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(Dis)connecting the Pearl River Delta: The transformation of a regional telecommunications infrastructure, 1978--2002

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Content (DIS)CONNECTING THE PEARL RIVER DELTA: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF A REGIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE, 1978-2002
by
Linchuan (Jack) Qiu
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(COMMUNICATION)
May 2004
Copyright 2004 Linchuan (Jack) Qiu
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UMI Number: 3140541
Copyright 2004 by
Qiu, Linchuan (Jack)
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1 1
DEDICATION
To my dear parents - for your encouragement and
unconditional support, all the way from Wuhan.
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Ill
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am most grateful for the opportunity to work with Professor Sandra
Ball-Rokeach and her Metamorphosis Project at USC Annenberg School for
Communication, from where I received vital inspirations for this dissertation
project. Special thanks are owed to all members of the Dissertation Committee:
Professors Sandra Ball-Rokeach, Manuel Castells, Carolyn Cartier, and
Stanley Rosen. So much has been learned that I cannot thank you more for
your most valued advice, on matters large and small, throughout the process of
project conceptualization, research, writing, and revision.
I am indebted to the professors and colleagues who helped shape this
dissertation at its different stages: Professors William Dutton, Margaret
McLaughlin, Peter Monge, and Michael Dear; Dean Geoffery Cowan at USC
Annenberg; Professors Guo Liang and Bu Wei at the Chinese Academy of
Social Seciences; Professor Joseph Chan at the Chinese University of Hong
Kong; Professor Francis Lee at the City University of Hong Kong; Dr. Nina
Hachigian at the Rand Corporation; and Rob Koepp at the Milken Institute.
I also hope to thank my family, Yang Song, and friends on both sides
of the Pacific Ocean who wove my support network in the past years: Big Sea,
Saozi, and Beibei; Baolei, George, Katie, and Kelly; Yang Yi and Chen Meng;
Li Fa and Zhang Nan; Mary Wilson, Wan-ying Lin, Connie Yuan, Benjamin
Hardyk, Jason Ingram, Elisia Cohen, Judy Morasco, and Mark Elliot; Zhang
Yong, Xu Kai, and Julia Chu.
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IV
Last but not the least, my fieldwork in the Pearl River Delta would
have been impossible without the cooperation and assistance from many local
people: telecom employees, government officials, local researchers, Internet
café managers, journalists, long-term residents, and the migrant workers who
administered surveys in those hot, humid days.
My gratitude goes to each and everyone mentioned above, to whom the
credits of this dissertation belong. The errors, however, are completely mine.
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TABLE OF CONTENT
DEDICATION ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii
LIST OF TABLES ix
LIST OF FIGURES xi
ABSTRACT xiii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1
The Theory of Communication Infrastructure 5
Basic Assumptions 5
Action Context and Storytelling System 9
The Quest for Community 12
From L. A. to the Pearl River Delta 16
Constructing a Telecommunications Infrastructure 21
Telecommunications as a Center for Social Organization 22
The Regional Telecom Action Context 25
The Regional Telecom Storytelling System 28
Telecom Storytelling, Storytelling Telecom 34
More Technology, More Disconnectedness? 39
The Notion of (Dis)connectedness 41
The Four Generic Types 42
The Compelling Questions 47
Significance of Research 49
Structure of Dissertation 52
CHAPTER II: THE EXAMINATION OF A CASE 55
Case Study Methodology 55
Data Collection 58
Document Research 64
Personal Interviews 65
Survey 70
Focus Group 75
Secondary Data 80
Participant Observation 81
From Analyses to Syntheses 82
CHAPTER III: GLOBAL AND NATIONAL BACKDROPS 90
The Influence of Late Capitalism 94
Technologies of Capitalism 97
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VI
Personal Consequences and Community 100
Rise of the Asian Pacific 103
Maoism in Oblivion? 105
After Cultural Revolution and the Cold War 106
The Persistence of History 111
Telecommunications in China: From Service to Industry 115
Post-Mao Telecom Policies 116
The Technology Cult 123
The Trajectories of Taking-Off 129
Action Contexts at Macro Levels 141
CHAPTER IV: REGIONAL HISTORY REVISITED 147
Approaching the Delta 149
Maritime Frontier 154
The People 155
The Land 159
The Ports 161
Lineage and Diaspora 164
Land-Based Communities 164
The Expatriates 166
“Semi-Feudal, Semi-Colonial Society” 169
Between Socialism and Capitalism 173
The Era of Mao 174
Reform and Opening-up 178
The Making of Ô^isjConneetions 186
Trajectories of Growth 187
Regional Telecom Policies 194
Patterns of Spatial Variation 197
Contextual Resources and the Regional Nexus 201
CHAPTER V: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF A COMMUNICATION
REVOLUTION 205
Storytelling Telecom: The Angle of Local Officials 206
The Story of a “Model” City 212
Social Economic Background 212
Achievements in ICT Development 214
The Assimilation of Discourse 217
The Frame o f Economy 218
“Opening-up to the World” 220
Realizing “Communism” 222
E-Government Improving Administrative Performance 223
The Myth o f a Leader 225
Building Internet, Shaping Local State 227
Struggle Against a Label 228
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v u
Persuasion and the Restructuring of Power 230
Top Leadership Project 231
Pressure on the Middle-Level 234
Bottom-Level Support 236
Precautions and Compromise 239
Storytelling, State Building, and (Dis)connectedness 242
A Nanhai Model? 242
Institutional Blocks 246
Gaps of Information 249
Discussion 251
CHAPTER VI: HE COMMERCIALIZATION OF (DIS)CONNECTIONS 257
Introduction 257
Networks of Commercial Narrators 259
Operators with State Affiliation 259
Foreign Players and Joint Ventures 263
Domestic Private Telecom Firms 271
Internet Cafés and Other Small Businesses 275
Many Images, One Theme 277
The Migration of Official Discourse 278
The Global, Urban, Techno-Consumerism 281
The Touch o f Globalization 282
Gendered Discourse o f Telecom-Based Land Development 284
The Legend of “Patriotic Entrepreneurs” 286
The Inevitable “Good vs. Evil” 290
The Doomed Fate o f Internet Café 291
The Globalization o f Garbage 297
Discussion: Storytelling Beyond the Bottom Line 299
CHAPTER VII: GRASSROOTS STORYTELLERS: CONNECTED? 305
Introduction 305
Exploring the Grassroots 306
Informational Stratification 309
Access and Usage Patterns 310
The Limited Effects of Demographics 317
Income and Telecom Expenditures 319
Different Practices, Different Stories 324
The Dominant Discourse 325
Suppressive Narrations 334
Squalors Under Splendor 338
Social Inequality, Institutional Barriers, and Psychological Detachment 346
Discussion 350
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Vlll
CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 355
Summary of Findings 355
General Appraisal And Broad Implications 364
Methodological Issues 374
Concluding Remarks: Through the Prism of Telecommunications 380
REFERENCES 385
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDICES 404
Appendix 1 : Interview Outline for Government Officials 404
Appendix 2: Interview Outline for Large- and Medium-Size Telecom
Enterprises 407
Appendix 3: Interview Outline for Internet Café Owners/Managers 409
Appendix 4 : Survey Questionnaire 412
Appendix 5: Focus Group Protocol for Long-term Residents 426
Appendix 6: Focus Group Protocol for New Immigrants 430
Appendix 7: List of Work-Units Visited in Nanhai That Were Known for
Internet Application Achievements 433
Appendix 8. Survey Implementation Contract for the Project on
Telecommunications in the Pearl River Delta 434
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IX
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1 The four generic types of disconnections 46
Table 2.1 The utilization of data collection methods in different cities of the
Pearl River Delta 63
Table 2.2 The utilization of data collection methods regarding key
components of the regional communication infrastructure 63
Table 2.3 Demographic profile of survey respondents (immigrants and long
term residents) in three cities in the Pearl River Delta 76
Table 2.4 Demographic profile of participants in the focus groups of long
term Pearl River Delta residents 78
Table 2.5 Changes of administrative units in officially designated Pearl River
Delta Region, 1985 - 2000 85
Table 3.1 The development of telephone services in China as compared to
the United States 93
Table 3.2 Growth of GDP, FDI, import/export volume, and telephone
penetration rates in China (1978-2001) 108
Table 3.3 Uneven development of telecommunications in China’s rural and
urban areas 139
Table 3.4 Distribution of basic economic and telecommunications resources
in core, coastal, central, and western regions 140
Table 4.1 The Pearl River Delta’s key exported products: a historical
comparison 153
Table 4.2 The growth of GDP and telecom revenue in the Pearl River Delta:
Total volume (adjusted on the basis of 1990 price) and as percentage of
Guangdong and China 189
Table 4.3 Percentage composition of telecommunications fixed assets
investment in Guangdong Province 196
Table 6.1 Production of telecom and IT products in Guangdong (2001)
266
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Table 6.2 Top ten imports of Guangdong (2001) 266
Table 6.3 Telecom and IT equipment manufacturers among the 50 largest
industrial enterprises in Guangdong ranked by measure of total capital assets
(2000) 268
Table 6.4 Telecom and IT equipment manufacturers among the 50 largest
industrial enterprises in Guangdong by measuring the net value of fixed assets
(2000) 268
Table 6.5 Telecom and IT equipment manufacturers among the 50 largest
industrial enterprises in Guangdong by measure of gross output value (2000)
269
Table 6.6 Telecom and IT equipment manufacturers among the 50 largest
industrial enterprises in Guangdong by measure of sales revenue (2000) 270
Table 7.1 Access to telecommunications: ownership of home phone, cell
phone, and pager, and access to work phone, fax, and Internet 312
Table 7.2 Frequencies using telecom services: home phone, work phone, cell
phone, public phone, long distance phone, and Internet 313
Tahle 7.3 Distribution of total telecom connections index in Guangzhou,
Shenzhen, and Zhuhai 318
Table 7.4 Telecom expenses: home phone, cell phone, pager, Internet, and
total monthly charge as proportion of monthly income (US$) 321
Table 7.5 Percentages of migrant workers and older residents who receive
partial or full reimbursement for telecom services 322
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XI
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Diagrammatic presentation of the communication infrastructure
model as applied to urban communities. 13
Figure 1.2 Map of the Pearl River Delta 19
Figure 1.3 Components of the regional communication infrastructure in
China’s Pearl River Delta 27
Figure 1.4 The social construction of a regional telecommunications
infrastructure as situated in the larger Communication Infrastructure 35
Figure 2.1 Overall Data Collection Design: The development of
telecommunications and communication infrastructure in the Pearl River Delta
59
Figure 3.1 Annual percentage increase of China’s teledensity as compared to
the growth of the national GDP, 1978-2002 124
Figure 3.2 The development of China’s telecommunications industry: total
investment in transportation and telecommunications and the total business
volume of telecommunication, 1978-2002 131
Figure 3.3 The growth of subscriber numbers for new telecom technologies:
pager, cell phone, and the Internet, 1985-2002 132
Figure 3.4 Transactions by telegraph and fax, 1980-1988 136
Figure 4.1 Top ten provinces with the highest volume of import and export in
2002 151
Figure 4.2 Development of telecommunications in Guangdong Province 192
Figure 4.3 Spatial Distribution of Telecommunications Revenue within the
Pearl River Delta (1980-2000) 199
Figure 5.1 A view of the regional telecom storytelling system from the
perspective of local state agencies 253
Figure 6.1 A view of the regional telecom storytelling system from the
perspective of telecom providers 302
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Figure 7.1 A view of the regional telecom storytelling system from the
perspective of local residents 352
Figure 8.1 The social distribution of telecom technologies in the regional
communication infrastructure of Pearl River Delta (1978-2002) 357
Figure 8.2 Overview of (dis)connectedness relationships within the regional
telecom storytelling system (2002) 359
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Xlll
ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies telecommunications in China’s Pearl River Delta, a
region that is increasingly “globally connected and locally disconnected.” It
focuses on the multi-level transformation from plain old telephone and
telegraphy to a highly complex system of information and communication
technologies over the course of a quarter century. How and why has this
regional telecom infrastructure taken the current form? What is the role of
telecom growth in the transformation of regional social ecology, especially
regarding issues related to connectedness and disconnectedness?
For these questions, we employ an adapted version of the Communication
Infrastructure Theory, which provides an ecological conceptualization that sees
telecom development as centered on discursive practices of key storytellers.
These constitute a storytelling system situated in the communication action
context of China’s reform and opening up, layered against the background of
economic globalization and the region’s historical tradition as a maritime
center of Southeast Asia.
The research is built on intensive fieldwork involving multiple
methods: archive research, interviews, survey, focus groups, participant
observation, and secondary data analysis. In addition to key officials,
representatives of large telecom operators, and long-term residents, we also
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XIV
target small private telecom providers (e.g., Internet café managers) and
migrant workers, the two groups usually ignored in conventional telecom
studies. To ensure the quality of data, interviews, surveys, and focus groups
were conducted in the dialects our respondents prefer. In total, nine dialects
were used in addition to the official language of Mandarin.
Drawing upon these multiple datasets, components of the regional
telecommunications infrastructure are identified; and their interactions
contextualized. Four generic types of disconnectedness (temporal-spatial
breaks, stratificational gaps, institutional blocks, and social psychological
detachments) are proposed, leading to a more full-fledged discussion of
(dis)connectedness dynamics. In conclusion, although we see a boom of
telecom technologies in the Pearl River Delta, this is not equated to the simple
enhancement of connectedness among key storytellers in the regional telecom
infrastructure. As a process and product of social shaping, technological
diffusion may reinforce existing inequalities. It may also give rise to new
forms of disconnectedness. Broader implications of these findings are
discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Instead, contemporary culture probably includes
combinations of, even contradictions among, elements that
have been labeled traditional and modem. In this more
complex view, we might consider a technology, such as the
telephone, not as a force compelling 'modernity,' but as a
tool modem people have used to various ends, including
perhaps the maintenance, even enhancement, of past
practices.
- Claude Fischer (1992, p. 272)
A most noteworthy phenomenon of our age is the exponential growth of
telecommunications, which is redefining human interactions and social stmcture
in urban and urbanizing environments around the world (Dutton, Blumer and
Kraemer, 1988; Castells, 1989; 1996; Mitchell, 1996; 1999; Graham and Marvin,
2001). Yet just as the invention of the telegraph in the Victorian Era was
accompanied by extremist predictions about the social consequences of the then-
new technology (Standage, 1998), so too has the “telecommunication revolution”
of late twentieth century been inundated by a deluge of debates among visionaries
of all kinds. ^ This dissertation, however, was initially compelled by a feeling of
discomfort with the grand narratives - utopian or dystopian - that these debates
have tended to produce; the subject of telecom technologies is so protean and the
contexts for telecom development are so diverse that a skeptical view is warranted
' In recent decades, ahistorical and universal truth claims have permeated much o f the public discussion
on the social role of new information and communications technologies. For a cogent, critical review,
see Carey and Quirk (1989, pp. 113-141), Dutton (1996, pp. 1-16), and Slevin (2000, pp. 1-10, 44-54).
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in regard to whether any overarching conclusion can be drawn about specific
social functions of a communication technology across time and space.
This skepticism does not deny the possibility for theoretical
understandings of the relationship between technology and social change. Instead,
it entails a different mode of theorization, not based on pure logic or armchair
critique, but grounded in empirical research on a particular communication
system situated in a specific social ecology. This is the approach taken in the
ongoing research project, “Metamorphosis: Transforming the ties that bind,”
which in many ways laid down the theoretical and methodological contours for
this dissertation.
The Metamorphosis Project is a major endeavor at USC Annenberg
School for Communication that studies communication and urban communities in
Los Angeles. An undertaking tfom an ecological point of view, the
Metamorphosis Project utilizes multiple research methods and multi-lingual data
collection in numerous study areas for the examination of a wide variety of issues
at multiple levels of analysis (Matei, Ball-Rokeaeh, Wilson, Gibbs, and Gutierrez-
Hoyt, 2001). This large project, currently giving rise to the Communication
Infi-astructure Theory, exemplifies a process of grounded theorization based on
the textured understanding of urban communities as “storytelling systems”
situated in a larger “communication action context” (Ball-Rokeach, Kim and
Matei, 2001). With the guidance of the Communication Infrastructure Theory,
members of the Metamorphosis Project have studied the role of communication
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3
technologies, particularly the Internet, in diverse urban communities in Los
Angles (Jung, Qiu and Kim, 2001 ; Loges and Jung, 2001 ; Matei and Ball-
Rokeach, 2001; forthcoming; Kim, Jung, Ball-Rokeach and Loges, 2002).
The essence of this study is to employ the Communication Infrastructure
Theory for the exploration of telecommunications developments in another social
ecology that is in many ways comparable to Los Angeles, yet also with its
distinctive socio-historical characteristics: the Pearl River Delta in South China.
By telecommunications we mean the totality of communication networks that
sustain long-distance communication processes via an array of technological
means such as telegraph, fixed-line telephony, cell phone, pager, facsimile, and
the Internet. In applying the Communication Infrastructure Theory to this regional
case study of telecom developments, we will (1) analyze the discursive processes
by which a regional telecommunications infrastructure is constructed under the
influences of global, national, and local factors, and (2) evaluate the social
consequences of telecom growth, especially the degree to which communication
connectedness has or has not been achieved in local communities. The
consequences are often multi-dimensional. For example, the diffusion of mobile
phones may facilitate the organization of neighborhood activities and thereby
enhance cohesion among residents. But it may also reduce local connectedness by
reinforcing existing social inequalities between the information haves and the
have-nots.
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How should we gain a textured understanding of the relationship between
telecom technology and community? To this end, grounded empirical research is
essential; the utilization of an appropriate theoretical framework is critical. Also
indispensable is to select a good case and define it properly so that the complexity
of social experiences and contextual meanings can be revealed. This attempt to go
deep into the case differs from many contemporary studies on telecom-society
relations, which often provide little more than linear representations (e.g. charts of
skyrocketing growth) or gross generalizations (e.g. Internet use leads to more
social isolation). Such oversimplified views may result from correct, or even
rigorous, analysis of empirical data that pays little attention to changes in social
context. In order to prevent similar errors and take full benefit of the
Communication Infrastructure Theory, the time frame of this study is context
dependent: it includes China’s post-Mao period (1978-2002); the research
respondents are selected to represent different segments of local communities at
different locales of the Pearl River Delta; and the subject matter is the totality of
telecom technologies rather than a specific type of telecom system like the
Internet. The target of examination is not one technology in one community,
studied from the perspective of a single social group. Rather, it is a complex
system of numerous technologies evolving as an integral part of a social ecology,
which is in itself under critical historical transformation. Such a comprehensive
conceptualization encompasses a great variety of intricate technology-community
relationships at multiple levels of analysis. It aims at capturing the natural ways in
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5
which telecom technologies relate to the regional socio-historical environments
by bringing factors of space and time back in.
The Theory o f Communication Infrastructure
Before discussing the empirical specifics of the study area, an introduction to
Communication Infrastructure Theory is in order to provide a broad conceptual
framework and initial analytical vocabulary. A communication infrastructure,
like a political or economic infrastructure, is a basic organizational form of
society. Building on and extending fi’ om Media System Dependency (MSD)
theory (Ball-Rokeach and Defleur, 1976; Ball-Rokeach, 1985; 1996; 1998;
Merskin, 1999), the Communication Infrastructure Theory fi-ames an ecological
view of the role of media and communication in changing social environments. In
particular, it has been used in the Metamorphosis Project to examine how the
Internet functions in the urban ecology of old and new media as reflected in
ethnically defined geographic spaces (Matei and Ball-Rokeach, 2002).
Basic Assumptions
Influenced by the sociological traditions of power-dependency theory (Emerson,
1962, 1964) and social ecology (Park, 1922; Lynd and Lynd, 1929; 1937), Sandra
Ball-Rokeach maintains that media and communication in the contemporary age
constitute “an information system central to the adaptive conduct of societal and
personal life” (1998, p. 9). This recognition encompasses a few assumptions that
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underlie both MSD theory and the Communication Infrastructure theory including
(ibid, 1998, pp. 15-26):
(1) Society can only be understood by knowing its parts
and their interrelations;
(2) Information is an essential but scarce resource for goal
attainment, especially in times of rapid social change
and high ambiguity;
(3) Institutions, organizations, and individuals in a given
society interact in attempting to gain access to and seek
control of information. This is a critical process for the
functioning of society;
(4) Players interact with each other both at the same level
and across levels. Interactions of players at macro and
meso levels may constrain media production and
consumption in smaller units of social action, whereas
micro and meso players are nevertheless agentic actors
capable of attaining or creating alternative information
systems.
These assumptions indicate clearly that, from its roots in MSD theory, the
Communication Infrastructure Theory is an open conceptual framework that aims
at understanding media and communication as an ecological system operating at
multiple levels of analysis (Ball-Rokeach and Jung, 2003). By “open” we mean.
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unlike functionalist conceptions, this theory does not presume the specific form of
the communication ecology, what it should look like, and how it may reach
equilibrium. Hence the general concept of the communication infrastructure may
find different empirical expressions in diverse urban communities (Ball-Rokeach,
et al, 2001a) or different patterns of connectedness to telecom technologies such
as the Internet (Jung, Qiu and Kim, 2001).
Particularly important is the conception of the communication
infrastructure as a multilevel system, understood as an ecological organism that
consists of components interacting on and across macro, meso, and micro levels.
Macro actors, such as multinational corporations, nation-states, and mainstream
media, are those who play a key role in large-scale social dynamics such as
globalization, the diffusion of communication technology, and the increase of
population diversity in urban communities, the three most profound social forces
being examined in the Metamorphosis Project (Ball-Rokeach, et al, 2001b).
Meanwhile, from the perspective of the Communication Infrastructure Theory,
more attention needs to be paid to agentic actions, mechanisms of change, and
storytelling narratives at the meso and micro levels of analysis. This is critical
because, while these domains are less researched, they sustain on daily basis the
transformations of communal structures, neighborly interactions, and personal
experiences. Therefore, rather than wrestling with grand theories, members of the
Metamorphosis Project engage in issues like “diverse paths to community
belonging” (Ball-Rokeach, et al, 2001a; 2001b), “the globalization of everyday
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8
life” (Gibbs, Ball-Rokeach, Jung, Kim, and Qiu, in press), and the “qualitative
dimensions of Internet connectedness” (Jung, et al, 2001; Loges and Jung, 2001).
In this study, we also hope to highlight the role of meso and micro players while
acknowledging, but not dwelling on, the macro backdrops of global and national
contexts for telecommunications development in the Pearl River Delta.
For a more complete capturing of communication environments in diverse
urban communities, the conceptual framework of the Communication
Infrastructure presupposes structural cohesion as well as disconnections. In a fully
integrated communication infrastructure, storytellers would ideally engage each
other and form a perfectly connected storytelling network. However, in reality, it
is not uncommon for elements of the system to be isolated from each other,
resulting in fragmentations in the communication environment (Ball-Rokeach, et
al, 2001a, pp. 411-418). So far members of the Metamorphosis Project have
studied several forms of disconnections in the Communication Infrastructure
while examining issues related to communicative connectedness, for instance,
obstacles to community belonging (Ball-Rokeach, et al, 2001b), the digital divide
(Jung, et al, 2001; Loges and Jung, 2001), and the effects of fear and
misperceptions of urban spaces (Matei, Ball-Rokeach and Qiu, 2001). This is
inevitable because social distinctions, geographic borders, and symbolic
boundaries are more than common barriers to community formation; they are also
ubiquitous resources for communities to exist and thrive. Connections and
disconnections are in this sense two sides of the same coin, constituting a most
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essential structural dimension of the Communication Infrastructure.
Understanding disconnectedness and its role in the social ecology is therefore an
intrinsic component in the epistemological process towards a full-fledged
Communication Infrastructure Theory. It is along this line of thinking that the
current dissertation ventures into the connectedness-disconnectedness dynamics
of a regional telecommunications system.
Action Context and Storytelling System
The Communication Infrastructure consists of two hasic components, i.e. a
“communication action context” and a “storytelling system” (Ball-Rokeach, et al,
2001a). The term of the communication action context is drawn from Hahermas
(1979, 1987), who developed the notion “to capture the importance of the
preconditions of rational discourse in the public sphere” (Ball-Rokeach, et al,
2001a, p. 396). However, the concept as utilized in the Communication
Infrastructure Theory also differs somewhat in that “our aim is to unfold the
discourse preconditions for storytelling neighborhood” (ibid.). The action context
therefore portrays the overall environment of communicative resources in which
local storytelling takes place. Major elements of the communication action
context in a given residential community include area appearance, safety in the
neighborhood, the availability of quality goods and services, among other things
(see Figure 1.1). The action context can be “open” and “encourages people to
engage each other in communication,” or “closed” and “discourages such
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10
encounters” (ibid.). “Any particular context will have elements of openness and
closedness” (ibid.).
The storytelling system, on the other hand, is situated in the
communication action context. By storytelling, we understand the production and
circulation of narratives that “interweave[s] individual experience with historical
reality” (Josselson, 1993, p. xiii) and could be assessed by measures of
“coherenee” and “validity” (Fisher, 1987). It builds on the philosophical
movement of hermeneutics, which regards stories as intrinsically related to life
experiences in three ways (Widdershoven, 1993, p. 19);
Aecording to Collingwood, experience is reconstructed in stories:
Stories help us to recapitulate our past experiences and actions.
Gadamer says that stories may enrich experience: Stories help us to
express the unity of our lives and thus to create our identity.
Derrida asserts that in stories experience is transferred to new
contexts: Stories thus articulate the intertextuality of life.
These three connections between stories and life experience are all essential to our
conceptualization of storytelling, a proeess through which individuals, social
groups, and organizations make sense of their practices within the communication
action context. This is a process for the creation of meaning beyond a particular
time-space. Most important, it is the process of bridging among storytellers, who
would eventually develop collective identity and sense of belonging to “imagined
communities” (Anderson, 1991).
The storytelling system consists of three types of storytellers in the multi
level communication infrastructure: “macro agents” (those who “tell stories
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11
primarily about the whole city, the nation, and even the world”), “meso agents”
(with more focus “on a particular part of the city” in their storytelling), and
interpersonal networks among the residents themselves that foster shared
eoneems about local community on this “third micro tier of the storytelling
system” (ibid, p. 397). All these are agentive actors - or “discursive agents” as
called in discourse analysis (Elliston, 2000; Brooks and Rada, 2002) - capable of
constructing narratives from their respective viewpoints in response to enabling or
disabling contextual conditions. This means the vitality of a storytelling system is
not always contingent upon the eonduciveness of the action context. Instead,
storytellers can overcome the effects of some contextual constraints when they are
equipped with an integrated storytelling network (ibid). ^
While studying the Communication Infrastructure of urban communities
in Los Angeles, Ball-Rokeach and colleagues identify two major types of
storytellers in the storytelling network including (1) loCal media and community
organizations at the meso level and (2) interpersonal discursive units at the micro
level (Ball-Rokeach, et al, 2001b). In this general model, the storytelling system is
conceived of as the host site for narrative practices, where grounded everyday
stories are told and circulated. The discursive agents interact with each other in a
variety of storytelling networks, leading to the formations of “imagined
communities” - not on the national level as Benedict Anderson originally used the
^ The distinction between storytelling system and storytelling networks is that the former is a theoretical
construct, whereas the latter are the actual formations o f communication flows that result in certain
structural patterns (“networks”) among a specific group or multiple groups o f storytellers
(Metamorphosis meeting minutes, January 23“" , 2003).
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12
term (1991) - but at the local level of ethnic neighborhoods that often transcend
national boundaries and utilize country-of-origin representations as resources for
communal identification (Ball-Rokeach, et al, 2000).
Storytelling interactions could be at the same analytical level such as an
alliance between local media and community organizations at the meso level, or
grassroots networks where individual residents engage each other in natural
storytelling units (e.g. among family members, friends, and neighbors). They may
also go across levels as in the case of a local media report spurring discussions at
street comers or residents provoke community organizations to address a shared
concern.
A diagrammatic presentation of this Communication Inffastmcture model
is demonstrated in Figure 1.1. As will be demonstrated in the following pages,
such a theoretical framework of a storytelling system situated in its
communication action context provides the most essential guide for my
conceptualization of regional telecom developments in China’s Pearl River Delta.
The Quest fo r Community
The ultimate concern in Communication Infrastructure Theory is the vitality of
urban communities, which are essential building blocks of a vital civil society but
now under challenge in contemporary urban ecology due to fragmenting and
centrifugal forces such as globalization and population diversity (Ball-Rokeach,
2001b). Hence, the communication action context is not any sphere where social
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Figure 1.1 Diagrammatic presentation of the communication infrastructure
model as applied to urban communities.
Schools
oods and y
Servicey
Bad/Good Arë^
Media Labels
Family
Services
Public Spaces
(Libraries, parks, etc.)
C oiqiniinity ' _ Community-'.
Area * #
k Appearances ^
I Stor> telling System | / Street
.Maintenance j
Cultural/Class
Cohesion
Street
Safety
Communication Action ( ontcxt
interactions occur but “a much larger fabric of association and identity that
merges geographic with other spaces that do not require shared locales” (Ball-
Rokeach, 2001a, p. 393). The central process of storytelling in the
Communication Infrastructure, on the other hand, is an indispensable mechanism
that links storytellers at the same level or across levels for the maintenance or
reconstitution of “a social world in which the T’ and the ‘we’ can survive” (ibid)
concomitantly for the creation and maintenance of an imagined community.
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14
In this respect, the intellectual roots of the Communication Infrastructure
Theory can be traced back to the late nineteenth-century discussions of the
Gemeinschaft and the Gesellschaft a la Tonnies. This tradition was continued and
transplanted across the Atlantic Ocean via the Chicago School of sociology,
which set new standards for community research under the rubric of “social
ecology” during early twentieth century (Ball-Rokeaeh, 1998, pp. 13-14),
producing classic works such as The Immigrant Press and Its Control (Park,
1922), The City (Park and Burgess, 1925), and The Polish Peasant in Europe and
America (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1927). With influences from John Dewey, the
Chicago School reflected on media, community, and democracy, which in many
ways has a long-lasting impact on studies of contemporary urban environments.
The various models of urban eeology generated along this classie line of research
are also being hotly eontested in the eontemporary era. Therefore, in addition to
those who emulate the Chicago School, there are also a series of critiques
including a shift towards theories that are more pluralistic (Castells, 1983; Dear,
2002).
The end of World War II precipitated the development of social
psychology in response to unexpected breakdowns in the eommunieation system,
giving rise to studies of the authoritarian personality, media and violence, and
stmctural and psychological ambiguity. These projects, in combination, prepared
a fertile ground for the conceptualization of a holistic, multi-level framework of
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15
media power (Ball-Rokeach, 1998, pp. 9-12,14) that characterizes both theories
of Media System Dependency and Communication Infrastructure.
Another source of inspiration for the Communication Infrastructure
Theory comes from Habermas’ theory of communicative action (1987; 1989),
whose imprint is manifest in the concept of communication action context,
although the main foeus of the communication infrastructure is more a dynamic
storytelling network than rational discourse in public sphere (Ball-Rokeach, et al,
2001b, p. 396). In his early days, Jurgen Habermas was a member of the Frankfurt
School, which combines Marxian and Freudian theories in response to social
issues prompted by the rise and fall of Nazi Germany (Rogers, 1994, pp. 115-
118).
Theoretieal development is a process of ereation based on accumulated
knowledge and conceptual integration for better understanding of problems facing
contemporary human society. The Communication Infrastructure Theory absorbs
from and builds on numerous intelleetual traditions on both sides of the Atlantie
Ocean over a period of more than a hundred years. Cognizant of this background,
we would suspect that the general framework of Communication Infrastructure is
applicable to the region of China’s Pearl River Delta, although the different
context and the focus on telecommunications mean that original theorization is
also essential in addition to simple adaptations of the Communication
Infrastructure Theory.
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16
From LA. to the Pearl River Delta
Los Angeles is the laboratory of the Metamorphosis Project and the main test
ground for the Communication Infrastructure Theory. The focus on a specific
urban region is most important given that corporations and knowledge elites are
increasingly attaching themselves to “sub-national territories” of “cities or city
region(s)” (Robins, 1999, p. 41), which at the same time also rely on the
availability of a massive but “inexpensive” labor force (Soja, 1991 ; Castells and
Hall, 1994). In this respect. Greater Los Angeles and the Pearl River Delta are
both prototypical regions where the wealth of global capitalism and the poverty of
migrant labor are embedded side by side.^ They are both characterized by
decentralized urban sprawl where telecommunicated information is critical to
each economic sector and every social class.
Also known as Zhujiang Delta, Zhu River Delta, or Southern China
Metropolis, the Pearl River Delta includes major cities such as Guangzhou
(Canton), Hong Kong, Macau, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai as well as smaller but
burgeoning cities such as Zhongshan, Jiangmen, Foshan, Nanhai, and Dongguan.
This is a region of 14 cities covering an expanse of 41,700 square kilometers, and
^ See Davis (1992) for an introduction to Los Angeles urban sprawl, and Lin (1997a, 1997b) for
discussions of urban development in the Pearl River Delta. Also see Cartier (2001:36-71) for the
establishment o f the “region” as a useful analytical unit that facilitates understanding o f South China,
and Lee (1998) for social inequality, especially gender inequality issues, in the case of immigrant
workers.
This is admittedly a preliminary analogy rather than a fully established argument. Systematic
comparisons between the two regions are still in order for the revealing o f the similarities and
dissimilarities between Greater Los Angeles and the Pearl River Delta.
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17
home to 40.8 million residents.^ It is where the largest watercourse in South
China, the Pearl River, flows into the Pacific Ocean.
For millennia, the Pearl River Delta has been China’s maritime frontier
that witnessed the exchange of products, the flow of immigrants, as well as the
first importation of Christianity, modem industry, and Western colonizers into the
Middle Kingdom (Cartier, 2001). With the escalation of post-Mao reforms since
1978, the region has also played a pivotal role in pioneering China’s “reform and
opening-up” processes out of the constraints of a Maoist planned economy and in
linking the country - via telecom technologies and other channels - with the rest
of the world (Lin, 1997a; 1997b; Sung, Liu, Wang and Lau, 1995; Foster,
Goodman and Tan, 1999).
Although systematic comparisons are still in order, a cursory look at the
spatial configuration of Pearl River Delta reveals much similarity to Greater Los
Angeles in that both have been constmcted, not as traditional metropolis with a
core and surrounding concentric “zones of succession,” but as a decentralized
region with endless spatial variation, adding to the urgency of concerns for strong
storytelling networks in these particular urban spaces. While many see Los
Angeles as the prototype of urban sprawl in the United States (Banham, 1971 ;
Soja, 1989; Davis, 1990; Fogelson, 1993; Dear, 2002), others observe that the
Pearl River Delta is “likely to become the most representative urban face of the
twenty-first century” when the juxtaposition of “global connectedness” and “local
^ Guangdong Statistics Yearbook, 2001, p. 34.
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18
disconnectedness” emerges as the essential feature of a contemporary city form
(Castells, 1996, pp. 409, 404). Commenting on the urban structure of the Pearl
River Delta, Castells cogently summarizes the spatial and social complexity of the
region, while highlighting the central role of communication in the development
of the area towards more internal as well as external connections, which exist side
by side with multiple disconnections in the region:
the Hong Kong-Guangdong metropolitan region is not
made up of the physical conurbation of successive
urban/suburban units with relative functional autonomy in
each one of them. It is rapidly becoming an interdependent
unit, economically, functionally, and socially, and it will be
even more so after Hong Kong becomes formally part of
China in 1997, with Macau joining the flag in 1999. But
there is considerable spatial discontinuity within the area,
with rural settlements, agricultural land, and undeveloped
areas separating urban centers, and industrial factories
being scattered all over the region. The internal linkages of
the area and the indispensable connection of the whole
system to the global economy via multiple communication
links are the real backbone of this new spatial unit. (1996:
409)
While applying the Communication Infrastructure Theory to the study of
telecommunications in the Pearl River Delta, a question emerges as to whether
this “Western” theory fostered in Los Angles can make sense in an Asian context?
As discussed earlier, there are certain similarities between the spatial
configurations of the two regions, especially in terms of their deviations from
traditional centralized urban models. Furthermore, the Communication
Infrastructure Theory also offers an open conceptual framework with high
generality. A closer examination of the notions of Media System Dependency and
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19
Figure 1.2 Map of the Pearl River Delta
y t
V / — L r " '
Guangzhou I
Foshan yOoUggUM^
1
Jiaiignu'n ■ -7V_
K,rpln*,y '
; Î T /h u h a i
T .,1 . v V ' ^
y A J ^ iW tm r
Buo'»n \
' s , Shenzhen
Hong Kong
t
/
IVIacaii
SiiiiJli China Sea
Communication Infrastructure yields two theoretical assumptions that need to
be emphasized in the case of the Pearl River Delta:
(1) In a given society, the more central the role of information at multiple
levels,^ the stronger the dependency of social units (individuals,
organizations, institutions) will be on the Communication
Infrastructure;
Unlike interpersonal communication and traditional mass media, telecommunicated information under
the influence o f technological convergence more often functions simultaneously at the macro, meso,
and micro levels. From web-casting to online newspapers, from bulletin board systems to cell phone
messages, today’s telecommunication system provides information and thereby facilitates goal-
attainment at multiple analytieal levels.
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(2) A transitional society in rapid change tends to produce more
uncertainty, which results in more dependency of social units on the
Communication Infrastructure for daily adaptation.
Both of the above propositions are based on Ball-Rokeach’s earlier
articulations about media system dependency and the communication
infrastructure (1998; 2001a). And they both apply to the transformation of the
Pearl River Delta in post-Mao era. On the one hand, prominent industrialization
and urbanization processes have occurred in the Delta since late 1970s (Sung, et
al, 1995; Lin, 1997a). These modernization developments, as elsewhere (in
particular the “Four Asian Tigers”), were accompanied by the surge of demand
for information, especially information critical for business operations (Wang,
1994; Hefiier, 1998). The information sector therefore boomed. “Informatization
(xinxihua),” the development strategy based on the utilization of new
communication technologies, has also become an official policy in recent years
that has quickly materialized in the Pearl River Delta (Yeung, 1994; 1998; Lee,
1997a).
On the other hand, while it took more than one and a half centuries for
Western societies to adjust to industrialization and move towards the so-called
“post-industrial society” (Bell, 1973), it took only a little more than two decades
for modernization to be unraveled in the Pearl River Delta.^ Since late 70s, the
Until late 1970s, public policy in the Maoist period had always failed to support industrialization in
South China. For various reasons, Maoist policy tends to favor the northern and eastern parts o f the
country (Lin, 1997; Cartier, 2001).
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21
telecom sector of this region has experienced a quantum leap from plain-old
telephone with mechanical rocker arms* to a highly complex system of advanced
network technologies ranging from cell phones to communications satellites to the
Internet. The extent of change is tremendous; so is the reliance of individuals and
organizations upon the communication infrastructure due to increased uncertainty
in the social environment. Rapid social transformations along with the increasing
centrality of information in the Pearl River Delta have enhanced the theoretical
relevance of the Communication Infrastructure Theory in this case study.
Constructing a Telecommunications Infrastructure
The case of telecom developments in the Pearl River Delta during the post-Mao
period is of special import for the understanding of the relationship between
communication technology and society. To understand this case from the
perspective of the Communication Infrastructure Theory, a general
conceptualization is in order regarding the role of telecom technologies in
contemporary society, which shall be followed by definitional discussions about
the notions of telecom action context and telecom storytelling system, the two
central concepts in the adapted version of the Communication Infrastructure
Theory that will guide empirical explorations in this dissertation.
Chronology o f Guangdong Province (Telecommunications), edited by Loeal History Compilation
Committee o f Guangdong Province. August 1999. p. 193.
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Telecommunications as a Center fo r Social Organization
By telecommunications infrastructure we understand the interaction of multiple
old and new communication technologies - telephone, telegraph, cell phone, fax,
pager, and the Internet - that form a distinct, multi-level information system. This
system of telecommunications plays a critical role in the goal-attainment of public
institutions, commercial entities, and groups of private citizens. Like the rise of
mass media defines an essential aspect of modernity, the totality of telecom
technologies including its technical, organizational, and cultural dimensions
(Pacey, 1983)^ has emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century as a
centerpiece of communication that differentiates contemporary life from previous
eras. Nowadays wired and wireless telecom networks are so central and taken for
granted in the everyday life of urban residents that, for many of us, telecom
systems have ceased to exist as mere instrum ents.They have formed, in fact, a
key part of contemporary urban social fabric.
Recognizing the central importance of telecom infrastructure in
contemporary society is not to deny the functions of other existing information
systems, in particular mass mediated and face-to-face communications. Yet this
dissertation foeuses on the social construction processes of telecom technologies
’ In his influential book, The Culture o f Technology (1983), Arnold Pacey clarifies that there is more
than pure technology when a new innovation is adopted in society. Besides the “technical” aspect of
technology, there are also an “organizational” dimension, involving coordination among innovators,
producers, and marketers, and a “cultural” dimension that reflects public opinions and values in a given
society.
This is not to deny the lack of access among older people and those who live in eities in the
developing world. Yet, at the same time, the increasingly importance of telecom technologies - from
fixed-line telephone to the Internet to mobile phone - needs to be emphasized particularly in key
institutions, industries, and sectors
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23
because they constitute a rapidly burgeoning realm of symbolic interaction that is
crucial to contemporary communities. No previous phase of human society relied
on telecommunications as a center for social organization like what we experience
today. Most importantly, there have been very few theory-guided empirical
studies of a complex regional telecom infrastructure. It is beyond dispute that the
growth of telecom industry has benefited from existing information systems as
evidenced by print ads for cell phone services or increased business volume for
online trading due to peer pressure in face-to-face interpersonal interactions. The
focus on telecommunications is therefore an analytical strategy that shall facilitate
the examination of a particular segment of an intricate communication ecology.
This does not mean that telecommunications has played a more important social
role than mass media or unmediated channels, an assertion that we would
consider premature. However, it is our argument that the construction of
telecommunications has become so central a component of social processes that it
can be a prism through which the larger Communication Infrastructure is
examined.
The real questions then pertain to how the interactions between contextual
factors and storytelling agents have shaped the construction o f the
telecommunications infrastructure, and the extent to which such social shaping
processes lead to a well-connected community or more disconnections in the
regional social ecology. This conception means that the telecommunications
infrastructure is not a pure, technical configuration, but a set of technological
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24
arrangements resulting from interaetions in the broader Communication
Infrastructure. This is a particular “storytelling system set in the communication
action context” (Ball-Rokeach, et al, 2001a, p. 396) accommodating a host of
social shaping processes that determine the technical configuration of the regional
telecom infrastructure.
Due to the significance of telecommunications in contemporary society,
such a complex conceptualization encompassing a wide range of social and
historical phenomena facilitates our understanding, not just of the social
construction processes for telecom technologies, but also of the storytelling
networks from the vantage points of actual players/storytellers and their
interactions situated in the communication action context of the region. Hence,
like the Communication Infrastructure Theory offering a distinctive perspective
on contemporary urban community, this study also has the potential of providing
unique insights about transformations of the communication environment in the
Pearl River Delta, and how these transformations have influenced local
communities in the past two decades.
Another important dimension of the telecom infrastructure is that it
includes multiple technologies. The recent spread of multi-media and new
telecom technologies means that theorization based a single technology is
increasingly circumscribed with less explanatory power for the real-world
telecom systems, which involves multiple technologies in their operation and calls
for ecological understanding. In this regard, the Communication Infrastructure
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25
Theory is an eclectic framework applicable to the study of multiple technological
systems - telephone, fax, pager, or Internet - which facilitates the examination of
historical trajectory, especially in the last quarter of the twentieth century when
the burgeoning of telecom innovations was unprecedented. Although the inclusion
of multiple technologies also adds to the challenge of this case study, it is a
venture worth exploring because so many studies on single technologies,
especially the Internet, have been conducted and rarely do we see these research
attempts being synthesized under the same conceptual umbrella in an integral
empirical project."
The Regional Telecom Action Context
In line with Communication Infrastructure Theory, the telecommunications
infrastructure of China’s Pearl River Delta is conceptualized as consisting of a
regional telecom action context and a regional telecom storytelling system. This
specific action context includes a constellation of institutional, economic, and
discursive forces that set the stage for policy deliberation, market dynamics, and
grassroots discussion regarding telecom developments.
Among the key elements of this action context are (1) global factors such
as technological advancement and economic integration under the banner of “new
" Most empirical researchers conduct studies on single technologies such as telephone, cellular phone,
or the Internet. Their findings were brought together in synthetic works like those by Manuel Castells
and William Dutton, whose reference point is mostly global rather than pertaining to a specific region.
Meanwhile there is another strand of research that involves authors such as Carolyn Marvin and Mark
Poster, who apply historical and interpretative approaches to the study of multiple media development
processes. This is also different from the current study in that there is less emphasis on first-hand
empirical data collection, for example, via surveys or interviews.
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26
capitalism” or “late capitalism,”'^ (2) national factors including nationwide
telecom initiatives and regional development plans established by the central
Chinese government,'^ and (3) regional historical factors like the mercantile
tradition, linguistic diversity, and the region’s economic structure and community
structure, which will be introduced in more detail. These are the most influential
forces at the macro and meso levels of analysis that provide the social and
historical underpinnings for the emergence of the regional telecom infrastructure.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the analytical framework for this study, an adaptation
of the Communication Infrastructure Theory with an original model regarding the
development of telecom technologies. It shows that constructing
telecommunications in the Pearl River Delta is not a process occurring in vacuum.
Rather, it is contingent upon global and national conditions as well as the socio-
historical characteristics of the region itself. While technical formations of the
telecommunications infrastructure are noteworthy, more prominent are the
interactions between technology and social dynamics within and beyond the Pearl
River Delta, deeply rooted in the region’s historical condition as a commercial
center of South China (Cartier, 2001, pp. 72-81) and a major origin of the global
“Late capitalism” (Harvey, 1989; Jameson and Fisher, 1992), “new capitalism” (e.g. Sennett, 1998),
“digital capitalism” (Schiller, 2000), “turbo-capitalism” (Luttwak, 2000), or “third millennium
capitalism” (Rogers, 2000), is a characterization o f contemporary human society that sheds light on the
profound transformations o f economic, political, cultural, and societal processes at the turn of the
century. Although to what extent this most recent and “advanced” type o f capitalism differs from
modem industrial capitalism remains debatable, elements o f the new social form can be readily
identified in aspects o f technology, globalization, and the rise o f a “networked society” (Castells, 1996).
In China, this refers to the Central Government in Beijing, which retains determining power at the
national scale. Although post-Mao economic reforms and the country’s accession to the World Trade
Organization in 2001 have been eroding the power dominance o f Beijing, policies issued by the
national government remains essential to regional developments, including initiatives in the telecom
sector.
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Figure 1.3 Components of the regional communication infrastructure in
China’s Pearl River Delta (model adapted from the Communication Infrastructure
diagram as presented in Ball-Rokeach, et al, 2001b)
National
Telecom
Policies
Econom ic *
Globalization \
Regional
Economic
Structure
V T '
Teucom
Telecom Storytelling System
Technological m m Soclo-cultura Technological
A dvancem ent
Telecommunications Action Context
Local
Community
Structure
Linguistic
\ Diversity
Mercantile
Tradition
lo-cultural
Regionalization
Chinese diaspora (Cartier, 2001; Skeldon, 2003, pp. 57-58). Also essential is the
new stage of globalization since the last two decades of the twentieth century
(Castells, 1996; Held, et al, 1999; Scholte, 2000), when cross-border activities
facilitated by telecom technologies became a key feature of late capitalism.
Within China, the era since 1978 is characterized by profound transformations,
when Maoism was replaced by the officially acclaimed “socialist market
economy,” or “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” (Karmel, 1994). Under
such social circumstances of rapid transition, macro factors including nationwide
telecom initiatives and regional development plans imposed by the central
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28
government still have great influence upon local development. However, during
the post-Mao period, the Pearl River Delta has also been the nation’s test ground
for new economic and political policies favoring local autonomy and economic
opening-up. As a result, Beijing’s significantly loosened institutional control, and
the inflow of foreign capital and migrant labor helped establish the Pearl River
Delta as the primary case for China’s “red capitalism” (Lin, 1997). A more
complete elaboration on these various contextual factors will be provided in
chapter three and chapter four of this dissertation, which is essential to the
understanding of telecom development in this region during the post-Mao period
since 1978.
The Regional Telecom Storytelling System
Figure 1.3 also demonstrates that, within the regional telecom action context,
there is a telecom storytelling system consisting of three sets of storytellers at
meso and micro analytical levels: (a) local state entities, (b) regional and local
telecom providers, and (c) interpersonal networks of local residents. While the
storytelling networks being explored in the Metamorphosis Project focus upon the
neighborhood of different ethnic groups in Los Angles (Ball-Rokeach, et al,
2001a; Ball-Rokeach and Jung, 2003), in this study the central subject of
storytelling in the Pearl River Delta is telecom issues and events. These
storytellers were identified during the fieldwork of summer 2002 because of their
prominent roles in providing and circulating narratives in the processes of social
construction of technology. They interact with each other via mass media, face-to-
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29
face, or telecom channels, forming an endogenous discursive system situated in
the regional communication infrastructure. By local state entities we understand
formal power structures at city, county, district, and township levels’'* within the
Delta, which include not only local governments but also local Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) agencies - hence the term “party-state officials” - given
China’s political system of one party rule. These local officials, unlike authorities
at the provincial level or in Beijing, identify more closely with local businesses
and residents groups. They are not ordinary communist cadres but “bureaucratic
entrepreneurs” (Hsing, 1997) who command key institutional and material
resources, play a major role in socio-economic development, and, in so doing, set
up “master narratives” for telecom storytelling in the localities.
Telecom providers in this storytelling system are either (1) regional
branches of national telecom oligopolies or (2) commercial players sponsored by
local state or (3) small private businesses such as Internet cafes. These are for-
profit organizations, many of which are closely connected to local state entities
that control access to capital, market, and various policy parameters of the local
telecommunications industry. There are therefore sustained information
exchanges between party-state officials and telecom providers in this particular
storytelling system. Even in the case of relatively independent private firms, their
fate is also very much decided by telecom policies established by the party-state
In the contemporary Chinese administrative system, “city” is the highest local government unit,
whieh oversees “counties” that often consist o f semi-urban towns surrounded by agricultural land. The
urban seetion of a “city” is then divided into “districts;” and a “county” into “townships.”
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30
authorities. This is true although there are also numerous ways in which certain
private operators may also bypass official constraints and create alternative
storytelling networks as will be discussed in more detail in chapter six.
Local residents also constitute an indispensable part of the telecom
storytelling process because in this region, arguably more so than most other
places in the country, local state and commercial players are dependant on
residents’ self-organized support for the attainment of goals, be they political or
commercial. It is important to note that local residents, as being discussed here,
are more than simple aggregates of individuals. A good proportion of them,
especially long-term residents in the region, are parts of natural storytelling units
such as families or lineage networks.'^ Meanwhile, the category of local residents
also includes new immigrants, covering a wide range of dialect groups and people
of diverse social cultural backgrounds. Their storytelling practices are often
limited to enclaves of migrant communities, ignored by local state and telecom
providers, and sometimes discursively suppressed in the state of “prenarrative
experience” (Kerby, 1991, p. 84), which will be elaborated in chapter seven in the
cases of telecom-based crimes against migrant workers. It is imperative to note
that the less integrated parts of the storytelling system, like new immigrant
groups, are indispensable as a sizable proportion of the telecom consumer market;
they are also the main source of labor for physical infi*astructure construction and
” Lineage is a traditional eommunity organization in the Pearl River Delta based on common ancestry,
which had profound implications for the sustaining o f communal ties among Delta residents and their
sojourning neighbors and family members around the world (Siu and Faure, 1995). Please see more
detailed discussion in chapter four.
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31
the manufacturing of telecom devices. Most importantly, examining how and why
migrant workers are marginalized in this telecom storytelling system is an
opportunity to reconsider questions of population diversity and the vitality of
urban communities.
Historically speaking, the telecom storytelling system of the Delta region
was relatively simple at the outset of post-Mao reforms, with party-state agencies
eommanding virtually all narratives about teleeom development. It has, however,
become much more complicated and akin to a full-fledged social ecology, where
the sole centrality of government authorities has subsided, replaeed by a more
integral, yet still problematie, system of local officials, telecom providers, and
groups of residents. Communieations within this storytelling system are processes
0 Î storytelling telecom, by which we understand the totality of symbolie
interactions among the three storyteller groups that revolve around the
eonfiguration of telecom systems in a given region.
For example, as found in my fieldwork during summer 2002, all the three
key groups of storytellers have actively participated in the symbolic construction
of “informatization” projects, which contributed to the boom of Internet projects
in the Delta. Similar processes of storytelling telecom that combine political,
commercial, and grassroots discourses were also observed in the diffusion of
mobile phone. Through these ways of storytelling telecom, the information
systems of existing social, cultural, and political entities leave their imprints on
the emergent regional telecom infrastructure because the key storytellers represent
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major institutions and interest groups at the meso and micro levels. Processes of
storytelling telecom can therefore be seen as a prism through which the entire
regional communication ecology of the Pearl River Delta is examined.
While storytelling telecom is situated in the communication action context
and constrained or facilitated by contextual factors, we should note that the
storytellers are not always passive recipients of what exogenous conditions would
impose. On the contrary, storytellers are agentic actors capable of making their
own decisions, which may or may not be consistent with contextual impositions.
Notably, there should also be little surprise that national and global forces often
do not cohere as a single condition conducive to one specific arrangement of the
telecom infrastructure. When discrepancy exists, when macro forces do not
specify local configurations in a compulsory manner - which is usually the case -
it is up to the storytellers at the meso and micro levels to define themselves
spatially.
In this telecom storytelling system, telecommunication channels are but
one of the conveyers of information, along with existing modes of mass media
and face-to-face communication. Mass media storytelling, informed by and
reacting to factors in the action context, constitutes a most pervasive symbolic
environment in this storytelling system where government agencies, telecom
providers, and grassroots storytellers are connected or disconnected with each
other in the making and implementation of specific decisions regarding the
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33
regional telecommunications infrastructure/^ However, although these
storytellers are physically located in the Delta, their primary storytelling
references are not the region or the city where they are situated/^ Instead, an
overwhelming amount of mass media telecom storytelling use national and global
issues as points of reference, which was confirmed from an audience perspeetive
based on interviews and focus groups the researcher conducted in the region
(please see chapters 5, 6, 7 for details). The same is true for telecom content
providers such as news websites in Guangzhou and Shenzhen. As learned from
interviews, focus groups, and my online observations, almost all major websites
in the region (e.g., netease.com, 21cn.com) carry news and discussions about
international and national stories that disproportionably outnumber regional or
local telecom stories.**
The solution is therefore not to focus on the media forms of storytelling -
be it mass media or telecom - but to focus on the storytellers themselves and the
narratives they generate. Telecom-related storytelling processes may involve a
Storytellers in the Teleeommunicatlons Infrastructure - local governments, telecom providers, and
users - are comparable to the three types o f storytellers in the Communication Infrastructure o f urban
residential communities, i.e. community organizations, local media, and individual residents,
respeetively (Ball-Rokeach, et al, 2001a). The role o f local state agencies is emphasized in this case
because the scale and complexity of contemporary telecommunications entail high involvement of
regional and local governments as not only industry regulators but also major investors and purchasers.
This is particularly the case after the dot-com crash since year 2000 when e-govemment initiatives
assumes more prominence following the downturn in e-commerce.
This is a finding from my monitoring o f mass media coverage regarding telecom development.
Before and during my fieldwork in summer 2002,1 monitored, both online and in the field, loeal
newspapers, magazines, television and radio broadcasting in the Pearl River Delta for approximately
four months on daily basis. Notably, the predominance o f macro storytelling in mass mediated channels
and the lack of local storytelling therein are also observed in studies of Los Angeles media environment
conducted by the Metamorphosis Project.
This is most clear in the surveys conducted in summer 2002 in Guanzhou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai,
which found very few users using websites to acquire local news.
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combination of different media forms; they may also be conveyed by unmediated
face-to-face interaction. As long as we gain information about the three main
groups of storytellers and the stories they tell about local telecom development,
we can have a good understanding of the internal mechanisms of the regional
telecom storytelling system.
As demonstrated in Figure 1.4, it is the telecom action context, the
telecom storytelling system, and the interactions between the two that ultimately
shape the historical trajectory of telecom technologies in the Pearl River Delta,
giving rise to a telecommunications infrastructure that spans across the region and
links the Delta with the rest of the world. This model, as an initial theoretical
framework, anticipates serendipitous outcomes in fieldwork and historical
analysis because it affords interactions between structural and agentic forces,
among storytellers at different levels of analysis.
Telecom Storytelling, Storytelling Telecom
It is important to note that the social shaping of technology process under current
examination is one that produces a system of communication technologies.
Hence, in tandem with storytelling telecom, there also exist processes of telecom
storytelling, by which we mean the physical networks of telecommunications,
wired or wireless, convey a system of information that plays a critical role in the
formation of narratives about the telecom infrastructure itself. As Figure 1.4
illustrates, the construction of a regional telecom infrastructure is not the end
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Figure 1.4 The social construction of a regional telecommunications
infrastructure as situated in the larger Communication Infrastructure
Telecom Action
Context
(macro, meso)
reacts to
facilitates o
constrains The social
construction
of a regional
telecom
infras
tructure
leadmg towards
Telecom
Storytelling
System (meso,
micro)
reifies & changes
The ( omniunication Intrastriicturc
result of discursive processes. When telecom technologies materialize, they merge
with and become part of the regional storytelling system; and in doing so they
may reify existing narratives about telecom technologies because the key
storytellers - powerful officials, for example - were also the main decision
makers in major telecom projects. A good example would be e-govemment
initiatives in Nanhai City, promoted by the municipal authorities to consolidate
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power/^ Web-based commercial promotions and consumer chat groups for
mobile phone products also represent other ways in which telecom technologies
can be used to facilitate telecom growth in itself. However as in most poliey
processes, the outcomes of telecom storytelling include both intended and
unintended consequences that may change existing telecom-related narratives to
the benefit or detriment of existing stakeholders. Excessive development of fiber
optic networks, for example, may slow down the burgeoning of newer
technologies such as Wi-Fi and telecom diffusion in less developed parts of the
region. From this perspective, processes of telecom storytelling and storytelling
telecom are construed as components of an ecological system of society-
technology interactions. The examination of the regional telecom infrastructure,
as captured in these interactions, is therefore, one way to understand the evolution
of the Delta regional society.
As mentioned earlier, so far telecom storytellers in the Delta (e.g., Internet
portals, online newspapers) have often used the national and global frames of
narration.^® Rarely do they use the regional or local points of reference. As a
result, the current role of telecom storytelling remains relatively marginal in the
storytelling networks, although it is expected to grow at a more mature stage of
technological diffusion. Nonetheless, the dual conception involving telecom
infrastructure as both the subject and conveyor of storytelling provides a new
Nanhai government and local CCP offices have widely used Intemet web-pages to promote
informatization projects in the city. See more details in Chapter 5.
^ See footnote 17
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articulation of the social shaping of technology perspective (Bijker, Hughes and
Pinch, 1987; Bijker and Law, 1992; Kubicek, Dutton and Williams, 1997), which
consists of three interconnected phases. First, narratives about telecom
developments in the Pearl River Delta result from the communication action
context of post-Mao Pearl River Delta, including complex social, historical, and
institutional factors that both facilitate and confine the growth of the new
telecommunications system. Second, because officials, entrepreneurs, and
networks of loeal residents are conceived as agentic actors in the Communication
Infrastructure, regional telecom storytelling agents may also react to contextual
factors for the construction of a telecommunication system that best reflects their
own interests. Finally, as a result, it is the interactions between the Delta’s
communication action context and its storytelling system for telecom-related
narratives that shape the ultimate outcome of regional telecommunications
development. A more generalized theorization of this three-pronged social
construction process is summarized below:
a. The communication action context including its contextual factors
(e.g. social, historical, and institutional) shapes the ways in which
stories are told about telecommunication technologies in a given
society.
b. Storytelling agents at multiple levels (e.g. government bodies,
commercial entities, and networks of local residents) react to
conducive and non-conducive conditions in the aetion context by
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constructing narratives about a technological system that best serves
their respective interests,
c. The interactions between the communication action context and the
storytelling system for teleeom issues finally shape the configuration
of telecommunications technologies, whieh, in turn, reifies and
changes existing narratives in the telecom storytelling system and its
action context.
This conceptual framework based on Communication Infrastructure
Theory contributes to the understanding of the social shaping of technology
process from a communication perspective. It highlights processes of influenee
more than any particular technology. Although it has been demonstrated that
technological systems are often constructed at social (e.g. Marvin, 1988),
institutional/organizational (e.g. Bijker and Law, 1992; Boezkowski, 1999), and
user levels (e.g. Fischer, 1992; Silverstone and Haddon, 1996), seldom have these
various domains been bridged together using a central organizing coneept. Yet the
notion of storytelling offers such a possibility because symbolic interaction is an
essential dimension that underlies all of the social shaping processes, as argued in
the three-pronged theorization outlined above. Moreover, this is a model of multi
level storytelling that offers a framework for the analysis of contextual factors,
storytelling agents, and telecom-related narratives at macro, meso, and micro
levels, a legacy of the Communication Infrastructure Theory.
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More Technology, More Disconnectedness?
The ultimate concern of this dissertation, as previously stated, is not to describe
the social shaping of technology processes per se but to examine how such a
communication system impinges upon the vitality of local community and
formations of civil society?' Examinations of the Pearl River Delta reveal many
propensities of this regional telecommunications infrastructure: it operates at fast
speed; it contributes to the urban diaspora; it facilitates transactions beyond
national boundaries. However, a critical issue is that, in the process of telecom
growth, certain consequences may emerge that constrain or even devastate local
community. Admittedly some socio-historical fabrics are maintained and renewed
with the growth of telecommunications. Yet others, including certain ties essential
to the sustenance of local community, are ignored and lost, hence giving rise to a
seemingly paradoxical observation that more technological connectedness does
not necessarily reduce social disconnectedness. On the contrary, it may generate
more forms of disconnections that involve more components of the storytelling
system in the Communication Infrastructure.
The idea that telecom development may augment disconnectedness, albeit
perplexing at first glance, is not entirely new. Since ancient times, there have been
critiques about the disrupting effects of new communication technologies upon
community fabrics (Ackoff, 1969; Dreyfus, 2001). The spread of telecom
inventions in the past few decades is essential to contemporary “life in fi-agments”
For discussions on civil society in China see Wakeman (1993), White (1996), and Kluver (1999).
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40
(Bauman, 1995), when “centrifugal tendencies” characterize social
transformations in late modernity (Giddens, 1990). Since we understand
telecommunications as a primary information system for social organization, this
also touches upon a classic theme in social theory: social disconnectivity tends to
escalate with the rise of more complex forms of social organization, as revealed
by Durkheim’s analyses on division of labor (1964) and the concept of
bureaucracy a la Max Weber (1946). From an ecological viewpoint, it is also of
little surprise that, when a telecommunications infrastructure develops, it would
follow a common trajectory among systems of all kinds by first acquiring an
increasing degree of complexity and then facing the challenge of potential
segmentation among its parts (Miller, 1978). This is a natural process and,
although actors at various levels of the system may attempt to integrate the
components, such efforts may nonetheless lead to unintended consequences.
The issue of disconnectedness is more prominent in the case of
telecommunications because a large number of technologies are involved and,
moreover, unlike modernist bureaucracies it is hard to implement a single
overarching rationale that governs the development of contemporary
telecommunications (Horwitz, 1989). Rather, it is often subjected to an “ecology
of games” (Dutton, 1992; 1999) in which institutions, organizations, and
individuals engage in mutual negotiation. The Telecommunications Infrastructure,
as a result of these interactions, is a system with varying degrees of openness
where multiple logics exist, compete, and co-evolve, at different levels of analysis.
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engendering a metabolism of (dis)connections in the regional telecom storytelling
system set in its global and national action contexts.
The Notion o f (Dis)connectedness
Connectedness is among the concepts that are often heard in recent years, yet for
which a grounded analytical definition is lacking. It has been used in different
contexts to refer to a psychological perception (Wang and Chan, 2001; Bonny, et
al, 2000), a type of interpersonal relationship (Floyd, 1999; Finkler, 2001), an
attribute of business networks (Gustavsen, Finne and Oscarsson, 2001) or a
feature of human communities in general (Freie, 1998). In the USC
Metamorphosis Project, connectedness is understood as a concept that “reflects a
multilevel and contextual way of envisioning the relationship between individuals
and technology” (Jung, et al, 2001, p. 513). While applying to the case of the
Intemet, it “implies dynamic and ecological” relations “embedded in a larger
communication environment composed of multi-level relationships among
individuals, institutions, organizations, and various storytellers, including all
available communication media forms” (Loges and Jung, 2001, p. 537). It is along
this line of articulation that we hope to extend our constmal of (dis)connectedness
into a concept that is both ecological and multi-level.
Connectedness and disconnectedness are the two opposite states of
communicative relationship among components of the Communication
Inffastmcture, particularly storytellers in the telecom storytelling system as in this
case study. While connectedness and disconnectedness - henceforth
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(dis)connectedness - refer to the stmetural properties of the communication
system, connections and disconnections, i.e. (dis)connections, are the specific
forms that embody and emplace relational conditions among storytellers in
particular situations. Based on my fieldwork in the Pearl River Delta during
summer 2002,1 would propose four generic types of disconnections to capture the
most fundamental dimensions of (dis)connectedness that encompass a spectrum
of structural relationships at multiple analytical levels of the regional
communication ecology: (1) spatial-temporal breaks, (2) stratification gaps, (3)
institutional blocks, and (4) grassroots detachment. This typology is necessary
because the case study involves an abundance of first-hand empirical evidence
and secondary data that entails an efficient and meaningful analytical framework
to adequately assess the social consequences of telecom developments in the Pearl
River Delta. Besides faeilitating description, the typology also resonates with the
coneem in social theory about the centrifugal impact of telecom technology upon
existing communities (Giddens, 1990; Bauman, 1995; Dreyfus, 2001), which
cannot be fully comprehended unless communicative disconnectedness is
examined.
The Four Generic Types
The first, and most basic, form of (dis)connectedness is spatial-temporal.
Discontinuities in space and time produce breaks in human communication.
Telecommunications, like other means for signal transmission, provide a system
of technical devices designed to overcome these breaks and make connections
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across spatial and temporal constraints. From plain old telephone to the Intemet,
telecommunications has become an increasingly powerful tool for the elimination
of spatial-temporal disconnections.
The diffusion of telecom technologies, however, is uneven in most
societies, which indicates a second form of (dis)connections, i.e. the stratification
gaps, which are in many cases the effects of pre-existing social inequalities upon
the likelihood of quality connections among different populations. The expansion
of a telecom infrastructure is usually accompanied by the emergence of two social
gaps. One is the access schism, also known as the “digital divide,” between social
groups who have or do not have access to telecom technologies; the other is the
internal stratification among groups with access to teleeom services but differ in
their patterns of connectedness due to different social economic status (Jung, et al,
2001). One of the anticipated social functions of telecommunications is to bridge
these gaps by “flattening-out” and enhancing information accessibility across all
sectors and social strata (Toffler, 1990). But whether this promise is realized in
actuality remains a question for empirical research, especially because the point-
to-point mode of telecom communication and its personalizing potentials may add
to the discriminatory capacity of the new media.
The third dimension of (dis)connections is institutional blocks and
attempts to eradicate them. In a speeific telecom infrastructure, institutional
constraints may take three forms. There can be offieial denial of access to certain
telecom market, services, or content. For instance, foreign companies in China are
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so far forbidden to become independent telephone operators (Yu, 2001) and
Intemet users are barred from viewing certain kinds of “harmful” online
information (Hao, Zhang and Huang, 1996; Qiu, 1999/2000). Institutional blocks
may also result from excessive development that leads to congestion in terms of
either telecom bandwidth (e.g. airwaves) or actual urban land resources, such as
the over-constmction of fiber optic networks resulted from a common obsession
of most telecom providers in the Pearl River Delta.^^ The third form of
institutional blocks is rooted in the lack of policy predictability. Changes in the
mles of game often engender chaos and impasse, especially in countries like
China where public policy processes are often murky. Consequently, business
operations, including those related to the telecom sector, are ordinarily based on
short-term considerations in lack of sustainability in the long run, which may
accumulate into critical system breakdown over a period of time. There are
reasons to believe that high-level telecom decision-makers, including those in the
Pearl River Delta, are aware of these three forms of institutional blocks. However,
this does not mean blocks will be easily removed since maintaining an open and
robust telecom infrastructure is only one component of the political “ecology of
“ While interviewing representatives o f telecom access providers in the region, I found that almost
every single one o f them would boast that their fiber optic networks were better than those of their
competitors. In some cases, I had to listen to five similar claims in a single city. This storytelling
practices reflected a “fiber optic construction fever,” when excessive and repetitive construction took
place in limited urban space. For example, along a major strip o f Guangzhou’s new central business
district (CBD), the pavement was carpeted by well covers o f fiber optic networks bearing trademarks of
all major access providers in the city, indicating an extremely congested fiber optic network
underground. As a result, it would be difficult for any company to upgrade their facilities. Overheated
fiber optic development also means that limited resources cannot be allocated to other important
projects, especially those serving the interests of residents who do not live in the CBD.
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games” and that much of the undesirable outcomes of institutional blocks resulted
from unintended consequences of seemingly benevolent policies.
Finally, there are socio-psychological disconnections that I term
grassroots detachment. While stratificational gaps and institutional blocks pertain
to macro and meso levels of analysis, grassroots detachment functions at the
micro level of interpersonal networks among local residents. These include both
long-term dwellers and migrant workers who engage each other in natural
storytelling units, such as families and friendship groups, regarding matters of
common concern, which under two conditions may lead to collective tendencies
to be disassociated with telecom technologies and even other social groups. First,
in certain grassroots storytelling units, most members are unable to access
telecom technologies due to the lack o f technological competence (e.g. senior
citizens). Second, among certain groups there may also he psychological
dismissal arising from repetitive experience of and frustration with the first three
forms of disconnectedness. For instance, those who had their pre-paid phone card
PIN stolen at public phone booths subsequently tended to avoid using this
telephone service.^^ This socio-psychological alienation not only adds to the
barrier for certain groups to access telecom technology; it also plays a large part
in isolating certain disadvantaged groups from telecom service providers and local
authorities. Grassroots detachment is most prevalent among new immigrants.
This is a finding from focus group with immigrant workers. Quite a few o f them had their pre-paid
phone card PIN number stolen while using public phone booths, most of which do not have privacy-
protection designs. Some focus group participants had fell victim to such crime several times.
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seniors, and the less educated. It reflects, reifies, and perpetuates stratificational
and institutional disconnections, and it is the hardest to counter because removing
detachment entails the establishment and sustaining of local community and a
strong sense of belonging.
Table 1.1 The four generic types of disconnections
Types of
disconnections
Definitions Sub-types Levels of
analysis
Spatial-
temporal
breaks
Basic discontinuities
caused by distance in
time and space
(1) Spatial breaks
(2) Temporal
breaks
Macro,
meso, and
micro
Stratificational
Gaps
Social differences in
accessing
technologies and
taking advantage of
useful information
(1) Access schism
(2) Internal
variation among
telecom
connectors
Macro and
meso
Institutional
Blocks
Constraints on
telecom development
caused by deliberate
imposition and
unintentional public
policy making
(1) Denial of
access
(2) Congestion
(3) Unpredictable
public policy
Macro and
meso
Grassroots
Detachment
Impediments at the
grassroots that deter
people fi’ om
accessing telecom
technologies, existing
in natinal storytelling
units (families,
friends, etc)
(1) Lack of
technological
competence
(2) Psychological
dismissal
Miero
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The above table summarizes the four generic types of disconnections, tbeir
definitions, sub-types, and levels of analysis. While the first three categories are
applicable at macro levels (e.g. within the entire People’s Republic of China), the
focus of this dissertation is to apply this typology to meso and micro levels of
analysis for a grounded assessment bow the telecom infrastructure impinges upon
the local communities of the Pearl River Delta. Notably, this is an analytical
framework consisting of ideal types designed for the sake of research. In reality,
multiple generic types may overlap in the presence of a specific formation of
disconnectedness, especially when observations are made from an ecological
point of view that highlights interactions of storytellers at and across different
levels of analysis.
The Compelling Questions
Construing telecom development in a Communications Infrastructure framework
allows for a systematic exploration of two overall questions: (1) how has the
current telecommunications infrastructure been developed and why has it taken
this form given the interactions between the telecom action context and the
telecom storytelling system in the Pearl River Delta since 1978? (2) What can we
learn fi-om this case study about the historical trajectory of telecom development
and its general role in the restructuring of regional social ecology?
These two broad queries can be explored more specifically by posing three
sets of questions concerning telecom development in the Pearl River Delta that
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contribute to more concrete knowledge about the regional telecom infrastructure
as well as reflections beyond this specific case.
The first series of questions are empirical and exploratory, aiming at a
eomprehensive and systematic disclosure of the components, structure, and
dynamics of this particular Communication Infrastructure in relation to regional
telecom developments: What constitutes the telecom action context and the
telecom storytelling system at different turning points of the post-Mao period
(1978-2002)? Who are major telecom storytellers in the region? What are the key
narratives about regional telecom development? How do storytellers interact at
the same and across levels of analysis? Why specific forms of (dis)connections
exist among teleeom providers, government entities, and local residents? How has
the structure of (dis)eonneetedness relationships been transformed since 1978?
What are the essential charaeteristics of this regional telecom system in flux?
Answers to the above questions shall shed light on the historical
trajectories of the regional telecommunications infrastructure, the major players,
their interrelations, issues of contention, and the stories they tell. Building on this
hody of knowledge, the second array of questions are explanatory and evaluative:
How did the key issues, by providing points of conjuncture for various political,
economic, and social forces at critical historic moments, determine the underlying
principles of the regional teleeom infrastructure? How can the consequences of
telecom development in the region be measured? What were the original goals of
telecom initiatives? Have these goals been attained? Were there unintended
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consequences? If so, why? Why are certain unique patterns of development found
in the Pearl River Delta? What contributed to these patterns? Are they unique to
the localities or are they indicative of more general implieations?
Finally, there are questions of a reflexive nature that eonffont all case
study researchers (Yin, 1994; Stake, 1995). These are partieularly important
beeause this project involves a new appraisal, from the perspective of the
Communieation Infrastructure Theory, of the ways in which systems of
communication technologies in metropolitan environments should be approached;
What is the best way to analyze, synthesize, and present the multiple types of
qualitative and quantitative data, so that the descriptive, explanatory and
evaluative questions can be addressed most appropriately? Is the “region” an
appropriate unit of analysis? Has the telecom infrastructure become an adequate
prism for the examination of the regional social ecology? What do we learn from
this speeific case that also connects to larger issues such as post-Mao political
economy in China and the social role of new communieation technologies in the
age of globalization?
Significance o f Research
By answering the above questions, I hope to enrich our understanding of recent
telecom developments in a key urban region both as an intriguing case, in and of
itself, and as a contribution to the broader Communication Infrastructure Theory.
In so doing, I hope to afford insight into the relationship between
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telecommunications technology and social ecology, as well as the pending
question of urban community under the new circumstances of globalization,
population diversity, and new communication technology.
That the Pearl River Delta has been a pioneer in incorporating different
resources and modes of production is commonsensical among those who hold
moderate interests in contemporary China. But it remains unclear how the
loosening of centralized political control has co-existed and worked together with
the heightening of commercialization in the making of the recent économie boom
of South China. Although rapid social change in the region has given rise to
increasing attention from several disciplines such as political science (Chan,
Madsen, and Unger, 1992), anthropology (Lee, 1998), urban planning (Soulard,
1997; Chung, Inaba, Koolhaas and Leong, 2001), and geography (Lin, 1997a;
1997b; Cartier, 2001; Leung, 1993), so far communication scholars have only
studied mass media in the Pearl River Delta (e.g. Chan, 2000; He, 2000; Lantham,
2000). When it comes to telecommunications, the work of Foster, Goodman, and
Tan (1999) stands out as most comprehensive in terms of documenting and
analyzing Intemet diffusion in Guangdong from the perspective of information
management.^"* These authors, however, paid little attention to technologies other
Foster et al (1999) utilizes the analytical framework o f the Global Diffusion o f the Intemet Project
(Goodman, et al, 1998) that focuses on six dimensions o f Intemet diffusion in Guangdong: (1)
geographical dispersion, (2) connectivity infrastructure, (3) sophistication of use, (4) pervasiveness, (5)
organizational infrastructure, and (6) sectoral absorption. They found that Intemet development in the
Pearl River Delta is better in terms o f the first three dimensions as compared to the latter three aspects.
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than the Intemet. Nor did they focus on the social context of communication and
telecom-related storytelling processes in the region.
Being sector-based and regionally oriented, this study responds to an
insufficiency of existing studies on telecommunications in China, namely an
obsession with national data and the lack of observation at meso and micro levels
(Qiu and Chan, forthcoming). A few scholars have sensitized us to the drastic
unevenness of teleeom growth throughout the nation (Lee, 1997; Zhao, 2000; Jin
and Wang, 2001), and therefore the necessity for intensive regional analysis. This
is, however, yet to be carried out, which adds to the import of this dissertation
project as one of the first studies that examines the social role of regional
telecommunications development in China.
Moreover, the regional telecommunication infrastructure is conceived of
as encompassing multiple storytellers at multiple levels of analysis including
small towns and rural areas in the Delta as potential agents of social change. This
conceptualization in line with the Communication Inffastmcture Theory differs
from the majority of China telecommunications and Intemet studies that focus
solely on major urban centers and their long-term residents. Conducting a
grounded regional case analysis guided by a framework that anticipates agentic
serendipity may therefore serve as a corrective that includes a great variety of
contexts and social classes, providing an unusual opportunity for the development
and refinement of the nascent telecom (dis)connectedness perspective
specifically, and the larger Communication Inffastmcture Theory in general. It is
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ultimately to this point that the this dissertation contributes epistemologically,
because the question of connectedness lies at the heart of scholarly concerns
regarding the globalizing China and the globalizing new communication
technologies, and we are only starting to come into terms with these set of
complex issues.
Structure o f Dissertation
To attain the goals of this dissertation, I shall follow an outline that consists of
eight chapters. The next chapter (Chapter 2), “The Examination of a Case,”
introduces embedded case study methodology and my research strategies
including modes of data collection, design for data analysis, and the synthesis of
analytic results.
Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to scrutinizing the telecom action context in
the Pearl River Delta. Chapter 3 looks at factors such as globalization, the
condition of late capitalism, and recent challenges to the formation and sustenance
of urban community. These processes are observed not only on a global scale but
also against the national backdrops of China’s post-Mao political economy, and
the national trajectories of media reform and telecom marketization since 1978.
Chapter 4, “Regional History Revisited,” first extends the frame of
historical discussion to maritime traditions of the Pearl River Delta, a mercantile
region at the fringe of the historic empire, which became a major anchor point of
the global Chinese diaspora. Then, the chapter reviews the transformation of the
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53
regional telecom infrastructure since 1978. In so doing, a brief review is provided
regarding growth patterns in different localities of the Delta, which unveils at the
city level some of the intra-regional telecom development disparities that are both
spatially embedded and historically path-dependent.
The three subsequent chapters (Chapters 5,6, and 7) focus on the telecom
storytelling system in the Communication Infrastructure of the Pearl River Delta.
Drawing from interviews, archives, and field observations. Chapter 5 presents an
analysis of official narratives and discusses the political logic of government
entities. It explores issues such as why local officials are eager to play an active
role of storytelling the “telecom revolution,” and how their involvement has
intended or unintended consequences that either alleviate or perpetuate regional
information inequality.
Chapter 6 takes the perspective of telecom enterprises, from national
oligopolies (e.g. China Telecom and Unicom) to medium-size providers backed
up by local states (e.g. Yintong and Xintong) to private firms such as Intemet
cafes and Guoxin, a small firm which started up as a pager operator in early 1990s
and later specialized in pre-paid IP phone card and Intemet access card business.
We shall discuss how the ecology of telecom providers acquires a higher degree
of (dis)connectedness both intemally among the entrepreneurs and extemally
when their relationship with government agencies and ordinary users is brought
under examination.
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Chapter 7 taps into the grassroots of the telecom storytelling system by
employing survey and focus group data as well as secondary analysis and
participant observations. Comparisons are made between long-term Delta
residents and immigrant workers, between youth and the elderly, in terms of bow
different social groups tell different stories about telecom technologies, bow they
face different forms of disconnections, and bow they may have unique
opportunities for community building. Attention is also brought to local residents’
perception of government and commercial promotion of new communication
technology, and bow they evaluate the consequences of the telecom boom on tbeir
everyday life.
In chapter 8, the last chapter, we shall reflect upon the empirical,
theoretical, and methodological lessons learned through this case study. In so
doing, discrete findings about different components of the telecom action context
and the storytelling system will be synthesized, and tentative conclusions will be
drawn to answer our research questions. Also included are the implieations of this
study for future research.
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CHAPTER n
THE EXAMINATION OF A CASE
By focusing on a single population in a carefully defined
geographical and chronological framework, one can
examine a wide variety of relationships between
technological and social change ... such a narrowing of the
subject in time and space widens the range of questions that
can be asked about this smaller historical unit and often
improves the precision of the answers.
- John Weiss (1971, pp. 2, 8)
Researching the communication infrastructure of post-Mao Pearl River Delta - its
components, structures, and dynamics - and the development of
telecommunications as part of this larger system is an empirical undertaking that
speaks to multiple issues about communication technology and social change,
both within China and beyond. Such an endeavor involves, first and foremost,
methodological decision-making: how should we observe, analyze, and present
this critical case in a meaningful yet effective way? This question is precisely
what this chapter shall address.
Case Study Methodology
The aim of this study is to uncover the basic parameters of the regional
communication infrastructure, contextualizing it both spatially and historically
and exploring the characteristics of the storytelling networks. In so doing, we seek
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56
to understand how the new telecom infrastructure is constructed and whether
more technological connectedness may lead to more social disconnectedness.
Such research goals render case study methodology the most appropriate
approach beeause it is the “preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are
being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the
focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context’’ (Yin,
1994, p. 1).
The main methodological challenge to this study, as to most cases studies,
is the development and deployment of a theoretical framework within which a
plethora of historical and empirical data can be analyzed. To account for the
transformation of telecom infrastructure in the Pearl River Delta, one may adopt a
chronological order and describe the development trajectory of regional telecom
infrastructure as a whole or as a combination of separate chronologies in different
localities. One may also take a technology-based approach and study how each of
the teleeom media - fixed-line telephone, mobile phone, pager, fax, and the
Intemet - evolved throughout the years. Yet our theoretical concerns entail an in-
depth examination of the Communication Infrastructure including its components,
the inter-component relationships, and the processes of change. We need to
identify and analyze major elements in the communication action context as well
as the storytelling system, and study how they relate to each other. In keeping
with these theoretical concerns, embedded case study design is employed because
it allows for, first, contextual analysis at macro (global and national) and meso
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57
(regional) levels, and second, a close study of storytelling networks among
organizations and grassroots storytellers at the meso and micro levels.
Unlike “holistic case study design” that examines “only the global nature”
of a case, embedded case studies “involve more than one unit of analysis”
including attention to “a subunit or subunits” (ibid, pp. 41-41). The embedded
design is therefore more suited for the exploration of complex issues at multiple
levels of analysis (Scholz and Tietje, 2002:3-4, 9-75). This is particularly
important for the current project because the conceptual framework of the
Communication Infrastructure Theory assumes relative autonomy for different
players, especially in the post-Mao Pearl River Delta where a decentralized mode
of urbanization has been recognized (Chung, et al, 2001). Such recognition thus
entails data collection in multiple localities within the Delta, including multiple
storytellers at macro, meso, and micro levels, which helps with the unveiling of a
more complete pieture of the regional communication ecology.
Like most other case studies, this dissertation “relies on multiple sources
of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion” (Yin, 1994,
p. 13) for the purposes of cross validation and supplementation, which ultimately
will shed light on a eomprehensive and ecological understanding of the subject
matter. This, however, poses a new challenge to the processing of data and the
synthesis of findings (Seholz and Tietje, 2002), especially for those findings that
are at odds with eaeh other. Fortunately, as previously stated, inconsistencies and
disparities are indeed antieipated in the theoretical framework of communication
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58
infrastructure in that the storytellers are situated differently in the action context,
with remarkably different command over the symbolic and/or tangible
policymaking resources that may or may not be accessible to others.
In the following, we shall first discuss the methods of data collection in
this project, and then move on to issues of data processing and the synthesis and
presentation of analytical findings. The design and implementation of the
subsequent research methods benefits enormously from prior Communication
Infrastructure Theory propositions and methodological strategies utilized in the
Metamorphosis Project.
Data Collection
Since Spring 2001,1 have been using various venues to familiarize myself with
relevant literature and explore the ways in which this case study could be carried
out. On this basis, I conducted three months of fieldwork in the Pearl River Delta
during May-August 2002 and utilized multiple methods including archive
research, personal interview, focus group, survey, secondary data analysis, and
participant observation. Please see Figure 3.1 for the overall design for data
collection.
As noted previously, one of the major insuffieieneies in studies on China’s
Internet and telecom industry is that most research has heen confined in the large
metropolitan centers like Beijing and Shanghai. While researchers of the Pearl
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CD
■ D
O
Q .
C
g
Q.
■ D
CD
C/)
C/)
Figure 2.1. Overall Data Collection Design: The development of telecommunications and communication infrastructure in the
Pearl River Delta
8
( O '
3.
3 "
CD
CD
■ D
O
Q .
C
a
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3
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o
CD
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" D
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C/)
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Archives since 1978
Research sites: Hong K o n g , Shenzhen, &
Guangzhou
Tvpes of data:
♦ ♦ ♦ Government documents
❖ Reports from commercial entities
❖ Statistical compilations (national,
provincial, regional, & municipal
yearbooks)
❖ Newspaper and magazine articles
❖ Analytical reports by external researchers in
Hong Kong and Taiwan
Secondary data
Research sites: Guangzhou, Nanhai, &
Shenzhen
Types of data:
♦> Annual reports from China Telecom
Guangdong Provincial Bureau (1978-
2001)
❖ Survey data: adult and adolescent Intemet
usage (2001, 2002)
Face-to-face Interview (N = 40)
Research sites: Guangzhou, Shenzhen,
Zhuhai, Zhongshan, Shunde, Foshan,
Dongguan, & Nanhai
Dialects used: Mandarin & Cantonese
Types of data:
❖ Interviews with local officials (N=17)
regarding regional and citywide telecom
projects and e-govemment developments
■ Provincial government officials (n=3)
■ City government policy analysts (n=2)
■ Cadres in city government
informationization offices (n=10)
■ Township government officials (n=2)
❖ Interviews with telecom entrepreneurs
(N=23) regarding company history &
regional telecom market dynamics
■ Local representatives o f national
enterprises like China Telecom & Unicom
(n=9)
■ Regional & local telecom providers
like Yintong Inc. and Diantong Inc. (n=7)
■ Intemet café managers (n=7)
Survey (N=
Research sites: Zhuhai,
452)
Shenzhen, &
Participant Observation
Research sites: Zhuhai, Zhongshan, Shunde, Foshan, Nanhai, Guangzhou, Dongguan, & Shenzhen
Types of data:
❖ Aimual reports from China Telecom Guangdong Provincial Bureau ( 1978-2001 )
❖ Using local telecom services and Intemet cafés
Guangzhou
Dialects used: Mandarin, Cantonese, Hakka,
Chaozhou, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei,
Sichuan, Guizhou, & Henan
Types of data:
Survey o f respondents’ connectedness to
telecom technologies (fix-line telephone,
cellphone, pager, fax, & Intemet)
❖ Long-term residents (n=I86)
❖ Immigrant workers (n=266)
Focus Groups (7 Groups)
Research sites: Guangzhou, Zhuhai,
Shenzhen, & Nanhai
Dialects used: Mandarin & Cantonese
Types of data:
❖ 4 groups o f Nanhai residents regarding city
informationization developments:
male/female, Intemet users/non-users (20
participants in total)
❖ 3 groups o f immigrant workers in
Guangzhou, Zhuhai, & Shenzhen regarding
their connectedness patterns (11 participants
in total - they were also survey interviewers
in the three cities)
60
River Delta usually concentrate on Guangzhou, the provincial capital of
Guangdong, and Shenzhen, the city on the Mainland border with Hong Kong,
seldom do they venture into smaller cities, towns, and the vast urbanizing areas
characterized by distributive networks of township and village enterprises
scattered on agricultural land. Even within the large cities, attention is often
directed to elite members of telecom industry or the regulatory bodies, which is
necessary but insufficient for a full examination of the case.
In this study I therefore conducted fieldwork in six smaller cities in
addition to Guangzhou and Shenzhen including Dongguan, Foshan, Nanhai,
Shunde, Zhongshan, and Zhuhai. In all these cities, like in Guangzhou and
Shenzhen, I interviewed local officials at different administrative levels and
telecom operators of various sizes. Three trips were made to Nanhai alone
because the city was a national model for e-govemment initiatives and the local
officials were carrying out an unusually ambitious plan for the constmction of a
“digital city.” In Nanhai, I visited villages in semi-urban townships with fiber
optic facilities and conversed with local officials about how they developed
telecom networks. I also conducted four focus groups among long-term Nanhai
residents regarding their evaluation of the city’s informationization endeavors.
Native Cantonese-speakers (journalists in a radio station hosted in a neighboring
city) were hired to moderate these focus groups (two moderators, one male, one
female, for male and female groups held separately) so that discussion would
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61
proceed in the most natural way.^^ Both the male and female moderators went
through a 3-hour training session when I explained to them in detail the focus
group protocol (please see Appendix 5) and various issues they needed to be
aware of. They then each held one practice session with their families, relatives,
and close friends before the actual focus groups.
To ensure a more comprehensive view on storytelling telecom and
telecom storytelling in the urban centers, I paid attention to short-term immigrant
workers as well as senior citizens, whose voices are seldom heard in policy
discussions although they make up a significant part of the regional storytelling
system. In Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai, I hired part-time survey
administrators to conduct face-to-face interviews (n=452 in total) regarding
telecom connectedness patterns among migrant workers and long-term residents
of older age.^^ These interviewers were first recruited in local labor markets. They
all went through a two-hour survey training session when they learned about the
questionnaire and practiced survey implementation by interviewing each other. In
each city, the interviewers met with me as a group every day for three days. At the
end of the third day, they were asked to form focus groups to discuss the issues
This is necessary due to my limited Cantonese capacity and lack o f knowledge about issues in the
local communities. Having a female moderator for the female groups is important to spur discussion
among participants, especially those o f younger age.
“ More attention is paid to older residents because they have lived in the region for longer period of
time and there has been few study on this particular group in China that usually has more diffieulty
using telecom technologies. The cut-off age for older residents is 45 because it is standard practice for
large enterprises in the country, especially the state-owned enterprises, to let employees retire at the age
of 45. Moreover, a predominant majority of savvy telecom subscribers such as Internet users are
younger than 45, which makes it more important for us to look more specifically at this understudied
age group.
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62
they discovered in the process of the survey and in their everyday life as new
immigrants in the Pearl River Delta.
Interviews with local officials and telecom entrepreneurs were carried out
in both Mandarin and Cantonese. I purposively selected survey interviewers
whose mother tongues are Hakka, Chaozhou, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan,
Guizhou, and Henan, in addition to the more frequently studied Mandarin and
Cantonese speaking populations. Hence in total, ten different dialects were
involved in the fieldwork that serves as the foundation of this dissertation. The
multiplicity of dialects is necessary due to the extraordinary linguistic diversity in
the region. Although I am fluent in Mandarin and semi-fluent in Cantonese, my
knowledge about local community is limited; so is my language capacity,
especially with the arrival of new immigrants from the rest of China.
Table 2.1 illustrates the utilization of different methods in different cities
of the Pearl River Delta. These methods were strategically designed to capture
major variables concerning the regional Communication Infrastructure as
demonstrated in Table 2.2. This includes key components of the action context as
well as the storytelling system. Following are detailed descriptions for the
methods used to collect empirical data about the transformation of the telecom
infrastructure in the Pearl River Delta.
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Table 2.1 The utilization of data collection methods in different cities of the
Pearl River Delta
Document
Research
Personal
Interview
Survey Focus
Groups
Secondary
Data
Participant
Observation
Guangzhou
/ / / y y y
Dongguan
V y
Shenzhen
/ V y y y
Zhuhai
/ y y y
Zhongshan
/ y
Shunde
• / y
Foshan
y y
Nanhai
y y y y y
Table 2.2 The utilization of data collection methods regarding key components
of the regional communication infrastructure
Key Components of Communication
Infrastructure
Methods of
Observation
The
Communication
Action Context
Economic Globalization
(e.g., telecom deregulation,
integration o f China with the world
system)
National Policy
(e.g., marketization, telecom
reform. Special Economic Zones
in the region)
Legacies of the Pearl River
Delta
(e.g., transboundary mercantilism,
traditional community stmcture)
Post-Mao Regional
Development
(e.g., in-migration, economic and
telecom take-off, regionalization)
Literature Review
(including relevant studies
in political science,
geography, sociology,
anthropology, and public
policy)
Document Research
(yearbooks, industry
reports, news clippings, and
official statistics at national,
provincial, and regional
levels)
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64
Table 2.2 The utilization of data collection methods regarding key components
of the regional communication infrastructure (continued)
Key Components of Communication Infrastructure Methods of Observation
The Storytelling
System
Local State Agencies
(e.g., advocacies for
informatization, methods o f
persuasion for officials with
reservations)
Personal Interview,
Document Research (of
publications and archives
provided by local officials)
Telecom Providers
(e.g., commercial discourse,
market competition,
advertisements, reactions to state
policies, including key
entrepreneurs and Internet café
managers)
Personal Interview,
Participant Observation
(especially in Internet cafés).
Document Research (of
promotional materials
provided by telecom firms)
Networks of Local
Residents
(e.g., grassroots narratives about
telecom technologies, channels
and effects o f storytelling,
perceptions o f telecom, including
long-term residents and migrant
workers)
Survey, Focus Group,
Personal Interview,
Secondary Data (other
studies on telecom in the
region).
Participant Observation
Document Research
I collected government and news archives dating from the late 1970s regarding
telecommunica-tions, economic and general social developments that affect the
Delta region at the global, national, provincial, regional (Delta-wise), and local
(citywise or smaller units) levels. The process of accumulating primary Chinese
sources started in spring 2001 by means of Internet searches of online statistic
yearbooks, official reports, and electronic newspapers. Upon arrival in the Pearl
River Delta in May 2002,1 also collected archives and documents, both online
and offline, in a much more intensive manner in the Universities Services Center
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65
at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Guangdong Provincial Sun Yat-Sen
Library, Shenzhen City Library, and the archive center of Institute for Studies on
Hong Kong, Macau, and the Special Economic Zones in Jinan University in
Guangzhou. A wide range of Chinese yearbooks, industry reports, newspapers
(e.g. Guangzhou Daily, Information Times, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone
Daily, Jing Daily, Southern Weekend) and magazines (e.g. New Weekly, China
Manager Times, Shenzhen Science and Technology, Economic Frontiers) were
included, which I gathered both in libraries and during the fieldtrips, when I
visited government offices, commercial entities, and street-side newsstands.
These archives and documents allowed for an overview of the field that provides
a historical outline and the outstanding characters, policies, business enterprises,
and so on, which constitutes a foundational knowledge base for other data
collection efforts.
Personal Interviews
Personal interview is a data collection method that was used most frequently
during my fieldwork from late May to early August 2003. Face-to-face, semi
structured interviews were carried out with local officials and telecom
entrepreneurs in eight cities in the Delta region including Guangzhou, Shenzhen,
Zhuhai, Zhongshan, Shunde, Foshan, Dongguan, and Nanhai. Due to internal
variation among the interviewees, different protocols were developed targeting at
three groups respectively: (1) party-state officials, (2) large- and medium-sized
telecom entrepreneurs, and (3) managers and owners of Internet cafes (please see
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66
Appendices 1, 2, and 3 for the protocols). Since Chinese officials and
entrepreneurs tend to be less approachable and self-censoring while interacting
with researchers fi’ om outside China, I used the identity of visiting research fellow
in the Institute for Social Development Studies (ISDS) at the Chinese Academy of
Social Science (CASS).^^ This turned out to be very effective for the initial
establishment of rapport. In some cases, especially in meetings with small private
business owners, I revealed my USC identity after introducing the CASS project
at the beginning of the interviews. In others, such as interviews with local state
officials in small cities, this was done towards the end of the conversations. Still
there were a few cases when I only used the CASS identity due to reasonable
concerns that revelation of the USC identity may cause unnecessary
complications. Most interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese, whereas
Cantonese was the working language per interviewee preference for
approximately one third of them. In total I conducted 40 face-to-face interviews.
17 of them were with local officials and 23 with telecom entrepreneurs.
Admittedly, this is not a scientific sampling of interviewees. Given the
limits of time and resources, I had to use a combination of convenient sampling
and purposive sampling so that, in each city, I would interview at least one
official telecom decision-maker and one major telecom provider. In some cities.
The ISDS-CASS project on Internet and medium- and small-size Chinese cities provided partial
funding for my fieldtrip. Its principal investigator, Prof. Liang Guo, also joined my interviews in
Nanhai during July 16-19, 2002.
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67
especially the City of Nanhai, snowball sampling was used to include multiple
facets of the local telecom storytelling system.
Most interviews were recorded. A research assistant in the CASS Internet
project then prepared the transcripts in Chinese, which I then translated into
English. When recording could not be used due to noisy environment (e.g., a
crowded Internet café) or upon request of the respondents (i.e., some officials and
representatives of large enterprises), I took detailed notes and transcribed them in
English within 2 or 3 days following the interviews.
Interviews with officials involved governmental and Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) cadres in charge of telecommunications. These include 3 provincial
officials, 10 telecom regulators in city governments and CCP city committees, 2
city-level telecom policy analysts, and 2 directors leading “informatization”
initiatives in a semi-rural township of Nanhai City. Representatives of the
provincial and city-level government entities include:
1. The Information Industry Department of Guangdong Provincial
Government
2. Office of Vice Curator, Guangdong Provincial Zhongshan
Library
3. Information Systems Division, Guangdong Provincial
Zhongshan Archive Center
4. Information Industry Division, Zhuhai Municipal Bureau of
Science and Technology
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68
5. Information Industry Division, Zhongshan Municipal Bureau of
Economy and Trade
6. Electronic Information Division, Shunde Municipal Bureau of
Science and Technology
7. Guangzhou Municipal Informatization Office
8. Foshan Munieipal Informatization Office
9. Dongguan Municipal Informatization Office
10. Shenzhen Municipal Informatization Office
11. Nanhai City CCP Committee Office of General Affairs
12. Nanhai Municipal Bureau of Science and Technology
13. Nanhai Municipal Informatization Leading Group Office
14. The People’s Court of Nanhai City
15. Xiqiaoshan District Government, Nanhai City
As shown in the above list, the most eonsistently represented government
agencies are municipal informatization offices and municipal bureaus of science
and technology, the two most important decision-makers at the local level.
Leaders of local CCP committees are not included in most cases (except in
Nanhai) because they are usually harder to reach. More officials in Nanhai were
interviewed due to the city’s outstanding efforts and achievements in e-
govemment and Internet application systems for everyday public administration.
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During the semi-structured interviews with party-state officials, questions
were asked about organizational history, the role of the organizations in regional
telecom development, local model projects, unique characteristics of these
projects, and the advantages and disadvantages for telecom development in the
localities. Please see Appendix 1 for the protocol used in interviews with officials.
Entrepreneur interviews included representatives of both large state-
sponsored telecom operators and small private access providers like Internet
cafes. In total, 23 entrepreneur interviews were conducted. These consist of (a) 9
interviews with local representatives of national enterprises including China
Telecom Guangdong, city branches of China Telecom in Shenzhen, Guangzhou,
and Nanhai, branch offices of China Unicom in Dongguan and Foshan, China
Mobile Hong Kong Shenzhen Branch and China Mobile Guangdong, and
Guangdong China Netcom); (2) 7 interviews with regional and local telecom
providers under the auspices of local state ineluding Eastern Fibemet (Yingtong)
and Gosun Communication Group that operate at the regional level in most parts
of the Delta; Shenzhen Saige Group, Foshan Chantong Communications, Zhuhai
Southern Software Park Development Co., Nanhai Information Industry
Investment Co. Ltd, and Zhongshan iCom Networks (Xintong), which are city-
sponsored telecom firms; and (3) 7 interviews with managers and owners of
Internet cafes in Guangzhou (manager of End of the World netbar, headquarters
manager and branch manager of Clearwater House netbar), Nanhai (owners of
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70
Information Age netbar and Xintianyou netbar), and Shenzhen (owner and
manager of City netbar).
Two protocols were developed for large and medium-sized enterprises
(i.e. the national and regional players) and Internet cafés separately because of
their different relationships with the state and different roles in the storytelling
system. Please see Appendices 2 and 3 for interview outlines with large and
medium-size telecom providers as well as Internet café operators. In both cases,
the semi-structured interviews collected basic information about these businesses,
their structure, development process, market competition, marketing strategies,
and their opinions on state-led informatization policies. While representatives of
large and medium-sized enterprises were asked to provide more information about
telecom institutional reform, especially in the context of China’s WTO entry,
Internet café owners and managers were asked to describe in more detail the
demographics and usage patterns of their customers. Internet café operators were
also prompted to discuss how negative labeling following the fatal Beijing
Internet café fire^* had an impact on the local discursive environment.
Survey
Meanwhile, purposive sampling survey was carried out from late July to mid-
August 2002 regarding telecom connectedness patterns among older residents and
migrant workers in three cities: Guangzhou, the provincial capital and largest city
^ “All Beijing Internet eafes closed for rectification to guarantee safety,” Xinhua News Agency, June
16, 2002.
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71
in the region; Zhuhai and Shenzhen, the two Special Economic Zones in the
Delta. Eleven survey administrators were selected (3 in Zhuhai, 4 each in
Guangzhou and Shenzhen) from local labor markets of the three cities based on
where they came from, what kind of dialects they spoke, and a minimum
education level of senior high school graduates. Although these groups of
administrators are relatively homogeneous in age (in their early 20s), gender (10
females, 1 male), education (mostly junior college graduates), and social
economic status (blue-collar working class), they spoke 10 different dialects
including Mandarin, Cantonese, Hakka, Chaozhou, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei,
Sichuan, Guizhou, and Henan, which covers the major and several more marginal
groups of new immigrants in the Pearl River Delta.
These administrators were first recruited in the largest labor markets of
Zhuhai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen. On the first day after recruitment, survey
administers went though a training session that lasted for about three hours.
During the training, I first explained the procedure of purposive sampling: (1)
among the 40 to 50 respondents for each administer, half should be their
hometown/home-province folks and acquaintances, half should be long-term
residents older than 45 years of age; (2) there should be approximately equal
numbers of females and males in the sample; (3) immigrant worker samples
should include members from three broad occupational status categories as evenly
as possible, i.e. manufacture occupations, services occupations, and those who are
unemployed/laid-off; (4) similar number of older long-term residents should be
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72
identified in three types of public spaces near survey administrator’s
neighborhood including residential recreational areas, parks, and shopping malls.
Then, after item-by-item explanation of the survey questionnaire, I would
emphasize the correct ways for them to reeord information whieh included not
only answers to the questions but also the time, location, and dialect used in eaeh
survey.
During the training session, the survey administrators were asked to
eomplete their first interview among themselves - both as a practice and because
they were members of the migrant population being identified in local labor
markets. This was followed by group discussions of common problems and ways
of improvement, especially regarding the way they introduced the project and
approached respondents at the beginning of the encounter.
Each day, a survey administer would complete 10 to 15 questionnaires,
which would be collected on daily basis. Every time I colleeted questionnaires, I
would read through them and ask appropriate questions.^^ This was done in a
group manner - often before or after a meal that I paid for - so that all of them
could learn from others’ lessons while a teamwork atmosphere could be fostered.
In case significant flaws were found, the questionnaires were returned to the
administrators for eorreetion or additional information until they had acceptable
quality.
^ Common errors in survey administering include incorrect skipping of some questions and turning in
questionnaires without recording the location and dialect in which the survey interviews were carried
out. These problems had to be fixed before I accepted the questionnaires.
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73
A survey administer would receive a fixed daily bonus of 30 yuan (or
US$3.6) in addition to their 6 yuan (or US$0.7) per questionnaire payment. All
transportation cost involved in survey administration was reimbursed. Meanwhile,
the interviewer had to sign and abide by a contract that ensures data authenticity
and strict compliance to sampling and survey procedures (see Appendix 8 for
details). The contract specifies that, “All data record should be hand-written on
the questionnaire and presented in a complete, clear, and standardized fashion,
including open-ended questions.” Questionnaires failing to meet this requirement
shall not be accepted nor counted towards the compensation for the survey
administrator. Most important, the survey “MUST truthfully reflect information
gathered from the respondents. Each respondent can only answer questions for
one questionnaire. In case of ANY deception found in the interviews, the related
interviewer shall take full responsibility of the misconduct and automatically
become ineligible for all compensations and bonuses.” As I repeatedly
emphasized the importance of data authenticity, in both training sessions and the
contract, no incident of untruthful data collection was found in this survey project.
In total, each survey administrator conducted 40 to 50 face-to-face
interview s.Am ong these interviews half were with people from their hometown,
home-city, or home-province where the respective dialects were used in survey
interview. These included their migrant worker friends and former
^ The requirement was 50 questionnaires for each surveyor in Zhuhai, and 40 for each in Guangzhou
and Shenzhen.
30.3% o f the survey interviews were conducted in local dialects besides Mandarin
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74
classmates/neighbors/co-workers now living in the same city. The other half
would be with long-term residents at least 45-year-old^^ in parks, residential rest
areas, and shopping centers close to the neighborhood of the surveyors. Besides
new immigrants, I chose to focus on older residents because they lived in the
region longer, played a key role in local storytelling, but were often neglected in
conventional telecom studies.
The interviewers were instructed to finish surveying hometown
respondents before they approach the seniors so that they would be more familiar
with the questionnaire while dealing with strangers.^^ The locality and duration of
each survey were recorded. By average each survey lasted for approximately 30-
35 minutes. In Zhuhai and Shenzhen, the spatial spread-out covered most urban
districts including major parks, manufactory centers, and shopping malls scattered
throughout the cities. In Guangzhou, however, due to the much larger
geographical size, surveyors were only able to cover the more recently developed
Eastside of the city including both the northern and southern banks of the Pearl
River, while old business areas on the Westside (e.g. Xiguan District and Upper
and Lower Nine Streets) were not covered. This implies that the current survey
dataset is still inadequate in representing groups living in the Delta’s traditional
The cut-off age for older residents is 45 because it is standard practice for large enterprises in the
country, especially the state-owned enterprises, to let employees retire at the age of 45.
There is an additional advantage in this procedure because the survey administrators tended to make
more mistakes or forgot to ask certain questions in the beginning. In such cases, if the respondents were
people they knew, they could return to the persons with more follow-up questions.
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75
urban center, although it is more robust in spatially representing the region’s
newly developed areas.
The survey questionnaire included (1) background information about
immigration (e.g., place of birth, duration of migration, current occupation etc),
(2) subjective perceptions of life in the Pearl River Delta (e.g., evaluation of life
quality, work environment, and community cohesion), (3) connectedness patterns
to various telecom services ineluding fixed-line telephone (at home, in office, and
public phone booths), mobile phone, pager, fax, Internet, (4) attitudes towards
new technologies (e.g., subjective evaluation of service quality, price, ease to use
and perceived dependency on each technology), and (5) basic demographics (e.g.,
age, gender, edueation, ineome). Please see Appendix 4 for an English version of
the survey questionnaire and Table 2.3 for demographic profile of the survey
respondents.
Focus Group
Seven focus groups were held including 4 for long-term loeal residents, consisting
of respondents fi-om different occupations (e.g., engineer, bank clerk, student,
private business owner), and 3 for new immigrants fi-om different parts of the
country who were seeking jobs or working in blue-collar occupations (e.g.,
factory assembly, street cleaning, food-serving, transportation). This design was
employed to ensure access to a wide range of opinions and narratives in
storytelling processes among different social strata and subcultures.
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CD
■ D
O
Q .
C
g
Q .
■ D
CD
C/)
W
o'
3
O
8
( O '
Table 2.3 Demographic profile of survey respondents (immigrants and long-term residents) in three cities in
the Pearl River Delta
3
3 "
CD
CD
" O
O
Q .
O
3
■ D
O
CD
Q .
■ D
CD
C/)
C/)
Average
monthly
income (US$)
Average
age
Average
level of
education
% Female % Married
Guangzhou,
capital of
Guangdong
Province (N=160)
Immigrants
Long-term
residents
All
141.4
112.5
124.3
33.8
54.6
41.8
Partial
senior high
Junior high
Partial
senior high
40
56.8
50
67.9
64.4
65.7
Zhuhai Special
Immigrants 190.7 29.2 Senior high 49.5 49.4
Economic Zone
(N=147)
Long-term
residents
241.2 50.1 Senior high 59.5 59.5
All 207.1 35.5 Senior high 49 52.9
Shenzhen Special
Immigrants 206.6 31.6 Senior high 46 46.2
Economic Zone
(N=1145)
Long-term
residents
412.7 52.2 Senior high 64.1 64.1
All 268.2 37.6 Senior high 50 51.5
Immigrants 185.4 31.2 Senior high 45.8 53.6
Total (N=452)
Long-term
residents
219.4 52.9
Partial
senior high
55.4 63.1
All 199.2 38.4 Senior high 49 49.9
On
77
Long-term resident focus groups were held in Nanhai. Since this was also
part of the CASS China Internet P ro je c t,4 groups were designed to include male
Internet connectors, male non-connectors, female connectors, and female non
connectors. Make and female groups were separately hosted by moderators of the
same gender to allow for fuller expression of personal opinions especially among
females. Non-connectors were also included to reveal their perceptions of the
technology and the barriers they have to face in accessing new telecom
technologies. Most of our participants grew up in Nanhai: students, white-collar
workers, housewives, private business owners, and so on. Among the 20
participants, there were also three white-collar immigrant workers who had lived
in Nanhai for at least five years.
Local media professionals were invited to administer the focus groups:
one male and one female who grew up in the Nanhai area but now worked in a
radio station of a neighboring city. They spoke the local type of Cantonese during
the focus groups, which discussed issues varying from perceptions of the Internet
to connectedness patterns to evaluation of city informatization projects (see
Appendix 5 for long-term residents focus group protocol). Both moderators went
through a 3-hour training session when I explained to them in detail the focus
group protocol and various issues they needed to be aware of. They then each
^ The CASS China Internet Projeet, led by Prof. Guo Liang (Principle Investigator, CASS Institute for
Social Development Studies) and Prof Bu Wei (Co-Prineiple Investigator, CASS Institute o f
Communication and Journalism), was designed to study the diffusion, connectedness patterns, and
social impact o f Internet in China. The Project started in 2000 as part of the World Internet Project
coordinated by the UCLA Center for Communication Policy. It has since received major funding from
the Markle Foundation. I have been a consultant for this project since 2000.
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78
held one practice session with their families, relatives, and close friends before the
actual focus groups.
The two focus groups involving Internet connectors were approximately
90 minutes each, whereas the non-connectors groups were shorter because
questions regarding online content and experiences with the Internet were
skipped. All these 4 long-term residents focus groups were held during a weekend
in a quiet, separate room of a local café.
Table 2.4 Demographic profile of participants in the focus groups of long
term Pearl River Delta residents
Focus Groups
Average
Age
(mean)
Years
Living in
Nanhai
(mean)
Average
Education
Level
(mode)
Occupations (in
descending order of
frequencies)
Male Intemet
connectors
(n=6)
28.5 21.3 College
Engineer (3)
State official (1)
Lawyer (1)
Self-employed (1)
Male non
connectors
(n=2)
36.5 36.5
Junior
high
Self-employed (1)
Salesperson (1)
Female
connectors
(n=5)
22.4 18.0 College
Students (3)
Bank clerk (1)
Engineer (1)
Female non
connectors
(n=7)
27.5 12.7
Junior
high/
high
school
Students (4)
Housewives (2)
Accountant (1)
Total (n=20) 27.5 19.0
High
school
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79
On the other hand, survey administers in Zhuhai, Guangzhou, and
Shenzhen formed the second type of focus groups that reflected the views of new
immigrants. As mentioned previously, the demographic profile of these surveyors
was relatively homogenous. They were young, junior college or high school
graduates from China’s northern provinces and the countryside of Guangdong. On
average, they had only lived in the Pearl River Delta for a little more than one
year. The general design creates two advantages for these focus groups. One was
that the participants came from a great number of provinces and dialectal
backgrounds, and they had interviewed people from their hometown about
telecom issues in the previous three or four days when they worked as survey
administrators. This made them experts for their respective subgroups. Moreover,
they had been working with me and with each other for a few days up to the time
of the focus groups, when we met on daily basis and had developed rapport. The
length of the new immigrant focus groups was about 60 minutes each. They were
held in a Zhuhai hotel guest room, a Guangzhou cafe, and a Shenzhen restaurant
in mid-afternoon before busy dinnertime. In the beginning of the survey, these
surveyors were instructed to take notes of unusual and/or interesting observations.
The focus groups therefore started with their reporting on these unexpected and
most impressive observations from the previous days of survey interviews. I
would then ask them questions about their perceptions of telecom technologies,
what troubles they had to face in using these technologies, how they would
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80
foresee the influences of the technologies, and so on. Please see Appendix 6 for
the discussion protocol for the new immigrants focus groups.
Secondary Data
Secondary data is another important source of information. For one thing, as a
guest researcher of the CASS China Intemet Projeet, I can access their survey
datasets about Intemet usage pattems among adults and adolescents, conducted in
Guangzhou in Spring, 2001. Similar surveys were repeated in December 2002 and
January 2003 in Guangzhou and Nanhai, whose findings are of high comparative
value to this study. Random sampling procedures were followed in these surveys,
which utilize face-to-face in-house interview of respondents, most of whom are
long-term residents in the Delta, in their households.^^
This study also benefits from secondary data collected in archive research
and entrepreneur interviews, when I collected statistics and historical records
about telecom development in the various cities, the Delta region, and the
Guangdong Province. These data include annual teledensity rates, telecom service
operation figures, and estimated numbers of Intemet users, online computers, and
general informatization index scores. They come from sources such as the semi
annual reports from China Intemet Network Information Center (CNNIC),
Guangdong Telecommunications Yearbook, annual reviews of Guangdong China
Telecom, Guangdong Provincial Informationization Office, and municipal
authorities in different cities of the Delta. Other more independent sources include
The CASS China Intemet Project does not include the migrant population in its survey.
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81
researchers in Mainland Chinese universities and research institutes or
organizations outside the Mainland such as Hong Kong Trade Development
Council and the Mainland Committee of Taiwan Executive Council.
Participant Observation
During the fieldwork, I attempted to submerge myself in the local environments
by living with migrant workers and long-term residents. Most of these people
were my friends and relatives, who had lived in the Pearl River Delta for different
periods of time. 1 also stayed in a wide variety of hotels, with daily rates ranging
from less than US$5 to over $100. For eleven days, I lived in a dormitory without
air-conditioning at the edge of a new industrial zone, which offered an
overwhelming mix of mosquitoes, noise, and heat. With my colleague from the
CASS China Intemet Project, I also spent two nights in the deluxe room of
Nanhai's Fontainebleau Hotel, famous for its gardening, architecture, and golf
course. One night, I woke up at 4am just to recognize I was sleeping in an
apartment of a new immigrant located right next to the White Cloud Airport of
Guangzhou, and a plane was landing. Early another morning, a stranger’s phone-
call awakened me in Shenzhen’s central business district, and it took me several
minutes to find out that he was trying to rip me off. These experiences are
invaluable as they unveil a much broader, more textured, and more reliable
perspective on the lives of local people than any official document or formal
interview.
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82
In the three months of fieldwork, I also used local telecom services on a
daily basis. Equipped with a roaming cellphone, dozens of pre-paid phone cards
and pre-paid Intemet access cards, I became a member of the region’s new media
market. Like others, I learned to bargain with telecom providers, from small
vendors on the streets to large enterprises equipped with the 800 service numbers.
Whenever possible, I would spend time in local Intemet cafés, participating in and
observing the ways in which the Intemet was put to use in the everyday life of
Pearl River Delta residents. This was essential for the understanding of telecom
connectedness pattems at the grassroots, about which the officials and well-to-do
telecom providers normally pay little attention.
From Analyses to Syntheses
Although a variety of data were collected, this study would not succeed without a
plan for data analyses and syntheses, both of which are essential to an embedded
case study methodology (Scholz and Tietje, 2002). This plan would not be
random, but in line with the communications infrastructure perspective and
responsive to the research questions outlined in the first chapter.
We set out to answer two sets of questions: (1) descriptive questions about
the components, stmctures, and historical trajectories of the post-Mao
communication infrastmcture regarding telecom developments in the Pearl River
Delta; and (2) explanatory questions regarding why certain (dis)connectedness
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83
pattems, not others, exist in the communication infrastructure of the Delta region,
which determined certain characteristics of telecom growth from 1978 onward.
To achieve descriptive goals in a case study, a common strategy is to sort
out information in chronological order or use certain other temporal schemes
(Miles and Huberman, 1984). In this specific case, however, several history lines
proceed side by side. The development of telecommunications in the Pearl River
Delta is a composite of growth and decline trajectories of multiple technologies
including telegraph, fixed-line telephone, fax, cellphone, and Intemet. For most of
these technologies, early records - telegraph and telephone in late 1970s and early
1980s or cellphone and Intemet in mid-1990s - were sporadic. Thus in archive
research, while some materials could be found regarding major events in certain
years, this would not be adequate for the reconstmction of the entire development
history or a comprehensive description for the waxing and waning of each of the
technologies, especially less documented ones like the facsimile.
A single regional chronology may also be divided into multiple
chronologies of the localities (cities and counties) in the Delta region. The
benefits of this approach are that it provides a basis for comparison among the
geographical subunits of the study area; and that local governments and telecom
authorities have made documentation in a relatively standard manner, which, if
given enough time, can be accessed, at least in principal. Yet this locality-based
approach is also most challenging in that the official subunits (e.g. cities and
counties) have gone through multiple mergers and splits in the past two decades.
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84
For instance, at one point, there were 14 cities in the Delta. But by the time of my
fieldwork in summer 2002, the number had decreased to 9. These complicated
changes in administrative division, as summarized in Table 3.3, have greatly
eonfounded the unit of analysis because the administratively defined area of the
same city changes significantly as time goes by.^^ The continual decrease in the
number of cities in the Pearl River Delta is, on the one hand, a preliminary
indication for the intriguing trend towards regionalization, probably owing at least
in part to the enhanced capaeity of administrative control as a result of telecom
diffusion among local state agencies. More importantly, for those who study
historical transformation, this has direct impact on data availability because, until
late 1990s, local state archives and China Telecom documents were almost the
only sources for historical documentation at the local level. When the
administrative units change, the archives and documents become difficult to
access, process, and compare.
A third historical account is issue-oriented. During the past two decades,
several issues - articulated or unarticulated - have eharacterized the management
of telecom development in the Delta: fiseal difficulty for telephone operation in
early 1980s, penetration of services among immigrant workers, e-govemment, the
The City of Guangzhou, for example, engulfed the Panyu City, Zengcheng County, Conghua City,
and Huadu City since late 1990s. Panyu and Zengcheng were originally separate administrative units in
the Pearl River Delta, where as Conghua and Huadu used to be neighboring cities outside the
administrative boundary o f the Delta region. Another example is that the City o f Foshan used to
command a vast area. But since early 1990s it has gone through secession, giving rise to two additional
cities: Nanhai and Shunde.
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85
Table 2.5 Changes of administrative units in officially designated Pearl River
Delta Region, 1985 - 2000
1985 (20 cities and
counties)*
1987 (31 cities
and counties)*
2000 (7 cities)
**
Cities:
Guangzhou,
Shenzhen, Zhuhai,
Foshan, Zhongshan,
Dongguan, Jiangmen,
and Taishan
County-level cities:
Nanhai, Shunde, and
Panyu
Counties:
Gaoming, Bao’an,
Doumen, Zhengcheng,
Sanshui, Kaiping,
Enping, Xinhui, and
Heshan
Additional cities
(based on 1985
designation):
Huizhou,
Zhaoqing, and
Qingyuan
Additional
counties (based
on 1985
designation):
Huiyang,
Huidong, Boluo,
Huadu, Conghua,
Gaoyao, Sihui,
and Guangning
Cities after merger
Guangzhou (including Panyu,
Huadu, Conghua, and Zhengcheng)
Shenzhen (including Bao’an)
Zhuhai (including Doumen)
Dongguan
Zhongshan
Jiangmen (including Taishan,
Xinhui, Kaiping, Enping, and
Heshan)
Foshan (including Nanhai, Shunde,
Gaoming, and Sanshui)
Cities and counties excluded:
Huizhou (including Huiyang,
Huidong, and Boluo)
Zhaoqing (including Gaoyao,
Sihui, and Guangning)
Qingyuan_________________
* Wang Guangzhen, Zhang Binshen, Zhao Ruizhang (eds). (1993). Zhujiang sanjiaozhou jin gji
shehui wenhua fazhan yanjiu “P earl River D elta Economic, Social, Cultural, and Developm ental
Research, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publications, p. 4.
** Guangdong Yearbook (2001), Guangzhou: Guangdong People’s Publication, p. 120
impact of China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, to mention just a few.
A full description and analysis of these topics can follow Dutton’s “ecology of
games” framework (1992; 1999). But this again is difficult because it entails a lot
of in-depth examination of the policy makers, their motives, strategies, and cost-
benefit evaluations. Data availability remains a key problem for earlier periods
and for marginal groups like migrant workers, whose voices were often
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86
suppressed. It is also hard to decide what is an “issue” and what is not since local
telecom actors, and the researcher, may have different priorities in observing and
thinking.
To answer our research questions, each of the aforementioned
chronologies - organized by types of technology, locality, or policy issues - has
limitations. While I shall utilize all three approaches to describe the regional
history of recent telcom developments, I shall also use theory-guided categories
rather than data-driven chronologies as the overall organizational form of this
dissertation. As Yin noted, “[t]he first and more preferred strategy is to follow the
theoretical propositions that led to the case study” (1994, p. 103), we shall
therefore employ the framework of Communication Infrastructure Theory (Ball-
Rokeach, et al, 2001a; 2001b; 2003) as the general categorization that includes
elements of the communication action context at global, national, and regional
levels, as well as interactions among government entities, telecom providers, and
local residents within the telecom storytelling system according to the
(dis)connectedness typology: spatial-temporal break, stratificational gap,
institutional blocks, and socio-psychological detachment. This four-type
framework generated through grounded theorization in fieldwork provides more
than tentative guidance. Rather, its importance rests in the fact that it responds to
our research questions regarding both the descriptive and explanatory dimensions
of the regional communication infrastructure.
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87
Moreover, a major pitfall in embedded case study “occurs when the case
study focuses only on the subunit level and fails to return to the larger unit of
analysis (ibid, p. 44).” We should hence consider the entire Delta region as a
macro imit in itself after examining meso-level organizations in cities and
counties, and micro-level relations among long-term residents and immigrants.
The overall concept of communication infrastructure allows us to return to the
macro without being trapped in the analyses of subunits, be they localities,
technologies, or policy dynamics.
Our ultimate objective is not to offer a cluster of chronologies but to make
sense of the regional communications infrastructure and explain its historical
characteristics. In order to do so, we shall use the “pattern-matching” strategy,
which is a dominant mode of analysis for explanation building in a case study
(ibid, p. 106; Trochim, 1989). According to this strategy, we shall “compare an
empirically based pattern with a predicted one,” and “if the patterns coincide, the
results can help a case study strengthen its internal validity” (Yin, 1994, p. 106).^’
On the one hand, we shall consider whether the patterns of rival explanations (e.g.
more telecom more connectedness) apply to the case more than our main
hypothesis that the adoption of new technology is in tandem with the
multiplication of communication disconnectedness. On the other hand, we shall
apply the four categories of breaks, gaps, blocks, and detachments to the
examination of disconnections among the three groups of storytellers, both within
In this case, the patterns include both structural characteristics o f the communication infrastructure
and the historical patterns generated by observing processes of transformation.
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88
each group and among them. This will be an essential part of our inquiry because,
only by so doing, can we assess the robustness of the overall hypothesis about the
regional telecom infrastructure - more connections, more disconnections - and
have an in-depth look into the disconnectedness patterns and their structural
change in time.
Another widely used method in case study is triangulation - of data
sources, research methods, and theoretical perspectives (Patton, 1987; Yin, 1994;
Stake, 1995). As a methodological logic, triangulation is fundamental to the
Communication Infrastructure approach that employed multi-level, multi-lingual,
and multi-method design (Matei, et al, 2001). More generally, the strategy of
triangulation enhances the external validity of data analysis while also helping to
synthesize different analytical results (Scholz and Tietje, 2002). Comparisons
should be made among what is learned from the various data sources and from
different perspectives. The findings should cross-validate to either demonstrate
the robustness of the methodology. Or, in case of data discrepancy on the same
event/issue, they should unveil conflict of interests among respondents and the
multiplicity of perspectives in storytelling processes. People at different levels,
such as high-ranking officials versus ordinary residents, may have different
perceptions and assessments. Hence triangulation is a useful method to piece
together diverse opinions from different viewpoints - with the exception of faulty
information of course - so that telecom development in the Delta will be
presented as a multi-level, multi-faceted social ecology.
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89
In case studies, the process of solid data analyses and syntheses has
another important characteristic: “the final explanation is a result of a series of
iterations” (Yin, 1994, p. 111). By this Yin means that the “initial theoretical
statement or proposition” needs to be compared with initial observations, which
leads to its revision, and the revised statement/proposition needs to be revised
over and again after the exploration of more empirical data (ibid,). This, in the
case of telecom development in the Delta, refers to observations in multiple
localities, regarding various technologies, in different historical periods, and from
the perspective of each of the three major groups of telecom storytellers. Yin
alerts that as the iterative process progresses, “an investigator may slowly begin to
drift away from the original topic of interest. Constant reference to the original
purpose of the inquiry and the possible alternative explanations may help to
reduce this potential problem” (ibid, pp. 111-112). Our initial statement is that
more technological connectedness may lead to more social disconnectedness; and
the primary alternative hypothesis is that technological and social connectedness
grows hand in hand. It is to these two competing general characterizations of the
regional communications infrastructure that we shall repetitively return to, after
examining the specific components of the telecom action context, of the
storytelling system, and their intricate relationships from the communication
infrastructure perspective.
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90
CHAPTER m
GLOBAL AND NATIONAL BACKDROPS
In today’s world, there are two really serious issues of
global strategic importance: one is peace; the other is
development.
- Deng Xiaoping, March 4, 1985.^*
For better or worse, China had opted to become the next
East Asian “little dragon.” For better or worse, Mao’s
revolution had come to an end.
- Richard Baum (1994, p. 23).
The goal of this chapter is to first identify critical factors and major processes at
the global and national levels, which are essential to the transformation of the
regional telecom infi'astructure of the Pearl River Delta. In this discussion of
macro communication action context, we will focus on key changes in global
capitalism, Asian Pacific nations, and contemporary China. We will then
construct in these overlapping contexts an outline for the national trajectory of
China’s telecommunications development in the post-Mao era. Understanding the
communication infrastructure in China’s Pearl River Delta neeessitates
knowledge about historical dynamics in the political and economic environments
of global capitalism and the Chinese society. The global and national dynamics
since 1970s constitute a most fundamental part of the action context that shapes
Author’s translation. Selected Works o f Deng Xiaoping (Deng Xiaoping Wenxuanj Vol. 3, Beijing:
People’s Press, p. 104.
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the processes of storytelling about telecom development in the Delta region.
Factors at global and national levels are also multi-faceted, complicated, and
quickly changing. An exhaustive review is therefore beyond the scope of this
chapter, whose purpose is instead the provision of a summary review from the
perspective of the communication infrastructure theory.
Since the late 1970s, the telecommunications sector in the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) has gone through a staggering process of expansion and
growth. The nation’s teledensity rate was a pathetic 0.38 telephone per hundred
persons in 1978 and ranked among the 30 countries with the lowest phone
penetration until mid-1980s.^^ But in year 2001, the ratio of fixed-line telephone
penetration jumped to 25.9 per cent in addition to an average number of 11.4
cellular phones per hundred people.'**’ By the end of 2002, China had the world’s
largest population of cell phone users (207 million as opposed to 142 million in
the United States),'** the second largest number of fixed-line telephone subscribers
(214 million, tailing only the U.S.) and the third largest Internet user population
of 59.1 million (tailing the U.S. and Japan).'*^ China also had the world’s largest
Foreign and Domestic Telecom Statistical Materials. Edited by Institute for Science-Technology
Information, China Ministry o f Post and Teleeommunications. June, 1991. pp. 20-21.
Basic Information about Telecommunications Industry (2000-2001). China Ministry o f Information
Industry. Available: http://www.mii.gov.en/mii/hyzw/tongii/nb/2001nb-01.htm
Semi-Annual Report on the Development o f Telecommunications Industry in China. China Ministry
o f Information Industry, Available: http://www.mii.gov.cn/mii/hvzw/2002tongiigongbao.htm
Ibid.
See “Semi-Annual Report on the Development o f Internet in China (January, 2003),” China Internet
Network Information Center (CNNIC). Available: http://www.ennic.net.cn. This is only smaller than
the United States (165.2 million, NetRatings, May 2002) and Japan (61.1 million, NetRatings, August
2002).
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92
pager market'^'* and, in 2002, it was the number two personal computer market in
the world/^ Table 3.1 illustrates the speed of telecom development in China since
1980 and its comparison with figures in the United States. In terms of absolute
number of subscribers, China had lagged far behind the U.S. in terms of both
landline and cell phone users prior to mid-1990s. But it quickly caught up at the
turn of century, mostly due to tremendous increase in the number of Chinese
mobile phone users from 2000 to 2002, an indication for China’s frog-leaping into
the era of new telecom technologies. However, despite the upsurge in absolute
numbers, the telephone penetration rate in China still remains at a very low level,
which is comparable to the U.S. in 1955, when there were 33.7 phone lines per
hundred people. Nonetheless, even regarding average penetration rates, this is still
a remarkable growth because, as shown in Table 3.1, what China has achieved in
the 24 years prior to 2002 is equivalent to what happened in the U.S. in the 63
years between 1892 and 1955.
At stake is the question why China’s telecommunications industry could
develop so rapidly since the late 1970s? Posing this question more specifically
The number o f Chinese pager users had grown from 31 thousand in 1987 to more than 80 million in
1997, which was the largest in the world. However, with the spread o f cellular phone, email, and short
messaging services, the Chinese pager market has been shrinking very quickly since 1997. See “Users
departure in large quantity; many pager stations are closed down.” Beijing Morning Post. April 3,2002.
The latest number o f pagers users is unavailable in all sources that I searched in the public domain
because o f the fact that China’s telecom authorities stopped release such statistics.
“China to overtake Japan in PC sales.” BBC News. October 29, 2002. Available:
http://news.bbc.CO.uk/1 dii/business/2371203.stm. According to the spokesman for the Japan Electronics
and Information Technology Industries Association (JEITA), only a little more than 10 million
computer units are expected to be sold in Japan in 2002, whereas the number in China will reach
approximately 13 million.
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Table 3.1 The development of telephone services in China as compared to
the United States
Number of landline
telephones (million)
Number of mobile
phone subscribers
(million)
Teledensity*
China U.S. China U.S. China Comparable
U.S. teledensity
in past years
1978 4 N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.38 0.39
(1892)
1980 4 102 N.A. N.A.
0.43
0.48
(1895)
1990 13 116 .02 5.3
1.11
1.33
(1899)
1995 41 136 3.6 37.8
4.66
4.88
(1905)
2000 145 160 85.3 109.5
20.1
19.8
(1945)
2002 214 N.A. 206.6 128.4 33.7 33.7
(1955)
* The number o f telephones per 100 population including both landline and mobile phones
Sources: Compilation based on China Statistical Yearbook Beijing: China Statistics
Publications; Annual Report on the D evelopm ent o f Telecommunications (1990-2002), China
Ministry o f Information Industry; Compilation o f International Telecom M aterials (1991), China
Ministry o f Post and Telecommunications; H istorical Statistics o f the United States: From
colonial times to 1970, U.S. Department o f Commerce, Bureau o f the Census; Trends in
Telephone Service (2002), U.S. Federal Communication Commission; Statistical Abstract o f the
United States (2003), U.S. Department o f Commerce, Bureau o f the Census.
from the perspective of Communication Infrastructure Theory, what are the major
macro factors at global and national levels of analysis that relate to this telecom
boom? How have these factors facilitated, constrained, and shaped
communication processes in the regional storytelling system about telecom
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development? To explore these questions entails the contextualization of the
telecom infrastructure of the Pearl River Delta, first and foremost, under the
circumstances of the interplay between the transitional post-Mao Chinese society
and the dynamics of the larger political economy of global capitalism.
The Influence o f Late Capitalism
The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed two essential changes in the
global context. First, the rise of “late capitalism” (Harvey, 1989; Jameson and
Fisher, 1992), also known as “new capitalism” (Senett, 1998; Smith, 2000), has
since the mid-1970s profoundly altered the mode of production moving it towards
what is known as a “new economy” (Stamp, 1995; Kelly, 1999; Camoy, 2000).
The transformation has been characterized by a shift fi-om “over-accumulation” to
“flexible accumulation” (Harvey, 1989; Colclough and Tolbert, 1992; Castells,
1996) and from “mass production” to “lean production” (Harrison, 1994; Smith,
2000). Second, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Union marked
the declining appeal of socialism as a viable alternative to capitalism as a basic
form of social organization. As a result, there is a surge of neo-liberalist
enterprises throughout the 1990s championed by the global systems of trade and
financial exchanges and multi-national corporations (Michlethwait and
Wooldridge, 2000; Anderson, 1998), which have had significant impacts on the
worldwide media and telecommunications sectors, leading to a new wave of
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95
deregulation, privatization, and conglomeration (McChesney, 1998; Schiller,
1999)
As the largest lingering communist regime whose legitimacy depends very
much on its ability to maintain economic growth, the Chinese state chose to
embrace the encroaching capitalist world-system. Several national policies were
implemented with extremely profound implications for the domain of
communication. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China started its “reform
and opening-up” process in 1978 that aimed at leading the country out of Maoist
constraints such as the obsession with class struggle and Soviet-style planned
economy. In 1992, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officially endorsed the
building of a “socialist market economy” as the most important goal of national
development. The last two decades of the twentieth century also witnessed
China’s increasing dependence on foreign trade, capital, and technology that
culminated in the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2002. In its attempts to reposition the nation as a component of the world-system,
the CCP went through a gradual but most remarkable metamorphosis firom a
proletariat “vanguard team” representing the interests of “workers, peasants, and
soldiers (gongnongbin)" to an assembly of technocrats eager to serve the interests
of global capitalism while trying to protect and expand their vested interests in the
status quo.'*^
^ A monumental change in the attitude o f CCP towards capitalism was the allowance o f private
business owners to join the Party in July 2001. See John Pomfret, “China Allows Its Capitalists To Join
Party: Communists Recognize Rise o f Private Business,” The Washington Post, July 2, 2001, p. A l.
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Under these global and national circumstances, there is little wonder that
foreign corporations would be attracted by the opportunity to exploit labor value
and tap the market of the world’s most populated nation/^ Indeed, foreign direct
investment (FDI) has increased dramatically during the post-Mao era, from less
than US $1 billion per annum in early 1980s to US$ 53 billion in 2002, when
China became the world’s largest recipient of FDl/^ Although the relative
augmentation in 2002 had to do with serious investment market collapse in the
United States and other major industrialized nations, China’s FDI was already of
impressive size prior to 2001. Since late 1990s, it has constantly been the world’s
second largest attraction to foreign investment, following only the United States.
In 2001, it was the recipient of more than 80 percent of FDI in Asia (Schell, 2002).
This indicates the fast growth of foreign enterprises in China,"*^ whose increasing
integration with the capitalist world-system has transformed the country into a
new “workshop of the world.”^° Heightening economic globalization contributes
According to the Fifth National Census eondueted on November 1, 2000, Mainland China has 1.27
billion population including 36.1% urban residents and 63.9% rural population. See “Fifth National
Population Census Report N o .l,” Available:
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tigb/rkpcgb/qgrlcpcgb/200203310083.htm.
‘ '^The Economist, “Is the wakening giant a monster?” February 13, 2003.The United States received
US$ 283 billion and 301 billion in 1999 and 2000, whereas the figures for China in the same years were
US$ 40 billion and 41 billion, respectively. However, the sudden collapse o f investment market due to
seandals and economic slow-down caused a huge plunge in the amount o f FDI in 2002 in the U.S. and
other major industrialized nations. At the same time, China’s FDI figure grew from 41 billion to US$
53 billion.
By the end of 1998, China had approved 324 thousand FDI projects. Its special law for foreign joint
ventures has been in place sinee 1979, which was amended thrice in 1986, 1988 and 2001 to meet the
demand of more foreign investors. See “Why the Law for Joint Ventures Needs to be Amended?”
Economic Reference Daily. March 9*, 2001.
The Economist, “Is the wakening giant a monster?” February 13,2003.
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97
to the surging need for better communications, especially in coastal areas like the
Pearl River Delta, where export-oriented activities are concentrated/^
Technologies o f Capitalism
According to Fiore and Sahel (1984), the rise of late capitalism was a historical
response to the exhaustion of the industrial mode of mass production that led to
the economic crisis of the 1970s. It is a fundamental shift of the world-system
from the dominance of Fordism to the prevalence of “lean production” and
“flexism” (Harvey, 1990; Lash and Urry, 1994; Anderson, 1998) that
characterizes the transformational mode of global economy and international
transactions at the turn of the century. Unlike traditional centralized modes of
production, this new system of capital accumulation is more responsive to instant
changes in technology, consumption demand, and the stock market, in order to
provide goods and services “just in time” (Portes, et al, 1989; Colclough and
Tolbert, 1992; Rogers, 2000). Also known as “late capitalism” (Harvey, 1989;
Jameson and Fisher, 1992) and “digital capitalism” (Schiller, 2000), New
Capitalism depends heavily on widespread utilization of telecommunication
technologies.
To open up new markets, linking in a global network,
valuable market segments of each country, capital required
extreme mobility, and firms needed dramatically enhanced
communication capabilities. Deregulation of markets and
See Figure 4.1 for Guangdong’s position as the leading foreign trade province in the country. By the
end o f 1995, the telephone network o f Guangdong Province had become the largest in the country. See
Fengji You (1997). Transportation and Telecommunications in the Mainland. Taiwan: CCP Studies
Publications, p. 296.
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98
new information technologies, in close interaction,
provided such condition.
- Manuel Castells, 1996, p. 85.
In western economies, the telecommunications sector is a primary site that
hosts deregulation and the loosening of state control over market competition.
Although deregulation does not always achieve its alleged goals (Horwitz, 1989;
Walker, 2001), the global telecom industry did witness a tremendous boom since
the early 1980s,^^ which provides an essential technological precondition for
furthering globalization of production, consumption, and capital flow. As a result,
international trade of manufactured goods as a proportion of total world
production was expected to almost double from 15.3 percent in 1973 to
approximately 28.5 percent in 2000 (Castells, 1996, p. 107). The same was true
for foreign investment that grew from 13.2 percent to 24.8 percent during the
same period (ibid.). Meanwhile, the amount of transborder financial flows also
grew tremendously. In the United States, for example, transborder financial flows
accounted for only 9.3 percent of GDP in 1980. But in 1992, it rose to 109.3
percent meaning the total amount of transborder financial flows has surpassed the
national GDP.^^ Hence there is a pattern of the financial market “outflanking”
national government, which also characterizes other industrialized countries such
as Canada, France, and Italy (Anderson, 1998, p. 79).
Figures from World Trade Organization shows that the total global telecom revenue has been growing
at a rate higher than 5 percent per annum since 1980, which accelerated in the 1990s. According to
International Telecommunication Union, the total telecom market revenue increased from 523 billion
USD in 1991 to 1232 billion USD in 2001 (see http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/statistics/at glance/KevTelecomOO.htmll.
Sixty-Second Annual Report. Bank for International Settlements. June 15, 1992.
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In the global telecommunications market, general growth rates in the
developed world have entered a relatively stable “saturation” stage (Tao, 1995).
The slowing down of growth in core capitalist markets was accompanied by the
trend of global telecom deregulation (Horwitz, 1989; McChesney, 1998; Schiller,
1999), as well as the transformation of China’s telecom industry from a very
primitive stage in the late 1970s into a take-off period in the 1990s (Zita, 1987;
Ure, 1994; Lee, 1998; DeWoskin, 2001). The fusion of global and Chinese
telecommunications was therefore inevitable because there was strong demand on
both sides for what can be drawn from the other. While China needs foreign
capital and technology, telecom MNCs were looking for places with large market
potential and inexpensive labor. It was in this milieu that China’s telecom industry
began to transform from a relatively independent national unit into a component
of global market.
An important lesson could be learned from this brief overview of the
relationship between New Capitalism and the recent worldwide telecom boom.
That is, the development of the telecom sector was not solely driven by the logic
of technological advancement. More importantly, it responded to and grew in
tandem with the need of global corporate power in the search for new modes of
accumulation, in a wider geographical scope, at an increasingly faster speed of
production and consumption. In a word, there is no global telecom bang that took
place in vacuum. The general trend of rapid telecom growth in the past two
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100
decades has been shaped by the capitalist world-system as a set of technological
arrangements to serve the needs of further expanding capitalism.
Personal Consequences and Community
The major sociological fallouts of late capitalism, as signified and catalyzed by
the prowess of global networks of financial and trade flows, are three. First,
spatially, there is more migration of low-end laborers as well as better-educated
knowledge workers, both domestieally and internationally, into certain urban
regions, which drastically increases population diversity therein (Soja, 1991;
Musterd and Ostendorf, 1998; Graham and Marvin, 2001).
Second, along the temporal dimension, “flexible accumulation” has
brought an end to long-term commitment in corporate strategy, which ultimately
destroys predictable career path for employees in many occupations (Sennett,
1996; Pink, 2002). As a result, average people have to put up with multiple jobs,
overtime work, and a heightened sense of fear and insecurity (Elliott and
Atkinson, 1998; Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2000; Adam, Beck and Loon,
2000), which are by and large hindrances to the vitality of local communities.
The third and more profound transformation, building on changes in the
spatial and temporal dimensions, is a multi-level challenge to urban communities
by reducing personal encounters and sustainable relationships in family,
workplace, and residential community (Sennett, 1998; Smith, 1998; Scanzoni,
2000; Delgado, 2000; Ball-Rokeach, 2001a; Loges, Ball-Rokeach, and Qiu, 2003;
Qiu and Cheong, 2003). Moreover, since community - as the chief locus of
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101
storytelling and sense of belonging among members of a given society - is the
cornerstone for both American democracy (Dewey, 1916) and civil society in
Europe (Habermas, 1989), when forces of late capitalism threaten community
cohesion, they also jeopardize the very foundation of liberal democracy.
The challenge of late capitalism to democratic traditions is visible in the
fragmentation of labor unions (Form, 1995) as well as the increase of social
inequality that excludes people from economic prosperity and disenfranchises
them from political participation (Colclough and Tolbertll, 1992; Castells, 1997;
2000; Schiller, 2000). This is the spirit of New Capitalism: it operates at the speed
of light, drawing in all types of potential resources for profit maximization while
discarding corporate responsibilities under the disguise of competition,
deregulation, and outsourcing. If unleashed without coordination, the macro
forces of New Capitalism are likely to cause serious “personal consequences”
(Sennett, 1996) and severe damage to residential communities (Camoy, 2000;
Friedland, 2001; Qiu, et al, 2002; Loges, et al, 2003) at the meso and micro levels.
While brought under the Chinese context, the challenge of economic
globalization to local community has its unique ramifications. Despite the
persistence of CCP’s one party rule, China is now more open to the world than
ever before. This means the post-Mao era is the very first historical period when
the uprooting and unsettling forces of economic globalization are impacting the
PRC in such breadth and intensity. The consequences are therefore often more
palpable than in western countries given the stark historical contrasts between
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102
neo-liberalism and the traditional collectivistic culture, between “flexible
accumulation” and Maoist socialism. Because increasing marketization also gives
rise to an emerging urban middle class and the burgeoning of countless grassroots
organizations, the integration of China with the capitalist world-system, especially
with overseas Chinese entrepreneurs who have played a critical role in the
nation’s economic reform, may also serve as a catalyst for the revival of
traditional communities that dated far before the founding of the PRC.
Given the gradual loosening-up of political and economic control and the
diffusion of new telecommunications technologies, it is possible for new social
bonds to be forged across boundaries that seemed to be insurmountable in the age
of Chairman Mao. It is in this unique context that the inquiry into technology and
community transformation acquires additional importance. If the diffusion of
telecommunications leads to more social connectedness - and nothing else -
according to the conventional belief, then one can argue that the technological
tools of capitalist expansion also function to counter the detrimental fallouts of
late capitalism. However, if technology also contributes to the increase of social
disconnectedness, the communication infrastructure would eneompass a far more
complex system of interactions between technology and community. There would
also be a far more complicated interplay between global forces of restructuring
and the tendency for historic traditions to return to the Pearl River Delta.
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Rise o f the Asian Pacific
Among the most notable changes on the map of global economy during 1960s and
1970s was the ascendance of several East and Southeast Asian countries, which
grew at high speed over a prolonged period of time. Sometimes known as an
“Asian economic miracle,this phenomenon emerged as a possible alternative
to the Euro-American model of economic modernization. First, there was Japan’s
taking-off, followed by the rise of the “Four Asian Tigers” - South Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore - and now the booming economy of China,
and to a certain extent, of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Despite their
internal variation (Heftier, 1998; Pye, 2001), these rising economies operate
within the closely embedded networks of traditional culture where social relations
contain more trust, predictability, and commitment to long-term cooperation than
in Western countries, as evidenced by Japanese business networks (Asanuma,
1985; Smitka, 1991; Gerlach, 1992). These traditional ties - such as the Japanese
system of on and giri, Indonesian bapakism, and the Chinese guanxi - persist as a
critical cohesive force against the centrifugal tendency of late capitalism
(Weidenbaum and Hughes, 1996). Traditional social bonds function dynamically
as responses of local cultures to the pressing challenge of western influences
(Hefner, 1998). In this sense, rapid economic development in Asia was less a
“miracle” than a blending of the new global capitalism into transforming cultures.
See Rigg (1997) and Cartier (2001, pp. 7-9). The “miraele” metaphor originated from and was
promoted by the World Bank in its economic analysis of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and
Taiwan. It is still under debate as for the appropriateness of this term in describing economic
development in the area.
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And since the Asian financial crises starting from 1997, there is also more need to
“rethink the nature of social relations in Asia” (Pye, 2001, p. 376)/^
Besides stable and sometimes exclusive family, kinship, and friendship
networks that underlie its interpersonal and interfirm connections, the new Asian
capitalisms are also distinctively characterized by the central role of the
“developmental state” in “fostering, guiding, and ensuring economic growth and
technological modernization” (Castells, 1998, p. 250). Although the financial
crisis of late 1990s had shaken the role of certain Asian states in the marketplace,
other governments like that of Hong Kong have increased their involvement in
business regulation and macro control. The general status of the state as a major
economic player has been persistent in Asia, which is particularly true in the
telecommunications sector: because the worldwide slow-down in high-tech
markets, telecom operators have become more dependent on official funding and
state purchases for projects such as e-govemance initiatives.^®
A critical consequence of strong state-market ties is that, once endorsed by
the Chinese government, capitalism usually becomes a more oppressive political-
economic regime imbued with excessive exploitation (O’Leary, 1998). For
instance, exploitation of female workers in South China sweatshops had been
The Asian financial crises beginning in 1997 is a clear indication that the global financial market is
essentially unpredietable due to its obsession on short-term profit returns. The power of short-term
speculators, once unleashed, would cause tremendous hard to the nation-states.
^ During summer 2002,1 attended several national and regional telecom and information technology
expositions in Shenzhen and Beijing, where the hype o f e-govemment had obviously replaced that of e-
commerce a couple years ago. This in part could be contributed to the worldwide dot-com crash.
Meanwhile, in the case o f China, it also had to do with large government budgets for e-govemance
projects at almost all state administrative levels, which was a development strategy adopted by most
states in the Asian Paeifie Rim.
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carried to such an extreme that it is characterized as “localistie despotism” (Lee,
1998). Meanwhile, because China’s southern coast is also geographically adjacent
to and has more personal ties with Chinese business circles in Southeast Asia, it is
easier for loeal officials in these regions to engage in cooperative business
arrangements with these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs who command huge
amount of capital (Weidenbaum and Hughes, 1996; Hsing, 1997). Such official-
entrepreneurial engagement is prototypical of many Asian economies (Hefner,
1998). In the case of China, it is most prominent in the southern areas such as
Fujian, the Province closest to Taiwan, and Guangdong, which includes the Pearl
River Delta as its heartland and borders Hong Kong.
Maoism in Oblivion?
Against the backdrop of surging global capitalism and economic marvels of its
Asian neighbors, social transformation in China is particularly intriguing because
of the country’s unique status as the world’s largest remaining eommunist regime.
Tremendous change in Chinese society since 1978 has led to the redefining of its
national policies in the domains of economy and foreign affairs. The
transformation reflects, to a large extent, the aforementioned trends towards late
eapitalism observed worldwide. In this sense, the case of the Pearl River Delta is
both unique and universal. Its action context is characterized by the encroaching
of global eapitalism into a historic borderland with distinct legacies and
community structures.
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On the other hand, the specter of Maoism has not vanished completely.
The CCP still monopolizes political power, especially when it comes to media
and communication (Zhao, 1998; Lee, 2000). Although the form of control has
changed significantly from totalitarian manipulation to hegemonic domination
assisted by partial commercialization, the essence of one-party rule remains
unchanged, which gives a distinct twist to the historical trajectory of telecom
development in the country.
After Cultural Revolution and the Cold War
Historians divide China’s post-Mao period into two phases, both under the
leadership of Deng Xiaoping and his protégées (Baum, 1994). Phase one started
from the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee in December
1978, which formally put Mao’s Cultural Revolution to an end. The most
important change was the shift of attention from political struggle to economic
development as the foremost policy priority in China. Phase two began, in the
wake of 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, the end of the Cold War, and the official
endorsement of marketization following Deng’s "Southern Speeches”^ ^ in 1992.
Despite multiple setbacks in the process from inflation to large-scale protests to
the escalation of unemployment, Chinese society has undergone a most profound
transformation in these two phases towards economic prosperity and more
connectivity with the rest of the world. This makes China a most valuable subject
Deng Xiaoping (1992). “Key points o f talks in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai.” In
Selected Works o f Deng Xiaoping. Beijing: People’s Press. Vol.3, pp. 370-383. This speech was the
most critical signal that China hoped to continue its market reform in the aftermath o f Tiananmen.
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for those who study the relationship between the shaping of communication
technology and its influences on connectedness in rapidly transforming societies.
On average, China’s economy has expanded at the rate of 8 to 9 percent
(constant price) between 1978 and 2002, which is 6 percent higher than the
world’s average over the same period.^^ As Table 3.1 illustrates, China’s GDP
grew over 27 times from 1978 to 2002, which, in US dollar terms, means a nearly
500 percent increase from 213.2 billion in 1978 to 1.23 trillion in 2002. The
highest speed of growth was recorded in 1993 and 1994, following Deng’s
Southern excursion in 1992^^ that marked the beginning of the second phase in
China’s reform and opening-up. Annual GDP increased more than 30 percent in
both years. By the end of 2002, China’s GDP was the sixth largest in the world in
dollar terms, just behind France. But in terms of purehasing-power parity, after
adjusting for price differences between the nations, it is second only to the United
States with an 11.8 percent share of world GDP.^*’
Accompanying the expansion of national economy is a 30-fold growth in
China’s total imports and exports volume, which rose from US$ 20.6 billion in
1978 to 620.8 billion in 2002. While international trade increased dramatically
worldwide during the same period, China’s share of world trade has also been on
a steady rise. It has almost quadrupled in the 24 years since 1978, which is
comparable to what Japan achieved between 1955 and 1985 or what the Asian
People's Daily, “Figures Show China Among World’s Fastest Developed,” October 21, 2002.
Deng Xiaoping (1992). “Key points of talks in Wuchang, Shenzhen, âiuhai and Shanghai.” In
Selected Works o f Deng Xiaoping. Beijing: People’s Press. Vol.3, pp. 370-383.
60
The Economist, “Is the wakening giant a monster?” February 13,2003.
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Table 3.2 Growth of GDP, FDI, import/export volume, and telephone
penetration rates in China (1978-2001)
Foreign Direct
Investment
(billion USD)
Total Imports
and Exports
(billion USD)
Gross Domestic
Products (billion
U S D )® *
Gross Domestic
Products (billion
yuan)
1978 20.6 213.2 362.4
1979 — 26.7 237.5 403.8
1980
—
38.1 265.8 451.8
1981
—
43.1 285.1 486.2
1982
- -
40.8 279.8 529.5
1983 0.9 43.5 300.4 593.5
1984 1.3 51.6 308.2 717.1
1985 1.7 69.6 305.2 896.4
1986 1.9 73.9 295.5 1020.2
1987 2.3 82.7 321.2 1195.5
1988 3.2 102.8 400.9 1492.2
1989 3.4 111.7 449.0 1690.9
1990 3.5 115.4 387.7 1854.8
1991 4.4 135.6 406.1 2161.8
1992 11.0 165.5 483.0 2663.8
1993 27.5 195.7 601.1 3463.4
1994 33.8 236.6 542.5 4675.9
1995 37.5 280.9 678.5 5847.8
1996 41.7 289.9 703.4 6788.5
1997 45.3 325.2 898.2 7446.3
1998 45.5 324.1 946.3 7834.5
1999 40.3 360.6 989.3 8191.1
2000 40.7 474.3 1079.9 8940.4
2001 46.8 509.8 1158.7 9593.3
2002 52.7 620.8 1232.0 10199.7
Sources: Compilation based on China Statistics Yearbook (1979-2001), Beijing: China Statistics
Publishing House; National Bureau o f Statistics o f China fwww.stats.gov.cn~): China Customs
General Administration (http://www.customs.gov.cn/~): and P eo p le’ s D aily, “China’s GDP Hit
1.23 Trillion US dollars in 2002,” December 30, 2002.
Exchange rate between US dollars and Chinese yuan changed from 1:1.7 to 1:8.3 in the 1980s and
1990s, which had a significant effect on the conversion of GDP into U.S. dollars. Because the rate is
mandated by the Chinese government who sometimes drastically modifies exchange ratio (e.g. in 1991
and 1994), these artificial decisions were reflected in the calculation of China’s GDP in dollar terms.
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109
newly industrialized economies (NIEs) accomplished between 1965 and 1995.® ^
Not only did the total volume of foreign trade increase exponentially, significant
change also occurred in the import-export proportion. While China had a trade
deficit of US$ 11.4 million in 1978, in 2001 it had an export surplus of US$ 225.5
million.^^ The most remarkable growth was in terms of foreign direct investment
(FDI), another critical indicator for the impact of economic globalization in this
country. China had no legal channel for FDI prior to 1979.^"* National statistics
authorities did not report FDI figures until 1983. However, since then, the amount
of FDI in China has increased tremendously fi-om less than US$ 1 billion in 1983
to US$ 52.7 billion in 2002.^^
All these economic achievements in China come at the expense of certain
essential principles characterizing national economic policy in Mao’s age. One
such principle that most clearly defines the relationship between China and the
world-system was Mao’s emphasis on self-reliance {zili gengsheng). Mao had
profound distrust of the United States and the Soviet Union due to his belief in the
imminence of a new world war. As a result, during the Cultural Revolution, the
Chinese state aggressively cut back on imports and international trade, trying to
minimize the consequences of the possible war scenario ((Lin, 1997a; Morris,
Ettkin, and Helms, 2001)). This led to a virtual isolation of the country from
^ China Customs General Administration (http://www.customs.gov.cn/).
The Chinese government issued its first ordinance for foreign investment in 1979, entitled the Law of
the People’s Republic o f China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures. See Huang, J.Z. (1995). “An
introduction to foreign investment laws in the People’s Republic o f China.’’ John Marshall Law
Review. 28, pp. 471-472.
The Economist, “Is the wakening giant a monster?” February 13, 2003.
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110
western industrial nations, as well as members of the Soviet Block. Developing
telecommunications, especially beyond the national boundary, therefore was not a
priority on the policy agenda.
Deng Xiaoping, however, had a different view on the inevitability of a
new world war. After the normalization of the diplomatic relationship between
China and the United States in 1978, he took numerous trips to the West and was
warmly welcomed.^® In 1985, Deng made it clear that “a future world war is
avoidable;” and that “we had underestimated the capacity of forces promoting
peace around the world.”® ^ Although by this time China’s economic opening-up
had already been underway for a few years, it was this statement that most clearly
announced the expiration of Mao’s isolationist principle and gave the most
profound justification for more connections with western powers and other Asian
countries.
Another critical element of Mao’s economic policy was central planning.
Because planned economy was deemed the only appropriate socialist mode of
economic organization, Mao took the effort to expand the public/planned sectors
of economy and successfully reduced the proportion of China’s private sector to
its minimum. This was the official ideology up to early 1980s, and it took a
prolonged process of almost 15 years to gradually introduce market elements and
For example, Deng was chosen to be the Times Magazine “Man o f the Year” in 1979 and 1984.
Deng Xiaoping (1985). “Speech in the enlarged conference o f the military committee.” In Selected
Works o f Deng Xiaoping. Beijing: People’s Press. Vol.3, p. 127.
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I l l
finally institutionalize the goal of “building socialist market economy with
Chinese characteristics” (Baum, 1994; Kluver, 1996).
A few key incidents in the late 80s and early 90s contributed to the final
abandoning of several Maoist principles: the Tiananmen bloodshed severed CCP
and the Chinese state from their pedigree of representing proletarian interests at
the grassroots; the sudden collapse of the USSR foreclosed the future alternative
of a successful socialist planned economy. At this point, the Chinese authorities
had no choice but to rely on the capitalist world-system for the continuation of
economic growth, the most critical source of legitimacy for the party-state. Hence,
there was the boom of the economy at large, and the rise of telecom industry in
particular, because enhancing productivity and globalizing the national economy
both entail dramatic improvement of the telecommunication infrastructure. In the
words of President Jiang Zemin, “Each of the four modernizations (of agriculture,
industry, education, and the military) has to depend on informatization.”® ^
The Persistence o f History
Sea change in economy and foreign relations, however, is not equivalent to total
transformation of the political system. Although in certain aspects the CCP has
loosened its control over public discourse, its status as the ultimate power center
of the entire nation has remained unchanged. However, it is certainly a laudable
A fb . ” See more o f Jiang’s writing about the central role of
informatization in his prologue for the book Exploration and Practice fo r Informatization in China, Hu
Qili (Ed.), (2001), Beijing; Publishing House o f Electronics Industry. In his speech at the Sixteenth
Party Congress, Jiang also emphasized the need to “prioritize information industry, and widely apply
information technologies in economic and social domains’’ (Xinhua News Agency, November 17th,
2002).
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112
improvement that, despite the continuation of crackdowns on dissidents, the post-
Mao period has been characterized hy the least amount of political persecutions in
the history of the People’s Republic. Most people today do not have to worry
about constantly demonstrating their political loyalty. As long as oppositional
ideas are not disseminated on a large scale (e.g. in mass media) one is usually
allowed to continue his/her life as a consumer - rather than a citizen in the full
sense - in this increasingly market-oriented society. Yet powerful deterrence
against nonconformist activities still persists. And the Chinese party-state had
proved over and again that under circumstances of perceived danger, it would not
hesitate to resort to the barrel of the gun.
This peculiar political environment in post-Mao China, of ruling with “an
iron fist in a velvet glove” (Barme, 1999), is well demonstrated in the nation’s
mass media reform, which moved “from totalitarianism to marketized
authoritarianism” (Chan and Qiu, 2002, p. 27). China’s journalistic education
today still emphasizes the role of media as the “mouth-piece” of CCP. However,
in practice, there has been a growing gap between the demand for information in
the burgeoning economy and the limited capability of party propaganda divisions
to meet such demands (Zhao, 1998; Lynch, 1999a). The commercialization of the
media sector was therefore inevitable, which sparked since the early 1980s the
rapid growth of advertising, “infotainment,” “weekend supplements,” and even
“paid journalism,” a process accelerated after 1992 (Chan, 1993; Chu, 1994; He
and Chen, 1998). Media marketization was also accompanied hy the growth of
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113
relative autonomy among journalists (Polumbaum, 1990; Pan, 2000) as well as
more connections to the international media market (Chan, 1994; 2000). While
the trend towards more commercial operation persists in terms of non-political
content and media business transactions, this has limited influence on domestic
political coverage and the ways in which public policy is discussed (Zhao, 1998;
Lee, 2000).
It is increasingly manifest that “in the absence of democratization (in the
national political system), economic development and marketization will not
necessarily lead to a free press” (Chan and Qiu, 2002, p. 43). What the media
market has to offer, under the political monopoly of CCP, is either non-political
infotainment that sometimes reaches an extreme state of sensationalism or an
upheaval of ultra-nationalist sentiments, which sometimes turns out to be the only
viable form of political discourse that could mobilize ordinary Chinese people in
the post-Cold War era (Wasserstrom, 1999). Nationalism is indeed one of the
most durable elements in China’s political culture both before and after Mao. It
easily lends itself to the political needs of the CCP in search of legitimacy amidst
a society disillusioned with communism. It is also a lowest common denominator
that generates huge market sales as evidenced by the sustained popularity of
nationalist publications, especially since the publishing of China Can Say No in
1996 (Guo, 1999; Zhao, 2000).
Finally, besides centralized political structure and the continuation of
nationalism, there is another important factor at the level of local government that
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114
characterizes both the entire post-Mao social transformation at large and the
development of China’s telecom industry in particular: the critical role of low-
rank officials in maneuvering loeal autonomy for economic development (Unger,
1994; Vermeer, Pieke, and Chong, 1998; Oi, 1999). A critical factor that
contributes to disconnectedness among the localities -especially in the forms of
institutional blocks - this phenomenon is particularly manifest in South China,
including areas like the Pearl River Delta. Here a new class of “bureaucratic
entrepreneurs” was on the rise, becoming “the most active entrepreneurs in the
newly opened economy” (Hsing, 1997, p. 6). This is the case especially when
foreign investors are involved. As Hsing (ibid, p.4) observes,
in contrast to the common practice of transnational corporations
dealing with the national government, the new pattern of
investment is for small investors to negotiate directly with low-
ranking local governments in the region receiving the capital.
Another indicator for the increasing prowess of local state is that, from
1978 to 1990, the Chinese local governments’ share of total national revenue
grew from less than 20 percent to 80 percent, one of the highest in the world
(Wang and Hu, 1994, p. 40).^^ Although apparently a “new” phenomenon, many
case studies have shown that these “new elites” of bureaucratic entrepreneurs
were in fact old stakeholders in the pre-1978 regime,^*^ which means that the role
See Hsing (1997, p. 110) for more discussion on research findings about the growth of
extradudgetary at the level o f local governments.
™ In many cases, it was the same CCP leaders who continued their governance in the communities and
managed local-level social, economic transformations during the post-1978 era. This is very different
from the leadership at national and provincial levels, characterized by multiple institutional reshuffles.
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115
of local state officials is indeed built on historical legacies of local state
institutions (Chan, et al, 1992; Lin, 1995; Ruf, 1998; Lin, 1997; Gilley, 2001).
Telecommunications in China: From Service to Industry
In the historical contexts of global and national politico-economic
transformations, the case of telecommunications in China is especially intriguing
in part because it has gone through a prototypical process from a completely
“planned” sector to a new industry with increasing competition, growing global
integration, and enduring state monopoly (Zita, 1987; Harwit, 1998; Zhang,
2000). Moreover, unlike the mass media, much less attention has been paid to the
understanding of China’s telecom industry as a whole. It is also rare that the
trajectory of China’s telecom development is construed against the backdrops of
post-Mao national dynamics amidst the global transformations in the age of late
capitalism.^'
By the time of Deng’s “reform and opening-up” program, the telecom
sector of China was experiencing hardship. The Ministry of Post and
Telecommunications (MPT), after being shut down during the Cultural
Revolution (1966-1976) (Yu, 1994, p. 8), was still recovering. Telephone
penetration rate stayed at the low level of 0.38 percent, which was one-tenth of
This, however, does not mean that the national and global backdrops have been completely ignored in
existing China Telecom studies. Notable exceptions include Zhao and Liu (1994), Gao and Lyytinen
(2000), and Mueller and Lovelock (2000). These works usually focus on a specific aspect o f China’s
telecom development (e.g. the 1998 institutional reshuffle or telecom reform and the entry into World
Trade Organization). They then frame the particular aspect in a macro context. This type of analyses is,
however, rare in comparison to volumes of books and articles that focus on China’s telecom industry
per se without considering the larger social, historical context. Neither do they discuss questions related
to the New Economy and New Capitalism.
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116
the world average and comparable to teledensity in the U.S. in late nineteenth
century.F or nine out of ten years of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976,
the post and telecom sectors were in deficit (Zhang and Shen, 2001, p. 37). This
was not surprising because in the planned economy telecom services were viewed
as a privilege for party-state cadres. There was very little demand among ordinary
Chinese, who were conditioned to perceive residential phones as a luxury and as a
symbol of social status. The party-state also had little incentive to expand the
telecom sector because beliefs in imminent warfare and political movements
hindered the development of all kinds of economic infrastructures. Meanwhile,
within the circle of economic policymaking, priority was given to heavy industry
following the Soviet model of industrialization.
Post-Mao Telecom Policies
Even developing heavy industry entailed better communications, as Chinese
cadres came to realize in the early years of economic reform. After the
normalization of diplomatic relationship with Western countries in the late 1970s,
China hosted an increasing number of foreign engineers and businesspersons,
who helped implement Deng’s modernization projects. Among other difficulties,
these foreigners learned how hard life could be without telecommunications. To
contact their families and business partners, for example, some had to take a plane
Two Decades o f Brilliant Achievements. Edited and published by China National Statistics Bureau.
August 1998. p. 219. Also see figure 3.1.
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117
to Hong Kong, just to place a phone call. “China is a country without telephones,”
said many of them.’^
To change the embarrassing situation, a series of favorable policies were
implemented to boost telecommunications. In 1980, the Beijing central
government allowed city-level post and telecom authorities (PTA) to collect
“telephone installation fees,”’" ^ a decision that reflects the influence of the way
Japan developed its telephone system after World War II (Yu, 1994, p. 8). This
was followed by the so-called “Three 9-to-l deals” in 1982 that permitted telecom
firms to retain 90 percent of their revenue tax, 90 percent of its non-trade foreign
currency income, and 90 percent of central government loans for telecom projects
in the localities (ibid, p. 13). In the same year, local governments and PTA were
also allowed to invest in the telecom industry, which used to be exclusively
developed and maintained by national telecom authorities (ibid). In 1986,
provincial authorities were also allowed to levy a “supplemental fee” for long
distance, telegraph, and postal services to facilitate telecom infrastructure
construction (ibid).
All these measures were aimed at shifting the budgetary responsibility for
telecom development from the central government to provincial and city-level
authorities in the name of “supporting telephone by telephone {yihua yanghua)”
" Ibid. p. 220.
See Zhang and Shen (2001). In Beijing for example, the installation fee was approximately US$24,1
in 1980, which grew to US$602.4 in 1996. At the highest point, cellular phone connection fee reached
US$3373.5 in mid-1990s, which was more than 10 times the monthly salary o f an ordinary worker.
Most o f these fees were collected on private persons, although a good proportion o f the new
subscribers, especially in the earlier years, would receive reimbursements from their work-units.
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118
(Zhang and Shen, 2001), which significantly strengthened local PTAs (Lu, 1994).
Starting fi-om the late 1980s, local government initiatives also played a significant
role in the early development of new telecom technologies such as the pager
(Sterling, 1999), mobile phone (Denton, 1996), and closed circuit cable systems
(Liu, 1994; Yu and Sears, 1996).^^ While remarkably different from the mode of
development in other major economic sectors such as heavy industry and energy,
which relied mostly upon a dramatic increase in government investment, the
pattern of telecom policy changes in the 1980s was more akin to the trajectory of
mass media reform in that both were featured by the gradual withdrawal of the
central government as the sole financial supporter, despite the escalation of state
control over the provision of media content (Zhao, 1998; Lee, 2000). This pattern
was understandable because, on the one hand, telecommunications were still seen
as secondary compared to the entrenched ambition for industrial outputs. On the
other hand, at the beginning of the reform period prior to 1985, there was also
nationwide inflation and overall state budget hardship due to excessive basic
infrastructure construction of roads, buildings, and imports of machinery.^^ In this
context, if telecommunications were to be developed, local government had to
Closed circuit cable systems might not be deemed as a telecommunications infrastructure when they
first appeared in China. However, since late 1990s they have become the major basis for a new national
telecom player, the State Authority o f Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) who started to modify and
connect cable TV systems into a national broadband network that provides Internet access as well as
other basic telecom services such as telephony. The early development of closed circuit cable system is
also important because local authorities played a central role in developing this technology in many
cases, which resulted in a noteworthy media “localism” that was not palpable in other telecom or mass
media industries in early and middle 1990s (Yu and Sears, 1996).
Basic Infrastructure Construction in Contemporary China. Beijing: China Social Sciences
Publication House. April, 1989. pp. 466-467.
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119
rely on itself and raise funds from non-budgetary channels including private
donations, foreign investments, or loans from overseas Chinese.
The national-level hands-off attitude towards telecommunications
gradually changed in early 1990s. For one thing, the development of the Internet
and “information economy” in the West captured the imagination of Chinese
leadership as a future direction for China’s economy. Meanwhile, despite
favorable policies allowing state telecom authorities to extract high profit, the
speed of telecom growth was still lower than the speed of general economic
development.^^ For example, even in the early 1990s, a Beijing resident normally
had to wait more than six months just to get home telephone installation (Zhang &
Shen, 2001, p. 31). As a result, the top echelon of the Chinese party-state decided
to explore a new mode of development that depends more on the mechanism of
market competition.
Before the 1990s, although MPT was the official monopoly of public
telecom-munications services, nationwide there were more than 30 specialty
telecom networks like those maintained by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),
the Ministry of Railroads (MOR), and the Ministry of Electric Power (MEP) (ibid,
p. 5). Envying the lucrative telecom market, the Army’s Communications
” Zaipu Tao, Recent situation and tendencies in the telecom industry o f the Mainland. (Taiwan)
Institute for Chinese Economy Research. Available:
http://www.moea.gov.tw/~ecobook/season/sa531 .htm. p. 3. Also see Foreign and Domestic Telecom
Statistical Materials. Edited by Institute for Science-Technology Information, China Ministry o f Post
and Telecommunications. June, 1991. p. 17. From 1980-1988, China's phone set number increases by
10.57% each year (as opposed to 7.34% per year from 1957-1980), the phone penetration rate also
increases at 9.05% per year (it was 5.34% during 1957-1980). In the same period, China's GDP grows
at 10.1% annually as opposed to 5.43% prior to 1980, which was faster than the growth o f teledensity.
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120
Division first applied for a commercial operation license in 1988. The application
was stalled first by MPT’s opposition and later by a general ban from the State
Council that prevented the PLA from owing any commercial enterprises. This,
however, was a precursor for a new decade of telecom developments in a tug of
war among major stakeholders in the Chinese party-state attempting to maximize
the economic benefits that can be reaped from their political clout.
Starting from a joint conference in June 1992, the largest and most
successful campaign against the monopoly of MPT was launched. Political power
was consolidated among several ministries including the Ministry of Electronic
Industry (MEI), MEP, and MOR, leading to the establishment of China Unicom
(Liantong) with the blessing of top CCP leaders in 1994 (Chang, 1994; Mueller
and Tan, 1997). This was a milestone in the history of China’s telecom industry
because it was the very first time that the government recognized a second
nationwide telecom provider other than MPT and its commercial module, China
Telecom.
Following the precedence set by China Unicom, a few new telecom
licenses were issued.^^ Although apparently the number of telecom providers has
increased, this does not mean that the telecom market is now in a state of full
competition. A closer look at new license holders reveals that each of them has
These include China Netcom Communications, China Jitong, China Tietong, China Satellite
Networks, and China Mobile, the former mobile phone division of China Telecom but a separate entity
since 1998. All these companies have strong support from existing telecom stakeholders. Netcom and
Jitong are backed up by components of the Ministry o f Information Industry and the Chinese Academy
of Science. Tietong is under the auspices o f the Ministry o f Railroad. China Satellite Networks receives
support from the State Administration o f Radio, Film and Television.
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121
strong ministry-level support. Some are under the joint auspices of several
powerful ministries (e.g. China Unicom). Others like China Netcom, on the other
hand, have support from Mr. Jiang Mianheng, son and technology advisor of
President Jiang Zemin.^^
Despite strong political pressure, the market transition from single
monopoly to oligopoly was anything but smooth as commercial competition rose
rapidly into a major source of disconnectedness among telecom providers. China
Telecom took several measures to defend its dominant position including setting
up administrative and technological barriers for new entrants, delaying the
provision of network inter-connectivity service and other co-operations, and using
monopoly price and cross-subsidization to undermine competition (Zhang and
Shen, 2001, pp. 7-10). Local representatives of China Telecom were also reported
to deliberately disconnect or even destroy communication lines with Unicom and
other competitors to tarnish their reputation, which sometimes led to armed street
fighting among employees of both sides.^*^ By late 1990s, the conflicts between
China Telecom, the incumbent monopoly, and new market entrants had escalated
to such an unprecedented level that coordination from outside of the market has to
be utilized.
See Yasmin Gharhremani, “China Netcom’s Big Connection,” yti/a Week. November 2, 2001. Also
see Denis Simon, “The Microelectronics Industry Crosses a Critical Threshold,” The China Business
Review. Nov/Dec 200; 28(6), pp. 8-19, for Jiang Mianheng’s involvement in other high tech industries.
See Zhang and Shen (2001). This report was confirmed in an interview with local China Unicom
managers in the Pearl River Delta.
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122
[You shall] separate government and commercial enterprise
[of telecommunications], change the mode of
administration, end monopoly, and protect competition as
well as the consistency between responsibility and
entitlement.
- A letter from CCP Central Committee to the
newly established Ministry of Information
Industry, 1998^'
To bring together diverging interests of various telecom providers,
especially between China Telecom and China Unicom, the State Council
announced in March 1998 the merger between MPT and MEI and the
establishment of the new Ministry of Information Industry (Mil) (Tan, 1999; Gao
and Lytinen, 2000; Harwit and Clark, 2001). This is widely regarded as a
watershed event in the history of China’s telecom reform. The strategy worked for
a limited period because the ME, as the regulatory body, consisted of officials
from both MPT and MEI representing both China Telecom and China Unicom.
However, with rapid technological advancement, especially the diffusion of Cable
TV systems in most Chinese urban households, the State Authority for Radio,
Film, and Television (SARFT) emerged as a new player with great potential.
Commercial competition and political tension between SARFT and ME has yet to
be resolved (Zhao, 2000).
Accompanying institutional reshuffling o f China’s telecom industry since
the late 1980s was the dramatic increase of government investment in this
See Year 2001 China Development Report: The Fifth Nine-Year Flan in China. Edited by China
National Statistics Bureau. Published by China Statisties Publications. July, 2001. p. 139.
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123
formerly neglected sector. In 1988, telecommunications, along with energy and
transportation was recognized as one of the three key seetors for eeonomic
development (Yu, 1994, pp. 9-10). Subsequently, large sum of state investment
was made in telecom projects and, between 1990 and 1994, the annual telecom
growth rate in China was more than twice the speed of GDP growth. While, in
1984 the telecom growth rate was only half the economic growth rate, in 1994 the
telecom sector expanded 42-47 percent, more than four times the growth rate of
national GDP (Tao, 1996, pp. 203). Although the phenomenal growth rate did
slow down since 2001, the telecom industry has continued to develop at a much
higher speed than the rest of the economy (see Figure 3.1).
The Technology Cult
Is it possible to foster new telecom infrastructures within relatively closed soeio-
political frameworks? It is not unusual for Western observers to express both
amazement and frustration at the apparent “built-in incompatibility” (Taubman,
1998, p. 256) between the assumed liberalizing potential of telecom technologies
and China’s non-democratic form of government. This is a most prevalent, yet
decontextualized, view that reflects the predispositions of many analysts. A eloser
look at the history of the People’s Republie reveals that the Chinese leaders have
in fact consistently held a deterministic and utopian view on technological
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124
Figure 3.1 Annual percentage increase of China’s teledensity as compared to
the growth of the national GDP, 1978-2002
Annual Percentage
Increase
60
50
40
30
20
10
a > O ^ C M f 0 ^ l 0 < 0 h - 0 0 0 > O T - C N C 0 ^ l 0 ( 0 N ' 0 0 0 ) O ^ C ' J
N.ooooooooooooooooooooa)0>o>a)a)0)a>ooo>ooo
a ) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0> 0) 0) G ) a ) 0) 0> 0> 0> 0> O 0> 0> o o o
T— r — V - T ~ T ~ ^ T — T— T— T— T— T— T— T— T— T— T— T— r — T— T— C N C N C N
Year
□ Gross Domestic Products BTeledenslty
Sources: Compilation based on China Statistical Yearbook (1981-2001), Beijing; China
Statistics Publications; Annual R eport on the Developm ent o f Telecommunications (1990-
2002), China Ministry o f Information Industry; and Statistical Communiqué o f the P eo p le’ s
Republic o f China (1978-2002), National Bureau o f Statistics o f China.
advancements of all sorts, owing in part to the inherently modernist tendency of
the Marxist ideology.
CCP’s obsession with technology in its ambitious modernization project
was already prominent in the 1950s, when the nation was mobilized to produee
iron and steel for industrialization during the Great Leap Forward (Yang, 1996).
This is not to say that all communist states would endorse the information-based model o f economic
development due to a eommon Marxist ideology. The failure o f the Soviet Union to adjust itself to
informationalism is a good example, which was caused by a series o f structural reasons such as the
dominance of planned economy and budget emphasis on heavy industry and military rather than
information technology (Castells, 1998, pp. 26-37). In the case o f China, Marxist pro-teehnology
discourse was used to promote information technologies because the leadership had decided to embark
upon the program o f informatization, a decision that was arguably as much an endeavor to emulate
advanced western new economy models as a result from the popular dislike o f Soviet industrialism
among Chinese decision-makers.
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125
Although this movement failed miserably, China did manage to become the
world’s third nuclear power in 1964 and launched its first satellite in 1970, and
succeed in manned space exploration in October 2003. Since the 1980s, the
Chinese party-state has also been actively involved in computer science and
genetic technology projects. It is beyond dispute that the Chinese authorities have
given priority to science and technology development for a long time (Bianchi,
Camoy and Castells, 1988; International Development Research Centre, 1997).
The technology cult in China can be traced back to the pre-reform period.
In Mao’s age, the development of telecommunications, albeit not as emphasized
as in the 1990s, was nonetheless an indispensable goal for the Chinese state. In
1948, one year before the communist takeover of the Mainland, Mao instructed
his subordinates that.
After policies have been fixed and directives issued, a
bureau or sub-bureau of the Central Committee should keep
in close contact with its area and prefectural Party
committees or with its own working teams by telegraph or
telephone, by couriers on vehicles or on horseback, or by
personal interviews; it should use the newspaper as an
important instrument of organization and leadership.^^
During the mid-50s, Mao emphasized the importance of telecom tools for
the new communist government. Again, addressing subordinates, he said:
“Besides the method of holding meetings, you can use the telegram and the
telephone and take inspection tours; these too are very important methods of
“ Selective Works o f Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 4, p. 204. Foreign Language Press, 1969.
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126
le a d e rs h ip .In the same year he requested that, “Within seven years, complete
the installation of telephone networks connecting townships and large co
operatives” all over China. This plan has not been realized even by the time this
dissertation is being written. Still there were 164 thousand villages (22 pereeent of
all villages in China’s countryside) that had no telephone connection by the end of
2001 (Zhang, 2002). Mao’s ambition nonetheless showed that there is no inherent
contradiction between telecom technology and the communist regime. It all
depends on how the technologies are put to use, for what purposes, and by whom.
While Mao saw the telephone and the telegraph as tools of communist
rule, this no longer held true after 1978. With the entrance of the telephone, pager,
and Internet into the everyday life of ordinary Chinese, an exclusively state-driven
model cannot explain the rapid diffusion of telecom services, especially in urban
and urbanizing regions. A broader consideration of the Chinese eollectivistie
tradition might account for the quick take-off after a critical mass - mostly
officials and successful entrepreneurs - adopting the technologies, oftentimes
with initial encouragements from the state.^®
Asian cultures are also known for their favorable attitudes towards
information technologies. For example, in the United States, while holding
income and education constant, Asian American families are more likely to
connect to the Internet than families of other cultures (NTIA, 2000; Jung, et al.
Selective Works o f Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 5, p. 222. Foreign Language Press, 1977.
p. 280.
For instanee, when Internet service was first available to the general public in 1995, the connection
fee was waived.
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127
2001),^^ probably owing to their emphasis on child education as well as a more
positive attitude towards technological progress.
China’s relative backwardness in telecommunications during late 70s and
early 80s also contributed to an unusually intense longing for better equipment
which was in tandem with the unprecedented burgeoning of the world telecom
sector in terms of both device capacity and the number of new gadgets being
produced.*®
Another important factor is the tremendous influence of Western techno-
utopian narratives about the role of information technology. Daniel Bell’s The
Coming o f Post-Industrial Society (1973) was published in Chinese in 1984 and
had widespread influence on Chinese intellectuals and policymakers.*^ Other
popular volumes taking a “futuristic” approach to communication technologies
(Toffler 1980; 1990; Naisbit, 1990; Gates, 1995; Negroponte, 1996) were also
introduced to China, sometimes in the next year of the publication of their English
versions (e.g.. Gates, 1994; Negroponte, 1995). All these high-profile utopian
accounts imbued with technological determinism sold well in China. Receiving
far less critical reading than in Western countries, they spawned Chinese books
According to the NTIA (2000) report, 56.8 percent Asian American households had Internet access,
which is significantly higher than the 46.1 percent for white households, 29.3 percent for African-
Americans, and 23.7 percent for Hispanics.
^ See Patricia Woodward, “U.S. Firms Vie for China’s Telecommunications Market,”
America, April 19, 1985, for an early account of how American companies perceived China’s telecom
market as “enormous” and “unlimited” (p. 3). Also see William Warwick, (1994), “A Review of
AT&T’s Business History in China; The memorandum of understanding in context,”
Telecommunications Policy, 18(3), pp. 265-274; and William Tittley (1994), “TT&C in the PRC,”
Satellite Communications, January 1994, p. 39; for the cases o f particular U.S. telecom providers in
China.
Translated by Shi Gao, Hongzhou Wang and Zhengling Wei, published by Commercial Publishing
House in December 1984.
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128
and book series featuring an amalgamation of Western futurism, the communist
faith in technological progress, and Chinese nationalism, which to a large extent
still dominated China’s policy discourse regarding telecom development by the
end of 2002.
Thus achievements in telecom and informatization are frequently used to
booster national pride since, after half a century of communist education, the
modernization paradigm has been deeply ingrained in the minds of the public,
who have almost unreserved appreciation for high technology. So long as the
Chinese are nationalistic and their mindset confined in scientism, domestic
politicians will use projects such as the construction of a large fiber optic network
to amass public support: after all, to many Chinese contemporaries, having the
latest technology is the ultimate demonstration of wealth and power.
The idea of linear progression for technological and economic
development, be it Marxian or Western futuristic models, encounters little
resistance in the Chinese context. This is because, in domestic policy circles,
China’s economy has long been seen as confined in agriculture and Soviet-style
industry, which suffers a lot from low productivity, poor coordination, and
isolation from the outside world. The Chinese telecom policymakers therefore are
more than ready to jump on the bandwagon of the “information economy.’’
Under these discursive circumstances of the communication action context,
discussions about telecom in China are frequently cast in the frame of foreign
models and trends in the world market, which, albeit standing in sharp
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129
contradiction with Mao’s model of using telecom as mere service for officials,
now become the dominant narrative. For instance, the imposition of telephone
installation fees in 1980, one of the measures taken by the government to ensure
profitability, was imitating a similar policy in Japan (Yu, 1994, p. 8). When
enhancing competition became a major goal in the late 1990s, by far the most
popular comparative reference in Chinese policy articles was the split of AT&T in
1984.^° After years of debate, this finally led to the reshuffle in May 2002 that
transferred half of China Telecom’s assets into the ownership of China Netcom
Communications. This is arguably the third key event for increasing telecom
market competition following the establishment of Unicom in 1994 and of MU in
1998.^' Two other instances with more overarching effects are the entry into the
WTO and the adoption of stockholding ownership management in China’s
major telecom organizations.^^ Both of these recent developments mark further
integration of the nation’s telecom industry with the world-system.
The Trajectories o f Taking-Off
Let us turn from the larger social, historic context to the transformation of the
telecommunications industry. As previously stated, those who study technology
For example, see Fengjie Qu, (2001). “Experiences and Inspirations from the Institutional Reform of
Global Telecom Operation System,” Beijing; Economic Research Reference. Vol. 48, Iss. 1528.
See Mark O'Neill, “Break-up o f largest operator marks competition milestone,” South China Morning
Post. May 20, 2002, Business p. 4.
See Mueller and Lovelock (2000) and Zhang (2001) for analysis about China’s concession in terms
o f domestic telecom market entry during its WTO negotiations, and how the change is affecting the
domestic Chinese telecom market.
China Mobile and China Unicom have adopted the stockholding system. China Telecom is the latest
to conform to this world standard. In November 2002, China Telecom was first listed for stock-
exchange in Hong Kong and New York. See Hui Yuk-min, “Final push delivers a ringing success,”
South China Morning Postj'Sio'vevchtr 15, 2002, Supplement p. 1.
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130
and structural social change should be interested in China due to the phenomenal
growth of China’s telecom industry in the post-Mao era. Figure 3.2 shows the
skyrocketing of national investment for transportation and telecommunications
and the gross telecom business volume. During the period of reform since 1978,
the total state investment for transportation and telecommunications rose from
US$ 2 billion in 1980 to US$ 74 billion in 2001, while total telecom business
volume increased from US$ 0.7 billion in 1978 to US$ 55 billion in 2001. It is
manifest that the growth rate of the entire telecom industry was relatively slow
until the mid-1980s, after which annual growth increased to double digits. The
speed further accelerated to around 30% per year after 1990, which was more than
three times the growth rate of the national GDP.
This pattern of gradual acceleration in the 1980s and rapid taking-off in
the 1990s applies most fittingly in the case of teledensity growth as shown
previously in Figure 3.1. While it took 12 years (1978-1990) for China to reach 1
phone set per 100 people, it took only 3 years (1990-1993) to double the
penetration, which then almost kept doubling every two years until 2002, when on
average there were 33.7 phone sets per 100 population. The rate of annual
increase for teledensity was also slower than national GDP growth until 1988,^"^
which means that the discrepancy between demand and supply in the telecom
market actually increased in most of the 1980s. This offers at least a partial
^ Foreign and Domestic Telecom Statistical Materials. Edited by Institute for Science-Technology
Information, China Ministry o f Post and Telecommunications. June, 1991. p. 17.
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131
Figure 3.2 The development of China’s telecommunications industry: total
investment in transportation and telecommunications and the total business
volume of telecommunication, 1978-2002
-O -T e le c o m Gross
Revenue
Investment:
transportation and
telecommunications
0 IV'V'9 > 9 ' 9
Year
Sources: Compilation based on China Statistics Yearbook (1980-2002), National Bureau o f
Statistics o f China; and Statistical Communiqué o f the P eo p le’ s Republic o f China (1978-2002),
National Bureau o f Statistics o f China.
expalation for the rapid growth of state investment in telecommimications (Figure
3.2) as well as multiple institutional reshuffles in the 1990s. Both additional
investments and changes in the monopoly market structure contributed to an
extraordinary leap in teledensity from 1.11 percent in 1990 to 33.7 percent in
2001.
The period of development since the mid 80s was accompanied by rapid
diffusion of new telecom technologies such as the pager, which was first
introduced to China in 1983. It encountered initial resistance in the first four years
(Tao, p. 6). Up until 1988, the entire pager sector was in deficit. Fewer than 50
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132
Chinese cities had pager networks. And there were only 33 thousand subscribers,
which means, on average, there were less than 1000 users per city. To change this
situation, telecom authorities “made a lot of publicity campaigns as well as
attractive offers to subscribers” (ibid). Starting from 1988, the subscriber
population multiplied. Chinese-character paging services started in November
1991, which facilitated the diffusion process as well as the development of a
sophisticated technological system for the transmission and display of ideographic
Chinese characters (Sterling, 1999). By the end of 1994, there were more than
Figure 3.3 The growth of subscriber numbers for new telecom technologies:
pager, cell phone, and the Internet, 1985-2002
N um ber of ^50
S u b sc rib e rs
(million)
200 -
150 -
100 -
50
8
C M eg eg
Y ear
- ♦ ’Pager ‘Cell Phone Internet
Sources: Compilation based on Annual Statistical R eport on the Developm ent o f
Telecommunications in China, Ministry o f Information Industry (2001); China Statistics
Yearbook (1980-2002), National Bureau o f Statistics o f China; and Semi-Annual Survey Report
on the Developm ent o f Internet in China, China Internet Network Information Center.
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133
10.27 million subscribers to pager stations in more than 2000 cities. The number
of subscribers reached a record-high of 50 million in 2000, after which the pager
market has been on decline. For instance, China Unicom, the largest pager
operator in China, lost 1.2 million subscribers in 2001 alone (Chen, 2002).
It is clear that, as figure 3.3 demonstrates, the decline of the pager market
is prominently associated with the remarkable boom of mobile phones since 1999,
when the number of mobile phone users first surpassed that of pager subscribers.
China experimented with its first mobile phone system in 1981, which had fewer
than 30 subscribers. Starting from 1987, Shanghai and the Pearl River Delta were
the first two regions to adopt more mature cellular phone systems (Tao, 1995, p.
4). Since then, mobile phone penetration had been increasing at an astonishing
annual growth rate of 302 percent to reach 6.77 percent in 2000 and 11.44 percent
in 2001. By the end of 2002, there were 206.6 million mobile phone users in
China, which is the largest total for any country. The speed of growth in the
mobile phone market has to do with the generally low land-line telephone
penetration, as well as the lowering of prices resulting from more market
competition since mid-1990s.^^ Besides voice telephony, China’s new mobile
phone industry also provides state-of-the-art services such as 3 G (third generation
cell phone) and Wi-Fi (wireless local area networks).
A very popular cell phone service, especially among young people, is
short messaging service (SMS), which allows the transfer of text messages and
For instance, after the founding of China Unicom in 1994, the price of mobile phone services
dropped by half.
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134
still images among cell phones and is a major explanation for the decline of pager
market in recent years.^® Although each short message costs only 0.1 yuan or 1.2
US cents, the popularity of this service and its geometric growth has generated
huge revenue with great market potential. In 2001,15 billion short messages were
exchanged among Chinese mobile phone users, which means a total market value
ofUS$181 million. By the end of 2002, the number of cell phone short messages
increased to 95 billion, which means a profit of US$ 723 million (Jen-Siu, 2003).
This quickly burgeoning cell phone service has caught the attention of Chinese
authorities, who are now entertaining the idea of regulating the content of short
messaging because it is not rare for the new medium to be used for the
dissemination of information deemed as inappropriate by the govemment.^^
High growth rates also characterize the expansion of China’s Internet
(Tan, 1995; Wu, 1996; Harwit and Clark, 2001). While the number of Internet
users around the world increases approximately twice every year, the Chinese
user population doubles almost every half-year.^® The number of online
computers in China multiplied from 40 thousand in 1995 to 16.1 million in July
2002. During the same period, the total number of Chinese domain names grew
from 4,066 to 126,146. The most phenomenal growth was in terms of the
bandwidth for access to Internet resources in other countries. Nationwide there
^ See the special issue of New Weekly (xinzhoukan), July 15, 2002, for several articles about the usage
of short-messaging services among urban youth.
See Jen-Siu (2003). A Beijing telecom consultant was quoted saying that short message “could offer
poorer people a cheap way to spread dissent.”
* See “Semi-Annual Report on the Development of the Internet in China,” China Internet Network
Information Center, Available: http://www.cnnic.net.cn/.
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135
were only four state sanctioned International Internet access providers^^ in 1997,
who had 25.4 Megabyte bandwidth capacity in total. In July 2002, there were 10
authorized international access providers*°° who had a total bandwidth of 7597.5
Megabyte. Meanwhile, China has also expanded its national fiber optic network
from 286,000 kilometers in 1995 to 1.25 million kilometers in 2000, forming a
web of “eight horizontals and eight verticals” that covers China both from east to
west and from north to south.
Statistics about the telegraph and facsimile, on the other hand, are harder
to find, although similar trends of sizeable - but not as phenomenal - growth can
be observed for the 1980s. From 1980 to 1987, the annual total number of
telegraph deliveries increased from 147 thousand to 312 thousand; the number of
fax messages increased from 54 thousand to 176 thousand (Yu, 1994, pp. 44-45).
The number of subscribed telegraph units rose from 727 in 1981 to 14027 in 1993,
while subscriptions to facsimile services leaped fi'om 8.2 thousand in 1987 to
141.8 thousand in 1993 (ibid). However, because the telegraph market was
shrinking and the facsimile has never acquired an important position in the
telecommunications industry in general (see Figure 3.4), statistical reports after
1988 almost never cover these two services. The gaps in official reporting
regarding services that are declining and/or of smaller business volume is a
” They are ChinaNet (owned by China Telecom), CSTNet (Ministry of Science and Technology),
CERNet (Ministry o f Education), and ChinaGBN (Golden Bridge Network, operated by Unicom).
The additional international access providers are UniNet (Unicom), China Netcom Communications
(CNCNet), China International Economy and Trade Network (CIETNET), China Mobile Network
(CMNET), China Great Wall Network (CGWNet), and China Satellite Network (CSNet).
See “Statistical Report for the Development of Telecommunications in China (2001).” China
Ministry o f Information Industry. Available: http://www.mii.gov.cn/mii/hvzw/2001toneiigongbao.htm.
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136
tendency also seen in the case of the pager market. For instance, when the pager
industry started to decline in 2001, the Mil annual statistical reports on
telecommunications development in the country stopped providing figures about
the pager market. This bias towards positive reporting of fantastic growth rates is
understandable given the ambition of the Chinese authorities to build the
telecommunications industry as a stronghold for national economy. However, it
also clearly indicates the insufficiency of relying solely on government statistics,
which are the end products, rather than full reflections, of telecom storytelling
processes among official policymakers.
Figure 3.4 Transactions by telegraph and fax, 1980-1988
1000
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Year
ITransactions by telegraph ■ Transactions by fax
Sources: Compilation based on Annual Statistical Report on the Developm ent o f
Telecommunications in China (2001), China Ministry o f Information Industry; and Zaipu Tao
(1995), Recent situation and tendencies in the telecom industry o f the Mainland. Taiwan: Institute
for Chinese Economy Research.
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137
While examining China’s telecom industry as a whole, a few essential
characteristics should be emphasized. First, attention needs to be paid to the
critical role of foreign telecom firms and investors. So far foreign investment and
ownership in the domain of telecom service provision has been p ro h ib ited .B u t
the import of technology and foreign capital have been central to China’s
booming telecom device production industry and the construction of various
telecom networks from cell phone infrastructures to the I n te r n e t.Whereas full
ownership of service provider businesses is unavailable to foreign investors, still
there has been a large flow of foreign funds into China in the form of joint
ventures, especially with respect to new technologies such as pager, mobile
phone, and the Internet. For example, in 1994, foreign investment in the
telecommunications sector was 2.26 billion, which accounted for a sizeable
twenty percent of total telecom investment in China (Tao, 1995, p.3). While
entering the WTO, China has also agreed to lift the ban on foreign investment and
ownership, which means western multinational corporations will play a more
important role in the future (Mueller and Lovelock, 2000; DeWoskin, 2001; Tan,
2002). Foreign telecom investors, in this case, include not only western telecom
giants such as AT&T and Sprint but also overseas Chinese entrepreneurs in Hong
Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia, who are more familiar with Chinese customs
For example, MPT issued an ordinance on May 3,1993, that forbid overseas organizations,
enterprises, and individuals to participate the management processes o f all public and special telecom
networks in China. See more detailed discussion in Mueller and Lovelock (2000), Chuang (2001) and
Tan (2002).
Hong Kong Cable and Wireless helped China to develop its first cellular phone system in the Pearl
River Delta in mid 1980s. In 1995, when China Telecom started to provide Internet access service to
the general public, its main international connection channel was established by Sprint.
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138
and therefore better at dealing with Chinese officials to obtain special treatment.
At the same time, they also have better knowledge about the global market and
many of them transfer subcontracts from major Western firms into Mainland
China, where cheap labor and raw material costs help maintain the profit margin.
The second characteristic, referring back to the initial theme of this study,
is that increasing technological connectedness may lead to various forms of
disconnection. The regulatory prohibition of foreign ownership in telecom service
provision is one of the institutional blocks. So is the lack of cooperation among
national competitors (e.g. China Telecom and China Unicom) and the persistence
of control over political content that applies to all new media.
Another notable disconnection is the stratificational gap between people
differing in social economic status (Lee, 1991). A prominent example would be
the schism between rural and urban residents in terms of their access to telephone.
During the two decades of post-Mao reform, the marketization strategy helped
expedite urban telephone penetration. It had less impact on rural areas, whose
teledensity growth rate had been constantly and substantially lower than that of
urban areas until the mid 90s (see Table 3.3). It was only after 1996 with the
initiation of the “village-to-village telephone” (cuncuntong dianhua) project’® ^
that the speed of rural telephone growth caught up and surpassed that of
The Chinese government has been trying to control online content since 1996 (Qiu, 1999/2000),
which was part of a larger effort to prevent the dissemination o f “harmful” information not only
through the Internet but also via pager and cell phone. Since year 2000, the content regulation has been
more specified and strictly enforced (Harwit and Clark, 2001).
See Yi Zhang, “Three difficulties to be Overcome in the telecom industry,” Xinhua News Agency.
October 30, 2001. and Kun Liu, “Multiple barriers caused the freeze of telecom poverty-alleviation
funds,” Financial Times, September 20, 2002.
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139
teledensity growth in the cities. As a result, while there was one telephone per 500
rural residents in 1989, the situation has significantly improved to one phone per
12 rural residents in 2001. But this is still much lower than the ratio of one phone
set for each four urban resid e n ts.S till there were 164 thousand villages, 22
percent of all rural villages in China, which had no telephone access by the end of
2001 (Zhang, 2002).
Table 3.3 Uneven development of telecommunications in China’s rural and urban
areas
Niunber of
telephone
subscribers in
rural areas
(million)
Annual growth
rate for rural
telephone
subscription
(%)
Number of
telephone
subscribers in
urban areas
(million)
Annual growth
for urban
telephone
subscription
(%)
79,5/ 0.80 -0.6 1.43 6.3
79gJ 0.93 7.8 2.19 14.6
79,59 1.28 16.3 4.40 21.4
7992 2.26 29.9 9.21 37.2
7997 16.94 39.2 96.54 24.4
2001 68.11 31.5 112.28 21.7
Sources: Compilation based on Annual Economic Report o f China (1981-1993), Beijing:
Economic Management Publications; Annual Statistical Report on the Developm ent o f
Telecommunications (1998, 2002), Ministry o f Information Industry.
Also prominent is the much-skewed distribution of telecommunication
resources in China’s coastal, central, and western regions, with the most intense
concentration of telecom services in the core luban centers of Beijing, Shanghai,
Calculations are based on China Statistics Yearbook and M il Annual Report on the Development o f
Telecommunications in China.
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140
and Guangdong Province (Lee, 1991; 1997; Qiu, 2001). As demonstrated in Table
3.4, while the distribution of land and population was approximately equal among
the coastal, central, and western regions, the coastal areas are much more wealthy
and have the highest numbers of landline telephone and cell phone users as well
as Internet users and Internet domain names. The central and western regions,
albeit having 60 percent of China’s population, have only 37 percent of national
fix-line telephones, 39 percent of mobile phone users, 17 percent of Internet users,
and 17 percent of total domain names. In contrast, while the core urban centers of
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong have only 2 percent of the land and 8 percent
Table 3.4 Distribution of basic economic and telecommunications resources in
core, coastal, central, and western regions
Core* Coastal Central Western
Share of national resources (%)
Land 2 21 19 60
Population 8 40 35 23
GDP 17 59 27 14
GDP per capita (US$) 1768 1216 651 508
Telephone
Fix-line telephone 25 63 26 11
subscribers
Cell phone subscribers 28 60 23 16
Internet
Internet users 31 83 10 7
Internet domain names 60 84 9 8
*Core region; Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong Province.
Sources: Compilation based on 2000 China Statistics Yearbook, Beijing: China Statistics
Publications; 2000 Thirty-One Provincial Statistical Yearbook, Beijing: China Statistics
Publications; and Semi-Annual Survey Report on the Developm ent o f Internet in China (January
2002), China Internet Network Information Center.
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141
of the population in China, they possess more than a quarter of the nation’s
telephone users, 31 percent of Internet users, and a staggering 60 percent of
China’s total Internet domain names. Although regional disparity in terms of
Internet user numbers has gradually decreased from 1997 to 2001, the inequality
in domain name distribution has remained largely unchanged (Qiu, 2001, pp. 167-
168).
Action Contexts at Macro Levels
This chapter has examined the rise of late capitalism and the integration of China
into the capitalistic world-system since late 1970s as two essential macro
background factors in the construction of the telecom infrastructure in the Pearl
River Delta. From the end of the Cultural Revolution to the progression of Deng’s
reform policies, from the conclusion of the Cold War to the encroaching of the
New Economy, all these historical events and processes are critical to the
increasing demand for telecom services in China against the overlapping global
and national backdrops that are conducive to a phenomenal technological boom.
They are also crucial to the understanding of technology-society relationship in
the Pearl River Delta. Under the combined influence of these different factors,
China’s telecom sector was transformed from a service infrastructure within the
party-state bureaucracy into an industry situated in the nation’s new ly built
market economy increasingly integrated with neighboring Asian economies and
the world-system. This telecom industry has grown exponentially in terms of
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142
business volume, technological advancement, and the diffusion of services.
Documenting these remarkable achievements and the problems therein is
fundamental to our knowledge about the communication action context for
regional telecom development in the Delta. More importantly, it provides a fresh
opportunity for the appreciation of the Communication Infrastructure Theory and
the discussion of a few research issues involved in the context of the transitional
Chinese society.
First, in reviewing a plethora of contextual elements at national and global
levels and how they impinge upon the growth of telecommunications in China,
we have examined evidence in support of the social shaping of technology
perspective based on theoretical assumptions of Communication Infrastructure
Theory. Despite the popular suspicion that communist regimes would have
reservations against the development of disperse telecom networks, the case of
China shows again the malleability of new technologies as highly contingent upon
the institutional parameters - including both facilitators and constraints - set by
various governmental agencies. It also demonstrates the increasing centrality of
these new information systems to the transformation of the national economy as
the action context evolves from a closed system to one with increasing level of
openness, and becomes part of the global New Economy. The assumption of
escalating information dependency during social transition is thus prominently
highlighted, and the import of the communication action context unequivocally
foregrounded, despite the ideological idiosyncrasies of the Chinese regime.
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143
Second, based on the numerous macro-level contextual factors identified
in this chapter, we can see a few types of resources that are most relevant in the
concept of the communication action context (Ball-Rokeach, et al, 2001a, p. 396).
These include the discursive components, which certainly constitute a
fundamental dimension of the action context. This chapter has demonstrated a
wide array of existing narratives that simultaneously fi*ame telecom policy
deliberations in China such as communist techno-utopianism and Deng
Xiaoping’s reform rhetoric as well as Western futurism and neoliberalist telecom
deregulation discourse. Hence, while comparing China’s telecom sector with its
automobile industry, Fengji You (1997, p. 271) concluded that telecom
development has been more suecessful in China due to a relatively consistent
discursive environment that supports telecom initiatives at both national and local
levels.
Also indispensable are the material resources that make it possible for
policy discussions to continue and ultimately shape the trajectories of telecom
developments. By material resources of the eommunieation action context we
understand publie facilities and the capital, labor, and technology involved to
build these facilities. In the case of China, the opening-up of the country allows
for enormous inflow of foreign eapital, oftentimes fi-om affluent overseas Chinese
entrepreneurs, and the importing of advanced technologies. The emergence of
migrant workers in the millions also provides a nearly inexhaustible labor base for
large-seale teleeom projeets. These are all essential material conditions in the
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144
action context in tandem with changes in discursive conditions. When discursive
and material resources are conjoined and their relationships formalized, they give
rise to institutional arrangements that would most directly shape the future
directions of the telecom industry and, in so doing, influence the subsequent
alignments of narrative and material resources in the action context.
Besides the discursive, material, and institutional components there are
two additional sets of resources that need to be recognized in the macro
communication action context. One of them has to do with the historical roots of
the action context. For example, Mao’s emphasis on the need to develop the
telephone and telegraph, China’s enormous labor surplus, and the desire of
western conglomerates to enter the Chinese market, these are all factors that have
existed for decades, if not centuries. Attention also needs to be paid to the
agentive dimension when institutional resources are actualized at the level of local
state, which could only be discussed briefly in this chapter. Nevertheless this
chapter has revealed that a key institutional characteristic of China’s post-Mao
telecom reform is a shift in the locus of policymaking and implementation from
national to local state authorities, hence giving rise to more regional variation and
more autonomy at lower levels of analysis.
These contextual resources include enabling and constraining factors that
operate simultaneously and leave a mix of influences on processes of storytelling
telecom at regional and local levels. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to
identifying facilitating contextual resources because an overwhelming majority of
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macro-level data are official statistics and documents that tend to report more
achievements than problems. However, while temporal-spatial disconnections
were reduced due to the spread of telecom technologies various forms of social
disconnectedness are also becoming manifest. Even at the national level, we could
see that the stratification gap has increased dramatically between telecom-haves
and have-nots, in different geographical regions, and between rural and urban
residents. There are also clear indications of institutional blocks such as the
prohibition of foreign ownership in telecom service sector, the censorship of anti
establishment online information, and the discriminatory measures taken by China
Telecom against its market competitors.
