University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Measuring for what: networked citizen science movements after the Fukushima nuclear accident

(USC Thesis Other)

Measuring for what: networked citizen science movements after the Fukushima nuclear accident

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content

MEASURING FOR WHAT:
NETWORKED CITIZEN SCIENCE MOVEMENTS
AFTER THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

by
Yasuhito Abe

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(COMMUNICATION)
August 2015

Copyright 2015 Yasuhito Abe
i

DEDICATION
To my wonderful wife, Tomoko Abe.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This dissertation project would not have been possible without the support of my
advisors, colleagues, friends, research participants and family. First and foremost, I
would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisors Professor Larry Gross,
Professor Andrew Lakoff, and Professor Thomas Goodnight. It is very difficult to express
how much I owe Professor Gross. He was always responsive to my inquiries, always very
supportive. I’ve been inspired (and sometimes mesmerized) by his excellent classes and
intellectual horizons. After the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami and the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear accident took place in 2011, I wanted to pursue research that could be
helpful for those who suffered from the disasters, but I struggled to find the right research
topic. Professor Lakoff’s exceptional seminar in science and technology studies allowed
me to pursue my dissertation topic and his generous introduction to Dr. Lisa Onaga
steered me to towards grassroots measuring networks as a focal point. Professor
Goodnight epitomizes intellectual awesomeness; I was always inspired by his cutting-
edge research and his unlimited intellectual curiosity. He guided me to approach my
dissertation topic from perspectives of science communication studies and I do hope that
I live up to his expectations of my dissertation. I was unusually lucky to have all three
professors as my dissertation committee.
Outside of my dissertation committee, I was very fortunate to have had the
opportunity to learn from various excellent scholars at the University of Southern
California: Professor Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach, Professor Manuel Castells, Professor
Henry Jenkins, Professor Sheila Murphy, Professor Patricia Riley, Professor Thomas
Hollihan, Professor Randy Lake, Professor Lian Jian, Professor Clinton Godart, Professor
iii

Lynn Millar, and Professor Nicholas Cull. Their most patient guidance made me the
scholar I am today. Furthermore, I am also grateful to the outstanding USC Annenberg
staff: Ms. Anne Marie Campian, Dr. Imre Meszaros, Ms. Christine Lloreda, Ms. Billie
Shotlow, and Ms. Kelly Kernaghan. Even while I was away from USC Annenberg, they
were always responsive, which certainly helped me to focus on my fieldwork in Tokyo
and Fukushima. And I would like to thank the USC Graduate School for the Research
Enhancement Fellowship, which allowed me to focus on doing dissertation fieldwork in
Japan. This research was fully funded by the fellowship.
At USC Annenberg, I was unusually lucky to have excellent colleagues and
friends. I do hope I deserved my place among them at USC Annenberg. My cohorts are
always inspiring and encouraging me to work harder and I would like to acknowledge
their tireless endeavors to do so; thank you Alex Agloro, Meryl Alper, Laura Alberti,
Janeane Anderson, Evan Brody, Dayna Chatman, Brittany Farr, Selene Hu, Erin Kamler,
Joel Lamuel, Ioana Literat, Wenlin Liu, Melissa Loudon, Theo Mazumdar, Aalok Mehta,
Jieun Shin, Katrina Pariera, and Cynthia Wang. Thanks to their encouragement, I believe
I have become a better scholar and person during my time at USC Annenberg. Other
colleagues were also extremely encouraging and inspiring, including Shoko Hayashi
Barnes, Ritesh Mehta, Garrett Broad, Andrew Schrock, Kevin Driscoll, Lana Swartz, Ben
Stoke, Rhea Vichot, Sandi Evans, Elisheva Weiss, Nan Zhao, Zhan Li, Deborah Hannan,
Nikki Usher, Poong Oh, Kelly Song, Alex Levitt, Renyi Hong, Rong Wang, Wei Wang,
Chi Zhang, and Lin Zhang. I am particularly grateful to Shoko Hayashi Barnes. Just like
a “big sister,” she helped my wife and me settle in Los Angeles and kindly guided me as
a Japanese colleague particularly when I was a first-year PhD student. Without her
iv

assistance, it would have been far more difficult for me to survive first-year course work.
Kelly Song is my best “advisee sister”: while we were away from USC Annenberg and I
engaged in fieldwork in Japan and she in South Korea, Kelly always cheered me on,
inspiring my research. Ritesh Mehta too encouraged my fieldwork and when I was
struggling with data collection and analysis, he is the one who guided me back on the
right track.
Outside of the USC Annenberg community, I would like to thank various scholars
and librarians that supported and aided my dissertation research. Professor David H.
Slater of Sophia University in Japan connected me to the Sophia University Institute of
Comparative Culture (ICC) as a visiting researcher, allowing me access to invaluable
resources at the Sophia University libraries. Professor Takeshi Suzuki encouraged me to
focus on working on dissertation while I struggled to find a job in Japanese academia. As
an excellent bilingual librarian, Tomoko Bialock was extremely helpful when I needed
Japanese materials on the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. And special thanks goes
to my excellent proofreader, Alicia Marie Weber.
I could not thank my research participants enough. Without their dedicated
participation, this dissertation would not have been possible. In hindsight, I was really
brave to choose my dissertation topic because I didn't know any Japanese experts before I
commenced fieldwork in Japan. Nevertheless many scientists, policymakers, and
radiation measurement manufacturers actively participated in my research. I would
especially like to thank Katsumi Shozugawa, Yuichi Moriguchi, Ryūgo Hayano,
Masaharu Tsubokura, Michiaki Kai, Kimiaki Saito, Tetsujiro Honda, Yujiro Kuroda,
v

Takashi Omura, Masato Shinagawa, Munemitsu Kikuchi, Masahiro Takita, Yōhei
Kamata, and Japanese dosimeter manufacturers who participated in my research.
I would also like to thank my research participants at Safecast: Sean Bonner,
Pieter Franken, Azby Brown, Joe Moross, Kyoko (Kiki) Tanaka, Jonathan Wilder,
Eckhard Hitzer, Jun Young Oh, Student Volunteer A, Akira Yamaguchi, Jun Yamadera,
Toshikazu Watanabe, and Norio Watanabe. As for Kodomo Mirai Sokuteijo and
5cm50cm Keisoku Net, I am deeply grateful to Hidetake Ishimaru, Yukihiro Maeda,
Atsuko Uchida, Natsuo Hattori, Chia Yoshida, and Yoshiaki Matsuo. As well, I am truly
thankful to Norifumi Ogawa for allowing me to study Hakatte Geiger. I would also like
to thank the two Hakatte Geiger users who shared their invaluable experiences.
I would also like to thank Mark Kramer, Professor Charles K. Armstrong, and
Professor George R. Packard, who kindly wrote recommendation letters for my
application to USC Annenberg’s PhD program. I believe that it must have been very
difficult for them to write a recommendation letter for me but thanks to those letters, I
had the unique opportunity to learn from excellent professors and colleagues at USC
Annenberg. For the past four years, I tried my best to live up to their expectations and I
do hope that I fulfilled a small part of that with this dissertation.
The Abe family has been always supportive of my academic journey, and I am
continually thankful to my father and novelist Yasuharu Abe and my stepmother Nobue
Abe. I should also thank my younger brother Kyohei Abe for his encouragement. My 91-
year-old super grandmother Hiroko Abe is always amazing; after my mother Misae Abe
passed away in 1994, she raised me always guiding me to work harder! Your
encouragement always made me feel the need to work harder, helping me become a more
vi

patient person. Also, I would like to thank the Kitano family: Nobuo Kitano and Hisayo
Kitano. I apologize to my father-in-law Nobuo Kitano (1944-2014) for taking his
precious daughter away to the United States. After receiving my admission letter from
USC Annenberg, you were the one that encouraged me to pursue my dreams.
Last but certainly not least; this dissertation is dedicated to my wonderful wife
Tomoko Abe. Without your encouragement, I would not have resumed my academic
career. I remember when I used to wonder whether I should return to the United States
and leave a full-time position in Japan, you encouraged me to pursue my academic career
saying that, “If you still don’t find a job after getting a PhD degree at USC, why don't we
open a Japanese noodle shop? I’m pretty good at making Japanese noodles!” Because of
you, we were fortunate to meet many good people in California. Because of you, I was
able to focus on studying communication with excellent faculty, staff and colleagues at
USC Annenberg. Because of you, we traveled to many beautiful places in the United
States and elsewhere. And because of you, we triumphed in hard times together. So, this
dissertation is for you, Tomoko. You saved my dream.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ii
ABSTRACT ix
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
Questioning Radiation Data in Post-Fukushima Japanese Society 5
Defining the Year 2014 13
Research Questions 18
Conceptual Frameworks 19
Three Cases: Safecast, Kodomo Mirai Sokuteijo and Hakatte Geiger 25
Method 28
Overview of Chapters 30

CHAPTER 2. LOW-DOSE RADIATION IN THE AIR IN JAPANESE MASS
MEDIA (1986-2014) 33
A Brief History of Japanese National Newspapers and
Nuclear Power (1945-1986) 38
Method 45
Portraying Low-dose Radiation from Chernobyl to Fukushima 48
Portraying Low-Dose Radiation after Fukushima 55
Conclusion 65

CHAPTER 3. DEFINING WHAT COUNTS AS DATUM ON RADIATION
IN EVERYDAY LIFE 67
Defining Experts: Scientists, Government Officials, and Dosimeter Manufactures
70
Post-Fukushima Japanese Measurement Infrastructure 72
Method 76
The Dosimetrists 78
The Radiation Protection Expert, Nuclear Physicist, Medical Doctor
and Environmental Systems Engineering Specialist 87
The Government Officials in Fukushima and Tokyo 94
The Japanese Dosimeter Manufacturers 105
Conclusion: Post-Fukushima Japanese Society was
defended in 2014? 110

CHAPTER 4. SAFECAST 112
Method 116
Safecast as a Pulling Network 118
The Birth of Datum 130
From Datum to Data: Data Management 142
Experts’ Views of Safecast 147
Safecast in Everyday Life in the Fukushima Prefecture 149
Safecast in 2014 and beyond 158
Conclusion 160
viii

CHAPTER 5. KODOMO MIRAI SOKUETIJO 162
Method 165
Constructing Accurate Datum 166
The ‘Making Radiation Visible’ Project 175
Redefining a Child-Centered Everyday Life:
“Measuring, Learning and Living” 187
Conclusion: Making Data as Drama 194

CHAPTER 6. HAKATTE GEIGER 196
Method 198
Going from Gas Price to Radiation 199
Designing Hakatte Geiger 202
Designing Participatory Radiation Data Quality Control 213
Using Hakatte Geiger in Everyday Life 218
Conclusion: Recording Measuring Activity Collectively 232

CONCLUSION. LEARN TO MEASURE AND MEASURE TO LEARN
TOGETHER 234
Nuclear Radiation Knowledge Infrastructures 236
So What? 245
Limitations 249
Looking Ahead 250

REFERENCES 252

ix

ABSTRACT
This dissertation is the first in-depth study of citizens’ radiation data production
practices following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident of 2011. It is also the first in-
depth fieldwork on citizen’s radiation data production practices after social media and the
Internet have become a part of everyday life in Japan and elsewhere. While various
citizens have engaged in data generation on radiation in the air using a wide variety of
dosimeters and circulated the resulting data via the Internet and social media, this study
captures one particular moment in the evolution of citizens’ data production practices.
This moment is a snapshot of 2014, more than three years after the Fukushima nuclear
disaster when there were still evacuees from the Fukushima Prefecture and elsewhere yet
the levels of radiation in the air had decreased.
This work has specific relevance to the study of citizen science. Most studies that
have preceded this work focus on a single case of citizens’ radiation data production
practice. While most of these earlier works failed to illustrate the fundamentally complex
picture of citizens’ radiation data production practices, this dissertation seeks to illustrate
how citizens take advantage of the Internet and social media to produce data on low-dose
radiation in the air in varying ways by investigating three different cases: Safecast,
Kodomo Mirai Sokuteijo and Hakatte Geiger. Rather than focusing on analyzing the
three cases in isolation from social, cultural and historical contexts, this study further
investigates public discourses on low-dose radiation through the lens of Japanese mass
media and also analyzes how experts such as scientists, government officials, and
dosimeter manufacturers viewed citizens’ data production practices in heterogeneous
ways.
x

This dissertation demonstrates that whereas most experts were inclined to view
citizens’ radiation data as scientifically untrustworthy, a wide variety of citizens took full
advantage of the Internet and social media to produce data on radiation in the air and to
reconstruct their everyday life after the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan and
elsewhere. The findings of this study are only a snapshot of the role citizens play in
generating data on low-dose radiation in the air in the digital era, but this dissertation lays
the foundation for future cross-cultural studies.

1

Introduction
This dissertation investigates how a wide variety of citizens contributed to the
production of data on radiation in the air after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. At
2:46 p.m. on March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and a resulting tsunami
devastated the northeastern area of Japan’s Honshu Island.
1
The deadly earthquake and
tsunami ultimately triggered the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, releasing a large
amount of radioactive material into the environment. Immediately after the disaster, both
the Japanese government and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) failed to
provide citizens in Japan and elsewhere with information about radiation in the air
effectively. To make matters worse, the Japanese government repeatedly announced that
the radiation would have “no immediate effects on human health” without further
detailed explanations. According to one investigative report on the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear disaster, this claim by the government may not necessarily have convinced
people who were particularly concerned about the long-term health effects of radioactive
material (Fukushima genpatsujiko dokuritsu kenshō iinkai, 2012). A lack of useful
information about radiation created alternative spaces for various citizens to become
engaged in measuring radiation in the air, which will be analyzed in this dissertation.
Before and after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, radiation existed
everywhere in the world (Torii, Shozugawa, & Watanabe, 2012). We are continuously
exposed to natural background radiation, such as cosmic radiation and we receive

1
The earthquake and tsunami, which is generally referred to in Japanese as Higashi
Nihon Daishinsai (or the Great East Japan Earthquake), reportedly killed over 15,000
people and more than 2,000 people are still officially missing as of 2014 (National Police
Agency of Japan, 2014).
2

medical irradiation when we undergo computed tomography (CT) scans. Given that the
health effects of natural background radiation are the same as those of manmade radiation
(Torii, Shozugawa, & Watanabe, 2012), we have all been more or less irradiated in
everyday life. However, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster highlighted the issue of
radiation exposure in the public’s eye. More importantly, as Shibutani (1966) suggested,
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster generated its own public. Shibutani (1966)
describes the characteristics of a public as follows:
A public is not an organized group, except in those instances when a crisis
happens to be confined to an already established unit. It dose not have a fixed and
easily identifiable membership, nor is there a formal organization of
conventionally defined roles. As a situation changes and the same event comes to
be viewed in a different light, the composition of its public changes…A public is
not to be confused with a community, for publics do not necessary consist of the
inhabitants of a particular territorial unit. Although the existence of a public
implies a common universe of discourse, their boundaries are not necessarily
coterminous; those who share a common perspective often develop somewhat
different interests. (p. 38)
As such, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster created an alternative space for
individual citizens to form various groups, organizations, and networks as publics dealing
with unknown exposure to radiation. Given that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster is
the first “known” major nuclear disaster in a country where the Internet and social media
were relatively widely available (Sōmushō, 2011), different publics actively took
3

advantage of digital media to deal with radiation in the air in many different ways.
2
This
dissertation focuses on investigating specific publics centered around measuring radiation
in the air after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.
There is significant diversity with respect to the agencies, motivations, focus areas,
goals, and strategies employed by a number of publics and organizations, all of which
could be placed under the collective banner of “grassroots measuring networks.”
3
This
dissertation uses the term “grassroots” in an attempt to differentiate between citizens’
measuring networks in isolation from government-funded or expert-driven measuring
networks. While the term “grassroots” may connote anti-establishment or rebelliousness
for some people, such a connotation is not necessarily the case for this dissertation.

2
The Internet was more or less integrated in Japanese society before the disaster
(Sōmushō, 2011). According to White Paper: Information and Telecommunication in
2011 by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), 78.2% of the
population in Japan was connected to the Internet by the end of 2010 (Sōmushō, 2011).
Among the many factors that influenced Internet usage by the end of 2010 in Japanese
society, the MIC report shows that age was the most fundamental factor that affected
Internet use: the percentage of Internet users aged 13–49 years old was more than 94%,
which is much higher than that of older users. The second most fundamental factor
modulating Internet usage was annual family income: families with an annual income of
less than two million yen (approximately 19,500 USD) were unlikely to be Internet users
in 2010. Among Internet users (n = 3171), MIC further shows that 42.9% were using
social media in 2010. The proportion of social media users among youth was in particular
much higher than that of older individuals. Thus, an analysis of the White Paper suggests
that youth belonging to a family with an income of at least two million yen were more
likely to be Internet users before the disaster.
3
Elsewhere, I referred to citizens’ measuring networks as “post-Fukushima DIY (Do
It Yourself) networks” because the term captured the characteristics of citizens measuring
radiation in the air by themselves in the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
disaster (Abe, 2014). While the scope of the concept of post-Fukushima DIY networks
captures an important aspect of Safecast, it does not however take into account those who
do not measure radiation but are still agents shaping citizens’ measuring networks. As
will be illustrated in the rest of the dissertation, there are people who make a significant
contribution to the development of citizens’ measuring networks even if they do not
measure radiation themselves. In order to give agency to those who do not measure
radiation in the air in this research, this dissertation employs the term “grassroots
measuring networks” rather than “post-Fukushima DIY networks”
4

Moreover, this dissertation uses the term “networks” as a way of emphasizing various
texts on grassroots measuring networks (Latour, 1993; Latour, 2005). Latour (2005)
views networks as a concept instead of a thing, which is “nothing more than an indicator
of the quality of a text about the topics at hand.” (p. 129) Rather than investigating
citizens’ measuring groups as monolithic or assembled movements, this dissertation
seeks to focus on re-assembling various texts related to grassroots measuring networks.
Investigating grassroots measuring networks is particularly important because
theoretically, radiation data collected by citizens could attract the largest audiences in the
history of the world compared to other radiation data collected before. Before the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, it was not necessarily easy for ordinary people to
access radiation data at a particular time and space. However, the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear disaster witnessed various radiation data available partly due to those who took
advantage of the Internet and social media. They not only collected radiation data but
also archived them for future reference (Takano, Yoshimi, & Miura, 2012).
Perhaps more importantly for this research, radiation data by citizens could
partially settle or maintain what could be called the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear crisis. The
question then is whether grassroots measuring networks and their data production
practices could help settle or prolong the crisis with their own data. How should we
conceptualize grassroots measuring networks and their data production practices in terms
of the maintenance of post-disaster society in time and space? What are the implications
of the birth of grassroots measuring networks for future risk governance? (Jasanoff,
2010) Or more generally, what can we learn from grassroots measuring networks in
threatening environmental hazards including nuclear disaster?
5

Questioning Radiation Data in Post-Fukushima Japanese Society
Since the beginning of the disaster, citizens have been engaged in measuring
radiation in the air, turning the imperceptible radiation in the air into quantified data.
Rosenberg (2013) aptly describes data in relation to similar concepts, such as facts and
evidence, from an etymological perspective:
The word “data” comes to English from Latin. It is the plural of the Latin word
datum, which itself is the neuter past participle of the verb dare, to give. A
“datum” in English, then, is something given in an argument, something taken for
granted. This is in contrast to “fact,” which derives from the neuter past participle
of the Latin verb facere, to do, whence we have the English word “fact,” for that
which was done, occurred, or exists. The etymology of “data” also contrasts with
that of “evidence,” from the Latin verb vidēre, to see. There are important
distinctions here: facts are ontological, evidence is epistemological, data is
rhetorical. (p. 18)
As such, Rosenberg indicates that data are rhetorical from an etymological point of view.
Gitelman and Jackson (2013) indicated that whereas there are no “good facts” or “bad
facts,” we have “good evidence” or “good data,” noting that “data need to be imagined as
data to exist and function as such, and the imagination of data entails an interpretive base.”
(p. 3) If these claims are correct, data production practices should be understood as
rhetorical practices. As such, it is important to investigate how citizens articulate their
measurement readings as data, which necessarily involves a rhetorical function.
It should be noted that grassroots measuring networks engaged in measuring
radiation as quantified data. In other words, their data production practices involved the
6

quantification of radiation. Porter (1995) discusses the language of quantity and points
out quantification as s “technology of distance” saying:
Since the rules for collecting and manipulating numbers are widely shared, they
can easily be transported across oceans and continents and used to coordinate
activities or settle disputes. Perhaps most crucially, reliance on numbers and
quantitative manipulation minimizes the need for intimate knowledge and
personal trust. Quantification is well suited for communication that goes beyond
the boundaries of locality and community. A highly disciplined discourse helps to
produce knowledge independent of the particular people who make it. (p. ix)
As such, Porter indicates that the quantification of radiation could contribute to making
radiation local and global data. Even if radiation was measured as data in a specific spot,
the quantification of data could make measurement readings globally accessible partially
because the quantification of radiation involves the decontextualization of radiation data.
Likewise, the quantification of radiation apparently creates what Barry (2006) terms
“technological zones.” Barry (2006) referred to technological zones as “a space within
which differences between technical practices, procedures and forms have been reduced,
or common standards have been established.” (p. 239) Barry points out three forms of
technical zones: metrological zones, infrastructural zones, and qualification zones.
Metrological zones are referred to as a space in which common measurement standards
and practices developed, making different data comparable in different locations.
Through the quantification of radiation with the units of dose rate (the micro Sievert),
grassroots measuring networks rather easily created a metrological zone on a global scale
with the help of the Internet.
7

However, this is not the case for such a quantification of radiation. In order to
investigate how grassroots measuring networks and their data production practices
evolved, this dissertation takes into account three major uncertainties affecting their
radiation data: radiation production standards, dosimeters, and data representations.
These three uncertainties were historically specific, being shaped by the contexts in
which citizens’ measurement readings were constructed as data to function in post-
Fukushima Japanese society.
Radiation protection standards: Measurement readings were taken, so what?
Measurement readings would be more or less socially meaningless as data if
isolated from radiation protection standards. What distinguishes low-dose radiation from
other environmental forms of pollution is the fact that there are several radiation
protection standards. The primary standard is based on the ICRP’s radiation protection
standards. Established originally as the International X-ray and Radium Protection
Committee in 1928, the ICRP is a non-governmental and international organization that
provides recommendations for radiation protection (Clarke & Valentin, 2009). Indeed, its
radiation protection standard was developed on the basis of data on the health conditions
of survivors of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From the
beginning of the 1950s, Japanese and American scientists collaborated to create
approximately 120,000 databases of interview and survey data on survivors of the atomic
bombs (Lindee, 1994; Nakagawa, 2011). Whereas critical historians suggested that the
process of initial data collection about survivors of the atomic bombs had serious
methodological problems (Lindee, 1994; Nakagawa, 2011), the large samples of atomic
bomb survivors ultimately contributed to shaping the most fundamental and
8

comprehensive dataset for constructing radiation protection standards in contemporary
society (Imanaka, 2012).
It should be noted that the ICRP’s recommendations have been historically
specific (Clarke & Valentin, 2009; Nakagawa, 2011). Since the 1950s, the ICRP’s
radiation protection standards have been based on the Linear-No-Threshold (LNT) model,
which assumes that there is no threshold below which the health risks of radiation are
harmless. However, the assembled data about Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors were
essentially inconclusive in terms of proving the health effects of low-dose radiation.
While much scientific evidence from the data shows that high-dose radiation has adverse
health effects (such as cancer), it is difficult to prove the health effects of low-dose
radiation scientifically. On the basis of precautionary principles, the ICRP thus
hypothesizes that given the health risks of high-dose radiation, biological damage caused
by low-dose radiation is directly proportional to the dose of radiation. From the ICRP’s
perspective, even a small amount of radiation should be considered to be potentially
harmful to the human body. As such, the ICRP has differentiated the health effects of
high-dose radiation as deterministic effects from those of low-dose radiation as stochastic
ones since 1977.
Most international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO)
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted the ICRP’s radiation
protection standards as a principle for radiation protection. In 2007, the ICRP issued a
recommendation for radiation protection and defined low-dose radiation rates as those
below 100 mSv, which means that the health effects of radiation levels below 100 mSv
are considered to be stochastic and not deterministic; exposure to radiation of 100 mSv
9

causes a 5% rise in cancers. As such, the ICRP’s 2007 recommendation set 1 mSv as an
annual dose limit of exposure to radiation for the general public where exposure to
radiation of 1 mSv causes 0.05% of cancers.
4
The Japanese government has adopted the
ICRP’s radiation protection standards.
Another radiation protection standard is based on the Threshold Model, which
asserts that there is a threshold below which radiation is harmless. According to the
Threshold Model, it is misleading to assume that the health effects of low-dose radiation
are stochastic on the basis of data about the incidence of leukemia from Chernobyl
(Imanaka, 2012). As such, the Threshold Model assumes that the LNT model
overestimates the harmful health effects of low-dose radiation below a threshold. In
contrast, other radiation protection standards, which are based on the European
Commission on Radiation Risk (ECRR)’s biphasic cell-response model, assume that the
ICRP’s LNT model underestimates the harmful health effects of low-dose radiation
(Busby, 2011). This model assumes that exposure to extremely low-dose radiation has
more adverse health effects than what the ICRP assumes. However Tetsuji Imanaka, a
nuclear scientist, has noted that there is very little data that support the assumption of this
model (Imanaka, 2012). Finally, other radiation protection standards are based on the
hormesis effects that assume that the health effects of low-dose radiation are beneficial
rather than harmful (Doss, 2013; Feinendegen, 2005; Lucky, 1999; Prekeges, 2003;
Vaiserman, 2010).

4
Radiation protection standards do not count medical irradiation as radioactive
protection because it is assumed that the merit of medical exposure outweighs the demerit
of being exposed (Torii, Shozugawa, & Watanabe, 2012).
10

As such, the same measurement readings taken by citizens could be interpreted
differently according to the radiation protection standards used. For instance, those who
believe in the Threshold Model may not view radiation below 100 mSv as meaningful
data in everyday life because low-dose radiation below 100 mSv has no negative health
effects according to the Threshold Model. Accordingly, it is not far-fetched to assume
that individuals who believe in the Threshold Model find it difficult to remain motivated
to measure low-dose radiation in 2014 when the levels of radiation in the air gradually
decreased. On the other hand, those who believe in the LNT model may view radiation
below 100 mSv as more meaningful data and may see grassroots measuring networks and
their data collection practices as more socially valuable accordingly. Therefore, an
analysis of radiation protection models indicates that measurement readings taken by
citizens may not always be processed the same way in post-Fukushima Japanese society.
5

Dosimeters: Measurement readings taken by what?
While citizens’ measurement readings are processed as data in relation to
radiation protection standards, perhaps more important for this research is the role of
dosimeters in shaping measurement readings as data. Immediately after the disaster,
citizens engaged in measuring radiation using a wide variety of radiation detectors or
dosimeters including Geiger-Müller counters (Geiger counters, hereafter) and

5
An analysis of radiation protection standards was perhaps more important
immediately after the disaster than in 2014. For instance, Christopher Busby, Scientific
Secretary of the ECRR, presented public talks around Japan in the wake of the disaster
and his book was translated into Japanese (Busby, 2012). In 2014, when this research was
conducted however, I did not find anyone among my research participants who believed
in ECRR’s biphasic cell-response model.
11

scintillation survey meters
6
. Every dosimeter is designed for different purposes. For
instance, Geiger counters are designed to detect surface contamination while scintillation
survey meters are used to measure the radiation dose rate in the air (Mizutani, 2011).
More specifically, Geiger counters are generally designed to count beta and gamma
radiation particles or rays when measuring radiation in places that use radiation such as
institutions. As such, Geiger counters are designed to represent measurement readings in
unit of counts such as counts per minute. The units of counts are not necessarily
comparable with the units of dose rates (Sieverts), which quantify the effect of radiation
on the human body (Mizutani, 2011). On the other hand, scintillation survey meters are
designed to measure gamma rays in the environment and to calculate measurement
readings in units of dose rate.
While both Geiger counters and scintillation survey meters were used to measure
radiation in the air, their measurement readings could be represented as different data
according to which dosimeters were used. In other words, the characteristics of the
dosimeters used could affect, if not define, the social meaning of the measurement
readings. As will be illustrated later, there were indeed many useless dosimeters
imported from abroad, which contributed to uncertainties about the dosimeters used when
discussing the measurement readings. Accordingly, the Japanese government and other
Japanese experts viewed measurement data using a specified scintillation survey meter as
being trustworthier than data collected with Geiger counters. Analyzing dosimeters also
reveals challenges and opportunities facing grassroots measuring networks and their data
production practices.

6
Other kinds of dosimeters include ionization chamber and semiconductor detectors
(Mizutani, 2011).
12

Representation of measurement readings as data: Measurement readings were
collected, but then what?
Finally, the measurement readings were represented in many different ways.
Citizens engaged in visualizing and categorizing measurement readings using digital
media from their perspectives. In terms of data visualization, Gitelman and Jackson
(2013) note that “data visualization amplifies the rhetorical function of data, since
different visualizations are differently effective, well or poorly designed, and all data sets
can be multiply visualized and thereby differently persuasive.” (p. 12) Therefore, it is
important to investigate the process by which the quantified measurement readings were
qualified as data when radiation data is discussed.
Moreover, it is important to note that the representation of measurement readings
could involve the representation of measurement methods and other “backstage”
information about the measurement data. As will be illustrated, some grassroots
measuring networks represented the process by which measurement readings were
processed as measurement data. O’Neile (2002) indicates that the proliferation of
information does not always help us manage uncertainties, saying “supposed sources
proliferate, leaving many of us unsure where and where there is adequate evidence for or
against contested claims.” (p. 74) As such, “inadequate” representation of measurement
data may be a source of uncertainties about radiation data even if there is a great deal of
data available.
Even if citizens’ measurement readings are represented as quantified symbols,
such as units of counts or units of dose rate, their measurement data are thus susceptible
to the three uncertainties described above. The measurement data can be interpreted as
13

socially meaningful or meaningless according to the radiation protection standards.
Measurement data taken using a specific dosimeter could be seen as more authoritative
compared with data taken using a different dosimeter. And finally, measurement readings
could be processed as different data according to the ways in which the measurement
readings are represented. As noted, the three uncertainties are apparently history specific
and, more specifically, situated in the post-Fukushima Japanese context. This dissertation
investigates grassroots measuring networks by examining these three uncertainties.
Defining the Year 2014
A description of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster from the beginning of the
disaster until the end of 2014 examined through the lens of radiation in the air provides a
social context in which grassroots measuring networks measured radiation in the air. This
section focuses on describing key issues related to radiation in the air in chronological
order.
As noted, the Japanese government was relatively slow to inform the Japanese
public of radiation released from the Power Plant (Asahi shimbun tokubetsu hōdōbu,
2012; Fukushima genpatsujiko dokuritsu kenshō iinkai, 2012; Funabashi & Kitazawa,
2012; Imanaka, 2012; Kingston, 2012; Tokyo denryoku Fukushima genshiryoku
hatsuden jiko chōsa iinkai, 2012). Despite being equipped with a System for Prediction of
Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI), which assesses the direction
wind would take in carrying various radioactive materials, the Japanese government did
not publicize the monitoring results to Japanese publics during the initial days after the
explosions of the three reactors (Fukushima genpatsujiko dokuritsu kenshō iinkai, 2012;
Funabashi & Kitazawa, 2012; Kingston, 2012).
14

On March 21, the ICRP (2011), a non-governmental and international
organization providing guidelines for radiation protection, issued a statement about the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster:
The Commission continues to recommend optimisation and the use of reference
levels to ensure an adequate degree of protection with respect to exposure to
ionising radiation in emergency and existing exposure situations. For the
protection of the public during emergencies the Commission continues to
recommend that national authorities set reference levels for the highest planned
residual dose in the band of 20 to 100 millisieverts (mSv) (ICRP 2007, Table 8).
When the radiation source is under control contaminated areas may remain.
Authorities will often implement all necessary protective measures to allow
people to continue to live there rather than abandoning these areas. In this case the
Commission continues to recommend choosing reference levels in the band of 1
to 20 mSv per year, with the long-term goal of residing reference levels to 1 mSv
per year.
Even though this statement was based on the ICRP’s 2007 recommendations and the
Japanese state had not yet adopted the ICRP’s 2007 guidelines into its domestic laws on
radiation protection, the Japanese government raised its radiation protection standard in
terms of the public dose limit for exposure to radiation from 1 mSv per year to 20 mSv
per year. As for the health of children, Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology (MEXT) issued a guideline titled “Tentative Guideline on Use
of School Buildings and Playgrounds in the Fukushima Prefecture” on April 19, 2011 and
set the same upper limit of 20 mSv per year for school children (Monbukagakushō,
15

2011a). MEXT’s guidelines provoked controversy over the dose limit among citizens in
part because the upper dose limit of adults was 1 mSv per the year before the disaster. On
April 22, 2011, the Japanese government further designated the planned evacuation zone
as an area with an upper dose limit of 20 mSv per year. MEXT announced on May 27,
2011 that MEXT would seek to lower radiation levels to less than 1 mSv per year at
schools (Monbukagakusho, 2011b).
In the meantime hotspots, which can be described as areas where radiation levels
are higher than in neighboring areas, were found in various residential areas in the greater
Tokyo area (Fukui, 2011; Komatsu & Sonoda, 2011). Radioactive materials released
from the nuclear power plant were scattered to different areas including Tokyo and Chiba
Prefecture and resulted in hotspots. The Asahi newspaper, for example, published an
article on June 17, 2011 that a Japanese mother was involved in discovering hotspots
using dosimeters in the Chiba Prefecture (Komatsu & Sonoda). As will be illustrated in
Chapter 5, the existence of scattered hotspots paved the way for citizens and individuals
concerned about the safety (of children in particular) to become involved in measuring
radiation.
It is important to note that there were various dosimeters available, even phony
ones, following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. The commercialization of
dosimeters, which resulted partly from the development of science and technology,
contributed to the production of phony dosimeters available around the country
immediately after the disaster further fueling uncertainties about dosimeters and their
measurement readings. As will be described in Chapter 3, the Japanese government
ultimately issued guidelines about dosimeters measuring radiation in the air.
16

On December 16, 2011, Yoshihiko Noda, then-Prime Minister of Japan, issued a
statement that the most critical phase of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster was over
because the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was confirmed to be in a state of cold
shutdown. This moment was critical since the Japanese government officially declared
that the nuclear power reactors were more or less stabilized, adding that the crisis itself
was far from over. While radiation levels decreased in some areas in the Fukushima
Prefecture (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2011m), there were areas that had yet to be
decontaminated. On February 24, 2012, the Ministry of Environment (MOE) announced
that it had designated 104 municipalities with radiation air dosage rates of more than 0.23
per hour as Focus Areas of Contamination Situation Investigation (Kankyōshō, 2012),
suggesting that measurement readings on radiation in the air mattered for the designation
of these areas.
On November 7, 2012, the Japanese government announced that measurement
readings taken by their monitoring posts in the Fukushima Prefecture and elsewhere were
showing radiation levels at 90% of the actual values because the sensors in the
monitoring posts were shielded by the battery (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2012d), which
also provoked controversy over the government’s monitoring posts and their
measurement readings on radiation in the air (Kirishima, 2014).
Perhaps more importantly for this study, Japan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority
(NRA) issued a report on November 11, 2013 stating that radiation exposure should be
calculated on the basis of individual radiation exposure, not on the basis of exposure to
radiation in the air (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2013). The Nihon Keizai, a national Japanese
newspaper, notes:
17

The level of individual radiation exposure tends to be lower than that of radiation
in the air, which assumes that people stay outside for a long period of time. On the
basis of measurement readings [of individual exposure], it’ll be easier for
residents to return. Also the costs of decontamination are likely to be saved.
This report suggests that radiation in the air, which grassroots measuring networks
primarily deal with, is likely to be a less important issue when calculating radiation
exposure, indicating that grassroots measuring networks would play a smaller role in
post-Fukushima Japanese society accordingly.
However, in 2014 there was controversy over low-dose radiation in the air.
Oishinbo, a well-known and popular cooking manga series in Shogakukan Inc.’s weekly
magazine Big Comic Spirits, focused on the health effects of low doses of radiation
exposure in the Fukushima Prefecture. In the chapter published in the April 28 and May
12 editions of the weekly magazine, Shirō Yamaoka, a Tokyo-based journalist and the
main character of Oishinbo, visited the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and
experienced a bad nosebleed after coming back to Tokyo. While Yamaoka’s doctor
denied the connection between his nosebleed and the health effects of low-dose exposure
to radiation in Fukushima from a scientific perspective, the storyline of the chapter
ultimately suggested a link between nosebleeds and the health effects of low-dose
exposure to radiation in Fukushima. This storyline thus provoked controversy over the
health effects of low-dose exposure to radiation in the air in 2014 (McCurry, 2014; Osaki,
2014; Strange, 2014). Both the Japanese government and the Fukushima Prefecture
issued protests letters to Shogakukan Inc., but the author of Oishimbo published a book
18

about the health risks of low-dose radiation in Fukushima in February 2015, offering
counterarguments to the criticism leveled against Oishimbo (Kariya, 2015).
In the meantime, MOE and the Fukushima Prefecture compiled an interim report
in August 2014 in which they stated that they would place more value on individual
radiation exposure than exposure to radiation in the air when it comes to the issue of
decontamination (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2014e). The interim report suggested that
grassroots measuring networks focusing exclusively on measuring radiation in the air
might play smaller roles in the issue of decontamination in the future.
This section reconstructs a brief history of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster
with particular focus on controversial issues related to radiation in the air. It indicates that
while many citizens were concerned about radiation in the air, particularly hotspots
immediately after the disaster, the Japanese government gradually shifted its focus from
exposure to radiation in the air to individual radiation exposure when it came to the issue
of radiation, suggesting that grassroots measuring networks may have played a smaller
role in 2014 when it came to the issue of decontamination.
Research Questions
Here, fundamental questions have emerged. Since the beginning of the disaster,
citizens have engaged in measuring radiation in the air using various dosimeters. They
processed measurement readings as data and circulated data using the Internet and social
media. Now that three and half years have passed since the nuclear disaster and given that
the Japanese government shifted its focus to individual radiation exposure when it comes
to the issue of decontamination, why do citizens keep measuring radiation in the air in
2014? How do they create measurement readings as legitimate data by using the Internet
19

and social media? How does measurement data affect the everyday lives of the measurers
in post-Fukushima Japanese society? To what extent was the issue of radiation in the air,
which grassroots measuring networks dealt with, articulated or marginalized in public
discourses in Japan before and after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster? What are the
implications of grassroots measuring networks and their data production practices in a
Japanese state and regulatory context? What is the role of the state in shaping
opportunities and challenges facing grassroots measuring networks? The ultimate
question of this dissertation is how citizens have shaped what would be called the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear crisis by measuring radiation in the air?
Conceptual Frameworks
Risk Society
In order to address these questions, this dissertation will explore the concept of
risk society developed by sociologist Ulrich Beck (Beck, 1992, 1995, 2008, 2011; Beck,
Giddens, Lash, 1994)
7
. Beck and other authors such as Giddens (1990; 1991; 1999) offer
an account of critical aspects of the contemporary world: the development of science and
technology, which was once a fundamental factor responsible for modernization,
contributed to generating unprecedented kinds of risks in contemporary society. In other
words, Beck and others indicate that the success of modernity ironically contributed to
introducing and inducing “disembedded” (Giddens, 1990) and incalculable risks. Beck

7
Following the Fukushima disaster, Beck’s concept of risk society received wide
attention from Japanese scholars, critics and journalists (Beck, Suzuki, & Ito, 2011;
Yamamoto, 2012). On July 6, 2011, for instance, the Asahi newspaper featured Beck’s
view of the Fukushima disaster. Beck views the consequences of a nuclear disaster as
being “unlimited in space, time, and the social dimension.” (Ohno, 2011) Furthermore,
Iwanami Shoten, an established academic publisher in Japan, published a book on Beck’s
view of contemporary Japanese society on July 29, 2011, fewer than five months after the
disaster (Beck, Suzuki, & Ito, 2011).
20

(1992) maintains that nuclear power plants are a key example of contemporary risks.
Beck notes that “[atomic accidents] outlast generations. The effected even include those
not yet alive at the time or in the place where the accident occurred but born years later
and long distances away.”(p.22) Indeed, the threatening force of science and technology
contributed to generating nuclear power plants, including the Fukushima Daiichi power
plant, from Beck’s perspectives.
Likewise, the issue of low-dose radiation could be seen as one of these
contemporary risks driven by the development of science and technology. While
radiation exists everywhere in the world, the development of science and technology
(such as dosimeters) created space for citizens to articulate low-dose radiation as a new
risk. However, partly because of the growing capacity of science and technology,
including statistics, the health effects of low-dose radiation are scientifically
unobservable based on existing data, which contributes to generating uncertainties about
the health effects of low-dose radiation for certain people.
It should be noted that Beck (1992) emphasized scientific tools, such as
dosimeters, are necessary for citizens to articulate low-dose radiation as health risks:
More and more, the center comes to be occupied by threats that are often neither
visible nor tangible to the lay public, threats that sometimes will not even take
their toll in the lifespan of the affected individuals, but only in the second
generation of their offspring. They are in any case threats that require the sensory
organs of science---theories, experiments, measuring instruments---in order to
become visible and interpretable as threats as all. (p. 162)
21

That said it is important to note that Beck indicates that “the sensory organs of science”
(p. 162) may not necessarily capture contemporary risks holistically because the scientific
tools articulate individual materials alone in isolation from other factors that could
influence our health and safety. Even so, Beck points out the role of scientific tools in
identifying contemporary risks. From Beck’s perspective it is necessary for citizens to
have “the sensory organs of science” against the claims of scientific rationality about
contemporary risks, particularly when the risks are invisible and intangible. Therefore, he
argues that risk society inevitably gave rise to the emergence of alternative space for
citizens to generate scientific information by using scientific tools as a primary resource
for identifying contemporary risks.
Whereas it is important for citizens to have scientific tools, it is also important to
view scientific tools as media. As noted, Geiger counters are designed to mediate
radiation as counts per minute and scintillation survey meters are to mediate the same
space through the unit of dose rates. Put simply, viewing scientific tools as media raises
an important question: what if scientific tools as media involve uncertainties about what
its users claim to represent? As noted, there were various dosimeters, including phony
ones, available to citizens after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and this vast array
of available dosimeters prompted uncertainties about citizens’ data on low-dose radiation.
Beck and others have conceptualized a critical characteristic of the contemporary society
as a risk society, but scientific tools as media has received less sophisticated attention
when the general idea of risk society is discussed. As such, this dissertation addresses
uncertainties of dosimeters as media and extends the concept of risk society.

22

Hybrid Forums
In a sense, this dissertation is a re-entry into the literature on citizen science.
There are a large number of scholars who have investigated the role of citizens or non-
experts in shaping scientific information (Brown, 1987, 1997; Callon et al., 2009; Collins
& Evans, 2007; Epstein, 1996; Fisher, 2000; Fortun, 2009; Irwin, 1995; Levine, 1982;
Nielsen, 2012; Ottinger, 2010; Wynne, 1992). Among much scholarship on citizen
science, Callon and others’ concept of hybrid forums is particularly relevant for this study.
Callon and colleagues (2011) focused on investigating how open and heterogeneous
environments help manage increasing uncertainties engendered by science and
technology, which are more or less equivalent to the concept of risk society presented by
Beck (1992). Callon et al. further proposed the concept of hybrid forums as follows:
[Hybrid forums are] forums because they are open spaces where groups can come
together to discuss technical options involving the collective, hybrid because the
groups involved and the spokespersons claiming to represent them are
heterogeneous, including experts, politicians, technicians, and laypersons who
consider themselves involved. They are also hybrid because the questions and
problems taken up are addressed at different levels in a variety of domains, from
ethics to economics and including physiology, nuclear physics, and
electromagnetism. (p. 18)
As such, they argued that controversy, or more specifically socio-technical controversy,
in hybrid forums should be understood as a new mode of exploration and learning
processes that challenge the division between experts and laypeople as well as the
division between ordinary citizens and institutional representatives. Moreover, they insist
23

that hybrid forums not only practically manage uncertainties generated by science and
technology effectively, but also supplement and enrich what is called “delegate
democracy” by facilitating dialogue between two opposing camps. Therefore, Callon et al.
assert that hybrid forums contribute to the democratization of scientific knowledge
production practices and political representations. The question then is whether
grassroots measuring networks could be viewed as alternative hybrid forums and, if so,
do they contribute to promoting the dialogue between citizens and institutional
representatives as Callon and his collaborators assume? What are the implications of
quantified data on radiation in the air by citizens within the conceptual framework?
Most scholarship on hybrid forums was conducted in the context of “Western”
society. Drawing on and extending from previous research on hybrid forums, this
dissertation analyzes grassroots measuring networks in a Japanese political context. What
were the circumstances by which members of grassroots measuring networks felt it
necessary to generate their own data following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster?
Was there any political or policy impact of their data production practices? Were they
challenging authoritative expertise in post-Fukushima Japanese society? As Irwin (1995)
rightly points out, scientific knowledge production practices cannot be captured as a
single enterprise. The question then is whether grassroots measuring networks generated
scientifically legitimate data by making radiation data. On the other hand, as Zuckerman
(2014) indicates, should we be more modest and assume citizens engage in various data
production practices? What are the implications of grassroots measuring networks in
terms of the concept of scientific knowledge production practices?

24

Knowledge Infrastructures
This dissertation further explores the concept of knowledge infrastructures
originally coined by Edwards (2010). Conceptualizing infrastructure as “ecologies or
complex adaptive systems” (Edwards et al., 2013, p. 5, emphasis added), Edwards (2010)
defines knowledge infrastructures as “robust networks of people, artifacts, and
institutions that generate, share and maintain specific knowledge about the human and
natural worlds.” (p. 17) Edwards refers to the weather forecast as an exemplary case of
knowledge infrastructures. Therefore, knowledge infrastructures are essentially socio-
technical networks and studies of knowledge infrastructures that involve investigating
“individuals, organizations, routines, shared norms, and practices.” (Edwards et al., 2013,
p. 5)
As indicated, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster was associated with a wide
variety of emerging knowledge infrastructures about nuclear radiation in Japan and
elsewhere.
8
As Edwards (2010) indicates, the formation of knowledge infrastructures

8
While various citizens were involved in measuring radiation in the air under
uncertain conditions, both public sectors and Japanese experts also engaged in collecting
data on radiation in the air and made the data available to the public. As a case of the
public sector’s data on radiation in the air, Japan’s NRA has provided real-time radiation
readings on its Radiation Dose Measurement Map online. Other cases provided by public
sectors include the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)’s Distribution Map of
Radiation Dose, the Fukushima Prefectural Government’s Fukushima Prefecture
Radioactivity Measurement Map and the Fukushima Prefecture Radioactivity
Measurement Map. Furthermore, Japanese experts and scientists played a role in
collecting radiation data immediately after the disaster (Asahi shimbun tokubetsu hōdōbu,
2012; NHK ETV Tokushū Shuzaihan, 2012; Tokyo denryoku Fukushima genshiryoku
hatsuden jiko chōsa iinkai, 2012). For instance, Dr. Ryo Ichimiya created the website
Radmonitor 311 on March 17, 2011 and made measurement data and graphs available to
the public (Tokyo denryoku Fukushima genshiryoku hatsuden jiko chōsa iinkai, 2012).
Another case worth noting is Team Bishamon (Biosafety Hybrid Automatic Monitor
Niigata) co-operated by scholars and graduate students at Niigata University and the
25

about nuclear radiation involved some tension or struggles contributing to the
authorization of some infrastructures and the subjugation of other infrastructures.
Drawing on Edwards (2010)’s concept, this dissertation examines grassroots measuring
networks as emerging infrastructures in relation to meta-infrastructure that can be called
“nuclear radiation knowledge infrastructures.” Nuclear radiation knowledge
infrastructures comprise radiation, various dosimeters, measurement methods, the
Internet, social media, mass media, scientists, engineers, business organizations, public
health officials, regulatory agencies, local governments, international radiation protection
organizations (such as the ICRP), public health laws, and grassroots measuring networks
among others. This dissertation investigates whether grassroots measuring networks
contributed to nuclear radiation knowledge infrastructures. As will be illustrated in
Chapter 3, the Japanese government and some experts formed what could be called post-
Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure as a sub-infrastructure of nuclear
radiation knowledge infrastructures, subjugating specific measurement readings taken by
citizens as useless. This dissertation illustrates the interplay between the Japanese
measurement infrastructure and grassroots measuring networks within nuclear radiation
knowledge infrastructures.
Three Cases: Safecast, Kodomo Mirai Sokuteijo and Hakatte Geiger
This dissertation is the first detailed, empirical study of grassroots measuring
networks measuring radiation in the air. While researchers have focused on examining a
specific measuring network since the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (e.g. Kelly,
2014; Platin, 2014; Shobugawa & Gotō, 2014), this dissertation investigates three

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). Bishamon also made its collected data
available to the public online (Kawano et al, 2012; Shobugawa & Gotō, 2014).
26

grassroots measuring networks, in part because investigating more than one particular
case helps to illuminate dynamic and complicated characteristics of grassroots measuring
networks.
Among the active grassroots measuring networks in 2014, this dissertation
focuses on three cases: Safecast, Kodomo Mirai Sokuteijo (thereafter Kodomira), which
can be translated as “Measuring Station for the Future of Children,” and Hakatte Geiger,
which can be translated as “Will you measure [nuclear radiation] by using a Geiger
counter?”
These cases were chosen for this dissertation for at least three reasons. First, they
are different styles of grassroots measuring networks measuring radiation in the air.
Safecast is a global project measuring radiation in the air by gathering various volunteer
dosimeter users. Hakatte Geiger is an online platform that allows non-dosimeter users to
request volunteer dosimeter users to measure radiation in the air at specific locations. As
will be vividly illustrated in Chapter 3, Kodomira was originally born as a measuring
station monitoring foodstuffs for the health and safety of children but it gradually shifted
its focus from radioactivity in foods to radiation in the air. Unlike Safecast and Hakatte
Geiger, Kodomira subsists by measuring radiation in the air for paying clients.
Analyzing three different styles of grassroots measuring networks focusing on radiation
in the air reveals different approaches that citizens take in generating data on radiation in
the air.
Second, among active grassroots measuring networks, the three measuring
networks represent three different levels of radiation data production practices in terms of
space. Safecast has collected measurement data around the globe and the scope of its data
27

production practices could be referred to as macro-level or global-level. Kodomira has
generated data on radiation in the air upon requests from citizens, indicating that the
scope of its data production could be described as micro-level or individual-level. Finally,
Hakatte Geiger has produced data on radiation in the air mostly in Japan, which indicates
that the scope of its data collection practices could be views as meso-level or national-
level. Analyzing grassroots measuring networks with different scopes of data production
practices illuminates the various data production practices of citizens.
Finally, Safecast, Kodomira and Hakatte Geiger have different motivations:
Safecast is dedicated to collecting data on radiation in the air and making it available for
everyone to use freely, Hakatte Geiger is designed to create a space that allowed non-
dosimeter users to contribute to data production practices, while Kodomira focuses on
measuring radiation in the air for the health of children. Investigating grassroots
measuring networks with different motivations reveals the distinct characteristics of their
data production practices and their various views of data on radiation in the air.
As will be shown, the three networks approach radiation on the air from different
scientific perspectives, cultural frames, and political perspectives. Thus, to understand the
role of grassroots measuring networks in generating scientific data on radiation in the air,
it is important to analyze their data in relation to experts’ normative assumptions, social
biases, and professional constrains. Pointing to the rhetorical dimensions of data, Prelli
(1989) noted:
Claims to knowledge…gain accreditation from an expert audience by such means
as rhetorical display of data in accordance with received tests or relevancy,
technical skill in developing and expressing arguments that are warranted by
28

shared community values, and application of claims to the problem-solving
concerns and troublesome issues that confront the knowledge community. (p. 25)
As such, this dissertation also investigates how experts constructed their views of what
good radiation data look like. Undoubtedly, it is difficult to generalize the findings of my
dissertation on the three active grassroots measuring networks to the characteristics of all
grassroots measuring networks that emerged after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster,
partly because the three grassroots measuring networks examined in this dissertation are
Tokyo-based grassroots networks. Despite the serious limitations of the cases, this
dissertation shows a number of aspects of grassroots measuring networks after the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Some of these aspects might be unique to the post-
Fukushima circumstances but many are likely to be reproduced in other contexts in Japan
and elsewhere. In this regard, this dissertation lays the foundation for future cross-cultural
studies, suggesting how grassroots measuring networks may function in contemporary
society.
Method
The principal method used in this dissertation was in-depth, one-on-one
interviews with experts and grassroots measuring networks volunteers because individual
interviews are arguably the best method to collect data on individuals’ potentially
conflicting thoughts about the measuring networks of citizens (Beitin, 2012)
9
. O’Reilly
(2005) rightly warns that “interviews often yield superficial answers or the formal line, or
what people say they do or say they should do in certain circumstances rather than what
they actually do.” (p. 119) Therefore, it should be emphasized that the findings of this

9
University of Southern California IRB approval was obtained for these interviews
on June 19, 2014.
29

research do not reveal anything about how individual grassroots measuring network
volunteers actually engaged in producing data on radiation in the air. Rather, this study
focuses on investigating how individual research participants actively reconstructed their
views of grassroots measuring networks and their data production practices through a
dialogue with the researcher (Gubrium, & Koro-Ljungberg, 2005; Witz, 2006). Therefore,
the findings of this research may not be generalizable but instead provide rich data about
individual research participants’ views of their data production practices. In order to
generate data on individuals’ honest points of view of grassroots measuring networks and
their data production practice, it is reasonable to conduct one-on-one interviews rather
than group interviews or focus groups, particularly because much research from different
scholarly perspectives has referred to Japanese society as a collective society (Bond,
2002; Keys, Wells & Denton, 1998; Yamawaki, 2012). As noted later, however, there
were several cases in which I conducted multi-person interviews because some research
participants were accompanied by other individuals. Data collected from interviews that
were not one-on-one interviews will be noted.
In terms of sampling method, I carefully followed the Institutional Review Board
(IRB) protocol and employed a snowball sampling technique to build rapport with my
research participants. Whereas a snowball sampling technique tends to involve sampling
bias, it is important to note that that the topic of my dissertation is likely to be a sensitive
issue for certain people in Japan and elsewhere. As a result, this technique is arguably the
best method to gain access to my research participants. As for the sampling method for
experts, I also supplemented a snowball sampling method by directly contacting those
individuals who were relevant to my study.
30

After receiving consent from the research participants, I conducted intensive
semi-structured interviews, which led to 36 interviews including one-on-one interviews
and multi-person interviews. In all, I conducted interviews with 41 research participants
for this dissertation. The questions changed slightly depending on the research
participant’s expertise and background. Most research participants agreed to be identified
by name but, as will be noted, some participants agreed to participate in my research on
the condition of anonymity. Moreover, I collected a wide variety of online and print
materials including the Japanese government’s guidelines for measuring radiation in the
air, news media reports, YouTube videos, and grassroots measuring networks’ blogs,
among others. For the data collection of the Japanese mass media’s portrayal of radiation
in the air, I collected newspaper articles from the online archives at the University of
Southern California and back issues of newspapers at the National Diet Library (for
details, see Chapter 2).
In order to conduct the data analysis, I regularly reread my electronic interview
transcripts and print materials. I started to code for key issues and terms during my
research and created approximately 30 codes. The codes were ultimately grouped into
four different themes: Data as what (views of data), data for what (motivation; target
audience), datum production, and data management (data representation and privacy).
The four themes are fundamental components of this dissertation.
Overview of Chapters
Chapter 2 sets the background for the discussion in the rest of the dissertation by
investigating how Japanese newspapers represented radiation in the air over the period
1945–2014. Specifically, this chapter focuses on examining low-dose radiation in the air
31

through the lens of Japanese national and local newspapers. I show how the media
represented the unknown health effects of low-dose radiation in the air in relation to the
thesis of risk society. This chapter contends that Japanese newspapers balanced a wide
variety of views of the health effects of low-dose radiation in the air.
Chapter 3 investigates how Japanese experts viewed and constructed the meaning
of grassroots measuring networks’ data production practices in general. This chapter is
unique among existing research on citizens’ measuring movements because it is the first
research to show how Japanese experts such as scientists, government officials, and
dosimeter manufacturers viewed and assessed data on radiation in the air provided by
grassroots measuring networks. This study details the distinct characteristics of experts’
views of radiation data and shows the changing role of grassroots measuring networks
from the perspectives of experts.
Chapters 4–6 discuss three Tokyo-based radiation measuring networks: Safecast,
Kodomira and Hakatte Geiger. Chapter 4 investigates the ways in which Safecast
volunteers constructed data on radiation in the air by involving a wide variety of
volunteers. This chapter is the first in-depth research on Safecast that provides a rich look
at how both Tokyo-based and Fukushima-based volunteers talk about Safecast’s data
production practices. Chapter 5 examines how Kodomira members viewed both their data
production practices as well as their data. This study is the first in-depth field research
that shows how Kodomira members constructed their everyday lives through the lens of
their measurement data on radiation in the air. Chapter 6 analyzes Hakatte Geiger and
shows how one programmer designed an online platform that allowed its users to
participate in collecting data on radiation in the air. Perhaps more importantly, this
32

chapter investigates how its users view Hakatte Geiger and shows how they take
advantage of Hakatte Geiger in their everyday lives.
The Conclusion section recapitulates the key findings of the previous chapters.
More specifically, this chapter revisits the main questions of this study: For what reasons
do grassroots measuring networks engage in producing data on radiation in the air? How
do they generate data on radiation in the air in relation to official data? And how they
view their data and data production practices? This conclusion section makes the case
that this study contributes to our understanding of low-dose radiation in the air after the
advent of the Internet. Finally, this conclusion addresses some limitations of this research
and ends with questions for future scholars who might be interested in further exploring
low-dose exposure to radiation, media/communication, and citizen science in Japan and
elsewhere.

33

Chapter 2: Low-Dose Radiation in the Air
in Japanese Mass Media (1986-2014)
This chapter provides a backdrop for the rest of this dissertation by examining
how Japanese mass media portrayed radiation in the air after Fukushima. As noted in the
Introduction chapter, radiation and more specifically background radiation, exists
everywhere in the world. Since Wilhelm Röntgen discovered radiation, or more
specifically X-rays, in 1895, radiation has been defined and described through a wide
variety of media and technology (Weart, 2012). As Kuchinskaya (2007) rightly suggests,
the imperceptible characteristic of radiation creates an alternative space for
communication studies scholars to investigate how radiation is constructed and
represented in public discourses. In particular, much scholarship in the field of
communications has focused on one key institution that played an important role in
shaping public discourses on radiation in our society: mass media (Friedman, 2011;
Friedman, Gorney, Egolf, 1987; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Itō, 2012; Jung, 2012;
Kōeki zaidan hōjin shimbun tsūshin chōsakai, 2012; Kuchinskaya, 2007; Lazic, 2013;
Takano, Yoshimi, & Miura, 2012; Takeda, 2011; Tanaka, Shineha, & Maruyama, 2012;
Tollefson, 2014).
Much written in the fields of media studies and sociology assumes that mass
media influenced the way people see their environment. For instance, Lippman (1922)
and Thompson (1995) indicate that mass media provides a distinctive manner of
imagining the world, more specifically the way the world works beyond the sphere of our
personal experience. While mass media apparently played a significant role in
constructing and representing what radiation looks like, it should be emphasized that
34

mass media is just one of the various entities that contributed to shaping public discourses
on radiation (Manabe, 2013; Suga, 2012; Utsumi, 2012; Yoshimi, 2012b). For instance
Manabe (2013), a scholar of musicology, analyzes the role of music in shaping the
characteristics of post-Fukushima anti-nuclear demonstrations and described how music
served as a symbolic resource for shaping public discourse on radiation as nuclear risks
following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Moreover Yoshimi (2012b), a
Japanese sociologist, examines how exhibitions were designed to shape public discourses
on radiation in postwar Japanese society. While these entities have influenced public
discourses on radiation, this chapter focuses on examining radiation in the air though the
lens of Japan’s mass media partly because as Gregory and Miller (1998) point out, mass
media create communication spaces about technical issues between general publics and
experts. As such, mass media can be seen as one of the key elements of nuclear radiation
knowledge infrastructures. Analyzing Japanese mass media’s portrayal of radiation
apparently illustrates a fundamental aspect of nuclear radiation knowledge infrastructures
and thus provides a backdrop for an analysis of the way in which both grassroots
measuring network volunteers and experts viewed radiation in the air after the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear disaster.
In particular, this chapter focuses on examining one specific type of radiation in
the air represented by mass media: low-dose radiation in the air. Focusing on low-dose
radiation in the air rather than radiation in the air in general provides at least two major
advantages. First, while many studies investigate the media’s portrayal of radiation, little
35

has been analyzed about the media’s treatment of low-dose radiation.
10
As noted in the
Introduction chapter, low-dose radiation is different from any other environmental
pollution, partly because unlike other environmental pollution the health effects of low-
dose radiation are scientifically unobservable. It is thus important to examine rhetorical
and cultural aspects of low-dose radiation in post-Fukushima Japanese society in which
grassroots measuring networks were involved in data collection practices.
Second, it’s socially important to investigate Japanese mass media’s portrayal of
low-dose radiation in the air because rhetorical and cultural aspects of low-dose radiation
in the air can be linked to the issue of security for years to come. Given that many
countries rely on nuclear power as a vital resource for energy security, it is important if
not necessary to discuss how mass media would convey the scientifically unproven health
effects of low-dose radiation in the air to their audiences.
Obviously, a full examination of Japanese mass media’s portrayal of low-dose
radiation in the air requires an analysis of the whole content of Japanese mass media
including national and local newspapers, radio, magazines and television. Yet the
delimitation of this chapter is more modest: this chapter investigates low-dose radiation
in the air through the lens of three Tokyo-based national dailies (the Asahi, the Yomiuri,

10
Before and after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, much scholarship examined
Japanese mass media’s portrayal of nuclear safety (Abe, 2012; Itou, 2004, 2005, 2009;
Kitahara, 2011;Yamamoto, 2012; Watanabe, 1995) and investigated why Japanese mass
media constructed and represented nuclear safety the way they did (Arima, 2006, 2008;
Homma, 2013; Inose, 1990; Jōmaru, 2012; Takeuchi, 2011; Sano, 1994; Shibata, 2013),
but little has been recorded about how Japanese mass media discussed low-dose radiation
in the air with some exceptions (Tanaka, Shineha, & Maruyama, 2012; Tollefson, 2014).
Given that low-dose radiation in the air is exactly the object grassroots measuring
networks cope with, this chapter seeks to contribute to research on mass media’s
portrayal of radiation in the air in Japan and elsewhere (Friedman, Gorney, & Egolf,
1987; Katchanovski, 2012; Kuchinskaya, 2007; Tollefson, 2014).
36

and the Nihon Keizai) and one Fukushima-based local daily (the Fukushima Mimpō).
11

Among national newspapers whose headquarters are based in Tokyo, the Asahi and the
Yomiuri were chosen for analysis because they represent two of the largest circulations
among Japanese national dailies (Nihon Shimbun, Kyōkai 2014b). The Asahi is known as
Japan’s national liberal newspaper whereas the Yomiuri is widely regarded as a
conservative national newspaper. The Nihon Keizai was also chosen because it is
regarded as Japan’s financial newspaper (Fujitake, 2012).
Whereas researchers investigated Japanese national newspapers’ portrayal of
radiation after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (e.g. Arai, 2012; Ito, 2012), this
chapter also includes the Fukushima Mimpō, a local newspaper with the largest
circulation in the Fukushima Prefecture as an object of analysis. Indeed, Tokyo-based
Japanese national dailies’ portrayal of radiation in the air may not necessarily have
represented public discourses on radiation in the air in the Fukushima Prefecture on the
grounds that national newspapers such as the Asahi and the Yomiuri do not gain a large
readership in Fukushima Prefecture (Fukushima Minyū, 2014). Therefore, an exclusive
analysis of Tokyo-based national newspapers’ portrayal of radiation in the air in the
aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster may have marginalized certain
important aspects of public discourse in the Fukushima Prefecture. As elsewhere (Abe,
2013), I focused exclusively on investigating these three Tokyo-based national

11
Japan is arguably one of the most newspaper-saturated countries around the globe
(Fujitake, 2012). Japan has five national newspapers: the Asahi, the Yomiuri, the
Mainichi, the Nihon Keizai, and the Sankei; several regional newspapers including the
Hokkaidō, the Chūnichi, and the Nishinihon, and local newspapers including the
Fukushima Mimpō among others. Each prefecture also has one or two local newspapers
(Fujitake, 2012; Kamata, 2002).

37

newspapers’ portrayal of nuclear safety after Chernobyl nuclear accident. As for the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, it is particularly important to analyze Fukushima’s
local newspaper when examining public discourses on radiation in the air in Japan given
that Fukushima residents (the target audience of the Fukushima’s local newspaper) were
apparently most affected by the disaster.
An analysis of four newspapers necessarily involves a radical simplification of
their historical and regional dimensions, reducing hardly homogeneous media in terms of
time and space to three Tokyo-based and one Fukushima-based newspapers, and
marginalizing certain discourses on radiation in the air outside the Fukushima Prefecture.
Despite its essential limitation, this chapter focuses on both Tokyo-based national dailies
and a Fukushima-based local daily in order to illustrate the wide variety of public
discourses on low-dose radiation in the air. Understanding the characteristic of public
discourses on low-dose radiation in the air in Tokyo and Fukushima provides invaluable
background for an analysis of nuclear radiation knowledge infrastructures in which
grassroots measuring networks generate data on low-dose radiation.
Before systematically investigating Japanese newspapers’ portrayal of low-dose
radiation in the air following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, it is important to
discuss the institutional and historical context, in which discourses on low-dose radiation
in the air emerged. As Karl Marx famously noted in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte that “men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please;
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances
directly found, given and transmitted from the past,” (Tucker, 1972, p. 437), the first
section of this chapter draws on existing research on Japanese newspapers in an attempt
38

to describe the characteristic of Japanese newspapers in relation to nuclear power. The
second section investigates how Japanese national newspapers represented low-dose
radiation in the air before the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. In particular, this
section focuses on investigating how Japanese national newspapers constructed some of
public discourses on low-dose radiation from the Chernobyl nuclear accident to the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster
12
. The second section indicates how multiple
narratives of low-dose radiation contributed to solidifying the dominant narratives of the
health effects of low-dose exposure to radiation in the air. The final section illustrates
how Japanese national and local newspapers represented low-dose radiation immediately
after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster from March 12, 2011 to December 31, 2014.
Finally, this chapter discusses the implications of the findings of this research for the rest
of this dissertation.
A Brief History of Japanese National Newspapers and Nuclear Power (1945-1986)
This section provides the institutional and cultural context for an analysis of
Japanese newspapers’ portrayal of low-dose radiation in the air. Many scholars have
shown that Japanese national newspapers contributed to promoting nuclear power in
Japan, marginalizing the issue of nuclear safety from public discourses at least before the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (Abe, 2013; Arima, 2006, 2008; Ikawa, 2002; Inose,
1990; Jōmaru, 2012; Takekawa, 2012; Shibata, 2013; Yamamoto, 2012). Drawing on
previous research on Japanese newspapers and nuclear power, this section briefly

12
Japanese national newspapers rarely discussed low-dose radiation before the Chernobyl
nuclear accident of 1986. In order to analyze Japanese newspapers’ portrayal of low-dose
radiation effectively, this chapter focuses on the time period after the Chernobyl nuclear
accident.
39

describes how they defined the issue of radiation accordingly, suggesting a relational
nature of radiation by Japanese newspapers from 1945 to 1986.
13

Before and after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, much scholarship
maintained that Japanese national newspapers contributed to promoting nuclear power by
distinguishing the peaceful use of nuclear power from atomic weaponry immediately
after the end of World War II (Arima, 2006, 2008; Ikawa, 2002; Inose, 1990; Jōmaru,
2012; Takekawa, 2012; Yamamoto, 2012). For instance, Takekawa (2012) shows that
during the occupation period (1945-1952), Japanese national newspapers such as the
Asahi, the Yomiuri, and the Mainichi celebrated the peaceful use of nuclear power by
differentiating civilian use of nuclear power from the atomic weaponry that devastated
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Perhaps more importantly, Takekawa’s study reveals that
Japanese newspapers endorsed the peaceful use of nuclear power even before Dwight
Eisenhower’s speech on Atoms for Peace in 1953
14
, even though many researchers

13
Japanese mass media presented radioactivity before Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Nakao,
2009, 2013). For instance, Nakao (2009) investigated Japanese mass media’s
representations of atomic bombs before Hiroshima and noted that Hantarō Nagaoka, a
Japanese physicist, was arguably the first person to mention exposure to radium, a
specific type of radioactive element chemical in Japanese newspapers as early as 1905.
On September 18, 1905 the Yomiuri (1905) published an interview with Nagaoka, who
described how radium would make a significant impact on science in a positive way.
According to Nakao (2009), the Yomiuri is thus the first Japanese mass media to have
covered the issue of radiation.
14
As a part of U.S. Cold War defense strategy, Dwight Eisenhower delivered a famous
speech at the United Nation’s General Assembly on December 8, 1953: Atoms for Peace.
In his speech, Eisenhower emphasized the need for Soviet Union to stop developing
nuclear weapons and promoted the peaceful use of nuclear power (Osgood, 2006). Much
scholarship suggests that the origin of Japan’s nuclear power can be traced back to
Eisenhower’s speech (Arima, 2008; Kuznick, 2011; Osgood, 2006; Sano, 1994; Tanaka
& Kuznick, 2011; Yoshimi, 2012a, 2012b) and many studies indicate that following the
Eisenhower’s speech, Matsutarō Shōriki, owner of the Yomiuri played a significant role
in introducing nuclear facilities to Japan’s soil (Arima, 2008; Inose, 1990; Sano, 1994;
Shibata, 1985).
40

agreed that Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech could be seen as the origin of Japan’s
nuclear power (Arima, 2008; Kuznick, 2011; Osgood, 2006; Sano, 1994; Tanaka &
Kuznick, 2011; Yoshimi, 2012a, 2012b). Although Eisenhower’s speech apparently
played a critical role in introducing nuclear facilities to Japanese soil, Takekawa’s
research indicates that Japanese national newspapers contributed to creating a rhetorical
situation that aided Japanese society to embrace Eisenhower’s idea of Atoms for Peace.
It’s important to note that it was very difficult for Japanese newspapers to
mention the issue of atomic bombs and the health effects of radiation during the
occupation period because General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied
Power (GHQ/SCAP) ordered Press Code on September 19, 1945 and banned Japanese
newspapers’ from reporting on atomic bombs (Dower, 2000; Takakuwa, 1984; Takemae,
2002). While Japanese newspapers actively reported on the effects of atomic bombs and
radiation (Asahi Shimbun, 1945a, 1945b, 1945c; Yomiuri Shimbun, 1945a, 1945b),
narratives of Hiroshima and Nagasaki which involved both bomb blast and the health
effects of radiation were more or less absent from Japanese newspapers’ representations
of nuclear power after GHQ/SCAP ordered Press Code. While Japanese national
newspapers celebrated the peaceful use of nuclear power, they did not discuss the health
effects of radiation, thus marginalizing memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from public
discourses during the occupation period.
Even after the occupation ended, Japanese national newspapers, and the Yomiuri
in particular, promoted the peaceful use of nuclear power (Arima, 2006, 2008; Ikawa,
2002; Inose, 1990; Jōmaru, 2012; Takekawa, 2012; Yamamoto, 2012). From the
beginning of 1954 for instance, the Yomiuri was actively engaged in the promotion of
41

nuclear power by reframing the memories of Hiroshima as a historical resource for
promoting nuclear technology (Abe, 2013; Yamamoto, 2012).
15
On March 1, 1954, a
Japanese fishing boat named Lucky Dragon No.5 was exposed to the Castle Bravo
thermonuclear device test on the Bikini Atoll near the Marshall Islands, which led to the
Daigo Fukuryūmaru Incident (or the Lucky Dragon No.5 Incident) (Ōishi, 2011).
Aikichi Kuboyama, one of the fishermen aboard, suffered from radiation syndrome and
passed away on September 23, 1954. In spite of the Lucky Dragon No.5 incident, much
research indicates that Japanese national newspapers continued to propagate the concept
of the peaceful use of nuclear technology in Japan (Ikawa, 2002; Takekawa, 2012;
Yamamoto, 2012; Yoshimi, 2012a, 2012b; Zwigenberg, 2012). In one extreme example
of the Yomiuri’s portrayal of radiation following the Lucky Dragon No.5 Incident, the
paper (1954) ran four vivid photos of an irradiated Daigo Fukuryūmaru crew on March
21, 1954 titled “The peaceful use of nuclear power: I don’t want to be a [human] guinea
pig.” The article used horrific images of the irradiated crew as a visual resource for
promoting the peaceful use of nuclear power and quoted the following:
I don’t want to be a [human] guinea pig!” said Sanjiro Masuda, aged 29, who kept
a close eye on newspaper journalists nearby with his darkly tanned face. Masuda
had his head shaved and his whole body was examined at the University of
Tokyo…It is natural that Mr. Masuda cried out “I don't want to be a guinea pig.”
However, a nuclear age has come into being no matter how much we don’t want it.
If neighboring [countries] do [develop nuclear power], we can’t refuse to

15
Much research has shown that the Yomiuri played a significant role in promoting
nuclear power in Japan (Arima. 2008; Inose, 1990; Sano, 1994). In particular, many
studies indicate that Matsutarō Shōriki, owner of the Yomiuri newspaper, engaged in pro-
nuclear campaign by using the Yomiuri (Arima, 2008; Inose, 1990; Sano, 1994).
42

acknowledge it out of fear. There is only one way to overcome [our fear for
nuclear power], which is to confront [nuclear power]. Horrible things can become
synonymous with terrific ones if we use them in a smart way. The time has come
when we step out into a nuclear age. (Yomiuri Shimbun, 1954)
The Yomiuri took advantage of the horrific images of exposure to radiation, underlining
its assumption that Japan would have no other option but to embrace the peaceful use of
nuclear power.
It’s also important to note how Nihon Shimbun Kyōkai or the “Japan Newspaper
Publishers and Editors Association”, an umbrella organization of Japanese mass media
including the Asahi, the Yomiuri, the Nihon Keizai, and the Fukushima Mimpō, viewed
nuclear power after the Lucky Dragon No.5 Incident. Established in 1946, The Japan
Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association launched an annual Newspaper Weeks
Campaign in 1948 and chose a new slogan for the campaign every year. Slogans chosen
for the campaign indicate how the association defined the role of Japanese mass media in
society
16
. Despite (or perhaps because of) the Lucky Dragon No.5 Incident, the chosen
slogan of 1955 reads: Newspapers are Nuclear Power for World Peace (Nihon Shimbun
Kyōkai, 2014a). The slogan emerged on October 1 1954 nearly nine years after atomic
bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and exactly seven months after the
Lucky Dragon No.5 Incident. As a result, the association referred to Japanese newspapers
as “Nuclear Power for World Peace,” and marginalized the memories of

16
Slogans chosen for previous campaign years include: “You should defend your
freedom. Newspapers will protect you” in 1948; “Newspapers guarantee security for a
democratic society” in 1950; and “Newspapers are watchdogs for sound politics” in 1954
(Nihon Shimbun Kyōkai, 2014a).
43

Hiroshima/Nagasaki and Daigo Fukuryūmaru, which involved both bomb blasts and
radiation, from public discourse in newspapers.
Since the beginning of the 1960s, Japan has witnessed construction of nuclear
power plants around the country (Yoshioka, 2012). Winner (1986) points out that
“artifacts” such as nuclear power plants can have political qualities and notes:
Because choices tend to become strongly fixed in material equipment, economic
investment, and social habit, the original flexibility vanishes for all practical
purposes once the initial commitments are made. In that sense technological
innovations are similar to legislative acts or political foundings that establish a
framework for public order that will endure over many generations. (p. 29)
By the same token, construction of nuclear power plants apparently established a
framework for public order and helped further restrain the communication space for
Japanese newspapers to discuss the issue of radiation in relation to the civilian use of
nuclear power. Despite radiation accidents such as the Mutsu Incident of 1974, studies
show that Japanese national newspapers continued to promote nuclear power by
marginalizing the issues of both nuclear safety and radiation from public discourses
(Jōmaru, 2012; Shibata, 2013). For instance, Shibata (2013) shows that the Asahi’s serial
articles on nuclear power portrayed anti-nuclear people as irrational while also promoting
nuclear power in the 1970s. According to Yamakoshi (2013), Fukushima’s local
newspapers including the Fukushima Mimpō similarly contributed to promoting nuclear
power after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant started to operate in 1971.
This section draws on previous literature on Japanese newspapers and nuclear
power to briefly describe how Japanese national newspapers dealt with the issue of
44

radiation. This section has indicated a relational characteristic of radiation in Japanese
newspapers. More specifically, this chapter shows that Japanese newspapers portrayed
radiation in relation to its positive description of civilian use of nuclear power. Japanese
newspapers clearly differentiated the peaceful use of nuclear power from nuclear
weaponry, promoting the civilian use of nuclear power from the late 1940s. Despite the
Lucky Dragon No.5 Incident and other radiation accidents, Japanese newspapers
continued to promote nuclear power by divorcing the peaceful use of nuclear power from
the issue of radiation.
But in 1986, the Chernobyl nuclear accident created a space for Japanese
newspapers to discuss the issue of radiation, and low-dose radiation in particular. Indeed,
much research has indicated that the Chernobyl nuclear disaster played a role in shaping
the Japanese anti-nuclear grassroots movements (Honda, 2005; Shibata & Tomokiyo,
1999; Suga, 2012; Takata, 1990; Yoshioka, 2012). Takata (1990) maintains that the
origin of Japan’s grassroots anti-nuclear movement named the “New Wave” can be
traced back to the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Honda (2005) further describes one
grassroots anti-nuclear network named Nuclear Radiation Disaster Alert Network (R-
DAN) that has been producing data about radiation in the air by using a Geiger counter in
Japan since the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.
17
If we take these claims of Chernobyl acting

17
Little research has been done about R-DAN. Established in May 1986, R-DAN started
at Kyōgakusha, a co-op style private school in Yokohama City, Kanagawa where its
students sought out Geiger counters because of their distrust of the Japanese government
(Honda, 2005). Tetsuo Iesaka, the president of Kyōgakusha, collaborated with Ken
Tuzuku (an engineer from a Toshiba Ampex labor union) and other Japanese physicists
such as Atsushi Tsuchida at the Riken Institute of Physical and Chemical Research in
order to built a Geiger counter. Before the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, Tsuchida built a
dosimeter named Moretā and equipped some measurement devices near the Kashiwazaki
nuclear power plant (Honda, 2005). Because the device was not affordable and portable
45

as a trigger for Japanese anti-nuclear grassroots movements, the question then is how
Japanese newspapers portrayed low-dose radiation after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.
Method
Data Access
The newspaper articles used for the present study were retrieved from the online
archives of the Tokyo editions of the Asahi, the Yomiuri, and the Nihon Keizai. The
articles from the Fukushima Mimpō were taken from its web archive.
18
In order to control
for discrepancies between the online archives and the web archive, I also read through the
paper copies of these newspapers from March 12, 2011 to December 31, 2014. I accessed
back issues of the newspapers at the National Diet Library in Tokyo, which is the only
Tokyo-based public library that stores back issues of the Fukushima Mimpō.
Data Selection
Since this study seeks to examine low-dose radiation in the air through the lens of
Japanese newspapers, only newspaper articles mentioning teisenryō or “low-dose” were
examined.
19
Articles that appeared not to be explicitly related to low-dose radiation in the

for many people, Toshiba Annex engineers helped make it so (Honda, 2005; Tuzuki,
1998). Iesaka (1986) clearly mentions that one of R-DAN’s characteristics is its
involvement in “non-violent and radical antinuclear activity” (p. 194) indicating that R-
DAN is a grassroots anti-nuclear organization. As an anti-nuclear movement, R-DAN
focused on discovering radiation leaks by using Geiger counters rather than measuring
radiation in the air because its members were focused on protecting themselves from
unknown exposure to radiation (Honda, 2005). As will be noted in Chapter 4, R-DAN
has engaged in monitoring radiation in the air since then.
18
For online archives of the three national newspapers, I used Kikuzo, Yomidas, and
Nikkei Telecom (three different online databases) for the Asahi, the Yomiuri, and the
Nihon Keizai articles respectively. As for the Fukushima Mimpō, I used the Fukushima
Mimpō website’s own archive on the Eastern Japan Great Earthquake.
19
The Japanese term teisenryō can be translated as low-dose in English. I didn't use key
phrases such as teisenryō hibaku or exposure to low-dose radiation for data selection
because exposure to low-dose radiation can be translated in Japanese in different ways
46

air were excluded during the coding process precisely because grassroots measuring
networks focus on measuring radiation in the air. For instance, articles discussing low
dose radiation in foodstuff were not included in the sample. The unit of analysis is the
article.
An analysis of three national Japanese newspapers’ portrayal of low-dose
radiation from Chernobyl to Fukushima was based on articles taken from online archives
of the Tokyo edition of the three newspapers from April 26, 1986 to March 11, 2011.
This search yielded 45 from the Asahi, 25 from the Yomiuri, and 25 from the Nihon
Keizai. After eliminating articles that were not explicitly related to low dose radiation in
the air, there were 32 from the Asahi, 14 from the Yomiuri, and 13 from the Nihon Keizai
remaining for analysis.
Likewise, investigations of the four newspapers’ portrayal of low-dose radiation
in the air following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster were based on articles that
referred to teisenryō from March 12, 2011 to December 31, 2014. This search yielded
166 items form the Asahi, 77 items from the Yomiuri, 69 items from the Nihon Keizai,
and 62 items from the Fukushima Mimpō. After eliminating articles that were not
explicitly related to low dose radiation in the air, there were 94 items from the Asahi, 47
items from the Yomiuri, 38 items from the Nihon Keizai, and 23 items from the
Fukushima Mimpō remaining for analysis.

including teisenryō hibaku or teisenryō no hibaku. Choosing articles that mentioned
teisenryō rather than teisenryō hibaku or teisenryō no hibaku is thus a more effective way
to collect articles that mentioned low-dose radiation or exposure to low-dose radiation.
47

Data Analysis
Analysis of low-dose radiation in the air represented by Japanese newspapers was
based on both quantitative and qualitative methods. The number of articles that referred
to low-dose radiation in the air was counted using content analysis. In order to conduct
qualitative analysis of the content of the four Japanese newspapers’ representations of
low-dose radiation in the air, this chapter draws on media framing analysis (Entman,
1993; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009).
Entman (1993) has referred to framing as to “select some aspects of perceived reality and
make them more salient in communication contexts, in such a way as to promote a
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
recommendation.” (p. 53) Framing analysis has been discussed and widely used in
various fields of communication research on radiation (Friedman, Gorney, & Egolf,
1987; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Kuchinskaya, 2007). The underlying assumption of
media frame analysis suggests that mass media provides “interpretative packages”
(Gamson and Modigliani, 1989 p.1) and therefore affects interpretations of low-dose
radiation. More specifically, media frame analysis is concerned with the process in which
some specific characteristics of low-dose radiation were articulated while others were
marginalized or neglected outside of the framework. Since the health effects of low-dose
radiation are not yet scientifically confirmed leading to different interpretations of the
health effects of low-dose radiation, it is important to investigate what kind of
interpretations of low-dose radiation Japanese newspapers articulated when the general
topic of low-dose radiation was discussed.
48

Drawing on framing analysis, I conducted a content analysis of the items and
coded for recurrent themes; each article was coded once per article. Ultimately, I
proposed six dominant themes:
1. Health effects of low-dose radiation are unknown;
2. Health benefits from low-dose exposure to radiation;
3. Physically harmful effects from exposure to low-dose radiation;
4. Psychologically harmful effects from exposure to low-dose radiation
5. Low-dose radiation as safe or acceptable risks; and
6. Balancing different views.
Qualitative analysis of Japanese newspapers’ portrayal of low-dose radiation in the air
enriched the codes and discussed their descriptions.
Portraying Low-dose Radiation from Chernobyl to Fukushima
On April 26 1987, a catastrophic nuclear disaster took place at the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant in the Ukraine, then under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union. The
Chernobyl power plant released an unprecedented amount of radioactive materials into
the atmosphere over Europe (and Japan to some extent) and the Chernobyl nuclear
accident became recognized as the world’s worst nuclear disaster, ultimately classified by
the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) as a Level 7. After the disaster, Japanese
national newspapers began to address the issue of low-dose radiation. While the period
from Chernobyl to Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (April 26, 1986 - March 11, 2011)
witnessed various serious radiation accidents including the Tokai Criticality Accident of
1999, the number of articles that referred to “low-dose” is relatively small. The following
table shows the ratio of each theme (See Table 1). This section illustrates the
49

characteristics of Japanese national newspapers’ portrayal of low-dose radiation through
six major themes, summarized below.

Table 1: Thematic categories of Japanese national newspaper articles that referred
to low-dose radiation from Chernobyl to Fukushima

A quantitative analysis of Japanese national newspapers’ portrayal of low-dose
radiation in the air clearly demonstrates that Japanese national newspapers did not
represent low-dose radiation in the air in relation to psychological issues such as anxieties
and stress. Rather, the three newspapers published articles that referred to the physically
harmful effects of low-dose radiation despite that the health effects of low-dose radiation
are scientifically unknown. Furthermore, it is also important to note that the three
newspapers provided articles that represented different interpretations of low-dose
radiation in the air. The following sections shows how low-dose radiation in the air was
actually discussed.
1. The Health Effects of Low-Dose Radiation are Unknown
As noted in the Introduction chapter, a majority of researchers on issues related to
radiation assume that the health effects from exposure to low-dose radiation are yet
scientifically unproven. Likewise, Japanese national newspapers, the Asahi and the
Yomiuri in particular, emphasized the unproven health effects of low-dose radiation
Unknown Healthy Physical Psychological Safe or acceptable risk Balancing views Total
Asahi 15 0 13 0 0 4 32
Yomiuri 4 0 8 0 1 1 14
Nihon Keizai 0 1 1 0 6 5 13
Total 19 1 22 0 6 9 59
50

(Asahi Shimbun, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1989b, 1989c, 1991a, 1991b, 1999b, 2001, 2003,
2004; Nakajima, 2004; Sasakoshi & Tamura, 1999; Tomokiyo, 1994; Yomiuri Shimbun,
1990, 1994a, 2004; Yoshida, 1987; Yoshida, 1991). For instance, the Asahi clearly states
on May 7, 1987 that, “(T)he contemporary radiation protection standard is based on data
on exposure to radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but there are unclear parts about
those who were exposed to low-dose radiation.” (Asahi Shimbun, 1987b) The Yomiuri
(1988b) referred to low-dose radiation when explaining the terminology to its audience
and noted that, “it is not adequately proven the degree of cancer risks [with low-dose
radiation].”
2. The Health Benefits from Low-Dose Exposure to Radiation
Some scientists believe there may be health benefits from exposure to low-dose
radiation (Doss, 2013; Feinendegen, 2005; Luckey, 1999; Prekeges, 2003; Vaiserman,
2010). Among the three Japanese national newspapers, the Nihon Keizai focused on
describing the health benefits from low-dose radiation exposure during the period from
Chernobyl to Fukushima (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1992a). As will be illustrated, most
articles mentioning the positive health effects of low-dose radiation were presented
alongside the opposite views of low-dose radiation as a health risk in a balanced way, but
the Nihon Keizai (1992a) represented research findings suggesting the health effects of
low-dose radiation from radioactive springs, or more specifically radon spas, as
beneficial for the human body and quoted a research group as saying that “the danger of
radon in nature was much overestimated. It is necessary to re-examine the effects of
exposure to low-dose radiation scientifically.” As such, the Nihon Keizai described low-
dose radiation in relation to everyday Japanese life, representing a view of low-dose
51

radiation as health-beneficial for the human body to its readership. As will be illustrated
in the next section, the symbol of a radon spa emerged again after the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear disaster when the health effects of low-dose radiation were discussed.
3. Physically Harmful Effects from Exposure to Low-Dose Radiation
The Asahi, the Yomiuri, and the Nihon Keizai all presented physically harmful
effects from low-dose radiation (Asahi Shimbun, 1989a, 1989d, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1999a,
2000a, 2007a, 2007b, 2010; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2000; Ozeki, 1994; Tanigawa, 1995;
Tsuji, 2000; Yamashita, 2001; Yomiuri Shimbun, 1986, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1992,
1994b, 2008). For instance, the Asahi (1990) asserted that:
No certain data were found concerning the hereditary effects [of low dose
radiation], but it is certain that the [physical] health of people living in
contaminated areas deteriorated day by day, let alone [that of] those who were
much irradiated by the [Chernobyl] accident.
The Asahi (1990) then featured a medical doctor discussing the rise in cancer in the
Ukraine. More importantly the Yomiuri, a conservative and pro-nuclear newspaper,
featured research findings on the physically adverse effects of low-dose radiation (e.g.
Yomiuri Shimbun, 1988a, 1992, 1994b, 2008). For instance, the Yomiuri (1994b) noted
that according to Shigenobu Nagataki, Professor of Nagasaki University, research
findings indicated that “even with low-dose radiation, late-onset radiation damage
emerged after a prolonged incubation period.” While researchers generally label the
Yomiuri as a pro-nuclear newspaper (Arima, 2008; Inose, 1990; Sano, 1994), the Yomiuri
did not necessarily underestimate the physically adverse health effects of low-dose
52

radiation and actively featured research findings on the physically harmful effects of low-
dose radiation.
4. Psychologically Harmful Effects from Exposure to Low-Dose Radiation
There were no articles on psychologically harmful effects from exposure to low-dose
radiation during the time period from Chernobyl to Fukushima.
5. Low-dose Radiation as Safe or Acceptable Risks
However, the Yomiuri and the Nihon Keizai simultaneously referred to low-dose
radiation as relatively safe or acceptable risks for their audience (Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
1988, 1989a, 1990b, 1992b, 1992c; Torii, 1999; Yomiuri Shimbun, 2003). The Yomiuri
(2003) featured the findings of an experiment with mice that sought to prove the dose
limit that nuclear workers are exposed to “doesn’t affect [their] life expectancies.” As
such, the Yomiuri (2003) indicated that the health effects of exposure to low-dose
radiation could be more or less negligible for human health. Moreover, the Nihon Keizai
(1989) featured a research experiment that focused on the threshold model, which
assumes that low-dose radiation is harmless. The Nihon Keizai also featured research
findings showing the possibility that low-dose radiation doesn't have any health effects
(Torii, 1999).
6. Balancing Different Views
The Asahi, the Yomiuri, and the Nihon Keizai all represented different views of
low-dose radiation in particular articles, creating a frame of balancing opposite views
(Asahi Shimbun, 1999, 2000b; Egi & Hatttori, 2006; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1989b,
1989c, 1990a, 1990c, 1991; Yomiuri Shimbun, 1994b). It appears to be a fair-minded
53

way for Japanese newspapers to present varying sides of controversy over low-dose
radiation. However, Nelkin (1987) noted that:
Applying naïve standards of objectivity, reporters deal with disagreement by
simply “balancing” opposing views, an approach that does little to enhance public
understanding of the role of science…Perhaps more important, the press tends to
reject statements by scientists who try to explain that they themselves do not
know the extent of a given risk. (p. 60-61)
As such, the Asahi and the Nihon Keizai in particular remained “objective” by offering
their readers different views of low-dose radiation. For instance, the Asahi proposed
opposite claims of exposure from low-dose radiation on March 2, 1994 (Atsumi, 1994);
the article started as follows:
There is a growing body of research that disagrees with “accepted notions” that
even small radiation has adverse effects for the human body. Researchers at
university and power companies get involved in animal-testing in order to
demonstrate an opposite hypothesis that exposure to small amount of radiation is
healthy. Theses supporting the new theory are increasing year after year. On the
other hand the International Commission Radiological Protection (ICRP) issued a
recommendation that lowered the limit of exposure to radiation and nuclear
workers who died of leukemia were acknowledged as those who died of a work
accident. These cases further emphasized the danger of radioactivity. Is a tiny
amount of radiation poison or medicine?
Then, the article presented both views of low-dose radiation by citing a wide variety of
researchers with opposite views of low-dose radiation. On the other hand, the Nihon
54

Keizai (1989b) published an article about two Japanese scientists with opposing views of
low-dose radiation in a balanced way: Sōhei Kondō of Kinki University emphasized the
existence of a threshold below which radiation is harmless whereas Jinzaburō Takagi of
Citizens’ Nuclear Information pointed out the physically adverse health effects of low-
dose radiation. In another article, the Nihon Keizai (1990c) noted:
Radiation was assumed to be harmful for the human body, but researchers on
radiation effects are paying attention to a new theory that maintains that a tiny
amount of radiation is beneficial for life…Since radiation effects involve the
issues of nuclear safety and radiological protection, [the new theory] could be a
focus of discussion.
As such, the Nihon Keizai (1990c) gave readers a view of the health benefits from low-
dose radiation as a “new theory.” However, the Nihon Keizai (1990c) also added a
comment from a commissioner of Nuclear Safety Research Association, who emphasized
the need for radiological protection against exposure to low-dose radiation.
Based on a content analysis of Japanese national newspapers’ low-dose radiation,
this section investigates how Japanese national newspapers provided interpretative
packages of low-dose radiation. Three key findings emerged. First, Japanese national
newspapers provided radically different interpretations of low-dose radiation. For
example, some articles by the Nihon Keizai featured the health benefits from exposure to
low-dose radiation whereas the same newspaper discussed the physically adverse health
effects of low-dose exposure elsewhere. Second, the three newspapers did not portray
the issue of low-dose radiation as a cause for psychological issues. As will be illustrated,
this finding is particularly important when analyzing how Japanese newspapers portrayed
55

low-dose radiation after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Finally, it should be
noted that even pro-nuclear newspapers, such as the Yomiuri, didn't necessarily
underestimate the physically adverse health effects of low-dose radiation. Rather, this
section shows that the Yomiuri presented research findings on the physically adverse
health effects of low-dose radiation.
Portraying Low-Dose Radiation after Fukushima
This section investigates how three Japanese national newspapers and
Fukushima’s local newspaper portrayed low-dose radiation from March 12, 2011 to
December 31, 2014. As the previous section shows, Japanese national newspapers did not
link low-dose radiation to psychological problems, but this section reveals that both
Japanese national newspapers and the Fukushima Mimpō portrayed low-dose radiation as
a component of psychological problems. The findings of a quantitative analysis of
Japanese national newspapers and the Fukushima Mimpō are below in table format (See
Table 2). The Asahi, the Yomiuri, the Nihon Keizai, and the Fukushima Mimpō all
presented low-dose radiation through six major themes, summarized below.

Table 2: Thematic categories of Japanese national and local newspaper articles that
referred to low-dose radiation after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster

Unknown Healthy Physical Psychological Safe or Few Risks Balancing views Total
Asahi 32 1 30 8 7 16 94
Yomiuri 16 1 5 13 5 7 47
Nihon Keizai 16 1 7 3 6 5 38
Fukushima Mimp ō 5 0 4 7 6 1 23
Total 69 3 46 31 24 29 202
56

As noted, a quantitative analysis of Japanese national and local newspapers’ portrayal of
low-dose radiation in the air clearly shows that Japanese national and local newspapers
published articles that portrayed low-dose radiation as a cause of psychological problems
such as mental health. Whereas the four newspapers published articles that mentioned the
physically harmful effects of low-dose radiation, they also presented the health effects of
low-dose radiation as being acceptable or safe. Moreover, it is important to note that
whereas the three national newspapers published articles that emphasized the positive
health effects of low-dose radiation, the Fukushima Mimpō never discussed positive
health effects of low-dose radiation. The following section illustrates how the papers
actually discussed low-dose radiation in the air after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
disaster.
1. The Health Effects of Low-Dose Radiation are Unknown
The majority of the articles presented the health effects of exposure to low-dose
radiation as something scientifically unproven (e.g. Asahi Shimbun, 2011b, 2011c;
Hayashi, 2011; Hosaka, Mizuno, Asakuno, Sato, Komatsu, 2012; Kaneko, 2013; Ōmori,
Akaike & Torigoe, 2011; Yomiuri Shimbun, 2011b, 2012a, 2012c, 2013a, 2013c, 2013d,
2013e, 2013g, 2014a, 2014b). For instance, the Asahi (2011d) published an editorial on
the issue of exposure to low-dose radiation on June 30, 2011 and discussed citizens’
concerns about low-dose radiation as follows:
Little has been known about the danger of low-dose radiation, and different
people interpret it differently. Because children are more likely to be affected by
radiation than adults, the parent generations worry [accordingly]…How much one
should worry and play for safety. It’s up to personal values.
57

Given the scientifically unproven health effects of low-dose radiation, the Asahi indicates
that individuals should make their own judgments about the health effects of low-dose
radiation in their own ways. While the Asahi appeared to be open to a wide variety of
views of exposure to low-dose radiation, the Asahi assumed that individuals are
responsible for their judgments about low-dose radiation given that the health effects of
low-dose radiation are not scientifically confirmed. The Yomiuri likewise suggested the
unknown nature of low-dose radiation in different ways (e.g. Yomiuri Shimbun, 2013c,
2013e). The Nihon Keizai (e.g. 2011f) and The Fukushima Mimpō (e.g. 2011d) further
highlighted that the health effects of exposure to low-dose radiation over a long period of
time are still unknown.
2. The Health Benefits from Low-Dose Exposure to Radiation
While the Nihon Keizai exclusively referred to the health benefits from exposure
to low-dose radiation in a single article before the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, the
Asahi, the Yomiuri, and the Nihon Keizai all published a view of exposure to low-dose
radiation as beneficial for the human body after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.
On May 5, 2011 for example, the Asahi featured Tokio Kanō, former Vice President of
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and his views of low-dose radiation
(Watanabe & Tosa, 2011). In the article, Kanō reportedly noted that:
There are researchers who claim that low-dose radiation is rather healthy. I think
[their claims] are convincing. My colleagues recovered from illness thanks to
radiation therapy. [I think Japanese society] overreacted to [low-dose radiation].
We cannot even say that low-dose radiation is rather beneficial for the body in our
society. I got interviewed because I wanted to express this.
58

The Asahi published this article mentioning the positive health effects of exposure to
low-dose radiation around two months after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster took
place. Unlike the Asahi, both the Yomiuri (2013b) and the Nihon Keizai (2011i) presented
radon spa in Japan as an example of the positive health effects of low-dose radiation.
There were only three cases that Japanese national newspapers mentioned the positive
health effects of exposure to low-dose radiation in a single article when the general issue
of low-dose radiation was discussed. While the Yomiuri and the Nihon Keizai presented
the positive health effects of low-dose radiation by referring to radon spa, the Asahi
uncritically published Kanō’s anecdote maintaining that low-dose radiation could have
positive health effects. Later, the Asahi published several letters to the editor, which
criticized Kanō’s view of low-dose radiation (Hanzawa, 2011; Nemoto, 2011; Saito,
2011). As noted, the Fukushima Mimpō did not publish any articles where low-dose
radiation claimed to be beneficial to health.
3. Physically Harmful Effects from Exposure to Low-Dose Radiation
As the previous section shows, Japanese national newspapers treated low-dose
radiation as potentially physically adverse before the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.
Likewise, the three national and local newspapers extensively presented low-dose
radiation exposure as potentially physically harmful (e.g. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2011k;
Takeshita, 2012a, 2012b; Yomiuri Shimbun, 2012d). The Asahi (2012a) for example,
quoted Tamotsu Baba, Mayor of Namie Town, as saying:
When the Fukushima nuclear accident took place, many residents ended up being
exposed to radiation unnecessarily. I’m afraid of effects of exposure to even low-
59

dose radiation for children and women. Even if I’m told that it’s fine [to be
exposed to] the limit of 20 millisievert [per year], I can’t take it at face value.
The Asahi published Baba’s view of the health effects of low-dose radiation as
potentially physically harmful for children and women, and like elsewhere (Roberson,
2012), children and women were also extensively utilized as symbols when referring to
both physically and psychologically harmful effects of low-dose radiation. The Yomiuri
did not clearly represent low-dose radiation as physically harmful just as it did before the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, but the Yomiuri (2011c) did feature citizens who
were concerned about the physically harmful effects of low-dose radiation on July 6,
2011. The Nihon Keizai (2012d) featured research findings showing that nuclear workers
who were exposed to low-dose radiation after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster had
increasing percentage of leukemia and indicated that exposure to low-dose radiation is
potentially harmful. The Fukushima Mimpō (2011b) featured a voluntary faculty group
from Fukushima University focusing on coping with the potential physically adverse
effects of low-dose radiation, indicating the need to deal with low-dose radiation in order
to ensure physical health.
4. Psychologically Harmful Effects from Exposure to Low-Dose Radiation
As shown in the previous section, the Asahi, the Yomiuri, and the Nihon Keizai
did not link low-dose radiation in relation to causes of psychological problems before the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. However, they articulated psychologically harmful
effects of low-dose radiation in many different ways after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
disaster (e.g., Nomura, 2011). For instance, the Asahi (2012b) portrayed low-dose
radiation as a cause of psychological problems by featuring Kayoko Nakamura, the
60

former technical editor of the Japan Radiological-Isotope Association, who discussed a
way to deal with the growing unease about exposure to low-dose radiation. Likewise, the
Yomiuri quoted various experts as a way to indicate the psychological effects of low-dose
radiation immediately after the disaster (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2011a, 2011g, 2011k). On
April 26 2011 for example, the Yomiuri (2011a) published a Japanese scientist’s view of
psychological effects of exposure to low-dose radiation. In this article, the scientist
asserted that:
Because the government poorly explained the effects of radiation that resulted
from the nuclear accident, saying there are no immediate health effects [of
radiation], [the government’s explanation] more or less amplified doubt and fear
[about the health effects]. There are many cases that the government should’ve
asserted that [we’re] safe…It’s important to take care of [radiation] readings, but
if one becomes too sensitive about [whether] [the levels] of the readings are
slightly increased or decreased, there is a significant risk of causing psychological
stress to build up and damage mental and physical health. After the Chernobyl
accident, mental-stress-driven-alcohol-addiction and anxiety-and-fear-driven-
meaningless-artificial-abortion became a social problem in addition to the direct
effects of radiation. [We] should learn from [the Chernobyl accident] and should
never make such mistakes (Emphasis added).
Despite that the health effects of exposure to low-dose radiation have yet to be proven
from a scientific perspective, the scientist asserted that the government should have
confirmed that citizens would be safe in Japan because psychological issues are
apparently more significant when it comes to the health risks of low-dose radiation. In
61

other articles too, the Yomiuri portrayed low-dose radiation as a psychological problem
(Yomiuri Shimbun, 2011k, 2012a, 2013h), which could contribute to what Kuchinskaya
(2007) describes as “the production of invisibility.” Unlike in the period before the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, the Yomiuri expressed low-dose radiation as a cause
of psychological problems while making the physical health effects of low-dose radiation
invisible. Likewise, the Nihon Keizai (2012c) published an article stating that citizens
and parenting generations in particular were suffering from stress about low-dose
radiation. The Fukushima Mimpō (2011a) published a piece about Fukushima
homemakers suing TEPCO for compensation for mental and psychological distress
damages, articulating the psychologically harmful effects of low-dose radiation.
5. Low-dose Radiation as Safe or Acceptable Risks
Japanese national and local newspapers also indicated that low-dose radiation has
no health effects (e.g. Maeno, 2011). Partly because the Japanese government adopted the
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)’s radiation protection
standard, they also defined low-dose radiation on the basis of ICRP’s standard.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the ICRP’s radiation protection standard does not
assume a threshold below which low-dose radiation is harmless, Japanese national and
local newspapers published articles that indicated the existence of such a threshold,
maintaining that low-dose radiation could be more or less physically harmless. For
instance, the Asahi’s byline articles by Takahashi (2012a; 2012b), an editorial committee
member for the Asahi, indicated that low-dose radiation doesn’t have harmful health
effects. In one specific article, Takahashi (2012b) discussed two different radiation
protection standards by ICRP and the European Committee on Radiation Risk (ECRR)
62

and implied that according to ICRP’s radiation protection standard that is also supported
by majority of scientists, low-dose radiation below 100mSv should be considered as more
or less safe by Japanese society. She further noted that, “(the) truth was never decided by
majority vote, but [our] society needs valid standards for regulation. So, I believe it’s a
good idea to adopt what the majority is among scientists.” Moreover, the Yomiuri (2011j)
indicated the dose limit of 20mSv for the safe return of residents to their homes set by the
government was acceptable because low-dose radiation in the air below 20mSv is
relatively safe.
Just two weeks after the earthquake and tsunami, the Nihon Keizai (2011a)
differentiated stochastic effects of radiation from deterministic effects of radiation and
indicated that low-dose radiation below 100mSv would not have negative deterministic
health effects. Furthermore, the Nihon Keizai (2011c) described cancer risks of exposure
to low-dose radiation below 100mSv as equivalent to those of secondhand smoking,
suggesting that low-dose radiation can be seen as more or less similar compared to
everyday life risks. In doing so, the Nihon Keizai contributed to the relativization of the
health effect of low-dose radiation in everyday life. Moreover, the Nihon Keizai (2011j)
featured Hideaki Karaki, Vice President of the Science Council of Japan, who noted:
The health effects of exposure to low-dose radiation below 100 mSv are not
completely proven in science, but it’s certain that cancer risks are extremely small.
It’s misleading to assume that there is huge danger involved even if the
mechanism [of the health effects of low-dose radiation] is scientifically unproven.
As such, the Nihon Keizai (2011j) published an article that emphasized that low-dose
radiation below 100mSv involves “extremely small” cancer risks, indicating that low-
63

dose radiation is relatively safe and acceptable. Likewise, the Fukushima Mimpō
presented low-dose radiation as relatively safe. For instance, the Fukushima Mimpō
(2012a) featured Akira Ōtsuru, a professor at Fukushima Medical University, who noted
that whereas the hearth effects of exposure from low-dose radiation over a long period of
time are scientifically unproved, “the current cancer risks from [exposure to] low-dose
radiation [in Fukushima] are extremely small from a scientific perspective.”
6. Balancing Different Views
Just as in the period after Chernobyl and before Fukushima, balanced treatment of
different views were similarly found after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in
Japanese national and local newspapers (e.g. Asahi Shimbun, 2011a; Kajiwara, 2011;
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2011b, 2011g; Taki, 2011). Japanese national newspapers in
particular provided different interpretations of the Oishimbo controversy (e.g. Yomiuri
Shimbun, 2014c; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2014c)
20
. Even before the controversy, the
Asahi published an article about a public lecture in the Fukushima Prefecture in which
one doctor and one scientist showed different views of the health risks of low-dose
radiation: the doctor emphasized the physically adverse effects of low-dose radiation
whereas the scientist indicated the health benefits from exposure to low-dose radiation
(Maeda, 2011). Likewise, both the Yomiuri and the Nihon Keizai featured opposing
interpretations of the health effects of low-dose radiation in particular articles. The
Yomiuri (2012b) for instance, presented local mayors’ different views of low dose
radiation in Fukushima. Just as in the Asahi, the Nihon Keizai (e.g. 2011g) treated
opposing views of low-dose radiation as potentially physically harmful and as potentially

20
For more detail, see the Introduction chapter.
64

physically beneficial. Likewise, the Fukushima Mimpō (2011c) presented opposite
interpretations of low-dose radiation, describing conflicting views of low-dose radiation
as follows:
From perspective of “safe”-leaning groups, humans have made a progress by
fixing damaged genes by natural background radiation. [From the perspective of
safe-leaning groups], the health risks of low dose radiation are smaller than those
of alcohol and tobacco. They believe that they have no choice but to make a
judgment by comparing the benefits of maintaining their lives and the various
risks, including radiation. On the other hand, from the perspective of “measured”-
leaning groups, there are health effects even with small amounts [of radiation].
There is a growing body of research to support [this assumption]. [From
perspectives of “measured”-leaning group], “safe”-leaning groups underestimate
the health effects of the Chernobyl nuclear accident.
After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, both Japanese national and local
newspapers provided more varied interpretations of low-dose radiation to their audience
when compared to the period from Chernobyl to Fukushima. As shown, Japanese
national and local newspapers portrayed low-dose radiation as a component of
psychological issues after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. At the same time, the
papers provided similarly opposing interpretations of low-dose radiation. Nelkin (1987)
described journalistic norms and scientific disputes as follows:
…scientific standards of objectivity require not balance but empirical verification
of opposing hypotheses. Simply to balance sides gives readers little guidance
about the scientific significance of different views. Though journalists’ norms of
65

objectivity were initially modeled on scientific method, their current
implementation in reports of scientific disputes is very often a source of irritation
to the scientists involved. (p. 88)
More importantly, individual audience members of the newspapers were presumably left
considering low-dose radiation in their own way after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
disaster. The unproven health effects of low-dose radiation paved the way for a wide
variety of interpretations and narratives of low-dose radiation after the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear disaster. To make matters worse, Japanese newspapers provided different
interpretations of low-dose radiation, apparently amplifying the individualization of
radiation risks.
Conclusion
This chapter investigated how Japanese national and local newspapers portrayed
low-dose radiation before and after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in order to
provide a backdrop for the rest of the dissertation. Three findings emerged:
First, given that the health effects of exposure to low-dose radiation are not
scientifically proven, Japanese national and local newspapers provided radically different
interpretations of exposure to low-dose radiation. More specifically, Japanese national
newspapers in particular published articles that mentioned the positive health effects of
low-dose radiation while at the same time they presented low-dose radiation as a cause of
physically adverse health problem in other articles.
Second, this chapter indicates that Japanese national newspapers viewed low-dose
radiation as a cause of certain psychological problems after the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear disaster. Whereas Japanese national newspapers promoted the peaceful use of
66

nuclear power since the 1940s, they did not view the issue of low-dose radiation as a
psychological issue before the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. After the disaster
however, they published articles that referred to the issue of low-dose radiation exposure
as a psychological issue.
Finally, this chapter indicates that whereas the health effects of low-dose radiation
are scientifically unproven, providing multiple and radically different interpretations of
low-dose radiation may not be practically useful for audience members. As Nelkin (1987)
pointed out, providing various interpretations of low-dose radiation could have been seen
as fair, objective or more or less inclusive, but the highly balanced treatment of different
claims over the health effects of low-dose radiation may have amplified uncertainties
over the health effects of exposure to low-dose radiation after the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear disaster.

67

Chapter 3: Defining What Counts as Datum on Radiation in Everyday Life
This chapter is the first detailed, empirical research on Japanese experts’ views of
grassroots measuring networks and their data production practices in 2014. Much written
about grassroots measuring networks assumes that citizens played a meaningful role in
generating information about nuclear radiation in the air after the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear disaster (Abe, 2014; Aldrich, 2012; Hemmi & Graham, 2012; Murillo, 2013;
Murphy, 2014). Few studies however, have explored the role of Japanese experts in the
construction of the meaning of grassroots measuring networks and their measurement
readings. To understand the complex dynamics of grassroots measuring networks, and in
particular to conceptualize their data production practices as a kind of scientific practice,
it logically follows a need to investigate how experts define the meaning of grassroots
measuring networks and their data (Ottinger, 2010).
Investigating experts’ view of grassroots networks is particularly significant for
two reasons. First, it is socially important. As some of my research participants
regrettably point out, certain citizens have stigmatized some experts and scientists, in
particular since the nuclear disaster, and because of this their views of grassroots
measuring networks were not necessarily shared in post-Fukushima Japanese society
21
.
Moreover, focusing exclusively on examining grassroots measuring networks may
celebrate, if not romanticize, the role of grassroots measuring networks in producing data
about radiation as resources for scientific knowledge without taking into account experts’

21
One particular label used for stigmatizing scientists is Goyōgakusha or “scholars under
the thumbs of the power that be.”

68

discourse on the networks. Therefore, it’s important to investigate experts’ diverse views
of the networks and their data.
Secondly, this approach is theoretically intriguing. Much scholarship in the field
of citizen science and science communication has rightly given agency to citizens,
contributing to the renegotiation of scientific practice in open-ended circumstances by
framing the situation of citizens as the central focus of discussion over scientific practice
(e.g. Brown, 1997; Callon, Lascoumes, Barthe, 2009; Epstein, 1996; Gross, 1994; Irwin,
1995; Wynne, 1992). Similarly, Foucault (2003) critically examines the mechanism by
which lay knowledge is subjugated. Foucault uses a concept of subjugated knowledge as
“…a whole series of knowledge that ha(s) been disqualified as nonconceptual
knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically
inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or
scientificity” (p.7) when he describes the insurrection of knowledge “against the
centralizing power-effects that are bound up with the institutionalization and workings of
any scientific discourse organized in a society such as ours” (p.9). Drawing on and
extending these studies, this chapter seeks to illuminate the dynamic nature of experts
rather than reifying experts as more or less monolithic entities who take an essentially
deductive or non-reflexive view of scientific practice by subjugating certain data
generated by citizens.
Further, an analysis of experts’ discourse is also of rhetorical interest. Pointing to
rhetorical dimensions of science, Prelli (1989) has viewed science as “unfolding
argumentation,” (p.266) suggesting that it’s important to examine “how the arguments
that comprise scientific communication are designed and on what grounds they are and
69

ought to be weighted as scientific claims” (p.266). In order to examine what kinds of
rhetorical strategy experts made to validate their views of grassroots measuring networks
and their data, this chapter draws particularly on Prelli’s stasis analytical framework of
scientific discourse. He provides four general stoppages in scientific discourse as superior
stases by noting that, “superior stases identify arguable points concerning the four grand
functions of doing science: adducing evidence, interpreting constructs and information,
evaluating the scientific significance of matters discussed, and applying scientific
methods” (p.145). Further, he adds that within each realm of superior stases, there are
four subordinate stases: conjectural stasis, definitional stasis, qualitative stasis, and
translative stasis. Based on Prelli’s stasis analytical framework, this chapter illuminates
what kind of issues experts articulate as a rhetorical strategy in defining grassroots
measuring networks and their data.
This chapter provides an additional useful context in which Safecast, Kodomira
and Hakatte Geiger engaged in measuring radiation in the air as a way to investigate
various challenges and opportunities facing the networks as they measure radiation in the
air in 2014 from experts’ perspectives. In other words, an analysis of experts’ discourse
on the networks would be a precondition for examining how Safecast, Kodomira and
Hakatte Geiger contribute to constructing nuclear radiation knowledge infrastructures.
Given that the three networks are all Tokyo-based grassroots measuring networks, this
chapter also takes into account how experts in Fukushima define the meaning of the three
networks and their data in the context of Fukushima in 2014. In doing so, this chapter
seeks to indicate the role of the Tokyo-based networks in Fukushima from local experts’
70

perspectives. Therefore, my initial data collection was oriented around the following
questions:
1. How do experts view the social role of grassroots measuring networks in general
in 2014?
2. How do experts view grassroots measuring networks’ measurement data in
general in 2014?
3. How do experts view Tokyo-based grassroots measuring networks such as
Safecast, Kodomira and Hakatte Geiger and their data in the Fukushima
Prefecture?
Defining Experts: Scientists, Government Officials, and Dosimeter Manufactures
In order to address the questions above, this chapter investigates views of
Japanese scientists, government officials, and radiation dosimeter manufacturers based on
their own set of criteria about data production as they are apparently more or less
authorized to define the meaning of citizens’ data production practice in post-Fukushima
Japanese society. Among the category of scientists, there are a wide variety of scientists
related to nuclear radiation in part because radiation has been studied in a wide variety of
areas including physics, chemistry, biology, medical science, engineering, and radiation
protection studies among others (Torii, 2013; Torii, Shozugawa, Watanabe, & Nakagawa,
2011). In order to address the questions effectively, I focused on interviewing three
dosimetrists (researchers on radiation measurements), a radiation protection expert, a
nuclear physicist, a medical doctor, and an environmental systems engineering specialist
for this chapter. Given the small sample size of scientists in each field, the findings of my
interviews with the various scientists are far from generalizable. However, investigating
71

their views provides a wide variety of contexts in which grassroots monitoring networks
are situated. As for government officials, I interviewed government officials who were
involved with the issue of decontamination or health promotion in Fukushima because
their views of grassroots measuring networks likely helped shape the challenges and
opportunities facing the networks in the Fukushima Prefecture.
As for radiation dosimeter manufacturers, it’s important to note that from the
beginning of the disaster one of the pressing issues was that there were various shoddy
measurement instruments available immediately in Japan. Indeed, National Consumer
Affairs Center of Japan (NCAC), an independent administrative agency handling
consumer issues under the Consumer Affair Agency (CAA), announced on September 8,
2011 that the Practical Living Information Online Network System (PIO-NET) of the
center received 391 inquiries about dosimeters from March 11 to the end of July 2011,
noting that 122 of the total inquires were about the quality and function of dosimeters
(Dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin kokumin seikatsu sentā, 2011). Put simply, there was (and
perhaps still is) controversy over the uncertainty about dosimeters. As such, it is
important to analyze dosimeter manufactures’ views of grassroots measuring networks
and their data. Whereas international organizations such as International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation (UNSCEAR) can be seen as groups of experts in the issue of radiation, an
analysis of international organizations’ discourse of grassroots measuring networks in
general is outside the scope of this chapter. Instead, this chapter seeks to enhance our
understanding of Japanese experts’ views of grassroots measuring networks and their
data.
72

Post-Fukushima Japanese Measurement Infrastructure
Before investigating experts’ discourse, however, it is useful to describe the
characteristic of post-Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure with particular
attention to the issue of calibration. By post-Fukushima Japanese measurement
infrastructure, I mean a kind of knowledge infrastructure as “robust networks of people,
artifacts, and institutions that generate, share, and maintain specific knowledge about the
human and natural worlds” (Edwards 2010, p.17). More specifically, post-Fukushima
Japanese measurement infrastructure involves networks of a wide variety of people,
artifacts and institutions that define what counts as good measurement data. Focusing on
the issue of calibration has one great advantage because, as illustrated later, many experts
point out the issue of calibration as a key factor responsible for their view of citizens’
data. The International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM), an international
measurement science and measurement standard organization under International
Committee for Weights and Measures (CIPM), provides the formal definition of
calibration with some caveats in International Vocabulary of metrology: Basic and
general concepts and associated terms VIM published by its Joint Committee for Guides
in Metrology (JCGM, 2012):
“Calibration: operation that, under specified conditions, in a first step, establishes
a relation between the quantity values with measurement uncertainties provided
by measurement standards and corresponding indications with associated
measurement uncertainties and, in a second step, uses this information to establish
a relation for obtaining a measurement result from an indication
NOTE 1 A calibration may be expressed by a statement, calibration function,
73

calibration diagram, calibration curve, or calibration table. In some cases, it may
consist of an additive or multiplicative correction of the indication with associated
measurement uncertainty.
NOTE 2 Calibration should not be confused with adjustment of a measuring
system, often mistakenly called “self-calibration”, nor with verification of
calibration.
NOTE 3 Often, the first step alone in the above definition is perceived as being
calibration.” (p.28-29)
As one of the member countries for CIPM, Japanese state follows CIPM’s international
measurement standard and defines what calibration looks like in Japan accordingly. More
specifically, Japan’s National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
and its National Metrology Institute of Japan (NMIJ) in particular define Japan’s national
measurement standard, which is traceable to CIPM’s international standard (Dokuritsu
gyōsei hōjin sangyō gijutsu kenkyūjo, 2014a). Whereas NMIJ defines Japan’s national
measurement standard, the National Institute of Technology and Evaluation (NITE) is
authorized to approve some Japanese institutes and business enterprises as calibration
services by providing the qualification of Japan Calibration Service System (JCSS). In
other words, Japanese institutions and business enterprises should be authorized by NITE
to serve as calibration services (Dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin sangyō gijutsu kenkyūjo, 2014b).
On October 21 2011, MEXT and JAEA co-issued an administrative guideline on
radiation measurement (Monbukagakushō & Nihon genshiryoku kenkyū kaihatsu kikō,
2011). The administrative guideline defines a measurement method with a caveat that
“this is just one of the general measurement methods. So it's not incorrect for local
74

governments and others to measure by seeking the opinions of experts” (p.1). In the
guidelines however, MEXT and JAEA explicitly define the NaI scintillator as a “main
survey meter measuring air dose rate” (p.6) whereas the Geiger Müller survey meters
should be used “for contamination test” (p.6) by noting that average air dose rate should
be “measured by [using] calibrated NaI (sodium iodine) scintillator measuring gamma-
ray” (p.2).
As for measurement method, the guidance adds that when measuring average air
dose rate, measurers should avoid measuring radiation at spots nearby any “ditch,
building, under trees, rainwater guttering of building, side ditch, a pool of water, grass, on
flowerbeds, and stonewall” (p.2). Measurers are supposed to measure radiation one meter
high above the ground by setting time constant as 10 seconds and read measurement
readings 30 seconds after they start measuring.
More importantly, the guideline explicitly states that in order to maintain their
quality, “it is desirable for survey meters [such as scintillator and Geiger counters] to be
calibrated regularly (more than once per a year)” (p.6). The guidelines suggests that
unless survey meters are calibrated more than once a year, their readings are
untrustworthy from the government’s view.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Environment (MOE) issued its guidelines for
decontamination on December 2011 and a revised version in May 2013 (Kankyōshō,
2013). In the revised guidelines, MOE explicitly notes that when measuring radiation air
dose rates, measurers are requested to use “calibrated scintillation survey meters and (in
general energy-compensated ones)” (p.28), adding that, “it is acceptable to use other
dosimeters if they can be used to measure gamma-ray, but even in that case, [measurers
75

are requested to] use calibrated dosimeters” (p.28). As for measurements for
decontamination, the guideline states that measurers are supposed to conduct shōsai
sokutei or “extensive measurements.” During extensive measurements, measurers are
supposed to report the following aspects of measurements:
Measurement place, dosimeter, the date of measurement, weather condition, the
summary of measurement results (the number of measuring spots, object of
measurement, condition of measurements, height of measurement), measurement
results, and map of measurement spot (the number of measurement spots and
object of measurements are supposed to be recorded) among others. (p.26)
As such, MOE’s guidelines define what is to be reported for decontamination. More
importantly, MOE’s most recent guidelines on decontamination titled Issues to
Decontamination: Q & A (Kankyōshō, 2014) define measurers for decontamination:
Q2-1: Would it be acceptable if residents play a central role in survey
measurement for [presenting] evidence used for the drafts of a plan for
decontamination practice (on the condition that cities, towns and villages rent
dosimeters to them)?
A: In order to maintain accuracy of measurement, business operators that are
authorized by cities, towns, and villages as being sufficiently-able are requested to
measure [radiation] (p.18)
As such, the guidelines define business operators authorized by local governments as
measurers for decontamination, marginalizing citizens from that category so that
measurement accuracy could be maintained. Perhaps more importantly, it should be
noted that the guideline views good data about air dose rate as a mass of individual
76

accurate datum with a focus on the characteristic of measurement device or dosimeter,
measurement method, and its state of calibration.
Defining useful data for decontamination as a mass of accurate datum could
further help exclude certain kinds of citizens. Indeed, NaI scintillators as designated by
the guidlines as a survey meter measuring radiation air dose rates, are generally much
more expensive than Geiger counters. According to NCAC, a calibrated NaI (TI)
scintillation survey mater costs 58,800JPY or $5,900 (Dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin kokumin
seikatsu sentā, 2011). Further, it is important to note that annual calibration fees are far
from cheap for certain people. As one of the institutions with the JCSS for instance, the
Institute of Radiation Measurements (IRM) shows that it costs 30,000 JPY or
approximately $300 to calibrate a Geiger-Müller survey meter per calibration (Kōeki
zaidan hōjin hōshasen keisoku kyōkai, 2014). As such, it is not affordable for certain
citizens to follow the guidelines since they need to have their dosimeter calibrated more
than once a year. The rest of the chapter investigates how scientists, government officials,
and radiation dosimeter manufactures view citizen’s data in relation to post-Fukushima
Japanese measurement infrastructure.
Method
In order to understand how experts view citizens’ measuring networks and their
data production practice, I conducted intensive one-on-one interviews with experts
precisely because individual interviews are arguably the best method to collect data on
individual experts’ potentially conflicting views of citizens’ measuring networks.
However, I also conducted multi-person interviews because some research participants
were accompanied by other people. As Beitin (2012) rightly points out, it is likely that in
77

the presence of others, some research participants may hold back their own perspectives
on the ground, as such perspectives could affect their relationship. However, I tried to
listen each participant’s views of grassroots measuring networks when conducting multi-
person interviews. Interviews that were not one-on-one interviews will be noted.
As for my sampling method, I investigated Japanese mass media to pick the most
relevant research participants in each field. I carefully followed IRB protocol and
contacted experts by email in the recruitment process. I also used a snowball sampling
technique in order to build rapport with my research participants. Although a snowball
sampling technique has its limitations, the technique was arguably the best method for me
to obtain access to high-ranked government officials. I also supplemented a snowball
sampling technique by contacting those who are relevant for my study directly.
At the beginning of the interviews, I provided my business card to research
participants and introduced myself as a PhD candidate at the University of Southern
California who studies the role of citizens in producing data about radiation after the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Following IRB protocol, I presented them an
information sheet and explained the purpose of my research in detail.
All of my research participants agreed to participate. All of my research
participants except for five employees at three dosimeter manufacturers agreed to be
identified by name. Each interview was originally planned for around one hour, but some
research participants spent upwards of two hours sharing their views of grassroots
measuring networks. I also collected a wide array of printed and online documents, which
include books, book chapters and articles written by my research participants among
others. The data analysis thus relies on the interview data and the documents.
78

The Dosimetrists
This section illustrates how dosimeterists view grassroots measuring networks
and their data. I conducted interviews with three dosimetrists: Dr. Katsumi Shozugawa at
University of Tokyo, Dr. Kimiaki Saito at Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), and Mr.
Tetsutaro Honda at IRM. Katsumi Shozugawa, Assistant Professor of the University of
Tokyo, is a young Japanese scholar specializing in radiation measurement. As the author
of The Introduction of Radiation Measurement for Everyone (Shozugawa, 2014), he has
actively engaged in sharing his knowledge on radiation measurement with citizens by
holding study sessions and lectures since the disaster. While checking radiation-
monitoring posts by the Japanese government every single day, he regularly takes a look
at radiation data published by a wide variety of grassroots measuring networks including
Safecast, Kodomira, and Hakatte Geiger.
Kimiaki Saito is a senior consultant at JAEA, an independent administrative
agency under MEXT, METI and NRA. After the disaster, he worked as a fellow of the
Fukushima Environmental Safety Center, JAEA. As a researcher at JAEA, Saito has
studied dose evaluation for environmental radiations as well as environmental radiation
measurements in general for more than thirty years. According to a public lecture record
(Saito, 2013a), Saito went to Chernobyl every summer for around one month in the 1990s
and he made a contamination map surrounding Chernobyl with other fellows. JAEA
provided this map to the Ukrainian government. In my interview, he also noted that he
was involved in a car-borne survey in Chernobyl, seeing it particularly useful when it
comes to its productivity of a large amount of data. With that experience, he proposed in
June 2011 that a car-borne survey be included in the government’s exploratory committee
79

about mapping radiation in air. Ultimately, Saito got involved in a project mapping
radioactive contamination with the support of MEXT: the Kyoto University RAdiation
Mapping System (KURAMA) project (Andoh et al, 2015; Tsuda et al., 2013; Saito,
2013b). On the government side, JAEA and other institutions played a key role in
creating radioactive contamination maps by conducting sampling, both car-borne and air-
borne survey (Seki et al., 2012).
Finally, Tetsujirō Honda is a dosimetry specialist at IRM, a kōeki zaidan hōjin, or
“public interest incorporated foundation,” which is a specific non-profit organization that
was approved as a public benefit corporation by the government. Located in the Tokai
Research and Development Center Nuclear Science Research Institute at JAEA in Tokai
Village in the Ibaraki Prefecture, IRM is a Japanese institute on calibration of dosimeters.
Honda has studied issues related to radiation, calibration and dosimetry for more than 30
years. He noted that he has never checked citizens’ measurement readings.
As a professional dosimetrist, Shozugawa explicitly emphasized that it is
extremely difficult to measure radiation in the air. In the Introduction of Radiation
Measurement for Everyone, he explicitly writes that, “regrettably, science of our time
cannot make it so easy to measure radiation accurately” (p.1). More specifically, he notes
in my interview that all radiation detectors and measurement instruments have some
degree of uncertainties in terms of accuracy.
Unlike temperature instruments or other measuring equipment commonly used by
citizens, Shozugawa notes that dosimeters make it difficult, if not impossible, for citizens
to generate accurate readings, adding that a portable scintillator used by researchers at his
80

laboratory at University of Tokyo has errors of around 10 percent. As such, Shozugawa
(2014) expressively writes in his book that:
There are still people who assume that they can take measurement readings
properly if they put a measurement detector close to an object. If you put a
measurement detector close to radiation source, you can see some readings, but
these readings will vary according to the way you put [a detector] close to
[radiation source], the direction [your detector takes], the height [where your
detector is], the duration of measuring time, or nuclides [you’re trying to measure].
[Just by looking at measurement readings], you don't want to alternate between
joy and grief, [saying] that, “[radiation levels are] high or low.” (p.7)
As such, Shozugawa emphasizes the need for citizens to learn about radiation
measurement. Yet, he states that whereas he views citizens’ measurement readings as
“rough indications,” citizens can obtain the general radiation levels by measuring
radiation repeatedly. When asked about his general view of grassroots measuring
networks, Shozugawa said:
Perhaps they are all good people. After all, they seek to generate [radiation] data
for the following generations, but they are awfully non-business oriented. So,
there are many cases that they lost money out of their pocket. Probably their
fundamental principle is based on volunteerism. I see them as a brilliant
educational movement showing where the level of radiation is relatively high or
enlightening [citizens] that radioactive materials tend to be accumulated at
rainwater guttering by rain and wind, but I can’t guarantee whether the absolute
value of their measurement readings are [truly accurate] just as whether 1 micro
81

Sievert [citizens claim] is truly 1 micro Sievert…But their goal is not to generate
exact measurement readings. Rather, they seek to inform about, if not warn about,
the higher or lower level of radiation in such and such a place. And they seek to
record [measurement] data. I find their goals really fantastic.
Shozugawa assumes that citizens are collecting data for future reference rather
than for present use. Even though citizens generate measurement readings, Shozugawa
indicates that he does not view citizens’ measurement readings as accurate. He implies
that citizens have made great progress in generating radiation data more precisely. When
asked if he sees citizens’ measurement data as a resource for his research on radiation in
air, Shozugawa says, “absolutely” and notes that there are “many cases” when citizens’
measurement readings showed high radiation levels at a particular spot, he went to
measure the radiation using his dosimeter. Shozugawa tactically uses citizens’
measurement data as a resource for his scientific work.
However, he notes that there are an “extremely limited number” of people who
are knowledgeable about measurement methods. When asked about the best method for
citizens to use in producing measurement data from his perspective, he states that it
depends on what they want to achieve by measuring radiation:
[The best method] indeed depends on [citizens’] goal. What do they want to do?
For example, do they want to monitor [radiation] only in their living area or do
they want to make a global database by standardizing [dosimeters]? Let’s say, if
[they are concerned about the fact] that a young child is playing around in a
nearby park, I don’t think that they need to standardize measurement
devices…This is precisely because even if they [use] any kind of dosimeter
82

regardless of its sensitivity, they’ll see the needle [of the dosimeter] move around
a ditch with high levels of radiation. This is the way in which whatever the
absolute value [of radiation] is, if every dosimeter’s needle is moved, there must
be something...[On the other hand] if they want to standardize radiation readings
globally, I think that the right thing to do is that they first off need to standardize a
dosimeter and then calibrate it.
Notably, Shozugawa negates the idea that all citizens should follow one particular
authorized measurement method in generating radiation data. Rather than taking a
reductionist view of science as “the deficit model” of the public (Gross, 1994),
Shozugawa sees citizens as agents designing measurement methods for their own
purposes. From Shozugawa’s point of view, citizens’ measurement data cannot be
viewed as scientific data or a primary source for his scientific research, but he
emphasizes that citizens’ measurement data “certainly” contributes to scientific
knowledge. Comparing citizens’ measurements to ‘a raw stone of diamond,’ he states that,
“(W)e scientists take only good information from that raw stone and then polish it. And
then we give it back to the society, saying ‘here you are.’ We don't start anything unless
we have a raw stone.” Shozugawa views citizens’ data as a sort of contributory expertise
(Collins & Evans, 2007).
Shozugawa characterizes citizens’ measurement readings as “dynamic data” in
relation to measurement readings by the government.
Rather than measuring [radiation] at the same time and place each time, citizens
report dynamic data [by saying] “here I measure radiation” and “here I take
measurement readings.” Then their data contribute to providing a general
83

impression of area-wide radiation data rather than radiation data in a specific spot.
So, we can get information about how radiation moves within the area. After all,
there is a great difference between the two ideas.
Shozugawa redefines citizen’s data, suggesting that it does not make any sense to
compare citizens’ data and the government’s data because their underlying processes are
different. If so, the question then is whether citizens could use their data as a resource for
lobbying for decontamination. Based on his experience, Shozugawa notes that the
political impact of citizens’ measurement data varies from city to city. Government
officials in some cities engage in decontamination with the help of civic measurement
data whereas those in other cities follow the Japanese state’s decontamination policy, not
viewing citizen’s measurement data as a reliable resource for decontamination.
Moreover, Shozugawa further indicates that the brand of dosimeter could be one
of the factors responsible for successful citizen-driven decontamination. According to
Shozugawa, Hitachi Aloka’s Sodium Iodide (NaI) scintillator is the “de facto standard”
for Japanese government officials to use for some reasons. Simultaneously, he points out
that measurement readings’ quality depends on the measurement methods even if one
uses Hitachi Aloka’s scintillator. He indicates that citizens’ measurement readings taken
using Hitachi Aloka’s scintillator could be generally viewed as better by government
officials when compared to readings taken by other dosimeters such as the Geiger counter.
However he emphasizes that there are seemingly no cases that Japanese public officials
take action for decontamination based solely on citizens’ measurement readings.
Shozugawa’s view of citizen’s measuring networks and their data indicates that
dosimetrists do not necessarily view citizens’ measurement readings as practically useless.
84

Although Shozugawa doesn't view citizens’ readings as scientific data, he acknowledges
the role citizens play in shaping what he characterizes as “dynamic data” independently
of the government’s readings. Furthermore, Shozugawa indicates that while it’s important
to understand issues related to radiation and measurement method, there is no one single
measurement method for citizens to follow. He doesn't mean, however, that all
measurement methods are acceptable. For instance, Shozugawa notes that in order to
create a worldwide database, it is necessary to calibrate a standardized dosimeter.
Needless to say, Shozugawa’s view of citizens’ data is not necessarily common
among Japanese dosimetrists. For instance, Saito notes that he didn't feel the pressing
need to check citizens’ information partly because he was initially too busy with the issue
of monitoring radiation. Among Safecast, Kodomira, and Hakatte Geiger, he only learned
about Safecast in February 2014 when he attended the International Expert’s Meeting on
Radiation Protection after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Promoting Confidence and
Understanding at IAEA. His personal views of Safecast will be elaborated in Chapter 4,
but suffice to say Saito thinks Safecast’s measurement data is not useful if one wants to
know the absolute value of measurement readings in a specific area with sufficient
accuracy.
Pointing to citizens’ display of measurement data, Saito suggests that it’s
important for persons responsible for measurements to include information on the
following factors about their dosimeters when publishing measurement readings: energy
response, direction response, rate response, and the state of calibration. Saito further adds
that if measurers see their measurement readings as almost the same as the government’s,
it would be better for them to show how close both types of data are by providing
85

quantitative data. Thus, Saito maintains that it’s not enough for measurers to publish
measurement readings as numbers alone because what matters is beyond measurement
readings from his point of view. He indicates that measurers should be more transparent
about the characteristics of their dosimeters and their measurement methods when they
publish their measurement readings.
Similarly, Honda notes that in his personal opinion that whereas it’s a “good thing”
for citizens to measure radiation, they need to measure radiation “properly.” In particular,
he states that under MOE’s decontamination guidelines, citizens are encouraged to use an
energy-compensated scintillation survey meter, adding that unless they use this specific
device, it’s difficult for citizens’ to compare their data with the government’s. Just like
Shozugawa, Honda suggests that there is no single way to measure environmental
radiation, noting that the purpose of citizens depends on their choice of measurements.
For instance, if citizens want to know roughly whether a specific spot has higher or lower
levels of radiation rather than the absolute value of measurement readings, they can use a
dosimeter measuring Cesium 134 and Cesium 137 alone on the condition that the
dosimeter is in a stable condition. As long as a dosimeter is properly calibrated he notes,
one can use a Geiger counter because what matters in 2014 is radiation solely from
Cesium on soil. As such, Honda suggests that calibration is essential to ensure the
accuracy of individual measurement readings.
Honda further points out that three factors particularly matter when producing
accurate measurement readings: the characteristics of dosimeters, measurement method
and calibration. Honda, like Saito, suggests that citizens may need to make information
about the three factors above open to the public. In terms of information about the
86

dosimeter, he specifically mentions that information on its energy and direction is “the
most important” in order to ensure accuracy of measurement readings, adding that the
model number of dosimeter is also useful. In terms of measurement method, he states that
it would be better to stay still while measuring radiation particularly when using Geiger
counters. If citizens have only a non-calibrated dosimeter, they need to calculate the
average value of some measurement readings due to the variations of its measurement
readings. However, if citizens standardize dosimeters and collect a large amount of data,
they can generate rough information about where radiation is relatively high or low
according to Honda.
When asked about his views of citizens’ “pragmatic” way of calibration in which
they compare their measurement readings with those of the government’s monitoring
posts, thereby adjusting their measurement readings accordingly, he notes that it is not
certain whether the government’s monitoring posts are calibrated properly, adding that
Cesium 137 at 662 Kev as a radioactive source for calibration does not directly come into
contact with a dosimeter in the environment, which confounds measurement readings
taken by a dosimeter (with poor energy characteristics in particular). Both Saito and
Honda define measurement data as a mass of datum whose quality is determined by the
characteristics of dosimeter, measurement method, and the state of calibration.
An analysis of three dosimetrists’ accounts shows that they define grassroots
measuring networks and their display of data in different ways. Shozugawa views their
data as useful contributory resource for scientific knowledge production whereas Saito
and Honda indicate that their data could be more useful if they make the characteristics of
their dosimeters, measurement methods, and the states of calibration open to the public
87

along with their measurement readings. What’s common among the three experts is that
they emphasize the importance of calibration for citizens’ data management. This section
indicates dosimetrists’ views of citizens’ measurement readings in a broader.
The Radiation Protection Expert, Nuclear Physicist, Medical Doctor and
Environmental Systems Engineering Specialist
This section examines how a wide variety of scientists view grassroots measuring
networks and their data. Unlike dosimetrists, they do not necessarily view citizens’
measurement with particular focus on technical issues such as the state of calibration.
However, they all describe their views of the changing role of the networks in post-
Fukushima Japanese society.
Dr. Michiaki Kai, Professor of Oita University of Nursing and Health Sciences, is
one of the Japanese committee members of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP). He also worked as a member of the shingikai, or
deliberation council, on radiation at MEXT in 2011. When asked about Safecast,
Kodmira and Hakatte Geiger, Kai notes that he is familiar with none of them, adding that
their measurement readings are rarely taken seriously among scientists on the ground that
the peer-review system is essential for scientific knowledge practice. Given that citizens’
data is not peer-reviewed, Kai indicates that it’s highly unlikely that scientists cite
measurements or online databases created by citizens for their scientific research, and
differentiates scientific information from citizens’ information as the following:
[Experts] do not treat [citizens’ measurement] on the same basis…In general, they
don't take everything on faith due to the issue of whether it’s trustworthy. It
88

doesn't matter even if [the value] of [citizen’s] measurement data is the same as
that of measurement data [by experts].
As such Kai does not see citizens’ measurement readings as a legitimized resource for
scientific knowledge, indicating that even if measurement readings look accurate, they
are scientifically meaningless at least for the science community because they are not
peer-reviewed in dose estimation as well as unlikely to be calibrated.
Pointing to the limited scientific value of citizens’ measurements from his
perspective, he indicates that some civic measurement data could be viewed as “precious
data” for scientists. For instance, he notes, scientists could pay attention to citizens’
measurements that were taken immediately after the disaster when there was little
measurement data available. When asked about the practical role of civic measurements
in 2014, he replies, “monitoring.” Kai states that given that the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant is not completely in a stable condition in 2014, citizens measuring
radiation can monitor whether it might unexpectedly affect areas that monitoring posts
cannot cover. He further suggests that the more the government grasp the situation about
radiation, the less it needs to spend financial resources on radiation monitoring, thereby
creating a larger alternative space for citizens to play a role in measuring radiation in
2014. He suggests that some specific scientific data could be valuable for scientists and
argues that as radiation levels decrease, there could be a bigger space for citizens to play
a valuable role in post-Fukushima Japanese society, adding that to successfully make
citizen’s data valuable, radiation experts would need to support them.
On the other hand, Dr. Ryūgo Hayano, Professor at the University of Tokyo,
views the changing role of grassroots measuring networks slightly differently. He is a
89

nuclear physicist affiliated with Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire (CERN),
or the European Organization for Nuclear Research. Whereas he is not a specialist in
radiation per se, he actively used Twitter to share his analysis of various issues related to
radiation immediately after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (Hayano and Itoi,
2014). He went to Minamisoma City, Fukushima Prefecture, located around 23
kilometers north of the nuclear power plant, and developed a scan for screening internal
exposure in babies (Hayano, Yamanaka, Bronson, Oginni, & Muramatsu, 2014). Hayano
notes that he knows about Safecast and its core member Azby Brown in particular.
Hayano notes that he and Brown exchange information on issues related to the disaster
because Brown is more familiar with English-language media, describing their
relationships as “give-and-take.” Hayano further notes that he gave advice to Safecast.
For instance, he checked the content of presentation slides that Brown used at the
presentation of IAEA (Brown, 2014). Although Hayano is not affiliated with Safecast, he
has a good working-relationship with Safecast, and Brown in particular.
He points out that citizens played a “more or less effective role” in producing
information about radiation in areas where the government did not cover from 2011 to
2012 in particular, thereby helping us capture the entire situation. One excellent example
that Hayano points out is a radiation map created by a Japanese citizen named S who
manually collected public radiation data from various databases of local governments. In
the wake of the disaster, local governments provided measurement data in heterogeneous
ways. Whereas each local government made its measurements open to its residents in its
own way, there was no useful information about the situation of radiation as a whole
beyond local boundaries. According to Hayano, S volunteered to unify this measurement
90

data by creating a radiation map manually based on public radiation data and used
Twitter to transmit information about radiation to a broader audience. It should be noted
that this map was not made from citizens’ data, but it apparently gained much attention
from both scientists and government officials (Moriguchi, 2011).
When asked about the role of citizen’s data in 2014 from his perspective, Hayano
notes that generally citizens have played a role in “filling in an [information] gap” where
the government has yet to provide measurement readings, and describes his view that
there used to be a bigger alternative space for citizens to play a meaningful role in
producing data about radiation in the air immediately after the disaster when compared
with 2014 when this space has shrunk with an increase in the government measurement
data:
Indeed, it’s extremely difficult for citizens to do [measure radiation] on a long-
term basis. On the other hand, the government is good at [measuring on a long-
term basis]. At some points, [the government’s measurement data] came from
behind against [citizens’ data] in terms of their quality and quantity. It was
certainly meaningful that citizens did what the government didn't do, by which
citizens certainly offered a new insight into [the society]…From 2011 to 2012,
[citizens] worked more or less effectively, but in 2014, this is no longer
necessarily [the case] in many places.
Hayano defines the changing role of citizens’ measurement data production practice in
relation to the government’s measurement data. In his view, citizens’ data are more or
less collateral data in relation to the government’s data. Indeed, Hayano states that he no
91

longer regularly checks citizen’s measurement data because he had a general idea of
what's going on.
More importantly, he points out the fundamental limitations of grassroots’
measuring networks that spread radiation information by using the Internet. According to
Hayano, the Internet was initially useful as a way to help give people a general idea of
what was going on around them in comparison with other areas, but even if the Internet
helped create a general idea of radiation levels, data on the Internet do not necessarily
relieve people’s anxiety in everyday life.
What matters now in terms of radiation is…a psychological problem rather than
science. So even if we say that readings tell something, things won’t work.
[People] won’t be convinced [about their health and safety] after looking at the
average value [of readings provided] by others. What matters is how I get my
data in a way that convinces me. Activists tend to measure different places, [but]
after all, ordinary people want to know how [safe] they are. For those who are
truly worried about how [safe] they are, it’s [necessary] to generate data for them
and let them know about the data.
Hayano states that while Internet-based one-way communication was effective at the
beginning of the disaster, what is needed in 2014 is a two-way communication, such as a
dialogue. Unlike Kai, Hayano does not see that grassroots measuring networks will play
an important role in the future partly due to its one-way communication style.
Furthermore, he indicates that it will not necessarily be easy for citizens to keep engaged
in measuring radiation air dose rates for years to come.
92

Dr. Masaharu Tsubokura shares Hayano’s view, stating that grassroots monitoring
networks are not sustainable in terms of their budget and manpower. He is a medical
doctor at the Division of Social Communication System for Advanced Clinical Research
at the Institute of Medical Science at the University of Tokyo. As early as April 2011, he
went to Minamisoma City and since May 2011, he has served as a physician at
Minamisoma Municipal General Hospital (Kami, 2012). Notably, he also has been
involved in the internal exposure-screening program for local people. Tsubokura also
acknowledges that he knows Safecast and Brown in particular; he was featured on
Safecast’s blog on September 20, 2012 (Tanaka, 2012)
Like Hayano, he notes that citizens initially played a great job in measuring
radiation in the air. However, Tsubokura indicates that it’ll be difficult for citizens to
keep motivated to measure radiation, as radiation levels will decrease for years to come.
As such, Tsubokura’s sees the changing role of citizens’ measuring networks in relation
to radiation levels in general. He shares Hayano’s view, stating that grassroots monitoring
networks are not sustainable in terms of their budget and manpower.
Similarly, Dr. Yūichi Moriguchi illustrates the changing role of citizens in
producing data about radiation in the air and views some merits of citizens’
measurements in 2014. He is a professor in the department of Urban Engineering at the
University of Tokyo. As an environmental systems engineering specialist, he worked as
the Director of the Research Center for Material Cycles and Waste Management at the
National Institute for Environmental Studies previously.
Like Hayano, Moriguchi points out that citizens played a role in generating
information about radiation in air immediately after the disaster. In particular Moriguchi,
93

like Hayano, points out S’s case as a good example of useful citizen’s information on
radiation. He notes that a government official found S’s radiation map before Moriguchi
let the government official know about the map. More importantly, based on S’s
radiation map, he provided some government officials with data that could be useful for
future policymaking. Moriguchi indicates that S’s information contributed to generating
useful information for scientists and government officials from his perspective. As such,
Moriguchi assumes that the Internet and Social Networking Service (SNS) were useful in
part because a wide variety of citizens, including S, created alternative spaces for
radiation information. He further notes that immediately after the disaster, there were
some cases in which citizens’ data were more useful than MEXT’s data.
Even in 2014, Moriguchi sees citizens’ data useful for at least three reasons. First,
they still provide detailed data about radiation in the air. According to Moriguchi, the
governments’ monitoring posts have mostly been built in areas with relatively high
radiation levels, which creates an alternative space for citizens to create detailed data in
areas with lower radiation levels. Second, citizens’ data could be also viewed as a
“deterrent force” against the government’s data, monitoring whether the government
manipulates its radiation data. Third, citizens’ measurements can be seen as a resource
for trust building. More specifically, Moriguchi views citizens’ data as a resource for
relieving citizens’ anxiety if there is no discrepancy between citizens’ measurement
readings and the government’s. As such, he indicates that citizens’ measurement readings
could possibly generate a trust-building space between the government and scientists on
the one hand, and citizens on the other if they both found no discrepancy between both
their measurement data.
94

As for citizens’ data as a resource for decontamination, Moriguchi emphasizes
that local government officials do not get involved in decontamination based solely on
measurement data provided online by citizens. In general though, local government
officials do double-check citizens’ claim by measuring radiation. His argument indicates
that online-based one-way communication may not work when it comes to the issue of
decontamination. He further indicates that with increased amount of knowledge about the
radiation in the air, general information about radiation in the air provided by citizens
using the Internet may not be as useful as it used to be.
As such, a wide variety of scientists define the meaning of grassroots measuring
networks in different ways. Kai points out that their data are generally not scientifically
valuable because they are not peer-reviewed whereas they may be practically valuable.
Hayano, Tsubokura and Moriguchi illustrate the changing role of grassroots movements.
Hayano and Moriguchi indicate that online radiation data by grassroots measuring
networks may not be as useful as they used to be. Tsubokura points out that grassroots
measuring networks may not be sustainable for years to come.
The Government Officials in Fukushima and Tokyo
This section investigates how government officials define grassroots measuring networks
and their data. I conducted individual and multi-person interviews with six officials total.
Dr. Yujiro Kuroda is a clinical psychologist, who has been working as a Health
Promotion Advisor for Iitate Village in Fukushima since the beginning of 2012. Iitate
Villege is located about 40 kilometers northwest of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power
plant. On April 22 2011, the Japanese government designated the village as Planned
Evacuation Zone on the ground that its residents could be potentially exposed to more
95

than 20 mSv per year (Shushōkantei, 2011). According to a survey conducted by Iitate
Village, 55.5% of all evacuees were evacuated from Iitate Village to Fukushima City, and
10.2% were in Date City (Fukkōchō, Fukushimaken, & Iitatemura, 2014) in part because
most Iitate villagers sought evacuation areas within one hour’s drive from the village.
22

Since the beginning of 2012, Kuroda has been engaged with evacuees in Fukushima City
where Iitate Village’s office is currently located, and elsewhere, including Date City.
Mayor Masato Shinagawa has served as mayor of Koriyama City, Fukushima Prefecture
since April 2013. Located approximately 60 kilometers from the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant, Koriyama City is the largest city in the Fukushima Prefecture in
terms of its population. During his interview, Koriyama city officials Munemitsu Kikuchi,
Masahiro Takita and Yōhei Kamata also participated. Among Safecast, Kodomira, and
Haktte Geiger, Shinagawa notes that he knows Safecast. Indeed, as illustrated in the next
chapter, Shinagawa helped Safecast to collaborate with a postal office in Koriyama City
to collect radiation data.
As a bureaucrat of MOE in Tokyo, Takashi Omura worked as the first Director of
the Fukushima Office for Environmental Restoration from April 2012 to July 2013. The
office was established in January 2012 to deal with the issues of decontamination and
radioactive waste disposal in Fukushima (Fukushima Mimpō, 2012b). Among Safecast,
Kodomira, and Hakatte Geiger, he knows of Kodomira as a citizens’ measuring station
that monitors foodstuff.
In my interview, Kuroda notes that he didn't know Safecast, Kodomira, or
Hakatte Geiger, adding that he wouldn't view them as particularly useful for evacuees

22
According to the most recent survey, around 7 % of the entire evacuees from the
village are living outside the Fukushima Prefecture (Iitatemura, 2015).
96

from Iitate Village precisely because members of the networks are “non-Fukushima
residents.” Kuroda describes his view of the Tokyo-based networks as follows:
At first glance, I didn't see them as [radiation measuring] movements in which
Fukushima Prefecture or local residents [in Fukushima] were getting engaged…I
am involved in two [radiation measuring] movements in which local people take
the initiative…That’s because [such movements] are [fundamental for] seikatsu
saiken [or “putting their lives back in order” in English]. They are movements in
which they put their lives back in order by acquiring knowledge, techniques and
particularly regaining self-confidence little by little. After all, they are their
movements. They can be referred as “Self-Productive-Action” [in English]. Such
movements are essential. So, even if people like me or those outside [Fukushima]
say “let’s do something,,” things never work out. [What would work out is the
manner in which] experts follow local people’s initiatives after local people say
that, “let’s do something.” After all, I think that things won’t work out unless
local people take the initiative.
As such, Kuroda clearly distinguishes non-Fukushima residents from local people and
defines Safecast, Kodomira and Hakatte Geiger as the former’s groups. He indicates that
measurement data that non-Fukushima residents collect are not necessarily useful
resources for seikatsu saiken for evacuees. His account indicates that the issue of identity
matters in grassroots measurement networks. More importantly, just like Hayano, Kuroda
indicates that a sense of “my data” matters for evacuees from Iitate Village.
After all, what’s important from my view is that after they measure [radiation],
they accept the situation [based on their data]. I am not talking about all [the
97

evacuees]. Not all the people have yet risen to that level. What I mean is that they
take dosimeters and accept the situation by saying “Oh, radiation levels are such
and such”... It would be much better to have scientific trustworthiness, but what’s
more important [for them] is, I think, their own data which they [took].
With the concept of “my data,” Kuroda implies that the issue of measuring radiation can
be understood as that of learning the environment (at least for certain evacuees from
Iitate Village). Put differently, measuring radiation and generating data in their own way
for seikatsu saiken involves more opportunities to learn about dosimeter, measurement
methods and their environment as well when compared to using data taken by others.
Moreover, Kuroda assumes that evacuees from Iitate view measurement data critically in
general partly because they have bad memories of System for Protection of
Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI), indicating that the idea of “my
data” or “our data” is more important and meaningful for them. As for the issue of
display of their data taken for seikatsu saiken, Kuroda notes:
I don’t think that [evacuees from Iitate] feel the need to transmit information [on
radiation] to anyone outside [their community] because it’s the information about
the place they’ll return to. They need such information just for themselves. There
is no reason for them to transmit information outside [their community].
More importantly, Kuroda points out from his experience that most evacuees from Iitate
Village do not use the Internet. Specifically, he emphasizes that information on the
Internet could be viewed by “the Internet generation” alone, including “those aged from
teen to the late 30s,” noting that, “information on the Internet does not reach those in 40s
and above.” Indeed, a web news service IT media (2013) reported that whereas Iitate
98

Village distributed 2300 touch-screen tablets to its evacuees such that they could
communicate with other evacuees in different places, elderly people struggled to use
them. He points out three media outlets as the most accessed media among villagers from
his experience as Health Promotion Advisor: television, newspapers, and kōhōshi, or
public information magazines for evacuees from the Village. Kuroda particularly
emphasize the role of kōhōshi in sharing information about radiation among evacuees
from Iitate. Indeed, in a survey conducted by Iitate Village in 2012 when asked about the
best way for studying the issue of radiation, 44.1% of evacuees from Iitate referred to
reading kōhōshi, fliers or newspapers (Iitatemura, 2012). As indicated in Chapter 2,
Kuroda further notes that evacuees from Iitate read the Fukushima Mimpō and the
Fukushima Minyū, and the Kahoku Shimpō rather than Tokyo-based major newspapers
such as the Asahi because from his perspective, local newspapers provide more useful
information for their everyday life. Most evacuees from Iitate may not receive
information on the Internet provided by Safecast, Kodomira and Hakatte Geiger for the
reasons described above.
Kuroda’s grounded account suggests that even if Safecast, Kodomira, and Hakatte
Geiger display their data through the Internet, evacuees from Iitate may not necessarily
receive that data. Furthermore, he indicates that measurement readings provided by the
Tokyo-based networks are not useful for seikatsu saiken in Iitate Village. Evacuees from
Iitate have already participated in measuring radiation for seikatsu saiken in their own
way, which marginalizes other kinds of data taken by non-residents.
In contrast, Shinagawa indicates Tokyo-based grassroots measuring networks and
their data could be more or less useful for Koriyama City. When asked about his general
99

view of citizens’ measurements, Shinagawa notes that he is more than welcoming to
measurement readings from citizens if these readings are taken properly. Specifically,
Shinagawa states that he views both the characteristics of dosimeters and the issue of
calibration as a kind of criteria for defining the meaning of citizens’ data in relation to
Koriyama city’s measurement data. Further, Shinagawa adds:
So, it is great [for citizens] to publish the results of their measurements, but [they
may want to] explain [about their measurements] by addressing Five Ws and One
H questions…We’d appreciate it if they provided us with information about what
kind of dosimeter they used, whether their dosimeters were calibrated, and when
and where their measurement readings were taken. Then, we can engage in
decontamination [with citizens] together and calculate annual exposure. That’s
our basic stance.
Following the way in which the Japanese government views measurement data,
Shinagawa apparently views citizens’ radiation data as a mass of individual datum,
seeing technical issues---the characteristic of dosimeters and the issue of calibration---as
being fundamental for constructing useful data for the security of Koriyama City. Yet,
this does not necessarily mean that he ignores measurement data taken by using a non-
calibrated decimeter. For instance, Shinagawa views Safecast’s data as a “reference for
remeasuring radiation”; based on Safecast’s data, Koriyama city officials could measure
radiation in their own way. As such, Shinagawa is flexible to use a wide variety of
citizen’s measurements. Likewise Munemitsu Kikuchi, Deputy Manager of the Public
Health Center at the Health and Welfare Department of Koriyama City, notes that he
checked Safecast’s dosimeter in relation to Koriyama City’s, suggesting that it wouldn't
100

make any sense if one compares Safecast’s dosimeters with Koriyama City ones because
Safecast’s measurement device was not designed to generate the absolute value of
measurement readings.
Koriyama City officials’ accounts indicate that they are generally open to
grassroots measuring networks and their data. Just as the Japanese government, however,
the officials’ view of citizens’ measurement data as a mass of individual datum with
particular focus on technical issues such as the characteristics of measurement,
measurement methods, and calibration. Indeed, Koriyama City has lending services of
calibrated scintillation survey meters to its residents and organizations in the city
(Koriyamashi, 2014b). Given that these calibrated devices are expensive for some people,
Koriyama City designed a system that allows a wide variety of its residents to contribute
to the security of the city.
Finally, Omura describes grassroots measuring networks and their data production
in relation to the government’s decontamination policy in Fukushima. According to his
accounts, the basic principle of the government’s decontamination policy is that the
government is supposed to decontaminate “massive areas…promptly and fairly.” By
“fairly,” he means that the government takes into consideration everyone in a fair manner.
He states that he tried to take advantage of citizens’ measurement data in Fukushima, but
he could not use them in accordance with the principle of the government’s
decontamination policy:
I knew that various people measured radiation, and they actually measured
radiation carefully and finely. I was thinking how I could take advantage of [their
data]. For instance, when I went to field, I met many farmers who worked very
101

hard to find a way [to decontaminate fields] or those who got dosimeters or
simplified dosimeters and measured [radiation] finely for themselves in
collaboration with the University of Tokyo, telling us about how to decontaminate
[fields effectively]. I really wanted to use [their data] because I believe that it was
the data from those who were desperate to solve their own problem, and those
who wanted to devote a great deal of time and care [decontaminating
fields]...Despite that I had such feelings, however, there was discrepancy between
[citizens’ heterogeneous measurement methods] and [our principle of]
decontaminating massive areas promptly. That is, if we really do it [very
carefully], we’ll require more human hands because [we need] to visit each area
to confirm whether their dosimeters work well…What we did in order to
[decontaminate] massive areas promptly was rather to standardize a
[measurement] method and find a contractor. Then with a more or less expensive
calibrated dosimeter, we, as a team took an approach to [decontaminate] many
areas promptly.
As such, Omura did not use citizens’ measurement data in accordance with what he
describes as the principle of the government’s decontamination policy. As noted, the
guidelines for decontamination actually indicate that standardized dosimeters and
measurement methods are required for decontamination. When asked about a
standardized dosimeter however, Omura emphasizes that it’s a misunderstanding to
assume that Hitachi Aloka’s dosimeters are the government’s official dosimeters. He
states that perhaps because Hitachi Aloka’s dosimeters were taken as an example of
102

calibrated dosimeters on MOE’s Issues Related to Decontamination Guidelines
(Kankyōshō, 2013), many people assume this is the Government’s official dosimeter.
Further, Omura states that it is natural for concerned citizens to measure radiation,
but he adds that interpretations of radiation are significant. Pointing that the Japanese
government standard is based on the ICRP’s radiation protection standard, he shares his
view of citizens’ interpretations of radiation as follows.
Hot spots make [people] sick, and it’s natural for them to learn them and avoid
them. That’s natural. Also, it’s very important to know high [radiation] levels at
rainwater guttering inside the property. That’s natural. On other hand, the long-
term goal of decontamination is to lower [radiation levels] to 1 mili Sievert per
year. That is, if one assumes air dose rates under certain conditions, [1 mili
Sievert] would be 0.23 micro Sievert per hour. Then, there are some people who
compare [their radiation measurement readings] with that [level], saying, that
“Wow, this is a hot spot. [My measurement readings] are more than 0.23 micro
Sievert [per hour]!” That [interpretation] is not good. This is misleading…In short,
people are walking on many places in a day. There are places with higher and
lower radiation levels, and [what matters] is how much [people] are exposed [to
radiation] in total and how many dose rates they are exposed to in a year.
As such, Omura defines meaning of radiation in accordance with the ICRP’s radiation
protection standard model, emphasizing the need to see radiation in everyday life rather
than at a specific spot. While Omura doesn’t deny the concept of hot spots, he defines a
proper interpretation of radiation. More importantly, he defines what everyday life looks
like for citizens in post-Fukushima Japanese society by doing so.
103

Normalizing what everyday life looks like for citizens in post-Fukushima
Japanese society defines useful measurement methods for society in relation to post-
Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure. For instance, one booklet “How do we
measure radiation” published by MOE (Kankyōshō, 2012) summarizes six points of
measuring radiation in Fukushima. Following MOE’s guidelines, the first point reads:
“Measure [radiation] at a representative place in the living environment: In order to
measure the average air dose rate in a living space, you should avoid [measuring
radiation] under rainwater guttering, side ditch, dent, [a spot] near a building, or under or
near a tree” (p.8). As such, the booklet normalizes measurement methods, constructing
the category of useful data for society. As illustrated in Chapter 5, this view is more or
less in opposition to Kodomira’s view of everyday life in post-Fukushima Japanese
society.
As for the role of the Internet in generating information about radiation including
what the government views as proper interpretation of radiation, Omura insists that all he
could do by using the Internet was to provide accurate information to people, adding that
he could not do anything about what citizens claim when publishing their own
information. He notes if he had engaged in talking with a specific citizen, some people
may have seen his engagement as the “suppression of free speech.” His account suggests
that whereas the Internet allows both the government and citizens to publish information
about radiation, it does not necessarily create a communication space between
government officials and citizens.
Finally, Omura emphasizes that the government does not conceal its measurement
data, noting that it cannot make its data open to the public due to the issue of privacy.
104

The government doesn't conceal [measurement data]. We provided all
measurement data to those [whose property is] decontaminated…but we don't
make them public; otherwise, they’ll be bothered. After leveling [decontaminated
lands], averaging [radiation levels] with [each] mesh, putting [data] onto map, we
then make [the resulting data] open. But we don't publish [radiation levels] at the
entrance of your house to others. That’s because the issue is related to real-estate
value and fūhyō higai, or “baseless rumors,” among others. Since we’re told not to
do that, we don't [make data open to the public]. [Measurement data] for whom?
Its’ misleading [to assume] that the government does not make [data] open to
everyone. We certainly show measurement data to certain people, but we don't
publish [radiation levels] at a neighbor’s house.
Omura maintains that the government is not supposed to infringe on people’s privacy by
making all measurements public. The underlying assumption Omura has is that
measurement data was taken for the sake of those whose lands are decontaminated, even
if all taxpayers contribute to decontamination practice. While there is no data to validate
Omura’s claims, a survey taken by the Fukushima Association of Real Estate Appraisers
from the beginning of May to the beginning of June 2012 indicates that it’s a sensitive
issue to publish interior property measurement data in Fukushima. According to the
survey, 87% of real estate appraisers in the Fukushima Prefecture believe that their
customers were worried about radiation (Shadan hōjin Fukushima fudōsan kanteishi
kyōkai, 2012). In particular, 25% of the real estate appraisers in Fukushima reported that
more than 25% of real estate value dropped due to radiation.
105

Government officials’ accounts indicate that their views of grassroots’ measuring
networks are far from monolithic. Kuroda indicates that Tokyo-based networks and their
data may not be useful for evacuees from Iitate. Shinagawa is more flexible and sees non-
calibrated measurement data as a reference for remeasuring radiation. Omura notes that
he found it difficult to take advantage of essentially heterogeneous citizens’ measurement
data in accordance with the government’s decontamination policy. Omura further
indicates that even if citizens publish their measurement data by using the Internet, it’s
difficult for government officials to refer to specific citizens’ data.
The Japanese Dosimeter Manufacturers
Finally, this section illustrates Japanese dosimeter manufactures’ views of
grassroots measuring networks. Just as dosimetrists, Japanese dosimeter manufactures
view the characteristics of dosimeters, measurement methods, and the state of calibration
as key focal points for assessing and ultimately defining grassroots measuring networks
and their data. All of my five male research participants from Japanese dosimeter
manufactures participated in my research on the condition of anonymity. My research
participants V and W at Company A note that they have never checked citizens’
measurements whereas X and Y at Company B indicate that only X has checked citizens’
measurements. Sales Person Y, staying in the Fukushima Prefecture, notes that he rarely
looked at citizens’ measurements. Z at Company C noted that he knows Safecast,
Kodomira, and Hakatte Geiger. I conducted multi-person interviews at Companies A and
B and a one-on-one interview at Company C.
At Company A, Engineers V and W both note that they never viewed citizens’
measurements precisely because they are apparently unreliable. When asked if there is a
106

way for citizens to produce reliable measurement data from their perspectives, V points
out three factors: the validity of dosimetry, the issue of calibration, and proper
measurement method. He further notes that, “(T)here are various conditions [when
measuring radiation in air]. Therefore, you’ll look at data in a wrong way if you focus
[exclusively] on looking at the value of [measurement readings] without taking into
consideration such various conditions.” As such, Engineer V indicates that citizens’ data
are unreliable from his perspective because citizens publish measurement readings alone,
making other important conditions invisible to the public. However, V sees some merits
of citizens’ measurement data from the perspectives of Company A on the grounds that
their data can be seen as a resource for marketing:
As for citizens’ information, what’s helpful for dosimetry manufacturers or
dosimetrists is the information about what citizens are worried about in everyday
life or what kinds of things they need, rather than information about the resulting
value of their measurements…What’s more or less useless [for us] is information
that citizens [collect] by going to different places and measuring [radiation]. But,
when they measure [radiation], they may [say] that, “I get bothered by the rain, so
I want these things,” or that, “Since there’s difference in temperature between
summer and winter, I want a thing that can deal with [the difference]”---Perhaps,
these opinions are useful, I assume… And, [these opinions] will allow [us] to see
the marketability [of our dosimeters]. In a word, [these opinions] allow us to see
how many [dosimeters] are needed in Fukushima, whether such demands will be
stronger continuing on or just temporarily in the future. Such [citizens’
information] is important for us to see [our] customers’ needs.
107

As such, V sees citizens measuring radiation as potential consumer data and does not find
citizen’s measurement readings per se particularly useful from his perspective. Similarly,
Engineer W does not see citizens’ measurement data helpful saying that, “From the
perspective of residents, no one basically wants to check citizens’ measurement
readings...the best thing is that if they see [radiation] air dose rates lower than a certain
level in their sphere of action, [their measurements] are no longer needed.” Thus, neither
V nor W see citizens’ measurement readings per se particularly useful in 2014.
Similarly, X at Company B emphasizes that it’s “unexpectedly difficult” to
measure radiation. X has been working as an engineer at Company B. With a sales person
Y, X participated in my interview, sharing his view of citizen’s measurement. Engineer X
notes that he has looked at Safecast and Hakatte Geiger among others, and states that he
sometimes checks citizens’ measurements, adding that, “There’s nothing to say about
[their] data.” Like V at Company A, he emphasizes that dosimeters should be calibrated
regularly and once a year in particular. Pointing to Geiger counter, X maintains that it is
particularly necessary for Geiger counters to be calibrated regularly; Otherwise, it’s likely
that its readings would be inaccurate. X states that even if they use a single dosimeter and
keep measuring radiation by using the same dosimeter, citizens cannot get a general
impression of where radiation levels are roughly higher or lower without having the
dosimeter calibrated regularly.
When asked about what kind of information citizens may need to show along with
their measurement readings from their perspectives, X and Y point out the following
comprehensive lists for judging measurement data quality: the calibration, the duration of
data collection, the assignment of a dosimeter’s readings in comparison with certified
108

value, the measurement method, the characteristics of the dosimeter, the model number
of the dosimeter, the name of its manufacturer, and the country of manufacture. In
particular, X indicates that it is important to take time when measuring radiation air dose
rates in areas with low radiation levels such as Tokyo. As for the country of manufacture,
X explains that some specific country uses Cobalt 60 for calibrating dosimeters while
Japan generally use Cesium 137. The result is that measurement readings could vary
according to the country of manufacturer. As such, X and Y view citizens’ measurement
data as more or less a mass of individual datum, suggesting that in order to produce a
better individual datum, citizens may need to show a wide variety of information about
the characteristics of their dosimeters, the states of calibration, and measurement methods.
Z at Company C has been working as a sales person at the company for thirty-five
years. He regrettably notes that too many measurement instruments under the feigned
name of “survey meter” have been coming on the market since the disaster. Z
differentiates survey meters from monitors, and emphasizes that all measurement
readings taken by using the latter should be referred as “reference values” rather than
absolute values. He points out that Safecast and Hakatte Gieger measurement instruments
are monitors. He also asserts that while survey meters are calibrated once a year,
monitors are not calibrated in the same way thereby arguing that “citizens should not
publish their measurement data in a quantitative way [by using a monitor]. They should
[publish them] as reference values.” Z emphasizes that monitors are measurement
instruments indicating where radiation levels are higher or lower, and do not provide
exact measurement readings. He has never checked measurement readings taken by
monitors, asserting that “[these measurement data taken by using monitors] are
109

completely ignored by the government.” However, he adds that measurement data taken
by using monitors may be helpful when used for the purpose of screening radiation.
Furthermore, he criticizes Safecast in terms of the characteristics of its dosimeters and its
measurement methods (this will be discussed in the next chapter)
Thus, dosimeter manufacturers at the three different companies unanimously
agree that the characteristics of dosimeters used, measurement methods, and the states of
calibration are important factors responsible for assessing grassroots measuring networks
and their data. In particular, calibration is a powerful rhetorical tool for subjugating
certain citizens’ measurement readings as quantitatively useless. Unless citizens’
dosimeters are calibrated, other issues such as citizens’ concerns or motivations are
largely marginalized if not completely ignored.
Their emphasis on the characteristics of dosimeters, measurement methods, and
the states of calibration indicates that they tend to view measurement data as a mass of
individual datum. Although some manufacturers indicate that the quantity of data is also
important, their basic assumption is unless you generate a good datum by following the
guidelines, you won’t create good data. As will be illustrated in the next chapter, this
view is more or less opposite to Safecast’s view of data.
In terms of citizens’ display of measurement data, dosimeter manufacturers
indicate that they are not open enough. From the perspectives of manufacturers, citizens
should be more open about information from the backstage of their data production
practice: the issue of calibration, the characteristic of their dosimeters and their
measurement methods. As noted, it’s rather expensive for most citizens to have their
dosimeters calibrated every single year, and it may be viewed that dosimeter
110

manufacturers use the issue of calibration for profit. That said, the companies’ accounts
indicate the issue of calibration is a fundamentally important issue when generating a
datum and data about radiation.
Conclusion: Japanese Society was defended in 2014?
From 1975 to 1976, Foucault (2003) held a series of lectures titled “Society Must
be Defended.” In the lecture series, he discussed the concept of subjugated knowledge at
the beginning, later describing what he calls a social war that “defends society against
threats born of and in its own society” (p.216). Around 40 years after his lectures,
grassroots measuring networks took their dosimeters and generated radiation data
quantitatively independent of measurement readings by the government, which could be
seen to exemplify a social war in the 21
st
century in Japan.
This chapter suggests that this is not apparently the case at least from the
perspectives of experts in 2014. Whereas citizens have generated data on air dose rates
quantitatively just as the government has, this chapter indicates that within post-
Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure, good measurement data should be
understood as a mass of individual good datum. In order to create individual good datum,
it is necessary to follow the government guidelines by MEXT and JAEA, which helps
marginalize certain dosimeter users from the category of authorized measurers. For
instance, manufacturers and some dosimeterists see the characteristics of dosimeters,
measurement methods, and the state of calibration as methodological stases to validate
their views of certain citizens’ measurement data and indicate that citizens should be
more open about the background of their data production practice.
111

Whereas there was an alternative space for citizens to engage in data production
practice effectively immediately after the disaster, some experts agree that such a space
has been decreasing given the increase in knowledge about air dose rates and the
decreased radiation levels. While some experts view citizens’ measurement data as more
or less useful in 2014, no experts assume that citizens’ data should be seen as
scientifically accurate data. The question, then is why citizens still keep measuring
radiation air dose rates in 2014? The following chapters address this question.

112

Chapter 4: Safecast
This chapter investigates how Safecast as a global network generated
measurement data on radiation in the air in relation to post-Fukushima Japanese
measurement infrastructure described in the previous chapter, and how and why Safecast
volunteers engaged in measuring radiation in the air in 2014. Safecast considers itself a
“global sensor network for collecting and sharing radiation measurements to empower
people with data about their environments.” (Safecast, n.d.-a) In 2011, Safecast allowed
users of its specific Geiger counters to submit geo-tagged measurement readings to
Safecast’s website via its Application Programming Interface (API), and achieved
remarkable success in terms of data collection. On December 23, 2014 for example,
Safecast proudly announced that it had collected 25 million radiation data points in Japan
and elsewhere (Azby, 2014c).
Perhaps because Safecast collected data so effectively, a wide variety of
researchers and critics in Japan and beyond have referred to Safecast as a case study for
citizen science (Abe, 2014; Aldrich, 2012; Hemmi & Graham, 2013; Kelly, 2014;
Murillo, 2013; Murphy, 2014; Platin, 2014; Zuckerman, 2014). For instance, Murillo
(2013), a sociocultural anthropologist, examined Safecast as a case of open hardware
platforms through ethnographic techniques at the Tokyo Hacker Space in 2012 and
portrayed Safecast as an alternative form of techno-scientific expertise. Moreover,
Hemmi and Graham (2013) conduct a comparative analysis of Safecast and KURAMA,
portraying Safecast as a case of “hacker science” in contrast to KURAMA as a case of
closed science. They note that, “The contrast between KURAMA and Safecast is not
113

between ‘real’ science and an anti-science insurgency, but rather is a contrast between
two very different models of how to do science.” (pp.10-11)
If we take these claims of Safecast as a case of citizen science seriously, an in-
depth analysis of Safecast’s individual volunteers could do much to illustrate the
characteristics of its data production practice. Indeed, Safecast is an essentially
heterogeneous network. A wide variety of volunteers have participated in the measuring
project in different ways. Nevertheless, much scholarship on Safecast has focused
primarily, if not exclusively, on investigating the views and voices of Safecast’s
Anglophone volunteers as the object of analysis. Investigating the views of other
volunteers, such as Japanese-speaking volunteers and those who are involved in the
Fukushima Prefecture in particular, could further contribute to a better understanding of
Safecast’s data production practices. Rather than viewing Safecast as one single
assembled and monolithic group, this chapter seeks to deconstruct Safecast by examining
volunteers’ heterogeneous data production and management practices.
This chapter also examines how experts discussed in Chapter 3 view Safecast’s
data collection practices. Partly because Safecast is known for its huge amount of
radiation data, some of experts in radiation measurements from Chapter 3 specifically
spoke about Safecast critically. Including their “institutionalized” views of Safecast as an
object of analysis further contributes to our understanding of Safecast as a case study for
citizen science in post-Fukushima Japanese society precisely because investigating their
views of Safecast illuminates the unique approach Safecast takes in measuring radiation.
This is the first detailed empirical research on various Safecast volunteers’ views
of Safecast and data production practices during the 2014 calendar year. This research
114

was conducted in Tokyo and the Fukushima Prefecture from July to December 2014.
23

Just as noted in the Introduction, Safecast, like many other grassroots measuring
networks, has been evolving as an organic network since the disaster and so it is
important to note that the findings of this chapter should be seen as a snapshot of what
Safecast looked like in 2014.
24
The questions then are how Safecast’s individual
volunteers viewed Safecast and its data production practices in 2014 when radiation
levels in the air had relatively decreased and how critical experts viewed the changing
role of Safecast in shaping post-Fukushima Japanese society.
25

Before analyzing Safecast volunteers’ views of Safecast and its data production
practices, it’s useful to refer to two different conceptual frameworks for this chapter:
hybrid forums and knowledge infrastructure. As noted in the Introduction chapter, Callon
and others (2011) created the conceptual framework of hybrid forum as a way to explore
possibilities of enhancing democracy in relation to science and technology under the
condition of what they referred to as “radical uncertainties” in which the consequences of
danger are unidentifiable and potentially unlimited. Callon et al describe the conceptual
framework of hybrid forums as follows:

23
Safecast added detailed explanations about the issue of calibration on its website in
February 2015. Since the state of calibration is one of the key issues for this research, I
also analyzed them too.
24
Safecast has evolved very quickly. For instance, Safecast is also developing air-quality
monitoring systems in 2015. Whereas research on Safecast’s different projects, including
air-quality monitoring systems, illustrates Safecast’s various data production practices,
the scope of this research is more modest: This dissertation focuses on investigating how
Safecast generated data on radiation in the air.
25
While this chapter focuses exclusively on examining Safecast in relation to its data on
radiation in the air, it should be noted that Safecast was also involved in various projects.
For instance, one of the most recent was a seaweed project to collect seaweed in the
Ibaraki and Fukushima Prefectures to test radioactivity in the seaweed (Wilder, 2014).
115

[Hybrid forums are] forums because they are open spaces where groups can come
together to discuss technical options involving the collective, hybrid because the
groups involved and the spokespersons claiming to represent them are
heterogeneous, including experts, politicians, technicians, and laypersons who
consider themselves involved. They are also hybrid because the questions and
problems taken up are addressed at different levels in a variety of domains, from
ethics to economic and including physiology, nuclear physics, and
electromagnetism (p. 18)
As will be vividly illustrated, Safecast is a similarly open and hybrid space where a wide
variety of people with different language skills and expertise come together to deal with
what Callon and others describe as radical uncertainties by producing radiation data from
different perspectives. As such, Safecast is open to a wide variety of people beyond
Japanese speakers, intensifying lay-expert collaboration in a global context. This chapter
applies this conceptual framework to analyze how Safecast engaged in data production
practice in 2014.
The other conceptual framework for this chapter is knowledge infrastructure
described as “robust networks of people, artifacts, and institutions that generate, share,
and maintain specific knowledge about the human and natural worlds” (Edwards, 2010
p.17). As described in the Chapter 3, post-Japanese measurement infrastructure is a
knowledge infrastructure in which certain data are defined as useful for knowledge on
radiation in the air within nuclear radiation knowledge infrastructures. While Safecast
generates huge amounts of radiation data, the question is whether Safecast contributed to
generating an alternative knowledge infrastructure by collecting radiation data in Japan
116

and around the world in 2014? If so, what are the distinct characteristics of knowledge
infrastructure by Safecast? This chapter applies this conceptual framework to address
these questions.
In order to analyze Safecast’s data production practices, it is necessary to survey
Safecast’s history and to highlight the fact that Safecast standardized its dosimeter as the
Geiger counter immediately after the disaster. Choosing the Geiger counter as their
official dosimeter to measure radiation in the air is one of the fundamental factors
responsible for characterizing Safecast’s database as knowledge infrastructure given that
the Japanese state’s guideline suggested that calibrated and energy-compensated
scintillation survey meters were an appropriate dosimeter to measure radiation air dose
rates. The question then is why Safecast chose a Geiger counter over a scintillator survey
meter and what the implications of choosing a Geiger counter were for its data production
practices in general. In order to examine the degree to which Safecast’s views of data and
its data production practices are unique, this chapter further briefly describes how experts
viewed Safecast’s data production practices critically. It also illustrates how Safecast
volunteers were engaged in Safecast and viewed the data production practices in
everyday life in the Fukushima Prefecture. Finally, this chapter investigates how Safecast
volunteers see the future of Safecast.
Method
Based on and extending the previous research, I conducted in-depth one-on-one
interviews with thirteen Safecast volunteers, and among them four volunteers were
engaged in Safecast in the Fukushima Prefecture. I conducted one-on-one interviews
because I believed that this was the best method to collect data on Safecast’s individual
117

volunteers’ heterogeneous and potentially conflicting views of Safecast and its data
production practices. However I also conducted semi-group interviews as there were
occasions when some Safecast volunteers joined my one-on-one interviews with another
volunteer at Safecast’s office. Interviews were mostly conducted at the Safecast office in
Tokyo. When my research participants suggested different interview sites in both Tokyo
and Fukushima, I visited sites designated by them to conduct my interviews as Elwood
and Martin (2000) rightly point out, “Participants who are given a choice about where
they will be interviewed may feel more empowered in their interaction with the
researcher” (p.656).
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, I followed the research procedure approved
by IRB. For the sampling method, I applied snowball sampling in order to build a rapport
with research participants. Most of the Safecast volunteers I contacted by using the
snowball sampling technique agreed to participate in my research. Moreover, all of my
research participants agreed to be identified by name except for one volunteer. The
questions changed dependent upon a person’s particular role in the network. Each
interview was planned for one and half hours, but some research participants spent
upwards of four hours in total sharing their views of Safecast and its radiation data
production practices with me.
I also included two critical experts’ views of Safecast as an object of analysis for
this chapter. One expert agreed to be identified by name and the other participated in my
research under the condition of anonymity. I collected and saved online and offline
materials about Safecast. My analysis is thus based on my interview data and documents
on Safecast.
118

Safecast as a Pulling Network
In what follows, Safecast’s own history will be briefly discussed as Safecast (n.d.-
b) provides and regularly updates a self-reported history on its weblog. Drawing on
Safecast’s weblog, other print and online media on Safecast, and my interview data this
section provides a backdrop for the rest of this chapter.
From the beginning, Safecast emerged with one question: what do radiation levels
look like in Japan? Sean Bonner, Joichi Ito, and Pieter Franken, the Safecast co-founders,
were not in the same physical location when the triple disaster took place and according
to Bonner, Bonner and Franken had not yet met at that time (though they did have mutual
friends). Nonetheless they all felt the pressing need to solve the same problem in a
practical manner in order to ensure the safety of their friends and loved ones in Japan.
Described as “a well-known web publisher and cultural curator as well as an inveterate
Internet troublemaker,” (Hagel, Brown & Davison, 2010, p.63) Bonner, a co-founder of
Safecast, noted that “(W)e started solving the problem before we realized that we were
creating an organization.” Based in Los Angeles, he had various work experiences in
different fields such as the music and coffee industries. Because of this, he explained that
he had an extensive network both in the United States and abroad.
Only a week after the nuclear accident Uncorked Studios, a Portland-based
company, created a project called RDTN.org as a way to deal with radiation. From the
beginning, RDTN.org was a participatory online project that encouraged people to submit
their own readings and share them with other people from around the globe. As early as
March 19, 2011, Bonner (2011) said of RDTN.org in Boing Boing:
119

The site [RDTN.org] allows people to submit their own reads, and maps them out
next to data from official sources and measurement dates. This way, anyone can
quickly get an idea of what is happening on the ground, first-hand. The site is
brand new but should be very useful going forward.
As RDTN.org was originally designed to let people “quickly get an idea of what is
happening on the ground, first-hand,” the website attracted many people including
Bonner, Franken, and Ito. RDTN.org and other projects ultimately merged into a wholly
new project: Safecast.
Based in Tokyo, Franken was concerned about the health of his family
immediately after the disaster. He purchased a Ukrainian-made Geiger counter on the
Internet but learned that it would take too much time to receive it. Having studied
electrical engineering, he happened to have some engineering equipment at home. After
studying how to make a Geiger counter, he decided that he would build his own Geiger
counter. He went to Akihabara, a shopping district known for home electrics and otaku
culture
26
, and found “small Geiger tubes” at a shop there. Ultimately, he built his own
Geiger counter, which he named “iGeigie” because he wanted it to function with an
iPhone. While his iGeigie did measure radiation, he requested International Medcom Inc.,
an American dosimeter manufacturer, to send him a Geiger counter. Franken dealt with
“radical uncertainties” building a Geiger counter by himself, indicating that he saw the
Geiger counter as a resource for ensuring the health of his family at this stage.

26
The definition of otaku varies. Among different conceptualizations of otaku, Azuma
(2009), a leading scholar of otaku culture, refers to otaku as “those who indulge in forms
of subculture strongly linked to anime, video games, computers, science fiction, special-
effects films, anime figurines, and so on.” (p. 3)
120

After an introduction through Ito, Franken developed a rapport with Bonner, who
then introduced him to Tokyo Hacker Space. Launched in 2009, Tokyo Hacker Space
describes itself as a “collective made up of programmers, engineers, IT administrators,
artists, chefs, musicians, and people interested in geek culture” (Tokyo Hacker Space,
n.d.-a). Immediately after the disaster, Tokyo Hacker Space (n.d.-b) issued an
announcement titled “Japan in Crisis” and showcased a plan for making community
sensors:
We also have on the way several Geiger counters and Geiger tubes, from which
we will be making community sensors, in order to help to keep the public in
harms way informed on a minute-by-minute and hour by hour basis. While the
initial exposure has been low, our concern is the long-term effects, food and water
supply, and ground soil conditions over the next several months.
Tokyo Hacker Space was independently finding a way to close the gap on the lack of
information on radiation available. More importantly, Tokyo Hacker Space also saw the
Geiger counters as a resource for solving these issues just as Franken did. Franken found
that a Tokyo Hacker Space member also created a dosimeter that connected to the
Internet. Tokyo Hacker Space provided an area for future Safecast volunteers to get
together until Safecast moved its office to Dogenzaka, Shibuya Ward, Tokyo in June
2012 (Sean, 2012).
In the meantime Joe Moross, a core member of Safecast who identified himself as
a “non-traditionally educated engineer,” sought to share his radiation measurement
readings with wider audience. When he was a child, Moross worked with his father and
his father’s co-workers at a radiation sensor manufacturing company. Given his
121

background, he had parts for a radiation sensor at his house and he assembled them to
build a radiation sensor just as Franken did. Moross then used Twitter to post his readings
manually. He sought to post measurements automatically and so he found the website
that would later become Safecast. Moross describes how Safecast emerged from his
perspective as follows:
By the website that was at that time…it was RDTN.org, OK? But there were a lot
of little websites that kind of combined together. There was one, GeigerCrowd.
There was a couple of different efforts where there’s different people were trying
to do something. And eventually those were brought together and consolidated
and made one effort, OK? So one of the ways I like to describe Safecast is like a
major river, OK? Every major river doesn't start as a giant river. It starts with
small flows, sometimes just one raindrop, which could be one person making a
measurement. And that goes together and becomes a small stream, and it meets a
larger stream. So I was doing something by myself with one sensor and a couple
of people…my son and I, we met, we noticed Pieter and Sean [founders of
Safecast] and them, and we came together with them.
Thus Safecast evolved in an organic way. On April 15, 2011 the New Context
Conference was held at Digital Garage in Tokyo. In hindsight, this conference was a
turning point for Safecast for several reasons.
First, as Franken noted, many future Safecast volunteers gathered there for the
first time. For instance Kyoko Tanaka, a bilingual Japanese journalist, attended the
conference. According to Tanaka, Franken made a remark at the conference that while
he’d like to measure radiation in Fukushima, he didn't have any contacts there. Although
122

Tanaka didn't have any specific contacts in Fukushima at that time, she believed that she
could help him reach people in Fukushima. As a result, she would eventually connect
future Safecast volunteers with people in Fukushima. She played a central role in
organizing Japanese volunteers for Safecast and handling the translation team in
particular. As will be illustrated, the translation team made it possible for Safecast to have
both English and Japanese websites for different audiences.
Second, the volunteers of what would eventually become Safecast defined
Safecast’s measurement methods and selected their dosimeter model. According to
Moross, Ray Ozzie, who ultimately decided on the name Safecast, proposed that a Geiger
counter paired with Global Positioning System (GPS) should be put on a vehicle in order
to collect a great deal of data effectively. As will be illustrated, this is a significant
moment for defining the fundamental characteristics of Safecast’s data production
practices precisely because its measurement method was defined as a car-borne survey
using a Geiger counter specifically. According to Safecast’s self-reported history,
Safecast’s Geigier counter named bGeigie (referring to a Japanese lunch box-shaped
Geiger counter) was designed and developed by engineers, including Franken, at Tokyo
Hacker Space in the week following the conference (Safecast, n.d.-b).
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the idea of a wholly new and larger scoped
project was born at the conference, and RDTN. org and other projects were combined to
the new project. A week later from the conference, the new project was named as
Safecast (Safecast, n.d.-b). Bonner describes the reason why on April 24, 2011
RDTN.org changed its name to Safecast:
123

While we certainly started this thinking about radiation in Japan, it became
obvious that a sensor network logging all kinds of data (weather, wind,
precipitation, etc.) could be very useful both in Japan and other areas of the world.
There’s no question that what is happening in Japan right now is our primary
focus, but we hope the work we are doing there will just be the first steps towards
something larger. We think that Safecast reflects these motivations a little better
(Sean, 2011)
It should be noted that just about one month after the nuclear disaster, the scope of
Safecast was expanded to broader environmental issues in general. Rather than being
constrained by its original problem, which is a lack of information about radiation levels,
Safecast actively changed its scope. Elsewhere, I have noted that Bonner referred to The
Power of Pull: How Small Moves, Smartly Made, Can Set Big Things in Motion as a
founding principle of Safecast (Abe, 2013). Hagel, Brown, and Davison (2010), the
authors of the book, describe the key concept of “pull” as “the ability to draw out people
and resources as needed to address opportunities and challenges” (p. 2). More
importantly, they emphasized the increasingly important role of “pull” in uncertain
conditions:
Pull platforms are emerging as response to growing uncertainty…(T)hey seek to
expand the opportunity for creativity by local participants dealing with immediate
needs. To exploit the opportunities created by uncertainty, pull platforms help
people to come together and innovate in response to unanticipated events,
drawing upon a growing array of highly specialized and distributed resources.
Rather than seeking to constrain the resources available to people, pull platforms
124

strive to continually expand the choices available while at the same time helping
people to find the resources that are most relevant to them. Rather than dictating
the actions that people must take, pull platforms provide people with the tools and
resources (including connections to other people) required for them to take
initiative and creatively address opportunities as they arise. (p. 80)
Safecast’s name indicates that its volunteers exploited “opportunities” created by
radiation in order to solve a bigger problem.
As a pulling network, Safecast further attracted a wide variety of experts, one of
whom is Azby Brown. A scholar of Japanese architecture, Brown has been living in
Japan for more than 30 years and published several books on Japanese architecture
including Just Enough (Brown, 2013). Brown played a central role in finding and
summarizing useful information for Safecast. While he notes that he learned about
radiation by reading and talking to specialists, he successfully cultivated contacts with
Japanese experts including Ryūgo Hayano and Masaharu Tsubokura
27
and spoke with
international institutions such as UNSCEAR and IAEA, and the United States
Department of Energy (DOE) and RAND Corporation. Safecast attracted academic
groups as well, including Keio University’s Scanning the Earth Project. This project was
designed to share information about the environment in collaboration with Safecast.
Franken and Moross coauthored a conference paper about radiation monitoring with Keio
project members (Furutani, Uehara, Franken, Wang, Moross, and Murai, 2012). Franken

27
Dr. Ryūgo Hayano is a Professor of Physics at the University of Tokyo and Dr.
Masaharu Tsubokura is a medical doctor at the Division of Social Communication
System for Advanced Clinical Research at the Institute of Medical Science at the
University of Tokyo (See Chapter 3).
125

noted that the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Media Lab was also later
involved.
While Safecast successfully “pulled” a wide variety of talents, the question
remains what attracted volunteers to Safecast. Many of my research participants pointed
out one specific reason: Safecast is politically neutral. For instance, Jonathan Wilder, a
Safecast volunteer managing inquiries coming through the website, clearly stated that he
was attracted to Safecast because it is apolitical. While Safecast volunteers may have had
their individual opinions on radiation or nuclear energy in general, Safecast shied away
from a political stance. Safecast’s website reads in both English and Japanese:
Safecast is not anti-nuclear, nor pro-nuclear…we are pro-data. Data is apolitical.
Safecast was created because we identified a lack of data and realized we could
help fill that gap. Our goal is simply to provide more information, data where
none previously existed, so that people can make more informed decisions based
on facts rather than the fear and speculation that comes from uninformed rumors.
(Safecast, n.d.-d)
As such, Safecast was not involved in anti-nuclear or pro-nuclear movements, and
thereby identified itself instead as pro-data. Safecast used the concept of pro-data
rhetorically to emphasize that Safecast didn't comment on issues related to nuclear power
because its primary goal was to collect radiation data. Furthermore, Bonner noted that
Safecast remained independent on radiation protection standards such as the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and the European Committee on
Radiation Risk (ECRR) because “it gets into being too political.” Bonner also stated that
Bonner, Franken and Ito defined what’s politically neutral for Safecast. While Safecast
126

used the concept of pro-data as a rhetorical resource, it should be noted that the concept is
also relational. The concept of pro-data doesn't exclude anything related to politics. As
for Safecast’s political stance, Bonner said:
…Our political stance is open data. So we’re not lobbyists, but the requests that
we make to politicians and organizations is to open up their data. That's the drum
that we bang, is like allow access to this data, because everything is better with
more data. So that’s what we’re interested in. We’re not saying go shut down this
plant. We don't care. But maybe somebody else is saying here's the Safecast data,
which confirms our argument you should shut down this plant. Which is fine.
That’s why we put it out there, for people to be able to take it and do that stuff.
And maybe that plant should be shut down. But that's not…(W)e’re not talking
that data to try to shut down that plant. We’re taking [about] that data so people
have valid information and then can make their own decision what to do based on
having accurate information.
Bonner indicates that as a pro-data network, Safecast was vocal about open data. Safecast
published its data under a CC0 (Creative Commons 0) designation, making measurement
data available for anyone to use freely. Perhaps because of this, many of my research
participants at Safecast indicated that there was no specific target audience for Safecast.
For instance, Franken notes:
We don't have a specific target audience. But we do appeal to citizens, because
it’s logical. We don't exclude government, companies and universities at all.
Actually, we closely work together with other organizations as well. And they are
also our audience, because they use our data for their work. So our audience is
127

anybody that wants to use our data or wants to participate in the project and move
forward. So in that sense, we’re not really inclusive or exclusive at all. We
actually don't care. The only area with a boundary is we’re not going to work with
the group in the government that does exactly what we do, because we want to be
independent of that.
As for the role of Safecast’s co-founders, Bonner noted that Franken dealt with
issues related to Japan whereas Bonner coped with matters outside of Japan. He further
pointed to Ito as a “spiritual advisor” for Safecast, indicating that Ito gives useful advice
to Safecast members when needed. Bonner was also responsible for designing Safecast’s
website and dealing with Safecast’s English-language Twitter account. Brown was
responsible for connecting Safecast with other grassroots measuring networks, including
Kodomira. Particularly noteworthy is Safecast’s translation team led by Tanaka. Most
Safecast volunteers in Tokyo were English speakers and wrote in Safecast’s weblog in
English. The translation team translated the English weblog to make it accessible to
Japanese readers. Student volunteer A, who joined Safecast in May 2014 because he
“wanted to study English,” states that Safecast’s translation team consisted of around 10
Japanese people. They had a closed Facebook page in which Tanaka occasionally shared
material in English to check if volunteers were interested in translating the piece to
Japanese. Student Volunteer A noted that the team used the Google Translation Toolkit to
collaboratively translate materials into Japanese. As an editor in chief, Tanaka generally
made final revisions of the translations.
Technically, Safecast is a part of the Momoko Ito Foundation within which
Bonner has assumed the Chief Operating Officer (COO) position. The Momoko Ito
128

Foundation served as a contact bridge between Safecast and foundations or other donors
that supported Safecast. Safecast received donations from the Knight Foundation
dedicated to “promote quality journalism, advance media innovation, engage
communities and foster the arts,” (Knight Foundation, n.d.) and more recently, Safecast
received donations from the Shuttleworth Foundation, dedicated to open philosophy
(Shuttleworth Foundation, n.d.). When asked if Safecast had ever received grants from
any Japanese foundations, Bonner noted that Safecast never received funds from them
because issues related to radiation were “too political” in Japan. He added that unlike in
the United States, there is no financial incentive for Japanese companies to donate to non-
profit organizations (NPO) in Japan. Safecast didn't become a non-profit organization in
Japan because there was no specific benefit in becoming one so Safecast received most
grants from outside Japan.
Safecast was rather successful for a grassroots organization at collecting data on
radiation in the air.
28
The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation [UNSCEAR] (2013) refers to Safecast as a case of “datasets provided to the
Committee that were used for the assessment” (p.99) in UNSCEAR 2013 Report. The
report adds that, “The Committee did not review the quality of these data.” (p. 101)
Brown was invited to speak about Safecast at the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and Brown made a presentation about Safecast with the help with Moross in
February 2014 (Azby, 2014a; Brown, 2014). Given that Safecast was a relatively new
network, it is quite remarkable that international organizations such as UNSCEAR and
IAEA acknowledged the role of Safecast in monitoring radiation in the air.

28
In 2015, Safecast is also developing air-quality monitoring systems.
129

It should be noted that Safecast was not without many trials and errors. According
to Moross, Safecast initially tried to monitor foodstuffs, but the project has not yet been
successful. Bonner also noted that Safecast attempted to create bGeigie III for monitoring
air quality that resulted in another failure. Despite these flops, Safecast learned through
engagement in different data production practices. On September 2, 2014 Bonner
announced the Safecast Code on Safecast’s blog (Sean, 2014c); he developed his original
draft with Franken, Moross and Brown, saying “I tried to think of what describes the
actions that we already take.”
The Safecast Code
1. ALWAYS OPEN – We strive to make everything we do transparent, public and
accessible.
2. ALWAYS IMPROVING -We can always do better so use agile, iterative design
to ensure we’re always refining our work.
3. ALWAYS ENCOURAGING – We aim to be welcoming and inclusive, and
push each other to keep trying.
4. ALWAYS PUBLISHING - Results are useless behind closed doors, we try to
put everything we’re doing out to the world regularly.
5. ALWAYS QUESTIONING – We don’t have all the answers, and encourage
continued learning and critical thinking.
6. ALWAYS UNCOMPROMISING – Our commitment to our goals keeps us
moving closer towards them.
130

7. ALWAYS ON – Safecast doesn’t sleep. We’re aware and working somewhere
around the world 24/7
8. ALWAYS CREATING – Our mission doesn’t have a completion date, we can
always do more tomorrow.
9. ALWAYS OBJECTIVE – Politics skews perception, we focus on the data and
the questions it presents.
10. ALWAYS INDEPENDENT - This speaks for itself.
This section provides an overview of Safecast with a focus on its history as a
backdrop to aid in discussion of Safecast’s data production practices. It demonstrates that
Safecast successfully “pulled” a wide variety of people with different expertise and that
Safecast volunteers chose the Geiger counter as Safecast’s official dosimeter immediately
after the disaster. As a self-proclaimed pro-data network, Safecast has successfully
collected a lot of data but the question is how Safecast volunteers view their data
production practices. Given that Japanese experts, such as dosimetrists and dosimeter
manufacturers, view accurate data as a mass of accurate datum, how did Safecast
volunteers generate radiation datum using the Geiger counter? This question is addressed
with particular focus on the dosimeter and measurement methods.
The Birth of Datum
While much scholarship on Safecast investigates how Safecast generated
radiation data, I focus on the process by which Safecast created a single datum on
radiation. Focusing on Safecast’s datum production practice is particularly significant in
relation to post-Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure, in which dosimetrists
131

and other experts tend to view good measurement data as a mass of good measurement
datum.
The previous chapter shows that the Japanese government’s guidance refers to
energy-compensated NaI (TI) scintillator survey meters as the “main survey meter
measuring air dose rates,” (Monbukagakushō & Nihon genshiryoku kenkyū kaihatsu
kikō, 2011, p. 6), noting that the dosimeter should be calibrated “more than once a year.”
(p.6) As noted in the Introduction, Geiger counters are generally used to measure surface
contamination in radiation research laboratories, whereas scintillation survey meters are
designed to measure air dose rates in the environment (Mizuguchi, 2011). From the
perspective of the Japanese government, Safecast’s measurement readings might not be
viewed as trustworthy partly because Safecast used bGeigie as a dosimeter to measure
radiation in the air. How did Safecast produce radiation datum using the Geiger counter?
bGeigie as a “Product of Compromise”
Safecast initially tried to standardize the 2″ pancake sensor produced by LND as
its official sensor in order to ensure its measurement readings were relatively consistent
(Safecast, n.d.-c). In so doing, Safecast sought to make a large volume of data relatively
comparable by maintaining consistency across individual dosimeters such as bGeigie
series. Because Safecast wanted to make its data comparable around the globe, Safecast
defined the general measurement characteristics for Safecast volunteers by standardizing
the 2″ pancake sensor. But it should be emphasized that Safecast never excluded any
dosimeter users from the category of volunteer measurers for Safecast. Indeed, the
Safecast API upload page allows volunteers with any kind of dosimeter to upload their
measurement readings freely. That said, the standardization of the 2″ pancake sensor
132

apparently legitimized specific Safecast measurers, including bGeigie users. Thus
Safecast situated the 2″ pancake sensor as a key component of Safecast’s database on
radiation.
Given that Safecast standardized a sensor to make its measurement readings
comparable, it is important to investigate the reason why Safecast chose the Geiger
counter with the 2″ pancake sensor as its dosimeter measuring radiation in the air as
Geiger counters are generally only used to survey surface contamination and measure
counts rather than dose rates. Franken said that Safecast’s choice of Geiger counters over
scintillation survey meters resulted in part from practical reasoning: they wanted to begin
measuring radiation in Fukushima as soon as possible. Franken:
The bGeigie was focused on practical use, and that really got us focused on how
can (sic) we get this thing to work. Later on, we built new versions that were
much more focused on the device. But in the beginning, it wasn't really the focus.
The focus was how do we get to Fukushima as fast as possible with something
that works and helps us to measure bigger space. So that was kind of how we got
in there. (Emphasis added)
Given that there were few dosimeters available immediately after the disaster, it was a
fair choice to use Geiger counters to measure radiation in the air. Franken further stated
that he wanted a dosimeter that “wasn't too expensive and wasn't too fragile,” leaving
scintillation survey meters out because they are both expensive and “sensitive to
humidity.” Choosing Geiger counters over scintillation survey meters thus helped pull
more citizens to get involved with Safecast. Franken described the process by which
Safecast chose the Geiger counter:
133

…We decided very early on that we didn't want to have a pure gamma only
measurement, we wanted to also see if there was bad activity in the air, which at
that time was something we didn't know of. So we put a beta window on the
bGeigie so that beta radiation could reach the sensor and we could also get
readings of that. I think only the beginning we could see some activity in the air.
Later on that became the same as just not measuring that radiation, but the key
thing was we wanted to not exclude that from the measurement…So, we decided
that we’re going to measure counts per minute, not necessarily micro Sieverts per
hour…we converted to micro Sieverts per hour because that’s what everybody
understands, and we can approximate that.
Franken indicates that Safecast volunteers initially wanted to explore radioactive
materials in the air in general. As noted in the Introduction, scintillation survey meters are
designed to measure gamma rays from specific radioactive materials alone. Perhaps
because of this, Safecast volunteers chose the Geiger counter as their standardized
dosimeter. Given that Geiger counters are designed to measure counts alone, Franken
further suggested that the bGeigie didn’t measure air dose rates: Safecast converted the
unit of counts as counts per minute (CPM) to the units of dose rates (micro Sieverts per
hour). Safecast’s pragmatism and its sense of exploration resulted in its choice of Geiger
counters over scintillation survey meters.
As for the accuracy of bGeigie, Bonner describes the way in which Safecast
volunteers confirmed the accuracy of their dosimeter as follows:
…by having a lot of devices that were all taking the same reading, we understood
that those were accurate readings versus devices that were all over the place. If we
134

had ten devices and eight of them all say the same thing, that’s very reliable
versus anything else. And then later on, when we were able to get a hold of
government readings and other things, they matched up with our readings. And
we were constantly showing what were doing to people to make sure that it was
worth our time. Because if we couldn't collect accurate data, then there was no
point.
Safecast volunteer members conducted an experimental comparison study of different
dosimeters in order to test the accuracy of the bGeigie. Even more importantly, Bonner
notes that they compared Safecast’s readings taken by using the Geiger counter with
“government readings.” According to Bonner’s account, Safecast’s bGeigie was thus an
empirically and experimentally developed dosimeter.
In fact, Safecast’s bGeigie has been updated seven times and the bGeigie Nano is
the most updated version (at the time of writing) whose sensor is still the 2″ Pancake.
According to Tanaka, Franken played a key role in developing the bGeigie Nano. Indeed,
Franken proudly unveiled the bGeigie Nano on March 22, 2013, describing the reason
why Safecast updated its dosimeter as follows:
The biggest limitation Safecast has faced in collecting data is the limited
availability of our workhorse device, the bGeigie. The design works great, but it’s
expensive (each one costs us about $1000) and time consuming (building one can
take an entire week) which results in us having limited numbers of them to keep in
use. We have way more people who want to drive around with bGeigies than we
have bGeigies to be driven around. To solve this issue, we’ve created the bGeigie
Nano, and thusly the bGeigie Nano Kit. (Pieter, 2013)
135

This account suggests that the bGeigie Nano was developed partly because Safecast
wanted to get more people involved in measuring radiation in the air. Safecast did
workshops for building bGeigie Nanos in Aizuwakamatsu City (Fukushima Prefecture),
the Safecast offices (Tokyo), Taipei (Taiwan), Strasbourg (France), Kobe City (Hyogo
Prefecture) and Washington DC (Azby, 2014b; Naozumi, 2013; Rob, 2014; Sean, 2013;
Sean, 2014a; Watanabe, 2013). Bonner noted that building Geiger counters helps
volunteers learn about how they work. As for calibration of a bGeigie Nano, the Safecast
website describes the issue of calibration on February 8, 2015 as follows:
The bGeigie Nano is a solid-state, fully digital device. Because of its design, its
performance is extremely consistent, and unlike devices with analog components
that can be affected by temperature and other effects, further calibration is not
expected to be necessary. bGeigie Nano units have periodically been put through
stringent calibration tests at QualTek in the US, at the Jülich Research Centre in
Germany, and at the IAEA testing laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria. In all cases
the measured accuracy has been shown to be compatible with the SAFECAST
specifications (Accuracy: +/- 10% typical, +/- 15% maximum). Please note that
+/- 10% is currently considered excellent performance for a Geiger counter.
(Emphasis added; Azby, 2015)
Safecast clearly states that in the case of the bGeigie Nano, “further calibration is not
expected to be necessary.” Simultaneously, Safecast carefully describes where bGeigie
Nano has been tested, showing the degree of uncertainties quantitatively. While the
Safecast website officially noted that bGeigie Nano was not expected to be calibrated
regularly, there were varying views on the issue of calibration among Safecast volunteers.
136

For instance, Tanaka notes “it would be better to [calibrate the bGeigie Nano] regularly.”
Furthermore, when asked if bGeigie Nano users could have their dosimeter calibrated,
Franken frankly stated that:
…you actually can’t calibrate it. You can confirm that it meets the curve, but if it
is out of calibration you can adjust for it, but basically the tube is old or
something and you just need to replace it. But it takes years for it to get old.
As such, Franken assumes that the bGeigie Nano needed to be replaced when it was too
old to use because it could simply not be calibrated. While there were different views of
the issue of calibration among Safecast volunteers, it should be noted that Safecast’s
reasoning behind the bGeigie Nano’s calibration is in sharp conflict with what the
Japanese state suggested. The Japanese government has said that dosimeters should be
calibrated more than once a year to maintain measurement quality. From the Japanese
government’s own guidelines, it would be difficult for Safecast volunteers to create an
accurate datum using bGeigie Nanos.
While there were some problems concerning the bGeigie Nano as per the
Japanese government’s guidelines, Tanaka described the bGeigie series as a dakyō no
sanbutsu or “product of compromise.” Notably, Tanaka used the term “compromise”
positively as a way to emphasize the agility of Safecast. She said:
To some extent, [bGeigie] is a product of compromise from the perspective of
[bGeigie developers] …that’s because [Safecast volunteers] took [the bGeigie] to
measure [radiation in Fukushima] even thought its degree of completion was
around 80%. From the perspective of developers, they made a compromise, you
know… From the perspective of those who take [the bGeigie to Fukushima], they
137

take [a dosimeter] with less than 100 % of its completion. That’s a product of
compromise…but, everyone repeats that [process]. There is no 100 percent
satisfaction, but [we are] goal-oriented anyway. Where is our priority? To collect
data! Then, let’s focus on collecting data.
As Tanaka rightly points out, Safecast volunteers had a specific goal from the beginning:
to measure radiation in Fukushima as soon as possible. Rather than assuming a
perfectionist attitude toward developing an ideal dosimeter, they took action to measure
radiation in Fukushima and elsewhere because their goal was to quickly measure
radiation not to create the best dosimeter. Tanaka indicated that the development of the
bGeigie epitomized Safecast as a goal-oriented, pro-data network.
Analyzing Safecast volunteers’ views of the bGeigie indicates that Safecast’s
choice of Geiger counter was based on pragmatism more or less. In order to collect data
in Fukushima as soon as possible, Safecast volunteers found it necessary to use the
Geiger counter to measure radiation immediately after the disaster. In order to make data
comparable, Safecast tried to standardize the 2″ pancake sensor. Perhaps more
importantly, Safecast officially announced that the bGeigie Nano is not likely to be
calibrated regularly. As such, Safecast shaped key factors responsible for creating its
datum.
Measurement Methods
Just as with Safecast’s Geiger counter of choice, Safecast’s measurement method
was based on pragmatic reasoning. Just as Katsumi Shozugawa, Assistant Professor of
University of Tokyo, notes in Chapter 3, Franken insists that, “there is no best way of
measuring radiation. There is only a best way if you define what you want to achieve.”
138

Franken further notes that, “Our goal was to measure all roads so we could get a general
impression of where the fallout went, and roughly what that meant if you were walking
on the road. And that is how we did it.” From Franken’s perspective, Safecast sought to
measure radiation in the air on all roads. Franken explains that Safecast volunteers were
inspired by Google Maps and Google Street View in order to achieve this goal effectively
saying “[Google] drive[s] around. You take pictures, and then you put [them] together,
right? So that was kind of: Yeah, let’s do the same thing, but done for radiation was kind
of the idea.”
The idea of the car-borne survey was nothing new from a historical perspective.
For instance, JAEA, Chernobyl Scientific and Technical Center for International
Research, and others conducted and developed a car-borne survey in the Ukraine after the
Chernobyl nuclear accident, describing their combined measurement method as follows:
A remote sensing unit was assembled using a 2" spherical Nal(Tl) detector fixed
to a rod extended backward from the roof of the Land Rover at 2m height above
the road's surface. A conversion factor was determined to convert the gamma dose
rate measured at this position into that at 1m above ground according to
measurement results on and around the Land Rover. For this purpose, we often
stopped and collected dose rates on the both sides of a road. The block diagram of
this mobile survey unit…consists of an accurate dose rate meter developed at
JAERI, a GPS (Global Positioning System) and a personal computer. The specific
features of this unit are its compact size, resistance to vibration, adaptability for
use on any type of car, and the loaded map data to enable us to navigate in the
Chernobyl area. (Sakamoto et al, 2001, p. 7)
139

It is thus misleading to assume that Safecast invented the car-borne survey. As noted in
the previous chapter, researchers such as Kimiaki Saito engaged in car-borne surveys in
Chernobyl and used the same method after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster with
Kyoto University researchers. That said, it is worth noting that Safecast initiated a
citizen-driven car-borne survey after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.
Safecast doesn't standardize measurement method except for the height of
measurement as 1 meter above the ground. That doesn't mean that Safecast volunteers
undervalued other elements of the measurement method. For instance, Moross
emphasized that the orientation of the sensor matters for measurement readings:
We need to know, we want to know the orientation of the sensor, so that we can
correlate properly and understand what might be affecting the readings, and we
have guidelines for how to position the sensor in terms of height and the location
of things…We want to know the orientation of sensor, because the pancake tube
is much more sensitive to beta from the front face than from any other direction.
So we want to know that, because if it’s in a contaminated area where there’s a lot
of beta emitters, like in anywhere in Japan, then its proximity to the ground and
its orientation will affect the reading.
As such, Safecast’s API uploading page requested bGeigie Nano users to report the
credits (the name of an uploader), cities, sensor heights (in meters) and sensor orientation
(facing left, right, down, front, back, or up) when submitting their measurement readings
to Safecast. Safecast did not request any other information about measurement method.
While the bGeigie Nano was originally designed to hang out of a car window,
Safecast did not exclude or specify any measurement method protocol such as measuring
140

by walking or biking. As a result, Safecast was open to all kinds of dosimeter users as
measurers including those who didn’t drive or bike. As for the standardized height of
measurement, Brown noted that, “We try to be consistent, using the same sensor, the
same pancake sensor type, and the same height of measurements. It’s not absolute but we
want be able to compare.” Moross also explained that Safecast standardized its
measurement height by following “the definition of the Sievert and the ICRP guidelines
and things.” For measurements taken at different heights, such as 50 centimeters above
ground, he added that they were put in another database. As for the consistency of
radiation readings taken using different measurement methods (save the height of
measurement) Safecast’s Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) section reads:
Are radiation readings affected by driving?
• Short answer: No
• Long answer: Under the radiation conditions we normally encounter, the
speed of a moving car (with a Geiger counter attached) does not affect the
readings taken when compared against readings taken in the same area with a
motionless sensor. Safecast has verified this through research collaborations
with Keio, Tokyo, and Nihon Universities.
• One caveat: Safecast’s “bGeigie” system is mounted outside of the car so that
readings are not affected by the car itself. Other groups, including the
Japanese gov’t, have taken mobile readings from inside vehicles, which
provides shielding and blocks out a portion of the radiation. It’s important to
verify how readings are taken. (Safecast, n.d.-d)
141

Safecast reasoned that “when compared against readings taken in the same area with a
motionless sensor,” it was confirmed that Safecast’s readings were not affected by
driving and added that University of Tokyo, Nihon University and Keio University
validated this claim. However, Tanaka pointed out that in order to take a measurement
reading at a specific spot, it is necessary to stay there “for a certain period of time.”
Therefore, she didn’t believe that Safecast’s measurement readings were accurate, adding
that they should be understood as “reference values.” Yet, Franken noted that while
measurement method matters for measurement readings in general, it does not really
matter for practical use. He further added:
But if you travel at the speed of light or the change in radiation field is extreme,
then the speed or the way, it does make a difference. We later saw that if you go
measure in [the] Daiichi [power plant], you need to move much slower or
measure the huge differences that happen over a short distance. But for practical
purposes, for us that wasn’t so important because in cities, those extreme levels
are not seen. So basically we’re fine. (Emphasis added)
Safecast’s various measurement methods were developed empirically and experimentally
in collaboration with Japanese universities. As such, Safecast didn’t standardize any
specific measurement method for Safecast volunteers to use in generating measurement
datum.
This section investigated how Safecast volunteers viewed radiation datum with
particular attention to its dosimeter and measurement methods and demonstrated that
Safecast tried to standardize a sensor to make readings relatively consistent across
different dosimeters. On the other hand, Safecast didn’t standardize measurement
142

methods, including allowing all types of dosimeter users (such as those who didn’t drive
or bike) to be data collectors for Safecast. Japanese dosimetrists and manufactures tend to
view citizens’ data in relation to the characteristics of the dosimeter, the measurement
methods, and the state of calibration but Safecast’s datum collection was based on
pragmatism rather than methodological purism.
From Datum to Data: Data Management
This section discusses Safecast views of data in relation to its views of datum.
Safecast’s view of data is intriguing for many reasons, and this section contends that
these views had a fundamental impact on the elements of Safecast’s data production
practice. Indeed, Safecast viewed radiation data differently than how experts described in
Chapter 3. From Safecast’s website:
Safecast supports the idea that more data—freely available data—is better. Our
goal is not to single out any individual source of data as untrustworthy, but rather
to contribute to the existing measurement data and make it more robust. Multiple
sources of data are always better and more accurate when aggregated. (Safecast,
n.d.-a)
As such, Safecast focused on obtaining a wide variety of people to be involved in order to
make data more robust, more specifically statistically accurate. Its views of data were
based on what Surowiecki (2004) conceptualized as the wisdom of crowds. Surowiecki
argues that, “under the right circumstances, groups are remarkably intelligent, and are
often smarter than the smartest people in them. Groups do not need to be dominated by
exceptionally intelligent people in order to be smart.” (p. xiii) In order to design the
wisdom of crowds, Surowiecki pointed to four different factors for amplifying this
143

wisdom: diversity of opinion, independence, decentralization, and aggregation (then
averaged). For instance, Surowiecki refers to market as a case of the wisdom of crowds
as follows:
The market was smart that day because it satisfied the four conditions that
characterize wise crowds: diversity of opinion (each person should have some
private information, even if it’s just an eccentric interpretation of the known
facts), independence (people’s opinions are not determined by the opinions of
those around them), decentralization (people are able to specialize and draw on
local knowledge), and aggregation (some mechanism exists for turning private
judgments into a collective decision). (p. 10)
Surowiecki’s conceptualization of the wisdom of crowds does not primarily discuss the
relationship between data and datum. Yet, the wisdom of crowds model explains much
about how Safecast designed its view of data collection. Theoretically, Safecast allowed
diverse and independent bGeigie users to submit their individual geo-tagged
measurement readings to Safecast and then Safecast aggregated these measurements in its
database.
Safecast published the resulting measurement data on radiation maps. The
Safecast Tile Map is the most recent map among Safecast’s radiation maps and is also
available on the App Store for free. Safecast radiation maps classified and visualized
radiation for its users. As noted, Safecast volunteers measured counts using the bGeigie
and converted the resulting counts to air dose rates; Safecast’s visualization of radiation
was based on these converted air dose rates. Brown states that, “science is not finished
unless it’s visualized clearly. So it is measuring the data, getting about measuring, and
144

having the system to bring the data together, the entire software, web database system,
and then the visualizations. And that’s essential.” As a pro-data network that avoided
providing interpretations of measurement readings, Bonner notes how Safecast volunteers
constructed colorization of radiation:
We thought about that quite a bit with our visualizations, which is in part why we
didn't use like green in safe. Like we avoided those green and red. We avoided
that, because that instantly makes people think about that. And so that’s why we
tried to, we’d go from blue to white with like various colors in between.
I wrote elsewhere that the visualization of radiation necessarily involves its
interpretations (Abe, 2013), but Bonner noted that on the iOS and OSX apps, people can
change colors for themselves. As such, Safecast created user-friendly radiation maps with
the power to visualize radiation while avoiding interpretations of radiation as much as
possible.
The Safecast Tile Map was not a real-time “live” radiation map (Sean, 2014b).
29

While Safecast allowed various bGeigie users to upload their readings to its website,
there are moderators who approve measurement readings as useful data for the Safecast
Tile Map. Moross stated that Safecast had seven moderators since early 2013 when it
found it necessary to have control over data quality due to the large increase in the
number of volunteers. As one of the moderators, Moross emphasized that moderators
never rejected any measurement readings (noting that all measurement readings existed
in the database) but unless moderators approved them, these readings didn’t show up on

29
Safecast is also deploying real time radiation sensor networks (Dolezal, 2015).
145

the map. Moross describes the process of approving each measurement reading as
follows:
We looked at the data. We can see it very quickly. Some of them wind up
becoming an email chain. So it will be the first person looks at it and will say,
“What do you think about this?” We have to have a discussion about it. If there’s
a technical issue, then usually it gets sent to me. In that case somebody will say,
look at upload number 14336. And I’ll look at it and say “OK, what’s your
concern with it? It looks OK. It looks good.” And he says, “Well, look at this part
down in this section. There’s a spike there. What do you think it is? And like the
one with the x-ray machine.” So then we think 'mm-hmm'. And then we have to
kind of reach a consensus between two or three of us, at least, to say “Yeah, this is
on balance it’s OK in the database.” Or whether we want to do something about it
or contact the uploader. Or sometimes it’s just the metadata. If the metadata is
confusing, we want to contact them and have them edit it before we approve it.
As such, Moross’ account indicates Safecast’s moderators defined accurate data in
relation to other data. As such, Safecast’ moderators contributed to developing and
deploying an alternative calibration standard through repeated measurements with
multiple devices. Rather than relying on conventional calibration techniques, Safecast
allows its data to “calibrate” each datum through eyes of its moderators, which can be
described as “data-based practical calibration of bGeigie.”
30
Similarly, Franken

30
Safecast’s data-based practical calibration of bGeigie is not essentially data-driven
because its moderators are actively involved in “calibrating” each bGeigie by viewing its
datum in relation to Safecast’s other data. Therefore, I referred to Safecast’ calibration as
data-based practical calibration rather than data-centric calibration.

146

emphasizes that “the accuracy is not what we’re looking for. We’re looking for
comparative accuracy between two street corners,” describing a single specific Safecast
datum in relation to its database as follows:
… So what we did is instead of trying to rely on one point of data, we had
multiple people measure it, and then in case we have an abnormal thing, what is
happening there, we actually tried to go there ourselves or have somebody go
there with another piece of equipment to do a spot check, take a sample or do
something to confirm if it was really there or not there.
Franken viewed the accuracy of datum as a relational category. From his
perspective, there is no practically useful radiation datum; there are only practically
useful data in relation to the database. In fact, an analysis of Safecast’s website reveals
that the term “datum” has been never used, which indicates that Safecast as a grassroots
measuring network doesn't see datum as a key component of its database. Moross
describes in his interview:
A lot of people focus on the bGeigie as the output of Safecast, and I don't think
so. I think the output, our compass, was not toward making devices. Our compass
and our purpose was to provide the information. So that in this day, was with a
website. And when there wasn't a source of data and we needed to fill in the back
end, have the data being fed in that required us to create devices that were
effective at that. But those are just tools toward the end. They’re not the real
product. The product is the database and the visualizations on the map.
This section describes how Safecast defined its radiation database in relation to its
datum and shows how Safecast saw the accuracy of datum in relation to its database.
147

While Japanese experts and measurement manufacturers tended to view the accuracy of
datum as a fundamental factor responsible for the accuracy of a database, Safecast
assumed that its database legitimized the accuracy of the datum through the data-based
practical calibration of bGeigie. As such, Safecast focused on producing more data by
engaging more people. From this point of view, it makes sense for Safecast to have
chosen a Geiger counter over a scintillation survey meter as a standardized device
because the former was more affordable for many people. Thus Safecast’s view of data
shaped the fundamental characteristics of its data production practices.
Experts’ Views of Safecast
While a wide variety of Safecast volunteers have engaged in data production of
radiation in the air and made their measurement readings open to the public under a CC0
designation, some experts maintain that Safecast could have made its data production
process more open in a specific way. Among experts discussed in Chapter 3, two of them
mentioned Safecast specifically. Needless to say, their views of Safecast are far from
generalizable in that the sample size is too small to make a substantial argument.
However, their “institutionalized” views of Safecast illuminate Safecast’s unique view of
its data and data production practice. For instance Kimiaki Saito at Japan Atomic Energy
Agency (JAEA), who attended the IAEA conference with Brown and Moross, indicated
that Safecast could be one of the useful resources for environmental radiation monitoring
if the quality of its datum is assured. In so doing, Saito suggested that it would be better
for Safecast to have shown how it compared its measurement readings with government
readings when validating the accuracy of the bGeigie. Saito noted that he wanted Safecast
to provide quantitative data to validate its claim that there were no substantial differences
148

between Safecast’s measurement readings and government’s readings detected. In his
view, rather than showing anecdotal evidence Safecast may have needed to report its
research methods that Safecast used in comparing two different datum. Saito also
indicated that it would be better for Safecast to show individual differences among
bGeigies as there are individual differences between bGeigies’ measurement readings. In
order to truly maintain consistent measurement readings, it would have been critical for
Safecast to report quantitatively how measurement readings of individual bGeigies vary.
As such, Saito views the accuracy of Safecst’s datum as a fundamental component for
Safecast’s database. Therefore, he suggested that Safecast make its claims on the
accuracy of datum more open to the public in a quantitative way.
Furthermore, dosimeter manufacturer Z from Chapter 3 argued that Safecast
should not have represented air dose rate quantitatively using a bGeigie since the bGeigie
is a self-made dosimeter and it’s difficult to assume that its measurement is comparable
to national standards. It should be noted that Z is in a dosimeter manufacture company
that comply with national standards. In part because of this, Z viewed Safecast’s datum-
making in relation to national standards. He thus argued that Safecast’s measurement
readings should be clearly designated as “reference values”. He further asserted that
Safecast’s car-borne survey method made existing hot spots invisible rather than visible
precisely because Safecast volunteers apparently didn’t take adequate time to measure
counts when using the Geiger counter. While Safecast clearly states that, “the speed of a
moving car (with a Geiger counter attached) does not affect the readings taken when
compared against readings taken in the same area with a motionless sensor,” Safecast
needed to provide actual data about the experimental research from Z’s point of view.
149

The accounts of critical experts suggest that Safecast’s measurement data could
not be comparable with the government’s measurement data unless Safecast makes its
datum production process more open from their perspectives. Although the findings of
this section are by no means generalizable, this section indicates that the critical experts
tend to view Safecast data merely as a mass of individual datum taken using the bGeigie
whereas Safecast focuses on seeking for statistically accuracy of its data through data-
based practical calibration of bGeigie.
Safecast in Everyday Life in the Fukushima Prefecture
This section investigates how individual volunteers engaged in Safecast in their
everyday lives in the Fukushima Prefecture. It should be emphasized that the findings of
my research participants are not generalizable just as Toshikazu Watanabe (a Safecast
volunteer in Fukushima) rightly points out in his interview that “ because there are still
1,950,000 people living in [the] Fukushima [Prefecture], there are 1,950,000 ways of
Fukushimas.” This section illustrates how four Safecast volunteers engaged in Safecast in
Aizuwakamatsu City and Koriyama City. In doing so, this section illustrates some of the
ways Safecast volunteers engaged in data production practice in the Fukushima
Prefecture.
Aizuwakamatsu City
Located in the western Fukushima Prefecture, Aizuwakamatsu City, the center of
Aizu Region, is approximately 100 kilometers (62 miles) from the Fukushima Daiichi
Power Plant. Akira Yamaguchi and Jun Yamadera participated in my interviews. Akira
Yamaguchi is a volunteer staff member of Aizu Radioactivity Information Center
(ARIC), which got involved with Safecast. He was one of the most active Safecast
150

volunteers measuring radiation in the air using a bGeigie. Established in the fall of 2011,
Aizu Radioactivity Information Center is a voluntary association without legal status in
Aizuwakamatsu City. The purpose of the association is to “collect and transmit
information about measurement readings” and to “collect and transmit information on
people’s sentiments” (Aizu hōshanō jōhō sentā, n.d). According to Yamaguchi, ARIC has
borrowed six bGeigies in total from Safecast. As a key measuring volunteer of ARIC,
Yamaguchi measured radiation in the air using bGeigies; he identifies himself as “a staff
[of ARIC] as a contact point for Safecast, who controls six [borrowed] bGeigies.”
When asked about how he measured radiation, Yamaguchi said that he followed
Safecast’s measurement method carefully. He took measurement readings at a height of
1.3 meters above the ground driving a car. Moreover, Yamaguchi positioned the face of
the bGeigie’s sensor on the left side of car window because pedestrians walk on the left
side of the road in Japan. He further noted that since he usually took measurement
readings at a level of 1.3 meter above the ground, he carefully reported the height when
uploading his measurements.
While Yamaguchi carefully collected radiation data, he viewed his radiation
measurement readings as a reference for radiation levels rather than absolute value of
readings.
…all the sensors [of the bGeigie] are standardized, but [we] don't take the same
readings when actually using six [bGeigie] at the same time…From the
beginning, that’s what the world of [radiation measurement] looks like. In the
case of Safecast, [we] used its measurement readings to suggest whether
[radiation levels] are high or low or [whether radiation levels] are safe or
151

dangerous rather than the absolute value of reading unless its measurement
readings are radically different [from others’]. [Emphasis added]
As noted in Chapter 3, the variations of measurement readings are inherent characteristics
about radiation measurement. As such, he had a general impression of radiation levels
from his bGeigie, adding that the “bGeigie’s pancake sensor is not good at low-dose
radiation…because of its detection range.” Perhaps more importantly, Yamaguchi
localized Safecast’s measurement readings for ARIC. Given that the descriptions of
measurement data on Safecast’s database are written in English, Yamaguchi described
the location of measurement data collected by ARIC volunteers on the ARIC website in
Japanese. While Safecast did not clearly specify its converted dose rates as reference
values on its database or elsewhere, ARIC clearly referred to Safecast’s converted air
dose rates as “those within the reach of reference values” (Aizu hōshanō jōhō sentā
hōshasen sokutei mappu, n.d). As such, ARIC redefined Safecast’s measurement readings
and recreated its data from Safecast’s database for audiences in Aizuwakamatsu City.
While ARIC used Safecast’s measurements, Yamaguchi pointed out that Safecast
was not well known in Fukushima because people seem to be less interested in radiation
in Fukushima. Still, he notes that it’s still meaningful for Safecast to collect radiation data
on the air:
…Cesium keeps migrating [through the environment]…. As such, [both the idea]
that the newer [data are] the better and [the idea] the more [data there are], the
better it is are certainly true. Currently, Safecast’s website doesn't allow [us] to
see [data] in a chronological order, which is a problem, but we can pick up any
152

data from Safecast’ database later because all data were recorded. In this sense, I
think that Safecast plays a role in generating important information.
Regarding his view of health effects of radiation however, Yamaguchi indicated the
difference between Tokyo’s Safecast volunteers and him in terms of risk assessment of
radiation. Pointing out that it could be theoretically true that, according to data from the
United Nations, there are no health effects for those in Fukushima. He notes:
… there are many people around us that don’t feel well or those evacuated here
after getting nodules in their thyroids. In short, it does not mean that because I’m
fine, so is everyone else. [The health effects of radiation] emerge on an individual
basis. You may want to see that [the health effects of radiation] are similar to
those of allergy.
As such, Yamaguchi’s account indicates that even if Safecast as a group did not comment
on the issue of the health effects of radiation, Safecast volunteers had different views of
radiation. Franken recognizes that there was a wide variety of opinions about radiation
among Safecast volunteers, noting that:
We figured out that we actually can’t do that in black and white. And it’s because
we have lots of disagreement about it. As members and in general, we saw lots of
disagreement. And we said that disagreement is good, because all it tells us is that
there is disagreement. And it also told us that we’re not going to solve that
disagreement. We may be able to contribute maybe a little bit to that, but it’s not
going to happen anytime soon. Because the effects of radiation exposure are years
and years [away], it takes ten years, twenty years.
153

As a father of three kids, Yamaguchi further noted that he was not convinced by a
view that health effects of radiation are a matter of statistics, saying “ For us, our children
are 100% ... [while] we’re told how many percentages of incidence rates [of disease] are.
If my kids were affected, such a story would be totally useless.” Yamaguchi’s account
suggests that as a staff member of ARIC, he took advantage of Safecast and its database
to localize radiation data for concerned citizens in Aizuwakamatsu City.
Whereas Yamaguchi was actively engaged in data production practice, Jun
Yamadera, the president of Eyes, Japan Co. Ltd., was engaged in designing Safecast in
the Fukushima Prefecture. Yamadera, who identified himself as Chief Chaos Officer
(CCO) of the IT firm, was involved in Safecast for more than two years in
Aizuwakamatsu City. Pointing out that Safecast could reinforce incentives for more
people to get involved in a more effective way, Yamadera noted that his role at Safecast
was to design a better incentive model for Safecast. One model that he designed is the
Fukushima Wheel Project in 2014. While the government’s monitoring posts measured
air dose rates around the posts, it was important to take measurement readings in a
dynamic way. As a bicycle sharing system, Fukushima Wheel Project allowed its users to
ride a bike with a bGeigie for free so that its users could enjoy a ride while also
automatically taking measurement readings. Yamadera emphasized that it’s important to
collect data naturally on the ground as data collected by those with political purposes are
likely biased. From his perspective, data could be politically neutral on the condition that
a massive amount of measurement data is taken naturally. He believed one of the ways to
collect a large amount of data naturally was to put bGeigies on rental bikes.
154

As for Safecast’s data production practices, Yamadera describes their
characteristics in relation to the government’s data production practices:
I think [Safecast’s] approach to good [data] is different. The government created
good data by using expensive and certified [dosimeters], and it’s like the approach
of classic music. In sum, it’s as if there were a conductor [and] when he or she
conducts a baton, its entire [approach] follows. It’s like a massive and heavy
[approach]. [On the other hand], Safecast’s [approach] is like improvisation or
jazz: Trusting in each other, someone [suggests] “Hey, can you do [the next] part
of music?” and then another replies, “Sure, I’ll play after you’ve done your part.”
Ultimately, the [completed] music emerges. After all, Safecast’s model is such an
agile one. If someone fails, others will [help] by saying “OK. I’ll play in the next
part [instead of you].” In a fashion, there is no center because everyone plays
differently. (Emphasis added)
Yamadera views Safecast’s data production practice slightly differently from the
Fukushima Wheel Project in interpersonal communications between different Safecast
volunteers. Whereas the Fukushima Wheel Project’s data production model can be
explained by Surowiecki’s wisdom of crowds model, Yamadera’s view of Safecast’s data
production practice is more closely analogous to Levy’s (1997) concept of collective
intelligence. He describes collective intelligence as a “form of universally distributed
intelligence, constantly enhanced, coordinated in real time, and resulting in the effective
mobilization of skills.” (Levy, 1997 p. 13) Levy adds that the “goal of collective
intelligence is the mutual recognition and enrichment of individuals rather than the cult of
fetishized or hypostatized communities.” (p. 13). Jenkins (2006) further points out that
155

whereas the notion of collective intelligence takes into account the role of participation
through interpersonal networks and communications in producing knowledge
collectively, the wisdom of crowds model neglects the role of interpersonal networks and
“focuses on aggregating isolated inputs.” Yamadera believed that Safecast volunteers
collaborated with each other to create radiation data together.
The cases of Yamaguchi and Yamadera in Aizuwakamatu City suggest that
Safecast members created and defined Safecast and its measurement data from their own
perspectives.
Koriyama City
As described in Chapter 3, Koriyama City is the biggest city in the Fukushima
Prefecture in terms of its economy size. Norio Watanabe and Toshikazu Watanabe
31

participated in my research interviews. Norio Watanabe was an active volunteer in
Koriyama City. Just as Franken and Moross did, Norio Watanabe, having studied
electronic engineering at college, built his own dosimeter to ensure his health and safety
immediately after the disaster. While he measured radiation in the air using his device, he
met Safecast volunteers through personal introductions in June 2011. When asked why he
became interested in Safecast, Norio Watanabe notes that what was particularly appealing
to him was that Safecast “avoids its subjectivity of judgments [about data]” and that it
“focuses on developing technologies and making measurement data open [to the
public].”As a Safecast volunteer in Fukushima, Norio Watanabe has helped hold Safecast
bGeigie workshops several times (Watanabe, 2013).

31
Since their family names are the same, I will use their full names.
156

However, he stated that it was difficult for citizens to use Safecast’s measurement
data as a resource for lobbying for decontamination in Fukushima because the Japanese
government didn’t authorize Safecast’s bGeigie as a sanctioned dosimeter to measure air
dose rates for decontamination. As noted in Chapter 3, the Japanese government defined
energy-compensated scintillation survey meters as a state-sanctioned dosimeter to
measure air dose rates. Given that radiation levels have decreased, Norio Watanabe
further noted that he no longer worried as much about radiation in the air at a height of 1
meter above the ground in Koriyama City. That said, Norio Watanabe emphasized that
Safecast still played an important role in investigating how radiation levels change across
time in Koriyama City.
Toshikazu Watanabe, the president of an advertising agency, was another Safecast
volunteer in Koriyama City and played a key role in Safecast’s collaborations with Japan
Post (JP) in the Fukushima Prefecture. Immediately after the earthquake, he met Franken,
Moross, and other Safecast volunteers through personal introductions in Koriyama City
on April 23, 2011. Toshikazu Watanabe noted that on the evening of that date he received
a bGeigie and iPhone from Franken, who asked Toshikazu Watanabe to send
measurement readings to him via iPhone. Using the iPhone, Toshikazu Watanabe took
photos of measurement readings taken using the bGeigie and sent them to Franken.
Toshikazu Watanabe has worked as a key volunteer in the Fukushima Prefecture since
the very beginning of Safecast.
In the summer of 2013, Safecast collaborated with JP to measure radiation on the
roads of Koriyama. Before that, Toshikazu Watanabe and Franken had successfully
helped establish the program with JP in Minami Soma City and Tamura City in the
157

Fukushima Prefecture. In this collaboration project, Safecast had bGeigies put on the
back of JP motorbikes such that JP’s postmen would collect radiation data on all roads in
each city. Toshikazu Watanabe stated that in order to collaborate with JP to collect data,
it was necessary for Safecast to receive requests for measuring radiation from local
governments. Whereas Koriyama City, Fukushima Prefecture, and the Japanese state co-
conducted a car-borne survey using NaI scintillation survey meters from July 20 to
August 13, 2011(Koriyamashi, 2014a), Toshikazu Watanabe noted that Safecast
volunteers (including him) received the requests from Koriyama’s Mayor Masato
Shinagawa. As a result, the Safecast-JP collaboration project created a bike-borne survey
using the bGeigie in Koriyama City.
Meanwhile, Toshikazu Watanabe set up Safecast media exposure in the
Fukushima Prefecture; perhaps because of this, Fukushima Mimpō featured the Safecast-
JP collaboration project (Fukushima Mimpō, 2013). In order to protect the privacy of
local residents, radiation data collected using the bike-borne survey within private
properties were reprocessed and published on Safecast’s map. As such, Toshikazu
Watanabe helped Safecast collaborate with JP and local governments in Fukushima.
This section illustrated how Safecast volunteers in the Fukushima Prefecture
engaged in Safecast. Perhaps because more than three years have passed since the
disaster, Safecast volunteers in the Fukushima Prefecture don't necessarily engage in
producing data on radiation in the air in an active way. However, they often directly and
indirectly engage in Safecast data production practices in their own ways.

158

Safecast in 2014 and Beyond
As Safecast (n.d.-e) clearly points out, radiation levels have decreased since the
nuclear disaster. While the disaster is still ongoing, in Chapter 3 some experts indicate
that grassroots measuring networks (including Safecast) play a smaller role in producing
data about radiation in the air. In fact, Bonner notes that one of the biggest challenges
facing Safecast in 2014 is “keeping [the Safecast] team motivated, finding new people to
help with [a] new piece that [is] com[ing] up.” The question is why Safecast would
continue to measure radiation in the air using a bGeigie in 2014 and beyond.
There are various views of radiation measurement in 2014 among Safecast
volunteers. For instance Jun Young Oh, a student volunteer of Safecast from South
Korea, stated that Safecast played a role in sharing kiki ishiki or “crisis awareness” of
radiation by collecting measurement data and making them open to the public in 2014.
He emphasized that the health effects of radiation vary from individual to individual,
noting that“[I] don't think that [Safecast’s measurement readings] can eliminate anxieties
about [the health effects of radiation]…although I believe [Safecast’s data] can gratify
intellectual desires about [the environment].” As such, Safecast played a role in
informing people of the existing possibilities of danger of radiation. On the other hand,
Bonner noted that Safecast is generating data for future generations, saying:
…If the dataset, like what Safecast has now, was available from before the
meltdown, we would have much more information. Like we would know exactly
what changed. But instead we had very poor information from before that, very
good information afterwards. So what we’re trying to do is create as much data as
possible now that’s very good, so that in the future, someone can reference
159

something back and see, if something happens, whatever, they can look and see
how something changed…What we want to do is [to] create like an historical
snapshot of what these readings are at this point in time…And maybe in twenty
years from now, something, if somebody needs to compare a reading, they’ll be
able to use the Safecast data and it will be very helpful for that, whereas we
realized, looking at the data from 2010 was not very helpful.
As such, Bonner sees Safecast making its database more robust for future reference by
collecting radiation data in 2014. Other volunteers shared his view, looking at Safecast’s
data as a gift for future generations. For instance Eckhard Hitzer, a researcher of
theoretical physics and mathematical physics who identifies him as a “supporter” of
Safecast, elaborated:
I think for Japan, especially with its still about fifty nuclear reactors scattered all
over the country, it’s good to have a complete radiation map, detailed radiation
map. So if ever in the future another accident should happen, then even the
scientists, the government and all levels from municipal to national, they will be
interested to be able to see now there is a different level of radiation, which we
can really attribute to an accident. And that could become a kind of good data for
making administrative decisions. And people in the agricultural sector would
actually be very interested, and also scientists who study the effect of radiation
not only on humans, but on fauna and flora on animals and plants. They would be
interested to have information about how has radiation changed, and they could
study what are the environmental impacts of that. So I think for humankind, we
take weather data, we even try to reconstruct whether data deep into the past in
160

order to understand climate development, etc. And now a little bit we learn, it
could be important to have hits invisible data of radiation, as well. And I think it’s
a service to future generations if you take these data now, and they consist of
valuable knowledge, which we can scientifically exploit in the future, or future
generations of scientists can exploit.
Tanaka agreed with Bonner’s view of the role of Safecast. She further adds two more
reasons why Safecast volunteers kept measuring radiation in the air. First, measuring is
equivalent to exploring for them. It is exciting to explore unmeasured areas using the
bGeigie to create comparable data in relation to Safecast’s dataset. As such, Tanaka
assumes that Safecast volunteers see unmeasured areas as a sort of radiation knowledge
frontier. Second, measuring confirms the half-life of radioactive materials in the
environment. By continuing to measure radiation in the air, Safecast volunteers ensure
the half-life theory of radioactive materials. From her perspective, Safecast volunteers
will learn to measure and measure to learn.
Conclusion
This chapter investigates how Safecast volunteers engaged in data production
practices in relation to post-Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure.
Three findings emerged:
First, Safecast’s database may not be comparable with the government’s because
Safecast chose its dosimeter and measurement method for practical reasons. As noted,
Safecast has standardized the Geiger counter with the 2″ pancake sensor as its official
dosimeter in order to make its data consistent across different devices, even though the
Japanese government defined NaI(TI) scintillation survey meters as the only government-
161

sanctioned dosimeter. Moreover, Safecast did not standardize its measurement method as
Safecast’s favored pragmatism over methodological purity in compiling Safecast’s
database as a knowledge infrastructure distinct from other knowledge infrastructures.
Second, while Safecast’s datum production may not necessarily be seen as
accurate from some critical experts’ perspectives, Safecast volunteers successfully
generated a large amount of data on radiation in the air and engaged in data management
through the data-based practical calibration of bGeigie. Safecast’s key concept of “pro-
data” is far from perfect as it has updated the bGeigie as many as 6 times within a 2 year
period after the disaster. Safecast’s pragmatic data collection and management practices
successfully created a radiation world map which allows its users to compare radiation
levels between different countries, constructing a sort of global knowledge infrastructure,
which would allow people think globally about the consequences of the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear disaster in terms of radiation in the air.
Third, this chapter demonstrates that Safecast provided an alternative hybrid
forum in which a wide variety of volunteers with different expertise could engage in data
production practice in their everyday life. While there are differences between volunteers
in terms of radiation views and other issues, Safecast is open to different opinions
because Safecast ultimately takes advantage of opportunities created by these differences
of opinions to move forward.

162

Chapter 5: Kodomo Mirai Sokuteijo
In the aftermath of the nuclear disaster, many Japanese citizens created grassroots
measuring groups in Fukushima and elsewhere in Japan in an attempt to protect their
children from exposure to unknown radiation levels.
32
How did Japanese parents deal
with radiation issues after the accident? In what way did they generate data for their
everyday lives and for what purpose? In order to address these questions, the story of
Kodomo Mirai Sokuteijo or the “Measuring Station for the Future of Children”
(Kodomira, hereafter) is a particularly enlightening illustration. Kodomira is a Tokyo-
based citizens’ measuring station in Kokubunji City, Tokyo. Just as other grassroots
measuring networks did, Kodomira has measured radiation for the health and safety of
children since its establishment on December 15, 2011. Like Safecast and Hakatte Geiger,
Kodomira underwent rapid change in terms of its core members, interests, and focus
areas. As noted in the Introduction chapter, Kodomira was born as a citizens’ measuring
station monitoring foodstuffs, but has gradually shifted its focus from radioactivity in
food to radiation in the air since the summer of 2012. The question then is why Kodomira
changed its focus to measuring radiation in the air despite radiation air dose rates
decreasing and what kind of data Kodomira generated in relation to nuclear radiation
knowledge infrastructures in 2014.
While it’s important to study how Kodomira generated data about issues related to
food safety, this chapter primarily investigates how Kodomira generated data about

32
There is no data available about the exact number of young Japanese parents’
grassroots groups, but Kodomotachi o hōshano kara mamoru zenkoku nettowāku or “The
National Networks of Parents to Protect Children from Radiation,” is an umbrella
organization of local grassroots networks to protect children from radiation that notes
there are more than 300 registered groups within Zenkoku Net (Kodomotachi o hōshano
kara mamoru zenkoku nettowāku, 2014a).
163

radiation in the air in 2014. More specifically, this chapter focuses on analyzing
Kodomira’s relatively new project, the Hōshasen Mieruka Project or the “Make Radiation
Visible Project.” This ongoing project seeks to measure air radiation dose rates with a
specified dosimeter upon requests from citizens. Analyzing Kodomira’s Making
Radiation Visible Project illustrates how citizens engage in measuring radiation in the air
in 2014 in relation to the post-Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure.
Before turning to the investigation of Kodomira’s Making Radiation Visible
Project however, we must examine three conceptual frameworks for a critical discussion
of Kodomira. The first are the technical and social reasons from a classic work in the
field of science communication by Farrell and Goodnight (1981). Farrell and Goodnight
investigate discourses on the Three Mile Island nuclear accident as “a rhetorical crisis” (p.
272) and analyze how the space for public deliberations was constrained by prevailing
concepts of the public. Farrell and Goodnight provide two useful analytical frameworks:
technical reasoning and social reasoning. Technical reasoning is “modes of inference that
are characteristic of specialized forums, wherein discourse is coded to functional
demands of particular information fields and evaluated according to an array of state-of-
the-art techniques” (p. 273) whereas social reasoning is alternative modes of “inferences
that are prompted through the pressing contingencies of ordinary life, wherein the claims
of advocates are affiliated with the interest of related others and grounded in the
generalizable convictions of a competent audience” (p. 273). In Chapter 3, we looked at
the characteristic of post-Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure in which the
act of measuring radiation is “coded to functional demands of particular information
fields and evaluated according to an array of state-of-the-art techniques.” (p. 273) This
164

chapter draws on the concept of social reasoning to illustrate how Kodomira analyzes
radiation in the air in everyday life after the disaster.
The second conceptual framework for this study is the social amplification of risk.
Kasperson et al (1988) investigate the information mechanism in which relatively “minor”
risks elicit strong public concerns and one key case is low dose exposure (Kasperson,
2012). Unlike Beck’s view of low dose radiation, low dose exposure can be seen as a
minor risk from Kasperson et al’s perspective, and more importantly they provide a
model explaining how social amplification of minor risks such as low dose exposure
occurs in relation to psychological, social, institutional and cultural factors. Given that
radiation dose rates decreased in 2014, an analysis of Kodomira will contribute to the
development of research on social amplification of risk.
The final conceptual framework is Carey’s ritual view of communication. Carey
(2009) describes a ritual view of communication as being “directed not toward extension
of messages in space but toward the maintenance of society in time; not the act of
imparting information but the representation of shared belief.” (p. 15) From the
perspective of a ritual view of communication, news is “not information but drama.” (p.
17) Drawing on Carey’s concept of a ritual view of communication, this chapter
examines how Kodomira defines, produces, maintains and ultimately transforms
radiation as drama, creating an alternative and open communication space for its
volunteers and other citizens to construct and maintain their everyday life in post-
Fukushima Japanese society. Drawing on and extending these conceptual frameworks,
this chapter investigates how Kodomira defines the meaning of radiation by engaging in
radiation data production practice.
165

In order to truly understand Kodomira’s Making Radiation Visible Project, it’s
useful to view Kodomira in a historical context. In the first section of this chapter, we’ll
discuss how Kodomira’s project emerged the way it did. Then we’ll investigate
Kodomira’s Making Radiation Visible Project with particular focus on its specific
dosimeter in relation to Post-Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure. We’ll
investigate how Kodomira defines, maintains, and ultimately transforms radiation,
constructing their views of post-Fukushima Japanese society by measuring radiation
accordingly. Finally, this chapter summarizes its findings and discusses the implications
of Kodomira in post-Fukushima Japanese society. Given that Kodomira is just one of the
Tokyo-based networks, the findings of this chapter are in no way generalizable of
Japanese parents’ grassroots measuring networks; this chapter simply seeks to lay a
foundation for future cross-cultural studies.
Method
I conducted individual interviews with two members and three volunteers at
Kodomira and one volunteer at 5cm50cm Keisoku Net (another Japanese grassroots
measuring network in which one of the key members of Kodomira was deeply involved).
All of my research participants agreed to be identified by name. I also investigated print
and online materials from Kodomira’s website and informational booklet. My analysis is
based on both interview data and these documents.

Constructing Accurate Datum
166

Kodomira has a history that extends beyond December 15, 2011 when the
organization was established in Kokubunji City, Tokyo. In fact, multiple explanations
provided by my research participants indicate that various factors should be taken into
account when investigating the origin of Kodomira. For instance Atsuko Uchida, a
Kodomira volunteer and one of the co-directors of Shizen Ikuji Tomo no Kai (Shizen
Ikuji hereafter) or “The Association for Raising New Babies Naturally,” points out that
Kodomira was born from two different networks. One is Kodomotachi o Hōshano kara
Mamoru Zenkoku Nettowāku (Zenkoku Net hereafter) or “The National Networks of
Parents to Protect Children from Radiation,” an umbrella organization of local grassroots
networks to protect children from radiation. Indeed, Zenkoku Net’s website states that it
initiated Kodomira as its pilot civic measuring station that focuses on monitoring
foodstuffs (Kodomotachi o hōshano kara mamoru zenkoku nettowāku, 2014b). The other
is Earth Day Tokyo Tower, which was established by members of Earth Day Tokyo after
the nuclear disaster. Kodomira’s website specifies Zenkoku Net and Earth Day Tokyo
Tower as collaborative organizations. On the other hand Yukihiro Maeda, the vice
representative of Kodomira, indicates that the origin of Kodomira can be also traced back
to Shizen Ikuji. Just as in the case of Safecast, the fact that Kodomira volunteers offered
multiple explanations on the origin of Kodomira could be taken as evidence that
Kodomira did not evolve from a single source.
While various influences on the founding of Kodomira must be analyzed, these
factors do not fully explain why Kodomira’s Making Radiation Visible Project emerged
the way it did. Nor do they explain how Kodomira’s views of dosimeters were shaped
historically. As noted, Kodomira emerged as a citizens’ food-monitoring station, not a
167

grassroots group measuring radiation air dose rates, and why after the summer of 2012
did Kodomira shift its focus from monitoring foodstuffs to measuring radiation in the air?
Although the three previously stated organizations played a role in creating
Kodomira, it’s difficult to assume that they shaped the way in which Kodomira generated
data on air dose rates in 2014. Investigating these organizations shows that they were
involved in one specific grassroots project that measured radiation air dose rates:
5cm50cm Keisoku Net or “The Network for Measuring [Radiation] at the Level of 5 and
50 Centimeters above the Ground.” This network is not technically affiliated with
Kodomira per se in terms of its data production practice and it suspended its activities as
of 2012. However Maeda, who is in charge of radiation measurement at Kodomira, was
deeply involved in 5cm50cm Keisoku Net even before joining Kodomira.
The aim of 5cm50cm Keisoku Net was more or less similar to Safecast’s original
strategy in some ways: given a lack of radiation data, 5cm50cm Keisoku Net lent
dosimeters to citizens in order to create a radiation map to enable self-empowerment. The
difference between Safecast and 5cm50cm Keisoku Net lies in the height of
measurements, and more generally their target audience for whom they sought to collect
radiation data. As its name indicates, 5cm50cm Keisoku Net has a specific target
audience: concerned parents with young children. 5cm50cm Keisoku Net sought to make
data on air dose rates useful in a practical manner for parents. As will be illustrated in the
next section, Kodomira later inherited this view of data production practice in relation to
specific target audiences. I’ll describe how 5cm50cm Keisoku Net emerged and provided
a historical context by which Kodomira’s Making Radiation Visible Project was born.
168

Originally Yoshiaki Matsuo, who was then a board of directors member at Earth
Day Tokyo, initiated and developed 5cm50cm Keisoku Net as his own project in June
2011. Before creating 5cm50cm Net in June 2011, Matsuo got involved in the Radiation
Disaster Alert Network (R-DAN) in the wake of the nuclear disaster. As described in
Chapter 2, R-DAN is a Japanese social network that emerged from distrust of the
Japanese governments’ information about radiation after the Chernobyl accident. Since
the accident, R-DAN has been monitoring radiation by using Geiger counters throughout
different areas in Japan. R-DAN has also engaged in nuclear disaster drilling once a year
by using a fixed-line phone and fax (Honda, 2005; Iesaka, 1986; Tsuzuku, 1988). R-DAN
has a long history of citizens’ monitoring radiation and Matsuo joined the group
immediately after the disaster.
At R-DAN, Matsuo helped create their Civic Radiation Measurement Reading
Map by using Google Maps and made it possible for dosimeter users to upload their
measurement readings manually. However, Matsuo states that his focus shifted from
creating a better R-DAN Radiation Map to collecting radiation data after he learned that
there was very little data on radiation in the air available. According to Matsuo’s self-
reported history, there were only two government radiation monitoring posts in Tokyo in
May 2011, and the heights of the monitoring posts were one meter and eighteen meters
above the ground (Matsuo, 2011). Thus the government’s monitoring posts would not
provide useful information about children’s safety. Matsuo’s reasoning concerning the
health effects of radiation is in opposition to what Farrell and Goodnight (1981) see as
technical reasoning because Matsuo views the issue of radiation as “situation-dependent
problems” (Farrell and Goodnight, 1981, p. 296). In order to solve these situation-
169

dependent problems, he “planned to lend dosimeters to mothers with young children in
order to relieve their anxiety” (Matsuo, 2011). During my interview he stated:
I assumed that it was mothers who were most concerned about whether they could
let their children go outside and play around in the sandbox. While it shouldn't be
good [for them to do so], the government said that it was OK. There’s no question
that [kids should] stay inside for the time being, but we need to create information
[to validate this assumption]. Additionally, the worst thing is to make [mothers]
stay in a state of high anxiety…There were many mothers who were worried
about whether they could take their children outside. In order to solve the problem,
I needed readily available dosimeters. I took action to get them such that I could
lend them to [mothers] if they wanted to know what was going on.
As such, he indicates that the limited number of monitoring posts in Tokyo, his distrust of
the government and his concerns about the state of maternal mental health were all
important factors responsible for a new project: 5cm50cm Keisoku Net. It should be also
noted that Matsuo emphasized the potentially physically harmful effects of low-dose
radiation in the air for children. From the beginning, Matsuo sought to produce data as a
resource for relieving mothers’ anxieties.
From the beginning of the project, Matsuo worked with Maeda. While Maeda was
not a trained expert in radiation measurement, he had studied agricultural engineering at
college and found his academic background particularly useful when it came to
measuring radiation. Maeda notes that agricultural engineering involves probability
statistics in experimental research, emphasizing that probability statistics is “absolutely
indispensable” in order to quantify radiation because radiation is necessarily distributed
170

in a patchy fashion due to the irregularities in radioactive decay. Maeda’s academic
background assisted him constructing radiation measurement readings data from the
perspective of probability statistics. More specifically, Maeda was trained to see the
necessity of calculating measurement readings in order to create one cohesive datum.
Although this view of constructing datum on radiation in the air can be seen as
scientifically appropriate by certain dosimetrists (Shozugawa, 2014), it is not necessarily
practical for most citizens to calculate measurement readings such that they create one
single datum on radiation in the air.
Maeda emphasized that he learned more about the issue of radiation in the air
after he started to measure radiation as a member of 5cm50cm Keisoku Net, suggesting
that he learned to be a better measurer by measuring radiation. Pointing to Jarome
Bruner’s study of learning and identity development, Brown and Duguid (2000) note
“(I)n learning to be, in becoming a member of a community of practice, an individual is
developing a social identity. In turn, the identity under development shapes what that
person comes to know, how he or she assimilates knowledge and information.” (p. 138)
Maeda ultimately played a key role in creating a measurement method for 5cm50cm
Keisoku Net volunteers. Just as Safecast did, 5cm50cm Keisoku Net standardized the
Geiger counter RADEX RD 1503 and began lending five Geiger counters to citizens by
the end of June, 2011 (Matsuo, 2011). Later, 5cm50cm Keisoku Net lent a total of twelve
Geiger counters (Matsuo, 2011).
By July 12
th
2011, concerns about the health effects of nuclear radiation had
reached a head. Hundreds of citizens including Matsuo, Maeda, Uchida and other future
Kodomira volunteers gathered in Chiyoda Ward, Tokyo to attend Zenkoku Net’s
171

inaugural meeting. Hidetake Ishimaru, a future representative of Kodomira, also attended
the meeting. Before that day, Ishimaru was involved in the measuring group “Energy
Shift! Kunitachi” in Kunitachi City, Tokyo and measured radiation in the air by using a
RADEX RD 1503. Indeed, grassroots groups such as 5cm50cm Keisoku Net and Energy
Shift! Kunitachi were rapidly created in Japan after the disaster, but they were not
necessarily connected (as was the case of 5cm50cm Keisoku Net and Energy Shift
Kunitachi). In this sense, Zenkoku Net’s meeting was a historical moment in which a
wide variety of citizens gathered to deal with radiation released from the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant. At the kickoff meeting several projects emerged in order to
ensure children’s health and safety; one of them was the Measuring Project led by
Matsuo’s 5cm50cm Keisoku Net. According to Matsuo, 5cm50cm Keisoku Net became
affiliated with Zenkoku Net and Shizen Ikuji as collaborators in terms of radiation data
collection, causing Zenkoku Net and Shizen Ikuji volunteers involved in measuring
radiation in the air to use the RADEX RD 1503.
However, Matsuo notes that 5cm50cm Keisoku Net did not become an influential
grassroots measuring network because its measurement method was too demanding for
volunteers. As a leader of Shizen Ikuji, Uchida agrees with this view, saying that
5cm50cm Keisoku Net created a “tough guideline” for measuring radiation and added
that 5cm50cm Keisoku Net struggled to create a radiation map. When compared with
Safecast’s measurement method, 5cm50cm Keisoku Net developed a more time-
consuming technique. According to 5cm50cm Keisoku Net’s measurement method
manual (co-designed by Maeda and Matsuo), volunteer RADEX RD 1503 users were
requested to stay still while taking four different measurements at one specific spot
172

(5cm50cm Keisoku Net, 2011a). More specifically, volunteers were expected to take 3
and 5.5 minutes respectively to record each measurement reading taken at the level of 5
cm and 50cm above the ground, and then calculate an average measurement reading for
each height. For a single datum of radiation at 5cm above ground, volunteers needed to
take both 3 minute and 5.5 minute readings and take two different level readings of 5cm
above the ground, and then calculate an average of the two different measurement
readings for each time limit (3 minutes and 5.5 minutes) in order to produce just one
datum at the 5cm height. Those who used other Geiger counter models were requested to
take as many as seven measurement readings and then calculate the average of those
seven measurement readings to create one datum on a single spot 5cm above the ground
(5cm50cm Keisoku Net, 2011b). It was time and energy-consuming for 5cm50cm
Keisoku Net volunteers to measure radiation in the air in this way.
When asked about 5cm50cm Keisoku Net’s measurement method, Matsuo notes
“[M]easurement readings taken by [using] Geiger counters are useless unless [we]
calculate an average measurement reading.” He further indicates that poorly constructed
measurement readings taken by using Geiger counters “…could cause a panic if
measurement readings suggest high levels [of radiation].” Matsuo describes what kind of
data 5cm50cm Keisoku Net sought to generate:
[We just wanted to create] data that would be convincing to okami (“the authority”
in English). We just didn’t want [the authority] to say that, “we cannot trust such
[poorly produced data]”… In that case we say that we measured [radiation] by
using a Geiger counter, it’ll be the most that we can do to see [the authority
dismiss our data] by saying “[We can’t use] such data.” If you seek to make a
173

complaint against the authority by saying, “Can you deal with this [contaminated]
area?” it’s necessary to create measurement readings that would be convincing to
the authority.
While Matsuo initially launched 5cm50cm Keisoku Net in order to relieve mothers’
anxieties, his account suggested that 5cm50cm Keisoku Net also sought to create data
that would be convincing for the government officials. Matsuo used the Japanese term
“okami” (“authority” in English), differentiating his fellow citizens from authority such
as the government, suggesting that he identifies himself as an active citizen lobbying for
the authority to decontaminate areas utilizing citizen measurement data. Indeed, citizens’
engagement with the state is one of the most striking differences between food
monitoring and air dose rate monitoring when it comes to the health and safety of
children. As for food monitoring, parents can technically avoid contaminated foods for
their children by monitoring radioactivity in foodstuffs. As for radiation in the air,
however, they may need to have the state involved in decontamination because their
children may not be able to avoid contaminated areas. Therefore, it is important for
parents to make their measurement readings as radiation datum that would be convincing
for the government officials.
More importantly, Matsuo views Geiger counters as more or less a useless
dosimeter for producing datum that would be convincing to the authority. When asked
about the reason why 5cm50cm stopped producing data in 2012, Matsuo said that while
5cm50cm Keisoku Net initially sought to measure radiation in the entire Tokyo area with
the help of volunteer citizens, the authority was eventually “forced by citizens” to
measure radiation in that area, thereby completing 5cm50cm’s mission. Matsuo pointed
174

out that it’s better for citizens to measure radiation at children’s playgrounds, noting
“after all, it’s difficult for laypeople to measure radiation there by using Geiger counter.”
Although 5cm50cm Keisoku Net stopped working in 2012, Matsuo’s views of data and
Geiger counters were apparently shared by its various volunteers including Maeda. As
will be illustrated in the next section, Kodomira as an organization embraced Matsuo’s
view of radiation data and dosimeter choice.
This section examined 5cm50cm Keisoku Net in order to provide a historical
context in which Kodomira’s Making Radiation Visible Project emerged the way it did.
Given the lack of data on radiation in the air, Matsuo initiated 5cm50cm Keisoku Net to
distribute standardized Geiger counters to citizens so a citizen-made radiation map could
be created. What differentiates 5m50cm Keisoku Net from Safecast is that while Safecast
focused on providing as much data as possible as information for wider audience by
using the Geiger counter, 5cm50cm Keisoku Net sought to generate accurate data by
using the same devices from the beginning. In order to generate accurate data that could
ultimately be trusted by authorities, Matsuo and Maeda created a measurement method
that was time-consuming for ordinary citizen volunteers. In the end, 5cm50cm Keisoku
Net could not successfully create a radiation map in part due to its time-consuming
measurement method.
Given that the government and other experts don't label the Geiger counter as the
best dosimeter to measure radiation in the air, it was not easy for 5cm50cm Keisoku Net
to create data that could be trusted by authorities. Constructing accurate datum by using a
Geiger counter ultimately helped discourage ordinary citizens to remain motivated to
measure radiation in the air. From Matsuo’s perspective, in order for citizens to generate
175

data that could be trusted by authorities, the Geiger counter is more or less practically
useless. Given that 5cm50cm Keisoku Net was affiliated with Zenkoku Net and Shizen
Ikuji, a view that the Geiger counter is not a particularly useful dosimeter was apparently
influential in other organizations, one of which was Kodomira.
The ‘Making Radiation Visible’ Project
This section illustrates how Kodomira engaged in data production of radiation
dose rates. Kodomira was originally a pilot project of Zenkoku Net’s Citizens’ Measuring
Station Project. In August 2011, Kodomira purchased a few Belarusian-made equipment
for measuring radioactivity in foods with financial support from Earth Day Tokyo. On
December 15
th
2011, Kodomira was officially established with Ishimaru as its
representative and Maeda as its vice representative within Shizen Ikuji’s general store
Memori [Measuring and Mothering for Life] in Kokubunji City. While 5cm50cm
Keisoku Net offered Geiger counters to its volunteers for free, Kodomira subsisted by
measuring radioactive materials in food for paying clients. In 2014, Kodomira measured
radioactivity in one food sample for 3,000JPY (around $30USD) (Kodomo mirai
sokuteijo, 2014). According to Ishimaru, many people sent a wide variety of foodstuffs to
Kodomira from the beginning of their establishment through the first half of 2012.
However, Kodomira’s focus gradually shifted to external radiation exposure.
Most of my research participants point to the summer of 2012 as the turning point
when Kodomira shifted its main focus from the issue of food safety to radiation in the air.
One salesman from Pony Industry, an Osaka-based Japanese company of Non-
Destructive Inspection (NDI) of various infrastructures, visited Kodomira and presented a
prototype of what would eventually become Kodomira’s official dosimeter: the Hot Spot
176

Finder (HSF). HSF is an energy-compensated Csl (TI) scintillator survey meter that
measures gamma rays in the air. As described in Chapter 3, scintillation survey meters
are generally expensive compared to Geiger counters, with the former defined as an
appropriate dosimeter to measure radiation in the air according to post-Fukushima
Japanese measurement infrastructure. Indeed, HSF costs more than 1,300,000 JPY (about
$13,000USD) (Kodomo mirai sokuteojo, 2013d). According to Kodomira’s self-reported
history, it initially borrowed an HSF prototype from the salesman, and Ishimaru and
Maeda measured radiation in Tokyo and Fukushima with it; they reported the advantages
of the instrument on the Kodomira blog (Kodomo mirai sokuteijo, 2013b). In the
meantime, Uchida, co-director of Shizen Ikuji, became involved in Kodomira as its key
volunteer responsible for accounting and general management.
At Earth Day Tokyo in April 2013, Kodomira members and volunteers created
the Information Transmission Team. Maeda speaking to the reason Kodomira created the
Information Transmission Team, said “We were uncertain about the future of foodstuff
monitoring. We had to do another project. We thought we’d need to engage in a media
campaign.” In fact, Greenpeace (2014) stopped monitoring foodstuffs in April 2013.
Maeda’s account indicates that as a citizens’ measuring station, Kodomira needed to find
a new way to measure radiation. As a result, Kodomira launched a new project to
measure radiation in the air, more specifically radiation from radioactive materials on
soil; thus the Making Radiation Visible Project was born. Kodomira started to purchase a
HSF through crowd-funding campaigns on Shooting Star, a Japanese donation-based
crowd-funding site. Ultimately, Kodomira successfully purchased their HSF dosimeter in
August 2013 (Kodomo mirai sokuteijo, 2013d). Since then, Ishimaru and Maeda have
177

measured radiation in the air upon request. According to Kodomira’s website, the base
hourly rate of measuring is 15,000JPY in 2014 (Kodomo mirai sokuteijo, 2014).
The following section examines how Kodomira members and volunteers defined
and constructed meaning of the HSF and its measurement readings by analyzing
interview data, and both print and online materials demonstrating the characteristic of
Kodomira’s data production practice. On its weblog post titled “The Characteristics of
the Hot Spot Finder” on July 5 2013, Kodomira describes three key characteristics of the
HSF: accuracy of its dosimeter measurements, its high reaction rate, and its automatic
mapping function (Kodomo Mirai Sokuteijo, 2013c). Investigating Kodomira’s discourse
on key themes reveals their view of measurement data on air dose rates.
Generating Accurate Readings
Just as dosimeter manufacturers unanimously point out in Chapter 3, Kodomira
sees the state of calibration as a key factor for guaranteeing the accuracy of its dosimeters.
Kodomira’s weblog post (Kodomo Mirai Sokuteijo, 2013c) reads:
Pony Industry, a developer [of the HSF] is one of the only two Japan Calibration
Service System (JCSS)-certified private calibration services for dosimeters
measuring air dose rates. Given that the developing company is an enterprise that
calibrates highly accurate dosimeters used by the government as well, [its
dosimeter] has high credibility of measurement reading. [And also], it has a lot of
credibility of its measurement data and map.
Kodomira used the JCSS certification of calibration provided by the government as a
rhetorical resource in order to make a claim about the accuracy of HSF’s measurement
readings. In my interview, Ishimaru similarly pointed out that Pony Industry (with JCSS)
178

calibrated the HSF when he described the accuracy of its measurements. As illustrated in
Chapter 3, the Japanese government’s guidelines states that dosimeters are supposed to
be calibrated “more than once a year” (Monbukagakushō & Nihon genshiryoku kenkyū
kaihatsu kikō, 2011, p.6), and JCSS certifies the traceability of measurement and its
technological competence in relation to measurement standards directly related to
National Standards (Dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin seihin hyōka gijutsu kiban kikō nintei sentā,
2014). As such, a certificate of calibration issued by organizations with JSCC involves a
rhetorical function: The quality of JSCC-certified dosimeters is guaranteed by the
Japanese state. However, as seen in Chapter 3, Shozugawa
33
emphasized that
measurement readings taken by using certified dosimeters are not necessarily accurate all
the time because measurement readings are also affected by the measurement method
used. Some Kodomira members and volunteers point out that HSF is an effective
dosimeter to encourage and legitimize local governments engagement in decontamination
due to its accuracy although Kodomira has never lobbied for local governments in order
to have them involved in decontamination. Ishimaru noted:
After all, the government basically finds it impossible to see [measurement
readings] taken by using non-accurate [dosimeters] as a guarantee for its datum,
you know. The question is by what means you measured. In the end, HSF has
higher capacity than [other dosimeters] that the government usually has due to its
greater accuracy. So, if we say that, “here is a map made [by using HSF]”, the
government can’t complain about its data very much. It can’t pick a quarrel with

33
Dr. Katsumi Shozugawa is a specialist in radiation measurement (see Chapter 3).
179

the accuracy of its data. Because HSF is such a dosimeter, I believe that it has an
advantage.
Ishimaru’s view of accurate measurement readings is more or less analogous to Matsuo’s.
Both Ishimaru and Matsuo assume that the government will take accurate measurement
readings taken by citizens as legitimate data for decontamination. Ishimaru emphasized
that it’s impossible for the government to engage in decontamination based solely on
citizens’ data; instead the government re-measures radiation for decontamination based
on citizens’ data. From their shared perspective, the accuracy of measurement readings
not only ensured the health and safety of children, but also worked as a fundamentally
important rhetorical device for lobbying Japanese government. Natsuo Hattori, an editor
of a magazine who joined Kodomira to volunteer for Information Transmission Team,
further stated that the accuracy of individual measurement readings is essential for
concerned citizens as the main target audience of Kodomira. Indeed, Ishimaru also
emphasized the significance of accurate data for citizens:
We just try to report accurate measurement readings. It’s substantially stressful to
live in [an] “ambiguous” [situation] by remaining anxious. If one sees the exact
air dose rate within one’s living space, one could deal with [the situation] calmly
(Hattori, 2014b)
This further indicates that Ishimaru viewed the accuracy of measurement readings as a
fundamental rhetorical resource for relieving people’s anxiety. Ishimaru assumes that the
accuracy of measurement readings guaranteed by calibrated HSFs not only help to lobby
Japanese states, but also relieve people’s anxiety.

180

Collecting Data Effectively Compared to Other Dosimeters
More importantly, Ishimaru highlighted high reaction rates as the HSF’s great
advantage when compared to other kinds of dosimeters. Ishimaru elaborates this view:
With a RADEX, for example, we wait for 40 seconds [to take one measurement
reading] each time, you know. With a Mr. Gamma… we’ll get a [measurement]
reading every 10 seconds. So, if we move and try to locate micro-hot spots [with
those dosimeters], we’ll miss them. But with this HSF, we can just walk and see
measurement readings going up in a second where [radiation] levels are high.
After passing the area [with high levels of radiation], we’ll see [measurement
readings] going down in a second. There is nothing like this measurement device.
Ishimaru reasons that HSF is particularly useful as compared to other kinds of dosimeters
such as Geiger counters in terms of effective datum production practice. In order to create
one single measurement reading, one doesn't have to take much time with the HSF.
Compared to 5cm50cm Keisoku Net’s measurement method using a Geiger counter, it is
clearly much easier for HSF users to generate radiation datum effectively. Moreover,
Maeda describes the role of HSF in measuring radiation in 2014 as the following:
After all, dose rates will continue decreasing from now on and there will be
smaller differences between naturally existing background radiation and radiation
[released from the nuclear power plant]. Thus, the variation of background
radiation is bigger [than radiation released from the plant]. In other words, [we
learned] the variation of background radiation is much higher when compared to
an accumulation of cesium after we purchased HSF and measured [radiation by
181

using it]. Under this condition, it seems impossible to measure radiation in the air
with ordinary dosimeters.
Maeda indicates that given that radiation levels decreases, it would be difficult to
measure radiation by using “ordinary dosimeters.” Kodomira’s website further notes:
HSF records its [radiation air] dose every one or five seconds [you] set. If there
are micro-hot spots, the HSF immediately responds to them, elevating the
numerical value [of its measurement reading]. Furthermore, the HSF is able to
detect [the presence of] low doses down to 0.001 μSv/h, telling cool spots [from
other areas] speedily. So far, there have been many cases that apparently accurate
dosimeters react slowly, but it’s not the case for the HSF. (Kodomo mirai
sokuteijo, 2013c)
Notably, this account characterizes HSF’s high response rate in relation to two different
concepts: micro-hot spots and cool spots. An analysis of Kodomira’s website shows that
the term “micro-hot spot” didn't show up until July 5, 2013 when Kodomira describes the
characteristics of the HSF. Kodomira never clearly defines what micro-hot spot means,
nor how the concept of “micro-hot spot” differs from that of “hot spot.” However,
Kodomira does describe what a micro hot spot looks like in its booklet titled Measuring,
Learning and Living (Hattori, 2014b). The concept of the micro-hot spot is similarly
elaborated in relation to the characteristics of HSF as follows:
The strongest advantage of the Hot Spot Finder is to detect scattered micro-hot
spots in everyday life by allowing [its users] to see highly detailed air dose
rates…Basically, micro-hot spots emerged “where radioactive materials that
182

descended on large areas gathered at a certain pinpointed spot, usually by running
water (Hattori, 2014b)
Kodomira’s account suggests that HSF makes it possible to articulate scattered tiny spots
with higher radiation levels when compared with their neighboring areas. While
Kodomira chooses the term micro-hot spots rather than the generally used term ‘hot spot’
in describing a tiny area with high levels of radiation, Prelli (1989) notes that,
In choosing one term over others, one directs attention toward particular meanings
and relationships and excludes or minimizes those supplied by other terms. An
individual selects words; they invited an audience (including the self) to conceive,
analyze, and evaluate phenomena in a particular way. (p.16)
As such, choosing the term “micro-hot spot” to describe the characteristics of the HSF
invites a specific audience, contributing to the construction of their shared views of
radiation. More specifically, the new concept of micro-hot spots apparently emphasizes
the idea of unnecessary exposure to radiation. In the wake of the disaster, citizens
measured radiation in the air in order to avoid unknown exposure to radiation. In 2014
when the level of radiation in the air relatively decreased, the prevailing concept of
micro-hot spots created a communication space for citizens to talk about how to avoid
unnecessary exposure to radiation. HSF’s technical competence thus made it possible for
citizens to recognize micro-hot spots as a cause of unnecessary exposure to radiation in
post-Fukushima Japan.
As for the term “cool spot,” Kodomira first used the term on April 4, 2013 on its
weblog when describing how Kodomira measured radiation in the air with a grassroots
183

movement in the Suginami Ward in Tokyo (Kodomo mirai sokuteijo, 2013a). Kodomira
notes:
The name of this dosimeter is Hot Spot Finder, but an alias was born as “Cool
Spot Finder” in that when we measured [radiation in the air] in Suginami, we
found a park with extremely low dose rates (0.02μSv/h range) and had a response
from [people] saying “I’m happy because [radiation levels] are low here!” Since
[HSF’s] measurement readings are updated very quickly just as every one or five
seconds, we can see not only hot spots but also cool spots [by using HSF]. We
learned from this measuring [experience] that HSF is also useful when we find an
anshin na basho [a place of relief from anxiety] with low dose rates.
Much scholarship on Fukushima describes how Japanese paired terms that are used to
designate issues related to safety played a role in shaping a sense of nuclear risk:
anzen/anshin (Assmann, 2013; Kinoshita, 2013; Yamaguchi, 2014). For example,
Yamaguchi (2014) refers to anzen as “scientifically proven safety” (p.170) while defining
anshin as “socially acceptable safety” for her study of food safety and argues that:
Underlying this thinking is the belief that assuring anzen is the absolute minimum
requirement, and that assuring anshin is also required when foods are put on the
market. In other words, anshin describes the responsibility on the part of the
entity who developed the products or who permits the products to be on the
market to proactively assure safety and to protect the public health and refrain
from harming the environment. This is an extra measure of responsibility that
goes beyond merely running required tests or meeting a certain minimum
standard; it suggests that a company or industry goes ‘‘the extra mile’’ and
184

actively seeks to ensure that the public has no cause for concern. There appears to
be no exact translation for this expression in English, and there is no obvious
corollary to this concept in Western culture or discourse (p.170).
While Yamaguchi describes anshin in relation to the issue of food safety, the term anshin
could be better translated for this chapter as “culturally accepted safety for children”
because as Yamaguchi indicates, anshin is a relational concept and can be better
understood as a mode of social reasoning. From the perspective of risk society proposed
by Beck (1992), the technological competence of the HSF’s high response rate opened a
new communication space for micro-hot spots as new risks. HSF’s high response rate,
which Kodomira perceived as one of HSF’s advantages, not only contributed to the idea
of unnecessary exposure to radiation in post-Fukushima Japanese society, but also shaped
its users’ views of anshin in post-Fukushima Japanese society.
Representing Measurement Readings
Kodomira automatically records measurement reading by using HSF with GPS.
As Uchida points out, 5cm50cm struggled to create a radiation map when lending Geiger
counters to its volunteers, but HSF’s mapping function helped users create a map more
effectively. However Kodomira does not make its all radiation maps and measurement
readings available to the public, partly because Kodomira measures radiation and detects
micro-hot spots upon request from citizens. For instance, Maeda notes, “If we use the Hot
Spot Finder to take measurement readings with GPS, these data are, after all, identical
with personal information due to the high accuracy [of its GPS].” When asked about
whether Kodomira is willing to publish measurement data on pubic spaces such as roads,
Maeda indicated that since its GPS is never perfect, measurement readings taken on a
185

road are sometimes recorded as those taken inside someone’s property, therefore
“[Kodomira] cannot make raw data open.” Hattori further notes that there were many
clients who requested Kodomira not to make measurement readings open to the public
particularly when the measurement readings were taken near clients’ houses. Hattori
states:
Most clients requested [Kodomira] to measure [radiation] inside their homes and
school roads [for their kids] …If [Kodomira] uploads detailed measurement
readings [to its website], the identity of the clients will be completely
disclosed…There could be a case that [clients] will be marked as “mothers who
are concerned about radiation” in their neighborhood.
From Hattori’s perspective, it is a sensitive issue for some people to be viewed as
someone who is concerned about radiation. Therefore, Kodomira generally used a screen
capture rather than Google Maps when publishing its measurement readings on its
website because Google Maps would allow people to pinpoint where measurements were
taken. Ishimaru clearly states that Kodomira uses a screen capture “for the sake of
privacy protection,” but ensures that raw measurement data are given to the clients. All
accounts described here indicate that the HSF dosimeter with its high quality GPS is a
critical factor to discourage Kodomira from making measurement readings open to the
public. Ironically, HSF’s automated mapping function is not necessarily useful when it
comes to data publication in the context of post-Fukushima Japanese society.
Whereas Hattori noted that he personally wants to make more measurement
readings accessible for all citizens, he simultaneously argued that Kodomira should not
186

have to publish all measurement data as Safecast does. In fact, Hattori describes
Kodomira’s philosophy of data collection practice as follows:
We are strangers anyway. We never get [disrespectful to our clients by saying
that,] “I am doing a favor measuring for you or reporting for you.” Only after [our
clients] have the need to have us to do something in a specific way, [we’ll go to
their place]. On the request from [our clients say] “Can you measure here?” and
we’ll go to [their place]….Unless we see their needs, we won’t go.
Hattori points out that Kodomira’s clients, not Kodomira members and volunteers,
initiate radiation data collection; Data collection is generally demand-driven for
Kodomira. Unlike Safecast, Kodomira volunteers did not standardize the height of
measurements because they listened to clients’ concerns first and then chose the height of
measurements accordingly. As such, Kodomira members and volunteers did not
standardize their measurement methods. According to Maeda, he generally measured
radiation one meter above the ground whereas Ishimaru noted that he tended to take
measurements 10 centimeters above the ground in order to detect micro-hot spots more
effectively.
An analysis of Kodomira’s Make Radiation Visible Project and its HSF dosimeter
found three major findings. First, Kodomira assumed that the accuracy of a dosimeter
calibrated by JCSS-certified organizations guarantees the quality of measurement
readings. Kodomira tactically followed the government’s guidance on radiation
measurement in order to create data that could be used for lobbying the government. This
view of measurement reading accuracy can be found in Matsuo’s view of measurement
187

readings as a fundamental rhetorical resource for lobbying the government. In addition,
Kodomira also assumed that the accurate reading help relieve people’s anxiety.
Second, Kodomira viewed the HSF as a more effective dosimeter compared to
other dosimeters such as the Geiger counter. This section illustrated that the HSF created
a communication space about micro-hot spots and cool spots due to its high technical
abilities. Social amplification of risk framework assumes that public perception of risks is
amplified by many psychological and social factors. An analysis of HSF’s high response
rate apparently indicates socio-technical amplification of risk among HSF users.
However, as the next section shows, this is not necessarily the case for Kodomira.
And finally, this section showed that despite HSF’s mapping function Kodomira
did not create a radiation map due to the issue of privacy. Unlike Safecast, Kodomira’s
data collection is demand-driven and in order to satisfy Kodomira’s clients, Kodomira is
flexible about its measurement methods. As such, an analysis of Kodomira’s Make
Radiation Visible Project is far from comparable to Safecast in many ways.
Redefining a Child-Centered Everyday Life: “Measuring, Learning and Living”
This section discusses how Kodomira constructed everyday life in post-
Fukushima Japanese society by utilizing the HSF. As the previous section shows,
Kodomira viewed HSF as useful dosimeter to articulate micro-hot and cool spots due to
its high response rate. The question then is how Kodomira members and volunteers
redefined their everyday life in post-Fukushima Japanese society by using the HSF in
2014. What were the implications of Kodomira’s Making Radiation Visible Project?
Through the Making Radiation Visible Propect, Kodomira actively engaged in
generating datum on radiation in the air in Tokyo, Fukushima, Chiba, Tochigi, and
188

Gumma (e.g. Hattori, 2014a, 2014c, 2014d; Itō, 2013; Kodomo mirai sokuteijo, 2013a).
As noted, Kodomira did not lobby the Japanese state with its data, but it generated data
that could be used as a resource for decontamination. For example Chia Yoshida, a writer,
reported that Kodomira’s measurement data contributed to the decontamination of hot
spots in Kashiwa City, Chiba (Yoshida, 2014a, 2014b). Although Yoshida has been
deeply involved in Kodomira since May 2014, she started as a part-time volunteer with
Kodomira since April 2012 when a print and online magazine Mom’s Revolution was
published. As a writer of Mom’s Revolution, Yoshida wanted to learn more about
radiation measuring at Kodomira. As a result, Mom’s Revolution has featured both
Kodomira and Ishimaru and publicized Kodomira’s fund-raising campaign for the HSF
(Itō, 2012; Itō, 2014; Mama rebo henshūbu, 2013).
Yoshida describes the meaning of micro-hot spots in her everyday life as follows:
…(W)hen my free-spirited son was little, he would touch anything at random. He
assumed that all things were as natural as his toys. It’s unpredictable whether such
a kid will grab grass where there happened to be micro-hot spots, taking it into his
mouth… Considering that parents would like to raise their children freely, I don't
think it’s possible [for them] to carry out their child rearing while worrying about
micro-hot spots. If so, we’d better rid [our environment of micro-hot spots].
Yoshida views micro-hot spots from the perspective of child-centered life. Given that
there were micro-hot spots, it was necessary for parents to know about them for the
health and safety of children. Ishimaru agreed with Yoshida’s views of hot spots and
added that it’s important to view hot spots in relation to the characteristic of their
locations:
189

…Let’s say there is a spot with extremely high [radiation] levels, but what matters
is what kind of activities people participate in and how long they stay…(I)n the
case of adults, [they] go past [a micro-hot spot] even if there are micro-hot spots,
things don't matter, though it’d better to decontaminate [them]. If there’re micro
hot spots in a place where children play, it’s necessary to give high priority to deal
with them.
Ishimaru constructed the characteristics of locations from perspective of children and
suggested that it is necessary to articulate where micro-hot spots are located. Rather than
being overwhelmed by the existence of micro-hot spots per se, Ishimaru actively defined
the meaning of each micro hot spot in relation to its location. Yoshida further noted an
advantage of citizens’ data:
It’s not certain about how children would move. Let’s say, when you measure
[radiation] on a school route, [the level of] measurement readings vary greatly
according to where you walk and measure, and children don't necessarily walk on
the street properly or sometimes they loiter on their way…. Perhaps, the public
administration would go by the rules to measure only one specific [area]. After all,
measuring citizens can cover other areas, which can be called “play [areas]”.
Yoshida suggests that citizens’ data were more useful in her everyday life compared to
the government’s data. She defines good data for her in terms of “closeness to children”
and emphasized “I think measuring [radiation] is about [everyday] life, not science.” In
order to defend children from unnecessary exposure to radiation, Kodomira found the
HSF particularly practical and useful. Kodomira members and volunteers detected micro-
190

hot spots by using the HSF and constructed children-centered data for everyday life
accordingly.
In the early spring of 2014, Japan’s NGO Center for International Cooperation
(JANIC), Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) Japan, and Kodomira co-
issued a free booklet titled Hakaru, shiru, kurasu: Kodomotachi o hōshano kara mamoru
tameni watashi tachi ga dekiru koto (“Measuring, Learning and Living: What We Can
Do to Protect Children from Radioactivity in English) (Hattori, 2014b). According to
Hattori, who was the booklet’s editor, they co-published 30,000 copies and Uchida sent
them to the Fukushima Prefecture and the Kanto Region for free. According to Hattori,
Hattori named the booklet Measuring, Learning and Living. Hattori notes:
When we talked about the basic concept of the booklet, we were convinced that
the topic shouldn't be about good or bad places where we live. In order to live in
post-disaster Japan or a world where nuclear power plants exist, it would be
necessary to measure [radiation] and learn [about our everyday environment]. In
order to show the fundamental stance [of the booklet], we chose the term “living,”
by which we meant something we need to do to live.
The short booklet consists of three chapters. The first chapter explains basic information
about radioactivity with a suggested booklist for the reader and includes an interview
with Akira Sugenoya, Mayor of Matsumoto and a doctor, who gave medical assistance to
the Belarusian people after the Chernobyl accident. The second chapter is about the issue
of radiation measurement, including an interview with Dr. Katsumi Shozugawa, a minute
of round-table talk among citizens who are involved in measuring radiation, and two
short essays on citizen’s measuring stations and the HSF. The final chapter illustrates
191

where hot spots and micro-hot spots generally exist in everyday environment, and how
readers should deal with radiation in case an emergency should occur as well as coping
with present-day [three years at the time of writing] after the nuclear disaster.
When asked about the booklet’s target audience, most Kodomira volunteers agree
that they made the booklet for citizens rather than scientists and government officials.
Pointing to Chapter 3 as the meat of the booklet, Hattori noted that the target audience is
“mothers who are extremely concerned [about radiation]” adding that “[T]heir husbands
will ultimately read it once they see their wife read it.” Uchida further remarked that the
target audience was “Parents living in areas affected by radiation released from the [the
Fukushima Daiichi reactor]” with her view of the affected area as “throughout the Kanto
Region.” Uchida also added that the booklet was designed to break the communication
barrier between those who were concerned about radiation and those who weren’t and
emphasized that, “we intended to create something that we could hand-out to anyone.”
Yoshida, who was involved in designing Chapter 3, includes children as a part of
the target audience, viewing parents and children as its main audiences rather than “adults”
alone. Yoshida pointed out that Chapter 3 of the booklet includes many vivid images
showing where specifically people should care about radiation. Ishimaru also takes a
different view of the booklet as a resource to solve the issue of digital divide between
Internet users and non-users:
We’re often told that people in Fukushima don't use the Internet. [We’re told that]
in particular, the elder generations doesn't use [the Internet]. That’s why we made
print media. After all, there are visual images showing what we should be careful
about in Chapter 3, you know. [For instance], grandmothers and grandfathers still
192

want to eat mushrooms or wild vegetables even if their daughter-in-law
emphasized that they contain [radioactive materials], but kairamban, or “a notice
for circulation” works [for them] unexpectedly. If [they receive information
[about radiation] via a notice for circulation, [they] would accept, that “wild
vegetables [would contain radioactive materials]. The degree of information
credibility or whether they take care of information [on radiation] thus depends on
what kind of media and channel they receive [the information] from. So, [the
booklet] is an [appropriate] media for the elderly…If anything, we try harder to
access those who’re living in Fukushima and other areas with the higher level of
radiation rather than in Tokyo. The digital divide in Fukushima is much more
[serious] than in Tokyo.
Ishimaru views the booklet as a resource that broke not only the digital divide between
the elderly and the younger, but also the information gaps between Tokyo on one hand
and areas with higher level of radiation (and Fukushima in particular) on the other.
Maeda further remarked that the content of the booklet was “nothing really new for those
who are more or less collecting information about radiation on the Internet,” adding that,
“Given the public reaction [to the booklet], the information is, after all, not that pervasive
unless its’ communicated [effectively].” As such, it should be emphasized that among
grassroots measuring networks examined in this dissertation, Kodomira makes a
particular effort to reach those who don't access the Internet.
The third chapter of the booklet illuminates where micro-hot spots are likely to
exist. According to Yoshida, Shozugawa volunteered to make sure that there are no
factual errors in the content of Chapter 3. She also noted that the content of chapter 3
193

epitomizes what Kodomira volunteers learned by measuring radiation with the HSF. For
instance, the booklet provides the description of a roadside, giving specific advice to
readers as follows:
Roadside:
Present: There are many cases that radioactive materials are on the surface of the
ground. So, it’s natural that the closer you get to the ground, the higher radiation
levels become. And there are cases that radiation levels are 1.5 to 2 times higher
on a roadside where dirt involving radioactive materials tends to be accumulated
than on the middle of a road. We need to be particularly careful about a place
where children walk when they commute to school (Hattori, 2014b, p.43)
In my interview, Ishimaru described the characteristic of Kodomira as a measuring
station as well as a “consulting station.” Ishimaru notes that, “[W]hile we were involved
as a measuring station, we communicate [to our clients], and clear their doubts by
providing information if possible. Since I started Kodomira, I’ve realized that that’s the
way Kodomira is.” Uchida further describes the role of Kodomira from her experience as
follows,
We are not experts or researchers, [but] we do measure [radiation]. We do realize
that we measure radiation, but… [the point] is how we convey [measurement
data] to ordinary people in a comprehensible and clear manner. I usually say that
we’ll report circumstances of the moment [to them].
The booklet not only shows what Kodomira has learned from its dialogue with its clients
since the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. In short, Measuring, Learning and Living is
194

a record of Kodomira’s views of post-Fukushima Japanese society. As such, Kodomira
reinvents children-centered everyday life in post-Fukushima Japanese society.
Conclusion: Making Data as Drama
This chapter examines Kodomira as a case study of Japanese citizens’ grassroots
measuring networks in Tokyo. The first section of this chapter traced the origin of
Kodomira’s Making Radiation Visible Program back to 5cm50cm Keisoku Net and
provided a historical context in which Kodomira’s project emerged the way it did in
terms of its data production practice. The second section focuses on examining
Kodomira’s Making Radiation Visible Project with particular focus on the HSF and
described how Kodomira members and volunteers conceptualized their data production
practices. The third section shows how Kodomira volunteers constructed post-Fukushima
everyday life by measuring radiation with the HSF.
Three findings emerged:
First, unlike Safecast, Kodomira primarily views its radiation data as an action
motivator rather than information. As described in the previous chapter, the goal of
Safecast was to collect as much data as possible to make its data available for people to
use freely. In other words, Safecast produced radiation data as information, which
someone could use in his or her everyday life. In short, Safecast’s data collection could
be described as supply-driven. In contrast, Kodomira measured radiation upon requests
from citizens as its clients, and accordingly Kodomira volunteers choose their
measurement method. As such, Kodomira’s data production is more or less demand-
driven. After measuring radiation, they shared their views of data and circulated the
meaning of measurement readings with clients. At Kodomira, Ishimaru suggested that
195

communication was always a dialogue between Kodomira volunteers and clients as they
both participated in creating meaning for each measurement reading together. Thus
Kodomira didn't need to make its data as a whole open to the public; Kodomira may not
contribute to the knowledge infrastructures directly. As such, to borrow from Carey’s
concept, Kodomira’s data production practice can be better understood as a ritual view of
data, which involves not only the transmission of data on radiation from Kodomira to its
clients exclusively but also the representation of shared meaning of data on radiation.
Second, Kodomira tactically used technical reasoning and social reasoning when
generating radiation data. This chapter shows that just as 5cm50cm Keisoku Net,
Kodomira sought to create datum that could be convincing to the Japanese state. It also
aimed to relieve people’s concerns by generating accurate measurement readings. In
order to achieve two different goals, Kodomira uses both technical and social reasoning.
As for technical reasoning, Kodomira emphasized the role of JCSS in legitimizing its
dosimeter as legitimate from the perspective of the Japanese state. On the other hand,
Kodomira used social reasoning to construct meaning of micro-hot spots in a child-
centered everyday life by using the HSF.
Finally, unlike the social amplification of risk thesis assumes, Kodomira
volunteers didn't necessarily amplify micro-hot spots as huge risks irrationally, in part
due to the technical competence of the HSF. This chapter indicates that Kodomira
volunteers, and Ishimaru and Yoshida in particular, actively defined the meaning of
radiation measurement readings by detecting micro-hot spots. As such, Kodomira
members and volunteers contributed to post-Fukushima Japanese society by protecting
children from unnecessary exposure to radiation.
196

Chapter 6: Hakatte Geiger
Hakatte Geiger, which can be translated as “Will you measure [radiation] by
[using] a Geiger counter?” is an online platform designed by Japanese programmer and
entrepreneur, Norifumi Ogawa. Hakatte Geiger allows non-dosimeter users to request
volunteer dosimeter users to measure radiation in the air at specific locations. As Ogawa
frankly admits during his interview, Hakatte Geiger has been less active in 2014 as
compared to 2011 when Hakatte Geiger received a great deal of media exposure in Japan
(Yomiuri, 2011d; Yomiuri, 2011f). There are some people who still contributed to the
platform in many different ways in 2014. The question then is how has a single
programmer initiated, operated, and maintained a platform on radiation air dose rates data
by using the Internet in post-Fukushima Japanese society.
My analysis draws on and extends Liu and Ziemke’s 2012 studies of participatory
crisis mapping. They illustrate how people with different skillsets contributed to the
making of crisis mapping after natural disasters such as the 2005 Hurricane Katrina and
the Haiti Earthquake of 2010 by utilizing information and communication technologies
(ICTs). Liu and Ziemke (2012) note “how we design our computing technologies will
determine what kind of experience and interaction we will have” (p.186). Simultaneously,
Liu and Ziemke add that what makes mapping truly participatory is affected by how its
users utilize the map, indicating that designers of crisis mapping alone never decisively
shape collective intelligence. They further argue that the design of ICT should be
discussed in relation to social and cultural contexts in which potential users (such as
concerned citizens) are embedded. In short, the notion of how user-friendly crisis
mapping design is should be more or less negotiable among stakeholders including its
197

designers and users. As will be illustrated later, the efforts made by Ogawa to design
Hakatte Geiger alone don't shape collective intelligence. The question then is how both
Ogawa and various Hakatte Geiger users contributed to the renegotiation of designing
Hakatte Geiger.
Among the many grassroots measuring networks, Hakatte Geiger is notably
unique for two reasons. First, Hakatte Geiger is a platform designed by only one Japanese
programmer and entrepreneur at GogoLabs, a Kamakura-based Japanese company.
Hakatte Geiger was by no means created as a social movement consisting of
organizations and groups of activists with a specific political purpose. Secondly, Hakatte
Geiger has created a communication space for people without measurement devices to
contribute to radiation data production practice, albeit indirectly. Investigating Hakatte
Geiger suggests how one particular person with the appropriate skillset managed to get
heterogeneous groups of people involved in generating data about nuclear radiation in
post-Fukushima Japanese society. This chapter illustrates this alternative style of
radiation measuring networks.
Based on in-depth interviews with Ogawa and Hakatte Geiger users, this chapter
is the first qualitative research on Hakatte Geiger investigating how Ogawa designed
Hakatte Geiger as a space to encourage its users to get involved in the radiation data
production practice and how individual Hakatte Geiger users have actually used Hakatte
Geiger in their everyday life. It is important to investigate how Hakatte Geiger emerged
the way it did and in the following pages I will describe the historical background that
gave rise to Hakatte Geiger. The rest of the chapter examines the rhetorical strategy that
Ogawa has employed in generating data about nuclear radiation at Hakatte Geiger and
198

suggests how Hakatte Geiger’s users have used Hakatte Geiger in their everyday life.
Finally, I’ll discuss the cultural and scientific implications of Hakatte Geiger in relation
to Safecast and Kodomira in the post-Fukushima Japanese society.
Method
In order to better understand how Ogawa has designed Hakatte Geiger and how
Hakatte Geiger volunteers have used Hakatte Geiger, I conducted individual interviews
with both groups as described in previous chapters. As for the sampling method, given
that most Hakatte Geiger volunteers are anonymous (not making their contact
information open to the public) I recruited research participants via snowball sampling
with Ogawa as the initial contact. I chose this method mainly because I found it necessary
to build rapport for interviews, given that the issue of measuring can be seen as a political
issue for certain parties. Given that there were very few active Hakatte Geiger users in
2014, I only secured two to participate in my research. Research participants were aware
that they were interviewed because they are active Hakatte Geiger users. All research
participants who agreed to participate in this study were limited to male participants,
partly because of the chosen data collection method. Ogawa and one of the Hakatte
Geiger users agreed to be identified by name, whereas the other user agreed to participate
in my research on the condition of anonymity. Given that a participant’s comments can
possibly result in retribution, I made both the Hakatte Geiger users anonymous. Given the
small sample size of Hakatte Geiger users, the findings of this research is far from
generalizable but this chapter focuses on illuminating how the two Hakatte Geiger users
have used Hakatte Geiger in their everyday life. Also, I collected various printed and
199

online documents on Hakatte Geiger, including newspaper articles. My analysis is based
on the interview data and the documents.
Going from Gas Price to Radiation
In order to illustrate Ogawa’s design of Hakatte Geiger as a communication space
for collective radiation data production practice it is useful to provide a brief overview of
Ogawa’s previous business experience. The origin of Hakatte Geiger can arguably be
traced back to Ogawa’s personal website gogo.gs. As a car-driving enthusiast and a full-
time employed programmer, he launched a personal website in November 2004 that
allowed its users to share data about changing gas prices all around Japan. Just as in the
United States and elsewhere, each gas station sets different gas prices every day in Japan.
Back in 2004, there was no information about gas-station-specific gas price available
(Taguchi, 2008). Ogawa noted that in hindsight, his personal concerns about changing
gas prices encouraged him to launch gogo.gs. After launching the website, he drove a
motorcycle to nearby gas stations over his weekends with his voice recorder and
collected data about gas station-specific gas prices (Taguchi, 2008). After collecting data,
he manually input data about gas station-specific gas prices to his website and made them
open to the public. According to his accounts, there was substantial increase in the
number of the website’s users who contributed data just one year after he launched the
service in part due to the soring gas prices from 2005 to 2006. Indeed, the Agency for
Natural Resource and Energy (ANRE)’s White Paper demonstrates that during November
2004 to January 2007, the nationwide average gas price ranges from 116JPY per one liter
up to 144 JPY in Japan (Shigen enerugī chō, 2007). There are various factors responsible
for the soaring gas price in Japan, and those same factors helped boost gogo.gs’s
200

popularity according to Ogawa. As a result, Ogawa turned his personal website gogo.gs
into a startup venture in Tokyo in June 2007 and GoGoLabs, Inc. was born. After
launching the startup, Ogawa added several new services allowing its users to share
information about the location of electric vehicle (EV) charging stations among others.
In order to understand the design of Hakatte Geiger in a historical context, it is
particularly important to investigate how Ogawa has designed and developed gogo.gs.
Given that his primary goal is to maximize chances of participation, he not only made
data on gas station-specific gas prices open to the public, but also offered Application
Programming Interface (API) to its users on the condition that they register for the
website (Ogawa, 2007). Simultaneously, Ogawa set one important condition for data
quality control: If you want to participate in gogo.gs by submitting your own data, you’re
required to register for the website by proving your email address as contact information.
This condition allows Ogawa to contact each participant if he or she submits suspicious
or untrustworthy data about gas prices. When asked about how he differentiates
trustworthy data from untrustworthy, Ogawa states that he looks at each datum in
relation to the average gas price to see if that datum is reasonably trustworthy. He further
notes that if one registered user submits a specific datum on a gas price showing 20 or 30
yen above or below the average price, he’ll receive an alert automatically. Then he
investigates whether the datum is accurate or not. Given that it is not easy for him to
confirm individual datum about gas prices, he defines good datum in relation to the
average gas price. Just as Safecast, Ogawa indicates that he views a specific datum in
relation to other data. His conceptualization of trustworthy datum does not necessarily
require enormous amounts of human resources for data quality control. Nevertheless,
201

Ogawa points out that the biggest challenge he faced was dealing with the site’s users
including those who fabricated data on gas prices. Ogawa noted that he experienced a
learning curve dealing with these users in order to establish quality control over data on
gas prices.
Then the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster drastically changed his life. In the
aftermath of the nuclear accident, Ogawa like many other Japanese citizens struggled to
find a dosimeter in Tokyo. In May 2011, around two months after the nuclear accident,
Ogawa finally got a Geiger counter: RADEX RD-1503. As a father of two young
daughters, he was aware that there were many parents with young kids in his
neighborhood, which encouraged him to measure radiation in air in a nearby park. He
then shared measurement readings on Google Maps for anyone to see. However, he
immediately learned that it was difficult to attract attention even if he published radiation
measurement readings on Google Maps and made them open to the public. He notes:
After doing that [uploading measurement readings on Google Maps], I learned
that at a kindergarten [where my kids go], there are many fellow moms saying, “I
don’t have a Geiger counter, but I am no less concerned about [radiation levels at]
that place.” While I went to such places to measure [radiation levels] several
times, I realized that there should be the same needs for [measuring radiation
levels] in other places beyond our neighborhood. So, I just tentatively made a
website.
As such, Ogawa suggests that his and his fellow mom’s concerns about the health and
safety of their young children could be one of the factors responsible for Ogawa’s
creation of a new project: Hakatte Geiger. More importantly, he conceptualized his
202

fellow moms’ concerns by using the term “needs” for the web service. With his
programming skills and business experience in GoGoLabs, he designed a platform for
non-dosimeter users such as his fellow moms that allowed them to articulate their
concerns about radiation in their neighborhood. He further adds that it was also
important for him to become one of the users for his service:
I was concerned about gas prices because I am a driver. Likewise, I was
concerned about radiation because I have children, which triggered me to [create
Hakatte Geiger] as one of its users…I cannot stay with [Hakatte Geiger] unless
I’m one of its users.
On June 15 2011, Ogawa launched Hakatte Geiger. With his personal experience
in talking to fellow concerned moms and his business background in getting a wide
variety of people involved as data collectors, Ogawa was confident at this time that “we
can share information about radiation just as we shared [information about] gas prices.”
This section describes a historical context in which Hakatte Geiger emerged. Just
as he successfully got gas price-conscious people involved in gogo.gs, he assumed that he
could use his background to share data on radiation in the air to a wider audience.
However, as Ogawa noted in my interview, he was ignorant of issues related to nuclear
radiation before the nuclear accident. In the following pages, I investigate how Ogawa
learned about the characteristics of dosimeters and measurement methods, and show how
he designed and developed Hakatte Geiger accordingly.
Designing Hakatte Geiger
The previous section illustrates how Hakatte Geiger emerged, indicating that the
original design of Hakatte Geiger was mostly inspired by Ogawa’s experience with
203

gogo.gs. Hakatte Geiger was designed to maximize the opportunity of participation in
collecting data about radiation in the air. Hakatte Geiger provides API to its users and
requests that participants register for the website if they wish to submit their data or
request another user to measure for them (participants with a dosimeter can register for
the website as sokutei yūzā or “measuring users” while other participants can register for
Hakatte Geiger as rikuesuto yūzā or “requesting users”). By November 2014, the number
of measuring users was recorded as 4,068.
Another feature that Hakatte Geiger inherited from gogo.gs is Ogawa’s view of
participants. When asked about the scope of the term ‘users’ in my interview, Ogawa
confirms that the concept of users include both registered and non-registered users,
including those occasionally visiting the website. His conceptualization of participants as
users indicates a purely business perspective in which Ogawa as the service provider
treats participants as customers. According to Ogawa, however, Hakatte Geiger is by no
means a for-profit organization. While Hakatte Geiger is technically a part of Ogawa’s
startup venture GoGoLabs, and it has built its own business partnership with a Japanese
company, Hakatte Geiger’s profits have been donated to non-profit organizations in
Fukushima. Ogawa targeted organizations in Fukushima because Hakatte Geiger is
“related to the issue of radiation and those who are suffering most [from radiation] would
be perhaps people in Fukushima.” On March 11 2014, GoGoLabs announced that it
donated Hakatte Geiger’s profits to the Fukushima Prefecture for the sake of children
affected by the disaster (GoGoLabs, Inc., 2014).
Ogawa designed the original structure of Hakatte Geiger partly based on his
experience at gogo.gs, but he emphasized in my interview that Hakatte Geiger was
204

updated and redesigned again and again upon request from its users, particularly in the
first six months after he launched the website. However, it should be noted that as Liu
and Ziemke (2012) indicate, the original design of Hakatte Geiger defines a context in
which radiation data was produced. More specifically, the original design of Hakatte
Geiger shapes the fundamental characteristics of its measurement method. Unlike
Safecast, Hakatte Geiger does not allow its users to collect measurement data by driving
a car precisely because the original design of Hakatte Geiger requests that its user
manually pinpoint a specific spot where he or she took the measurement reading when
uploading it to the website. Ogawa’s design of Hakatte Geiger, which derived in part
from his past gas price collecting experiences, has fundamental implications for users
measuring and uploading data.
Originally, he designed Hakatte Geiger consisting of four basic sections: Hakatte
Request, Hakarune Report, Hakattayo Response, and Arigato Message. Hakatte Geiger
also started with two different maps: Request Map and Radiation Dose Map.
Hakatte Request, which can be translated as “request for [radiation] measurement”
shows where measurement readings are wanted on a map. Requesting users can submit a
request for measuring users to measure a specific spot and can also add messages
specifying measurement method characteristics, such as the height of measurements.
Ogawa notes that on June 26, 2011, upon request from Hakatte Geiger users, he added a
new design allowing requesting users to open the map on Google Maps. Also in response
to user feedback, on September 7, 2011 Ogawa allowed requesting users to ask for re-
measurements even if measurement datum had already been received for a specific spot.
Hakarune Report, which can be translated as “I intend to measure [radiation],” showcases
205

where measuring users chose to measure radiation independent of another user’s request.
These responses from measuring users are all recorded on the site’s map as well as
Google Maps. Hakattayo Response or “I measured [radiation] and here it is” shows
where measurement data were actually taken. Measuring users can upload measurement
readings independently of any requests. These reported readings are also shown on the
site’s maps and Google Maps. Hakattayo Response was designed to allow measuring
users to describe measurement conditions, such as the weather, creating a space for
measuring users to construct what their “raw” datum looks like. Finally, Ogawa added a
communication space between requesting users and measuring users: Arigato Message
or “Messages of thanks.” In this section, requesting users generally express their gratitude
to measuring users after receiving requested measurement readings. Ogawa noted in my
interview that he designed Arigato Message as a way to get measuring users motivated,
given that they spend time and money measuring radiation upon request without any
monetary payment. On June 21, 2011 Ogawa also added a new design allowing
requesting users to send a direct message of thanks to measuring users. According to
Ogawa, this is the first design that he added to Hakatte Geiger based on user requests.
When compared with Safecast and Kodomira, Hakatte Geiger seems to have been
designed to generate different kinds of information about radiation and make them
available for the public. This has been true since the early stages of development when
requesting users wanted measurement readings; measuring users wanted to measure;
measuring users actually took measurement readings; appreciative requesting users
wanted to express that; and measuring users wanted to illustrate what their raw datum
looked like. Hakatte Geiger not only produces measurement readings, it shows the
206

process in which data were requested, generated, and consumed in everyday life after the
disaster. In other words, Hakatte Geiger has provided various historical snapshots of
citizen’s measurement data collection practices and concerns.
All data in the first three sections (Hakatte Request, Hakarune Report, Hakattayo
Response) are reflected in the Request Map. The Request Map shows all spots where
Hakatte Request, Hakarune Report, Hakattayo Response generated locations of and for
measurements. Hakatte Requests are red on the map whereas Hakarune Report and
Hakattayo Response are blue and green respectively. The Radiation Dose Map shows
measurement reading results from Hakattayo Response. Upon requests from its users,
Ogawa redesigned the map classifying each measurement reading level by different
colors on July 13, 2011. Unlike Safecast and Kodomira, Hakatte Geiger radiation
readings can be divided into as many as nineteen categories
34
. When asked why he
classified the level of radiation into nineteen levels, Ogawa emphasizes that the
classification of radiation levels does not reflect his personal views of radiation at all:
I referred to a various websites. I thought it would be a problem if [Hakatte
Geiger’s] designation [of radiation] were different from other websites’. I found a
website mapping radiation like [Hakatte Geiger], and I asked [a designer] of the
website to see if I could classify and color [radiation] in the same way [the
designer] did.

34
The nineteen categories are: -0.1μSV/h, -0.2μSV/h, -0.3 μSV/h,0.4 μSV/h, 0.5, μSV/h,
0.6 μSV/h, 0.7 μSV/h, 0.8 μSV/h, 0.9 μSV/h, 1.0 μSV/h, 1.5 μSV/h, -2.0 μSV/h, 2.5
μSV/h, 3.0 μSV/h, 3.5 μSV/h, 4.0 μSV/h, 4.5 μSV/h, 5.0 μSV/h, 5.0-μSV/h. The
categories are visualized with five different colors from low to high level of radiation:
blue, waterish blue, green, yellow, orange, and red.
207

Ogawa adopted the data representation method from a private website and because of this
Hakatte Geiger’s classification and visualization of data on radiation air dose rates does
not necessarily comprise Ogawa’s own interpretations of radiation.
According to Ogawa, the Radiation Dose Map was refined and developed in
regards to feedback from its users. For instance, he redesigned the website allowing them
to look at measurement readings with respect to specific dosimeters on September 2,
2011. On April 16, 2013, Ogawa further refined Hakatte Geiger allowing its users to look
at measurement readings by setting a date range. As such, Ogawa developed Hakatte
Geiger’s data representation system by including various user feedback. In fact, Ogawa
added yet another map on decontamination to the website upon requests from users on
December 28 2011. The Decontamination Map allows its users to share information
about where decontamination is conducted.
An analysis of Hakatte Geiger’s data submission protocol implies that the
interplay between Ogawa and Hakatte Geiger’s users is very important to the site’s
development and growth. At the time of writing, Hakatte Geiger required its measuring
users to report the following information manually when they upload their measurement
readings: the date (year, month, day, and hour], the brand of dosimeter, the measurement
reading [micro Sievert per hour], the place of measurement [outside, outside/asphalt,
outside/soil, outside/lawn, outside/side ditch, outside/sandbox, or inside], the level of the
building in which the measurement was taken [basement, land surface, 1
st
floor, 2
nd
floor,
3
rd
floor, 4
th
floor or 5
th
floor and so on], the height of the measurement taken [5
centimeter, 50 centimeter, 1 meter or 1.5 meter]. According to Ogawa, the development
of data submission involved the interaction between Ogawa and Hakatte Geiger users.
208

For instance, Ogawa noted that he added “basement” in the section “level of building” on
July 7, 2011 because of user requests. In response to user feedback, Ogawa allowed users
to publish a photograph of their measurement on September 9, 2011 and added a
YouTube URL function in May 2013. When asked about his views of Hakatte Geiger
user feedback, Ogawa notes that:
Those who look at information [on radiation] want to refer to how radiation was
actually measured. [By the same token], those who contribute to [Hakatte Geiger]
are motivated, feeling that “given that I submit [my data to Hakatte Geiger], I
want to submit more data more properly.” That’s why I [added] photograph and
video [functions].
Ogawa designed and redesigned Hakatte Geiger considering a wide variety of user-
voiced concerns. On the Hakatte Geiger website, Ogawa describes Hakatte Geiger as the
following:
[Hakatte Geiger] is a website in which those without Geiger counters can request
Geiger counter users to measure [radiation]. You can submit [your] measurement
readings independently of requests, letting everyone know [your measurement
readings]. Measurement requests are filled on a voluntary basis, so both
[measurement] requests and measurements involve neither payments nor rewards.
Both measurement readings and conditions on this website come exclusively from
information submitted by measuring users. If you find [some] published
information untrustworthy, you might want to re-request measurements by [using]
Hakatte Request, or you might want to measure [radiation] for yourself. (Hakatte
Geiger, 2014)
209

Just as with gogo.gs, the issue of data quality and trustworthiness is one of the key
challenges facing Ogawa. Indeed, he stated in my interview that immediately after he
released the website, he received a lot of emails and messages via Twitter saying that
measurement readings on Hakatte Geiger are untrustworthy because all information on
measurement readings came from laypeople. He elaborates how the concept of Hakatte
Geiger was born:
Just as with gas prices, there was indeed more and more information that’s
impossible to tell where the truth ends and the lie begins. But, [what we needed]
was primary information, you know, because the Japanese government cannot
measure [radiation] on every detail. So, [my approach is] to let us share
information [about radiation] together by letting somebody go to [a specific spot]
and roughly measure [radiation]. If unusual measurement readings are found, it’d
be good to have municipal or prefectural government measure [radiation] properly.
I don't think that measurement devices ranging in price from 30,000JPY to
50,000JPY produce exact measurement readings. However, [Hakatte Geiger] may
play a role in removing or relieving peoples’ concerns [about radiation].
It’s important to note that Ogawa did not assume that all measurement readings
on Hakatte Geiger were accurate when interviewed in 2014, in part due to the quality of
dosimeters. More importantly, Ogawa actually designed Hakatte Geiger, allowing users
of any kinds of dosimeters to register for Hakatte Geiger as measuring users. He noted
that initially he received requests from its users saying, “since Chinese-made dosimeters
have a large margin of error, you should not publish [data taken] by using such
dosimeters.” However, Ogawa didn't restrict users of some specific dosimeters from the
210

category of measuring users. As a result, he left the decision of whether a dosimeter was
trustworthy to Hakatte Geiger users. Ogawa notes that:
In short, there are people who would like to measure [radiation] by using a
Chinese-made dosimeter. I don't think that it’s good to tell them that they’re not
allowed [to measure] because [their dosimeters] are Chinese-made…Anyway,
since I don't know what measuring readings are accurate, I publish [all data] for
now, and then viewers of the data can make a judgment. If everyone finds [a
specific datum] unusual, it’s good to report to [public officials] such as mayors.
Or you might want to measure [radiation to make sure that the datum is accurate]
for yourself.
Unlike Safecast and Kodomira, Ogawa thus does not standardize one single
dosimeter and as a result, Hakatte Geiger’s Radiation Dose Map reflects measurement
readings taken by using a wide variety of dosimeters including the Geiger counter and
scintillator. An analysis of the Hakatte Geiger Radiation Dose Map shows that there are
measurement readings taken by as many as 85 different dosimeters. Also, the Radiation
Dose Map includes measurement data taken by using self-made and other unbranded
dosimeters.
From the perspectives of experts who assume that the characteristics of
dosimeters are one of the most important factors for assessing citizens’ data, it is difficult
to get even a general impression of radiation by using the Radiation Dose Map. Unlike
gogo.gs, maximizing chances of participation may not necessarily ameliorate the quality
of Radiation Dose Map because measurement readings taken by using different
dosimeters are not comparable within the map even if these readings are recorded
211

quantitatively. It should be noted that unlike other grassroots measuring networks,
Hakatte Geiger doesn't exclude users of any dosimeters from the category of measuring
users and creates an inclusive participatory communication space in which users of any
dosimeters (including self-made ones) can contribute to the website. In short, Hakatte
Geiger is open to any dosimeter users.
While maximizing alternative spaces for citizens who use different dosimeters to
participate, Ogawa standardized the measurement methods. Ogawa noted in my interview
that he studied measurement methods by using two specific online materials, which he
lists as references for measurement methods on the Hakatte Geiger website. One is a
conversation designed by Dr. Mihoko Nojiri, a physicist at KEK Theory Center in Japan,
who assembled tweets about measurement methods and published them as a conversation
at the website of togetter (Mihoko_Noriji, 2011). The tweet interactions began with Dr.
Ryūgo Hayano’s tweets on accurate ways of using a Geiger counter. In his tweets,
Hayano emphasizes that when using a Geiger counter to measure the dose equivalent rate
(Sv/h), one needs to measure gamma rays alone by blocking beta rays in order to avoid
potential confounding factors in assessing radiation exposure effects by the presence of
beta rays (Mihoko_Noriji, 2011). What follows after his initial tweets are tweet
interactions between Hayano and others including Nojiri. Togetter was used in
constructing scientific information through a series of different tweets and some togetter
users like Ogawa learned about radiation from the conversation. The togetter
conversation was widely circulated via Twitter and Facebook (Mihoko_Noriji, 2011).
The other online material Ogawa referred to is an online public domain comic illustrated
by Japanese cartoonist Miso Suzuki (2011). The short comic book, titled How to Measure
212

Radiation, animates a lecture by Dr. Nojiri who explains basic information about
radiation and different types of dosimeters including the Geiger counter. At the time of
writing, the comic book had been downloaded around 40,000 times (Suzuki, 2011).
Ogawa took advantage of free online resources and educated himself about
Geiger counters in a scientifically accurate way. He shared this information with the
Hakatte Geiger community by attaching links to togetter and the public domain cartoon
to show how measurement method should be. He also notes on the website that, “before
measuring [radiation], you want to confirm the accurate way of using a Geiger counter.
[You want to read] the instruction attached to [your] dosimeter,” and thus raising
awareness about the characteristics of dosimeters. There is no data available about how
measuring users looked at Ogawa’s message, but Ogawa noted in my interview that after
putting the links to the website, he received a lot of comments on measurement methods.
On request from Hakatte Geiger users, he added on November 7
th
2011 that, “if [your
dosimeter has] a shielding board, please measure [radiation] by shielding [your sensor]
from beta-rays.” As such, Ogawa redesigned Hakatte Geiger’s standardized measurement
methods by accommodating requests from Hakatte Geiger users such that measuring
users could generate a better datum on radiation in the air. While Ogawa thus
standardized the measurement method for producing datum on radiation based on
requests from Hakatte Geiger users, the fundamental question still remains: How does he
strike a balance between maximizing a space for citizens’ participation without restricting
users of specific dosimeters on the one hand and controlling the quality of measurement
readings taken by using different measurements on the other. In what follows, I’ll
illustrate how Ogawa has dealt with this difficult question by using social media.
213

Designing Participatory Radiation Data Quality Control
Hakatte Geiger’s data quality control can also be traced back to gogo.gs. While
Safecast has seven moderators sorting out contributions before approving them, gogo.gs
never sorted gas price data. By the same token, measurement readings submitted by
volunteer dosimeter users are automatically mapped on the Hakatte Geiger website.
Ogawa pointed out harmful consequences of moderators approving contributions in terms
of the maximization of chances to participate as follows:
…If I institute an approval system or permission system, the number of
information contributors will significantly decline. After all, this is what I felt
when creating the website on gas prices. Basically, what every contributor is
motivated to do is to transmit his or her own data to society. So if the operator [of
the website] sorts out data, there are cases that [contributors] will say something
like “Gee, I did submit [my data], but I can't see my data [on the website]” or “It
takes time to see [my data], but I just want to see them published right away.”
As such, Ogawa notes that an approval system discourages motivated contributors to
participate in Hakatte Geiger and redefines the role of moderators as collective users of
the website.
[With regard to the role of moderator], I’m fine if our users check each datum. In
a nutshell, I think that moderators are users. I don’t have moderators, so I can’t
[check each data by myself], but to the extent that I could, I’ve made all received
data tentatively open, making all users moderators that sort out each datum for
themselves…I am also one of the moderators because everyone is moderator.
214

Ogawa indicates that an approval system is more or less useless in terms of the
maximization of opportunities of participation and quality control. Ogawa has used
Twitter for Hakatte Geiger since December 29, 2011 (Hakatte Gaigā, 2015) and for
Hakatte Geiger, Twitter is particularly useful for quality control of data on radiation.
Once a measuring user submits a measurement datum to Hakatte Geiger, Hakatte Geiger
automatically tweets it on its Twitter account (@hakatte). The number of tweets is
comparable to the number of individual datum submitted on air dose rates by measuring
users after December 29, 2011.
35
Ogawa noted the reason he uses Twitter for sharing data
on radiation:
In a nutshell, we spread [data on radiation] to make everyone informed. In order
to spread them efficiently, I use Twitter… If someone retweets a [particular]
tweet, it means that he or she is concerned about the tweet. Then, I will confirm
[the content of the datum]… If one particular tweet is retweeted so many times,
something’s likely wrong and I’ll deal with the issue immediately. If nobody
retweets one particular tweet, its datum is not that important.
As such, Ogawa views Hakatte Geiger’s Twitter followers as a useful resource for
the quality control of individual measurement readings. More specifically, he views re-
tweeting as a sort of collective articulation of radiation. He notes that if he finds a
specific tweet articulated by Twitter users, he immediately contacts the measuring user
who submitted the specific datum to Hakatte Geiger to make sure the measuring user
reports measurement readings properly. Ogawa notes that he’ll delete the datum if he

35
Hakatte Geiger retweets some tweets mentioning Hakatte Geiger. Therefore, the exact
number of data should be calculated by subtracting the number of retweets from the
number of Hakatte Geiger’s total tweets.
215

doesn’t get any response from the measuring user after one week. As of January 2015,
Hakatte Geiger had more than 7000 Twitter followers. In Ogawa’s opinion, Hakatte
Geiger has more than 7000 moderators who monitor individual datum submitted by
measuring users. Ogawa tactically took advantage of Twitter as a free source to grapple
with quality control of measurement readings by designing what can be called collective
articulation of radiation.
An analysis of Hakatte Geiger’s Twitter records portrays the history of Hakatte
Geiger in terms of its data production. What follows is a record of Hakatte Geiger’s
monthly tweets from January 1, 2012 to January 31, 2015. Data were retrieved using a
Twitter log service named Twilog (Hakatte Gaigā, 2015). The number of measurement
readings was calculated using the Hakatte Geiger Twilog. The number of retweets was
subtracted from the number of Hakatte Geiger total tweets.

216

Figure 1. Number of Hakatte Geiger Measurement Readings
from January 1, 2012 to January 31, 2015.

The Y-axis is monthly volume of tweets.

As seen above, the monthly volume of measurement data submitted by measuring
users has been declining. Indeed, Ogawa noted in my interview that many Hakatte Geiger
users stopped checking Hakatte Geiger as a resource for information on radiation around
one year after the nuclear disaster, Ogawa remarks:
After one year passed, [Hakatte Geiger users] got a rough idea of where
dangerous areas are. That’s the reason all in all. And also, after one year passed,
along with Hakatte Geiger users, those who once wondered what they’re
supposed to do following the earthquake, more or less formed a view of what they
should do. After one year passed, for instance, people came to the general
conclusion about where they evacuate, whether they keep staying in the
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Year 2012.1
4
7
10
Year 2013.1
4
7
10
Year 2014.1
4
7
10
Year 2015.1
N of Measurement Readings
N of Measurement
Readings
217

Fukushima Prefecture or Tokyo, whether they make a judgment about what kinds
of foods they give or don’t give their kids. After [reaching some conclusions],
there are extremely few people who investigate various websites [on radiation
information] with their hearts pounding.
Ogawa assumed that there are fewer people who keep investigating data on radiation one
year after the meltdown because of this. When asked about the role of Hakatte Geiger in
2014, Ogawa made the following remark:
Perhaps, [Hakatte Geiger] served most of its purpose for one year [after the
nuclear accident]. In the case of the gas price comparison site or EV charging
station location site, everyone gets engaged and contributes [to the websites] to
make [the community] bigger. These cases are sustainable. For instance, in the
case of gas station [location], the website will be sustained and information-
sharing [among users] will be enhanced accordingly unless gas vehicles disappear.
However, in terms of radiation, the end points [of the project] is the time when
everyone is relieved…So, I see the amount of web traffic as that of a need to be
relieved, or that of anxiety. I don’t think that [the Hakatte Geiger] needs be
sustained eternally. Neither do I think that everyone should get involved in
measuring [radiation]. When everyone’s anxiety is relieved, Hakatte Geiger will
complete its role.
Notably, Ogawa views web traffic as manifestation of concerns about radiation in
the air, indicating that Hakatte Geiger may not necessarily be a sustainable project in
post-Fukushima Japanese society if “everyone is relieved.” Ogawa originally launched
Hakatte Geiger because there were needs for measuring radiation in the wake of the
218

disaster, but after three and a half years have passed, Ogawa indicates that such needs are
gradually disappearing. Still, there are active measuring users in 2014. How and why do
they engage in Hakatte Geiger as measuring users in 2014?
Using Hakatte Geiger in Everyday Life
In what follows, I’ll examine how Hakatte Geiger users have engaged with
Hakatte Geiger as a matter of everyday life, and in particular how they have used Hakatte
Geiger as a cultural resource through which they stake their claims about the state of
post-Fukushima Japanese society in heterogeneous ways. Specifically, I’ll explore the
relationship between Ogawa’s design for collective articulation of radiation and Hakatte
Geiger users’ actual use of Hakatte Geiger.
Given the difficulty of accessing the small number of active Hakatte Geiger users
at the time of research, I’ll explore and describe how two active measuring users have
taken advantage of Hakatte Geiger in everyday life. Hakatte Geiger user A is one of the
most active registered measuring users with more than 1,000 measurement readings
reported, which is the largest number of measurements for a single user at Hakatte Geiger.
He lives in a city in the Nagano Prefecture, a part of the central region of Japan’s main
island. His city is more than three hundreds and twenty kilometers away from the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, which is equivalent to the approximate distance
between New York City and Washington D.C. Another research participant, Hakatte
Geiger user B, lives in a city in the Chiba Prefecture, a part of the Greater Tokyo Area.
His city is more than two hundred and fourteen kilometers away from the power plant,
which is approximately the distance between New York City to Albany, NY. As noted,
the Chiba Prefecture has some “hot spot” areas where the level of radiation and
219

contamination is significantly greater than neighboring areas. Based on my interviews
with these two participants and on the online materials provided by the participants, I’ll
describe how they have used Hakatte Geiger in their everyday life.
Hakatte Geiger as Means of Distributing My Measurement Data
A is a retired male public official in a city in the Nagano Prefecture. In my
interview, He identifies himself as “gadget otaku” (gadget geeks in English), who is
extremely enthusiastic about a wide variety of gadgets. However, he knew little about
dosimeters before the disaster. Immediately after the disaster, he investigated several
websites to learn about dosimeters. Since he had some experience in importing gadgets
from abroad via eBay before the disaster, he imported a watch-shaped Geiger counter
from the United States via eBay, and a dosimeter on March 28, 2011.
When asked about the issue of calibration of his imported dosimeter, he
emphasizes that since he does not like to pay a lot of money for a one-time calibration, he
also imported Cesium 137-sealed radioactive sources (which are coin-shaped test metal
containers where a particular amount of Cesium 137 is sealed) from the United States.
From the beginning, he engaged in self-calibration in which he uses the radioactive
sources to adjust his measurement readings.
According to A, he considered it a sort of “hobby” to measure radiation and to
share his measurement readings on multiple radiation-mapping websites. He imported an
energy-compensated Csl (TI) scintillation survey meter Mirion PDS-100GN, a gamma
and neutron radiation detector from the United States via the Internet, which functions as
his main dosimeter. As illustrated in Chapter 3, the Japanese government’s guidance on
dosimeter designates the Nai (TI) scintillation survey meter as the “main survey meter
220

measuring air dose rates” (Monbukagakushō & Nihon genshiryoku kenkyū kaihatsu kikō,
2011, p.6). While Hakatte Geiger user A uses an energy-compensated Csl (TI)
scintillation survey meter in order to measure radiation air dose rates, his dosimeter is
basically the same model as what the government considers as the “main survey meter
measuring air dose rates.” He went to Nagoya, Tokyo and Chiba to measure radiation
using the new device. He even built his own monitoring post on his property in October
2011 with a different dosimeter one meter high above the ground and updates the
readings automatically every 20 minutes, distributing them to a wider audience by using
Twitter.
After the summer of 2011, he happened to find Hakatte Geiger while seeking out
a new radiation mapping website. He has contributed to Hakatte Geiger in many different
ways since then. Beyond providing measurement readings, he contributed to the diversity
of dosimeters designated by Hakatte Geiger. Since he didn't find his dosimeter, the
Mirion PDS-100GN, among the dosimeters designated by Hakatte Geiger he sent an
inquiry to Ogawa and asked him to include his dosimeter. Upon request from user A,
Ogawa added this dosimeter to the designated list of dosimeters.
Whereas he has made the most significant contribution to Hakatte Geiger in terms
of the volume of measurement readings, he emphasizes that Hakatte Geiger has been just
one of his means to spread his measurement readings. As such, he indicates that he
doesn't see his data submission as a sort of contribution to Hakatte Geiger. Indeed, he
does not know any other measuring Geiger users. Nor does he check measurement data
provided by other measuring users because he would be “worried sick” if he found the
discrepancy between his measurement method and others’. He further indicates that he
221

doesn't check Hakatte Geiger’s Twitter account. He thus emphasizes that he takes a look
at his own measurement readings alone. Indeed, he even notes that he doesn't look at the
government’s radiation-monitoring posts.
While he does not refer to others’ measurement readings, A regularly checks
Hakatte Request. He notes that he has tried to accommodate requests from requesting
users. However, user A also notes that he has actively engaged in taking measurement
readings independent of requests because there are no longer many requests in the
Nagano Prefecture. Taking measurement readings in his neighbors’ properties, he sees
whether the general levels of radiation changes in his surroundings.
As for data representation, he notes that he initially reported various measurement
conditions such as the weather, the direction of wind, and the force of wind, among other
measurement conditions in the Hakattayo Response section. In 2014, however, user A
reports just the weather and the height of measuring radiation as measurement conditions.
As for the Hakattayo Response, A notes that it’s good for Hakatte Geiger not to require
measuring users to put too many measurement conditions when uploading their readings;
Otherwise, he would no longer engage in the site. When asked why A continues to use
Hakatte Geiger as the means to spread his measurement readings in 2014, he notes that
Hakatte Geiger is a web service. Unlike many smart-phone applications, Hakatte Geiger
is not affected when a smart-phone’s Operation System (OS) is updated. He explained:
After all, I [have used] this website because there is no commitment requested.
For example, it would be a bother if I were requested to report [measurement
readings] on a monthly basis or to hold discussion meetings on [Hakatte Geiger].
Or if I were requested to do something after receiving requests [from its users],
222

[I’d be bothered] …so I’ll [measure] at my own pace. Now, fewer and fewer of
people really need [measurement readings] and want me to take them. So, I am
doing [measurements] at my own pace… After you get up and say “good
morning,” you’ll wash your face won’t you? [Measuring radiation] conveys the
same feeling for me. It’s customary [for me to measure radiation].
His account suggests that because fewer people are interested in radiation air dose rates in
his residential area in the Nagano Prefecture, it’s force of habit that motivates him to keep
measuring radiation air dose rates there. He further adds that given that more than three
years have passed since the disaster, there are likely people who found their cheap
dosimeters have broken, indicating that it is not necessarily easy for measuring users of
all dosimeters to remain involved in Hakatte Geiger in 2014.
As shown, Hakatte Geiger user A views Hakatte Geiger as one of the resources
for spreading his measurement readings in his everyday life in the Nagano Prefecture.
Since he takes measurement readings mostly for himself, he noted that he doesn't intend
to use his measurement readings for any other purpose. In the following, we’ll see a
radically different case of Hakatte Geiger user B.
Hakatte Geiger as a Cultural Resource for Constructing “Raw” Datum for
Decontamination
Hakatte Geiger user B is a father of two young children in a city in the Chiba
Prefecture. While he knew nothing about issues related to radiation before the disaster,
user B had some knowledge about Geiger counters because he watched Lupin III, a
popular Japanese manga and animation series in which its main character used a watch-
shaped Geiger counter. When asked about why he got involved in measuring radiation by
223

himself, he points out Japanese mass media’s initial response to the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear disaster, stating that in the wake of the disaster when Japanese media emphasized
that there were no immediate health effects from the radiation released by the nuclear
power plant, he realized the need to measure radiation for himself.
Just as many other Japanese citizens, he sought out information about radiation
and dosimeters by using online resources such as Wikipedia and 2channel. He described
that immediately after the disaster one specific Chinese-made dosimeter was still
available for around 60,000JPY in Akihabara, Tokyo. However, because he read negative
reviews of Chinese-made dosimeters in general on various websites, he didn't buy that
dosimeter. Rather he was determined to save money to buy a better-reviewed one. For the
time being, he used a relatively reasonably priced Geiger counter kit from Akihabara
starting in the middle of May 2011. Because he needed to build a Geiger counter from a
kit, he spent time making it but finally made a dosimeter by the end of May. After using
the self-made dosimeter, he found its readings rather untrustworthy.
As an active Twitter user, B had a chance to purchase from a fellow Twitter user
what B perceived to be a better Geiger counter, the RADEX RD 1503. In the meantime,
he learned of Hakatte Geiger in the middle of June 2011. With his new dosimeter, B
started to contribute to Hakatte Geiger in many ways. For instance, he requested Ogawa
to allow Hakatte Geiger users to view data taken by specific dosimeters alone and Ogawa
redesigned the Hakatte Geiger accordingly. Also, B notes that he filled in gaps in data on
radiation by measuring radiation in areas where the Radiation Dose Map did not cover.
Unlike Hakatte Geiger user A, user B took care of other users’ measurement readings and
sought to contribute to the development of Hakatte Geiger as a community.
224

In hindsight, however, B believes he produced “terrible [measurement] readings”
using his Geiger counter at that time. According to B, he initially submitted each
measurement reading to the website after measuring radiation just once rather than
measuring radiation several times and calculating the average of those measurement
readings. At that time, he happened to compare his measurement readings with a local
officer’s and discovered a huge margin of error between the readings. In order to make
his measurement readings “usable,” B started to calculate the average of five
measurement readings and corrected values to generate “more accurate” measurement
readings. However, B still found it very difficult to measure radiation effectively by using
his Geiger counter.
While struggling to find a way to generate “more accurate” radiation data, he
finally got an ideal dosimeter from a fellow Twitter user in March 2012, a Mr. Gamma
A2700. The dosimeter is an energy-compensated Csl (TI) scintillator detector produced
by a Japanese company Clearplus. Compared with his Geiger counter, he found that there
was a much smaller margin of errors in the scintillator detector. Later, he learned that
some city governments adopted Mr. Gamma as an official portable measurement device.
Indeed, Noda City in the Chiba Prefecture still lent Mr. Gamma to its residents and
business operators in 2015 (Nodashi, 2015). Because he learned there was a smaller
margin of error when using the Mr. Gamma, and given that some city governments
apparently authorized Mr. Gamma as an official portable dosimeter, B began using the
dosimeter as his main device. Another reason behind his decision to use a Mr. Gamma,
was “If [he] found some areas actually contaminated [by using his dosimeter], [he]
wanted to have local government clean those areas.” He sees Mr. Gamma as a potentially
225

effective rhetorical device for lobbying for the government to decontaminate areas in
which the level of radiation is much higher than neighboring areas.
In order to generate “usable” measurement datum with the Mr. Gamma, B notes
that Hakatte Geiger is particularly useful for data representation management for the
following three main reasons. First, he mentions that Hakatte Geiger allows him to
pinpoint where his measurement was actually taken on the Hakattayo Map. Unlike
Safecast’s bGeigie and Kodomira’s Hot Spot Finder, his dosimeter does not have a
Global Positioning System (GPS). Thus B uses Hakatte Geiger to compensate
shortcomings of his dosimeter such that he can pinpoint where measurement readings
were taken when he lobbies the local government with his measurement readings. In
doing so, B emphasizes the need to remember the characteristics of the surrounding
environment in which his measurement was taken, including the location of power poles
as landmarks, such that he can upload his measurement reading to Hakatte Geiger’s
website accurately.
Second, Hakatte Geiger allows him to upload his measurement method and
measurement readings on YouTube. From his perspective, YouTube helps his data
representation management more effectively:
It’ll be frustrating if [somebody] is suspicious about how I actually measured
[radiation] and does not believe that I spent enough seconds measuring
[radiation]…In order to have him or her take a look at what [my] measurement
readings actually are, I believe that things will become more factual if I
demonstrate [by using a YouTube video] my actual measurement method…If [I]
226

could further enhance credibility in [measurement] data by adding something, it’s
worth doing that!”
He takes advantage of YouTube as a free resource in order to record details of his data
production practice. In particular, B emphasizes that attaching YouTube videos to his
measurement readings on Hakatte Geiger allows him to demonstrate the way in which he
measured radiation and the minutes he spent producing his measurement readings. As
noted, measuring users are not required to attach YouTube videos when uploading their
measurement readings, but user B implies that he found it necessary to attach YouTube
videos to his measurement readings as a way to construct useful “raw” datum for viewers,
and for local governments’ officers dealing with the issue of decontamination in
particular.
Finally, Hakatte Geiger allows him to add comments to his measurement reading
posts in the Hakattayo Response section.
36
In other words, he can define and interpret
meaning of his own measurements on Hakatte Geiger. B notes that while he initially
added personal comments on his measurement readings by saying something like that, “It
would be better to wear a mask [in order to avoid unknown radiation exposure],” he later
stopped giving such statements on measurement readings because he realized that he’d be
responsible for the content of his comments. Perhaps more importantly, B took advantage
of Hakatte Geiger’s Hakattayo Response section as a creative space to make his
measurement readings “more or less useful” datum for local government to refer to. For
him, the description of his measuring practice is significant in part because “I suspect that
there perhaps could be people who don’t be bother to watch my YouTube video even if

36
Hakatte Geiger also allows its users to add comments to their measurement reading
posts in the Hakarune Report section.
227

they can get a full picture by watching [the video] alone.” As such, B tactically uses
Hakatte Geiger to construct what he perceives to be practical data in his everyday life.
He makes his datum on radiation air dose rate from his measurement reading by
taking advantage of Hakatte Geiger as a rhetorical resource. He not only adds a link to his
YouTube video to the Hakattayo Response section, but also describes various
measurement conditions very carefully in the Hakattayo Response section so that his
datum can have a practical use for decontamination. When asked about what kind of
information he puts in the Hakattayo Response section, B points to three pieces of
information in particular. First, he notes that it is important to describe the weather
condition and the soil surface condition very carefully in that “measurement readings are
generally different if the soil surface is wet.” Second, he said it’s necessary to report both
the minimum and maximum values that his measurement readings suggest. Finally, he
calculates and reports the region between the minimum and maximum values on one
hand and its reported measurement readings on the other. In addition, he notes, it is also
important to report the brand of the dosimeter, the degree of differences in the dosimeter
when compared with measurement taken by the local government, and the measurement
method. When asked about how he learned about data representation, B notes that he
learned from other Hakatte Geiger measuring users. From his perspective, B also uses
Hakatte Geiger as a learning resource for making his “raw” measurement reading as
practical as possible.
He emphasizes that he often sends emails to local government officials with a link
to his measurement records at Hakarune Report or Hakattayo Response. According to
user B because of his measurement data, local government officials sometimes took
228

action to re-measure radiation rates by using their authorized dosimeters, and ultimately
decontaminated such areas. B is not always successful in lobbying for local government;
according him, some specific local government didn't accept measurement readings that
he took 50 centimeters above the ground while others took such measurement readings
into consideration in view of the health and safety of children. But that B apparently had
a local government decontaminate a hot spot with high levels of radiation shows how B
constructed data using Hakatte Geiger as a resource for lobbying the government. In
order to create one datum, B reported the following conditions with an attached picture of
measurement:
Measurement reading: 0.186μSv/h
4:00PM on April 15
[Dosimeter]: Clearplus A2700
Outdoors (side ditch)
50 centimeters above the ground
The weather: Fine weather
Measurement reading is an average value of measurement readings after
measuring for 180 seconds.
During measuring [radiation] the minimum and maximum values are 0.179 and
0.195 respectively.
Breakdown of measurement readings
0.179
0.184
0.184
229

0.186
0.183
0.195
0.189
0.188
0.187
0.189
0.190
0.182
0.186
Note: the attached picture was taken after finishing measurement (April 15,
4:00PM) (Tokumei, 2012)
B thus carefully constructed one datum from his measurement readings taken by using
his scintillation survey meter. He reported not only the minimum and maximum value of
measurement readings but also a breakdown of the measurement readings. After
compiling the datum, he sent a local government official an email with the link to his
measurement reading on Hakarune Report to request decontamination for that area. On
November 15 2011, B reported on Hakatte Geiger that he had re-measured the same
place in the same way under the same weather condition, confirming that his
measurement reading was 0.096μSv/h (Tokumei, 2012). As such, B not only constructed
a datum that was apparently convincing to local government, but also shared his data
production method with other Hakatte Geiger users through Hakatte Geiger. He created
230

and shared knowledge of producing datum as a resource for lobbying for local
government.
B generated measuring readings on Hakatte Geiger from the perspective of his
everyday life. He emphasized that citizen’s measurement readings are more useful than
local government’s in terms everyday life:
In order to [measure radiation] in our immediate environment…there is only one
way for [citizens to measure radiation]. Even if local government lend dosimeters,
I measure [radiation] and I investigate [radiation]. Local government officers
don't come to measure [radiation] for us. If you know about radiation, you must
investigate [radiation] by yourself… If you have kids, you’ll better understand
[what I tell you]. Kids like narrow or strange areas very much… but since these
areas tend to gather [contaminated] muds, the level of radiation tends to be high.
Kids really like to play in mud, you know. And then they touch [contaminated]
mud. It’s true that our kids don't stay in these areas with micro-hot spots…They
don't stay there, but there are kids who go there and touch [mud], right? I don't
like them to go to such areas, but I can’t say, “Don’t play [there].” I want them to
play hard. So, I’d like [local government] to clean such areas. I’d like [local
government] to put [contaminated areas] back the way they were!
B views citizen’s measurement readings as a useful resource for constructing the safety
of his children’s everyday life. Just like Yoshida at Kodomira, B defines what everyday
life looks like for citizens by focusing on micro-hot spots in relation to his children.
Given that his concerns are about the health of his children, B stated that he rarely
checks Hakatte Geiger’s Twitter account, noting that he engages with Hakatte Geiger
231

exclusively on its website in part because he uses Hakatte Geiger as a means to lobby for
local government alone. His account indicates that Ogawa’s design of collective
articulation of radiation may not necessarily work for some Hakatte Geiger users because
they just care about their surroundings. However, B notes that when he volunteered to
measure radiation on request and received a thank-you message from a requesting user,
he became more motivated to contribute to requested measurement data on Hakatte
Geiger. After not receiving a message of thanks after he responded to measurement
requests, he convinced himself that it would be worth measuring radiation in areas where
his kids play instead. When asked about the reason why B continues to use Hakatte
Geiger in 2014:
I’d just like to measure our own neighborhood, making our environment better.
No, I must do so. After all, my kids will be affected. It would be the easiest [for
me] to turn away from [radiation]. The easiest thing [we could do] is to pretend
[the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster] never happened. This would be the
easiest thing for me to do….but, [if] my kids get a disease [due to radiation
exposure], they will ask me why I was not careful about [the health effects of
radiation] at that time. How would I answer [their question]? I can’t answer! …
[From this perspective, Hakatte Geiger] is useful, but I hope to take advantage of
Hakatte Geiger in a better way.
This section investigated how two Hakatte Geiger measuring users have used the
site in their everyday life. Both Hakatte Geiger users A and B tactically used Hakatte
Geiger. User A uses Hakatte Geiger as a means to distribute his data whereas user B sees
Hakatte Geiger as a resource for government decontamination. While Ogawa uses
232

Twitter as a resource for making Twitter followers moderators of individual datum, this
chapter suggests that the two active users do not necessarily work as moderators, as
Ogawa assumes. Rather than using Hakatte Geiger’s Radiation Dose Map as a database
on radiation, an analysis of their accounts indicate that they view individual datum on the
map as a resource for their everyday lives.
Conclusion: Recording Measuring Activity Collectively
This chapter investigated how Ogawa designed Hakatte Geiger and how Hakatte
Geiger users used Hakatte Geiger in everyday life in 2014. Based on his business
experience in gogo.gs and personal experience in talking with fellow concerned parents,
Ogawa designed Hakatte Geiger. As illustrated, the original design of Hakatte Geiger
provided a socio-technical context in which its users construct their everyday life. Unlike
other grassroots measuring networks, Hakatte Geiger provides an alternative space for all
citizens including users of any dosimeters and non-dosimeter users to get involved as
long as they have access to the Internet. Given that the government and other grassroots
measuring networks such as Safecast and Kodomira more or less restrict users of certain
dosimeters from the category of measurers, Hakatte Geiger can be seen as a platform that
has recorded citizens’ heterogeneous measuring practices after the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear disaster.
This chapter also demonstrates that Hakatte Geiger’s users have used Hakatte
Geiger in different ways in 2014 (though, admittedly the sample size is small). Hakatte
Geiger user A has used Hakatte Geiger as a resource to distribute his measurement
readings whereas Hakatte Geiger user B finds it necessary to ensure the health and safety
of his children in everyday life after the disaster as B tactically uses Hakatte Geiger to
233

generate a “raw” datum as a resource for the decontamination. Furthermore, this chapter
shows that both users A and B contributed to the design of Hakatte Geiger in many ways.
Just as Baxandall (1972) uses pictures from fifteen-century Italy as a “record of visual
activity”(p. 152), Hakatte Geiger’s design can be seen as a record of online interplay
between Ogawa and Hakatte Geiger users after the nuclear accident.
Whereas Ogawa indicates that Hakatte Geiger will “complete its role” in years to
come, this chapter suggests that Hakatte Geiger has already played a significant role in
creating a database of citizens’ datum production practices after the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear accident. Hakatte Geiger not only provides opportunities for citizens to learn
about how to create practical datum in their everyday life, but also provides materials for
future historians to refer to when investigating what citizens’ post-Fukushima datum
production practices actually looked like.

234

Conclusion: Learning to Measure and Measuring to Learn Together
The setting for this study is 2014, a time when levels of radiation in the air were
gradually decreasing in Fukushima (Kankyōshō Fukushima saisei jimusho, 2014; Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, 2014b) and the Japanese state was shifting its focus from exposure to
radiation in the air to individual radiation exposure in terms of decontamination. While a
wide variety of citizens rushed to purchase dosimeters and engage in measuring radiation
in the air in the aftermath of the meltdown of the power plant, less people continued to
measure radiation in the air in Tokyo and elsewhere in 2014. Research participants have
proposed several explanations for this apparent declination of grassroots measuring
networks. Some indicated that people stopped measuring radiation because they lost
interest in the adverse health effects of radiation. Others argued that they learned that the
levels of radiation in the air are so low that they do not need to bother measuring
radiation. Still others indicated that the Japanese state built so many monitoring posts in
past several years that they no longer feel the need to measure radiation in the air for
themselves.
While the number of citizens measuring radiation in the air appeared to have
declined, there were still active grassroots measuring networks that focus on measuring
radiation in the air in 2014. This dissertation investigates why they continued to measure
radiation in the air in 2014 and further analyzes how they viewed and constructed
radiation data accordingly.
Rather than viewing grassroots measuring networks and their data production
practices in isolation from authoritative expertise about radiation in the air, this research
investigates how Japanese experts such as scientists, policymakers, and dosimeter
235

manufacturers view radiation data provided by grassroots measuring networks. This
approach is particularly significant for this research, partly because it is important, if not
necessary, for citizens to have the state involved in decontamination of hot spots that
grassroots measuring networks examined. In order to understand how grassroots
measuring networks’ data could be politically effective, it is thus necessary to analyze
how the Japanese experts view the citizens’ data from their perspectives.
As such this study investigates grassroots measuring networks and their data
production practices in relation to what can be called “nuclear radiation knowledge
infrastructures.” Nuclear radiation knowledge infrastructures consist of a wide variety of
human and non-human networks including radiation, various dosimeters, measurement
methods, the Internet, social media, mass media, scientists, engineers, business
organizations, public health officials, regulatory agencies, local governments,
international radiation protection organizations such as the ICRP, public health laws, and
grassroots measuring networks among others. In so doing, this dissertation not only
investigates grassroots measuring networks and their data production practices within
such nuclear radiation knowledge infrastructures, but also discusses how their data
production practices contribute to the renegotiation of nuclear radiation knowledge
infrastructures in Japan after the Fukushima nuclear disaster.
This dissertation was based on intense one-to-one interviews with research
participants. As noted, research data collected using an interview method does not
necessarily reflect what the research participants actually did, but conducting interviews
demonstrates how they approached nuclear radiation from different scientific
perspectives, cultural frameworks, and political perspectives. Given their potentially
236

conflicting views of radiation and radiation data, one-to-one interviews were the arguably
the best method, particularly when compared with focus groups.
In what follows, the conclusion chapter describes key findings of this dissertation
and the significance of the findings vis-à-vis other ongoing works in related fields.
Finally, this dissertation addresses the limitations of this research and provides questions
for future scholars.
Nuclear Radiation Knowledge Infrastructures
Different views of low-dose radiation or the individualization of nuclear risks
In order to investigate nuclear radiation knowledge infrastructures, this
dissertation started by examining public discourses on low-dose radiation in the air in
Japanese society through the lens of Japanese newspapers (see Chapter 2 for details). An
analysis of Japanese newspapers’ portrayals of the topic demonstrated that whereas
national newspapers did not represent the issue of low dose radiation as a cause of
psychological problems (such as mental stress) before the Fukushima nuclear accident,
both Japanese national and local newspapers did portray low-dose radiation in relation to
the issue of psychological problems afterwards. Moreover, Japanese national newspapers
such as the Asahi, the Yomiuri, and the Nihon Keizai linked the issue of low-dose
radiation to the issue of physical health problems during the period from the Chernobyl
nuclear disaster to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, but provided an alternative
view of low-dose radiation as a cause of psychological problems only after the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.
Perhaps more importantly, Japanese newspapers provided radically different
views on the subject, which left the audience seeking their own way in which they could
237

ensure their health in post-Fukushima Japanese society. Because Japanese newspapers
provided diverse views of the health effects of radiation in the air, they contributed in part
to the individualization of nuclear risks, which could be a factor responsible for the birth
of grassroots measuring networks seeking to understand their environment by measuring
radiation in the air.
Post-Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure
Under such public discourses on low-dose radiation in the air, a wide variety of
grassroots measuring networks quantified radiation as data by using dosimeters. They
widely spread this data using the Internet and social media, however this dissertation
shows that Japanese experts including scientists, politicians, and dosimeter manufacturers
didn't take the data at face value. In Chapter 3, I came up with an analytical framework of
post-Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure that defined what would be
considered good data on radiation in the air from the perspective of the Japanese experts.
Post-Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure consists of human and non-human
networks including scientists, policymakers, dosimeter manufacturers, regulatory
administrative guidance, and particular dosimeters, technical norms, and radiation among
others. Perhaps more importantly, this dissertation demonstrates that the underlying
assumption of post-Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure, as a part of nuclear
radiation knowledge infrastructures, is that good data is defined as a mass of good datum.
Unless one successfully demonstrated that a good datum was generated by following
some particular conditions, the data could be easily dismissed as useless in post-
Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure.
238

As illustrated in Chapter 3, the underlying presumptions of post-Fukushima
Japanese measurement infrastructure, attaching importance to how one single datum was
constructed, indicate three technical issues (the characteristic of dosimeters, measurement
methods, and the state of calibration) as fundamental information for good datum
production practices. More specifically, post-Fukushima Japanese measurement
infrastructure and the Japanese state in particular defined NaI scintillation survey meters
as dosimeters measuring radiation in the air and limited spaces where measurement
readings are supposed to be taken by using the dosimeters. Perhaps more importantly for
certain grassroots measuring networks, the fundamental assumptions of post-Fukushima
Japanese measurement infrastructure are that it is necessary to have dosimeters calibrated
more than once a year for good datum production practices. As a result, post-Fukushima
Japanese measurement infrastructure marginalized certain measurers and their
measurement readings from the categories of measurers and data on radiation in the air in
post-Fukushima Japanese society.
It’s thus important to note that from perspectives of post-Fukushima Japanese
measurement infrastructure, grassroots measuring networks’ measurement readings could
not be considered trustworthy unless they made background information about the datum
collection practices and measurement readings open to the public. Put differently, if
citizens are to use data as a rhetorical device for the public good, they need to get
involved in good communication from the perspective of post-Fukushima Japanese
measurement infrastructure. As shown in Chapter 3, post-Fukushima Japanese
measurement infrastructure indicated that grassroots measuring networks ultimately
failed to communicate radiation data effectively. Grassroots measuring networks’
239

communication failed according to post-Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure
guidelines and society was shielded from alternative data/knowledge produced by
grassroots measuring networks.
Redefining good data in post-Fukushima Japanese society
However such explanations alone do not fully account for why grassroots
measuring networks still continued to measure radiation, spreading the collected data to a
wider audience in 2014 when the level of low-dose radiation had declined. As indicated
in Chapter 3, the changing levels of radiation in the air are one of the key factors
responsible for shaping an alternative space for grassroots measuring networks within the
nuclear radiation knowledge infrastructures. Given the decreasing levels of radiation in
the air in the environment, which make it difficult for citizens to discover hotspots
measuring radiation in the air, grassroots measuring networks played a smaller role in
shaping nuclear radiation knowledge infrastructures from the perspective of some experts.
The question then is for what reasons did grassroots measuring networks continue to
measure radiation in 2014?
In answering this fundamental question, this study describes three case studies of
citizen science in which grassroots measuring networks, defining good data in different
ways, represented their collected data on low-dose radiation in the air and communicated
them to a wider audience using the Internet. More specifically, the three grassroots
measuring networks engaged in data production and management in radically different
ways, creating individual radiation knowledge infrastructures. As illustrated in previous
chapters, their data production, management practices and data representations reflected
240

their motivations, dosimeters, views of datum/data, target audiences, ethical points of
view, and their skillsets.
Safecast
From the beginning of the disaster, Safecast viewed data as a source of
information and made them available for free use. Safecast focused on collecting
radiation data around the globe. When compared to Kodomira, Safecast’s data collection
is more or less supply-driven. It focuses on data collection and does not get involved in
any politics, such as nuclear policy or radiation protection standards. In part because of
this, Safecast does not have a specific target audience.
Like many other grassroots measuring networks, Safecast took full advantage of
the Internet and created a huge database on radiation in the air through which volunteers
could submit their individual measurement readings. Ultimately, it generated an
alternative knowledge infrastructure that allowed its followers to think globally about
what levels of radiation in the air looked like after the Fukushima nuclear disaster.
Safecast standardized its dosimeter as the bGeigie to make data more or less
consistent between different places in 2011. In 2013, Safecast designed what could be
described as a data-based practical calibration, allowing its moderators to “calibrate” each
bGeigie by viewing its datum in relation to Safecast’s other data. As noted, post-
Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure designated NaI scintillation survey
meters as the appropriate dosimeter to measure radiation in the air and encouraged
dosimeters to be calibrated more than once a year, indicating that good data are a mass of
individual good datum. However, Safecast did not follow post-Fukushima Japanese
measurement infrastructure guidelines and invented an alternative calibration standard to
241

generate a huge volume of comparatively accurate data within its database. From
Safecast’s perspective, a single accurate datum was not practically useful in everyday life.
As such, Safecast has focused on creating comparatively accurate data by making a
robust database through the work of its volunteers.
Therefore Safecast created an alternative radiation knowledge infrastructure,
which may not necessarily be comparable to other radiation knowledge infrastructures in
part because of its standardized dosimeter. Whereas levels of radiation in the air are
expected to decrease for years to come, Sean Bonner, a co-founder of Safecast, noted that
the organization continues to measure radiation in the air for future reference. Other
volunteers, such as Yamaguchi in the Fukushima prefecture, measure radiation in the air
for the health and safety of children in Fukushima.
Kodomira
Kodomira is different from Safecast in many ways. One of the most striking
differences is that Kodomira views radiation data not just as information, but also as an
action motivator. From its inception, Kodomira generated data on radiation in the air
upon requests from citizens for the health and safety of children. Kodomira’s clients were
the target audience. Accordingly, Kodomira volunteers choose their measurement
methods on the basis of clients’ requests. Kodomira essentially operated using two-way
communication and it engaged in creating meaningful measurements together with
Kodomira clients.
As noted, citizens may need to have the state involved in decontamination in
order to ensure the health and safety of children because they might not be able to avoid
contaminated areas. Thus, Kodomira followed a more or less “orthodox” method and
242

tactically followed the norm of post-Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure.
More specifically, Kodomira has carefully generated accurate radiation datum that could
be used to lobby the Japanese state. As such, Kodomira took advantage of the Hot Spot
Finder authorized by Japanese Calibration Service Systems (JCSS). This is rhetorically
important because radiation data taken using dosimeters with the certificate of JCSS are
more likely to be seen as trustworthy by post-Fukushima Japanese measurement
infrastructure when compared to data taken using other non-calibrated devices. Because
of its technical competence, Kodomira discovered micro-hot spots and cool spots and
reconstructed post-Fukushima Japanese society as child-centered in everyday life. From
Kodomira’s perspective, accurate datum on micro-hot spots is practically useful when
considering the health and safety of children.
Just as with Safecast, Kodomira took advantage of the Internet to create a
radiation map. Because Kodomira’s data collection is demand-driven, they did not
necessarily make measurement readings open to the public because in doing so, they
could infringe upon their clients’ privacy. Therefore to ensure confidentiality, Kodomira
used a screen capture rather than Google Maps when representing its measurement
readings as radiation data. As such, Kodomira did not seek to create a radiation
knowledge infrastructure that was open to the public. It should be noted that while
Kodomira took advantage of the Internet to generate radiation data, it also considered the
issue of the digital divide. Kodomira published a booklet, “Measuring, Learning, and
Living,” which allows non-Internet users to share information about radiation in the air.

243

Hakatte Geiger
Based on his business experience, Ogawa took full advantage of the Internet to
create Hakatte Geiger. This website was designed to allow non-dosimeter users to request
volunteer users to measure radiation in the air at specific locations. As such, Hakatte
Geiger’s data collection was demand-driven and its target audience was its requesting
users. Because Hakatte Geiger volunteers measure radiation on request from requesting
users, it is not necessarily concerned with the issue of privacy protection in regard to data
production.
Ogawa designed the original structure of Hakatte Geiger, allowing its measuring
users to submit a single datum to the website. Similar to Kodomira, Hakatte Geiger
assumed that a single datum is practically useful in everyday life in post-Fukushima
Japanese society. As noted however, Ogawa designed and redesigned Hakatte Geiger
upon requests from users and developed a space in which users could submit their datum.
In 2014 for instance, Hakatte Geiger allowed its measuring users to show their
measurement methods through YouTube videos. Thus, Hakatte Geiger offered a space in
which its users shared “background” information about the collection of radiation datum.
The most striking characteristic of Hakatte Geiger in terms of its data production
is that it does not exclude uses of any dosimeters from the category of measuring users,
and allows them to contribute to the website in order to maximize opportunities of
participation. In order to manage a wide variety of data, Ogawa designed what can be
called a participatory radiation data quality control using Twitter. He then used Hakatte
Geiger’s Twitter followers as collective moderators who monitor individual datum.
While Ogawa noted in 2014 that Hakatte Geiger would “complete its role,” there are still
244

some volunteers measuring radiation in the air. As shown, one of the volunteers noted
that he considered radiation measuring as a hobby, while another volunteer continued to
measure radiation in order to ensure the health and safety of his children. They
constructed their radiation data in their own ways by taking advantage of Hakatte Geiger.
As such, Hakatte Geiger demonstrated the entire process by which data was requested,
generated, and consumed in everyday life after the Fukushima nuclear disaster. In doing
so, Hakatte Geiger also created its own distinct radiation knowledge infrastructure.
This dissertation illustrates the characteristics of nuclear radiation knowledge
infrastructures by investigating these three grassroots measuring networks. As noted,
previous research tends to celebrate the role of grassroots measuring networks in post-
Fukushima Japanese society without investigating experts’ views of grassroots measuring
networks and their data collection practices. This research shows that the three grassroots
measuring networks dealt with low-dose radiation in the air in different ways by using the
Internet and social media tactically. Whereas post-Fukushima Japanese measurement
infrastructure tends to view citizens’ measurement readings more or less monolithically,
often viewing them as scientifically untrustworthy, this dissertation shows the
fundamentally complex picture of three grassroots measuring networks’ data production
practices. Safecast and Hakatte Geiger created their own nuclear radiation knowledge
infrastructures from their own perspectives while Kodomira sought to create radiation
data that could be convincing to the state by following the norms of post-Fukushima
Japanese measurement infrastructure and participated with clients to create meaningful
radiation data. In so doing, the three networks reconstructed everyday life in post-
245

Fukushima Japanese society through their data collection practices. They all learned to
measure and measured to learn together in post-Fukushima Japanese society.
So What?
This dissertation has sought to take into account the interests of three different
audiences: those who study communication, those who study science, technology and
society (STS), and those who study science communication. This section offers some
final comments regarding each audience.
In regard to communication studies, the findings of this dissertation extend
Carey’s concept of a ritual view of communication. Carey (2009) questioned the idea of
communication merely as the transmission of information by differentiating a ritual view
of communication from a transmission view of communication. By a ritual view of
communication, Carey emphasized the link between the ideas communication and
community and noted “a ritual view of communication is…toward the maintenance of
society in time.” As shown, Safecast and Hakatte Geiger viewed radiation data as a
resource in the transmission of information. However, Kodomira viewed radiation data
not merely as a source for information, but also as a source for participation. From
Kodomira’s perspective, radiation data is essential for Kodomira and its clients to
reconstruct everyday life in post-Fukushima Japanese society. Whereas the three
grassroots measuring networks viewed their data production practices slightly differently,
their data articulated the existence of both natural background and manmade radiation in
some way or another, constructing what post-Fukushima society looked like within the
nuclear radiation knowledge infrastructures.
246

As such, grassroots measuring networks and their data production practices
helped shape post-Fukushima society as “imagined communities” (Anderson, 2006),
further defining the temporality of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear crisis. Measuring
radiation by using dosimeters and representing the collected data by using the Internet not
only indicates the participation of citizens in defining the temporality and spatiality of the
Fukushima nuclear disaster but also archives the actuality of the Fukushima nuclear crisis
for future generations. Thus, grassroots measuring networks and their data production
practices are involved in constructing the temporality and spatiality of post-Fukushima
society from their perspectives: post-Fukushima society must be defended by generating
and sharing data on radiation together.
To STS scholars, the findings of this dissertation suggest that post-Fukushima
Japanese measurement infrastructure plays a role in declaring certain data on radiation by
citizens as useless as a resource for decontamination policy. In particular, the Japanese
state standardized measurement methods by harnessing uncertainties of dosimeters as
media and established standardized decontamination practices accordingly. Under such a
political context, it is still too early to say whether grassroots measuring networks were
successful or not, but it is important to note that the grassroots measuring networks
examined in this research never challenged authoritative data by harnessing their own
data and never made political claims about the effects of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
disaster accordingly. This finding is particularly important in relation to citizen science
scholarship demonstrating the ways in which citizens challenged conventional scientific
research practices (e.g. Brown, 1987, 1997; Callon et al., 2009; Epstein, 1996; Ottinger,
2010). For instance, Ottinger (2010)’s study of community-based air-quality monitoring
247

project using bucket methods shows that citizens problematized authoritative air-
monitoring data by tactically creating their own data. However, this dissertation shows
that grassroots measuring networks didn't challenge authoritative expertise on radiation in
the air. Safecast and Hakatte Geiger focused on measuring radiation in the air and shared
the gathered data with a wider audience without seeking to affect power relations
between citizens and experts. On the other hand, Kodomira, harnessing the Hot Spot
Finder, used the standards of post-Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure to
their advantage not challenging authoritative expertise, which epitomized post-
Fukushima Japanese measurement infrastructure.
While much scholarship on citizen science emphasizes the need to alter the power
relations between citizens and experts (e.g. Ottinger & Cohen, 2011), the finding of this
dissertation indicates that there are cases in which citizens learn to measure and measure
to learn together without challenging authoritative expertise when generating radiation
data. Their goal was not necessarily democratizing science or democratizing expertise,
rather they were learning about their post-disaster environment together. As indicated in
the previous chapters, the collective will to learn is one of the reasons why grassroots
measuring networks continued to measure radiation in the air. As such, radiation data
created by citizens following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster can be seen as the
largest learning records about radiation in the air, perhaps in the entirety of human history.
The finding that citizens’ engagements with environmental monitoring can be
sustained without making efforts to challenge authority has clear practical implications.
Rather than challenging authoritative expertise, grassroots measuring networks focused
on learning about their environment, which apparently help the networks sustain
248

themselves until the collective will to explore fades away. This study proposes an
alternative citizen science model that does not involve affecting the power relations
between citizens and experts.
For those involved in science communication, this dissertation investigates and
describes various rhetorical aspects of radiation data production practices. Quantified
radiation data, which is the “front stage” of information, suggests one of the rhetorical
aspects of radiation data production practices. From the perspective of post-Fukushima
Japanese measurement infrastructure, the issues of dosimeter characteristics,
measurement methods and the state of calibration are methodological stases to define
radiation data. As noted, unless such “backstage” information on radiation data (and
dosimeters as media) is communicated effectively, quantified radiation data is useless
from the perspectives of Japanese experts. On the other hand, grassroots measuring
networks employed various rhetorical strategies, which articulated multiple rhetorical
aspects of radiation data production practices in constructing data on radiation in the air
using the Internet. Perhaps more importantly, grassroots networks not only represented
data on radiation in the air, but also made their rhetorical strategies, which clarify various
rhetorical aspects of radiation data production practices, open to the public by harnessing
the Internet. Thus, grassroots measuring networks not only demonstrated rhetorical
aspects of radiation data collection practices, but also archived rhetorical strategies that
grassroots measuring networks employed within the nuclear radiation knowledge
infrastructures.

249

Limitations
There are several limitations to this study. For one, this dissertation focused
exclusively on investigating Tokyo-based grassroots measuring networks and the
findings cannot reflect Japanese grassroots measuring networks as a whole. While there
were active grassroots measuring networks outside Tokyo, this research did not
investigate their motivations and assumptions in measuring radiation in the air. Focusing
on Tokyo-based cases allowed me to access research participants, but investigating cases
outside Tokyo would have refined the complicated picture of grassroots measuring
networks. As indicated in Chapter 3, it is particularly important to investigate the role of
grassroots measuring networks in areas with high levels of radiation in the air.
Another limitation uncovered in examining the three grassroots measuring
networks was my inability to set up interviews with audience members who regularly
monitored data on radiation in the air provided by the three grassroots measuring
networks in 2014. While there were some citizens who noted that they used to check
citizens’ radiation data immediately after the disaster, few citizens apparently monitored
them any more. It is necessary for future scholars to take into account that citizens did not
necessarily monitor data on radiation in the air several years after the disaster. Finally,
this dissertation involves a methodological issue. Whereas conducting one-on-one
interviews revealed how research participants viewed low-dose radiation and radiation
data, this dissertation did not demonstrate how grassroots measuring networks actually
measured radiation in 2014, partly because there were few people who engaged in
measuring radiation in the air. Despite the small sample size of measurers, participation
250

observation could have enhanced this research on grassroots measuring networks and
their data production practices in relation to nuclear radiation knowledge infrastructures.
Looking Ahead
This dissertation investigates three Tokyo-based grassroots measuring networks
and their data production practices. As shown, the health effects of low-dose radiation
were scientifically unobservable and there were various interpretations of the health
effects of low-dose radiation available in the public discourse, but low-dose radiation had
tremendous social implications, one of which was the emergence of grassroots measuring
networks. This research demonstrates that while citizens tactically engaged in data
production practices after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, Japanese experts did
not necessarily see their data as practically useful for the various reasons described.
Simultaneously, grassroots measuring networks never challenged authoritative expertise
by harnessing data on radiation in the air themselves. The question then is whether this
case is unique for post-Fukushima Japanese society. There could be multiple
explanations why grassroots measuring networks didn't challenge authoritative expertise,
one of which is that Japanese society is not a litigation-oriented society particularly when
compared to the United States. Therefore, comparative analysis of radiation measurement
networks in other countries would enhance our understanding of the distinct
characteristics of grassroots measurement networks examined in this research.
Moreover, this study showed that grassroots measuring networks generated a
tremendous amount of data on radiation in the air over the past several years. The data
indicated that grassroots measuring networks shared common views of the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear disaster, learning experiences and rhetorical strategies among others.
251

Whereas some of these data is seen as more useless than other data, the findings of the
dissertation suggest that there are tremendous opportunities to learn from data for public
good. For example, what could experts and the general public do with the existing data
to prepare for the next disaster? (Lakoff, 2008)
As noted, the findings of this dissertation are culturally and historically situated,
but this dissertation extends our understanding of grassroots measuring networks in post-
Fukushima society by showing how the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster created
opportunities and challenges for both grassroots measuring networks and Japanese
experts in a digital era.

252

References
Abe, Y. (2013). Risk assessment of nuclear power by Japanese newspapers following the
Chernobyl nuclear disaster. International Journal of Communication, 7, 1968-
1989. Retrieved from http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/1848/982
Abe, Y. (2014). Safecast, or the collective intelligence on radiation risks after 3/11. The
Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 12(7,5). Retrieved from
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Yasuhito-_Abe_/4077
Aizu hōshanō jōhō sentā. (n.d). Kyōsankin no onegai [Request for support money].
Retrieved from http://aizu-center.com/information/support
Aizu hōshanō jōhō sentā hōshasen sokutei mappu. (n.d). Saito no mikata [How to look at
the website]. Retrieved from http://km-
aizu.jimdo.com/%E3%82%B5%E3%82%A4%E3%83%88%E3%81%AE%E8%
A6%8B%E6%96%B9/
Aldrich, D. P. (2012). Post-crisis Japanese nuclear policy: From top-down directives to
bottom-up activism. Analysis from East-West Center, 103, 1-11. Retrieved from
http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/22213/api103.pdf?s
equence=1
Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of
nationalism. New York, NY. Verso.
Andoh, M., Nakahara, Y., Tsuda, S., Yoshida, T., Matsuda, N., Takahashi, F., ... & Saito,
K. (2015). Measurement of air dose rates over a wide area around the Fukushima
Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant through a series of car-borne surveys. Journal of
environmental radioactivity, 139, 266-280.
253

Arai, F. (2012). Jūdai saigaiji ni okeru media no yakuwari: Tokyo denryoku Fukushima
Daiichi genshiryoku hatsudensho jiko go ni okeru hōshasen kenkō higai risuku
hōdō no kenshō [The role of media in a time of severe disaster: Examinations of
the coverage of the adverse health effects of radiation after the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear accident]. Kyoto Sangyō Daigaku Ronshū: Jinbun kagaku keiretsu, 45,
103-145. Retrieved from https://ksurep.kyoto-
su.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10965/764/1/AHSUSK_HS_45_103.pdf
Arima, T. (2006). Nihon terebi to CIA: Hakkutsu sareta Shōriki fairu [Nippon television
and the CIA: The discovered Shōriki file]. Tokyo, Japan: Shinchōsha.
Arima, T. (2008). Genpatsu, Shōriki, CIA [Nuclear power, Shōriki, and the CIA]. Tokyo,
Japan: Shinchōsha.
Asahi Shimbun. (1945a, August 12). Isshun ni Hiroshima henbō [Hiroshima transformed
in a moment]. Asahi Shimbun, p.1.
Asahi Shimbun. (1945b, August 16). Uran genshikaku no bunretsu [Nuclear fission of
uranium]. Asahi Shimbun, p.1.
Asahi Shimbun. (1945c, August 20). Genshibakudan: Bakufuude senro gai ni
fukitobasareta kasha Hiroshima shi [Atomic bomb: The train blown away by a
bomb blast in Hiroshima City]. Asahi Shimbum, p.1.
Asahi Shimbun. (1987a, January 21). Cherunobuiri kara 9 kagetsu, hibakuchi otozureta
soren chōsa dan [Soviet investigation team visited bombsite nine months after
Chernobyl]. Asahi Shimbun, p.3.
Asahi Shimbun. (1987b, May 7). Soren no genpatsu jiko no hibakusha: Kokusai
kyōryoku de tsuiseki chōsa e [Follow-up survey of those who were irradiated by
254

the Soviet nuclear accident through international cooperation]. Asahi Shimbun,
p.1.
Asahi Shimbun. (1988, December 8). Hōshasen igaku kenkyūsha o soren ni haken:
kagaku gijutu chō [Dispatching a researcher on radiology to the Soviet Union’s
Science and Technology Agency]. Asahi Shimbun, p.3.
Asahi Shimbun. (1989a, January 31). Genpatsu sagyōin no senshokutai ijō ippanjin no
nibai: Fukushima ken kankyō igakuken chōsa [Chromosome abnormality in
nuclear workers double than that of the general public: A survey of Fukushima
Prefectural Institute of Environmental Medicine]. Asahi Shimbun, p.3.
Asahi Shimbun. (1989b, February 8). Genpatsu sagyōin no senshokutai ijō kenkō e no
eikyō o kagichō hitei [The Science and Technology Agency denied the health
effects of radiation on abnormalities in the chromosomes of nuclear workers].
Asahi Shimbun, p.3.
Asahi Shimbun. (1989c, June 24). Teireberu hōshasen hibaku no eikyō chōsa: Kagichō
hōhō kentō o itaku [Impact study of exposure to low-level radiation: Science
Technology Agency consigned methodological examination for experts]. Asahi
Shimbun (evening edition), p.5.
Asahi Shimbun. (1989d, August 26). Beigun kakushisetsu takai gan shi ritsu enerugi shō
ga rōdōsha shūhen jūmin o chōsa [High rates of cancer death at American nuclear
facilities: Department of Energy investigates nuclear workers and nearby
residents]. Asahi Shimbun, p.11.
Asahi Shimbun. (1990, August 18). Gan no me [Buds of cancer]. Asahi Shimbun, p.4.
255

Asahi Shimbun. (1991a, April 24). Shinryō de kakehashi: Hiroshima taizai oeru
cherunobuiri no kora [Bridging medical care: Chernobyl children’s visit to
Hiroshima draws to a close]. Asahi Shimbun, p.3.
Asahi Shimbun. (1991b, May 19). Cherunobuiri jiko no eikyō hyōka: Jūmin ni wa tsuyoi
fuan [Impact assessment of the Chernobyl accident concerns residents very much].
Asahi Shimbun, p.3.
Asahi Shimbun. (1992, February 4). Shokuba hibaku no gan hassei, genkō suiteichi no 2
bai risuku: Eikoku no ekigaku chōsa kekka [British epidemiological research
found that the incident rate of cancer from exposure to radiation at the work place
is twice as high as currently estimated]. Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), p.7.
Asahi Shimbun. (1993, May 10). Genpatsu no hibaku kanri o nyūnen ni [Manage
radiation exposure at nuclear power stations carefully]. Asahi Shimbun, p.2.
Asahi Shimbun. (1999a, October 1). Shikichi gai no 5 nin mo hibaku shain aratani 18 nin
Tokaimura no kakunen kōjō jiko [Tokaimura factory incident: Five employees
outside of the premises and an additional 18 employees irradiated]. Asahi
Shimbun, p.1.
Asahi Shimbun. (1999b, December 22). Hibaku iryō no sonae kyūmu: Tokaimura no
rinkai jiko, Ōuchi Hisashi san shibō [The pressing need to design a remedy for
exposure to radiation at the Tokaimura Criticality Accident: Hisashi Ōuchi dead].
Asahi Shimbun, p.32.
Asahi Shimbun. (2000a, February 7). Hibaku iryō ni sonae o: JCO jiko ga oshieta koto
Maekawa Kazuhiko kyōju ni kiku [Preparation of medical services for the
256

irradiated: Lessons from the JCO Incident by Professor Kazuhiko Maekawa].
Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), p. 9.
Asahi Shimbun. (2000b, September 29). “Hōshanō no kōnō” kenshō e: Sentā raigetsu
Komae de Denryoku chūo ken ga setsuritu [Examining the positive effects of
radiation: Central Research Institute of Electric Power established a new center in
the next month in Komae]. Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), p.30.
Asahi Shimbun. (2001, January 14). Konna heiki wa iranai: Rekka uran dan [We don't
need depleted uranium bombs]. Asahi Shimbun, p.2.
Asahi Shimbun. (2003, April 1). Hijindō heiki o tsukauna: Iraku sensou [Don't use
inhumane weapons in the Iraq War]. Asahi Shimbun, p.2.
Asahi Shimbun. (2004, September 8). X sen ya CT kensa no hōshasen wa anzen? [Is the
radiation from X-rays and CT-scans safe?]. Asahi Shimbun, p.22
Asahi Shimbun. (2007a, March 6). Kyakka seido nandayo [That’s the rejection system].
Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), p.3.
Asahi Shimbun. (2007b, November 18). CT de haigan kajō shindan: Chiisana kage ryōsei
no baai mo [Overdiagnosis of lung cancer by CT scan: Cases where small
shadows are benign]. Asahi Shimbun, p.32.
Asahi Shimbun. (2010, July 29). Iraku Fukaki fuchi yori 2: Shinukedo kanashiku naino
[From the deep brink of Iraq vol. 2: I’ll die, but I’m not sad]. Asahi Shimbun, p.1.
Asahi Shimbun. (2011a, March 26). Jishu hinan to iwaretemo: Okunai taihi kara 10 ka
20-30 kiro ken Fukushima Daiichi genpatsu jiko [Even if we are told to evaluate
voluntarily…: Ten days after the sheltering order 20-30 kilometer from the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant]. Asahi Shimbun, p.31.
257

Asahi Shimbun. (2011b, June 15). Hisaisha no jinken do hairyo: Asahi shimbun hōdō to
jinken iinkai [Considering the human rights of the affected people: Asahi
newspapers’ Press and Human Rights Committee]. Asahi Shimbun, p.27.
Asahi Shimbun. (2011c, June 19). Cherunobuiri no keiken to kyōkun [Experiences and
lessons from Chernobyl]. Asahi Shimbun, p.3.
Asahi Shimbun. (2011d, June 30). Hōshasen to fuan: Kanji kata no chigai mitomeyō
[Radiation and anxieties: Understanding different views of radiation], Asahi
Shimbun, p. 14.
Asahi Shimbun. (2012a, August 3). Zen chōmin ni hōshasen techō: Fukushima Namie
dokuji haifu e [Namie in Fukushima will distribute radiation notebooks to its
residents of its own accord]. Asahi Shimbun, p.3.
Asahi Shimbun. (2012b, November 8). Genpatsu jiko dō fusegu: Genshiryoku kiseii no 5
iin ni kiku [How to avoid a nuclear accident: Listening to five committees from
the Nuclear Regulation Authority]. Asahi Shimbun, p.30.
Asahi shimbun tokubetsu hōdōbu. (2012). Purometeusu no wana [Prometheus’ trap].
Tokyo: Gakken.
Assmann, S. (2013). Reassessing food safety, risk and globalization in China and Japan:
an overview of emerging research trends. Food, Culture and Society: An
International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research, 16(1), 7-19.
Atsumi, K. (1994, March 2). Biryō hōshasen wa gai ni iron: Karada ni ii tono kasetsu
[Disagreement that a tiny amount of radiation is harmful: A hypothesis that it’s
healthy]. Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), p.10
258

Azby. (2014a, February 17). Safecasting IAEA [Web log post]. Retrieved from
http://blog.safecast.org/2014/02/safecasting-the-iaea/
Azby. (2014b, October 29). bGeigie Nano workshops on opposite sides of the world
[Web log post]. Retrieved from http://blog.safecast.org/2014/10/bgeigie-nano-
workshops-on-opposite-sides-of-the-world/
Azby. (2014c, December 23). 25 million! [Web log post]. Retrieved from
http://blog.safecast.org/2014/12/25-million/
Azby (2015, February 8). About calibration and the bGeigie Nano [Web log post]
Retrieved from http://blog.safecast.org/faq/about-calibration-and-the-bgeigie-
nano/
Azuma, H. (2009). Otaku: Japan’s database animals. Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press.
Barry, A. (2006). Technological zones. European journal of social theory, 9(2), 239-253.
Baxandall, M. (1972). Painting and experience in fifteenth century Italy: A primer in the
social history of pictorial style. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Beck, U. (1992). Risk society. Towards a new modernity. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Beck, U. (1995). Ecological politics in an age of risk. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Beck, U. (2008). World at risk. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Beck, U. (2011). Kono kikaini: Fukushima, aruiwa sekai risuku shakai ni okeru nihon no
mirai [On this occasion: Fukushima / Japan’s future in world risk society] In U.
Beck, M. Suzuki & M, Itō (Eds.), Risukuka suru Nihon shakai: Ururihhi bekku to
no taiwa [Japanese society at increasing risk: A dialogue with Ulrich Beck] (pp.
1-12). Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.
259

Beck, U., Giddens, A., & Lash, S. (1994). Reflexive modernization: Politics, tradition
and aesthetics in the modern social order. Cambridge, UK: Politic Press.
Beck, U., Suzuki, M., Itō, M. (2011). Risukuka suru Nihon shakai: Ururihhi bekku to no
taiwa [Japanese society at increasing risk: A dialogue with Ulrich Beck]. Tokyo:
Iwanami shoten.
Beitin, B. K. (2012) Interview and sampling: How many and whom. In J. F. Gubrium,
J.A. Hosltein, A.B. Marvasti, & K.D. McKinney (Eds.), The Sage handbook of
interview research: The complexity of the craft (pp. 243-268). Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
Bond, M. H. (2002). Reclaiming the individual from Hofstede's ecological analysis--a 20-
year odyssey: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002). Psychological Bulletin,
Vol.128, No.1, 73-77.
Bonner, S. (2011, March 19). RDTN.org: Crowdsourcing and mapping radiation levels
[Web log post]. Retrieved from http://boingboing.net/2011/03/19/rdntorg-
collects-cro.html
Brown, A. (2013). Just enough. Tokyo, Japan: Tuttle Publishing.
Brown, A. (2014). SAFECAST: Effective use of Internet and social media in third-party
environmental radiation monitoring after the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP disaster.
Retrieved from http://www-
pub.iaea.org/iaeameetings/cn224p/Session6/Brown.pdf
Brown, J. S., & Duguid, P. (2000). The social life of information. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Business School Press.
260

Brown, P. (1987). Popular epidemiology: Community response to toxic waste induced
disease in Woburn, Massachusetts and other sites. Science, Technology, and
Human Values 12, 12(3-4), 76-85.
Brown, P. (1997). Popular epidemiology revisited. Current Sociology, 45, 137-156.
Busby, C. (2011). The health outcome of the Fukushima catastrophe: Initial analysis
from risk model of the European Committee on Radiation Risk ECCC. Retrieved
from http://www.llrc.org/fukushima/subtopic/fukushimariskcalc.pdf
Busby, C. (2012). Fūin sareta hōshanō no kyōfu: Fukushima jiko de nannin gan ni
narunoka [Sealed fears for radiation: How many people will get cancer due to the
Fukushima accident?]. Tokyo, Japan: Kōdansha.
Callon, M., Lascoumes, P., & Barthe, Y. (2009). Acting in an uncertain world: An essay
on technical democracy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Carey, W. J. (2009). Communication as culture: Essays on media and society. New York,
NY: Routledge.
Clarke, R. H., & Valentin, J. (2009). The history of ICRP and the evolution of its policies.
Annals of the ICRP, 39(1), 75-110. Retreived from
http://new.icrp.org/docs/The%20History%20of%20ICRP%20and%20the%20Evol
ution%20of%20its%20Policies.pdf
Collins, H., & Evans, R. (2007). Rethinking expertise. Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press.
Dokuristu gyōsei hōjin kokumin seikatsu sentā. (2011). Hikakuteki anka na hōshasen
sokuteiki no seinō [Quality of relatively cheap radiation measurement devices].
Retrieved from http://www.kokusen.go.jp/pdf/n-20110908_1.pdf
261

Dokuristu gyōsei hōjin sangyō gijutsu kenkyūjo. (2014a). Hōshasei keisoku no shinraisei
ni tsuite [On the trustworthiness of radiation measurements]. Retrieved from
https://www.nmij.jp/library/IR%28J%29/foundation/index.html#a
Dokuristu gyōsei hōjin sangyō gijutsu kenkyūjo. (2014b). Toresabiriti [Traceability].
Retrieved from https://www.nmij.jp/library/traceability/
Dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin seihin hyōka gijutsu kiban kikō nintei sentā. (2014). JCSS 20 nen
shi: Mirai ni tsunagu torēsabiritī [Twenty years’ of JCSS history: Traceability for
the future]. Retrieved from http://www.nite.go.jp/data/000050173.pdf
Dolezal, N. (2015, January 14). Development: Real-time interpolation [Web log post].
Retreived from http://blog.safecast.org/2015/01/rt-interpolation/
Doss, M. (2013). Linear no-threshold model vs. radiation hormesis. Dose-Response,
11(4), 480-497.
Dower, J. W. (2000). Embracing defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II. New York,
NY: WW Norton & Company.
Edwards, P.N. (2010). A vast machine: Computer models, climate data, and the politics
of global warming. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Edwards, P.N., Jackson, S.J., Chalmers, M.K., Bowker, G.C., Borgman, C.L., Ribes, D.,
Burton, M., & Calvert, S. (2013). Knowledge infrastructures: Intellectual
frameworks and research challenges. Ann Arbor: Deep Blue. Retrieved from
http://pne.people.si.umich.edu/PDF/Edwards_etal_2013_Knowledge_Infrastructu
res.pdf
Egi, S., & Hattori, H. (2006, May 16). Radon nōdo kisei e teisenryō demo haigan risuku:
WHO shishin zukuri ni chakushu [WHO starting to create guidelines to regulate
262

radon concentration: Even with low-dose radiation, there is lung cancer risk].
Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), p.11.
Elwood, S. A., & Martin, D. G. (2000). “Placing” interviews: location and scales of
power in qualitative research. The Professional Geographer, 52(4), 649-657.
Retrieved from
https://www.clarku.edu/departments/geography/pdfs/Deb%20Martin/elwood_mar
tin2000.pdf
Entman, R.M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of
Communication, 43 (4), 51-58.
Epstein, S. (1996). Impure science: AIDS, activism, and the politics of knowledge.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Farrell, T. B., & Goodnight, G. T. (1981). Accidental rhetoric: the root metaphors of
Three Mile Island. Communication Monographs, 48(4), 271-300.
Feinendegen, L. E. (2005). Evidence for beneficial low level radiation effects and
radiation hormesis. The British journal of radiology, 78(925), 3-7.
Fisher, F. (2000). Citizens, experts, and the environment: The politics of local knowledge.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
5cm50cm Keisoku Net (2011a). Keisoku manyuaru: RADEX 1503 no baai
[Measurement method manual in the case of RADEX 1503]. Retrieved from
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1ShIKRZ9DQTZjAzOTk3NTUtNGJhOS00N2
NhLWFkZmQtZTMxNmVjYzNjYWE0/view
5cm50cm Keisoku Net (2011b). GM kan shiki kojin senryō keiyō keisoku memo [Note
on individual dosimetry by the Geiger-Muller Counter]. Retreived from
263

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1ShIKRZ9DQTYmM0YmExYmItMjY5Ni00N
mJiLWFkMzItOGIyNDA3ZjVhMWFl/view
Fortun, K. (2009). Advocacy after Bhopal: Environmentalism, disaster, new global
orders. Chicago, IL; University of Chicago Press.
Foucault, M. (2003). “Society must be defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France,
1975-76. New York, NY: Picador.
Friedman, S. M. (2011). Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima: An analysis of
traditional and new media coverage of nuclear accidents and radiation. Bulletin of
the atomic scientists, 67(5), 55-65. Retrieved from
http://gabe.palomares.com.au/uni/66905310%20-%20Copy.pdf
Friedman, S. M., Gorney, C. M., & Egolf, B. P. (1987). Reporting on radiation: A content
analysis of Chernobyl coverage. Journal of Communication, 37(3), 58-67.
Fujitake, A. (Ed). (2012). Zusetsu Nihon no media [Illustrations on Japan’s media].
Tokyo, Japan: NHK Shuppan.
Fukkōchō, Fukushimaken, & Iitatemura. (2014). Iitatemura jūmin ikō chōsa: Sokuhōban
[Survey of local citizens’ thoughts and feelings in Iitate Village: Preliminary
report]. Retrieved from http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat1/sub-
cat1-4/ikoucyousa/20140131_ikouchousa_sokuhouiitate.pdf
Fukui, Y. (2011, June 22). Hōshasenryō hakatte mo fuan: Kijun naku kudasenu hyōka
[Even measuring radiation doses dosen’t relieve anxieties: You can’t assess
without any standards]. Asahi Shimbun(evening edition),p.11.
Fukushima genpatsujiko dokuritsu kenshō iinkai (2012). Fukushima genpatsujiko
dokuritsu kenshō iinkai: Chōsa houkokusho [Report on the Fukushima nuclear
264

disaster by the Independent Investigation on Fukushima Nuclear Accident].
Tokyo: Discover.
Fukushima Mimpō. (2011a, June 5). Fukushima no shufu ra teiso e: Touden ni seishin
teki baishō o motomeru [Fukushima home keepers will sue TEPCO for damages
for mental distress]. Retrieved from
http://www.minpo.jp/pub/topics/jishin2011/2014/06/post_10119.html
Fukushima Mimpō. (2011b, July 12). Hōshasen tono tatakai 6: “Kenkō” dou mamoru?
Chōki no kenmin chōsa ni kadaimo [Fighting against radiation no. 6: How to
ensure “Health”: Problems of the long-term prefectural survey]. Retrieved from
http://www.minpo.jp/pub/topics/jishin2011/2011/07/post_1531.html
Fukushima Mimpō. (2011c, July 14). Hōshasen tono tatakai 8: Anzenha ka shinchōha ka
senmonka no gensetsu ni yureru [Fighting against radiation no. 8: Experts’
discourse vacillates between safe-leaning and measured-leaning groups].
Retrieved from
http://www.minpo.jp/pub/topics/jishin2011/2011/07/post_1536.html
Fukushima Mimpō. (2011d, November 29). Monshinhyō kaishū susumazu senkōchiku
igai wa 15 pasento: Kenmin kenko chōsa [Prefectural survey’s questionnaire not
retrieved: Only 15% outside early-surveyed areas]. Retrieved from
http://www.minpo.jp/pub/topics/jishin2011/2011/11/post_2615.html
Fukushima Mimpō. (2012a, March 1). Asu e no teigen: Fukushima idai igakubu hōshasen
kenkō kanrigaku kōza kyōju Ōtsuru Akira shi chōki teki na mimamori hitsuyō
[Proposal for Tomorrow: The need to monitor for a long period of time by Akira
Ōtsuru, Professor of radiation health management at the Fukushima Medical
265

University medical department]. Retrieved from
http://www.minpo.jp/pub/topics/jishin2011/2012/03/post_3311.html
Fukushima Mimpō. (2012b, November 11). Asu e no teigen: Kankyōshō Fukushima
saisei jimushochō Omura Takashi [Proposals for tomorrow by Takashi Omura,
the director of the Fukushima Office for Environmental Restoration]. Retrieved
from http://www.minpo.jp/pub/topics/jishin2011/2012/11/post_5752.html
Fukushima Mimpō. (2013, August 17). Yūbin baiku de hōshanō sokutei: Borantia dantai
ga 26 nichi kara Koriyama de senryō chizu o kōkai [Measuring radioactivity on
post officer’s motorcycles: Volunteer group will publish air dose rate map of
Koriyama on the 26
th
of August]. Retreived from
http://www.minpo.jp/pub/topics/jishin2011/2013/08/post_7883.html
Fukushima Minyū. (2014). Fukushima Minyū media dēta [Fukushima Minyū media data].
Retrieved from http://www.minyu-net.com/honsha-annai/web-
koukoku/img3/14baitai.pdf
Funabashi, Y., & Kitazawa, K. (2012). Fukushima in review: A complex disaster, a
disastrous response. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 0(0), 1-13.
Furutani, T., Uehara, K., Franken, P., Wang, C., Moross, J., & Murai, J. (2012). A study
on a platform to scan the earth information including environmental radiation in
the Internet society. In R. Kakimoto, & F. Yamada (Eds.), Proceedings of the
Disaster Management 2012, The 8th Annual Conference of International Institute
for Infrastructure, Renewal and Reconstruction (pp.450-456). Kumamoto, Japan.
Retrieved from http://www.iiirr.ucalgary.ca/files/iiirr/B7-2_.pdf
266

Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1989). Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear
power: A constructionist approach. American Journal of Sociology, 95(1), 1–37.
Giddens, A. (1990). The consequences of modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Giddens, A. (1999). Runaway world: How globalisation is reshaping our lives. New
York, NY: Rouledge.
Gitelman, L., & Jackson, J. (2013). Introduction. In L.Gitelman. (Eds.), “Raw data” is an
oxymoron (pp.1- 14). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Gitlin, T. (1980). The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and unmaking
of the new left. Berkeley: University of California Press.
GoGoLabs, Inc. (2014). Fukushimaken “Higashinihon daishinsai fukushima kodomo
kifukin” e no kifu ni tsuite [Donations for Fukushima Prefecture’s Foundation for
Children in Fukushima after the Great East Asian Earthquake]. Retrieved from
http://gogolabs.jp/news/450
Greenpeace (2014). Greenpeace hōshano sokutei Shiru-Beku [Greenpeace’s radiation
measurement “Shiru-beku”]. Retrieved from
http://www.greenpeace.org/japan/monitoring/
Gregory, J., & Miller, S. (1998). Science in public: Communication, culture, and
credibility. Cambridge, MA: Basic Books.
Gross, A. G. (1994). The role of rhetoric in the public understanding of science. Public
Understanding of Science, 3, 3-23.
267

Gubrium, E., & Koro-Ljungberg, M. (2005). Contending with border making in the social
constructionist interview. Qualitative Inquiry, 11(5), 689-715.
Hagel, J., Brown, J.S., & Davison, L. (2010). The power of pull: How small moves,
smartly made, can set big things in motion. New York: Basic Books.
Hakatte Gaigā. (2015, February 3). Hakatte Geiger Twilog. Retrieved from
http://twilog.org/hakatte/stats
Hanzawa, M. (2011, May 13). Teisenryō hōshasen no chi ni kite wa [Why don't you
come to the land of low-dose radiation?]. Asahi Shimbun, p.16.
Hattori, N. (2014a, January 20). Hakaru shiru tsutaeru, Koriyama: Keisoku repōto
[Measuring, learning and communicating Koriyama: A measurement report][Web
log post]. Retrieved from http://kodomira.com/HSF/report/fukushima/entry-
11409.html
Hattori, N. (Ed). (2014b). Hakaru, shiru, kurasu: Kodomotachi o hōshano kara
mamorutameni watashitachi ga dekirukoto [Measuring, learning and living: What
we can do to protect children from radioactivity]. Tokyo, Japan: Kodomo mirai
sokuteijo.
Hattori, N. (2014c, November 14). Hakaru shiru Nasushiobara (kōhen) [Measuring and
learning in Nasushiobara (part two)]. Retrieved from
http://kodomira.com/HSF/report/kanto/entry-12604.html
Hattori, N. (2014d, November 25). Hakaru shiru Gunma (zenhen) [Measuring and
learning in Gunma (part one)] [Web log post]. Retrieved from
http://kodomira.com/HSF/report/kanto/entry-12605.html
268

Hayano, R., & Itoi, S. (2014). Shirou to surukoto [To learn about radiation].Tokyo,
Japan: Shinchōsha
Hayano, R. S., Yamanaka, S., Bronson, F. L., Oginni, B., & Muramatsu, I. (2014).
BABYSCAN: A whole body counter for small children in Fukushima. Journal of
Radiological Protection, 34, 645.
Hayashi, Y. (2011b, May 24). Genpatsu shūhen no 15 mannin, 30 nen kenkō chōsa e:
Fukushima ken gan hassei ritsu nado chūshi [Fukushima Prefecture monitoring
15,000 people near the nuclear power plant for 30 years]. Asahi Shimbun, 37.
Hemmi, A., & Graham, I. (2013). Hacker science versus closed science: Building
environmental monitoring infrastructure. Information, Communication & Society,
17(7), 1-13.
Homma, R. (2013). Genpatsu kōkoku [On advertisement for nuclear power]. Tokyo: Aki
shobō.
Honda, H. (2005). Datsu genshiryoku no undō to seiji: Nihon no enerugī seisaku no
tenkan wa kanō ka [Anti-nuclear movements and politics: Is it possible to change
Japan’s energy policy?]. Sapporo, Japan: Hokkaido daigaku tosho kankōkai.
Hosaka, N., Mizuno, T., Asakuno, S., Sato, Y., & Komatsu, N. (2012, August 12).
Shinsaigo kagakusha shinrai dekimasuka? [Can you trust scientisits after the
disaster?]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.7.
Iesaka, T. (1986). Cherunobuiri jiko to shimin undō [The Chernobyl accident and citizen
movements]. Keizai Semina Zoukan, 189-196.
Iitatemura. (2012). Iitate sonmin no hinan seikatsu jittai oyobi kison ikō nado ni kansuru
ankēto chōsa hōkokusho [The survey report on the state of evacuees from
269

Iitate Villege and their intentions to return]. Retrieved from
http://www.vill.iitate.fukushima.jp/saigai/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/27fe90c68dfcd08ecba20a8a13176e07.pdf
Iitatemura. (2015). 2015-03-01 genzai no hinan jōhō [Information on evacuation on
March 1, 2015]. Retreived from http://www.vill.iitate.fukushima.jp/saigai/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/8525c2dbae13cc073ecaf40d70674870.pdf
Ikawa, M. (2002). Genshiryoku heiwa riyō hakurankai to shimbunsha [The ‘Atoms for
Peace’ exhibition and newspaper agencies]. In T. Tsuganezawa (Ed.), Nihon
no media ibento 1945–1960 [Japan’s media event (1945–1960)] (pp. 247–
265). Kyoto, Japan: Sekaishisōsha.
Imanaka, T. (2012). Teisenryo hōshasen hibaku: Cherunobuiri kara Fukushima e [Low
dose radiation exposure: From Chernobyl to Fukushima]. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.
Inose, N. (1990). Yokubō no media [The media of desire] Tokyo, Japan: Shōgakukan.
Internatioan Commission on Radiological Protection (2011). Fukushima nuclear polwer
plant accident. Retreived from
http://www.icrp.org/docs/fukushima%20nuclear%20power%20plant%20accident.
pdf
Irwin, A. (1995). Citizen science: A study of people, expertise and sustainable
development. London: Routledge.
IT media. (2013, January 22). Hinansha ni taburetto o haifu shita monono: Fukushima
ken Iitatemura [Tablets were distributed in Iitata villege, Fukushima, but…].
Retreived from http://www.itmedia.co.jp/news/articles/1301/22/news102.html
270

Itō, C. (2012). Shoku to anzen to hōshanō 2: Sokutei to jikken [Food, safety and
radioactivity part 2: Measurement and experiment]. Mamarebo, 1, 6-7.
Itō, C. (2014). Anata no machi no shimin sokuteijo sirīzu 5: Tokyo to kokubunji shi
Kodomo mirai sokuteijo daihyō Ishimaru Hidetake san [The citizens’ measuring
stations in your town series, vol. 5: Hidetake Ishimaru, director of Kodomo mirai
sokuteijo in Kokubunji City, Tokyo]. Mamarebo, 7, 20-21.
Itō, E. (2013, August 25). Kodomo zenkoku netto san ni yoru Chibaken Shiroi shi sokutei
repōto [Measurement report by Zenkoku Net in Shiroi City, Chiba][Web log post].
Retrieved from http://kodomira.com/HSF/report/kanto/entry-11115.html
Ito, H. (2012). Fukushima genpatsu jiko ikō no genshiryoku hōdō: Jikogo sankagetsukan
no shimbun shasetsu no ronchō kara miete kurukoto [Coverage of the Fukushima
nuclear accident: What can we see through an analysis of the tone of newspaper
editorials]. Pool Gakuin Daigaku Kenkyu Kiyo, 52, 199-212.
Itō, M. (2012). Terebi wa genpatsu jiko o dō tsutaetanoka [How did television portray the
nuclear accident?]. Tokyo: Heibonsha.
Itou, H. (2004). Genshiryoku kaihatsu/riyō o meguru media gidai: Asahi Shimbun
shasetsu no bunseki (jō) [A media agenda regarding the development and use of
nuclear energy: The analysis of the editorials section of the Asahi Shimbun (1)].
Poole Gakuin Daigaku Kenkyu Kiyo 44, 63-76. Retrieved from
http://ci.nii.ac.jp/els/110001136834.pdf?id=ART0001302259&type=pdf&lang=e
n&host=cinii&order_no=&ppv_type=0&lang_sw=&no=1407418045&cp=
Itou, H. (2005). Genshiryoku kaihatsu/riyō o meguru media gidai: Asahi Shimbun
shasetsu no bunseki (chū) [A media agenda regarding the development and
271

use of nuclear energy: The analysis of the editorials section of the Asahi
Shimbun (2)]. Poole Gakuin Daigaku Kenkyu Kiyo 45, 111–126. Retrieved
from
http://ci.nii.ac.jp/els/40007268001.pdf?id=ART0007271078&type=pdf&lang
=en&host=cinii&order_no=&ppv_type=0&lang_sw=&no=1356121174&cp=
Itou, H. (2009). Genshiryoku kaihatsu/riyō o meguru media gidai: Asahi Shimbun
shasetsu no bunseki (Ge) [A media agenda regarding the development and use
of nuclear energy: The analysis of the editorials section of the Asahi Shimbun
(3)]. Poole Gakuin Daigaku Kenkyu Kiyo 49, 101-116. Retrieved from
http://ci.nii.ac.jp/els/110007478296.pdf?id=ART0009305087&type=pdf&lan
g=en&host=cinii&order_no=&ppv_type=0&lang_sw=&no=1407426063&cp
=
JCGM. (2012). International vocabrary of metrology: Basic and general concepts and
associated terms (VIM). Retreived from
http://www.bipm.org/en/publications/guides/vim.html
Jasanoff, S. (2010). Beyond calculation: A democratic response to risk. In A. Lakoff
(Ed.), Disaster and the politics of intervention (pp.14-40). New York, NY:
Columbia University Press.
Jenkins, H. (2006, November 27). Collective intelligence vs. the wisdom of crowds [Web
log post]. Retrieved from
http://henryjenkins.org/2006/11/collective_intelligence_vs_the.html
Jōmaru, Y. (2012). Genpatsu to media [Nuclear power and media]. Tokyo, Japan: Asahi
Shimbun Shuppan.
272

Jung, J-Y. (2012). Social media use and goals after the Great East Japan Earthquake.
First Monday 17(8,6). Retrieved from
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/4071/3285
Kajiwara, M. (2011, June 19). Hōshasen risuku o yomitoku: ICRP kanbu ni Pari de atta
[Reading radiation risks: Met a top ICRP official in Paris]. Asahi Shimbun, p.1.
Kamata, S. (2002). Chihōshi no kenkyū [Studies of local papers]. Tokyo, Japan: Ushio
Shuppansha.
Kami, M. (2012). Fukkō wa genba kara ugokidasu [Recovery gets rolling at the
[affected] scene]. Tokyo, Japan: Tōyō keizai shimpōsha.
Kaneko, Y. (2013, May 19). Hōshasen no jintai e no eikyō: Genkaku na nen 20 miri
shīberuto de hinan [The effects of radiation on the human body: Tough evacuation
policy at more than 20 milli Sievert]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.31.
Kankyōshō. (2012). Hōshasen tte dō yatte hakaruno? Seikatsu kūkan no hōshasen kiso
chishiki [How do we measure radiation? Basic knowledge of radiation in living
spaces]. Retrieved from http://josen-
plaza.env.go.jp/materials_links/pdf/sokutei_kiso.pdf
Kankyōshō. (2013). Josen kankei gaidorain [Issues related to decontamination guidlines].
Retrieved from http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/rmp/attach/josen-gl-full_ver2.pdf
Kankyōshō. (2014). Josenkankei: Q&A [Issues related to decontamination: Questions
and answers]. Retrieved from http://josen-
plaza.env.go.jp/materials_links/pdf/decontamination_qa_141020.pdf
Kankyōshō Fukushima saisei jimusho. (2014). Josen moderu jisshō jigyō go no kūkan
senryō no suii ni tsuite [Transition of radiation air dose rates after an examiniation
273

of the decontamination model was conducted]. Retrieved from
http://josen.env.go.jp/area/pdf/transition_141121.pdf
Kariya, T. (2015). Oishimbo hanaji mondai ni kotaeru [My answer to the Oishimbo
controversy concerning the issue of nosebleeds]. Tokyo, Japan: Yugensha.
Kasperson, R. E. (2012). The social amplification of risk and low-level radiation. Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, 68(3), 59-66.
Kasperson, R. E., Renn, O., Slovic, P., Brown, H. S., Emel, J., Goble, R., ... & Ratick, S.
(1988). The social amplification of risk: A conceptual framework. Risk analysis,
8(2), 177-187.
Katchanovski, I. (2012). Fukushima vs. Chernobyl: Coverage of the nuclear disasters by
American and Canadian media. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting at
American Political Science Association, New Orleans. Retreived from
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2108667
Kawano, Y., Shepard, D., Shobugawa, Y., Goto, J., Suzuki, T., Amaya, Y.,…Naito, M.
(2012, October). A map for the future: Measuring radiation levels in Fukushima,
Japan. Paper presented at Global Humanitarian Technology Conference (GHTC),
2012 IEEE, Seattle, WA. Abstract retrieved from
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6387021
Kelly, A. R. (2014). Hacking science: Emerging parascientific genres and public
participation in scientific research (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from
http://repository.lib.ncsu.edu/ir/handle/1840.16/9367
Keys, J. B., Wells, R. A., & Denton, L. T. (1998). Japanese managerial and
organizational learning. Thunderbird International Business Review, 40, 119–139.
274

Kingston, J. (2012). The politics of natural disaster, nuclear crisis and recovery. In J.
Kingston (Ed)., Natural disaster and nuclear crisis in Japan (pp. 188-206).
London, UK: Routledge.
Kinoshita, T. (2013). Rethinking assumptions: The post-Fukushima risk assessment
controversy. In S. Ikeda., & Y. Maeda (Eds.), Emerging Issues Learned from the
3.11 Disaster as Multiple Events of Earthquake, Tsunami and Fukushima Nuclear
Accident (pp.12-14). Retrieved from http://www.sra-
japan.jp/cms/uploads/311Booklet.pdf#page=18
Kirishima, S. (2014, February). Ikari no sukūpu: Kuni no hōshasen sokutei no detarame o
abaku Fukushima 55 chiten jissokuchi to tettei hikaku [Inside scoop with a side of
anger: Revealing the manipulation of the state’s radiation measurement through
an exhaustive comparison of actual measured values at 55 points in Fukushima].
Shūkan Aashi,119 (6), pp.18-22.
Kitahara, T. (2011). Nihon no shimbun wa “genshiryoku” o donoyouni tsutaetekitaka:
Asahi Shimbun to Yomiuri Shimbun no shasetsu ronchō no kōsatsu (Dai I kki
to dai niki) [How have the Japanese newspapers reported “atomic energy”?:
Comparative studies of editorials of The Asahi Shimbun and The Yomiuri
Shimbun (the 1st and 2nd period)]. Shōbi Journal of Policy Studies, 13, 35–53.
Knight Foundation. (n.d.). Our mission. Retreived from
http://www.knightfoundation.org/
Kōeki zaidan hōjin hōshasen keisoku kyōkai (2014). Ryōkin [Price]. Retrieved from
http://www.irm.or.jp/ryoukinn.html
275

Kōeki zaidan hōjin shimbun tsūshin chōsakai (2012). Daishinsai genpatsu to media no
yakuwari [Great earthquake, nuclear power and the role of media]. Tokyo, Japan:
Kōeki zaidan hōjin shimbun tsūshin chōsakai.
Kodomo mirai sokuetijo (2013a, April 4). Hotto supotto faindā ni yoru kuukan senryō
mappu (Suginami no rei) to āsude Tokyo deno demonsutorēshon no oshirase [A
map of radiatin in the air by a Hot Spot Finder in the case of the Suginami Ward
and a demonstration announcement of a Hot Spot Finder at Earth Day Tokyo].
Retreived from http://kodomira.com/HSF/report/tokyo/entry-10418.html
Kodomo mirai sokuetijo (2013b, July 3). Hōshasen mieruka purojekuto ga sutāto shimasu
[Launching the “Making Radiation Visible” Project]. Retrieved from
http://kodomira.com/news/entry-10465.html
Kodomo mirai sokuetijo (2013c, July 5). Hotto supotto faindā no tokuchō [The
characteristics of a Hot Spot Finder] [Web log post]. Retrieved from
http://kodomira.com/HSF/about_HSF/entry-10466.html
Kodomo mirai sokuetijo. (2013d, September 24). Hakaru, shiru, hōshasen mieruka
purojekuto iyoiyo shidō shimasu [Measruing and Learning: Launching the
“Making Radiation Visible” Project]. Retrieved from
http://kodomira.com/HSF/news/entry-11286.html
Kodomo mirai sokuteijo. (2014).Gyōmu annai [Business outline] Retreived from
http://kodomira.com/service/entry-8484.html
Kodomotachi o hōshano kara mamoru zenkoku nettowāku. (2014a). Gaiyō [General
description]. Retrieved from
http://kodomozenkoku.com/%E5%AD%90%E3%81%A9%E3%82%82%E5%85
276

%A8%E5%9B%BD%E3%83%8D%E3%83%83%E3%83%88%E3%81%AB%E
3%81%A4%E3%81%84%E3%81%A6/outline/
Kodomotachi o hōshano kara mamoru zenkoku nettowāku. (2014b). 2011-2012 nen do
no katsudō hōkoku [Activity report from 2011 to 2012]. Retreived from
http://kodomozenkoku.com/%E6%B4%BB%E5%8B%95%E3%81%AB%E3%81
%A4%E3%81%84%E3%81%A6/2011%E3%80%9C12%E5%B9%B4%E5%BA
%A6%E6%B4%BB%E5%8B%95%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A/
Komatsu, S., & Sonoda, J. (2011, June 17). Hōshasen shutoken mo binkan: Kashiwa
Matsudo chiiki [Radioactivity as a sensitive issue in Tokyo metropolitan district:
the Kashiwa and Matsudo areas]. Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), p.19.
Koriyamashi. (2014a). Josen keikaku: Dai yon han [Decontamination Plan: The fourth
edition]. Retreived from
https://www.city.koriyama.fukushima.jp/186000/shinsai/documents/josenplan4.p
df
Koriyamashi. (2014b, April 1). Sābei mēta (hōshasenryō sokuteiki) o kashidashi masu
[We’ll lend survey meters]. Retrieved from
http://www.city.koriyama.fukushima.jp/186000/shinsai/sokuteki.html
Kuchinskaya, O. (2007). “We will die and become science”: The production of
invisibility and public knowledge about Chernobyl radiation effects in Belarus
(Doctoral dissertation). Retreiced from ProQuest.
Kuznick, P. (2011, April 13). Japan’s nuclear history in perspective: Eisenhower and
atoms for war and peace. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Retrieved from
277

http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/japans-nuclear-history-perspective-
eisenhower-and-atoms-war-and-peace
Lakoff, A. (2008). The generic biothreat, or, how we became unprepared. Cultural
Anthropology, Vol.23, Issue 3, 399-428.
Latour, B. (1993). We have never been modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Lazic, D. (2013). News analysis of the Fukushima accident: Lack of information
disclosure, radiation fears and accountability issues. Journal of Contemporary
Eastern Asia, 12(2), 19-34.
Levine, A. G. (1982). Love Canal: Science, politics, and people. Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books.
Levy, P. (1997). Collective intelligence: Mankind’s emerging world in cyberspace.
Cambridge, MA: Perseus books.
Lindee, M.S. (1994). Suffering made real: American science and the survivors at
Hiroshima. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Lippman, W. (1922). Public opinion. New York, NY: Free Press Paperbacks.
Liu, S.B., & Ziemke, J. (2012). From cultures of participation to the rise of crisis
mapping in a networked world. In A.Delwiche, J.J. Henderson. The participatory
cultures handbook (pp.185-196). New York: Routledge.
278

Luckey, T. D. (1999). Radiation hormesis overview. Radiation Protection Management,
16, 22-34. Retrieved from http://www.radiation-hormesis.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/hormesis-641luckey.pdf
Maeda, M. (2011 November 30). Mushubutu no sekinin: Sensei futari hanashi wa
seihantai [Responsibility of res nullius: Two teachers, opposite views]. Asahi
Shimbun, p.3.
Maeno, K. (2011, March 24). Kijun uwamawaru suidōsui: Nyūji mo nyūyoku senpatsu
mondainashi hōshasei busshitsu kazeni nori ame de kōka ka [Tap water has higher
than standard levels of uranium, but no problem for bathing and shampooing
babies: radioactive materials moving through the wind and rain?] Yomiuri
Shimbun, p. 2.
Mama rebo henshūbu. (2013, August 8). Mama rebo henshūbu tsūshin No. 4 [News from
the editorial desk of Mom’s revolution] [Web log post]. Retreived from
http://momsrevo.blogspot.jp/2013/08/no-100.html
Manabe, N. (2013). Music in Japanese antinuclear demonstrations: The evolution of a
contentious performance model. The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 11 (42,
3). Retrieved from http://japanfocus.org/-Noriko-MANABE/4015
Matsuo. (2011, Novemer 25). Mazu hakaru koto kodomo mesen de [Measure it from the
height perspective of children] [Web log post]. Retreived from
http://kodomira.com/measure/entry-5303.html
McCurry, J. (2014, May 22). Gourmet manga stirs up storm after linking Fukushima to
nosebleeds. The Guardian. Retrieved from
279

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/gourmet-oishinbo-manga-link-
fukushima-radiation-nosebleeds
Mihoko_Noriji. (2011, May 16). β sen no mado: gaigā kauntā deno hōshasen no tadashii
hakarikata [A window for β-ray: How to measure radiation with Geiger counters]
[Online forum comment]. Retreived from http://togetter.com/li/136232
Mizuguchi, H. (2011). Kichin to shiritai genpatsu no shikumi to hōshanō [Properly
learning about the structure of nuclear power plants and radioactivity]. Tokyo,
Japan: Newton Press
Monbukagakushō. (2011a). Fukushima kennai no gakkō no kōsha kōtei nado riyou
handan ni okeru zanteiteki kangaekata ni tsuite [Tentative guideline on the use of
school buildings and playgrounds in the Fukushima Prefecture]. Retreived from
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/saigaijohou/syousai/1305173.htm
Monbukagakushō. (2011b). Fukushima kennai ni okeru jidō seito tō ga gakkō to ni oite
ukeru senryō teigen ni muketa tōmen no taiō ni tsuite [Tentative approaches to
loweing dose rates that child students are exposed to in schools]. Retreived from
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/saigaijohou/syousai/1306590.htm
Monbukagakushō & Nihon genshiryoku kenkyū kaihatsu kikō. (2011). Hōshasen sokutei
ni kansuru gaidorain [Guideline for radiation measurements]. Retrieved from
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201110/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/10/21/
21shiryou02.pdf
Moriguchi, Y. (2011). Genpatsu jiko ni kansuru jōhō o dō yomitokuka: Hōshasen
hōshanō monitaringu no dēta o chūshin ni [How to understand information on the
nuclear accident with particular focus on monitoring data on radiation and
280

radioactivity]. In M. Morita (Ed.), Fukushima Genpatujiko no kenshō to kankyō
hōshano osen (pp.57-70). Tokyo, Japan: Kankyō komyunikeshonzu.
Murillo, L.F.R. (2013, May). New expert eye over Fukushima: Open source response to
the nuclear crisis in Japan. Paper presented at STS Forum on the 2011
Fukushima/East Japan Disasters, Berkeley, CA. Retrieved from
http://fukushimaforum.wordpress.com/workshops/sts-forum-on-the-2011-
fukushima-east-japan-disaster/manuscripts/session-3-radiation-information-and-
control/new-expert-eyes-over-fukushima-open-source-responses-to-the-nuclear-
crisis-in-japan/
Murphy, S. M. (2014). Grassroots democrats and the Japanese state after Fukushima.
Japanese Political Science Review 2, 19-37. Retrieved from http://www.jpsa-
web.org/eibun_zassi/data/pdf/JPSA_MURPHY_final_July_9_2014.pdf
Nakagawa, Y. (2011). Hōshasen hibaku no rekishi: Amerika genbaku kaihatu kara
Fukushima genpatu jiko made [A history of radiation exposure: From America’s
development of atomic bombs to the Fukushima nuclear accident]. Tokyo: Akashi
shoten.
Nakajima, K. (2004, March 10). Gan no 3.2% hōshasen shindan ga geiin: Muyō na shinsa
sakeru shimpai nara hibakuryō kiite [3.2 percent of cancer resulted from
radiological diagnosis and unnecessary diagnosis should be avoided: Learn the
amount of exposure if you are worried]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.26.
Nakao, M. (2009). The image of the atomic bomb in Japan before Hiroshima. Historia
Scientiarum, 19(2), 119- 131.
281

Naozumi. (2013, October 8). Safecast bGeigie Nano building workshop and good design
award reception party at Loftwork, Saturday Oct. 19, 2013. Retrieved from
http://blog.safecast.org/2013/10/safecast-bgeigie-nano-building-workshop-and-
good-design-award-reception-party-at-loftwork-saturday-oct-19-2013/
National Police Agency of Japan (2014). Damage situation and police countermeasures
associated with Tohoku district off the Pacific Ocean earthquake, July 10, 2014.
Retrieved from http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo_e.pdf
Nelkin, D. (1987). Selling science. How the press covers science and technology. New
York, NY: Freeman.
Nemoto, S. (2011, May 10). Tōden komon no hatsugen “ijō” deha [Isn’t TEPCO’s
advisor’s comment “abnormal”?]. Asahi Shimbun, p.14.
NHK ETV Tokushū Shuzaihan (2012). Hotto Supotto: Nettowāku de tsukuru hōshanō
osen chizu [Hot Spots: Networked radiation contamination map]. Tokyo,
Japan: Kodansha.
Nielsen, M. (2012). Reinventing discovery: The new era of networked science. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (1988, August 30). SOS chikyū kankyō 5: Hōshanō osen Hōiken
kānkyō eisei kenkyūbuchō Iwakura Tetsuo shi [SOS global environment vol. 5:
Radioactive contamination comments by Tetsuo Iwakura, the director of the
Environmental Public Health Department at the National Institute of Radiological
Sciences]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, p.13.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (1989a, August 28). Gan sentā dōbutsu jikken hōshasen no
hatsugan kiken kyūgen: “Shikii chi” sonzai ka [Cancer Center’s animal testing
282

shows that carcinogenic hazards from radiation radically decreased: Is there a
threshold?]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun (evening edition), p.14.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (1989b, August 28). Hōshasen no kiken kyūgen: Kinki dai
Kondō Sōhei shi, Genshiryoku shiryo jōhō shitsu Takagi Jinzaburō shi [The Sharp
decline of danger of radiation: Sōhei Kondō from Kinki University and Jinzaburō
Takagi from Citizen’s Nuclear Information Center]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun
(evening edition), p.14.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (1989c, September 17). Doku ka kusuri ka? Biryo hōshasen
kenkō ni purasu kōka? Shikii chi sonzai setsu mo [Poison or medicine? Does
radiation have positive health effects? Does threshold theory exist, too?]. Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, p.17.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (1990a, May 16). Hōshasei busshitsu wa warumono? Atsukai
atoshimatsu kigakari: Abisugiru to kikenmo [Are radioactive materials evil?
Concerns about dealing with them: The dangers of being overexposed]. Nihon
Keizai Shimbun (evening edition), p.11.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (1990b, July 2). Teisenryō no hōshasen abitemo hakketsubyō
hassei ritsu henka nashi!? Soren no senmonka ga hōkōku. [Exposure to low-dose
radiation doesn't affect the rates of incidence of leukemia reported by a Soviet
expert]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, p.17.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (1990c, November 17). Hōshasen, shōryō nara jintai ni yūeki:
Kenkyūsha wa tsuyoi kanshin, kagakuteki shōmei wa korekara [Is radiation
beneficial for the human body if the amount is small? Researchers show strong
indications, but scientific proof has yet to come]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, p.11.
283

Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (1991, September 15). Shinsetsu ni giron futtō: Hōshasen
teireberu nara kenkou ni yoi? [A new theory fueling controversy: Does low dose-
radiation have health benefits?]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, p.15.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (1992a, January 30). Radon onsen, gan ni yūkō? Moto Okayama
dai jokyōju ra 37 nenkan no tōkeichōsa [Is radon spa effective for treating
cancer?: 37-year-long statistical survey by Former Assistant Professor of
Okayama University et al.]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun (evening edition), p.18.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (1992b, January 30). Radon onsen gan ni yūkō? Aichi ken gan
sentā kenkyūjo Tominaga Suketami shi kenkō ni yoi wa sōkei [Is radon spa
effective for treating cancer? Premature to assume that it’s healthy: Suketami
Tominaga at Aichi Center Cancer Research Institute]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun
(evening edition), p.18.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (1992c, July 11). Tei reberu hōshasen jizen shōsha de teikou sei
Osaka furitsu dai kenkyū sentā ga kakunin [The irradiation of low level radiation
enhancing resistibility confirmed by Osaka City University Research Center].
Nihon Keizai Shimbun (evening edition),p.10.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2000, April 13). Kaku shisetsu rōdōsha beiseifu gan hasshō
sekinin mitomeru [The U.S. government admitted responsibility for cancer
incidence of nuclear workers]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun (evening edition), p.18.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2011a, April 3). Tokushū: Hōshasen to kenkō tadashiku shiru,
nen 1 miri shīberuto demo kyūsei shōjō no 1000 bun no 1 [Special topic: Learning
the health of radiation in a proper way. Even 1mSv per year is one-thousandth of
acute symptoms]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, p.4
284

Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2011b, April 17). Yowai hōshasen o nagaku abiruto? Seibutsu e
no eikyō wa chiisaku [What would happen if you were exposed to weak radiation
for a long time? Minimal effects on living objects]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, p.15.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2011c, April 25). Hōshasen no hatsu gan risuku: 100 miri
shīberuto de judō kitsuen nami himan yori hikuku [Cancer risks of radiation:
100mSv is equal to secondhand smoking less than obesity]. Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, p.38.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2011d, May 2). Tokushū: Q&A Hōshasen kenkō eno eikyō wa?
[Special topic: What are the health effects of radiation?]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
p.6.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2011e, May 11). Sagyōin no kenkō kanri ni banzen o [Take all
possible measures to ensure the health of nuclear workers]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
p.2.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2011f, May 28). Fukushima ken, zen kenmin no kenkō chōsa,
hōshasei busshitsu eikyō saguru [Health survey on the residents of the Fukushima
Prefecture seeking to explore the effects of radioactive materials]. Nihon keizai
Shimbun, p.30.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2011g, June 27). Hibaku no eikyō jikken aitsugu, daigaku ya
Jaxa, jimichi na kenkyū ni kitai naibu teisenryō [A flurry of experiments on the
effects of exposure to radiation by universities, JAXA: Steady research on internal
exposure]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, p.11.
285

Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2011h, August 21). Hōshasen 7: Shizen senryō, gan hasshō sayū
sezu [Radiation vol. 7: Background radiation rates don't affect cancer incidence].
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, p.10.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2011i, August 28). Hōshasen 8: Radon o abiru kōka jisshō e
[Radiation vol. 8: Examining the health efffets of exposure to radon]. Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, p.10.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2011j, August 29). Hōshasen meguru konran shūsoku tōku:
Karaki Hideaki Nihon gakujutu kaigi fuku kaicho, risuku hyōka kuniga jōhō o
[Confusion over radiation has yet to be solved and the state should provide a risk
assessment. By Hideaki Karaki, Vice President of the Science Council of Japan].
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, p.11.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2011k, October 14). Hōshasen chishiki manabu fukudokubon,
monkashō shōchūkōmuke, minomamorikata shōkai [MEXT shows elementary
school, middle school and high schools how to protect students with
supplementary reading material on radiation knowledge]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun
(evening edition), p.14.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2011l, November 10). Teisenryō hibaku de seifu ga hatsu kaigō
[The first government meeting about low-dose radiation exposure]. Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, p.38.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2011m, December 23). Jieitai josen no keikai kuiki nado, senryō
saidai 78% gen [Radiation dose rates decreased by up to 78% in areas, including
caution zones where Self Defence Forces engaged in decontamination]. Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, p.34.
286

Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2012a, March 9). Minamatabyō kyūsai, mienu kecchaku: Osen
to byōki no kankei risshō. Genpatsu jiko demo kyōkun ni [Whether rescuing those
with Minamata disease is possible remains to be seen: Learning from the nuclear
accident by probing the relations between contamination and disease]. Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, p.43.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2012b, July 6). Hoshanō to tatakau: Fukushima kenmin kenkō
chōsa kara ge [Fighting against radioactivity: Fukushima Prefecture health survey
vol. 2]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun (evening edition), p.7.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2012c, September 9). Higashi nihon daishinsai tokushū:
Nagabiku hinan seikatsu de kodomo no kenkō fuan ichidan to [Special topic on
the Great East Japan Earthquake: Growing concerns about children’s health in
prolonged evacuation life]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, p.11.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2012d, November 8). Hōshasen kanshi sōchi, 10% hikuku hyōji:
675 chiten de kaishū e [Monitoring posts show radiation levels ten percent lower
than the actual values: Monitoring posts will be recalled at 675 points]. Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, p.42.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2012e, December 28). Hōshanō to tatakau Fukushima: Genpatsu
sagyōin hibaku dō haaku [Fukushima, fighting against radioactivity: How nuclear
workers know whether they’ve been exposed to radiation?]. Nihon Keizai
Shimbun (evening edition), p.7.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2013, November 12). Hibaku senryō kojin no senryō ni kiseiian
Fukushima kikan ni jisshitsu kanwa [The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)
states that radiation levels will be based on individual radiation exposure: NRA’s
287

plan more or less contributes to a relaxed return to Fukushima]. Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, p.1.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2014a, February 22). Fukushima keizai tokushū: Fukushima
ikuji ni anshin na machi e, hōshasen eno fuan fusshoku, asobiba zukuri sōdan
teatsuku [Special topic on Fukushima’s economy: Making Fukushima safe for
child-raising, relieving anxieties about radiation, and consulting playground-
making with care]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, p.37.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2014b, June 11). Kūkan senryō 50-80% gen, josen kitaku
konnan chiki de kenshō, hinan kaijo ni itaranu basho mo [Radiation air dose rates
decreased 50-80% in difficult-to-return-zones and even in zones where evacuation
orders have yet to be lifted]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, p.42.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2014c, July 18). Manga byōsha de hamon: Teisenryō no hibaku
eikyō wa, hanaji tono kankei mikaimei, hatuan yōin nao kigu mo [Controversy
over manga’s representations: Unproven health effects of low-dose radiation in
relation to nose bleeding with growing concerns about causes of cancer]. Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, p.26.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. (2014e, August 2). Josen, kojinsenryō o jūshi taishō shibori
kōritsu yoku: Kuninado chūkan hōkoku Fukushima 4 shi jūmin ni tomadoimo
[The government’s interim report gives greater importatnce to individual radiation
exsposure by targeting the object of decontamination effectively: Growing
conerns of residents in four cities in Fukushima]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, p.39.
288

Nihon Shimbun Kyōkai. (2014a). Kako no daihyō hyōgo ichiran [Lists of accepted
slogans of the past]. Retrieved from
http://pressnet.or.jp/about/recruitment/slogan/past.html
Nihon Shimbun Kyōkai. (2014b). Nihon shimbun nenkan [Japan newspaper annual].
Tokyo: Nihon Shimbun Kyōkai.
Nodashi. (2015, January 28). Kūkan senryō kei no kashidashi [Circulation of dosimeters
on radiation in the air]. Retreiced from
http://www.city.noda.chiba.jp/kurashi/shinsai/houshasen/1001345.html
Nomura, S. (2011, October 6). Kōreisha no saigai iryō: Sutoresu geiin no soukishi fusege
[Disaster medical care for the elderly to prevent stress-induced early death]. Asahi
Shimbun, p.13.
Ogawa, N. (2007). Saito shōkai: Gasorin kakaku hikaku saito gogo.gs [Introducing the
gas price comparison site gogo.gs]. Retrieved from
http://www.slideshare.net/ogaworks
Ohno, H. (2011, July 6). Interview/Ulrich Beck: Systems of organized irresponsibility
behind the Fukushima crisis. Retrieved from
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/analysis_opinion/AJ201107063167
Ōishi, M. (2011). The day sun rose in the west: Bikini, the lucky dragon and I. Honolulu,
HI: University of Hawai'i Press.
Ōmori, A., Akaike, Y., & Torigoe, K. (2011, May 22). Jōhō katayori nai sentaku hitsuyō
[Information: Unbiased selection is necessary]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.23.
O'neill, O. (2002). A question of trust: The BBC Reith Lectures 2002. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
289

O'Reilly, K. (2005). Ethnographic methods. New York, NY: Routledge.
Osaki, T. (2014, November 12). ‘Oishinbo’ editor defends manga. Retrieved from
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/05/19/national/oishinbo-editor-defends-
manga/#.VO6e0cY6nu1
Osgood, K. (2006). Total cold war: Eisenhower’s secret propaganda battle at home and
abroad. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Ottinger, G. (2010). Buckets of resistance: Standards and the effectiveness of citizen
science. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 35(2), 244-270.
Ottinger, G., & Cohen, B.R. (Ed.). (2011). Technoscience and environmental justice:
Expert cultures in a grassroots movement. Cambridge, MA: the MIT Press.
Ozeki, A. (1994, October 16). Chōki no teisenryō hibaku ni fuan: Cherunobuiri kara 8
nen han [Concerns about exposure to low-dose radiation for a long period of
time: Eight and half years after Chernobyl]. Asahi Shimbun, p.3.
Pieter (2013, March 22). The bGeigie Nano kit [Web log post]. Retrieved from
http://blog.safecast.org/2013/03/the-bgeigie-nano-kit/
Platin, J-C. (2014). Participatory mapping: New data, new cartography. London, UK:
ISTE Ltd & John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Porter, T.M. (1995). Trust in numbers: The pursuit of objectivity in science and public
life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Prekeges, J. L. (2003). Radiation hormesis, or, could all that radiation be good for us?.
Journal of nuclear medicine technology, 31(1), 11-17. Retrieved from
http://tech.snmjournals.org/content/31/1/11.long
290

Prelli, L.P. (1989). A rhetoric of science: Inventing scientific discourse. Columbia, SC:
University of South Carolina Press.
Rob (2014, December 7). bGeigie Nano workshop Kobe [Web log post]. Retrieved from
http://blog.safecast.org/2014/12/bgeigie-nano-workshop-kobe/
Roberson, K. (2012). Silence deafening: Fukushima fallout…A mother’s response. Playa
Del Rey, CA: Vision Talk.
Rosenberg, D. (2013). Data before the fact. In L.Gitelman. (Eds.), “Raw data” is an
oxymoron (pp.15- 37). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Safecast. (n.d.-a). About Safecast. Retreived from http://blog.safecast.org/about/
Safecast. (n.d.-b). History. Retrieved from http://blog.safecast.org/history/
Safecast. (n.d.-c). Devices. Retrieved from http://blog.safecast.org/devices/
Safecast. (n.d.-d). Safecast data FAQ. Retreived from http://blog.safecast.org/faq/data/
Safecast. (n.d.-e). Japan specific FAQ. Retreived from http://blog.safecast.org/faq/japan/
Saito, K. (2011, May 28). Tōden no Kanō shi wa shōjiki na hitoda [Mr. Kano of TEPCO
is a honest man]. Asahi Shimbun, p.12.
Saito, K. (2013a). Environmental radiation in Fukushima. Retrieved from Japan Desk
Scotland, Japan Matters public lecture website:
http://www.japandeskscotland.com/activities/japan-matters-lecture/201314-2/4-
radiation-in-fukushima
Saito, K. (2013b). Mappu chōsa no butaiura [Behind-the-scenes of a mapping project].
Radioisotopes, 62, 791-798.
Sakamoto, R., Saito, K., Tsutsumi, M., Nagaoka, T., Moriuchi,S., Stolyarevsky, I.,
…Suhoruchkin. (2001). Study on the measurements and evaluation of
291

environmental external exposure after a nuclear accident. In H. Amano., & K.
Saito (Eds.), Proceeding of the Workshop on the Result of the Cooperative
Research between JAERI and CHESCIR concerning the Study on Assessment
and Analysis of Environmental Radiological Consequences and Verification of an
Assessment System. (pp. 5-36). Tokyo, Japan. Retrieved from
http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/33/009/3300995
5.pdf
Sano, S. (1994). Kyokaiden [The biography of a monster]. Tokyo, Japan: Bungeishunju.
Sasakoshi, T., & Tamura, K. (1999, October 30). Hibaku chiryō tesaguri no renzoku
Tokaimura rinkai jiko kara 1 kagetsu [Treatment of exposure to radiation in
confusing ways one month after the Tokai Criticality Accident]. Asahi Shimbun,
p.4.
Sean. (2011, April, 24). RDTN is now Safecast [Web log post]. Retrieved from
http://blog.safecast.org/2011/04/rdtn-is-now-safecast/
Sean. (2012, June 30). Safecast has moved! Open house this weekend! [Web log post].
Retreived from http://blog.safecast.org/2012/06/safecast-has-moved-open-house-
this-weekend/
Sean. (2013, July 3). bGeigie workshop in Aizu [Web log post]. Retrieved from
http://blog.safecast.org/2013/07/bgeigie-workshop-aizu/
Sean. (2014a, April 24). Safecasting DC [Web log post]. Retrieved from
http://blog.safecast.org/ja/2014/04/safecasting-dc/
Sean. (2014b, May 28). Updated Safecast webmap! [Web log post] Retrieved from
http://blog.safecast.org/2014/05/updated-safecast-webmap/
292

Sean. (2014c, September 2). Safecast code [Web log post]. Retrieved from
http://blog.safecast.org/2014/09/safecast-code/
Seki, A., Takemiya, H., Takahashi, F., Saito, K., Tanaka, K., Takahashi, Y, …Tsuzawa,
M. (2012). Development of radioactive contamination map of Fukushima nuclear
accident. In M. Resch, X. Wang, W. Bez, E. Focht, & H. Kobayashi. (Eds).
Sustained simulation performance 2012: Proceedings of joint workshop on high
performance computing on vector systems, Stuttgart (HLRS) and workshop on
sustained simulation performance, Tohoku University 2012 (pp. 93-104). New
York, NY: Springer Heidelberg.
Shadan hōjin Fukushima fudōsan kanteishi kyōkai (2012). Higashi nihon daishinsai go
no Fukushima ken shijō dōko ni kansuru ankēto chōsa kekka [The result of
questionnaire on real-estate market trend in Fukushima Prefecture after Great East
Japan Earthquake]. Retrieved from http://www.frea.jp/documents/web-
4ankeito.pdf
Shibata, H. (1985). Sengo masukomi kaiyūki [Record of migration in post-war mass
media]. Tokyo, Japan: Chūo Kōron.
Shibata, T. (2013). Genshiryoku hōdo [Coverage of nuclear power]. Tokyo: Tokyo denki
daigaku Shuppankyoku.
Shibata, T., & Tomokiyo, H. (1999). Genpatsu kokumin seron: Seron chōsa ni miru
genshiryoku ishiki no hensen [National public opinion on nuclear power plants:
The transition of sentiments on nuclear power through the lens of public opinion
research]. Tokyo, Japan: ERC Shuppan.
293

Shigen enerugī chō. (2007). Heisei 18 nen ni do enerugī ni kansuru nenji hōkoku [White
paper on energy in 2007]. Retrieved from
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/about/whitepaper/2007html/2-1-2.html
Shobugawa, Y., & Gotō, J. (2014). Chīmu Bishamon no Minami Sōma shi shien katsudō
kiroku [Activity report of Team Bishamon in Minami Soma City]. Niigataken Ishi
Kaihō, 771, 2-8. Retrieved from http://www.niigata.med.or.jp/file/pdf/4458.pdf
Shozugawa, K. (2014). Minna no hōshasen sokutei nyūmon [Introduction to radiation
monitoring for everyone]. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.
Shushōkantei. (2011). Kanbōchōkan kisha happyō [Press release by Chief Cabinet
Secretary]. Retrieved from
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201104/22_a.html
Shuttleworth Foundation. (n.d.). Sean Bonner: Citizen science. Retrieved from
https://www.shuttleworthfoundation.org/fellows/sean-bonner/
Sōmushō. (2011). Heisei 23 nendo ban jōhō tsūshin hakusho [White paper: Information
and telecommunications in 2011]. Tokyo. Nikkei Insatsu.
Strange, A. (2014, May 20). Japan forced to talk about Fukushima radiation after
nosebleed comic. Mashable. Retrieved from
http://mashable.com/2014/05/20/outrage-over-fukushima-comic/
Suga, H. (2012). Hangenpatu no shisō shi: Reisen kara Fukushima e [The intellectual
history of anti-nuclear movements]. Tokyo: Chikuma shobō.
Surowiecki, J. (2004). The Wisdom of crowds. New York. Anchor Books.
Suzuki, M. (2011). Hōshasen no tadashii hakarikata [How to measure radiation properly].
Retrieved from http://p.booklog.jp/book/30823
294

Taguchi, G. (2008, August 26). Seikatsu ni micchaku sureba tsukatte moraeru: Gasorin
kakaku hikaku saito gogo.gs Ogawa san [People will use the service if it’s
situated in everyday life. By Mr. Ogawa of the gas comparison website gogo.gs]
[Web log post]. Retrieved from
http://bizmakoto.jp/bizid/articles/0808/26/news044.html
Takahashi, M. (2012a, April 17). Josei to hōshasen: Shinpai shisugiru hitsuyou wa nai
[Woman and radiation: No need to worry too much]. Asahi Shimbun, p.16.
Takahashi, M. (2012b, June 27). Hōshasen risuku o wakete kangaeyō [Thinking about
radiation risk by distinguishing it from other risks]. Asahi Shimbun, p.14.
Takakuwa, K (1984). Makkāsā no shimbun kenetsu: Kinshi sakujo ni natta shimbun kiji
[MacArthur’s newspaper censorship: Banned and deleted newspaper articles].
Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha.
Takano, A., Yoshimi, S., Miura, S. (2012). 311 jōhōgaku: Media wa nani o dō tsutaetaka
[Information studies on March 11: What and how did the media report?]. Tokyo:
Iwanami shoten.
Takata, A. (1990). Hangenpatsu undō nyū uēbu no kenkyū [Studies of anti-nuke
movements: A New Wave]. Seikei daigaku bungakubu kiyō, 26, 131-188.
Takeda, T. (2011). Genpatsu hōdō to media [Coverage of nuclear power and media].
Tokyo: Kōdansha.
Takekawa, S. (2012). Drawing a line between peaceful and military uses of nuclear
power: The Japanese press, 1945–1955. The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan
Focus, 10(37), number 2. Retrieved from http://www.japanfocus.org/-
Shunichi-TAKEKAWA/3823
295

Takemae, E (2002). Inside GHQ: Allied occupation of Japan and its legacy. London,
UK: Continuum.
Takeshita, A. (2012a, August 27). Fukushima kengi ga mita Cherunobuiri fukkō no
kewashisa tsūkan: Nōgyō saisei e hitosuji no kōmyō [Chernobyl from the point-
of-view of a member of the Fukushima assembly: Realizing the difficulty of
reconstruction and seeing the light of the rebirth of agriculture]. Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, p. 33.
Takeshita, A. (2012b, December 28). Hōshanō to tatakau Fukushima: Genpatsu sagyōin
hibaku dō haaku [Fukushima fighting against radioactivity: How to get an
accurate picture of nuclear workers’ exposure to radiation]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun
(evening edition), p.7.
Takeuchi, K. (2011). “Genpatsu ga heru jidai” no media wa seido henkaku no shutai o
sodateru hōdō o [Media should contribute to the development of agents that
change the regime in the “era of declining nuclear power”]. Journalism, 253, 42-
49.
Taki, J. (2011, October 10). Kagakusha no shinyō dō torimodosu? Shinshi na ronsō de
gōi keisei o [How can we regain public confidence in scientists? Building
consensus through serious discussion]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, p.5.
Tanaka, M., Shineha, R., Maruyama, K. (2012). Saigai jakusha to jōhō jakusha: 3.11 go
nani ga misugosareta noka [We’re vulnerable to disaster and to a lack of
information: What’s missing after March 11
th
]. Tokyo, Japan: Chikuma shobō.
Tanaka, K. (2012, September 19). Tsubokura Masaharu ishi: Minamisoma de jūmin no
naibuhibaku no kensa kara igaina jijitsu ga ukiborini [Unexpected facts found
296

after investigations of residents’ inner exposure to radiation in Minamisoma City:
Dr. Masaharu Tsubokura] [Web log post]. Retrieved from
http://blog.safecast.org/ja/2012/09/dr_tsubokura_interview/
Tanaka, T., & Kuznick, P. (2011). Genpatsu to Hiroshima: “Genshiryoku heiwa riyō” no
shinsō [Nuclear power and Hiroshima: The truth behind the peaceful use of nuclear
power]. Tokyo, Japan: Iwanami Shoten.
Tanigawa, A. (1995, May 9). Hibakusha sasaete Nihon no ishi funsen: Cherunobuiri jiko
kara 9 nen [Japanese doctors struggling to support irradiated people nine years
after Chernobyl]. Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), p.1.
Tewksbury, D., & Scheufele, D. A. (2009). News framing theory and research. In J.
Bryant, & Oliver, M.B. (Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory and research.
(pp.17-34). New York, NY: Routledge.
Thompson, J.B. (1995). The media and modernity: A social theory of the media.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University.
Tokumei. (2012). Chibaken Chibashi Inage-ku Kashiwadai shūhen no hōshasen hakarune
repōto [Hakarune Report around Kashiwadai, Inage Ward, Chiba City, Chiba
Prefecture]. Retrieved from http://hakatte.jp/spot/30462
Tokyo denryoku Fukushima genshiryoku hatsuden jiko chōsa iinkai. (2012). Kokkai
jikochō hōkokusho [The official report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Independent Investigation Commission]. Tokyo: Tokuma shoten.
Tokyo Hacker Space. (n.d.-a). About Tokyo Hacker Space. Retreived from
http://www.tokyohackerspace.org/en/about-tokyo-hackerspace
297

Tokyo Hacker Space. (n.d.-b). Japan in crisis. Retreived from
http://www.tokyohackerspace.org/en/japan-in-crisis
Tollefson, J. W. (2014). The discursive reproduction of technoscience and Japanese
national identity in The Daily Yomiuri coverage of the Fukushima nuclear
disaster. Discourse & Communication, 8(3), 299-317.
Tomokiyo, H. (1994, November 30). Hoshanō more no eikyō: Jizen no ekigaku chōsa
chikuseki o [The affects of radiation leaks: Preliminary epidemiological surveys
conducted]. Asahi Shimbun, p.4.
Torii, H. (1999, August 21). Yowai hōshasen to shikiichi: Itteiryō made mugai? Idenshi
shūfuku nadomo kankei [Weak radiation and threshold: No harmful effects up to
a certain extent? Gene repair and others involved]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, p.11.
Torii, H. (2013). Hōshasen o kagakuteki ni rikaisuru tame no kyōiku [Education to
understand radiation scientifically]. Nihon Butsuri Gakkaishi, 68(6), 390-393.
Torii, H., Shozugawa, K., Watanabe, Y. (2012) Hōshasen o kagakuteki ni rikaisuru
[Understanding radiation scientifically]. Tokyo, Japan: Maruzen Shuppan.
Tsuda, S., Yoshida, T., Nakahara, Y., Sato, T., Seki, A., Matsuda, N., …Saito, K. (2013).
Sōkō sābei shisutemu KURAMA-II o mochiita sokutei no kiban seibi to jissoku e
no tekiyō [Construction of a car-borne survey system for measuring dose rates in
the air: KURAMA-II, and its application]. Retrieved from http://jolissrch-
inter.tokai-sc.jaea.go.jp/pdfdata/JAEA-Technology-2013-037.pdf
Tsuji, A. (2000, April 13). Kakuheiki kōjō deno hibakusha hoshō e: Bei ga hōshin tenkan
[U.S. shifted its policy to compensate the irradiated at nuclear power plants].
Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), p.2.
298

Tsuzuku, K. (1988). Hoshanō saigai keihō nettowaku zukuri [Creating an alert network
for radiation disasters]. Chingin to shakaihoshō, 994, 75-81.
Tucker, R.C. (Ed). (1972). The Marx-Engels reader. New York, NY: W.W, Norton and
Company.
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. (2013). Sources,
effects and risks of ionizing radiation: UNSCEAR 2013 report to the general
assembly with scientific annexes (Volume I, scientific annex A). Retrieved from
http://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/2013/13-85418_Report_2013_Annex_A.pdf
Utsumi, H. (2012). Nuclear power plants in “the only A-bombed country”: Images of
nuclear power and the nation’s changing self-portrait in postwar Japan. In D.V.
Lente (ed.), The Nuclear age in popular media: Transnational history, 1945-1965
(pp.175-202). New York, NY: Palgrave macmillan.
Vaiserman, A. M. (2010). Radiation hormesis: historical perspective and implications for
low-dose cancer risk assessment. Dose-Response, 8(2), 172-191.
Watanabe, N. (2013, June 24). Aizuwakamatsu de no wākushoppu 2013 nen 6 gatsu 15-
16 [Workshop in Aizuwakamatsu from June 15 to 16 in 2013] [Web log post].
Retrieved from http://blog.safecast.org/ja/2013/06/safecast-workshop-bgeigie-
nano-in-aizu/
Watanabe, T. (1995). Media torikku no shakaigaku [Sociology of media tricks]. Kyoto,
Japan: Sekai shisōsha.
Watanabe, T., & Tosa, S. (2011, May 5). Jimin, genpatsu suishinha haya shidō:
Genshiryoku mamoru seisaku kaigi hossoku [Liberal Democratic Party’s pro-
299

nuclear group already set up: Kick-off meeting to save nuclear power]. Asahi
Shimbun, p.4.
Weart, S.R. (2012). The rise of nuclear fear. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wilder, J. (2014, December 17). Safecast seaweed collection feasibility study [Web log
post]. Retrieved from http://blog.safecast.org/2014/12/safecast-seaweed-
collection-feasibility-study/
Winner, L. (1986). The whale and the reactor: A search for limits in an age of high
technology. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Witz, K. G. (2006). The participant as ally and essentialist portraiture. Qualitative Inquiry,
12(2), 246-268.
Wynne, B. (1992). Misunderstood misunderstanding: Social identities and public uptake
of science. Public understanding of science, 1(3), 281-304.
Yamaguchi, T. (2014). Social imaginary and dilemmas of policy practice: The food
safety arena in Japan. Food Policy, 45, 167-173.
Yamakoshi, S. (2013). Genshiryoku seisaku hōdō to chihōshi [Coverage of nuclear policy
and local newspapers]. In Kōeki zaidan hōjin shimbun tsūshin chōsakai (ed).
Daishinsai genpatsu to media no yakuwari [The Great Earthquake, nuclear power
and the role of media]. (pp.30-42). Tokyo, Japan: Kōeki zaidan hōjin shimbun
tsūshin chōsakai.
Yamamoto, A. (2012). Kaku enerugī gensetsu no sengoshi 1945-1960 [A postwar history
of discourses on nuclear energy from 1945 to 1960]. Kyoto, Japan: Jinbun shoin.
Yamashita, S. (2001, August 3). Cherunobuiri shien keizoku o [Keep supporting
Chernobyl]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.13.
300

Yamawaki, N. (2012). Within-culture variations of collectivism in Japan. Journal of
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 43(8), 1191-1204.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (1905, September 18). Saientifikku posibiritī: Rajiumu no hirakitaru
genshi no himitsu [Scientific possibility: Secrets of atoms revealed by radium].
Yomiuri Shimbun, p.1.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (1945a, August 15). Shingata bakudan hōsha kōsen wa shigaisen:
Higai chūshinchi no chōki taizai wa kiken [The radiation of a new type of bomb
through ultraviolet rays: Dangerous to stay in the center of the affected area for a
long period of time]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.2.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (1945b, August 23). Shishō 19 man koyu: Hiroshima Nagasaki genshi
bakudan no zangyaku [More than 190,000 dead and injured: The atrocity of
atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.2.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (1954). Genshiryoku o heiwa ni: Morumotto ni wa naritaku nai [The
peaceful use of nuclear power: I don’t want to be a [human] guinea pig]. Yomiuri
Shimbun (evening edition), p.1.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (1986, December 1). Cherunobuiri to iryō igaku kyōryokudan no
hōkoku [Chernobyl and the report of medicine and medical studies partnership].
Yomiuri Shimbun, p.9.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (1988a, January 18). Hiroshima Nagasaki genbaku no teisenryō
hibaku eikyō o saichōsa e: Kōseishō nado [Re-investigation of the effects of
exposure to low-dose radiation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the Ministry of
Health and Welfare and others]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.2.
301

Yomiuri Shimbun. (1988b, January 19). Teisenryō hibku [Exposure to low-dose
radiation]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.9.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (1988c, October 10). Hōshasen gishi ni hakketsubyō ooi: Shiga idai
gurūpu ga 4000 nin chōsa de kakunin [Shiga University of Medical Science
confirmed from a survey of 4000 people there are many cases where radiology
technicians have leukemia]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.7.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (1990, November 30). Genpatsu sagyōin ra no ekigaku chōsa jisshi e:
Kagaku gijutsu chō [Epidemiological study of nuclear workers will be conducted
by the Science and Technology Authority]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.2.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (1992, May 1). X sen shūdan kenshin ni gimon no koe: Kodomo no
teisenryō hibaku shimpai monbushō mo minaosu ugoki [Questions about X-ray
group investigations and concerns about children’s exposure to low-dose
radiation: The Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture reconsidering
investigations]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.19.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (1994a, January 12). Genshiryoku taikoku no kokusai kouken
[International contributions of big nuclear power]. Yomiuri Shimbun (evening
edition), p.15.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (1994b, August 3). Nagasaki genbaku hibakusha “enkakuchi” demo
hōshasen shōgai: Chōki senpukugo ni shutsugen [Bomb survivors in Nagasaki
had radiological damage after passing the prolonged incubation period even if
they were “distant” from the bomb]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.26
Yomiuri Shimbun. (1994c, December 14). Teisenryō hoshanō no kenkō e no eikyō o
kangaeru: 19 nichi Tokyo, Sendagaya de shimpojiumu [Thinking about the health
302

effects of low-dose radiation: A symposium on the 19
th
in Sendagaya, Tokyo].
Yomiuri Shimbun (evening edition), p. 12.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2003, July 31). Teisenryō hōshasen de jumyō ni henka nashi: Mausu
jikken de kakunin Kankyō kagaku gijutu kenkyūjo [No effects on life
expectancies from low-dose radiation confirmed by experiment in mice by the
Institute for Environmental Sciences]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.34.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2004, July 18). Musuko ga CT kensa: Hibaku shimpai [Concerns
about my son having a CT scan due to radiation exposure]. Yomiuri Shimbun,
p.19.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2008, August 5). “Hiroshima” shōryō hibaku demo gan risuku kuroi
ame “zanryū” eikyō Meidai chōsa [Even limited exposure to “residual” black
rains in Hiroshima involves cancer risks: An impact investigation by Nagoya
University]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.2.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2011a, April 26). Kado no fuan kenkō ni risuku: Yamaoka Kiyonori
Okayama dai kyōju [Excessive anxieties lead to health risks. By Kiyonori
Yamaoka, professor at Okayama University]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.37.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2011b, May 22). Chōki no teisenryō eikyō michisuu: Ishikawa
Masayori Hokkaido dai igaku kenkyūka kyōju [The effects of long-term low dose
(radiation) is unknown. By Masayori Ishikawa, professor at the Medical Research
Institute, Hokkaido University]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.37.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2011c, July 6). Hōshasen jōhō, manabi sonaeru oya: Hirogaru renkei
jichitai ni yōbō [Parents learning about radiation information: Spreading
cooperation requests for local towns]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.19
303

Yomiuri Shimbun. (2011d, August 17). Hōshano to kurasu (7): Fukusū kai sokutei,
heikinchi de handan [Living with radiation vol. 7: Making judgements based on
the average value after measuring radiation several times]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.19.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2011e, September 17). Shobunjo kakuho tanan na michinori [A
thorny path to acquire disposal fields]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.2.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2011f, October 3). Hōshasen hakatte anshin: 10 man en ika demo jiei
ni kōka [Measuring radiation relieves your anxieties: Even dosimeters that cost
less than 100,000 JPY are effective for self-preservation]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.10.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2011g, December 4). Reisei ni kenkō risuku o kangaetai [Let’s think
about health risks in a non-emotional manner]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.3
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2011h, December 16). Teisenryō hibaku dēta busoku: Hinankuiki
shukushō meyasu hoka risuku tono hikaku ni tayoru [Lack of data on low-dose
exposure: Designing a rough indication of smaller evacuation zone in comparison
with other risks]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.37.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2011i, December 16). 20 miri shīberuto miman kyojū kanō 50 chō
wa kitaku konnan: Seifu saikubun e [The government will rezone areas below
20mSv as habitable and those above 50mSv as difficult-to-return zones]. Yomiuri
Shimbun, p.1.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2011j, December 17). “Jiko shūsoku” sengen: Kanzen fūjikome e
zenryoku o ageyo [Declaring “the accident is over”: Making every effort to
contain the Fukushima crisis completely]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.3
304

Yomiuri Shimbun. (2011k, December 28). Risuku o hakaru Nakanishi Junko; Inochi ni
kagiri o nentō ni [Measuring risks: Life with limits in mind. By Junko Nakanishi].
Yomiuri Shimbun, p.10.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2012a, January 29). Teisenryō hibaku: Seikatsu e no eikyō wa [Low
dose exposure to radiation: Implications for life]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.20.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2012b, March 8). Higashi nihon daishinsai 1 nen: Hisaichi 42 shuchō
ankēto [One year anniversary of the Great East Japan Earthquake: Survey on 42
mayors in affected areas]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.34.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2012c, March 9). Gakkō to shinsai sōshūhen hōshasen mondai to
mukiau [Omnibus: School and Disaster: Facing the Issue of Radiation]. Yomiuri
Shimbun, p.26.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2012d, December 13). Iryō runesansu Matsumoto fōramu hōshasen
manande jiei [Renaissance of medical care: the Matsumoto Forum on self-defense
by learning radiation]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.27.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2012e, December 19). Kodomo no hibaku nen 1.14 miri shīberuto
Kawamata machi chōsa “kenkō ni eikyō nashi.” [Kawamata Town survey:
Children exposed to 1.14 mSv per year did not show health effects]. Yomiuri
Shimbun, p.35.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2013a, January 30). Hibaku risuku tsutaeru muzukashisa: Matsui
Shirō shi [The difficulty of informing risks of exposure to radiation. By Shiro
Matsui]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.15.
305

Yomiuri Shimbun. (2013b, February 10). Genki nau: Onsen no kōyō radon seiri kinō
takameru [Now healthy for you: The positive effects of radon spa to enhance our
health]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p. 17.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2013c, March 6). Fukushima no kenkō chōsa kunino sekinin:
Genshiryoku kiseii ga teigen [Nuclear Regulation Authority Committee’s
recommendations: The state is responsible for the health survey in Fukushima].
Yomiuri Shimbun (evening edition), p.10.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2013d, April 4). Bekureru o issho ni kagaku shimashō [Let’s do
science with the Becquerel together]. Yomiuri Shimbun (evening edition), p.10.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2013e, July 7). Takahashi Sentarō kyōju: Hibaku risuku to kensa
rieki [Professor Sentaro Takahashi: Radiation risks and benefits of examinations].
Yomiuri Shimbun, p.23.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2013f, July 12). Fukushima fūkko kihaku na ronsen chōki hinan kaku
taisaku [The recovery of Fukushima: Empty discussions and measures that don’t
take into consideration long-term evacuation]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.12.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2013g, November 1). Fukushima no hōshasen mondai: Kagakuteki
kentō no ba kakuritsu o Funabashi Harutoshi shi [The issue of radiation in
Fukushima: Establishing a place of scientific examination. By Harutoshi
Funabashi]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.11.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2013h, November 18). Kikango tsūjo no seikatu o: Akashi Makoto
san [Mr. Makoto Akashi: Coming back to a normal life after returning home].
Yomiuri Shimbun, p.23.
306

Yomiuri Shimbun. (2014a, March 7). Daishinsai 3 nen saigai kenkyū no kyōka hitsuyō
Ōnishi Takashi shi [Three years after the disaster: A need to enhance research on
disasters. By Takani Ōnishi]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.11.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2014b, May 3). Kagakusha no yakuwari: Seikaku na jōhō ni tessuru
[The role of scientists: Focusing on providing accurate information]. Yomiuri
Shimbun, p.11.
Yomiuri Shimbun. (2014c, May 20). Oishimbo saishingō manga hyōgen hamon to kadai
[Oishimbo’s current issue: Controversies and challenges over its cartoon
portrayal]. Yomiuri Shimbun, p.35.
Yoshida, C. (2014a, November 11). Hakaru shiru Kashiwa (Kashiwanoha kōen)
[Measuring, learning Kashira at Kashiwanoha Park] [Web log Post]. Retreived
from http://kodomira.com/HSF/report/kanto/entry-12469.html
Yoshida, C. (2014b, November 25). Hakaru shiru, Kashiwa (zokuhen) [Measuring,
learning Kashiwa (Continued)][Web log post]. Retreived
http://kodomira.com/HSF/report/kanto/entry-12608.html
Yoshida, F. (1987, May 11). Chūmoku sareru hibakusha tsuiseki chōsa: Soren genpatsu
jiko [Noticeable follow-up investigation of bombed survivors: The Soviet’s
nuclear accident]. Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), p.5.
Yoshida, F. (1991, November 15). Shi no hai [Ashes of death]. Asahi Shimbum (evening
edition), p.3.
Yoshioka, H. (2012). Genshiryoku no shakaishi: Sono nihon teki tenkai [Social history of
nuclear power in Japan]. Tokyo, Japan: Asahi Shimbunsha.
307

Yoshimi, S. (2012a). Radioactive rain and the American umbrella. The Journal of Asian
Studies, 71, 319–331.
Yoshimi, S. (2012b). Yume no genshiryoku [Atoms for dreams]. Tokyo: Chikuma shobō.
Zuckerman, E. (2014, April 20). Water monitoring in China, and the changing role of
citizenship [Web log post]. Retrieved from
http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2014/04/20/water-monitoring-in-china-
and-the-changing-role-of-citizenship/
Zwigenberg, R. (2012). “The coming of a second sun”: The 1956 Atoms for Peace
exhibit in Hiroshima and Japan’s embrace of nuclear power. The Asia-Pacific
Journal: Japan Focus, 10 (1,6). Retrieved from http://www.japanfocus.org/-Ran-
Zwigenberg/3685

Abstract (if available)

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

Network hermeneutics: interpretation of texts as social practice and performance in the age of digital media

PDF

Deliberating the science of madness: DSM-5 and the polytechtonic rhetorical economy of psychiatric nosological controversy

PDF

Contextualizing Asian masculinity in media post-race: a critical race theory inquiry on metadiscourses

PDF

Comparative analysis of nuclear crisis communication: 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis and 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear crisis

PDF

The impact of engaged communication scholarship on the re-imagination of space and place in South L.A.

PDF

Se ve, se siente: transmedia mobilization in the Los Angeles immigrant rights movement

PDF

The paradoxes of network neutralities

PDF

Configurable culture: mainstreaming the remix, remixing the mainstream

PDF

Food is the medium: food movements, social justice and the communication ecology approach

PDF

The out field: professional sports and the mediation of gay sexualities

PDF

Social media and health: social support and social capital on pregnancy-related social networking sites

PDF

These are their stories: two decades of Showrunner production, content, and context in Law & Order: SVU

PDF

Baseball talk: investigating fan participation in the blogosphere

PDF

Mapping out the transition toward information societies: social nature, growth, and policies

PDF

Staying ahead of the digital tsunami: strategy, innovation and change in public media organizations

PDF

Focusing the family: the rhetorical construction of "family values" in contemporary cultural politics

PDF

Making business news in the digital age

PDF

Agricultural informatization and agrarian power dynamics in rural China

PDF

The social functions of celebrity gossip among high school girls

PDF

Rebels with a cause: Youth, social movements, and media

Asset Metadata

Creator Abe, Yasuhito (author)

Core Title Measuring for what: networked citizen science movements after the Fukushima nuclear accident

School Annenberg School for Communication

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Communication

Publication Date 07/29/2017

Defense Date 04/24/2015

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag citizen science,Fukushima,Japan,media studies,OAI-PMH Harvest,science communication

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Gross, Larry P. (committee chair), Lakoff, Andrew (committee chair), Goodnight, Gerald Thomas (committee member)

Creator Email yasuhita@usc.edu,yasuhitoa@hotmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-620280

Unique identifier UC11303365

Identifier etd-AbeYasuhit-3770.pdf (filename),usctheses-c3-620280 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-AbeYasuhit-3770.pdf

Dmrecord 620280

Document Type Dissertation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Abe, Yasuhito

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA