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Securitizing language: political elites and language policy securitization in South Korea
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Securitizing language: political elites and language policy securitization in South Korea
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SECURITIZING LANGUAGE:
Political Elites and Language Policy Securitization in South Korea
by
Eunice Y . Kang
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirement for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
December 2016
2
Acknowledgements
This dissertation would not have been possible without the tremendous support of my
husband, Hayoon Kim, and my parents, Won and Jason Kang.
I also owe thanks to my young son Myles who had to adapt to different childcare
situations while I worked. I could not have finished my work without the help of great
friends who cared for him — Rachael Kang, Esther Bang, Kristy Jeong, Eunjoo Kim,
Alysa Heinz, Ashley Chang — and of course, my parents-in-law, Susan Lee and Donny
Kim.
I am grateful to my adviser, Dr. Laurie Brand, who read through countless drafts and
provided invaluable feedback throughout the entire process. I would also like to thank my
dissertation committee members, Dr. Sun-young Park and Dr. Daniel Lynch, for their
insight and encouragement on my work. Thank you to Dr. Veri Chavarin for always
having her door open to me and providing behind-the-scenes support; to Dr. Saori Katada
for her administrative help, which enabled me to finish my dissertation from the East
Coast; and to my mentor, Dr. Kathy Rim, for her daily emails to keep me on track.
I would also like to deeply thank my dear sister, Christine Kang, and my friends, Alicia
Cruz, Sarah Son, Helen Lee, and Joanne Kim, for their help with proof-reading many
chapter drafts. A big thank you to my close friends, Hannah Lee, Christina Kim, and
Bonnie Mays, for all of their encouraging emails and text messages of prayers. I am also
grateful to my graduate program colleagues Matthew Mendez and Kym MacNeal for
their friendship and camaraderie in cheering each other on and celebrating our individual
successes.
I am grateful to all of the wonderful people who played an influential part in helping me
get where I am today. With the knowledge gained from this journey, I hope to make a
difference in the world.
3
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Language Securitization and Policy Shifts 4
Chapter 2 History of the Korean Language Before 1948 33
Chapter 3 Language Policies under Rhee and Park: 55
The Battle between Hangul and Hanja in the 1950s-1980s
Chapter 4 Language Policies Under Kim and Lee: 95
English for National Security and the “Globalization” of Language
Policies in the 1990s-2000s
Chapter 5 Language Policies Under Lee and Park: 132
A New Direction? Revival of Korean Language Policies for
Cultural Security
Chapter 6 Conclusions 165
Bibliography 175
4
Chapter 1
Language Securitization and Policy Shifts
Introduction
South Korea is “one of the most linguistically and ethnically homogeneous countries in
the world.”
1
Even if some disagree, at the very least, South Korea projects a strong
image of monolingualism and ethnic homogeneity. Phrases such as “pure Korean blood,”
“common ancestry” and “homogenous Korea” have been regularly used in official
political discourse and taught regularly in schools to refer to the country’s ethnicity,
2
while in the realm of language the vast majority of the population speaks Korean, which
is the predominant language used in all state, educational, cultural, religious and media
institutions. Indeed, there is a perception that Korean monolingualism is a “natural”
outcome born of the historical sociolinguistic patterns of an ethnically homogeneous
people. But is monolingualism a natural outcome for South Korea, or is it actually a
surprising outcome given its multilingual
3
past?
An examination of Korean history shows that periods of multilingualism actually
predominate. For most of Korea’s history from ancient times during the Three Kingdoms
Period until the end of the 19
th
century, Korean elites knew two languages: they spoke
Korean but wrote in Chinese. Even when the Korean alphabet and writing system were
introduced in 1446, the Korean elites continued to write in Chinese. Later, during the
Japanese colonization of Korea (1910-1945), the Japanese restricted and banned the
1
Baker and Prys-Jones, 1998:382, cited by Park, Joseph Sung-Yul. (2008). Two Processes of Reproducing
Monolingualism in South Korea. Sociolinguistic Studies, 2(3), 331-345. and he also quotes this in his book,
Local Constructions of a Global Language, Ideologies of English in South Korea p. 29; this view is also
2
Kang, Shin-who. (2008, December 22). Is Korea Homogenous Country? Koreatimes. Retrieved from
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2009/10/242_36575.html
3
Multilingualism refers to a society in which a number of languages are used; as defined by Spolsky,
Bernard. (2004). Language Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5
Korean language and it was supplanted by Japanese. After the expulsion of the Japanese,
during the American occupation of South Korea (1945-1948), the American leaders
designated English as the official language of the government and English was imposed
in all public schools’ curriculum. So in 1948, when the newly established South Korean
government was determining which language(s) should be official, South Korea was
multilingual. Many Koreans knew up to four languages: Korean, Chinese, Japanese and
English, albeit to differing degrees of proficiency. Yet some sixty years later, South
Korea had become overwhelmingly monolingual. This study seeks to account for the
development whereby South Korea was transformed into a monolingual society, when
only a half a century earlier, it had been multilingual. The argument presented here is
that this was achieved by implementing language policies that were wrapped in the
rhetoric of “security.”
The historical experience of having its language almost eliminated and devalued
among competing languages (Chinese, Japanese and English) perhaps predisposed its
elites to make a security issue out of language and language-related concerns. After
1948, political elites sought to change South Korea into a mainly monolingual society by
passing laws that established Korean as the only national language. They made both
direct and indirect efforts to influence, manipulate or intervene in the language of the
people by seeking to amend national laws or make new ones in the name of “security,”
trying to change language policy in order to “protect” and “preserve” Korean language
and culture. By framing language issues in terms of security, political elites claimed they
had the right to take extraordinary measures in the form of unilateral decisions on
language policy in order to manage the issue. As a result the securitization of language
6
issues provides a useful lens through which to explore South Korea’s language shift
toward monolingualism.
Throughout history, political elites have often sought to connect language issues
with security concerns, but they have not always chosen to do so. Indeed there has been
variation in the framing of language issues over time, thus raising the question: Under
what conditions do political elites attempt to securitize language, as part of a strategy to
shift language policy to address a threat? To answer this question, this study will draw
and build on securitization theory. It examines a range of official texts to explore the
emergence of securitization discourse in the context of military security threats and threat
of large protest, which has the potential to lead to social instability, that have faced the
Korean government since 1948, under periods of both democratic and authoritarian rule.
In addition, this study explores the process of securitization as the interplay between
security framing and top-down policy-making in order to address a threat.
Language Policy
Definition of Language Policy
Traditional notions of language policy portray laws or regulations enacted by a
government or policy.
4
For example, national language laws generally specify which
languages must be used in official governmental documents, media, and public signage,
while language education policies generally specify not only the medium of instruction
but also school curriculum that sets requirements on a second or foreign language
4
Johnson, David Cassels. (2013). Language Policy. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan.
7
education. The purpose of language policies is to shape or manipulate a society’s
linguistic behavior.
5
A broadened definition of language policy, however, would encompass not only
official regulations enacted by some authoritative body, but also “unofficial principles
and cultural constructs that emerge within a community” such as “beliefs and ideologies
about language as well as language practices.
6
”
7
For example, Schiffman and Spolsky
point to the language practices of a family as a form of language policy. Although the
definition of “language policy” could also be extended to encompass language beliefs,
ideologies, and practices, the value of conflating these with language policies that are
enacted by the government is not clear. Johnson argues that it is actually helpful to
distinguish between language ideology and language policy as distinct but interconnected
concepts, just as he argues against conflating “language attitudes and practices” as
language policies.
8
He defines language policy as:
A policy mechanism that impacts the structure, function, use, or acquisition of
language and includes:
1. Official regulations- often enacted in the form of written documents, intended
to effect some change in the form, function, use, or acquisition of language-
which can influence economic, political, and educational opportunity;
2. Unofficial, covert, de facto, and implicit mechanisms, connected to language
beliefs and practices, that have regulating power over language use and
interaction within communities, workplaces, and schools;
3. Not just products but processes- ‘policy’ as a verb, not a noun- that are driven
by a diversity of language policy agents across multiple layers of policy
creation, interpretation, appropriation, and instantiation;
4. Policy texts and discourses across multiple contexts and layers of policy
activity, which are influenced by the ideologies and discourses unique to that
context.
9
5
Kaplan, Robert and Baldauf, Richard Jr. (2003). Language and Language in Education Planning in the
Pacific Rim. New York: Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 6.
6
Language practices is defined as “all modes of human interactions such as patterns in conversations,
utterances, and interactions” in Johnson, Language Policy, 7-8.
7
Johnson, Language Policy. 7.
8
Ibid., 9.
9
Ibid.
8
In this way, Johnson’s definition of language policy encompasses the spectrum of types
of language policy that scholars have identified.
Origins of Language Policy
Language policy is an interdisciplinary field, but it originated as a branch of
sociolinguistics in the 1950s and 1960s when Western-trained language scholars became
interested in solving the language problems of new, developing, and/or post-colonial
nations of Africa, South America and Asia.
10
Following World War II, many newly
independent countries emerged from the disintegration of colonial empires and were
faced with the question of national language policy. The transition from colonial status
to independence provided an opportunity for a country to decide or reconsider its
language policy.
11
During this era, many linguists were recruited to help develop
grammar, writing systems and dictionaries for indigenous language; from there, many
language scholars became interested in how a society could best allocate functions and or
uses for particular languages known as “status planning.”
12
Status planning questions
included: which language should be official and which language should be used in
schools and in the media.
13
These status planning decisions were generally made by the
political elites of the state, and the early scholarship of the field reflected the focus of
languages policies as an activity done by governing polities for an established purpose.
10
Johnson, Language Policy, 27; Ricento, Thomas (Ed.). (2006). An Introduction to Language Policy:
Theory and Method. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 13.
11
Spolsky, Language Policy, 133.
12
Johnson, Language Policy. 27.
13
Ibid.
9
Types of Language Policies
Language policies may be divided into different categories or approaches. First there are
“top-down” vs. “bottom-up” language policies, referring to the manner in which language
policy decisions are made.
14
Kaplan and Baldauf define “top-down” language policies as
“policies that come from people of power and the authority to make decisions for a
certain group, without consulting the end users of the language” (emphasis mine).
15
In
top-down policy-making, the opinions of the affected population are often ignored. In
contrast, “bottom-up” language policies are driven by smaller communities and provide
an avenue for individual or community-led decisions to be made for language needs and
uses.
16
Thus, policies may be debated, formulated and enacted at many different levels,
more obviously through national governments and their agencies, but also below the level
of the state: regional and local government, institutions of civil society such as NGOs and
interest groups, communities or neighborhoods, and families.
17
Second approach involves the explicit/implicit distinction, which refers to the
status of a policy (official vs. unofficial) and how a policy is promulgated--whether
formulated and detailed in some written document or not.
18
Language policies are easiest
to recognize when they are explicit-- “clear-cut labeled statements in official
documents.”
19
They might take the form of “a clause in a national constitution, or a
14
Kaplan 1989 as cited in Kaplan, Robert and Baldauf, Richard Jr. (1997). Language Planning from
Practice to Theory. Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 196.
15
Kaplan and Baldauf (1998), 196. In Gill, Saran. (2014). Language Policy Challenges in Multi-Ethnic
Malaysia. New York: Springer Science + Business Media Dordrecht, 12.
16
Kaplan and Baldauf (1997), 196, 209. In Gill, Language Policy Challenges in Multi-Ethnic Malaysia, 12.
17
Stevenson, Patrick and Carl, Jenny. (2010) Language and Social Change in Central Europe: Discourses
on Policy, Identity and the German Language. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 12.
18
Johnson, Language Policy, 10.
19
Spolsky, Language Policy, 11.
10
language law, or a cabinet document or an administrative regulation.”
20
About 125 of the
world’s constitutions explicitly state some policy about language, and approximately 100
of these name one or more official or national languages with special privileges of use.
21
On the other hand, there are “language policies that are implicit--not necessarily written
in a formal document. For example, the United States does not explicitly declare English
to be the official language “but unofficially, or implicitly, it certainly is.”
22
England is
also a case where language policies are implicit; “one must search for the implicit lines of
policies in a maze of customary practices, laws, regulations and court decisions.”
23
Theoretical Developments of the Field of Language Policy
Early Language Policy Scholarship: Propensity for Monolingualism
The history of the field of language policy can be divided into three main stages.
Following the wave of decolonization, the first stage of language policy scholarship was
characterized by a propensity to advocate monolingualism (in the context of multilingual
states), usually based on the colonial language or the “majority language,” the language
of the dominant ethno-linguistic group of the country. This view held that the selection
of a single national language (ie. colonial or indigenous) should be based on which
language was supposedly the most “useful and efficient.”
24
Scholars argued that it was
possible to divorce the “objective science” of language policy from its inherent
sociopolitical and ideological implications.
25
For example, Tauli (1974) argued that the
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Johnson, Language Policy, 11.
23
Spolsky, Language Policy. 13.
24
Johnson, Language Policy, 29.
25
Ibid.
11
efficiency and usefulness of a language is based on its ability to “describe things
effectively.”
26
Among Western sociolinguists, there was a consensus that major colonial
languages (such as French or English) were the most descriptive and efficient; thus,
colonial languages should be used for formal and specialized domains while local
languages could serve other functions.
27
The idea of a hierarchy of languages had the
effect of “lowering the status and relegating the domains of indigenous language to local
uses, while elevating the status and extending the domains of the former colonial
language” to state and international level uses.
28
The second option under monolingualism was choosing the national language
based on the “majority” language. This approach claimed to be scientifically neutral and
dominated by an interest in the individual. Schmidt argues that a key element in the
support of a majority language was that it facilitates “social mobility, higher earnings,
and integration into the dominant culture.”
29
Research in the economics of language then
applied economic models and principles to operationalize these claims as testable
hypothesis.
30
One of the important conclusions from this research was that
multilingualism, usually based on minority ethnic languages, often leads to market
failures.
31
According to Grin, political elites’ decisions to minimize language diversity
were believed to be “justified and necessary.”
32
Thus, decisions made by political elites
to choose a “majority language” as the national language were considered to be for the
societal good.
26
Tauli (1974:51)
27
Ricento, An Introduction to Language Policy, 13.
28
Ibid.
29
Cited by Ricento, An Introduction to Language Policy, 8.
30
Ricento, An Introduction to Language Policy, 8.
31
Ibid.
32
Cited by Ricento, Thomas (Ed.). (2006). An Introduction to Language Policy: Theory and Method.
Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 8.
12
This view is not too different from the one theorized by Laitin (2011), although he
wrote his work well after the first wave of language policy scholars. In his
groundbreaking work on African language policy, Laitin theorized that states should
adopt one language or at least minimize the number of official languages to promote
efficiency.
33
He argues that political elites have an interest in “language rationalization”
defined as “the territorial specification of a common language for purposes of efficient
administration and rule.”
34
German sociologist, Weber used the term “rationalization” to
refer to the process by which a state establishes efficient and orderly rule.
35
Although
Weber did not specifically discuss language rationalization, Laitin argues that “the use of
state power, through administrative regulation and public education, to standardize
language within the boundaries of the state” falls under Weber’s concept of it.
36
Political elites have sought to transform their multilingual societies into
monolingual societies through policies of “language rationalization” for the following
benefits: legal uniformity is easier to ensure when court decisions are delivered and
recorded in a common language; taxes can be collected more efficiently and monitored
more effectively if merchants all keep their books in the same language; state regulations
can be disseminated more efficiently if translations are not necessary; and territorial
boundaries are easier to patrol if the population at the boundary speak the language of the
country’s political center.
37
Frequent calls by leaders for a single national language
reflect a belief in the principles of “language rationalization” that efficiency and
33
Laitin, David. (2007). Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 18.
34
Ibid., 9.
35
Cited by Laitin, Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa, 9-10.
36
Ibid., 10.
37
Ibid.
13
development are associated with the policy of a single, official language in the
government and education.
Second Stage in the Field of Language Policy: Critical Scholarship (1980s-1990s)
Over time, critical views on the supposed apolitical, neutral, objective, and scientific
nature of early language policy approaches emerged. The view that economic
development and increased efficiency were somehow connected to the establishment of a
single national language in newly independent states was called into question. The view
of monolingualism and cultural homogeneity as necessary requirements for social and
economic progress, modernization and national unity were challenged. Scholars
acknowledged that such policies often created and sustained social inequality among
dominant and minority language users and that political elites usually promoted the
interests of dominant social groups.
38
Scholars also argued that “decisions made about
language policies” and processes of language change were not necessarily objective,
neutral, fair or for the greater good; but “ultimately reflect[ed] power relations among
different groups and sociopolitical and economic interests.”
39
Tollefson criticizes the
work of the early period as failing to “capture the complex social and political context of
language policies” and accepting “uncritically the claims of state authorities.
40
As more linguists focused on the relationship between language and power, the
“critical movement in linguistics and sociolinguistics” emerged in the 1990s.
41
The
notion that language policies create social inequality among dominant and minority
38
Johnson, Language Policy. 40.
39
Ricento, Thomas (2006). Theoretical Perspectives in Language Policy: An Overview. In Ricento, An
Introduction to Language Policy:
40
Tollefson 2002:4, as cited in Gill, Saran. (2007). Shift in Language Policy in Malaysia: Unraveling
reasons for Change, Conflict, and Compromise in Mother-Tongue Education. AILA Review, 20, 107.
41
Johnson, Language Policy, 33.
14
languages users was a central tenant in this new approach.
42
Critical scholars revealed
that shifts in language policy were a manifestation of asymmetrical power relations based
on social structures and ideologies that position groups – and their languages--
hierarchically within a society.
43
Scholars looked at sociolinguistic arrangements not as
inevitable or logical, but rather as the result of political processes.
During this period, many critical scholars were concerned that institutions
associated with governance and the state underpinned inequality and supported a
hegemonic world order. Rubin (1986) argued that not just one actor (the state), but rather
the greatest possible number of concerned parties should be involved in language
planning and policy-making.
44
Fishman’s (1990) model of “Reversing Language Shift”
recognized the existence of strong counter forces working for the recognition of minority
language and rights against the pressure of central nation-state for linguistic
homogeneity. This model was directed at practical efforts to support continued use of
minority languages. In this view, multilingualism, not monolingualism, was seen as
“normal,” “its recognition and acceptance… an important requirement for the realization
of meaningful democracy,” and a “basic human right” for national minorities.
45
Third Stage in the Field of Language Policy: Move Towards Multilingualism (2000s)
Following the critiques made against monolingualism, especially ones based on colonial
languages or language of the dominant ethno-linguistic group, a “central movement”
42
Ibid., 39.
43
Ricento, Thomas (2006). Theoretical Perspectives in Language Policy: An Overview. In Ricento, An
Introduction to Language Policy.
44
Rubin, J. (1986). p. 119. Cited By Jernudd, Bjorn and Nekvapil Jiri. (2012). History of the field: a sketch.
In Spolsky, Bernard (Ed.). The Cambridge Handbook of Language Policy. (p. 28). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
45
Ricento, Thomas (2006). Theoretical Perspectives in Language Policy: An Overview. In Ricento, An
Introduction to Language Policy, 15.
15
toward the promotion of multilingualism and of indigenous languages emerged.
46
The
theoretical development of the field shifted to seek more democratic policies that reduced
inequality, promoted the maintenance of minority languages, and resisted the hegemony
of colonial languages throughout the world.
47
A new wave of scholars made great efforts
to maintain and develop linguistic diversity in order to preserve and protect minority and
indigenous languages. The work of political theorist Kymlicka on multicultural
citizenship provides a detailed argument in support of the pluralist position.
48
For
Kymlicka, the well-being of the individual is the proper moral foundation for a
community, and this well-being must be defined by that individual (not, for example, by
the state), which means that s/he needs to be free to define what is meaningful and
worthwhile in her/his own life. Applying this approach to language policy, Schmidt
concludes:
The implications of Kymlicka’s arguments are powerful for ethnolinguistic
groups that are basic components for a multilingual country. In order to give
individuals fair equality and opportunities to realize their own conception for a
good life, the state must try to provide equally effective support for the structures
of each component ethnolinguistic community making up the country. This would
seem to provide a powerful and reasoned support for language policy in support
of multiple languages in a multilingual country.
49
Kymlicka’s focus on the individual as the moral foundation for a community is
compatible with the “bottom-up” approach of language policy-making that focuses on
grassroots movements. Linguistic minorities can resist top-down language policies that
46
Johnson, Language Policy. 47.
47
Ibid., 40.
48
Schmidt, Ronald, Sr (2006). Political Theory and Language Policy. In Ricento, An Introduction to
Language Policy, 105.
49
Schmidt, Ronald, Sr (2006). Political Theory and Language Policy. In Ricento, An Introduction to
Language Policy, 106).
16
tend to favor the interests of the dominant sociopolitical group by engaging in “bottom-
up” language policies to guarantee the rights of minority languages and their users.
Language Policy Today: Explaining Shifts in Language Policy
Language policy as an interdisciplinary field continued to evolve through expanding
research to language matters in education, economics, political science, history,
sociology, geography and other fields.
50
Some topics in language policy research over
the past half century have attracted more attention than others. Explaining language
policy choice and shifts by national/state governments and their agencies is one area in
which there is growing interest (Liu and Ricks 2012, Geertz 1994, Simpson 2007,
PuruShotam 1998, Tarling 2004, Brown 2009, R. Ganguly 2003, S. Ganguly 2003).
Indeed language policies are not static; they shift and are shaped over time and
there is no shortage of potential factors that may shift language policy in the direction of
either monolingualism or multilingualism.
51
Changes in language and language policy
“exist in highly complex, interactive and dynamic contexts.”
52
Tollefson (1991) argues
that language policy shifts are a result of the sociopolitical and historical context
53
and
proposed that an “historical-structural approach” should be used to analyze the creation
and shifts in language policies.
54
Spolsky similarly argues, “A host of non-linguistic
factors (political, demographic, social, religious, cultural, psychological, bureaucratic and
so on) regularly account for any attempts by persons or groups” to shift language
50
Ricento, Thomas. (2006). Language Policy: Theory and Practice- An Introduction. In Ricento, An
Introduction to Language Policy, 18.
51
Liu, Amy H., and Ricks, Jacob I. (2012) Coalitions and Language Politics: Policy Shifts in Southeast
Asia. World Politics 64(3), 477.
52
Spolsky, Bernard. (2004). Language Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 6.
53
Johnson, Language Policy. 226.
54
Ibid., 39.
17
policy.
55
Gill also observes that many scholars have argued that the reasons underpinning
changes in language polices could be “social, educational, political or economic.”
56
Ostensibly missing from this list of explanatory factors is national or societal
“security.” Although security could overlap with political, economic or cultural reasons,
it is worth distinguishing security as a distinct concept. Security is no longer restricted to
the narrow confines of military or physical threats, and language issues are beginning to
be recognized as a non-traditional security concern along with the environment, energy,
migration and health issues. But can language issues really affect state security? When
security is understood as more than just military power, it can.
Copenhagen School’s Securitization Theory
To show how issues such as language have been constructed as a security concern, it is
useful to review the theoretical contribution of the so called Copenhagen School (CS):
the issues at stake in securitization; how CS’s assumptions and concerns differ from those
of other schools; and how it defines “securitization.”
Origins of Copenhagen School
After the end of the Cold War, an intellectual “dissatisfaction” with the traditional
conception of security emerged.
57
As the East-West military confrontation diminished,
the military focus of security studies seemed anachronistic, thus leading to calls for a
broadening of the conception of security to include non-military issues in security
55
Spolsky, Language Policy, 6.
56
Gill, Language Policy Challenges in Multi-Ethnic Malaysia.
57
Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, Security, 2.
18
studies.
58
This dissatisfaction was first stimulated by the rise of economic and
environmental concerns in international relations during the 1970s and 1980s and later by
the rise of identity issues and transnational crime during the 1990s.
59
The collapse of
bipolarity also weakened neorealism’s arguments of explaining international conflict at
the system level and “self-help” at the unit level.
60
A post-Cold War world opened up the
field to explain conflict in levels of analysis below the system and unit level to include
subunits and individual level. This allowed those arguing for broadening of security
studies to look at non-military causes of conflict in the international system and also look
at the role of non-state actors. In this context, securitization theory was introduced
which argued for the widening of the conception of security to include military, political,
economic, environmental and societal sectors.
Overview of Copenhagen School
Within international relations, the concept of securitization is connected with the
Copenhagen School (CS) of security studies. It is a synthesis of constructivism and
neorealism, with its origins in international relations theorist Buzan’s book, People States
and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (1983). In this
work, Buzan introduced “security complex theory,” which holds that “the logic of
security stems from the fact that international security is a relational matter.”
61
International security is about “how human collectivities relate to each other in terms of
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid., 6.
61
Ibid., 10.
19
threats and vulnerabilities.”
62
A subsequent study, Security: A New Framework for
Analysis, by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), also a foundational text of the CS re-
conceptualization of security, argued for a “deepening” and “broadening” of the concept
by rejecting the idea that security studies is exclusively about war, that threats are
military-focused, and that the only legitimate referent object is the physical territory or
political sovereignty of the state.
63
It thus “widened” the traditional materialist security
studies by looking at security beyond the military sector to include the political, societal,
economic, and environmental.
64
For non-traditional security scholars, additional important dimensions of security
include economic and cultural power. In an increasingly economically interdependent
international system, exercising economic power can be as or more effective than
military power in protecting national economies and in ensuring economic security and
prosperity. In terms of cultural power, it is important to protect the state’s cultural
identity from foreign cultural imperialism and also to exert a state’s own cultural
influence and soft power on other states.
Critics of this approach argue that a progressive widening of the concept of
security endangers its intellectual coherence.
65
The concern is that allowing a broad
range of non-military issues (among them cultural issues) be viewed as security issues
would undermine the field. For example, Walt argued that security studies are about the
phenomenon of war and should be defined as “the study of the threat, use, and control of
62
Ibid.
63
Buzan, B. and Hansen, L. (2008). Widening and deepening security. In The Evolution of International
Security Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 187-225.
64
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security, 26.
65
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security, 2.
20
military force.”
66
He says that expanding security studies excessively to include non-
military issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse or economic recession would
destroy the intellectual coherence of realism.
67
This may be a valid concern, but even
some traditionalists have gradually loosened their insistence on the centrality of the
military and the state to security studies and accepted the need to look at nonmilitary
causes of conflict or threats.
The strength of the securitization framework is that it “explores the logic of
security to find out what differentiates security and the process of securitization from that
which is merely political” (emphasis mine).
68
It does this by defining security as a self-
referential practice where “an issue becomes a security issue, not necessarily because a
real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.”
69
It does
not ask what inherently is or is not a security problem; rather, it is interested in the
process by which “security” and “security threats” are constructed.
70
It does not assume
that certain issues are or are not innately threats, rather, it sees securitization as “a
political choice, a decision for conceptualization in a special way.”
71
Thus, the main difference between scholars of securitization and realism is their
understanding of threats. For realists, threats “exist,” are “objective” and “real” whereas
securitization scholars believe threats are socially constructed. That said, the
66
Cited in Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security, 3.
67
Walt, Stephen M. (1991). The Renaissance of Security Studies. International Studies Quarterly, 35:2, pp.
212-213 as cited in Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security, 4.
68
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security, 4.
69
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security, 24.
70
McDonald, Matt. (2008). Securitization and the Construction of Security. European Journal of
International Relations, 14(4), 563.
71
Waever, Ole. (1995). Securitization and Desecuritization. In Lipschutz Ronnie D. (Ed.). On Security. (p.
65). New York: Colombia University Press as cited Sheehan, Carrie. (2008). Securitizing the HIV/AIDS
pandemic in US Foreign Policy (Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved from
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.vcu.edu/docview/304684177/abstract/5F43B9EA88C94176PQ/1
21
securitization framework incorporates realism’s focus on the material aspects of security
by revealing them as socially constructed. The securitization approach helps improve our
understanding of security because it is able to explain the analytical assumptions
underlying “objective threats” held by traditional security scholars as in fact political
decisions made by political elites to classify an issue as a security problem. Thus, this
approach is able to explain realism’s focus on military and non-military sectors,
“traditional” threats, but also to address new, emerging threats that affect contemporary
international politics with the continued advancements in technology, communication and
transportation, further environmental degradation, evolution and spread of diseases, and
the like.
In sum, securitization is a process whereby actors (usually political elites)
transform issues into matters of security through discourse. By doing so, political elites
can then claim the right to handle the issue through emergency measures, bypassing the
normal political process. Securitization involves three main components: 1) a
securitizing actor (someone who makes the discursive statements invoking “security” on
an issue); 2) the “speech act” (the “securitized” discourse where an existential threat and
referent object are defined by the securitizing actor); and 3) an audience (those who need
to be persuaded by the speech act that political elites should be allowed to suspend
“normal politics” in dealing with the issue.
72
This does not mean, however, that everything can easily be securitized. In order to
successfully securitize an issue, a securitizing actor has to perform a “speech act”
(present something as an existential threat to a referent object), which has then to be
accepted by the audience. Only once it is accepted by the audience can the issue be
72
McDonald, Securitization and the Construction of Security, 567.
22
moved from the sphere of normal politics to emergency politics, thus allowing political
elites to break normal procedures and rules and implement exceptional measures.
The Securitizing Actor
Buzan et al. argue that the articulator, the securitizing actor, must be in a position of
authority,
73
and the securitization framework has traditionally focused on the role of
political leaders in the articulation and designation of threat both because they are the
ones who are able to secure a wide audience for their statements and because they are
able to marshal the resources of the state to respond to an existential threat.
74
The Speech Act
Waever (1995) based his notion of securitization in language theory, grounded in
Austin’s articulation of the “speech act.”
75
Austin (1975) argues that speech acts are
“performatives,” meaning, “By saying it, an action is performed.” Examples of
performative statements include the declaration of marriage between two people, the
naming of a ship, making a promise and making a bet.
76
In the same way, when inserting
the word “security” into an issue, that formerly “non-securitized” (bounded by
democratic rules and political procedures) issue is now “securitized” (meaning the issue
is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions
outside the normal bounds of political procedure).
77
73
Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, Security, 33.
74
McDonald, Securitization and the Construction of Security, 563-587.
75
Waever argues “Security is a speech act” in Waever Ole. (1995). Securitization and Desecuritization. In
Lipschutz, On Security, 55.
76
Waever, Ole (1988). Security, the Speech Act, unpublished manuscript; Austin, J. L. (1975). How to Do
Things with Words. Second Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 98.
77
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security, 24.
23
A speech act needs two elements: designation or construction of an existential
threat and the identification of a referent object (that which needs to be protected).
78
Referent objects are “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a
legitimate claim to survival.”
79
A legitimate referent object usually has a quality that is a
shared value among the public. Buzan et al. say a “referent object for security has
traditionally been the state and in a more hidden way, the nation.”
80
Audience
Waever’s work on securitization (1995) focused on speech acts and the securitizing actor,
but the book he co-authored with Buzan and de Wilde three years later introduced a new
component to securitization: the role of the audience in “backing up” speech acts. While
the focus on speech acts highlights securitization as a result of articulation by the actor,
the emphasis on the audience accentuates securitization as a negotiated process between
the actor and the audience. Stritzel investigates the “conceptual tension” that exists
between the emphasis on the subjective view of security as presented by the actor through
a speech act and the inter-subjective view of security where the actor must persuade the
audience to accept the “speech act” for a successful securitization. Balzacq (2005) is also
a major proponent of “bringing the audience back” to the securitization framework.
However, in bringing the audience back, McDonald argues that the power of the speech
act would appear to be undermined by the reliance on the audience’s acquiescence,
consent or support of security pronouncements.
78
Rens van Munster finds that an issue is securitized when an actor identifies a security threat and a
referent object; Buzan et al. hold that speech act must identify an appropriate threat and name a worthy
referent object. Buzan Waever, and de Wilde, Security.
79
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security, 36.
80
Ibid.
24
Thus, a major point of debate in the securitization framework is how one knows
when an issue has been securitized. Buzan et al. give a vague definition of how we are to
know when we are witnessing a case of securitization. They argue that it is when the
speech act by political leaders is “backed up” by governmental action that moves an issue
from “normal” politics to “emergency” measures. The dynamic of an issue’s moving
from normal politics to emergency politics is mentioned, but under-theorized. Buzan et
al. give examples of what is considered normal politics vs. emergency measures but do
not elaborate. The examples of emergency measures they give include “the form of
secrecy, levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights
or focusing society’s energy and resources on a specific task,” but they do not elaborate
further.
81
Normal politics, on the other hand, are democratic procedures or rules that
political elites are usually bound by. McDonald defines normal rules in terms of
domestic political debate or adherence to international rules and norms,
82
whereas
emergency measures are generally identified as military action, but this is obviously
problematic because it serves to “reify and normalize traditional military approaches to
security.”
83
Securitization Of Language Issues as a Tool for Shifting Language Policy
Generally, the mainstream view of securitization focuses on how the invocation of
security in political discourses often works to legitimize exceptional military measures to
eliminate or reduce a threat. But this study differs from the mainstream view in that it
argues that securitization may operate differently when it comes to language issues; that
81
Ibid., 24.
82
McDonald, Securitization and the Construction of Security, 567.
83
McDonald, Securitization and the Construction of Security, 563-587.
25
securitization may be a strategy political elites use in order to legitimize shifts in policy in
order to address a threat. Rather than being about military or police action, the
securitization of language issues has aimed at shifting language policy in a top-down
manner.
When securitizing policy discourses such as those surround language issues,
political elites claim a right to make quick, unilateral decisions to shift policy, not
necessarily for exceptional military measures to handle a threat. A top-down approach in
language policy decision-making is in line with emergency style politics: in such
circumstances a leader(ship) makes unilateral decisions on behalf of the group without
consulting “the end users of the language.”
84
When government decisions are carried out
and the opinions of the affected population are ignored, these actions are “outside” the
realm of normal politics. These actions stand in stark contrast to the often much slower
democratic process, which involves communication and argumentative procedures by
means of which various actors provide reasons, justifications and evidence as a way of
convincing the audience of the need to take a certain decision.
85
So while securitization
of language issues may not result in exceptional measures in the form of military or
police action, nevertheless, it bypasses the normal, public policy-making process as it
seeks to legitimize top-down decision-making toward language policy.
When political elites define threats to language issues, they can justify the need to
make quick, unilateral decisions in language policy under a strong sense of priority and
importance. Making top-down decisions is in line with the Copenhagen School’s notion
84
Kaplan, Robert and Baldauf, Richard Jr. (1997). Language Planning from Practice to Theory.
Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters Ltdm 196, as cited in Gill, Language Policy Challenges in Multi-Ethnic
Malaysia, 12.
85
Williams (2003), p. 522 in Van Munster, Securitizing Immigration, 37.
26
of securitization as a process that bypasses the normal, democratic rules of the game. The
Copenhagen School argues: “Securitization works to silence opposition and has given
power holders many opportunities to exploit ‘threats’ for domestic purposes, to claim a
right to handle something with less democratic control and constraint.”
86
Political elites
can leverage the security frame to make decisions outside democratic debates and public
policy-making procedures. The result is that the public has little opportunity to construct
alternative framings of an issue or to influence policy because political elites will justify
their decisions on the grounds that they are dealing with questions of national security: a
top-down decision to shift policy is portrayed as necessary to reduce the threat or risk.
With the introduction of a security framing in language issues, the routine policy-making
procedures that characterize more inclusive ways of decision-making are suspended.
Invocation of security in policy discourse relocates the authority to make decision at the
state-level by political actors to manage threats and not the audience.
Securitization as Silencing Opposition and Excluding Civil Society Discourse
Securitization is generally understood to be a negotiated process of constructing a
security threat by many actors seeking to define an issue as a question of security. The
following chapters, however, analyze primarily the official discourse of presidents and
state officials rather than civil society discourses. Critics may take issue that there is a
lack of analysis on forces opposing securitization. While it is true that securitization does
not operate in a vacuum;
87
nevertheless, this study focuses on official discourses because
in practice, once security is invoked by political elites, it becomes difficult for other
86
Buzan, Waver, et al (1998), p. 29 in Van Munster, Securitizing Immigration, 37.
87
Van Munster, Securitizing Immigration, 17.
27
actors to argue against this framing. This study argues that key actors such as presidents
and state officials generally have special authority to speak and invoke security and
power to take decisive action in policy-making. Thus, the emergence of security rhetoric
tends to close off and crowd-out alternative views.
88
Contributions and Importance of Findings
Ultimately, this study attempts to investigate the factors that have influenced the
rapid and multiple shifts in language policy toward monolingualism in South Korea. Its
theoretical objective is to explore the conditions under which political elites securitize
language in order to shift language policy. If there is a pattern of when securitized
discourse is utilized, it can be used to build to gain a clearer understanding of the
conditions under which securitization is used by political elites. Such a pattern can
indicate when political elites are likely to attach a security label to language issues in
order to shift language policy. Political elites do not necessarily securitize an issue based
on the “objective or scientific” degree of threat since threats can be constructed. Political
elites choose how to handle a major challenge- they can downplay a “threatening” issue
or conjure a security threat. Securitization is a choice and political elites may use it in
order to shift language policy in the face of a range of political, economic or cultural
military challenges or threats.
Securitization theorists assert that securitized issues receive a disproportionate
amount of attention and resources in comparison with non-securitized ones. Since
securitized issues can receive disproportionate attention and resources, some political
elites have attempted to use securitization as a convenient tactic to exert more clout and
88
Ibid.
28
limit opposition when shifting language policy. If an issue is securitized, then it is
possible to legitimize extraordinary means to manage a threat. This may tempt political
elites to engage in frequent securitization of a range of issues in order to achieve their
political agenda by making quick, unilateral top-down decisions (whether they be
military action or policy-making) instead of going through the normal political process in
decision-making. This would threaten the quality of a democratic, participatory-style of
government.
Framework for the Dissertation
The goal of this dissertation is to explore the conditions under democratic and
authoritarian systems in which political elites try to securitize language issues in order to
shift policy. The securitization framework only begins to address the conditions under
which political elites choose to securitize an issue. A weakness in the framework is the
under-development of conditions that facilitate the securitization of an issue. This study
attempts to develop a theoretical framework to explore other conditions under which
political elites in South Korea have attempted to securitize language issues in an effort to
shift language policy. To do so, the study will look at the political context and conditions
in cases where political elites have put forward their understanding of language as a
security issue. The two factors that this dissertation will examine are: 1) the type of
threat facing the state, whether military or non-military; and 2) the threat of large protest
that has the potential to undermine social stability. In democratic states, this study
hypothesizes that when military threats are low (or largely absent), political elites will use
securitization less or they will securitize non-military threats such as economic or cultural
29
issues in order to shift policy. In the face of a military threat, difficulty or uncertainty,
securitization is a tool that political elites can readily use to stoke fear in the public to
elicit cooperation and support for changes in language policy.
A second hypothesis is that political elites will also try to securitize language
issues when there is a threat of a large protest that could trigger social instability. In
democratic states, the support of the public and a majority in the legislative body are
critical in shifting policy. Under conditions where the threat of large protests can be
destabilizing and threatens the functioning or survival of the government, the president
may securitize language issues in order to muster public support and/or stifle dissent.
Securitization provides a moral standing to justify pushing through top-down policies.
By contrast, when the threat of domestic political opposition is low (or perceived to be
low), political elites may securitize less because they can shift policy with few concerns
regarding stability or survival of the government.
In democratic states, the public can be a strong political constraint against
political elites if it opposes the government. When the threat of public opposition against
the government is high, securitization may be used more frequently by political elites to
build public support and thwart possible protests in order to shift policy.
It is important to note that this study hypothesizes that political elites’ choice for
securitization of language issues depends on the threat of opposition in relation to the
strength of the government to carry out its political goals. Securitization will most likely
be used if public opposition in the form of violent protests can challenge the functioning
or survival of the government. Alternatively, if political elites perceive the public
opposition vis-à-vis the government to be weak, they may try to shift language policy
30
without resorting to securitization. Building on the securitization literature, this study
argues that the choice of securitization by political elites is the product of a combination
of a high level of military threat and threat of social unrest, specifically the threat and
eruption of protests, facing the government in democratic systems.
In non-democratic systems, this study hypothesizes that since the public plays a
less critical role in the policy decision-making process, political elites are less likely to
securitize language issues in order to shift language policy. Whether there are military or
non-military threats or threats of large protests or not, since political elites in
authoritarian governments are not accountable to the public for their policy decisions to
the extent that they are in democratic systems, there is less of a need to securitize
language issues in order to shift language policy. Instead, the leadership primarily relies
on the backing of loyal supporters in the government and military to enforce policy
decisions.
Methodology
This study adopts the speech act model of securitization, in which the sources for reading
securitization are texts. Among the texts, state documents are given priority. Among state
documents used in this study, perhaps the most basic are laws related to language. Laws
generally embody key social, political, cultural, and economic values, and these values
can be framed, constructed, and presented as security interests. Parliamentary debates
around these laws are recorded and published, thus giving analysts access to the
lawmakers’ thoughts and concerns about the issue. Among the most important texts
analyzed are speeches made by presidents. First, presidents tend to be very responsive to
31
challenges, eager to frame the issues for the media and the people. Second, South Korea
has a strong presidential system
89
and the policy documents produced by ministries tend
to follow cues the president has made in speeches.
South Korea is an interesting case to analyze securitization because the existing
literature explaining changes to language policy focused on ethnically diverse countries
that speak different languages and looks at competition between ethnic groups to have
their language reflected in the government. Korea, on the other hand, lacks ethnic
diversity: it is one of the most ethnically homogenous countries in the world. Yet there
have been a series of shifts in language policy over the years, some of which have
involved securitization. This study will explain when and why securitization has been
attempted.
The Outline of this Dissertation
This dissertation is a study of how South Korea was transformed from a multilingual
society into an intensely monolingual one. It presents a chronological analysis of
language policies that favored the exclusive use of Korean by focusing on the political
elite’s attempts to use securitization discourse on language issues in order to shift policy.
It consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 begins with historical background on South Korea’s
language usage so that the reader can appreciate the origins of certain security concerns
that predate the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948. Empirical Chapters 3, 4,
and 5 proceed chronologically and are divided according to three main periods from the
89
Kim, Choong Nam. (2007). The Korean Presidents: Leadership for Nation Building. Norwalk, CT:
EastBridge.
32
standpoint of language policy: debates on the exclusive use of Korean and use of mixed
script (consisting of both Korean and Hanja [Chinese characters]) in the written language
(1950s-1980s); the intensification of English language education policies (1990s-2000s);
and the rise of Korean language promotion policies domestically and abroad (2000s to
the present). Each of these chapters provides an analysis of the official discourse that
took place preceding shifts in language policy and looks for the presence of a speech act.
Then in cases where discourses on language issues were securitized, it examines the
political context under which the securitized discourse occurred. By delving into the
context in which the securitization took place, it endeavors to investigate if there is a
pattern regarding when securitized discourse is utilized by political elites in order to shift
policy. Finally, Chapter 6 reviews the conditions and constraints under which political
elites have sought to securitize language in order to shift policy in South Korea under
authoritarian and democratic contexts. It includes a section on the securitization of
migration issues in South Korea as an area for further research. It also considers the
dangers of frequent securitization by political elites for the quality of participatory
democracy and the policy-making process. Finally, it speculates how much variation in
securitization owes to the type of threat and how much to the regime time.
33
Chapter 2
History of the Korean Language Before 1948
Introduction
In August 1948, the Republic of Korea was established in the southern half of the
Korean Peninsula. This was a momentous moment in the history of Korea because it was
the first time in almost half a century that Koreans governed themselves. Since 1905,
Korea had been a protectorate of Japan, formally annexed in 1910. From 1945 to 1948,
the United States military occupied and governed the southern half of Korea, while
Soviet troops occupied the northern half. Separate governments were formed in each of
the two regions of Korea, which was divided at the 38
th
parallel.
One month after the establishment of the South Korean government, the newly
elected national assembly passed legislation designed to protect and develop the Korean
language. Entitled “The Exclusive Use of the Korean Language Law,” this act declared
Korean to be the national language and stipulated its use alone in all official documents.
Unlike some governments of decolonized countries, which opted for a bilingual policy
that included the language of the former colonizer along with its native language, the
South Korean national assembly justified rejecting the use of Japanese completely, as it
had almost replaced the Korean language during the period of colonization. The assembly
also discontinued the use of English, which was the official government language during
the American occupation. Since then, successive Korean leaderships, whether
authoritarian or democratic, have consistently identified the Korean language as being in
need of protection, thus “securitizing” it by depicting it as vulnerable and under threat.
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how the post-WWII securitization of the
34
Korean language had its roots in the threats and vulnerabilities in the pre-1948 period of
foreign influence and rule.
This chapter is divided into two parts: The first half focuses on the cultural and
historical background of the formation of the Korean language and the progression of the
use of Chinese writing in Korea. It begins during the “Three Kingdoms Period” (57 BCE
to 668AD) when three distinct but similar versions of “Korean” were spoken and Chinese
writing was used but not institutionalized. The unified Silla (668-918) era marks both the
political and the linguistic unification of the three strands of “Korean” into one. Then
during the Koryo dynasty (918-1392), Korean was spoken, but Chinese writing was
officially institutionalized in the government.
The second half of the chapter covers the three main periods of foreign influence
and rule over Korea during which the language was devalued and vulnerable. The first
was the Choson dynasty (1392-1910), which was characterized by a Sino-centric
worldview. The second was the era of Japanese colonization (1910-1945), and the last
was the period of American occupation (1945-1948). Influences during each of these
periods affected the securitization of the language post-1948; however, the most
significant basis of language in security can be traced to the Japanese occupation.
The Formation of Korean and the Development of the Use of Chinese Writing
Three Kingdoms and “Old Korean”
The earliest records on language and ethnicity in the Korean peninsula are from
third-century Chinese histories that are based on first-hand reports of Chinese visitors
35
who discovered a society organized into tribal confederations.
90
By the fourth century,
these tribal confederations had consolidated through wars and political alliances into
three main competing kingdoms – Koguryo (37 BCE- 668
91
AD), Paekche (18 BCE- 660
AD) and Silla (57 BCE- 918 AD) – which came to be known as the “Three Kingdoms”
period. During this time, “Old Korean,” (which refers to the three different, but closely-
related languages) was spoken in each of these kingdoms.
Although the three kingdoms spoke Old Korean, the absence of a native writing
system forced them to adopt a foreign one. Due to geographical proximity, Chinese
characters, which had been introduced into the Korean peninsula prior to this period,
came into widespread use.
92
Classical Chinese served as the primary means of writing in
the three kingdoms, with Silla the last to adopt it.
93
Sillan literati wrote in Classical
Chinese for ordinary affairs of state and commerce, but some used the Chinese characters
to phonetically transcribe Old Korean.
94
Chinese influence on Old Korean vocabulary
grew in Silla, as evidenced by the sinification
95
of the official word for “king” to the
Chinese title wang in 503.
96
Silla also sent students to China to study Chinese starting in
640 AD.
97
The influence of Chinese language on Korean vocabulary and writing
continued to grow under Silla’s political unification of the Korean peninsula in 668 AD
90
Yi, Kimun and Ramsey, Robert. (2011). A History of Korean Language. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 4.
91
Silla and T’ang Chang mounted a coordinated offensive and although Koguryo managed to hold out for
another year, the end came in 668. Eckert, Carter, Lee, Ki-baik, Lew, Young Ick, Robinson, Michael,
Wagner, Edward W. (1990). Korea Old and New: A History. Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 42.
92
Eckert, Lee, Lew, Robinson and Wagner, Korea Old and New, 36.
93
Classical Chinese is the language of the classic literature from the end of the Spring and Autumn period
(early 5
th
century BC) through the end of the Han Dynasty (220AD); Lee and Ramsey, History of Korean
Language, 50.
94
Lee and Ramsey, History of Korean Language, 5, 101.
95
Sinification, (or, to Sinicize) means the assimilation or spread of Chinese culture.
96
Yi and Ramsey, A History of Korean Language, 51.
97
“In the ninth year of King Seondeok, in the fifth month of the summer, the king sent juniors to Tang,
requesting to allow them to attend the Tang’s imperial college.”
36
through the destruction of Paekche and Koguryo with the help of the Chinese dynasty,
the Tang.
Unified Silla and Unified Korean Language
In the mid-seventh century, Silla sought an alliance with Tang China to defeat its
rivals, Koguryo and Paekche. Tang accepted Silla’s request and helped invade Paekche in
660, which fell to the combined attack. In 667, Silla and Tang China mounted a
coordinated offensive against Koguryo, whose end came a year later in 668. Following
the defeat of Koguryo and Paekche, Tang China suddenly moved against Silla and seized
the Korean peninsula as its own protectorate. Tang China appointed a Protectorate-
General to rule over the three conquered kingdoms and demoted the Silla King to
governor-General of the Silla domain.
98
Eckert et al. (1990) argued that Tang China had
aided Silla only with the ulterior motive of eventually bringing the Korean peninsula
under its own imperial control.
99
Silla resisted Tang’s aggression and quickly launched a
campaign to regain control over the former Koguryo domain and assisted local Koguryo
forces that were trying to drive out the Chinese. Silla also sent armies into the Paekche
region and defeated Chinese occupation troops there. In 671, Silla succeeded in
reclaiming control over the former Paekche kingdom. Five years later, Silla drove out the
Tang armies to retreat from the Korean Peninsula, which led to Tang’s de facto
recognition of Silla’s autonomous rule.
100
The fact that Silla prevented its political
absorption into Tang China and preserved the independence of the Korean peninsula is of
great historical significance. At that time, Chinese military strength was formidable –
98
Eckert, Lee, Lew, Robinson and Wagner, Korea Old and New, 43.
99
Ibid., 42.
100
Ibid., 43.
37
Tang China had conquered or subdued several regions that it indirectly controlled
through a protectorate system, and various kingdoms and states paid tribute to the Tang
court. The Tang also exerted a powerful cultural influence over neighboring states, which
included Korea, Japan and Vietnam.
Silla’s victory in its struggle for independence from Tang China in 676 allowed
for the Sillan language to become the lingua franca of the peninsula. The political and
cultural consolidation by a sovereign, unified Silla eventually led to the unification of Old
Korean based on the Sillan language. For this reason, Lee and Ramsey (2001) posit that
the establishment of unified Silla (7
th
-10
th
century) is one of the most important events in
the formation of the Korean language.
101
Although unified Silla had political autonomy, it could not escape Tang China’s
pervasive culture, and the Chinese language gained influence in unified Silla. At the
time, Tang China reached its zenith with its golden age of cosmopolitan culture and
technology, which also benefited and influenced Korea. In 757, the powerful King
Kyŏngdŏk of unified Silla carried out a reform that gave all locations in Korea a Chinese-
style name, written with two Chinese characters.
102
Shortly afterwards, people’s names
also were sinified.
103
Over time, however, unified Silla declined in power due to major
rebellions against the Sillan rulers. General Wang Kon, who ruled Korea from 918-943
and was known posthumously as King Taejo, founded a new dynasty called Koryo in 918
AD. He secured the peaceful submission of Silla’s last king in 935 and ruled the Korean
101
Yi and Ramsey, A History of Korean Language. 47.
102
Ibid., 38.
103
Ibid., 51.
38
peninsula in 936.
104
Although unified Silla fell to Koryo, Old Korean continued to be
used and was adopted by the Koryo dynasty (918-1392 AD).
105
The Koryo Dynasty’s Institutionalization of Chinese Writing
During the Koryo dynasty, King Kwangjjong, one of King Taejo’s sons who ruled
from 949 to 975, took the throne and instituted a series of reforms to strengthen his royal
authority. One of his reforms, which was the implementation of a Chinese-language-
based state examination in 958 for civil service recruiting, spurred a growth in the
importance of Chinese.
106
As a result, specialized and literary terminology from Chinese
swelled in the Korean lexicon, and older native words fell into disuse.
107
The
implementation of a civil service examination in written Chinese constituted a seminal
turning point in language use in Korea. This action ensured the adoption of Chinese by
the ruling class for the next millennium. It became absolutely essential to have a superior
command of Chinese for civil service eligibility and to serve in the government, as nearly
all government documents were written in it.
108
However, it should be noted that little
attention was paid to spoken Chinese, except for training a small group of interpreters
whose status could not compare with scholar-bureaucrats equipped with a mastery of the
Chinese written language.
109
104
Hwang, Kyung Moon. (2010). A History of Korea. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan, 35.
105
Unified Silla refers to the unification of the three Kingdoms of Koguryo, Baekje and Silla. The fall of
Baekje to Silla in 688 marks the recognized beginning of the Unified Silla dynasty.
106
Yi and Ramsey, A History of Korean Language, 98; Cho, Young-mee. (2002) Diglossia in Korean
Language and Literature: A Historical Perspective, East Asia, 20:1, 3.; Hwang, A History of Korea, 40.
107
Yi and Ramsey, A History of Korean Language, 98.
108
Lee, Iksop, Ramsey, Robert S. (2000) The Korean language. Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 56.
109
Cho, Diglossia in Korean Language and Literature, 4.
39
This reform reinforced the low standing of Korean and exacerbated the diglossic
situation: a sociolinguistic situation in which a community uses two or more languages,
one of which is often considered superior to the other(s).
110
The “high” language is
perceived as more prestigious, beautiful, logical and advanced, and is exclusively
reserved for education, “high” literature, official religion and other formal public
functions; in contrast, the “low” language is viewed as vulgar, informal and unworthy of
study despite often being the native language of the population. Chinese cultural
hegemony and the diglossic situation in Korea guaranteed that the Korean language,
although never in danger of being replaced by Chinese as the spoken language, was
devalued.
111
By the late 13th century, Koryo lost much of its power due to invasions from the
Mongols and their interference in Koryo’s politics.
112
When General Yi Seonggye
overthrew Koryo’s last king in 1392 and declared a new dynastic order called Choson,
113
the spoken Sillan-based Old Korean continued to endure (1392-1910)
114
and is
considered to be the direct ancestor of the language spoken throughout Korea today.
115
110
Ibid., 3.
111
Ibid., 4.
112
Eckert, Lee, Lew, Robinson and Wagner, Korea Old and New, 97.
113
Eckert, Lee, Lew, Robinson and Wagner, Korea Old and New, 102; Hwang, A History of Korea, 59.
114
Qian, Youyong (2015). The Study of the Origin of Modern Sino-Korean (Doctoral Dissertation)
Retrieved from: ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 9-10.
115
“Early Middle Korean” refers to the language of the Koguryo Dynasty (918-1259), “Late Middle
Korean” refers to the language used from the beginning of the Choson Dynasty (1392) to the end of the 16
th
century, “Recent Korean” is the language beginning of the 17
th
century to the end of the 19
th
century and
“Modern Korean” is from the beginning of the 20
th
century to the present day; Lee and RamseyThe Korean
language, 273-274.; Yi and Ramsey, A History of Korean Language, 4.
40
Vulnerabilities and Threats to Korean
Resistance to Korean Alphabetic Writing from the Choson Dynasty’s Ruling Class
King Sejong (r. 1418-1450), the fourth king of the Choson dynasty, invented the
Korean alphabet in 1446 to improve literacy among the common people. The Hunmin
chŏngŭm (“The Correct Sounds for the Instruction of the People”) was both a document
and a handbook for promulgating and learning the alphabet.
116
The Hunmin chŏngŭm was
accompanied by a much longer scholarly commentary called Hunmin chŏngŭm haerye
(“Explanations and Examples of the Correct Sounds for the Instruction of the People”)
that explained how to construct the letters to write Korean. Korean writing is an
alphabetic system; it is also phonetic, meaning there is a direct correlation between the
letters and the sounds they represent.
117
However, it is not written in a linear, sequential
fashion as most alphabetic systems are; rather, the letters are grouped together into
syllable blocks to make words.
118
King Sejong stated his goal was to devise a writing system that would be easy for
Koreans to learn and use, as evidenced in his preface of the Hunmin chŏngŭm:
The sounds of our country’s language are different from those of the Middle
Kingdom [China] and are not confluent with the sounds of [Chinese] characters.
Therefore, among the ignorant people, there have been many who, having something
they want to put into words, have in the end been unable to express their feelings. I
have been distressed because of this and have newly designed twenty-eight letters,
which I wish to have everyone practice at their ease and make convenient for their
daily use.
119
Despite the creation of the Korean alphabetic writing system, however, the Chinese
116
Kim-Renaud, Young-key. (1997). The Korean Alphabet, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2.
117
Ibid.
118
Ibid., 4.
119
Translated by Lee, Ki-Moon, (1997) The Korean Alphabet, 27.
41
characters and writing in Korea continued to hold their prestigious position.
120
The ruling
class of the Choson dynasty protested the new Korean writing by continuing to use
Chinese writing in all official documents until the end of the 19
th
century, even
pejoratively calling it Onmun, or “vulgar writing.”
There are several reasons why the new Korean writing system was not adopted
by elites and applied universally in Korea. According to a document submitted to King
Sejong by the Cho’oe Malli faction, which opposed the new Korean writing system, there
were two main criticisms. The first was the notion that using a separate script based on
local speech would make them “barbaric” and akin to the undesirable “Mongolian,
Tanguts, Jurchen, Japanese and Tibetans.” The second was the concern that using a
vernacular script instead of Chinese would negatively affect their relationship with China,
which they held in high regard. The document stated that Korea had always borrowed
heavily from China in terms of “culture, literary, material, ritual and music,” and thus a
divergence in language would be to step back in civilizational progress and to “discard
China,” which they viewed as the pinnacle of civilization and cultural enlightenment.
The ruling class’ opposition to the new Korean writing system stemmed from
their adherence to a Sino-centric worldview. Chinese writing was held in high esteem
because of China’s prominence as the cultural, economic, and political hegemon in the
region. Because China was regarded as the center of the East Asian world, its language
represented high culture and Korean writing in contrast was considered inferior.
Furthermore, since Korea was in a subordinate relationship to the Ming dynasty China
(1386-1644 or 1662) as a tributary state, the Choson ruling class preferred to use Chinese
to maintain close ties with Ming China.
120
Lee and Ramsey, The Korean language, 55.
42
The lack of structural modifications to change the writing system also led to the
prominent use of Chinese and reinforcement of Sino-centric views among Korean elites.
Government civil service exams remained based on the knowledge of Chinese classics
and writing, which continued the need for Chinese education as a pathway to government
service among Choson scholars. Since King Sejong never issued an edict requiring the
use of Korean writing, it took more than a century before it gained a foothold in society,
albeit mainly among women and Buddhists.
121
It was not until the final years of the
Choson dynasty when, inspired by modernization and nationalism, reforms were
implemented to replace Chinese with Korean in the government and the press.
Language Reforms: From Chinese Hegemony to Japanese Threat
The Korean elites’ insistence on using Chinese writing began to decline as
Korea’s political ties and cultural reverence for China ended with Japan’s victory in the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the subsequent signing of the Treaty of
Shimonoseki. In the treaty, Japan forced Qing dynasty China to acknowledge Korea’s
independence in order to put an end to Chinese interference in Korean internal affairs,
thus allowing Japan to dominate Korean politics instead.
122
Japan removed the pro-
Chinese presence in the Korean government and replaced it with pro-Japanese reform-
minded officials as a first step toward gaining control over the political process.
123
China’s defeat by Japan, its former tributary state, significantly shifted the Sino-centric
order in East Asia and sent psychological and cultural shock waves through Korea. The
Sinophile Korean elites were forced to confront and re-evaluate their acceptance of
121
Ledyard, Gari. (1997). The International Linguistic Background of the Correct Sounds for the
Instruction of the People. In The Korean Alphabet. (p. 73). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
122
Hwang, A History of Korea, 223.
123
Ibid.
43
Chinese cultural domination. China’s decline opened political and cultural space for the
Korean language to emerge as the national language.
Under reform-minded officials, sweeping changes were introduced that affected
vital areas of the linguistic, cultural and social fabric of Korea. These changes were
known collectively as the Kabo Reform Movement and lasted for more than 16 months
(July 1894 - February 1896). Under these reforms, efforts were made to imbue people
with a sense of national identity and patriotism by using Korean writing in major
government publications and teaching Korean history in newly organized schools.
124
Significant shifts in language usage began to occur: in 1896, a daily newspaper called
Tonnip Sinmun (“The Independent”) was founded and printed in Korean, marking a
radical departure from the long-held tradition of almost exclusively using Chinese for
official purposes since the Choson era.
125
Government civil service examinations that
tested knowledge of Chinese language and literature were also eliminated. Political
leaders ended the use of the Chinese calendar in official documents, replacing it with a
dating method based on the year of Choson dynasty’s founding.
Language became an important symbol to assert autonomy from foreign
countries, particularly from the historically dominant Chinese and Japanese empires.
Leaders aimed to build the Korean identity around a unified language in effort to bridge
the divide between the nobility and the lower classes, a divide that had manifested itself
linguistically with political elites writing in Chinese and lower classes writing in Korean.
This linguistic consciousness gained momentum as Koreans sought to distinguish
themselves culturally from the Japanese, who became the “other” against which Korea
124
Ibid., 225.
125
Ibid.
44
could define its nation, language and literature.
126
During the closing years of the 19th century, rival imperial powers – Japan,
Russia and China – began targeting Korea for territorial gain or commercial exploitation.
The Japanese empire had already defeated Qing dynasty China in the 1894-95 war and
conquered Taiwan and parts of Manchuria, but it had regional ambitions to control Korea
as well. Japan encountered competition over Korea with a new power, Russia, which also
eyed the peninsula as a key component in its geopolitical strategy to establish a strong
presence in northeast Asia.
127
Even after its defeat by Japan, China, too, wanted to keep
Korea in a subordinate position and was rebuilding its own modern imperial power.
In the Choson court, Japan and Russia competed for Korean officials’
cooperation. Korean leaders who were pro-Japanese worked to suppress rising factions
that looked to Russia to help drive out the Japanese. In a move to weaken the threat,
Japanese official Miura Goro ordered the assassination of Empress Myeongseong, known
informally as Queen Min, who opposed Japanese influence and advocated for stronger
ties with Russia. In reaction to her murder, guerilla bands sprang up throughout the
country and waged armed struggles against pro-Japanese officials and Japanese troops. In
the midst of the chaos, King Kojong escaped the palace in 1896 and took refuge at the
Russian legation in Seoul, marking a shift away from pro-Japanese factions and leading
to the repeal of the linguistic and cultural reforms of the Kabo movement. A year later,
King Kojong returned to the palace and was declared the first imperial head of state of
126
Choi, Ann (2000) Overcoming the Purity of Purpose: Korean Poetry of the 1920s (Doctoral
Dissertation). Retrieved from: University of California, Los Angeles. As cited by Cho, Diglossia in Korean
Language and Literature, 6.
127
Hwang, A History of Korea, 139.
45
the Empire of Korea.
128
Hence the “Great Korean Empire” or Taehan cheguk was born.
The Japanese Domination Of Korea
As the rivalry between Russia and Japan over Korea intensified, conflict between
the two powers culminated in the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905,
which ended in a Japanese victory. Thousands of Japanese soldiers and policemen who
fought in the war remained in the peninsula, and Japanese advisors began interventions in
the financial, military and diplomatic sectors of the Korean government, which
undermined the hard-fought efforts to make Korean the national language and to establish
politically autonomy of Korea.
Just as the Treaty of Shimonoseki had called for China to renounce claims to
Korea and recognize Japan’s interests in the country, the Treaty of Portsmouth that ended
the Russo-Japanese War called for Russia to acknowledge Japan’s supremacy in Korea.
Having gained recognition from China (Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895), England
(Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902), the United States (secret Taft-Katsura Agreement of
July 1905), and now Russia (Treaty of Portsmouth of September 1905), Japan,
unchallenged, moved immediately to establish a protectorate over Korea. The
Protectorate Treaty of 1905, signed by Korean ministers under coercion, established the
Japanese protectorate government, the Residency General. The Resident-General, Ito
Hirobumi, controlled the Korean government’s foreign and financial affairs and
established consulates around the country to oversee the Japanese migrant population and
military presence.
129
In 1907, Choson dynasty’s Emperor Kojong was forced to abdicate,
128
Hwang, A History of Korea, 140.
129
Ibid., 154.
46
and Hirobumi took power.
Koreans with reliable ties to Japan filled the highest posts in the central
government, the provincial governorship and most of the country magistratures.
130
The
518-year rule of the Choson dynasty officially ended when Korea formally became a
Japanese colony with the signing of the Treaty of Annexation in 1910. Hirobumi became
the first Governor-General, or head of the colonial Government General of Korea. Upon
annexation, the Japanese cajoled and appeased the royal family and prominent elites with
lavish bribes and nobility titles, and Japanese-friendly Koreans were appointed to high
positions in the colonial government. Although the takeover of Korea was secured thanks
to the presence of the Japanese military, force was generally not used. The Japanese
enticed thousands of Korean officials to provide legal and institutional assistance to the
colonial government in exchange for payments and promises for material improvements,
which facilitated the transition to foreign rule.
Attempts to Eradicate Korean During the Japanese Colonization (1910-1945)
During the Japanese colonization (1910-1945), systematic attempts to suppress
Korean language and identity were made to institutionalize Japanese as the kokugo, or
national language. The colonial language policy emphasized the ideological link between
its language and “national spirit,” aiming to produce loyal subjects through the teaching
of Japanese in schools. Japanese cultural assimilation policies focused heavily on
language and threatened the survival of the Korean language and ethnic identity.
According to one statistic, in 1933, 80% of the Korean population was illiterate, but by
130
Ibid., 157.
47
the end of 1945, an estimated 30% of Koreans were fluent in Japanese.
131
Had Japanese
rule in Korea continued for another six years past 1945, it was projected that 100% of the
population would have been fluent in Japanese. The historical experience of the near
obliteration of the Korean language and ethnic identity during this period produced
enduring fear and resentment. Korean public and political figures regularly refer to the
colonial experience and harsh assimilation policies with great bitterness.
The linguistic and cultural assimilation policies in Korea shifted throughout the
35-years of Japanese colonial rule, but the changes over time grew more coercive.
Schools were used as vehicles to teach Japanese and remodel Koreans into Japanese
subjects. Schools began reducing hours of Korean language instruction, and eventually it
was banned altogether in schools, government and the public sphere. To diminish Korean
ethnic identity, Japanese authorities claimed a shared cultural and ethnic linkage between
Japan and Korea, with the Japanese subsuming Korean ethnicity.
132
This idea was also
asserted in schools with textbook revisions that erased Korea’s distinct history, rewriting
it as part of Japanese history.
The history of teaching Japanese in Korea can be divided into three periods,
distinguished by the educational ordinances of 1911, 1922 and 1938. The Proclamation
of Imperial Rescript on Education in Korea in 1911 established the basis of the colonial
education system and introduced Japanese textbooks in schools. Nearly all textbooks
131
Lim (1996) 164. As cited by Heinrich, Patrick. (2013). Visions of Community: Japanese Language
Spread in Japan, Taiwan and Korea. International Quarterly for Asian Studies, 44:3-4, 239-258.
132
Robinson, Michael E. (1988). Cultural Nationalism in Colonia Korea, 1920-1925. Seattle: University of
Washing Press, 40.
48
were in Japanese,
133
and more than one-third of the schooling hours were devoted to
teaching the language.
134
Teachers of all subjects were instructed to speak exclusively in
Japanese to their students and ignore questions addressed to them in Korean.
The repressive linguistic and cultural assimilation policies led to the March 1
st
Movement, in which approximately two million Koreans gathered in a peaceful
demonstration for Korean independence. Japanese authorities reacted brutally, killing
7,500 protesters, wounding 15,849 and arresting more than 46,303.
135
However, the
incident did lead authorities to re-assess their strict policies. Until then, the governance
style had been militarized – even schoolteachers had dressed in military uniforms and
carried swords – so the Japanese decided to soften their approach in hopes of avoiding
future protests. Japanese leaders began to allow some Korean history and language to be
taught in schools, and more permits were given to newspapers to be printed in Korean.
136
Despite these measures, the second Imperial Edict on Education in 1922 still declared
Japanese language and moral education to be the principal educational objectives of the
colony.
Between 1910 and 1930, assimilation policies fluctuated with the Japanese
colonial administration’s trial and error of ruling Korea. But 1931 marks a turning point
in assimilation programs in Korea. That year, Japan incorporated Manchuria into the
empire and a new emphasis on Korea’s increased economic and strategic importance led
to an acceleration of forced cultural assimilation programs in the mid-1930s, which led to
133
Kim, Eugene C. (1973) Education in Korea under the Japanese Colonial Rule, In Nahm Andrew C. (Ed.)
Korea Under Japanese Colonial Rule. (p. 138). Michigan: Western Michigan University. As cited by
Heinrich, Visions of Community, 239-258.
134
Lim, Sang-lok. (1996), 127-130. As cited by Heinrich, Visions of Community, 239-258.
135
Nobody knows the real numbers but these are the most frequently cited from Park, Eun-sik. (1920). The
Bloody History of the Korean Independence Movement (Hanguk dongnip undong ji hyeolsa).
136
Heinrich, Visions of Community, 239-258.
49
the complete banning of teaching and using Korean throughout the peninsula.
137
The
intention was to create subjects who would actively support imperial goals, not merely
comply passively.
138
A campaign was launched to foster “unity between the homeland
(Japan) and Korea” and a stringent monolingual plan was established.
139
The third
Imperial Edict on Education in Korea of 1937 formally mandated all school subjects to
be taught exclusively in Japanese.
140
In 1940, Koreans were forced to adopt Japanese
names, and Korean language was removed as a school subject in 1941.
141
Language
usage was monitored, and the use of Japanese was more strictly enforced in public and
private settings, including companies, factories, mines, theaters and concert halls. People
who spoke Japanese were rewarded, while those who did not were punished. Once again,
newspapers written in Korean were prohibited.
142
Linguists were jailed for promoting the
Korean language
and students were encouraged to report their peers if they used
Korean.
143
Assimilation policy in Korea evolved over the 35 years of colonial rule with
periods of both relative freedom to use Korean language and strict banning of it. But the
latter years of Japanese colonization, during which the administration instituted the most
repressive assimilation policy that intended to inculcate Koreans with Japanese identity,
have decisively influenced the memory of colonialism in present day Korea, particularly
137
Robinson, Michael. (2007). Korea’s Twentieth-Century Odyssey: A Short History. Honolulu: Hawaii
University Press, 93.
138
Ibid.
139
Yasuda, Toshiaki (1997), 175-178. As cited in by Heinrich, Patrick, Visions of Community, 239-258.
140
Kim, Eugene C. (1973) Education in Korea under the Japanese Colonial Rule, In Nahm Andrew C. (Ed.)
Korea Under Japanese Colonial Rule. (p. 142). Michigan: Western Michigan University. As cited by
Heinrich, Visions of Community, 239-258.
141
Kim-Rivera, Eungyone. (2002). English Language Education in Korea under Japanese Colonial Rule.
Language Policy 1(3), 266-268. As cited by Heinrich, Visions of Community, 239-258.
142
Lee, Yon. (2002). As cited by Heinrich, Visions of Community, 239-258.
143
Kumatani, Akiyasu. (1990). Language Policies in North Korea. International Journal of the Sociology
of Language, 82, 90.
50
the language policy of the exclusive use of Japanese. The attempts to force Koreans to
speak, think and act Japanese struck at the heart of Korean national and cultural identity.
The Imposition of English during the American Occupation
Japanese rule came to an end in 1945 when it was defeated by the United States
and Soviet Union. The U.S. military began their occupation and governed over the
southern half of Korea for three years from the U.S. force’s arrival on September 9, 1945
to the establishment of the First Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948.
144
During its
occupation, the U.S. military government worked to establish the country as a bulwark
against communism. It not only laid the foundation of South Korea’s political structure
(which lasted until the 1960s) and introduced a capitalist economy, but it also
transformed the linguistic landscape of the newly formed state through new English-
centered language policies and programs. While the Americans had liberated Korea from
the Japanese, their privileging of English meant Korean was once again threatened by a
foreign occupier. As the Korean language competed with English, the sense of linguistic
inferiority and insecurity continued to grow.
The U.S. military government ordered English as the official language for all
government documents, with a Korean translation accepted as secondary. In areas of
discrepancies between the two translations, the English document took precedence. The
American military also employed in the government only Koreans who were proficient in
English. In the education sector, the U.S. sought to bolster the teaching of English in
schools. This addition to the national curriculum went into effect in September 1946 and
144
Kim, E.G. (2008). English Education under US military government. The Korea Times. As cited by
Kim, Eun Gyong. (2011). English educational policies of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea
from 1945 to 1948 and their effects on the development of English language teaching in Korea. Language
Policy 10:3, 193-220.
51
outlined that English would be a required subject and the only foreign language taught in
secondary schools.
145
English also became a mandatory section in university entrance
exams, and the three most prestigious universities – Seoul National University, Yonsei
University and Korea University – all required it, alongside Korean, from 1946 to
1947.
146
The Devaluation of Korean by the American Military Occupation in South Korea
As evidence of the growing devaluation of Korean, some U.S. leaders even
recommended that English, not Korean, be the national language. In a proposal for the
establishment of an English language school submitted to the Military Governor on
March 5, 1946, Chief of Foreign Affairs Section Lieutenant Colonel Gordon B. Ender
argued that Korean would not be useful for modernization, and therefore English should
be taught instead. He wrote:
The Korean language has been in disuse for several generations. It is entirely
inadequate to serve as a medium for expressing modern social concepts of
technological developments… The Korean language is still in an elementary state
of development… The logical answer to the language problem, then, would seem
to be the introduction of the English language as the best medium for the
education of Koreans.
147
In a report to the Advisor to the Director of Education in the spring of 1946,
Supervisor of English Monika Kehoe presented a similar argument, writing:
Because of the nature and limited development of the Korean language, …it is at
present inadequate as a tool for learning what Koreans need most to learn in order
to assist their country to a place in the twentieth century world… (English) will be
145
Kim, English educational policies of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea from 1945 to 1948,
193-220.
146
Ibid.
147
Chong 1992b: 1121-1123. As cited in Kim, English educational policies of the U.S. Army Military
Government in Korea from 1945 to 1948, 211.
52
the most effective instrument for that awareness necessary in a modern society.
148
Enders and Kehoe were not alone in their ethnocentric predisposition and
criticism of the indigenous language. This attitude was common among the American
officials and educators in Korea at the time.
149
Had Enders and Kehoe’s proposals been
instituted, the Americans’ condescension toward Korean might have led to further
denigration of the language. However, their proposals were never implemented, as the
state leadership changed hands from Americans to Koreans with the establishment of the
Republic of Korea in 1948. The gradual withdrawal of American troops started with the
Korean elections in 1948, which marked the end of a half-century of control by foreign
powers. The new leadership moved swiftly to establish its political control, and the new
South Korean government chose Korean as its national language.
Conclusion
The post-WWII securitization of the Korean language had its roots in the threats
and vulnerabilities in the pre-1948 period of foreign influence and rule that dates back to
the pre-modern period of the Korean peninsula. During the Three Kingdoms Period,
after the Silla kingdom politically unified the various regions of the peninsula, the three
similar but distinct dialects of Old Korean were merged and it became the spoken lingua
franca of the land. However, during transition between the Three Kingdoms era and the
period of unified Silla, Tang China's military maneuverings and political ambitions to
control Korea put the language in great danger of disuse and elimination. If not for Silla’s
148
Chong 1992b: 1127-1131. As cited by Kim, English educational policies of the U.S. Army Military
Government in Korea from 1945 to 1948, 211.
149
Kim, English educational policies of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea from 1945 to 1948,
212.
53
success against the Tang, all of Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula would have been
brought under Chinese authority, which would have posed a severe threat to the Korean
language and culture. The development of Korea’s own identity would have stalled under
Tang’s political and cultural domination.
150
Then during the Koryo dynasty, with the rise
of China’s influence in the region, the Korean government institutionalized Chinese
writing through mandating that state examinations be given in Chinese, thus expanding
the diglossic situation in Korea.
Vulnerabilities and threats to the Korean language continued during the modern
history of Korea. During the period from the Choson dynasty until 1910, language policy
shifted in numerous and significant ways. In 1446, the Korean alphabetic writing was
introduced, but the ruling class protested the new system. In the late nineteenth century,
emphasis on Korean as the national language emerged as the political elites rushed to
assert Korea’s autonomy in the face of the looming threats from Japan, Russia and China.
Their efforts were short-lived, however, as Japan established a protectorate over Korea in
1905 and formally annexed the country five years later, shifting the dominant language
from Korean to Japanese. Hope for a shift back to Korean came when the U.S. liberated
Korea in 1945, but English was imposed in Japanese’s stead. It would not be until the
establishment of the first Republic of Korea in 1948 when the Korean language would
enjoy a level of security from threats, as the newly elected leaders set Korean as the
national spoken and written language.
As we shall see in the coming chapters, securitization of the Korean language can
be largely traced to threats encountered during periods of foreign influence, but
particularly during periods of foreign occupation. Foreign occupiers devalued Korean by
150
Eckert, Lee, Lew, Robinson and Wagner, Korea Old and New, 43.
54
imposing or privileging their own language. Among all historical periods, that of the
Japanese colonization, when Korean was banned, played a particularly pivotal role in the
formation of South Korea’s language insecurities. This suppression made the people
keenly aware that language served as a specific marker of their ethnic identity. Therefore,
after liberation, the Korean language became a distinctive marker of “Korean-ness,” a
cultural symbol protected by the government. After the near eradication of their language
and culture, leaders of the first republic of South Korea and successive leaderships
enacted protectionist policies to ensure the continued development and endurance of the
Korean language. This influence of Korea’s colonization experience offers important
insights into post-1948 language efforts at securitization. The harsh policies to expunge
Korea’s language, history and identity made protecting them a matter of national security.
55
Chapter 3
Language Policies under Rhee and Park:
The Battle between Hangul and Hanja in the 1950s-1980s
Introduction
South Korea experienced a major shift in the direction of the national language
policy after the United States trusteeship of South Korea ended and Koreans gained their
national independence in 1948. The establishment of the their own government allowed
the Korean people to make their own decisions regarding the national language without
foreign intervention. Hangul was quickly identified and constructed by political elites as
a symbol of national unity, identity, and independence, and a language policy of
“linguistic purism”
151
aimed at expelling foreign influences was pursued by the political
elites. One strategy they used to influence language policy was to frame Hangul as a
referent object that actively needed to be protected by the state for cultural and political
security.
This chapter will outline the policy of the exclusive use of Hangul and the
securitization discourse during Rhee Syng-man and Park Chung-hee’s governments. It is
divided into two parts: the first focuses on the language discourse and policy shifts during
Rhee’s 12-year rule, and the second on Park’s 18-year rule. It first analyzes the discourse
on language by looking at the political context: potential security threats facing South
Korea during Rhee (1948-1960) and Park’s (1961-1979) governments including regional
politics of the Cold War, domestic unrest, the Korean War, fears of abandonment by the
United States, continued North Korean hostilities post-Korean war, and questions of
151
George Thomas defines this as “an opposition to foreign influences on the native language and a striving
to retain the language in an unchanged traditional form” Thomas, George. (1991). Language Purism.
London: Longman, 37. As cited in Ramsey, Robert S. (2004). Language Policy in South Korea and the
Special Case of Japanese. International Circle of Korean Linguistics, 12, 131-139.
56
political legitimacy and economic decline. It analyzes if and how the securitization
discourse on language changed during Rhee’s rule, which began as a democratic system
of government in 1948, but quickly devolved into an authoritarian system after the end of
the Korean War. It will also examine the period under Park’s authoritarian rule, and how
his use or not of securitization of language issues might have been affected by dictator-
centered political dynamics. The chapter presents in chronological order some of the
discussion surrounding each shift in language policy from speeches, policy documents,
and texts of the National Assembly floor debates, looking for evidence of securitization.
This study argues that in democracies, the conditions under which political elites
securitize language in order to shift language policy are when military threats are high;
conversely, when military threats are low, there will be less securitization attempts by
political elites.
In authoritarian systems, this study argues that even when military threats are
high, there is no need for political elites to securitize language issues because the
leadership can impose shifts in language policies from above due to the centralization of
power. While democratic leaders are accountable to the public for their policy decisions,
authoritarian leaders may be less accountable to the public for their policy decisions
because they rely ultimately upon military force (rather than democratic legitimacy) to
push through controversial policy issues. Thus, under conditions of low military threats,
there would also be no need to securitize language issues in order to shift language
policy.
57
The Political Context of Language Policy Under Rhee Syng-man (1948- 1960)
On May 10, 1948, under the supervision of the United Nations Temporary Commission
on Korea (UNTCK), general elections took place for the first time in South Korea’s
history, and the first National Assembly was inaugurated.
152
The National Assembly
quickly drew up the country’s first constitution on July 12, 1948, and it was promulgated
on July 17, 1948.
153
It established a democratic system in which the president was to be
elected by the National Assembly.
154
On July 20, 1948, Rhee Syng-man was elected
president and on August 15, 1948 the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established in the
southern part of the peninsula.
155
The Rhee administration faced very serious security problems. Communism was
a visible, external, physical threat to the sovereignty of South Korea in the Cold War era.
Geopolitically, South Korea’s national security was threatened by the proximity and
presence of Communist countries-- North Korea and the Soviet Union. The North-South
division of the Korean peninsula at the 38
th
parallel posed a danger to South Korea’s
national security. North Korea was a hostile government and claimed to govern all of
Korea and made known its intention to unite the peninsula on its own terms.
156
Rhee also
considered the Soviet Union a threat because he believed the Soviet Union had
geopolitical ambitions to expand into South Korea.
157
Then a year into Rhee’s
presidency, Rhee’s security concerns continued to grow when Mao Zedong declared
China a Communist country with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in
152
Kim, Choong Nam. (2007). The Korean Presidents: Leadership for Nation Building. Norwalk, CT:
EastBridge, 39.
153
Ibid., 40.
154
Ibid.
155
Ibid., 41.
156
Ibid., 42.
157
Kim, Myongsob, Kim, Seok Won (2011). The Geopolitical Perceptions of Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee:
Focusing on the Period of Japanese Occupation. Korean Social Science Review 1:1, 115.
58
1949. The future looked bleak as South Korea found itself surrounded by aggressive
Communist countries to its north and west and its enemy and former colonizer, Japan, to
its south and east.
Not only were there military threats to South Korea’s sovereignty; its internal
political stability was also threatened by the presence of Communist supporters. North
Korean guerillas infiltrated into the South and staged terrorist raids
158
and pro-communist
South Koreans led armed insurrections.
159
Under the democratic political system that
allowed the formation and participation of various political parties, the South Korean
Worker’s Party-- a Communist party in the South—was able to organize and mobilize
massive uprisings. The membership of the South Korean Worker’s Party numbered
roughly 40,000, but it also had vast numbers of sympathizers and supporters.
160
From
1948 to 1950, North Korean fighters together with pro-communist South Koreans
engaged in guerrilla warfare that claimed 36,000 lives, wounded 11,000, destroyed 5,000
houses and displaced 432,000 people.
161
The government lacked resources to repress and
fight against the Communist forces. Militarily, the Army of the Republic of Korea in
November 1948 consisted of only 18,000-20,000 men. In contrast, the strength of the
North Korean army was believed to be 120,000 to 150,000 soldiers.
162
158
Kim, The Korean Presidents, 42.
159
Cheong, Sung-hwa. (1991). The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: Japanese-South Korean
Relations Under American Occupation, 1945-1952. New York: Greenwood Press, xii.
160
Kim, The Korean Presidents, 38.
161
Haebang Isipyon Pyunchanhoe (Compilation Committee of the Post Twenty Years of Korea after
Liberation) (1965); Haebang Isipyeon:Kirokpyun (Twenty Years History of Korea: Chronicle), Seoul:
Samunsa, p. 141; As cited by Ahn, Byong-Man. (2003). Elites and Political Power In South Korea.
Northampton MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 76.
162
Cho, Soon Sung. (1967). Korea in World Politics 1940-1950. An Evaluation of American Responsibility.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 249. As cited by Kim, Choong Nam. (2007). The Korean
Presidents: Leadership for Nation Building. Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 42.
59
Political elites in South Korea viewed the development of a distinctly “Korean”
national identity to be critical for the new state both politically and culturally. Post World
War II, anti-Japanese sentiments also had a strong grip over society. Political elites
viewed Japanese elements in Korean society as a threat to its cultural identity; in
addition, they also desired to emerge from the Sino-centric language, culture, and
worldview that had dominated most of Korea’s history. With its political and territorial
sovereignty threatened, securing a distinct South Korean cultural identity to buttress its
political identity was critical for the sovereignty, independence and unity of the new
state.
Political elites also had fervent aspiration for the unification of the Korean
peninsula, and thus this issue rose to the top of the political agenda. The floor debate
proceedings regarding the national language revealed that along with rooting out
communist elements in South Korea and the need to develop a strong national identity,
inter-Korean security issues-- particularly unification-- were among the main concerns
among policymakers affecting language issues in the National Assembly. The security
challenge at the international and domestic levels deeply affected discussions of language
issues.
Hangul-only Constitution and National Language Legislation
In July 1948, the newly elected National Assembly set to work on its first task: drafting
the Constitution. But the National Assembly quickly faced a major question: Should the
Constitution be written in Hangul-only or mixed script? The relevant language law
during this time was Executive Order No. 4 of the United States Army Military
60
Government in Korea (USAMGIK). According to Executive Order No. 4: “effective 1
July, 1947 the official language of South Korean interim government will be Korean.”
163
Although the official language was stated as “Korean,” the executive order did not
specify the written form of the language-- whether it should be Hangul only or a mixed
script style of Hangul with some Chinese characters. This left the matter open to debate.
On July 16, 1948, during the 32
nd
general meeting of the National Assembly,
Representative Kwon Tae-hui presented a motion to write the Constitution entirely in
Hangul and an overwhelming majority of 139 representatives voted to approve the
motion. The very next day, on July 17, 1948, the Constitution was prepared using only
Hangul and was signed by President Rhee in Hangul rather than using the customary
Hanja version of his name. The language used for the Constitution seemed to indicate
that South Korea was on a path to embrace a Hangul-only language policy.
The text of the National Assembly floor debate regarding the language to be used
to compose the Constitution is not available, but the rationale may not be all that different
from the National Assembly floor debates on the official language of South Korea. On
September 29, 1948, two months after National Assembly member Kwon Tae-hui led the
National Assembly majority to write the Constitution in Hangul, he submitted a proposal
to the National Assembly to legislate the exclusive use of Hangul as the official national
language of South Korea.
164
A careful reading of the floor debates regarding this language policy proposal
reveals that members of the Assembly were focused on three different types of security
163
USAMGIK, “Executive Order No. 4—Establishment of Korean as Official Language,” Official Gazette,
June 28, 1947.
164
The initial proposal original stated, “In the Republic of Korea, all official documents must be written in
Hangul”(translations mine).
61
concerns at the time. The first was inter-Korean security issues. South Korea’s
Constitution claimed jurisdiction over the entire Korean peninsula. Article 3 states: “The
territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent
islands.”
165
In 1948, re-unification with North Korea was a desired outcome for most
South Koreans, and the government thought it was feasible. Article 4 of South Korea’s
Constitution states, “The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and
carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the free democratic basic order.”
Significantly, North Korea had adopted the exclusive use of Hangul in the government
and in all public affairs on August 15, 1945. During the national language debates from
September 29 to October 1, 1948, Kwon Tae-hui argued in the national assembly, “North
Koreans…use Hangul as the official language,” thereby implying that since North Korea
used Hangul as its official language, South Korea should, too, given the goals of ultimate
re-unification.
166
Political elites wanted to prepare for the day when North and South
would be united politically, territorially and linguistically.
Second, in the period between 1948 and 1950, the government faced a double
crisis of national identity and political legitimacy. Korea’s cultural and linguistic identity
had been suppressed during the Japanese colonization, and the division of Korea
damaged the hopes of creating or institutionalizing a single national identity. In addition,
the division of the country and the establishment of the government in only the southern
half of the peninsula created a legitimacy crisis, for some Koreans rejected the division of
the country, and many leftists and moderates boycotted the 1948 election for the National
165
South Korea’s Constitution of 1948
166
All translations are my own except where otherwise noted; National Assembly Law, “Hangul-usage
Law”
62
Assembly as a result.
167
Moreover, leftists and pro-unification groups questioned not
only the legitimacy of the South Korean government, but also its anti-Communist
policies. Finally, the political and administrative appointments of former Korean colonial
officials who had served under the Japanese also weakened the legitimacy of the
government.
In the National Assembly floor debate regarding the legislative proposal of
Hangul as the national language from September 29 to October 1, 1948, policymakers
referenced Korean suffering under the Japanese colonization, and the fate of Hangul was
constructed as a symbol of the larger suppression of Korean identity during that period.
Representative Kwon said, “Hangul suffered under the Japanese rule. People who were
involved in the Hangul Movement were captured and tortured. Today, we are here to
recover our national land and make our own government. There should be no opposition
to using Hangul.”
168
His view was representative of those political elites who thought it
was important to adopt Hangul as the only official form of writing because they
considered it an important symbol of national identity, ethnic pride, and an independent
spirit of self-reliance.
During the same National Assembly legislative debate regarding the issue of
national language, the Minister of Education, An Ho-sang, alluded to the importance of
Hangul in rebuilding Korea’s cultural and linguistic independence and identity in his
support for Hangul as the official language. An argued that Hanja was China’s language,
not Korea’s: “If our best classical Chinese scholars in Korea went to China, they would
be devalued as small-time scholars. Is it because we are not as smart as Chinese? No. It is
167
Kim, The Korean Presidents, 9.
168
National Assembly Law on “Hangul-usage Law.”
63
because Hanja is their mother language…Is our government China’s? If we abolish
Hangul and use Hanja, that is a shame.”
169
The third security concern facing the government in 1948 was the growing threat
of Communist sympathizers among farmers and laborers (who made up as much as 80%
of South Korea’s 30 million).
170
On August 15, 1948, in Rhee’s inaugural address, he
explicitly named “Communists” as a threat due to their “destructive behavior” and
identified this group as one of the “many difficult problems arising from the process of
state building in Korea.”
171
In particular, farmers were vulnerable to Communist
propaganda, which advocated free redistribution of farmland. Farmers were frustrated by
the continued practice of an old land tenure system that did not allow them to own the
land that they tilled. In 1944, the richest 3 percent owned 64 percent of all the farmland,
and this had not changed significantly by 1948.
172
According to Kim, the South Korean
Workers’ Party dominated farmer’s organizations and student-intellectual groups and
controlled labor unions.
173
From September 29 to October 1, 1948, during the National Assembly legislative
debate regarding the national language, policymakers invoked security on the issue of
Hangul because they believed that this language was the key to quelling Communist
sentiments among Hanja-illiterate farmers. Representative Kwon Tae-hui argued during
this debate, “Sooner or later, the Land Reform Act will be enacted. Even though farmers
169
National Assembly Law on “Hangul-usage Law”
170
Blank, Lenore. (1981). Language Policies in South Korea Since 1945 and Their Probable Impact on
Education (Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved From:
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/303057044/abstract, 149.
171
Kim, The Korean Presidents, 41.
172
Ibid., 45.
173
Ibid., 38.
64
should know how to read, most of the farmers cannot read Hanja, only
Hangul…therefore it is imperative to use Hangul as South Korea’s official language.”
174
The “land reform act” that Kwon Tae-hui referred to was the Land Redistribution
Law that was pending and would later be passed on June 22, 1949. Through this reform,
land ownership was capped at 7.5 acres, small farmers became independent, and large
landlords virtually disappeared. But before this land reform act could be implemented,
Kwon argued that it was “imperative” to secure the literacy of farmers to effectively
communicate the contents of the land reform act. The national assembly members were
well aware that illiteracy of farmers would impede the communication of the land reform
policies that were designed to defuse their frustrations. The literacy rate in 1948 Korea
was fairly low, with estimates ranging between 20-40%.
175
Using a simple language
(Hangul) that farmers could learn quickly and understand was crucial to averting social
unrest stemming from Communist propaganda among farmers. Thus, Kwon invoked
security regarding the importance of Hangul in order to triumph over the Communist
threat.
Despite Kwon’s securitized arguments for Hangul-only as the official written
language of South Korea, on October 1, 1948 during the 78
th
general meeting of the
National Assembly, Representative Cho Hyun-young proposed an amendment to the
original draft of the Hangul-usage Law to allow for the use of Hanja. The opposition
provided the following rationale against the complete abolition of Hanja: the
transcription of Hanja into Hangul would lead to many homonyms, thus creating
174
National Assembly Law on “Hangul-usage Law.”
175
Blank, Language Policies in South Korea Since 1945 and Their Probable Impact on Education.
65
confusion.
176
Eventually, the bill passed with 86 in favor and 22 opposed. The text of
the final version of the law stated: “In the Republic of Korea, all official documents will
be written in Hangul. But for the time being, Hanja can also be used, if necessary. This
law is effective immediately.”
177
The significance of the Hangul-usage Law, also known as Resolution 6, cannot be
overstated in terms of its passage and application. The same National Assembly that
voted on drafting the most important official document-- the Constitution--purely in
Hangul reversed its position to allow the use of mixed script in all official documents. In
terms of the application of the law, even though it emphasized that all official documents
should be written in Hangul, in reality the additional clause of “Hanja can be used if
necessary” gave governmental, media and public organizations the freedom to use Hanja
liberally. For example, the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Governmental Legislation
used mixed script in all their documents. Equally important, the passage of the Hangul-
usage Law demonstrates that in 1948, the new democratically elected legislative body
was fairly autonomous from the executive branch, as it acted independently and against
the personal wishes of President Rhee, who supported the use of Hangul-only. Checks
and balances (separation of powers) seemed to be intact for at least the first four years of
the South Korean government, until 1952, when Rhee sought steps to cement his power
and presidency under an authoritarian political system. The prevalent use of mixed script
by various ministries also reveals that the bureaucracy during the democratic period
(1948-1952) had the freedom to not always follow the political preference of the
president.
176
Ibid., 150.
177
National Assembly Law on “Hangul-usage Law.”
66
The one ministry that did actively strive to write all its official documents in
exclusively Hangul was the Ministry of Education because the minister, An Ho-sang, was
a staunch proponent of the exclusive use of Hangul. In keeping with Resolution 6, the
Ministry of Education published national textbooks in Hangul for elementary and
secondary schools with very minimal use of Hanja, written in parenthesis. The
secondary level textbooks contained only 9% Hanja, limited to Chinese numerals,
country names and place names. These Hangul books were the only language textbooks
used in schools until 1952. However, as the next section explains, these national
textbooks were removed within one year and replaced by mixed script textbooks teaching
Hanja.
Resolution for Hanja Use in National Education Textbooks
A year after Hangul was passed as the official language of South Korea under Resolution
6, a small group of Assembly members led by Representative Im Yong-sin worked to
restore Hanja to official status. After a week of debates, on November 5, 1949, the
National Assembly passed the Hanja Education Law, that overturned the Hangul law in
the realm of education and legislated that national textbooks on language include the
teaching and use of Hanja. A careful reading of the floor debates regarding the Hanja
policy reveals that policymakers invoked security regarding language policy on this side
of the debate as well.
The securitization of language was decisive in shifting language policy at the time
of the drafting of the Constitution, and political elites continued to securitize language
during the legislative debate in October-November of 1949 to restore Hanja as a national
67
language. The National Assembly records reveal that illiteracy was viewed as a threat and
the lack of quality education was framed as a critical issue in the developmental state.
During this particular legislative debate Assembly Member Lim Young-shin asked the
Chairman of the Education Review Committee, Yi Yong-jun,
The current elementary school education produces ignorant citizens. Due to the
elimination of Hanja from national textbooks, graduates are unable to read
newspapers, magazines and books that are published in mixed script. The present
policy is creating illiteracy rather than literacy. What plans are there to correct this
situation? The current curriculum creates a huge language gap between high
school texts that are written in Hangul and college texts that are written in mixed
script. What plans are there, if any, to narrow the gap?
178
This quote shows that in the beginning of the debate on language reform, although
assembly members did not specifically use the word “security” when addressing
language issues, they saw education as critical to the overall development of the state.
As the debate continued, the National Assembly records show that securitization
was explicitly invoked by identifying a different kind of threat that proved to be decisive
in reversing the Hangul-only policy. Policymakers identified the defection to North
Korea of Yi Kug-ro, the author of Hangul-only textbooks that were being used in public
schools, as a threat to their security in terms of nationalism because they believed a
traitor’s prominent work should not be part of the general curriculum. Representatives
who advocated Hanja-use charged Hangul-only advocates with being “North Korea
sympathizers like Yi Kug-ro, who had defected to the North. We cannot and will not
educate our young generation with the present textbooks that were written by the traitor
(Yi Kug-ro).” The author of the Hangul textbooks’ defection to North Korea was
presented by Hanja advocates as a blow to South Korea’s national identity and sense of
178
National Assembly, The Annals of the National Assembly, Vol. 1, pp. 183-186
68
patriotism. On November 5, 1949, the discussion of Yi Kung-ro’s defection gave Hanja
advocates in the National Assembly enough power to pass a new resolution for Hanja use
in the domain of education. With 118 members present, it was passed by 89 to 1 with 28
abstentions. The resolution read, “Simple Hanja should be reinstated into the elementary
textbooks. Detailed plans, however, shall be delegated to the Central Education
Committee.” The shift from Hangul-only to the inclusion of Hanja in national education
textbooks demonstrates a considerable shift in viewing North Korea as an enemy by 1949
and not as a long lost brother. It should also be noted that although the resolution for
Hanja use claimed victory in education textbooks, it did not legally overturn Resolution
6’s required use of Hangul in official, governmental documents.
The Growing North Korean Threat
It is worth restating that only a year earlier North Korea’s Hangul-only language policy
had been used as argument that South Korea should also adopt a Hangul-only policy.
However, by 1949, North Korea was viewed with deep suspicion. Since the passage of
the Hangul-only law of 1948, North Korea had held its own elections, established the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), proclaimed Kim Il Sung as its leader,
and also claimed to be the sole legitimate government on the Korean peninsula. The
image of North Korea in the South grew increasingly negative as it grew in military
strength, which posed a great threat to South Korea. When Soviet troops withdrew from
the North in late 1948, they turned over their weapons and equipment to the North
Korean troops. Under the terms of an aid agreement concluded on March 17, 1949, the
Soviet Union supplied North Korea with ten reconnaissance aircraft, 100 Yak fighter
69
planes, 70 attack bombers and 100 Russian T-34 and T-70 tanks and heavy artillery
between the summer of 1949 and the following spring.
179
In addition, after the
Communists overthrew the Nationalists in China, Mao Zedong was eager to support Kim
Il-sung’s ambition to take over South Korea. As a result, North Korea also received
military support from China. Indeed, between 1949-1950 the Chinese People’s Liberation
Army released approximately 30,000 ethnic Korean soldiers to return to the North with
their military equipment.
The same year North Korea was building up its military with the strong backing
of its Communist allies, South Korea appeared increasingly vulnerable, as the withdrawal
of American forces added to Rhee’s sense of insecurity and isolation. In May 1949, Rhee
sent a letter to Truman asking for the retention of US forces until the defense forces of
South Korea were capable of dealing with the Communist threat (North Korea). The
United States refused and completed its withdrawal from Korea at the end of June
1949.
180
To add to South Korea’s security problem, on January 12, 1950, US Secretary
of State Dean Acheson announced that South Korea was outside the defined American
defense perimeter. In May 1950, US Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, reinforced Acheson’s statement by remarking that the US
did not intend to support South Korea militarily in the event of war.
181
South Korea
found itself virtually alone, with little military strength and no security ally. These
179
The development of North Korean forces may be found in Sawyer, Robert K. (1962). Military Advisors
in Korea: KMAG in War and Peace. Washington DC, 104-109. As cited by Kim, The Korean Presidents,
54.
180
Cheong, Sung-hwa. (1991). The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: Japanese-South Korean
Relations Under American Occupation, 1945-1952. New York: Greenwood Press, xiii.
181
US News and World Report, June 5, 1950. As cited in Kim, The Korean Presidents, 50.
70
declarations made by American officials contributed in Kim Il-Sung’s decision to invade
the South a couple of months later on June 25, 1950.
Hanja Education Textbook Development during the Korean War
Complying with the Hanja Education law of 1949, in January 1950 the Ministry of
Education compiled a list of the 1300 most commonly used Hanja in Korean
publications. Of these, the Education Ministry then selected 1000 Hanja characters to be
taught in the elementary and secondary schools from 4
th
to 12
th
grade. However, North
Korea’s surprise invasion of South Korea halted the Hanja textbook project temporarily
as government officials adjusted for wartime procedures and the announcement of this
Hanja list was not made until May 1951. By September 1951, Cho Hyon-bae, an official
working in the publication department of the Ministry of Education, had rewritten the
national textbooks to incorporate the 1000 Hanja characters for the 4
th
-12
th
grade levels.
The new textbooks using Hanja were printed and replaced the old Hangul-only textbooks
in 1952.
182
The 1000 Hanja characters were divided into three groups for learning by
education levels: 300 Hanja characters from 4
th
-6
th
grade; another 300 from 7
th
-9
th
grades
and another 400 from 10
th
-12 grades. 1
st
-3
rd
grade students were only taught Hangul. It
would not be until 1956-1957 that the tide would slowly move back to Hangul-only
instruction.
Rhee’s Turn Toward Authoritarianism, The End of the Korean War and Improved
Perception of South Korean Security
Rhee’s four-year term was to end in 1952 (during the middle of the Korean war). Ahead
of the 1952 elections, he forced a constitutional amendment through the National
182
Blank, Language Policies in South Korea Since 1945 and Their Probable Impact on Education, 159.
71
Assembly providing for direct election of the president by popular vote when it became
clear to him that under the 1949 Constitution he was unlikely to be re-elected by the
majority in the National Assembly. He used undemocratic methods – intimidation and
arrests of members who opposed him - to bend the National Assembly to his will. This
started a downward spiral of dismantling democracy and putting into place an
authoritarian system in which Rhee would wield power without significant checks or
balances. Thus 1952 marks a turning point in the transformation of Rhee’s government
from democratic to authoritarian. The first popular presidential election was held on
August 5, 1952, during the Korean War. The people voted overwhelmingly for Rhee and
he won 74.6% of the vote. The need for his continued leadership during the war played
an important role in consolidating his support among the people who looked to him as
their leader to guide them through the crisis. But later, Rhee’s continued used of
undemocratic practices eventually eroded his political support base among the general
public.
183
The Korean War ended on July 27, 1953 with an armistice, not a peace treaty, and
the two Koreas remain technically at war at the time of this writing. However, Rhee
considered the threat of any future North Korean invasion to be low after he successfully
secured a US-ROK mutual security treaty and an economic aid agreement following the
armistice. Rhee’s perception that the security of South Korea had vastly improved is
exemplified by this statement, “Now that a defense treaty has been signed between Korea
and the United States…we will enjoy the benefits of this treaty for generations to come.
Our united efforts in this field will assure our security, protecting us from alien
183
Woo Jongseok (2011). Security Challenges and Military Politics in East Asia: From State Building to
Post-Democratization. London: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 31.
72
aggressors.”
184
Rhee firmly believed that the security guarantee by American forces
would be an effective deterrent in any North Korean invasion.
After the end of the Korean War, Rhee continued his struggle to amass more
political power and to ensure his lifelong rule. Although he stated that the security of
South Korea had vastly improved with American security and economic support, at the
beginning of 1954, Rhee used the continued existence of the Communist regime in North
Korea as an excuse to usurp the power of the legislature.
185
In November 1954, Rhee
forced through the legislature another constitutional amendment to remove the two-term
limitation on the presidency so that he could run for a third term. The same constitutional
amendment also called for the abolition of the position of the prime minister as well as all
other elements of a parliamentary
186
system to garner greater presidential power. The
National Assembly voted on the constitutional amendment bill, with 135 of 203 in favor,
which fell short by one vote of the two-thirds needed for approval. Nevertheless, Rhee
forced the amendment through by signing and promulgating the law on November 30,
1954. That he succeeded in this unilateral action demonstrates that he had accrued
enough power to effectively usurp the legitimacy of the National Assembly, leaving
himself virtually unchallengeable. Rhee then reshuffled the Cabinet and military
leadership to install his firm supporters. The head of the National Police was an officer
who had personal allegiance to Rhee. The Army’s Counter Intelligence Corp and other
184
Office of Public Information, the Republic of Korea, Korea Flaming High, Vol, 1, 91-92. As cited in
Kim, The Korean Presidents, 66.
185
Syngman Rhee’s authoritarian rule and the dispute with the US, Korea Observer, Winter 2001; 32,4, IN
Soo Hwang, 605.
186
A parliamentary system is a system of democratic governance of a state where the executive branch
derives its democratic legitimacy from legislature (parliament) and is also held accountable to that
legislature.
73
regional intelligence security forces also remained under Rhee’s direct control.
187
In
addition to having the backing of the armed forces and the police, he used his political
base—the Liberal Party – as a loyal instrument. Around the same time, however, the
South Korean people became more politically conscious. The press frequently exposed
government corruption and criticized Rhee’s increasingly authoritarian and coercive
political tactics. In the May 1956 presidential election, Rhee won only 55% of the vote
even though his main opponent had died ten days before the election. Government
interference in the election was widespread, and people were increasingly dissatisfied
with the election intimidation and repressive measures.
Hangul-only Policy of December 6 and December 29, 1957
In 1956, Rhee considered both the threat of North Korea and his political
opposition to be low. There was no reason for him to securitize language to justify shifts
in language policy. His authoritarian power gave him control over political goals,
agenda, strategies and the ability to change language policy. Until 1956, schools were
still using the Hanja textbooks that had replaced the Hangul textbooks in 1952. On
October 9, 1956, known as Hangul Day, a national Korean commemorative day marking
the invention and the proclamation of Hangul, Rhee addressed the nation in an effort to
change the existing language policy that emphasized Hanja. He said, “For the
development of South Korea’s democracy, newspapers and magazines must use Hangul
only.” In his speech, Hangul was tied to the development of democracy, but there was no
invocation of “security.” One possible reason behind President Rhee’s decision to
187
Hwang, In Soo. (2001). Syngman Rhee’s Authoritarian Rule and the Dispute with the US. Korea
Observer 32:4, 608.
74
change language policy could be that he was personally fond of Hangul and was
interested in building a nation where Hangul was the official and only writing system as a
symbol of Korean independence.
With the low military threat from North Korea along with the political power that
Rhee had acquired and the backing of the military and police, he was able to direct and
implement his preferred language policy with the help of other state actors. In keeping
with the President’s wishes, the following year, on December 6, 1957, during the 117
th
meeting of the National Assembly, the members drew up the “Exclusive Use of Hangul”
policy.
188
This policy delineated that all “signs, covers of publications, public
announcements, notices, bulletins, all printed materials” shall be written exclusively in
Hangul. However, “only in certain proper nouns and academic words can Hanja be used
in parenthesis when clarifying the Hangul word.”
To reinforce this Hangul-only policy, in a December 29 speech, Rhee reiterated
his full support by stating, “We also should not use the difficult Hanja, but use
Hangul.”
189
He further addressed the nation through the Office of Information on
December 29, 1957 by stating, “China decided to abolish Chinese characters and adopt
the Latin alphabet, so we must also not use Chinese characters.
190
It is my desire that we
put all our energy into using the Korean alphabet, as it will develop civilization and
promote the welfare.”
191
In his speech, he did not securitize language to promote
Hangul-only policy; he simply hinted at the role Hangul could play in “developing” and
188
There is no law record in the national assembly but there is a record in the National Assembly debates.
So this was just a policy drawn up but it is not a law.
189
Korean Language Society, publication.
190
Also, in his reference to China, he is referring to Singapore and its decision to add English as an official
language along with each ethnic group’s mother tongue.
191
Korean Language Society, publication.
75
“promoting” Korea’s cultural development and economy. This is the first time Hangul is
alluded to as a basis of national cultural development and economic progress.
On the same day as Rhee’s speech, the Ministry of State Affairs issued a detailed
implementation plan and instructions to carry out the Hangul-only policy of December 6,
1957. The speed at which the ministry’s plan aligned with Rhee’s wishes confirms the
amount of power Rhee had. No national security justification was needed to get the
policy Rhee wanted in place. The “Implementation of the Hangul-only” policy issued by
the ministry stated, “all official documents must be written in only Hangul, but in cases
of ambiguity or confusion of the Hangul expression, Hanja can be used in parenthesis.”
These included “government periodical publications, documents and brochures.”
Significantly, it also required that government signboards, department stamps (insignia)
be re-written and corrected to Hangul. It further instructed governmental departments to
encourage all organizations and affiliates under their supervision and influence to follow
these instructions. These detailed instructions were to go into effect on January 1, 1958.
The Office of Home Affairs followed the “Implementation of Hangul-only” policy and
designated the week of August 21-27, 1958 as “Hangul signage promotion period.” With
the exception of Chinese restaurants, all businesses were to switch their signs to Hangul.
The Ministry of Education followed the Ministry of State Affairs’ steps and changed all
school seals to use only Hangul.
192
President Rhee’s Hangul-only language policy was adopted, but before the use of
Hangul-only could be fully implemented and take root in Korean society, a student
revolution in 1960 brought down the government. On March 15, 1960, presidential
elections were held and Rhee was declared the president for a fourth term. Violence,
192
Information from Hangul Society’s internal document, p. 674.
76
intimidation and fraudulent counting of votes were used to ensure his win. Resentment
had been brewing against Rhee for his undemocratic rule and his failure to jump-start
Korea’s economy after the Korean War. Rhee had failed to implement an economic
recovery plan-- South Korea’s GNP had grown by 5.2 percent in 1954, 4 percent in 1955,
but only 0.3 percent in 1956.
193
During the same period (1954-1956), North Korea had
experienced a 220 percent increase in national income and 280 percent increase in gross
industrial product; from 1956-1960, the national income in North Korea increased 210
percent and gross industrial product by 340 percent.
194
By 1960, North Korea had
undeniably far surpassed South Korea in terms of economic performance.
The results of the rigged 1960 presidential election caused civil disorder to erupt
in many parts of the country. Several student demonstrations broke out against him,
which revealed how much popular support Rhee had lost among the people since the
1952 election in which he had won 74.6% of the vote. On April 12, 1960, approximately
40,000 demonstrators rallied and engaged in a broad protest against the police, the ruling
party office and government buildings.
195
Finally on April 19, 1960, around 100,000
students demonstrated in Seoul, and the ensuing clash between the police and protestors
led to widespread political turmoil that toppled Rhee’s regime. He fled to the United
States and lived in exile in Hawaii until his death in 1965.
In sum, during the short-lived democratic period from 1948 until 1952, National
Assembly members exerted a fair amount of political independence from Rhee and
invoked security on language issues in order to shift language policy, zigzagging between
193
Woo Jongseok (2011). Security Challenges and Military Politics in East Asia: From State Building to
Post-Democratization. London: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 31.
194
Ibid.
195
Hwang, In Soo. (2001). Syngman Rhee’s Authoritarian Rule and the Dispute with the US. Korea
Observer 32:4, 618.
77
Hangul-only and the inclusion of Hanja. The securitizations of language policy took
place under conditions of growing military threats from North Korea and a democratic
context where the political elites needed to generate support for their policies among the
people for implementation. In contrast, after the Korean War, with security assurances
from the United States and an increase in Rhee’s authoritarian power over the legislative
body and state ministries, national security justifications were not employed in order to
shift language policy. Instead there was the beginning of a discourse of language and
cultural/economic development.
As described in the first chapter, in democracies, securitization discourse tends to
be utilized by political elites under conditions of military security threats. When few
military threats are perceived by political elites, a securitization discourse will be
employed less to shift language policy (although they may securitize non-military threats
such as economic or cultural issues). Similar to the democratic context, in the context of
limited military threats, the attempts at securitization by political elites in authoritarian
systems were also few.
In the period following the Korean War Rhee had amassed sufficient power to
carry out his will without having to securitize language to secure support. For example,
in 1956, he considered both the threat of North Korea and the threat of large protests to
be low. There was no reason for Rhee to securitize language to justify shifts in language
policy. The low military threat facing the government and the authoritarian-centered
political dynamics gave Rhee control over setting political goals, agenda, strategies and
ability to contain negative consequences of his policy decisions. His downfall came with
the April 1960 student revolution, in which students and other segments of Korean
78
society forced Syng-man Rhee to resign the presidency.
196
Subsequent ruling
governments probably noted the important role that antigovernment protest had had in
bringing down Rhee’s government. From then on, political elites were particularly
sensitive to the possibility that large protests could become serious threats to the
survival of the government.
The Political Context of Language Policy Under Park Chung-hee (1961-1979)
After Rhee was overthrown, Yun Po-sun was elected as the second President of South
Korea on August 13, 1960. The new government then initiated a series of major
economic reforms designed to reverse the low economic performance that had
characterized the period from 1954 to 1960. Reduction in American foreign aid to South
Korea had resulted in a serious recession, and unemployment in 1959 soared to about 2
million workers, 20 percent of the labor force.
197
Unfortunately the economy did not
respond quickly to these reforms, and popular unrest grew. In the face of growing
economic and social instability, the Korean military overthrew the government on May
16, 1961. General Park Chung-hee emerged as the leader and ruled Korea until his
assassination in 1979.
Park was acutely aware of the powerful potential of large protests to cripple social
stability and challenge the functioning and survival of the ruling government. Because he
witnessed how the large student protests in 1960 developed into a revolution that brought
down Rhee’s government, Park was wary of large protests that could erupt. Although
196
Chang, Paul. (2015). Protest Dialectics: State Repression and South Korea’s Democracy Movement,
1970-1979. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 4.
197
Cited by Kim, The Korean Presidents, 81.
79
Park had the military capability to enforce policies without having to securitize issues, it
appears that he may have chosen to utilize securitization discourse before consolidating
political power and pursuing an economic modernization drive as a strategy in the hopes
that it would preempt and quell potential protests that could develop against the proposed
changes or challenge the ruling government itself. In securitizing his economic
modernization plan, Park was successful in claiming greater political power overall under
the guise of safeguarding national security, resulting in greater policy-making power in
other areas including language policy.
Along with the threat of large protests, another security problem was the growing
threat of North Korea. While Rhee perceived the threat of North Korea as low after
signing the security treaty with the United States, upon seizing power, Park quickly
defined North Korea as a threat in response to the provocative steps that North Korea’s
leader Kim Il-sung had recently taken. In 1961, Kim had visited Moscow and Beijing to
establish formal alliance relations and increased North Korean aggression toward the
South by violating the armistice agreement on 736 occasions in that year (compared to
fewer than 200 times in the previous year).
198
Also in 1961, North Korea’s per capita
GNP was $160 - twice that of South Korea - and the gap in economic performance
continued to rise.
199
Park viewed North Korea’s growing diplomatic and economic
power as a grave threat, and in response, he declared anti-communism to be South
Korea’s “national essence” (kushi) in 1961. Park securitized the threat of communism
and North Korea to consolidate his political control in the South, which allowed him
simply to impose policies in other areas. In 1963, in the first direct presidential election
198
Kim, Byung-Kook and Vogel, Ezra F. (2013) The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South
Korea. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 406.
199
Ibid.
80
since the 1961 coup, Park won by a narrow margin securing the transition to civilian rule
under his Democratic Republican Party.
He established an authoritarian political system with power concentrated in the
presidency and staffed the government with people loyal only to him.
200
The
government’s main purpose was to implement the goals and visions of the executive.
201
Park believed that a good government ensured political order and efficiency over
democratic procedures and the rule of law.
202
Structurally, he made the executive branch
strong and the legislative and judicial branches weak.
203
Political parties were also weak:
they lacked vision, programs and grassroots organizations for mobilization and were
constrained by police surveillance.
204
Park securitized the threat of North Korea in order to embark on economic
modernization to catch up with the North. He believed in the primacy of economic
development in fighting the communist threat in the Cold War era. He thus became
obsessed with economic growth and engaged in a high risk- high reward, but high cost,
strategy of modernization to jump-start the economy. Park’s rhetoric of “modernization”
and “catch-up” are examples of securitization that highlight the urgency of implementing
his policies to guarantee South Korea’s security from the North Korean diplomatic,
economic and military threat. Park also realized that economic development could
alleviate concerns over his political legitimacy: a strong economy could be a means of
political legitimation.
200
Ibid., 203.
201
Ibid., 129.
202
Ibid.
203
Ibid.,130.
204
Ibid., 6.
81
Add to that Park’s increased authoritarian control: In December 1962, the
military government drew up a new constitution and put it to a popular referendum,
where it received 78.8 percent of the vote. Under this constitution, the president was to
have strong powers, including the authority to appoint the prime minister and cabinet
members without legislative consent and to order emergency financial and economic
measures.
205
As soon as Park assumed power as president on December 17, 1963, he
further strengthened the power of the presidency as he worked to create a centralized,
strong, and effective presidential staff to plan, coordinate and monitor governmental
policies.
206
Throughout Park’s rule, the perceived security threat from North Korea was high,
and he securitized the threat of North Korea to pursue an economic modernization drive.
The necessity of South Korea’s economic growth legitimized Park’s political control and
emboldened him to increase his authoritarian power of the South to combat the threat of
the North. The tightening of Park’s authoritarian control ultimately allowed him to enact
shifts in language policy because he had gained the resources to impose his political will.
Thus, under conditions of high military threats, Park did not engage in securitization of
language issues directly; however, he did utilize securitization discourse in economic
issues, which helped build and strengthen the capacity, reach and power of the
authoritarian state. He then was able to use that political power to ultimately shift
language policy. In other words, while securitization was not used on language issues per
se, securitization was used as a strategy by Park to strengthen his control over the policy-
making process, which he used to impose language policies according to his preference.
205
Kim Ki-bum. (1964). Certain Features of the Constitution. Korean Affairs,3:1. Cited by Kim, The
Korean Presidents, 106.
206
Kim, The Korean Presidents, 108.
82
Even though Park is best known for his role in developing South Korea’s economy, he
actively pursued the strengthening of Hangul-only policies. Of all the presidents, it was
during his presidency that the most was done to advance the exclusive use of Hangul and
decrease the use of Hanja.
Hangul-only Policy of November 20, 1963
On November 20, 1963, the Ministry of Government Administration strengthened the
Hangul-only law of 1948. Unfortunately, there appear to be no records of discussions
surrounding the new regulation entitled, “Regulation of government official documents.”
It stipulated that documents should be written in Hangul, but with spaces between words
and written horizontally. If necessary, foreign languages could be used, but only in
parentheses. The only exceptions were law-related documents, where mixed script of
both Hangul and Hanja was permitted because Hangul vocabulary had not yet developed
to describe many legal concepts. Until then, many official government documents were
still being written in mixed script. It should be noted that this regulation was limited to
documents written in the government sector. Later we will see this scope being
broadened to include the education and societal sectors.
Security Context in 1965 and Hangul-only Law of November 28, 1965
In 1965, Park’s regime caused political instability that was sparked by his own policy
miscalculations. As part of his economic drive, Park had normalized diplomatic relations
with Japan in order to receive reparation funds to be used as seed money for a steel mill.
Park’s political weakness was exposed when he failed to anticipate a nationalist backlash
83
from this policy given the anti-Japanese sentiment that still gripped the nation. His
background as a former officer in the Japanese-controlled Manchukuo Imperial Army
and his myopic vision focusing only on economic modernization may have affected his
decision. The normalization of relations with Japan signed on June 22, 1965 triggered an
explosion of student protests. Park declared martial law and was able to re-establish
political order, but the protests would later resurface and “explode without warning
making politics highly volatile, uncertain and full of tension” in the remainder Park’s
rule.
207
In 1965, as Park’s government continued to concentrate most of its energies on
economic growth, South Korea began to achieve concrete economic development and
increases in exports.
208
The economic stagnation that had first been manifested in 1954-
1960 was over. With the improved economy, Park thought that the security challenge
from North Korea had been mitigated. This, in combination with the lack of anticipated
social resistance, likely led Park to conclude that he did not need to invoke security to
achieve his desired language policy. Park stated his personal support of Hangul, and
bureaucratic actors enacted appropriate policies in line with his wishes. On the
anniversary of Hangul Day on October 9, 1965, President Park addressed the nation and
stated, “The Korean language is scientific, independent and democratic.”
209
What he
meant by this statement was that the Korean language had been created scientifically by
King Sejong, not derived from foreign languages, and thus was independent. As for
being “democratic,” he might have meant that it was a language simple enough for all
people to master.
207
Kim and Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era, 25.
208
Kim, The Korean Presidents, 109.
209
Korean Language Society Publication
84
On November 28, 1965, the Ministry of Government Administration made
revisions to the Hangul-only law of 1948. The purpose of these revisions was to
strengthen the exclusive use of Hangul in writing. To that end the changes: 1) defined
and clarified important terms; 2) gave detailed instructions on the proper way of writing;
and 3) allocated power to different individuals and groups.
First, the revision defined and clarified important terms in the laws. For example,
there were questions of whether Roman numerals, international symbols and punctuation
marks were a foreign language and thus needed to be written in parenthesis. “Korean”
language was redefined to encompass Hangul, Roman numerals, international symbols
and punctuation marks. The term “documents” was specified to include all public
documents, any public complaints written by citizens that were submitted to the
government, and all newspapers, magazines and publications, thus broadening the
jurisdiction of the law. Second, the revisions included detailed instructions on the proper
way of writing. For example, the revisions reiterated a policy issued on November 20,
1963 to write Hangul horizontally (not vertically) and gave specific dates regarding
implementation of the new format and deadlines for translations of documents into
Hangul. Finally, the revisions to the Hangul-only law also gave administrative power
regarding the researching and evaluating of the usage of Hangul to the prime minister and
to a new Hangul Committee; even though the President determined the purpose of the
new Hangul Committee and was the only one who could call for meetings. The president
was also given powers regarding the Hangul-only law’s enforcement, progress and
methods, thus affording Park a tremendous amount of control in leading the country on a
Hangul-only path.
85
Five Year Hangul-Only Plan
In May 1967, direct presidential elections were held again in South Korea, and Park won
with 51.4% of the vote. During the first year of his second term as president, on
November 16, 1967, the newly re-elected president issued the “Order regarding the
Hangul-only Issue,” to Prime Minister Jung Il-kwon, in which he called for making an
annual plan for speeding up the usage of Hangul and setting a deadline for the complete
use of Hangul.” In it, Park made three points: “1) the exclusive usage of Hangul-only is
the final goal; 2) the exclusive use of Hangul should not be carried out hastily but
gradually to reduce the use of Hanja; 3) a series of activities would be held to promote
the usage of Hangul-only, but language usage would be enforced without penalty.
In response to Park’s direct orders, the ministries of Education, Culture,
Government Administration, Judiciary Administration and other affiliated departments
held a joint meeting and drafted a plan called the “Five-Year (1968-1972) Language Plan
of Hangul-only Usage” for the complete abolition of Hanja. On March 14, 1968, the
plan was submitted to the Cabinet Council for review. In the plan, the Ministry of
Education agreed to reduce the use of Hanja in textbooks gradually. From textbooks, the
existing Hanja list of 1000 characters was to be reduced to 700 by 1969. By 1972, all
Hanja characters were to be eliminated from textbooks. The Ministry of Information
promised to reduce the use of Hanja in newspapers and all publications to 2000
characters by 1968, 1300 characters by 1969, 700 characters by 1970, and use only
Hangul by 1972. The Ministry of General Administration also pledged to gradually
reduce Hanja in all public office notices and personnel file cards. The Ministry of
86
Judiciary Administration agreed to gradually record all family registry and court
proceedings in Hangul.
On May 2, 1968, the following deadlines in the “5-year Hangul-only Plan” were
passed by the National Assembly:
“By 1968, only 2000 Hanja can be used.
By 1969, reduce Hanja usage to 1300 characters.
By 1974, abolish the use of Hanja completely.
By 1973, there shall only be the exclusive use of Hangul in Korean writing.”
It should be noted that these target dates differ from the pledged dates proposed two
months earlier by the different ministries. The deadlines outlined in the May 2, 1968
plan passed by the National Assembly were the finalized dates to be enforced.
This was an ambitious plan to begin with, but a mere five months later, on October 7,
Park issued stronger directives, accelerating the “5-Year Hangul-Only” plan’s deadline
by three years to 1970, although he did not give any reasons to justify the new deadline.
His authoritarian power was such that he did not need to securitize language issues in
order to shift policy nor worry about having to generate broad support for this policy.
To promote this new deadline, he declared 1969 “Hangul-only Preparation Year.”
In keeping with the new target dates, on October 25, 1968, the Prime Minister, Minister
of Education, and Minister of Culture established a committee called, “Committee for the
Exclusive Use of Hangul” to make the appropriate adjustments to the new deadline. On
October 9, 1968 on the 522
nd
anniversary of Hangul, Park announced the new deadline of
Hangul-only policy in a speech addressed to the nation. “Remembering our forefathers’
grand design to promulgate literacy among the populace, we must make every effort to
87
overcome the difficulties and realize that exclusive use of Hangul, beginning 1970.” The
following day, on October 10, 1968, he issued another directive to Prime Minister Chung
Il-kwon to establish a committee to formulate plans based on the new 1970 deadline.
On October 25, 1968, Park issued another follow-up directive called, “The
Hangul Acceleration, Seven Points.” The first point stated that beginning January 1,
1970, all branches of the government “shall use Hangul exclusively for all official paper,
otherwise they will not be accepted.” The second point established an institute for the
exclusive use of Hangul called the “Hangul-only Research Institute.” The third point
called for the improvement and wider use of the Hangul typewriter. Fourth, the exclusive
use of Hangul was to be accelerated in the publication field. Fifth, the original Hangul
legislation of 1948 was amended to expurgate the clause, “But for the time being, Hanja
can also be used, if necessary.” This legislation was also amended to include the
mandatory start date of January 1, 1970 to use only Hangul. Sixth, Hanja was to be
eliminated from textbooks of all levels, and lastly, books written in mixed script were to
be “transcribed into Hangul as soon as possible.”
This presidential directive was reviewed and revised by the Committee for the
Exclusive Use of Hangul
210
and promulgated as Presidential Decree No. 3625 on
November 5, 1968. Then, on December 24, 1968, Prime Minister Chong Il-kwon issued
Resolution No. 68 called “the Exclusive Use of Hangul Follow-Up Report” to encourage
the use of Hangul. One of the more significant points of this policy was that all
specialized vocabulary in each field were to be made “consistent and unified across fields
and departments.” The heads of each government office were instructed to send a list of
words to the Minister of Education, and the Minister of Education was given the
210
Hangul Society, Internal Document, p. 681.
88
responsibility to compile all specialized terms (law-related, scientific, administrative,
technical), decide on a common vocabulary, and issue a list of the standard terms to be
used by each department. The Prime Minister then directed the National Defense
Department to start enforcing the exclusive use of Hangul. The Minister of Defense
relayed his order to 600,000 soldiers in the national army on January 6, 1969 with
specific guidelines, deadlines and follow-up methods.
Opposition to the Hangul-Only Policies
Park’s Hangul-only policies were not unanimously accepted; indeed, there was
pushback from Hanja-advocates. Opposition to the impending five-year Hangul-only
plan, which included many lawyers, academics, writers, journalists, and Hanja-
advocating NGOs such as the Korean Language Education Research Center (Hanguk
Omun Kyoyuk Yonguhoe) grew. On May 13, 1969, some 140 professors, writers and
lawyers who opposed the exclusive use of Hangul signed and submitted an official
declaration to the Ministry of Education objecting to the government’s laws. Then on
July 31, 1969, a nationwide rally took place in Seoul where the opposition’s resolution
was announced to the public. However, the resistance of Hanja-advocates was met with
limited success because of Park’s power, and the regime proceeded to implement the Five
Year Plan. In 1970, it became illegal to teach Hanja and use mixed script textbooks in
public schools, from elementary school to high school. But Park was not completely
immune to the opposition and protests, because he did make some concessions regarding
the 5-year Hangul-only plan. In 1972, the government permitted optional Hanja
education in middle schools and high schools, but it maintained the ban on Hanja
89
education in elementary schools and the ban on mixed script in textbooks other than
Hanja textbooks.
Securitization of North Korea and Park’s Regime Change
In 1969, in preparation for the upcoming 1971 presidential election, Park plotted
to prolong his rule. At the time, the presidency was constitutionally limited to two terms.
So in 1969, he forced a constitutional amendment through the National Assembly to
allow him to seek a third term. He was re-elected president in 1971, but then endeavored
to look for and use national security challenges as an opportunity to institute lifelong rule.
The year 1971 was filled with several unrelated domestic and international
security challenges. On the domestic front, in August 1971, fifty thousand residents in the
city of Kwangju engaged in violent protests and staged sit-ins at government buildings
because they claimed the government had not kept its promise to provide economic
assistance for the resettlement of squatters forcefully removed from the slums in Seoul.
211
Then, on August 23 1971, twenty-four commandos in a South Korean air force camp who
were training to infiltrate North Korea in retaliation for a North Korean attempt to
assassinate Park in 1968 voiced their grievances concerning maltreatment and committed
suicide during the ensuing gunfight with the military forces.
212
In the fall of 1971,
students at Seoul National and Korea University held anti-government protests criticizing
police surveillance of students and corruption in the government.
213
In the international realm, the United States withdrew a third of American armed
forces (10,000 troops) stationed in South Korea by 1971, causing a security crisis for
211
Kim and Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era, 185.
212
Ibid.
213
Ibid.
90
Park’s regime.
214
The same year, United States also decreased economic aid, which Park
saw as signaling a decline in the previous US security commitment.
215
Park responded to
the perceived weakening of US military commitment to South Korea with the declaration
of a national emergency.
216
He then proceeded to securitize his discourse regarding
North Korea in order to tighten his control by launching a new regime called Yushin.
217
He argued that under a Yushin regime, which would give even greater power to the
presidency, South Korea would be able to strengthen its military as a deterrent and would
be better able conduct negotiations with the North.
218
He framed Yushin as the solution
for South Korea’s fear of military invasion and its hope for peaceful coexistence with the
North.
219
Thus the securitization of North Korea was used by Park to justify the
promulgation of the Yushin constitution on October 1972. The new constitution got rid of
the limits on presidential terms and endowed the presidency with near absolute power
which essentially made Park dictator for life.
220
Park used securitization discourse in
order to stifle criticism and prevent large protests; nevertheless, the declaration of the
Yushin Constitution led to anti-government protests as students called for
democratization. The Yushin period (1972-1979) became one of rule by emergency
decrees as the government frequently used repressive measures to put down large protests
to maintain political order and social stability. Yet the protests continued to grow as
more people joined the movement for democracy including political opposition leaders,
intellectuals, religious leaders, farmers and laborers. When Park was elected to another
214
Ibid., 221.
215
Ibid.
216
Ibid., 460.
217
The Korean pronunciation of the Japanese word Ishin (Restoration) is named after Japan’s 1968 Meiji
Restoration.
218
Kim and Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era, 187-188.
219
Kim and Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era, 260.
220
Kim and Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era, 222.
91
term by indirect election in 1978, mass anti-government demonstrations occurred
nationwide in response. In the midst of the resulting political turmoil, the director of the
Korean Central Intelligence Agency assassinated Park in 1979.
Conclusion
From 1948-1979, the periods under presidents Rhee and Park, the linguistic battle was
between using either only Hangul or incorporating some Hanja in Korean writings.
During South Korea’s short democratic period from 1948-1952, many different state
actors participated in the securitization of language issues in a political environment of
high security threats in order to generate support and shift language policy. The political
elites were able to securitize language issues by taking advantage of the presence of many
perceived threats facing the nation- particularly the threat of North Korea and
communism. They used the fear of the North as a rationale for the formulation and
implementation of top-down language policies that were not consensual. Securitization
justified decisions made by the top leadership and policy-making by command rather
than consensus building. In particular, National Assembly representatives were very
active in the securitization of language issues during the National Assembly policy
debates and the resulting policies were at times contrary to the preferred policy of the
president. However, after the Korean War, securitization of language issues was used
less frequently by political elites in order to shift language policy. In his speeches in
1956 and 1957, Rhee declared his support for Hangul-only policies without using
national security justifications (although there is the beginning of a discourse of language
and cultural/economic development) and his policy preferences were quickly followed up
92
by ministries issuing Hangul-only policies. What explains the decline in securitization of
language issues after the Korean War?
This study hypothesizes that two significant things changed after the Korean war
that might have led to the decrease in securitization of language policy: Rhee’s
perception of low levels of threats from the North and the transformation from a
democratic to authoritarian regime that increased political power of the president. In an
environment of improved national security, there were fewer military threats that political
elites can identify. This chapter also shows that an increase in presidential power under
an authoritarian system coincided with fewer examples of language policy securitization
by political elites. In an authoritarian system, the president may be less inclined to
securitize language issues because s/he may not need to generate broad public support in
order to shift language policy. The lack of significant checks and balances allows the
president a great deal of leeway to formulate and implement policies. Thus, a
combination of the decreased level of military security threats facing Rhee’s regime and
the increase in Rhee’s political power after 1952 might help explain the decline in cases
of securitization of language policy. In contrast, before 1952, when South Korea faced
many military security threats and was a democracy, many political elites engaged in the
securitization of language issues to muster popular support in order to shift language
policy through democratic procedures.
During Park’s regime, his administration faced many security challenges and he
perceived North Korea as its gravest security threat. Park used the threat of the North in
order to pursue an economic modernization drive and tighten authoritarian control, which
gave him greater policy-making power to impose policies in many areas, including
93
language. Park’s case demonstrates how valuable securitization discourse has been to
build and maintain power. So while language issues were not securitized directly by
Park, it is important to note that his use of securitization discourse on other issues
ultimately strengthened his overall political power to make drastic top-down changes in
language policy. But this begs the question, why did he not securitize language issues
directly in order to shift language policy? First, Park had a tremendous amount of policy
control due to the hierarchic bureaucratic arrangements he created in the authoritarian
political system. The rise of authoritarian executive-bureaucracy arrangement meant he
had the power to impose top-down language changes without having to securitize it
directly. He had amassed great political power and had the ability to formulate,
implement and enforce his policies with the backing of the military. Second, this study
suggests that perhaps Park chose not to securitize language issues directly as he either
anticipated they would not lead to large protests, or anticipated that any opposition could
be easily be subdued with force. Interestingly, he did choose to securitize the threat of
North Korea before he pursued economic modernization policies and launched the Yushin
Constitution. This study suggests that perhaps Rhee chose to securitize issues when he
anticipated the top-down implementation of a particular policy would lead to significant
criticism and resistance. As stated above, Park was conscious of the potential of large
protests to threaten social stability that led to Rhee’s demise. He may have anticipated
economic issues and the Yushin Constitution to be more controversial than language
issues and thus chose to securitize one and not the other.
In sum, to answer the question of under what conditions political elites tend to
securitize language in order to shift language policy, this chapter’s cases demonstrate that
94
in democratic governments, political elites are inclined to securitize language issues when
military security threats are high. On the other hand, Korean political elites are less
inclined to securitize language issues in the absence of a serious external military threat
and during relatively quiet periods when protests are absent.
In stark contrast to the securitization behavior of political elites in democracies,
this chapter’s cases suggest that in authoritarian governments, political elites are less
inclined to securitize language issues in order to shift language policy even when military
threats and/or the threat of large protests are high. In authoritarian contexts, the President
may not feel there is a need to securitize language issues directly because he/she can rely
on the loyal bureaucracy to formulate his/her preferred policy with the backing of the
military to enforce them. From this, one can infer that there is even less incentive for
political elites to securitize language issues when there is no military threat or political
opposition. In the next chapter, the patterns of securitization discourse change with
South Korea’s transition to democracy. Securitizations became more frequent in the
democratic context as President Kim Young-sam pursued a globalization drive as a
means to increase South Korea’s security.
95
Chapter 4
Language Policies Under Kim and Lee:
English for National Security and the “Globalization” of Language Policies
in the 1990s-2000s
Introduction
The assassination of Park Chung-hee in 1979 did not mean an abrupt end to his
vision of making South Korea a Hangul-only nation. The Hangul-only policies instituted
during his regime continued as successive regimes under General Chun Doo-hwan (1979-
1987) and General Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993) maintained Park’s Hangul exclusivity
policy. Nevertheless, the national language debate moved on, transitioning from an
emphasis on Hangul to English with the election of Kim Young-sam, who replaced the
last of the country’s military leaders and led the country’s political transition to a civilian
democratic government in 1992, the first in more than three decades.
221
During Kim’s
presidency (1993– 1998), his quest to segyewha (globalize) Korea into an advanced
nation led to dramatic education reforms that expanded the teaching of English language
in public schools. Kim’s English language education policies were further emphasized
and strengthened during Lee Myung-bak’s presidency (2008- 2013). It is clear that the
national language goals of the government changed course from Hangul to English in the
1990s and 2000s. The debate between Hangul and Hanja was set aside as government
resources and national attention shifted their focus to English. South Korea had entered
into a new phase in its language development as it prepared for the challenges of the 21
st
century.
221
Direct presidential elections were held in 1988 where Roh Tae-woo, protégé of Chun Doo-wan, was
elected president, but the 1992 elections were the first direct presidential elections where a civilian was
elected president.
96
In keeping with the previous chapter, this chapter considers the political context
in which the discussions of English language policies were introduced and then identifies
the securitization (or not) of language issues by political elites. It presents the
discussions surrounding each language policy change and carefully analyzes the official
discourse for evidence of securitization, if any, by political elites.
The analysis focuses on two elements. First are the potential security threats
facing the Kim and Lee governments. For the period of Kim’s rule, such threats included
corruption, a sluggish domestic economy, increased international economic competition,
the student uprisings of 1996, and the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Under Lee, the
challenges were political opposition to his English immersion plan, large-scale protests
against the import of US beef, and South Korea’s weak international competitiveness.
This study hypothesized that when military threats are low, political elites will use
securitization less or will securitize non-military threats such as economic or cultural
issues in order to shift policy. Therefore, since military threats were largely absent we
would expect political elites to focus on securitizing mainly economic issues in order to
expand English education in South Korea.
Second, are the potential threats of large protests, which political leaders may
identity as a powerful destabilizing force in society. Unlike Rhee Syng-man and Park
Chung-hee, who operated in an authoritarian political system, Kim and Lee’s executive
powers were checked and balanced by the other two branches of government along with
the influential political force of South Korean civil society in a democratic system, which
protected the people’s right to protest. As discussed in Chapter 1, when the threat of
opposition seems greater than the strength of the government to carry out its political
97
goals, one would expect an increase in the utilization of securitization by political elites
in order to shift policy. Securitization will most likely be used if public opposition in the
form of violent protests can challenge the functioning or survival of the government. On
the other hand, if political elites perceive the public opposition vis-à-vis the government
to be weak, one would expect a decrease in the utilization of securitization as political
elites may try to shift policy without resorting to security rhetoric. Thus with South
Korea’s transition to civilian democracy in 1992, which guaranteed the right to civil
protest, one would expect securitizations by political elites to have become more
frequent. With the rise of civil protests, the leadership may attempt to securitize issues to
stifle potential criticism in order to secure passage and implementation of a shift in
policy.
The Political Context of Kim Young-sam’s Securitized Discourse on Segyehwa
Military threats against South Korea were quite low when Kim took over as president, as
South Korea’s relations with three of its most threatening adversaries--the Soviet Union,
China and North Korea—had improved dramatically. As Cold War allies, both the
Soviet Union and China had supported North Korea, but as the Cold War came to an end
in the late 1980s, South Korea vigorously increased its efforts to improve relations with
communist countries. South Korea and the Soviet Union officially normalized relations
on October 1, 1990, issuing a joint Declaration of General Principles of Relations, which
pledged good-neighborly relations, a relaxation of tensions on the Korean peninsula and
an eventual reunification of South and North Korea. Four months later, South Korea
98
agreed to provide economic assistance to the Soviet Union with $3 billion in credits.
222
In return the Soviet Union gave a written commitment to support South Korea’s
admission to the United Nations, offered assurances that offensive weapons would no
longer be supplied to North Korea and guaranteed that assistance would no longer be
given to the North’s nuclear program. This normalization of South Korean-Soviet
relations significantly improved in military terms the security condition of South Korea.
In the realm of peninsular relations, the two Koreas engaged in unprecedented
face-to-face talks in the early 1990s.
223
On December 13, 1991, at the end of the fifth
round of South-North Korea prime ministerial talks in Seoul, the “Basic Agreement on
North-South Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchange and Cooperation” was signed.
The agreement upheld the principle of noninterference in the internal politics of the other
and renounced the use of military force against the other. Both sides also promised to
“conduct economic exchanges and cooperation, trade goods, engage in domestic
commerce, and hold joint investment in industrial projects” in order to promote an
integrated and balanced development of the two states.
224
On December 31, 1991, the
two also signed the six-point “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula” in which they pledged to use nuclear power only for peaceful purposes and
not to test, manufacture, produce receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons
in any form, and to permit mutual inspection of nuclear facilities.
225
China moved more slowly in normalizing political relations with South Korea.
Although bilateral trade had been steadily increasing after China shifted to a free market
222
Kim, Jinwung. (2012). A History of Korea: From "Land of the Morning Calm" to States in Conflict,
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 502.
223
Ibid., 517.
224
Korea Times, December 14, 1991. As cited in Kim, The Korean Presidents, 245.
225
Kim, A History of Korea, 517.
99
economy, China insisted on a separation of politics from economics.
226
Finally, on
August 24, 1992, the two nations established diplomatic ties; however, as a condition for
normalizing diplomatic relations with China, South Korea had to break diplomatic ties
with Taiwan.
227
South Korea was the only Asian nation that had recognized Taiwan’s
nationalist regime as China’s legitimate government. South Korea was able to establish a
formal relationship with China largely because China wanted to curtail Taiwan’s growing
diplomatic recognition.
228
The ROK’s establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and
China dramatically changed the military security on the Korean peninsula. It was a great
victory for South Korea to improve relations with North Korea’s two greatest allies, and
it left North Korea more vulnerable and isolated than before. In the period covered in the
previous chapter, these three Communist states had been a security concern for the
Korean leadership that affected security discourse and language policy. In this period,
the threats they posed were reduced, thus, as this study suggests, leading political elites to
identify non-military economic threats as the basis for the securitization of language
policy.
With the end of the Cold War, the international economic environment was
rapidly changing as the erosion of ideological barriers increased the intensity of
international competition. The strong performance of the Chinese economy that resulted
from Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the 1980s posed a serious challenge to South
Korea. World trade had been expanding with economic globalization
229
and with
226
Kim, A History of Korea, 502.
227
Ibid.
228
Ibid.
229
Increasing economic integration and interdependence of national economies.
100
multilateral trade negotiations that reduced tariffs under the framework of General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In the early 1990s, Korean products were
losing their competitiveness internationally,
230
and in 1992, the nation’s economic growth
rate declined from 9% to 5%.
231
In the absence of a serious military adversary, economic
threats took center stage. This decline in the South Korean economy was a primary
concern of President Kim’s administration, and his securitization of segyehwa discourse
was born out of this economic crisis.
In terms of civil society, since the late 1980s and early 1990s, after the collapse of
communist countries and the emergence of civil government, student protests had
significantly declined around the world, including in South Korea.
232
In previous
decades, student political activism and violent protests had been more widespread with
the authoritarian government often the target of attack. However, with South Korea’s
transition to democracy, civil reforms and more liberal policies throughout society, the
authoritarianism of the government was no longer an issue.
233
Thus the domestic scene
was quiet as Korean university students started to concentrate more on career
development than involvement in politics. In the absence of a military threat and with
relative domestic social stability, Kim, at the start of his presidency, pursued
globalization as a means to increase Korea’s economic security.
230
Kim, The Korean Presidents, 273.
231
GDP Growth Rate of Korea. (June 2, 2016). Data from World Bank. Retrieved From:
https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=ny_gdp_mktp_kd_zg&idim=cou
ntry:KOR:JPN:HKG&hl=en&dl=en#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=ny_gdp_mktp_kd_z
g&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:KOR&ifdim=region&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=fa
lse
232
Choi, Hyaeweol. (1996). Student Uprisings in South Korea: Passion for Reunification and a Return to
Violent Protest. International Higher Education, 8.
233
Ibid.
101
The Emergence of Securitized Discourse under Kim
In his inaugural address on February 25, 1993, Kim invoked security on the issue of
corruption: “Corruption in our society is a dreadful enemy that destroys the country little
by little from within…We will stamp out all manner of improprieties and graft…There
must be an end to the dark political night…”
234
Following his speech, in the first year of
his presidency, he dismissed many political officials and military officers who had close
ties to the previous government and pursued an aggressive anti-corruption campaign. He
purged and disbanded a clique of politically ambitious army officers called Hanahoe,
which roughly translates into “association of one-for-all, all-for-one,” forcing them to
retire.
235
He also arrested and convicted previous presidents General Chun and General
Roh on mutiny and corruption charges for their roles in the 1979 coup, in the bloody
crackdown on pro-democracy groups known as the 1980 Gwanju Uprising, and for
accepting millions of dollars each in bribes from businessmen. These political purges
were a critical step to prevent any future coup attempts and ensure that South Korea’s
democracy would not fall back into the hands of military officers.
Near the end of the second year his presidency, Kim shifted his political agenda to
a different issue. On November 17, 1994, he announced a segyehwa policy, defining
segyehwa as: “reinforcing the nation from cascading developments and sweeping changes
in the world and building the Republic into a first-class nation in the coming century.”
236
He continued to say that he would do this by opening Korea to the world “in all fields
234
Inaugural address, the Presidential Secretariat (1995), 7-8. Cited by Kim, The Korean Presidents, 266.
235
Choe Sang-hun. (2015, November 21). Kim Young-sam, South Korean President Who Opposed
Military, Dies at 87. The New York Times. Retrieved From:
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/world/asia/kim-young-sam-former-president-of-south-korea-dies-at-
87.html?_r=0
236
Chosun Ilbo, November 18, 1994. Cited in Kim, The Korean Presidents, 276.
102
including political, economic, and social activities.”
237
Indeed, Kim made segyehwa the
central doctrine for the rest of his term. In December 1994, he told his cabinet ministers
that their first task would be to promote segyehwa, which he called the “main pathway to
(our) country’s development and national prosperity.”
238
The following month, in his
New Year’s message to the nation, Kim called for making 1995 the “first year of
globalization,” in which both the government and the people would vigorously pursue
segyehwa.
239
On January 6, 1995, President Kim addressed the nation thus,
Fellow citizens: Globalization is the shortcut which will lead us to building a first-
tier country in the 21
st
century. This is why I revealed my plan for globalization
and the government has concentrated all of its energy in forging ahead with it. It
is aimed at realizing globalization in all sectors- politics, foreign affairs, economy,
society, education, culture and sports. To this end, it is necessary to enhance our
viewpoints, way of thinking, system and practices to the world-class level… We
have no choice other than this.
240
In this speech, globalization was presented not as a choice, but as a necessity. The
country had to pursue globalization as a means to increase its security through developing
its political, economic and cultural power. To this end, Kim explained that the
government would have to implement policies that would reach into all sectors of society,
including education, and that all of the nation’s financial resources had to be directed
toward globalization efforts to propel Korea to become a “first-tier country.”
Thus, in contrast to the previous authoritarian governments marked by dictator-
centered political dynamics, under the democratic political system, Kim could not simply
impose policies from above but had to engage in democratic practices of consensus
237
Ibid., Ibid.
238
Hanguk Ilbo (Korea Daily). (1994, December 27). Cited in Kim, Samuel (Ed.). (2000). Korea’s
Globalization. New York: Colombia University Press, 197.
239
Ibid.
240
Seoul, KBS-I Television in FBI SEAS 95 004, (1995, January 6). Cited in Kim, Korea’s Globalization,
1.
103
building for the approval and implementation of a policy. A successful securitization of
the globalization drive would allow for the swift implementation of Kim’s bold and
sweeping reform agenda. It seems that Kim may have used securitization as a political
strategy in the hopes that it would pre-empt, silence, or weaken potential dissent that
could potentially develop against his drastic globalization drive.
Kim then proceeded to establish the Presidential Segyehwa Promotion
Commission, in January 1995, headed by Prime Minister Lee Hong-koo. It consisted of a
set of committees on policy planning, administrative reform, science and technology,
and, most notably for this study, educational reform. As part of Kim’s segyehwa
campaign, education reform targeted strengthening English language education in
Korea’s public schools, since Kim believed that English was the language of
globalization.
In particular, Kim focused on trying to build the state’s political/diplomatic
power. On January 25, 1995, in a speech entitled, “The Vision for the Development of
Korea in the 21
st
Century,” Kim argued that, “The national goal in the segyehwa era is to
construct a unified state that will be the center of the world and (a place where) people all
over the world will want to come (to), invest (in) and live.”
241
That same day, he outlined
his segyehwa drive’s priorities at a luncheon with 27 members of the newly established
Presidential Segyehwa Promotion Commission. Stating that segyehwa’s goal was to
enable South Korea to reach the level of the advanced nations of the world, Kim
identified six areas that required reforms: 1) education; 2) the legal and economic order;
241
Kang, In Duk. (1995). South Korea’s Strategy Toward North Korea in Connection with Its “Segyehwa”
Drive. East Asian Review 7:1, 56. Cited in Kim, Korea’s Globalization, 244.
104
3) politics and the press; 4) public administration; 5) the environment; and 6) culture.
242
Kim’s goal in the globalization drive was to increase Korea’s overall power, with an
emphasis on making Korea a leader in the global arena and enhancing its international
status. To achieve this vision, the Commission identified English as the most important
language for Koreans to master to be able to communicate with foreign people and states.
Only then could Korea’s political and diplomatic power grow.
It should be noted that on March 6, 1995, Kim’s government announced that it
had decided to keep, not translate, the Korean word “segyehwa” into English, as the
official name for its globalization drive. Too many foreigners interpreted globalization to
mean “economic liberalization,” according to the Ministry of Information and
Communications, whereas segyehwa was far more comprehensive, embracing political,
cultural and social open-mindedness.
243
Just as the Chinese government had adopted
capitalism, but “with Chinese characteristics,” so the Korean government adopted
globalization, but with Korean characteristics. Segyehwa was “Korea’s unique concept,”
“encompassing political, economic, social and cultural enhancements to reach the level of
advanced nations in the world.”
244
Contextualizing English Language Policies Under Kim Young-sam
To secure smooth passage and implementation of expanded English language education,
Kim utilized security rhetoric to justify his language reforms. Under his leadership, the
government proposed and implemented a number of English language promotion
policies; two of which are discussed below. First, in order to improve Koreans’ English
242
Hanguk Ilbo (Korea Daily), (1995, January 26). Cited by Kim, Korea’s Globalization, 198.
243
Far Eastern Economic Review, (1995, June 22), 48. Cited by Kim, Korea’s Globalization, 3.
244
Kim, Korea’s Globalization, 3.
105
speaking abilities, the government launched a program to import native English speakers
to teach in Korea’s public schools. Second, English language curriculum requirements
were revised with the development of a new national curriculum to improve students’
communicative competence in English.
The Establishment of English Program in Korea (EPIK)
The government launched its English Program in Korea (EPIK) in 1995, the first
year of Korea’s segyehwa drive, with the mandate to improve English-speaking abilities
of students and teachers in Korea. This program is administered by the National Institute
for International Education Development (NIIED), under the Ministry of Education
(MOE), which recruits native speaking English teachers (NSETs) to teach in public
schools in Korea.
The swift implementation of EPIK was the result of the successful securitization
of language. The program was actively endorsed by government officials who shared the
view that English was tied to the economic survival of South Korea as evidenced in
speeches and stated goals of the English program. According to Soo-Taek Rhee,
president of the NIIED, “through EPIK, English language education will cultivate open-
minded and well-rounded Korean individuals capable of advancing Korea in this age of
information and globalization.”
245
Also, the mission statement of EPIK states that its
goal is, “To foster primary and secondary students’ English communication ability in the
age of information and globalization.” Kim’s securitized discourse on segyehwa and
245
Jeon, M. and Lee, J. (2006). Hiring Native-Speaking English Teachers in East Asian Countries. English
Today, 22(4), 53-58. Cited by Jeon, Mihyon. (2009). Globalization and Native English Speakers in English
Programme in Korea (EPIK). Language, Culture and Curriculum, 22:3, 231-243.
106
English are clearly echoed by the president of NIIED and in the in the mission statement
of EPIK.
According to EPIK’s official history, in May 1995 the program was promoted as
part of a national educational reform that called for reinforcing foreign language
education and globalization education.
246
Two months later, in July 1997, 54 EPIK
teachers were recruited. From 1995 to 2014, data released by EPIK revealed that a total
of 9,527 NSETs came to Korea. Eligibility requirements to be an EPIK teacher include:
being a citizen of a country where English is the primary language--it specifies that an
applicant must be from Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom,
United States or South Africa-- and holding at least a bachelor’s degree from an
accredited university. The main duties of EPIK teachers include but are not limited to: 1)
assisting Korean teachers with their English classes and/or jointly conducting English
classes with Korean teachers; 2) conducting English conversation classes for Korean
students and teachers; 3) preparing teaching materials for English language education;
and 4) assisting in developing teaching materials for English language education.
247
The
contract period is one year, and teachers are expected to work eight hours a day
(Monday-Friday) but the total instruction hours are not to exceed 22 hours per week.
248
Salaries of teachers average $2,000 dollars per month, but this varies slightly based on
the candidates’ education, teaching experiences and the location of the school.
246
English Program in Korea, Retrieved From:
https://www.epik.go.kr/contents.do?contentsNo=53&menuNo=282
247
Ibid.
248
Ibid.
107
The Shifts in National Education Curriculum
Since the first National Education Curriculum (NEC) was established in 1955, the
content of schooling in South Korea has been determined by a national curriculum that is
applied to all public elementary, middle and high schools.
249
The NEC details which
subjects are mandatory at each grade level and the hours of instruction for each including
for foreign language education. The NEC, therefore, is one of the most influential
policies affecting English language education.
250
At the time of this writing, the national
curriculum had been reissued seven times. Very little information is available for the
first through fourth NEC. The National Curriculum Information Center (NCIC) for
South Korea provides detailed curriculum documents starting only with the fifth NEC,
issued in 1987.
251
From the first to the fifth NEC, English was compulsory only in
middle schools (7
th
-9
th
grades) and high schools (10th-12
th
grades). It was taught with a
major pedagogical focus on grammar and English translation skills.
When Kim was elected President, the fifth NEC was in effect. In the middle of
his term, the sixth NEC, which had been decided upon by the previous administration of
President Roh Tae-woo, in 1992, came into effect in middle schools (1995) and high
schools (1996). The sixth NEC shifted the teaching method to English communicative
competence focusing on developing conversational English skills. It may seem that the
realization that a mastery of English was critical came before Kim’s presidency;
however, the sixth NEC did nothing to increase the total number of school hours for the
249
Seth, Michael J. (2002). Education Fever: Society, Politics, and the Pursuit of Schooling in South
Korea. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 113.
250
Chang, Bok-Myung. (2009). Korea's English Education Policy Innovations to Lead the Nation into the
Globalized World, Journal of Pan-Pacific Association of Applied Linguistics, 13 (1 ), 89.
251
National Curriculum Information Center, “Introduction: Education System of Korea.” Retrieved from:
http://ncic.kice.re.kr/english.inf.ivi.index.do;jsessionid=244C33C75208E431CAFB98D6FB625483
108
subject. In that sense, this change was minor because it was a shift to equip the people
with basic communicative skills in English to interact with foreigners in the aftermath of
the Seoul Olympics of 1988. There was no securitization for this particular shift in
English language policy.
In contrast, as part of the securitized segyehwa discourse, a new NEC (the
seventh) was enacted by the Ministry of Education to strengthen English language
policies during the last year of Kim’s presidency. On December 31, 1997, the seventh
NEC introduced a major change in the English language curriculum: mandatory English
language education classes for third to six graders in all public elementary schools across
the nation.
252
Some scholars call this reform the most significant change in the history
of Korea’s English education.
253
In previous NECs, English had always been taught only
in middle and high schools, but the reforms under the seventh NEC were implemented by
2001 in elementary schools.
254
The new NEC also increased the hours of English
instruction in middle and high schools. The table below shows the seventh NEC’s
minimum number of total annual instructional hours by grade level (3
rd
to 10
th
grade)
during an academic year consisting of 34 weeks (which is still in effect today at the time
of this writing). Only the instructional hours for Korean and English language subjects
are listed below, but in total there are 10 required subjects: Korean Language, Moral
Education, Social Studies, Mathematics, Science, Practical Arts (Technology, Home
Economics), Physical Education, Music, Fine Arts, and Foreign Language (English). By
the 9
th
and 10
th
grades, the time dedicated to English language education is equal to that
252
Ibid.
253
.Kwon 2000, Cited in Chan Kyoo Min, 117.
254
The English education classes were implemented for the 3rd and 4th grades in 2001 and the 5th and 6th
grades in 2002.
109
devoted to Korean. During the 11th and 12th grades, students are given the opportunity
to choose their elective courses. Out of the English elective classes offered, students may
take: English I, English II, English Conversation, English Reading Comprehension or
English Composition.
Table: Total number of instructional hours for Korean and English language by
grade level during the academic year
Grade
Subject
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Korean
language
238 204 204 204 170 136 136 136
English
language
34 34 68 68 102 102 136 136
The 7
th
NEC’s compulsory English language education beginning at lower grade
levels was significant, but there was also a significant discursive change that was
apparent in the 1997 education policy which focused on “globalization” and a
“knowledge based society.” The introduction to the seventh NEC stated:
To prepare students for the 21
st
century, the era of globalization and knowledge
based society, the seventh curriculum attempts to break away from the spoon-fed
and short-sighted approach to education of the past towards a new approach in the
classroom to produce human resources capable of facing new challenges.
255
Thus, there is a clear awareness of the outside world and the Ministry of Education’s
explicit goal to produce “global” graduates equipped for it. These themes are repeated in
the section on “goals of high school education,” which states that it seeks to help
students not only to build “a sense of national community,” but also “to develop an
255
Korean MEST (1997). Retrieved from: ncic.kice.re.kr
110
awareness and attitude as global citizens.”
256
It further encourages students to develop
Korean traditions and culture, but “in a way that is appropriate in the global setting.”
257
The goal is not simply to be a Korean citizen in a Korean state, but a “global citizen” who
can function effectively in a “global setting.”
Changes to the national curriculum that expanded English language education
demonstrate that government officials took their cues from Kim’s securitized segyehwa
doctrine to shift policy. The Ministry of Education actively participated in issuing
changes to the NEC policy that reflected Lee’s speeches on segyehwa. The South Korean
public also absorbed the president’s message and started to invest in the English
education of their children by supplementing the English language education in public
schools with private tutoring, after-school language institutes, and sending their children
abroad. While the securitization of language utilized by Kim is considered successful
because of resulting shifts in English language policy and absence of protests against the
policy, this did not mean that the government was completely immune to political
opposition on other issues.
Political Protests in 1996
In August 1996, 10,000 university students demonstrated, trying to march to the
38
th
parallel for a joint rally with North Korean students in pursuit of reunification.
258
The protest was organized by a nationwide college student organization called Hanguk
Taehak Chong Haksaenghwe Yonhap (Union of Korean University Students), which had
256
Ibid.
257
Ibid.
258
Choi, Hyaeweol. (1996). Student Uprisings in South Korea: Passion for Reunification and a Return to
Violent Protest. International Higher Education, 8.
111
chapters at 180 universities and colleges and included about one million student
members.
259
The students demanded the reunification of the Korean peninsula through a
federal system, a plan under which the two Koreas would be considered a single nation,
but each would be an independent state with its own system of government. The
government had declared the reunification rally illegal because it believed that the
students were being manipulated by the North Korean communist regime in an effort to
undermine the South Korean government. It addition, it was also against reunification via
federalism because it had its own agenda on reunification insisting, “unification can only
take place under a free democratic system.”
260
The government cracked down on the
rally and violent clashes between the students and police took place over a week of
confrontation. Over 1,000 people were injured, more than 5,500 students were taken into
custody, more than 400 students were arrested and 51 students received prison sentences
for their role in the demonstrations.
261
The August 1996 student protest, the first to occur
since the transition to democracy, shocked Kim’s government, which had been enjoying
relative societal stability. The student uprising clearly demonstrated that the civilian
democratic government was not immune to protests, citizens were capable of assembling,
and that the government had to be vigilant toward protests that could destabilize political
or social order.
As stated above, securitization on globalization was used by Kim in the hopes that
it would dampen the threat of large protests from developing. However, the
securitization discourse did not help to muster popular support or prevent political
259
Ibid.
260
Taylor, Brian. (1996, September 9). Korea Youth Demand Unification. The Militant 60(31).
261
The Japan Times, (1996, September 18); S. Korean Student Demonstrators Sentenced to Prison, (1995,
October 29). CNN. Retrieved from: http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9610/29/korean.students/
112
opposition to a labor law that was unilaterally passed by the ruling party in December
1996 which allowed companies to lay off employees, something unheard of in South
Korea. Many South Korean workers assumed at the time that once they were hired by a
company, they would have a job for life. In contrast, businesses said they could not
compete in the world market without the flexibility to restructure and lay off workers.
Ruling party officials presented the labor policy change as necessary for segyehwa, using
the same securitization discourse on globalization that was effective in shifting language
policy. The New Korean Party chairman Lee Hong-koo tried to persuade the striking
workers that the law was in their best interest saying, “We struggled to write a law that
would protect workers’ rights and gain management flexibility for competitiveness.”
262
In the end, the government ordered the police to use tear gas to disperse the 5,000
demonstrators and 12 people were arrested.
263
The demonstrators were part of the larger
group of 373,000 workers who participated in the country’s largest organized labor strike,
which stopped the production of cars, ships and other export plants.
264
The protest and
strike caused massive economic losses and also resulted in a dip in the South Korean
stock market to its lowest level in three years.
265
The protest and strike threatened
political, economic and social order and thus was considered a threat to national security
by the government.
262
South Korea Labor Strike Turns Violent. (1996, December 28). CNN. Retrieved from:
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9612/28/korea.clashes/
263
Ibid.
264
Ibid.
265
Ibid.
113
The Korean Financial Crisis and the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997
In a continued effort to propel South Korea economically and to accelerate segyehwa
reforms, President Kim sought membership for his country in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). However, admission to the OECD
meant accelerating deregulation, a change that would bring greater competition with
foreign firms. As a condition for entry, the OECD demanded strict terms under which
South Korea had to liberalize its economy and completely open its domestic economy,
including the financial market. Many questioned whether Korean industries and banks
would be able to withstand international competition. Nevertheless, South Korea
continued to seek membership and it was granted entry into OECD in 1996.
In early 1997, a Korean financial crisis was triggered by a series of bankruptcies
of large conglomerates (chaebols) that had heavily borrowed from banks to finance their
investment projects. The banks in turn had borrowed abroad to loan money to the
chaebols. By mid-1997, eight of the top 30 conglomerates were bankrupt. The string of
corporate bankruptcies started with Hanbo Steel in January 1997; then in July, the Kia
Group, the eighth largest chaebol failed to pay $370 million worth of liabilities. These
massive business failures led investors to flee en masse, sending a shock throughout the
country’s highly exposed financial market.
266
At the same time, the Southeast Asian Financial Crisis, which began in Thailand
in July 1997, quickly spread to other countries in the region. Business failures in South
Korea and the government’s mismanagement of the economic crisis, compounded by the
Asian Financial Crisis, further fed the fears of foreign investors. When many pulled their
266
Kim, Byung-kook (2000). Electoral Politics and Economic Crisis, 1997-1998. In Diamond, Larry and
Kim, Byung-kook (Eds.) Consolidating Democracy in South Korea. (p.173). Boulder and London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers.
114
money from the South Korean stock market, the sudden outflow of capital led to the
collapse of the Korean won. The exchange rate fell by 44 percent between November and
December 1997,
267
the stock market index dropped 33 percent,
268
and a total of 3,197
firms went bankrupt, failing to honor more than 151 trillion won (more than $100 billion
dollars) worth of notes in December 1997 alone.
269
As a result, on November 21, 1997, a year after joining the OECD, South Korea
had to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for economic assistance. That day,
Deputy Prime Minister Im Chang-yol asked for an IMF bailout, and the Korean press
called it a “day of humiliation,” lamenting it as the day that South Korea lost its
economic sovereignty.
270
Calling it a “day of humiliation” was reminiscent of the type of
language that had been used to describe the day when South Korea was formally made a
colony of Japan in 1910, known as the “Day of National Humiliation.”
271
The
agreement, a $57 billion rescue package, required that South Korea tighten its fiscal and
monetary policies and implement market-oriented reforms in its financial and corporate
sectors, as well as in the labor market.
At the beginning of his presidency, Kim had pledged to make South Korea into a
first-tier country in an increasingly globalized and competitive world through his
segyehwa policies. But at the end of his term, South Korea was embroiled in an economic
267
Ibid.
268
Ibid.
269
Ibid.
270
Joongang Ilbo, (1997, November 22); Joongang Ilbo (1997, December 4); Dong-A Ilbo, (1997,
December 4); Kyonghyang Shinmun, (1997, December 6); and Hanguk Ilbo, (1997. November 22). As
cited by Oh, Kongdan. (Ed.). (2000). Korea Briefing 1997-1999: Challenges and Change at the Turn of the
Century, Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 35.
271
Kim, Knox. (2013). Kim Hyong Jik’s Idea of “Jiwon” (Aim High) and the Korean National Association.
Creative Education, 14(1), 19.
115
crisis. His goal of strengthening South Korea’s international competitiveness remained
elusive.
The Political Context/Security Challenges of Lee Myung-bak’s Administration
(2008-2012)
North Korean military threats against South Korea in the early to mid 2000s, were
arguably low and following Kim Young-sam’s term, the successive administrations of
presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998-2002) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2007) tried to manage
the North Korean threat through generous engagement strategies. Kim Dae-jung’s
“Sunshine” policy led to the historic first inter-Korean summit held in June 2000 and the
South Korean Ministry of National Defense stopped referring to North Korea as the main
security threat in its biennial defense white papers. Even though North Korea launched
several missiles in 2003 and 2006, conducted its first nuclear test and succeeded in
becoming a nuclear weapons state in October 2006,
272
the threat seemed contained as the
Roh administration continued its engagement strategies with North Korea, held the
second inter-Korea summit and signed a summit agreement in October 2007.
273
Therefore, although North Korea had become a nuclear state, Roh did not securitize
relations with North Korea.
As for the domestic political scene, the issues that the South Korean people were
concerned about had changed by the mid 2000s. Economic concerns dominated the 2007
presidential election ahead of the issues of reconciliation with North Korea, political
272
Sanger, David. (2006, October 9). North Koreans Say They Tested Nuclear Devise, The New York
Times. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/world/asia/09korea.html
273
Kim, Doug Joong (2011). The Lee Administration and Changes in ROK Strategic Culture. In Bechtol,
Bruce E. Jr. (Ed.). Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula (pp. 75-98). Quantico:
Marine Corps University Press.
116
change and social equality that had influenced South Korean voters in the previous
decade.
274
Pre-election polls showed that for young Koreans, the economy far
outweighed concerns about the North and its nuclear programs due to a 20 percent
unemployment rate among recent college graduates.
275
The younger generation of South
Koreans appeared to be more focused on domestic issues, in contrast to the 1990s when
they were politically interested in the unification of Korea. Moreover, the election of Lee
Myung-bak in December 2007 consolidated democracy as it marked the fourth peaceful
transfer of political power, and the second peaceful transfer of power to an opposition
party since the transition to democracy.
276
As for activism in civil society, Lee enjoyed popular support and had little
opposition at the onset of his term if his landslide victory in the presidential election was
any indication. Lee, former CEO of Hyundai and former mayor of Seoul (2002-2006),
defeated his closest competitor by the largest margin since 1987: he won 48.7 percent of
the vote with the closest candidate managing to only get 26.1 percent.
277
Lee likely felt
confident that that he had the public support to push forward with his political agenda to
fulfill his election pledges without having to securitize issues in order to shift policy.
Moreover, since military threats against South Korea during this period seemed limited,
as this study suggests, this may have led political elites to securitize less or identify non-
274
Onishi, Norimitsu. (2007, December 20). Conservative Wins Vote in South Korea. The New York Times.
Retrieved from: www.nytimes.com/2007/12/20/world/asia/20korea.html
275
Kirk, Donald. (2007, December 20). South Korea shifts right with new president Lee Myung Bak. The
Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved from: http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1220/p07s01-woap.html
276
The first-ever peaceful transfer was when Kim Dae-jung was elected President and power shifted from
the ruling conservative government to a liberal-democratic opposition party; first transition to democracy in
South Korea technically believed to be in 1987 when the first direct elections were held after Chun Doo-
hwan’s coup with the election of Noh Tae-woo.
277
Onishi, Norimitsu. (2007, December 20). Conservative Wins Vote in South Korea. The New York Times.
Retrieved from: www.nytimes.com/2007/12/20/world/asia/20korea.html
117
military, economic threats in order to shift policy. The president-elect enjoyed a
honeymoon period as the public initially seemed to welcome a corporate executive-style
of top-down decision-making in hopes that it would improve the economy.
Contrary to his own expectations, a major misstep by Lee’s Presidential
Transition Committee (PTC) was announcing a far-reaching overhaul of South Korea’s
English education system, provoking a major political challenge even before his official
inauguration. The public quickly turned against Lee for his unilateral governing style and
for treating the citizens as corporate employees. Lee’s failure to engage in securitization
discourse before his PTC’s announcement of the drastic changes in language education
may have in part led to the severe opposition. Thereafter, Lee noticeably used a
securitization discourse in an effort to garner popular support and prevent opposition
before pursuing reforms.
Lack of Securitization Discourse and English-Immersion Policy
On January 23, 2008, debate erupted after the Presidential Transition Committee (PTC)
for President-elect Lee announced a unilateral “English Immersion” plan to use English
as the medium of instruction in schools.
278
The debate began when the PTC unveiled its
English Education Roadmap and called for all subjects in high school to be taught in
English (including math, science, etc) starting in 2010. The PTC’s chairwoman, Lee
Kyung-sook, had planned for the English-immersion classes to then gradually expand to
278
Lee, Josephine. (2010) Ideologies of English in the South Korean “English Immersion Debate” Selected
Proceedings of the 2008 Second Language Research Forum, Matthew T. Prior et al., 246-260. Somerville,
MA: Cascadilla Proceedings Project.
118
elementary and middle schools nationwide. This was a 4.25 billion dollar project that
was to be completed in five years.
279
However, within five days of announcing the initial proposal, the committee
withdrew the plan after facing a strong backlash from the public, including parents,
teachers, and education experts.
280
Different civil society actors questioned the plan’s
feasibility, including representatives of the Korean Federation of Teachers’ Association
who said it would be difficult to implement due to a lack of trained teachers to give
lectures in English and the inability of students to learn in an English immersion class.
There were also concerns about the viability of revising the curriculum, developing new
teaching methodologies, and printing new textbooks for an English immersion program
by the proposed deadline.
Not ready to completely abandon the English immersion plan, the PTC revised
the initial plan and proposed that only English language classes would be taught in
English in high schools starting in 2012 or 2013. Also under the plan, the hours allocated
for English instruction in elementary schools were to be lengthened to three hours a
week, which was an hour increase for 5-6
th
graders and a two hour increase for 3-4
th
graders. Simultaneously, Lee’s administration also actively engaged in the securitization
of English in an effort to garner support and decrease criticism and opposition in order to
implement the policy. Lee himself and members of the PTC linked the ability of the
people to speak English with economic security and prosperity to support the English
immersion proposal. On February 2, 2008, in a televised interview, a member of the
279
Immersion Roadmap. (2008 January 30) The Korea Times
280
Immersion Roadmap. (2008 January 30) The Korea Times; Lee Myung-bak urges participation in
English-language education initiatives. (2008 February 1), Hankyoreh
119
PTC, Professor S.Y. Chun, explained the objective of the English immersion proposal in
this way, “When we go out to the global stage, we need to use English, which is a very
important element of national competitiveness. However, don’t we often struggle because
we cannot say a single word, even though we’ve received 12 years of [English]
education? Therefore, we’ve decided there’s a problem with school education, and by
improving public education, we hope that now people will at least be able to acquire
conversational English skills when they graduate from high school.”
281
The next day, on
February 3, 2008, the PTC asserted that the ability to speak English by all people would
lead to an increase in GDP.
282
On February 17, 2008, Lee asserted, “In the age of
globalization, higher English proficiency level improves the status of countries and of
individuals.”
283
Lee emphasized this point by claiming, “Among non-English-speaking
countries, those using English are richer than other countries.”
284
The message was clear:
if English education was not pursued aggressively, the state would lose its competitive
edge. The government framed English as an essential tool to ensure national
competitiveness that would lead to national stability and security.
Emergence of Securitization Discourse
After Lee encountered difficulties in implementing his bold plan for English instruction,
he quickly adapted his political strategy and continued to use securitization in order to
281
Lee, Ideologies of English in the South Korean “English Immersion Debate,” 250.
282
Yoo, Yen Chae (Host) (2008, February 3). Yenge kyoyuk, ettehkey hayyahana? [English education,
how should we do it?]. In Kyung Joo Lee (Producer), Sunday Debate [Television broadcast]. Seoul: KBS,
Cited in Lee, Ideologies of English in the South Korean “English Immersion Debate,” 249.
283
Jin, Myung-Sun (2008, February 17). Yenge=kwuklyekcengmal kurelkka? [English=national power
really?]. The Hankyoreh. Retrieved from http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/schooling/270130.html; cited
by Lee, Ideologies of English in the South Korean “English Immersion Debate,” 249.
284
President-elect Lee Myung-bak said, “Among non-English-speaking countries, those using English are
richer than other nations.”
120
help get his key reforms passed. On February 28, 2008, he unequivocally used
securitization discourse during his inauguration speech. Rather than relying on the
decisive mandate from the public he thought he had from the comfortable majority he
achieved in the elections just two month prior, he tried to get the people to accept his
reforms by using fear. In his inaugural speech, Lee stated that the country was in danger
due to economic insecurity and implied that the public should accept changes that he
would propose in order to alleviate the threats or else accept the grave consequences.
Our nation’s competitiveness has fallen, and instability in the resource and
financial markets threatens our economy…. I beseech you to take a more positive
attitude to change so that we can surmount this critical moment in history with
ease… If we slight this call for change, we will fall behind. If we stand up against
change, we will be swept away.
285
In the speech he prioritized economic revival as the most urgent task.
286
To this end, he
then hinted at some of the changes that needed to take place in order to achieve economic
growth. Of the many policy proposals he introduced in his speech, he included the
education sector: “Our education system must be reformed…. the future of Korea
depends on the education of talented persons” and the government must develop their
“global readiness.” He put the issue of English education on an equal footing with such
national priorities as economic prosperity. Lee believed that English was key in
achieving economic revitalization and repeatedly linked English with economic
development throughout his five-year term.
Although the Lee administration’s use of securitization discourse was part of an
effort to implement the revised, more limited version of his English immersion policy,
the plan still faced public opposition. Perhaps it was because securitization had occurred
285
Lee’s Inaugural speech, February 28, 2008. Cited in
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/271850.html
286
Ibid.
121
after the announcement of the government’s unilateral decision for English immersion
and, thus people were less inclined to listen. The ideal sequence for securitization to be
effective is to engage in such discourse before a policy is announced. In any case, on
March 20, 2008, the Lee government abandoned its plans to teach any subjects in
English. The Korea Times newspaper reported, “President Lee told education
policymakers during the briefing session that a radical program for English immersion is
unrealistic.”
287
Lee’s top-down style of decision-making did not resonate with the
Korean public, who criticized him as “acting more like a business executive than as a
politician.”
288
In the democratic context, he would have to adopt a more democratic
leadership style of policy-making by informing and addressing public concerns, building
consensus and/or use securitization more effectively to pass key policies.
Large-Scale Political Protest over Beef Imports
Unfortunately, Lee’s administration blundered again, this time leading to a political crisis
with the emergence of a large-scale protest of 100,000 people at its climax. On April 18,
2008, Lee made the mistake of making a unilateral decision to resume imports of U.S.
beef during his visit to the US.
289
The purpose of making this political concession was to
encourage members of the US Congress to ratify the US-South Korean free trade
agreement (FTA) and also advance his goal of developing closer ties with the US. The
South Korean government had banned US beef imports since 2003 after a case of mad
cow disease had been detected in the US. Lee’s decision sparked public criticism about
287
No English Immersion. (2008, March 21). The Korea Times.
288
Cited by Kwon, O Yul (2010) Impacts of the Korean Political System on Its Economic Development:
with a Focus on the Lee Myung-bak Government, Korea Observer, 41.2, 189-220.
289
Ha, Michael. (2008, June 5). Beef Impasse Complicates Korea-US Alliance. The Korean Times.
Retrieved from: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/06/116_25400.html
122
health concerns over US beef, and the issue was enflamed by a widely televised
sensationalist report linking US beef with mad cow disease (bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE)) in addition to internet rumors that sub-standard US beef would be
served in school and military cafeterias.
290
On June 10, 2008, about 100,000 South
Koreans protested in Seoul demanding that Lee renegotiate the terms of the US beef deal
to impose stricter standards on the type of meat that could be imported. Initially Lee’s
government refused, but in the end, the month-long demonstrations pressured Lee’s
government to back down and impose more stringent regulations on US beef imports. In
the process, Lee’s approval ratings dropped from 52 percent in February 2008 to 21
percent in June 2008.
Although Lee engaged in securitization discourse in general terms during his
inauguration speech, he had not securitized the specific issue of resuming US beef
imports. Thus, he did not build public support on the issue before making this change. By
not securitizing this issue, he did not persuasively argue the necessity of this policy in an
effort to stifle criticism and major dissent. The Korean public was not informed and
public concerns were not addressed before making this decision, and they reacted
strongly against Lee’s policy. The people’s confidence in Lee was broken, and this left
his presidential authority and credibility weak, unable to exert decisive influence. As a
result, Lee engaged in more frequent securitization discourse to justify and legitimate
changes in policies in the name of increasing South Korea’s security.
290
Snyder, Scott. (2009) Lee Myung-bak’s Foreign Policy: a 250-day Assessment, Asia Foundation,
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 21(1).
123
Successful Shifts in Language Policy Following Securitization Discourse
Although Lee had been defeated in passing his English immersion policy at the start of
the year in 2008, by April and May he had a series of successes in strengthening English
language education. One notable difference was that the content of the policies involved
less drastic change than had the English immersion policies, and hence they elicited much
less opposition from civil society actors. Second, and more instrumentally, the policies
proposed in April and May 2008 were preceded by the use of a securitization discourse
on the importance of English, especially with his inaugural speech in February in which
he tied South Korea’s economic development to better English language education.
Chronologically, these shifts in language policies were occurring around the same time
the opposition to the US beef import issue was gaining momentum.
The first successful shift in language policy following the failed English
Immersion plan was the establishment of a governmental program called Teach and
Learn in Korea (TALK). Established in April 2008, like EPIK, the TALK Program is
administered by NIIED, under the auspices of the Ministry of Education (MOE). Also,
similar to EPIK, TALK invites native English speakers to teach English in elementary
schools, but these schools are located in rural areas of the country. Kim In-hee, who
worked for TALK from its inception, said that this program was President Lee’s idea.
291
On May 29, 2008, three pieces of legislation all strengthening English language
education were passed by the National Assembly. Thus securitization of English by Lee
and the PTC seemed to have borne fruit, as the National Assembly passed such policies
and employed much of the discourse used by the Lee administration as its rationale. The
first law, “The Special Bill on Native English-Speaking Teachers,” called for having one
291
Interview with Eunice Kang
124
native English-speaking teacher in every elementary and middle school by 2010.
292
According to the official summary of the floor debate on this policy, at least four reasons
were given to justify this policy. The first echoed the securitization of English of the Lee
administration about the economy and national competitiveness. The summary read,
“There is a growing need for speaking English and it is closely tied to national
competitiveness. The number of native English-speaking teachers must be expanded.”
Second, the National Assembly identified that many schools could not afford hiring a
native English-speaking teacher, and thus this led to “inequality in the public education.”
The third problem noted was “a large waste of foreign currency because of the increased
number of students studying abroad to learn English.” For 2004, it was estimated that 7
trillion Korean won (approximately $5.9 billion dollars) was wasted; for 2005, 10 trillion
won (approximately $8.5 billion dollars). The last problem identified was “family
breakups;” that is, families living apart due to English education. Many children and
mothers moved abroad while fathers stayed in Korea working to support the children’s
language education. The National Assembly representatives viewed the splitting up of
families for English education as a social problem that needed to be addressed.
The second piece of legislation was entitled the “English Education Promotion
Act.” This policy required national and local governments to provide resources for
English-only “theme parks,” native English-speaking teachers, and teacher training for
English education. It also stipulated that the Korean government had to prepare a “Five
Year Comprehensive Measures of English Education” report. According to the official
summary of the floor debate regarding this law, there were at least four reasons why this
292
In 2005, there were only 1,017 native English-speaking teachers working in Korean public schools out
of 10,474 elementary, middle and high schools across the country.
125
policy was needed. The first reason echoed the Lee administration’s securitization of
English regarding the survival and success of the state and individuals: “In the
globalization of the 21
st
century, English as the universal language is an essential element
in the competitiveness of the country and individuals.” Other reasons included: the
burden of the high costs of private English education on families; massive capital outflow
due to students studying English abroad; and uneven educational quality due to lack of
local government funding for expensive native English-speaking teachers.
The third law, the “Special Law on English Education support,” strengthened the
obligation of national and local governments to build a public education system that
would effectively teach English to students. According to the official summary of the
floor debate, the public education system in Korea was characterized as “lacking
competent English teachers and native English-speaking teachers” as well as suffering
from “regional disparities in providing quality English education.” The summary
detailed that in “2004, more than 3,000 elementary and middle school students had left
the country to study abroad and in 2005, 7,600 elementary and middle schools students
left during the summer for English language training.”
Also in May 2008, in its continued effort to facilitate English education, the
Korean Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development announced a “Five
Year Plan for English Education Revitalization.”
293
This plan emerged as a result of the
significant economic loss incurred by sending students abroad to study and as a response
to increasing public criticism about and mistrust of the public English education
293
Jeon, M. and Lee, J. (2006). Hiring Native-Speaking English Teachers in East Asian Countries. English
Today, 22(4), 53-58.
126
system.
294
The plan would place an NSET at each middle school by 2010 (a total of
2,900 teachers nationally) and work towards placing one NSET ” at every elementary and
high school as well. The rationale for the plan was that interaction with a NSET would
provide students with a more authentic English environment and greater cultural
understanding.
English Language Education Policy by Ministry of Education in 2011
Six years later, the Ministry of Education announced another language policy to cement
English education in South Korea. Securitization of English seemed to have been
successful as policies strengthening English language education continued into the end of
Lee’s term. A textual analysis of the 2011 policy reveals three themes: (1) English is the
international language; (2) English-speaking Koreans are needed for the state to play a
leading role in global affairs; and (3) “global” Koreans are desired. It claimed that in
today’s global environment, English was the main language “used internationally.”
Based on that claim, it stated, “Therefore, the ability to communicate in English is one of
the key abilities to be developed for students.” Teaching students to communicate in
English was one the key priorities of Korea’s schooling. The details are as follows:
These days, international exchange is prevalent, and nations are closely related to
each other to the extent that the whole world is referred to as a global village. In such
an environment, English, as a language used internationally, plays an important role
in understanding people whose cultural and linguistic backgrounds differ from ours
and in the communication and establishment of bonds with them. Therefore, the
ability to communicate in English is one of the key abilities to be developed for
students at school.
294
Jeon and Lee, Hiring Native-Speaking English Teachers in East Asian Countries, 53-58. Cited by Jeon,
Mihyon. (2009). Globalization and Native English Speakers in English Programme in Korea (EPIK).
Language, Culture and Curriculum, 22:3, 231-243.
127
The ultimate goal for the government was to increase state power and its influence with
other nations around the world. The following statement reveals the main motivation of
the government’s goal of building the English fluency of Koreans nationwide:
In order to play a leading role in the era of globalization and information, the
ability to understand English and communicate in English is essential. Also it is
fundamental to be qualified with English communicative competence to improve
one’s quality of life through leading a cultured life and reinforce individual
capacity.
This text implies that it is not enough to be Korean citizens; embracing a global
citizenship that is based on the ability to use English is also necessary. This excerpt from
the same policy document reveals that the government was interested in producing a
workforce that was active in world affairs by “understanding and using everyday
English.” The construction of a Korean global citizen is found below:
Moreover, we need to help them (students) understand foreign culture properly
and develop their qualification and knowledge as a citizen of the world. We aim
to improve their basic communication ability that is necessary for understanding
and using everyday English.
295
The securitized discourse framed by the Lee administration seemed to have influenced
the Ministry of Education to follow its lead to shift policy to develop English-speaking
Koreans. The framing of the issue as a security matter by the president led governmental
officials to follow the president’s directives and the people to accept the governmental
policies without any resistance.
295
Kim, Heejin. (2015). Private Education as De Facto Language Policy in South Korea. Working Papers
in Educational Linguistics, 30(1), 90.
128
National Legislation of 2012
During the final year of Lee’s presidential term, English language acquisition was still
important, as evidenced by another piece of national legislation strengthening English
language education passed by the National Assembly on May 29, 2012. Entitled “Special
bill on strengthening English public education,” this law called for improving the training
system for English teachers. In the official summary of the floor debate, English is
explicitly referred to as a fundamental element in South Korea’s future: “improving the
nation’s English skills through English education has become an essential element in the
future development of South Korea.” The summary also noted that among Asian
countries, English proficiency levels in South Korea were very low. The reason for this
was identified as “the failure of public English education,” “lack of English teacher
capabilities” and “lack of a proper English learning environment.” The state of English
education in 2011 was severely problematized and was framed as an issue that hindered
the bright future of South Korea.
Conclusion
During the terms of Presidents Kim and Lee, there was a change of course in the
linguistic goals of the state. The government wanted to produce Koreans who were
proficient in English so that they could contribute to making the state more powerful in
the global economy. English was identified as the lingua franca in international settings
and thus was securitized by both presidents in order to achieve political and economic
stability. Kim and Lee’s utilization of securitization produced many educational reforms
that strengthened and intensified English language policies in a top-down way.
129
Both Presidents governed in an environment of low military threats. The
Northeast Asian regional security had improved greatly. South Korea had improved
diplomatic and economic ties with the former Soviet Union and later Russia, China,
North Korea and Japan by early 1990s. These ties demonstrated that the overall national
security of South Korea improved. What then explains the frequent securitization of
language during Kim and Lee’s regimes? In the absence of a serious military threat, this
study hypothesized that there would be either fewer securitizations utilized by political
elites or that they would continue to securitize but focus on non-military threats such as
economic or political one in order to shift language policies. In these two cases, both
Kim and Lee were invested in discursively constructing a securitized view of the English
language to achieve economic and political security. In this period, the shift toward and
intensification of English language policies were consistently defended with securitized
economic and political justifications rather than military reasons.
Kim proved to be a master securitizer, and he successfully shifted the national
linguistic direction from Hangul to English by employing this strategy. He elevated
language to a national security issue and moved the country away from a largely Hangul-
only focused education curriculum built by his predecessors. Through securitization, he
rebuilt a bilingually focused education system that centered on English under his drive
for segyehwa. Lee’s government then consolidated Kim’s English language policies. Lee
also invoked security on language issues by linking the state’s international
competitiveness to a populace that could communicate well in English. Lee initially did
not engage in the securitization of language, perhaps owing to his confidence in having
strong popular support, and contrary to his expectations, his English immersion policies
130
were not readily accepted by the public. However, after experiencing their strong
opposition to his English immersion policy, he started to engage fully in the securitization
of language issues and he then succeeded in passing other educational reforms.
This study has also hypothesized that securitization is more likely to be used by
political elites when there is a threat of strong political opposition against the
government. In such circumstances, a president may opt to utilize securitization as a
strategy to shift policy. In other words, if securitization is a means to shift policy in the
face of real or anticipated opposition, those who are not in a position of absolute power in
the political system (usually democratic presidents) may have more of a reason to use
securitization as a strategy to change policy. The political system over which both Kim
and Park presided was a democratic one, and both were very committed to following
through with their political agendas. And Kim and Lee’s goals were quite similar: they
both wanted to enhance state power through developing greater English competency. The
subtle difference in their discourse was that Kim focused on increasing the state’s overall
political/diplomatic power with his insistence on the need to play a greater role in world
politics while Lee focused on economic power and competitiveness.
In sum, to answer the question of when political elites attempt to securitize
language, this chapter’s cases demonstrate that when military threats against South Korea
were quite low, political elites tried to securitize language by focusing on the economic
and political threats against the state. After South Korea transitioned into a democratic
system of government, the study also revealed that Kim and Lee used securitization in the
face of political opposition to stifle potential dissent in order to shift policy. As evidenced
in both cases, Kim and Lee faced an unexpected threat-- the Korean public-- that had the
131
potential to oppose policies and threaten social stability. So to pressure the public to align
with the president’s political agenda, Kim and Lee both created a sense of crisis and
urgency through discourse.
In chapter three and four, we saw that language issues can be securitized by
focusing on the military and economic dimensions of security threats. We will see if
language issues can be securitized from another angle—the cultural dimension -- to shift
South Korea’s linguistic direction yet again. It is the shift back to Hangul that the
discussion now turns.
132
Chapter 5
Language Policies Under Lee and Park:
A New Direction? Revival of Korean Language Policies for Cultural Security
Introduction
Beginning in 2010, South Korea witnessed a major shift in the direction of the
national language policy from that pursued under the leadership of presidents Kim
Young-sam and Lee Myung-bak, which can be characterized as a return to Korean. Yet,
the resurgence of the Korean language in the 21
st
century has taken on a completely
different form from the emphasis in the 1960s on the mother tongue as a response to the
threat of foreign elements. Rather, current policy recognizes Korean as the “most
valuable cultural heritage of the nation.”
296
Not only has the government striven to raise
the awareness of the Korean language domestically, but it has also established and
expanded Korean language programs overseas for foreigners. Thus, the discourse on
South Korea’s national language policy among the political elites has evolved from a
concern regarding economic security to one related to cultural security.
This chapter will outline the revival and spread of Korean language policies and
securitization discourse during the presidencies of Lee Myung-bak (2008-2012) and Park
Geun-hye (2013-2017). While the previous chapter focused on Lee’s role in intensifying
English language education policies, this chapter will highlight Lee’s role in reinitiating
an emphasis on Korean, focusing on the strides Lee made in revitalizing and globalizing
Korean language and culture through “nation branding” targeting both domestic and
foreign audiences. His successor, Park, has further expanded Lee’s cultural policy to
solidify Hangul’s prominence and global reach as part of her political agenda to develop
296
Framework Act of the Korean Language, Article 2.
133
and export Korean cultural content for overseas markets. She identified Korean culture as
an avenue for creating new markets and new jobs for economic growth. She earmarked
the “cultural industry,” which includes both Korean traditional and pop culture (including
music, film and dramas), as a strategic industry that the government would support for
South Korea’s cultural and economic security in the 21
st
century.
The presentation that follows employs the same approach as the previous chapter.
It focuses on the discussions surrounding each language policy change and carefully
examines the official discourse for evidence of securitization by the Lee and Park
administrations. To this end, key materials, including speeches and policy documents, are
analyzed in order to better elucidate modern language policies aimed at raising the profile
of the Korean language at home and abroad. This study also considers the political
contexts affecting language policies; in particular, the potential security threats facing the
Lee and Park governments. Lee’s biggest challenge was to overcome the threat of social
instability following the government’s unilateral decisions regarding English immersion
education and the importation of US beef, both of which resulted in large-scale political
protests. Lee’s ability to fulfill his political agenda was threatened by severe political
opposition to his policies, lack of government supporters, and distrust in his
administration. He problematized the low rankings that South Korea received in the
Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index (NBI), which measures the national image of a
country, and used it to argue that this negatively affected South Korea’s economic and
cultural security. After securitizing South Korea’s low rankings, he pursued a nation
branding drive to strengthen cultural policies. Although Lee was covered in the last
chapter, his securitizing strategies for pursuing Korean language spreading policies are
134
markedly different from his securitizing strategies for strengthening English language
policies. His decisions in this chapter are distinguished from what preceded it, in that he
focuses on a different referent object: the cultural security of South Korea, as justification
for a shift in language policy.
For the period of Park’s rule, the key challenges have included the fragile global
economy, the threat of North Korea, and cultural stagnation. In regards to cultural
stagnation, expanding South Korea’s global presence has been made a priority to increase
South Korea’s cultural security. The South Korean government’s latest preoccupation
with the global outreach of Korean language and culture suggests that the leadership has
not only recognized the value of fortifying the state’s economic sector but that it also
seeks to increase its cultural influence and power abroad. The pursuit of globalization by
South Korea in letting the “outside in” as a pathway to economic security in the 1990s
and 2000s evolved to the country’s trying to propagate Korean culture starting in 2010s
as a route to cultural security. But one of the biggest national security threats during
Park’s term has been domestic social instability: recurring political protests against not
only her policies, but also her presidency. She has been accused of governing with a
heavy hand like her father, the late Park Chung-hee, threatening the quality of
democracy.
The Political Context of Lee’s Nation Branding
Nation branding can be defined as “strategic self-presentation of a country” aimed at
creating a positive national image in the political, economic and cultural sectors at home
and abroad. A well-crafted brand is expected to increase a country’s success in
135
competing for investment, trade, tourism, and a highly educated and skilled labor. A
strong national brand is also expected to translate into increased respect for and
acceptance of that country internationally. The brand aims at “convey[ing] an image of
legitimacy and authority in diplomatic arenas”
297
and securing a seat in multilateral
negotiations and global decision-making.
298
Since the concept was first introduced in
1996 by Simon Anholt, the South Korean government has fully taken it to heart.
299
Anholt, the developer of both the “nation brand” concept and index
300
contended that
perceptions (whether they are founded in fact or not) of a country’s image “can have a
significant impact on the way overseas consumers view its products, and the way they
behave toward a particular country in sport, politics, trade and cultural matters.”
301
By
the same token, those perceptions will “affect their propensity to visit or relocate or
invest there; their willingness to partner with such countries in international affairs; and
whether they are more likely to interpret the actions and behaviors of those countries in a
positive or negative light.”
302
In late 2001, South Korea adopted its first official national slogan: “Dynamic
Korea.” The opening of the FIFA World Cup in South Korea and Japan the following
year was an opportune moment for the government to present a new image for South
297
Aronczyk, Melissa. (2013). Branding the Nation: The Global Business of National Identity. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
298
South Korean Nation Branding: Global Recognition as the Final Step in a Successful Capitalist
Development. (2015, April 1). Perspectives Internationales. Retrieved from:
http://perspectivesinternationales.com/?p=1274
299
Lee , Katherine In-Young (2015). Dynamic Korea: Amplifying Sonic Registers in a Nation Branding
Campaign. Journal of Korean Studies, 20(1), 130.
300
The Nation Brands Index (NBI) measures the power and quality of each country’s brand via the
assessment of six criteria (people, tourism, exports, governance, culture and heritage, and investment and
immigration).
301
Cited by Lee , Dynamic Korea, 130.
302
Ibid.
136
Korea, which was still recovering from the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
303
At roughly the
same time, the rising influence of the Korean Wave or Hallyu (growing interest in South
Korean films, dramas, and popular music) in parts of East Asia, and the global
recognition of brands such as Samsung and LG stood in stark contrast to the long-held
images of Korea as a quiet, isolated, and remote country known as the “Land of the
Morning Calm” and the “Hermit Kingdom.” In light of these developments, the South
Korean government embarked on nation branding to raise its international image and
reputation by highlighting, promoting, and marketing its core values and assets.
304
The
slogan, “Dynamic Korea,” selected by Kim Dae-jung’s administration, was meant to
highlight the achievements made in “cultural, economic, scientific and political sectors
through the constantly evolving dynamism of Korea and its people.”
305
The successor
Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-2008) further promoted “Dynamic Korea” as the
national slogan, but the pursuit of nation branding was taken to another level under the
leadership of President Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013).
The Securitization of Nation Branding
As discussed in Chapter Four, when Lee became president in 2008, his
government had to deal with social instability when over 100,000 South Koreans
protested to oppose his decision to resume the importation of US beef. After the protests
subsided and order was restored, Lee started to call attention to the country’s image (soft
303
Lee , Dynamic Korea,119.
304
Lee , Dynamic Korea, 131.
305
Cited by Lee , Dynamic Korea, 120; Korean Overseas Information Service, Dynamic Korea: Origin and
Concept, 5.
137
power). In 2008, according to the NBI, Korea ranked 33
out of 50 countries.
306
Lee’s
administration argued that the massive protests had hurt the nation’s economy as “the
rallies turned away foreign investors and diminished the country’s international
standing.”
307
He framed South Korea’s poor national image as a threat to its economic
and cultural security. Thus, Lee argued that improving its reputation and nation brand
was most urgent and that he would do this mainly through policies that would strengthen
its cultural, political and diplomatic security.
By 2008, South Korea had made one of the most successful economic comebacks
in decades, rising from the ashes of the Korean War and rebuilding from the economic
crisis of 1997 to become the world’s 13
th
largest and Asia’s fourth largest economy.
308
Yet, Lee believed that the perception of South Korea internationally--its national brand--
was not appropriately reflective of its high level of economic achievement. For example,
in 2008, he described the disparity between Korea’s ranking as the world’s 13
th
largest
economy and its ranking of 33
rd
in the NBI as a “big problem.”
309
The NBI also showed
South Korea’s ranking was in continuous decline: from 25
th
in 2005 to 32
nd
in 2007 and
then 33
rd
in 2008 among 50 nations. Concerned by this poor ranking, Lee securitized
nation branding and made cultural security a key element in his political agenda. Perhaps
consolidation of material power was a precondition for paying attention to soft power;
however, Lee may have also decided to securitize South Korea’s poor image in order to
shift policy in the face of social instability and domestic opposition. He wanted to
306
Choi, DaeYong, and Kim, Pan Suk. (2014) Promoting a Policy Initiative for Nation Branding: The Case
of South Korea. Journal of Comparative Asian Development, 13(2), 349.
307
Riots break out in Seoul over US beef. (2008, July 1). CBS News. Retrieved from:
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/riots-break-out-in-seoul-over-us-beef/
308
Kim, Jack. (2008, April 9). South Korea Conservatives Win Parliamentary Majority. The Los Angeles
Times. Retrieved from: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/03/world/fg-korea-brand3
309
Glionna, John. (2009, May 3). How about, “Shout Korea: Way Better than you think it is”?. The Los
Angeles Times. Retrieved from: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/03/world/fg-korea-brand3
138
strengthen South Korea’s cultural policy, but he knew that he lacked the public support to
push through reforms. He thus securitized South Korea’s poor image to justify a nation-
branding drive not only to strengthen its cultural security but also to stifle political
opposition and regain political control.
After taking office in 2008, Lee raised concerns about Korea’s overseas image.
In his speech on August 15, 2008, on the 60
th
anniversary of the founding of the ROK,
Lee announced that it was:
extremely important for Koreans to win respect in the international
community…The value of Korea’s national brand only accounts for
approximately 30 percent of the nation’s economic power, a proportion that is no
more than a small fraction of that of the United States and Japan. Korea is now
one of the most advanced countries in the world…Nevertheless, the very first
images that come to foreigners’ minds are labor management disputes and street
rallies.
310
By comparing South Korea to the United States and Japan, he was pointing out how the
country needed to catch up to other advanced nations. In his speech, Lee asserted that
South Korea’s national brand was valued at 30 percent of its GDP, while the United
States’ and Japan’s national brands were valued at 143 and 224 percent respectively of
their GDP.
311
It is not clear how Lee calculated the undervaluation of South Korea’s
brand, but he claimed that Korean export products were undervalued, leading prices to be
rated lower than identical products made in the United States. During the same speech, he
expressed regret that even though Korea was one of the most advanced countries
economically, foreigners often associated Korea with strikes and street demonstrations.
Thus, he proclaimed, “If the nation wants to be labeled as an advanced country, it is
310
Lee Myung-bak. (2008, August 15). A Great people with New Dreams (Presidential Speech). Retrieved
from: http://www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/Presidential-Speeches/view?articleId=91000
311
Dinnie, Keith. (2016). Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice Second Edition. London and New
York: Routledge, 234.
139
necessary to improve its image and reputation significantly… During the remainder of
my term in office, I will upgrade the value of Korea’s national brand so that it will be on
par with that of advanced countries.”
312
Lee raised nation-branding as an especially
urgent matter, arguing that it was necessary to improve Korea’s reputation and implying
that Korea had not yet reached advanced status in terms of its image. Perhaps he wanted
to also repair the damage that was done to South Korea’s image by the violent, large-
scale protests during the first few months of his term. His solution was to develop and
spread Korean culture through a nation branding drive.
Shifts in Language Policy Under Lee
After Lee engaged in securitized discourse on nation branding, he created a
separate organization wholly for the improvement of Korea’s image, the Presidential
Council on Nation Branding (PCNB), which he placed under his direct control on
January 22, 2009. The PCNB’s purpose was to improve the country’s international
reputation and image on a comprehensive scale, including language and cultural
programs. Lee made culture and language the centerpieces of his nation-branding project
because Korean culture was not well known relative to its economic development.
Culture Minister Yu In-chon mentioned in 2008, “Letting our culture be known to other
countries is the top priority of the government. It is time that not only the economy but
also our culture be known to other countries.”
313
The securitization of nation branding
justified the state-led initiatives to elevate the reputation of Korean and to enact policies
to spread the language to other parts of the world.
312
Lee Myung-bak, A Great people with New Dreams (Presidential Speech).
313
Cheng, Li-Chih. (2008). The Korea Brand: The Cultural Dimension of South Korea’s Project in 2008.
John Hopkins University.
140
In the “vision and strategy” of the PCNB, one of the four goals was to
“disseminate the value of traditional culture.” It detailed that the PCNB was to “promote
an image of Korea as an economically advanced nation and raise awareness of the
nation’s cultural values.”
314
In March 2009, the PCNB presented an action plan in ten
areas. Among them, the promotion and learning of Korean language was detailed.
315
The
PCNB also set an ambitious goal of raising the country’s Nation Brand Index ranking to
15
th
by 2013, a 16-step leap from 31
st
in 2009.
316
On May 3, 2009, the head of the
PCNB, Euh Yoon-dae, admitted that Korea lacked cultural power and was reported to
have said, "I am frustrated that people don't appreciate our culture. For so long, Korea has
been sandwiched culturally and economically between Japan and China."
317
The
government’s focus on transforming the Korean language into a source of pride for the
nation domestically supplemented its efforts abroad. Efforts were made to teach the one
million foreigners residing in South Korea Korean, while King Sejong Institutes (Korean
language schools) were established to teach foreigners abroad.
The Hangul Museum
Lee’s commitment to boost Korea’s cultural brand through Hangul was
demonstrated by his administration’s decision during the first year in office to construct a
314
Presidential Council on Nation Branding. Retrieved from:
http://17koreabrand.pa.go.kr/gokr/en/cms/selectKbrdCmsPageTbl.do?cd=0120&m1=1&m2=5
315
Ih-Prost, Olivia and Bondaz, Antoine. (2014 July). South Korea Trying to Improve its Nation Brand.
Leonie Allard (Ed). Translated Article from Korea Analysis. Retrieved from:
http://www.centreasia.eu/sites/default/files/publications_pdf/note_ka1_south_korea_trying_to_improve_its
_nation_brand.pdf
316
Dinnie, Keith. (2016). Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice Second Edition. London and New
York: Routledge.
317
Glionna, John. (2009, May 3). How about, “South Korea: Way Better than you think it is”?. The Los
Angeles Times. Retrieved from: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/03/world/fg-korea-brand3
141
museum to boost Hangul awareness and usage. With a 32.6 billion won (US $27.4
million) budget, this establishment was one of Lee’s first policies to boost Korea’s
national brand. A proposal for such a museum was first presented to the president in
December 2009. The following year, a preliminary plan for building the museum was
approved, and in May 2011, construction began. In 2012, preliminary plans for
exhibitions were completed and research was begun on a general development plan for
the museum. A press release by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism in 2013
stated that it hoped that the museum would bring about “cultural prosperity in the country
for the next generation.” This was consistent with Lee’s nation branding drive for
building Korea’s cultural power.
318
In 2013, the last year of Lee’s term, the museum was
built, and on October 9, 2014, it opened to the public.
319
The museum boasts a three-story building that houses both permanent and special
exhibitions, a Children’s Museum, a Hangul Learning Center, a library and other
amenities. The museum exhibits roughly 10,000 items and works of art representing the
symbolic and historical meaning of Hangul from its creation to the present.
320
Notably, it
also offers a space for foreigners to learn Korean in the Hangul Learning Center,
introducing them to the composition of the language and native pronunciation, and
teaching them how to write their own name as well as the name of their home country in
318
Hangeul Museum to Open Next Year. (2013, May 13). The Korea Herald. Retrieved from:
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130513000687
319
History of Museum. (2014). National Hangeul Museum. Retrieved from:
http://www.hangeul.go.kr/lang/en/html/museumOverview/history.do
320
National Hangeul Museum Opens to Promote Korean alphabet (2014 October 6). Retrieved from:
http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Policies/view?articleId=122044
142
Korean.
321
This fulfills the dual purpose of boosting public awareness of and affection
for Hangul among Koreans while also providing opportunities for foreign audiences to
learn about Hangul.
The King Sejong Statue
In addition to the museum, Lee also sought to increase public awareness of the
importance of Hangul by erecting a statue to honor the creator of Hangul, King Sejong
(1397-1450). On October 9, 2009, the statue was erected next to the statue of Admiral
Yi Sun-sin, a Korean naval commander famed for his victories against the Japanese navy
during the Imjin war (1592-1598). The King Sejong statue was placed in Gwanghwamun
Square in central Seoul on the 563
rd
anniversary of the promulgation of Hangul. It is
noteworthy that the dimensions of King Sejong’s statue were carefully planned so that
the Admiral Yi Sun-sin statue would not overshadow it. The bronze statue stands 6.2
meters tall, weighs 20 tons and sits on a 4.2-meter high pedestal. King Sejong is also
depicted holding the Hunminjeong Haeryebon, the document that purportedly introduced
the Korean alphabet system.
At the unveiling of the new statue, Lee expressed his strong admiration for both
King Sejong and Hangul saying, “It’s our pride to have such a great leader as King
Sejong, and Hangul, which is our treasure and world heritage.”
322
Lee referenced his
commitment to Hangul promotion repeatedly, calling it a national “treasure” of South
Korea and a part of “world heritage.” The link between the government’s decision to
321
Ibid.
322
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2911118s
143
iconize King Sejong as part of a nation-branding policy is clear in Lee’s statement that
“Admiring King Sejong contributes to making Korea a cultural powerhouse.”
323
The Discourse and Policies on Promoting Korean Language Overseas
Lee’s dedication to nation branding not only motivated his administration to
engage in domestic activities to raise the status of the Korean language, but also to
expand international activities to teach the language overseas. There are many recorded
instances in which Lee and other political elites discussed plans to protect and expand
Hangul abroad. As early as 2009, during the first year of his presidency, Lee identified
Hangul as a national treasure that should be shared with the world, saying, “To help those
in various countries who wish to learn Korean, and to promote Hangul around the world,
the government will increase the number of state-run Korean language education
institutes, Sejong Hakdang.”
324
On Hangul Day in 2009, Prime Minister Chung Un-chan said that the government
would intensify efforts to preserve and promote Hangul, promising to “establish more
Sejong Hakdang in many places overseas and help people of the world easily learn
Korean through the internet. The government will also pour efforts into preserving and
managing our language…”
325
During the second year of his presidency, on March 29, 2010, Lee again vowed to
increase his efforts to spread Hangul abroad and increase the number of Sejong Hakdang
state-run institutes established overseas to teach Korean. His statement also coincided
323
Lee Vows to Spread Hangul. (2010 March 30) The Korea Herald. Retrieved from:
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20091010000017
324
Sejong Hakdang Are State-Run; http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20091010000017
325
Lee vows to spread Hangul. (2010, March 30, 2010); The Korea Herald. Retrieved from:
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20091010000017
144
with a government announcement in March 2010 of its plans to increase the number of
Sejong Hakdang to 500 by 2015. At this time, there were 16 Sejong Hakdangs in six
countries including China, Japan, Russia and the United States.
326
Establishment of the King Sejong Institute Foundation
The discourse promoting the government’s plans to spread the Korean language
bore fruit with the establishment of the King Sejong Institute Foundation (KSIF), a public
organization tasked with coordinating the government’s project to teach and spread
Korean as a foreign language through Korean language centers called “King Sejong
Institutes” (KSI). KSIF was established on May 23, 2012 when Article 9, Section 2, was
inserted by Act No. 11424 into the Framework of the National Language legislation, a
law passed in 2004 to conserve and develop the Korean language.
327
According to the
King Sejong Institute (KSI) Guidebook published in 2013, the purpose of the KSIF is to
“spread Korean culture by providing Korean language education” by establishing KSIs in
foreign countries. KSIF would oversee and provide administrative support for KSIs
including training Korean language teachers, developing educational materials and
providing other services necessary for the diffusion of the Korean language as a foreign
or second language.
The “King Sejong Institute Establishment and Operation Memorandum of
Understanding” stated that KSIs were part of “Korea’s national brand project.” It also
said that all parties should “make every effort to promote the brand name of KSI as an
institute specialized in teaching the Korean language and Korean culture.” As part of the
327
Framework Act of the Korean Language. (2004) Framework Act of the Korean Language. Retrieved
from: http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=28092&type=part&key=17
145
efforts to better brand the state-run Korean language institutes across the world, all
Korean language centers, known previously as Sejong Hakdangs, were renamed King
Sejong Institutes (KSI).
The government established KSIs because Lee’s administration believed that it
needed to better promote Korean language education in foreign countries, similar to such
campaigns launched by other countries in Korea and globally for their native
languages.
328
Well-known examples include China’s Confucian Institutes, Germany’s
Goethe Institutes and the United Kingdom’s British Council. Over the years, the
government subsidized the costs of establishing KSIs, thus demonstrating its commitment
to spreading Korean. The Ministry of Culture increased the budget in 2012 to support the
globalization of the Korean language,
329
and, from 2011 to 2012, the number of KSIs
increased from 60 to 90.
National Legislation on Revitalizing Korean
In 2008, the National Assembly passed three pieces of legislation that aimed to
strengthen Korean language usage at home and abroad. The first law, entitled, “Support
Hangul to become a Major World Language,”
330
called for promoting Hangul to become
a language that is spoken internationally and learned and spoken by a large number of
people as a second language. The second piece of legislation entitled, “Change
Gwanghwamun from Hanja to Hangul,” required that the sign hanging in front of the
328
King Sejong Institute Foundation. (2014). Pamphlet.
329
Government steps up efforts to encourage Korean language study overseas. (2011, October 6) Yonhap
News. Retrieved from:
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/culturesports/2011/10/06/94/0701000000AEN20111006003800315F.HT
ML
330
All three of the legislations were only available in Korean and were translated by the author.
146
King Sejong statue in Gwanghwamun Square, at that point written in Hanja, be changed
to Hangul. According to one representative quoted in the official floor debate regarding
this law, “the reason why we made a bronze statue of King Sejong in front of
Gwanghwamun Square in central Seoul is to remember his great achievement: the
invention of Hangul. But hanging a signboard written in Hanja is insulting to King
Sejong.”
331
On November 1, 2012, the third law, the “Designation of ‘Hangul Day’ as a
public holiday” upgraded Hangul Day from a national commemoration day to a public
holiday from work and school. According to the official summary of the floor debate, the
political elites believed that excluding “Hangul Day” as a national holiday reduced the
value of Hangul and its significance.” Therefore, the National Assembly of South Korea
supported designating ‘Hangul Day’ as a public holiday to celebrate the invention and
propagation of Hangul.
Initially established in 1926, Hangul Day had been intended to commemorate the
day that King Sejong promulgated Hangul. It became an official public holiday after
liberation from Japanese rule in 1945 and remained so until 1991.
332
During those years,
Korea was the only nation in the world with a public holiday to celebrate the creation of a
writing system.
333
In 1991, the government worried that having too many holidays would
hurt the economy and therefore downgraded Hangul Day to a national commemoration
day without a day off. Thereafter, political elites made greater efforts to put emphasis on
Hangul Day to give Koreans a chance to celebrate this cultural achievement. As a result,
331
The Proposition of Changing Hanja signboard to Hangul signboard (National Assembly Legislation), 3.
332
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2015/09/314_123995.html. It is observed on October 9
in South Korea and on January 15 in North Korea.
333
Fouser, Robert. (2012, November 5) Remake Hangeul Day a holiday. The Korea Times. Retrieved from:
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2015/09/314_123995.html
147
on May 23, 2012, Article 20 was added as an amendment to the “Framework of the
National Language” law.
334
The amendment required the government to hold
commemorative events on Hangul Day: “In order to introduce the unique and scientific
features of Hangul at home and overseas and to raise nationwide awareness of and
affection for Hangul, the government shall designate the ninth day of October every year
as Hangul Proclamation Day and hold commemorative events.”
335
This amendment gave
power to the president to make all arrangements for the events by decree.
Although this was a step in the right direction to honor Hangul, it fell short of
restoring it as a public holiday. Finally, on November 1, 2012, the National Assembly
overwhelmingly voted (189 to 4 with 4 abstentions) to reinstate Hangul Day as a public
holiday beginning October 9, 2013.
336
This change in the law reveals that political elites
prioritized honoring its national language and culture over possible effects on the
economy.
Lee made significant strides in raising the profile of and expanding Korean
language education. It appears he was concerned with the destabilizing threat of
domestic protests that could erupt during his term and decided that securitizing South
Korea’s poor image was an effective way to pass language policies under a nation
branding drive to strengthen Korean language cultural policies to consolidate the
country’s cultural security. Lee’s successor, Park, has continued state efforts to
“globalize” Hangul and disseminate the Korean language and culture. Her
administration’s securitization of “cultural enrichment” and its link to Korea’s economy
334
It was a law passed in 2004 to conserve and develop the Korean language.
335
Framework of National Language, revised on May 2012
336
Lee, Emma. (2014, April 10). Happy Hangul Day. Retrieved from: http://www.korea4expats.com/news-
hangul-day-history.html
148
has also led to shifts in language policy focused on expanding Korean language education
abroad but also on deemphasizing English language education domestically.
The Emergence of a Securitized Discourse under Park Geun-hye (2013-present)
Daughter of Park Chung-hee, Park Geun-hye was elected president of South Korea in
December 2012. During her inaugural speech on February 25, 2013, Park made clear her
political agenda by outlining three goals: economic rejuvenation, cultural enrichment and
happiness of the people.
337
She framed these goals as solutions to three main security
threats confronting the nation: the fragile global economy, the perpetual threat of North
Korea, and cultural stagnation.
The first security threat she identified was “a global economic crisis.” Park
reiterated an ongoing sense of crisis, justifying reforms regarding cultural enrichment
that would continue to shift the focus and resources from English language education to
Korean culture and language. The second goal, “enriching Korea’s culture,” was linked
to economic benefits. Park presented Korean culture as a global commodity and
therefore as a means to rejuvenate the economy. Citing the “Korean wave,” or recent
popularity of Korean pop culture on the international stage, she argued that cultural
activities should be supported and nurtured in order to ignite the economy and create new
jobs. Thus, harnessing Korean culture was identified as an important way to increase
South Korea’s economic output. Viewed as a vital means to increase Korea’s overall
national power, Park declared, “In the 21
st
century, culture is power.”
The third goal, targeting “people’s happiness,” aimed to engage with North
Korea so as to secure a more stable relationship between the two countries because she
337
The 18
th
Presidential Inaugural address, February 25, 2013, Blue House
149
perceived a direct link between the people’s happiness [and comfort] and greater stability
vis-a-vis the North. She addressed North Korea’s nuclear program as “a challenge to the
survival and future of the (South) Korean people” and emphasized the threat of North
Korea against South Korea by declaring, “there is no doubt that we are faced today with
an extremely serious security environment.” After outlining South Korea’s stance on the
North Korean nuclear program, she then introduced plans to engage in a trust-building
process with North Korea and “lay the groundwork for an era of harmonious unification.”
Discourse on Cultural Policy by Political Elites
Following Park’s recommitment to cultural enrichment, other political elites followed
suit and acted to push this cultural agenda forward. For example, during the 2013 meeting
of heads of overseas diplomatic missions of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Ambassador
for Public Diplomacy Ma Young-sam echoed President Park’s advocacy of “cultural
prosperity” as a critical factor in achieving the foreign policy vision of “a charming
Korea trusted by the global community.”
On March 27, 2013, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, jointly with the Ministry of
Unification, gave Park a policy brief that called for immediate governmental action to
increase Korean language education for overseas Korean residents. Foreign Minister Yun
Byung-see presented the Ministry’s foreign policy vision in six main points. After citing
that the ROK’s overseas travelers would reach 14 million and emigrants would reach 7
million, Minister Yun said that the Foreign Ministry should “start providing relevant
150
educational content produced by the Educational Broadcasting System (EBS) to Korean-
language schools across the world by early 2014.”
338
Park also established a Presidential Committee on Cultural Prosperity (PCCP) to
lead the cultural enrichment initiative. At the first meeting of PCCP on July 25, 2013,
339
she argued that these initiatives would boost the Korean economy and stressed the power
of culture saying, “Cultural enrichment can be the foundation for a creative economy;
culture is the 'alchemy of the 21st century,' which can create new added value for new
industries. Through culture and industry, we need to develop the cultural industry so that
it can become a new locomotive in the Korean economy.”
Securitization of the Political Environment
Both in public as well as in legislative chambers, Park has consistently stressed
the many domestic and foreign threats that South Korea faces. She used these threats to
repeat calls for the National Assembly to swiftly pass bills related to economic
revitalization and support for the cultural industry. Her use of securitization discourse
demonstrates Park’s preferred political strategy to develop and secure institutional
infrastructure that would enable long-term growth for cultural policies. She renewed this
pledge on November 18, 2013 during an address to the National Assembly on the 2014
budget proposal plans and fiscal operations.
During this address, she reiterated the economic threat stating, “many countries
around the world still face the danger of global economic crisis and recession…We, too,
338
2013 Policy Briefing to the President by MOFA. (2013 March 27). Retrieved from:
http://www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/Press-Releases/view?articleId=2071.
339
President Leads 1
st
meeting on Cultural Prosperity. (2013 July 26). Retrieved in:
http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Policies/view?articleId=110469
151
are facing many difficulties. In order survive the current crisis at home and abroad we
must pool our strength, achieve innovation in all areas and stay ahead in international
competition.” She presented the world as a fiercely competitive forum in which South
Korea was falling short. “Countries around the world are now engaged in relentless
competition behind the scenes to gain an advantage over one another,” said Park. “We,
too, are short on time.” She went on to say that South Korea needed to “catch-up with
advanced economies.”
340
Her claims regarding South Korea’s falling behind the rest of the world were
intended to bolster her efforts to pressure the National Assembly to cooperate and pass
her bills on these economic and cultural issues. “When it comes to economic
revitalization and job creation,” she said, “there should not be any separation between the
National Assembly and the Administration, or between the ruling and opposition parties.
All parties concerned have to join forces.” Despite this coalition-building language, it is
clear that Park expected representatives of all parties to fall in line to realize her agenda.
She presented economic bills she claimed were “crucial for the recovery of our [South
Korea’s] economy.” She presented the passage of these bills in the National Assembly as
an urgent security issue stating: ” If these bills cannot be passed in time, the Korean
economy that is now showing signs of recovery may easily sink back into a recession. I
sincerely urge all to collaborate to pass these pending bills at this regular session of the
National Assembly.”
She additionally announced that a Presidential Committee for Cultural
Enrichment had been established with a budget of 5.3 trillion Korean won ($4.6 billion
340
Address by President Park Geun-hye at the National Assembly, (2013, November 18). Retrieved from:
http://www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/Presidential-Speeches/view?articleId=115352
152
US dollars), 1.5 percent of the total government budget in 2014, for the implementation
of the policies for cultural enrichment.
341
She referenced the widespread popularity and
exposure of Korean culture in Europe, citing how young people were embracing K-pop,
Korean films and dramas, as an example of “the boundless potentials of our culture
industry.” She said that the government would support the cultural industry and make it a
“new growth engine for national development.”
During her speech at the National Assembly on November 18, 2013 on the 2014
budget plan she also addressed the North Korean threat, where she reemphasized her
desire to forge a path toward peaceful unification with North Korea, despite heightened
tensions owing to North Korean military provocation. Park also expressed concern about
“corruption and wrongdoings in the public sector and in Korean society as a whole” as a
threat to national security. She then pointed specifically to corruption in the defense
industry and in military supply contracts, saying that the ones engaging in corruption
would “be equated with aiding the enemy by undermining national security.” She said
that if the state failed to reform the public sector and eliminate corruption, the people
would “suffer.” After defining corruption as a national security concern, she then referred
to specific reform bills that needed to be passed by the National Assembly with no further
delay in order to combat corruption and misconduct at its roots.
After identifying these various threats to the nation, she called on the National
Assembly to pass bills to address them, warning that failure to do so would have dire
consequences: “If crucial legislative reforms are not enacted in time, the costs will be
borne in their entirety by the people and the national economy. I ask you today, ruling
341
Ibid.
153
and opposition party members alike, to put your heads together in a spirit of collaboration
for mutual benefit and make sure that these bills are passed as soon as possible.”
342
Curbing English Language in Korea
During Park’s second year of office, she took notable measures affecting English
instruction in an effort to redirect the national passion for English acquisition. On
February 13, 2014, she voiced her opinions on English education in South Korea,
labeling pre-existing policies “excessive,” and calling for fundamental changes in the
way English was taught in the country. During a joint policy briefing by the Ministry of
Education and Ministry of Culture, she expressed her disapproval of the situation in
South Korea where “excessive” and “high” levels of English education were required of
students. Such requirements were being enforced across the board, regardless of students’
individual interest and without taking into consideration English’s potential relevance to
their career. She argued, “Some students want to learn English proficiently, while for
some others, basic levels are enough”
343
and expressed her belief that families spent too
much money on English education, citing that one-third of the money families spent for
private tutoring was going toward English education.
344
She then argued that the English
education curriculum and textbooks were too difficult and that students were forced to
342
Address by President Park Geun-hye at the National Assembly on Government Proposal for FY 2015
Budget Plan. (2014, October 29). Retrieved by: http://www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-
Room/Presidential-Speeches/view?articleId=123273
343
Crazy English Education Needs to be Reined In. (2014 March 11). The Korea Herald. Retrieved from:
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140311001494
344
Park Calls for Fundamental Changes in Excessive English Education. (2014, February 13) The Yonhap
News Agency. Retrieved from:
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/full/2014/02/13/11/1200000000AEN20140213004700315F.html
154
rely on supplemental private tutoring
345
and proposed that the school curriculum reduce
the teaching of English to reflect a healthier and sustainable educational model.
Park’s comments led to immediate shifts to curb English language education by
the Korea Institute of Curriculum and Evaluation (KICE). KICE, the organization
responsible for the College Scholastic Ability Test, (CSAT the annual national college
entrance exam) said that it would reduce the difficulty level of the English portion of the
test, effective immediately. This change shifted the focus from English proficiency as a
deciding factor for evaluating candidates for higher education to other Korea-centric
topics, such as history, sociology and geography.
346
KICE also reduced the overall
length of the English portion of the CSAT.
347
Since 2010, the Ministry of Education has maintained a rule that 70 percent of the
CSAT be based on textbooks provided by Korean English Broadcasting System (EBS), a
public educational television and radio network, in an effort to reduce the need for private
education. This development has, however, produced serious side effects, particularly
affecting the English proficiency section of the CSAT.
348
The English proficiency of
many high school students dropped as they neglected their English reading
comprehension skills, instead memorizing the Korean translations of the English text in
EBS's CSAT-preparation materials without understanding them. Park’s efforts de-
345
Ibid.
346
Lim, Seong-ho. (2014, November 19). CSAT English Test Easiest Since 1993. The Korea Times.
Retrieved from: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/09/113_168457.html
347
One of the changes in the English listening comprehension portion of the CSAT was a reduction in the
number of questions, from 22 to 17. In contrast, the number of questions in reading comprehension doubled
from eight to 16, while the grammar and vocabulary sections remained unchanged. The number of
questions in the “fill in the blank” section was reduced from seven to four. According to KICE, 76 percent
of the questions were connected to practice questions aired by the Education Broadcasting System (EBS), a
state-run educational TV channel.
348
Sah, Dong-seok, (2015 February 6). How English Should Be Taught In School. The Korea Times.
Retrieved from: http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2015/02/137_173134.html
155
emphasized English education, but further shifts in language policy were put on hold as
one of the worst peacetime disasters struck the country.
National Tragedy and Subsequent Protests
Two years into Park’s presidency, a national tragedy sparked anti-government protests
that would plague Park through the rest of her term. On April 16, 2014, a ferry called
Sewol sank killing more than 300 people, mostly high school students who were on a
school field trip. In the immediate aftermath of the Sewol sinking, parents of the students
initially gathered and spent nights at a local gymnasium near the rescue operations
waiting for news of survivors and recovery of bodies of the dead.
349
Weeks later on May
9, 2015, parents of the victims and their supporters gathered and demonstrated near the
Blue House
350
demanding a meeting with Park and criticizing the government’s
ineffective emergency response.
351
They were blocked by hundreds of police, some in
riot gear but in the end the group dispersed peacefully. Thereafter, the families of the
victims and their supporters staged hunger strikes in the city center criticizing the
government’s failure to fully investigate the role of official incompetence and lax
enforcement of safety regulations, which, they believed, led to the disaster.
352
As protests continued through the summer and fall, the government was at a
political standstill due to disagreements over the composition of the investigation
349
South Korea ferry disaster: Anger, agony for grieving parents and relations, (2014, April 17). ABC
News. Retrieved from: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-17/grieving-south-korean-parents-consumed-
by-anger-and-agony/5397406
350
The president’s residence.
351
South Korea ferry victims’ parents protest at presidential palace. (2014, May 9). The Telegraph.
Retrieved from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/southkorea/10818639/South-Korea-
ferry-victims-parents-protest-at-presidential-palace.html
352
Investigation revealed that the ship sank in part because it carried twice the maximum allowed cargo
weight and also because regulators and coast guard officials had turned a blind eye; Choe, Sang-hun. (2014,
October 2). Ferry Disaster that United South Korea Now Polarized It. The New York Times. Retrieved
from: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/world/asia/sewol-ferry-disaster-polarizes-south-korea.html
156
commission and setting the limits of its authority.
353
In early October 2014, the ruling
and opposition parties reached a compromise regarding who should be a part of the
investigation commission, but the parents, their supporters in the political opposition
were not satisfied because they were not given a voice in choosing who would carry out
the investigation.
354
Deep distrust of the government by the public had been growing
with the government’s perceived mishandling of the rescue operations and failure to
conduct a thorough investigation into the sinking. Regular protests demanding further
investigation into the sinking took place over the next year, and on the anniversary of the
sinking in April 2015, thousands of people demonstrated, alleging the government’s
responsibility in the disaster. Around 40,000 unionized workers joined the demonstration
opposing Park’s labor policies that would reduce job security and benefits for state
employees. The rally turned violent as thousands of protesters clashed with the police and
as the government arrested protesters and used water cannons and pepper spay on
demonstrators.
355
Anti-Government Protests Against Park
Political opposition unrelated to the Sewol sinking also continued to grow against
Park’s administration. A series of mass demonstrations against Park erupted at the end of
the year in 2015. On November 14, 2015, tens of thousands of people
356
(estimates
353
Borowiec, Steven. (2014, October 24). The South Korean Ferry Tragedy has Exposed a Bitter Political
Divide. Time. Retrieved from: http://time.com/3536337/sewol-south-korea-ferry-political-divide/
354
Ibid.
355
Eleftheriou-Smith, Loulla-Mae. (2015, April 19). South Korea: Protestors and police clash in Seoul as
Sewol ferry remains un-raised a year after disaster that killed 300 people. The Independent. Retrieved from:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/south-korea-protesters-and-police-clash-in-seoul-as-sewol-
ferry-remains-un-raised-a-year-after-10188149.html
356
Protest organizers estimate 130,000 participants while the police put the number at 68,000; Choe Sang-
hyun. (2015, November 14). Tens of thousands march in Seoul, Calling for Ousters of President. The New
157
range from 60,000-130,000) protested against Park’s labor and education policies, calling
for Park’s resignation in the largest antigovernment demonstration held since the protest
against the resumption of US beef imports in 2008. Demonstrators were protesting
against Park’s labor policies that critics said would make it easier for companies to fire
workers, and they denounced her then recent decision (in October 2016) requiring middle
and high schools to use state-issued history textbooks starting in 2017. Critics claimed
that the revisions in these history books had been politically motivated, intended to
whitewash her father’s authoritarian rule. Hundreds of protesters were hurt as the
government used tear gas and water cannon to disperse the crowds, sprayed dye so that
protesters could be identified and rounded up later, and also used police buses to block
the protesters who were marching towards the Blue House, the president’s executive
office and official residence.
357
The November 14
th
protest was followed by a
significantly smaller demonstration on December 5
th
2015, in which 30,000
358
people
gathered in Seoul to protest against Park’s pro-business labor laws and her efforts to
change history textbooks. The demonstration was carried out despite the government’s
ban on the planned demonstration, which cited safety concerns.
359
In response to the growing dissent, Park and her ruling Saenuri party justified its
tough dealings with protests by securitizing the threat of North Korea. For example,
York Times. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/asia/antigovernment-protest-
seoul-south-korea.html
357
Lockie, Alex. (2015. November 16). Intense Photos from South Korea’s biggest protest in 7 years.
Business Insider. Retrieved from: http://www.businessinsider.com/intense-photos-from-south-koreas-
biggest-protest-in-7-years-2015-11; Hazzan, Dave. (2016, July 14). Is South Korea Regressing Into a
Dictatorship. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/14/is-south-korea-
regressing-into-a-dictatorship-park-geun-hye/
358
Tens of Thousands Rally Against South Korean President. (2015, December 5). Al Jazeera. Retrieved
from: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/30000-hit-streets-skorea-anti-government-rally-
151205111903538.html
359
South Korea Activists vow to hold planned protests despite ban. (2015, November 29). Retrieved from:
http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/south-korea-activists-vow-to-hold-planned-protest-despite-ban-1248911
158
Saenuri party spokesman, Kim Yong-woo, said that South Korea was still at war with
North Korea. We’re still living in the Cold War era.”
360
To justify its suppression of
protests by excessive police tactics, the ruling party said it had to protect itself from
North Korean sympathizers within South Korea’s borders. Party spokesman Kim
characterized the demonstrators as communists: “They’re anti-government. They praise
North Korea and bring all sorts of political issues onto the table. These demonstrations
don’t have a just cause and are impure.”
361
On November 24, 2015, Park also warned at a cabinet meeting that “terrorist
elements” had infiltrated the November 14
th
protests.
362
She also called for a ban on
masks worn in demonstrations, comparing it to a tactic used by ISIS.
363
Such statements
were efforts by Park to accentuate the threat of protests to national security. In addition,
following the November 14
th
protest, a Cold War era law was used to arrest a labor union
leader who was charged by the government with sedition and with inciting violence at the
November 14
th
rally.
In response to the textbook controversy, security rhetoric was also used to justify
the revision of history textbooks. The president’s spokesperson, Chung Hye-ran, said the
existing history textbooks had been “ written by a group of authors with ideologically
biased views, who downplayed the proud achievement of South Korea and instead
glorified North Korea.”
364
Although the North Korean threat is widely viewed by the
360
Hu, Elise. (2016, January 4). Civil rights at Issue in Korea, but not the Korea You’d Expect. NPR.
Retrieved from: http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/01/04/460647346/civil-rights-at-issue-in-korea-
but-not-the-korea-youd-expect
361
Ibid.
362
South Korea’s Park calls for Mask Ban at Protests to Thwart “Terrorist Elements.” (2015, November
24). Straits Times. Retrieved from: http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-koreas-park-calls-for-
mask-ban-at-protests-to-thwart-terrorist-elements
363
Ibid.
364
Hu, Civil rights at Issue in Korea, but not the Korea You’d Expect.
159
public to be contained, Park’s government, in the face of rising protests, has increasingly
securitized communism since the November 14
th
protest to justify the repression of
dissent.
Park’s handling of dissent has not gone unnoticed by the international community.
Human Rights Watch expressed “concerns about the freedom of expression, freedom of
association, freedom of peaceful, public protest” in South Korea under Park’s
government.
365
Commenting on the government’s response to the November 14
th
protest,
a representative from Amnesty International stated, “The police should use proportional
force, not excessive force. The current president is going to fail if she tries to reverse the
course toward democracy by using excuses to silence political critics.”
366
International
groups called for the country’s allies like the US to raise human rights issues with the
government. Park’s biggest security threats then shifted to domestic protests that called
for her resignation, accusing her of forcefully suppressing the political opposition and
“ruling with a heavy hand” like her father.
367
With growing distrust of her
administration, a weakened presidency and criticisms by prominent international
organizations on human and civil right abuses, Park continued to utilize securitization
discourse as a strategy to achieve her political agendas.
Strengthening Korean Language Education
Around the same time as the anti-government protests, shifts in language policy resumed
as part of Park’s cultural strengthening efforts. Legislation supporting the globalization
of Hangul was passed, and the number of KSIs continued to climb. On December 9,
365
Ibid.
366
Ibid.
367
Ibid.
160
2015, the “Support for Spreading Hangul,” law was passed by the National Assembly
with the goal of organizing support for the worldwide dissemination of Hangul. To that
end, the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST) was tasked with submitting
and implementing, “A Basic Plan for development and globalization of Hangul,” every
five years. The law also states that the Korean government may draw on the national
budget to financially support organizations created by presidential decree for the
globalization of Hangul.
The government also continued to expand facilities for overseas Korean language
education. KSI branches continued to grow in number, and in 2013 the total had risen
from 90 in 2012 to 117 across 51 countries.
368
By 2014, there were 130 in 54 countries
with a total of 44,000 students.
369
In contrast to the increase in the number of KSI
branches in 2014, the number of native English speakers employed by public schools
through the English Program in Korea (EPIK) program dropped by 10 percent in the
same year.
370
The number of native English speakers teaching at universities also
dropped considerably following a presidential decree that university English instructors
should have at least four years of research experience after their bachelor’s degree,
meaning that they need to have either a Ph.D. or a master’s degree and two years of
experience as instructors at a university.
371
The above examples demonstrate that under
Park’s presidency, the government has taken measures to curb the national passion for
368
King Sejong Institute Guidebook 2013
369
16 new King Sejong Institute Branches to be Built. (2015, June 3). Retrieved from:
http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Policies/view?articleId=127779
370
The Future of English In Korea. (2015, June 29). The Diplomat. Retrieved from:
http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/the-future-of-english-in-korea/
371
Ibid.
161
English while investing in Korean language centers to promote Korean as a widely used
foreign or second language.
Virtual Protest and Political Setback for Park
As Park entered her fourth year in office, on February 24
th
, 2016, protesters
gathered in Seoul to condemn the administration’s increasing restrictions on free speech
and assembly. Life-size holographic figures marched across a transparent screen at
Gwanghwamun Square, the city center. The virtual rally was organized by the local
branch of Amnesty International, after the government rejected Amnesty’s request for a
live, human one.
372
Police stood by the demonstrations warning that if the event included
any “chanting indicative of a collective expression of opinion” it would be considered an
illegal demonstration and shut down immediately.
373
On April 13, 2016, Park’s Saenuri Party won 122 seats and South Korea’s main
opposition party, Minjoo Party, won 123 out of 300 seats, ending the conservative ruling
party’s 16-year majority in the National Assembly.
374
The significance of the Saenuri
party’s loss of majority control in the National Assembly is that Park will likely struggle
to push through her political agenda for the two years left in her term (at the time of this
writing). In the face of this additional political constraint, Park may intensify
securitization efforts to garner popular support and stifle dissent in order to shift policies.
372
Kang, Haeryun. (2016, February 24). “Ghost Protest” in Seoul Uses Hologram, Not People. NPR.
Retrieved from: http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/02/24/467957260/ghost-protest-in-seoul-uses-
holograms-not-people
373
Stars, Jenny. (2016, February 25). Activists Stage Holographic “Ghost rally” in South Korea.
Washington Post. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2016/02/25/activists-stage-holographic-ghost-rally-in-south-korea/
374
South Korea Opposition Wins Surprise Victory in Parliamentary Elections. (2016, April 14). Channel
News Asia. Retrieved from: http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/south-korea-
opposition/2693618.html
162
Conclusion
The evolution of South Korea’s language policies and the discussions surrounding them
from 2008 to the present have involved a dynamic shift in the nation’s focus, from one
geared toward preparing its population for an English-dominated global stage to a greater
appreciation of the value of Korea’s own language and culture. Under presidents Lee and
Park, the South Korean government labored to raise the profile of Hangul by recognizing
both its unique role in South Korean heritage and its marketability to an international
community that is increasingly aware of and interested in Korean language and culture.
The government’s efforts to build Korean language infrastructure domestically and
abroad have crossed institutional lines, from establishing monuments to historical figures,
to opening museums and developing more traditional pedagogical systems. Hangul, as a
tool for nation branding, and as a means to expand the reach of Korean cultural
commodities abroad, has become a key component of South Korea’s cultural power.
During Lee’s presidency, English continued to be taught in schools and remained
an important part of South Korea’s international competitiveness. Simultaneously,
however, having achieved vast improvements in economic security and establishing itself
as the 13
th
largest economy in the world, the government shifted its attention to national
cultural security. Lee noted that South Korea’s cultural power had not grown
proportionally to its economic achievement, and he believed the government had to
redirect its policies to build its cultural influence around the world.
Lee’s successor, Park, continued to emphasize the centrality of Korean culture to
the nation’s growing development and international status. She emphasized the
importance of nurturing South Korea’s cultural industry as a new avenue for greater
163
economic growth. Park’s administration prioritized Korean cultural enrichment activities
by expanding programs that taught Korean language and culture overseas. Thus, the
Korean language was identified as an important cultural symbol to be marketed
domestically and abroad through state-led reforms. The one area in which Park
significantly departed from Lee, however, was in English language education. Lee was
an unwavering advocate of English language education while Park denounced English
language education in South Korea as “excessive” and called for fundamental changes.
While both presidents engaged in promoting the Korean language as cultural
currency, Park has shown herself to be especially active in securitizing language, in her
appeals to lawmakers and to the general public to endorse her various policies. By
outlining the various threats confronting the country, she exhorts the lawmakers and the
public to join her in bolstering cultural enrichment policies, warning that a failure to do
so in a timely manner would jeopardize the country’s economic future. This discursive
pattern is clear in several of her addresses to the nation, in which she portrayed an
atmosphere of impending crisis to justify her policies.
With the end of authoritarianism in Korea, democratic presidents have
experienced more difficulty in pushing reform measures through the government with the
reduction of presidential power, volatile presidential approval ratings and the periodic
threat and eruption of protests. This study hypothesized that in a political setting where
the powers of the president are constrained, presidents have needed to find a different
way to achieve reforms, and securitization has been a useful strategy in order to achieve
political goals. For Lee, the rhetoric of security was aimed at highlighting purported
threats and dangers to garner support from the public and prevent political opposition in
164
order to shift policy; for Park, securitization discourse was used to elicit cooperation from
the legislative body and the public in order to shift policy and also to justify her heavy
suppression of dissent.
In sum, securitization has proven to be an effective strategy for changing the
direction of South Korea’s language focus from English to an outward looking global
branding of Hangul. Whereas the previous zeal for English language education served to
facilitate South Korea’s access to the global market, more recent efforts to bring greater
awareness of Hangul and Korean language to the rest of the world reflect the nation’s
growing strength as an international economic power. This transition points to South
Korea’s increased confidence, which allows for redeployment of national resources
towards securing the state’s cultural power. In the past, political elites largely used
“economic survival” as a justification for shifts in South Korea’s language policy, but
now the discourse has evolved to the attainment of “cultural power,” “cultural security,”
and “cultural prosperity” in hopes of joining the ranks of the most powerful nations in the
world.
165
Chapter 6
Conclusions
By the time of the founding of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the long history of foreign
intervention had produced a multilingual society, as its people were educated in Hangul,
Hanja, Japanese and English. However, over the course of the next 60 years the country
was transformed into a largely monolingual society with the national language, Hangul,
the main form of communication. How did this transformation from a multilingual to a
monolingual society take place? This study has argued that it was through the
implementation of language policies that employed the rhetoric of security. In other
words, securitization discourse was used as a tool by political elites in order to shift
language policy.
In the first stage of South Korea’s language policy evolution, political elites
focused on the political-cultural dimensions of security to promote a purification policy
based on Hangul. Political elites identified the political threat of the growing appeal of
communist ideology among certain groups in society, smoother reunification with North
Korea, and Hangul’s importance to Korean national and cultural identity as reasons to
embrace a Hangul-only language policy. In the second stage, political elites emphasized
the economic dimension of security to expand English language education. Dramatic
reforms strengthening English language education were achieved through a securitized
discourse on the need for segyehwa (globalization) and to increase South Korea’s
national competitiveness. In the third and most recent stage, political elites concentrated
on the cultural dimension of security to promote the use of the Korean language at home
and abroad. In particular, the government’s campaign of raising the awareness and
166
prestige of Hangul abroad has been shaped by political elites’ discourse on the need to
strengthen South Korea’s soft power and cultural security.
Through securitization, political elites changed Korea from being a predominately
multilingual country for most of its history into a mainly monolingual (speaking and
writing in Korean) within sixty-plus years. This shows that securitization is a powerful
tool that facilitates not only incremental shifts but also drastic changes in language policy
and that a combination of conditions of a high level of military threat and threats of large
protests that could lead to social instability can facilitate securitization tendencies by
political elites.
Findings
This study sought to explain the conditions under which political elites attempted to
securitize language issues in both democratic and authoritarian settings. In doing so, it
reviewed all shifts in national language policy in South Korea from 1948 to 2016,
analyzed the discourse of political elites regarding each shift in language policy through
a careful reading of presidential speeches, parliamentary debates, policy documents, and
language-related laws— to see if and how securitization discourse was used; that is, if a
speech act (where a threat and referent object are identified) was made.
The main findings of this study are that in democracies, political elites are more
likely to try to classify language issues as a security threat to shift policy under two
conditions: the presence of military threats or the threat of large anti-government protests.
Conversely, this study found that political elites are less likely to securitize issues when
military threats are low, or they will securitize non-military threats such as economic or
167
cultural regarding language issues in order to shift language policy. In addition, when
there is no threat of political opposition, political elites are less likely to securitize
language issues in order to shift policy.
Compared to democratic governments, in authoritarian regimes, even when there
are military threats or threats of large protests, there appears to be no need for political
elites to securitize language issues directly in order to shift language policy because they
have greater control over the policy-making process and coercive capability to repress
political opposition. When the military threat is low or when the threat of protests is
absent, there is even less of a need to securitize language issues because political elites
can simply impose language policy. A matrix of the findings is found below:
Conditions Under Which Political Elites Attempt to Securitize Language Issues
In Order To Shift Language Policy In South Korea (1948-Present)
Political System
Political Circumstance Authoritarian Democratic
Military Threat
No need to securitize language
issues directly in order to shift
language policy
Political elites securitize
military threats to shift
language policy
Social Instability (Threat of
Large Protest)
No need to securitize language
issues directly in order to shift
language policy
Political elites securitize
language Issues to shift
language policy
Non-military Threat
(Economic or Cultural)
No need to securitize language
issues in order to shift language
policy
Political elites securitize non-
military threats such as
economic or cultural regarding
language issues in order to shift
language policy
Social Stability (No Threat of
Large Protest)
No need to securitize language
issues in order to shift language
policy
No need to securitize language
issues in order to shift language
policy
168
The historical material presented in the three case study chapters underpins these
conclusions. In Chapter 3, before 1952, democratic political elites securitized language
issues in order to shift language policy when military security threats were high. After
1952, when military threats were low and with the transition to an authoritarian rule,
Rhee did not securitize language issues in order to shift policy. Then during Park’s
authoritarian rule, when military threats were high, he did not securitize language issues
directly in order to shift language policy. He did however, use securitization discourse to
implement drastic economic plans, which he deemed were necessary to develop the
economy and protect national security. The economic growth that his policies created
bolstered his political legitimacy and power and emboldened him to impose top-down
policies in other areas including language.
In Chapter 4, democratic Presidents Kim Young-sam and Lee Myung-bak both
governed at a time of a low level of military threats, so they used non-military threats
(mainly economic) to pursue a strengthening of English language policy. In Lee’s
government, his administration did not securitize language issues when introducing the
proposal for an English immersion program; however, after experiencing public
opposition to the new policy, Lee utilized securitization discourse as a strategy,
emphasizing the need for economic security and competitiveness to strengthen English
language instruction—although admittedly, the subsequent policies were less drastic and
more moderate than his initial English immersion policies.
In Chapter 5, Lee Myung-Bak’s and Park Geun-hye’s governments, both
democratic and facing a high level of political opposition, securitized language issues to
provide greater cultural security by promoting Korean language expansion policies at
169
home and abroad. This chapter shows us that security and material consolidation may be
a precondition for the pursuit of cultural power. Surrounded by militarily and
economically powerful countries--China, Russia, North Korea, and Japan—South Korean
leaders have felt the need to reinforce the country’s national security, both militarily and
economically. However, militarily South Korea is constrained in developing nuclear
weapons, while economically it is an export-dependent country which makes it acutely
vulnerable to market volatility and external shocks. Because of these constraints, the
government has recently shifted its efforts to build its cultural muscle through promoting
Korean language and pop-culture (music, film, drama) globally. This suggests that other
middle power countries that want to pursue national security, but are limited in the
military and economic sense, may turn to strengthen national security through cultural
means. Admittedly, cultural influence would not protect South Korea against an attack
from the North; however, the value internationally of an enhanced national image --soft
power -- should not be underestimated. The South Korean example also suggests that
when a country attains a certain level of military (as South Korea is under the US security
umbrella) and material power, it may start paying more attention to soft power.
In sum, the myriad examples of securitization by political elites explored in the
previous chapters show that democratic political elites have frequently utilized
securitization to pursue a shift in language-related policies under conditions of a
significant military threat or when the threat of large protests against the government is
high. In democracies, since elected political elites are accountable to the public for their
policy decisions, political elites have sought the consent of the governed through
securitization attempts in order to shift language policies. Under authoritarian regimes, in
170
which political elites are less directly accountable to the public, securitization of language
issues was not needed to shift language policies.
Contributions
This study found that securitization of policy discourses (such as those around language
issues) has been used to change policy in order to address a threat or challenge. This is a
departure from the existing, mainstream literature on securitization, which has mainly
focused on the consequence of securitization leading to military or police measures in
order to address a threat. The study’s focus on securitization leading to shifts in language
policy provides a more nuanced understanding of how securitization of non-traditional
security issues such as language may address a threat or challenge.
The findings of this study also contribute to the field of language policy to explain
shifts in policy in the context of an ethnically homogenous country. The existing
literature on language policy explains such shifts by focusing on the role of ethno-
linguistic groups competing for political dominance in ethnically and linguistically
heterogeneous countries such as Malaysia and Singapore. However Korea’s
homogeneity challenges such explanations, and as this study has shown, multiple shifts in
language policy can be explained by securitization discourse used in the face of a range
of challenges.
Possible Areas for Future Research
Looking ahead to directions for future research based on the insights developed here,
several possibilities suggest themselves.
171
First, on the theoretical level, securitization could be further explored to include
the question of what constitutes a case of a “successful” securitization. What counts as a
successful case of securitization is under-theorized in the literature. This study offers the
suggestion that a securitization attempt by political elites may be considered successful
when a speech act leads to a top-down policy decision. There are several reasons for
defining it in this way. First, it is in line with the definition put forward by Buzan et al.
(1998) that when a speech act is backed up by government action that moves an issue
from “normal” politics to “emergency” politics, it is a case of securitization. Examples of
emergency politics that they name include: “the form of secrecy, levying taxes or
conscription, placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights or focusing society’s
energy and resources on a specific task, but do not elaborate further.”
375
Second,
although Buzan et al.’s definition has been critiqued as too broad, the vague definition
has allowed for different scholars to construct their own definitions of what a successful
securitization of an issue involves. After reviewing the conceptual shortcoming of
previous research in securitization studies regarding the under-theorization of what is a
successful securitization, this study, offers its own definition.
This study’s suggested definition builds on previous work done by others such as
McDonald who argued that in a democratic political system, “normal” politics is
characterized by domestic political debate, a bottom-up approach in policy-making.
376
A
bottom-up approach involves the process of political debate, garnering support for a
policy, building consensus and/or making compromises. In contrast, “emergency” politics
is characterized to be a top-down approach in policymaking, one in which the political
375
Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole, and de Wilde, Jaap. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis.
Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 24.
376
McDonald, Securitization and the Construction of Security, 567.
172
leadership makes a decision for the entire nation with minimal or no consultation with
the population. How, then, does one know if an attempt at securitization has been
successful? Put simply, this study suggests that a successful securitization of language
issues by political elites is when a speech act results in unilateral, top-down decision that
is made and then implemented by the government to address a threat or risk. Such a
definition would bring a more comprehensive understanding the policy-making effects of
securitization regarding more non-traditional security issues.
A second area for further research could involve the South Korean response to
North Korean defectors. Allowing thousands of North Koreans into the South since the
division of the country has showed that the two peoples are different in terms of values
and culture, and policy makers face a challenge in framing North Korean defectors as
ethnic brethren, refugees, foreign economic migrants and/or enemy. A particular framing
can have significant effects on identity issues and refugee, migration, integration and
unification policy. Securitization discourse is a powerful tool that can define and re-
define who North Korean defectors are in relation to South Koreans, and this narrative is
never static, always changing. A positive framing of North Korean defectors that focuses
on shared ethnicity and culture could lead to more resources for defector settlement
programs. On the other hand, negative framings of North Korean defectors laden with
security rhetoric may not only decrease support for defector settlement but could also
further magnify the boundary between North and South Korea in a psychological sense,
in addition to the physical border that divides them.
Third, looking in more depth at the over-utilization of securitization by political
elites in South Korea and its effects on the quality of democracy could be a valuable
173
extension of this research. This study found that securitization is most likely to be used
by political elites when the government faces a significant opposition from the public,
namely, the threat of large-scale anti-government protests. In particular, Park Geun-hye’s
government has frequently used securitization discourse to justify the use of excessive
force in the suppression demonstrators and dissent. The pattern of using securitization to
repress dissent is worrisome, as reliance on securitization to impose top-down policies
and to justify harsh repressive tactics to quell protests erodes not only the quality of
democracy in the policy-making process but also civil rights. In fact, many domestic and
foreign critics have raised concerns regarding the current government’s dealing with
dissent and violating citizens’ freedom of expression, association and of peaceful, public
protest. T. Kumar, the international advocacy director for Amnesty International said,
“the current president is going to fail if she tries to reverse the course toward democracy
by using excuses to silence political critics.”
377
The examples in this study help specify
that the “excuses” being used to silence, thwart, stifle and/or pre-empt dissent are in fact,
securitization discourses. The virtual rally that was held earlier this year in partnership
with Amnesty International ended peacefully. International organizations’ participation
in the protests may have been crucial to deflect repression by the state because of the
advantages they possess including moral status, organizational resources and
international networks. Partnering with international organizations may be an effective
strategy used by domestic protesting groups to constrain harsh suppression by the
government in the context of securitization of such movements.
377
Hu, Elise. (2016, January 4). Civil rights at Issue in Korea, but not the Korea You’d Expect. NPR.
Retrieved from: http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/01/04/460647346/civil-rights-at-issue-in-korea-
but-not-the-korea-youd-expect
174
Finally, what if the external military threat from the North increases dramatically?
Under a democratic government, this study would expect political elites to securitize
some language-related issue if there were a language policy to be changed. This then
begs the question, how much of the variation in securitization of language issues owes to
the type of threat involved as opposed to regime type? Since the public plays a more
critical role in policy decisions in democratic governments, as this study has shown,
regime type does seem to be an influential factor in the frequent securitization patterns of
political elites on language issues. Yet, regime type does not definitively determine
whether securitization will be used. What is clear is that the type of threat and the nature
of the regime have both played a role in the securitization choices made by political
elites. If securitization discourse is more likely to be used by political elites in a political
context in which a policy choice must be debated in the public sphere, this gives rise to
questions about agency in utilizing securitization discourses in authoritarian regimes.
That is, if authoritarian political systems are less accountable to the public, why do its
political elites engage in securitization discourse at all? If regime type is significant in
attempts at securitization by political elites, particularly in the case of authoritarian
regimes, this study presents an important area worthy of further exploration:
incorporating the conditions of securitization in authoritarian regimes into the
securitization framework. Authoritarian regimes could be an exciting area of research to
explore and develop to see to what extent the securitization framework applies to
situations outside the framework of inclusive and participatory forms of politics.
175
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Kang, Eunice Y.
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Core Title
Securitizing language: political elites and language policy securitization in South Korea
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College of Letters, Arts and Sciences
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Doctor of Philosophy
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Political Science and International Relations
Publication Date
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Globalization,Hangul,Hanja,language policy,language policy shifts,nation branding,national security,OAI-PMH Harvest,political elites,political protests,securitization,segyehwa,South Korea
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language policy shifts
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political elites
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segyehwa