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The fortunes of fishes and fishers: The political economy of innovation in Atlantic resource management

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The fortunes of fishes and fishers: The political economy of innovation in Atlantic resource management

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Content THE FORTUNES OF FISHES AND FISHERS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INNOVATION IN ATLANTIC RESOURCE MANAGEMENT Copyright 2005 by DG Webster A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUBLIC POLICY) December 2005 DG Webster R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. UMI Number: 3220167 Copyright 2005 by Webster, DG All rights reserved. INFORMATION TO USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. ® UMI UMI Microform 3220167 Copyright 2006 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Epigraph It is when resource limits are recognized and consumption ceases to be seen as non-rival that the use and management of international environmental resources become political issues. — Barkin and Shambaugh 1999, 9 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Dedication To my parents... For being wonderful. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Acknowledgements For generously funding my research: USC Wrigley Institute for Environmental Studies The Offield Family Foundation The Alice C. Tyler Charitable Trust and the John C. Tyler Trust The Haynes Foundation The Rose Hill Foundation The Florence and A. Leroy Webster Trust For invaluable assistance providing information and advice: Current and past committee members: Timur Kuran Linwood Pendleton Hayward Alker Robert Friedheim Anthony Michaels John Elliot Academics, decision makers and others directly involved in international fisheries: Alan Gray Helen Bours Philomena Seidita Andrew Penney John Graves Richard Ruis David Wilmont John Spencer Robert Hayes David Ardill Kim Blankenbecker Robin Allen David Balton Masanori Miyahara Susan Singh-Renton Ellen Peel Nelson Beideman Victor R. Restrepo Gary Sakagawa Peter S.C. Ho Xavier Vant iv R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. I would also like to thank: Farideh Motamedi for shepherding me through my early years in the program Young Miller, Sheila Williams and Julie Brown for their assistance with the many technicalities of my studies David Kerstetter for going beyond the call of duty to help out a fellow graduate student Cindy Locken for doing so much to support me through these last three years R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Table of Contents Epigraph.....................................................................................................................ii Dedication.................................................................................................................iii Acknowledgements................................................................................................... iv List of Tables............................................................................................................ ix List of Figures........................................................................................................... x Abbreviations..........................................................................................................xiii Abstract...................................................................................................................xiv Chapter 1: Failure and Success in Managing International Fisheries........................1 1.1 Value of International Fisheries....................................................................... 5 1.2 Causes of Overfishing in International Fisheries............................................11 1.2.1 Open-access Incentives and Biological Depletion.................................. 13 1.2.2 Globalization and the Nationalization of Fisheries Management............19 1.2.3 Barriers to Effective International Management.....................................22 1.3 Innovation in the Atlantic...............................................................................30 1.3.1 Relating Regulation and Rebuilding.......................................................35 1.3.2 Accounting for Unexpected Success.......................................................38 1.3.3 Explaining Variations in Effectiveness.................................................. 43 1.3.4 Non-charismatic Species and the Global Civil Society Option.............. 48 1.4 A New Perspective: Vulnerability Response..................................................52 Chapter 2: Crisis and Response in International Fisheries...................................... 57 2.1 Simplifying Assumptions...............................................................................60 2.2 Globalization and Fisheries Economics.........................................................66 2.2.1 Increasing Competition............................................................................68 2.2.2 Comparative Advantage..........................................................................75 2.3 Recession in a domestic fishing fleet and States’ Regulatory Preferences.... 84 2.3.1 Economic Vulnerability to Increasing Competition................................86 2.3 .2 Linking Political Response to Biological Depletion............................94 2.4 Vulnerability Response and Negotiated Outcomes..................................... 103 2.5 Testing Primary and Secondary Hypotheses................................................113 2.5.1 Scientific Uncertainty............................................................................ 117 2.5.2 Economic Unknowns.............................................................................120 v i R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Chapter 3: Tropical Tunas......................................................................................128 3.1 Missing the MSY Mark................................................................................130 3.2 Bigeye Tuna: Vulnerability Response in Action..........................................136 3.2.1 Conflicts over Costs..............................................................................145 3.2.2 Overcoming Obstacles...........................................................................155 3.3 Mixed Surface Fisheries: Management without Biological Depletion 163 3.4 Yellowfm Tuna: Rebuilding without Effective Management......................174 Chapter 4: Billfishes and By-catch........................................................................ 185 4.1 Commercial Versus Non-Commercial Stocks..............................................187 4.2 North Atlantic Swordfish. Outside Competition..........................................195 4.2.1 Disagreement over Distribution............................................................204 4.2.2 Reaching a Rebuilding Plan.................................................................. 212 4.3 Marlins: Including Non-commercial Interests............................................. 220 4.3.1 Partial Management Response..............................................................227 4.3.2 Special Monitoring and Enforcement Issues........................................ 236 Chapter 5: Questions, Old and New...................................................................... 244 5.1 Evidence of Vulnerability Response............................................................247 5.1.1 Commercially Targeted Stocks.............................................................248 5.1.2 By-catch Issues......................................................................................252 5.2 Three Old Questions....................................................................................256 5.2.1 The Question of Causality.................................................................... 257 5.2.2 The Question of Timing........................................................................ 259 5.2.3 The Question of Variation.................................................................... 262 5.3 Solidifying the Model................................................................................. 268 5.3.1 Political Importance.............................................................................. 270 5.3.2 Strength.................................................................................................275 5.3.3 Strategy.................................................................................................281 5.4 Learning and Domestic Change................................................................... 291 5.5 The Future of Fishers and Fishes................................................................. 298 Bibliography.......................................................................................................... 301 Appendix A: Basic Bioeconomics of Fisheries......................................................321 A. 1 Static Models..............................................................................................321 A.2 Dynamic Models.........................................................................................329 Appendix B: Innovation in Fisheries..................................................................... 335 Appendix C: Regulatory Options.......................................................................... 345 v ii R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix D: Regional Fisheries Organizations.....................................................352 Appendix E: Long Run Supply............................................................................. 355 Appendix F: Creation of ICC AT........................................................................... 362 Appendix G: ICC AT Member States by Date of Ratification...............................370 Appendix H: ICCAT Size Limits.......................................................................... 372 Appendix I: Early Discussions on Yellowfin.........................................................379 Appendix J: Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs).................................................... 384 Appendix K: Early Regulation of Bigeye Tuna.....................................................386 Appendix L: Management Areas for Atlantic Swordfish...................................... 391 Appendix M: Protecting Juvenile Swordfish.........................................................394 Appendix N: Marlins By-catch and Scientific Uncertainty...................................402 Appendix O: Market Forces and the Future of Specific Stocks.............................404 O.1 Demand side............................................................................................... 404 0.2 Supply Side................................................................................................. 408 0.3 Non-commercial Stocks............................................................................. 411 v iii R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. List of Tables 4.1 1995 Division of North Atlantic Swordfish Catches 209 4.2 1996 3-Year Plan for North Atlantic Swordfish 211 4.3 1999 Rebuilding Plan for North Atlantic Swordfish 213 5.1 Data on Economic Importance for Representative Fishing States 271 F. 1 Initial Coverage of ICC AT Species Panels 366 K. 1 Average Total Catch of Tropical Tunas by Decade 388 ix R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. List o f Figures Figure 1.1: Pivotal Cycle in International Fisheries...................................................4 Figure 1.2: Nominal Annual Export Value of Major Highly Migratory Species................................................................................................................7 Figure 1.3 Map ofHMS Regional Fisheries Organizations..................................... 26 Figure 1.4: Biological Depletion and Rebuilding in Atlantic HMS Fisheries...........................................................................................................32 Figure 1.5: Comparisons between Depletion, Rebuilding, Regulation, and Price.................................................................................................................45 Figure 2.1: Multilateral Management as Mechanism of Change.............................59 Figure 2.2: Effects of Shift in Demand on Long Run Quantity Supplied............... 70 Figure 2.3: Effect of International Trade on an Overexploited Fishery.................. 72 Figure 2.4: Production and Per-unit Value for Highly Migratory Species.............. 74 Figure 2.5: Effect of International Trade for Underexploited Fishery.....................77 Figure 2.6: HMS Landings Aggregated by Level of Economic Development.................................................................................................... 80 Figure 2.7: Export Value Minus Import Value ofHMS Stocks, Aggregated by Level of Development................................................................................82 Figure 2.8: Economic Vulnerability Matrix............................................................. 93 Figure 2.9: How Management at MSY Affects Long-Run Equilibrium................. 97 Figure 2.10: Preferred Response and Economic Vulnerability................................99 Figure 3.1: ICCAT Reported Landings of Tropical Tunas.....................................131 Figure 3.2: Value of Atlantic Landings of Tropical Tunas.....................................133 Figure 3.3: ICCAT Reported Landings and Most Recent Estimate of MSY 135 Figure 3.4: Atlantic Bigeye Landings by Gear...................................................... 138 x R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 3.5: Economic Vulnerabilities of States Harvesting Bigeye Tuna..............140 Figure 3.6: Longline Landings of Bigeye Tuna..................................................... 156 Figure 3.7: Economic Vulnerabilities of States Harvesting Small Tropical Tunas..............................................................................................................165 Figure 3.8: Country Composition of Atlantic Surface Fisheries for Tropical Tunas............................................................................................... 166 Figure 3.9: Purse Seine Landings of Tropical Tunas.............................................. 171 Figure 3 .10: Atlantic Yellowfm Landings by Gear................................................ 175 Figure 3.11: Economic Vulnerabilities of States Harvesting Yellowfm Tuna...............................................................................................................177 Figure 3.12: Tropical Tunas as Percentage of Purse Seine Catch........................... 181 Figure 4.1: Real Value of Billfishes per Metric Ton..............................................190 Figure 4.2: ICCAT Reported Landings of Billfishes..............................................191 Figure 4.3: Landings of Marlins Relative to MSY.................................................193 Figure 4.4: Landings of North Atlantic Swordfish vs. MSY................................. 194 Figure 4.5: Reported Landings of North Atlantic Swordfish by Country..............196 Figure 4.6: Swordfish Landings by Ocean Area....................................................199 Figure 4.7: Economic Vulnerabilities of States Harvesting North Atlantic Swordfish....................................................................................................... 200 Figure 4.8: Economic Vulnerabilities of States Harvesting Blue and White Marlins...........................................................................................................221 Figure 4.9: Non-commercial Susceptibility of States Harvesting Blue and White Marlins................................................................................................ 224 Figure 5.1: Relative Strength of Individual States in Each Vulnerability Category........................................................................................................ 279 Figure 5.2: Comparison of Group Cohesion on a Cross-section of Regulations.................................................................................................... 284 xi R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 5.3: Changes in the Domestic Payoffs of Regulation (b) over Time.......... 287 Figure A. 1: Schaefer Yield-Effort Curve...............................................................323 Figure A.2: Gordon-Schaefer Model..................................................................... 325 Figure A.3: Non-Critical Depensation...................................................................327 Figure A. 4: Critical Depensation........................................................................... 328 Figure G. 1: Long Run Supply for Commercial Stocks.........................................357 Figure G.2: Long Run Supply for By-catch Stocks............................................... 360 Figure H.1: Total Catches Reported to ICCAT 1950-1975...................................363 Figure K. 1: Real Value per Metric Ton.................................................................387 Figure L. 1: Swordfish Landings by Management Area........................................392 Figure R. 1: Effect of a Change in Demand on the Long-run Equilibrium for Bigeye Tuna.............................................................................................405 Figure R.2: Shifts in Demand for Tropical Tunas................................................. 407 Figure R.3: Shift in Long Run Supply for Atlantic Swordfish..............................409 Figure R.4: Long Run Supply for Billfish Stocks.................................................413 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Abbreviations A1DCP Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program CCSBT Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna CPR Common Pool Resource EC European Community EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN HMS Highly Migratory Species IATTC Inter-American Tropical Tunas Commission ICCAT International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas INGO International Non-Governmental Organization IOTC Indian Ocean Tuna Commission IUU Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated NEI Not Elsewhere Included NGO Non-Governmental Organization NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service UN United Nations UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea WCPFC Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission WTO World Trade Organization x iii R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Abstract Downward spirals are common in fisheries, as stocks decline and fishers become hard-pressed to profit from shrinking harvests. Thus, the fortunes of fishes and fishers have always been linked, but when fleets from many nations compete over the same stock, some countries win while others lose out. Under open access, the benefits of exploitation are distributed according to the comparative advantages of domestic fleets, but under multilateral regulation, distribution is determined by negotiations. Conflicts over allocation and similar impediments to international collective action may be overcome if powerful states believe they will benefit more from cooperation than from competition. Using this logic, several hypotheses are proposed, linking the economic vulnerability of domestic fleets to changes in national agendas as stocks decline and competition escalates. Six in-depth case studies from the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas were compiled to test this vulnerability response model. States generally behaved as predicted based on their domestic fleets’ operational costs and the opportunity costs of alternative sources of revenue. The sole exception was the US role in protecting marlins, which are only by-catch in their commercial fisheries. Modification to include domestic susceptibility to non commercial interests is indicated. Secondary expectations were also developed to investigate the impact of vulnerability response on management outcomes. A clear pattern was observed, including the increasing use of transfers from more to less vulnerable states to ensure cooperation as commercially valuable stocks declined. A major implication of the xiv R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. behavioral model - that management at MSY should not be expected but that innovations may occur to rebuild depleted stocks - was also substantiated. While more timely and effective management might be desirable, the fact that states are able to overcome their differences in order to deal with dire economic and biological situations remains a positive step toward sustainability. In such circumstances even severe depletion can be seen as opportunity as well as calamity. New institutions may arise and learning may take place as states collectively come to terms with the limited nature of international fisheries resources. Nevertheless, the future of these fishes and the fishers who target them is precarious. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Chapter 1: Failure and Success in Managing International Fisheries Progress is an unruly phenomenon. It has driven humanity’s prosperity, yet has also enabled us to forge tools of great devastation. In fisheries, progress has meant bigger, faster boats, more efficient capture techniques, and a wider availability of fish for human consumption - as well as profits, jobs, and other economic benefits. At the same time, the rapid expansion of fishing effort in the last century has caused significant concerns regarding the long-term viability of living marine resources, whether or not they are commercially valuable. Recent collapses of important stocks like Pacific anchovetta and the North Atlantic groundfishes have made the connections between the declining abundance of fishes, or species of fish, and changes in the fortunes of fishers painfully obvious. What may surprise many people, including those who study fisheries for living, is that there are causal linkages that work in the opposite direction, between the declining profits of fishers and improvements in the fortunes of several stocks of fish. Like so many other problems of our modern age, fisheries have been plagued by a proclivity toward procrastination, leading fishers and fishing states to postpone effective limits on production until the predicted costs of overexploitation finally hit home. In the collapses referenced above, those costs included severe recessions in fishing communities that have lasted for years.1 Elsewhere, the decline has been more gradual, but no less costly. Today, almost half of the world’s known saltwater fishes are listed as fully exploited by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization; of the remainder, half are underexploited or moderately exploited but 1 Hutchings and Reynolds (2004), Iudicello, Weber, and Wieland (1999, 12-15), etc. 1 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. the rest, 25% of marine fishes, are either overexploited or severely depleted. What's more, the most depleted stocks tend also to have the highest commercial value, and so, even as the number of fishers continue to grow, the marginal value of their harvests is declining.3 Given our demonstrated inability to prevent overexploitation in spite of anticipated losses, research designed to illuminate changes in individual and national behavior as costs manifest is both timely and practical; it can help predict our collective ability to either avert or adopt to future stock collapses. This thesis focuses on an especially difficult area of fisheries analysis, the international management of highly migratory species (HMS) such as tunas and billfishes, which requires that states cooperatively regulate their domestic fleets. Intellectual arguments against the viability of the multilateral management of such fishes cite multiple problems including a poor contractual environment, limited national capacity, and significant conflict over the allocation of access rights. Until recently, authors could also point to a long and dismal history of ineffectiveness on the part of the regional fisheries organizations that states have established to manage highly migratory species.4 However, striking improvements in the quality of regulations and the status of some stocks have occurred since the mid-1990s, contradicting the bleak predictions of earlier assessments. Not only have catch limits been assigned for several stocks, but states have generally adhered to their national quotas and biomass has been rebuilt.5 These new developments necessitate a re-examination of both the context and substance of international fisheries management. Either an important factor has 2 FAO (2002a, 23). Applies only to stocks for which information is available. 3 ibid, 120. 4 Peterson (1995) and De Sombre (1999). 5 ICCAT (2002 - 2004, vol. 2). 2 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. changed over the last decade or previous authors missed some crucial dynamic in HMS fisheries. Whichever is the case, it is important to study these anomalous successes to understand why they have occurred at this time and only for certain stocks. Taking into account the myopic nature of decision-making described above, the hypotheses presented and tested in the following chapters begin the process of linking theories of fisheries management that were previously isolated within diverse disciplines. Figure 1.1 illustrates the nature and purpose of this exercise, which is to relate biological, economic, political, and international factors in order to show how changes in one aspect of a fishery can affect the entire system. It is through this pivotal mechanism that the declining fortunes of fishermen can have a positive impact the abundance of a stock of fish. Previous authors have regarded this cycle as a downward spiral, fueled by the inefficient incentive structures associated with open access and perpetuated because states are unable to cooperate to restrict fishing effort. Without large-scale changes in public perceptions of highly migratory species, which can hardly be considered charismatic, traditional approaches predict that states will remain incapable of agreeing on effective management, leading to drastic reductions in the size and profitability ofHM S stocks. However, a more complete conception of the political economy of international fisheries, even the simple illustration of Figure 1.1, shows that there can be self-limiting aspects of the cycle as fishers and fishing states respond to bioeconomic changes via political mechanisms. 3 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 1.1: Pivotal Cycle in International Fisheries Biological Parameters Economic Incentives Multilateral Managment For instance, the economic incentives that lead fishers to overexploit a resource, increasing competition and decreasing profits, eventually create recession at the domestic level. Under the right circumstances, political responses to the resultant localized economic downturns could result in effective multilateral management, altering fishing effort and helping to rebuild a stock of fish. In order for such an endogenous limitation to work, stocks would still have to decline well below the level that will support maximum sustainable yield before effective - albeit belated - response to overfishing is possible. In fact, sometimes political responses generated by economic changes may not be of sufficient quantity or quality to 4 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. prevent stock collapse in a multilateral setting. The main purpose of this thesis is to find ways to determine, in the absence of formidable noncommercial interests, which circumstances facilitate or prevent biologically and economically beneficial regulation of international fisheries. To that end, this chapter reviews the relevant literature, and then points out the gaps that prevented predictions of the successful rebuilding of stocks of highly migratory species. Section 1.1 presents the economic value of HMS fisheries for consumers, producers, and other interest groups such as conservationists and recreational fishers. The economic and political causes of the overfishing of highly migratory species are then covered in Section 1.2. In Section 1.3, special attention is paid to the advances in international fisheries management that have been made by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). Recent actions taken by ICCAT have precipitated significant rebuilding for some species, but other stocks that are more severely depleted have not benefited from such management measures. As Section 1.4 points out, understanding the successes as well as the failures of the Atlantic Tuna Commission will require a new perspective that shows how states' policy preferences change as overfishing creates recession in domestic fleets targeting highly migratory stocks. 1.1 Value o f International Fisheries International fisheries contain some of the most important of the Earth’s renewable resources and present some of the most complicated practical issues for sustainable use. Fisheries resources are a significant source of nutrition around the world. Around 16% of the animal protein intake of the human population is derived R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. from fish, crustaceans, and mollusks.6 Furthermore, demand for high quality HMS fishes, such as the larger tunas or swordfish is increasing as consumers in developed countries change their preferences for health or cultural reasons. At the same time, demand for the lower quality small tunas is increasing in developing countries as n populations expand and land based sources of protein are exhausted. Fisheries resources also provide a considerable source of income and value added in the world economy. In 2000, 37% of fish products entered international trade, exported at an estimated value of US$55.2 billion.8 About 35 million people are employed in fish production worldwide.9 O f those, 65% work in marine capture fisheries, the sector which contributes 64-71% of production per annum.1 0 HMS stocks are some of the most valuable of all marine fisheries. Adult tunas, especially bluefin and bigeye, are prized by sushi and sashimi connoisseurs and can bring in very high prices for quality fish.1 1 Juvenile and small tunas are canned and sold in 1 9 large quantities at low prices. Swordfish, which is also commercially targeted, is 1 ^ consumed mainly in high-end restaurants in the USA and Europe. As Figure 1.2 6 FAO (2002a, 30). 7 ibid, 40. 8 ibid, 39; ibid, 34. 9 ibid, 3. 1 0 ibid, 3; ibid, 4 (calculated from Table 1). 1 1 Prices for tuna in the international marketplace are notoriously difficult to pin down. They vary widely even within the same species depending on size, condition, season, etc. Sashimi grade fish are usually sold individually to brokers either dockside or at special fish auction houses, like Tsukiji Market in Japan. That said, the most expensive o f the three sushi-quality tunas, bluefin, often brings in more than US$10,000 for a 700 to 800 pound fish. (Iudicello 1999, 57 and 64). 1 2 At doc, skipjack tuna for canning is usually sold for between U S$600-1,000 per metric ton. Recent prices have been on the rise from about US$450 per mt in 2000 to a high o f U S $1,110 per mt in Thailand for October 2004. Thailand is the world’s largest producer o f canned tuna. (FAO GLOBEFISH 2005). 1 3 FAO Commodities and Production 1976-2001 Database. 6 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. shows, commercial fishing for HMS stocks is a multi-billion dollar international industry. Figure 1.2: Nominal Annual Export Value of Major Highly Migratory Species1 4 ■ Yellowfm Tuna □ Swordfish ■ Skipjack □ Marlins □ Bigeye Tuna ■ Bluefin Tunas S Albacore Although not the most depleted, commercial marine fisheries are under serious pressure, which shows little sign of decreasing without some external intervention. Approximately 75% of stocks for which there are data are listed as fully exploited or overexploited by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).1 5 In fact, harvests from capture fisheries have generally leveled off, even though effort has been increasing as the size and technological capacity of the fleets rises.1 6 1 4 FAO Commodities and Production 1976-2001 Database. 1 5 FAO (2002a,23). 1 6 ibid., 8-9. 7 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Fishers have heavily invested, overcapitalizing as they compete to catch fish that are harder and harder to find. For example, Joseph (2003) estimated that the purse seine fleet targeting tunas in the Eastern Pacific Ocean could be substantially reduced without negatively impacting landings in the area. He further extrapolated those findings and concluded that it is highly likely that excess capacity exists in the tuna fleets of other oceans.1 7 Beyond their role for human consumption, highly migratory species are also valued by conservationists and recreational fishers. Such groups are often concerned with many species, including those that commercial fishers do not target but capture incidentally. Some recreational fishers value the “fight in the fish” which gives them the satisfaction of having won a difficult battle with nature. While big-game fish are coveted, charter boat operators and vacationing recreational fishermen rely on 1 o commonly available species to provide more consistent utility. Because of these concerns, sport fishers prize species such as marlins and yellowfm tuna as much as swordfish and the larger tunas, which generally get a better price in commercial markets.1 9 O f especial concern to recreational fishers is the waste they perceive in 1 7 Joseph (2003, sec. 5.2). 1 8 Many recreational fishers expressed concern regarding access to smaller gamefish due to their limited resources. Sportfishers who are not wealthy enough to own their own boats must spend relatively large amounts o f money for short fishing trips (1 day - 2 weeks). Because big game fish tend to be rare, these fishers and the charter boat captains who cater to them cannot be certain o f a strike by a marlin or bluefin tuna within the small window o f time available. However, utility can be derived from the capture o f smaller fish such as yellowfm and bigeye tuna, which are more abundant and therefore more commonly encountered. 1 9 Though they do sometimes eat the fish they catch or have them preserved as trophies, there is a considerable movement toward live release in the recreational fishery as they realize that the stocks they prize are dwindling due to high mortality rates from both fishing technologies. 8 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. the commercial fisheries as non-target species are caught but discarded to leave room 90 for higher value fish. Such instances of waste in fisheries practices can create considerable apprehension regarding non-target species and ecosystem resilience. For instance, marlins and sharks of different types have little commercial value, but they can be caught on the lines set out for swordfish or the larger tunas. Catch and survival rates are not well documented for many of these species, otherwise known as by-catch, and data on the discard practices ofHM S fleets is even more rare. However, between incidental mortality in commercial fisheries and, to a lesser extent, targeted catch by recreational fishers, stocks of big game fish in the Atlantic have become heavily 2 1 overexploited. While recent studies suggest that measures such as the release of by- catch brought in alive could effectively reduce both recreational and commercial mortality, the enforcement of such regulations would be quite difficult, since, 22 without observer coverage, fishers could simply discard incidental harvests at sea. Recreational fishers may lament the gradual disappearance of some of their most prized fish, but there are broader issues to consider as well. It is unclear what impact the loss of large top-end predators will have on the ecosystem as a whole. As with land-based environments, the oceans are complex and delicately balanced 20 Ellen Peal, personal communication August 2001. Ellen is president o f The Billfish Foundation, an advocacy group for recreational fishers. Discards are fish that, once caught are either thrown back or cut loose. An important distinction is between live discards, which could survive capture and dead discards, which definitely add to fishing mortality. 2 1 ICCAT (2004, Vol. 2) Heavily depleted stocks include blue marlin, white marlin, and northern bluefin tuna. Northern swordfish and bigeye tuna were depleted but have been rebuilt substantially. Sailfish and spearfish seem to have reached sustainable harvest levels, although the science on these fishes is particularly uncertain. 2 2 Studies o f postrelease survival o f commercial by-catch in the Atlantic include, among others, Graves, Luckhurst, and Prince (2002) and Kerstetter et al. (2003) on blue marlin, and Horodysky and Graves (2004) on white marlin. 9 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. arrangements that can be negatively affected by anthropogenic forces. When fishers take a disproportionate toll at any level of the food chain within an ecosystem, they can upset that balance, either depriving predators of prey or taking too many predators, allowing numbers of prey to increase beyond their available food supply. It is the existence of this balance and the preservation of biodiversity that most conservationists regard as of paramount importance. Because they focus more frequently on the interconnectedness of the entire marine system, conservationists are extremely troubled by the ecosystem impacts of fishing. Biodiversity is central to most conservationist arguments. Mainstream groups may lobby more to protect species that are particularly threatened and there are some environmental organizations that tend to be species or family specific, advocating for management that protects their chosen fauna even to the detriment of 9 3 other types of life, but the majority have a more holistic view. That said; conservation organizations often ignore the economic health of the human element in fisheries ecosystems, which can generate bitter, long-term struggles with commercial and even recreational fishing communities. Conflicts over proper utilization of stocks of highly migratory species are complicated by the international nature of these fisheries. Since HMS stocks are targeted by fleets from many different nations, some of which can actually move from ocean to ocean to catch fish, declines in the abundance of these valuable species can only be counteracted by cooperation among sovereign states. Thus, effective management rests in the hands of decision makers facing disparate and 2 3 Notably, the several NGOs that insist that “dolphin safe” tuna refers only to fish caught without encircling any dolphins, as opposed to the definition agreed on in the Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP). (Margi Prideaux, personal communication June 2003. Margi is a consultant for Cetacean Conservation, a whale and dolphin advocacy group). 10 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. often conflicting national interests. Before moving on to investigate the relevance of political maneuvering in the multifaceted arena of international fisheries management, it is important to understand the incentive structures that create biological depletion and competition among states. 1.2 Causes o f Overfishing in International Fisheries More than any other living resource on earth, highly migratory species of marine life form a global and common pool. These types of fish are found in all oceans and are not confined to nutrient rich coastal areas. Highly migratory species earn their title by crossing the seas in search of good hunting and spawning grounds. As impressive as the abilities of these fish are, it is the human element that elevates the common pool dynamic of these fisheries to a global scale. Technological advancements and globalized markets for HMS products have enabled fishers to travel even farther than the fish in their pursuit of a profitable catch. Distant water fishing fleets can move from ocean to ocean to find fish and to evade whatever rules and regulations might be applied in a specific region or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Coastal commercial and recreational fleets also target HMS resources when they are in range, adding to the total number of states involved in the exploitation of the resource. The result is shrinking stocks of fish and growing conflict among fishers and fishing nations. Economists blame these problems on the absence of property rights, which might otherwise enable fishers to manage a fishery as an asset, exerting the profit- maximizing level of effort rather than going all out to capture fish that might otherwise be taken by someone else. In fact, at the microeconomic level, without 11 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. property rights, fishers are expected to increase their effort in a fishery to the point where total revenue is equal to total costs and no profits are made. In their “race for the fish” fishers may remove more of the resource than can be replaced in the natural reproductive cycle, such that the stock is diminished and less will be available in 94 future periods. When the equilibrium level of production is above the maximum sustainable yield for a fishery, biological depletion occurs and eventually economic crises will result. These issues will be discussed further in Subsection 1.2.1. Burgeoning biological depletion of HMS stocks can be attributed to a failure in collective international management as well as the individual incentive structure that leads to overfishing. Referring again to Figure 1.1, political responses can alter a cycle of overexploitation in a fishery. In fact, there are cases in which fishers themselves have cooperated, forming a distinct polity in order to sustainably manage the stocks that they target. Despite differences in scale, there are lessons that can be learned from studies of such indigenous collective responses to the common pool nature of marine fisheries. Subsection 1.2.2 delves into the literature on collective action in fisheries and also discusses how globalization has largely replaced community management with government regulation. For highly migratory species, however, communities of states must function as well as communities of individuals 'J c if they are to sustainably manage these fisheries. At the international level, there is no outside arbiter of national demands for access and the multilateral organizations that states have created to cooperatively 2 4 Gordon (1954). 2 5 Unlike Ellickson’s (1991) description o f welfare-maximizing norms among whalers in the 18th and 19th centuries, there are not many non-state mechanisms available to counteract dissipation o f scarcity rent in HMS fisheries. The scale o f fishing operations and the obvious barriers to communication between fishers from more than 40 nations rule out the possibility o f individual collective action to limit fishing effort to sustainable levels. 12 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. regulate harvests of these fish have not been very successful at preventing • 26 overexploitation. Numerous factors impede proactive regulation of these fisheries, including scientific uncertainty regarding the state of the stocks, disagreements over the allocation of access rights and lack of monitoring and enforcement capacity, both at the national and international levels. Yet the well-known norm of sovereignty in the current world system prevents the creation of some independent governance structure that could regulate, monitor and enforce management measures 97 internationally. Therefore, cooperation among states is the only alternative to global open-access to high migratory species. Specific barriers to effective multilateral fisheries management will be elaborated further in Subsection 1.2.3. 1.2.1 Open-access Incentives and Biological Depletion Bioeconomic modelers have thoroughly investigated the incentive structures and systems parameters that lead to biological depletion in fisheries. Because of the scarce nature of renewable resources, producers can potentially earn economic rents from their harvests. However, imperfect and often non-existent property rights undermine the capture of that rent as well as the efficient utilization of fisheries resources by driving effort above profit-maximizing levels. Teitenberg (2003) sketches the basic microeconomic dynamics between fish and fishers, Conrad (1999) provides a much more detailed view, and Clark (1990) thoroughly examines fisheries 9 8 economics and management using highly mathematical modeling tools. 2 6 Rebuilding to maximum economic yield would be a better, but even more difficult goal. Also, MSY is the target level exploitation cited in most o f the regional fisheries organization’s charters. 2 7 See Young (2000) regarding global governance. 2 8 See Appendix A: Basic Bioeconomics o f Fisheries, for an overview o f the more technical aspects o f these models, including specification o f production functions and equilibrium conditions for static and 13 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Many bioeconomic models rely on a central concept known as maximum sustainable yield (MSY); the largest amount of biomass that can be removed from a stock of fish without decreasing long-run availability. Schaefer (1957) was the first to show that, on average, there is a logistic relationship between stock size, growth and the rate of harvest that results in an optimally productive level of biomass that generates the maximum sustainable yield for a given fish stock.2 9 Since the 1950s, marine biologists have been developing much more sophisticated and specialized models of population dynamics in ocean fisheries, but maximum sustainable yield continues to be an exceptionally important indicator of the biological health of a 30 stock of fish. In fact, the concept of MSY has become a widely accepted target for fisheries management regimes, including the regional fisheries organizations with -3 i jurisdiction over highly migratory species. Maximum sustainable yield is such a prominent goal because any higher level of extraction results in a diminution of the productiveness of a stock of fish. Like many living resources, fish are a scarce, yet potentially renewable source of utility for human beings. Most people are aware of scarcity in the context of non renewable resources, like oil and coal, each of which exists on Earth in a fixed amount that can be diminished, but cannot be increased. Renewable resources are also scarce, but they differ from non-renewable resources in that the flow of dynamic models. A brief version o f central bioeconomic postulates will be found in the rest o f this section. 2 9 Technically, Schaefer was the first biologist to use the logistic growth function in a fisheries context. Others, including pioneer P.F. Verhulst, had used logistic models o f population growth since the mid-1800s. (Clark 1990, 11). 3 0 Clark (1990, 23). 3 1 It should be noted that there is a growing movement to shift goals toward ecosystem management and optimal yield rather than MSY. However, there are both technical and political impediments to such a transformation. Furthermore, M SY is the official goal o f the International Tuna Organizations, so it is the most applicable benchmark for this study. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. production is dependent on the replacement rate of the stock as well as the marginal cost of extraction. Fish are scarce, in the sense that the rate of reproduction limits the 32 overall level of availability of any given stock. For better or worse, property rights seldom exist in marine fisheries. As a fugitive resource, a fish is not owned until it is caught, and oceans are much more difficult to partition or own than land. Because of these factors, most marine fisheries are common pool resources, in which there exist both open-access and rivalness attributes. Open-access refers to the inability to exclude anyone from using the resource, and rivalness means that use of the resource by one person diminishes the - 3-5 availability to others. Gordon (1954) theorized that, since they cannot ensure that fish left behind to propagate the stock will not be taken up by others, each fisher using a common pool resource would increase effort to the point where total revenue equals total cost. For the majority of fisheries, the open-access level of production is higher than the maximum sustainable yield. Once a stock falls below the level of biomass that would support MSY ( B m s y ) , the overall flow of fish for harvest will be diminished in the long run.3 4 This means that over time, the size of a stock of fish will decrease until long run equilibrium is established. For any specific species, the higher the net marginal benefit to producers, or scarcity rent, the greater incentives 3 2 The term stock refers to fish o f the same species that are geographically and behaviorally able to breed with each other. By definition, all fish o f the same species are able to produce viable offspring, but in the oceans, geographic distance or spawning patterns may divide a single species, such that there is very little opportunity for inter-breeding between the various stocks. In fact, different reproductive rates and age o f maturation have been observed in separated stocks o f the same species. 3 3 Common pool resource as defined by Barkin and Shambaugh (1999, 8). 34 As used here, the term biomass refers to the abundance o f a particular stock in terms o f weight, not the entire mass o f biota in a particular ecosystem. Sometimes the biomass is subdivided by age composition or other characteristics, but it should be assumed to refer to the entire stock unless otherwise indicated. 15 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. there are for entry into the market and the more quickly the stock will be used up.3 5 It is the existence of this rent, which is over and above the intrinsic value of a fish, that allows fishers to continue to make profits well past the economically and biologically optimal levels. Entwined with biological attributes, economic parameters determine the unregulated level of exploitation of a stock. Exogenous changes in either the cost or revenue side of the production function can explain movements of fishing effort that in turn effect the level of biomass by changing the amount of fish extracted. By expanding revenues, an outward shift in demand draws effort into a fishery, increasing short run harvests of a stock and thereby decreasing the actual size of the biomass. Concomitantly, higher prices for one kind of fish can draw effort away from others, providing a short respite for substitutes. Alternately, there are both short and long-term fluctuations in reproductive rates and other biological parameters that can directly impact the availability of fish and therefore the operational costs of producers. Some biological shifts are stochastic, but many follow well-known climatological patterns and can be predicted over time.3 7 These movements are important because the costs of production are partially determined by the geographic location, abundance, and behavioral attributes of a 3 5 Where ownership exists, scarcity rent is the portion o f the net revenues that are not eradicated by free-market competition due to the limited availability o f a resource such as land, oil or fish. Therefore all scarcity rent is similar to profit but not all profitability in a fishery is scarcity. 3 6 Conrad (1999, 41). rent. 3 7 Many studies have linked changes in stock abundance to long and medium-run climate cycles. The majority focus on the Pacific, but some, like Parsons and Lear (2001) examine climate impacts in the Atlantic. They found that atmospheric changes related to the North Atlantic Oscillation can have profound effects on many fish stocks, but that the mechanisms o f those impacts are poorly understood. 16 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. TO species. Among HMS fisheries, high quality fish that can bring in premium prices have been of the larger, more slowly growing species such as bluefin tuna, swordfish 39 and toothfish. Unfortunately these are some of the least productive fishes and therefore the least able to sustain high fishing mortality over the long-term. These species were also harder to catch prior to the technological revolutions of the last century, but new methods have been developed that have significantly lowered the marginal cost of production. This increased scarcity rent and drew many new entrants into the fishery, causing considerable declines in the biomass of these stocks.4 0 Technological change has also impacted catches of smaller, less valuable fishes. These can now be caught cheaply, in very large quantities and are currently under much greater fishing pressure than they have been in the past. Since these species are usually more numerous and productive than their more valued counterparts, they have been better able to withstand such high levels of fishing mortality. Yet, as demand continues to increase with the decline in availability of higher quality fish, it is likely that the value of these lower-end fishes will in fact increase in the near future and therefore production will go up as well. Sufficient capacity certainly exists to considerably deplete even the most prolific species in the 3 8 See Fisheries for more information regarding specific fishing techniques and recent technical advancements, including improvements in the size and range in vessels, the effectiveness o f fishing gear, and the accuracy o f fish finding technologies. All o f these innovations have made commercial fishing more cost effective, although some advancements, such as distant-water factory ships, are quite expensive. 3 9 Prices are usually linked to the quality o f the flesh o f the species, including its texture, color, and fat content. Popularity and marketing are important as well. 4 0 Majkowski (2005, 4). 17 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. ocean.4 1 If this occurs, then both producers and consumers face severe losses in profits and utility. Long-run predictions from bioeconomic models suggest two possible equilibriums for any stock 4 2 The most widely applicable projection is of stagnation at relatively high levels of fishing effort and very low levels of biomass. Alternately, in fisheries where marginal profits are high or biological depensation exists, gradually declining stocks could suddenly collapse, resulting in either non-viability or even extinction 4 3 This second, more catastrophic outcome of the common pool incentive structure is most often associated with catastrophic losses in fisheries. In fact, even if a fishery could reach long run equilibrium without stock collapse, there would still be high economic costs in terms of current and future revenues forgone, overcapitalization and the displacement of less competitive fishers. Elevated levels of biological depletion can cause these costs to increase and can precipitate recession in a domestic fishing fleet for individual fishers, fishing communities and the states that harbor them. Thus, overfishing is important both because it can lead to biological crises such as sudden stock collapse and because it contributes to resession and stagnation in the fisheries sector. 4 1 Joseph (2003, 54). 4 2 See Appendix E: Long Run Supply for more on the specification o f long-run equilibrium and the derivation o f the backward bending supply curve for renewable resources. Biological and economic factors, such as the rate o f growth, costs o f production, and price, that contribute to differentiation among the long-run supply curves for various stocks are also covered. 4 3 Clark (1990, 133). Non-viability refers to a circumstance where stocks are so small that the marginal cost o f production becomes prohibitive. That is, there are so few fish remaining in a stock that it is not cost-effective for fishers to continue targeting them. Depensation refers to a situation where a stock o f fish exhibits an inability to compensate for fishing pressure once the stock size falls below a certain point, given constant effort. In a case o f critical depensation, even if all fishing pressures are removed, the stock will continue to shrink and eventually go extinct. See Appendix A: Basic Bioeconomics o f Fisheries, for more detailed information on these concepts and the models derived from them. 18 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 1.2.2 Globalization and the Nationalization of Fisheries Management One of the ways that fishers have dealt with the economic problems associated with the common pool nature of fisheries is to collectively establish rules and norms that govern rights of access to important stocks. In fact, cooperative management of fisheries resources may date back as early as 2300 BC, among the Sumerians who organized themselves into groups of fishers with well-defined territories.4 4 Since that time, the rise of the nation-state and the industrialization of fishing technologies have lead to a decline in such traditional, collective solutions to common pool resource problems. Only a few cooperative management structures still exist today, and almost all are supported in some way by a formal legal system and state authorities. Nevertheless, studies of these indigenous solutions have provided significant insights into fisheries management and collective action problems generally. Such understanding is much needed, since expansion of fishing effort has proven difficult for state authorities to curtail within their exclusive zones and on the high seas. For the most part, national or local governments now regulate once open-access fisheries. This is a somewhat natural result of the common pool dynamics of fisheries, since competition over declining resources often leads to conflict, which usually reaches the attention of the authorities if cooperative solutions cannot be found.4 5 Since Garrett Hardin (1968) published his seminal work on the Tragedy o f the Commons, literature on common pool resources has proliferated across the social sciences. Some authors like Elinor Ostrom (1993), Daniel Bromley (1992), and others have focused their attentions on theories and case studies of collective action 4 4 Royce (1987, 74). 4 5 Ellickson (1991, 250). 19 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. to resolve problems associated with common pool resources at the local level. Studies in fisheries include Acheson (1988) and Wilson (1977) who examined successful cooperation and exclusion with some government regulation in Maine lobster fisheries; Alexander (1982) who documented overcapitalization and unrest surrounding an outdated but legalized traditional share fishing system in a Sri Lanka village that resulted in overcapitalization and inter-factional conflicts; and Berkes (1992) who studied five Turkish fisheries and found that exclusion was inherently necessary to successful cooperative management, but that it could easily be undermined by legal or traditional mores protecting open-access. Many other cases exist, but the general consensus is that both cooperation and exclusion are necessary to successfully prevent the overexploitation and economic inefficiencies associated with common pool resources. Cooperation allows fishers to establish rights of access within the group and exclusion provides stability in terms of income and social linkages. Furthermore, monitoring and enforcement of both types of measures should be cost effective and appropriate to the fishing technique in question. Additionally, measures adapted to collectively control fishing effort must be legitimized either by the local population, if the community is isolated enough, or by government authorities in order to successfully counter pressures to increase access.4 6 Where such institutional mechanisms exist, sustainable fisheries have endured for centuries without the direct intervention of any higher authority than the fishers themselves. However, as the fishing industry becomes globalized, exclusion, enforcement and other keys to collective management have become much more difficult due to the proliferation and dispersion of fishers. 46 Ellickson (1991, 251). 20 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Fishing communities have exhibited interesting reactions to this expansion of fishing effort. While rational choice perspectives predict that cooperation and exclusion should only occur when the net present value of action is greater than that of continued open-access, many communities try to hold on to their traditional practices long after the costs of monitoring and enforcement become economically prohibitive. This was true in the Sri Lankan case, four of the Turkish cases, a Brazilian fishery, and several other cases.4 7 Considering that most forces that undermine enduring collective action solutions come from outside the community, it is not so surprising that locals resist such encroachment. Even so, this reticence illustrates the need to consider cultural concerns when analyzing the perspectives of fishers and fishing communities. In most cases, resistance has not prevented the collapse of local, collective management strategies that endured for generations in isolation. When conflicts arise between local and external fishing interests, governments often step in on the side of more industrialized fishers in order to increase production, jobs and revenues. In fact, state based regulatory agencies have proliferated significantly over the last two centuries with implicit and explicit goals ranging from resolving conflicts among fishers to development of fisheries to sustainable management of fish resources. Some agencies may hold all these objectives simultaneously, complicating the management process. Due to domestic politics, bureaucratic constraints and other factors, regulators have not been entirely successful as managers of domestic 4 7 Cordell and McKean (1992, 198). 21 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 48 fisheries. However, government intervention has eliminated the collective action problem in domestic fisheries by harnessing the coercive power of the state. 1.2.3 Barriers to Effective International Management Although states can unilaterally impose regulations on many coastal fisheries, the economic incentives that generate the biological depletion of highly migratory species can only be counteracted via collective action between sovereign states. Individual governments are still responsible for their national fleets targeting HMS stocks, but all the difficulties that they face in regulating domestic fisheries are multiplied many times because they must cooperate to manage global or regional stocks.4 9 Today the high seas are more open to fishers than ever before. Technological innovations have facilitated access to every comer of the world’s oceans, from arctic seas to deep-water trenches. With all of their innovations, fishers are running out of new stocks to exploit, and pressures on known stocks are increasing. In spite of a great need for international intervention, limited national capacity, compounded by a poor contractual environment and weak governmental concern, has made effective agreements on management measures among states difficult to obtain.5 0 4 8 There is a broad literature regarding the design and effectiveness o f state-based fisheries management. These range from sophisticated bioeconomic models such as Clark (1990) to comparative studies o f the politics o f management in specific fishing states such as Weber (2002), Lequesne (2004), and Bergen and Haward (1996) to narrative cases that glean practical lessons from the real-world success and failure o f various management practices. Examples o f this last approach can be found in Royce (1987), Waugh (1984), and many others. 4 9 See Appendix C: Regulatory Options, for more information regarding common regulatory issues and government options for dealing with those problems. 5 0 Peterson (1995). 22 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Cooperative regulation is necessary because highly migratory species are such perfect illustrations of global common pool resource problems. Until recently, it has not been legally or physically possible to exclude anyone from fishing on the high seas, as it has been within a country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).5 1 Also, overfishing by a national fleet on the high seas can deplete stocks to the detriment of all fishers. Similarly, because HMS fish are a fugitive resource, moving between EEZs and the high seas, it is possible for a national fleet fishing within its own EEZ to affect the overall level of stock available elsewhere. Thus the requirements of non-excludability and rivalness have held quite strongly for HMS capture fisheries. Furthermore, the inefficient behaviors associated with common pool resources are widely observed in international fisheries, as evidenced by the severe depletion of most commercially valuable stocks in the last century. International fisheries management, like most other attempts to regulate global common pool resources, cannot be successfully undertaken by non-state actors for two reasons. First, the scope of the problem and number of actors involved is much greater than it would be in a purely domestic fishery. Cooperation on resource acquisition between fishers from so many different countries is not tenable. Besides the language and cultural barriers, the shear number of fishers and diversity of targeted species, combined with the vastness of the oceans makes a self-organized arrangement virtually impossible. Moreover, there is no clear basis for the authority of any such organization. Domestically, self-organized management groups receive 5 1 The current system o f Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), which extend 200 miles from a state’s coastline, was initiated by unilateral declarations o f jurisdiction by the US and other countries in the 1960s and 70s, and then formally instituted by the UN Law o f the Sea Treaty in 1982. (Weber 2002, xxii). 5 2 Barkin and Shambaugh (1999, 5). 5 3 De Sombre (1999, 59). 23 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. their legitimacy, explicitly or implicitly, from the state, but it is unclear where that right would come from outside of the national jurisdiction.5 4 Given that there are several other groups with interests in the management of international fisheries besides commercial fishers, the authority of any self-organized access or acquisition scheme is likely to be challenged at the global level. That said, there is no supranational institution with sufficient power to create and enforce legislation to change incentive patterns internationally. Thus, cooperation between states is necessary for the management of highly migratory species. Though international organizations like the United Nations exist and can be influential in world affairs, the authority of the state continues to be the dominant paradigm. Even the World Trade Organization, which has the broadest powers to enforce its policies of any international institution to date, cannot punish defection itself. It can only allow compliant states to demand recompense or enact sanctions against non-compliers. Moreover, monitoring of compliance is carried out by the states themselves, though the WTO does consolidate the information collected by its members.5 5 Like the WTO, regional fisheries organizations are dependent on states for their authority and the implementation of their decisions. In the absence of a higher power, states must negotiate a coordinated regulatory system to prevent or alleviate biological depletion in stocks of highly migratory species. In many ways, it is as if governments rather than resource users must cooperate and self-organize within the context of the anarchic world system.5 6 The legitimacy of the state as negotiator and policy maker at the international level is 5 4 Ostrom (1993, 101). 5 5 Keohane andN ye (2001, 261). 5 6 See Young (2002) on the issue o f scale in collective action problems. 24 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. already established via the staunchly guarded concept of sovereignty, or the recognized right of the state to enact and enforce its own laws within its own territory. At first glance, it might seem that cooperation in the management of common pool resources limits sovereignty, since states must agree to enact laws domestically that curb their citizens’ appropriation of the resource. However, since all such management has occurred within the context of international institutions, established by treaties and agreed on by states, the legal status of the state is enhanced, rather than diminished.5 7 One of the mechanisms that states have created in order to make international cooperation easier, for common pool resource management as well as other issues, is the multilateral organization. For HMS stocks, multilateral management is co undertaken by states in the context of regional fisheries organizations. As indicated in Figure 1.3, the first of these international bodies were set up in the 1950s and 60s, including two that were created to deal with HMS stocks, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC, established in 1949) and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT, est. 1969). Along with the two older organizations, three more recent bodies have been created, the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT, est. 1994) the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC, est. 1996) and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC, est. 2004). Each body has its own 5 7 Litfin (1998, 6). 5 8 See Appendix D: Regional Fisheries Organizations, for more regarding regional fisheries organization and international relations theory. These organizations are long-term, multilateral settings for the negotiation o f management measures. As such, they are composed o f states and all management measures undertaken by regional fisheries organizations are self-enforcing, with the exception o f the appropriate use o f non-discriminatory trade measures. Under current international law, the recommendations adopted by these organizations apply to all fishing states, whether or not they are members. 25 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. convention, secretariat and protocol, but their goals are generally the same - to sustainably manage the stocks of highly migratory species in their convention areas. Figure 1.3 Map of HMS Regional Fisheries Organizations WCPFC (2004) IOTC | (1996) CCSBT (1994) V CCSBT (1994) CCSBT (1994) Little has been written about regional fisheries organizations and the management of HMS fisheries specifically. Peterson (1995) compiled an extensive survey of international fisheries organizations, including global, transnational and regional commissions that manage species from seals to halibut.5 9 Ultimately, Peterson views international fisheries management as a collective action problem containing three aspects: access, overfishing and overinvestment. Solving these problems requires biological, economic and administrative expertise. In her analysis, 5 9 She also provides a fairly exhaustive narrative o f the evolution o f fisheries sciences and preferred management options. 26 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. the combination of leader, follower, and laggard states involved in the management of a fishery is key to its effectiveness.6 0 According to Peterson, the central factor for successful management of international fisheries is the elimination or conversion of laggard states either via side-payments, persuasion on the basis of scientific evidence, or new international institutions.6 1 When discussing highly migratory species specifically, Peterson identifies three major barriers to effective management: • Lack of governmental concern on the part of fishing states • Poor contractual environment for multilateral management • Insufficient national capacity to enforce international regulations The first barrier refers to the overall low level of states’ willingness to pay for current regulations to ensure the future availability of highly migratory species. In Peterson's terminology, leader states might be willing to give up some of their current catches in pursuit of sustainability but their concern is not sufficient to overcome the impediments presented by laggard states. Additionally, both leader and laggard states are exceedingly reluctant to give up the privileges associated with sovereignty in order to improve the contractual environment under which management regimes are created. Because of this concern with sovereignty, Peterson’s second barrier is closely related to the first. As a collective action problem, international fisheries management requires that contracting parties be reasonably assured that all members would uphold their ends of a cooperative bargain. In the mid-1990s, when she was 6 0 This characterization o f states was utilized throughout Haas, Keohane, and Levy (1995), the book in which Peterson’s work appears as a chapter. 6 1 Peterson (1995, 261; 273; 281). 27 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. writing, there was no way to effectively monitor fishing operations on the high seas, making national compliance with international regulations impossible to quantify. Furthermore, members were left on their own recognizance in regards to the implementation and enforcement of management measures. Other weaknesses in the contractual environment included the use of consensus as opposed to majority decision-making, the existence of an objection procedure whereby members can opt out of regulations, and the international norm that exempted nonmembers from compliance with adopted regulations. All in all, any party to an agreement on international fisheries regulations could not be certain that others would comply with 62 the arrangement and therefore cooperative measures were seldom successful. Peterson's third barrier to effective management of highly migratory species, lack of capacity, had similar impacts on international fisheries management. Given the norm of reliance on individual states to monitor and enforce collective regulations, noncompliance can be attributed to a lack of national capacity as opposed to purposeful defection. Fishing states might be unable to reach agreement due to this problem or they might adopt regulations that are meaningless because they have not been implemented. Capacity building is also linked to governmental concern because states must consider fisheries management to be important if they are to invest in infrastructure and administration. Approaching the topic as a common pool resource rather than from an institutional perspective, De Sombre (1999) reaches similar conclusions regarding barriers to effective management of highly migratory species.6 4 Much like Peterson, 6 2 Peterson (1995, 283). 6 3 ibid., 285. 6 4 De Sombre’s (1999) analysis is a chapter in a book edited by Barkin and Shambaugh (1999) and was undertaken as part o f a collective effort to test their hypotheses regarding the impact o f different 28 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. De Sombre identifies the contractual environment, specifically the potential for free ridership (non-compliance), as a major barrier to cooperation among fishing states.6 5 She also discusses governmental concern, in terms of differentiated shadows of the future or time horizons. In other words, some states (Peterson’s leaders) value the future availability of HMS stocks more than others (Peterson’s laggards). Combined with the consensus decision-making process, these differences lead to acceptance of the least common denominator, which is usually inadequate when the goal is sustainable management.6 6 Finally, De Sombre also sites a lack of grassroots charisma and concentrated market power in a discussion comparing the successful protection of dolphins, a by-catch in some tuna fisheries, as opposed to the failure to f t 7 sustainably manage the tunas themselves. Both Peterson and De Sombre were exceedingly pessimistic about the ability of fishing states to overcome these various barriers to cooperative management of highly migratory species. In fact, much of the more general literature on global environmental governance and collective action also forecasts that international attempts to regulate common pool resources with the scope and scale of highly migratory species would not succeed. By and large, these predictions have held true. Regional fisheries organizations have not been able to maintain the stocks in their jurisdiction at maximum sustainable yield. However, in the last decade, some stocks of highly migratory species have been rebuilt from relatively low levels of biomass. Scientific assessment that document this rebuilding will be reviewed in the next shadows o f the future, threats o f defection, and market power on international management of common pool resources. 6 5 De Sombre (1999, 59). 6 6 ibid., 61. 6 7 ibid., 65. 29 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. section, along with the potential explanations that can be found in the existing literature on the international management of natural resources. 1.3 Innovation in the Atlantic Among the five HMS regional fisheries bodies, the stocks managed by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICC AT) are the most depressed and depleted. Since the Commission has been in existence, the number of stocks identified as being overexploited has grown from zero to more than ten. Most other stocks in the region are fully exploited.6 8 While ICCAT has allowed many Atlantic HMS stocks to become depleted, recent scientific estimates of biomass have shown that some of the more heavily regulated stocks have rebounded somewhat and a few have recovered to levels close to those which would support MSY. This rather pleasant surprise contradicts the fatalistic conclusions found in the literature and therefore merits further investigation. Scientific estimates of changes in the abundance of important ICCAT stocks are reported below, along with background information on the institutional characteristics of the Commission. An additional purpose of this section is to pose the important questions raised by the existence of the observed but unexpected phenomena of rebuilding and then to vet existing theories that might explain the biological turn around. Some gross indicators such as changes in ICCAT membership over time, the adoption of various types of regulatory measures, and anecdotal evidence of interest group involvement will be referenced in preliminary 6 8 ICCAT (2003, vol. 2). 30 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. tests to determine which aspects of the literature are most applicable to the problem at hand. As Figure 1.4 illustrates, and as predicted by previous authors, several of the most important ICCAT stocks have been heavily depleted and were facing severe biological depletion. In this graphical representation, the darker bars represent the lowest historic estimation of the biomass of the stock relative to the level that would support maximum sustainable yield. A stock that is at or above 100% of the level of biomass that will support MSY ( B m s y ) is relatively healthy but, once a stock falls below that level, it can be considered to be overfished and biomass will continue to decline even if fishing effort is at maximum sustainable yield.6 9 Therefore, the figure indicates that western bluefin tuna, blue marlin, and white marlin have been heavily overexploited and are facing severe biological depletion. Bigeye tuna, North Atlantic albacore, and northern swordfish have been moderately overexploited, while yellowfin tuna and Eastern bluefin tuna have only evinced mild levels of biological depletion. Of these important stocks, only skipjack tuna, southern swordfish and 7 0 southern albacore have never been overexploited in the Atlantic. 6 9 There is a technical difference between overfishing (overexploitation), which indicates that extraction is occurring at a rate that is not sustainable, and the state o f being overfished (overexploited), which means that the biomass o f the stock has fallen below the level that would support maximum sustainable yield. Overfishing can occur before a stock is overfished; in fact, overfishing is the verb that leads to stock depletion and can push biomass below B Ms y - Once a stock is overfished, catches have to be reduced to some replacement yield (always less than MSY) in order for rebuilding to occur. 7 0 Biomass estimates are unavailable for Atlantic skipjack due to uncertainty regarding the stock structure and catch data. However, the SCRS reports that it is likely that skipjack is fully exploited. (ICCAT 2004, 32). 31 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 1.4: Biological Depletion and Rebuilding in Atlantic HMS Fisheries7 1 > < C/3 2 C Q O ' " cd s o m ■ Lowest Biomass □ Current Biomass ‘ Spawning stock biomass, most optimistic estimate “ Spawning stock biomass relative to 1970, includes Mediterranean - C C . £ S 3 - o cd cd o S - O 2 2 £ £ 0 ) O C /3 C/3 - 5 . " t i Z C/3 5 £ Bigeye Skipjack Yellowfin E Bluefin** W Bluefin* N Albacore Current Year 2002 N/A 2001 2000 2001 1999 Lowest Year 1998 N/A 2001 2000 1995 1997 S Albacore N Swordfish S Swordfish Blue Marlin White Marlin Current Year 2002 2002 1999 2000 2001 Lowest Year 1997 1996 1996 1996 2001 On the other hand, as the lighter bars signify, the current biomass of some of these stocks has actually increased from the low levels experienced in previous 10 years. Note that blue marlin and western bluefin tuna have shown only slight improvements in their biomass levels but northern albacore has been rebuilt to a moderate level of biological depletion. Furthermore, both bigeye tuna and North 7 1 Estimates o f biomass relative to MSY were taken directly from species reports o f ICCAT Sub- Committee for Research and Statistics (SCRS). (ICCAT 2004, vol. 2). Time series o f estimates were unavailable as assessments are not carried out annually. The year o f the lowest and current assessments for each stock is indicated in the table below the figure. 7 2 The lower the bar, the deeper the biological depletion. Therefore if the current biomass is higher than the lowest historical estimate o f biomass, rebuilding has occurred. If the current and worst bars are even, then the stock is either stagnated or continuing on a downward path. 3 2 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Atlantic swordfish have almost returned to MSY levels of biomass. Interestingly, 73 stocks that were formerly at or above B m s y have increased in biomass as well. Other stocks have shown little change, including yellowfin tuna and Eastern bluefin tuna as well as white marlin, which is down to only 12% of the level of biomass that would support maximum sustainable yield. During the first two decades of the Commission’s existence few management measures were adopted and none were strongly enforced.7 4 As recently as 1970 only two HMS stocks were thought to be potentially overexploited in that ocean: yellowfin and northern bluefin tunas. After 34 years of ostensibly aiming for sustainable management of Atlantic highly migratory species, ICCAT’s scientific committee now recognizes almost a dozen overfished stocks, including the same two that were initially identified.7 5 More importantly, from the organization’s Annual Reports, it is clear that scientific advice regarding limitation of fishing mortality at levels close to MSY was available for the majority of these stocks prior to the onset of biological depletion, but actions were not taken on those early warnings. As recently as 1989, the only regulations adopted by ICCAT were unenforced size limits 7 3 Southern albacore and southern swordfish are outliers because they have not been heavily fished for nearly as long as their northern counterparts. In fact for most o f the last century, these stocks were only taken as a secondary species in the fisheries for bigeye and yellowfin tunas. It was only after northern stocks were severely depleted that fleets targeting swordfish and albacore specifically moved into the southern Atlantic. 7 4 FAO (1970) and ICCAT (1971-1990). From 1969-1989 ICCAT’s only recommendations were to limit the capture o f small fish in the bluefin and yellowfin fisheries, as well as a catch restriction on bluefin tuna. SCRS reports show that the size restrictions were never implemented fully and that Bluefin limits in the western Atlantic were o f questionable effectiveness until the 1990s. 7 5 In addition to the eight overfished stocks in Figure 1.4, SCRS reported that eastern sailfish and Mediterranean swordfish could possibly be overexploited, although there is not enough information to estimate biomass relative to MSY. (ICCAT 2004, vol. 2). 33 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. on yellowfin, bigeye and bluefin tunas and catch limits on western bluefin tuna, one 7 f \ of the most overexploited fish stocks in the world. In contrast, from 1990 to 2003 ICCAT introduced catch limits for stocks of yellowfin, bluefin, albacore and bigeye tunas, as well as some stocks of swordfish and blue and white marlins. Time-area closures and capacity limits have also been 7 7 adopted for several of these stocks. Furthermore, ICCAT has been in the lead on innovating new monitoring measures, including the use of trade statistics to check catch records along with positive and negative vessel lists to help identify non- compliant fishers and the states that flag their boats. Enforcement has also improved with the application of sanctions against several non-members and one member state found to be out of compliance with ICCAT rules. These innovations reflect important changes in the contractual environment at the Commission that limit the potential for free riding by nonmembers. Although it is uneven, the unexpected improvement in the biomass of some stocks, along with the endogenous enhancement of the contractual environment at ICCAT, suggest three important questions: 1. Can stock rebuilding be specifically traced to ICCAT management or are there some other forces at work? 7 6 See Appendix F: Creation o f ICCAT, and Appendix H: ICCAT Size Limits, for more on early ICCAT regulations. In the 1970s, yellowfin tuna was the first stock to be regulated by the Commission, followed by bigeye. Size limits were adopted for both stocks, although the bigeye regulation was targeted at reducing misreporting o f small yellowfin. In the 1980s, bluefin tuna became an issue and catch limits were adopted along with size limits. 7 7 A time-area closure is simply a prohibition on fishing in specific areas during certain periods. Capacity limits restrict the level o f fishing effort by reducing the number or size o f vessels permitted to target the stock. See Appendix C: Regulatory Options, for more information on these and other types o f management measures that are common in the fisheries context. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2. What, if anything, has changed to make successful rebuilding via ICCAT regulation possible? 3. Why has management been more successful for some stocks than others? Question #1 is primary because, if the rebuilding cannot be attributed to regulation by the Commission then the subsequent questions are unimportant. However, if ICCAT management measures can be linked to rebuilding then understanding the factors that break down barriers to effective management is crucial from both academic and policy making perspectives. The rest of this section addresses the three questions more closely, starting with a brief overview of evidence for causality. Subsections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 will then go on to address Questions #2 and #3, focusing on potential answers available in the current literature on management of highly migratory species. Finally, Subsection 1.3.4 specifically addresses the role of non commercial interests and their ability to impact regulation of non-charismatic fauna like the highly migratory tunas and billfish managed by ICCAT. 1.3.1 Relating Regulation and Rebuilding Of course, the simple existence of stock rebuilding does not necessarily indicate that ICCAT management was responsible for reversing growing biological depletion. Exogenous factors such as shifts in demand or improved oceanographic conditions could account for increasing biomass with or without ICCAT regulations. Young (2002) covers the intricacies of establishing a causal relationship between international regulations and environmental changes generally. Unfortunately, when there are multiple driving forces, determining exactly how much one factor 35 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. contributes to a change in biomass is seldom tenable. However, by tracking changes in key variables like fishing effort and the size composition of landings, while simultaneously accounting for alternate causal factors, it is possible to show whether no or not regulations have had the desired effect on biomass. ICCAT has used many different kinds of management measures over the years. All of these regulations have been aimed at reducing fishing mortality whether they limit catches (total allowable catch, freezes on catch increases), effort targeting an entire stock (vessel limits) or catches and effort aimed at a portion of the 7Q population (size limits and time-area closures respectively). In older to connect these regulations with stock rebuilding, it is necessary to show three things: • The regulation has been implemented • The implemented regulation has reduced fishing mortality • Reduced fishing mortality has increased stock biomass With enough data, it would be possible trace the direct causal linkages between ICCAT recommendations, implementation of those rules at the national level, changes in fishing mortality and ultimately shifts in the stock biomass. Such an approach is highly costly. In fact, given the current availability of fisheries data, both qualitative and quantitative analysis at such a high level of detail can be labeled a O A Herculean task. 7 8 Young (2002, 12-13). 7 9 Total allowable catch and freezes on catch increases are exactly what they sound like. Vessel limits are restrictions on the number o f fishing vessels in a national fleet (that is the number o f vessels flagged by a country, not the number owned by a country). Size limits define the minimum size o f fish landed, or in other words, the minimum size that can be kept by fishers. Maximum size limits are also useful in some circumstances. Time-area closures are restrictions on fishing effort in specific geographic locations at specific times. See Appendix C: Regulatory Options. 8 0 ludicello (1999, 63-64), Young (2003) and Joseph (2003, sec. 3.2). The proprietary nature of fisheries information, lack o f calibration among national systems o f information gathering, and adverse incentive structures that create reasons to either over report or underreported fishing activities 36 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Alternately, one can look for correlations between changes in management regimes, landings of a regulated stock of fish, and estimates of stock biomass. In most cases, landings can be an acceptable proxy for both the implementation of the regulation and its impact on fishing mortality. Even so, it is important to account for any shifts in market forces that could exogenously impact fishing effort irrespective of the presence of management agreements. The next step is to relate changes in landings to changes in biomass. If landings reductions are accompanied by increasing stock biomass, then it is likely that reduced fishing effort is responsible for stock rebuilding. Again, exogenous forces cannot be forgotten and the possibility of favorable biological or oceanographic conditions must be accounted for along with anthropogenic factors. Unfortunately, past studies of ICCAT effectiveness were undertaken prior to the positive changes in biomass documented in recent years. At the time, ICCAT management could be unequivocally labeled ineffective because so many stocks were depleted below the level that would support maximum sustainable yield. Unlike depletion, stock rebuilding is not a clear indicator of successful regulation; neither are reduced landings of a stock. Both proxies are necessary to show that management has had a positive effect, but because other factors could have created the same results, these must be eliminated before causality can be established. Since this has not been done before, proof of causation will have to be undertaken along with other substantive analysis in later chapters. all served to muddy the waters, preventing the collection o f data regarding international fisheries. However, there are ways o f maneuvering around such informational issues. These will be discussed at length in Section 2.5 Testing Primary and Secondary Hypotheses. 37 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 1.3.2 Accounting for Unexpected Success Returning briefly to the literature review presented in Section 1.2.2, the main barriers to effective management of highly migratory species included: insufficient national capacity, a poor contractual environment and the lack of governmental concern. If the reasoning behind previous evaluations of ICCAT management holds true then some significant change must have taken place in one or more of these factors to enable states to cooperatively rebuild depleted HMS stocks. One such improvement has already been mentioned, the enhancement of the contractual environment at the Commission via the adoption of better monitoring and enforcement measures for some stocks. However, no explanation has been offered regarding the impetus behind that shift. Furthermore, it is possible that other factors have also changed, either for better or for worse. First, consider the problem of insufficient national capacity, which exists in industrialized countries but is most rampant among developing fishing states. In spite of strenuous efforts on the part of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and others, many developing countries that fish in the Atlantic still lack the capacity to monitor harvesting within their Exclusive Economic Zones or to enforce ICCAT O 1 recommendations. Also, the number of developing countries that are members of ICCAT has increased from 13 in 1990 to 28 in 2004.8 2 In fact, the overall fishing capacity of fleets flagged by developing countries has increased greatly due to capital shifts from industrialized countries where costs are higher and regulations are no more stringent. One result of this movement was the expansion of fishing effort by 8 1 FAO (2002a, 46). 8 2 See Appendix G: ICCAT Member States by Date o f Ratification. 8 3 This will be discussed further in Section 2.2 Globalization and Fisheries Economics. 38 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. O A vessels flying flags of convenience from states with no regulatory systems at all. Capital shifts and the entrance of new fishing states have counteracted whatever regulatory capacity building has taken place at the domestic level. Due in part to this lack of national capacity, ICCAT member states have chosen to develop more international means of monitoring and enforcing the regulations they agree on. This does represent an improvement in the contractual environment at the Commission but many other aspects of that problem have not changed. For instance, decisions by the Commission are still taken on the basis of consensus rather than a majority vote. This gives inordinate power to individual countries to block agreement on regulations that are detrimental to their domestic interests, including any trade measures that might be necessary to ensure compliance or by contracting parties. Because of this system, ICCAT has mainly been successful at excluding nonmembers rather than enforcing cooperation internally. Considering that membership at ICCAT is still open to any state with interests in fishing in the Atlantic, countries wishing to avoid sanctions can simply join the Commission. Most of the other weaknesses in the contractual environment that were identified by 8 4 FAO (2002a, 48). Under current maritime law, vessels are required to be "flagged" in order to show which country the vessel's owner, captain and crew are accountable to from a regulatory perspective, flags o f convenience originate from countries like Panama, which simply require that vessels pay a fee in order to receive their flag. (FAO 2002a, 65). 8 5 New research on consensus using the International Regimes Database suggests that, in general, it is not as impermeable barrier to effective environmental management as previously thought. (Oran Young, personal communication August 2005. Oran is a professor at the University o f California, Santa Barbara and one o f the founders o f the International Regimes Database). 8 6 ICCAT (1966, art. XIV, par. 1). ICCAT did impose trade sanctions on Honduras the year after that country joined the Commission. However, no representatives from Honduras were present at that meeting to utilize their ability to block consensus. In addition, when representatives attended the next annual meeting, sanctions were lifted without much commotion. (ICCAT 2001, vol. 1 and ICCAT 2002, vol. 1). 3 9 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Peterson still exist, including the objection procedure, which allows states to opt out of cooperative agreements they find to be unacceptable. A second issue that needs to be raised regarding the contractual environment is the force behind those improvements that have actually taken place. As was noted in the introduction to this section, new monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are innovations whose origins can be attributed to ICCAT itself. There were no exogenous institutional or legal changes that can directly explain the timing or the motive behind the creation of statistical document programs, vessel lists, or trade sanctions. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which formally gave the regional fisheries organizations power to enforce regulations on all fishing states, whether or not they are members of a commission, did not come into effect until 2001. This was a decade after ICCAT first included prohibitions on fishing by non-contracting parties in management measures for western bluefin tuna.8 7 In fact, the only major global regime shift that directly preceded ICCAT’s management innovations was the end of the Cold War. Although the impact of that revolution reverberated through the international system, the only noticeable difference at ICCAT was a name change for the USSR.8 8 Since external forces did not drive ICCAT members to improve the contractual environment in which they work, there must have been some internal cause for the change. This brings us to the third barrier to management, lack of governmental concern. While the current decision-making procedures at ICCAT may forestall the application of compliance measures to contracting parties, the adoption 8 7 ICCAT (1992). 8 8 According to ICCAT records, few alterations were made to states’ policy positions after the fall the Wall. The USSR was never a strong force in the Commission since it has very few boats targeting highly migratory species in the Atlantic. 40 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. of stronger, multilateral monitoring and enforcement mechanisms still represents a potential threat to Commission members. More importantly, contracting parties have agreed to serious cuts in their own harvests of some HMS stocks and newly developed monitoring systems such as statistical document programs can indicate noncompliance by members as well as nonmembers. All in all, the recent actions taken by ICCAT indicate that its members are giving up more now to obtain cooperative management than they were willing to pay when Peterson and De Sombre conducted their analyses. This suggests that escalating governmental concern is likely to have precipitated observed changes in ICCAT management, and therefore that sources that would influence this factor should be explored further. In her discussion of early changes in governmental concern, Peterson (1995) cites the importance of open-ended knowledge creation in altering government QQ perceptions of overfishing in the 1960s and 1970s. Unfortunately, she also notes that the gains in reliance on scientific advice that occurred then have been diluted by inherent uncertainty and politicization. From a comparative perspective, Peterson posits that regional fisheries organizations with independent scientific advisory panels are better equipped to influence governmental concern via dissemination of information.9 0 In contrast, ICCAT’s scientific advisory committee is composed of national scientists representing various member states. As such, it is not an independent body and is plagued by high levels of contestation and politicization. More to the point of this section, there has not been a change in the way ICCAT 89 9 0 ibid., 267. Peterson (1995, 266). 41 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. receives its scientific advice, nor has there been a stark consolidation of scientific opinion since the mid-1990s.9 1 Another possible source of change in governmental concern comes from the articulation of non-commercial interests in a given stock. Such influence has been cited as a causal factor in the international protection of several marine mammals, including the dolphin case presented by De Sombre (1999). However, fmfishes like the highly migratory stocks managed by ICCAT do not have the same motivating Q9 power as turtles, dolphins, whales and other charismatic megafauna. Although conservation and recreational fishing interests have been active in a few states, like the USA and Canada, their efforts have been localized and therefore limited. Because of its growing popularity as a solution to international common pool problems, this issue will be dealt with more extensively in Subsection 1.3.4. A third possibility is that changes in governmental concern are endogenous to the system, rather than exogenous. As De Sombre (1999) and others point out, concern on international issues is often related to differing time horizons among states. Exogenous forces like epistemic communities and non-commercial interests can change the temporal preferences of states, causing decision makers to value future availability of the resource more than they had previously. On the other hand, as was shown in Subsection 1.2.1, without intervention fisheries tend toward biological depletion and, even without changes in their time horizons, states will 9 1 This is a complaint voiced to me by scientists from many different countries, including the United States, Canada, Japan and the EC. 92 Peterson (1995, 302), De Sombre (1999, 64), and Princen (1994, 150). 9 3 The impact o f various interest groups can be evaluated by examining the representation o f these groups on national delegations, their access to the domestic decision-making process and the nature o f national policy agendas. This information can be found in ICCAT annual reports and via discussions with policy makers and interest group representatives. 42 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. inevitably face the consequences of myopic management. Therefore, governmental concern should be increasing as biological depletion deepens even in the absence of exogenous impacts on temporal preferences. Unfortunately, the facts do not support this perspective either. As Figure 1.4 showed, the most heavily depleted HMS stocks in the Atlantic, western bluefin tuna, blue marlin and white marlin have not been successfully rebuilt while the record on moderately overexploited stocks like bigeye tuna, northern albacore and northern swordfish is rather variegated. In combination with the lack of correlation between rebuilding and either scientific certainty or activities by non-commercial interests, these discrepancies imply that some other factor has been largely responsible for changes in governmental concern. At the same time, the existence of such differentiation may be the key to finding the source of increasing effectiveness at ICCAT. Understanding why some stocks have been rebuilt and others have languished could unlock the black box of increasing governmental concern at the Atlantic Tuna Commission. 1.3.3 Explaining Variations in Effectiveness No simple, intuitive explanation exists for the variation in the strength and effectiveness of ICCAT management measures. Bioeconomic theory gives reasons for different rates and levels of depletion by elucidating the impact of variables such as profitability, catchability and reproductive capacity. Also, obvious variations in the technicalities of regulations, including adherence to sound scientific advice, independent monitoring systems and significant enforcement mechanisms, explain 43 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. both success and failure of specific management programs.9 4 While these technical aspects of the fishery cannot be ignored, deeper and more pertinent explanations of variation must also account for the political economic forces that facilitate cooperative problem solving in some cases more than others. Figure 1.5 contrasts the level of biological depletion, the effectiveness of rebuilding and the regulatory attention a stock receives from ICCAT, as represented by the cumulative number of management measures.9 5 This is a simplistic illustration, but several essential points can be drawn from the figure. First, note that there is no correlation between the level of depletion and the amount of regulatory attention that a stock receives. If there were, then the lowest levels of biomass, represented by the darker bars, would be matched in some consistent way with the positive values of the striped bars. Instead, stocks experiencing the deepest level of depletion like western bluefin tuna and the marlins received widely differing levels of attention from the Commission. The same is true for stocks at other levels of depletion and even underexploited stocks like southern albacore. 9 4 See Subsection 1.3.1 Relating Regulation and Rebuilding, regarding the strength o f management measures and their effectiveness. 9 5 The measure o f attentiveness used in Figure 1.4, the cumulative number o f management measures, is very simplistic. However, from my review o f ICCAT documents, I believe that it is representative in this case. Cumulative regulation may not account for the effectiveness o f ICCAT management, but it does reflect the attention - in terms o f time spent in discussions, efforts by states to reach consensus and ancillary attempts at enforcement - that ICCAT pays to specific stocks. 44 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 1.5: Comparisons between Depletion, Rebuilding, Regulation, and Price9 6 5 120 & P 100 □ Current Biomass ■ Lowest Biomass H Attention from ICCAT ^ 1 l~ fe c P Q £ c X a > -5 C Q W C O IS ■ o w o £ C Z ) X T 3 5 — o £ c/3 C/3 0> 1 m c X fi c O o o 1 m o o > c g C G c G R J X C G X) ' 2 2 2 < < S C /3 O 3 1) Z c/3 5 X £ ICCAT Stocks arranged by Commercial Value - Highest to Lowest * Spawning stock biomass, most optimistic estimate ** Spawning stock biomass relative to 1970, includes Mediterranean Second, successful rebuilding does not seem to be related to the amount of regulation ICCAT piles on to a specific stock. To see this, compare the change in value between the first set of bars representing the current level of depletion and the second set of bars representing worst levels of depletion with the cumulative management measures symbolized by third set of bars. The largest improvements in the biomass of overexploited stocks have occurred for bigeye tuna and northern swordfish, both of which have received less attention from ICCAT than either western or eastern bluefin tuna. In contrast, the stock that has received the most 9 6 Estimates o f biomass drawn from the annual reports o f ICCAT's Subcommittee for Research and Statistics. Cumulative number o f management measures covers the years from 1969-2003 and was calculated from ICCAT (2005b). 45 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. attention, western bluefin tuna is biologically in a similar position to blue and white marlins, which have received very little attention from the Commission. From a cursory review of these 11 stocks, the only simple correlation that exists is between the price of a stock, as represented by the per-unit export value of 0 7 the species, and the level of attention that it receives from ICCAT. Note that the stocks in Figure 1.5 are placed in order from the highest priced on the left hand side Q O to lowest on the right hand side. Presented in this way, there is a clear positive correlation between the per-unit commercial value and cumulative regulation by the Commission. An interesting side note is the case of blue and white marlins, which are located at the far right hand side of the figure because of their status as by-catch to fisheries targeting more valuable stocks such as bigeye tuna and swordfish." As incidental catches, marlins are different from commercially targeted stocks both in terms of unregulated levels of production and cost distribution of regulation. This is at least one likely source of variation in governmental concern and regulatory effectiveness, due to the difficulty of reducing fishing mortality on marlins without incurring the costs of harvest forgone for commercially valuable stocks. Technical problems like those posed by by-catch stocks are certainly important constraints on the effectiveness of regulations. For instance, statistical documents are easier to implement for large fish that are sold individually as opposed to mixed harvests of small fish that are sold in mass quantities.1 0 0 Nevertheless, regulatory solutions do exist. For instance, time-area closures allow 9 7 There is no correlation with either the overall value o f a stock, the size o f a stock, or any other bioeconomic parameters except profitability, which is also correlated to price. 9 8 Order determined by the nominal per-unit export value for 2001 from the FAO Commodities and Trade 1976-2001 Database. 9 9 ICCAT (2004, 2:75 and 82). 1 0 0 FAO (2002b). 46 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. regulators to restrict fishing effort to periods and locations where landings of incidental species are minimal. Alternately, in cases like that of dolphins in the Eastern Pacific Oceans or certain kinds of sea turtles in shrimp trawling fisheries, fishers can be encouraged to use different gears to avoid by-catch species. Interestingly, some of these by-catch are more strenuously protected than commercial stocks.1 0 1 It is this type of disparity that requires more systematic, in depth explanation. Aside from the bioeconomics of technical deviation, there is not much in the literature regarding variations in the effectiveness of regulations for different stocks that are managed by the same regional fisheries organization. The majority of studies of international natural resource management focus on single cases or comparisons among different institutional regimes. Cross-species comparisons under the same institution have mainly been undertaken in regards to the protection of endangered 1 AA species. Although this is an important segment of the literature, in the cases considered here, institutional variation is minimized because all ICCAT stocks are managed under the same set of rules and norms. In the few studies where comparisons are made within an institution, success is most often linked to the broad popular appeal, or charisma, of certain species. Because it is linked to the importance of non-state actors, this will be dealt with further in the next subsection. 1 0 1 De Sombre (1999, 66). 1 0 2 For example, Reeve (2002), Sas-Rolfes (2000), Webb (2000), Princen (1994) and others discuss comparative cases o f protection under the Convention for International Trade in Endangered Species o f Fauna and Flora (CITES). 47 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 1.3.4 Non-charismatic Species and the Global Civil Society Option There is a division within international relations literature that focuses on the impact of nonstate actors on problems of an international scale. Among these, the concept of global civil society is increasingly being associated with global i m environmental governance. Lipschutz (1996) argues that real and lasting change in environmental management, globally and locally, can only come about once society has changed its perceptions of place to encompass ecosystems holistically. He envisions a shifting pattern of social ‘projects’ that fill in the gaps left by economic and political value systems.1 0 4 Although many non-state actors are heavily involved in international fisheries, as Litfin (1995) points out, states are still the major players and the only ones with the capacity to deal with a problem of this scope. That said; it may be useful to consider the more readily observable aspects of global civil society, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). Princen, Finger and Manno (1994) examine the role of environmental NGOs in world politics. Like Lipschutz, they perceive NGOs as instrumental in filling the conceptual spaces left by the current world system, by performing key roles as independent bargainers and as agents of social learning.1 0 5 Wapner (2000) is also of this view.1 0 6 Susskind (1994) expounds on the suitability of NGOs to work as checks within the state dominated system of international governance. He advocates increasing the voice of environmental NGOs 1 07 in international forums. 1 0 3 Lipschutz (1996), Princen and Finger (1994). 1 0 4 Lipschutz (1996, 254). 1 0 5 Princen, Finger and Manno (1994, 218). 1 0 6 Wapner (2000, 83). 1 0 7 Susskind (1994, 47). 48 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Brown et al (2000) are more circumspect with regards to expectations of benefits from multisectoral cooperation between the political, economic and social components of the world. They posit the theory that NGOs and other advocacy groups can improve international governance, but that such organizations can also 108 obscure issues, undermine accountability and monopolize resources. De Sombre (1999) is a good example of a case where NGO advocacy, though successful within its specific interest area (dolphins), can undermine attempts to sustainably manage other resources (tuna).1 0 9 Though the term NGO is most often associated with social and environmental activism, it is important to note that scientists, businesses and even government workers have formed their own non-governmental, non-profit organizations to pursue their interests on international issues. Clark (2000) is careful not to limit the advocacy coalitions emergent in environmental globalization to only those that strive to conserve global resources.1 1 0 Most authors do not make such a distinction, but in this thesis the more inclusive term interest group is used, rather than NGO. This is especially to capture the importance of the fishing industry, which has been active in a much quieter way than environmental or recreational interest groups and for a longer period of time.1 1 1 1 0 8 Brown et al. (2000, 291). 1 0 9 De Sombre (1999, 67). Also, in his study o f the ivory trade ban imposed by the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), Princen (1994) shows how one o f the most internationally prominent conservation organizations, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) have focused their efforts on what has come to be known as ‘charismatic megafauna’, like the giant panda and the elephant in order to raise funds, often neglecting or harming other, more threatened species. (Princen 1994, 150). 1 1 0 Clark (2000, 101). 1 1 1 Peterson (1995, 296). A more detailed lists o f interest groups that participate in Atlantic fisheries management can be found in Subsection 2.1. 49 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Regarding marine resources, De Sombre (1999), Joyner (1999) and others have highlighted the importance of non-state actors by comparing the protection of species that are widely valued for their existence relative to management of purely commercial stocks under the same international institutions. Along with institutional distinction, the charismatic appeal of certain species more than others is most often cited for the inconsistencies in the success of international management regimes.1 1 2 Nevertheless, there is no correlation between the charisma of specific ICCAT species and the timing or the effectiveness of regulatory measures. As was noted above, as finfishes, tunas and tuna like species have little appeal to broad-based, grassroots • 113 conservation movements. In fact, the narrative regarding bluefin tuna presented below shows that even the most charismatic of the stocks that are regulated by ICCAT has not been managed successfully while other, less well-known fish like bigeye tuna have been rebuilt. There is little evidence that a broader community of non-commercial interest groups have had much impact on the management of highly migratory species in the Atlantic but, because this is one of the most common answers proposed to the major questions listed above, further discussion is necessary. Several authors, mainly from the conservation community, have pointed to a single catalyzing event that they claim significantly increased the concern of ICCAT members regarding the status of Atlantic bluefin tuna.1 1 4 In 1991, international conservation organizations like the National Audubon Society and the World Wildlife Fund worked with Sweden in an attempt to list Atlantic bluefin tuna under 1 1 2 Joyner (1999, 73). See also Ando (1999) and Princen (1994) regarding charismatic megafauna. 1 1 3 De Sombre (1999, 63). 1 1 4 Weber (2002, 161), Ellis (2003, 31), and Safina (1997, 105). 50 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. the Convention for International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES).1 1 5 Because such a listing would result in prohibition of trade in Atlantic bluefin this maneuver certainly got the attention of ICCAT contracting parties. That year, ICCAT members targeting western bluefin tuna agreed to a four-year plan that would gradually reduce allowable landings of the stock from 2,660 mt to 1,729 mt.1 1 6 Concomitantly, the Commission also took its first steps toward more effective monitoring and enforcement measures on Bluefin by setting up a working group to look into the technical aspects of trade documentation and the legal implications of sanctions.1 1 7 Although it was not as large as they had hoped, the gradual 35% catch reduction was a triumph for the global conservation community. However, the overall impact of the CITES threat was limited. For one thing, management was only modified for the more heavily depleted western stock of Atlantic Bluefin; no changes were made to catch limits for the Eastern stock, which was also overexploited. More importantly, the leverage of a possible CITES listing could not be maintained since no country could be convinced to propose listing of bluefin tuna in subsequent years because of heavy pressure from fishing states. By 1996, the allowed catch of western bluefin tuna by ICCAT member states was back to pre-1991 levels. While improved compliance measures were adopted for Atlantic bluefin soon after Sweden nominated the species for CITES, discussions regarding the measures predate that move and were actually more effective when applied to other stocks like bigeye tuna and northern swordfish. In fact, referring again to Figure 1.4, stock estimates for 1 1 5 Audubon started out at the national level, but it has since developed chapters in many nations around the world. 1 1 6 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 91-1). 1 1 7 ICCAT (2005a, res. 91-2). 51 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. western bluefin tuna are only marginally larger today than they were in the early 1990s.1 1 8 Several other stocks that are valued by noncommercial interests have fared badly as well, especially blue and white marlins, which are facing very heavy biological depletion in spite of maneuvers by both conservationists and recreational fishers. Besides lobbying activities in the USA and elsewhere, non-commercial interests have funded ICCAT research on Atlantic billfishes since 1986 and they even threatened to nominate white marlin for a CITES listing in 2000.1 1 9 Since then, ICCAT has developed a rebuilding plan for marlins but no enforcement mechanisms have been adopted and the stocks are still severely depleted. O f the two stocks that have experienced rebuilding at ICCAT, only one, North Atlantic swordfish, received any attention from non-commercial interests.1 2 0 In spite of campaigns by popular naturalists like Jacques Cousteau and Carl Safma, even extraordinary fish still do not draw the international support that is necessary to garner the protections afforded to large marine mammals such as dolphins, seals and whales. 1.4 A New Perspective: Vulnerability Response In order to understand recent innovations in international fisheries management, one must account for the ways in which countries actually respond to 1 1 8 ICCAT (1991, 168-172) and ICCAT (2004, 2:57). 1 1 9 ICCAT's Enhanced Research for Billfish Program began in 1986 and has been funded almost entirely by private sources in the USA since then. (ICCAT 1987, 91 and 126, and ICCAT 2001, 1:241-242). 1 2 0 The US-based ‘Give Swordfish a Break’ campaign, which encouraged chefs on the East Coast o f the USA to boycott Atlantic swordfish in the late 1990s is controversial. Conservationists claim that the market-oriented movement was responsible for ICCAT's 1999 Swordfish Rebuilding Plan but the US fishers counter that the program simply deprived them o f market share. More in-depth analysis o f this problem can be found in Chapter 4: Billfishes and By-catch. 52 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. biological depletion and resultant domestic economic losses. Previous authors are correct in that states seem to be incapable of cooperating to maintain stocks of highly migratory species at their maximum sustainable yields. Assumptions regarding the temporal preferences of states and their willingness to pay now to ensure continued future streams of benefits from a stock have held true in the Atlantic and elsewhere. However, past analyses stopped short, without considering how states would react when the losses associated with overfishing actually manifest in political economic terms. Furthermore, these studies also overlooked the redistributive effects that endogenous economic changes such as increasing competition and shifting capital can have on the costs and benefits that states face for the management of a stock as biological depletion deepens. Because they did not use a multidisciplinary approach, research on international fisheries failed to predict improvements in the contractual environment and stock rebuilding at ICCAT. Globalization has not left international fisheries behind. Fishers from many states have been able to expand their production capacity via geographical exploration and improvements to fishing technologies.1 2 1 As stocks decline due to overfishing, the potential substitute diversions for excess effort decrease as well. At this point, the true scarcity of highly migratory species becomes evident via declining revenues, increasing competition, and the impoverishment of some fishing communities. Like other international industries, these pressures often cause fishers to either seek subsidies and protections from their national governments or move to 1 2 1 See Appendix B: Innovation in Fisheries regarding the technical aspects o f improvements in vessel capacity, gear size, and fish finding devices that enabled fishers to bring in larger harvests from a wider array o f stocks. In addition, advancements in transportation allowed fishers to target stocks in geographically remote areas, like the high seas. 53 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. countries where the costs of production and regulation are low er.1 2 2 Hypothetically, there could be linkages between the overall reduction in profitability associated with biological depletion and the resultant redistribution of capital to the level of 123 governmental concern. Certain fishing states will experience recession in a domestic fishing fleet as a repercussion of biological depletion, causing them to prefer stock rebuilding, especially when it can be linked to legislation of access rights.1 2 4 Not only is this a new perspective on international fisheries but it is also a novel approach to the study of environmental problems generally. Like many other exhaustible resources, unsustainability in international fisheries is a downward spiral, which accumulates costs that are spread out over time and are distributed over large segments of the human population.1 2 5 Although some fisheries, such as the Pacific anchovetta, have collapsed suddenly and unexpectedly, the path of decline for most overfished stocks can be predicted by both the theory of common pool resources and specific bioeconomic models. Due to deficient data and complex, nonlinear elements 1 9A in fish biology, accurate prediction of collapse is not possible. However, for many 1 2 2 Iudicello, Weber and Wieland (1999). In addition, since the net marginal benefits from the extraction o f more valuable stocks causes them to be exploited first, the economic pressures on fishers are growing. Most o f the stocks that are currently under exploited or moderately exploited will not bring in the same revenues that heavily exploited and depleted stocks did, even though the biomass may be at approximately the same levels. 1 2 3 Again, the term governmental concern, or a state’s commitment o f resources to attaining international regulations that contribute to the rebuilding a given stock o f fish, is used here as per Haas, Keohane and Levy (1995) and Peterson (2000). 1 2 4 Much o f the literature on highly migratory species and international fisheries generally carries an implicit assumption that, in the absence o f strong alternate voices, states base their policy preferences on the concerns o f their domestic fishing industries. See Ellis (2003), Weber (2002) and Safina (1997). 1 2 5 McGoodwin (1990, 15). 1 2 6 While this research focuses on stock-by-stock analysis, the problems addressed can be related to wider concerns as well. For instance, because o f ecosystem effects, it is even possible that a biological tipping point exists, such that, once enough biomass is removed from key trophic levels, the marine 54 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. stocks both biological depletion and recession in a domestic fishing fleet can be anticipated as the biomass declines below sustainable levels.1 2 7 Additionally, some authors place modem fisheries in a persistent state of recession because so many stocks are overfished, creating hard times for fishing communities and higher risks that fisheries or even ecosystems might collapse completely.1 2 8 Indifference to lower levels of biological depletion and economic resession in fisheries is a pivotal factor in the perceived lack of governmental concern over this and other environmental issues. For some, like fishers who go bankrupt because they can no longer compete over dwindling stocks, the costs of overfishing are concentrated and debilitating. Therefore, it is no surprise that commercial fishers are often the most outspoken group with interests in policy making for international 1 9 Q fisheries, no matter what nation they hail from. However, for the majority, the disappearance of the world's fisheries is difficult to perceive because of changing baselines, high costs of information and the availability of substitutes.1 3 0 Moreover, the threat posed by the global decline in fisheries does not carry the same psychological weight as a nuclear attack or some other form of international or domestic violence. As a result, states are not currently willing to resort to the use of force in order to settle conflicts over access to HMS resources, as they would in situations that are typically labeled as international crises.1 3 1 environment could be irrevocably transformed. They model proposed in Chapter 2 gives analysts a tool to gauge the likelihood that effective management will occur prior to such a point, given the current tendencies toward pseudo-myopic, single-stock decision making. 1 2 7 Iudicello, Weber, and Wieland (1990, 57). 1 2 8 McGoodwin (1990, 1). In fisheries, collapse refers to a situation in which a stock has been diminished so much that it is no longer viable from a commercial perspective. 1 2 9 Peterson (1995, 260). 1 3 0 Pauly (2003, 93). 1 3 1 There have been several fish “wars” in the 20th century, including the “Cod War” between England and Iceland in 1952 and the “Turbot War” between Canada and Spain in 1995. However, both o f 55 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. International fisheries are critical resources that are valued for consumption, for recreation and purely for their existence. Even so, governmental concern has not been sufficient to attain sustainable management for many highly migratory species. Instead, states have cooperatively responded to the biological depletion of several stocks in the Atlantic while others, of widely varying commercial value, have continued to decline toward possible collapse. Chapter 2 presents a set of hypotheses that partially explain the unexpected and variable successes of international management of highly migratory species by formulating expectations of changes in national policy preferences based on the economic vulnerabilities of domestic fishing fleets. Issues that need to be considered when formulating ad hoc secondary hypotheses linking the behavioral predictions to adopted measures are also covered, along with appropriate methods of testing both sets of hypotheses. The next two chapters analyze the validity of the hypotheses using six case studies drawn from the Atlantic Tuna Commission; Chapter 3 covers the national incentive structures, collective negotiations and management records for three stocks of tropical tuna and Chapter 4 does the same for three stocks of billfish. these cases were selected because they represent a wide swatch of ICCAT stocks, in terms of both price and productivity. Finally, Chapter 5 offers overarching comparisons among the cases in order to provide preliminary answers to the questions presented in Section 1.3 and to identify ways of refining the model and areas for future research. these so-called wars consisted mainly o f the detention o f foreign vessels believed to be fishing “irresponsibly” in or around national EEZs. In fact, the more recent conflict involved only one such event and was quickly resolved. (Ellis 2002, 68, and Barkin and Shambaugh 1999, 1-2). 56 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Chapter 2: Crisis and Response in International Fisheries International management of highly migratory species has been widely unsuccessful. All but the most remote or prolific of these species have been overexploited for a decade or more, causing the biomass of many stocks to fall well below the levels that would support maximum sustainable yields. However, members of one international fisheries commission have been able to rebuild at least two stocks of highly migratory species in the Atlantic by agreeing to sharply curtail harvests and developing new ways to monitor and enforce those cutbacks. As related in Section 1.3, these successes have been sporadic, without direct correlation to obvious factors such as commercial value, strength of regulation, or the level of biological depletion. This chapter will put forth a set of hypotheses that help to explain both the timing and variation of rebuilding for various HMS stocks in the Atlantic. It draws on bioeconomic and geopolitical perspectives to clarify the stepwise linkages between domestic recession in a fishing fleet and international management response. Methods of testing the hypotheses will be discussed as well. Both biological depletion and economic recession in international fisheries have been predicted for decades.1 Until the 1990s, the dire economic consequences of open-access had not yet manifested due to the global nature of fisheries for highly migratory species. Continued expansion of the fishing industry, including phenomenal growth in the quantity produced, was facilitated throughout most of the 20th century by technological advancements in both catching and processing 1 Christy and Scott (1965, 233), Johnston (1965, 79). Also, see Appendix A for more on the early development o f fisheries models, including the Gordon-Schaeffer model o f depletion under open access that was developed in the 1950s. 57 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 • products from the sea. During this boom-time, it was difficult to convince decision makers that international action should be taken on any specific stock in order to prevent overexploitation. However, as bioeconomic predictions began to come true in the form of the declining availability of fish and falling profits in fisheries, many countries decided that something needed to be done to counter the common pool problems inherent in fisheries for highly migratory species. A modification of Figure 1.1, Figure 2.1 illustrates the logic behind the transformative aspects of the approach of this chapter by highlighting the potential for both positive and negative cycles in international fisheries. Note that the left-hand side of the figure is the commonly anticipated downward spiral in which open access creates biological depletion, which creates economic recession, which in turn leads to the political response of growing governmental concern. As long as a multilateral management remains ineffective, this cycle will continue. However, if governmental concern becomes strong enough, then effective multilateral management might be achieved, leading to stock rebuilding, economic rebound, and, in the absence of learning or domestic change, weakening governmental concern. Although the creation of new institutions could ensure that management remains effective in spite of decreasing concern, it is quite possible that the innovations and rebuilding recounted in Section 1.3 are simply the first of many transitions between depletion and rebuilding. 2 See Appendix B: Innovation in Fisheries. Mechanization and other technological advancements allowed fishers to harvest more fish from more stocks. In addition, preservation technologies such as factory canning and freezing enabled transportation o f fish products to inland consumers who had not previously had access to marine stocks. 58 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 2.1: Multilateral Management as Mechanism of Change Growing Concern Weakening Concern Along those lines, this chapter presents a basic model of state behavior in which increasing governmental concern regarding the biological depletion of certain highly migratory species is a direct response to economic recession in domestic fisheries. Declining biomass and globalized markets lead to increasing competition between individual fishers and national fishing fleets. Because of comparative advantage, states that are identified as being economically vulnerable will experience recession in their domestic fleets while less vulnerable states appropriate market share due to lower costs of production and greater flexibility. In today's globalized economy, those more vulnerable states that face escalating socioeconomic losses from the disappearance of their national fleets can be expected to respond politically by increasingly favoring international management that leads to large, sustainable harvests while also formalizing national rights of access so as to combat widening 3 The term governmental concern is used here as per Keohane, Haas, and Levy (1995, 19). It reflects the willingness o f states to devote scarce resources to obtaining an effective management regime. 59 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. recession within their domestic fisheries, because economic vulnerability and political responses are central ideas in the model, its main components will be referred to as the vulnerability response hypotheses. The rest of this chapter elaborates the details of a basic vulnerability response model and then addresses the methods that will be used to test it in subsequent chapters. Section 2.1 puts forward several of the most important simplifying assumptions and definitions that serve as the foundation for the nascent model. Section 2.2 deals with the economics of vulnerability response, including the driving forces that lead to increasing competition and the sources of comparative advantage that make some fleets more competitive than others. Section 2.3 goes on to discuss national responses to recession in a domestic fishing fleet, in particular with respect to changes in state policy preferences at international management negotiations. Linking these propensities to specific outcomes of international negotiations on management of highly migratory species is a more elaborate task, but Section 2.4 covers the basic issues that must be dealt with in order to make that leap. Finally, Section 2.5 provides the rationale for the six case studies that will be used to test the model of vulnerability response and elaborates on the methodology used in the analysis presented in Chapters 3 and 4. 2.1 Simplifying Assumptions International fisheries is a multi-faceted issue area that brings together national interests with many different perspectives. Consumers and conservationists; commercial and recreational fishermen; politicians, diplomats and bureaucrats - all of these groups value highly migratory species for different reasons and therefore 60 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. have diverse, often divergent, perspectives on fisheries crises. Furthermore, there are divisions within these clusters and overlaps as well. For stocks like highly migratory species such disparate demands on policy makers are complicated by national considerations involving the relative gains of other states. Given the scope of the problem and its international nature, certain simplifying assumptions were needed in order to develop the foundations for a coherent model. Within the United States alone, there are at least a dozen organizations that have some input on US policy at ICC AT. These include representatives of the commercial fishing industry like the Blue Water Fisherman's Association and the East Coast Tuna Association, recreational fishing groups like The Billfish Foundation, the Recreational Fishing Alliance, and the National Association of Charter Boat Operators, as well as conservation organizations like the Humane Society and the National Coalition for Marine Conservation. Within the European Union, fishermen from many states have their own lobbying organizations while conservationists are represented by organizations like Traffic Europe. These are just a few examples of interest groups that are active at the domestic level. In addition, international conservation organizations, notably the World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace have also sent representatives to ICCAT meetings. Furthermore, the relationships between these groups are quite complex. For example, within a single country, recreational fishers concerned with the effects of by-catch on sportfish like marlins and swordfish may work to limit the activities of commercial fishers while conservationists may want to limit the activities of both other groups to protect some stock they believe is endangered. Interestingly, conflict also occurs domestically between fishers that specialize in different gear types. For 61 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. instance, once a specific sharing system was established for high-priced western bluefm tuna, fishers using different types of gear were forced to compete politically for a portion of the US quota, which has largely been allocated to a few large purse seiners.4 In-depth analysis of the impact that these various interest groups have on the management of highly migratory species would be an interesting and valuable contribution to our understanding of how they are able to influence state behavior. Actually, several narratives of the influence that domestic interests have on national agenda-setting already exist, including Webber (2002), Carey (1999) and Sloan (2003) regarding the US policy-making process, Lequesne (2004) and Concei9 ao- Heldt (2004) covering fisheries politics in the EU, and Bergin and Haward (1996) on tuna politics in Japan. Other country studies elaborate on the range of interests that exist in smaller fishing states as well.5 However, such detail-laden description is outside of the purview of this thesis. The purpose here is to propose and test several hypotheses that will serve as the foundation for a broader theory that can fully link endogenous economic shifts in HMS fisheries to changes in international management.6 To do this, it is necessary to abstract from the rich tapestry of interaction between interest groups and governments, focusing instead on a more basic model of state behavior in an international, collective action setting. For now, several assumptions will be used to limit the discussion to the state level of analysis. First, it is assumed that states are unitary and independent actors in fisheries negotiations, in the sense that all 4 Frustration on this count was expressed by several representatives o f US commercial fishers. 5 For example, UNEP (2002), Royce (1987) and OECD (2000). 6 See King, Keohane and Verba (1994, sec. 3.1) for a definition o f causality in a social sciences context. 62 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. decisions are made by the state as a single entity, with no internal divisions. Secondly, as instrumentally rational decision makers, all states are assumed to follow n the logic of consequences rather than the logic of appropriateness. Generally speaking, this implies that members of ICCAT can be expected to negotiate in order to maximize their net domestic benefits from the management of any given stock of highly migratory species. Furthermore, nonmembers are only expected to join the Commission and participate in negotiations if they perceive some benefit from that involvement.8 Because there are many ways in which decision makers, now reified as states, could measure the costs and benefits of management options, it is further assumed that they define their utility functions based mainly on the well being of their national commercial fishing interests. This assumption is either implicit or explicit in most of the literature on international management of non-charismatic species of fish.9 There have also been studies that specifically address the issue of government “capture” by commercial interests in fisheries and other major industries.1 0 A corollary to this assumption is that domestic fishers, and therefore the states that harbor them, are only concerned with biological depletion insofar as it is linked to recession in a domestic fishing fleet targeting the given stock of highly migratory species.1 1 Future losses from reduced productivity are not ignored but they are often 7 March and Olson (1998). 8 Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) pioneered this interest-based approach to explaining international environmental policy. Interestingly they defined national interests in the area o f transboundary pollution by state’s ecological vulnerability and the relative costs o f abatement. 9 Peterson (1995, 279). 1 0 See Berck and Costello (2001), Thompson (2000), Karpoff (1987) and Johnson and Libecap (1982). 1 1 In this case, a domestic fleet is all vessels flagged by the state that are targeting the e stock in question. States are not considered to be concerned with the internal distribution o f harvest when formulating international policy. 63 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. superseded by more prescient concerns over relative gains.1 2 As was noted in Section 1.2, this seemingly myopic assessment of national utility is created by the common pool nature of international fisheries resources and is frequently blamed for the 1 3 failure of states to prevent biological depletion and fisheries crises. Although the above assumptions are fairly well accepted among economically-oriented social scientists, there are some potential objections to the collective-action approach to modeling vulnerability response. First, many scientists and economists would critique the rationale behind the rationality assumption because there is so much uncertainty involved in biological and economic assessment of fisheries for highly migratory species.1 4 This highly technical aspect of international fisheries requires significant elaboration and will be discussed further in the Section 2.5. Secondly, authors who take a social-practice view of international environmental governance would criticize this characterization of state behavior because it seems to disregard non-commercial interests while ignoring the importance of a wider context for state decision-making.1 5 Social-practice theorists emphasize linkages between different levels of analysis and believe that state behavior is based on legitimacy and socialization rather than simple cost-benefit analysis.1 6 Both points are well taken. In the current context, rational decision-making by states is severely limited because of bioeconomic uncertainty for these fisheries. In fact, the presence of uncertainty is central to the model of vulnerability response. 1 2 See Baldwin (1993) regarding absolute versus relative gains. 1 3 Barkin and Shambaugh (1999, 5). 1 4 Young (2003, 24). 1 5 See Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff (1998), Dessler (1989) and Wendt (1999) for social-practice critiques o f collective-action approaches. 1 6 Young (2002, 30-37). 64 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. With perfect foresight, crisis avoidance might be more likely since states would be 1 7 able to calculate the true costs of depletion prior to the advent of overfishing. On the other hand, some studies have shown that cooperation is actually prevented when • • 1 8 there is certainty regarding the distribution of harvests among fishing communities. In this thesis, it will be assumed that states have limited information, in that they cannot accurately predict the onset or subsequent intensity of recession in a domestic fishing fleet. Because of this, calculations of the utility of management are expected to lag behind the true value of such measures at any given point in time. Therefore, governmental concern will only increase as a response to burgeoning losses for domestic fishing fleets. Social practice theorists have also raised important issues regarding collective action that cannot be ignored in any study of success and failure in international fisheries management. General international norms such as those associated with state sovereignty as well as specific norms of access on the high seas and participation in regional fisheries organizations have shaped the management of highly migratory species for centuries.1 9 Instead of denying the formative impact of such institutions, the vulnerability response hypotheses presented below endogenizes them into states' decision-making processes as per the rational institutionalism exemplified by Coase (1960) and Ostrom (1993). As states consider their response to recession in a domestic fishing fleet, the modification of management practices carries a higher cost when it requires transformation of either fisheries specific or general international norms. More to the point of this section, one facet of 1 7 Peterson (1995, 273-274). 1 8 McKelvey, Miller and Golubtsov (2003) and Young (1994). 1 9 See Johnston (1965), Schrijver (1997) and Hannesson (2004) regarding the evolution o f international fisheries institutions and the Law o f the Sea. 65 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. vulnerability response in HMS fisheries is the way in which bioeconomic elements engender change, forcing states to reevaluate their habitual behaviors and 20 interactions. Looking at bioeconomic factors as a source of political response also has implications for the premise that states' policy preferences for international fisheries are predicated on the interests of their commercial fishing industries. As a founding assumption, this more general hypothesis will be tested along with this nascent model of vulnerability response. If and when the short run interests of commercial fishers are not fully reflected in states' agendas it can be seen as a signal that groups with other normative perspectives on crisis have had an impact on policy-making. Alternately, learning may have taken place, impacting either the time horizons of the fishing industry or the decision criteria of policy makers.2 1 Of course, a large number of exceptions could negate the assumption entirely, but that in itself would be an important finding. Moreover, if there are temporal shifts in state behavior away from purely commercial valuations then the sources of those changes need to be identified and could be incorporated into a less restrictive model of vulnerability response in the future. 2.2 Globalization and Fisheries Economics Highly migratory species are present in all oceans, ranging throughout tropical and temperate waters, unaware of coastal and high seas demarcations. However, these fisheries are globalized in more than just their geographic scale. First, production of highly migratory species is global both in the sense that fishers 2 0 Nathan (2000, 12). 2 1 Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), Hurst (1995), Nathan (2000) and Simon and Pauchant (2000). 66 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. from many nations target these stocks and also because large multinational • • * 22 companies are involved in harvesting and processing operations. Second, globalization has also impacted consumption of these fish as improvements in preservation and transportation technologies have facilitated the creation of international markets for products derived from HMS stocks. The distance between consumers and primary producers has further increased due to globalization of the distribution sector, in terms of large international supermarkets and other food 9 3 retailers. The first major contribution of this thesis is the modification of basic bioeconomic fisheries models to account for the forces of globalization and development, including rapid dissemination of fishing technologies, the internationalization of capital and commodities markets, and, most importantly, the pervasiveness of the free-trade doctrine and its impact on national fishing interests. Section 1.2, reviewed the basic incentive structure that leads to excessive biological depletion of open-access fisheries. It also briefly explained how overfishing leads to the dissipation of scarcity rent, which can cause recession in a domestic fishing fleet in fishing communities. Like the majority of bioeconomic models, those presented in Chapter 1 did not incorporate globalization or its impacts on highly migratory species. In fact, fisheries economists have paid little attention to the changes brought about by globalization, leaving the effect of this influential trend on domestic fishing interests to be explored by political scientists, sociologists, and geographers. This oversight has significantly impaired studies of HMS management because of the strong relationship between national fishing interests and governmental concern. 2 2 Symes (1996, 8). 2 3 Friis (1996, 175). 67 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. The purpose of this section is to evaluate the impact that globalization and development have had on the economics of fisheries for highly migratory species. First, Subsection 2.2.1 addresses the influence of globalization and development on competitiveness and the dissipation of scarcity rent in international fisheries. It tackles the question of whether or not individual primary producers are better off in a globalized fishery, especially given the nature of the relationship between price and quantity supplied. Then, Subsection 2.2.2 delves into the relative gains and losses that individual fishing states can anticipate due to the machinations of comparative advantage and free trade. Because of variations in national production functions, some states will be able to flourish under increasing competition while others will be pushed out of fisheries, creating severe domestic recession in a domestic fishing fleet. 2.2.1 Increasing Competition Even in the absence of an international element, fisheries evince a tendency towards increasing competition over decreasing harvests as fishers expand effort in pursuit of scarcity rent.2 4 By opening up local markets to competition from the four comers of the earth, globalization usually increases the overall quantity supplied and decreases the prices that historically active fishers receive for their harvests. This violates an assumption that most bioeconomic models are based on because it creates a situation in which price bears little relation to the quantity supplied from a single stock of fish. Inevitably, as trade liberalization expands, local fisheries will face even greater levels of recession in their domestic fleets without regulatory intervention. 2 4 Conrad (1999, 4). 2 5 Friis (1996, 177) and Iudicello, Weber, and Wieland (1999, 15). 68 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Considering that the volume of trade in highly migratory species grew by more than 400% from 1976 to 2001, this is an important economic aspect of international 26 fisheries. Figure 2.2 shows the long-run supply curve for a typical open-access fishery. In this generic case, three possible equilibriums are depicted. At low levels of demand, like curve D), there is a large quantity supplied at a relatively low price. However, when demand shifts outward to D2, quantity supplied will increase to the level of maximum sustainable yield and price will go up slightly. If the short run dynamics within a fishery are relatively steady, then this could be a stable equilibrium point. However, demand for fish products tends to fluctuate in the short 9 7 run, as does supply. When this is the case, the equilibrium (Q2A , ? 2a) is not stable and the market will gradually adjust to a new equilibrium at (Q2B , P2b)- At this point, there is a small quantity supplied and a high price. 2 6 FAO Commodities and Production Database 1976-2001, the volume o f trade was approximated using aggregate data on export quantities. 2 7 In the real world, many other biological and economic factors can fluctuate as well. However, in this model supply and demand are the only forces that are allowed to change. 2 8 Clark (1990, 133-134). 69 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 2.2: Effects of Shift in Demand on Long Run Quantity Supplied2 9 Price Long Run Supply 2B MSY 2A Qi Q 2 A Quantity Another important change occurs as the long-run equilibrium moves from P2A to P2B ; as the quantity supplied decreases at higher prices, the level of competition 29 This is a generic long-run supply curve for an open-access fishery based on the Gordon-Schaeffer Model. Specification o f the function was drawn from Clark (1990, sec. 5.2) and the figure closely resembles Clark’s Figures 5.10 and 5.11, although he is illustrating different points regarding the relationship between supply and demand. 70 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. O A t among fishers increases. Moreover, because of short run incentives that entice entry into a fishery as price rises, competition is compounded by overcapacity and overcapitalization.3 1 Unless there is perfect symmetry, some fishers will be driven out of this fishery while others will have to increase their efforts simply to stay afloat. Technological innovations that decrease the costs of production can temporarily give fishers a competitive edge, but such advancements actually shrink the long-run supply curve, negating any short run gains.3 2 Inexorably, overfishing leads to recession in a domestic fishing fleet as consolidation pushes many fishers out of the market or as harvests are spread too thinly over a stagnant, depressed fishery. Next, consider a situation in which a local market (Community 1) suddenly is open to trade with a neighboring market (Community 2) whose fishers are identical except that they target a larger stock of the same quality of fish. There are different ways that such a scenario can play out depending on the comparative advantage of each trading partner. In Figure 2.3, it is assumed that Community 1 has a closed long-run supply equal to LRSi and is receiving a surplus of production from Community 2, which increases its long-run supply to LRS2 without concomitantly 3 0 This is especially true o f the more elastic portion o f the long run supply curve, where large changes and quantity supplied are required in order for fishers to see even small changes in price. In this flatter section o f the curve, total revenue is declining rapidly and fishers will have to scramble to stay competitive. 3 1 ludicello, Weber, and Wieland (1999, 9). 3 2 According to Clark (1990, 131), the long run supply curve for an open-access fishery can be rc specified as: Y = ----- pq f \ 1 - C where q represents the “catchability coefficient”. Any V P< 1K ) technological advancements that increase the effectiveness o f fishing effort cause q to increase. Because this coefficient is found in the denominator o f both factors in this quadratic function, the long-run yield (Y) will move down on the Y-axis (price) and contract on the X-axis (quantity) as catchability (q) increases under open-access. See Appendix E: Long Run Supply. 71 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. increasing demand via reciprocation of trade in fish. Because supply has increased, the long-run equilibrium price is reduced from Pi to P2. However, the long-run quantity supplied cannot increase without a period of rebuilding due to the fact that overfishing has already lessened the productivity of the local stock. Figure 2.3: Effect of International Trade on an Overexploited Fishery Alrs |LRS R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Ceteris paribus, competition among fishers from Community 1 will increase 33 at the lower price because the amount of total revenue available has been reduced. If any one fisher wishes to remain viable at the new price, P2, he or she will have to harvest a larger number of fish to generate enough revenue to cover his or her operating costs. In the short run, this will cause landings from the local stock to increase as fishers strive to adjust to new market conditions. However, just as in the closed market scenario, what will follow is a period of cyclical boom and bust because this higher level of production is unsustainable. As the catch per unit of effort falls rapidly, local suppliers will be pushed out of the market; effort is thereby reduced, rebuilding the stock, which creates scarcity rent that draws fishers back to this stock of fish. The process is repeated until a new long-run equilibrium is established at a slightly higher level of production, Ch-3 4 These examples are abstractions from the real world, but they are representative of actual forces at work in international fisheries. If anything, Figure 2.3 downplays the impact o f globalization and development on the productivity, population size and well-being of many local fleets that target highly migratory species. Rather than a mere boost in the supply of a certain species, expanding markets for HMS products, improvements in distant water production and processing technologies, and the proliferation of fishing capital to a wide array of states, has enabled production of HMS stocks to increase by 167% in the last quarter of a 3 3 Note that this portion o f LRSt is highly inelastic, so the overall change in total revenue for the local fishers will be negative. 3 4 There are situations in which opening a market to foreign competition could actually increase total revenue and therefore accommodate a larger number o f local fishers. In fact, this is exactly what would occur for the second market, LRS2, which supplied surplus production to LRS!. This possibility will be addressed in Subsection 2.2.2 Comparative Advantage. 73 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 35 century alone. Over the same period of time, the nominal per-unit value of highly migratory species has risen only 121% and real prices for the stocks have actually fallen by approximately 30%. (See Figure 2.4.) This is in spite of increasing demand due to population growth, inland expansion of markets for fisheries products and positive shifts in consumer preferences for fish.3 6 Figure 2.4: Production and Per-unit Value for Highly Migratory Species 4,000,000 4,000 3,500,000 3,500 3,000,000 3,000 2,500,000 2,500 2 ,000,000 2,000 1,500 % C / 3 1,000 p 1,500,000 1,000,000 i i Production Quantity A Export Value per Metric Ton - 1995 USD —♦— Export Value per Metric Ton - Nominal 500,000 500 O © < N o o O S T j - o© o s SO © o o s CO O O o s < N O n O S S O ON O S O O O n O S OO Os O n Year In addition to the changes depicted in Figure 2.4, recent estimates show that there is a collective overcapacity in the worldwide fleets targeting highly migratory 3 5 FAO Commodities and Production Database 1976-2001, production is equal to the aggregate production quantity reported in the database. In contrast, global fisheries production only increased by 63% over the same period. 3 6 Iudicello, Weber, and Wieland (1999, 11). 3 7 FAO Commodities and Production Database 1976-2001, the nominal per-unit value was calculated by dividing the aggregate nominal export value by the aggregate quantity exported. These numbers were then adjusted using the 1995 CPI in order to estimate the real export value o f highly migratory species. 7 4 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. oo species. Together, these factors indicate that international competition over HMS stocks is intense and increasing. With the removal of technical and legal trade barriers, fishers no longer have power over prices because multinational processors and retailers are able to draw on many kinds of substitutes in order to keep their O Q input costs low. The increasing availability of substitute primary products, whether fish, fowl or otherwise, helps middlemen keep prices low at the docks, even though they may be higher in the supermarket.4 0 In order to stay competitive, fishers must cut costs, especially for overfished stocks, which cannot sustain higher yields in the long-run. Like many other industries, globalization has truly increased competition in international fisheries. 2.2.2 Comparative Advantage Competition, especially economic competition, creates winners and losers. In a purely domestic fishery, an open-access system may be inefficient, but the winners and losers are contained within the same national polity. International fisheries present a different problem because increasing competition can create losers in one state and winners in another. This is a side effect of the well-known economic concept of comparative advantage first propounded by David Riccardo in the 1800s.4 1 In the past, some states had an advantage in production of highly migratory 3 8 Joseph (2003, sec. 10). This trend was also noted in Section 1.1 Value o f International Fisheries. 3 9 Symes (1996, 9). 4 0 Friis (1996, 179). 4 1 In this context “winners” and “losers” refer specifically to fishers who either managed to stay in the market or not. Overall, comparative advantage is beneficial to all states because it allows for reduced prices and better efficiency o f production. However, consumers and even retailers are not as politically active in the fisheries management policy process, hence the focus on the effects o f comparative advantage on fishers. This will be discussed more in Section2.3 Recession in a domestic fishing fleet and States’ Regulatory Preferences. 75 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. species because these fish traveled through their coastal waters.4 2 Similarly, many fishers benefited from their proximity to markets where demand for certain species was higher than elsewhere 4 3 Technological innovations linked to globalization have eroded these sources of security and increasing competition has lead to major shifts of fishing capital and fish production. While some national fleets have suffered under increasing competition, others have flourished as natural and legal barriers to trade have been surmounted.4 4 Reconsider Figure 2.3 from the perspective of the fishers from Community 2. For these fishers, open markets meant higher demand for their harvests, much like the shift from Di to D2 in Figure 2.5. Prices in the market for Community 2 are too low to tempt the fishers from Community 1 to export any of their catch, so supply does not change in Community 2. However, because they can afford to supply their fish to Community 1, fishers in Community 2 effectively increase the demand for their products by trading with Community 1. Thereby, they receive a higher price for their harvests, creating scarcity rent, which encourages entry and moves the long-run equilibrium to (Q2, P2). In this example, demand has not increased enough to push 42 For example, Mediterranean countries have been able to exploit Bluefm tuna for thousands o f years because o f favorable climactic conditions and near shore migration patterns o f the stock. (Sahrhage and Lundbeck 1992). See Maggio (2001) and Cousteau (1953) for detailed descriptions o f the Mediterranean tuna traps and cultures surrounding them. 4 3 For instance, until the 1970s Atlantic catches o f Bluefm tuna were worth very little because they could not be transported to Japan quickly enough to maintain sashimi grade quality. Once air transport technologies were modified to expedite shipping to the highly lucrative Japanese markets, fishers from Japan and other East Asian nations no longer had a strong geographical advantage over Atlantic fishing fleets in this highly lucrative market. (Webber 2002, 68). 44 A national fleet is not necessarily owned by the state. In fact, in most cases national or domestic fleets are privately owned but they carry the flag o f their homeport state. This flag indicates which nation has jurisdiction over these vessels and, in fisheries, it also determines which state harvests should be attributed to when compiling data on national landings. Therefore, a nation's fishing fleet consists o f all fishing boats flagged by that state. Fishing fleets can also be narrowed by the type o f gear the use, the size o f their boats and the species that they target. 7 6 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. production above maximum sustainable yield, so total revenues are higher at the new long-run equilibrium. It is also possible that opening up to new markets would increase demand further, creating a situation more like the one represented in Figure 2.2. Either way, Community 2 would experience at least a temporary boom from access to new markets for their fish. Figure 2.5: Effect of International Trade for Underexploited Fishery Price Long Run Supply MSY Quantity 7 7 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Similar dynamics occur between fishing states when one has a comparative advantage over another. In the example illustrated by Figures 2.2 and 2.4, the source of the advantage was in the availability of the stocks that each group of fishers exploited. One stock was overexploited (Figure 2.3, Community 1) and therefore the biomass was smaller, fish were harder to find and overcapacity already existed in the fishery. These factors contributed to higher costs of production and therefore higher prices. On the other hand, the underexploited stock (Figure 2.5, Community 2) was plentiful, relatively easy to target and therefore could be harvested at a lower cost and sold at a lower price.4 5 Once trade began between the communities, fishers with access to the overfished stock were forced to take less money for their catches but the fishers targeting the more abundant stock were able to increase their total revenues. This example is less applicable to highly migratory species today than it was half a century ago due to the expansion of distant water fishing fleets. While some fishers remain tethered to coastal areas by the range of their vessels and the availability of capital, others have invested heavily in extremely mobile fleets that can operate on the high seas for long periods, allowing them to exploit whichever stocks are most profitable.4 6 In fact, this distant water capability can be another source of comparative advantage between national fleets that target highly migratory 4 5 Referring again to Clark (1990, 131), the long run supply curve for an open-access fishery is predicated on the basic yield function Y = qEx where q is catchability, E is fishing effort and x is the size o f the stock o f fish. By definition, overfishing reduces x, which in turn reduces Y. Therefore, even if all other attributes o f these two stocks and two communities are exactly the same, Community 1 will catch fewer fish with more effort (and higher total cost) than Community 2 because x x < x 2 . 46 Peterson (1995, 259). 78 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. species. Once a fisher or fishing company recoups its investment in capital and R&D, higher operating costs can be offset by higher productivity due to access to more abundant stocks. There are also economies of scale in that distant water vessels tend to have higher capacities than coastal ships.4 7 Since globalization has taken control of prices out of the hands of primary producers, most other sources of comparative advantage are similar to those discussed above in that they involve costs of production. Lower prices for labor, fuel, bait and other inputs give fishers in some countries an advantage over their competitors elsewhere. Access to capital is also important, but has become less definitive as overcapitalization has increased in fisheries for highly migratory species.4 8 Moreover, the marginal benefits from improving vessel and gear technologies have declined as the industry has matured. Economies of scale have been used up as evinced by empty holds on large factory ships and, with GPS and radar, fish finding technologies are already highly advanced 4 9 Like many other globalized industries, marine fisheries production has shifted from industrialized to developing countries in order to take advantage of lower operational costs now that gains from innovation have become relatively minor.5 0 Figure 2.6 illustrates some of the impact that this trend has had on national landings of highly migratory species. While developed fishing states like Japan, the EC and the United States have been able to maintain relatively high levels of production, the vast majority of the increase in HMS landings has been harvested by developing countries. Although they did not reach high levels of production until the 4 7 Peterson (1995, 258). 4 8 ludicello, Weber, and Wieland (1999, 62). 4 9 McGoodwin (1990, 101-103). 5 0 ludicello, Weber, and Wieland (1999, 15). 79 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. late 1960s, four of the seven biggest HMS fishing states in the world are classed as developing by the FAO.5 1 O f the 24 countries that averaged between 10,000 and 100,000 mt, only Norway is neither a developing nor an emerging economy and it has experienced deep declines in its landings since the late 1970s.5 2 In fact, industrialized countries' landings of highly migratory species have gradually fallen over the 1990s while developing countries' catches have continued to grow. Figure 2.6: HMS Landings Aggregated by Level of Economic Development 5.000.000 4.500.000 4.000.000 3.500.000 | 3,000,000 o 2,500,000 | 2, 000,000 1.500.000 1. 000.000 500,000 0 ir> tnsosor--r-©cooovaso Gn On C ^ O n Os Os Os Os On Os O Year 5 1 These are the Republic o f Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, province o f China, and Indonesia. All four have average annual production in excess o f 100,000 mt for the period from 1950 to 2001. The only other fishing entities in this category are Japan, the European Community and the USA. (FAO World Capture Production 1950-2001 Database). 5 2 Norway's landings o f highly migratory species went from a high o f 28,517 mt in 1972 to only 1,767 mt in 2001. In contrast, landings for the 23 developing countries in this category went from a total o f 188,381 mt to 1,536,815 mt over the same period. (FAO World Capture Production 1950-2001 Database). 5 3 FAO World Capture Production 1950-2001 Database. 80 ■ Developing Countries □ Developed Countries R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Trends in the trade of highly migratory species are even more indicative of the impact that competition has had on the distribution of benefits from global HMS fisheries. As Figure 2.7 shows, developing countries have significantly increased their positive balance of trade in highly migratory species over the last quarter century. By 2001, developing countries were exporting over US$2 million more of HMS stocks than they were importing. In contrast, developed countries have a trade deficit in highly migratory species of more than US$3 million. While there is some trading among developed countries, much of the growth in imports to these states has come from developing countries like Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and the Philippines. In addition to these high volume producers, many other developing countries have also contributed to the rising exports from this economic class.5 4 From this would appear that economic development has had a significant impact on international fisheries in the last three decades. However, as discussed below, globalization has played a larger role by encouraging that development and also by enabling direct competition among national fleets that had previously been confined to domestic markets. 5 4 FAO Commodities and Production 1976-2001 Database. More than 130 countries that export highly migratoiy species have been classified as developing by the FAO. Less than 50 countries that export highly migratory species have been classified as developed by the FAO. 81 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 2.7: Export Value Minus Import Value of HMS Stocks, Aggregated by Level of Development5 5 3.000.000 2. 000.000 1,000,000 i/l 4 3 0 "o Q 00 - 1,000,000 P -2,000,000 -3,000,000 -4,000,000 J-------------------------------------------------------------- Year It is interesting to note that the value of developed country imports of highly migratory species has rapidly outpaced the quantity imported. While the volume of developed country imports of highly migratory species increased by approximately 1,000,000 mt from 1976 to 2001, the value of those imports grew by four times that amount in US dollars.5 6 This difference can be attributed to better preservation technology, especially flash freezing, which allows more trade in higher quality HMS products. Most importantly, the expansion of airfreight shipping into fisheries has opened up the highly lucrative fresh fish markets of Japan, Europe and North America.5 7 Even in these markets, higher prices are only paid for quality fish that have been carefully handled in order to prevent damage to the delicate flesh of the 5 5 FAO Commodities and Production 1976-2001 Database. 5 6 ibid. 5 7 Friis (1996, 185). 82 ■ Developing Countries □ Developed Countries R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. tastier species. As a result, fisheries for these species are more labor-intensive, since human hands have more discretion than large machines. This gives greater advantage C O to developing countries where labor is cheap and abundant Along with lower costs of production such as wages, developing countries sometimes have an advantage over developed countries because government regulations tend to be less prolific. There are often fewer limits on landings, capacity and gear along with less stringent safety and environmental codes in developing countries. Taxes, licenses and dockage fees are usually lower as well.5 9 Many developing countries actively seek to build up their domestic fleets by encouraging an influx of human and physical capital from struggling fisheries in developed states.6 0 This is the other side of government regulation. Subsidies, both direct and indirect, can both shore up failing fleets and build up developing fisheries. However, it is important to note that the burden of subsidies is negatively correlated to the competitiveness of the national fleet. In addition, subsidies contribute to the problem of overcapitalization, making fisheries more acutely competitive once assistance is removed.6 1 Developed countries have engaged more heavily in non-tariff protection for their commercial fishing fleets than developing countries, even as multinational retailers and processors have successfully lobbied to open up international markets to 5 8 ludicello, Weber, and Wieland (1999, 15). 5 9 See Peterson (1995, 285) regarding national enforcement capacity. It should be noted that some developing economies, may be less profitable because o f endemic problems, such as a prevalence of political rent-seeking or a shortage o f infrastructure may also inhibit the profitability o f domestic fleets, especially in the least developed economies. (Shleifer and Vishny 1998; Lawson 1984). However, as will be seen in the next section, these issues have not prevented the growth o f fleets in all developing countries or their appropriation o f market share. 6 0 ludicello, Weber, and Wieland (1999, 63). 6 1 ibid., 60. 83 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. f? free trade via the World Trade Organization. This is just one aspect of the interplay between states that results from increasing global competition over highly migratory species and the asymmetries among states that give some countries a comparative advantage over others. Historically dominant fishing states do not want to relinquish the economic benefits they have derived from exploiting HMS stocks. At the same time, developing countries and others, such as those with distant water fleets, are eager to capitalize on their comparative advantages in order to improve their shares in international markets for highly migratory species. Because the changes brought about by globalization necessarily impact the economic viability of national fishing fleets, they also influence negotiations of international management measures for these stocks. 2.3 Recession in a domestic fishing fleet and States ’ Regulatory Preferences While there may be winners and losers in the short to medium-term, the long- run dynamics of overfishing remain the same. In fact, by reducing costs of production, capital shifts to developing countries speed up the open-access depletion of fish stocks and create increasingly shortened cycles of boom and bust in • • 63 international fisheries. The problem of sustainability remains and it becomes more acute as fishing capacity increases and fish stocks decline. Section 1.2, discussed the need for cooperation among fishing states in order to counteract incentives to 62 6 3 Returning to Clark (1990, 131), the long run supply curve for an open-access fishery can be Garcia and Newton (1997, 5) and WWF (2001). T . rc specified as: Y = ----- pq r \ 1 - c where c stands for the marginal cost o f production, which is V P < 1 K ) assumed to be constant in this model. Because c is in the numerator o f both factors in this quadratic formula, a reduction in the marginal costs o f production will cause the long-run yield (Y) to move down on the Y-axis (price) and contract on the X-axis (quantity). See Appendix. 8 4 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. overfish, as well as the barriers that have prevented such cooperation in the past. Section 1.3, went on to identify governmental concern as the key to recent changes in the effectiveness of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. This section presents a more generalized set of new conjectures that link the economic trends associated with globalization and widespread biological depletion to changes in the policy preferences of fishing states. The logic of the linkages hypothesized here is predicated on the earlier assumptions from Section 2.1 regarding the rationality of states and the predominance of commercial fishing interests in the domestic decision-making process. Because of these behavioral characteristics, the economic changes described in Section 2.2 will effect national policy preferences for management of highly migratory species in predictable ways. As competition escalates, fishers that are unable to remain in a fishery often clamor for protection and assistance from their government representatives.6 4 Fishing communities and supporting industries also loose revenues when domestic fishers can no longer compete in the globalized marketplace.6 5 One important political response to these problems has already been mentioned - the use of subsidies to protect national fisheries. Alternately, states may also seek to create legalized rights of access for their domestic fishers in order to guarantee adequate national harvests. Several authors have attributed the creation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) to exactly that set of governmental incentives.6 6 Essentially, the model presented in this section can be thought of as the unit- level side of a collective action problem in which the payoffs of open access vis-a- 6 4 McGoodwin (1990, 14). 6 5 Sym es(1996, 9). 6 6 Webber (2002) and Hannesson (2004). 85 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. vis cooperation change at different rates depending on the economic vulnerability of states and the level of stock depletion.6 7 As a first step toward linking the economic changes associated with overexploitation to policy innovations such as those described in Section 1.3, Subsection 2.3.1 covers the major sources of comparative advantage among domestic fishing fleets targeting highly migratory species. These economic parameters are then used to create a simple matrix that can be used to categorize countries by the vulnerability of their fleets in terms of relative costs of production and opportunity costs of alternative sources of revenue. From there, Subsection 2.3.2 links the economic vulnerability of states to their optimal policy preferences for international management. Although a significant lack of data prevents the prediction of detailed national agendas at this point time, expectations can be formed regarding the timing and strength of management measures preferred by states in relation to each other. 2.3.1 Economic Vulnerability to Increasing Competition Section 2.2 showed that, because of globalization and open access incentive structures, less efficient fishers will be pushed out of fisheries targeting highly migratory species due to increasing competition. More importantly, basic bioeconomic models were modified to illustrate how variations in comparative advantage can cause economic losses that differ across countries. The second important contribution of this thesis is the development of a basic framework for categorizing national fishing fleets according to their competitiveness under those 6 7 Work on dynamic costs in game theoretic models has been done by many authors, particularly Mason and Phillips (1997) and Mason and Polansky (1997), in the area o f common pool resources and Hannesson (1997) in fisheries. 86 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. conditions. In this context, the economic vulnerability of a state is defined as the likelihood or depth of recession in a domestic fishing fleet relative to other national fleets targeting the same stock of highly migratory species. In other words, ceteris paribus, economic vulnerability should indicate which national fleets are forced out of a fishery earliest and also which states will be hit worst by recession as a stock shrinks and competition gets tougher. Three important aspects of vulnerability under open-access can be gleaned from Section 2.2: • Ceteris paribus, the likelihood or depth of recession in a fleet is increasing for all countries as biological depletion deepens, but it may be changing at different rates • National vulnerability can vary across countries at any point in time depending on domestic costs of production • National vulnerability can be mitigated at different levels depending on the opportunity costs of alternatives First, the temporal element of the model is driven by the cycle of unsustainability described in Chapter 1 and again as the left-hand side of Figure 2.1. As long as open- access is the norm, the biomass of a stock that has been depleted below the level that would support MSY will continue to decline. All else equal, fewer fish will be available for capture and, as the size of the stock contracts, all fishers will get closer to being pushed out of the fishery, even though only a few will actually be unable to stay in business. Globalization compounds this propensity by diluting the 6 8 Here, a domestic fishing fleet is delimited as the vessels targeting a specific stock that are flagged by the same country. They may be privately or publicly owned. Most often domestic fleets are dominated by a single gear type, depending on the proclivities o f the targeted stock, but this is not always the case. 87 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. relationship between price and quantity supplied for a single stock of fish. As both price and availability decrease, fishers from some states may suffer more, but profits will decline for all fleets targeting the depleted stock. Second, variations in economic vulnerability between states generally can be linked to the comparative advantages of their national fleets. While domestic production functions are not uniform, it is a common assumption that, because of the wider economic context in which they operate, fishers within national fleets will be clustered around some aggregate level of production costs. When forced to compete internationally, states with higher costs of production will face recession in their fleets earlier and to a greater degree than states with lower costs of production.6 9 Such asymmetries among domestic fleets depend on the productivity of capital in terms of vessels, gear, and fish finding technologies, along with operating costs such 70 as labor, fuel, bait and dockage fees. In addition, government regulations can either reduce or increase the costs of production depending on the nature of restrictions, 7 1 fees and subsidies. Third, diverting fishing effort to more abundant stocks or different sectors of the economy can mitigate some of the economic repercussions of high costs of production. As the example of distant water fishing fleets shows, industry diversion 6 9 At some point in the future, it may be possible to model domestic fisheries targeting Atlantic highly migratory species more accurately for all fishing states. However, at the moment there is very little data available on the costs o f production for most national fishing fleets. The problems posed by this lack o f information will be discussed further in Subsection 2.4. 7 0 Access to new capital was much more important earlier, in the developmental stage o f the international fishing industry. Now that overcapitalization is widespread, and also because o f the dispersion o f technology associated with globalization, operating costs have become more salient for determining differences in national vulnerabilities. (Christy and Scott 1965, 151). 7 1 See Appendix C: Regulatory Options, regarding the public and private net costs o f several common types o f fisheries regulations including effort limits, catch limits, time-area closures, and tradable quotas. 88 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. can be a successful means of keeping a fleet viable. However, there may be opportunity costs to such transitions that differ from country to country. For instance, the opportunity cost of moving a fleet from one of ocean to another in order to take advantage of a less depleted, and therefore more profitable stock of the same species is relatively low for countries that are already home to distant water vessels. New port facilities might need to be found and transportation costs could be higher, but these expenses are easily outweighed by the larger stream of benefits from 79 exploitation of the new stock. In contrast, the costs of such a move are much higher for coastal fleets that would have to develop distant water capacity by the purchase of new, expensive vessels and gear and then find the manpower to run them. Significant amounts of capital would have to be diverted into the domestic fishing industry, either privately or through the government, hence the higher opportunity costs and lower likelihood that a state with only coastal fleets would utilize a distant water strategy once competitive pressures set in.7 3 Furthermore, the opportunity costs of engaging in fleet 7 2 O f course, if these vessels simply moved elsewhere, there could be opportunity costs in the home country as port facilities and local businesses suffer from the loss o f clients. Along those lines, it is interesting to note that most o f the historical fishing states that developed distant water capabilities did so as additions to coastal fleets, rather than as replacements. The pattern seems to be one o f moving into an area, allowing the capacity o f the fleet to expand with the appropriation o f scarcity rent, then, once rents are dissipated, breaking o ff portions o f an overcapitalized fleet and moving it to a new stock in a different area. (Johnston 1965, chap. 1; Sahrhage and Lundbeck 1992). 7 3 There is definitely some historical determinism in the current structure o f national fishing fleets. Distant water vessels are rather expensive (ranging from several hundred thousand to several million dollars, depending on the size and age o f the vessel) but, during the booming years prior to the dissipation o f scarcity rent, the opportunity cost o f investing in such capacity is low, both because o f the availability o f capital within the industry and because the expected income stream from the investment is much higher. (Royce 1987; Sahrhage and Lundbeck 1992). The in-depth, domestically- oriented studies cited in Section 2.1 Simplifying Assumptions, provide historical narratives on the development o f distant water fleets (or lack thereof) in several states, but a rigorous generalized explanation o f the phenomenon is not yet available. Again, this is an important aspect o f the internal structure o f states that should be brought back in to the model in future works, once the foundations o f the theory are laid down and tested in the rest o f this thesis. 8 9 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. development of any kind are increasing as scarcity rent is dissipated and alternative stocks are used up. Once competition becomes heavy, new investment in productive capacity is only economically rational in countries where operating costs are relatively low, and therefore some profits can be expected. At the same time, some countries that have low operating costs are capital poor, and therefore the opportunity costs of purchasing distant water vessels are also prohibitively high.7 4 It is important to note that fishers and the states that harbor them are not always purely rational in the strictest economic sense of the word. There are often social considerations that create opportunity costs above and beyond the most profitable use of capital. Expanding on the above example, fishers themselves may evince decided preferences that would increase the individual opportunity costs of distant water fishing. When many members of a fleet derive utility from such amenities as owning their own boats, spending only a certain amount of time at sea per trip, or just maintaining the family business, sociological barriers can prevent a national fleet from moving to exploit a distant stock, even if it is economically viable.7 5 Similar constraints can be externally imposed on fishers who might prefer to expand into distant waters or move to less depressed sectors of an economy. Fishing requires very specific knowledge but little formal education, restricting the potential for redirecting fishers to non-fishing activities in many developed economies. Conversely, in developing countries, the overall lack of opportunities 1 ft may keep fishers bound within the sector. 7 4 Lawson (1984, 162-173). 7 5 McGoodwin (1990), Crean and Symes (1996), and Apostle et al. (1998) cover social aspects o f fishing communities and fisheries management. 7 6 Lawson (1984, 158-162). 90 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. In fact, fisheries labor exhibits a high amount of stickiness within the sector, 77 irrespective of the level of development or other country-specific characteristics. Therefore, at this point, it is reasonable to restrict the discussion of alternative sources of revenue to the exploitation of different stocks of fish. The opportunity costs involved could be derived from options that range from gear modifications, such as increasing the depth of a longline set to target bigeye tuna instead of adult yellowfin, to the much larger investments in new vessels discussed in the example of the distant water alternative above. This simplification is useful for the time-being because it facilitates explanation of a new model by focusing on one of the most important alternative sources of revenue within the fisheries context. At some future time, when the groundwork has been well-laid and data on the myriad of domestic opportunities are available, the model can be refined to include other alternatives. Regarding highly migratory species generally, the data that is available on the three aspects of economic vulnerability discussed above is inconsistent across countries and time periods, with many gaps and holes. This prohibits the specification of a detailed model. However, it is possible to create a simple vulnerability matrix that correlates crude proxies for the costs of production and the opportunity costs of alternatives with the likelihood of recession in a domestic fishing fleet, relative to other fishing states. The simplest form for this matrix is illustrated in Figure 2.8. Although it relies heavily on gross indicators of vulnerability, this 2 x 2 matrix both illustrates the most important facets of economic vulnerability and also can serve as the foundation for a more refined model once a 7 7 OECD (2000, 13). 91 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 78 larger, calibrated set of parameters is available. Given those roles, a general discussion of the matrix is included here, to be followed by more specifics on its use and application in Section 2.5. Returning to Figure 2.8, note that states whose fleets have high costs of production and high opportunity costs of alternatives are highly vulnerable to recession in a domestic fishing fleet.7 9 The expectation is that these states will experience recessions in their fleets earlier than others and will pay higher socioeconomic costs as depletion increases. In contrast, states with high costs of production and low opportunity costs of alternatives are gradually vulnerable 8 0 because they are better able to displace fishing effort to more profitable stocks. This category most often encompasses industrialized countries with distant water fleets that can cheaply target multiple geographical areas in order to keep their fleets going.8 1 Eventually, these alternate sources of revenue will be depleted in turn and scarcity will reassert itself, leaving these states with very large fleets and very few options for diverting that capacity.8 2 7 8 Creation o f a non-discrete vulnerability space, allowing countries to be placed more specifically in relation to each other is one possibility. However, because there are so many combinations of factors that impact the independent variables (domestic costs o f production and opportunity costs of alternatives), it will be necessary to carefully formulate whatever indices are used to determine such placement. 7 9 A similar matrix relating ecological vulnerability and abatement costs for states dealing with transboundary pollution can be found in Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994, 207). 8 0 Remember that scarcity rent begins high and then decreases as a stock is depleted, so that a stock that was originally very desirable from a commercial standpoint becomes less so as exploitation progresses. Thus, a stock that is currently more profitable than one that is depleted may have been less profitable earlier-on. 8 1 See Clark (1990, 152) for more on pulse fishing. 8 2 The distinction between highly and gradually vulnerable states is really centered around the pace o f change. For highly vulnerable states the correlation between the depletion o f a stock and the decline o f its domestic fishery approaches a linear relationship, whereas gradually vulnerable states evince a path o f change that is closer to an exponential curve. 9 2 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 2.8: Economic Vulnerability Matrix Domestic Costs of Production High Low X f l O r> o 5 c - 4 — » < <4 - 1 o £ o 4 - 1 Highly Vulnerable Moderately Vulnerable ■ 4—* o o £* c X t; o & 4 D C 2 Gradually Vulnerable Mildly Vulnerable & 4 o In the right-hand column, states with low costs of production are further divided by the opportunity costs of alternatives. These states are mostly developing countries that are able to take advantage of the cheap availability of domestic labor and other inputs now more than ever due to the globalization of markets and declining costs of vessels and gear associated with overcapitalization. Some have only coastal fleets and are capital poor; therefore the opportunity costs of investment in distant water fishing technologies are quite high. This makes them moderately vulnerable to recession in a domestic fishing fleet because, although they are quite competitive, they are also heavily reliant on the abundance of HMS stocks in their local waters. The least vulnerable fishing states are those developing countries with 8 3 Iudicello, Weber, and Wieland (1999, 63). 93 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. distant water fleets that can produce fish cheaply and can exploit multiple stocks around the world. Even when overfishing is widespread, these states will be able to avoid recession in a domestic fishing fleet the longest because of their strong competitive advantage and their access to many stocks of fish. One aspect of economic vulnerability that is extremely difficult to articulate is the dynamism of the relationships between biological depletion, domestic cost structures, and the opportunity costs of alternatives. In its current form, the matrix appears static, as if the countries relegated to these categories are immutable. On the contrary, as escalating competition begins to impact national fleets, fishers actively struggle against that tide. In fact, those fishers who are willing and able to exit the fishery are expected to do so, moving their boats or abandoning them for other kinds of work. Others may hang on, investing in the latest gear, exploiting less valuable species, and even taking on debt. Still others, unable to remain competitive or adjust to new lines of work become jobless and often homeless. Furthermore, regions or supporting industries that depended on the fisheries sector for revenues and jobs also become hard-pressed as more and more fishers move or become bankrupt. While governments can artificially maintain fleets and the economies that rely on them via subsidies, this strategy is unsustainable because it contributes overcapitalization and • 84 imposes increasing opportunity costs on society as a whole. 2.3.2 Linking Political Response to Biological Depletion The increasing costs of deepening recession give decision makers strong reasons to engage in the international management process in order to minimize their 8 4 Iudicello, Weber, and Wieland (1999, chap. 4) 94 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. oc national fleets' vulnerabilities to resession. If symmetry existed between fishing states, then they would have equal incentives to prevent economic losses in the fisheries sector by avoiding overfishing. However, asymmetries in economic vulnerability, combined with the political importance of a fishery and national budget constraints are expected to result in different levels of governmental concern O r regarding biological depletion. Since the model still only encompasses the decisions made by individual states, these changes in governmental concern are referred to as political response to economic vulnerability. For the sake of simplicity, fishing states are initially assumed to be completely symmetrical except for their levels of economic vulnerability. This focuses the discussion on the hypothesized linkages between vulnerability and preferred response to biological depletion, in terms of the relative timing and strength of regulation preferred by a state, irrespective of the costs of achieving it. Once those relationships are established, temporal aspects of governmental concern will be introduced in order to fully link economic vulnerability to political response. This is the third key contribution of vulnerability response hypotheses to the wider literature on the political economy of international resource management. Returning briefly to the bioeconomic models presented in Section 2.2, it can be seen that limiting landings to maximum sustainable yield should prevent overfishing, changing the nature of the long run supply curve from LRS to L R S reg, as shown in Figure 2.9. Without limits on effort as well as catch, overcapitalization 8 5 It has already been noted that other perspectives on crisis may come into play in the policymaking process, but for the purpose o f this analysis governmental concern will be limited to the vulnerability o f commercial fishing fleets. As McGoodwin (1990) points out, even though most o f the world consumes fish, few outside the industry pay any attention to fisheries issues. 8 6 These linkages between economic vulnerability and governmental concern are closely related to a similar concept o f national vulnerability found in Keohane and N ye (2001, 13). 95 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. will remain a problem, but fishers will be competing over a stable rather than diminishing total catch. Also, because quantity supplied is perfectly inelastic at MSY, total revenue is constantly increasing with demand. Although this is not the revenue maximizing level of production, combined catch and effort restrictions can allow for the consistent appropriation of some of the potential scarcity rent for a 87 • stock. This could alleviate overall vulnerability to recession for a domestic fishing fleet by ensuring access to a stock for selected fishers. However, there are winners and losers under regulation just as in the open- access system. The difference is that shares of harvest under open-access are determined by comparative advantage while catch and effort limits dictate distribution via legal mechanisms. Disparate regulatory systems will have varying impacts on the distribution of access rights and shares of the total harvest of a stock. For instance, in an unallocated total allowable catch system, which allows open- access up until some previously agreed on catch level has been reached, the race goes to the swiftest, rewarding overcapitalization with a larger percentage of the total oo harvest. Alternately, regulations that limit fishing effort to current levels create barriers that could prevent the entrance or development of more efficient fleets that might have flourished under open-access. 8 7 MSY is seldom the equivalent o f Maximum Economic Yield (MEY), which provides the highest sustainable flow o f profits for a fishery. See Appendix A: Basic Bioeconom ics o f Fisheries, for more on the relationship between M SY and MEY, particularly the issue o f maximizing scarcity rent as opposed to total production. 8 8 Conrad (1999, 51). A large fishing organization with many boats could easily crowd out smaller scale fishers, even if the latter were more efficient. 96 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. O Q Figure 2.9: How Management at MSY Affects Long-Run Equilibrium LRS REG2 MSY R E G l Q reg These are just a few examples. Members of regional fisheries organizations are constantly aware of the impact that regulations will have on their domestic fleets. Although the details may differ, preferred responses can be expected to vary in predictable ways, depending on a state's economic vulnerability and the level of 8 9 This is a logical extension o f the definition o f management at maximum sustainable yield combined with the basic long run supply model described in Clark (1990). 9 7 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. stock depletion. Less vulnerable states benefit from open-access in relative terms while more vulnerable states experience deepening recession in their domestic fleets as a stock is depleted. As long as a state can benefit from the unregulated status quo, it is not expected to show much willingness to forgo current or future harvests for the sake of sustainable management.9 0 However, once a state perceives the possibility of recession in a domestic fleet due to increasing competition, it can be expected to push for regulation in order to keep the overall supply of a stock high and to secure as much market share as possible for its domestic fishers. Figure 2.10 illustrates the hypothesized relationship between preferred response and economic vulnerability for the different types of states found in Figure 2.8. Because they experience recession in their domestic fishing fleets early, it is expected that highly vulnerable fishing states will be the first to express concern regarding biological depletion. They are also expected to opt for the strongest management measures because continued open-access will lead to further reductions in their shares of the total harvest, which in turn leads to deeper recession in a domestic fishing fleet. Since alternative sources of revenue have been limited to other stocks of fish, states that gradually become more vulnerable over time will only desire a moderate response once their distant water advantage has been dissipated. They will be less concerned with the biological health of any single stock than they are with the overall availability of options to their distant water fleets.9 1 Gradually vulnerable states' preference for a more malleable regulatory framework will 9 0 Ostrom (1993, 6). 9 1 There can be conflicts between coastal and distant water fleets within the same country over policies that affect them differently. This was especially clear during the period in which EEZs were being established since distant water fleets feared that coastal enclosure would cut them o ff from valuable harvests in foreign waters. Similar issues still exist, but they are much less contentious than in the past. (Webber 2002, 64-67). 98 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. dominate their perspective on the need for management of a single stock even when most opportunity costs of alternatives have been exhausted. Figure 2.10: Preferred Response and Economic Vulnerability Domestic Costs of Production High Low Opportunity Costs o f Alternatives Low Highly V Vulnerable — N . Early, Strong -----, / Response Moderate V ly Vulnerable v___ k Delayed, \ Moderate 1/ Response High Gradu \ ally Vulnerable Delayed, \ Moderate Response Mildl;y Vialnerable v Late, Weak -— . / Response Moderately vulnerable states will also evince delayed concern regarding biological depletion. While declines in sustainable yields are not beneficial overall, moderately vulnerable states have little reason to restrict the development of their fleets unless there is some compensation for the benefits forgone from that forbearance. These are countries whose fleets could continue to grow under open- access even when stocks are seriously depleted and international competition is heavy. They prefer moderate levels of response that will restrict open-access somewhat but still allow room for the expansion of their domestic fleets. With 9 9 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. distant water fleets, mildly vulnerable states are virtually immune from both international competition and concerns over the disappearance of any one stock of fish. This very low risk of recession in a domestic fleet makes mildly vulnerable fishing states least willing to switch from open-access to any type of regulatory 92 system. Just as recession deepens and spreads as the biomass of a stock declines below sustainable levels, the aggregate level of governmental concern should be increasing with biological depletion. For instance, highly vulnerable states will express concern first and will always prefer the strongest version of regulations, but they will also be willing to expend greater levels of diplomatic effort to achieve cooperative regulations as a stock continues to shrink. States in other categories of vulnerability may block those efforts initially, but as they began to feel the impact of recession in their fleets, these countries will also become more willing to make threats, concessions, or side payments in order to achieve their preferred policy outcomes. It is this graduated change in both the number of states that can benefit from regulation and the depth of governmental concern expressed by all states that is hypothesized to produce the pattern of depletion and rebuilding that was observed for some Atlantic stocks in Section 1.3. These hypothesized linkages between economic vulnerability and political response are important because they help to determine the negotiating positions of 9 2 It is possible for states to move between the vulnerability categories, if there is a change in one o f the underlying factors. For instance, a moderately vulnerable state could invest in distant water technology, moving it into the mildly vulnerable category. However, for the reasons described above, this does not happen often. (Lawson 1984, 173). 9 3 Note the similarity to Olson’s (1965) conception o f the privileged group. The key difference here is that, since the payoffs o f cooperation change over time, the privileged group grows in size and power, starting with the highly vulnerable states and continuing with gradually vulnerable, then moderately and possibly even mildly vulnerable states, until cooperation is achieved or the stock collapses. 100 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. states as biological depletion becomes more severe. However, since policy preferences are the predicted for states in each category relative to each other, the mix of states with fleets targeting a stock also has implications for individual state behavior. For instance, if all states involved in a fishery have the same level of operating costs and opportunity costs of alternatives, then no state is particularly vulnerable because their percentage shares of the market remain stable over time, even though absolute harvests may be declining. In such a situation, all states could benefit equally from effective collective management, but because they react to losses rather than seeking to prevent them, incentives to cooperate would always be weaker than incentives to defect.9 4 Similarly, the model predicts that the smaller the threat of appropriation of market share by less vulnerable fleets, the longer more vulnerable states will wait to put forth regulations.9 5 Moreover, it is important to note that there may be fleets that operate from nonmember states or even outside the state system.9 6 Traditionally, these de facto defectors would be expected to make cooperation more difficult by increasing costs of enforcement.9 7 Vulnerability response does not deny the impact of enforcement costs, but, as long as they are strongly competitive, non-member fleets increase the pressures on highly vulnerable states and therefore may increase 9 4 At the most basic level, symmetry among states causes the model to revert to Hardin’s (1968) tragedy o f the commons. See Ostrom (2001,132-135) and Hardin (1982, chap. 5) regarding asymmetries in collective action on the local scale. 9 5 An exception would be regulations designed to keep other national fleets from entering a fishery. There is a lot o f interesting discussion on this topic, especially the importance o f coastal versus distant water states, in studies pertaining to the creation o f the Exclusive Economic Zones. See Hannesson (2004), Weber (2002), and Schrijver (1997). 9 6 Some states are non-members o f regional fisheries commissions, but they adhere to the adopted fisheries regulations anyway, as required to by the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Others states, wittingly or unwittingly, harbor fleets that are not in compliance with regulations. Collectively, these vessels are usually referred to as Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported (IUU) fleets. 9 7 Barret (1990, 73). Also see Sandler (1997) on enforcement costs in the provision o f club goods. 101 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 98 the likelihood of cooperation if effective means of exclusion can be found. Although the vulnerability response hypotheses still only addresses the policy preferences since states, it is already clear that the mix of states exploiting different stocks could have much to do with variations in the success of management measures described in Section 1.3. Finally, there are situational aspects that could skew predictions of vulnerability response. Any technical or geopolitical forces that prevent the growth of moderately and mildly vulnerable fleets can delay the proposal of effective management measures by protecting more vulnerable countries. Conversely, by increasing flows of knowledge and capital, globalization has facilitated the rapid development of fleets in less vulnerable countries, increasing the pressure on more vulnerable states as well as HMS stocks. Another factor that would escalate vulnerability response is the exhaustion of technology based methods of staying competitive, such as mechanized gear and improved fish finding devices." In addition, limits on the availability of alternative sources of revenue, like the scarcity of comparable but less exploited stocks of fish, speeds up political response by gradually vulnerable states, since they will run out of options earlier. Together with endogenous mechanisms discussed in the previous subsection, these wider trends help to answer the "why now?” question posed in Chapter 1. 9 8 Cooperative exclusion effectively transforms a fishery from a common pool resource into a club good, as per Comes and Sandler (1996). 9 9 See Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994, 219-220) regarding the impact o f technologies to reduce abatement costs in their model o f state behavior in the negotiation o f pollution agreements. 102 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2.4 Vulnerability Response and Negotiated Outcomes Although the vulnerability response hypotheses presented above are a pivotal link between economic forces and the behavior of fishing states, the model is not yet refined enough to predict the adoption of regulations at the international level. Expanding the specification to explicitly show how vulnerability response translates into changes in the actual management of highly migratory species is a complicated undertaking that will require better data on parameters and a greater understanding of the issue area as a whole. That said; as testing of the more basic hypotheses is undertaken, larger inferences can be drawn from the analysis by incorporating lessons from the wider literature on international relations. This can serve to improve the availability of data while also providing insights that can be used when refining the model. Therefore, informal secondary expectations regarding the timing and strength of adopted regulations based on predictions of changes in the mix of national policy preferences will also be developed on a case-by-case basis. Fortunately, scholars in international relations have developed many frameworks for analyzing multilateral outcomes. As was noted in Subsection 1.2.3, the scope and scale of highly migratory species impede any attempts at unilateral regulation of these fisheries. Under current international norms, fisheries issues are not significant enough to draw states into military conflict over rights of access and therefore, the countries that target highly migratory species must negotiate collective management measures.1 0 0 Recognizing this, fishing states have created multilateral regional fisheries organizations that meet annually in order to negotiate management measures for HMS stocks in their 1 0 0 De Sombre (1999, 51). 103 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. respective oceans. To obtain their policy goals, members of these organizations can engage in common diplomatic tactics such as issue linkage, side payments, consensus blocking and the threat of noncompliance.1 0 1 They may also negotiate bilaterally or in groups, forming alliances with other countries in order to increase their clout within a regime. Like any other international forum, the ability of a state or group of states to impact international management of highly migratory species 102 depends greatly on their collective capacity to utilize these mechanisms. Haas, Keohane, and Levy (1995), presented the idea that the mix of environmental leaders, followers and laggards involved in a fisheries commission determines the severity of internal conflicts and the overall success of cooperative measures. Basing her analysis on that framework, Peterson (1995) defined leaders as states that greatly desired sustainable management of a fishery. In order to attain this goal, these countries would have to utilize their combined negotiating power to convince followers and laggards to cooperate on and comply with management regulations. Higher collective concern on the part of leaders would increase the pressures aimed at followers and laggards. Conversely, greater reticence on the part of laggards would inflate the concessions demanded of leaders, making cooperation more costly for them. Collective management could only be successful when leaders were concerned enough to overcome the demands of less environmentally conscious • 10T states along with whatever institutional barriers might exist. 1 0 1 Peterson (1995, 261). 1 0 2 Baldwin (1993, 18). 1 0 3 Peterson (1995, 259-262). See also Peterson (2000) in which she refines the classifications into leaders, followers, laggards and resistors. It should be noted that vulnerability response more closely resembles the interest-based approach o f Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994), although their analysis was relatively static in that no explicit source o f change in national policy preferences was identified. Furthermore, because o f their focus on unit-level analysis, Sprinz and Vaahtoranta only loosely linked the behavioral characteristics o f states to negotiated outcomes via ad hoc observations regarding the 104 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. The model of vulnerability response builds on similar neoliberal collective action principles by endogenizing governmental concern. Rather than classifying countries by their previous positions on regulatory measures, governmental concern is extrapolated over time based on the state's economic vulnerability and the level of stock depletion.1 0 4 O f course, it is seldom the case that countries in each vulnerability category are evenly matched, as assumed in Subsection 2.3.2. Therefore, to determine which states will succeed in attaining their management goals, when they will do so, and also how much they will give up to whom in the process, the relative power of states in each category needs to be addressed. Moreover, expectations regarding what a state wants and what they can get can be combined in order to predict the point at which regulations would become effective, or if rebuilding is even possible for some stocks. In fact, when addressing questions posed in Section 1.3, asymmetries and alterations in the relative power of states are just as important as variations in political response. Like the vulnerability response framework presented in Subsection 2.3.2, the structure of power in negotiations over a stock is a result of the mix of states at the table, rather than just a summation of national characteristics. Given the assumptions of rationality outlined in Section 2.1, states within each vulnerability category in Figure 2.10 can be seen as members of different protocoalitions.1 0 5 Because each numbers and strength o f the states in each o f their categories, so there was little to be gleaned from them on the topic. 1 0 4 To be fair, Peterson did point out the incentives that led distant water fishing states to be laggards. However, she did not provide such rationale for her classifications o f states as leaders or followers. Nor did she suggest that distant water states might alter their positions as opportunity costs o f alternatives dry up. 1 0 5 As per Axelrod (1997, 70), protocoalitions are defined as groups that share an affinity in certain characteristics that make it more likely that they cooperate, rather than simply dynamic subsets o f a larger group that are formed via the actions o f a leader, as per Riker (1984, chap. 5). 105 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. category prefers a different set of policy outcomes, and some, like gradually vulnerable states, actually respond to depletion at different rates, the distribution of power among them should strongly effect the timing and strength of measures that are eventually adopted. As noted by Haas, Keohane, and Levy (1995),the ability of one group of states to influence regulatory outcomes will depend on the quantity and quality of power exercised by that group vis-a-vis the others. Though it may seem simple, determining the power structure surrounding negotiations of regulations for HMS stock is complicated by the conjunction of the temporal changes in governmental concern that are predicted by vulnerability response and cross- sectional variations in the power welded by different states. In cross-section, states whose fleets are more politically influential and which have larger endowments can be expected to invest the most to attain cooperation on their preferred responses to biological depletion while states that have few diplomatic resources and whose fleets are only marginally involved in domestic politics should expend the least. All other combinations of influence and endowment fall between these two extremes. Such variations in governmental concern are complementary to the vulnerability response matrix presented in Figure 2.10 in that they impact the initial level of investment in the negotiating process without changing the management responses preferred by states or the expectation of escalating concern as a stock is depleted.1 0 6 Nevertheless, the analyst should be aware that exogenous forces, such as an economy wide recession, a natural disaster, 1 0 6 There is another possible source o f variation among states that would prove contradictory to the hypotheses; if one or more states can be found to behave in an irrational manner or to be susceptible to non-commercial interests groups, the basic assumptions o f Section 2.1, would be violated. Evidence invalidating these assumptions would include altruistic behavior such as forfeiture o f access rights prior to the onset o f heavy competition or belligerent behavior such as the refusal to agree on measures based on allocations to other parties that have no bearing on states own access to a stock. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. or the outbreak of war, can lead to seemingly unrelated shifts in the forcefulness of a • • • 107 country's negotiating position. Because of the rationality assumptions stated earlier, political importance will be equated with economic importance in the case studies. Specifically, expectations of relative levels of concern will be based on the national shares in the total landings of a stock of fish. However, in a less restrictive model political influence could be derived from many sources, including the lobbying efforts of fleet representatives, the economic importance of the fleet in regions represented by powerful politicians, the presence of large unions that could cause domestic unrest, and conflicts of interest on the part of decision makers who either own or are owned by part of the fleet. National budget constraints, in terms of diplomatic resources are equally varied, but these will be discussed in detail in a few paragraphs. Note that asymmetries in these aspects of governmental concern do not impact preferred responses to biological depletion, but only the willingness of states to consign resources to achieving favorable cooperative outcomes. Variations in the nature of states' diplomatic resources are just as important as differences in levels of governmental concern. The rationality assumption put forth in Section 2.1 constrains states to use the cheapest tools at their disposal, but, although money may be one source of power, diplomatic resources are not as easy to standardized as currency. Wealthy industrialized states have larger endowments, in terms of manpower, funding, and sources of side payments or coercion, but, in 1 0 7 For example, in the 1990s a sudden recession in Korea forced the vast majority o f its fleets to exit the Atlantic. As might be expected, Korean involvement in the negotiations o f Atlantic HMS regulations also dropped precipitously after this event. In this case, both the national budget constraint and the political importance o f the fisheries were reduced simultaneously as the government turned its attention to more pressing matters. 107 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. multilateral settings, coalitions of weak states can engage in tactics such as 1 OS consensus blocking and issue linkage in order to attain their objectives. The institutions that circumscribe negotiations can also impact the options available to states. For instance, in settings where consensus is the norm, individual states have more power to prevent the adoption of unfavorable regulations than they would under other methods like a majority voting system.1 0 9 Country specific information can be used to determine what kinds of negotiating strategies are available to the disparate states targeting a specific stock, but knowledge of the larger setting and established theories of interaction among states is necessary as well. At the moment, the formulation of expectations regarding negotiated management measures must be on a case-by-case basis but there are four important general implications of vulnerability response within the neoliberal framework. First and foremost, sustainable management is not a predicted outcome of international fisheries negotiations, but neither is stock collapse, except in a few cases.1 1 0 Instead, states are expected to respond to biological depletion once recession in a domestic fishing fleet has set in. Postponement of management response is partly due to the malleability of biological stock assessments but is more directly related to national uncertainties regarding their fleets’ abilities to compete in the international 1 0 8 Keohane and Nye (2001, 31) 1 0 9 Young (1994, 133). 1 1 0 See Appendix A. 1 Static Models. Potential cases o f collapse include by-catch species that are harvested incidentally with commercially targeted stocks. Because they are not associated with recession in the fisheries sector, such species are not expected to precipitate management response. In addition, if agreement occurs too early, access rights can be institutionalized before competition from less vulnerable states becomes an issue. Without pressures that reduce their percentages o f total catches, highly vulnerable states may not have sufficient cause to enact strong management measures. This is especially true for a stock with a very high marginal value and few market substitutes. Lastly, there are some stocks o f fish whose reproductive patterns are stochastic or exhibit depensation, in which cases stock collapse can occur without a direct relationship to recession in the fisheries sector. 108 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. marketplace. Considerable short run variation in the profitability of domestic fishers can obscure those shifts in comparative advantage that precipitate recession in a domestic fishing fleet. However, even without such uncertainty successful management will still be delayed until biological depletion and recession in a domestic fishing fleet are extensive enough to create the necessary levels of governmental concern. The higher the costs of cooperation, the more prolonged the period of burgeoning crisis prior to enactment of management response.1 1 1 Second and relatedly, successful rebuilding will occur at different levels of biological depletion for different stocks depending on the mix of states that exploit them. As Subsection 2.3.2 explained, states with distinct types of vulnerability prefer disparate levels of management response. A significant determinant of the costs of cooperation is the preponderance of states in each category of vulnerability. If highly vulnerable states command extensive resources and capacity, then their preference for early, strong response to biological depletion can be expected to prevail. On the other hand, when gradually or moderately vulnerable states predominate then delayed, moderate response is more likely. Similarly, when mildly vulnerable states can control negotiations, late, weak response is predicted. Balanced power among two or more types of states can be expected to create consensus on some middle ground once transfers or threats have been made by the more vulnerable states to the 112 less vulnerable. A third important implication of the vulnerability response model is that geoeconomic factors impact the timing of management response relative to the 1 1 1 O f course, the concept o f side payments goes back to Coase (1960), but Barret (1990, 78-79) succinctly discusses their role in fostering collective action among asymmetric members o f international environmental agreements. 1 1 2 Peterson (1995, 261). 109 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. biological depletion of a stock. As discussed in Section 2.2, the amount of scarcity rent available and the number of substitutes for a stock of fish are important determinants of the onset of recession in a domestic fishing fleet in each of the four vulnerability classifications. High-quality fish with few substitutes are more profitable in per unit terms and therefore are targeted more intensively, causing scarcity rent to be dissipated more rapidly than for a larger, but less valuable stock of fish.1 1 3 Ironically, this can lead to earlier agreement among a few vulnerable states, excluding less vulnerable states before they can enter the fishery but crippling the management regime by removing incentives to truly rebuild the stock. In contrast, some by-catch species can provide the same level of scarcity rent in per unit terms as other lower-priced fish but, because they are less abundant and more difficult to catch, they are not targeted commercially. As a result, recession in a domestic fishing fleet does not occur in association with the depletion of by-catch stocks and management is not undertaken even when the stocks are heavily depleted. At a more disaggregate level, free trade norms and the declining marginal value of technological innovations influence relative vulnerability by impacting the rate of the capital shift between more and less vulnerable states. As long as countries with high input costs are able to mitigate that portion of their cost function by increasing productivity via new technologies, they will be able to remain competitive and forestall recession in a domestic fishing fleet. Nevertheless, in the information 1 1 3 Assuming o f course that differing costs o f production do not negate the benefits of the higher price. In addition, this tendency is often compounded by the fact that most high quality species are less abundant and productive than lower quality fish. This is not a coincidence. Fish that live longer tend to grow larger and invest more evolutionary energy in production and maintenance o f muscle and fat tissues. They also reproduce less frequently and have smaller cohorts. (Pauly et al. 2000, 49-51). As the cases will show, the described relationship between price and fishing effort is apt for highly migratory species. 110 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. age, the dissemination of these innovations is relatively rapid and therefore research and development provide only temporary relief to more vulnerable states. Furthermore, globalization has made movements of vessels, gear and even experienced captains easier than ever. This eliminates the advantages previously enjoyed by developed countries in terms of capital formation. Access to used vessels and technology makes it easy for countries with lower operational costs to acquire the capital they need to develop their fleets and appropriate market shares.1 1 4 Fourth, institutional arrangements can cause significant variation in the management of different stocks when other factors are quite similar.1 1 5 Two of the most important institutional facets of international fisheries management involve the general norms associated with sovereignty and specific norms of allocation within various regional fisheries organizations. Sovereignty plays a role in both the negotiation of regulations and the creation of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.1 1 6 Decision-making by consensus and an “honor system” under which states bear sole responsibility for reporting national landings and implementation of management measures domestically are two of the major barriers to cooperation that 117 are created as states strive to protect their operational sovereignty. The initial steps toward either establishing an international monitoring and enforcement system or shifting to a vote-based procedure are very difficult for states to take. However, once these institutions have been changed for one stock of fish, the bar is lowered and similar arrangements are easier to achieve for other stocks. 1 1 4 Christy and Scott (1965, 137) predicted this trend decades ago. 1 1 5 There is already a wide literature on the effects o f institutions on international management o f natural resources. See Young (2002), Haas, Keohane, and Levy (1995), etc. 1 1 6 See Litfin (1998) regarding sovereignty bargains and international environmental management. 1 1 7 Peterson (1995, 276). I l l R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Norms of allocation are somewhat different because they have divergent impacts on the material well-being of states under regulation. Until recently, the most commonly accepted norm of allocation was to base national quotas on historical landings. States that had landed large percentages of past harvests under 1 1 o open-access would be given large percentages of future harvests under regulation. Obviously, this would be detrimental to the interests of less vulnerable countries who would not be given an opportunity to capitalize on their comparative advantages. Such institutions can increase cooperation early on by giving historically dominant states incentives to engage in management but, as other countries perceive the potential for development of their fleets, conflicts over allocation criteria can severely hinder the negotiation process. States realize that the establishment or elimination of norms of allocation have much more protracted and widespread implications for their national access to highly migratory species than the short run distribution of quotas for a single stock. Therefore, they will fight harder and longer to ensure that norms of allocation are favorable to their domestic interests. In spite of these many sources of variation among different stocks of fish, the vulnerability response hypotheses provide a cohesive approach to modeling the policy preferences of states. Although less explicit, the eventual management outcome of negotiations can be derived from this model as well. Institutional, geopolitical and geoeconomic factors must be accounted for, but in the end sustainable management depends on the balance of power between more and less 1 1 8 This norm was frequently cited in discussions regarding quota allocations in all o f the Tuna Commission meetings that I attended, and also occurs regularly in the annual reports o f the Atlantic Tuna Commission. Both developing and historically active fishing states mention the historical rationalization o f quota allocations; although the latter are in favor o f it, while the former prefer alternate criteria. See ICCAT (2000, 1:167-169) for more regarding this debate. 112 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. vulnerable states as they struggle to either minimize losses or maximize gains precipitated by increasing competition and shifts in comparative advantage. Because of this, successful management of highly migratory species often appears to be a response to heavy levels of biological depletion when in fact it is a result of burgeoning recession in a domestic fishing fleet. In fact, successful rebuilding of a stock depends on the convergence of multiple factors, and, although depletion is necessary in order to engender response, it is not a sufficient cause for effective management. 2.5 Testing Primary and Secondary Hypotheses Vulnerability response can be used to predict differences in the behavior of states during multilateral negotiations of international management measures for highly migratory species. Furthermore, in combination with the secondary expectations described in Section 2.4, the model predicts differences in the timing and strength of the international management of a stock based on the level of depletion and the mix of states targeting the stock, as constrained by the technicalities of the fishery and international institutions. Therefore, it is possible to test the vulnerability response hypotheses by comparing predictions based on these factors with the actual behavior of states in negotiations and, ultimately, to gage the impact of national policy preferences on the management measures that are adopted for specific stocks. States’ policy preferences and their levels of governmental concern can be predicted by their economic vulnerability and domestic political attributes. Then, the entire array of states involved in negotiating management of the 113 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. stock can be brought together to extrapolate expectations regarding collective international action. Vulnerability response is a new and incomplete perspective on the machinations of a complex, multilevel system. Unfortunately, because the hypotheses are still nascent, and also due to a significant lack of standardizable data, it is not yet possible to build or test a purely quantitative model. In fact, there is too much variation and uncertainty to even build a statistically acceptable data set. For many states, data on economic factors in fisheries are so scarce that specification of production functions for domestic fleets is not possible.1 1 9 Furthermore, estimation of biological benchmarks may differ between stocks and for the same stock over 1 9 f ) time, depending on the accuracy of parameters and the methods available. Finally, as Section 2.4 pointed out, the concept of negotiating power is not an opaque determinant of cooperative management and the actualities of international fisheries negotiations cannot be easily aggregated. Different states draw influence from different sources and the dynamics of power will vary based on the mix of states 19 1 exploiting a stock as well as broader trends in world politics. All of these factors make testing of vulnerability response in the area of international fisheries management more amenable to detail rich, case based methods of analysis. The most practical focus of such research is on individual stocks of 199 highly migratory species. This minimizes biological, economic and institutional 1 1 9 Iudicello, Weber and Wieland (1999, 64). 1 2 0 This variation is apparent in the reports o f the scientific bodies associated with each regional fisheries organization. 1 2 1 See Keohane and Nye (2001, chap. 2) regarding the complex use o f power to negotiate regimes in the modem, interdependent world system. 1 2 2 Stocks are biologically and geographically distinct groups o f fish and, in this context, they are also managed separately at the Commission. 114 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. variation, illuminating the temporal dimensions of vulnerability response. At the same time, comparing and contrasting across stocks with different vulnerability response patterns can expose larger trends in the general management of highly migratory species. Therefore, the following chapters present case studies of six stocks that are managed by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT): • Chapter 3: Tropical Tunas o Atlantic bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus) o Atlantic skipjack tuna (Katsuwonuspelamis) o Atlantic yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares) • Chapter 4: Billfishes o North Atlantic swordfish (Xiphias gladius) o Atlantic blue marlin (Makaira nigricans) o White marlin (Tetrapturus albidus) Atlantic stocks were selected because, as explained in Section 1.3, many of the most important changes in international fisheries management have been adopted to regulate highly migratory species in this heavily depleted ocean. Each case can be considered an individual, although not independent, test of vulnerability response model. Some comparative analysis will be carried out as well, in order to explore the wider implications of the model. To facilitate evaluation, the cases have been grouped according to biological similarities.1 2 3 This carries an added advantage in 1 2 3 The tropical tunas covered in Chapter 3 consist o f bigeye, skipjack and yellowfin. Not only are these stocks prone to concentrate in tropical waters but they are also large and highly prolific. In contrast, the billfishes covered in Chapter 4 - North Atlantic swordfish, blue marlin and white marlin - are relatively small stocks that can be found in temperate and tropical waters. 115 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. that the grouping of the cases mirrors the committee structure of the Commission.1 2 4 Furthermore, the six cases are widely representative in terms of the commercial value of the stocks in question. For instance, the tropical tunas are all very large in terms of biomass, but bigeye is much pricier than either yellowfin or skipjack tuna. Therefore, all three stocks are important commercially but bigeye has a higher marginal value than the other two tunas. In contrast, the billfishes are much smaller stocks, but because swordfish prices are only slightly lower than for bigeye, the stock is also a commercially important species. The marlins on the other hand, rank in price near skipjack and yellowfin, but because they cannot be produced cheaply and 125 in large quantities, they are only captured as by-catch to commercial fisheries. If the vulnerability response hypotheses hold over this wide array of stocks, it will be strong evidence for the general applicability of the concept. Before moving on to the cases, there are two methodological hurdles to be addressed. First, scientific uncertainty regarding the biological status of a stock can have repercussions throughout the cases. Predictions are made based on the expectation of response at a certain level of biological depletion. If that indicator is incorrect, then cases might seem more or less supportive of the hypotheses than they actually are. Additionally, since rebuilding is an important sign of the effectiveness of measures, incorrect estimates could also skew the analysis. These problems will be covered in Subsection 2.5.1. Secondly, as has been noted several times, political 1 2 4 Management measures for tropical tunas originate in ICCAT's Panel 1 while Panel 4 deals with billfish. Panels are made up o f contracting parties that pay additional fees for membership, usually those directly targeting one or more species covered by the panel. Panel decisions are made by consensus and must be approved by the entire Commission. However, the larger body seldom overturns regulations adopted in a panel. 1 2 5 Specific information on the commercial value and size o f these stocks will be presented for each individually in the cases. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. economic data is insufficient for full specification of several important factors in the model. This leaves substantial aspects of classification to the discretion of the individual analyst. Case specific postulates will be dealt with in the appropriate chapters, but Subsection 2.5.2 puts forth the procedures and parameters used when compiling all six cases in this thesis. 2.5.1 Scientific Uncertainty Even in a world of perfect information and exact science, efficient and effective management of a stock of fish would require a nuanced understanding of many relationships, including stock structure, recruitment and spawning patterns as well as the connections between fishing effort and fishing mortality. For instance, the age and size composition of a stock can change the yield per recruit, which will in turn influence the maximum sustainable yield. If high mortality on small fish reduces the level of MS Y, does that constitute a crisis situation? What about when the spawning stock declines precipitously, endangering future recruitment? Alternately, recruitment could improve for non-anthropogenic reasons, increasing the biomass of the stock and the maximum sustainable yield, which would help to alleviate an overfished situation without expected costs. The reality of stock assessment is even more complicated, since there are many unknowns and significant levels of uncertainty. Both the scale and the scope of fisheries for highly migratory species are detrimental to data collection and analysis. For the most part, catch and effort statistics are used in combination with information on growth rates, fecundity and other data from tagging studies to model and estimate stock size and capacity. As with many deductive methods, these models may be 117 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. sensitive to selected parameters, data quality and estimation procedures. However, it is also important to note that both the scientific procedures and the data used to carry them out have been significantly improved over the years since ICCAT was created. Unfortunately, gains from greater knowledge and better methods have also been undermined by political machinations, including the introduction of junk science and either non-reporting or misreporting of data. Due to complexity, uncertainty and politicization, scientific estimates of indicators such as M S Y and B m sy may vary greatly from year to year and even 1 Ofi within the same year given different interpretations of the data. Variegations like these are prohibitive to quantitative approaches to the analysis of vulnerability response, since aggregation is precluded by excessive differences underlying estimation of both the benchmark itself and the state of a stock in relation to it. One cannot simply create an index measuring the distance between the biomass at regulation and the biomass that would support MSY, throw the numbers into a statistical model and expect to find meaningful correlations. Even the number of years between the point where the stock is first considered over exploited and when it is finally regulated effectively is not a homogenous measure, since fisheries may decline at different rates and because underlying factors may change overtime, alleviating pressure on a stock without the intervention of management. Perhaps in the future a longer and more cohesive time series of biomass measures may become available, but current information is not amenable to statistical analysis. That said; there is still significant insight to be gained from a qualitative examination of the relationship between the scientific advice provided to ICCAT and 1 2 6 Young (2003) provides a broad overview o f the problems associated with the validity o f stock assessments. 118 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. the measures that the organization takes regarding management of its stocks. As a political economist rather than a marine biologist, I have left the determination of the status of stocks and effectiveness of regulations to ICCAT's Sub-Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS). While the ICCAT Secretariat employs several individuals to maintain its databases and evaluate scientific studies, it is the SCRS that has the responsibility of advising the Commission on management measures for the conservation of stocks. As such, the Sub-Committee is made up of national scientists from ICCAT member states, who are charged with providing stock assessments and management options to achieve the purported goal of the Commission: keeping stocks at levels that will produce MSY. Of course, scientists from so many nations will have disparate ideas regarding the actualization of stock models and the reference points used to determine benchmarks like MSY and B Msy- The recommendations provided by the SCRS are almost as much a result of negotiations as the management measures taken by the Commission itself. As such, SCRS advice may not be squarely founded on the best science available but it does usually represent a median point between the views of interested scientists. Moreover, SCRS is the only officially recognized source of scientific advice for ICCAT, and is therefore the most appropriate tool for this study. In fact, the SCRS reports, which are available on an annual basis, provide ample evidence regarding the biological status of most stocks relative to MSY as well as the effectiveness of measures undertaken by ICCAT in order to manage specific stocks. This information can be used on a stock-by-stock basis to illuminate the fundamental vulnerability response pattern for each stock under ICCAT’s purview. Although painstaking, the process is rather simple. After combing through 119 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. the assessments for a given stock, one can create a timeline or history comparing the biological state of the stock to the recommendations and resolutions passed in association with it. Changes in statistical procedure or model assumptions may also be taken into account if they mitigate or exacerbate the biological depletion in any way. It is upon this grid work that all other analysis will be overlaid. 2.5.2 Economic Unknowns Compiling cases to test the vulnerability response hypotheses and secondary predictions of negotiated outcomes also requires information on the politics and economics of national fisheries and nation states. Unfortunately, data on these characteristics are seldom available from official sources because of the proprietary nature of economic indicators and the strategic aspects of political information. On the economic side, many countries lack the national capacity to undertake even basic data collection on harvests, let alone important indicators such as the level of employment, income per capita, value of existing capital and expenditures on other inputs for a fleet. Elsewhere, fishers refused to provide public officials and academics with accurate details on their operating costs in order to avoid government regulations or because they fear that their competitors might access that information and use it to gain an advantage. Even in countries where such data are collected, surveys are often conducted haphazardly, with different methods being used in 197 different regions. All of these problems are further complicated by governments' reluctance to provide such information to noncitizens and also the incompatibility of those national databases that can be acquired. 1 2 7 FAO (2002, 59-62). 120 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Accurate information regarding the politics of international fisheries management, including the importance of various fleets to national decision makers and also the diplomatic assets of fishing states, is even more difficult to attain. Representatives of commercial fishing interests have incentives to obscure the magnitude of their influence on the domestic policy making process. Astute interest group leaders and lobbyists will exaggerate the importance of their causes, but they may also downplay their successes in order to amplify the volume of their grievances.1 2 8 Similar subterfuge is used by the representatives of fishing states as they maneuver for the best negotiating positions possible. Strategic aspects of information include the overstatement of policy preferences, bluffing about diplomatic resources, obscuring side payments or transfers, and prevarication on matters of compliance. These are tactics that states to use to win as much as possible in negotiations without giving up more than necessary.1 2 9 Therefore, although transparency may be improving, researchers must needs rely on observable but incomplete official documentation and detailed but circumspect unofficial communications from participants in the negotiations. When data are lacking and a model is not yet well-defined, it is incumbent on the researcher to provide a greater depth of detail regarding the formation of expectations and analysis of outcomes than would be necessary under more auspicious circumstances. The rest of this section elaborates on the general application of vulnerability response and the major sources of data used to test the hypotheses. First, all six cases were compiled following the same four steps: 1 2 8 Grossman and Helpman (2001) extensively cover interest group incentives to provide incomplete or incorrect information. 1 2 9 Kauffman (1988, 162). 121 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. • Determine state’ s vulnerabilities and negotiating power • Evaluate expectations of governmental concern • Assess predictions of cooperative outcomes • Review impacts of regulation The first step is to place the various fishing states that target a stock within the vulnerability matrix and to expound on the magnitude and type of negotiating power that can be commanded by each country. Indicators of economic vulnerability include the level of development, purchasing power parity, gross national product and of course the distance capabilities of domestic fleets. Unfortunately, more specific indicators are seldom available due to the proprietary nature of information on costs of production such as wages and purchases of capital. Gross indicators can also be used to approximate national endowments in terms of negotiating power. For instance, large industrialized states will generally have more clout in terms of both carrots and sticks but developing countries can wield power if they are able to 1 O A cooperate to block consensus or if they have a large capacity to free ride. When placing states within the vulnerability matrix, several fisheries specific assumptions are needed, in addition to the general assumptions laid out in Section 2.1. First, although most fishers harvest more than one species, since the purpose here is to relate depletion of one stock to recession in a domestic fishing fleet, only countries whose fleets directly target the stock in question should be placed in the matrix. Secondly, it is assumed that the costs of production for national fleets can be approximated using indicators that largely capture operational costs as opposed to the productivity o f capital. Specifically, since data on important factors like labor 1 3 0 De Sombre (1999, 53). 122 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. and input prices are unavailable, development indicators like gross domestic product per capita and purchasing power parity were used to crudely determine that a state's i i costs of production were likely to be high relative to other fishing countries. That said, large fleet improvements that allow new countries to enter the fishery, ease the economic pressures on historical fishing states, or could potentially shift a state from 1 77 one type of vulnerability to another were also accounted for. Thirdly, because of the pervasive specificity of fishing labor and capital, the opportunity costs of alternatives were limited to the ability to shift portions of a national fleet to target other stocks where scarcity rent would still be available. As mentioned in Subsection 2.3.1, the most relevant source of lower opportunity costs for exploitation of alternate stocks is the preexistence of distant water capabilities. Historically, states would also have had to be differentiated on the size and productivity of their coastal waters, but for the time period covered in the cases, 1969-2004, those countries most in need of alternative sources of revenue, highly 1 7 7 and gradually vulnerable states, have already substantially depleted their EEZs. In the future, it is quite possible that the opportunity costs of alternatives will be further constrained by the availability of coastal locations suitable to aquaculture.1 3 4 For the 1 3 1 Recent studies, especially Joseph (2003) suggest that commercial fleets targeting highly migratory species are already overcapitalized on a global scale, and that there are few gains to be made from technological improvements or the production o f new vessels and equipment. In fact, this has been the case for several decades. Historical accounts o f innovations in fisheries, such as Christy and Scott (1965) and Sahrhage and Lundbeck (1992) also point to declining marginal revenues from improvements in gear or fish finding technologies. 1 3 2 Examples o f this would be the capital shifts described in Section 2.2 Globalization and Fisheries Economics, that allowed many developing countries to begin large-scale harvesting o f highly migratory species, the Japanese change to deep-water longline gear when they began targeting bigeye in the mid-1980s, and the introduction and proliferation o f Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 1 3 3 FAO (2002, 23-24). The cases are restricted to the period o f ICCAT’s existence. 1 3 4 Marine “ranching” is already giving M exico, Australia and several countries along the Mediterranean an edge in the production o f Bluefin tuna, although there are issues associated with the 123 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. moment however, distant water capacity is the most appropriate indicator to use when placing states within the vulnerability matrix. Once a state’s position in the matrix has been determined, it can be used to predict the timing of changes in political response relative to the biological depletion of a stock. The second step in building a case is to evaluate these expectations relative to observed state behavior over time. Most of the discernible aspects of governmental concern have been recorded in ICCAT's Annual Reports, which consist of the proceedings of meetings of the Commission and its subcommittees, along with administrative and financial overviews. Published by the ICCAT Secretariat every year, these volumes also compile the national reports on fisheries activities and management actions taken by member states. The Annual Reports are a fount of information that reveal the issues of importance to contracting parties, the proposals they make to deal with those problems and the final measures adopted by the Commission. Also, the financial reports provide information on members' contributions to the Commission's budget and the administrative reports give a concise review of the important events that occur during the year. In total, the Annual Reports chronicle ICCAT's collective response to crisis over its more than 30 years of HMS management. While the majority of the knowledge used in the case studies is based on facts gathered from official documentation like the Annual Reports, insight into governmental concern was also gained via more informal channels. This includes personal observation of four of ICCAT’ s annual meetings, as well as one meeting of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission and a meeting of the Inter-American Tropical demand for these fish (ranched tuna is thought to be o f lower quality by some consumers) and also the price repercussions o f a larger supply. 124 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. • • 135 Tuna Commission. Scrutinizing the proceedings of negotiations firsthand provided a more nuanced and deeper understanding of the relations between states, domestic interests and governmental concern. These meetings also provided many opportunities to interview decision makers and collect qualitative data that extends beyond what could be perceived from outside the negotiations. These contacts added to the historical store of knowledge and filled in the somewhat dry timeline provided by documented sources with the expert opinions of people who were directly involved in past negotiations.1 3 6 The third step in building a case also relies heavily on ICCAT records and firsthand accounts of negotiations. By combining observed changes in governmental concern with assumptions regarding the relative negotiating power of the states involved, is possible to develop expectations of cooperative management outcomes. Although there is more room for variation at this level, general predictions can then be tested by comparing proposed regulations with the actual resolutions and recommendations adopted by the Commission over time. Special attention must be paid to institutional factors that may have changed exogenously since this would affect the costs of negotiations. In addition, the analysis should indicate if quota transfers or other side payments have been made in order to achieve an agreement. This is often difficult since states can use informal channels to reward cooperation 1 3 5 The author attended the ICCAT meetings as an official observer from 2001 to 2003. This allowed her to sit in on all sessions o f the meetings except for those o f the heads o f delegation and any informal drafting exercises. The author was also an observer at the 2001 meeting o f the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission and the 2003 meeting o f the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. 1 3 6 Realizing that every person contacted regarding ICCAT had their own perspective and their own objectives, the author took all these communications with a grain o f salt. In the case studies, every private communication is corroborated with as much physical evidence as possible and all assertions rely only on information obtained from multiple sources. 125 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. and to punish defection. In spite of this lack of transparency, many important side payments have been documented and can be included in the case studies. Fourth and finally, after showing that states have behaved as expected and negotiations have concluded as predicted, it is also important to review the impacts of regulations to make sure that resolutions deemed to be effective have actually had a positive impact on the biological health of the stock. Alternately, if management measures are expected to be ineffective because of temporal or distributional issues, then it is important to show that biological depletion is continuing. Fortunately, ICCAT’s Sub-Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) evaluates the effectiveness of management measures on a stock-by-stock basis and their findings are published in the Annual Reports. Usually, these analyses include estimates of changes in effort, correlations between those shifts and improvements in biomass and any indications that non-anthropogenic forces have affected stock size. Shifts in effort due to exogenous economic factors must also be taken into account when evaluating the effectiveness of management measures. Information on such changes can be found in ICCAT documents and FAO data on the value of trade. Once the cases are completed, comparisons can be made between the different stocks. The vulnerability response pattern might prove more apt in some cases than others, and alterations to the model might be required. On the other hand, because the model does not predict success in all cases, comparisons among stocks that have successfully been rebuilt and those that continue to be overfished could create insights into ways to improve the likelihood of effective management for all stocks. It has already been pointed out that successful vulnerability response only occurs in a small space of overlap between a large number of variables. Hopefully, 126 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. comparisons among the cases could provide indicators as to which factors in this nascent perspective on international fisheries management are most crucial to achieving effective management when countries can only respond to economic recession instead of preventing it. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Chapter 3: Tropical Tunas There are few types of fish more ubiquitous than tuna, yet this piscine family presents incredibly complex problems for states as they negotiate measures to sustainably manage these highly migratory species. Chapter 2 offered a model of vulnerability response in international fisheries management that links biological depletion to recession in a domestic fishing fleet to governmental concern, which finally determines regulatory outcomes. The following cases are designed to both test those hypotheses and elaborate on several important variations of vulnerability response. Using quantitative and qualitative data on tropical tuna fisheries, it will be shown that states do behave as boundedly rational units striving to maximize their domestic economic benefits from management measures. However, because of different technical and economic aspects of these fisheries as well as biological differentiation between stocks, it is possible to predict and test different outcomes for each case. Although it is not as parsimonious as other theories, vulnerability response model will be shown to have considerable power when analyzing international management of commercial fisheries. This chapter covers three stocks of tropical tuna in the Atlantic: yellowfin {Thunnus albacares), skipjack {Katsuwonuspelamis) and bigeye {Thunnus obesus)} O f these, bigeye is something of an outlier, since only juveniles are confined to tropical waters. Adults of the species cover a much wider range, including northern and southern temperate zones. However, the management of these three stocks is intertwined because small tunas are usually targeted in mixed schools made up of 1 There are many other tuna species present in tropical waters, but these are the only three that have been managed by ICCAT. 128 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. young bigeye and yellowfin, not just skipjack. Juveniles of all three species are caught mainly by surface fisheries such as purse seines or baitboats and processed at canneries around the globe. Adult bigeye and yellowfin are also targeted by longlines for sale as sushi, sashimi or seared ahi tuna in Japan, the USA and other affluent countries. In addition, recreational fishers and the businesses that cater to them value medium sized yellowfin as a significant game fish. These specific stocks were chosen for several reasons. First, the tropical tunas are some of the most valuable fisheries in the world, creating billions of dollars of revenue for fishers and fishing states every year.2 From an analytical perspective, the tropical tunas need to be considered together because this is a mixed fishery, where different species are harvested at the same time so there is no geopolitical or economic separability between the stocks. In addition, these stocks are managed by the same regional fisheries organization, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), minimizing institutional differences that would further complicate an already complex set of cases. Finally, each case poses its own inherently interesting set of problems and conundrums from a vulnerability response perspective. Whereas bigeye tuna could be labeled a classic case of vulnerability response, the mixed surface fisheries present a situation where management response seems to have occurred in the absence of significant biological depletion and the yellowfin case is an example of biological rebuilding without serious management response. Before moving on to the specific cases, Section 3.1 covers important technical, biological and economic aspects of the fisheries for tropical tunas to give 2 FAO (2002a, 10). 129 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. the reader a sense of the relationship between these stocks as well as their respective levels of overexploitation. From there, Section 3.2 focuses on vulnerability response in the fishery for bigeye tuna. This is the longest case study, largely because ICCAT has been much more active in dealing with bigeye than any of the other tropical tunas. Although references to the fishery for small tunas cannot be avoided in the bigeye case, the application of the vulnerability response hypotheses to the management of mixed surface fisheries will be covered in Section 3.3. Finally, Section 3.4 describes how rebuilding has occurred for yellowfin tuna due to changes in exogenous variables rather than a management response by ICCAT. These last two sections illustrate the importance of considering vulnerability response in relation to levels of biological depletion and economic competition within a fishery. 3.1 Missing the M SY Mark As Figure 3.1 shows, tropical tunas form a very large proportion of the highly migratory species captured in the Atlantic. Together, these three stocks accounted for around 60% of all Atlantic landings of highly migratory species throughout the 1990s. Biologically, skipjack is the smallest of the three species, maturing at between 42-52 cm and with a relatively short life span of 2-3 years. Uncertainty regarding the stock structure of skipjack has prevented scientists from estimating maximum sustainable yield (MSY), but ICCAT’s Sub-Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) has suggested that catches as high as 175,000 mt are unsustainable.4 Yellowfin tuna grow much larger than skipjack, reaching a maximum length of about 3 ICCAT (2004, 2:42). 4 ICCAT (1998, 2:37). 130 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 170 cm. The most recent estimates put MSY for yellowfin at about 148,000 mt.5 Bigeye is the largest of the three species, reaching fork lengths of over 200 cm. It is also the slowest to mature, taking about 3 years to reach spawning age at approximately 100 cm.6 Estimates of MSY for bigeye are much lower than for yellowfin, ranging from 79,000 to 105,000 mt. Thus, skipjack is the most abundant of the three stocks in the Atlantic, followed closely by yellowfin and trailed considerably by bigeye. n Figure 3.1: ICCAT Reported Landings of Tropical Tunas 800,000 700.000 600.000 500,000 Bigeye Skipjack □ Yellowfin Other G o 400,000 2 300,000 200,000 100.000 \° > \° > s'*' o ft s ’ .oV S’ S’ eft S’ S’ Year 5 ICCAT (2004, 2:28). 6 ibid., 34. 7 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database, early data on landings from 1950-1964 have been excluded because o f incomplete reporting during that period. Landings refers to fish that have actually been brought to land and recorded. Harvests include all fish that are taken from the sea, regardless o f whether or not they are brought to land. The distinction between landings and harvests is important because the latter is more representative o f fishing mortality, but the former is used more commonly because it is easier to monitor. 131 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Tropical tunas are important in value as well as volume. In 2000, global catches of bigeye tuna were the most valuable of any marine species, bringing in revenues of about US$3 billion. Yellowfin and skipjack were also significant with total catches valued at US$2 billion and US$1 billion respectively.8 Figure 3.2 shows the estimated real value of Atlantic landings of tropical tunas from 1976 to 2001. At the beginning of the time series, bigeye is the least valuable of three species, while yellowfin brings in the most revenue, followed closely by skipjack. However, prices for bigeye tuna were already on the rise by 1978 and the overall value of this species rivals that of the other tropical tunas through the eighties, greatly surpassing them from the early nineties onward. Although catches of bigeye do increase over the period, as shown in Figure 3.1, the precipitous rise in the value of this species is due more to changes in price that resulted from increasing popularity among sashimi connoisseurs. At the same time, the per-unit value of yellowfin showed little increase while prices for skipjack tuna actually declined, negating most gains from higher catches.9 8 FAO (2002a, 10). 9 Actually, the decline in prices for skipjack reflects the overall decline in the value o f tunas caught for canning purposes. The per-unit value o f yellowfin is higher in aggregate because it includes the sale o f longline caught adult fish for high-end consumption as well as surface caught small fish sold for canning. The same is true for bigeye, but it’s much larger value is due to the much higher prices for unprocessed fish. 132 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 3.2: Value of Atlantic Landings of Tropical Tunas1 0 & C Z > D ON ON T 3 § t / > D O 1,000,000 900.000 800.000 700.000 600.000 500.000 400.000 300.000 200.000 100.000 Skipjack Yellowfin OO O CN OO O S ON O S ON ON Year From the mid-1980s onward, the least prolific of the tropical tunas, bigeye, was also the most valuable.1 1 As per the discussion in Section 2.2, these bioeconomic factors suggest that competition will increase more rapidly and reach a higher intensity for bigeye than for the other two tropical tunas. Higher prices create bigger profits, causing more fishers to target bigeye tuna, which increases fishing mortality. Since bigeye is already the least abundant of the three stocks, it is the least able to sustain such high levels of fishing mortality. After the price of bigeye increases, 1 0 FAO Commodities Production 1976-2001 Database, export value. 1 1 This negative correlation between value and biological productivity is quite common in today's fisheries. Generally speaking, greater longevity allows species to develop firmer and therefore more palatable muscle tissues. In order to stay in balance with their environments, stocks that live longer have also evolved slower reproductive cycles, spawning less often and with fewer offspring than species with shorter life spans. Another reason that less prolific fish are in greater demand is that humans tend to enjoy fatty fishes, which reside in colder waters where food is scarcer and therefore the ecosystem cannot support larger stocks. For instance, bigeye tuna move from tropical to temperate waters as they mature, so the food resources available in colder waters limit their abundance in both zones. (Pauly et al. 2000). 133 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. overfishing and overcapitalization will occur swiftly, causing it to become more depleted than either of the other two tropical tunas. Similarly, yellowfin, which is slightly less abundant than skipjack, is also somewhat more valuable. Ceteris paribus, in any given period, competition will be tougher for yellowfin than for skipjack because it will be more heavily exploited at lower levels of biomass. Figure 3.3 illustrates the points made above by showing actual landings of the tropical tunas relative to the most recent estimates of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for each stock. From these data it would seem that landings of skipjack were 1 9 only labeled as unsustainable for two years, 1991 and 1993. On the other hand, landings of yellowfin have fluctuated around MSY since 1980, including prolonged overexploitation that lasted from 1989 to 1994. In spite of this, estimates of biomass i o for Atlantic yellowfin showed that it was only fully exploited until 2001. Note that these high landings of yellowfin declined as landings of bigeye steadily increased to unsustainable levels after the per-unit value skyrocketed in the late 1980s.1 4 Although the magnitude of overfishing for bigeye tuna was potentially smaller than for yellowfin, because of differing reproductive rates, it had a larger impact on the 1 2 The dashed line representing M SY for skipjack in Figure 3.3 is not a true estimate, it is only the maximum catch above which SCRS felt certain that harvests would be unsustainable. The actual MSY is likely to be somewhat lower. Estimates o f biomass for skipjack tuna have not been completed. (ICCAT 2003, 2:32-35). 1 3 SCRS estimates o f yellowfin biomass averaged at 105% o f BM S Y from 1994 to 1996 with a range from 81-130%. Estimates increased in 1997 to 117% (92-135%) and then decreased again to an average o f 91.5% (87-129% ) for 2001, although that information was not available until 2003. (ICCAT 1997, 2:17; ICCAT 1999, 2:19; ICCAT 2004, 2:17-18). 1 4 There is some uncertainty regarding the level o f overexploitation o f this stock because MSY is expressed as a range rather than a specific value. If the lower estimate o f M SY is correct, then bigeye was heavily overexploited for the entire decade from 1991 to 2001. However, if the higher estimate is accurate then bigeye was moderately overexploited from 1993 to 1999. 134 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. size of the stock. As early as 1996, the biomass of bigeye was estimated to be only 70% of the level that would produce maximum sustainable yield.1 5 Figure 3.3: ICCAT Reported Landings and Most Recent Estimate of MSY1 6 250,000 -♦— Bigeye « — Skipjack Yellowfin 200,000 Skipjack MSY Yellowfin MSY 150,000 n— lime vc MSY 50,000 oo M3 O '. M 3 OO o M 3 M3 OS OS < N Year From this broad overview, it would seem that ICCAT has not been able to respond to overexploitation in a timely manner. At the same time, many questions are raised and anyone who is familiar with the history of ICCAT and its management process is likely to point out that aggregating data like this smudges out important temporal and qualitative changes. For instance, where as the levels of MSY reported in Figure 3.3 represent only the most recent estimates of that indicator, actual 1 5 1996 estimates o f bigeye biomass ranged from 60-80% o f B M s y and continued at this low level until 2002 when several years o f reduce fishing effort are allowed increase in biomass to 80-90% o f B MSY. (ICCAT 1997, 2: 22-24; ICCAT 2003, 2: 26-27). 1 6 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. Estimates o f MSY were taken from Executive Summaries o f Stock Assessments found in ICCAT (2004, vol. 2). 135 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. recommendations made by SCRS have evolved over time, reflecting changes in fishing parameters and scientific knowledge. These and other issues will be addressed in detail as the cases are used to test the vulnerability response model. Since it is the most overfished and most regulated, bigeye will be covered first to illustrate the full journey from increasing recession in a domestic fishing fleet to effective management response. Short examinations of other variants of vulnerability response in fisheries targeting a mix of small tropical tunas and then specific fisheries for yellowfin tuna will follow this longer case study. 3.2 Bigeye Tuna: Vulnerability Response in Action As has already been noted, in aggregate terms bigeye tuna is the most valuable of the highly migratory species. However, aggregation conceals an important dichotomy within the Atlantic fishery for bigeye tuna. Large adult bigeye are targeted by longline vessels for sale as raw material for high-end products such as sushi, sashimi and seared ahi tuna. Bringing in as much as US$31 per kilogram, it is these individually caught adult bigeye that create the majority of the commercial value for the entire species.1 7 Small, juvenile bigeye are caught by purse seines and baitboats incidentally with skipjack and yellowfin tunas that are destined to be sold en masse to canneries for between US$ 500 and 1,500 per metric ton.1 8 The presence of bigeye in these catches does not affect the value. As such, juvenile bigeye are a commercial by-catch to fisheries targeting other small tunas. 1 7 NMFS (2005). 1 8 The market fluctuates by season and year as well as composition o f the catch in terms o f whether it is mainly composed o f skipjack or yellowfin tuna. For instance, the average value per metric ton for skipjack sold to Thai canneries in 2004 was 898 US$. The comparable value for surface catches o f yellowfin tuna was 1,088 US$. Thailand is the world's largest producer o f canned tuna. (FAO GLOBEFISH 2005). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 3.4 shows the breakdown of Atlantic bigeye landings by the three major gear types: longline (targets bigeye directly), purse seine (harvest bigeye indirectly) and baitboat (mixed direct and indirect). Historical data shows that longlines have been the dominant gear in this fishery for almost 40 years. It also shows that longline harvests increased significantly with the higher prices for bigeye that began in the late 1980s. Shares of bigeye captured by other gears also grew in the early 1990s due to the proliferation of Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs), which changed the composition of schools of small tunas.1 9 This double pressure on the stock is largely responsible for the rapid decline in the biomass of Atlantic bigeye in the mid-1990s.2 0 1 9 See Appendix J: Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) for a description o f the operation o f FADs, which, whether natural or manmade serve as natural or aggregation points for the fish and can be fitted with global positioning systems so that fishers can easily relocate a device and the fish school associated with it. 20 See Appendix K: Early Regulation o f Bigeye Tuna. It chronicles the increase in fishing pressure from the rise in prices on adults in the mid-1980s onwards. Growing concern in the recommendations o f the SCRS is also documented as stock assessments show the biomass on a consistently downward trend. However, little discussion was held among Commission members until the m id-1990s, which is covered by Section 3.2. 137 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 91 Figure 3.4: Atlantic Bigeye Landings by Gear 140,000 □ Other □ Bait Boat ■ Purse Seine □ Longline 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 - - 40,000 20,000 - Y e a r Technical aspects of the Atlantic bigeye fishery have important impacts on the economic vulnerability of fishing states as well as the biological abundance of the stock. Most importantly, national fleets tend to be specialized in either longlines that target adult bigeye or surface gears (purse seines and baitboats) that target schools of small tunas. ICCAT member states whose fleets directly target bigeye can be expected to follow the vulnerability patterns described in Section 2.4. In contrast, states whose fleets indirectly target bigeye are not economically vulnerable to increasing competition over the species. Without such vulnerability, those states have no endogenous economic incentive to forego harvests of skipjack and yellowfin in order to protect juvenile bigeye. This can amplify the obstacles to effective 2 1 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 138 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. management because of increased conflict over the distribution of the costs of regulation and vehement objections from states that only capture bigeye incidentally. Figure 3.5 displays the vulnerability matrix for the Atlantic bigeye tuna fishery. The impact of the dichotomy between surface and deepwater gears appears in the Mildly Vulnerable box where the European Community (EC) and Ghana are 22 listed because bigeye is a by-catch to their fleets that target schools of small tunas. In 2002, members of the EC were responsible for 65% of purse seine landings of bigeye tuna and 51% of baitboat landings. Ghana was responsible for only 9% of purse seine landings but 38% of baitboat landings of bigeye that same year. A few other countries do capture bigeye in their surface fisheries, but the relative amounts 9 3 are much smaller, mainly due to geographical location and the use of FADs. Whenever proposed bigeye regulations could impinge on the ability of these states to freely harvest their target stocks, strenuous objections or cost minimizing maneuvers can be expected. While the Commission may run roughshod over a small developing state like Ghana, the EC is a major heavyweight in this arena and its influence is wide-ranging.2 4 2 2 The European Community is a pillar within the European Union structure that has been given the task o f negotiating international treaties and regulations on behalf o f EU member states. The EC became a member o f ICCAT in 1997, replacing individual EU members such as France, Spain, Portugal, etc. (ICCAT 1998, 1:5). 2 3 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 2 4 The EC is one o f the biggest fishing entities in the Atlantic and around the world. Surface fisheries in the Atlantic are dominated by two EC member states, France and Spain. With its fingers in many pies, the EC has multiple sources o f linkage with developing and industrialized countries alike. There is also the significant threat o f defection posed by such a large fishing entity. (Lequesne 2004, 146- 147). 139 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 3.5: Economic Vulnerabilities of States Harvesting Bigeye Tuna Domestic Costs of Production High Low Opportunity costs o f alternatives £ u fa Highly Vulnerable Moderately Vulnerable USA & Canada Group of 18 Early, Strong Response Delayed, Moderate Response Many Gradually Vulnerable Mildly Vulnerable EC & Ghana (b-c) Taiwan & China Aak Dnse Japan Delayed, Moderate Response Late, V Resp< As developing countries that have distant water fleets targeting bigeye, Taiwan and China are also located in the Mildly Vulnerable position in the matrix. In 2002, Taiwan brought in the largest percentage of Atlantic bigeye captured by longlines (38%). China was responsible for 13%.2 5 Although there are pockets of affluence in both of these countries, cheap labor is available along with significant government subsidies for the development of national fleets. In addition, both countries have benefited significantly from transfers of capital due to economic downturn and government regulations on Japanese fleets.2 6 Because of these factors, the Chinese and Taiwanese fleets are highly competitive and could appropriate significant market share under open-access. They are expected to prefer a late, weak 2 5 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 2 6 ICCAT (2001, 1:206-208). 140 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. response to biological depletion when restrictions on longlines are under consideration. Both countries can wield the threat of defection but Taiwan is much less powerful in the ICCAT context because geopolitical factors prevent it from joining the Commission and therefore it has no ability to block consensus.2 7 The entry in the Moderately Vulnerable box in Figure 3.5 may seem cryptic to those who are unfamiliar with politics at ICCAT. The Group of 18 is a set of developing countries that have presented a united front in negotiations of regulations for highly migratory species in the Atlantic, especially those pertaining to bigeye tuna.2 8 The majority of members in the Group have not been historically responsible for large percentages of bigeye harvest. However, most of these countries have considerable interests in developing fisheries for bigeye in their EEZs because of its value in hard currency. Moreover, these countries have a general interest in changing the allocation criteria at ICCAT to recognize the rights of coastal states as well as historical fishing states for all highly migratory species in the Atlantic. Individually, each of these states is susceptible to pressures from the rest of the Commission, especially industrialized countries with control over development assistance. Together, the Group of 18 has been able to use their majority status as leverage within the Commission. 2 7 Taiwan, or Chinese-Taipei as the Chinese insist on calling it, cannot be a member o f the United Nations or its subsidiary bodies under current international law and therefore cannot be a member o f ICCAT. Special cooperating status was developed for Taiwan, but its power is still extremely limited. 2 8 The nomenclature is somewhat misleading. Although the Group o f 18 did originally have 18 members, that number has increased with the recent influx o f developing countries to the Commission. Because this is an informal group, no official list o f members in the Group is available. 2 9 Brazil is the most productive o f the Group o f 18, with 6% o f longline landings o f bigeye tuna in 2002. None o f the other developing coastal states come close to that mark. The majority, like Venezuela (0.08%) and Uruguay (0.15%), capture less than 0.2% o f the total longline harvests o f bigeye. (ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database). 3 0 As o f December 2004, there are 41 members o f the commission, 28 o f whom could be classified as developing coastal states. These large numbers prevent historical fishing states from simply opting to 141 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Japan is the only member of ICCAT in the Gradually Vulnerable category for bigeye tuna. With very high costs of labor, Japan has not been able to maintain its dominance in the production of Atlantic bigeye. In 2002, Japan captured only 34% of the longlined bigeye in the Atlantic. That figure is down from a peak of 68% in 1989, due both to reduced Japanese landings and increasing harvests by fleets from T 1 other countries. Furthermore, because Atlantic bigeye is itself a secondary alternative to other stocks of bigeye and bluefin tuna for the Japanese fleets, Japan will become vulnerable earlier than it would if other stocks have not already been used up. In spite of its economic vulnerability in this fishery, Japan remains a powerful force within the Commission. Like the EC, Japan has multiple avenues by which it can influence other contracting parties. Most important of these is Japan's role as the largest consumer of sushi and sashimi quality bigeye in the world. It is the Japanese market that pays the highest prices for longline caught bigeye and closure of this market to a national fleet can be devastating.3 2 Finally, the United States and Canada occupy the Highly Vulnerable section of Figure 3.5 because both countries have high domestic costs of production in combination with coastal fleets that have few opportunity costs of alternatives. Although the United States only captures about 1% of longlined bigeye in the Atlantic, that small amount is quite important to its domestic fleets. US longliners vote on a measure when developing countries choose to block consensus. See Appendix G: ICCAT Member States by Date o f Ratification. 3 1 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 3 2 Japan has taken in almost 100% o f all bigeye imports over the recorded history o f the fishery. At the peak o f the market in 1999, Japanese imports o f bigeye were valued at upwards o f U S$950,000. (FAO Commodities Production 1976-2001 Database). The current analysis focuses solely on commercial fishing interests as determinants o f national policy but it is likely that its interest in maintaining the availability o f bigeye for domestic consumption has increased governmental concern somewhat in Japan. 142 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. started targeting bigeye seasonally along its northeastern coast once the price of the fish began to rise in the 1980s. Those catches became even more important in the 1990s as prices of alternative stocks such as swordfish dropped, causing US longline revenues to decline as well.3 3 During that same period, ICCAT adopted new regulations that limited access to both Western bluefin tuna and North Atlantic swordfish for US fishermen.3 4 Canada catches an even smaller percentage of Atlantic bigeye, but the same political and economic forces have negatively impacted its fleets.3 5 Having already tasted the bitterness of economic decline in these two alternative fisheries, US and Canadian policy makers should be doubly wary when approaching bigeye regulations. As the most vulnerable, the US and/or Canada are expected to be first to bring up the issue of biological depletion of Atlantic bigeye. In addition, they should continue to push for the most stringent regulatory actions throughout negotiations on bigeye management at ICCAT. However, their formidable power in most international circles is curtailed here because they harvest so little of this stock. In addition, because bigeye remains a small alternative source 3 3 US swordfish landings from the Atlantic and Gulf o f M exico peaked at U S$30.8 million in 1988 and quickly dropped to U S$20.6 million by 1992. The decline continued until 1998 and US landings o f Atlantic swordfish have varied around the US$10 million since then. (NMFS Annual Commercial Landings Statistics Database). 3 4 The first serious limits on Western bluefin tuna were adopted in 1992. (ICCAT 2005a, rec. 91-1). The first limits for North Atlantic swordfish were adopted in 1994. (ICCAT 2005a, res. 94-4). 3 5 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. Catch limits on Western bluefin and North Atlantic swordfish were specified for Canada as well as United States. Canada became especially interested in bigeye tuna when the stock shifted northward, making it more accessible to coastal Canadian fleets in the late 1990s. (ICCAT 2000, 1:177). Therefore, they are not expected to be vocal as early on as the United States. 3 6 There is a common norm in international fisheries that the states targeting a stock should have proportional influence on its management according to their economic dependence and share o f the total catch. References to this norm were often made by both large and small fishing states as I observed at multiple meetings o f regional fisheries organizations. 143 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. of revenue for a relatively minor industry, these countries would be unwilling to make substantial linkages outside of the international fisheries arena.3 7 They are curtailed by both international norms and domestic budget constraints. Several important predictions can be made based on these combined observations regarding economic vulnerability and international power within the bigeye fishery. Although the timing or strength of measures cannot be pinpointed, these five general expectations can be tested: • As highly vulnerable states, the US and/or Canada will be the first to raise concerns regarding biological depletion of bigeye, possibly even before scientific assessment shows that the biomass has fallen below the level that will support MSY. • Japan will begin pushing for protection of juveniles early on but will gradually become the driving force behind limitations on longlines as the stock reaches moderate levels of overexploitation. • While the Group of 18 will not oppose bigeye regulations per se, they can be expected to block allocation of quotas until provided with sufficient room to develop their fleets and take advantage of their comparative advantages as. • China and Taiwan will resist any regulations that limit their ability to exploit bigeye tuna, either via consensus blocking (China only) or noncompliance. Transfers and/or punitive measures will be necessary to gain the cooperation of these states and to ensure the effectiveness of longline regulations. 3 7 Weber (2002, 200). 144 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. • Because of defensive maneuvers from the EC and Ghana, measures to protect juvenile bigeye that impact surface fisheries for tropical tunas will be much less successful than limitations on longlines. As per the discussion in Section 2.4, these expectations will be tested against the actual behavior of commission members and the outcomes of annual negotiations of management measures at ICCAT. Subsection 3.2.1 covers the conflicts over the allocation of costs and benefits that delayed management response until biological depletion was quite severe. Subsection 3.2.2 covers the concessions made by more vulnerable states that finally allowed the Commission to overcome those obstacles to consensus. 3.2.1 Conflicts over Costs Over the first two decades of ICCAT history, bigeye tuna was considered underexploited in the Atlantic. This status quickly changed with the economic and technological transformations of the fishery that were mentioned in Section 3.1. Scientific assessments of the bigeye stock by ICCAT's Subcommittee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) moved gradually from slightly underexploited in 1990 O O severely overfished in 1998. Conflicts over the allocation of the costs of 3 8 SCRS estimated the stock was fully-exploited in 1994 and somewhat overexploited in 1996. (ICCAT 1991, 154; ICCAT 1995, 2:168; ICCAT 1997, 2:23; ICCAT 2000, 2:26). There is evidence to suggest that the stock was depleted even more quickly than is reflected in the ICCAT reports due to a high level o f unreported catch by non-contracting parties and others using flags o f convenience; Maritime law requires all vessels to exhibit the “flag” o f their port state when they are at sea. In many countries, fishers must comply with various regulations, including labor, environmental and resource management laws and pay fees in order to receive a “flag”. However, there are some small developing countries that have sold their flags rather cheaply and with no strings attached. These are known as providers o f flags o f convenience, sought after by some fishers in order to avoid more stringent regulations elsewhere. (FAO 2002a, 65). 145 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. management were the major impediment to prevention of biological depletion in this fishery. Specifically, there were three arenas of contention over bigeye management measures: • Protection of Adults Versus Juveniles • Historical Versus Coastal and Developing Allocation Criteria • Restriction of Developing Distant Water Fleets It is not surprising that these obstacles mirror the national incentives of more versus less vulnerable states. Economically vulnerable members like the USA and eventually Japan benefit from the elimination of open-access, but only under certain terms. None of these countries is altruistic. Only increasing competition and growing recession in a domestic fishing fleet will lead the Commission to effective management. As would be expected from such a highly vulnerable state, in 1992 the US was the first to suggest that restrictions on bigeye landings might be necessary, citing the SCRS assessment that recent landings were above maximum sustainable yield.3 9 Interestingly, this occurred before SCRS even recommended that catches should be limited. Instead, scientific advice favored full implementation of the 3.2 kg size limit for bigeye tuna that had been adopted in the 1970s to eliminate confusion with a similar regulation on yellowfin tuna.4 0 A decade or so later, studies showed that reducing fishing mortality on the small fish could increase maximum sustainable yield by improving the yield per recruit, which would allow for a larger take of adult 3 9 ICCAT (1993, 93). 40 See Appendix H: ICCAT Size Limits. It chronicles the adoption o f size limits for yellowfin tuna, then the most valuable highly migratory species in the Atlantic and the subsequent adoption o f size limits for bigeye tuna in order to prevent misreporting o f undersized yellowfin. 146 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. bigeye.4 1 As it had been throughout the history of discussion on bigeye size limits, Ghana was vociferous in its objections to this scientific advice because it was impossible to implement without reducing Ghanaian harvests of tropical tunas in the Gulf of Guinea 4 2 In 1992, Japan was unwilling to recognize the possibility that bigeye was overexploited, but by 1994, it was concerned enough to begin pushing for three measures: research into the effects of fish aggregating devices (FADs), reductions in Taiwanese catches and the extension of management measures to non-contracting parties.4 3 Such attempts to place the burden of management costs on other shoulders are typical of early actions by more vulnerable states and are predicted by the bounded rationality assumptions of the vulnerability response model.4 4 Of course, less vulnerable states will not simply acquiesce to the demands of more vulnerable states. Hence the vigorous rebuttal of Japanese demands by Spain (EC) and Taiwan respectively 4 5 Non-contracting parties have little voice at the Commission, but they continued to harvest irrespective of ICCAT regulations.4 6 4 1 ICCAT (1992, 107). 4 2 ICCAT (1993, 93). The Gulf o f Guinea is a major fishing ground for tropical tunas, including bigeye. It is also the only region in which Ghana's coastal fleets can operate. As will be seen in Section 3.3 Mixed Surface Fisheries: Management without Biological Depletion, this plays an important role in the protection o f juvenile bigeye. 4 3 ICCAT (1993, 93) and ICCAT (1995, 1:169). Ghana had begun to push against FADs in 1992, but by 1994 its fleets had begun using the technology. China had not yet begun targeting bigeye in the Atlantic, so it was not yet active at ICCAT. 44 See Section2.1 Simplifying Assumptions. 4 5 ICCAT (1995, 1:169). The EC did not become a member o f ICCAT until 1997. Before that individual EC member states represented themselves and the Commission. Interestingly, Portugal, with its small fishery targeting bigeye, agreed with Japan on FADs. However, since the consolidation o f EC membership, the interests o f the two largest fishing countries, France and Spain, have dominated positions taken by the Community. 46 This is indicated by the Panama and not elsewhere included (NEI) landings in Figure 3.6: Longline Landings o f Bigeye Tuna. 147 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. No measures were taken at the 1994 meeting of ICCAT and by 1995 scientific assessments of Atlantic bigeye showed that the stock biomass was at 90- 92% of the level that would support MSY. With reported landings well above MSY, conflict over management measures intensified but the dividing lines remained the same.4 7 Japan proposed restriction of purse seine and baitboat landings as well as time-area closures on FADs. With their large purse seine fleets, Spain and France (EC) countered that longlines take the majority of the catch of bigeye tuna and should therefore make the largest cuts. As is expected of a highly vulnerable state, the US supported both proposals, even though reductions of longline harvests would affect their domestic fleets negatively. Caught on the sidelines, Taiwan was pressed by all sides to decrease its longline effort, which had been increasing recently due to shifts from the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In the end, consensus was reached on a non-binding resolution (proposed by Spain) that urged countries to reduce their catches below MSY and set up observation programs to study the effects of Fish Aggregating Devices and catches of undersized fish 4 9 SCRS stock assessments showed that bigeye was at 70-120% of the level that would support MSY in 1996, but little else changed that year.5 0 Reported landings were down slightly in 1995, but the SCRS advice remained in favor of a reduction in catch to below MSY (60,000-70,000 mt) and protection of juvenile fish (<3.2 kg).5 1 4 7 ICCAT (1996, 2:18). Reported landings were 31,000 mt above the highest estimate o f MSY. 4 8 ICCAT (1996 1:148-150). 49 ICCAT (2005a, res. 95-8). 50 ICCAT (1997, 2:23). The Commission did formally move bigeye from Panel 4 to Panel 1 in recognition o f its close interactions with yellowfin and skipjack tunas in tropical waters. Also, Panel 4 was getting over-worked with two important species, swordfish and bigeye, while Panel 1 was relatively unencumbered since there was little controversy surrounding yellowfin and skipjack. Moving bigeye would redistribute the workload more evenly. (ICCAT 1997, 1:48). 5 1 ICCAT (1997, 2:23). 148 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Discussions again centered on who should bear the costs of restrictions, longlines or surface fleets. There was a slight movement on the part of gradually vulnerable Japan in that it seriously proposed reducing landings from all gear types, including longlines. However, Japan was not yet willing to make sacrifices that were not matched or exceeded by regulations on surface fisheries.5 2 Therefore, ICCAT remained in a practical impasse. A binding recommendation was adopted, but it only extended the data collection programs instigated the year before.5 3 Continued high catches of both adults and juvenile bigeye tuna further reduced the biomass of the stock to 6 0 -8 0 % of B msy by 1 9 9 7 .5 4 Recognizing the uncertainty in their conclusions, SCRS recommended that the Commission reduce catches to not more than 8 5 ,0 0 0 mt for 1 9 9 8 . They further insisted that continued high catches of undersized fish would severely harm future abundance of the stock.5 5 In line with its previous positions, the US proposed a 2 0 % reduction in all landings of bigeye tuna, but conflicts among other members of the Commission again prevented a serious management response.5 6 However, quite a few other important 5 2 ICCAT (1997, 1:127-131). 5 3 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 96-1) The Panel also discussed the creation o f a special Bigeye Year Program to study this economically important fish, which is still one o f the least understood o f the larger tunas. Many members approved o f the goals o f the program but did not like the US$2.2 million price tag. France and Spain were in favor o f the program no matter what the cost. (ICCAT 1997, 1:131). 5 4 Since reported landings remained above 100,000 mt in 1996 and effort was up to 150-200% o f the optimal level, it was clear that the 1995 resolution had not been effective. Nor was there improvement in the application o f the 1979 size limit, since 70% o f the total catch was < 3 .2 kg. (ICCAT 1996, 2:22-24). Because the biomass was already below the level that could support MSY, catches o f that magnitude would continue to deplete the stock until it was rebuilt. In order to get the stock back to a size that would support MSY, the Commission would have to reduce fishing mortality to a level below the replacement yield (60,000-80,000 mt). On the positive side, revised historical data from Taiwan lead to the upward revision o f M SY to 70,000-90,000 mt. (ICCAT 1998, 2:31). Replacement yield is the amount o f fish that can be caught without reducing the biomass o f the stock. It is basically equal to the surplus production o f the stock. M SY is itself a replacement yield when the biomass is at a level high enough to support such a yield. 5 5 ICCAT (1998, 2:30). 5 6 ICCAT (1998, 1:152). 149 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. changes occurred at the 1997 meeting of the Commission. Although it maintained calls for reduction of juvenile catches, Japan finally began pressing for limits on longline effort irrespective of actions taken on surface fisheries. Concomitantly, the main debate shifted away from the old dispute between surface and longline fleets to a conflict between historical and developing fishing states. With longline regulations looming, Brazil, a leader of the Group of 18, began to speak out against restrictions on the capacity of developing countries. China also 57 entered the discussion with similar objections to proposed vessel limits. As an initial step toward excluding or limiting the effort of new entrants, Japan proposed the creation of a “white list” of vessels that were properly registered and controlled by ICCAT member states or cooperating non-contracting parties. In order to gain the cooperation of these less vulnerable states, concessions were made to exempt most co , developing countries. Moderate concessions were also made to Taiwan in return for its cooperation. Although ICCAT still adopted a non-binding resolution that limited Taiwan’s 1998 catches of bigeye tuna in the Atlantic to 16,500 mt, behind the scenes negotiations added 4,500 mt to Japan’s original proposal of a 12,000 mt quota as per the 1995 resolution on effort reduction.5 9 These were the first steps 5 7 ICCAT (1998, 1:151). 5 8 ICCAT (1998, 1:151-152). Several alternatives were considered, but the binding recommendation that was finally adopted required contracting parties and cooperating non-contracting parties to provide the Secretariat with information only on their vessels targeting bigeye that were greater than 80 gross registered tons. (ICCAT 2005a, rec. 97-13). 5 9 ICCAT (2005a, res. 97-15). This reduction requirement was instituted because Taiwan’s landings o f bigeye had rocketed from 1,000 mt in 1989 to 25,000 mt in 1996. O f course, Taiwan expressed severe reservations regarding the resolution, but could do little more at official levels because it is not a member o f ICCAT. Although it has one o f the largest fleets in the Atlantic, Taiwan has been unable to join the Commission due to objections from China regarding its status as an independent state. (ICCAT 1998, 1:151). 150 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. toward placation of moderately and mildly vulnerable countries by gradually vulnerable Japan. No new stock assessment was conducted for bigeye tuna in 1998, but SCRS reiterated its earlier advice to limit catches and decrease fishing mortality on juveniles.6 0 The Commission was able to build on its previous initiatives by instructing contracting parties and cooperating non-contracting parties to reduce or limit the number of commercial fishing vessels greater than 24 meters in length targeting bigeye to the level of the average number of such boats targeting that species in 1991 and 1992 for the next year.6 1 Much as in 1997, due to vehement objections from Brazil and other moderately vulnerable states, the 1998 recommendation exempted some developing countries by creating an exception for those states who landed less than 2,000 mt on average over the previous five years. Also, Taiwan’s quota o f 16,500 mt was extended for the period. The operating principle of this recommendation was that by restraining the number of vessels permitted to catch bigeye tuna, effort would be limited and catches would go down to the earlier levels. In addition, a non-binding resolution was adopted that asked SCRS to develop rebuilding scenarios for the bigeye stock, with special focus on size 6 0 ICCAT (1999, 2:31). Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties are hard to define. The term was originally developed to provide a place for Taiwan, but other countries have since tried to fit under this umbrella. The Commission itself is still trying to decide how to deal with the issue. 6 1 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 98-3). 6 2 ICCAT (1999, 1:139). A few ancillary measures were taken in 1998 as well. To facilitate the new capacity restrictions, another binding recommendation was adopted that amended the previous year’s “white list” to require annual reporting o f vessels o f more than 24 meters length licensed to target bigeye. The 1998 recommendation went further by also requesting contracting parties and cooperating non-contracting parties to provide the Secretariat with any information they may have regarding unlisted vessels observed catching bigeye. (ICCAT 2005a, rec. 98-2). 151 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. composition of the catch. Proposed by the USA with support from Canada, this resolution was not heartily welcomed by others, but was not strongly objected to either. Less vulnerable states, especially the EC and Japan, expressed the hope that the capacity limits, combined with a time-area closure on FADs would be sufficient to rebuild the biomass.6 4 This latter management measure was proposed by the EC, for reasons that will be discussed more in Section 3.3. The recommendation established a closed season for fish aggregating devices in the Gulf of Guinea from November 1, 1999 to January 31, 2000, purportedly to protect juvenile tropical tunas in this well-known spawning area.6 5 As it turned out, the 1998 regulations were not as effective as some countries had hoped. In 1999 landings of Atlantic bigeye tuna were just over 120,000 mt, the highest since the peak in 1994.6 6 SCRS also warned that the situation was close to recruitment overfishing, which is in itself a precursor to stock collapse.6 7 In spite of these dire warnings, little was accomplished regarding bigeye tuna in 1999. The USA did present a proposal to gradually reduce the total allowable catch down to 80,000 mt in three years while allowing for trade restrictive measures on states found to be out of compliance with bigeye regulations. However, there was a pervasive “wait and see” attitude that stemmed partly from the newness of the regulations already in place and partly from the wider conflict between historically active and 6 3 ICCAT (2005a, res. 98-16). 6 4 ICCAT (1999, 1:140). 6 5 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 98-1). 6 6 SCRS had been able to revise landings data using Japanese trade statistics to calculate estimates o f unreported landings and now recognized that catches had been well above MSY since 1991, rather than 1994. (ICCAT 2000, 2:26). 6 7 ICCAT (2002, 2:27). On a positive note, the proportion o f undersized fish in the catch had gone down to an average o f 55% per year over the period from 1996 to 1998 and Taiwan had complied with its established quota o f 16,500 mt. 152 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. developing coastal fishing states.6 8 Using the regulation of bigeye tuna and other stocks as leverage, the Group of 18 had finally opened an official dialogue on their concerns via the new Working Group on Allocation Criteria. They were unwilling to agree on further catch or effort restrictions until the outcome of that working group was known.6 9 By 2000, the exceptionally high landings from 1998 and 1999 were reported to the Commission, making it clear that the recommendations already in place were not effective. There was no new scientific assessment that year, but SCRS did point out that recent high catches had probably depressed the biomass of bigeye in the Atlantic even farther. In response to this advice, Japan and the USA presented a joint proposal to limit landings of bigeye to 80,000 mt as per SCRS advice. Canada supported the proposal, but the EC was against it, citing the multi-species nature of their fishery and a preference for enforcement of measures already in place. Again, the breakdown between countries fishing with different gear types came to the fore. Those contracting parties in favor of the lower total allowable catch targeted the more valuable adult bigeye with longlines, while those against were engaged in 6 8 ICCAT (2000, 1:167-169). Due to lags in data reporting, the Commission was not yet aware o f the exceptionally high catches reported in 1999, nor could SCRS provide detailed rebuilding plans for the fishery due to a lack o f basic biological data. Given that the Bigeye Year Program had finally begun in 1998, with substantially less funding than had originally been requested, some countries felt that ICCAT should wait to see what effect the 1998 vessel limit had on landings and give SCRS time to collect and analyze data before taking new measures. 6 9 ICCAT (2000, 1:167-169). The Working Group was put together in response to conflicts that had arisen in the context o f two other ICCAT stocks, bluefin tuna and South Atlantic swordfish. Landings o f both species were already limited by quota systems, and it was the criteria for setting each state’s allotment o f the total allowable catch that had caused friction between contracting parties. Countries that had historically high catch levels, such as the USA, Japan and the EC, believed that quota allocations should be based on past catch levels. On the other hand, countries that were still trying to develop fisheries for highly migratory species, like Brazil, Venezuela and South Africa, believed that other criteria should be considered. They wanted recognition for coastal states rights o f access as well as economic and nutritional dependence on a given stock, and were willing to block management measures until their concerns were addressed. 153 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. surface fisheries that targeted mainly yellowfin and skipjack. In the end the less vulnerable party won out. Taking into consideration the EC’s concerns, Japan put forward a second proposal for a binding recommendation that again called on contracting and cooperating parties to limit their catches to the average 1991 and 1992 level.7 0 North-south issues cropped up as well. Although no agreement had been reached on allocation criteria, developing coastal states were able to negotiate for an exemption from the recommendation on catch limits. Specifically, contracting and cooperating parties that had caught less than 2,100 mt of bigeye in 1999 were not required to limit their catches in 2001. As in the past, Taiwan was instructed to keep its catches at 16,500 mt with a maximum of 125 vessels, but specific limits were also established for China (4,000 mt and 30 vessels) and the Philippines (5 vessels). Again, Japan lead the charge against these countries, alleging that the growth in China’s fleet was due to the movement of formerly unregistered vessels that had been pushed out o f the Taiwanese fleet. China did not deny the charge but held that its actions had been lawful and compliant with ICCAT recommendations. In spite of its demand for a quota of 6,000 mt, China was allocated 4,000 mt. Although they chose not to block the consensus, the Chinese did warn that they might have to 7 1 formally object to the recommendation. At the turn of the millennia, ICCAT had made some progress on management measures for bigeye tuna, but the effectiveness of these regulations was undermined by conflicts between more and less vulnerable fishing states. However, as biological 7 0 ICCAT (2000, 1: 191). 7 1 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 00-1). Recommendation {00-1} established effort limits for only a single year, but similar recommendations have been adopted every year since. 154 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. depletion became more severe, increases in governmental concern can be identified on the parts of highly vulnerable states like the US and Canada and gradually vulnerable Japan. As governmental concern grew among these countries, they became more willing to accommodate the demands of the moderately vulnerable Group of 18 and mildly vulnerable China and Taiwan. Although states with longline fleets continued to pressure the hardly vulnerable EC and Ghana to reduce their landings of small bigeye, they no longer predicated regulation of adult fish on protection of juveniles. The next subsection discusses changes that reduced the importance of these conflicts and improved the effectiveness of management of longlines. Regulation of surface fisheries will be dealt with in Section 3.3. 3.2.2 Overcoming Obstacles As Figure 3.6 shows, ICCAT was quite successful at decreasing reported landings of bigeye tuna from 2000 onward. By 2002, harvests had dropped to around 73,000 mt, 26,000 mt below the total allowable catch, and landings in the Not 7 9 Elsewhere Included (NEI) category had all but disappeared. Also, in its 2004 assessment, SCRS reported that the stock biomass had rebuilt to between 85-107% 73 of the level needed to support maximum sustainable yield. Interestingly, the specific limits on bigeye tuna production did not change much from 1998-2003. Instead, changes in fishing practices and therefore in stock biomass were brought about by the implementation of monitoring and enforcement measures. Highly vulnerable contracting parties also chose to work bilaterally with developing states to 7 2 ICCAT (2004, 2:36-37). 7 3 ICCAT (2005b). The 2004 assessment also showed that fishing mortality was at 73-101% o f the level that would produce maximum sustainable yield. 155 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. control entry into the fishery. Adoption and implementation of effective bigeye regulations hinged on concessions from more vulnerable states as growing depletion created recession in a domestic fishing fleet for the domestic fisheries of the US, Canada and especially Japan. Figure 3.6: Longline Landings of Bigeye Tuna7 4 90.000 80.000 70.000 60.000 Kfi e {2 50,000 0 1 40,000 S 30.000 20.000 10,000 0 Year NEI stands for Not Elsewhere Included and designates landings that are not associated with a reporting country While the measures adopted at ICCAT's 1997 meeting did not reduce landings or rebuild biomass, there was a definite shift in the dialogue regarding effort limitations. Specifically, topics like over-capacity and flags of convenience came up for the first time in the bigeye context. Japan was especially adamant that capacity was at the heart of the overfishing problem and that movement to flags of 7 4 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 156 ■ Other □ U.S.S.R ■ Taiwan □ Panama ■ NEI □ Korea H China □ Brazil ■ Japan Panama China R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. convenience would have to be prevented if limits on contracting parties were to be nc t 4 effective. The roots of the Japanese concern can be seen clearly in Figure 3.6, 7 f \ which shows reported longline landings of bigeye tuna by country. While harvests of adult bigeye increased markedly from 1989 onward, the Japanese share in production fluctuated until 1994 and then went into a steep decline. Increases in landings by longlines from Taiwan, Panama, China and the Not Elsewhere Included (NEI) category crowded historical fleets such as the Japanese and the Koreans out of the market.7 7 High levels of catch in the NEI category were especially disconcerting to some members of the Commission, since these reflected harvests by fishers who 78 were not associated with any particular flag state. With such large catches by non-contracting parties, many ICCAT members saw the inherent benefits in assuring that regulations apply to all fishing entities, especially flag of convenience states like Panama and NEI vessels. Similar monitoring and enforcement measures were previously developed by ICCAT to deal with problems related to the overexploitation of bluefin tuna, by far the priciest of the species under the Commission's jurisdiction. Over the years, the Commission had been refining its system for dealing with monitoring and enforcement issues, including the establishment of the Permanent Working Group for the Improvement of ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures (PWG) in 1992 and the ICCAT 7 5 ICCAT (1998, 1:151). 7 6 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 7 7 In fact, a combination o f increased competition and economic troubles at home lead to the almost complete cessation o f Korean longlining for bigeye in the Atlantic by 1991. (ICCAT 1993, 2:141). 7 8 Fleets in the NEI categories are not represented at the Commission, and therefore have no direct impact on management. However, as long as these states contribute to the level o f competition in a fishery, they speed up vulnerability response. Furthermore, excluding NEI fleets carries little to no negotiations costs since they have no power at the Commission. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 70 Conservation and Management Measures Compliance Committee in 1995. Basically, PWG collects information and decides on trade measures to punish noncompliance by non-contracting parties and the Compliance Committee serves the same purpose when dealing with infractions by contracting parties to the Commission. The first trade measures for bigeye tuna were undertaken in accordance with the 1998 Resolution by ICCAT concerning the unreported and unregulated catches O A o f tunas by large-scale longline vessels in the Convention area (IUU Resolution). This resolution set up a system whereby longline vessels of greater than 24 m that fish in the Convention Area in contravention of ICCAT management measures could be identified, along with their flag states. Moreover, any state found to be a haven for Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) vessels could be instructed to alter their domestic management system to come into compliance with ICCAT regulations pertaining to large-scale longlines. If a state so identified failed to make significant improvements within a year, further action, including nondiscriminatory trade measures, could be taken by the Commission on the recommendation of either PWG O 1 or the Compliance Committee. Like the "white list" of longline vessels that was started in 1997, the 1998 IUU resolution exempted small-scale fishing boats in 8 9 deference to demands from the moderately vulnerable Group of 18. In 1999, PWG sent letters of identification under the IUU Resolution to eight non-contracting parties: Belize, Cambodia, Honduras, Kenya, the Philippines, Sierra 7 9 ICCAT (2005a, res. 92-2) and ICCAT (2005a, oth. 95-15). 8 0 Coined in the late 1990s, the Commission generally uses the term to IUU to refer to any fishing activity that takes place in contravention o f ICCAT recommendations, or is misreported to the Secretariat. 8 1 ICCAT (2005a, res. 98-18). 8 2 ICCAT (1998 1:151-152). 158 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Leone, Singapore and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, notifying them of IUU activities undertaken by vessels flying their flags. The next year, PWG agreed to instruct all contracting parties and cooperating non-contracting parties to prohibit imports of bigeye tuna from Belize, Cambodia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Honduras was given an extra year to complete the modifications of its management policies while no actions were taken against the Philippines or Sierra Leone.8 3 Similar action was taken by the Compliance Committee against a single state: C iA Equatorial Guinea. Interestingly, this contracting party had not sent a delegation to either the 1999 meeting of the commission, when it was identified, or the 2000 Of meeting, when sanctions were imposed. Although each non-contracting party was afforded a chance to explain itself in PWG, without either the ability to vote or truly significant capacity to undermine ICCAT management measures, there was little that the individual states could do other than strive to comply with the demands of the Commission. Also in 2000, a supplemental resolution was passed that urged and supported cooperation between Japan, China and Taiwan in order to reduce IUU fishing on Q /T bigeye tunas. As a gradually vulnerable fishing state and major consumer of high quality bigeye, Japan has spearheaded several of the moves to enforce ICCAT catch limits. An added incentive has been the fact that a large portion of the IUU fleet is comprised of former Japanese vessels that moved on to Taiwan or other countries once Japan began cutting its production and reducing its domestic tuna operations. 8 3 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 00-15). The states sanctioned were Belize, Cambodia, Honduras, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 8 4 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 00-16). 8 5 ICCAT (2000, vol. 1) and ICCAT (2001, vol. 1). 8 6 ICCAT (2005a, res. 00-2). 159 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Indeed, by pushing for stricter recommendations, as well as supplying trade data and lists of vessels they identified as IUU, the Japanese delegation was the major 87 motivating force behind most of the actions taken to control IUU activities. However, because these two states by themselves have the ability to undermine bigeye management measures, Japan and the rest of the Commission have had to engage mildly vulnerable China and Taiwan with positive as well as negative • 8 8 incentives to discourage IUU fishing. Japan has consistently put public pressure on Taiwan and China to reduce their effort in the Atlantic and other oceans, but they have also worked bilaterally with these states to develop practical means of obtaining that end. For instance, in 2001, Japan and Taiwan announced a joint effort to scrap 62 Japanese built, large- scale longliners that were identified as IUU vessels. They also agreed to work together on the re-registration of 67 other IUU vessels in the Taiwanese fleet by O Q t 2005. Also in 2001, Japan announced that it would work with China to stem the flow of secondhand IUU vessels that had flooded the Chinese fleet after they were pushed out of Taiwan.9 0 In return for their cooperation, the Chinese and Taiwanese would receive a portion of the Japanese bigeye quota once IUU elements had successfully been removed from their fleets. The first of such side payments occurred in 2003, when ICC AT adopted a resolution that temporarily transferred 1,250 mt of Japanese quota each to China and Taiwan.9 1 87ICCAT (2000, 1:117). 8 8 For instance, China officially objected to the 2000 Recommendation that limited its landings o f bigeye to 4,000 mt, setting its own autonomous quota at 7,300 mt for 2001. (ICCAT2002, 1:323-325). 8 9 ICCAT (2002, 1:322). 9 0 ibid., 323. 9 1 ICCAT (2005a, res. 03-02). 160 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Along with the sanctions and side payments that were meant to influence fishers through their flag states, in 2002, ICCAT also established a Statistical Document Program (SDP) for bigeye that would directly impact the ability of IUU Q 9 fishers to benefit from the practice. Modeled after a similar program set up for bluefin, the bigeye SDP was designed to create a paper trail that would begin with the validation of a catch by the flag state of a longline vessel and move with the fish through each point of trade. ICCAT contracting parties were instructed to require that these documents be produced whenever bigeye was imported into their markets. Considering that the major markets for bigeye tuna all exist within ICCAT member states, such trade measures are quite restrictive. Without an authorized statistical document, no longline-caught bigeye tuna can be legally sold in the international 93 marketplace. Of course, illegal sales of bigeye tuna do continue, since the high price for the species creates incentives for such risky behavior as smuggling and fish laundering.9 4 In the past three years, ICCAT has continued to focus steadily on identifying sources of IUU catches of bigeye tuna and eliminating them. Sanctions have been levied on several other non-contracting parties, including Bolivia, Sierra Leone and Georgia.9 5 Further measures have also been taken to refine the statistical document program for bigeye tuna and Japan continues to work with Taiwan, China and other states to scrap vessels and break ties with IUU vessel owners. The results of the 9 2 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 00-22 and rec. 01-21). 9 3 ibid., rec. 92-1. 9 4 Fish laundering is a term coined by the Japanese themselves. It refers to the transshipment o f fish through ICCAT member states in order to obtain statistical documents that falsely attribute the catch to a legal source, much like money-laundering. 9 5 Sanctions have only been lifted for one country, Honduras. This occurred in 2002, the year after Honduras joined the Commission. (ICCAT 2005a, rec. 02-18). 161 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Commission's efforts are obvious in the decline of reported landings since 1999 and recent estimates of stock biomass for Atlantic bigeye.9 6 Less transparent are the costs that contracting parties have paid in order to successfully enforce management measures. Aside from bureaucratic costs associated with maintenance of vessel lists and statistical document programs, members can also be negatively impacted by increased scrutiny on their own fleets' fishing activities. With the widespread acceptance of multilateral punitive mechanisms, the risk that even strong contracting parties like the EC, Japan and the US could face trade measures for failure to comply Q7 with ICCAT regulations looms closer than ever before. This helps to explain why the adoption and implementation of such measures were postponed until bigeye was severely depleted and more vulnerable states had begun to loose market share. The brief but rich history of recession in a domestic fishing fleet and management response for fisheries targeting bigeye tuna directly substantiates the vulnerability response model presented in Chapter 2. States in each category of vulnerability behaved as predicted in the introduction to this section. Moreover, there was a clearly increasing trend in the level of governmental concern expressed by highly vulnerable (Canada and the US) and gradually vulnerable (Japan) states in terms of their willingness to shoulder the costs of regulation. As expected, both moderately vulnerable (Group of 18) and mildly vulnerable (China and Taiwan) states received concessions and side payments from more vulnerable states in order to gamer their cooperation. However, it should be noted that the success of recent 9 6 See Figure 3.3: ICCAT Reported Landings and Most Recent Estimate o f MSY, and Figure 3.5: Economic Vulnerabilities o f States Harvesting Bigeye Tuna. 9 7 Currently, members are protected from and enforcement mechanisms by their ability to block consensus or formally object to management measures. It is unlikely that these aspects o f the contractual environment will change any time soon. See Subsection 1.2.2. 162 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. monitoring and enforcement mechanisms was facilitated by the high percentage of landings by non-contracting parties. With precedents already in place, it was relatively easy for the Commission to exclude outsiders. Continued sustainable management might be more difficult, especially if prices for bigeye rebound.9 8 3.3 Mixed Surface Fisheries: Management without Biological Depletion While ICCAT made progress on the regulation of longline fisheries targeting bigeye tuna, discussions on management of surface fisheries continued as well. In fact, in 1997, France and Spain, two of the most important countries targeting small tropical tunas, unilaterally adopted a three-month time-area closure on the use of artificial fish aggregating devices (FADs) in the Gulf of Guinea, an important nursery area for yellowfin and bigeye.9 9 Subsequently, the EC proposed and ICCAT adopted the extension of this closure to all fishing states using FADs.1 0 0 At first, these moves might seem contrary to assumptions regarding member state behavior as laid out in Section 3.2, since the EC should not be economically vulnerable in regards to the availability of small bigeye. However, surface fisheries targeting small tunas are composed of fleets with their own economic and geopolitical dynamics. This section will briefly review important aspects of this fishery and show how recent regulations stemmed from internal forces more than pressures from longline states targeting adult bigeye and yellowfin.1 0 1 9 8 Economic recession in Japan contributed to falling prices for bigeye around the turn o f the millennium. This served to increase competitiveness in the fishery as per Section 2.2 Globalization and Fisheries Economics. (FAO Commodities Production 1976-2001 Database). 99 ICCAT (1998, 1:175-176). 1 0 0 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 96-1, rec. 98-1, and rec. 99-1). 1 0 1 For a look at the historical regulation o f juvenile yellowfin and bigeye, see Appendix H: ICCAT Size Limits, and Appendix I: Early Discussions on Yellowfin. Interestingly, yellowfin tuna was the first to be regulated by the Commission in the early 1970s when it was also the most valuable stock R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. As was noted in Section 3.2, the EC and Ghana are the two largest producers of small tropical tunas in the Atlantic. As an industrialized country with substantial distant water capabilities, the EC fits into the gradually vulnerable category in the • 109 economic vulnerability matrix for this fishery (Figure 3.7). As a developing country, Ghana has access to cheap labor and other inputs, but its fleets are technologically confined to its coastal waters in the Gulf of Guinea. Therefore, 1 0 9 Ghana fits into the moderately vulnerable category. Other moderately vulnerable countries with surface fisheries targeting schools of juvenile tunas include Venezuela and Brazil, whose fleets operate off their coasts in the Eastern Atlantic.1 0 4 There are no highly vulnerable or mildly vulnerable countries currently targeting schools of small tropical tunas in ICCAT's jurisdiction.1 0 5 However, because of their vulnerability in relation to adult bigeye and yellowfin, countries like the United States, Canada and Japan can be expected to work for protection of juveniles of those species. and also was thought to be slightly overexploited. Only size limits were adopted at the time, although fleet expansion from east to west allowed large increases in harvests o f yellowfin without detrimental impacts on the stock. Bigeye size limits were only adopted to protect juvenile yellowfin which were being misreported. 1 0 2 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 1 0 3 ibid. 1 0 4 ibid. 1 0 5 ibid. 164 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 3.7: Economic Vulnerabilities of States Harvesting Small Tropical Tunas Domestic Costs of Production High Low Moderately Vulnerable Highly Vulnerable Early, Strong Response Delayed, Moderate Response Gradually Vulnerable Mildly Vulnerable Delayed, Moderate Response Late, Weak Response EC None None Ghana, Venezuela & Brazil It should be noted that, by the 1990s, EC fleets had already moved back and forth from the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian Oceans several times to take advantage of the least depleted and least regulated stocks of tropical tunas.1 0 6 Over the 1980s, EC surface fleets faced increasing competition from each other and developing countries around the world. (See Figure 3.8) With the dissipation of most opportunity costs of alternatives, France and Spain introduce FADs into the Atlantic 1 07 in 1990 to stay competitive. However, that advantage was quickly reduced as other countries targeting small tunas also began using artificial fish aggregating 1 0 6 See Appendix I: Early Discussions on Yellowfin, and Appendix J: Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs), for details o f these movements, which originally took place in the early 1980s. At least two such moves are recorded for EC fleets. Fleet growth continued over these periods as well, so that more vessels were left behind after each movement and crowding occurred in all three oceans. 1 0 7 See Appendix J: Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) for details on specifics o f the gear, which exploits the natural tendency o f small tunas to aggregate around floating objects. 165 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. devices. Therefore, it can be inferred that the EC was at the higher end of the gradually vulnerable scale. With few opportunity costs of alternatives and significant competition from moderately vulnerable states, the EC and its members with the largest purse seine fleets, France and Spain, can be expected to work for regulation that would increase their market share in Atlantic fisheries targeting small tropical tunas. 108 Figure 3.8: Country Composition of Atlantic Surface Fisheries for Tropical Tunas 400.000 350.000 300.000 g 250,000 o O 200,000 u | 150,000 100.000 50,000 0 Year Before moving on to examine the behavior of ICCAT member states in respect to management of this fishery, it is necessary to review some of the important changes brought about by the proliferation of FADs. This technological revolution 1 0 8 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. Until the early 1980s, the Others category consisted mainly o f US boats and Japanese vessels based out o f Tema in Ghana. The Japanese fleet was unable to stay competitive and eventually its vessels either moved elsewhere or became part o f the newly established Ghanaian fleet. (ICCAT 1985, 65). 166 H Venezuela ■ Panama □ NEI □ Ghana H Brazil ■ Other ■ EC Brazil Venezuela Ghana E uropean C om m unity ^ ro tn r - « Os Os On Os O s O s O s O S O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. had the greatest impact on catches of skipjack tuna, which rose rapidly from just over 114,000 mt in 1989 to more than 200,000 mt in 1991.1 0 9 In contrast, surface catches of bigeye and yellowfin only increased by about 13,800 and 3,000 mt respectively.1 1 0 The spike in overall production is clearly visible in Figure 3.8. Reported landings of skipjack tuna did decline from the 1991 peak, vacillating around 150,000 mt from 1992 to 2001.1 1 1 However, as SCRS has noted several times, dead discards of skipjack increased when fishers started using FADs, so actual fishing mortality has 1 1 9 been consistently higher than reported landings. Although FAD technology extended the exploitable biomass of the skipjack stock, the concomitant improvement in effectiveness and overall growth in catches 1 1 ^ counterbalanced that expansion. By 1997 SCRS stated that recent high catches of skipjack could not be sustained and that the stock might be overexploited.1 1 4 In subsequent years SCRS also found indications of localized depletion of skipjack, especially near the equator where the majority of FADs were deployed.1 1 5 These signs of overexploitation were quite a turn around for skipjack tuna. Until the mid- 1990s SCRS consistently considered the species to be underexploited, even though they were never able to estimate MSY for the stock.1 1 6 In fact, management 1 0 9 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. Most o f that increase was in captures by purse seines using FADs. From 1991 to 1998, 70% o f all skipjack was caught with FADs. (ICCAT 2000 2:33). 1 1 0 ibid. Actually, yellowfin catches rose by more than 28,000 mt from 1989 to 1990, but dropped again in 1991 and have not been much higher since. 1 1 1 ibid. 1 1 2 ICCAT (1993, 145); ICCAT (1998, 2:37). 1 1 3 ICCAT (2000, 2:34). The use o f FADs allowed fishers to spread out over larger areas. 1 1 4 ICCAT (1998, 2:37-38). 1 1 5 ICCAT (1999, 2:39); ICCAT (2000, 2:33). 1 1 6 ICCAT (1984, 120). As a potential source o f expanding catches, skipjack was the first species to be the focus o f an ICCAT Year Program, an intensive research initiative that, contrary to the nomenclature, lasted from 1977 to 1982. Having been assured by scientists that there was plenty o f room to grow for landings o f skipjack, the Commission turned its attention elsewhere. 167 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. measures have yet to be seriously considered for the species in the Atlantic. Instead, ICCAT has been content to indirectly impact landings of skipjack via recommendations designed to protect juvenile bigeye and yellowfin.1 1 7 While the introduction of FADs did not greatly increase the total volume of bigeye harvested and may have actually decreased catches of yellowfin, the new method did amplify the percentage of undersized fish in the landings of these species. Given that SCRS had been pushing the Commission to reduce catches of yellowfin and bigeye weighing less than 3.2 kg for decades, it isn’t surprising that this shift toward larger catches of undersized fish caused biological depletion in these fisheries. For the better part of the 1990s, undersized yellowfin were about 50% of the total catch. The numbers were even higher for bigeye, with undersized fish comprising from 65 - 70% of landings. SCRS estimates suggested that these high catches of small fish had decreased yield per recruit by 11% and 25% for 1 i o yellowfin and bigeye respectively. The impact on the higher value stock, bigeye, was compounded by levels of fishing effort that were estimated to be between 120- 290% of the level that would produce MSY.1 1 9 Not surprisingly, questions regarding catches of undersized fish were first raised by long lining states like Japan and the USA that are vulnerable in markets for i 'yo bigeye tuna. They began to press SCRS for analyses on the impact of FADs on 1 1 7 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 72-1 and rec. 79-1). In the 1970s and 1980s, size limits were put in place for bigeye and yellowfin tunas, but were deemed unnecessary for skipjack. 1 1 8 ICCAT (1995, 2:151) and ICCAT (1997, 2:25). 1 1 9 ICCAT (1997, 2:24). 1 2 0 Bigeye only makes up around 10% o f the total purse seine catch. For baitboats, the number is somewhat higher, ranging between 15-20%, but more o f those are adult fish. For comparison, more than 70% o f annual longline landings o f tropical tunas are reported as bigeye. Yet, when regulating the use of fish aggregating devices, which are only useful for surface fisheries, almost all o f the discussions held by the Commission focused on the effects measures would have on bigeye tuna. 168 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. tropical tunas as early as 1993. However, the data available at the time was not complete enough to provide a basis for substantial advice regarding FADs. By 1996, Japan was pushing for strict implementation of size limits on yellowfin and bigeye, along with limits on fishing and consideration of time-area closures on FADs. France and Spain (EC), states that were home to the large purse seine fleets that had introduced the technology in the Atlantic, pressed the Commission to postpone 1 9 1 action until better scientific advice was available. As discussed in Subsection 3.2.1, the least vulnerable states in the bigeye market (France and Spain) were able to avoid any real management measures and the states with greatest concern over bigeye (the US and Japan) had to settle for a recommendation on scientific 122 monitoring. ICCAT itself did not take further measures on FADs in 1997, but France and Spain did choose to implement a voluntary time-area closure on the use of FADs by their purse seine fleets in the Gulf of Guinea from November through January of 1998. In its statement on the measures at the 1998 meeting of ICCAT, the EC1 2 3 pointed out that the decision was based on the best data possible and that it would be enforced via 100% observer coverage. He also noted that by complying with the closure, French and Spanish boat owners would forgo about 17,500 mt of tropical Little mention was made o f the sub-optimal utilization o f less valuable stocks like skipjack or the increase in mortality on undersized yellowfin. 1 2 1 ICCAT (1997, 1:108-109). 1 2 2 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 96-1). Required coverage was 25% o f all vessels fishing on FADs and 5% on others. Observers would also collect data on the time and location o f catches o f small fish in order to establish the most effective time-area closures for consideration at future meetings o f the Commission. 1 2 3 1997 was the year in which the EC replaced its component states at the Commission. As will be seen, the Community did not veer far from the interests o f its two biggest tuna fishing states, France and Spain. 169 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. tunas, representing gross revenues around US$19 million.1 2 4 Much as in the case of bigeye tuna, these two gradually vulnerable countries chose to lead the initiative on time-area closures rather than follow. In 1998, SCRS found that the voluntary time-area closer did actually lead to a reduction in landings of undersized tunas in the area. Although the major impact was on catches of skipjack, SCRS estimated that the yield per recruit could increase by as much as 10% for yellowfin and 13% for bigeye due to lower mortality on small 1 9 S fish. As Figure 3.9 shows, there was a precipitous decline in purse seine landings by French and Spanish vessels during the initial period of the time-area closure. Interestingly, this downturn was a continuation of a trend that had begun in 1993, as biological depletion and increasing competition from other fleets undermined European market share. Also, referring back to Figure 3.8, losses by all EC fleets, including purse seines and baitboats from 1996 to 1997 were around 30,000 mt, almost twice the losses France and Spain attributed to their closures in the Gulf of Guinea.1 2 6 1 2 4 ICCAT (1999, 1:137) 1 2 5 ibid. 1 2 6 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 170 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 127 Figure 3.9: Purse Seine Landings of Tropical Tunas □ All Other Areas □ West Tropical Atl. - Other East Tropical Atl. - Other □ East Tropical Atl. - France & Spain 300,000 250,000 -- 200,000 100,000 50,000 e O 150,000 - U O m c-- On i—i cn in 8 S £ £ £ £ £ :||p 5is j j l ijb 8 i p l r- i ...i... O n 1 " ...1 ...I ...i " " ■ “ i m r i n 1 ..1 ... r- O s r- r ~ - 00 00 00 oo O O g n ON ON ON ON ON ON 1 1 — 1 Year O s O s O n O S O n O s O s O s O S O s Given the apparent success of their voluntary moratorium on FADs, the European Community proposed a recommendation for a mandatory time-area closure on all purse seine fleets using FADs in the Gulf of Guinea during the same three months. They also expressed hopes that the Commission would decide to limit longline effort. While many other states welcome the time-area closure on surface fleets, some believed that this was an insufficient response to the problem of high juvenile mortality on tropical tunas. Japan was one of the first countries to express its reservations, but Ghana was the most adamant contracting party, demanding a full 36-month closure to collect data on fishing without FADs in the Gulf of Guinea. Incidentally, the Ghanaian fleet was comprised mainly of boats that did not use FAD technology at the time and were limited to near shore waters in the Gulf. The 1 2 7 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 171 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. observer from Mexico supported this perspective, but in the end it was the EC 1 9 8 proposal that was adopted. The next year, SCRS could report more fully on the effects of both the voluntary and mandatory moratoria on FADs in the Gulf of Guinea. Landings of undersized bigeye were down from an average of 70% to an average of 55% of the 1 9 0 total catch of the species. On the other hand, a larger percentage of undersized yellowfin were being caught, up from about 50% to just over 66% of landings. Fewer small yellowfin were taken during the time-area closure, but higher effort throughout the rest of the year caused the annual landings of undersized yellowfin to 1 9 0 increase. In spite of these negative repercussions on yellowfin, in 1999, the Commission chose to extend moratorium indefinitely and to extend its application to baitboats as well as purse seines. Furthermore, the 1999 Tropical Tunas Recommendation required that non-contracting parties observe the time-area closure in order to deal with growing landings by flag of convenience states like Panama and 1 9 1 not elsewhere included (NEI) fleets. There are several ways in which the gradually vulnerable EC benefited from their seemingly altruistic leadership on management measures for surface fisheries targeting small tropical tunas. First, the time-area closures were much less costly than a full implementation of the bigeye and yellowfin size limits would have been. Also, these measures gave the EC something to point to whenever states with longline fleets accused surface fleets of not doing their part for sustainable 1 2 8 ICCAT (1999, 1:140); ICCAT (2005a, rec. 98-1) placed a moratorium on the use o f FADs than in the Gulf o f Guinea from November 1, 1999 through January 31, 2000. 1 2 9 ICCAT (2000, 2:27). 1 3 0 ICCAT (2000,2:17). 1 3 1 ICCAT (2000, 1:167); ICCAT (2005a, rec. 99-1). 172 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. management of bigeye and yellowfin. Third, in line with vulnerability response model, the time-area closures on the Gulf of Guinea actually allowed the EC to gain back some market share by having a disproportionate effect on their biggest rival. Whereas Ghanaian fleets are confined to the Gulf of Guinea, EC fleets are active all 1 T 9 over the tropical Atlantic. The 1999 extension of the closure legally excluded the second largest producer of small tropical tunas in the Atlantic from utilizing this highly effective fishing technology three months of the year. Lastly, the 1999 i oo measure also helped curb non-member production in the area. There was one important flaw in the logic of the time-area closure. Although it did circumvent objections from powerful Group of 18 countries like Brazil and Venezuela, enforcing the closure on Ghanaian vessels was more of a challenge. By defecting, Ghana could fill in the gap left by European forbearance, substantially increasing its catches as shown in Figure 3.8. By 2002 noncompliance was so blatant that the European Community began to put heavy pressure on Ghana and other states fishing in the Gulf of Guinea in contravention of the moratorium.1 3 4 Furthermore, the EC also brought up the fact that vessels of 23.6 m, just below the 24 m exemption level, had been proliferating in recent years, undermining the effectiveness of the moratorium. This helps to explain why the EC shifted its position in 2004, 1 3 2 The Ghanaians started using FADs in 1999. (ICCAT 2000, 1:167). 1 3 3 Harvests in the not elsewhere included (NEI) category decreased somewhat after the implementation o f the time-area closure, but landings by the flag o f convenience state, Panama, virtually disappeared. (ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database). 1 3 4 By adopting FAD technology, Ghana and several other small African states had significantly increased their catches o f tropical tunas in their coastal waters. See Appendix J: Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) for details on specifics o f the gear, which exploits the natural tendency o f small tunas to aggregate around floating objects. 1 3 5 ICCAT (2004, 1:179). 173 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. proposing to reduce the time element of the closure to one month and applying the 1 measure to all surface vessels, even those fishing without FADs. In this case, management response to recession in a domestic fishing fleet occurred even without significant depletion of targeted stocks and actually reduced the abundance of yellowfin tuna. However, increasing competition globally put pressure on gradually vulnerable states (the EC) whose fleets had exhausted capital based sources of advantage as well as opportunity costs of alternatives. In response to the resultant domestic economic crises, the EC maneuvered to utilize ICCAT regulations to protect their domestic fleets by excluding less powerful, moderately vulnerable states (Ghana) and nonmembers (Panama, NEI, etc.). Although these measures were undermined by defection, as Figure 3.8 shows, the EC was able to arrest a steep decline in landings for its fleets and has maintained a fairly constant percentage of harvests of small tropical tunas since 1997. It should also be noted that this type of regulation, the time-area closure, is not always applicable, depending on 1 T 7 technical and geopolitical aspects of the fishery. 3.4 Yellowfin Tuna: Rebuilding without Effective Management The fishery for yellowfin tuna is similar to bigeye in that there is a bifurcation between longline fleets that target adults of the species and surface fleets that catch juvenile yellowfin in combination with other small tunas. In addition, stock assessments of yellowfin tuna showed some biological depletion in the early 1990s, which has since been reversed. On the other hand, yellowfin is distinct from 1 3 6 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 04-1). 1 3 7 For instance, if the nursery area singled out for a closure were located in the Western Atlantic, the EC would have faced much stronger opposition from members o f the Group o f 18. Alternatively, for many stocks nursery areas have not yet been identified so a closure would not be a viable option. 174 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. bigeye in that a combination of lower prices and a larger, more prolific stock has 1 resulted in less depletion of the species in the Atlantic. Also, as shown in Figure 3.10, yellowfin is like skipjack in that a much larger component of harvest is taken by surface fleets than bigeye. Biologically and economically, yellowfin tuna inhabits a geopolitical space in between high-priced, low-volume bigeye and low-priced, high-volume skipjack. This section shows that, because of insufficient or misdirected domestic economic pressure, ICCAT has failed to manage either fishery for yellowfin tuna in spite of recent estimates that show the stock is close to the level that would support maximum sustainable yield. 1 -3Q Figure 3.10: Atlantic Yellowfin Landings by Gear 250.000 200.000 § 150,000 H 0 1 100,000 50,000 - □ Other H Longline □ Bait Boat ■ Purse Seine in r-~ Os , — i CO *n r - Os CO <n c-- os CO in r - Os , — i so kO SO r-- r - r - C"- OO 00 00 00 00 OS Os Os os Os o Os Os Os Os Os Os Os Os os os OS OS os Os os Os Os OS o i — i - * — < i- 1 Year 1 3 8 Compare Figure 3.10: Atlantic Yellowfin Landings by Gear, to Figure 3.4: Atlantic Bigeye Landings by Gear. 1 3 9 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 175 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. In terms of the wider fishery, inclusive of longlines as well as surface fleets, the vulnerability matrix for yellowfin tuna (Figure 3.11) is a hybrid between the bigeye matrix (Figure 3.5) and the mixed tropical tunas matrix (Figure 3.7). With the exception of Canada, all of the longline states that target bigeye tuna also have fleets targeting yellowfin in the Atlantic.1 4 0 The other change to the vulnerability matrix is that yellowfin cannot really be considered a by-catch in the surface fleets, since it makes up more than 40% of purse seine and baitboat landings.1 4 1 In Figure 3.11, the EC and Ghana have been placed in their respective vulnerability categories with the indication (surface). For longlines, expectations regarding the behavior of ICCAT member states in the yellowfin fishery are basically the same as those for bigeye. Similarly, states with surface fleets are expected to conform to the same behavioral patterns as in the mixed fishery case. 1 4 0 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. Canada is excluded from the yellowfin fishery because the species is more geographically confined to tropical waters than bigeye. Yellowfin just don't get that far north. The US commercial fishery for yellowfin tuna is mainly in the Gulf o f Mexico. There is also a significant US recreational fishery targeting yellowfin. 1 4 1 ibid. 176 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 3.11: Economic Vulnerabilities of States Harvesting Yellowfin Tuna Domestic Costs of Production High Low t z i _ > e S C 3 i- u < + H o t / 2 o o 3 t; o O h O , o £ u p H Highly Vulnerable Moderately Vulnerable USA Early, Strong Response Group of 18 & Ghana (surface) Delayed, Moderate Response £ 0 3 Gradually Vulnerable Mildly Vulnerable Japan & EC (surface) Taiwan & China Delayed, Moderate Response Late, Weak Response Although the mix of states involved is virtually identical, there are two major differences that have impacted management outcomes for yellowfin tuna. First, competition over yellowfin has never been as tough as competition over bigeye tuna. Scientific studies show that yellowfin tuna has a flattened yield-per-effort curve, which, combined with lower prices, results in a higher sustainable long-run equilibrium than is currently faced by bigeye tuna.1 4 2 As per the discussion in Section 2.2, this facet of the fishery results in less stringent competition and therefore vulnerable states are less exposed, leading to lower levels of governmental concern. Second, the economic vulnerability of surface fleets is reduced for yellowfin alone because of the availability of skipjack and even bigeye tuna as opportunity costs of 1 4 2 ICCAT (2001, 1:190). 177 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. alternatives.1 4 3 Because their fishery targets all tropical tunas rather than just one species, states with surface fleets can be expected to express less concern for any one species than for the totality of their harvests. This second differentiating factor has precipitated the Commission's most obvious failure in respect to yellowfin management. ICCAT has evinced a consistent inability to reduce landings of very small yellowfin as per scientific advice. In fact, the Commission's very first regulatory action was the adoption of a size limit for landings of yellowfin tuna in 1972.1 4 4 This supposedly binding recommendation has never been effective, and with the introduction of time-area closures on the use of FADs in the Gulf of Guinea, effort redistribution has actually lead to an increase in fishing mortality on undersized yellowfin.1 4 5 Scientific opinions regarding the benefits of protecting very young yellowfin have not changed but neither has the incentive structure for states with fleets targeting small tropical tunas. As Section 3.3 demonstrated, regulations for this mixed fishery were driven by concerns over national market share rather than the biological health of any of the three tropical tunas. Therefore, is not surprising that the time-area closures have continued irrespective of their impact on the yellowfin stock. ICCAT's record on keeping both longline and surface fishing mortality at sustainable levels for yellowfin tuna has also been unimpressive. SCRS began recommending catch limitations in 1972 but dispersion of fishing fleets and 1 4 3 Even though the same type o f gear targets adult tropical tunas, yellowfin is not an economically comparable alternative for bigeye tuna because its price is so much lower while the costs remain the same. Although some fleets might use yellowfin as a seasonal supplement to their bigeye harvests, there is no guarantee that a fleet targeting the latter would be able to survive if they had to shift all effort to the former. 1 4 4 See Appendix H: ICCAT Size Limits for details on the adoption o f that regulation, which was designed to increase the yield o f the stock by ensuring that more fish reached spawning age. 1 4 5 ICCAT (2000,2:17). 178 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. technological innovations allowed fishers to expand their harvests further than early models had predicted.1 4 6 However, by the early 1990s scientists found that the Atlantic yellowfin fishery as a whole was fully exploited and in 1993, SCRS advised that the Eastern portion of the stock was only at 65% of the level of biomass that would support MS Y.1 4 7 From the vulnerability response perspective, it is not surprising that the highly vulnerable US was the first to propose that ICCAT limit landings of yellowfin in 1992.1 4 8 No actions were taken until 1993, when France and Spain agreed to US proposal to limit effective fishing effort targeting yellowfin to 1992 levels for all fishing states, whether or not they were members of the Commission.1 4 9 Concerns regarding the high catches in the not elsewhere included (NEI) category were cited as rationale for this binding recommendation.1 5 0 As Figure 3.10 shows, reported landings of yellowfin did fall below 1992 levels by 1995, statistics that might lead one to believe that ICCAT’ s Recommendation had been successful. However, close scrutiny of the following decade reveals that little was really accomplished on yellowfin tuna. First, many scientists believed that the fishing capacity of fleets targeting tropical tunas had gone down somewhat, but that efficiency had increased substantially since 1990 (3-5% per 1 4 6 See Appendix I: Early Discussions on Yellowfin. Most yellowfin were captured in the eastern Atlantic when ICCAT was formed but the rapid growth o f South American fleets and also improvements in the range o f vessels increased the area o f exploitation. 1 4 7 ICCAT (1994, 176). This was down from an estimate o f 80% the year before. (ICCAT 1993, 138). 1 4 8 ICCAT (1993, 79). See Appendix I: Early Discussions on Yellowfin. Historically, Japan was the first to propose restrictions on yellowfin landings in the early 1970s. As geographic and technological expansion reduced pressures on yellowfin stocks, Japanese concern waned in the face o f more optimistic scientific reports. In fact, the early 1980s provided a respite for yellowfin in the Atlantic. 1 4 9 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 93-4). 1 5 0 ICCAT (1994, 84). 179 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. year).1 5 1 Unlike stringent mechanisms used to enforce regulations on bigeye and several other stocks, no further actions were taken to implement the 1993 1 S 9 recommendation on yellowfin. Lack of knowledge and scientific evidence was often cited for the Commission’s inability to reach a consensus on new measures. Such concerns significantly undermined SCRS' 1998 advice to limit the total catch to 135,000 mt, well below the almost 152,000 mt landed in 1992.1 5 3 SCRS remains concerned regarding the effective fishing effort targeting yellowfin, but the Commission has not yet taken further measures to ensure compliance on the 1993 recommendation. There is also evidence to show that the observed reduction in landings of yellowfin tuna from 1995 to 2000 resulted from technological and economic changes in the fishery as opposed to implementation of ICCAT Recommendations. Instead of geographic shifts, the 1990s brought transfers of nominal fishing effort away from yellowfin and toward other tropical species. On the one hand, as the value of bigeye tuna increased, longlines that had previously targeted yellowfin switched over to the more dispersed, deeper feeding adult bigeye.1 5 4 On the other hand, the introduction of a new technology called Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) changed the 1 5 1 ICCAT (1999 2:19-20). In addition, it was difficult to determine whether catches were below the 1992 landings mark because effort had declined or because the catch per-unit o f effort was down, making it difficult to judge the overall change in effort. 1 5 2 In 1995 the Commission did pass a non-binding resolution stating that in 1996 members would put together more specific management measures in order to implement the 1993 Recommendation, but nothing ever came o f it. (ICCAT 2005a, res. 95-6). 1 5 3 ICCAT (1999, 2:19-20). SCRS suggested further limits partly because new technologies were increasing catches o f small fish. Also, if effective effort had indeed increased, then any growth in the stock biomass would result in higher catches, much as were observed in 2002, when reported landings exceeded the 92 catch by about 5,000 mt. That’s not much in percentage terms, but SCRS did point out that continued catches o f that magnitude would cause the biomass o f yellowfin to decline further below that which would support MSY. 1 5 4 ICCAT (1994, 141). 180 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. composition of the schools that surface fleets targeted, increasing their catches of skipjack and juvenile bigeye relative to yellowfin. As Figure 3.12 shows, the proportion of yellowfin in the total catch of tropical tunas by purse seines in the Atlantic went down by about 10-15% in the 1990s. In the same period the skipjack and bigeye components of the stock increased proportionally. Considering that purse seines caught an average of 65% of all yellowfin tuna in the Atlantic from 1970 to 2002, this change in the composition of catches must have had a big effect on landings of this stock.1 5 5 Figure 3.12: Tropical Tunas as Percentage of Purse Seine Catch1 5 6 120 100 80 1 60 < D C u 40 20 0 ..-A — Bigeye ■ Skipjack Yellowfin L * A " 1! ,* m V * ‘ ■ * v ............................... A A - A A * * ..I ...i." I H —r..i— r I I i i I I I i i I I I i i I I i i i I I i i i i i ( N ’^ - ^ 0 0 0 0 ( N ^ ' 0 0 0 0 ( N ’^ V 0 0 0 0 ( N ^ - ' 0 0 0 0 ( N vO k o v« o ' o r ^ r - - c ^ t ^ r - o o o o o o o o o o ^ C N O s o s O N O O Year Catches of yellowfin tuna have remained close to MSY since 1995. This does not mean that they will necessarily stay so low, as evinced by the high landings 1 5 5 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 1 5 6 ibid. 181 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. reported for 2001. That year, fishers harvested almost 159,000 mt, 11,000 mt over 1 S 7 the most recent estimate of MS Y. In 2002, landings returned to a level below MSY but the capacity for overexploitation of the stock continues to be cause for concern regarding the future of the species in the Atlantic. However, the dialogue among ICCAT member states regarding yellowfin tuna remains sparse. As the fishery hovers around maximum sustainable yield, there is just not enough governmental concern to take precautionary actions or even to enforce previous recommendations. This case reinforces the assumptions regarding the temporal aspects of the vulnerability response hypotheses. ICCAT only took action when biological depletion and competition were high in the early 1990s. Once the influences of rising bigeye prices and the introduction of FADs relieved those pressures, little more was done or said on the matter of yellowfin management. If those exogenous parameters ever revert, then recession in a domestic fishing fleet will again create management response Together, these three cases illustrate the explanatory power of the vulnerability response model. In Section 3.2, the bigeye case shows how increasing biological depletion is correlated with growing governmental concern on the part of highly vulnerable (USA and Canada) and gradually vulnerable (Japan) states. These changes are then linked to concessions made by more vulnerable contracting parties to less vulnerable members of the Commission in order to gain their cooperation on rebuilding measures. Examples would be the exceptions made for the of moderately vulnerable states (the Group of 18) in the majority of bigeye regulations and the 1 5 7 ICCAT (2004, 2:28). 182 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. direct side payments in terms of quota transfers between Japan and mildly vulnerable China and Taiwan. Also, as biological depletion deepened, longline states that directly targeted bigeye became more willing to shoulder the costs of rebuilding irrespective of concomitant sacrifices on the part of surface fleets that only catch of bigeye incidentally. Finally, the bigeye case also demonstrates how vulnerability response leads to the proliferation of institutional innovations as powerful yet economically vulnerable countries look for ways to exclude non-contracting parties.1 5 8 Sections 3.3 and 3.4 show how insubstantial ICCAT management can be for stocks that have not been severely depleted. These sections are much shorter than the bigeye case because the mixed surface and targeted yellowfin fisheries elicited so much less discussion and action at the Commission. In the case of the mixed surface fisheries, as a gradually vulnerable contracting party that had used up many of its opportunity costs of alternatives, the EC did push through a time-area closure for the fishery. This allowed them to benefit from a biological feature of tropical tunas that placed an important nursery ground in the coastal area of a economically less vulnerable but politically weaker member of ICCAT (Ghana). Alternately, the case of yellowfin tuna showed how exogenous factors can relieve both biological and economic pressures within a fishery, eliminating the urgency felt even by highly vulnerable states. As long as yellowfin continues to hover around maximum sustainable yield, ICCAT members can afford to ignore scientific advice on measures designed to prevent overfishing. 1 5 8 See March and Olsen (1993, 193-195) regarding the costs o f innovation and the motivation to pay that cost due to dissatisfaction with the status quo. 183 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. In both the secondary and tertiary cases, the absence of crisis is associated with mediocre and ineffective response at full exploitation, which glaringly contrasts to the Commission's vigorous management of bigeye tuna once it became heavily depleted. For all three cases, states behaved as expected and outcomes occurred much as predicted. It should be noted that the bigeye case was temporally condensed due to 1980s price hike and was facilitated by pre-existing institutional innovations. Also, the time-area closure for skipjack and other small tropical tunas is not an option for all fisheries since appropriate areas for closure might not be biologically available or politically expedient. It is nuances like these that make detailed, qualitative analysis necessary when testing the vulnerability response hypotheses. As the above cases show, the vulnerability response hypotheses have passed the test in regards to tropical tunas in the Atlantic. Chapter 4 will present several more case studies involving Atlantic management of billfishes. 184 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Chapter 4: Billfishes and By-catch Few people are acquainted with the generic term "billfish", but members of the billfish family are iconic in many cultures around the world. Perhaps the most well known reference to a billfish in the English-speaking world is Hemingway's description of swordfish angling in his famous work, The Old Man and the Sea. In addition to swordfish (Xiphias gladius), Atlantic billfish include blue marlin (.Makaira nigricans) and white marlin (Tetrapturus albidus)} All three of these well- known species have been heavily overfished in the Atlantic, even though only swordfish is directly targeted by the commercial fishing industry. In some countries, marlins are coveted trophy fish for recreational fishers but most of the fishing mortality for these species is the result of incidental landings by commercial fleets targeting other stocks. Although tunas are the only types of fish mentioned in its name, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) is responsible for sustainable management of all highly migratory species in the Atlantic, including billfish. In Chapter 2, it was explained that one of the underlying assumptions of vulnerability response model is that states only consider commercial fishing interests when they formulate their agendas on international fisheries management. Chapter 3 showed that this assumption fits the management of fisheries for tropical tunas in the Atlantic quite well. If the commercial-only assumption always holds true then there would never be any reason for states to regulate incidental harvests of noncommercial by-catch species like marlins. Yet there have been a few cases in 1 Sailfish and spearfish are also found in the Atlantic, but they are relatively coastal species that have not yet been regulated by ICCAT. 185 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. which regional fisheries organizations have chosen to limit incidental catches of -y dolphins or turtles at the expense of decreased landings of targeted stocks. Ordinary and even extraordinary fish seldom receive the same level of attention and interest as those charismatic by-catch species. Nevertheless, there have been a few, concentrated interest groups such as the Ocean Wildlife Campaign, the National Coalition for Marine Conservation, Traffic Europe, and The Billfish Foundation, that have worked for the conservation of non-commercial fish stocks. Furthermore, the record on ICCAT management of blue and white marlins shows that the influence of noncommercial interests should not always be ignored. In addition to providing further tests of the basic vulnerability response hypotheses, the following billfish cases are used to highlight analytical and regulatory problems associated with by-catch issues. This is done by comparing the success of ICCAT regulation of commercial versus by-catch stocks. The cases also contrast management of commercial versus noncommercial by-catch. A classic example of vulnerability response, the North Atlantic swordfish case shows how more vulnerable states were able to negotiate reductions on incidental harvests of adult swordfish in longline fisheries targeting bigeye tuna. It also illustrates the importance of globalization and increasing outside competition in triggering economic vulnerability as the stock becomes depleted. Unlike the bigeye case, North Atlantic swordfish has been more heavily buffered by the existence of multiple, less heavily exploited stocks of swordfish. 2 The most well-known case is the tuna-dolphin controversy in the Eastern Pacific Ocean that resulted in the creation o f the Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program, which is administered by the Secretariat o f the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. De Sombre (1999) and others have written about this program extensively. 186 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Management of blue and white marlins was much weaker than for either -2 North Atlantic swordfish or Atlantic bigeye tuna. Using a modified version of vulnerability response model, the marlin case shows how non-commercial by-catch is ignored unless some ICCAT faction is politically susceptible to alternative interest groups such as conservationists or recreational fishers. Furthermore, when monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are compared for all three billfish stocks, it is clear that economic concerns still dictate most ICCAT policy because the Commission has yet to truly commit to effective management of marlins as they have for swordfish. This case shows how vulnerability response model can be adapted to account for noncommercial values but at the same time it demonstrates the power commercial fishing interests can wield to undermine by-catch management that might otherwise result in lower harvests of targeted species. 4.1 Commercial Versus Non-Commercial Stocks Among Atlantic billfishes, swordfish is the only commercially valuable species, and it is one of the most important fishes managed by ICCAT. Incidental catches of juvenile swordfish have been a problem in the fishery since 1990 and the species is a common by-catch in other longline fisheries, especially those targeting bigeye tuna. Other billfish, particularly blue and white marlins, have almost no commercial value but are considered highly desirable by recreational fishers. Marlins have received some attention from the Commission because they are caught incidentally by longliners targeting swordfish, bigeye tuna and other HMS stocks.4 3 Marlins have been managed concomitantly by the Commission in the same resolutions and recommendations. Therefore, they will be discussed together. 4 There are two other billfishes in the Atlantic, Sailfish (Istiophorus albicans) and Spearfish ( Tetrapturuspfluegeri). Unfortunately, there has not been enough scientific evidence to provide a 187 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Otherwise known as by-catch, these incidental landings of marlins can have significant impacts on the interplay of crisis and response for these fisheries. Both commercial and non-commercial by-catch exists in Atlantic fisheries for highly migratory species. For example, as discussed in Chapter 3, large incidental catches of juvenile bigeye and yellowfm tuna lead to reductions in the yield-per- recruit for each stock, negatively impacting the maximum sustainable yield for several fisheries.5 This chapter provides examples of two other types of bycatch within the vulnerability response framework. As part of a larger case, Section 4.2 illustrates the ways in which incidental catches of adult swordfish in the North Atlantic impacted vulnerability response outcomes for that commercially valuable stock of fish. Then, Section 4.3 reviews ICCAT's record in regard to blue and white marlins, which are not commercially valuable but have been depleted mainly due to indirect fishing mortality from Atlantic longline fleets. It is somewhat misleading to assert that marlins lack commercial value. In addition to the economic benefits that marlins provide to the recreational fishing industry, these species can also be sold in commercial markets. As Figure 4.1 shows, international prices for marlins have been fluctuating around US $2,000 per metric ton for much of the last decade.6 In per unit terms, marlins are on par with foundation for management recommendations on the species and therefore they have not been included in this case study. 5 Juvenile bigeye were a by-catch to mixed surface fisheries. Because the fleets targeting schools of small tunas would not be harmed by biological depletion o f bigeye, it was virtually impossible for longlining states to convince them to limit their harvests o f undersized bigeye in order to increase the availability o f adults o f the species. For the example o f the case in which juveniles o f the species are a bycatch to the fishery that directly targets o f adults, see Appendix M: Protecting Juvenile Swordfish. 6 Individual values for the different species o f Marlin were unavailable. Therefore the data presented here actually covers all marlins, including black marlin and striped marlin, which are not found in the Atlantic. Unfortunately, Atlantic only values were not available either. The international value is probably higher than that for the Atlantic alone because, except for artisanal sources, marlin is not 188 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. commercially important highly migratory species such as skipjack and yellowfin n tunas. The difference between these two kinds of species is that the tunas are extremely abundant, schooling fishes that can be caught cheaply and in very large o quantities, whereas marlins are relatively rare and expensive to target. Tuna fishers can make up for the low prices of the stocks they target by producing huge harvests at a low per unit cost. Anyone wishing to target marlin would pay much more for every unit landed and receive about the same price for their output. Therefore, although marlin can be sold internationally, it is not profitable to target them specifically. really consumed very much in Atlantic coastal countries and is too cheap to be transported to those places where it is eaten. 7 FAO Commodities and Production 1976-2002 Database. 8 ICCAT (2004, vol. 2). Executive Summaries o f Stock Assessments provide information on technical aspects o f the fisheries. 189 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 4.1: Real Value of Billfishes per Metric Ton9 o — Marlins * — Swordfish o s o s Year By comparison, swordfish is both more valuable and more abundant than either blue or white marlin, making it more important for commercial fishers. Figure 4.2 shows the volume of reported landings of billfish in the Atlantic. Landings of swordfish have been consistently much larger than landings of both blue and white marlins combined. In fact, since US and Canadian bans on the sale of swordfish ended in 1977, there has been a rapid increase in the value of swordfish as well as fishing effort targeting the species.1 0 Reported landings quickly began to rise, reaching a peak of more than 50,000 mt in 1988, a year when Atlantic marlin landings did not even top 4,000 mt. Since then, landings of swordfish have generally 9 FAO Commodities and Production 1976-2002 Database. 1 0 ICCAT (1978, 147). The ban was related to US and Canadian fears over heavy metal poisoning, especially the high mercury content found in North Atlantic swordfish. (ICCAT 1972, 98). This is an example o f how exogenous crises can impact the fishery and must not be left out o f the analysis. See Ellis (2003, 44) for more on the swordfish mercury scare. 190 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. been declining while reported landings of blue marlin have increased somewhat. Reported landings of white marlin continue to be relatively small. Figure 4.2: ICCAT Reported Landings of Billfishes1 1 70,000 60.000 50,000 40.000 30.000 20,000 10,000 □ White Marlin ■ Blue Marlin ■ Swordfish 0& oj^ d*? d r?5 d?5 & V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V ' W Year At this point, it is important to note the distinction between reported landings and actual fishing mortality. As the term implies, landings are the portion of the catch that is brought to land, whether directly by the fishing vessel itself or indirectly via a processor ship or a transshipment vessel.1 2 There are two ways in which landings data may differ from actual fishing mortality. First, because landings information must be logged by fishers, then collected by their flag states, and finally transferred to the ICCAT Secretariat, there are several points at which the data might be misreported. This is especially true when a stock is facing regulation or under 1 1 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 1 2 ICCAT (2004b). 191 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. some kind of effort restriction.1 3 Secondly, fishers do not always land all of the fish that they catch. They may discard less valuable or illegal catches at sea, dead or alive. Depending on survival rates, live discards have little impact on the abundance of species, but dead discards do diminish the size of the by-catch stock. States and other management organizations may choose to require that discards be reported, but monitoring fishing activities at sea is much more difficult than it is on land.1 4 Although commercial fleets do not directly target them, marlins have been severely depleted due to incidental mortality. Recreational fishing does add to the pressure on these stocks, although accurate data on the amount of that impact is not available.1 5 Figure 4.3 shows reported landings of blue and white marlins, along with the most recent estimates of maximum sustainable yield calculated by the Commission’ s Sub-Committee for Research and Statistics (SCRS). There is a large margin of error in the estimates for blue marlin, but it is still evident that the species has been overexploited for much of the time series. SCRS calculates that the biomass of blue marlin is about 40% of what would be needed to keep harvests at maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and that fishing mortality was four times the MSY level.1 6 White marlin has been more severely overfished, with estimates of abundance ranging from 12-22% of the biomass that would support MSY and fishing mortality at between five and eight times the maximum sustainable level.1 7 It is clear that 1 3 Waugh (1984, 124). 1 4 OECD (1997, 64-65). 1 5 This is a contentious issue for many types o f fish stocks as a recent exchange between Coleman et. al. (2004; 2005a; 2005b), Nussman (2005), and Arlinghaus (2005) in the journal Science. 1 6 ICCAT (2004, 2:77). Biomass estimates ranged from 25-60% o f BM SY - Fishing mortality was at between 250-600% o f the level acceptable for management at MSY. 1 7 ICCAT (2004, 2:85). Biomass estimates ranged from 6-25% o f B M S Y . Fishing mortality was at between 450-1,580% o f the level acceptable for management at MSY. 192 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. marlin stocks are facing a very deep biological crisis, even though they are not commercially valuable. Figure 4.3: Landings of Marlins Relative to MSY1 8 7.000 6.000 5.000 c / 5 £ 4,000 0 1 3,000 2 2.000 1,000 0 Year At the opposite end of the spectrum, swordfish is by far the most abundant of the billfishes, but it has also been overexploited by commercial fishing operations. ICCAT recognizes three different management areas for swordfish: North Atlantic, South Atlantic and Mediterranean.1 9 O f these, SCRS has only been able to determine maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for the northern stock; they put it at around 1 8 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. For blue marlin the most recent estimates o f M SY range from 2,000 to 3,000 mt. (ICCAT 2001, 2:66). For white marlin the most recent estimates o f MSY range from 849 to 1,070 mt. (ICCAT 2003, 2:77). 1 9 See Appendix L: Management Areas for Atlantic Swordfish for descriptions o f the geographical areas and biological characteristics o f the three stocks. 193 Blue Marlin White Marlin Blue Marlin W l^ite m r-- O ' — m uo r' "' O ' — n ^ n ^ r - r ^ o r ^ o o o o o o o o o o ^ o s o s o c s On Os Os Os Os Os On Os On Os Os Ov On O'n Os On Os Os R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 20 14,240 mt. As Figure 4.4 shows, landings of North Atlantic swordfish were above the lower boundary of MSY estimates from 1978 to 1997 and were exceptionally high in the late 1980s. By 1996, SCRS estimated that the biomass of North Atlantic 2 1 swordfish was down to 58% of the level that would support MSY. A combination of lower prices and ICCAT regulations led to a steep reduction of landings from 1999 onward. In 2002, SCRS estimated that the biomass of North Atlantic swordfish 22 had rebuilt to approximately 94% of that which would support MSY. Figure 4.4: Landings of North Atlantic Swordfish vs. MSY2 3 25,000 20,000 g 15,000 H o 10,000 5,000 r - - o n > —immr-'-O'' On O N C 5 0 N O N C N O N O N C s G N O n O N O N C n O N O N C N — m r - O ' -— m m r-. © O O C O O O O O O O n Cn Cn On on on o o Year 2 0 ICCAT (2004, 2:105). Parameters like these cannot be estimated for South Atlantic swordfish because catch per-unit effort (CPUE) indicators were conflicting. Data from vessels targeting southern swordfish showed that the stock has been stable while information from fleets that catch swordfish incidentally indicates a decline in biomass. Scientists could not calculate biological parameters for Mediterranean swordfish because there are not yet enough data available. Nevertheless, SCRS did suggest that the catch levels (14,000-15,000 mt) for South Atlantic and Mediterranean swordfish should be maintained until better information emerges. 2 1 ICCAT (1997, 2:66). Estimates ranged from 41-100%. 2 2 ICCAT (2003, 2:94). Estimates ranged from 75-124%. 2 3 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. Most recent SCRS estimates o f MSY range from 11,500 to 15,500 mt. (ICCAT 2003, 2:94). 194 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. In spite of a level of uncertainty in the scientific analysis, ICCAT has taken many steps to protect northern swordfish, including the establishment of total allowable catches for the targeting fishery, size limits to prevent catches of juvenile fish and even limits on by-catch of adult swordfish in other fisheries. Furthermore, the Commission has instituted statistical documentation, mandated observer programs and utilized trade restrictive measures to monitor and enforce these regulations. The effects of these endeavors can be seen in changes to the biological abundance of stock. In contrast, a rebuilding program has been adopted for Atlantic blue and white marlins but ICCAT has not been nearly as determined or successful in its management of these noncommercial stocks. Although the vulnerability response hypotheses do not predict any regulation of Atlantic marlins when states only consider commercial values in their policymaking, the ineffectiveness of ICCAT measures suggests that this exception is not highly substantive. Both cases are interesting examples of the relationship between by-catch phenomenon in international management as well as additional tests of vulnerability response. 4.2 North Atlantic Swordfish: Outside Competition The commercial fishery for North Atlantic swordfish is one of the oldest in the world.2 4 Situated between the two continents, this fishery has been dominated by European and North American fishers for centuries 2 5 As Figure 4.5 shows, most 2 4 Johnston (1965, 72). 2 5 See Appendix L: Management Areas for Atlantic Swordfish. For administrative purposes, Atlantic swordfish are divided into two stocks at the 5° north latitude line. However, since this is a temperate stock, the largest concentration o f fishes is found much farther north. (ICCAT 1989, 131). 195 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. harvests of northern swordfish are still landed by Canada, the US and members of the European Community. Landings by other states have remained relatively stable except for those of Japan, which virtually disappeared in 1999. This contrasts strongly to the tropical tuna cases in that there has not been significant entry into the fishery in recent years. Given the comparative advantage premise of the vulnerability response model, one must inquire as to the driving force behind management measures on this geographically protected stock. If states whose fleets have lower operating costs do not or cannot choose to target the stock, where do the competitive incentives for regulation come from? 9 f t Figure 4.5: Reported Landings of North Atlantic Swordfish by Country 20,000 18,000 16,000 14.000 12.000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4.000 - 2.000 - 0 □ Japan ■ Others H Canada □ USA ■ EC in r- so so O S O S O s ^ S O l > O s O s C O r-- o s in o O s o r- O s O s r- O s ▲ E u ro p ea n C om m issio n (E C ) 00 o s c o oo o s < n oo O s U - ' 00 o s O s 00 o s — c n m , r - O s O s O s O s O s O S O s O s O S i- h O S O O S O ^ < N Year 2 6 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. In the early years o f the Commission, worries regarding the mercury content o f North Atlantic swordfish resulted in the national closure o f both the US and Canadian fisheries for the stock. This created a short-term depression in effort targeting the species, keeping it o ff ICCAT's radar until the early 1980s. In 1977, the end o f the ban signaled the beginning o f a period o f rapid increase of northern swordfish landings, as shown in Figure 4.5. While Canada never quite recovered from the closure, fleets from other countries, like the US and EC member states, were able to expand their production. See Ellis (2003, 44) for more on the swordfish mercury scare. 196 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. The first and more obvious answer to this question is that there is still competition among these countries over consistently declining landings of the stock. Harvests of North Atlantic swordfish have been falling around a steep trend since 1987. This was partly due to declining availability of the stock and partly due to shifts of EC fleets to the more abundant South Atlantic stock.2 7 In spite of the reduction in fishing mortality that resulted from the exodus of part of the European fleet, the biomass of the stock continued at levels well below that which would support MSY until 2002 2 8 With fewer fish available and effective fishing effort at around twice the level that would produce maximum sustainable yield, the struggle to stay solvent in the North Atlantic swordfish fishery became more and more difficult under open-access.2 9 However, internal competition alone is not likely to create sufficient governmental concern for effective management, especially when easy options such as the exclusion of non-contracting parties would have little 2 A impact on the stock. Like many historically significant fisheries for highly migratory species, fishers targeting North Atlantic swordfish face burgeoning competition from outside sources. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 4.6, which shows how landings of swordfish have more than doubled since the early 1980s due to expansion of fishing effort targeting stocks in the Indian Ocean as well as the southern Atlantic and Mediterranean (Other Atlantic). In these areas and in the Pacific, developing countries such as Taiwan, Sri Lanka, Chile and Brazil have become important 27 ICCAT (1993, 179). 2 8 ICCAT (2003, 2:94). 2 9 ICCAT (1997, 2:66). 3 0 Harvests by non-contracting parties and within the not elsewhere included (NEI) category have been much lower for North Atlantic swordfish than for bigeye tuna, even in percentage terms. (ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database). 197 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. fishing states. In fact, developing countries’ share in global swordfish harvests went from around 20% per year in the early 1980s to around 50% per year in the late 3 1 1990s. Even though fishers targeting North Atlantic swordfish do not compete with many developing countries for access to the stock, they are at a disadvantage when competing for shares in the globalized market for the species. All fishers targeting swordfish have also faced increasing competition from alternatives such as farmed salmon, Chilean Sea Bass and other restaurant quality fish. In line with the discussion in Section 2.2, this outside competition exerts even more pressure on economically vulnerable states by reducing prices, making economic survival more difficult.3 3 3 1 FAO World Capture Production 1950-2001 Database. 3 2 Johnson (1995, 86). 3 3 Referring to Figure 4.1: Real Value o f Billfishes per Metric Ton, notice that the value per metric ton for swordfish began to fall steeply in the early 1990s, just as developing countries shares o f catches began to rise. There are certainly other factors that might have affected swordfish prices, but it is not unreasonable to assume that reduced costs o f production linked to expansion o f effort in developing countries was at least partly responsible. 198 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 4.6: Swordfish Landings by Ocean Area3 4 120,000 □ Indian Ocean H Other Atlantic North Atlantic Pacific Ocean 100,000 80.000 o 60,000 40.000 20.000 Year Because of its dramatic impact on the comparative advantage of domestic fishing fleets, outside competition must be kept in mind as one considers the economic vulnerability of fleets that harvest North Atlantic swordfish. Of the major fishing entities targeting the stock, only the EC's features both high costs of production and multiple opportunity costs of alternatives, placing it in the gradually vulnerable category in Figure 4.7. With their large-scale, distant water longliners, EC member states, especially Spain, have been able to expand their swordfish fleets in spite of high labor costs and stock-specific biological depletion that might otherwise • 3 c have resulted in serious loss of market share. Therefore, the EC can be expected to 3 4 FAO World Capture Production 1950-2001 Database. 3 5 Spain has harvested o f the lion's share o f EC landings o f North Atlantic swordfish (80-100%) over the entire data set for the stock. Portugal captured most o f the remainder but its fleets are coastal and were technologically unable to move South with Spanish longliners in the early 1990s. (ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database). Labor costs are high for large-scale European vessels that catch the 199 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. forestall management measures that would reduce its landings of North Atlantic swordfish until alternate stocks have also been seriously diminished. As the largest harvester o f northern swordfish and a geopolitical powerhouse in its own right, the EC carries a lot of clout at the Commission. Vulnerability response predicts that effective management of the stock will not occur until the EC's opportunity costs of alternatives have also become depleted. Figure 4.7: Economic Vulnerabilities of States Harvesting North Atlantic Swordfish Domestic Costs of Production High Low Moderately Vulnerable Highly Vulnerable USA & Canada Group of 18 Early, Strong Response Delayed, Moderate Response Gradually Vulnerable Mildly Vulnerable Japan (b-c) EC O h Delayed, Moderate Response Late, Weak Response Referring again to Figure 4.5, the other big producers that directly target North Atlantic swordfish are the USA and Canada. These countries have few opportunity costs of alternatives because their longline fleets cannot operate more majority o f swordfish because they pay their workers minimum wage, which is not high relative to US wages, but is considerably higher than wages paid in many other fleets. (Lequesne 2004, 6). 2 0 0 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. * 3 C . than 200 miles from port. Although fishing is not the most lucrative career in developed countries like the US and Canada, costs of labor are still high when compared to most of the rest of the world. Given this combination of high costs and few alternatives, the US and Canada are highly vulnerable to both biological depletion and outside competition. Portugal also falls into this category' but its interests were subsumed under its larger neighbor's when the EC replaced its • 3 7 individual members at ICCAT in 1997. As highly vulnerable states, these three countries can be expected push for early, strong regulation of North Atlantic swordfish. This stock is the staple of US and Canadian longline fisheries, so they are expected to show higher levels of concern than in the bigeye case. Furthermore, the US has more power in this case than in any of the tropical tuna fisheries because it lands a large percentage of total harvests. Japan, the fourth largest producer of North Atlantic swordfish is located in the mildly vulnerable position in Figure 4.7. This is because swordfish are a by-catch for Japanese fishers targeting bigeye tuna. Since the Japanese fleets do not directly 3 6 In the 1980s, these fleets did begin to target an alternative species, bigeye tuna, but the volume o f bigeye harvests was not large enough to compensate for the drop in swordfish landings. US landings o f bigeye tuna vary from between 500-800 mt per year. The total reduction in US landings of swordfish from 1989 to 2002 was over 3000 mt. Canada lands between 100-300 mt o f Atlantic bigeye each year, but its swordfish landings have been reduced by over 1,000 mt since 1993. Even though bigeye prices were quite a bit higher than swordfish prices during the period, the additional income was just enough to keep US and Canadian longline fisheries going. As competition increased over both stocks, these fleets began experiencing recession in the fisheries sector again. In addition, the US longline fleet had split up in the 1990s, as some fishers took their boats to the Gulf o f M exico to target adult yellowfin tuna. These landings also declined severely over the late 1990s and into the new millennium. (ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database). 3 7 Portugal is the second largest EC producer o f North Atlantic swordfish (0-20%) but its fleets are coastal and were technologically unable to move South with Spanish longliners in the early 1990s. (ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database). 3 8 ICCAT (2004, 2:101). Until 2000, North Atlantic swordfish were equal to roughly 6% o f their bigeye landings in the area. These landings dried up when the Japanese banned retention o f swordfish by fleets in the Atlantic. More on this can be found in Subsection 4.2.2 Reaching a Rebuilding Plan. 201 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. target North Atlantic swordfish, they are not economically vulnerable to either depletion of the stock or increasing competition in this area. Without such vulnerability, the vulnerability response hypotheses predict that the Japanese will resist any ICCAT regulations on northern swordfish that would negatively impinge on their bigeye harvest. While Japan does not catch large amounts of northern swordfish compared to the US or the EC, it is a powerful state with multiple linkages in other fisheries.3 9 More vulnerable states will have to make significant concessions to Japan in order to gain its cooperation on North Atlantic swordfish. Finally, there are some developing states that have interests in targeting North Atlantic swordfish, including Venezuela, Morocco and Brazil.4 0 Although fewer of the Group of 18 are able to harvest northern swordfish as opposed to any of the tropical tunas, this set of countries with a common interest in maintaining the availability of highly migratory species for developing coastal states has been active in recent debates on the management of the stock 4 1 As in the Chapter 3 cases, members of the Group can be expected to resist management on northern swordfish until concessions are made recognizing their rights of access. However, their behavior in this fishery differs because of timing and the magnitude of concern. Fewer developing countries have less to gain on northern swordfish than on bigeye 3 9 Bergin and Haward (1996, 1). 4 0 Countries like Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil seldom catch more than 100 mt o f North Atlantic swordfish per year. In fact, annual landings o f the stocks are often closer to 30 or 40 mt for these states. O f the developing states known to harvest northern swordfish on the Western side, only Trinidad and Tobago consistently topped 100 mt until recent actions by ICCAT forced a reduction. (See Subsection 4.2.2 Reaching a Rebuilding Plan) On the eastern side, Morocco is the only major developing country, with landings that can fluctuate between 100 and more than 500 mt per year. (ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database). 4 1 The nomenclature is somewhat misleading. Although the Group o f 18 did originally have 18 members, that number has increased with the recent influx o f developing countries to the Commission. Because this is an informal group, no official list o f members in the Group is available. 202 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. tuna; this is expected to weaken their resolve, facilitating the use of side payments to satisfy individual countries and obtain consensus. In addition, an allocation system for northern swordfish was developed prior to the organization of the Group, setting a precedent that is difficult to change.4 2 To summarize the expectations predicted by vulnerability response: • As highly vulnerable states, the US, Canada and Portugal (prior to 1997) are expected to be the first to propose management measures on North Atlantic swordfish and the first to make concessions in order to obtain a cooperative outcome. • The EC (Spain) will exhibit gradually increasing vulnerability in that it will not agree to substantive management measures on northern swordfish until it has used up the expansionary potential of other swordfish stocks. • Once members of the Group of 18 become organized, quota allocations will have to be given to individual moderately vulnerable states to prevent them from blocking consensus on management measures. • Any regulations that require reductions of Japanese by-catch of North Atlantic swordfish will only be adopted once significant transfers have been made. Side payments will come from highly and gradually vulnerable states. As in Section 3.2, the case of North Atlantic swordfish is expected to follow a pattern of early conflict over the allocation of costs and benefits that undermines 4 2 A percentage system o f allocation for North Atlantic swordfish was adopted in 1995 but developing coastal states did not become organized until later in the decade. In fact, the formation o f the Group o f 18 can be traced to the incursion o f EC fleets targeting swordfish into the southern Atlantic and resultant conflicts over allocation as that stock also declined. 203 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. international management of the stock. Unlike the Atlantic bigeye case there will be a longer period of contention over the net costs of management as outside competition builds pressure on more vulnerable states. This segment of negotiations will be covered in Subsection 4.2.1. As internal and external competition escalates, highly vulnerable states will begin to make sacrifices to obtain agreement. Eventually, gradually vulnerable states will run out of options and lend their support to create effective management measures. Subsection 4.2.2 describes that turnaround. 4.2.1 Disagreement over Distribution Scientists in ICCAT's Subcommittee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) began expressing concern for Atlantic swordfish in 1979.4 3 Responding to this advice, highly vulnerable states, Canada, the US and Portugal, began to gently push for better data collection and analysis.4 4 Their efforts culminated in two scientific workshops on swordfish in 1987 and 1988 that confirmed that the northern stock was at or above full exploitation.4 5 The following year, the US proposed that ICCAT limit effort targeting northern swordfish to current levels. In this it was strongly supported by Canada, but other countries, especially the gradually vulnerable Spain (EC) and mildly vulnerable Japan were against taking such a step when the science was still uncertain 4 6 It is important to note that Canada had put its own restrictions on effort and size at landing within its EEZ as early as 1980 and by 1989, the USA 4 3 ICCAT (1980, 150). 4 4 ibid., 77-78. 4 5 ICCAT (1989, 141). For more on early swordfish science, see Appendix L: Management Areas for Atlantic Swordfish. 4 6 ICCAT (1990, 78 and 89-90). 204 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. was in the process of developing a domestic management regime to reduce catches in its EEZ.4 7 These national measures increased the incentives for these highly vulnerable states to ensure that other fleets would also be required to reduce their harvests of North Atlantic swordfish. In the face of continuing contention over catch reductions, ICCAT members adopted a size limit for swordfish in 1990 but were unable to take action on SCRS 4 8 recommendations to reduce fishing mortality by at least 30% on the northern stock. The US did propose a measure to implement that scientific advice, but it was again opposed by less vulnerable states.4 9 Instead, the Commission chose to limit catches by fleets targeting northern swordfish to 1988 levels, a year of peak production for the fishery (see Figure 4.5). Countries whose fleets harvested the stock as a by-catch to other fisheries were given a 10% allowance by total weight for incidental catches of northern swordfish. It was believed that this would keep their landings at current levels.5 0 The recommendation was adopted by consensus but Spain and Morocco both abstained. Gradually vulnerable Spain maintained that size limits were sufficient protection for the stock and moderately vulnerable Morocco expressed the first concerns over the rights of developing coastal states.5 1 The 1990 recommendation was patently ineffective. It was neither in line with scientific advice, nor seriously implemented. By 1992, SCRS found that the 47 ICCAT (1981, 74) and NMFS (1989, 5). 4 8 Like all other size limits that were adopted by ICCAT, this one was never fully implemented and remains ineffective. For more on how the size limit issue fits into the crisis response theory, see Appendix M: Protecting Juvenile Swordfish. Interestingly, the swordfish size limit was the product o f pressures from highly vulnerable Canada and the US and was substantially less than they had proposed. Both countries wanted limits on landings as well as size limits, but gradually vulnerable states like Japan and the EC were staunchly opposed to such measures at that time. 49 ICCAT (1991, 86-87). 50 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 90-2). 5 1 ICCAT (1991, 35). 205 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. biomass of North Atlantic swordfish was between 84-95% of that which supports MSY. No proposals were made, but Canada did express great concern over the o state of the stock. The next year, scientists determined that, while reported landings in 1991 and 1992 were low enough to prevent further decline, the total fishing mortality was likely to be too high due to unreported dead discards of small fish.5 4 Furthermore, reported landings in 1993 showed that effort was still increasing in the north and that the total catch that year was actually greater than the replacement yield for the stock. Whatever reduction in catches had been obtained due to shifts of portions of the Spanish fleet to the south and imposition of the size limit had only been temporary.5 5 In 1994, new estimates put the biomass of swordfish in the North Atlantic at 68% of that which would support MSY and fishing effort was at approximately 180% of the maximum sustainable level.5 6 This represented a rapid and significant decline in the availability of North Atlantic swordfish. At the same time, because of increasing outside competition, the value of the species had dropped from a high of almost US$8,000 per metric ton in 1992 to just over US$5,000 per metric ton in 1994.5 7 Combined, these trends put serious pressures on many of the fishers targeting swordfish in the North Atlantic. As would be expected, the hardest hit were highly 5 2 ICCAT (1993, 172). 5 3 ICCAT (1994, 112). 5 4 ibid., 217. 5 5 ibid., 214-217. 5 6 ICCAT (1995, 2:170). 5 7 See Figure 4.1: Real Value o f Billfishes per Metric Ton. Estimates o f fishing mortality remained around twice the M SY level until the adoption o f regulations in the late 1990s. This suggests that fishing effort was actually increasing, since mortality remained stable while biomass is declining. Although counterintuitive to most economists, this pattern o f increasing effort with decreasing prices is common for open-access fisheries, as explained in Section 2.2 Globalization and Fisheries Economics. 2 0 6 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. vulnerable fishers in the USA and Canada; they faced relatively high costs of production, were unable to shift their effort to more abundant southern stocks and, in some cases, were more strictly regulated than their counterparts elsewhere. In fact, the value of US swordfish landings was cut in half over the period, falling from a peak of almost US$40 billion in 1988 to just over US$15 billion in 1994.5 8 Although recession in a domestic fishing fleet hit coastal fleets much harder than those that could move to more abundant waters, falling prices as well as declining availability were making the fishery less profitable for all. By 1994, most of the contracting parties that targeted swordfish in the North Atlantic realized that serious action would have to be taken to ensure future access to the stock that they exploited. As had happened before, states lined up in support of several different proposals, seeking to reduce overall catches while minimizing the regulated cuts to their domestic fisheries. This time around, it was a case of major versus minor fishing states. Canada, Portugal and Japan lead an effort to place the heaviest burden of catch reduction on the states that had historically been responsible for the vast majority catches in the area, the USA and Spain.5 9 In response, these two states countered that catch reduction should be spread equally across all users of the resource. All five of these contracting parties could agree that entry or escalation of effort by states whose catches had been very small in the past should be prohibited until the stock was in better condition. When the 1994 negotiations were finalized, everyone got what they wanted in terms of quota allocation, but the resulting total allowable catch was considerably 5 8 NMFS Annual Commercial Landings Statistics Database. 5 9 In 1987, a peak production year for North Atlantic swordfish, Spain caught 53%, the USA caught 28% and Japan and Canada combined caught only 9% o f reported landings. (ICCAT 1988, 139). 207 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. higher than scientists had recommended. At the time, replacement yield was estimated to be about 13,800 mt, so ICCAT would have to limit catches to at least that level to prevent further decline of the biomass of the stock.6 0 The recommendation that was finally adopted by the Commission gave the four main direct producers in the area, Canada, Portugal, Spain and the USA, national quotas that would add up to 13,200 mt in 1995 and 11,800 mt in 1996. If they had been the only states exploiting the resource, then this would be sufficient, but smaller fishing states could increase landings by at least 1,600 mt and remain in compliance with the recommendation. In addition, Japan was given a by-catch allowance of 8% of its total bigeye landings that would further contribute to fishing mortality on North Atlantic swordfish. At a minimum, landings would be 7% over replacement yield in the first year of the plan and less than 3% below that in the second year.6 1 Governmental concern was not yet high enough to result in effective management. Biomass and effort indicators estimated in 1995 showed that the biological situation had gotten slightly worse in the North Atlantic. That year, SCRS made it clear that the size limit adopted in 1990 had not been implemented and would not have prevented the overexploitation of the stock even if it had been enforced. With this further impetus, members of ICCAT turned their attention to developing a rebuilding plan for northern swordfish. First, they passed a resolution that instructed the SCRS to develop a recovery program for the stock so they could utilize this 6 0 ICCAT (1994, 217). 6 1 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 94-14). States without a quota or by-catch tolerance were instructed to limit their catches to 1993 levels. 6 2 ICCAT (1996, 2:69). 208 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. information at the next annual meeting to establish TACs for 1997 and beyond.6 3 Also in preparation for future negotiations, the Commission adopted a binding recommendation to allocate the percentage shares that would be applied to TACs from 1997 onward. The major fishing states all received specific portions of future total allowable catches based on an agreement that was hacked out in close-door meetings (see Table 4.1). All other states wishing to harvest swordfish in the North Atlantic would have to share 6% of whatever catch limit might be established. Although a few moderately vulnerable countries protested their small quota allocation, they were not yet unified and would not block consensus in the face of powerful states like the US and Spain.6 4 Due to the fact that 1994 effort limits were insufficient and unenforced, the biomass of northern swordfish continued to decline over the next two years.6 5 By 1996, the stock was at 58% of the level that would produce maximum sustainable yield, while fishing effort had risen to more than twice the intensity that would result 6 3 ICCAT (2005a, res. 95-9). The Commission requested estimates o f the Total Allowable Catches (TACs) that would give a 50% chance o f rebuilding the biomass to M SY level in 5, 10 and 15 year periods. 6 4 ICCAT (1996, 1:150-154). During the 1995 meeting o f Panel 4, a few developing countries, notably Korea and Brazil, complained about the lack o f room in the sharing arrangement for small developing states to build domestic capacity. They requested that the share allotted for "Others" be increased to 10% but were denied because the agreement among the five major fishing states was so tenuous that reopening discussions might destroy the recommendation altogether. 6 5 Technically, ICCAT had already adopted four enforcement measures on swordfish with the 1995 Swordfish Action Plan. However, the trade restrictive measures set up in the plan were not used until 1999. Furthermore, monitoring was problematic until the adoption o f the statistical document program for swordfish in 2001. See Subsection 4.3.2 Special Monitoring and Enforcement Issues. 2 0 9 Table 4.1: 1995 Division of North Atlantic Swordfish Catches Country Share of TAC Canada 10.00% Japan 6.25% Portugal 7.50% Spain 41.25% USA 29.00% Others 6.00% R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. in MSY.6 6 Although SCRS was able to reach these conclusions, they could not develop the rebuilding scenario options that the Commission had requested the year before. Instead, they informed the Commission that the replacement yield for the stock had declined to 11,360 mt and that total catch would have to be limited to around 10,000 mt to ensure that the stock would return to MSY levels. Because of uncertainty in the analysis, SCRS also noted that there was a slight chance that catches as high as 12,000 mt would also serve to rebuild the stock. Having already agreed on sharing arrangements, the major states with fleets targeting North Atlantic swordfish had only to agree on the total allowable catch in 1996. Three separate proposals were made on the stock. First, Canada proposed setting the TAC at 10,000 mt for the next three years, 1997-1999. While agreeing that action needed to be taken quickly, Spain felt that SCRS advice was overly pessimistic and proposed that the TAC be set at 14,000 mt for the next two years. Somewhat in between these two viewpoints, the USA proposed that the TAC be set /TO at replacement yield. After private consultations and a special redrafting session, these contracting parties presented a joint proposal that would set the 1997 TAC at replacement yield, then gradually reduce it by increments of 300 mt for each of the next two years, as shown in Table 4.2.6 9 Unfortunately, since these negotiations took place outside of the official meeting, there is no record of the discussions and any assertion regarding transfers from the highly vulnerable US and Canada to the gradually vulnerable EC would only be speculative. 66ICCAT (1997, 2:66). 6 7 ICCAT (1997, 2:68). 6 8 ICCAT (1997, 1:128). 6 9 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 96-7). Quotas for the contracting parties were established as per the 1995 sharing arrangement outlined in Table 4.1:1995 Division ofNorth Atlantic Swordfish Catches. 210 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. One other recommendation to limit effort in the North Atlantic fishery was adopted during the three-year period of the 1996 scheme. In 1997, the major fishing states noted that fleets from the “Others” category had taken more than twice their 6% share of the TAC in 1996. This caused them concern because, although the plan did not actually apply to 1996 catches, it meant that in order to comply, “Others” would need to drastically cut their effort levels in 1997. To ensure that this would happen, Canada drafted a proposal that would require all countries fishing from the “Others” category to reduce their catches of North Atlantic swordfish by 45% from 1996 levels for the next two 7 0 years. Also, any fishing state that had landed less than 100 mt in 1996 was prohibited from increasing its harvests from 1996 levels. Bermuda, represented as an overseas territory of the United Kingdom, expressed strong reservations on the proposal and was granted its own quota of 28 mt for 1997.7 1 The effectiveness of the 1996 recommendation on total allowable catches was somewhat mixed. Reported landings exceeded the TAC by about 11% for each of the three years of the program. Both major and minor fishing states contributed to 7 9 these overages and dead discards of small fish continued as well. On the other hand, by 1999, estimates of the biomass of North Atlantic swordfish had improved slightly from 58 to 65% of the level that would support MSY. Fishing effort was down as well, but it was still 134% of that which would produce maximum 70 ICCAT (1998, 1:168). 7 1 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 97-6). Future allocations to Bermuda would be decided on at the next annual meeting. 7 2 ICCAT (1999, 2:94), ICCAT (2000, 2:88), and ICCAT (2001, 2:88). 211 Table 4.2: 1996 3-Year Plan for North Atlantic Swordfish Year TAC 1997 11,300 mt 1998 11,000 mt 1999 10,700 mt R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. n -> sustainable yield. ICCAT regulations could only be partly credited for this reduction, since some longliners had independently chosen to move out of the North Atlantic while others began targeting different species, like tunas and sharks.7 4 Still, this was a preliminary step toward effective management and the first indication that highly vulnerable states were finally willing to make sacrifices to win the cooperation of their less vulnerable counterparts. 4.2.2 Reaching a Rebuilding Plan As the 1996 three year plan on North Atlantic swordfish drew to a close in 1999, SCRS informed the Commission that recent low levels of fishing mortality would need to be maintained over a longer period of time in order to rebuild the stock to levels that would support MSY. Scientists estimated that an annual TAC of 10.700 mt would rebuild the stock of North Atlantic swordfish in about 15 years. They also warned that even a 10% overage on that TAC could potentially undermine the rebuilding process. This time, competing proposals were introduced by the USA, the EC and Japan. Seeking to restore the stock more quickly, the highly vulnerable US proposed to set the TAC at 10,000 mt per year for 10 years. The gradually vulnerable EC preferred a more flexible approach, proposing to set the TAC at 10.700 mt for three years, with the review at the end of the period. Facing losses in its bigeye catches due to restrictions on swordfish by-catch, mildly vulnerable Japan 75 proposed that the TAC be set at replacement yield, 11,700 mt. 7 3 ICCAT (2000, 2:87). 7 4 ICCAT (1999, 2:92). 7 5 ICCAT (2000, 1:187-190). 212 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. As was the case of the 1996 agreement, a compromise was hacked out via side negotiations and a joint proposal was put to Panel 4. Major fishing states had agreed to establish a 10-year rebuilding plan, but specific TACs were only set for the first three years of the program. Again, a gradual reduction was factored into the regime, with total allowable catches set as per Table 4.3. In addition, a dead discards allowance was incorporated into the annual TACs and it was from this portion of the catch that reductions were taken. The dead discards allowance was divided between the USA (80%) and Canada (20%), the only two countries that actually reported dead discards to the Commission. Since discards counted directly against those states’ quotas, they were effectively the only countries whose catches were set to decrease after the year 2000. These highly vulnerable states had chosen to give up some of their national landings quotas in order to bridge part of the gap between their conservative preferences for management measures and less vulnerable states' proposals for much higher TACs. Interestingly, Japan's consent to the 1999 Rebuilding Plan for North Atlantic Swordfish was obtained via a quota swap with the EC. Bigeye tuna, Japan's targeted species had moved north in recent years, increasing their by-catch of swordfish in the 7 6 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 99-2). The sharing arrangement was maintained as per the 1995 recommendation except that the shares for Spain and Portugal were combined with a small portion o f the “Others” category to give the newly joined European Community a 49.85% allotment. The “Others” share was reduced to an allocation o f only 4.9%. Ireland and a few other EC member states had been targeting swordfish under the “Others” quota. During its first three years, the 10-year rebuilding plan that was adopted in 1999 was only modified once, in 2001, to correct a technical error in the quota designation for Trinidad and Tobago. (ICCAT 2005a, res. 01-3). 213 Table 4.3: 1999 Rebuilding Plan for North Atlantic Swordfish Dead Discards Year TAC Allowance 2000 10,600 mt 400 mt 2001 10,500 mt 300 mt 2002 10,400 mt 200 mt R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. North Atlantic. In 1996, Japanese landings of northern swordfish jumped by about 450 mt to 1,494 mt and remained rather high until 2000.7 7 Under the 1994 recommendation, Japan was granted a by-catch clause and could land up to 8% of the weight of its total catches in swordfish, so the 1996 increase was not a big 78 problem for them, linked as it was to increased effort on bigeye in the area. However, under the 1996 recommendation on catch levels, Japan was allotted a specific portion of TAC, which amounted to around 700 mt annually for 1997- 70 1999. In each year, Japanese landings exceeded that amount by between 400-600 mt.8 0 This overage was a serious problem for the Japanese, who regard themselves as leaders in international fisheries management and were loath to loose face over it. Reputation is a practical issue at ICCAT. Non-compliance by Japan on swordfish could be used as a shield by countries that were unhappy with the regulation of 8 1 stocks that are important to the Japanese, like bigeye tuna. In addition, ICCAT had set up a set of compliance regulations for North Atlantic swordfish in 1996, and these measures could potentially have resulted in trade restrictions if Japan had not 89 found some way to deal with their overages. Foreseeing these problems, the Japanese negotiated some extra breathing room for themselves, as the only country with large-scale catches of swordfish that did not directly target the stock. In the 7 7 ICCAT (2004, 2:96). 7 8 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 94-14). 7 9 ibid., rec. 96-7. Landings data it is usually not known until the year after fish are harvested. If Japan had known about the 1996 increase in their landings o f northern swordfish in 1996 they might not have agreed to the recommendation so readily. 8 0 ICCAT (2004, 2:96, SWO-Table 1) 8 1 The charge o f hypocrisy has regularly been used as defensive tactic by countries that are under pressure to conform to ICCAT regulations that they deem to be unfair. Taiwan and China often lobbed such accusations at Japan when pressed to curb their fishing effort in the Atlantic. 8 2 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 96-14). 214 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 1996 catch limit recommendation, Japan was granted 5 years in which to adjust its catches. Most countries were allowed to count any overages against only the next year’s quota allocation. This is another testament to the ability of mildly vulnerable states to gain concessions on management measures. By 1999, Japanese overages added up to more than 1,600 mt, more than two years worth of their proposed quota under the new rebuilding plan. Even with a second five-year grace period, there was no way that Japan could correct such a large excess catch on its own. To assist Japan, and convince them to agree to the rebuilding plan in 1999, the EC arranged for an “emergency relief’ transfer of its own quota for the northern stock. In return, Japan agreed not to block consensus on the rebuilding plan and also transferred some of its quota for South Atlantic 85 swordfish back to the EC. In order to prevent such large overages in the future, Japan instituted a new policy in 2000, requiring all longline vessels in its fleet to o/- discard every swordfish, dead or alive. This brought their total catches well under their quota allotment of 636 mt for 2001 and 2002.8 7 With the added help of transfers from the US in 2001 and 2002 and north-south swaps thereafter, Japan has managed to come into compliance with regulations on northern swordfish without negatively impacting its landings of bigeye tuna. 8 3 ibid., rec. 96-7. 8 4 ICCAT (2004, 2:96, SWO-Table 1); ICCAT (2005a, rec. 96-7); ICCAT (2005a, rec. 99-2). 8 5 ICCAT (2000, 1:177). The amount o f the transfer was not specified. 8 6 The regulation was designed to prevent fishers from killing swordfish brought to their boats alive. After the ban on all landings o f swordfish, Japanese fishers no longer had any incentive to keep live swordfish to sell along with the bigeye they targeted. Dead discards were still counted against the Japanese quota, but because live fish were released, Japan was able to cut its landings in half. This caused dead discards o f North Atlantic swordfish to more than double in a single year, while Japanese landings from the stock were reduced to zero. 8 7 Landings for Japan were 161 mt in 2000, the discard regulation was not quite fully effective in its first year. The total Japanese catch (landings plus dead discards) was 741 mt that year. (ICCAT 2004, 2:96-97, SWO-Table 1). 2 1 5 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. The situation surrounding by-catch of swordfish by tuna longlines in the North Atlantic is somewhat atypical. The fact that Japan was the only major source of by-catch of northern swordfish made effective regulations easier in some ways and harder in others. Unlike many members of ICCAT, Japan does have the domestic capacity to enforce by-catch avoidance mechanisms such as the 2000 moratorium on landings of northern swordfish. Also, Japan was under added pressure to compromise because of its reputational concerns due to economic vulnerability in other fisheries. Even so, this did not prevent Japan from parlaying its reluctance to forgo catches of bigeye into leverage that brought concessions and transfers from contracting parties that target swordfish directly. Its power as a major fishing nation and harvester of northern swordfish gave Japan the ability to demand large side payments for its cooperation. Therefore, the willingness of more vulnerable states to make concessions and transfers was vital. Even the gradually vulnerable EC temporarily gave up some of its quota to avoid the risk of further OQ stock depletion that was implied by the Japanese proposal in 1999. When it came time to negotiate the total allowable catch for the next three years of the plan in 2002, contracting parties were encouraged by some positive signs from the fishery. Due in part to the effort restrictions adopted by ICCAT, along with independent shifts of the longline fleet away from North Atlantic swordfish and 8 8 Japan keeps close tabs on its distant water fleets and strictly punishes non-compliance. (Bergin and Haward 1996, 52). Other fishing states like Taiwan and Ghana often fall short because they cannot control their domestic fleets. 8 9 By 1999, the EC was finally feeling its vulnerability as regulations for the South Atlantic stock came under consideration by the Commission. Gradually vulnerable characteristics are also displayed in the EC's preference for short term versus long-term measures, as seen in its proposal to set the TACs for 3 years as opposed to 10 years and its single year arrangement with Japan. Flexibility is key for gradually vulnerable states because o f their multi-stock approach to risk management. Countries with distant water fleets do want to prevent the collapse o f any one stock, but they also need the ability to quickly transfer effort if a sudden change in availability does occur. 216 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. relatively high recruitment around the turn of the millennium, the biomass of the stock had rebounded to 94% of that which would produce maximum sustainable yield. Furthermore, fishing effort was down to 75% of the MSY level.9 0 These optimistic results came with the caveat that overall catches had been underestimated in recent years due to Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing as well as underreported dead discards of the fish in both commercial by-catch categories.9 1 More information had become available on IUU fishing due to monitoring measures included in the 1995 Swordfish Action Plan and the creation of a Statistical Document Program for swordfish in 2001. Because of these improvements in stock biomass, SCRS revised its estimate of a suitable total allowable catch upwards to 14,000 mt. They advised that, if annual catches were sustained at this level from 2003 to 2009, the North Atlantic swordfish stock had 50% chance of rebuilding to the level that would support MSY in 10 years. However, they also noted that a lower TAC would rebuild the stock more quickly and with more certainty. Some contracting parties were eager to take advantage of the gains that resulted from their restraint in previous years. Others, especially the highly vulnerable USA and Canada, were somewhat skeptical and pushed to keep the TAC at a lower level for a few more years to ensure that the rebuild was as robust as possible. After some discussion, the EC presented a proposal to set the TAC at 14,000 mt annually for 2003, 2004 and 2005.9 4 In addition, Japan was permitted to 9 0 ICCAT (2003, 2:94). 9 1 ICCAT (2002, 2:93); ICCAT (2003, 2:96). 9 2 This will be dealt with more in Subsection 4.3.2 Special Monitoring and Enforcement Issues. 9 3 ICCAT (2003, 2:96-97). 9 4 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 02-2). The dead discards allowance was reinstated but at the low level o f 100 mt and only for 2003. Any discards above the allotment would be counted against the contracting parties' catch quotas. 217 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. count up to 400 units of overage in the north against double that amount of quota in the south.9 5 The issue of allocation came up again in 2002. Even though the total allowable catch had increased significantly, small fishing states in the “Others” category were receiving less from this recommendation than they had in 1999. This agreement differed from the previous sharing arrangement because the “Others” category was divided into specific allocations for minor fishing states.9 6 Mexico, Venezuela, and other members of the Group of 18 vociferously expressed their dissatisfaction with the portions they were allotted. Having recently experienced severe contention over allocation of other stocks like southern swordfish and bigeye tuna, more vulnerable fishing states were well aware of the inaction that such discord could precipitate. In order to advance discussions on the matter, a small working group was formed to bring together the concerned parties. Finally, a compromise was reached whereby the quota for those in the “Others” category was increased from 835 mt to 1,185 mt. The dissenters did not get all that they wanted, but more vulnerable states did give up small portions of their quota allocations to appease 97 these moderately vulnerable countries. With a new three-year plan in place, there was little discussion on North Atlantic swordfish in 2003; although they did choose to postpone the next scientific assessment of the stock until 2006, when they would need to negotiate a new 0 8 arrangement. It will be interesting to see what the future holds for the stock. In the 9 5 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 00-3). As part o f his program, Japan also agreed to place observers on its vessels and to participate in a scientific study o f the stock structure and mixing o f Atlantic swordfish. 9 6 ibid., rec. 02-2. Large historical fishers preferred individual quotas for the “Others” category because small fishing states would be more accountable for their overages. 9 7 ICCAT (2003, 1:233-234). 9 8 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 03-3). 2 1 8 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. past, the Commission was unable to overcome disputes over allocation until biological and recession in a domestic fishing fleet had set in. By 1994, the first year of catch restrictions, the biomass of the stock had declined to 67% of that which supports MSY, total catches were down more than 15,000 mt from their 1988 high and the per unit price of swordfish had dropped by almost US$3,000 per metric ton. Even so, the actions taken that year were not enforced and would have been insufficient even if they had been put into action. It took two more years, and a further decline in the biomass and the price of North Atlantic swordfish, to convince members of ICCAT to take effective measures to rebuild the stock. Once ICCAT finally agreed on effort limits for northern swordfish, reported landings remained above total allowable catches until strenuous enforcement began in 1999." Like the limits placed on directed landings of swordfish, controls on by-catch of swordfish by tuna longliners were not really made effective until crisis was exceedingly evident in the fishery. In fact, these regulations were completely intertwined. Limits on direct and indirect harvests of swordfish in the North Atlantic were negotiated in tandem and set out in the same recommendations. The main difference between management of the two types of harvests was that Japan, which caught swordfish as by-catch, received side payments from more vulnerable contracting parties like the USA and the EC in return for its cooperation. Still, because regulation of swordfish by-catch is so directly tied to the need for limits on directed effort, the continuation of such successful measures will depend heavily on ICCAT's long-term commitment to sustainable management of northern swordfish. 9 9 This will be dealt with more in Subsection 4.3.2 Special Monitoring and Enforcement Issues. 219 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. If the Commission's resolve evaporates with the full rebuilding of the stock, then a boom-bust cycle will result. 4.3 Marlins: Including Non-commercial Interests Since the Commission has undertaken regulation of these two separate stocks simultaneously, blue and white marlins will be discussed together in this section. Compared to swordfish, the role of marlins in commercial fisheries in the Atlantic is minuscule. Combined, these two species represent less than 1% of the stocks managed by ICCAT.1 0 0 With very little commercial value, marlins have not received much attention from contracting parties to the Commission. However, this does not mean that stocks of marlins have not been affected by commercial fishing operations or ICCAT regulations. As by-catch species, populations of blue and white marlins have been severely depleted due to incidental fishing mortality by longlines targeting swordfish, bigeye tuna and other commercially valuable stocks. In addition, marlins are prime game fishes, and are often targeted by recreational fishers. Although ICCAT has virtually ignored the plight of marlins over most of its history, some actions have been taken recently to rebuild the heavily depleted stocks of these species. In its strictest form, vulnerability response model is contradicted by the fact that ICCAT has adopted management measures for blue and white marlins. When only commercial interests are accounted for in the decision-making processes of states, then all ICCAT members would reside in the mildly vulnerable category because Atlantic marlins are not directly targeted by the fishing industry (see Figure 1 0 0 ICCAT (1989, 69). 220 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4.8). Because of their by-catch status, the decline in biomass of Atlantic marlins does not create commercial recession in a domestic fishing fleet in any ICCAT member state. Therefore, the vulnerability response prediction, as it was laid out in Chapter 2, would be that countries completely ignore the issue of marlin depletion. This has not occurred. In fact, the Commission has adopted several binding recommendations that are designed to reduce fishing mortality on blue and white marlins irrespective of the impact on commercial harvests. This exception to vulnerability response expectations needs an explanation. Figure 4.8: Economic Vulnerabilities of States Harvesting Blue and White Marlins Domestic Costs of Production High Low Moderately Vulnerable Highly Vulnerable None None Early, Strong Response Delayed, Moderate Response Gradually Vulnerable Mildly Vulnerable All States (b-c) None Delayed, Moderate Response Late, Weak Response The key to unlocking the marlin conundrum lies in alternate valuations for the species. Conservationists and recreational fishers represent the most common 2 2 1 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. noncommercial valuations in fisheries. Although there is significant variation and overlap among members of these groups, they can usually be differentiated by their motivations for engaging in the policy process. In general, conservationists value a stock of fish for its existence. They may range in their views from complete preservationists, who would like to keep stocks perfectly intact, to pragmatists, who recognize the access rights of others while working to make sure that stocks remain available for future generations. Like commercial fishers, recreational fishers believe in conservation for use, but they work to increase their own utility from the game fish they value. In the United States and other countries, recreational fishing is an industry itself, generating revenues, jobs and other economic benefits. Thus, recreational fishers and the businesses that cater to them have organized to protect their access to sportfish stocks now and in the future.1 0 1 To test this iteration of the vulnerability response hypotheses, it is necessary to place another layer on top of the economic vulnerability matrix for the marlin 102 fishery. For the sake of differentiation, this will be called a non-commercial susceptibility matrix. Figure 4.9 illustrates the impact of these alternative interest 1 0 1 Recreational fishing can be large enough to reduce the size o f a stock o f fish. For Atlantic Marlins, accurate estimates o f recreational fishing mortality are unknown, but they are believed to be significantly less than commercial mortality. In addition, recreational fishers had been finding ways to minimize the impact on the stocks they targeted by promoting catch-and-release along with the use o f gears that are less destructive to the fish such as circle hooks and monofilament lines. 1 0 2 This layer exists for commercial fisheries as well as by-catch fisheries, but in the previous cases, alternate valuations were either drowned out or co-opted by commercial interests. For instance, US conservation and recreation organizations were pushing for swordfish regulation from the late 1980s onward, but by then, so were commercial fishers targeting swordfish. A similar scenario evolved as conservationists began pressing for reduction o f IUU catches o f bluefin and other important stocks. In other cases, like a Greenpeace campaign to eliminate landings o f undersized bluefin tuna by European fleets, public support has not rivaled the power o f the commercial fishing industry and has had little impact on EC policy at ICCAT. More research into the balance between commercial and alternative viewpoints for noncharismatic fish species would be useful. 2 2 2 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. groups on the states harvesting blue and white marlins in the Atlantic.1 0 3 The columns indicate the level of influence wielded by environmental organizations, while the rows specify the weight of recreational fishing interests in the domestic policy process. In the absence of a commercial element, states that face strong pressures from both of these non-commercial valuations will be highly susceptible to the repercussions of biological depletion and will prefer early, strong management response. States that are only influenced by one of these alternate interests are moderately susceptible and will only support delayed, moderate action on by-catch stocks. Finally, countries in which neither environmental nor recreational interests have much influence will be mildly susceptible and therefore prefer late, weak regulatory response to biological depletion. 1 0 3 Again, this is a simple representation o f a complex issue, but it is useful in the current model. 223 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 4.9: Non-commercial Susceptibility of States Harvesting Blue and White Marlins Influence of Environmental Organizations High Low CO < L > 4 = CO 1 2 " 3 . 2 High Highly Susceptible Moderately / Susceptible USA Venezuela, Cuba Early, Strong Response Delayed, Moderate Response o 0 ) & Moderately . Mildly Susceptible o <D Susceptible O c s £ o None All Others 3 H - ) ca H H Delayed, Moderate Late, Weak Response Response Unfortunately, interest groups are not often forthcoming regarding their ability to influence policy, so placing countries within the susceptibility matrix can be somewhat difficult.1 0 4 The categorizations found in Figure 4.9 are based on a combination of discussions with representatives at ICCAT and analysis of national delegations.1 0 5 For instance, the US is shown as being highly susceptible to recreational and environmental interests because both groups are represented on its 1 0 4 See Axelrod and Cohen (2000) for more regarding the incentives and mechanisms used by agents as they seek to influence policy makers. 1 0 5 ICCAT annual reports provide lists o f delegation membership at each annual meeting, including names and affiliations o f all delegates. Small developing states often send only a few delegates, usually government employees. However, larger developing countries and industrialized members o f the Commission sometimes send more than 40 delegates to the annual meetings, many o f whom are representatives o f commercial fishing interests. Delegates representing alternative values are much less common. 2 2 4 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. delegation and on the national advisory committee that formulates US ICCAT policy.1 0 6 In fact, of the three US Commissioners to ICCAT, one is always a representative of recreational fishers.1 0 7 Only a few other countries like Venezuela and Cuba have ever had representatives of noncommercial interest groups on their delegations. These countries are moderately susceptible because recreational fishing 1 OS is important part of their tourism industries. Although there are some groups, like Greenpeace Europe, that are active in other ICCAT member states, they have little direct influence on policymaking and are not represented on national delegations.1 0 9 Therefore, all other contracting parties fall into the mildly susceptible category. When developing expectations regarding outcomes for a by-catch fishery like that of blue and white marlins in the Atlantic, one must compare the economic vulnerability and noncommercial susceptibility matrices. All members of ICCAT that harbor longline fleets targeting swordfish, yellowfin, bigeye and other highly migratory species in the Atlantic also incidentally harvest blue and white marlins.1 1 0 When states are mildly susceptible to alternative values, these commercial interests will completely drown out any protests by environmentalists or recreational fishers regarding marlins in order to avoid foregoing landings of their target stocks. Much might be said concerning the need for sustainable management of by-catch stocks, but little will be done unless transfers are made. At the same time, even states that are highly susceptible or moderately susceptible to alternative valuations will go 1 0 6 US Congress (1975, chap. 16A, sec. 971a, para. a2B). 1 0 7 ibid, chap. 16A, sec. 971b, para. al. 1 0 8 ICCAT (1996, 2:46). 1 0 9 Lequesne (2004, 40). 1 1 0 As has been mentioned, is very difficult for any state that would not be affected by regulation to speak out regarding the need for stricter management measures. Even if they do so, they may not be listened to and they might face retaliatory gestures from countries whose commercial interests are threatened by proposed regulation. (ICCAT 2004, 2:75 and 82) 225 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. through a period in which internal conflict among the various interest groups results in non-action. Proposals on management will be delayed until the economic value of domestic commercial fisheries declines significantly or the political importance of other interest groups increases. For Atlantic marlins specifically, the multi-interest version of vulnerability response model creates these specific expectations of state behavior: • As a state that is highly susceptible to alternative valuations, the USA will be the first to propose measures for Atlantic marlins, although this response will be mild until commercial interests become convinced that regulation could be beneficial to domestic longline fleets. • Moderately vulnerable states like Venezuela and Cuba will verbally support US efforts, but are unlikely to do much more. • All other states, especially those with large longline fleets like Japan and the EC, will oppose regulations of marlins that would negatively impact their commercial harvests. Transfers and concessions will be necessary to achieve consensus on any rebuilding regime. Predictions regarding ICCAT management response to biological depletion for blue and white marlins also differ from more typical commercial stocks: • If any management measures are taken at all, they will not be adopted until stocks of these species are reduced to much lower levels than commercially valuable stocks like swordfish and bigeye tuna. 2 2 6 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. • The effectiveness of those measures will also be undermined by the absence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, mainly due to opposition from states that are mildly vulnerable in both political and economic terms. Subsection 4.3.1 reviews the Commission's record on blue and white marlins in order to test the expectations predicted by this modified version of vulnerability response model. This will be followed by a comparative examination of the monitoring and enforcement measures adopted for marlins as opposed those adopted for North Atlantic swordfish in Subsection 4.3.2. Specific obstacles to management response for non-commercial by-catch stocks will be discussed further in each subsection 4.3.1 Partial Management Response As Figure 4.3 showed, incidental landings of blue and white marlins in the Atlantic have remained substantially above estimates of maximum sustainable yield throughout ICCAT's history. In accordance with vulnerability response expectations, the highly susceptible United States has consistently expressed apprehension regarding the status of marlin stocks and pushed for better research on the species.1 1 1 First voicing concern in 1975, the US subsequently asserted that current catches of billfish were too high in 1977 and announced their intention to introduce regulations 112 • • on the species two years later. Although the US did institute domestic legislation to reduce their own landings of blue and white marlins by 20% in 1981, their 1 1 1 See Appendix N: Marlins By-catch and Scientific Uncertainty, regarding the difficulties o f scientifically assessing by-catch as opposed to commercially targeted stocks. The main obstacle is the ability of fishers to discard landings o f by-catch at sea with little opportunity forgone, as opposed to commercial stocks, which could not be discarded without a loss o f revenue. Thus, unless effective monitoring is undertaken at sea, fishers can easily misreport incidental catches. 1 1 2 ICCAT (1976, 69); ICCAT (1978, 69); ICCAT (1980, 77-78). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. intentions to propose measures at ICCAT were forestalled by lack of scientific data and internal dissension between commercial fishers, conservationists and 113 recreational fishers. It was not until 1985 that the US again spoke out on marlins, asking the SCRS to prepare a plan for a billfish research program to be instituted the next year.1 1 4 In 1986, SCRS submitted its proposal for the Enhanced Research for Billfish Program (ERBP). The US supported this program, along with Cuba, but there were some concerns raised regarding funding.1 1 5 In order to get the research program approved, the USA proposed that ICCAT allot only $10,000 for the first year of the ERBP. The rest of the program's budget, $25,000, would be raised from private sources in the United States.1 1 6 Although ICCAT's contribution to the ERBP was only about 1.7% of its annual budget, and was minuscule relative to the amounts expended for research on bluefin, skipjack and yellowfin tunas, a few contracting parties still expressed reservations about funding the program.1 1 7 However, the ERBP was approved, with its budget, and began its activities in 1987. The path of scientific assessment on marlins is indicative of multi-interest vulnerability response in that the only state that was highly susceptible to non commercial interests ended up footing the bill for all research on these by-catch stocks. After its first year of operations, all of the funding for the Enhanced Research 1 1 3 ICCAT (1982, 81). 1 1 4 ICCAT (1986, 73). 1 1 5 Before it could be approved, the ERBP proposal was sent to ICCAT’s Standing Committee on Finance and Administration to determine the amount o f funds that could be allocated to the program. Although members o f the Commission did sometimes expressed concern regarding the costs o f research programs on other species, including skipjack and bigeye tuna, objections were never as vociferous as on the ERPB. 1 1 6 ICCAT (1987, 126). 1 1 7 ibid., 51 and 127. 228 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. for Billfish Program was provided by private sources.1 1 8 By 1994, the ERBP was attracting as much as $68,000 per year from non-governmental organizations.1 1 9 Most of the money came from groups of recreational fishers in the USA who were dismayed at the decline in their catch per unit of effort from 1980 to 1987.1 2 0 Other countries with important recreational fisheries also contributed to the ERPB, including Venezuela, whose sportfishers were also observing fewer billfish on their lines.1 2 1 Progress on the ERPB was slow at first, mainly because there was so much that needed to be done to improve databases and analytical techniques. Solid results were not available until 1992, when SCRS asserted with certainty that both blue and white marlins were overfished (stock biomass was below the level that would support MSY), and that overfishing (fishing effort was above the level that would produce MSY) was still occurring for the species.1 2 2 They also advised the Commission to decrease harvesting of both species, recommending that live release of incidental marlin catches could reduce fishing mortality by as much as 3 7%.1 2 3 Two years later, SCRS’ prognosis had gotten worse, the biomass of the stocks had declined further and indirect effort was increasing fishing mortality on marlins.1 2 4 As SCRS advice became more solid, discussions regarding billfish at ICCAT became more substantial. In 1992, the USA put forth a proposal that would require 1 1 8 ICCAT (1989, 69). 1 1 9 ICCAT (1994, 114-115). 1 2 0 ICCAT (1988, 151). Recreational fishers had been involved in the US policy making process for many years and had also engaged in scientific tag-and-release efforts since the mid-1970s. (ICCAT 1978, 147). 1 2 1 ICCAT (1989, 69); ICCAT (1991, 177). 1 2 2 ICCAT (1993, 164 and 165). 1 2 3 ICCAT (1993, 168). 1 2 4 ICCAT (1995, 172). 229 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 1 9S all contracting parties to release whatever billfish they caught, dead or alive. Other states also spoke out. Japan expressed its concern, offering to cooperate but insisting that recreational fishers should share the burden of catch limits with commercial fishers. They also rankled at the idea of discarding dead marlins, believing it to be a wasteful practice. Spain (EC) announced that it had started research into billfish by- catch in 1990 and was currently studying the issue. Thus, a dialog began, but no actions were taken that year. Similar discussions were held in 1993 and 1994. No • 196 consensus could be reached and ICCAT continued to do nothing. By 1995, SCRS was able to estimate that, in 1990, the biomass of blue marlin had been 42% of that which supports MSY ( B m s y )-127 White marlin was even more adversely affected, with 1990 biomass being 25% of the level that would enable maximum sustainable yield.1 2 8 These numbers were very disturbing to the United States, which claimed that its recreational fisheries for billfish were worth more than $15 billion. In response to serious biological depletion, the US proposed a 12-year scientific program that would require longlines to release all live billfish caught 1 9 0 (other than swordfish) and tag them if possible. Japan again raised concerns regarding the equanimity of such a program, insisting that longlines not be singled out and that recreational fishers should also have to reduce their catches. During this discussion, the US pointed out that recreational fishers already release about 80% of the billfish they catch. Other states, like Korea and Spain, suggested that live release 1 2 5 ICCAT (1993, 94). 1 2 6 ibid., 95. 1 2 7 ICCAT (1996, 2:51). 1 2 8 ICCAT (1996, 2:53). In contrast, swordfish biomass had never fallen below 58% o f B M S Y and bigeye biomass was not allowed to fall below 60% o f BM S Y . 1 2 9 ICCAT (1996, 1:166). 230 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 1 ™ should be voluntary and that rewards should be provided for tagging. Eventually, a watered-down, non-binding resolution was adopted that established a five-year scientific program during which contracting parties were encouraged to promote the 1 ^ 1 live release and tagging of billfish is by both commercial and recreational fishers. The next year, more current estimates of biological parameters were a v a ila b le , p u ttin g th e b io m a s s o f b lu e m a rlin at 24 % o f B m sy an d th e b io m a s s o f white marlin at 2 2 .6 % of B m s y -1 3 2 Also, a workshop on billfish held in the United States had found that the use of monofilament, rather than steel lines in fishing gear could potentially reduce by-catch mortality of species like marlin. Building on this information, the USA proposed a recommendation to promote this change from steel 1 to monofilament lines, and to expand research on the effect of the switch. Again, there was resistance making such a transition mandatory, especially from some states like Brazil and Spain, who questioned the impact that monofilaments would have on billfish mortality and landings of targeted species. Other countries were concerned about the costs of the changeover.1 3 4 After some discussion, ICCAT adopted another non-binding resolution that did urge contracting parties to promote the use of monofilament lines, but left out much of the research included in the USA's original proposal.1 3 5 Although no new assessments were carried out for marlins in 1997, the USA put forth a new proposal that would prohibit all landings of blue and white marlins 1 3 0 ICCAT (1996, 1:155). 1 3 1 ICCAT (2005a, res. 95-12). 1 3 2 ICCAT (1997, 2:51 and 58). 1 3 3 ICCAT (1997, 1:88). 1 3 4 ibid., 129-130. 1 3 5 ICCAT (2005a, res. 96-9). 231 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. \ ' \ f \ except for tournament fish. Such drastic measures were unacceptable to many members of the Commission. A second proposal was developed in informal meetings between the USA, Japan and other interested parties. Rather than a complete moratorium, the joint proposal required a 25% reduction in landings of 1 7 7 blue and white marlins from 1996 levels by the end of 1999. US perseverance had finally brought about the first binding recommendation adopted for any non commercial by-catch species. As per modified vulnerability response model, this was only achieved after significant concessions, such as the modification of the original US proposal that lowered the mandated reduction in marlin landings from 100 to 25%.1 3 8 It is also interesting to note that this big push by the US came the year after the passage of domestic legislation that could potentially reduce US longline effort 1 IQ and effectiveness in order to protect blue and white marlins. As revolutionary as the 1997 recommendation was, its immediate effect was to undermine reporting of marlin landings in the Atlantic. In 1998, 34% of the states that had previously provided data on landings of blue marlin reported nothing on the 1 3 6 ICCAT (1998, 1:172). 1 3 7 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 97-9). 1 3 8 A cynical observer o f the 1997 meeting might notice that a few other US proposals, including a 20% reduction on bigeye catches and a compliance recommendation on catches o f small fish, had been laid aside with little complaint from their originator. Since the US doesn't catch much bigeye tuna and has been quite successful at minimizing its landings o f small fish in accordance with ICCAT regulations, these proposals seem designed impact countries like Japan and the EC. However, because such negotiations are carried on behind closed doors, one can only speculate regarding the trade-offs that were made to attain consensus on the billfish proposition. 1 3 9 As part o f a larger marine conservation movement, the Sustainable Fisheries Act o f 1996 requires that all fish stocks, commercial or otherwise, be managed at an optimal yield that is less than or equal to maximum sustainable yield. Implementation o f this act included requiring commercial longliners to discard all marlins, dead or alive, and the creation o f several time-area closures within the US EEZ in 2001. (ICCAT 2004, 2:75). In addition, the Endangered Species Act o f 1990 caused US fishers to be more responsive to SCRS reports on the level o f biological depletion o f marlins because listing o f either stock as an endangered species could potentially result in a complete closure o f the US longline fishery in the Atlantic. White marlin was especially important in this regard because it does not exist in any other oceans. (ICCAT 2001, 1:219). 2 3 2 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. species and 12% stopped reporting data on white marlin.1 4 0 Even so, the USA put forth a proposal to keep landings of blue and white marlins at 1998 levels for 1999. Initially, the recommendation also included instructions for SCRS to develop a recovery plan for the two marlin species.1 4 1 Opposition from Japan and the EC forced the USA to remove that portion of the proposition, postponing the next assessment of the stocks until 2000.1 4 2 It is important to note that both Japan and the EC faced much bigger commercial losses from regulations of marlins than the US did. This is because their longline operations, targeting bigeye tuna and swordfish respectively, were much greater in volume than US fisheries for the species.1 4 3 This gave them considerable power within the fisheries and ensured that commercial fishing interests could overwhelm whatever low levels of non-commercial concern existed in these mildly susceptible countries.1 4 4 For several years, non-reporting prevented assessment of either stock as well as a valuation of the effectiveness of the 1997 regulation. Little was said on billfish during the 1999 meeting of the Commission, but discussions resumed with new scientific analysis in 2000. Although the 2000 assessment was somewhat more optimistic for blue marlin, indications were much worse for white marlin then they 1 4 0 ICCAT (1999, 2:69 and 76). 1 4 1 ICCAT (1999, 1:161). 1 4 2 ibid., 73; ICCAT (2005a, rec. 98-10). 1 4 3 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 1 4 4 Bigger fishing operations give states more power in terms o f the ability to defect as well as national legitimacy under the norm o f conservation for use that places socioeconomic concerns above all other reasons for regulation. It's evident throughout the recorded history o f ICCAT negotiations that socioeconomic arguments are used for validation by all states, no matter what their position on management measures. In this instance, the US frequently pointed out the economic importance o f its domestic recreational fisheries when pleading for protection o f marlins. Other states like Japan and the EC countered that their commercial fishing interests would be too severely damaged by US proposed marlin regulations. As o f yet, commercial considerations trump recreational interests from the perspective o f most ICCAT member states. 2 3 3 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. had been in 1996. The 2000 biomass of blue marlin was estimated to be 40% of that which would support MSY. On the other hand, fishing mortality on the species was estimated at four times the maximum sustainable level in 1999.1 4 5 For white marlin, the 2000 biomass was only 15% of that which would support MSY, but fishing mortality was at seven times the level that would produce MSY.1 4 6 The fact that the biological situation for marlins had deteriorated so much indicated that earlier resolutions and recommendations had been ineffective. The 2000 SCRS report instigated a protracted discussion regarding the fundamental scientific basis for the stock assessments of blue and white marlins. Mildly susceptible Japan presented its own interpretations of the data available, which showed that the biomass of marlins was much healthier than the official scientific report. In response, the USA defended the original analysis on a point-by- point basis. The US also pointed out that representatives of Japan had been present at SCRS meetings and had approved the scientific report.1 4 7 In addition, the USA brought up the possibility that international nongovernmental organizations would attempt to have white marlin listed for protection under the Convention for International Trade in Endangered Species if ICCAT did not take serious actions soon.1 4 8 Conflicts over the level of biological depletion for marlins still continue.1 4 9 Convinced that a complete rebuilding program was necessary to reverse negative trends in the abundance of blue and white marlins, the USA presented a 1 4 5 ICCAT (2001,2:66). 1 4 6 ibid., 73 1 4 7 ICCAT (2001, 1:230-231). 1 4 8 ibid., 241-242. Such a listing would eliminate all trade in white marlins and could also have domestic repercussions, even in states with low susceptibility to environmental interests, due to high levels o f publicity associated with the endangered species label. 1 4 9 See Appendix N: Marlins By-catch and Scientific Uncertainty for a description of those differences, which have led to vacillations in the pessimism o f assessments since the 1980s. 234 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. detailed proposal designed to further decrease fishing mortality on the species. After much discussion, mainly involving the usefulness of requiring marlin to be discarded if brought in dead, amounts of marlins that could be retained by fishers and appropriate size limits for the species, a long-term plan was finally adapted. Specifically, ICCAT agreed that for the next two years, all states fishing in the Atlantic Ocean would be required to further reduce their landings of blue and white marlins to 50% and 33% of 1999 levels respectively. Also included in the recommendation were regulations aimed at reducing mortality of marlins in recreational fisheries. The United States agreed to limit its recreational landings of blue and white marlins to a total of 250 fish, all of which would be taken in duly monitored tournaments. All other states were required to establish size limits for both species in their recreational fisheries. The plan was scheduled for review after new assessment and development of rebuilding plans in 2002.1 5 0 As ambitious as ICCAT's management of marlins may seem, its effectiveness has been almost nil. Although reported landings of both species have declined, nonreporting and misclassification has increased, obscuring actual fishing mortality on the species. Assessments still cannot be performed with a high degree of certainty, but the biological crisis for blue and white marlins is so severe that 1 5 0 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 00-13). The 2000 Marlins rebuilding plan has been revised two times in the past three years. First, in 2001, at the instigated o f Japan, the reference point for reduction o f landings was changed to account for compliance, or lack thereof, with the 1997 recommendation to reduce catches o f both species by 25% by 1999. As Japan pointed out, some countries had complied with the 1997 regulation, reducing their catches in 1999 while others had not. To make things more equitable, the rebuilding plan was modified so that states could choose to reduce their landings o f blue and white marlins relative to either 1999 or 1996 landings, whichever was higher. Due to an overload o f work for SCRS, the blue marlin assessment was postponed until 2003, and the terms o f the rebuilding plan were extended for that species. (ICCAT 2003b, res. 01-10). Similarly, in 2002, the landings and size limits in the rebuilding plan were extended for both species for three more years and assessments were also postponed until 2005. (ICCAT 2005a, rec. 02-13). 235 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. overfishing is higher than the entire range of estimates. For instance, estimates of the 2000 biomass for blue marlin range from 25-60% of MSY levels and 2001 estimates for the biomass of white marlin ranged between 6-25% of MSY levels. Even the best-case scenario is not very good in regard to these by-catch species. Furthermore, reported landings have not been brought within the range of replacement yield for either of the two species. This means that, even if there were no data reporting issues, fishing mortality would be too high to allow stocks of the species to rebuild.1 5 1 So far, marlin management has failed because ICCAT did not adopt monitoring and enforcement measures like those used to ensure the effectiveness of bigeye and swordfish regulations. 4.3.2 Special Monitoring and Enforcement Issues Part of the reason that management measures were more effective for swordfish and bigeye than for marlins was that the reductions in fishing mortality mandated by the Commission were adopted sooner and were more in line with scientific advice. Of equal importance was ICCAT's commitment to monitoring and enforcing catch limits on the commercially valuable stocks as opposed to reductions in marlin landings. In the absence of measures to ensure compliance, problems such as misreporting data, dead discards of managed stocks, and violation of catch limits can easily undermine even the most well intentioned management plan. However, monitoring and enforcement are costly actions in their own right, and will only be taken when there are significant and widespread gains to be made. This subsection reviews the enforcement mechanisms that were adopted for swordfish and then 1 5 1 ICCAT (2004, 2:67 and 75). 236 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. discusses the impediments to implementation of similar measures for by-catch stocks like blue and white marlins. In 1995, a year after ICCAT adopted its first catch limits for northern swordfish, the Commission passed a resolution initiating a compliance regime known as the Atlantic Swordfish Action Plan. This plan briefly provided for review of compliance by contracting parties, then went on to discuss methods of ensuring that non-contracting parties also abide by ICCAT regulations. The Commission was directed to identify non-contracting parties who were fishing for Atlantic swordfish in a manner that undermined ICCAT conservation measures. To do this, ICCAT would have to compile reported landings data, trade statistics and other information relevant to non-contracting parties’ impact on swordfish stocks. Reviewing this data annually, the Commission, through its subsidiary body, the Permanent Working Group for the Improvement of ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures (PWG), would take non-discriminatory trade measures against non-contracting parties identified as being non-compliant.1 5 2 When ICCAT adopted its second set of catch limits for North Atlantic swordfish in 1996, the Commission also amended the Swordfish Action Plan to make sure that contracting parties would have strong incentives to adhere to their quota allocations. Under the auspices of the Compliance Committee, which had been established in 1995, contracting parties to the commission were required to report their landings of northern swordfish, explain any over-harvest and describe domestic measures taken to prevent future overages. More importantly, any contracting party that landed more than its share of the TAC in one year would have the amount of that 1 5 2 ICCAT (2005a, res. 95-13). 237 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. over-harvest subtracted from the next year's quota. If a contracting party were to go over their quota two years in a row, ICCAT could reduce their catch limits to a minimum of 125% of the overage, with the option to enact trade measures on the 1 S T offending state. Interestingly, 1999 was the first year that trade restrictive measures were taken against non-contracting parties under the 1995 Swordfish Action Plan. Contracting parties were instructed to ban imports of Atlantic swordfish and any of its products from Belize and Honduras. In 1998, these states had been identified as providers of flags of convenience for fleets targeting Atlantic swordfish in contravention of ICCAT regulations, and a letter had been sent to each of them explaining the nature of their infraction and the results of continued non- compliance.1 5 4 The initial response of these parties was deemed insufficient and so sanctions were imposed. Both countries have taken measures to curb the non- compliant activities of their fleets. ICCAT maintained sanctions on these countries until they could prove that they no longer harbor illegal, unregulated or unreported (IUU) vessels.1 5 5 1 5 3 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 96-14). This is the compliance measure that gave Japan such difficulties when it was unable to control its by-catch o f northern swordfish in the late 1990s. A few other contracting parties were having some trouble with over-harvests as well, so in 1999, the compliance recommendation was amended to provide two years in which to remedy any overage. The amendment also permitted contracting parties to roll any under-harvests o f northern swordfish, applying any unused quota to catch limits over the next two years. This gave contracting parties a little more leeway to adjust their effort levels to highly variable economic and environmental conditions. (ICCAT 2005a, res. 99-13). The recommendation was extended in 2001, as per ICCAT (2005a, rec. 01-13). 1 5 4 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 99-8). 1 5 5 The import ban on swordfish from Honduras was lifted in 2001, when that country chose to j oin the Commission. (ICCAT 2005a, rec. 01-15). Trade restrictive measures against Belize have also ended, pursuant to a 2002 recommendation that stipulated that the import ban would be lifted in 2004 pending a 2003 review o f measures taken to comply with ICCAT regulations. (ICCAT 2005a, rec. 02- 16). 2 3 8 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. The final mechanism ICCAT uses to monitor and enforce regulations limiting catches of North Atlantic swordfish is the Statistical Document Program (SDP). Originally developed to track the very valuable Atlantic bluefin tuna, ICCAT applied SDPs to swordfish and bigeye tuna in 2001. The purpose of the SDP is to facilitate trade measures related to Atlantic swordfish by creating a paper trail that traces landings from point of capture to point of final sale. Issued and validated by a vessel’s flag state, a Statistical Document verifies that Atlantic swordfish being exported was caught in compliance with all ICCAT regulations on the stocks. At the other end of the trade, importers for contracting parties to ICCAT are instructed to require a Statistical Document for all Atlantic swordfish entering their markets. Both exporter and importer should then report all data collected under the SDP to the ICCAT Secretariat. This information is finally used to crosscheck reported landings and other catch statistics.1 5 6 Although some data on landings of marlins are provided to both the Compliance Committee and PWG, ICCAT has not adopted any recommendations to effectively monitor or enforce regulations for these types of by-catch. In fact, most of the methods that ICCAT has developed to ensure compliance with its management measures would not really work for marlins. One important problem is that fishers have the option to discard incidental catches rather than altering their fishing practices to avoid them. Statistical Document Programs could be used to track and limit trade in by-catch, but that would just be a shadow of the true rate of extraction. Only with very well structured monitoring programs that include onboard observers, can actual fishing mortality on by-catch be documented. As was noted above, 1 5 6 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 01-22). 239 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. stringent monitoring programs are not widespread and many contracting parties do not even report catch-at-size data or dead discards to the Commission. If total catches, including dead discards, could be accurately estimated, it would be possible for ICCAT to use many of the same measures for enforcement of regulations on by-catch of marlins or small swordfish in the Atlantic. In fact, this has actually taken place in the North Atlantic, where the USA and Canada were granted dead discard allowances for incidental catches of juvenile swordfish and any 157 overages of discards were counted against their landings quotas. If there were sufficient governmental concern, a similar system might be used to enforce regulations on by-catch of non-commercial species. Incidental catches of marlins could be counted against contracting parties’ landings quotas for bigeye or swordfish, making their capture more costly to fishers and fishing states. This system could also be used to enforce by-catch regulations on non-contracting parties. In order to use these enforcement mechanisms on by-catch species, the Commission would have to be willing and able to impose sanctions on targeted stocks as punitive measures for excessive incidental catches of marlins. As yet there is insufficient governmental concern for marlins and ICCAT is unlikely to adopt such costly enforcement mechanisms. The vast majority of states that incidentally harvest marlins face no domestic repercussions from the biological depletion of these stocks, but they would encounter economic losses if landings of targeted species had to be reduced to limit marlin by-catch. Therefore, while a politically strong state that is highly susceptible to non-commercial interests, like the US, might persuade the 1 5 7 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 99-2); ICCAT (2005a, rec. 02-2). O f course, a different method would need to be found to deter states that do not engage in discarding but consistently report excessive landings o f undersized fish. Theoretically, catches o f small fish could be counted in some ratio against a state's quota, making them more expensive in terms o f the allowed catch. 240 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Commission to adopt weak management measures on marlins, substantial monitoring and enforcement mechanisms will not be acceptable to most members. In essence, ICCAT has been able to agree on the rebuilding plan for blue and white marlins because there are no supranational means of monitoring or enforcing the regulations. Highly susceptible countries like the US benefit from ineffective management because partial measures help to mollify national noncommercial interest groups and commercial fishers who have been affected by domestic legislation protecting marlins. Even though marlin recommendations are supposed to be binding, other countries appreciate the appearance of action to limit by-catch without the accountability they would require for commercially valuable stocks. Without exogenous changes in the balance of susceptibility to non-commercial interests, marlin management is likely to remain superficial and ineffective. Since depletion of by-catch stocks does not create recession in a domestic fishing fleet and interest groups with alternative definitions of crisis currently influence only one ICCAT member state, negotiated regulations for marlins are constantly undermined by domestic economic concerns. The vulnerability response patterns for billfishes in the Atlantic clearly depict a system in which by-catch issues are dealt with as ancillary and often inconsequential. Compared to ICCAT's diligence and success in rebuilding North Atlantic swordfish, this failure to effectively respond to crisis for blue and white marlins is exceptionally striking. The Commission allowed the biomass of marlins to declined to much lower levels than swordfish and took much less stringent measures to rebuild depleted marlin stocks. In addition, once economically vulnerable states 241 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. began to feel competitive pressures associated with biological depletion, uncertainty stopped being used as an excuse to delay rebuilding of northern swordfish, but uncertainty remains a point of contention regarding marlin management even after years of pessimistic assessments. The first catch limits on North Atlantic swordfish were established before SCRS could fully estimate the biomass of the stock relative to MSY. By 1996, the biomass of swordfish was at 58% of the MSY level and the Commission adopted a three-year plan to reduce catches to levels recommended by SCRS. This action was followed by a 10-year rebuilding plan in 1999 and by 2002, North Atlantic swordfish was up to 94% of the biomass that would support MSY. In contrast, 1996 estimates put blue marlin at 24% of B Ms y while white marlin had been diminished to only 22.6% of the biomass that would support maximum sustainable yield. The Commission's response to these crisis situations was a non-binding resolution for the promotion of the use of monofilament leaders and live release of billfish generally. Future recommendations did require that landings of blue and white marlins be cut by various percentages, but never brought catches down below replacement yield. Clearly, ICCAT's response to crisis was much more determined and effective for commercially valuable swordfish than for by-catch species like blue and white marlins. In fact, if it were not for pressures from a single contracting party, is possible that the Commission would not have taken any action on marlins at all. Aside from the effect of noncommercial interests on marlin management, the predictions of vulnerability response were proven to be accurate in terms of state behavior and management outcomes. With slight modification to account for national susceptibility to noncommercial interests as well as economic vulnerability, 242 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. vulnerability response expectations for management of blue and white marlins were also met. Finally, it is important to note that economic concerns remained distinctively deterministic, as illustrated by the lack of measures to monitor and enforce marlin regulations. Governmental concern for the stocks would have to be greater and more widespread in order to overcome these obstacles to effective management response to depletion of by-catch stocks. 2 4 3 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Chapter 5: Questions, Old and New Rapid and extensive changes are a hallmark of the modem area. Progress tangles with catastrophe more often than most people would like to admit. As such, our collective ability to recognize and respond to the kinds of creeping calamities that are often associated with environmental problems will necessarily impact the well being of future generations. In this larger context, vulnerability response is an approach to understanding the emergent tendencies created by the confluence of globalization and scarcity. It recognizes that global political will is not always sufficient to prevent the overexploitation of common pool resources but that the threat of losses closer to home can generate enough concern to precipitate positive change. Nonetheless, this is a precarious process and, at times, international response may be too little, too late. Because so many stocks are heavily depleted and technical solutions to the problem of overexploitation are also dwindling, international fisheries for highly migratory species are at a pivotal juncture in the development of management measures. During this crucial stage, ICCAT's innovations have the potential to skew future multilateral regulation towards greater timeliness and effectiveness. New institutions may arise and learning may take place as states collectively come to terms with the limited nature of fisheries resources. At the international level, institutional change can make cooperative regulation o f HMS stocks less costly by pioneering more effective means to deter defection. Once accepted and perfected for high-value stocks, methods of enforcement of effort limits should be much easier to implement for other species as market forces place increasing pressure on all fish 2 4 4 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. stocks. At a more systemic level, learning may take place, changing the attitudes and decision-making processes of states and their representatives as each new fleet-wide recession arises and is dealt with. When this is the case, the vulnerability response patterns of today may evolve into a system of sustainable management for future generations. The main contribution of this study has been to develop and test hypotheses regarding the relationship between economic vulnerability and political response within the context of increasing competition precipitated by stock depletion. To accomplish this task, a model of state behavior was developed using a hybrid approach that combined fisheries specific assumptions regarding national decision making, theories of collective action, and neoliberal schools of thought.1 The resultant hypotheses were then tested by formulating predictions regarding state policy preferences for the management of six Atlantic HMS stocks and comparing those expectations with records of actual state behavior. Section 5.1 reviews that evidence on the primary vulnerability response hypotheses, drawing further comparisons among all six case studies. Generally speaking, this nascent model proved quite powerful, although there were indications that noncommercial interest group should also be considered when predicting national policy positions. In addition, secondary predictions regarding the impact of vulnerability response on management outcomes were also developed and analyzed. The purpose of this exercise was twofold; first, to provide preliminary answers to questions raised by recent innovations in the Atlantic and second, to serve as a foundation on which to build a more complete and accurate theory of vulnerability response that could 1 Section2.4 Vulnerability Response and Negotiated Outcomes describes those literatures that were utilized when formulating the secondary assumptions. 245 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. encompass all levels of analysis. Using the new information generated by the subsequent examination of the vulnerability response hypotheses, Section 5.2 reevaluates the original questions of causality, timing, and variability that were asked in Chapter 1. While vulnerability response does provide some answers to those questions, especially in regards to the impact of the mix of states on the regulation of stocks, many new questions arise from this analysis as well. In order to provide a more complete view of the problem, the model needs to be refined and further research should be undertaken. Section 5.3 discusses insights from the cases on ways to solidify the model in order to forge stronger theoretical linkages between the behavior of states and multilateral management measures. Although improved quantitative datasets may not be available for years to come, it is possible to focus on important aspects of state interaction that were observed in the cases to build an agent based model of HMS negotiations. In the opposite direction, Section 5.4 points out the importance of bringing greater detail to the state-level model, so as to incorporate important factors such as the impact of non-commercial interest groups and the potential for learning among fishers and decision makers. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes the dissertation with a brief look and the implications of vulnerability response for the future of fishers and fishes. The primary and secondary hypotheses elucidate a mechanism for positive change in the typical downward spiral associated with open access fishing on the high seas. On the other hand, vulnerability response does not predict effective management for all stocks, nor does it create the expectation that those stocks that have been rebuilt will be managed at MSY in the future. Fishing has always been a precarious profession, more so now than ever because of declines in the abundance of fishes; if either 246 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. tendency is to change in the long-run, states will need to alter their vulnerability response behavior through the creation of better institutions and the adoption of more forward-looking policy-making practices. 5.1 Evidence o f Vulnerability Response In Chapter 2 it was proposed that the states that are most vulnerable to recession in a domestic fleet can be expected to push for the earliest and strongest management measures for a stock. The most important indicators of economic vulnerability were identified as the relative size of a fleet's average cost function and the opportunity cost of shifting effort to alternative sources of revenue. These factors combine to form a state's relative policy response preference as illustrated in Figure 2.10. When a state is highly vulnerable - that is when its fleets are expensive to run and have high opportunity costs of alternatives - it will work for an early and strong response to biological depletion. Low opportunity costs of alternatives can ameliorate recession in the fisheries sector in gradually vulnerable states, but that source of advantage will be eroded as the availability of other stocks declines. Those states whose fleets have low cost functions are moderately vulnerable and will evince a preference for moderate and delayed management responses. Finally, states whose fleets have low cost functions and cheap access to multiple stocks will be able to ward off recession in the fisheries sector most easily and therefore will prefer a later, weaker response. The validity o f this vulnerability response model was tested via analysis of detailed information on economic and biological parameters, as well as the negotiations of regulations adopted for six stocks that are managed by the 247 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). For the most part, the cases validated the model as it was presented in Chapter 2. With a few exceptions, ICCAT records showed that actual state behavior was in line with vulnerability response expectations. Subsection 5.1.1 covers the results for commercially targeted stocks, all of which support the hypotheses. Most deviations from vulnerability response predictions can be found in mixed fisheries where by- catch is a problem. These will be dealt with in Subsection 5.1.2, which looks at issues related to incidental landings in several of the fisheries covered in Chapters 3 and 4. Most important are the interesting findings in the cases of blue and white marlins, which indicate that the hypotheses need to be expanded in order to include susceptibility to noncommercial interests as well as economic vulnerability. 5.1.1 Commercially Targeted Stocks O f the six stocks covered in the case studies, four are commercially targeted in the Atlantic: northern swordfish, bigeye tuna, yellowfin tuna and skipjack tuna. Only the first three have evinced biological depletion below levels that support maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Because skipjack tuna is still relatively abundant, vulnerability response predicts that even highly vulnerable fishing states would not yet have reason to desire management measures. This expectation has held true insofar as no regulations have been proposed to directly protect this species. Vulnerability response predictions for the other three commercially valuable stocks 2 Interestingly, these three species are more valuable than skipjack in per-unit terms but less abundant as well. 3 Management o f the mixed fishery for tropical tunas will be covered in Subsection 5.1.2. 248 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. were more complex but they also bore up under scrutiny. States behaved as expected based on their economic vulnerabilities and the level of stock depletion. When they participated in one of these commercial fisheries, highly vulnerable fishing states were always the first to propose management measures and consistently pushed for regulations that were fully in accord with scientific advice. For instance, in the early 1980s, highly vulnerable states like Canada and the US were the first countries to express concern regarding the biological situation for North Atlantic swordfish and invested heavily in scientific research on the stock throughout the decade.4 Once estimates of biological parameters were available, these two states were also the first to propose effort limits. Starting in 1989, US and Canadian delegates tabled recommendations to either freeze or actually reduce catches of North Atlantic swordfish as per recommendations from ICCAT's Subcommittee on Research and Statistics (SCRS).5 The US played a similar role in management of the fishery for bigeye tuna, in which it was the only highly vulnerable state.6 In contrast, gradually vulnerable states generally opposed early intervention, often citing uncertainty in the scientific advice and the political economic costs of regulation as the reasons for their positions. This was certainly the perspective of the European Community (EC) and Japan for all of the stocks under review. Furthermore, these gradually vulnerable countries, whose fleets are relatively expensive to operate but are able to cushion the effects of a decline in a single fishery by exploiting alternate stocks, evinced less resistance to conservation 4 ICCAT (1984, 80). 5 ICCAT (1990, 78). 6 ICCAT (1993, 93). 249 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. measures as the availability of substitutes declined due to the global expansion of fishing effort. For instance, the EC became more amenable to effort limits on North Atlantic swordfish and time-area closures on fish aggregating devices (FADs) after its longline fleets targeting swordfish had spread to the South Atlantic and its surface fleets had expanded to exploit tropical tunas in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.7 States whose fleets were moderately vulnerable because of more efficient cost functions did not show such increasing governmental concern and were able to gain some concessions from their more anxious counterparts. Note the exceptions made for small fishing states in almost every recommendation passed by the Commission in the last decade, including those limiting catches of bigeye tuna and North Atlantic swordfish as well as time-area closures on purse seining and compilation o f ICCAT's vessel registry. Indeed, even though most of the states in this category are relatively small and wield little power separately, united as the Group of 18, they have been able to postpone the institution of a quota system to regulate catches of bigeye tuna until their demands are met regarding recognition of developing countries’ rights in the Commission's Allocation Criteria.8 Quota concessions were also made to several moderately vulnerable states in the 1999 and 2002 rebuilding plans for North Atlantic swordfish.9 Lastly, the least vulnerable states, either because they were highly competitive and mobile or because their only interest in the stock was as a by-catch to another fishery, tended to be the most reticent and were able to gamer the largest side payments for their cooperation on management measures. Most notable among 7 ICCAT (1993, 96). 8 ICCAT (1999, 1:139). 9 ICCAT (2000, 1:176) and ICCAT (2003, 1:234). 250 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. these were the concessions and quota transfers made by Japan to China and Taiwan for their cooperation in reducing landings of bigeye tuna in the Atlantic.1 0 As both a high-cost producer and major consumer of bigeye, Japan found itself vulnerable to the decreasing availability of stocks throughout all of the oceans and has therefore made side payments to countries whose fleets extract high quantities of bigeye at lower costs. In contrast, Japan refused to limit its own landings of bigeye in order to reduce by-catches of North Atlantic swordfish until strict enforcement mechanisms were adopted that could have resulted in trade measures against Japan. Even so, Japan was able to negotiate with more vulnerable states such as the US and the EC for concessions and quota transfers on North Atlantic swordfish.1 1 Judging by the cases of commercially targeted stocks, the vulnerability response hypotheses are powerful because they predict state behavior both in relation to other fishing states targeting the same stock and relative to the level of depletion in the fishery. For one thing, management innovations and rebuilding were not observed for stocks that were only mildly depleted or assessed to be fully exploited. More importantly, as depleted stocks began to fall below the level that would support maximum sustainable yield, highly vulnerable states with the first to propose management measures, followed by gradually vulnerable states, and finally moderately and mildly vulnerable states. Furthermore, the acquiescence of these final two groups was only attained after concessions and side payments were made by states in the highly in gradually vulnerable categories. 1 0 ICCAT (2004, 1:198-199). 1 1 ICCAT (2000, 1:177). 251 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 5.1.2 By-catch Issues Incidental harvests (by-catch) of fish that are not targeted by commercial fishers present more complicated problems than management of directed fisheries. Three different types of by-catch showed up in the cases: • The capture of juveniles of commercially valuable species (bigeye tuna) • Harvesting of commercially valuable non-target species (swordfish) • Incidental catches of species with little or no commercial value (marlins) Each of these types of by-catch has different biological and economic consequences for a fishery. For example, high juvenile mortality reduces the yield per recruit, negatively affecting the maximum sustainable yield in a commercial fishery. This causes competition to increase more rapidly by constricting the long run supply of a i stock. Substantive by-catch of adults of a commercially valuable species also heightens competition by reducing the availability of the stock to fishers who actually target them. Finally, excessive incidental fishing mortality can significantly • 13 • decrease the biomass of non-commercial species. Under open-access, this has no impact on commercial fishers but it can trigger reactions from other interest groups such as conservationists and recreational fishers. Actions to reduce by-catch are usually costly and often negatively effect harvests of the targeted stock. This creates management obstacles, especially when the national fleets that are responsible for the incidental harvests target other species and therefore do not experience economic repercussions from biological depletion of 1 2 Clark (1990, 291-298) covers impacts on biomass with multiple age cohorts and nonselective fishing gear. 1 3 Clark (1990, 311-318) covers the bioeconomics o f concomitant exploitation o f species with differential productivity. 252 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. the by-catch stock.1 4 The failure of size limits on bigeye tuna to sufficiently reduce landings of undersized fish is a case in point. While the US, Japan and other states with longline fleets targeting bigeye tuna were negatively impacted by reductions in the yield per recruit caused by large catches of small fish, it was the harvests of surface fleets like those belonging to the EC and Ghana that would be reduced if the size limit was ever seriously implemented.1 5 As discussed in Section 3.3.1 on the mixed tropical tuna fishery, no substantive actions were taken to protect juvenile bigeye until the EC found it politically and economically expedient to push for a closure in the Gulf of Guinea that would have a disproportionate impact on the landings of Ghana, their biggest rival in the Atlantic.1 6 It is indicative of the difficulties associated with by-catch that undersized fish still average around 50% of purse seine landings of Atlantic bigeye.1 7 Similarly, by-catch of adult swordfish in the fishery targeting bigeye tuna strongly influenced management of the northern stock. In this case, Japan harvested the majority of incidental landings of North Atlantic swordfish while more 18 vulnerable states like Canada, the US and the EC targeted the stock directly. Because Japan was unwilling to reduce its bigeye harvests to protect northern swordfish, it was able to gamer large concessions and side payments from the US 1 4 For the most part, any type o f by-catch unintentionally increases fishing mortality on the non-target species or age group. When incidental mortality is low relative to the reproductive capacity o f the stock, by-catch may be a non-issue. On the other hand, if incidental catches are relatively large, the abundance o f the stock will be diminished. When this is the case, it can have serious ramifications for a fishery. 1 5 ICCAT (1994, 181). 1 6 ICCAT (1997, 1:79). 1 7 ICCAT (2004, 2:26). Interestingly, none o f the size limits adopted by ICCAT have ever been fully implemented. Appendix H: ICCAT Size Limits and Appendix M: Protecting Juvenile Swordfish, discuss this issue in relation to overharvests o f juvenile yellowfin, bigeye and swordfish. 1 8 ICCAT (1990, 167). 253 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. and the EC in return for its cooperation. Initially, these came in the form of special allowances for incidental harvests but eventually, as more vulnerable states sought to tighten regulations on northern swordfish, the Japanese were given quota transfers and overage swaps as part of the agreement on the 1999 rebuilding plan.1 9 Finally, Japan prohibited landings of swordfish by its Atlantic bigeye fleets in order to completely avoid the by-catch issue. This does not mean that Japanese fleets no longer catch northern swordfish. It simply forces them to discard all incidental 9f) harvests of the stock, dead or alive. By-catch reduction is difficult to achieve when there are gains to be made for a targeted stock, but it is even harder when biological depletion does not have an economic impact on any commercial fishery. In fact, the documented regulation of blue and white marlins showed that management has occurred even though it is not predicted by the strictest version of the vulnerability response hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. Therefore, modifications were made to account for national 9 1 susceptibility to noncommercial interests. Further scrutiny of the ICCAT record on marlins revealed that all actions to reduce by-catch of these species were instigated by one country, the United States, which was strongly influenced by groups such as conservationists and recreational fishers.2 2 Although the US was able to facilitate 1 9 ICCAT (2000, 1:177). 2 0 ICCAT (2003, 1:93). 2 1 A preliminary review o f ICCAT reports showed that the US consistently alluded to the demands o f its recreational fishers when proposing management measures for marlins. Also, there are several studies that show that noncommercial interest groups can play a role in environmental management, so modification o f crisis response theory to account for their influence seemed like the logical next step. See Ando (1999), Peterson (1995), De Sombre (1999), and Princen (1994) for more. 22 In fact, in 1995, the US Representative to Panel 4 o f ICCAT asserted that Atlantic billfish were worth more than US$15 billion annually to US recreational interests. (ICCAT 1996, 1:154). Again, in 2000, a US delegate compared the economic importance to the US o f recreational fishing for billfish in the Atlantic to that o f commercial fishing for bigeye tuna to Japan and swordfish to the EC. 2 5 4 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. cooperation on supposedly binding recommendations mandating reductions in incidental landings of marlins, no monitoring or enforcement measures were ever adopted and biomass of both species remains well below the level that would support MSY.2 3 In this light, the Commission's response, though unexpected, is still very weak relative to cases where commercial fishing interests were the driving force behind regulations. Nevertheless, the behavior of the US suggests that further research should be carried out in order to incorporate domestic attributes such as the susceptibility to non-commercial interests into the model.2 4 Because of the monitoring difficulties associated with by-catch, it is possible that the actual situation for all three of these types of incidental harvests is much worse due to unreported dead discards. In terms of both compliance and biological abundance, fishing mortality has always been difficult to estimate with a high degree 25 of certainty because there are strong incentives to underreport by-catch harvests. However, comparing the management of targeted versus incidental harvests reveals that states tend to err on the side of political and economic rather than biological concerns when interpreting scientific estimates. Less vulnerable states consistently utilized uncertainty as an excuse to delay management irrespective of actual changes in the accuracy of official estimates of biological parameters. Objections based on uncertainty also disappeared as states became more vulnerable or received transfers for their cooperation. Furthermore, the range of estimates for biological parameters like maximum sustainable yield and stock biomass were actually wider for the first 2 3 (ICCAT 2001, 1:241-242). No monitoring or enforcement mechanisms were ever adopted to ensure compliance with the effort limitations ICCAT placed on marlin stocks. 2 4 This issue will be discussed further in Section5.4 Learning and Domestic Change. 2 5 See Appendix N: Marlins By-catch and Scientific Uncertainty, which expressly explains the difficulties o f monitoring by-catch at sea and the implications o f misreporting for assessments. 255 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. stock to be strongly regulated, northern swordfish, than for any of the other stocks, including by-catch like blue and white marlins. Accurate science is necessary for good management, but uncertainty can be a red herring in the struggle between more 9 7 and less vulnerable states. 5.2 Three Old Questions In addition to reviewing the literature on international fisheries management, Chapter 1 presented information on recent biomass rebuilding for several highly migratory species in the Atlantic, which contradicted the pessimistic predictions of previous authors. Because of these seemingly anomalous observations, three important questions were raised regarding the implications of regulatory innovations at the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. First, there is the question of causality, which is primary because, if stock rebuilding cannot be specifically traced to ICCAT management, then there is little point to further analysis of the forces behind regulatory innovations. Secondly, there is the question of timing, which asks, what, if anything, has changed to make successful rebuilding via ICCAT regulation possible. Finally, there is the question of variation, because no obvious cause could be found underlying the noticeable disparity in the levels of depletion and rebuilding for several ICCAT stocks. 2 6 For instance, in the 2002 Report o f the Subcommittee on Research and Statistics (ICCAT 2003, vol. 2) summary o f stock assessments, bigeye tuna was reported to be at 80-90% o f B M S Y , depending on the model used to estimate parameter. Confidence intervals were not reported. Estimates o f the biomass o f northern swordfish were at 94% o f B M S Y with an 80% confidence interval ranging from 65-124%. The same figures put the biomass o f blue marlin at 40% o f B M S Y with an 80% confidence interval ranging from 25-60%. Biomass o f white marlin was estimated to be 12% o f B M s y with an 80% confidence interval ranging from 6-25%. 2 7 Peterson (1995, 274) also notes how states she defined as "laggards" were quick to utilize uncertainty as a delaying tactic in many other international fisheries. 256 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. The vulnerability response hypotheses were posited as a crucial step toward answering those questions. However, because vulnerability response only addresses the individual behavior of states, well-established theories from international relations were used to develop case specific hypotheses linking national policy preferences to the effectiveness of negotiated management measures. In addition to the state level expectations, the secondary predictions were also tested in the six ICCAT cases. The rest of this section reviews the results of that analysis as it applies to the three fundamental questions discussed above. Each subsection addresses a different question, presenting answers that can be drawn from both the hypotheses themselves and the concrete information available in the case studies. 5.2.1 The Question of Causality A close review of the cases in Chapters 3 and 4 showed that, when the Commission adopted strong regulations it was indeed effective at rebuilding biomass. Regulations can be said to be strong if they both coincide with scientific advice and are accompanied by international enforcement mechanisms such as 9Q statistical document programs and trade restrictive measures. In no cases could positive changes in the biomass of a stock be conclusively linked to weak regulations that either contradicted scientific advice or were unaccompanied by international enforcement. There are several caveats to this larger conclusion of causality. First, the impact of exogenous economic, technical and biological factors can either help or 2 8 Sources o f data included the official record o f ICCAT management measures, prices for highly migratory species and their substitutes, spatial distribution o f fishing fleets and the biological productivity o f ICCAT stocks as reported by ICCAT's Sub-Committee for Research and Statistics. 29 Peterson (2000, 125-135) and Porter, Brown, and Welsh (2000, 142). 257 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. hurt the effectiveness of management measures. In some cases, like that of North Atlantic swordfish, the overall level of rebuilding can be linked to a combination of reduced fishing mortality due to regulations and several concomitant strong OA recruitment years, when the stock was exceptionally productive. Another interesting example is that of yellowfm tuna, which has been weakly regulated by ICCAT since 1993.3 1 During the period of regulation, landings of Atlantic yellowfm A A have actually fallen below the level mandated by the Commission. However, this reduction cannot be directly attributed to ICCAT regulations because of powerful exogenous forces. In the early 1990s, prices for Atlantic bigeye tuna rose sharply, drawing longline effort away from yellowfm. Around the same time, a technical innovation in the purse seine fishery reduced the concentration of yellowfm in those catches as well. Because of these exogenous factors landings of yellowfm would have declined even if ICCAT had not enacted regulations, so causality is not likely in this case. A second caveat can be derived from commonsense, although it was not evident in the case studies themselves. When the science on a stock is uncertain or contested, even strong management measures may not be effective.3 4 It stands to reason that incorrect assumptions regarding the structure of the stock, failure to account for important environmental factors, or outdated proxies for the 3 0 ICCAT (2004, 2:102). These changes in recruitment were reported by the SCRS, but no explanation was given. It is possible that they are linked to the northward shift o f the species which occurred around the same period. 3 1 Size limits for yellowfm were adopted in 1972 and have never been enforced. The 1993 regulations did limit catches to the average o f 1991/1992 levels. See Appendix H: ICCAT Size Limits, and Appendix I: Early Discussions on Yellowfm. 3 2 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 3 3 See Section 3.4 Yellowfm Tuna: Rebuilding without Effective Management for more regarding the introduction o f Fish Aggregating Devices and their impact on the yellowfm stock. 3 4 Young (2003) 258 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. effectiveness of fishing effort could lead to the overestimation of important benchmarks such as maximum sustainable yield. Such deficiencies would lead to overoptimistic scientific advice and, even if fishing mortality were limited accordingly, rebuilding would not occur. It should be noted that, if scientists were to err in the opposite direction, regulations might be effective, but they would not be efficient. This underlines the importance of paying sufficient attention to scientific uncertainty that was discussed in Subsection 2.5.1. Fortunately, uncertainty did not have a direct negative impact on the effectiveness of management in the cases presented earlier because it always coexisted with weak regulations like size limits and by-catch protections. On the whole however, the cases showed that, although its success is uneven and rebuilding is often aided by exogenous factors, ICCAT has actually been able to reduce the level of biological depletion for some stocks of highly migratory species in the Atlantic. The data set for these fisheries is small and determining interaction among multiple driving forces is always difficult, but the causal relationship between regulation and rebuilding is strong enough to justify the development and further testing of the vulnerability response hypotheses. 5.2.2 The Question of Timing In regards to the question of timing, the six case studies have shown that vulnerability response exists, but they have also revealed that there are sources of change within the system. As discussed above, there were some notable exogenous shifts in bioeconomic parameters that may have assisted rebuilding in some cases. 3 5 The opposite was not always true - that is, weak regulations were also observed when the status o f a stock was not highly uncertain. 259 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. However, the most important temporal element to the model and the cases is the classic tragedy of the commons behavior of fishers, which alters the governmental concern of fishing states as increasing competition drives some fleets into recession. This dynamic is compounded by globalization and economic development, factors that have amplified overexploitation and eased the inevitable shift of capital from developed to developing nations, as documented in Section 2.2. Also, in the case studies, the creation of new rules and norms was identified as a chief facilitating mechanism for the successful rebuilding of bigeye tuna and North Atlantic i i f swordfish, so institutional precursors are also an important aspect of timing. One of the most counter-intuitive extrapolations of the vulnerability response hypotheses is that effective regulation is only expected once the stock has become significantly overharvested and the fishery is overcapitalized. It might seem that agreement on management should be easier to reach when sharing a larger harvest among a smaller number of fishing states, but this has not been the case. Two forces are at work here. First, states are often uncertain regarding the timing and extent of recession in a domestic fishing fleet until after losses have been incurred. Therefore, their policy preferences tend to be reactive rather than proactive. Secondly, even if there were perfect information, management would still be delayed until more vulnerable states have built up enough governmental concern to make the T 7 concessions required by less vulnerable states. Generally speaking, the evidence in the cases supported this prediction of delayed response. Of the six stocks, five have been depleted to levels below that 3 6 Specifically, the development o f better monitoring and enforcement mechanisms improved the ability of ICC AT members to sanction defectors, an important factor in international cooperation (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985, 235). 3 7 Barkin and Shambaugh (1999, 16). 260 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 38 which would support MSY and none had successfully been managed at MSY. Furthermore, strong, effective management only occurred after alternative stocks had become fully utilized and transfers were made from more to less vulnerable states. In fact, the important role that gradually vulnerable states played by tipping the scales toward effective management indicates that a second important determinant of timing is the availability of less exploited stocks to serve as alternatives for distant water fishing states. In other words, some Atlantic stocks are now being effectively managed not only because they have been severely depleted but also because highly 39 migratory species in the other oceans are also overexploited. The case studies further highlighted the importance of larger trends such as globalization and economic development. Although these were discussed in the aggregate in Section 2.2, the narrative of the cases showed how mildly and moderately vulnerable fishing states were making inroads into HMS fisheries while highly and even gradually vulnerable countries were losing market share. This dynamic would not have been possible without the dispersion of fishing technology and increased access to international markets associated with a globalized economy.4 0 One blatant instance of competition exacerbated by global interconnectedness was the rapid appropriation of fish aggregating devices (FAD) technology on the part of Ghana and other developing countries only a few years after it was first utilized in the Atlantic by France and Spain 4 1 Another example 3 8 Skipjack tuna, the most prolific o f all Atlantic highly migratory species, is the only stock that is thought to be anywhere near full exploitation. Interestingly, ICCAT regulations did lead to reductions in landings o f skipjack from unsustainable levels in the early 1990s, but this was only a side effect o f measures aimed at protecting juvenile bigeye in the Gulf o f Guinea. (ICCAT 2004, 2:35). 3 9 In one case, southern Atlantic swordfish served as an alternative for fleets targeting the northern stock, so the depletion o f separate temperate stocks is also a part o f this phenomena. 40 Lawson (1984, 21). 4 1 ICCAT (1997, 2: 22). 261 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. would be the rapid price increases for bigeye tuna, which would not have benefited Atlantic fisheries if they did not have access to the Japanese sushi market.4 2 Global overexploitation would not lead to rebuilding if less vulnerable states did not have the ability to compete with their more vulnerable counterparts. Lastly, there was evidence that the rebuilding observed in the cases was facilitated by institutional innovations that had been created for the protection of other stocks of fish. Most notably, both the statistical document programs and the use of sanctions as enforcement mechanisms for northern Atlantic swordfish and bigeye tuna originated as compliance mechanisms for bluefin tuna regulations. Less obvious advancements included formalization of quota transfers to facilitate side payments in the bigeye fishery and the adoption of overage and underage clauses that help states to deal with the fluctuations that are inherent in all capture fisheries. Such findings suggest that rules and regulations like these can proliferate, smoothing the way for agreement on management of other fisheries. It is possible that, if the costs of cooperation had not been reduced via precedents in other fisheries, effective management would have taken much longer for bigeye and northern swordfish. 5.2.3 The Question of Variation Vulnerability response predicts variation in the effectiveness of regulation for different stocks of fish according to two factors, the level of biological depletion and the mix of states targeting the stock. The depletion aspect of the model is the simplest to analyze. From the information in the cases, there was obvious 4 2 The vast majority o f all bigeye imports are received by Japan and, in recent years, about two thirds o f bigeye production entered the international marketplace annually. (FAO Commodities and Production 1976-2001 Database). 262 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. differentiation between the moderate levels of depletion observed for both of the high-priced stocks (bigeye tuna and northern swordfish) the mild depletion of both low-priced, high-volume stocks (yellowfin and skipjack tunas), and the severe depletion of both low-priced, low-volume stocks (blue and white marlins). Interestingly, only the high priced stocks experienced significant rebuilding that was attributable to ICCAT regulation. It makes a certain amount of sense that high-priced stocks would be the first to be rebuilt because, all else equal, they would also be the first to be depleted and have the fewest number of viable alternatives.4 0 However, the conclusion that high prices for a stock necessarily lead to effective management at moderate levels of depletion is premature. Multiple alternate scenarios, given a different mix of states exploiting similar high priced stocks would predict different levels of rebuilding under vulnerability response. For instance, skewed vulnerability could inhibit cooperative management of a stock. If there were some geographical or technological limit to the vulnerability and of states targeting a stock, then the operative principal of changes in market share under competition would not apply, no matter what the price of the stock. Furthermore, it's entirely possible that depletion is simply taking longer for skipjack and yellowfin tunas. The fact that they are more prolific and lower-priced does not necessarily mean that the current intensity of exploitation is a stable or sustainable equilibrium. The best one can conclude is that the level of biological depletion is a necessary but not sufficient determinant of variation in the management of different stocks. 4 3 Given the same biological and cost parameters, higher prices lead to faster depletion because the wider margin o f scarcity rent creates stronger incentives for fishers to enter the fishery, increasing fishing mortality. Similarly, the greater the scarcity rent available on a stock, the fewer the alternative sources o f equivalent revenue. 263 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Theoretically, the mix of states that is able to exploit a stock is just as important as reduced availability due to overfishing. According to the vulnerability response hypotheses, states do not cooperate simply because the pie is shrinking. Instead, collective management occurs when more vulnerable states react to being pushed out of the fishery by the expansion of effort by less vulnerable states under open access.4 4 There are three aspects of this factor that help to determine variability among stocks. The first is the distribution of fishing states among the four categories of vulnerability. As mentioned above, if more vulnerable states (those in the highly and gradually vulnerable categories) are not economically threatened by less vulnerable states (those in the moderately and mildly vulnerable categories) then they have no incentive to take action at the international level. Second, the threat of defection wielded by less vulnerable states determines the level of concessions and side payments that would have to be made to achieve cooperative regulation. Third and relatedly, the political and economic power of more vulnerable states relative to the demands of less vulnerable states determines how soon effective management measures are adopted.4 5 Among the cases in this thesis, bigeye tuna and northern swordfish provided the most complete evidence linking biological depletion to the mix of states and the eventual adoption of effective rebuilding. Both stocks share a narrative in which management actions are instigated by highly vulnerable states, diluted by conflicts over allocation and finally made effective by transfers from more vulnerable states to 4 4 Note that this is a referral to the less restrictive application o f relative gains/losses where the distribution o f resources is at issue, rather than a more restrictive realist interpretation that would be disruptive to cooperation. (Snidal 1991, 174). That is, more vulnerable states are concerned with losses in market share because it increases their absolute losses, not because less vulnerable states are benefiting from larger shares in the market. 4 5 Barkin and Shambaugh (1999, 15). 264 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. attain the cooperation of their less vulnerable counterparts. However, these cases also represent distinctive iterations of vulnerability response due to temporal and geographic factors. As a historic fishery, the case of northern swordfish was more drawn out than bigeye tuna because more alternatives were available to gradually vulnerable states like the EC. Distant water fleets that had begun exploiting northern swordfish could still move on to other stocks as recently as the early 1990s.4 6 In comparison, distant water fleets only began heavily targeting bigeye tuna in the Atlantic in the late 1980s, when Indo-Pacific stocks had already been exploited for decades.4 7 Management of bigeye tuna has also been more strongly impacted by the moderately vulnerable Group of 18 because regulation occurred later and more developing coastal states are technologically able to access the stock. Temporally, bigeye depletion became an issue around 1998, after the Group of 18 had already organized in response to attempts to exclude them from the fishery for southern swordfish. This gave moderately vulnerable states more power during the initial phase of management negotiations than they had had when measures for northern swordfish commenced in 1994.4 9 In addition, since bigeye is managed as a single stock that ranges throughout northern and southern temperate zones as well as tropical areas in the Atlantic, more developing countries could potentially exploit bigeye than northern swordfish using coastal fleets.5 0 The combination of greater 4 6 ICCAT (1993, 169). 4 7 ICCAT (1994, 181). 4 8 ICCAT (1998, 1:181-188). 4 9 ICCAT (1995, 1:171-172). 5 0 For administrative purposes, Atlantic swordfish are divided into two stocks at the 5° north latitude line. However, since this is a temperate stock, the largest concentration o f fishes is found much farther north. (ICCAT 1989, 131). See Appendix L: Management Areas for Atlantic Swordfish, for more on the division o f Atlantic swordfish stocks. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. power and additional demands for access rights has meant that moderately vulnerable states have had more influence on management of bigeye, as evinced by the absence of a quota allocation system in spite of the adoption of other highly effective management measures.5 1 In stark contrast, those few management measures that had been adopted for blue and white marlins were much more flawed and much less effective than for either of the higher priced stocks. Again, this can be traced to the mix of states, or lack thereof. The fact that no states have commercial fleets that directly target marlins in the Atlantic explains both their deep level of biological depletion and also the inability of the Commission to agree on effective management measures that would result in the rebuilding of these stocks. Perhaps, if there had been different distribution of states in terms of their susceptibility noncommercial interest groups, then more effective regulations would have been adopted. As it was, only one state has incentives to push for strong management measures on these by-catch species and, even though that state, the US, is quite powerful, its influence was limited by the multilateral nature of negotiations. The case studies also provided evidence of a source of variation that cannot be derived directly from the vulnerability response hypotheses. As has already been noted, the institutions that were built for excluding nonmembers from the Atlantic bluefm fishery in the early 1990s were later transferred to both the bigeye and North 5 1 Enforcement measures like those supplied to swordfish and bluefin tuna were adopted for bigeye tuna in 2000 and 2001. Due to ICCAT's effective exclusion o f illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) vessels, the stock has rebounded from around 70% o f the biomass that would support MSY to between 81 -91 % o f that indicator. Notice that, as o f 2003, Commission members have been unable to agree on either total allowable catch or a quota sharing arrangement for bigeye tuna. Therefore, they have been able to exclude nonmember states, but they have not been able to either cooperate among themselves or tighten international norms that allow any fishing state to become a member o f ICCAT. 266 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Atlantic swordfish fisheries. However, there are technical limitations that would prevent the extension of these measures to cover the four other stocks in the case studies. Most obvious is the fact that by-catch stocks provide only incidental revenue to fishers; therefore the threat of sanctions on the importation of a by-catch species is not an effective deterrent. To avoid trade-based enforcement measures, fishers can simply discard any by-catch at sea, or they can keep those fish for personal consumption. Difficulties devising effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are institutional factors that increase the costs of cooperation on by- catch management, distinguishing by-catch from commercially valued stocks. Additionally, monitoring mechanisms like Statistical Documents work for higher-end fish because they are both caught and sold individually, so that each fish can be accurately documented and that document can follow the fish throughout the international marketplace. In contrast, cheaper fish such as skipjack and yellowfin, which are purse seined rather than longlined, are captured in large masses and often in combination with other species such as juvenile bigeye tuna and multiple other small, schooling fishes. These catches are usually sold to canneries en masse, irrespective of composition. In these circumstances, the certification of the entire catch could depend on a vessel's compliance on a single species. Although political factors made it possible to do just that with the Dolphin Safe certification program, few fish species are considered important enough to warrant such measures.5 4 5 2 World Trade Organization (2002). 5 3 Peterson (2002, 126-127) and Axelrod and Keohane (1985, 94-98). 5 4 Overview from discussions at the FAO Expert Consultation o f the Regional Fisheries Management Bodies on the Harmonization o f Catch Certification. (FAO 2002b). 267 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 5.3 Solidifying the M odel Although the case study results are promising, the vulnerability response model needs further refinement and testing. This nascent approach to understanding international common pool resource regulation needs to be unified by refining the state level model and replacing the ad hoc secondary assumptions with a more formal conceptualization of the linkages between political response and multilateral management. As discussed in Chapter 2, a lack of data at all levels of analysis limited the specification of vulnerability response to gross economic indicators and prevented the development of a generalized, multilevel theory. This led to the case study approach, which proved the basic applicability of vulnerability response and provided some preliminary answers to the questions raised in Chapter 1. At the same time, the cases can also be used to identify means of solidifying a broader theory and illuminate areas in which further research is needed. Before moving on to describe those findings, it is necessary to point out that the problems of inter-stock variation and insufficient information will continue to thwart any attempts at traditional statistical analysis. Building a database that is substantial enough to test an econometric-style model would require collection of huge amounts of new information and the calibration of existing data sets where possible.5 5 Creation of even a cross-sectional database for a single stock would require that research be carried out among many different countries, within each of which there could be a wide variety of users of the resource, in terms of technology, 5 5 Landings and trade data are available from the FAO and a few time series on the value o f their domestic catches have been compiled by industrialized fishing states. Otherwise, estimates of important elements such as costs o f production, level o f employment and value added tend to be scattered and are seldom comparable due to the different methods o f sampling and evaluation employed. The same can be said o f biological parameters and benchmarks, most o f which are estimated on a stock-by-stock basis with significant changes in procedure and methods over time. 268 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. productive capacity, and governance.5 6 Because of these complexities, a rigorous quantitative study will take many years and experts from multiple disciplines.5 7 Knowing that such limitations exist should not prevent further refinement and 58 testing of models based upon the vulnerability response hypotheses. Referring back to Section 2.4, there were three important links between vulnerability response and multilateral management outcomes that were left to be measured and hypothesized at the discretion of the analyst: the political importance of a fleet, the diplomatic endowment of a state, and the strategic maneuvers available based on the mix of states. The secondary predictions that were tested in the case studies were developed from these factors on an ad hoc basis. This section reviews important observations regarding that analysis as a precursor to development of a more formal theory at some point in future. Specifically, Subsection 5.3.1 discusses findings on political importance and Subsection 5.3.2 looks at links between the levels of analysis in terms of the strength and strategies available to various fishing states. Lastly, Subsection 5.3.3 brings up issues that should be included in a generalized version of the theory but require further research. 5 6 Biologists at ICCAT and other regional fisheries organizations are generally forced to use time series from one or two fleets, usually from Japan or the United States, when determining the catch per unit effort and other parameters they use to estimate M SY for a stock. These problems would be compounded in a political economic model since time series o f costs production, fishing effort and other important factors are unavailable. 5 7 Some movement towards this is already occurring under the auspices o f a project lead by Bob McKelvey and funded by the NSF Decision, Risk and Management Science Program. A wider approach is being undertaken by the Social Sciences Working Group o f the Climate Impacts on Top Oceanic Predators (CLIOTOP) Project under the Global Ocean Ecosystem Dynamics (GLOBEC) umbrella. Ron Mitchell, at the University o f Oregon, is also undertaking an econometric analysis o f tuna fisheries and fishing regulations. 5 8 King, Keohane, and Verba (1994). 2 6 9 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 5.3.1 Political Importance Understanding political importance is the second step in formally linking national agendas to international regulations. The first step is found in the vulnerability response hypotheses themselves, which can be used to create expectations regarding the policy agendas of states, irrespective of the costs of obtaining preferred outcomes. Political importance modifies those expectations by asking how much national decision makers are actually influenced by a domestic fleet.5 9 In other words, it indicates how strongly decision makers will respond to either economic losses in more vulnerable states or economic gains in less vulnerable states. In the case studies, political importance was measured in relative terms and based solely on the national shares in the total landings of a stock of fish. Nevertheless, several key possibilities for a wider definition of political importance were identified as the cases were compiled. As might be expected, political importance seems to have some connection to economic importance. However, there are very few countries in which a fleet targeting some highly migratory stock contributes significantly to the national economy as a whole. As Table 5.1 shows, exceptions seem to be small, coastal developing countries like Ghana and Sierra Leone, where fisheries provide a significant portion of GDP (3-5%) and Atlantic highly migratory species comprise a large portion of the total catch (around 10% or more). In contrast, fisheries contributed less than 1% to the GDP of most other ICCAT member countries, and in distant water countries like Japan and China, which do rely on the sector somewhat, 59 Seminal works on domestic-international linkages include Rosenau (1969) and Putnam (1988; two- level games). 270 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Atlantic HMS stocks were a very small portion of the total catch.6 0 The relative lack of importance of highly migratory species in terms of contribution to most national economies suggests that there must be a more complex basis for political importance. Table 5.1: Data on Economic Importance for Representative Fishing States Nominal GDP (millions of US$ 2001)* Fisheries as % GDP** Atlantic HMS as % National Landings (2001)*** Sierra Leone 811 4.20 9.44 Trinidad and Tobago 5,886 0.30 29.14 Ghana 6,000 3.00 19.95 Venezuela 81,917 0.06 9.36 Canada 717,386 0.24 0.19 Brazil 798,745 0.25 6.21 China 1,117,227 3.10 0.06 Japan 5,647,678 2.00 0.61 EC 8,151,158 1.00 3.24 France 1,804,853 0.07 9.97 Spain 723,472 0.39 9.36 USA 9,013,861 0.29 0.21 *World Development Indicators: On-line; Trinidad and Tobago 1998, Ghana 2002 (FAO 2005). **FA0 2005, various years 1997-2003. ***FAO Commodities and Production 1976-2001 Database. With a few caveats, the data analyzed for the cases suggest that political importance can largely be approximated by looking at the combination of the economic importance of the domestic fishing industry as a whole and the size of a fleet's contribution to total national landings. That is to say, a domestic fleet can be 6 0 Unfortunately, value data are not available for individual stocks or groups o f stocks, so calculation o f Atlantic HMS as percentage o f GDP is not possible; this method is the simplest approximation. Additional information was utilized in the cases, including the value o f national exports o f the species, although these were not available by Ocean. 2 7 1 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. considered to be very important when it supplies large portions of the national landings in a country where the fisheries sector produces a sizable chunk of GDP (i.e. Ghana and Sierra Leone). On the other end of the spectrum, a fleet will not usually be politically important if it contributes little to national landings in a country where fisheries are a negligible portion of GDP (i.e. the USA and Canada). In between are fleets that either contribute little to fisheries sector that is important (i.e. China and Japan) or that land a significant portion of the national catch in countries where fisheries are not very important (i.e. Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago). Although there is a strong correlation between political and economic importance, politics can still play a major role in determining how governments allocate resources to protect various fleets. In fact, for many fishing states, the only reason that highly migratory species have any importance at the national level is a tendency toward regionalism within the decision-making process. For instance, Atlantic HMS stocks were worth less than 0.0006% of GDP in the United States in 2001. However, these fishes are very important to communities along the Atlantic coastline, where landings alone brought in US$ 54,288,961 that year.6 1 To protect their revenues, representatives of US fleets rigorously lobby bureaucrats and regional politicians to intervene on their behalf in ICCAT, increasing their political importance beyond their economic importance. It's interesting to note that, in the European Union this process is repeated twice, as fishers from the major states targeting highly migratory species, usually France and Spain, lobby their 6 1 NMFS Annual Commercial Landings Statistics Database. 272 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. governments, who in turn exercise their political clout to influence the EC's agenda at ICCAT.6 2 It's worth mentioning here that regionalism poses methodological problems because of the correlation between a state's fishing capacity and its ability to exploit multiple substitutes. It is possible that distant water fishing countries have resisted early response to biological depletion due to domestic political factors rather than vulnerability to recession in a national fishing fleet. Strong fisheries unions, well- established subsidy programs and a greater dependence on fisheries generally could be the underlying causes for the differentiation between coastal and distant water attitudes towards sustainable management. If this is the case, then distant water capabilities are simply a proxy for unwillingness to cutback on fish production due to i\ 3 heavier political costs. Although this preliminary research suggests that recession in a domestic fishing fleet is actually the causal factor, additional studies comparing stocks of the same species that are exploited by different combinations of distant and coastal fleets are indicated. Specifically, the case of eastern versus western bluefin tuna would be quite useful.6 4 Regionalism can impact political importance in almost any country, but there are other national characteristics that can complicate specification of that variable. First, complication arises if there is a conflict of interest, such as when a decision maker is also a part owner of a fleet. Theoretically, such favoritism would increase 6 2 Lequesne (2004, 146). See Table 5.1 to compare the importance o f highly migratory species and France and Spain and relative to the entire European Community. 6 3 Japan's voluntary reductions on its fleets seem to contradict this possibility, but further research would still be useful. 6 4 Eastern bluefin tuna is captured almost exclusively by fleets from Canada, the US, and Japan. The EC usually produces around 50% o f Western bluefin tuna landings on an annual basis. (ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. the political importance of a fleet over and above its economic importance. Alternately, there could be countries in which fisheries are relegated to a position of unimportance because no politically powerful personage holds any economic interest in the national fleet. Similar undervaluation of the sector could occur in countries that are inundated with economic or political problems. An example would be the case of Sierra Leone, which, even though highly migratory species are an important part of the economy, has not been able to regulate its fishers and therefore has been under ICCAT sanctions from 2000-2004. Second, as discussed in Chapter 4, there were some indications that susceptibility to non-commercial interests could influence the political importance of maintaining a commercial fleet. At the same time, it is important to point out that non-commercial groups may not always work against commercial interests, especially when vulnerable domestic fleets are already heavily regulated and others are not.6 5 Whether noncommercial interests augment, neutralize, or overcome their commercial counterparts is an issue for future research. Similarly, conflict among two or more domestic fleets targeting the same stock could have various implications for the overall political interests of decision makers and should be studied further. All of these complications are issues that depend heavily on domestic institutions and even the personal characteristics of individual decision makers. As such, they could be illuminated by the in-depth country studies that will be proposed in Section 5.4. Lastly, the cases also showed that political importance can be magnified when states perceive their conflicts over the regulation of a single stock as part of a 6 5 Porter, Brown, and Chasek (2000, 70). 274 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. larger battle. An example would be the battle over allocation criteria that led the Group of 18 to block consensus on sharing arrangements for bigeye tuna in order to pressure more vulnerable historical fishing states to reconsider their previously intractable position.6 6 Along similar lines, Japan accepted and eventually complied with costly limitations on its landings of Northern swordfish in order to fortify its position as leader in the battles to eliminate IUU fishing and restrict the growth of Chinese and Taiwanese fleets in the bigeye fishery.6 7 Such interconnectedness highlights the importance of maintaining a wider view of vulnerability response, rather than simply looking at fishes, fishers, or fishing states in isolation. 5.3.2 Strength One of the most significant subtexts found throughout the case studies was the affirmation of the assertion in Section 2.4 that there is no simple formula for predicting the outcome of fisheries negotiations. In combination with vulnerability response, the concept of political importance serves as an indicator of what individual states want and how much they want it. However, these ideas alone fail to capture the complexities of international fisheries management. When circumstances force them to negotiate, countries do not always have the resources to get what they want. More importantly, power cannot be measured in a vacuum, so a complete model of vulnerability response requires additional hypotheses on the behavior of states in relation to each other.6 8 By zeroing in on the aspects of power that are most important in fisheries negotiations, it may be possible to make more accurate 6 6 ICCAT (2000, 1:167-169). 6 7 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 00-3). 6 8 Sprout and Sprout (1965, 215-216). 275 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. predictions regarding the timing and effectiveness of regulation for different stocks of fish. Much of the following discussion centers around two closely related interpretations of the same question: how much do states have to spend? The first interpretation, denoted here as strength, refers to the relative diplomatic endowment of a state in the fisheries context, or the level of economic, political, and other types of resources a state can draw upon in order to make threats or side payments to other states that participate in the management of a fishery.6 9 This aspect will be covered here. The second interpretation, strategy, refers to the position of a state's policy preference in relation to the preferences of the other states with fleets targeting a stock. In other words, how much would a state have to give up in order to either convince other countries to adopt its preferred policy or to resist pressures to accept 7 A management measures that are not optimal from a domestic perspective. 71 Approaches to the concept of strategy will be dealt with in the next subsection. The cases showed that strength is still derived from commonly recognized sources such as economic clout and political connections, both of which can be used 7 9 to make promises of side payments or threats of punitive measures. However, the 6 9 This is basically the same as Keohane and N ye’s (2001, 220) interpretation o f hard power, although they do not make the distinction between the ability to obtain preferred outcomes (in their terms, behavioral power) and the willingness to utilize resources, or resource power, to obtain preferred outcomes (in my terms, political importance). 7 0 Referring again to Keohane and Nye (2001, 220), this concept closely resembles their interpretation o f soft power. 7 1 As per Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954), the ability o f states to utilize their strength could additionally be impacted by domestic decision-making processes and the attributes o f domestic decision-makers. For the moment, however, this aspect o f national power is better dealt with once more complete research on domestic decision-making has been undertaken. 7 2 Morgenthau (1993; new edition o f his 1948 work) was one o f the first to enumerate the elements o f national power. Since then, many have debated over the elements on such a list and their relative importance, but most agree that there are economic, political, and military aspects o f power, all o f which can be utilized as either carrot or stick as states attempt to influence each other. 2 7 6 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. distribution of strength among fishing states in the cases does not perfectly mirror the world stage. The distinction is most obvious among developed countries, as evidenced by the consistent inability of highly vulnerable states like the US and Canada to obtain their policy objectives until gradually vulnerable states like the EC or Japan also perceived the benefits of regulatory restrictions on open access. Actually, most of the substantive regulations that were documented in the cases more closely resembled the policy preferences of these gradually vulnerable states, with concessions to moderately and mildly vulnerable states, rather than proposals set forth by their highly vulnerable counterparts. This is not to say that the highly vulnerable states were completely powerless at ICCAT, but rather that these two countries, especially the United States, were less powerful than they would be other 73 arenas. In fact, it does not take a huge logical leap to see that, as defined in Chapter 2, individual states in the highly vulnerable category will consistently be weaker than gradually vulnerable states in fisheries negotiations. Figure 5.1 summarizes the most common strength characteristics of states in each vulnerability category that directly targeted the stocks in the cases.7 4 Because of the frequent correlation between high operating costs and the level of economic development, states in the highly and gradually vulnerable categories tended to be fairly evenly matched on the economic front.7 5 However, to foster their distant water operations, gradually vulnerable states 7 3 Granted, if these fisheries were more important in the US and Canada or if there were broader linkages to other interest areas, then one might have observed greater success on the part o f these highly vulnerable states. 7 4 By-catch exceptions will be discussed a little further on. 7 5 Compare the GDPs o f the US and Canada to the EC and Japan in Table 5.1. Interestingly, prior to 1997, when the EC joined the Commission, the biggest European fishing states targeting HMS stocks, France and Spain, still won many battles with the United States, even though they separately have 277 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. usually had firmer and more numerous bilateral ties with other fishing states, 7 f \ especially developing coastal countries. This gave the gradually vulnerable states an advantage politically, since they had greater leverage over a wider array of participants in the negotiations.7 7 Furthermore, since their fleets are usually bigger, gradually vulnerable states almost always produced larger percentages of the landings of a stock than highly 78 vulnerable states. This gave coastal states with distant water fleets an institutional edge, because the legitimacy of a nation's voice on regulations was linked to the socioeconomic importance of its landings, but was not helpful to purely distant water fishing states that were often considered to be less legitimate because they were not proximate to the stocks. In either case, a larger portion of the catch fortified the strength of gradually vulnerable states by increasing the threat of defection that they 70 were able to wield and marginalizing the costs of quota transfers to other states. much smaller GDPs. This underlines the importance o f other factors when determining the country's strength in this context. 7 6 FAO (1999c). 7 7 This is a murky area, since few such threats or promises would ever be recorded in official documents. However, is important to note that many o f the individual decision makers at ICCAT have fisheries specific jobs and linkages to other issue areas seem to be quite weak. 7 8 An exception would be the situation in which the majority o f the stock resides within a highly vulnerable state's EEZ. In that case, the highly vulnerable state's domestic fleets could still capture o f fairly large portion o f the stock. North Atlantic swordfish is an imperfect example, since coastal US fleets catch around a quarter o f those landings but the EC fleet captures double that amount. (ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database). 79 For example, although its share in the harvest have decreased over the last decade, gradually vulnerable Japan still catches about 20% o f all bigeye landings on an annual basis, only rivaled by mildly vulnerable Taiwan and the EC, which only catches juvenile bigeye incidentally. Alternately, the EC is gradually vulnerable in the northern swordfish fishery where its fleets harvest 45-55% o f the stock, more than twice its nearest rival, the USA. (ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database). 2 7 8 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure 5.1: Relative Strength of Individual States in Each Vulnerability Category Domestic Costs of Production High Low m Highly Vulnerable Moderately Vulnerable > ts £ Developed Underdeveloped-Emergent I d 0 > H - l Some Fisheries Ties Few-Some Fisheries Ties < o Small-Moderate % Catch Small-Moderate % Catch m O u '2 Gradually Vulnerable Mildly Vulnerable X Developed Emergent % Q 0 0 2 Many Fisheries Ties Some Fisheries Ties a a O Large Percent of Catch Moderate-Large % Catch B y-ca tch E xcep tio n Like gradually vulnerable states, those in the moderately and mildly vulnerable categories tended to exhibit the same economic, political, and productive strengths in fisheries that they would in most other multilateral sightings. O f the four types, moderately vulnerable countries were the most diverse, ranging from least developed countries like Sierra Leone to emergent economies like Brazil. Individually, smaller states in this category had little clout at the Commission, but the large countries did have the political and economic connections to carry some weight. On the other hand, in the Atlantic, mildly vulnerable states were almost all emergent economies like Taiwan and Korea, with the exception of one, China, which stood out as military and commercial powerhouse in spite of its developing status. More importantly, some of these states produced large enough portions of the total 2 7 9 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 80 catch to wield a substantial threat of defection. Nevertheless, these countries had few bilateral ties in the Atlantic and were also perceived by some other members as having less legitimate claims in that ocean because they were not coastal states. Mildly vulnerable states were stronger than most moderately vulnerable states, but they did not rival highly or gradually vulnerable states. The largest deviations from the pattern of strength outlined in Figure 5.1 occurred in situations where by-catch existed, and one or more strong states were aligned with the mildly vulnerable category. As covered in Subsection 5.1.2, there are two main by-catch variations on the mix of states. First, when a commercially valuable stock is the by-catch in some other fishery, like swordfish in the bigeye tuna fishery or bigeye in the tropical tuna fishery, then those states whose fleets incidentally harvest the focal stock can be set considered mildly vulnerable. In those cases, more vulnerable states were forced to make larger side payments and concessions, delaying effective management response. Secondly, for stocks that were only incidentally harvested in commercial fisheries, all states were mildly vulnerable 81 from commercial standpoint and management measures remained ineffective. The ICCAT system appears to be quite stable, so states in each vulnerability category can generally be expected to follow the same strength patterns for targeted and by-catch stocks that were observed in the cases. In fact, even the end of the Cold War did little to change the dynamics of management at ICCAT, largely because the 8 0 Most notably, Taiwan has the capacity to land at least 22,000 mt, even though the Commission has limited its allowed harvests to 16,500 mt. If Taiwan chose to ignore ICCAT regulations the potential overage could be equal to upwards o f 8% o f the total catch. (ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database). Additionally, mildly vulnerable states like China, which currently make moderate contributions to the catches o f several stocks, have the potential, and even the plans, to rapidly increase their productive capacity. (ICCAT 2004, 1:179). 8 1 The issue o f susceptibility to noncommercial interests is an area in which further research is needed, and will be discussed in Section 5.4 Learning and Domestic Change. 280 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. USSR was never a major player in the organization. Substantial disruptions, like a world war, or the displacement of major fishing states like the US, the EC, or Japan could have significant impact. For instance, as pointed out in the paragraph on mildly vulnerable states, the political and economic ascendancy of emergent states like China could alter the current pattern. That said, the most important temporal change observed in the cases was the entrance of moderately vulnerable states, which altered the strategies involved in negotiations, rather than the expectations regarding the strength of states in each category. 5.3.3 Strategy It is important to remember that the term strength refers only to the individual assets of states relative to each other, but that these endowments alone do not determine which state's policy preferences prevail; strategy is involved as well. In all of the regional fisheries organizations covering highly migratory species, major strategies take one of two forms: forging consensus or blocking consensus. Bilaterally, strong states have an advantage in both areas because they have more resources to dedicate toward transfers, greater leverage in terms of threats, and a higher level of independence. Multilaterally, coalitions of weak states can be formed O Q in order to combine their strengths and improve their mutual bargaining position. This behavior was certainly observed in the cases, usually on the part of moderately vulnerable states in order to increase the threat of defection and reinforce engagement in a consensus blocking strategy. However, an equally important 8 2 See Kaufman (1988, 24-27 and chap. X) for a very thorough, practical guide to the nature o f consensus decision making and the tactics used by states in negotiating a consensus. 8 3 This was already mentioned in Section 2.4 Vulnerability Response and Negotiated Outcomes, see Keohane and N ye (2001, 31). 281 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. strategic behavior was the rise of coalitions among strong states in the highly and gradually vulnerable categories. In both cases where rebuilding occurred, these states pooled their resources to build consensus via the exploitation of a wider array of bilateral ties. One of the more interesting aspects of the vulnerability response model is that the categories encompass protocoalitions due to the similarity of policy preferences. Although they did not always work well together, states within each vulnerability category cooperated without the exchange of threats or side payments more often than states of disparate types. In fact, it can be asserted that the power of an individual state is magnified by the strength of other states in the same vulnerability category and the cohesiveness of their policy preferences.8 4 For instance, the voices of moderately vulnerable states were significantly amplified on the issue of allocation criteria because of their joint interest in establishing access rights for coastal developing countries. In contrast, when those same states participated in discussions on the allocation of specific stocks, their individual interests in maximizing national quotas undermined that cohesiveness, leaving these weaker states to be cajoled bilaterally by highly and gradually vulnerable states. Figure 5.2 illustrates that example in a fairly generic, but representative schematic comparison of group cohesion under two possible regulations, (a) the inclusion of status as a developing or coastal state when determining quota allocations and (b) the adoption of an effective total allowable catch with quota allocation based on historical catches. Each diagram represents a payoffs space in which the y-axis in each diagram measures the payoffs from the adoption of the 8 4 Kaufmann (1988, chap. IX) also provides a good review o f the workings o f groups in conference diplomacy and the ways in which members are able to combine their strengths. 282 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. designated regulation, while the x-axis indicates the payoffs from the status quo.8 5 States are represented by circles, which are larger or smaller depending on the strength of each country, adjusted by the relative political importance of domestic 86 fleets. Each circle was labeled according to its vulnerability category: highly vulnerable (HV), gradually vulnerable (GV), moderately vulnerable (MoV), and mildly vulnerable (MiV). In Figure 5.2a, notice that moderately vulnerable states, although relatively weak individually, are clustered together by their mutual preference for changing the norm of allocation from one based on historical landings to one based on the development and the coastal status of each state. This natural cohesion makes it easier for them to combine their strength and helps to explain their success in first getting the issue on the ICCAT agenda and then inserting their preference into the 87 official Allocation Criteria at the Commission. Since historical landings continue to be an important factor in determining quota allocations, these same states are much less cohesive when faced with the actual allocation of quotas for a stock of fish. In fact, as Figure 5.2b shows, moderately vulnerable states are usually scattered by their individual preferences for access to larger quotas, whereas highly and gradually vulnerable states are united by their need to limit landings and institutionalize their historical access rights. Thus, moderately vulnerable states have only received small concessions and side payments on quota allocations for specific stocks, even though 8 5 Purely historical quota allocation is the status quo for Figure 5.2a and open access is the status quo in Figure 5.2b. Because the alternatives in this case are discrete, each state can be represented by a single point, the center o f each circle, rather than an indifference curve or some similar device. 8 6 The nature o f this adjustment is not yet clearly defined. This is an area in which further research is needed. However, it might be possible to set up a weighting system based on the relative economic importance o f the fleets with corrections for political factors that might skew that indicator. 8 7 That said, more vulnerable fishing states were not completely out-maneuvered, since historical landings were also included in the document. 283 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. they were able to push through new allocation criteria for the Commission as a whole. Figure 5.2: Comparison of Group Cohesion on a Cross-section of Regulations b. Total Allowable Catch w/ Quota Allocation a. Developing/Coastal Allocation Criteria H V HV GV 0 9 GV HV H V MiV o o GV M iV MiV GV M iV ■> Payoffs o f Status Quo Payoffs o f Status Quo As an extension of the vulnerability response hypotheses, this connection between strategy and cohesion deserves further elaboration. Moderately vulnerable states are clustered in Figure 5.2a because they would doubly benefit from the proposed changes in the allocation criteria as both developing and coastal states. As relatively new entrants into the fishery, mildly vulnerable states also do not benefit much from the status quo of allocation based on historical performance, but as distant water states, they risk being cut out under the new scheme in spite of their developing status. Highly vulnerable states could benefit somewhat because of their coastal position, although they also face the prospect of loosing some historical 2 8 4 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. allocation to developing coastal states. Gradually vulnerable states that do not boarder on the stock would be hurt the most under the proposed scheme, since they oo have neither coastal nor developing claims on the resource. Quite a different picture develops when looking at quotas for individual stocks, as represented in Figure 5.2b. In this illustration, as with several of the stocks under negotiation around the same period that the allocation criteria were established, depletion is substantial and competition has set in. At this point, moderately vulnerable states are dispersed in their policy preferences because of internal competition and differences in the developmental capacity of their fleets. Even though they have been placed in the same category, some moderately vulnerable states are more competitive than others and some have more aggressive fleet development strategies. Such variations divide states in this category as each seeks to maximize its individual share in the benefits available from regulation vis-a- vis the status quo, whether it's increased access rights or some other form of side payment. By comparison, mildly vulnerable states are shown to be much closer together in Figure 5.2b because they have the largest capacity to develop their fleets and therefore the strongest preference for the status quo over any kind of regulatory regime. Even when it is not explicitly expressed, this cohesiveness, along with the strength of the individual states in the category, gives mildly vulnerable states more O Q leverage to demand concessions. On the other end of the spectrum, highly 8 8 The EC could be an exception, since, for some stocks, it is a coastal state. 8 9 An important side-bar to this discussion is the potential for irrational behavior on the part o f states - that is, a refusal to cooperate with other states that share the same policy preferences for ideological reasons. Alternately, there could be non-fisheries issues asserting themselves within the negotiations. A case in point is the relationship, or lack thereof, between China and Taiwan, both of whom have come under attack at the Commission for seeking to develop their fleets in the Atlantic. Nevertheless, 285 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. vulnerable and gradually vulnerable states are also close together on policy preferences. Already having experienced economic losses in their fleets and running out of options, highly and gradually vulnerable states can benefit much more from managing the stock so as to limit production and prevent further declines in their domestic fleets. That said, there is a limit to which these strong states are willing to reduce their own quotas in order to attain consensus. Thus, moderately vulnerable states are caught in the middle, pressured to agree to effective rebuilding plans and fighting amongst themselves over the relatively small amount quota left over from the demands of highly and gradually vulnerable states and the placation of mildly vulnerable states. Although it occurred commonly in the case studies, the scenario depicted in Figure 5.2b is not the only possible assignation of national payoffs under the vulnerability response hypotheses. Variations in the strength and number of individual states in each category are quite possible when different stocks are involved.9 0 However, predictions regarding the changes in national policy preferences over time do not depend on the strength of a state or the political importance of its domestic fleets. Therefore, by projecting state preferences as a stock is depleted, it is possible to locate protocoalitions on a temporal scale just as one would for the cross-sectional comparison above. For instance, Figure 5.3 posits the trajectory of changes in the national payoffs of regulation (b) the adoption of an effective total allowable catch with quota allocation based on historical landings, versus the status quo of open access for states in each vulnerability category. The the long-term animosity between these “fishing entities” (China refuses to allow Taiwan to be recognized as a country) has prevented strategic cooperation. 9 0 See Section 5.4 Learning and Domestic Change, regarding the need for further research on stocks for which the mix o f states differs from those in the cases. 286 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. arrows designate the movement of each state through the payoffs space from the point at which scarcity rent is fully dissipated in the fishery up to the time when effective regulations are adopted. Figure 5.3: Changes in the Domestic Payoffs of Regulation (b) over Time i. Temporal Trajectory o f Highly Vulnerable States ii. Temporal Trajectory o f Gradually Vulnerable States Payoffs o f Status Quo iii. Temporal Trajectory of Moderately Vulnerable States Payoffs o f Status Quo iv. Temporal Trajectory o f Mildly Vulnerable States H V H V HV HV GV GV GV GV ° 9 1 ( M iV MiV MoV MiV Payoffs o f Status Quo Payoffs o f Status Quo 2 8 7 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. In each of the four charts depicted in Figure 5.3, the jumping off point for all states occurs in the lower right hand comer, where the payoffs from the status quo far outweigh the payoffs from limiting landings via regulation. At this early stage, highly and gradually vulnerable states may have just begun to experience recession in their domestic fleets but remain myopically in favor of open access. As the stock declines and competition becomes tougher, states change their preferences according to the vulnerability response hypotheses. The length and steepness of each path is determined by the relative costs of production while the curvature, usually concave to the origin, indicates the opportunity costs of alternatives. This reflects the hypothesis that countries with cheaper alternative sources of revenue prefer to postpone regulations until those alternatives are used up. Several important inferences can be drawn from this example. First, the strategic alignment of highly and gradually vulnerable states can be expected to occur for all commercially valuable stocks. With similar costs of production, the policy preferences of these two categories should eventually converge, although gradually vulnerable states may always prefer greater regulatory malleability. Between the two extremes, states in these categories will be dispersed by conflicts over allocations of specific quotas, much as moderately vulnerable states were in the previous example. In fact, as long as highly and gradually vulnerable states have considerable weight within the issue area, evidence of cooperation among members of this set of states can usually be considered to be a signal that effective management will be achieved soon.9 1 This was certainly true in the cases, where the 9 1 The major exception would occur for high value fish stocks that occupy niche markets and therefore for which there are few true alternatives. Atlantic bluefm tuna is one such stock. In such a case, gradually vulnerable states may not exist, or may be difficult to distinguish from highly vulnerable states, because there are already so few other stocks that could bring in the same levels o f revenue. 288 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 1995 sharing agreement for Northern swordfish and the 2000 joint proposal by the USA and Japan both ended years of conflict between highly and gradually vulnerable states and heralded the regulatory improvements that led to stock rebuilding. Such cooperation was not observed in any of the other, less successful cases. The second issue that stands out prominently both in the figure and the cases is the larger number and wider array of policy paths projected for moderately vulnerable states compared to the other vulnerability categories. In many ways, this is a system level characteristic, since there are so many countries in the world that are capable of taking advantage of their abilities to cheaply extract fish from their coastal zones. Nevertheless, this finding indicates that, when reworking the vulnerability response hypotheses into a larger theory, greater attention should be paid to distinctions among states in this category. For instance, the leaders of the Group of 18 were largely countries like Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico; all of which were moderately strong states with emerging economies. As such, these countries have more resources for fleet development than many other states in the category, providing stronger incentives to establish coastal and developing status as criteria for quota allocation. At the same time, somewhat higher operating costs, larger historical catches, and greater individual leverage for side payments would also cause these states to prefer historical regulation sooner than other moderately vulnerable states. Calculating specific trajectories for national policy preferences and gauging the power structure among states that are involved in the management of real-world stocks would be useful, but difficult. There are still too many questions regarding the 92ICCAT (2005a, res. 95-9) on northern swordfish; ICCAT (2000, 1: 191) regarding bigeye tuna. 289 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. linkages between domestic and international levels of analysis. Several of these questions were mentioned above, but many others come to mind. For instance, once measurements are developed, how exactly should political importance and national strength be combined to determine the diplomatic resources that states actually bring to the table? Alternately, how does the strategic location of one state translate into a particular magnitude of threat or side payment required to gain support for a particular policy? On a larger scale, how does the overall mix of states impact the distribution and movement of specific states through the payoffs space? Further studies comparing northern and southern stocks of temperate fishes or stocks of tropical species from different oceans could help to answer these questions, since a wider variety of cases would provide more empirical evidence of natural variations on the vulnerability response theme. While additional qualitative research is needed to fill in the gaps between the hypotheses, the creation of a nested agent-based model could serve a similar purpose. With a simulated ocean as their environment, hypothetical fish stocks could be programmed to fluctuate based on natural and anthropogenic factors, interacting with fishers who follow their own decision rules while states of different types and strengths work to maximize their fleets’ access to those stocks. In such a system, it would be possible to vary factors individually or in groups to see what effect specific changes have on the behavior of agents and the collective outcomes of interactions. Building such a complex model is a long-term project, but, together with the existing 9 3 This could be done by building on the several “landscape” type models such as the computer generated sugarscape developed by Epstein and Axtell (1996) and the theory o f aggregation that Axelrod and Bennet (1993) developed to model coalition building among states. 290 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. literature on bioeconomics, collective action, and international relations, the above lessons from these cases should serve as a solid starting point. 5.4 Learning and Domestic Change As has been mentioned several times already, the internal politics of national policy making is an essential aspect of international fisheries management that was heavily simplified in the nascent vulnerability response model that was presented in Chapter 2. For practical reasons, state decision-making was limited to rational but myopic maximization of commercial revenues for domestic fleets. Subsection 5.3.1 pointed out that the political importance of fleets is not always equal to their economic importance and that more country-specific information could be used to refine that aspect of the model. Additional research is also needed to incorporate other issues, such as learning and non-commercial interest groups into the model. Both of these factors could have long-term implications for vulnerability response as a set of hypotheses, and a determinant of state behavior. As shown in the case studies on blue and white marlins, noncommercial interest groups should be brought into the model because, when they are able to gain access to the policy process, states may substantially alter their positions on management issues.9 4 Learning is also an important force for lasting change, since decision makers and commercial fishers who have faced recession in a domestic fishing fleet might be more proactive when other FIMS stocks become overexploited.9 5 9 4 Changes along these lines can be associated with the global civil society literature typified by Lipschutz (1996) and Wapner (2000). 9 5 See Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997) regarding changes in reference points and experienced utility. 291 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. There is some evidence in the cases that decision makers and interest groups do learn from encounters with recession in a domestic fleet. The experience of highly vulnerable states shows that, when fishers themselves are convinced of the importance of sustainable management, decision makers find it much easier to push for early, strong response to biological depletion. The same issues of scope and scale in HMS fisheries that make scientific analysis difficult also inhibit fishers' perceptions of biological depletion and recession in its early stages. However, once fishers have experienced the costly adjustment and rebuilding process for one stock of fish, they may be more willing to compromise earlier on management of other stocks.9 6 For example, the US longline fleet was hit hard by the rebuilding plan for bluefin tuna in the early 1990s. Forced to give up all exploitation of the highly valuable bluefin, these fishers became even more concerned regarding the status of 97 northern swordfish, as did US representatives at ICCAT. Moreover, the 1996 adoption of the Sustainable Fisheries Act suggests that a broader movement toward science over vested interests may be occurring in the US, although the Act and its Q O implementation remain contested issues. Returning to the larger picture, it would seem that this type of learning is not highly transferable. That is, less vulnerable states are not necessarily made more 9 6 Tversky and Kahneman (1991) present a cognitive model o f risk assessment that is reference dependent with loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity. Haas (1994, 42) discusses such cognitive learning among policymakers in international cooperative environmental management. See also Haas (1990). 9 7 Although the US still had a quota for Western Atlantic bluefin, it was allotted to the small fleet o f purse seines, rather than longlines. A similar learning situation occurred when Japan staunchly pursued trade measures on bigeye tuna because o f what it had learned from its experience trying to control IUU fishing o f bluefin tuna. South Africa also displayed learning in its attempts to obtain sharing arrangements on southern albacore and southern swordfish to prevent overexploitation o f those stocks. 9 8 Weber (2002, chap. 10). 292 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. cautious by the example set for them when their more vulnerable counterparts pay the economic costs associated with the depletion of a stock." More importantly, the changes caused by learning are not unidirectional. This is because it is not limited to states that desire early, strong response. Experience with vulnerability response for one stock of fish may cause a member of ICCAT to be more circumspect in regards to other stocks, but that caution can include machinations aimed at inhibiting early action rather than preventing additional depletion. Contracting parties with more competitive fleets can increase their benefits, both in terms of market share and side payments from more vulnerable states if they postpone action on stocks whose biomass has fallen below MSY.1 0 0 Moderately or mildly vulnerable fishing states that have been pressured into acquiescence in the past may learn better ways to maximize those benefits when dealing with other stocks of fish.1 0 1 Much more information is needed to incorporate this important factor into a consolidated model of vulnerability response. Furthermore, Haas and Haas (1995, 261) point out that, for organizational learning to occur in multilateral settings, a coalition of hegemonic members states must be committed to advocating the measures prescribed by a consolidated epistemic community. That coalition certainly 9 9 For one thing, loss aversion plays out differently for most developing fishing states since they are more concerned with the ability to increase their fishing activities rather than to maintain a certain level o f exploitation. There are also availability issues, in that domestic decision makers that have not experienced recession in the fisheries sector may not believe that similar problems will occur in their country, even when they have heard accounts from elsewhere. See Kahneman et al. (1982) on decision heuristics. It will be interesting to see whether or not more widespread experience o f recession in the fisheries sector linked to biological depletion might lead to information cascades that could alter current perceptions o f risk. See Kuran and Sunstein (1999). 1 0 0 Barkin and Shambaugh (1999, 16). 1 0 1 For instance, the Group o f 18 has become much more adept at manipulating its numerical advantage to gamer concessions from more vulnerable states by learning from previous experience. This is partially illustrated in the comparison between management o f northern swordfish and bigeye tuna as per Subsection 5.1.1 Commercially Targeted Stocks. 2 9 3 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. does not yet exist at ICCAT, and given the predicted propensities of gradually vulnerable states regarding flexibility in management of various stocks, it may never occur in any generalized way. Furthermore, given the level of disputation within the Commission’s scientific committee, one could also question the existence of a 1 09 cohesive epistemic community within this issue area. Already identified as a source of change in Subsection 5.2.2, the ascendance of noncommercial interest groups like recreational fishing and conservation organizations should also be the focus of further, in-depth country studies. By advocating for alternate valuations of highly migratory species, these groups can influence decision makers’ perceptions of the political and socioeconomic benefits that could be derived from management of HMS stocks. When they are successful, the work of noncommercial organizations can increase a state’ s willingness to pay for 1 09 management response to biological depletion. Although this may help improve vulnerability response timing for commercial stocks, the influence of these organizations is most important when dealing with by-catch species, which would otherwise go unnoticed. As recounted in Chapter 4, US intervention on blue and white marlins is a key case in point. If it were not for recreational and conservation interests, marlins probably would not have been put on the US agenda and if it were not for the leadership of the United States, little would have been done to manage the stocks at the Commission. 1 0 2 See Haas (1990, 41) for a definition o f epistemic communities in the context o f organizational learning; especially important is the common acceptance o f the legitimacy o f a proposed solution to whatever problem is at hand. 1 0 3 There are instances when contention between commercial, recreational and/or conservation interests have actually lead to a weakening o f US resolve on ICCAT issues. This usually occurs more before recession in the fisheries sector is strongly felt by the commercial sector. 294 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Measured by ICCAT's own goals, management of blue-and-white marlin has not been successful as yet, since both stocks remain seriously below the levels that would support MSY. Internationally, the US wields great power, but, as the only country with motivation to act on marlins in the Atlantic, its ability to achieve effective management measures has been severely limited. This situation is not likely to change anytime soon. Even though they have been at work elsewhere, conservation and recreational interests have only been effective in highly susceptible states like the USA and Canada.1 0 4 Organizations like Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund have been actively pursuing conservation policy for Atlantic HMS fisheries in EC member states and elsewhere, but even these formidable interest groups have been unable to counter the exceptional power of the fishing industry in gradually, moderately and least vulnerable states.1 0 5 This is not surprising considering that noncommercial interests held little sway even in the United States or Canada prior to the economic decline of their fishing fleets. Fishing for highly migratory species is a much larger part of the economies of the other industrialized states where conservation and recreational groups traditionally have their power bases, so battles there are much harder to fight.1 0 6 While it has increased fishers’ awareness of the need for management and facilitated the entry of noncommercial interest groups, the economic decline of the US and Canadian fleets has precipitated a concomitant weakening of their bargaining 1 0 4 Nominal support for the recreational agenda on marlins has come from some coastal developing countries that have capitalized on sportfishing as a tourism industry, but all actual initiative has come from United States. See Subsection 4.3.1 Partial Management Response. 1 0 5 Their few international successes have either been items already in the self-interest o f ICCAT members (prevention o f IUU fishing) or larger concerns o f a global scale (a recent measure against shark finning). 1 0 6 This was discussed more extensively in Subsection 5.3.2. 295 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. position vis-a-vis less vulnerable states. This is a common irony within vulnerability response model, since the process that causes states be interested in catch limits and sharing arrangements also undermines their productive capacity. Reduced fleet size and other repercussions of recession in a domestic fishing fleet cut into a state's political power at ICCAT because of the often-expressed norm that a member's influence should be directly related to their stake in the commercial exploitation of a 1 0 7 stock of fish. Lacking the ability to threaten defection and the legitimacy associated with heavy dependence on a stock, it is likely that highly vulnerable states will continue to push for conservation at ICCAT but that their success will be increasingly dependent on cooperation from other contracting parties. Indeed, the case studies all showed that management response has only occurred at ICCAT after gradually vulnerable distant water states began to feel the pinch of increasing competition along with their highly vulnerable counterparts. Distant water fishing states with high costs of production like the EC and Japan have run out of cheap alternatives as HMS stocks have been depleted globally. With fewer and fewer fresh stocks to exploit, these countries are quickly losing the advantage that distant water capabilities imparted to them in the past. Facing recession in its fisheries, Japan has mobilized to reduce its capacity and redirect its industry into processing and other alternative modes of production.1 0 8 In contrast, because their survival strategies included expansion and subsidization of their fishing operations, 1 0 7 There are many different ways to define dependence on a stock, but all include some form o f use value, whether for domestic consumption or generation o f foreign exchange. Artisanal, or subsistence, dependence is actually recognized as well, but, by definition, it is limited in scope and therefore seldom considered to be a matter o f discord in HMS management. In fact, almost all ICCAT recommendations specifically apply to commercial and/or recreational fishing, with exemptions on artisanal fleets. 1 0 8 Bergin and Howard (1996, 108-109). 296 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. fleets from several EC member states continue to be overcapitalized. Also, Japan appears to have undertaken a global approach to fisheries management whereas the EC may be engaging in pulse management, which, like pulse fishing, capitalizes on their ability to move from one stock to another to avoid economic catastrophe.1 0 9 If global stocks continue to decline in spite of international management efforts, EC fishers may be forced to either leave the industry or migrate to countries were production costs are lower, much as fishers from the US, Canada, and Japan have done. The repercussions of these types of alternatives, as opposed to the distant water fishing option that was a major determinant of vulnerability in the cases, are far-reaching. Essentially, these fishers would be choosing exit over voice, to use Hirschman's famous terminology. Even though there would still be economic costs involved in such a transition, the exit of large portions of a domestic fleet could substantially reduce its political importance. Furthermore, when regulations are unsuccessful, either in terms of rebuilding the stock or protecting vulnerable fleets, highly and gradually vulnerable states could be pushed out of a fishery entirely, leaving those in the mildly and moderately vulnerable categories to take their place. While the equity of such an occurrence is debatable, the implications under 1 0 9 Pulse fishing occurs when a fleet overfishes one stock then moves on to another while allowing the first stock to rebuild. This can lead to a cyclical pattern o f overfishing and rebuilding between two or more stocks o f fish. The term I have coined here, pulse management, refers to a situation in which regional fisheries organizations allow the temporary overexploitation o f one stock in order to cushion the effects o f cutbacks required to rebuild another stock. This strategy may not be obvious or even intentional on the part o f the entire organization but it can result when one or more powerful states have coordinated policy processes that transcend geographic and species boundaries. For instance, the EC began backtracking on management o f Eastern bluefin tuna and other stocks in the North Atlantic the same year that groundfish fisheries in the region were closed because o f heavy overexploitation. Considering that the same people, in fact the same man, developed the EC policy for both types of species, it is not inconceivable that the intention is to mitigate some o f the negative repercussions o f the groundfish closure by redirecting fishing effort toward highly migratory species. 2 9 7 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. vulnerability response undeniably point toward a prolonged period of overexploitation and a lower likelihood that sustainability will be achieved. As far as the cases presented here are concerned, the displacement of highly and gradually vulnerable states is not likely to occur at any time in the near future. In spite of large fleet declines, countries like the US, Canada, and Japan have remained active and powerful participants in the management process. Nonetheless, a better understanding of variations in the culture of commercial fleets in different countries is an essential component in a more long run version of the vulnerability response model. Without deeper knowledge of commercial fishing interests, predicting the impact of noncommercial interests on national policy or the potential for learning within the domestic decision-making processes is not possible. At the same time, without the occurrence of learning or some other alteration in the dialogue of fisheries management, the rebuilding explained by the cases could be short-lived, as better times diminish the political force behind effective regulations and conflicts over allocation once again trump the desire for collective response. 5.5 The Future o f Fishers and Fishes From the vulnerability response perspective, there are both optimistic and pessimistic possibilities for the future of HMS fisheries in the Atlantic. On the one hand, ICCAT has rebuilt several stocks under its jurisdiction and created important institutions for monitoring and enforcement of its management measures. The Commission has been especially successful in excluding nonmembers from exploiting its stocks and eliminating illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing. In addition, learning and domestic change have taken place in highly 298 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. vulnerable fishing states, appreciably increasing their sensitivity to recession in their fleets and actually altering the way they value HMS stocks in the Atlantic. Even gradually vulnerable fishing states have begun to feel the pinch of resource scarcity under competition and have supported rebuilding plans for bigeye tuna and northern swordfish. All of these things are indicative of more timely and effective management of HMS stocks in the future. On the other hand, conflict over allocation and escalating demands for access to HMS stocks threaten the viability of continued cooperation at ICCAT. Increasing market demand combined with the facile movement of fishing capital in pursuit of lower costs of production has brought an influx of new members to the Commission. Most of these recent additions are in the moderate to mildly vulnerable categories, and they are all jockeying for access to ICCAT stocks. In spite of attempts to address conflicts over access rights via recommendations such as the Allocation Criteria adopted in 2001, sharing arrangements are an increasingly bulky impediment to improving the vulnerability response pattern at ICCAT. The pressures created by increasing membership and declining stocks could eventually lead to a much stronger, more powerful system of management if contracting parties can make the transition to a vote-based system of decision-making. However, those same forces could also tear the Commission apart if the policy impact of fleet declines in more vulnerable developed fishing states does not keep pace with the ambitions of developing countries. Because of this tension, each stock that is depleted represents both a threat and an opportunity for HMS management at ICCAT. As contracting parties negotiate sharing arrangements and rebuilding plans, they have the opportunity to learn from 299 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. past experiences, build better institutions and, most basically, to continue to collectively deal with the problems associated with open-access fishing on the high seas. 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Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1991. Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: a Reference-Dependent Model. The Quarterly Journal o f Economics 106 (4): 1039-1061. UNEP. See United Nations Environment Programme. UNEP. 2002. Integrated Assessment o f Trade Liberalization and Trade-Related Policies: A Country Study o f the Fisheries Sector in Senegal. New York: United Nations. US Congress. 1975. Atlantic Tunas Convention Act o f 1975. Public Law 94-70, US Code 16, http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/titlel6/chapterl6a .html (accessed July 16, 2005). Victor, David G., Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, eds. 1998. The Implementation and Effectiveness o f International Environmental Commitments. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1999. Globalization and Governance. Political Science and Politics. 32 (4): 693-708. Wapner, Paul. 1994. International Cooperation and Global Environmental Challenges. Politics and the Life Sciences 13 (1): 31-37. — . 2000. Governance in Global Civil Society, in Young 2000b, 65-84. 318 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Waugh, Geoffrey. 1984. Fisheries Management: Theoretical Developments and Contemporary Applications. Boulder: Westview Press. Webb, Grahame J.W. 2000. Are All Species Equal? A Comparative Assessment, in Hutton and Dickenson 2000, 98-106. Weber, Michael L. 2002. From Abundance to Scarcity: A History o f US Marine Fisheries Policy. Washington DC: Island Press. Weick, K.E. 1988. Enacted Sensemaking in Crisis Situations. Journal o f Management Studies. 25 (4): 305-317. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory o f International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, Abiodon., ed. 1992. Many Voices: Multilateral Negotiations in the World Arena. Boulder: Westview Press. Wilson, James A. 1977. A Test of the Tragedy of the Commons. In Managing the Commons, ed. G. Hardin and J. Braden, 96-111. San Francisco: Freeman. World Development Indicators: On-line. 2004. Washington DC: World Bank, http://publications.worldbank.org/subscriptions/WDI (Accessed May 15, 2004). World Wildlife Fund. 2001. Hard Facts, Hidden Problems: A Review o f Current Data on Fishing Subsidies. World Wildlife Fund, http://www.worldwildlife.org/oceans/hard facts.pdf (accessed February 8, 2004). World Trade Organization. 2002. GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to Article XX, Paragraphs (b), (d), and (g). WTO Committee on Trade and Environment Paper WT/CTE/W/203. Young, Oran R. 1994. International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press — . 1999. The Effectiveness o f International Environmental Regimes. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press — . 2000a. Rights, Rules and Resources in World Affairs, in Young 2000b, 1-26. — , ed. 2000b. Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 319 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. — . 2002. The Institutional Dimensions o f Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay, and Scale. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. — . 2003. Taking stock: management pitfalls in fisheries science; blind faith in the validity of scientific assessments can result in poor policy. Environment. 45 (3): 24-33. 320 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix A: Basic Bioeconomics of Fisheries A. 1 Static Models The scarcity limitations of a stock of fish are most readily described by a yield-effort curve, which can be derived from the overall relationship between stock size and growth of the biomass. Schaefer (1957) showed that, on average, there is a logistic relationship between stock size, growth and rate of harvest such that: In this model, the change in the size of the stock over a given period of time is a function of the catchability coefficient, q, the fishing effort, E, and the stock level, x. Replacement depends on the intrinsic growth rate, r, the current stock level, and the carrying capacity, K, which is the maximum population the environment can sustain. In fact, K can be considered a biological equilibrium that exists in the absence of harvesting by human beings. It does fluctuate over time, as does the intrinsic growth rate, depending on water temperatures, nutrient contents, etc, but this model assumes that these factors will average out around the incremental curve. Figure A .l depicts a typical interpretation of the Schaefer model. As effort increases from 0, the stock size begins to decrease from K, improving recruitment, which causes the yield of the fishery, Y, to increase.2 This will continue until the 1 Clark (1990, 14, equ. 1.10). 2 Because there is usually very high mortality for fish eggs and fly, biologists usually discuss the rate o f recruitment rather than o f spawning or birth. Differing from species to species, scientists estimate 321 dt v K ) x )-q E x = rx 1 - — - qEx (1.1) — depends on the natural replacement levels F (x) , and the rate of capture, which { d t Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. yield reaches an apex, and then declines to form an inverted U-shaped curve. Generally speaking, with fewer fish, more food is available, so natural mortality declines, improving recruitment, but at some point, the stock is so small that the ability to reproduce is negatively impacted, causing a decline in natural replacement. The top of this curve is the highest biologically possible yield for the fishery, otherwise known as the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). In this model, MSY occurs where the stock is at half the carrying capacity and effort is at half its maximum. This static model is often misinterpreted to mean that any increase in effort above the level associated with MSY will cause an immediate decline in the level of harvest. In actuality, an increase in effort almost always leads to a short-term increase in harvest, as predicted by Equation 1.1. The negative effects of fishing above MSY occur as a gradual decline in the stock level that makes fish harder to catch in future periods. In order to obtain MSY, it is not only necessary for effort to be fixed at the proper level, but the stock size must also be sufficient to maintain -2 such a high level of yield. age markers for recruitment by examining the probability o f survival to adulthood given natural levels o f mortality. Once the mortality level for the young fish is approximately equal to that o f the adult population, the marker is set, providing a better approximation for the actual addition to stock biomass than counts at earlier ages would produce. 3 Clark (1990, 16). Dynamic models will be dealt with a little later on. 322 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure A .l: Schaefer Yield-Effort Curve4 X = — ,{x = x Although it is a biological maximum, the level of effort associated with MSY is seldom economically efficient. To determine the profit-maximizing level of effort (and of harvest), costs (C) and revenues (R) must be brought in to the model. Assuming that fishers are price takers, the price in this model can be fixed at some level p, in which case R = pY (E ). Similarly, assuming that the unit cost of fishing is fixed at some constant c > 0, then total cost can be expressed by a straight line such 4 The figures is a combination of Clark (1990, 16, fig. 1.4 and 13, fig. 1.2). I included the stock levels from the graph on page 13 in parenthesis, but otherwise the figure is the same as on page 16. Corroborated by Conrad (1999, 38, fig. 3.2). 323 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. that C = c E . Figure A.2 shows how the original yield-effort curve can be modified to express the economic as well as biological relationships in the Schaeffer model. Since p is constant, the total revenue curve maintains the same shape as the yield- effort curve, only shifted up or down depending on the price level. A line indicating the total cost at each level of effort has been included as well. When property rights are enforced, the individual fisher should chose to maximize profits by expending effort where the difference between total cost and total revenue is greatest. By placing a line with the same slope as C tangent to the total revenue curve and dropping another line straight down from the intersection point to the x-axis, the model shows that effort at Ej is the economically efficient choice. This level of effort will always be lower than that which produces MSY in this model, especially since costs are constrained to be greater than zero. 32 4 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure A.2: Gordon-Schaefer Model5 C,B slope = c, tangent to R MSY For better or worse, property rights seldom exist in marine fisheries. As a fugitive resource, a fish is not owned until it is caught, and oceans are much more difficult to partition or own than land. Because of these factors, most fisheries are common pool resources (CPRs), in which there exist both open-access and rivalness attributes. Open-access refers to the inability to exclude anyone from using the resource, and rivalness means that use of the resource by one person diminishes the availability to others.6 Gordon (1954) theorized that, since they cannot ensure that fish left behind to propagate the stock will not be taken up by others, each fisher 5 Based on Conrad (1999, 38, fig. 3.3). Some subscripts have been changed, and the MSY level o f effort has been added for comparison. See also Clark (1990, 29) and Teitenberg (2003, 286). 6 1 use the term common pool resource as defined by Barkin and Shambaugh (1999, 8). 325 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. using an open-access resource would increase effort to the point where total revenue is equal to total cost. As can be seen in Figure A.2, this occurs at effort level E2, where profits are zero and all scarcity rent has been dissipated. Moreover, this level of effort will be greater than that which is associated with MSY as long as c < . Only when the cost per unit effort is so high that total cost is equal to E msy total revenue at some point to the left of £ msy can unregulated open-access be a sustainable option. This basic model can be manipulated in many ways to account for biological and economic vagaries of specific fisheries. It is the foundation for a wide body of literature on the subject, most of which requires advanced knowledge of biology, economics and mathematical techniques.7 Clark (1990) provides a highly inclusive and in depth review of many different approaches. Before moving on to more dynamic models of fisheries, there is one variation on the Schaefer theme that needs to be mentioned here. In some cases, a stock of fish may exhibit an inability to compensate for fishing pressure once the stock size falls below a certain point, given constant effort. This reproductive pattern is known as depensation, and can either be reversible, as shown in Figure A.3 or critical, as shown in Figure A.4. 7 Most notable is the Beverton-Holt (1957) model that incorporates the existence o f multiple age classes, or cohorts into the basic Schaefer logistic system. 326 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. o Figure A.3: Non-Critical Depensation E* M S Y In the original model, the effect of fishing effort on yield and stock size was continuous and incremental. Thus, small increases in effort would cause yield to decline, but only by marginal amounts. Where depensation is present, a small increase in effort above the level of E* causes the stock to collapse, and yield becomes 0. In either case, maintaining such a high level of effort will quickly cause extinction. Depensation is non-critical when decreasing effort below some level E ** allows the stock to rebuild and eventually brings back the population to exploitable levels. This may in fact have occurred with several stocks, including Northeast 8 Figure A.3 is similar to Clark (1990, 19, fig. 1.7). It has been modified as to labeling. 327 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Atlantic swordfish and Peruvian anchovy.9 On the other hand, when depensation is critical, even a complete decline in effort will not allow rebuilding to occur. It is an irreversible trend, such as lead to the disappearance of the Antarctic blue-whale and the passenger pigeon.1 0 Figure A.4: Critical Depensation1 1 E * M S Y 9 Clark (1990, 33). 1 0 ibid., 20. 1 1 Figure A.4 is similar to Clark (1990, 20, fig. 1.8). It has been modified as to labeling. 328 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. A.2 Dynamic Models While static models are very useful for explaining key concepts such as scarcity rent, maximum sustainable yield and depensation, dynamic models offer insights into how and why fishing effort changes, as well as its effect on the fish stock. The common pool nature of fisheries resources has lead to many different attempts to manage or limit effort at all levels, local, state and international. Examination of effort and incentive structures is crucial if these management measures are to be effective. The hypothetical single owner is often invoked as an ideal type of perfect fisheries management, although maximizing even a simplified model of a generic fishery is no easy task. Calculation of an economically efficient level of effort over time, in the absence of perfect markets is much more difficult than determination of the biological maximum sustained yield. This partially explains why MSY is used as a management goal much more often than maximum economic yield. A different approach to understanding fisheries dynamics involves setting up behavioral models and seeing how they play out. Hypothetical parameters can be manipulated to show how effort and availability might vary under changing circumstances. Each method has its shortcomings, but both are useful tools for understanding how best to manage a fishery. One of the most common means of introducing a temporal element into a model is by calculating the net present value of a series of payments or actions. In fisheries that would be the sum of the profits obtained from a sequence of harvests, 1 0 discounted over time. A simple version of a fisher’s NPY function can be written: 1 2 From the static profit function, substitute T ( e ) = qEx , and then plug into basic Net Present Value format. 329 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Price (p ) , unit cost (c)and the catchability coefficient (q) are still assumed to be constant, as is the discount rate (< 5 ) .1 3 Only effort and stock size change. When the fisher owns the resource, he considers it to be an asset and will maximize the flow of net revenues over time (t). As long as the rate of extraction is less than or equal to MSY, the stock of a renewable resource will sustain that level of output indefinitely^ — > + c o ). However, once a producer begins to extract at a rate that is higher than the replacement level, the stock of the resource will decline and less will be available for capture in future periods (t = (lK T )). The number of periods of availability is constrained by a biological growth function, such as is shown in Equation 1.1. Without time preferences, a level of effort resulting in MSY or below is almost always preferred, since an infinite flow of revenues will always be greater than a finite one. However, there are several cases in which temporal preferences can lead to harvesting at levels above MSY. Discounting is used to account for the fisher’s private preference to earn revenues now rather than later. As can be seen in Equation 1.2, the higher the discount rate, the less the fisher prefers future as opposed to present benefits. Theoretically, the discount rate should also reflect the rate of return on other potential investments.1 4 If the producers temporal preference does not differentiate 1 3 Variations where these factors are allowed to change are possible and useful, as long as there is some hypothesis regarding the pattern o f their variation. 1 4 Conrad (1999, 14). 330 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. between present over future revenues, then 8 = 0, and the result should be a constant level of effort at the static profit-maximizing point (£) in Figure A.2). On the other hand, when the fisher greatly prefers present over future revenues, the discount rate tends toward infinity and he will chose to extract at the same rate as he would in a common pool resource situation (E2 in Figure A.2).1 5 For any given set of profit and growth functions, the economically optimal level of effort will fall between the two extremes bounded by the range of discount rates between zero and infinity. In fact, if a system of Lagrange multipliers is used to solve for the maximum of NPV of a profit function, 7i{»), constrained by a generic growth function, Axt = F (xt) - Yt, it is possible to obtain the fundamental equation of renewable resources: F .(x)+M h A =(5 (1.3)< « v 7 dx(»)/dY The left hand side of the equation sums the marginal net growth rate, F'(x), with the marginal value of the stock, d7r(»)/dx, divided by the marginal value of the harvest or yield, o^(*)/d Y . In essence, Equation 1.3 states that the internal rate of return for the resource must be equal to the discount rate for a level of harvest to be economically optimal over time.1 7 Implicitly, Equation 1.3 describes an entire series of stock and yield pairs that maximize the NPV of the resource in the model. Therefore, it is necessary to further refine the results to a steady-state equilibrium where Y = F(x). Only when the yield 1 5 Clark (1990, 42-43). 1 6 Conrad (1999, 14, equ. 1.16). A more specific version appears in Clark (1999, 40) and many other places. 1 7 Conrad (1999, 14). 331 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. is equal to the natural growth rate does the stock size remain the same, maintaining the equilibrium condition. This effectively limits the potential steady-state optimal harvest to those included in the model’s yield-effort curve, like the one shown in 1 & Figure A. 1. Interestingly, commercial collapse of a stock is not only possible but also optimal under this capital-theoretic approach if the intrinsic growth rate is below the fisher’s discount rate. In addition, if the marginal cost of extracting the last unit of fish, or if depensation exists, extinction may also be a bioeconomic optimum. Ownership only leads to sustainable use when the net present value of the stock is greater than the opportunity cost of alternate investment opportunities for the cash a fisher can attain by full exploitation. In the marine environment, most species of whale, several sharks and some of the larger, deep-water fishes have population growth rates that are low enough to cause such an effect. Although the above approach can show how things should be, if economic efficiency is the goal, it does not shed much light on the incentive structures within fisheries, where property rights seldom exist. Conrad (1999) takes an interesting method by setting up a dynamic model of an open-access fishery using two equations, one to describe the effect of fishing on the stock and a second to capture the fisher’s choice of effort. Conrad’s original equations were quite simple and boiled down to:1 9 */+i =[l + r(l- xt/K)-qEt}xl 0 - 4 ) 1 8 itid., 15. 1 9 Both equations are similar to Conrad (1999, 40, equ. 3.4). The only difference is that stock size is a lowercase x instead o f uppercase X for continuity, and the symbol for stickiness is replaced with C , instead o f T ] , since the latter is used differently elsewhere in this text. 332 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. E,-i =\l + £(pqxt ~ c)]E, (1.5) In this example, the stock function is a single iteration form of Equation 1.1, with the subsequent period isolated on the left hand side. The effort function is predicated on the expectation that the fisher(s) will increase effort whenever scarcity rent exists, given a certain stiffness that determines the speed of the fisher’s adjustment to changes (<^). By setting the various parameters (r, K, q, p, c) and iterating the two equations from known base levels (x0, E()), Conrad simulated changes in both effort and stock size over time. Many simulations can be performed from this simple model, but Conrad only presents three important cases. First, a base case, where: c = = 0.3,K = 1 ,p = 200, q = 0.01, r = 0.1 and x0 = E0 = 1 Iterated over 100 periods, the model showed a gradual spiral convergence to a steady state equilibrium where the stock would rest at half its original size (xx = 0.5) while effort increased five fold (Ex = 5). In the second model, C , = 1 while all other parameters remain the same. This increase in the stiffness factor leads to a limit cycle, which, although stable, does not converge to a single equilibrium level as was possible when fishers’ reactions were more malleable. The third simulation returns adaptation to its original level { C , = 0.3), increases the intrinsic growth rate to r = 2.9 and leaves all other parameters unchanged. The higher growth rate leads initially to chaos in both effort and stock size, but eventually the factors 333 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. converge to an equilibrium where xM = 0.5 and E.r = 145 . Much like the base case, the stock falls to half its original level, but on the other hand effort increases enormously from 1 to 145 units. Other, more sophisticated simulations have been derived, but a constant problem is the necessity for stable or predictable parameters over time. This is an issue with the calculation of the NPV of a fishery as well. On the other hand, dynamic systems methods do show how even small changes in assumptions regarding biological or human behavior can change the nature of a bioeconomic equilibrium. In addition, it is possible to account for less than rational decision making on the part of fishers or discontinuous reproductive patterns in a stock using the simulations approach. Still, it must be remembered that these are quantitative models with limitations that cannot be applied in every situation. Understanding of the rapid evolution of fisheries technologies and increases in effort over the past century requires that microbioeconomic models undergo constant refinement and improvement in order to keep up with changing times. Accounting for change is particularly important in today’s fast-paced, technologically advanced fisheries. One thing that all of the bioeconomic models have predicted is that open-access to fisheries should lead to economic and sometimes biological overexploitation of the resource. This has indeed taken place in some cases. However, by ignoring changes in fisheries as a whole and focusing only on each stock as a single, isolated unit fished by isolated fishers, these models fail to account for the effects of globalization, some of which have slowed the process and other of which have sped it up. 3 3 4 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix B: Innovation in Fisheries1 There are many examples of innovation in fisheries. From development of more efficient gear to expansion of vessel ranges to creation of new markets, fishers have been expanding their options for centuries. Political innovation has occurred as well, both via cooperation among fishers and intervention by government authorities. Technological innovations have increased efficiency, range and the number of targeted species, allowing fishers to cut costs, redistribute effort to fisheries that are still profitable, and develop new markets for species that were historically underexploited. Better processing techniques have also widened markets to areas that had not been able to access fish previously, as well as introducing certain fish products as luxury goods that bring in a premium price. The upshot of technological change has been expansion of the industry, which temporarily improves profits but does not permanently alleviate the biological and economic problems associated with scarcity. On the other hand, institutions have evolved to cope with issues arising from the open-access and rivalness nature of fisheries. In isolated communities, some collective action measures have ensured sustained use of local fisheries, although mounting pressure from external forces has undermined many such regimes. By and large, state intercession is the most common institutional mechanism in fisheries today. Historically, many government agencies worked to further the development of fisheries. This was seen as a way to provide economic growth in coastal areas, improve state revenues and diminish conflicts arising in overcrowded fisheries. 1 Most o f this section is derived from my discussions with fishers and fishery managers. Other sources are cited where applicable. 335 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. However, government policies aimed at sustainable management or stock recovery have had a much spottier record. Only recently, when scarcity of the world’s fishery resources has become strikingly apparent have big fishing states like the EU, Japan and the US seriously started programs to cut back domestic effort in their coastal waters. Marine fishing has always been a risky business. Not only have fishers braved capricious seas for centuries, they have also faced the sometimes seasonal, sometimes fickle movements of the fish themselves. Unlike most of the bioeconomic models used in academia, this is not an industry in which a constant supply of inputs will yield the same quantity of output, trip for trip, season for season and year for year. For any given stock of fish, harvest levels depend on the abundance and density of the stock of fish, the ability of fishers to find concentrations of fish within their vessels’ range and the opportunity cost of alternate stocks forgone as well as the combined fishing effort targeting the stock. Fishers may make decisions regarding effort and capacity in the current period, but the availability of stocks depends on their past levels of capture as well as biological factors such as water temperature, nutrient concentration and recruitment rates. The importance of historical or biological factors in stock availability does differ by species and geographical area, so some stocks are more predictable and static than others. However, variability is the norm and fishers who seek to gain from specialization in a particular stock or fishing technique must be prepared to deal with risks arising from factors outside of their control. From bioeconomic theory, it is clear that more efficient techniques, better access to underexploited stocks, higher prices and new markets can increase fishers’ 336 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. short-term gains, but that very improvement in profitability also drives up incentives for entry and expansion of effort. Globalization of fisheries has helped to slow down the common pool resource effect in many singular fisheries, but as demand for fish products continues to increase with population growth and changes in preferences, pressure on fisheries world wide also maintains an upward trend. Malleability has saved the industry so far and innovation continues to lead to progress, but these options are limited by global scarcity, and institutional changes to counter open- access and rivalness incentives structures are necessary if amenities from marine fish resources are to continue to flow in the future. To cope with the uncertainties associated with specialization, fishers developed several strategies designed to maximize the malleability as well as the profitability of their enterprises. One of the earliest and most persistent tactics has been reliance on substitute sources of income when the more profitable stocks cannot be found. The most common sources of substitution are alternate stocks of fish. Although substitutes are somewhat limited by vessel technology and gear type, most fishers can chose to exploit more than one stock of fish, and often target stocks from different species as well as different geographical locations. In fact, target stocks, those that fishers deem to be most profitable, may change according to season and location. When better fish are not available, due to seasonality or low biomass concentration, fishers may choose to target less valuable or more costly fish in order to bring in some revenue. Due to the high fixed costs of fishing, this opportunistic strategy extends beyond establishment of the target stock. To ensure the highest return possible from each trip, fishers will usually take fish of a non-target species 3 3 7 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. when available, although they may discard them later when more valuable fish come along. From Equation 1.1 and the discussion of bioeconomic theories, it is clear that an individual fisher in an open-access situation really only controls one factor in his production function: effort (e ). The actual level of effort exerted is a function of three main factors, time spent fishing ( r ) , technology used in fishing (a) and the knowledge used to find the fish ('F ). It can be written as: £(0= !7(r,.A ,'H ,) (1.6) Specification of the effort function (77) depends on the characteristics of the commercial fisher and his vessel. The time spent fishing on a particular stock is usually measured by the number of sets, that is how many times the gear is set out and pulled back in, multiplied by the duration of each set. Soak time may need to be included in the case of baited gear types. The vessel’s crew, provisions and fuel capacity levels limit fishing time in conjunction with the travel distance required to reach the designated fishing area. Many technological gains have been made to increase the potential time spent fishing. First, boats have gotten faster, and also larger in some cases. There is a dichotomy in this aspect of effort between coastal and distant water fishing vessels. In general, coastal fleets have benefited much less from improvements in vessel technology, since they cover smaller distances and travel time is less of a factor in their cost functions. On the other hand, distant water fleets would not be profitable if they were not able to spend weeks or months at sea without having to return to docks 338 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. to unload and refuel. Improvements in storage facilities have also been crucial to the rise of distant water fishing, including the development of on-board freezers and transshipping vessels, which meet fishing boats at sea, unload the catch and restock supplies. Serviced by transshippers, some of the giant factory trawlers can stay out at sea for years, catching, cleaning and processing fish. All of these innovations have helped to divert effort to stocks that were not fully exploited, and therefore still profitable. The vessel’s gear has three aspects that determine not only how much but also what kind of fish it can catch: type, quality and quantity. There are three main types of commercial marine fishing gear: trawl, purse seine and longline. Trawlers pull large nets through the ocean, sometimes dragging the bottom as well. They mainly target demersal species that live at or near the bottom of the ocean. Also known as ground fish , these include cod, haddock, sole and halibut. Shrimp are another species caught using trawlers. Purse seines also use big nets, but they encircle schools of fish rather than trawl for them. They usually target small tunas, such as yellow fin and skipjack, sardines and anchovetta. Fish caught in seines are usually destined for canneries for processing.3 As the name suggests, longliners reel out long fishing lines with hooks and bait attached. There is usually a main line that runs across the surface with floats supporting many baited drop lines that can be set a various depths. Longlines tend to target large, predatory fish such as swordfish and several types of tunas, including adult bigeye and bluefin tunas.4 2 FAO FIGIS (2005, “trawler”). 3 FAO FIGIS (2005, “purse seine”). 4 ibid., “longline”. 339 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Three other types of gear are also utilized commercially, baitboats, trailers and gill nets. Baitboats chum the water with live bait, then use a pole and line technique to pull in the fish that come to feed. These boats usually target skipjack and yellowfin tunas, but may also go after albacore as well. The technique was quite important prior to technological improvements in the purse seine industry that made it a more efficient method of extraction.5 Not to be confused with trawlers, trailers are usually fairly small vessels that set out baited lines from the rear of the boat or from the sides using outriggers, then troll through an area where fish are thought to congregate. Trailers can only set a dozen or so lines, which do not extend very far from the vessel and are pulled in either via hand or using a small winch. They target some small fish like mackerel, along with larger fish like pelagic tunas, especially albacore.6 Gill nets are large nets set adrift vertically in the ocean for long periods of time. Fish swim into the nets, their gills are caught and they are held there until hauled by the fisher. Nets of different sizes can be used to target different species of fish. The incredibly indiscriminate and destructive nature of drift gill netting has lead to its prohibition on the high seas and in many countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Gill nets are usually used to target swordfish and other large non-schooling species.7 Gear quantity and quality are type specific, but all have been improved greatly over time. For gill nets, purse seines and trawlers, the capacity of the net usually determines the quantity of catch per deployment while the strength and size appropriateness of the webbing are major quality attributes. Better materials, such as 5 FAO FIGIS (2005, “baitboats”). 6 ibid., “trailer”. 7 ibid., “drift net”. 340 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. polymer nets instead of those made out of natural fiber have increased the durability, size potential and soak time of net-based fishing techniques. Size is somewhat limited by the pressure built up in the net, which can crush fish if the net is too large. This is of little concern for fish intended for animal feed or fertilizer, but does play a roll when the catch is destined for direct human consumption. Longline gear quantity is usually measured by the total number of hooks set out per deployment, while quality can depend on the strength of the line, efficiency of the hook and the type of bait used. Trollers follow a similar system. Baitboats have similar standards, though quantity is measured by the number of poles used and quality depends much more on the skill of the human operators than in most of the other gears. Both line types of gear have been greatly improved by the use of monofilaments, which last longer and also enable much bigger sets than old hemp or sisal fibers. Hooks have also been improved over time, including the introduction of circle hooks, which tend to hold the fish better than j -hooks did. For all types there are qualitative attributes of the vessel that have been refined as well, mainly in the compatibility of its design with the type of gear being used. In general, the more efficient the gear, the more effective the time spent fishing. This lowers costs, improves capture efficiency and temporarily increases profits until new entry or stock collapse dissipates them once more. The final factor in Equation 1.6 is one of the most difficult to pin down. I have referred to it as knowledge, but T * basically measures the ability to locate the best place to fish for the targeted species. Fish are one of the few truly fugitive resources in the world. Since there are usually high fixed costs per trip, a lot of effort goes into finding the fish in the most efficient way possible. Once the domain of 341 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. fishers with good memories and what may have been talked of as psychic abilities, modern day science and technology is making locating concentrations of fish easier. From sonar to helicopter spotters to global positioning systems (GPS), many fishing boats are equipped with the latest technologies to help them find the biggest and best concentrations of fish. They also rely on biological studies of fish preferences for depth, water temperature, nutrient concentrations, etc. These are especially important to longliners that tend to target non-schooling pelagic species that do not present surface disturbances or definable sonar signals. Baitboats and purse seiners have also developed methods of drawing the fish to them. The introduction of fish aggregating devices, or FADs, has been a major boon to purse seine fishers. This technology takes advantage of schooling fish tendencies to congregate below large floating objects. Seiners can set out a FAD with a GPS tracker, wait a while, and when they return to it, there will usually be a nice big school of fish ready to be caught. The knowledge factor in the effort function is closely related, and may even be correlated to the catchability coefficient in Equation 1.1 (q), which relates the behavioral characteristics of the fish to the effort of the fisher. For instance, swordfish is a diffusive species that is usually well spread out through its geothermal range. It is therefore not very likely that many swordfish will be caught in a purse seine net. However, a longline set, which can stretch for a hundred miles and also draw swordfish with bait is much more likely to pull in many swordfish, given the same distributional characteristics. Similarly, with the knowledge that swordfish can range in depth from surface waters to 550 meters, longliners have learned to drape or bell their lines between buoys, so that hook depth ranges by about 3-5 fathoms, increasing the likelihood of interception. On the other hand, the stock biomass in a 3 4 2 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. given area might be the same for swordfish and small tunas, but because the latter tend to aggregate, or school, the longliner would not catch too many of these, while the purse seine would be able to take many. There are scores of such gradations and situation specific concerns that can affect the catchability coefficient, and it is a somewhat subjective factor in the production function. It can be approximated using catch per unit effort (CPUE) statistics, but there are quite a few other variables that contribute to CPUE, including the level of knowledge applied and the overall stock level in the area fished. What is certain is that an improvement in the ability to locate fish with the right kind of gear to catch them can provide an advantage to a fisher and create rents even where effort is otherwise over the no-profit threshold. Another set of technological advancements that have helped to keep the fishing industry going are innovations in fish processing and marketing. There are two aspects of this advancement. First, better preservation technology has enabled the extension of markets into areas that previously could not be supplied, or expanded the source options for markets that already existed. Not long ago, obtaining marine fish in inland areas was once a nearly impossible task. Salted, dried and pickled fish were the only semi-portable options until the commercialization of canning technology in the late 1800s. Canned tuna, sardines and anchovies, among other fish are now consumed world wide as a cheap source of protein. With advancements in freezer and air transport technology in the mid 1960s, higher quality frozen and chilled marine fish became available all over the globe. Perhaps the most dramatic effect on a single species was the huge jump in price that fishers from the US, Europe and elsewhere could receive for bluefin tuna once it could be shipped overnight to the sashimi markets of Japan. In the US, prices soared from 15 343 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. cents per pound in 1970 to US$1.21 by 1980. Prices continued to increase through the 1980s and 1990s. Recently, a 718 lb fish went for US$67,500 at a Tokyo o market. Innovations in shipping and processing also helped to expand the consumer base for other high value added species such as swordfish, Chilean seabass (which is actually Patagonian or Arctic toothfish), and salmon, among others. Webber (2002, 68). 3 4 4 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix C: Regulatory Options When faced with the task of fixing an overcapitalized, overexploited fishery, policy makers have tried out quite a few management tools. When the fishery is very important either economically or politically, subsidies may be introduced in order to alleviate the financial hardship associated with producing at a level where total revenue is less than or equal to total costs. Subsidies may be paid to fishers directly, or may take more subtle forms including low-interest loans, technological assistance and tax relief.1 When depressed harvests and economic losses are related to temporary conditions, such as seasonal stock migrations or extended geothermal conditions (i.e. El Nino) state relief would be beneficial because it would preserve the industry until the temporary problem is resolved. However, if the fishery is depressed because of overexploitation, then subsidies alone will only serve to increase entry, generating a growing drain on public coffers. Only by reducing effort can a long-term, successful management plan be implemented. Most people think of effort restrictions as a means of preventing stock collapse or rebuilding stocks that have declines so far as to be economically or physically depressed. Conservation for use is certainly a valid reason for public intervention in a fishery, but there is also an efficiency gain when excess capital, labor and other inputs are removed from a fishery. Effort controls come in several different forms. Seasonal closures force fishers to cram their efforts into a certain period of time, which can range from weeks to months, depending on the desired effect. It should be noted that fishers are very good at finding ways to make sure that they get their days in, and a common 1 FAO (2002a, 92). 345 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. result of closures is greatly increased time spent fishing within the period as well as higher levels of capitalization in the fishery as a whole. A similar mechanism, time-area closure, prohibits fishing in certain areas at certain times. These are particularly effective when managers wish to protect spawning fish or concentrations of juveniles from being captured before they are able to reproduce. However, the stock must have very strong and predictable behavioral patterns for time-area closures to work and displaced effort tends to increase pressures in open areas and seasons. One alternative to closures is gear restrictions. By limiting fishers to less efficient gears, effort can be brought down temporarily, but like with seasonal closures, gear restrictions alone generally leads to increases in the number of trips and the number of vessels fishing. On the other hand, restriction of the number of vessels tends to increase fishers’ investment in better gear as well as the time they spend fishing. Harvest levels can thus be maintained and sometimes increased. Seasonal, gear and vessel limits do have their benefits. Monitoring is relatively simple, since any boat observed to be targeting a species during a closure or using prohibited gear is clearly violating the regulations.4 Nonetheless, there are so many ways for fishers to get around these rules that they are usually used in conjunction with other measures. Another way to curtail effort is via a tax or license fee. This directly increases fisher’s total cost, lowering the level of effort he can maintain without going broke. Actually, the regulatory measures described in the paragraph above also increase the 2 Teitenberg (2003, 296). 3 Waugh (1984, 192). 4 Teitenberg (2003, 295). 346 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. cost per unit effort, by forcing the fisher to work harder for his catch. A tax program has an advantage in that it creates less waste, since the cost increase is in the form of government revenues. Presumably, fees collected in such a system should be put back to use for the greater social good. Some efficiency losses are created due to the transfer costs associated with taxation but the situation is generally less wasteful than where closures, vessel limits and gear restrictions are used. All the same, taxes cannot be used to replace situation specific limitations, such as time-area closures of nurseries and bans on gears that have been proven to create environmental hazards.5 Quotas, or limits on the total size of the catch can help to decrease the pressure on the stock if they are distributed among individual fishers, as a license or transferable quota. When quotas are only enforced fishery wide, the harvest may be kept to a desired level, but competition for the allowed catch of fish is intense and effort remains well above efficient levels. Furthermore, in order for a blanket quota to truly curtail the harvest, real time data on the total catch must be available along with some means to ensure that fishing effort stops once the allocation is filled.6 Assigned quotas must also be enforced, although this can be done via the combination of stiff penalties for violations and random observation programs. Distribution can be a very contentious issue when quotas are fisher or vessel- specific. Whenever effort is reduced, someone has to lose in order for others to gain and fairness becomes an issue. Wrangling over who gets how much quota puts a lot of pressure on decision makers to set the limits high enough so that everyone can have a chance. Even when a cost is involved, such as with licensing, fishers using different gear types or from different regions or social strata will seek to influence 5 Teitenberg (2003, 297). 6 Waugh (1984, 124). 347 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. their representatives or other government officials in order to gain more access rights for themselves and exclude fishers from other groups. In this age, when pork-barrel politics is the norm in most countries, competing demands can certainly undermine attempts at fisheries management. Although there may be quite a bit of institutional inertia in fisheries management, there is also a certain level of innovation. Recently, market based methods have become popular. Where possible, aquiculture has been encouraged by establishing property rights to pens where fish are raised. Like most forms of domestication, once the kinks are worked out, aquaculture not only creates private property incentives, it also enables the fish farmer to control other aspects of the yield equations, up to and including genetic modification to make growth more n rapid. Aquaculture is not a panacea. First, it is only possible with a limited number of species. Secondly, there are significant ecological externalities associated with marine and fresh water fish farming, including introduction of contaminants, destruction of habitats, potential mixing with wild stock and general concerns regarding the level of antibiotics, hormones and other chemicals that must be used to keep fish alive in close quarters. The animal rights people don’t much like it either. Another means of instituting property rights of a sort is in the use of individual transferable quotas (ITQs). Relative losses still play a role, especially in the original distribution of the quotas, but by establishing a market for access to a fishery, these mechanisms do provide a certain amount of compensation to those who must give up their rights to exploit the fishery. In theory, the owners of ITQs can buy and sell them much as property owners make land transactions. With an 7 Teitenberg (2003, 293). 8 FAO (2002a, 82). 348 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. established market for access rights, appropriately limited to a certain quantity of fish, owners should be able to treat their quotas as assets, maximizing the scarcity rent for the resource with very low transaction costs. At the same time, competition is not prevented, so progress in fisheries technologies and practices continues. ITQs have been strikingly successful at reducing effort in New Zealand, Australia and Canada, as well as some fisheries in the US. Consolidation occurred quickly in all cases where the transferable quotas were used, as less efficient fishers sold their ITQs to more successful operations. Those fishers who had to exit were at least compensated by the price charged for their access rights, so an element of fairness also exists in the program.9 Even so, there are normative concerns regarding transfer of quotas away from indigenous users toward large, industrial concerns and ITQs, like many other general effort reduction schemes, do not serve to curtail externalities where they exist. When multiple stocks and age classes are factored into management problems, regulation becomes much more difficult. Biologists and ecologists have long emphasized the physical relationships between all organisms and many lessons have been learned regarding such ecosystem externalities. Removal of a large number of one species can create loops and holes in the food web that may destroy but inevitably imbalance the biological equilibrium established through natural selection. Economists and fisheries managers have also identified inefficiencies associated with multi-species fisheries. The most frequent problems arise from by- catch, or incidental catch of species or age classes that are not targeted by fishers. These constitute the main portion of dead discards, fish that are killed by fishing but 9 Conrad (1999, 54-57). 349 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. not consumed by humans in any way. Discarded fish are a dead weight loss in utility since they can no longer fulfill their roles in the ecosystem, reproduce their species or provide benefits to any but a few ocean scavengers.1 0 When juvenile fish of a commercially valuable species are discarded the economic loss is compounded by the opportunity cost of stock replenishment forgone since such young fish have not been able to reproduce even once. Sometimes technological solutions are available for reduction of by-catch. Sea turtles routinely escape shrimp trawlers now that turtle excluding devices (TEDs) have been put into use throughout the Gulf of Mexico and dolphin mortality in Eastern Pacific tuna purse seines has gone down significantly due to introduction of gear modifications. These technologies may be a bit more costly, but they also provide improved PR and in some cases, as with dolphin-safe tuna, a price premium for being eco-friendly.1 1 When technological change is insufficient, sometimes time- area closures can be used to strategically limit by-catch, or gear restrictions, such as the worldwide ban on drift gillnets that was put into effect because the practice was so incredibly wasteful. However, in other cases, like marlins and sharks that are incidentally caught by longlines or small tunas that school with adults and are taken too early, the only way to prevent over-exploitation of the by-catch stock is to decrease the effort on the targeted stock. This can be done via any of the methods above, but significant monitoring is required, since by definition by-catch is not landed and can only be counted as it is caught at sea. 1 0 Some people have put forth the idea that dead discards enrich the ocean by providing an easily captured source o f food to other organisms. However, marine biologists dismiss this conjecture and assert that such a benefit, if it exists, is very small relative to the overall loss in biota. 1 1 De Sombre (1999, 65). 350 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. If only commercial values are considered in management plans, then there is seldom cause to sacrifice harvest of the targeted stock to conserve fish caught incidentally. Exceptions are in cases of growth overfishing, in which small fish by- catch can lead to decline in the population of targeted adults, and by-catch of prey 12 species that are necessary for the continued availability of more valuable fish. It has also been true that today’s by-catch is tomorrow’s commercial species, so there is a potential risk of future revenues forgone if non-targeted species are allowed to decline unduly. On the other hand, when fishers practice high-grading the presence of by-catch can help to decrease the risk of a very small catch. Vessels have limited capacity to store the catch, so most fishers only keep the largest and most valuable species that they take. During a trip, however, they will kill and keep smaller or less valuable fish as a precaution in case the total catch is disappointing. As bigger and better fish are caught, the less valuable cargo is discarded to make room for fish that will bring in more revenue. By-catch becomes useful, even desirable when the fishers keep the most valuable fish and throw the rest back into the ocean, usually dead or dying. In some fisheries, as much as 40% of the total catch is tossed back due to high-grading. 1 2 Peterson (1995, 256). 1 3 Tidwell and Allen (2001, 962). 351 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix D: Regional Fisheries Organizations As what might otherwise be termed specific institutions1 or inter governmental international organizations2, regional fisheries organizations have been dealt with in the literature, though not singled out as such. There are certain characteristics of the regional fisheries organizations that are theoretically and analytically important. First, they are not institutions in any informal sense of the word, they are organizations established by treaty and subject to international laws, rules and norms. The legal status of regional fisheries organizations at once limits the ability of non-state actors to affect the decision making process and reinforces the ■ 3 external sovereignty of the member states. Secondly, though they may have subsidiary functions, regional fisheries organizations are set up specifically for the purpose of long-term policy coordination between states that utilize fisheries in well-defined geographic areas. Unlike other international organizations that have different objectives, such as the collection and dissemination of information, global activism or provision of development assistance, regional organizations have a mandate to directly bring together their members in order to influence their domestic policies over time. In doing so, the organizations set up an iterative process within a specific issue area, thus creating a structured forum for interaction, increasing the regularity of interaction between states and strengthening considerations for reputation in strategy formulation.4 On the other hand, past and potential effects at home can draw the attention of domestic 'Keohane (1988, 386). 2 Young (1994, 4). 3 Litfin (1998, 5). 4 Keohane and Nye (1985, 290). 352 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. interest groups who may then try to influence policy choice in subsequent meetings of the organization. Such dynamics differ significantly from onetime or short-term policy coordination, such as arms limitation agreements or emissions abatement treaties. Thirdly, the multilateral aspect of regional fisheries organizations is very important because it creates a different structure of relationships between states. Bilateral negotiations do continue within the organizations and certainly affect outcomes, but there is also much more opportunity for either actual or threatened joint action, which can alter power structures. It may be that perception of this ‘benefit’ of multilateralism, especially for weaker states, is what has lead to the increased interest in regional membership in recent years. On the other hand, and established multilateral setting may also provide legitimation for punitive actions aimed at exclusion of some state or group of states.5 A common facet of common pool resources in general, free riding can occur in marine capture fisheries either when members of multilateral management organizations ignore agreed practices or when states that fish a stock refuse membership in such an organization. A very significant free rider problem for all international fisheries is the large catch by what are known as Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) vessels.6 Since IUU fishing can undermine management plans both directly, by taking more fish than is sustainable, or indirectly, because data on catch used to formulate policy is under-estimated, it is doubly important to put an end to the practice. Some of the most decisive steps to document and punish IUU fishing are taking place in the 5 Waltz (1999, 702). 6 There is considerable confusion regarding an exact definition o f IUU fishing, but the most thorough and legitimate source is the International Plan o f Action on IUU fishing. (FAO 2001). 353 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Atlantic management of HMS fisheries. While cracking down on IUU fishing may be good for management, it raises important issues of fairness and state’s rights that can be camouflaged in a multilateral context. 3 5 4 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix E: Long Run Supply Any expectations regarding future production from a stock of fish will have to take into account the long run supply curve for the fishery. Different stocks of fish will have different long rim supply curves, depending on the natural abundance and productivity of the stock and the related production function for the fishery. There is also temporal differentiation, in that a stock of fish that has been exploited over a longer period or at a faster rate will be closer to its long run equilibrium than a stock that is only just beginning to be targeted heavily. In essence, the position of a stock relative to the long run supply curve will be directly related to the level of depletion in the fishery. As the long run equilibrium quantity supplied decreases from the MSY apex, it reflects increasing levels of overfishing and decreasing stock biomass. Shifts in the long run supply curve are caused by economic factors but also may be due to biological changes in the stock itself. Specifically, any change in the intrinsic growth rate or the carrying capacity of the environment can shift the long run supply curve of the stock. Both of these often fluctuate with changing environmental factors, including water temperature, availability of prey species, prevalence of predator species and the level of marine pollutants. Most natural fluctuations are temporary and are likely to average out over time, so that they have little effect on the long run supply curve. On the other hand, anthropogenic forces may cause systemic changes that do alter supply in the long run.1 1 An Example would be the impact o f whaling, which removed the main consumers of krill in the Southern Ocean. This led to an explosion in the krill population, which gave pollock an advantage over herring, making the latter more numerous. Thus, a movement along the long run supply curve for stocks o f whales caused the change in the environment for other fishes, and resulted in expansion o f long run supply for pollock but contraction for herring. (Trites et al. 1999). 355 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. To date, no scientific studies have been published that determine whether or not there have been long-term shifts in the supply of highly migratory species due to biological and environmental factors. On the other hand, biology has caused great cross-sectional differentiation among the long run supply curves for the commercial stocks under review here. As Figure E.l illustrates, there is a large gap between the abundance of swordfish and that of the tropical tunas. This is because, as a billfish, the initial stock of swordfish in the North Atlantic was smaller, plus they grow more slowly and mature later than the other commercially valuable stocks. Therefore, North Atlantic swordfish will become depleted more quickly and more deeply than its counterparts like bigeye tuna. Both stocks are in high demand, but the one with the smaller long run supply curve is more vulnerable to crisis. 2 The separation o f swordfish stocks in the Atlantic has had an impact on Figure E .l. However, even when the southern stock is included, the long run supply curve for swordfish in the Atlantic is quite a bit lower than for the tropical tunas. 3 5 6 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. -3 Figure G.l: Long Run Supply for Commercial Stocks Skipjack (SKJ) LRS Yellowfin (YFT) Bigeye (BET) Northern Swordfish (NSWO) NSWO BET YFT SKJ Q n s w o Q bet Q y f t Q skj As was noted in Chapter 3, among the tropical tunas, bigeye is the least prolific. Thus its long run supply curve is much smaller than those of yellowfin and skipjack tunas, in spite of the fact that the costs of production are somewhat higher 3 The long run supply curves were estimated following Clark (1990, chap. 5.2). Specifically, I used his Equation 5.6, which is simple manipulation o f the Schaefer Model (1957) for calculation o f the curve for swordfish and a variant o f that equation which was derived from a yield-effort curve that was more flattened at the top for the tropical tunas. The specific parameters used in creating this figure are available upon request. 357 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. for bigeye.4 Although they are most often caught together in purse seine nets, yellowfin is slightly less prolific than skipjack, as reflected by the relative position of its long run supply curve. Finally, all three curves for tropical tunas evince a wider range of prices at which the quantity supplied remains close to maximum sustainable yield. This is because the yield effort curves for tropical tunas tend to be rather flat at the top. Therefore, the yield of these fisheries will to decline much more slowly relative to the biomass of the stock than predicted by the uniform distribution assumed by the traditional Schaefer Model.5 To show the effect that the variation between the long run supply curves for the commercial stocks has on price and quantity supplied, I've drawn in a hypothetical demand curve.6 Notice that, given this single demand curve, in the long run swordfish and bigeye tuna will be severely overexploited at equilibrium but that harvests of the more prolific yellowfin and skipjack tunas will remain below MSY. However, if demand for these stocks were to increase substantially, the long run equilibrium yield of each fishery could be reduced to much lower levels at much higher prices. In the example, this has already occurred for northern swordfish and bigeye tuna, both of which have reached long run equilibrium at a quantity supplied well below MSY. For North Atlantic swordfish and bigeye tuna, both of which are overfished, it is important to note that a drop in demand for these stocks will not result in an 4 Like swordfish, bigeye is mainly caught by longline, which is more labor and time intensive than the purse seine or baitboat type o f gear. 5 ICCAT(1975, 73). 6 In actuality, the demand for these four species will be different and therefore they do not face the same demand curve. However, a single curve presented in Figure E. 1 is designed to illustrate a point regarding the long run supply curves, not the actual demand for each stock. This will be dealt with in species specific sections. 358 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. immediate increase in landings because the short run supply curve is upward sloping. If demand decreases, the stock will have to rebuild to higher levels before it will be cost effective to exploit it at the new long run equilibrium. The short run supply curve for bigeye tuna (S R S bet) has been included in the graph to illustrate this point. If demand shifts to the left, quantity supplied will follow the short run supply curve at first, and then gradually expand as the biomass rebuilds and fish become easier to catch. Only a small shift in demand will start the process of rebuilding to MSY for bigeye tuna, but the crisis for northern swordfish stipulated in Figure E.l is much deeper and would require a larger drop in demand for significant rebuilding to occur. The situation is somewhat different for by-catch stocks like blue and white marlins. Fishers do not decide to target the species because they are too few to bring in substantial revenues at market prices. However, incidental catches of marlins are directly related to longline effort targeting swordfish and bigeye tuna.7 Only a very small percentage of the longline catch is comprised of blue and white marlins, but the low abundance and biological productivity of these species mean that they have much smaller long run supply curves. In fact, the long run supply curves for blue and white marlins are so small that they would barely be visible in a figure designed to show the long run supply for any o f the tropical tunas. The difference in scale can be seen by comparing them to the long run supply curve for northern swordfish, which is actually specified exactly the same way in both Figures E.l and E.2. 7 ICCAT (1991, 176). 3 5 9 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. o Figure G.2: Long Run Supply for By-catch Stocks Northern Swordfish (NSWO) Blue Marlin (BUM) LRS W hite Marlin (WHM) NSWO 'NSWO MAR 'MAR Q swo Q b u m Q w h m In Figure E.2, we see the effect that incidental fishing mortality can have on by-catch stocks like blue and white marlins. Note that catches of marlins are not determined by either the demand or supply curves for these fishes, but instead face 8 The long ran supply curves for blue and white marlins were based on Clark (1990, chap. 5.2), just like North Atlantic swordfish. The costs o f production were the same as those for swordfish and bigeye tuna. These curves are differentiated in that the catchability for the species is much lower, as are the intrinsic growth rate and the carrying capacity o f the stock. The specific parameters used in creating this figure are available upon request. 360 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. the fishing pressure associated with the long run equilibrium for northern swordfish.9 In this case, long run catches of blue and white marlins are expected to decline to very low levels, even though demand for the species would put harvests well below maximum sustainable yield. As long as marlins are caught incidentally with other, more abundant and higher priced stocks, there will inevitably be deep crisis at the open-access equilibrium. There are two important variations that could alter this scenario significantly. First, if the catchability of marlins, the number incidentally hooked by longlines targeting other species, were to decline, the long run supply curves would shift to the right, increasing the equilibrium quantity supplied. On the other hand, if catchability is higher than has been assumed, the opposite will be true. Second, if depensation exists in the marlin fisheries, it is possible that such high levels of incidental catches will lead to the collapse of the stocks rather than constant but exceptionally low stock levels. 9 For simplicity, only North Atlantic swordfish has been included in the figure, even though marlins are taken in the South Atlantic swordfish and bigeye tuna fisheries and by recreational fishers who target them specifically. These additional sources o f fishing mortality will increase the pressure on the white marlins, making for a even more pessimistic scenario than the one described here. 361 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix F : Creation of ICCAT Fishing as a commercial endeavor began before the current world system of sovereign but interdependent states was even conceived of. As such, the industry flourished in the Atlantic Ocean for centuries without the intervention of states or the negotiation of international conventions. However, technological advancements in the early 20th century created greater capacity for capture fisheries production than had been previously available and by the 1950s many new states began to enter into the fishery. Figure F.l shows the data on capture production of highly migratory species in the Atlantic from 1950 to 1975. Those states with the highest average production for the period have been singled out, while others were aggregated according to the magnitude of their average landings. At the beginning of the time- series, France, Spain, the USA and several countries with smaller average catches were participating in the fishery. Over time, capture production grows rapidly, fueled in large part by the entry of new participants, including distant water fleets from Japan, Korea and Taiwan. 3 6 2 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure H .l: Total Catches Reported to ICCAT 1950-19751 600,000 500,000 „ 400,000 c /3 5 G O O 300,000 o 2 H I mmm 200,000 100,000 © ( N ’^ ' s O O O O C N ^ ' s O O O O C N ^ 0 \ C s O s G \ Q ^ O ' O ^ O s Q \ O s O ' G s O s Year Elavg < 1,000 mt (59) B a v g < 5,000 mt (22) D avg < 15,000 mt (8) □ Spain ■ France H Japan ■ Ghana □ Taiwan ■ NEI B U .S .A □ Brazil HTurkey H V enezuela ■ Korea As Figure F. 1 shows, the number of new entrants may have been of secondary importance relative to the rapid growth and large catches of a few fleets. First, Turkey substantially increased its fishing capacity in the Mediterranean, making prominent contributions to the total landings of highly migratory species from 1952 to 1973. This may not have been of great concern if Japan had not started fishing for Atlantic HMS in 1952, dominating the landings data for almost a decade. Even after Japan’s catches declined from a peak of more than 150,000 mt in 1965, its level of production continued to be on par with historical fishing giants Spain and France. In addition Korea and Taiwan began harvesting HMS stocks in the Atlantic in 1965 and 1966 respectively, taking up some of the slack from the drop in Japanese 1 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 363 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. catches. Meanwhile, coastal states also continued to increase their exploitation of the stocks, such that total landings doubled from 1950 to 1960 and had almost quadrupled by 1970. In the face of the growing effort and increasing number of participants, major fishing states in the Atlantic began to discuss the creation of a new regional management organization in the early 1960s. After several years of negotiations, the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas that established the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) was opened for signatures on May 14, 1966 and entered into force three years later, having been ratified by the requisite total of seven states.2 Countries that become members or contracting parties of ICCAT agree to cooperate to maintain the populations of tuna and tuna-like fishes in the Atlantic and its adjacent seas at levels that will permit the maximum sustainable yield for food and other purposes.3 Many other working aspects of the Commission are established in the Convention, including the mandate to collect scientific data, the scope of the recommendations made by the Commission, voting procedures for acceptance of recommendations, objection procedures for those contracting parties who do not agree with a majority of members on a given recommendation and the enforcement responsibilities of members.4 Interestingly, the longest section of the Convention is Article X, which sets out the budgetary procedures and financial obligations of the contracting parties. By the time of its first meeting, December 1, 1969, ICCAT had ten contracting parties: Brazil, Canada, France, Ghana, Japan, Morocco, Portugal, South 2 See Appendix G: ICCAT Member States by Date o f Ratification 3 ICCAT (1966, Preamble and art. I). 4 ICCAT (1966, art. IV, art. VIII and art. IX). 364 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Africa, Spain and the USA. Observers from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Commission for Exploration of the Seas (ICES), the European Community and 9 non-member states were there as well.5 While observers could make statements to the Commission when recognized by the chair, only contracting parties could vote on management recommendations. The Convention itself provides that decisions should be taken by a majority vote, given a quorum of two-thirds.6 Elowever, because the Convention also contains an objection procedure, by which states may formally remove themselves from the purview of a recommendation, consensus became the accepted method used for adoption of regulations fairly early on. Gathering in Rome, those first delegations dealt mainly with administrative matters including the appointment of a secretariat, adoption of operating rules and creation of subsidiary bodies. Both the rules of procedure and the financial regulations were adapted, as well as the first budget and the scale of member contributions. Important decisions included the choice to headquarter the Secretariat in Madrid, Spain, and the composition of the species panels mandated by the 1966 Convention.7 Each of the four panels established that year were made responsible for closely reviewing scientific evidence and recommending management measures on certain stocks of interest to the Commission. Table F.l lists the panels and the stocks assigned to them. Any contracting party could join any one of the four panels but for each one US$ 1,000 would be added to the amount of the member’s annual contribution. 5 FAO (1970, 4-12). 6 ICCAT (1966, art. III). 7 The other option for headquarters was Miami, Florida. This was one o f many times that the US and Spain competed for influence in the Commission. (FAO 1970, 34). 365 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Table F.1: Initial Coverage of ICCAT Species Panels8 Panel 1 Tropical Tunas: Yellowfin (Thunnus albacares) and Skipjack (Euthynnus pelamis) Panel 2 Temperate Tunas (North): Bluefin (Thunnus thynnus) and Albacore ('Thunnus alalunga) in the northern hemisphere Panel 3 Temperate Tunas (South): Bluefin (Thunnus thynnus) and Albacore (Thunnus alalunga) in the southern hemisphere Panel 4 Other Species: Bigeye (Thunnus obesus), bonito (Sarda sarda), billfishes and other species Given that there are over 30 species of tuna and tuna-like fishes within ICCAT’s purview, the original panel composition provides a strong clue as to which stocks were considered to be most important at the outset of the organization. Little has changed over the history of the Commission, although swordfish and bigeye tuna have gained in prominence while small tunas like bonito have generally been left to the jurisdiction of coastal states. Blue and white marlins have also received special attention, mainly due to their value in US and other recreational fisheries, and their role as by-catch in commercial operations. Normally, the scientific information considered by the panels is provided by ICCAT’s Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS), a body of national scientists charged with providing scientific advice to the Commission. SCRS had not convened prior to the first meeting in 1969. However, the temporary Working Party on the Programme did meet to consider the availability of scientific evidence and its implications for any management measures. The Working Party noted that there were many holes in the data on tuna and tuna-like species in the Atlantic and also many difficulties to be overcome in order to fill in those gaps. These included: 8 FAO (1970, 29). 366 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. proper identification of catch when species cannot be distinguished by fishers, conversion factors needed to make data collected by different states and different methods comparable, means of determining both area and date of capture, finding some uniform standard of effort to use for a multi-gear fishery and preventing under- or double-counting of fish. In response to these issues, the Working Group made three suggestions: 1. Convene the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics as soon as possible. 2. Encourage increased scientific work on tunas and tuna-like species by member states of ICCAT 3. Develop a tagging program for tunas and tuna-like species in the Atlantic, with special focus on increasing the return rate of tags for studies undertaken by member states. No management recommendations were made, but the Working Group did acknowledge that this was due to lack of knowledge of the fisheries and that such measures might indeed be necessary. With no scientific evidence to go on, the Commission did not enact any recommendations. ICCAT members did take the Working Party’s advice seriously. SCRS met within the year and was able to review national reports from most members, including Korea, which had recently joined, along with information from two non members, Taiwan and the USSR.9 The results of the SCRS’ deliberations were 9 Taiwan has always had an ambiguous role at ICCAT, and in most other fisheries organizations. It is one o f the largest producers o f marine fish in the world, including tuna and tuna-like species. However, due to the objections o f China, Taiwan is seldom afforded official membership in 367 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. presented at the first regular meeting of the Council, a subset of member states that were elected by the Commission to meet in a biennial cycle with the Commission itself.1 0 The Council accepted the SCRS’ recommendations on guidelines for collection of catch statistics, establishment of a tuna-tagging program and other measures designed to fill in the holes in the available data. In spite of continued complaints regarding the inadequacy of their data, the SCRS Sub-Committee on Stock Assessment was able to come to some preliminary conclusions regarding a few important stocks. Most of the Sub-Committee’s efforts were aimed at yellowfin and albacore tunas, with secondary concern regarding bluefin, bigeye and skipjack tunas and billfishes. Stocks could not be assessed in relation to maximum sustainable yield (MSY), but it did appear that stocks of yellowfin tuna, northern albacore, northern bluefin tuna and blue marlin were probably declining based on increasing catch per unit effort in the fisheries. Although data were especially lacking, the Sub-Committee also felt that there was probably room for expansion in the fisheries for southern albacore, bigeye and skipjack tunas. No management recommendations were made for any of the stocks, but many suggestions were presented for improving data and analysis. So this is where ICCAT stood at its inception. From here on out the Commission or the Council would meet every year to consider the scientific advice on stocks and decide what to do about it. As was shown in Figure 5.1, membership in ICCAT grew from 9 contracting parties in 1969 to 36 by 2003. Of the stocks under international bodies. A special “cooperating status” has been developed for Taiwan at ICCAT, and it makes contributions like other members but it has no vote and must always be referred to as “Chinese-Taipei”. (China really will correct any speaker who refers to Taiwan by any other name.) 1 0 The Commission also set the Council’s agenda and authority. At the 1970 meeting, 9 o f 11 member states made up the Council. Only Korea and Ghana were not represented. (ICCAT 1979, 27-31). 368 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. ICCAT’s jurisdiction, at least ten are currently listed as overexploited by the Sub committee on Research and Statistics and of those more than half are under some kind of management regime. Trade measures have only been put into place for three specific species, bluefin tuna, bigeye tuna and swordfish. In the past, the Commission has not been able to prevent either biological or recession in a domestic fishing fleet in stocks of highly migratory species in the Atlantic. Illuminating the pattern of vulnerability response that precipitated the current state of affairs should also help us to determine if such international management will be more successful in the future. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix G: ICCAT Member States by Date of Ratification Contracting Party First Year of Membership UNITED STATES 1967 JAPAN 1967 SOUTH AFRICA 1967 GHANA 1968 CANADA 1968 FRANCE (St-Pierre et Miquelon) 1968 BRASIL 1969 MAROC 1969 KOREA, Rep. of 1970 COTE D'IVOIRE 1972 ANGOLA 1976 RUSSIA 1977 GABON 1977 CAP-VERT 1979 URUGUAY 1983 SAOTOME E PRINCIPE 1983 VENEZUELA 1983 GUINEA ECUATORIAL 1987 GUINEE-CONAKRY 1991 Contracting Party First Year of Membership UNITED KINGDOM (0. territories) 1995 LIBYA 1995 CHINA, People's Rep. of 1996 CROATIA 1997 COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE 1997 TUNISIE 1997 PANAMA 1998 TRINIDAD and TOBAGO 1999 NAMIBIA 1999 BARBADOS 2000 HONDURAS 2001 ALGERIE 2001 MEXICO 2002 VANUATU 2002 ICELAND 2002 CYPRUS, Rep. of 2003 TURKEY 2003 MALTA 2003 PHILIPPINES 2004 Note 1 : SENEGAL was a member of the Commission from 1971 to 1988. CUBA was a member of the Commission from 1975 to 1991. BENIN was a member of the Commission from 1978 to 1994. Note 2 : FRANCE (member since 1968), SPAIN (member since 1969), PORTUGAL (member since 1969), the U.K.* (member since 1995) and ITALY (member since 3 7 0 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 1997) withdrew from the Commission following the access of the European Community on 1997. However, FRANCE and the UNITED KINGDOM retain membership on behalf of their overseas territories not covered by the Treaty of Rome. * As concerns the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Anguilla, Bermuda, St. Helena, Turks and Caicos. Source: http://www.iccat.es/ go to <About ICCAT> then <Contracting Parties> accessed 1/23/04 371 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix H: ICCAT Size Limits O f the three tropical tunas, yellowfin was the most important in the early years of the commission. In fact, it has the dubious distinction of being the first stock to be regulated by ICCAT. As early as 1970, SCRS pointed out potential growth overfishing of the yellowfin stock in the Atlantic. They believed it likely that too many juvenile fish were being taken before they had a chance to replace themselves via reproduction. A year later, the SCRS felt confident enough to make two regulatory recommendations to the commission:1 1. Increase the size at first capture of yellowfin tuna 2. Reduce the fishing mortality on yellowfin tuna According to the SCRS report, by 1971 some headway had been made in the collection of data, and while no concrete suggestions could be made on reduction of fishing mortality, the SCRS did point out that a minimum size at landing requirement might be a way to increase size at first capture.2 When making this suggestion, the SCRS also noted that it would not prevent fishers from capturing and discarding small fishes at sea, but the alternative, implementation of time-area closures where small fish congregate would take much more information than was available. In its own report in 1971, the SCRS’ Sub-Committee on Stock Assessment had been able to inform the Commission that the optimum size at first capture for 1 ICCAT (1972, 75). 2 ICCAT (1972, 66). Landings refers to fish that are both caught and sold. Generally speaking, to make a sale fishers have to return to land and unload their catch, hence the term. Landings are much more easily monitored and enforced than catches, since port facilities, documents o f sale, etc., are required. 372 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. yellowfin tuna ranged between 10-25 kg. However, delegates believed that there was insufficient information that year and the Commission did not take action on these suggestions. Instead, they referred the issue of a size limit for yellowfin to the Council, which would meet the next year. The 1971 Commission authorized the 1972 Council to establish minimum size limits between 3.2 and 10 kg for yellowfin, with the caveat that contracting parties would be able to set a certain reasonable tolerance level, or percentage of catch to be exempted from the new rule.4 When the Council met in Madrid in 1972, it was indeed supplied with more information on yellowfin tuna than had previously been available. Specifically, the SCRS revised and strengthened its recommendations for the optimal size at first capture, advising that it ranged from 6.5 to 10 kg, depending on the level of fishing effort.5 In addition, the SCRS found that the current size at first capture was below the optimal 6.5 kg level and reiterated that any size limit on landings may not change the mortality of small fish if they are still caught but discarded.6 By running several simulations of different size limits at landing, levels of fishing effort and actual mortality of small fish, the SCRS found that a lower limit of 3.2 kg provided less potential benefit but also less potential risk than the higher level of 8.9 kg. However, they also expressed some optimism that the minimum size at 3 ICCAT (1972, 92 and 97). Optimum size at first capture is calculated based on a model where only fish above a certain size are removed from the stock. The idea is to optimize the reproductive capacity o f younger fish by leaving them in the water long enough to at least replace themselves. The optimum varies among stocks depending on the recruitment rate, age at recruitment, age at first reproduction and other factors. 4 ICCAT (1972, 27). The 3.2 kg lower boundary was based on size limits already in place in some West African countries including Ghana and the Ivory Coast. Fish as small as 1 kg were being taken in fisheries for both species. 5 ICCAT (1973, 75). Higher levels o f effort lead to larger optimal size at first capture because stronger replacement rates are necessary to maintain the stock at maximum sustainable yield. 6 ICCAT (1973, 76). 373 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. landing requirement could change fishing practices and increase avoidance of n capture of small fish. In its review of this evidence, Panel 1 decided to recommend the minimum size of 3.2 kg to the Council, along with a 15% tolerance level. This would mean that up to 15% of the number of fish caught could be under the 3.2 kg O minimum size limit. The Council accepted this recommendation and went so far as to instruct the Secretariat to inform the press of the accomplishment.9 At first, it did seem that landings of small yellowfin actually declined after the adoption of the size limit. However, a major source of unease was the increasing tendency to misreport catches of undersized yellowfin as bigeye, which was not subject to a size limit. The issue was first raised in the 1974 meeting of Panel 4 under their discussion of the bigeye stock assessment.1 0 Two years later, it came up again in the SCRS assessment of yellowfin and in discussions in Panel l .1 1 In Panel 4, which was responsible for bigeye until 1997, France floated the idea of a size limit on bigeye equal to the one adopted for yellowfin, in order to remove the incentive to 1 2 misreport. SCRS was instructed to look into the effects of a 3.2 kg size at landing limit on bigeye and in 1977 reported that it would benefit the fishery as a whole, i -2 though it might also limit the total catch of skipjack. Nonetheless, several 7 ICCAT (1973, 77). If all mortality o f small fish is avoided, then those fish survive to reproduce and may be caught when they have grown to a larger size, so that actual production increases. However, if those fish are simply discarded dead (and most don’t survive capture), then they do not reproduce, nor are they utilized in any other way, compounding the loss in utility. 8 ICCAT (1973, 51) and ICCAT (2005a, rec. 72-1), entered into force July 1, 1973. 9 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 72-1). 1 0 ICCAT (1975, 85). 1 1 ICCAT (1977, 75). 1 2 ICCAT (1977, 61). 1 3 ICCAT (1978, 146). 3 7 4 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. contracting parties were unconvinced, including the USA, Japan and Korea, so the decision was postponed another year.1 4 After two years, much debate and several votes, the Commission adopted the 3.2 kg size limit for bigeye tuna.1 5 SCRS had held a special Working Group on Bigeye Size Regulations in 1978, which confirmed its earlier conclusions about the usefulness of such a measure. The Working Group felt that a matching size limit on bigeye would not only help to counter the misreporting problem with yellowfin but would also be good for the bigeye stock, which had come under increasing pressure from both purse seines and longlines during the decade.1 6 That year, a joint meeting of Panels 1 and 4 was held to tackle the issue. With ten votes for and three against, a proposal for a 3.2 kg size limit with a 15% tolerance was sent to the full Commission for approval. The proposal passed with 8 votes out of a total of seventeen members. Two contracting parties were absent, three abstained and four were against the proposal.1 7 Since it had not obtained a simple majority, procedural questions were raised, and the recommendation was sent out for a vote by mail. The measure was finally adopted in 1979 after another vote in which all contracting parties but one were either in favor or abstained. On the surface, the support of the measure by major purse seining countries like France and Spain might seem counter intuitive. Seines catch mostly small fish and would be most heavily impacted by a size limit on bigeye, which really was a secondary species in the composition of their catches. However, the majority of bigeye less than 3.2 kg were caught in the Gulf of Guinea, a small area when 1 4 ICCAT (1978, 42-43). 1 5 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 79-1). 1 6 ICCAT (1979, 147). 1 7 ibid., 68. 375 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. compared with the geographic dispersion of European fleets. In fact, by passing this lower size limit early on, European purse seiners could forestall the imposition of a higher, possibly more appropriate limit that would impact catches of yellowfin, their main target species. On the other hand, with its dependence on baitboats in that problem area, Ghana’s catch of skipjack as well as the other two tropical tunas would be deeply curtailed by the bigeye size limit, so it is not surprising that the country chose to vote against the measure and declared its intention to raise a formal objection.1 8 States that targeted adult bigeye, especially Japan and Korea, were not so convinced regarding the effectiveness of a 3.2 kg size limit for the slow growing bigeye. Unlike the recommendation for a yellowfin size limit, which applied indefinitely, the bigeye limit was scheduled to last until the end of 1983 and went under review in 1982. It was hoped that more information on the usefulness of the limit would be available at that point, but this was not the case. In 1982, the Commission extended the recommendation for an additional year to give SCRS more time to collect and analyze data on the measure.1 9 By 1984 SCRS could report that undersized fish of both species were still being caught in large numbers, far above the stipulated 15% tolerance level, but data had also improved and misreporting was less of a problem. At that point, the Commission decided to extend the bigeye size 2 1 limit indefinitely. On paper, it is clear that ICCAT responded rather quickly to the SCRS advice on a size limit for yellowfin tuna, while the size limit on bigeye took much longer to 1 8 ICCAT (1980, 50). 1 9 ICCAT (1983, 85). 2 0 ICCAT (1985, 122). 2 1 ibid., 36. 376 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. enact. The situation certainly seemed more serious for the former, which had been fished more heavily and for a longer period, but it is also telling that, at the time, yellowfin was the more valuable stock. While the initial call for a size limit on yellowfin was biologically justified and scientifically determined, the bigeye size limit was introduced only to deal with a misreporting problem. The necessity for a bigeye size limit was so intertwined with the management of yellowfin that the original recommendation and each decision to extend it were made by joint meetings of Panels 1 and 4 so that states with interests in both stocks could participate. The case for greater crisis and better response in the yellowfin stock is further underscored by the fact that SCRS advised restricting fishing mortality on the entire stock of yellowfin tuna as early as 1970 but did not even feel that effort on bigeye had reached the level that would produce MSY until 1985. Although ICCAT did adopt size limits for both yellowfin and bigeye as per the advice of SCRS, their response to the level of crisis at this early stage was far from complete. Both limits have remained active through 2004, but neither has ever been effectively implemented. Year after year the SCRS has reported that undersized fish constitute a much larger proportion of the yellowfin and bigeye landings than the 15% tolerance specified in the recommendations. By 1979 SCRS began suggesting that the Commission begin looking into other measures to protect juvenile yellowfin, 99 but no such actions were taken until the late 1990s. In addition, misidentification problems between the two species continued throughout the period, although the data was less skewed than it had been when there was incentive to misreport. Apparently members of the Commission felt that taking too many juvenile yellowfin and 2 2 ICCAT (1980, 118). See Appendix J: Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) for a technical definition o f this type o f fishing gear. 377 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. misreporting bigeye merited a regulatory response, but were not important enough for the development of extra measures for the enforcement of the size limits that were adopted. Unless fishing behavior changes, size limits at landing are necessarily wasteful and difficult to enforce in commercial operations. Those set for tropical tunas may have helped prevent even larger catches of juvenile fishes, but they certainly were never fully implemented. Like most other management decisions, the benefits of protecting juveniles are directly tied to the overall level of fishing pressure. Since the size limits for yellowfin and bigeye tunas were measured in percentage terms, as the level of catch changes so do the landings of undersized fish. Moreover, if the catch remains the same but is taken from a wider geographical range, or the size of the stock changes exogenously, the impact of high levels of juvenile mortality will be more dispersed. This is an example of the temporal specificity of SCRS advice. If the pattern of fishing behavior had remained the same over the entire period, it is likely that continued high catches of juvenile yellowfin and bigeye would have precipitated a burgeoning crisis situation that would eventually have had to be dealt with. However, significant changes in effort on tropical tunas did occur, impacting the variables underlying earlier recommendations. 3 7 8 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix I: Early Discussions on Yellowfin In parallel with their advice on instituting a minimum size limit at landing, SCRS also recommended that the commission limit the fishing mortality on yellowfin tuna. In 1972 they suggested that the yellowfin catch be limited to 75,000 mt but amended that recommendation to 90,000 mt in 1973. Japan put forth proposals to implement this SCRS advice from 1972 to 1974, but the Commission could not reach any agreement.1 Access to the stocks was at the heart of the problem. Developing states like Ivory Coast, Senegal and Brazil wished to expand their utilization of many highly migratory stocks and, as coastal states believed they had a right to do so. The representative of the FAO also expressed a wish that developing countries be afforded a more equitable participation in the fisheries. On the other hand, historically dominant fishing states like Japan, the US, Spain and others were not willing to give up any of their share of the catch to allow for such expansion under an effort limitation scheme. In 1974, the Japanese did offer to increase the total allowable catch they had set out in their yellowfin proposal from 70,000 mt to 90,000 mt to provide for growth • • 3 • • in developing countries, but no consensus was reached on the subject. This was in spite of the fact that landings that year were 17,000 mt over the higher estimate of MSY and growing fast. By 1975, reported landings of yellowfin tuna were almost 125,000 mt, about 30% higher than the catch limit suggested by the SCRS.4 During this period, the Commission took no action to limit effort or fishing mortality on 1 ICCAT (1973, 29 and 51); ICCAT (1974, 36-37); ICCAT (1975, 45). 2 ICCAT (1975, 57). 3 ibid., 45. 4 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 379 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. yellowfin tuna, yet catches continued at around this level until 1980 when another growth spurt was observed. No evidence of the expected decline in availability due to overfishing was experienced, other than a slight contraction of 3.5% in the yield per recruit.5 Two exogenous factors eased the situation somewhat in the second half of the 1970s. First, SCRS came to the conclusion that the yield-effort curve of the yellowfin stock was probably flattened at the top.6 This meant that higher catches could be maintained longer than had previously been thought. On the other hand, due to uncertainty regarding the exact shape of the curve, there was also increasing likelihood that there would be a sudden drop in recruitment that could lead to stock collapse. Secondly, as catch per unit effort continued to decline over the period, the marginal net benefit of increasing the quantity produced went down sharply in historically fished areas. As a result, fishers began to shift their operations further and further away from traditional fishing grounds in coastal areas. Fishing capacity continued to increase, especially among purse seiners, but considerable westward movement enlarged the total biomass of yellowfin under exploitation. In other words, by expanding their targeted area, fishers themselves were able to avert a crisis situation in the Eastern Atlantic yellowfin fishery without cutting back on effort or production. 5 ICCAT (1977, 75). 6 ibid., 74. 7 In the 1970s and early 1980s, SCRS was unsure if there was a single yellowfin stock or two different stocks; one in the Eastern Pacific, the other in the West. They have since determined that the single stock scenario is more likely, so this discussion leaves out the assessments o f the separate areas. Additionally, the viscosity o f the yellowfin stock was uncertain for a while, but it became clear that local depletion was possible in the early 1980s, so that is taken for granted in this context. 380 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. At first, SCRS was unsure what effect these changes in fishing practices would have on the state of the stock, since that would depend on the age structure of o the schools in the new areas. However, by 1977 SCRS was able to provide the Commission with a range of estimates for MSY. Total catch was within this range for about seven years, during which time both the estimates of MSY and the reported landings of yellowfin tuna increased steadily. By 1983 SCRS again began expressing concern regarding potential overfishing of yellowfin tuna, as both catch and effort rose above the level prescribed by their estimates of MSY. No effort limits were suggested that year, but the SCRS did warn the Commission that it might need to take action in the near future. In addition, the growing dominance of surface fisheries like purse seines and baitboats, which take mainly small fish, over longlines that target adults compounded the SCRS concern as they continued to call for full implementation of the size limits adopted in 1972.9 Just in time, another major shift in fishing effort occurred in 1984, preempting the predicted overexploitation of the yellowfin stock yet again. In this case a large portion of the purse seine fleet actually left for the Indian Ocean, significantly decreasing effort in the Eastern Atlantic.1 0 Due to this move, total landings of yellowfin in the ICCAT convention area dropped by almost 50,000 mt between 1983 and 1984, but almost immediately began to rise again. A few years later, Venezuelan purse seines also left the Western Atlantic, shifting their operations to the Pacific. In this case, landings also went down but only by about 10,000 mt.1 1 8 ICCAT (1977, 76). 9 ICCAT (1984, 113). 1 0 ICCAT (1985, 117). ICCAT used this opportunity to study the effects o f such a big change in effort by starting the Yellowfin Year Program in 1985. 1 1 ICCAT (1989, 115). 381 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Together these changes in fisher behavior provided a brief respite for the yellowfin stock and for the decision makers at ICCAT. The exit of some fleets that targeted yellowfin did not prevent the entry of new fishers or improvements that could make the remaining vessels more productive. One such technological advancement was the introduction of bird radar, an echolocation system developed to locate large conglomerations of sea birds and the schools of fish they usually gather around. A second innovation was the utilization of artificial fish aggregating devices (FADs). Fishers had long known that schools of tuna tended to associate with large, naturally occurring floating objects but by the 1990s global positioning technology allowed for the placement and tracking of artificial FADs. Fishers could place a FAD, return to it after a few months, and then spend months taking from the school of fish that had formed underneath. By making it easier to find the fish, bird radar and FADs improved the effectiveness of surface fleets. Furthermore, in 1990 some of the purse seines that had gone to the Indian Ocean returned to the Atlantic, contributing to that year’s historic catch of almost 200,000 mt, about 50,000 mt greater than the last best estimate of MSY. The re-exit of some Spanish vessels that had returned to the Indian Ocean helped to push landings down again in 1991, but catches were still above maximum 19 sustainable yield and the decrease was not sufficient to stem the stock decline. By 1992 SCRS recommended limiting effort and catch to current levels, about 150,000 mt.1 3 There were some proposals to do just that, but Panel 1 decided to wait for the outcome of a new Working Group on Yellowfin Assessment scheduled for early in 1 2 ICCAT (1992, 102). 1 3 ICCAT (1993, 140). 382 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 1993.1 4 So it was in that year that the Commission adopted the Recommendation by ICCAT on Supplemental Regulatory Measures for the Management of Atlantic Yellowfin Tuna, that instructed all countries fishing for yellowfin to limit their effort to 1992 levels, whether or not they were contracting parties to the commission.1 5 The reference to non-member states was included because by that time purse seine catches in the not elsewhere included category were up to 32% of the landings reported by that gear.1 6 Catches remained well above the recommended level in 1993 17 and 1994, but were generally in line with the effort restriction thereafter. 1 4 ICCAT (1993, 79). 1 5 ICCAT (1994, 116) and ICCAT (2005a, rec. 93-4). 1 6 ICCAT (1994, 174). 1 7 The sole exception was in 2001, but the overage was rather small. 383 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix J: Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) O f all the innovations in fishing technologies, the introduction of artificial Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) contributed the most to the continued growth in th catches of tropical tunas in the last decade of the 20 century. Developed originally in the Pacific Ocean, French and Spanish purse seine fleets started using FADs in the Atlantic in the 1990s and the practice rapidly caught on. FADs changed fishing in four ways. First, by aggregating fish into easily located, large and dense schools, FADs made it easier to catch more fish at a much lower cost. Secondly, FADs made it possible to expand the area fished into new waters, increasing the available biomass of skipjack tuna, but not yellowfin or bigeye. Thirdly, because schools associated with floating objects are usually more mixed in species content than free swimming schools, use of FADs changed the composition of catches as per Figures 3.9 and 3.10. Finally, more small fish are caught with FADs than otherwise, therefore the juvenile mortality for tropical tunas increased dramatically as the technology became more prevalent. Surface fisheries (purse seines and baitboats mostly) have traditionally found schools of tropical tunas conglomerating around incidental floating objects such as kelp, tree branches, and vegetal or industrial debris. As of yet there has been no conclusive evidence regarding the reason for the correlation between schools of pelagic tunas and drifting objects, but that has not stopped fishers from exploiting the tendency. By placing artificial floating objects, usually buoys that are allowed to drift, fishers have exponentially increased the number of floating objects for tropical tunas to aggregate around. Moreover, by equipping these fish aggregating devices 3 8 4 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. (FADs) with sounding and GPS technologies, fishers are able to track the devices in order to return once a school has formed. Now, instead of spending days or weeks searching for incidental drifting objects or free-swimming schools, these fishers can move from FAD to FAD with a fair expectation of finding a sizable conglomeration of fish.1 1 Purse seines and baitboats are the only effective methods o f targeting fish are schooled. 385 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix K: Early Regulation of Bigeye Tuna When ICC AT first convened in the early 1970s, bigeye was one of the stocks that SCRS believed was underexploited, but by the end of the 1990s the stock was so overexploited that several management measures were put in place to curb effort.1 As early as 1975 SCRS noted that bigeye landings were approaching MSY, and by 1980 they listed the stock as fully exploited. From 1981 to 1989 bigeye landings were generally below or within the estimated range of MSY for the stock. Like yellowfm, both catches and estimates of MSY increased during this period due to shifts in fishing effort to deeper waters. However, because bigeye has a longer lifespan and is less productive than yellowfm, the effect was muted and overall MSY was much lower. For example, in 1979 the MSY for yellowfm ranged from 113,000 to 175,000 mt while the MSY for bigeye went from 48,000 to 100,000 mt, depending on the model used. Little concern was expressed regarding bigeye tuna through the 1980s. In fact, effort was briefly below the MSY level from 1986-1988 due to a temporary shift of a part of the longline fleet to the Indian Ocean. A more permanent change was the introduction of deep longlines, which, as their name suggests, could be set at greater depths, improving the efficiency of the longline gear when targeting bigeye.4 In fact, the gear was deemed to be 50% more effective from 1985-1991 than it had been from 1961-1984, lowering the cost of production for bigeye. In addition, from 1 Underexploited means that total catch was less than M SY and the biomass was larger than BM S Y , so there was room to increase effort. Overexploited is the opposite. 2 ICCAT (1980, 114 and 145). 3 ICCAT (1989, 119). 4 ICCAT (1991, 154). 386 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. the early 1980s, the per unit value of the species began to rise due to its growing popularity in Japanese sushi markets, where high quality bigeye could draw a premium price over other tunas such as yellowfm and albacore.5 Figure K.l shows the divergence between the export value per metric ton of bigeye and that of the other species in this category.6 Together, the higher value and lower costs lead to rapidly increasing effort targeting adult bigeye from 1980 onwards. Figure K .l: Real Value per Metric Ton .00 Bigeye ■«— Skipjack Yellowfm 7.00 6.00 p 5.00 < 7 2 = > 4.00 O s 2 3.00 2.00 T3 1.00 £ 0.00 < N O s O s V O O s O s 00 V O 00 O s 00 00 o s 00 O S OS o s O s o s o s 00 O S 00 O S O S Year As shown in Table K .l, the 1990s was apeak decade for capture production of all three of the species of tropical tuna. However, in both relative and absolute 5 There are two reasons that longlines would be the gear o f choice for supplying sushi-grade bigeye. First, only the adult fish have developed the muscle and fat structured favored by sushi consumers. As these fish are much more dispersed than juveniles, a widespread, low density, bait based method like longlining is more efficient at targeting those fish. Secondly, special handling is required for sushi- grade fish and there is generally less damage to the flesh from longlining than from other gear types. 6 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 3 8 7 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. terms, the jump in production of bigeye tuna from the 1980s to the 1990s was the biggest among these three stocks. In fact, the 61% growth in reported landings is the second largest in ICCAT’s history.7 Given the relatively low reproductive rate of bigeye tuna, it is not surprising that such high catches lead to a steep decline in the stock of this species in the Atlantic. SCRS assessments of the bigeye stock went from slightly underexploited in 1990 to slightly over MSY in 1992, fully exploited in 1994, somewhat overexploited in 1996, to severely overfished from 1999 to 2002. Table K .l: Average Total Catch of Tropical Tunas by Decade* 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2002 Bigeye 52,644 67,873 109,544 90,286 Skipjack 83,549 127,073 158,182 134,082 Yellowfm 108,682 147,514 156,855 143,050 *ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the stock was depleted even more quickly than is reflected in the ICCAT reports. Although the science had improved greatly over the previous two decades, SCRS advice was skewed in the early 1990s due to a high level of unreported catch by non-contracting parties and others using flags of convenience.9 At the height of this practice in 1991 and 1992, more than a 7 The biggest was a 131% increase in average landings o f Atlantic swordfish when comparing the 1970s to the 1980s. (ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database). Swordfish catches had previously been depressed due to concerns regarding the level o f mercury content in the fish, but the market rebounded once the health threat was over. 8 ICCAT (1991, 154); ICCAT (1993, 142); ICCAT (1995, 2:168); ICCAT (1997 2:23); ICCAT (2000 2:26). 9 Maritime law requires all vessels to exhibit the “flag” o f their port state when they are at sea. In many countries, fishers must comply with various regulations, including labor, environmental and resource management laws and pay fees in order to receive a “flag”. However, there are some small developing countries that have sold their flags rather cheaply and with no strings attached. These are known as open registries or providers o f flags o f convenience, sought after by some fishers in order to avoid more stringent regulations elsewhere. 3 8 8 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. quarter of the total catch - over 25,000 mt - went unreported each year.1 0 This is exceptionally disappointing because in 1990 SCRS was able to utilize an updated production model that significantly improved the accuracy of their estimates of MSY.1 1 Between 1988 and 1989 the lower bound of MSY remained around 66,000 mt, but SCRS was able to eliminate outliers that had pushed the upper bound above 160,000 mt, cutting it down to 73,500 mt. Ironically, at around 60,000 mt, reported catches for 1989 were below the lowest estimate of MSY, but the actual catch was 12 closer to 80,000 mt, quite a bit above the highest estimate of MSY. Reported landings remained within the range of MSY until 1994. At this point actual landings were so high that even the underreported catch was above the maximum sustainable yield. In spite of misrepresented landings levels, there had been evidence that pointed to overexploitation of the bigeye stock as early as 1992, 1 T but the SCRS did not recommend limits on landings until 1995. Instead, the sub committee focused its advice on full implementation of the size limits and protection of juvenile bigeye, which would help to raise the yield per recruit, thereby increasing MSY. However, very high landings in 1993 and 1994, combined with persistent high mortality on juveniles and a much less optimistic stock assessment lead SCRS to recommend that catches be reduced to a level below MSY for 1996. The 1995 stock assessment of bigeye tuna should have been an eye-opener for members of the Commission. Reported landings were over 110,000 mt, about 1 0 From comparison o f landings listed in the annual reports (ICCAT 1992 and 1993), with revised landings data from the ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 1 1 ICCAT (1991, 154). 1 2 From comparison o f landings listed in the annual reports (ICCAT 1993), with revised landings data from the ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 1 3 SCRS had revised some o f its earlier estimates in 1992 with new information on actual landings and improvements in vessel efficiency, showing that both yield and effort were higher than optimal in 1990. (ICCAT 1993, 142). 389 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 1 ,0 0 0 mt above the highest estimate of MSY. Furthermore, all of the models used in the assessment showed similar results: the biomass of bigeye was about 8-10% less than B Msy and the level of effort in the fishery was 6 8 -7 1 % greater than that which would produce MSY. In addition, 65% of the 19 9 4 catch was below the minimum size limit established in 1979, continuing a trend of very high catches of juvenile bigeye that necessarily undermined the reproductive potential of the stock.1 4 According to revised statistics, the actual catch in 1 9 9 4 was closer to 1 3 0 ,0 0 0 mt, so the SCRS advice was probably more optimistic than it might have been otherwise. 1 4 The percentage o f the catch < 3.2kg is calculated in numbers, rather than weight. (ICCAT 1996, 2:17-18). 3 9 0 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix L: Management Areas for Atlantic Swordfish As early as 1979, SCRS warned the commission that they would need to closely monitor Atlantic swordfish. Member states like the US, Canada and Portugal also expressed concern regarding the declining availability of the species. 1 By 1985, SCRS reported that the biomass of swordfish had dropped to 40% of its 1978 level and that the fish being caught were 40% smaller than those harvested in 1973. Together, these changes indicated that the fishery was nearing full exploitation but, in spite of more than a decade of requests for better data and more resources to study swordfish, SCRS was unable to provide more specific advice. Some of the contracting parties to ICCAT, especially the USA and Canada, were witnessing the declining abundance of swordfish within their own exclusive economic zones (EEZs), so they pushed for better data reporting and the convening -2 of special workshops to study the species. Two workshops were held under the auspices of the SCRS, one in 1987 and a second in 1988. During these special sessions, scientists were able to significantly improve the ICCAT database on swordfish and reach important conclusions regarding the biology of the species. One very significant finding was that swordfish under ICCAT’s jurisdiction were probably divided into three geographically distinct stocks. So that regulation could reflect the structure of those stocks, SCRS recommended the creation of three 1 ICCAT (1980, 150); ICCAT (1980, 77-78). 2 ICCAT (1986, 131). 3 Canada had instituted swordfish regulations within its EEZ as early as 1980. (ICCAT 1981, 74). Fishing effort and total catch limits were first recorded for US coastal waters in 1986. (ICCAT 1987, 98). 391 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. separate management areas for swordfish: North Atlantic (above 5° north latitude), South Atlantic (below 5° north latitude) and Mediterranean.4 Figure L .l: Swordfish Landings by Management Area 25,000 Northern 20,000 B— Southern A— Mediterranian 15,000 10,000 5,000 o VO ON vn ON ON 00 ON ON Year Figure L.l shows the distribution of catches among the three management areas.5 Historically, North Atlantic swordfish was more heavily exploited over a longer period of time than either of the other stocks. In fact, the growth in landings of southern swordfish in the early 1990s was due in large part to a transfer of effort from the northern stock. Once availability had declined in historical fishing areas, longliners, mainly flying the Spanish flag, began to target swordfish in an area just south of the 5° north latitude boundary drawn between the two stocks.6 Along with 4 ICCAT (1989, 131). 5 ICCAT Landings 1950-2002 Database. 6 ICCAT (1989, 167) and ICCAT (1999, 2:92). The shift was also recorded in several reports that fell between these two. 3 9 2 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. growing landings in the Mediterranean, this expansion allowed total catches of swordfish to increase in contravention of the 1984 prediction by SCRS that increasing effort would not yield much improvement in total catches.7 Management measures have been taken by ICCAT to regulate all three swordfish stocks. Size limits to protect juvenile fishes were adopted for both Atlantic o stocks in 1990. Other regulations aimed at decreasing total catches have also been put into place by ICCAT for northern and southern swordfish. No concrete measures have been developed for the Mediterranean stock, although contracting parties have been urged to find ways to decrease juvenile mortality in the area.9 7 ICCAT (1985, 140). 8 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 90-2). 9 ibid., rec. 03-4. 3 9 3 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix M: Protecting Juvenile Swordfish One outcome of the 1987 and 1988 scientific workshops on Atlantic swordfish was the finding that swordfish exhibited slower growth in the early stages of its lifecycle than had previously been believed. This meant that the decline in the spawning biomass of the stock, basically fish larger than 150 cm fork-length, was more severe, ranging between 50-60% of the 1978 levels. Recruits, swordfish in the 1 to 2 year age range, were increasing because they had fewer adults to compete with for food, but this trend would also be reversed if young fish continued to be caught before they reached spawning age, at between 4-6 years old. 1 This new understanding had significant implications for the interpretation and management of by-catch of juvenile swordfish. Hearing such disturbing results, the Commission realized that more consistent and in-depth analysis would need to be undertaken, so SCRS was encouraged to continue to focus on the stock. As SCRS advice became clearer, it also became more pessimistic. In the entire Atlantic, unregulated fishing effort greatly surpassed the maximum sustainable yield and ICCAT was urged to step in, adopting measures to control both the quantity and size distribution of swordfish landings. The first of such actions took place in 1990, with the introduction of a 125 cm (25 kg) limit on landings of swordfish in the Atlantic. Fishers were granted a tolerance; they could keep quantities of undersized fish up to 15% of their total catch by number. Because the 1 ICCAT (1989, 140). SCRS found that fish over five years o f age were at 50% o f their 78 levels in the North Atlantic while fish over six years o f age had declined by 60% in the South. Swordfish are notoriously difficult to age, but females o f the species are thought to reach reproductive size at 150- 180 cm, or between four and six years o f age. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. situation for the northern stock was more critical, this recommendation also required a 15% decrease in catches of fish less than 125 cm in that management area. It is interesting that ICCAT chose to implement a minimum size limit at this point, since SCRS had not actually advised the Commission to do so. The scientific body had recommended decreasing the mortality of juvenile fish in the North Atlantic, but could not determine a specific size limit. Moreover, SCRS placed much more emphasis on the need to cut landings in order to rebuild the stock. In fact, they said that the total catch in the North Atlantic would have to be cut by 50% and that ■ 3 effort directed at swordfish there would have to be reduced to pre-1988 levels. Detailed scrutiny of the negotiations of management measures during this period shows that disputes over rights of access to the stock were the main source of delay on catch restrictions. It is possible that the size limit was merely a placeholder; a recommendation that was easy to agree on because it would be so difficult to enforce. The wrangling over what to do about northern swordfish had actually begun in 1989. SCRS' advice was even less certain at this earlier point, but they did say that the current yield could not be maintained in the long run and that the Commission should at least prevent effort from increasing further.4 With the support of Canada, the USA made a proposal to do just that, but there was resistance from Spain, France, Portugal, Japan and others who required greater certainty before they would take action that would be so costly in political economic terms.5 It is important to 2 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 90-2). As might be expected, action was taken earlier the North Atlantic, where stocks had been under fishing pressure for a longer period o f time. 3 ICCAT (1991, 191). 4 ICCAT (1990, 174). 5 ICCAT (1990, 87-93). 395 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. note that Canada had put its own restrictions on effort and size at landing within its EEZ as early as 1980 and by 1989, the USA was in the process of developing a domestic management regime to reduce catches in its EEZ.6 Therefore, they would face the costs of management whether or not ICCAT agreed on effort limits. Dividing lines were sharper and more fragmenting when discussions resumed in 1990. As was recounted above, SCRS was able to present more detailed analysis and specific recommendations that year. Again, the US proposed a recommendation, but this time it sought to cut catches in the Atlantic by 30% from their 86-89 levels. Canada presented its own proposal, which introduced the 125 cm size limit with 15% tolerance that was eventually adopted. Spain also proposed a size limit, but included other measures such as encouraging the establishment of time-area closures at the national level, prohibiting the use of new gears, promoting movement of fleets other parts of the Atlantic and limiting incidental catch of swordfish to 10%. While the Canadians had introduced their proposal as an addition to effort restrictions, the Spanish believed that the size limit would sufficiently depress catch levels, negating the need for direct regulation of effort or catch. The discussion ranged back and forth, between the US and Canada, who sought to protect their coastal fleets by limiting access to the resource, and Spain, who defended its belief that such drastic measures were unnecessary at this point. In a constant side- dialogue, countries with small percentages of the total catch argued that those with the largest landings should pay the highest costs of adjustment. Several states, especially France, were against the restrictions on new gears in the Spanish n proposal. 6 ICCAT (1981, 74) and NMFS (1989, 5). 7 ICCAT (1991, 76-82). 396 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. In the end, Panel 4, which makes recommendations on billfish to the Commission, could not reach consensus on any of these proposals, but a joint recommendation was forwarded to the full Commission for a vote.8 Of the 13 members present at the meeting that year, 11 voted for the recommendation while Spain and Morocco abstained. Thus, ICCAT adopted its first management measures on Atlantic swordfish.9 In 1991, SCRS examined the theoretical usefulness of the 125 cm size limit and determined that it would help to improve the biomass of the stocks as long as actual juvenile mortality declined. As is often the case when trying to control incidental catches, the effectiveness of the recommendation would be undermined if fishers could not avoid catching undersized fish and were forced to discard them back into the sea in order to comply with the regulation. 10 ICCAT had adopted minimum size limits for other species in the past and the measures had proven to be insufficient to protect juvenile fish.11 Indeed, as early as 1992 SCRS indicated that the reported landings of juvenile swordfish (< 125 cm) had decreased, but that dead discards had increased at 12 the same time. As various other measures were taken to limit landings of all swordfish, by-catch of juveniles showed little improvement. In 1996, 22% of reported landings by number were below the 125 cm threshold and that number 1 ^ remained about the same through the year 2000. By this time, the USA and Canada had both instituted policies whereby fishers were required to discard all swordfish 8 ICCAT (1991, 76-82). 9 ibid., 35. Although the recommendation was adopted at the Commission meeting in 1990, it was still sent out for mail vote by the three absent contracting parties. 1 0 ICCAT (1992, 130). 1 1 See Appendix H: ICCAT Size Limits. Size limits had been adopted for yellowfm, bigeye and bluefln tunas in the 1970s but were never enforced and resulted mainly in misreporting o f the data. 1 2 ICCAT (1993, 217). 1 3 ICCAT (1999, 2:94); ICCAT (2003, 2:96). 397 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. smaller than 119 cm fork length, so they reported high levels of dead discards but no landings of undersized fish. These states had chosen the zero-tolerance option so that they could effectively ban the sale of undersized fish in their domestic markets. 14 On the other hand, Spanish fishers were not required to discard small fish and that country consistently reported landings of undersized fish that were around 45% of the total number of fish they landed annually. 15 It would seem that the 1990 size limit was insufficient protection for juvenile swordfish in the Atlantic. Since 1994, language has been included in multiple recommendations and resolutions urging contracting parties to conduct research on the use of time-area closures and gear modifications to reduce juvenile mortality of swordfish. 16 More recently, the Commission adopted a resolution instructing SCRS to look into potential time-area closures to protect young swordfish in the North and South Atlantic areas in 1999.1 7 So far, SCRS has been unable to determine suitable candidates for time-area closures due to high inter-annual variability in concentrations of juveniles and insufficient data regarding the migrations of young 1 f t swordfish. A second, non-binding, resolution was adopted in 2001 encouraging states to evaluate and report on whatever time-area closures they may have instituted to reduce dead discards of undersized swordfish in their own EEZs. That same resolution instructs SCRS to review such reports and use them in the development of time-area closures to be instituted by ICCAT in the future. 19 As of 2003, only one 1 4 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 95-10). In discussions regarding this recommendation, the USA and Canada expressed the reasons for preferring this method. (ICCAT 1996, 1:152). 1 5 ICCAT (1999, 2:94). 1 6 ICCAT (2005a, rec. 94-14). 1 7 ibid., res. 99-4. 1 8 ICCAT (2003, 2:231). 1 9 ICCAT (2005a, res. 01-4). 398 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. contracting party, the USA, has reported to ICCAT regarding its unilateral 9 0 establishment of time-area closures in its own EEZ. On the whole, data reporting has been negatively affected by the swordfish size limit. Size data has always been more difficult to collect because it requires additional skills and effort on the part of either fishers or inspectors. The introduction and, more importantly, the enforcement of a size limit at landing create a dual incentive to misreport the size distribution of total catches. Early on, size data was skewed by the fact that dead discards were not included in the landings data used by the Commission. Although SCRS noted that this was a problem right after the implementation of the 1990 size limit, only a few countries, notably the USA and Canada, actually set up observer programs and began reporting their dead discards to 2 1 ICCAT. As pressures increased on contracting parties to implement the minimum size regulation, misreporting of size distribution became a problem is well. Some countries even chose to simply omit size composition from the landings data they submitted to the Commission. The problem has become so widespread that from 2001 onwards SCRS has been unable to evaluate the effectiveness of the size limit or 99 to estimate dead discards of small swordfish. Meanwhile, SCRS continues to advise the Commission that more needs to be done to reduce the mortality o f small swordfish in the Atlantic, as they have been doing for more than a decade.23 In the mid-1990s, Canada and the USA undertook concrete actions to prohibit the sale of undersized fish in their markets and they have 2 0 ICCAT (2003, 2:96). In 2002, SCRS found that the 2001 closures in the US EEZ did seem to cause fishers to avoid catching juvenile swordfish. 2 1 ICCAT (1993, 217); ICCAT (2004, 2:92). 22 ICCAT (2003, 2:96); ICCAT (2004, 2:94). 2 3 ICCAT (2004, 2:94). 399 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. both implemented programs aimed at observing and minimizing dead discards of juveniles in their exclusive economic zones. More recently, in 2001, the USA instituted five time-area closures to prevent the capture of undersized swordfish in their EEZ.24 If other actions have been taken, they have not been reported to ICCAT. Furthermore, from discussions regarding the most recent resolutions on studies of alternatives to the current size limit, it is clear that many states, especially in the EC, are unwilling to give ICCAT the power to establish time-area closures or gear restrictions in their domestic waters.25 Unilateral actions on the part of a few states will not serve to eliminate the problem of by-catch of juvenile swordfish. There is considerable uncertainty in the overall effect of ICCAT regulations to reduce by-catch of juvenile swordfish. It is possible that the size limit adopted by the Commission in 1990 did reduce the mortality of undersized fish. However, because there is so little information on dead discards and so much misreporting of the size composition of catches, the magnitude of that reduction would be impossible to measure. On the other hand, it is certain that fishers continue to capture and kill too many small swordfish, reducing the reproductive capacity of the stocks they exploit. Whatever success ICCAT has had in managing this type of by-catch is a very limited and is definitely incomplete. All contracting parties to ICCAT that target swordfish have expressed concern about the high level of juvenile mortality in the Atlantic, but few have been willing to pay the costs of foregoing catches of adults. Only in the USA and Canada, where both biological and recession in a 2 4 ICCAT (2003, 2:93). 2 5 ICCAT (2002, 1:314). Concentrations o f juvenile swordfish are usually found in coastal areas, so effective time-area closures would have to be instituted within states’ EEZs. 400 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. domestic fishing fleet has been acutely visible for coastal stocks of swordfish, strong response to the problem enacted. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix N: Marlins By-catch and Scientific Uncertainty Collecting and interpreting data on noncommercial by-catch like marlins is always more difficult than it would be for a commercially valuable species. Since by-catches are often discarded before landing, actual fishing mortality is almost always underreported by fishers. This has most certainly been the case for reported landings of blue and white marlins. 1 Also, identification of the specific species is much less important to fishers when reporting by-catch, because there is little differentiation in the value. In ICCAT’s early years, the majority of billfish, other than swordfish, were reported as a group without being classified as one species or another. Although improvements have been made, as recently as 2002, 13% of reported billfish landings were unclassified. The underreporting or misreporting of marlin landings forces scientists to use sample data to extrapolate fishing mortality on the species, increasing the uncertainty of their stock assessments. Once data are collected or estimated, they must be interpreted. This is also more difficult when assessing a by-catch species because key parameters such as the catch per unit of effort (CPUE) are more likely to be correlated with exogenous changes in the target species or fisher behavior rather than the abundance of the by- catch stock. For instance, for a targeted stock, a declining CPUE usually is interpreted to reflect decreased availability of fish due to lower stock abundance. However, during the 1970s and early 1980s, SCRS had difficulty interpreting declining CPUEs for blue and white marlins because lower hook rates could have been the result of changes in target species and distribution of fishing fleets. 1 ICCAT (1992, 124-125). 2 ICCAT (1977, 100). 402 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Scientists have worked out several different methods for dealing with this issue, each of which has its own implications for regulation of both by-catch and targeted species. These various ways o f interpreting data on catches of marlins have been politicized, more so than for commercial species, fracturing the discourse on management. In spite of the fact that scientific analysis of by-catch fisheries is more difficult, research on blue and white marlins has received much less funding, both from national sources and from ICCAT itself. Until 1986, minimal science was performed on these two species, even though there were signs of trouble with the stocks as early as 1971. During the early years of the Commission, when assessments of yellowfm tuna, bluefin tuna and other commercially valuable species revealed stock biomass, optimum size at first capture and harvest limits, SCRS advice on blue and white marlins tended to fluctuate with uncertainty. CPUEs were down but there was insufficient information on the structure and behavior of the stock to interpret that data with any certainty. In some years, SCRS would conclude that stocks of blue and white marlins had been overfished.4 A few years later, they would retract previous models, returning to a state of vague concern and ad hoc interpretation of raw data.5 Such ambiguous scientific analysis made it easy for most contracting parties to ignore SCRS advice to prevent further increases in fishing mortality on blue and white marlins.6 3 ICCAT (1962, 70). 4 ICCAT (1980, 158). 5 ICCAT (1981, 114). 6 ICCAT (1981, 115). 403 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Appendix O: Market Forces and the Future of Specific Stocks O.1 Demand side Figure 0.1 shows the dramatic effect that a shift in demand can have on price and quantity supplied in the long run. Although accuracy is limited by lack of data, this figure reflects the best information available on the market for Atlantic bigeye tuna. In the 1980s, a shift in preferences simultaneously increased demand for bigeye and made it less elastic, as represented by the movement of the curve from Di to D2. If the short run dynamic in the fishery had been relatively steady, then (Qia, P2a) could have been a stable equilibrium point. However, for Atlantic bigeye, as with most fisheries, this change in demand caused the selling price of bigeye to shoot up rapidly, which in turn precipitated a huge influx of fishing effort targeting the stock. This caused the biomass to decline below that which would support maximum sustainable yield and set off a chain reaction that pushed the market toward a new long-run equilibrium at (Qib, P2b)- 4 0 4 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure R .l: Effect of a Change in Demand on the Long-run Equilibrium for Bigeye Tuna1 P LRS 2B MSY Q 2A Q 2B Q 3 The distance between these two equilibria is quite striking, but note that a further shift in demand from D2 to D3 will have a much smaller effect on the long run 1 The supply curve in Figure 0.1 is derived from Clark (1990, 131-133), which provided the basic formula for the curve, SCRS biological information, including MSY, and from economic data relating price to quantity supplied over time. Costs o f production were estimated relative to other stocks in this study. Demand is also only approximate, drawn from known quantities such as value per metric ton and anecdotal evidence regarding causes for changes in demand. More detailed explanation o f the derivation o f these curves can be provided upon request. 4 0 5 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. equilibrium quantity supplied. This suggests that, in terms of competition among states, the initial change from Di to D2 will have a greater impact than future increases in demand. As was shown in Chapter 2, the shape of the long-run supply curve for bigeye and other fisheries dictates a period of transition in which scarcity rent is dissipated and competition forces less efficient fishers to exit the fishery. Data examined in Chapter 3 showed that the bigeye fishery was indeed undergoing such a shift due to a large increase in demand in the early 1990s (Di to D2). In the absence of regulation, further increases in demand might have hastened the process, but the effect on the biomass at long run equilibrium would have been quite small. As the bigeye example illustrates, the magnitude of any change in the long- run equilibrium will depend on several factors, including the elasticity of demand, the abundance of supply and the size of the shift in demand within a given fishery. Compare Figure 0.1 with Figure 0.2, which represents the market for canned tunas, mainly skipjack and yellowfm. The supply curve for bigeye has been included to indicate scale. Demand for cheaper fish that are valued mostly for their protein content rather than specific taste characteristics is expected to be much more elastic than for high quality fish that have fewer substitutes. Hence, the demand curves for these stocks are flatter, and much larger shifts are required to tip long-run -5 equilibrium to levels below maximum sustainable yield. 2 In this case, w e’re assuming that there is no depensation in the fishery. That is, there is no level o f biomass below which the stock would not be able to rebound. Fishers would actually have to take the last two fish to cause extinction o f the species. Because bigeye is a schooling fish, it is possible that dispensation exists in the fishery. It might not be cost effective to capture the last bigeye tuna, but the last school o f bigeye might be worth it. However, most scientists agree that only extremely high levels o f exploitation could cause the disappearance o f bigeye from the Atlantic. 3 The apex o f each supply curve is MSY for that specific stock. 406 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Figure R.2: Shifts in Demand for Tropical Tunas4 LRS Skipjack (SKJ) Yellowfin (YFT) Bigeye (BET) Y3 S3 Y2 S2 QyI *Qy2 Qs2 Qsi While the transition may be prolonged, as demand curve D3 shows, skipjack and yellowfm tuna will begin transition into a position similar to that of bigeye once 4 These species are captured together and, although they may be targeted separately, generally command the same price no matter what the make-up o f the catch. In this sense, Figure 0 .2 is somewhat misleading, although it does correspond w/ value per metric ton data, which shows that yellowfin commands a higher price. However, this is due to the aggregated nature o f the Trade and Commodities Database, which combines prices o f juvenile yellowfin for canning (80% o f landings) and adult yellowfin used for sushi or steaks. The curves in Figure 0 .2 were derived in the same way and at the same time as those for Figure 0 .1 , with special attention to maintaining the comparability and scale o f the model. 407 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. demand becomes high enough. This is likely to occur sooner for yellowfm, which has historically been exploited at low levels for sushi and other high-end products, in addition to its more common usage in canneries. The rate of change will be much slower for skipjack, but each of these stocks can be expected to progress towards biological depletion as demand increases. Given that these stocks are even more widely distributed than bigeye and they are exploited by a more variegated array of fishing states, management response would be harder to achieve for these stocks if current institutions persist. 0.2 Supply Side Another noticeable difference between the tropical tunas is the abundance of the Atlantic stocks. The larger long-run supply curves for skipjack and yellowfin tuna dampen the effects of increasing demand. Figure 0.3 shows the effect that an outward shift in the long-run supply curve can have on long-run equilibrium when demand is also increasing. Specifically, this figure represents the market for Atlantic swordfish, which was supplied mainly from the northern stock until the late 1980s. At that point, a large portion of the swordfish fleet moved into the southern Atlantic, opening up a new stock and thereby causing the long-run supply of the fish to shift outward. Note that, once the southern stock is opened for exploitation, the market price is determined by the combined supply for the entire Atlantic. The long run equilibrium price decreases from Pi to Pi a , while the quantity supplied from the North Atlantic stock actually increases from Qi to Q tA. However, as demand rises from Di to D2, the long run equilibrium for the northern stock shifts from ( Q i a , P ia ) 4 0 8 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. to (Q2 T 2), where price is higher and quantity supplied is lower than it had been originally. Figure R.3: Shift in Long Run Supply for Atlantic Swordfish5 LRS North A tla n tic A ll A tla n tic B igeye (BET) 1A - 1988-1990 - > IT MSY, 5 These curves were derived in the same manner as those in Figures 0 . 1 and 0 .2 . Again, the LRS for bigeye tuna was included to provide scale. 4 0 9 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. As the swordfish example shows, when demand is constantly increasing, expansion of the long-run supply curve can only temporarily ameliorate the problems associated with open-access fisheries. The case studies in Chapters 3 and 4 present numerous examples of this phenomenon, including movements of vessels from the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian Oceans in search of better fishing on tropical tunas as well as deployment of deeper gear that could reach portions of a stock that had previously been unexploited. Unlike demand for tuna and tuna like species, the supply of these fish is limited. The only area in which expansion of long-run supply of highly migratory species might be tenable is in the Western and Central Pacific, which has just recently come under the jurisdiction of a new regional fisheries organization. However, according to the FAO's Atlas of Tunas and Billfish, as well as the scientific findings of regional fisheries bodies, all four of the commercially valuable stocks in this study are either fully exploited or overexploited throughout their ranges.6 Therefore, it is unlikely that growing demand will be met by increasing long-run supply in the future as it has in the past. At the same time, declining costs of production inversely impact the long-run supply curve. As economies of scale make fishing technologies cheaper to produce and capital shifts to take advantage of purchasing power parity, current landings increase, detracting from future production and causing the long-run supply curve to shift inward. In this more gradual reversal of the scenario depicted in Figure 0.3, contracting long-run supply compounds the effects of increasing demand discussed earlier. This results in a long-run equilibrium in which the stock biomass is smaller, competition is tougher, and fewer flag states can survive in the absence of regulation. 6 FAO Atlas o f Tuna and Billfish Catches. 410 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Unlike expansion of the resource base, cost-cutting is still a viable option for temporarily increasing catches in many fisheries. The dynamics associated with this survival technique will continue to have a strong impact on future management of high migratory species. 0 .3 Non-commercial Stocks The outlook is quite different for low-volume, low-value stocks like blue- and-white marlin. As noted in Appendix E, the level of gear interaction and the production function for the targeted species determines the volume of marlin that is caught in commercial fisheries. Given seasonal variations, price fluctuations and other factors, landings of marlin are difficult to predict. Furthermore, uncertainty due to misreporting of dead discards hinders the estimation o f the actual fishing mortality on these by-catch species. Even so, it is not unreasonable to assume that increasing effort on targeted species will lead to higher levels of marlin by-catch. In the absence of regulation, increasing demand for marlins would lead to a higher retention rate, but this effect would be dwarfed by the impact of increasing demand for target species. Figure 0.4 illustrates this point in a rather crude, yet striking manner. Note that in this case, the long-run supply curves for blue and white marlins are based on a production function that treats them as incidental rather than target species. As such, the market for the target species determines the level of fishing effort and ultimately the long-run equilibrium for these by-catch fishes. This is why the long-run quantity supplied of blue and white marlins is set by the price of North Atlantic swordfish. When demand for the target species is quite low, increases could have a significant 411 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. impact on catches of blue-and-white marlin. However, when demand is high, as it is for North Atlantic swordfish, further increases will have little substantive effect on the volume of by-catch. This is because the stock has already been depleted so far that interaction between the gear and the by-catch stock is minimal. 412 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. n Figure R.4: Long Run Supply for Billfish Stocks Northern Swordfish (NSWO) Blue Marlin (BUM) LRS W hite Marlin (WHM) NSW 0 2 N SW 01 'NSW 0 2 W O l Qwhm Q b u m Three major factors have been omitted from Figure 0.4. First, although marlins are by-catch in both Atlantic swordfish and bigeye fisheries, the figure has been limited to northern swordfish because of the significant differences in scale 7 These curves were derived in the same manner as those in Figures 0 .1 -0 .3 . Because SCRS formulated stock assessments for blue and white marlins based on data from fleets that capture them incidentally, these long run supply curves are only representative o f the stocks as by-catch. This is why I did not place in demand curve for marlins in this figure. 413 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. between these by-catch species and the target stocks. The long-run supply curves for both marlins would be virtually invisible if placed in relation to all Atlantic swordfish or bigeye tuna. Second, the shape of the long-run supply curves for marlins neglects the possibility that depensation exists in the fishery. Because of the dispersion of the species and the fact that fishers do not directly consider the costs of extraction when determining their level of effort for by-catch, it is possible that long- run equilibrium for these stocks would actually hit the y-axis, rather than simply approaching it. Third, because the calculations in Figure 0.4 are based on landings of marlins rather than catches, actual fishing mortality will be even higher in the long-run. Since the abundance of blue and white marlins is so low relative to other commercially exploited fishes, there is little chance that they will ever be anything other than a by-catch species. An exceptionally large increase in demand for marlins would be required to make them profitable to exploit commercially. However, if this were to happen, the production function for these stocks would become more efficient and the long-run supply curves would contract accordingly. Because of this, it is unlikely that growing demand for fish generally or even an exogenous shift in preference for marlins would ever make these species commercially viable given their existing level of overexploitation. Other by-catch species such as spiny dog fish, menhaden and orange roughy are somewhat more abundant than marlins and these fish have been able to make the transition from incidental to targeted species. Between their natural scarcity and constantly growing demand, prices for highly migratory species of fish are expected to increase in the long-run without really improving the profitability of the fisheries. For commercial stocks, this means 414 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. that incentives to enter a fishery will become stronger even as the availability of the fish declines. In the absence of regulation, market shares for the commercially valuable species would shift to the most flexible and efficient fleets as the fisheries approach various long-run equilibria, all of which entail heavily depleted stocks and high marginal costs of production. This transition was already underway for the high-value stocks in the case studies and is likely to occur for high-volume, low value yellowfin and skipjack tunas, albeit at a slower pace. Marlins are not expected to transition out of the by-catch category due to their extremely low abundance relative to the target stocks with which they interact. Even so, as overall fishing effort increases relative to the available biomass, both commercially targeted and by- catch species will come under increasing strain. 4 1 5 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Webster, DG (author)

Core Title The fortunes of fishes and fishers: The political economy of innovation in Atlantic resource management

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Economy and Public Policy

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquaculture,Economics, Agricultural,OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, international law and relations

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-619267

Unique identifier UC11335966

Identifier 3220167.pdf (filename),usctheses-c16-619267 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 3220167.pdf

Dmrecord 619267

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Webster, DG

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

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Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA