University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

The Japanese mainstream media in the Sino-Japanese rapprochement, 1964--1972

(USC Thesis Other)

The Japanese mainstream media in the Sino-Japanese rapprochement, 1964--1972

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content THE JAPANESE MAINSTREAM MEDIA IN
THE SINO-JAPANESE RAPPROCHEMENT, 1964-1972
by
Zhen Wang
A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVESITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(EAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES)
August 2004
Copyright 2004 Zhen Wang
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: 1422421
INFORMATION TO USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
®
UMI
UMI Microform 1422421
Copyright 2004 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Professor Gordon Berger, Director of East Asian Studies
Center for his guidance and encouragement, without which I could not have
completed the thesis. It was my greatest honor to study Japanese history under his
guidance at USC. Words cannot adequately express my deep gratitude to him. I am
also profoundly grateful to Professor Stanley Rosen of the Political Science
Department for his valuable comments and unfailing interest in my work. It was
my privilege to work with him as a student, teaching assistant and research
assistant. I must express my gratitude to Professor Eugene Cooper of the
Anthropology Department, Ms. Yuka Kumagai (Japanese language instructor) and
Mr. David Rands (Ph.D. candidate in Japanese history) for their help,
encouragement and interest in my work.
I should also like to acknowledge the aid and encouragement given to me by
Mr. Sam Jameson, veteran j oumalist and Columnist for The Japan Times, and
former Tokyo Bureau Chief for The Los Angeles Times, for providing me
invaluable sources and for sharing his insights with me. My heartfelt thanks also go
to my friends, including Rachel Cosijns Plump and Shogo Suzuki, for their interest
and guidance at the earlier stage of my thesis. Especially, I should register my
deepest gratitude to my senior friend, Professor Yue-Him Tam of Macalester
College, for his generous mentoring and support throughout my graduate studies,
also for his editing and various help for my thesis. Last but not least, I should thank
my dearest parents in China for their great love and support.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements............................ . ........ ii
Abstract.............................. v
Introduction......................... 1
Accusation .......................... ..3
Echoes from Abroad...................... .6
Defenders ’ Counterarguments ..................................................... 8
Eastern and Western Observers.............................. 10
The Core o f the Controversy.......................... 14
Japanese Press Culture............................ ..15
Different Journalist Institutions:
U.S vs. Japan............................................... 20
Accusers and Defenders:
Domestic Conflict. ........................................ .27
Content Analysis of Asahi and M ainichi. ...............................34
The Cultural Revolution and the Reporter Expulsion. ..........35
Campaign for Sino-Japanese Rapprochement................ 39
The Portrait of Ordinary Chinese People ................ ....43
Atrocities Recalled. ....................... 46
China’s Regaining of Representation at the U .N .......... 49
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Conclusion...
Bibliography
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the controversy over the alleged bias of the Japanese press
coverage of China from 1966 to 1972. The core of the controversy is whether or
not it was ethical for the Japanese press to “promote” the Sino-Japanese
rapprochement. Much of this thesis consists of content analysis of reports on China
by the two leading Japanese dailies, the Asahi Shimbun and the Mainichi Shimbun.
The main argument is two-fold. First, the Japanese j oumalistic institutions and
journalists’ self-identity were different from their American counterparts. Second,
by looking at the personal background and political affiliation of the accusers and
defenders, it is also found that the debate on the objectivity of the Japanese
reporting of China is in effect a reflection of Japan’s internal conflict over her
changing China policy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1
Introduction
More than one critics have charged that the Japanese press coverage of People’s
Republic of China on the eve of the establishment of Sino-Japanese diplomatic
relations in 1972 was consistently glorifying the developments in China in the late
1960s and early 1970s, and lacking objective, critical reporting. They have accused
the major national dailies such as the Asahi and the Mainichi for being unethical
and unprofessional to the extent that the press was mining the Japanese nation.1
These serious charges affect our understanding of the press culture and the making
of Sino-Japanese relations in post-war Japan. Thus, the primary purpose of this
thesis is to review the posture of the Japanese press towards the PRC when Japan
was pondering what to do with her giant neighbor in the 1960’s and early 1970’s. It
is also my hope to shed light on the relevancy of the charges and the characteristics
of the press culture in modem Japan.
We will first look at the controversial issue of the alleged bias of the Japanese
press in its coverage on China from 1966 to 1972. Criticism and charges from
Japan and overseas in the early 1970s will be examined. The core of the
1 See Miyoshi Osamu and Eto Shinkichi, Chugoku Hodo no Henkoo o tsuku (Denouncing the biased
reports on China: threat to the freedom o f the press) (Tokyo: Nisshin Hod5, 1972); Miyoshi Osamu
and Et5 Shinkichi, Shimbun bokoku ron (The press is ruining the nation) (Tokyo: Jiyu sha, 1972);
Tsuchiya Michio, Hodo wa shinjitsu ka? (Is the reporting trustworthy?) (Tokyo: Kokusho kankokai,
1994), pp. 107-12; Otani Ken, Mondai kiji: aru Asahi Shimbun kasha no kaiko (Problematic
reporting: the memoir o f an Asahi Shimbun reporter) (Tokyo: S5shisha, 1993), pp. 87-136);
Tsujimura Akira, Sengo Nihon no taishu shinri (Mass psychology in post-war Japan) (Tokyo:
Tokyo University Publishing House, 1981), pp. 104-08; C. Y. Kim, Japanese Journalists and Their
World (Virginia: University Press o f Virginia, 1981), pp. 142-59; O. Feldman, Politics and the News
Media in Japan (Ann Arbor: niversity o f Michigan Press, 1993); Ogata Sadako, Normalization with
China: a Comparative Study o f US and Japanese Process (Institute o f East Asian Studies: UC
Berkeley, 1988), p.392; George P. Jan, “Public Opinion’s Growing Influence on Japan’s China
Policy,” in Journalism Quarterly (Spring 1971), pp. 111-119; Chae-Jin. Lee, Japan Faces China:
Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1976), p. 111.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2
controversy is whether or not it was ethical for the Japanese press to attempt to
“promote” Sino-Japanese rapprochement. One side had the affirmative answer.
Tagawa Seiichi, for example, who was involved in the “Sino-Japan reporter
exchange” and served as a pro-Peking Dietman (from Liberal Democratic Party2),
argued that the media was justified in acting as political “catalysts.” The other side,
including the pro-Taiwan faction within the LDP and in the American press,
harshly attacked the “biased” posture of Japan’s major papers in their reporting of
China issues. These critics contended that Japan’s major newspapers’ acceptance of
China’s “three political principles”3 as a condition for dispatching correspondents
to Peking violated “freedom of the press” and “journalistic ethics”.
In order to understand the core of the dispute, and to explain why it arose, it is
useful first to examine the origins of the Japanese press and its journalistic culture
in the Meiji era (1868-1912). We will then discuss the institutions of Japanese
journalism during the first three decades of post-war Japan. Next, I will look at the
personal background and political affiliation of the accusers and defenders. My
main question is two-fold. First, by looking at the Japanese press culture since its
origins we may see that the Japanese journalistic institutions and journalists’ self-
identity were different from their American counterparts. Public notions and
expectations of the press differ from Anglo-American norms to a certain extent. Is
fairness to be served by judging the professional ethics of Japanese journalists from
norms which are not Japanese? Second, by examining the backgrounds of both
2 Japan’s dominant ruling party since 1955
3 “Three political principles” are: not to pursue a hostile policy toward China; not to participate in
any “plot: to create “two Chinas”; and not to obstruct the restoration o f Japan-China diplomatic
relations.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3
those who were accusers and those who were defenders, we hope to gauge how
much of the controversy were simply a reflection of Japan’s domestic political
conflict over her China policy, and of the power struggle between pro-Taiwan and
pro-PRC factions within the Liberal Democratic Party.
Much of the presentation here consists of content analysis4 of the two largest
national dailies, the Asahi Shimbun and the Mainichi Shimbun with regard to the
China matters from the late 1960s until the beginning of the 1970s. Specially, we
will focus on the press coverage of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1967~68,
the Japanese portrait of the Chinese people during the Cultural Revolution and the
PRC’s gaining of representation in the United Nations in 1971. Concurrently, I will
try to shed light on the role of the Japanese press in the historical trend towards
Sino-Japanese rapprochement in 1972.
The Accusation
Nine Japanese correspondents took residence in Peking in September 1964.
They included one each from the Kyoto News Agency, the semi-public TV and
radio network NHK, the private TV network TBS and the leading newspapers, the
Asahi, Mainichi, Sankei, Nihon Keizai and Nishi Nippon. In exchange Chinese ,
reporters from the Xinhua News Agency, People’ s Daily, Gongming, Dagong,
Beijing Daily, Wenhui, China News were stationed in Japan. This reporter
4 1 am not doing a formal content analysis, as applied in political science studies. Thus, my analysis
of messages provides only a limited view o f the newspapers. See footnote 67 for the requirements of
more formal content analysis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4
exchange program was carried out through the Liao-Takasaki Trade Office5.
Quickly, Japanese correspondents in Peking gained international prominence, when
their reports of the Cultural Revolution in late 1966 and early 1967 were picked up
and carried by newspapers throughout the world.
In 1972, before the establishment of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, a
heated debate exploded over the favorable posture of major Japanese newspapers
towards China alleged to have persisted since the late 1960s. Critic Miyoshi
Osamu6 , a former Mainichi reporter, stirred up the dispute by his report, “Shimbun
wa koshite pekin ni kuppuku shita” (Here is How Our Papers Yield to Beijing) in
the April 1972 edition of the magazine Keizai Orai. Miyoshi thought that the
biased reports of the Japanese major newspapers on China aimed to generate public
pressure on the Japanese government to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC,
and thus violated the code of professional ethics for a democratic press. His
accusation soon aroused heated debate both at home and abroad on issues of
journalistic ethics and the freedom of the Japanese press.
On April 4, 1972, in the Budget Committee of the House of Councilors,
Tamaoki Waro, Ishiwara Shintaro and other LDP members queried the government
about newspaper reporting concerning the PRC; Prime Minister Sato, Foreign
Minister Fukuda responded. At around the same time, a prospectus entitled
5 In April 1964, along with the L-T (Liao cheng-zhi and Takasaki) Trade Communique, Liao and
Takasaki business offices were set up respectively in Tokyo and Peking. According to the L-T
Trade Communique, the eligible Japanese firms to trade with China should agree with the “three
political principles”— 1. Not to pursue a hostile policy toward China; 2. Not to participate in any
“plot” to create “two Chinas; 3. Not to obstruct the restoration o f Japan-China diplomatic relations.
6 Miyoshi Osamu, bom in 1916, entered the Mainichi Shimbun in 1942; worked as a Washington
correspondent, and editorial writer. He became a chief editorial writer in 1970 and professor in
international relations at Kyoto Sangyo University.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5
“Parliamentarian Group to Preserve the Freedom of the Press” was circulated
among LDP members. Both inquiries in the Budget Committee and the prospectus
charged that Japanese press stories on the PRC were largely biased. Judging from
their contents, it seems that these assertions relied primarily upon the “Investigation
Report” by Miyoshi Osamu, which was published in the April edition of Bungei
Shunju and Keizai Orai.
In June 1972, Jiyusha (the Liberal Publishing House) published a book entitled
Shimbun bokoku ron (The Press is Ruining the Nation), which included articles by
Miyoshi Osamu and Eto Shinkichi, along with other critics citing “corruption” in
the major Japanese press.7 The book also included a symposium with the same title
as the book, along with a report8 presented by Professor Koyama Kenichi that
bitterly described the Japanese press as “criticizing our own government, and
eulogizing the Communist regime of Peking.”
In July 1972, Miyoshi and Et5 Shinkichi fired a second salvo in their new book
entitled Chugoku hodo no henkd o tsuku: chosa hokoku jiyu na shimbun no kiki
(Denouncing biased reporting from China: Threat to Freedom of the Press). Having
reviewed the newspaper coverage of the 1970-71 period, Eto harshly denounced
Asahfs coverage of China and Japanese-Chinese relations as displaying
manipulation of public opinion and active advocacy. He also pointed out that the
7 In the book, the following articles discussed the “biased” Japanese press towards China matters:
“Kokusai seiji to genron no jiyu” (International politics and the freedom o f speech), by Irie
Michimase; “Shimbun kiji izen no mondai—shuzai no ronri to ronri” (The problem before news
reporting—the ethics and logic for source collecting), by Ogaya Shoz5.
8 The report is entitled “Jiyu na shimbun no jybken” (The principles for a free press).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6
Japanese commentators did not want to buck the strong pro-Peking tide in the
Japanese intellectual community, and thus, few criticisms had been voiced.9
Echoes from Abroad
The charges and dispute within Japan also drew attention from overseas
newspapers such as The Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, and The
Christian Science Monitor. On April 14, 1972, The Los Angeles Times published a
feature report on its front page, entitled “Three Political Principles,” by Sam
Jameson, a LAT correspondent in Tokyo, who was severely critical of the “three
principles” drawn up by Peking that Japan’s major media agreed to abide by as a
price for stationing correspondents in Beijing. He argued that this practice violated
the freedom of the press.
Two days later, on April 16, 1972, the Los Angeles Times published a lead
editorial entitled “Japan’s Press Sells Out.” The editorial read: “A good part of the
Japanese press has voluntarily committed itself to what is in effect a standard of
dishonest reporting and commentary about affairs involving Communist China.” It
condemned the “dishonorable negation of basic professional values” of the
Japanese press for not carrying news or editorials critical of Peking’s politics or
hostile to its interests. “These persons—to call them reporters would no longer be
accurate—file dispatches that are clear of any criticism of Chinese affairs.” “Why
the journalistic sellout?” The Los Angeles Times reasoned “intense competitiveness
and status-consciousness of the Japanese press.” The editorial concluded that the
9 Miyoshi and Et5, pp. 219-24
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7
“bought and sold” of “creditability, integrity, responsibility” of the ally Japan’s
major press was a real cause for concern, not only to the Japanese people but also
Japan’s friends in the world as well.1 0
Thus, the heart of the matter was whether or not the Japanese press’ acceptance
of China’s “three political principles” as a condition for dispatching correspondents
to Peking violated “the freedom of the press” and “journalistic ethics.” The “three
political principles” are: not to pursue a hostile policy toward China; not to
participate in any plot to create “two Chinas”; and not to obstruct the restoration of
normal Japan-China relations. From The Los Angeles Times ’ interpretation of these
rules, the three principles apparently “rule out even any implicit disapproval or
opposition to policies or activities pursued by Peking.”1 1
Likewise, The Christian Science Monitor published a report by Elizabeth Pond,
entitled “The Japanese Press Rapped as Too Timid on Peking,” on April 11, 1972.
Pond quoted some of Eto’s critiques from the Bungei Shunju, accusing Japan’s
major paper of “not having reporters in Taiwan since the late 1960s,” “giving
Taiwan so little coverage,” “reporting blandly on Chinese developments, giving
readers little beyond official Chinese pronouncements,” including “superficial
coverage of Chinese agriculture and housing in comparison with The New York
Times. ” Pond also noted that few voices criticized the Japanese press’ deference to
Peking to the degree that Eto’s book alleged.
1 0 The Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1972
1 1 The Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1972
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8
In the same tone, primarily based on Et5’s criticisms, The New York Times
published one piece by John M. Lee, with the headline “Japan’s Press Attacked for
its Peking Reporting” on May 1, 1972. Lee gave out several possible motives for
“the complaisant attitude” of Japan’s mass media towards China. One was the
highly competitive nature of the Japanese press. “Each newspaper wants its own
man in China. In the absence of diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Peking,
some excuse the press arrangement as the only way to obtain Japanese access to
Chinese news developments.” Some other more complex and psychological
motives were discussed, such as “the ambivalence toward Japan’s right-wing
12
Government” and “an expiation of Japan’s war guilt toward China.”
Defenders’ Counterarguments
In response to the criticisms of Miyoshi and Eto, a pro-China LDP Diet
member Tagawa Seiichi strongly defended the position of the Japanese press in his
article “ Shinjitsu ha magerarenai— nichu kasha kokan he no chusyo ni kotaeru
(The Truth Cannot Be Distorted—Response to the Critics on the Reporter
Exchange Program)” on July 15th 1972. Tagawa’s major counterarguments are as
follows. 1 3
First, the criticism of the lack of press freedom in China, as Miyoshi
stressed in his report, was one-sided and egoistic. In socialist nations such as the
PRC and the Soviet Union, there were more restrictions upon the “freedom of
1 2 The New York Times, May 1, 1972
1 3 For details of the negotiation on reporter exchange, refer to Tagawa, Seiichi. Nichyu koshd hiroku:
Tagawa nikki— 14 nen no shogen (a secret memoir of Sino-Japanese negotiation: diary o f Tagawa—
14 years witness) (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun Publishing House, 1973), pp. 56-58.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9
press” than in the countries of parliamentary democracy. It seems arrogant or
egoistic to charge that the Japanese news media were subjected to unequal
treatment by the Peking Government simply because in China the “freedom of
press” was not guaranteed to the same extent as it is in Japan.1 4
Second, those who criticized Japan’s major newspapers’ favorable posture
towards the PRC were the ones who wished to maintain relations with Taiwan and
to separate Taiwan from the Chinese mainland. “If one takes such a stand, it is no
wonder that he should feel irritated by any press article which attempts to convey
the changes in the world tide as well as the rising tendency toward the restoration
of the Sino-Japanese relations.”1 5
Third, the “three political principles”1 6 and the principle of “not separating
politics from economics,” as the basis for both the L-T Trade Communique (1964)
and the reporter exchange program (1964), were quite natural when there is no
diplomatic relations established between the two nations. “Where on earth would
there be a country that is willing to permit the entry of a correspondent from a
1 4 Miyoshi Osamu and Et5 Shinkichi, Chugoku hodo no henko o tsuku: Chugoku Hodo no Henkoo o
tsuku (Denouncing the Biased Reports on China: Threat to the Freedom of the Press) (Tokyo:
Nisshin h5do, 1972), p. 236
1 5 Ibid., p. 238
1 6 Since the 1950s, Japan’s conservative government’s policy towards China was based on
“separation o f politics from economics”, but holding to this position was becoming increasingly
difficult after 1964, when Peking forced Japanese trading companies and businessmen to take a
more definite political posture. In 1964, along with the L-T Trade Communique, Liao and Takasaki
business offices were set up respectively in Tokyo and Peking in April 1964. According to the L-T
Trade Communique, the eligible Japanese firms to trade with China should agree with the “three
political principles. Also, through the negotiation o f Liao and Takasaki Offices, Japan-China
Reporter Exchange was carried out in June 1964, based on the same condition o f the “three political
principles” for dispatching Japanese correspondents to Beijing.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
foreign newspaper attempting division of this country or objecting to normalization
of diplomatic relations between the two countries?”1 7
Fourth, the allegation that the three political principles for reporter exchange
was a requisite for reaching “the L-T Communique” was not the truth. The truth is
that the reporter exchange agreement was reached after the L-T Communique.
When the original Japan-China Reporter Exchange Agreement was amended in
1968, only the number of the newsmen was limited, no supplemental agreement
1 Q
was concluded.
Also, it is important to note that the reporter exchange agreement was reached
with the acknowledgement of both sides’ governments. Kawamura Kinji, then
foreign news editor of the Asahi, and Arai Akira, the managing editor of the Nihon
Keizai, concurred with Tagawa’s view that Chinese three political principles had
been implicitly accepted by the Japanese newspapers since 1964. In this light, the
mission of reporter exchange has diplomatic implications.
The Eastern and Western Observers
In spite of Tagawa’s defense of the Japanese press, criticisms on the favorable
attitude of the press towards China cannot easily be silenced. As mentioned above,
in June 1972, Jiyu Sha published the book Shimbun bokoku ron, which included
articles by Miyoshi Osamu and Eto Shinkichi and other critics on the “corruption”
17
Miyoshi Osamu and Eto Shinkichi, Chugoku hodo no henko o tsuku: Chugoku Hodo no Henkoo o
tsuku (Denouncing the Biased Reports on China: Threat to the Freedom o f the Press) (Tokyo:
Nisshin h5d5, 1972), pp. 240-41
1 8 For details o f the negotiation on the amendment o f L-T Trade Agreement, “three political
principles” and “non-separation o f politics and economics,” refer to Tagawa, pp. 78-84, p. 99.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
of the Japanese press.1 9 This book also included a symposium named “Shimbun
bdkoku ron (The Press Is Ruining the Nation)” with a paper presented by Koyama
Kenichi, a law professor. Koyama bitterly described the Japanese press as
“criticizing our own government, and eulogizing Peking.” He complained that the
press was only critical of what the Japanese government was doing, while
sympathized anti-government movements and glorified the Chinese and the
Chinese society.
In the early 1990s, this unresolved controversy was mentioned in the memoirs
20
of some Japanese journalists. As Suzuki Kenji recalled, the Japanese press was
condemned by right-wing critics for their “biased” coverage of China before the
normalization of Sino-Japanese relations.2 1 Otani Ken, a retired Asahi journalist,
recalled the numerous errors the Asahi Shimbun had made in its coverage of China
in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.2 2 He contended that it was only acceptable to
discuss Sino-Japanese friendship and the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations
in the paper’s editorial, making it neither professional nor ethical to convey these
ideas in the news reporting.
1 9 In the book, the following articles discuss the “biased” Japanese press towards China matters:
“Kokusai seiji to genron no jiyu” (The international politics and the freedom of speech), by Irie
Michimase; “Shimbun kiji izen no mondai—shuzai no ronri to ronri” (The problem before news
reporting—the ethics and logic for source collecting), by Ogaya Shozo.
2 0 Suzuki entered the Mainichi in 1967, former correspondent in Washington, vice-deputy of the
political desk, editorial writer.
2 1 See Suzuki Kenji, Sensd to Shimbun, pp. 121-24.
2 2 Otani Ken, “Nazei Asahi ha chugoku kodo wo ayamatta no ka” (Why Asahi’s coverage on China
is misleading) in Mondai kiji: aru Asahi Shimbun kasha no kaiko (problematic reporting: the
memoir of an Asahi Shimbun reporter) (Tokyo: Sdshisha, 1993. pp. 87-136)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12
Tsuchiya Michio, a political critic, in his book Hodo wa shinjitsu ka? (Is the
reporting trustworthy?)23, accused the Asahi of only publishing stories favorable to
Peking. Like others of the same persuasion, he charged major Japanese newspapers
were biased in their coverage of China. Based on what he observed, the Asahi did
not publish anything on the sadistic movement of the Red Guards; but only
glorified China and the Chinese people in print.
With a few exceptions, Western scholars and observers seldom published on
this subject.2 4 In these limited scholarly publications, I have found some problems
that cannot be ignored. One is that they exclusively rely on Miyoshi’s and Eto’s
report and take it as truth, which actually bears bias in itself. Another problem is
that they adopt the Anglo-American conception for journalistic ethics and the
freedom of the press to judge the Japanese experience. Third, there is a lack of
attention in these essays to the Japanese press coverage of the social and cultural
aspects of China, such as the image of ordinaiy Chinese and their life 2 5 As these
are important issues, I will discuss them below through content analysis of the
newspapers.
In Japan Faces China, Lee only quoted the allegation that the Japanese
mainstream media was manipulated by the Chinese government to create a pro-
2 3 Tsuchiya Michio, “Chugoku ni taisuru shisei” (The posture towards China), in Hodo wa shinjitsu
ka,
pp. 107-12
2 4 The following seem to be the exceptions: Lee, Chae-Jin. Japan Faces China: Political and
Economic Relations in the Postwar Era (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1976), p. Ill; Young C. Kim, Japanese Journalists and Their World (Virginia: University Press of
Virginia, 1981), pp. 142-59; O. Feldman, Politics and the News M edia in Japan (Ann Arbor:
University o f Michigan Press, 1993).
2 5 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
China public opinion in Japan for the purpose of Sino-Japanese rapprochement,
without providing any concrete evidence or substantive evidences. In Japanese
Journalists and Their World, Kim only gave a review of some critical events, such
as Prime Minister Sato’s resignation in June 1972 and the Lin Piao incident. He
argued that “the three political principles” constituted severe restraints when
applied to press activities, but his assertions relied primarily upon the
“Investigation Report” by Miyoshi and Eto, with few other supporting documents
provided. Likewise, Ofer Feldman wrote that “in support of the Japanese
government’s efforts to establish and maintain good relations with the PRC, the
press has tended to avoid any criticism of China since the beginning of the
1970s.”2 6 This statement is problematic in its first part. As will be discussed later in
this thesis, before July 1972, Japan’s mainstream media generally did not support
the government’s foreign policy towards the PRC. For example, the Asahi exerted
considerable pressure upon the Sato administration2 7 for a more progressive China
policy from November 1962 to July 1972. It was only in late 1972 that this major
press started to be in concord with the government, strenuously backing the new
Tanaka administration (July 1972 to December 1974) in realizing the normalization
of Sino-Japanese relations in late 1972.
2 6 Feldman, O. Politics and the News Media in Japan (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press,
1993), p. 14
2 7 The Sato administration’s foreign policy priories were to gain US consent for the reversion o f
Okinawa and to demonstrate support for the U S ’s security position in East Asia. Sato presided over
the normalization of Japan-South Korea relations in June 1965 and the automatic extension o f the
security treaty in June 1970. He paid an official visit to Taiwan in September 1967 and indicated in
the joint communique with President Richard Nixon in November 1969 that ‘maintenance o f peace
and security in the Taiwan area were also important factors for Japan’s security.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
The Core of the Controversy
As indicated above, the core of the dispute is whether or not it is acceptable for
Japan’s mass media to “promote” Sino-Japanese rapprochement. One side is
represented by Tagawa Seiichi, who was involved in the reporter exchange
program, contending that the media was justified in acting as political “catalysts.”
In his words, “The restoration of Sino-Japanese relations is rapidly becoming a
reality. It must be a great obstacle for the anti-restoration camp to see the news
media promoting the restoration as well as attempting to play the role of catalyst
for that goal.” 2 8 For Tagawa, the strong and negative reaction from the anti
restoration camp, to the favorable posture of the press towards China, was expected.
The opposition side mainly consists of criticisms from the American press and
criticisms from within Japan. A typical argument, as made by Sam Jameson, is that
the “three political principles” forced reporters to go beyond the journalistic
boundaries of reporting facts and writing editorials.2 9 Thus, the main question is
whether the Japanese press is justified in promoting the Sino-Japanese
rapprochement in the name of national goal or interest.
I will now proceed to examine the Japanese press culture in different historical
contexts by examining its origin in the Meiji era (1868-1912), followed by a
discussion on the Japanese j oumalist institution in the first three decades of post
war era. Then, I will look at the personal background and political affiliation of
both accusers and defenders. My main arguments are two-fold. First, by looking at
2 8 Miyoshi and Eto, Chugoku Hodo no Henkoo o tsuku, p. 249
2 9 This is based on my email correspondence with Sam Jameson on February 14, 2004.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
15
the Japanese press culture since its origin in Meiji Era, it is important to note that
the Japanese journalistic institution and journalists’ self-identity were different
from those of the United States. The notion of the press and its expectation from
the Japanese society are contradictory, to some extent, to those in the Anglo-
American conception. Thus, it is unfair to judge the professional ethics of the
Japanese j oumalists from the American “code of conduct.” Second, by examining
the backgrounds of both accusing and defending camps within domestic, the pros
and cons of the argument on the objectivity of the Japanese press on China
reporting, is in effect a reflection of Japan’s domestic political conflict over the
China policy—the power struggle between pro-Taiwan faction and pro-China
faction within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.
Japanese Press Culture
To better understand Japan’s press culture and the Japanese journalist
institution in 1960s and 70s, it is important to trace back to the Meiji era to review
its origins and early development, and then to examine it in the specific historical
milieu of 1960s and 70s. In the paragraphs below, I will look at the self-identity of
the pioneer journalists, the missions of the newspapers, and expectations from the
state and the public for the press, during the Meiji period when the Japanese
modem press began to take shape. I concur with James L. Huffman, who noted: “A
study of the press’s behavior in nineteenth century Japan also should tell us much
about the role newspapers can be expected to play in the evolution of modem
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
16
societies more generally.”301 will then examine the Japanese journalistic institution
in the post-war milieu, by reviewing the ideological, psychological and institutional
characteristics of the press. A good understanding of the above issues will help
explain the particular Japanese press behavior in dealing with China matters.
What is the role of the press in a modem society? Wilbur Schramm, one of this
century’s most thoughtful analysts of the press’ social role, notes that the
newspaper in a healthy society has three fundamental functions. It is a watchman, a
policy shaper (introducing ideas and channeling debates) and a teacher (providing
information and opinion).3 1 Newspapers are organizers and disseminators of
information, shapers of public opinions; but more importantly the society’s
educators, the teachers who acquaint their readers with the events, facts, people and
concepts needed to make life meaningful. It is this role that so many of the early
Meiji editors had in mind, and talked about themselves as shakai no bokutaku
(teachers of society).3 2
One characteristic of the Meiji press, the sokokai (j^ lli# ), is the degree of
freedom its writers experienced in expressing their views. This characteristic sheds
light on the core image of the Meiji newsmen: nationalist, non-partisan, and most
crucially the elites in society. Many sokokai were addressed not by their
professional title, but the honorific “sensei” (5fc^fe) on par with political leaders,
medical doctors, professors and teachers. As Huffman noted, the style of the major
3 0 James Huffman, Creating a Public: People and Press in M eiji Japan (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii’s Press, 1997), p. 2.
3 1 Huffman, p. 7.
3 2 Huffman, p.6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
17
papers suggests that the early journalists were Confucian-bred, being self-conscious
leaders of their generation. At their very core, they were the intellectual and
political beings.3 3 Many of the founders of the earliest newspapers were former
samurai, and the editors and journalists of these papers often ran for public office,
moved back and forth between the bureaucracy and the press.3 4 These elites shared
two important attributes: a nationalist mentality and the belief that they should act
as the enlighteners of the masses. They shared a common noble mission as a result
of their common Confucian training and educational background.
Most of these opposition editors had left their own han during
the bakumatsu years to join the Tokugawa bureaucracy and
thus to serve the country as a whole, while many of the new
Meiji leaders had continued to work within their own then-
rebellious fiefs. So it was for the sake of the “nation” that these
journalists railed against the new order....The point of
“rebellion” against the new regime was not rebellion per se but
an incipient nationalism. A salient feature of late Meiji and
Taisho journalism was its boisterous patriotism even when
editors fought a specific policy or cabinet. That overweening
nation-consciousness already was there at the birth of the
modem press.3 5
The “boisterous patriotism” leads to the conviction that the role of the Japanese
newsmen is to t to the citizenry, and to build a strong nation state. For the purpose
of national interest and goal, the press regards its “influence” even more important
than the notion of “the freedom of the press” in the Western institution. The origin
of the Japanese press culture is cmcial in shedding light on the controversy on the
3 3 Huffman, p.61
3 4 Laurie Anne Freeman, Closing the Shop: Information Cartels and Japan's M ass Media (NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 32.
3 5 Huffman, p. 44.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
ethical issue of the Japanese mass media in their China reporting, as discussed
below.
In order to understand the behavior of Japan’s major press in dealing with
China matters in the late 1960s and early 1970s, we will examine the Japanese
press culture in the post-war context. We will especially pay attention to the
ideological, psychological and institutional characteristics of the mass media and
the journalists. There are two important characteristics of the mass media in the
first two decades of postwar Japan: first, no government censorship or oppression;
36
second, the journalists being critical of the government and slightly lefdst-flavor.
The Japanese Constitution, adopted in 1946 during the Allied Occupation
(1945-52), explicitly guarantees the freedom of speech. More importantly, it is
generally believed that the major newspapers were very much critical of
government policies, which were having a progressive attitude, left-wing
orientation, critical of LDP and favorable to the Socialist bloc.3 7 In the first three
decades of the postwar era, indeed, Japanese major national newspapers were
favorable to the Socialist bloc and socialism and unfavorable to the Japanese and
the U.S. governments and their policies. For instance, they did not endorse Japan’s
Self Defense Forces and were cynical of the Japanese imperial system. They were
very sympathetic to workers’ strikes and critical of capitalists and the corporate
38
management.
3 6 According to Tsujimura, the anti-Japanese tone o f the press weakened as Japan’s economy was
boosting and doing very successful after the second half o f 1970s.
3 7 See Tsujimura 1981, pp.57-9; Kim 1981, p .l; Feldman 1993, p.28
3 8 Ito 1990, p. 433
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
There are at least three underlying reasons for the above postwar characteristics
of Japan’s mass media. First, the media were particularly conscious of the reaction
against its pro-government role before the war. After serving as an instrument for
the imperialist and militarist propaganda during the war39, the press was reformed
and instilled the notion of democracy in the post-war years, and transformed into
highly anti-authoritarian and anti-government. Many of the war-time editors and
managerial staff resigned from their positions because of their guilty feelings for
their unforgivable wartime wrongdoings, namely, serving as mouthpiece of the
militarist, promoting propagandas, and giving up the role of the watchdog in
Japanese society. New staff of the major press strenuously strived to create a truly
free and democratic press—anti-military, anti-authoritarian, but safe guarding
Japan’s national interest.
Second, in the 1950s and 60s, the Socialist and Communist ideologies were
prevailing among intellectuals; many of the newsmen, as the society’s new elites
and intellectuals, were influenced by or involved in this leftist school of thought.
Third, the newsmen in postwar Japan inherited many of the virtues of their Meiji
predecessors: nationalistic and patriotic, and loyal to the people and democracy,
rather than to the emperor alone. It is clear that the postwar newsmen still think of
themselves as the enlighteners and educators in the new Japan.
As the above discussion on Japan’s mass media in Meiji and in postwar era
indicates, some journalistic institutions, including reporters’ values, ethics and
3 9 For discussion on the role o f the press and it responsibility in the WWII, see Suzuki Kenji, Senso
to Shimbun (the war and press) (Tokyo: Mainichi shimbun sha, 1995); also see Yasuda Sh5zo and
Ishibashi Kotaro, Asahi Shimbun no Sensd sekinin (the wartime responsibility o f Asahi) (Tokyo,
1995).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
social responsibilities, might have retained much continuity over time. The
journalists in the new Meiji era (1868) were Confucian-bred, self-conscious leaders
of their generation, being highly intellectual and political. In the postwar context,
when Japanese imperialism and militarism were denounced while democratic
reforms were the new order of the day, the post-war journalists still saw themselves
as enlighteners and educators for Japanese society. They saw it as their mission to
educate the people against the imperial system, Self-Defense Forces, US-Japan
alliance, and capitalism, which in many cases contradicted with government
statements.
Different Journalistic Institutions: U.S. vs. Japan
If social theories facilitate universality and generalizability, it would be
worthwhile to compare and consider the applicability of major social theories to the
Japanese experience. In the field of mass communication and journalism, it is not
uncommon for one to evaluate the Japanese experience from an Anglo-American
scholarly perspective, emphasizing the concept of press freedom, the journalist
ethics, and the so-called universal values. I will argue that such Western values and
ethics cannot be uncritically applicable to Japanese society. Neither is it possible to
effectively evaluate all the phenomena in the Japanese press culture by adopting the
Western standards.
In order to better understand ideological and psychological tendency of postwar
Japanese j oumalists—their normative conception of their career, their self-identity
and self-worth, it will be helpful to introduce the survey conducted by Young C.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21
Kim in 1975-76. Kim’s survey is based on his interviews with a sample of
reporters from four major national dailies, the Asahi, Yomiuri, Mainichi and Sankei.
The survey result is valuable in shedding light on Japan’s press culture in the late
1960s and the early 1970s, since the major attributes included the journalist
behavior, self-identity, and the press-state-public relations, etc.
One of Kim’s studies was on how Japanese reporters perceived the press-
govemment relations. The question was “Do you feel the government press
relations are basically conflicting or basically harmonious? How do you describe
this relationship?” Over 90 percent of the Japanese respondents (34 out of 36)
characterized govemment-press relations as basically conflicting. The remaining
two saw them as basically harmonious. For most respondents the question brought
a swift response: “conflicting; so it should be, and so it is.” 4 0
The most crucial interview result reflecting the self-identity of Japan’s reporters
went to question “To what extent should reporters do or not do the following: 1.
Report the facts without any interpretation; 2. Write without regard for the editorial
guidelines of their news organization; 3. Attempt to influence government policies;
4. Act in the role of opposition or watchdog?”
For item 1, about three-fourths of the Japanese reporters said there was no
question that an interpretation or a commentary should accompany news reports.
The remainder said that there were some cases where an interpretation might not be
necessary, but they too felt that news reports should be accompanied by an
4 0 Kim, Japanese Journalists and Their World (University Press o f Virginia, 1981), p. 85
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
interpretation. In order to gain a cross-cultural perspective,4 1 of the nine American
reporters interviewed, five disagreed with the statement, three thought that the
reporters might or might not do so, one agreed with the statement.
On item 2, practically every Japanese reporter thought that he should try to stay
with the editorial policy guidelines of his news organization. However, several
reporters, all of the Mainichi, felt that they should write without regard for the
editorial views of their paper, but they added that it would be desirable that their
writings be consistent with those editorial views. The Asahi reporters were more
sensitive to and felt more obligated to follow editorial views than did the reporters
of other papers. The American responses4 2 offer a sharp contrast. Virtually every
American reporter of the Chittick sample thought the reporter should write
“without regard for the editorial views of their news organizations.”
Item 3 revealed a near unanimity of the view among the Japanese reporters that
the reporter should attempt to influence government policy. Of those who agreed
with the proposition (33 out of 36), about 50 percent gave unqualified approval,
with the reminder qualifying their approval by adding that it was permissible to do
so “to certain extent, “sometimes,” or “depending on circumstances.” The
overwhelming majority of the American reporters interviewed by Chittick (30 out
of 40) thought the reporters should not “attempt to influence policy officers.”
With regard to item 4, nearly every Japanese reporter (thirty-four) felt that he
should act as an opposition element or watchdog vis-a-vis the government, with the
4 1 According to the American data presented by William Chittick, State Department, Press, and
Pressure Groups (NY: Wiley-Interscience, 1970)
4 2 This is based on the data from chapters 5 and 6 in William Chittick, State Department, Press, and
Pressure Groups (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
exception of two who said “only to a certain extent.” Surprising enough the data of
the American press in early 1970s indicated a tendency opposite to that in Japan.
Six American reporters gave negative answers, whereas three were affirmative.
The above data reflect the gap between different Japanese and American
perspectives of the role and function of journalists, which to some extent,
contributes to our understanding of the heated debate on the behavior of Japanese
mass media towards China. As the beginning of the paper indicates, the core of the
debate is whether or not it is acceptable that the media had been “promoting” the
establishment of diplomatic relations with China. Kagawa, who was involved in the
reporter exchange program, implies that he believes the media is justified in acting
as political “catalysts.” But from the perspective of Sam Jameson, an American
correspondent in Tokyo at that time, the “catalysts” role of the media goes beyond
the journalistic boundaries of reporting facts and writing editorials.4 3 In fact, both
sides have their own right and reason, suffice it to look at the different journalistic
institutions from two cultures. Although Japan was democratized by the U.S.
occupation (1945— 1952), many of the Japanese traditions, values and institutions
could hardly be overthrown overnight. Thus, thanks to Japan’s own experience, it
might be considered as a legitimate mission or responsibility for the press to
promote Sino-Japanese rapprochement in the name of die national interest.
For a counter-balance concern, it is important as well to see the press-
govemment interactions from the perspective of the officials. According to the
interview conducted by Kim in 1975, with a sample of twenty-six officials from the
4 3 This is based on my email correspondence with Sam Jameson on February 14, 2004.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and the
members of the Diet, all interviewees expressed some degree of dissatisfaction with
the activities of the reporters.4 4 The source of such dissatisfaction varied, but the
following received frequent mentioning: 1. lack of objectivity; 2. dearth of factual
reporting; 3. partial and unfair reporting; 4. tendency to concentrate on stories that
embarrassed the government; 5. abundance of speculative and inaccurate reporting;
6. anti-American bias.
When asked the role that the officials expected the press to play, about one-
third of the respondents called on the press to eliminate anti-government bias and to
refrain from the “act of opposition for opposition’s sake,” and about one-fifth
repeated their call for accurate and/or fair reporting of facts. These two categories
constituted about half of the respondents. Another third of the sample expressed a
desire that the press more adequately reflected, rather than manufacture, public
opinion. The remainder expressed a hope that newspapers would provide material
reflecting diverse viewpoints so as to facilitate the reader’s judgment. 4 5
One thing significantly noteworthy from Kim’s interview data is that the
Japanese officials were not prepared to exclude interpretation or commentary, as
distinct from reporting of fact. The administrative officials interviewed felt that it
was “permissible” for an interpretation to accompany the reporting of facts. The
legislators’ attitude was more positive; they felt it was natural and desirable for an
interpretation to accompany the presentation of facts. This contrasts sharply with
44 Kim, pp. 95-97
4 5 Kim, p. 100
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
the American officials, who felt that reporters should be factual, avoiding any
interpretation whatsoever.4 6
In reality, even Prime Minister Satd, whose policies often lead to numerous
criticism from the press47, acknowledged and expected interpretation and
commentary accompanying news reporting. He stated that “the newspapers and
broadcasters should go beyond a mere reporting of facts. More than ever before,
emphasis should be placed on the pursuit of national interest. For example, whether
the issue is one pertaining to national security or education, we will be able to
achieve national consensus on the issue if the media make an effort to form fair
48
public opinion.” (Underline mine)
As the above Japan-US comparative studies indicate, a salient gap lies between
Japanese and American different perspectives of the role and function of a
journalist in society. The Japanese reporters tend to think the govemment-press
relation is basically conflicting; the Japanese reporters assert that there is no
question that an interpretation or a commentary should accompany news reports. In
addition, they believe they have all the right to try to influence the government
policy, for the overwhelming majority feel that they should act as an opposition
element watching and opposing the government. Equally important, in terms of
allowing reporters to include interpretation in their reporting, the gap between
4 6 Kim, p. 109
4 7 Sato had years o f frustration and anger with the press. On June 17, 1972, when he decided to
retire, Sato overtly expressed his extreme dislike o f the press, which he condemned as “biased
newspapers.” See Kim, Japanese Journalists and Their World (University o f Virginia, 1981), pp.
166-67
4 8 Prime Minister Sato’s speech before a general meeting o f the Japanese Association o f
Newspapers in June 1969
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26
Japanese and American officials is significantly huge: while the Japanese officials
are rather positive about reading reports with interpretation, their American
counterparts remain much more critical.
Thus, one can sense the different value standards the two countries adopt to
gauge matters like “ethics,” “objectivity,” and “fairness.” To some extent, this can
help illuminate the controversy over the ethical issue of Japan’s major press in
dealing with China matters. It is equally important to note that the Japanese major
newspapers were regarded as “fair” “ethical,” from the Chinese perspective,
considering the significant mission the press was taking—to push forward Sino-
Japanese rapprochement. In reality, the Chinese government made enormous
efforts in building up rapport with the Japanese correspondents, whom Peking
expected to create a pro-China environment in Japan. According to Tagawa’s
memoir (February 9, 1964), the Chinese officials openly praised Japanese
newspapers that “the tone of Japan’s newspapers has been better recently,” “very
objective in reporting about China.” 4 9 Even after the arrest of Japanese reporters in
late 1968, according to the surviving Beijing correspondents of the Asahi, NHK and
Kyoto Tsushin, Japanese reporters were better treated than their counterparts from
other countries. “... At the press conference, the Japanese translation was given
priority over the English translation.” “Only the Japanese reporters were invited to
dinner on National Day.” “The Information Department of the Foreign Ministry has
been treating the Japanese press much better recently.”5 0
4 9 Tagawa, p. 54
5 0 Tagawa, p. 126
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
Tagawa also stressed the role of the press in dealing with China matters, and the
importance of reporter exchange when there was no diplomatic tie. He stated that
“one good way to achieve normalization of Sino-Japanese relations is the exchange
of reporters, which improves mutual understanding.”5 1
Accusers vs. Defenders—Domestic Political Conflicts
If the criticism from overseas is due to Anglo-American prejudice and
misunderstanding of Japan’s press culture and journalistic institution, then how do
we explain the criticism of Japanese journalists coming from within Japan? Are
these criticisms “un-Japanese”? Why did Eto Shinkichi and his fellows advocate
Anglo-American journalistic ethics and code of conduct to evaluate the “fairness”
of the Japanese press? Did their motivations simply come from their full support
and worship for Western “democracy”? As intellectuals, are they completely
ignorant of their own cultural values and supporting the abandonment of their
“roots”? If we know about who these people are—their background, opinions and
social affiliation, we may be able to answer the above questions.
Meanwhile, it will be equally important to examine the background, interests
and motives of other party of the controversy—the defenders. Why was Tagawa
such a faithful spokesperson and defender for the major Japanese press against
criticisms from both domestic and overseas? The pros and cons of the argument on
“the fairness” of Japanese mainstream media, as I will argue, are related to Japan’s
5 1 Tagawa, p. 54
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
domestic conflicts over its China policy—the power struggle between pro-Taiwan
faction and pro-PRC faction within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.
It is interesting to note the strategic time the two related books on this
controversy were published, as well as the opposite orientation of the their
publishing houses. Tagawa’s Nichu kosho hiroku: Tagawa nikki— 14 nen no
shogen (A secret memoir of Sino-Japanese negotiation: Tagawa Diary—
Witnessing for 14 years) was published in October 1973, shortly after the
normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. Miyoshi’s and Eto’ Shimbun bokoku ron
was published in June 1972, three months before the establishment of Sino-
Japanese diplomatic relations. Tagawa’s memoir of Sino-Japanese negation was
published along with a series of recommended books introducing Chinese culture,
society and history, by Mainichi Shimbun Sha; while Eto’s and Miyoshi’s book
was printed by Jiyu Sha (Liberal Publishing House), as part of the series published
around 1972, on the theme of Japan’s China Policy and Sino-Japanese relations,
claiming “to recognize the real truth and pursue the real logic is the necessity for
living a life with freedom.”
The factions of the LDP were characterized by traditional sorts of oyabun-
kobun (boss-follower) behavior. The dynamics of factional competition were not
only shaped by the combined effect of hierarchical personal relations and
ideological or policy differences, but also by a sharing of interests in electoral
contests, campaign funds, and career backgrounds. More often than not, factional
polemics on important foreign policy issues, such as China, tended to lose their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
policy relevance, and instead became a carefully contrived instrument of inter-
factional rivalry.5 2
As a Dietman for House of Representatives, Tagawa belonged to the pro-PRC
faction within Liberal Democratic Party.5 3 Bom in 1919, Tagawa worked as a
reporter for the Asahi Shimbun, and then a secretary for Matsumura Kenzo5 4 , who
had been the mainstay of the pro-China school within the LDP. In his memoir of
Sino-Japanese negotiation, Tagawa wrote:
...After college, 1 was a reporter for the political desk at Asahi
Shimbun, then worked for Matsumura Kenzo as his secretary, by
whom I was greatly influenced. My interest in China matters was
even stronger under Mr. Matsumura’s guidance. Since 1959 I first
visited China with Mr. Matsumura till today when Japan and
China normalized their relations, I have been to China for eleven
times and I am able to maintain close contact with Chinese leaders.
The most unforgettable memory I have had is the negotiation on
Memorandum Trade55.... The Chinese side was harshly attacked
5 2 Lee, pp. 18-9
53
See The Postwar Conservative View o f Asia (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation,
1999), authored by Wakamiya Yoshibumi, deputy managing editor o f the Asahi Shimbun; also see
Tagawa, Nichyu kosho hiroku: Tagawa nikki— 14 nen no shogen (a secret memoir o f Sino-Japanese
negotiation: Tagawa Diary— 14 years witness) (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun Sha, 1973); and Tagawa,
“Rizhong youhao de qiaoliang” (the bridge for Sino-Japanese friendship), translated from chapter
three of Matsumura Kenzo to Chugoku.
5 4 Special mention should be given to his role in steering the course o f events leading to the
normalization o f diplomatic relations with China. Bom in 1883, Matsumura graduated from Waseda
University, served on the staff o f the Hochi Shimbun, was elected to the Toyama prefecture
assembly, joined the Democratic Party and won a seat in the House o f Representatives in 1928.
Later, Matsumura joined the national mobilization machinery. His postwar commitment to friendly
relations between Japan and China stemmed from self-critique. When his purge from public service
after the war was lifted, Matsumura worked closely with Miki Takeo. After the conservative
coalition of LDP, he headed the “Miki-Matsumura” faction, and achieved renown as a politician of
impeccable integrity. In the 1959 LDP election in which Kishi Nobusuke was re-elected President,
Matsumura ran as the representative o f the ani-Kishi camp. He wanted to stand for a view of China
that was antipodal to Kishi’s. Matsumura’s first visit to China after the war was in the fall o f 1959.
Kishi was in power then and the US-Japan Security Treaty was due for revision the next year.
Matsumura’s visit successfully paved the way for the “Liao-Takasaki (L-T) trade” agreement to be
later signed and put into effect by Liao Chengzhi and Takasaki Tatsunosuke, for a journalists’
exchange program.
5 5 Even though Liao Cheng-zhi and Matsumura Kenzo had agreed in May 1966 to extend the L-T
trade beyond its original five-year limit, the prospect o f its actual extension was clouded during
1967 by the intensifying political friction between Peking and Tokyo and by the pervasive effects of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
from the Japanese government; in domestic Japan, encountering
criticism like “to accommodate with communist China,” “weak
[politics],” we insisted on the opening contact with China as our
“only diplomatic route.” 5 6
In February 1968, Tagawa and fellow LDP Dietmen Furui Yoshimi, and
Okazaki Kaheita (chairman of the Japan-China Overall Trade Liaison Office) went
to visit China for trade negotiations. The extreme acrimony with which the Chinese
perceived Sato’s foreign policy, especially his state visit to Taipei in September
1967, contributed to blocking negotiations on the L-T trade throughout 1967. After
a tense month-long negotiation, which almost collapsed, both sides signed the
Memorandum Trade in March 1968. Tagawa and Furui recognized Peking’s three
political principles and reaffirmed their acceptance of the principle of inseparability
of economic and political matters. The latter reference was specifically intended to
rebuke Sato with China without granting diplomatic recognition. The Japanese side
also accepted China’s request that Japanese newspapers whose correspondents
were stationed in Peking would be asked to respect China’s three political
principles. As Tagawa recalled in his memoir:
In March 1968, when it was written in the Memorandum Trade
Agreement that “the three political principles and the non-separation of
politics and economics are the basis that both Japan and China sides
should comply with,” voice of disagreement roared within the LDP. Furui
Yoshimi and I, who involved in the negotiation with the Chinese, received
all kinds of criticism such as “surrender to China.” 5 7
the Cultural Revolution in China. See Kim, Japan Faces China (Johns Hopkins University Press,
1981), p. 148
5 6 Tagawa, Nichyu kosho hiroku: Tagawa nikki— 14 nen no shogen), introduction.
5 7 Tagawa, p. 379
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
In June 1972, just before the Tanaka cabinet was launched, Tagawa
published a collection of essays titled Matsumura Kenzo to Chugoku
(Matsumura Kenzo and China). The last essay in the volume, “Essentials of
the Japan-China Problem,” presents Tagawa’s criticism of the pro-Taiwan
elements in his party.
They emotionally detest China, do not care to know anything about
China, and object purely and simply to the normalization of any
relations with China. They don’t want to have anything to do with
China, merely because China maintains socialistic institutions and
because, fanatic believers in anti-communism, they fear that any
exchange with China would only precipitate the spread of communism
in Japan. Those who hold to such a position are often precisely those
who not only measure China with the same yardstick and prejudice as
in the prewar years but also cultivate an indulgent sense of their own
superiority over Chinese and other Asians while suffering at the same
time from an inferiority complex vis-a-vis Europeans and
Americans.5 8 (Underline mine)
Thus, as a faithful defender for Japan-China reporter exchange and the
acceptance “three political principles,” Tagawa carried out the mission of
Matsumura Kenzo for normalizing Sino-Japanese relations. He fought for the
interests of pro-China faction within the ruling LDP, and criticized the pro-Taiwan
faction for their prejudice against Communisms and worship for Americanism. In
reality, the Japan-China reporter exchange was reached through pro-China faction
with the governing LDP and Chinese politicians, instead of through Nihon
Shimbun Kyokai (Japan Press Association). So, the system of reporter exchange
was built based on political motives for Sino-Japanese rapprochement. No wonder
3 8 Tagawa, Matsumura Kenzo to Chugoku (Matsumura Kenzo and China), (Tokyo: Yomiuri
Shimbunsha, 1972, pp. 207-27.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
32
there existed a crucial conflict between the freedom of the press and the semi
official mission that the Japanese press was granted when it was set up.
On the other side, the major accuser of the Japanese press for their favorable
attitude towards China, Eto Shinkichi is a professor of international relations at
Tokyo University. He is a well-known China specialist, and has written extensively
on Asian politics, and has been a visiting professor in the Department of History,
University of Hawaii and Department of East Asian Studies, Princeton University.
Although there is very little explicit evidence indicating Eto’s connection with the
mainstream faction within LDP5 9 , some of his articles published between 1968
and1980 very well indicate his political position.6 0 The following statements from
Eto’s articles are useful to understand his viewpoints on China matters and Sino-
Japanese relations.
Japanese j oumalism is daunted encountering China
matters...facing ‘the huge Chinese nationality’ the Japanese are
daunted. I think this is an inferiority complex. .. .The Japanese are
not psychologically ready to treat the Chinese on an equal
base. ...In the wartime, didn’t you Japanese do criminal things in
the wartime? When hearing this, we feel even more daunted. The
more intellectual one is, the more daunted he might feel. We are
not theoretically well armed.,.6 1
59 The mainstream faction of the LDP tended to disfavor China, North Korea, and North
Vietnam, but to support the staunch anti-Communist governments, such as Nationalist
China, and South Korea.
6 0 See articles “Nihon no Asia seisaku” (Japan’s Asia policy), “Han niron no kozo” (The
construction o f the anti-Japan theory) in Eto, Mukoku no min to seiji (Politics and the people who
have nowhere to turn for). Tokyo: Tokyo University Publishing House, 1973. A lso see his English
article “Evolving Sino-Japanese Relations,” in Journal o f International Affairs, n o.l (1983).
6 1 Eto and Miyoshi, Shimbun bokoku ron, p. 198.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
Eto is very concerned about the guilty-complex thinking the Japanese had since
the -defeat, which he thinks could be exploited by the Chinese.6 2 In his article,
“ Han nichi ron no koz^,, (The construction of anti-Japan theory), Eto wrote:
...For long time, the Communist China frequently uses the word
“Japanese imperialism,” which is only related with the Japanese
invasion a long time ago. In the postwar era, Japan was miles away
from imperialism...but Japan is the country that receives the most
criticism only because she followed United States. 6 3
Clearly, Eto felt it unfair for his country to be unreasonably denounced as
“Japanese imperialism.” Neither did he like China repeatedly talking about Japan’s
wartime invasion. He showed his sympathy to the Sato administration6 4 for being
criticized only for going hand in hand with the U.S. “During the last few years of
the Sato’s cabinet, Peking vehemently attached the Japanese leader, claiming a
resurgence of Japanese militarism.” “Every effort made by the Sato cabinet to settle
differences with Peking was mercilessly attacked, not only by Peking but also by
the Japanese media.”6 5
Likwise, Koyama Kenichi, a professor who has a strong objection to any
serious and responsible reviews on historical issues such as “the Comfort Women”
and the Nanking Massacre.” He questioned the professional ethic of Japanese
reporters, “based on my contact with reporters, I often want to ask them if on earth
their jobs are reporters. They often give me a false impression that they are
6 2 Eto, “Politics and Economic Prosperity in East Asia,” in The Pacific in the 7PP0ftUniversity Press
of America, 1990), p. 38
6 3 Eto and Miyoshi, Shimbun bokoku ron, pp. 130~31
6 4 Refer to footnote 27. The Chinese government viewed Sato administration’s foreign policy
priories as evidence o f militarism in Japan and its aggressive stance in support o f the U S ’s regional
allies and containment policy toward china.
6 5 Et5, “Evolving Sino-Japanese Relations,” in Journal o f International Affairs, no. 1 (1983), p. 59
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
politicians or the civil movement leaders.” He argued that reporters should not
bring their viewpoints in reporting. “If you want your political thoughts to
influence more people, then you’d better quit the reporter job, to become a
politician or mass movement leader.6 6
Eto, Koyama, and their like seem to have the following concerns in common.
First, they fear the Japanese press may fall under the control of the Chinese
Communist, which will spread Communist ideology to the Japanese audience;
second, they fear the press will mislead public opinions on Japan’s China policy.
t\7
Content Analysis of the Asahi and Mainichi
In order to examine the role that Japan’s major press played in the Sino-
Japanese rapprochement in the late 1960s till 1972, the bulk of the following pages
will be dedicated to content analysis of two national dailies, the Asahi Shimbun and
the Mainichi Shimbun in their coverage of the China issues. I will take a close look
at the following events: 1. the Cultural Revolution and the reporter expulsion; 2. the
social and cultural change in China during the early 1970s; 3. China’s gaining
representation in the United Nations in October 1971. My selections are based on
the following considerations. First, the coverage of the Cultural Revolution
(1966~69) is most effective in showing the posture of Japan’s major press towards.
6 6 Et5 and Miyoshi, Shimbun bokoku ron , p. 204
671 am doing an informal “content analysis,” thus my analysis o f messages provides a limited view.
The content analysis, used in formal political science studies, including the following operations: (1)
determination o f the kinds o f messages to be sampled; (2) the selection o f an adequate sample of the
messages; (3) the designation of appropriate units o f analysis (words, themes); (4) the construction
of an unambiguous and exhaustive set o f categories into which the units will be classified; (5)
formulation o f explicit coding rules for assigning units to categories; (6) the coding process in which
messages are examined and items assigned to categories.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
Second, it will be interesting to see how the Japan’s newspapers cover the new
development in China (1969-1971) with special reference to the life of ordinary
Chinese people. Third, the issue of China’s representation at the United Nations has
a great repercussion on Japan and the United States, hence the press coverage can
significantly reveal the press-govemment relations in Japan.
The reasons for my choice of Asahi and Mainichi are as follows. First, both
papers are national dailies with great circulation throughout the country; second,
the Asahi is usually considered to be of “leftist flavor,” being an “intellectual
paper,” serious in tone and thus regarded as the most influential newspaper till
1970s; while the Mainichi is considered politically neutral ranging between the left
and the right.
The Cultural Revolution6 8 and the Reporter Expulsion
Both the Asahi and Mainichi gave full attention to the chaotic Cultural
Revolution, but some of their stories were slightly different in terms of rhetoric and
approach. For example, on the issue of August 29, 1966, both papers reported the
anti-Soviet Union rally of the Red Guards. While the Mainichi's headline reads:
6 8 Cultural Revolution (1966.5-1969.4): Upheaval which supposedly lasted from 1966-76, but
whose worst violence took place in 1966-69. Ostensibly a movement for a final clearing out of old
ideas and habits, it was more an attempt by Mao once again to re-establish his waning authority as it
was being marginalized by managers and experts more suited to guide a modem society than the
ageing guerrilla and support. His prestige allowed him to call upon young people (the Red Guards)
to first criticize and then attack those in authority, while commanding the forces o f law and order to
stand down. By the time those in authority realized what was happening they were beaten into
submission, imprisoned or isolated. Most institutions ceased functioning as they were invaded and
taken over by gangs o f rebels and looters. The mination o f authority brought to local power cliques
and thugs who vaunted their loyalty to Mao while enjoying the fruits o f power. Over this mess the
Gang o f Four presided until 1976, although some o f the old institutions and administrators gradually
returned from around 1970.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
“Red Guards Rally at Soviet Embassy: Thousands Rally in Massive Display of
Power,” the Asahi runs such a headline: “Red Guards Rally at Soviet Embassy:
Demonstrating in an Orderly Manner.” There is no specific difference in the two
headlines. However, the Asahi gives a brief coverage, while the Mainichi story is
far more detailed.
On the August 29 issue, the Mainichi published another piece from its Peking
correspondent Takada with the headline “The People’ s Daily Appeal to the Red
Guards.” The report reads:
...Starting from the renaming of streets and stores, the Red
Guards’ so-called “revolution” is pushed forward radically.
National capitalists’ fixed interest was abolished, democratic
parties were broken up, the Constitution, national flag, and
national song were amended. Moreover, the Red Guards
supervised the running of stores and shops, checked passengers’
clothes in the street, and even entered private rooms without
permission, and confiscated all jewelry, stocks and checks. The
owners and so called “anti-revolutionists” were put into kangaroo
court and even lynched.
On the same day, Asahi published a story from its correspondent Ugami with
the salient headline “The Turmoil of the Red Guard: Mao’s Coup d’Etat.” Its
subtitle reads: “The Red Guard Whirlwind: Do Mainliners Control Directly? First
Destroy Everything, Then Rebuild.” The story writes:
From correspondent Ugami in Peking via international phone: The
“Red Guard whirlwind” has been sweeping all of China.
Bureaucrat’s belongings are being confiscated by force. The Red
Guards terrorize those who try to resist Started by the Red
Guards, the mass craze is spreading across the country in an extreme
radical way...
Asahi printed another piece from Ugami a day before. It reads: “Although it
seems that people have an antipathy to such ruffians’ riots and Red Guards’
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
rampages..., overall, as I see it, the posters6 9 that welcome the Red Guard’s
revolution are absolutely in the majority. Also, the newspapers speak highly of the
Red Guards, seeking support from citizens.” (August 28, 1966) Besides, the Asahi
published an interview with Professor Yoshida after his visit to China, with the
headline “Take the Advantage of the Commoners: Professor Yoshida’s Talk after
His Visit to China” (August 29, 1966) and another story “Lipstick is Bourgeois: the
Red Guard in Student Visitor’s Eye.” (August 29, 1966)
From these Asahi reports, one can hardly find any overt exaggeration intended
to please the Chinese government. It is salient that the words that the Asahi used to
describe the fanatical behavior of the Red Guards were mostly negative, such as
“kyoko” (by force), “tero” (terror), “boryoku” (violent), “gorotsuki” (ruffian),
“bodo” (riot), “5ko”(rampage), “nekkyo” (craze) “kageki”(extreme radical). It is
equally important to note that the Mainichi articles talked about how the Red
Guards entered residences, grabbed private fortunes, and checked people’s clothes
in the street. While the Asahi articles set the picture much more like a revolution,
the Mainichi articles portrayed it more like a chaos. Neither paper had positive tone,
only their narratives and tones were slightly different.
In fact, Japanese reporters made undeniable contribution to the world to know
about “what is happening” during the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Although there
were a few reporters from other countries stationed in Peking, the Japanese reporter
had the advantage in reading Chinese characters to get valuable information. They
6 9 Posters (da zi bao) were used as a main means of communications in the Cultural Revolution, not
only for people to post their personal views and comments, but more importantly also used as a tool
to criticize and attack other people.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
were highly praised as “the ears and eyes for the world.”7 0 Their reports were often
cited by newspapers of other countries, and honored for its objectivity in
reporting.7 1
However, on September 10, 1967, the Chinese Foreign Minster decided to
expel correspondents from the Mainichi, Nishi Nihon and Sankei due to their “anti-
China reporting.” The alleged reasons from Peking for expulsion are: 1. the
newspapers encouraged “the reactionary Sato government’s anti-Communist, anti-
China and anti-people criminal activities72; 2. the newspapers maligned the Cultural
Revolution and Chairman Mao through cartoon.7 3 The Mainichi stated in its
editorial of September 20, opposed to the expulsion decision from Peking with the
following defense that “the Japanese general newspapers were independent from
political power influence in the postwar era, not to mention being the “spokesman”
for the government; [We] have never encouraged the government’s anti-China
action, so it is very disappointing to hear such criticism from the Chinese side; [We]
do not necessarily agree with all the practice of Sat5 administration, but the
Chinese accusation that “the current ministry is most reactionary and evil” was
over exaggerated.”7 4
The number of Japanese correspondents was reduced to five in September 1967,
and ultimately in 1970 only the Asahi was able to maintain their correspondents in
7 0 See “Katsuyaku suru Peking no nihonjin kasha” (The active Japanese reporters in Peking), the
Asahi, January 20, 1967
7 1 See Mainichi no san seiki, p. 262; also see the report “The Active Japanese Reporters in Peking,”
Asahi, January 20, 1967
7 2 Sato paid an official visit to Taiwan on September 7, 1967.
7 3 See the Asahi, September 11, 1967; Mainichi no san seiki (the three century o f Mainich), p. 263
7 4 See Mainichi no san seiki, p. 264
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
Peking. Thus, the objectivity and fairness of the Asahi's reporting of China was
bitterly questioned, by political critics such as Eto and Miyoshi. Indeed, the Asahi
coverage on China after the expulsion incident needs further study and scrutiny.
Campaign for Sino-Japanese Rapprochement
Throughout the year of 1971 major national dailies gave extensive
attention to the issues regarding the Sino-Japanese rapprochement. The
Mainichi published a daily series of 48 editorials titled “Nicchu seijoka he
no michi” (The Path Towards Normalization Of Sino-Japanese Relations)
starting from August 11, 1972.
However, the Asahi was the most faithful trumpeter pushing for Sino-Japanese
rapprochement. As early as 1969, the Asahi made the assessment that the urgent
topics in the Japanese foreign policy in the 1970s will be “Japan-China
normalization” and “Asia problems”. To meet the challenge for the compelling
national priorities, the Asahi promptly set up the China Asia Research Team.7 5 The
Asahi’ s campaign for Sino-Japanese rapprochement began with the first day of
January 1971, calling for a govemment-to-govemment contact to restore Sino-
Japanese relations. After consulting with the China Asia Research Team, the
editorial department authored a feature article titled “Nichu kokko he fumidase
seifu no kihon shisei ima koso tenkan” (The government should adjust their posture
in order to realize the Japan-China normalization) on January 1st 1971 published on
7 5 Asahi Shimbun hyakunenshi henshu iinkai (ed). Asahi Shimbun Shashi: showa sengo hen (History
o f Asahi Shimbun). Tokyo: Asahi Shumbun sha, 1995, p. 472.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
the front page of the paper. On the same day, the chief executive of the Asahi,
Hirooka Chidan, an active advocate for the Sino-Japanese rapprochement,
published his personal commentary calling for the prompt normalization of Sino-
Japanese relations. Hirooka contends:
I think we have to improve the friendship between Japan and
China. This should be the wish for all the Japanese citizens,
although theoretically very few Japanese truly understood the
war ending arrangement (compensation)...
Currently, the disconnection between the people of Japan and China
is severe. The Chinese think of Japan as a confident economic
power, who will invade the mainland again for resources and market.
Thus, the opening of the Japan-China contact is extremely
difficult. ..I think it is the crucial time for more and more Japanese
to sincerely encounter this with their courage. If our compatriots
insist on our commitment for peace and disarmament, Chinese will
relax their wariness.7 6
The extent of the Asahi’s active attempts to influence the government for earlier
normalization of Sino-Japanese relations could be seen in its commentary “Ima
koso tenkan wo” (Let’s make a change from now on). The Asahi article contended
that “as the international trend has changed, China joining in the international
society has become an unquestionable reality.” “Regarding the relationship with
our neighbor China, it is already not the time for us to discuss it over and over
again, instead it is the time that we head for the normalization with China with our
substantive actions.”7 7
The commentary urged Prime Minister Sat5 to understand Japan’s real national
interest and adjust his China policy accordingly. “If [Satd’s administration] does
1 6 The Asahi, January 1, 1971
7 7 The Asahi, January 1, 1971
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
not have an explicit position towards the opening of Sino-Japanese relationship,
[his] diplomatic tactics will only end up in vain.” It also called for the Japanese
government to terminate support for Taiwan’s representation of China at the United
Nations, and to acknowledge Taiwan as part of China’s territory.
During March 20~April 21, 1970, Hirooka, the president of the Asahi joined in
the Matsumura China Visiting Team, visited China as Matsumura Kenzo’s friend,
and met with Premier Zhou Enlai on April 19. The meeting was highly publicized
by the Asahi on April 20. In an April 29 editorial entitled “Nichu yuko ni gyakko
surujiminto seimei” (the LDP Statement Against Japan-China Friendship), the
Asahi states that the public opinion indicates that the Japanese citizens look
forward to an earlier normalization of Sino-Japanese relations.
Meanwhile, during his visit to Peking, Hirooka made a proposal that sports
communication between Japan and China should be launched to broaden Sino-
Japan rapprochement channels. In March 1971, toward the end of the Sato
premiership, the World Ping Pong Game was being held in Nagoya. China sent a
team of players with Wang Xiaoyun as deputy team-leader to Japan, where he
launched what the world quickly came to call “ping-pong diplomacy.”
When the World Ping-pong Game was held in March, the Asahi put strenuous
efforts in promoting this ping-pong diplomacy. Different from the Mainichi, the
Asahi’s coverage of the Chinese ping-pong team and their performance was largely
politically orientated, as they were printed in the main page political section instead
of the sports section in the newspaper.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
On March 13, 1971, the Asahi ran a story to create a favorable climate for the
arrival of the Chinese sports team:
...(T)his is the first time for a sixty member delegation from China to
visit Japan since the Cultural Revolution. We hoped that this will
become a good beginning, and the Japanese and Chinese people
should interact with each other more than ever before...
...(T)he communication between people and trade are important
criteria to measure the closeness of two nations in the political
aspect. If the political relation between the two nations improves,
the communication of people and trade will increase accordingly. If
the political relation get frozen, non-official communication will
78
indicate in advance.
A follow-up story covering the welcome party for the Chinese team appeared in
the Asahi on March 20, 19171, bearing the headline “The Chinese Ping-pong
Delegation Arrived in Japan: the Women Players Burst into Tears at the Warm
Welcome”. The text was filled with emotional bits:
...The welcoming party reached its peak. Over 600 people raised up
the badge high with China’s flag and Mao’s red book in the right hand,
yelling “great welcome to Chinese Ping-pong Delegation to visit
Japan.” ...
When the Chinese side denounced the admission of the Nationalist Government
to the World Game, on March 28, 1971, the Asahi published a report titled
“Chugoku daihyddan ga kogi danwa: Taiwan kaimei shinsei nadode” (The Chinese
delegation addressed disapproval of Taiwan’s Participation.” It stated that “China
7 8 The Asahi, March 13, 1971
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
adamantly opposed to the conspiracy of creating “two Chinas” or “one China and
one Taiwan.” All in all, the Asahi’s pro-China attitude was undeniable.7 9
The Portrait of Ordinary Chinese People
Early in January 1971, the Mainichi started to introduce the new development
in China using entire page with the headline “The Seven Billion Neighbors”
(January 4, 1971). The article describes the life of the ordinary Chinese, including
their marriage age, price index, the railroad, clothes, education, mass
communication, entertainment, people’s commune and Communist Party.
In introducing the entertainment that the Chinese enjoyed, it writes “the Peking
opera is particularly popular with people. However, in the modem Peking opera,
there is no more scenarios of ‘genius and beauty, king and minister.’ Instead, there
are only plots that workers, peasants and soldiers become heroes, with strong faith
in Mao’s ideology, and fight hard against Imperialism and feudalism.” 8 0
On the same day (January 4, 1971) and same page of the Mainichi, there is a
story titled “Encounter Reforms courageously,” which reports how China planned
to initiate a series of reform such as regulating waters and speeding up the railroad
construction. Next to this is an opinion piece titled “Make the Life for People by
Using Mao’s Ideology,” which targets at correcting Japanese false impression of
Chinese.
At entrance of the Huangpu Park in Shanghai, before China
was liberated, there stood a bulletin board on which was written
7 9 The Asahi, March 28, 1971
8 0 The Mainichi, January 4, 1971
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
44
“Dog and Chinese are not allowed to enter.”...these words not
only made the foreigners look down upon Chinese, but also
showed the humiliated image of Chinese, who did not even dare to
rebel. But, there was an American-China scholar with good
conscience, who did not think of Chinese this way. He analyzed
that the typical Chinese was honest and cared about other people;
in fact, also democratic...Ms. Pearl Buck described the Chinese
peasants as people with strong perseverance, self-esteem in her
well-known novel The Earth. But, for most Japanese, the Chinese
before the liberation were “lazy, weak and lying.”
... “Lazy Chinese” are probably “latent Chinese,” “honest and
hardworking Chinese” might probably become a potential “lion” in
the future. It is the birth of Chinese Communist Party that made this
image change possible. The People’ Army made the landlord who
enjoyed jurisdiction and power over people completely extinct, and
brought out a new relationship between people...
The above quotes from the Mainichi became a typical example of “biased”
reporting on China as criticized by critics from within and from outside Japan—
“consistently glorifying the developments in China,” “with critical reporting
virtually absent.” Of course, the above story from the Mainichi contradicted the
speculation of the American press and the domestic anti-PRC factions, who
certainly did not want to see any good happening and new development in a
socialist country.
In November and December of 1971, the Mainichi ran serial stories on the
themes of thess Chinese people, with the title “A Breeze from Peking,” including
stories of “University for workers, peasants and soldiers,” “Slogan as a beautiful
language,” “Energetic young Red Guards,” “Husband goes to the factory, and wife
goes to the commune.” On November 24, 1971, the newspaper published serial
8 1 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
pictures portraying all aspects of China— working women, busy streets flooded
with bicycles, clothes store, etc. On the issue of December 13, 1971, the Mainichi
published a report from the Fukusbima Study Trip to China with the headline
“Chinese women working as leaders on all kinds of job duty”. The following are
some of the excerpts from the story:
“What is most impressive is that women workers are active on all kinds of job duty
as leaders.”
“Women become executives of all kinds of committees in communities, working
units and schools, enjoying equal rights of speech as men.”
“The price rate stays stable for twenty years”
“The requirement for marriage partner is ‘diligent in study and never become a
turncoat (against the Communist party)”
The report ends with high remarks that “what our visiting members were most
impressed with was a feeling that this was really a country truly for workers,”
“Today’s China is no more what she was in the past—the times is? changing.” The
above “glorifying words” incited the anger of critics such as Tsuchiya Michio. He
said that “the low price rate” and “the everyday life of a typical couple” would play
down? the Sato government.
A content analysis of the Mainichi reports shows some favorable impressions
were revealed in the many positive words and phrases, which appeared frequently
in the texts, including “rapid growth,” “new building, great country”, “China: the
sleeping lion,” “the hard working and sincere Chinese people”. It is clear that the
Asahi is not alone in the pro-PRC camp, as the Mainichi newsmen’s efforts in
introducing a developing China have testified for their pro-PRC posture is truly
evident.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
Atrocities Recalled
From August 26 to December 25 of 1971, the Asahi published a 40 piece series
by reporter Honda Katsuichi, entitled Chugoku no tabi (The journey to China). The
series describes the atrocities the Japanese troops committed in China during World
War II, mainly based on Honda’s investigative trip to China and interviews with
victims in June and July of 1971. The following are excerpts from Honda
Katsuichi’s account
(August 26, 1971) Headline: The Marks of the Atrocities on Site that I saw: the
Deep Scar that the Japanese Military Left
.. .My main purpose of finding sources is to try to verify what
the Japanese militaries did to Mainland China during the war. I
especially want to visit those original spots where slaughters
occurred and to hear what those survivors have to say. This is
my first journey to China, but I think I will be able to know the
details of the atrocities that Japanese militaries did to China,
which our Japanese compatriots have never known.
...At the time when the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations
is drawing nearer, if our Japanese compatriots do not give a
serious consideration about the history of invading China, and
do not take a responsible attitude for the past, a promising
progress in two countries’ relationship can hardly be expected. I
think it is very important for the Japanese to build up the
consciousness that we know little about this part of history, and
little has been told. With my short journey to China, I am not
expecting myself to understand the feelings of the victims
completely. But, I am trying to report the truth with the best as I
can.
In the next story, although the tone sounds very much identical to Communist
China’s propaganda, the sincere feelings the author conveyed towards the Chinese
victims cannot be denied.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
(December 25, 1971) Headline: The Population Finally Recovered
(An interview with a survivor from a Japanese troop’s slaughter
in a village)
...“I am the only one who escaped from the slaughter. When I
ran out of the fire, I was scalded and lost my fingers,” said the
old man. ...The old man and other villagers brought together
some invaluable photos for display when they heard that a
Japanese journalist is coming to find sources....
The survivor said the following words at the farewell. “We
Chinese have defeated the Japanese imperialists. The Japanese
people also joined other peoples in the world to support us. I
know that the Japanese people are now standing side by side
with us to fight against the revival of Japanese imperialism... We
Chinese should unite with the suppressed people all over the
world, to fight against American imperialism. Victory is always
in the hands of people, of course in the hands of the Japanese
people too.”
Honda’s reports received favorable echoes as well as attacks from Japan and
abroad. Many Japanese readers expressed their support; some veterans went out of
their shell to speak to the public. Bufi some right-wing factionists harshly attacked
the Asahi and Honda for accuracy of the stories. The motivation of the reporter was
under fierce attack—“Repeatedly writing on the Japanese wartime criminals,” “if
you want to condemn the evil of warfare,” “Honda is blinded with the lives the
Chinese Communists slaughtered recently.”8 2 With the headline “Japan’s Press
Attached for its Peking Reporting,” The New York Times wrote: “atrocities cities
recalled, for the purpose of normalization.” (May 1, 1972).
8 2 See Et5 and Miyoshi, Shimbun bokoku ron, p. 49. trie marked that not only Asahi but other major
press as well ignored the research report from Dr. Walker o f South Carolina University that the
Communist party slaughtered 33,000,000-63,000,000 people, which the most two popular weekly
magazines The Newsweek and Times gave a full attention.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
Eto also questioned the accuracy of Honda’s stories. Instead, he was convinced
with Akira Suzuki’s theory of “A Myth in the “Rape of Nanking,” citing an
acknowledging it in his published literature.8 3 Eto said that “I am afraid Asahi’s
Honda Katsuichi wrote about the wartime atrocity, only unconsciously aggravating
Japanese frustration.” His fellow, Koyama agreed by saying “our press should work
on counterargument (against Chinese criticism on Japanese militarism)...On the
contrary, our press keep using “Japanese militarism” in large headlines...”
The controversy over Honda’s serial report was never resolved. In 2003, the
Asahi, the Mainichi as well as Honda were taken to court by the family members of
the deceased Japanese in the Nanking Massacre. The plaintiffs charged that
Honda’s description of the Japanese atrocities in China were “inaccurate reporting
which disgraced the name of the deceased.” In fact, the Mainichi was also charged
for “lack of truth” in its story of “hundred men killing game” published in 1937.
As such, both the Asahi and Mainichi were accused of selling out the integrity of
the Japanese people to please the Chinese.
8 3 Eto cited and acknowledged Akira Suzuki’s arguments that “in 1937 a young Japanese
newspaperman fabricated a report that two Japanese army officers had competed to see how many
Chinese each could kill. His report, saying that each had killed over one hundred Chinese, appeared
in a reliable Tokyo newspaper. As a result, after Japan’s surrender, these two army officers were
arrested by the occupation forces in Japan, sent to China, and executed as war criminals. The
newspaperman is now working quietly in the office of a Sino-Japanese friendship organization as a
faithful pro-China activist.” See Et5, “Sino-Japanese Relations” in Journal o f Sino-Japanese Affairs,
no. 1 (1980), p. 54
8 4 See Et5 and Yiyoshi, Shimbun bokoku ron, p. 199
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
China’s Gaining of Representation at the United Nations
In the following pages, I will take a close look at the Mainichi’ s and Asahfs
coverage of the issue of China’s representation at the United Nations. News reports
and editorials of October 26, 1971, the day when UN’s decision on China’s
representation was made, will be under close observation.
First of all, let us review the historical context of the event. For many years,
the Japanese delegation at the United Nations made strenuous efforts in attempt
to retain the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the General Assembly by blocking
the PRC’s entrance.8 5 The result of the United Nations voting on October 25,
1971 was disastrous to the Japanese delegation. The important resolution on the
expulsion of Taiwan was defeated by a vote of fifty-five to fifty-nine, with fifteen
abstentions. The Albanian resolution passed by an overwhelming majority of
seventy-six to thirty-five, with seventeen abstentions. As a result, the dual
representation resolution was not even voted on. In Japan, the opposition parties
immediately made statements welcoming China to the United Nations and started
to rally for the resignation of the Sato cabinet. On the next day, they resolved to
present a non-confidence resolution on Foreign Minister Fukuda to both houses
of the Diet. Twelve pro-PRC LDP members, including Fujiyama Aiichiro, Furui,
85
The United States which along with Japan, had already decided to implement a “one-China, one
Taiwan” solution at the United Nations, asked the Sato government to cosponsor the two U.S.-
drafted resolutions—one (commonly known as the “reverse important question” resolution for
defining the expulsion o f the ROC as an important question and the other for making the PRC a U.N.
member-state in Security Council, while affirming the right of ROC for continued representation in
the General Assembly. When Sato announced in September 1971 his decision to cosponsor both
resolutions, he brought about quite a public uproar, not only from opposition political parties and
business circles but also from within the LDP. See Lee, Japan Faces China (Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1976), pp. 101~04.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
and Tagawa, absented themselves at the time of the voting and thus showed their
alignment with the opposition party.8 6 (Underline added).
In the October 26, 1971 edition of the Mainichi, the headline title reads “The
People’s Republic of China Joined in the United Nations: the World Trend Shifted”.
The Asahi used salient headline “Chinese Presentation at U.N. Confirmed” on the
front page.
Mainichi printed a story “Walk out of the Assembly Hall with Anger: the
Nationalist Government Representative,” attached a close-up photo of the scene.
The story reads:
...Hearing the announcement of “expulsion,” the Nationalist
government representative steps out the platform and directly
walked out of the Assembly Hall. At this moment, the warm applaud
to congratulate the victory of PRC ceases. Wait until Foreign
Minister Chou shu-kai (Nationalist government) left the hall,
applauds began loudly again.
In contrast, with the feature photo of the thrilled Albanians, on the same page, a
story reads under the headline “the thrilled Albanians: stand up, hurricane of
applause.”
When the historical moment arrived, applause burst out the
assembly hall, and seem to refuse to end....The leading player, the
Albanian representatives, quickly stood up and shook hand with the
Chinese representatives. One Albanian spokesman stepped into the
forum with greatest honor. The expression on his face was
relaxed...
The Asahi also printed identical photos as Mainichfs. It is interesting to note
that the two biggest national dailies filed very similar feature photos for this
8 6 Ogata Sadako, Normalization with China: a comparative study o f US and Japanese process
(Berkeley, 1988), p.43
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
historical event: the thrilled representatives of the countries which support PRC; the
depressed and astonished face of Foreign Minister Fukuda hearing the U.N
decision; the Nationalist representative walking out of the Flail. This might indicate
the identical value standards the two papers pick for news, as well as the collective
message that they want to convey to their readers.
Similarly, both the Asahi and Mainichi were strenuously critical of Sato
government’s foreign policy, as seen in their pages of coverage on PRC’s regaining
of representation at the UN. The Asahi’s front page headlines are: “The danger of
being isolated: at the international political stage,” “The opposition party,
requesting the resignation of Sato: take the responsibility for going against the
historical trend.” On page two, headlines include: “American prestige lost,” “The
pro-China faction, the sign of victory,” “Give thanks to the countries which helped
with China’s return to the U.N.”
The Mainichi expressed its joy in witnessing China’s replacing Taiwan for the
U.N. seat, under the headline “Overjoyed and thrilled: the Chinese-Japanese
business office; extremely angry and irritated: the Nationalist government
embassy,” the story provides a sarcastic picture.
At the Chinese-Japanese business office:
...Before the voting started, we were not necessarily anxious. If
this year does not work out, we can try the next year, so we are
pretty calmed. ...I f China could regain representation at the
United Nations this time, we will drink beer to celebrate, and we
will be thrilled that this place will become the embassy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
For the ROC government’s embassy located in Tokyo, the tone of
the Mainichi report is grim:
...it has been continuously raining from the morning, which makes the
gloomy atmosphere even deeper...
At a Chinese school in Yokohama:
...Thirty teachers and three hundred-fifty pupils had very
delighted expression on their face...When the UN decision was
announced on live TV, in a meeting room where the photo of
Chairman Mao was hung, the 30 students cheered and applauded.
The headmaster made the remark: “to build up a friendly
relationship with China is the world trend.”
According to the Mainichi, even the sky colors shifted in accordance with the
political trends.
. ..When the decision that PRC entered the UN was made.. .the sky
over Peking is bright without a single cloud. The sky over Tokyo
is especially cloudy and gloomy, so is in Taipei, which symbolizes
the international trend. In the street, in the office, and at the bus
station, it is often heard “it’s gotta be that way.”
Based on Mainichi's interviews with citizens in the street, from company
employees to college students, it is interesting to observe that every selected
interviewee has the identical tone about U.N.’s decision on PRC’ representation.
One might suspect that it is the Mainichi's strategy in presenting a picture of
favorable attitude towards the PRC and Sino-Japanese rapprochement in the paper.
“A company employee” is reported to have said:
...This time, the U.N. really made a function, so the time for world
peace should not be out-of-the-way. By taking this opportunity,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
the Japanese government should seriously think about normalizing
relations with the P.R.C.
“A magazine company employee” has similar historic vision:
.. .No matter how the U.S. and Japanese governments tried to
restrain China from entering the U.N., the historical trend is
irresistible.
“A graduate student in applied physics” is alleged to have made the following
remark:
.. .China will make a greater advancement in science and
technology, although we don’t know when Japan and China can
normalize their diplomatic relations.
The Asahi also published interviews, not with citizens in the street, but with
Akioka lee, the Japanese correspondent in Peking, regarding the significance of
China’s regaining representation at the U.N. A part of the interview goes like the
following:
Q: Regarding the China’s return to the UN, from the Peking
government’s perspective, how do they think of this historical
moment?
A: The P.R.C. represented 7 billion Chinese, so it is no doubt
that China should gain her representation in the UN. The
Chinese see this as a historical trend of the world.
Q: The Sato government should be most greatly shocked by the
result of the voting. Then how do the Chinese see Japan, as
Japan proposed dual-representation resolution?
A: Japan is becoming more and more isolated, if Japan does not
choose to go along with the world trend. When the world’s
middle and small nation have gained more voices, if Japan only
cooperates with the U.S., not only China but also other nations
will think Japan as going against the times.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
The contents and tones of two of Japan’s major papers shed invaluable light on
the conflicting press-govemment relations in early 1970s. Primarily, both papers
seem to be concerned with Japan’s national interest with regard to the Sino-
Japanese rapprochement. If they are Sinophiles, their critics are more likely to be
Sinophobic. These two giant papers are slightly different in terms of style and
narrative: while the Asahi is more intellectual and political, the Mainichi is more
mass-orientated and lively.
Conclusion
In this thesis, I have tried to tackle the controversy over the fairness of major
Japanese press’s coverage of China in 1966-1972. The core of the controversy is
whether or not it was ethical for the Japanese mass media to attempt to “promote”
Sino-Japanese rapprochement. In order to understand the underlying reasons for
numerous criticisms from both within and outside Japan in the early 1970s, I have
focused on two themes. First, I examined the Japanese press culture and journalistic
institutions within an historical context. Second, I looked at the personal
background and political views of both the accusing and defending camps.
I have offered two basic conclusions. First, the Japanese joumalistic institution
and journalists’ self-identity were different from those of the United States. It is
unfair to judge the professional ethics of the Japanese journalists from the
American “code of conduct.” Second, the debate on the objectivity of China
reporting by the Japanese press reflects Japan’s domestic political conflict over
China policy; more specifically, it is inseparable from the power stmggle between
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
55
the pro-Taiwan and pro-PRC factions within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.
The two camps adopted different value standards. The pro-Taiwan camp insisted
on the Anglo-American “code of conduct,” attacking the major newspapers’ role in
pushing forward Sino-Japanese rapprochement; while the pro-China camp
defended the favorable press coverage of China by emphasizing good intentions
and national interest.
Meanwhile, it is important to note that the realization of the Japan-China
reporter exchanges was not reached through Nihon Shimbun Kydkai (Japan Press
Association); instead, it was built on Reporter Exchange Agreement signed by
politicians8 7 and the Trade Offices (Liao-Takasaki Trade Office). Clearly, the
system of Japan-China reporter exchange was based on political motives for Sino-
Japanese rapprochement. Thus, inevitably, there was a fundamental conflict
between the idea of freedom of the press and the semi-official mission that the
Japanese press was given.
As my content analysis of the two national dailies, the Asahi and Mainichi,
indicates, the Japanese mainstream media was generally favored the Sino-Japanese
rapprochement in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which virtually matches the press
culture in the first two decades in postwar Japan: anti-government, anti
authoritarian, leftist sympathy, and nationalism. Although the pro-China posture of
the Japanese mainstream media bears criticism, the catalyst role it played in the
Sino-Japanese rapprochement cannot be ignored. I must admit that my paper has
8 7 Matsumura, Tagawa, Fund, and Okazaki from Japanese side, Liao Cheng-zhi, Liu Xi-wen, Xun
Ping-hua from the Chinese side.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
not attempted to settle all the significant problems involved. I will consider my
mission accomplished if the assumptions and arguments that I made can stimulate
further study and discussion on the Japanese mass media, focusing on Sino-
Japanese relations from the end of the Second World War to the present.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. PRIMARY SOURCES
Asahi Shimbun. (1966-1972)
Mainichi shimbun. (1966-1972)
The Los Angeles Times. 1972
The New York Times. 1972
The Christian Science Monitor. 1972
2. JAPANESE SOURCES
Asahi Shimbun hyakunenshi henshu iinkai (ed.). Asahi Shimbun Shashi: showa
sengo hen (History of Asahi Shimbun: Section on Post-war Showa Era). Tokyo:
Asahi Shimbun sha, 1995.
________ . Asahi Shimbun Shashi: Shiryo hen (History of Asahi Shimbun:
Reference Documents). Asahi Shimbun sha, 1995
Eto, Shinkichi. Mukoku no min to seiji (politics and the people who have nowhere
to turn for). Tokyo: Tokyo University Publishing House, 1973.
Kato, K. and Kiuchi, H. Shimbunkisha (Newspaper Reporters). Tokyo: Godo
shuppan, 1984.
Mainichi Shimbun hyakusanju nenshi kanko iinkai (ed.). Mainichi no san seki—
shimbun ga mitsumeta gekiryu hyakusanjunen (the three century of Mainichi—the
swift current that newspaper recognized). Tokyo: Mainichi shimbun sha, 2002.
Miyoshi, Osamu & Eto Shinkichi, Chugoku hodo no henko o tsuku: chosa hokoku
jiyu na shimbun no kiki (denouncing the biased reports on China: threat to the
freedom of the press). Tokyo: Nisshin hodo, 1972.
Miyoshi, Osamu & Eto Shinkichi, Shimbun bokoku ron (Theory of erosion of the
nation by the press). Tokyo: Jiyu sha, 1972.
Otani, A. Shimbunkisha ga abunai (Newspaper Journalists are Dangerous)
Tokyo: Asahisonorama, 1987.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
Otani, Ken. Mondai kiji: am Asahi Shimbun kasha no kaiko (Problematic
Reporting: the Memoir of An Asahi Shimbun Reporter). Tokyo: Soshisha, 1993.
Suzuki, Kenji. Senso to Shimbun (the war and press). Tokyo: Mainichi shimbun sha,
1995
Tagawa, Seiichi. Nichyu kosho hiroku: Tagawa nikki— 14 nen no shdgen (a secret
memoir of Sino-Japanese negotiation: diary of Tagawa— 14 years witness). Tokyo:
Mainichi shimbun sha, 1973.
Tomeki, K. Shimbun o utagae (Distrusting the Press). Tokyo: Kodansha, 1984.
Tsuchya, Michio. Hodo wa shinjitsu ka? (Is the Reporting Trustworthy?). Tokyo:
Kokusho kankokai, 1994
Tsujimura, Akira. Sengo nohon no taishu shinri (the Post-war Japanese Mass
Mentality). Tokyo: Tokyo University Publishing House, 1981
Yasuda, Shozo and Ishibashi, Kdtard, Asahi Shimbun no Senso sekinin (the
wartime responsibility of the Asahi).Tokyo: Tada Publishing House, 1995.
Zheng, Hui. “Sengo NiChu kankei no hensen,” Inoue Kiyoshi and Eto Shinkichi
(eds.) NiChu senso to NiChu kankei. (The Sino-Japanese War and Sino-Japanese
Relations). Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1988. pp. 330-328.
3. ENGLISH SOURCES
Published Materials
Cooper-Chen, A. “Japan's Great Daily: Editorials in the Asahi shimbun During a
Year of Political Change,” Keio Communication Review, 19. 1997. pp. 67-84.
Eto, Shinkichi. “Evolving Sino-Japanese Relations,” in Journal o f International
Affairs, 37, no. 1 (1983), pp. 49-65
Feldman, O. Politics and the News Media in Japan. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1993.
Jan, George P. “Public Opinion’s Growing Influence on Japan’s China Policy,”
Journalism Quarterly. Spring, 1971. pp. 111-119
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
Hall, I., P. Cartels o f the Mind, Japan's Intellectual Closed Shop. New York: W. W.
Norton, 1998.
Hook, Glenn. Japan ’ s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security.
London and New York: Routledge, 2001.
Huffman, James L. Creating a Public: People and Press in the Meiji Japan.
Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1997.
_ . Politics o f the Meiji Press: the life o f Fukuchi Gen ’ ichiro. Hawaii:
University of Hawaii Press, 1980.
Ito, Youichi. “Mass communication theories from a Japanese perspective.” Media,
Culture and Society, Vol. 12 (1990), pp. 423-64.
Kajima Institute of International Peace (edi.) Japan in Current world Affairs. The
Japan Times, Ltd., 1971
Kim, C. Y. Japanese Journalists and Their World. Virginia: University Press of
Virginia, 1981.
Lee, B., Jung. The Political Character o f Japanese Press. Seoul: Seoul National
University Press, 1985.
Lee, Chae-Jin. Japan Faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the
Postwar Era. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
Mendl, Wolf. Issues in Japan’ s China Policy. NY: Oxford University Press, 1978.
Ogata, Sadako. Normalization with China: a comparative study o f US and
Japanese process. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, UC-Berkeley, 1988.
Radtke, Kurt. China's Relations with Japan, 1945-83: the Role o f Liao Chengzhi.
NY: Manchester University Press, 1990.
Van Wolferen, K. The Enigma o f Japanese Power. London: Macmillan, 1989.
Yoshibumi, Wakamiya. The Postwar Conservative View o f Asia: How the Political
Right Has Delayed Japan’ s Coming to Terms with its History o f Aggression in Asia.
International Library Foundation, 1998.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
Unpublished Materials
Maeno, John Rey. “Postwar Japanese Policy toward Communist China, 1952-1972:
Japan’s Changing International Relations and New Political Culture.” Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Washington, 1973.
Ori, Kan. “Japanese Public Opinion of Sino-Japanese Relations, 1969-72.”
Research Papers, Institute of International Relations for Advanced Studies on Peace
and Development in Asia. Tokyo: Sophia University, 1972.
White, Nathan Newby. “An Analysis of Japan’s China Policy under the Liberal
Democratic Party, 1955-1970.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
Berkeley, 1971.
Yang, Alexander Ching-an. “The Policy-Making Process in Japan’s Policy toward
the People’s Republic of China: the Making of the Liao-Takasaki Trade Agreement
of November 1962.” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1969.
4. CHINESE SOURCES
Dongbei Diqu ZhongRi Guangxishi Yanjiuhui (ed.). ZhongRi Guangxishi Riwen
Lunzhu Mulu, 1945-1982 (Bibliography of Japanese publications on the history of
Sino-Japanese relations, 1945-1982). Shengyang,1984.
Gao, Jing. “Zhongri youhao sanshiwu nian” (Thirty-five years of Sino-Japanese
friendship), Chichihaer Shifan Xueyuan Xuebao Bianzhibu and Dongbei diqu
zhongRi guangxishi yanjiuhui (eds.) ZhongRi Guangxi Lunji, Vol. II (Chichihaer,
1985), pp. 325-336.
Lin, Daizhao. ZhanHou ZhongRi Guanxi Shi (The history of Sino-Japanese
relations in postwar). Beijing: Beijing University Publishing House, 1992.
Lu, Chengzuo, “Zhanhou zhongri biwanglu mouyi banshichu di xieli” (The
establishment of the Sino-Japanese memo trade office in post-war years), ibid., pp.
296-309.
Riben Zhongguo Youhao Xiehui (Zhengtong) Zhongyang Benbu (ed.), translated
by Wu Xiaoxin, et al. Riben Zhongguo Youhao Xiehui yundong shi (History of the
movement sponsored by the All-Japan Sino-Japanese Friendship Association).
Beijing: Shangwu Inshuguan, 1978. (For internal circulation)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
61
Wen, Guoyan & Lan, Juan. Zhanhou Riben Youyi Yundong: 1945-1990 (The right-
wing movement in postwar Japan: 1945-1990). Beijing: Shishi Publishing House,
1991.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

The impact of ethnic mobilization in postwar Japan: A reflection of Japan's two Korea policy

PDF

China's telecommunications race: An attempt by the CCP to achieve technical legitimacy and hold onto power

PDF

Disparity of power: The United States engagement with Korea

PDF

The evolving vocabulary of otherness in pre-imperial China: From 'belligerent others' to 'cultural others'

PDF

A commercial and optimistic worldview of the afterlife of the Song people: Based on stories from the "Yijian Zhi"

PDF

The collapse of Japan's bubble economy and its consequences

PDF

National character studies in America and Japan: Toward a new understanding of nihonjinron

PDF

How China's economic reform changed domestic circumstances for exports during the 1980s

PDF

Representations of the mother as origin and force of life in Japanese literature and history

PDF

China's periphery in perspective: A comparative look at the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and Shenzhen Special Economic Zone

PDF

Maternal devotion: the symbiotic relationship between mothers and sons in Yi Jian Zhi

PDF

Nationalism in China: Shifts, contentions, and compromises

PDF

If you build it...: A "different story" of the re-emergence of baseball in China, the people who play it, and why

PDF

The dilemma of Chinese students in America: To return or stay?

PDF

From denationalization to patriotic leadership: Chinese Christian colleges, 1920s--1930s

PDF

Japan's modernization and troubled identity: Grappling with the West and other foreigners

PDF

Ito Noe: Living in freedom. A critique of personal growth in Japanese society

PDF

The death penalty in Japan and China: A comparative study

PDF

China's Korean minority: A study in the dissolution of ethnic identity

PDF

Ethnic identity and nationalism in Taiwan

Asset Metadata

Creator Wang, Zhen (author)

Core Title The Japanese mainstream media in the Sino-Japanese rapprochement, 1964--1972

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag history, Asia, Australia and Oceania,Journalism,OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, international law and relations

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-319208

Unique identifier UC11328848

Identifier 1422421.pdf (filename),usctheses-c16-319208 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 1422421.pdf

Dmrecord 319208

Document Type Thesis

Rights Wang, Zhen

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA