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Heritage conservation in post-redevelopment Los Angeles: evaluating the impact of the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles (CRA/LA) on the historic built environment
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Heritage conservation in post-redevelopment Los Angeles: evaluating the impact of the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles (CRA/LA) on the historic built environment
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Content
HERITAGE CONSERVATION IN POST-REDEVELOPMENT LOS ANGELES:
EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF THE COMMUNITY
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES (CRA/LA) ON THE
HISTORIC BUILT ENVIRONMENT
by
Andrew Robert Goodrich
A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC SCHOOL OF ARCHITECTURE
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF HERITAGE CONSERVATION
December 2013
Copyright 2013 Andrew Robert Goodrich
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to sincerely thank the three members of my committee:
Jay Platt, Trudi Sandmeier, and Don Spivack. Your insight, advisement, encouragement, and
support helped transform what initially seemed like an overwhelming task into a truly enriching
learning experience. I certainly would not have been able to accomplish this without the three of
you, and for this I cannot thank you enough. I would also like to extend thanks to my family and
friends who served as my “support network” throughout this process and waited so patiently for
me to finish. Thank you all; I am so very fortunate.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ ii
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ v
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... vi
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
Premise ........................................................................................................................................ 1
Dissolution of Redevelopment Agencies .................................................................................... 2
Future Implications for Heritage Conservation ........................................................................... 6
Research Questions, Methodology, and Structure ...................................................................... 8
CHAPTER 1: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF REDEVELOPMENT AND CRA/LA .......... 12
Introduction and Purpose .......................................................................................................... 12
Origins of Redevelopment: Urban Renewal ............................................................................. 12
California Redevelopment: Emergence of a Locally-Based Redevelopment Strategy ............. 18
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles (CRA/LA) .......................... 24
CRA/LA and Historic Properties: A Brief History ................................................................... 34
CHAPTER 2: RESIDENTIAL AND MIXED-USE CASE STUDIES ........................................ 40
Introduction and Purpose .......................................................................................................... 40
Case Study: Premiere Towers, 1984 ......................................................................................... 41
Case Study: Grand Central Square, 1995 .................................................................................. 53
Concluding Notes ...................................................................................................................... 66
CHAPTER 3: NON-RESIDENTIAL AND OFFICE CASE STUDIES ...................................... 70
Introduction and Purpose .......................................................................................................... 70
Case Study: Bradbury Building, 1983....................................................................................... 71
Case Study: Broadway Department Store/Junipero Serra State Office Building, 1999 ........... 80
Concluding Notes ...................................................................................................................... 92
iv
CHAPTER 4: INSTITUTIONAL AND PUBLIC USE CASE STUDIES ................................... 94
Introduction and Purpose .......................................................................................................... 94
Case Study: Biddy Mason Park, 1991 ....................................................................................... 95
Case Study: Angels Flight, 1996 ............................................................................................. 101
Case Study: Broadway Streetscape Plan, 1998 ....................................................................... 109
Concluding Notes .................................................................................................................... 117
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 118
Purpose and Structure.............................................................................................................. 118
Conclusions and Key Findings ................................................................................................ 118
Projected Implications of ABX1 26 and the Dissolution of CRA/LA .................................... 125
Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research............................................................... 127
Concluding Notes .................................................................................................................... 129
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 130
v
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure i.1. Summary of key events leading up to the dissolution of RDAs... ................................ 6
Figure i.2. Map of CRA/LA’s City Center Project Area, adopted in 2002.. .................................. 9
Figure i.3. Map of CRA/LA’s designated boundaries for the Historic Core. ............................... 10
Figure 1.1. City inspector evaluates slum-like conditions in Los Angeles. .................................. 14
Figure 1.2. Public hearing on redevelopment and public housing in Los Angeles, 1952. ........... 17
Figure 1.3. Summary of key events in state redevelopment history ............................................. 23
Figure 1.4. Existing conditions on Bunker Hill, 1957.. ................................................................ 26
Figure 1.5. Ann Street neighborhood, before redevelopment. ...................................................... 28
Figure 1.6. CRA/LA’s redevelopment plan for Bunker Hill, 1960. ............................................. 30
Figure 1.7. Bunker Hill after redevelopment activity had begun, circa 1960s. ............................ 31
Figure 1.8. The Salt Box (right) and the Castle (left) being prepared for relocation, 1969. ......... 36
Figure 2.1. Location map of Premiere Towers ............................................................................. 43
Figure 2.2. Present-day view of Premiere Towers ........................................................................ 52
Figure 2.3. Location map of Grand Central Square ...................................................................... 54
Figure 2.4. Interior of Grand Central Market, circa 1930 ............................................................. 56
Figure 2.5. Tiled veneer obscures the historic façade of the Lyon Building, 1962 ...................... 57
Figure 2.6. Present day view of Grand Central Square................................................................. 64
Figure 2.7. The San Fernando Building, located at Main and Fourth streets ............................... 69
Figure 3.1. Location map of the Bradbury Building ..................................................................... 72
Figure 3.2. Bradbury Building atrium, photographed by Julius Shulman. ................................... 75
Figure 3.3. Lankershim Hotel at Broadway and Seventh Street, circa 1907. ............................... 78
Figure 3.4. Present-day view of Bradbury Building, view looking southeast.. ............................ 79
Figure 3.5. Location map of the Junipero Serra State Office Building ........................................ 81
Figure 3.6. The Broadway Department Store. .............................................................................. 84
Figure 3.7. The Broadway-Spring Center Garage at Spring and Third streets. ............................ 87
Figure 3.8. Present-day view of the Junipero Serra State Office Building, .................................. 92
Figure 4.1. Location map of Biddy Mason Park ........................................................................... 96
Figure 4.2. “Biddy Mason: Time and Place,” by Sheila Levrant de Brettville. ............................ 99
Figure 4.3. “Biddy Mason: House of the Open Hand,” by Bette Saar ....................................... 100
Figure 4.4. Location map of Angels Flight, showing current and historic locations .................. 102
Figure 4.5. Angels Flight at its original location at Hill and Third streets, 1939. ...................... 103
Figure 4.6. Present-day view of Angels Flight. .......................................................................... 108
Figure 4.7. Location map of the site for the Broadway Streetscape Enhancement project ........ 110
Figure 4.8. Historic view of Broadway, looking north from Fourth Street, circa 1924 ............. 112
Figure 4.9. Terrazzo tile sidewalk in front of 648 South Broadway ........................................... 115
vi
ABSTRACT
Redevelopment agencies (RDAs) were a key local economic development tool in
California for more than six decades, but were eliminated in 2012 in response to the state’s
ballooning budget deficit. The dissolution of redevelopment is projected to yield wide-reaching
policy implications; however, since the relationship between redevelopment and the historic built
environment has not yet been addressed at length, the ramifications of redevelopment’s demise
on heritage conservation is difficult to predict. This thesis uses this dearth of information as a
window of opportunity to learn more about this relationship as it pertains to one particular RDA:
the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles (CRA/LA). Seven case study
redevelopment projects in downtown Los Angeles that were associated with CRA/LA and
included a conservation component are addressed at length to provide information toward this
end. Analysis of these case studies reveals that CRA/LA demonstrated a commitment to heritage
conservation, exhibited good stewardship of historic properties, and played an influential – and
often critical – role in bringing conservation projects to fruition. Thus, the dissolution of
CRA/LA is likely to produce negative impacts on future efforts to conserve the historic built
environment in downtown Los Angeles.
1
INTRODUCTION
Premise:
Redevelopment agencies (RDAs) represented an important component of local economic
development policy in California for more than six decades. Since their inception in 1945, RDAs
have served an integral role in the preparation and execution of locally-based community and
economic development programs. RDAs were tasked with the identification, eradication, and
redevelopment of urban areas that exhibited signs of physical neglect and economic distress. To
accomplish these goals, RDAs generally approached redevelopment as a multi-step process: the
RDA would first survey an area, create a redevelopment plan, and establish a project area; would
next acquire blighted property within the project area; would make necessary improvements and
prepare the site(s); and would finally sell the improved property to private parties, who would
then redevelop the site(s).
1
RDAs financed their operations using a financing model referred to
as tax increment financing (TIF). Under the TIF model, RDAs could issue bonds to finance the
upfront costs of a redevelopment project, and the increase in property taxes that the project was
expected to generate could then be used to repay the agencies’ outstanding debt. Each RDA
carried out redevelopment in a different manner, although all of the agencies worked toward the
shared goal of fostering investment and economic prosperity within neglected neighborhoods.
However, in 2012 all of California’s 425 RDAs were officially eliminated as a result of
legislation that was initiated by state lawmakers, signed by the Governor, and upheld by the
California Supreme Court. Among the RDAs that were eliminated was the Community
Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles (CRA/LA), the largest and oldest RDAs in
the state. As of February 1, 2012, CRA/LA, through a successor agency created pursuant to the
legislation, continues to carry out contracts legally in effect as of mid-2011, but can no longer
take on new projects.
The dissolution of RDAs was a controversial decision with potentially profound and
wide-reaching implications. However, the potential impacts of RDAs’ elimination on the field of
heritage conservation have not yet been explored. The dissolution of CRA/LA raises many
questions toward this end: what role did CRA/LA play in the conservation of historic and
1
California Redevelopment Association et al. v. Matosantos, S194861 (CA Sup. Court Dec. 29, 2011), 9.
2
cultural resources, and did this role change over time? In general, what kind of stewardship did
the agency exhibit toward these resources within its project areas? In what ways and to what
extent did the agency contribute to the conservation of these resources? How might the
dissolution of CRA/LA impact future efforts to conserve the City’s historic built environment?
These questions are addressed through the analysis of several case studies that shine light on
CRA/LA’s commitment to heritage conservation.
Dissolution of Redevelopment Agencies:
Like almost every state in the nation, California had encountered severe fiscal problems
by the late 2000s, when the “Great Recession” was at its peak.
2
But whereas many states began
to exhibit some signs of improvement when the recession came to an official close in 2009,
California’s fiscal woes persisted, due in large part to the state’s longstanding reliance on volatile
sources of revenue to balance its annual budget.
3
The state’s economic problems came to a head
in 2010. By that November, the state suffered from an unemployment rate of 12.4 percent – the
third highest in the nation – and analysts projected a budget deficit of 25.4 billion dollars over
the following eighteen months.
4
In December, then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger declared
a state fiscal emergency.
5
To many observers, California appeared to be on the brink of financial
collapse.
Shortly after taking office in January 2011, incoming Governor Edmund G. “Jerry”
Brown released an austere state budget proposal for Fiscal Year 2011-2012 that aimed to restore
California’s economic vitality. In addition to deep spending cuts and a series of temporary tax
increases, the Governor’s proposal called for a “vast and historic restructuring of government
operations.”
6
Specifically, Governor Brown called for the elimination of the state’s two largest
2
Elizabeth McNichol and Iris J. Law, State Budget Troubles Worsen (Washington, D.C.: Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, 2009).
3
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “The Recession of 2007-2009,” modified February 2012, accessed May 30, 2013,
http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/recession/pdf/recession_bls_spotlight.pdf; Report of the State Budget Crisis Task
Force (Sacramento: State Budget Crisis Task Force, September, 2012).
4
“California Unemployment Rate Again the Third-Highest in Nation,” Los Angeles Times, November 23, 2010;
California Legislative Analyst’s Office, “The 2011-12 Budget: California’s Fiscal Outlook,” modified November
10, 2010, accessed May 21, 2013, http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2010/bud/fiscal_outlook/fiscal_outlook_2010.aspx.
5
California Redevelopment Association et al. v. Matosantos, S194861 (CA Sup. Court Dec. 29, 2011).
6
Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., “Governor Brown’s Budget Slashes State Spending by $12.5 Billion,”
press release, January 10, 2011.
3
local economic development programs – redevelopment agencies (RDAs) and enterprise zones –
so that government resources could be more efficiently directed toward core services and
operations including public safety and K-12 education.
7
Both programs slated for elimination
had been designed to encourage and reward investment in low-income and economically-
distressed communities throughout the state. As budget negotiations continued into the spring,
enterprise zones were ultimately spared by the California Legislature, but RDAs remained slated
for dissolution.
8
The elimination of enterprise zones was once again put on the table as part of
Governor Brown’s 2013-14 budget proposal; in June 2013, state legislators passed AB 93, which
phased out the program altogether.
9
Governor Brown’s restructuring plan cast a bright spotlight on redevelopment, a
statewide economic development program that had existed since World War II but had largely
fallen out of the public eye in subsequent years.
10
The California Community Redevelopment
Act (CCRA), adopted in 1945 and modified several times thereafter, established a process
whereby cities and counties could stimulate investment in neighborhoods that exhibited signs of
blight or economic malaise.
11
Under the CCRA, participating cities and counties were given the
power to form RDAs, identify blight and establish project areas, acquire private property within
designated project areas, and stimulate investment in project areas through the use of tax
increment financing (TIF). By 2011, 425 of the state’s 540 municipalities had formed RDAs
under the CCRA, and 394 of these agencies were active.
12
In June 2011, the California Legislature passed a set of bills in special session that
determined the fate of RDAs: ABX1 26 and ABX1 27. The two bills were passed in conjunction
and represented a compromise between Governor Brown, who had pushed for the elimination of
RDAs, and local governments, which had fought the Governor’s proposal. The first of these
bills, ABX1 26 or the “Dissolution Bill,” shut down California’s 425 active RDAs by prohibiting
7
Ibid.
8
Max Shenker, “New PPIC Report Focusing on Enterprise Zones and Redevelopment,” EZ Policy Blog, Accessed
May 19, 2011, http://www.ezpolicyblog.com/new-ppic-report-focusing-on-enterprise-zones-and-redevelopment/.
9
Julie Small, “CA Legislature Approves Governor’s Plan to Dismantle Enterprise Zones,” KPCC, June 27, 2013.
10
Julie Small, “How Redevelopment Agencies Work and Why Governor Brown Wants to Scrap Them,” KPCC,
February 2, 2011.
11
Michael Dardia, Subsidizing Redevelopment in California (San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California,
January, 1998).
12
California Department of Housing and Community Development, “All Active and Inactive Redevelopment
Agencies,” accessed May 21, 2013, http://www.hcd.ca.gov/hpd/rda/09-10/app_a1_09-10.pdf.
4
the agencies from carrying out their day-to-day operations. Under ABX1 26, RDAs could no
longer adopt or implement redevelopment plans, enter into or modify contracts, or incur new
indebtedness.
13
Furthermore, ABX1 26 mandated that RDAs turn over any funds not used to
repay outstanding obligations to local governments, which would subsequently use the funds to
finance “core governmental services including police and fire protection services and schools.”
14
The second bill, ABX1 27 or the “Continuation Bill,” permitted local jurisdictions to
exempt RDAs from the provisions of ABX1 26 and allowed the agencies to continue to exist
under a modified structure if certain specific conditions were met. Specifically, an RDA could
remain active if its sponsor community chose to participate in the Voluntary Alternative
Redevelopment Program (VARP), a revenue-sharing agreement in which a city or county “must
agree to pay its proportionate shares of $1.7 billion in [Fiscal Year] 2011-2012 and $400 million
annually for subsequent years to the County Auditor.”
15
Upon receipt of VARP funds, the
County Auditor would subsequently redistribute this money to local agencies and special
districts to help finance such services as schools, police and fire protection, and mass transit –
services that had been traditionally financed by the state’s General Fund.
16
In essence, VARP
funds were intended to help fill projected gaps in the state budget that would have otherwise
been closed by the elimination of redevelopment and the redirection of redevelopment funds.
The passage of ABX1 26 and ABX1 27 was nothing short of controversial. Proponents of
redevelopment, including the not-for-profit Community Redevelopment Association (CRA) and
League of California Cities (LOCC), likened the Legislature’s action to a money-grab, and
contended that both bills were in violation of the California Constitution.
17
The CRA and LOCC
further warned that the dissolution of RDAs would be detrimental to the state’s poorest
communities, many of which had benefited greatly from RDA funding over the years.
18
But
critics of redevelopment sided with Governor Brown, and argued that RDAs siphoned
13
California State Assembly, ABX1 26, filed June 29, 2011.
14
Ibid.
15
California State Association of County Auditors, Uniform Guidelines for the Implementation of Assembly Bill No,
26 of the First Extraordinary Session (ABX1 26) in Connection with the State of California Budget for Fiscal Year
2011-2012 (Draft Report, January 24, 2012).
16
Ibid.
17
California Redevelopment Association et al. v. Matosantos, S194861 (CA Sup. Court Dec. 29, 2011).
18
Mac Taylor, The 2011-12 Budget: Should California End Redevelopment Agencies? (Policy Brief, Sacramento:
California Legislative Analyst’s Office, February 9, 2011).
5
government resources away from fundamental operations.
19
These critics also pointed to
instances in which RDAs were considered to be inefficient and wasteful, and used these cases to
draw a connection between these agencies’ dissolution and the state’s economic vitality.
20
Both ABX1 26 and ABX1 27 were subsequently challenged in court. In July 2011, the
CRA and LOCC requested that the California Supreme Court throw out ABX1 26 and ABX1 27
for violating California Proposition 22, a constitutional amendment that “prohibits the state from
taking funds used for transportation or local government projects and services.”
21
Proposition 22
had been placed on the ballot a few years earlier through the initiative process after the state
redirected a variety of local funds to the state as a budget-balancing move. The CRA and LOCC
contended that redevelopment funds were among the funding sources protected under
Proposition 22. In December 2011, after several months of testimony and deliberation, the Court
issued a decision on the issue: in California Redevelopment Association v. Matosantos, the Court
found that Proposition 22 does not preclude the Legislature from dissolving RDAs, but does
prevent the Legislature from mandating special payments from RDAs for other uses.
22
As a
result of this finding, the Court upheld ABX1 26 (dissolution) and overturned ABX1 27
(continuation). The Court’s decision in California Redevelopment Association v. Matosantos
spelled the worst possible outcome for proponents of redevelopment; not only was the
dissolution of RDAs upheld, but the Court overturned the alternative arrangement that would
have allowed RDAs to continue operations, albeit under a modified structure.
Pursuant to the Court’s direction, all of California’s 425 RDAs were officially dissolved
as of February 1, 2012.
23
However, since most RDAs remained active up until their dissolution,
each RDA was appointed a successor agency that would wrap up business, oversee remaining
19
Ibid.
20
Steven Greenhut, “California’s Secret Government: Redevelopment Agencies Blight the Golden State,” City
Journal 21.2 (Spring 2011), accessed May 31, 2013, http://www.city-journal.org/2011/21_2_california-
redevelopment-agencies.html.
21
California Legislative Analyst’s Office, “Proposition 22: Prohibits the State from Taking Funds Used for
Transportation or Local Government Projects and Services. Initiative Constitutional Amendment,” modified July 15,
2010, accessed May 25, 2013, http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/2012/general_govt/unwinding-redevelopment-
021712.aspx.
22
California Redevelopment Association et al. v. Matosantos, S194861 (CA Sup. Court Dec. 29, 2011).
23
California Legislative Analyst’s Office, “The 2012-13 Budget: Unwinding Redevelopment,” modified February
17, 2012, accessed May 25, 2013, http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/2012/general_govt/unwinding-redevelopment-
021712.aspx.
6
financial obligations, and dispose of assets and properties in the RDA’s possession.
24
A summary
of significant events leading up to the dissolution of RDAs is provided below, in (Figure i.1).
Figure i.1. Summary of key events leading up to RDAs dissolution. Illustration by author.
Future Implications for Heritage Conservation:
Not surprisingly, the Court’s ruling in California Redevelopment Association v.
Matosantos engendered feelings of panic among the 425 local jurisdictions with RDAs. For the
first time in more than six decades, these jurisdictions were forced to envision a future without
24
Noa L. Clark, Robert C. Herr, and Paul C. Levin, “California’s Post Redevelopment Agency Landscape,”
Perspectives on Real Estate (Spring 2012), accessed May 25, 2013,
http://www.pillsburylaw.com/stageFiles/Publications/RealEstateNewsletterSpring2012.pdf.
2/2012: All redevelopment agencies officially shut down
Successor agencies appointed to oversee each agency's outstanding obligations
12/2011: Court issues a decision, rules against redevelopment
Upholds Dissolution Bill (ABX1 26) Overturns Continuation Bill (ABX1 27)
7/2011: Both bills are challenged in Court
Plaintiffs argued that the bills violated the California Constitution, as amended by Prop. 22
6/2011: Legislature passes a set of bills authorizing the dissolution of RDAs
Dissolution Bill (ABX1 26) Continuation Bill (ABX1 27)
1/2011: Brown releases budget proposal, calls for an end to redevelopment
Ending redevelopment projected to save the state approximately $1.7 billion annually
11/2010: Jerry Brown elected Governor, inherits fiscal crisis
Unemployment rate: 12.4% Projected budget deficit: $25.4 billion
7
the steady stream of tax increment revenue that was generated by these agencies. A considerable
amount of press coverage was dedicated to the impact that ABX1 26 would yield on the
financing and construction of affordable housing, since RDAs had represented the second-largest
funding source for affordable housing in California after the federal government since the mid-
1970s.
25
However, only minimal attention has been devoted to the potential implications of ABX1
26 on heritage conservation, defined as the “process of identifying, protecting, and enhancing
buildings, places, and objects of historical and cultural significance.”
26
Heritage conservation is
often referred to as historic preservation; the two terms are used interchangeably throughout this
thesis. Aside from a single article published in the not-for-profit California Preservation
Foundation’s quarterly newsletter, which pondered the future of public-sector heritage
conservation undertakings in the absence of RDA funding, the topic does not appear to have
generated much discussion among the heritage conservation and public policy communities.
27
Likely, the dearth of information toward this end stems from the fact that to date, the relationship
between redevelopment and heritage conservation has not been evaluated in depth. In contrast to
affordable housing, which bore a discernible connection to redevelopment policy, heritage
conservation was never formally identified as an objective of redevelopment.
Furthermore, the information that is readily available on this topic lacks context and
therefore tells a story that is largely ambiguous. An evaluation of various redevelopment projects
throughout the state does not convey a clear picture of how redevelopment affected heritage
conservation. Some RDA-backed projects, including the redevelopment of San Francisco’s
Western Addition (1969-2009), culminated in the demolition of entire historic neighborhoods
and uprooted generations of organic growth within these areas. Yet others, including the
redevelopment of San Diego’s Gaslamp Quarter into a tourist destination (1982-2012),
intentionally aimed to incorporate the community’s architectural and cultural heritage into the
25
Josh Stevens, “Redevelopment Demise Could Hinder Affordable Housing,” California Planning and
Development Report 26.2 (January 2011), 7.
26
National Trust for Historic Preservation, “What is Historic Preservation?” accessed June 29, 2013,
http://www.preservationnation.org/resources/faq/careers-and-/what-is-historic.html.
27
Alicia Fisher, “Life Without Redevelopment,” California Preservation Foundation News (Spring 2013): 8-9.
8
project.
28
Given the variety of outcomes to RDA-sponsored projects that involve historic
buildings and sites, it is difficult to conclude if the relationship between RDAs and heritage
conservation can be generally characterized as cooperative or acrimonious, or if this relationship
evolved over time.
The Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles (CRA/LA), which
was the largest and oldest RDA in the state upon the implementation of ABX1 26, is
representative of this ambiguity. Over its sixty-four year lifespan, the agency amassed an
expansive portfolio that demonstrated an equivocal commitment to heritage conservation.
Several of the agency’s foremost projects, including the implementation of the Bunker Hill,
Hoover, and Beacon Street redevelopment plans, led to the demolition of high concentrations of
historic properties, and were thus often criticized for their lack of sensitivity to the existing
neighborhood fabric. Yet CRA/LA also oversaw a considerable number of projects in which
historic properties were rehabilitated and repurposed, particularly in its later years of operation.
29
Given this information, it is challenging to draw conclusions regarding the agency’s commitment
to rehabilitating and conserving the historic built environment.
Research Questions, Methodology, and Structure:
CRA/LA’s ambiguous role in heritage conservation leaves several critical questions
unanswered. These questions establish the foundation for this master’s thesis. Specifically, I
address the following research questions: what role did CRA/LA play in the conservation of
cultural resources in the City of Los Angeles? Did this role change over time, and if so in what
way(s)? In general, what kind of stewardship did the agency exhibit toward historic and cultural
resources within its project areas? To what extent did the agency contribute to the conservation
of these cultural resources, and in what way(s)? Will the implementation of ABX1 26 impact
future efforts to conserve historic and cultural resources in the City of Los Angeles? If so, what
might this impact be?
28
Leslie Fulbright, “Sad Chapter in Western Addition History Ending,” San Francisco Chronicle, July 21, 2008;
Jordan Ervin, “Reinventing Downtown San Diego: A Spatial and Cultural Analysis of the Gaslamp Quarter,”
Journal of San Diego History 53.4 (Fall 2007), 188-217.
29
Los Angeles Conservancy, “2011 Preservation Awards: President’s Award: Community Redevelopment Agency,
City of Los Angeles,” accessed June 1, 2013, https://www.laconservancy.org/awards/11_cra.php.
9
Pursuit of this topic serves a variety of purposes related to heritage conservation policy:
to supplement the existing body of literature on redevelopment’s demise; to refine and expand
upon RDAs’ legacy; to ascertain the potential impacts of ABX1 26 on future heritage
conservation projects; and to help heritage conservationists and policymakers accurately plan for
a future without RDA funding.
Given the subjectivity of the aforementioned research questions and the nuanced quality
of potential data sources, a qualitative research design was deemed most appropriate for this
analysis. Several development projects that involved cultural resources and were either
undertaken by or received substantial support from CRA/LA are called out as “case studies.”
Each case study is evaluated at length to assess how the operations of CRA/LA impacted the
conservation of the cultural resource, for better or worse. The selected case studies are divided
into three broad land use categories: residential and mixed-use, non-residential and office, and
institutional/public use.
Figure i.2. Map of CRA/LA’s City Center Project Area, adopted in 2002. Source: Community Redevelopment
Agency of the City of Los Angeles. Accessed at http://www.crala.org/internet-
site/Projects/City_Center/city_center_map.cfm.
10
Figure i.3. Map of CRA/LA’s designated boundaries for the Historic Core. Illustration by author and Google Maps.
Seven case studies are selected from within one of CRA/LA’s thirty-four Redevelopment
Project Areas: the City Center Project Area in Downtown Los Angeles, which was adopted in
2002 and includes Downtown’s historic commercial core (Figure i.2).
30
Most of the historic
commercial core area was originally located in the boundaries of the Central Business District
Project Area, which was adopted in 1975, but was subsequently transferred to the City Center
Project Area upon its adoption in 2002.
31
While the selected case studies are drawn from within
the entire Project Area, particular emphasis is placed on a smaller sub-area that CRA/LA defined
as the “Historic Core.” This sub-area is bounded by Second Street on the north, Hill Street on the
west, Sixth Street on the south, and Main Street on the east (Figure i.3). One case study, Angels
Flight, is technically located in the Bunker Hill Project Area, but was nonetheless included in
30
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, “City Center: About the Project Area,” accessed
June 29, 2013, http://www.crala.org/internet-site/Projects/City_Center/about.cfm.
31
Ibid.
11
this analysis since it is in close geographic proximity to the City Center Project Area and bears
historical association with the Historic Core. The designated study area was selected for several
reasons: it has clear administrative boundaries; it features a relatively high concentration of
cultural resources; and CRA/LA invested heavily in this area during the three decades that the
Project Area was active.
32
My findings are presented in subsequent chapters, as follows. The first chapter
establishes a context for the thesis by discussing the origins and evolution of California
redevelopment policy, as well as the origins and evolution of CRA/LA. The following three
chapters identify, describe, and analyze the aforementioned case studies, which are broken down
according to land use type: the second chapter discusses two residential and mixed-use case
studies, the third chapter delves into two commercial and office case studies, and the fourth
chapter addresses three case studies involving public and institutional uses. In conjunction, the
second, third, and fourth chapters elucidate the relationship between CRA/LA and heritage
conservation. I conclude by summarizing my findings, analyzing the implications of the
dissolution of CRA/LA with regard to heritage conservation, and identifying potential areas for
additional study.
32
Ibid.
12
CHAPTER 1: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF REDEVELOPMENT AND CRA/LA
Introduction and Purpose:
Before assessing individual case studies related to the work of the Community
Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles (CRA/LA), it is important to first place
redevelopment policy into a broader historical context, and to understand how the objectives and
policies of redevelopment agencies (RDAs) changed and evolved over time. The aim of this
chapter is to construct an analytical framework upon which the case studies can be evaluated. I
work toward this end in four steps. I begin by discussing the federal Urban Renewal movement,
which was conceived in the interwar period and went into full effect in 1949. Urban Renewal
paved the way for California’s redevelopment program by sanctioning and financing slum
clearance and the redevelopment of inner-city neighborhoods. I then trace the history of
California’s pioneering Community Redevelopment Law from its beginning in 1945 to its
termination in 2012, noting key milestones and changes that occurred along the way. The
California Community Redevelopment Law provided local governments with the statutory
authority and financial resources needed to create RDAs and carry out redevelopment projects,
and enabled the creation of CRA/LA. Next, I include a discussion of the origins and evolution of
CRA/LA, with an emphasis on how the agency’s mission and core objectives were expanded and
reshaped over its sixty-four year lifespan. I conclude with a brief analysis of how CRA/LA’s
general attitude toward historic preservation and neighborhood conservation has evolved.
Origins of Redevelopment: Urban Renewal:
Urban Renewal was an ambitious federal program that developed in response to the
economic and physical decline of inner-city neighborhoods that began during the Great
Depression and worsened after World War II. The program officially began in 1949 and came to
a close in 1974.
33
One of the most controversial and wide-reaching public policy initiatives of the
twentieth century, Urban Renewal sought to rehabilitate the nation’s distressed urban
neighborhoods through large-scale slum clearance and redevelopment programs. Perhaps most
33
William J. Collins and Katherine L. Shester, “The Economic Effects of Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal in the
United States” (working paper, Department of Economica, Vanderbilt University, October 2010), 1.
13
importantly, the program laid the groundwork for similar state and local redevelopment efforts,
among which included California’s Community Redevelopment Law.
The impetus for Urban Renewal can be traced to the economic devastation that was
brought on by the Great Depression. By the early 1930s, many American cities, which had long
stood as testaments to the nation’s economic prosperity, began to exhibit noticeable signs of
physical and economic decline. Problems associated with the nation’s fragile housing market
were largely to blame. High rates of unemployment and poverty associated with the Depression,
coupled with the lack of a strong, centralized federal housing program under the Hoover
administration, resulted in unprecedented foreclosure rates and drove millions of American
households into homelessness.
34
By the time that the Roosevelt administration signed the Home
Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) into law in 1933, scores of homeowners and their families
had already been evicted from their residences.
35
Numerous renters also faced eviction because
of their inability to keep up with rent payments.
36
As many evictees squeezed in with relatives,
overcrowding and slum-like living conditions abounded.
37
Others squatted or took up residence
in makeshift shantytowns – satirically referred to as Hoovervilles – which often lacked such
basic amenities as electricity and running water.
These issues took a heavy physical and economic toll on the urban landscape, and
deterioration and blight became increasingly evident in inner-city neighborhoods across the
nation (Figure 1.1).
38
Mounting pressure was placed on government officials at all levels to take
measures in order to alleviate the nation’s blight problem. In 1943, real estate economist Homer
Hoyt likened the distressed state of American cities to a disease and called upon government
34
Jon C. Teaford, The Twentieth-Century American City: Problem, Promise, and Reality (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1993), 75-81.
35
Ibid.
36
University of Washington Pacific Northwest Labor and Civil Rights Projects, “Hoovervilles and Homelessness,”
modified 2009, accessed July 16, 2013, http://depts.washington.edu/depress/hooverville.shtml.
37
David C. Wheelock, “Changing the Rules: State Mortgage Foreclosure Moratoria during the Great Depression,”
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 90.6 (November/December 2008): 569-584.
38
“Blight,” as defined by the State of California, refers to a combination of physical (such as vacant, decrepit, or
unsafe buildings) and economic (such as declining property values, high crime rates, high poverty rates) conditions
that prevent private enterprise from investing in a given area. The specific physical and economic conditions that
comprise blight are listed in the definition of blight in the California Health and Safety Code, §33031 Each
redevelopment agency was able to adapt this broad definition to their own community.
14
officials to take action: “like a cancer, blight spreads through all the tissues of the urban body
and the urban organism [is] unable to cure itself except by a major surgical operation.”
39
Figure 1.1. City inspector evaluates slum-like conditions in Los Angeles. Source: USC Libraries, Los Angeles
Examiner Collection, File Name: EXM-N-9626-001~11.tiff.
Cities experienced further decline shortly after World War II, when suburbanization took
root and many middle-class households moved out of central cities and into new communities in
the suburbs. Post-war suburbanization can be attributed to a variety of factors including pent-up
consumer demand, a severe housing shortage after the war, mass production and marketing of
39
Eric Gordon, The Urban Spectator: American Concept Cities from Kodak to Google (Lebanon: Dartmouth
College Press, 2010).
15
the automobile, and the federal government’s tendency to underwrite mortgages in racially
homogenous, suburban communities.
40
The proliferation of post-war suburbs was detrimental to
cities: as the middle class migrated to new suburbs en masse, so too did business, industry,
employers, and investment capital – all of which had traditionally concentrated in and around
central business districts. Consequently, many cities lost a substantial portion of their economic
base and struggled to remain solvent.
41
Without a strong middle class, inner cities became the
realm of the poor and disenfranchised, many of whom relied on costly government aid and social
services that were generally provided by municipal governments.
42
Crime rates in urban areas
increased, and once-prosperous inner-city communities became inundated with blight.
Congress responded to the ongoing deterioration of inner cities by passing two landmark
pieces of legislation, both of which aimed to improve the general condition of urban
environments: the Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949. In addition to establishing a national public
housing program and securing the role of the federal government in providing “a decent home
and a suitable living environment for every American family,” both pieces of legislation included
provisions that sanctioned and encouraged slum clearance and the redevelopment of properties
that were considered to be blighted.
43
At the core of Urban Renewal was the clearance and
redevelopment of urban slums, which were defined by the United States Census Bureau as areas
that consisted of buildings or structures that “had serious deficiencies, [were] rundown or
neglected, or [were] of inadequate original construction, so that [they] did not provide adequate
shelter or protection against the elements or endangered the safety of the occupants.”
44
In the
eyes of Urban Renewal’s proponents, improving the physical condition of cities was key to the
renaissance of urban neighborhoods.
The first of these acts, the Housing Act of 1937 or the Wagner-Steagall Act, officially
sanctioned the practice of slum clearance for the first time, albeit in a roundabout manner. The
principal objective of the 1937 Housing Act was to establish the United States Housing
40
Robert A. Beauregard, “Federal Policy and Postwar Urban Decline: A Case of Government Complicity?” Housing
Policy Debate 12.1 (2001): 129-151.
41
Ibid.
42
Jan Blakeslee, “White Flight to the Suburbs: A Demographic Approach,” Institute for Research on Poverty
Newsletter 3.2 (Winter 1978-79): 1-4.
43
University of California, Santa Barbara American Presidency Project, “Statement by the President upon Signing
the Housing Act of 1949,” accessed July 15, 2013, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13246.
44
William J. Collins and Katherine L. Shester, “The Economic Effects of Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal in the
United States” (working paper, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, October 2010), 2.
16
Authority (USHA), a federally-funded agency that oversaw the issuance of grants, loans, and
cash contributions to local housing agencies for the purpose of constructing public housing
units.
45
The 1937 Act also built upon the earlier National Housing Act of 1934 or Capehart Act,
which had created the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and sought to make housing and home
mortgages more affordable. But the 1937 Act also included a caveat that encouraged slum
clearance: in order to receive USHA funds, local housing authorities had to guarantee “that one
slum unit be demolished for [each] housing unit built.”
46
Although the 1937 Act only provided
federal officials with a limited role in slum clearance – local housing agencies were neither
required to accept USHA funds nor construct public housing units – it was nonetheless perceived
by redevelopment advocates as a step in the right direction: by 1941, USHA funds had financed
the demolition of 100,000 slum units and the construction of 100,000 new public units in their
place.
47
However, due to mounting political opposition and the onset of World War II, USHA
funding was halted in 1942.
48
The second of these acts, the Housing Act of 1949 or the Taft-Ellender-Wagner Act,
facilitated slum clearance and urban redevelopment on a much larger scale. One of the most
controversial and politically-charged pieces of legislation of its day, the 1949 Housing Act
restored many of the housing-oriented programs and policies that had previously been
established by the 1937 Housing Act.
49
Title I of the 1949 Housing Act also funneled billions of
dollars of federal funding into “the clearance of slums and the preparation of sites for
redevelopment.”
50
Once local jurisdictions had identified, acquired, and razed blighted parcels in
these slum neighborhoods, the sites were graded and equipped with basic public infrastructure
and services, and were then sold to private developers, who were charged with the task of
redeveloping the vacant parcels and constructing new buildings in accordance with the
redevelopment plan adopted by the RDA. By subsidizing site acquisition and assembly costs and
45
Alexander von Hoffman, “A Study in Contradictions: The Origins and Legacy of the Housing Act of 1949,”
Housing Policy Debate 11.2 (2000): 299-326.
46
Ibid.
47
Jon C. Teaford, The Twentieth-Century American City: Problem, Promise, and Reality (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1993).
48
Jan Blakeslee, “White Flight to the Suburbs: A Demographic Approach,” Institute for Research on Poverty
Newsletter 3.2 (Winter 1978-79): 1-4.
49
Alexander von Hoffman, “A Study in Contradictions: The Origins and Legacy of the Housing Act of 1949,”
Housing Policy Debate 11.2 (2000): 299-326.
50
“Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment,” American Builder, September 1, 1951.
17
offering prime pieces of urban real estate at reduced rates, Title I of the 1949 Housing Act
encouraged the redevelopment of inner-city districts by removing the key economic barriers that
had precluded such development in the past. Private developers also benefited from the fact that
the rules stipulating what could be developed on vacated sites were notoriously vague, which
thereby allowed developers to pursue large and profitable projects on these publically-subsidized
sites.
51
Given the scale and implications of Urban Renewal undertakings, slum clearance and
redevelopment projects financed under the 1949 Housing Act often engendered a considerable
amount of controversy and debate, particularly in Los Angeles (Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2. Public hearing on redevelopment and public housing in Los Angeles, 1951. Source: USC Libraries, Los
Angeles Examiner Collection, Filename: EXM-N-9141-019~1.tiff.
51
Jon C. Teaford, “Urban Renewal and its Aftermath,” Housing Policy Debate 11.2 (2000): 443-465.
18
Urban Renewal played in a critical role in the manner by which city-building was carried
out in the 1950s and 1960s. Highly influential figures, such as New York “master builder”
Robert Moses, used the program to their full advantage and initiated large-scale slum clearance
and urban redevelopment projects that brought about significant physical, economic, and social
changes to many of the nation’s largest cities. Entire urban neighborhoods, including the West
End in Boston, Bunker Hill in Los Angeles, and the Fillmore District in San Francisco, were
entirely demolished. Master-planned districts comprised of sleek, modern skyscrapers, cultural
amenities, and large-scale public housing developments were constructed in their place.
However, by the 1970s Urban Renewal had grown increasingly unpopular among some
politicians and members of the general public, due to its tendency to displace the poor and
disenfranchised and its reputation for demolishing large swaths of older urban neighborhoods.
Congress halted Urban Renewal funding in 1973, and folded several of the program’s key
objectives over into the Community Development Act of 1974.
52
By establishing a precedent for slum clearance and providing the financing for doing so,
the federal Urban Renewal program spurred the creation of several state and locally-driven urban
redevelopment programs. Among the earliest and most progressive of these programs was
developed and implemented by the state of California.
California Redevelopment: Emergence of a Locally-Based Redevelopment Strategy:
Redevelopment officially began in California in 1945, when then-Governor Earl Warren
signed the California Community Redevelopment Act (CCRA) into law.
53
The CCRA provided
cities and counties with the legal authority to create a redevelopment agency (RDA), a separate
governing body whose primary task was to “prepare and carry out plans for the improvement,
rehabilitation, and redevelopment of blighted areas.”
54
RDAs were granted a variety of powers
and tools toward this end, including the acquisition of private property that was considered to be
blighted using eminent domain, if needed; the preparation of acquired properties for
redevelopment through demolition and the construction of infrastructure; the sale and/or leasing
52
Ibid, 459.
53
Craig Lawrence Johnson and Joyce Y. Mann, eds., Tax Increment Financing and Economic Development: Uses,
Structures, and Impacts (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 114.
54
California Health and Safety Code § 33131(a) (2010).
19
of acquired properties to individuals or organizations without engaging in the public bidding
process that accompanied most public sales; and the undertaking of “certain improvements to
other public facilities in the project area,” as needed.
55
RDAs were also granted the right and the
obligation to provide relocation assistance for owners and tenants that had been displaced in the
acquisition process.
56
Given these powers and tools, RDAs generally approached redevelopment
in four steps: the RDA would first survey an area, formulate a redevelopment plan, and create a
project area; would next acquire blighted property; would make improvements and prepare the
site for redevelopment; and would finally sell the improved property to private parties for
redevelopment.
57
Proponents of the CCRA, like those of the federal Urban Renewal program,
believed that the clearance and redevelopment of urban slums was necessary to spearhead the
physical and economic rehabilitation of inner-city communities.
The CCRA provided municipal governments with the legal authority to create RDAs, but
did not provide the financial resources needed to carry out redevelopment projects. Financing
was incorporated into the law as part of a 1951 revision, when the CCRA was renamed the
Community Redevelopment Law (CRL) and was subsequently codified into the California
Health and Safety Code. Section 33670 of the newly-codified law granted RDAs the authority to
finance their operations by means of tax increment financing (TIF), an innovative funding
strategy in which agencies could borrow against future increases in tax revenue (above the pre-
existing tax revenue baseline) to finance current projects within a redevelopment project area.
58
California was the first state in the nation to use tax increment financing as an economic
development tool.
59
Under the TIF model, most RDAs issued bonds to finance the upfront costs
of a redevelopment project, and the subsequent increase in property taxes that were expected to
be generated by redevelopment projects would then be used to repay the agencies’ outstanding
debt. TIF was predicated on the “but-for” theory, which assumed that future increases in property
tax revenues would not occur “but for” the use of public funds to finance projects in the
55
California Redevelopment Association et al. v. Matosantos, S194861 (CA Sup. Court Dec. 29, 2011), 9.
56
Lisa M. Feldstein, Rick Jacobus, and Hannah Burton Laurison, Economic Development and Redevelopment: A
Toolkit for Building Healthy, Vibrant Communities (Sacramento: California Department of Health Services, 2007),
56.
57
California Redevelopment Association et al. v. Matosantos, S194861 (CA Sup. Court Dec. 29, 2011), 9.
58
Ibid.
59
Jeffrey I. Chapman, “Proposition 13: Some Unintended Consequences,” Paper, Public Policy Institute of
California, 1998, 12.
20
redevelopment project area.
60
The use of TIF won the approval of the California electorate in
1952 and was subsequently incorporated into Article XVI, Section 16 of the California
Constitution.
61
A tremendously flexible and powerful financing tool, TIF allowed RDAs to
operate with a degree of financial self-sufficiency, and provided RDAs with the necessary
financial resources to undertake large and costly redevelopment projects within their respective
jurisdictions.
Over time, other revisions were made to the state’s redevelopment law. The provision of
a safe and decent stock of affordable housing had always been inextricably tied to slum clearance
and urban redevelopment, but the relationship between affordable housing and RDAs was not
explicitly defined until 1976. That year, the California Legislature passed AB 3674, the next
major milestone in the evolution of California redevelopment law. Per AB 3674, each RDA was
mandated to set aside twenty percent of tax increment revenue that was generated in its
redevelopment projects areas to preserve, improve, and increase its supply of low and moderate-
income housing.
62
Tax increment revenues that were earmarked for affordable housing purposes
– known as the Twenty Percent Housing Set-Aside – were redirected into separate Low and
Moderate Income Housing trust funds, and with few exceptions were predominantly used within
the project area from which the funds were initially derived.
63
As a result of AB 3674, tax
increment revenues associated with RDAs came to represent the second-largest financing source
for affordable housing development in California, after federal funds, and RDAs thereafter were
involved in almost every affordable housing project initiated in the state.
64
The bill also reshaped
the state’s redevelopment program, which had focused primarily on the acquisition and
development of real property, into a broader community and economic development vehicle.
The scale of California’s redevelopment program increased substantially after the
California electorate approved Proposition 13 in 1978, which instituted a cap of one percent on
60
Richard F. Dye and David F. Merriman, “Tax Increment Financing: A Tool for Local Economic Development,”
Land Lines 18.1 (January 2006): 2-7.
61
California Redevelopment Association et al. v. Matosantos, S194861 (CA Sup. Court Dec. 29, 2011), 9.
62
“Redevelopment Dissolution: History of Redevelopment in California,” accessed July 15, 2013,
http://redevelopmentdissolution.lacounty.gov/wps/portal/rdd?1dmy&page=dept.rdd.home.detail.hidden&urile=wcm
%3Apath%3A/lacounty+content/lacounty+site/home/redevelopment+dissolution/rdd+home/home+links+of+interest
s/rd_history+of+redevelopment+in+california.
63
Ibid.
64
Josh Stevens, “Redevelopment Demise Could Hinder Affordable Housing,” California Planning and
Development Report 26.2 (January 2011): 7.
21
the general purpose property tax and resulted in a substantial rollback on local property tax
receipts.
65
Prior to 1978, redevelopment in California was a relatively small program; the
majority of cities and counties did not have RDAs, and those municipalities that did participate
in the redevelopment program generally limited redevelopment to project areas that were
relatively small in area.
66
Since local governments had relied on property tax revenue as the
primary source for municipal budgets, Proposition 13 left many cities and counties scrambling to
identify alternative sources of revenue to account for the funding gaps that arose from the one-
percent property tax cap. Attracted to the flexibility associated with TIF financing and the
relatively lax oversight of RDAs at the time, many cash-strapped municipalities created RDAs in
order to retain a greater share of the property taxes generated within their boundaries.
67
Property
taxes were normally shared among many government bodies, including cities, counties, school
districts, and other special taxing districts, but under the TIF model the incremental revenues all
accrued to the RDA and remained entirely within the municipal boundary from which they were
derived. In addition to increasing the number of RDAs, the fiscal constraints that were brought
on by Proposition 13 also led to an increase in the number and relative size of redevelopment
project areas. Instead of confining project areas to zones measuring less than 100 acres, as was
typical in the earlier years of redevelopment, post-1978 project areas often encompassed
thousands of acres, and at least one city is known to have “placed all privately-owned land in the
city under redevelopment.”
68
State law continued to mandate that twenty percent of tax
increment revenue be redirected to affordable housing projects, but many RDAs exhibited a
tendency to favor commercial projects over residential development after 1978, since
commercial projects generated more sales taxes for the municipality and substantially more tax
65
Ibid.
66
California Legislative Analyst’s Office, “The 2012-13 Budget: Unwinding Redevelopment,” modified February
17, 2012, accessed May 25, 2013, http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/2012/general_govt/unwinding-redevelopment-
021712.aspx.
67
Michael Dardia, Subsidizing Redevelopment in California (San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California,
January, 1998), 27.
68
Ibid; Coronado, an affluent city within San Diego County, created a redevelopment project area that encompassed
the entire city, thus indicating that the entire city suffered from blight. Rancho Palos Verdes and Indian Wells,
affluent cities within Los Angeles and Riverside counties, respectively, also created redevelopment project areas that
encompassed the majority of the city limits.
22
increment than residential development.
69
By the time the program came to an official close in
2012, RDAs’ total share of statewide property tax had increased six fold.
70
Thus, largely due to the one-percent property tax cap imposed by Proposition 13,
redevelopment evolved into an economic and political behemoth that “bore little resemblance to
the small, locally-financed program the Legislature authorized in 1945.”
71
The rapid growth of
redevelopment in the era of Proposition 13 thrust the once-small-scale program into the public
eye, and generated much controversy and debate regarding the redevelopment program and its
core mission. Critics of RDAs were quick to point out that RDAs lacked many of the key
transparency provisions that were typical of local government agencies, such as state oversight
and fiscal checks, and argued that the agencies were able to make significant financial decisions
without adequate public input or support. Critics also challenged the law’s definition of “blight”
by pointing to instances in which redevelopment project areas had been established in the
absence of physical or economic deterioration.
72
Indeed, several municipalities had established
redevelopment project areas and were collecting tax increment revenue in zones that were
comprised primarily of vacant land. While some argued that the redevelopment program had
simply strayed from its core mission of eliminating blight and revitalizing urban neighborhoods,
others argued that RDAs deliberately engaged in graft and corruption. Meanwhile, advocates of
redevelopment defended the program by pointing to instances in which RDA operations and tax
increment financing produced positive, tangible results in the revitalization of depressed urban
neighborhoods and the creation of affordable housing units.
The controversy and debate that accompanied the growth of redevelopment led state
lawmakers to enact a series of modifications and reforms to the Community Redevelopment
Law. One of the most comprehensive sets of reforms to the redevelopment program was made in
1993, when the California Legislature adopted AB 1290, or the Community Redevelopment Law
Reform Act. The legislation included multiple provisions that directly addressed many of the
aforementioned concerns and criticisms that had been directed toward the state’s redevelopment
69
Jeffrey I. Chapman, “Proposition 13: Some Unintended Consequences,” Paper, Public Policy Institute of
California, 1998, 12.
70
Daniel S. Maroon, “Redevelopment in the Golden State: A Study in Plenary Power under the California
Constitution,” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 40.2 (Winter 2013): 453-474.
71
Ibid.
72
Michael Dardia, Subsidizing Redevelopment in California (San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California,
January, 1998). 70-77.
23
program. Specifically, AB 1290 provided a clear and narrowly-defined definition of blight for
the first time; required RDAs to develop implementation plans and justify how the objectives of
the plans would eliminate blight; imposed statutory time limits on redevelopment plans; and
prohibited RDAs from extending financial assistance to automobile dealers, a practice that,
Figure 1.3. Summary of key events in state redevelopment history. Illustration by author.
2012: All redevelopment agencies officially shut down
Successor agencies appointed to oversee each agency's outstanding obligations
2011: Governor Brown releases budget proposal, calls for elimination of redevelopment
Ending redevelopment projected to save the state $1.7 billion annually
2006: State legislators adopt a package of additional reforms to redevelopment law
Further redefinition of blight, restrictions on use of eminent domain
1993: State legislators pass the Community Redevelopment Law Reform Act
Blight definition tightened, implementation plans required, reporting requirements tightened
1978: Voters pass Proposition 13, redevelopment significantly expands
Caps property tax rate at 1 percent Number of agencies doubles
1976: Redevelopment agencies required to contribute to affordable housing
20 percent of tax increment revenue to be set aside for low and moderate-income housing
1952: Redevelopment agencies authorized to use tax increment financing (TIF)
Borrow against future increases in revenue Incur debt through the issuance of bonds
1951: CCRA renamed the Community Redevelopment Law
Redevelopment law formally codified into the California Health and Safety Code
1945: Governor Warren signs the California Community Redevelopment Act (CCRA)
Cities and counties permitted to establish redevelopment agencies
24
especially in smaller communities, had led to communities offering large financial incentives to
lure such dealerships into their jurisdictions to benefit from the sales tax revenues generated from
automobile sales.
73
AB 1290 also created a uniform pass-through formula that redirected a
proportion of tax increment revenues generated by RDAs to other local agencies.
74
A series of
additional reforms that were enacted in 2006 – SB 1206, AB 773, and SB 53 – tightened the
statutory definition of blight, facilitated public participation in the redevelopment process, and
imposed restrictions on RDAs’ ability to exercise eminent domain, respectively.
75
The 1993 and
2006 amendments to the Community Redevelopment Law sought to impose a series of fiscal
checks on a program that had experienced rapid growth and, as noted earlier, was regarded by
many as lacking key transparency and accountability measures.
As discussed at length in the introduction chapter, the redevelopment program was slated
for elimination in 2010, when the state of California was in the midst of a fiscal meltdown. After
a series of legal challenges, all RDAs were officially shut down for new business in February
2012. The outstanding obligations of each RDA are overseen by a successor agency, which is
also charged with winding down the agencies’ operations. Key events in California
redevelopment policy are summarized on the previous page, in (Figure 1.3).
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles (CRA/LA):
The first municipality in California to take advantage of the state’s pioneering
redevelopment enabling statute was the City of Los Angeles, which established the Community
Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles (CRA/LA) in 1948.
76
Over time, CRA/LA
evolved into what became the largest and one of the most prolific redevelopment agencies in the
state. The legacy of CRA/LA looms large in the history of Los Angeles; in its sixty-four years of
operation, the agency “master-planned and oversaw the rise of the city’s downtown financial
district, built the infrastructure and laid the foundation for Hollywood’s renaissance…helped the
73
“Community Redevelopment Law Reform Act,” accessed July 14, 2013, http://www-
scf.usc.edu/~ngale/CurrentCourses/Finance/com-redev-law-act/.
74
Michael Dardia, Subsidizing Redevelopment in California (San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California,
January 1998), 72-73.
75
California State Senate Governance and Finance Committee, “2006 Significant Legislation,” modified October 2,
2006, accessed July 14, 2013, http://sgf.senate.ca.gov/2006significantlegislation.
76
Eric Gordon, The Urban Spectator: American Concept Cities from Kodak to Google (Lebanon: Dartmouth
College Press, 2010), 129.
25
San Fernando Valley rebound from the devastation of the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, financed
the construction of 30,000 units of affordable housing, and left a legacy of significant public
investment in public art throughout its thirty-two project areas.”
77
The variety of undertakings by
the agency left profound impacts on the physical, economic, and social fabric of the city.
Paralleling the origins of the Urban Renewal program, CRA/LA was conceived out of
city officials’ desire to eliminate blight and slums throughout the city. Of particular concern to
city officials was Bunker Hill, a residential district to the northwest of downtown Los Angeles
that had historically been developed as an enclave for the city’s most affluent residents but had
incrementally suffered from disinvestment between the 1920s and 1940s (Figure 1.4).
Consequently, Bunker Hill was considered to be the most blighted district in the entire City of
Los Angeles by the onset of World War II.
78
As the upper classes moved to new residential
districts further away from downtown, Bunker Hills’s once-stately Queen Anne style mansions
were subdivided and converted into rooming houses and residential hotels, most of which came
to be inhabited by a mix of single males, transients, and low-income families. Many of the
subdivided units in these rooming houses and residential hotels lacked basic amenities including
running water, electricity, kitchens, and private baths, and often entire families were crowded
into a single-room unit.
79
Bunker Hill featured the highest population density in the city and
therefore suffered from comparatively high rates of communicable disease. The district also
suffered from high rates of violent crime and property crime, “and the Fire Department deemed
the preponderance of wooden structures a fire hazard to this densely populated area.”
80
In the
eyes of city planners, the crime and squalor that characterized Bunker Hill clearly exemplified
the problems of blight and inner-city deterioration that afflicted cities in the interwar period.
Prior to the adoption of the California Community Redevelopment Act in 1945, city
officials had little power to respond to the deterioration of neighborhoods such as Bunker Hill.
Instead, efforts to clean up the neighborhood were left to the private sector and largely failed.
81
77
Cecilia Estolano, “Sustainable Growth with Equity in Practice: The Example of Community Redevelopment
Agency of the City of Los Angeles,” accessed July 14, 2013, http://21c4all.org/content/sustainable-growth-equity-
practice-example-community-redevelopment-agency-city-los-angeles.
78
Mara A. Marks, “Shifting Ground: The Rise and Fall of the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Agency,”
Southern California Quarterly 86.3 (Fall 2004): 241-290.
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid.
26
The state Legislature’s decision to enact a redevelopment enabling statute was thus a watershed
moment for city officials who had long expressed frustration about their inability to eradicate
slum-like conditions, both in Bunker Hill and elsewhere. Creating a redevelopment agency in
accordance with the state’s Community Redevelopment Act provided city officials with the legal
and financial tools needed to adequately invest in the rehabilitation of Bunker Hill. At its
meeting on April 15, 1948, the Los Angeles City Council voted to establish CRA/LA with the
primary objective of alleviating blighted conditions atop Bunker Hill.
82
Figure 1.4. Existing conditions on Bunker Hill, 1957. In the foreground is Mary Connor Rasche, whose father
designed the Melrose Hotel, pictured at rear. Source: USC Libraries, Los Angeles Examiner Collection, File Name:
EXM-N-12099-002~2.tiff.
82
Ibid.
27
In spite of its ambitious agenda, CRA/LA got off to a slow start. Having been established
in 1948, the agency predated many of the legal and financial mechanisms that were essential to
its operations, and therefore lacked the financial resources needed to undertake redevelopment
projects. Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 first provided local agencies with legal and financial
tools needed to acquire and redevelop property, and the agency lacked the ability to use tax
increment financing until 1952. Both federal funding and tax increment financing were necessary
to finance a redevelopment project the size and scope of Bunker Hill. In 1954, after establishing
a redevelopment project area and submitting a redevelopment plan, CRA/LA applied for and was
awarded $33 million in federal aid for the redevelopment of Bunker Hill, and also received $7
million in matching local funds.
83
But the inextricable connection that the Housing Act of 1949
had created between local redevelopment agencies and public housing was a source of great
controversy among private developers and several elected officials, who likened the construction
of public housing units to a socialist political agenda.
84
Public outcry and political wrangling
temporarily prohibited CRA/LA from using its federal housing dollars and stalled the Bunker
Hill project for much of the 1950s.
In the meantime, CRA/LA embarked on a smaller-scale redevelopment project that was
entirely financed by the city and did not require federal financial assistance. Initiated by
CRA/LA in 1952, the Ann Street Redevelopment Project targeted thirty-nine acres of blighted
development near present-day Chinatown, and was intended to serve as a pilot project that would
help prepare the agency for the eventual redevelopment of Bunker Hill. The Ann Street
Redevelopment Project also stood out as the first redevelopment project that was approved in the
state of California.
85
After conducting an initial survey, which found that approximately two-
thirds of dwelling units in the area met the statutory definition of blight, CRA/LA acquired the
blighted properties, cleared and improved the sites, and then sold the properties to private parties
for redevelopment (Figure 1.5). Properties within the redevelopment site were sold to industrial
enterprises including the Carnation Company, which constructed a processing plant on nineteen
83
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, Bunker Hill Redevelopment Project Area
Implementation Plan: FY 2010 – January 1, 2012, December 17, 2009.
84
William Deverell and Greg Hise, A Companion to Los Angeles (West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 2010), 137.
85
Allen John Scott and Edward W. Soja, eds., The City: Los Angeles and Urban Theory at the End of the Twentieth
Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 95.
28
of the thirty-three acres of land that had been cleared for redevelopment.
86
Although CRA/LA
helped evicted households locate alternate housing, the agency did not construct any new
dwelling units within the redevelopment site. CRA/LA officials projected that the Ann Street
project would yield a return of approximately 650 percent – a figure that justified the public
expenditures involved and painted an optimistic picture for the future of the city’s redevelopment
program.
87
Figure 1.5. Ann Street neighborhood, before redevelopment. Source: Los Angeles Public Library, Housing
Authority Collection, Order Number 00033553. Permission requested – response pending.
In 1959, more than a decade after CRA/LA was founded, the Los Angeles City Council
voted to approve the redevelopment plan and Project Area for Bunker Hill that had been
developed and amended several times by CRA/LA. The Project Area comprised 132 acres of
blighted property atop the hill. The Council’s decision paved the way for CRA/LA to begin work
86
Ray Hebert, “Ann Redevelopment Project Will Provide Industrial Area,” Los Angeles Times, August 29, 1960.
87
Ibid; although the Ann Street Redevelopment Project did bring short-term economic gain to the area, these effects
have not necessarily been enduring. The present-day Cornfield Arroyo Seco Specific Plan proposes to bring mixed-
use development and housing back to the neighborhood as an economic development strategy.
29
on the redevelopment project. As it had done previously for the Ann Street Redevelopment
Project, the agency approached redevelopment in Bunker Hill through a standardized process, in
which the agency commissioned a study of the area and made a determination of blight;
established a project area and adopted a redevelopment plan; acquired properties within the area;
cleared the site by demolishing or relocating existing buildings; improved the site and prepared it
for redevelopment; and ultimately sold improved parcels within the area to private developers
(Figure 1.6). The agency began purchasing and improving the 288 parcels that comprised the
Project Area in 1960, and the project carried on for five decades before coming to an end in
2012.
88
Major changes occurred in the area during this time. In addition to leveling the area’s
hilly topography and completely realigning its circulation network, CRA/LA facilitated the
construction of millions of square feet of office and retail space, 2,500 hotel rooms, 3,250
residences, and 385,000 square feet of cultural facilities.
89
The efforts of CRA/LA dramatically
transformed Bunker Hill from a predominantly residential district into the “financial and
corporate heart of downtown Los Angeles” (Figure 1.7).
90
Subsequent projects that were
initiated by CRA/LA – including the Temple Redevelopment Project west of downtown Los
Angeles (1962), the Hoover Redevelopment Project adjacent to the University of Southern
California (1965), and the Beacon Street Redevelopment Project in San Pedro (1969) were
predicated on the same Urban Renewal model as Bunker Hill, in which the agency sought to
revitalize neighborhoods through area-wide property acquisition and site clearance as the
primary means of eliminating physical blight, followed by near-total reconstruction of the area.
Both the Hoover and Beacon Street projects came to fruition, but CRA/LA ultimately did not act
on the Temple redevelopment project.
CRA/LA’s slum clearance and redevelopment efforts in Bunker Hill achieved their stated
goal of eliminating blight and substandard conditions. The project also resulted in the creation of
a world-class financial and commercial district for Los Angeles. But the project – and especially
CRA/LA’s raze-and-rebuild approach to redevelopment – also engendered a considerable
amount of controversy and criticism even before it was carried out. Various stakeholders and
policymakers expressed concern about the demolition of entire neighborhoods, and argued that
88
Ray Hebert, “4.6 Million Bunker Hill Land Bought in 2 Weeks, Los Angeles Times, May 17, 1961.
89
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, Bunker Hill Redevelopment Project Area
Implementation Plan: FY 2010 – January 1, 2012, December 17, 2009.
90
Ibid.
30
the slum clearance model ultimately did more harm than good in the communities in which the
model was implemented. Given its magnitude, the Bunker Hill redevelopment project drew
much criticism in this regard. Opponents of the project – and of the City’s redevelopment
program in general – lodged a wide variety of complaints regarding the project and cited its
physical and sociological implications. Of principal concern was the displacement and relocation
of existing residents: a total of 7,310 residential units in the Project Area were eliminated in
order to make way for new development, but only a smaller number of affordable replacement
and political activists argued that CRA/LA’s top-down approach to redevelopment – and
particularly its involvement in the financing and construction of public housing units – was akin
to socialism. Some academics have argued that the project created an environment that was
Figure 1.6. CRA/LA’s redevelopment plan for Bunker Hill, 1960. Source: USC Libraries, Los Angeles Examiner
Collection, File Name: EXM-N-12798-002~1.
31
inhospitable to poor and working-class stakeholders in downtown Los Angeles, who had long
called the Bunker Hill neighborhood home.
91
These criticisms of CRA/LA reflected a larger
national backlash to slum clearance and Urban Renewal that had emerged by the late 1960s.
92
The Urban Renewal program had been halted altogether by 1974.
Figure 1.7. Bunker Hill after redevelopment activity had begun, 1968. The Union Bank Building, the first skyscraper
to be constructed on Bunker Hill, is in the foreground. Source: USC Libraries, “Dick” Whittington Photography
Collection, File Name: DW-87-54-B10-ISLA.
By the 1970s, CRA/LA, like many local redevelopment agencies across the nation, had
moved away from its emphasis on slum clearance and the demolition of blighted neighborhoods,
ideas that had once dominated public policy but had fallen out of favor. After shedding its slum
91
Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris and Tridib Banerjee, Urban Design Downtown: Poetics and Politics of Form
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 32.
92
Jon C. Teaford, The Twentieth-Century American City: Problem, Promise, and Reality (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1993), 126.
32
clearance roots, the agency began taking on a wide variety of community development projects
and evolved into a far-reaching economic development agency that approached community
development and neighborhood investment in a more integrated, holistic manner.
93
Instead of
aggressively pursuing the identification and elimination solely of physical blight, as had been
done in the 1950s and 1960s, CRA/LA instead focused on broader policies and programs that
were intended to stimulate private-sector investment in the city’s most disadvantaged and
neglected neighborhoods. Projects financed and undertaken by the agency were much more
varied; the agency helped create and rehabilitate housing units, financed new locally-oriented
commercial development, embarked upon façade improvements and streetscapes enhancements,
and administered the city’s foremost public art program, among other projects.
94
CRA/LA came to play an integral role in the provision of low and moderate-income
housing within the City of Los Angeles. Housing became a key priority of the agency following
the passage of AB 3674 in 1976, which required each RDA in the state to direct not less than
twenty percent of its tax increment revenue into an affordable housing trust fund. The agency
demonstrated its commitment to housing by surpassing the state’s twenty percent housing set-
aside and redirecting twenty-five percent of its tax increment revenue to the construction and
rehabilitation of affordable dwelling units within the city.
95
Private and non-profit housing
developers came to rely heavily on CRA/LA funding and support: CRA/LA accounted for many
of the upfront and predevelopment costs associated with inherently-risky low and moderate-
income housing projects, which in turn provided developers with the financial leverage needed to
obtain additional financing from third-party lenders. Upon its dissolution in 2012, CRA/LA had
spurred the creation of approximately 30,000 new affordable housing units within its designated
Project Areas.
96
The agency played a role in almost every affordable housing development that
was undertaken in the city.
Over time, CRA/LA expanded its scope even further by championing issues related to
social justice and equity. The socioeconomic revitalization of communities complemented the
93
Cecilia Estolano, “Sustainable Growth with Equity in Practice: The Example of Community Redevelopment
Agency of the City of Los Angeles,” accessed July 14, 2013, http://21c4all.org/content/sustainable-growth-equity-
practice-example-community-redevelopment-agency-city-los-angeles.
94
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, “The CRA/LA at a Glance,” n.d.
95
Ibid.
96
Ryan Vaillancourt, “Some Cheer End of CRA,” Los Angeles Downtown News, February 10, 2012.
33
agency’s efforts to revitalize the physical and economic condition of neglected areas. The first
major development toward this end took place in 1986, when the agency adopted a progressive
wage policy that required developers and property owners who were under contract with
CRA/LA to pay construction workers a prevailing wage.
97
CRA/LA’s commitment to equity and
social welfare was further enhanced in the 1990s, when the agency began to coordinate and enter
into comprehensive Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) with local community
organizations and project developers to ensure that community members would benefit directly
from major redevelopment projects that received public subsidies.
98
Each CBA was tailored to
meet a community’s specific needs, but most included provisions for developer-funded job
training programs, local hiring quotas, living and/or prevailing wage goals, and equal
opportunity and fair labor policies. The agency also adopted a series of goals and policies that
sought to advance ecological and environmental sustainability, clean energy, transit-oriented
development, and healthy communities.
99
CRA/LA was among the 425 RDAs in California that were officially shut down for new
business in February 2012, when ABX1 26 went into effect. In addition to standing out as the
oldest and largest RDA in the state, CRA/LA was also among the most prolific: upon its
dissolution, the agency was engaged in “active development projects valued collectively at an
estimated $3 billion” within thirty-four Project Areas located throughout the City.
100
ABX1 26
mandated that the outstanding contractual obligations associated with each RDA be carried out
in full by a successor agency, which most often consisted of the elected body of a sponsor
community. However, in January 2012 the Los Angeles City Council voted against assuming the
role of successor agency to CRA/LA. Los Angeles was one of four sponsor communities that
instead opted to relinquish its RDA to a designated local authority, a separate governing board
comprised of three citizen members appointed by Governor Brown.
101
The designated local
97
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, Policy on Payment of Prevailing Wages by
Private Redevelopers or Owner-Participants, February 24, 1986.
98
Cecilia Estolano, “Sustainable Growth with Equity in Practice: The Example of Community Redevelopment
Agency of the City of Los Angeles,” accessed July 14, 2013, http://21c4all.org/content/sustainable-growth-equity-
practice-example-community-redevelopment-agency-city-los-angeles.
99
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, Layman’s Guide to CRA/LA Policies, n.d.
100
Ryan Vaillancourt, “Some Cheer End of CRA,” Los Angeles Downtown News, February 10, 2012.
101
Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., “Governor Brown Forms Boards to Wind Down Redevelopment
Agencies in Los Angeles, Merced, Stanislaus, and Ventura,” press release, February 1, 2012.
34
authority is responsible for winding down CRA/LA’s operations and managing the agency’s
outstanding obligations.
CRA/LA experienced tremendous growth and transformation over the course of its sixty-
four year lifespan. What initially functioned as a slum clearance operation evolved into a well-
rounded and comprehensive economic development organization that sought “to make strategic
investments to create economic opportunity and improve the quality of life for the people who
live and work in our neighborhoods.”
102
CRA/LA and Historic Properties: A Brief History:
As the mission and principal objectives of CRA/LA evolved over time, so too did the
agency’s general attitude toward historic preservation and neighborhood conservation. Following
is a summary of how CRA/LA’s policies and programs have taken historic and cultural resources
into account between the agency’s inception in 1948 and its termination in 2012.
CRA/LA was established in the midst of the Urban Renewal movement, which placed
great weight on the clearance of slums and the wholesale rebuilding of distressed inner-city
neighborhoods. Redevelopment projects undertaken in the era of Urban Renewal were thus
largely focused on the demolition – not the preservation – of older properties, which culminated
in the widespread demolition of entire older neighborhoods in cities across the nation.
103
City
planners and elected officials of this era tended to look at older properties not as awash in
historic or cultural value, but rather as obsolete, deficient, and harbingers of blight and
deterioration. The goals and policies of Urban Renewal were thus widely perceived as
antithetical to those of the nascent heritage conservation community, and it was largely because
of the loss of older properties associated with Urban Renewal that “a growing public sensitivity
to the needs of preservation” ultimately arose and became incorporated into public policy in the
1960s.
104
The federal program went into effect several years before the national historic
preservation movement came into fruition: urban critic Jane Jacobs did not publish her seminal
102
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, “The CRA/LA at a Glance,” n.d.
103
Lina Cofresi and Rosetta Radtke, “Local Government Programs: Preservation Where It Counts,” in A Richer
Heritage: Historic Preservation in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Robert E. Stipe (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 2003), 119.
104
Ibid, 120.
35
text on the vibrancy of urban neighborhoods until 1961, and the National Historic Preservation
Act was not enacted until 1966. It was largely because of the demolition associated with the
Urban Renewal policies of the 1950s and 1960s that historic preservation emerged as a
worthwhile pursuit.
During its early years of operation CRA/LA did not make historic preservation and
neighborhood conservation priorities, and accordingly historic properties generally did not fare
well under the agency’s direction in this early period. Upon the founding of CRA/LA, its first
chairman, William T. Sesnon, asserted that the agency’s primary objective was to “wipe out
substandard housing…and redevelop it in conformity with its highest use potential.”
105
The
pursuit of this goal, by both CRA/LA and others, culminated in the widespread demolition of
older neighborhoods throughout the city and culminated in the elimination of many of Los
Angeles’s oldest communities. The Bunker Hill Redevelopment Project, which began in 1959, is
a strong case in point. In order to reconfigure and improve the land for redevelopment, CRA/LA
acquired and demolished almost all of the Victorian-era mansions and residential hotels atop the
hill. Demolition commenced in 1960, shortly after the redevelopment plan for the area was
approved by the City Council, and the last residence in the neighborhood was demolished in
1969.
106
As a result of the Bunker Hill redevelopment project, Los Angeles lost a significant
portion of its nineteenth century building stock and some ofits most remarkable examples of
Victorian-era residential architecture. The project also resulted in the eradication of nearly a
century of organic growth that had developed and evolved on Bunker Hill in a single decade.
107
Largely in response to criticism and public outcry regarding the loss of buildings, CRA/LA did
attempt to save and relocate several of the structures to other locations, including Heritage
Square, although arson ultimately destroyed two of these structures after relocation (Figure 1.8).
The controversy and debate that surrounded the mass demolition of Bunker Hill is well-
documented. Many lamented CRA/LA’s perceived disregard for historic buildings within the
Project Area, even though several buildings had been saved, and the city had determined
previously that a substantial portion of the housing stock in Bunker Hill was so substandard as to
105
Ray Hebert, “Bunker Fishbowl: House on Hill is Alone but Not Forgotten,” Los Angeles Times, June 15, 1969.
106
Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris and Tridib Banerjee, Urban Design Downtown: Poetics and Politics of Form
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 32.
107
Ibid.
36
Figure 1.8. The Salt Box (right) and the Castle (left) being prepared for relocation, 1969. Source: Los Angeles
Public Library, Herald Examiner Collection, Order Number 00059374. Permission requested – response pending.
not be adequately safe or healthful for inhabitation. The author of a Los Angeles Times article
from 1953 lamented the impending loss of the buildings associated with the Bunker Hill
Redevelopment Project, stating that “old buildings are living things to me, and it grieves me to
see them die…their fatality has been high of late.”
108
A subsequent Los Angeles Times article
from 1979, which looked back on the conception of the Bunker Hill project, stated that “the
tragedy of Bunker Hill was the city’s failure to recognize the historic and architectural value of
its old mansions and the way of life they once stood for.”
109
108
Timothy G. Turner, “Lament for the Death of our Venerable Buildings,” Los Angeles Times, November 27, 1953.
109
Ray Hebert, “Bunker Hill: Slow Rise to High Rise,” Los Angeles Times, April 15, 1979.
37
Subsequent projects undertaken by CRA/LA in the 1960s also resulted in the widespread
demolition of older properties. Under the Hoover Redevelopment Project, which was approved
in 1966 in conjunction with the University of Southern California’s expansion plan, 166 acres of
stores and older residences adjacent to the university were demolished to make way for new
residential units and commercial and institutional amenities, many of which were intended to
serve the university.
110
Dozens of turn-of-the-century residences, rooming houses, and
commercial buildings that comprised the character of the University Park area were eliminated in
the process.
111
A similar case involved the Beacon Street Redevelopment Project in San Pedro,
which was approved in 1969. One of the oldest commercial corridors in Los Angeles, Beacon
Street contained a concentration of forty-seven turn-of-the-century buildings “of architectural
value that form part of an unusually consistent and well-scaled streetscape.”
112
Despite a plan put
forward by local architects in 1968 to rehabilitate the old buildings, CRA/LA moved forward
with a comprehensive redevelopment plan for the Project Area, which called for the demolition
of the commercial buildings on Beacon Street and the subsequent construction of affordable
housing, offices, stores, banks, and a mall.
113
Four intact blocks of historic commercial buildings
along Beacon Street had been demolished by 1976, leaving “only a weed-choked field where
generations of seamen once bellied up to the bar.”
114
Early projects such as Bunker Hill, Hoover,
and Beacon Street drove a wedge between CRA/LA and the heritage conservation community.
However, as CRA/LA moved away from its Urban Renewal roots and adopted a more
holistic and comprehensive approach to urban redevelopment in the 1970s and 1980s, the agency
also took a much more proactive role in neighborhood conservation and the rehabilitation of
existing buildings within its Project Areas. Older buildings came to be embraced for their
historic character. Throughout the 1980s, the agency provided critical financing for the
rehabilitation of a large number of historic properties within its project areas. Numerous
residential hotels and residences were converted into low- and moderate-income housing, and
numerous single- and multi-family structures were rehabilitated in communities from Boyle and
Lincoln Heights to Pico-Union and West Adams. CRA/LA financed and oversaw several high-
110
Ray Hebert, “Bulldozers – and a Big Boost: Hoover Redevelopment Project: Slum’s No Longer the Word,” Los
Angeles Times, August 7, 1972.
111
Ibid.
112
Tony Shultz, “Architects Want to Save Beacon Street,” Los Angeles Times, October 27, 1968.
113
Ibid.
114
Jerry Ruhlow, “Beacon St. Looks Back and Ahead,” Los Angeles Times, November 28, 1976.
38
profile conservation projects in downtown Los Angeles, among which included the
rehabilitation, modernization and expansion of the Central Library building in the 1980s.
115
The
agency also played a role in identifying potential historic properties within its Project Areas by
financing historic resource surveys within its project areas beginning in the 1990s.
116
Public
sentiment toward CRA/LA and its role in heritage conservation also began to change. In 1982,
CRA/LA, the same agency that came under scrutiny for its demolition of entire urban
neighborhoods including Bunker Hill and Beacon Street, received a historic preservation award
from the nonprofit Los Angeles Conservancy in recognition of its “achievements in historic
preservation and urban conservation.”
117
CRA/LA’s heritage conservation and rehabilitation efforts across the city eventually
coalesced into a comprehensive Neighborhood Conservation Strategy. First adopted in 1991 with
a clear focus then on preservation of historic or culturally significant structures, the strategy
formally articulated the agency’s ongoing commitment to the conservation and rehabilitation of
historic properties in its jurisdiction.
118
Historic properties were no longer seen as a hindrance, as
had been the case in the 1950s and 1960s, but were rather seen as integral components of a
neighborhood’s character and fabric. The agency updated its Neighborhood Conservation
Strategy in 2003, which placed even greater weight on the agency’s commitment to the
conservation and rehabilitation of historic properties.
119
Per the updated strategy, the agency did
not merely rehabilitate older buildings for the sake of heritage conservation, but sought to
integrate these buildings into a larger community-building program. Specifically, the
rehabilitation of a historic landmark within a neighborhood was to be used to catalyze further
neighborhood development. Historic and cultural institutions, including theaters, churches,
hotels, and fire stations, functioned as “anchors” for further investment in the Project Area. A
number of heritage conservation projects were undertaken by CRA/LA under the philosophy set
forth in the 2003 update to the Neighborhood Conservation Strategy.
120
115
Donald Spivack, personal correspondence with author, March 11, 2013.
116
Getty Conservation Institute, The Los Angeles Historic Resource Survey Report, 2008.
117
“Conservancy to Present Six Preservation Awards,” Los Angeles Times, May 30, 1982.
118
Donald Spivack, personal correspondence with author, March 11, 2013.
119
Ibid.
120
Ibid.
39
Between its inception in 1948 and its dissolution in 2012, CRA/LA significantly changed
its general approach to historic preservation and neighborhood conservation. The agency that had
initially pursued projects that culminated in the widespread demolition of older buildings
eventually became a partner in their conservation and rehabilitation.
40
CHAPTER 2: RESIDENTIAL AND MIXED-USE CASE STUDIES
Introduction and Purpose:
Following the passage of AB 3674 in 1976, which required each RDA in the state to
allocate twenty percent of its tax increment revenue to the provision of low and moderate-income
housing, CRA/LA assumed an increasingly-important role in the financing and development of
housing units, both market-rate and subsidized, within its designated Project Areas.
121
Given the
large number of residential hotels and underutilized buildings in and around the Historic Core of
downtown Los Angeles, CRA/LA’s housing projects within the study area primarily involved
the rehabilitation and repurposing of properties that were extant but had either been abandoned
or were underutilized and, in most cases, were in poor physical condition. Many of the buildings
that CRA/LA rehabilitated and/or repurposed for residential use were historic landmarks that
bore some degree of architectural or cultural merit. CRA/LA’s involvement in the rehabilitation
of deteriorated buildings marked a far cry from its previous redevelopment undertakings in
nearby Bunker Hill, in which scores of older and neglected properties were regarded as too
blighted and deteriorated to salvage.
122
Using this information as a general frame of reference, this chapter aims to explore the
overall impact that CRA/LA’s commitment to the provision of housing yielded on architecturally
and culturally significant property within the study area. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on
selected redevelopment projects that embodied a substantial residential component. The third and
fourth chapters address similar issues as they relate to commercial and institutional properties,
respectively. Toward this end, I identify and evaluate two redevelopment projects within the
study area that were associated with the agency’s housing agenda. I begin with an analysis of the
Premiere Towers project (completed 1984), the first attempt to convert vacant commercial and
office space into condominiums targeted at both upper and moderate-income buyers.
123
Although
this project ultimately fell far short of its initial goals and expectations, it clearly demonstrates
121
For more information on AB 3674 and CRA/LA’s involvement in low and moderate-income housing, refer to
Chapter 1: Origins and Evolution of Redevelopment and CRA/LA.
122
In part, CRA/LA’s different approach to deteriorated buildings in the Historic Core and Bunker Hill can be
attributed to the different material composition of buildings within these areas. Commercial buildings in the Historic
Core tended to feature brick, masonry, and/or steel frame construction, whereas residential buildings in Bunker Hill
tended to be constructed of wood. Buildings in the Historic Core, while generally in poor condition, tended to be
perceived as more structurally sound and stronger candidates for rehabilitation.
123
Thirty-two of the 120 residential condominiums in Premiere Towers were intended for moderate-income buyers.
41
CRA/LA’s approach to heritage conservation and helped pave the way for future commercial-to-
residential conversion projects in the area. Next, I analyze the Grand Central Square project
(completed 1995), a mixed-use project that resulted in the development of both market-rate and
subsidized apartments. Grand Central Square was conceived and initiated by a private developer,
but relied heavily upon the ongoing assistance and support of CRA/LA to remain solvent. I
conclude with a brief discussion of what these case studies mean with regard to CRA/LA, as well
as their broader policy implications.
Case Study: Premiere Towers, 1984:
In the early 1980s, nearly two decades before the City of Los Angeles adopted its
pioneering Adaptive Reuse Ordinance, CRA/LA played an instrumental role in the conversion of
two adjacent historic bank buildings into a market-rate condominium development. Residential
conversions were part of CRA/LA’s effort to increase the number of housing units in what was
then-known as the Central Business District Project Area, and reintroduce middle and upper-
income earners to an area that had become overridden with blight and decay.
124
The project,
which was referred to and marketed as Premiere Towers, was unprecedented and stood out as
“the first office building in Los Angeles to be converted to residential condominiums.”
125
For a
variety of reasons, the project ultimately fell far short of its initial goal – catalyzing the
redevelopment of Spring Street – but nonetheless resulted in the conservation and comprehensive
rehabilitation of two historically significant buildings that had been neglected and had fallen into
a state of disrepair.
126
The Premiere Towers project also established a precedent wherein
CRA/LA adaptively reused landmark buildings to create new housing units and to encourage
further investment and redevelopment activity nearby.
The Premiere Towers project was conceived in 1981 as part of a larger adaptive reuse
strategy devised by CRA/LA that was intended to reinvigorate the Historic Core district of its
Central Business District Project Area. This particular project, which was intended to be the first
of many publically and privately-initiated rehabilitation projects in the area, focused on the
124
Ray Hebert, “Spring Street Gem Starts a Renewal,” Los Angeles Times, July 6, 1981.
125
“Condo Project to Open in Financial District,” Los Angeles Times, February 19, 1984.
126
Ryan Fennell, “Better Downtown Living Through Adaptive Reuse?” Planning Forum 9 (2003): 4-27.
42
rehabilitation and repurposing of several landmark buildings clustered between the 500 and 700
blocks of South Spring Street. In addition to converting the two former bank buildings into
condominiums, the project called for the former Security National Bank building (constructed
1917) to be converted into the Los Angeles Theatre Center, a live performance and entertainment
venue; and for the former Los Angeles Stock Exchange Building (constructed 1931) to be
repurposed as a nightclub. Together, these rehabilitation projects were intended to establish the
economic base needed to catalyze further redevelopment activity outward, which would in turn
result in the creation of vibrant mixed-use district in the Historic Core of downtown Los Angeles
and work toward eradicating blight within the project area. In pursuing these projects, CRA/LA
“assumed that their central positioning of housing and entertainment venues in the Historic Core
would draw retail, restaurants, and other services aimed at middle and upper-income earners.”
127
CRA/LA’s redevelopment strategy for the Historic Core, which was predicated upon the reuse
and rehabilitation of neglected buildings, marked a significant transformation from the agency’s
previous undertakings, which had stressed the wholesale demolition of blighted districts.
Premiere Towers, the first residential component of CRA/LA’s redevelopment strategy
for the Spring Street project, encompassed two adjoining landmark buildings that had formerly
housed financial institutions but had since been vacated (Figure 2.1). Both buildings were of
particular historical and architectural significance to downtown Los Angles and occupied
adjacent parcels on Spring Street. The northern of the two subject buildings, located at 621 South
Spring Street, was designed in 1931 by the architectural firm of Parkinson and Parkinson, a
prolific father-son team that was also involved in the design of other landmark structures in the
city including Los Angeles City Hall, Union Station, the Continental Building, and several of the
original buildings and planning features on the University of Southern California campus.
128
The
twelve-story building served as the west-coast headquarters of E. F. Hutton and Company, a
leading brokerage house, and stood out as a well-executed example of Art Deco architecture.
129
The second building, located at 635 South Spring Street, was adjacent to the E. F. Hutton and
Company building and was constructed in 1923 by notable Los Angeles architects Alexander
Curlett and Claud Beelman. Originally constructed as the California Canadian Bank, the building
127
Ibid, 8.
128
David Gebhard and Robert Winter, An Architectural Guidebook to Los Angeles (Layton: Gibbs Smith, 2003).
129
“National Register of Historic Places Inventory-Nomination Form: Spring Street Financial District,” prepared by
Tom Sitton, August 10, 1979.
43
embodies the ornate architectural detailing and base-shaft-capital configuration that are
associated with Beaux Arts architecture, a style that was popular in the early twentieth
century.
130
In addition to standing out as strong and remarkably intact examples of their
respective architectural styles, both the E. F. Hutton and Company and California Canadian Bank
buildings are historically significant for their association with the development of Spring Street
as the financial core of Southern California in the early twentieth century.
131
Figure 2.1. Location map of Premiere Towers, which is identified in red. Illustration by author and Google Maps.
However, by the 1970s the architectural and historical integrity of both buildings – and
the Spring Street corridor as a whole – had become threatened by a variety of forces that resulted
in widespread disinvestment and decay throughout the Historic Core of downtown Los Angeles.
Ironically, the issues that CRA/LA sought to remedy in the Historic Core partially stemmed from
130
Ibid.
131
Ibid.
44
the relative success of its first major redevelopment initiative in nearby Bunker Hill; by the
1970s, almost all of the major financial institutions in Los Angeles had vacated their Spring
Street offices and had shifted several blocks west to the new, corporate office towers that had
been constructed as part of CRA/LA’s Bunker Hill project.
132
The California Canadian Bank,
later known as the First Interstate Bank of California, relocated from its original Spring Street
location in the early 1960s; E. F. Hutton and Company followed suit in 1973, which in turn left
the side-by-side buildings devoid of tenants.
133
Both buildings were subsequently neglected and
fell into a state of disrepair. By the time that CRA/LA had established the Central Business
District Project Area in 1975, much of Spring Street had been abandoned, and the once-thriving
financial hub of the city was largely characterized by vacant or largely-vacant edifices and a
growing transient population.
134
The already-struggling area was further afflicted by the sharp
rise in violent crime and the emergence of the crack cocaine and heroin trades in the early 1980s,
giving the district a “skid row” quality characterized by boarded-up office buildings, drug
dealers, and panhandlers. In 1981, when Premiere Towers was initiated, there existed an
estimated two million square feet of vacant office space on Spring Street.
135
Although the E. F.
Hutton and Company and California Canadian Bank buildings retained their key architectural
features, both properties had become visibly neglected during this time.
The incremental deterioration that transformed the once-thriving Spring Street financial
corridor into “a neighborhood of hoodlums, derelicts, and winos – a neighborhood of echoing
buildings full of absolutely nothing above the ground floor” – spurred efforts to revitalize the
corridor and rehabilitate its constituent buildings.
136
Among the first concerted efforts toward
this end involved the nomination of a roughly-three-block section of Spring Street for
designation as a National Register Historic District in 1978. The Spring Street Financial District,
which comprised twenty-six buildings between Fourth and Seventh streets, was officially listed
on the National Register of Historic Places in 1979.
137
In addition to calling attention to the
architectural and historical significance of Spring Street, nomination of the corridor also served
132
Elaine Woo, “Condo Pioneers Bitter as Spring Street Rebirth Fails,” Los Angeles Times, April 1, 1991.
133
Ray Hebert, “Spring Street Gem Starts a Renewal,” Los Angeles Times, July 6, 1981.
134
Ibid.
135
Elaine Woo, “Condo Pioneers Bitter as Spring Street Rebirth Fails,” Los Angeles Times, April 1, 1991.
136
John Dreyfuss, “Spring Street: On the Road to Respectability,” Los Angeles Times, May 14, 1982.
137
“National Register of Historic Places Inventory-Nomination Form: Spring Street Financial District,” prepared by
Tom Sitton, August 10, 1979.
45
as an early revitalization and economic development strategy. Listing on the National Register
provided the owners of contributing buildings with “favorable financing from government
agencies and [gave] building owners certain tax advantages – two strong incentives to improve
properties.”
138
By the early 1980s, docents from the non-profit Los Angeles Conservancy
frequently led walking tours of the Spring Street corridor, in part to spark public interest in the
revitalization of the district.
139
CRA/LA also became heavily involved in the effort to revitalize Spring Street, as the
physical and economic conditions of the area satisfied the statutory definition of blight as
articulated by the California Community Redevelopment Law. In 1981, private developer
Western Towers Inc., in partnership with CRA/LA, moved forward with an ambitious plan to
convert the two deteriorating former bank buildings into market-rate condominiums that would
be marketed to young professionals and provide what CRA/LA called “a unique alternative for
middle-income households desiring downtown living.”
140
The intended structure of the
partnership between Western Towers Inc. and CRA/LA was typical of partnerships that the
agency often entered into for new construction projects: Western Tower would construct and
manage the new units, and CRA/LA would provide support and critical financial backing to help
reduce risk and make the project economically feasible. Between 1981 and 1984, eleven stories
of former office space were converted into 121 condominium units that comprised a variety of
floor plans. Rehabilitation work also included the preparation of ground-level and basement
space for retail tenants, as well as the construction of parking facilities for 121 cars within the
bottom three levels of the rehabilitated buildings.
141
Amenities to attract middle and upper-
income tenants included a doorman, valet parking service, and a shuttle to the Bunker Hill
financial district. The project was initially popular among prospective occupants; within a week
of CRA/LA’s listing of the condominiums in 1981, security deposits for $2,000 had been placed
on all 121 units within the development.
142
Rehabilitation and conversion of the two former bank buildings was supported and
championed by CRA/LA, “which view[ed] the project as a big step in its drive to provide more
138
John Dreyfuss, “Spring Street: On the Road to Respectability,” Los Angeles Times, May 14, 1982.
139
Ibid.
140
Elaine Woo, “Condo Pioneers Bitter as Spring Street Rebirth Fails,” Los Angeles Times, April 1, 1991.
141
Ray Hebert, “Spring Street Gem Starts a Renewal,” Los Angeles Times, July 6, 1981.
142
Elaine Woo, “Condo Pioneers Bitter as Spring Street Rebirth Fails,” Los Angeles Times, April 1, 1991.
46
housing, both subsidized and at regular market rates, in the Central Business District,” and to
reverse the crime, blight, and decay that had come to characterize the Historic Core by the early
1980s.
143
Accordingly, CRA/LA played an instrumental role in the rehabilitation process and
provided Western Towers Inc. with ongoing support to help ensure that the unprecedented
development project remained feasible and could come to fruition. In the predevelopment phase
of the project, CRA/LA’s involvement was primarily financial; in addition to providing Western
Towers Inc. with a $1.9 million acquisition loan to purchase the side-by-side properties, the
agency also issued revenue bonds to finance the $12 million construction loan that was needed in
order for the developer to begin work.
144
But as the project proceeded, CRA/LA took on
additional financial and administrative duties to ensure the project’s success. Among the boldest
actions undertaken by the agency toward this end involved the issuance of “soft second
mortgages” on several units, in which the agency would provide favorable-term loans to
potential buyers who were interested in purchasing a unit but were unable to obtain private loans
for the full purchase amount.
145
Soft second mortgages ensured that at least some units in the
completed project would remain available to moderate-income homebuyers and individuals with
less-than-perfect credit, which in turn increased the pool of potential buyers and provided the
inherently-risky development project with an added layer of financial protection. Jan Neiman, a
real estate broker for Western Towers, Inc., attested to the importance of the soft second
mortgage program: “without the CRA’s ‘soft’ seconds, the average person who would be able to
buy here would have to be earning $38,000 and be squeaky clean – no bills, no outstanding
credit. But the ‘soft’ seconds make our units available to someone earning about $33,000” –
roughly $76,000 when adjusted to the conditions of today’s market.
146
In addition to extending supplementary mortgages to prospective buyers, CRA/LA
enticed young professionals and middle-income households to the development by offering
innovative and generous financing options. To purchase a condominium unit in the Premiere
Towers development, buyers were only required to put forward a down payment of five percent
143
Ray Hebert, “Spring Street Gem Starts a Renewal,” Los Angeles Times, July 6, 1981.
144
Ryan Fennell, “Better Downtown Living Through Adaptive Reuse?” Planning Forum 9 (2003): 4-27.
145
Mike Teverbaugh, “Urban Pioneers Sink their Roots in L.A.’s Downtown: New Housing in Heart of City
Appeals to Many,” Los Angeles Times, January 5, 1986.
146
Ibid.
47
– an amount that was substantially lower than most comparable new developments.
147
In
addition, CRA/LA implemented a system of graduated interest rates that began at 7.95 percent
during the first year and incrementally rose to 10.95 percent during the fourth year, where it
remained thereafter; at the time, interest rates in the private market averaged twelve percent.
148
The financing terms offered by CRA/LA were much “better than most any deal a buyer could
strike on the open market.”
149
Like the soft second mortgage program, CRA/LA’s superior
financing terms aimed to make the converted condominium units available to a larger sector of
the population, which in turn was intended to increase the pool of prospective buyers in this
largely-untested market.
In 1984, after nearly three years of construction and rehabilitation work, the Premiere
Towers condominiums were ready for occupancy and opened with great fanfare: at a reception to
celebrate and call attention to the completion of the multi-million dollar conversion project, then-
Mayor Tom Bradley, speaking on behalf of the City of Los Angeles, asserted that the project
“reinforces our determination to revitalize Spring Street as a multi-use area, one of residential,
commercial, and cultural living.”
150
CRA/LA envisioned the condominium project as an anchor for future redevelopment
activity in the neglected and crime-ridden Historic Core district of downtown Los Angeles, as
did many of the prospective homebuyers who had provided security deposits when the
conversion project was first announced. But in spite of the fanfare and optimism that
accompanied the completion of Premiere Towers, the project was plagued by financial problems
from the start. In large part, these problems were external and fell outside of CRA/LA’s control,
including a sharp downturn in the condominium market that had taken root between the project’s
inception in 1981 and its completion in 1984.
151
The relatively-high mortgage rates of the time
also deterred potential buyers from investing in real estate; even CRA/LA’s graduated interest
rate plan, which imposed discounted interest rates that ranged between approximately eight and
eleven percent, was high relative to present-day mortgage interest rates, which average less than
147
Ibid.
148
“Tom Bradley Attends Reception at Premiere Towers Condominiums,” Los Angeles Times, June 23, 1985.
149
Mike Teverbaugh, “Urban Pioneers Sink their Roots in L.A.’s Downtown: New Housing in Heart of City
Appeals to Many,” Los Angeles Times, January 5, 1986.
150
“Tom Bradley Attends Reception at Premiere Towers Condominiums,” Los Angeles Times, June 23, 1985.
151
Ryan Fennell, “Better Downtown Living Through Adaptive Reuse?” Planning Forum 9 (2003): 4-27.
48
five percent.
152
The bottoming-out of the condominium market, driven in part by rising mortgage
interest rates, sharply reduced the demand for units and significantly compromised sales.
Although security deposits had been placed on all of the units within a week of their listing in
1981, the majority of interested buyers ultimately backed out, and Western Towers Inc. and
CRA/LA were only able to sell thirty-three of the 121 converted units.
153
CRA/LA’s soft second
mortgages and extremely-favorable financing options did little to entice prospective buyers,
many of whom still found it hard to qualify for first mortgages; thus eighty-eight of the units
remained unsold and unoccupied for months after the project opened. To many observers, the
project appeared to be on the brink of collapse, given that the development had incurred millions
of dollars of debt and was plagued by a stubbornly-high vacancy rate.
CRA/LA responded to the financial problems associated with Premiere Towers by taking
on a more proactive role in the financing and administration of the project. The agency’s
involvement helped carry the project through a period marked by financial problems. In 1984,
after most units in the newly-converted residential development had sat vacant for several
months, CRA/LA sold thirty-six of the eighty-eight unoccupied units to a private investment
syndicate headed by Beverly Hills accountant Murray H. Neidorf.
154
Selling off these units
provided the agency with the capital that was need to repay the multi-million dollar construction
loan for the development project that it had previously guaranteed. The remaining fifty-six
vacant condominium units were sold to Neidorf in 1985 for the same purpose, and Neidorf
subsequently placed all of the eighty-eight recently-acquired units on the market as rental
apartments.
155
But like the condominium market, the rental market in downtown Los Angeles
was also too weak at the time to support Neidorf’s investment, and the project once again
exhibited signs of financial distress. CRA/LA responded by providing Neidorf with an additional
$1.8 million in subsidies to help alleviate the operational deficit associated with the property’s
operation as a rental residential complex. The thirty-three condominium owners who had
purchased units at the property in 1984 were incensed by this action – many of these owners had
expressed concern that “their equity had been evaporated with the conversion of seventy-five
152
Donald Spivack, personal correspondence with author, August 22, 2013; Freddie Mac, “Weekly Primary
Mortgage Market Survey,” modified September 5, 2013, accessed September 5, 2013,
http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/.
153
Ibid.
154
Elaine Woo, “Condo Pioneers Bitter as Spring Street Rebirth Fails,” Los Angeles Times, April 1, 1991.
155
Ibid.
49
percent of the building’s units to rental housing” and believed that they deserved the subsidies
“since they had bought into the CRA’s redevelopment scheme.”
156
Nonetheless, the agency’s
decision to provide Neidorf with subsidies was beneficial, as it prevented the project from falling
into immediate default.
CRA/LA continued to take a proactive role in the Premiere Towers project into the
1990s, saving the project several more times from financial ruin. Faced with mounting pressure
from the owners of the thirty-three condominiums at the property, CRA/LA negotiated a buyout
plan with the owners in 1991, in which the agency agreed to buy back each unit for either the
purchase price or its fair market value, whichever was greater. The agency then negotiated an
agreement with Neidorf, in which the agency agreed to sell him the thirty-three units it had
bought back if Neidorf thereafter agreed to sell all units in the building to a non-profit developer
for low and moderate-income housing.
157
CRA/LA’s buyout arrangement with the condominium
owners went as planned, but the agreement between the agency and Neidorf did not come to
fruition, When unfavorable conditions in the housing market ultimately forced Neidorf’s
syndicate to file for bankruptcy, the eighty-eight rental units at Premiere Towers were
repossessed by CRA/LA, which thereafter assumed all managerial and operational duties
associated with the property, in addition to serving as its primary financial backer.
158
Since the 121 residential units were repossessed by the agency and not by a private-sector
financial institution, tenants were permitted to remain in their units and were not faced with the
eviction that generally accompanied the foreclosure of rental properties to a private lender.
CRA/LA’s involvement in the repossession process also ensured that both historic buildings
remained adequately maintained and did not once again fall into disrepair, as often occurred
when residential properties were repossessed and ownership shifted. CRA/LA eventually sold
the property in 1999 to developer Izek Shomof, who completed further rehabilitation work to the
historic buildings including façade improvements and retrofitting.
159
Shomof at the time had
purchased the building south of Premiere Towers for conversion into loft-style units, and later
bought and rehabilitated additional properties on Spring Street, including the Hayward Hotel at
156
Ryan Fennell, “Better Downtown Living Through Adaptive Reuse?” Planning Forum 9 (2003): 4-27.
157
Elaine Woo, “Condo Pioneers Bitter as Spring Street Rebirth Fails,” Los Angeles Times, April 1, 1991.
158
Ibid.
159
Jason Mandell, “King of Spring Developer Izek Shomof Is Quietly Transforming a Neighborhood,” Los Angeles
Downtown News, November 24, 2003.
50
the corner of Sixth and Spring streets. Both buildings comprising Premiere Towers continue to
function as market-rate housing and stand out as pristine and well-preserved examples of the
1920s and 30s-era financial institutions that characterized Spring Street as the early financial hub
of Los Angeles.
Given the array of fiscal challenges that were associated with Premiere Towers, the
project is regarded by some as a failure from an economic development perspective; the
conversion of this commercial square footage into condominium residential space neither
attracted a strong middle and upper-class presence to the Historic Core nor on their own
catalyzed the transformation of Spring Street into a thriving twenty-four-hour mixed-use district,
as CRA/LA officials had envisioned.
160
But from a heritage conservation perspective, the
Premiere Towers project was largely successful, and clearly demonstrated CRA/LA’s
commitment to the conservation and rehabilitation of historic and cultural properties within
downtown Los Angeles. As part of the conversion process, both the E. F. Hutton and Company
and California Canadian Bank buildings were comprehensively rehabilitated, and their
architecturally distinctive facades were fully restored. Largely out of necessity, some alterations
to the interiors and systems of both buildings were made: interior office spaces that comprised
upper floors were demolished and reconfigured to accommodate residential units, and both
properties’ antiquated building systems were removed and subsequently replaced with modern,
state-of-the art systems that supported residential use and complied with the city’s building
codes.
161
Parking facilities were incorporated into the lower three stories. Neither the interior
spaces nor the building systems of either property bore particular architectural or cultural merit.
With CRA/LA financing, the original developer, Western Towers Inc., cleaned and
repaired the buildings’ Art Deco and Beaux Arts facades, and restored the ornate lobbies and
architecturally significant interior spaces to their original appearance during the rehabilitation
process.
162
The buildings’ intact architectural features, character, and quality workmanship were
marketed to distinguish the Premiere Towers from other residential projects and to entice
potential middle and upper-income buyers to purchase condominium units. Western Towers Inc.
160
Ray Hebert, “Spring Street Gem Starts a Renewal,” Los Angeles Times, July 6, 1981.
161
Ibid.
162
Ibid.
51
and CRA/LA’s emphasis on architectural conservation helped ameliorate decades of
deterioration and damage.
By undertaking the conversion of the E. F. Hutton and Company and California Canadian
Bank buildings into residential units, CRA/LA promoted heritage conservation by demonstrating
how two functionally-obsolete bank buildings could be creatively placed back into productive
use. The agency did not limit the concept of adaptive reuse to residential space: in the late 1980s,
two nearby properties, the former Security National Bank and Los Angeles Stock Exchange
buildings, were converted into an entertainment venue and a nightclub, respectively, using the
financial and administrative resources of CRA/LA.
163
Although all of the aforementioned
projects encountered financial problems of various magnitudes, the agency challenged the
prevailing notion that old and functionally-obsolete buildings were candidates for demolition,
and encouraged private-sector investors and developers to consider investing in historic
properties. It would be years before loft conversions and adaptive reuse became commonplace
along the Spring Street corridor and within the study area – that occurred after the Adaptive
Reuse Ordinance was passed in 1999 – but through the Premiere Towers project, CRA/LA
arguably helped sow the seeds for the adaptive reuse “movement” of the early 2000s.
CRA/LA played a critical role in making the conservation and rehabilitation of the E. F.
Hutton and Company and California Canadian Bank buildings a reality. The financial problems
that were associated with the project from the beginning suggest that in the absence of the
agency’s financial assistance and ongoing support, the project would have encountered a series
of insurmountable hurdles that would have precluded the conversion and rehabilitation of the
two former bank buildings. Specifically, the agency’s unique ability to both issue tax increment
bonds and to provide funds for site acquisition and the $12 million construction loan provided
the project with a degree of financial security and helped developer Western Towers Inc. obtain
the private financing needed to undertake the project. In 1981, when the project was conceived,
the project was regarded as tremendously risky: the market for middle and upper-income
residences in the Historic Core was untested, and the area was generally perceived as blighted,
crime-ridden, economically depressed, and overrun by the poor and destitute – factors that
163
Ryan Fennell, “Better Downtown Living Through Adaptive Reuse?” Planning Forum 9 (2003): 4-27.
52
Figure 2.2. Present-day view of Premiere Towers, which includes both the historic California Canadian Bank
building (left) and the historic E.F. Hutton Building (right). Photo by author.
discouraged risk-averse developers and lenders in the private sector from investing in the
project.
164
CRA/LA’s provision of acquisition and financing assistance subsidized much of this
risk. In the absence of CRA/LA, these two buildings likely would have never been rehabilitated,
164
Ibid.
53
and would have suffered further deterioration and neglect. In addition, the agency’s role in the
financial rescue of the project in subsequent years prevented a messy foreclosure that would have
likely resulted in successive ownership and could have culminated in the buildings becoming
vacant once again. CRA/LA’s ongoing support and involvement in the project ensured that these
two historic properties remained in the hands of a financially stable, preservation-minded
steward – a factor that was critical to the long-term conservation of these buildings. A present-
day photo of the side-by-side bank buildings can be seen on the previous page, in Figure (2.2).
Case Study: Grand Central Square, 1995:
Among the most significant redevelopment projects within the study area that involved
the rehabilitation of historic buildings into residential use and relied upon the support and
assistance of CRA/LA was conceived in the late 1980s and was undertaken in the early 1990s.
The project, which came to be known as Grand Central Square, culminated in the conservation
and rehabilitation of three deteriorated landmark buildings near the intersection of Broadway and
Third Street, at the northern edge of the historic Broadway theater and commercial district
(Figure 2.3). The three buildings were converted from underutilized commercial and office space
into a combination of offices and affordable and market-rate rental residential units.
165
CRA/LA
did not undertake Grand Central Square directly – the project was the brainchild of a private
developer who was interested in transforming Broadway into a vibrant and thriving hub for
downtown Los Angeles – but the agency provided critical behind-the-scenes assistance and
support that helped bring the project to fruition and also saved it from financial ruin. CRA/LA’s
ongoing involvement in the project therefore played a critical role in the rehabilitation of several
historic buildings and catalyzed similar undertakings in the vicinity.
Like the aforementioned Spring Street revitalization project that preceded it by nearly a
decade, Grand Central Square was intended to breathe new life into downtown Los Angeles’s
historic commercial core, which had suffered from blight and deterioration for decades.
However, instead of honing in on Spring Street, Grand Central Square focused on the
revitalization of the Broadway corridor, which had traditionally served as the commercial hub of
165
Lewis MacAdams, “Prophet of Boom,” Los Angeles Magazine, March 1998, 58.
54
Los Angeles but had lost much of its luster in the post-World War II era, when retailers and
entertainment venues decentralized and relocated to regional commercial centers and suburban
malls.
166
The project was conceived in the mid-1980s by lawyer-turned-real estate developer Ira
Yellin, who saw great potential in the revitalization of Broadway and envisioned the corridor as a
vibrant and eclectic mixed-use “district akin to such places as New York’s Greenwich Village or
Denver’s Lower Downtown.”
167
To carry out his vision, Yellin purchased three landmark
properties near the northern edge of the historic Broadway commercial corridor in the late 1980s:
the Million Dollar Theatre (1918), the adjacent Homer Laughlin Building (1897), and its annex,
the Lyon Building (1905). The Homer Laughlin Building and Lyon Building housed a vibrant
and eclectic public market on their ground stories. Yellin purchased all three properties with the
intent of rehabilitating and repurposing the aging buildings, and placed great emphasis on
retaining and repairing each building’s distinctive architectural features. As part of the
redevelopment project, Yellin also purchased the Bradbury Building (1893), which is located
across the street from the buildings he had acquired for the Grand Central Square project. The
Bradbury Building was associated with the other three buildings in Grand Central Square and
Yellin’s vision of a revitalized block, but was rehabilitated separately.
Figure 2.3. Location map of Grand Central Square, shaded in red. Illustration by author and Google Maps.
166
Karl Schoenberger, “Bringing Life Back to City’s Heart,” Los Angeles Times, December 14, 1993.
167
Aaron Curtiss, “Grand Hopes for City Core Downtown,” Los Angeles Times, September 12, 1994.
55
The Million Dollar Theatre, the Homer Laughlin Building, and the Lyon Building were
well-known landmarks on the Broadway corridor that bore architectural and cultural significance
in their own right. Located at 307 South Broadway, the Million Dollar Theatre building was
designed in 1918 by prolific architect Albert C. Martin, and stood out as one of the City’s best-
executed examples of Churrigueresque style architecture.
168
As its name indicates, the building
originally housed the Million Dollar Theatre, a 2,345-seat live theater that was the first
entertainment venue in Los Angeles owned and operated by theater magnate Sid Grauman.
Additionally, the building included ground-floor commercial space and upper-story offices,
which served as the headquarters of the Metropolitan Water District for more than three
decades.
169
The Million Dollar Theatre took on additional cultural significance in subsequent
years as the “first theater on Broadway to feature Spanish-language variety shows.”
170
The Homer Laughlin Building, located immediately south of the Million Dollar Theatre
at 317 South Broadway, was constructed in 1897 by prolific architect John Parkinson. The
building was commissioned by Homer Laughlin, proprietor of one of the nation’s foremost
pottery and dinnerware manufacturing companies.
171
In addition to being one of the oldest extant
commercial structures on Broadway, the six-story Beaux Arts-style building stood out as an
excellent example of late-nineteenth century commercial architecture.
172
Its ground floor had
been occupied since 1917 by the Grand Central Market, an eclectic public marketplace that had
originally served the affluent homeowners on Bunker Hill and was among the most recognizable
cultural institutions in downtown Los Angeles.
173
The upper stories of the Homer Laughlin
Building originally housed thousands of square feet of office space. Attached to the rear
elevation of the Homer Laughlin Building was an annex known as the Lyon Building, which was
constructed in 1905 by notable architect Harrison Albright.
174
The Lyon Building was the “first
fireproofed and steel-reinforced structure” to be constructed in the City of Los Angeles, and
168
David Gebhard and Robert Winter, An Architectural Guidebook to Los Angeles (Layton: Gibbs Smith, 2003).
169
Martha Groves, “Developer Buys Downtown Landmark,” Los Angeles Times, February 10, 1989.
170
Los Angeles Conservancy, “Million Dollar Theatre,” accessed August 14, 2013,
https://www.laconservancy.org/locations/million-dollar-theatre.
171
. Jerry Cohen, “Act of Love: Partnership Purchases 68-Year Old Grand Central Market,” Los Angeles Times, July
24, 1985.
172
Los Angeles Conservancy, “Grand Central Market,” accessed August 14, 2013,
https://www.laconservancy.org/locations/grand-central-market
173
Ibid.
174
Ibid.
56
originally was home to Ville de Paris, an upscale department store.
175
Since 1917, the Grand
Central Market occupied the ground floor of the Lyon Building in addition to the ground floor of
the adjacent Homer Laughlin Building (Figure 2.4)
Figure 2.4. Interior of Grand Central Market, circa 1930. Source: Los Angeles Public Library, Security Pacific
National Bank Collection, Order Number 00007459. Permission requested – response pending.
.
Like many of the buildings in the Historic Core district of downtown Los Angeles, the
Million Dollar Theatre, the Homer Laughlin Building, and the Lyon Building had suffered from
visible signs of deterioration by the time that Yellin purchased the properties in the late 1980s.
Although the Million Dollar Theatre continued to operate as a motion picture venue, it primarily
showed second-run movies and bargain-priced multi-features and rarely showed first-run
175
Ibid.
57
screenings, as the theater had done in its heyday. Years of deferred maintenance had taken a toll
on the building’s ornate façade – a 1984 account of downtown Los Angeles described the
building as “resembling an aging Miz Kitty in her dated dance-hall finery” – and most of the
upper-story offices had sat vacant since 1963, when the Metropolitan Water District moved to a
new location.
176
The Homer Laughlin Building had suffered a similar fate. Although the Grand
Central Market on the building’s ground story continued to operate, the market “was in desperate
need of repairs,” and the building’s five upper stories had been legally abandoned.
177
Upper
stories of the Lyon Building, which had previously housed offices, were used primarily for
storage.
178
Exterior remodeling that had taken place between 1961 and 1962 had resulted in the
construction of a monolithic tiled veneer that obscured the Beaux Arts facades of both the Homer
Laughlin and Lyon buildings (Figure 2.5).
179
Figure 2.5. Tiled veneer obscures the historic façade of the Lyon Building, 1962. Source: Los Angeles Public
Library, Order Number 00033764. Permission requested – request pending.
176
Charles Willard Moore, Peter Becker, and Regula Campbell, The City Observed, Los Angeles: A Guide to its
Architecture and Landscapes (New York: Random House, 1984).
177
Lewis MacAdams, “Prophet of Boom,” Los Angeles Magazine, March 1998, 58.
178
Ibid.
179
Los Angeles Conservancy, “Grand Central Market,” accessed August 14, 2013,
https://www.laconservancy.org/locations/grand-central-market.
58
Yellin believed that placing these monumental yet deteriorated buildings back into
productive use would function as a catalyst for additional redevelopment and investment activity
on the Broadway corridor, and would play a crucial role in “stimulating reinvestment in the core
of the city’s historic downtown area.”
180
In 1987, after he had purchased the three subject
buildings, Yellin articulated his vision for Grand Central Square: in addition to renovating the
public market and the theater, he sought to fully rehabilitate the three landmark properties,
convert the long-vacant upper stories of the buildings into luxury Class A office space, and
construct an eleven-level, 500-space parking garage to support these new uses.
181
Market forces
and a decreased demand for new luxury office space in the area forced Yellin to revisit his plans
and revise the scope of Grand Central Square. Per Yellin’s revised plan, the Lyon Buildng would
continue to be rehabilitated into offices, but the upper stories of the other two buildings that had
been purchased by Yellin – the Million Dollar Theatre and the Homer Laughlin Building –
would instead be converted into a combination of subsidized and market-rate rental
apartments.
182
A total of 121 apartment units were planned as part of Yellin’s amended project;
about half of these would be reserved for low and moderate-income households.
183
Yellin’s vision for Grand Central Square engendered a considerable amount of
enthusiasm and support among area business owners and downtown stakeholders, but this sense
of optimism was not shared by private lenders and financial institutions, who – as had been the
case with the Premiere Towers project a decade earlier – perceived the untested market for
downtown mixed-use development as too risky to underwrite. Most lenders contended that
extending financing to an unprecedented project in a blighted area of the city was far too risky a
venture, and refused Yellin’s requests to underwrite the project.
184
Others, who had initially
expressed some interest in the project, “backed away after they visited the neighborhood, a
largely Latino shopping district lined with sagging buildings and garish signs.”
185
A 1993 quote
from commercial real estate executive Robert Caudill expresses the general sentiment of private
lenders toward the project: “economically, the numbers really don’t pan out. I just don’t
180
Justin Harmon, “Visionary Links Worlds in Downtown Los Angeles,” Princeton Alumni Weekly 95.1 (September
14, 1994), 39.
181
Martha Groves, “Developer Buys Downtown Landmark,” Los Angeles Times, February 10, 1989.
182
Iris Yokai, “City Council Oks Grand Central Loan,” Los Angeles Times, December 6, 1992.
183
Ibid.
184
Ted Rohrlich, “City Made Bad Real Estate Investments, Report Shows,” Los Angeles Times, March 30, 1999.
185
Aaron Curtiss, “Grand Hopes for City Core Downtown,” Los Angeles Times, September 12, 1994.
59
understand what forces are behind the renovation of buildings on Broadway and Spring
[Street].”
186
After years of reaching out to lenders with roots in the downtown Los Angeles area,
Yellin was ultimately able to secure $20 million of privately-financed loans, mostly from his
friends and personal acquaintances; this accounted for less than a third of the projected $64
million price tag that was associated with rehabilitating and repurposing the three subject
buildings.
187
To help bridge this funding gap, Yellin reached out to public agencies for
assistance and support, including CRA/LA.
CRA/LA played an instrumental role in bridging this funding gap and making Yellin’s
vision a reality. Yellin’s plan for the revitalization of Grand Central Square was consistent with
the agency’s mission to stimulate reinvestment in the Historic Core of downtown Los Angeles.
In 1987, CRA/LA’s governing board authorized the future issuance and sale of tax increment
bonds to finance Grand Central Square.
188
Several years later, in 1993, the agency issued $44
million of bonds that it had previously approved, which supplemented the $20 million of
financing that Yellin had secured from private sources and bridged the funding gap that had
previously prevented the project from moving forward.
189
In a somewhat unconventional
arrangement, CRA/LA’s support was augmented by that of the Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), which agreed to service a portion of the bond
debt in exchange for collecting a portion of the revenue that would be generated by the
project.
190
The MTA’s involvement in the project was justified by its proximity to a station for
the recently-constructed Red Line subway line; MTA officials postulated that the renovation of
Grand Central Market and the introduction of residential units to the area would bolster ridership
numbers on the subway.
191
In cooperation with the MTA, CRA/LA issued two bonds in support
of Grand Central Square: (1) a Qualified Redevelopment Bond (QRB), and (2) a Multifamily
186
Karl Schoenberger, “Bringing Life Back to City’s Heart,” Los Angeles Times, December 14, 1993.
187
Ryan Fennell, “Better Downtown Living Through Adaptive Reuse?” Planning Forum 9 (2003): 4-27.
188
Bill Boyarsky, “Bond Plan OKd for Renovating Million Dollar Theater, Market,” Los Angeles Times, December
24, 1987.
189
Ryan Fennell, “Better Downtown Living Through Adaptive Reuse?” Planning Forum 9 (2003): 4-27.
190
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Finance and Budget Committee Recommendation,
June 9, 1993.
191
Aaron Curtiss, “Grand Hopes for City Core Downtown,” Los Angeles Times, September 12, 1994.
60
Housing Bond (MHB) “to renovate and improve the Grand Central Market and three ancillary
buildings:” the Million Dollar Theatre, the Homer Laughlin Building, and the Lyon Building.
192
By subsidizing the risk associated with Grand Central Square that private lenders had
previously balked at, CRA/LA and the MTA provided Yellin with the financial means that were
needed to begin work on Grand Central Square. The project, which had been revised and
amended several times following its inception in 1987, ultimately included four components: (1)
a full-scale rehabilitation of Grand Central Market, (2) conversion of the upper stories of the
Million Dollar Theatre Building and the Homer Laughlin Building into 121 market-rate and
affordable apartment units, (3) conversion of the upper stories of the Lyon Building into
commercial offices, and (4) the construction of an adjoining multi-story parking structure to
service the new residential and commercial uses.
193
Construction on Grand Central Square
commenced in 1993 and was completed in 1995. Upon its completion, the project was widely
perceived as a success, and “garnered national attention as an example of mixed-use planning
and architectural preservation where low-income residents could rub shoulders with movie
star[s].”
194
When Grand Central Square opened in 1995, it appeared to represent a successful
experiment in downtown redevelopment; Grand Central Market thrived, the 121 apartment units
rarely featured vacancies, and much of the office space there and in the Bradbury Building was
rented to the City Attorney’s office and other elected officials.
195
But shortly thereafter, the
project encountered financial problems when Yellin fell “far behind in semiannual payments on
the publically issued bonds.”
196
Foreclosure of the market, apartments, and offices appeared to be
imminent.
197
Yellin’s inability to make essential payments was largely attributed to a general
decline in the downtown real estate market; however, some “blamed the development’s financial
woes on artificially low cost projections” that had been put forward by Yellin.
198
The idea of
foreclosure proceedings was concerning to both CRA/LA and members of the heritage
192
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Pedestrian Improvements and Conceptual Master
Plan for the Pershing Square Metro Red Line Station Area, January 26, 1995.
193
Ibid.
194
Larry Gordon, “Grand Central Rescue Planned,” Los Angeles Times, November 7, 1997.
195
Larry Gordon, “Grand Central Rescue Planned,” Los Angeles Times, November 7, 1997.
196
Ibid.
197
Ryan Fennell, “Better Downtown Living Through Adaptive Reuse?” Planning Forum 9 (2003): 4-27.
198
Ibid.
61
conservation community, as such proceedings would highlight the risks associated with adaptive
reuse projects in downtown Los Angeles and could undermine future efforts to conserve and
rehabilitate other landmark properties in the vicinity. Pursuing foreclosure was also seen by both
CRA/LA and the MTA to be a complicated and messy process that could yield potentially
devastating impacts on the buildings’ tenants.
In November 1997, CRA/LA officials facilitated a complex bailout arrangement among
the agency, the MTA, and Yellin and his private investors so that Yellin could avoid foreclosure
on the three historic Grand Central Square properties. Under the terms of the arrangement, the
two public agencies involved in the project, CRA/LA and the MTA, agreed to cover the portion
of future semiannual debt payments that the project did not support and that Yellin could
therefore not afford to pay.
199
As the lead public agency associated with the project, CRA/LA
would account for a majority of future bailout payments, which were projected to cost the agency
approximately $14 million over a seventeen-year period; the MTA would account for a smaller
portion of the bailout payments, since such payments fell outside the typical purview of the MTA
and had engendered a considerable amount of scrutiny.
200
Both CRA/LA and the MTA presumed
that after the seventeen years had passed, Grand Central Square would be profitable, and Yellin
would be able to repay both public agencies with interest.
201
CRA/LA also took less-favorable
terms under the bailout arrangement, under which the “MTA received priority for repayment.”
202
In exchange for the financial support of CRA/LA and the MTA, Yellin could continue to retain
ownership of the properties and collect management fees, but neither he nor his consortium of
private investors that fronted the original $22 million for the project would be able to collect any
return on investment until both public agencies had been fully reimbursed.
203
The financial
rescue plan was unanimously approved by the CRA/LA board; according to then-CRA/LA
chairwoman Christine Essel in a 1997 interview, providing emergency assistance to Grand
Central Square “is a very, very important component of our downtown redevelopment.”
204
199
Larry Gordon, “Grand Central Rescue Planned,” Los Angeles Times, November 7, 1997.
200
“MTA Role in Project’s Bailout Plan Questioned,” Los Angeles Times, November 11, 1997.
201
Ryan Fennell, “Better Downtown Living Through Adaptive Reuse?” Planning Forum 9 (2003): 4-27.
202
Ibid.
203
Larry Gordon, “Grand Central Rescue Planned,” Los Angeles Times, November 7, 1997.
204
Ibid.
62
Emergency financial assistance provided by both CRA/LA and the MTA ultimately
spared the project from complicated foreclosure proceedings. Grand Central Square continues to
operate to this day, and the public market has recently been slated for another round of
renovations in response to the recent revival of the Historic Core as a vibrant mixed-use district
comprised of an increasing number of middle and upper-income young professionals.
205
From an
economic development perspective, the legacy of Grand Central Square is mixed; many have
commended Yellin’s entrepreneurial spirit for helping catalyze future investment and
redevelopment in downtown Los Angeles, whereas others have pointed to the multi-million
dollar deficit that the project generated as evidence that the city “made some unwise investments
in private commercial real estate projects in the 1990s.”
206
Likewise, CRA/LA’s role in the
financing and subsequent rescue of Grand Central Square has generated mixed opinions:
proponents have credited the agency with saving the project – and the broader neighborhood –
from economic devastation, whereas some critics called the judgment of CRA/LA’s governing
board into question.
207
But from the perspective of heritage conservation, Grand Central Square is generally
regarded as a successful venture that called attention to the rehabilitation and adaptive reuse of
architectural and cultural landmarks in the Historic Core – an approach to development that had
gained a foothold in other cities across the nation but was largely unprecedented in Los Angeles
at the time.
208
Its financial problems notwithstanding, Grand Central Square functioned as a
model of how older properties that have been dismissed as being functionally obsolete can be
rehabilitated and adapted to incorporate new uses that respond to present-day demand and
market forces. From the time the project was completed in 1995, the 121 upper-story apartment
units have been essentially continuously occupied – demonstrating to developers that a market
did exist for residential and mixed-use development in the Historic Core.
209
Due to Yellin’s
entrepreneurship and CRA/LA and the MTA’s assistance and support, a total of three historic
buildings that were underutilized and had suffered from neglect and deterioration were placed
back into productive use. The project, which was ahead of its time and preceded the passage of
205
Betty Hallock, “Major Update Planned for Grand Central Market,” Los Angeles Times, December 26, 2012.
206
Ted Rohrlich, “City Made Bad Real Estate Investments, Report Shows,” Los Angeles Times, March 30, 1999.
207
Ryan Fennell, “Better Downtown Living Through Adaptive Reuse?” Planning Forum 9 (2003): 4-27.
208
Vincent Roger, “How I Made It: Brenda Levin: Restoring L.A. Landmarks,” Los Angeles Times, August 2, 2009.
209
Larry Gordon, “Grand Central Rescue Planned,” Los Angeles Times, November 7, 1997.
63
the City’s Adaptive Reuse Ordinance by almost a decade, “was intended as the staging ground
for the revived downtown residential and shopping district” and served as a catalyst for the
rehabilitation of other deteriorated yet significant historic properties nearby.
210
As a partial response to those who questioned CRA/LA’s judgment in participating in the
project, one of the first and most publicized adaptive reuse projects to be undertaken in
downtown Los Angeles, Grand Central Square marked a pivotal moment in the eventual
transformation of the Historic Core into a vibrant mixed-use community in the early 2000s. Ira
Yellin asserted in 1998 that Grand Central Square “created an economic catalyst for this part of
downtown; 140,000 square feet of real estate have been brought back on the market; hundreds of
low-income people are being employed; from a tax base that was dormant, we created a tax
revenue stream that is going to go on forever.”
211
In addition to helping place three underutilized historic buildings back into productive
use, the completion of Grand Central Square resulted in the rehabilitation of the upper stories of
the Million Dollar Theatre, as well as the rehabilitation of the Homer Laughlin Building and the
Lyon Building.
212
Recognizing the economic benefits of preserving the historic character of the
buildings, Yellin ensured that national historic preservation standards were applied during
construction and commissioned Brenda Levin and Associates, an architectural firm well-known
for its expertise in historic preservation, to carry out the work. Toward this end, the facades of
the Million Dollar Theatre, the Homer Laughlin Building, and the Lyon Building were cleaned
and repaired; a non-historic marquee was removed from the primary façade of the Million Dollar
Theatre; non-historic tiled veneers that had been constructed over the original facades of the
Homer Laughlin and Lyon Buildings were removed; and the original Beaux Arts architectural
elements that adorned the façade of the Homer Laughlin Building but had been obscured by the
tiled façade were restored.
213
Although the interiors of the buildings were largely reconfigured in
order to accommodate new residential uses in spaces that had traditionally been used as offices,
Levin restored the character of several interior spaces that bore architectural and historical
210
Levin and Associates Architects, “Urban Revitalization: Creating and Preserving Place,” accessed August 15,
2013, http://www.levinarch.com/urban/grand.html.
211
Lewis MacAdams, “Prophet of Boom,” Los Angeles Magazine, March 1998, 58.
212
Although the upper stories of the Million Dollar Theatre Building were rehabilitated and the building was
seismically reinforced, the theater itself has not yet been truly restored.
213
Martha Groves, “A Vision for L.A.’s Broadway,” Los Angeles Times, February 27, 1989.
64
significance. Within Grand Central Market, “vintage neon signs marking each stall [were]
restored and new ones were created,” and skylights that had been painted over since the 1940s
were uncovered and restored.
214
Within the Million Dollar Theatre building, the mahogany-
paneled boardroom associated with water baron William Mulholland during the Metropolitan
Water District’s tenancy was incorporated into one of the new apartment units.
215
When the
project was completed in 1995, decades of deferred maintenance had been reversed, historically-
incompatible alterations had been removed, and original architectural features on each building
had been restored. A present-day photo of Grand Central Square is presented in (Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.6. Present day view of Grand Central Square. Photo by author.
214
Levin and Associates Architects, “Urban Revitalization: Creating and Preserving Place,” accessed August 15,
2013, http://www.levinarch.com/urban/grand.html.
215
Aaron Curtiss, “Grand Hopes for City Core Downtown,” Los Angeles Times, September 12, 1994.
65
Much of the published literature on Grand Central Square, including newspaper and
magazine articles and interviews, attributes the project’s success primarily to Yellin’s
entrepreneurship and unwavering confidence in the economic potential of downtown Los
Angeles’s Historic Core. Indeed, the project would not have been possible without Yellin, who
was one of a handful of real estate developers at the time who championed investment in the
city’s downtrodden commercial core. But while this body of literature makes mention of
CRA/LA and the MTA’s involvement in the financial bailout of the project, minimal attention is
given to the fundamental role that these two public agencies played in the financing and
execution of the redevelopment of Grand Central Square. The project’s contributions to heritage
conservation relied heavily on the partnership and cooperation among the private sector (Yellin)
and the public sector (CRA/LA and the MTA). Had the CRA/LA board not authorized the sale
of tax increment bonds for the project in 1987 and issued said bonds in 1993 in conjunction with
the MTA, Yellin would not have been able to carry out his pioneering vision for revitalizing this
section of the Broadway commercial corridor. Although Yellin was able to secure $20 million of
private investment from his colleagues and acquaintances, private lending sources would not
have extended the financing needed in order to begin construction: “no bank in L.A. would lend
Yellin a penny to upgrade the heart of downtown” because of the risks associated with such an
undertaking, which left Yellin with a funding gap in excess of $40 million.
216
Had CRA/LA not
elected to underwrite a majority of the project’s construction loan, Yellin would have lacked the
funds needed to rehabilitate and repurpose the three historic subject buildings, and the buildings
would have likely continued to sit vacant and deteriorate. In a 1999 interview, Yellin asserted
that the Grand Central Square project ultimately “saved a cultural landmark that would have
died.”
217
The three landmark properties would have also suffered had CRA/LA foreclosed on
Yellin and not conceived and administered a financial rescue plan when the project encountered
financial problems in 1997. Had foreclosure proceedings been initiated against Yellin, residential
and commercial tenants within the three subject buildings would have likely been threatened
with eviction. Given the project’s complicated administrative structure and the large number of
public and private parties involved in its financing, initiating foreclosure proceedings would have
216
Lewis MacAdams, “Prophet of Boom,” Los Angeles Magazine, March 1998, 58.
217
Ibid.
66
resulted in “a financially tangled [process] and other problems if government entities tr[ied] to
operate or sell the complex.”
218
In addition to thrusting the three historic buildings into an
uncertain future, foreclosure would have also sent a strong message on the agency’s behalf that
investing in the rehabilitation of the city’s older building stock was not a pursuit worth taking.
By continuing to invest in Grand Central Square by providing Yellin with emergency financial
assistance, CRA/LA sent exactly the opposite message to the real estate development
community: that investing in the city’s historic and cultural resources was a worthwhile venture
that should be actively pursued. The agency’s steadfast and ongoing support of Grand Central
Square therefore helped secure a future for future historic rehabilitation projects in and around
the study area.
Concluding Notes:
Both Premiere Towers and Grand Central Square are often criticized in economic
development literature for falling “short of expectations, both in occupancy and impact,” but
these two redevelopment case study projects had a positive impact on efforts to conserve and
rehabilitate historic properties in the study area for residential use.
219
Upon completion of these
two projects, a total of five historic and cultural landmarks that had fallen into various states of
disrepair underwent full-scale architectural rehabilitations and were adapted to meet what were
perceived as current market needs. Consequently, these five underutilized and neglected
properties were placed back into productive use – a major step forward with regard to heritage
conservation in downtown Los Angeles, an area that is awash in architectural and cultural
resources but has long suffered from neglect and disinvestment. CRA/LA played an
instrumental, albeit behind-the-scenes role in the execution of both projects; simply stated, the
two projects would not have come to fruition without the ongoing financial and administrative
support that the agency provided, and the heritage conservation benefits that each project yielded
would not have been realized. Had the agency not continued to provide financing to the two
projects through its ability to sell and issue tax increment bonds, neither project would have been
able to secure necessary financial support from lenders and investors in the private sector, and
218
Larry Gordon, “Grand Central Rescue Planned,” Los Angeles Times, November 7, 1997.
219
Ryan Fennell, “Better Downtown Living Through Adaptive Reuse?” Planning Forum 9 (2003): 4-27.
67
therefore could not have been executed. CRA/LA’s commitment to both projects also signified
that the agency saw the economic potential of investing in the repurposing of historic properties.
In addition, CRA/LA’s involvement in both the Premiere Towers and Grand Central
Square projects helped sow the seeds for the wave of residential rehabilitation projects in the
Historic Core that began to take root in the early 2000s. By subsidizing risk and absorbing initial
losses associated with the largely-untested market for downtown residential redevelopment,
CRA/LA helped cultivate a market for residential development in the Historic Core. CRA/LA’s
participation in these two case study projects also served as the impetus for broader public policy
implications – specifically, the development of the City of Los Angeles’s pioneering Adaptive
Reuse Ordinance (ARO). Initially adopted exclusively for downtown Los Angeles in 1999 and
extended into other communities in the city in 2003, the ARO “encourages developers to convert
older buildings into new developments by providing [various] incentives” related to parking,
floor area, setbacks, building height, unit size, and density.
220
Under the ARO, many adaptive
reuse projects “permitted by right” were also exempted from environmental clearance as
mandated under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).
221
In many instances, these
incentives permitted the developers of adaptive reuse projects “to bypass the lengthy planning
and zoning approval process altogether and proceed directly to the [City’s] Department of
Building and Safety for permits.”
222
By offering incentives and resolving many of the challenges
associated with the adaptation of historic downtown commercial buildings into contemporary
uses, city officials hoped to stimulate additional development in the Historic Core area.
In large part, these redevelopment incentives derived from the challenges associated with
the redevelopment of Premiere Towers and Grand Central Square. Challenges arose as these
projects were upheld to prescriptive-based building and zoning codes that mandated setbacks,
on-site parking facilities, and other requirements that were not conducive to the rehabilitation of
historic downtown commercial buildings.
223
As a result, obtaining necessary permits for the
220
Matthew A. Young, “Adapting to Adaptive Reuse: Comments and Concerns About the Impacts of a Growing
Population,” Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18.3 (Spring 2009): 703-728; Ken Bernstein, “A
Planning Ordinance Breathes New Life into Historic Downtown,” in Planning Los Angeles, ed. David C. Sloane
(Chicago: American Planning Association, 2012), 258.
221
Ken Bernstein, “A Planning Ordinance Breathes New Life into Historic Downtown,” in Planning Los Angeles,
ed. David C. Sloane (Chicago: American Planning Association, 2012), 258.
222
Ibid.
223
J. Gabriel Linnares, “Adaptive Reuse of Existing Structures,” Structure Magazine, February 2007, 26-27.
68
projects was impossible without first obtaining numerous code exemptions and variances – thus
adding considerable time and cost to both projects. The city’s prescriptive building and zoning
requirements also resulted in parking facilities that proved to be both costly and logistically
challenging: three floors of the former bank buildings that were rehabilitated into Premiere
Towers were hollowed out to make way for parking space, and the garage that was constructed
adjacent to Grand Central Square lacked efficiency and was constructed on an undersized corner
of the redevelopment project site.
224
Seeking to alleviate the administrative burdens that
complicated the adaptive reuse of historic properties and create a more streamlined entitlement
process for such projects, CRA/LA had worked in conjunction with the nonprofit Central City
Association, an alliance of businesses in downtown Los Angeles, and convened a workshop in
1996 to explore possible solutions to the aforementioned challenges.
225
The workshop evolved
into an adaptive reuse task force, whose “work culminated in the 1999 passage of the ARO.”
226
In addition to spearheading the ordinance, CRA/LA also played a a critical role in financing the
earliest projects initiated under the ARO in the Old Bank District, a concentration of historic
properties near the intersection of Fourth and Main streets that were targeted for rehabilitation by
developer Tom Gilmore (Figure 2.7).
227
The success of the Old Bank District demonstrated the
success of the ARO and indicated to lenders that adaptive reuse bore economic potential.
The ARO has proven to be a remarkably successful urban revitalization strategy that has
spurred an unprecedented wave of residential development in downtown Los Angeles over the
past decade. Between 1999 and 2011, the ARO was applied to seventy-six adaptive reuse
projects in downtown Los Angeles and culminated in the production of 9,137 new residential
units, among which 2,479 – or roughly twenty-seven percent – are condominium units.
228
With
new residential development came “new retail development and nightlife,” and as a result
downtown Los Angeles had experienced the initial phases of a radical transformation from an
area associated with blight and decay into a vibrant twenty-four hour urban district.
229
The
success of this pioneering economic development policy was largely made possible because of
224
Donald Spivack, personal correspondence with author, August 22, 2013.
225
Ken Bernstein, “A Planning Ordinance Breathes New Life into Historic Downtown,” in Planning Los Angeles,
ed. David C. Sloane (Chicago: American Planning Association, 2012), 257.
226
Ibid.
227
Melinda Fulmer, “Rental Units are Proposed for Downtown,” Los Angeles Times, December 1, 1998.
228
Ibid, 261.
229
Ibid, 263.
69
CRA/LA’s ongoing involvement in the move to adaptively reuse historic commercial buildings
in downtown, which was sparked by its support and participation of early adaptive reuse projects
including Premiere Towers and Grand Central Square.
Figure 2.7. The San Fernando Building, located at Fourth and Main streets in the Old Bank District, was the first
residential conversion project completed under the Adaptive Reuse Ordinance. Photo by author.
70
CHAPTER 3: NON-RESIDENTIAL AND OFFICE CASE STUDIES
Introduction and Purpose:
In addition to helping convert properties within the Historic Core into residential and
mixed-use development, which ultimately resulted in the conservation of several architectural
and cultural landmarks, CRA/LA was also involved in the conservation and adaptive reuse of
several landmark properties into functional office space for both private and public sector
occupants. When these redevelopment projects were undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s, they
were generally perceived by the development community as risk-prone; skeptics pointed to the
glut of vacant office space in the upper stories of almost every commercial building on
Broadway and Spring Street as evidence that a market for Class A or “premiere” office space –
or even Class B or “secondary” office space – simply did not exist within the Historic Core.
However, with regard to their economic performance, many of these non-residential projects
were exceptionally successful upon their completion, and the reintroduction of functional
commercial and other office space into the long-neglected Historic Core helped work toward
revitalizing the neighborhood and eliminating blight. As a result of these projects, a number of
architectural and cultural landmarks that had suffered from disrepair or abandonment were
placed back into use through careful rehabilitation.
The purpose of this chapter is to ascertain the role that CRA/LA played in the planning
and execution of these non-residential and predominantly office redevelopment projects, and to
determine the eventual impact that the agency’s involvement yielded on the conservation of
these properties. Since CRA/LA was so heavily vested in the development of housing units,
including affordable units as mandated by state law, it seems most appropriate to evaluate the
agency’s role in other properties independent of its role in residential and mixed-use projects.
Toward this end, I identify and evaluate two redevelopment projects that (1) involve a
historically significant property, (2) were predominantly office rather than residential in use, and
(3) bore some degree of involvement from CRA/LA. I begin with a discussion of the iconic
Bradbury Building, which underwent a full architectural restoration in the early 1990s but had
also been seismically overhauled in 1983. Since the later architectural rehabilitation was
undertaken and financed by private developers, discussion is limited to the 1980s-era seismic
rehabilitation project, which had received direct CRA/LA support. Next, I analyze the Junipero
71
Serra State Office Building project (completed 1999), which involved the conversion of an
abandoned former department store into office space for State of California employees. I
conclude with a brief discussion of what these projects convey in the broader context of the
functional relationship between CRA/LA and heritage conservation.
Case Study: Bradbury Building, 1983:
Across the street from the aforementioned Grand Central Square project is the Bradbury
Building, an iconic architectural landmark that was constructed in 1893 and is among the finest
extant examples of nineteenth-century commercial architecture in Los Angeles (Figure 3.1). The
building was meticulously restored and reconditioned by Ira Yellin and his business partner,
Allen Alexander, between 1989 and 1991 and emerged as “the cornerstone of revitalization
efforts” in the Historic Core.
230
While associated with the adjacent Grand Central Square
redevelopment project, rehabilitation of the Bradbury Building was financed and undertaken as a
separate venture, and construction was completed before Grand Central Square had secured
financing. However, restoration of the iconic building may not have been possible without the
assistance and support of CRA/LA several years prior to Yellin’s purchase of the building.
During the early 1980s, the agency engineered a complex development agreement between the
Bradbury Building’s owners and a prominent downtown developer, which helped finance
necessary seismic upgrades to the architectural landmark and ultimately spared it from possible
demolition. CRA/LA assumed a much more behind-the-scenes role in the Bradbury Building
project than it had in previous undertakings, although its support and assistance played an
important role in the outcome of the project.
The architectural landmark came under the scrutiny of city building officials in the early
1980s, shortly after the Los Angeles City Council implemented a wide-reaching earthquake
safety ordinance that aimed to reduce the seismic hazards associated with unreinforced masonry
(URM) buildings constructed prior to 1933. The Earthquake Hazard Reduction Ordinance
(EHRO), passed by the Council in 1981, was developed largely in response to the damage and
economic losses that had resulted from the 1971 Sylmar Earthquake, and sought to minimize the
230
Elaine Woo, “”Restored Bradbury Building Called Key to L.A.’s Downtown Core Renovation,” Los Angeles
Times, September 30, 1991.
72
damaging effects of future seismic activity.
231
Toward this end, building officials commissioned
a survey of the City and identified nearly 8,000 URM buildings that were considered to be “high-
risk earthquake hazards.”
232
Buildings identified in the City’s survey were flagged, and their
respective owners “were required to either make structural improvements over a time period of
several years, vacate the building, or face demolition.”
233
While the ordinance was intended to
prompt property owners to strengthen their URM buildings, in actuality it put scores of historic
buildings at immediate risk for demolition by creating an avenue wherein the owners of said
properties could “precipitously choose to demolish the structures” instead of choosing to invest
in their rehabilitation.
234
Figure 3.1. Location map of the Bradbury Building, shaded in red. Illustration by author and Google Maps.
231
Ray Hebert, “Downtown Focus of Quake Safety Effort,” Los Angeles Times, July 17, 1982.
232
Ibid.
233
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Report on Costs and Benefits of Natural Hazard Mitigation, April
1997, 30.
234
Sam Hall Kaplan, “Quake Jolts Preservationists: They Fear Owners May Destroy Landmarks,” Los Angeles
Times, November 3, 1985.
73
Among the 8,000 URM structures identified in the survey was the Bradbury Building,
which was constructed in 1893 of unreinforced glazed brick and sandstone.
235
The building did
feature some steel structural components, although these components failed to comply with the
strict seismic building standards that had been implemented by the City. Located near the north
end of the Historic Core at 304 South Broadway, the Bradbury Building is consistently lauded as
one of the most remarkable examples of commercial architecture in Los Angeles. The five-story,
mildly-Romanesque Revival style building was commissioned by Lewis Bradbury, an affluent
businessman and mining magnate who lived in a mansion atop nearby Bunker Hill and “fancied
having a unique office building” in close proximity to his residence.
236
Although the exterior of
the building is unassuming and architecturally modest, within its envelope is “one of the most
beautiful interior spaces to be found in Los Angeles,” complete with a sky-lit atrium, open
balconies and staircases, earthen-tone glazed brick walls, wrought iron ornamentation, and open
cage elevators (Figure 3.2).
237
The building’s architect is a subject of intensive debate and has
become a part of Los Angeles lore over time: some architectural historians attribute the building
to Sumner Hunt, a prolific architect in Los Angeles at the turn of the twentieth century, while
others credit its distinctive interior spaces to Hunt’s subordinate, George Wyman, an entry-level
draftsman in Hunt’s office who allegedly drew inspiration for the building’s design from a
planchette board and an 1887 science fiction novel that “described a utopian civilization of the
year 2000.”
238
In addition to its cultural and architectural appeal, the Bradbury Building is
significant as an excellent and rare example of an intact nineteenth century commercial building
– one of few remaining such buildings in the vicinity.
Due to a clerical error and “the owners’ [erroneous] belief that the building was sound,”
Western Management Corporation, a family-owned management company that owned the
Bradbury Building at the time, was not aware that the property was included in the City’s
inventory of seismic hazards upon its release in 1981, and thus did not carry out the seismic
retrofitting work that was required under the EHRO.
239
Per the conditions of the EHRO, Western
235
Cecilia Rasmussen, “Sifting Myth from History at the Bradbury,” Los Angeles Times, May 21, 2000.
236
Ibid.
237
David Gebhard and Robert Winter, An Architectural Guidebook to Los Angeles (Layton: Gibbs Smith, 2003),
249.
238
Cecilia Rasmussen, “Sifting Myth from History at the Bradbury,” Los Angeles Times, May 21, 2000.
239
Ray Hebert, “Sale of Air Rights May Save Bradbury Building in Los Angeles,” Los Angeles Times, November
17, 1983.
74
Management’s failure to complete the required seismic rehabilitation work signified to building
officials that the architectural landmark, which was listed on both the local and national historic
registers and had been granted the rare designation of a National Historic Landmark, was
included on “the City’s list of buildings that do not comply with the ordinance” and therefore had
been identified as a potential candidate for demolition.
240
Without sufficient reinforcement of its
structural components, the brick-and-sandstone building also ran the risk of sustaining severe
and perhaps irreparable damage in the event of a major earthquake. The issue was eventually
brought to the attention of Western Management in 1983, which agreed to perform all necessary
stabilization work but was required to do so in an abbreviated time frame. Completing the
seismic retrofit of the building – which was projected to cost $1.1 million – in a truncated time
frame proved challenging to the management company, which struggled to secure the financing
needed to carry out the work.
241
CRA/LA worked in conjunction with Western Management to engineer a creative
financing strategy that would permit the owners to complete necessary upgrades to the building
within the specified time frame. Toward this end, CRA/LA utilized its power to administer and
approve the transfer of unused development rights between property owners, a sparsely-used yet
powerful development tool called Transfer of Floor Area Ratio (TFAR). Used in Los Angeles
since the early 1980s, TFAR refers to a process whereby property owners could sell transferrable
development rights, or the “unused portion of square footage allowed to be developed on a parcel
according to zoning regulation,” to the owner of an alternate site, which permitted that owner to
subsequently develop the alternate site in excess of the maximum density otherwise permitted
under the City’s Zoning Ordinance.
242
Unused development rights were common among older
buildings within the Historic Core, many of which had been constructed when a 150-foot height
limit had restricted the vertical limits of downtown development, and most of which had interior
courts or light wells to facilitate natural light in office spaces and cross-ventilation in a pre-air-
conditioning era.
243
In most instances, property owners had to first demonstrate that the transfer
240
Ibid.
241
Ray Hebert, “Bradbury Building Finds Airy Solution to Problem,” Los Angeles Times, November 17, 1983.
242
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, “Frequently Asked Questions,” accessed August
26, 2013, http://www.crala.org/internet-site/faqs.cfm.
243
Nathan Masters, “L.A.’s Changing Skyline: A Brief History of Skyscrapers in the City of Angels,” modified May
23, 2012, accessed August 26, 2013, http://www.kcet.org/updaily/socal_focus/history/la-as-subject/las-changing-
skyline-a-brief-history-of-skyscrapers-in-the-city-of-angels.html.
75
of unused development rights would serve one or more public benefits, among which was
included historic preservation.
244
The price for TFAR was negotiated between the owners and/or
developers of participating sites; CRA/LA and the city’s Planning Commission jointly
administered the program and either approved or denied transfer requests.
245
Figure 3.2. Bradbury Building atrium, photographed by Julius Shulman. Source: USC Libraries, Library Exhibits
Collection, File Name: shulman-1997-JS-11-ISLA.
244
Nancy Rivera Brooks, “Bargaining for the Sky: Buying Air Rights is Down to Earth Way to Get More Use out of
Land,” Los Angeles Times, August 29, 1988.
245
Ibid.
76
Under the TFAR agreement coordinated and approved by CRA/LA, Western
Management sold all of the property’s unused development rights in 1983 to Mitsui Fudosan
Inc., a development company that used the Bradbury Building’s development rights and those
that it had purchased from other properties to construct a fifty-two story office tower at the
intersection of Figueroa Street and Wilshire Boulevard in the downtown financial district.
246
Mitsui Fudosan paid Western Management a total of $1 million for the development rights,
which approximated the projected cost of the seismic strengthening that was needed in order to
bring the historic building into compliance with the EHRO.
247
Proceeds from the sale were
subsequently placed “into a CRA-controlled interest-bearing account payable only to the
Bradbury Building’s reinforcing and rehabilitation work,” and necessary improvements were
completed shortly thereafter.
248
The sale of unused development rights helped promote both the short-term and long-
term preservation of the Bradbury Building. In the short-term, sale of the building’s
transferrable development rights provided its owners with the immediate financing that was
needed in order to carry out the costly seismic retrofitting work mandated under the City’s
stringent earthquake safety and management program. Completing the retrofitting work in a
timely manner removed the building from the list of properties not in compliance with the EHRO
and spared “the historic landmark from possible demolition.”
249
The seismic overhaul of the
building enhanced the likelihood that the landmark could withstand and survive a major
earthquake. Perhaps most importantly, the sale of unused development rights helped ensure the
long-term conservation of the building by eliminating the ability for developers to increase
density on the site, which in turn “virtually ensured that the architectural treasure will not be torn
down in the future to make way for a new, taller structure.”
250
In addition to its contributions related to the rehabilitation of the Bradbury Building,
CRA/LA participated in and helped finance a study related to the overhaul of other historic URM
246
Ibid.
247
Ibid.
248
Ray Hebert, “Sale of Air Rights May Save Bradbury Building in Los Angeles,” Los Angeles Times, November
17, 1983.
249
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, “Frequently Asked Questions,” accessed August
26, 2013, http://www.crala.org/internet-site/faqs.cfm.
250
Ray Hebert, “Sale of Air Rights May Save Bradbury Building in Los Angeles,” Los Angeles Times, November
17, 1983.
77
buildings in the Historic Core that were subject to the provisions of the EHRO. Responding to
concerns related to the potential for the widespread demolition of pre-1933 buildings that was
posed by the EHRO, CRA/LA in 1985 partnered with the Los Angeles Conservancy and
spearheaded a study to determine how the owners of historic properties “might comply with the
ordinance in a cost efficient and architecturally sensitive manner.”
251
The study, which focused
exclusively on URM buildings located on the Broadway and Spring Street corridors, was
financed by a combination of CRA/LA funding and a corresponding grant that was provided by
the National Trust for Historic Preservation. Using the Bradbury Building’s rehabilitation as a
model, the study devised several creative ways for the owners of URM buildings “to meet
seismic safety standards without destroying the building or its architectural integrity.”
252
The
study likely would not have come to fruition without the support and financial backing of
CRA/LA.
CRA/LA’s involvement in the administration and approval of the TFAR agreement
between the owners of the Bradbury Building and Mitsui Fudosan was critical to the
rehabilitation of the landmark property. As one of only two agencies that were able to approve
transfer agreements at the time – the other being the city’s Planning Commission – CRA/LA
possessed the unique ability to tap into a lucrative funding source that would have not been
available had the agency not exercised its authority to coordinate and approve TFAR
transactions. In the absence of the TFAR proceeds, it is unclear if the owners of the Bradbury
Building would have been able to secure the funds needed to rehabilitate the building and spare it
from demolition; Terry McKelvey, then-president of Western Management, remarked upon
completion of the seismic strengthening that “without this [the air rights money], there is little
doubt…the Bradbury Building definitely would [have been] in jeopardy.”
253
Also speaking to the powerful role that TFAR played in the conservation of the Bradbury
Building is the fate of other URM buildings located in the Historic Core that were not able to
benefit from such agreements, the most telling example being the nine-story Lankershim Hotel at
the intersection of Broadway and Seventh Street. The Lankershim Hotel, like the Bradbury
251
Sam Hall Kaplan, “Quake Jolts Preservationists: They Fear Owners May Destroy Landmarks,” Los Angeles
Times, November 3, 1985.
252
Ibid.
253
Ibid.
78
Figure 3.3. Lankershim Hotel at Broadway and Seventh Street, circa 1907. Source: USC Libraries, California
Historical Society Collection, File Name: CHS-2427.
Building, bore historical and architectural merit. Constructed in 1905 by architect R.B. Young,
the 300-room hotel was “[Seventh] Street’s first major commercial building” and featured an
elaborate stone-and-press brick façade (Figure 3.3).
254
Also like the Bradbury Building, the
Lankershim Hotel was listed on the National Register of Historic Places as a contributing feature
of the Broadway Theater and Commercial District, which had been formally designated
254
“National Register of Historic Places Inventory-Nomination Form: Broadway Theater and Commercial District,”
prepared by Tom Sitton, May 9, 1979; Los Angeles Conservancy, Strolling on Seventh Street: Downtown’s Historic
Thoroughfare, 2010, 1.
79
Figure 3.4. Present-day view of Bradbury Building, view looking southeast. Photo by author.
in 1979.
255
However, a confluence of factors rendered an alternative financing strategy, such as a
TFAR transaction, infeasible for the hotel building, whose upper stories had sat entirely vacant
since the 1971 Sylmar Earthquake.
256
In part, these factors were economic. Prior to the closure of
the hotel’s upper stories, the property had operated as a Single Room Occupancy (SRO) hotel,
and thus would have had to reopen as such; the relatively low financial returns associated with
SRO housing simply could not justify the relatively high costs associated with retrofitting the
building in accordance with modern building codes, which made “the seismic repairs necessary
for the hotel…economically infeasible.”
257
Other logistical factors were also at play. As part of
255
“National Register of Historic Places Inventory-Nomination Form: Broadway Theater and Commercial District,”
prepared by Tom Sitton, May 9, 1979.
256
“Rehab Near on Lankershim,” Los Angeles Times, February 19, 1984.
257
Ibid; Donald Spivack, personal correspondence with author, September 3, 2013.
80
the strategy to revitalize downtown, CRA/LA had made an effort to concentrate SRO housing in
the area east of Main Street – several blocks east of the Lankershim Hotel – and in effect
CRA/LA officials expressed concerns related to the cost and management of a large SRO
property in the heart of the Broadway commercial district.
258
The site of the Lankershim Hotel
was also seen as a strong candidate for a new parking structure to serve the businesses and
entertainment venues along Broadway, which in turn limited support for the building’s
rehabilitation. Combined, these factors, coupled with the lack of TFAR or another form of
financial assistance, ultimately led to the demolition of the hotel in the early 1990s.
259
Comparing the Bradbury Building with the Lankershim Hotel demonstrates the
importance of CRA/LA’s assistance and support. Given the different outcomes associated with
the rehabilitation of these two properties, it seems likely that the Bradbury Building could have
suffered a similar fate as the Lankershim Hotel without the behind-the-scenes support that was
extended to the property owners by CRA/LA. A present-day photo of the Bradbury Building is
presented in (Figure 3.4).
Case Study: Broadway Department Store/Junipero Serra State Office Building, 1999:
In the mid-1990s, the State of California elected to relocate the offices of approximately
1,750 state employees from a seismically-unsound building near the Los Angeles Civic Center to
a new location in the heart of the Historic Core (Figure 3.5).
260
Completed in 1999, the Junipero
Serra State Office Building was not new construction, but rather involved the repurposing and
comprehensive rehabilitation of the former flagship location of the Broadway Department Store,
an architectural landmark that had been abandoned since the 1960s and had deteriorated into one
of the most blighted properties in the vicinity.
261
Between 1995 and 1999, state officials oversaw
the conversion of the building’s multiple stories of vacant square footage into cost-effective and
functional office space. The completion of the Junipero Serra project marked a celebratory
moment for heritage conservation advocates and downtown entrepreneurs and stakeholders
258
Donald Spivack, personal correspondence with author, September 3, 2013.
259
Los Angeles Conservancy, Strolling on Seventh Street: Downtown’s Historic Thoroughfare, 2010, 1.
260
Kenneth Reich, “State to Vacate and Demolish Quake-Threatened Office Building,” Los Angeles Times, March
17, 1997.
261
Larry Gordon, “State to Buy Broadway Site Renewal: Officials Plan to Renovate Old Department Store Complex
Downtown for Government Offices,” Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1995.
81
Figure 3.5. Location map of the Junipero Serra State Office Building (formerly the Broadway Department Store),
shaded in red. Illustration by author and Google Maps.
including Ira Yellin, whose Grand Central Square project was located just a half-block north of
the rehabilitated office facility. In addition to placing a moribund architectural landmark back
into productive use, the project signified a commitment to long-term investment within the
Historic Core and stimulated additional investment and redevelopment activity in the vicinity.
The project also reintroduced members of the white-collar workforce into an area that had been
regarded as the domain of the working class since the mid-twentieth century.
262
The project was
undertaken and managed by the Los Angeles State Building Authority (LASBA), an independent
joint powers entity comprised of the State of California acting through its Department of General
Services and CRA/LA. The authority had been created to “oversee the development of state
office facilities in Downtown Los Angeles.”
263
The authority was created in 1982 and was
overseen by a board consisting of two state officials appointed by the Governor and one
262
Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris and Tridib Banerjee, Urban Design Downtown: Poetics and Politics of Form
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 32.
263
Christine Essel, Los Angeles State Building Authority Members, March 29, 2012, 1.
82
appointee from CRA/LA.
264
CRA/LA played a critical, behind-the-scenes role early in the
development process by assisting state officials with issues related to site acquisition and
planning. CRA/LA’s contributions to the Junipero Serra project reinforced the agency’s steadfast
commitment to the revitalization of the Historic Core.
The Junipero Serra project can be traced back to a downtown revitalization plan that had
been conceived several years prior by then-Governor Pete Wilson. Seeking to save the state
money and reinvigorate downtown areas that had largely suffered from incremental
disinvestment and deterioration after World War II, Governor Wilson issued an executive order
in 1993 that called for the consolidation of thirty-seven state offices scattered around Southern
California into a six-square-block area within the Historic Core of downtown Los Angeles.
265
Governor Wilson’s executive order, which “made a strong and positive statement about the true
qualities of Los Angeles,” placed faith in the economic potential of the city’s historical
commercial core and was largely inspired by the recent completion of the Ronald Reagan State
Office Building in 1990, a high-rise office building on Spring Street that was developed by
LASBA and which had received assistance and support from CRA/LA.
266
In conjunction with
the Governor’s executive order, the state’s architect inventoried and evaluated the seismic
strength of existing office buildings owned and/or occupied by the state to determine which
facilities represented the strongest candidates to house the consolidation of state employees into
the downtown area; using data collected from said analysis, the architect thereafter “identified
the twenty most seismically unsafe state buildings in California, including three in downtown
Los Angeles that [were] singled out for demolition.”
267
At the top of the list prepared by the
architect was the first Junipero Serra State Office Building, a 1960s-era building that stood at the
intersection of Broadway and First Street and was occupied by approximately 1,750 state
employees from various state agencies. According to the architect’s report, the first Junipero
Serra building posed such a high risk of structural failure during a major earthquake that a
seismic retrofit of the building was deemed infeasible.
268
Pressure to relocate the Junipero Serra
264
Morris Newman, “In Downtown Los Angeles, A Former Department Store Will Have New Life as State
Offices,” New York Times, August 2, 1995.
265
James Rainey and Jeffrey L. Rabin, “2000 Jobs May Move Downtown,” Los Angeles Times, September 18, 1993.
266
Morris Newman, “In Downtown Los Angeles, A Former Department Store Will Have New Life as State
Offices,” New York Times, August 2, 1995.
267
Mark Gladstone, “20 Most Unsafe State Buildings are Identified,” Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1994.
268
Ibid.
83
building’s occupants mounted after the Northridge earthquake of 1994, which caused severe
structural damage to the building and rendered its adjacent parking garage unfit for use.
269
In 1995, LASBA selected an alternate site for the Junipero Serra building. Located at 320
West Fourth Street, the subject site was occupied by a ten-story commercial building that was
constructed in 1914 by prolific architects John Parkinson and Edwin Bergstrom; an addition was
appended to its west elevation approximately ten years later.
270
The building had long stood out
as one of downtown’s best-executed examples of Beaux Arts style commercial architecture, and
was characterized by its ornate architectural elements including terra cotta and pressed-brick
cladding, floor-to-ceiling plate glass windows, “a pressed metal cornice with dentils, and egg-
and-dart molding” (Figure 3.6).
271
In addition to its architectural significance, the building was
also representative of Broadway’s development as the commercial core of Los Angeles in the
early twentieth century. Originally, its ground story was occupied by the flagship location of the
Broadway Department Store, an iconic Los Angeles-based company that was founded in 1895 by
entrepreneur Arthur Letts and thereafter emerged as “California’s largest retail establishment of
the era.”
272
Like most early-twentieth century buildings on the Broadway corridor, upper stories
consisted of office space as well as additional sales space for the department store.
However, the once-stately building had become badly deteriorated over time.
Suburbanization and the associated decentralization of the middle class that occurred in the post-
World War II era drove many retailers and department stores to move away from traditional
downtown business districts and relocate in regional malls and suburban shopping centers.
273
The Broadway was representative of this national trend and closed its flagship store at Fourth
Street and Broadway in 1973, which left the building without a principal tenant.
274
The building
sat almost entirely vacant for the following two decades, during which time it devolved into a
visual blight, inhabited by squatters and the target of perpetual vandalism. By the
269
Kenneth Reich, “State to Vacate and Demolish Quake-Threatened Office Building,” Los Angeles Times, March
17, 1997.
270
Ibid.
271
Los Angeles Conservancy, “Junipero Serra State Office Building,” accessed August 24, 2013,
https://www.laconservancy.org/locations/junipero-serra-state-office-building.
272
Ibid.
273
Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985), 257-261.
274
Los Angeles Conservancy, “Junipero Serra State Office Building,” accessed August 24, 2013,
https://www.laconservancy.org/locations/junipero-serra-state-office-building
84
Figure 3.6. The Broadway Department Store, 1937. Source: USC Libraries, “Dick” Whittington Photography
Collection, File Name: DW-010-144-1-ISLA.
time that LASBA purchased the property in the mid-1990s, the building was generally regarded
as one of the worst eyesores in the Historic Core. Developer Ira Yellin, whose nearby Grand
Central Square redevelopment project preceded the rehabilitation of the former Broadway
building by several years, described the former Broadway store as a “block-long slum that
85
divides the Broadway shopping corridor in half.”
275
A Los Angeles Times article from 1993
paints a similarly-bleak picture, noting that the building’s “eight-story façade is scarred by
graffiti and its street level is battered in wooden boards.”
276
Many of the building’s interior
spaces had been demolished and only partially reconstructed as a result of a previous renovation
project that was undertaken but had ultimately fallen through well before construction was
complete.
277
The property changed hands several times as owners fell into bankruptcy and was
eventually acquired by the Resolution Trust Corporation, a federal agency that oversaw the sale
of assets of insolvent financial institutions.
278
Given the severity of the building’s deterioration, most private-sector developers
perceived the former Broadway Department Store as “a mess tangled in bankruptcies” and were
thus unwilling to invest in the rehabilitation of the property.
279
Developers were further
dissuaded from investment because of an effort to overhaul the building in the mid-1980s and
“convert it into offices, shops, restaurants, and a health club,” which was aborted and culminated
in financial disaster.
280
But to the state officials and CRA/LA member that comprised LASBA,
the former department store was well-suited to accommodate the offices of the 1,750 state
employees who worked at the seismically-unsound Junipero Serra State Office Building several
blocks to the north. In addition to complying with Governor Wilson’s executive order – the
former department store was located in the heart of the Historic Core and was less than one block
away from the Ronald Reagan State Office Building – the site was well-served by public transit
and was in close proximity to a station for the recently-constructed Red Line subway, the same
station that had figured in MTA’s decision to participate with CRA/LA in the Grand Central
Square project discussed previously.
281
In addition, the building’s “large size, open floor plan,
and thirteen-foot-high ceilings” were conducive to the installation of infrastructure and amenities
275
Larry Gordon, “State to Buy Broadway Site Renewal: Officials Plan to Renovate Old Department Store Complex
Downtown for Government Offices,” Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1995.
276
Larry Gordon, “New Life Planned for Old Downtown Buildings,” Los Angeles Times, September 27, 1993.
277
Ibid.
278
Morris Newman, “In Downtown Los Angeles, A Former Department Store Will Have New Life as State
Offices,” New York Times, August 2, 1995.
279
Larry Gordon, “New Life Planned for Old Downtown Buildings,” Los Angeles Times, September 27, 1993.
280
Bob Howard, “$52 Million Rejuvenation of Broadway Building Nearly Complete,” Los Angeles Times, March
17, 1997.
281
Morris Newman, “In Downtown Los Angeles, A Former Department Store Will Have New Life as State
Offices,” New York Times, August 2, 1995.
86
such as telecommunications cables and HVAC ducts.
282
LASBA purchased the property from the
Resolution Trust Company for $1.8 million in 1995.
283
CRA/LA played a significant, albeit behind-the-scenes role in the acquisition and
assemblage of the former Broadway Department Store property. By occupying one of the three
seats on LASBA, the agency was able to advocate for the selection of a site that not only
complied with Governor Wilson’s executive order, but that was also conducive to the agency’s
ongoing effort to revitalize and stimulate reinvestment in the Historic Core. Selection of the
former Broadway property dovetailed with several projects that the agency had undertaken
toward this end, including the aforementioned Grand Central Square project, located a half-block
to the north, and the reconstruction of the Angels’ Flight funicular railway, located one block to
the west.
284
Selection of the former Broadway store was also largely made possible because of
other redevelopment projects that had previously been undertaken by CRA/LA in the immediate
vicinity. As part of the nearby Broadway Spring Center project, a mixed-use development that
opened in 1989 and was largely financed by CRA/LA, a 1,274-space parking structure had been
constructed in order to provide necessary off-street parking facilities for employees of the
adjacent Ronald Reagan State Office Building (Figure 3.7).
285
Per an agreement drafted between
CRA/LA and the state, portions of the Broadway Spring Center garage would also be reserved
for the employees who would be relocated to the site of the former Broadway store.
286
Since the
Broadway Department Store property was constructed prior to the rise of car culture in Southern
California, it lacked the on-site parking facilities needed to make feasible the conversion of the
former department store into functional office space; CRA/LA’s provision of off-street parking
facilities played an integral role in the selection of the former Broadway site.
CRA/LA also extended ongoing financial assistance and support to the project that
augmented the state’s investment in the rehabilitation of the property. As part of the acquisition
deal for the Broadway site that was reached between the Resolution Trust Company and
282
Larry Gordon, “New Life Planned for Old Downtown Buildings,” Los Angeles Times, September 27, 1993.
283
Morris Newman, “In Downtown Los Angeles, A Former Department Store Will Have New Life as State
Offices,” New York Times, August 2, 1995.
284
Larry Gordon, “State to Buy Broadway Site Renewal: Officials Plan to Renovate Old Department Store Complex
Downtown for Government Offices,” Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1995.
285
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, Central Business District Redevelopment
Project, 1.
286
Ibid.
87
LASBA, CRA/LA agreed to forgive $1.7 million in outstanding property taxes owed to the
agency that had accrued while the property was mired in foreclosure proceedings. The agency’s
decision to forgive outstanding taxes associated with the property helped expedite the
redevelopment process and ensured that “the money [that would have otherwise been used for
taxes] could be reinvested in the structure.”
287
CRA/LA, through its participation in LASBA, was
also involved in “execut[ing] lease agreements with the state and issu[ing] lease revenue bonds
to finance the construction” work associated with the rehabilitation and repurposing of the
former Broadway store.
288
Since the property was owned, financed, and operated by LASBA,
collaboration between CRA/LA and state officials early in the development process ultimately
played a key role in the project’s success.
Figure 3.7. The Broadway-Spring Center Garage at Spring and Third streets, completed in 1989, largely made
redevelopment of the former Broadway Department Store possible. Photo by author.
287
Gerry F. Miller, CRA – Fifth Modification to the Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement for the Los Angeles State
Building Authority, June 15, 2010, 1-2; Morris Newman, “In Downtown Los Angeles, A Former Department Store
Will Have New Life as State Offices,” New York Times, August 2, 1995.
288
Christine Essel, Los Angeles State Building Authority Members, March 29, 2012, 2.
88
Under the direction of LASBA, which managed the project and served as its principal
developer, the former department store was converted into eight floors of office space between
1995 and 1999. An experienced team of architects and engineers demolished most existing
interior spaces and subsequently constructed modern, state-of-the-art offices in their place.
Interior spaces that bore historical significance were restored and incorporated into the
rehabilitated office space.
289
In addition, both the Broadway and Fourth Street facades were
extensively cleaned and restored, and the building was cleared of hazardous materials and
underwent a seismic retrofit to ensure that it was safe for long-term occupancy.
290
In 1999, after
several years of construction, the former Broadway Department Store building officially
reopened as the Junipero Serra State Office Building, “a modern 350,000-square foot office
building occupied by 1,700 employees.”
291
Despite being placed on the market in 2010 as part of
a short-term strategy to address the state’s fiscal emergency, the Junipero Serra State Office
Building continues to be owned by LASBA and leased to the state. From an economic
development perspective, the project has been successful and “is 100 percent leased, of which
99.7 percent is leased to the state of California for a term of twenty years firm.”
292
The economic
success of the Junipero Serra building distinguished the project from previous rehabilitation
efforts in the Historic Core in the 1980s and 1990s, including the aforementioned Premiere
Towers and Grand Central Square projects, which encountered financial challenges upon
completion. In large part, this economic success could be attributed to the twenty-year lease
agreement that had been reached between LASBA and the state of California for state office use,
which ensured that the property would retain a high occupancy rate.
Redevelopment of the former Broadway Department Store into state offices was
undeniably successful in the context of heritage conservation. Rehabilitation of the large and
highly visible property helped save the architectural landmark from further deterioration, and
stood out as an excellent example of how blighted and functionally-obsolete buildings could
satisfy present-day market demands and could be creatively adapted into productive, functional
space. According to Dan Rosenfeld, who had served as the state’s real estate director when the
289
S.calate Technology, Inc., “Junipero Serra State Office Building,” accessed August 25, 2013,
http://www.scalate.com/our-clients/junipero.html.
290
“Building Kept in Wraps During Hazardous Cleanup,” Los Angeles Times, July 8, 1997.
291
Los Angeles Conservancy, “Junipero Serra State Office Building,” accessed August 24, 2013,
https://www.laconservancy.org/locations/junipero-serra-state-office-building.
292
CB Richard Ellis, Inc., Golden State Portfolio Offering Memorandum, 2010, 6.
89
Junipero Serra project was conceived, completion of the project “took what was probably the
biggest eyesore in the city and turned it into the least expensive and most attractive office
building the state has procured in the last thirty years.”
293
Completion of the Junipero Serra
project also complemented several historic rehabilitation projects that had been undertaken or
were proposed in the immediate vicinity, including the Grand Central Square project and the
Angels’ Flight funicular railway, and represented “a major set piece in the revitalization of the
Broadway-Spring Street corridor.”
294
The project has also been credited with stimulating
additional investment in the Historic Core. Since it opened in 1999, the building has consistently
been almost fully occupied, almost exclusively by state office employees. In large part, the
building’s high occupancy rate is associated with the financing plan for the building – a twenty-
year lease for the building was drafted between the state and LASBA to back the revenue bonds
that were issued to finance the project’s construction, thus providing the property with a built-in
market. But the project nonetheless sent a strong message to investors and developers regarding
the economic potential of downtown Los Angeles’s historic building stock.
The project also culminated in the conservation and meticulous restoration of its
distinctive architectural character. During all phases of the redevelopment process, measures
were taken to ensure that the building’s architecturally significant, or “character-defining”
features were treated in a manner consistent with the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for
Rehabilitation. Several architectural firms with demonstrated expertise in historic preservation
were commissioned to participate in the project’s execution. Before construction commenced, an
existing conditions assessment of the building was performed and its character-defining features
documented.
295
During construction, original wood sash windows were either repaired or
replaced in-kind, depending on the severity of the damage, and graffiti was removed from the
building’s glazed terra cotta façade through the application of “a low-pressure spray of powder-
like glass beads” that was intended to protect the glazing from irreparable damage.
296
The
building’s decorative sheet-metal cornices, which had rusted and deteriorated beyond the point
293
Bob Howard, “$52 Million Rejuvenation of Broadway Building Nearly Complete,” Los Angeles Times, March
17, 1997.
294
Morris Newman, “In Downtown Los Angeles, A Former Department Store Will Have New Life as State
Offices,” New York Times, August 2, 1995.
295
JAG | ROTO Architects. “JAG | ROTO Architects,” accessed August 25, 2013,
http://jagrotoarchitects.com/sites/jagrotoarchitects.com/files/JAGROTO%20Architects.pdf.
296
Bob Howard, “$52 Million Rejuvenation of Broadway Building Nearly Complete,” Los Angeles Times, March
17, 1997.
90
of repair, were refabricated by Preservation Arts, a well-respected specialist in historic
preservation, and “the old fire escapes outside the building were repaired, repainted, and left in
place.”
297
Interior spaces, most of which had been partially demolished in the 1980s and had
sustained severe damage over time, were reconstructed with modern motifs that were distinctive
from yet compatible with the building’s original Beaux Arts exterior; architect Scott Johnson of
the architectural firm Johnson Fain Partners described the rehabilitated building as “like a brand-
new body in a beautiful old dress.”
298
When construction was complete and the former
department store officially reopened as the Junipero Serra State Office Building in 1999, its
exterior closely resembled its original, 1914 appearance, but its interior had been entirely
repurposed as a modern, state-of-the-art office facility. The project was celebrated and won
numerous awards from historic preservation advocacy organizations, including the Los Angeles
Conservancy and the San Francisco-based California Preservation Foundation.
299
Upon completion, the Junipero Serra project demonstrated the often-complementary
relationship of local economic development and heritage conservation, and exemplified how the
rehabilitation and repurposing of historic buildings that suffer from functional obsolescence can
work toward achieving the key goals and policies of both disciplines. When the building
reopened in 1999, a decaying architectural landmark had been carefully and fully restored; a
derelict yet historically significant building had been placed back into productive use; the
building boasted comparatively-low operating costs and a consistently-high occupancy rate; and
it demonstrated the economic potential of office space within the Historic Core. The
overwhelming success of the project, both from economic development and heritage
conservation perspectives, corroborated the findings of nearly a decade’s worth of research
related to the intersection of economic development and historic preservation. Upon evaluating
hypothetical pro formas and comparing the relative costs associated with rehabilitation and new
construction projects, economist Donovan Rypkema (1991) concluded that “historic preservation
is a rational and effective economic response” to many, but certainly not all development
297
Ibid.
298
Ibid.
299
Scott Johnson and William H. Fain, Jr., Figure/Ground: A Design Conversation (Glendale: Balcony Press, 2003),
230.
91
scenarios.
300
A subsequent analysis undertaken by Listokin, Listokin, and Lahr (1998), a team of
urban planning academics, appraised the economic benefits of historic preservation and found
that preservation projects often generate “advantageous multiplier effects” that benefit a local
economy.
301
The success of the Junipero Serra project contributed to further rehabilitation
activity by demonstrating that the historic building stock in downtown Los Angeles could be
adapted to meet present-day market demands in an economically advantageous manner.
CRA/LA played an instrumental, yet largely behind-the-scenes role in the redevelopment
of the former Broadway Department Store into productive and functional state office space.
Thus, CRA/LA’s involvement in the project is generally not given tremendous weight or is not
mentioned at all in press and literature regarding the project and its contributions to the
revitalization of the Historic Core. Yet the agency, in conjunction with the State of California,
played a key role in all phases of the development process and ultimately helped carry the project
to fruition. By holding one of the three seats on the joint-powers governing body that was tasked
with acquiring and assembling the site, issuing “lease revenue bonds to finance the construction
of [the] building,” and managing operations of the building after construction, CRA/LA exerted
influence in key decisions that were made over the project’s duration.
302
Selection of the former
Broadway store site, which bore strong economic potential but was accompanied by financial
problems and logistical challenges upon its purchase, was made possible largely because of the
financial and logistical support provided by CRA/LA. The agency’s decision to forgive $1.7
million of outstanding property taxes that were associated with the site and owed to CRA/LA
expedited redevelopment by avoiding time-consuming and costly legal proceedings, and ensured
that money that would have otherwise been spent to repay outstanding debt could instead be
reinvested into the property’s rehabilitation. Additionally, CRA/LA’s provision of necessary off-
street parking facilities in its nearby Broadway Spring Center garage alleviated logistical
challenges related to the lack of parking facilities at the Broadway store site, which had been
constructed in the era of electric streetcars. The site likely would have not been able to
accommodate 1,750 state employees in the absence of adequate off-street parking facilities. In
300
Mason, Randall, “Economics and Historic Preservation: A Guide and Review of the Literature,” Discussion
paper, The Brookings Institution, September 2005, 6.
301
David Listokin, Barbara Listokin, and Michael Lahr, “The Contributions of Historic Preservation to Housing and
Economic Development,” Housing Policy Debate 9.3 (1998): 479-485.
302
Christine Essel, Los Angeles State Building Authority Members, March 29, 2012, 2.
92
partnership with state officials, who were also heavily involved in the redevelopment project,
CRA/LA played a significant role in the conservation and repurposing of one of the most iconic
architectural landmarks along the northern end of the historic Broadway commercial and
entertainment corridor. (Figure 3.8) shows a present-day view of the property.
Figure 3.8. Present-day view of the Junipero Serra State Office Building, view looking southwest. Photo by author.
Concluding Notes:
CRA/LA’s role in the rehabilitation of the Bradbury Building and the Broadway
Department Store/Junipero Serra State Office Building assumed a somewhat different character
than its role in the aforementioned residential case study projects. Instead of championing and
managing the rehabilitation project, as the agency had done in the case of Premiere Towers, or
functioning as the project’s principal financier, as it had done in the case of Grand Central
93
Square, the agency took on a much more nuanced, behind-the-scenes role in the rehabilitation of
the Bradbury Building and the redevelopment of the Junipero Serra Building. However, in spite
of operating largely behind-the-scenes, CRA/LA played an integral role in the successful
completion of both projects, which ultimately spared the Bradbury and Junipero Serra buildings
from possible demolition and continued deterioration, respectively. Had the agency not utilized
its authority to administer TFAR transactions for the Bradbury Building, it is unclear if the
owners would have been able to front the hefty costs associated with bringing the building up to
code. Coordinating the TFAR transaction would have been difficult, if not impossible, had
CRA/LA not intervened, identified and secured a user for the density, and provided support to
the owners of the architectural landmark. In a similar vein, completed rehabilitation of the
Junipero Serra building rested heavily on the logistical and financial assistance provided by
CRA/LA. Although Governor Wilson’s executive order essentially guaranteed selection of a site
within the Historic Core to replace the quake-damaged state office building at Broadway and
First Street, the former Broadway Department Store site was fraught with a series of financial
and logistical challenges – including nearly two million dollars in outstanding property tax debt
and a complete lack of parking – that would have presented difficult hurdles for state officials to
overcome on their own. CRA/LA helped alleviate these challenges by forgiving the outstanding
taxes and providing off-street parking, in effect “softening” the potential risks and challenges
associated with the property and making the site a more attractive and feasible candidate for
redevelopment. CRA/LA’s willingness and ability to actively participate in the rehabilitation of
both buildings demonstrates the agency’s steadfast commitment to the conservation and
repurposing of architectural and cultural landmarks within the Historic Core.
94
CHAPTER 4: INSTITUTIONAL AND PUBLIC USE CASE STUDIES
Introduction and Purpose:
In addition to actively participating in the rehabilitation of historic buildings into
residential and commercial office and retail uses, CRA/LA also contributed to redevelopment
projects that involved institutions or public facilities within the Historic Core, many of which
bore historic or cultural value. Among the best-known historic rehabilitation projects that
involved an institutional use and benefited from the support and participation of CRA/LA was
the rehabilitation, expansion, and modernization of the city’s Central Library between 1982 and
1993. By devising and implementing a complex financing plan that took advantage of multiple,
and somewhat obscure, funding sources, CRA/LA successfully restored the landmark building
and adapted the property to meet present-day needs “with minimal fiscal impact on the City’s
general fund.”
303
Despite being complex, and at times controversial, the library restoration
project is often regarded as one of the agency’s greatest successes in downtown Los Angeles.
Given its relative scope and success, the Central Library project is certainly worthy of
mention, but CRA/LA also participated in the planning and development of many smaller-scale
institutional and public facilities projects within the study area that involved historic or cultural
resources. This chapter delves into the role that CRA/LA played in the conservation and
rehabilitation of this category of historic resources, and aims to assess the agency’s treatment and
stewardship of said resources. Toward this end, I evaluate three case study redevelopment
projects that (1) feature a heritage conservation component, (2) involve institutional uses or
public facilities, and (3) involved a degree of participation from CRA/LA. I begin with a
discussion of Biddy Mason Park, a small pocket park that conserves and promotes cultural
memory and more intangible aspects of heritage. I continue with an analysis of Angels Flight, a
funicular railway that was ironically both dismantled and restored by CRA/LA over the span of
twenty-seven years. Next, I evaluate the agency’s participation in the Broadway Streetscape
Enhancement Plan, which failed to come to full fruition but nonetheless culminated in the
identification and documentation of historically-significant streetscape features on an eight-block
303
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, “Building a World Class City: Central Business
District Redevelopment Project 1975-2010,” accessed August 30, 2013, http://www.ladifferentiated.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/02/Building_a_World_Class_City1.pdf.
95
stretch of the Broadway commercial corridor. I conclude by briefly discussing what the case
studies reveal regarding CRA/LA and its general approach to the treatment of historic properties.
Case Study: Biddy Mason Park, 1991:
CRA/LA not only participated in the rehabilitation of buildings and the conservation of
material features of the historic built environment, but was also involved in projects that sought
to conserve and promote cultural memory and more intangible elements of heritage within the
study area. One of these projects was the planning and development of Biddy Mason Park, a
small pocket park that forges a linear connection and facilitates pedestrian access between the
Broadway and Spring Street corridors. The pocket park was developed in conjunction with the
adjacent Broadway Spring Center, a CRA/LA-backed development that includes ground-story
retail space as well as a 1,274-space parking garage – which is used in large part by employees
of the aforementioned Ronald Reagan and Junipero Serra State Office Buildings.
304
Prominently
featured in the pocket park are two public art installations that commemorate the life and
contributions of the park’s namesake, Biddy Mason, a local philanthropist and homesteader who
was an influential figure in Los Angeles during the mid and late-nineteenth century but whose
legacy had been largely forgotten over time.
305
Although the project was spearheaded, partially
financed, and executed by a non-profit organization, the project was also carried out on land that
was owned and operated by CRA/LA. CRA/LA ultimately played an important role in the
planning and development of the space.
Completed in 1991, the pocket park was developed on the site of Mason’s former
homestead and residence, which comprised several adjacent parcels on the block bounded by
Broadway, Spring, Third, and Fourth streets in an area that was historically on the outskirts of
town (Figure 4.1).
306
The park sought to pay homage to Mason and her contributions to the city’s
early history. Born in 1818, Biddy Mason spent her early years enslaved in Mississippi and
eventually “became the property of a Mormon family that migrated” west to California, a state
304
Ibid.
305
Gregory Crouch, “Early Black Heroine of L.A. Finally Receives Her Due,” Los Angeles Times, March 28, 1988.
306
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, “Place Making,” 2-3.
96
where slavery was not practiced, in 1851.
307
While state officials generally turned a blind eye to
slave owners who had immigrated to California from other states, Mason was able to petition the
court for a writ of habeas corpus and, along with her three daughters, was granted freedom by a
California magistrate in 1856.
308
After working for several years as a midwife and nurse, Mason
made history in 1866, when she purchased the land on which the park now sits for $250 and
became “one of the first African American women in Los Angeles to own property.”
309
A
dedicated humanitarian and philanthropist, Mason went on to establish an orphanage, organize
the first-ever African American church in Los Angeles, found an elementary school for African
American children, and finance “a disaster center for residents left homeless by flooding.”
310
In
1884, she constructed a two-story brick building on the land she had purchased nearly two
decades prior, where she resided until her death in 1891.
311
Figure 4.1. Location map of Biddy Mason Park, shaded in red. Illustration by author and Google Maps.
307
Ibid.
308
Michael Several, “Biddy Mason’s Place: A Passage of Time,” modified December 1999, accessed August 27,
2013, http://www.publicartinla.com/Downtown/Broadway/Biddy_Mason/mason.html.
309
Ibid.
310
Bob Pool, “Proud Legacy: Park Opens on Site Owned by L.A. Pioneer,” Los Angeles Times, July 31, 1991.
311
Michael Several, “Biddy Mason’s Place: A Passage of Time,” modified December 1999, accessed August 27,
2013, http://www.publicartinla.com/Downtown/Broadway/Biddy_Mason/mason.html.
97
However, as downtown Los Angeles came into being and was punctuated by successive
waves of rapid development in the early twentieth century, Mason’s life slipped into obscurity.
In 1905, one of Mason’s grandchildren had attempted to convert her former residence into a
cultural center geared toward African American youth, but lacking sufficient political support the
plan was never realized.
312
In the 1920s, as the Broadway and Spring Street corridors rapidly
emerged as the commercial and financial hubs of Los Angeles, respectively, mid-rise and high-
rise buildings enveloped Mason’s former homestead, and her brick residence was demolished
and “all structural references to Mason and her family were [subsequently] obliterated.”
313
Over
time, a series of surface parking lots were developed on the site to service nearby commercial
and financial buildings on Broadway and Spring Street.
314
In the absence of any material
evidence of the former homestead or residence, the general public’s memory of Mason and her
significance waned, and with time her contributions to the social and cultural development of
nineteenth-century Los Angeles were “all but forgotten.”
315
Thus, the Mason homestead
remained a site that was awash in cultural and social value but lacked any identifiable and
tangible connection to its past.
An effort to memorialize Mason and showcase her contributions was made in the mid-
1980s as part of a larger public history initiative that was spearheaded by The Power of Place, a
non-profit organization that was founded in 1983 by architect and historian Dolores Hayden. The
initiative, also entitled The Power of Place, challenged conventional methods of historical
inquiry that were generally male-dominated and Anglo-centric, and instead “sought to create a
sense of place in Los Angeles by restoring and perpetuating the memory of the economic
contributions of women and minorities through experimental, collaborative projects.”
316
As an
indication of its support of the organization and its core mission, CRA/LA awarded a grant to
The Power of Place in 1985 that helped the organization produce a pamphlet and corresponding
map of sites in downtown Los Angeles “where public history projects involving women and
312
Dolores Hayden, The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 170.
313
Michael Several, “Biddy Mason’s Place: A Passage of Time,” modified December 1999, accessed August 27,
2013, http://www.publicartinla.com/Downtown/Broadway/Biddy_Mason/mason.html.
314
Dolores Hayden, The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 170.
315
Gregory Crouch, “Early Black Heroine of L.A. Finally Receives Her Due,” Los Angeles Times, March 28, 1988.
316
Michael Several, “Biddy Mason’s Place: A Passage of Time,” modified December 1999, accessed August 27,
2013, http://www.publicartinla.com/Downtown/Broadway/Biddy_Mason/mason.html.
98
minorities could be created.”
317
Given her achievements and her prominent role in the early
cultural development of Los Angeles, Biddy Mason exemplified the nonconventional type of
historical figure that The Power of Place sought to commemorate, and upheld the organization’s
mission to position “working men and women at the center of L.A.’s history.”
318
Accordingly,
the site of Mason’s former homestead and residence was among the points of interest identified
in the CRA/LA-funded pamphlet and related map that The Power of Place produced.
Initially, The Power of Place had proposed the creation of “a small project for the [Biddy
Mason homestead] site” that would memorialize her life.
319
However, CRA/LA’s concurrent
involvement in the planning and development of the Broadway Spring Center mixed-use project
on the site of the Mason homestead in the late 1980s created a window of opportunity to
undertake a memorialization project that was both larger in scale and more comprehensive in
scope. As part of its plan for the Broadway Spring Center project, CRA/LA had initially called
for the creation of a mid-block pedestrian network between Broadway, Spring, Third, and Fourth
streets in order to facilitate pedestrian circulation, activate ground-level retail space in the
vicinity, and create a discernible connection between the Broadway Spring Center and other
nearby destinations.
320
Given the recent publication of The Power of Place’s pamphlet, which
called attention to the site of the Mason homestead, and political support by then-Mayor Tom
Bradley to memorialize the site, The Power of Place was commissioned to incorporate a public
art installation commemorating Mason into CRA/LA’s proposed pedestrian network.
321
Using
grant money awarded to the organization from the National Endowment of the Arts, The Power
of Place planned and designed “a series of works communicating [Mason’s] role in the city’s
history” and assembled a team of local artists and designers to execute the plan. To carry the
project forward, the organization raised funds from a wide variety of benefactors and
organizations, among which included CRA/LA.
322
317
Ibid.
318
Donna Graves, “Mapping Urban History Through Public Art,” Monographs 4.2 (1995): 16-22.
319
Michael Several, “Biddy Mason’s Place: A Passage of Time,” modified December 1999, accessed August 27,
2013, http://www.publicartinla.com/Downtown/Broadway/Biddy_Mason/mason.html.
320
Donald Spivack, email message to author, August 29, 2013.
321
Ibid; Michael Several, “Biddy Mason’s Place: A Passage of Time,” modified December 1999, accessed August
27, 2013, http://www.publicartinla.com/Downtown/Broadway/Biddy_Mason/mason.html.
322
Ibid.
99
Using funds that had been provided by CRA/LA and other sponsor organizations, The
Power of Place in 1990 oversaw the installation of two prominent works of public art that
memorialized Biddy Mason and called attention to her association with the site of the Broadway
Spring Center, an important aspect of the city’s cultural history that had been largely forgotten
over time. The first of the two installations, entitled Biddy Mason: Time and Place, consists of an
eighty-one-foot-long black concrete wall that flanks CRA/LA’s pedestrian pathway and uses a
combination of “text and images to tell Mason’s story against the backdrop of the city as it grew
during her lifetime” (Figure 4.2).
323
The installation was designed by graphic designer Sheila
Levrant de Bretteville. The second installation, entitled Biddy Mason: House of the Open Hand,
was designed by assemblage artist and sculptor Bette Saar and was intended to evoke the
vernacular character of the Mason homestead with the assemblage of a photo mural, clapboard
siding, a picket fence, and other material elements that bore association with the Mason
homestead (Figure 4.3).
324
Upon its opening in 1991, the park was widely regarded as a
successful, albeit unorthodox heritage conservation venture that was credited with promoting “a
growing awareness [and appreciation] of the diverse cultures that have built Los Angeles.”
325
Figure 4.2. “Biddy Mason: Time and Place,” by Sheila Levrant de Brettville. Photo by author.
323
Donna Graves, “Mapping Urban History Through Public Art,” Monographs 4.2 (1995): 16-22.
324
Dolores Hayden, The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 181.
325
Bob Pool, “Proud Legacy: Park Opens on Site Owned by L.A. Pioneer,” Los Angeles Times, July 31, 1991.
100
Figure 4.3. “Biddy Mason: House of the Open Hand,” by Bette Saar. Photo by author
Due to the collaboration of The Power of Place and several agencies and organizations,
“what might have been an undistinguished causeway between buildings” was transformed into a
dynamic interpretive space that celebrated the life and legacy of an important, yet largely-
forgotten figure in the city’s cultural and ethnic history.
326
Although the project was administered
by The Power of Place, a number of organizations and agencies were involved in the project’s
planning and development, and ultimately helped bring the project to fruition. CRA/LA was
among these agencies. While CRA/LA’s role in the Biddy Mason Park project was largely
supplemental, the agency did take several actions that facilitated the planning and development
of the park as constructed. Through the provision of financial assistance, both for the production
of the pamphlet and map that first identified the Mason homestead and for the installation of the
two interpretative public art pieces, CRA/LA helped set the process of developing the park into
motion. Additionally, ongoing collaboration between CRA/LA personnel and The Power of
326
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, Place Making, 2.
101
Place was necessary in order to coordinate incorporation of the artwork into the pedestrian
network that was planned and developed under the guidance of CRA/LA. Importantly, the
agency’s involvement in the project spoke to its commitment to the conservation of culturally
significant sites within the Historic Core.
Case Study: Angels Flight, 1996:
In the early and mid-1990s, CRA/LA financed and oversaw the reconstruction of Angels
Flight, an early-twentieth century funicular railway that had been disassembled and stored for
nearly thirty years. Located at 351 South Hill Street, across the street from the aforementioned
Lyon Building and Grand Central Market, the newly-reconstructed railway was first constructed
in 1901 and had originally occupied a site approximately a half-block to the north (Figure 4.4). It
was dismantled in 1969 – incidentally by CRA/LA – to clear the way for site improvements and
new construction associated with the Bunker Hill Redevelopment Project.
327
The re-opening of
the shuttered railway nearly three decades later marked a celebratory moment for members of the
heritage conservation community, who had long awaited CRA/LA to make good on its “firm
promise to relocate the railway as near as possible to its original location at Hill and Third
Streets,” a promise that had been made when the railway was disassembled in the late 1960s.
328
Although Angels Flight is technically located within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Bunker
Hill Redevelopment Project Area, its proximity to and historical association with the Historic
Core justify its analysis as a case study. In addition, CRA/LA’s involvement in the rehabilitation
and re-opening of the railway is a particularly telling example of how the agency’s general
approach to the treatment of historic properties markedly evolved over the course of its sixty-
four year lifespan.
Prior to its disassembly, Angels Flight stood out as an iconic and much-beloved piece of
the Bunker Hill landscape. Built by Colonel James Ward (J. W.) Eddy, a former politician who
was also experienced in railroad construction, the 315-foot funicular railway opened to the public
in 1901 and stood out as being one of the earliest – and shortest – public transportation systems
327
Ibid.
328
“Angels Flight – End of an Era,” Los Angeles Times, May 13, 1969.
102
Figure 4.4. Location map of Angels Flight. The current location is shaded in red, and the original location is shaded
in yellow. Illustration by author and Google Maps
developed in the city.
329
Eddy’s railway was the first of two funicular railways on Bunker Hill
that were constructed to transport passengers between the then-affluent residential enclave atop
the hill and the central business district below.
330
With regard to engineering, Angels Flight was
relatively simple: two counterbalanced cars – named Sinai and Olivet in reference to biblical
mountains – were connected to a singular cable, which was in turn powered by an electrical
substation located at the railway’s upper terminus.
331
The cars, substation, an ornate Beaux Arts
329
Los Angeles Conservancy, “Angels Flight,” accessed August 28, 2013,
https://www.laconservancy.org/locations/angels-flight.
330
Nathan Masters, “Incline L.A.: Angels Flight and its Lost Sibling, Court Flight,” modified May 30, 2013,
accessed August 29, 2013, http://www.kcet.org/updaily/socal_focus/history/la-as-subject/incline-la-episode-one-
angels-flight-and-its-forgotten-sibling-court-flight.html.
331
Los Angeles Conservancy, “Angels Flight,” accessed August 28, 2013,
https://www.laconservancy.org/locations/angels-flight.
103
style archway at the eastern entrance to the railway, and all associated features were painted with
a distinctive black-and-orange palette.
332
Given its distinctive aesthetic character and its role as
an early public transportation system, Angels Flight was a well-known and widely-popular
landmark that offered a tangible link to the city’s Victorian-era past (Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.5. Angels Flight at its original location at Hill and Third streets, 1939. Source: USC Libraries, “Dick”
Whittington Photography Collection, File Name: DW-B5-47-18-ISLA.
The development and subsequent implementation of the Bunker Hill Redevelopment Plan
in the 1950s jeopardized the future of the funicular railway, which occupied a site that was slated
for extensive redevelopment. By the early 1960s, when CRA/LA initiated the process of
acquiring blighted properties and evicting tenants, the demand for transportation up and down
332
Esmerelda Bermudez, “Could Price of Ride on Angels Flight Get Too Steep?” Los Angeles Times, November 27,
2010.
104
the hill had diminished and ridership on the railway steadily decreased. Citing sharp losses in
revenue associated with declining ridership figures, L. B. Moreland, president of the association
that owned and operated the railway, declared in 1962 that the association would have no other
choice than “to suspend operations immediately if Angels Flight [was] not purchased” by
another person or agency.
333
CRA/LA expressed interest in purchasing the railway and
continuing its operation – temporarily – to serve the residents of Bunker Hill who had not yet
been evicted as well as “downtown visitors who park on the hill.”
334
Upon receiving a revolving
loan from the City Council for this purpose, CRA/LA purchased the beleaguered railway in 1962
for a sum of $35,000.
335
CRA/LA’s decision to purchase Angels Flight did nothing to secure the future of the
historic railway. On the contrary, the agency initially expressed interest in “discarding [the
railway] because, it was argued, its turn-of-the-century character had no place in a complex of
skyscraper office buildings and apartments.”
336
This sentiment was voiced by William T.
Sesnon, then-chairman of CRA/LA’s Board of Commissioners, who estimated that “Angels
Flight [would] become obsolete in about two years,” once the agency had acquired and
subsequently cleared all of the blighted properties on Bunker Hill.
337
But fervent public
opposition and a 1966 decision by the City’s Cultural Heritage Commission to designate Angels
Flight and two other Bunker Hill properties as Historic-Cultural Monuments led the agency to
reconsider its plans for the railway. Rather than permanently removing Angels Flight, CRA/LA
instead elected to temporarily disassemble the railway, so that necessary excavation and grading
work on Bunker Hill could occur, and then reassemble the railway within two years.
338
Its
constituent pieces would be stored in a warehouse in the interim. Several potential new sites for
Angels Flight were contemplated, including the Hollywood Bowl and Griffith Park, but
ultimately CRA/LA decided to reassemble the railway as close as possible to its original site on
the eastern banks of Bunker Hill.
339
Angels Flight was one of only a handful of Victorian-era
333
Ray Hebert, “Railway Faces Shutdown,” Los Angeles Times, February 6, 1962.
334
Ibid.
335
“Council Votes Loan to Purchase Angels Flight,” Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1962.
336
Ray Hebert, “Angels Flight Will Be Razed – Temporarily,” Los Angeles Times, September 25, 1968.
337
“Board Approves Plan to Buy Angels Flight,” Los Angeles Times, February 21, 1962.
338
“Angels Flight to Make Final Run May 18,” Los Angeles Times, May 8, 1969.
339
Ibid.
105
resources that were conserved and/or relocated by CRA/LA during the early phases of the
Bunker Hill Redevelopment Project. The railway made its final run in May 1969.
340
In spite of CRA/LA’s promise to reassemble Angels Flight and incorporate the resource
into the redevelopment plan for Bunker Hill within two years, reconstruction of the funicular
railway encountered a series of lengthy delays. CRA/LA attributed these delays to unexpected
challenges that arose during implementation of the Bunker Hill Redevelopment Plan, but some
local stakeholders and members of the city’s nascent heritage conservation community argued
that the delay exemplified the agency’s lack of commitment to conserving the resource.
341
Although CRA/LA commissioned an initial study to explore various “ideas to relocate and
rebuild the historic railway on downtown’s Bunker Hill” in 1976, no further action was taken
until almost two decades later because of delays associated with the development of California
Plaza, the development site that had been ultimately selected for the relocated Angels Flight.
342
The delays associated with the project culminated in the material degradation of the railway’s
constituent parts, which had been largely neglected. After years of “lying among stacks of scrap
materials in [the] warehouse,” the “old wooden cars were suffering from dry rot,” and several of
the railway’s other components had been formally deemed unsafe.
343
CRA/LA’s plans to
reconstruct the railway were further complicated by the fact that its original configuration –
which conformed to the hill’s steep thirty-three-percent grade – would be difficult to incorporate
into the new physical landscape of the hill, which had been extensively excavated and graded in
order to accommodate new commercial high-rise development.
344
Per the conditions of a development agreement that had been arranged by CRA/LA, the
agency placed “the railway reconstruction in the hands of the builder of the California Plaza
Office complex” on Parcel Y-1, the site that had been selected for Angels Flight.
345
But a
subsequent downturn in the market for luxury office space in Bunker Hill led the project’s
developer, Metropolitan Structures, to place the development of Parcel Y-1 – and also the
340
Ibid.
341
“Plans to Restore Angels Flight Face Delay Until 1975,” Los Angeles Times, October 22, 1970.
342
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, “Bunker Hill Redevelopment Project Area
Implementation Plan, FY 2010 – January 1, 2012,” report, December 17, 2009, 8.
343
Bart Everett, “Angels Flight Awaiting Uncertain Resurrection,” Los Angeles Times, February 3, 1975.
344
Ibid.
345
James Rainey, “Cable Cars Get a Push from City,” Los Angeles Times, June 18, 1993.
106
reassembly of Angels Flight – on hold indefinitely.
346
CRA/LA thereafter intervened and devised
a plan to reconstruct the funicular railway itself, rather than wait for market conditions to
improve and for the development of Parcel Y-1 to resume. In 1991, CRA/LA’s Board of
Commissioners approved a plan in which the agency would finance and oversee the
reconstruction of the railway adjacent to the first two phases of California Plaza, both of which
had been completed prior to the economic downturn.
347
After the plan had been unanimously
approved by the City Council, CRA/LA’s Board approved the expenditure of $4 million for
implementation of the plan in 1993 and selected a local general contractor to carry out the
reconstruction, which commenced in 1995.
348
After almost a year of construction and
rehabilitation work, Angels Flight officially resumed operation in 1996, nearly three decades
after it had been dismantled and placed into storage. Once the reconstruction was complete,
CRA/LA, which owned the narrow parcel that Angels Flight occupied, leased the property to the
non-profit Angels Flight Railway Foundation, which would manage the railway’s day-to-day
operations. Per the conditions of the lease, CRA/LA would act as landlord and, in conjunction
with the non-profit organization, would ensure that “a safe and efficient rail system is provided
to the public at all times.”
349
In addition to coordinating and financing the reconstruction effort, CRA/LA played a key
role in ensuring that the reconstruction project adhered to historic preservation protocol.
Specifically, CRA/LA officials, in conjunction with personnel from the city’s Cultural Affairs
Department, the Los Angeles Conservancy, and the Angels Flight Railway Foundation, served
on a board that oversaw all restoration efforts that were being undertaken.
350
Funds appropriated
by CRA/LA were also used to assemble a broad-based team of architects, engineers, and historic
preservation professionals that carried out the work.
351
As a result of these efforts, “almost ninety
percent of the historic material was retained,” in spite of nearly thirty years of deferred
346
Ibid.
347
“CRA Approves Plans to Resurrect Angels Flight,” Los Angeles Times, September 20, 1991.
348
Nancy Rivera Brooks, “Angels Flight Gives Lift to Reputation of Small Contractor,” Los Angeles Times, March
26, 1996.
349
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, Report to Transportation Committee, August
11, 2010.
350
“Guide to the Restoration and Reconstruction of Angels Flight: The Historic Inclined Railway in Downtown Los
Angeles,” accessed August 27, 2013, http://www.publicartinla.com/Downtown/figueroa/angels_flight_guide.html.
351
Ibid.
107
maintenance and incremental decay.
352
Although the reconstructed railway was shortened by
seventeen feet in order to conform to the altered topography of Bunker Hill, and several of the
mechanical elements of the original railway necessitated replacement, the original “cars, station
house, and Hill Street arch [were] completely restored.”
353
Thus, the reconstructed railway
closely resembled its original appearance, although its context and setting had been dramatically
altered due to redevelopment activity. The project won the approval of historic preservationists
and received preservation awards from the Los Angeles Conservancy and California
Preservation Foundation.
354
However, Angels Flight encountered problems just five years after re-opening. In
February 2001, the railway’s main drive system abruptly failed, which sent one of the two cars
careening down the hill and resulted in one death, seven injuries, and “significant damage to the
cars and mechanical equipment.”
355
A subsequent investigation conducted by the National
Transportation Safety Board concluded that the crash occurred because of “faulty mechanical
and brake systems,” and faulted a number of state and local agencies, including CRA/LA, for
“failing to tightly oversee the reconstruction and operation of the railway.”
356
The railway
remained closed for investigation and repairs until 2010, when it once again re-opened, this time
with upgraded safety features and an “all new drive and control system.”
357
While CRA/LA
retained ownership of the narrow strip of land that was occupied by the railway and continued to
serve as landlord, repairs and safety upgrades after the 2001 crash were financed using $3.5
million that had been fundraised by the Angels Flight Railway Foundation.
358
Given the mechanical problems associated with the reconstructed railway and the tragedy
that ensued, the overall reputation of Angels Flight remains on shaky ground. However, from a
352
Nancy Rivera Brooks, “Angels Flight Gives Lift to Reputation of Small Contractor,” Los Angeles Times, March
26, 1996.
353
“Guide to the Restoration and Reconstruction of Angels Flight: The Historic Inclined Railway in Downtown Los
Angeles,” accessed August 27, 2013, http://www.publicartinla.com/Downtown/figueroa/angels_flight_guide.html.
354
Tetra Design Architects and Planners, “Angels Flight Funicular Railway,” accessed August 29, 2013,
http://www.tetra-ibigroup.com/project/angleflt.html.
355
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, Bunker Hill Redevelopment Project Area
Implementation Plan, FY 2010 – January 1, 2012, December 17, 2009, 8; Kurt Streeter, “Design, Oversight Faulted
in Fatal Angels Flight Accident,” Los Angeles Times, August 6, 2003.
356
Kurt Streeter, “Design, Oversight Faulted in Fatal Angels Flight Accident,” Los Angeles Times, August 6, 2003.
357
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, Bunker Hill Redevelopment Project Area
Implementation Plan, FY 2010 – January 1, 2012, December 17, 2009, 9.
358
Ibid.
108
Figure 4.6. Present-day view of Angels Flight, view looking west. Photo by author.
heritage conservation perspective, the re-opening of the funicular railway in 1996 was a success,
as the project resulted in the restoration of an iconic architectural and cultural landmark and the
rehabilitation of its constituent pieces, which had previously fallen into a state of disrepair after
years of neglect and deferred maintenance. CRA/LA’s role in the conservation and rehabilitation
of Angels Flight is complex; the same agency that had removed the funicular, had initially called
for its demolition, and had allowed its components to fall into disrepair during its lengthy storage
also led the charge to finance and oversee its restoration. Had the agency not voluntarily
intervened in the project and allocated “property tax revenue generated by the new high-rises on
Bunker Hill to pay for the work” in the early 1990s, the restoration project would have likely
never occurred, given that the restoration of the railway was tied to a private development project
109
that, as of now, still has not come to fruition.
359
Thus, the involvement and financial support of
CRA/LA was essential in reconstruction of the landmark. The case of Angels Flight also
signifies CRA/LA’s evolving approach to the management of historic and cultural resources in
its Project Areas over time. What was initially seen as “obsolete” and a hindrance to progress
was eventually embraced by agency officials and emerged as a cultural attraction and focal point
of the agency’s Bunker Hill Redevelopment Project. (Figure 4.6) shows a present-day view of
the funicular railway.
Case Study: Broadway Streetscape Enhancement Plan, 1998:
As part of a longer-term strategy to improve the general appearance of the Broadway
corridor and restore the thoroughfare’s reputation as a vibrant commercial and entertainment
district, CRA/LA coordinated the production of a comprehensive streetscape enhancement plan
for a portion of the Broadway corridor in the mid-1990s. Improvements were planned for the
section of the corridor between Second Street and Olympic Boulevard (Figure 4.7). The
enhancement plan aimed to attract potential investors and tenants to the Broadway corridor by
undertaking much-needed improvements to physical elements that comprised the streetscape,
which had suffered from incremental deterioration as a result of age and poor maintenance.
Toward this end, the enhancement plan called for the improvement and enhancement of the
street, sidewalks, and associated elements of the streetscape. Since some, but not all, of these
streetscape elements bore historic value and dated from the early twentieth century – among
them the street light fixtures, glass blocks in sidewalks that provided natural light to building
basements, tinted concrete, and terrazzo – CRA/LA commissioned a historic architectural survey
of the Broadway streetscape in 1998 to ensure that all proposed work associated with the
streetscape enhancement plan would complement, and not detract from, the historical character
of the street. While funding challenges prevented the enhancement plan from being fully
implemented, the historic architectural survey was completed as planned, thereby providing
CRA/LA and other public agencies with a comprehensive historic preservation planning
document.
359
Christine Essel, “Angels Flight Returns to LA,” Los Angeles Times, March 1, 1996.
110
Figure 4.7. Location map of the proposed site for the Broadway Streetscape Enhancement project, with the proposed
project area shaded in red. Illustration by author and Google Maps.
CRA/LA had been involved in piecemeal efforts to enhance the Broadway streetscape
since the late-1980s. In 1986, the agency issued a grant of $400,000 that provided local business
owners with the funding necessary to establish a business improvement association called
Miracle on Broadway.
360
The merchants and stakeholders who comprised the association had a
common interest in bolstering business and “bring[ing] back Broadway’s glory” by making the
street “decent and clean again, a place where people can shop all night without being afraid.”
361
Working toward this end, the association spearheaded an ambitious improvement project for
Broadway in 1987 that called for enhanced trash service, the provision of additional maintenance
and security personnel, the construction of a trolley line, and improvements to some streetscape
360
Martha Groves, “A Vision for L.A.’s Broadway,” Los Angeles Times, February 27, 1989; Santiago O’Donnell,
“Broadway Glory: The Hope is Alive,” Los Angeles Times, November 20, 1987.
361
Santiago O’Donnell, “Broadway Glory: The Hope is Alive,” Los Angeles Times, November 20, 1987.
111
features including sidewalks, light standards, and signage.
362
This plan won the support of
CRA/LA, which voted to finance the initial phase of the three-year enhancement project.
363
Only
a small portion of the planned project was completed. CRA/LA provided additional assistance in
subsequent years by providing financing for what came to be known as “safe and clean teams,”
in which work crews would clean up trash and debris that littered the Broadway streetscape and
would also report suspicious activity to law enforcement personnel by walkie-talkies “that [were]
connected to Los Angeles and Metropolitan Transportation Authority police.”
364
Together, these
efforts helped improve the physical appearance of Broadway and provided additional sets of eyes
upon the street, but their piecemeal approach failed to address larger, infrastructural repairs that
needed to be made.
Responding to merchants’ concerns and the “perception of a declining and unsafe
environment which has an adverse impact on the retail environment of the street,” CRA/LA
initiated a large-scale, multi-phased streetscape enhancement project in 1996. The project, which
encompassed an eight-block-long stretch of Broadway between Second Street and Olympic
Boulevard, was slated to be carried out in three phases, each of which addressed infrastructural
issues on a roughly-three-block section of the street.
365
Among the infrastructural issues were
deteriorated sidewalks, curbs and gutters, lack of handicapped access curb cuts, and subsidence
of portions of sidewalks that were decks on top of subterranean basements that extended into and
under the sidewalk space. The initial design study that was commissioned by the agency stated
that “the purpose of this renovation project [was] to provide the setting for a welcoming and
vibrant Broadway street scene…and enhance the street’s ability to serve its historic function as a
significant transportation and commercial corridor.”
366
Toward this end, CRA/LA advocated for
the installation of new and enhanced streetscape features and commissioned the landscape
architecture firm of Campbell and Campbell to create a comprehensive streetscape master plan,
which the agency would thereafter implement in phases.
367
Pursuing these much-needed
improvements and improving the “public face” of Broadway were seen as “key to developing a
362
Eric Malnic, “Three Year Project to Spiff Up Broadway Begins,” Los Angeles Times, February 24, 1987.
363
Ibid.
364
Tommy Li, “Cleanup Diminishes Blight on Broadway,” Los Angeles Times, July 10, 1994.
365
Teresa Grimes, Historic Architectural Survey and Evaluation Report and Finding of No Adverse Impact:
Broadway Streetscape Improvement Project, October 1, 1998.
366
Broadway Streetscape Design Study: Executive Summary for Community Presentation, April 6, 1996.
367
Ibid.
112
revitalized district and the impression of a clean and safe environment,” which would help
CRA/LA achieve its long-term goal of eliminating blight and stimulating additional investment
and development along Broadway and throughout the Historic Core.
368
Specifically, CRA/LA’s
streetscape enhancement plan called for the improvement of six fundamental elements of the
Broadway streetscape: “sidewalk paving, street lighting, street graphics, building façade
treatments, street furnishings, and street trees.”
369
Many of the streetscape features that were
targeted for enhancement had been installed in the early twentieth century, when Broadway came
into being as Los Angeles’s preeminent commercial and entertainment district, and thus
functioned as character-defining features of the historic streetscape. A historic image of the
Broadway streetscape is shown in (Figure 4.8).
Figure 4.8. Historic view of Broadway, looking north from Fourth Street, circa 1924. Source: USC Libraries,
California Historical Society Collection, File Name: CHS-9011.
368
Los Angeles Conservancy, “Broadway Initiative Action Plan,” July 1999, 10.
369
Teresa Grimes, Historic Architectural Survey and Evaluation Report and Finding of No Adverse Impact:
Broadway Streetscape Improvement Project, October 1, 1998.
113
Environmental review was required before CRA/LA could begin construction. In 1979,
six blocks of the Broadway corridor, bounded by Third Street on the north and Ninth Street on
the south, had been listed on the National Register of Historic Places as the Broadway Theater
and Commercial District.
370
The district encompassed ninety-nine buildings along the corridor
that were constructed between the 1890s and 1930s, bore architectural distinction, and were
associated with the rise of Broadway as the heart of commerce and entertainment in Los Angeles
in the early twentieth century.
371
Since most of the project area overlapped with the boundaries
of the Broadway Theater and Commercial District, which was listed on both the national and
state historic resource registers, CRA/LA’s established project area satisfied the statutory
definition for “historic resource” as defined under the statutes and guidelines of the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Thus, environmental review was necessary to ensure that
CRA/LA’s undertakings would not adversely impact the essential form and character of the
designated historic district.
372
Since the proposal had been partially financed by federal dollars,
the project also constituted an “undertaking” per Section 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act, which mandated similar environmental review to avoid and/or mitigate project
impacts that would adversely affect the historic district.
373
The National Register nomination that had been submitted for the Broadway Theater and
Commercial District only identified the buildings as character-defining elements of the district
and did not account for the historic infrastructural elements that helped define the character of
the street.
374
Thus, in addition to completing the baseline environmental compliance
requirements required under CEQA and Section 106 and evaluating the effects of the project on
the defined elements of the district, CRA/LA also sought to remedy the ambiguity regarding
related features by commissioning a study to evaluate and document character-defining elements
of the historic streetscape. Toward this end, CRA/LA hired Historic Resources Group, a locally-
370
“National Register of Historic Places Inventory-Nomination Form: Broadway Theater and Commercial District,”
prepared by Tom Sitton, May 9, 1979.
371
Ibid.
372
In California, properties and districts that are listed in the National Register of Historic Places are automatically
listed on the California Register of Historical Resources.
373
Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 requires projects undertaken by federal agencies,
or projects that receive funding from federal agencies, to take into account the effects of their undertakings on
historic and cultural resources. “Section 106 Review” refers to the environmental review process that is required of
all formally designated “undertakings.”
374
Teresa Grimes, Historic Architectural Survey and Evaluation Report and Finding of No Adverse Impact:
Broadway Streetscape Improvement Project, October 1, 1998.
114
based historic preservation consulting firm, to conduct a survey of the streetscape, identify and
inventory streetscape features that bore historical significance, and prepare an architectural report
that described the surveyors’ findings and identified mitigation measures that would protect the
integrity of the identified streetscape features.
375
Historic Resources Group’s survey and historic
architectural report were submitted to and subsequently certified by CRA/LA in 1998. The
survey findings and mitigation measures that were identified in the report allowed the agency to
pursue the streetscape work in a manner that complied with national historic preservation
standards and took into account the value of the street’s historic character.
The historic architectural report identified and catalogued streetscape features that were
associated with Broadway’s historical period of commercial development and were thus
considered to be character-defining. Specifically, the report called attention to the electric
streetlights, which featured ornate bases that were “elaborately ornamented with stylized motifs
from nature;” stamped and stained concrete sidewalks; brass markers and plaques that were
embedded in the sidewalk and helped delineate property lines; and cast iron vents and clear and
purple glass blocks that were inserted into the sidewalk in order to provide air and light to
storage areas that were located beneath the public right-of-way.
376
The report also called special
attention to the “quality and variety of terrazzo sidewalks, present in front of some stores and
many theaters on Broadway,” that featured elaborate detailing and helped signify the
preeminence of particular commercial and entertainment venues located along the corridor
(Figure 4.9).
377
Using these findings as a basis, the report evaluated the potential impact of
CRA/LA’s streetscape enhancement plan on the aforementioned historic streetscape features,
and drafted a series of mitigation measures to ensure that the project conformed with the
Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for Rehabilitation and would not result in the inappropriate
treatment of or damage to significant streetscape features.
378
The report provided CRA/LA with
valuable historic preservation planning guidance and support.
Upon certifying the findings that had been presented in the architectural report prepared
by Historic Resources Group, CRA/LA began the first phase of the streetscape enhancement
375
Ibid, 1.
376
Ibid, 6-9.
377
Ibid, 3.
378
Ibid, 12-15.
115
Figure 4.9. Detail of terrazzo tile in front of 648 South Broadway, with high artistic quality. Photo by author.
project in 1998 using funds that had been secured from a federal Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) grant, the state of California, the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA), and tax allocation bonds that had been issued by the agency.
379
The first phase of the project spanned the northern section of the Broadway commercial corridor,
between Second and Fifth streets.
380
While the agency had been able to secure financing to plan
and initiate the streetscape enhancement project, challenges in obtaining additional project
379
Ibid; Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, Central Business District Redevelopment
Project: Five-Year Implementation Plan, October 19, 2000, 18.
380
Teresa Grimes, Historic Architectural Survey and Evaluation Report and Finding of No Adverse Impact:
Broadway Streetscape Improvement Project, October 1, 1998.
116
financing – especially as the full cost of reconstructing basements beneath sidewalks became
known – precluded CRA/LA from fully implementing Campbell and Campbell’s master plan for
the Broadway streetscape that had been developed in 1996. Consequently, only small portions of
the streetscape enhancement measures that had been proposed in the master plan were realized,
and the subsequent phases of the streetscape plan, which together encompassed the stretch of
Broadway between Fifth Street and Olympic Boulevard, were put on hold.
381
Although CRA/LA’s Broadway streetscape enhancement plan failed to come to fruition
as it had initially been planned, the project is nonetheless significant for its contributions to
heritage conservation efforts within the Historic Core. Due to the planning and financial support
provided by CRA/LA, a run-of the-mill environmental compliance effort associated with CEQA
and Section 106 was transformed into a wider-reaching study of the historic streetscape elements
that comprised Broadway. Said features had never been previously assessed for the purposes of
historic preservation and were identified, evaluated, and documented for the first time as part of
the CRA/LA-funded study.
382
As a result of the assessment and report that it coordinated and
financed, CRA/LA and other public agencies were left with an advisory document that could be
used to guide future historic preservation and planning undertakings involving the Broadway
corridor. Indeed, the 1998 architectural report was consulted and helped guide design decisions
that were associated with the most recent streetscape master plan for Broadway that was released
in 2013 as part of City Councilman Jose Huizar’s Bringing Back Broadway initiative, a ten-year
revitalization plan that aims to reinvigorate the historic corridor through a combination of public
investment and the nurturing of public-private partnerships.
383
While CRA/LA was required by
law to perform historic preservation review before breaking ground on the project – and thus did
not initiate this project on an entirely voluntary basis – this efforts went far beyond the baseline
requirements and demonstrated the agency’s willingness to pursue the conservation of historic
and cultural resources located within its jurisdiction.
381
Trudi Sandmeier, personal correspondence with author, August 28, 2013.
382
Teresa Grimes, Historic Architectural Survey and Evaluation Report and Finding of No Adverse Impact:
Broadway Streetscape Improvement Project, October 1, 1998.
383
Los Angeles Department of City Planning, “Broadway Streetscape Master Plan,” modified February 2013,
accessed September 6, 2013, http://cityplanning.lacity.org/complan/othrplan/pdf/Broadway_StreetscapePlan.pdf.
117
Concluding Notes:
The three projects evaluated in this chapter – Biddy Mason Park, Angels Flight, and the
Broadway Streetscape Enhancement Plan – all involved institutional or public-use properties that
bore historical and/or cultural significance to the study area. All three of the projects benefited to
some degree from the involvement and support of CRA/LA. Although each of the three projects
involved a wide variety of players and stakeholders, CRA/LA played an important, often behind-
the-scenes role in bringing these projects forward. In addition to resulting in tangible, on-the-
ground results, CRA/LA’s involvement in these three projects is also symbolically significant for
demonstrating how the agency – which had been conceived in the Urban Renewal movement and
had initially engaged in the raze-and-rebuild approach to urban redevelopment – came to
embrace historic and cultural resources, and centrally incorporate said resources into its broader
redevelopment plans. The case of Angels Flight is particularly telling in this regard; although
CRA/LA was responsible for removing the historic resource during the agency’s early years of
operation, its involvement and financial assistance were ultimately critical to reconstructing and
restoring the funicular railway. Finally, these case studies demonstrate the breadth of CRA/LA’s
involvement in issues related to heritage conservation. In addition to participating in the
conservation and rehabilitation of landmark buildings and more “traditional” types of resources,
the agency also actively participated in the conservation of cultural memory and intangible
heritage, historic infrastructure, and smaller-scale and more supplemental elements of the
historic built environment.
118
CONCLUSION
Purpose and Structure:
Prior to its dissolution in 2012, the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of
Los Angeles (CRA/LA) engaged in an array of economic development projects that ultimately
shaped, and at times re-shaped, communities across the entire City of Los Angeles. “Historic
rehabilitation” had been formally identified as one of the ten pillars that defined CRA/LA’s core
mission, yet to date almost no literature has been published regarding the agency’s broad impact
on the historic built environment.
384
This thesis set out to evaluate, in general terms, the
relationship among the goals, policies, and undertakings of CRA/LA and efforts to conserve
architecturally and culturally significant resources in the Historic Core of downtown Los
Angeles. Exploration of CRA/LA’s own history and development (Chapter 1) and the
subsequent evaluation of seven heritage conservation case studies in which CRA/LA participated
(Chapters 2, 3, and 4) have revealed a wealth of information toward this end. This final section
of the thesis aims to make sense of the information that was conveyed in the previous four
chapters. Included are a series of conclusions that can be drawn from this information, a
discussion of potential implications associated with CRA/LA’s dissolution, and a brief
discussion of limitations and opportunities for further research.
Conclusions and Key Findings:
Several conclusions can be drawn from the body of this thesis. Among these conclusions
is the observation that CRA/LA’s general approach to heritage conservation experienced a
dramatic transformation over time. Established in 1948, CRA/LA was born into a public policy
environment in which slum clearance and the complete re-building of inner city districts was
both widely promoted and heavily subsidized by federal officials. Accordingly, the relationship
between CRA/LA and heritage conservation was acrimonious during the agency’s early years of
operation. Projects initiated and administered by CRA/LA in the 1950s and 1960s were based on
the slum clearance model and resulted in the demolition of entire districts of older buildings,
many of which were architecturally distinctive and were of historical or cultural merit. In part,
384
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, “January 19 Board Presentation,” January 19,
2012.
119
CRA/LA pursued far-reaching slum clearance projects in order to receive funding under the
federal Urban Renewal program. However, publications and statements that were released by
CRA/LA officials and affiliates indicate that, at the time, the agency generally perceived older
buildings as both obsolete and a hindrance to progress and modernity. Older buildings, especially
those in Bunker Hill, were frequently described by agency officials using qualifiers such as
“outmoded,” “outdated,” “obsolete,” “infested,” and “plagued.” Upon the release of an existing
conditions report of Bunker Hill by CRA/LA in 1956, William T. Sesnon, then-chairman of
CRA/LA’s Board of Commissioners, asserted that “obsolete and outmoded buildings [atop
Bunker Hill] will be cleared…[this] will erase the ugly blight that is Bunker Hill today and
convert the area into a model of civic achievement.”
385
These statements are substantiated by the
agency’s early actions in the Ann Street, Bunker Hill, Hoover, and Beacon Street redevelopment
projects, in which scores of older buildings were demolished to make way for new development,
that reflected the rationalism and modernism that dominated city planning at the time.
In large part, it was the early undertakings of CRA/LA that helped spur the coalescence
of an activist historic preservation community in Los Angeles. While there had been some
interest in historic properties in Los Angeles prior to the era of Urban Renewal, no formal
historic preservation efforts had taken root, largely due to the fact that historic preservation itself
was a nascent discipline.
386
The mass demolition of older properties that was proposed as part of
CRA/LA’s Urban Renewal scheme for Bunker Hill generated concern among some citizens and
sparked a grassroots effort to save sites that bore architectural and cultural significance to the
city. This concern translated into action. A small group of architects affiliated with the local
chapter of the American Institute of Architects (AIA) partnered with the City of Los Angeles’s
Municipal Art Commission (MAC) in 1958 to address the issue. Toward this end, the AIA and
MAC “began working on an ordinance that would create a citizens board to survey, identify, and
protect historic sites throughout the city.”
387
The final product of this collaboration, the Cultural
Heritage Ordinance, was passed in 1962 and provided a legal basis for the conservation of
385
“Bunker Hill Clean-Up Backed,” Los Angeles Times, July 9, 1956.
386
The National Historic Preservation Act, which set into place a national historic preservation program and is often
regarded as marking the “birth” of the historic preservation discipline, was not passed until 1966. Thus, the lack of
an organized historic preservation community was not unique to Los Angeles per se, but was reflective of a much
broader national trend.
387
City of Los Angeles Office of Historic Resources, “History of the Cultural Heritage Commission,” accessed
September 8, 2013, http://preservation.lacity.org/commission/history-cultural-heritage-commission.
120
significant buildings and sites.
388
In addition to designating two Victorian-era residences as well
as Angels Flight as local Historic Cultural Monuments in 1965, paving the way for their
preservation and relocation by CRA/LA, the five-member Cultural Heritage Board (now Cultural
Heritage Commission) was a driving force behind the creation of Heritage Square, a site to house
relocated historic properties from Bunker Hill and elsewhere in the city “that would have
otherwise been demolished.”
389
Adoption of the ordinance and the concurrent creation of the
Cultural Heritage Board generated an interest in historic preservation and provided an avenue for
pursuing the conservation of architectural and cultural landmarks. Ultimately, these early historic
preservation efforts gave way to the creation of a much larger and more organized conservation
community. While multiple factors influenced the City’s decision to pursue the adoption of the
Cultural Heritage Ordinance, the origins of the local historic preservation community can largely
be attributed to early urban redevelopment efforts, including those undertaken by CRA/LA.
As the federal government shifted away from the Urban Renewal model in the 1970s and
instead adopted community development strategies that were more holistic in scope, so too did
CRA/LA. In the absence of federal Urban Renewal funding, CRA/LA, like most local agencies,
had stopped pursuing far-reaching slum clearance projects that resulted in the mass demolition of
historic buildings by the early 1970s. Beginning in the 1980s, historic and cultural resources
within distressed neighborhoods – which had been perceived in previous decades as exemplary
of blight and decay – were seen in terms of their economic potential. Rather than actively
pursuing the demolition of older buildings and sites, as it had done in its earlier years, CRA/LA
financed and oversaw their rehabilitation in the hope that said resources would stimulate
additional investment and development within its Project Areas. Over its lifespan, then, the
agency transformed from an affiliate of the Urban Renewal program, which was predicated on
wholesale clearance of neighborhoods and districts deemed to be “slums,” to a participant in the
rehabilitation of the historic built environment. The case of Angels Flight, which was dismantled
by CRA/LA in the 1960s and subsequently reconstructed by the agency in the 1990s, is
representative of this transformation. The landmark railway that was once removed to make way
388
Ray Hebert, “City Asks to Save Historic Monuments,” Los Angeles Times, January 16, 1962.
389
City of Los Angeles Office of Historic Resources, “History of the Cultural Heritage Commission,” accessed
September 8, 2013, http://preservation.lacity.org/commission/history-cultural-heritage-commission.
121
for modern development was, in the end, carefully restored to function as a cultural centerpiece
of the neighborhood.
Additional conclusions can be drawn from the seven case study projects that were
identified and evaluated in previous chapters. First, and perhaps most generally, the case studies
indicate that between the early 1980s and its dissolution in 2012, CRA/LA demonstrated a clear
and steadfast commitment to the conservation and rehabilitation of architecturally and culturally
significant resources in the Historic Core of downtown Los Angeles. In part, this commitment is
demonstrated by the sheer number of conservation-related projects that were undertaken by or
received assistance and support from the agency; in addition to the seven case study projects that
were evaluated in this thesis – which on their own, represent a relatively-high volume of projects
– CRA/LA played a role in many other rehabilitation projects throughout the Historic Core.
CRA/LA’s commitment to heritage conservation is also demonstrated by the agency’s
willingness to absorb and subsidize the economic risk that was associated with many of the case
study projects, particularly projects such as Premiere Towers and Grand Central Square that
introduced residential uses into the Historic Core before a solid and tested market for such units
had been established in the area. In conjunction, CRA/LA’s sizable portfolio of historic
rehabilitation projects, which spans nearly three decades, and its propensity for pursuing
economically-risky projects indicate that heritage conservation was not a haphazard pursuit, but
rather reflected a central element of the agency’s larger community-building strategy for the
study area.
Moreover, CRA/LA expressed its support of heritage conservation in a wide variety of
ways, most of which involved the provision of behind-the-scenes assistance. The most common
form of assistance provided by the agency was financial, largely made possible by its ability to
fund redevelopment projects by means of tax increment financing. This in turn provided
CRA/LA with a considerable amount of financial leverage that only CRA/LA could make
available to private developers and other public agencies. Often times, CRA/LA’s financial
support was overt and direct, and involved financing some of the “hard” costs of historic
rehabilitation projects – such as site acquisition and construction loans – through the issuance of
tax increment bonds. But the agency also helped finance a number of soft-cost expenditures
associated with historic rehabilitation projects, which included, for example, hiring architectural
122
conservators and historic professional consultants to oversee the rehabilitation of the former
Broadway Department Store; issuing a grant to The Power of Place to produce an inventory of
culturally-significant sites, which culminated in the development of Biddy Mason Park; and
commissioning a historic architectural report that identified and documented all of the historic
character-defining streetscape elements of the Broadway theater and commercial corridor. The
agency also helped orchestrate alternative financing strategies – such as the coordination of a
TFAR transaction for the Bradbury Building and the implementation of a soft second mortgage
program for Premiere Towers – that played a significant role in financing these projects.
390
It is
important to note that CRA/LA’s involvement in heritage conservation was not limited to
financial assistance; the agency also provided administrative support and/or assumed the role and
duties of project manager in several instances.
In conjunction, the case studies attest to the breadth of the agency’s heritage conservation
portfolio, from which it can thus be concluded that CRA/LA participated in an array of heritage
conservation projects that encompassed a variety of property types, resource attributes, and
development scenarios within the Historic Core. Even within the confines of the study area,
which is relatively small in size, the agency applied heritage conservation in a wide variety of
contexts, which culminated in the development of for-sale and for-rent residential units, market-
rate and income-restricted affordable housing, mixed-use developments, retail establishments,
commercial office space, parks and public facilities, transportation infrastructure, and streetscape
elements. In addition to partaking in the material rehabilitation of landmark buildings – which
represents the more conventional approach to conservation – CRA/LA was also involved in the
conservation of intangible heritage and cultural memory, as demonstrated in the case of Biddy
Mason Park. In effect, the agency’s impact in the study area was therefore not limited to a single
property type or resource attribute, but rather culminated in the conservation and rehabilitation of
a wide variety of architectural and cultural elements within the Historic Core.
From all of the case studies, it can be concluded that, having evolved from its Urban
Renewal roots, CRA/LA subsequently exhibited good stewardship of the historic and cultural
resources within its purview. Although in many instances the interior spaces and systems of
390
TFAR refers to “Transfer of Floor Area Ratio,” a development tool in which unused development capacity on a
site permitted by its zoning can be sold to the owner of another property in certain instances. Refer to Chapter 3 for
additional information on the program.
123
historic buildings were reconfigured in order to facilitate new uses, the agency ensured that the
rehabilitation of exterior character-defining features of historic buildings was carried out in
accordance with the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for Rehabilitation. As a result of
CRA/LA’s good stewardship, many character-defining features that had been damaged or
compromised due to neglect or previous alterations (such as with the Homer Laughlin and Lyon
Buildings) were fully restored and more closely resembled their original appearance. In addition
to architectural restoration, CRA/LA also helped finance costly seismic strengthening projects
(such as with the Bradbury Building and former Broadway Department Store), which helped
ensure the buildings’ strength and longevity. CRA/LA’s stewardship also relates to the agency’s
involvement in attracting and securing a stable tenant base for its rehabilitated properties, which
helped protect these resources from further deterioration and deferred maintenance.
CRA/LA’s heritage conservation undertakings resulted in far more than the mere
conservation and rehabilitation of individual landmarks. Over time, the agency’s steadfast
commitment to heritage conservation had a catalytic effect that helped spearhead widespread
growth in downtown Los Angeles and the revitalization of its historic fabric. Early residential
rehabilitation projects that had involved the agency – namely, Premiere Towers and Grand
Central Square – demonstrated the successes and shortcomings of such projects, and served as
the basis for the City’s pioneering Adaptive Reuse Ordinance (ARO) that has since catalyzed an
unprecedented wave of historic rehabilitation projects in downtown Los Angeles. CRA/LA’s
efforts to rehabilitate and revitalize the Broadway corridor have since given way to an initiative
sponsored by Los Angeles City Councilman Jose Huizar – Bringing Back Broadway – which
works toward many of the same objectives as the previous CRA/LA initiative. The historic
architectural report that CRA/LA commissioned as part of the Broadway streetscape
improvement project in the 1990s was expanded and incorporated into a streetscape
enhancement plan that was produced by the Los Angeles Department of City Planning and is
currently in the planning phases.
391
The efforts of CRA/LA arguably helped propel both of these
larger preservation programs into motion.
391
Los Angeles Department of City Planning, “Broadway Streetscape Master Plan,” modified February 2013,
accessed September 6, 2013, http://cityplanning.lacity.org/complan/othrplan/pdf/Broadway_StreetscapePlan.pdf.
124
Finally, the case studies demonstrate that despite acting largely behind-the-scenes,
CRA/LA often played a critical role in heritage conservation projects, and the agency’s
involvement was often the key determinant to a project’s success. Simply stated, many of the
historic buildings that were restored and placed back into productive use in the study area
between the 1980s and 2000s would not have been successfully completed without the
participation, and sometimes intervention, of CRA/LA. The agency’s vested interest in the
revitalization of the City Center (previously Central Business District) Project Area and its
ability to issue tax increment bonds, approve TFAR transactions, and leverage other alternative
financing strategies put CRA/LA in a unique position to provide assistance to costly and often
risky preservation projects in ways that other public agencies and private developers and lenders
simply would not – or could not – do. Unlike non-profit historic preservation advocacy
organizations, which generally possessed the will but lacked the resources to pursue conservation
projects, and private-sector developers and lenders, who generally possessed the resources but
lacked the will, CRA/LA had both the resources and was committed to investing a substantial
portion of these resources into the conservation and rehabilitation of historic properties. The
agency thus acted as an influential and powerful partner to the heritage conservation community
whose shoes will likely be difficult, if not impossible, to fill.
Six of the seven case study projects encountered critical hurdles that would have likely
impeded their completion had CRA/LA not assumed a role in the project’s financing and/or
administration. Prior to CRA/LA’s involvement, neither the Premiere Towers nor Grand Central
Square projects were able to attract the investment capital that was needed in order to initiate
construction; the agency subsequently provided additional financing and administrative support
that ultimately prevented both projects from financial collapse. Given the hefty price tag and
truncated time frame that was associated with the mandated seismic retrofitting of the Bradbury
Building, it is not clear if the building’s owners would have possessed either the desire or the
financial means needed to save the building from demolition had CRA/LA not coordinated and
approved a TFAR transaction with the owner of another property. The outstanding property taxes
and lack of on-site parking that were associated with the former Broadway Department Store –
both of which were dealt with by CRA/LA – would have likely rendered the site infeasible for
office use, thus resulting in further deterioration and neglect of the building. Since the
reconstruction of Angels Flight was linked to the development of an office tower that has not yet
125
been constructed as of 2013, the resource would have remained in storage, disassembled, had
CRA/LA not financed and overseen its reconstruction. Had the agency not financed the historic
architectural report that identified the character-defining streetscape elements on Broadway, the
features would have remained undocumented and thus vulnerable to historically-inaccurate
repairs or replacement. Although The Power of Place obtained sufficient financing on its own
accord to install commemorative public art pieces at Biddy Mason Park, the agency’s
collaboration with The Power of Place and its provision of supplemental funding paved the way
for an installation that was larger and more monumental than initially planned.
In summary, although the initial relationship between CRA/LA and heritage conservation
was acrimonious, by the 1980s the agency had emerged as a key player in the conservation and
rehabilitation of historically and culturally significant sites in the Historic Core.
Projected Implications of ABX1 26 and the Dissolution of CRA/LA:
Sufficient time has not yet passed to adequately assess the impacts that ABX1 26 and the
subsequent dissolution of CRA/LA will yield on heritage conservation. Since each of
California’s 425 redevelopment agencies (RDAs) operated independent of one another, the
effects will almost certainly be different in each municipality. However, based on the
information that was conveyed in the seven case studies, it seems inevitable that the dissolution
of CRA/LA will produce noticeable and negative impacts on efforts to conserve and rehabilitate
historic and cultural resources in the Historic Core and, likely, in other parts of Los Angeles as
well. Given CRA/LA’s role as a critical funding source for many conservation-related projects,
the greatest impacts will likely relate to project financing. In the absence of CRA/LA and its
ability to help finance heritage conservation projects through the issuance of tax increment
bonds, project financing falls in the hands of either other local agencies – most of which are
cash-strapped and must tend to other priorities – or lenders and developers in the private sector.
Although private-sector lenders and developers have expressed increased interest in historic
rehabilitation projects upon the adoption of the Adaptive Reuse Ordinance in 1999, thus helping
bridge the funding gap as it relates to residential properties, private lenders generally only invest
in projects that demonstrate a strong potential for return on investment. Projects that are not
associated with a tested market and are thereby risker, such as the Junipero Serra State Office
126
Building, or projects that bear cultural and historical significance but are not especially lucrative,
such as Angels Flight and Biddy Mason Park, are far less likely to receive private financing. It
will likely be these types of non-lucrative conservation projects that are impacted the most as a
result of CRA/LA’s dissolution.
Unfortunately, there is no obvious substitute for the tax increment financing that was
provided by CRA/LA, which played a critical role in bringing several of the case study projects
to fruition. Taking full advantage of local and federal historic preservation incentive programs,
such as rehabilitation tax credits and Mills Act Property Tax Abatement contracts, may help
account for some, but certainly not all, of the financial void left by CRA/LA. While the success
of CRA/LA through its efforts prior to dissolution on creating a level of private momentum in
the Historic Core will result in the conversion of numerous remaining buildings into lofts and
other forms of housing, it is likely that many deteriorated and underutilized properties in the
Historic Core that bear architectural and/or cultural merit and would have otherwise been
targeted for redevelopment by CRA/LA will now sit untouched. Any future historic
rehabilitation projects that are initiated by private-sector developers but encounter financial
problems, such as Premiere Towers and Grand Central Square, would lack CRA/LA-provided
assistance and would be likely candidates for default and foreclosure. In addition to the financial
implications associated with CRA/LA’s demise, the heritage conservation community has lost
one of its strongest advocates and most prolific and financially-stable partners.
Luckily, CRA/LA’s long-term impact on the revitalization of downtown may present a
silver lining for future heritage conservation efforts. By heavily investing in rehabilitation and
adaptive reuse projects in the 1980s and 1990s and absorbing a considerable amount of the risk
and economic losses associated with these early revitalization efforts, CRA/LA demonstrated
that a market did in fact exist for residential development downtown, which in turn catalyzed
additional development in the area. The agency’s involvement in the implementation of the 1999
Adaptive Reuse Ordinance (ARO) touched off a wave of growth and development that has
transformed large portions of downtown into a vibrant live-work community.
392
Since the
passage of the ARO, demand for residential units in downtown has substantially increased, and
large, underutilized historic commercial buildings are now perceived by developers as wise
392
Refer to Chapter 2 for additional information on the Adaptive Reuse Ordinance and its implications.
127
investment opportunities with a great deal of economic potential. Hopefully the relatively new-
found demand for historic buildings in downtown will continue to encourage private investment
and will help soften the financial impact of CRA/LA’s absence.
Nonetheless, CRA/LA’s absence is likely to make the financing of heritage conservation
projects in the Historic Core more challenging and, in some cases, infeasible. The dissolution of
the agency is a loss for the heritage conservation community that will likely yield noticeable and
negative impacts, particularly with regard to project financing. However, additional time needs
to pass to determine the magnitude of these fiscal impacts.
Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research:
Several limitations associated with this thesis create opportunities for additional research.
Arguably the greatest limitation of this study is its relatively narrow scope, which in turn affects
the generalizability of its findings. Limitations related to the representativeness of findings
across multiple units of analysis are a common disadvantage of the case study research model.
393
A concerted effort was made to ensure that the seven case study projects that were selected and
assessed encompassed multiple property types and development scenarios so that in conjunction,
these case studies possessed sufficient internal variety. Nonetheless, all of the case studies aside
from Angels Flight are concentrated within the jurisdictional boundaries of a single subsection
(the Historic Core) of one CRA/LA Redevelopment Project Area (City Center, formerly Central
Business District), and consequently the conclusions and findings of this thesis apply only to a
small portion of the 20,000 acres across the City of Los Angeles that fell within the jurisdiction
of CRA/LA.
394
These conclusions are valuable within the context of the Historic Core, but do not
necessarily apply to CRA/LA’s thirty-three other Redevelopment Project Areas. Since many of
these Project Areas encompassed districts within the city that were equally rich in historic and
cultural fabric, an analysis of CRA/LA’s commitment to heritage conservation within other
Project Areas is a topic that merits additional research and would complement the conclusions
that were reached by this thesis.
393
Jacques Hamel, Case Study Methods: Qualitative Research Methods (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1993).
394
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, “January 19 Board Presentation.” January 19,
2012.
128
Similarly, it is important to consider that this thesis accounts only for the actions of a
single RDA. Although all of California’s 425 RDAs operated under the umbrella of California’s
Community Redevelopment Law and adhered to a common set of broad, statutory guidelines, all
of the agencies operated independently of one another and responded to the specific needs and
conditions of their respective sponsor communities. Thus, the conclusions drawn from this thesis
are not necessarily applicable to other communities that were served by an RDA. Given the wide
variety of communities and constituencies across the state, it seems likely that some other RDAs
approached the issue of heritage conservation either in a markedly different manner or not at all.
However, additional research would be needed to draw decisive conclusions toward this end.
Accounting for the goals, policies, and actions of other RDAs with regard to heritage
conservation thus represents another area of opportunity that would expand upon and supplement
the findings of this thesis.
The fact that the implementation of ABX1 26 and the subsequent dissolution of CRA/LA
took place only seventeen months in the past presents an additional limitation of this thesis,
specifically with regard to the discussion of potential impacts that may be linked to CRA/LA’s
demise. Although the body of this thesis provides an in-depth evaluation of CRA/LA’s origins,
evolution, and contributions to several heritage conservation projects and thus provides a strong
basis for analysis, it is simply too soon to decisively pinpoint what the impacts of CRA/LA’s
absence will be. A series of projections have been made toward this end, based on an
understanding of how CRA/LA operated and how the agency generally approached heritage
conservation projects, but additional time is needed before these impacts can be identified and
analyzed with certainty. Once that time has passed, the contents of this thesis can be expanded
upon to also include a discussion and analysis of how heritage conservation has been impacted
over time in CRA/LA’s absence.
Finally, while this thesis identifies a number of potential implications associated with the
implementation of ABX1 26 and the subsequent dissolution of CRA/LA, it does not identify any
alternative strategies to account for these implications. Likely, the development of one or more
innovative and creative policy-oriented solutions – not unlike the Adaptive Reuse Ordinance –
will need to be developed to ensure that the conservation of historic and cultural resources
continues to remain economically feasible in the post-redevelopment environment. The
129
conclusions that are reached in this thesis help lay the groundwork for additional research and
analysis toward this end. Developing a series of policy-based strategies to account for CRA/LA’s
void in heritage conservation undertakings represents another potential way in which the findings
of this study can be expanded upon in the future.
Concluding Notes:
CRA/LA played a central role in local community and economic development policy in
Los Angeles between 1948 and 2012. Thus, the state’s decision to eliminate redevelopment
agencies and the subsequent dissolution of CRA/LA is likely to produce profound and wide-
reaching impacts across the city. Among the numerous programs that CRA/LA helped finance
and support was heritage conservation; although the agency initially relied upon federal Urban
Renewal funding and engaged in slum clearance and the widespread demolition of older
neighborhoods, CRA/LA came to actively participate in the conservation and rehabilitation of
historic and cultural resources by the early 1980s, especially within the resource-rich Historic
Core of downtown Los Angeles. Between the 1980s and 2012, CRA/LA represented a
significant funding source and administrative partner for heritage conservation projects in the
Historic Core, although the agency often operated behind-the-scenes and is therefore not always
duly credited for its contributions to the conservation of the built environment. Given the
instrumental role that CRA/LA played in many conservation and rehabilitation projects within
the Historic Core, it seems likely that the agency’s absence will yield a noticeable and negative
impact with regard to future heritage conservation undertakings. Only time will tell what
precisely these impacts will entail.
130
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Creator
Goodrich, Andrew Robert
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Core Title
Heritage conservation in post-redevelopment Los Angeles: evaluating the impact of the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles (CRA/LA) on the historic built environment
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School of Architecture
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Master of Heritage Conservation
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Heritage Conservation
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10/04/2013
Defense Date
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CRA/LA,Historic Preservation,OAI-PMH Harvest,redevelopment,redevelopment agencies
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Tags
CRA/LA
redevelopment
redevelopment agencies