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Lessons from TAP implementation: obstacles and solutions to improve the transit users experience

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Lessons from TAP implementation: obstacles and solutions to improve the transit users experience

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Lessons from TAP Implementation:

Obstacles and Solutions to Improve the Transit Users Experience

By

Grace Eng Nadel

A Professional Dissertation

Presented to the
Faculty of the Sol Price School of Public Policy
University of Southern California

In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Policy, Planning, and Development

Committee Members:
Juliet Musso, Ph.D., Chair Price School
Marlon Boarnet, Ph.D., Price School
Doran Barnes, Executive Director of Foothill Transit

May 15, 2015
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Abstract
The TAP fare collection program in Los Angeles County is a transit program shared
among Los Angeles County transit agencies that uses smart card technology so that transit
customers could more easily travel across the County via transit. As a collaborative program
among the County’s federally funded transit agencies, contracts were begun for TAP services
and TAP fareboxes were purchased for all of the medium and large sized transit agencies in
2002. By the end of 2014, while a majority of the connections for Los Angeles County transit
users can be made using a TAP card, the TAP card lacks an ease of use, and the originally
purchased TAP fareboxes are ready for replacement. Understanding the implementation issues
from the current TAP program can aid in not repeating the same mistakes in the future.
The use of technology is one way to improve transit use. However, the lack of planning
for a technology driven collaborative program has led to problems in the implementation of the
TAP fare collection program in Los Angeles. Interviews were conducted with transit managers
that participated in the decision making process of the TAP program in order to understand the
decisions that their transit agency made about its participation. Besides a lack of planning for the
implementation and use of the program, issues of distrust and autonomy were found to be some
of its major obstacles. The role of the network relationships for a regional fare collection
program is as important as the development of the technology. Collaborative partnerships play a
large role in the implementation of any policy, however, among public agencies, this role needs a
larger consideration for continued use of technology in order to improve its customer service.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
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Acknowledgements
From the slums of poverty around the world, to the inner cities across the country, to the
universities that I have been privileged to attend, and to the halls of government that I have
walked through, these places have inspired me to become a change agent to improve the quality
of people’s lives. I would like to thank and acknowledge all of the leaders that I have met,
especially my past supervisors that inspired to me to continually seek for improvements and not
to accept the status quo, even if it seemed “impossible.” They have taught me that I can use my
life’s work to seek to make a difference in people’s lives.
I would also like to that the transit managers in Los Angeles County who have given of
their time to share their expertise and encourage me along the way. I especially am grateful for
the time, attention, and wisdom of my doctoral committee members, Professor Juliet Musso,
Doran Barnes, and Professor Marlon Boarnet who have contributed valuable insight into this
project.
Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my husband, Wes Nadel, who was my
primary supporter and champion in this endeavor and logistically helped me to complete this
project. I also want to thank my children, Joshua and Hannah, without whom I would not have
embarked on this project, but also for their patience as I focused on school. Finally, I would like
to thank God, my family, and my friends who have encouraged me and supported me along this
journey.
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Table of Contents
Abstract 2
Acknowledgements 3
List of Figures 6

Chapter 1: Introduction 7
1.1 Issue Overview
Table 1.1 - Comparison of metropolitan areas with percentage of
commuters 16 years and older using transit vs. driving alone 8
1.2 Policy Context 12
1.3 Purpose 15

Chapter 2: Literature Review 18
2.1 Transit Technology – Improving the transit user experience 19
2.2 Policy Implementation 22
2.3 Collaborative Governance 25
2.4 Organizational Development 31
2.5 Literature Application 34

Chapter 3: Methodology 36
3.1 Interview Process 37
3.2 Documentary Data 39
3.3 Analysis 39
3.4 Strengths and Limitations 40
3.5 Ethical Considerations and Human Subjects 42

Chapter 4: Analysis 43
4.1 The TAP Implementation Process 44
4.2 Policy Implementation Effectiveness 48
4.3 TAP Case Studies 57
4.4 Collaboration/Partnership Effectiveness 69
4.5 Summary of Analysis 79

Chapter 5: Concluding Discussion 81
5.1 Current State of the TAP program 81
5.2 Overview of Significant Findings 82
5.3 Recommendations 85
5.3.1 Improve the Current TAP program 86
5.3.2 Strengthen the Collaboration 87
5.3.3 Develop a Plan for the Future Regional Fare Collection System 91
5.4 Areas of Further Research 101
5.5 Implications of the Study for Professional Practice 102

LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
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References 106

Bibliography (Other sources) 110

Appendix A: IRB Application 117

Appendix B: Interview Protocol 120

Appendix C: IRB Authorization 122
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List of Figures
Figure 4.1: Implementation framework for the TAP program 50
Figure 5.1: Logic model for future regional fare collection program 92
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Chapter 1: Introduction

This professional dissertation considers how Los Angeles County transit agencies can
improve its customer focus through the implementation and utilization of advanced technologies
for fare collection. Many people in Los Angeles choose not use transit because they find it
inconvenient and/or difficult to navigate the transit system even as the County spends billions of
dollars on new transit projects to improve transit. In Los Angeles, transportation managers have
typically focused their improvement efforts on providing more transit service to their current
ridership, often the transit dependent, those without a personal vehicle and depend on transit to
get to work, school, or return home. While this is one way to improve the transit system, another
way is to focus on attracting discretionary transit riders by improving the transit user experience.
This project examines a program for getting the transit agencies in Los Angeles County to work
together on the common goal of improving transit services for their customers. The lens for this
inquiry is the implementation of the TAP program in Los Angeles County.
A primary goal is to identify lessons from the process of the implementation of a
universal transit fare card program for the County. The implementation process has been
ongoing since the mid 1990s, and is still not fully implemented by all of the fixed route
municipal operators of transit agencies that receive federal funds in Los Angeles. This project
focuses on the Los Angeles County transit agencies, understanding the barriers and locating
potential improvements for the universal smart card program. Some of the solutions may also be
applicable to other improvements and technological updates that require interagency partnerships
among public agencies.

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1.1 Issue Overview
Even as traffic congestion clogs the freeways and gas prices increase, many people in
Southern California do not utilize public transit. In other large metropolitan areas across the
United State, public transit is a popular mode of transportation for commuters. In the New
York/Northern New Jersey/Long Island metropolitan area, 40.4% of the commuters utilize
transit. On the west coast, 14.6% of commuters in the Bay area use public transit. In the Los
Angeles/Long Beach/Santa Ana metropolitan area, only 6.1% of commuters utilize public transit
for commuting to work, while 73.6% drove alone in a vehicle (2007-2011 American Community
Survey 5-year estimates, U.S. Census Bureau). Table 1 compares Los Angeles to other large
metropolitan areas in the United States:
Table 1.1 Comparison of metropolitan areas with percentage of commuters
16 years and older using transit vs. driving alone
Metropolitan Area % Transit
Riders
% Driving
Alone
Boston/Cambridge/Quincy, MA, NH 13.1% 75.4%
Chicago/Joliet/Naperville, IL 12.3% 69.6%
New York/Northern NJ/Long Island, NY, NJ, CT 40.4% 39.9%
Los Angeles/Long Beach/Santa Ana, CA 6.1% 73.6%
Portland/Vancouver, OR 7.0% 69.8%
San Francisco/Oakland/Fremont, CA 14.6% 61.9%
Seattle/Tacoma/Bellevue, WA 8.3% 69.8%
Washington/Arlington/Alexandria, DC, VA, MD, WV 37.5% 35.5%
Source: 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-year estimates, U.S. Census Bureau
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
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John Pucher (2004) outlines many benefits associated with transit use in large cities. In
Los Angeles, where “rush hour” typically extends several hours in the morning and in the
evenings, bus and rail transit can provide congestion relief. In Los Angeles County, the passage
of the current Propositions A and C, and Measure R for improved public transit, has
demonstrated that many in Los Angeles are willing to pay additional taxes in order to improve
public transit services for the alleviation of traffic congestion.
There are also several “green” benefits for transit travel, although estimates of these
benefits vary widely (Pucher, 2004). Transit travel is typically more energy efficient than the
private car, though there are variations in the environmental savings depending on the size,
vehicle type, and occupancy of the vehicle. Transit, typically, has less environmental impacts
than private vehicles, when compared on a per passenger mileage basis. Given the movement of
transit agencies in Los Angeles to utilize alternative fueled transit vehicles, the environmental
impacts of transit vehicles have smaller emissions rates per passenger compared to most gas
powered private vehicles (Bae, 2004). Transit also connects well with environmentally friendly
non-motorized transit modes of walking and biking.
While the benefits of transit travel have been demonstrated, it is difficult to compete with
the comforts and convenience of the automobile (Pucher, 2004). Other metropolitan areas
around the world have made it more expensive and less convenient for private automobiles,
through such means as implementing high car taxes for ownership, parking fees for downtown
areas, tolls for access to the downtown areas, and gas taxes to offset the costs of roads and
subsidizing transit. In the United States, elected leaders often have been resistant to programs
that are found in other countries with vibrant transit services.
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Providing more and better public transit services might be considered the most obvious
way to get people to use public transit. However, increasing service levels may not be the most
cost effective, and may not be feasible given limited financial resources available to transit
agencies. Finding technological solutions to improve transit services is one way to make
improvements to transit services without the high cost of sustaining additional services. Several
of the transit agencies in Los Angeles have been implementing newer technology, like Automatic
Vehicle Locators (a GPS tracking device for transit vehicles), Intelligent Transportation Systems
with signal prioritization for transit vehicles, or Wi-Fi as an added benefit to customers.
This study considers a technological solution to increase the convenience of transit by
integrated fare collection. In Los Angeles, regional use of transit is made inconvenient by the
fragmented character of the transit system. There are many transit operators that are connected
with each other, requiring different fares and payment rules. For example to get from the Culver
City Hall to the University of Southern California, the Metro Trip Planner notes that the trip
would require a $1 fare, plus a $.40 transfer fee on a Culver CityBus. Using the transfer, the
rider would be able to get on the Metro Expo light rail utilizing the transfer, but then on a return
trip, would pay $1.50 on a the Metro Expo light rail plus a $.35 transfer to get on a Culver
CityBus. Those varying fare tables and products cause confusion, which may lead discretionary
riders in particular to avoid transit even if the option is available and cost effective. For regular
commuters, an integrated fare collection system should allow them to use one fare payment
system to board multiple transit systems without carrying cash for each bus or worrying about
transfers.
Research suggests that the use of smart card technology, such as the TAP card in Los
Angeles, can ease transit by providing provide customers a cashless means of fare payment. For
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example, in New York City, introduction of the discounted MetroCard in 1997 caused a 30%
increase in ridership even though no new services were added (Pucher, 2004). The use of the
TAP card can also make boarding quicker and easier, allowing for overall faster travel times
(Tirachini, 2011), especially at popular stops.
For transit agencies, the transit use information recorded through use of the TAP card has
the potential to improve transit planning by improving the data on transit use (Chu and Chapleau,
2010 and Jang, 2010.) The information from smart cards could enable transit planners to fully
understand the transportation needs of their customers by knowing the beginning and end points
of trips and the times of travel. Without the use of a smart card, transit planners rely on
passenger counts coming on and off at stops. They do not know where and when the travel
began and ended, especially when there are transfers involved from one transit system to another.
Smart cards would be able to provide much more data and information about passenger travel
that could reshape the transit routes.
The technology can easily be implemented at a single agency level; however, the
technology becomes increasingly more useful as more agencies cooperate in its use. The
Automatic Vehicle Locator Program could be improved by allowing customers to know the wait
time for their next bus or train as well as for their connecting routes. Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITS) could be improved by giving buses and light rail cars signal prioritization as they
pass through multiple cities’ jurisdictions. Smart cards could make transfers between buses or
rail easier for customers. It can also keep track of an entire trip, rather than just have each
agency tracking a piece of the entire trip. However, as more agencies are involved, the
technology becomes more complex because of the communication and data exchange
requirements (Giuliani and O’Brien, 2004).
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1.2 Policy Context
Transit operations in Los Angeles County is unique because Metro, as the primary
County transit operator, operates 70% of the County’s system of buses and rail transit for the
County. They also share in federal, state, and local transit grant funds with other regional and
municipally operated transit agencies. Since the 1950’s when Metro began as a transportation
planning agency known as the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority for the
County, they also started taking over the services of many of the other smaller transit agencies
(Source: http://www.metro.net/about/library/
about/home/los-angeles-transit-history/). While Metro eventually took over many of the services
of transit agencies around Los Angeles, there are currently 16 other regional and municipal
transit operators that share in the federal and state funds. There are also several other
municipally operated transit services that also share in County funds. Metrolink is another key
transit agency for the County that operates commuter time services and their own rail cars
between the five Counties that surround Los Angeles County.
Metro is still charged with the Planning and Programming of Transportation for the
County as well as operating a large portion of the transit for the County. The planning and
programming functions not only includes transit, but all of the transportation functions of the
County, including the freeways. There is one Board for Metro with appointed elected officials
from the City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles, as well as other elected
representatives from the County that makes the decisions for Planning and Programming as well
as the transit operations. The lines between Metro’s roles in the transportation network within
the County are often blurred because of its dual role as a Transit Operator for 70% of the transit
operations in the County and the Planning and Programming agency for the entire County.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
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In this dual role, Metro partners with the other transit agencies through the Bus Operators
Subcommittee, one of the subcommittees of the Technical Advisory Committee that advises the
Metro Board, is made up of transit managers from 17 agencies. There is also a more informal
meeting of the General Managers that also meets monthly with all of the top administrators of
the transit programs from each agency represented. Another informal group, the Los Angeles
County Municipal Operators Association (LACMOA) (“the Munis”) is the same group of
General Managers without Metro that meets on as as-needed basis, whenever, the members have
an issue to discuss with Metro.
In order to share Federal, State, and Local transit funds between the municipal transit
operators, a Formula Allocation Procedure (FAP) was first developed in 1979 and was codified
into state law in 1996. The FAP is a formula that involves the calculating fare units using the
base fares and annual passenger counts as well as using annual vehicle service mileage. While
small modifications have been made since its inception, the FAP is a source of ongoing tension
between Metro and the Munis, with Metro executives often believing that it should received a
larger share of the funds and with the Munis’ share of the funds being sensitive to any policy
changes from.
It is in this policy context that for over 20 years, Los Angeles County transit agencies
have discussed the implementation and use of a universal fare card, but have yet to fully
implement such a tool that would help to make it easier for LA County residents to use public
transit. The MetroCard was its first attempt in the 1990’s, however, only five of the 17 federally
funded transit agencies in Los Angeles ended up utilizing the program. The most recent attempt
at implementing a Universal Fare Card for transit users was launched in 2003 when the County
was awarded federal funds through the Congestion Management and Air Quality (CMAQ) funds
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
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to establish the TAP program, a fare collection system that uses the technology of the smart card
to collect transit fares.
Using CMAQ funds, new TAP fareboxes were purchased for all of the federally funded
transit agencies. By 2012, the TAP fareboxes purchased with the Federal grant were only being
utilized in seven of the 14 agencies that originally bought and agreed to use the TAP system.
Realizing that the transit agencies were at an impasse with the implementation of the TAP
program as well as the continual extension of funds for the TAP program being approved at the
Metro Board, the outgoing Chair of the Metro Board, Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa,
requested a meeting with the transit agencies without Metro staff present, to air their grievances
about the TAP program. After the grievances were aired, the Mayor offered County funds to
find a solution for all of the remaining agencies to continue using their own fareboxes, while
accepting TAP users. It is likely that in 2015 all of the transit agencies will finally be able to
accept fares on TAP cards, by using Los Angeles County purchased mobile validators, a newer
technology that has been developed to allow some agencies to continue using their own
fareboxes. The limitation of the TAP mobile validator is that fares and transfers cannot be
purchased and loaded onto the TAP card, like the fully equipped TAP farebox.
While the implementation of the TAP program continues to move forward, the
technology is quickly becoming dated. Moreover the transit agencies have found many
limitations of technology in the current TAP program. For example, currently customers are
unable to load their TAP cards with funds or passes for immediate use because the bus needs
time to download that information at its home base before validating the information on the TAP
card. While fraud in counterfeit passes has been reduced due to the elimination of paper passes,
several of the transit agencies worry that transit users have found a way to abuse the system by
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
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falsely telling the bus operators that they have loaded their TAP card with funds even though the
TAP card reads “invalid” at the farebox. The bus operators have reported that they only receive
an indication that their TAP card is not valid and often waive the customer on in order to avoid
argument and stay on schedule.
In sum, many issues with the current TAP card system have been identified during the
implementation process. Many of these problems have been resolved, but in doing so, the TAP
system has become a bit of a “quilted” system with solutions patched in to fix the problem at
hand. The TAP card does not totally function as it was meant, as a seamless fare card that makes
using transit easier for many customers.