Besides these general types of disconnections, we know up to this point of
discussion very little about the interplay between specific organizations in the
macro context that can be systematically theorized. Nor do we have enough data
to discuss the problem of community because statistics at global and national
levels are usually top-heavy and lend little to a textured understanding of the life
experiences of urban residents. Moreover, most of these data - especially official
statistics and reports - are themselves end products of institutional negotiations,
which in many cases reflect a collectively constructed reality. This is particularly
a challenge to researchers dealing with non-democratic nations because, in
countries like China, those who write the reports almost always are closely
affiliated with official policymaking agencies (e.g. CNNIC being authorized by
the Informatization Leading Group of the State Council) or are themselves major
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stakeholders in the industry (e.g. Ministry of Information Industry and China
Telecom). Alternative national data sources are rare. Although news clippings
sometimes do reveal problems, especially in recent years when the monopoly of
China Telecom started to erode, these sporadic accounts are not systematic
assessments and, therefore, insufficient for a full consideration of
disconnectedness in the communication infrastructure.
Dwelling on the macro conditions of national and global processes gives
us little control over the quality of data, which is particularly problematic in the
Chinese context when the CCP continues its role as the ultimate power holder in
the national telecom industry. But exactly how did the system of storytelling
telecom transform? To what extent has the burgeoning telecom infrastructure
impacted local community? These remaining questions are central to this case
study guided by Communication Infrastructure Theory. The narrowing down of
geographical scope, from global and national levels to the regional context of the
Pearl River Delta, is one of the worthy solutions that should be utilized to seek
answers with a more comfortable degree of precision.
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CHAPTER IV
REGIONAL HISTORY REVISITED
It is not an infrequent experience to be driving along an
interstate highway and to become aware that the highway is
paralleled by a river, a canal, a railroad track, or telegraph
and telephone wires. In that instant one may realize that
each of these improvements in transportation and
communications merely worked a modification on what
preceded it.
- James Carey (1989, p. 203)
In an era of late capitalism, with its characteristic flexible
organization of production, forces of globalization have
rendered many political boundaries more porous to flows of
people, money, and things. Contemporary regionalism,
then, is also a more flexible geography that captures
characteristic processes of the era in transboundary,
transnational, and world city-region geographies.
- Carolyn Cartier (2001, p. 269)
In February 2003, a new wave of discussion was under way concerning economic
integration between Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta, triggered by the 2003
Administration Speech of Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Tung Chee-Hwa in
January 2003: “After some 20 years, the Pearl River Delta is now a highly
developed and closely knit region.” “To advance its competitive edge, Hong
Kong must pool its strengths with other cities in the region.”'® ^ These remarks
made in the midst of a severe economic recession in Hong Kong provoked heated
debates in both the Delta and the global Chinese diaspora in part because this was
South China Morning Post, January 9*, 2003.
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the first time that the Hong Kong government explicitly recognized the
significance of Delta regionalization after its decades-long emphasis on the
construction of Hong Kong as a global city.
What contributed to this strategic re-orientation? Obvious factors would
include Hong Kong’s 1997 sovereignty transfer, the city’s current fiscal hardship,
and its export-oriented economic structure. It also has to do with the increase of
competition in global economy and the integration of China with the capitalist
world-system, prominently signified by the country’s accession into the World
Trade Organization (WTO). But most importantly, it has to do with rapid
industrialization of the Pearl River Delta, its close economic ties with Hong Kong,
and the resurfacing of strong cultural connections between the Delta and overseas
Chinese communities, all of which are greatly facilitated by the region’s booming
telecom infrastructure.
While the previous chapter introduces the important global and national
elements in the communication action context for the development of
telecommunications in the Delta, the focus of this chapter is upon the region’s
historical conditions and its contemporary transformations, both of which shaped
the historical trajectories of the regional telecom infrastructure. Emphases will be
given to the region’s maritime tradition, unorthodox cultural practices, and
lineage-based community structure, all of which are related to phenomenal
economic growth in the post-Mao period. In so doing, we shall highlight the
relationship between historic and contemporary forms of social disconnectedness.
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in aspects of both the stratificational gaps and spatial variation within the region.
We shall also provide a concise overview of post-Mao telecommunications
development in the Delta and articulate its connections with the larger global and
national context.
Approaching the Delta
The Pearl River Delta, a territory of 16,100 square miles and home to 41 million
residents in year 2000,'®^ is at the confluence of three major tributaries of the
Pearl River: the East River or Dongjiang, the North River or Beijiang, and the
West River ox Xijiang (see Figure 1.2). Unlike most river valleys in central,
northern, and eastern China, the Pearl River Delta is mountainous terrain divided
by a complicated web of waterways. The topography of the region means a
shortage of farmland and hinders ground transportation. Hence, millennia of
collective endeavor based on family and community bonds were spent in
reclaiming “sandy land (shatian),” constructing river dikes, and improving
transportation networks both on land and over the waterways (Siu and Faure,
1995, p. 2). In the process, a distinct regional economy imhued with
transboundary activities was fostered in tandem with a unique social ecology in
South China that “emerged as an alternative to the historically dominant north”
(Cartier, 2001, p. 260).
Guangdong Statistical Yearbook, 2001, p. 34. O f the 41 million population in the region, 24 million
are permanent residents and 17 million are immigrant workers.
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The accumulation of these distinctive regional legacies serves as an
important foundation for the rise of the Pearl River Delta as China’s major export-
oriented industrial powerhouse. By the end of 2002, with 0.43 percent of China’s
landmass and 3.1 percent of its population, the delta region on Mainland China
had a GDP of US$ 101 billion, which accounted for 8.3 percent of the national
total. Adding it up with Hong Kong (US$ 164 billion) and Macau (US$ 8 billion),
the entire delta has a GDP size of about US$ 273 billion in 2002.'*^^
Not only is the Delta economically sizeable but it is also growing at a
faster speed than the rest of Guangdong Province and other parts of China. While
the national annual GDP growth rate was about 7 to 9 percent between 1980 and
2000, it was 13.8 percent for Guangdong Province, and 16.9 percent for the Pearl
River D elta.T h e region’s average annual GDP per capita reached US$ 3,300 in
2000, which was 1.2 times above the provincial average and 2.9 times above the
national average.'
The most notable characteristic of the Delta economy is its close
connection with global capitalism, which depends to a great degree on the fast
growth of telecommunications that enables “[t]he internal linkages of the area and
the indispensable connection of the whole system to the global economy via
multiple communication links” (Castells, 1996, p. 409). From 1995 to 2001,
cumulative actual FDI in the region amounted to US$ 72 billion, i.e. 24 percent of
Guangdong Statistical Yearbook, 2002.
Guangdong Statistical Yearbook, 2001.
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151
the national total.'B y 2002, 260 of the Fortune 500 companies had invested in
the region; the total number of foreign firms in the Delta exceeded 40,000; and in
2001 alone, foreign companies in the region exported as much as US$54.4 billion
worth of products."^ In the same year, the Pearl River Delta is the sourcing
ground for 80 percent of Wal-Mart’s US$10.3 billion procurement from China. It
also accounted for 80 percent of IBM’s US$3 billion Mainland China
procurement."'' The bypassing of temporal and spatial breaks, a primary
consequence of telecom growth, has obviously reduced the distance between the
Delta and global capitalism, resulting in a new form of economic connectedness
that did not exist prior to Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening-up program.
Figure 4.1 Top ten provinces with the highest volume of import and export in
2002
Total Import & Export (billion US$)[
^ ^ ^ ^ ------------F—
ource: Ministry o f International Trade o f the People’s Republic o f China, 2002
Hong Kong Trade Development Council, “Introduction to the Pearl River Delta,” 2002.
^ Ibid.
'ibid.
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Nationwide comparison confirms the economic power of the Delta, which
accounts for the bulk of exports from Guangdong. As Figure 3.1 demonstrates,
Guangdong had exported more than US$ 221 billion in 2002. This includes 87
percent of China’s exports of telephone sets, 89 percent of radios, 94 percent of
electrical fans, and 98 percent of wristwatches.*'^ Exports from foreign companies
in the region accounted for US$ 54.4 billion.''^ From General Electric to NEC,
from Nokia to Motorola, a great number of major manufacturers in industrialized
nations have either moved their factories or outsourced their production needs to
the Pearl River Delta, transforming the region into China’s most important
production base for consumer goods ranging from household appliances (e.g. air
conditioners, refrigerators, and color televisions), to garments, toys, micro
computers, and telecommunications equipments (e.g. telephone sets, fax
machines, and Internet switches). This is however not a brand new status for the
Delta region to become a center of economic production and trade. As Table 4.1
illustrates, key exports of the Delta at the turn of the millennium have certain
interesting parallels to the region’s major outputs during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Although there is variation as to the exchange value of the
commodities, in both cases these are products that require good craftsmanship,
intensive labor, and small to medium size of eapital input at the times - factors
that are all critical to the regional telecom action context.
Hong Kong Trade Development Council, “Introduction to the Pearl River Delta,” 2002.
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Table 4.1 The Pearl River Delta’s key exported products: a historical comparison
Major Types of Exports from the Pearl River Delta
18* and 19* century* 1990s till 2002* *
Silk Toys
Cotton cloth Garments
Oranges Artificial flowers
Palm-leaf fans Air conditioners
Pottery Refrigerators
Incense Color televisions
Sacrificial papers Telephone sets
Iron implements Telephone switches
Fax machines
Computer components
* Source: David Faure and Helen Siu, (1995). Down to Earth: The territorial bond in South
China. Standford, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 3.
** Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council (2002).
The rapidity and export-oriented nature of economic development in the
Pearl River Delta has inspired scholarly interests in several disciplines such as
political science (Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1992), anthropology (Stockard, 1989;
Lee, 1998), urban planning (Soulard, 1997; Chimg, Inaba, Koolhaas and Leong,
2001), and geography (Leimg, 1993; Lin, 1997a; 1997b; Cartier, 1999; 2001).
How should scholars explain rapid economic growth in this burgeoning region
since 1978? Why has the Pearl River Delta, rather than other regions of the
country, emerged as a key interface between China and the capitalist world-
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154
system?” ^ To answer these questions, examining global and national conditions
are indispensable, yet insufficient. A consensus bas gradually emerged from the
increasing body of multi-disciplinary literature that understanding the rich social
and cultural history of the Delta is critical to explanations of what has occurred in
the region in the contemporary era. This was the argument in the groundbreaking
book on globalization processes in South China, where Carolyn Cartier articulates
the centrality of a regional perspective that is not confined by the boundaries of
the Chinese nation-state:
‘[GJlobalizing’ South China means first working to open up a
cosmopolitan knowledge about the region, in ways that recognize both
historical processes at the basis of regional formation and how places
in the contemporary region have experienced the transformations
wrought by internationalized transboundary activity (Cartier, 2001, p.
ix).
Maritime Frontier
According to conventional wisdom, the Chinese civilization, with its origins in
northern China plains, is known for its agriculture-based economy and a political
culture primarily defined by Confucianism, which reflects the properties of
agrarian communities (Pye, 1992). The emphasis on agricultural production led to
long-standing prejudice against commerce, which was reified in the Confucian
Another key region of the kind is Shanghai and the surrounding Yangtze River Delta, which has
recently attracted attention from analysts in both policy circles and the academia. The fast development
o f international trade and export-oriented production in the Yangtze River Delta, however, was not until
the mid 1990s, whereas the economic take-off and transboundary activities in the Pearl River Delta
started in late 1970s. In this sense, the Pearl River Delta is the frontier region for China’s post-Mao
reform and opening-up program. Its time o f development predates that of Shanghai and the Yangtze
River Delta.
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hierarchy that places “traders (shang)” as the lowest social class following
“intellectuals (shf),'” “farmers (nong),” and “craftsmen (gong).” Hence the sole
purpose for the Great Wall was to protect the land-based Han civilization from
nomadic invasions. In so doing, it intended to reduce transboundary activities to
the minimum, which, however, was not always successful.
While generations of historians have been fascinated by the complicated
interactions between ethnic Han people and their nomadic neighbors, relatively
less attention had been paid to the southern maritime cultures."^ But as
archaeological discoveries and historical archives jointly demonstrated, the
earliest human settlements in South China “antedate the land-based, systematic
southern expansion of the Chinese empire,” which produced “a maritime
economy [that] antedated Han arrival” (Cartier, 2001, p. 79) and “a pre-Conftician
worldview of mercantile imperialism” (ibid, p. 72).
The People
Historical records in China refer to aboriginals in the southern and eastern parts of
the country as Bai Yue (meaning “a hundred Yue people”), which is a category
for a variety of different ethnic minorities in the region (ibid, p. 53). Those who
initially inhabited the Pearl River Delta between the Nanling Mountains and the
' Part o f the reason is that historical records about northern nomadic cultures are relatively rich, given
that the Mongolians and Manchurians both started as nomadic tribes that later established their
dynasties over a broad territories. In contrast, the seafaring peoples o f southern China tend to have less
institutional resources to secure archives. Their records scatter throughout the region and throughout
southeastern Asia that were only recently beginning to be systematically assembled and analyzed.
Important records, such as the logs of Zheng He, the famous Ming Dynasty explorer who made
multiple voyages to Southeast Asia and reached as far as East Africa in the fifteenth century, were also
believed to be purposefully destroyed, most likely by the Confucian scholar class who held very hostile
view towards seafaring people in the early periods o f the Ming Dynasty (Cartier, 2001, p. 91).
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South China Sea were known as Nan Yue (“southern Yue”). Archaeological
evidence indicates that at least some of the Bai Yue groups were seafaring people
who came to reside along the coast as a consequence of coastal migration rather
than migrating from the land routes of the hinterlands. Neolithic finds also
suggest that the Yue groups had gone through a major regional culture formation
process from 6000-4000 B.C. which coincides with “the end of a major sea level
rise that submerged at least a 130-km wide strip of the coast.”'
Until 215 B.C., the area of today’s Pearl River Delta was not
administratively incorporated with the rest of China. Although the First Emperor,
Qin Shihuang, established the County of Nanhai in the region in 215 B.C.'^''
during the first unification of the Chinese mainland, after the fall of Qin in 206
B.C., the subsequent Han Dynasty did not gain eontrol over the Delta for more
than a hundred years, when the Nan Yue people formed an independent kingdom
of themselves (Cartier, 2001, p. 53).
Since the integration of the Pearl River Delta as a Chinese territory during
the first Century B.C., ethnic Han migrants from northern China began to settle
systematically. These included those who spoke Cantonese, the dominant dialect
in the region, and Hakka speakers who concentrated in the eastern part of the
delta in Huizhou and Bao’an. Until the twentieth century, there were only very
limited number of Mandarin speakers in the region, including mostly officials and
Meacham, (1983). Direct quote from Cartier (2001, p. 79).
Nanhai was one of the 36 counties incorporated into the maps o f the Qin Dynasty (221-207 B.C.),
which united the country for the first time.
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merchants from the north. As probably the most important origin for overseas
Chinese expatriates, the Delta population is characterized by a high proportion of
families with relatives living abroad, mainly in Southeast Asia and North
America. This global diaspora, as will be discussed later, is instrumental to the
economic take-off of the region as well as the revival of traditional community
structure during the post-Mao era. It is also key to the understanding of
(dis)connectedness patterns and the structure of narrative expressions in the
telecom storytelling system.
With massive migration from the north and the establishment of
Confucian social institutions in the region, records about aboriginal Yue groups
became rare. Some indigenous people were also assimilated with the predominant
Han culture and its agrarian political economy. Those who were less incorporated
were ancestors of the Dan people (also known as “Danjia”), the boat-dwelling
floating population who spoke Cantonese with an accent and were systematically
discriminated by land residents.Official records described them as “foolish,
illiterate, and ignorant of their ages”* ^ ^ They were not allowed to own property or
take civil service examinations until the eighteenth century. Up until mid
twentieth century they were still customarily forbidden to even wear hats and
shoes while on land. As late as 1990 there were reports of political discrimination
The Dan people of today are descendants of the coastal seafaring Yue and Yao groups (Cartier,
2001, p. 79). The Yao people inhabited today’s Guangxi and the western part o f Guangdong before the
area was incorporated into the Chinese empire.
The 1561 Records o f Guangdong Province, translated by David Faure.
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158
against the Dan people in Hong Kong/^^ Discriminatory treatment of the Dan is
relevant to our study in two senses. First, it shows the historic phenomenon that
population diversity has heen coupled with the rise of social disconnections in
terms of class stratification, which in many ways also characterize the systematic
mistreatment of migrant workers in the region during the post-Mao period.
Second, the discriminations are not only economic but also cultural and
psychological. They include both stereotyped storytelling and the suppression of
alternative grassroots discursive agency, which culminates into distrust, social
detachment, and dismissals of mainstream narratives among disenfranchised
populations.
Another distinct population category in the Pearl River Delta is foreigners.
The region, as a major huh of trade and transportation for both domestic and
international markets, has been magnetic to explorers, merchants, and
missionaries of all kinds from all over the world. While there are visible Indian
and Islamic communities, especially in contemporary Hong Kong, the largest
group of non-Chinese residents is from Southeast Asia, including returning
For instance, the Dan people were barred from local elections in Hong Kong’s Cheung Chau island,
which included only “land residents” as eligible voters. See Choi Chi-Cheng, (1995). “Reinforcing
ethnicity: the Jiao Festival in Cheung Chau,” in David Faure and Helen Siu (eds.). Down to Earth: The
territorial bond in South China. Stanford University Press, p. 104)
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expatriates'^"^ and hundred of thousands of laborers, from the Philippines,
Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia.
There are also the guei-lou, meaning literally “devils” in Cantonese, which
is a derogatory label for Caucasians in the Delta. This includes of course tourists
and short-term business travelers. But there are also a good number of guei-lou
who grew up, or gained permanent residency in the region, especially in the
former colonies of Portuguese Macau and British Hong Kong. Many of these
localized Caucasian residents can speak fluent Cantonese. My fieldtrips to two
up-scale neighborhoods in Guangzhou during summer 2002 also revealed that
almost half of the residents were Caucasians, blended with IT professionals of
South Asian descent. The majority of these more recent foreign immigrants are
members of multinational corporations, speaking English and less incorporated
with the local society.
The Land
The land of the Pearl River Delta was more fertile than most other parts of South
China due to the alluvium produced by Pearl River tributaries.*^^ Before the
Southern Song Dynasty (1127 - 1279 A.D.), the Pearl River Delta was however
relatively less developed in comparison with economic centers in northern and
eastern China. But starting from the twelfth century, constant warfare in the north
Many o f these returning expatriates can speak perfect Cantonese and are therefore not considered as
foreigners by local residents. But there are a sizeable number of Southeast Asians, especially from
Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia, who were ethnically Chinese but with limited Cantonese language
capacity, which hinders their assimilation with the local communities.
For instance, there are more than 200,000 Philippine domestic helpers in Hong Kong alone.
See maps o f soil quality and related discussions in Cartier (2001, pp. 80-81).
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caused substantial increase of migration into the region. Historical records of the
Delta’s export of rice to other regions, especially the lower Yangtze River area,
the population eenter of Southern Song Dynasty, date back to this period (Siu and
Faure, 1995, p. 2).
Despite the region’s exceptional soil fertility, the size of arable land is
however very limited given the mountainous terrain, eomplicated watercourses,
and monsoon season floods. This was accompanied by the quiek increase of
population density with the influx of Han migrants from inland China. The
reclamation, protection, and control of land therefore emerged as the most
fundamental socio-economic issue, whieh was resolved in a unique pattern that
defined the region’s eultural geography. First, there was the sustained reclamation
of “sandy land (shatian)” along coastlines throughout the Song, Ming and Qing
dynasties from the twelfth eentury onward. Seeond, all major river channels in the
Delta were diked by mid-fourteenth eentury (ibid, p. 3). Third, “mulberry-dike
fishponds (sang/i yutang)” a distinetive mode of marshy lands utilization,
emerged on the western bank of the Delta due to high costs in the reclamation and
maintenance of agriculture land.'^^ All these types of projects were highly labor-
intensive, which demanded large amount of capital input and involved
eomplicated issues of land control. A unique lineage system based on beliefs of
“Mulberry-dike fishponds” usually exist in low marshy lands where mulberry trees are grown on the
dikes that divide fishponds from each other. While mulberry leafs are food for silkworms, organic
wastes o f silkworms can be used to feed fish. The byproduct of fishery - nutritious soil at the bottom of
fishponds - can then be extracted to nurture the mulberry trees, hence giving rise to a sustainable
production ecology, in which natural resources are utilized to its maximum. Even today, this most
efficient way o f utilizing productive space for high market value outputs (i.e. fish and silk) remain
functional in the rural areas o f the Delta.
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common ancestry was therefore developed to ensure order of the territorial
community in a way that mixed Confucian principles in mainstream Chinese
political culture and the region’s unique maritime traditions.'^* The lineage-based
community structure, a key component of the regional telecom action context,
will he discussed in more detail in the next section of this chapter.
The Ports
Another essential characteristic of the Delta’s policy economy is the maritime
tradition being embodied and sustained by major transportation ports, which set
the stage for the openness of the regional action context. High population density
contributes to the availability of surplus labor that could be used for purposes
other than agriculture and fishery. For instance, the region has been a center for
China’s silk and textile production. As shown in table 4.1, the main exports of the
region during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries included silk products,
cotton cloth, as well as other outputs of local workshops ranging from pottery and
incense to iron implements. This base of local craftsmanship, along with the
region’s geographical position and natural resources, adds tremendously to the
value of the Pearl River Delta, especially its main port, Guangzhou (or Canton as
known to historians), as China’s most important maritime frontier. As Van Dyke
summarizes (2002, p. 13):
Helen Siu and David Faure provided grounded analyses of various lineage communities in the Pearl
River Delta in their edited book Down to Earth: The territorial bonds in South China (1995). For more
introduction, see Maurice Freedman, (1958). Lineage Organization in Southeastern China. London:
Athlone; Robert Eng, (1986). “Institutional and Secondary Landlordism in the Pearl River Delta, 1600-
1949,” Modern China. 12(9), pp. 3-37; David Faure, (1989). “The Lineage as a Cultural Invention: The
case o f the Pearl River Delta,” Modem China. 15(1), pp. 4-36.
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Unlike many other Chinese seaports, Canton was also a major
inland river port, which gave it additional advantages. Canton has
very good and extensive access to inland supplies of provisions,
naval stores, and packaging and bracing materials. There was a
good source of lumber upriver for the making of all the chests that
were needed to pack the goods, and the Canton hinterland afforded
all the necessary items needed for the repair of the ships and the
stowage of cargo. There was also a huge craftsman community in
Canton to service the foreign trade and to make all the necessary
repairs to the factories and to the foreign ships. All of these goods
and services were essential for the smooth, regular, and timely
conduct of trade. Other Chinese ports had some of these
advantages as well, but Canton was exceptional in all of the areas.
Therefore, as European sailors started to frequent the China’s coastline in
the Qing Dynasty,
[i]n the early years of the eighteenth century. Canton quickly
emerged as one of the most regular and flexible places to negotiate
business. While it was not what one would consider ‘free,’ ‘open,’
or even ‘consistent’ from one year to the next, the terms that could
be agreed upon in Canton was almost always more beneficial than
what foreigners could find in any other Chinese port, (ibid, p. 6)
Indeed, long before the westerners arrived, the Delta region had already
been a key node along China’s “Maritime Silk Road (haishang sichou zhilu),”
which linked the country directly with Southeast Asia, India, the Middle East,
East Africa, and indirectly with Europe. A recent archaeological discovery of the
Song Dynasty cargo ship, “Nanhai N o.l” (Che, 2001) in the Yangjiang area west
o f the Delta serves as a most prominent reminder o f the region’s historical
importance as a major international trade center. Not only is Nanhai No.l the
largest millennium-old wood structure seafaring vessel ever unearthed in the
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world, it is also loaded with exquisite porcelains and decorative artifacts produced
in China, some of which were made according to Arabic design.
The Portuguese were among the first European sailors who came ashore in
South China. In 1557, Portuguese Macau became the first European settlement in
the Far East. However, with the decline of Portugal as a colonial power. Canton
remained the most important port in the Pearl River Delta until the mid-nineteenth
century under the “Canton system” by the Qing Dynasty, which made Canton the
sole port of trade for Western merchants (Frederic Wakeman, 1975). The purpose
of the Canton system, however, is to establish institutional barrier against foreign
merchants and maintain a degree of disconnectedness between China and the
outside world. This heavily controlled trade structure finally collapsed due to “the
heavy dependence on silver and widespread opium smuggling, internal corruption
in Chinese administrative structures, and a lack of interest of Chinese officials to
encourage international trade” (Van Dyke, 2002, p. 1). Another reason was that
westerners gained control over the coastal waterways with the arrival of the
steamship in 1830 (ibid, p. 3), which made it much more difficult for Qing
officials to track transactions, levy tax, and impose restrictions. A new trade order
then emerged, following the end of the First Opium War in 1842, when the center
of commerce was shifted from Canton to the British colony of Hong Kong.
Historic struggles over the control of port resources are symptomatic of
today’s tug of war regarding the telecommunications infrastructure.
Transportation and communication, as James Carey (1989) argues, are both
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socially constructed technology systems that are central to community structure
and social control. In the case of the Pearl River Delta, issues of port control are
critical to the region’s globalization processes. Moreover, they alert us that
technologies of apparently “opening” nature - be they trade systems or telecom
infrastructures - are prone to be transformed in an opposite manner and lead to
the increase of disconnectedness, resulting from the intervention of existing
institutions such as the former colonial powers or local Chinese authorities in the
contemporary era.
Lineage and Diaspora
The unique territorial, demographic, and economic characteristics of the maritime
frontier complicated the regional social ecology by accommodating farmers,
landowners, bureaucrats, and members of a typical Confucian agrarian society as
well as seafaring merchants, tribute bearers, missionaries, pirates, and smugglers.
All these actors are indispensable to the regional formation of the Delta. The
convergence of agricultural and commercial interests, on top of land scarcity and
population diversity, gave rise to a distinct and tenacious form of community
bonds known as the lineage.
Land-Based Communities
Along with many anthropologists who conducted fieldwork in the Pearl River
Delta, Johnson observed that:
A dominant and distinctive feature of villages throughout the Pearl
River Delta is that they are lineage villages. Chinese villages are
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property-holding corporations that socially integrate groups of
households whose male heads trace their descent to an apical
ancestor (1993, p. 131).
Lineage determines the commercial cooperation and the allocation of
resources in much of the Delta before Mao’s age. Lineage functioned as an
economic necessity because diking rivers and reclaiming foreshores were both
“capital-intensive,” “high-risk” commercial projects; and “[t]he enforcement of
communal rights, and the clash of interest between communities and individuals,
came to be very much at the heart of social development in the delta” (Siu and
Faure, 1995, p. 3).
Some scholars deem lineage organizations as pure instruments of class
control. For instance, Fu Yiling argues that lineage is “the remnant of the clan
system,” used by landlords “to stabilize the intensification of social class
contradiction and conflict in order to achieve the actual results of ruling the
peasants” (Fu, 1961, p. 81). As pointed out by Liu Zhiwei,
actual reclamation and cultivation activities were not carried out by
lineage members, but by tenant farmers who were commonly the
Dan, the boat people. Landowners did not allow the Dan to own
land or erect substantial housing, and referred to them as shuiliu
chai (floating twigs) and waimian ren (outside people). They
lacked the cultural complex of the limian ren (inside people), or
the bendi ren (original people) who deployed their wealth and
status to maintain socially constructed class relations and economic
opportunities (Liu, 1995, p. 35).
Lineage relationships in the Pearl River Delta, therefore, have both an
economic dimension of property ownership and an anthropological dimension.
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which, to borrow from Duara (1988), constitute “a cultural nexus of power.”
While maintaining cohesion within local communities and differentiating from
the Dan and guei-lou, lineage groups formed “the lowest unit into which south
China society could be atomized” (Freedman, 1958, p. 133). Their tenacity is of
utmost importance to the understanding of collective identification among the
region’s overseas expatriates and the revival of traditional social relationships
during the post-Mao era. Both processes are essential to the telecom action
context of the Delta.
The Expatriates
Overseas expatriates are probably the group that has been most active in the
globalization process of South China, and therefore crucial to the transformation
of the regional communication action context. Until the nineteenth century,
historical records have been relatively rare with regard to emigration from the
Delta to Southeast Asia and other parts of the world. But when Admiral Zheng He
of Ming Dynasty led his famous voyages across the Indian Ocean in the fifteenth
century,there were already Chinese emigrant communities in major port areas
of Southeast Asia. The largest and well-documented wave of emigration is in the
second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century.
See more discussions on the Zheng He voyages in Cartier (2001), pp. 91-93.
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which laid the foundation for the eontemporary global Chinese diaspora.
According to the Basel Mission archives, an excellent souree of information about
Hong Kong and adjacent areas during the period, large-scale emigration from the
Pearl River Delta started in around 1851. By 1880s, the missionaries were
speaking of “emigration fever” and by 1894 of deserted villages and depopulated
districts. By 1906 they described villages with no adult males left at all (Hase,
1995, p. 254).
While such a craze of emigration certainly had devastating consequences
in the local community, those who went offshore did not simply fade away.
Rather, many of them were held together by cultural connections centered on
lineage. One would often be surprised by the amount of resourees that could be
mobilized in this pre-telephone global diaspora when messages had to be
delivered either by mail or personal encounter.'^' In 1896, for example, villagers
of Sha Tau Kok area at the northern border of Hong Kong rebuilt their main
temple. This was one of the areas hit heavily by outward migration. Deeisions
were made that donations would be colleeted for the project from villagers living
abroad. Over a thousand young men from the area responded around the world
It is important to note a distinctive pattern o f immigration among expatriates from the region. While
more immigrants from the eastern part o f the Pearl River Delta are now residing in Hong Kong and
Southeastern Asia, the western delta is the homeland of many North Americans o f Chinese descent
(Johnson, 1993; Woo, 1989; 1990). This is because the eastern delta adjacent to Hong Kong is
historically wealthier and people from this area tended to have their own boats and mercantile resources
that allowed them to own businesses in Southeast Asia; whereas those residing in the western areas
were more likely to be poor, landless peasants who had no choice but to sell their labor during the
period of surging labor demands in the Americas in the nineteenth century, especially during the Gold
Rush in California.
No evidence was found that telegraph was widely used among expatriates at the time, although it is
possible that the technology was in use sporadically by very few members of the Chinese diaspora.
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and sent sizeable contributions from United States, Australia, New Zealand, Peru,
British Columbia, Hawaii, and many other places worldwide (Faure, Luk, and Ng,
1986, pp. 262-280).
A most famous hometown for overseas expatriates in western delta is
Taishan (or toi-san). According to Taishan City Office of Immigrant Affairs, the
city with a population of 1.03 million in 1998 had 1.3 million overseas
expatriates, of whom more than 677,000 resides in North America, including the
parents of Governor Gary Lock in Washington State (Wang, 2003, p. 6). Another
famous expatriate from the Pearl River Delta is Madame Adrienne Clarkson,
Governor General of Canada since 1999, who was bom in Hong Kong and
brought to Canada during World War II as a refugee.
Maritime traditions of the region not only explain the entrepreneurial spirit
and diligent work ethic that characterize most migrant Chinese communities.
They also gave rise to an unusual capacity of the expatriates in their adaptation to
local cultures worldwide, as most prominently evidenced by the diplomatic talents
of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic of China, who were bom in
Zhongshan on the westem bank of the delta and received education in Hawaii,
and later in a Chinese medicine college in Hong Kong. To end the mle of the
Manchurians, Sun gamered support throughout Southeast Asia, and from Japan,
the United States, and various European countries. Based on networks of South
China expatriates, he founded the Nationalist Party (Guomingdang) and used the
Pearl River Delta as a major base for his republican revolution. He successfully
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removed the Manchurians from power and is the only political figure now
commemorated every year on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. As his biographer
writes:
Sun Yat-sen, a Cantonese raised in Hawaii and Hong Kong, was a
pure product of maritime China, the China of the coastal provinces
and overseas communities, open to foreign influences. The travels,
the encounters, and education that the young peasant received in
missionary schools initiated him into the modem world and
aroused him a desire to give China a rank and role worth of it in
that world. ... His extreme geographic mobility nurtured his
equally great versatility of mind and temperament. He could cross
cultural boundaries as easily as geographical ones, adapt to all
societies, all types of men. ... He was as capable of operating in
missionary circles as in the lodges of secret societies, in merchant
guilds as in students’ cultural societies, and was as active in
Tokyo, London, and San Francisco as he was in Hong Kong,
Hanoi, and Singapore (Bergere, 1998, pp. 3, 6).
“ Semi-Feudal, Semi-Colonial Society”
The Pearl River Delta is geographically positioned at the fiinge of the Chinese
Empire bordering the major sea route between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans.
With the encroaching of westem powers in the region, especially since mid-
1800s, this unique location led to a distinct mixture of foreign influences and local
traditions. Contemporary Mainland Chinese textbooks refer to the century
between the Opium War (1839-1842) and the founding of the People’s Republic
in 1949 as a “semi-feudal, semi-colonial” period. While this label is normally
used to describe the entire nation of China, whose lost of sovereignty was
restricted in certain coastal regions and inland cities, it applies particularly well in
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the case of the Delta in capturing the mixed idiosyncrasies of the area’s recent
history, and to a certain extent, of its communication action context today.
The breaking up of the Opium War between Britain and China culminated
from profound differences in the two worldviews on international trade’^ ^ is a
historic watershed for the submission of the Qing Dynasty to European
colonialism, which fundamentally altered power relationship in the Pearl River
Delta. Although Macau was under the rule of Portugal since the sixteenth century,
its role as a trade center had been quite limited. It was in Canton where most
transactions were conducted because this is the only officially sanctioned port for
foreign trade (Wakeman, 1975; Van Dyke, 2002). However, the Chinese demand
for British textile and industrial products could not match up with the purchases
of China’s tea, porcelain, and silk, leading to a total Chinese trade surplus of
about US$ 74.7 million between 1810 and 1826 (Hao, 1986, p. 122). To offset the
deficit, opium was planted in British India and shipped to the delta at the turn of
the nineteenth century by private traders holding licenses from the British East
India Company. This effectively changed China’s trade surplus to deep deficit,
which accounted for US$ 133.7 million from 1827 to 1849 (ibid, p. 129). Opium
remained the leading Chinese import until 1890 (Feuerwerker, 1969).
The impact of the Opium War was not restricted to the commercial
domain. By forcefully opening up China to foreign trade, it also changed the
During this period, the British were in a period o f imperialist expansion and upheld the principle of
“free trade.” On the other hand, the Qing Dynasty, with a record o f hostility towards seafaring peoples,
understood foreign trade as a way to collect tributes and, therefore, was very condescending to foreign
delegations.
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structure of local economy and caused lasting cultural ramifications that rendered
the delta region increasingly different from the rest of the country that remained
under the confinements of the Confucius political culture (Pye, 1992). In parts of
the Pearl River Delta, for example, male dominance in the patriarchic family
order was significantly subverted in a local form of marriage - “delayed transfer
marriage” - as Stockard (1989) terms it. According to this “customary marriage
pattern” in the region, “brides separated from their husbands on the third day after
marriage and returned home to live with their natal families” (ibid, p. 4).'^^ The
reason for this unorthodox cultural practice, as Topley (1975) explains, has to
with the higher economic status of girls because they tended to have higher
income than the male counterparts by working in the burgeoning local silk
industry, which, by the time of late nineteenth century, had absorbed modem
machineries for textile production.
With the arrival of traders came missionaries. While there was some
diffusion of Islam in South China due to the influx of Arabian businessmen, in no
way was this comparable to the impact of Christianity. Catholic missions were
active in both Portugal Macau and Hong Kong; so were various Protestant faith-
based organizations. British missionaries were known as founders of the first
modem Chinese-language periodical, the Chinese Monthly Magazine, in 1815 in
This was expected to last for three years during which the husband could only invite the bride during
important occasions such as festivals, usually by sending sedan chairs and gifts to the bride’s home.
However, it was also “customary” for the brides “to demonstrate a reluctance to visit the husband’s
family, and even to refuse the first invitations” (ibid, p. 15) showing an unusually privileged status o f
young females. It was recorded that, if the bride did not turn down the broom at least in the beginning,
her female friends in the village would “sneer at her and even her mother-in-law would think less of
her” (Stockard, 1989, p. 15).
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Melaka, Malaysia, which was a center of expatriates from the delta and other
parts of South China, hi 1833, the publication o ïEastern Western Monthly
Magazine, the first modem Chinese-language periodical ever published in
Mainland China was also owing to Pmssian missionaries in Guangzhou.
The most prominent result of amalgamating Christianity with indigenous
culture in the Pearl River Delta was the Taiping Rebellion between 1851 and
1864 that posed the most serious challenge to the Manchurian government since
its founding in the seventeenth century.To many historians, the most
interesting subject about the Taiping Rebellion was not its military wax and wane
but its defiant policies targeting at the foundation of Confucianism. One such
policy is their land reform that abolished private ownership and strived for the
even distribution of land among peasants. Another was the promotion of gender
equality, according to which foot binding was prohibited and women were
appointed as administrators and army officers, which was quite unusual in
China’s long history of agrarian revolution. Although the rebellion was finally
suppressed in 1864 under the joint assaults of the Qing army and their British and
American reinforcements, its historical influence was tremendous, today both the
Chinese communists and the nationalists in Taiwan claim to be inspired by the
Taiping Rebellion.
See Miehael Franz (1971). The leader of Taiping Rebellion, Hong Xiuquan, was a village teacher in
the delta’s northern part, who realized under the influenee of westem missionaries that he was the
younger brother o f Jesus Christ sent to establish the Heavenly Kingdom on earth. Hong mixed Christian
faith with Buddhism and declared war against the Manehurians. His troop swept over the entire South
China and half o f Central China, making Nanking its capital, where a faith-based military government
was founded in the name o î “Taiping Tianguo," meaning “the Heavenly Kingdom o f Eternal Peace.”
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As previously mentioned, the Pearl River Delta is also the hometown and
revolutionary base for Sun Yat-sen's republican revolution that successfully
ended the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Since then, the delta region had been a major
center of Chinese revolutions in the first half of the twentieth century (Dirlik,
1989) that fostered a large multitude of political activists fi’ om republican
nationalists (Bergere, 1998) to anarchists (Dirlik, 1991). As for Chinese
communism, the decade between 1917 and 1927 was known among historians as
the “Canton decade” (Chan, 1996) because the period was characterized by the
surging of proletariat unionization, collective actions, and armed clash with both
Chinese and colonial authorities, culminating in the establishment of the short
lived Guangzhou Soviet Government in December 1927.
Between Socialism and Capitalism
When the People’s Liberation Army took over Guangzhou in 1949, the Pearl
River Delta had been traumatized for two decades by Japanese occupation, civil
war, and coercive control exerted by warlords and their affiliates known as “local
bosses” (Siu, 1995). Community-based lineage networks were impaired because
the armed forces paid little respect to traditional social structures.Although
compared to local warlords the Maoists less frequently engaged in smuggling and
the extortion o f ordinary delta residents, their attitudes towards local lineage were
more apprehensive and hostile. Transboundary connections were significantly
For example, the local strongmen occupied ancestral estates and extract taxes from the localities to
be consumed by the Japanese army, the warlords, or themselves. In one instance, they even looted the
wealthy town o f Shiqiao for 3 days in 1940 {ibid, p. 203).
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reduced in the early years of the People’s Republic. But even during the period
under Mao’s rule, linkages had never been completely cut off between Hong
Kong, Macau, and the Delta.
The internal political economy of the region and its connections with the
outside world were profoundly transformed in the post-Mao period after 1978.
Due to economic globalization and the region’s complex cultural and historical
linkages with the global Chinese diaspora, the Delta has become not only a hub
for industrial production and commercial transaction but also a ft-ontier for
China’s economic reform and opening-up. Rapid economic growth in the region
led to acclaims that it has become a new Asian economic “dragon” following the
four Asian tigers of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (Sung, Liu,
Wong, and Law, 1995). This interaction between the socialist and capitalist
modes of social organization is key to the understanding of contextual factors and
(dis)coimectedness patterns in the communication infrastructure of the
contemporary Pearl River Delta.
The Era o f Mao
As previously discussed in chapter three, a central principle of Maoism is self-
reliance, which resulted from an ideology of anti-imperialist nationalism that, as
Friedman points out, “stigmatized the south as the enemy of the nation” (1994, p.
81). By “the south” he means the coastal cities with traditions of international
trade and the home regions of Chinese expatriates, who reside in capitalist
countries and even become capitalists themselves. As a result, Mao once called
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Hong Kong “a pimple on the baekside of China” (Abbas, 2002, p. 217). With him
being the supreme leader of the nation, “[t]be assumptions of development policy
for much of the thirty years after 1949 compromised the operation of local
economies, which turned inward under intense pressure from the Chinese state”
(Johnson, 1993; p. 122).
In anticipation of a new world war, Mao’s economic policy was
excessively focused on the industrial growth of interior provinces (Lin, 1997, pp.
174-177), thus leading to institutional blocks on the economic development in the
Pearl River Delta. Among the 141 key development projects of China’s First
Five-Year Plan, none was located in Guangdong Province (Lei, 1998, p. 7).
Among the 156 key projects aided by the Soviet Union in 1950s and early 1960s,
there was only one that was in westem Guangdong, yet still not in the Delta
region. Moreover, when the pressure of war increased in mid-1960s, the very
limited existing industrial base in Guangzhou was moved to the neighboring
inland province of Jiangxi and more mountainous areas of Guangdong, which
further weakened local economy in the Pearl River Delta (ibid, pp. 7-8). From
1953 to 1978, economic growth in Guangdong was significant lower than the
national average in terms of major indicators such as Gross National Products,
average income, and government financial revenue (Lei, 1998, p. 6).'^^
Guangdong’s GNP growth between 1953 and 1978 was 5.1 percent, which was 1 percent lower than
the national average. Its average income increased by 5 percent per annum, whereas on average the
national figure was 6.6 percent. Government revenue in Guangdong grew 5.5 percent each year, which
was also lower than the 6.9 percent level o f the entire nation.
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It was therefore not surprising to find that, until Deng’s reform and
opening-up, the urban infi-astrueture of Guangzhou improved very little from its
status before the eommunist conquest in 1949 (Cartier, 2001, p. 147). Situation in
some parts of the Delta even deteriorated due to their adjacency to Hong Kong
and Macau. Places like Dongguan, a county halfway between Guangzhou and
Hong Kong, which was considered vulnerable to the “contamination” of
capitalism and naval attacks by overseas enemies (Lin, 1997, p. 172). Little state
investment was thus allocated to the area, leading to incredibly low annual per
capita income (US$ 10) in certain towns (ibid). Given economic hardships during
the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, tens of thousands of people had
to run the risk of death penalty to escape to Hong Kong. According to Vogel
(1989, p. 176), approximately 20 percent of the young people in Dongguan
managed to cross the border to Hong Kong before 1978. The failure of local
economy under Mao’s rule unwittingly produced a new generation of emigrants
who would later return in the era of reform and opening-up.
The lack of development in the Delta during Mao’s age however ironically
prepared a ground void of leftist legacy. Comparing to other economic centers of
the nation, there are less heavy industry productions in the Delta region at the eve
of Deng Xiaoping’s reform. The mode of socialist central planning was not as
deeply embedded as in other places. This structural condition shaped by regional
underdevelopment contributed above and beyond geographical factors to the rapid
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growth of export-oriented light industry in the Pearl River Delta (Lin, 1997, pp.
174-175).
Before 1978, the Maoists also tried to uproot lineage traditions and
disconnect local communities with the overseas Chinese diaspora by labeling
lineage rituals as “feudal remnants,” destroying genealogies, ancestral tablets, and
communal halls (Johhson, 1993, p. 131). There were penalties for those who kept
in touch with overseas families or relatives, a situation that worsened in the
Cultural Revolution, when more than 10,000 family members of expatriates were
persecuted as “traitors” and “spies” (Lei, 1998, p. 9). Officials with overseas
relatives were prevented from being promoted. Those who retained “political or
economic ties” with overseas relatives were advised to be “severely punished”
(ibid., pp. 8-9).
However, economic and cultural connectedness between the Delta and
overseas Chinese persisted during Mao’s age (Vogel, 1989, p. 163). Studies show
that before 1978, households in certain parts of the region still had higher
standards of living than other villagers due to remittances from overseas family
members and relatives in Hong Kong and Macau (Woon, 1990, p. 143).
Moreover, as the massive revival of lineage networks in the post-Mao era
demonstrates, lineage practices were only temporarily forced into dormancy
(Chan, Madsen, and Unger, 1992). They would quickly revive to become a pillar
for transborder regional communities once institutional shackles disappear.
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Reform and Opening-up
If the era of Mao was characterized by the ignoring, suppressing, and demolishing
of historical legacies in the Pearl River Delta, then the period since 1978 has
witnessed the swift reversal of almost all these trends. In the matter of a few
years, the region had become China’s new industrial powerhouse, hosting an
export-oriented economy that attracts huge foreign investment. With the returning
of expatriates, the traditions of lineage have resurfaced with strong popularity.
Caught by surprise, some observers acclaimed this boom of the region as
“miraculous.” Yet, an examination of the regional history would reveal that these
recent developments are at least in one respect the return of the Delta’s past,
compelled by the impoverishing consequences of Maoist radical policies, and
precipitated by the reform and opening-up policies since 1978.
Most critical to the revival of regional economy and traditional social
networks in the delta was the change in state policy as guided by Deng Xiaoping,
China’s paramount leader after Mao. In stark contrast with Mao, he not only
abandoned the assumption of an imminent world war and the political emphasis
on class struggle but also promoted market-oriented developments in South China
as the model that the entire nation should emulate in building a “socialist market
economy with Chinese characteristics.” In so doing, the Delta has been formally
granted favorable policies since 1980 when Shenzhen and Zhuhai were
established as Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Guangzhou was recognized as
an Open Coastal City (Wang, Zhang, and Zhao, 1993, p. 5). Since then, the three
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cities have been enjoying tax relief and more autonomy in offering preferential
treatments to foreign investors. In 1985 and 1986, the Pearl River Delta Open
Economic Region was officially demarcated to include four municipalities
(Dongguan, Foshan, Zhongshan, and Jiangmen) and thirteen counties, where
similar institutional setups were implemented to attract foreign investment as in
the SEZs and Guangzhou. Under the pressure of collective lobbying, this official
definition of the PRD Open Economic Region was expanded in 1987 to include
three additional municipalities and eight other counties (Lin, 1997, pp. 79-80).
One of the essences of post-Mao reform is to empower local governments
whose role was previously limited to policy implementation but now enhanced to
include a broader realm of social and economic planning. The Guangdong
Province, for example, maintained a favorable fiscal relationship with the central
government. Its financial obligation to Beijing remained fixed at RMB 1 billion
yuan per year, even when its revenues grew from 3.43 billion yuan in 1979 to
10.78 billion yuan in 1988 (Wong, 1992, p. 208). At the same time, the central
government was supposed to keep its allocation of investment funds to
Guangdong for transportation and communication construction (Ho and
Huenemann, 1984, p. 48).
On the other hand, the central government did not increase its investment
in Guangdong or the Delta region during the 1980s. Instead, they implemented a
policy known as zhigei zhengce bu geiqian (“the top gives the policy - therefore
the authority, but not the funds”), which essentially authorizes local officials to
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engage in for-profit économie activities (Hsing, 1997, p. 110). This led to a great
surge of extrabudgetary funds collected from both domestic and foreign sources
via the manipulation of political capital in the localities. By the end of the 1980s,
extrabudgetary revenues in Guangdong had reportedly surpassed budgetary
revenues (Wang, S., 1994, p. 99).^^^ Concomitant with the growing financial
power, a great variety of localist practices emerged in South China to take
advantage of preferential policies, sometimes in ways that went beyond the limits
set by Beijing (Yuan, 1994, p. 20), hence, giving rise to a most interesting
contradiction that “Beijing people go to Guangdong to learn the essence of
dealing with the central government” (Qin and Ni, 1993, p. 10).
The convergence of political authority and economic interests at the local
level gave rise to a new class of “bureaucratic entrepreneurs” (Hsing, 1997) who
play a central role in post-Mao reform. These are low-level officials practicing
“local state corporatism” and trying to maximize enterprise revenues by
maneuvering their political and economic resources in unconventional ways (Oi,
1992; Lin, 1995). Besides official incumbency, they are also in a good position to
cater to the needs of the traditional lineage networks and mobilize support in local
This is part of the nationwide surge o f extrabudgetary funds in the 1980s. In 1953, extrabudgetary
funds in China were equivalent to 4 percent of the total state budget. In 1977, on the eve o f the current
economic reform, it was 35.6 percent. As the fiscal authority was further decentralized, the
extradudgetary funds were equivalent to 60 percent of the state budget in 1981, 80 percent in 1985, and
95 percent in 1989 (Wang, S., 1994, p. 99).
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181
communities (Yang, 1994, pp. 59-98).^^* There is a more complicated side in the
role of bureaucratie entrepreneurs that is critical to the formation of
disconnectedness in the regional communication infrastructure, especially the
centrifugal tendency that often results in institutional blocks both within the
business eircles and among the government offices themselves.
Compartmentalized interests and lack of coordination mean that local state
eorporatism may not always be beneficial to investors. For instance, in 1994, “a
property developer in Guangzhou had to pay 62 types of fees and taxes for a
project, which included 12 payments for national taxes and 50 local charges”
(Hsing, 1997, p. 111). It is also possible that the bureaucratic entrepreneurs may
engage in “predatory” praetices with their sole aim being to extract rents from
entrepreneurs through fees, levies, and fines (Baum and Schevchenko, 1999).
However, the constraints set by predatory bureaucratic entrepreneurs
should not be exaggerated. Given that there are many localities in the Delta,
which are geographieally adjacent and enjoying similar policymaking privileges,
investors are more than likely to move to the neighboring town if they were
mistreated in one plaee. This is particularly true because, as previously discussed,
firms in the Pearl River Delta, be it foreign owned or export-oriented Chinese
factories, engage in the late capitalist mode of lean produetion that emphasizes
As Wank argues, “[t]his is not a case o f scattered officials supporting entrepreneurs by making
deviant decisions to favor them but a case of entire bureaus defining their practical policies and
operating procedures to support private firms in ways o f varying legality” (2001, p. 20). And in many
parts o f South China, the relatively decentralized local state structure has formed a symbiotic
relationship with networks o f entrepreneurs (Hsing, 1997, p. 9).
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182
flexibility and deliveries just in time. As a result, local state agencies in the region
have to compete with each other to attract investors by improving basic
infrastructure and granting prolonged tax breaks. In some cases, they even
allowed for the birth of a second child in certain areas of the Delta because they
claim that Deng Xiaping “wanted to attract investment from overseas Chinese and
they would be upset if their family roots were cut” (Becker, 1999).
Deng was right on this point because “[i]t is the loyalty to ancestral points
of origin on the part of expatriates that calls forth a willingness, even after
decades abroad, to donate to homeland projects” (Johhson, 1993, p. 127). The role
of traditional lineage is both prominent and effective in attracting foreign capital,
which shows that the strengthening of social connectedness has real implications
for the regional economy. For instance, in 1984, sixteen towns in the Pearl River
Delta, where most overseas expatriates were originally from, received US$ 66.7
million as remittance (Zheng, 1989, p. 96). And when after 1978 lineage networks
resurfaced in the region, leading to the repair of ancestral graves, lineage libraries,
and the practices of traditional rituals, major donations are almost always from
abroad:
Funds are remitted through a network that is worldwide but
energized from Hong Kong. The network is maintained by a
sophisticated and widespread communications system. From the
westem delta there flows a large stream of local publications that
focus on the reliance of local areas on the contributions of kinsmen
and fellow countrymen overseas in maintaining local integrity.
Local history and local tradition are emphasized, and while
economic advances receive careful attention, they are seen to be in
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183
harmony with a local cultural base that is firmly rooted in kinship
(Johhson, 1993, pp. 132-133).
The critical role of Hong Kong is not only seen in the revival of lineage
networks but in all aspects of economic taking-off in the Pear River Delta. Before
large-scale industrialization in the 1990s, in places like Dongguan, “vegetables
are cultivated year round for the Hong Kong market by an enterprise that works
jointly with a Hong Kong-based expatriate; it employs wage workers, the bulk of
whom are villagers” (ibid, p. 123). Until 2002, it is estimated that Hong Kong
firms have employed 11 million workers in the Delta (Feng, 2003). In a typical
day of 2002, there were more than 600 cargo vessels and about 25,000 goods
vehicles plying between Hong Kong and the Delta and there are about 400
container line services on weekly basis from Hong Kong to 500 overseas
destinations. Each week, there are also 1500 flights to 130 destinations to ensure
that goods produced in the Delta are delivered to target markets just in time.’^ ^
Besides favorable local policies and historical linkages with overseas
expatriates, a key attraction of the Delta is its low production cost, especially in
terms of labor. Daily wage for a 12-hour shift in a toy factory in Shenzhen, for
example, was about one U.S. dollar in mid-1990s (Yi, 1998, pp. 28-29). By the
end of 2002, the average manufacturing wage increased to about US$ 0.6 per
hour, which is still only 5 percent of the American average and 10 percent of that
Hong Kong Trade Development Council, “Introduction to the Pearl River Delta,” 2002.
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184
in neighboring Asian economies.Most of the workers in the Delta region are
migrants from inland provinces, who, like the Dan people being denied property
and residence rights in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, are not officially registered
as local residents. They come from virtually every province of China with
different levels of education, speaking dialects that are not mutually
understandable, thus adding greatly to the diversity of population and subsequent
forms of social disconnectedness due to linguistic barriers. In certain localities
migrant workers make up the majority of residents (Fan, 1995; 1999).''^*
Gender gap also contrihutes to social disconnectedness especially among
the new immigrant groups, hi the labor-intensive mode of production that
characterized the Delta region, rural girls from other provinces are the major
victims of systematic exploitation. According to the male dominated discourse,
they were believed to be more “docile” and “disciplined” with “nimble fingers”
that suit the work of making toys or electronic gadgets (Cartier, 1997, p. 193).
The ethnographic work of Ching Kwan Lee (1998) and You-tien Hsing (1998)
documented in detail how migrant female workers were subject to structural
constraints (e.g. shopfloor rules) and excessive abuse (from overtime work to sex
demands). The gravity of the problem is confirmed by macro spatial statistical
analyses of Guangdong Province (Fan, 1999), revealing probably only the tip of
The Economist, “Is the wakening giant a monster?” February 13, 2003.
For example, migrant workers made up 70 percent o f Shenzhen’s three million people in mid-1990s
(Yi, 1998, p. 28). All these workers however are forbidden to form independent unions, and the All-
China Federation of Trade Unions, the only legitimate organization to represent workers is unusually
manipulated by the COP and cannot stand up against local government or foreign investors when there
is a conflict o f interests.
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185
iceberg for the larger context of China’s “gendered industrialization” (Cartier,
2001, pp. 176-204).
In sum, the contemporary period of Pearl River Delta since 1978 is
characterized by the revival of historical legacies, from transboundary activities to
community lineage, juxtaposed with the speed, flexibility, and networked forms
of late capitalism that has re-structured the regional economy and local society.
Most remarkable is the tenacity of certain traditional social ties that survived
Maoist suppression for almost three decades and played a critical role in the boom
of regional economy. Although power had been shifted from community elders
and warlords to local officials and returning expatriates, the basic structure of
insider/outsider defined by land ownership and dialects has remained little
changed. And migrant workers, just like the boat-dwelling Dan people, remain the
most disconnected group because they have less economic and cultural resources,
despite the fact that they provide the bulk of labor for key production activities, be
it the reclamation of “sandy lands” or the assembly of phone sets.
“Forms of economic organization do not develop in a social vacuum: they
are rooted in cultures and institutions” (Castells, 1996, p. 172). The cultural and
institutional complex of contemporary Pearl River Delta resulted from the
traditional nexus of transboundary activities and lineage networks. It has gone
This does not mean that all traditional ties before the communist revolution have been revived.
Indeed, there were forms o f social connectedness that were destroyed in Mao’s era, which haven’t
resurfaced during the post-1978 reforms. However, arguably the two most important essences of the
Delta’s traditional regional culture - lineage and transboundary mercantilism - have both re-emerged
forcefully and become key driving forces for the transformation o f the region in the post-Mao period.
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186
through a profound transformation and renaissance in the post-Mao era to become
the major maritime frontier of the People’s Republic, where global capital meets
China’s floating population, providing a most intriguing case for the study of a
communication infrastructure at the margin between socialism and capitalism.
The Making o f (Dis) Connections
The terrain of Pearl River Delta is characterized by a multitude of barriers to
communication among the localities given complex waterways in the center,
islands in the south, and mountains and lakes scattering throughout the region.
Due to limited economic development during Mao’s age, one would not be
surprised to find a shortage of telecom services in the area at the inception of the
marketization reform. In 1978, for instance, the average teledensity in Guangdong
Province was 0.32 phone sets per hundred people, or one telephone for each 313
people (Liang, Shen, and Chen, 1992, p. 78). Guangzhou, the provincial capital
and economic center of the delta had no direct long-distance phone line with 49
percent of counties and cities in the Guangdong Province until as late as 1983.
According to MPT’s nationwide regional administrative divisions, Guangzhou
was not even the center of China’s South-Central telecom area (zhongnan qu). Up
to 1984, it was administratively subordinate to Wuhan Post and Telecom Bureau,
an inland city along the Yangtze River.
Geography o f Post and Telecommunications, Beijing: People’s Telecom Press, 1984.
Ibid. p. 61.
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187
While the general level of aceess to telecommunications was extremely
low among average residents of the region, there was a fairly elaborated system
for the provision of telephone services among officials and state agencies. On
March 1,1978, at the eve of Deng’s reforms, Guangdong Provincial Telecom
Bureau promulgated eight types of long-distance telephone services that included
seven special categories for usage among CCP and government cadres in addition
to the only one type - “Ordinary Telephony (putong dianhua)” - designed for the
general public.''*^ This institutional setup clearly reflected the Maoist conception
of telecommunications as primarily a service sector attached to the communist
party-state. It was designated to serve the authorities, rather than “the people,” be
it entrepreneurs or ordinary members of the society.
Trajectories o f Growth
An overlooked sector in a “marginal” region, the telecommunications
infrastructure in the Delta was in deed quite pathetic by the end of the Maoist era.
In the 26 years between 1952 and 1978, the total telecom business volume had
increased only RMB 58 million yuan in Guangdong, while the total number of
local branch telecom offices did not increase but decreased by 1,823 (Zhou, Chen,
and Fei, 1990, p. 208). This was understandable because telecommunications was
not emphasized in economic policies of the time that prioritized heavy industries.
History o f Guangdong Province: Post and Telecommunications. Guangzhou: Guangdong Local
History Editorial Committee. August 1999. p. 188. The seven speeial types are: (1) Code Telephony
(daihao dianhua), (2) Special Telephony (tezhong dianhua), (3) Leadership Telephony {shouzhang
dianhud), (4) Emergency Control Telephony (jinji diaodu dianhua), (5) Military and Official
Telephony (junzheng dianhua), (6) News Reporting Telephony (xinwen dianhua), and (7) Public
Affairs Telephony {gongwu yewu dianhua). Most o f these special types are no longer in use.
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188
and the Pearl River Delta, a region with extensive “suspicious” overseas relations
and assumed vulnerability to imperialist invasion, received little support from the
central government.
However, with the region being at the frontier of Deng’s open-door
reforms and its geographic adjacency to Hong Kong and Macau, the Maoist
approach to telecommu-nications, which was heavily state-based and centrally
planned, turned out very quickly to be unfitting with the new age. Demands for
more and better telecom services surged in early 1980s, especially in non-state
sectors. Burgeoning regional economy, heightening local autonomy, and the
returning of wealthy expatriates, all add to the momentum of telecom growth in
Guangdong and the Delta, which started to be at a much faster speed than the rest
of the nation. The first major progress was in 1984 when new telephone
transmission systems were imported and installed in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and
Zhuhai, the three cities that enjoyed the most preferential treatments of economic
opening-up.^"*^ Besides telephone, a three-tier organizational structure was also
established for the management of data transmission at the provincial,
prefectural/municipal, and county levels throughout the Delta,'^^ which is the
major administrative framework governing telecom development between 1984
and 2002.
Guidebook fo r Investment in the Pearl River Delta Economic Open Area. Hong Kong: Xinhua
Publications. 1986, p. 69.
Guidebook fo r Investment in the Pearl River Delta Economic Open Area. Hong Kong: Xinhua
Publications. 1986, p. 70.
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189
Table 4.2 The growth of GDP and telecom revenue in the Pearl River Delta:
Total volume (adjusted on the basis of 1990 price) and as percentage of
Guangdong and China
Total Telecom Telecom Revenue Total GDP GDP as % of
Revenue as % of
(billion
(million USD*)
Guangdong China
USD*)
Guangdong China
1980 5.3 41.9 3.3 1.4 47.7 2.6
1985 15.4 61.8 4.3 3.7 52.6 3.4
1990 150.8 47.4 15.3 10.5 55.9 4.7
1995 2,053.8 82.9 17.2 47.2 68.0 6.7
2000 6,591.4 65.6 15.2 89.2 77.6 8.3
Sources: Compilation based on China Statistics Yearbook (2001). Edited by National Statistical
Bureau. Beijing: China Statistics Publications; Fifty Years o f Guangdong: Statistics (1949-1999),
edited by Guangdong Provincial Government Office and Guangdong Provincial Statistics Bureau;
Guangdong Statistical Information Handbook (2001), Guangdong Provincial Statistics Bureau;
Guangdong Telecommunications Yearbook (2000), edited by Guangdong Provincial Bureau o f
Telecommunications; and P earl River D elta Economic Statistics (1980-1994). Edited by CCP
Guangdong Provincial Committee Office and Guangdong Provincial Statistics Bureau, 1995.
* 1 USD = RMB 8.27 Yuan
The development of telecommunications in the Pearl River Delta has been
most phenomenal in the last two decades of the twentieth century, as shown in
Table 4.2. It is important to bear in mind that the Delta only accounts for 0.4
percent of China’s land mass and less than 3 percent of its population. Yet from
1980 to 2000, the total telecom revenue of the region increased more than 1000
times from US$ 5.3 million to 6.6 billion, which was remarkable not only in
absolute terms but as percentage of the Guangdong Province and of the entire
nation. In this period, the Delta’s share of the provincial telecom revenue also
rose from 42 percent to 66 percent, suggesting a further strengthening of the
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190
region’s economic significance in the province. Meanwhile, the region’s share of
national total telecom revenue increased almost five times from 3.3 percent in
1980 to 15.2 percent in 2000, which is a most extraordinary growth relative to
telecom developments in other parts of the country. As shown in Table 4.2,
phenomenal telecom development in the Delta was coupled with dramatic
economic growth as indicated by the delta’s GDP figure and its shares in
Guangdong Province and the nation.
Up to 1990, the general information environment of the delta region had
significantly improved beyond the provincial and national average levels. A study
by Lu and Wang quantifies the utilization of telecommunication, post, and mass
media channels in China by latel980s, and demonstrated that the overall
information environment of the Pearl River Delta is 71 percent better than
Guangdong’s provincial average and 458 percent better than the national average
(1992, p. 315). In terms of more specific dimensions of informatization, they
found that the Delta has relatively low score for information provision but very
high score for information demand (ibid, p. 319). This is consistent with the
national level observation that actual telecom development in the 1980s was
slower than the increase of demand in telecom services. It also resonates with the
provincial statistics that, while manufacturing industries had been growing at the
speed of 28.2 percent per year in Guangdong in the 1980s, its telecommunication
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191
and transportation sector only increased 22.4 percent each year.*'*^ There was
therefore a wider gap between information supply and demand in the booming
Pearl River Delta, which triggered strong impetus to develop telecommunications
in the delta in the 1990s.
As Figure 4.2 demonstrates, the turning point for regional telecom
development was in 1992, along a trajectory that shares striking similarity with
the growth pattern at national level (see Figure 3.2). 1992 was the year when
Deng Xiaoping made his influential “Southern Tour Speeches,” which led to the
formal addition of “building socialist market economy with Chinese
characteristics” to the Constitution of the CCP. In this sense, telecom
development in the Pearl River Delta reflects a general pattern of change in the
telecom sector at the national level. Moreover, it signals a path of growth more
reliant on communication and information technologies when more connections
can be made to both domestic and international markets. By the end of 1995,
Guangdong has become the largest telephone network in China, with 5.8 million
landline subscribers, 1 million mobile phone subscribers, and a teledensity of 12.2
percent (You, 1997, p. 296). Telecom growth since 1995 was even more
extraordinary with indicators for year 2001 being 17.1 million landlines, 24.2
See Hong Ma and Weishen Fang, (1991). China's Regional Development and Industry Policies
{zhongguo de diqufazhan yu chanyezhengce). Beijing: China Finance and Economy Publications, pp.
894-897. Until late 1990s, most official statistics aggregate telecommunications with transportation,
which in many cases was the only available data for approximations of historical changes in the
telecommunications sector.
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192
Figure 4.2. Development of telecommunications in Guangdong Province
10000
Gross
Revenue
Investment:
Telecom and
Transportation
Maintenance:
Telecom and
Transportation
-r
Year
Sources: Compilation based on History o f Guangdong Province: Post andTelecommunications.
Guangdong Local History Editorial Committee. August 1999; Guangdong Statistics Yearbook
(1984-2001). Guangdong Provincial Statistics Bureau; Guangdong Statistical Information
H andbook (2001). Guangdong Provincial Statistics Bureau; and Compilation o f Provincial
H istorical Statistics M aterials in China (1949-1989). Edited by National Statistical Bureau.
Beijing: China Statistics Publications. August 1990.
million mobile phones, and a teledensity rate of 57.3 percent.In 2002, the total
telecom revenue of Guangdong Province reached US$ 10.4 billion, which was the
largest among all provinces in China.
The growth of export-oriented economy and the resurgence of lineage ties
were instrumental in accelerating the development of telecom infrastructures in
the Delta. Until 1978, there were few such communication channels even to Hong
Guangdong Province Economic Overview. Guangdong Provincial Statistics Bureau. Available:
http://www.gd.gov.cn/gov gd/gd economv.htm.
Guangdong Statistics Network. Available:
http://www.gdstats.gov.cn/tongiishuiu/ind vsvd pub.htm.
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193
Kong and Macau despite their physical adjacency. It was only in April 1979 when
the first-ever direct public phone line was set up between the Delta and Macau.
In the same year, Guangzhou Municipal Telecom Bureau added 25 semi
automatic dialing lines to Hong Kong with financial and technical support from
Cable & Wireless Hong Kong. By then, Guangzhou only had 300 manually
operated long-distanee lines with Hong Kong, which were the only phone lines to
reach overseas expatriates in the entire Guangdong Province at the time. The
gradual improvement of telecom infrastructure in early 1980s did not match with
skyrocketing demand for cross-border telephone calls, as evidenced by a major
shortage of long-distance services in the Spring Festival of 1984.'^^ To increase
supply, large amount of investments from non-state sectors were mobilized for the
construction of telephone networks, and by the end of October 1988, a fiber optic
line was established along a strip of major cities from Guangzhou, Dongguan, and
Huizhou, to Shenzhen and Hong Kong.'^^ In 1990, Guangdong had acquired
3402 phone lines to Hong Kong and 259 lines to Macau. By 2002, there were not
only a great multitude of fixed-line connections between the delta and the former
colonies, but also pervasive use of roaming services for pagers and mobile
phones.There was also a burgeoning Internet market in Guangdong,which
History o f Guangdong Province: Post and Telecommunications. Guangzhou: Guangdong Local
History Editorial Committee. August 1999. p. 221.
Ibid.
This project was also a joint venture with Hong Kong Cable & Wireless Co. Ltd.
See History o f Guangdong Province: Telecommunications, p. 215. On October 17, 1986,
Guangdong Provincial Telecom Bureau started to build mobile phone network in the delta using
equipments from Eriksson, the Swedish mobile phone giant, which was put to use during the Sixth
National Games in Guangzhou on November 18, 1987.
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194
had the largest provincial Internet user population in China, i.e. 4.4 million
subscribers including 138 thousand broadband users by July 2002.*^^
Regional Telecom Policies
One of the most serious barriers to the construction of telecom networks in the
Pearl River Delta is the lack of investment. In the three years from 1980 to 1982,
telecom projects in Guangdong needed RMB 190 million, but financial support
from the central government was less than 10 percent of the total amount.
Preferential policies were therefore granted to the region, which by then had been
recognized as the frontier of policy experimentation for Deng’s economic
reforms. Due to the lack of financial resources, the general policy principle in
early 1980s was that “whoever invests can manage and profit (from telecom
networks and services) {shuitouzi shuijingying shuishouyi)” (Zhou, Chen, Fei,
1990, p. 211).’^ * Along this line of thinking, a variety of investment channels
were utilized in addition to budgetary supports from MPT and the central
government, including domestic bank loans, foreign capital, and funds from local
telecom enterprises themselves such as installation fees and long-distance
surcharges, which did not exist before 1980.*^^ It was thus of little surprise that,
from 1980 to 1985, two thirds of telecom investment in Guangdong was from
See History o f Guangdong Province (Telecommunications). Guangzhou: Guangdong People’s
Publications. August 1999. p. 45. Guangdong started to have commercial public Internet services on
October 1, 1995.
Guangdong Provincial Bureau of Information Industry. August 2002.
7’ wo Decades o f Brilliant Success. Beijing: China Statistics Bureau, 1998, p. 223.
This is a particular expression in the telecom sector based on the overall economic policy at the time:
“the top gives the policy - therefore the authority, but not the funds.”
History o f Guangdong Province (Telecommunications). Guangzhou: Guangdong People’s
Publications. August 1999. pp. 310-311.
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195
extrabudgetary channels,via local state, collectives, and individuals, especially
successful overseas expatriates, which effectively compensated for the
insufficiency of input from the central government. This was by and large an
effective policy. By 1985, Guangdong had been equipped with an additional
147,000 urban telephone access lines and almost 3000 additional long-distance
phone lines.
The utilization of extrabudgetary channels was formally authorized by
MPT in 1990 when a new policy was issued to promote capital input for telecom
projects in the country, especially from banks, foreign firms, and
nongovernmental sectors.With more institutional support and surging demand
in the telecom market, the investment structure further changed towards more
reliance on local telecom firms and foreign capital, which accounted for 76
percent and 18 percent of the provincial fixed assets investment from 1991 to
1995, as shown in Table 4.3. Meanwhile, the proportion of central government
investment and funds from MPT continued to decline from nearly 30 percent
during 1981 - 1985 to less than 1 percent during 1991 - 1995.
From 1978 to 1997, Guangdong had utilized US$ 6.56 billion from
overseas sources, i.e. 14 percent of the provincial fixed asset investment in the
Almanac o f China's Economy (1986), Beijing Economic Management Publications, p. VI-209.
Ibid.
See Two Decades o f Brilliant Success. Beijing: China Statistics Bureau, 1998, p. 223. The new
principles are (1) telecom investment should be raised from multiple agencies; (2) telecom providers
should be compensated, (3) profit should be divided according to capital input, and (4) taxes should be
collected according to regulations.
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196
Table 4.3 Percentage composition of telecommunications fixed assets
investment in Guangdong Province (Ding, 1996, p. 9)
TYPES OF
FUNDS
1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995
Budget: Central
Government
26.33 2.04 0.3
Budget: Ministry
of Post and
Telecom
1.51 1.07 0.67
Budget: Local
Telecom
Enterprises
55 56.93 76.15
Loans from
Domestic Banks
10.17 19.29 4.7
Foreign
Investment and
Loans
2.83 19.44 17.82
Others 4.16 1.23 0.36
TOTAL FUNDS
(billion RMB)
0.6 4.3 36
telecom sector. Most foreign investments were allocated to the upgrading of
urban telephone systems, involving advanced long-distance switching machines,
fiber optics, microwave, satellite communications, and other new technologies. In
this process, investors fi-om Hong Kong have been the most active group due to
the status of the city as a center for international financial and trade transactions
' See Two Decades o f Brilliant Success. Beijing: China Statistics Bureau, 1998, p. 223.
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197
as well as a key link for the global Chinese diaspora (Kwok and So, 1995; Lin,
2003).
Patterns o f Spatial Variation
The overwhelming importance of Hong Kong in the development of telecom
infrastructures in the Pearl River Delta is manifest in the evolution of the region’s
spatial distribution of telecom services. As shown in figure 4.3a, Guangzhou, the
single most important source of telecom income among all cities in 1980,
produced more than US$ 2 million of revenue or 38 percent of the regional total.
Figures 4.3h and 4.3c demonstrate the continual importance of Guangzhou as a
center of telecom services. But its relative importance had declined, mostly due to
the rise of Shenzhen, the Special Economic Zone next to Hong Kong, and its
neighboring city of Dongguan, which also hosts a large number of Hong Kong
manufacturers.
As a result, the share of Guangzhou in the regional telecom market
decreased to 24 percent in 1990. Although in the 1990s, Guangzhou incorporated
several small counties and cities surrounding it including Zhengcheng, Huadu,
Conghua, and Panyu, its share was still less than 32 percent in year 2000 at a
much lower level than in 1980. In contrast, Shenzhen’s share of regional telecom
revenue was steadily on the rise. It increased from 4 percent in 1980 to 26 percent
in 1990 and 30 percent in 2000. Dongguan’s share also increased from 4 percent
to 10 percent to 14 percent in these three years. The growth of telecom is most
impressive in Shenzhen and Dongguan because, unlike Guangzhou and Foshan,
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198
the two cities closest to Hong Kong did not merge with formerly separate
administrative units, yet their speed of increase was faster than the rest of the
Delta.
Two additional trends can be observed regarding the evolution of spatial
distribution for telecom revenues within the region. First, the level of telecom
development is higher in the inner circle of the Delta than the outer circle, which
was also a finding in the study by Lu and Wang (1992, p. 320). Second, telecom
growth on the western side of the Delta is slower than cities on the east bank. The
Special Economic Zone of Zhuhai, although enjoying the same preferential
policies as Shenzhen, has not become a new hub for telecom operations of similar
scale. Moreover, before being integrated into large cities, the small counties of
Taishan, Kaiping, Enping, and Doumen had the lowest speed of development
throughout the delta during 1980 - 1994.^^"^ This unevenness of telecom growth is
reflected not only by gross revenue of the localities but also in per capita terms
such as teledensity. By the end of 1999, for example, only three of the major cities
in the region - Jiangmen, Shunde, and Nanhai - had fewer than 50 telephone sets
per hundred people. All of them are on the west bank of the Delta, where a higher
proportion of residents live in rural areas.
Statistical Materials about Major Social Economic Indicators in Twelve Cities in the Pearl River
Delta (2000). Jointly edited by statistical bureaus o f the twelve cities. Published by Dongguan Statistics
Bureau.
See Statistical Materials about Major Social Economic Indicators in Twelve Cities in the Pearl
River Delta (2000). Jointly edited by statistical bureaus o f the twelve cities. Published by Dongguan
Statistics Bureau, p. 93.
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199
Figure 4.3. Spatial Distribution of Telecommunications Revenue within the Pearl
River Delta (1980-2000)'^^
Figure 4.3 a. Spatial Distribution of Telecommunications Revenue within the
Pearl River Delta (1980)
RMB M -n m U k m
# RM BIj-aBm & m
e SMBl.0-1.4raiU*)»
* RNB 0.4 -0.9
f liuhui
M mcmu
M ■ « > » n « ♦
S l U 'l l / l l CN
# % n n g Kong
/
Figure 4.3b. Spatial Distribution of Telecommunications Revenue within the
Pearl River Delta (1990)
RMB2£>0 - 330M iüliDn
RMB 130-130 «rnmm
m nB 25~70imlboft
St»«îî>i i hi**.# s * *
Sources: Compilation based on Pearl River Delta Economic Statistics (1980-1994). Edited by CCP
Guangdong Provincial Committee Office and Guangdong Provincial Statistics Bureau, 1995; Basic
Information about Postal and Telecom Enterprises in Guangdong Province (1991-1995). Edited by
Guangdong Provincial Bureau o f Post and Telecommunications; Guangdong Telecommunications
Yearbook (2000). Edited by Guangdong Provincial Bureau o f Telecommunications; and Statistical
Materials about Major Social Economic Indicators in Twelve Cities in the Pearl River Delta (2000).
Jointly edited by statistical bureaus o f the twelve cities. Published by Dongguan Statistics Bureau. USD
1 dollar = RMB 8.27 Yuan.
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200
Figure 4.3c. Spatial Distribution of Telecommunications Revenue within the
Pearl River Delta (2000)
£
.N
6 . q
• / h u h i i i
I ' \ m Ov*
IlnnK K < m f£
S t m t f t f h i i ' w
The spatial variation shows clearly that telecom growth has been uneven
within the Delta, between the central and eastern parts of the region and places on
the west bank, along the line of split between more urbanized areas and those with
larger span of rural space. What is not shown in these maps are the lack of
connections among state-sponsored telecom providers, commercial players, and
local residents including long-term dwellers and migrant workers, which will be
elaborated in the following chapters.
In sum, while there are notable geographic disparities in the growth of
telecommunications, the regional telecommunication infrastructure of the Pearl
River Delta was significantly improved during the 1980s, and the speed of
development further accelerated since the 1990s. This led to rapid increase in the
building of telecom facilities, the emergence of private business with connections
to overseas expatriates, and expansion of the user base from a highly limited
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201
circle of party-state officials to average members of the society. Indeed, this is a
series of transformations facilitated by the diffusion of telecom technologies,
which has profound implications for the (dis)connectedness patterns of the
regional communication infrastructure.
Contextual Resources and the Regional Nexus
Unlike the pre-1978 era, when telecom services were seen as exclusive privilege
for party-state officials and therefore too much a luxuary for average delta
residents, the discursive preconditions for storytelling telecom changed
dramatically during the post-Mao period of marketization reforms. Because
Deng’s modernization policies place special favors on the Pearl River Delta, the
regional communication infrastructure has been transformed from a fairly closed
system to one with probably the highest level of openness in the country with a
great multitude of economic and cultural connections to overseas Chinese
expatriates and the capitalist world-system.
It is the argument of this chapter that the rapidly increasing level of
openness in the Delta’s communication infrastructure owes as much to economic
and institutional factors at national and global levels as to the historical legacies
of the region itself. Without its historic maritime tradition, the booming of export-
oriented econom y in the region would have been impossible. Without its land-
based lineage community structure, overseas expatriates would not have returned
to the region bringing investment, new technology, and business expertise despite
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three decades of Maoist repression. Also notable is that, without the pedigree of
unorthodox cultural practices, from delayed transfer marriage to the blending of
religious and revolutionary movements, the resurgence of localism and
bureaucratic entrepreneurship would have been more difficult.
While this chapter only provides a brief overview of the region’s
geography and history, the main purpose is to demonstrate the intrinsic
connections among the Delta’s terrain, maritime culture, and traditional
community structure, and how all of them prepare a fertile ground for the
development of télécommunications in the post-Mao era. In this sense, dramatic
telecom growth in the region should be seen as less a manifestation or cause for
historical discontintuity than the revival of past traditions, whereby the
significance of new technologies is found in the fulfilling of old purposes. Like
the reclamation of “sandy land,” large-scale telecom infrastructure is built to
augment land value. Like local craftsmanship serving Canton, the burgeoning
telecom service and manufacture sector is essentially part of the export-oriented
economy. And the ultimate challenge for the development of telecom in the
region, as we will discuss further, is to maintain a balance between easier trans-
border activities and the cohesion of local community, a problem that the local
society has confronted for a long time. The influence of history is therefore most
profound in this case precisely because it is embedded in the geographical unit of
the Delta.
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The focus on the region’s history and geography allows for a systematic
examination of contextual resources - be they discursive, institutional, or material
- and how they collectively shape the processes of storytelling telecom. The
region, conceptualized as such, is a centerpiece of this communication action
context because it serves not only as the most fundamental spatial unit containing
various contextual resources but also as a critical transformational force in itself
that brid'ges history with agentic actions at present. This was evidenced by the
phenomena of bureaucratic entrepreneurship as well as activities of returning
expatriates, which, in both cases, demonstrate mutual influences among late
capitalism, the Chinese diaspora, and the vested interests of local officials, all
situated and enacted in this regional nexus of communication ties.
A key merit of such a regional conception is that “it presupposes no
particular territorial boundary definitions and imputes spatialities alternative to
the state” (Carteir, 2001, p. 37). In this relatively open action context from 1978
onward, telecommunications started to be seen as not only an industry that could
exist outside the state bureaucracy but also as a basic infrastructure servicing the
region itself, as a means of economic modernization, a channel for transboundary
transactions. This is also a way by which a renaissance can be fostered for the
region’s historical legacies. In this sense, post-Mao telecom development in the
Pearl River Delta, growing at a much faster speed than the national average, can
be seen to a certain extent as indication for a delinkage of the region from the rest
of China, while integrating it with the Asian Pacific section of the capitalist
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world-system, spearheaded by overseas Chinese entrepreneurs originated from the
region.
Finally, revisiting the regional history also provides a glimpse into various
symptoms of communicative disconnectedness inside the Delta. The past
suppression of the Dan people shares much similarity with discriminatory
treatment of migrant workers in the post-Mao era in that both groups form an
essential part of the region’s labor force yet were denied equal rights due to lower
economic status and socio-cultural differences. The returning of expatriates
should give as much cause to concern as to celebration because they often form
close relationship with local officials and such joint ventures are often
characterized by most radical practices of lean production. There are also
considerable spatial variations between the region’s urban and rural segments
with the historically deprived areas constantly tailing wealthier cities in telecom
development. This chapter has started to explore some of these questions by
providing a historical background. But to understand contemporary forms of
transformation and the evolving patterns of telecom-facilitated
(dis)connectedness, we would need to examine more specifically the ways in
which local governments, commercial telecom players, and ordinary residents of
the Delta play their roles as key storytellers in the communication infrastructure.
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CHAPTER V
THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF A
COMMUNICATION REVOLUTION
Communism is a good social system, and it also needs
good technical support. That was why East Europe failed,
because they didn’t know the secret of information
technology. Informationization is indeed an essence of
communism. Last time I sang the Internationale at a
gathering, I thought, “Gee, ‘the Internationale (yin te na
xiong na ’ er)' - that sounds very close to ‘the Internet (yin
te nai te).”’ That’s very obvious, isn’t it?
- Local official. City of Nanhai
To analyze the telecom storytelling system, we start with local state agencies
because, as previously discussed, they are the ultimate decision-makers for most
telecom-related projects within the Pearl River Delta. In many cases, local
officials were the first in initiating telecom projects by verbally promoting new
communication technologies as ways to modernize local societies, and then
implementing the plans and materializing their ambitions for advanced telecom
infrastructures. They were able to do so because of the decentralized structure of
governance in the Delta region, a consequence of post-Mao reforms, as well as
the institutional legacy that telecommunications was a state monopolized industry
up until the mid 1990s.
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How are narratives constructed regarding telecommunication
developments from the perspective of local governments in the Pearl River Delta?
Why are some stories told rather than others? What are the basic features of
telecom storytelling networks among local officials? How do their storytelling
practices have an influence on connecting and disconnecting the regional
communication infrastructure both within the local government institutions and
with other key storytellers such as telecom providers and groups of local
residents? This chapter examines these questions by first encapsulating the role of
local government and then focusing on narrations of state-led informatization
initiatives in the City of Nanhai, a national e-govemment model city located at the
center of the Delta. It will also provide an overview of (dis)connectedness
patterns in the networks of local officials, commercial players, and grassroots
telecom storytellers.
Storytelling Telecom: The Angle o f Local Officials
While studying urbanization in the Pearl River Delta, George Lin concludes that
economic growth and structural change in this southern region have not been the
outcome of active state involvement in local economic affairs. “Rather, they have
been the results of relaxed state control over the local economy (1997, p. 189).” In
examining telecom development in the Delta, this argument is true to some extent
as shown by the increase of extrabudgetary funds in telecom-related projects (see
figure 4.3). But it has obvious limitations because three characteristics of the
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telecom industry entail more state involvement than other economic sectors: (1)
the large scale of financial investment and organizational coordination especially
in the physical construction of telecom networks, (2) the traditionally
monopolized nature of telecommunications'®’ and its remnants in the semi
opened contemporary Chinese telecom market, and (3) the recent slow-down of e-
commerce both globally and in China, which reinforces the dominance of state
expenditure as a primary source of telecom revenue. It is hence of little surprise to
find that a most important group of telecom storytellers in the Delta is local state
agencies and officials.'®* Their narrative practices reflect the ways in which local
authorities understand the new technologies and set out to realize their
imaginations of an “information society” at the meso and micro levels. As the
primary control center for institutional and material resources, they often set the
“master narrative” of storytelling telecom in the localities.
Of cardinal importance is to recognize that the definition of “state” in the
context of the Pearl River Delta needs to be expanded to include not only “central
state” (i.e. the Beijing government and its top-down control of the localities) as
Lin defines it (ibid.), but more specifically as “local state” including the
governing bodies of the cities, counties, townships, urban districts, and villages.
In China before 1993, the telecom industry had been monopolized by the Ministry o f Post and
Telecommunications. All public telecom services in the Pearl River Delta were therefore owned and
operated by provincial and local MPT bureaus.
’ * By state agencies we understand the institutional bodies and public offices that storytell telecom by
means o f government documents, meetings, and state-sponsored propaganda campaigns. The actual
storytellers are of course local officials, i.e. individuals who may or may not reiterate the discourse o f
the party-state while revealing more o f their own ideas in interviews. Both formal and informal
narratives are components o f the storytelling system.
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Meanwhile, local state officials are anything but stereotypical Chinese communist
cadres, speaking rigid Maoist political language, untouched by the commercial
demands or grassroots opinions. Being distinctively situated in the period of
marketization reforms at the frontier of the South China opening-up region, they
are indeed “bureaucratic entrepreneurs” (Hsing, 1997) who run local government
agencies as CEOs managing business corporations in a mode of “local state
corporatism,” as Oi (1992) would call it. While getting involved in telecom
initiatives, these authorities are not looking forward to changing themselves as a
result of access to the new technology, which may nonetheless occur to a certain
degree. Rather, as a key group of telecom storytellers, they would, first and
foremost, prefer to create a world after their own image.
The temporal dimension of the communication action context is essential
to state-led telecom storytelling because economic growth in the Delta was far
from a policy priority until 1978. Local state agencies would have played a much
less significant role, were central planning still the dominant mode of economic
organization. However, the increase of local autonomy in the reform era,
especially after Deng’s “Southern Speeches” in 1992, has altered the
administrative structure towards more loeal deeision-making, thus enhancing the
capacity of officials in the Delta to shape trajectories of telecom growth in the
localities. In so doing, local state agencies also become eentral to the formation of
disconnectedness - especially institutional blocks as we will diseuss in more
detail - in the regional telecom storytelling system.
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Also critical is the region’s spatial adjacency to Hong Kong and Southeast
Asia, and its accessibility for overseas Chinese, many of whom are originally
from the Delta. The geographic condition greatly facilitates transboundary non
orthodox practices among local party-state authorities. For instance, it is widely
known that, while the perspective among officials in northern China is “if there is
no poliey, we cannot do it,” the comparative southern standard holds that “as long
as policy is not prohibitive, we will do it” (Qin and Ni, 1993, p. 77). It is thus not
unusual for bureaucratic entrepreneurs in the Pearl River Delta to engage in new
ways of telecom development, such as the utilization of FDI and the setting up of
foreign-domestie joint ventures, whieh in many cases were in practice for several
years before formal endorsement from Beijing.
The emergence of local officials as key actors in the telecom storytelling
network gives rise to a central component of the regional nexus where a few
entangled processes occur simultaneously. This is a breakaway from the Maoist
mode of central planning and a return to the regional tradition of development
centered on local decision-making. It embodies “regionalization,” which “may be
understood to hold the potential to undermine the priority of state-based
territorialities, but may also serve as the basis for the state’s interests to reposition
itself in response to dynamic economic events” (Cartier, 2001, p. 266). This is a
process of reconfiguring discursive resources in the regional action context, in a
movement from top-down domination to agentic actions, from a closed system
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governed by institutional constraints to a communication infrastructure with
higher level of openness.
The complexity of storytelling practices is reflected in the multiplicity of
target audiences both within the region and beyond. On the one hand, telecom-
related discourse must be in line with official ideology of the nation so that it
would make sense to, and win support from, supervising government agencies,
from the Guangdong Province to Beijing. Meanwhile, state-led telecom
storytelling also caters to the needs of foreign investors and domestic
entrepreneurs, who have different agendas that prioritize economic profitability.
Meanwhile, long-term dwellers, not including migrant population constitute
another major group of audience because, due to their intricate connections with
overseas Chinese diaspora, these residents not only sustain the needs for more
telecom services but may also provide extrabudgetary funds for local initiatives.
Finally, the most immediate discursive task for city- and country-level leaders,
who are usually the major driving force for local informatization projects, is to
persuade low-rank officials that the growth of new communication technologies
would not impair their power so that they would contribute to, rather than resist,
the construction of new telecom infrastructures.
To sell development plans to a single group is not easy. It would be even
harder to do this for multiple groups: high-rank officials, low-rank administrators,
foreign investors, local residents, and indirectly a significant portion of the global
Chinese diaspora. It is not infrequent that various groups may have very different,
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even competing, preferences. Storytelling telecom from the perspective of local
state agencies has therefore been in no shortage of political voltage. Indeed,
without strong political motivation and commitment, telecom narratives
advocated by the local officials would have been of much less influence, and the
regional telecom growth would have been probably much less impressive. As Fei
Xie, the Guangdong Provincial CCP Secretary advocated (1995, p. 153):
The issue (of developing new telecom technologies) is urgent for
Guangdong to study, make plans, and implement. In particular, it
should involve leaders with highest authority in the localities and a
specialized leading team that includes both officials and technical
experts (author’s translation).
This provincial guideline resulted in what is known among local cadres as
the “Top Leadership Project (yibashou tongsheng),” when normally the city
mayor and city-level CCP general secretary would command the establishment of
an “Informatization Leading Group {xinxihua lingdaoxiaozu)” staffed by top
officials from the local telecom sector, science and technology divisions, other
related government offices, and in some cases university professors. This is the
standard administrative model throughout the Pearl River Delta, which was most
prototypical in the City of Nanhai, where the city’s top leaders not only supervise
but actually get seriously involved in promoting a new “digital” future of this
ancient town.
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The Story o f a “ Model” City^^^
Social Economic Background
Nanhai is located at the center of the Pearl River Delta, bordering Guangzhou to
the east and Foshan to the south. The northern part of Nanhai consists of largely
mountainous areas; its central and eastern parts are flat agricultural land; and its
southern half at the lower reach of the Pearl River includes reclaimed land with
concentrated fishponds and mulberry dikes (Lin, 1997, p. 127). Up to 2002,
Nanhai consists of 20 townships and districts, 252 administrative villages,
covering 1,150 square kilometers of land and accommodating 1.1 million
registered residents and 650,000 migrant w o rk ers.M o re than 400,000 overseas
Chinese emigrants originated from Nanhai, scattering throughout Southeast Asia
and the rest of the w orld.H istorically, Nanhai is known as one of the three
wealthiest counties in the Pearl River Delta (the other two being Panyu and
Shunde). Its traditional economic outputs include silk, pottery, pond fish, and
sugar cane (Lin, 1997, p. 129). Since 1978, Nanhai has built on its existing
industries and become a major center in South China for the production and
To study local state and telecom development in Nanhai, I made three trips to the city. The first visit
was on June 26, 2002, for archive collection, Internet café observation, and a brief interview at the City
Science and Technology Bureau. The second and most rewarding fieldtrip was during July 15-20, when
Guo Liang, my colleague at Chinese Academy o f Social Sciences, and I interviewed more than a dozen
local officials at eight local state agencies for an in-depth examination of e-govemment initiatives in the
city. During August 13-19, a third visit was paid to interview local telecom providers and Internet café
owners in the city. In the last period o f study, I also held four focus groups o f long-term residents
among Internet users and non-users o f the two different sexes. This chapter focuses on data gathered in
official interviews and archives with supplementary findings from entrepreneur interviews and residents
focus groups regarding the effects of local state narratives on these two other key groups in the telecom
storytelling system o f Nanhai.
Nanhai Yearbook (2002), Nanhai Yearbook Editorial Committee.
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transaction of textile, ceramics, electronic appliances, aluminum, and leather
products (ibid, pp. 139-140).
Before 1992, Nanhai was a county subordinate to the City of Foshan.
Since then, it has become a county-level city (xianjishi) with relative
administrative autonomy and has experienced remarkable acceleration in
urbanization and economic growth. In terms of overall economic development,
Nanhai ranked No.3 and No.4 nationwide and No.l in Guangdong Province
during the 1990s. In 2001, it was recognized as the second most developed county
(or county-level city) in China with a total GDP of USD 4.72 billion and the local
state financial revenue being USD 302.3 million.
There is little doubt that the strength of local economy is a key factor that
enables Nanhai authorities to engage in new telecom initiatives. Although the
majority of Nanhai’s economy relies on manufacture and agriculture, high state
revenue and high income among local residents are both essential to rapid telecom
growth. On the other hand, however, the industrial base for informatization in
Nanhai was quite tenuous. Up to the 1990s, the only project sponsored by local
authorities was the Zhong Nan Computer Factory, built in mid-1980s, but
according to a senior local official it was “too early to generate profit.”’’'*
It was not until 1990 when a relatively urban center of Nanhai was built in the traditional market
town o f Guicheng (Lin, 1997, p. 128). Rapid development was recorded since then. For instance,
during the Eighth Five Year Plan (1990-1995), Nanhai's GDP increased by 36% every year, and the
financial revenue o f the City Government grew at the average rate o f 43% per annum.
Nanhai Yearbook (2002), Nanhai Yearbook Editorial Committee.
Interview with a high-rank Nanhai official.
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Achievements in ICT Development
Nanhai city leaders started in 1995 to promulgate the strategy of “using
informatization to propel modernization (yi xinxihua daidong xiandaihua)" in
1995. The City Informatization Committee was established in August 1996 to
coordinate informatization projects. Since then, a major upgrading of teleeom
system has been under way, and in five years, a fiber optie network was
constructed that connects government offices in urban areas with all 252
administrative villages in the rural areas.This achievement is outstanding in a
country where most rural residents have no access to telephone and the majority
of urban dwellers have no Internet access. Every household in Nanhai now could
be connected via fiber optics or phone lines at a fee. hi 2002, there were
approximately 70,000 households with Internet connections, accounting for more
than 20 percent of households in the city.'^^ Besides the construction of telecom
networks, Nanhai also started to foster a local software industry. The new Nanhai
Information Technology Park, founded in 1998, covers a landmass of about 20
square kilometers. Software firms and local authorities have cooperated in
providing new software applications for city administration in fields such as
In interviews and government documents, this achievement is referred to as “all villages linked up
by fiber optics, all households may get online f ’/ ’ rT -Ii RI).”
Nanhai Informatization Construction (nanhai xinxihua jianshe), brochure jointly published by
Nanhai City CCP Committee and Nanhai Municipal Government, 2002.
See http://www.nhitp.com/gb/kj/yq.htm/. As one o f the four key software engineering centers in
Guangdong, Nanhai Information Technology Park has formed cooperative relationships with Microsoft,
IBM, Chinese Academy o f Science, Peking University, and several important IT research institutes in
and outside China. It has also attracted universities to establish educational branches there such as the
South China Normal University and North East University Software Engineering School. According to
the No. 27 Guangdong Provincial Government document issued in April 22, 2002, however, Nanhai is
supposed to be a training center for “blue-collar software workers” as opposed to the three other key
software parks in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai.
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distant accounting, prosecution and legal information provision, and the
management of rural affairs ranging from village fiscal reports to family planning.
Up to summer 2002, Nanhai work-units (mostly government offices) had
provided computer and Internet training programs to more than 60,000 employees.
All schools in Nanhai had been equipped with computer labs.*^* Starting from the
third grade (age 9), students are required to take “information class {xinxi ke)” that
introduces them to basic IT and Internet know-how. As a result, most households
with school children have online computers at home at the time of field research
in summer 2002.'^^
The City of Nanhai affords a most valuable case for the study of local state
telecom storytelling because of its remarkable achievements in e-govemment and
new media projects centered on the construction of an advanced Internet
infrastmcture. It has been recognized by multiple ministerial and provincial
authorities and promoted in the media as a national model for e-govemment and
the “informatization of govemance (zhengwu xinxihua)."'’ Reports about computer
networks in Nanhai have appeared in People’ s Daily, Xinhua Digest, Guangming
Daily, and various elitist national outlets. In 2001, China’s President Jiang Zemin
and Premier Zhu Rongji both visited Nanhai to inspect its successful e-
govemment initiatives. The city is also formally recognized as a model or
experimentation site for various Intemet projects conducted by state agencies at
national and provincial levels including:
Ibid.
™ Interview with a high-rank Nanhai city official.
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❖ National Experimentation City for Computer Network
Construction, State Science and Technology Commission
(1996)
❖ National Experimentation City for Urban Information
Network Services System Construction (1997)
❖ Guangdong Provincial Experimentation District for
Informatization Construction (1998)
❖ Guangdong Provincial Experimentation City for
Informatization of Economic Transactions (1999)
❖ National Experimentation City for Informatization (2000)
❖ National Model Project for E-Govemment Applications
(2001)
❖ National Experimentation City for Information Security
Applications (2001)
♦ ♦ ♦ Provincial Experimentation City for Social Security
Information Systems (2001).
Admittedly, e-govemment initiatives and Intemet constmction are only
part of the larger telecommunications infrastmcture. However, they constitute the
key site when local authorities are most actively involved in telecom projects -
not to expand the existing networks of telephone established by MPT but to start
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from anew and build a network under the direct auspices of the city authorities.
This local development is along the line with national and provincial trajectories
of rapidly accelerated telecom growth since 1992, which was featured by the
booming of new telecom technologies. This rapid growth in telecom has most
decisively enhanced technological connections within Nanhai and between
Nanhai and other cities. It however also offers ample opportunities for local
officials to restructure patterns of (dis)connectedness in the regional storytelling
system. As a result, while technical connections have increased dramatically,
social and institutional disconnectedness also multiply, a process of
transformation captured in this evolving local ecology of telecom narratives.
The Assimilation o f Discourse
From the communication infrastructure perspective, what is genuinely interesting
about the recent telecom boom in Nanhai is not its rapidity and scale of
development, which are observed in most other parts of the Delta and elsewhere
in the nation, but how local officials utilize storytelling resources to promote
telecom projects in a unique way that facilitate the realization of their political
goals. In Nanhai as elsewhere, these goals center on the need to consolidate and
increase power for one particular layer of government vis-à-vis stakeholders at
both higher and lower administrative levels. In this part we shall examine five
most important narratives utilized in Nanhai to promote telecom projects
including (1) the frame of economic development, (2) articulation of opening-up,
(3) communism as technology, (4) improving state performances, and (5) the
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218
personal stories of Mr. Deng Yaohua, general secretary of Nanhai City CCP
Committee, also known as “informatization secretary {xinxi shuji)” among local
cadres.
The Frame o f Economy
First of all, the overarching marketization discourse in post-Mao China means that
the political goals are often veiled in the discourse of economic development,
propagated nationwide as the program of “building socialist market economy with
Chinese characteristics.” Under these circumstances, Nanhai officials attempted to
articulate the needs to promote telecommunications as primarily an economic
strategy of the city, which, if unpacked, reveals the reliance of local politicians on
economic success as their main source of legitimacy. Notably, Nanhai has been a
traditional center of manufacture and commerce in the Pearl River Delta with
remarkable economic achievements since 1978. Local leaders therefore advocate
the informatization of Nanhai’s economy as a new driving force to continue
economic marvels of the city for a “second leap forward,” as documented in
Nanhai Internal Reference:
In tandem with the deepening of reform and rapid development in
other places, économie competition has intensified, leading to the
gradual diminishing of certain advantages that our city enjoyed in
the past and the growing of several disadvantages such as the
shortage of natural resources, especially land, and high costs in
production and labor. We will face more challenges in socio
economic development. We have to seek new opportunities and
new driving forces, if we want to maintain our competitive edge
and realize sustainable development in Nanhai, if we want to
create a second leap forward and bring Nanhai into a more wealthy
and civilized twenty-first century.
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It has become increasingly clear that information technology and
informatization methods are the multiplier of economic
development. Those who control new media technologies will
achieve acceleration in economic growth. Those who are better at
controlling information technologies will gain even greater
acceleration. Developing information industry and advancing
informatization projects have therefore become a major way to
demonstrate economic power and a main domain of economic
competition, which is also the key to the economic future of
Nanhai (author’s translation).
This document, prepared by Nanhai City CCP Committee Policy Analysis
Division targeting at party-state officials in the city, demonstrates a great deal of
discursive amalgamation, imbued with hyperbole of techno-utopianism, centered
on the capacity of new communication technologies as “the multiplier of
economic development (jingjifazhang de beizengqi).” This assertion, familiar as it
sounds, is indeed the most effective persuasive instrument that caters to the needs
of multiple audiences from high-level governing bodies to low-level
administrators, from foreign investors to the majority of local residents. It links up
pro-technology elements of Marxist ideology and age-old discourse of
modernization with Western futurism and Deng Xiaoping’s market economy
rhetoric. It uses signifrers such as “competition” and “sustainable development”
for justification and the creation of a sense of urgency, which all funnels down to
the economic prowess of the city, taken implicitly as the base of political power.
The efforts to associate “informatization” with economic prosperity,
however, rely more on hasty conjecture rather than careful thinking. Why does
Nanhai Internal Reference, Nanhai City CCP Committee Poliey Analysis Division, March 11, 1997,
pp. 2-3.
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220
increasing competition in traditional industries necessitate the new economic
strategy centered on new communication technologies? How does the new
strategy compare to other alternatives such as capitalizing on existing
advantageous industries?'®* Can informatization solve land shortage, or will it add
to the problem in large land-consuming projects such as the Nanhai Information
Technology Park? If this is going to transform Nanhai’s economy into
“sustainable development,” does it mean the major polluting industries (e.g.
aluminum processing) will be driven out of Nanhai? All these questions are
glossed over under the call for further economic development, showing that the
propositions are products of one-way storytelling from the authorities rather than
results from sustained interactions with other key storytellers. Although these
questions may sound inevitable from the standpoint of economic planning, during
interviews and focus group discussions, none of them seemed to have occurred to
the officials, entrepreneurs, and local residents being interviewed. Although these
respondents may raise questions regarding other aspects of informatization in
Nanhai, the assumed economic power of new telecom technologies is the
argument least challenged.
“Opening-up to the World"
While economic pursuit forms a nearly omnipresent narrative in Nanhai’s official
storytelling about local telecom initiatives, equally important and closely
This is particularly true because Nanhai had very tenuous base in high-tech projects up to this point.
One city official told me that Nanhai government actually built a computer factory in the 1980s, which
performed very poorly and couldn’t make much profits. There was no successful prior experience o f IT
development in Nanhai until mid-1990s.
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connected is the argument that new communication technologies will open up the
city to the world and, in so doing, facilitate local economic development. Notably,
that telecom technologies can become a driving force in economy was in itself an
imported idea. A senior CCP cadre who participated in the drafting of Nanhai’s
first informatization documents recalled that, “At the time (of mid-1990s), we
heard that the United States was building its Information Superhighway and
Intemet is the most advanced technology. We thought that was the future and we
insightfully grasped the new opportunity.” The theme of opening-up was stressed
in an interview with Mr. Deng Yaohua, secretary general of Nanhai City CCP
Committee, when he emphasized that one of the primary goals in Nanhai’s efforts
to transform itself into an “information city” is
... to create in Nanhai an information environment that is
synchronic with the world. Our city will be connected with the
outside world at the speed of light. Time difference with the globe
will be basically eradicated. Economic activities in our city will be
synchronized with the world in terms of information access,
thereby expediting the integration of Nanhai with global economy
and facilitating the arrival of overseas investors (author’s
translation).*^^
The narrative of opening-up certainly appeals to foreign investors -
especially expatriates from the Pearl River Delta who might still have families
and relatives living in Nanhai. It is in line with the national rhetoric of “opening-
“Interview with City CCP Committee General Secretary Deng Yaohua,” Nanhai Daily, January 27,
1999, p.l. Author’s translation. Other goals mentioned in the interview include (1) building new
information networks, (2) developing e-govemment open to the public, and (3) promoting e-commerce
and social applications that everyone can use.
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up” as part of the principal policies of the central government, while at the same
time reflects the time-honored tradition of transborder activities in the Delta
region. Also manifest is that this particular strand of opening-up rhetoric was
clearly captured by neo-liberalist discourse of “synchronizing economic
activities” and “eradicating time differences.” In this last regard, the local state
storyteller sounds more like an assistant to Bill Gates rather than an average cadre
of the Communist Party. In my interviews with other local officials, their
willingness to “be connected with the outside world at the speed of light” also
seemed to be unreserved,'*^ which indeed reflects the paradoxical lack of
criticism against global capitalism in the world’s largest socialist country.
Realizing “Communism ”
However, in certain occasions it is still necessary to utilize official socialist
ideology, particularly when confronting representatives from higher governing
bodies. This gave rise to the third theme of storytelling telecom in Nanhai, i.e. the
argument that the growth of new communication technologies will necessarily
pave the way for communism, thus granting legitimacy to telecom initiatives from
an ideological standpoint. As shown in the quotation at the beginning of this
chapter, a senior cadre in Nanhai said he believed that, “Informatization is indeed
an essence of communism,” due to phonetic similarities between the Chinese
translations of the “Intemet” and the communist “Internationale.” He further
elaborated the assertion:
These include interviews during which I did not disclose my USC affiliation and only engaged in
respondents as researcher from the Chinese Academy o f Social Sciences.
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As I understand, there are two essences of communism. One is that
the world should be united {sijie datong)\ the other is that
resources should be shared {ziyuan gongxiang). That’s also what
informatization means. We build networks to connect everyone so
that we ean share (author’s translation).
This grand understanding, to our surprise, is not found in interviews with
officials of lower administrative ranks probably because there are indeed many
oecasions and various forms of disconnectedness that bring the idea of “sharing”
to the edge of hypocrisy. We will focus on institutional blocks in the next section.
Nonetheless, justifications from the standpoint of the official ideology constitute
an indispensable part of the loeal state telecom storytelling system, which is an
intriguing phenomenon in itself because new eommunication network
technologies are usually held in Western countries as anything but compatible
with the eommunism ideology (Taubman, 1998).
E-Government Improving Administrative Performance
More popular among offieials at lower administrative levels is the belief that new
information technologies will enhance their work performance by bringing about
more transparency and higher efficiency, particularly through various e-
govemment initiatives carried out by the City.'^"^ Here transparency means both
within the party-state bureaucracy and between loeal authorities and average local
enterprises and residents. At the newly built Financial Accountancy Center for
The most prominent e-govemment initiatives include a distant accounting system for the city’s non
profit organizations, an electronic legal case processing system of Nanhai People’s Court, a rural
administrative management system, and a CCP membership organization system in Guicheng, the
urban center o f Nanhai.
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Nanhai City Non-Profit Administrative Organizations,'^^ for instance, the most
celebrated goal of this highly computerized office was to provide instant
information for city leaders to supervise the financial situation of government
service providers such as public libraries and the transportation unit of the city
government. “Our new distant accounting system has greatly enhanced work
efficiency,” said a director of the Financial Accountancy Center, “and, by
increasing information transparency, this also deters corruption among medium
and low-level officials.”
On the other hand, a good example for better state-society interaction as a
result of the teleeom projects is the City’s Administrative Services Center opened
in January 2002, which housed 16 city bureaus/offices that local enterprises and
residents had to deal with most often, from water and electricity provision to
hygiene control to public security to the issuing of various kinds of licenses and
permits. These state agencies used to scatter in different parts of Nanhai. Now
each of them sends staff members who work in the Administrative Services
Center with computers linked back to the databanks in their main offices. The
Intemet technology thus enabled a “one-station (yizhanshi)” management mode,
which greatly benefits those who have to deal with the bureaucracy. “Our center
is the best manifestation of the spirits of President Jiang Zemin’s ‘three
representatives.’ We use the most advanced technologies to serve the people in
Established in March 2002, this office functions as a central node in the nerve system that does
bookkeeping for all the subordinate offices and operationalizes all the transactions between these
governmental bodies and their bank accounts.
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Nanhai, which I’m very proud of.” said a senior manager of the Center during the
interview.
The Myth o f a Leader
The most mythical story about new telecom projects in Nanhai is the role of a
single person, Mr. Deng Yaohua, general secretary of the Nanhai CCP City
Committee, the most powerful person in Nanhai. Known as the “informatization
secretary {xinxi shuji)," he received much of the credit for initializing and
promoting new communication technologies in the city during my interviews with
local officials. As one high-rank city cadre put it.
Back in the 1980s, our Secretary Deng already studied Information
Theory, Control Theory, and System Theory in the Provincial CCP
Party School in Guangzhou. He also began to learn using
computers and new communication technologies then and thought
about their profound impact on economy and society.... Later in
mid-1990s, it was mostly because of him that we thought of IT
industries and the Intemet as opportunities for a new mode of
economic development that is different from traditional agriculture
and manufacture industry. In 1995, after Nanhai passed the
national standards of being a wealthy county-level city (xiaokang
dabiao), it was also Secretary Deng who proposed that
informatization could bring about a second wave of growth (dierci
zengzhang) in Nanhai (author’s translation).
Indeed, the critical role of Secretary Deng was a major theme in the city’s
local storytelling about new telecom development, as we found in multiple
interviews with local officials and in national print media coverage o f Nanhai as a
model case for informatization. In interviews, almost every Nanhai cadre
attributed accomplishments in informatization to Mr. Deng Yaohua, referring to
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him as “our leader (lingdao)" or “our Secretary Deng.” Such encounters were so
commonplace that one may become suspicious as to what extent this is a true
reflection of Deng’s role, particularly considering that most interviews in the
period of July 15-20, 2002 were set up through Nanhai City CCP Committee and
the City Government.
The only interview with local state officials that was not arranged by city-
level authorities was in the first trip of June 26, 2002, when I had a conversation
with a low-level official in Nanhai’s Science and Technology Bureau, using the
identity of a CASS researcher without disclosing any affiliation with the city
government. After obtaining from her several official publicity materials
concerning informatization in the city, I posed the question, “What do you think is
the most distinct feature of new IT projects in Nanhai?” In a stem and
discouraging tone, she responded, “Those materials (i.e. the materials she just
gave me) have all you need to know. In my opinion, now there is nothing
newsworthy about Nanhai’s informatization.” She might he right because there
has been much news coverage of recent telecom projects in Nanhai, and in that
sense, “there is nothing newsworthy.” However, verbal manifestations may not be
what is most telling in this encounter. Rather, her discouraging tone reflected a
sense of discontent in stark contrast with the pride and enthusiasm that
characterized most other interviews.
Very obviously, the storytelling efforts of Nanhai City have not been
completely successful. Even within the city government, one result of prolonged.
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repetitive advocacy could be the sense of dreadfulness, which I could see on the
face of this particular interviewee and hear in her voice. Even within the city
government, disconnectedness could emerge as an unintended consequence of
storytelling telecom.
It is therefore essential to note that the key narratives identified so far - be
they economic development, opening-up, communism, administrative
performance, or the personal role of Secretary Deng - are only the most
prominent consequences of official storytelling in the City of Nanhai. To
understand how they interact and become assimilated in the local context and to
reveal the political logic of this local “information revolution,” it is probably more
important to look into the discursive processes rather than the narrative products
per se, and in so doing the official telecom storytellers should be construed, not as
a perfectly coherent functional whole, but as a structure containing elements of
oppression, resistance, and conflict, as any real-world political institution would
be.
Building Internet, Shaping Local State
From the perspective of the Communication Infrastructure, the most interesting
thing about Nanhai is probably not its remarkable speed and scale of new telecom
development, which was not unparalleled in the Pearl River Delta. Rather, the
uniqueness of Nanhai lies in the capacity of city authorities to make use of various
For instance, as previously discussed, in terms of general telecom revenue growth, the highest
development speed throughout the Delta region was found in Shenzhen rather than Nanhai (see Chapter
Four, Figure 4.3).
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storytelling resources, blend them according to contextual needs at different
historical moments, and construct narratives that are most conducive to the
realization of their own goals. These consist of not only one-way narration from
the standpoint of city officials but also contestations, negotiations, and
compromises with stakeholders at both higher and lower administrative levels.
The processes demonstrate in the ease of Nanhai the malleability of a peculiar
storytelling network as a prism for the examination of the narrative shaping of
technology based on the needs of the local state.
Struggle Against a Label
One most important element in the genesis of informatization in Nanhai has to do
with the city’s attempt to get rid of a derogatory label, which was only mentioned
in passing in official interviews but revealed more fully in archive research. Since
1980s, Nanhai has been known for simultaneously achieving rapid economic
growth in different modes of local ownership at the five administrative levels of
county, township, district, village, and individual. This approach, known as
“driving forward on five wheels (Lin, 1997, p. 127),’’ differs remarkably from
growth patterns elsewhere in the Pearl River Delta such as Shunde and Dongguan,
two other bustling towns known for large-scale development projects usually
owned by township and district enterprises (e.g. Meidi Home Appliances Inc. in
Shunde) or foreign investors (e.g. Eriksson factories in Dongguan). In 1991, for
instance, more than half industrial output in Nanhai was generated at or below the
village level (ibid, p. 140). As a result, throughout the 1980s, despite rapid
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economic development in Nanhai, the eity was repetitively criticized for being a
“heaven of small produeers (xiaoshengchanzhe de tiantang)” and as a hotbed of
petty-capitalism, which reached a pinnacle in the anti-reform baeklash following
Tiananmen (Yuan, 2001, p. 21).
In my interview, a senior Nanhai offieial recalled that, during early 1990s,
during anti-bourgeois ideologieal eampaigns in the aftermath of Tiananmen,
leaders of Nanhai did not dare to sit in ft-ont seats at meetings in Guangdong
Provinee for fear of being publicly censured. The collective memory makes it less
surprising for Nanhai to suddenly engage in the building of Intemet
infrastructures because, aeeording to popular wisdom at the time, computer
network is the ultimate eoming together of latest teehnological aehievements of
the human race, whieh represents the most advaneed “mode of production” in
Marxist terms. The inclination towards larger economy of scale explains the
incommensurable amount of finaneial input made by Nanhai city government,
which was not seen in cities of similar level of economic development.
Worries about the “petty-capitalism” label were manifest in many Nanhai
City government documents as shown in the following quote that illustrates how
new technologies are construed as an effective means to change the “stmcture of
industrial production” toward more economy of scale and less private ownership.
Problems in our City’s structure of industrial production have been fully
exposed. First, there are few large-seale enterprises or famous brands. Our
City has claimed a significant portion of domestic and international
markets for porcelain, textile, and aluminum. However, we only have
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limited competitive advantage because most of our factories are of small
scale. “There are shining stars but no moon.” Second, most non-publicly
owned enterprises rely little on science and technology. Short-term
behaviors prevail among these ventures, which are often poorly managed,
labor-intensive enterprises. They tend to be heavy polluters, slow in
information processing, and producing low quality products only. By no
way can they adapt to the needs of future market development.*^’
These arguments for the necessity of economic restructuring are key
manifestations of the politico-economic motivations behind Nanhai’s Intemet
projects. The aforementioned techno-utopian discourse are probably only
convenient justifications for what the City had already decided to pursue. To see
more clearly the process of storytelling, historical analysis of the particular
contextual factors are indispensable.
Persuasion and the Restructuring o f Power
It is however anything but easy to establish the “New Economy” mode of
development because to do so it entails a redistribution of both financial and
institutional resources that often disfavors the politio-economic status quo
particularly regarding mid-level officials in townships and urban districts and
leaders with vest interests in traditional industry. To them, more state spending
and beneficial policies for new telecommunications technologies mean the
vanishing of existing privileges. Moreover, as the strength of traditional township
and village enterprises have usually given rise to local state bodies with relatively
high poliey autonomy, the new initiatives of e-govemment and of more
Nanhai Internal Reference, Nanhai City CCP Committee Policy Analysis Division, December 7,
1999, Vol. 12, Issue 144, p. 8. Author’s translation.
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centralized mode of control by the City would significantly reduce the power of
village and township leaders. It was therefore unsurprising that, when Nanhai’s
new Internet-oriented development campaign began in mid 1990s, it faced a
formidable amount of resistance among both low-rank staff of the City whose
benefits were likely to be negatively affected and leaders of local state agencies in
the districts, townships, and villages. According to an interview in semi-formal
occasions, the main project of Nanhai during mid 1990s, the “Digital City
Construction Project,” was initially criticized as “insane {fengle)” and its
advocates as “idiots (shazi).” To deal with the discontent and implement the plan
for Intemet development, persuasive methods were used at multiple levels of
govemance from the City to mid-level townships and districts to bottom-level
villages, and an ecology of positive storytelling was created to provide the
essential discursive support for the materialization of new telecom technologies in
Nanhai.
Top Leadership Project
Most important for the dissemination of informatization discourse in Nanhai were
the efforts of leading officials in the city who have been constantly promoting
new telecom technology including infrastmcture development and e-govemment
applications. From Nanhai CCP Secretary Deng Yaohua to Mayor Chen
Zhongyuan to directors of the city’s Science and Teehnology Bureau and
supervisors in Nanhai People’s Court, the top echelon of leaders from all major
state agencies in the city were included in a network of telecom storytelling under
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the rubric of the so-called “Top Leadership Project {yibashou gongcheng)."' By
“top leaders,” people usually mean the highest-rank official in a city government
agency and the CCP director in this work unit, which sometimes can be the same
person. Notably, this leadership network did not come into being due to command
from Beijing or Guangdong Province. Nor was it a sudden imposition of
Secretary Deng’s vision about the future of Nanhai. It was a result of several
months of interpersonal dialogue among Deng and his close comrades. A member
of this core group recalled.
There were several months in 1995 when Secretary Deng often asked me
and a few other high-rank leaders in the City to go to the Dunhuang
restaurant after work. We would have dinner and then a ‘meeting about
intangibles (wuxuhuiy to discuss informatization, to unite our thoughts
(tongyi renshi), and discuss how we can convince others that this will
benefit Nanhai (author’s translation).
It was during these informal face-to-face gatherings when the idea of
building Intemet in Nanhai was first elaborated, debated, and integrated into a
narrative system, which not only used the official language of economic reform
but also appeals to local officials at the lower levels. Some initial proposals such
as Web-based administrative assistance and the developing of Nanhai Software
Park, were also first tested in this informal evening meetings. Active members in
this interpersonal network became key components of Nanhai City
Informatization Committee established in 1996. From then on, members of the
City Informatization Committee were required to advocate Intemet projects to
their subordinates both in routine work situation and in public gatherings. To
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increase impaet, they were encouraged to “reiterate in all meetings, large or small,
on daily basis (dahuijiang, xiaohuijiang, tiantianjiang).” Of these many
reiterations, a succinct sample can be found in an interview with Secretary Deng
Yaohua in the January 27,1999, issue o îNanhai Daily, the official outlet of
Nanhai CCP Committee.
Some people are skeptic, saying it’s too early to construct the information
city. But I believe informatization is an inevitable result of Nanhai’s
development, and it is urgently needed for both economic and spiritual
civilizations {liangge wenming). We have to adapt ourselves to using
computers. Fearful emotions must be overcome. Once we study and try,
new communication technologies are not something unattainable because,
as technologies improve, advanced machines will be easier to operate,
even by the mass.
Leaders at all levels should take the initiative to study and use these new
technologies. Additionally, there must be concerted coordination among
different divisions and work-units to form a coherent and unified growth
situation.
We have enough reasons to believe - given the great support from
Guangdong Provincial CCP Committee and Provincial Government, the
powerful guarantee from Nanhai City CCP Committee and City
Government, our material resources accumulated in the 20 years of reform
and opening-up, and the tenacious efforts and pursuits of the Nanhai
people - our objectives in ‘constructing information city for a new century
(jianshe xinxishi yinjie xinshijiy will certainly be realized (author’s
tranlstion)!***
Of little doubt, the resistance against telecom storytelling was not a unique
phenomenon in Nanhai as the rapid growth of labor-intensive industrial
development was rampant in Guangdong, which leads to popular suspicions. This
was revealed in Provincial Governor Xie’s speech (1995), which called for
“Interview with Secretary Deng Yaohua,” Nanhai Daily, January 27, 1999, p. 1. Author’s translation.
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“highest authority in the localities” to be actively involved in the advocacy and
policy implication for inforamization. On this note, Nanhai might not be an
innovator for the “Top Leadership Project,” but its dedication to this mode of top-
down storytelling and the visible consequences in infrastructure building are
probably hard to find parallel in the Pearl River Delta.
Pressure on the Middle-Level
The involvement of top leaders and their reiteration of informatization discourse
had great impact on mid-rank officials including the majority of those who work
in various city government offices and staff members of township and district
governments. Not to mention the formal power of controlling institutional
resources, the top leaders are also opinion leaders in their respective government
bodies. However, despite persistent pro-Intemet storytelling, when it comes to
everyday bureaucratic routine, there are still significant variations in terms of the
actual utilization of the new technology. The City CCP Committee Office, City
Mayor Office, and Informatization Office therefore jointly formed a semi-annual
examination procedure when Intemet application in all state and party work-units
shall be assessed every six months. The result of cheeking in July 2002, for
instance, revealed that, among information websites owned by Nanhai authorities,
only one third had frequent content updates. There were one third of them that
had little updates or still display old content that had long expired back in 1998.'^^
Personal interview with Nanhai eity officials.
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A major barrier had to do with the technophobia of many city officials,
who had little training in using computer or the Intemet but, unlike the “top
leaders” who only talked about informatization, they had to actually deal with the
technology by themselves at work. A massive training program thus began since
1997 when tens of thousands of local officials joined hi-tech training programs to
acquire basic computer literacy, learning how to use database software and
network applications. With high honorariums paid the City, computer scientists
and electronic engineers from around China were brought in to teach the training
courses and help with various IT development plans. Model students in these
training programs were also identified including “Uncle Fa,” a 5 5-year-old clerk
with only elementary school education attainment, who was praised in public due
to his quick adoption of the new technologies. “If Uncle Fa can do this, there is no
excuse for most of us younger people not to learn the new technology,” said a
township leader.*® ®
Yet the most difficult task of persuasion was when informatization
projects entail the sharing of information, and therefore the power of control (e.g.
over extrabudgetary funds), among mid-level state officials who used to
monopolize the information resources. One such project was the Financial
Accountancy Center for City Non-Profit Administrative Organizations, starting
operation in March 2002, which directly controls two dozens of city-level
government service providers. It functions as a central node in the nerve system
’ This is a classic communist model of public persuasion used in China since early ages of the CCP.
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that does bookkeeping for all the subordinate offices and operationalizes all the
transactions between these governmental bodies and their bank accounts. The
City of Nanhai was interested in promoting the project because it reduces
administrative cost and increases work efficiency. Most importantly, it allows city
leaders to check the accounts of all the subordinate organizations online at real
time, which significantly reduced mid-level autonomy and added to the centrality
of top city leaders in the power structure. As articulated by a cadre in the City
CCP Committee, such reforms increase information transparency; it “deters
corruption” and “enhances socialist democracy.” “We realize that this is a
revolution on our own heads (geminggedao womenziji toushang)," he continued,
“because we all have to be more careful in spending state money.” “But we are
willing to proceed with the revolution since it empowers the leadership to control
financial flows and enforce budgetary planning. It also prevents problems in the
management processes and provides a most effective technological guarantee
{jishu baozhang) for anti-corruption.”
Bottom-Level Support
Compared to mid-level state agencies, there is relatively less reluctance against
informatization at the bottom of the government bureaucracy because average
clerks have less vest interests in the existing power structure. There were even
more enthusiasm among those in townships and districts that were traditionally
less wealthy because the City allocates more than US$ 6 million every year to
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subsidize key projects and the most needy government offices.*®* A pro-Intemet
dynamic therefore came into being in Nanhai known as “bureaucracy being
propelled by the grassroots (jicheng tuidongjiguan)." By grassroots it means
officials in the vast rural areas of the city and the townships and districts that have
less resources, and therefore are more willing to share information with the top
leadership of Nanhai (e.g. their needs for fund).
Out of the 250 village committees in Nanhai, for example, 190 had
established their Rural Informatization Management System, a local access
network (LAN) designed for the supervision of all major aspects of rural life,
from the control of population and collective resources to the interactions between
cadres and villagers. A touch screen computer in Minle Village of Xiqiaoshan
District, for instance, provided to the public financial records of the village
committee, of the village’s sub-units, and even the status of family planning in
different neighborhoods.*®^
Another major source of support at the bottom level, also an essential
component of official storytelling about telecom development in Nanhai, was the
claim that the adoption of new technologies would benefit local business,
especially the many small-scale companies that proliferate in the city yet do not
have the ability to independently develop computer and Internet applications.
Since 1980s, Nanhai authorities have been facilitating Computer Aid Design
(CAD) applications in local factories, such as textile firms and companies
Interviews with City and district officials.
Participant observations.
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specializing in aluminum frames. With the burgeoning of the Internet, the CAD
projects are now connected both with each other in Nanhai and with their partners
around the world. A widely publicized exemplar is Huadagao Wooden Mold
Factory that utilized online CAD applications with help from the city authorities.
Before using the Internet, the factory had to send people to Japan to fetch
blueprints, which often took months to process passport and visa and make the
trip via Hong Kong, a very inefficient mode of communication especially when
there needed to be modifications. Being part of the city initiative for new telecom
development, they now have set up a CAD system on the Internet, and can
perform real-time interactive design editing with their Japanese partners. That was
“miraculous,” said one of the interviewees.
Still some low-rank work-units remain reluctant, especially those who are
more affluent and therefore not qualified for subsidies from the city. The exact
number or proportion of such units is unknown. However, it was learned from
multiple interviews that the progress of state-led informatization projects is slower
in the city’s two most wealthy townships, Dali and Nanzhuang, than the Town of
Jinsha, one of the poorest areas in the city, which nevertheless developed the
city’s second high-tech innovation center for hardware production (wujin jishu
chuangxin zhongxin). Again, this was because, without subsidies, the more
resourceful organizations were hesitant to dedicate part of their own budget to
computer networking, which they either do not understand very much or fear for
the possibility of subsequent loss of power.
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Precautions and Compromise
While various forms of resistance are present at lower levels of governance, it
needs to be noted that hesitation and conflict of interest also exist among the top
leaders and between the City and higher-rank offices. A major precaution
concerns network security, i.e. whether online resources may be accessed (or
hacked) without official permission. Due to this consideration, the computer
networks built by Nanhai government consist of two parts, one being the “internal
network (neiwang)” for everyday administration of the city that includes all inter
office information, the other being the “external network (waiwang)” that
connects to the Internet so that ordinary citizens and Internet users around the
world may retrieved information about the city. These two networks are
“physically separated (wuli geli),” as required by the City government. This,
however, works against the basic logic of e-govemment because it is more costly
and less efficient to transfer files from the internal network to the external one,
and vice versa, and the interactivity of the overall network structure is
compromised. It also flies into the face of the “information sharing” narrative
used by the city to promote the Internet.*®^
In the mean time, informatization experiments in Nanhai also triggered
major fiasco when they endanger, or were perceived to endanger, the interests of
higher-level governing bodies. The best case in point is a critical campaign in
Hence, in recent years, Nanhai has invested in network security research, partnering with the
National Science and Technology Commission in developing eleetronic identifieation systems,
particularly the PKI platform that hopefully will link up the internal and external e-govemment
networks while ensuring information security.
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1997 against Nanhai’s bold networking experiments started by the Propaganda
Division of Guangdong Provineial CCP Committee, which may well be the most
serious challenge to Seeretary Deng and his informatization plan at any given
moment. As previously stated, Nanhai’s new teleeom craze resulted in the
political ambition of the new city government to maximize its power hy
developing large-scale Internet projects. One of the most grandiose goals was to
establish an integrated network infrastructure for the delivery of telephone,
television, and Internet through a single broadband cable into each household.
Known as “ Three Gadgets, One Network (sandian gongwang)” and “ Many
Databases, One Network (yiwang duoku), ” the program entered its
experimentation stage during 1996 in new residential areas in Lishui District not
far from Guangzhou. Nanhai City officials exerted major influence on the project
to ensure that the integrated network would be controlled by the City, which
inevitably subdued the city’s Cable TV network to the city’s new power center.*® '*
Under the pressure created at the hype of informatization in 1996,
Nanhai’s CATV operator, a delegate from CCP Provincial Committee, reluctantly
entered the coalition controlled hy City authorities. However, the situation
changed in 1997 when CCP Provincial Propaganda Division realized that, if
Nanhai’s experimentation succeeded, they would lost control over other city-level
The integrated network was directly controlled by Nanhai Information Network INC, a stock-sharing
company that incorporated four informatization stakeholders in the city: Nanhai Science and
Technology Council and Nanhai Investment Development INC, both receiving large funds from the
City government, as well as Nanhai City Post and Telecom Authorities and the city’s Broadcasting
Bureau (in charge of Cable TV systems), both of which were only allowed to hold a small fraction of
the stocks and to play a subordinate role in the single-network experimentation by design.
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CATV systems, which had great potential to offer telephone and Internet services
hy themselves. They therefore initiated a major media campaign, accusing Nanhai
City Government of “attempting to dilute the leading role of the Cable TV
network (and therefore the leadership of CCP).” Critiques against Nanhai
appeared on provincial TV stations and party organ newspapers, which
immediately connected the “new errors” of Nanhai with its old reputation of being
“a paradise of petty bourgeoisies.” It created tremendous pressure on Nanhai’s top
leadership until the Guangdong Provincial Governor, Lu Ruihua, had a
conversation with the Provincial CCP Propaganda director Xu Guanghui, and a
compromise was made that the experiment was to be stalled if the provincial CCP
media cease-fire. Since then, no further action has been taken to consolidate the
three networks of telephone, cable television, and the Internet. The goal in Nanhai
was also modified from integrating the three networks to maintaining their
relative autonomy while keeping them inter-connected.
The incident of single-network experimentation showed powerfully that
the determined will of top city leadership is not a factor that explains everything
about Internet development in Nanhai. When power holders at higher
administrative levels are involved, especially when the conflict of interests have
significant implications in the larger political economy, the relationship among
key Internet players have to he carefully coordinated.
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Storytelling, State Building, and (Dis)connectedness
A Nanhai Model?
The case of Nanhai was examined in depth in this chapter because of the active
involvement of the city authorities in telecom storytelling and their success in
fostering Internet projects from the perspective of the local state. Yet to what
extent does the story of Nanhai hold general value for the understanding of the
regional communication infrastructure in the Pearl River Delta?
First and foremost, it is necessary to clarify that the Nanhai model o f
telecom development, which is heavily state-driven - discursively, institutionally,
and financially - may not apply in the neighboring cities o f Pearl River Delta.
Even in places where economic development and the dependency on export-
oriented production are at a similar level, there are few state initiatives of
comparable dedication to new communication technologies. While more and
more state agencies in the Delta are starting to pay attention to informatization,
there is no other city-level coordination that is of similar magnitude as in Nanhai.
It is therefore more interesting to treat the case of Nanhai, not as a representative
case, but as a testing case for the exploration of various issues regarding state-led
telecom projects within the region, including both the connections between the
communication action context and the storytelling system and the internal
(dis)connections among the three main types of telecom storytellers.
What are the contextual conditions that gave rise to the new telecom
campaign in Nanhai? Answers to this question may be inferred to the regional
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243
level, although the purpose is not to pin down any single factor as omnipotent but
to illuminate an ecology of facilitating conditions that works collectively in giving
rise to the telecom boom in the post-Mao era. A common belief goes that places
with stronger economy and higher income would adapt faster to new technologies
and thus pro-technology discourse, which does apply in the case of Nanhai to a
certain extent. Without the general economic boom of the city since 1978, the
local government most certainly would have been unable to provide ample funds
for Internet projects. But two additional observations would weaken this
economy-determinist view because, on the one hand, other rich cities in the
region, from Shunde, a county-level city of similar scale, to major metropolitan
areas such as Guangzhou and Shenzhen, did not promote Internet as a primary
mode of modernization back in as early as 1995. Even though some cities made
similar efforts in subsequent years, our interviews and document analyses
regarding other e-govemment and state-led informatization projects revealed that
none of these other cities had similar commitments to new media development as
the City of Nanhai. On the other hand, while looking into different parts of
Nanhai, as previously discussed, the city’s two wealthiest townships, Dali and
Nanzhuang, were in fact slower in adopting new technologies than the rest of the
city, whereas the poorest town of Jinsha founded the city’s second hi-tech
innovation center for hardware production. Both considerations suggest that,
although the availability o f economic resources plays an indispensable role in the
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growth o f Internet, there are other more significant factors explaining spatial
variation fo r the dijfusion ofInternet in the Pearl River Delta.
A more sophisticated, yet still economy-based argument would be that the
success of new telecom storytelling would correlate with the structure of economy
rather than the general level of economic growth. In the towns of Dali and
Nanzhuang, for example, the pillar industry had to do with aluminum processing,
especially of aluminum frames used to build windows and doors for urban and
suburban constructions. The techniques of making these aluminum products do
not need frequent updates. And the factories in Nanhai do not need to expand
their market overseas because China’s construction needs had been constantly
surging and, most importantly, the city had already established itself as the largest
trade center for aluminum products in South China. In contrast, business
operations in less wealthy towns such as Jinsha and Xiqiao were smaller and more
sensitive to fluctuations in the market. Their main staple, hardware and textile
products, needs more innovative design than aluminum frames, which need to be
kept up with the latest global trend. On this account, the information components
of local products and the need of local companies work together as a better
explaining factor than the sheer size of local economy, in aggregate or per capita
terms.
However, the structure of economy only has indirect effect on telecom
storytelling as local businesses are not policymakers or primary narrators for the
Internet development campaign. Although undeniably there are networks of
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“bureaucratic entrepreneurs” that intricately link together local state officials and
IT entrepreneurs, the government and CCP agencies remain key storytellers who
shape the system of storytelling telecom in a most immediate manner. In Nanhai,
the pivotal role of Secretary Deng Yaohua, his vision, and his intensive
involvement in the “Top Leadership Project” probably constitute the most unique
favorable condition, which most other localities in the Pearl River Delta do not
share. In addition, the specific mindset of this local state leader, and of his
colleagues, fixated on new telecom technologies could only make sense in the
particular historical moment when Nanhai had just become a city, when the
officials were hoping to get rid of the derogatory label “paradise of petty-
bourgeoisie,” when China was in search for a new mode of modernization, and
when the hype of Information Superhighway, originated in the United States,
became in vogue in the region. There is obviously a certain degree of historical
coincidence when so many factors at different levels of analysis, both historical
and present, overlap in the case of Nanhai’s state-led telecom storytelling as
described above. But this is not a completely idiosyncratic case because
administrative reshuffles were indeed ample during this period of transition in a
region as dynamic as the Pearl River Delta. Even if Nanhai had not taken the first
step, interviews at other city’s informatization offices revealed that it would be
more than likely that other cities, especially Shunde, who have taken similar
efforts given its high income level, outward-oriented economy, and the political
ambitions of the city.
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While many questions persist regarding the motives and narrative
frameworks of loeal state telecom storytelling, the case of Nanhai powerfully
demonstrates that the effectiveness of storytelling telecom does not always
correlate with the level of economic development in the localities. Rather, the role
o f the state in storytelling telecom is oftentimes more important than economic
factors alone, and state involvement may both facilitate and constrain the
informatization o f the city.
Institutional Blocks
More systematic explanations are in order for the constraining effects of local
state storytelling upon telecom infrastructure development in Nanhai and the Pearl
River Delta. As introduced earlier, state-built computer networks in Nanhai
include an “internal network” and an “external network” that are “physically
separated {wuli ge/f)” due to worries about unauthorized access to secret
information held in government and CCP servers. This was a common practice in
other cities of the region and the provincial government of Guangdong so that
only a very limited amount of state information can be retrieved on the public
Internet.
Meanwhile, a more sophisticated mode of access control based on
personal identification devices was being developed as my fieldwork proceeded in
summer 2003.1 had a chance to interview some engineers involved in the
designing and testing of new identification systems and observe schematic
representation of such systems in both government offices and industry
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conventions. The idea was that, in much the same sense as Lessig (2000) specifies
it, a virtual architecture was created based on the offline power status of the user
in state-ran eomputer networks, with high-rank officials having more access
privileges and those at the bottom of administrative hierarchy having less right to
access information. This way of control had already being tested in the internal
networks, and respondents believed that it would be commercially viable,
applicable in external networks, and resulting in the merging of internal and
external networks with the Internet hopefully in one or two years.
Granted the optimistic estimation that network merging will be realized,
still this will not be a fully open strueture, and consequently the process of
storytelling teleeom has been, and will continue to be, imbued with the principles
of secrecy and power maximization. Not only do eity governments intend to
create telecom infrastructures centered on themselves and reduce information
control at lower levels, high-rank agencies, such as the Propaganda Division of
Guangdong Provincial CCP Committee, may also interfere and prevent network
merging as observed in the single-network experiment in Nanhai. This, at the
regional level, is confirmed by an evaluative document from Guangdong
Provincial Bureau of Information Industry, which lists the laek of network
connectivity as the No.l problem for urban informatization projects in
Guangdong Province. As the Pearl River Delta is the most urbanized region of
Guangdong, an overwhelming amount of the projects are hosted in cities in this
region.
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Because different work-units overemphasize their respective
characteristics, there is a pervasive problem that the information
systems are separated and inefficiently utilized. The most visible
indication of this problem is that horizontal connections between
certain information networks cannot be established, there is little
coordination among projects of network construction, thus resulting in
needless redundancy and difficulties in the integration of telephone,
Internet, and cable TV networks (author’s translation, emphasis
added).
While this document might not be hinting support for the aborted Nanhai
single-network trial in 1997, it refers to the problem of redundant infrastructure
development and inefficiency in networking. This problem, however, is less
serious in the case of Nanhai due to its centralized way of informatization
dominated by the City. However, in other cities such as Shenzhen and Guangzhou
the obstacle matters more because their political economies are much more
complicated. Shenzhen, China’s largest Special Economic Zone located at the
Guangdong-Hong Kong border is known for accommodating constant tug of war
among political forces from the central government and the Guangdong Province.
“Most cadres there can call up a top person in Beijing for help, and none of them
likes the idea of sharing information,’’ an official in the informatization office of
neighboring Dongguan City said in an interview, “Therefore, when Shenzhen first
started its informatization office, it couldn’t do any coordination for a long time.
Even after the mayor repetitively advocated bringing together networks and
Progress Report on Urban Informatization in Guangdong Province. Guangdong Provincial Bureau
o f Information Industry. July 2002. Available: http//eei.hd.gov.cn/xxh/jlcl/gdsxxb.htm. Author’s
translation, emphasis added.
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databases, very few mid-level offices would listen to what he said.” Similar
situation was found in Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong, where local
factions at both provincial and municipal levels compete for domination and
network connectivity becomes less of a priority.
Gaps o f Information
On another note, to what extent does official storytelling about new telecom
technologies reach the IT industry and local residents, the other two key groups of
storytellers in the communication infrastructure? Interviews with telecom
providers in the Delta region reveal that most of them are well informed about
government policies, although some of them, especially managers of small private
companies (e.g. Internet cafes), do not understand certain policy rationales. The
Dongguan Municipal Government, for example, had refused to issue a single
license for Internet café in this city, which caused a great deal of discontent
among the local IT industry. According to interview with a local telecom
entrepreneur conducted before the deadly cyber-café fire in Beijing, the city has a
huge market potential for Internet cafe services that cannot be tapped, as millions
of migrant workers in the city tend to be a major consumer base for Internet cafes.
However, the city has never even bothered to explain such an odd policy to local
telecom providers.
Compared to telecom providers, local residents were even less informed in
the process of telecom infrastructure building. In a focus group of long-term
Nanhai residents, a middle-aged housewife complained that, “I know the city has
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spent tons of money on informatization. It’s a good thing. But it does not change
my life at all.” “It’s not something for people like us,” continued one of her
friends in the focus group. “I don’t know where I can learn those things,” she said
with frustration, “but the less I know, the more I worry about my kids going
online.” Another participant, a long-time Internet user, asked, “Now that we are
building a ‘digital city,’ why we don’t have any discount for Internet access? Why
we don’t have cheaper rates than elsewhere?”
The lack of information about state telecom initiatives is most serious
among members of the migrant population. In the three migrant worker focus
groups held in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai, not a single participant
expressed positive evaluation of telecom-related propaganda from state
authorities. They either do not understand the grandiose language, which
invariantly characterizes official storytelling (e.g. Secretary Deng’s articulation
quoted above), or it was because their everyday experiences with new telecom
technologies were so full of fraud and frustration, which flies into the face of
official rhetoric about the benefits of the new media. We shall elaborate these
findings at the grassroots level in Chapter Seven. For the current purpose, it is
adequate just to bear in mind Herbert Schiller’s alert that applies to the “Internet
Age” as to previous periods: “Freedoms that are formally impressive may be
substantively oppressive when they reinforce prevailing inequalities while
claiming to be providing generalized opportunity for all (1976, p. 45).” This
would be inevitable due to the fact that top leaders in various localities of the
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Pearl River Delta were the only de facto policymakers for local telecom projects,
whose power is not checked by anyone outside the party-state complex. And now,
because those who did not participate in the policy processes receive fewer
benefits from the new telecom campaigns, they are more suspicious toward the
technologies themselves.
Discussion
In one sense, local state telecom policymakers are probably the most powerful
type of storytellers in the communication infrastructure of the Pearl River Delta
when it comes to the question which telecom projects should be implemented in
which locality at what time. Government officials and CCP cadres, especially at
the city level, directly control large amount of financial, institutional, and land
resources, which, if put into telecom development, would become a tremendous
boost of the industry, as evidenced by the Internet boom in Nanhai and many
other e-govemment and new telecom networking projects observed in all of the
seven cities where fieldwork was conducted.
Yet, despite their control over material and institutional resources, local
authorities are also rather limited in their success as effective communicators. The
governments and CCP committees have their newspapers, television channels,
and websites, whieh however are normally marginal sources of information for
local residents. As learned from focus groups and participant observation, the
residents tend to rely on mainstream commercial media based in Guangzhou,
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Shenzhen, or Hong Kong, rather than those located in their own cities and towns.
This creates a gap of information because most of these media narratives are
about macro (global and national) telecom issues and events. They fail to storytell
with regional or local points of reference.
In sum, as Figure 5.1 demonstrates, we found that the strongest
storytelling link exists within, not beyond, the local party-state bureaucracy. The
e-govemment initiatives entail intense persuasion mostly by city-level leaders that
targets cadres at lower administrative ranks in the bureaus, districts, townships,
and villages. In this process, the majority of stories being circulated indeed
concern concrete projects regarding telecom issues in the localities. However, the
mode of storytelling is more top-down imposition than two-way communication
as it is very rare for low-level officials to influence decisions made by their
leaders. The process of building telecom infrastructure therefore often turns out to
be a process by which state power is consolidated and re-configured. Meanwhile,
as there is a lack of coordination among the cities and secrecy remains a central
principle for the powerful leaders of informatization, the problem of institutional
blocks has become increasingly prominent as a main source of disconnectedness
in the storytelling networks.
On the other hand, the amount of communication between local state
agencies and other storytellers remains limited. There is relatively more
storytelling interaction with telecom providers than with local residents, although
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Figure 5.1 A view of the regional telecom storytelling system from the
perspective of local state agencies
LOCAL STATE
AGENCIES
“Top leaders”:
especially at city
level
i
Party-state
cadres at
lower levels
Sources o f disconnectedness:
Institutional blocks among the
offices & with the public
Foreign firms & state-
sponsored companies
Long-term residents
t
Small private business Migrant workers
TELECOM LOCAL
PROVIDERS RESIDENTS
most direct exchanges only occur in the cases of foreign firms and state-sponsored
telecom firms rather than with small private business such as Internet cafes. To a
lesser extent, some reciprocal storytelling also exists between state agencies and
long-term residents, despite the meager amount of interaction between the two
parties. Meanwhile, the most obvious lack of communicative ties is between local
state and migrant workers, who, like small private telecom providers, usually only
bear the consequences of official telecom storytelling without being integrated
into state-led storytelling processes.
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Even if given the chance, many local residents and ordinary telecom
providers may nevertheless prefer to stay away from official discourse because
the narratives are usually made up of sterile slogans or high-flown rhetoric, as
exemplified by the above-quoted interview with Secretary Deng published in
Nanhai Daily in 1999. While local officials tend to draw heavily from Marxist
historical materialism, Beijing’s discourse on reform and opening-up, and A 1
Gore’s speech on building the information superhighway, they seldom pay
sufficient attention to the needs of local business, and almost invariantly fail to
pick up the everyday language of local residents.
Such an observation, however, should not be surprising given that the
officials are selected by the party-state rather than elected by local business
leaders or the residents. Those in the non-state sectors essentially have little
power to veto any telecom initiative put forward by the authorities, nor are they
capable of modifying the course of action for officials. Without a major
transformation of the institutional settings, it is hard to imagine that official
storytelling about telecommunications in the Pearl River Delta would adopt new
style or content that is more accessible for local audiences. Although this does not
suggest a completely passive or inactive role in the parts of telecom entrepreneurs
and residents - they actually are agentic storytellers, which we will discuss more
in the next two chapters - it is vital to take into account the lack of connectedness
in the telecom storytelling network among local state, telecom enterprises, and
local residents.
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Whereas examination of the three-part storytelling network reveals a
system far from open, one should also bear in mind that the lack of reciprocal
communication among state and non-state sectors is accompanied by a most
remarkable telecom boom at both the regional level and the local level as seen in
the case of Nanhai. Once local officials are committed to a telecom project,
particularly when this was a result of interpersonal storytelling amongst
themselves rather than imposition from higher-level authorities, the state
apparatus would function rather efficiently in building infrastructure, providing
telecom services (especially within the party-state bureaucracy), and suppressing
second opinions among lower-level agencies by “uniting thought” campaigns.
The most critical problem about official telecom storytelling therefore is
not its effectiveness or capacity in achieving discursive unity but its sustainability
in the long run. This is particularly problematic because rapid progress in
technology means new telecom infrastructure and services need frequent updates
and constant attention, while state-led initiatives such as the “Top Leadership
Project” practiced in Nanhai and elsewhere are too dependent on key political
characters. What will happen if Secretary Deng is promoted, or if he and other top
leaders decide to try another set of strategies? Given the political vicissitudes and
complexity of local-central relationships in the country, one should not expect
prolonged engagement with a single development plan whose implementation
depends solely on politicians. Fortunately, this is not the case for telecom projects
in the Pearl River Delta due to the active involvement of commercial enterprises
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and many local residents, although their connectedness with local state agencies
clearly needs to be strengthened and made into a more open, interactive
storytelling network that is not only effective and sustainable but also conducive
to the goals of local community-building. Of this larger picture, local politics
merely constitute an important part.
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CHAPTER VI
THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF (DIS)CONNECTIONS
Since its inception, our company has endeavored to
promote information industry in the entire province, to
eonstruct a second-generation fiber optic Internet network,
and to serve the informatization of the government and all
occupations for the realization of the ‘Tenth Five Year
Plan’ promulgated by Guangdong Provincial CCP
Committee and the Provincial Government.
- Official Introduction to Eastern Fibemet
Investments Ltd, Guangdong
Talking about Internet café today is like talking about
nightclubs in the 80s. Its public image is really bad. My
parents do not think high of my job either. And it’s not paid
very well. But I love this job despite all the setbacks. I love
being on the Net. To me, there is nothing more important.
- Manager of Qinshuiju Internet café, Guangzhou
Introduction
This chapter is designed to first identify the major commercial telecom
storytellers in the Pearl River Delta, including those with or without state
sponsorship, and then capture the stories circulated among them about telecom
development in the region, and finally explore the ways in which the stories are
told in this most essential sphere of the communication infrastructure: the
commercial domain. A most critical development in the regional telecom
storytelling system during the post-Mao era is the multiplication and emergence
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of commercial storytellers, which also reflects macro changes in the
communication action context. The role of for-profit telecom players is
particularly important because they convey and constitute the main storytelling
connections within and beyond the Delta that is not directly controlled by the
party-state. Moreover, there is also a rationale of commercial storytelling that
contribute to social disconnectedness in its distinct manner, caused by heightening
market competition, leading to illegal operations as well as systematic
discriminations against certain populations.
The tremendous growth of business interests is probably the most
extraordinary change of the Pearl River Delta since 1978. Although telecom
monopoly of the MPT did not end until 1993, more than one decade later than
market-oriented reforms in other economic sectors, the telecom boom since then
has been most impressive, as reviewed in Chapter Four. Remarkable is not only
the skyrocketing of industry indicators, fi'om teledensity to revenue to the amount
of FDI, but also the multiplication of commercial telecom enterprises and the
types of stories they tell. In the Delta, one may find large-scale semi-state
enterprises becoming increasingly worried about competition after China’s
accession to the WTO, as well as small firms such as Internet cafés whose fate
depend more on loeal state policy and enforcement. There are teleeom device
manufacturers relocated from neighboring regions inside or outside Mainland
China, NASDAQ listed Internet start-ups, and commercial networks with
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different degrees of legality, all of which constitute a diverse ecology of
storytelling among commercial entities.
Networks o f Commercial Narrators
Until 1993, the telecom sector of the Delta region had been governed as part of a
national hierarchy monopolized by the MPT that supervised the Guangdong
Provincial Bureau of Post and Telecom, which in turn oversaw post and telecom
authorities (PTAs) in the cities and counties. However, as market-oriented reform
proceeded in China since late 1970s with Guangdong being its leading region of
experimentation, the centralized structure was loosened up. The autonomy of
local agencies increased with the shift of financial responsibilities to the localities;
so did the openness of the telecom market as funds and technological advantages
of non-state players, including those from outside the mainland, started to take
part in the building and shaping of the regional telecom infrastructure.
Operators with State Affiliation
During the process of gradual market opening-up, the remnants of old state
monopoly and new state-sponsored commercial enterprises retained critical
importance, particularly in the most profitable access and service provision
business. As part of a national reform, the business sector of the post and telecom
bureaus was rendered into China Telecom in 1995. To reduce market monopoly,
new telecom operators have been formed under government stipulation since
1993 such as China Unicom, which took over China Telecom’s pager service
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sector in 1998, and China Mobile, the former mobile phone division of China
Telecom established as an independent stock-sharing enterprise since 1999. The
most significant downsizing came in May 2002 when the northern half of China
Telecom’s fixed line network was transferred into the ownership of China
Netcom. But this did not affect the predominance of China Telecom Guangdong,
which remains the largest owner of fixed-line telephone networks in the Pearl
River Delta. During interviews with China Telecom local representatives in
Guangzhou, Dongguan, Nanhai, and Shenzhen during summer 2002, respondents
revealed a great deal of nostalgia for the old days of state monopoly. While high-
level managers were very concerned about increasing competition and the
pressure to enhance organizational efficiency, office clerks tended to explicitly
express their discontent with the state policy of “unbalanced regulation
(buduicheng guanzhi)” that purposively gives preferential policies to foster the
new and smaller competitors.'^^
While China Telecom enjoyed state-protected market incumbency, its new
competitors were not without state sponsorship. China Unicom was a consortium
among several ministries envying for the telecom market including the Ministry
of Electronic Industry (merged with MPT in 1998 into Mil), Ministry of Railroad,
and the Ministry of Electricity. China Netcom reportedly has close ties to Jiang
Mianheng, the son of former president Jiang Zemin, and its taking over of half of
For instance, the new firm China Unicom holds license to provide a full spectrum of telecom
services from pager to cellphone, from data services to fix-line telephony. But China Telecom is limited
to the provision of fixed-line and data services only.
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China Telecom’s national network indicates that it is strongly supported by the
State Council Informatization Steering Group, the highest telecom decision
making agency in China. In summer 2002, the Ministry of Railroad also acquired
license to provide fixed-line and IP telephony services, founding a new company
named Tietong.
All the above-mentioned new telecom firms operate on a national scale
and have branches in the Pearl River Delta. However, except China Unicom, most
of them pose less competition to China Telecom in comparison with another
group of locally based operators affiliated with state authorities in Guangdong
Province and the cities. As it became increasingly clear that telecommunications
is one of the most profitable field of investment that yields high returns, almost all
local CCP and government bodies in the Delta started to get involved as
“bureaucratic entrepreneurs” (Hsing, 1997) to build infrastructure and provide
telecom services. Like what was done in Nanhai, usually a state agency or several
of them would form a nominally independent for-profit entity, whieh still takes
order from the government body (or bodies) while at the same time enjoying the
benefits of existing institutional and personal networks as well as privileges in
getting state orders. The prime examples include Nanhai Information Industry
Investment Co. (NIII) backed up by Nanhai City Science and Technology
Bureau, Foshan Chantong Information Broadband Networks Co. (Chantong)
affliated with the publicity division of Foshan City CCP Committee, and iCom
Networks supported by Zhongshan City Electricity Bureau.
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Among those affiliated with city-level authorities, most would follow the
model of semi-official enterprises led by either the city science and technology
bureau (e.g. in Nanhai and Shunde), the city informatization office (e.g. in Zhuhai
and Dongguan), or local CATV operator, which is part of the city’s CCP
Committee. The case of iCom Networks in Zhongshan is the most distinctive as it
is the only city in the region where the local electricity bureau sponsors a major
local telecom player. As found out in interview with iCom CEO Mr. Baohua
Zhang, this was because the state-run electricity networks need a communication
system for automated control. Being financially very resourceful, they had been
building a fiber optic network for internal communications since 1997. By the end
of 2001, 930 kilometers of fiber optics had been in operation, which was not only
technically most advanced in the city but also connecting all township-level
governments and electricity provision units. It was therefore not surprising that
the City would select iCom Networks as the backbone of e-govemment
applications. While the iCom case is probably not representative of most other
local telecom operators, it does show the malleability of institutional set-up when
local state engages in the commercial aspect of telecom development in the Delta
region.
The most active local telecom provider in the Pearl River Delta is
probably Eastern Fibemet Investments Ltd affiliated with Guangdong Provincial
Bureau of Information Industry, CITIC Industrial Bank, and ChinaSat, a
subsidiary of Mil that holds nation-wide license to provide Internet access.
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Established in January 2000, Eastern Fibemet was originally designated to
provide telecom services for the Ninth National Games of China held in
Guangzhou in November 2001. Tempted by huge market demand in the region,
Guangdong Provincial Government, CITIC, and ChinaSat decided to join forces
and expand the network from Guangzhou and its adjacent area to the entire
province. Until summer 2002, Eastern Fibemet had laid more than 9,000
kilometers of frher optics including a 40 gigahit loop for areas surrounding the
Pearl River Delta and a 400 gigahit loop for cities within the Pearl River Delta.
This network is the main platform for the provincial public access e-govemment
system as well as some of the intemal state communications. It also provides
services such as system integration and Netmeeting to non-govemmental
commercial entities. To a great extent, government-sponsored telecom firms are
not essentially different from state officials in their storytelling. They are
extensions of the state into commercial spheres.
Foreign Players and Joint Ventures
The telecom storytelling network is becoming more complicated because, as a
result from the increasingly opened communication action context, telecom firms
from outside Mainland China have played an indispensable role in the Delta’s
economic development and the take-off of a regional information industry. The
influx of FDI and increasing demand from international trade greatly propelled
rapid growth in the telecom sector, which has to be transformed from a pure
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264
component of the party-state bureaueracy in late 1970s to an integral part of the
dynamic and globalizing regional market eeonomy.
More importantly, foreign players (operationally defined as including
those fi’ om Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) also directly participated in the
eonstruction of teleeom infrastructure in the Pearl River Delta as either service
providers or device manufacturers. Although due to regulatory restrietion at
national level, no foreign company can hold majority share of any teleeom service
provider, foreign firms may still partner with domestie operators to form share
holding joint ventures or non-share-holding contraetual operations. The best
example for this type of cooperation is Shenda Telephone Company in Shenzhen,
China’s largest Speeial Economie Zone. In 1983, PTA Shenzhen and Cable &
Wireless Hong Kong founded the first Sino-foreign telecom joint venture in
China, which was responsible for infrastructure development and service
provision in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. Cable & Wireless provided
funding, technology, and experience in management, which was instrumental for
Shenzhen’s teleeom boom between 1980 and 1990 (see figures 4.3a and 4.3b).
Due to stricter restriction on foreign ownership of telecom operations sinee mid-
1990s, Cable & Wireless has become only a contraetual partner of Shenda.
While the sanctioned space of operation for foreign companies in the
service provision market has been shrinking and it remains unclear when China’s
commitment to WTO will materialize regarding the opening up of this highly
profitable market, foreign players have demonstrated their most impressive
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265
vibrancy as manufacturers of telecom gadgets in the Pearl River Delta. Unlike
service provision, the manufacture seetor has little ownership restriction, which
means foreign firms ean either establish themselves as independent entities or
enter into share-holding joint ventures with domestic partners. The geographic
adjacency to Hong Kong means that the region, especially cities like Shenzhen
and Dongguan, is conveniently accessible in terms of both financial flow and
transportation, which, combined with the faetor of inexpensive labor, add
significantly to the competitive edge in the global market as well as the
burgeoning domestic market.
Spearheaded by foreign firms and foreign-Chinese joint ventures,
Guangdong has been China’s leading province for eleetronic IT product
manufacture throughout the 1990s, which reached the height of US$ 36 billion in
1 9 9 9 1 9 7 Qp ^ 1 1 telecom and IT products, 96.3 percent are eoneentrated in the Pearl
River Delta.The rapid development of telecom manufacture is an essential
factor in the telecom storytelling networks because it in many cases
fundamentally re-defmes the local political economy by making telecom
production a new pillar industry in the localities. In so doing, forces of economic
globalization were brought in together with the huge population of migrant
workers from other Chinese provinces, thus adding tremendously to the
complexity of (dis)connectedness ecology in the Pearl River Delta.
Guangdong Yearbook (2000), Guangzhou: Guangdong People’s Publications, p. 110.
Ibid.
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Table 6.1 Production of telecom and IT products in Guangdong (2001)
Units Produced in
Guangdong (million units)
Guangdong’s share in
the national total
Telephone sets 76.2 73.9%
Fax machines 2.2 69.8%
LAN switches 30.2 41.8%
Micro computers 2.3 26.1%
Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council
Table 6.2 Top ten imports of Guangdong (2001)
Imports Value
(billion USD)
Imports Value
(billion USD)
Integrated circuit and 7.84 Data processing 1.57
electronic parts equipments
Plastic materials 6.34 Circuit protective 1.16
(polyethylene, ABS) devices
Rolled steel 3.37 Electric wire and 0.58
cable
Paper and paperboard 1.95 Motor vehicles 0.28
and chassis
Semiconductor devices 1.60 Pulp 0.26
Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 summarize data provided by Hong Kong Trade
Development Council, which demonstrate Guangdong’s burgeoning telecom
manufacture business in 2001. Table 6.1 shows how many units of telephone sets,
fax machines, LAN switches (for Internet infrastructure), and micro computers
were produced in Guangdong, and that these products account for a large
proportion of China’s national total. Table 6.2 on the other hand demonstrates the
top ten imports of the province in 2001, which indicates the primacy of telecom
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267
and IT-related manufacture in the local economy. The largest item of imports is
integrated circuit and electronic parts (US$ 7.84 billion), while four other items
among the top ten also have to do with the regional information industry
including semiconductor devices (US$ 1.6 billion), data processing equipment
(1.57 billion), circuit protective devices (1.16 billion), and electric wire and cable
(580 million). Other major imports such as plastic materials and paper and
paperboards are used for other local industries (e.g. the manufacture of toys,
shoes, and apparels) as well as the manufacture of telecom and IT products.
Official statistics show that in 2000 there were more than 50,000
electronic and information technology companies in the Pearl River Delta, hiring
a total of about 120,000 employees with college-level training in science and
technology.This however means that on average there are only 2.4 specialists
per firm and the scale of operation is generally rather small. This is not surprising
given that many of them are family-based factories and shops, which characterize
business networks in South China and Southeast Asia. Moreover, a sizeable
proportion of them are only manufacture units of firms in Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and advanced industrialized nations, which retain R&D teams in the headquarters
while sending orders and contracts to factories in the Delta region, where
inexpensive labor is exploited and access to China’s domestic market is tested and
maintained.
Guangdong Yearbook {2001), Guangzhou: Guangdong People’s Publications, p. 93.
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Yet a look at the 50 largest industrial enterprises in Guangdong as listed in
Guangdong Yearbook 2001 reveals that a significant number of telecom
manufacturers, particularly those involving foreign firms, are large-scale
operations. For instance, by measure of total capital assets (table 6.3), six out of
the top 50 industrial enterprises in Guangdong produce devices for the telecom
industry, and among the six, four of them involve foreign players such as IBM,
Samsung, and Nortel. In term of the net value of fixed assets (table 6.4), Samsung
Electron Tube Co. Ltd in Shenzhen is the largest telecom device manufacturer,
which began as a television maker but now also produce computer monitors and
LCDs.
Table 6.3 Telecom and IT equipment manufacturers among the 50 largest
industrial enterprises in Guangdong ranked by measure of total capital assets
(2000)
#1. IBM Technology Products Co., Ltd, Shenzhen
#10. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd, Shenzhen
#29. Shenzhen Seg Samsung Share Holding Co, Ltd
#34. Samsung Electron Tube Co, Ltd, Shenzhen
#35. Guangdong Nortel Telecommunications Equipment Co. Ltd,
Guangzhou
#38. Shenzhen Micro-Electronics Co, Ltd
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2001), p. 565. Emphasis added to foreign firms and
joint ventures.
Table 6.4 Telecom and IT equipment manufacturers among the 50 largest
industrial enterprises in Guangdong by measuring the net value of fixed assets
(2000)
#22. Samsung Electron Tube Co, Ltd, Shenzhen
#41. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd, Shenzhen
#42. Shenzhen Micro-Electronics Co, Ltd
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2001), p. 566. Emphasis added to foreign firms and
joint ventures.
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While foreign-owned and jointly owned companies such as IBM and
Samsung have the largest amount of total assets among telecom manufacturers,
the situation differs when output value and sales revenue are used as the criteria of
comparison, which is demonstrated in tables 6.5 and 6.6. First, telecom equipment
producers account for 25 of the 50 largest industrial enterprises by measure of
gross output value and 22 of the top-50 list as rated by the size of sales revenue.
This means although not many telecom firms have large capital assets and fixed
assets, they tend to be very productive and generating more revenue than
companies in other industries. Second, about one third of the most productive
telecom manufacturers are foreign-owned or Chinese-foreign joint ventures
including local companies for global IT giants such as Nokia, Epson, LG, and
again Samsung, IBM, and Nortel. Third, these large-scale operations tend to be
spatially concentrated, particularly in Shenzhen and Dongguan, the two cities
most adjacent to Hong Kong.
Table 6.5 Telecom and IT equipment manufacturers among the 50 largest
industrial enterprises in Guangdong by measure of gross output value (2000)
#3. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd, Shenzhen
#8. Zhongxing New Communication Equipment
#11. Changcheng International Information Products (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd
#13. Nokia Automobile Telephone Co. Ltd, Dongguan
#15. Konka Group Joint Stock Co, Ltd (Shenzhen)
#16. PC Pro Teclmology (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd
#18. Epson Engineering (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd
#19. Seagate Technology (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd
#21. LG Electronics (Hnizhon) Inc
#22. Mitac Computer (Shunde) Ltd
#25. Uniden Electronics Products (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd.
#27. Shenzhen Kaifa Technology Joint Stock Co. Ltd.
#32. Hailing Memory Equipment Co., Ltd, Shenzhen
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#33. Shenzhen Sanyo Huaqiang Optical Technological Co., Ltd.
#34. Shinwa Computer Industries (Huizhou) Ltd.
#35. Amertek Computer (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd.
#36. Philips Consumer Communication and Sed Co., Ltd, Shenzhen
#37. Weiguan Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd.
#38. Flextronics International Ltd (Zhuhai)
#39. Sanyo Electric (Shekou) Co. Ltd
#40. Fenghua Advanced Technology Group Ltd (Zhaoqin)
#41. Samsung Electron Tube Co, Ltd, Shenzhen
#42. IBM Technology Products Co., Ltd, Shenzhen
#45. China Great Wall Computer Shenzhen Co. Ltd
#47. Guangdong Nortel Telecommunications Equipment Co. Ltd,
Guangzhou
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2001), p. 567. Emphasis added to foreign firms and
joint ventures.
Table 6.6 Telecom and IT equipment manufacturers among the 50 largest
industrial enterprises in Guangdong by measure of sales revenue (2000)
#2. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd, Shenzhen
#12. Konka Group Joint Stock Co, Ltd (Shenzhen)
#15. Nokia Automobile Telephone Co. Ltd, Dongguan
#21. Seagate Technology (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd
#22. Epson Engineering (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd
#23. Zhongxing New Communication Equipment
#25. Mitac Computer (Shunde) Ltd
#26. Guangdong Nortel Telecommunications Equipment Co. Ltd,
Gnangzhou
#27. Shenzhen Chung Wei RGB Electronic Co. Ltd
#28. Shenzhen Kaifa Technology Co. Ltd
#29. LG Electronics (Huizhou) INC
#33. Uniden Electronics Products (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd.
#36. Hailing Memory Equipment Co., Ltd, Shenzhen
#37. Shenzhen Sanyo Huaqiang Optical Technological Co., Ltd.
#38. Shinwa Industries (China) Ltd, Huizhou (computers)
#39. Amertek Computer (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd.
#42. PC Pro Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd.
#43. Philips Consumer Communication and Sed Co., Ltd, Shenzhen
#45. Weiguan Technology (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd
#46. Samsung Electron Tnbe Co, Ltd, Shenzhen
#47. Sanyo Electric (Shekou) Co. Ltd
#49. Fenghua Advanced Technology Group Ltd (Zhaoqin)
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2001), p. 568. Emphasis added to foreign firms and
joint ventures.
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Domestic Private Telecom Firms
The lists of top 50 industrial enterprises in Guangdong also reveal that a good
number of domestic private telecom firms have grown to a large size comparable
or even surpassing the level of the foreign players. Most notable is Huawei
Technologies in Shenzhen, which has the largest output value and sales revenue
among all telecom facilities producers in the Pearl River Delta. Huawei’s
legendary leader, Mr. Ren Zhenfei, is a former People’s Liberation Army telecom
specialist, who founded the company in 1987 with an initial investment of less
than US$ 5000. Since he was dedicated to develop China’s own brand of hi-tech
telecom equipments, Huawei earned support from MPT although it is not directly
affiliated with any government agency. With the rapid expansion of China’s
telecom infrastructure and soaring needs for equipment, Huawei developed its
own program-controlled telephone switchers, digital routers, GSM equipment,
and Internet networking facilities, all of which used to be imported at a much
higher price from western countries. Since solidifying its position as the leading
telecom manufacturer in China, Huawei has also been expanding to other
markets, establishing 40 branches in North America, South Africa, the Middle
East, and Southeast Asia, with major contracts won in Russia, Thailand, India,
and Mexico. The company’s online self-introduction highlights its ability “to
consider the needs of (its) customers from start to finish, from the chip to the
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network.”^ ® ® During one interview, a California-based IT business consultant
referred to Huawei as “the company that’s competing head to head with Cisco.
Meanwhile, according to the Forbes Magazine, Mr. Ren Zhenfei has become the
third wealthiest person in mainland China with personal assets of approximately
US$ 500 million in 2000.
Besides Huawei and other large-scale manufacturers, there are tens of
thousands of small factories producing parts and phone sets that require less
sophisticated technology. Many of these firms cluster together in a specific
locality to reduce transaction cost among them, which means collectively their
products will be more competitive on the global market. For instance, the City of
Dongguan on the eastern side of the Pearl River Delta has the world’s densest
concentration of mouse and keyboard manufacturers, most of which specializes in
producing only a few parts to be assembled into the devices. Enping, a county-
level city in western PRD, specializes in making microphones. In year 2000, there
were more than 300 factories in Enping that produced more than 50 million
microphones, which account for US$ 73 million, i.e. 70 percent of the national
total products for microphones.
While hardware manufacture is booming, software production has also
started to take root in the Delta region with preferential state policies in rent.
^ See http://www.huawei.com.
While this dissertation is being written, a lawsuit regarding intellectual property right infringement is
in process between Cisco and Huawei, which is widely believed to be a tactic that Cisco uses to prevent
Huawei from entering the U.S. market. See Peter Burrows and Bruce Einhom, “Cisco: In hot pursuit of
a Chinese rival,” Business Week. May 19, 2003, p. 62; Ben Kwok, “Cisco suit just a bump on the road
for Huawei,” South China Morning Post, April 5, 2003, p. 2.
Guangdong Yearbook (2001), Guangzhou: Guangdong People’s Publications, p. 130.
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taxation, personnel management, and so on. By the end of 2000, there were 1,600
software companies in Guangdong, about one third of all software firms in China,
most of which concentrate in the Pearl River Delta, particularly the four state-
recognized software parks in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Nanhai.
Although most of them are still small firms, in total they employed 40,000
software developers, generating an annual product value of about US$ 1 billion,
which is the largest among all provinces in China.
Another type of domestic private telecom firm is content providers, or the
dot-coms, for which Netease.com may serve as the best exemplar. Founded by
Mr. William Ding in Guangzhou in June 1997, Netease was recognized as the
most popular website among Chinese users by China Internet Network
Information Center in 1998 and 1999. With a registered membership base of 107
million by the end of 2002, the company provides online news, gaming, e-
commerce, and virtual community services such as chatroom, alumni BBS, and
hobby clubs. As the second Chinese Internet firm being listed in Nasdaq, Netease
experienced a serious stock slump and financial difficulty in late 2001. But its
share price skyrocketed more than 1500% from US$ 69 cents in October 2001 to
US$ 11.45 in December 2002, which means it was the biggest gainer among all
high-tech Nasdaq companies (Kurtenbach, 2003). The rapid return from loss to
profit was due to the ability of Netease to provide content (news, jokes, images
Ibid. pp. 128,283.
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etc) for cellular phone short message services (SMS) and collect profit from
telecom operators such as China Mobile and China Unicom.
Success stories about private telecom firms can also be found in the
service provision sector, although unlike content provision and gadget
manufacture businesses telecom service provision, from fixed-line telephony to
Internet services, is much more dominated by state-affiliated companies such as
China Telecom and Eastern Fibemet. However, there are certain nitch markets for
private firms particularly when it comes to new technologies with untested market
potential or limited return of profit. Gosun Communication Group is probably the
most successful enterprise in this category. Started in 1992 by Mr. Chen Yibiao as
a retailer of beepers in Guangzhou, Gosun quickly established its own paging
network and satellite transmission system in 1993, and expanded to cover the
entire Pearl River Delta with a total number of 800,000 subscribers in June 2001.
Due to the decrease of market demand for traditional paging services, Gosun
restructured itself to include more diverse services for mobile telephony and
Internet-related applications, including popular IP-telephone cards and get-online
cards that I used during my fieldtrip to place long-distance phone calls and obtain
Internet access. A manager of Gosun branch office in Dongguan told me there is
less competition in the phone card and Internet card market because the profit
margin is relatively small and more knowledge about local markets is needed.
This means these more “marginal” domains of telecom business usually do not
attract large state-affiliated players, thus leading to the formation of a relatively
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independent storytelling network consisting of privately owned telecom providers
in the regional communication infrastructure.
Internet Cafés and Other Small Businesses
In addition to big private manufacturers, successful dot-coms, and local ISPs like
Gosun, there are also thousands of smaller telecom enterprises operating at
varying degree of legality in the Pearl River Delta. The largest group in this
category is Internet cafés, also known as cyber-cafés or netbars {wang ba),
catering to the needs for entertainment and information among youth groups,
traveling businesspeople, and migrant workers. While some cyber-cafés in
Beijing have more than 1000 terminals, most netbars in the Pearl River Delta have
less than 60 online computers, although some larger ones may have up to 100
terminals. The majority of Internet café owners and managers are immigrant
entrepreneurs from other provinces and laid-off or underemployed urban residents
who are strongly committed to new technology and would borrow money from
families and friends to start the business. However, there is very significant
variation among the localities in terms of how local authorities treat cyber-cafes,
including more tolerant cities such as Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Foshan and less
tolerant cities such as Guangzhou, Nanhai, and Dongguan. While in all cases,
Internet cafes are required to get permissions from local authorities (the police,
taxation, hygiene, industrial and commercial management), cities like Guangzhou
and Nanhai deliberately discouraged the proliferation of netbars by limiting the
number of licenses. The City of Dongguan, although with a population of 6
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276
million, had never issued a single netbar license; yet a casual visit to a middle-
class Dongguan residential neighborhood revealed four Internet cafés within
walking distance from each other - all operating in an artificially imposed
“illegal” status. Shortly after the fatal netbar fire in Beijing that killed dozens of
students in June 2002, the crackdown on illegal Internet café accelerated in the
entire Delta region. However, in Shenzhen and Zhuhai, where local authorities
were more sympathetic to the netbar business, Internet cafés with proper licensing
remained open although the owners were instructed to observe regulations more
strictly.
Why Internet cafés have to face many additional hurdles that do not bother
telecom enterprises of larger scale? The size of operation is only one part of the
answer, whereas more significantly this has to do with unfavorable telecom
storytelling by which cyber-café operators are more often passive objects of
biased narratives than active storytellers in themselves. As a netbar manager told
me in Guangzhou, “Talking about Internet café today is like talking about
nightclubs in the 80s. Its public image is really bad. My parents do not think high
of my job either.” Both mass media and interpersonal communication took part in
the negative storytelling about cyber-cafés, which will be discussed in more detail
in the subsequent section. In the meantime, the type of biased storytelling against
Internet café is prototypical and it reflects public perception of other small private
telecom businesses such as mom-and-pup mobile parts retailers, street vendors of
IP phone cards, and small factories that refurbish computers or make pirated
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software. All these operations of lesser scale are constantly portrayed within
negative frames such as tax evasion, ffaudulence, and environmental pollution.
But despite repetitive efforts of the authorities to eliminate these “underground”
activities, they persist in the Pearl River Delta and become an indispensable
component of the regional telecom storytelling system, which is particularly
important in regard to the patterns of disconnectedness between the local state and
the new entrepreneurial storytellers.
Many Images, One Theme
Compared to narratives from the officialdom, commercial storytelling that affects
telecom developments in the Pearl River Delta is much more diverse given greater
intemal variation among the storytellers in terms of ownership, production/service
type, and scale of operation. At one extreme of the spectrum, there are state-
affiliated enterprises like China Telecom and Eastern Fibemet, which, although
formally separated from party-state authorities, retain the mode of high-flung
official discourse that discourages interaction with local residents and other
telecom players. Meanwhile, there are commercial enterprises less dependent on
state funding and policy protection, which therefore would adopt a more
accessible language of consumerism that characterizes recent global, urban
developments observed in industrialized societies. The nationalist frame was also
utilized among domestic private telecom players, who sought to increase their
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278
storytelling resources, although none of them capitalizes on the potential of the
Delta region as a storytelling system in and of itself.
Moreover, besides active storytellers within the telecom business
community, there are also firms of smaller scale that are highly disadvantaged in
the communication infrastructure. They either do not have adequate resources to
storytell or they suffer from prejudices and stereotypes created by other
storytellers ranging all the way from local authorities to large enterprises to the
media, or both may be true in certain cases.
Yet regardless of the images constructed and conveyed by popular
narratives, regardless of the types of storytellers being involved, the fundamental
theme of all storytelling about telecom development in the Delta has to do with
techno-utopianism despite the fact that each type of commercial storytellers
would have their own way to promote the new technologies. Even stories about
companies that are resource-poor (e.g. the Internet cafés) are not painting a
completely dystopian vision. Rather, they aim at shaping the regional telecom
infrastructure in a specific way that is believed to be more beneficial from the
standpoint of the stakeholders, which however often ends up adding to the
alienation of the disenfranchised members of the local community.
The Migration o f Official Discourse
Given that the commercialization of telecom services is in itself a consequence of
state-led reform and opening-up in China, there is little surprise that official
discourse would enter the sphere of corporate storytelling, particularly among
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those with state affiliation. While discussing their relationship with the state, a
China Telecom manager in Guangzhou said, “Although as telecom operator we
are separated from the government, in fact we are old colleagues. After all, the
separation was just ten years ago, and we still feel more like a family.”
In addition to historical affinity, large-scale telecom operators have to pick
up official language because, even among the new access and service providers in
the localities, most are directly founded by local state agencies to support the
networking of government entities. For instance, the president of Nanhai
Information Industry Investment Co. is a senior official in Nanhai city
government; Foshan Chantong Broadband Networks is led by a member of the
Foshan City CCP Standing Committee; and the chairman of Zhongshan iCom
Networks had been working for the City Electricity Bureau for more than 30
years. Thus in interviews, while articulating their goals and plans these official-
tumed entrepreneurs sounded more like party-state cadres rather than ordinary
members of the business community. Catchphrases like “informatization” and
“frog-leap” are often used as well as standard Chinese political cliché such as “the
benefits of the people.”
It is important to note that all privileges granted to telecom operators are
not coincidental or purely due to historical legacy. There is also the institutional
framework that requires state approval and the renewal of licensing for all
telecom providers from network operators to equipment manufacturers to small
Internet cafes. Yet large-scale state-affiliated companies remain the group that is
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most captured by the relatively closed system of state discourse, for which the
offieial introduction to Eastern Fibemet quoted in the beginning of this chapter
can serve as a good example. Here is another excerpt from the company’s
brochure that deliberately portrays the company not as an ordinary telecom firm
but as a government subsidiary designated to realize the “Tenth Five Year Plan”
of Guangdong Province:
Eastern Fibemet Investments Ltd is now mostly dedicated to the
constmetion and management of broadband IP networks in
Guangdong Provinee. This networking project was approved by
Guangdong Provincial Planning Committee in January 2000 to
become the basie transmission network for the information system
of the Ninth National Games, Guangdong Provincial Social
Security Information System, and the Information Network System
of the Guangdong Provincial Government. It is also the basic
network platform for the “One Platform, Two Centers, and Three
Bases” design promoted by the “Tenth Five Year Plan” of the
Guangdong Province (author’s translation).
Noting that the phrase “One Platform, Two Centers, and Three Bases” is a
classic format of official narrative, I asked a division manager in the Guangzhou
headquarters of the company to explain what it meant. “The ‘One Platform’ is
us.” he answered quickly, but then stumbled, “The ‘Two Centers and Three
Bases’ ... those are something else the provincial leaders decided ... maybe for
places like Shenzhen.” It doesn’t really matter if he or others in the company
understand the abbreviations created by party-state authorities. All they need is to
adopt the language, and it is almost never their task to explain the specialized
phrases to local business community or the residents. This eodifred language both
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reflects and contributes to discursive disconnectedness and institutional blocks
within the regional telecom storytelling system.
The official mode of storytelling also penetrates certain segments of the
telecom industry, especially those that are dependent on e-govemment initiatives,
which account for a sizeable proportion of telecom providers. As observed in the
Hi-Tech Trade Expo held in Shenzhen in July 2002, one such company is
Shenzhen Haotian Network Security Technology Co. Ltd. whose marketing goal
is to serve the secrecy needs of large institutions including state agencies and
armed forces in particular. Its self-narration is thus full of military jargon;
Our company focuses on providing close-combat network security
services for government, military, financial, and commercial
enterprises. Our army of technicians consists of well-trained
security experts who provide all-weather examination and
surveillance of latest hacker activities and security holes. Once
discovered, security problems will be reported to the central
network command center in less than 30 minutes (author’s
translation).
The Global, Urban, Techno-Consumerism
The influence of official discourse, however, is relatively limited in comparison
with the frame of technology-centered consumerism that incorporates storytelling
elements of global neo-liberalism and an emerging form of Chinese
informationalism in a primarily urban setting (Qiu, 2003), which is becoming
increasingly ubiquitous in the regional telecom storytelling system. Until late
1980s, few telecom providers had perceived home telephone connection as a
common consumer service, let alone the then hi-tech technologies such as pagers.
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fax machines, and cellular phones, which were all prominent signifiers of high-
rank official position or outstanding social economic status. Yet the mode of
commercial storytelling transformed most dramatically starting from early 1990s
into a market-oriented approach, as most clearly evidenced by extensive
advertising campaigns via broadcasting and print media, online and offline
billboards, as well as the mobilization of interpersonal networks, which will be
discussed in more detail.
The Touch o f Globalization
A major telecom marketing campaign in summer 2002 was the promotion
of CDMA mobile phone services in the Pearl River Delta, when local branches of
China Unicom, the main CDMA service provider, engaged in collective
storytelling about their new products and services. The promotion was
synchronized with the World Cup soccer game of 2002 held in Korea and Japan,
where CDMA services had prevailed over older generation GSM mobile
technology, which was still industry standard in China. Besides running many
advertisements in print and broadcasting media, China Unicom sponsored a series
of activities such as soccer nights with big-screen TV showing live games and
sending journalists abroad who would report using CDMA cell phones, all
designed to promote the new service as a truly “global” technology for the urban
elite. Press conferences were held in Guangzhou to announce that CDMA phones
have only 0.1 percent electro-magnetic radiation as GSM phones and therefore
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would be less likely to cause brain tumors?®'* Local Unicom operators also
focused marketing efforts on high-end consumers by offering free CDMA phones
to the GSM subscribers whose monthly cell phone expenses are more than 1000
yuan, i.e. approximately US$ 120.
Meanwhile, there is a more prolonged dimension of this global, urban,
techno-consumerist narration that includes not only individual advertisements or
series of advertising campaigns but also dozens of new magazines and websites
dedicated to constant and in-depth discussion of telecom-related issues. The
importance of teleeom technologies has so definitely gone beyond the sphere of
instrumental utility and into the symbolic domain of urban imagination that it is
very difficult to find a media character representative of people living in the Pearl
River Delta, in either print ads, soap operas, or official posters, who does not
conspicuously possess a mobile phone. Another indication is that the tallest
skyscraper in Guangzhou is named “China Teleeom Building (zhongxin dasha),"
a 80-floor landmark that overlooks the entire new central business district of this
ancient city at the center of the Delta.
With the increasing opening-up of China’s telecom market, espeeially
after the country’s accession to the WTO, even state-affiliated enterprises like
China Telecom has to be part of this global neo-liberalist diseourse, although with
much reluctance. “In retrospect, it is inevitable that some of us are nostalgic of the
^ The press release by China Unicom provoked strong counter reaction from China Mobile, the largest
operator o f the GSM networks. See for instance, Lei Zhao, “Equal Radiation Between GSM and
CDMA, Environmental Protection Cell Phone Is a Lie,” Guangzhou Daily, June 4*, 2002.
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good old days (of telecom monopoly),” said a senior China Telecom manager in
Dongguan. He continued in a nervous tone on the way out for a meeting:
But there is no choice now. We have to face competition and
particularly be ready for the cruel reality (canku xianshi) that the
day will come when large foreign firms will be part of our
domestie telecom market, when state protection that we have
enjoyed for so many years will finally vanish. That’s why we are
having so many meetings these days to discuss how we can get
prepared. If this means we have to combine offices and lay off
people, then that’s what we’ll have to do. There is no achievement
without saerifiee (author’s translation).^^^
Not surprisingly, the heightened sense of market competition has greatly
contributed to inter-organizational disconnectedness among the commercial
storytellers. Not only is it more difficult to share information among the
competitors. Major telecom firms may also attempt to develop, given the lack of
coordination, parallel or essentially identieal network infrastructures (e.g. fiber
optic networks in Guangzhou) or systems with high incompatibility with each
other.
Gendered Discourse o f Telecom-Based Land Development
The hype of cross-boundary consumerism intensified when it comes to the
telecom entities that also own real estate in the Delta region, for which
storytelling telecom not only serves the purpose of promoting and shaping the
telecom infrastructure hut also works as a way to promote their property values.
Besides the above-mentioned China Telecom Building in Guangzhou, another
According to another interview with a China Telecom manager in Guangzhou, sizeable laid-off plan
was aetually been eontemplated because the company hoped to be listed on the stock market yet its
financial consultants, including Morgan Stanley, pointed out that the per-employee produetivity of
China Telecom is too low, despite the fact that it is the largest teleeom inffastrueture owner in
Guangdong.
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prototypical project of similar nature is Shenzhen SEG Plaza in downtown
Shenzhen, a 72-floor skyscraper that also happens to be the largest trading center
for computer and telecom equipments and accessories in South China/°^ SEG
Group, the property owner, is a large-scale telecom manufacturer and trading
company, which also built this building that, according to a mid-level property
manager, houses a daily transaction volume of RMB 100 million yuan (US$ 12
million) by companies inside the SEG Plaza. Besides the large quantity of small
firms that populated most of the building, they also endeavored to cater to the
needs of top leaders in the telecom industry by investing in an e-commerce club
on the 61st and 62"“ * floors of the skyscraper, which is described in both Chinese
and English in a flashy brochure:
SEG e-commerce club is a city commerce club for commercial
activities, reunion and high-class social activities. It is a stage for
the electronic and telecommunication and other high-tech circles as
well as the tenants of the building, a bridge for the communications
of home and foreign business people. SEG e-commerce club is
linked up with other outdoor resorts, such as the Golf Club in
Hangzhou, Nanhai Guantang Hot Spring Resort, Dongguan
Shanshui Tiandi Resort, Shenzhen Kaiyue Hotel, etc.
The club will arrange all the reception activities for members of
the club according to his personal style and manner. And the
demand and suggestions of the members shall be transferred over
from time to time. Social activities will be organized by the club
from time to time, to enhance the communications of the members,
and deepen their friendship, enlarge the areas of cooperation
(original English translation by the SEG Group).
' See http://www.segplaza.com.cn/
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Note that the second paragraph of the quote proclaims that reception
activities will be arranged to suit ''his personal style and manner,” although the
interviewee and her officemates in the SEG Plaza property management office
were all young females. Upon inquiry, she said that the head of the office is male,
and so are most board members of the SEG Group. It is clear that, while the
content of this specific instance of storytelling highlights the trans-border capacity
of the e-commerce club to cross over to resorts in other cities and facilitate
communication among the business leaders, it also reifies the existing gender
boundary and reinforces the social imagination that successful telecom
entrepreneurs are always men. Hence, this particular instance of storytelling could
be regarded as a prime exemplar for the emergent urban ecology that is both
“globally connected” and “locally disconnected” as Manuel Castells articulates
(1996, p. 404).
The Legend o f “ Patriotic Entrepreneurs ”
It is not uncommon for constructed images of globalization to sound very much
hyped-out. One such instance of telecom storytelling is the promotion of
Dongguan International Computer Communication and Consumer Electronic
Products Exposition, which was organized by Dongguan City Government. The
following excerpt from the Expo brochure shows how the local state is also
captured by the hyper-globalist discourse, while at the same time the
overconfidence of this narrative in proclaiming the city to be the center of global
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telecom manufacturing industry would even put to shame the most audacious
commercial storytellers in the private sector.
Dongguan is located at the crossing of Hong Kong-Shenzhen-
Guangzhou economic corridor, which is among the largest
international manufacturing and processing bases in the world....
No matter where you order, all is made in Dongguan. Traffic jam
in Dongguan, short of stock worldwide. This is the actual
portraiture for this famous international manufacturing city
(original English translation by Dongguan City Government).
The excerpt from Dongguan’s International Expo is one of many examples
showing that storytelling telecom in the Pearl River Delta, although quite oriented
to the global market, also contains localized elements conducive for an
exaggerated form of collective pride. However, the collective identity being
honored most frequently is not based on residential community or the Delta
region, although promotions of local identity were observed sporadieally in the
eities of Dongguan, Nanhai, Shenzhen, and to a lesser degree, also in Guangzhou
and Zhuhai. Upon seeond thought, it was actually the nationalistic framework
linking up the images of successful hi-tech entrepreneurship with the revival of
the Chinese nation that is most widely and constantly celebrated.
“Coimecting China with the world, bringing the world to China.” This has
been a theme repeated since 1980s in countless telecom conventions and
advertisements both within the Delta region and throughout China. The purpose is
not to simply advocate the obliteration of national boundaries but to promote the
idea that more connections between China and the outside world will ultimately
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benefit the revitalization of the nation itself. Interestingly, those who are most
actively promoting the nationalist frame tend to be large-scale private telecom
players in stead of the state-affiliated entities, which is on the other hand not
totally surprising because private firms do not have the same amount of discursive
resource and capitalizing on the nationalist frame of storytelling would add
greatly to their symbolic repertoire.
Most explicit articulations can be found in the cases of the two largest
telecom manufacturers of the region, which are also among the largest of the
country: Huawei and Zhongxin. In Chinese, the literal meaning of Huawei is
“China’s action” or “China’s achievement,” and Zhongxin means “China’s
prosperity.” Huawei’s CEO, Mr. Ren Zhenfei, was often praised for bravely
standing up against foreign companies who dominated China’s hi-tech telecom
device market until the 1990s. Several interviewees said they admired Mr. Ren for
his patriotism in addition to his business visions and management skills, saying
that he repetitively declined proposals from foreign companies to change Huawei
into a foreign-Chinese joint venture, despite very attractive offers, because he
hoped to keep Huawei a “purely Chinese corporation.”
Besides informal interpersonal storytelling, Huawei also formalizes its
patriotic orientation by including two articles in Chapter One, “Core Values,” of
Huawei Basic Law, the company’s internal code of conduct:^®’
See Huawei Basic Law online at http://www.eduvang.com/exellence/haweifa.html. English
translation provided by the author.
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Article 4 SPIRIT Love of the nation, the people, career and life is the
origin of our solidarity. Sense of responsibility, spirit of innovation,
professionalism, and teamwork are the marrow of our corporate culture.
Seeking truth from fact is the yardstick of our action.^®*
Article 7 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY Huawei’s responsibility is to
serve the Chinese nation as an industry leader and help revive the nation
via the development of science and technology so that the growth of the
company will contribute to the larger community that we are situated in.
The purpose of our diligent work is the prosperity of our great country, the
renaissance of the Chinese nation, and the happiness of ourselves and our
families (author’s translation).
A similar claim can be found in Zhongxin’s stipulation of their corporate
culture: “The career of collective endeavor in Zhongxin Telecommunications is to
promote wealth and prosperity of China and the growth of our national telecom
industry.” Explicit articulation of the national theme is also often aligned with
neo-liberalist discourse for corporate share-holding and high profitability, as
shown in the self-introduction of Tsinghua Bitway, an Internet equipment maker
in Beijing that was expanding in the regional telecom market of the Pearl River
Delta.
Ever since the establishment, we are in persistent pursuit of our
initial principle - set up famous domestic brand of network product
and combine high and advanced technology with excellent staff
and abundant capital to give the company higher starting point,
higher efficiency and higher return. The tempting prospect has
drawn enterprising pioneers to join in the company and innovative
management system and effective staff-share-holding plan is
attracting a growing number of domestic and foreign technical and
management talents to join in (original translation).^^^
^ “Seeking truth from fact” is a politically loaded term for “being honest,” which signifies association
with Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening-up policy.
^ Tsinghua Bitway introduction brochure found at Shenzhen Hi-Tech Expo in June 2002.
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The precise reason why certain large-scale private manufacturers
utilize nationalistic appeals in their commercial storytelling is not that they
hope to contribute to the building of the national “virtual community”
(Anderson, 1983). Instead, nationalist discourse was employed to be in
similar wavelength with official narratives as well as much of the urban
grassroots opinions that emphasizes patriotism given that state agencies
and urban residents constitute the bulk of today’s telecom consumer
market. The routinization of such storytelling practices may certainly
enhance connectedness between companies in the Delta and other parts of
the country. However, the nationalistic frame may lead to confinement in
terms of international and global outreach. It may also most likely cause
more negligence in local and regional storytelling about telecom issues.
The Inevitable “Good V 5 . Evil”
Like official storytelling, the promotion of urban consumerism and Chinese
nationalism from the perspective of telecom providers has been by and large
straightforward advocacy for new technologies as means to improve personal life,
collective well-being, and the status of China in international community. Yet
commercial storytelling differs the most from official discourse in more open
exposure of failures and problems in the system of telecommunications to
increase the salience of issues related to telecom development in the region.
Admittedly, key state figures also utilize fear as a storytelling device, building
mostly on concerns for technological stagnancy that would limit economic growth
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of the Chinese nation or of a specific city (e.g. Nanhai). But their target audience
is restricted to mid-level administrators or upper-class urbanites, who share these
concerns. Their language is usually too formal and high-flung. And never was the
exploitation of fear so successful as in commercial storytelling that actually
penetrates the personal life of average local residents.
The Doomed Fate o f Internet Café
Most representative is the framing of Internet cafes as the culprit to “corrupt
innocent children,” which was first propagated in mass media outlets and then
picked up and circulated among networks of large-scale telecom providers,
government officials, as well as local residents, resulting in closed, negative
storytelling that significantly limited the development of this particular Internet
access provision service. Prior to the deadly fire in a Beijing cybercafe that killed
25 people on June 16, 2002,^^° a clearly unfavorable pattern of storytelling was
already observed during my fieldwork in the Pearl River Delta, blaming Internet
café managers for tax evasion, bad hygiene, admitting under-aged minors, letting
them being online for too long playing violent games and being exposed to
pornography.
This was particularly the case in Guangzhou, where a large number of
print and broadcasting media are concentrated that would report on regular basis
about parental discontent or instances of cybercafe tragedies, either inside or
outside the Delta region. For instance, within a week of late May and early June
See “All Beijing Internet cafés closed for rectification to guarantee safety,” Xinhua News Agency,
June 16, 2002.
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2002, the largest newspaper in the Delta, Guangzhou Daily, reported on the
sudden death of a 17-year-old Hong Kong Internet café user^" and another story
on a 21-year-old in Wisconsin who committed suicide after playing online games
for too long/^^ In the same week. Information Times, another influential
newspaper in the region also ran a full-page coverage on the development of
secret codes among young Internet users and how it threatens the education
system and child-parent communication/ ^ ^ In addition to traditional media, online
news providers also participated in the process of negative storytelling. Following
are headings of an online article regarding Internet café in China, being published
by Guangzhou Net {Guangzhou shichuang), one of the most popular Internet
news providers in the region.^^"^
Guns, Bombs, and Moans, All Engulf Netbar Students
The Black Hole of Internet Café Swallows Many Students
Immoral Commercial Practices Trap Playful Kids
In general, Internet café services are described as ways for greedy
“immoral” shop owners to make profit from “innocent” minors at the expense of
their schoolwork, health, and safety. Hence, the perception of Internet café among
' “Crazy Game Player Suddenly Died in Netbar,” Guangzhou Daily, May 31, 2002, p. A29.
“Online Games: Sweet Wine or Poison?” Guangzhou Daily, June 3, 2002, p. A20.
“Underground Secret Language Frightens Parents,” Information Times, May 31,2002, p. 4.
See news article on Guangzhou Net available at http://wwwl.gznet.com/news/zhuanti/wangba/c-
7.htm. Author’s translation.
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ordinary urban residents was rather unsympathetic, and so was the attitude of
local authorities, ha interviews with cyber-café owners and managers in
Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Nanhai, all interviewees expressed serious discontent
with the unfair treatments they had to face. As quoted in the beginning of this
chapter, one of them said that, “Talking about Intemet café today is like talking
about nightclubs in the 80s. Its public image is really bad.” While asked to
comment on this remark, another cyber-café owner exclaimed, “That was not just
simple talking or a matter of perception. Here (in Shenzhen), the city commercial
authorities actually list us in the category of ‘special business {teshu jingyingY
together with nightclubs!”
Given the strong prejudice against Intemet café, it is not surprising that,
even before the Beijing fire in June 2002, Guangzhou city had already carried out
a large-scale police inspection of cybercafés in mid-May.^ Yet, after the deadly
fire in Beijing more fi'equent police raids were used to clear up Intemet cafés
without full licensing. In Guangzhou, for instance, it was found that there were no
more than 70 licensed Intemet cafes, but the actual number of netbars was beyond
1000, most of which are illegal “black netbars”.^'® In Shenzhen, authorities
identified 757 netbars in total, but only 125 had acquired permissions from all
related government agencies: the police, municipal commerce office, and telecom
People’s Daily Online, “Guangzhou Netbar Must have ‘Filters,”’ May 21, 2002. Available: http://
www.people.com.cn/GB/kejiao/230/ 6150/6151/20020521/732959.html
Xinkuaibao, “Emergent Fire Safety Cheek on the Evening of the 16'’ ’ Revealed Many Problems in
Guangzhou,” June 17,2002.
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regulation authorities.^*^ Immediately the new statisties were cross-linked with
unfavorable public images of Intemet cafés, and café owners were blamed for
ignoring state regulation, neglecting parental concerns, and being blindly market-
driven.
Most of these common accusations were at the same time easily
discreditable as learned from cyber-café owner interviews and confirmed with
participant observation. First, students only constitute a large proportion of those
who visit netbars. While in smaller cities like Nanhai, Foshan, and Dongguan
there were indeed more urban youth in Intemet cafés, schoolchildren only account
for a small customer base for licensed netbars in Guanzhou, the largest urban
center in part due to higher price. Their proportion is even lower in Shenzhen and
Zhuhai, where predominantly it was migrant workers who use the cyber-cafes.
Not a single Intemet cafe owner saw his or herself as “greedy businessperson” as
many of them were migrant entrepreneurs and unemployed or underemployed
local youth who borrowed money from families and friends to start the
business.^*^ They simply could not afford for waiting to get all necessary licenses
- a process that may take anywhere from one year to indefinitely, which means
their recently purchased equipment would then become obsolete. It was tme that
some children were accessing inappropriate content in Intemet cafes, but that also
“Thorough Intemet Café Rectifieation Campaign In Process Starting From Today,” Shenzhen
Evening News. June 20, 2002. p.I.
There were larger chain-store Intemet cafés in other regions of China such as one that I did research
on in Chengdu, southwest China. Similar chain stores could be found in a much smaller scale in
Guangzhou, but not other cities in the Pearl River Delta. This is probably because most well-to-do
people in the Delta region tend not to be interested in investing in Intemet cafés. To them, the business
entails too much risk and gives too little retum.
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happens at home and at school. Referring to the Beijing cyber-café fire, a former
netbar owner who lost the equivalence of more than twenty thousand US dollars
because the government stopped renewing licenses in the city, berated
vehemently.
Look at this fire. So easily people just point fingers at the Intemet
cafe owner. But he was indeed implementing state law by denying
the boys access to his netbar (which infuriated them, and they set
the fire). There was nothing wrong with the owner or manager. It
was the kids’ parents and teachers who should take more
responsibility, had they not divorce, had they given the kids strict
education. But now everyone just blame the Intemet cafe. How
unfair! How unreasonable! I particularly do not understand why
netbars in this city have to be shut down because of what happened
in Beijing. We’ve been always having more space and better
conditions than them. No one here has anything to do with the
wrongdoings in Beijing (author’s translation)!
This quotation is but an epitome of many expressions from suppressed
Intemet café owners that I happened to encounter during the fieldwork. Yet
because the small private firms tend to have too limited material resources to put
up advertisements or systematically present their counter-arguments, other
storytellers very seldom understand their perspectives. In this sense, the bias
against Intemet cafés is not an isolated issue but one that represents the
maltreatments of small private players in the regional telecom storytelling system
and the disconnectedness between them and other components of the
communication inffastmcture.
Along the same line of prejudiced storytelling, there are also two widely
circulated narratives that deserve attention. One has to do with the so-called
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“voice information stations (shenxun tai)” that provide information and chatting
services to those who call a set of special numbers, equivalent to the 900 numbers
in the United States. Very quickly the chatting services became imbued with adult
topics and it was reported that some teenage boys were regular callers, who later
not only suffered psychological trauma but also contributed to huge phone bills
because they were using home phones without informing their parents.^W hile
most owners of the voice information stations have close ties with local China
Telecom branches, they were seldom singled out as the target of media criticism.
Rather, most reports choose to focus on the female employees of voice
information stations who engaged in provocative conversation with minors. They
were depicted as devoid of moral character, obsessive with money, and dishonest
because many of them are mid-aged women pretending to sound like teenage
girls. Almost never was the blame pointed at the business owners or local China
Telecom branches. Nor was it clarified that the females were not “evil” by nature
- rather, they are part of China’s growing body of laid-off and underemployed
urban population who had very few job alternatives. Again, this specific
storytelling network revealed its gendered nature and prejudice against the less
powerful, both of which are key to the formation of social disconnectedness in the
regional communication infrastructure.
See related Netease online discussion at http://news. 163.com/editor/020610/020610 442561 .html.
Also see “Erotic ads from voice information stations sent to students,” Shenzhen Evening Post, May 13,
2002.
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The Globalization o f Garbage
The other story is what might be called “the globalization of garbage,” i.e.
underground operations that has to do with the refurbishing and re-assembly of
used computer parts shipped from overseas, mostly computers thrown away as
garbage in developed nations. As reported in news investigation articles and a
special program by China Central Television (CCYV) in June 2002, there was a
large production and marketing network for imported garbage computers in
Nanhai, concentrated in four villages in the township of Dali (Yan, 1998; Wen,
2002). Here, local residents would use Intemet to shop around garbage sales and
place orders based on images they saw online. Normally, electronic garbage costs
US$ 1200 per ton. When they arrived, they were taken by migrant workers,
mostly those from Hubei, Sichuan, and Hunan, who would reassemble them into
computers with famous brands, to be sold as second-hand computers, usually at
the wholesale price of US$ 35 for a desktop computer and US$ 120 for a laptop.
Reportedly, in the four villages of Dali Township alone, there are more than 1,000
shops that produce or sell such second-hand computers. Up to 2002, the
underground market had existed for more than 10 years, despite repetitive efforts
of the local government to clean it up.
Important is to note that CCTV reporters first interviewed local officials
and then long-term residents in the area, but not a single source from the migrant
worker population. Hence, the target of criticism quickly narrowed down to the
immigrants, who were accused of ignoring government orders, releasing
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pollutants, and using false brand names to deceive customers. No report points out
that, without local support from the low-level administration to the long-term
residents, these immigrants would never have been able to continue operation, let
alone other more critical issues such as what proportion of profit in fact ended up
as local state income or the rent paid to long-term residents who owned the land.
There are more negative stories being circulated in the regional telecom
storytelling network ranging from hacker attacks to computer viruses. Despite
some internal variation, this set of stories with a “good versus evil” plot are most
effective in triggering interpersonal discussion among average Delta residents,
who might not otherwise be influenced by official discourse, hyper-globalism, or
nationalistic narratives, but now have to care about the mental health of their
children, their own phone bills, and whether the Intemet café down the street
would also cause a deadly fire. These could be good conversation starters, but the
ways the stories were told actually reify a closed symbolic system that
disadvantages small private owners and tends to put excessive blame on the
powerless, be they unemployed urban females or migrant workers from the
countryside. This is a vicious circle of telecom storytelling that involves mass
media, state authorities, large enterprises, and the local residents. It increases
connectedness within the circle of privileged storytellers while at the same time
contributes to further exclusion of those who are less resourceful in the
increasingly commercialized telecom storytelling system.
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Discussion: Storytelling Beyond the Bottom Line
As previously discussed, commercial telecom storytelling, as a second essential
unit in the regional telecom storytelling system, does have higher accessibility and
discursive diversity in comparison with official narratives. This, however, is not
an absolute evaluation because on the one hand there is mutual penetration
between state-led storytelling and narrations initiated by large-scale enterprises,
particularly those with government affiliations. Official discourse is frequently
picked up not only because some telecom providers are economically reliant upon
state funding or purchases but also because state storytelling is increasingly
captured by global capitalism as seen in China’s accession to the WTO and its
promotion of competition in the telecom market.
It is important to note that the market of telecom service provision in the
Pearl River Delta, although relatively more open than other regions in the country,
remains an oligopoly structure. In this transitional stage, storytelling ties between
state-affiliated firms and government agencies may result in a discursive
hegemony that is not only more deceptive but may give rise to new ways of
suppression against new competitors, which increases schisms within the
networks of commercial storytellers. The most prominent issue in this regard is
the problem of network interconnectivity, especially between China Telecom the
incumbent monopoly and its main competitor China Unicom, which was briefly
discussed in Chapter Three at the national level. More specifically, in Guangzhou
during the 1990s, Unicom branches had to pay full telephone fee and local
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supplemental fee to China Telecom when a Unicom subscriber called a China
Telecom subscriber, but when China Telecom subscribers called Unicom
subscribers, China Telecom did not pay any fee/^'^ During the fieldwork in
summer 2002 I also noticed that the Intemet Protocol (IP) telephone cards issued
by Guangzhou Unicom often had network failures whereas this seldom occurred
for IP phone cards sold by China Telecom. Upon inquiry, a mid-level manager in
China Telecom Guangzhou explained unsympathetically.
That is inevitable. We both produce IP phone cards. Of course we
want to set up the network in a way that prioritize our own
products. They promised to build their own network long time ago,
but still I don’t see them making much progress. They just want
free ride (author’s translation).
This argument surrounding IP telephony escalated in the second half of
2002. With more financial resource and closer ties to city authorities, China
Telecom clearly emerged as the winner. After coordinating a mass media
campaign via multiple newspapers and TV channels in Guangzhou, which painted
Unicom’s IP phone services as “illegal,” the emboldened China Telecom
representatives even started a raid and confiscated IP phone dialers issued by
Unicom and other competitors (Gao, 2003). The coercive action and the
systematic manipulation of local telecom storytelling environment triggered
significant counter-actions from Unicom and thousands of small private public
phone operators throughout the city, who utilized Intemet posting as a major
vehicle of expression due to their disadvantage in having guanxi with local
™ Interview with Guangzhou Unicom manager.
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officials and voicing opinions via mass media in the city. This incident shows that
deliberate denial of access, or institutional blocks, may also result from the
commercial rationale of market competition besides its origins in political
concerns for information secrecy and the diminishing of centralized power.
Another way that the logic of commercial storytelling leads to more
disconnectedness is through the so-called “natural selection” of the marketplace,
which means those who are financially less resourceful will be disenfranchised.
As learned in Intemet café interviews, none of the owners or managers lacks the
capacity or willingness to storytell, to express their frustrations and question the
status quo, at a personal level. But except small interpersonal networks and the
signs of their small shops, they have very few means to engage in storytelling and
counter the prejudice against small private firms at a higher level. It was precisely
the institutional setup of market-driven discourse that excluded this particular
group of telecom providers and rendered them into seemingly “passive” objects
rather than active storytellers as large-scale enterprises with either state affiliation
and/or advertising power.
Figure 6.1 is a diagrammatic representation of commercial telecom
storytellers, their inter-relations, and relationships with other key storytellers. In
general, the structure of this particular system of narrative practices is much less
hierarchical than that of state-led telecom storytelling (see Figure 5.1). Yet there
are still more symbolic interactions among large-scale operators (e.g. between
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Figure 6.1 A view of the regional telecom storytelling system from the
perspective of telecom providers
TELECOM
PROVIDERS
J
High-rank officials
State-affiliated
service providers
\
Cadres at lower ranks
Large-scale manufacturers
(domestic and foreign)
LOCAL STATE
AGENCIES
Small private business
Long-term residents
Migrant workers
Sources o f disconnectedness: market
competition, gender stereotypes,
prejudice against migrants
etc.
LOCAL
RESIDENT
service providers and manufacturers on the one hand and local state agencies on
the other) vis-à-vis storytelling among small private businesses and migrant
workers. As a main group of telecom consumers, long-term residents have
received an increasing amoimt of attention from both state-affiliated telecom
providers and large-scale manufacturers, although one-way advertising and
promotions often characterize these particular storytelling processes. Still migrant
workers are neglected as a consumer group with no major telecom firms
attempting to communicate with them.
The internal structure of telecom provider networks, however, is rather
fragmented. While major service providers and key equipment makers both
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303
attempt to establish long-term ties with local state and long-term residents, there
is a lack of coordination among these firms due to increasing market competition.
Meanwhile, small private firms are also far from integrated with other commereial
entities of larger scale. In fact, too often are they regarded as a different species,
labeled by derogatory media frames and abhorred by large-scale providers as well
as loeal offieials and long-term residents.
The exclusion of small private telecom storytellers is but the tip of an
iceberg for the capacity of commercialization to lead to disconnectedness in the
Delta. Similar patterns were observed in the stereotyping of female workers at
voice information service stations and of migrant workers who refurbish junk
computers from overseas. Moreover, historical records also show systematic
discrimination of rural residents in the region in the 1980s. For instance, there was
a special charge for telephone service in the countryside called “rural telephone
fee (nonhuafei)” and rural telephone users were required to pay for long-distance
phone calls when they are receiving calls starting fi'om February 3,1986, both of
which never applied to urban residents.The stratification effects of the
imbalanced storytelling network structure will be explored in more detail in the
next chapter.
Finally, the promotion of consumerism in telecommunications has been
largely successful in that, more often than not, telecom development in the Pearl
River Delta has been narrated in a commercial fi-amework - not only by telecom
See History o f Guangdong Province: Telecommunications, p. 227.
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304
providers, but also by state agencies and local residents. While becoming a
ubiquitous part of the regional communication infrastructure, processes of
storytelling telecom draw discursive resources from existing social narratives
such as nationalism and gender biases; and by so doing, the market-driven
mechanisms become new means to reify long-standing social categories, which is
not surprising given that the ultimate goal of commercial storytelling is profit
maximization, rather than any other commitment in bringing about social change.
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305
CHAPTER Vn
GRASSROOTS STORYTELLERS: CONNECTED?
I waited for almost an entire year before they (the Post and
Telecom Authorities) finally sent someone over. That was actually
not too slow because I knew someone in the PTA indirectly and I
asked for a favor. When the telephone worker showed up at the
end, I even had to give him as token of appreciation expensive
wine and cigarettes!
- Factory manager of a Sino-Hong Kong joint venture
When the phone rings, be careful if the caller pretends to be an
acquaintance of your relative or friend. Please be alerted
against deceptions in the name of card application, borrowing
money, and so on.
- Warning from the Police, Guangzhou East Train Station
Introduction
In addition to government agencies and commercial enterprises, the third type of
telecom storytellers are those residing in the Pearl River Delta who share in
interpersonal networks experiences of and knowledge about telecommunications
technologies. The goal of this chapter is to examine these interactions at the micro
and meso levels among long-term residents and migrant workers in the region. In
particular, we shall first utilize survey data to look at the diffusion of telecom
technologies among the populations and how they were utilized in everyday life.
Then, after examining issues of informational stratification, we shall discuss how
different patterns of telecom connectedness are associated with various types of
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telecom-related stories and distinctive modes of storytelling. This discussion will
be built on survey and focus group data collected in Guangzhou, Shenzhen,
Zhuhai, and Nanhai as well as participant observations during the fieldtrip in
summer 2002.
To a significant degree, telecom discourse from state agencies and
commercial storytellers, such as consumerism and globalist expressions, is
reproduced and reified at the grassroots. However, there are also widely circulated
stories based on dissatisfactory experiences with the technology that have not
been picked up by the media or, in the case of telecom-related criminal activities
against vulnerable groups, the negative stories almost never disseminate beyond
the initial circles of storytelling among migrant workers; nor could they enter the
interpersonal networks of mainstream telecom storytelling among long-term
residents. The interactions between negative storytelling and repetitive
disappointments add to psychological detachment among the victims fi-om other
storytellers and from the technology itself, which will be discussed in the latter
part of this chapter.
Exploring the Grassroots
Given that the Pearl River Delta is a flagship of telecom development in China,
Chinese as w ell as foreign researchers, non-profits, and commercial survey
companies have paid significant attention to the growth of telecom users, their
demographics, and consumption patterns in the Delta. For example, every half
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307
year since 1997 CNNIC has been confirming that the region is among the three
most concentrated centers of Intemet users in the country;^^^ AC Nielsen has set
up headquarters in Guangzhou to conduct regular surveys on advertising effects
and telecom usage;^^^ researchers such as Foster, Goodman, and Tan (1999) have
also paid special attention to the development of Intemet in this particular region
of Greater South China.While providing essential information about the
Delta’s telecom market, these studies however perceive residents as passive users
and consumers rather than active storytellers, as a “mass” of individuals rather
than networked social groups.
The conceptualization of grassroots storytelling units in this chapter is
very different from the conventional, non-differentiating notion of “telecom user.”
By grassroots we mean, first, these are agentie actors organized in networks of
individuals capable of shared storytelling, group decision-making, and collective
action. Second, these are millions of narrators at the micro level, whose
connections to telecom technologies are in part constrained by macro and meso
factors yet they still maintain their own capability in storytelling. Third, there are
significant intemal variations at the micro level of analysis, which both reflects
and adds to the social diversity of the Delta region, giving rise to a peculiar
system of myriad connections and disconnections, whose complexity far
surpasses that of storytelling networks among official and commercial entities.
^ CNNIC Semi-Annual Survey Report on Intemet Development in China. Available:
http://www.cnnic.net.cn.
^ AC Nielsen headquarters information is available at http://www.acnielsen.com.cn/.
^ See Chapter One, pp. 43-44 for more discussion on Foster et al’s project.
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Different conceptions entail different research methods. As introduced in
Chapter Two, we choose to focus on migrant workers from outside the Pearl
River Delta and older residents of approximately 45 years of age or above^^^
because the two groups are underrepresented in existing studies. Knowledge
about them, their telecom connectedness, and the stories they tell about the new
technologies would contribute greatly to a holistic understanding about system
integration and differentiation within the storytelling network at the micro level.
While much has been known about average urban residents via research and
mainstream media representations'^^ including user demographics and popular
perceptions of new technologies, this is not true for migrant workers and older
residents due to the conception - or misconception - that there is insufficient
market value to warrant any serious research effort or news coverage on their
connectedness to telecommunications. There are also methodological difficulties
in random sampling, particularly in studies of the migrant population.^^’ In
approaching these under-researched populations, clustered purposive sampling
was used to include 10 different dialect groups under the assumption that dialect
distinction is a major factor of differentiation among micro-level storytelling
^ See Chapter Two for more diseussion on survey methods. The 45-year-old threshold was determined
because 45 is the age when most large state-owned enterprises use to lay off older employees, also
known as “off-duty workers (xiagang gongren).”
^ Influential news outlets in the Delta such as Guangzhou Daily, Shenzhen SEZ Daily, Jing Bao, and
Information Times all have dedicated technology sections, which include large amount of reports on
regional telecom development on daily basis. Besides coverage on important telecom policy, players,
and events, they also foster discussions among residents, officials, and telecom operators regarding
issues o f common interests. From time to time, they also publish summaries o f research findings from
official and commercial research institutes.
See generally Scott Rozelle, Guo Li, Minggao Shen, Amelia Hugh art and John Giles. June 1999.
“Leaving China’s Farms: Survey Results o f New Paths and Remaining Hurdles to Rural Migration.”
China Quarterly. 158:367-393.
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networks. In so doing, a diverse sample of immigrants and older, long-term
residents was collected in Guangzhou, Zhuhai, and Shenzhen, the three largest
cities in the Pearl River Delta, adding up to a total sample size of 452.^^*
To what extent do these two groups connect to telecom technologies and
participate in storytelling telecom? This is the first question we need to answer
because, unlike government agencies and commercial enterprises, some
individuals may not engage in telecom-related activities due to low income, the
lack of training, or fear for new technology. This phenomenon, also known as the
“digital divide,” has received much attention worldwide (Hoffman and Novak,
1999; Schon, Sanyal and Mitchell, 1999; Hofhnan, Novak and Schlosser, 2000;
Jung, et al, 2001), which is referred to in this study as the “stratification gap,” i.e.
one of the four generic types of disconnections in the Commimication
Infrastructure. Findings from the three city survey will be compared with official
statistics as well as a survey conducted by Liang Guo and Wei Bu at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in December 2002, which studies Intemet
users and non-users in Guangzhou and Nanhai.^^^
Informational Stratification
The purpose of this section is to introduce the empirical ground for telecom
storytelling among different social groups by exploring issues o f technology
^ See Chapter Two for sampling and survey administration procedures, and Appendix 4 for the survey
questionnaire.
^ ® Preliminary findings from this study are released at the conference “China and the Intemet:
Technology, Economy, and Society in Transition” held at Los Angeles, May 30-31, 2003.
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310
diffusion among the study populations: what proportions of migrant workers and
older residents are accessing what types of telecom services at what frequency,
and how the usage patterns are related to demographic characteristics. Secondary
data from official statistics and the CASS study will serve as comparative points
of reference, whereas the bulk of analysis will be based the three-city survey
conducted in summer 2003. Comparisons will be made (1) between the two study
populations of grassroots telecom storytellers, i.e. migrant workers and long-term
residents and (2) between these two groups and general findings about average
residents in the Pearl River Delta.
Access and Usage Patterns
Ownership is one of the basic indicators for people’s involvement in issues
regarding telecom technologies. According to official record during early 1980s,
in Guangzhou, the largest telecom market in the Pearl River Delta, there were
mere 1.5 telephones in 1983,^^° which was nonetheless the highest among all
cities in the region. However, the teledensity rate of Guangzhou surged to 145
percent by the end of 2002 with 91 cellular phones and 54 fixed-line telephones
each hundred population.^^' More rapid boom was observed in Shenzhen where
there are 54 fixed-line telephones and 120 cellular phones per hundred people at
™ Geography o f Post and Telecommunications, Beijing: People’s Telecom Press, 1984, p. 61.
Fixed-line telephones include phone sets at home, at work, and public pay phones. See Guangzhou
City Information Center. January 7,2003. Available:
http://www.gzonline.com.cn/citv/economy/kaifan/gzxdh.htm
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311
the end of 2002.^^^ In Zhuhai in 2002, there are also 119 mobile phones for each
hundred residents/^^ These official figures should be taken with caution because
they are gross subscription numbers from telecom operators divided by registered
population in the cities, which does not include short-term migrant workers who
nevertheless may subscribe to telephone services in the Delta. Moreover, in no
way should the teledensity rates of over 100 percent be taken as signals for
saturation because it is a common practice for the more affluent to own multiple
fixed phone lines at home or at work and even multiple mobile phones, whereas a
good number of new-comers, especially those from the rural hinterland, may not
subscribe to any services, which means they will have to depend on facilities such
as pay phone or Internet café or remain disconnected from the technologies.
While official statistics and commercial pollsters usually focus on average
residents in the cities, one would expect migrant workers and older residents to
have less access to telecom services due to lower social economic status, which
was confirmed by comparison between the CASS study and the three-city
survey.^^'^ As shown in Table 7.1, none of the phone services has more than a
hundred percent penetration as official statistics proclaim for the general
population. The CASS study also found that Internet penetration is about 76
Shenzhen City Statistics Bureau. February 27,2003. Available:
http://www.shenzhen.net.cn/iuiiao/fabu/200302280029.htm
China News Agency, January 25, 2002. Available:
http://news.sohu.com/35/36/newsl47763635.shtml
The CASS sample of ordinary residents has an average monthly income o f USS 220.9 with a median
education level o f partial college. In contrast, migrant workers only earn US$ 185.4 and on average
they only have senior high school diplomas. The income o f older residents is US$ 219.4, very close to
the CASS sample. However, older residents tend to have the lowest education with most o f them being
only junior high school graduates or elementary school graduates.
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percent in the Delta, which is much higher than the 51 percent level for migrant
workers and the 14 percent level for older residents. However, there are still
remarkable proportions of respondents among migrant workers and older
residents, who would either subscribe to telecom services such as home phone,
cell phone, and pager or have access to work phone, fax, and Internet. Most
notably, despite disadvantages in income and education, only 2.9 percent of
migrant workers and 8.5 percent of older residents do not have access to any of
the listed services, indicating that an overwhelming majority of them are
technically “users” of one or more of the six listed telecom devices.
Table 7.1 Access to telecommunications : ownership of home phone, cell phone,
and pager, and access to work phone, fax, and Internet
Migrant Workers (N=276) Older Residents (N=176)
N % N %
Home phone 132 '/Z.g 143
Work phone 197 77.4 109 61.9
Cell phone 172 62.3 57 J2 4
Pager 100 27 15.3
Fax 86 J7.2 46 26.1
Internet 140 JO. 7 24 13.6
No access to
any of the 8 2 9 15
above
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The analysis of usage frequency demonstrated in Table 7.2 verifies that
most migrants and older residents maintain certain regularity in accessing the
technologies. Compare it with Table 7.1, it is clear that there are distinct patterns
among the two groups. On average, cellular phone is the most popular telecom
service among migrant workers with the highest penetration rate and highest
usage frequency. The service of central importance to older residents, on the other
hand, is home phone, which is most often used and present in more than 80
percent of the respondents’ households.
Table 7.2 Frequencies using telecom services: home phone, work phone, cell
phone, public phone, long distance phone, and Internet*
Migrant Workers
(N=272)
Older Residents (N=176)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Home phone 2.66 3.1 4.11 2.9
Work phone 3.00 3.1 3.34 3.3
Cell phone 3.99 3.3 2.21 3.2
Public phone 2.71 2.2 1.35 1.2
Long distance 3.33 1.7 2.44 1.8
phone
Internet 1.55 1.8 0.46 1.3
Never Used Any
of the Above 5 1.5% 14 8.0%
(number and
percentage)
* Measured by 7-point scale with 1 being the least frequent and 7 being the most frequent
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The popularity of cell phones among migrants and of home phone among
long-term residents is not surprising due to high population mobility among
migrant workers, who are also more susceptible to advertising campaigns that
promote mobile phone as a quintessential symbol for modem material lile/^^
Meanwhile, older residents tend to rely more on phone sets at home because the
device is easier to operate and many of them had already obtained home phones
prior to the take-off of cell phones in late 1990s/^^ Some of them recalled that
they had to pay an outrageous installation fee of approximately US$ 726 to
acquire their first home phone in mid-1980s, which was prohibitively expensive
for migrant workers.
For both groups, telephone at the workplace is the second most accessible
telecom service, available to 71.4 percent of migrants and 61.9 percent of older
residents. The percentage is lower for older residents because, a good amount of
them have retired and therefore have less access to work phone. For migrant
workers, especially those in service industries, there are sometimes special
workplace policies restricting how work phone should be used. For instance,
among the 24 waiters and waitresses working in restaurants and teahouses, twelve
of them said there were phone-sets in the workplace, but they were forbidden to
make or receive any call using the work phone. This prohibition does not exist for
Mobile phone has been the most heavily advertised among all telecom service via multiple channels
such as broadcasting and print media, outdoor bulletins, sponsorship o f concerts and sports events, and
so on. More accounts of mobile phone advertising campaigns are included in Chapter Six.
On average, respondents in the three-city survey adopted home phone in March 1996, and the
average adoption time for mobile phone is May 1999.
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other occupations and for long-term residents at all. In Guangzhou, three migrant
worker respondents also revealed that they have to pay a fee to use work phones,
which is a discriminatory practice unheard of among ordinary urban residents.
Most remarkable differences are observed in access to mobile phone and
pager, the two wireless telecom services. On the one hand, 62.3 percent of
migrant workers have cell phones, which is diffused to only 32.4 percent of older
residents. On the other hand, the smallest proportion of older residents (15.3
percent) have pagers whereas the penetration rate for migrant workers is 36.2
percent, more than double the percentage for older residents. Among both groups,
there was a transition from pager to cell phone in the early half of 1999 as on
average pager drop-offs ended their subscription in November 1998 and the
typical adoption time for cellular phones was in May 1999.
Another difference between migrant workers and older residents, as shown
in Table 7.2, is that the former are almost twice as likely to use public phone than
the latter, and they also place long distance calls at a much higher frequency. This
again would have to do with population mobility among the migrants, who also
have higher needs to keep in touch with families back home or to obtain job-
related information in other cities. Indeed, the most likely site for them to make
long distance phone calls is at public phone booths with 44.2 percent of migrants
admitting that they have done so, while the number for older residents is only 11.4
percent. A higher proportion (38.6 percent) of older residents would use home
phone to call people outside the city, which is about twice the proportion (19.6
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316
percent) for migrant workers. Meanwhile, one fourth of migrants using cell phone
for long-distance calling, while the proportion for older residents is only one
tenth.
Neither group depends on Internet as a major source of information. In the
CASS survey, 76 percent of randomly selected urban residents in the Pearl River
Delta have regular access to the Internet. In contract, only 50.7 percent of migrant
workers and 13.6 percent of older residents in the three-city survey admit they had
the past experience of going online. Although half of the migrants have Internet
access, as indicated in Table 7.2, the frequency that they actually get online is by
far the lowest among all listed telecom services, which means that the access is
sporadic and irregular. This explains the high percentage of 67.3 percent for
Internet users among the immigrant population who would access the Internet in
cyber-cafés, whereas the figure for older residents is significant lower at 51.7
percent. Moreover, 41.7 percent of migrant Internet users first learned how to surf
the Web in cyber-cafés and only a mere 20.3 percent of older residents first
accessed the Net in these venues, which shows the fimction of cyber-cafe as
educational sites particularly for migrant workers.
A series of t tests were conducted to compare the mean frequencies of
access to all eight telecom services: home phone, work phone, cellular phone,
public phone, pager, facsimile, long-distance call, and the Internet. Except work
phone and fax, for which the mean differences were statistically not significant,
all other t tests yield significant results. Older residents are much more frequent
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317
users of home phone (m.d. = 1.45, p < .001), whereas migrant workers have
higher frequencies in accessing cell phone (m.d. = 1.78, p < .001), public phone
(m.d. = 1.36, p < .001), pager (m.d. = .21, p < .001), long distance calls (m.d. =
.88, p < .001), and Internet (m.d. = 1.09, p < .001). This shows that, while long
term residents are more dependent on home phone, overall it is the migrant
workers who have more frequent access to a larger diversity of telecom
technologies.
The Limited Effects o f Demographics
As class differentiation is a main reason for focused attention on migrant workers
and older residents, to what extent do demographic characteristics such as
income, education, age, and gender affect respondent’s connection to the
telecommunication technologies? To answer this question, frequency indicators
for access to telephones (at home, at work, cellular, and public) and the Internet
were transformed into standardized scores, all of which were summed together
with pager ownership and facsimile access into a composite index of total telecom
connections with acceptable reliability (alpha = .72). As shown in Table 7.3, the
index is evenly distributed with a range of 2-20 (mean = 9.57, s.d. = 3.62) for all
respondents and the migrant worker sub-sample, although the distribution is
slightly positively skewed among long-term residents.
T tests shows that male respondents have significantly higher total telecom
connections score than females (m.d.-1.70, p<.01). The total connection index is
correlated positively with income (coefficience=.292, p<.001) and education
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Table 7.3 Distribution of total telecom connections index in Guangzhou,
Shenzhen, and Zhuhai
Total Telecom
Connections
All
Respondents
n(%)
Migrant
Workers
n(% )
Long-term
Residents
n(% )
2.0-5.0 55 (12.2) 17 (6.2) 38 (21.6)
5.01-10.0 199(44.0) 117(42.4) 82 (46.6)
10.01-15.0 161 (35.6) 114(41.3) 47 (26.7)
15.01-20.0 37 (8.2) 28(10.1) 9(5.1)
Sum 452(100) 276(100) 176 (100)
Mean 9.57 10.37 8.32
S.D. 3.62 3.34 3.68
(coefficience=.539, p<.001) but negatively with age (coefficience = .333, p
<.001). In combination, these findings suggest that young, well-educated males
with higher income are more likely to have more access to telecom technologies,
a similar pattern that has been observed in the general population among Chinese
Internet users on the national scale (Qiu, 1999; 2001) and documented in digital
divide studies worldwide (Hoffinan, et al, 1999, 2000).
Given the above results, a stepwise multiple regression analysis was
conducted with total telecom connection index being the dependent variable. The
independent variables include main demographic characteristics: income,
education, age, and gender. It turns out that education level is the most powerful
predictor that explains 24 percent variance by itself (p < .001), whereas gender
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319
has the least explanatory power (p > .05). Combined with income and age, the
three significant factors together have a total R square of 34 percent (p < .001).
Although the regression model is statistically significant, it only accounts for
about one third of the variance in total telecom connection scores, which indicates
that demographics only impose limited effects on people’s connectedness to
telecom services.
Another way to assess the constraining effects of demographic factors is to
examine more closely those who do not access teleeom services. As shown in
Table 7.2, 5 migrant workers and 14 long-term residents indicated that they did
not use any of the telecom technologies. Among the not-connected migrants, three
are females with only elementary school education or no schooling at all. Two of
them have no income, and the rest with less than average salary. Although their
ages tend to be evenly spread out, two of them came to live in the Pearl River
Delta for less than one year. Meanwhile, among the 14 not-connected older
residents, nine are women (64.3 percent). Eight of them admitted that they had no
income and another eight did not have any formal education. Their average age is
about 69. Altogether, it is obvious that demographic factors are still important in
influencing people’s relationship with telecom technologies especially when the
least connected people are taken into consideration.
Income and Telecom Expenditures
Also helpful is to look at the expenditure on telecom services and its proportion as
part of people’s income. In the three-city survey, questions were asked about
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320
home phone (average monthly charge and initial connection fee^^^), cell phone
and pager (monthly charge, connection fee, and gadget cost) as well as average
monthly expenses on Internet access. Table 7.4 demonstrates expenses related to
these four technologies, where total monthly charges were summed up and then
divided by the respective average monthly income of the groups. Most notably,
migrant workers not only spend significantly more in comparison with long-term
residents, the proportion of their monthly income used on telecommunications is
also much higher than one would expect. While mean expenditure for older
residents is US$ 71.4, i.e. 32.5 percent of their income, migrant workers pay out
US$ 88.6 on telecom services, that is, 47.8 percent of their monthly income. The
validity of this preliminary finding might he questioned because the sampling
procedure is not random and there is a chance for respondents to exaggerate their
monthly charges (if so, ditto for monthly income) especially because the
interviewers are acquaintances of migrant worker respondents. However, the
figure may also be a conservative estimation for total telecom expenditure
because it does not include expenses on public phone and fax, which tend to be
more irregular, although migrant workers tend to use public phone much more
(see table 7.2).
There is another reason that the summation figures in Table 7.4 may only
partially reflect total financial pressure on the two groups regarding telecom
The imposition of the installation fee, also called “connection fee,” was a national policy since the
beginning o f China’s telecom reform in early 1980s. It ended in approximately 2001. See more
historieal accounts about the installation fee in Chapter Three.
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Table 7.4 Telecom expenses: home phone, cell phone, pager, Internet, and total
monthly charge as proportion of monthly income (US$)
Home Phone Cell Phone Pager Internet Monthly total
Migrant Monthly charge 23.8 37.4 4.2 23.2 88.6 (i.e.
Workers Connection fee 48.9 42.6 12.8 n.a. 47.8% of
Gadget cost n.a. 231.1 108.3 n.a. income)
Long Monthly charge 21.2 30.4 4.2 15.6 71.4 (i.e.
term Connection fee 45.5 42.4 7.1 n.a. 32.5% of
Residents Gadget cost n.a. 298.2 64.0 n.a. income)
expenses. That is, it only includes the monthly charges but not the
installation/activation fees or gadget costs. As previously noted, there has been a
significant drop in home phone connection charge throughout the 1990s. Cell
phone activation charge has been declining too, although it still held at about $40
in the region in summer 2002. The price of a pager used to be as high as US$
1000 in late 1980s. But given the spread of mobile phones, some pager operators
started in 2001 to offer free pagers under the condition that users would subscribe
for at least a certain period of time. In contrast to the decreasing of prices,
however, the cost for a cellular phone remains fairly high. For both migrant
workers and older residents, the average expenditure on purchasing a cell phone
far exceeds their total income for an entire month.
Meanwhile, the price factor is leveraged by telecom-expense
reimbursement as a form of employment benefits. This was particularly the case
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Table 7.5 Percentages of migrant workers and older residents who receive
partial or full reimbursement for telecom services
Home Phone Cell Phone Pager Internet
Migrant Monthly charge 17.8 15.1 5.6 0.0
Workers Connection fee 14.1 10.0 13.4 n.a.
Gadget cost n.a. 10.7 7.1 n.a.
Long-term Monthly charge 11.4 33.3 25.0 14.3
Residents Connection fee 16.8 26.6 25.0 n.a.
Gadget cost n.a. 19.6 26.1 n.a.
before the telecom reform in 1993 when home phone, cell phone, and pager were
all extremely expensive and generally regarded as symbols for high official
profile and unusual wealth, which in most cases warranted full reimbursement
from CCP and state agencies. However, as seen in Table 7.5, the proportion of
people who have the privilege of getting reimbursement from their employers has
dropped to a low level. In most cases, no more than a quarter of long-term
residents were reimbursed for using telecom services. The only exception is cell
phone when more than on fourth of the older residents receive compensation for
cell phone activation and monthly changes. In contrast, the proportion of migrant
workers is even lower as found most obviously in terms of Internet access:
whereas 14.3 percent long-term residents admitted that they were at least partially
reimbursed for getting on the Internet, there was not a single migrant worker who
received any reimbursement for Internet access.
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In sum, three key propositions ean be drawn from the above analysis of
telecom ownership and consumption patterns at the grassroots level in the Pearl
River Delta. First, contrary to conventional wisdom seeing migrant workers and
older, long-term residents as incapable and/or inactive in their telecom
connectedness, the predominant majority of these two groups are indeed
connected to various teleeom technologies. There are significant constraining
effects of demographic factors such as lower education, less income, and older
age (for long-term residents), yet the effects are limited in that even within the
lower class there are still only very few people who do not have access to any
teleeom service at all. Second, both migrant workers and long-term residents
allocate a large portion of their income on telecom-related expenses, which
account for nearly half of income for migrants and almost one third of income for
older residents. The unusually high proportion of telecom expenditure among
migrant workers is particularly noteworthy because it occurs despite the
disadvantages of receiving less reimbursement for telecom services. It also
confirmed the finding that migrant workers access telecom technologies more
frequently and at multiple sites of access. This relentless enthusiasm among
migrant workers toward telecommunications is probably due to the fact that
migrants have higher information needs in job seeking, getting adapted to the new
living environment, and to keep in touch with families and friends outside the
Pearl River Delta. Last, but not least, between the two groups of respondents there
is also remarkable internal differentiation in terms of their access patterns. Long
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term residents of older age are most dependent on home telephone, whereas
migrant workers are reliant on a more diverse combination of telecom services
ranging from cell phone and pager to public phone and Internet café. Therefore,
what constitutes the regional communication infrastructure at the grassroots level
is not a single category of telecom “users” but multiple types of social networks.
In terms of class differentiation and access patterns, groups of micro actors do not
share much in common, although, technically speaking, most of them are
“connected” - at least with the technologies per se, if not with other members of
the regional society.
Different Practices, Different Stories
Now that there is remarkable differentiation at the grassroots in terms of access to
telecom services, one would be less surprised to find a splintered ecology of
storytelling based on multiple, or even contradictory, experiences with the
technologies, circulated in different interpersonal networks that may or may not
be interconnected. While the previous section examines telecom ownership,
behavioral connectedness patterns, and how they are influenced by demographic
characteristics, the purpose of this section is to focus on the stories themselves:
what narratives are being circulated, among what type of storytellers, and how
they are shaping (dis)connectedness at the micro level. We shall first discuss
based on interviews and participate observations the mainstream of grassroots
storytelling among average urban residents in the Delta, which shares certain
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commonality with state-dominated discourse and commercial media storytelling.
Attention will be paid to narratives that are conducive to telecom development as
well as those that are explicitly or implicitly suppressive thus resulting in
disconnections within and among the storytelling networks. In so doing, we shall
introduce narrations of telecom-based crime that were widely and frequently
circulated among migrant workers but almost never heard of among long-term
residents, which is one of the most unexpected findings during the fieldtrip of
summer 2002.
The Dominant Discourse
First and foremost, it is essential to recognize the linkage between the specific
context at macro and meso levels and storytelling processes at the grassroots.
While we conceive micro storytellers as agentic actors, they are still situated in
and thus shaped by China’s gradually opening economy and the encroaching
global capitalism. There is no need to belabor the contextual factors that were
explained in Chapters Three and Four or the specific forms of storytelling by local
state and commercial enterprises. But it is precisely this peculiar historical
complex of institutional settings and organizational change - as reflected by
policy deliberations, industry reports, trade figures, and advertisements - that
mold telecom practices and storytelling at the micro level. Given this larger
picture, the most dominant discourse among residents of the Pearl River Delta,
including both long-term dwellers and migrating population, share high similarity
with the market-oriented official discourse increasingly characterized by
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consumerism and hyper-globalism while still reflecting the semi-liberalized
nature of the telecom industry.
Until early 1990s, since telecom provision had been monopolized by MPT
and telephone services had been seen largely as special privilege, a long-term
resident in Guangzhou recalled, “At that time, ordinary people (laobaixin) like us
would never even think about having a phone at home. You have to be a high-
ranking official first (to get home phone).” This was validated in interviews with
senior citizens in other cities, which points to a particular type of storytelling that
depicts telephone as a luxurious service designed exclusively for the most
powerful. This is on the one hand a confirmatory narration reflecting low telecom
penetration at the time and, on the other hand, a constraining discourse that
restricts technological diffusion once the privilege status of teleeommunication
was accepted as a truism in interpersonal storytelling networks.
Despite the popular perception of telecom as luxury, as something for
“high-ranking officials,” and the pressure for conformity in networks of common
people, early adopters nevertheless emerged outside the party-state apparatus with
the gradual opening-up of the telecom market. This was because, in the Pearl
River Delta more than elsewhere at the time, there was an increasing group of
entrepreneurs who would “get rich first” using Deng’s Xiaoping’s political
slogan, which led to higher demand outside the establishment for telecom services
given that the region is China’s test ground for economic opening-up. In
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retrospect, a retired general manager of a Sino-Hong Kong joint venture described
the lengthy process through which he obtained his first home phone.
In 1986, my work-unit decided to start a joint-venture faetory with
a boss from Hong Kong to produce cameras. They appointed me as
the general manager representing the mainland side. Without this
factory, I don’t know how long it would take for my family to have
a home phone. But even after I became the general manager, I had
to first get a stamped introduction letter from work-unit leaders
(lingdao) before the request was filed in Guangzhou City Post and
Telecom Authorities. Then, I waited for almost an entire year
before they finally sent someone over. That was actually not too
slow because I knew someone in the FT A indirectly and I asked
for a favor. When the phone worker showed up at the end, I even
had to give him as token of appreciation expensive wine and
cigarettes (author’s translation) !
This said, the former factory manager recollected that he still felt lucky
when his home phone finally rang for the first time. He did not want to complain
regardless of all the paperwork and guanxi endeavors because “everyone who had
home phone at the time had to go through the same thing.’’ Thinking back, he had
another reason to feel lucky because he did not have to pay the installation charge,
approximately US$ 725 at the time, or the monthly fee. “No, not a cent.” He said
with a proud smile.
With the telecom reform in 1993, the establishment of China Unicom, and
an unprecedented price drop including 50 percent reduction of the installation
charge in the Pearl River Delta,the traditional perception of telecom services as
“luxury” and “privilege” started to be shaken. More non-state private business
See Chapter Three for the creation of China Unicom and its tremendous impact on the telecom
market in China.
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owners now had access to telephone at work and at home. One of them recalled,
“I applied for home phone connection right after the price cut (of 50 percent for
installation fee). It was still expensive, but there was no other choice.” This
respondent waited for five months to get the phone set up.
At certain point in mid-1990s, a new view quickly prevailed among
average Delta residents that telephone is a standard equipment for common
households. As a Shenzhen resident recalled.
Until then (mid 1990s), I never had a phone at home. Nor
did I think about getting one. But all of a sudden, I realized
that most of my colleagues had installed home phones, and
so did many of my fiiends. There was still pricey
connection fee at the time (approximately US$ 300), but
my husband and I both felt it was time for us to have our
home phone (author’s translation).
In this case, it is clear that the dropping of price was but one factor
influencing the decision to adopt. Without peer pressure, the respondent most
likely would not have considered home phone subscription, which was directly
triggered by grassroots storytelling at the workplace and among friendship
networks that described home phone service as a life necessity rather than a
privilege. This is more than a change in collective perception. It is probably the
single most decisive moment, a “tipping point” to borrow from GladwelTs book
on network effect (2000), which marks a fundamental shift in the evolution of
mainstream storytelling at the micro level.
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Although of less magnitude, similar change in the discursive environment
also occurred in narrations about new technologies such as the Internet and
mobile phone. Since the first commercial Internet service was offered in the Pearl
River Delta in 1995, the general image of the new medium changed from a hi-
tech device designed exclusively for scientist to helpful instrument for all
professions and a major mode of entertainment for the younger generation. In the
beginning of focus group discussions held among long-term residents in Nanhai,
respondents were asked to do an exercise of semantic association for several
terms including “the Internet.” Interestingly, the professionals (engineers,
government clerks, and a lawyer) made associations to words such as
“instrument,” “seek materials,” and “long distance communication;” whereas the
youngsters (students and young private business employees) tended to relate to
“entertainment,” “chat,” and “play games.” There were still a third set of answers
in the non-user focus groups where participants of older age including housewives
and shop-owners still regard the Internet as “mysterious” and “something I don’t
know,” indicating that unlike the case of storytelling home phone, old narratives
about the exclusive nature of new technologies were still lingering well and alive
among people of older age.
Mobile phone, on the other hand, started as a status symbol but also
gradually acquired more weight as an indispensable professional tool. One of the
survey respondents said he paid approximately US$ 3600 to get his first cell
phones in late 1980s. Since the hand-held device was fairly bulky at the time.
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people referred to it as “da ge da” meaning literally “big brother big.” A urban
legend in Guangzhou had it that, in order to show off, a young business clerk
borrowed a da ge da from his boss and pretended to speak on the phone (which
was actually idle) on a crowded bus. While others were looking at him jealously,
the phone rang, revealing that he was pretentious. Although the penetration of
mobile phone has greatly surged since then, the socially “showy” dimension of
this new technology remains salient, especially among the younger generation.^^^
Owning an expensive, “cool-looking” cell phone is very popular among the urban
youth. Even one of my telecom entrepreneur interviewees in Foshan, who was in
his late 40s, was eager to display to me his latest CDMA mobile phone, which he
believed was healthier to use than traditional GSM phones.
Notable is that, while home phone never acquired its “necessity” status in
storytelling among the migrant population, the fanfare surrounding cellular phone
certainly appeals to newcomers in the region in a most effective way. Not only
does cell phone charge account for a significant chunk of their monthly
expenditure, but many of them also see cell phone as the quintessential “modem”
lifestyle indicator, as do the majority of urban youth. Extra meaning from a spin
of consumerism has been attached to this particular technology. A migrant worker
from Jiangxi Province disclosed that he had spent almost an entire year’s saving
on purchasing his first cell phone. “It’s worth it.” he said, “I know it’s expensive.
But we (friends among fellow migrant workers) made comparisons, including the
Findings from participant observations. It was routine that when young people got together, they
would immediately compare their new cell phones and new applieations.
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machine cost and service package, altogether I got the best deal at the lowest
price.” Another new immigrant from Hubei Province who was recently laid off
told me about his observations in the job market.
The bosses (employers) would expect you to have at least a pager.
Otherwise they won’t think about hiring you. But if you give them
your cell phone number, that’ll definitely be advantageous for you
to get the job. So when there is a chance, I always give out my
number. After all, my cell phone is pretty advanced (gaoji),
although I haven’t received many calls from others yet (author’s
translation).
In addition to consumerism, the mainstream of grassroots telecom
storytelling also has a hyper-globalist inclination that “celebrates the emergence
of a single global m arket... and the ‘denationalization’ of economies” (Held, et
al, 1999, p. 3). In long-term resident focus groups, the most widely held
assumption about the Internet is that it would reduce or demolish distance, bring
down spatial barriers, and lead to an “open” world. “No matter what happens in
whatever place on earth, the Internet lets you know about it,” said a 28-year-old
man who owns a car parts shop. “There is nothing more powerful in this regard. I
firmly believe this.” Notably, such an opinion towards the Internet was shared
across the board among people of different demographic backgrounds, both
Internet users and non-users. It also turned out to be a widely accepted view
during all migrant worker focus groups in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai.
There should be little wonder that the discourse advocated by official and
corporate agencies has taken root in grassroots storytelling. Consumerism,
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globalism, and a general utopian attitude towards telecommunications, these have
all become key attributes of telecom-related narratives at the micro level. Party-
state authorities and telecom providers, after all, have made major commitments
and serious efforts in promoting telecom technologies. However, in no way does
this mean all themes being advocated have the same successful effect. One of the
least mentioned categories is the political benefits that local officials often
proclaim for state-led telecom initiatives including improvements in “socialist
democracy,” more transparency in policy processes, and better institutional setup
against corruption. Although under quite relaxing circumstances, none of the
focus group participants spontaneously referred to this set of issues although they
did discuss, sometimes even openly debate on, other possibly sensitive issues
such as Internet censorship and online pornography. While prompted with the
question “How do you assess the statement that new technologies will help the
government to improve its work?” some of them would say that they agree the
technology might help enhance efficiency but they are not sure about anti
corruption or the transparency of the political institution, whereas others would
say they don’t know anything about this topic. Still others would say “e-
govemment is good” in an obviously cynical tone or simply laugh in silence while
slightly shake their heads.
Another less influential narrative is the nationalist discourse centered on
the belief that new telecom developments will rejuvenate the country, which was
central to official promotions and inscribed as a key principle for some major
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telecom providers in the Delta. However, in focus groups for long-term residents
and migrant workers, no one made remote reference to the theme of national
rejuvenation. In the male Intemet-user group, a few participants did mentioned
their online involvement in nationalist movements such as the 1998 anti-
Indonesian demonstrations and Web-based mobilization after the NATO bombing
of Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. However, while being asked whether
they thought the diffusion of new communication technology would make China
more powerful, most members of this group simply replied “yes” or “of course”
without any further elaboration before another participant, a 32-year-old local
state official started to blow off the empty discourse forcefully:
No, I don’t think they will make China stronger. They only
will weaken this country and make it more vulnerable to
enemies. You know how much of our government data is in
computers and on the Internet? Even a little virus may
corrupt all the data, and we can’t do anything then.
Therefore personally I don’t expect the day at all when
there is hi-tech all over the country. It’s scary to just
imagine what a catastrophe that may incur (author’s
translation).
This argument, rather unexpected at the moment of utterance, provoked no
further discussion. Even those who just gave positive answers to my question did
not make any counter-argument. This is most likely an indication that the
nationalist justification for telecom development has been repeated in the media
frequently enough that people ean identify it in a superficial way. But it is yet to
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be absorbed as a substantive element at the level of personal experience, which
would serve as the basis for meaningful interpersonal storytelling.
Suppressive Narrations
Mainstream storytelling at the grassroots level absorbs much of official discourse
and commercial promotional framework because those who most actively engage
in the communication processes, the “opinion leaders,” tend to be capable
consumers of the technologies. Or in other cases, they would be enthusiastic
observers who can only aspire to become capable consumers due to lower income
or lack of technical know-how. It is therefore little wonder that discursive
formations under such circumstances would marginalize alternative meanings and
discriminate those with lower social economic status, while contributing to the
strengthening or creation of social inequalities.
As mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, commercial storytelling in
the Delta often contains strong paternalistic flavor and treats male as the default
social category where telecommunications fit in. Gendered storytelling is also
prominent among narrations in interpersonal networks, particularly in the early
stage of technological diffusion at the grassroots level when early adopters tended
to be powerful officials or wealthy entrepreneurs, hoth being more male-
dominated than many other occupations. Hence it was not surprising to have
sexist colloquial expressions such as ‘Wa ge da (big brother big)” for mobile
phone.
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However, as teleeom services gradually became an indispensable part of
urban life, the number and proportion of female users both increased dramatically.
This pattern, particularly in new teleeom services such as the mobile phone, is
reminiscent of the American history when fixed-line telephony was first promoted
only as a tool at the workplace but household subscription, and housewives’
involvement, ended up being a primary driving force of the technological
diffusion (Fischer, 1992, pp. 75-83,222-247). While it is premature to attribute
the catching-up of female usage to mainstream storytelling under the untested
assumption that females in the Pearl River Delta are more susceptible to
advertising or consumerism, there is some preliminary evidence that, once a new
technology reached its critical mass in an urban environment, female residents
tend to adopt fairly quickly due to peer pressure from colleagues and friends as
demonstrated in the above quote from a Shenzhen resident who obtained her first
home phone in mid-1990s. Similar stories were gathered regarding mobile phone
subscription among female respondents in both long-term resident and migrant
worker focus groups. Another white-collar woman who had lived in the Delta for
12 years boasted that broadband ADSL Internet services had just been set up at
her home. In a palpably satisfied voice she said, “From now on, I can download
movies and music like my friends.”
Yet the narrowing down of gender gap in telecom access does not equate
to the vanishing of usage inequality between males and females, nor does it
indicate any fundamental change in the suppressive nature of the paternalistic
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storytelling framework. T test on the average scores of total telecom connection
index between the two genders in the three-city survey suggests that females in
general still have significantly less telecom access than males (m.d. = .73, p <
.05). More specifically, gender difference is particularly acute among migrant
workers of younger age as shown in the following table. Whereas the mean
difference between males and females among long-term residents is statistically
not significant, there is very significant difference between males and females of
the migrant population.
Table 7.5 Gender differences in total telecom connection index among migrant
workers and older residents
Migrant Workers
Mean S.D.
Long-term Residents
Mean S.D.
Male 9.11 3.93 10.49 3.24
Female 7.41 3.17 10.22 3.42
p ..002 p = .50
Meanwhile, in the focus groups, female participants of different residential
tenure also expressed gendered views on telecommunications. In Nanhai, an 18-
year-old high school graduate said she didn’t expect herself to leam much about
hi-tech telecommunications as long as she knew “how to surf the Net and do
online chatting.” While being asked why, she answered, “How can girls be
compared to guys? We won’t get jobs in high technology.” More typical is a 46-
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year-old housewife who said she couldn’t leam how to use new gadgets due to
time constraints. In addition to the reification of gender stereotypes, the following
quotation fi-om her also reflects the popular belief that people of older age should
focus on things other than new telecom technologies such as the Internet.
Where can I find extra time? I have to take care of the kid,
while cooking, and doing all the housework. My husband
took a training session at his work-unit. So he must know
how to use the Internet. And my son learned that at school
too. I don’t know where I can study those things, and I
don’t think I need them either. They are not for people like
us after all (author’s translation).
While mainstream storytelling suppresses alternative imaginations about
the social constituents of the telecom infi-astmcture, it also constrains the scope of
“desirable” technologies by putting negative labels on certain types of telecom
services. One such restrictive fi'ame was imposed on Internet cafés, whose
specific form as reflected in mass mediated commercial storytelling was discussed
in Chapter Six. At the grassroots level, other stories were repeated about the
terrible influences of Internet pornography and voice information services
{shenxuntai) on children. Of no exception, five parents in long-term resident focus
groups - including two in early 30s, two in their 40s, and one in early 50s - all
expressed serious concern that “my kid might be exposed to those indecent stuff’
as said one of them. In the male Internet user group, participants discussed the
catastrophic consequences of hacker attack, reaching the consensus that it was the
worst challenge to computer networks. On the other hand, female Internet users
paid more attention to problems in online dating services because they heard from
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mass media and interpersonal channels that many guys online were pretentious,
that those “virtual” relationships are not trustworthy, and girls should not date
online friends. Be it Internet pornography or hacker attack or online dating, none
of the respondents admitted that they or anyone they directly knew had
“undesirable” telecom services, suggesting that the pattern of storytelling is most
likely a process of amplification in interpersonal networks based on stories fed in
from the mass media.
Squalors Under Splendor
While discriminatory narrations were found against females, older residents, and
certain types of telecom providers (e.g. netbars and voice information stations), a
more serious problem exists that has most devastating influence on the
connectedness between migrant workers and the telecom infrastructure. This, in
practice, results from a series of telecom-based crimes, which migrant workers
have to face and experience on daily basis throughout the Pearl River Delta.
However, the victims often do not have access to media channels or, even if they
do, they more often than not tend to be unable to articulate the gravity of the
problems. Under the predominance of for-profit management, given the
increasing role of telecom firms as advertisers, nor would most news reporters try
to reveal the difficulties that immigrant workers have to go through. Thus comes
the deeply troubling phenomenon that, although dwelling in the same high-
density urban space and despite the expanding array of new telecom technologies,
there emerges a separate universe of storytelling about the crimes within, but not
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beyond, the interpersonal networks among immigrant population. These stories
have been largely unheard of among other members of the local society, as if they
were well-kept secrets despite the fact that there have been rampant telecom-
based crimes, especially in the areas with high concentration of migrant labor, and
there has been constant storytelling about these crimes within the interpersonal
networks of new immigrants.
Although having surveyed telecom-related news reports in the Delta for
years, I was completely caught unprepared for the prevalence of such criminal
activities until I checked in a three-star hotel in Guangzhou where a bi-lingual
warning was placed next to the telephone set in the room, whose original English
version reads:
TO ANNOUNCE RESPECFULLY
For your excellency the safety that, if you have to receive
the telephone from the stranger, please to increase the
vigilance! Don’t borrow your mobile phone to the stranger!
To prevent the trickster!
Wish you have a pleasure journey!
Here is this author’s translation that hopefully better conveys the message:
ANNOUNCEMENT TO RESPECTED GUESTS
For your safety, when you receive telephone calls from
strangers, please be alerted! Please do not lend to strangers
your mobile phone in order to guard against tricksters!
Wish you a pleasant journey!
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It took me a while to understand what was going on, that there were
crooks who would call into the room to set up traps or borrow travelers’ cell
phone and run away. This is not an isolated instance in Guangzhou. In fact, I saw
similar warnings in most three-star and some four-star hotels that I happened to
stay in, in other cities including Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan, and Dongguan. Hotels
of cheaper rates usually do not have phones in guest rooms, whereas five-star
hotels have personnel to filter calls, thus leaving people like me exposed to
telephone hassles, if not more serious potential criminal threats. Thanks to the
warning, I instantly realized what was going on when a man rang me up at 6 a.m.
saying he was waiting for me for dim sum; when in another instance another guy
kept asking me to guess who he was upon my inquiry on his identity. “Are you
Mr. Wang?” I came up with a common name although I knew no Mr. Wang in the
city. “That’s right,” he replied joyously, “I’m so glad you still remember my
voice...” I hung up. From then on, I often unplugged the phone while moving into
a new hotel, overwhelmed by a sense of self-protection that I had never
experienced towards any telecom technology.
If this is what three-star hotel dwellers have to face, what would average
migrant workers have to put up with? With this question, I spent an afternoon
exploring Guangzhou East Train Station, probably the largest railway
transportation center in the Pearl River Delta. In front of the station building,
there was a line of approximately 30 public phones with transparent plastic hoods
covering the top of the machines. Each of the hoods had a red-color warning in
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bold Chinese characters. Most of the warnings, however, had more or less faded
due to exposure to rain and lack of maintenance. I therefore had to compare the
warnings before figuring out the full notice, whose English translation reads:
NOTICE FROM THE PEOPLE’S POLICE
When the phone rings, be careful if the caller pretends to be
an acquaintance of your relative or friend. Please be alerted
against deceptions in the names of card application,
borrowing money, and so on.
Being completely uninformed, I could only vaguely make out that this was
a warning against certain kind of deception. Although I comprehended its every
single character, the message was so brief and abstract that I could not understand
how the crime took place or how to prevent it from happening. I asked a young
man in his late-20s who just made a phone call and looked like he was fresh off
the train. “I didn’t see that,” he said and then looked carefully at the notice. “It
says we need to be cautious... about... I don’t know what it’s about,” He replied
with a typical grin of a northern country boy. I then proceeded to a police booth at
one end of the phone poles. A policeman in his mid-20s was on duty. Before
approaching him, I saw another warning, this time big white paper-cut characters
on a red banner that read:
BE CAREFUL OF DECEPTIONS: THE CALLER MAY
PRETEND TO BE AN ACQUAINTANCE OF YOUR
RELATIVE OR FRIEND.
- Guangzhou East Train Station Police Branch
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“What does that mean?” I asked the police after introducing myself, my
study, and showing him see my ID. After initial suspicion, he answered
indifferently that there were “criminals” who would call into the public phones
and ask who just paged them. The first thing that many newcomers from the
countryside would do, after a long trip from their homes, is to page their relatives
or friends in the city. Some of the pager numbers have expired, or their
acquaintances are not available. Thus, impostors would take advantage of the
newcomers’ inexperience and eagerness to leave the train station. The charlatans
would ask, “Whom did you page?” When the innocent callers answer this
question, they would say they are colleagues or friends of their acquaintances,
who cannot come to the train station now but, since they are really good friends,
they (the impostors) would come and meet the newcomers. Once they meet, the
impostors would have all kinds of rip-off tricks using excuses such as they forgot
to bring cash but have to bring raw materials back to the factory, or that they can
help the newcomers get resident permits in the city but that would cost a sizeable
amount. Occasionally, violence is used and people may get hurt. It took me more
than several minutes to understand how the public phone can be used as a tool of
deception in broad daylight.
A tropical rain started in the middle of our conversation. The police let me
into his booth, large enough for four or five people, and we continued. I asked
him how effective were those warnings, many of which needed to be repainted to
be eligible, and how about using pictures rather than writings to illustrate the
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deception process so that the less educated would be able to understand? He
responded as a typical bureaucrat that bis duty is only to take record of criminal
activities, “bi most cases, I don’t go out to chase the bad guys because we are
short of bands,” be said, “but I’ll report your suggestions to officers of higher
rank.”
Before the rain stopped in twenty minutes, two migrants came and
reported criminal acts against them. One of them was a lady in her 40s who
entrusted her luggage to an imposter but lost her valuables including her license
as an accountant. “Let them go with my money,” she wept, “but if you find my
accountant license, please, please give it back to me. It’s of no use to them. But I
need it to find a job!” Another victim was a young man who said be worked in
Shenzhen and was on a business trip to Guangzhou. “They took all my belongings
except this,” with tears in bis eyes, be unfolded bis band and presented a pager in
front of the police. “Would you please buy my pager so that I can go back to
Shenzhen?” The officer shook bis bead and proceeded to the routine of recording
when and where the crime took place and bow the criminals looked like.
Later, when the question about telecom-related crimes was raised to
migrant worker focus group participants in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Zbubai, it
triggered very active discussions, indicating that this was most central to their life
experience with and storytelling about telecom technologies. Most of them knew
about the public phone scam not because they saw the official warnings and
understood them but because they beard about it from other migrant workers who
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once fell victims. Since I identified the participants in local labor markets, one of
the deceptions they all seemed to be familiar with was that imposters may also
pretend to be employers, lure job seekers to pay an application fee and then
disappear. This used to be done face-to-face but now it accounts for a large
proportion of online job advertisements.
Another common complaint in migrant worker focus groups was that their
phone cards often got “stolen” while using the public phones. As mentioned
above, some of the better equipped public phones had no more than transparent
plastic hoods whereas other phone poles had even less physical protection. There
is no door (as in phone booths) or other means to prevent the prying of phone card
“thieves,” who in this case do not physically “steal” anything but only need to
look at the dial board of the phones, sometimes through a telescope, to get the
access and PIN numbers. An 18-year-old Sichuan girl who had been working in
the Pearl River Delta for two years recalled.
In the first two months I bought three phone cards to call
my family, but all of them were stolen when I was using
the public phones. When I used the card the second time,
there should have been several hundred remaining minutes.
But it always said there was no money left. I was really
frustrated to death because I really wanted to call my
family and there were no other place where I can use the
phone cards. I ended up paying more expensive fees in
long-distance call rooms in the China Telecom building. At
least it’s safer there. I will never buy any phone cards in the
future (author’s translation).
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This girl had no idea that she was the victim of a crime until she lost the
value of her third phone card because, unlike those at the train station, the
majority of public phones in residential neighborhoods of migrant workers have
no warning posters from the police or any other public authority. Privacy of
migrant workers and guarantee of safety in using the phone cards are obviously
not on the agenda of local state authorities, given that the migrant workers are
perceived to be but contemporary equivalence of the historic dan people, at the
bottom of the social strata. “Did you tell the phone company about these terrible
things?” I asked and instantly realized the absurdity of this question. The Sichuan
girl laughed, “How can they listen to me?” - No, they would not, because their
service targets “capable consumers {you xiaofeinengli deren),” and if you have
problems with the phone cards, there is always the “choice” to use safer services
at higher prices.
Indeed there are many complaints about the “service attitudes (gongzuo
taidu)” of telecom providers among immigrant focus groups in all three cities,
which was not an issue at all during the long-term resident discussion sessions.
Not only were they uninformed about the criminal activities migrants have to face
but some of them also regard migrant workers as the source of problem because
these low-end consumers would take any service at the cheapest rate, regardless
of its quality, thus driving down the profit margin in the increasingly competitive
market. Moreover, members of the floating population are also depicted as
untrustworthy in mainstream storytelling. One such instance is that the
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Guangzhou branch of China Telecom publicized in July 2002 that many migrants
were using fake IDs to obtain fixed-line home telephone installation and then
using it to make money as unlicensed public phone. They would leave after owing
a significant debt to the phone company, which added up to more than US$ 6
million in Guangzhou alone during the first half of year 2002.^'*° News stories like
this never delve into the real source of problem, i.e. unemployment in the cities
that is at the root of this and other criminal activities aforementioned. Rather, they
label all migrant workers as a group of lower moral standards without mentioning
that, in many cases, it was precisely caused, directly or indirectly, by the failure of
state agencies and telecom providers because of their lack of willingness and
sincerity to treat migrant workers on equal basis.
Social Inequality, Institutional Barriers, and Psychological Detachment
There are more types of telecom-based crimes targeting at migrant workers,
which we shall not exhaust in this study because the number will continue to rise
as the most fundamental source of problems, i.e. social inequality, is not dealt
with, or even discussed in storytelling processes among long-term residents,
commercial entities, and public authorities. Certainly one may propose that, when
new technologies emerge, it is inevitable some would put the inventions to
dreadful purposes, much like the beginning of the telegraph which, according to
Standage, “provided unscrupulous individuals with novel opportunities for fraud.
^ “Super-Cheap ‘Black Public Phones’ Rampant in Guangzhou,” Xinhua News Agency, July 19,
2002.
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theft, and deception” (1998; p. 106). But more importantly, what really matters in
the context of this study is that the squalors were covered up by splendid growth
figures and grand discourses like consumerism and globalization. While millions
of migrant workers in the Pearl River Delta have to face the risk everyday from
the moment they step out of the train station, stories about their sufferings are
only circulated within their limited interpersonal networks. They are not picked
up by the media, thus largely unknown to official regulators, telecom providers,
and long-term residents, who on the other hand only worry about issues such as
online pornography, protection of state and commercial secrecy, computer virus,
and others of less immediate threat like excessive reliance on telecom
technologies.
Considering the processes of political and commercial storytelling
discussed in previous chapters, it is obvious that the lack of media attention to
issues among migrant workers and the subsequent disconnectedness between the
storytelling networks are in no way coincidental. They resulted directly from
institutional constraints because the political logic for telecom development is
centered on power maximization for the “top leaders,” whereas the commercial
rationale aims only at the increase of profit with long-term urbanites being its
target market. In neither case are migrant workers construed as a particular
political or economic group that deserves attention, and therefore their sufferings
are not problematized but ignored and taken for granted. Yet at the same time, the
existing vest interest groups of officials, telecom firms, or more precisely the
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348
bureaucratie entrepreneurs have the most convenient access to media and
policymaking processes, and so do the more articulate long-term residents
although to a lesser degree. The public and commercial policy discussions are
therefore becoming increasingly skewed towards the enfranchised and away from
the disenfranchised, albeit that as found in this study migrant workers are equally,
if not more, dependent on telecommunications in their daily lives compared to
older, long-term residents.
Here arises a most fragmented structure of storytelling that involves
migrants, whose internal heterogeneity and inconsistency surpasses those of
official discourses, commercial narrations, and storytelling among those who have
lived in the Delta for a longer period of time. This body of micro-level narration is
most splintered because, in comparison with articulations by other storytellers,
migrant workers tended to limit their personal stories to a personal scope of
experience during focus groups and interviews. None of them, presented their
stories in a way that was based on specific local issues on the one hand, but at the
same time also appeals to more general concerns about their neighborhood, the
larger society, or the entirety of the telecom infrastructure. Such personal stories
are indeed not full-fledged narratives but only “prenarratives,” defined by Herman
as a particular way of storytelling among vulnerable groups that “does not
develop or progress in time” (1992, p. 175). This cannot be more different from
the sustained discourses - regarding market liberalization, Internet cafes, negative
impacts on minors, and so on - that involve state, commercial, and long-term
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349
residents, which were often fueled and renewed by the media, ending up in the
shaping and reshaping of the regional telecom infrastructure. Under such
circumstances, the more the system works to serve the interests of the powerful
and to ignore the sufferings of the weak, the more psychological detachment there
will be from other storytellers, from storytelling telecom in general, and from all
telecom technologies.
Besides detachment from other storytelling networks, there is also
indication for disconnectedness within the interpersonal communication system
among migrant workers themselves. That is, very seldom did they refer to the
“we” in storytelling, not the “we” for all migrants or the “we” for a particular
occupation or the “we” for those from the same hometown. Hence, despite the
multiple stories being told constantly in different migrant worker networks, little
collective storytelling exists that would name telecom-based crimes or prejudice
from the establishment as some problem “we” should deal with. There is thus
even less change for the building of collective efficacy.
Four tentative reasons may be offered that underlie the fragmented nature
of grassroots telecom storytelling among migrant workers. First, lower social
economic status and shorter residential tenure, while reflecting existing social
inequality, contributes to the lack of experience and confidence among migrant
workers as well as their pressure to make a living, all of which lead to a lower
level of collective engagement with issues of common concern. Second, migrant
workers come from all over China, forming multiple sub-systems of dialect-based
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350
storytelling networks that often are in competition with each other, which impedes
the formation of an overall alliance. Third, as reviewed previously, there are
discriminatory institutional barriers in both political and commercial settings of
the region, which reifies existing social inequalities. Finally and most
perplexingly, a discursive hegemony has come into being, under which the lack of
cultural capital within the floating population leads to excessive dependence on
urban-centered, hyper-consumerist narratives, particularly among the migrant
workers who are most actively involved in telecom-related issues. Regardless of
the fact that migrants suffer the most from the abuse of telecom technologies, on
average a large proportion of their income is spent on making phone calls and
accessing the Internet; and still, as vehicles of conspicuous consumption, telecom
gadgets and services carry a special weight in their urban experiences and
imaginations.
Discussion
This chapter describes and analyzes grassroots storytelling in the Pearl River
Delta among both long-term and immigrant populations, including the stories they
tell and indications of social and psychological disconnectedness in the context of
increasing technological diffusion. It is important to note that, according to the
survey conducted in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai, the penetration of
telecom services among migrant workers and older residents, the two often
ignored social groups, is quite substantial. Despite lower social economic status in
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351
comparison with randomly sampled urban residents, which are subjects of most
conventional studies, they still spend anywhere between one third and half of their
monthly income on telecom expenses. This indicates that at the micro level
telecom storytelling is no longer an exclusive business of the urban elite, as once
it was in the 1980s, but a collective enterprise that involves virtually everyone
residing in the region at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
This said, there is clear evidence that remarkable differences exist between
different social groups in terms of telecom connection patterns, which contribute
to a wide variety of stories being told about the technologies. Narratives reflecting
consumerism and globalism are most popular among long-term residents who
tend to be relatively young, well-educated, wealthy, and more often than not,
males, who are both early adopters as well as opinion leaders in mainstream
telecom storytelling. The discursive framework is at the same time suppressive
when it comes to the stereotyping of women, older people, migrant workers, and
the widely held false conviction that disadvantaged groups are incompetent in
dealing with telecom technologies.
A schematic representation of grassroots telecom storytelling system and
its relations with state and commercial storytellers can be found in Figure 7.1,
which shows more differentiated networks of storytellers at the micro level of
analysis as opposed to discursive practices at the meso levels (see Figures 5.1 and
6.1). It is obvious that high-income residents of younger age and higher education
have become the driving force of mainstream urban telecom storytelling. They are
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352
the most capable in articulating their needs and having their voices heard. Such
capacity is reduced among older, long-term residents and females, who
nevertheless often join mainstream narratives in discriminatory storytelling
against migrant workers. Notably, migrant workers are criticized by almost all
other groups of telecom storytellers (except small private businesses who lack
storytelling resources in themselves), which is not a surprising finding given the
group’s minimal political power and perceived commercial value.
Figure 7.1 A view of the regional telecom storytelling system from the
perspective of local residents
Sources o f disconnectedness:
stratification gaps, negative
stereotypes, psychological
^^_detachment etc,...-.^^
f Older \
residents
Female
residents
Large providers
Small business
Cadres at lower ranks
High-rank officials
LOCAL
RESIDENTS
Migrant workers
LOCAL STATE
AGENCIES
TELECOM
PROVIDERS
High-income residents
of younger age &
higher education
It is however incorrect to ignore the capacity of migrant workers - and
residents of older age and female gender - to actively engage in telecom
technologies. As indicated by survey and focus group data, these other, non-
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353
mainstream groups have gradually caught up in terms of access to the
technologies. This is especially due to the effect of the closely clustered nature of
these storytelling networks, which often facilitates the dissemination of telecom
services via peer pressure among group members including both migrant workers
and long-term residents.
Yet there is a flip side of this particular network effect in the process of in
group storytelling. That is, grassroots communication is equally likely to
discourage access to certain telecom services, if not all, when deeply unsatisfying
experience with the technology becomes the origin of interpersonal narration.
Stories generated in such a manner are often circulated among females and older
people, reifying the stereotypes that high technology is “not something for people
like us.” They are most popular among migrant workers because, on the one hand,
as newcomers in the Delta, they are more dependent on telecommunications to
keep their social networks and search for job-related information, whereas on the
other hand they are subject to repetitive mistreatments and criminal activities
while using telecom technologies.
Also important is to recognize that behavioral experience is but one
dimension in the shaping of grassroots storytelling, and so is the networked nature
for the groups of micro storytellers. Other dimensions would include mass
mediated messages as well as public and commercial policies, under the joint
influence of official agencies and telecom providers. Here, a feedback mechanism
has emerged between mainstream grassroots storytelling, official discourse, and
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354
commercial promotions. Although certain grand narratives like nationalism and e-
govemment democracy are less successful in appealing to the residents,
mainstream storytelling that dominates symbolic construction processes in the
region does indeed draw heavily from state-led and for-profit initiatives in
portraying generally attractive, and selectively undesirable (e.g. Internet café),
images for telecom services. Meanwhile, when stories about certain technologies
are particularly positive, or particularly negative, and has been widely circulated
among long-term residents, other storytelling units, especially the media, would
be more than likely to reinforce and further amplify the influences of the stories.
This amplification process, however, works in reverse direction on the
upper and lower levels of informational stratification. For the enfranchised long
term residents, their negative feedback would be amplified and then used by
policymakers to modify the telecom infrastructure, revisit its existing
components, and reconsider its future structure, so that the technology would
better serve the interests of mainstream storytellers. However, for those who are
disenfranchised, normally those of lower social economic status including the
majority of the migrant population, their complaints are systematically ignored
and suppressed. What is amplified for this second type of storytellers is therefore
not the stories themselves but the psychological detachment hence engendered:
suspicion of the technologies, distrust of other storytellers, and alienation from
local communities in the Pearl River Delta.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This study explores the relationship between eommunication ecology, social
transformation, and the trajectory of telecom development in China’s Pearl River
Delta during the post-Mao period of 1978-2002. Inspired by the holistic approach
of the Communication Infrastructure Theory and informed by the eclectic
methodology of the USC Metamorphosis Project, we have presented a course of
transformation by which the regional communication infrastructure shifted away
from official dominance of telecom-related discussions into a partially integrated
and partially disintegrated system of storytelling networks, layered upon an
evolving context of multi-level social transition with extraordinary speed, scale,
and profundity. In this process, not only is the communication infrastructure more
diversified to include commercial enterprises and average people in the Delta, but
it is also more globalized because the region is at the frontier of exchange
between China and the capitalist world-system, allowing for a focused study of
(dis)conneetedness patterns, the issue of our ultimate concern.
Summary o f Findings
First, the most prominent eharacteristie for the evolution of the regional
telecom infrastructure was its tremendous growth - not only statistically but in the
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356
social scope of the diffusion, as reflected in figure 8.1. In 1978 and the early stage
of post-Mao reform, telecommunications (mostly fixed-line telephones)
accounted for only a small portion of the regional communication infrastructure.
Most teleeom resources were monopolized by state agencies. Telecom providers
were extensions of the government. And among the residents, only those with
high official ranking had access to telecommunications such as residential
telephones.
Yet, the diffusion of teleeom teehnologies was far greater by 2002, when
the combination of fixed-line telephone, mobile phone, pager, fax, and the
Internet has penetrated almost all major groups of storytellers in the
communication infrastructure (see figure 8.1b). State control of telecom
resources, either administratively or through state-affiliated telecom providers,
was still important. But it was only a small part of the telecom infrastructure.
Telecommunications have diffused widely among local businesses. Telecom
firms with little official support, including small private operations, have emerged
and beeome an indispensable component of the communication system. Although
certain residents, especially those with lower social economic status, still had no
access to telecom technologies, the growth of telecommunications as a new mode
of symbolic exchange has been most phenomenal in the short period of a quarter
century.
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Figure 8.1 The social distribution of telecom technologies in the regional
communication infrastructure of Pearl River Delta (1978-2002)
Figure 8.1a The social distribution of telecom technologies in the regional
communication infrastructure of Pearl River Delta (1978)
The regional
communication'
infrastructure (1978)
Telecom
providers
State
agencies
businesses
residents
The diffusion of telecommunications
Figure 8.1b The social distribution of telecom technologies in the regional
communication infrastructure of Pearl River Delta (2002)
The regional
communication
infrastructure (2002)
Telecom
providers
^ State
F /"agencies
Local \
businesses \
The residents
The diffusion of telecommunications
Second, the proliferation of telecom technologies is not simply a force that
contributes to better communication within and beyond the Pearl River Delta.
Instead, the growth of technological connections is juxtaposed with the
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358
proliferation of social disconnectedness both within and among the three key
groups of storytellers. As we have learned from the narratives being circulated
among and between local officials, teleeom providers, and grassroots networks,
the fervor for high technology is palpable throughout the region. But the tragedy
is precisely that, where teleeom storytelling is most enthusiastic and conducive to
rapid technological development, it is often most insensitive to issues of social
inequality.
Figure 8.2 provides an overview of (dis)connectedness relations within
and among the three types of storytellers at the turn of the century. We first
examined local state agencies. Despite the gradual withdrawal of central state
from overall regional development (Lin, 1997), the local state remains a critical
player in the transformational process due to the historical legacy of official
monopoly, high entry barrier, and the more recent proliferation of e-govemment
projects in the region. State-led telecom storytelling, however, bears much
influence from the official hierarchical mode of communication in which those of
higher administrative ranks dominated cadres at lower levels. This is particular
true for “top leaders” at the city level as shown in the case of Nanhai, where the
city government and CCP leadership decided to build new telecom infrastructure
to consolidate their power and create a political bandwagon in the localities. The
narrative of informatization was appealing to many local officials because
telecom technologies were framed as representing “the most advanced mode of
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359
Figure 8.2 Overview of (dis)connectedness relationships within the regional
telecom storytelling system (2002)
LOCAL STATE
AGENCIES
“Top leaders”:
especially those at the
city level
i
Party-state cadres at
middle and lower
levels
Sources of disconnection:
Jnstitutional blocks among thcy
offices & with the public
TELECOM LOCAL
PROVIDERS
\ / / ^ \ \ y
RESIDENTS
State-sponsored
^ / \ /
High-income
service providers
/ \ / —
residents
A
A . \ ' ." 1 X : .
y
Large-scale manufacturers
(domestic and foreign)
residents
/
y
/
'emale'
Small private business
Sources of disconnection: market/
\pompetition, gender stereotype^
prejudice against migrants^
etc.
Migrant workers
Sources o f disconnection:
stratification gaps, negative
s^stereotypes, psychological^
detachment etc.
production.” Moreover, those who benefit the most from “informatization” tend to
be the most enthusiastie in storytelling telecom using the most grandiose
discourse. Problems exist in sueh official narrations because the political logic of
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360
power maximization is anything but a unifying rationale. It causes power struggle
between government entities at different levels, for which the Nanhai’s “Top
Leadership Project,” its suppression of local interests and conflicts with
Guangdong CCP Provincial Committee, serve as a prototype. It also underlies
institutional blocks against information sharing among the offices and with the
public. Although official storytellers tend to have more exchange with state-
affiliated telecom providers, large-scale manufacturers, and long-term residents
with higher income, their narratives regarding telecom issues rarely target small
private operations, migrant workers, or those residents of lower social economic
status (e.g. seniors and females).
While the role of local state remained important, it was the commercial
entities that contributed in a most materialistic way to the establishment of a
storytelling network with more diverse narratives within an overarching
consumerist framework. Notably, there is heavy borrowing from official
discourse to cater to the CCP, the government, and the military, all of which are
major policymakers, investors, and purchasers for the telecom industry. But the
reliance on the authorities decreases from state-affiliated enterprises to large-scale
non-state operations (privately owned or foreign-Chinese joint ventures) to small
private telecom businesses. Market competition often generates inconsistent
accounts of the same technology (e.g., the case of CDMA mobile phone
advertising). There is also dramatization of policy debates in the mass rriedia
regarding Internet cafes, voice information stations {shenxuntai), and undesirable
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influences on children, which altogether contradict the generally positive image of
telecom technologies. As Cartier writes on the culture of commercial entities in
South China, “The reality is that contemporary business networks are internally
differentiated and distinctive, especially hased on differences of citizenship, class,
and dialect, or ethnic sub-group” (2001, p. 62). Although this study does not focus
on citizenship and dialect variation per se, the internal differentiation hased on
differences in commercial storytelling is fairly clear among telecom providers of
different scale and types of ownership. Meanwhile, like local state agencies,
commercial storytellers tend to focus attention on rich long-term residents rather
than disadvantaged social groups. The goal of profit maximization also leads to a
new role of commercial storytelling, i.e. circulating and reproducing stereotypes
against females, seniors, and migrant workers, which is key to the emergence of
disconnectedness in the regional telecom storytelling system.
The most complicated, and arguably most fragmented, storytelling
networks are those at the micro grassroots level, where the region’s population
diversity, coupled with a variety of access patterns, contribute to drastically
different connection patterns to telecom technologies and therefore very different
kinds of storytelling. Over the course of telecom reform, restrictions hased on
class status have significantly reduced, espeeially since early 1990s when the
gadgets and services have become more affordable and accessible. A loose form
of camaraderie thus has taken shape among early adopters within the mainstream
storytelling system of long-term residents, who absorb and negotiate consumerist
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narratives from official and commercial storytelling. Their opinions are not only
exchanged in interpersonal networks but also picked up in mass media and
thereby further disseminated to spur more public responses. This mainstream of
grassroots storytelling, however, reifies discursive prejudice against older people
and females. Moreover, it is insensitive and discriminatory towards issues facing
migrant workers, who have high demand for telecom services and spend a larger
proportion of their income on telecom expenses, but have to put up with abusive
officials and unsympathetic telecom providers, while suffering from rampant
telecom-based crimes. Very few people outside the circle of migrant workers care
to know these miseries of the migrants, who on the other hand do not articulate
these problems in everyday life as objects of collective concern. Hence, while
many migrant workers see telecom access as the most quintessential urban
experience, others who were repetitively finistrated tend to be psychologically
detached from the new technologies.
Finally, all the aforementioned analyses of the storytelling system are
situated in the communication action context, whose importance in the regional
communication infrastructure cannot be overemphasized. Although economic
globalization and new telecom technologies indeed reduce the constraints of
physical distance, they do not demolish the fundamental significance of locality in
social, economic, political, and cultural processes. Without its adjacency to Hong
Kong and Macau, its accessibility to Southeast Asia and capitalist world-system,
and arguably its distance from the political center of Beijing, it would be difficult
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to explain why the Pearl River Delta was selected to be the test ground for
China’s post-Mao reform and opening-up. The spaciality of the communication
infrastructure also matters within the region at multiple levels of analysis and
thereby gives rise to different forms of telecom development at different speeds of
growth, by different local agencies, and responding to the needs of different
storytellers, as shown most obviously in the examination of loeal e-govemment
initiatives.
Place matters, precisely because localities within the Delta are not
“abstract space” (Lefebvre, 1991) but imbued with historical legacies and
meanings. In the short time frame of 1978-2002, we have seen a elear trajectory
for the regional telecom infrastructure from initially a sphere of exclusion to a
sphere of semi-openness and multiple diseonneetions, a feature that probably
eharaeterizes more than telecom-related storytelling networks but also the entire
eommunication infrastructure. The extraordinary speed and scope of change
during this period is, however, not surprising once the telecom take-off is
historicized in the region’s time-honored tradition as a maritime frontier and
center of eross-border mercantilism, as a region of high population diversity,
pluralistic cultural practices, and robust lineage bonds. Such contextual analyses
show that mueh of what the Delta has achieved is not totally new. They are but
ways for regional history to extend and re-surface. During this process, several
eonducive conditions have emerged that greatly facilitate telecom growth in the
Delta such as the mercantile tradition, the returning of overseas Chinese, and the
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lack of development in Mao’s era that created a vacuum to be filled in terms of
both the needs for technology and the relative weakness of conservative old-guard
political elite. Besides facilitating components of the action context, there are also
constraints of all kinds - be they materialistic, discursive, or institutional - that
impede telecom development and lead to various forms of disconnectedness.
Constraints and resources, however, are not absolute categories for contextual
factors, whose ultimate effect upon the course of telecom growth depends on
agentic constructions and intersubjective negotiations within the storytelling
system.
General Appraisal And Broad Implications
The main theoretical purpose of this study is to apply the Communication
Infrastructure Theory, a theory in progress, to test its explanatory power and
refine it by reconstructing, first, the socio-historical contexts of telecom
development at global, national, and regional levels, and then, the narrative
structures of official propaganda, commercial promotions and grassroots
storytelling. In so doing, we have examined the intricate relationship between the
communication action context, the multi-level storytelling system, and the process
by which telecom technologies were socially constructed in the Pearl River Delta.
A few caveats need to be stated regarding the limited scope of this
empirical exploration, suggesting that the research is still preliminary, that its
main contribution is raising questions rather than answering them in full, and that
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much more remains to be learned. First, the time frame of this study is limited to
the post-Mao period of 1978-2002, an era of rapid transformation towards
globalization and market economy. The goal of our research is to unveil patterns
of social change during this period instead of full-fledged prediction about the
future. Second, we examined the development of telecommunications, not other
technologies or means of communication. We do not assume that identical social
role and shaping processes for different telecom devices and services. Rather,
they are specific to the locale, the context, and the relevant stories being
exchanged. Third, our discussions primarily focus on the region of the Pearl River
Delta. Although factors at global, national, and local levels of analysis are
considered throughout, it is the region that we are most interested in. This means,
on the one hand, observations in the Delta do not necessarily characterize the
entire China, let alone other parts of the world. On the other hand, we did not
conduct systematic comparison among cities, organizations, and communication
networks beyond the region, which, although highly valuable, is beyond the
capacity of this study given the limits of time and resources.
The peculiarities of this empirical inquiry do not impede theorization. As
John Weiss (1971, p. 8) points out, the “narrowing of the subject in time and
space” allows for a wider range of questions to be answered with higher precision.
These more precise observations, as in all case studies, can then be utilized to
modify and refine existing generalizations and substantiate them with meanings in
the real world (Stake, 1995, pp. 7-9). Moreover, these grounded findings may also
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test general theories using the logic of falsification that Karl Popper holds as the
foundation of all scientific inquiries (1959). Given these recognitions, let us
revisit key observations about the communication action context, the storytelling
system, and offer an overall appraisal of the Communication Infrastructure
Theory as a result of this empirical exploration.
Given the complexity of the subject, it has to he acknowledged that this
broad scope of understanding would have been impossible without the conceptual
fi-amework of the communication infrastructure. The theory has high generality to
do justice to the richness of this particular case where the region’s multifaceted
history and transitional reality are conjoined, where a host of interacting
institutions, populations, and discourses are intermingled in a most unique
geographic region. This holistic approach is critical to establishing the argument
that the social processes of building telecommunications are at the same time
connecting and differentiating. Thanks to the Communication Infrastructure
Theory, itself the product of interactions between time-honored scholarly
traditions (e.g. human ecology and MSD) and the urban experience of a particular
global region (i.e. that of Greater Los Angeles), a systematic examination of
telecommunications in the Pearl River Delta is conducted that adds to our
understanding of both urban change in East Asia and the relationship between
communication technology and social ecology in a broad sense.
A most important finding with such larger theoretical value is that
economic status as a single factor only has limited effect on storytelling as being
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demonstrated in the case of Nanhai^'^' and the analysis of survey demographics.
This is indeed part of a more general observation that the actual trajectory of
telecom development is not pre-determined by technology, public authority, any
particular economic logic, or any single line of historical causality. It is not our
aim here to substitute for all the one-sided deterministic arguments an equally
simplifying model centered on communication processes alone. Rather, from the
Communication Infrastructure perspective, storytelling networks provide the
mechanism of linkage, interaction, and integration among a variety of actors,
discourses, and rationales situated in the specific time-space context. In this
system-wise conceptualization, communication is not everything; nor does it
explain everything. But it is the thread that connects agentic storytellers with
relevant contextual elements into a system of storytelling that best explains
decision-making, market growth, and diffusion patterns as an interconnected
ecology of social change. Focusing attention on these linkages and their absence
is therefore a most valuable approach to understand the evolution of the Pearl
River Delta conurbation, the incorporation of technology in society, and the
mutual shaping of “glocal” structures and individual agency at multiple levels of
analysis. This is not a convoluted argument but an ecological perspective that
better crystallizes the relationship between technology, communication, and social
change than any deterministic formal theory.
That is, some districts with lower average income and less successful local businesses actually took
the lead in building telecom infrastructures.
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This dissertation builds on the social shaping of technology perspective,
confirming its general applicability, while also refining it in the case of the Pearl
River Delta. Most social shaping of technology analyses focus on immediate
structural settings (Bijker, et al, 1987; 1992; Bijker, 1995; Cawson, Haddon, and
Miles, 1995) or individual “user heuristics,” when “users try to put a new
technology to their own ends, which can lead to paradoxical outcomes not easily
deducible from the straight-forward logic of the technology” (Fischer, 1992, p.
269). These arguments are validated in our analysis at the meso and micro levels.
However, more importantly, this study branches out in light of the
Communication Infrastructure Theory to a system of storytelling situated in the
context of the region, in its history as a maritime frontier, and its central position
in the integration between China and the capitalist world-system. Thus, besides
individual users, shaping forces also come from government and corporate
entities, all of which bring in their existing politico-economic propensities - and
therein characteristics of the soeio-historical context - that exert influence on the
ultimately shaping of the dominant way by which a telecom technology is put to
use in a mode that is particularistic to the period and locale. In this process of
shaping technologies, space and history matter, so do social institutions and
human agency, which all function at the same time in a multi-level
communication ecology.
Furthermore, while the specific form of telecom technologies is molded in
storytelling systems situated in the communication action context, new ways of
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communication also facilitate and constrain social relations among different social
groups. This is of critical importance because telecommunications have emerged
as a center of social organization, hence giving rise to a pattern of mutual shaping
between technology and society (Bijker, 1995; Fujimora, 1996; Boczkowski,
1999). As learned from this particular case study, by assimilating organizations
and individuals while alienating others, telecom development not only reinforces
existing inequality, institutions, and inter-group relations but also brings about
social change - not all types of change though, but those which historical
circumstances have prepared the region for.
That the Pearl River Delta pioneers globalization processes in China,
particularly in the economic domain, has been established via the examination of
historical records and trade figures. As a specific form of discourse, globalism is
also found to be prominent in official narratives and commercial promotions,
although its presence at the grassroots is more limited in a form intermingled with
consumerism and techno-utopianism and no storyteller outside the mainstream
(e.g. migrant workers and older residents) demonstrates strong interests in
globalist discourse. This implies that, while much of the regional economic
structure has become increasingly globalized and a series of pro-globalization
institutions have been created from state agencies to commercial enterprises, the
structural forces have not completely penetrated local storytelling. That is, less
resourceful as they are, many micro-level storytellers have nonetheless resisted
the global “visions” that have little to do with everyday life “reality,” despite
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repetitive promotions in official and commercial storytelling, which targets
mostly only long-term residents with more purchase power.
From another perspective, if globalization is construed not as the
annihilation of boundaries but as a transformational process that may also
maintain old boundaries while creating new ones (Giddens, 1990; Castells, 1996;
Held, et al, 1999), then the evolution of telecom infrastructure and the history of
telecom storytelling in the Pearl River Delta may serve as a prototype of such
restructuring processes. This is one of the “regions” that Cartier articulates to be
“a mediating spatiality and a material space of globalizing processes ... their
slippages in meaning, like those of globalization, are embedded in their
spatialities, in being simultaneously unbounded yet discrete and interconnected”
(2001, pp. 262-263).
This condition of “being simultaneously unbounded yet discrete and
interconnected” is precisely what the notion of (dis)connectedness is designed for.
Over and again we have argued that, underneath the camouflage of stunning
growth figures, flashy commercials, and grandiose discourse, there are
controversies, contradictions, crimes, and conflicts, of which this study reveals
but a small part. The four generic types of disconnections are proposed that
include (a) spatial-temporal breaks, (b) stratification gaps, (c) institutional blocks,
and (d) grassroots detachment.^'*^ This classification is most useful in that, more
than an organizational scheme, it serves as a multi-level framework for evaluating
Please see Table 1.1.
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structural change of the regional communication infrastructure. With its help, we
can see that the capacity to cross spatial-temporal breaks via telecom instruments
used to be a privilege of high-rank officials. Yet with technological diffusion, the
constraining effects of spatial distance have been significantly reduced for low-
rank officials, non-state businesses, and the majority of long-term residents and
migrant workers. However, at the same time, social distance does not vanquish
but take on new forms in the strorytelling and actual construction of
telecommunications in the region, which has become an enduring feature of the
regional communication infrastructure at both meso and micro levels.
Existing demographic group disparities have been reproduced and reified
in stratification gaps; institutional blocks were imposed, either deliberately or as
unintended consequences, by state agencies and commercial corporations; and
grassroots storytellers may also be detached from technologies and/or other social
groups due to incompetence or repetitive frustrating experiences in obtaining
telecom services. The gaps, blocks, and detachments did not predate the diffusion
of popular telecom technologies such as home phone, cell phone, and the Internet.
Rather, the fact that they have been proliferating after the region’s telecom boom
suggests that the social role of these new communication technologies is far more
complicated than conventional wisdom would have us to believe.
Given the multitude of empirical evidence that telecom technologies are
both connecting and differentiating, we need to reconsider the normative
assessment of the differentiating effects. First, in the classic Chicago School
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approach to urban ecology, the ultimate value is placed upon assimilation, as
Robert Park (1922, p. 468) clarifies,
When assimilation is achieved, this does not mean that individual
differences are eradicated or that competition and conflict cease
but only that there is enough unity of experience and communality
of symbolic orientation so that a "community of purpose and
action" can emerge.
Important is to note that even this most modernist urban theory
does not argue for the complete eradication of “competition and conflict,”
although fundamentally it still eonstrues the processes and consequences
of social differentiation as challenges to “unity of experience and
communality of symbolic orientation,” as things that may lead to the
breakdown of urban communities. This view dominated studies of social
change in urban environments until after the 1960s when the Civil Rights
Movement, feminist movement, and the general contestation of traditional
values seriously problematized the theoretical perspective of the Chicago
School. According to Manuel Castells (1983, p. 292),
... But the classic integrationist approach of urban sociology,
easily prone to considering social conflict as a form of deviance, is
no longer tenable in a new situation in which the management of
the entire urban system by the state has politicized urban problems,
and so translated the mobilization of local communities into a new
significant form of social challenge to established values.
The result of the new social conditions gave rise to pluralist theories of
social movements, especially among political scientists, which, to the contrary of
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the Chicago School, conceive of differentiation as a necessary dimension of social
organization and a positive force that propels social change. Based on a different
presumption of the rational individual, this approach rejects the assumption that
an overarching unifying principle is indispensable or even desirable for urban
community building. To a certain degree, this perspective is applicable in this
case study for analysis of narratives among the most articulate long-term residents
and even some commercial and official storytellers of comparable bargaining
power. But it is obviously of little help in explaining stratificational gaps and
institutional blocks that involve the perpetuation of existing inequalities and the
power of structural constraints.
Along this line of thinking, the notion of (dis)connectedness may serve as
a coneept that subsumes different approaches to community building and different
traditions of understanding social differentiation by posing the least amount of
normative judgment on empirical observations. The proposal of the four generic
types is but an initial attempt to encompass the broadest spectrum of
(dis)connectedness forms within a single coneeptual framework, which construes
differentiations as manifestations of existing social structure, facilitators of social
change, as well as meehanisms of soeial control. In certain occasions (e.g. crimes
associated with the public phone), some forms of disconnectedness may cause
system breakdown; but in other situations (e.g. mass media discussions on
Internet and children), they may function as the basis of negotiation and
contribute towards a telecom infrastructure that serves the interests of multiple
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groups. In other words, our general contention of “more technology, more
(dis)eonnectedness” is neither utopian nor dystopian a statement for prospects of
community building. Rather, it is to argue for a more inclusive notion of
community with higher flexibility that may operate at multiple levels of analysis;
it is to contend that the traditional faith in a single “we” and the pluralist belief in
the rational‘T ’ are both insufficient for new forms of urban community given the
trends of globalization, new eommunication technology, and population diversity.
Methodological Issues
From this study, we learned tentative findings as well as necessary caution in
conducting research about the communication infrastructure. As this dissertation
is merely one of the first attempts to understand telecom development in the Pearl
River Delta, it raises more questions than providing definite answers, entailing a
series of methodological improvements. This is particularly necessary because the
subject matter - the construction of telecommunications in a rapidly transforming
communication environment - is still in a burgeoning process with the constant
emergence of new technologies and new projects as well as the Delta’s increasing
economic integration with the rest of the world. Methodological issues in this case
study may also have much more general value in shedding light on similar
projects in other globalizing regions around the globe.
While this dissertation focuses on the case of the Pearl River Delta, the
embedded design does not allow for equal attention to all the subunits.
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Meanwhile, as being partially shown in the course of data analysis, from each city
to each organization, from each telecom technology to each mode of data
collection, they do offer a rich body of collective and personal experiences that
this study only begins to make sense of. Of little doubt, historical analysis in this
study needs to be strengthened espeeially in regard to storytelling telecom in late
1970s and early 1980s. Although this researcher attempted to cover archives and
records in the most comprehensive way before and during the fieldtrip, the highly
monopolized nature of the telecom industry in this early period means that the
available information was almost exclusively official statistics and reports,
reflecting only a partial view about meso-level processes and almost nothing at
the grassroots. Sporadic personal interviews have been conducted with long-term
residents to fill in the data gap. However, this is far from sufficient, and if
possible, more systematic exploration should be carried out regarding the earlier
period of telecom reform during focus groups and interviews.
Another aspect that this dissertation is unable to delve into is the diversity
of population in the region especially when it comes to foreign investors,
entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, and how they participate in
processes of storytelling. The role of emigrants from outside Mainland China,
especially the returning of expatriates originated from the Delta, was highlighted
in the contextual analysis. However, still little is known about the general
communication pattern of these groups and the specific role they play in the
communication infrastructure, which is of particular value given that one of the
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reasons we are interested in this region has to do with the increasing influence of
globalization and the increasingly diversity of population, both facilitated by new
telecom technologies.
In addition to issues of general design, this dissertation can be improved if
more systematic utilization of secondary data is utilized as not only helpful
indicators by themselves but also substantive comparative references triangulated
with other information collected in fieldwork to enhance data quality and overall
understanding of the eommunication infrastructure. In particular, the CASS
survey on Internet usage served as a valuable benchmark for us to make sense of
the under-researched populations. Yet its help is largely limited to comparisons in
demographics and Internet penetration rates, and there is little, if any, information
regarding connectedness to other types of technologies, inter-group relations, or
patterns of storytelling. Certainly it is unrealistic to demand high comparability of
secondary data that serve the purposes of other projects. However, now that the
three-city survey follows a purposive sampling design and the sample size is
relatively small, if it will be carried out in the future at a larger scale, it would be
extremely helpful to include average long-term residents in addition to migrant
workers and older residents.
A related task that was initiated but only partially completed in this study
pertains to the maintenance and analysis of multiple datasets for statistical records
from official archives and industry yearbooks. However, this turned out to be
quite challenging because on the one hand these data describe phenomena at
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different levels of analysis, from the most local to the most global, with provincial
and national records being the most numerous. On the other hand, since the region
itself has been rapidly transforming, it is commonplace that the way statistics are
constructed would vary significantly due to changes in either the local state (e.g.
the merging of cities) or the telecom industry (e.g. the split of telecom monopoly).
This is probably an issue for everyone using embedded case study design because
the multiplicity of analytical levels and historical variation both add greatly to
requirements in data collection.
Meanwhile, given more time and resources, the current project could have
looked more in-depth into mass media storytelling about the technologies, various
social groups, and specific telecom policies. In addition to the limited mass media
messages being presented so far, a random-sampled content analysis of key media
outlets would be very beneficial. So it would he important if themes identified in
personal interviews and focus groups can be incorporated as key principles (e.g.
consumerism, globalism) built into the coding scheme of content analysis.
Due to the lack of transparency in local state politics, and to some extent
also in the commercial realm due to market competition, much of the telecom
policymaking processes within state apparatus and commercial firms remain
opaque to this researcher. Although a sizeable set of data have been collected via
publications and personal interviews, this set of information remains tenuous
especially in comparison with what we know about the grassroots storytellers. To
improve data quality in this respect, triangulation would be a necessary but sill
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insufficient solution. Meanwhile, more in-depth interviews still need to be
conducted if we hope to leam more about official storytelling, commercial
rationale, and the logics behind them.
In regard to data analysis, the major issue for this dissertation, as for most
case studies, pertains to the organizational framework for the classification,
comparison, and theorization of empirical observations. The primary goal is to
develop a most meaningful and effective organizational framework for
quantitative and qualitative data. To this end, the concepts of communication
action context, the storytelling system, and storytelling networks are of
fundamental significance. Of similar importance are the categorization of
contextual resources (i.e., institutional, discursive, material, historical, and
agentic), the four generic types of disconnectedness (i.e., break, gap, block, and
detachment), and their sub-types. Yet, unlike the framework of Communication
Infrastructure Theory, which has gone through multiple iterations of
generalization and empirical testing, the new typologies being proposed in this
dissertation are largely first attempts in the theorization of a highly complex
subject matter. Although to different extents, these categories have been applied
and tested at multiple analytical levels regarding different kinds of storytellers, by
and large they have undergone merely one process of inductive and deductive
analysis, leaving much more for future research that should consider at least two
specific goals.
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First, these have to be analytical categories rather than purely descriptive
ones, by which we understand that the typologies would not only serve as
convenient pigeonholes to accommodate empirical data but more importantly they
must also relate to each other in a meaningful way that responds to our theoretical
concerns. In this regard, more attention needs to be paid to the disconnectedness
types given their centrality in our argument. Up to this point, we have established
the existence of disconnectedness, identified the specific types and sub-types, and
presented a history in which disconnectedness proliferates despite rapid telecom
growth. Yet how do the types and sub-types relate to each other? How do they
interact with patterns of connectedness, which also grow in tandem with the
technology boom? These questions remain to be answered.
Second, the new categories need to be better integrated with the
Communication Infrastructure Theory in future research, which hopefully will
build on what is already done in this study but will focus more on the role of
telecom technology in the transformation of urban community. More specifically,
this entails further analysis of the question: how do the (dis)connectedness
patterns of the storytelling system relate to facilitating or constraining factors in
the communication action context? Only by such continuous rethinking and
returning to our theoretical framework can this line of research produce, not a
cluster of information, but a true body of knowledge.
It is also necessary to point out that certain limitations of the empirical
dataset, especially the three-city survey, are obstacles that need to be removed
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before eoncrete conclusions can be drawn using more advanced statistical
techniques. With larger sample size and more systematic random sampling design
(at least for long-term residents), it is possible that we would have enough Internet
connectors to use the Internet Connectedness Index (Jung, et al, 2001). Given
more resources in survey conduction, the Telecom Total Connections Index
would also be significantly improved to include more qualitative and historical
dimensions along the same line of thinking with the ICI. Meanwhile, in terms of
qualitative analysis of interview and focus group data, it would also be better if a
more structured approach is taken using qualitative research tools such as the
NVrVO software.
Concluding Remarks: Through the Prism o f Telecommunications
To sum it up, this dissertation has explored the social construction of telecom
technologies and its role in the transformation of the Pearl River Delta. By so
doing, we are able to not only examine the multi-faceted relationship between
technology and society at multiple levels of analysis but also make
generalizations about the theoretical framework of the Communication
Infrastructure. This is possible, and valuable, because telecommunications have
become a new center of social organization hosting a wide variety of social
imaginations, historical and institutional legacies, contestations among vest
interests, and globalized narratives of late capitalism. The increasing centrality of
telecom technologies in processes of urban transformation calls for our efforts in
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examining the telecom infrastructure as a prism for the intricate relationships
between state, commercial, and micro-level storytellers, their roles in the evolving
system of communications, and structural changes in the entirety of the regional
social ecology.
From this study, a few conclusions can be drawn that enrich the
Communication Infrastructure Theory by adding to it a body of contextualized
knowledge:
1. Macro-level factors in the communication action context enable,
facilitate, and constrain formations of telecom infrastructure in the
Pearl River Delta by providing basic policies, regimes of exchange,
historical legacies, and fundamental narratives about new
communication technology.
2. Storytellers at the meso and micro levels, be they local state,
commercial, or grassroots networks, are by themselves agentic units
of storytelling, which means the actual results of discursive
interaction and the ultimate construction of the technologies seldom
follow straightforward logics deduced from macro-level
observations.
3. While telecommunications provide new channels and content for
storytelling, adding to the fabrics of communication, the social
construction of telecom technologies is accompanied by the
proliferation of stratificational gaps, institutional blocks, and
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grassroots detachments. This is a dialectic socio-historical process of
(dis)connectedness, which this dissertation only starts to unveil.
4. Recognizing emergent forms of communication disconnectedness is
a challenge to macro theories that attempt to use technology, global
trend, and/or national policy to explain processes of telecom
development. In specific, the increase of disconnections is contrary
to the assumed “connecting” nature of telecommunications; so is it
to the logic of global capitalism and China’s opening-up policy.
While some disconnections (e.g. congestion) are probably
unintended consequences, many others resulted from deliberate
decisions based on compartmentalized interests of party-state
agencies, market competition, and entrenched prejudice against
certain social groups.
Finally, does this study on the transformation of storytelling telecom and
the structure of the Communication Infi-astructure indicate a new form of
community emerging in the Pearl River Delta, one that may apply more generally
in other regions around the world. This is highly relevant to our purposes because
the ultimate concern of the Communication Infrastructure Theory is the well
being of contemporary urban communities; because a close look at the Pearl River
Delta, as part of the efforts to understand the larger South China, is an “early
recognition of the relationship between an evolving mercantile economy and a
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distinctive type of community formation that would articulate meaning of global
civil society and an international public sphere” (Cartier, 2001, p. 267). But what
is a “new community”?
According to Herbert Cans, a new community “is not new at all, but only
a new physical site on which people develop conventional institutions with
traditional programs” (1967, p. 408). This is largely what we found in this study
that reveals how existing forces at the macro, meso, and micro levels shape social
relations and social structures simultaneously while interacting with each other,
except that the “physical” limit has been increasingly transcended with the
advance of technology, although the significance of place still matters. It is this
more elastic scale of community building that brings in more diverse substance of
storytelling in the scope of a “region,” where the global and the national are
conjoined, negotiated, and re-rooted to give rise to a sometimes networked
sometimes fragmented social ecology.
What we have found in this study is that, arguably a “community of
purpose and action” as Park would like to see is not taking place in this
increasingly (dis)connected regional communication infrastructure. However,
since telecom is construed primarily as a means of production rather than of
collective action in this particular region, George Lin suggested from an economic
perspective based on the critical role of low-rank officials that, “a new local
economy, motivated primarily by local community initiative and shaped by free
market forces, is gradually taking shape in the Pearl River Delta (1997, p. 147).”
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In this sense, there is an emerging “community” based on local commercial
interests, global transactional bonds, and a new form of consumerism centered on
telecom technologies, which, however, should be conceptualized as the re
surfacing of the time-honored mercantile tradition of the region. Meanwhile,
market-oriented social relations, in the classic sense of the gesellschaft, have
failed to demolish existing barriers to community building because incumbent
authorities, large commercial entities, and those of higher social economic status
tend to monopolize the shaping of the telecom infrastructure, a process
characterized by the reinforcement, reproduction, and renewal of existing social
inequalities against people of less residential tenure, older age, female gender, and
of less income and education. This self-perpetuating tendency casts it into most
serious doubt that the construction and diffusion of telecommunications would
become a unifying experience for all storytellers, or is it more of a differentiating
process that will ultimately become flaws of fatal consequences for the inchoate
regional community. Prediction is not our goal. But what this study precisely
shows is that the building of community- in new or old forms, via telecom
technologies or traditional channels - is a business of all storytellers. State
authorities at all levels, firms of all scales, long-term residents and migrant
workers, all of them need to be networked in the communication infrastructure
before eommunity formations take place. This is probably the most profound
lesson we have learned from this study that applies to not only the Pearl River
Delta but also other rapidly transforming regions in China and beyond.
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Interview Outline fo r Government Officials
I. Introduction to the project: CASS and the Institute for Social Development
Studies; why we are interested in the Pearl River Delta and its cities; no right or
wrong answer as long as you’re telling us your observations and opinions;
protection of privacy; the discussion is of no sensitive nature; you may decline a
question, or request an answer to be off record.
II. Warming-up discussions; What kind of telecom services do you use? How
do you think about telecom develop in the Delta region and in your city since late
1970s? Do you use the Internet? What do you think is Internet? What are the good
things that you expect Internet and other telecom technologies to do - to your
work, your everyday life, and to the society? Anything undesirable about new
communication technologies?
III. General outlook of city informatization processes:
a. When and how did your region/city/township start to develop
telecommunications? What was the historical background - for the take-off
telephone penetration rates, for cellular phone diffusion, and the spread of the
Internet? Why the govemment/CCP leaders decided to engage in informatization?
What goals were set in the beginning?
b. What are the unique characteristics of telecom development in this
region/city/township? What’s the timeline and major events in the local
informatization process? Who are the major players? What are the major
achievements and barriers?
c. To what extent did you borrow resources (experiences, funding, technology,
personnel etc) from more advanced countries or regions like the US, Japan,
Taiwan, and Hong Kong? How?
IV. Institutional settings and functioning
a. In the government and CCP committee of this region/city/township, which
offices are in charge o f telecom development? When were these offices
established? What role does each of them play? How do they relate to one
another?
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b. What is the history of your organization? When and why your organization
was set up in the first place? Has its goal changed over the years? If so, what
kinds of changes are they?
c. How do you promote telecom and Internet services among government
organizations that are not in charge of technological development? How about
among local business enterprises? And among ordinary citizens?
d. What are the milestone achievements in your organization’s history? What
are the drawbacks? Do you have policies to retain the achievement while
removing the drawbacks?
V. Specific projects and policies
a. How does your region/city/township design and implement its e-govemment
plan or to engage in informatization in general? Which government offices are
fast in carrying out the plan? Which are relatively slow? Are there some
districts/regions in the city that developed the Internet really rapidly, whereas the
project has less impact elsewhere? Why were there these discrepancies?
b. How’s the situation of e-business and general application of
telecommunications in the area’s economic sectors? Does the government have
special measures to foster e-business or e-commerce? With what effects? Any
achievements, lessons learned or barriers identified? As for the speed of telecom
dissemination, are there also gaps among different types of enterprises such as
state-owned versus private company or joint venture? If so, why?
e. Are there any outstanding e-govemment or e-business models in the
region/city/township? What are they and how are they especially interesting?
d. An increasingly contentious debate these days is the regulation of Internet
cafés. How do you think of the issue? What’s the situation of Internet cafés in this
area?
e. Another hot topic concerns the influence of Internet on children. Do you
think this is a serious problem? Why or why not? Is there any past or future policy
that you know, which is designed for the protection of minors from online content
and telecom services?
f. What are the most important lessons you’ve learned in the development of
telecommunications in this region/city/township? What are the most successful
projects? What are the most difficult problems?
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g. Any future plan?
VI. Additional comments, recommendations of other potential interviewees,
intention for future collaborations, and thanks.
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Appendix 2: Interview Outline for Large- and Medium-Size Telecom Enterprises
I. Introduction to the project: CASS and the Institute for Social Development
Studies; why we are interested in the Pearl River Delta and its cities; no right or
wrong answer as long as you’re telling us your observations and opinions;
protection of privacy; no commercial secrets should be released; feel free to
decline a question, if you feel it’s sensitive, or request an answer to be off record.
II. General information about the company
a. What types of Internet and telecom services does your company offer?
Which divisions in your company are in charge? What is the division of labor
among them?
b. When did your company start to provide telecom and Internet services?
Were there remarkable events during the past two decades? What were these
events? What are the major developmental phases? What is unique about each of
these phases?
c. Why did you start providing Intemet/pager/cell phone services? How did
you conceive the new technologies then? Where did you get the information about
them? At that time, what expectations did you have while entering this new
market?
d. After all these years, have you changed your perceptions of telecom
networks, their commercial value and social influences? If so, how? And why?
ni. Market Competition and Corporate Strategies
a. According to your observation, what are the characteristics of the telecom
market in this region/city/township? Is market competition intensive? What are
the key issues related to competition? How do other compete (e.g. lower price,
additional services, more support from the officials, etc.)?
b. What do you know about your target market? What proportion of your
revenue com es from government offices, business enterprises, and individual
subscribers, respectively? What are the demographics of your subscribers
(income, gender, age, education, urban or rural residents, etc)?
c. Do you know how your subscribers (officials, businesspeople, and
individuals) use the Intemet and other telecom services? What is the most popular
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way for your customers to retrieve information about local news using these new
communication technologies?
d. What strategies have been taken in your company to face market
competition? Were they successful? Was there any hindrance in the process of
strategy implementation? What have been learned about Intemet market in this
region/city/township after the implementation of these strategies? (Ask for
relevant PR materials.)
IV. Policy evaluations
a. How do you think of the local state’s efforts in “informatization”? From the
perspective of your telecom company, this informatization campaign has led to
what kinds of positive effects? Any example? Are there any undesirable
consequences or things that need improvement in the part of the authorities?
b. Some people say the development of telecom and Intemet has profound
impact upon the economy and societal development in this region/city/township.
But others think not much has changed as the result of the new technology. How
do you think? Could you illustrate your point with examples?
c. Nowadays, China’s telecom industry has to face a few serious issues. Would
you share with us your opinions about them?
1. The recent partition of China Telecom and the reshuffle of telecom market
forces,
2. Foreign competition following the entry into WTO,
3. E-govemment - were you involved in local e-govemment projects, what
measures would you take to improve it?
4. Intemet cafés - Do you think Intemet cafés are somehow related to your
Intemet services? What do you think of the current Net café regulations?
5. Do you think online content poses a threat to children? Who’s responsible to
protect children from harmful information - ISPs like yours, local or national
government, parent, school, or some sort of committee that synthesize ideas from
multiple parties?
d. What is your general plan for future development?
V. Additional comments, recommendations of other potential interviewees,
intention for future collaborations, and thanks.
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Appendix 3: Interview Outline fo r Internet Café Owners/Managers
I. Self-introduction: My name is I work for CA SS CASS and the
China Intemet Project; why we are interested in small and medium-sized cities;
no right or wrong answer as long as you’re telling us your observations and
opinions; protection of privacy; no commercial secrets should be released;
discussion is not of sensitive nature; you may decline a question, or request an
answer to be off record at any time.
II. Background information: Are you the owner or manager of this Intemet
café? What is your age, education level, family background, and what did you do
before opening this netbar?
III. Initial and current set-up
a. When did you open this netbar? How did you leam about the Intemet in the
first place? Could you describe your first online experience? What expectations
did you have while entering this new business?
b. How did you get started? Where did you get the initial investment? Where
did you buy the equipments? How did you find this location?
c. Since then, have you changed your opinions about the value of Intemet
cafes? Why or why not? Any specific example to illustrate your point?
d. Were there notable events in the development of this Intemet cafe? (For
instance, a major renovation, a change in the scale of the netbar, or a temporary
closedown.)
e. How long did it take for you to get license? Which government agencies
were in charge? Have the licensing procedures changed? What do you think about
these changes?
f. How many online computers did you have at the beginning? How many do
you have now? What are the configurations of these machines (CPU, memory,
display, etc)? Do you handle technical problems by yourself or do you hire a tech-
support personnel/team?
IV. Management and everyday operations
a. How much does it cost to surf the Net in this Intemet cafe? What are your
business hours? When do you usually have the largest number of clients?
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b. Who are these clients? What are their average age, occupation, education
and income level? Do most of them live close by? Approximately what
percentage of them is female?
c. How long do you work here everyday? According to your observations,
what are the most popular online activities among your clients? Games,
chatrooms, streaming music/video, and anything else?
d. Are your computers equipped with floppy disk drives, CD-RW drives, or
USB storage devices so that users can upload and download materials on the
Intemet? Are these machines connected to printers in case customers hope to print
out hardcopies? How do you charge for these additional services?
e. What technological and administrative measures have been taken to prevent
access to harmful information in this Intemet cafe? Among these measures, which
are imposed by the officials? Does this lead to compulsory expenditure on
hardware, software, or security updates?
f. What is the greatest satisfaction in operating this netbar? What is the
greatest frustration or difficulty?
g. Is market competition increasing intensive among Intemet cafés in this
city/neighborhood? What are your competitive advantages? What are the
drawbacks? How can you keep the business and let it grow?
V. Policy evaluations
a. How do you think of the local state’s efforts in “digital city constmctions”?
Do you think this informatization campaign has brought benefits to your business?
Are there any ways of improvement that city authorities should pay attention to?
b. Some people say the development of Intemet has profound impact upon the
local economy and societal development here. But others think not much has
changed as the result of the new technology. How do you think? Could you
illustrate your point with some examples?
c. How do you think of the ways in which Intemet cafes are regulated in this
city? What’s the best way to foster netbars? How do you feel about the fire in
Beijing that killed college students in an Intemet café? What’s your opinion about
the policy repercussions of this tragic accident? How do you feel about
underground Intemet cafes that operate without licenses?
d. Do you think online content poses a threat to children? Who’s responsible to
protect children from harmful information - ISPs like yours, local or national
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government, parent, school, or some sort of committee that synthesize ideas from
multiple parties?
e. Future plan for this Internet café?
V. Additional comments, recommendations of other potential interviewees,
intention for future collaborations, and thanks.
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Appendix 4: Survey Questionnaire
Interviewer ID:
Interview location:
Is respondent an acquaintance? □ Yes □ No
Hello. Excuse me for a while. We are helping the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences to study how people in the Pearl River Delta use telecommunications
technologies. This is an academic study. No sensitive question will be asked, and
your privacy will be guaranteed. There is no right or wrong answer. As long as
you tell us your real-life situations, that will be greatly appreciated!
Interview starting time:_____ (minute):_____(hour):_____ (date)
First, I’d like to ask a few general questions about your life.
Q1. How long you’ve been living in the Pearl River Delta?
(in total)_______ year_________month(s)
n always live in the Pearl River Delta [skip to Q2.3]
Q2.1. What was your occupation before coming to the Delta?
Q2.2. What is your occupation after coming to the Delta?______________[skip to
Q3]
Q2.3. What is your current occupation?________________
Q3. What do you think are the advantages of living in the Pearl River Delta?
(May choose more than one answer)
□ The salary is high.
□ There are lots of new opportunities.
□ Living conditions are better than elsewhere.
□ Work conditions are nicer than elsewhere.
□ I know more people here.
□ Work is more challenging and ftm.
□ I can decide things for myself.
□ Other (please specify)_________________________________
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Q4. What do you think are the disadvantages of living in the Pearl River Delta?
(May choose more than one answer)
□ The salary is not high enough.
□ I don’t understand the dialects.
□ Living conditions are not good.
□ There are too few friends.
□ Work is tedious.
□ There are too many contingencies, and I can’t control my life.
□ There is no job security.
□ Other (please specify)_________________________________
Q5. Do you live by yourself or with others? Do you rent? (Single choice only.)
□ I haven’t settled down.
□ I rent with a friend (including one of opposite sex).
□ I rent and live by myself.
□ I live with colleagues in dormitory or employer-provided apartment.
□ I rent with families and/or relatives.
□ I live by myself and own my home.
□ I live with families and/or relatives and we own the home.
□ Other (please specify)______________________________________
Q5.1. Except you, how many people live together with you?_____________
Q6. How frequently do you speak to your neighbor?
□ Several times a day
□ Once a day
□ Once every two or three days
□ Once a week
□ Once every two or three weeks
□ Once a month
□ Almost never
Now, let me ask some questions in regard to the telephone.
[Home Phone]
Q7. Is there a fixed-line telephone in the place where you live?
□ Yes
□ No (skip to Q8)
Q7.1. How often do you use the phone?
□ Several times a day
□ Once a day
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□ Once every two or three days
□ Once a week
□ Once every two or three weeks
□ Once a month
□ Almost never
Q7.2. If you use the phone at least once a day (others skip this question), by
average, approximately how long do you talk on the phone every day?
______________ hour(s)____________minute(s)
Q7.3. Normally who are the other person that you talk to on the phone? (May
choose multiple answers)
□ Family members or relatives
□ Friends
□ Salesperson (those who sell to you)
□ Clients (those who buy from you)
□ Supervisors or colleagues
□ Other (specify)_______________________
Q7.4. When was your current residential place first equipped with telephone?
_________ (year)__________ (month)
□ It always has telephone.
□ I don’t know.
Q7.5. Do you happen to know the installation fee of the fixed-line telephone?
□ Yes (specify how much)____________yuan
□ No, I don’t know.
Q7.5.1. Did your employer reimburse the installation fee?
□ Yes, it was reimbursed in full.
□ Yes, it was partially reimbursed.
□ No, there was no reimbursement at all.
Q7.6. Do you know by average how much the phone bill is every month?
□ Yes (specify how much)____________yuan
□ No, I don’t know.
Q7.6.1. Does your employer reimburse your monthly phone bill?
□ Yes, it was reimbursed in full.
□ Yes, it was partially reimbursed.
□ No, there was no reimbursement at all.
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Q7.7. Except regular within-city calls, have you used these other services at your
home phone? (May choose multiple answers)
□ Little Smart or City Sm art^"*^
□ Call-in information stations (e.g. 411)
□ Pre-paid phone cards (e.g. IP phone cards)
□ IP direct-dial services (e.g. 17909)
Q7.8. Through which channel(s) did you get to know the above services? (May
choose multiple answers)
□ Advertisements on radio and television
□ Print advertisements
□ Outdoor advertisements
□ Everyday word-of-mouth
□ Face-to-face advertising campaigns held by telecom operators
□ Other (specify)______________________________________
[Work Phone]
Q8. Do you have telephone in your current workplace?
□ Yes □ No (skip to Q9)
[For the unemployed] Did you have telephone in your previous workplace?
□ Yes □ N o (skip to Q9)
Q8.1. How frequently do/did you use the work phone?
□ Several times a day
□ Once a day
□ Once every two or three days
□ Once a week
□ Once every two or three weeks
□ Once a month
□ Almost never
Q8.2. Usually who are the other persons that you talk to on work phone? (May
choose multiple answers)
□ Supervisors or co-workers
□ Clients (those who buy from you)
□ Salesperson (those who sell to you)
□ Friends
□ Family members or relatives
These are home-phone based cell phone services in urban areas provided by local branches o f China
Telecom. Unlike regular cell phone, Little Smart (xiaolingtong) and City Smart (shihuatong) do not
charge for incoming calls. But the reception is o f lower quality and less reliable than regular cell phone.
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Q8.3. What kinds of restrictions are there for you to use the work phone? (May
choose multiple answers)
□ No restrictions on local and long-distance calls
□ No restrictions on local calls
□ I can only talk about work-related issues
□ I can only use it during work hours
□ Other (specify)______________________________
[Cell Phone]
Q9. Do you have cell phone? (Not including Little Smart or City Smart)
□ Yes, I do. □ Yes, I did. But not for now. □ Never (skip to
QIO)
Q9.1. What type of cell phone do/did you have?
□ GSM □ CDMA □ Don’t know
Q9.2. How often do/did you use the cell phone?
□ Several times a day
□ Once a day
□ Once every two or three days
□ Once a week
□ Once every two or three weeks
□ Once a month
□ Almost never
Q9.3. If you use/used cell phone at least once a day (others skip this question), by
average, approximately how long do you use the cell phone every day?
______________ hour(s)____________ minute(s)
Q9.4. Normally who are/were you talking to on the cell phone? (May choose
multiple answers)
□ Family members or relatives
□ Friends
□ Salesperson (those who sell to you)
□ Clients (those who buy from you)
□ Supervisors or colleagues
□ Other (specify)_______________________
Q9.5. When did you start to have cell phone? (year) (month)
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[For those who currently do not currently have cell phone'. When did you stop
having cell phone?___________ (year)____________(month)
Q9.6. Do you remember how much was the cell phone connection fee?
□ Yes (specify how much)____________yuan
□ It was free of charge.
□ No, I don’t remember.
Q9.6.1. Did your employer reimburse the cell phone connection fee?
□ Yes, it was reimbursed in full.
□ Yes, it was partially reimbursed.
□ No, there was no reimbursement at all.
Q9.7. Do you remember how much did you pay for the cell phone handset?
□ Yes (specify how much)____________yuan
□ It was free of charge.
□ No, I don’t remember.
Q9.7.I. Did your employer reimburse the cell phone handset cost?
□ Yes, it was reimbursed in full.
□ Yes, it was partially reimbursed.
□ No, there was no reimbursement at all.
Q9.8. Normally how much are the monthly cell phone expenses?
___________ yuan □ Don’t know.
Q9.8.1. Does your employer reimburse your monthly cell phone bill?
□ Yes, it was reimbursed in full.
□ Yes, it was partially reimbursed.
□ No, there was no reimbursement at all.
Q9.9. Have you used these value-added services with your cell phone? (May
choose multiple answers)
□ Short-messaging
□ Call-in information stations (e.g. 411)
□ Pre-paid phone cards (e.g. IP phone cards)
□ IP direct-dial services (e.g. 17951)
□ W AP (cell phone Internet access)
Q9.10. How did you know the above services? (May choose multiple answers)
□ Advertisements on radio and television
□ Print advertisements
□ Outdoor advertisements
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□ Everyday word-of-mouth
□ Face-to-face advertising campaigns held by telecom operators
□ Other (specify)______________________________________
[Public Telephone]
QIO. Do you often use public phone?
□ Several times a day
□ Once a day
□ Once every two or three days
□ Once a week
□ Once every two or three weeks
□ Once a month
□ Almost never (skip to Q11)
QlO.l What kind of public phone do you often use?
□ Manually charged public phone
□ IC-card public phone
Q10.2 Where do you usually use public phone? (May choose multiple answers)
□ In my residential neighborhood
□ Close to where I work
□ Close to public transportation stations
□ Other public spaces (e.g. library, shopping mall)
□ There is no fixed place
[Long Distance Calls]
Q11. How frequently do you make long distance calls?
□ Several times a day
□ Cnee a day
□ Once every two or three days
□ Once a week
□ Once every two or three weeks
□ Once a month
□ Almost never (skip to Q12)
Q l l . 1. What kind o f phone do you normally use to place long distance calls?
□ Home phone
□ Work phone
□ Cell phone
□ Public phone
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419
Q ll.2. Who are the persons you usually talk to in long distance phone calls?
(May choose multiple answers)
□ Family members or relatives
□ Friends
□ Salesperson (those who sell to you)
□ Clients (those who buy from you)
□ Supervisors or colleagues
□ Other (specify)________________________
[Pager]
Q12. Have you ever used pager while living in the Pearl River Delta?
□ Never (skip to Q13)
□ Yes, I have been using pager.
[Specify: pager user since (year) (month)]
□ Yes, but I have stopped using it.
[Specify from (year) (month) to _____ (year) (month)]
Q12.1. How much did you spend purchasing the pager?
_________ yuan □ Free of charge □ Don’t know
Q12.1a. Did your employer reimburse your payment for the pager?
□ Yes, it was reimbursed in full.
□ Yes, it was partially reimbursed.
□ No, there was no reimbursement at all.
Q12.2. How much was the pager’s initial connection fee?
_________ yuan □ Free of charge □ Don’t know
Q 12.2a. Did your employer reimburse your payment for the pager connection fee?
□ Yes, it was reimbursed in full.
□ Yes, it was partially reimbursed.
□ No, there was no reimbursement at all.
Q12.3. How much was/is your average monthly bill for the pager?
_________ yuan □ Free of charge □ Don’t know
Q12.3a. Did/does your employer reimburse your payment for the monthly pager
bill?
□ Yes, it was/is reimbursed in full.
□ Yes, it was/is partially reimbursed.
□ No, there was/is no reimbursement at all.
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Q12.4. What kinds of information does/did your pager normally receive?
(Multiple answered allowed)
□ Messages from relatives and friends
□ Messages from employer and co-workers
□ Messages from clients and business partners
□ News briefing (e.g. general headlines)
□ Weather forecast
□ Stock market information
□ Other (specify)________________________
[Facsimile]
Q13. Have you ever used fax machine while living in the Pearl River Delta?
□ Yes, I have. □ Never (skip to Q14)
Q13.1. When did you start to use facsimile? (year)_______ (month)
Q13.2. How did you learn it?
□ Took class at school
□ Employer-provided Training
□ Learned from co-workers
□ Learned from relatives or fiiends
□ Self-taught
Q13.3. When you use fax, it is/was usually for which of the following goal(s)?
(Multiple answers allowed)
□ Business for the company/work-unit
□ For your own business
□ To contact relatives and fiiends
□ To help relatives and fiiends who do not have access to fax
□ Other (specify)____________________________________
Q13.4. What kind(s) of fax sheets do you usually receive? (Multiple answers
allowed)
□ Relating to business for the company/work-unit
□ Relating to your own business
□ Commercial promotions
□ Documents from relatives and fiiends
□ Other (specify)____________________________________
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[Internet]
Q14. Do you know how to use the Internet?
□ Yes, I do. □ No, I don’t (skip to QI5)
QI4.I. Where do you usually get online? (Multiple answers allowed)
□ At home
□ At relative’s or friend’s home
□ At work
□ At relative’s or friend’s workplace
□ At school
□ At Internet café
□ Other (specify)________________
QI4.2. What is the Internet connection mode that you usually use?
□ Dial-up network
□ Direct Dedicated Network (DDN)
□ ADSL/DSL
□ Cable Modem
□ WAP (Dial-up from cell phone)
□ Other (specify)____________
□ Don’t know
[Skip to QI4.4 if respondent does NOT have home Internet access]
QI4.3. If you have Internet access at home, what is the average monthly expense
for Internet connection?_____________yuan
QI4.3a. Does your employer reimburse your monthly Internet access fee?
□ Yes, it is reimbursed in full.
□ Yes, it is partially reimbursed.
□ No, there is no reimbursement at all.
QI4.4. When did you know how to use the Internet? (year)_______
(month)
QI4.4.1. Where did you leam to use the Internet?
□ At home
□ At relative’s or friend’s home
□ At work
□ At relative’s or friend’s workplace
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□ At school
□ At Internet café
□ Other (specify)
Q14.4.2. How did you leam it?
□ Taking class at school
□ Employer-provided Training
□ Learning from co-workers
□ Learning from relatives or friends
□ Attending training classes not provided by employer
□ Self-taught
□ Other (specify)________________
Q14.5. How often do you use the Internet?
□ At least once a day
□ Once every two or three days
□ Once a week
□ Once every two or three weeks
□ Once a month or less
[Those who do not use the Internet at least once a day, please skip to Q 14.7.]
Q14.6. If you go online at least once a day, by average, how much time do you
spend on the Internet every day?___________ hour__________ minutes
Q14.7. When you go online, it is usually for which of the following goal(s)?
(Multiple answers allowed)
□ Read news and get information about the surrounding society
□ Express your opinions and emotions
□ For your work needs
□ For your education
□ To leam how to deal with people and events
□ For entertainment
□ To make fiiends and keep in touch with others
□ Other (specify)____________________________________
Q14.8. Besides email, have you participated in the following online interactive
activities? (Multiple answers allowed)
□ Online games
□ Chatrooms
□ Electronic Bulletin Board System (BBS)
□ ICQ, QQ or other online chat software
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□ MUDs and MOOs
□ Other (specify)_ _
Q14.9. Which website you will go to if you hope to find news about this city or
the entire Pearl River Delta? (Specify)
[Subjective evaluations]
Q15. From the perspeetive of your work, how do you think will he the general
impact of the following technologies upon your workl
Very
bad
Bad Both good
and bad
Good Very
good
No
influence
Don’t
know
Internet
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Facsimile
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Pager
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Cell phone
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Office
phone
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Home
phone
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Q16. From another perspective, as an ordinary resident in the Pearl River Delta,
how do you think will he the general impact of these technologies upon your
everyday lifel
Very
bad
Bad Both good
and bad
Good Very
good
No
influence
Don’t
know
Internet
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Facsimile
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Pager
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Cell phone
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Office
phone
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Home
phone
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Q17. Which of the telecom technologies are easier to use? Which are more
difficult? Please rank the technologies according to your idea about how easy it is
to use them with 1 being the easiest and 6 being the most difficult. (Identical rank
allowed)
Internet__________________ Cell phone _
Facsimile_______ Office phone_______
Pager Home phone_______
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Q18. How do you think about the average price of these technologies? Please
rank them with 1 being the most affordable and 6 being the most expensive.
(Identical rank allowed)
Internet_______ Cell phone_______
Facsimile
Pager___
Office phone
Home phone
Q19. How about the relative quality of the services they provide? (1 being the
worst quality of service; 6 being the best service; identical rank allowed)
Internet_______ Cell phone_______
Facsimile
Pager___
Office phone
Home phone
Q20. Imagine, if one day you wake up to find that all these telecom
technologies had vanished, which one of them you would miss the most
(indicated by “1”), which one you would miss the least (indicated by “6”).
Please rank them according to the relative desire you would have to use each
of the technologies under such circumstances. (Identical rank allowed)
Internet_______ Cell phone_______
Facsimile
Pager___
Office phone
Home phone
Q21. Gender:
[Demographics]
□ Male □ Female
Q22. Age:
Q23. Education:
□ Partial elementary school
□ Complete elementary school
□ Partial junior high school
□ Junior high school graduates
□ Partial senior high school
□ Senior high school graduates
□ Partial college or partial college-level professional training
□ College-level professional training diploma holders
□ College graduates or bachelor degree holders
□ Partial graduate school
□ Master degree holders
□ Doctorate degree holders
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Q24. Marriage status:
□ Married, living with spouse
□ Married, not living with spouse
□ Divorced
□ Single, having boyfriend/girlfriend
□ Single, not having boyfriend/girlfriend
Q25. Approximately, what is your average monthly income in the past year
while living in the Pearl River Delta?_______________________ yuan
Thank you very much for your cooperation!
Interview ends a t_________ (hour)__________(minute)__________ (date)
Dialect used in interview:
□ Mandarin □ Hunan □ Hebei
□ Cantonese □ Jiangxi □ Sichuan
□ Hakka □ Hubei
□ Chaozhou □ Yunnan
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426
Appendix 5: Focus Group Protocol fo r Long-term Residents
(Total time: 100 minutes for high connector groups;
75 minutes for low connector groups)
Distribute sign-in sheet.
I. Project introduction (3 minutes)
Why we hold this focus group (to study the development and influence of
hitemet); there is no right or wrong answer as long as you’re telling us your
observations and opinions; protection of privacy; no commercial or political
purposes, academic research only.
II. Self-introduction (7 minutes)
[Host/hostess first, then go around the table] What is your name; how do you
want to be called in discussion; age; occupation; family background; how long
have you lived in Nanhai; what is your general impression about Nanhai.
III. Semantic association (5 minutes)
Now let’s play a game first. I’m handing out a sheet of paper that shows a few
terms: 1. technology, 2. email, 3. Internet café, 4. e-govemment, 5. online
chatting, 6. openness, 7. Internet. What is the first word that occurs to you
when you see each of these terms? This can be a noun, an adjective, a verb, a
phrase or anything random. Please write it down on the paper.
IV. General impression of the Internet (30 minutes)
a. Just now you used ... (fill in the blank) to describe Internet. Why? Could
you explicate your view of the Internet? In your opinion, what indeed is this
thing we call the Internet?
b. Do you think the Internet is: useless, fun, stimulating... which adjective
is the most accurate for your overall impression o f the Internet? Why?
c. How do you think the Internet will make life better? What’s good about
going online? Why do you think so? How did you form this opinion?
d. What problems the Internet can bring to individuals and the society?
Why? How did you know about this?
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e. In general, what do you think is more influential about the Internet: its
positive effects or the downsides? Let’s take a vote.
f. Do you think whether the Internet should be regulated and controlled? If
not, why? If yes, how should the Internet be regulated? By whom?
g. How do you think the Internet is different from other media?
h. What’s you vision about the future of hitemet? If everyone uses Internet,
will Nanhai look very differently?
V. [For Internet users/high connectors only] Internet usage patterns (20
minutes)
a. (Quickly go through) How often do you get online? How long that
usually is for one time? Do you think you spend too much, too little or
appropriate amount of time online?
b. (Quickly go through) Where do you normally get Internet access? At
work? Home? Internet café? School? Or touch-screen computers in some
public venues?
e. When did you start using the Internet? How did you leam? What
anticipations did you have at that time?
d. Did you get all you anticipated from subsequent online experiences?
Were there unexpected things - both good surprises and problems - that you
encountered? Any example?
e. How did you solve these problems (technical, social, economic...)?
What’s the most serious problem that you have to confront while going online?
f. (Quickly go through) What is the major thing you use the Intemet for?
Work, study, entertainment, reading news, checking email, online chatting,
playing games, making friends, keeping in touch with families.......
g. Would you tell us the most impressive event that occurred to you during
your online experiences? Such as getting in touch with an old friend, online
shopping, or being infected by a computer vim s... What’s special about this
incident?
VI. [For non-users/low connectors only] Reasons not to use Intemet (20
minutes)
a. Why you do not use the Intemet?
1. At work: not need for your job? All other colleagues do not use it? Or
it’s because there are secretaries and clerks who use the Intemet for you?
2. At home: too expensive? No place to leam how to use it? Afraid of
harmful information?
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3. Other reasons: bad service? Security worries? Just do not like to deal
with technology?
b. Which of the above reason is the most important?
c. What are the major channels of information that you prefer? Newspaper,
magazine, radio, TV, or interpersonal communication?
d. Just now you said Intemet is (too expensive, too difficult...) - from
where did you leam about these characteristics of the Intemet? Was it a
newspaper article or a TV program or was it from one of your fiiends? Do you
remember the specific name of the outlet (e.g. the newspaper column, TV
station) and when did you see/hear their related coverage and comments?
VII. [For users/high connectors only] Online content (15 minutes)
a. Which website do you visit most frequently? Why do you like it?
b. How do you think about the credibility of online information (more
specifically, emails, news websites, shopping sites, chatrooms etc)?
c. Except browsing and email, do you also express yourself to the online
public like posting article to BBS? Do you know how to make a homepage?
Do you have your own webpage? Do you download things from the Intemet?
What do you download most fi’ equently?
d. Are there some types of information that you cannot get from traditional
media (print or broadcasting) but now you have access to because of the
Intemet?
e. If you have the power to delete some information online, what will you
delete?
f. If you want to know about local affairs in Nanhai (e.g. the constmction of
a new road), which information channel will you use? (Personal contact,
newspaper, radio etc. Do NOT read: e-govemment websites)
g. Do you visit Nanhai Government Online or other websites of local
government and CCP organizations? How frequent is that? Normally which e-
govemment websites do you go to? For what purposes?
VIII. [For users/high connectors only] Social influences and policy evaluations
(10 minutes)
a. Are there obvious changes in your life after you started to use the
Internet?
1. in terms
2. in terms
3. in terms
4. in terms
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b. Imagine, if one day you wake up and the Intemet had vanished, how
would you feel?
c. How do you think it will look like, were there a complete breakdown of
the Intemet in today’s world?
IX. [For ALL respondents] Final questions:
a. Recently there were many debates about the regulation of Intemet cafés.
How do you think of this issue?
b. Another topic of public concem is the influence of Intemet on children.
Do you think this is a serious problem? Why or why not?
c. Since 1996, Nanhai’s Intemet has been developing very quickly due to
the plan of “digital city constmctions.’’ How do you think of this project? What
impact does it have on the overall development of Nanhai?
X. Additional comments, recommendations of other potential interviewees,
intention for future collaborations, and thanks. Distribute RMB 50 Yuan per
person as the token of appreciation.
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Appendix 6: Focus Group Protocol for New Immigrants
(Total time: 60 minutes on average)
[Note: Participants in these focus groups had worked with me for three days as
survey interviewers in the cities of Guangzhou, Zhuhai, and Shenzhen. Rapport
had been built among them when diseussion began. They were asked to take
note of unusual and/or interesting observations during survey interviews,
especially those not reflected in the questionnaire, about both their hometown
friends and senior citizens.]
Observations in survey interviews: I have asked you to take note o f unusual
and/or interesting observations while you interact with interview respondents.
What are your observations, especially those not reflected in the questionnaire,
about each o f the following set o f questions (ask focus group participants to
look at the questionnaire):
Home phone
Work phone
Cell phone
Pubic phone
Long-distance phone
Pager
Facsimile
Intemet
Subjective evaluation of the technologies
[Probe for special observations for both their hometown/home province friends
and senior citizens. Ask them to use direct quote as much as possible, and
illustrate with examples.]
Personal experiences with telecom
How do you use these various telecom technologies? Why you use them in
such ways? Where did you leam about these technologies and services?
Do you think using these telecom technologies has good or bad influence on
your life? Why? What prior experiences do you have that make you to think
so? Any example?
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431
How do you compare telecom technologies with mass media? Which is more
important to you? Why?
How about face-to-face interaction? Do you think telecom can substitute
personal encounter? Is that a good or bad thing for you?
Among the aforementioned telecom technologies, which one(s) do you like
more than others? Why? Can you explain with examples from your actual
experiences with the technologies or your friends’ experiences that you know
of?
Choosing telecom for specific content or particular goals
You rely on telecom channels for what type of information? What are the main
things that you leam from home phone, work phone, cellphone, pager, and the
Intemet? Why do you want to use these telecom channels instead of other
forms of communication? For what goals?
What information is ONLY available through certain telecom channels? What
kind of information is this, and through which channels? Why?
What kinds of information are NOT available through telecommunications that
you have to rely on other communication modes such as mass media or face-
to-face interpersonal interaction?
As new comers in the Pearl River Delta, you need information to leam to cope
with the new environment. In this process, is there any information that you
need the most but cannot find through telecom, mass media, or face-to-face
channels?
General evaluations of telecom’s social role
How do you think about the following statements?
While telecom technologies bring people in the other side of the world
virtually into my neighborhood; they also send my real neighbors to the
world’s other side.
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Telecommunications will help solve all social problems and make this world a
much better place.
With the development of telecom technologies, our life tempo will increase
correspondently. This is inevitable.
How do you think the development of telecommunications is related to your
everyday life?
Do you think telecom technologies are absolute necessities for your life and
work in the Pearl River Delta?
How important is telecom to most of your friends in the Delta? Examples?
Key issues of publie concem: What is your opinion on the following issues
emerging in the process o f telecom development in this Delta region?
The regulation of Internet café - how do you use it? How do your friends use
it? Does it have a positive or negative role? How do you think Intemet cafe
should be managed to meet the needs of migrant workers?
How about recent discussions on the negative influence of Intemet on
adoleseents? Have you followed the discussion? Who do you think should be
responsible for the online activities of youngsters - government, web-site
sysops, parents, teaehers, or adolescents themselves?
How do you think about the role of phone-in Information stations, including
900 numbers that sometimes offer prurient chat services? How do you think
about the phenomenon? Have you or someone you know ealled these stations?
And how do you think about the overall role of this phone-in information
stations?
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Appendix 7: List ofWork-Units Visited in Nanhai That Were Known for
Internet Application Achievements
1. Nanhai City Administrative Services Center
2. Nanhai Financial Accountancy Center for City Non-Profit Administrative
Organizations
3. Communist Party Committee of Guicheng District
4. Xiqiao District Government Informationization Office
5. Minle Village Committee, Xiqiao District
6. Nanfang Textile Design Innovation Center
7. Nanhai City Information Center
8. Nanhai Jietong Company
9. The People’s Court of Nanhai City
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Appendix 8. Survey Implementation Contract for the Project on
Telecommunications in the Pearl River Delta
Mr. Jack Linchuan Qiu, researcher at the Center for Social Development
Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, hires survey interviewers to
conduct face-to-face questionnaire surveys for the Project on Telecom and
Pearl River Delta. The tasks and benefits of each survey interviewer are as
following:
1. For the completion of every questionnaire, the interviewer receives a
compensation of 6 yuan. The interviewer shall complete 48 survey
questionnaires in three days including 24 migrant worker samples (8 in labor
markets, 8 in manufactory jobs, 8 in service sector) and 24 senior citizen
samples (8 in public residential recreational areas, 8 in parks, 8 in shopping
malls). There shall be equal numbers of males and females answering the
questions.
2. Questionnaire survey MUST truthfully reflect information gathered from
the respondents. Each respondent can only answer questions for one
questionnaire. In case of ANY deception found in the interviews, the related
interviewer shall take full responsibility of the misconduct and automatically
become ineligible for all compensations and bonuses.
3. Interview shall proceed strictly in accordance with the guidelines hereby
listed including the procedures and localities. Interviews with hometown/home
province respondents may take place at home. But no interviews shall be
conducted in public transportation stations or vehicles to prevent premature
termination of interviews.
4. All data record should be hand-written on the questionnaire and
presented in a complete, clear, and standardized fashion, including open-ended
questions.
5. Survey interviewers shall clearly record the start time, end time, and the
locality of the interview. Specific street addresses and the full names of
buildings/work-units should be recorded.
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6. Those who fail to abide by article 3, 4, or 5 will have their compensations
and bonuses being partially deducted, depending on the degree to which the
quality of survey data is impaired.
7. Completed questionnaires shall be returned to Mr. Qiu on daily basis,
who shall cross-examine the questionnaires, ask for necessary
clarifications/work improvements, and distribute compensation of the day.
8. Mr. Qiu shall reimburse public transportation expenses for survey
purposes at the daily gathering. Receipts are needed for reimbursement.
9. A daily bonus of 30 yuan shall be provided for each survey interviewer
for three days.
10. Survey interviewers can work in the evenings among his/her
acquaintances. But extra caution shall be exercised for personal security in
evenings.
11. The right of explanation for this contract belongs to the Center for Social
Development Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
12. While encountering problems during interviews, the survey administrator
shall not hesitate to call Mr.Qiu at 1362.108.xxx for guidance.
Interviewer name (print):
Signature (interviewer):
Personal ID number:
Hometown:________ (province)_________ (city/county)
Date:
Jack Linchuan Qiu
Researcher,
Center for Social Development Studies
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Signature:____________________
Date:
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

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University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

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Asset Metadata

Creator Qiu, Linchuan (Jack) (author)

Core Title (Dis)connecting the Pearl River Delta: The transformation of a regional telecommunications infrastructure, 1978--2002

School Graduate School

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Communication

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag geography,history, Asia, Australia and Oceania,information science,OAI-PMH Harvest,sociology, social structure and development

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Ball-Rokeach, Sandra (committee member), Cartier, Carolyn (committee member), Castells, Manuel (committee member), Rosen, Stanley (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-525001

Unique identifier UC11335727

Identifier 3140541.pdf (filename),usctheses-c16-525001 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 3140541.pdf

Dmrecord 525001

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Qiu, Linchuan (Jack)

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA