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County governance reform in California: introduction of the council‐executive model and the elected county‐executive
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Content
COUNTY GOVERNANCE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA:
INTRODUCTION OF THE COUNCIL-EXECUTIVE MODEL AND
THE ELECTED COUNTY-EXECUTIVE
by
Justin James McCusker
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC SOL PRICE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND DEVELOPMENT
May 2015
Copyright 2015 Justin James McCusker
i
Table of Contents
Epigraph ...........................................................................................................................................v
Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... vi
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ vii
List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. viii
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ix
Preface..............................................................................................................................................x
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................1
Focus of the Study ....................................................................................................................1
Background: Highlighting the Importance of Governance ......................................................2
A Lesson from Long Ago: Alexander the Great ..................................................................2
A Lesson on a Massive Scale: The Federal Government ....................................................4
A Lesson Closer to Home: Orange County .........................................................................4
The Research Problem: California’s Outdated County Governance Structure ........................5
Population Expansion and Executive Fragmentation ..........................................................6
Population Growth Trends Continue .................................................................................10
Phenomenon Under Research: Diversity of County Governance Models in America ..........15
Governance Diversity Exists ..............................................................................................18
Looking Elsewhere for Examples of Governance Diversity .............................................19
Governance Diversity Close to Home: Three Airports…Three Different Ways to Govern
............................................................................................................................................19
Researching County Governance Diversity .......................................................................21
Contributions to Practice ........................................................................................................25
Structure of the Manuscript ....................................................................................................32
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION .....................................................................36
The Origins of County Government in the United States ..........................................................36
Earliest County Governance ...................................................................................................36
The Purpose of County Government ......................................................................................39
Common County Government Characteristics ..........................................................................42
Row Officers .........................................................................................................................42
ii
County Unincorporated Areas ...........................................................................................45
Form of Government: Charter and General Law Counties ........................................................45
Charter Counties ................................................................................................................47
General Law Counties .......................................................................................................48
Evolution of County Government Structures in America ..........................................................49
County Organizational Structures ......................................................................................49
Commission ...........................................................................................................49
Commission - Administrator..................................................................................51
Council - Executive................................................................................................52
America’s Largest Counties and Use of the Strong Elected CEO Model .........................55
Governance Critique: Structures Currently Used in California Counties ..........................57
Commission ...........................................................................................................57
Commission - Administrator..................................................................................59
Moving Forward: The Changing Face of County Governance in America.......................61
History of California County Government .................................................................................65
California’s First Counties .................................................................................................65
The Process to Form a California County: How 27 Became 58 ........................................66
Form of California Counties ..............................................................................................69
History of California Structural Reform ............................................................................71
Progressive Era Reforms........................................................................................71
Los Angeles County Reform Efforts .....................................................................74
California is Out of Step ....................................................................................................77
CHAPTER THREE: ORANGE COUNTY GOVERNMENT ......................................................82
History and Formation of the County of Orange ...............................................................82
Orange County Demographics: 125 Years of Rapid Changes ...........................................86
Population Growth .................................................................................................86
Geography & Population Density ..........................................................................87
Diversity .................................................................................................................89
Orange County as a Candidate for Governance Reform ............................................................92
Executive Fragmentation: A History of Governance without Executive Leadership ........92
Robert E. Thomas ..................................................................................................95
iii
Larry Parrish ..........................................................................................................95
Ernie Schneider ......................................................................................................96
William Popejoy ....................................................................................................97
Jan Mittermeier ......................................................................................................99
Michael Schumacher ............................................................................................100
James D. Ruth ......................................................................................................101
Thomas G. Mauk .................................................................................................102
Robert Franz.........................................................................................................104
Mike Giancola ......................................................................................................105
Scandals and Issues of Accountability: A History of Damaged Public Trust .................106
Conclusions: Orange County Needs Governance Reform ...............................................111
CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF THE COUNCIL – EXECUTIVE
MODEL .......................................................................................................................................117
The Essential Ingredient: Separation of Powers Doctrine ...............................................117
The Origins of Separation of Powers Doctrine ....................................................117
Polybius....................................................................................................118
Montesquieu .............................................................................................119
Applicability for County Government .............................................................................120
Power Checks Power .......................................................................................................122
Analysis: Council – Executive Model in Practice .....................................................................125
Wayne County Governance .............................................................................................126
Organizational Structure: Separation of Powers for Co-Equal Branches of
Government..........................................................................................................126
Legislative Branch: Wayne County Board of Commissioners ............................129
Executive Branch: County Executive’s Office ....................................................133
Oakland County Governance ...........................................................................................136
Organizational Structure: Separation of Powers ..................................................137
Legislative Branch: Oakland County Board of Commissioners ..........................137
Executive Branch: County Executive’s Office ....................................................138
Applicability for Orange County, California ...................................................................141
iv
CHAPTER FIVE: A PATHWAY FOR COUNTY GOVERNANCE REFORM IN
CALIFORNIA .............................................................................................................................154
Implementation of the Council–Executive Model in California: State or Local? ...........155
Conclusion: State Mandated Governance Reform is Required .......................................158
The Action Plan: A Summary of Benefits, Conclusions, and Recommendations ...........169
Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................172
References ....................................................................................................................................174
v
Epigraph
“Governance and leadership are the yin and the yang of successful organisations. If you have
leadership without governance you risk tyranny, fraud and personal fiefdoms. If you have
governance without leadership you risk atrophy, bureaucracy and indifference.”
- Mark Goyder
Director of Tomorrow’s Company
vi
Dedication
Dedicated to Shelly, Hadley, Jackson, Hazel, Whitney, Mom, Eileen Daniher, Tanya Stephens,
Mark Heim and The Segerstrom Family
vii
List of Tables
Table 1: Historical Census Populations of Counties in California, 1850 - 2010 ...........................7
Table 2: California’s 10 Largest Counties .....................................................................................9
Table 3: Diversity of Governance Models by State .....................................................................22
Table 4: Descriptions of Regional County Services ....................................................................43
Table 5: America’s Largest Counties and Use of the Strong Elected CEO Model .....................54
Table 6: Orange County Population Change 1900 – 2010, by Decade ......................................86
Table 7: Population Density Ranking: 2012 County Comparison...............................................89
Table 8: Orange County Change in Share of Total Population by Race/Ethnicity .....................91
Table 9: County Administrative and Executive Officers for Orange County .............................93
Table 10: Executive Vacuum: Notable Scandals and Resignations of
Orange County Leadership ........................................................................................110
Table 11: 2015 Orange County Budget as Compared to State Budgets .....................................112
Table 12: Summary of Legislative Powers Granted to
Wayne County Board of Commissioners ..................................................................132
Table 13: Summary of Executive Powers Granted to the Wayne County Executive .................134
Table 14: Separation of Powers in Oakland County Government ..............................................137
Table 15: Recent Orange County Supervisors with Service in California Legislature ..............161
Table 16: California counties with one million in population ....................................................164
viii
List of Figures
Figure 1. The United States Global Change Resource Program’s map .......................................10
Figure 2. United States Counties ..................................................................................................17
Figure 3. Proposed Six States Ballot Measure Map .....................................................................30
Figure 4. Population and Largest Cities for Proposed Six States Ballot Measure .......................30
Figure 5. Boundaries (in red) of the first eight counties in Virginia.............................................38
Figure 6. Boundary Map for Virginia Counties in the Year 2000 ................................................38
Figure 7. Franklin County, Ohio Government Services ...............................................................41
Figure 8. Map of California’s Original 27 Counties .....................................................................66
Figure 9. Current Map of California’s 58 Counties ......................................................................68
Figure 10. Map of Southern California Counties in 1853 .............................................................82
Figure 11. 1889 Map of Orange County ........................................................................................84
Figure 12. Map of Orange County Highlighting the Cleveland National Forest and
the Santa Ana Mountains .............................................................................................87
Figure 13. Wayne County’s Governance Structure .....................................................................129
Figure 14. Map of Wayne County Commission Districts ..........................................................130
Figure 15. Map of Oakland County Commission Districts .......................................................138
Figure 16. Organizational Chart for the County of Orange ........................................................143
Figure 17. California Projected Population Growth, 2010 – 2060, Numeric Growth ................166
ix
Abstract
This research analyzes the introduction of the council–executive governance model, with an
elected chief executive officer (CEO), in California’s largest counties. This model is absent in
all of California’s traditional county governments, excluding only the city/county consolidation
of San Francisco, but a widely accepted governance model elsewhere, including twenty-six
states, eight of the ten largest by population, and in numerous counties nationwide. This includes
more than one-third of the most populous counties in the nation, who utilize the council–
executive model because of its underlying principle of separation of powers with checks and
balances between branches of government. The goal of this research is to reignite the county
reform discussion in California. It builds upon the past research and recommendations by first
identifying the major issues that challenge California and its largest counties, including their
ability to serve their massive, dense, and diverse populations effectively with a governance
structure that has largely gone unchanged for nearly a century. Second, it examines the use of
the council–executive model with an elected CEO throughout nation, but particularly in
America’s largest states and counties, to provide more than a call to action, but a template for
reform. Through gathering data on where the elected CEO is in use, as well as the reasons for its
use, this research highlights California’s antiquated county governance structure and the critical
need for a new era of county governance reform in the Golden State.
Keywords: Counties, governance reform, council–executive model, elected county
executive, separation of powers, executive fragmentation
x
Preface
This research is the culmination of a desire to grow intellectually and to offer solutions to
problems that confront government and society, and not simply complain about these issues.
This challenging endeavor could not have been accomplished or even attempted without my
loving and encouraging wife, Shelly and my children: Hadley, Jackson, Hazel and Whitney, a
supportive employer in C.J. Segerstrom & Sons, parents who instilled me with an insatiable
intellectual curiosity and professors who guided my academic path.
This study was inspired by recommendations made by Dr. Raphael Sonenshein and Mark
Baldassare for county governance reform in California. Though not acted upon and now more
than a decade old, their separate calls for California and its counties to explore implementing a
governance structure with an elected CEO are still relevant today. I read their research during
the completion of my master’s program at California State University, Fullerton. Both papers,
Dr. Sonenshein’s, The Prospects for County Charter Reform in California, and Mark
Baldassare’s, When Governments Fails: The Orange County Bankruptcy identified important
problems plaguing county government in California that were hard to ignore. It was particularly
hard for me to ignore, as I came upon their research at the same time I was moving up the
management ranks at the County of Orange. My last two positions at the County were as the
Manager of Legislative Affairs in the CEO’s Office and then as Chief of Staff to a member of the
Board of Supervisors. Both county positions provided me with a front row seat to the problems
that can occur in a massive governmental jurisdiction like Orange County that lacks a well-
defined separation of powers and checks and balances. Problems related to political and
executive fragmentation were constant hurdles to providing Orange County’s residents with the
highest quality of government services, as they deserve.
xi
I recalled back to my early career in my home state of Michigan, and remembered that its
most populous counties utilized governance structures with an elected CEO and separation of
powers. Was absence of an elected county CEO in California the anomaly or was it the presence
of it in Michigan? This very question sparked my interest in the subject area of county
governance reform more than a decade ago and ultimately led to the decision to complete my
doctoral research with a coast-to-coast analysis of county governance models.
The data utilized in this research were secondary and collected through academic and
professional literature, media reports, and governmental websites. Where appropriate, I draw
upon my nearly decade long experience in management at the County of Orange.
Finally, I want to thank my committee chair, Dr. Peter Robertson for his support and
patience during this process. In addition to Dr. Robertson, I would like to thank Professor
Deborah Natoli (USC) and Dr. Marlon Boarnet (USC) for their service on my committee and
positive contribution to my research and experience at USC.
March 16, 2015 Justin James McCusker
1
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Focus of the Study
The focus of this study is the lack of diversity in California county governance structures
and, specifically, the lack of the council-executive structure or any countywide elected chief
executive officers (CEOs) among California’s 58 counties. The study will:
analyze the evolution of county governance structures from before the country’s
inception to present day;
highlight the wide variety of ways that counties and states have implemented the council
– executive model nationwide;
identify the contextual elements (political, economic, social, etc.) present in counties that
have attempted to transition (regardless of success or failure) to a countywide elected
CEO governance model;
attempt to understand why previous efforts by California counties to shift to an elected
CEO have failed; and
analyze the prospects of county governance reform in the form of an elected CEO in
Orange County, California.
For purposes of this study, I will discuss, but not focus on, city/county consolidations with
elected CEOs or mayors, as they tend to operate more like cities and not regional entities more
closely affiliated with their respective state. The one example of this in California is the
consolidated city/county of San Francisco. San Francisco County only provides services to the
City of San Francisco, with no other incorporated cities or county unincorporated areas within its
jurisdiction.
2
Background: Highlighting the Importance of Governance
A Lesson from Long Ago: Alexander the Great
The essential balance of governance and leadership has intrigued me since my earliest
childhood recollection of my father’s nearly three-decade rise from a seasonal city laborer to a
municipal government executive in Michigan. Many government, political, and public policy
practitioners, as well as researchers, are initially struck by someone who displayed great
“leadership” in the government or political arena. We often hear about the next generation of
leaders being inspired by the leadership style of icons such as Presidents John F. Kennedy and
Ronald Reagan. This human element of leadership is critical; it is the lifeblood of activism and
change. The power of charismatic and thoughtful human leadership has overcome great
obstacles facing the United States and civilizations for eons. However, in many cases, it is the
structure, or the governance model, that either limits progress or sets a path for enduring
prosperity in the relationship between a government and its constituents. The governance model
bears so much importance, if for no other reason than, for good or bad, it tends to have a lifespan
far beyond the leaders who set the cornerstones in place.
In my nearly 20-year career in governmental affairs, both in the private sector and in
government positions at an airport, water district, transportation agencies, cities, counties and
state governments in both Michigan and California, I have become somewhat of an intellectual
collector of governance models, one who is interested in how a governmental body, department,
or jurisdiction operates, and how very similar governmental operations can have very different
governance structures. The focus of this study is county governance structures and why
California, once the leader of the progressive era of county governance reform, has stagnated and
largely adhered to a model that struggles to deal with the massive and diverse populations it
3
attempts to serve. Additionally, no county governance structure currently in use in California
provides for a true and equal separation of powers between the executive, legislative and quasi-
judicial functions held by the respective five-member county boards throughout the state.
Governance policy and research tends to be the focus of self-described policy wonks or
the proverbial “nerds” of the political process. However, the absolute critical nature of
governance crystalized for me while reading a book in another genre of interest, classical
antiquity. The book, Dividing the Spoils, by Robin Waterfield (2011), provides more than a
lesson in history, speaking to the importance of governance regardless of how charismatic,
powerful, or transformative the leadership element may be. In summary, the book analyzes the
speed with which Alexander the Great’s newly conquered empire split apart. Alexander the
Great is considered by most to be one of the greatest—if not the greatest— military leader in
antiquity. As King of Macedonia, he conquered land after land, from the Mediterranean to
modern day India with epic speed and ease. Alexander’s willingness to let conquered lands
continue to worship their own deities and celebrate their existing customs seemed like a recipe
for successful rule. However, Alexander’s Macedonian Empire lasted less than a decade, and
many historians feel that it unraveled as soon as Alexander’s last breath left his body.
Alexander’s empire never had the endurance of his friend and subordinate Ptolemy, who was
able after Alexander’s death to establish the longest reigning dynasty in Egyptian history. There
are many factors to consider as to why Alexander’s empire crumbled and Ptolemy’s endured, but
one key factor was governance. Alexander’s satrapies (regional governorships) fell apart as soon
as the news of his death reached them. Waterfield and other historians such as John D. Grainger
(2007) highlight that Alexander paid very little attention to setting up governance structures that
could operate successfully without his direct and personal involvement. For me, this is a
4
poignant example of how fleeting the benefits of leadership can be, but also how enduring
governance structures are, for the good or detriment of those they serve.
A Lesson on a Massive Scale: The Federal Government
Regardless of one’s personal views on the federal government’s role in the health care
industry, President Obama’s Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), or more
commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA), is an instructive example of the
importance of not overlooking governance or policy implementation in the creation of public
policy. A 2013 paper by the Brookings Institute’s Center for Effective Public Management
confronts that very important yet nuanced issue of governance. The authors do not delve into the
politics or policy of ACA, but present the notion that it will succeed or fail based on a decision
made by the Obama Administration regarding the governance of the ACA:
Regardless of whether policies are run at the state or federal level, one thing is clear:
allowing each state to independently choose whether the Affordable Care Act health
insurance exchanges will be managed by the state or delegated to the federal government
introduces new problems that could be avoided by uniformly assigning implementation
responsibilities to either the states or the federal government. Moreover, those
problems—increased political polarization and distrust of the federal government—reach
beyond health care reform itself and may further muddy the waters of political discourse
in our nation. (Dropp, Jackman, & Jackman, 2013, p. 17)
A Lesson Closer to Home: Orange County
This project will explore Orange County’s history and county governance structure in
great detail in Chapter 3. However, it is important at this time to introduce a seminal moment in
the history of Orange County, namely, its 1994 bankruptcy. Baldassare (1998), in his analysis of
5
this event, defines a condition that was present in 1994 and is still present today in Orange
County, namely, political fragmentation. He noted,
A large suburban area typically includes dozens of local city governments, a county
government, regional single-purpose agencies, local school districts, and local special
districts. Although these individual entities often have overlapping geographical
boundaries and jurisdictions, an area is politically fragmented if each pursues its own
goals and separate policies without regional coordination and often in competition with
others. This fragmentation gives rise to problems such as traffic congestion, air pollution,
sprawling land-use patterns, lack of affordable housing, inefficient delivery of local
public services—and in the case of Orange County, lack of oversight for a county
treasurer who would push the county into financial crisis. (Baldassare, 1998, p. 8)
This lack of oversight noted by Baldassare is truly the fatal flaw for Orange County and other
large California counties where political fragmentation erodes governance and ultimately results
in executive fragmentation that makes county governance easily corruptible and unpredictable.
The Research Problem: California’s Outdated County Governance Structure
California is home to one of the most diverse populations in almost every discernable
way that government and pollsters aggregate populations (race, ethnicity, income [extreme
affluence to horrible poverty], language, religion, political affiliation, sexual orientation, etc.).
However, with the great diversity and extreme changes California has experienced in the last
century in terms of population growth, as well as culturally and economically, California
counties have largely remained stagnant in their governance model over the same time. Indeed,
new counties have formed during California’s history, with the number growing from
approximately 27 to 58 today. However, this growth has happened without a meaningful
6
evolution in its governance model. Today, 57 of the 58 counties still utilize a five-member
elected board of supervisors and an appointed manager. The manager may be referred to as the
CEO or by other common titles such as Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) or County Manager
(CM). However, the majority of the responsibilities of the appointed manager or CEO remain
the same regardless of the title. The National Association of Counties (NACo) describes this
commonly used county governance structure:
The longest standing form of county government, and the one most prevalent in rural
areas, is the so-called “commission” form, in which voters elect a multi-member
board. Known by different names—commissioners, supervisors, aldermen, etc.--these
board members wield both legislative and executive authority, sharing some specific
responsibilities with separately elected “row (or constitutional) officers” such as a sheriff,
clerk, and coroner. (Retrieved from
http://www.naco.org/Counties/learn/Pages/HistoryofCountyGovernmentPartI.aspx)
The form of county governance in California, with the only exception being the city/county
consolidation of San Francisco, has not changed from the five-member elected board and an
appointed manager during this time.
Population Expansion and Executive Fragmentation
Table 1 is a snapshot of the changes in population that California counties have had to
find a way to serve with basically an unaltered governance structure.
7
Table 1
Historical Census Populations of Counties in California, 1850–2010
Note. California State Data Center—California State Department of Finance, retrieved from
http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/demographic/state_census_date_center/historical_census_1850-
2010/view.php March 2014.
The same five-member board and appointed CEO has been employed whether it is Los
Angeles County, the largest American and California county in population at approximately 9.8
million residents, San Bernardino County, which is the largest county in the contiguous United
States by land size at over 20,000 square miles of land for its more than 2 million residents,
densely packed Orange County with 3,175.1 residents per square mile or tiny Alpine County
with only 1.6 residents per square mile (total population of 1,175).
Gargan (1981) noted the shortcomings of local government’s management capacity to
address the “qualitatively new problems” facing their outmoded governance structures. One
such qualitatively new problem that he identified was the ongoing “dramatic inter-regional
COUNTY/YEAR 1850 1900 1920 1950 1980 2010
CA Statewide 92,597 1,485,053 3,426,861 10,586,223 23,667,764 37,253,956
L.A. County 3,530 170,298 936,455 4,151,687 7,477,238 9,818,605
San Diego County 798 35,090 112,248 556,808 1,861,846 3,095,313
-1890
13,589 19,696 61,375 216,224 1,932,921 3,010,232
Riverside County 17,897 50,297 170,046 663,199 2,189,641
-1860
5,551 27,929 73,401 281,642 895,016 2,035,210
Santa Cruz County 643 21,512 26,269 66,534 188,141 262,382
Inyo County 4,377 7,031 11,658 17,895 18,546
-1880
4,399 5,076 5,425 9,678 8,610 9,686
-1870
685 509 243 241 1,097 1,175
Orange County
San Bernardino
County
Modoc County
Alpine County
8
shifts” that are resulting in massive losses in population in the northern regions of the United
States. Gargan then highlighted that the shift has moved to the South and West and explains the
changing dynamics for local governments experiencing population gain:
Compounding the problems resulting from inter-regional shifts are those produced by the
changing attitudes, life styles, and public service demands of the very large cohort group
of the 1950s "baby boom" as it moves through the life cycle. The movement of
population and economic activity geographically, and individuals through the life cycle,
creates serious strains on local governments. Local governments of the South and West
must manage growth…. (Gargan, 1981, p. 655)
It would be daunting enough if the only task were to deal with a numerical game of population
increase or decrease. However, counties encounter many other diverse issues and far-reaching
complexities that cannot be solved with a “one-size-fits-all” governance structure. Los Angeles
County has 101,296 budgeted personnel positions in the 2013/2014 fiscal year, and that is within
a $26.09 billion budget (L.A. County Online, Retrieved from
http://ceo.lacounty.gov/pdf/portal/2013-14%20Final%20Budget%20112713.pdf ). Inyo
County’s 2013/2014 budget was $76,933,477 (County of Inyo, retrieved from
http://www.inyocounty.us/Budget/2013-2014/Documents/Budget.pdf). However, they both use
the same governance structure. This highlights the great disparity in California counties when
looking at budget size. Table 2 is a snapshot of California’s 10 largest counties and highlights
their sheer size in comparison to American states.
9
Table 2
California’s 10 largest counties
Note. Based on US Census 2010 data for state and county population, retrieved from
http://www.usa.com/rank/us--total-population--state-rank.htm.
The following additional county data is informative:
Los Angeles County has a greater population than the sovereign nations of Switzerland,
Austria, Finland, Norway, Ireland, Croatia, Belarus, and Bulgaria.
An individual Los Angeles County Supervisorial District has a greater population than
the states of West Virginia, Nebraska, Idaho, Hawaii, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode
COUNTY
TOTAL COUNTY
POPULATION
LARGER THAN #
OF STATES
# OF CONSTITUENTS
PER SUPERVISOR
Los Angeles
County
9,818,605 42 1,963,721
San Diego
County
3,095,313 21 619,062
Orange
County
3,010,232 20 602,046
Riverside
County
2,189,641 15 437,928
San
Bernardino
County
2,035,210 14 407,042
Santa Clara
County
1,781,642 12 356,328
Alameda
County
1,510,271 11 302,054
Sacramento
County
1,418,788 11 283,757
Contra
Costa
County
1,049,025 7 209,805
Fresno
County
930,450 6 186,090
10
Island, Montana, Delaware, South Dakota, Alaska, North Dakota, Vermont, and
Wyoming.
An individual Los Angeles County Supervisorial District has a greater population than
the sovereign nations of Estonia, Iceland, Cyprus, Malta, Montenegro, and Luxembourg.
San Diego County has a greater population than the sovereign nations of Kuwait,
Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Mongolia and Oman and more residents than Iowa and 20
other states.
Orange County has a greater population than 20 states including Mississippi, Arkansas,
Kansas, Utah, and Nevada.
Population Growth Trends Continue
If population growth is a problem, it is not going away any time soon. As impressive in
sheer size as California counties are in 2014, the trend of continued population growth and
density in America’s largest counties shows no sign of ebbing. Figure 1 highlights this shift
in population from rural counties to new homes in already densely packed, massive urban
counties.
Figure 1. The United States Global Change Resource Program’s map highlights future growth in
many of America’s largest counties, from U.S Global Change Resource Program, retrieved May
9, 2014 from http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/Library/nationalassessment/images/PopMap-o.jpg.
11
The comparative population data for California and its largest counties, with that of higher level
governmental units (with comparable size) such as American states and foreign nations,
highlights a major problem with the universal use of an appointed CEO and a five-member board
of supervisors in California’s ten (10) largest counties. To reiterate the description by NACo,
this “longest-used” commission form was initially tailored for “rural areas,” but somehow
survived with little to no alteration in California’s counties with the highest and most densely
packed populations, with highly urbanized counties with larger economies than many states and
nations. However, these comparable states and nations (especially in the European Union)
operate with an elected chief executive, whether referred to as a governor, prime minister,
chancellor, or president. Regardless of title, the key element present in these other governmental
bodies, and absent in all California counties, is an individual with a position that is primarily
responsible for the executive administration of government and, in democracies, is directly
answerable to the electorate. It is important when a governmental jurisdiction operates on such a
massive scale, and this would apply to at least California’s top 15 counties in population (all over
700,000 residents), that the governance system employs a strong elected executive to provide a
voice reflective of the collective “inter-regional” population shift as described by Gargan (1981).
As populations change, whether through immigration or loss via outward migration, long held
norms and more shift. This change in demographics and preferences can be collected and
represented as part of a whole, when an official is elected on behalf of a jurisdiction’s entire
population. Examples include the president at the federal level, United State Senators giving
voice to the collective of a state, juxtaposed with members of the House of Representative
echoing the preferences of just one section of the collective, a governor at the state level, and a
strong mayor in a city. An elected county executive, a role absent in California, would play this
12
critical role in representing this collective voice. As the only person elected county-wide and
with responsibilities that range the entire spectrum of county services (as opposed to a
countywide elected sheriff that only focuses on law enforcement) the elected CEO would be
forced to campaign throughout a county to listen and respond to a far larger base of voters than
California’s current system allows for, with supervisors elected from individual districts, that in
many instances have vastly different demographics and voter preferences. Additionally, the
elected CEO role could be of equal importance to combat the executive and political
fragmentation described by Baldassare (1998).
The problems under research in this paper stem from an outdated “commission” county
governance model. As noted earlier, both Inyo County ($76 million 2013/2014 budget) and
Alpine County (1,175 total population) have the same governance structure as Los Angeles
County with nearly 10 million residents, more than 100,000 employees and a budget in excess of
$26 billion for 2013/2014. It is not logical to employ the same structure for these starkly
different counties. Los Angeles County and most of the very large California counties (16
counties with more than 500,000 in population) have adapted to their massive growth, more or
less, by simply hiring more staff. The ultimate answer, however, is not that simple and the great
diversity of California counties in size (population and economic), demographics, density and
environment must be taken into consideration when analyzing governance. A rejection of the
“one-size-fits-all” mentality toward county governance was issued by Lobao and Kraybill
(2005). Their research looked at the differences in counties based on their size, environmental,
and demographic differences. On the whole, Lobao and Kraybill supported the idea that large,
urban, metropolitan counties tend to have more influence and greater power on key issues and
services such as transportation and economic development than smaller counties and cities. “Our
13
survey findings point to an increased role of county governments in economic growth and public
services, although the changes vary by metro-nonmetro location” (Lobao & Kraybill, 2005, p.
254). There is significant competition between counties for private investment and economic
development, the extent of which is a derivative of a county’s influence. Lobao and Kraybill
went further in describing the differences between metro and nonmetro counties by focusing on
the disparities of urban and rural populations. California counties embody these disparities and
thus demand a renewed look at county governance throughout the state.
California’s outdated governance model is plagued by two problematic elements. The
first, per Gargan (1981), is the past, present, and future effects of dramatic inter-regional shifts of
population on local government capacity. Researchers who have explored local government
capacity have pointed to a number of “qualitatively new problems” that affect the ability of local
governments to perform. One of those problems takes its form in massive and ongoing
population shifts. Gargan’s research focused on the impacts of both dramatic population and
resource gains and losses to a region, including a related increase in the volume and diversity of
demands made upon local government as a result of these shifts.
A second issue is political fragmentation, a problem that was addressed by Baldassare
(1998) in his description of Orange County’s governance model leading up to bankruptcy:
Orange County was politically fragmented in ways that allowed [Treasurer Bob Citron]
to operate and that kept the various stakeholders and observers from understanding how
big the risks were. The county government was headed by five supervisors elected by
district to represent the interests of the district not the county as a whole. There was no
county mayor or CEO. The county departments were headed by elected and appointed
officials who operated fairly autonomously—like the county treasurer. No other county
14
officials had oversight over Bob Citron. Elected countywide, he was not directly
accountable to either the Board of Supervisors or the county administrative officer. Since
the other county officials could not keep track of what the treasurer was doing, they did
not have up-to-date information on the county's finances. Moreover, they were also not
in a position to question, much less dictate, the treasurer's investment decisions. (p. 11)
Orange County adheres to this same fragmented governance model today, twenty years
after the bankruptcy, and the same can be said of the model in use by all pure California counties
(except for San Francisco’s City-County consolidation). The problems of political fragmentation
in California’s commission governance model are exacerbated by the lack of traditional checks
and balances between the county’s administrative/executive, legislative, and quasi-judicial
functions. Drawing upon my personal experience as a former management level professional in
the Orange County CEO’s office, as well as in my role as chief of staff to a member of the board
of supervisors, I can attest to the fragmented goals of each board office and the appointed CEO.
These fragmented agendas can go far beyond reconciling multiple goals, but in many cases
manifest themselves as personal competition between supervisors to acquire resources for their
respective constituents. Too often it becomes a zero-sum game with no one elected countywide
to speak on behalf of the collective. Furthermore, the sheer size of each supervisorial district and
the lack of formal responsibility for a board office to oversee the appointed administrative CEO
leave California counties ineffectual in constructing broad, countywide goals and objectives. As
California counties have grown in size (population, employees, and budget,) they have not
adjusted with the safeguards, primarily a system of checks and balances that should be associated
with governmental entities that are now larger than many states. As noted earlier, the five-
member board of supervisors system in California provides no true separation of powers that one
15
sees at the state level or in many other counties nationwide. In Los Angeles County, the media
refer to the county supervisors as the “Five Kings,” as they have districts with nearly two million
constituents. The five-member model in California places the executive, legislative, and quasi-
judicial responsibilities in the hands of the board of supervisors. This consolidation of power in
one entity, absent of checks and balances, is one of the largest obstacles for implementation of an
elected CEO model for California counties, as the supervisors are reluctant to relinquish control.
In addition, as populations and the diversity of issues have increased, it has proven to be an
inefficient and easily corruptible model. There is simply so much power within the offices of a
county supervisor that they will, with history as a guide, oppose diminution of their power.
Finally, it can be said that a board of supervisors can and does provide executive responsibilities
to an appointed CEO/CAO or county manager. However, as Chapter Three will address in
greater detail, that power is always subject to being curtailed, amended or completely withdrawn
by the board of supervisors, who are not even statutorily obligated to have the position of
appointed CEO/CAO, and at any time can wrest away executive authority from its appointed
manager by vote or the simple dismissal of an at-will employee.
Phenomenon Under Research: Diversity of County Governance Models in America
The United States has more than 3,000 counties throughout its 50 states. The 2010
United States Census puts the number at 3,143 counties or county equivalents nationwide. As
additional background, an example of a county equivalent could be a city that does not reside
within a formal county’s jurisdiction or an area of a state that is neither a city nor a functioning
county governmental operation. Forty-eight of the 50 states have operational county
governments. Connecticut and Rhode Island are divided into geographic regions called counties,
but they do not have functioning governments (county equivalents). Alaska calls its counties
16
boroughs and Louisiana refers to them as parishes (NACo, retrieved from
http://www.naco.org/Counties/learn/Pages/Overview.aspx).
There is also great demographic diversity within the shifting county populations, and that
diversity is mirrored in the array of governance models utilized across America’s counties.
These models will be identified and analyzed in great detail in Chapter Two. However, as more
and more Americans find themselves on the move, very often they are landing in the same area,
creating far-more densely populated and diverse counties almost overnight. The increasing
concentration of population in a relatively small number of counties was highlighted by the
research of UK Daily reporter Michael Zennie (2013):
Half of the United States population resides in 146 very large urban and suburban
counties clustered around the nation's most populous cities. The remaining 157 million
Americans are scattered through the country's 3031 smaller counties, boroughs and
parishes - many of them rural. (UK Daily Mail Online, 5 Sept., 2013).
The map in Figure 2 clearly illustrates how Southern California is home to a disproportionate
share of America’s largest counties, with nearly the entire Southern California area highlighted
on the map.
17
Figure 2. United States counties, from UK Daily Mail Online & U.S. Census Data (2010),
retrieved from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2413498/The-146-large-counties-HALF-
U-S-population-lives.html
Although there is great diversity in California’s county populations, the populations are
served by a relatively uniform commission form of governance originally intended for rural
areas. This paper will research an alternative governance model, namely, the countywide-
elected, CEO county governance model, that is utilized in 25 of the 48 states with functional
county governmental operations. This project will research the applicability of this model to
deal with the impact of inter-regional population shifts and executive/political fragmentation on
county government in California. Specifically, this paper is intended to build upon a policy
recommendation made in a 2001 Special Report to the Speaker of the California Assembly,
namely: “The State should foster and encourage discussion among California counties of reforms
– such as the elected County Executive – used widely in other parts of the nation” (Sonenshein,
2001, p. 5). The research of the county governance diversity nationwide and specifically the use
18
of the council-executive model in Chapter Two leads to the applicability analysis of the elected-
CEO model in Orange County, California in Chapter Three.
A goal of this research is to explore the potential to apply this alternative model in
California and explore why it has yet to find root here. This research can inform practitioners
and researchers who want to effect change in county governance. I plan to draw upon my
professional experience and observations in this dissertation. To that end, this research project
will endeavor to bridge lessons learned about the evolution of counties in California and
nationwide, with my in-depth knowledge of Orange County’s government, political
environment, business community, and organized labor.
Governance Diversity Exists
Some states, including Michigan, Arkansas, Kentucky, and New Jersey, have made
significant strides in reforming county governance models and already employ an elected CEO
structure. Thus, we have proof positive that this can be accomplished. Cities, transportation
authorities, and other special governmental districts throughout California and the nation already
utilize a broad range of governance models to serve their growing and diverse constituencies.
However, California counties have, nearly without exception, failed to adapt their governance
model to their ever-changing constituencies. The lack of meaningful self-evaluation of the
appropriateness of California’s existing county governance model leaves counties ineffectual and
vulnerable to corruption. Analysis and examples of the detrimental consequences of failed
governance reform efforts in Los Angeles County will be presented in Chapter Two, and a look
at the historic negative cost of executive and political fragmentation in Orange County related to
its largely unreformed governance model will be addressed in Chapter Three.
19
Looking Elsewhere for Examples of Governance Diversity
After moving to California from Michigan in the late 1990s, I started to notice the
sometimes subtle but, in many instances, stark differences between the two states in the
governance models used at all levels of government. At first, I paid them very little attention,
but over time came to understand that to truly understand government, especially “how and why”
it operates, it is not sufficient to simply read the politicians’ headlines in the newspaper, but more
so, to focus on the governmental jurisdiction’s existing governance model. Some examples of
the diversity of models include California’s preference to elect the governor and lieutenant
governor separately, while Michigan elects the governor and lieutenant governor as a ticket, the
same way we elect the president and vice president nationally. Michigan and California both
utilize a variety of municipal government organizational models for cities, allowing for a strong
mayor system (directly elected) or a weak council-manager form of government where the
mayor is only a symbolic position that rotates among councilmembers. However, Michigan has
a wider set of formal classifications for municipal jurisdictions. Some of these other governance
models in Michigan include formal villages and townships. The number of elected officials, as
well as their roles and responsibilities, can vary greatly between a city, township, and village.
Diversity related to the size of the governing board even exists within each category.
Governance Diversity Close to Home: Three Airports…Three Different Ways to Govern
Even airports in Southern California have very different organizational and local
governance models. While all commercial airports are ultimately regulated by a variety of
federal agencies, including the Federal Aviation Administration and Transportation Security
Administration, they are governed locally using a variety of models that have evolved in an
effort to serve their unique constituencies effectively. Los Angeles International Airport is part
20
of Los Angeles World Airports, which operates as a department within the City of Los Angeles.
John Wayne Airport in Orange County is a department within the County of Orange and has a
five-member advisory board, but all formal decisions fall to the county board of supervisors.
San Diego International Airport is part of an independent governmental body known as the San
Diego County Regional Airport Authority and, while it utilizes the word “County” in its name, it
is operated separately and distinctly from the County of San Diego (the formal county
governmental body) or City of San Diego. Therefore, the three largest airports in Southern
California operate with completely different governance models. For example, while John
Wayne Airport is Orange County’s only commercial airport in service to the entire county, the
majority of the County’s cities have no formal say in its operation. San Diego is a direct
contrast, as its airports are part of a joint powers authority in order to bring in the voices of a
broader regional representation for airport operations. However, while governance diversity
seems to work well for airport operations in California, governance diversity is not what we see
in the defining commission style governance model utilized by California counties. Sonenshein
(2001) highlighted this stunning lack of differentiation and adaptation by California counties
regardless of the massive diversity in populations, economies, environment, and overall size,
noting:
…other than San Francisco, which has 11 city-county supervisors, all 57 other California
counties have exactly 5 members of the county board of supervisors, even though the
state Constitution only requires that charter counties have a minimum of 5 members.
(Sonenshein, 2001, p. 17; emphasis in original)
21
Still, more than a decade later in 2014, there are no countywide elected CEOs and all counties
still utilize a five-member board of supervisors, whether in service of nearly 10 million or less
than 2,000 residents.
Researching County Governance Diversity
Twenty-six states currently have counties that utilize some form of a county-wide elected
executive. Table 3 illustrates the broad diversity of county governance models that these states
and counties currently utilize, as well as the variations in governing board size employed.
Figures in parenthesis indicate the total number of variations that a specific state has for county
governing boards. While California adheres without exception or justification to five-member
boards, Table 3 indicates that there are counties with governing boards as large as 20, 30, 40, and
54 members and as small as Bleckly County, Georgia with only one elected county
commissioner.
22
Table 3
Diversity of Governance Models by State
STATE
# of
Counties
# of
Counties
with
Elected
CEO
Governing Board
Size (and # of
variations)
Primary Title Used
By Elected “County”
Executive
Alaska 19 19 5,6,7,8,9,11 Mayor
Arkansas 75 75 9,11,13,15 County Judge
Colorado 64 2 3,5,10,13 Mayor
Delaware 3 1 5,7,13 County Executive
Florida 67 3 5,6,7,9,13,19 Mayor
Georgia 159 5 1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 Mayor & CEO
Hawaii 4 4 7,9 Mayor
Illinois 102 1 Range 3-30 (22) County Executive
Indiana 92 1 3,29 Mayor
Kansas 105 1 3,5,7,10 Mayor & CEO
Kentucky 120 120 3-9, 16,26
County
Judge/Executive
Louisiana 64 7 5,7-15 Parish President
Maryland 24 9 3,5,7,9,15 County Executive
Massachusetts 7 1 3,5,7,13 Mayor
Michigan 83 4 5-9,11-15, 19,21 CEO
Missouri 115 5 3,7,9,29 County Executive
New Jersey 21 5 3,5,7,9 County Executive
New York 58 19 Range 7-54 (17) County Executive
Ohio 88 2 3,11 County Executive
Pennsylvania 67 5 3,5,7,9,11,15,20 County Executive
Tennessee 95 95 9-21, 24-25, 40
County
Mayor/Executive
Texas 254 254 5 County Judge
Utah 29 2 3,5,7,9 County Executive
Virginia 95 1 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 County Executive
Washington 39 4 3,5,7,9 County Executive
Wisconsin 72 11 Range 7-38 (22) County Executive
Note. The source of this data is compiled from NACo “Find a County,” retrieved from
http://www.naco.org/Counties/Pages/FindACounty.aspx.
23
Additional points regarding this data include the following:
Some of the largest states make use of the elected CEO role and a diverse set of
governing board sizes to provide better checks and balances in dividing the
executive/budget and legislative functions:
o New York with 19 elected CEOs and 17 different board sizes ranging up to 54
members;
o Wisconsin with 11 elected CEOs and 22 different board sizes ranging up to 38
members;
o Pennsylvania with five elected CEOs and seven different board sizes ranging up
to 20 members;
o Michigan with four elected CEOs and 12 different board sizes ranging up to 21
members;
o Florida with three elected CEOs and 6 different board sizes ranging up to 19
members; and
o New Jersey with five elected CEOs and four different board sizes ranging up to
nine members.
Five additional states mandate the election of a county executive for all their respective
counties:
o Alaska - 19 Boroughs;
o Arkansas - 75 Counties;
o Hawaii – 4 Counties;
o Kentucky – 120 Counties; and
o Tennessee – 95 Counties.
24
Even the smallest states incorporate some version of the elected county CEO model and
have diversified their respective boards in response to unique local issues:
o Alaska – six varieties ranging to 11 board members;
o Delaware – all three counties unique with boards of five, seven, and 13 members;
o Kansas – four varieties ranging to 10 board members; and
o Utah – four varieties ranging to nine board members.
California counties have less governance diversity than other states/counties:
o Counties have not deviated from a five-member board size in more than 100
years; and
o There are no countywide elected CEOs among California’s counties.
Taking into account the diversity of governance models described in the preceding
section and chart, there are numerous examples for California’s counties to investigate.
However, they rely upon a nearly identical model, utilizing an appointed CEO/CAO and an
elected five-member board of supervisors. An example that will be discussed in depth later in
this paper is Michigan and its 83 counties serving nearly 10 million residents. Four of
Michigan’s counties have an elected county CEO. This includes Michigan’s three largest
counties by population and size of the economy.
Finally, it is important to note again that the city-county consolidation of San Francisco
will be referenced at various points throughout this discussion. However, for purposes of this
project it is not considered as a formal county and, therefore, not an anomaly to the lack of
diversity of county governance in California, as described by Sonenshein (2001): “With its
combined city and county government, San Francisco has been more like a city than like a
traditional county in its charter approach” (Sonenshein, 2001, p. 16).
25
Furthermore, unlike traditional California counties, as referred to by Sonenshein, San Francisco
governs no county-unincorporated areas and has no other city or equivalent municipal
jurisdictions within its boundaries. This is in stark contrast to other city-county consolidations.
For example, the city-county consolidations of Indianapolis/Marion County (Indiana), Kansas
City/Wyandotte County (Kansas), Jacksonville/Duval County (Florida), Miami/Dade County
(Florida) all retain county boundaries broader than the city, include residents outside their
respective major city, serve county un-incorporated areas, serve other cities and towns and,
therefore, truly act as broad regional governmental bodies on behalf of their residents.
Contributions to Practice
“The west has always attached high importance to vigorous local government.
California, after all, was the first state to allow county charters, and Los Angeles County, in
1912, was the first county to adopt one…” (NACo, retrieved from
http://www.naco.org/Counties/learn/Pages/HistoryofCountyGovernmentPartIII.aspx ). You can
feel the energy that comes out of NACo’s description of a golden era of county reform and
change, both nationally and in California. This period is referred to as the Progressive Era,
which will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter Two. It was a time of significant change and
evolution in county governance and services. The shifting of populations and economies to the
West Coast forced states and counties to restructure and reprioritize. In response to this shift,
California counties started to adopt charters, as analyzed in-depth in Chapter Two, in part to limit
the State’s influence in local affairs and to deal with changing demographics. However, more
than 100 years since the start of the Progressive Era in California, the scholarly analysis and
research, as well as county governance evolution, have subsided, even though the population
influx and ever-changing demands of radically changing demographics increase decade after
decade. Therefore, my contribution to the literature and practice will be to help renew scholarly
26
discourse focused on counties in California and to inspire policy makers and practitioners to
make drastic changes to California county governance.
The major contributions to practice are twofold, with the first priority being to contribute
to the existing literature. Existing scholarly literature regarding counties is sparse. Throughout
my life, whether as the son of a professional city executive, student of government, researcher, or
governmental professional at the city, special district, county and state levels, I have always been
in a position to watch the evolution of practice and discourse around the various levels of
government and politics in the United States. Everyone has an opinion on how government
should be operated, who should run it, and what programs are beneficial or detrimental.
Students, researchers, and practitioners in government or politics have a seemingly endless
panoply of papers, books, journals, and articles at their fingertips, informing their opinions on
immigration, education policy, foreign policy, and national debt at the federal level. Everyone
seems consumed with the executive branch at the federal level and the United State Congress.
State politics related to charismatic governors like New Jersey’s Chris Christie or California’s
Jerry Brown tend to dominate newspaper headlines and scholarly journals. At the city level,
local newspapers, bloggers, academics, and think tanks now pay great attention to big-city
mayors, municipal government compensation, and, specifically, the debate surrounding reform
of public employee pensions. However, when you move to the topic of county government,
people tend to reflect that glazed look of disinterest. Unfortunately, the lack of scholarly
attention and analysis of county government seems to echo that lackadaisical response.
In public policy and public administration circles, the phrase “forgotten governments”
has become synonymous with county government research. The phrase and this unfortunate
trend was first referenced by Marando and Thomas (1977) in their landmark Forgotten
27
Governments: County Commissioners as Policy Makers. In the foreword to Forgotten
Governments, Thomas P. Murphy of the Federal Executive Institute highlighted one of the
critical conundrums identified by Marando and Thomas that has continued to plague counties to
this day and helped to relegate them to scholarly obscurity:
Counties generally have been neglected as objects of analysis; much of what is known
about them has been inferred from research on cities… Also, counties, which may
include more than one jurisdiction, range geographically from the urban core through
suburbs to rural areas, and they are faced necessarily with a broader array of demands
than the basically urban city. This study indicates, then, that counties are sufficiently
distinct to warrant caution in making generalizations about these two types of local
governments. (Murphy, foreword in Marando and Thomas, 1977, p. 10)
Much of the most current scholarly literature still refers to “forgotten governments” and typically
laments the decades of silence between bursts of new research related to county government.
Benton referred to counties with the phrase “forgotten governments” nearly 30 years later
(Benton, 2005, p. 462). Streib et al. (2007, p. 971) highlighted this desert of research noting,
“Lack of clarity about formal (governance) structures probably contributes to the dearth of
research on leadership roles (in counties).”
The second contribution to practice, through research and analysis, is to build upon two
specific recommendations from Sonenshein (2001). I studied under Dr. Sonenshein while
obtaining my Masters of Public Administration in Urban Planning and Management at California
State University, Fullerton (CSUF) and was then honored to be chosen by the faculty of CSUF to
teach one of Dr. Sonenshein’s signature undergraduate courses in metropolitan politics, where I
focused a great deal on county governance. In speaking with Dr. Sonenshein regarding this
28
research paper, I asked whether he was aware of any additional literature, or official action by
the California Legislature or counties to act upon his 2001 report. He confirmed by email what
is painfully obvious in both county government operations and scholarly literature, “Not a
word….Oh well, it happens” (Sonenshein, private communication, May 8, 2014). Reanalyzing
and building upon Dr. Sonenshein’s report not only adds to the literature, but also has the
potential to provide legislators, county supervisors, and community activists with fresh
information and data to spark innovation in governance, leadership, operations, and scholarly
research into California’s counties. This project is intended to be a tool to assist academic
researchers and county government practitioners alike (whether professional or elected).
Sonenshein’s report offered nine different policy recommendations for the California
Legislature to consider. As noted, none have been formally acted upon or considered. The two
policy recommendations forming the focus of this research as contributions to practice are as
follows:
1. “The State should foster and encourage discussion among California counties of reforms
– such as the elected County Executive—used widely in other parts of the nation”
(Sonenshein, 2001, p. 5).
2. “The State should set a limited goal of charter reform in a small number of counties with
large populations. The focus should be on the percentage of the population included in
these counties, rather than the percentage of counties participating” (Sonenshein, 2001, p.
5).
In conclusion, my intent with this research is to insert a new element in the discussion
related to county governance. That discussion is inextricably tied to the oft-discussed unwieldy
nature of the State of California as a governmental body. California counties, similar to their
29
brethren in most other states, are in fact, creatures of the state. Historically, a county’s raison
d’etre was to bring state services closer to the constituent than a far-flung state capitol ever
could. It is odd then that in the debate about how to better govern California, counties tend to be,
as Marando and Thomas (1977) would point out, “forgotten” pieces of California’s governance
challenge. The cry of California’s lack of governability was brightly illustrated in a proposed
2014 ballot measure that aimed to carve California into six separate states. The author and main
proponent of the measure is venture capitalist Tim Draper. In an interview with reporter Alastair
Gee in The New Yorker, Draper succinctly echoed the same complaint regarding the State of
California that this project makes here regarding counties, “I think it’s just too big…” (Gee, A.
2014, March 29, Retrieved from Online Blog
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/currency/2014/03/to-fix-problems-in-california-an-
investor-suggests-breaking-it-up.html). The California Legislative Analyst Office (LAO)
provided a map and new population divisions if the six-state proposal were to move forward.
30
Figure 3. Proposed six states ballot measure map. From California Legislative Analyst’s Office,
retrieved from http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2013/130771.aspx
Figure 4. Population and largest cities of the six proposed new states, from California Legislative
Analyst’s Office, retrieved from http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2013/130771.aspx
31
These maps and charts highlight eerily similar statistics to those already addressed in this
research. Draper (2014) and the “Six States” measure simply contends that the State of
California is no longer governable by a governance structure that never envisioned the speed of
the massive and diverse population influx experienced by California. However, the reformation
of county structures, though a less interesting crusade than breaking apart an entire state, could
yield many of the same benefits to Californians who feel disconnected from government.
Further, even if Draper’s six states measure were ever to be approved by the voters of California,
it would have an even higher and potentially insurmountable hurdle to overcome, namely
obtaining federal government approval to divide the state. The California LAO’s analysis
highlights the problem:
Congressional Approval Required. Assuming voters approve this measure, California
would not be split unless the federal government enacted a law approving the separation.
The bill to create the new states would have to be approved by a majority of the U.S.
House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. Finally, the measure would have to be
approved by the President of the United States, unless his or her veto were overridden by
Congress. (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, retrieved on June 20, 2014 from
http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2013/130771.aspx).
This individual ballot measure would have the potential to shift control of Congress, as the
measure would allocate two additional U.S. Senators for each new state. The California
Legislature would have a far easier time building off Sonenshein’s 2001 recommendations,
notably the two cornerstone recommendations analyzed in this paper, by encouraging counties to
look at implementation of an elected CEO model and focus on this reform in California’s largest
counties. Thus, to take Tim Draper’s (2014) “too-big” quote, the combined population of
32
California’s 10 largest counties is approximately 26,839,177 and that works out to be roughly
72% of the entire population of the state as a whole. The remaining 28% of the population is
spread out among the remaining 48 California counties. Therefore, a great benefit in governance
reform could begin with a focus by the legislature on California’s largest counties, rather than
forming six new states. This paper intends to jump-start that important shift in focus, to
counties, among researchers and practitioners.
Finally, this project has the ability to contribute another pathway to significant reform in
governance in California. Neither presidential nor congressional approval would be necessary to
start reform in California’s largest counties. More research done on large counties adds to the
existing literature and focuses on how shifting populations and executive/political fragmentation
are affecting America’s largest counties. To reiterate, from a specific analysis of Orange
County, California, America’s sixth largest county, lessons can be extrapolated and tested in
other areas of California, which is home to a disproportionate number of super-sized counties.
This would also aid in analysis of diverse super-sized counties nationwide. The analysis of
Orange County can result in a toolkit for practitioners and scholars, helping to fill a gap in
research, and allow researchers and practitioners to draw upon ideas developed in this analysis,
hopefully to confront similar governance issues facing large and fast growing counties
throughout the nation.
Structure of the Manuscript
Chapter 1 introduces the topic of county governance as a critical, but often ignored, level
of government. It is comprised of five sections that explain (a) the focus of the study, (b) the
relevant background, (c) the research problem, (d) the governance analysis, and (e) the
contribution to practice. Through each section, Chapter 1 acquaints the reader with the diversity
33
of California counties, both in the issues they face and the constituents they serve. It then
juxtaposes that diversity with the unilateral use by all pure county governments in California of a
single, uniform governance model, comprised of a five-member commission and an appointed
chief executive. This chapter also identifies two of the most challenging issues facing counties
today by explaining first the concepts of executive and political fragmentation and second, inter-
regional population shifts and its requisite effect on counties in the way of rapid population gains
or losses. After introducing the concepts of executive/political fragmentation and inter-regional
population shifts, Chapter 1 utilizes charts and graphs to illustrate the challenges facing
California’s largest counties, and introduces two specific policy recommendations first made by
Dr. Raphael Sonenshein in 2001 to reform county governance. In summary, the policy
recommendations are that (a) the focus of county reforms in California should be in its largest
counties and (b) to begin a discussion concerning the introduction of a county-wide elected CEO,
as a new and alternative governance model available to California counties.
Chapter Two provides the foundation for the research by explaining the history of
counties within the United States and specifically in California. This chapter allows students,
new practitioners, and their more experienced colleagues in the field of county government to
utilize this research by exploring why counties exist, how they were formed, and their purpose as
governmental bodies. It also charts the evolution of county governance structures by looking at
the reform movement during the progressive era of government transformation, which was led in
large part by California in the early 1900s.
Chapter Three continues to narrow the focus of the paper by exploring the applicability of
county governance reform in Orange County. This chapter reintroduces relevant literature from
Chapter One related to local government capacity theory, inter-regional population shift,
34
executive and political fragmentation, and their impact on governmental operations. Chapter
Three is critical in that it bridges the theoretical analysis with an historic to present-day view of
county governance in an actual county, namely, Orange County, California. This chapter speaks
to the dearth of new literature and information available to county governance scholars, policy
makers, and professional practitioners, who face these issues in America’s largest counties.
Specific analysis of Orange County, California, America’s sixth largest county, can be
extrapolated into lessons learned and tested in other areas of California, which is home to a
disproportionate number of super-sized counties, as well as in other super-sized counties
nationwide. For better professional application and issue comparability, Chapter Three
highlights Orange County’s creation, demographics, and the historic struggle with executive and
political fragmentation by its elected officials and appointed executive. Finally, it explains
important historical decisions and events that may present Orange County as a successful
candidate for governance reform.
Chapter Four examines the historical underpinnings of the doctrine of separation of
powers within governmental structures, as well as the doctrine’s use in American counties and
absence in California counties. This chapter analyzes the governance structures in Michigan’s
two largest counties, both of which utilize the council-executive model (elected county
executive). This involves observations and critiques of the model and a discussion of its
applicability for Orange County, California.
Finally, Chapter Five discusses the results of the research and provides concluding
remarks. It summarizes and considers the issues that may determine whether an elected county
chief executive governance model can be successful in California. This summary will include
data related to the frequency that the council-executive model is used (countywide elected CEO)
35
in other large states, as well use in America’s largest counties in terms of population size.
Additionally, Chapter Five analyzes two pathways for county governance reform. The first
pathway analyzes governance reform emanating from the local level. This pathway would be
more an expression of local control. The second pathway contemplates a potential mandate by
the State of California for governance reform through a legislative vehicle that highlights
counties as conduits and their most basic role as service providers for the State, as opposed to the
role of cities, school boards, water districts, and other governmental entities. Both reform
pathways have been successful in other states and counties nationwide and this discussion will
apply those lessons and models for potential application in California. Finally, Chapter 5
concludes with a policy recommendation on county governance reform for use by state and local
policy makers in California.
36
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION
THE ORIGINS OF COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Earliest County Governance
County government in the United States takes its general form, function, and purpose
from a common European governmental jurisdictional ancestor known as a shire. This
connection to an ancestral governmental subdivision, dating back a millennium or more, is
commonly referenced by county government scholars and specifically noted by Sonenshein
(2001), Roger Kemp (2008) and best described in NACo’s History of Government Part I:
Settlers in North America brought with them a strong memory of, and attachment to, their
English roots. Yet almost immediately this English experience began to be altered to suit
the quite different living conditions both between America and England and within the
colonial region itself. The colonists’ collective memory of English county organization
had roots nearly a millennium deep. When years still had only three digits, English kings
had divided the country into districts called shires, a nomenclature that survives today in
such place names as Yorkshire and Hampshire. The shire was simply a mechanism for
maintaining royal power in places distant from the throne. At the head of the shire was
an earl appointed by the king; usually he was a large landholder, and he also commanded
the king’s military forces in the shire. At a minimum, the earl was responsible for
organizing and leading an armed force in the king’s service when called on to do so. In
local matters the Crown delegated considerable discretion to the earl and other shire
officials. Generally both legislative and judicial authority rested with a shire court
composed of local landholders. (Retrieved from
http://www.naco.org/Counties/learn/Pages/HistoryofCountyGovernmentPartI.aspx).
37
The first county in the United States was formed in James City, Virginia in 1634.
However, this forefather of today’s counties had its roots first as a subdivision of a private
corporation, rather than a governmental entity. The new colony of Virginia was a private
investment governed by the stockholders of The Virginia Company of London, which was given
its charter by King James I:
By 1617 the Virginia colony had been divided by the Virginia company into the
Incorporations of Henricus, Charles City, James City, and Kecoughtan. In 1618 King
James I granted the Third Charter with provisions for elected representatives to help
govern the colony…Starting with the 1619 meeting, the General Assembly handled
executive, legislative, and judicial issues for the Virginia colony. The assembly created
the first courts to handle small lawsuits in 1621, but the population increase - to about
5,000 colonists in 1634 - caused the administrative workload to become a hassle. In 1634
the General Assembly chartered eight shires, which were called "counties" afterwards.
The first eight counties were the four existing Incorporations (Henrico, Charles City,
James City, and Elizabeth City - which replaced the "heathen" name of Kecoughtan) plus
four new areas: Accomack, Charles River, Warrosquyoake, and Warwick River.
The boundaries of the eight counties were drawn so most colonists could reach their
county court sessions, where justices dealt with property issues and criminal accusations,
in one day. (Harch, 1957, pp. 75-76)
It is apparent from the last entry that, just as today, even the earliest American shires or counties
performed the same overarching function as modern day counties, by bridging a governance
divide that brings a distant centralized government’s services closer to the people. At first, it was
for private industry with New World merchants and Old World venture capitalists. However, it
38
eventually morphed and grew into the more recognizable public structure we are familiar with
today. The following maps track America’s first counties in the Colony of Virginia up to
modern day:
Figure 5. Boundaries (in red) of the first eight counties in Virginia, retrieved from Virginia
Places at http://www.virginiaplaces.org/vacount/howstart.html.
The modern State of Virginia now has 95 counties:
Figure 6. December 31, 2000 – Virginia County Boundaries, retrieved from The Newberry
Library at http://historical-county.newberry.org/website/Virginia/viewer.htm.
39
The Purpose of County Government
The most basic tenet of the English shire and its closest relative, the American county,
remains constant today, to bring essential state government services closer to the people. County
government in the United States is commonly referred to as a “creature” of state government or
the layer of government below the state. A county is distinguished from a city in this role as an
intermediary for the state, as well as by the regional nature of the services provided, contrasted
with the majority of city services only focused on the residents of that particular city. The
United States Constitution goes to great length and in many cases specificity when describing
each branch of the federal government. In numerous instances, it describes not only what
functions are prescribed for a branch of government, but with as much detail describing
limitations on governmental power. An example of this would be Article I, Section 9 of the
Constitution that lists eight specific limitations on congressional power. Further, the
Constitution pays significant attention to the state government, the tier of government directly
below the federal level. However, absent in any true form or detail in the Constitution is a
discussion of local municipal jurisdictions resembling cities or counties. It is the states and their
constitutions that describe and enumerate powers to counties.
Currently, forty-eight states describe or use the term county, with two states, Connecticut
and Rhode Island, formally abolishing county government as a distinct level of government with
a structure to provide services to the public. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the term county
only refers to jurisdictional boundaries for specific state-level functions and therefore no
traditional county apparatus is in place. Other states such as Massachusetts are recognized as
having a “weak” system of county government and the state delivers services directly to the
citizens without another governmental jurisdiction as an intermediary. County jurisdictional
boundaries in Massachusetts are used to describe administrative areas for the state, such as a
40
state district court jurisdiction or to define locations for National Weather Service alerts for
flooding, blizzards, tornados or other severe weather.
After World War II, population growth, suburban development, and the government
reform movement strengthened the role of local governments, including counties. These
developments set the stage for post–World War II urbanization. Changes in structure,
greater autonomy from the state government, rising revenues, and stronger political
accountability ushered in a new era of county governments throughout the nation.
During this time, counties began to offer an ever-widening range of services to the
citizens they served, a trend that has continued to the present time. State constitutions or
statutes assign many of the administrative responsibilities held by counties.
Independently elected county officials, including the sheriff, coroner, clerk, treasurer, and
registrar of voters, serve the functions of department managers in other forms of
government. (Kemp, 2008, p. 52)
One goal of this project is to add to the overall understanding of county government in
the United States, as well as to provide a better bridge between academic research and
practitioner innovation. To that end, this paper builds upon another important scholarly
contribution that focuses on that very link between academic researchers and county
practitioners, specifically to further the knowledge and comprehension of county governmental
operations and governance for policymakers and the public in general. In Conducting Research
on Counties: Commentary from County Government Practitioners, Burks County,
Pennsylvania’s Chief Administrative Officer William E. Dennis states,
…authors discuss the history of counties as “forgotten” in the sense that they have failed
to receive sufficient and serious attention from their state governments and local citizens.
41
They also remind us that county organizational structures were archaic, fragmented and
basically incomprehensible to the public…. (Lundy et al. 2007, p. 986)
In some respects, the internet era has helped in connecting the ‘forgotten’ and
‘incomprehensible’ county to its constituents. A great example of this is taken from the official
Franklin County, Ohio webpage in Figure 7. Franklin County, America’s thirtieth largest in
population (2014 ranking), created a useful table on their website to help inform local citizens
about the purpose of county government and services they provide. The list provides great
examples of a county attempting to help its residents better comprehend what services they
actually provide.
County Functions Example of Services
Protect the health and safety
of its citizens.
Sheriff dept., fire department, 911, snow removal, maintaining
roads, keeping water clean, sewer systems, Sanitation dept., Food
inspection, Animal Control.
Providing and maintaining
public services through the
collection of taxes.
Parks, libraries, public records of marriages, housing deeds, Board of
Elections, Mid-Ohio Regional Planning Commission.
Providing a system of justice. Local courts, Public Defender, Prosecuting Attorney.
Protecting the rights of
individuals.
Zoning, Children Services, Human Services, Office of Aging, Child
Support Enforcement, Veterans Service Commission.
Promoting the common
welfare of the people.
Public parking, sponsoring day care facilities, Rickenbacker Airport,
Economic development, job training and educational services, Mental
Retardation and Development Disabilities, welfare, Entertainment -
Cooper Stadium, Convention center, Veterans Memorial, County Fair,
Human Services.
Figure 7. Franklin County, Ohio Government Services Table, retrieved from
http://www.franklincountyohio.gov/commissioners/edsite/purposeOf.cfm.
42
Common County Government Characteristics
Row Officers
A common characteristic in county governments across the United States is the presence
of independently elected (county-wide) officials that are equivalent to department managers in
other forms and levels of government. Most counties refer to these officials as “row” officers.
The term row officer is a reference from the early history of county government in America and
describes the candidate line-up on the electoral ballot for these positions, as they were always
listed in a row. Some of the most common row officer titles in American counties, regardless of
state or size of county, are county sheriff, district attorney, and treasurer. Table 4 provides a
general description of row officer titles and the services they provide.
43
Table 4
Descriptions of Regional County Services
Row Officer Title Common Description of Services
Assessor Required by law to determine the value of all taxable property for property
tax purposes.
Auditor-Controller Provides professional accounting services that are mandated by a state’s
statutory code sections, along with other essential accounting services
required for a County to receive and utilize Federal, State and other County
agency funds.
Clerk of the Courts Responsible for processing, maintaining, and recording criminal case
records for a Court of Common Pleas (east coast counties). Among its other
duties, the Clerk of the Courts also collects court costs/fines, and licenses
private detectives.
Clerk-Recorder Records documents related to real property transactions. Maintains an
index and issues copies of all recorded documents, birth, death and marriage
records, marriage licenses, civil wedding ceremonies and archives.
District Attorney Prosecutes criminal and civil court cases on behalf of the citizens.
Sheriff-Coroner Law enforcement for unincorporated areas and by contract to cities.
Treasurer-Tax
Collector
Responsible for the receipt, custody, depository, investment, and recording
of funds for the county, school districts, and special districts. The Tax
Collector's Office is responsible for collecting taxes on all secured and
unsecured property in the county. This office is also responsible for the sale
of property subject to the "power to sell," formerly known as delinquent tax
deeded property.
Prothonotary All civil litigation is filed with the Prothonotary. Such litigation includes
mortgage foreclosures, personal injury cases, license suspension appeals,
divorce, child custody, and protection from abuse cases. The Prothonotary
also accepts U.S. passport applications.
Public
Administrator
Protects the assets and manages the affairs of deceased residents who at the
time of death left no known heirs, no will, no named executor, or an
executor who is ineligible. The PA searches for assets belonging to the
decedent, arranges for the interment when there are no known relatives,
makes a search for heirs, and acts as administrator of estates when named in
a will or when heirs request such service.
44
It is important to note for clarification purposes and future research into counties, that the
titles of row officers vary state-by-state and the list in Table 4 captures only a commonly used
cross-section of titles. To confuse matters for new students of county government, many
jurisdictions utilize the same titles in their organizational chart, but instead of the position being
an elective post, it is either appointed by the elected governing board or elected CEO, or even
hired by the appointed CAO. Further, many jurisdictions either combine or separate the row
officer duties and titles. For example, a county may have both an elected county sheriff and a
separately elected county coroner (or the coroner might be a separate appointed position).
Another example is counties that separate the auditor and controller roles or separate the clerk
and recorder responsibilities. Most counties have somewhere between three and ten row officers
in their organizational structure. However, some counties have adopted reforms within their
charters to abolish row officers, as happened in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania and are now
under consideration in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Reporter Daniel Warmer of The
Sentinel newspaper described the potential impact for Cumberland County.
A home rule charter would provide organizational flexibility and would free the county
from state code requirements for third-class counties, league representatives said. It
could extend to replacing the county commissioners and row officers with a council form
of government, or have more modest aims. ‘It’s the opportunity to create a government
tailor-made for your circumstances,’ said Gerald Cross, executive director of the
Pennsylvania Economy League, the nonprofit arm of which is designed to educate
officials and the public on local government issues. (Warmer, 2014, June 4, retrieved
from http://cumberlink.com/news/local/communities/carlisle/home-rule-charter-could-
45
transform-cumberland-county-government/article_b2c183e4-ec42-11e3-adfe-
001a4bcf887a.html)
County Unincorporated Areas
Areas within a county that are not incorporated as part of a city, with its own city council,
are defined as county unincorporated. In these areas, the county board of supervisors or
commission is the only local government present and provides the municipal services to the
residents. As a subsection of a state, regardless of whether a charter is present, the county exists
in large part to provide state services to a local population. This conduit for state services is
provided by the county to residents in its jurisdictional boundaries, irrespective of whether the
resident lives within the confines of a city or county unincorporated area. The amount of
unincorporated area as a percentage of total land or population can vary greatly county-by-
county. As an example, the County of Los Angeles, the largest county in terms of population,
has 88 cities, however more than 65% of the county’s land is unincorporated and is home to
approximately 1 million residents (retrieved from County of Los Angeles website at
http://www.lacounty.gov/government/geography-statistics/unincorporated-areas).
Form of Government: Charter and General Law Counties
American counties are typically divided into two broad categories, general law counties
and home rule or charter counties. Whether a county has either designation is, at least initially, a
decision by the state within which it is located. As discussed earlier, but important to reinforce
again in this section, counties are considered creatures or subsets of a state.
The United States Constitution sets out the powers of the federal government, as well as
those of the states. The Tenth Amendment provides that, ‘[t]he powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
46
States respectively, or to the people.’ This provision at once greatly limits the powers of
the federal government and vests much power with the states. All told, nearly 40,000
local governments exist in the U.S. However, the Constitution makes no mention of the
power, if any, they should assume. (Richardson, Gough, & Puentes, 2003, p. 3)
This absence of language or description of powers and responsibilities for counties (cities as
well) has led to considerable debate and consternation among policymakers, scholars and
attorneys over what powers, if any, are independently held or inherent to a county and thus fully
separate from the state. This debate came to a boiling point in an Iowa courtroom in 1886 when
“Dillon’s Rule” was created. United States Circuit Court Judge John F. Dillon set forth a ruling
that attempted to remove any ambiguity related to the absence of enumerated powers to counties
and cities by declaring,
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses
and can exercise the following powers, and no others: first, those granted in express
words (within a state’s constitution); second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or
incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of
the declared objects and purposes of the corporation—not simply convenient, but
indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power
is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied. (NACo’s
Research Brief, Jan 2004, vol. 2, no. 1,
http://www.celdf.org/downloads/Home%20Rule%20State%20or%20Dillons%20Rule%2
0State.pdf) Parenthetical comment added for clarification purposes.
47
Charter Counties
A county’s broad designation as either a general law or charter (home rule) county
defines whether that specific county has any significant discretion outside the purview of the
state. The discretion or authority afforded a county through a charter can vary, with some
examples including adding the power of local initiative or referendum for countywide policy
matters, transitioning certain elected row officer positions to appointed positions (public
guardian is a common example), and allowing local voters to vote on replacing county
supervisor board vacancies, which under general law are appointed by the governor. To aid in
the distinction of the two county governmental designations, it is helpful to interpret the word
charter as constitution, i.e., a locally created constitution that provides a set of powers and
responsibilities to the county that are not proscribed in state law. Again, it is important to
reiterate that in order for a county (or city) to have a charter, or become a charter county, a state
must authorize that option through the state’s constitution, via the legislature or by the court
system. Therefore, a home rule county has a charter (constitution). A working definition of
home rule is a state constitutional provision or legislative action that provides a city or county
with a greater measure of self-government (Black, 1990) than what is generally authorized to a
general law county and
…generally signifies a shift of governing power from the state to county or municipal
governments to implement principles of local self-government. There is no set standard
or agreed upon criteria for determining whether a local government has home rule, as
different states grant varying degrees of local autonomy to local governments. However,
home rule often represents a decrease in state interference in local affairs and an ability to
48
exercise some functions without a prior express delegation of authority from the state.
(retrieved from http://ballotpedia.org/Home_rule).
Forty states, including California, allow counties some form of home rule and, thereby,
the ability to create or have some semblance of a charter (retrieved from NACo’s Research Brief,
Jan 2004, vol. 2, no. 1). As reminder and noted earlier, some states (Massachusetts as an
example) do not have functioning county governments or have abolished them altogether and
therefore have no need to allow for county home rule provisions within their respective state
constitutions. However, the process through which states reach the decision to allow county
charters or home rule can also vary greatly between states. For example, California’s fourteen
charter counties established their charters through a local initiative, because the State of
California allows any county to make that local decision (by a vote of the county residents). In
contrast to California is Alabama, which does not allow counties to establish a charter
organically at the local level. However, through a special act of the Alabama Legislature, the
state granted two of their sixty-seven counties a version of home rule status.
General Law Counties
In contrast to the charter county are general law counties. General law counties fully
adhere to their specific description in state law and thereby lack a local charter (constitution) that
expands or alters the counties’ prescribed powers and responsibilities per state law. It is far more
common for a county to be described as a general law county. Even with forty states authorizing
some form of home rule, the majority of counties have not created a charter.
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Evolution of County Governance Structures in America
County Organizational Structures
It is generally accepted that counties nationwide fall into one of three structural
categories (Kemp, 2008, pp. 52-53; Sonenshein, 2001, p. 11).
Commission
Commission – Administrator (with an appointed CAO/CEO/CM)
Council – Executive (with an elected CEO)
However, different academic journals, articles, and research utilize some variations in name and
description of these governance structures. This only adds to the confusion of different titles and
names given to structures based on the state or region where they operate and can leave county
government researchers confused and frustrated. In Conducting Research on Counties in the 21
st
Century: A New Agenda and Database Considerations it is noted that “…it is challenging to
even assemble complete and generally accepted statistics about basic structural characteristics”
(Streib et al., 2007, p. 970). They emphasize their point further by explaining that the confusion
over county structure is exacerbated “in part because of the unclear connection between form and
practice, it is difficult to get a precise count of how many counties use different forms of
government” (Streib et al., 2007, p. 971).
Commission
The elected “Commission” form of government is the oldest and most traditional form of
county governance model used today. It is considered to be the most basic and “unreformed”
structure in use today (Sonenshein, 2001, p. 11).
The distinguishing feature of this type of structure is the fact that legislative authority
(e.g., power to enact ordinances and adopt budgets) and executive powers (e.g., to
50
administer policies and appoint county employees) are exercised jointly by an elected
commission or board of supervisors. (Retrieved from
http://www.naco.org/Counties/learn/Pages/Overview.aspx)
At the county level, this form of governance was the focus of reform advocates during the
Progressive Era. Reform minded activists, then and now, point out the peculiar loyalty that
county government seems to have to the commission form, especially when taking into
consideration that it provides for no recognizable version of traditional governmental checks and
balances between executive/administrative, legislative (policy-making/appropriating) and any
quasi-judicial functions (i.e., settlement of claims against the county and in review of resident
appeals of land use and tax decisions made by county departments). While board or commission
sizes vary, this form tends to put all three governmental branches under the direct responsibility
and influence of a small three to seven (typically five) member board. Further, these elected
boards and commissions, along with the row officers, function in a dual role, as a representative
to their constituents, which is a traditional role of an elected official in a representative
democracy, but also as a department head/manager, which is not. At the city, school board,
special district, state and federal level there is not any other example where a governing board is
vested with so much authority, that it literally oversees some of the most basic day-to-day
functions of government, as happens in a straight commission form of county governance.
“Although the elected county commissioners are more heavily involved in operations than are
city councilmembers (Svara, 1990), only in counties are specific agencies directly managed by
the county governing body” (Cigler, 1995, p. 58).
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Commission - Administrator
A creation more than a century in the making, the commission-administrator structure has
become the most common governance structure for American cities and has made significant
strides in acceptance among counties as well. “Under this form, the county board of
commissioners appoints an administrator who serves at its pleasure. That individual may be
vested with a broad range of powers, including the authority to hire/fire department heads and
formulate a budget” (retrieved from NACo’s website at
http://www.naco.org/Counties/learn/Pages/Overview.aspx).
In cities it is better described as a council-manager (city manager) form of government. This
concept was born in the Progressive Era of government reforms and was first conceptualized by
the National Civic League (NCL), originally named the National Municipal League, and its
founding members, former President Theodore Roosevelt and Louis Brandeis among others.
They gathered together to discuss the future of cities and a way to deliver them from corruptive
forces that limited their effectiveness in service delivery and management. To that end, the NCL
first proposed the council-manager structure in the 1915 Model City Charter and then turned its
attention to the often-ignored relative, the county. The Model County Charter adopted by the
NCL has long recommended that counties move from the pure commission form to a county
manager form of government (Sonenshein, 2001, p. 12).
The revised Model County Charter continues to endorse a structure in which all the
powers of the county are vested in the elected governing body which appoints as the
county’s chief executive a professional manager who is continuously responsible to and
removable by the elected governing body. (National Civic League, 1990, Introduction, p.
xi)
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There is also great diversity in variations of this structural model nationwide and even within the
same state.
The commission-administrator form includes several variants: (a) council-manager, with
a council or board and an appointed manager who performs executive functions for the
county; (b) chief administrative officer, consisting of a board or commission which
appoints a manager who supervises county departments, prepares budgets, and oversees
program implementation; and (c) county administrative assistant who carries out the
directives of the commission, which acts as both the legislative and executive body. The
responsibilities of the nearly 790 county administrators, then, may vary widely-from
liaison to direct management. (Cigler, 1995, p. 59)
For context, the primary differentiating factor between the council-manager and CEO models
would be the extent to which the governing body (in California it is the county board of
supervisors) empowers the manager in the council-manager form with executive authorities, such
as hiring and firing of department heads, reorganization of county departments, raises for
employees and departmental audit/investigatory authority as a few examples. Those executive
authorities would not typically be furnished to the CAO. In the simplest terms, one has
“borrowed” executive authority from the governing board and the other is relegated to
supervisory activities, with the executive decision making power still residing with the governing
board or commission.
Council - Executive
Only in the council-executive governance model is the executive/administrative and
budget authority truly wrestled away from the governing county board or commission. Thus, it
is also the only structure with a well-defined system of checks and balances between the
53
executive, legislative, and quasi-judicial functions of a county. In some variations of this
structure, an elected CEO may still choose to hire a CAO (some counties refer to it as a COO/
chief operating officer or a CM/county manager) to manage the day-to-day operations, while the
CEO concentrates on large policy objectives and manages political considerations.
.The separation of powers principle undergirds this governance system. A county
executive is the chief administrative officer of the jurisdiction. Typically, he or she has
the authority to veto ordinances enacted by the county board (subject to their possible
override) and hire/fire department heads. Although a majority of counties still operate
under the commission form, more than 40 percent have shifted to either the county
administrator or the elected executive type. State policy-makers have contributed to this
trend, as Arkansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee now mandates that counties in those states
be headed by an elected executive. (retrieved from NACo’s website at
http://www.naco.org/Counties/learn/Pages/Overview.aspx).
This model, more than any other, mirrors the strong mayoral form of governance utilized in
America’s largest cities. It is also the least used structure among counties. Large counties would
arguably derive the same benefits that large cities gain from having an elected executive such as,
checks and balances, reforms of government and pursuit of broad and regionally beneficial
policy objectives. This research will highlight a number of important examples of the council-
executive structure in practice, in an effort to gain a better understanding of the use of a county-
wide elected CEO structure among America’s largest counties. Table 5 lists America’s largest
counties by population and highlights the use of both the appointed CAO structure and the
elected CEO.
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Table 5
America’s Largest Counties and Use of the Strong Elected CEO Model
State County
Population:
Census 2012
Land Area:
square miles
Elected
Executive
Largest
City
California Los Angeles 9,962,789 4,060.871 NO Los Angeles
Illinois Cook 5,231,351 945.680 YES Chicago
Texas Harris 4,253,700 1,728.825 YES Houston
Arizona Maricopa 3,942,169 9,203.137 NO Phoenix
California San Diego 3,177,063 4,199.891 NO San Diego
California Orange 3,090,132 789.404 NO Santa Ana
Florida Miami-Dade 2,591,035 1,946.064 YES Miami
New York Kings 2,565,635 70.606 NO New York
Texas Dallas 2,453,843 879.599 YES Dallas
New York Queens 2,272,771 109.235 NO New York
California Riverside 2,268,783 7,207.369 NO Riverside
California San Bernardino 2,081,313 20,052.495 NO San Bernardino
Washington King 2,007,440 2,126.044 YES Seattle
Nevada Clark 2,000,759 7,910.335 NO Las Vegas
Texas Tarrant 1,880,153 863.419 YES Fort Worth
California Santa Clara 1,837,504 1,290.688 NO San Jose
Florida Broward 1,815,137 1,205.396 NO Ft. Lauderdale
Michigan Wayne 1,792,365 614.152 YES Detroit
Texas Bexar 1,785,704 1,246.824 YES San Antonio
New York New York 1,619,090 22.964 NO New York
California Alameda 1,554,720 737.572 NO Oakland
Pennsylvania Philadelphia 1,547,607 135.090 NO Philadelphia
Massachusetts Middlesex 1,537,215 823.458 NO Lowell
New York Suffolk 1,499,273 912.198 YES Brentwood
California Sacramento 1,450,121 965.652 NO Sacramento
New York Bronx 1,408,473 42.027 NO New York
Florida Palm Beach 1,356,545 1969.76 NO W. Palm Beach
New York Nassau 1,349,233 286.692 YES Hempstead
Florida Hillsborough 1,277,746 1020.21 NO Tampa
Ohio Cuyahoga 1,265,111 458.489 YES Cleveland
Pennsylvania Allegheny 1,229,338 730.170 YES Pittsburgh
Michigan Oakland 1,220,657 872.511 YES Farmington Hills
Note: The source of this population data is from the United States Census Bureau, “County
Populations and Rankings” retrieved from
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/counties/totals/2012/CO-EST2012-02.html. The source of
area information retrieved from http://uscounty.org/us-counties-descending-by-population.htm.
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America’s Largest Counties and Use of the Strong Elected CEO Model
In contrast to California and its counties; America’s other largest states and counties
utilize variations of both the commission-administrator and council-executive structures. Table 5
shows that eight out of the ten largest American states employ some form of the council-
executive structure in one or more of their counties, with the only exceptions being California
(#1) and North Carolina (#10). California is further isolated in its lack of governance diversity,
as North Carolina has counties with six variations of governing board size in use and California
still only uses a five-member board structure. California is home to eight of the top twenty-five
largest American counties, including the largest in terms of population (Los Angeles) and area
(San Bernardino) in the contiguous United States, but none of these counties utilizes the council-
executive structure to create checks and balances or elect a countywide CEO who is
representative of the citizens’ collective voice. The additional data below underscore how
uniquely stagnant California is as a state, especially when you compare it and its largest counties
to America’s other largest states and counties. The data are from Texas, New York, Florida, and
Illinois, which round out the top five most populous states behind California. Data are also
included from Michigan, not a small state in any analysis, eighth largest in the 2010 Census, as
Chapter Four will take a deeper look and analysis of the governance model employed by
Michigan’s largest counties.
Texas is America’s second most populous state and has four counties on the list. The
largest county in Texas (Harris, #3 nationally) utilizes a governance structure that elects a
“County-Judge” that serves as Harris County’s top executive branch official. The second
(Dallas, #9 nationally) and fourth (Bexar, #19 nationally) largest counties in Texas also
use a variant of the council-executive model and elect an executive county-wide.
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New York is America’s third most populous state and has six of the thirty largest
American counties. As one of America’s largest states in terms of population, with a
very diverse populace, it also shows a mix in terms of the governance models used in its
largest counties, recognizing that one size, or in this case, structure, does not fit all.
o Borough Model – A “Borough-President” is elected; however, the position does
not hold traditional executive powers or indicate a separation of powers within the
borough. This position is more likened to an elected advocate for the unique
issues in the specific borough to the City of New York. However, even with a
weak executive, the boroughs have an advantage with a borough-wide elected
official over counties with an appointed manager, who is subject to a governing
commission or a board’s political fragmentation. The borough president is
elected borough-wide and can speak with a single voice on behalf of the residents.
o CEO Model – Two of New York’s largest counties Suffolk (#24 nationally) and
Nassau (#28 nationally) utilize a strong county-wide elected CEO model that
provides for a clear delineation between the executive and legislative
governmental functions.
Florida is America’s fourth most populous state and has four counties on the list.
Florida’s largest county (Miami-Dade, #7 nationally) utilizes a governance structure that
elects a “County-Mayor” completely separate from the Mayor of the City of Miami and
serves as Miami-Dade’s top executive branch official.
Illinois is America’s fifth most populous state and is home to America’s second most
populous county, Cook County, which elects a county-wide “Commission-President” that
presides over the county commission, a 17 member legislative body in the county and has
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executive oversight functions (the county finance department as one example) separate
from the county commission and its legislative functions.
Michigan is America’s eighth (2010 Census) most populous state and has two counties
on the list with Wayne (#18 nationally) and Oakland (#32 nationally), both of which
utilize a county-wide elected CEO who has full executive authority that is separate from
the legislative governance function. Michigan’s third largest county (Macomb) also uses
the council-executive structure with an elected CEO.
Governance Critique: Structures Currently Used in California Counties
This research ultimately focuses on the potential use of the council-executive governance
structure for California’s largest counties. However, it is important to understand some of the
fundamental scholarly critiques of the two longest used and numerically dominant county
governance structures in the United States, the commission and commission-administrator
structures. Other than the city-county consolidation of San Francisco, the commission and
commission-administrator are the only structures currently employed by California counties. A
critique of the council-executive governance structure occurs in Chapter Four with the analysis
of Michigan’s two largest counties, along with an examination of its applicability for California’s
largest counties.
Commission
The biggest drawback to the commission structure for counties is the complete lack of
separation of power between a county’s executive, legislative, and quasi-judicial functions, each
of which was briefly described earlier in this chapter.
Each commissioner usually directs one or more functional departments and also has a
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policymaking role…the breaking of the separation-of-powers doctrine and the lack of a
single executive, evident in most counties, hampers the ability to provide coherence and
direction in policymaking or administration. (Cigler, 1995, p. 57)
Historically, the commission form did not employ a seasoned or even trained professional as a
manager. Staff was subject to conflicting direction from a number of elected officials, who often
had competing priorities based on their election from only a portion of the county, or in
California, only one-fifth of the county. Furthermore, the commission form only have a
symbolic chairman who does not have any additional mandate or responsibilities to oversee the
daily activities of appointed managers and department heads.
The lack of any recognizable separation of powers leads to questions related to the level
of accountability in a pure commission structure. “Historically, in addition to a lack of a single
executive, counties have had weak central controls by their governing body and significant
restrictions on the ability of the governing body to manage county operations” (Cigler, 1995, p.
58). The lack of any separation of powers and the requisite heightened level of executive
fragmentation can lead to corruption, is shared in Chapter Three’s look at Orange County, as
well as a county’s diminished capacity to meet service obligations. It was these inherent
shortcomings in the commission structure that led to oft-repeated disparaging descriptions by
countless county researchers and historians over the decades. The American county frequently
was described in a number of unflattering ways, such as “the sleeping giant,” “a ramshackle,”
“the headless wonder,” “the dark continent of American government,” “the jungle of the
American political scene,” “a backward institution,” and “a plague spot on American politics”
(Streib et al., 2007, p. 968). Unfortunately, many of these descriptions, as heinous as they sound,
59
were justly earned as counties were and in some ways are still today, completely
incomprehensible to their constituents.
This lack of understanding of county operations lead the NCL to create a Model County
Charter in 1930, with specific principles to remedy issues related to weak executive control and
accountability. Listed below are the NCL’s agreed upon “Principles of a Model County
Government” that outline its intent to shift counties and their best practices from the commission
form to the commission-administrator form:
Provisions of a wieldy but representative policy-making determining body, elected by the
people and responsible to them for the conduct of county government.
Creation of a single responsible executive head chosen by the policy-determining body
and accountable to it for the administration of county services and operations (i.e., a
manager).
Appointment of administrative officers by the CEO, providing a short and centralized
administrative control.
Concentration of activities in a few departments on the basis of function.
Provision of a substantial degree of flexibility (by the board of supervisors/commission)
to permit adjustment to varying local situations.
Commission-Administrator
The commission-administrator structure was the outgrowth of the 1930 Model County
Charter with the CAO role modeled after the traditional city manager position in cities. It is
important to note that, in addition to an honest attempt by NCL to provide a new governance
model that more clearly defined separation of powers between the executive and other functions,
the introduction of the CAO role clearly introduced a level of professional expertise to counties
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that had been absent in the unreformed commission governance model. A more detailed analysis
of the separation of powers doctrine and its applicability to counties is explored in Chapter Four.
While the benefits of professionalizing government management roles, especially the
CAO, have been achieved in many counties, the council-administrator model has struggled in a
great many others, specifically, where the line between the appointed professional administrator
and the elected governing board is blurred or ignored all together. “If an elected board retains
legal responsibility for policy, legislation, and budget matters, and the appointed administrator
reports to that governing body, there is obviously no strict separation of powers between the
executive and legislative functions” (Cigler, 1995, p. 60). The lack of a strict separation of
powers highlighted by Cigler in the commission-administrator model is a serious governance
conundrum that leads to operational problems related to executive fragmentation and often
manifests itself in large urban counties with an appointed CAO/CEO. An elected CEO is better
positioned to confront attacks against their executive authority than an appointed CAO/CEO who
serves at the pleasure of the governing board. This blurred separation of powers is present in
Orange County, California and in the vast majority of California’s traditional counties that use
either the pure commission or a commission-administrator model. Further, this lack of a true or
“strict” separation of powers as described by Cigler is consistent with my experience as a senior
manager within the appointed CEO’s Office for the County of Orange, as well as the chief-of-
staff to a member of the Orange County Board of Supervisors. This lack of a strict separation of
powers will be addressed in a detailed case analysis of Orange County, California in Chapter
Three. In many cases, a structurally weak or non-existent separation of powers leaves capable
professional managers paralyzed due to the political fragmentation of a board of supervisors,
who operate with a district-first focus, leading to a lack of unified vision for the county as a
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whole. This aggravates the already present elements of executive fragmentation. The appointed
administrator’s control over the executive function is also challenged by row officers who are
county-wide elected executives and heads of their specific departments (sheriff, auditor,
controller, treasurer, tax-collector, etc.). This unbalanced relationship between county-wide
elected executives (row officers) with political muscle and an appointed administrator further
blurs the separation of powers and adds to the fragmentation of the executive function and
operation of county government.
As noted earlier, a critique of the council-executive governance model is shared in
Chapter Four of this project. It will look at the applicability of an elected CEO by exploring its
use in Michigan and then analyzing its potential applicability for Orange County, California and
for California’s largest counties.
Moving Forward: The Changing Face of County Governance in America
It is safe to say that the council-executive form of county governance remains the least
utilized structure among America’s counties. However, just in the decade after Sonenshein’s
Report to the California Assembly (still with no action on the nine recommendations) a new
trend toward adopting charters that allow for an elected county executive is gaining momentum.
Sonenshein’s 2001 report featured, among other case studies, the adoption of the elected CEO in
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania and Bergen County, New Jersey.
New Jersey stands as an example of a state in which counties not only adopted charters,
but also pursued the County Executive model. The results in improved efficiency and in
the visibility of counties led to further adoptions. In fact, in New Jersey county
government, reform became the preferred model. Urban counties such as Passaic that
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refused to consider such reforms in the 1990s were widely derided for their refusal to
adopt modern methods. (Sonenshein, 2001, p. 36)
This again highlights that California is not required to reinvent the wheel in reforming county
government and can look to other large and diverse states and counties that have already
instituted governance reforms. This pathway is clearly a better use of the voters’, legislature’s
and policymakers’ time, to understand county reforms in other large states, rather to pursue
ballot measures to divide California into six separate states, as the voters considered in 2014.
While there has been no action or structural reform in California counties since
Sonenshein’s report, there has been similar and enlightening research conducted nationally. One
of the most important resource documents uncovered in this research was a March 2012 report
conducted by the National Center for the Study of Counties (NCSC) in collaboration with the
Carl Vinson Institute of Government at the University of Georgia and NACo. In Responding to
the New Realities: Case Studies in County Governance, eleven additional county case studies are
presented:
The cases were selected to reflect diverse reforms as well as demographics. Of the 11
cases, 1 comes from a Mid-Atlantic state (PA), 2 from the Northeast (NY and ME), 2
from the South (TN and GA), 4 from the Midwest (IN, KS, OH, MI), and 2 from the
West (NV and OR). The county with the smallest population is Bibb County, GA, with
155,547 people, while the largest is Cuyahoga County, OH, at 1,280,122. (NCSC et al,
March 2012, retrieved from the Municipal Research and Services Center of Washington
at http://www.mrsc.org/artdocmisc/m58county.pdf, p. 2)
Given this regional and demographic diversity, the authors created a short list of critical themes
and lessons learned after digesting the variety of issues confronted in each of the eleven counties.
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The authors identified corresponding themes that suggested a “…wider applicability. The
themes reflect leadership philosophies and possible trends in public opinion and governance that
county officials may want to consider as they move forward in the new economy” (NCSC et al,
March 2012, retrieved from the Municipal Research and Services Center of Washington at
http://www.mrsc.org/artdocmisc/m58county.pdf, p. 9).
While all five critical themes identified are insightful to a county government scholar or
practitioner, only two themes speak specifically to California’s counties and the complete
absence of structural governance reforms like the elected county CEO model (in any form or
variation), as compared to other large states and counties nationally, as well as the persistent and
inherent problem of political and executive fragmentation in California’s commission and
commission-administrator governance structures. Summarized below are the two key themes
from Responding to the New Realities:
Reform in Order to Thrive over the Long Term:
County officials and/or proponents of change want their respective county not just to
survive the next budget cycle but also to thrive over the long term. There were repeated
assertions that the reforms were about creating lasting benefits for the
counties…Likewise, the charter campaign in Cuyahoga County focused on moving the
county forward economically, while in Macomb County, reform resulted from
recognition that the current form of government was outdated. (NCSC et al, March 2012,
retrieved from the Municipal Research and Services Center of Washington at
http://www.mrsc.org/artdocmisc/m58county.pdf, p. 9)
Increase Accountability through Centralization of Authority:
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A few of the cases (i.e., Cuyahoga, Macomb, and Luzerne Counties) reflect a push
toward centralizing executive leadership. The belief is that centralization would result in
increased accountability to the public, better control of spending, and easier
implementation of efficiency reforms. The distribution of power over the budget and
administration among several elected officials was seen in some instances as hindering
effective financial planning and resulting in decreased efficiencies. Furthermore,
proponents of an elected executive/professional manager argued that the position would
allow the government to speak with a single voice in promoting economic development
projects and would promote growth.
This push for accountability and centralization of authority was also apparent
among governments that created new charters reflected in their treatment of elected row
officers. Eliminating these positions was viewed as a way to better control administrative
costs. Cuyahoga and Luzerne Counties abolished all but one or two of their elected row
officer positions, not only to control costs but also to improve accountability and
transparency, as these were viewed as particularly important in light of the financial
corruption scandals that had occurred in these counties. Cumberland County eliminated
two of its six elected row officers (the remaining four were mandated in the state
constitution). (NCSC et al., March 2012, retrieved from the Municipal Research and
Services Center of Washington at http://www.mrsc.org/artdocmisc/m58county.pdf, p. 10)
California’s stagnated status quo flies in the face of these common sense reforms and governance
changes taking place across America’s states and counties. The March 2012 report conducted by
NCSC, The Carl Vinson Institute and NACo shows states and counties taking introspective looks
at their respective governance structures, in relation to their changing demographics, with the
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goal to adapt government to better perform and serve in a modern age. This is not the case in
California. California’s counties have arguably experienced the most rapid and diversified
changes to their population as compared to any state in America, but still operate with the same
general governance structure that has been in place in most counties for more than fifty years
and, in some counties, far longer.
History of California County Government
California’s First Counties
Throwing the most generally accepted definition of counties onto its proverbial head, i.e.,
counties as creatures of the state, California’s first twenty-seven counties came into being before
the former Spanish province and then American territory of California was formally admitted
into the Union as new state on September 9, 1850. California’s first twenty-seven counties were
formed and recognized shortly after the end of hostilities related to the Mexican-American War
in 1848 and the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, but before California’s official
statehood. California County Clerk Emeritus John Taylor recounts the history for the California
State Association of Counties (CSAC):
The first session of the California Legislature was held from Dec. 15, 1849, to April 22,
1850…the state’s first counties were created by an Act signed Feb. 18, 1850. In
summary, the first 27 counties were Butte, Branciforte, Calaveras, Colusi, Contra Costa,
El Dorado, Los Angeles, Marin, Mariposa, Mendocino, Monterey, Napa, Sacramento,
San Diego, San Francisco, San Joaquin, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara,
Shasta, Solano, Sonoma, Sutter, Trinity, Tuolumne, Yola, and Yuba. (Taylor, CSAC:
County History, retrieved from http://www.csac.counties.org/pod/county-clerk-emeritus-
john-taylor-discusses-history-our-counties)
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Figure 8. Map of California’s Original 27 Counties, retrieved from CSAC’s website at
http://www.csac.counties.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/1907.gif.
The Process to Form a California County: How 27 Became 58
The original process of county formation was at the sole discretion of the California
Legislature and within a relatively short time after establishing the first twenty-seven counties in
1850, an additional thirty-three were formed. From 1850 until 1893, all that was required to set
in motion the establishment of a new county was to convince the California Legislature to
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approve it and for 43 years, boundaries were redrawn and county after county was added to the
State. However,
In 1894, the state constitution was amended to require uniform laws concerning county
creation. In Sections 23320 through 23374, the California Government Code specifies
the procedure: A favorable majority vote of the people is needed both in the entire county
affected and in the territory of the new county, an almost impossible task. As a result of
the tougher laws with constitutional foundation, no new county has been formed since
1907, when Imperial County was created from eastern San Diego County, although it is
still theoretically possible. (Taylor, CSAC: County History, retrieved January 12, 2015
from http://www.csac.counties.org/pod/county-clerk-emeritus-john-taylor-discusses-
history-our-counties)
Therefore, all but one of California’s current counties was created between 1850 and 1893 and
only Imperial County (1907) has been added since the California Constitution was amended in
1894.
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Figure 9. Current Map of California’s 58 Counties, retrieved from the California Secretary of
State’s website at https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ca-map-counties.htm.
69
Form of California Counties
Similar to other states and counties nationally, California counties are classified into two
general categories, as either a general law or charter county. California State Association of
Counties describes the distinction between the two,
The California Constitution recognizes two types of counties: general law counties and
charter counties. General law counties adhere to state law as to the number and duties of
county elected officials. Charter counties, on the other hand, have a limited degree of
“home rule” authority that may provide for the election, compensation, terms, removal,
and salary of the governing board; for the election or appointment (except the sheriff,
district attorney, and assessor who must be elected), compensation, terms, and removal of
all county officers; for the powers and duties of all officers; and for consolidation and
segregation of county offices. A charter does not give county officials extra authority
over local regulations, revenue-raising abilities, budgetary decisions, or
intergovernmental relations. (Retrieved from CSAC: County Structures & Powers at
http://www.csac.counties.org/general-information/county-structure-0)
California Government Code Sections 23700 – 23714 provides the ability for a county to pivot
from a general law county to become a charter county by a majority vote of its residents.
A county may adopt, amend, or repeal a charter with majority vote approval. A new
charter or the amendment or repeal of an existing charter may be proposed by the Board
of Supervisors, a charter commission, or an initiative petition. The provisions of a
charter are the law of the state and have the force and effect of legislative enactments.
(Retrieved from CSAC: County Structures & Powers at
http://www.csac.counties.org/general-information/county-structure-0)
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There are currently 44 general law counties and 14 charter counties in California. The first
grouping of counties below shows California’s general law counties and the year each county
was established in parentheses.
General Law Counties: Alpine (1864), Amador (1854), Calaveras (1850), Colusa (1850),
Contra Costa (1850), Del Norte (1857), Glenn (1891), Humboldt (1853), Imperial (1907),
Inyo (1866), Kern (1866), Kings (1893), Lake (1861), Lassen (1864), Madera (1893),
Marin (1850), Mariposa (1850), Mendocino (1850), Merced (1855), Modoc (1874),
Mono (1861), Monterey (1850), Napa (1850), Nevada (1851), Plumas (1854),
Riverside (1893), San Benito (1874), San Joaquin (1850), San Luis Obispo (1850),
Santa Barbara (1850), Santa Cruz (1850), Shasta (1850), Sierra (1852), Siskiyou (1852),
Solano (1850), Sonoma (1850), Stanislaus (1854), Sutter (1850), Trinity (1850), Tulare
(1852), Tuolumne (1850), Ventura (1872), Yolo (1850), and Yuba (1850).
The following list of charter counties shows the year the county was established and the year it
adopted a charter. The charter adoption dates were identified by searching for the charter
document on the county’s website or in some cases by calling the county directly when the date
was not online (San Diego and Tehama counties). Also, counties varied in the date reported, as
some counties reported the charter by the date it was ratified by the voters of the county, while
others listed when the charter was filed with the State of California. Regardless, the date never
varied by more than a few months between ratification by voters and filing with the State.
Charter Counties: Alameda (1853/1926), Butte (1850/1917), El Dorado (1850/1994),
Fresno (1856/1933), Los Angeles (1850/1913), Orange (1889/2002), Placer (1851/1980),
Sacramento (1850/1933), San Bernardino (1853/1913), San Diego (1850/1932),
San Francisco (1850/N/A City/County Consolidation), San Mateo (1856/1933),
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Santa Clara (1850/1976) and Tehama (1856/1917).
History of California Structural Reform
Progressive Era Reforms. As a Midwestern transplant to California, one of the first and
oft repeated phrases that I came to hear as a governmental affairs professional was that
innovation and leadership in the public policy arena flowed from West to East. Simply put, if an
idea was new or controversial in government, social life, or private industry, it tended to be
borne out of the vision of those in the West and then over time would find acceptance in the
Midwest and East Coast. One such example of this was California’s jump into Progressive Era
reforms.
The Progressive Era and Presidents Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson (in the general timeline
of 1890s – 1920s) followed a period in which corruption was rampant in the form of the
Tammany Hall style politics in New York, as patronage systems became the norm for
government work and contracts in many major metropolitan areas. The push back came in the
form of creating systems that modernized government and industry to create efficiencies in their
operations, such as Frederick Taylor’s scientific management in industry and the establishment
of electoral policies that empowered the citizenry to have a greater say and impact in their
government at all levels.
In this reform arena, California was for a time the leader in state and county governance
reform. This was the period with Governor Hiram Johnson and California’s provision of the
direct democracy tools of the initiative, referendum, and recall powers to the voters of the State.
This same period also saw counties and their residents gain more local control in the form of
home rule and charter government with a change to the California Constitution (Article 11).
This movement started at the national level, but California was the first to act:
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The longest-lasting, and potentially most profound, change in county governments was
home rule. In general, this new concept simply meant that state legislatures would give
their counties grants of broad, general powers, under which the counties could actually
function as units of local government. California, in 1911, was the first state to follow
this route, and in 1913 Los Angeles County became the first in America with a home rule
charter. (NACo, History of Government Part I: A Growing Nation, retrieved from
http://www.naco.org/Counties/learn/Pages/HistoryofCountyGovernmentPartI.aspx)
The initial burst of charter reform energy came in California’s largest county, but also sparked
the start of a separate and distinct movement with many California’s counties shifting from the
pure and unreformed commission structure of governance, with a five-member board of
supervisors and no professional administrator, to the creation of a formal and professional
administrative role in county government. The two separate themes of the new reforms were
embodied in the ideals of local control (charter creation) and ending corruption with the addition
of a professional administrator (appointed CAO model).
Even with this burst of initial reform fervor at the county level with nine counties
adopting charters between 1911 and 1933, the actual number of counties jumping on board and
adopting a charter slowed to a crawl with only Santa Clara, Placer, El Dorado and Orange
adopting charters between 1934 and 2014 (80 years). As the previously referenced list from
CSAC highlights, more than 100 years after Los Angeles County became California’s and the
nation’s first home rule county, only thirteen additional California counties have adopted a
charter. Orange County adopted its charter only a mere thirteen years ago in 2002.
Therefore, the most lasting reform of the Progressive Era for California was the transition
by most counties from the unreformed commission structure to the commission-administrator.
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Today, nearly all California counties operate with some variation of the commission-
administrator structure, as hiring an appointed CEO/CAO or manager does not require a charter
to be adopted. However, underscoring how change sometimes comes along very slowly in
California, a few exceptions still remain, with the counties of Alpine, Sierra, Plumas and Glenn
choosing not to operate with a professional administrator in 2014 and still adhering to the
unreformed commission model. A search of the Glenn County website under County
Administrative Office still lists the CAO position, but acknowledged on the phone and website
that they have no current interest in filling the position:
“Welcome to the County Administrative Office”
The County Administrative Officer is appointed by and under the direction of the Board
of Supervisors and is responsible for the coordination of county programs, departmental
budgets, and the oversight of overall operations of county business. The Clerk of the
Board Office and the Personnel Department are separate divisions under the jurisdiction
of the County Administrative Office. (The CAO position is currently unfilled and will
stay vacant through until the Board of Supervisors makes a determination to fill the
position). (County of Glenn, County Administrative Office, retrieved January 12, 2015
from http://www.countyofglenn.net/govt/departments/county_administration/. Bold is
emphasis from original text online by the County of Glenn)
Recently, both Alpine and Sierra (2011/2012 Grand Jury Recommendation) have decided that it
would be beneficial to hire a CAO, but have not done so as of January 2015. Plumas County
terminated its CAO in 2012 and has not refilled the position, even after a scathing grand jury
report criticizing the Plumas County Board of Supervisors for neutering the CAO position and
“paralyzing” the county for operating without one (McDonald, D, Plumas County News, 2012
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August 8, retrieved from http://cgja.org/feeditem/plumas-co-grand-jury-blasts-county-
supervisors). The neutering and even bypassing of an appointed CAO in the commission-
administrator structure is a common criticism that underscores just how weak an appointed
CAO/CEO can be when the executive functions of government are only separate in theory, but
not in practice. This was described by Cigler’s (1995) research earlier in this chapter and was a
critical topic that will be explored in greater detail with a case study analysis of Orange County,
California in Chapter Three. To this day, even with the initial momentum for change and reform
for county governance originating in the State of California, the state is still without a single
traditional county that uses the council-executive structure.
Los Angeles County Reform Efforts. Among the national examples of successful
county governance reform efforts in numerous other states, Sonenshein does devote time to Los
Angeles County and its attempts to reform the county’s governance structure by shifting to a
countywide elected CEO model and an expanded board of supervisors from five to nine
members. Serious campaigns aimed at dramatic governance reform in Los Angeles County
occurred in 1976, 1978, 1992, and 1999, all ending in defeat. Sonenshein notes,
In 1976, a blue-ribbon commission on county government issued a report To Serve Seven
Million, which criticized the fragmentation and lack of accountability of county
government (Public Commission, 1976). The commission recommended that the county
charter be amended to create an elected County Executive and to increase the Board of
Supervisors from five to nine members. The voters did not agree. Heavy majorities
rejected the 1976 ballot measure to expand the Board. In 1992, voters turned down
measures to increase the size of the Board and to create a County Executive. (Sonenshein,
2001, p. 24)
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The attempt to reform Los Angeles County governance in 1992 reflected both the debates and
failures in 1976 and future years. The liberal wing on the board hotly debated connecting board
expansion and the elected CEO to the formation of a new ethics commission. The ethics
commission was championed by Supervisor Gloria Molina. She faced her greatest opposition
from another member of the liberal wing of the board in the voice of Supervisor Ed Edelman,
who refused to provide her motion for an ethics commission with even a second for discussion
purposes. If the fiery debate between ideological allies was not enough, the conservative
members, Michael Antonovich and Deane Dana, both opposed the measure arguing that the
increase in board offices would only create a more costly bureaucracy. With a 3-2 vote (Molina
acquiescing) the ballot measures were placed before the voters, but without an enthusiastic and
vocal champion. One measure would have expanded the board to seven, another would expand
the board to nine, and a third would allow for an elected CEO if a board expansion were
ultimately approved by the voters. These damaging debates wounded each measure and its
chances of victory among the electorate. This was only exacerbated by the confusing number of
measures (three in all) that the Los Angeles County board considered putting before the voters.
Los Angeles Times staff reporter Richard Simon covered the 1992 County elections and used
history to frame the governance question before the voters:
In 1885, Los Angeles County supervisors presided over 70,000 people. The county's
population was smaller than that of Omaha, Neb. The county board was responsible for,
among other things, preventing dogs from injuring sheep. And it had five members.
Today, the supervisors oversee a $13 billion budget and 8.9 million people--larger than
the population of most states. Their actions affect anyone who ends up in court, calls the
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Sheriff's Department, visits the beach, applies for welfare or fills up from county-
inspected gas pumps.
Yet the board has remained at five members--even as other bodies have grown,
including the Los Angeles City Council, which has increased from nine members in 1925
to 15 today. (Simon, R., 1992, Oct 12, retrieved from Los Angeles Times: Los Angeles
County Board of Supervisors http://articles.latimes.com/1992-10-12/local/me-
195_1_county-executive)
At the time of the 1992 defeat, the ballot propositions were placed on the ballot with a majority
vote and support of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, but to no avail. The 1999
attempt to reform the county governance model, again with an expanded board and elected CEO,
died when the board refused to place the elected CEO measure, that it spent months crafting in
open debate, before the voters as it had intended. This decision came in the wake of another
rejection by voters of a measure to expand the board.
As noted earlier, but important to reiterate here, today Los Angeles County is the nation’s
largest county in population at more than ten million residents (2014) and has an annual budget
in excess of $26 billion. So the issues of fragmentation and accountability apparent with a
population of seven million have clearly not been remedied in the last 40 years of debate and
inaction, with the Los Angeles County budget more than doubling in size and the county adding
millions of residents. The County is still served by a five-member board, now with each
supervisor serving more than two million constituents and without an elected executive
providing a single voice for the County’s residents and establishing a concrete separation of
executive power from the legislative and quasi-judicial functions.
77
California is Out of Step
In 1911, California blazed a trail and was the first state to allow home rule for its counties
in the wake of the Dillon decision. A year later, Los Angeles County was well on its way to an
equally monumental step by creating the nation’s first county charter and providing a pathway
for other counties that were interested in exploring governance reform. Eight additional
California counties would follow and adopt home rule charters in the next two decades.
However, the push for county governance reform has now stagnated. California has a great
diversity of counties in every way imaginable: large and small, rural, suburban and urban,
mountainous, desert-landscaped, forested and coastal, populations over ten million or under two-
thousand, and the list could go on and on. Still, its counties are served by-and-large by one
relatively uniform model of a five-member board of supervisors and an appointed administrator.
The information in this chapter confirms that California’s county governance stagnation
stands in direct contrast to what has occurred in America’s largest states and counties. These
states and counties employ a wide-range of governing board sizes; they implement some form of
the council-executive model and have counties actively undertaking governance reform efforts.
California’s stagnation also stands in the face of recommendations and commentary made by
California scholars, researchers, practitioners and media who have observed the need for
reforming California’s largest counties. The 1996 California Constitution Revision Commission
(CRC) crafted very specific recommendations aimed at counties, looking to empower them with
Home Rule Charters like cities. The CRC report states, “The assignment of governmental
responsibilities between the state and various local governments, particularly counties, is
fragmented/confused. The absence of clearly assigned responsibilities for operating and
78
financing government services has weakened the accountability of government officials to the
public” (CRC, 1996, p. 10).
The CRC goes further and recommends, “Each county (or multi-county area) would be
required to initiate a process to examine their current governance structure, methods of service
delivery, and assignment of responsibilities and powers” (CRC, 1996, p. 11). These
recommendations from a bipartisan and diverse (public and private industry) blue-ribbon panel,
coupled with Dr. Sonenshein’s 2001 Report to the Speaker of the Assembly, urge state and
county leaders to undertake an immediate and significant county governance reform effort.
Whether in the CRC Report, Sonenshein’s Report or in the media coverage of the failed attempts
at reform in Los Angeles, the rationale for structural reform is eerily consistent; county
governance structures are outdated, cause executive and political fragmentation, provide no
separation of power between branches of government, and are confusing to the residents that
counties intend to serve. However, the vast majority of California counties still operate without
a charter and only one charter county (Los Angeles) has attempted to institute a council-
executive model via a ballot measure (verified via email with CSAC staff on June 19, 2014).
California’s governance stagnation also runs into a national headwind. To reiterate
information from Table 5, eight out of the ten largest American states have one or more counties
that employ some form of the council-executive structure, including a strong countywide elected
CEO, with the only exceptions being California (#1) and North Carolina (#10). Again,
California is home to eight of the top twenty-five largest American counties, none of which has a
council-executive governance structure, even while sharing many of the same service and
operating issues related to their massive, diverse and rapidly changing populations and service
needs. Thirteen of America’s largest thirty-two counties as listed in Table 5 have some form of
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council-executive structure. Four of the top ten (#2 Cook County, Illinois; #3 Harris County
Texas; #7 Miami-Dade, Florida; and #9 Dallas County, Texas) have a formal separation of the
executive branch of county government by virtue of their council-executive governance
structure. Even the New York Boroughs (county equivalents) of Kings (#8) and Queens (#10)
elect borough presidents (borough/countywide) to advocate for the collective voice of the entire
borough. While borough presidents lack traditional executive powers, their borough election and
primary responsibility is to advocate with one voice for borough-wide issues (regional issues) as
opposed to specific local community issues within the numerous neighborhoods of the larger
borough. Even this seemingly small electoral responsibility of a borough president, advocating
on behalf of the collective, is completely absent in all traditional California counties. No
traditional California county elects an executive, who is forced to campaign county-wide and
then balance the diversity of issues that can be in play, especially in a large urban county. That
leaves only Maricopa County, Arizona (#4) and California’s three largest counties (Los Angeles
#1, San Diego #5 and Orange #6) without any semblance of the separation of powers inherent in
a strong council-executive governance structure. However, the Arizona State Legislature has
been exploring, with formal legislation, county governance reforms aimed at Arizona’s largest
counties (Maricopa included), that would specifically take executive powers away from the
board of supervisors.
For the third year in a row, state lawmakers are discussing a realignment of power in at
least some Arizona counties that would take certain authority from boards of supervisors
and put it in the hands of other elected county officials. The latest attempt failed last
week for lack of support in the state Senate, but the issue is expected to return as the
legislative session continues. (Wingett, Y. Kiefer, M., 2011, March 6, The Arizona
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Republic, Arizona lawmakers push supervisors reform, retrieved from
http://www.azcentral.com/12news/news/articles/2011/03/06/20110306arizona-
lawmakers-reform-budget-control-supervisors.html)
In summary, it cannot be stated much clearer than the title of the 2012 NCSC/NACo
research study on American counties referenced earlier, Responding to the New Realities: Case
Studies in County Governance. The counties profiled are dealing with issues of executive and
political fragmentation, with issues related to a lack of accountability from their elected officials,
as well as with outdated governance structures that are confusing and no longer serve
populations that in any way resemble the constituencies they began with decades ago. These
same issues are present in California counties, but the reforms highlighted in this chapter, taking
place in states and counties of all shapes and sizes nationally, are absent in California. The
authors echo the voices of these reform minded counties and highlight the need to embrace some
portion of these new realities, such as reforming in order to thrive over the long term and to
avoid the temptation to look for short term solutions, such as hiring more staff or throwing
money at a problem. They note the importance of increasing accountability through
centralization of authority and to that point highlight counties that have moved to eliminate
elected row officer positions and to embrace the election of a county-wide chief executive to
speak with a single voice for the electorate. John Adams once commented, “all great changes are
irksome to the human mind, especially those which are attended with great dangers and uncertain
effects.” I once thought this poignant quote from a national hero and forefather best
encapsulated California’s inability to confront serious county governance reform in the late 20
th
and 21
st
Centuries, but I no longer see “danger” or “fear of uncertain effects” as a logical
rationale for inaction, especially when this research highlights that many states and counties have
81
already laid the groundwork for California to take a step forward. The next chapter will
highlight in great detail the problems of executive fragmentation and accountability in
California’s third largest county and thus make it a logical candidate for the reforms noted in
New Realities.
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CHAPTER THREE: ORANGE COUNTY GOVERNMENT
History and Formation of the County of Orange
The County of Orange (Orange County) as a formal and independently recognized unit of
government gained its independence from Los Angeles County with the signature of
California Governor Robert Waterman on March 11, 1889. Today, in 2014, and as this very
analysis takes shape, Orange County is in the midst of a yearlong celebration
commemorating its 125
th
Anniversary and emancipation from Los Angeles County. Prior to
1889 only three cities, Anaheim (1878), Santa Ana (1886) and Orange (1888), existed in the
area that would become Orange County, which at the time was simply referred to as southern
Los Angeles County. The map below shows Southern California without Orange County.
Figure 10. Map of Southern California counties in 1853. Courtesy UCLA Young Research
Library, retrieved from http://www.kcet.org/updaily/socal_focus/history/unraveling-the-
history-of-socals-patchwork-of-local-government-30267.html.
Orange County’s entrance as a new county in 1889 also marked the last pruning of Los Angeles
County. Los Angeles County lost 789 square miles of land and 42 miles of coastline when
Orange County was sliced away by the California Legislature.
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Orange County’s founding was not accomplished with ease or haste. Leaders and
activists of the future Orange County and former region of southern Los Angeles County labored
for two decades and left a pathway littered with failures and false starts before ultimately
achieving self-governance from Los Angeles with a piece of legislation entitled “An Act to
Create the Orange County.” Two leaders of the secession movement, W.H. Spurgeon and James
McFadden, led the effort in the state’s capital of Sacramento. Their goal was to give a voice to
newly growing areas in the Santa Ana and Saddleback Valleys, in the fledgling cities of
Anaheim, Santa Ana, and Orange, as well as in the vast unincorporated areas of the county
stretching all the way from the southern border of the modern City of Long Beach, to the San
Diego County border. Residents and businesses in this area felt overtaxed, underrepresented,
and generally disconnected from their county seat in Los Angeles. However, even this legitimate
hue and cry alone was not enough to achieve autonomy for Orange County and they needed
allies in the legislature and among other counties.
The city of Santa Ana, which had outgrown the other cities in the proposed new county,
took the lead in the struggle, for county division. A lobby was maintained at Sacramento
all winter at considerable expense, without being able to overcome the influence of Los
Angeles against the bill for the new county…Finally, late in the session, W.H. Spurgeon
and James McFadden took up the matter in the legislature with better success. They
found members who were friendly to their project and others who were hostile to Los
Angeles…Because the rich county of Los Angeles would not distribute a large defense
fund among such members, they turned against that county. Then, too, San Francisco
had begun to recognize in Los Angeles a possible rival, and was glad of the opportunity
to deprive her of some of her territory. These various interests and antagonisms were so
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skillfully handled that the bill passed the legislature and was signed by Governor
Waterman, March 11, 1889. (Armor, 1911, p. 33)
The map in Figure 11 is one of the first to show the new boundaries of the fledgling county.
Figure 11. 1889 Map of Orange County. From the website of the Library of Congress,
Geography and Map Division, Contributor: S.H. Finley, published in 1889 by H.S. Crocker &
Co. of San Francisco, retrieved from http://www.loc.gov/item/2012592100/.
85
Shortly after the governor’s approval, the next step was to ratify the vote in the new area
designated for the county and then start down the pathway of installing a governance structure.
“An election was called for June 4
th,
to ratify or reject the action of the legislature…the election
was carried in favor of county division by a vote of 2,509 to 500” (Armor, 1911, p. 34). As was
typical in the age before Dillon’s Rule and charter counties, the governor made the first critical
appointments for the five-member board of commissioners, Orange County’s first board of
supervisors as they are referred to today. The first board of supervisors operated in the pure
commission structure with the executive/administration, legislative and quasi-judicial powers all
within its authority. The all-male board was comprised of J.W. Towner of Santa Ana; J.H.
Kellom, of Tustin; A. Cauldwell, of Orange; W.M. McFadden of Placentia; and R.Q. Wickham
of Garden Grove (Armor, 1911, pp. 33-34). This initial and appointed board of commissioners
was charged with getting the necessary elections scheduled (choosing the county seat and
electing row officers) and logistics of commencing county operations moving forward. Later
that year, the first elected Orange County board of supervisors, chosen by the residents of the
new county on July 11
th
, hosted its inaugural meeting on August 5, 1889. The board of
supervisors met as a five-member board in August of 1889 ready to face a county of just more
than 13,000 residents in total, with each supervisor representing districts of approximately 2,600
constituents. One hundred and twenty-five years later in 2014, the five-member board still meets
in Santa Ana, a stone’s throw from its first meeting place in the Billings and Congdon Blocks on
East Fourth Street, but now its bi-weekly Tuesday meetings in service of a still-growing county
of more than 3.1 million residents, and each supervisor represents a district of more than 620,000
constituents. The County still conducts its business without a proper separation of powers, with
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all executive, legislative, and quasi-judicial authority resting with the board of supervisors, just
as it did on August 5, 1889.
Orange County Demographics: 125 years of rapid change
Population Growth
The most common referenced population figure for 1889 Orange County is 13,589.
However, the allure of open land, a new county seat close to home and business opportunities
soon triggered a population explosion that turned the former backwater known as southern Los
Angeles County into America’s sixth largest county that only recently was overtaken by its
neighbor San Diego County to the south for fifth place by less than 200,000 residents. The
following table highlights the County’s rapid growth in population over its first 120 years.
Table 6
Orange County Population Change, 1900 – 2010 by Decade
Period Population Increase Percent Change in Population
2000-2010 163,943 +5.44%
1990-2000 435,733 +18.08%
1980-1990 477,847 +24.72%
1970-1980 512,323 +36.07%
1960-1970 716,461 +101.78%
1950-1960 487,701 +225.55%
1940-1950 85,464 +65.36%
1930-1940 12,086 +10.18%
1920-1930 57,299 +93.36%
1910-1920 26,939 +78.23%
1900-1910 14,740 +74.84%
1890-1900 6,107 +44.94%
Note: The source of this population data is compiled from the California State University,
Fullerton’s Center for Demographic Research’s 2013 Orange County Progress Report retrieved
from http://www.fullerton.edu/cdr/progressreport/orange%20county.pdf, United States Census
Bureau and the OC Almanac retrieved from http://www.ocalmanac.com/Population/po07.htm.
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Geography & Population Density
This rapid wave of population expansion has occurred within the same small confines of
the original 789 square-mile area carved out of Los Angeles County. While Orange County has
grown to be one of the largest counties in both California and the nation in terms of population, it
is one of the smallest in California in terms of land (area) size. Geographically speaking, Orange
County is confined by barriers far more stout than the Los Angeles County line to the north. The
natural barriers are impressive with 42-miles of Pacific Ocean coastline hemming in the County
from the west and the Cleveland National Forest to the east, both halting expansion. The map in
Figure 12 highlights the southern portion of the County sandwiched between preserved open
space and the coast. Nearly one-third of the County lives in this area between the Santa Ana
Mountains and the Pacific Ocean.
Figure 12. Map of Orange County highlighting the Cleveland National Forest and Santa Ana
Mountains. Original courtesy of California Division of Tourism, retrieved Jun 2014 from
http://www.visitcalifornia.com/media/pages/getting_around/maps/OC_tiled_region_2011_rev.pdf.
88
Nearly as formidable as the natural barriers to the west and east, is the border Orange
County shares with the Camp Pendleton Marine Corp Base to the south. These three “non-
negotiable” barriers to expansion have not constrained the flow of people to Orange County over
the years, even as the County’s Parks Department accepts more land permanently preserved as
open space. The County of Orange through the Orange County Parks Department manages a
system of parks and preserved open space totaling more than 60,000 acres that adds to the allure
of living in Orange County, but also compounds the growing challenges related to population
density. Furthermore, most of the County parkland and open space is in the southern portion of
the County. In many instances, it adjoins state and federal land, thereby forcing the demand for
development into smaller and smaller pockets.
It is this cocktail of limited developable land, coupled with ocean and pristinely preserved
open space, which provides for a wide variety of recreational opportunities that has led Orange
County to become California’s most densely populated county (excluding the city-county
consolidation of San Francisco). Table 7 is taken directly from the 2014 Orange County
Community Indicators Report, a collaboration between the Orange County Business Council and
the County’s Human Relations Commission. The list compares Orange County in terms of
population density against counties, both in California and nationally, that Orange County most
often competes with for jobs and private investment linked to economic development.
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Table 7
Population Density Ranking: County Comparison, 2012
Rank out of all
U.S. Counties
County (Major City)
Persons per Square Mile
of Land Area
5
San Francisco (County/City
Consolidation
17,234
7 Suffolk County (Boston) 12,459
19 Orange County, CA 3,822
27 Dallas County (Dallas) 2,731
31 Los Angeles County 2,452
38 Hennepin (Minneapolis) 2,092
68 Sacramento County 1,474
77 Santa Clara (San Jose) 1,386
105 Travis (Austin) 1,045
121 King (Seattle) 917
146 San Diego County 737
249 Maricopa (Phoenix) 418
349 Riverside County 304
825 San Bernardino County 102
Note: This chart and information was compiled and located in the 2014 Orange County
Community Indicators Report (p. 6) and cites sources as U.S. Census Bureau, GCT-
PH1R: Population, Housing Units, Area, and Density, Census 2010 (land area) and 2012
American Community Survey, 5-Year Estimates (population).
Diversity
The early history of Orange County’s racial and ethnic population after seceding from
Los Angeles County was a homogenous collection of Caucasian residents from a cross-section of
European and Scandinavian countries including England, Germany, Norway, and Sweden among
others. From this early period and up until the middle of the 20
th
Century, “diverse” was not a
term that would accurately describe most of Orange County’s communities and neighborhoods.
However, the post-Vietnam era of the 1970s through today has seen a dramatic shift in the size
of Orange County’s population, as well as the diversity of racial and ethnic groups calling
Orange County home. This transformation, specifically the speed and significance of the
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County’s diversification, became the focus of an August 2010 article in the New York Times
titled, Orange County Is No Longer Nixon Country. In the article, reporter Adam Nagourney
notes,
At the end of 2009, nearly 45 percent of the county’s residents spoke a language other
than English at home, according to county officials. Whites now make up only 45
percent of the population; this county is teeming with Hispanics, as well as Vietnamese,
Korean, and Chinese families. Its percentage of foreign-born residents jumped to 30
percent in 2008 from 6 percent in 1970, and visits to some of its corners can feel like a
trip to a foreign land. (Nagourney, 2010, August 29)
Sukhee Kang, the former mayor of the City of Irvine, California (2008-2012) was the first
Korean American to be elected mayor of a major American city. In 2006, Orange County voters
elected Garden Grove city council member Janet Nguyen to the Orange County Board of
Supervisors. With that election she became the first Vietnamese-American to serve on Orange
County’s Board of Supervisors, and also the highest ranking Vietnamese-American elected
official in California and the highest ranking Vietnamese-American woman elected official in the
United States. A recent article in the Orange County Register by Erika Ritchie highlighted the
tremendous growth in immigrant populations from Asia and noted that the Orange County cities
of Westminster and Garden Grove “are home to the largest concentration of Vietnamese outside
of Vietnam” (Ritchie, 2014, June 29). Table 8 highlights the changing face of Orange County
since 2000.
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Table 8
Orange County Change in Share of Total Population by Race/Ethnicity
Race 2000 2010 2010 Population
Non-Hispanic White 51.3% 44.1% 1,328,499
Hispanic or Latino 30.8% 33.7% 1,012,973
Asian & Pacific Islander 13.5% 17.7% 532,477
Black 1.5% 1.5% 44,000
All Other Races 3.0% 3.1% 92,283
Sources: Center for Demographic Research, Orange County Change 2000 to 2010 (p.1),
retrieved from http://www.fullerton.edu/cdr/census/Census2010_OC_change.pdf and the
2013 Orange County Progress Report, p. 15.
The diversity of racial and ethnic groups in Orange County is also highlighted in its three
largest cities (in terms of population) of Anaheim (10
th
in California/56
th
in nation), Santa Ana
(11
th
in California/57
th
in nation), and Irvine (15
th
in California/85
th
in nation). The 2010 U.S.
Census reports that 52.8% of Anaheim’s residents and 78.2% of Santa Ana’s residents identify
themselves as Latino or Hispanic, while 39.2% of Irvine’s residents identify themselves as
Asian, of which the majority is of Chinese descent. This rapidly changing demographic was
chronicled in a July 8, 2014 article by reporter Anh Do of the Daily Pilot Newspaper.
Orange County now ranks as the third-largest Asian American population nationwide,
with nearly 600,000 Asian Americans living in a county once defined by its dominantly
white communities…In a boom decade running through 2010, the number of Asian
Americans living in the county increased 41%, changing the face of cities from Anaheim
to Irvine. Across the United States, Orange County now boasts the third-highest count of
Asian American-owned businesses, employing more than 96,000 workers. Until the new
millennium, Orange County’s most distinguishing Asian American community was in the
central county cities of Garden Grove and Westminster where Vietnamese immigrants
settled, forming the now-sprawling Little Saigon district. Since then, the Asian American
growth has moved both north and south. Irvine is now home to the county’s largest
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Asian American population, and tiny La Palma is the county’s first majority Asian
American city, with 51% of the population. Asian Americans make up roughly 43% of
Irvine’s population. (Do, Daily Pilot, July 8, 2104)
Orange County as a Candidate for Governance Reform
Executive Fragmentation: A History of Governance without Executive Leadership
Orange County had been in existence a mere twenty-two years when the Progressive Era
reforms swept through California and the nation. As discussed in Chapter Two, Los Angeles
County jumped head first into reforms by becoming the first county in the nation to adopt a
charter in 1911. In contrast, Orange County did not adopt a charter until 2002. Orange County
operated for its first seventy-eight years under the unreformed commission governance structure
that it began with in 1889, when the County had only three cities and 13,000 residents. Orange
County’s five-member board of supervisors held dominion over all functions of county
government during this period of dramatic population growth, development, and expansion of
county governmental budget and services. By the late 1960s, Orange County’s population had
sprouted from 13,000 residents and three cities, to twenty-four incorporated cities. There was
recognition by the board of supervisors that they needed a professional manager to assist them in
carrying out the administrative functions of a rapidly growing county. To that end, in 1967,
Robert E. Thomas became the first person to fill the new job, then titled county administrative
officer. “The county’s population was around 1 million, its budget was in the $300-million to
$400-million range” (Los Angeles Times, Strength at the Top in O.C., Oct. 1998. Retrieved
from http://articles.latimes.com/1998/oct/18/local/me-33802).
The hiring of Robert E. Thomas, and more importantly, the establishment of a
professional CAO in the county organizational chart, marked the first tangible change of the
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governance structure for Orange County in more than three-quarters of a century. However,
questions linger from 1967 through to today, as to just what exactly is the role of a CAO or CEO
in Orange County’s commission-administrator governance model. Table 9 lists every Orange
County CAO/CEO from 1967 through to the present day. Along with title and tenure of each
individual, Table 9 highlights a tumultuous history for the County’s top appointed administrator
regardless of era.
Table 9
County Administrative and Executive Officers for Orange County
Name Title Tenure Result
Robert E. Thomas CAO 1967-1985 Retired after fight
w/Board over salary
Larry Parrish CAO 1985-1989 Resigned
Ernie Schneider CAO 1989-1995 Fired
William Popejoy CEO 1995 Forced to Resign
Jan Mittermeier CEO 1995-2000 Fired/Forced to
Resign
Michael Schumacher CEO 2000-2003 Fired
James D. Ruth CEO (Interim) 2003-2004 Interim Hire Only
Thomas G. Mauk CEO 2004-2012 Forced to Resign
Bob Franz CEO (Interim) 2012-2013 Interim Hire Only
Michael Giancola CEO 2013-Present Present CEO
Sources: Orange County Clerk-Recorder’s Office, Orange County Archives. Information related
to name, title and tenure retrieved from
http://ocarchives.com/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=31411.
The board of supervisors has never provided a consistent role or separation of powers for
its CAO and CEO regardless of title. The Orange County Archives provides the following paltry
explanation for the shift in title over the years, but with no context as to what, if any, were the
substantive changes to the powers and responsibilities of the position within county government.
County Executive Office:
The title of County Administrative Officer was changed to Chief Executive Officer with
the appointment of William Popejoy in 1995. The title was changed again to County
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Executive Officer in October of 1998. (OC Archives, retrieved on July 8, 2014 from
http://ocarchives.com/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=31411)
However, the list of individuals to occupy the CAO/CEO role, and the benign and contextually
ambiguous description from the Orange County Archives, belie the tumultuous history of the
battle over executive power and the resulting executive fragmentation in Orange County. This
brings the analysis back to Cigler’s critique of the commission-administrator model discussed in
Chapter Two: “If an elected board retains legal responsibility for policy, legislation, and budget
matters, and the appointed administrator reports to that governing body, there is obviously no
strict separation of powers between the executive and legislative functions” (Cigler, 1995, p. 60).
This lack of a clear or, as Cigler notes, “strict” separation of powers, a well-defined and common
aspect of American governance at all jurisdictional levels but absent in the commission and
commission-administrator forms of county government, has played out in dramatic fashion over
the entire time Orange County has utilized the commission-administrator structure. On at least
two occasions, in 1983 and 1994, management audits and reports conducted on behalf of the
Orange County Board of Supervisors recommended a shift to a more powerful and influential
CEO, although stopping short of calling for an elected CEO. However, even the empowering of
the appointed CAO/CEO has been fraught with false starts and political peril for supervisors and
CAOs/CEOs alike. The following is a compilation of archival research related to each individual
who occupied the CAO’s/CEO’s office. Sources of information include media and news outlets
dating back to the tenure of Orange County’s first CAO, Robert E. Thomas, through to today.
The headlines and quotes uncovered in this research paint a dramatic if not schizophrenic picture
of executive power in Orange County.
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Robert E. Thomas. The first and longest serving county CAO quit his position after a
series of confrontations with the board of supervisors over his role in government and
compensation. The clashes were chronicled by the Los Angeles Times in 1985. Reporters David
Holley and Kim Murphy described the tension between Thomas and the board,
Orange County Supervisor Bruce Nestande proposed Thursday that the county Hall of
Administration be named after County Administrative Officer Robert E. Thomas, who
will retire later this year after a series of conflicts with the Board of Supervisors…
Thomas was one of only two agency or department heads not to receive a pay raise. The
board decision was widely interpreted as a sign of displeasure with his performance, and
Thomas said in an interview with the Times two months later that the board’s action
‘doesn’t show much class.’ (Holley & Murphy, 1985, January)
Later that year and after selecting Larry Parrish to replace Thomas as CAO, Supervisor Nestande
provided the board’s perspective on the type of CAO needed in Orange County: “I think a pro-
active CAO is what we want,” said Supervisor Nestande. “Without question, the CAO’s position
is going to be strengthened from what it was under Thomas…” (Needham, 1985, May).
Larry Parrish. Larry Parrish was the only Orange County CAO to have held a
comparable role in another California county, either before coming to Orange County, or after.
He held the CAO position in Santa Barbara County before coming to Orange County and
eventually held the same position in Riverside County after spending time as a lobbyist in
Sacramento immediately after resigning as Orange County CAO. He is also the only CAO to
exit service to the County completely of his own accord.
Supervisors and county department heads said Monday that Parrish's resignation came as
a surprise and, although some occasionally criticized his administration, they called his
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departure a loss to the county. ‘There have been a few times I've had my eyebrows raised
by something he's done, but, in general, I think he did a good job,’ Supervisor Don R.
Roth said. ‘I'll tell you, it's not an easy task, the demands are so great,’ Roth said of the
county administrative officer's job. Said Supervisor Gaddi H. Vasquez: ‘It will be a
significant loss to the county. The CAO is in a pivotal position to help steer the county
rudder in terms of administrative philosophy. Throw in his positive attitude and his good
sense of humor and I think he brought . . . the needed leadership during some tough fiscal
times. (Lesher & Schwartz, Los Angeles Times, 1989 October, retrieved from
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1989-10-03/local/me-668_1_orange-county)
Ernie Schneider. Similar to Robert E. Thomas, Ernie Schneider came up through the
ranks of Orange County’s organizational chart, with various leadership roles within the County.
In 1989 he was promoted to CAO and served in that position when the County declared
bankruptcy in 1994, which at the time was the largest municipal bankruptcy in the history of the
United States. The Schneider CAO era truly begins and encapsulates Orange County’s struggles
with executive fragmentation, rooted in a system without separation of powers or checks and
balances. This is recounted in a Los Angeles Times article written shortly after his death in 2013.
An internal audit by Auditor-Controller Steven E. Lewis concluded that county Treasurer
Citron was making risky financial deals and refusing to consult Schneider's committee to
maximize returns from his investments. In the ensuing years, Schneider repeatedly said
that neither his office nor the Board of Supervisors could be held responsible for what
another public official elected countywide has done. He said he had no power to force
Citron to do anything. ‘Responsibility for managing the pool lies with a separately
elected official, and that was Bob Citron,’ Schneider told The Times in 1994. He later
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testified against Orange County officials who were accused of fraud. Schneider was
never accused of a crime, but he was blamed for failing to properly oversee Citron's
actions. On Jan. 23, 1995, Schneider was officially removed as chief administrative
officer. (Hennigan, W. J., Los Angeles Times, 2013 April, retrieved from
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2013/apr/15/local/la-me-0415-ernie-schneider-20130415)
William Popejoy. In the wake of the 1994 bankruptcy and firing of Ernie Schneider, the
board of supervisors looked to reinstill the faith of the public in the County’s financial stability
and trust in the CAO role as the County’s top appointed management position. In an effort to
highlight his Wall Street background and Orange County’s affinity for business sector
excellence, the board of supervisors hired William Popejoy and changed his title from CAO to
CEO. Whether accurate or not, the board of supervisors painted former CAO Ernie Schneider as
inactive and ignorant in his lack of oversight of the risky investments that led to bankruptcy.
Now, with a new CEO, power and prestige would be restored to the County’s executive
management. However, the five months of William Popejoy’s tenure as CEO would highlight
the schizophrenic relationship that the board of supervisors had with its top appointed executive
manager. Hired with great excitement on February 10, 1995, Mr. Popejoy tendered his
resignation just five months later stating that the supervisors had made his position “powerless”
(The Quotable Mr. Popejoy, Los Angeles Times, 1995, retrieved from
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1995-07-13/news/mn-23575_1_orange-county). His resignation
came on the heels of the board of supervisors neutering the CEO position by voting to reign in
his authority to make policy decisions as the executive and to prohibit him from speaking to the
press. Headlines from the Los Angeles Times in the summer of 1995 perfectly recount this one-
sided battle over executive power in the County’s commission-administrator structure:
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Supervisors Dilute Power of Popejoy in Wake of Tax Defeat: Board limits executive
authority to make policy decisions. June 30, 1995, Rene Lynch and Matt Lait;
Orange County Bankruptcy: Replacement CEO Won’t Be a Replicate: Supervisors say
whoever takes Popejoy’s place will have to be much more willing to take orders. July 13,
1995, Mark Platte;
Popejoy Takes Parting Shots at Orange County Supervisors. July 14, 1995, Rene Lynch
and Matt Lait.
In one of his last interviews before leaving office, the embattled CEO puts voice to the executive
power fragmentation and schism that can occur when a county’s appointed chief executive is
continuously responsible to and removable by the elected body.
‘I'm disappointed in the county government's leadership and greatly concerned about the
organization, which is dysfunctional, in my mind,’ said Popejoy, who will officially step
down July 31, four months earlier than anticipated. One day after he resigned in
frustration, contending that interference from supervisors had made his job impossible,
Popejoy chiefly took to task his critics on the board, Roger R. Stanton, Jim Silva and
Chairman Gaddi H. Vasquez. ‘I don't know how they are going to get back to the
management of this county when they haven't shown any aptitude to do that, as far as I
can see,’ said Popejoy, who has long contended that the lack of consensus among
supervisors made the role of a strong-willed CEO all the more critical. ‘You have five
CEOs now, and that won't work. It just won't work.’ (Lynch and Lait, Popejoy Takes
Parting Shots at Orange County Supervisors, 1995)
With history as our guide, documented in article after article by the Los Angeles Times, it
is important at this point in the discussion of Orange County’s executive branch history to recall
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the parting words and criticism provided by former Supervisor Bruce Nestande in 1985, in direct
reference to the County’s first CAO Robert E. Thomas. “I think a pro-active CAO is what we
want…Without question, the CAO’s position is going to be strengthened” (Needham, 1985).
Fast forwarding a decade, in the aftermath of the Schneider and Popejoy tenures, the new
headline-grabbing policy statement from the board of supervisors regarding its view of the top
county management post was captured by Mark Platte of the Los Angeles Times: “The next chief
executive officer of Orange County (after Popejoy) will come from California, earn $135,000 to
$145,000 a year and will be required to dutifully carry out the policies of the Board of
Supervisors. Or else” (Platte, Los Angeles Times, 1995).
Jan Mittermeier. After the forced resignation of William Popejoy, the Board chose an
internal candidate, Jan Mittermeier, director of John Wayne Airport. She was considered a
strong organizational leader within governmental circles, but with the added allure of financial
acumen that was attractive in the hiring of William Popejoy. However, shortly after her
appointment, the headlines and media sound bites started to sound eerily similar to the tenures of
her predecessors. Already in 1998, the board was moving to scale back her authority, as a Los
Angeles Times headline from October 1998 read, “O.C. Board Seeks to Reclaim Some Power
From CEO.” The proposal pushed by the board was summarized by Los Angeles Times reporter
Lorenza Munoz:
In a move that could prompt Jan Mittermeier to quit as Orange County's chief executive,
the Board of Supervisors made public Wednesday its contract offer to her--one that
would reduce her authority and give her a new title…The proposal would restore some of
the board's former power in approving top-level hires, change Mittermeier's title to
executive director…The 58-year-old executive has battled to protect the powers ceded to
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her by the board three years ago as the county worked to recover from its 1994
bankruptcy…The proposed contract would allow the supervisors to reject a candidate for
a top department position with a four-fifths vote. Currently, Mittermeier hires and fires
department heads without consulting the board. She has said she would not support a
change of duties requiring her to consult with supervisors on hirings. (Munoz, Los
Angeles Times, 1998 retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/1998/oct/01/news/mn-
28245)
The volatile relationship between Mittermeier and the board would continue and eventually she
was stripped of additional powers and responsibilities in a 4-0 closed session vote that amounted
to a dismissal. She chose to step down. In the Los Angeles Times article, Over and Out:
Mittermeier Quits as CEO, the combative nature of her five year tenure is chronicled in one
sentence, “Supervisors had been at this juncture three times in the past two years, most recently
in April, over whether to fire Mittermeier” (Pasco and Reyes, Los Angeles Times, 2000, retrieved
from http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jun/28/news/mn-45778). Mittermeier expressed her
frustration at the board’s systematic neutering of the County’s chief executive role at a press
conference after stepping down. “The board and I philosophically disagree on what a strong
central management means but they are elected and responsible for making those decisions,” she
said, adding that she hoped supervisors would not take back any of the CEO’s duties previous
boards held (Pasco & Reyes, Los Angeles Time, 2000).
Michael Schumacher. After the formal dismissal and forced resignations of the prior
three top county executives, the board looked within the County organization again and chose
Michael Schumacher, head of the County Health Care Agency, to replace Jan Mittermeier as
CEO. Initially lauded for his consensus-building and collegial management style, he was fired in
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less than 2 ½ years. This time, in a complete 180-degree reversal from previous headlines, the
Los Angeles Times read, “O.C. Executive Fired for His Lack of Fire.” Therefore, after more than
a decade of stripping the executive function and criticizing CEOs for being too powerful, too
involved, and too aggressive, the board fired a CEO for not being aggressive enough.
Orange County supervisors Wednesday fired County Executive Officer Michael
Schumacher, complaining that he wasn't aggressive enough in confronting the challenges
facing county government. The Board of Supervisors announced the 3-1 vote after a day
of closed-door discussion about Schumacher's future. Schumacher, 62, wasn't in the
building when board Chairman Tom Wilson announced his ouster and could not be
reached for comment later. Two supervisors said after the vote that they were not pleased
with Schumacher's response to pressing problems, notably a financial meltdown at the
county Planning and Development Services Department. ‘Michael's personality and style
have outlived themselves, as far as I'm concerned, in the county of Orange,’ said Wilson,
adding that Schumacher's replacement should be more of a hands-on manager. ‘We need
to get a little more pep in the system.’ (Pasco and Mehta, Los Angeles Times, 2003,
retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jan/23/local/me-ceo23).
James D. Ruth. After the dismissal, questions that had lingered in quiet corners of the
County’s Hall of Administration now became public and the County was forced to address the
question of who would actually want to accept a position that had so consistently been the center
of controversy and tension with the board. The board decided that they needed to conduct a wide
search for the new county CEO and to conduct a thorough search, they would need time. They
turned to former Anaheim City Manager James D. Ruth. He had no interest in the full-time
position, but had the background and skillset to keep the County ship afloat while the CEO
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search commenced. It was widely believed at the time that Ruth would have been hired for the
permanent position if he had expressed an interest.
Ruth originally accepted a six-month contract to give the county time to search for an
executive officer, at a cost of $85,000. He was praised for bringing vigor to the job and
providing experienced leadership even as board members looked for a permanent
replacement -- a job Ruth has said he doesn't want. Nearly a year later, however, at least
half a dozen prospects have turned down offers; at the same time, supervisors haven't
been able to agree on a replacement who could secure at least four votes on the five-
member board. The most promising prospect was Riverside County chief executive
Larry Parrish, who declined because his retirement package there was more lucrative than
Orange County could offer. (Pasco, Los Angeles Times, October 2003, retrieved from
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/oct/28/local/me-ceo28)
The position was turned down again eight months later in June 2004, as the Los Angeles Times
headline read, “O.C.’s CEO Job Rejected Again,” this time by Clark County, Nevada CEO
Thom Reilly. Another three months passed before Orange County finally got its permanent
CEO, retired city manager Thomas G. Mauk.
Thomas G. Mauk. In the article “O.C. Top Job Finally Filled,” the Los Angeles Times
reported on the hire and the end of a costly two-year search for a new CEO,
Thomas Mauk, former city manager of La Habra, Whittier, and Norco, will oversee the
nation's fifth most populous county and a government agency still burdened with debt
from its 1994 bankruptcy. It's a post that has had little in the way of job security. Mauk,
60, will become the county's fifth chief executive since 1995. Several of his predecessors
were fired or forced out because of disagreements with the Board of Supervisors. Board
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members agreed to hire Mauk after unsuccessfully courting other candidates, including
managers of Riverside County and Clark County, Nev., which includes Las Vegas.
(Pfeifer, Los Angeles Times, September 2004 retrieved from
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2004/sep/29/local/me-ceo29)
Mauk’s first five years on the job were generally calmer than his predecessors. This
détente with the board hit its high point in January of 2005, with Mauk receiving an offer and
initially accepting the CEO’s position in Los Angeles County. The Orange County Board of
Supervisors went into closed session and immediately put together an offer in a last ditch attempt
to convince Mauk to stay in Orange County. The move worked and after a raise and contract
extension to 2010, that would eventually make Mauk the second longest serving CEO in the
County’s history, they had secured the CEO spot and avoided another costly recruitment.
However, Mauk’s tenure eventually ended in 2012 when he was also forced to step down
in the wake of a sexual scandal involving another county executive. In this incident, Mauk was
accused by the board of ignoring or not being aggressive enough in the County’s internal
investigation of the criminal accusations that resulted in the arrest and indictment of Orange
County Public Works executive Carlos Bustamante. One last important note in the Mauk era
was the creation of the Office of the Performance Auditor by the Board of Supervisors. This
new department and position was a direct report to the Board of Supervisors, not to the CEO, and
existed to assess the performance of County departments, budgets, and staff. Mauk fought
behind the scenes to stop or significantly alter the plans for the new department. He argued that
it was a further stripping of the CEO’s authority to audit his own executive staff and
departments, however the Board moved forward regardless. Mauk would spend his final years
responding to numerous performance audits of his staff and departments.
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Mauk’s 2012 resignation came in the midst of a mass exodus (or purge) of County
executive level staff. This included the demotion of the County’s Assistant CEO to a non-
executive position in a County department, a stress related medical leave, a lawsuit and
termination of the County’s Deputy CEO, the “timely” retirement of the County’s Human
Resources Director, as well as the termination of the Director of the Department of Public Works
(who also filed a lawsuit against the County). The County’s executive branch, long stripped of
power, was now stripped of staff.
Robert Franz. One survivor of the 2012 culling was the County’s Chief Financial
Officer (CFO) Robert “Bob” Franz, who had remained basically unscathed during the executive
fallout. Franz was asked to step in as Interim CEO, after he removed himself from consideration
for the permanent position. As has always seemed to be the case with the position of Orange
County CEO, history was about to repeat, as the recruitment for the new CEO would stretch
longer than anyone had anticipated and with more than one external candidate turning down the
Board’s offer of employment. One of those candidates was Santa Barbara County CEO,
Chandra Wallar who, after being chosen by the entire Board, suddenly found herself at an
impasse in negotiations over her new salary and compensation. The California County News
website recounts the bizarre tale:
It’s back to the drawing board for Orange County supervisors. Their unanimous pick for
County Executive Officer, Chandra Wallar, declined to accept the job in a formal letter
on Thursday. In the letter, Wallar called the entire situation “awkward” and lamented the
fact that her discussions with the board over possible employment were leaked to the
press, forcing her to disclose her possible plans to the Board of Supervisors in Santa
Barbara, where she currently works as CEO. ‘I think she felt she had been sabotaged,’
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said Orange County Supervisor Todd Spitzer. The main factor in Wallar’s decision,
however, seems to have been a matter of compensation. Wallar requested an annual
salary of $290,000, which is $36,000 more than what the board was ultimately willing to
pay her. Wallar had upped her salary request from $270,000 after she learned she’d have
to pay the full employee share of her pension obligations…Wallar, however, said the
discussions were too chaotic from the get-go, fraught with mixed messages and delay.
Wallar was actually the board’s second choice. Their first choice was axed after they
learned he’d also be receiving a government pension from a previous job. (Orange
County CEO Hopeful Says Thanks, but No Thanks, California County News, retrieved
July 10, 2014 from http://www.californiacountynews.org/2013/03/orange-county-ceo-
hopeful-says-thanks-but-no-thanks.html)
Soon after news coverage of the debacle with the Orange County Board and Chandra Wallar had
quieted, the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors voted in closed session not to renew her
contract. They allowed her contract to expire before the end of 2013, leaving the once sought
after CEO without a job. When the news of Wallar’s failure to earn a contract extension reached
Orange County, speculation focused on whether the County’s turbulent history with their own
appointed CEOs had been a contributing factor to her dismissal and thus claimed its first casualty
that was not even employed by Orange County.
Mike Giancola. To bring this stormy history of executive power, or lack thereof, current
to 2014, the Board of Supervisors followed up the debacle with Wallar by sparring over an
internal candidate (head of the Performance Audit Department) who was ultimately unable to
garner three votes and then ultimately turning to Mike Giancola, the Director of the County’s
Waste and Recycling Department. CEO Giancola is less than one year into his tenure.
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Scandals and Issues of Accountability: A History of Damaged Public Trust
Politicians, authors, and academic professionals have built careers spending the last two
decades analyzing the causes and fallout of Orange County’s 1994 bankruptcy, which at the time
was the largest municipal bankruptcy in the history of the United States. The history centers on
Bob Citron who was the Orange County Treasurer in 1994, a row officer position elected county-
wide. A critical element to understand about Mr. Citron’s position is the treasurer is elected by
voters independently from the County’s board of supervisors, who are elected from distinct
districts. Therefore, the treasurer post is elected from a broader countywide constituency than
the board and is also not answerable to the County’s appointed CEO.
While this analysis does not focus on the financial complexities of the bankruptcy, it is
important to summarize the pertinent details and in that summary highlight just how devastating
the bankruptcy was for Orange County, and also to national markets. National news syndicates
such as Bloomberg Businessweek documented Orange County’s fallout with up to the moment
coverage simply referred to as “Today, Orange County…” and the article on December 18, 1994
provides a glimpse of what America was learning about Orange County, California a week
before Christmas that year.
California's Orange County had announced that its investment fund of $7.4 billion faced
losses of $1.5 billion, the result of a confluence of sharply higher interest rates and an
investment strategy that relied primarily on derivatives and enormous leverage. The
problem, in a nutshell: County Treasurer Robert L. Citron borrowed $14 billion,
investing the money in interest-sensitive derivatives contracts, hoping to increase returns
for his fund. When rates turned up, Orange County was forced to pay more on its
borrowings than it was earning on its investments. Quickly, the crisis played itself out.
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First, Orange County missed a $200 million payment on $2.6 billion in reverse
repurchase agreements, a form of securitized loans, to First Boston Corp. With the
county close to default, First Boston immediately liquidated its entire holdings of Orange
County collateral, made up primarily of government bonds. Orange County's stunning
bankruptcy filing, the largest ever in the municipal world, cast a chill over U.S. markets--
driven partly by investor worries about other portfolio losses. On Dec. 7, prices in the
$1.2 trillion municipal bond market sank more than a full point--a huge drop in that
market. Treasuries took a hit as well, pushing the yield on 30-year bonds up to 7.89%.
Even stocks were hurt, with the Dow Jones industrial average declining 10.43, led by
financial companies, including brokerages that lent money to Orange County. (Koester,
Bloomberg Businessweek, 1994 retrieved from
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/1994-12-18/today-orange-county-dot-dot-dot)
In a matter of less than a day, Citron’s dangerous dealings and investments had gone
from the realm of the generally ignored, misunderstood, and unknown, even to the County’s
Board, CEO, and general public, to now being national news. Just a few months earlier in April
1994, the Los Angeles Times quoted Thomas Riley, Chairman of the Orange County Board of
Supervisors, about his faith in Citron and knowledge about the County’s investment pool, “This
is a person who has gotten us millions of dollars. I don’t know how in the hell he does it, but he
makes us all look good” (Martinez & Johnson, “O.C. Tax Collector to Meet 2
nd
Challenger in 24
Years,” Los Angeles Times Orange County Edition, April 2, 1994 retrieved from
http://articles.latimes.com/1994-04-02/news/mn-41335_1_tax-collector). County supervisors
and CEO Ernie Schneider would both use a shield of ignorance and a structural lack of executive
power to oversee Citron’s investments, as a defense to both public criticisms and legal questions,
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and neither would serve time in prison. Supervisor Riley would retire from office in 1994 and
Ernie Schneider would be fired for his lack of oversight during the bankruptcy. However, Bob
Citron would eventually plead guilty to six felony counts and spend time in prison.
Just a little more than a decade later, Chriss Street, a former critic of Bob Citron, was
now the Orange County Treasurer. His short tenure was marked by scandals related to the
awarding of county contracts, calls for his resignation by the Board of Supervisors, attempts to
strip him of his investment authority, an investigation by the Orange County District Attorney,
and finally a rebuke by a federal judge that ultimately left Street with no other alternative than to
announce that he would not seek reelection. The Los Angeles Times headlines from his one-term
in office, elected in 2006 and no attempt to seek reelection in 2010, tell a tale of a fragmented
system of governance that does not provide for effective executive oversight:
OC Candidate Being Probed Loses D.A.’s Endorsement. May 5, 2006, David Reyes;
Will Street get off the dime and step down? August 28, 2007, Dana Parsons;
OC Funds face questions on holdings. December 5, 2007, Times Staff and Bloomberg;
Investment fund loses value. April 16, 2008, Christian Berthelsen; and
After a judge’s rebuke, O.C. Treasurer won’t seek reelection. March 3, 2010, Raja
Abdulrahim and Christopher Goffard.
Questions about the accountability of the County’s fragmented leadership have grown out of
a seemingly endless chorus of scandals that feed a perception that the County is rudderless, with
neutered executive staff and a collection of elected officials with varying visions from the micro
to macro, but with none specifically called upon or empowered to lead in one of the largest, most
diverse and densely populated counties in America. Even the County’s chairmanship is simply
an annual, mostly ceremonial rotation among the five-member board without additional
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executive powers of any significance. Scandals and resignations have shaken the County’s
resolve and added to its deteriorating level of respect from the public at a nearly continuous pace
for the last four decades. The deteriorating level of respect has manifested itself in the form of a
seemingly endless annual chorus of Orange County Grand Jury reports attacking the County’s
culture, transparency, ethics, and operational efficiency. The Grand Jury is comprised of Orange
County residents. Their charge is to operate as the eyes and ears of the public, to ensure Orange
County residents are being governed honestly and efficiently by their vast array of governmental
jurisdictions. The Grand Jury’s jurisdiction includes far more than the County of Orange, but
also the County’s 34 cities, water districts, school boards, transportation agencies and other
special districts. However, the County of Orange has been a favorite focus of investigation and
criticism. Provided below is a small cross-section of grand jury reports critical of the County of
Orange; however, the full list devoted just to the County is far more expansive.
The Culture of Harassment: Change on the Horizon – May 8, 2013
A Call for Ethical Standards: Corruption in Orange County – May 8, 2013
Orange County Investments: The Need for Stronger Oversight – June 9, 2009
Orange County Human Resources Procedures: Out of date, Out of time – May 20, 2008
Orange County Disciplinary Procedures for Elected Officials – June 7, 2007
For further detail of Orange County’s scandal ridden past, Table 10 provides a snapshot of
Orange County’s history with executive level scandals and resignations.
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Table 10
Executive Vacuum: Notable Scandals and Resignations of Orange County Leadership
Name Title Year Result/Cause
Robert W. Battin County Supervisor 1974 Convicted -
Misappropriation of
County funds
Phillip L. Anthony County Supervisor 1976 Indicted by
Orange County
Grand Jury
Andrew Hinshaw County Assessor 1977 Convicted - Bribery
Ralph A. Diedrich County Supervisor 1979 Convicted – Bribery
Don R. Roth County Supervisor 1994 Resigned and
Convicted – Political
ethics violations
Robert Citron County Treasurer 1994 Convicted-Six felonies
related to bad
investments/ County
bankruptcy
Gaddi Vasquez County Supervisor 1995 Resigned – Bankruptcy
fallout/ Though never
accused of criminal
wrongdoing
Mike Corona County Sheriff 2009 Convicted -
Conspiracy and witness
tampering
Chriss Street County Treasurer 2006-2010 Forced to retire -
Corruption allegations
and federal lawsuit
John S. Williams County Public
Administrator/Guardian
2011-2012 Resigned - Lawsuits
and Grand Jury
Investigations
Carlos Bustamante Executive Manager 2012 Arrested - Charges that
he sexually assaulted
his female employees
In addition to the most notable scandals and resignations listed in Table 10 were the
indictments of numerous County officials in the 1970s, as well as the 2007 convictions of
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Assistant County Sheriff George Jaramillo of two felony counts including tax evasion and
Assistant County Sheriff Don Haidl of tax evasion and illegally funneling campaign funds and
bribes to then Sheriff Mike Corona.
Conclusions: Orange County Needs Governance Reform
The analysis of Orange County reveals a county level governmental jurisdiction that
confronts public policy issues and serves a diverse population that is more like a state in
magnitude and scope. Long considered a suburban bedroom community south of Los Angeles, it
is now the sixth largest county in total population and 19
th
in population density in the entire
United States. Further, this analysis dispels the notion that Orange County is exclusively an
enclave of suburban whites of European descent, homogenous in every way, but in fact is an
extremely diverse population with a large Hispanic population, as well as a diverse and growing
concentration of Asian immigrants representing countries such as China, Korea, The Philippines
and Vietnam.
In some ways Orange County appears to mirror its comparable state-level counterparts as
it boasts a 2014/2015 fiscal year budget of $5.4 billion and employs a county staff of nearly
18,000 budgeted positions. The following table highlights Orange County’s budget size relative
to comparable states.
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Table 11
2015 Orange County Budget As Compared to State Budgets
State 2015 Executive Budgets
Kansas $6.2 Billion
Mississippi $6.1 Billion
New Mexico $6.07 Billion
Vermont $5.64 Billion
ORANGE COUNTY $5.4 Billion
Arkansas $5.0 Billion
South Dakota $4.28 Billion
Delaware $3.83 Billion
Sources: State budget data compiled from the National Association of State Budget Officers,
Summaries of Fiscal Year 2015 Proposed Executive Budgets, retrieved from
http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Summary%20of%20FY15%20Proposed%20Executi
ve%20Budgets.pdf. Orange County Budget data compiled from, County of Orange, Highlights
of the FY 2014-15 Recommended Budget, retrieved from
http://ocgov.com/gov/ceo/deputy/finance/budget/fy2015/201415recada.
However, in other critical elements, namely governance structure, Orange County does
not mirror states, many large counties in states other than California, or major American cities.
Orange County’s governance structure does not provide for an independent and separate
executive branch and thus does not conform to the separation of powers doctrine uniformly
adopted by states with governors, but also widely in use in counties across America that utilize
the council–executive structure by electing a county-wide CEO, and in major American cities
that use a strong-mayor form of governance. To this point, this chapter highlighted the historic
practice by the County Board of Supervisors of neutering the power of the appointed county
executive or CAO. Repeatedly, archival research of past media reports quoted exasperated
Orange County executives, who vented their frustration at being rendered powerless by the
Board of Supervisors to carry out even their most mundane of administrative functions.
In his analysis of Orange County’s 1994 bankruptcy, Mark Baldassare proposed ten
policy recommendations for the State of California and Orange County leaders to consider in the
aftermath of the bankruptcy. One of these recommendations was that, “The state of California
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should revise the general law governing its counties, because general-law counties currently
have a structure that is lacking in local leadership.” Specifically, the recommendation calls for
the state to intervene and bring forward county governance reform in California’s largest
counties.
The bankruptcy pointed out an important deficiency in the large counties that operate
under general law. They lack strong leadership, and this can hurt their efforts to cope
with an emergency such as a financial crisis. Suburban metropolitan regions would be
better served if they had a mayor elected countywide and highly visible to the people.
Their government structure would also be improved by having a CEO with authority over
the budget and personnel in all county departments. The state government should also
consider requiring the large counties that do not have a county charter to create a new
organizational structure that will provide them with county leadership. (Baldassare,
1998, p. 17)
This same recommendation was later echoed in Raphael Sonenshein’s 2001 Report and
discussed in the March 2012 report conducted by NCSC, the Carl Vinson Institute of
Government at the University of Georgia and NACo discussed previously in Chapter Two.
However, even with Baldassare’s 1998 report as a guide or, better perhaps, an ominous warning,
Orange County has not implemented any meaningful structural governance reform, but instead
has continued to operate without a separation of power, while firing CEOs and CAOs at such a
pace that the position has been turned down during recruitments more often than it has been
accepted since the bankruptcy.
The County did however adopt a charter and thus transitioned from a general law county
to become a charter county, but this is only in terms of a categorical definition and not in any
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way a meaningful distinguishing governance practice. The ballot measure that changed Orange
County to its current charter status was Measure V of 2002 and was brought to the voters by
Supervisor Todd Spitzer. In the passing of Measure V by voters, Orange County did become
California’s newest charter county. However, the only change adopted by the voters was to
ensure that reliably republican Orange County would not have a democrat, Governor Gray
Davis, appoint a replacement to a vacant seat on the County’s board of supervisors. The
County’s own website highlights this singular differentiating factor of Orange County’s status as
a charter county that operates largely as a general law county.
The County is a charter county as a result of the March 5, 2002 voter approval of
Measure V that provides for an electoral process to fill mid-term vacancies on the Board
of Supervisors. Before Measure V, as a general law County, mid-term vacancies would
otherwise be filled by gubernatorial appointment. In all other respects, the County is like
a general law county. A five-member Board of Supervisors governs the County. Each
elected member serves a four-year term, and the Board annually elects a Chair and Vice
Chair. Each district varies in geographical size; however, the populations are relatively
equal at approximately 600,000 residents. (Source: County of Orange retrieved from
http://ocgov.com/gov/ceo/deputy/finance/budget/fy2015/201415recada)
Why would Supervisor Spitzer be motivated to draft a ballot measure that shifted Orange County
from general law to charter, but only change one aspect of County operations? The answer
stems from politics. As Supervisor Spitzer was drafting Measure V, he was also campaigning
for a seat in the California Assembly. As the odds-on favorite to succeed then Assemblyman
Bill Campbell, who was also interested in running for Spitzer’s supervisor seat, the charter was
crafted to quell criticisms by the County’s republican majority that his personal ambition for a
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seat in the California Legislature would allow Governor Davis to appoint a democrat to his
vacant seat on the County Board. While a number of media outlets and leaders criticized
Measure V as a purely political move, lacking any true governance reform, it passed
comfortably. Therefore, the prime motivation for the County’s transition to a charter county was
self-preservation by Supervisor Spitzer and protection from potential political fallout from the
County’s Republican Party, rather than genuine and much needed structural governance reform.
Chapter Three has shown Orange County to be just as out-of-step with its governance
structure as California proved to be in Chapter Two, with its lack of attention to the emerging
county governance struggles statewide. Orange County has struggled to govern its massive and
ever-diversifying population effectively. While Baldassare called for a governance change in
1998, as did Sonenshein in 2001, the unfortunate status quo has been maintained without any
meaningful governance structure reform among California’s largest counties. In Orange County,
that has meant the continued loss of accountability with voters, instability in the CEO’s Office
and seemingly perpetual scandal. Orange County must look to establish a meaningful separation
of executive authority within its governance structure. That can be accomplished in the council-
executive model utilized in numerous counties across America. Many large urban and suburban
counties have shifted and now operate with a countywide elected executive, specifically to
confront many of the same problems and issues facing Orange County. Some of these
empowered executive roles have been in use for decades and offer Orange County a rich
reservoir of information and lessons-learned, in evaluating implementation of a governance
structure that allows for a countywide elected CEO. To that end, Chapter Four will further
explore literature related to the critical nature of the separation of powers doctrine and benefits of
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checks and balances in governance, as well as analyzing in greater detail the governance
structures of other counties that could be utilized effectively in Orange County and California.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF THE
COUNCIL-EXECUTIVE MODEL
The Essential Ingredient: Separation of Powers Doctrine
The Origins of Separation of Powers Doctrine
“The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands,
whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
James Madison
January 30, 1788
Federalist, no. 47, 323—31
In making this historic statement, James Madison is clearly speaking to the debate
surrounding the formation of the United States Constitution and our federal system of
government, both in its day-to-day functional operation, and also in its relationship with the
states. Taking into consideration the magnitude of the issues before Madison in constructing the
Constitution, not to mention, still only five years removed from the end of the Revolutionary
War, his use of the word “tyranny” to describe a system of government without a true separation
of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches does not appear as hyperbolic
as it may in other governmental arenas. Surely, by contrast, county governance can seem quite
dull. However, Chapter Three’s analysis of county governance and Orange County’s long
history of problems related to executive fragmentation and corruption, much of which was borne
out of the absence of a true separation of powers, has been anything but blasé and has remained a
constant source of controversy for both the County’s organizational structure and in the media
headlines. As highlighted in the 1994 bankruptcy, Orange County’s troubles are rooted in a
governance model that is absent effective oversight controls and checks and balances, which are
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key tenets of structures with a true separation of powers. The importance of the separation of
powers doctrine cannot be understated and Madison removed any ambiguity in his description of
its value in Federalist no. 47: “No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is
stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty...” (Madison, 1788).
To better understand this core element of American governance, Chapter Four will begin with a
look at the origins of the separation of powers doctrine. The doctrine, similar in origin to the
county, also traces its roots back to Europe with origins in classical antiquity and 18
th
Century
France.
Polybius. Polybius of ancient Greece, born in 200 BC, was quite possibly the first to
write about the virtues of checks and balances in the operation of a governmental jurisdiction or
embedded in a constitution. Polybius, a Greek living under Roman rule, wrote extensively in
Histories about every facet of the Roman governmental operation and noted the importance of
checks and balances in Book VI:
Such being the power that each part has of hampering the others or co-operating with
them, their union is adequate to all emergencies, so that it is impossible to find a better
political system than this… For when one part having grown out of proportion to the
others aims at supremacy and tends to become too predominant, it is evident that…none
of the three is absolute, but the purpose of the one can be counterworked and thwarted by
the others, none of them will excessively outgrow the others or treat them with contempt.
All in fact remains in statu quo, on the one hand, because any aggressive impulse is sure
to be checked and from the outset each estate stands in dread of being interfered with by
the others…. (The Histories, 6.18 retrieved from
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http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/6*.html on November 20,
2014)
At the time, Polybius was referring to the governance of city-states and not referring to what we
know today as the modern branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial) operating
at the federal, state, and local level in the United States. However, it is clear that the key tenet of
modern separation of powers doctrine, checks, and balances was unmistakably idealized by
Polybius as an essential component to virtuous and effective governance more than 2,000 years
ago. Polybius built upon the writings of Aristotle and the merits of mixed government. His own
examination of governmental checks and balances would inspire the work of Baron de
Montesquieu, an 18
th
century French philosopher, and Montesquieu’s writings would become the
foundation of the American separation of powers doctrine.
Montesquieu. Montesquieu’s ideas came into fashion during the period known as the
French Enlightenment. His most famed work, The Spirit of the Laws in 1748, set the basis for
the modern American governance concept of constructing a clear separation of powers between
the executive, legislative, and judicial aspects of governmental operations. In The Spirit of the
Laws, he makes particular note of the critical importance of separating these power centers that
exist within government:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same
body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the
same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical
manner. (Montesquieu, 1748, pp. 151-152)
James Madison and other framers of the United States Constitution heaped praise and credit
upon Montesquieu for his enlightened governance construct and they eventually adopted it for
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the preservation of liberty and as an essential mechanism for effective governance. Moving
forward, the separation of powers doctrine became entrenched within America’s federal system
and it would also find a home in American states and cities.
Applicability for County Government
The lessons from Polybius, Montesquieu, and Madison were initially formed from
debates pertaining to nation-states of Ancient Greece and Europe, as well as for inclusion in
national constitutions. However, as time moved forward, the separation of powers doctrine with
the concept of checks and balances became an essential governance amenity for large, non-
nation-state governmental jurisdictions like American states. From the time that James Madison
and America’s Founding Fathers placed the doctrine of separation of powers firmly within the
federal system and shortly thereafter within state government, it would take more than 150 years
before a similar discourse regarding the benefits of checks and balances would pervade the arena
of local government.
As has always been the case, American counties very rarely act as the petri dish of
innovative ideas. Counties as a forgotten level of government would again, not play a leading
role in the discussion of introducing the doctrine of separation of powers at the local level, but
take a back seat to cities. Separation of Powers in Municipal Government: Division of Executive
and Legislative Authority by Bradley E. Morris described the earliest court cases that shaped the
path for separation of powers to become a fixture in large American cities and thus a precursor
for its introduction to counties. In his 1978 article from the Brigham Young University Law
Review, Morris described the clashes over executive authority in major American cities like New
York and San Francisco.
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An early indication that separation of municipal powers might eventually be recognized
appeared in the forceful 1942 dissent by Chief Justice Lehman of the New York Court of
Appeals in LaGuardia v. Smith. The Chief Justice vigorously attacked the majorities
view that the separation of powers doctrine did not protect the mayor…Where the
fundamental law of any government distributes the executive, legislative, and judicial
functions among different branches, he argued, it necessarily implies that the branches
are to be kept separate and distinct. (Morris, 1978, pp. 964-965)
While Chief Justice Lehman made his case in a dissenting opinion in New York, just four years
later, support for separation of powers in local government would find a permanent foothold in
California.
The argument that the separation of powers doctrine could justify a mayor’s assertion of
an exclusive executive power was adopted…by the California Supreme Court in Kennedy
v. Ross. In that case the California court upheld the validity of a contract made by the
mayor of San Francisco without the authorization of the city’s board of supervisors.
(Morris, 1978, p. 965)
Cases like LaGuardia v. Smith and Kennedy v. Ross would be followed by other major court
decisions in Florida, Georgia, and Utah that set the stage for separation of powers to become far
more commonplace in large American cities. Today, it takes the form of the strong-mayor form
of governance and with the validation by the courts; many large cities began to shift to
governance models that create a “classic” separation between the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches within cities.
Courts may turn to the state and federal separation of powers models to interpret a city’s
governing statute or charter if the city chooses to operate under a form of government
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with divided powers. When the city of Atlanta recently abandoned the strong
commission form of government, the Supreme Court of Georgia took occasion to
comment, in dicta, that the city’s charter had been ‘changed drastically’ to handle the
growing demands of a large urban area. The new charter, the court said, had established
a government with a ‘classic separation of powers.’ (Morris, 1978, p. 966)
Decades later and lagging far behind, American counties started to look to embrace a
model similar to the city’s strong-mayor form that provided for checks and balances. They were
starting to face the same issues mentioned in the court decision pertaining to the city of Atlanta,
becoming more urban and experiencing large population influxes with increased densities. The
elected county executive model they chose, as described in Chapter Two, is most commonly
referred to as the council-executive model. However, many large American counties still prefer
to describe their structure as being similar to a strong-mayor form of government, to avoid
confusing constituents who better connect with how cities operate, as opposed to the confusion
that always seems to cloud their understanding of county operations. Regardless of the preferred
title used by a county (mayor, judge or CEO), American counties followed the lead of America’s
largest urban cities and started to look for a new way to create a meaningful firewall primarily
between the two most potent operational powers, their executive and legislative authorities.
Power Checks Power
In reading Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws for this research, two areas he focused
on seem especially poignant to the case study analysis in Chapter Three pertaining to the
struggles experienced by Orange County, California, due to the lack of a true separation of
powers in its commission–administrator model. Montesquieu seems to purposefully avoid
generalizations in discussing the importance of applying separation of powers doctrine and
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checks and balances within governmental bodies. Instead, he clears away nuance and warns
against attempts to create checks and balances that are only in name and have no practical
benefit. It is a reminder of the historic arbitrary nature of the Orange County board of
supervisors capriciously curtailing the executive functions of its appointed administrator.
Montesquieu addresses the danger of arbitrary decision making throughout The Spirit of the
Laws, discussing the rationale and importance of a clear and unmistakable separation between
governmental branches. He notes some of the perils related to weak, symbolic or non-existent
barriers between the branches:
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be
exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to
the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.
(Montesquieu, 1748, p. 152)
The primary issue in Orange County and other large California counties is less about the limited
quasi-judicial functions of a board of supervisors and more so about the blurred line between the
board’s executive and legislative powers vis-a-vis the appointed administrator/executive.
However, Montesquieu’s admonition against establishing governance structures that could
encourage arbitrary decision-making is as relevant today as it was when he wrote it in 1748. He
later writes with a more specific focus on the risks associated with governance structures that do
not clearly separate the executive from the legislative branches.
Were the executive power not to have a right of restraining the encroachments of the
legislative body, the latter would become despotic; for as it might arrogate to itself what
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authority it pleased, it would soon destroy all the other powers. (Montesquieu, 1748, p.
157)
Polybius, Montesquieu, and James Madison were from different eras and focused on
different governmental entities, facing different challenges during their respective times.
However, each recognized what might be described as a law of nature and attempted to apply it
to the man-made construct of governmental authority. Each man addressed it in writing,
however Montesquieu’s quote best encapsulates both the statement of the problem and a viable
solution:
But constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it,
and to carry his authority as far as it will go. Is it not strange, though true, to say that
virtue itself has need of limits? To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature
of things that power should be a check to power. (Montesquieu, 1748, p. 150)
It is the concept of a truly equal power being introduced in large California counties, similar to
Orange County, which is necessary to provide a healthy and much needed separation between
branches of government. This echoes the critique by Cigler of the most commonly used
structure, the commission–administrator model with an appointed CAO, currently used by the
largest California counties. Again, Cigler points out, “If an elected board retains legal
responsibility for policy, legislation and budget matters, and the appointed administrator reports
to that governing body, there is obviously no strict separation of powers between the executive
and legislative functions” (Cigler, 1995, p. 60). The true benefit of the appointed CAO was the
introduction of professional expertise to the county’s administrative role, but it is naïve to think
that it provides a true separation or preservation of executive authority as was illustrated in the
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historic analysis of the County of Orange. Only the council-executive model, with an elected
executive, truly exemplifies Montesquieu’s revelation “that power should be a check to power.”
Analysis: Council – Executive Model in Practice
There are a number of counties nationwide, both large and small, which currently utilize
the council–executive model. Their reasons for shifting from either the pure commission form or
the commission-administrator with an appointed CAO are as unique as their local communities,
environment, and cultures, as you can find the council-executive model in use by counties and
states as different as rural Kentucky and Texas to urban and dense Illinois and New York.
However, to build upon the historic analysis of the separation of powers doctrine, this research
will focus on the same issue that gave rise to the court-recognized validity of checks and
balances and separation of powers for America’s largest cities. It was their growth in population,
sometimes massive geographic areas to govern, and the complexities of issues and demographic
changes that led cities to establish unambiguous separation for their executives (strong mayors).
Over the decades, as noted in Chapter Two, nearly all of America’s largest states (top 10 in
population) and more than one-third of America’s top thirty-two counties have instituted some
form of the council-executive model and now elect their executive position county-wide. While
it is not feasible in this specific research to analyze all the various ways the council-executive
structure is implemented across different states and counties, it is still important to draw a frame
of reference for California’s largest counties to potentially emulate or extract best practices. To
that end, we look at the State of Michigan, America’s 9
th
most populous state and its use of the
council-executive model in its two most populous counties, Wayne and Oakland counties. As of
the 2012 Census, Wayne County is America’s 18
th
largest county with a population of nearly 1.8
million people and Oakland County stands as 32
nd
with a population of more than 1.2 million.
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Both counties elect their chief executive, refer to this position as their “County Executive,” and
establish a clearly defined set of powers and responsibilities that are exclusive to this elected
executive role and thus separate it from the county’s respective legislative bodies.
Wayne County Governance
Wayne County is Michigan’s most populous county and is a home rule charter county
with the powers and responsibilities of the county executive, its legislative body (commission)
and constitutional officers (row officers) derived from the charter document and county code.
Organizational Structure: Separation of Powers for Co-Equal Branches of
Government. Wayne County became a charter county in 1981 and the driving force behind the
adoption of the charter and home rule was to construct a governance model that embraced the
separation of powers doctrine as modeled at the state and federal level in America. While the
separation of powers doctrine and checks and balances between the legislative and executive
functions are referenced throughout the 87-page document, perhaps it is most clearly defined in
section 3.118 titled, “Non-Interference in Administrative Affairs.”
Except insofar as is necessary in the performance of the duties of office or as otherwise
provided by this Charter, a Commissioner or an employee of the Commission shall not
interfere, directly or indirectly, with the conduct of any executive department. (Home
Rule Charter for the County of Wayne, retrieved from Wayne County’s website at
http://www.waynecounty.com/documents/exec/commission/county_charter_2013.pdf, p.
18)
Compiler’s comments were added to the official charter document in 2012 (time of the last
amendment) and they add great clarity to the intent of each section of the charter and specifically
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to section 3.118 with respect to both the rationale and importance of a true separation of powers
doctrine for Wayne County.
This provision is a typical means of expressing the tenets embodied in the separation of
powers doctrine, which is woven into the fabric of this Charter. That doctrine was
developed by the federal and several state courts to moderate and resolve some of the
conflicts between the legislative and executive branches of the federal and state
government. Wayne County with a population of more than two million people is larger
and more complex than many states in the United States. It was appropriate, therefore,
that the Charter adopt a flexible form of government modeled after the federal and state
systems, rather than one of the five or six organizational models more commonly used for
local units of government. (Compiler’s Comments, Home Rule Charter for the County of
Wayne, p. 18)
This comment is a clear statement of intent by the authors of the Charter, Wayne County’s
voting electorate and the State of Michigan, that an entity the size of Wayne County is far too
complex to use a governance model more akin to a smaller and simpler governmental body.
Further, two of the “five or six governmental models more commonly used for local units of
government,” as referenced in the compiler’s comments, include the preferred commission-
administrator and pure commission form currently in use by all California counties, regardless of
population size or complexity of issues that confront them.
Earlier in Wayne County’s Charter, it provides even greater specificity as to the intent of
those who drafted and ultimately adopted the original charter in 1981. That goal was to provide
the County’s governance structure with an executive branch that was independent enough to
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operate as a strong and co-equal branch of government for one of America’s largest and most
diverse counties.
While there was a clear intent in adopting the Charter to provide for a strong executive
branch, it is also important to note that the County Commission is vested with ALL
legislative authority, and not with more limited powers. Rather than a strong
mayor/weak council form of government, Wayne County government is modeled after
the co-equal branches of the state and federal governments, which are moderated by a
court-developed doctrine on the separation of powers. Both branches exercise certain
control over the activities of the government. The dividing line is not between policy and
procedure, nor a difference in subject matter. It is rather in the manner by which control
is exercised. The legislative body is mainly limited to making law. It may direct within
that law in great detail as to how a goal is to be accomplished. But it may not directly
supervise the implementation of the law. (Compiler’s Comments, Home Rule Charter for
the County of Wayne, p. 9)
Figure 13 highlights the general governance structure of Wayne County’s co-equal branches of
government.
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Figure 13. Wayne County’s Governance Structure. Retrieved from A Citizen’s Guide to Wayne
County Government at http://www.waynecounty.com/documents/exec/commission/2013-
14_Citizens_Guide.pdf, p. 7.
Legislative Branch: Wayne County Board of Commissioners. The official name of
Wayne County’s legislative branch of government is the Wayne County Board of
Commissioners or the Wayne County Commission (Commission) for short. It consists of fifteen
(15) members elected from separate, non-overlapping districts from across the County. Each
commissioner represents an average of 121,372 residents and serves a two-year term in office (A
Citizen’s Guide to Wayne County Government, p. 8). The following map in Figure 14 highlights
the Commission’s fifteen districts, as well as the population figures from each distinct city within
the respective district.
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Figure 14. Map of Wayne County Commission Districts. Retrieved from Data Driven Detroit at
http://datadrivendetroit.org/projects/wayne-county-apportionment/.
Unlike California counties and their five member boards of supervisors, Wayne County’s
Commission has the look and feel of a traditional American legislative body in its structure and
role in government. It operates as a “committee of the whole” but also utilizes eight standing
sub-committees that conduct the in-depth analysis of issues before they reach the full
commission for consideration.
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The Wayne County Commission operates under a committee system, with eight standing
committees established to review and make recommendations to the full commission
regarding contracts, ordinances and other items within each committee’s designated area
of responsibility. The eight standing committees are: Audit, Economic Development,
Government Operations, Health & Human Services, Public Safety, Judiciary &
Homeland Security, Public Services, Ways & Means and Youth Services. (A Citizen’s
Guide to Wayne County Government, p. 9)
Orange County’s board of supervisors does not operate with the standing committee structure
and instead conducts its official business as a committee of the whole. It may from time-to-time
and on an as-needed basis, form ad-hoc (temporary) committees consisting of two board
members to make a recommendation back to the full board for consideration. However, this
process is not formalized with dedicated staffing, as each standing committee is afforded in
Wayne County.
Finally, the basis of a well-functioning system of separation of powers within any
governance structure is a clear and formalized set of roles and responsibilities for each co-equal
branch to follow. Table 12 summarizes the powers and responsibilities of the Wayne County
Board of Commissioners as established in section 3.115 of the Home Rule Charter for the
County of Wayne.
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Table 12
Summary of Legislative Powers Granted to Wayne County Board of Commissioners
Adopt, amend, or repeal ordinances or resolutions.
Appropriate funds, levy taxes, fees and other charges, and authorize borrowing.
Approve the making of all contracts by the County.
Approve or reject appointments by the CEO of the Deputy CEO, department heads, their deputy
directors, and members of boards and commissions.
Override a veto of the CEO by a 2/3 majority of Commissioners serving.
Approve, amend, or reject rules or regulations issued by any department or officer.
Require any County officer or employee to testify and to produce records and documents.
Subpoena records, documents, and witnesses and administer oaths.
Appoint and remove, by a majority vote of Commissioners serving, the members of the Board of
County Canvassers, the Metropolitan Airport Zoning Board of Appeals, the Planning and
Development Commission, and the County Election Scheduling Board.
Appoint and provide compensation for employees of the Commission. Including appointment of a
Commission Clerk who can be removed by a majority of Commissioners.
Merge the Register of Deeds with the County Clerk or provide for their separation.
Judge the qualifications of Commissioners. A Commissioner may be removed from office by a 2/3
vote of commissioners serving upon conviction or admission of guilt during a term of office for a
felony or a 4/5 vote of commissioners for misfeasance or malfeasance of office or for removal of
principal residency from his or her district.
Submit ballot questions including advisory questions and amendments to this Charter for approval by
the registered voters. A tax increase must be approved by a 2/3 vote of Commissioners to be placed
on the ballot. Renewals of a previous tax increase or increase in the property tax may be placed on
the ballot by a majority vote.
Exercise any power granted by law to Charter or general law counties except those prohibited by this
Charter.
Establish the compensation of other elected officers as provided by law or ordinance.
Sources: Home Rule Charter for the County of Wayne from
http://www.waynecounty.com/documents/exec/commission/county_charter_2013.pdf, pp. 12-16.
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Executive Branch: County Executive’s Office. The current Wayne County Executive
is Warren Evans. Evans was elected on a partisan county-wide ballot in the November 2014
General Election to a four-year term over a field of eleven seasoned candidates to win his first
term in office. His victory in 2014 included the unseating of the incumbent CEO Robert Ficano
who had held the office since 2003.
While the 1981 Charter was the ultimate vehicle that changed Wayne County’s
governance structure from a commission form to the council-executive, with the establishment of
co-equal executive and legislative branches, it was the Michigan Public Act 139 of 1973 that
provided Michigan counties with a list of allowable governance options codified in statute, that
was far more extensive than options available to California counties.
While significant authority and responsibility is held within Wayne County’s legislative
branch, it is clear when reading its charter that the driving force in the County’s 1981 reform
effort was to create a strong executive and in that action curtail the legislative branch’s influence
in the administrative functions of county operations. As noted earlier, section 3.118 in Wayne
County’s Charter is explicit in its statement that the legislative branch should not interfere in
administrative activity. Additional commentary within the Charter sets forth the County’s goal
of a strong executive with protections from the legislative branch. It leaves no ambiguity that the
authors of the charter wanted protections specified within the document. “It is clear and
undisputable that neither a Commissioner nor a Commission staff member has the power to
directly supervise the implementation of an executive branch program, or to hire and fire
executive branch employees” (Compiler’s Comments, Home Rule Charter for the County of
Wayne, p. 19). Section 4.111 of the Charter establishes the CEO and 4.112 provides the powers
and duties of the CEO. “The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the head of the executive branch
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of County government…The executive and administrative power of the County is vested in the
CEO” (Home Rule Charter for the County of Wayne, p. 25).
The CEO’s powers are summarized in Table 13.
Table 13
Summary of Executive Powers Granted to the Wayne County Executive
Supervise, coordinate, direct, and control all county facilities, operations, and functions
except as otherwise provided by law or this Charter;
Implement and enforce the laws of this State and County ordinances, resolutions, orders, and
rules;
Exercise all powers and duties granted the CEO by law, ordinance, or other provisions of this
Charter;
Submit reports and recommendations to the Commission on any matter affecting the County;
Exercise powers and duties required for emergency preparedness;
Maintain a Planning division in the office of the CEO; and
Veto any ordinance or resolution having the effect of law, or approving a contract, or any line
item in an appropriation ordinance by transmitting to the Commission written certification of
the veto and reasons therefore.
Sources: Home Rule Charter for the County of Wayne from
http://www.waynecounty.com/documents/exec/commission/county_charter_2013.pdf, pp. 25-27.
In addition to the powers listed in Table 13, the CEO has the right to structure or reorganize
(section 4.113) the executive branch to fit their vision of the office and what they would like to
accomplish in office.
Within 90 days after taking office, the CEO shall submit a proposed Executive Branch
reorganization plan to the Commission. The plan may provide for the creation or
abolition of any department, agency, division, or officer not expressly exempted by this
Charter. The plan may assign all the powers, duties, and functions of the County among
the agencies or departments not prohibited by this Charter. The CEO may propose
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amendments at any time to the Executive Branch reorganization plan. (Home Rule
Charter for the County of Wayne, p. 25)
In summary, Wayne County was profiled first in this analysis of the council-executive
governance model due to the extensive material available, specifically in Home Rule Charter for
the County of Wayne. The Charter, as well as the County’s website and other materials such as
the Citizen’s Guide to Wayne County Government, paints a clear picture of the policy goals in
the 1981 reform effort. That goal was to establish a county governance structure with co-equal
branches to provide Wayne County’s residents with a strong executive that could be checked by
the legislative branch, but not needlessly interfered with as has been historically documented in
Orange County. The Citizens Research Council (CRC) of Michigan conducted an independent
analysis of Wayne County’s charter effort and provided the following commentary regarding the
benefits of establishing a strong elected executive position:
The advantages cited for the county executive approach stem largely from the directly-
elected nature of the position. Thus, it is asserted that an elected chief executive should
be highly responsive to public opinion, since he or she must face the voters at the next
election; that such an official can be and usually is a strong political leader as well as an
administrator and thus can help reconcile the diverse views found among the citizens of
an urban county; that establishment of the elected executive position focuses on one
individual an image of high prestige and leadership which could be of substantial value in
dealing with outside interests and higher levels of government; that a clear separation of
powers between executive and legislative branches is in keeping with the American
tradition and often helps produce a healthy debate on policy issues; and that/an elected
executive enjoys more permanent job tenure than an appointed administrator, which can
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be a decided advantage in a period of crisis. (Sinclair Powell, Wayne County Charter
Issues…Elected County Executive/Chief Administrative Officer, retrieved from
https://crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/1980s/1981/rpt265.pdf, p. 5)
Oakland County Governance
Oakland County is Michigan’s second most populous county and operates as a general
law county. As compared to Wayne County, there is not as much historical research available
for Oakland County regarding the establishment of their council-executive governance structure.
However, I was able to confirm that while Oakland County has not adopted a charter, it has
moved from a commission form of governance to a council-executive form by virtue of Public
Act 139, which was cited in the earlier analysis of Wayne County. Act 139 reads:
AN ACT to provide forms of county government; to provide for county managers and
county executives and to prescribe their powers and duties; to abolish certain
departments, boards, commissions, and authorities; to provide for transfer of certain
powers and functions; to prescribe powers of a board of county commissioners and
elected officials; to provide organization of administrative functions; to transfer property;
to retain ordinances and laws not inconsistent with this act; to provide methods for
abolition of a unified form of county government; and to prescribe penalties and provide
remedies. (Optional Unified Form of County Government Act 139 of 1973 retrieved from
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(kv33tp55p2qarf45tohobtfz))/mileg.aspx?page=GetObje
ct&objectname=mcl-Act-139-of-1973)
Wayne County’s Charter provided great specificity and rationale for adoption of its governance
structure. However, even without a charter document to research, Oakland County’s official
website does provide helpful information as to how the county’s governance structure operates.
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Organizational Structure: Separation of Powers. Similar in many ways to Wayne
County, Oakland County provides for a clear separation of powers between the executive and
legislative branches. While not mandated in a charter adopted by the residents of Oakland
County, it is a product of Michigan state code, specifically section 45.559 of Act 139. The
County’s website provides a list of the powers held by each branch and they are summarized in
Table 14.
Table 14
Separation of Powers in Oakland County Government
Executive Powers Legislative Powers
Supervise, direct and control the functions of
County departments under the Executive;
Establish and formulate county policies;
Coordinate County activities and unify
management of its affairs;
Establish annual county property tax millage
rate;
Enforce all orders, rules and ordinances of
the Board of Commissioners and laws of the
State required to be enforced by this office;
Adopt ordinances and rules;
Prepare and submit to the Board a
recommended annual County Budget and
administer expenditure of funds;
Adopt annual county budget and long-range
capital improvement program;
Appoint directors to head various
departments within the Executive Branch;
Adopt the county development plan;
Veto resolutions.
Adopt and enforce rules establishing the
authority, duties, and responsibilities of
county departments and offices.
Sources: What is the County Executive? Retrieved from
http://www.oakgov.com/exec/Pages/about/execduties.aspx. About the Oakland County Board of
Commissioners. Retrieved from http://www.oakgov.com/boc/Pages/about.aspx.
Legislative Branch: Oakland County Board of Commissioners. The official name of
Oakland County’s legislative branch of government is the Oakland County Board of
Commissioners or the Oakland County Commission (Commission) for short. It consists of
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twenty-one (21) members elected from separate, non-overlapping districts from across the
County. According to the County’s website, each commissioner represents approximately
57,000 residents and serves a two-year term in office. The following map in Figure 15 highlights
the Commission’s twenty-one districts.
Figure 15. Map of Oakland County Commission Districts. Retrieved from Detroit Free Press at
http://archive.freep.com/interactive/article/99999999/NEWS15/120730060/Map-Oakland-
County-Commission-Districts.
Executive Branch: County Executive’s Office. “Oakland County is headed by an
elected County Executive whose responsibilities are similar to those of a governor or mayor of
a large city” (Official website of Oakland County, Michigan, About the Oakland County
Executive, 2014 November, retrieved from
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http://www.oakgov.com/exec/Pages/about/default.aspx. Bold is emphasis from original text
online by Oakland County, MI).
For more than two decades, L. Brooks Patterson has occupied the County Executive
position (CEO) in Oakland County. He is currently in his sixth four-year term. While the
Wayne County Executive position derives its authority from a charter approved by the voters, in
contrast the Oakland County Executive’s authority comes from state law, Michigan Compiled
Law (MCL) section 45.558 (sub-section 8), County manager or county executive; powers and
duties. Under this section, Oakland’s CEO can hire/appoint all executive branch department
heads (directors), but is required to submit them to the Oakland County Board of Commissioners
for approval. However, after that process is complete, which is more of a courtesy to the
Commission than a true vetting, the department director serves at the pleasure of the CEO, not
the Commission. An area of even more direct authority is the CEO’s cabinet. In Oakland
County, it consists of five executive positions referred to as “Deputy CEOs” who wield
significant influence over executive departments and policy, but are not subject to Commission
confirmation, oversight, or interference. It should be noted that many of the same or very similar
positions exist in Orange County and other California counties. However, it is not uncommon in
California for a member of a county board of supervisors to circumvent the appointed CEO and
call a meeting or request a policy direction of a department head or deputy CEO based on the
board’s mandated role in the county’s executive function/operation. As noted earlier in both
Chapters Two and Three of this paper, even with an established appointed CEO, executive staff
can find themselves in a confusing position between loyalty to their unelected boss, the
appointed CEO, and to the elected board of supervisors who maintain significant executive
authority, and where the board’s authority is less clear, members still wield the influence as
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elected officials. In Oakland County, there is no blurred line between real authority and political
influence for the deputy CEOs or department directors to contend with. In Oakland County, the
blurred line of ambiguity for executive staff created by political influence that could theoretically
emanate from the elected commission is counterbalanced by the fact that they report to an
executive who is not only elected, but elected from a countywide population of 1.2 million, as
opposed to a commissioner who represents 57,000.
However, one of the most significant powers afforded to the Oakland County Executive,
that is completely absent in the office of appointed county executives in California, is the ability
to directly influence critical regional policy matters that stretch beyond even the borders of its
respective county. One example of this was the creation of the Great Lakes Water Authority
(GLWA). Created in 2014, the GLWA has been called a historic compact between the Mayor of
the City of Detroit, the Chief Executives of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb counties and the
Governor to manage water and sewer operations in what Michigan refers to as the tri-county
area, similar to what a Californian would refer to as Southern California. The GLWA governing
board will be made up of 6 members: 2 from the City of Detroit, 1 each from Wayne, Oakland,
and Macomb counties and 1 appointed by the Governor. Oakland County’s Executive, L.
Brooks Patterson, appointed one of his deputy CEOs, Robert Daddow, to serve on the GLWA
board. This appointment did not require formal consultation or confirmation by the Oakland
County Board of Commissioners. This is not to suggest that the Oakland County Commission
was absent input, as they did need to vote as a committee of whole, for Oakland County to join
with the other governmental jurisdictions in forming GLWA at its inception. However, it was
the CEO’s office that set the policy direction for the creation of and participation in GLWA.
Moving forward, through Robert Daddow, the CEO’s office will also set the policy for the
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County’s voice in GLWA. This powerful aspect of executive branch leadership and influence
does not exist with California’s appointed executives or with board of supervisors who are not
elected from a countywide electorate.
Applicability for Orange County, California
Based upon the analysis of the council-executive structure in practice, I offer the following
policy findings for application in Orange County and California’s largest counties:
1. Size Matters: Council-Executive model establishes a true separation of powers.
To reiterate, Wayne and Oakland County are large counties by nearly any evaluative
methodology and both cite their size, diversity, and complexity of policy issues as reasons why a
governance model with a true separation of powers is essential to their effective operation.
Specifically, Oakland County’s website describes its CEO as being similar to a governor and
Wayne County’s charter makes the case that its population and economic size is more akin to a
state and thus demands a governance model different from less complex cities and smaller
counties. They highlight that old, outdated governance models borrowed from bygone eras or
smaller and simpler governmental jurisdictions, simply do not work for entities as big as states
and in some cases nations. If that is true for Michigan’s largest counties, as well as the largest
counties in New York, Texas, Florida and Illinois, as noted in Table 5 of Chapter Two, it makes
perfect sense for Orange County and California’s massive counties, which usually dwarf even
the largest counties in other states, to introduce the council-executive model with a strong elected
executive, to afford their chief executives with the first true protection for their administrative
authority.
Orange County and California’s largest counties operate massive governmental
operations without utilizing the critical, yet basic tenet of American governance, separation of
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powers and the requisite protections afforded by the institution of checks and balances. Orange
County’s four-page charter (Wayne County’s is 87 pages) makes no reference to its governance
structure having any role in providing for checks and balances or recognizing its value. Whether
the absence is due to political laziness related to the seemingly mundane issue of county
governance or by purposeful omission in order to protect county supervisors and preserve their
influential posts, its application in Orange County would provide the first true protection for
operation of the County’s administrative/executive function through the CEO’s Office.
Providing this clearly delineated separation would go a long way toward avoiding the chaotic
granting and removing of CEO authority noted in the historical analysis of Orange County.
The County’s official website does little more to clarify the direct reporting
responsibilities, but does acknowledge that the Orange County Board of Supervisors maintains
both the legislative and executive power. The County’s top/down organizational chart (see
Figure 16) shows no firewall between executive and legislative functions and highlights the
challenge for a five-member board, elected from separate districts, to govern a county of 3.2
million residents, a county operation featuring more than twenty-five distinct departmental
specialties and a workforce in excess of 17,000 employees. A clearly defined separation for such
a complex governmental operation would benefit staff efficiency and provide better transparency
and understanding for the greater public served by the county.
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Figure 16. Organizational Chart for the County of Orange. Retrieved from the County of
Orange/Ocgov.com at http://ocgov.com/gov/ceo/resources/orgchart.
2. Power Checks Power: Council-Executive model helps to eliminate executive
fragmentation.
For a member of the public or even a county employee, the organizational chart in Figure
16 is far more confusing and difficult to follow than the basic governance structure represented
in Figure 13 for Wayne County. However, one important element is clear from Figure 16, true
executive authority lies with the board of supervisors and not the Orange County CEO. To
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connect this with the history of executive fragmentation covered in Chapter Three, the chart
notes four basic categories of departments beneath the board of supervisors and CEO. One
category is titled “Elected Departments” and this includes the Orange County Assessor, Clerk
Recorder, District Attorney, Sheriff-Coroner, Treasurer-Tax Collector, and Auditor-Controller.
These positions are described in Chapter Two as row officers or constitutional officers in some
states. These department heads are elected countywide and the board of supervisors has little
authority, outside of budget, over their operation. The Orange County appointed CEO has no
direct authority, other than acting as an agent of the board of supervisors. A second category,
“Board Appointed Departments,” includes the Clerk of the Board, County Counsel, Performance
Audit, Internal Audit, and the Office of Independent Review. These departments are appointed
by and report directly to the board of supervisors. The CEO has no authority over these
departments.
The final two categories, “Infrastructure and Public Services” and “Community Services”
both comprise five (5) distinct county departments for a total of ten (10) separate departments.
Traditionally, these are the departments under the authority of the CEO, however the legend for
the organizational chart (legend symbol = o) notes that five of the ten departments are appointed
by the board of supervisors and not the CEO, who they technically report to on the chart and thus
further confuses executive authority. To make matters more needlessly convoluted, each top-
level position in the organizational chart, outside of the directly elected departments, can
ultimately be hired, fired or have its reporting responsibility redirected to the board of
supervisors without the ability of the CEO to effectively push back, other than to resign, as was
the case with William Popejoy and Jan Mittermeier, among other Orange County CEOs.
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The Orange County charter blandly and bluntly, without a hint of context or rationale,
describes its governance model in sections 101 and 202, as listed below:
101. Governing Body
The governing body of the county is a Board of Supervisors of five (5) members elected
by and from designated supervisorial districts (Orange County Charter,
http://ocgov.com/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=4492, p. 2).
202. General Law Governs
Except as expressly set forth in this charter, the general law set forth in the Constitution
of the State of California and the laws of the State of California shall govern the
operations of the County of Orange (Orange County Charter,
http://ocgov.com/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=4492, p. 3).
By stark contrast, Wayne and Oakland County executive officers have full protection to operate
the executive/administrative functions without the detrimental interference that has historically
and dramatically plagued the Orange County CEO/CAO position and functional operation. The
Wayne County charter provides the much needed context and rationale throughout the document,
and a critical statement of its commitment to the establishment of co-equal branches, including a
strong executive, is found in section 3.118, Non-Interference in Administrative Affairs. After the
establishment of a true separation of powers, the introduction of a similar clause in Orange
County would be a monumental step toward curing the ills of county executive fragmentation.
The presence of charter language and code is critical, but as Montesquieu would note,
only power checks power. While section 3.118 provides a strong statement and warning to the
legislative branch in Wayne County to stay out of administrative affairs, it is more so a
supporting document to the real protection of executive authority; the establishment of an elected
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executive versus an appointed CEO/CAO with the same powers in theory, but not practice. It is
important to reiterate the CRC analysis of Wayne County’s charter by Sinclair Powell:
“…advantages cited for the county executive approach stem largely from the directly-elected
nature of the position” (Wayne County Charter Issues…Elected County Executive/Chief
Administrative Officer, p. 5). Whether described by Montesquieu, Madison or in modern times
by Cigler, no one can expect a true separation of power or meaningful checks and balances if the
top executive, as well as their own staff, are ultimately hired and subject to discipline or
termination by a governing body they ultimately serve.
In Orange County, each board member is elected from very large and unique
constituencies. However, no one at the County of Orange is elected with the established
responsibility to govern the county as a whole and is at the same time answerable to the
electorate as a whole. For example, Orange County’s first district supervisor directly represents
one of the largest supervisorial districts in America with more than 650,000 residents in four
cities. This single responsibility, in acting as a representative voice for constituents, is nearly the
magnitude, in overall size, to the state of Alaska that has less than 750,000 total residents.
However, the first district supervisor is only elected from a cross-section of four of Orange
County’s thirty-four cities. An elected Orange County CEO would be elected from an overall
population of 3.2 million residents and thirty-four cities and numerous city-sized county
unincorporated areas. This individual, by virtue of size and diversity of the overall electorate,
could act as the collective voice for Orange County, in a way that Orange County and no other
true California county has ever experienced. Again, it is important to restate another key
analysis point made by the CRC and Sinclair Powell in 1981 regarding an elected CEO:
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…an elected chief executive should be highly responsive to public opinion, since
he or she must face the voters at the next election; that such an official can be and
usually is a strong political leader as well as an administrator and thus can help
reconcile the diverse views found among the citizens of an urban county. (Wayne
County Charter Issues…Elected County Executive/Chief Administrative Officer,
p. 5)
As noted by Sinclair, it was important for Wayne County in 1981, with a population of more
than two million, to recognize the critical need to have a position within county government that
could legitimately work to “reconcile the diverse views found among the citizens of an urban
county.” This same rationale should be applied to Orange County. Only the power of a
countywide elected CEO that cannot be summarily fired or stripped of power, could hope to
provide a check to the county board of supervisors and thus end Orange County’s well-
documented history of executive fragmentation between the board of supervisors and CEO’s
office.
It is important to note that while the election of a countywide CEO would greatly
diminish, if not effectively end the war of executive fragmentation between the CEO’s office and
the board of supervisors, it would not cure the issues of executive fragmentation stemming from
countywide elected department heads such as the sheriff and district attorney. Whether there is a
real need to elect county row officers is another complex point of analysis for county governance
researchers and is not the focus of this research. However, considering Montesquieu’s theory of
needing power to check power, establishment of an elected CEO position, charged with
oversight of the entire county operation, would be the first formidable and legitimate balance
against rogue row officers, such as Orange County’s former Treasurer Bob Citron and Sheriff
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Mike Corona. The CEO’s countywide electoral mandate and political standing alone would
place his or her voice in an effective position to denounce or mitigate row officer corruption far
more effectively than a supervisor who in truth only represents one-fifth of the county.
3. Effective Governance: Council-Executive introduces meaningful regional leadership and
countywide accountability for countywide operations.
The larger a governmental jurisdiction, the more likely it will need to influence regional
affairs and be able to respond with one trusted and impactful voice in times of crisis. In the
federal and state governments, and in large American cities, there is not confusion, debate, or
lack of awareness over what role or position should be leading or speaking on behalf of the
whole on broad policy matters or in a time of crisis. When crisis occurs on a national or global
level, Americans expect to hear from the President of the United States, at the state level they
expect to hear from their respective governor, in New York, Los Angeles and Chicago they
expect to hear from the mayor. The common thread between each example and at each level of
government is an elected executive. A single, legitimate, and recognized voice is useful when
leading on issues that cross jurisdictional lines or during times of crisis. The public wants to
know who is leading and who is to be held responsible if the need arises.
Elected executives in major American counties serve the same role for their respective
jurisdictions, as does the President, a governor or big city mayor. During the recent public health
crisis related to Ebola patients in Dallas County, Texas, it was not the mayor of Dallas or the
governor of Texas that assumed the lead role in responding to public concern and providing
information related to a course of action, it was the Dallas County Judge Clay Jenkins. As
described earlier in this paper, the position of a countywide elected executive has a variety of
different official titles across America, though many of their executive responsibilities are
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similar. In Texas, the position is titled “judge” and is not to be mistaken in anyway with the
traditional judicial branch role. During the three confirmed cases in Dallas, it was Clay Jenkins
providing weekly and sometimes daily updates to print, radio, and television news outlets. As
the head of the Dallas County executive branch, Clay Jenkins is directly responsible for all
emergency and crisis preparation and response. The responsibility is clearly noted and easy to
find on the Dallas County website:
As the chief-elected official of the county, Judge Jenkins is also responsible for the
Homeland Security and Emergency Management Department that provides around the clock
staff to protect Dallas County citizens through coordinated security and emergency-
management resources with regional and national partners. (Dallas County, Dallas County
Commissioners Court, retrieved from
http://www.dallascounty.org/department/comcrt/cjenkins.php)
While the ceremonial rotation of the Orange County board of supervisors provides the County
with a chairman and vice-chair on an annual basis, when a crisis occurs, there is a one-in-five
chance that it will not be in their district. If placed out in front of the residents via the media, it is
likely that those in most need of reassurance will be hearing from a person they have never heard
of nor voted for. This problem is only magnified with an appointed executive, who the public
will have little knowledge of, or understand what they are responsible for.
Another critical role for a chief executive is setting a strategic direction. Countywide
public policy issues and the need to work collaboratively with other counties, as well as at the
state and federal level, are important examples. This is another area of significant turmoil for
Orange County over the years. The example of the Oakland County executive making
appointments to critical regional boards such as the GLWA are not part of the repertoire of an
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Orange County or California county executive. Again, this same issue was analyzed and
referenced in the CRC analysis of the Wayne County charter as well: “…establishment of the
elected executive position focuses on one individual an image of high prestige and leadership
which could be of substantial value in dealing with outside interests and higher levels of
government” (Wayne County Charter Issues…Elected County Executive/Chief Administrative
Officer, p. 5).
4. Government Closer to Home: Council-Executive establishes a more clearly defined
legislative branch and an enhanced version of representative democracy, a critical tenet
of American government.
The application of this research has primarily focused on an effort to shed light on the
inherent flaws in California’s outdated county governance structure, as it relates to the executive
function. That focus has been specific to the lack of structural change to the all-powerful
governing body of five supervisors, which provides none of the protections associated with the
doctrine of separation of powers or checks and balances between branches of government.
However, it bears important mention that the potential benefits that the council-executive model
would have on the executive branch, would also extend to the legislative branch. The Wayne
County charter and the context provided in the compiler’s comments make this point clear: “it is
also important to note that the County Commission is vested with ALL legislative authority and
not with more limited powers” (Compiler’s Comments, Home Rule Charter for the County of
Wayne, p. 9). A clearer definition and protection of the executive role, which is the goal of this
research, also provides the legislative branch with a set of clear and protected powers and
responsibilities that the executive cannot infringe upon. While the enumerated set of powers can
vary in subtle and not-so-subtle ways from government to government, there are a few important
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powers that tend to be vested in the legislative branch that make them a powerful check to
executive power. One common but important example of this is the power to appropriate funds.
While the executive may have the power to set a strategic direction or implement a program, it
will have little effectiveness if the legislative branch should decide to withhold funding.
Another potential benefit, especially in Orange County and California’s other massive
counties, would be the opportunity to expand the board numerically. With an eye toward
decreasing the number of constituents per supervisor and increasing the ability to be responsive,
California county supervisors could be far more effective in directly interfacing with the public.
As noted in Table 3 of Chapter One, at least half of the states and their respective counties utilize
an incredibly wide range of sizes for their governing boards. Some of the largest were county
legislative branches featuring governing boards with 26, 29, 38, and 40 members. California
counties already have the ability to change their board’s numerical composition, but no county
has ventured to alter the historic five-member arrangement. Remember, a Los Angeles County
supervisor represents more than 2.5 million people and a supervisor from either Orange or San
Diego counties has more than 620,000 residents per district. To borrow Wayne County’s model
of fifteen (15) commissioners for Orange County, would reduce the number of residents served
per supervisor to approximately 206,000.
For Orange County and California’s largest counties, it defies logic to use a governance
structure with only five members for counties that count their populations in the millions. This
specific issue deserves even greater analysis and is an opportunity for future research, but I felt it
was important to highlight here as well, especially with this research showing (Table 3) that
twenty-six states allow some form of directly elected executive in their counties, and also use a
wide variety of sizes for their legislative governing board composition.
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5. Understanding Government: Council-Executive can promote greater visibility and
understanding of county government issues and operations.
A last but important benefit would be to raise the public awareness and understanding of
county government operation in California. In Michigan and other states, county executive
political campaigns attract a wide range of candidates, many of whom are willing to jeopardize
their current electoral post for an opportunity to serve as an elected county executive. The 2014
race for Wayne County CEO featured a field of eleven candidates attempting to unseat the
incumbent Robert Ficano. The field of challengers included the mayor of Wayne County’s fifth
largest city (Westland), an elected member of the Michigan House of Representatives, an elected
Wayne County Commissioner and the former elected Wayne County Sheriff, among others.
Ultimately, voters selected a new Wayne County CEO, as Robert Ficano had been embattled
with charges of corruption and mismanagement.
Former Wayne County Sherriff Warren Evans became the county’s first African-
American CEO and won overwhelmingly. Ficano was seeking his fourth term in office and had
become a political fixture, but in high-profile campaigns like those for county CEO in large,
urban counties, both the voters and media paid great attention and resulted in Ficano failing to
advance to the general election. By contrast, the down ticket supervisor races in California
counties do not often draw large or competitive fields unless the seat becomes open due to term
limits or resignation. In Orange County, only two incumbent county supervisors (Anthony in
1980 and Coad in 2002) have lost a bid for re-election in nearly four decades. An elected
Orange County CEO would likely be the most recognized public official in the county, and in
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Los Angeles and San Diego counties, an elected CEO would rival their big city mayor
counterparts.
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CHAPTER FIVE: A PATHWAY FOR COUNTY GOVERNANCE REFORM IN
CALIFORNIA
In commencing this research, I was forced to acknowledge that instead of blazing a trail
with the creation of a new and innovative philosophical governance construct for county
government, I would instead become a cheerleader for one of the oldest “good-government”
tools, the doctrine of separation of powers. In my nearly two decades researching and working
with government at all levels, I became more and more concerned about the lack of meaningful
conversation focused on how California’s massive counties operate with basically the same
governance structure in place at their creation. While elsewhere nations, states, numerous other
counties and cities embrace a governance model with a separation of powers, it is absent in
California’s pure county jurisdictions. I have always felt as if an antidote for much of what ails
county government in California was hidden in plain sight, just as CSAC’s website states under
its description of County Structure & Powers: “Unlike the separation of powers that characterize
the federal and state governments, the Board of Supervisors is both the legislative and the
executive authority of the county. It also has quasi-judicial authorities” (CSAC, County
Structure & Powers retrieved from http://www.counties.org/general-information/county-
structure-0 on November 28, 2014).
However, the size of California’s largest counties and the complex policy issues they
confront are not at all unlike the federal and state governments. A growing number of California
counties face many of the same multifaceted issues as the federal government and are the same
size or larger than many state governments, in both population and budget. For decades,
counties across America have installed the council-executive model with the express purpose of
creating meaningful checks and balances, to help with efficiency of operation and as a protection
against despotic and arbitrary rule making. While no two counties operate exactly the same way,
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the structures highlighted in Chapter Four and utilized in Michigan’s largest counties, provide a
useful set of applications for Orange County and California’s other massive counties to be
implemented.
Implementation of the Council-Executive Model in California: State or Local?
Los Angeles County had the only meaningful county governance reform effort uncovered
by this research, reflecting an attempt by a pure California county to move from the
commission– administrator model with an appointed CAO, to a council–executive model with an
elected CEO. While Mark Baldassare highlighted the council-executive structure with an elected
CEO as a potential post-bankruptcy fix to Orange County’s plague of executive fragmentation,
no meaningful reform effort was ever undertaken. Clearly, there is not local momentum for
county governance reform and this sentiment was confirmed in an email correspondence with
CSAC’s legislative staff during my research for this paper. California State Association of
Counties staff was unaware of any county governance reform movements on the ballot in the
primary or planned in the general election for 2014 (CSAC Legislative Staff, private
communication, May 15, 2014).
Sonenshein’s 2001 analysis of county reform made a number of important observations
regarding the probability of reform taking root in California. Though his primary focus was
more specific to overall charter reform, i.e. the transition from general law to a charter county,
and not precisely the introduction of the council-executive model for California counties, he felt
successful reform for counties had to come from counties themselves.
It is not feasible for the State of California to chart the direction of county reform. It can
prod, it can encourage, it can frighten, and it can provide incentives. But ultimately, the
decision in these matters requires the development of a constituency within the
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boundaries of each county that will adopt reform…Officials in these counties might be
shocked and stunned by a state mandate to undertake governance reform efforts.
(Sonenshein, 2001, p. 41)
This is an acceptable conclusion for charter adoption, which is and justifiably remains an
intimately local action. A charter is in fact a local constitution and reflects the local values of its
elected leadership and residents. Clearly, there may be vastly different motivations and
philosophies behind charter language from a county in Northern California, from what you might
find in Southern California, or a coastal county juxtaposed against an inland county in the
Mojave for example.
However, governance reform need not take root in a charter movement. Again, four
Michigan counties currently utilize the council-executive model with an elected CEO, two are
charter counties (Wayne and Macomb) and two are general law (Oakland and Bay). As
referenced earlier, Michigan’s Public Act 139 of 1973 established the elected county executive
structure as a valid option for both general law and charter counties to choose as an acceptable
alternative form of government. A Michigan county is not first required to pass a charter to
choose a council-executive structure. Both Oakland and Bay established their elected executive
structure as general law counties through Public Act 139. This is an example of a state simply
providing additional governance options that are easier to access for a county that senses the
need for governance reform, but does not want to go through the charter adoption process that
can be difficult and highly politicized. This highly politicized environment is what killed
numerous attempts at governance reform in Los Angeles County and sapped the momentum for
meaningful reform in Orange County after the bankruptcy. Sonenshein (2001) does make note
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of the significant obstacles for county governance reform to take root organically at the local
level.
Certainly some of the greatest obstacles to reform can be found within the counties
themselves. Even after states take bold initiatives to encourage reform, the initial burst of
activity tends to subside. Forces within the county political environment – whether row
officers, or government employee unions, or county supervisors – fall back into the
lethargic acceptance of a comfortable status quo that is the mortal enemy of reform. It
becomes difficult to propose reforms in the face of such resistance, whether active or
passive (Sonenshein, 2001, p. 41).
The local obstacles to reform identified by Sonenshein’s analysis are amplified to a greater
degree in California’s massive counties, where the political environments can easily devour
efforts to try something new, especially something that no other California county has
implemented. California has nine (9) counties with at least one million residents and five (5)
with more than two million as highlighted in Table 2 of Chapter One. The political
environments in these counties are just as complex as those of states, but command far less
media coverage and interest from the general public. This allows issues to fester and go
unnoticed until the system breaks down, as has happened in Orange County. It harkens back to
counties being described by researchers as the “forgotten” layer of government. The lack of
meaningful reform in Orange County is best described by a portion of Sonenshein’s observation
that a common, but powerful obstacle to reform is simply, “…lethargic acceptance of a
comfortable status quo…” (Sonenshein, 2001, p. 41). History has shown that even a massive
bankruptcy, widespread political corruption and an influx of millions of residents have failed to
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lead to successful reform efforts. Clearly, meaningful reform must come from the State of
California.
Conclusion: State Mandated Governance Reform is Required
Locally Inspired Governance Reform for California’s Largest Counties is Unlikely and
Impractical…
The lethal cocktail of massive size, complex political environments, and acceptance of
the status quo has made California’s largest counties reform resistant organisms. To this point,
meaningful governance reform for California’s largest counties would need to come from the
state level. There are states that have some form of a mandate for the governance structure/s to
be used by their respective counties and some require all their counties to have an elected
executive. This is true in Alaska (boroughs/county equivalents), Arkansas, Kentucky, and
Tennessee. However, most states that have counties with an elected executive only use the
council-executive model in a handful of their respective counties. Two exceptions are Maryland
(9 out of 24) and New York (19 out of 58) where one-third of all their respective counties utilize
the council-executive model and elect at-large chief executive.
The State of California has a vested interest in efficient county operation, as they are
ultimately creatures of the state. County government in California takes its current form and
authority from Article 11 (Local Government) of the California Constitution and the very first
sentence of Section 1 leaves no confusion as to a county’s status vis-a-vis the state. “The State is
divided into counties which are legal subdivisions of the State” (California Constitution, Article
11 Local Government, Sec. 1 (a)).
However, as discussed earlier in this research, even with a county’s clear role as an
administrative arm of the state, California does allow home rule and describes the process for a
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county to adopt a charter under Sec. 4 of Article 11 of the California Constitution. There are
three particular areas in Sec. 4 that form the basis for the past attempts in Los Angeles County
and conversations in Orange County to adopt a strong elected executive model. The first clearly
allows a charter county to adopt a model that includes a governing body with a member elected
at-large: “A governing body of 5 or more members, elected (1) by district or, (2) at large, or (3)
at large, with a requirement that they reside in a district” (California Constitution, Article 11
Local Government, Sec. 4 (a)).
Not only does this century old passage allow for an at-large elected official in the
governing body, but also allows for a governing body to expand beyond five members.
However, still today, no charter county has used this section to reform its governance model by
electing an official from the entire electorate who is then able to speak effectively for the
collective voice and/or by expanding the governing board to reflect the dramatic population
gains that most California counties have experienced.
Another section speaks to a charter county’s ability to have “other” elected officers along
with those mandated by the state to all counties, regardless of status as general law or home rule.
It states that a charter shall provide for: “An elected sheriff , an elected district attorney, an
elected assessor, other officers, their election or appointment, compensations, terms and
removal” (California Constitution, Article 11 Local Government, Sec. 4 (c)).
Finally, charter counties can craft new and/or assign existing powers and duties in a
charter: “The powers and duties of governing bodies and all other county officers, and for the
consolidation and segregation of county officers, and for the manner of filling all vacancies
occurring therein” (California Constitution, Article 11 Local Government, Sec. 4 (e)).
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The evidence is clear, California counties have the power to enact meaningful
governance reforms, but simply have not done so. Whether the failed attempts at reform in Los
Angeles and the fruitless analysis of the council-executive model in Orange County died because
of political pushback or lethargic leadership, there is constitutional authority granted to a county
to alter/amend its governance model. This reality speaks to the low probability that momentum
for significant governance reform can take root locally, especially after more than a century of a
stagnant governance status quo.
A State Legislative Solution Makes Most Sense…
The California Legislature has the power and authority to help shape the governance
models of their local administrative arms. However, difficult public policy problems like county
governance reform can take years to solve. In many cases, legislative solutions are a battle of
attrition and patience with the same piece of legislation simply reintroduced year-after-year and
session-after-session, until the right political climate or amendments allow it to move forward.
Many of California’s best (and worst) policy ideas festered in legislative purgatory for years,
before ultimately securing the necessary votes and all-important Governor’s signature. So after
nearly a century of county governance stagnation, it is time to introduce a legislative solution to
provide counties with additional governance options described in statute and to direct counties
with the most antiquated or overly simplistic models to reform. Another beneficial outgrowth of
commencing with a legislative solution for counties is that even a poorly drafted piece of
legislation tends to bring interested parties to the proverbial table to discuss the topic; and with
regard to county governance reform even conversation would be an improvement. The first
challenge is to find legislative leaders to take on the effort. County governance reform is not the
type of issue that governors or aspiring state senators and assembly members tend to promote as
161
a central theme at their campaign kick-off. However, the California Legislature consistently has
a number of former county supervisors serving in its ranks, so relying on members with
important institutional knowledge of county operations would be helpful in crafting a legislative
vehicle aimed at meaningful reform. Again, it is important to turn to the California Constitution
that clearly proclaims the power of the California Legislature over how a county operates and
power it can exert: “The Legislature shall provide for county powers…an elected governing
body in each county…The Legislature or the governing body may provide for other officers…”
(California Constitution, Article 11 Local Government, Sec. 1 (b)).
Orange County in particular, has consistently sent county supervisors to the legislature
and vice versa, as described in Table 15 below:
Table 15
Recent Orange County Supervisors with Service in California Legislature
Name County Office County Tenure Legislative Office
Marian Bergeson
Jim Silva
William “Bill” Campbell
5
th
District Sup.
2
nd
District Sup.
3
rd
District Sup.
1994-1996
1995-1996
2003-2013
Assembly & Senate
(1978-1995)
Assembly
(2006-2012)
Assembly
(1996-2002)
Chris Norby
4
th
District Sup. 2003-2010 Assembly
(2010-2012)
Todd Spitzer 3
rd
District Sup. 1996-2002 &
2012-Current
Assembly
(2002-2008)
Lou Correa
1
st
District Sup. 2004-2006 Assembly & Senate
(1998-2004 &
2006-2014)
Pat Bates
5
th
District Sup. 2007-2014 Assembly & Senate
(1998-2004 &
2014–Current)
Janet Nguyen 1
st
District Sup. 2007-2014 Senate
(2014-Current)
Sources: Orange County Clerk-Recorder’s Office, Orange County Archives. Information related
to name, title and tenure retrieved from
http://ocarchives.com/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=25981 on December 6, 2014.
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Recommendation #1:
Incentivize and promote change by establishing the council-executive model in California
Government Code as a valid governance option for use by all counties.
Just as the current status quo makes little sense with counties of all shapes and sizes
utilizing nearly identical governance structures, neither would a mandate that ignores county
diversity. I have never been a proponent of top-down legislative mandates. I believe
government should first look to provide incentives, before more forceful tactics are employed.
To this end, the California Legislature should move to draft legislation that first memorializes,
with specific language, the benefits of county governance structures with a clearly defined
separation of powers between a county’s executive and legislative operation. This action would
define the general powers and responsibilities of an elected county executive and establish it in
government code, similar to Michigan’s Public Act 139, discussed in Chapter Four, and
specifically MCL section 45.558 (sub-section 8). This first legislative act would not amount to a
mandate, but more a proclamation by the State of California, that the council-executive model is
a valid and accepted governance model for counties. Not only is this not a mandate, but it would
officially allow general law counties to adopt the council-executive model without first creating
a charter, just as Michigan’s Oakland and Bay counties have instituted the council-executive
model, structured with a strong chief executive elected at-large. Sonenshein and others have
noted how difficult full-blown charter reform can be at the local level and this option, if
promoted by the State of California, would allow counties to adapt their model without the
significant obstacles associated with charter reform. This option would be available to all
California counties large and small.
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California Government Code already provides this state endorsed, menu styled flexibility
for city government. Beginning with Chapter 4 of Title 4 (sections 34851-34906), California
Government Code provides cities with three separate articles of “Alternative Forms of
Government” from which to choose their governance structure. Therefore, this first step would
establish a similar, but now absent, section titled “Alternative Forms of Government” in Title 3
allowing counties to choose their governance model, and council-executive would be listed next
to the pure commission and commission-administrator models as valid options available to all
counties.
Recommendation #2:
Mandate California’s largest counties to reform.
As mentioned earlier, I am not a fan of mandates. However, if a century of stagnation,
endless scandal and massive population gains have not inspired meaningful self-reflection for
California’s largest counties, it is time to force the discussion. The lack of a single example of
the council-executive model, separation of powers, checks and balances or a chief executive
elected at-large in any of California’s pure county governmental jurisdictions, simply defies
logic and principles of good governance for fair representation of county residents. This is a
failure of both the State of California and California’s largest counties. While many states have
large and small counties with an elected executive, this research has shown that America’s
largest states, by-and-large, have their largest counties with elected executives and thus a
structure with a true separation of powers.
Therefore, the California Legislature in a second action should mandate that all
California counties with at least one million residents should have the following:
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1. A clearly defined set of separate and protected authorities for executive and legislative
branches of county government.
2. A county executive officer elected at-large.
3. A numerically expanded board of supervisors with:
o A maximum cap for the number of residents in each district, and
o A minimum county population level for requiring board expansion.
Based on the population statistics from the 2010 Census and shown in Table 2 of Chapter One,
California has nine (9) counties with a population of more than one million. Therefore, this new
mandate would currently apply to the following counties listed in Table 16.
Table 16
California counties with at least one million in population
County 2010 Population
Los Angeles County 9,818,605
San Diego County 3,095,313
Orange County 3,010,232
Riverside County 2,189,641
San Bernardino County 2,035,210
Santa Clara County 1,781,642
Alameda County 1,510,271
Sacramento County 1,418,788
Contra Costa County 1,049,025
Note. The source of this data is the United States Census Bureau’s website, State and County
QuickFacts, retrieved from http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html on December 6,
2014.
Even though the State of California is ignoring governance reform for counties, it is in
fact tracking population growth projections for each of its counties. Future population growth
for California’s largest counties is not projected to shift elsewhere, but instead, is likely to
concentrate even a greater proportion of California’s total population where it resides today.
This information is highlighted in the January, 2013 press release titled, New Population
Projections: California to Surpass 50 Million in 2049 by the California Department of Finance:
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By 2060, California will have 13 counties of one million or more, with eight of those
with 2 million or more residents. Six of the counties with at least one million will be
inland counties. The four new counties reaching one million will be Fresno, Kern, San
Joaquin, and Ventura…Southern California will lead the State’s growth over the next 50
years (2010 to 2060) growing by 8.3 million to 31 million in population. For this report,
in the interest of geographic simplicity, Southern California includes San Luis Obispo,
Santa Barbara, Kern, San Bernardino, Ventura, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San
Diego and Imperial counties (Palmer, H.D., California Department of Finance, January
31, 2013 Press Release, p. 1, 3).
The population map provided in Figure 17 clearly illustrates that California’s mega counties of
today (2014) are largely where population gains will continue in the future. The addition of 8.3
million new residents is the equivalent of transporting the entire population of the State of
Virginia and dropping them in a handful of California’s largest counties. These projections only
add to the urgency of commencing meaningful county governance reform today.
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Figure 17. California Projected Population Growth 2010-2060, Numeric Growth. Retrieved
from http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/demographic/reports/projections/P-
1/documents/Projections_Press_Release_2010-2060.pdf on December 9, 2014.
167
The analysis in this paper has primarily focused on both the creation of an elected CEO
and the importance of separation of powers. However, after establishing the position of an at-
large elected CEO and separation of powers, these mega-counties will require an expanded
legislative branch for better representation of their growing populations. In crafting legislative
language for the expansion, the California Legislature could look to its own legislative districts
as a guide for reshaping the county’s governing body, its board of supervisors.
In 2014, a California state senator represented a district with an average population of
931,349 and a state assembly district includes roughly half that amount at 465,674 (retrieved
from http://senate.ca.gov/senators). There are fifty-three (53) congressional districts in
California, and with the state’s population rising well above 38 million residents, congressional
districts now encompass approximately 700,000 residents each. Given those figures, it makes
sense for California’s largest counties (today and into the future) to have supervisorial districts
no larger than the smallest of those jurisdictions, an assembly district. Even today, the impact
would be dramatic, especially for Los Angeles County where the board size would rise to
approximately twenty-one (21) members and reduce the ratio of constituents per supervisor from
1,963,721 today, to approximately 465,500. A Los Angeles County board of 21 members would
not be out of place in comparison to large counties in other states, as has been highlighted in this
research. Oakland County, Michigan currently utilizes a 21-member legislative body.
Furthermore, establishing standards for board size to be tied to a specific numerical cap in state
code, removes a large portion of the political consternation associated with reform efforts.
Therefore, the first component of the board expansion mandate would be to establish a maximum
allowable district population size:
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Establishment of a maximum numerical ceiling for county district population, to be tied
to the size of a state assembly district (465,674).
To be clear, this is a not-to-exceed number and counties can adjust their board sizes accordingly,
but must have enough evenly proportional districts all at or under the maximum allowable
residential total. Today, this maximum would only be needed in California’s three largest
counties of Los Angeles, San Diego, and Orange; however, the growth projections in Figure 17
show that three additional counties, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Santa Clara, are likely to hit
this maximum ceiling in the not too distant future.
A second component of the mandate for board expansion would be to establish a minimum
population level, at which time a county must consider and adopt an expanded board of
supervisors. This floor should be for counties with at least one million in total population.
All California counties with more than one million residents and a five-member board of
supervisors must place a ballot measure before the voters of that county with at least two
options to expand the legislative branch proportionally beyond five members.
Again, clarification is important. These counties, of at least one million, are required to expand
beyond a five-member legislative body. The local board of supervisors will be required to
undertake an analysis of at least two board expansion options, but no more than four, such as an
expansion to seven or nine members. The county must then place a proposal on the ballot for the
voters of that county to decide at the next general election. Establishment of maximum
population criteria for counties forces each county to prepare for population change, analyze its
impacts on governance, and communicate these issues with the electorate. In truth, these
mandates for governance reform only mandate discussion, analysis, and action, but leave the
ultimate details and most important decision making to the elected officials and voters.
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The Action Plan: A Summary of Benefits, Conclusions, and Recommendations
This research has revealed that the council-executive structure, with an elected county
executive, is a legitimate and widely accepted governance structure in America’s largest states
and counties. Both the complete absence of its use among California’s pure county jurisdictions
and the lack of discussion on reform, either in Sacramento or locally, is a troubling reminder of
how difficult it is to commence, sustain, and complete meaningful governance reform in a
massive state, with massive counties. Further, the lack of traditional separation of powers and
the requisite benefit of checks and balances is a critical reason for the State of California to act
and force the reform discussion.
The analysis of the State of Michigan’s use of the council-executive model provides
California lawmakers and county leaders with a useful and real world template to build upon
important past county governance critiques, like those made by Cigler, Baldassare and
Sonenshein and reviewed in this paper. The five (5) beneficial applications identified for Orange
County in Chapter Four would also benefit California’s other massive counties. Again, the five
benefits of utilizing the council-executive model with an elected county CEO are that it:
1. establishes a true separation of powers;
2. helps to eliminate executive fragmentation;
3. introduces meaningful regional leadership and countywide accountability for county
operations;
4. establishes a more clearly defined legislative branch and an enhanced version of
representative democracy; and
5. promotes greater visibility, transparency, and understanding of county government issues
and operation.
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The research and analysis in this paper clearly illustrate that California’s counties currently
have the ability to embrace these common sense and beneficial reforms via the charter process,
however after more than a century since the State of California allowed home rule for its
counties, none have been willing or able to implement these meaningful reforms. The reasons
for lack of reform vary from Sonenshein’s “lethargic acceptance of the status quo” to the
complex political environments found in California’s largest counties. To this point, this paper
makes two conclusions that serve as the basis for intervention by the State of California:
1. Locally inspired county governance reform has proven unlikely and/or impractical.
2. County governance reform must emanate from the State of California, down to the
counties, their administrative arms.
Therefore, with population projections for California’s largest counties showing drastic
increases, it is time for the State of California to step in, to first provide additional flexibility and
incentivize and then mandate county governance reform. This paper makes two legislative
recommendations to begin the effort of accomplishing meaningful county governance reform:
1. Incentivize and promote change by establishing the council-executive model as an option
in California Government Code.
2. Mandate California counties of more than one million to reform and adopt the council-
executive model with a county executive elected at-large and expanded legislative
branch.
Finally, any major county governance reform effort in California would benefit from an
endorsement by the California State Association of Counties (CSAC). Mentioned frequently
throughout this research, CSAC is undoubtedly the most important and respected voice on
county-related policy matters under consideration by the California Legislature. CSAC is a
171
sophisticated advocacy organization, led by a sixty-two member board of directors, which
includes a county supervisor from all fifty-eight California counties, as well as a four-member
group of county supervisors who act as executive officers to the board of directors (i.e. board
president) and thus provide a select number of counties with two CSAC representatives.
California State Association of Counties utilizes a system of caucuses and policy committees
that, with the assistance of highly capable professional staff, undertake the majority of policy and
issue analyses. The caucuses divide the counties into urban, suburban, and rural counties for
matters unique to their specific demographic description. It is unclear at this time just how
CSAC would choose to address and analyze the recommendations made in this research.
Specifically, would the mandate for counties with more than a million in population to adopt a
governance structure with an elected CEO and expanded board only be considered by the urban
caucus, which is exclusively comprised of California’s largest counties, though not all with
populations currently in excess of one million (Ventura and San Mateo counties)? Or would the
recommended change in California Government Code related to adding the council-executive
structure as a governance option for all counties convince CSAC’s large board to provide a
recommendation borne of its collective membership, regardless of whether they are large, small,
urban, suburban or rural in nature? Nonetheless, CSAC’s opinion on these reform ideas would
be the most critical factor in whether they could ultimately win approval in the legislature.
However, as has been noted before in this research, legislative and reform efforts do not typically
find success in the first attempt. Therefore, even consideration and analysis of reform ideas by
CSAC and the resulting policy dialogue would be a victory in relation to the silence that exists
today.
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Concluding Remarks
The legislative recommendations made in this chapter are intended to be a framework for
state legislators and county leaders to build upon in an effort to achieve meaningful governance
reform. However, far greater detail and analysis will need to be included in the eventual
legislative vehicle. My hope is that simply the start of reform talk in Sacramento will inspire
charter counties to shake off their lethargic nature and construct meaningful governance reform
so the State of California has a local example to point to, rather than only out-of-state examples,
like the analysis of Michigan used in this research.
An example of an area that will demand greater analysis and future research is the area of
expanding the legislative branch or today’s board of supervisors. While population has increased
historically and looks to continue in the future, board expansion, for purposes of this research,
was more so a critical component of the larger discussion of the absence of the council-
executive/elected CEO in California. My recommendation related to a maximum threshold is an
important starting point; however, it will need greater research in the process of policymaking by
the California Legislative Analyst’s Office, CSAC, and the National Association of Counties.
The introduction of California’s first threshold for maximum supervisorial district size would be
the actual achievement, and I acknowledge that the ceiling may need to be amended during the
analysis that accompanies policy making.
A second example of future research needed pertains to the role/need of row officers in
California, due to the limitation they pose on the council-executive model’s beneficial impact in
reducing executive fragmentation. Row officers still present a problem for both executive and
political fragmentation. Many states have taken up efforts directly focused on reforming and in
173
some cases eliminating row officers all-together. This is a worthwhile study for California and is
not addressed in the detail it deserves in this research.
174
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Abstract (if available)
Abstract
This research analyzes the introduction of the council‐executive governance model, with an elected chief executive officer (CEO), in California’s largest counties. This model is absent in all of California’s traditional county governments, excluding only the city/county consolidation of San Francisco, but a widely accepted governance model elsewhere, including twenty‐six states, eight of the ten largest by population, and in numerous counties nationwide. This includes more than one‐third of the most populous counties in the nation, who utilize the council‐executive model because of its underlying principle of separation of powers with checks and balances between branches of government. The goal of this research is to reignite the county reform discussion in California. It builds upon the past research and recommendations by first identifying the major issues that challenge California and its largest counties, including their ability to serve their massive, dense, and diverse populations effectively with a governance structure that has largely gone unchanged for nearly a century. Second, it examines the use of the council‐executive model with an elected CEO throughout nation, but particularly in America’s largest states and counties, to provide more than a call to action, but a template for reform. Through gathering data on where the elected CEO is in use, as well as the reasons for its use, this research highlights California’s antiquated county governance structure and the critical need for a new era of county governance reform in the Golden State.
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Asset Metadata
Creator
McCusker, Justin James
(author)
Core Title
County governance reform in California: introduction of the council‐executive model and the elected county‐executive
School
School of Policy, Planning and Development
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Doctor of Policy, Planning & Development
Degree Program
Policy, Planning, and Development
Publication Date
04/13/2015
Defense Date
03/03/2015
Publisher
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(original),
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(digital)
Tag
council‐executive model,counties,elected county executive,executive fragmentation,governance reform,OAI-PMH Harvest,separation of powers
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Electronically uploaded by the author
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Robertson, Peter John (
committee chair
), Boarnet, Marlon (
committee member
), Natoli, Deborah (
committee member
)
Creator Email
jwarrior8@cox.net,mccusker@usc.edu
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Tags
council‐executive model
counties
elected county executive
executive fragmentation
governance reform
separation of powers