1.3 Purpose
The purpose of this project is to develop lessons about technology innovation from the
implementation of the TAP card in Los Angeles County. Learning from our past missteps as
well as our current obstacles, will identify potential options for a future fare collection program
that could improve transit services in Los Angeles County and perhaps throughout all of
Southern California. While each transit agency in Los Angeles County is concerned about
providing transit services to its own community, providing better and more convenient services
for transit customers to connect to other transit systems should be a greater value that all of the
mangers of the transit agencies that can be agreed upon.
While there are many problems with the current TAP program, this project will not
address all of the issues and problems with the current TAP program. It does, however, seek to
learn from the problems, and suggest some methods for improving the system as well as make
recommendations for the future of a regional fare collection program. The current TAP smart
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
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card technology, along with the TAP fareboxes, is quickly becoming outdated. The transit
operators have begun discussing the future regional fare collection technology and trying to
assess the needs of the future as well as to decide which fare collection technology to use to
address them. This project will analyze the TAP program to learn from the past and will seek to
inform the process so that the transit agencies and customers can be better served. It also serves
to inform the parties on future implementation projects that may require joint efforts in order to
better serve their customers.
In particular, Metro and Metrolink are currently looking into expanding the TAP program
throughout Southern California so that people can use one fare card to travel between Santa
Barbara and San Diego. This is particularly aimed towards the tourism industry, looking to help
tourists from all over the world to be able to travel from the different tourist destinations
throughout Southern California, such as from Hollywood to Disneyland, without needing to rent
a car. Tourists visiting from Asia and from Europe are used to utilizing public transit and are
surprised to find that they are unable to easily use public transit in Southern California.
Developing a fare collection program that is usable throughout a larger region is one way that
would make it more likely for tourists to use public transit for their mode of transportation. Such
a project on a large scale, with multiple counties involved, requires even more careful
coordination of an implementation plan. It is hoped that the lessons from the current TAP
program in Los Angeles can be applied with much larger network collaborations.
As technology continues its development, the future of the implementation of the
technology between public agencies will continue to be a challenge. If public agencies want to
keep up with the changing technology in order to deliver the services that the public expects
from technology, they will need to learn to collaborate as they implement the technology or the
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
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level of service will be limited to each jurisdiction. For example, with Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITS) traffic control, many cities have implemented this technology with different
companies using different technology. On an arterial route, such as Sepulveda Boulevard which
is often used as an alternative to the congestion on Interstate 405, the route crosses through
several different jurisdictions of the City of Los Angeles, the County of Los Angeles, the City of
Culver City, the City of El Segundo, the City of Manhattan Beach, and the City of Torrance.
Many of the cities have installed their own ITS system using different technologies for each
jurisdiction. Having different technologies prevents the ITS from fully controlling the flow of
traffic along the entire arterial across multiple jurisdictions.
This project will begin to inform the readers of some of the obstacles when implementing
technology among multiple agencies. While the technology is intended to fix problems and
bring about solutions to make life easier, it should be cautioned that the use of technology, if not
implemented correctly, can have an unintended consequence of making life more complicated
and difficult for customers. The implementation process should not only focus on the
technology, but also needs to consider the collaborative nature of the involvement of multiple
agencies.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter reviews the current literature that is applicable to understanding and
addressing the issues found in the implementation of the TAP program. It integrates and applies
published literature in several distinct fields that are applicable to the challenge of smart card
implementation. First, the literature on transit technology considers how to improve the transit
user experience with a focus on studies that have been done on smart card technology. The
literature on policy implementation identifies critical problems in implementation and the
requisites for successful policy implementation. Because of the TAP program has been
developed as a universal fare card, it requires that multiple agencies are involved in the
implementation and governance of the program. The literature on collaborative governance,
partnerships, and networks discusses the theory behind bringing together multiple agencies and
evaluates them for effectiveness. And finally, the organizational development literature suggests
methods for removing obstacles and moving organizations forward towards a set of goals.
There is a challenge to implementing new technology or another new program to improve
service with a collaboration of multiple agencies. In particular, Southern California is highly
fragmented with a strong culture of local control. Many regionally focused entities such as water
districts, school districts, Council of Governments, etc., can be aided in learning how to benefit
the people they serve by working together collaboratively. There are examples in the
collaboration literature about the benefits of institutional collective action (ICA) (Feiock, 2004).
The current literature on collaborative governance, with its focus on partnerships, needs to be
integrated with the literature on organizational development, which largely focuses on the
agency level, by considering goal setting and by becoming learning organizations. Each of the
bodies of literature used to inform this thesis project is addressed in more depth in this chapter.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
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2.1 Transit Technology – Improving the transit user experience

In society, technological advances have disrupted the way that we function in everyday
life. For example, the invention and use of personal computers and smart phones have rapidly
changed the way that communication occurs and information is shared around the world,
eliminating the need for every household to have a phone line as well as multiple options for
connecting to the Internet within households. The development of Amazon.com and other e-
commerce companies have also changed the way that we shop, contributing to the downsizing
and closing of “brick and mortar” stores. Video rental stores developed quickly after the
invention of the VCR, but with the invention of DVDs, Netflix also changed the industry by
mailing DVDs for rent. However, Netflix and Blockbuster have also had to contend with faster
streaming videos online they have had to continually change and update their own technologies
in order to continue to be relevant to their customers. These are a few examples of disruptive
technologies to other industries.
In the face of rapid technological change, the provision of public transit service has
largely remained the same over the years by having its customers pay fixed fares to ride a fixed
route service. Technology can and should make public transit easier and more convenient for
people. In Los Angeles, there are common complaints of public transit being too confusing, not
taking people where they need to go, taking too long to get there, or requiring too many transfers.
There should be innovative solutions that can change the common complaints to make transit
more useful to the average discretionary transit rider.
Many new technologies have been invented and over the past few decades are slowly
being implemented for use in public transit. One such innovation is the use of a smart card for
cashless fare payments that could simplify boarding. Another innovation is the Intelligent
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
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Transportation Systems (ITS) that provides information and communication between the
transportation infrastructure and vehicles to provide signal prioritization for transit vehicles.
Automatic Vehicle Locator (AVL) systems allow for transit systems to know the location of their
vehicles. Many of these transit technologies have been also used to support the development of
Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems around the world by prioritizing transit and making it faster
for passengers. Internet applications can also make travel more convenient to discretionary
riders. Google Transit works with Google maps to find the best route for people to get from one
place to another using maps and transit information. Nextrip provides real time information on
the timing of the arrival of the next bus using information from the AVL system that allows
passengers to know when to expect a bus, even if they are unable to visual see a bus.
This project focuses on the technology of the smart cards that have been in development
for transit uses. A smart card is a mini-computer with an antenna embedded in a card that allows
for near field communication (Smart Card Alliance, Inc., 2006). It uses a reader to pass
information at multiple points with a larger background system in place. The smart card
originated as an identification card that can allow access to secure places, but can also be used
for credit card/debit card payments, transit fare, medical identity, and even can function as an
identification card with multiple ATM banking functions.
The smart card has the technological capacity to make fare payment on multi-modal
transportation systems seamless for the customer. The smart card allows customers, both regular
transit users and occasional users to use one card to pay the correct fare on any transit or rail
system at multiple transfer points. It can hold a monthly or weekly pass for one a transit agency
as well as a debit system for use on other transit agencies. It also can potentially allow the
customer to pay for parking and other amenities, such as a newspaper or a cup of coffee, in order
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
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to make a commute more pleasant. Smart cards have been seen as an improvement to the older
technology of swipe cards, which present repair and maintenance problems, and to visual
cards/passes, which can easily be susceptible to fraud, especially to drivers who are encouraged
to quickly load their vehicles to stay on schedule. The use of the smart card is also thought to
make transit more accessible to discretionary transit riders, who would normally not take transit
because of the lack of exact change on hand or lack of knowledge of the correct fare payment
and rules for the transit trip. For heavily used stops, smart cards can lead to faster boarding than
cash and also the rear doors can also be equipped to accept cashless fares from smart cards.
The data from smart cards can support transit planning, providing transportation planners
more information on who, where, and when people use transit, an improvement over current
estimates based on a conglomeration of information from multiple sources (Chu and Chapleau,
2010 and Jang, 2010.) The data could be used to understand the transit customer’s travel
patterns and needs and use the data to optimize the transit schedule to accommodate those needs.
Transit trips can become more seamless as the data gathered from smart card use can inform an
improved understanding of travel patterns, which could lead to the need for fewer transfer points.
It could also be used for other strategic planning purposes for the transit agencies and provide
informed data for regional transportation plans.
There is also a possibility of developing partnerships between transit agencies and
commercial partners for added funding support to transit systems. Transit smart card holders
could receive incentives from commercial partners, especially those located in or near transit
stations (Páez, Trépanier, and Morency, 2011). As there is potential for financial bank
institutions, such as VISA to get involved in the transit smart card, a variety of consumer
applications could be developed.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
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However, there continue to be general challenges to the broad implementation of the
transit smart card. Single agency transit smart card programs are simpler to implement, although
there are fewer choices for using multiple modes for the transit user. Multi agency transit smart
card programs are more difficult to implement, even though such a fare collection program
would be more useful to the transit user. The more agencies involved, the more technically
complex because of the communication and data exchange requirements (Giuliano and O’Brien,
2004). Different operators have different objectives and often have different fare policies, which
make it more complex for the implementation of a jointly used smart card. Various transit
agencies with different governing boards, do not necessarily want to implement similar fare
policies when they have different constituents with different needs. This is especially found to
be true within Los Angeles County, which has many local transit agencies and have been trying
to implement a regional fare payment card for over two decades. Researchers have found that a
large part of the lack of change also was the lack of knowledge and trust of the smart card system
(Yahya and Noor, 2008).

2.2 Policy Implementation
In the 1990’s there was a discussion among the General Managers of the transit agencies
about developing a policy for a Universal Fare System throughout Los Angeles County that
would make using transit easier for transit riders by adopting one fare card that would be valid
on all of the transit systems. In 1997, the Metro Board adopted the Standards Regional Revenue
Processing System to pursue compatible fare collection equipment for all of the transit agencies
in Los Angeles County. However, even though the policy was approved, the implementation of
that policy occurred in two separate forms. The first program to roll out was the EZ transit pass,
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
23
which was a monthly pass that was visibly validated by the bus operator. The other policy
implementation solution came in the form of the smart card, which became known as the TAP
program.
The literature on policy implementation provides information and methods to consider
when implementing policies such as a smart card fare program. This literature provides a
framework for identification of the factors that support or hinder effective policy
implementation. There are often two approaches to implementing policy, which can be used to
evaluate policy, the top down and the bottom up approach (Hill and Hupe, 2009). While there
has been a debate over which approach is more effective, May and Winter (2007) argue that
there is no doubt that the street level bureaucrats at the frontline of the policy implementation
have different intentions that do policy makers, requiring attention to the different influences in
political attention and managerial actions. In the case of the TAP program, an argument could be
made that it was started as a top down approach and it was tried to get the street level bureaucrats
to take up the program to be implemented in a bottom up fashion, but was not very successful.
The influences required to get the street level bureaucrats to implement the TAP program were
missing.
An argument of the analysis of the TAP implementation will be structured with attention
to Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian’s (1979) five conditions for effective policy
implementation. With the TAP program, the first condition existed which was a “program based
on sound theory relating changes in target group behavior to the achievement of the desired end-
state.” The policy directive was unambiguous and the agencies appeared willing at the onset to
collaborate on the implementation of the TAP program. However, despite the unambiguous
policy directive, Sabatier and Mazmanian’s other conditions were lacking. The second
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
24
condition, a sound implementation structure, was not developed. The third condition, strong
leadership, requires a champion from among the implementing agencies. Several of the transit
managers involved in the initial development of the TAP program dropped their participation
due to job attrition and retirement. The fourth condition, support from constituency groups,
waned as the implementation of the TAP program dragged on. The fifth condition is the priority
of statutory objectives, which also waned. While the TAP program could be seen as a relatively
unambiguous and straightforward program as the implementation of a smart card fare collection
program, it nevertheless only weakly at best satisfied most of Sabatier and Mazmanian’s
preconditions for effective implementation. This will be evaluated further and discussed in
Chapter IV.
Matland (1995) discusses an ambiguity/conflict model that can also aid in understanding
successful implementation, where there is not a clear-cut top-down or bottom-up approach. In
the case of the TAP program, there is low to medium policy conflict. Although the agencies
apparently agreed with the general goals of the program, agencies differ in the way in which they
wanted to use the smart card. Because each agency has its own fare tables with differences in
base fares, senior and disabled fares, senior ages (60+, 62+, or 65+), transfer fares, discount pass
types available, etc., there has been a heightened sense of conflict as each agency uses TAP and
adds layers to the customers’ use of the card.
Policy ambiguity is medium to high, as discussed above, because while there is not much
ambiguity with respect to the goal of having a universal fare card, there is considerable
ambiguity of the means to reach that goal. Matland suggests that in these cases the contextual
conditions, meaning the resources and actors, dominate the outcomes. In the case of the TAP
program, the partial implementation of the TAP program speaks to the participation of different
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
25
managers from the beginning of the project until the present, but also the varying equipment and
technology currently being used to implement TAP. Matland suggests that this type of
implementation can also be useful as an effective learning process, basically, learning from the
past actions and making adjustments for the future.
Moving the program forward, implementation literature can guide in developing some
recommendations for the future of the regional fare card program in Los Angeles. A logic model
was developed to outline some steps for implementation for a new farebox program, perhaps
utilizing newer technology. Mazmanian and Sabatier’s (1989) implementation framework can
also be used to anticipate problems and challenges that might come up with the implementation
process and provide some steps to remedy these anticipated problems.

2.3 Collaborative Governance
The most critical challenge to implementation of the TAP program is that several
different transit agencies had to work together in the process, requiring collaborative governance
among the public agencies. Each of the different transit agencies has a General Manager that
made decisions regarding the development of the TAP program. While Metro’s Board,
represented by elected officials from the City and the County of Los Angeles, makes policy
decisions to move the TAP program forward for the County, each of the transit agencies also has
its own City Councils or Board that informs its decision making process. Collaborative
governance requires cooperation of all of the managers and the governing bodies of the different
agencies.
The Los Angeles County transit agencies participate in several organizational
partnerships. There are monthly meetings of the Bus Operators Subcommittee (BOS) of Metro,
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
26
all of which share in being recipients of Los Angeles County’s federal transit funds. Primary
representatives on the Subcommittee are typically Senior Managers of the transit agencies
involved in legislative activities and/or grant activities for the transit agencies. A more informal
group of the same partnership of agencies is the General Managers Group, where the General
Managers typically share updates and transit ideas. Minutes are not taken at the General
Manager meetings, but it builds on the transit industry professional relationships that they have
with each other. Another informal partnership is the Los Angeles County Municipal Operators
Association (LACMOA), which includes the same transit agencies as the General Managers
meeting with the exception of Metro. This meeting is primarily convened when there is an issue
to be discussed about Metro. The chairperson of the General Managers meetings with Metro
also becomes the de facto chair of LACMOA.
The formation of organizational partnerships and collaborations has been a popular
method since the 1990’s as part of the New Public Management movement to deal with the
pressure to improve the performance of public agencies (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994). Political
pressure on public agencies, especially with competition for public funding, has pushed
partnerships together. This subject is addressed in a set of literature on organizational
collaborations, partnerships, and networks, much of which address various organizations
working together (Ansell and Gash, 2007; Fleishman, 2008; Glatter, 2003; Majumdar,
Moynihan, and Pierce, 2009; Page, 2003; Provan and Kenis, 2007; Provan and Milward, 2001;
Schnobrich-Davis and Terrill, 2010; Sørensen and Torfing, 2011; Sowa, 2008; Twitchell,
Borrero, Good, and Burk, 2007; and Vangen and Huxham, 2011). Continuing this idea into the
early 2000’s, the idea of “new regionalism” developed which addresses the public partnerships in
urban areas in which collaborative governance of sub-regional entities is required to address
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
27
shared borders and problems (Feiock, 2004.) The collaborative governance literature addresses a
number of aspects of the benefits and challenges of working with other organizations. It also
examines effectiveness of these partnerships, with a focus on developing the factors that make
partnerships more effective.
The primary benefit of organizational partnerships is that multiple agencies are able to
more effectively and efficiently provide services than they could on their own. The idea of
institutional collection action (ICA) specifically addresses partnerships among public agencies to
provide a service (Feiock, 2004). It can also help the partnering organizations become more
profitable than its competition because it allows them to provide better and more efficient
services. However, the partnerships are typically of greatest benefit to those receiving the
service or services, such as the customers and clients, by providing more seamless services over
the gaps in services or eliminating confusion to which they were previously subject (Provan and
Milward, 2001.) Collaborations of organizations, the bringing together of ideas, can also enhance
innovation. Sørensen and Torfing (2011), discuss innovation as a process that involves
stakeholders working together. Several organizations working on a similar problem could
brainstorm new ideas to solve those problems. The process continues with the selection of an
idea, the implementation of a new idea, and the dissemination of a new practice that requires
stakeholders to be involved in the entire process.
Grant funding opportunities may come up that require partnerships and stakeholder
support that would benefit the organizations. Many times, the grantor wants their funding to
affect a greater number of people or organizations. The use of a partnership or a collaboration of
organizations assures the grantor that the funding will have a more widespread affect.
Partnerships could enable an organization to have access to more funding from various grant
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
28
sources. The “new regionalism” approach of distributing grand funding has been a popular
approach to encourage organizations to work together (Feiock, 2004.)
The collaboration of transit operators in Los Angeles County has produced many of these
benefits identified in the collaborative governance literature. Each of the transit agencies
currently fills in a gap that Metro transit is unable to fill on its own. While many of the transit
agencies existed prior to Metro transit operations, other transit agencies in Los Angeles County
were developed because the members in a particular community did not receive what they
judged to be adequate service from Metro. The networking of transit agencies can promote
better overall service to the transit customer, so that more people can use transit for their
transportation needs.
Collaboration among the transit operators in Los Angeles has led to diffusion of
innovations, such as the development of more green fleets of buses. After early adopters
purchased alternative fuel buses, members of the transit network saw positive outcomes and
made similar changes to their fleets. Collaboration additionally has provided opportunities for
joint procurement, allowing for better pricing. Other innovations to improve service, such as
Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) lines, and Automatic Vehicle Locators (AVL) would likely not be as
common place in Los Angeles, had there been an absence of collaboration among the transit
agencies. It is also likely that many of the transit agencies would have found it too expensive to
implement the TAP technology had it not been a collaborative effort to implement this new
technology, but also to fund the initial fareboxes through a joint application for a federal
Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality (CMAQ) grant.
While there are clearly benefits to collaboration in theory and practice, there are also
many challenges to developing effective interagency partnerships. The working relationships
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
29
among partner agencies are not always easy to navigate. A decision about the type of
partnership must be worked out early on to establish how organizations will work with one
another, whether by formal agreement or a more informal “handshake” partnership (Post, 2004
and Feiock, 2009).
The issue of trust is of particular importance in partnerships, and appears to be a critical
challenge to transit operators in the Los Angeles region. Stephanie S. Post (2004) discusses the
role that social capital among the local officials of public agencies plays in successful
institutional collective action (ICA). Because many professionals are part of larger professional
groups, these relationships can lead to agencies working together. Building relationships and
developing trust in the partnership organizations and especially with the individuals that
participate in the partnerships can be challenging, but also be a determinant as to whether or not
the partnerships are effective. In larger collaborative efforts, trust among the partner
organizations need not be deep, but must be consistent among the organizations (Provan and
Kenis, 2007). The strength of partnerships depends on the personalities of individuals who are
representing and/or leading the organizations, which means that there may be struggles in
developing who has the power and authority in the relationships (Vangen and Huxham, 2011).
Another challenge is the development of goals for the partnership, as each organization
differs on its main goals. Individuals and organizations bring both spoken and unspoken goals
and expectations for the partnerships. How those individual organizations deal with the
acceptance of the group’s goals and perhaps their own disappointments over their expectation for
the group, can affect the effectiveness of the partnerships. Vangen and Huxham (2011) discuss
the many nuances of the differing mission and goals that each individual and organization brings
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
30
into collaborative relationships that make it difficult to establish a clear set of common goals.
The constant flow of network memberships only exacerbates those challenges.
Another important challenge to organizational partnership involves transaction costs
(Feiock, 2007 and Booher and Innes, 2002). The benefits must exceed the costs of collaborating
in order for the collaboration to succeed. While the services of collective action may be
beneficial to those receiving the services, it is also important that the individual agencies or the
managers participating in the partnership perceive the partnerships to be personally beneficial.
Those benefits can also include political benefits for the managers working together. If staff
members see the meetings and events as burdensome, they may disengage. As another example,
if grant funding is a major reason for the network, the reporting requirements may seem
burdensome compared to the share of the funding received. An ill managed network, for a
variety of reasons, can be seen as burdensome to the participating organizations, who can feel
that the time and energy put towards a partnership is not worth the outcomes.
Issues also may arise if network members perceive the collaboration to threaten
organizational autonomy. Taking on roles and responsibilities beyond their organizational goals
can be viewed as a threat to the organization. It is often difficult to see past one’s own
organizational goals and/or problems and often is not willing to take up partnerships that might
negatively affect their autonomy (Fleishman, 2008). Richard C. Feiock (2007) describes the
amount of autonomy as the “ease of exit” and suggests that managers will need to give up some
autonomy to make a collaborative program successful.
All of these challenges of working collaboratively with the transit agencies are relevant to
the implementation of the TAP program. Because the Los Angeles transit agencies have relied
on a “handshake agreement” rather than any written or contractual agreements with each other to
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
31
implement their program it has led to mixed results in participation throughout the
implementation period. Issues of trust and autonomy have come into play between Metro and
the transit agencies. Each of the participating transit agencies have also had to measure their
transaction costs for the TAP program and whether or not to continue to participate in the
program.

2.4 Organizational Development
The organizational development literature also informs issues around collaboration in
implementing the TAP program. Collaboration is a process of learning and growing from
members of the partnership. This literature considers how organizations can identify and rally
around common goals in order to be more effective as an organization. While the transit
agencies are autonomous, they do interact regularly because they share federal, state, and local
transit funds as well as some customers. The effectiveness of the collaboration and the working
relationships among the transit agencies in Los Angeles can play can play a large role in their
desire to improve public transit services. The effectiveness of the collaboration also likely
played a large role in the implementation of the TAP program.
Additionally, the literature on organizational development considers how groups can
improve in its functionality. For example, Edgar H. Schein (1998) suggests that the area of
process consultation can help a group by having an outsider’s perspective on the ongoing group
dynamics, such as awareness of who leads, who speaks, and how they speak. Even non-verbal
communication, such as who participates and where people sit speaks volumes as to the
dynamics of the group. There are also norms and culture of the group that are at work every time
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
32
they speak or work together. Identifying the human process and the current dynamics at work
can identify the some of the problems that occurred in the collaborative relationships.
Leadership can be strengthened within a collaborative group if the leader is aware of the
group dynamics and can make changes to the group in order to lead more effectively (Schein,
1998). For example, if there are certain people who usually speak at meetings and others who do
not, there may be opportunity for the leader to allow those who do not usually speak to voice
their opinions. Gabris and Ihrke (2006) also identify a “crisis of disengagement” among the
collaborative partners that if the leader has awareness of the disengagement, can lead to change
the chosen course of action that is more acceptable to the group. A leader that is aware of the
group dynamics can address the issues that may be causing the disengagement, rather than to
allow it to continue.
The organizational development literature counsels attention to group dynamics to inform
interventions to solve problems and make improvements. If the members of the group are not
willing to move forward, the group dynamics can doom any project to failure. The literature on
Organizational Behavior illuminates individual action within the cultural context of a group. For
example, Fred Luthans (2002) suggests the need for positive organizational behavior in order to
promote positive change with an organization. Distrust within groups can prevent changes from
happening by having individuals undermine the change process.
Public agencies can also greatly benefit from organizational development interventions,
although there are more challenges in conducting organizational development tools in the public
eye. With elected politicians, administrators, and the community all involved in a public
agency’s decision-making process, the interventions need to be made available to all
stakeholders. David G. Carnevale (2003) discusses the challenges of applying organizational
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
33
development to public agencies because changes demand the involvement of multiple actors.
Involvement of these actors can lead to power dynamics and make it difficult to agree upon
shared values. However, while it may take time to persuade multiple parties, those changes tend
to be longer lasting because more people will have bought into those changes.
When it comes to multiple public agencies collaborating on a project, the
intergovernmental relations adds another level of complications with issues of coordination and
power as well as understanding the responsibilities of the different agencies (Cummings and
Worley, 2005.) While the administrators may be willing to participate in interagency
collaborations, the financial and resource responsibilities are often limited, unless the political
decisions makers also buy into the interagency collaboration. Any organizational development
intervention needs to appreciate and understand the nuances and differences between the political
domains and the administrative domains and be willing to address interventions at the multiple
levels.
Network interventions, where multiple organizations have joined together for a common
purpose are particularly sensitive to changes and their effectiveness often depends on their
relationships with one another. In the case of Los Angeles transit agencies, they have an
established network with the General Managers from the transit agencies and also the Bus
Operators Subcommittee, which both have regular monthly meetings. Cummings and Worley
(2005) admit that organization networks are viewed as complex systems and have characteristics
that cannot always be explained and demonstrate a variety of network behaviors and patterns.
They suggest that the type of people and connections within a network can determine a great deal
of the direction that the change can be made.
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34
These aforementioned challenges of being public agencies and working on a networked
collaborative project confront the application of organizational development techniques to a
group of managers from different organizations like the group of transit agencies in Los Angeles
for the implementation of the TAP program. Because each organization represented within the
group has different governing bodies, no player has total freedom to make decisions. The
managers were able to collaborate on the TAP program, but ultimately also had to be responsible
to their political bodies that approved the program as well as to the needs of their transit users.
The individual managers also played a key role in the TAP implementation, especially in how
the implementation was played out. In responding to the different needs, the managers of some
agencies decided to stall or drop out of implementing the TAP program, while others moved
forward on it. The early decisions of some of the managers also played a role in the decisions
that other managers within the group decided to make about the program.

2.5 Literature Application
Further application of this project is the idea of developing network collaborations as
learning organizations is particularly applicable to Southern California. There is a pervasive idea
of “local control” where there are several different agencies, often with similar responsibilities,
but with smaller jurisdictions because of a community’s desire for better services and more
autonomy. Some have formed networks with informal agreements and others with more formal
structures in Joint Power Authorities. Examples of possible networks from the Los Angeles area
include local Water Districts as part of the Metropolitan Water Districts, School Districts and
Charter Schools, and Subregional Councils of Governments that are part of the overall Southern
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
35
California Association of Governments. In all of these examples, they provide the similar
services to customers with overlapping needs.
Another area of further application of this literature is the implementation and use of
technology for a network of agencies. Public agencies are typically seen as being “behind the
times” in terms of technology that people expect from private organizations. If a network of
agencies can effectively collaborate on the implementation of technology, it would allow them to
become more effective in their provision of customer service.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
36
Chapter 3: Methodology

The purpose of this project is to analyze the obstacles to implementation of a smart card
program for use as a universal fare card for all of the transit agencies. In particular, the project
examines the implementation of the TAP program as a collaborative project between Metro and
the municipal transit operators in Los Angeles County. The goal is to learn from the
implementation process, which involved multiple agencies in a15-year process of trying to
implement the TAP program in Los Angeles County.
The project draws in part on experiential learning. As a manager with Culver CityBus
from 2006 – 2010, I was given the responsibility of being the TAP liaison with Metro and the
other transit operators. I attended TAP Money Committee meetings, General Manager meetings,
and Bus Operators Subcommittees when TAP was being implemented in some of the first transit
agencies, including Culver CityBus. I also worked with the TAP managers and consultants,
along with a handful of other transit managers, to iron out the needs of Culver CityBus in
implementing TAP and working out some of the TAP “bugs” prior to installing the TAP
fareboxes. When I left Culver CityBus, in 2010, I had a sense that the TAP implementation for
the region was not going smoothly.
The primary methodology for this project is qualitative, and involves the collection of
interview and documentary data that can illuminate the various perspectives on the
implementation of the TAP program as a regional program. This information was integrated
with the literature review presented in Chapter II in considering the various factors that appear to
have influenced the implementation process.

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37
3.1 Interview Process
The design for selection of the interviews was purposive, focusing on the level of
administrator likely to be most familiar with the implementation process. I invited all of the
General Managers of the municipal transit operators that originally participated in TAP program
to participate in an interview. These agencies meet together regularly in a General Managers
meeting as well as in a Bus Operators Subcommittee (BOS). I did not request interviews from
the smallest of the transit agencies that are allocated less than 0.2% a year in federal funds (FTA
5307) that are members of the General Managers and BOS meetings. For these agencies, local
funds are the primary source of funds for these transit services and thus they have not shown
interest in participating in the TAP program.
In most cases, I received interviews from the top transit manager. In other cases, I was
referred to other managers that had more involvement in the TAP implementation than the
General Manager. In some cases, the person that I invited to participate in the interview invited
others to participate with them because of their additional knowledge of the TAP implementation
process for their agency. Several interview subjects, who had changed positions and agencies
over the course of the past 15 years following development of the plan for the TAP program,
were able to provide multiple perspectives from those different positions.
To provide context and cross-validate the interviews of transit managers, I sought
interviews from external agencies that were connected to the implementation process. In
particular, I sought interviews from those agencies that were involved in connectivity with TAP,
such as Metrolink and the Orange County Transit Authority. I also invited participation from the
contracted consultants for TAP, but was not granted any interviews.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
38
In total, I conducted 20 interviews with 26 different people. The participants were
interviewed about their experience in participating in the TAP program. The interview protocol,
as seen in Appendix A, had five questions that sought the participants’ knowledge and thoughts
on the TAP program implementation. The first interview question asked them to recall their
knowledge of the history of the TAP program and possibly even prior knowledge of the
discussions of the Universal Fare Card program. Most of those interviewed were not in their
current position when the discussions of TAP began. However, they were usually able to recall
the view from the agency they were in at the time. Another question asked about them benefits
of the TAP program, which sought the participants’ understanding of the reasons the region
decided to use the TAP card and their understanding of the smart card technology. A third
question asked them about the obstacles in the TAP implementation process. This question
helped the participants to state the difficulties that they saw with the TAP implementation
process. The participants were also asked to address the collaborative nature of the TAP project
and asked if other agencies in the region influenced their decision to implement TAP. The last
interview question asked about the future of TAP as a regional universal fare card. This question
allowed the participant to share their perspective on the future on the program.
Most of the interviews were in-person interviews that were conducted in the participant’s
office or in a neutral setting. Three interviews were conducted via phone. Most of the
interviews lasted between 30 minutes to one hour. All of them were recorded after receiving
verbal permission from the participant. Audionote was used to take timed notes while the
interviews were being recorded. The recordings were reviewed and additional notes were taken
in order to draw out more detail and themes.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
39
3.2 Documentary Data
In addition to interviews, I found documentation on the TAP program by reviewing
available meeting minutes and notes from the Metro Board and its subcommittees as well as
from the Bus Operators Subcommittee. I used meeting minutes from Metro Board meetings in
order to put together a timeline and to establish the policies and programs that were put into
place in order to see where the actual actions deviated. Local news reports were also used to
confirm the timeline as well as to confirm the media’s view of the TAP program.

3.3 Analysis
The interviews were analyzed in several different ways. First, I summarized the history
of the TAP program from the Metro perspective. Mini-case studies were written in order to
summarize the perspective of the TAP implementation program from different agencies. The
mini case studies demonstrate the challenges of the TAP implementation from three of the larger
municipal transit operators, one an early TAP adopter, one a late TAP adopter, and one that
changed its perspective on TAP over the years as well as the challenge on a small transit agency.
The analysis also involved interpretive analysis in the way of identification and summary
of themes found in the interviews. These themes involved the benefits of TAP, the obstacles
faced in TAP implementation, and the perceived future of TAP. The responses to a question on
the history of the TAP program, varied greatly from participant and their personal experience.
Many of the current participants were found to have little knowledge of the beginnings of the
Universal Fare Card and the TAP program, with many either not being involved in the transit
industry or being involved in a different capacity within the transit industry at the time. Those
who were able to respond to the question on the history of TAP provided useful direction in
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
40
developing the overall development of the timeline of the program. All of the responses
indicated that they were not influenced by the other agencies’ decisions on whether or not their
agency chose to implement the TAP program.
The policy implementation analysis method, utilizing Mazmanian and Sabatier’s
implementation framework is employed as to consider the reasons that the program has gotten
“stuck” and to support the development of recommendations for solutions. The last of the transit
agencies in Los Angeles County are on a schedule to install TAP mobile validators so that TAP
cards can be fully functional on each of the transit agencies in 2015. However, one agency has
only agreed to use TAP on its Bus Rapid line into Downtown Los Angeles and currently has no
plans on fully implementing TAP.
A logic model is included in order to develop a plan for the future of the TAP program.
Currently, there are many “bugs” in the system that make using the TAP card difficult. The
technical details of the “bugs” will not be discussed in this project, primarily because these are
programmatic issues on which Metro has previously received reports from consultants.
Recommendations, however, will be discussed for the future of the regional fare collection
program.

3.4 Strengths and Limitations of Methodology
My own professional experience with TAP is a source of both strengths and limitations in
this analysis. The strengths associated with this direct experience include an in-depth
understanding of the nuances of the program, as well as the ability to get access due to personal
connections. In conducting the interviews for this project, I tried to identify with the participants
and their perspective on the TAP project. About half of the participants were familiar with me
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
41
and I have had previous contact with them prior to this project. With the others that I did not
know, one or at most two degrees of separation separated us. This professional familiarity may
have played an important role in providing access to interviews.
At the same time, my professional familiarity with the TAP implementation project
presents a potential for personal perspective to influence the analysis. As much as possible, I
relied on the perspective of the interviewees rather than my own perspective, especially when
their perspective did not match my own. In order to take a more objective approach, I also relied
on the review of the literature to inform my analysis of the interviews.
Another potential limitation has to do with issues around access to the original managers
associated with the program. Several of the key managers who were involved in the early part of
TAP implementation have transitioned or were not in the same decision making positions as
when the TAP program started. Many of the policy makers such as the CEO of Metro and the
Board members have changed since the start of the implementation and thus different people
were involved at different time and decision-making points. Some of the interviewees did not
know the full history or the full story of their agency’s involvement in the implementation of the
program. For some perspectives, I interviewed several people from the same agency, sometimes
separately and other times together in order to put together an agency’s story of their TAP
implementation. I also interviewed several people from Metro who participated in various roles
with the TAP program to try to get a Metro perspective. By putting together the pieces of the
story into one document, the actions or inactions of the agencies might make more sense. I also
tried to conduct interviews with those who had retired; however, I was only able to contact one
of these individuals.

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42
3.5 Ethical Considerations and Human Subjects
An application (Appendix A) for the interviews to be exempt from the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) was submitted to iSTAR. The application along with the interview
protocol (Appendix B) was submitted to iSTAR and was determined to be exempt from IRB
review (Appendix C). The interviews with managers did not gather data about human subjects,
but rather, sought historical data regarding the development and implementation of the TAP
program as well as expert and stakeholder information regarding the current state of the TAP
program. The interviews are confidential and I verbally provided a statement of confidentiality
at the beginning of each interview stating that it will only used for the evaluation of the TAP
implementation program. Participation in the interviews was voluntary. There is expected to be
minimal risk associated with participation in the interviews.

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43
Chapter 4: Analysis

The story of the TAP implementation process puts together a history and timeline for the
TAP program that was developed through interviews with various transit managers that were
involved in the process and verified with information found in the Metro archives, Metro Board
agenda items, and newspaper articles. Analysis of this TAP implementation process can reveal
some of the reasons for the incomplete implementation of the TAP program. Mazmanian and
Sabatier’s (1989) policy implementation framework is used to analyze the TAP program for
effectiveness. It reveals that while the TAP program may have been well timed for the
implementation, some of the necessary supporting statutory features were never put into place
and some of the non-statutory characteristics were lacking. The combination of these features
lead to an incomplete implementation of the TAP program.
The consequences of the weakness in the policy implementation framework are
highlighted further in the interviews with many of the transit managers that were making
decisions for their transit agencies about the TAP program. Analysis of the interviews of
managers from the various agencies involved in TAP implementation reveals an array of reasons
for the organizational choices made regarding TAP. The case studies are a sample of some of
the thoughts from the transit managers involved in implementing the TAP program for their
agency that were echoed by other managers from other agencies. In addition, an analysis of
effectiveness of the collaborative partnership of the TAP program will be discussed. The
analysis of the interviews will demonstrate that while many of the issues and problems identified
were similar from agency to agency, each agency expressed differences in the importance that
these issues played for the agency in their decisions regarding the TAP program.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
44
4.1 The TAP Implementation Process
Metro took the lead role in the development of the TAP program for Los Angeles
County. Metro has a duel role as the planning and funding agency for the County of Los
Angeles, as well as being the largest transit operator in the County. In 1998 the Metro Board, in
this dual role, approved a vision for having a universal fare card for all of the transit agencies in
Los Angeles County and set up a department for the Universal Fare System (UFS). The EZ
transit pass was developed and successfully launched as one of the products of the UFS, as a
“flashed” regional monthly pass that depended on the bus operators to recognize and count.
There was a shared goal among most of the transit operators to replace manual counts of
paper passes, which are easily susceptible to fraud. Thus at that time the Metro Board approved
the research of an appropriate technology for the use of a universal fare card for fare collection.
Roger Snoble, the Executive Director for Metro at the time, was impressed by the proximity
smart cards that were being used in Europe and recommended to the Metro Board that they move
the County’s transit systems forward in implementing the TAP program for the technology to be
used throughout the County. The UFS department was renamed the TAP department as it
focused on developing this new fare collection technology.
As a regional collaboration, Metro applied for a Federal Congestion Mitigation and Air
Quality (CMAQ) grant, and received funding for purchase of fareboxes for all the transit
agencies. The specifications of the TAP farebox and the contract for the award of the fareboxes
were developed under direction of a TAP Money Committee, in which all of the transit agencies
were invited to participate. While the transit agencies agreed to take part in the purchase order of
the federally funded fareboxes, only a handful of agencies chose to participate in formation of
policy related to TAP, including the development of the Operating Rules and the Business Rules.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
45
Paula Faust, who was at that time a Manager for Montebello Bus Lines, and is now a Deputy
Director of the Gardena Bus Lines, co-lead the Money Committee with Jane Matsumoto, the
UFS/TAP Manager in the early 2000’s ensuring input and direction from the municipal transit
operators. Matsumoto managed the TAP Department, and also managed the TAP
implementation for Metro Transit Operations. After Faust left Montebello Bus Lines to work for
Metro in early 2004, Matsumoto single-handedly managed the TAP projects for both Metro
Transit Operations and for the region.
Metro began installation of the TAP fareboxes on buses in 2004. The use of the TAP
card on Metro buses started as a pilot project in 2006, introducing TAP to different institutions
and businesses in Los Angeles, such as the University of California Los Angeles. In late 2008,
the TAP program was opened to the general public in the form of Metro’s monthly and weekly
passes. This early system of Metro passes on TAP cards created an unintended consequence of
customer confusion for the other transit operators who were planning on using the TAP card
primarily as debited cash fare payments.
While some municipal operators began to move forward with the full implementation of
the TAP program in 2009, others moved back their scheduled date for TAP implementation, and
some decided not to move forward. Long Beach Transit was the first of the municipal transit
operators to install TAP fareboxes without using the TAP technology soon after the TAP
fareboxes were purchased. However, it made a decision to withdraw from the TAP and fully
removed the TAP technology from the fareboxes prior to the other agencies installing the TAP
fareboxes. The City of Santa Clarita Transit, Culver CityBus, and Foothill Transit were the first
of the municipal transit operators to install the TAP fareboxes and implement the TAP fare
collection program.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
46
Around this time, the economy was experiencing the beginning of a recession and public
funds for transit were becoming less dependable. The Metro Board had a growing concern about
fare evasion on Metro rail stations, which depended on an honor system of purchasing tickets
prior to boarding the rail lines. The TAP card could also be used as the fare media for the Metro
rail stations. Contract extensions with the TAP contractors were approved for installation of
gates at the stations.
At the same time, Metro was experiencing resistance from other municipal operators
related to the problems with the TAP program. The few municipal operators that installed the
TAP fareboxes reported difficulties with the system because they were designed for use for
Metro and modified for the transit agencies prior to their installation. A primary concern was
that of customer confusion in using the TAP card because Metro only sold Metro passes on TAP
cards while the other transit agencies were using the TAP card for fare payment. Several
municipal operators declined to install their TAP fareboxes and use the TAP system until the
confusion could be sorted out. Some of the municipal operators expressed concerns about data
running through a regional central computer, which would co-mingle data and would potentially
allow Metro and other municipal operators to see their data. They were seen by Metro as being
fearful of not being able to control their data and potentially receiving fewer State and Federal
funds if their data did not match up to their current data that they were reporting to Metro.
After Roger Snoble retired in 2008, a new CEO, Art Leahy was appointed in his place.
Over the next few years, restructuring of Metro’s Executive Management took place. Several
consultants were brought in to look at the problems with the TAP program amidst the Board’s
growing concern of the expanding TAP contracts. By 2012, Metrolink, the five County regional
rail operator, implemented a paper ticket with a smart card antenna that would allow their
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
47
customers in Los Angeles to use TAP. However, the TAP implementation stalled as half of the
municipal operators had not yet installed their TAP fareboxes. The outgoing Mayor and Metro
Board Chair Antonio Villaraigosa stepped in to work with the municipal operators, holding a
meeting for them to air their grievances and figure out a plan to move forward.
By this time, the TAP fare collection technology was becoming outdated and the
municipal operators would have had to purchase additional TAP fareboxes at their own cost in
order to have them installed on their expanded systems. The TAP mobile validators were
developed as a solution so that municipal operators could use TAP cards for fare collection on
their buses, alongside their existing farebox system. After the meeting with Metro Board Chair
Villaraigosa, the Metro Board approved the purchase of TAP mobile validators so that all of the
remaining transit agencies could to use the TAP fare collection system. Soon after that, the rest
of the municipal operators who had refuse to use the TAP fare collection system, agreed on a
schedule to install the TAP mobile validators. The last of the municipal operators are set to
install the TAP mobile validators in 2015.
Now that the originally installed TAP fareboxes are almost at the end of their useful lives
and are nearly ready for replacement, Metro has begun looking forward to the next fare
collection technology. They have begun by organizing a working group with the municipal
operators to look at the latest in fare collection technology and develop a “wish list” for the
future. They have also begun discussions with other County Transportation agencies about
developing a “CaliCard,” a smart card that can be used throughout all of Southern California
from Santa Barbara to San Diego. The CEO of Metro has been looking forward to developing a
better regional fare collection program for the future.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
48
The TAP fare collection project was intended to be a collaborative project with Metro
and the municipal transit operators, however it was not implemented as a collaborative project.
It was implemented in a top down approach with Metro taking the lead in much of the process,
both as directed from the Board and from Metro’s Executive Management. As an agency with a
dual role in the Planning and Programming for the County, as well as its largest operator, those
lines were often blurred in the implementation process. Some of the municipal transit operators
felt pressured into participating in the TAP program to implement what they perceived to be a
Metro product. Metro Executives midway through the TAP implementation process were
frustrated by the lack of cooperation from the municipal transit operators who had previously
agreed to the purchase of the TAP fareboxes.

4.2 Policy Implementation Effectiveness
The implementation of the TAP program has thus far taken over 15 years to implement,
with not all of the federally funded municipal operators on board yet. There are several
unresolved problems with the TAP program. The TAP fareboxes are aging and the technology is
not quite meeting the needs of many of the transit users. The interviews revealed problems of
the implementation of the TAP program that can be useful to move the program forward for the
future, if we can learn from them.
An Implementation Framework model was developed by Daniel Mazmanian and Paul
Sabtier (1989) that outlines the pieces that are necessary for policies to be successfully
implemented. This framework includes understanding the Tractability of the “Problem” which
looks at the changes that are to be made with the policy; the Statutory Features, which looks at
the supporting policies that are either in place or set up to implement the policy; and the Non-
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
49
Statutory Characteristics, which looks at the timing and the political “environment” being ripe
for implementation. Using this Implementation Framework to evaluate the TAP implementation
process, we can develop some “lessons learned” and recommendations for the future of the TAP
program in Los Angeles County.

The Tractability of the “Problem”
A universal fare card would make it easier for people to use public transportation in
Los Angeles County. Public transportation in Los Angeles County is not seen as being
convenient or easy to use and therefore is not often seen as a choice for transportation. Having a
Universal Fare Card could change some of this perception. Prior to the TAP card, if someone
had to ride multiple transit systems to get across the County, they were required to carry exact
change in small bills and coins for each system and were also required to know the complicated
fare policies for each system. Having a true Universal Fare Card would allow customers to not
have to worry about exact change when they are riding the bus. However, the current system of
the TAP program still puts the onus on the rider to know which pass they carry and also to tell
the bus operator when they need a transfer unless they are a regular commuter and carry a
monthly EZ transit pass. Also, since currently not all transit agencies accept TAP, the rider still
needs to have the exact change for the agencies that do not use TAP.
Successful implementation would require the participation of all transit agencies.
All of the agencies interviewed for this thesis project supported the idea that riders should be
able to ride seamlessly throughout the County. However, that idea was often seen as less
important that self-preservation of the agency, making sure that it received its fair share of
funding. Participation in the TAP program was voluntary. Metro was under the impression that
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
50
the
Tractability of the “Problem”

• A universal fare card would make it easier for people to use public
transportation in Los Angeles County
• Successful implementation would need participation of all transit
agencies
• A “shared” smart card among multiple agencies did not have
precedence
• There was already existing organizational partnerships among the
municipal transit operators, e.g. regular General Managers
meetings and Bus Operators Subcommittee meetings
Statutory Features

• Metro Board supported a
Universal Fare Card since 1998
• No official agreements in place
among the transit agencies
• Not adequate financial resources
dedicated to the TAP – program
dependent on contract extension
• Future of funding the TAP
program is unclear (new
technology)
Non-Statutory Characteristics

• Socioeconomic conditions and
current technology support a
cashless fare card
• Media not attentive to the TAP
program
• Knowledge and support for the
TAP program by people who
regularly use transit
• Political officials have come and
gone, although Metro Board
generally supportive
• Implementing officials skilled in
technology, not in collaboration
Outcome
Incomplete implementation of TAP program
Source:
Adapted
from
Daniel
Mazmanian
and
Paul
Sabatier,
Implementation
and
Public
Policy,
University
Press
of
America,

1989

Figure 4.1 Implementation framework for the TAP program

LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
51
joint procurement of TAP fareboxes was an agreement for participation in the program.
The idea of a voluntarily shared smart card among multiple agencies did not have a
precedent prior to the implementation of TAP, however, there has been discussion of a
universal fare card in Los Angeles since the 1990’s. The MetroCard was a previously
attempted Universal Fare Card program using a magnetic swipe card in the mid 1900s that ended
up with only five transit agencies adopting it for use after Metro pulled its support. Transit
systems throughout the country and the world have implemented smart cards for fare payment,
which is an improvement in technology to the magnetic swipe card. The smart card has proven
to be effective in most metropolitan areas where there is one transit agency that runs the entire
transit system for the region. In the San Francisco Bay Area, they have also been working on a
shared fare payment system for municipal and regional transit operators at the same time as the
transit operators in Los Angeles County. They chose to legislate via State legislation their shared
smart card, so that those that did not implement the Clipper Card, the Bay Area’s smart card fare
program, would also not be able to receive federal and state funds.
There currently exist organizational partnerships among the municipal transit
operators. The monthly meetings among the General Managers and in the Bus Operators
Subcommittee demonstrated the collaborative relationship. They shared in certain federal, state,
and local funds and had to submit reports to Metro, as a planning agency who administered the
funds. However, there was also some distrust in the relationships that the municipal transit
operators had with Metro. For some of the transit agencies, their communities did not
necessarily trust Metro to run an adequate level of transit services for their community and
developed their own transit systems. Having a Universal Fare Card that would have fare
payments comingled with each other and rely on another agency to handle fares on a daily basis
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
52
required a new level of trust. For transit agencies that typically only handled their own fare
payments this change was a large one.
There is evidence that there was tractability in the TAP program, with the potential for
the program to solve the problem of needing to carry change in order to use transit. The transit
agencies in Los Angeles County had been discussing the development of a program that would
benefit their collective transit users moving from one system to another. The agencies had a
working relationship with each other that would enable such a program to be implemented with
all of the federally funded transit agencies in the County. The idea of implementing the program
was supported, however, it was the statutory and non-statutory features of the program that were
not fully developed and led to its failure.

Statutory Features
Metro Board motions since 1998, demonstrate that they were supportive of a
Universal Fare Card for Los Angeles County. The Board motions also approved the
implementation of the TAP program and the funding and contracts for the TAP program.
However, these motions had limited action on the municipal transit operators that were governed
through different governing boards.
There were no official agreements about a universal fare card among the transit
agencies prior to the start of the implementation of the TAP program. The agencies had
signed off on the purchase order of the TAP fareboxes with CUBIC Transportation Systems to
provide the TAP fareboxes. The TAP Money Committee, developed the TAP Operating Rules
and the TAP Business Rules, but by 2009, when the other agencies started using the TAP
technology, those rules were not yet adopted by Metro or the other agencies. As it remained, it
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
53
became an issue of trust that the rules would eventually be worked out and the program would be
fair for the participating agencies.
There were not adequate financial resources dedicated to the TAP program.
Because of the CMAQ funds that were made available to all of the transit agencies and were
used for the purchase of the TAP fareboxes, the municipal transit operators had an expectation
that they would not have to fund the TAP program since it was a regional program. The Metro
Board has continually approved extensions for the scope of work and for funding to the original
contractors. Thus far, the municipal transit operators have had to shoulder minimal financial
obligations in order to take part in the TAP program. However, had the TAP program not been
in place, each of the transit operators would have had to fund their own replacement of fare
boxes for their system. County transportation funds are currently being used to fund the TAP
program.
The future of funding the TAP program is unclear. While the funding for the TAP
Regional Service Center is outlined in the TAP Operating Rules, there will be future costs of
new/replacement equipment. It costs the County millions of dollars every year in order to collect
fares via the TAP program. With transitions and the need to update technology, it is still unclear
how the program will continue to be funded in the future. There are unknowns as to if the
municipal transit operators will be expected to support the TAP operations for the region as it
continues to grow or if the Metro and Los Angeles County will be expected to shoulder this
burden.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
54
Non-Statutory Characteristics
The socioeconomic conditions and the technology do support the change for using a
cashless fare card that can be used with all of the transit agencies. A heavily cited
MasterCard study (September 2013) looked into the amount of transactions being done with cash
and compared it with electronic financial transactions. It found that in the United States, that
80% of the financial transactions were cashless, behind the “nearly cashless” countries that
included several in Western Europe, Canada, and Australia. This indicates that the use of
cashless fare payments is supported by socioeconomic conditions. The use of cashless transit
fare payment cards are well used around the country. Unfortunately, the current TAP technology
is behind the expectations of current technology, with yelp.com and tripadvisor.com complaints
about not being able to use purchased TAP cards right away, which requires TAP users to have a
planned out their trips in advance in order to take advantage of the full benefits of TAP. In the
current technology, people have come to expect more immediate ability of the TAP card.
The media has not been attentive to the TAP program. Although there were a few
articles about the launching of the TAP program when the selling of passes was announced by
Metro at the end of 2008, the media has not paid attention to the progress of the program. There
were very few periodicals that mentioned the use of the TAP cards’ goals and purpose to use it as
a universal fare card to serve as cashless fare payment.
There is some knowledge and support of the TAP program from the public by
people who use transit. With 47% of Metro’s unlinked transit trips in 2012 (Metro TAP data
and 2012 National Transit Database) taken by using a TAP card, the knowledge of the TAP card
is widespread among Metro’s current users likely because a TAP card is required to take
advantage of discounted daily pass rates and free transfers. However, the knowledge and support
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
55
from discretionary transit users and potential users, is unknown. Reviews of the TAP program
on Yelp.com and TripAdvisors.com provide knowledge of the TAP card for people looking to
use TAP and while the reviews are supportive of the technology, the reviews primarily express
frustration over use of the TAP card.
Many political officials have come and gone during the time of the implementation
of the TAP program although the Metro Board has generally been supportive of the TAP
program. They have continually approved contract extensions and additional funding for the
program. However, until the 2012 meeting with the Board Chair and Los Angeles Mayor
Antonio Villaraigosa, during which he and his staff met with the municipal operators to move the
TAP program towards full implementation with the transit agencies, the political officials have
primarily allowed Metro managers and the municipal operators to make their own decisions
about the implementation of the TAP program.
The original TAP program manager has expertise in the TAP technology and would have
likely had an easier time with implementing the TAP program if it were only used for Metro’s
transit operations. CUBIC Transportation Systems, the primary TAP contractor, also has much
experience implementing smart card programs with other transit agencies. It is responsible for
implementing many of the smart card transit programs in the United States (Introducing Cubic,
2014) and has established smart card transit programs throughout the world. However, the TAP
program was intended to be a regional program among the transit agencies. Neither the TAP
program manager nor CUBIC Transportation Systems were prepared for the politics of the
dynamics between the transit agencies or the autonomy that each agency demanded.
Several interviews of current managers working with the TAP system, mentioned the
prior lack of political and collaborative skills that previously existed in managing the TAP
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
56
program. Several transit managers complimented the newer TAP management and as well as
CUBIC Transportation Systems’ willingness to work with the needs of the various agencies over
the past few recent years. Most of those interviewed expressed confidence in the TAP program
as a regional program for the future.
The interviews also revealed that many of the managers did not fully understand the
capabilities of the TAP program and the use of the smart card. Some admitted that they did not
know the capabilities of the TAP program because they trusted the decisions of other managers
who made the decisions for the agency. Some of the interviewers were fearful of their agency’s
data being wrong and not receiving their fair share of fares because they did not trust the
technology. Many were not aware of the potential of the use of the TAP card for transit planning
to develop more efficient transit trips for their transit users.

Summary of Policy Implementation Analysis
Using Mazmanian and Sabatier’s (1989) Implementation Framework, one can see that
while the TAP program was feasible and the timing was right for a smart card transit program to
be implemented as a universal fare card for the County of Los Angeles, without many Statutory
Characteristics and Non-statutory Characteristics in place, there was not much to support the
implementation of the TAP program. The result has been an incomplete implementation of the
TAP program with the first TAP fareboxes beginning to reach the end of its useful life without
the TAP program fully implemented with the transit agencies. Not all of the municipal transit
operators have installed the TAP program. It is more likely that the policy would have seen
more success in its implementation early on if collaboration was seen as an important goal in the
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
57
implementation of the TAP program. While the TAP program started as a collaborative project,
it took a back seat to the implementation of the TAP technology.

4.3 TAP Case Studies
With this broader implementation context in place, we now turn to a discussion of four
case studies of the municipal transit operators. These case studies provide an array of
perspectives on the TAP program and reveal complex reasons for the choices made regarding the
project. Three of the agencies are the largest municipal transit operators in the County outside of
Metro’s Transit Operations. Each of the three agencies made different choices regarding the
TAP program. One small agency was included as a case study in order to highlight the
transaction costs of the TAP program on a small agency.

Case Study: Foothill Transit
Foothill transit was a transit agency that implemented the TAP fare collection program,
despite the TAP program’s shortcomings. Because Foothill Transit recognized that many of its
customers also used Metro’s buses and rail as a commuter connection, it was willing to be
partners with Metro for the TAP fare card so that its customers could have seamless service
between their transit system and Metro’s transit system. It also understood the potential that the
TAP smart card had to provide for an improved fare collection service.
Foothill Transit was one of the early adopters of the TAP card and is the second largest
transit agency in vehicle service miles behind Metro. Foothill Transit runs local service
throughout the cities in the San Gabriel Valley and also a Silver Streak Commuter line that runs
between San Bernardino County to downtown Los Angeles. A Joint Powers Authority
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
58
composed of several San Gabriel Valley cities governs the agency. Foothill Transit management
and employees are a contracted service of Transdev (formerly Vieola Transportation), which is a
private transportation company with roots in Europe, perhaps leading to its openness to the smart
card technology for fare collection which is widely used in Europe.
During the period in which Metro initiated TAP, Foothill Transit’s fareboxes were aging
and in desperate need of replacement. With the availability of Federal Funds from CMAQ,
Foothill Transit purchased TAP enabled fareboxes for their entire system. Doran Barnes, the
Executive Director of Foothill Transit, had been working for Foothill Transit for a majority of
the time during the County’s discussions of the Universal Fare Card. However, he was not
involved in the decisions and the initial stages of TAP until he became Executive Director in
2003. Foothill Transit was an active participant in the early TAP discussions and
implementation, with its Chief Financial Officer attending TAP Money Committee meetings and
taking an active interest in ensuring that the rules regarding TAP were fair for Foothill Transit
and the other municipal transit operators. The Executive Director saw the smart card TAP
program as a natural progression in fare collection, improving on the magnetic swipe debit card
of the MetroCard program, a collaborative fare card program of five of the municipal transit
operators. The agency’s Marketing Manager was also fully involved in the transition of the
program from MetroCard to the TAP Card.
Foothill Transit was one of the first to install its fareboxes and participate in the TAP fare
collection system along with Metro, the City of Santa Clarita Transit, and Culver CityBus in
2009. In becoming an early implementer of the TAP program, the TAP card was not
programmed to do all that the technology was capable of doing. The managers at Foothill
Transit had to adjust their expectations of the TAP card and accepted the limitations of the TAP
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
59
card. One such limitation of the technology was in its handling of transfers. The “newer” TAP
fareboxes were unable to print out transfers for time validation as their “old” fareboxes had.
Technologically, the transfers could be loaded into a TAP card that would allow it to be used
onto another system. However, because most of the other transit agencies were not TAP
enabled, the agency had to move back to an old system of passing out paper transfers to their bus
operators. This required the bus operators to manually hole punch the paper transfers, which
slowed down boarding times. While they were also initially hoping for mobile TAP validators
in order to speed up rear boarding on their Silver Streak commuter service, the product was
never fully developed for their use, taking a back seat to the development of the gates for
Metro’s rail stations.
The managers at Foothill Transit made the TAP program a priority for their transit
system. The agency has participated in the TAP planning meetings and delegated staff resources
to support the transition from the MetroCard to the TAP card for its customers. Perhaps because
the agency crosses many city boundaries throughout the San Gabriel Valley and is accustomed to
work collaboratively with many City Councils, it sees itself as a regional player and places an
importance in developing their connection with the rest of the region.
The priority of being a regional player and partner in the County’s transit system, its
connections (as contracted agency) to other transit systems around the world that use smart card
technology, along with the timing of its need for new fareboxes, likely aided in the willingness of
Foothill Transit to be an early adopter in the TAP program, despite known problems with the
TAP fare collection system. Foothill Transit used the new fare collection program, worked
around the unknowns of the system and known problems, choosing to work with Metro and the
TAP contractors to figure out solutions. We next turn to another large transit agency that was
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
60
also in desperate need of new fareboxes and decided to be the first agency to install the newly
purchased TAP fareboxes without using the TAP fare collection technology.

Case Study: Long Beach Transit
Long Beach Transit is an agency that initially appeared headed towards being an early
adopter of the TAP fare collection system. Full implementation stalled, however at least in part
due to concerns about autonomy to make decisions regarding fare products and payment. It was
the first transit agency to fully install the newly acquired TAP fareboxes in 2005; however it
used those fareboxes without allowing customers to use the smart card features until other transit
systems also implemented the TAP card program. By 2007, when the transit agencies were still
discussing the installation schedule, it reversed its course, removing the TAP technology from
the fareboxes and developing a localized system of day passes. The agency did not participate in
the TAP program until the funded TAP mobile validators were offered to the agency in 2012. It
was then the first of the agencies to install the TAP mobile validators in the spring of 2014.
When new fareboxes were awarded and purchased with Federal money through the
CMAQ funds in 2003, Long Beach Transit (LBT) was the first of the transit agencies to install
the TAP fareboxes because of its need to replace its aging fareboxes. It installed the TAP
fareboxes; however, it decided to wait on the use of the TAP smart card system until the
operating and the business rules were further developed to ease questions about the regional
partnership. The Chief Executive Officer of Long Beach Transit, Larry Jackson, vocally
expressed frustration with Metro and the lack of progress being made on the TAP program and
decided to withdraw altogether from the TAP program in December 2007. The agency made a
decision to “gut” the fareboxes of the TAP technology. This allowed Long Beach Transit to
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
61
once again use a swipe card technology on its fareboxes so that it could develop its own monthly
passes and day passes. The agency watched from the sidelines as the other transit agencies
struggled with the TAP technology.
Five years after Long Beach Transit decided to withdraw from the TAP program, the
Metro Board offered to fund TAP mobile validators for all of the federally funded municipal
transit operators that were not yet participating in the TAP program. It was during this time that
Long Beach Transit offered to be the first of the remaining transit agencies to install and use the
TAP mobile validators. With its former CEO, Larry Jackson, about to retire, the agency put
management resources into developing an installation plan for the TAP mobile validators. The
TAP mobile validator allows the transit agency to continue using its own farebox along with a
TAP mobile validator that can read and validate TAP cards. This dual system of fare payments
gave the agency enough confidence to soft launch the product. It turned on the TAP mobile
validators in all of their buses in the spring of 2014.
While there were several minor adjustments yet to be made on the TAP mobile
validators, the managers have reported that they have been pleased with the TAP mobile
validators and with the staff support they received from the TAP managers at Metro and the TAP
contractors. The TAP mobile validators are a newer technology than the older TAP fareboxes.
Because it utilizes a wireless 3G network and gets updated every 30 minutes, any fares
purchased online or from a vendor can be used the same day, whereas transit riders for other
agencies with TAP fareboxes need to wait 48 or 72 hours prior to using a newly loaded TAP
card.
The managers at Long Beach Transit are hoping to see faster boarding times for their
passengers and to move towards a cashless system that will also cut down on the amount of fraud
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62
they are currently seeing. An EZ transit pass can now be used as a TAP card instead of having
the bus operator visually validate and count the card. The development of a “second boarding”
transfer fare will allow for the TAP customers to be able to automatically deduct a transfer fee on
the second bus that they ride. It will allow each agency to collect a transfer fee via the TAP card
for each rider, rather than collecting a paper transfer without funds. This TAP process will also
allow for less interaction and time between the TAP user and the bus operator.
The decisions regarding the TAP fare collection program that were made by Long Beach
Transit were made for the best interests of its own agency, so that it could control its own fare
collection program. Like Foothill Transit, new fareboxes were needed when it first agreed to
purchase the TAP fareboxes. Because of the agency’s need for new fareboxes, it was willing to
install and use the TAP fareboxes, even prior to the operating and business rules about the TAP
program were developed. However, Long Beach Transit’s autonomy was tested when it was
unable to implement its own monthly and day passes using the TAP technology without an
additional contract and funds for the TAP contractors. It made a decision to disengage from the
entire TAP program. It was also evident to many of the transit managers that over there was
visible growing animosity between the former Chief Executive Officer at Long Beach Transit
and the former Executive Director of Metro, primarily over Metro’s grab for a larger share of the
region’s transit funding. This testing of autonomy and distrust between leadership can be a
powerful determinant in the effectiveness of partnerships (Post, 2004; Provan and Kenis, 2007;
and Vangen and Huxham, 2011.) The agency is currently actively participating in discussions on
the future of TAP for the region and the possibility of connecting with all of Southern California.
Long Beach Transit and Foothill Transit were eager to use the TAP fareboxes that were
purchased for the region to replace their aging fareboxes and their decisions were led by their
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63
need for new fareboxes. In contrast to those agencies, another of the County’s larger transit
agencies, Santa Monica Big Blue Bus, was not in need of new fareboxes and was concurrently
developing its own plan to implement new transit fare collection technology to its own
customers. Its lack of dependence on the County’s TAP fareboxes allowed them to hold off on
implementing the TAP program.

Case Study: Santa Monica Big Blue Bus
Santa Monica Big Blue Bus is currently set to be the last of the federally funded TAP
adopter, choosing instead, to prioritize customer service to its own customers rather than to
participate in a County wide system that was known to cause customer confusion. However, as
one of the larger transit agencies in Los Angeles County, the fact that it has not yet adopted the
TAP program has hampered regional TAP connections. Santa Monica Big Blue Bus provides
transit service throughout the City of Santa Monica and West Los Angeles to LAX, Century
City, and UCLA, as well as and a Commuter Bus service to Downtown Los Angeles. Although
the agency purchased TAP enabled fareboxes in 2003 along with Metro and the rest of the
municipal operators, it never installed those fareboxes.
Santa Monica Big Blue Bus was an active participant in the early development of the
TAP program along with Metro on the TAP Money Committee. It participated on the committee
that developed the specifications for the TAP fare collection program and the selection of the
TAP contractors. It also participated in the development of the Operating and Business Rules for
the TAP program. After regular meetings of the TAP Money Committee ceased shortly after the
Co-Chair of the TAP Money Committee Paula Faust left Montebello Transit to work for Metro
and was not replaced, the agency took a back seat in the TAP implementation process.
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64
When the TAP fareboxes were first being installed with the other municipal transit
operators, Santa Monica Big Blue Bus was concerned that the TAP card might not allow them to
provide a level of customer service that their passengers have come to expect from the agency.
The problems that the other municipal operators faced with the TAP fareboxes were not
acceptable to the agency. It was concerned that the TAP contractors, TAP Managers, and Metro
Executives were not very accommodating to the needs of the municipal transit operators. They
were not comfortable with the initial customer confusion that the other municipal transit
operators faced when installing their TAP fareboxes.
Despite participating in the purchase order of the regional TAP fareboxes, Santa Monica
Big Blue Bus decided to look at newer farebox technology that would better serve its needs and
customers, a program that was initiated under the previous Executive Director, Stephanie
Negriff. Ed King, the current Executive Director of the Santa Monica Big Blue Bus since 2011,
felt that the TAP fareboxes and the TAP contractor, CUBIC Transportation Systems, was
primarily there to serve the needs of Metro, not the rest of the needs of the municipal operators,
which made it difficult for the agency to choose to use the TAP fareboxes. The agency decided
to purchase its own fareboxes with a smart card system that will also allow for their customers to
purchase fares using a mobile application, which is not currently available in the TAP system.
Even after the initial decision for the County decided to purchase TAP mobile validators
for the transit agencies not using the TAP technology, the agency was still unsure about using the
TAP technology alongside their new fareboxes. CUBIC Transportation Systems, the TAP
contractors initially seemed wary about sharing its program that would allowing its software to
interface with the agency’s new farebox technology. Metro stepped in to convince the TAP
contractor that it was important for TAP customers to have seamless service through Santa
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65
Monica Big Blue Bus. However, the agency is the last of the municipal operators scheduled to
install the TAP mobile validators on their buses in 2015.
As a large transit agency, Santa Monica Big Blue Bus participated in the early formation
of the TAP program as well as in the procurement of TAP fareboxes for its buses that was never
utilized by the agency. As a municipal transit operator responsible to the City of Santa Monica,
it prioritized its community and its customers over the regional TAP program and the regional
transit users. The agency was uncomfortable with the level of service being provided by the
TAP program. It was unwilling to give up its autonomy and level of control to the regional TAP
program, one of the obstacles discussed by Rachel Fleishman (2008) in deciding whether or not
to work collaboratively.

Case Study: Beach Cities Transit
In stark contrast to the size of Foothill Transit, Long Beach Transit, and Santa Monica
Big Blue Bus that have multiple managers that can help the agency focus on fare collection and
implement the TAP fare collection program, Beach Cities Transit is a small transit agency with a
three person staff that manages the entire transit services. The agency is governed and funded
through the City of Redondo Beach, with some local funding from of the City of Manhattan
Beach. Beach Cities Transit runs two fixed route bus systems in addition to dial-a-ride services.
It primarily services Redondo Beach, Hermosa Beach, Manhattan Beach, and El Segundo with
connections to Metro Bus, Torrance Transit, and the Metro Green Line.
The City of Redondo Beach manages Beach Cities Transit and includes a Transit
Manager and two staff members, with a contracted service for their bus operations. There has
been two different Transit Managers of the Beach Cities Transit during the TAP implementation
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66
period. The current Transit Manager, Joyce Rooney, has worked for Beach Cities Transit since
2010.
At the time that the contract was developed for purchase of the TAP fareboxes in 2002,
Redondo Beach did not have fixed routes and thus were not part of the procurement of the TAP
fareboxes. The current fixed routes were picked up from bus lines that Metro was looking to
drop in 2004 and 2005. After Beach Cities Transit established the fixed route systems and joined
the Municipal Transit Operators receiving federal funds, the TAP fareboxes had already been
purchased. Setting aside funds to purchase TAP fareboxes was not a priority for the agency. It
has primarily remained silent in the discussions of TAP throughout the years, not seeing it as
relevant to its operations.
This view changed in 2012 following the meeting set up by Metro Board Chair and
Mayor of Los Angeles, Antonio Villaraigosa. Beach Cities Transit accepted Metro’s offer to
fund and install TAP mobile validators. It is scheduled to start using the TAP system in late
2014. This will allow the agency to continue using its current fareboxes and the system of paper
monthly passes and paper transfers, which are preprinted each month for the three hundred or so
passengers (primarily students) who use the passes. Using paper passes allows the agency to
mail out the 50 to 100 passes requested each a month. As Beach Cities Transit does not
currently have any electronic systems in place, it does not have plans to sell its monthly passes
on the TAP cards. Using the TAP mobile validators will help them to accept the EZ transit
passes on the TAP card as well as transfers from the Green Line Light Rail.
Joyce Rooney, the transit manager for Beach Cities Transit, and also the Chair of the Bus
Operators Subcommittee expressed concern about participating in the TAP program. Offering a
new fare product will create more work and for its staff to manage the selling of TAP fare cards
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67
along with its current monthly pass programs. The TAP fare collection program will require a
new set of reports to integrate and analyze each month for federal reporting purposes. Rooney
has also expressed concern about not being able to recoup fares from TAP cards. As the Chair of
the Bus Operators Subcommittee, she has heard the municipal transit operators complain about
the initial invoice of fare reconciliation to the TAP program after Metro tried to recoup its TAP
fares from the first few years of the TAP program.
There are several reasons for the Beach Cities Transit to be a late adopter of the TAP fare
collection program. The primary reason is that they were not a participant in the original CMAQ
grant for Federal funds for the TAP program and therefore would have had to fund their own
TAP fareboxes in order to be part of the program. This changed when Metro offered to fund the
TAP mobile validators in 2012. The current Transit Manager, Rooney, who serves as the Chair
of the Bus Operators Subcommittee and also participates in the General Managers meetings, has
only herself and two staff to manage and administer their entire transit operations. Beach Cities
Transit does not have the extra staff resources like Foothill Transit to participate fully in the
multiple planning meetings for TAP, much less to develop a plan for the use of TAP in their
current transit operations.

Lessons Learned from Case Studies
Three of the four mini cases involve the largest transit agencies in the region, just behind
Metro’s transit operations. Foothill Transit, Long Beach Transit, and Santa Monica Big Blue
Bus, each took a different stance with the TAP program. One agency was an early adopter.
Another agency initially moved to be an early adopter of the TAP program, but pulled out and
eventually came back as a late adopter. A third agency has watched TAP program on the
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68
sidelines and is set to be a late adopter. Because of the size of the three agencies along with the
areas that they cover, these varying degrees of participation constrain the ability of the transit
users to use the TAP card as a true universal fare card for the County.
In each of the interviews with the three larger agencies, the importance of being a
regional player was mentioned. Mistrust of Metro, the TAP program, and the TAP contractors,
was mentioned as a limiting factor to their participation in the midst of the TAP implementation
period. Foothill Transit was willing to move forward with the TAP program despite the trust
issues, seeing itself as a regional participant, while Long Beach Transit and Santa Monica Big
Blue Bus were not willing to move the TAP program forward with their agency because of their
distrust.
Beach Cities Transit is included as a mini case to help the reader to understand the issues
of being a “latecomer” to a collaborative project, and also demonstrate the struggles of the
smaller agency in implementing the TAP program because of the lack of available resources.
Financially, it missed out on receiving a share of the CMAQ grant funds that were made
available to the other agencies. Having only three dedicated transit staff was also a resource
constraint that makes it difficult to be fully involved in making decisions about TAP
implementation. While the TAP program is a fare collection system, it also requires training in
customer service, training of the bus maintenance staff, and the training of the bus operators.
Also, with any new technology, there also needs to be an understanding of the technological
issues. While large agencies have multiple managers to handle each area, many of the medium
and smaller agencies do not have the luxury of these resources.
Having experienced the implementation of TAP as a manager in a medium sized agency,
the implementation of the program was not an easy one, utilizing much staff time of all of the
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69
managerial staff by having to play multiple roles in managing the marketing, customer service,
as well as understanding the financial and technical issues that come with implementing the TAP
program for the agency. Coordination with the other agencies also requires many meetings with
the TAP management and TAP consultants.
In all of the agencies interviewed, the incentives of funded TAP fareboxes and TAP
mobile validators were the primary reason each agency eventually decided to implement the
TAP program. While all of the agencies agreed that the TAP program has problems, most agree
that the idea of bringing their customers a universal fare card is important. With the EZ transit
pass, a regional monthly pass, being placed on TAP cards, the agencies recognize that the
regional transit customers will benefit from the TAP program.

4.4 Collaboration/Partnership Effectiveness
The mini cases highlighted many of the problems that were faces by four of the transit
agencies in the TAP implementation process. They and others interviewed discussed topics that
could be categorized as problems with collaboration and partnership as identified in the literature
review. There were three identified themes that consistently came up during the interviews
which were the issue of trust, a concern about autonomy, and the high transaction costs of seeing
more obstacles than benefits of the TAP program, all of which are also discussed in the literature
review on collaboration and partnerships.

Areas of distrust
Distrust was implied by many of those interviewed as an obstacle to the development of
the TAP program. There was often an “us” verses “them” mentality when it came to the
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70
relationship between Metro and the “Munis,” which are all of the federally funded transit
agencies in the County besides Metro. In the interviews there was a lack of distinction between
Metro as the County’s planning and programming agency and Metro the transit operator. The
TAP manager often was seen to be focused on developing the TAP program for Metro’s Transit
Operations, not necessarily looking to the Munis’ best interests as it should have as part of the
County’s planning and programming agency. This distrust of the TAP program also was
directed at the TAP smart card technology and the TAP consultants.
Metro. Most of the distrust of the program was mostly directed at Metro. Several of the
interviewees suggested that Metro chose the TAP farebox specifications and the TAP contractors
without input from the Municipal Operators. Some of the distrust was based on perception, as
the former TAP manager and at least one of the municipal operators recalled that there were
municipal operators that also participated in the selection process. Because of the turnover of
transit managers, it is also likely that many of the current managers were not aware of the TAP
program back in 2003.
There is a lack of understanding about any contractual agreements with the TAP program
that likely contributed to the distrust. The latest copy of the TAP Operating Rules was dated
2011, but still has several sections labeled, “TBD,” Indicating that it is not kept up to date and
not closely followed. The municipal operators were asked for a large amount of trust to
implement the TAP program, without knowing the exact methodology for the sharing of the TAP
funds (the “Clearinghouse”) prior to the installation as well as how the TAP program would
continue to be funded. The agencies that were early adopters in using the TAP program had to
“trust” Metro and the TAP program that the reconciliation process would be fair.
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71
The TAP Technology. Prior to the installation by an agency, there was some distrust of
the “regional central computer” that was set up to house all of the farebox information that is
controlled by an outside party formerly known as ACS, now Xerox. Because the rules for the
sharing and payments were not fully agreed upon prior to the installation of the TAP fareboxes
on other systems, several of the transit agencies did not want to install their TAP fareboxes.
Metro was also weary of sharing of the funds and chose not to sell cash value on TAP cards for
the first few years, choosing to only sell Metro passes which would be funded directly back to
Metro. Cash value on TAP cards were only available through Ticket Vending Machines (TVMs)
at Metro Rail stations, through the taptogo.net website on the internet, or through the limited
number of transit agencies using TAP. This demonstrated to the other transit operators that
Metro also did not trust the regional central computer and the clearinghouse process. With the
limited availability of cash value on TAP cards, Metro would ensure that less of its funds would
get comingled with the other transit agencies using TAP.
Also prior to installation, there was distrust over the technology and the “truthfulness” of
the data. While none of the existing TAP users complained that it was an ongoing issue, this
remained a large concern for non-users and for those that held out on installing the TAP
fareboxes. All of the TAP fareboxes for the transit agencies were pre-programmed with Metro’s
fare tables and required modification in order to fit the specific agency’s fare tables and products.
Receiving fareboxes pre-programmed with Metro fare tables, rather than blank fare tables
highlighted the other transit agencies’ perceived positions as secondary players to Metro in the
TAP program. These were programming issues that the TAP contractor would need to fix in
order to correctly record an agency’s data. For some agencies, those corrections occurred slowly
for a number of reasons from the fault of the agency not communicating their needs and the
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72
some from the TAP contractors in their response to those needs. Those that held out on
installing the TAP technology cited their fear of bad data as their primary reason to hold off on
installing the TAP fareboxes.
TAP contractors. Another area of distrust was directed at the contractors of the TAP
card. CUBIC Transportation Systems, which programmed and installed the technology and
ACS/Xerox, which controlled the regional central computer, was often seen as unresponsive to
the transit agencies’ needs. Some of the agencies mentioned that they were not included in the
development of the specifications of the TAP farebox or the choosing of CUBIC Transportation
Systems or ACS/Xerox. Their perception of CUBIC Transportation Systems was that of a
contractor that often said problems could not be fixed or if it was fixable, that it was out of their
scope of work and they would need a contract extension. While ACS/Xerox was contracted to
manage the Regional Central Computer for the TAP program, the “Clearinghouse” was not fully
developed until several years after a few of the transit agencies had been on the TAP system.
The TAP contractors were seen as “outsiders” that did not fully understand the autonomy
expected by the individual transit agencies within a regional fare collection program.
Fairness of shared public funds. Although peripheral issues to TAP, there were other
issues that exacerbated the distrust between the municipal transit operators and Metro. One such
issue mentioned in several interviews, was the issue of transit funds. In Los Angeles County,
there is a complicated Formula Allocation Procedure, a formula based on “fare units” for the
allocation of transit subsidies given to the County from local, state, and federal sources. During
the time of the TAP implementation, it was perceived that Metro took advantage of the formula
to take a larger share of the transit funds, which meant that the other transit agencies would get
less.
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73
For some of the transit agencies, there was anger over the perceived “gaming” of the
Formula Allocation Procedure (FAP) being done by Metro when it first developed a day pass
and lowered its base fare. Some of the other agencies quickly realized this and followed suit by
developing their own day passes as well. However, since Long Beach Transit was already using
the TAP fareboxes, the TAP contractor would not change their fare tables without additional
payment for changes to their fare tables at a higher rate than it typically costs to make changes to
fare tables. It was one of the reasons that Long Beach Transit decided to withdraw from the TAP
program.
This regional distrust spilled over to the implementation of TAP, with many of the transit
agencies distrustful of anything coming from Metro. Metro also held onto a distrust of the
municipal transit operators’ reporting on their numbers, believing their numbers to be inflated,
especially the numbers reported on their ridership so that they could claim a larger share of funds
from the FAP. It was one of the reasons that Metro thought that the transit agencies were
hesitant to install their TAP fareboxes because they would be on the same data system and would
no longer be able to “fix” their numbers.

Fear of Losing Autonomy
Wrapped up in the issue of trust was a fear by the agencies that would have less
autonomy by participating in the TAP program. Each transit agency in Los Angeles has its own
fare policies. For each agency, it has its own rate for base fares, local transfers fares, interagency
transfer fees, etc., policies that are set by its City Councils or Boards. Each agency also has
different fares and ages for seniors and youth ages. For example, a passenger that is aged 61
might be able to use a senior rate (usually half price) on some agencies, but may be required to
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74
pay the full fare on other transit agencies whose senior age starts at 62 or 65. While this policy
makes it difficult for a person to determine their fare for each agency, it is the autonomy that
each agency has expected. The transit agencies did not want their fare policies to be determined
by Metro or the other agencies.
The TAP manger and consultants had a difficult time with keeping up and adjusting each
of the agencies’ fare policies for each agency. When municipal operators wanted to change fares
or develop new fare policies, they were held hostage to the TAP consultant’s timeline and costs
for those adjustments. The lack of control over the ability to change their own fare policies was
a cause for concern about the TAP program for the agencies.
There were other issues that caused concern about autonomy in participating in a regional
TAP program. While it is still an issue moving forward, the use of the TAP mobile validators
allows an agency to retain its autonomy by controlling its own fareboxes alongside the TAP
program. This is one of the primary reasons that agencies like Long Beach Transit and Santa
Monica Big Blue Bus were willing to move forward with finally participating in the TAP
program.

High Transaction Costs
While most of the interviewees seemed to understand the ideal benefits of participating in
a universal fare card program with the region, it was easier for interviewees to discuss the
obstacles previously discussed in implementing the TAP program. Most interviewees also
mentioned being cashless as another benefit for customers who did not like to carry cash as well
as to their agency needing to handle and count less cash. Several mentioned that the EZ transit
pass program was a successful implementation of a universal fare card program for regular
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75
transit commuters that was less complicated for the region to implement than the TAP program.
The obstacles/ transaction costs that came up in implementing a smart card program was an
unknown to the early TAP adopters, but for many years had prevented the late TAP adopters
from adopting the TAP program.
Richard Fieock (2004) suggests that transaction costs can be reduced by pursuing
regional goals, which includes the building social capital or creating incentives. The regional
goal of developing a universal fare card program for transit customers throughout Los Angeles
was an incentive for the TAP program. Through a shared grant and County funding, much of the
financial costs for the TAP program have been reduced. It is likely that many of the agencies
would not be participating in the TAP program if they had to fund the technology on their own.
TAP confusion. All of the interviewees were quick to point out that the implementation
of the TAP program caused confusion among their customers and bus operators. This presented
a major concern for the transit agencies because they were unable to provide good customer
service because of the confusion in using the TAP card. Fortunately, for regular riders who
frequently use their TAP card, it has now become easier to use. However, for many
discretionary riders, the TAP system can be confusing and using the TAP card can take more
time for the bus operators because of the confusion. At the beginning of the TAP program, many
customers did not understand that the TAP card could carry multiple fare products at the same
time, including passes and debited “cash” for fares. For example, many Metro customers who
purchased monthly, weekly, or daily passes incorrectly assumed that if they saw a TAP symbol
on another bus system, that their pass would also be valid with the other systems.
There are several reasons for an “invalid” read on the bus that demonstrates a flawed
product. Customers could board the bus with a newly loaded TAP card, however, the TAP
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76
farebox would read, “invalid” on the bus because the TAP information from the card is not
downloaded onto the buses farebox until the bus pulls into their maintenance yard at end of the
day. Also the current rules for multiple transfers on TAP are confusing and not intuitive. For
example, a customer carefully researched and planned a trip using Metro and Long Beach
Transit using a TAP card. She paid for the entire trip at the Metro Rail Ticket Vending Machine
(TVM). When she tried to use her TAP card to board a Long Beach Transit Bus, the card was
“invalid” and she was asked to pay the full fare on the bus. Understandably, that customer was
irate and complained to Long Beach Transit’s customer service. Long Beach Transit’s customer
service had to research the issue with a TAP Customer Service Member to find out that her
sequence of paying on the first trip and using the card was incorrect. Multiple fare tables and
rules for each transit agency also make the TAP card more cumbersome and confusing for the
transit rider.
Fraud. Knowing that the TAP card often reads, “invalid,” some people fraudulently use
a TAP card without any fare media on the bus, telling the bus operator that they paid for the fare
on their TAP card. The bus operator has no way of knowing the true reason why their card does
not work and often allows them to board to avoid a confrontation and hold up the bus. Most of
the transit managers interviewed expressed concern with losing fares over “invalid” TAP cards
or holding up boarding to deal with problem cards, although for some agencies, those lost fares
were more important than for others.
Shortage of personnel. The implementation of the TAP program took much time and
effort for every agency that implemented the TAP program. All of the bus operators needed to
be trained in the use of the TAP fareboxes. The bus maintenance staff needed to be trained in
working with a new piece of technology on the buses. The customer service staff needed to be
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77
trained in handling TAP questions and servicing the TAP cards. For many of the small to
medium agencies, their entire agency was involved in implementing the TAP program. For
several agencies this represented a difficult obstacle and they decided that they would rather not
implement the TAP programs with the problems associated with the TAP card rather than to try
to fix the problems.
Several interviewees mentioned that the former TAP Manager and the consultants from
CUBIC Transportation Systems were slow to respond to their agency’s needs. Less staff
resources were dedicated to helping the municipal operators respond to their TAP concerns and
install the fareboxes, especially when Metro extended its contract with CUBIC Transportation
Systems and began work on installing the gates at the Metro Rail stations. This slowed down the
process of the TAP farebox installations with the transit agencies and led some agencies to
disengage in the TAP program. There was a negative transaction cost due to the frustration and
stress factor of the agencies’ needs not being met.

Technology and Data
An interesting find in analyzing the interviews was that while there was a general
understanding of the technology and the data for the smart card, most were not aware of the type
of data that could be used for transit planning from the smart card, a primary benefit mentioned
in the smart card literature (Chu and Chapleau, 2010 and Jang, 2010.) Should that data be used
for collaborative transit planning in Los Angeles, the information would allow the agencies to
redesign trips for more efficiency, noting where and when people are transferring. The agencies
have not used the available data other than the traditional passenger and pass counts that they
need for reporting requirements. The interviewees have generally reported that the data is more
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78
reliable than their previous passenger counts that relied on the bus operator manually pressing
buttons on the farebox as each passenger came through. While there was some initial distrust of
the data received through TAP, for most of the agencies that currently use TAP, the data is
generally seen as reliable.
Metro is the only agency beginning to use the data for transit planning, likely because it
is the only agency with transportation planning staff dedicated to analyzing TAP data. However,
because of the distrust over being able to “see” each other’s TAP data, the Metro staff can only
analyze Metro Bus and Rail information, preventing full analysis of transit data of the County.
Should the other transit agencies allow for shared data analysis it would also require a level of
trust that Metro will not just use the transit data for its own benefit.
The collaboration failure was one of the major obstacles that was identified in the ability
for the TAP program to move forward. The issues of distrust between the organizations as well
as with the TAP technology and TAP consultants left many of the organizations unwilling to
move forward despite the TAP fareboxes that were purchased and sitting in a warehouse. The
TAP program failed to address the issues of autonomy and the fear of the agencies’ ability to
control their own fareboxes and their own data. While there were federal grant funds used to
purchase the TAP fareboxes which made the initial decision to participate in the TAP program
an easy one for the transit agencies, there was a failure to count the transactions costs that were
needed prior to the implementation of the TAP program. While the timing of the available grant
funds seemed to have led to the implementation of the TAP program, there could have been
better planning for the implementation of the TAP program.

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4.5 Summary of Analysis
It is clear from the analysis that the implementation of the TAP program was not
effectively planned. There was impetus for the development of a universal fare card in Los
Angeles County and the funding for the fareboxes were available, which pushed the TAP
program to move forward. However, the planning for the TAP program and its implementation
was not very well thought through prior to the hiring of TAP contractors and purchasing the TAP
fareboxes for the region.
Different agencies made different decisions about their participation in the program. This
was primarily due to the decisions of the General Managers and the weight that they placed on
being part of a regional program verses their own agency’s autonomy to control its own funds
and ability to service its own customers. For medium and smaller agencies it was a transaction
cost issue of being able to implement the TAP program with minimal additional financial costs
to their agency.
While there was effort made at the beginning of the process to have the TAP project be a
collaborative project, once a key municipal transit operator manager left the planning process,
the focus on being a collaborative program fell apart. While the previous TAP manager from
Metro was extremely knowledgeable about the smart card technology, her strength and priority
was not on building collaboration and trust among the municipal transit operators. The TAP
contractors that were awarded the contracts for the TAP program were picked for their expertise
with the transit smart cards; however, they were likely unaware of the collaboration skills that
would be needed to navigate a universal fare card program in Los Angeles County. Especially
being “outsiders” to the transit dynamics in Los Angeles County, it is likely that the TAP
contractors were also unaware of the distrust and politics that they were stepping into. To their
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credit, as indicated from the interviews, Metro and the TAP contractors have changed their
course over the past few years and have been placing collaboration as a priority to the
implementation of the TAP program.
The analysis demonstrates some of the weaknesses of the implementation of the TAP
program thus far. One large agency in Los Angeles County has still not implemented the TAP
program although it has plans to do so by the end of 2014 or early 2015. Another medium sized
agency has no plans on implementing the TAP program beyond its current Bus Rapid line. The
TAP card has many complaints from discretionary riders and is not easy to use for tourists or
people looking to use public transit as a transportation option. For many of the “poor” that use
public transit in Los Angeles, the TAP card is not very accessible because it costs money to
purchase a TAP card and many do not have available cash to prepay for their rides by loading a
TAP card at least 48 hours in advance of their trip.
The more we can learn from the lessons of the TAP program, the more likely that the
future of a universal fare card for the region can succeed. Recommendations and solutions will
be discussed in more depth in Chapter V. While many of the transit agencies in the region are
looking forward to planning for a better universal fare card for the future of Los Angeles as well
as a possible expansion throughout Southern California, care should be noted to the
implementation of the program as well as its collaboration among the agencies, which can get
more complicated as the program involves more agencies.

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Chapter 5: Concluding Discussion

When the Metro Board approved the universal fare card program in 1998, it is likely that
they did not expect a TAP fare collection program that is not fully implemented by the end of
2014. The analysis reveals many of the problems that occurred in its implementation from the lack
of supporting statutory features and non-statutory characteristics. There was potential for the use
of the TAP smart card to improve the transit users’ experience in Los Angeles. However much of
that potential became lost in the TAP program as the TAP card was developed for use for Metro’s
transit operations and other transit agencies were tacked onto the system. There was a lack of
understanding of the collaborative partnership that was required for the regional project. By
identifying the failures in the implementation of the TAP program, there are many lessons that we
can learn from those failures and use them to develop some solutions for future improvement.

5.1 Current state of TAP program
The originally purchased TAP fareboxes in 2003 is quickly becoming old technology.
While most of those TAP fareboxes have been installed, those purchased for some agencies have
not installed those TAP fareboxes in those systems and another agency disabled its fareboxes of the
TAP technology. To date, there is one large municipal transit operator (Santa Monica Big Blue
Bus) that has not yet implemented the TAP program and another medium sized agency (Torrance
Transit) that has no plans to fully implement the TAP program system-wide. The system is still not
very customer friendly, particularly to non-regular transit users, leaving customers unable to use
freshly loaded TAP cards on most buses.
With all of the municipal transit operators planned to come “online” with the TAP program
by sometime in 2015, there is also some optimism that the TAP system can be improved with
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reprogramming of the TAP software. Once all of the transit agencies are using the TAP system,
the current “antiquated” use of paper interagency transfers can be eliminated. By developing a new
second transfer policy, it would allow the TAP card to “remember” that a full fare was just
previously deducted and deduct a smaller transfer rate at the second boarding for a different transit
agency. This would allow faster boarding of TAP users by eliminating the need for the customer to
interact with the bus operator to handle the transfer process. The second bus agency would also
automatically receive the credit for funds for the transfer, whereas currently, the second bus
operator receives nothing for giving the transfer ride.
The Executive Director of Metro, Art Leahy, has already invited the General Managers of
the Municipal Operators to participate in developing the next generation of fare collection
technology for the region. This invitation has given the Municipal Operators a sense of optimism
about the future of the TAP program or the next generation of a universal fare card program. They
are hoping to look at the different fare collection technologies that are available to transit agencies
and develop a plan for implementation of a program in the future.

5.2 Overview of Significant Findings
Lacks customer focus. Throughout the implementation of the TAP program, the focus of
the program became the technology of the fare collection system and became less about the ease of
use of the TAP program for the transit customers. The TAP website (Welcome to TAP, 2014)
claims that the TAP card is for “seamless, convenient travel,” however this has failed to be true for
many passengers. Not being able to load the TAP card online and use it for 48 hours is not
convenient for customers. The inability to use the card between the beach and Hollywood and
other popular tourist destinations, is not seamless. It is not easy for discretionary riders to use
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TAP, needing to ensure that their TAP card has the proper fare product and still be aware of the
fare policies for each transit agency they use. It is not easy for tourists to use the TAP card because
of the time that it takes to activate the card and the complicated fare policies in transferring from
different transit agencies. However, the TAP card can be seamless, convenient travel for those that
regularly use transit for commuter trips and for those who have regular travel patterns.
Inconsistent implementation. An analysis of the interviews revealed that each agency
made different decisions about TAP for different reasons. While all of the agencies “agreed” to
use TAP fareboxes when the fareboxes were purchased, the “agreement” was for the purchase
agreement for grant-funded fareboxes. There was no agreement in place about the level of
participation. Some agencies participated in development while some of them did not. As the TAP
implementation process dragged on through the years, the level of participation in the TAP
program waned. Some of the agencies chose to disengage from the program and have only re-
engaged in the past few years with additional County funds and newer technology.
The installation of TAP has yielded mixed results. Most of the municipal transit operators
are now on the TAP system and Metrolink passengers are also able to use TAP on Los Angeles
County transit systems. While the TAP fareboxes are reaching the end of their useful lives, one of
the larger agencies in the County is still not yet on the TAP system and another medium agency has
no plans to expand its use other than on a bus rapid line that goes into Downtown Los Angeles.
There are also several different TAP technologies currently in use. Some of the agencies
have the original TAP fareboxes, which allow for TAP purchases on the bus. One agency uses
TAP light validators attached to its farebox, which also allows bus operators to adjust fare
payments for distance-based fares or pay for transfers. The late TAP adopters are receiving TAP
mobile validators that can only read TAP cards and may or may not be attached to a farebox. The
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bus operator has limited interaction with the card other than to see if the fares are valid. The TAP
mobile validators also have a newer technology, which allow for updates to the devices over the
mobile 3G networks.
Collaboration Issues. The analysis in Chapter IV shows that there were some of the
common pitfalls present for collaborative projects as discussed in Chapter II. The common pitfalls
mentioned during the interviews were areas of distrust, fear of losing autonomy, and high
transaction costs. The presences of these collaborative obstacles made the TAP program a difficult
regional project to implement. The previous Metro CEO recognized that there was distrust from
the Municipal Transit Operators, “over anything coming from Metro.” Autonomy was tested every
time another agency was added to the TAP program and requested customization of the TAP cards
to fit its existing fare structure. There was no set agreement at the beginning of the TAP program
that laid out expectations for each agency. Therefore, there was no real understanding of the
transaction costs and process that went along with participating in the program.
The early TAP adopters had managers that believed in the smart card technology and did
not foresee the problems that would arise in implementation. Middle TAP adopters delayed their
TAP installation dates and waited for some resolution on the problems, but they often adopted the
TAP program out of necessity for new fareboxes. This caused the other municipal transit operators
to have second thoughts after seeing earlier adopters encounter problems. It is likely that many of
the transit agencies would have continued their disengagement from the TAP program had it not
been for the offer of funded TAP mobile validators. This allowed for some distance from some of
the TAP problems and allowed for more control for the agency over its own fareboxes.
Policy Implementation Issues. While the TAP program is nearing full implementation
with all of the transit agencies in region, there are still obvious failures of implementation. The
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TAP contractors were signed and fareboxes purchased before a plan was in place. The TAP
program began because there was funding in place, but it could be argued that the funding was
wasted because many fareboxes were not installed until the technology was aging and not all of the
agencies ended up using the TAP fareboxes that they purchased. The impacts of the TAP program
were not well planned regarding the usability of product on the customers. Invalid TAP cards
often confused customers. Bus operators are often put into difficult situations, unable to give an
accurate reason when TAP cards are invalid. Agencies lost the ability to control of their own
fareboxes and are often at the mercy of a TAP contractor to fix their problems or make any changes
to their fare tables. There also remains a long list of technical issues that should be fixed in order
for TAP to better serve the transit riders and the transit agencies.
While the TAP program may have started with the intention of being a universal fare card
as a regional program, it was not a full collaborative effort in its implementation. Several agencies
stated that they felt it was Metro’s program, rather than a regional program. Prior managers at
Metro and the TAP contractors were ill prepared for the difficulties of the TAP program as a
collaborative project with different agencies. Some of the agencies would disengage over their
frustration with the project, only to be brought back in after some political pressure was applied to
the agencies. All of the interviewees with the municipal transit operators were in agreement that
there are deficiencies in the TAP program.

5.3 Recommendations
The following recommendations are based on the findings from the literature review and
the analysis conducted from the interviews. The recommendations are in divided into three
categories. The first category is based on the current TAP implementation process and the things
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that should be done to “complete” the TAP implementation that was started in 1997. While the
TAP card and program is not perfect, the idea of a universal fare card for regular commuters will
be achieved. The second recommendation is based on the idea that the TAP program could be
improved as a collaborative program. For the future of the transit in the region, the ability to
improve the collaborative relationship among the transit managers will help with making transit
better for the region. The recommendations within this category will help for the future of the TAP
program and also to help with transit improvements and innovation for Los Angeles County. The
third category of recommendations will be on the steps needed for policy implementation for the
future of the TAP card, for which the process and the discussion has begun. By developing the
steps needed to make the TAP program successful for the region, it can be immensely improved by
learning from the past missteps of the implementation of the TAP program.

5.3.1 Improve the Current TAP Program
Develop a priority list of TAP improvements. The current TAP system has outstanding
programmatic issues that need to be addressed. Some of the agencies are better at vocalizing their
issues and getting them fixed than others. Some agencies are still having issues with their data,
while most have reported to be satisfied with theirs.
Developing a priority list and timeline with the TAP contractors so that they can address the
technical issues will help the region to manage the issues and make it transparent to all of the
agencies of the progress being done. Being more transparent would also allow the agencies to
know that the TAP contractors are also making progress and are investing in the progress of the
program. TAP progress reports can be given monthly at each GM and BOS meetings as well as
regular reports to the Metro Board.
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Work with the remaining agencies to implement the TAP program. Priority should be
placed on getting the remainder of the Municipal Transit Operators fully onto the TAP program.
Extra effort may need to be made to ensure that they get their concerns addressed with the TAP
card. The other transit agencies on the TAP program should also be used to address any remaining
concerns and issues.

5.3.2 Strengthen the Collaboration
Build trust. With the issue of distrust playing a large role as an obstacle with many of the
agencies for the delay in the TAP implementation, working on building trust between Metro and
the Municipal Transit Operators could be integral to improving the process of developing the next
phase of the universal fare card as well as perhaps bring about an improvement in transit service
throughout Los Angeles. While many interviewees reported that the issue of trust has improved
over the past few years and most seem to be optimistic about the future relationship, taking steps to
continue to improve trust among the organizations can improve the collaboration to the point of
sprouting further innovation among the transit agencies (Sørensen and Torfing, 2011.)
Organizational development consultants or activities can help with exercises and group
activities to build trust. One of the shortcomings of the area of organizational development is that
it has not been used much with collaborations/partnerships. However, because the transit agencies
work in “groups” though the General Managers meetings and the Bus Operators Subcommittee
meetings, these are potential “groups” that could be used to develop better collaboration. Hiring an
organizational development consultant to work with the groups would help in building trust among
the organizations.
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The area of process consultation (Schein, 1988) can help in providing methods to
understanding the current group dynamics. Process consultation can help with understanding the
dynamics of a group, by having someone intentionally notice the interactions within the group.
The communication in a group can be easily observed, such as who talks, when people talk, who
talks to whom, etc. However, some communication is also non-verbal, where body language and
gestures may play a larger role, which can also be more easily observed by an outsider. The
culture of a group can also speak to the dynamics of the group as to how they operate. Even
though some of the group may change from meeting to meeting, there is still an understood culture
and norms of the group dependent on those that come in and out of the group. Understanding the
group dynamics can help identify areas of distrust that people in the group may be feeling with
each other, but may be unwilling to verbalize it in the group.
An identified area of distrust remains in the current Formula Allocation Procedure (FAP)
that is used to allocate funds. The FAP may need to be reassessed so that the transit agencies can
build trust. Addressing the FAP may also lead to the transit agencies being able to have more
similar fare tables across the region. The current fare policies for many of the transit agencies are a
result of trying to keep the base fares low to get more money from the FAP and has led to the
development of daily passes, different transfer rates, etc.
Develop and understand the goals. One of the failures of developing the TAP program
was an inconsistent understanding of the goals of the program. If the goal was to develop a
universal fare card for the region for commuters that goal was achieved by the development of the
EZ transit pass. If the goal was to move the transit agencies towards a cashless fare system that
could be used Countywide, that goal should have been more clearly understood and communicated.
As it currently stands, the TAP card primarily benefits commuters. It does not work well for
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discretionary transit riders and for tourists, who need to pay extra in order to use a TAP card, need
to do some advanced planning to ensure that the funds and the products will be useable by the time
they plan to use it, be well versed in the product types they need to use, and know which agencies
currently use TAP technology.
Address Autonomy. Another fear of the TAP program was that participating in the
program would cause a loss of control of the agencies own fare policies. This fear was exacerbated
by the TAP fareboxes being preprogrammed with Metro’s fare tables and having to request
adjustments from the TAP contractor to the correct fare tables for their own agency. The agencies
feared having all of their transit data being put into a central computer and not being able to pull
the information off at will, as they had prior to the TAP program. The agencies also feared losing
control of their own fare tables, being forced to “wait in line” while the TAP contractor worked on
other issues before getting their fare tables corrected.
One of the primary considerations for the future of the TAP program is addressing the issue
of autonomy for the transit agencies in the region. If the TAP program were meant to be customer
focused, universal fare policies should be developed that would make it easier for customers to use
the TAP card. However, if the autonomy of each agency were a priority over transit customers of
the TAP program, than any new fare collection technology would need to allow agencies to retain
their control. Had the preservation of autonomy of each agency been discussed and understood at
the beginning of the program, the TAP fareboxes might not have been purchased for the region.
A solution to autonomy preservation is the expansion of the TAP mobile validators
program. The agencies that will use the TAP mobile validators are allowed to utilize the full
function of their own farebox and control their own fare policies while accepting the TAP fare
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payments. The separate hardware for TAP mobile validators makes it more obvious to the transit
users that they are using a shared regional product.
While the transit agencies may choose to give up control of programming their own
fareboxes in favor of a developing a fare collection program that is more customer focused and a
less costly procurement to each agency, those choices should have been made though a joint
collaboration of the agencies and not by Metro. Had the functioning of all of the agency’s
fareboxes originally been kept separate from the TAP program, the agencies might have felt less
threatened by the TAP technology and a better outcome might have been achieved.
Lower transaction costs. The burden of establishing a regional fare card needs to consider
the transaction costs on the smaller agencies as well as the larger agencies. It should be made clear
to the transit agencies that the TAP department was a function of the County’s Planning and
Programming function, rather than primarily to Metro Transit Operations. The transit agencies
should be able to request support from the TAP department when it came to training, marketing,
and data analysis, especially for the smaller transit agencies. While training and marketing services
were made available to the other transit agencies when requested, the requests have typically taken
a back seat to Metro transit operations.
One of the primary benefits of utilizing a smart card is that passenger data can be tracked
across multiple transit agencies. Because of the other transit agency’s sensitivity to giving Metro
access to their data, Metro has not been able to fully analyze the TAP data. The medium and small
transit agencies typically do not have the staff available to dedicate to analyzing the TAP data for
their own agency’s planning purposes. The County’s transit system could be made more efficient
and effective if transit planners in the region to be able to access the transfer data to know where
the transit customers are going.
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An improvement in partnership among the transit agencies can move the TAP program
forward. There should be a conscientious effort to decrease the distrust that exists in the region,
partly stemming from the past steps of the TAP implementation, but also other regional issues that
may need to be addressed. A better collaboration among the transit agencies can also lead to
innovation among the agencies (Sørensen and Torfing, 2011) for improved transit service.

5.3.3 Develop a Plan for the Future Regional Fare Collection System
Developing a logic model for the implementation of a new universal fare collection
program for the region can aid in learning from past mistakes of poor implementation and
developing the steps needed to implement a new universal fare collection program that benefits the
region. A logic model is a systematic method to ensure that the necessary elements of the
Mazmanian and Sabatier’s (1989) policy implementation framework are fully developed. These
steps include understanding and developing the non-statutory characteristics that are necessary to
support the program, that is, the resources needed for the program that include an understanding of
the stakeholders, the financial resources, and staff needed to improve the program. The activities
needed to achieve the goals should be planned and implemented as statutory features. The
activities should address the expected outputs and outcomes from those activities. A recommended
logic model is demonstrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 5.1 Logic model for future regional fare collection program
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Understand Inputs/Resources
Identify and understand the stakeholders. One of the primary failures in the
implementation of the TAP program was that the stakeholders were not well understood and/or
utilized. Several of the municipal transit operators stated that they felt as if the TAP program was
Metro Transit Operations’ project that they were pressured to join. Metro Transit Operations is
just one of the stakeholders, albeit the largest one, in a new universal fare collection program.
The municipal transit operators are stakeholders and should play a large role in the decision
making process. The smaller transit operators, the members of the Local Transit Systems
Subcommittee (LTSS) should also be considered to be stakeholders, especially since they
typically serve to carry the passengers for their first and last mile.
Some transit agencies have different needs for fare policies other than the fixed route
base fare. Reducing bus operator interactions for easier distance based fares should be
considered, such as for LADOT’s Commuter Express, The City of Santa Clarita Transit, and
Antelope Valley Transit Authority (AVTA). Currently, the TAP user must tell the bus operator
where they are going in order for the correct fare to be deducted. Access Services, the
paratransit service for Los Angeles County, as well as other agencies that charge by distance for
paratransit service should also be able to use a distance based fare technology. Those that use
paratransit services should also be able to utilize the fare collection program for Access Service
taxi services as well as on fixed transit routes.
Transit customers should also be considered to be stakeholders. Focus groups could be
used to ensure that the TAP program is easy to use for transit customers. Currently, the TAP
card benefits regular commuters and frequent transit users. There are several transit and
transportation advocates that would be willing to provide input into the future of the regional fare
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collection program. Utilizing transit customers for input into the technology would help to
ensure that the fare program would be easy to use. It is not as easy for discretionary riders to
access the TAP program. With the many tourists from all over the United States and from
around the world that visit Southern California, the transit agencies should also consider a fare
collection program that would make it easier to access public transit to get between tourist sites
like Downtown Los Angeles, Hollywood, and the beaches.
Political support needs to be built for a regional fare collection program. Elected officials
from all across the County should be aware of the TAP program, especially among the municipal
transit operators. The Metro Board will also need to be committed to developing the regional
fare collection program and providing support for a better program than the current TAP
program. Its support is necessary to approve the funding and the work plan. The Metro Board
can also put the pressure on the Metro Planning and Programming to ensure that there are
sufficient resources for a countywide program, not just a Metro Transit program. Local City
Councils and Transit Agency Boards should also be kept updated with the regional fare
collection program that is being developed to ensure that there is broad political local support for
the program.
Dedicated funding for the future of the TAP program should also be developed and
openly reported. Currently, County transit funds are being used for the operations TAP program.
The TAP Operating Manual from November 2010 states that Metro is responsible with 70% of
the expenses, the Municipal Transit Operators responsible for 15% of the expenses, and the
remaining 15% from cost recovery. However, the dedication of those funds for the TAP
program are basically funds that are not distributed to the rest of the region, rather than funds
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distributed to the agencies and paid to the TAP operations. This cost sharing structure should be
evaluated to see the actual sharing of the expenses and be determined for future costs.

Collaboratively Develop Implementation Activities
There are several steps that should be done prior to making purchases of the technology.
These steps were not started or completed prior to the TAP contractors being hired and fareboxes
were purchased. The result of the lack of understanding and agreements was confusion and
distrust between Metro and the Transit Operators.
A primary step would be to develop and agree upon the goals of the program. For the
TAP program, a cashless universal fare card was developed and implemented for transit
commuters. The EZ transit pass that was developed at the same time as the TAP card and had a
similar goal, but was easier to implement without using new technology. However, if the
intention was to make the TAP card easily accessible for non-regular transit users, that goal was
not reached. Because every agency did not implement the TAP program at the same time, the
transfer rules between agencies became unintentionally confusing. TAP cards also need to be
purchased and prepaid 48 hours in advance online or through a vendor in order to be valid for
use on buses with TAP fareboxes.
Developing goals for the use of a regional fare collection program would clarify
expectations of the program. Decisions could be made upon the agreement of those goals. Once
the goals are agreed upon, it would be easier for the hired contractors to have clarity on their
responsibilities. Collaborating on a shared set of goals would also help with deciding on new
technology. Innovation can occur for the technology to be developed. Any new technology to
be purchased and utilized could be developed and programmed to satisfy those goals. For
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example, if the agencies decide that they would like to use smart phones to be able to pay for the
fares, as well as having separate smart cards for those that do not have smart phones, a transit
technology could likely be programmed and developed that could read the near field
communication in smart cards as well as in smart phones. Transit fare transactions could
possibly be made by using an electronic wallet via smart phone or provide incentives to use
stored value to a transit fare account. Retaining an electronic reader, like the TAP mobile
validators, could also allow agencies to use their own fareboxes with its own technology or
integrate their agency’s fare payments with the regional program. Existing technology can be
developed and programmed as subject to the demand.
Deciding the amount of autonomy and the responsibilities of each party would clarify the
roles and expectations. Several interviewees mentioned the concept of “an open architecture” for
the technology that would allow the agencies to hire their own contractors and be able to “plug
into” a regional fare collection program. There should be an agreement about which parts of the
program are regional and which parts of the program will be the responsibility of the agency.
Prior to the development of the technology, the transit agencies should review the
existing TAP program to understand all of the technical difficulties with the program from
various points of view. This includes looking at the transit agency’s difficulties with gathering
data and delivering service to customers. Bus operators, who provide customer service on the
bus while driving, should also provide input for service improvement. Vendors of the fare cards
should also provide feedback. Most importantly, the customers who use the TAP card should
also provide input into the current system. Reviews on social media play an important role in
current society and should be addressed.
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After developing goals for the program, there should be careful thought to developing the
operating and business rules and procedures for the program. These documents should be used
to ensure that the agencies understand the details of the programs. The documents should also be
approved by each agency for agreement and should also be maintained and updated. These rules
and procedures will clarify the share of the costs of the program as well as to maintain a long
term funding plan for the program and responsibilities for payment of contractors and equipment.
A plan for the transition to a new program/technology should be developed. Each of the
transit agencies has installed the TAP program at different times over the past decade. Some
agencies with new TAP mobile validators will not need their products replaced for some time,
while the agencies with older TAP fareboxes are likely to need replacements in the next few
years. Careful thought should be made into any transitioning of an older technology to a new
technology.
Developing a request for proposals and signing of contractors should be carefully crafted
by the agencies involved and should be in line with the goals of the program. The specifications
for the technology should also be developed in this same manner, although a massive
procurement for all of the transit agencies may not be needed this time around, especially if an
open architecture is developed so that multiple contractors can program into the same system.
However, agencies should consider collaboration on pursuing grant funding and joint
procurements for cost savings.

Output
The output of the activities that are undertaken should be a new and improved seamless
fare payment program for transit customers. The new product should be a vast improvement for
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the region over the current TAP card program by working out the deficiencies of the current TAP
product. It should be simple for commuters to use and reload. It should be easier for
discretionary transit users and for tourists visiting Southern California to use the exiting transit
system. The bus operators should be able to have minimal interactions with fare payments and
transfers. The agencies should be able to easily reconcile their fare payments.

Outcomes
A working regional seamless fare payment program can lead to multiple beneficial
short-term outcomes for the transit agencies and the region. It was hoped that the TAP
program could lead to a reduction in fraud of the visual passes and paper transfers, but those
benefits have yet to be realized with the continuation of the use of paper transfers because some
of the transit agencies were not using the TAP program. With the potential for eliminating paper
transfers with the development of the “second transfer,” the source of fraud from paper transfers
will also be eliminated. Any new regional fare collection program should be able to allow the
use of the second transfer on each system. Being able to clarify an “invalid” read for the fare
media will also help with fraud of being able to use unloaded TAP cards. The more information
the bus operator has available to them about the fare payment being processed, the more likely
fraud will be eliminated. While new technology might also lead to other ways to beat the fare
system, developing a regional approach to addressing the potential for fare evasion of customers
should be considered as part of the operating procedures.
As the regional fare collection program becomes more widely used by regular transit
users there is even more potential to handle less cash at the farebox. Less cash in the fareboxes
could potentially translate to faster boarding times and more vehicles being on time. For Bus
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Rapid Transit services, these faster boarding times would lead to an improvement of services
especially if many riders board at the same stop. The smaller cash counts would also mean time
savings for each transit agency, as they will not require as much staff time for emptying
fareboxes and counting cash. Also, as the equipment for the coins and bills in a farebox is often
the cause for the need for repairs, needed repairs should be less frequent. Electronic transfers of
funds could eventually become automatic, allowing for faster monetary transactions.
An unrealized potential for the TAP card program is the development of use of the data
for regional transit planning. Knowing where and when riders are starting their trips and times
of transfers are helpful to planning and developing more efficient bus routes. Currently, Metro is
only evaluating its own data for Metro Transit Operations. Most of the transit agencies are
unable to access their own transit data at will, only being allowed to access regular reports
needed for reporting requirements. Most of the medium to smaller transit agencies do not have
the transit planning staff to handle the data of the technology. Metro Regional Planning and
Program transit planning staff should be more made accessible to the regional transit operators in
order to continue to build trust and work on developing better transit routes together.
A working regional fare collection program can lead to multiple beneficial long-
term outcomes for the transit agencies and the region. The primary long-term outcome is the
benefit of improving the overall transit system in the region. Because many people claim to not
use transit in Los Angeles County, because it is not easy or efficient, the improvement of a
regional seamless fare payment program can eliminate some of the excuses. A fare payment
program with multiple payment options available is only one way to make using the transit
system easier. However, more effective collaboration with a universal fare collection program
could spur other improvements and innovation among the transit agencies.
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100
Technological advances can make transit more accessible to discretionary riders and
tourists. For example, using current technological advances, a potential transit user should be
able to expect to use an application on one’s smart phone to map the route one needs to take via
walking and transit, along with the time for the next transit vehicle. The Transit App could
present payment options via the phone. In contrast with the current TAP program, one might
need to access a transit website or Google Maps, which finds the transit routes. The rider might
be able to download and use Nextrip to find the next bus available if it is Metro Bus. However,
the payment choices are difficult with the option to use a TAP card. If it is 48 hours in advance
of the trip with a nearby vendor or a ticket vending machine, one can purchase a TAP card for $1
and load it with a day pass or with cash with the potential to have excess funds on the card.
Using cash, the rider would need to interact with a bus operator to in order to pay for and receive
a transfer, being conscience of requesting a local transfer or an interagency transfer.
If a fare payment system becomes considerably easier for discretionary riders and tourists
to use, they may be more willing to choose public transit as an option for their trip. With transit
planning using trip data from the electronic fare payments, frequently made trips would also be
able to be made more efficient by adjusting routes and times according to the trips that were
being taken. It would allow transit agencies to adjust and make improvements as more people
utilize the transit system.
As more people make the choice to utilize transit, it could have the long-term effect of
taking single occupancy vehicles off of the road if people find using transit more easy and
efficient to use in the region. The more single occupancy vehicles are taken off the road; it could
decrease air pollution from the carbon emissions from sitting in traffic. It could also further
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
101
decrease air pollution as many buses and trains in the region are already using alternative fueled
vehicles and can carry more people than a passenger car requiring less vehicles on the road.

5.4 Areas for Further Research
As the number of participating agencies grow, it is likely that the difficulties associated
with a collaborative project will also grow. If the “CaliCard” is developed for use through
multiple counties, the rules and agreements will need to be clear to all of the participants.
Agencies will join if they see the benefit to their agency and their County’s transit systems. The
issues of distrust that were discussed in this study will likely come into play because some of the
other county transit “distrust” anything coming from Los Angeles County and may be opposed to
joining the TAP program as revealed in interviews with OCTA and Metrolink executives.
However, if the major transit agencies, like the Orange County Transit Authority (OCTA) or San
Diego Metropolitan Transit System (MTS) decide to share in a seamless transit fare system, it
will be easier for other agencies to join. If the larger transit agencies join in a joint fare
collection program, the determinants of participation will more likely be the transactions costs.
The transit agencies would have vision for the role that they play in the Southern California
tourism industry as a benefit to their transactions costs.
One of the major decisions to be made about the stakeholders is that of the size of the
regional program. Metrolink, the commuter rail serving five counties in Southern California,
would like to see a fare collection program that is usable throughout Southern California from
San Diego to Santa Barbara. Their paper tickets are currently embedded with TAP technology
that allow their commuters to transfer onto Los Angeles County transit systems. Some of the
other transit operators on the other ends, like Orange County Transit Authority (OCTA), will
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
102
likely not want to adopt Los Angeles’ fare card program, especially if they are asked to conform
to Los Angeles’ technology (interview with OCTA manager.) However, they might have a
different stance if they are part of the decision to develop the technology and it allows for
autonomy. A major challenge of implementing a multi-county transit fare card is that the more
stakeholders involved in the technology, the more complicated the implementation (Giuliano and
O’Brien, 2004.)
The logic model for policy implementation for a “CaliCard,” will need to be expanded
and the issues of policy implementation should be researched. There will be a new issue of
governance with the transit agencies that are not already in an existing relationship with one
another. There are multi-county governance councils for metropolitan planning agencies, such
as the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG) that have local elected city
councils, but the transit agencies are currently not members, only participants in the broader
organization. The transit agencies would need to develop their own governing organization.

5.5 Implications of the Study for Professional Practice
Implications of this study go beyond a regional fare collection program. Partnerships
among public agencies can be useful for service improvements between jurisdictions or when
customers need to interact with several agencies when undertaking a task. However, there
should be several considerations prior to a partnership of public agencies undertaking a
technological improvement for service. There are several important insights that can be learned
from the implementation of the TAP program.
Technology is not necessarily the best solution, especially if poorly implemented.
While technological solutions can be used to solve a problem, poor or incomplete
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
103
implementation can make things more difficult for customers. There are many benefits for a
smart card fare collection system that can make it easier for customers to travel throughout a
transit system that has been implemented in many transit systems throughout the world.
However, using this same technology without careful planning between the regional transit
agencies has led to a TAP card program that is not very user friendly, especially when the
program was only partially implemented. While the TAP card can be programmed for
improvements, the customers and the agencies are still not completely satisfied with the product.
Giuliano and O’Brian (2004) acknowledge that technological implementations can get more
complicated the more parties are involved.
We have seen other technological solutions fail. A recent example was the iPad program
that was intended to be a teaching tool for students with the Los Angeles Unified School District.
The program failed because of poor implementation by not fully considering the outcome of
putting iPads into students’ hands. Another technological solution that was poorly implemented
was the electric cars chargers that were installed all over California for a planned future of the
personal use electric cars which would reduce pollutants for gasoline powered vehicles. The
implementation failed when consumers did not want to purchase electric cars that were not
reliable for longer trips or getting stuck in traffic.
The program goals or the purpose of the policy implementation should play an
important role when implementing program with collaborative partnerships (Sabatier and
Mazmanian, 1979). Throughout the implementation of the TAP program, the reason for the
implementation of the program seemed to have gotten lost. The purpose that the TAP program
was to be a regional product that would make it easier for customers to use the transit network
across agencies seemed to have gotten lost as the transit agencies fought to preserve their
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
104
autonomy. Metro had the TAP fareboxes programmed with its own fare policies. Adding each
new transit agency’s new fare policies added another layer of connections and programming of
the TAP card, making it difficult for customers to navigate between agencies.
When several agencies partner together, they bring with them different goals and
purposes for participation. Typically, partnerships happen because each agency sees some
benefit to the partnership. Developing an understood set of goals early in the development of the
partnership and holding to them can help to prevent agencies from the fear of losing their
autonomy. Statutory features should have been planned and put into place prior to the roll out of
the TAP program that would have clearly established the goals and purposes of the program.
The network relationships can play a large role in the effectiveness of any regional
program/policy implementation. For many local agencies, they may see the benefits of jointly
working together to provide better service, but they are also concerned about their autonomy and
are unwilling to give up control over their agency’s functions, even if it would help their
customers. The network relationship needs to be better understood and prioritized if trust is to be
built among agencies across the region. The issue of trust was one that was mentioned by
several interviewees when discussing the issue of a Southern California “CaliCard.” There was
concern that other transit agencies outside of Los Angeles would not want to participate in a Los
Angeles program. Building the relational networks could reduce some of the stigma.
Being able to work together effectively with multiple agencies, requires the knowledge of
collective institutional learning, something that Organizational Development literature
contributes for a group within an organization, but does not currently address across multiple
organizations. Planning on successful development of technology for the public sector requires
the navigation of technology, policy implementation, organizational and network development
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
105
skills. Professional practice can learn from the lessons of implementation of the TAP program,
so that they can better plan for a joint implementation of technical programs across multiple
public agencies in the future.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
106
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Appendix A: IRB application

Date: Sunday, December 07, 2014 1:50:56 PM
Print Close
NOT HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH(NHSR) APPLICATION (USC ONLY)
This application is used to determine if a project meets the regulatory definition of human
subjects and/or research. When the IRB determines a project does NOT meet the regulatory
definitions, a determination letter will be generated which states IRB approval is not required. If
the IRB determines the project DOES meet the regulatory definitions, a "New Study" application
must be submitted for IRB approval.
Guidance
DO NOT use this application for:
Projects involving FDA regulated products
Projects that meet the regulatory definition of human subjects research
Projects that involve only Coded Data/Specimens
These projects will not be reviewed through this application, and need to be submitted as a “New Study”
application in iStar.
To proceed, click the Continue button. Otherwise, click the Back button.
I. Project Information:
* Specify a title for this project: Lessons from TAP Implementation: Obstacles and solutions to improve the
transit user experience
Guidance
* Please indicate which IRB you are requesting review from:
University Park IRB (UPC)
Guidance
* Is the Principal Investigator a student, resident, fellow, other trainee, or visiting scholar?
Yes No
Guidance

Please designate a Faculty Advisor:
Juliet Musso HS Certification: Current ( 6/5/2016 )
Guidance

II. Does Project Meet Regulatory Definitions
"Human Subjects"
1. * Does the study involve interaction or intervention with live human subjects?
Yes
(Though interaction or intervention may have occurred previously, specimen(s)/data/information were
collected from live subjects. Cadavers, autopsy specimens or specimens/information from subjects now
deceased is not human subjects).
Guidance
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2. * Is the information/data/specimen(s) obtained about the subjects?
No
(i.e. does the research data sought pertain to the individual subject, or is the data sought merely
provided by the subject. For example, a quality improvement project for an education program may ask
teachers to provide information on how to improve the program. This information is not “about” the
teacher but information provided by the teacher about the education program.).
Guidance
3. * Is the collected information/data/specimen(s) private information?
No
(Private information is that which allows identity of individual to be associated with the
information/specimen/data)
Guidance
"Research"
1. * Is your study designed to produce generalizable knowledge?
Yes
(Generalizeable knowledge is when the intended use of the research findings can be applied to
populations or situations beyond the studied unit.)
Guidance
2. * Is the study systematic?
Yes
(Follows step by step procedures organized according to interrelated ideas or principles evidenced by a
research plan and objectives.)
Guidance
III. Study Description
Additional information (to determine whether or not your project qualifies as human subjects research:
1. * Provide a brief (1 to 2 paragraph) description of the study in LAY LANGUAGE. This should not
be a scientific abstract.
The universal fare card, the TAP card, has been implemented in Los Angeles County to improve the
convenience of public transit for transit users. Transit passengers using the TAP card, are not required
to carry cash in order to use the public transportation system. Smart cards, like the TAP card, can also
provide better passenger information for transit agencies for more effective and efficient transit
planning. Unfortunately, political and organizational hurdles have impeded full implementation of the
TAP card program in Los Angeles. The TAP card program, from which federal funds were awarded and
utilized, was originally intended that every major transit system in Los Angeles County would use the
TAP card so that a transit user could easily transfer from one transit system to another. The goal of this
research project is to analyze the current impasse over the TAP card program, and identify solutions to
the political and organizational hurdles that impede implementation of the universal fare card. The
research will employ a qualitative approach that relies primarily on interviews of transit managers and
other key TAP managers and implementers in order to understand the history of the TAP
implementation and to establish some of the reasons for the failure of its full implementation. The
outcome of the study is to establish a plan for moving the transit agencies forward to full implementation
of a TAP program or another agreed upon universal fare card program for the benefit of transit users in
Los Angeles County.
Guidance
2. * Describe the subject population being studied.
The subject of the study are the policies of the organizations of transit systems in Los Angeles County. I
will be exploring the reasons for transit technology, specifically, the use of the smart card, not being fully
implemented for transit user improvement. Decision makers for transit agencies and other stakeholders
will be interviewed for their knowledge and reasons for making decisions for their agencies.
Guidance
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3. * Provide a brief description of the design and methodology of the study.
The primary methodology being proposed is to collect qualitative data from those involved in the
implementation of the TAP program in order to better understand the perceived problems with the
program. My goal is to conduct 20-30 in person or phone interviews with an approximate duration of 30
minutes each with stakeholders who participated in the TAP program. The interviews will be conducted
during the Spring and Summer 2014 semester and will primarily take place at the interviewees’ office or
work place. The interviewees will include General Managers and Senior Managers who played a role in
the decision making of whether or not their agency implemented the TAP program. Some of the
interviews will take place with those who are no longer transit managers in the Los Angeles area, but
have played key roles advocating for the TAP program in the beginning of its implementation. In
addition, I would like to interview the TAP program managers at Metro and some of the vendors of the
TAP program, including the Cubic managers who provided the programming for the TAP program with
the transit agencies to install the TAP system and managers from ACS who where hired to be the third
party vendor to manage the TAP cards. Other decision makers would include staff of Metro Board
members who have participated in the policy making and continued financial support of the program.
Other stakeholders include those who have considered participating in the TAP card program, including
the UCLA Transportation Department and MetroLink. I am also planning on conducting several
interviews with expert staff from the Transportation Cooperative Research Program who are in the midst
of conducting research on regional fare collection programs throughout the Country.
In addition to interviews, I will try to find as much documentation on the TAP program, by reviewing
available meeting minutes and notes. I will be able to use meeting minutes from Metro Board meetings
in order to put together a timeline and to establish the policies and programs that were put into place in
order to see where the actual actions deviated. I will also review BOS meeting minutes, to find out the
actual actions that were agreed to as well as those that actually took place. Local news reports will also
likely be useful in establishing the media’s view of the TAP program. Interviews and meeting minutes
from the Metro Board meeting and BOS meetings, notes from TAP meetings, and other documentary
sources will be used to document the events of implementation and any policy action that occurred.
Guidance
4. Submit the survey or questions that the subjects will be asked (if applicable).
name Version Modified
TAP Implementation Protocol 0.01 4/7/2014 11:51 AM
Guidance
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol

Los Angeles County TAP Program Implementation Study
Interview Protocol

Purpose of Interview:

Thank you for agreeing to discuss the TAP program for Los Angles County. Grace Eng Nadel, a
Doctoral student at the University of Southern California in the Sol Price School of Public Policy, is
conducting a research project to understand the implementation of the universal fare card program,
currently, the TAP program in Los Angeles County. The purpose of this interview is to gather more
detail about the development of the TAP program, and to learn about the perceptions of the TAP program
from the experiences of the agencies during the implementation of the TAP program.

The interview is voluntary and you may decline to answer any question or end the interview at any time if
you wish. The information gathered from the interview is confidential. You will not be quoted by name
without your advance written permission. If you have any questions about the project please feel free to
contact Grace Eng Nadel (gnadel@usc.edu).

Questions for the transit agency mangers and decision makers:

1. Could you describe the history, as you perceived it, of the universal fare card program(s) within
the Los Angeles County? (Historical information)

2. What were some of the potential benefits of the TAP program for your agency? (Benefits)

3. What were some of the challenges for the TAP program being developed for your agency that
played into the decision of whether or not to implement the program? (Obstacles)

4. Did other agencies/organizations play a role into the decision of your agency over whether or not
to implement the TAP program? (Agency Partnerships)

5. If not the TAP program has not been implemented: Is the agency likely to implement the TAP
program in the future? If not the TAP program, Is the agency likely to participate in a different
universal fare card program in the future if changes were made to the implementation of the
program? What kind of changes would you hope to see in a new universal fare card program?

Questions for other TAP stakeholders (non-transit agencies):

1. How did the implementation of the TAP program affect your organization? What were the
benefits and/or harms for your organization?

2. What were some of the primary challenges of implementation of TAP program for your
organization?

3. Based on your expertise, how would you assess the effectiveness of the TAP program
implementation? What is your opinion of how the TAP program was implemented? How did the
implementation process affect your view of the TAP program?

LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
121
4. Are there ways that you would like to integrate the TAP technology into your organization? E.g
ID cards, debit card program, etc.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAP IMPLEMENTATION
122
Appendix C: IRB Authorization
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
UNIVERSITY PARK INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
FWA 00007099

Determination of NOT Human Subjects Research

Date: Fri May 02 10:30:54 2014
To: Grace Nadel
From: Dalar Shahnazarian
Project
Title:
Lessons from TAP Implementation: Obstacles and solutions
to improve the transit user experience ( IIR00001605 )

The University Park Institutional Review Board (UPIRB) designee reviewed
the information you submitted pertaining to your study and concluded that the
project does not qualify as Human Subjects Research.*

This project focuses on TAP
and
Metro
program
management,
former
staff,
third
party
vendors,
board

members
and
stakeholders
participating
in
in-‐person
or
phone
interviews,
as
well
as
supplemental

documentation
on
the
TAP
program
including
meeting
minutes
and
local
news
reports. This project is not
collecting information about subjects, but rather explores
the
reasons
for
transit
technology
not
being

fully
implemented
in
order
to
establish
a
plan
for
moving
the
transit
agencies
forward
to
implementing
a
TAP

program
or
another
agreed
upon
universal
fare
card
program
for
the
benefit
of
transit
users
in
Los
Angeles

County. The research activities as described do not meet the Federal definition of a human subject
and are not subject to the requirements of 45 CFR 46 or continuing review.

This review and opinion is based on the information provided and is not valid if
the proposed project is not exactly as described, or if information has been
withheld. If your project design changes in ways that may affect this
determination, please contact the IRB for guidance.

Sincerely,

Dalar Shahnazarian

Abstract (if available)

Abstract The TAP fare collection program in Los Angeles County is a transit program shared among Los Angeles County transit agencies that uses smart card technology so that transit customers could more easily travel across the County via transit. As a collaborative program among the County’s federally funded transit agencies, contracts were begun for TAP services and TAP fareboxes were purchased for all of the medium and large sized transit agencies in 2002. By the end of 2014, while a majority of the connections for Los Angeles County transit users can be made using a TAP card, the TAP card lacks an ease of use, and the originally purchased TAP fareboxes are ready for replacement. Understanding the implementation issues from the current TAP program can aid in not repeating the same mistakes in the future. ❧ The use of technology is one way to improve transit use. However, the lack of planning for a technology driven collaborative program has led to problems in the implementation of the TAP fare collection program in Los Angeles. Interviews were conducted with transit managers that participated in the decision making process of the TAP program in order to understand the decisions that their transit agency made about its participation. Besides a lack of planning for the implementation and use of the program, issues of distrust and autonomy were found to be some of its major obstacles. The role of the network relationships for a regional fare collection program is as important as the development of the technology. Collaborative partnerships play a large role in the implementation of any policy, however, among public agencies, this role needs a larger consideration for continued use of technology in order to improve its customer service.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Nadel, Grace Eng (author)

Core Title Lessons from TAP implementation: obstacles and solutions to improve the transit users experience

School School of Policy, Planning and Development

Degree Doctor of Policy, Planning & Development

Degree Program Policy, Planning, and Development

Publication Date 02/13/2015

Defense Date 12/15/2014

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag collaboration,collaboration effectiveness,collaborative governance,fare collection,Los Angeles County transit,OAI-PMH Harvest,organizational development,partnership effectiveness,policy implementation,public agencies,smart card implementation,TAP,technology implementation,transit,transit improvement,transit technology,transit users

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Musso, Juliet A. (committee chair), Barnes, Doran (committee member), Boarnet, Marlon (committee member)

Creator Email gengnadel@gmail.com,gnadel@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-534210

Unique identifier UC11298687

Identifier etd-NadelGrace-3191.pdf (filename),usctheses-c3-534210 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-NadelGrace-3191.pdf

Dmrecord 534210

Document Type Dissertation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Nadel, Grace Eng

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA