D SPA C E ADMINISTRATION DOLLAR DISTRIBUTION B Y ACCOUNT TYPE e § § g § g § g § ? ° S J B | | O Q M 8 | S | J O J U 0 O J 8 d 2 s >- X I s 3 + & \ 8 ^ g ° 152 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. , AERONAUTICS A N D SPA C E ADMINISTRATION DISTRIBUTION B Y PERIOD O F AVAILABILITY CO o S 2 % g >- sjunoooy |o JsquunN < 0 + © eo £3 O E Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NATIONAL AERONAUTICS A N D SPA C E ADMINISTRATION DISTRIBUTION O F NO-YEAR ACCOUNTS Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ K# ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ < f Fiscal Years ■General -Special ■Trust - FIGURE 31 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF NO-YEAR ACCOUNTS Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 6 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION SUMMARY TABLE 1870 1872 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1884 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Question #1: Number of accounts by type General 3 3 3 4 3 4 5 6 5 5 6 5 8 8 8 8 Special 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Trust 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 3 Percent of accounts by type General 75 75 75 80 60 100 83 100 83 83 75 71 73 80 80 73 Special 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Trust 25 25 25 20 40 0 17 0 17 17 25 29 27 20 20 27 Question #2: Dollar distribution by account type (in percent) General 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Special 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Trust 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Question #3: Dollar distribution by period of availability (in Annual 19 22 24 23 percent) 22 18 19 17 17 20 17 11 12 12 12 13 Multi-Year 0 2 3 2 78 77 80 81 82 79 81 89 86 88 87 86 No-Year 81 76 72 75 0 5 1 2 1 1 3 0 2 1 0 1 Question #4: Number of no-year accounts General 2 1 1 2 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 3 3 3 3 Special 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Trust 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 3 Percent of no-year accounts General 67 50 50 67 0 100 50 100 50 50 33 0 50 60 60 50 155 Special 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Trust 33 50 50 33 100 0 50 0 50 50 67 100 50 40 40 50 Department of Education Account Distribution lay Account Type Research Question #1: How did the number of accounts change by account type over the test period? Answer: The account distribution at Education was very stable over the test period and shows that the overwhelming majority of accounts were general fund accounts. Beginning in 1970, Education had a total of 24 accounts: 22 were general accounts (92 percent), two were special accounts (8 percent), and zero were trust accounts. Despite a slight dip in the following year, the total number of accounts receiving new dollars varied between 24 and 26 for 1970 through 1978. In 1980, while the new Department was being separated from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the total reached 61. For the years from 1982 to 2000, totals ranged from 32 to 43. In most years, the percentage of general accounts varied between 88 and 100 percent. Special accounts accounted for a small percentage from 1970 through 1982, then declined to zero. Trust accounts frequently accounted for between 2 and 5 percent. This is illustrated in Figures 32 and 33. Dollar Distribution by Account Type Research Question #2: How did the dollar distribution change by account type over the test period? 156 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Answer: As measured in dollar's, the distribution between general, special, and trust accounts shows that the overwhelming majority of new dollars went to general accounts. Throughout the period, approximately 100 percent went to general accounts each year except 1974 through 1980 and 1992, when the percentages were 95 and 98 percent. Special accounts accounted for a small percentage during these four years. This is illustrated in Figure 34. Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability Research Question #3: How did the dollar distribution change by period of availability over the test period? Answer: The distribution between annual, multi-year, and no-year varied considerably over the test period. The first major variation occurred between 1974 and 1976. In 1974, 80 percent of new dollars was annual, 12 percent was multi-year, and 8 percent was no-year. From 1976 onward, the relative contribution of annual and multi-year dollars virtually flipped. In 1976, the percent of annual dollars dropped to 49 percent, multi-year increased to 43 percent, and no-year accounted for just 8 percent. After 1978, the annual and multi-year dollar relative contribution remained fairly stable. With only two exceptions, the percent of annual dollars varied between 16 and 29 percent. The percent of multi-year dollars varied between 53 and 69 percent. The percent of no-year dollars increased beginning in 1980. Prior to 1980, the no-year designation accounted for between 3 and 8 percent. From 1980 157 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. through 2000, this percentage ranged from 12 to 29 percent, except for 1998 when the percentage was 9 percent. This is illustrated in Figure 35. Distribution of No-Year Accounts Research Question #4: How did the number of no-year accounts change over the test period? Answer: In 1970, seven accounts received no-year dollars: five were general accounts (71 percent) and two were special accounts (29 percent). The total number of accounts increased gradually throughout the test period, reaching a high of 12 in three years (1980, 1992, and 1994), then dipped down again slightly. Between 63 percent and 100 percent of the no-year dollars went to general accounts throughout the test period. From 1972 through 1982, general, special, and trust accounts received some portion of the dollars, with the lowest at 10 percent. From 1984 onward, special accounts received no-year dollars in only one year, 1992. Over the entire test period, trust accounts received no-year dollars in all but three years, with relative contributions ranging from 7 percent to 25 percent. This is illustrated in Figures 36 and 37. 158 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. s o c s s o o w s H - I i C O + o E sjunooov |o JsquiniM 159 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DEPARTMENT O F EDUCATION ACCOUNT DISTRIBUTION B Y ACCOUNT TYPE Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. m € < ■ £ § Q _ 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 ^ ^ # # # # # , # # ^ # n # Fiscal Years ■General -Special ■Trust FIGURE 33 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION PERCENT DISTRIBUTION BY ACCOUNT TYPE Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. too 90 m c a B O 8 70 60 ® z 50 < * - o 40 c A ) 30 o © 20 n 10 0 Fiscal Years ■ General • Special ■Trust FIGURE 34 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION DOLLAR DISTRIBUTION BY ACCOUNT TYPE Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. too JS 2 I Z 0 < * « f > 1 0 ) Q_ / v O / I 1 < i 5j A * b ^ A A A (ft A ot1 < # > c& v o . ' . a ' ’ . a ' . c s ^ ,6 P .cS P . c ^ . o f .o r9 . o f .O F . o f „ c f Fiscal Years ■Annual ■Multi-Year • No-Year FIGURE 35 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION DOLLAR DISTRIBUTION BY PERIOD OF AVAILABILITY C h ts > Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C O c. 3 < > 4— © I - a > a 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 ^ A* < £ > C# .c# .<# .<# .c# .<# .<# .<# .<# jc*? Fiscal Years ■General ■Special •Trust FIGURE 36 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION DISTRIBUTION OF NO-YEAR ACCOUNTS Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 B c 3 O ffl CL ^ O A .& > .O k ' O v ' Fiscal Years ■General ■ Special -Trust FIGURE 37 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF NO-YEAR ACCOUNTS 5 Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 7 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SUMMARY TABLE 1970 1972 1974 1976 ' 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 ' 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Question #1: Number of accounts by type General 22 19 21 22 23 56 33 32 32 31 33 37 42 36 35 39 Special 2 2 2 2 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 Trust 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 2 2 2 Percent of accounts by type General 92 86 88 88 88 92 94 97 100 94 97 95 98 95 95 95 Special 8 9 8 8 8 7 3 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 Trust 0 5 4 4 4 2 3 3 0 6 3 0 2 5 5 5 Question #2: Dollar distribution by account type (in percent) General 100 100 98 98 95 95 100 100 100 100 100 94 100 100 100 100 Special 0 0 2 2 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 Trust 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 Question #3: Dollar distribution by period of availability (in percent) Annual 91 88 80 49 26 23 19 21 19 21 19 16 19 21 22 29 Multi-Year 6 6 12 43 69 64 59 64 61 66 63 55 66 64 69 53 No-Year 3 5 8 8 5 12 22 15 19 13 18 29 15 16 9 18 Q uestion #4: Number of no-year accounts General 5 5 5 5 5 9 8 7 9 7 8 10 11 7 6 9 Special 2 2 2 2 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 Trust 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 2 2 2 int of no-year accounts 92 78 75 82 General 71 63 63 63 63 64 80 88 100 78 89 83 Special 29 25 25 25 25 29 10 0 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 0 Trust 0 13 13 13 13 7 10 13 0 22 11 0 8 22 25 18 Department of Labor Account Distribution by Account Type Research Question #1: How did the number of accounts change by account type over the test period? Answer: The majority of Labor accounts was general fond accounts. In 1970, new dollars were provided to a total of 19 accounts: 15 general accounts (79 percent) and four trust accounts (21 percent). Throughout the test period, the relative percentage distribution remained fairly constant, with a low of 60 percent of general accounts in 2000 and a high of 83 percent in 1986. The actual number of general accounts varied between 11 In 1974 and 19 In 1986. Aside from the stable mix of accounts, the only other remarkable observation is the growth of special accounts. Until 1990, Labor had zero special accounts, then one was added each year from 1990 through 1996, then two in 1998, and four In 2000. This is Illustrated in Figures 38 and 39. Dollar Distribution by Account Type Research Question #2: How did the dollar distribution change by account type over the test period? Answer: As measured in dollars, the distribution between general, special, and trust accounts shows that trust accounts received the majority of new dollars. Trust accounts received between 56 percent and 91 percent of new dollars. This 166 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. distribution grew somewhat stronger over the test period. Special accounts received some dollars, but it is a relatively insignificant amount. General accounts varied from a high of 44 percent in 1972 to a low of 10 percent in 1996, ending the period at 14 percent. This is illustrated in Figure 40. Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability Research Question #3: How did the dollar distribution change by period of availability over the test period? Answer. Labor historically received a high percentage of no-year dollars. The percentage varied from a low of 56 percent in 1972 to a high of 91 percent in 1996. Multi-year dollars showed significant variation from 1976 through 1984 but then leveled out to a slightly declining trend. Annual dollars varied from 1970 through 1984 but then leveled off at between 5 and 9 percent. This is illustrated in Figure 41. Distribution of No-Year Accounts Research Question #4: How did the number of no-year accounts change over the test period? Answer: In 1970, three accounts, all trust accounts, received no-year dollars. Until 1992, the total number of accounts receiving no-year dollars varied between three and six, with only one general fend receiving no-year dollars in any given year. In 1992, the total increased to eight, ending the study period with 10 in 2000. Starting in 1990, special accounts also received some no-year dollars, with one in 167 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1990 through 1996 (between 13 and 17 percent), two in 1998 (25 percent), and four (40 percent) in 2000. Throughout the period, trust accounts received between 63 percent and 100 percent of no-year dollars, except for 2000 when that percentage dropped to 50 percent. This is illustrated in Figures 42 and 43. 168 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4s « \ L L S O 0 t ( M O O O 0 ^ M O s o K CO + 2 0 9 C 0 ) 0 \ 0 0 O E sjunoooy jo JsqiunN 169 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DEPARTMENT O F LABOR ACCOUNT DISTRIBUTION B Y ACCOUNT TYPE 8 8 S g g S ? S S ? ° siunoooy jo iu©oj©d % % % % \ £ C O 0 3 % >- s \ L. % O n < 8 - % ■s. a . % a , % co 3 i — + m o 0 3 Q . CO + 2 03 C 0 3 C D \ o\ O S 170 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DEPARTMENT O F LABOR PERCENT DISTRIBUTION B Y ACCOUNT TYPE Q. O O O C M t - o o sje ifO Q M 9 N |0 juaojad Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 40 Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. e JO s I z c 8 < D Q. 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 & / • A / i f V A k a < o a' .a' .a' A Fiscal Years -Annual -Multi-Year ■ No-Year FIGURE 41 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR DOLLAR DISTRIBUTION BY PERIOD OF AVAILABILITY < 0 o CO % \ & r . \ < h . % sjunoDov 10 jequunisj I — + m I CO + S 0 c 0 C D 1 *s T f 173 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DEPARTMENT O F LABOR DISTRIBUTION O F NO-YEAR ACCOUNTS Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. m C 3 < O c 8 u . < D 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ N # 4 ? 4 ? 4 ? 4 ? Fiscal Years ■ General ■ Special ■Trust FIGURE 43 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF NO-YEAR ACCOUNTS ■ - j Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 8 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR SUMMARY TABLE 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Question #1: Number of accounts by type General 15 13 11 17 13 16 16 18 19 18 17 17 18 17 18 15 Special 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 4 Trust 4 5 3 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 Percent of accounts by type General 79 72 79 81 72 80 76 82 83 82 71 71 72 71 69 60 Special 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 8 16 Trust 21 28 21 19 28 20 24 18 17 18 25 25 24 25 23 24 Question #2: Dollar distribution by account type (in percent) General 21 44 29 40 29 42 31 33 17 17 18 22 23 10 13 14 Special 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Trust 79 56 71 60 71 58 69 67 83 83 82 78 77 90 87 85 Question #3: Dollar distribution by period of availability (in percent) Annual 7 25 8 15 12 8 18 10 5 6 7 5 5 8 9 7 M ulti-Year 15 19 21 25 17 34 14 23 12 11 12 13 17 2 5 8 No-Year 79 56 71 60 71 58 69 67 83 83 81 82 77 91 87 85 Question #4: Number of no-year accounts General 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 1 1 1 Special 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 4 Trust 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 Percent of no-year accounts General 0 20 0 20 17 20 17 20 20 0 0 25 25 14 13 10 Special 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 13 13 14 25 40 Trust 100 80 100 80 83 80 83 80 80 100 83 63 63 71 63 50 Small Business Administration Account Distribution fey Account Type Research Question #1: How did the number of accounts change by account type over the test period? Answer: Relative to other agencies, SBA has a small, though growing, number of accounts. From 1970 through 1988, the total number of accounts was most frequently between three and four accounts. Frequently, the majority of those accounts were special accounts. No trust accounts existed. After 1988, the total number of accounts increased to six in 1990 and to nine for 1992 through 1994. After 1990, the relative distribution between general and special accounts changed so that general exceeded special accounts. In 1992, there were six general accounts (67 percent) and three special accounts (33 percent). In 1994, general accounts increased to seven (78 percent), then held there through 2000. This is illustrated in Figures 44 and 45. Dollar Distribution by Account Type Research Question #2: How did the dollar distribution change by account type over the test period? Answer: From 1970 through 1980, special accounts received between 89 and 100 percent of dollars. In 1982, the mix changed so that general and special accounts were more equally divided. This continued until 1994 when 86 percent of dollars 176 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. went to general accounts. For both 1996 and 1998, 100 percent of dollars went to general accounts. Then, in 2000, once again general and special accounts flipped, with only 34 percent of new money going to general accounts. No trust account received new dollars during the test period. This is illustrated in Figure 46. Dollar Distribution by Period of Availability Research Question #3: How did the dollar distribution change by period of availability over the test period? Answer: From 1970 through 1984, the majority of new dollars was no-year. Between 1986 and 1994, the majority oscillated between no-year and annual dollars. In 1996, the percentage of no-year dropped from 60 percent in 1994 to 24 percent. It fell to just 2 percent in 1998, then rebounded back to 20 percent in 2000. During this time, the significance of multi-year dollars increased. From 1970 through 1992, no multi-year dollars were received. In 1994, multi-year dollars accounted for 8 percent, increasing to 11 percent in 1998 and 14 percent in 2000. This is illustrated in Figure 47. Distribution of No-Year Accounts Research Question #4: How did the number of no-year accounts change over the test period? Answer: From 1970 through 1974, only two accounts—both special accounts—received no-year dollars. Throughout the test period, the maximum 177 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. number of accounts that received no-year dollars in any year was five. General accounts received no-year dollars in only six years, and only three times did two general fond accounts receive no-year dollars in the same year. Agency access to no year dollars, especially in general accounts, was very limited. Because of the small number of accounts given no-year dollars, the percentages have very limited value. This is illustrated in Figures 48 and 49. 178 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CO < 0 CO o C M I h- I C O + \ sjunoooy |o JsqninN 0 179 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SM ALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNT DISTRIBUTION B Y ACCOUNT TYPE Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Fiscal Years Trust Special General FIGURE 45 SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION PERCENT DISTRIBUTION BY ACCOUNT TYPE 00 o copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 1 90 1 » - 0 70. 1 “ 1 Z 60 © 40 - 1 30' ® 20 • ^ 10 - A-—# \ \ j \ \ | —J*l / \ f \ j > — ♦ J l / V A f ♦ \ /i / \ / r - * — ................X 1 . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ N # N # N # ^ N # N # ^ Fiscal Years | — ♦-G eneral Special -A -T ru st FIGURE 46 SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION DOLLAR DISTRIBUTION BY ACCOUNT TYPE 00 Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. g P ' ^ ^ ^ ftP (ftp Fiscal Years -Annual ■ Multi-Year •N o -Y e FIGURE 47 SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION DOLLAR DISTRIBUTION BY PERIOD OF AVAILABILITY 0 0 sjunooov p jaqainN Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SM ALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION DISTRIBUTION O F NO-YEAR ACCOUNTS o o r~ I l £0 + O n ' ' f siunoooy p jueojod 184 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SM ALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION PERCENT DISTRIBUTION O F NO-YEAR ACCOUNTS Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 9 SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION SUMMARY TABLE 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Question #1: Number of accounts by type General 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 6 7 7 7 7 Special 2 2 2 3 4 3 3 2 2 3 4 3 2 1 1 1 Trust 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Percent of accounts by type General 33 33 0 25 20 25 25 33 50 25 33 67 78 88 88 88 Special 67 67 100 75 80 75 75 67 50 75 67 33 22 13 13 13 Trust 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Question #2: Dollar distribution by account type (in percent) General 9 5 0 Special 91 95 100 Trust 0 0 0 Question #3: 00 U j Annual 9 5 Multi-Year 0 0 No-Year 91 95 Question #4: Number of no-year accounts General 0 0 Special 2 2 Trust 0 0 Percent of no-year accounts General 0 0 Special 100 100 Trust 0 0 0 0 100 0 2 0 9 5 11 39 38 55 54 43 83 86 100 100 34 91 95 89 61 62 45 46 57 17 14 0 0 66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (in percent) 9 5 11 39 38 54 54 43 38 33 72 86 66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 4 11 14 91 95 89 61 62 46 46 57 62 60 24 2 20 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 2 1 1 3 4 3 3 2 2 3 4 3 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 0 0 40 50 67 50 50 too 100 100 100 100 67 100 100 60 50 33 50 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CHAPTER V FINDINGS This study has provided an in-depth exploration of the characteristics of budget accounts and agency flexibility in the timing of obligations and outlays. A proposition tested is that an increasing trend is for Congress to appropriate monies with longer periods of availability. This reduces Congressional control and increases executive control because it gives agencies virtually unlimited amounts of time to implement the policies of Congress. Budget accounts for eight significant agencies were examined over a 30-year period. Summary of Agency Findings Department of Commerce For the Department of Commerce, the trend has been for the preponderance of dollars—96 percent in 2000—to be placed in no-year general accounts. This clearly shows the trend toward longer periods of availability of appropriated funds. 186 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Interior For the Department of Interior, the percent of no-year funding has remained fairly constant, while the percent of annual funding is quickly switching to multi-year availability. This clearly shows a trend toward longer periods of availability of appropriated funds. Department of Veterans Affairs For the Department of Veterans Affairs, the trend has been for a slightly decreasing amount of dollars to be placed in no-year accounts. In 1970, 79 percent of funding was placed in no-year accounts, while in 2000 only 57 percent was no year. However, the number of accounts receiving no-year funding has increased significantly. This shows a trend of declining no-year flexibility as measured in dollars while at the same time providing no-year flexibility to more accounts. General Services Administration For the General Services Administration, recent years have shown a dramatic switch to increased no-year funding. From 1978 through 1988, no-year funding was less than 8 percent. In 1992 and 1998, no-year funding reached 59 and 62 percent, respectively. This shows a trend toward increased flexibility through longer periods of availability. 187 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Mational Aeronautics and Space Administration For NASA, no-year funding dropped from 81 percent in 1970 to one percent in 2000. At the same time, the percent of annual dollars also declined. Multi-year funding increased dramatically, from zero percent in 1970 to 86 percent in 2000. This clearly shows a trend away from the complete flexibility of no-year funding but toward the increased flexibility of multi-year funding. Department of Education For the Department of Education, the trend has been toward more dollars to be placed in multi-year and no-year accounts rather than annual accounts. In 1970, 91 percent of .funding was annual; but, by 2000, annual funding was only 29 percent. This clearly shows a trend toward increased flexibility. Department of Labor For the Department of Labor, the trend has been for increasing amounts of dollars—91 percent in 1996 and 85 percent in 2000—to be placed in no-year accounts. At the same time, the total number of no-year accounts has increased from three in 1970 to 10 in 2000. This shows a trend toward more flexibility. Small Business Administration For the Small Business Administration, the trend has been for a decreasing amount of dollars—20 percent in 2000—to be placed in no-year accounts. At the 188 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. same time, there has been a slight increase in the amount of dollars placed in multi year accounts. This shows a trend of tightening no-year flexibility while still providing some flexibility through increased use of multi-year funding. Major Findings This chapter discusses agency-specific and agency-combined findings and provides a summary table of ail researched accounts. Three major findings, illustrated in Table 10, are of particular importance. First, the total number of accounts increased significantly. Because new accounts can be created only by Congressional action, this trend demonstrates specific Congressional action either to increase the variety of activities performed by agencies or to more tightly control those activities already being performed. Even though this study did not examine that particular question, one can reasonably assume a combination of the two. If Congress wanted to, it could provide funding on a lump-sum basis covering relatively more programs. Instead, the data show that Congress prefers a tighter control of executive branch discretion. This research did not examine Congressional earmarks, yet another legally binding Congressional control over dollars within a budget account. 189 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 10 SUMMARY OF ALL RESEARCHED ACCOUNTS 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Question #1: Number of accounts by type General 152 149 135 137 135 170 138 139 136 130 148 181 206 171 162 160 Special 47 51 57 58 56 58 53 56 62 63 69 68 78 81 84 92 Trust 34 37 35 35 37 31 34 26 21 26 30 32 36 34 30 32 Percent of accounts by type General 65 63 59 60 59 66 61 63 62 59 60 64 64 60 59 56 Special 20 22 25 25 25 22 24 25 28 29 28 24 24 28 30 32 Trust 15 16 15 15 16 12 15 12 10 12 12 11 11 12 11 11 Question #2: Dollar distribution by account type (in percent) General 79 80 77 72 68 73 71 67 68 68 72 73 73 72 74 74 Special 1 2 1 1 7 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 Trust 20 19 22 27 25 24 28 32 32 31 27 25 27 28 25 25 Question #3: Dollar distribution by period of availability (in percent) Annual 32 36 31 24 23 21 24 25 21 22 22 22 22 24 23 23 Multi-Year 5 7 8 16 21 28 21 31 28 24 26 27 30 25 28 24 No-Year 63 58 61 60 56 51 55 44 51 54 52 51 49 51 49 54 Question #4: Number of no-year accounts VO O General 51 58 51 56 50 52 44 48 45 47 52 67 81 64 60 69 Special 42 46 49 55 50 52 47 50 57 58 64 63 74 77 78 84 Trust 32 35 35 35 37 31 34 26 21 26 29 31 35 33 29 26 int of no-year accounts General 41 42 38 38 36 39 35 39 37 36 36 42 43 37 36 39 Special 34 33 36 38 36 39 38 40 46 44 44 39 39 44 47 47 Trust 26 25 26 24 27 23 27 21 17 20 20 19 18 19 17 15 Second, most agency funding is still provided by the general fund of the Treasury. Even though some agencies have a significant number of special accounts and trust accounts, the dollar value of those accounts is relatively small. This question was of importance because it shows the funding source for the account: unless it is a general account, some source other than the general taxpayer is contributing the dollars. As funding becomes tighter government-wide, Congress looks to sources other than the general fund. The number of special and trust accounts is also a measure of Congressional control because it is a form of earmarking. Third, the period of availability trends for many agencies in the study showed considerable changes, both between years and among account types. In general, flexibility increased significantly for most agencies. Multi-year and no-year, as a percentage, replaced much of what was previously annual authority. In one case, Labor, no-year authority has been and continues to be clearly dominant. The reverse is true, however, for NASA and GSA because much of their no-year flexibility dropped drastically. Even though the general trend is toward increased flexibility, that trend does not hold for all agencies, and it certainly changes between years and accounts for those agencies where the trend does apply. It seems reasonable to theorize that, while Congress is granting more flexibility, it is not doing so blindly, and it does not hesitate to tighten control when it chooses to. An in-depth review of Congressional documents concerning NASA and GSA would be interesting to 191 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. determine the motivation and chain of events leading to the tighter control now experienced by those two agencies. Implications for Presidential Oversight This research has several implications for presidential oversight. The president and the presidency must balance between several competing interests: protecting and promoting presidential interests, seeking reasonable managerial flexibility for agencies, ensuring that agencies remain responsive to political leadership, and providing proper oversight. In addition, those presidents interested in budget deficit reduction confront yet another challenge. The growth in number of accounts shows that Congress still wants to control, through appropriations law, which programs receive how much funding and the level of transparency used when the executive reports back to Congress through the annual President’s Budget. This portion of the study shows that the executive branch does not seem to be gaining flexibility toward lump-sum appropriations. From the presidential perspective, this means that considerable controls are in place to ensure that dollars are used for specified programs and that potential discretion is limited. Any violation of this would trigger cries of impoundment. This also means that the president is accountable to implement programs that may be counter to administration policy. In addition to these controls, considerable additional controls 192 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. are placed on executive action through the use of earmarks in appropriations laws and specific program protections in rescissions. Based on these findings, agencies should not expect more freedom to move budgetary resources around internally within their organizations, as was advocated in the Reinventing Government literature. Instead, agencies may need to persuade their individual oversight committees to grant some relief in exchange for increased financial accountability reporting. For priority presidential initiatives, increased flexibility might be achieved through political bargaining as well as periodic reports to Congress on how the funding is being used and how quickly it is being used. A recent example of this is the quarterly report required by Congress on expenditures associated with the Emergency Response Fund for terrorism. The period of availability portion, however, does show some gains by the executive. As more accounts and more dollars move away from annual control and toward multi-year or no-year control, the executive gains flexibility. This flexibility can be used in several ways, both programmatic and political. When the motivation is programmatic, theoretically program administrators should be able to use dollars more prudently because the fear of loss at year-end is removed. When the motivation is political or due to low management standards, accountability is sacrificed and an agency can eventually lose credibility with Congress, as well as have future flexibility revoked. The experience of President Nixon's impoundments is a classic 193 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. example of that. Future problems could also arise if executive branch officials push agencies too hard to constrain outlays in order to control the deficit. 194 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Relationship to Existing Theories Few would argue that the executive branch should be allowed to pursue its interpretation of law and Congressional direction without reasonable controls and oversight. The perennial question, though, is how much control and oversight should Congress exercise and in what forms should these powers be exercised? Earlier sections of this dissertation documented the straggle for control between the executive and legislative branches. The executive branch historically seeks greater flexibility while the legislative branch seeks greater control. Moe and Teel, Truman, Huntington, Macmahon, Aberbach, Davidson, Bond, and Schlesinger described the changing dynamics of oversight and Presidential-Congressional relations. Tugwell, Fisher, Schlesinger, Bums, Wilson, Moe, Wiidavsky, Neustadt, Berman, Mosher, Fulbright, Landy and Milkis, and Seligman documented the historical rise in presidential power while Cooper, Newland, Mayer, and DeConde raised important considerations about increased presidential power in the context of current events. 195 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This dissertation describes the struggles over spending power generally and examines in detail one aspect of that struggle, period of availability. The shear volume of accounting data generated by this construct, period of availability, government-wide raises the questions whether this control mechanism might be too detailed and thus cause inefficiency in agency implementation and whether it causes considerable expense to track such detail. Harris (1964, p. 2) emphasizes the need to reach a proper balance: a balance that provides effective scrutiny and control for Congress while at the same time providing flexibility and discretion for the executive branch. Rosenbloom (2000) offers a stronger view: “If necessary, efficiency, economy, and even managerial effectiveness should be subordinated to participation, transparency, and the protection of individual rights” (p. 58). Addressing specifically the presidency, Heclo and Salomon (1981, p. 16) recommend a balance: flexibility to accommodate the needs of the president as politician but enough structure to protect the institution; the ability to reconcile long-term processes with short-term policies; a balance between the roles of president as business manager, administrative leader, and policy manager while at the same time controlling centralized power; and a balance between the accountability achieved from centralized power versus the advantages of dispersed power. Addressing the growth of presidential power and the non-statutory power tools available to presidents, Cooper (2002) stresses the importance of long-held 196 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. operating rales, norms, and informal relations that allow work to continue between parties even when the parties disagree. Specifically in the context of presidential direct action, he emphasizes the need to understand the constitutional or statutory legal authority cited for individual instances of asserted presidential prerogative power. This is coupled with the necessity to maintain a continuous constitutional dialog between the three branches, including input from a wide variety of stakeholders nationwide. And, perhaps most important to current events, while Congress and the courts typically grant deference to presidents during emergency situations, they are quick to demand accountability and explanations. The importance of these requirements increases each year as the number of partisan appointees and the emphasis on government-by-poll and sound bytes grows. Several additional current trends further highlight the importance of maintaining norms and relations: a greater role in world affairs as the only “super power” nation; increasing unilateral action aimed at protecting national economic interests; increasing instability in oil-rich countries; the growing disparity between the world’s richest and poorest; and the rise of rogue nations and terrorist groups. Each of these trends puts additional pressure on elected officials, civil servants, and citizens, as well as the various institutions and the delicate, historical balance between them. The importance of the federal budget is a constant fact of life now for citizens and policy officials alike. The budget theory described in this dissertation brings together the importance of the budget as a policy driver and the essential linkage to 197 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. power and oversight. White and Wildavsky, Schick, Harris, Joyce, Wilmerding, Wallace, Caiden, Rubin, Penner, and Stith describe the fundamental theories and competing interests that compose the economic and political budget battle ground. With increasing pressure to fight the war on terrorism and to commit military forces, political officials will likely respond with increased spending and a growing deficit. This increased spending does not include other domestic and international priorities, such as caring for an aging population or famine relief. At the same time, a significant constituency will demand fiscal constraint to limit federal borrowing. As these pressures mount, the federal budget and the appropriations process will become even more important and contentious policy drivers than they are today. If executive aggrandizement is to be checked, the dynamics of Presidential-Congressional relations and the budget process will need to be reassessed. In the Handbook of Public Law and Administration, Newland observes that researchers commonly focus on either one branch or one facet of one branch. The purpose of the Handbook is to escape such a trap and to focus on “interrelated processes and contents of law and administration that ultimately give practical meaning to constitutional democracy” (Cooper & Newland, 1997, p. 127). That is the desired outcome, too, of this research. The sections above tell a rich, colorful history. It touches on Supreme Court cases, public laws, personalities, contemporary events, and wrong doing by officials in the executive branch. It hopefully builds a case for why Congressional controls, in 198 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a wide variety of forms, are absolutely essential for democracy. It also shows how, with each decade, more power moves to the executive branch. It also shows how the budgetary process drives all other policy decisions and political behaviors. With these last two forces converging (first, more executive discretion through longer periods of availability, and second, primary focus on controlling the deficit), one might conjecture that executive branch officials could have strong incentives to delay spending (i.e., implementation of Congressional will) in order to achieve deficit reduction. Considering that numerous researchers already believe that the budget process is “irresponsible politics,” such an extension would certainly cause increased conflict between the two branches. Earlier in this dissertation, Tulis theorized that the modem presidency is governed by two constitutions. One is the formal Constitution. The other is an informal constitution based on presidential activism, public image, and continuous popular support. Tulis cautions that, over the long-term, however, reliance on the informal constitution creates extraordinary presidential power on a routine basis. Jones too cautions presidents that they must find their proper place within the separated system. The findings In this dissertation Indicate that wise presidents should seek to balance their gains in flexibility against improved relations with Congress. The construct tested in this research has a simple and direct relationship to the most fundamental theories of political science, public administration, and budgeting. 199 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Congress appropriates a certain amount of money for an authorized purpose for a certain amount of time. Separation of powers with checks and balances calls for legislative decision making by Congress and implementation by the executive branch with reasonable controls and oversight. Among other controls, period of availability provides unambiguous direction to the executive branch on timing. Flexibility in the timing of obligations and outlays provides the executive discretion to use its expertise in program management (effectiveness) as well as administrative management (economy and efficiency) to achieve the purposes stated in the public law. Accountability is provided through budget accounting reports reviewed by executive and legislative oversight bodies. This research uses those legally required reporting documents to demonstrate that Congress is still very interested in controlling the executive by controlling the purpose of accounts but that much timing flexibility is being granted to the executive. Recommendations for Congressional Oversight The history of Congressional oversight over the president and agencies is a long, colorful one. Congress must engage in oversight that protects its own interests as a governing body as well as the multiple interests of the various committees and individual members. This research indicates that Congress is still actively involved in account structuring. As Congress authorized new programs and endorsed structural changes of organization in agencies, Congress created and funded new budget accounts that aligned with these changes. 200 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Agencies are gaining significant flexibility in the timing of obligations and outlays. As discussed above, flexibility can be used for programmatic or political purposes. When agencies are given more flexibility, agency officials may be less than enthusiastic to implement new programs, award grants and contracts, or hire new staff. This is not an impoundment and can only be monitored through vigorous oversight. An additional concern is the accumulation of unobligated balances from one year to the next. For accounts that have multi-year or no-year authority, dollars that are not obligated during the current fiscal year are rolled over to the next fiscal year. Even though these resources can only be used according to the purpose stated in the law, they are significant because an agency can use them even if Congress has not provided an appropriation for the new fiscal year or is operating under a continuing resolution. As a result, the ability of Congress to control agencies on the basis of enacting, or not enacting, the annual appropriations bills in a timely manner is reduced. To the extent accounts accumulate unobligated balances, Congress is removed from controlling the annual program level. Based on these findings, Congress may want to revisit the appropriations language for certain accounts. As a starting point, committees may want to determine what situations merit unlimited time to obligate their funding. While some projects do require long procurement cycles, generally a few years is adequate to accomplish the project. Other committees may want to review closely the 201 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. unobligated balances in certain accounts and either rescind those amounts or decrease the appropriation for the following year. Other committees may have already reached a reasonable oversight balance with the agency but should continue to monitor unobligated balances and program administration to ensure that the intent of Congress is implemented in a timely manner that accommodates the needs of agency program managers. Contributions of this Study TMs research examines the movement of budgetary and policy control from Congress to the executive branch via period of availability. By measuring changes in the period of availability, it helps researchers and practitioners to understand better how changes in this non-monetary statutory funding control mechanism impacts the valued checks and balances between Congress and the executive and how budgetary power may be shifting away from Congress and toward the executive. The literature shows that the executive continues to seek and gain broader authorities. The literature also shows, however, that increased flexibility and executive aggrandizement must be tempered and balanced against the need for each branch, at its best, to contribute to policy formulation and implementation. Public administrators have a unique task: joining together what constitutional principle keeps apart (Rohr, 1986, p. x). The ever increasing pressures on constitutional government call for an even greater level of understanding, appreciation, and respect of basic arrangements. TMs research contributes to that. 202 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TMs research also joins the two sides of budgeting: one side is the politically glamorous power realm, and the other is the mountain of mundane accounting data based on the federal appropriations process. Most research in this area uses case studies and qualitative approaches to focus on assessments of funding levels (what was increased and what was cut), pet policy initiatives, pork barrel spending, or the budget process itself. In contrast, this research uses a fairly large data set reflecting a 30-year period. Future Research The data collected in this research provides starting points for several additional interesting agency-specific inquiries. For example, further research could be done on a specific agency that examines whether Congress makes changes to account characteristics in response to agency requests and under what conditions. A researcher could identify when the change occurred and then examine hearings records and agency budget documents to describe the conditions under which changes are made. The data from this research indicates that SBA and NASA could be important candidates for such an inquiry. Another interesting inquiry would examine accounts by appropriations subcommittee. Subcommittees are the primary authors of appropriations laws and would, therefore, be most closely tied to changes, especially those relating to period of availability. It is possible that variation exists between subcommittees, and 203 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. describing that variation could contribute to understanding agency relations with Congress. Yet another research project could examine accounts with no-year authority that have accumulated large unobligated balances. Such an examination could analyze the balances in relation to how actively the agency is implementing the program and whether Congress is aware of and agrees with the agency implementation schedule. The findings could point to several types of problems, such as problematic authorizing language that makes the program, too difficult to implement, agency management problems, or possibly executive officials reluctant to implement Congressional policy. 204 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Aberbadi, Joel D. (1990). Keeping a watchful eye: The politics o f congressional oversight. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Ash, Roy L. (1973, October). Controlling federal government expenditures: The roles o f Congress and the administration. Washington, DC: Committee for Economic Development. Banks, William C., & Straussman, Jeffery D. (1999). Defense contingency budgeting in the post-cold-war world.” Public Administration Review, 59 (2), 135-146. Berman, Larry (1979). The Office o f Management and Budget and the presidency, 1921-1979. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bond, Jon R., Fleisher, Richard, & Krutz, Glen S. (1996). An overview of the empirical findings on presidential-congressional relations. In James A. Thurber (Ed.), Rivals fo r Power: Presidential-Congressional Relations, Washington, DC. CQ Press. Brownlow, Louis (1949). The President and the presidency. Chicago: Public Administration Service. Bums, James MacGregor (1971). The politics of the presidency. In Ronald C. Moe (Ed.), Congress and the President: Allies and Adversaries (pp. 290-293). Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc. Byrd, Robert C. (2002, October 10). Congress must resist the rush to war. New York Times, p. 39. 205 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Calieo, David P. (1992). r The bankruptcy o f America: How the federal budget Is impoverishing the nation. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. Clayton, James L. (1984). On the brink: Defense, deficits, and welfare spending. New York: Ramapro Press. Cleveland, William S. (1993). Visualizing data. Summit, NJ: Hobart Press. Committee for Economic Development (1973, October). Controlling federal government expenditures: The roles o f Congress and the administration. Washington, DC: Committee for Economic Development. Cooper, Phillip J. (2002). By order o f the President: The use and abuse o f executive direct action. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. Cooper, Phillip J., & Newland, Chester A. (Eds.). (1997). Handbook o f public law and administration. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. Davenport, Ronald R. (1973, October). Controlling federal government expenditures: The roles o f Congress and the administration. Washington, DC: Committee for Economic Development. Davidson, Roger, Kovenock, David M., & O’Leary, Michael K. (1971). Theories in Congress. In Ronald C. Moe (Ed.), Congress and the President: Allies and adversaries. Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc. DeConde, Alexander (2000). Presidential machismo: Executive authority, military intervention, andforeign relations. Boston: Northeastern University Press. DeGrazia, Alfred (1971). The Myth of the President. In Ronald C. Moe (Ed.), Congress and the President: Allies and adversaries (pp. 100-101). Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc. Dodd, Lawrence C. (1990). In Joel C. Aberbach, Keeping a watchful eye: The politics o f congressional oversight. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 2 06 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Eastaugh, Steven R. (1994). Facing tough choices: Balancing fiscal and social deficits. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Edwards, George C., Ill, & Wood, B. Dan (1999). Who influences whom? The President, Congress, and the media. American Political Science Preview, 93 (2). Eisner, Robert (1986). How real is the federal deficit? New York: The Free Press. Evans, Diana (1994). Congressional oversight and the diversity of members’ goals. Political Science Quarterly, 109 (4), 669-670. Evans, Gary R. (1997). Red ink: The budget, deficit, and debt o f the U.S. government. New York: Academic Press. Feidmann, Linda, & Richey, Warren (2002, October 3). Power shift to president may stick. Christian Science Monitor, p. 1 . Fenno, Richard F., Jr. (1966). The power o f the purse: Appropriations politics in Congress. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Fink, Richard B L , & High, lack C. (1987). A nation in debt: Economists debate the federal budget deficit. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America. Fisher, Louis (1972). President and Congress: Power and policy. New York: The Free Press. _ _ _ _ _ _ (1975). Presidential spending power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ______ (1978). T T te Constitution between friends: Congress, the President, and the law. New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc. _ _ _ _ _ _ (1993). The politics o f shared power: Congress and the executive (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc. _ _ _ _ _ (1994-1995). Congressional checks on military initiatives. Political Science Quarterly, 109 (5), 739-762. 207 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ________ (2000). Congressional abdication on war and spending. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press. Fulbright, 1 William (1971). Congress and foreign policy. In Ronald C. Moe (Ed.), Congress and the President: Allies and adversaries (p. 198). Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc. Garvey, Gerald (1995). False promises: The NPR In historical perspective. In Donald F. Kettl & John J. Dilulio, Jr., Inside the reinvention machine: Appraising governmental reform (p. 101). Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Genovese, Michael A. (2000). Greatness and abuse of power. In Michael Nelson (Ed.), The presidency and the political system. (6th ed., p. 427). Washington, DC: CQ Press. ________ (2001). The power of the American presidency: 1789-2000. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. Gilmour, Robert S. (1971). Central legislative clearance: A revised perspective. In Ronald C. Moe (Ed.), Congress and the President: Allies and adversaries (p. 109). Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc. Haas, Lawrence J. (1990). Running on empty: Bush, Congress, and the politics of a bankrupt government. Homewood, IL: Business One Irwin. Hager, George, & Pianin, Eric (1997). Mirage: Why neither democrats nor republicans can balance the budget, end the deficit, and satisfy the public. New York: Times Books. Hamburg, Morris (1987). Statistical analysis for decision making (4th ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers. Hargrove, Erwin C. (1974). The power of the modern presidency. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Harris, Joseph P. (1964). Congressional control o f administration. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 208 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Heclo, Hugh, & Salomon, Lester M. (Ed.). (1981). The illusion o f presidential government Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Henderson, Thomas A. (1970). Congressional oversight o f executive agencies: A study o f the House Committee on Government Operations. University of Florida Social Sciences Monograph Number 40. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press. Huntington, Samuel P. (1971). Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century. In Ronald C. Moe (Ed.), Congress and the President: Allies and adversaries (p. 10). Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc. Jones, Charles O. (1994). The presidency in a separated system. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Joyce, Philip G. (1996, July-August). Congressional budget reform: The unanticipated implications for federal policy making. Public Administration Review, 56 (4), 317-325. Kendall, M. G. (1973). Time Series. London: Charles Griffin & Co. Kettl, Donald F., & Dilulio, John J., Jr. (Ed.). (1995). Inside the reinvention machine: Appraising governmental reform. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Key, V. O. (1981). The lack of a budgetary theory. In Frederick C. Mosher, Basic Literature o f American Public Administration, 1787-1950. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc. Korn, Jessica (1994-1995). The legislative veto and the limits of public choice analysis. Political Science Quarterly, 109 (5), 883. Landy, Marc Karnis, & Milkis, Sidney M. (2000). Presidential gi'eatness. Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas. Leonard, Herman B. (1986). Checks unbalanced: The quiet side o f public spending. New York: Basic Books, Inc. 209 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Macmahon, Arthur W. (1943, June; 1943, September). Congressional oversight of administration: The power of the purse. Political Science Quarterly, LVIII (2) and LV1II (3). Manos, Karen L. (1994, Spring). The Antideficiency Act without an “M” account: Reasserting constitutional control. Public Contract Law Journal, 23 (3), 337- 377. Mayer, Kenneth R. (2001). With the stroke o f a pen: Executive orders and presidential power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Moe, Ronald €., & Teel, Steven C. (1971) Congress as a policy-maker. In Ronald C. Moe (Ed.), Congress and the President: Allies and adversaries (pp. 290- 293). Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc. Moe, Ronald C. (Ed.). (1971). Congress and the President: Allies and adversaries. Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc. Monahan, John F. (2001). Numerical methods o f statistics. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Mosher, Frederick C. (1952). The executive budget: Empire State style. Public Administration Review, 12 (2), 73-84. ________ (1985). A tale o f two agencies. Baton Rouge, LA: University Press. National Performance Review (1993). From red tape to results: Creating a government that works better and costs less: A report o f the National Performance Review. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Neustadt, Richard E. (1971). Central legislative clearance: A revised perspective. In Ronald C. Moe (Ed.), Congress and the President: Allies and adversaries (p. 109). Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc. Newland, Chester A. (n. d.). Ihe facilitative state, political executive aggrandizement, and public service challenges. Los Angeles: University of Southern California. 2 10 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. O'Sullivan, Elizabethann, & Rassel, Gary R. (1989). Research methods fo r public administrators. New York: Longman. Patashnik, Eric M. (1997, Fall). Trust funds and the politics of precommitment. Political Science Quarterly, 431-432. Payne, James L. (1991). The culture o f spending: Why Congress lives beyond our means. San Francisco: ICS Press. Penner, Rudolph G. (1986). An appraisal of the congressional budget process. In Allen Schick, Crisis in the budget process: Exercising political choice. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research. Penner, Rudolph G., & Abramson, Alan I. (1988). Broken purse strings: Congressional budgeting 1974 to 1988. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Penny, Timothy J., & Setter, Steven E. (1996). Payment due: A nation in debt, a generation in double. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Peterson, Peter G., & Howe, Neil (1988). On borrowed time: How the growth in entitlement spending threatens America’ s future. San Francisco: ICS Press. Potter, Ronald W. (2000). The art of measurement: Theory and practice. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc. Preston, Thomas (2001). The President and his inner circle: Leadership style and the advisory process in foreign affairs. New York: Columbia University Press. Reveley, W. Taylor, III (1971). Presidential war-making: Constitutional prerogative or usurpation? In Ronald C. Moe (Ed.), Congress and the President: Allies and adversaries (pp. 231-232). Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc. Rohr, John A. (1986). To run a constitution: The legitimacy of the administrative state. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. 211 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Rosen, Jeffrey (2002, September 15). Liberty wins—So far; Bush runs into checks and balances in demanding new powers. The Washington Post, p. B 1 . Roseribloom, David H. (2000). Building a legislative-centered, public administration: Congress and the administrative state, 1946-1999. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press. Rubin, Irene S. (1987). Preventing or Eliminating Planned Deficits: Restructuring Political Incentives. In Allen Schick, Perspectives on budgeting (2n d ed.). Washington, DC: American Society for Public Administration. ________(1990). The politics o f public budgeting: Getting and spending, borrowing and balancing. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc. Saloma, John S., III. (1971). Legislative Effectiveness: Control and Investigation. In Ronald C. Moe (Ed.), Congress and the President: Allies and adversaries. Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc. Sanger, David E. (2002, January 27). There’s a small matter of checks and balances. New York Times, p. 4. Schick, Allen (1986). Crisis in the budget process: Exercising political choice. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research. ________(Ed.). (1987). Perspectives on budgeting (2n d ed.). Washington, DC: American Society for Public Administration. __(1987). Budgeting as an administrative process. In Allen Schick, Perspectives on budgeting (2n d ed.). Washington, DC: American Society for Public Administration. ________(1990). The capacity to budget. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Schlesinger, Arthur M. (1973). r The imperial presidency. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 212 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Seligman, Lester G., & Covington, Cary K. (1996). Presidential Leadership with Congress: Change Coalitions and Crisis. In lames A. Thurber (Ed.), Rivals fo r power: Presidential-congressional relations (p. 4). Washington, DC: CQ Press. Shuman, Howard E. (1984). Politics and the budget: The struggle between the President and. the Congress. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hali. Stitfa, Kate (1988, May). Rewriting the fiscal constitution: The case of Gramm- Rudman-Hollings. California Law Review, 76 (3), 595-668. Tai, Joseph (2001). Reading between the numbers: Statistical thinking in everyday life. New York: McGraw-Hill. Thurber, James A. (1996). Congressional-Presidential Battles to Balance the Budget. In James A. Thurber (Ed.), Rivals for power: Presidential-congressional relations (p. 210). Washington, DC: CQ Press. _ (Ed.). (1996). Rivals for power: Presidential-congressional relations. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Truman, David B. (1971). The governmental process: Political interests and public opinion (2n d ed.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Tugwell, Rexford G. (1960). The enlargement of the presidency. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co. Tulis, Jeffrey K. (2000). The Two Presidencies. In Michael Nelson (Ed.), The presidency and the political system (6th ed.). U.S. Department of T reasury (1970-2000). United States government annual report appendix. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. General Accounting Office (1978, September 19). No-year appropriations in the Department o f Agriculture. B-142001. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office. ________ (1992, May 20). Letter, correspondence no. B-248164.2. 213 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ________ (1994, February 24). Letter, correspondence no. B-256425. ________ (1998, July). Year-end spending: Reforms -underway but better reporting and, oversight needed. B-280218. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office. ________(1999, August 30). Budget issues: The importance o f increased accuracy in budget outlay estimates. B-283112. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office. U.S. Office of Management and Budget (1977, December). Overview o f the current “ state-of-the-art” o f federal outlay estimating. Washington, DC: U.S. Office of Management and Budget. Wallace, Robert Ash (1960). Congressional control o f federal spending. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press. Weidenbaum, Murray L. (1965). Congressional control o f government spending: A presentation to the Institute in the Management of Government Finances, sponsored by the U.S. Civil Service Commission, Washington, DC, December 1, 1965. Unpublished. ________(1973, October). Controlling federal government expenditures: The roles o f Congress and the administration. Washington, DC: Committee for Economic Development. White, Leonard D. (1948). The federalists: A study in administrative history. New York: The Macmillan Company. White, Joseph, & Wildavsky, Aaron (1989). The deficit and the public interest: The search for responsible budgeting in the 1980s. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Wildavsky, Aaron (1964). The politics o f the budgetary process. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. (Ed.). (1969). The presidency. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 214 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ________(1971). The Two Presidencies. In Ronald C. Moe (Ed.), Congress and the President: Allies and adversaries. Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc. Wilmerding, Lucius, Ir. (1943). The spending power: A history o f the efforts o f Congress to control expenditures. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Wilson, lames Q. (1973). Political organizations. New York: Basic Books, Inc. Wilson, Woodrow (1981, originally published 1885). Congressional government. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. ________ (1908). Constitutional government in the United States. New York: Columbia University Press. 215 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE SOURCE DATA (dollars in thousands) O n Account Number 1970 1972 1974 1976 Annual Multi-Year No-Year Annual Multi-Year No-Year Annual Multi-Year No-Year Annual Multi-Year No-Year 0120 6,073 7,509 8,588 16,607 0122 0125 20,007 31,753 0126 0128 0150 310 0160 2,940 0200 1,219 5,597 0201 38,000 9,518 26,131 14,225 48,088 0300 5,793 0400 20,153 24,201 0401 41,117 54,981 0426 161.847 13,618 0427 3,860 0430 211 1,472 0432 3,842 0450 19,100 43,795 0500 135,929 79,029 0515. 0525 0527 0550 0551 0552 0651 40,009 48,060 0652 2,325 0654 500 500 0700 4,538 6,474 11,252 15,999 s Q > C O £ o z I 3 ,7 0 0 I I 6 9 3 1 ! 3 9 ,6 0 0 1 ! 7 8 ,2 2 0 I M20.618 I 1 2 ,7 5 6 I 1 1 ,8 8 0 I I Multi-Year I Annual I 3 3 ,8 3 9 I 1 2 7 ,7 0 7 I 1 1 3 ,6 9 0 I I 7 7 ,3 6 9 I 1 1 ,9 8 6 I C M CO G > I No-Year C O C M CO C M I 4 1 ,7 5 0 I I 8 7 ,8 9 8 I I 11 7,8 22 I C O 0 0 CD V 1 8 ,0 0 0 I I Multi-Year! [ Annual I 25,0001 I 1 4 ,8 9 1 I ! 5 7 ,2 0 0 I 7 ,6 0 0 I 1 1 9 8 0 I I N o-Y ear I I 10,0001 o o ^ t* 3 I 666,038 I I 9 3 ,5 9 7 | ! 1 7 ,6 4 4 I 2 3 ,7 0 5 I I Multi-Year I Annual 1 3 0 ,3 8 0 1 1 4 0 ,8 2 5 ! I 1 4 ,5 5 0 I I 5 3 ,6 9 0 I 7 ,9 9 5 I 1978 I No-Year I 3 8 ,4 3 5 I CD S CM CO 7 4 ,2 5 2 I o N . CO I Multi-Year! I Annual I 1 2 1 .8 7 7 I I 7 5 0 I 1 2 8 .2 8 5 1 I 1 0 ,9 6 2 I 4 7 ,6 1 4 I ! 4 ,3 6 0 | 14,364 Account Number o CM O I 01221 1 01251 CD CM O 0 0 C M o 1 01501 o CD O © o C M o o C M O I 0300I I 0400I I 04011 I 0426I r - CM § o CO § I 04321 I 0450I lo o so I I 05151 Iszso I 05271 I 0550I 0551 Izsso I I tS 9 0 I 0652 $ 8 0700 217 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ’ S a s •c s © u ? a W P h 1 1 9 9 2 | 3 $ z § O h - ’ C M S ■ s r o > C O I 1 6 4,0 00 I 1 1 8 0,9 45 I I 6 3 ,7 1 3 I I 2 ,0 0 0 I I 009‘Z .i. ! 1 9 ,9 2 5 I 2 2 ,4 8 0 I I Multi-Year I Annual I 31,280 C M C O C D h - " C M 1 15,140 ' 5 3 - C M 1 1 5 ,5 0 0 i 8 C M t o C M I 1990 I No-Year C M C O & n C M I 4 1 ,4 1 6 I 1 1 ,4 2 4 ,8 3 6 I I 1 6 3 ,2 8 6 I 6 9 0 I o C M I M ulti-Year I I Annual I 27,821 1 25,356 I 13,331 I 1 4 ,4 2 0 i I 9 9 ,8 9 0 I 1 3 ,3 1 2 I 1 4 ,1 2 2 I I 1988 I No-Year I 39,204 ! 2 5 ,4 6 3 ! I 3 7 ,4 6 5 i I 3 46,444 I ! 1 4 4 ,7 8 3 I I O O Z 2 1 ,2 9 0 I I M ulti-Y ear I I Annual C M ■ M 1 C M I 1 4 ,2 4 2 I I 9 4 ,8 3 5 I i n m ^ 3 " C M 1 ^ . 1986 I N o-Year I I 3 0 ,141 | I 101,0591 I 1 1 8 ,6 5 4 I o < o I 2 2 ,9 6 8 I 1 3 2 I Annual I I 3 0,911 I 1 2 4 ,8 8 2 I I 1 2 ,9 2 4 | I 8 6 ,5 1 3 I 1 2 ,1 5 4 I 1 1 ,4 8 4 | Account Number I 01201 I 0122| 1 01251 C D C M O I 0128| 1 01501 1 01601 I 02001 I 02011 o o C O o I 0400| I 04011 I 0426I C M S I 0430I I 0432I 1 04501 I 0500I I 05151 I 05251 I 0527I 1 0 9 9 0 I I 05511 1 05521 1 1 -9 9 0 1 C M i n c o o 3 8 07001 218 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C M I No-Year | to C O I 58,853! [4^609,3471 I 281,8881 o § 8 o C O h- C D C M I 10,9531 j 26,500! to' [Multi-Year 1 3,758 O h- 05 05 to I Annual 1 31,392 § to C O c s s 1 19,9621 si C S S 1 1998 I No-Year I 43,900 | 1 555,813 I 1 276,852 | 1 95,000 I 1 305,750 I ! 16,550 I I 21,000 I I 20,000 I |(ooo‘ e) I Multi-Year I Annual I 27,490 I 21,028 1 20,140 j I 25,000 I C O 3 s- C M ' M ' I 1996 1 o z r ^ C M s C M r * I 39,029 I I 150,100 I 1 257,845 I 1 (.15,023)1 I 300,427 I 17,000 I 15,500 I 21,500 I C M o C M 1 Multi-Year C O O O 1 Annual I 29,100 I O o o o C M I 19,849 I I 32,000 I I 143,617 | 2,000 I 1994 | I No-Year ! o o C O I 32,300 I C O I 5,500 O o JO o L 225,850 | I 60,086 1 ! 231,234 j o o o 19,927 | o o o C M | 26,000! 20,120 I M ulti-Year | 3,500 1 Annual I C M o C O C O O O 05 C S S I 16,000 I o o C O I 128,286 I Account Number I 0120! I 01221 I 01251 C O c s s T ~ o I 01281 1 0150! o C O o o o C M o I 02011 0300 I 0400! I 0401 I 0426I I * - . C M O o C O o I 04321 I 0450I looso 1 t o t o o 0525 0527 0550 I 0551| 0552 0651 ( 0652 0654 0700 219 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1 9 7 6 I u a s 0 ) % z I 10,997 I C O 5 lO h - I 644,731 I i 22,543 1 I 1,000] I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 3 C O 8 s C M C M h- 0 5 I No-Year [ 366,8411 1 12,000 I I M ulti-Y ear 1 16,112 I Annual I 37,435 I I s - 8 C M I s- 0 5 I No-Year I 65,000 I 1 4,903 1 1 108,663 I I 5 0 0 I I 33,120 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 62,372 I I 15,445 ! [ 1,333 I I 185,082 I 4,498 | 1970 I No-Year I 25,993 I 1 5,444 I 1 7,5141 I M u lti-Y ea r I I A nnual I I 48,685 I 1 2 9 0 I 1 132,401 I 3,505 1 Account Num ber! § C O o o o o o I 10061 8 1 11011 I 12001 1 12101 I 12501 1 13001 I 1402! I 14031 1 14041 1 14121 I 14171 I 1421| C M C M " S t C O C M ^ r C M 1 14501 1451 I 14521 1 14531 S " T ” I s - m s M - O ) I O o C O ^ r 1500 220 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1 9 8 4 I fe S o Z C O h - i n 5 ! 168,307 I 11,001,767] ! 13,356 | 1 = 3 2 I Annual I 38,230 I 1 9 8 2 I I N o-Y ear ! I 125,335 I I 151,995 | I 845,868 I I 7,415 | I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 8,200 I ! 28,771 I 1980 I N o-Y ear i i n c s s 1 ^ S ' - I 720,516 I ! 70,120 I I M u lti-Y ea r I j jen u u v | I 104,833 I I 16,106 I 22,035 1978 I N o-Y ear ! I 14,198 ! ! 69,020 | | 627,142 | I 0S8‘ 0 S I ! 15,500 I I M u lti-Y ear I I 6,150 I I A nnual I I 94,321 I C O s 14,110 Account Number 0080 o G O O I 1006! I 1100! I 11011 1 12001 1 12101 I 12501 o o C O ■ V — 1 14021 1 14031 1 14041 1 1412| 1 14171 1 14211 C M C M 14231 1424 1450 m 14521 C O m 1 14561 1457 G O i n 14591 1460 1500 221 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX A (continued) Account Number 1986 1988 1990 1992 Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year 0800 0801 1006 81,058 120,000 85,900 1,547 1100 3,875 4,600 1101 1200 1210 (1,541) 1250 183,744 161,432 180,304 209,160 1300 1402 1403 1404 1412 1417 1421 1422 1423 1424 1450 1,098,696 1,110,015 1,282,869 1,540,046 1451 1452 34,917 1453 1,148 1456 1.770 1457 33,200 1458 110,000 1459 1460 1500 29,188 32,079 30,908 40,380 -o s .5 s o w ? a a 5! o 8 C M I No-Year 8 05 C M 1 312,5481 1 1,813,3161 j 8981 592,8661 M u lti-Y ear I O O C O 49,3301 I Annual in A I 58,000! 1 3371 GO a 05 I No-Year 1 290,540 1 11,622,689 I I (55,098)1 05 8 C D 491,609 I I M ulti-Y ear 1 1 ,600 I 1 9,040 I 47,499 I I Annual I 6,900 i I 3 3 8 1 1996 I No-Year O) s 1£) 1 267,162 I 11,909,459 I I 00S7S 1 8 O 0 0 1 s 45,900 I 1 A nnual I 8 O I 2 5 0 I 1994 1 N o-Y ear 1 I 5 7 0 I I 259,490 I 11,774,768 | 1 101,368 I I 1 ,000 I I 73,214 I I 43,000 I 1 M u lti-Y ea r 1 45,220 1 Annual I I 5,700 I I 3 5 0 I o o o _ ■ s f I 4 5 9 I Account Number O o 0 0 o 1 08011 I 10061 I 11001 1 11011 1 12001 1 12101 I 12501 1 13001 1 14021 1 14031 1 14041 1 14121 r * C M 1 14221 1 14231 I 14241 1450 CO 1452 1453| 1456 t o 0 0 8 0 ■sf T— 05 i n •sr o CD 1500 223 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1 9 7 6 I ! : z: S o C O C M I s * * C O C O C O sn C O I 16,000 | 1 57,556 I 1 5 3 0 1 C O C M C O 0 3 o h- C M C O I Multi-Year ! 374,000 I I Annual r^ . 5 c m ' 360,0001 1 9 7 4 ! I No-Year 1 275,000 1 1 226,588 I I 19,000 | 1 36,825 I 1 36,338 1 in C M C O o I Multi-Year I Annual I 2,700 I I 1 5 0 I 1 174,000 i ! 20,000 I I 26,500 I G O s in 2 6 4 I h- C O C M h- 0 3 I No-Year O O Z 'Z 1 1 229,687 | 0 3 to o > C M I 23,750 I I 2 0 0 I 3 O 0 3 C O T " C O I Multi-Year 1 10,988 ! I Annual C M I - - * C O C M 1 22,594 ___ 7,602, I 12,274 I ! 6,138 I I 190,000 I I 50,000 I I 20,855 I 23,537 1970 I No-Year I to * r “ r* 1 15,918 I 1 213,738 I I 11,100 I i 2 0 0 1 1 3 2 C M C M I Annual , < 5 r I 3,160 j I 09942 1 O C M 0 0 0 3 4 0 ’ ’ O ' cd I 8,959 I I 996‘S H ! 174,480 I in s o > X f - i 27,000 I o" C M Account Number I 1600! I 16101 1 17001 1 17031 1 1707| I 17081 I 17091 I 1716| I 17501 I 18001 I 18011 C M O c o I 18051 1 19001 I 2030I I 2031i I 2032| C O C O o C M 2051 1 20501 Izsoz 1 § C M 3904 I 39501 4295 4315 C O C O C O C O 224 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ § s .e " • 5 C © o < E O z w p < 3 1 1 9 8 4 I I N o - Y e a r I I 2 6 , 0 0 0 I 1 3 2 1 5 3 C c < o 8 O C M I 1 9 8 2 1 N o - Y e a r 1 M u l t i - Y e a r 1 1 0 , 0 0 0 I I A n n u al 1 1 9 8 , 5 0 0 I I 1 9 8 0 I N o - Y e a r I 1 0 1 , 0 0 0 I 1 3 1 4 , 4 6 9 I I 1 6 , 3 0 0 I [ 6 6 , 8 4 1 I o C M C O C M C O 8 lO C O 1 3 2 8 c o o C M I 5 , 0 0 0 I 1 A n n u al I 5 0 7 , 5 2 5 I 1 9 7 8 I I N o - Y e a r I 1 3 5 , 0 0 0 I I 2 8 4 , 7 0 9 ! I 1 8 , 3 2 5 ] I 5 6 , 0 4 4 | 6 4 , 7 5 0 I 1 1 5 ,0 0 0 1 I M u l t i - Y e a r | 1 A n n u al | I 4 9 4 , 0 0 0 I 3 , 7 8 8 I A c c o u n t N um ber 8 C D 1 1 6 1 0 1 1 1 7 0 0 1 C O o .........1 7 0 7 I 1 7 0 8 1 O i O h - C O T — I 1 7 5 0 1 1 1 8 0 0 1 1 1 8 0 1 1 C M O C O I 1 8 0 5 1 1 1 9 0 0 1 1 2 0 3 0 1 C O o C M 1 2 0 3 2 1 1 2 0 3 3 1 1 2 0 5 1 1 I 2 0 5 0 I I 2 0 5 2 1 lo o ts I 3 9 0 4 I 3 9 5 0 | 4 2 9 5 C O 5 4 3 1 6 0 0 C O ■ sf 225 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1 9 9 2 I I N o-Y ear I ! 75,000 1 (4,574)1 I Multi-Year I Annual 1 226,836 1 0 6 8 V I No-Year o o to C M § t o I M ulti-Y ear I I Annual 1 188,980 I 1988 I N o-Y ear I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual ! 182,028 I 1986 I N o-Y ear ! 5 c o * I M ulti-Y ear I A nnual j I 167,475 j Account Number O O C O I 1610! I 1700! I 17031 1 1707! I 1708! I 1709! C D 8^ O m r*- o o 0 0 I 18011 C M o 0 0 I 18051 1 19001 o C O o C M 1 20311 C M C O O C M C O C O O C M 1 20511 I 20501 I 2052I 21001 S o C O losee i i O o > C M m t I O C O C D C O M T 4318 226 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2000 I I N o-Y ear I 1 432,7791 3,183 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 1998 I No-Year C M 05 C O to ' I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 1 340,000 I I 1996 I No-Year 1 16,750 I l(soz) 5,464 | I M ulti-Y ear I Annual j I 328,500 I 1994 I No-Year I 103,500 I S C D I M ulti-Y ear I 96,500 I I Annual ! I 317,242 | Account Number § C O * r - lO t-9 1 - I loozt 1 1 17031 1 1707| I 17081 I 17091 C O 1 17501 o o 0 0 t— o 0 0 1 18021 1 18051 § 0 5 1 2030| C O o C M C M C O o C M C O C O O C M m o C M I 2050| C M m o C M § v- C M s G ) C O I0 S 6 S 1 O ) C M 4315 4316 I 4318 227 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ o 3 ^3 * ■ « e © © a p & w p P h 1 9 7 6 I § o z 0 0 C M C M 1 10,818 I L.. 2,1541 to I 81,112 | ! 9 4 1 | s h - 0 0 ___ ZiM J 10,306 | I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 1 2,405 1 9 7 4 , I No-Year 1 1,335 I L . , 7,287 C M r v . c o ’ C M to to ■ M " 3,597 I 4,827 | I M ulti-Y ear! I Annual o C O o > r* C M r ^ O ) I No-Year I 7,552 I to 1 8 9 6 I I 17,754 | O C M 5 o > o G O C M C O a n O C M I M ulti-Y ear 1 9 8 9 ! I Annual I C M C O cq 1 9 7 0 ! I N o-Y ear I 600J o 0 0 C O f f C C O C O C D C O s c o ’ 280 I M u lti-Y ea r I I Annual I Account Number I 4406I I 44171 I 4650| I 51021 1 '- lO 1 51191 1 51201 1 5121| 1 51221 C O C M to 1 51241 1 51271 I 51391 s C M to 8105 I 82171 O ) C M C O s C O 8501 8509 tO C O c o to G O 8538 1 6698 I 8542 8543 8544 tn 3 228 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 8 4 I 3 O Z 1 2,0061 1 § h- 1 1 - 0 8 S 1 I 33,585 I I d33)I 1 3 6 6 1 C M L (18,369) I § C M 3 1 3 S I Annua! o o o C O 1982 1 No-Year G O s. 1 4,709 ! 1 1 ,800 i 1 3,046 1 I 26,186 I 1 3,057 | ..... 346 h- I 1.673] 3 0 9 I 8 o C M 0 5 to C D 15,807 I I M ulti-Y ear 1 Annual G ) C O o s. 1 N o-Y ear i 1 4,652 1 1 3,178 I 1 0 0 9 1 I 9 0 3 I I 26,679 | m c m " 1 2 7 3 1 0 0 0 5 in s? ! 1,493 I C OC O C O ▼ — C M C O o > h - T 10,558 I 1 M ulti-Y ear 1 Annual I 9 9 3 | 0 0 N . 0 5 1 O Z 1 3,208 1 I 12,984 | C M s 0 0 C M T " 8 o c o ” I 9 1 9 I 2 6 I s I 6,361 I 8,896 | 1 M ulti-Y ear [ Annual ! 1 8 1 6 I Account Number 8 3 1 1 46501 I 51021 I 51171 I 51191 o C M H O I 5121| 1 51221 1 51231 I 51241 1 5127] I 51391 1 5284| 8105 I 82171 1 82191 1 83471 1 85011 I 8509I I O o o 8516] I 8538I 8539 C M S 0 0 § I 8545 229 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1 9 9 2 I I N o-Y ear I o o G _ C O i O l O O c m ’ 1 2 3 8 1 C O o ■ M * C M S C O s' C M O 0 5 0 0 C O io C O [ 3 6 2 | 1 E 2 I Annual I 1990 I No-Year 1 559 0 0 Q O h- 1 2 0 5 I 1 2,201 I I 2,160 I iO C O o > 1 29,583 1 i 4 9 5 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 1 9 8 8 ] I No-Year I 1 ,0 4 6 I § C M I 2,569 I I 2 3 2 I 1 56,337 I 1 3 9 1 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 1986 I No-Year I 6 3 8 I 1 1 .547 I I 1,161 I I 3,134 I I 113,884 I 1 43,706 I I 4431 & • _ C Q S 1 5 2 I Annual Account Number 1 4406! 1 44171 I 46501 1 5102! I .......51 1 7 ! I 51191 I 51201 I ....... 51211 C M C M 5 I 51231 I 51241 N - C M K O I 51391 1 52841 1 81051 C M 00 1 82191 1 83471 I 85011 I6 0 S 8 1 § 1 85161 8538 1 85391 8542 C O £ 00 8544 I 8545 230 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. o o o C M I No-Year 8 h - o S O C M 0 0 o r * * - (1,222) o C M 0 5 C M 1 1 ,044 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 1998 I No-Year O O I O C M s C O N io a > 8 O C M 1 3,353 1 o > C O h - I M u lti-Y ea r i I Annual I 9661 I I No-Year 1 22,000 I 4 0 C M IS O ) o i O C O h- S O s ! 82,324 | 1 9,893 I 0 0 ? I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I *66t I N o-Y ear I I (29,000)1 I 5,000 1 o 0 0 0 0 I C O 0 0 C M s 1 88,329 I 1 7,144 | ^ f C M C O h * . I M ulti-Y ear I A nnual I Account Number 1 44061 1 44171 1 46501 1 51021 1 5117| 1 51191 1 51201 1 51211 1 51221 1 51231 1 51241 1 5127| 5139 § C M 4 0 8105 h - C M 0 0 I .8219] | 8347| s o o 1 6098 I M - 4 0 0 0 I 85161 I 85381 0 5 C O in G O 8542] 8543] 8544 8545 231 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX A (continued) i 1 9 7 6 I I N o-Y ear | I 16,853 I 5 C M o q I M u lti-Y ear I Annual I I 1 9 7 4 I I N o-Y ear | C M 2 40 I 2,659 | I M u lti-Y ea r | I A nnual I I 1 9 7 2 i I N o-Y ear | I 4,613 I L ......U 6 4 J I M u lti-Y ear | I A nnual I I 1 9 7 0 i I N o-Y ear I I 3,231 I r - I M u lti-Y ea r I I A nnual I Account Number I 85461 I 8547I I 85501 I 85801 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX A (continued) s 05 I N o-Y ear I I 30,173 I I 3,823 I I M u lti-Y ear I I A nnual I 1982 I N o-Y ear I o C M r*. in C D I M u lti-Y ear | I A nnual I ! 1980 I N o-Y ear | I 20,375 I C S S C O I 880‘8 I M u lti-Y ear | I A nnual I 1978 N o-Y ear | | 18,272 I I 5 1 3 I 4,575 I M u lti-Y ea r I I A nnual I Account Number I 8546I I 85471 I0 S S 8 I I 8580 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX A (continued) 1 9 9 2 I N o-Y ear I css h - C M N-" C O M u lti-Y ear I I A nnual I 1990 N o-Y ear I I 48,787 I I M u lti-Y ea r | Annual I I 1988 I N o-Y ear | I 41,849 I i M u lti-Y ear I I A nnual I I 1 9 8 8 I N o-Y ear I I 33,259 I I M u lti-Y ear | I Annual j Account Number I 8546I I 85471 I 85501 8580 234 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX A (continued) 2000 1 I N o-Y ear I M u lti-Y ear I I Annual I 1 1998 I N o-Y ear I I M u lti-Y ear | A nnual I i 1 9 9 6 I I N o-Y ear I I M u lti-Y ear I I A nnual I I 1 9 9 4 I I N o-Y ear I I M u lti-Y ear | I Annual I Account Number I 8546! I 8547! 1 0998 I 0 898 I 235 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX B DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR SOURCE DATA (dollars in thousands) K J U > Os Account Number 1970 1972 1974 1976 Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year 0102 10,878 12,626 19,794 23,632 0103 875 2,000 0104 15,300 30,650 123,400 0105 500 670 1,569 0106 1,085 1,500 20,255 0107 6,578 6,567 9,067 14,380 0108 3,686 5,920 700 14,936 0109 0113 25,000 26,988 3,627 0115 11,281 14,290 13,769 18,491 4,100 0118 0119 0120 0140 0274 3,100 870 465 805 0277 2,548 5,180 5,287 7,954 0326 119,705 118,605 132,614 0412 15,207 21,304 14,500 51,557 0414 48,112 59,980 59,386 101,576 0415 0416 5,000 18,600 0417 3,000 0418 0573 685 870 900 1,257 0660 2,000 2,965 16,850 27,686 0661 34,381 103,055 79,275 408,142 0663 26,800 0664 11,125 15,282 12,293 23,152 s o > I N o-Y ear I C M C O C D 0 2 h - 1 114,109 I I 65,257 I 670! 1 Z J I A nnual 1 | 44,068 | I 0 0 8 I I 4201 . 19,541 | I 2,124] C M G O 0 2 T— I N o-Y ear I I 87,778 I [ 98,614 I I 66,094 I i 2 0 0 I I 26,760 I I M ulti-Y ear I 3,842 I I 16,814 I 1 2,837 ] I Annual 1 41,632 I 0 2 C D co C O r * 1 17,750 j I 2 8 4 I ...... 7.739 J ^ r i o 1 9 8 0 I I No-Year 1 1 ,0 0 0 I 1 2,000 I I 90,079 ] I 120,002 | I 006*68 I C M 0 2 00 r * I 30,161 I 1 M u lti-Y ea r 1 1 11,464 I I Annual ] 16,466 I 1 52,561 I [ 19,276 I 14,905 I 1978 1 N o-Y ear 1 8 O L 86,968 [ | 121,666 | | 121,735 | I 22,675] 2,842 I M ulti-Y ear] in 02 I A nnual 1 I 23,311 I ] 14,407 ] I 15,703 I I 17,332 I 19,073 Account Number I 0102] C O o o s o I 01051 [9 0 1 -0 1 I 01071 [ 8 0 l - O I I 01091 1 01131 I 0115| 1 01181 1 01191 o C M o o o I 02741 1 0277| C D C M C O O I 0412| I 0414| m 1 C D s 0417 00 s C O i^- in © 1 0990 I 0661 [8990 I I 0664 237 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. " O u s s a © w pq a P Z, w P h p * 1 9 9 2 I I N o-Y ear I I 2,059 1 1 88,685 1 24,142 | 163,489 I S o 8 I M u lti-Y ear I I A nnual 1 1 63,632 " s f O I c s s ' 1 23,741 r * - C M C O 1 2,190 I r 3,9791 I 1990 1 N o-Y ear 1 I 7 5 0 I [ 73,543 1 ! 32,927 I i 136,4601 C M o > m c o “ h - 1 M u lti-Y ear i I 1 ,6 5 6 I 1 Annual ! 1 50,331 I o o C O I 20,464 1 25,305 1 C O a C M 1988 1 No-Year 1 75,287 I 41,940 I I 160,700 I ! 71,199 I 3,510 I I M u lti-Y ea r | I Annual I 47,519 I 1,800 I 17,757 1 23,053 I 1 2,948 ] C O G O O i 1 No-Year .........951.., 1 74.105J ! 76,454 | i 79,914 I 6,220 I M ulti-Y ear 1 A nnual ] I 41,295 ! C M C O C M ^r I O s C O a > I 2,353 I C M C O in C M Account Number C V S O < r - O I 01031 I 0104! 1 0105! I 01061 o o 1 01081 I 01091 C O o 1 0115| I 0118| O ) o I 01201 o o I 02741 1 02771 1 03261 | 0412] 0414 to i 0416 N - r* § C O s 0573 8 8 0661 [£990 I 0664 238 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2000 I I J B 9 A -0 N | I 3001 L069‘Z 8 J I 66,0761 I 140,7621 I M ulti-Y ear len u u y | 1 62.706 I 26,0861 s § m 8 ! 1998 I No-Year I 39,2761 1 63,6651 isto'zn I 80,184 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 1 58,286 I 24,500 | 1 35,443 i ! 1 ,0 0 0 1 1 3,849 | 9661 I I No-Year C M C O C O I 71,086 I I 156,646 I 81,072 I I M ulti-Y ear [ 200,000 I I Annual 1 56,838 I 5 0 0 j I 23,906 I 1 34,381 I I 9 9 9 I 1 4 2 4 | I 3,527 | 1 9 9 4 I No-Year 1 (9 9 1 .) I I 77,369 I 8 0 0 C O C M I 142.870 I I 101,864 I I M ulti-Y ear C O o > C M C O r* I Annual 1 64,111 I 2,394 | C O C O C M S ' I 33,359 I I 1 ,000 I i 4,538 I Account Number C M O O C O o o o o I 01051 1 01061 I 01071 C O o o 1 01091 C O o I 01181 j 0119| o C M o 1 01401 1 ^ . C M O h - C M O 1 03261 I 04121 I 04141 a n 1 c o s r ^ - T “ s 0 0 I C O r ^ - c n o 0660 I 06611 0663 I 239 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1 9 7 6 I & _ C O £ o z O h * C O C O 0 5 C M 0 0 C O I 342,160 | o C M C D r- 34,668 I 30,706 | I M ulti-Y ear I I Annual 1 7,385 j 79,118 I 335.701 I 3,386 1 i 1 9 7 4 I I N o-Y ear I I 18,422 I I 6 0 0 I o > h - [ 35,0001 C M v * O cT C M 15,842 I I M ulti-Y ear | I 7,500 I I Annual I 1 4.696 1 I 172,244 I I 156,812 I 193.442 I 2,400 I I 1 9 7 2 I I N o-Y ear I I 11,395 I I 9 0 9 I L 79J 75,752 I 50,000 I 8,369 | I M ulti-Y ear I I Annual I 1 3,949 j I 130,900 I r 49,763] I 81,431 I I 2,013 I I 71,523 I r 57,557] I 4,052 I I 1 9 7 0 I I N o-Y ear | I 5,650 | I 2 ,5 0 0 1 0 5 h- ! 7,689 | T “ C M s C O 0 ) S = f 3 S I Annual I 0 0 o I 102,830 I I 43,2881 I 26,090 | I 1 ,829 I I 53,8931 ! 41,117 I T - C O C O Account Number I 06671 I 06801 C M O O C O o 1 0684| 1 06851 1 06871 1 0700| 1 07201 I 0 7 4 0 ! 1 0787! 1 08011 I 08041 I 08051 C M tO 0 5 O C O t o 0 5 O I 0955] I 09591 I 1031] 1 1033| r 10341 19 0 0 1 . 1 I 1036| 1 10371 0 0 C O o 05 C O O o o I 10421 1 1043 240 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. s o> b - r a m o z £ an a C O 8 O C O ! 81,695 I I 8,700 I 069'S9 1 =5 2 o 00 1 Annual C M C D £ C O I 0 9 1 * * 9 9 ! 616,390 I ! 4,542 I C O o’ C M 8 1 No-Year 1 22,614 1 326,770 1 1 C M I 107,907 | I 7,680 I I 93,852 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 1 507.846 1 I 42,051 I 521,528 | C M C M 12,607 | 1980 1 No-Year C D C O C M O c m ' 8 O O 1 175,627] ! 105,951 I CM an an an 8 C D O 1 3 2 1 Annual 1 15,640 I ! 469,862 | C M GO O CD C M 390.955J o C O 1978 1 N o-Y ear I I 27,753 I 4,015! 1 209,541 I I 55,838 I 1 o ’ C O C M 3 s V * [Multi-Year 1 A nnual i I 12,581 I I 4,010 I 1 375,899 I I 82,362 I £ an o ' 8 I 3,855 1,869 Account Number s o § C D O C M C D C D O 3 § 1 06851 r ^ . 00 s 1 0 0 2 0 I o C M O I 0740I I 0787I I 08011 I 0804 I 0805! I 09521 I 0953I I 09551 1 6960 I I 10311 8 O 1034 I 10351 I 10361 1037 00 C O o 1039 o o 1042 1043 241 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C M I I N o-Y ear | I 362,381 I i 2,000 I I 99,413 | I ___4I37J ! 80,977 I 15,798 I 300,221 I 1 3 2 I 3,375 I 7 5 3 I I Annual i I 0 6 8 I I 582,619 I I 74,062 | S O C O 6,857 I 21,812 I 2 4 6 | 1 1990 § Z I 33,644 I I 323,121 I I 23,246 I C O o I 50,693 I s C O 8 C O 5 C O I M u lti-Y ear i i 6,000 I r - T - C M I Annual I 478,156 I I 68,800 I I 717,110 i s 1C 16,023 I § C M 8 8 6 U I I No-Year I 31,522 I 330,015 | I 88,259 I S' C O I 2,000 | 4,904 1 115,817 | I M ulti-Y eari I Annual I 447,747 I I 58,139 I I 718,779 | I 12,935 I 2 5 0 I 1986 I No-Year I 36,859 I 235,418 I I 75,660 I 103,959 I I M u lti-Y ea r I I A nnual j I 412,306 | I 52,050 I | 610,634 I j 4,566 I 10,555 237 Account Num ber: £9 9 0 I I 0680 f 0682 S s r 0685I oo I 0700I I 0720I I 0740! f '- G O 5 s- O ! t-0 8 0 I 3 C O o f 0805I I 09521 I 0953| 18860 I 16860 I I 10311 1033 1034 1035 1 10361 1037 00 C O o 1039 1040 1042 1043 242 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ 8 s s • B * s © u ffl a 1 2000 I I N o-Y ear 1 1 125,702 I I 11,654 I I 60,000 I h- I f) r * - C O C M I 18,318 I C O o > 178,580 I 1 M ulti-Y ear ! 138,174 | 1 Annual I 658,1341 s C M 0) s 52,5421 8661 1 1 No-Year I 974,603 I I (180,349)1 I 10,425 I I 85,000 I I 30,022 I 1 19,598 I § C D 72,568 | 222,769 I 1 M ulti-Y ear I 145,159 I 8 sn xf 1 Annual i 595,679 I < 0 r- f * - co 39,759 I 1996 I No-Year 1 312,166 I T — I 25,583 i I 15,980 I I 63,911 I I 68,618 I 191,225 I 1 M ulti-Y ear C O C O 00 C O C O 1 A nnual I I 4 2 5 I I 576,483 I 11,012,956 I 37,579 I ip— 1 No-Year C M I D ay C M I 12,900 I o lO C M I 12,300 I I 105,163 I 5,000 C M 8 < D h- I 12,697 I C D C M G O C O O C M 1 M ulti-Y ear I 25,000 I 1 Annual I 0 0 9 I I 584,685 | [ 64,273 I ! 992,328 C M C O G > I 42,585 1 250 Account Number 1 06671 f 0680I I 06821 I 06841 9890 I I 06871 I 0700| I 0720I I 07401 I 07871 I 08011 s C O o I 08051 0952 C O IT) a > o 1 9960 I 1 6960 I I 10311 1033 s o if) C O o 1036 N* C O o I 1038 1039 1040 1042 1043 243 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX B (continued) Account Number 1970 1972 1974 1976 Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year 1044 1046 1109 81,598 2,899 88,242 116,721 275,197 1110 4,827 6,800 11,679 1113 5,000 10,000 20,000 1114 1116 1118 1119 1120 1121 1125 1132 1140 1145 1200 103,899 1,500 1201 87,126 1202 800,000 1500 400 457 756 1,316 1501 600 500 513 800 1611 53,270 66,757 86,971 148,232 2,000 1612 4,279 7,226 8,126 20,371 1613 1,950 2,240 1614 5,800 7,500 3,500 7,500 1618 1620 2,293 2,332 1643 1650 " S 3 •S * - S E O u « & % 1 1 9 8 4 | I N o-Y ear I o 1 " - c > C O C O C O 40 00 1 6 6 9 1 1 5,729 1 G O C O 1 7,000 I I M u lti-Y ear | 1 3 0 0 I I Annual I I 411,336 i I 105,000 I ! 271,505 I C M G O 05 I No-Year I 12,211 I 1 52,788 ! 10,683 I O o C M I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 414,269 I 95,520 I 226,722 I I 1980 I No-Year I 16,343 ! 5,000 I 58,757 I © O o _ 40 I M ulti-Y ear I 5,000 I Annual I 353,459 I 108,000 I 206,349 I I 1978 I No-Year C O C O o C M o o o 68,660 I 10,000 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 306,995 O o o o' o ! 39,261 I 173.082 I Account Number I 1044 C O ^ f o I 1109 I 1110 I 1113; | 11141 1116 I 11181 1 11191 1 11201 1121 I 11251 1 1132! I 11401 1 11451 o o C M I 1201J C M O C M r* I___ 15001 O 40 I 16111 I 16121 1 16131 I 1614| 1 16181 1 16201 1 16431 1 16501 245 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 a e vs s o u ffl a 1 9 9 2 I I N o-Y ear I I 24,586 I < o CO a > C O CO CO 1 99,598 I 1 39,515 I I 126,212 I t ..... .(296)] I 6,620 | I M u lti-Y ear I I 115,492 I I 1 ,0 8 4 I [ Annual I 507,763 I 14,137 I 103,677 I 501,212 I I 1990 I N o-Y ear | I 23,766 I I 10,705 ! I 94,039 i I 150,824 I I 165,530 I I 16,518 I i 81,417 | I M ulti-Y ear I 99,911 I CM CO CM in I Annual I 412,148 I 105,000 CO **• I 1988 I No-Year o CO CO I 58,475 1 1 8 6 I I 10,828 I I 35,312 | o o o I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 425,325 I 105,000 328,966] I 1986 I No-Year 5 C O I 53,379 I 1 ,5 9 2 ] 9,593 I 20,258 I 14,323 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 379,138 I 7,200 I 99,882 276,935 I Account Number I 1044 I 1046 I 1109 I 1110 I 1113 I 1116: I 11181 I 11191 o CM 1121 I 11251 CM CO v - I 1140] CO O o CM I 12011 CM O CM 1 1500| 1 15011 [ft9t | I 16121 1 16131 M- CO I 16181 o CM CO C O CO I 16501 246 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX B (continued) Account Number 1994 1996 1998 2000 Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year 1044 1046 13,445 1109 528,980 200 566,537 582,082 669,406 1110 10,467 8,115 5,091 9,267 1113 1114 104,108 113,500 120,000 134,385 1116 4,800 83,052 132,295 98,906 98,775 1118 (2,387) 1,146 1119 117,143 (4,863) (1.367) (1.285) 1120 116,674 (2.416) (1,499) 1121 10,000 12,000 9,955 1125 292,710 283.886 593,741 1132 1140 5,000 1145 5,516 1200 1201 1202 1500 1501 1611 473,884 1,000 18,919 493,884 13,157 581,242 13,362 700,632 1612 (4,000) 74,959 74,905 76,622 34,497 1613 1614 1618 (54,658) 3,990 4,228 5,374 1620 1643 22,424 27,265 28,250 33,127 1650 1,000 800 800 797 " O < u s 1 c © w 'w' m a w Pm 1 . 1976 | I N o-Y ear | ! 542,466 I C M C M C M 0 > I M ulti-Y ear! I Annual I 705,073 | I I No-Year 54,606 I o o o o ' to S M ulti-Y ear I Annual 5,594 | 93,833 I C S i r * * o > I No-Year 43,481 I o o o o ' C O I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 5 'T- C D ! 75,764 i I 1970 I No-Year to C M C O C M * " I 3,000 I to T— 26,210 I o o o o C O I M ulti-Y ear I 3,800 I I Annual I 28,060 o > C M O C O to o C O CM C O 5 lO C O C O C O C O Account Number I 1652 I 1658 I 1691 I 1692 I 1699 I 1731 C M CO h - I 1733 I 1734! h*> CO I 1738! I 1739! I 1801! C M O C O I 19171 CD r * O CM o o C M C O o CM o C M C M I 22021 1 22031 1 22041 o C O C M I 23031 I 23051 I 23101 3 C O C M 1 23661 248 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 | e o w m a e 5! CO O ) I N o-Y ear I 1 15,051 I I 0 0 6 I I 95,920 I 4,000 | I M ulti-Y ear I I 301,561 I I Annual I I 5,760 I i 70,695 ! 1 164,625 I I 551,260 I 1 1 9 8 2 I No-Year I 0 0 h - I 94,628 I ! 47,160 I I M u lti-Y ear I I 66,290 ! I Annual I 5,760 1 58,515 ] I 758.104 I I 1980 I N o-Y ear i I 5,485 I ! 89,374 | 66,479 I I M ulti-Y ear I 58,723 I I Annual i s 0 > I 84,687 I I 740,276 I I 3,917 I I 1978 S No-Year 1 36,647 I I 5,025 I I 67,144 I 75,335 I u C O 1 3 2 I 34,642 ! 1 Annual o 0 0 0 0 o CO I 685,594 | Account Number CM LO CO 1 1658! O) CO r * I 1692! I 16991 1 17311 1 1732! I 17331 1 1734! I 17371 0 0 0 0 1 1739| I 18011 CM O 0 0 I 1917| CO T ~ o CM o o CM I 21031 1 22011 CM O CM CM L .. 2203! I 2204I o CO CM CO O CO CM I S O E Z I O v ” CO CM I 2364I I 23661 249 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ 8 s .S • M s © © n a g ft 1992 I N o-Y ear I I 1,185 I o o C M 1 tse 6 1 ! 3,988 I 201,380 I 122,617 I C O 1 = 3 2 I 1,481 I 1 317,913 I I A nnual I I 11,848 ! I 109,700 I I 202,979 I I 894,710 I I 1990 I No-Year I 47,500 I I . (21,860)| o fsj I D o C O C D 0 0 191,864 I (13,314)| 1 M ulti-Y ear 1 94,419 | 1 Annual I 8,904 GO C M C M O C M O C D h- I 948,928 I I 1988 1 No-Year C O C M I 49,758 I 108,225 I 13,340 I 1,000 I I M ulti-Y ear I 50,444 | I Annual I 5,645 m C M c m " o T * I 168,717 | I 845,553 I 5 9 1 I 1986 I No-Year L 2745 I 103,317 | I M ulti-Y ear I 292,387 I I Annual I 5,370 C M 0 3 1 ^ . O 0 0 I 160,028 I I 592,546 I 7,492 I Account Number C M id C D r~ 1 1658 I 1691 I 1692 o > C O I 1731 C M C O r ^ . ' T * I 1733' ■ M - CO I 1737' 1 17381 1 1739! I 18011 1 18021 I 19171 1 20161 I 21001 1 21031 1 22011 1 22021 1 22031 1 22041 I 23011 I 2303I I 2305I I .....23101 I ...2364! I 2366I 250 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ g s .S s © u ffl a o o o C M I N o-Y ear I C D C O c m ” C M C O I 9,821 I 1 0 6 S 1 I * * * o c m ’ C D o o o I D ! 1,4561 1 168,453 I I 27,1281 to . C O 1 3 2 1 3,000 I 11,588,828 I I 27,792 I 1 A nnual 1 I 10,7391 I 95.585 I 1 107,232 I 1 1998 1 No-Year § O I 4 0 0 I I 54,222 I 1 L Z Q 'l 1 j 125,279 I ! 43,352 I ; 39.300 ! 1 M ulti-Y ear I 3,000 I 11,474,695 i I Annual CD N - h- O I 91,774 I I 134,521 I 9661 1 I No-Year o o C D § C M I 50,920 I ! 5,685 I [ 117,333 I 1 80,645 I 13,600 I 1 M ulti-Y ear i 1 ,500 I ! 424,094 | 1 Annual 1 10,779 I I 95,470 I I 180,812 I I 950,096 I I 1994 I No-Year C D C D V " I 5 0 0 I I 55,331 I o C O 179,342 I 103,259 I 76,600 I 1 M ulti-Y ear I 1,500 I I 385,617 I 1 Annual I 12,000 I 110,552 I I 191,697 I [T ,050,885! Account Number C M in C D I 1658 o > C D I 1692; I 1699 eo I 1732 I ___ 1733J C O N * I 17371 1 17381 1 17391 I 18011 1 18021 r * . C D C D C M I 21001 C O O C M 1 22011 I3 0 2 Z I C O o C M C M s C M C M o C O C M C O c* C O C M in o C O C M o , F “> - co C M I 2364| I 2366| 251 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ 8 s •I s © o « w P M 1 9 Z 6 S - I N o-Y ear | C M G ) O O I 47,500 I t o u > h -’ t o I 53,722 I 1 3,000 I o o o o 1 197,777 I I 422,974 I I 19,000 I I 4 0 0 I I 1,548 I I M ulti-Year! I Annual O O C O 1 1974 I N o-Y ear ! I 294 I O O S 'Z f r I 1 17,500 I I 24,426 I 1 0 0 6 1 I 56,746 I I 106,223 | I 27,300 I I 1 6 5 I I 8 S 9 ! I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 315,050 o o o o C M h - a > I No-Year I 238 I 9 4 6 I I 30,875 I I 27,284 | ! 391,500 I 5 0 0 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 274,593 I 12,500 I 1970 I No-Year I 225 I 48,1541 C M I 25,740 | I 0 9 1 o o o I 52,549 I I 131,065 I 3 3 3 I I M ulti-Y ear 3 I Annual I 190,502 Account Number I 2368 I 2369 I 2507 C O C M C O C M I 2626 h - C M C O C M 0 0 C M CO C M I 2701i I 40531 I 4079I I 40811 1 43181 1 44091 I 44101 1 45231 I 45241 1 45251 !ooos 1 leoos I I 5005I I900S I T”’ o t o t o o t o I 5016] I 50171 0 0 o t o 1 50191 o C M O « o 252 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ 8 s .§ e o o 'w' « I N o-Y ear I r- 1 735,891 I 271,228 I 1,035 I 1 698‘ E 5,989 I 52,297 I 1 1984 I M ulti-Y ear I I Annual I 1982 I No-Year o C O ! 536,101 I I 30.000 I C O C O C O to C O C O C D 6.340 1 co c m ' 16,491 I I M ulti-Y ear I I Annual I 1980 I No-Year 1 763 I 91,217 I I 53,812 I I 267,963 I I 539,194 I C M C D 3 0 0 I 94,843 I C D C D 6,102 I 3,421 I I Multi-Year I Annual O o o o C O I 1978 I No-Year I 787 I 78,415 j I 63,253 ! 1 2,000 1 I 175,134 I I 835,000 I C O s. 3 0 0 I C O I D 7,704 | I M ulti-Y ear I Annual o o o © C O Account Number I 2368 1 2369 2507 < o C M C O C M I 2626 1 2627 C O C M C O C M 1 27011 I 4053! I 40791 I 40811 I 43181 1 44091 1 44101 1 45231 1 45241 1 45251 1 50001 I 5003I L O o o to 1 9 0 09 I O m I 50151 I 50161 I 50171 I 50181 50191 I 5020 253 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C M o > 0 5 I N o-Y ear I 0 5 0 5 C O C M ! 145,741 I I 96,878 I 1 1 1 , 0 0 0 I o o 05 id 1 432,164 I CO 0 5 « o I D 0 0 ! 1,283 I G O C O ■ s f 05’ 3,566 1 99,850 I I M u lti-Y ear | I Annual I 9 8 7 I o o ' * 3 * 0 5 1 1990 I No-Year O O C O 6 6 6 I I 183,033 I I 146,696 I ......4,718 0 0 CO 0 0 ~ ! 451,168 I 1 192,772 I t " - CO c m ’ 7,906 1 h - CO to 3 2 5 I 92,829 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 1988 I No-Year I 996 1 3,085 I I 396,368 I 206,380 I 1 ,903 I 7,693 I 8,647 I 62,004 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 1986 I No-Year § C M O c m " I 422,559 I I 197,276 I 1,465 I 4,998 I 6,928 1 o C O © I M ulti-Y ear I Annual Account Number 0 0 C O CO C M I 2369 I 2507 I 2623 I 2626 f- C M C O C M CO C M C O C M I 2701! I 4053! I 4079! | 4081] 1 43181 1 44091 1 44101 1 45231 1 45241 1 4 5 2 5 1 1 5 0 0 0 1 I 5003| I 50051 I 5006I I 50111 I 50151 I 50161 U t O S I 00 © to 1 50191 50201 254 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. o o o C M I N o-Y ear I to. CO I (849)1 o o o s s 1 690,561 I 1 368,666 1 CD 0 3 ! 13,252 I ! 1,586 I 44,952 I I M u lti-Y ear I I A nnual I I 6 , 2 9 5 ] I D C O o > 1 1998 I N o-Y ear | CO § T “ “ 's r I 17,246 ! o o o I 545,561 I 1 343,232 I ! 9 3 2 I 12,187 I 1,619 I 62,632 I M ulti-Y ear! I Annual I G O CM CM I 000‘S I S 1 9 9 6 I I N o-Y ear j 5 I 94,515 | I 26,434 | o o o i 453,589 I 325,797 I 9 4 6 I 9 , 1 4 7 | 2,007 I o > r * CO o ' I M ulti-Y ear I Annual o o s I I 5,000 I I 1 9 9 4 I No-Year I 2,466 3 5 o o > I 906't I I 177,280 I I 20,151 ! o o o I 519,635 I 1 291,585 I 0 0 CO V - 9,689 I 95,555 I M u lti-Y ear j I 160,132 ! Annual I 1 , 9 7 0 J I 2,484 I 9.690 I I 2,690 I Account Number GO CO CO CM I 2369 2507] CO CM CO CM 2626 I 2627j 0 0 CM CO CM I 27011 I 4053! I 4079| I 4081j 43181 44091 o CO CM i O 4524 I 4525| I 50001 I 5003I I 5005I I 5006I I 50111 I 50151 I 50161 f" - o to 0 0 o m I 50191 50201 255 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 ..................1 9 7 6 | I N o-Y ear I I 63.046 I CM CO CM CO I 1.357 I o o CM 1 218,000 I 143,027 I o c q CM I Multi-Year I Annual I 1974 I No-Year I 49,800 S h * . C O CM CM C M CO I 0 0 9 I s r CO o o 115,000 I I Multi-Year I Annual 76,707 | 18,320 I I 1972 I No-Year I 36,704 CM N - C O h- I 533 I 55,868 ; o o o CO O ) c o 19,435 I 114,961 I I Multi-Year I Annual 0 0 CM CD to 15,525 I 0 Z 6 I> I I No-Year I 33,081 I 931 CO 0 5 CO « S — CO c o 15,060 I 114,947 | I M ulti-Y ear I Annua! 43,740 | o CO o Account Number I 5028 0 5 CM O to I 5030 I 5031 I 5032 I 5033 I 5035 I 5038 I 5039! I 50431 I 5044! I 5045I I 5048I I 5049! I 5050I I 50511 I 5052j I 5053I Issos 1 1 50561 50571 1 50581 I 50591 1 0909 1 I 50611 I 50631 I 5064I I 50651 256 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ 8 3 .s s © u eq a, % 1 1 9 8 4 I I N o-Y ear I I 93,706 I N CO 4 0 0 > < 3 0 to " 1 203,650 I o o o N I 6 ,7 .7 1 I C M t o to ’ C M CO I 33,387] 134,291 I 10,500 I I M ulti-Year! I Annual O t o C M C O • M * I 1982 I No-Year I 121,887 o N cm' C M IN- CO 1 133,462 I CO IO "sr 0 0 I 30,396 I 91,758 I I Multi-Year I Annual 39,928 I o CO 03 I No-Year O o C M I 93,974 1 2,086 m I 09 C O 34,451 I 60,000 I I Multi-Year C 5 3 C C < 86,448 l 28,600 I 1978 I No-Year I 150 03 C O N N C O C O C O o cm" to I 20 C O 236,990 | I 86 I Multi-Year I Annual 59,318 I 24,845 Account Number I 5028 I 5029 I 5030 I 5031 1 5032 I 5033 I 5035! I 5038 I 5039! I 5043! I 5044! I 5045) I 5048I I 5049I I 5050! I 50511 I 5052| I 5053I IS S 0 S I I 5056J Izsos I 1 8909 I 1 6909 I I 5060I I 50611 I 5063I I 5064[ 1 9909 I 257 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 9 2 I I N o-Y ear I I 178,606 I C O T " 0 5 ' C * “ * I 25,497 | I 107,772 | r -- m C M ■ ! — 1 2 4 6 I I 8S8‘6 I 1 ^ , I Q C O C O C D 1 ..........43] C O 0 0 I 13,554 | 4 7 5 I 258,585 I © o G O I M u lti-Y ear | I 1 ,0 0 0 I I Annual 52,945 I o 0 5 0 5 I No-Year I 305,156 I 3,628 I I 15,372 I 120,594 I I 9 8 6 I G O 1 9 1 7 ] 1 2 5 5 I I 9,538 I 1 819* I 1 ! 5,730 I C M S. I 2 5 i C M in C MG O 7 8 4 | 209,062 I I 986 I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 46,325 | G O 0 0 < 3 5 m ! : z I 117,889 I 2,885 I 8,885 I 90,749 o o o in I 1 ,0 0 2 ! 1 2 1 4 | I 8,632 I I 1 9 9 * 1 - 1 1 m ‘9 I I 16,440 I C O C M iz fr ! G O 16,590 I 7 1 6 I C O C O o o © r* I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 50,690 I I 1986 I No-Year 120,828 I 2,285 I 2,188 I 93,603 1 ^ * . m 0 5 I 2,630 I I 3 4 0 I C M O g o ’ C M C O 1 6,9591 C O I 5 5 | C O 32,571 | 120,739 I 4,689 | I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 42,395 I Account Number I 5028 I 5029 I 5030 I 5031 I 5032 I 5033 I 5035 I 5038 I 5039 1 50431 1 50441 1 50451 I 5048I I 5049I 1 50501 1 50511 I 50521 I 50531 I 5055I I9 S 0 S I I 5057I 1 8 9 08 I I 5059I 1 0908 I I 50611 I 5063I 3 o lO w C O o m 258 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2000 1 I No-Year | [234,099 | I 1.445 | I 15,600 I I 97,680 I I ......... 2 9 ) I 40,298 I ' M - in I 15,321 I 1 2,241 | C O C O N- M - C M C O ■ t — o C M in T“ I 1 2 2 [ in co C O C O 47,424 I I M u lti-Y ear I I D O S '9 U I I Annual 8661- 1 I No-Year 8 C M S C M o C O o o C M ! 143,290 C M 0> C M o C O I 14,791 I I 2,050 I C M O ID c o ’ CO C O s I 34 8 I o © in co m © g > 1 4 2 I (144,285)1 ....4 7 ,5 5 8 ] I Multi-Year I 532,000 ! I Annual 1 1996 I No-Year I 202,965 I 1,441 O o I 44,262 3 I 45 I 2 9 0 j I 12,534 I o o C O I 5,986 I C O C O ^r C M I 3 1 6 I 11,353 I r* 00 12,684 I C M m CO 272,976 1 1,400 I I Multi-Year I Annual 46,750 I I 1994 I No-Year I 231,713 r - » T— O) T“ C M C M c m ’ C M C M O O C M CO O O O 0> T " C M CO C M I 10,7361 I 1,785 I I 9 0 t‘9 I o> I f r z .. I I 2 5 4 I 11,353 I C Oco 13.819 I 51 9 I 282,798 1 I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 52,863 I Account Number I 5028 | 5029 o CO o U D I 5031 I 5032 I 5033 I 5035 00 CO O m I 5039 I 5043 I 5044 I 5045 I 5048] 5049 | 5050| I 50511 C M ID O ID I 5053I I 5055I 1 9809 I I 5057| I 5058| I 5059I 1 0909 I I 5061J l £909 I CO © in 1 8909 I 259 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. s •1 e © o a O fc e % 1 9 7 6 | I N o-Y ear I o o C M I e s o 9 I •M- 8 C M !■*- C O o C D ! 9 8 9 I o C M 1 44,429 I 1 16,443 I 1 21,894 I I M u lti-Y ear I I Annual ! I 1974 I N o-Y ear j § o > CO C M C M C M co" I 4 3 1 I 1 29,307 | I 10,219 I I 15,539 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 1972 I No-Year I 134 Is*- CO h - ■sf IO h - CO CM i n cm" I 3 3 3 I 1 18,946 I V— ID C O Is-’ I 14,303 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 1970 I No-Year CO N - CO • s f C M I 3 0 6 ! o > CO h - I 2 1 2 | I 14,893 I Is- O C O I 11,903 | 1 7,636 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual Is*- Is-- cm" Account Number I 5067 I 5076 I 5077 I 5078 I 5079 OO O i n I 5091 I 5092] 1 5103! I 5109! I 5110! 1 5117! I 51181 1 51291 1 5130! CM CO 5 > I 51331 I 51341 1 51351 I 51361 I 51371 I 51381 1 51391 1 51401 1 51411 C O 5 1 51501 f^- m m 260 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ g 9 •S B O A « 1 9 8 4 I N o-Y ear I C M C M o o o I 3 6 5 , 7 6 2 I r-- m o rC C M I 2 2 0 1 i 8 9 3 I 1 9 , 4 0 0 1 I 8 8 8 I C M i 1 3 , 9 9 9 I I 3 3 , 7 0 5 I I M u lti-Y ea r I I 5 , 8 0 0 I 1 2 6 , 5 0 0 1 I A nnual I C M 1 I N o-Y ear I 1 1 0 0 i [ 2 2 1 , 7 3 5 I I 7 , 0 5 4 j CO CO C O C M 0 0 r * 1 1 3 , 2 2 5 I I 6 3 5 i • M " ! 1 5 , 8 4 4 I ! 3 1 , 9 4 3 I I M u lti-Y ea r I 1 2 5 , 4 4 0 1 I Annual 0861. 1 I No-Year O o I 4 ,5 0 8 1 ..........1 2 7 1 1 4 6 I 6 i- 9 ‘ 0 l . I t o t o o I 2 3 | CO o 0 0 C O I 1 6 , 6 3 6 I I 3 0 , 4 1 7 I i. C O 1 3 2 ! 5 5 ,0 0 0 1 I Annual 1 1 9 7 8 1 No-Year I 3 5 0 I 2 5 1 C M 0 0 O C M a> I 9 , 1 7 1 I h- t o 1 4 3 , 1 4 4 I C O C M T * * C O CO CO C M 1 M ulti-Y ear 4 5 , 0 0 0 I I Annual Account Number I 5 0 6 7 5076: I 5 0 7 7 I 5078! I 5079! I 5 0 8 4 I 5 0 9 1 I 5 0 9 2 j I 5 1 0 3 1 6 0 f S 1 o t o f " - t o 1 5 1 1 8 ] I 5 1 2 9 1 1 5 1 3 0 1 C M C O t o I 5 1 3 3 ! 0 0 s I 5 1 3 5 1 I 5 1 3 6 1 I 5 1 3 7 ] I 5 1 3 8 ] 1 5 1 3 9 1 1 51401 1 5 1 4 1 1 1 5 1 4 3 1 1 5 1 5 0 1 1 5 1 5 7 1 261 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ § s e '4 3 fi W 0 H P h C M 0 5 C D T * “ j N o-Y ear I G O C M s C O o > C O C M 1 1 0 0 I 1 Z Q l ' Z 1 G O C O o I 9 8 9 1 V C O G O s ' I M u lti-Y ear | 1 35,478 1 I Annual 1 1 9 9 0 i I N o-Y ear I O C O C M l 7,209 C O T- C O C M C O in C M i n C M c m ' 1 9,403 1 1 2,084 I C M 1 34,056 1 I s - G O C D I M ulti-Y ear in t * - T — C O C M I Annual 8,805 1 G O G O C D I No-Year 1 314: I 4,700 I 373,700 i 6,7 9 8 , C M C O r* s C M 1 4 1 9 I C D C O C O C O C O C M 1 30,334 ] o o o C O 1 = 3 2 27,250 1 1 Annual I 1986 1 No-Year I 457 I 8,449 I 263,848 I 5,470 C O C O I 2 3 9 i S C O h- C D ? C M I 2 2 | C O in cq I M ulti-Y ear 05 C M I s - C O ~ C M I Annual Account Number 1 5067 I 5076 I 5077 I 5078 I 5079 I 5084 I 50911 I 50921 I 51031 l60tS I I 51101 1 5117| 1 51181 I 51291 1 51301 C M C O T ~ i n 1 51331 1 51341 1 51351 1 51361 Uei - s 1 G O C O in 0 5 C O T “ in O to 1 51411 1 51431 1 51501 izsts 262 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2000 1 I No-Year I L 134! T “ o > C D c 6 C O o V * I ... 2 2 5 ] I 137,746 I I 9 8 . | o © o o’ C M © C O ’ M r 1 10,623 I 1 8,613 I I 23,000 I C O I Multi-Year I 64,170] I Annual 8661 1 I No-Year 1 104 ID O C M I 136,842 I h- C T > C O o > ID 5 ID i 43,682 I 1 4,200 1 14,000 I I 008 I M ulti-Y ear ! 36,612 I I Annual 1 1996 I No-Year S 6 6 ‘ 8 I I 274 I 202 I 1 0 0 I 1 1 6 2 ! C M I D C M 0 3 1 1,083 I C O I 40,151 I 8,074 I 789 I 1 4 7 I [M ulti-Year 35,212 I I Annual I 1994 5l ! z \ 7,062 a> CO I 203 I 1 0 0 ! C D G O C M 1 10.025 I 03 ID I 44,078 I o © © o> 1,352 I I Multi-Year 40,000 I I Annual Account Number I 5067 I 5076 I 5077 | 5078 I 5079 | 5084 I 5091 I 5092 I 5103 I 51091 I 51101 Ims 1 I 51181 I 51291 | 51301 I 51321 I 51331 1 5134| 1 51351 1 5136] C O 5 I 51381 1 51391 I 51401 I 51411 C O T * * & D I 51501 & D 5 263 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ s a .S + ..S fi O u « a 1 9 7 6 I I N o-Y ear I C O o> to o> 05 C O C M I M ulti-Year! I Annual I 1974 I N o-Y ear | 00 1 6,361 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 1972 I No-Year C O IO T" I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 1970 I No-Year I 4,849 I 2 0 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual Account Number I 5164 I 5165 I 5166 05 C O to I 5173 I 5174 I 5197 I 5198i I 51991 I 52321 1 52331 to C O C M to o C M to C M to C M C M to I 5243J I 5244I I 5248I I 5249| I 52521 I 5253I 1 2933 \ to C O C M to I 52671 I 5364I I 54121 1 54131 1 54251 264 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. u a . a a © u a s 0) I N o-Y ear I 1 16.024 I I 45,000 I I M u lti-Y ear | I A nnual j 1 1982 I No-Year I 13,269 I I M ulti-Y ear! I Annual I 1980 k . C O = ? O 2! I 11.592 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 1978 I No-Year o I 9,883 I 1 3 2 1 5 3 C C < Account, Number 1 51641 1 5165! I 5166! I 5169] I 51731 1 51741 1 51971 1 51981 1 51991 1 5232! 1 52331 I 52351 I 5240I I 52411 I 5242] I 5243] | 5244| G O C M to I 5249] C M t o C M to I 5253| I 5262] C O C M t o | 5267] I 5364| I 54121 C O t o t o C M s 265 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C M O o > I N o-Y ear | I 20.944 I o o o I M ulti-Y ear j C O 3 C C < 1 1990 I No-Year C O C M c m C M I Multi-Year I Annual I 1988 I No-Year I 18,792 I 7 8 6 1 I Multi-Year I Annual I 1986 I No-Year I 16,633 I 1 .. 764J I 3 I Annual Account Number I 5164 I 5165 I 5166 I 5169 I 5173 I 5174; I 5197! I 51981 1 5199 I 5232! I 5233I I 5235I I 5240I I 5241! C M C M m 1 52431 1 52441 1 52481 1 52491 1 52521 1 52531 1 52621 L 52651 1 52671 1 53641 1 54121 1 54131 t o C M t o 266 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ 8 3 fl ' • C e o w ffl a O 2; w Ai 5 1 o o o C M I N o-Year I I 096‘1 - I h - < 3 0 C O T * I 3 0 ,4 9 3 I I 4 2,000 I 1 3 1 ,4 8 8 I 1 1 8 ,6 3 2 I 1 1 6 ,3 7 5 I I .1,251 | I 2 1 ,9 2 6 I I 1 5 ,5 5 3 I S '- o 05 C D r- C M 1 9 3 3 1 I 1 0 ,1 4 6 I I 5 4,109 I [ 6 ,9 7 1 I 1 907,131 I I Multi-Year I 3 ,4 2 6 I I Annual 4181 1 1998 I No-Year I 5,897 I 378 I 26,287 I 24,631 I I 2 9 ,5 6 2 I I 1 9 ,3 4 6 I < o 0 0 C D 1 4 0 0 ! I 2 9 ,1 5 7 I o o C M o C O a C O I 7 5 1 I I 3 1 ,8 0 3 ] 3,527! I Multi-Year I 3 .0 8 9 I I Annual 4 2 2 I I 1996 I No-Year I 7,037 I 323 I 32,004 I 46,293 I 34,363 I 28,719 I 2 9 ,3 7 3 i O o C M I 2 2 ,9 0 3 I I 6 ,7 6 3 I C O o r * - C M C O I D I 8 4 9 I I Multi-Year I Annual I 1994 b . C 0 S o z CO C M I 29,751 I 18,678 I 86,209 0 0 I D C O C M h - I 2 6 ,9 9 7 i I 1 2 ,0 1 0 i I 2 ,6 6 3 i 1 L Z Z 'Z \ ! 1 ,2 2 8 I I Multi-Year I Annual Account Number I 5164 I 5165 I 5166 I 5169 I 51731 I s - l O I 51971 I 51981 1 5199| I 5232I C O CO C M I D I 5235i I__ 52401 I 52411 1 52421 C O C M I D L _ 52441 o o C M I D I 5249i C M I D C M I D I 52531 I 5262| 1 52651 c- C D C M I D 1 53641 C M s I 5413| I D C M 'M - I D 267 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 Z 6 1 - I N o-Y ear I I 8 ,9 5 3 I N - 0) M T C O C M I 7151 1 O S I C D V 1 2 2,009 I o o C O I 108,4681 I 4 3 7 I I 1 ,6 2 8 I ! 1 ,5 1 9 I C O I 4 7 5 I C M 2 9 1 I I M ulti-Year I I Annual | 1 1974 I N o-Year I I 5 ,2 4 0 i to s c m ' C O C M h- to c m ' 1 2 3 0 I 1 2 0 i 1 2 9 I 1 1 7 ,4 7 8 I I 4 2 0 I o 0) I s -' I 2 5 1 I £ C O5 C O c m ’ £ in " w C M 4 7 4 I C M 9 8 5 I I M ulti-Y ear j I 6 7 5 I I Annual I 1972 I No-Year 1 .... 4,227... I 254 I 2,758 C O C M C M 0) I 3 8 ,8 4 9 I I 3 6 7 | I 3 1 ,8 6 7 I I 1 4 3 I I 4 0 7 I s to C O C M C M d > h- c o C M (M ulti-Year I Annual o I s - 0) I No-Year 0) © C O I __ 2 .8 0 0 i C O C M C M • > r “ U ) $ c m ' r* C M C M I 1 4 ,4 0 3 | L 3 2 ,1 1 6 I I s - C M C M I 3 7 3 I 4 ,6 5 0 I 9 3 5 I C M I s - o C O I Multi-Year I Annual s C M h -’ Account Number I 5430 I 5431 I 5435 I f) if) ^ r to I 5648 I 5649 I 5652I I 5653! 9 S 9 S I I 5662I 1 56631 1 56661 1 56671 1 56851 I 5738I I 5739I I 5884I I 5896I I 58981 I 8030I I 8036I h- C O O C O I 8038I I 8052] I s - to o 0 0 I 8058I I 8060I I 8068I 268 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. " O < u s a s o w 'w ' ffl a W C 4 5- ^ r G O o> V“ I N o-Year | I 26,591 I I 1 ,9 3 0 I I oes I L O C O C O I H 'Z 'Z f r I 05 C O I 5 4 7 I 1 6 ,5 6 0 I h - B O — I Multi-Year] I Annual C M G O 05 I N o-Year I C O C M 00 05 I 2 ,1 3 0 I C M I 3 9 0 I C O C D I 97,041 I C D o C O I 5 6 7 | SO C D JS. C M I Multi-Year C O 3 C C < O C O 05 I No-Year I 16,196 I 2 ,1 0 1 I C M 05 r ^ C O to C M SO I 3 3 ,101 I I 9 6 ,7 7 4 | G O o C O I 5 2 2 I 1 1 ,3 9 9 I C O C M I Multi-Year I Annual I 1978 I No-Year C O 00 o I 2 ,1 8 3 ! C O I 4 1 0 ] I 2 2 I C O C M C O C O C M I 10 6,0 45 I 05 C O 1^. C M 05 7 9 9 I C M C M 1 2 5 I I Multi-Year I Annual Account Number I 5430 I 5431 I 5435 I 5455: I 5648I I .5649! I 5652] I 5653] I 5656] I 5662] I 5663| 1 9999 I I 5667] 1 9 8 9 9 I I 5738| I 5739I I 5884| [9 6 8 9 I C O 05 00 ID O C O O 00 C O C O o 00 1^- C O o G O 00 C O O G O 1 80521 1Z S 0 8 1 1 8 9 0 8 1 1 0 9 0 8 1 00 C O o G O 269 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 9 2 I I N o-Y ear I I 37,470 I 8 o C D o o o I 3 5 I 0 3 I 118,508 I I e * . . . I I 5 7 4 I I 10,004 I o [ M u lti-Y ea r | I Annual I 1990 I N o-Y ear I C M © ' M * C O I 62,168 I I 5 0 0 ! I 3 5 I C M I 203,711 | CO 0 0 0 0 C M 0 0 I 11,307 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 1988 I No-Year I 29,633 0 0 C M O L 625 o> C O 0 0 I 165,839 I I 5 4 1 I p i 3^ 0 3 I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 1986 I No-Year I 28,499 I 19,568 I 1,405 I 0 9 I o r* I 73,620 I ! 1 ,043 I ! 4 4 9 I 10,804 I co I M ulti-Y ear I Annual Account Number I 5430 I 5431 I 5435 I 5455 I 5648 I 5649 I 5652 I 5653) I 5656) C M C D CO LO I 5663) I 5666I CO C O in I 5685I I 5738| I 57391 M - 0 0 0 0 to I 5896I I 5898I o C O o 0 0 CO C O o 0 0 C O o CO 0 0 C O o 0 0 I 8052I in o 0 0 1 8908 I 1 0908 I I 8068I 270 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ 8 s .9 B O o p q a w C U o o o C M I N o-Y ear | I 486,295 I I 16,462 I I 1 -3 3 7 | C O o C O C D I 66,905 I C O C O 0 5 to C M 5 0 5 C D I 5 3 4 1 C M 0 5 1 15,850 I I 18,414 I C O I M ulti-Y ear! I Annual , 8661. 1 I No-Year I 1-000 1 45,850 I 35,953 o s C D I 67,491 I 1 3 7 8 1 1 5 3 6 I C O C O • M r r- 12,877 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 1 1996 I No-Year | 44,871 o o C O id C O o in C O O C M o L O I 73,039 I 1 5 7 4 1 1 5 8 0 I 15,740 I h - C O I M ulti-Y ear C O 3 C C < I 1994 I No-Year 0 0 C O c m " I 42,607 ! G OO C M C O I 19,055 I 1 5 3 7 I I 6 2 4 I 9,225 I C O I M ulti-Y ear I Annual Account Number I 5430 I 5431 I 5435 I 5455 I 5648 I 5649 I 5652 I 5653 I 5656 I 5662I I £999 I I 5666! I 56671 I 5685! I 5738! 0 5 C O ID I 5884| 1 58961 I8 6 8 S I I 8030I C D C O O C O 8037I C O C O o C O I 80521 I 80571 I8808 1 1 0908 I 1 8908 I 271 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ 8 2 I e © w n a CO h - G > I N o-Y ear I I 9 1 - 9 7 1 . I I 2,623 I CO CO o I 9,390 I s t o co~ CO CO I 896‘9 I a n CO I 3 2 I i n I M u lti-Y ear | I Annual O) T“ I N o-Y ear I 1 2,162 I I 20,113 ! N - O ) 1 6 8 5 1 I 76,482 | I 155,949 I CO lf> 1 4 6 0 I o V " CO 7 ,3 4 1 | I M ulti-Y ear I Annual CM a> T * I N o-Y ear I I 1 ,538 I C M Y " N - CD 1 1 ,376 I I 12,500 I s 1 ^ CO 1 1 2 9 I 2 2 I o o r^ . 2,084 I I M ulti-Y ear C O 3 C c < 1 1970 I No-Year I 6,915 I I 3,336 I I 2 5 2 I I 1,055 I CO CO 0 0 I 1 ,336 I I 6,000 I T “ CO T “ s u . C O s 3 S I Annual Account Number 6 909 I I 8070! I 8151 I 8154 CO CO \ 8 1 7 8 1 in CM CO CO CM 0 0 I 82171 1 82191 r * - c o C M 0 0 CM CO G O I 8356I I 8364I 8365 I 8366I I 8368i 1 6 9 98 I I 8370I I 8500I I .85621 CO s 00 I9998 I 1 99 9 8 I I 8740I 272 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1984 I No-Year I C M C O C O C M u > I 9 ,9 0 0 I I 3 ,5 3 7 | 1 zzv | 1 378,050 1 C O C O C M r* 1 o s 1 I M ulti-Year I I Annual I I 1982 I N o-Year I o C M T " I 5 .4 0 2 I O ) o C M C O 1 2 4 3 1 1 506,300 i I 4 ,6 3 1 | 1 2 6 7 I eo T “ [ M ulti-Y ear | I Annual 0861 I I N o-Year I I 1 ,1 8 2 I I Z99' L I I 2 .3 6 0 i 1 5 0 5 I 1 955,931 i I 1 2 ,6 1 2 I 4 0 6 1 I Multi-Year I Annual I I 1978 C O $ o z I 813 I 4,936 C O C M C O C N I 1 7 3 0 1 I 303,620 I I 6.830J C M C M r^ I Multi-Year I Annual Account Number 6 9 0 8 I I 8070 I 8151 I 8154 C O 5 I 8178: in C M C O I 8216 h- C M C O I 82191 1 8287J 1 83271 1 83561 3 C O C O I 8365I I 8366I C O C O C O C O I 8369I I 8370I I 8500I C M C O 10 C O C O C O to C O 1 85651 1 9 9 9 8 I 1 87401 273 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I 1992 I N o-Y ear I C D •sf C M o » I 72.021 I I 236,000 I 00 C D o> I 38,500 I C M <S I 887| 1 433,650 I O) C M C O I m \ I 2 2 0 I C O I M ulti-Y ear | C O 3 C C < I 1990 I No-Year 00 C D C M C D I 39,821 I 181,000 , I 9.450 1 5,633 i 1 . . . . 5071 £ h - I 8864 I 00 03 L ..........4 2 I to I Multi-Year I Annual I 1988 I No-Year I 4,823 I 44,506 I 42,366 j 1 I Q Z 'L 1 1 4 3 9 1 i 372,973 I I 1 ,370 I L S * .........; 3 6 I C O I Multi-Year I Annual 9861 I I No-Year I 3,337 I 4,731 I 3,857 1 5,548 I 1 6 9 9 1 1 310,148 I I IZ t I 2 3 I § I M ulti-Y ear I Annual Account Number I 8069 I 8070 I 8151 I 8154 I 8176 I 8178 82151 1 82161 r^- C M 0 0 I 82191 C O C M 0 0 1 83271 8356 C D C O 0 0 L O C O C O 0 0 I 8366! I 8368| I 8369I o co 0 0 o o I D G O I 8562| I 8563I to C D in 0 0 19 9 98 I I 8740I 274 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ 8 s § s o w m a 2000 I N o-Y ear | I 14,138 I I 11,575 j f 282.060 I I 8 9 3 I CO 0 0 r * CD I 7 7 6 I I M ulti-Y earl I A nnual I I 1 9 9 8 ! I N o-Y ear I I 10,732 I I 32,231 I o o o CD C M CO CO I 5,365 I 0 0 C O C M I 7.1 JQ I 1 438,296 i I 4,554 | I 1 1 0 ' I I i 6,118 I 2 8 3 I o T“ I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 1996 I N o-Y ear : I 8,246 I 24,478 I 220,966 I 6 0 0 , I 2,900 I I 2,953 I I 8 5 5 I 1 27,242 ! ! z e e l 1 337,117 I I 996't I 1 2 3 7 1 o o co~ C M O C M 3 s I M ulti-Y ear I Annual *661 I < 0 S o z t o o> C M < J > 0996 I 1213,000 I __ 1,169: o o 0 0 o > I 2,373 00 C O C O T1 " 1 1,429 I C M CO CO I 361,347 I C O 0 0 0 0 0 0 s CO CO t o t o CO r “ 3 0 I b . C O 1 3 2 I Annual Account Number 6908 I 8070 I 8151 8154 CO •i — C O 8178 t o C M 0 0 CO C M 0 0 I 8217 I 8219 I 8287! I 83271 1 83561 1 83641 I 8365I I 8366I 1 83681 1 83691 I 8370i i 8500I I 8562I I 85631 19998 I I 85661 I 8740| Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX C DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS SC (dollars in thousands) Account N um ber 1970 1972 1974 1976 A nnual M u lti-Y ear N o-Y ear A nnual M u lti-Y ear N o-Y ear A nnual M u lti-Y ear N o-Y ear A nnual M ulti-Y ear N o-Y ear 0102 5,367,885 6,248,000 6,743,800 10,388,900 0103 0108 69,152 93,622 0110 68,343 313,324 0111 40,018 122,916 0120 7,253 6,500 9,050 0128 0129 0137 1,016,215 1,888,700 3,353,000 7,173,947 0144 1,336 2,100 2,000 4,150 63 0151 242,643 291,112 333,588 604,530 0152 17,941 22,531 33,949 48,758 0160 1,683,209 2,299,325 2,859,076 4,869,526 0161 58,783 1,200 68,707 76,142 122,836 0162 1,290 261 0163 0170 0181 4,000 8,000 10,000 0182 25,000 38,332 0183 0190 0200 1024 1025 1114 1118 1119 1120 i 1 9 8 4 , | § % z 113,996,900 | CM 0 3 C O Iff I 185,3781 I 7 ,4 0 0 | I 1,603,2001 I M u lti-Y ear | 130,000 1 I . . 5 0 0 j | 217,680 | [ 1 8 ,0 0 0 j I o o o 'e I I A nnual I 715,676 | 0 4 ss $ “ S f 5 CM 0 0 51,000 | | 1982 ! z 113,778,150 I 372,270 1 102,010 | O S S ‘ 6 I I 1,964,100 | I M u lti-Y ear 0 0 9 i ! 000‘8 I | 136,657 [ 15 ,8 4 0 | I A nnual I s - V O O CM" CO CO I 55,392 | I 7,113,726 ! I 1980 I N o-Y ear 111,146,800 I 321,292 I 73,233 I 5,400 I 2,373,535 O S I I M u lti-Y ear I 125,847 | I 0 0 9 1 1 I 000‘ S I I A nnual I 1,300 I 611,609 I I .4 8 ,2 0 5 j I 5,832,039 | I 1978 I N o-Y ear I 9,636,400 I 393,689 I 95,234 I 3,711 I 2,617,778 0 9 I I 111,053 ] IM ulti-Y ear 1 5 ,0 0 0 | 53,411 | I A nnual I 1,650 I 581,850 | CO c o CO I 4,924,649 ! Account N um ber I 0102 C O o o 0 0 o o I 0110 I 0111 o CM T * “ o CO CM O CD CM T ~ o I s - < o O I 0144 T — V O o I 01521 o CO o I 0161] I 0162| 1 2 9 1 .0 1 I 01701 I 0181| CM CO o CO QO o I 01901 I 0200| CM O I O s ^ r CO 0 3O CM T * “ 277 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ g s •S s o u U a g Pm « < CM o> a> I No-Year j 116,303,643 | | 413,560 | r 190,711 | I 25,740 | I 635,400 | CO [ 16,793 | | Multi-Year o o to I 56,100 | I 227,000 | I 85,000 | I 5,104 | [ Annual I 67,045 | | 792,677 | | 43,479 j | 13,609,892 | | 10,113 | I 29,959 | CO CM h- o> CO CM CO CM 00 Ui 1,041 | CO CO 535,512 | I 1990 I No-Year | 115,590,495 | | 457,022 I 91,637 ! CO | 477,313 j | Multi-Year CM o> I 213,652 | o> s 5 | 4,288 | I Annual | 811,628 [ 46,697 [11,436,306 | I 21,786 | I 1988 [ No-Year 114,769,887 | 402,884 I 115,942 o o> CM r- | 875,700 I Multi-Year § I 192,889 | [ 40,320 | I Annual I 762,810 | I 46,628 110,126,538 | | 1986 | No-Year 114,408,999 I 460,544 I 95,077 I 9,745 I 895,569 § >r U - * 3 5 I 35,000 I 473,500 | I 181,126 | I 20,822 | 2,839 | | Annual 0> CO CO | 51,221 CO 00 s ' Oi Account Number CM O o I 0103 CO o o o o o o CM O I 0128 0 > CM • « r “ O N - CO o mo I m V “ O CM iO o o CO o CO T ” o | 0162[ I £ 91.0 1 o 5 T— CO o \Z9iO I | 01831 | 0190| looso 1 CM O to CM © r* n r * CO 05 r* O CM T “ 278 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. [ 2 0 0 0 | | N o-Y ear | 121,568,364 | I 65,140 | I 160,000 | I 28,670 | I 45,250 | | 1,469,000 | [ 563,7541 I 0 0 0 * 0 6 I ! 25,000 | 1,503,197 | u . C 6 % ± £ 3 2 I I Q Z 'P I 11,720,481 | ! 321,000 | I A n n u al j I 97,1381 | 936,355| tO o h - C D to 117,177,9551 [ 43,170| 472] to T " C M 156,9581 o C M to I 1998 I N o-Y ear j 120,482,997 j I 177,900 | | 175,000 | | 51 ,3 6 0 | I 1,366,000 j | 666,578 | I 80 ,0 0 0 | | 1 0 ,0 0 0 | 919,921] r o s 3 2 ! ooo'ozs I O © o P C M | A nnual I 84,183 ! | 786,577 | I 59,860 | 1 16,487,396 | | 31,013 | 4 3 2 | T — o C M 160,437 I 5 1 5 I I 1996 I N o-Y ear 118,603,561 I 128,969 I 189,740 | 42,890 I 1,555,300 | i 47,397 | V - 1 .4. •w 3 2 I 789,000 ! I 256,678 ! Y * I A nnual I 72,507 i | 847,016 j | 63,516 j 1 15,753,750 | [ 30,858 | 4 5 9 | 5 2,138 | C O§ 65,226 | 2 0 5 | I 1994 I 6 z 117,491,146 | 474,100 I 155,540 I 15,370 I 1,080,600 ! 20,198 ! I 41,080 | to C O 29,345 | 829,678 | I M u lti-Y ear ! Q O S I I 651,000 | | 252,000 I C M ■ M - C M t O 1 A nnual I 70,507 I 827,450 | o o © 1 14,968,952 | I 10 ,3 8 6 | i 31,436 | I 6S 2 ,8 6 3 | 70,716 | i o o 5 6,330 | ,.156.1 Account Num ber I 0102 I 0103 C O o o o v © I 0111 | 0120 C O C M O o > C M O h - co © 5 I ___01511 I 0152! o C O o I 0161J 1 01621 | 0163| io z t-o I It8t0 I C M C O o C O 0 0 O 1 o o o C M o C M O to C M O * M - T” T ” C Oo > o C M 'T“ 279 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C O h- 0 > i N o-Y ear | o o I 29,000 | I 1,007,099 | i 39,140 | ! 6,002 I | M ulti-Y ear | I Annual | 1 9 7 4 | I N o-Year j co 0 0 | 10,576 | 808,431 | 38,444 | 3,854 | | M ulti-Y ear | Annual CM f -~ 0 5 | No-Year | 4,638 C O 0 0 o C O 772,790 | 40,292 | 1 tr6£'£ I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 1970 I No-Year I Wi ' f I 711,4101 h- CM in 5 1 m ‘z i >- £ 3 S | Annual Account Number I 4014 00 o CO CM O CM O | 4025 5 GO • e — ■ s r CO C O 5 h - co in 0 0 CO in • m - I 5Q 14I I 52871 CO in co in 0 0 CM CO 1 8129] CM CO 0 0 co CO 0 0 o in ** 0 0 | 8180| 280 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. s o > I N o-Y ear | ! 100,0001 1,248,781 | I 215,8521 23,279 | 13 ,4 4 7 | | M ulti-Y ear I A n n u al | a 0 0 0 > 1 6 z 1,163,632 | 161,057 | 31,208 | 9 ,9 4 2 | I M u lti-Y ear I A n n u a l | | 1980 1 N o-Y ear i 1,044,165 | 111,301 | I 896'Z E 7 ,4 1 4 | 1 M u lti-Y ear I A nnual I 1978 1 N o-Y ear 1 17,2001 1 0 0 0 * 0 2 I C O CM N - of CO O ) 3 1,735 | 3 6,152 | I S0£*9 1 M ulti-Year 1 A nnual Account Number o I 4018 CO CM O 4024! m CM o 5 1 41181 i m p ... j r- CO in C O CO to o h - c o * C M V > C O I O CO to I 81281 I 81291 CM CO 0 0 I 81331 o L O 5 o C O s Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX C (continued) Account Num ber 1986 1988 1990 1992 A nnual M ulti-Y ear N o-Y ear A nnual M u lti-Y ear N o-Y ear A nnual M u lti-Y ear No-Y ear A nnual M ulti-Y ear No-Y ear 4014 4018 690 4023 57,485 4024 (110,000) 4025 200,000 894,670 658,500 4114 4118 (4,500) 4138 4537 4538 3,936 28,543 19,200 5014 5287 5358 8128 8129 133 40 8132 1,367,012 1,406,849 1,441,867 1,494,211 8133 323,875 274,746 197,105 70,813 8150 19,643 16,363 13,892 11,811 8180 13,995 20,294 25,153 28,404 ■ § a .9 a o u u a § 5! o o o C M I No-Year | [ 131,450 | CO C O 0 5 Is- Is- I s- C O T“ i 1,089,584 | ! 3,979 | CO CM in 32,184 | 1 Mufti-Year] | Annual j 0 5 0 5 [ N o-Y ear | I 104,335 | 8 i 165,627 | l(0E9‘ 8 ) i I 53,039 | T " o i 1,195,576 | 1 38,475 | 6,133 | I 30,974 | I M ulti-Y ear | I Annual j § 0 5 I N o-Year j 8? CO S ? s I 0002 I | 126,355 | o N - 1,288,040 | 15,328 | 7,260 | 27,173 | I M ulti-Y ear | I Annual § I No-Year I 6,000 j s c m" 95,763 a ? u ? CD C M 1,417,258 | 36,527 I 9,924 | 26,821 | [ M ulti-Year | Annual Account Number T “ o GO O CO 0 4 O O CM o 'M ' GO r * < S } > CO C O V r * - CO s § 8 Is- o o CM If? 0 0 If? CO m CO CM 5 0 5 CM • v — CO CM CO GO CO CO s o If? T " GO o 0 0 r - 0 0 283 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX D GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION SI (dollars in thousands) Account Number 1970 1972 1974 1976 Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year 0100 0103 1,234 1,400 2,950 0104 665 1,318 0105 335 418 60 343 0106 1,375 0108 0109 2,290 3,350 0110 11,116 0111 5,096 20,000 0112 3,260 0113 0114 0115 0116 0200 0300 23,640 29,055 500 40,445 730 72,824 200 0301 1,085 1,746 0302 350 2,500 0400 0500 82,814 89.087 101,950 206,966 0515 1,000 0533 0535 0701 2,000 0702 69,921 0900 6,678 7,519 7,100 9,231 1000 332,800 416,371 532,265 1002 62,336 92,000 21,683 82,000 1 I N o-Y ear I O O O M*" I M ulti-Y ear § o 0 5 CO CO s I Annual I 1,1711 I 19,536 I 1 133,881 I ! 161,774 I I 87,534 I CM § 29,272 I 1 1982 I No-Year I 5,100 I I M ulti-Y ear 18,350 I I Annual 1 69,774 I 1,290 ! 8 I 1 8 , 1 8 3 I I 114,970 I I 12,000 I I 15,588 | I 75.765 I ! 122,236 I 14,808 | 14,314 I I 1 9 8 0 I No-Year o o o I 2,500 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 1 70,159 CM CO 1 759 I 18,245 I 2,720 I I 7,023 I 14,181 I I 78,417 | I 2,833 I I 6,611 I CM h - CO © CO I 69Z'9£ 101,982 | 11,464 | I 1978 I No-Year I 3,500 I I 1,000 I L . C O 1 3 2 1 Annual o o ! h ~ 1 671 I 2,955 I 13,654 I 40,202 I 1 1,300 I I 66,374 | I 1 ,565 I I 168,144 I 83,682 I 8,490 I Account Number I 0100 I 0103 I 0104 I 0105 CD O o 0 0 o o I 0109 I 0110 I 01111 1 01121 I 01131 ^ r o I 0115! I 01161 o o CM O o o CO o I 03011 CM O CO O I 0400| lo o so I I 05151 0533] I 0535I o F " - O CM O N - O I0060 I I 10001 1 10021 285 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C M 05 05 T * * I N o-Y ear I I O O P 'Z I § h - I 12,000 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I a> C M c m " I 33,594 I 1 30,431 I 1 54,605 1 h - C M C M T“ ^ r C D $ I 1990 I No-Year o o o T - s o> C M C M a I M ulti-Y ear I Annual C O o C O I 25.396 G O O G O 8i < r“ o> s n T [ 10,862 I 32,405 1 i 1988 I No-Year looo's I M ulti-Y ear I Annual G O 0 > I 24,334., I 122,500 I 1 69,6001 31,193 I 9861 I I No-Year I M ulti-Y ear 28,285 I I Annual I 1,065 N . co C M o> I 109,647 i 1 165,142 I C M h - o > 28,692 I Account Number I 0100 0103 o o I 0105 I 0106 C O O o 0109 I 0110 I 01111 1 01121 1 01131 I 01141 in T — o C O T - O o o C M O looeo I O C O o I 0302I I 0400| looso I I 05151 I 0533I I 0535I I 07011 C M O O I 0900I § o C M O O 286 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. o o o C M I N o-Y ear I I 22,957 I I M ulti-Y ear I Annual C M c m ’ I 33,317 ! I 105,071 I 1 1998 I No-Year I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 2.208 I 33,870 I 107,487 I I 1996 I No-Year I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 2,181 I 33,274 I 119,126 i I 1994 I No-Year C M 0) 1 20,994 I C O G O C O I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 2,833 I 34,925 1 31,404 I 1 43,378 1 I 15,741 I C O C O io Account Number I 0100 C O o V o I 0104 I 0105 I 0106 I 0108 03 O o I 01101 1 01111 C M o 1 01131 I 01141 1 01151 1 01161 o o C M O O o C O o o C O o I 03021 1 04001 1 0 0 9 0 1 rstso n C O co ID O [seso I I 07011 C M O 1^. O I 09001 O o o 10021 287 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ 8 s a v » a © u o a <0 Is- 0> T ™ I N o-Y ear I 8 O o' CM CM I M u lti-Y ear I I Annual I I 7,690 I in ^r o > 1 1974 I N o-Y ear ! I 5 0 0 ! CM I s- m cm’ 1 2 7 I I M ulti-Year! I A nnual I I 7,300 I I 7,000 I Is- o > Is * o o CM 00 CO I 1972 I N o-Y ear I CO s o CM I 246,398 ! 00 I M ulti-Y ear! I Annual I 2,400 I I 2,780 j 0 3 N- < o ! 35,696 I I 1970 I N o-Y ear I I 11,371 I 26,553 I m CO I M ulti-Y ear I Annual i O O P 'Z I I 1,250 I I 669 29,796 I Account Number I s*GO • M - T"“ I 1152! I s- o o 00 CM I 4048I I 4530! I 4533I 4540 4542 I 4549| I 4550I 5246] o m CM m CO m CM m *5f in CM m m m CM m Is- 0 3 £ I 8296I Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX D (continued) Account Number 1978 1980 1982 1984 Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year 1147 1148 1152 1157 2800 4,582 3,543 4048 4530 4533 5,000 4540 4542 (3,593) 2,650 4549 1,347 4550 5246 5250 5253 7,935 6,526 6,649 14,464 5254 1,000 868 671 57,600 284 2,895 5255 8197 160 75 34 1,352 8296 2,945 t s > G O Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX D (continued) Account Number 1986 1988 1990 1992 Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year 1147 1148 1152 1157 2800 4048 4530 4533 4540 4542 10,199 39,983 270,567 4549 1,182 1,279 1,339 1,944 4550 19,020 5246 7.600 5250 13,040 9,503 15,415 5253 11,414 12,000 5254 3,668 2,114 11,159 4,117 5255 8197 8296 2000 1 1 i o 2 o 's l id I 2,622 | I M u lti-Y ear | I Annual 1 I 12,364 I ! 6,000 I 1998 1 N o-Y ear I 1 256,712 I C O C O C M C M o > ? c \T 1 M u lti-Y ear I 1 Annual s I 12,000 I C O s 1996 ! N o-Y ear I I 23,600 I I 2,061 I [ M u lti-Y ear 1 1 A nnual 1 I 14,247 I C O s C M I 1994 1 N o-Y ear 1 I 156,245 I o C M I M u lti-Y ear | I Annual o C M C M T “ * 1,200 I Account Num ber! 1 1147| 0 0 I 11521 1 11571 o o G O C M I 4048I o C O w o 'S f I 4533I I 4540] C M in ' M - o > s 1 4550] C O C M m loszs I I 5253| in C M in I 5255] I 81971 C O 05 C M 0 0 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission APPENDIX E NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRA (dollars in thousands) Account Number 1970 1972 1974 1976 Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual Multi-Year No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year 0103 702.554 732.590 744.600 1.013.107 0105 0107 53,233 52.700 101.100 92.880 6.999 0108 2.992.954 2.522.700 2,194,000 3.377.980 0109 0110 0111 0112 8550 8977 8978 8979 3.027 11.748 2,536 1,140 8980 Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX E (continued) Account Number 1978 1980 1982 1984 Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year 0103 889,761 996,186 1,133,300 50,000 1,256,082 0105 3,772,700 0107 162,340 159.100 272,066 77,338 54,788 110,414 112,782 0108 3.011,600 4,088,086 4,738,000 2,051,200 13,000 0109 0110 0111 0112 8550 8977 8978 8979 21 (56) 8980 12 125 1 to ■ ' O " § 3 a tq e o u W a 5 * % 1 9 9 2 I I N o-Y ear ] 1 3 4 0 I C M h- co I Multi-Yearl 15,384,775 1 1 525,006! 16,846,706 1 I Annual I s « v T I * - . O O CD I 1 9 9 0 I I N o-Y ear I o o o tf > 1 331,996 I I 1 ,350 I I 9 6 I I Multi-Yearl 14,619,155 I 3 C O GO GO 15,224,676 I I A nnual I 12,023,434 | I 8.659 I 8 8 6 1 - I I No-Year I 75,000 ' M * I M ulti-Year 13,805,709 1 I 138,188 I 13,179,900 I I A nnual I 11,762,580 I i 1 9 8 6 I I No-Year CO p T ” C O I Multi-Year 13,670,139 I 105,164 | 12,619,257 ! I Annual S I • ‘ T — Account Number C O o s — o I 01051 h - . o r ' O GO O O I 01091 1 0110| T T * O C M o 1 85501 0 5 GO I 8978] 0 5 N - 0 5 0 0 0 868 I 294 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX E (continued) Account Number 1994 1996 1998 2000 Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year 0103 1.691.508 0105 4,821.500 13,600 0107 304.400 250,100 0108 7,526.300 7,200 0109 15,391 16,000 18,300 20,000 0110 5,898,100 30,800 5.684,100 5,900 5,556,195 26,200 0111 5.429,400 27,200 5,552,700 6,800 5,476,900 11,000 0112 1,595,600 834,188 53,300 1,637,100 697,707 45,571 1,726,098 700,184 85,400 8550 14 21 22 26 8977 333 8978 1,387 1,398 1,418 1,109 8979 8980 158 VO K M Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX F DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SOUB (dollars in thousands) Account Number 1970 1972 1974 1976 Annual Multi-Year No-Year Annual Multi-Year No-Year Annual Multi-Year No-Year Annual Multi-Year No-Year 0011 0100 0100 0101 0102 0102 0103 0104 0106 0147 0200 0201 1,846 0202 10.000 0204 40.000 57,571 0207 2.600 0210 0212 134.703 9,185 5,083 62.609 9,500 13,000 163,124 83,861 147,330 0215 19,032 19,799 0230 0231 0240 0241 0242 0243 0260 0270 36,893 0271 46.003 52,003 87,523 134,160 0272 Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX F (continued) Account Number 1978 1980 1982 1984 Annual Multi-Year No-Year Annual Multi-Year No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year 0011 0100 169,282 3,412,993 (1,000) 0100 2,536 0101 75,075 77,852 68,780 0102 494,296 20,000 33,000 437,000 9,600 19,200 565,300 35,000 0102 17,328 0103 303,312 0104 85,218 171,000 80,080 86,880 0106 66,978 0147 11,011 0200 37,891 2,910,843 3,569,480 3,976,860 0201 388,480 26,458 349,456 18,066 25,500 394,366 7,135 24,500 0202 0204 59.732 824 0207 0210 0212 85,712 167,500 269 0215 0230 948,431 3,073,846 2,256,500 0231 0240 2,744 48,879 19,846 0241 0242 0243 0260 345,660 2,908,843 3,493 544,034 0270 100,659 1,566 0271 133,407 70,631 0272 I 1 9 9 2 I ! z I 29,942 I I 16,718 I 1 28.912 I 14,226,391 I 13,709,962 I I 3,598 I I M ulti-Y ear I 1 ,550 I I 82,500 I 16,927,735 I I Annual I 75.019 I 741,756 I 131,029 i I 798,491 I I 8,095 I I 1990 I No-Year I 77,318 | o o o > cd I 40.342 I 14.377.558 I 5,129 I I M ulti-Y ear 0 0 h * - U 5 16,082,246 ! I Annual I 72,042 I 717,354 I 117,746 I 584,189 I I 1988 I No-Year I 22,978 I 22,595 I 61,609 j I 19,148 I 12,565,000 1 I M ulti-Y ear I 1,600 15,544,792 I I Annual I 64,726 I 685,498 I 112,494 I 472,862 I 1986 I No-Year I 62,726 I 46,317 I 21,533 o C O C D 3.265.941 I 17,991 I I M ulti-Y ear s ^ r 14,822,859 1 I 27,952 i I Annual I 636,405 I 100,484 I 366,081 I Account Number o o o o o I 0100 © T - o C M O O C M O O C O O O © o I o r * O 1 02001 o C M O I 0202I I 0204I o C M O o C M O C M C M O m T” C M O o C O C M O T * C O C M O o C M O C M O C M C M O I 0243I I 0260I I 0270I T * K - C M © C M 1^- C M O 298 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ g a s " ■C a o w a o o o C M I N o-Y ear I 1 ....80,252j ! 16,450 I 95.817 I 4.575,997 I 735.000 1 I M u lti-Y ear I o o o t o <o 19,374,717 I o o o o I Annual I 77,000 | o o C M CD C M G O 11,503,879 I ! 48,000 I 7 3 7 1 1 1998 I No-Year I 65,000 j I 13,700 I 550,973 1 2,054,449 I 532,000 1 I M ulti-Y ear I8.978.934 I I Annual I 62,600 I 743,000 I 933,038 I C M G O CD 6 9 8 1 390,243 1 I 1996 I No-Year 8 O o to I 16,369 I I 16,712 I CO 0 0 C M G O 13.080,900 1 C M o > t o 435.652 I I M ulti-Y ear 16.258.147 I I Annual I 52,497 I 643,000 I 116,136 I [ 820,245 I 29,977 I 1 869 243,720 1 I 1994 I No-Year I 45.341 I 17,792 ! I 25,594 I 1.950.463 I 2,463.550 1 5,885 1 o o © o CD C M 1 3 I 1,735 I 165.000 18,103,325 I 1 Annual I 81,765 I 752.867 I 128,517 j I 868.094 I 69,966 I 7 3 0 1 87,967 I Account Number 1 0011 I 0100 I 0100 I 0101 I 0102 I 0102 I 01Q 3I I 0104! I 0106! I 01471 o o C M O o C M O C M O C M O s C M O I 02071 I 02101 1 02121 1 02151 o C O CM O C O C M O I 02401 1 .02411 1 02421 C O C M O O CO C M O O C M O I 02711 1 02721 299 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX F (continued) Account Number 1970 1972 1974 1976 Annual Multi-Year No-Year Annual Multi-Year No-Year Annual Multi-Year No-Year Annual Multi-Year No-Year 0273 385,877 6.500 6,500 560,188 8,000 8,000 579,710 8,000 8,000 809,601 79.500 8,000 0274 43,740 0275 73.395 258,193 275,025 0278 21,737 0279 1,649,382 2,028,804 2,037,168 8,000 2,399,988 2,234,521 12,500 0280 505,400 15,129 592,594 20,040 574,416 19,000 730,000 44,000 0282 100,000 115,750 147,079 236,875 200.000 0287 1,000 3,000 1,000 2,200 0291 18,000 0292 83,208 113,557 137,008 15,675 0293 549,285 246,520 75,650 901,189 320,715 225,610 816,472 748,300 341,425 673,966 2,168,593 576,000 0294 107,500 135,800 0296 75,700 0300 0301 0400 0500 0501 0502 0600 0601 0602 0603 0700 0800 0801 0802 0900 ^r CO O) I N o-Year I I 8 ,7 4 8 I 8 CO CO I Multi-Year 1 1.095.205 I I 830,297 I 3,480,000 I I Annual i 1 4 5 ,4 4 0 i 1 1 ,1 5 5,10 0 i I 5 ,0 0 0 I O o o 0 0 CM ! 5 6 ,0 0 0 I 1 1 4 9 ,7 1 0 I 4 9 ,3 9 6 S © o o o CO CM 8 ,2 5 0 I C S S CO 0 > I No-Year I 7 ,1 7 7 I I6Z L ' Z I 1 3 ,5 0 0 I o CD o > I Multi-Year I 955,008 i I 735,008 I 3,033.969 I I Annual I 11 3,5 72 I I 952,171 i 5 ,0 0 0 I 23,571 I 5 2 ,0 0 0 I 1 3 1 ,7 0 0 I 45,038 I 218,429 | o o 1 1980 I No-Year o o o o I 1 0 ,7 3 0 I o o o o ... .475 3 ,0 0 0 I i— CO 1 3 2 1 2,235 I 899,500 I I 896,641 I I 1 5 ,0 3 3 I I 06 I Annual 1 188 O CO © T " * 1 277,703 1 2,450 1 3 ,7 8 6 j I 1 4 7 ,0 7 4 | I 574,269 | I 2 0 ,7 1 8 I I 7 .3 8 6 I i 8 0 ,3 5 8 I 1 73,185 I CO CO 6 ,3 3 7 | CM CO CM O CM 4 4 ,9 1 4 I 2 2 ,1 8 0 | 8 9 ,6 2 9 I 1 0 ,7 0 5 I I 1978 1 o z 1 28,307 o o o o > 1 30,000 o o CM I 2 ,0 0 0 j 1 Multi-Year I 704,604 12,932,500 1 517,800 I Annual o o CM to CO CO 1 239,028 1 775,000 I 140,425 1 341,200 I Account Number 1 0273 m- N - CM O I 0275 CO CM O 1 0279 O CO CM O 1 0282 1 0287 1 02911 1 0292 I 0293I I 0294i I 0296] o o CO o o CO o I 0400I I 0500I o m o I 0502I o o CD O o CD O CM O CD O I 06031 roozo I o o 0 0 o o 0 0 o CM O 00 o I 0900I 301 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1992 I N o-Year I I 6 ,0 0 0 I I 3 ,0 0 0 I I 3 4 2 I I 25,928 I I M ulti-Year I 12.614.095 I 11,439,608 I 6.675,591 I I Annual i o o 0 0 o C M 1 2 ,0 7 1,15 8 I I 5 ,9 0 0 I i 3 9 ,0 9 7 | 7 3 ,0 4 0 I 1 86,432 I 5 3 ,6 2 5 I 291,527 I C O C O C O o CO I 1990 I N o-Y ear i I 7 9 8 I [ 9 8 6 1 I 1 ,5 0 0 I I Multi-Year 1 1,873,640 I 1 1.129,518 i 4 3 0 I 5,342,485 I I Annual I 18 1,6 15 I 1 1 ,7 8 0,21 2 I I 5 ,6 6 3 I I 3 5 ,2 7 2 I 6 6 ,657 I 180,9 46 I 4 4 ,5 7 2 I 273,303 I 2 5 ,8 7 6 I I 1988 I No-Year 3 > 9 5 7 I I Multi-Year 1 1 ,6 9 9 ,8 0 9 i ! 5 0 0 I 1 1 ,0 1 2 ,7 0 5 I 4,320,746 I I Annual I 169.2 10 I 1 1 ,5 8 9 ,9 0 0 I I 5 ,2 6 6 I I 3 1 ,4 0 3 I 6 1 ,2 3 8 I CO o C M c m ’ 1 * . V 4 0 ,5 3 0 I 241,028 I 1 5 ,7 9 7 I I 1986 I No-Year G O h » _ • ^ r s I Multi-Year 1 1,191,992 I I 907,472 I 3,524,552 I I Annual I 1 5 8 ,3 4 4 I 1 1 ,3 0 4 ,9 7 6 I I 5 ,2 6 3 I i 3 0 ,6 2 4 I 5 9 ,3 3 4 I 1 5 5 ,2 5 4 I 4 2 ,7 0 4 I 2 16,154 I 1 2 ,1 9 7 I Account Number I 0273 I 0274 I 0275 I 0278 I 0279 o G O C M O C M 0 0 C M O h- G O C M O I 0291! C M C T > C M O I 0293I I 0294| I 0296I o o CO o o C O o I 04001 I 0500I O t o o I 0502I 1 0 0 9 0 I I 06011 I 0602I I 0603I o o h- O o o G O O O 0 0 O C M O 0 0 O I 0900I 302 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ 8 a a '4 3 a o u (in g W % o o o 0 4 I N o-Year I 1 3 ,5 0 0 1 I 1 .9 9 2 I I 009‘2 I I 3 ,5 3 0 I I M ulti-Y ear I 12.047,885 I 1 882,650 I I 511,500 I 12,46 2,82 3 1 I Annual I 1 246,311 I 1 2.706,989 1 o o C D 1 1,253.682 I O o o V* 1 4 5.500 1 I 8 3 ,4 8 0 I I 215,914 I I 7 1 ,2 0 0 I O s c m " CD CO 1 3 3 .4 0 0 1 1 1998 I N o-Year i I 1 ,5 0 0 I I Multi-Year 14,56 5,18 5 I 11 ,5 0 4,59 8 I I 664.500 I [6.554,155 I I Annual I 243,961 I 1 2 ,5 9 1 ,1 9 5 I I 3 ,1 0 0 I I 610,535 I 1 8 ,1 8 6 I I 44,141 | f 8 1 ,0 0 0 I 8 O o C M 6 1 .5 0 0 I 3 41,064 I 1 9 ,2 8 5 I I 1996 I No-Year s I Multi-Year 13,00 0,00 0 1 1 1 ,3 4 4,47 9 I I 520,000 I 5,879,785 I I Annual 1 245,415 I 1 2 ,4 5 6 ,0 9 2 I I 2 ,9 1 9 I o o o o I 6 ,6 8 0 I i 4 2 ,1 8 0 I 7 7 ,6 2 9 I 1 8 2 .3 4 8 I h - C M C O C O 326,686 I 1 6 ,3 2 8 I I 1994 I No-Year o o CO o> C M ID I 000'Z 5 CO I Multi-Year 12,85 8,97 3 1 [1,485,085 I I 14 7,0 00 I 6,898,052 I I Annual 1 249.729 1 1 2 .2 9 6 ,9 3 6 1 I 2 ,9 4 6 I I 6 ,4 6 3 | N - O C O M- I 7 6 ,3 4 5 I 18 9,2 45 I 5 6 ,5 7 0 I 3 46,008 I 2 8 ,4 4 5 I Account Number I 0273 I 0274 I 0275 I 0278 o> I s- C M O O 0 0 C M O I 02821 0 0 C M O I 0291! C M 0 5 C M O I 0293I I 0294i C O o> C M O o o CO o o C O o I 04001 I 0500I I 05011 1 05021 I 0600I © CD O 1 0602I CO o C O o I 0700I © o CO o I 0801I 0802 0 0 6 0 I 303 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX F (continued) Account Number 1970 1972 1974 1976 Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual Multi-Year No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual Multi-Year No-Year 1000 1100 1296 90,000 1300 1400 1401 38,099 1403 1500 1600 1800 1900 1901 4058 4250 4251 4252 4308 10,826 12,765 100,668 231,787 4312 2,945 4,692 3,983 4,186 8258 8324 8560 3 19 8 8893 ( j j © ■ 8 3 •S s o w to a W to 5| s o> I N o-Y ear I o I M ulti-Y ear | m t o C M t o C O C O C O C O I A nnual I 1 76,212 I 56,978 ! I 135,679 I I 12,989 | o o o o * C O I 1 9 8 2 I I N o-Y ear ! 1 2 3 2 I N * 0 3 I M ulti-Y ear I 442,176 I 3,686 I Annual I 94,704 I 61,978 N - C O C O T ” I 11,944 | I 1980 I No-Year C V S I 12,611 I ! 660,912 I 5 3 I C M C O I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 0 3 O C O IO C O N . C O * I 1 9 4 | I 1978 I No-Year 479,663 I h- 0 0 C M * T * r * - I M ulti-Y ear I Annual I 90,100 I 36,279 ! o o Account Number I 1000 I 1100 8 C M o o C O I 1400 I 14011 I 14031 1 1500 I 16001 o o 0 0 I 19001 1 19011 C O U > O I 4250I I 42511 \Z 5 Z t 1 0 0 o C O C M C O I 8258I I 8324I I 8560I C O 0 3 0 0 0 0 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1992 I N o-Y ear I 12.090.103 I I 22,461 I I Multi-Year! 11,236,963 I I 7,135 j I 90,115 I I Annual ! [ 341,232 I I 258,309 I I 225,407 I O CO C M CD C M I 1990 I N o-Y ear i 1 (282)1 v— I M ulti-Y ear 11,077,090 I I 5,913 ! I Annual I 340,597 I 89,327 I 188,674 i I 23,110 I 1988 I No-Year 1^. o I M ulti-Y ear I 794,487 I I Annual I 245,825 ! I 67.526 I 191,751 i I 09S‘Z f I I 1986 I No-Year I 2,391 I M ulti-Y ear I 530.262 I Annual I 142,134 I 57,399 I 165,521 I 14,654 ! Account Number I 1000 I 1100 I 1296; I 1300 I 1400| 1 14011 1 14031 1 15001 o o CO o o 00 I 19001 1 19011 1 40581 o m C M i n C M C M i n C M 00 O CO I 43121 1 82581 1 83241 1 85601 1 88931 306 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ o u 3 .5 3 © u a P h % o o o C M I N o-Y ear I ! 8 7 4 I o r* C M I M u lti-Y ear I 1 955,300 i I 95.000 I [ Annual i 1 536,584 ! I 496,449 I I 406,000 I O o o s 1 2 0 7 1 1 1 9 9 8 I I N o-Y ear | 3 9 8 I C M u . C O 5 3 3 [1,246,300 I I 25,000 ! I Annual I 291,888 I 406.438 I 354,000 I CM C M O CO 1 1 0 4 I I 1996 1 No-Year Q CO C M 1 M ulti-Y ear 11,009,596 o o o N - ' 1 Annual I 208,138 I 350,646 1 29,003 1 CO CO I 1994 I No-Year ___ 65 [ M ulti-Y ear 11,050,603 I 38,992 ! 1 Annual I 326,056 I 292,592 C O C O T “ * o C M 1 28,840 o o C M Account Number I 1000 I 1100 I 1296 I 13001 1 1400 I 1401 I 1403! O o to | 16001 1 18001 1 19001 I 19011 1 40581 I 42501 m C M C M t o C M ’ M * I 43081 C M C O 1 82581 1 8324J 1 8560] I 88931 307 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX G DEPARTMENT OF LABOR SOURCE (dollars in thousands) Account Number 1970 1972 1974 1976 A nnual M ulti-Year No-Year A nnual M ulti-Y ear No-Year A nnual M ulti-Y ear No-Year A nnual M ulti-Year No-Year 0104 13,137 22,767 24,349 57,349 0105 14,139 85,000 57,240 110,028 0106 0121 6,596 7,689 0131 7,074 0150 1,527 1,996 0151 100 70 0165 6,149 10,550 24,240 41,914 5,000 0167 2,930 0169 1,116 0171 705,765 0172 36,081 62,126 71,721 85,552 0173 2,825,000 0174 776,717 905,349 2,265,584 528,420 2,985,900 0175 10,000 30,000 55,900 0177 1,000,000 0178 0179 64,400 101,600 0200 24,653 48,635 82,436 0326 185,000 735,562 365,000 505,000 0327 600,000 5,000,000 0400 70,104 146,581 0752 28,201 1200 1521 55,699 25,778 100,523 138,450 349,726 1700 4510 46011 I I ■ 8 s e • 4 3 S o W Q a T “ I No-Year | < 0 I M ulti-Year 13,632,015 | I 20,300 | I 3,378 | 7,109,000 | I Annual I 62,1361 I 188,483 | I 38,000 ] I 95,559 | I 82,739 | 12,914,210 | | 317,300 | ! 52,200 | | 133,959 | 12,000 | | 212,560 | I 151,397 | 220,100 | I 1982 I No-Year N C O I M ulti-Year o 8 I 20,000 | 4,318,000 | ! Annual I 54,910 I 158,202 I 126,068 I 87,695 | 1 3,027,844 | | 277,100 | i 19,272 | j 113,066 | 306,000 | ' 195,464 | 149,312 | 348,892 | | 1980 I No-Year I 70 I M ulti-Year 11,627,000 | 16,493,293 | 300,000 | 1,741,000 | I Annual I 56,164 1168,805 1103,486 s o s 1266,900 | o o C O cm" C M ! 102,890 | 950,000! 186,394 | 143,8371 269,212 | I 1978 I No-Year o h- | 1 3,440,930 1 j Annual I 57,061 I 119,632 I 66,428 1 90,832 1 | 211,700 | | 53,600 I 84,015 | 1,200,000 | 139,070 | 73,266 1 319,360 | Account Number 3 © I 0105 9 0 1 -0 I 1 0121 I 0131 O S i-0 I L O o I 0165! C O • * — o I 01691 © C M h- O I 01731 © I 01751 h- O GO K * O Oi h- T “ o 0200 C O CM C O O h- C O o 8 ' s CM 6 0 O 8 CM T" 1521 I 17001 1 45101 46011 309 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX G (continued) Account Num ber 1986 1988 1990 1992 A nnual M ulti-Y ear No-Year A nnual M ulti-Y ear No-Year A nnual M ulti-Y ear No-Year A nnual M ulti-Y ear No-Year 0104 55,042 64,713 12,063 67,549 6,400 93,422 0105 172,140 8,000 207,709 216,322 226,679 0106 37,076 37,051 41,422 45,301 0121 0131 0150 0151 45 0165 95,034 114,929 117,072 140,738 0167 0169 0171 0172 65,225 70,872 64,693 72,665 0173 0174 24,882 3,312,310 59,957 3,747,689 11,343 3,917,611 9,312 4,531,925 0175 312,002 331,260 367,013 395,181 0177 0178 1,293,000 0179 861 21,724 670 21,733 1,200 20,800 2,200 21,838 0200 145,971 5,848 169,115 7,336 192,585 251,383 0326 10,000 141,000 280,024 226,250 0327 464,785 30,000 33,000 474,642 0400 208,692 235,474 267,147 296,540 0752 1200 145,157 160,193 168,226 182,036 1521 270,462 217,000 169,025 192,000 1700 4510 4601 I I Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX G (continued) Account Number 1994 1996 1998 2000 A nnual M ulti-Y ear No-Year A nnual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year A nnual M ulti-Year No-Year 0104 27,309 1,700 0105 236,805 263,695 299,660 337,030 0106 47,215 44,426 42,605 48,095 0121 0131 0150 0151 0165 143,127 142,047 153,610 241,171 0167 0169 0171 0172 91,808 83,054 90,008 100,944 0173 0174 221,153 4,668,801 33,000 628,252 121,467 875,000 118,491 10,563 2,944,661 0175 410,500 373,000 440,200 440,200 0177 1,488,000 (50,000) 0178 (266,000) 0179 2,056 74,986 1,876 133,452 (1,000) 173,452 163,452 0200 291,101 280,242 11,549 312,179 15,430 350,528 6,986 0326 190,000 346,100 349,000 415,150 0327 3,055,400 436,000 22,000 0400 296,428 303,810 336,480 381,461 0752 1200 194,607 195,724 203,334 228,044 1521 279,000 218,000 201,000 79,000 1700 63,959 67,126 79,000 3,000 98,934 4510 (56,335) 460-1 3,000 3,000 Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX G (continued) Account Number 1970 1972 1974 1976 Annual M ulti-Year No-Year A nnual M ulti-Year No-Year A nnual M ulti-Y ear No-Year A nnual Multi-Year No-Year 5142 5152 5155 8042 4,078,228 5,449,760 7,539,355 19,592,677 8130 59 13 2,796 3,442 8131 55 8134 13 6 743 942 8144 8289 8315 377 37,300 129 8675 395 291 C O to Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX G (continued) Account Number 1978 1980 1982 1984 A nnual M ulti-Year No-Year A nnual M ulti-Year No-Year A nnual M ulti-Y ear No-Year A nnual M ulti-Year No-Year 5142 5152 5155 8042 14,160,883 16,194,791 20,124,917 29,892,327 8130 4,401 10,262 30,028 40,226 8131 30 18 8134 1,118 2,904 6,034 8,162 8144 112,166 808,099 779,427 864,977 8289 8315 8675 Irrm rd U ) ■ § 3 O « R B < 3 o u o a 5 » 1 1 9 9 2 I 1 9frS‘ H I 129,073,353 | 1 8 £ a > 8 a > I 969,278 I 1 M ulti-Y ear | r Annual I C O r * - I 1 9 9 0 I I N o-Y ear | 1 096‘U I 125,609,986 I 1 96Z‘ S 6 1 C M C M C O 671,248 | I M ulti-Y ear | I Annual 160,938 | ! 886!- I I N o-Year | 1 26,983,631 | 1 8 1 £80‘ Z . 1 I 639,828 | I 1 Annual! I 1986 ! z 1 26,072,584 I 1 55,4261 1 11,286 | 600,1161 u (0 I | Annua! 1 1 < z 5! Y- S D C M ID " T " m 5155 m i .... 8 T" C O * < — C O 00 8134 8144 § lO § ..... .86.75 314 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX G (continued) Account Number 1994 1996 1998 2000 Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year A nnual M ulti-Y ear No-Year A nnual M ulti-Y ear No-Year 5142 8,056 5152 75,595 5155 16,456 14,769 9,441 5,101 8042 33,664,864 32,226,312 32,100,729 33,055,390 8130 115,763 119,139 118,145 136,239 8131 176 271 143 98 8134 8,807 11,469 11,617 12,491 8144 984,512 990,994 1,008,047 1,010,239 8289 186,648 170,390 181,955 184,341 8315 8675 i-‘ Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX H SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION SO (dollars in thousands) Account Number 1970 1972 1974 1976 Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year 0100 17,465 22,786 23,000 36,703 0104 0200 1152 1154 4147 4153 179,993 172,354 1,601 101,196 4154 2,599 277,754 225,253 278,750 4156 12,500 4157 U > O s Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX ft (continued) Account Number 1978 1980 1982 1984 Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Y ear No-Year Annual M ulti-Year No-Year 0100 179,000 218,768 221,945 225,543 0104 0200 1152 1154 4147 4153 2,640,826 1,208,350 4154 605,000 565,000 326,000 363,400 4156 47,000 19,000 8,910 4157 4,000 4,000 3,000 V S 3 B o u w w a a 1 9 9 2 I I N o-Y ear I 1 779,1351 i 83,9251 1 40,0001 I 273,843! O o < 0 T “ I M ulti-Y ear I Annual ! I 235,8111 O o o o o o o C O o V * 1 374,7591 I 0661 . I I N o-Y ear I O o o CO 1 342,3611 I 159,5001 O o o I M u lti-Y ea r | I Annual I 1 396,3961 o o h - T I 1 9 8 8 I I N o-Y ear I 1 13,6561 1 165,7001 9,4971 I M ulti-Y ear I Annual 1 226,1321 I 1 9 8 6 ! I N o-Y ear I 1 2,5841 [ 161,9261 T jO O O l I M u lti-Y ear I I Annual 1 199,8221 Account Number 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 01041 O O C M O C M T - T * 5 V* CO m [W tfr 1 S 3 r ^ . U ) T ~ - 318 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■ 8 s e o u m a 1 2000 1 I N o-Y ear I 1 181,3001 ! (11.768)1 1 3,0001 I M ulti-Y ear I I 83.8011 1 45,0001 I Annual I I 221.8091 1 10,9051 1 136,0001 1 230,0201 1 1 9 9 8 I I N o-Y ear J 1 23.2001 1 (2,800)1 |00S‘£ I M ulti-Y ear | 1 75,8001 1 45,0001 I A nnual I 1 181.2001 o o o o T “ 1 210,8381 1 539,4281 I 1 9 9 6 I I N o-Y ear I 1 259,4321 C D C M V I 2,5301 I Multi-Year 1 40,5101 I A nnual I 1 221.0441 o o h- 0 0 1 71.5781 1 483,1561 I 1 9 9 4 I I N o-Y ear I 1 5001 1 534,7501 [ 164,7101 o o © I M u lti-Y ear | C D C D C M r * o o o o C M I Annual 1 187,634] 1 7,962! 1 76,1011 1 303,6241 Account Number 1 01001 1 01041 o o C M O I 11521 I 11541 I 41471 I 41531 1 41541 1 41561 Is - ID 5 319 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

A configuration study of multiagency partnerships as practiced in Taipei City government

PDF

Adapting and applying a mission-focused strategic framework for emergency management

PDF

Bridled boldness: Reengineering the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Lessons learned

PDF

Historical perspectives and future horizons of local government managers and the International City /County Management Association

PDF

Do uses of human resource information technology (HRInT) tools in federal organizations improve their human resource management productivity?

PDF

Evaluation of professional services consultants in rural government

PDF

A financial audit model for entrepreneurial governments

PDF

Educational reform for private state -approved schools in California

PDF

Assessing United States information assurance *policy response to computer -based threats to national security

PDF

Executive development and effectiveness: A study of mobility assignment experiences of career executives in federal research and development agencies

PDF

Detecting the effects social and business pressures on small California trucking firm tax compliance

PDF

Drug treatment providers' organizational responses to implementation of California's Proposition 36

PDF

Banking on the commons: An institutional analysis of groundwater banking programs in California's Central Valley

PDF

Internal venturing in public agencies

PDF

Conversion of health care organizations from non -profit to for -profit status

PDF

Determining acceptable seismic risk: A community participation-based approach

PDF

Determining risk propensity of government program managers for high risk /high payoff projects

PDF

Charter schools' influence on public school administrators' innovative behaviors

PDF

Care management for the uninsured: A force field analysis of the business case

PDF

Getting 'how' and 'why' straight: A critical discourse analysis of the National Partnership for Reinventing Government's ideological discourse on information and communication technologies

Asset Metadata

Creator McAllister, Shelly Alane (author)

Core Title Executive spending power: Flexibility in obligation and outlay timing as a measure of federal budgetary and policy control

School School of Policy, Planning and Development

Degree Doctor of Public Administration

Degree Program Public Administration

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Political Science, public administration

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Newland, Chester (committee chair), [illegible] (committee member), Norman, Memphis (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-374132

Unique identifier UC11334794

Identifier 3103945.pdf (filename),usctheses-c16-374132 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 3103945.pdf

Dmrecord 374132

Document Type Dissertation

Rights McAllister, Shelly Alane

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA