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China's periphery in perspective: A comparative look at the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and Shenzhen Special Economic Zone

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China's periphery in perspective: A comparative look at the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and Shenzhen Special Economic Zone

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Content CHINA’S PERIPHERY IN PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT THE
YANBIAN KOREAN AUTONOMOUS PREFECTURE AND SHENZHEN
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE
Copyright 2004
by
Juli C. Schwartz
A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(EAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES)
August 2004
Juli C. Schwartz
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1 1
CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES.............................................................................................................. iii
LIST OF FIGURES............................................................................................................. iv
NOTE ON ROMANIZATION............................................................................................ v
ABSTRACT......................................................................................................................... vi
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................1
Defining the Research Project
Chapter
1. THE YANBIAN KOREAN AUTONOMOUS PREFECTURE........................ 21
Geography
History
Structural Factors
Cultural Factors
2. THE SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE............................................. 52
Geography
History
Structural Factors
Cultural Factors
3. YANBIAN AND SHENZHEN AS “TYPICAL” ANOMALIES...................... 89
Center-periphery
Territoriality
Identity
CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................128
Why Yanbian and Shenzhen Matter
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................................135
INDEX................................................................................................................................ 144
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iii
LIST OF TABLES
1. Graduates of Higher Education By Selected Ethnic Group..................................... 41
2. Guangdong’s Role in China-Hong Kong Trade From 1990-1991...........................68
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iv
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Map of YKAP and Surrounding Regions....................................................................22
2. Map of Shenzhen SEZ and Surrounding Regions......................................................53
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V
NOTE ON ROMANIZATION
All Chinese words referred to follow the Pinyin system, except for a few well-known
proper names (especially those with Cantonese pronunciation). The occasional usage
of Korean and Japanese words follows the Hepburn and McCune-Reischauer
systems, respectively.
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VI
ABSTRACT
There are useful conclusions to be reached from comparative analysis even when the
subjects being compared seem altogether different from one another. The Yanbian
Korean Autonomous Prefecture and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone share
commonalities, despite social, historical and geographical differences. First, they are
both territorial units, with interior boundaries that are designed to separate those
inside from those outside. Second, because they are situated in close proximity to
national borders, they are greatly influenced by cultural and economic metropoles on
the other side. And most importantly, their relationships with Beijing exhibit patterns
that fit within a center-periphery framework. These relationships are constantly
changing, depending on the mix of centripetal and centrifugal forces currently at
work. Ultimately, it is the author’s contention that the situations of Yanbian and
Shenzhen are representative of a larger phenomenon in China where actors, practices
and policies emerge and evolve without achieving fundamental, qualitative change.
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INTRODUCTION
1
DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROJECT
The inspiration for this project derived from a number of influences. Chiefly, my
work at the University of Southern California provided exposure to several
disciplines that in some capacity addressed state-society relations in the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). Whether ethnographic material concerning minority
nationalities, readings on the significance of localized administration or hypotheses
regarding prospects for a bona fide civil society, sources identifying antithetical or
marginalized interests vis-a-vis Beijing proved invaluable. To a lesser extent, my
experiential knowledge of sub-cultural and underground circles gleaned from
personal contact thereof also assisted me in the preparation of this study, as did a
general and longstanding interest in border regions and “third-culture” persons.1
From these contributions I began to loosely recognize the outlines of a
conceptual framework broad enough to encompass the many relationships and
struggles both germane to my overarching aims and applicable at the micro level,
too. The need for versatility was particular important, given the fact that the subjects
of this study, the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture (YKAP) and Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone (SEZ), were selected because of their general and particular
1 A conversation several years ago with an aid worker in Juarez, M exico first piqued my curiosity on
the cultural peculiarities o f border towns. I am also grateful to my friend, Heather Vaughn, for
insights she passed on while studying the role cultural environs play on the psychosocial development
of children o f foreign missionaries.
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2
significance. It was fortunate, therefore, that this process coincided with my
discovery of an intriguing strain running throughout various pieces of scholarship
that I have placed within a “center-periphery” context. The resulting paradigm is
invoked prolifically in the pages that follow.
Immediately, of course, the center-periphery label conjures up many different
associations, some of which may or may not be intended components of this work.
Defining what is meant by “center” and “periphery” is therefore of the utmost
importance. Since my ultimate concern here is to ascertain whether or not two
locales within China can become powerful enough to challenge the authority of the
party-state, one of these possible meanings must be political. The center in this
circumstance refers to the seat of power. The periphery is represented by any entity
far enough removed from central control to retain some degree of independence,
including, perhaps, local authorities (Cheung and Tang 2001; Crane 1996;
McKenney 1993; Skinner 1977; Starr 2001). Other related descriptions of center and
periphery include political function but also connote inherent spatial considerations.
According to this type of conception, the center of power is specifically named as the
“capital,” and the periphery is the real and symbolic area surrounding it (Gottmann
1980). Some authors advocating this type of explanation go so far as to develop a
corresponding visual construct to support their ideas about center and periphery,
such as Kwok and Ames’ concentric circles model (1995). Though the adoption of
particular visualizations is not necessarily practicable for my purposes, because of
the nature of the chosen case studies below an appropriate designation of center-
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3
periphery does have to incorporate spatial characteristics. The most cogent and
sophisticated example of this principle was put forth by G. William Skinner in his
study of urbanization in nineteenth-century China. Here, physiographic features are
incorporated into an analysis involving the political and economic hierarchies of
eight macro-regions, each of which has multiple and distinct “central places” and
surrounding hinterlands (1977a, 1977b).
Beyond these usages, however, more abstract orientations must also be
considered. I find Edward Shils’ essays on center-periphery in a sociological context
to be extremely helpful, for instance. His discussion of the two concepts emphasizes
philological importance, where “center” is imbued with notions of integrality,
charisma and legitimacy, and “periphery” with parochialism, marginality and even
alienation. This kind of understanding is hopefully one likely to substantiate deeper
implications that might arise from succeeding analysis. Further, Shils also includes a
definition of center and periphery that notes de jure and de facto distinctions. He
speaks of the competitive nature between an authoritative center and a “counter
center” (1975). The interplay of competing centers will become important as this
thesis unfolds.
Since I have named the above variations of center-periphery among those
relevant to the project, I should also briefly mention those that are less resonant. I
carefully considered at first to what extent, if any, economic approaches to the
paradigm should be employed. Those that come to mind most readily are of the
“world system” variety, where the center (or core) stands for developed countries or
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4
regions and, by contrast, the periphery is comprised of underdeveloped and poor
nations. The latter is predicated upon the existence of the former, and vice versa.
Moreover, the periphery is not capable of resisting the center precisely because it is
integrated into the world economy (see the writings of Wallerstein, Moulder and
others). The applications of this model, although compelling within a revisionist
frame of reference, are rather different from the ones with which I am primarily
concerned. In the first place, the world economy theorists conceive of center and
periphery in global terms, which renders their utility for domestic comparisons
tenuous—though writers such as Andre Gunder Frank aptly note the arbitrariness of
interpreting economic cycles within the rigid confines of national boundaries (1998).
But even if one might argue that the world system framework can be altered to
explain economic disparities among core, semi-peripheral and peripheral regions
within China, as Skinner indeed indicated (1977), others feel that the center-
periphery polarity is least meaningful for economic systems (as compared with other
structural domains) because spatiality in the economic sphere need not be a salient
factor (Strassoldo 1980, 42-43). More importantly, however, since from a world
economy perspective the periphery has very little chance of defying the center (at
least without the latter’s compliance), the parameters of this center-periphery
relationship are incongruent with others I encountered. As will become apparent, the
dialectical nature of the center-periphery relationship itself is paramount to many of
this study’s conclusions.
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Given the above, any use of the center-periphery paradigm should be
judicious. Having developed mostly in the postwar period in response to
socioeconomic patterns, international relations and curiosity about the effects of
progress and technology (Gottmann 1980, 17-19), many contemporary scholars have
used it ex post facto to describe conditions in pre-modem or early modem states as
well (see following discussion). Whether or not it can sustain itself as a theoretical
construct appropriate for future assessment remains to be seen. In fact, Raimondo
Strassoldo argues that the center-periphery model could become obsolescent as more
nations modernize and decentralize, accordingly (1980). In the meantime, however,
for nation-states where there exist a strong bifurcation between center and periphery
and powerful centrifugal agents, the model is still valid (Shils 1975).
It is clear from the bulk of research I have gathered that China is indeed such
a nation-state. In order to present a cohesive account of China’s current center-
periphery struggle, it is first beneficial if not necessary to present an historical
overview of this pattern. Even in times when central control was stalwart,
fragmentary elements emanating from the periphery did not disappear. China’s
political unity always coexisted with disintegration, even if sometimes contradicted
by literary and historical writings. Cultural, regional, ethnic and economic
diversity— especially between northern/interior and southern/coastal origins—
traditionally have been a part of the Chinese experience (Kwok and Ames 1995).
Here the regional dimension of center-periphery is particularly apparent. Patterns of
dual influence, central and local, have existed because of China’s size and the rather
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6
fluid tributary borders in pre-modern times (Cheung and Tang 2001, 92). China’s
mostly rural population is also cited as a contributing factor to Chinese society’s
decidedly local bent, since the village-kinship structure provided the only contact
with political authority most residents ever knew (Liu 1996, 16). Furthermore, as
Skinner points out, various regions in an agrarian empire the size of China’s had to
be independent of one another since they lacked mechanized transport (1977, 217).
Following in the footsteps of Skinner and others, like Philip Huang, Prasenjit
Duara employs rural economic and political conditions as markers of imperial
strength. In his study of the late Qing state, Duara pinpoints some local catalysts to
the destruction of pre-Communist regimes. Examining a few areas of northern China,
he charts the practice of tax collection as one of those catalysts. Local officials,
legitimized by symbols in the “cultural nexus of power,” were responsible for
extracting hated tankuan levies at an increasingly rapacious rate. Eventually, when
those officials refused to continue the practice, the state relied on “entrepreneurial
brokers” to resume their duties. These new elites, who predictably skimmed off the
top, were not vested with legitimacy by the cultural nexus. Tankuan collection
became harder and harder to perform, with fewer funds reaching the central
government. This diminishing return was directly responsible, in Duara’s view, for
the larger process of “state involution,” whereby the state expanded in size
unaccompanied by corresponding growth or depth, and eventually crumbled (Duara
1988, passim).
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Other writers also characterize the relationship between the center and local
officials or brokers as one “...carefully crafted...to ensure local interests [were not]
in competition with the interests of the throne... [Nevertheless, the]
arrangement.. .broke down when the throne was weak, threatened.. .and in need of
the assistance of local authorities,” (Starr 2001, 149). No doubt the breakdown partly
occurred as a result of the previously mentioned corruption in China’s civil service
(since officials were messengers of central authority), which might have encouraged
the social masses to seek other centers of charisma (Shils 1975, 417). But more
importantly, limited bureaucratic resources mandated that a certain number of
governmental functions be delegated to the non-official power structure (Skinner
1977, 338-339).
Despite the previous explanations, though, in the end center and periphery
were not exclusively oppositional but instead wound up in a pattern of mutual
cooptation. In fact, the periphery was responsible for many forms of innovation that
challenged the center, particularly in border or frontier regions where development,
security and defense were key issues. Nomadic peoples on the steppe, for instance,
negotiated with their Chinese neighbors in ways that helped both groups attain local
goals, which the capital at some point was forced to acknowledge (Lattimore 1980).
If one jumps ahead to the current Chinese state, it is clear that similar patterns
of opposition and cooptation between center and periphery still inhere. The causes of
this murky relationship (some of which will be explored later on) are multifarious. In
the process of nation building, for instance, the center meets the extraction of
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initiative, devotion and resources from various segments of society with difficulty
because of the tendency towards local identification (Shils 1975,405). This
observation is true for many developing states, including China. When the real
heterogeneity of social groups is carefully measured, such an acknowledgement is
indispensable. Alternatively, some contend that though China shows corporatist
propensities, the formerly totalitarian nature of its system actually has sharpened the
demarcation between state and society because the “masses [have been] relegated to
a structurally similar position,” (Liu 1996, 7). Finally, one must acknowledge that
the process of reforming China’s economy has posed additional challenges to central
power. The ongoing lack of differentiation between economic and political
competition strengthens centrifugal forces (Crane 1990, 155), as does Chinese
leaders’ refusal to concede— officially—that material successes in modernization
have introduced new political and cultural preferences (Pye 1996, 110). Yet in spite
of these difficulties, there is evidence that the center has outlasted any singular threat
to its hegemony through tactics such as cooptation, exploitation, factionalism and, of
course, coercion. The most important of all these factors will be evaluated
throughout the text below, as the case studies reveal how specific circumstances in
anomalous border areas substantiate such claims concerning center-periphery.
From my decision to recognize this topic as one that broadly falls under the
aegis of center-periphery dynamics, flowed investigations into the suitability of
allied but secondary theoretical umbrellas. Since I have established that physical
space is a significant prerequisite for my acceptance of center-periphery, it follows
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9
naturally that my research should also be concerned with specific characteristics of
the two locations I selected for comparative study. Any issues, then, that come to the
fore in light of their physical features, I classify as those concerning “territoriality.”
The idea that physical space, generally, is a primordial principle of social
organization is intuitive. Even before the inception of modem nation-states and their
concomitant geopolitical significance, native-place association was an inherent part
of social identity (more on this point later). Shils’ determination of what constitutes a
modem society is much wider than either its connection with a certain political
system or a defined set of national borders, but he still concurs that the latter in
particular is essential to any coherent concept of society (1975). In China, concerns
about territorial integrity have become one of the primary vehicles through which
nationalism is expressed. In the post-Mao era, China’s nationalism is no longer
reflected through an inward orientation but rather through an outward orientation,
and its unresolved territorial claims might indicate how a modernized China could
flex its muscle in the future (Townsend 1996, 5).
Likewise, special territories within China bordering external domains also
realize the significance of geographical situation, and use that situation to their own
advantage as much as possible. If one of these “special” areas, for example, borders
an economically advanced neighbor, it can often utilize this linkage for its own
economic development. Depending on its physical traits, relationship with Beijing
and individual development plans, it may also attempt to influence such arenas as
international relations (Cheung and Tang 2001, 96-97). And a territory specially
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10
intended for ethnic minority residence views its natural setting as one important both
for nurturing cultural affinities or contacts with adjacent countries and for
determining relations with the majority culture surrounding its perimeters (Strassoldo
1980, 49). It is worth mentioning that some have posited the claim that internal
borders of this type of locale are never so solidly fixed as to completely insulate
those within from the larger territory to which it ultimately belongs, though these
borders might translate into more autonomy for such an area and also usually
indicate relatively sparse participation in central or national culture (1975, 51, 63-65,
70).
While the above considerations testify to the consequence of physical
territory to societies at large and China in particular, it is nonetheless imperative to
provide context. As with the center-periphery concept, I will introduce historical
precedent for China’s view of territoriality. Up until this point, I have referred to
territoriality as an idea rather than an actuality, but in the nineteenth century, China
did indeed experience the latter manifestation. In its semi-colonized state following
the Opium Wars, China extended rights of “extraterritoriality” to foreign powers
who controlled certain parts of “treaty port” cities completely unfettered. Trade was
the strict province of these foreign concessions. The treaty ports were significant for
many reasons, but not the least of which was its separation of the modernized
Chinese elite from their countrymen elsewhere in China. And while the Chinese who
lived in treaty port cities undeniably preferred the efficiency and prosperity of
foreign rule, these enclaves were evidence of China’s humiliation at the hands of
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11
imperial powers. Therefore, even though interior China was characterized by poverty
and corruption, it was viewed as the “real” China and coastal treaty ports along with
their inhabitants were castigated as traitorous, an outcome with marked implications
for the future (Pye 1996, 93). This chasm, both real and perceived, between
successful economic enclaves and the rest of China endures. In fact, the idea of
“spatial constraints,” doing something special somewhere special, resonates in China
today by way of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and other zones representative of
contemporary China’s continued practice of economic territoriality (Crane 1996,
156).
Outside of the treaty ports, other historical occurrences involving territorial
dimensions are important to our discussion. The tributary relationship China had
with many of its “barbarian” (or at least “inferior”) neighbors is informative here. As
self-proclaimed lesser kingdoms, these states would send emissaries with gifts of
tribute in formal recognition of China’s superiority to the emperor. Moreover, as
previously alluded to, tributary borders during this period were fluid since China was
the dominating influence in the region and at times, despite commonly held beliefs to
the contrary, was expansionist. During the conflicts of the twentieth century, these
historical relationships often contributed to the strategy and outcome of struggles
being waged with China or its neighbors. Any comprehensive discussion of the
issues below, then, must take into account the importance of geographic space,
particularly those concerning borders, both within and without.
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The third overarching theme I want to introduce as essential to understanding
the following material is one broadly named “identity.” This theme is complex
because identity can be bound up with many things: nationality, culture, ethnicity
and political economy, just to name a few. Most important for our purposes is
obtaining a clear grasp of Chinese identity as it developed historically, and then
investigating its role in shaping the types of identities with which I am most
concerned. It is worth noting, yet again, that our discussion on identity will touch on
facets already mentioned in prior sections (i.e. those pertaining to the center-
periphery and territoriality models).
What does it mean to be “Chinese?” Modem persons intuitively might be
tempted to frame their answers in terms of China’s national consciousness. Nation
and nationality, though, are modem constructions. Since Chinese civilization spans
five millennia or so, this interpretation, while not incorrect, is far too narrow (we will
return to this point in short order). In pre-modem China, being Chinese was
primarily a cultural identity—even if tinged with elements approximating racial
distinction, patriotism, dynastic loyalty and xenophobia (Townsend 1996). This
cultural affiliation consisted of components like ethnicity and language,2 among
others, but was always changing to accommodate the assimilation of outside people
groups. Those on the inside—ethnic Chinese or Han Chinese (hanren)—usually
2 The connection o f the Chinese language to identity is not to be overlooked. In her 1994 essay, “No
Solace From the Lethe,” Vera Schwarcz remarks, “Even in the aftermath o f the May Fourth language
revolution (from classical to vernacular), even in the aftermath o f the history-devouring Cultural
Revolution, Chinese identity remains inseparable from the Chinese language, much as the future is
inseparable from the past,” (1994, 69).
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assumed that the absorption of others obviously supported beliefs about Han
superiority; Han Chinese themselves were largely incognizant of the constant flux in
their ethnic complexion (Wu 1994, 151).
Lineage and descent comprised a principal constituent in the formation of this
mainly cultural identity. Ultimate obedience within a unique kinship network has
always been an intrinsic part of the Chinese experience, and contrary to widespread
belief, cannot be distilled down to an oversimplified “Confucian” mindset (Elvin
1994,47). The continuity of family and ancestral identification from generation to
generation informed to a large extent Chinese perceptions of ‘self’ and ‘other.’
During the early Qing era, concerns about lineage following increasing cultural
amalgamation and internecine ethnic feuds brought about new categories of race.
While China is often seen as promoting heightened ethnocentricity, these types of
conflict are to be expected since even in relatively homogenous societies, total
integration is difficult. Most societies came together over time through immigration,
conquest and dynastic union of distinct cultures (Shils 1975, 78). Patrilineal descent
came to dominate both elite and mainstream thought as the conceptualization of race
in terms of common ancestry became prevalent (Dikotter 1997). The latter part of the
Qing dynasty saw a more systematic articulation of this cultural norm. Contact with
the West forced China to confront an advanced, powerful but radically different
civilization that challenged China’s sense of superiority on many fronts, partly
resulting from violations of its territorial integrity. Or in the words of Mark Elvin,
“The modem West was, simply by making China conscious of its existence, to
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destroy this...ennobling vision [of China as the incarnation of righteousness and
learning], and so to devalue a history,” (1994,44).
Western encroachment, loss of central revenue and other factors signified a
weak Qing government, and therefore, a weak China as well. Fin de siecle
intellectuals, reformers and future revolutionaries began looking for a unifying trait
that would define “Chinese-ness” and exclude the unpopular ruling Manchus
(despite their nearly complete Han acculturation). That trait became common lineage
(Chow 1997, 50). Exclusion by lineage eventually came to represent racial
distinction as well, especially in light of exposure to “foreign devils.” Allusion to the
“Yellow Race” and mytho-historical progenitors like the dragon and the Yellow
Emperor were picked up by the intelligentsia and legitimized through academic
discourse (e.g. science), in order to espouse national unity (Dikotter 1997, 14-18).
Racial homogeneity was equated with strength:
Far from being a “derivative discourse” of a more “authentic” form of
“white racism,” narratives of blood and descent in China had an
internal cohesion which was based on the active reconfiguration of
indigenous modes of representation. Lineage discourse was perhaps
one of the most prominent elements in the construction of symbolic
boundaries between racially defined groups of people (Dikotter 1997,
14).
Such a proposition, of course, was not commensurate with reality; in large societies
such as China with a plurality of ethnic, religious and status groups, society cannot
be defined by its exclusive link to only one lineage (Shils 1975, 66).
As noted earlier, though Chinese nationality as it pertains to Chinese identity
is a relatively new idea, it is one that should not be understated. In fact, it is
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impossible to speak today of being Chinese without also comprehending the due
emphasis placed on national consciousness. Although this modem form of
identification formally must consist of different criteria by which inclusion in the
Chinese nationality is judged, older notions of race and culture have survived
wholesale. The resulting syncretism reflects the accommodation of both nation and
race or ethnicity in determining the meaning of “Chinese,” and in the minds of most
anyway, obliterates nuances that distinguish among these competing dimensions. For
example, to be a citizen of China (zhongguoren) is to be a patriot— someone who is
concerned with China’s destiny as the motherland. This definition is inextricably
linked to one’s membership in the Chinese ethnicity (zhongguo minzu), since one
must be ethnically Chinese (associated with the han, hua or xia labels) to be a
Chinese citizen. In both cases, a belief in China’s centrality (zhong) is key; China
(and its subjects) was always at the center surrounded by barbarians (Dikotter 1997,
18; Wu 1994, 148-150).3
Since I have taken up national identity as part of identity at large, it is worth
noting a few consequences of this recognition. National identity is coterminous with
the process of nation building and with a certain degree of nationalism, too (as
3 This explanation o f identity is complex, but it is true that race, culture, ethnos and nationality are, if
not synonymous, then certainly interchangeable according to most Chinese people. Not only is the
moniker, “Middle Kingdom,” (zhongguo) contained in any definition o f “Chinese,” but the word
minzu heretofore translated as “ethnicity,” can also be equivalent to “nationality,” as we shall see
when our discussion turns to China’s ethnic minorities. Moreover, because race, culture, ethnos and
nationality are conflated, “Chinese-ness” at times seems to assume a rather mystical quality; being
born o f Chinese ancestry is supposed to be sufficient in the eyes of other Chinese to internalize the
Chinese identity without difficulty, regardless o f environmental factors. The experiences o f Chinese-
Americans, for example, living abroad in China or Taiwan indicate that this observation is not without
basis— those who are friends, acquaintances or colleagues have shared the difficulty o f explaining to
native Chinese the crosscutting pull dual cultural identities wields on their personal development.
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16
touched on briefly above). Nationalism is a favorite tool of political leaders hoping
to consolidate their own power while endorsing strength, social order and economic
progress within their respective nation-states. And because the tendency in China is
to associate citizenship with ethnicity, it is not surprising that ethnic nationalism has
surged alongside state nationalism, perhaps even surpassing the latter in magnitude
(Townsend 1996, 19). Even in state rhetoric or doctrine, Han chauvinism persists, as
evident from public statements by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials.4 If,
therefore, ethnic Chinese nationalism continues to inform sentiment among mass
numbers of people in the PRC, it should not be surprising that ethnic nationalism
among non-Han minorities has not dissipated either. This point is a crucial one to the
section below on China’s minority policy in the context of center-periphery relations.
Furthermore, other circumstances within China have posed challenges to the growth
of state nationalism, which in turn would enhance the power of central authority. In
the postcolonial era, it is not uncommon for countries like China to experience the
growing pains of identity crisis, as local or communal allegiances vie with national
allegiance for influence over members of the polity, including influence over their
participation in modernization (Lee 1995, 120). Lucian Pye and others have also
pointed out the contradictory nature of nationalism under Communist rule because
the divisiveness of class struggle and the iconoclasm associated with a Leninist
4 Remarkably, officials espousing Han chauvinism and their supporters do not even seem to realize
the blatant nature o f their prejudice: “W e feel that all nationalities have their strong points. Some are
large while others are small, some are advanced and some are backward, but there is certainly no
distinction by which one is superior,” (He 1990, 3, emphasis added).
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17
system make it nearly impossible to find the cultural building blocks necessary to
construct a unified and coherent version of nationalism (Pye 1996; Townsend 1996).
The complicated interplay of ethnic versus state nationalism with Chinese
identity on the whole behooves us to investigate other identities that emerge from
this process. As stated briefly above, ethnic nationalism for non-Han peoples in
China has grown simultaneously with that of the Han majority. Shifting definitions
among various “nationalities,” including Han Chinese, as to what constitutes
membership in their respective groups spawn new permutations in non-ethnic forms
of identity. For example, so-called “local nationalism” among different ethnic groups
cohabiting the same region has sprung up partly in response to this evolving
fluidity—especially in areas where joint labor-intensive efforts are needed to achieve
some common end (Hansen 1999). A socioeconomic or cultural network, not
interethnic cooperation, underpins other forms of local identity, as we shall see in
one of the case studies.
Finally, with each of the types of identity mentioned thus far, it is necessary
to examine an “internal” as well as an “external” perception of any given group,
since both are reflective of relative position and participation in the PRC. This idea
we will return to again, as the project develops.
Having explained at some length the larger purposes of this study, I will now
say something about the research project specifically, and how its components were
chosen. First, my work two years ago on China’s Korean minority (chaoxian minzu)
engaged my interest for many reasons, not the least of which was my curiosity about
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18
marginal groups in China, and the Koreans’ relatively unusual position among
China’s ethnic minorities. As I began my research, the importance of the YKAP as a
political, cultural and social center for Chinese Koreans became evident. Located
close to North Korea’s border, the YKAP partly serves to insulate or buffer the
ethnic Koreans inside its boundaries from the majority culture surrounding it. For
those living within, the experience of being a PRC citizen is refracted through the
particularities of living in official but voluntary segregation. In such a case, the
significance of Yanbian’s placement as a special area cordoned off from the rest of
China, and as a “border region” in close proximity to nation-states with which it has
strong ties is noteworthy. The fact that it houses ethnic minorities increases its
meaningfulness both as a peripheral entity and as a place highly conscious of
identity-related issues.
Second, the series of trips I made to Shenzhen while studying in Hong Kong
two summers ago impacted the development of this project in a similar way. The
Shenzhen SEZ is also an example of territorial containment by way of partition. Its
nearness to Hong Kong situates it within a cultural, social and economic network
perhaps without parallel in the Asia-Pacific region. Shenzhen’s location across the
border from Hong Kong certainly qualifies it as a border area, and Hong Kong’s
sway over Guangdong means that it is capable of functioning as a “center” in
competition with Beijing. And because of Shenzhen’s special economic and
administrative status— in addition to its relationship with Hong Kong— life there
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19
tends (or has tended) to function differently from other places in China. This
disparity raises important questions about the distinctiveness of Shenzhen’s identity.
In deciding on the approach to this project, I took my cue from many recent
scholars who evaluate both structural and cultural factors in their work. In order to
help measure or quantify relative position within China, I selected three constituents
that will serve as objective barometers of conditions within the two chosen locales:
socioeconomic development, education and political participation (including
administrative structure). Further, where beneficial, I also provide background on
each of the two enclaves’ geographical and historical settings.5
Finally, since this study ultimately is comparative, I evaluate the results of
the two case studies under the auspices of the three theoretical paradigms introduced
here. My design is to uncover important lessons about current and future state-
society relations in China—especially those concerning center-periphery dynamics.
At this juncture it might seem appropriate to object; after all, Yanbian and Shenzhen
are divergent enough so as not to lend themselves to ready comparison. The former
is an Autonomous Prefecture (AP), the latter an SEZ. The reasons for center-
periphery struggle, to the extent that it exists, are not necessarily parallel. Whereas
ethnicity is an important factor for one, for the other it is not. Nonetheless, if it
seems that I am endeavoring to compare apples and oranges, that is rather the point.
If instead, for instance, I chose to compare two regions lodging ethnic minorities,
5 Again, Skinner’s work, especially in terms of methodology, is invaluable. Though his analysis is
quantitatively more intricate than mine, we selected many of the same variables for their comparative
value: economic importance, political or administrative importance, physiographic situation, etc.
Skinner also introduced broad approaches to understanding the data presented, as I also do here.
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20
whatever inferences were made about their given relationships with central authority
might be simply attributed to the government’s tenuous relationship with its minority
populations. Alternatively, I have opted to write about territorially contained border
regions with the potential to counter China’s political, social and (to a lesser degree)
economic center, so that the specificities of the two entities involved cannot
obfuscate the larger aims of the project that follows.
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21
CHAPTER 1
THE YANBIAN KOREAN AUTONOMOUS PREFECTURE (YANBIAN
CHAOXIANZU ZIJ1ZHOU)
Geography
Yanbian is located in the easternmost portion of Jilin Province, bordering both North
Korea and Russia. YKAP administers six cities within its borders: Yanji City (its
capital), Tumen, Dunhua, Longjing, Hunchun and Helong. In area, Yanbian spans
42,700 square kilometers. Its population is 2.15 million, almost 40% of which are
ethnic Koreans. Yanbian, in fact, boasts the largest concentration of Chinese Korean
residents, which number about 4 million altogether (The Information Office of Jilin
Provincial Government of PRC).6
The Tumen River, recognized today as a natural boundary between North
Korea and China (and one of the region’s most important aquatic channels), runs
along the northeastern border of Jilin (see Figure 1). As was the case with many
tributary states in the Chinese orbit, Korea did not share a clearly demarcated border
with China in centuries past (despite both the Yalu and Tumen rivers). In fact, prior
to the Yi dynasty’s foundation (1392), Korea’s fluctuating borders at times extended
well into parts of Siberia and Manchuria (Cumings 1997; European-Asian Business
Council 1999). This ambiguity was the subject of the 1909 “Sino-Japanese
Agreement on the Tumen River Border,” in which Japan promised to respect the
6 This number includes many illegal immigrants (estimated) from North Korea who surreptitiously
cross the border in search o f food, employment and other economic necessities.
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C h e n g d u j'"'
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Fig. 1. Map of YKAP And Surrounding Regions. Available at
http://www .asahi .com/english/asianet.
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23
geopolitical integrity of the Tumen River border in exchange for several trade
concessions concerning Manchuria. In 1952, this ambiguity was brought to the fore
again when the PRC and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) reached a
formal understanding on the citizenship status of Koreans in China, with some being
permitted—depending on location of residence— to choose between the two
countries (Lee 1986, 17-19, 68).7
The drawing of Yanbian’s borders as an Autonomous Region (AR) first took
place in 1952, and then was “downgraded” to an AP in 1955.8 Since three prior
waves of migration from Korea had brought settlers to the northeast, the carving out
of Yanbian’s territorial constraints was consistent with the demographic makeup of
the region as it existed, though the area’s dominance as a cultural preservation center
developed gradually. In fact, it was Dongbian that initially attracted most immigrants
in the years just succeeding Japan’s annexation of Korea (1910). Eventually,
however, most fled to Yanbian and surrounding areas in order to avoid accusations
that they were sympathetic to Japanese occupiers, as well as punitive treatment at the
hands of Nationalists. There they survived and flourished, due in large part to their
skills in rice-paddy agriculture and forestry (Piao 1990,44-55).
An area rich in natural resources, Yanbian contains abundant deposits of 50
plus metals, including zinc, copper, lead, gold, silver, etc, and over 30 species of
7 The Shanhaiguan Pass was the physical barrier used to designate citizenship: Koreans living outside
the pass were treated as Chinese citizens and those living inside were asked to choose between
citizenship in the PRC and citizenship in the DPRK.
8 Today there are actually other, smaller autonomous units in Jilin (such as the Changbai Korean
Autonomous County), but since Yanbian is the oldest and largest Korean zone in the region, it will
remain the focus o f the forthcoming discussion.
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24
trees (The Information Office of Jilin Provincial Government of PRC). Because of
this natural wealth, the area has always been viewed as a promising hinterland for
those capable of exploiting it, such as the Qing state— and even more to the point—
the Japanese during their occupation of Manchuria. Yanbian’s deposit of resources,
rugged frontier conditions and border-town function mean that the area’s inhabitants
have had to join efforts with one another (despite ethnic or cultural differences) and
with those in neighboring countries in order to improve and sustain their quality of
life.
History
Yanbian is in a unique position among autonomous regions and prefectures, even
though others, such as Xinjiang in China’s northwest, also accommodate large
numbers of ethnic minorities—much larger in fact, than Yanbian’s Korean
population. Its unusual situation stems instead from its ties to an ancestral homeland
just beyond its borders that today boasts two modem nation-states. The historical
relationship between Korea and China, and in particular this part of northeast China,
is therefore essential to exploring the substantive issues discussed in this case study.
Pre-modem Korea, as commonly known, was one of China’s neighboring
satellites. As with other tributary states, Korea’s deference to China was based on a
profound belief in the absolute superiority of Chinese civilization within a Confucian
worldview. Korea was expected to send regular embassies and missions to China
under the rubric of commercial and cultural exchange (Cumings 1997, 90). These
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visits, while mutually beneficial in a limited sense, actually revealed more about the
Korean practice of sadae (“serving the greater”) than it did Korea’s self-interest
(Cumings 1997).
Modernity brought an end to the tributary system, but not the inexorable
formation of new linkages between the two areas. During Japan’s colonization of
Korea and Manchuria, both locales were incorporated into the “Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere,” Japan’s economic machine designed to drive the
development of its colonies according to the metropole-satellite concept (a plan quite
similar to that executed by other imperialist regimes).9 Though the Japanese set their
sights on Manchuria at least as early as their victory in the Sino-Japanese War, after
the Japanese established Manchukuo’s puppet government, they no longer faced any
obstacles whatsoever to complete seizure of the territory and its resources. They
proceeded to move heavy industrial production in steel, chemicals, hydroelectric
facilities and automobile production to Manchuria, as well as mining and
manufacturing. As a result, by 1940, thousands of Koreans were relocated (either
forcibly or voluntarily) as relatively low-paid laborers. Unfortunately, the perception
among Chinese living in northeastern provinces was that Koreans in Manchuria,
treated slightly better than their Chinese neighbors, collaborated with Japanese
colonizers in ravaging the region (Cumings 1984). Much of this stigma persisted,
9 Because o f the exploitive and hierarchical nature o f this model, some also place Japan’s
development o f its Asian conquests within a world system framework, where the core is represented
by Japan, the semi-periphery by Korea and the periphery by Manchukuo (manchuguo). Even though it
is stated in the introduction that the world system approach will not be substantively employed, it is
worth mentioning here.
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26
until the Chinese Civil War, despite the fact many Koreans had migrated to China
generations earlier.
After Japan’s defeat in 1945, many Koreans chose to remain in Manchuria in
spite of certain difficulties because they had established roots there, they were
uncertain about the future of Korea’s stability or they found themselves becoming
embroiled in tensions between the Communists and Nationalists (Lee 1990, 95). In
fact, Koreans’ contributions to the War were by no means insignificant. Of
Yanbian’s 51,000 troops in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 85% were Korean,
and 90% of the casualties from the area were Korean, too. Koreans supported the
CCP because of the Communist rebels’ efforts to combat Japanese aggression, the
party’s ostensible commitment to ethnic equality, their promises to carry out land
reform and fear of the Kuomintang’s (guomindang) anti-minority predisposition.
Indeed, some argue that if the Nationalists had not so antagonized the Koreans in
Manchuria, they might not have turned to the Communists (Hansen 1999; Lee
1990).1 0
At any rate, the fact that Koreans and Chinese were cohorts during this period
spawned a number of interesting implications in the years that followed. First,
Communist movements in Korea and China organically coincided to a certain
degree. Chinese and Korean Communists would ultimately need the same
1 0 By 1947, 8,468 Koreans had been arrested by the Nationalists on charges o f pro-Communist
sympathy. In addition, businesses were confiscated, native language publications banned and
residence permits issued for tighter surveillance. Just a few years earlier, however— during China’s
War Against Japanese Aggression— Koreans did periodically join forces with the Nationalists
(Hansen 1999, 96; Suh 1990,166).
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organizational and strategic skills in order to unify their respective countries.
Koreans on both sides of the border often lent assistance to their Communist brethren
on the other side. For what would later become the DPRK, the experiences of
Koreans in Manchuria proved to be invaluable. The core members of the North
Korean elite, including Kim U Sung himself, began their military careers as
Manchurian guerillas (Cumings 1997, 492). On a related note, the Korean War in
many ways mirrored China’s revolution, completed less than one year before
hostilities between the Koreans and Americans officially began. The entry of the
Chinese into the War is often depicted as a quid pro quo; since Kim II Sung some
years before had dispatched thousands of Koreans to help stave off a PLA crisis, it
follows naturally that the Chinese would return the favor by sending in experienced
veterans—including many Koreans who had fought with the PLA in the Korean
Volunteer Army (KVA). In reality, China probably did not need too much prodding
by the North Koreans to commit troops because in all likelihood, it genuinely feared
a US invasion of Manchuria. Having its own soldiers stationed near the border
provided a reassuring buffer (Cumings 1997, 239-240, 283). In addition, besides
military assistance, China mobilized other material resources for North Korea during
this period, and the Korean presence in Manchuria made provinces such as Jilin and
Liaoning excellent bases of mobilization (Cheung and Tang 2001, 106).
In the end, of course, Kim II Sung and the brand new DPRK would have to
be content with control over territory north of the thirty-eighth parallel. Though both
North Korea and China expressed sentiments of solidarity for one another during
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those tenuous years, in the following decades relations between the two countries
actually soured—especially during China’s Cultural Revolution, when portrayals of
Kim II Sung turned decidedly negative (Cumings 1997, 460).1 1
Moreover, one cannot underestimate the role economics played in shaping
bilateral affairs between China and both Koreas in the postwar years. All three
nations embarked on programs designed to modernize their given economies, but
both Koreas were actually more successful than China at first. Fostered by Park
Chung Hee’s export-led growth policies in the 1960s, the Republic of Korea (ROK)
grew at approximately 10% annually for almost three decades. In turn, North Korea
was the most successful industrializing economy among socialist nations during
most of the 1970s. China, by contrast, did not produce stunning results relative to the
Koreas in either agricultural or industrial production until the post-1978 reforms
(Cumings 1984, 1-3). Since the beginning of the Reform Era, however, China has
caught up with and surpassed its neighbors, while North Korea especially has
seriously declined.
As China has allowed itself greater integration into the global economy, it has
placed more emphasis on establishing and strengthening ties with South Korea and
distancing itself from the North. In the first place, China found itself competing with
South Korea for the comparative labor advantage and realized friendlier negotiations
would strengthen its bargaining capacity. South Korea, by this point disillusioned
with entrenched, US-promulgated anti-Communist rhetoric was all too willing to
1 1 Correspondingly, this difficult period in the PRC’s short history acutely affected China’s Korean
population in Yanbian as well (see subsequent discussion).
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reciprocate. Second, as Seoul and Moscow stepped up their efforts to achieve
normalization (Seoul was particularly astute at what became known as nordpolitik),
China became keenly aware of shifting alliances in the balance of regional power.
The 1984 Olympics held in Seoul probably also contributed to China’s changing
outlook. Finally, by the late 1980s, South Korea and China were mutually
indispensable, interdependent trading partners; China’s trade with the ROK far
outweighed its trade with North Korea (1991 figures put PRC-ROK trade at $5.8
billion—five times as great as PRC-DPRK trade). All these events ultimately
culminated in official recognition between the two countries on August 24, 1992
(Cumings 1997, 463; Janelli 1993, 73, 181-182; Kim 2001, 371, 375-377).
It should not be surprising that fluid, trilateral arrangements between China,
North Korea and South Korea impact Yanbian and other Korean areas in China’s
northeast in copious ways. Much of the cultural exchange between the three states,
for example, has reflected this shift, which will become clear as the case study
unfolds. As the narrative above indicates, Yanbian’s importance in Sino-Korean
relations is historically based, and discovering whether or not it is successful in
negotiating competing influences is one of this study’s most meaningful objectives.
Because Yanbian’s creation was an outgrowth of China’s minority policy at
large, an accurate history of the YKAP must also take the PRC’s handling of
minority nationalities into account. First the term “national minorities” (shaoshu
minzu) and the government’s use of it should be explained. As noted in the
introduction, the Chinese typically do not distinguish between many concepts
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acknowledged as distinct in other cultures: people, nation, nationality and ethnos. In
Chinese, all of the above are called “mmzw,” which is a significant point to be made
at the outset. In determining how to deal with its various ethnic groups, the central
government has employed a number of terms that reference the word “nationality:”
nationality policy, nationality commission, nationality cadres, nationality territory,
etc. (Heberer 1989, 11). Outside of the bearing the “nationality” designation has on
identity (a deeper discussion of which is still forthcoming), the term also affects the
government’s orientation as far as policy is concerned. Consider the language used in
the goals set forth early on by the CCP: 1) upholding equality among nationalities, 2)
establishing autonomy in minority areas, 3) accomplishing development jointly and
4) achieving unity and prosperity among all of China’s people groups (He 1990, 3).
At first glance, neither the ideas nor the language used to depict them may strike one
as particularly interesting one way or another. But the tone of the phrasing suggests
an immutable belief in the separateness of each group; that is, each nationality is
encouraged to remain independent from the others. Even though words like “unity”
and “equality” are used, the text appears to be highly conscious of differences among
nationalities. The four statements cumulatively imply an orientation that is insular
rather than assimilative, and that attitude is reflected in the very formation of special
minority areas.
This segregationist proclivity was evident in early measures, circa 1960,
targeted towards minorities. The formal classification of minority nationalities
resulted in a heightened awareness of differences among various groups of people,
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31
especially Han and non-Han. This new awareness, unfortunately, both belied reality
and reinforced notions of Han supremacy, since it is well known that differences
among Han populations from diverse regions often overshadow differences between
Han and non-Han cohabiting the same region (Wu 1994, 155-156). Early policy, in
this sense, reflected the Party’s ambivalence towards minority groups. While they
envisioned a place for non-Han nationalities in their interpretation of Marx’s five
modes of production, their ultimate assessment of social progress nonetheless
reaffirmed the superiority of the Han. Marginal peoples, therefore, were placed in the
unusual position of being ideologically validated as “foils” to the majority population
(Hansen 1999).1 2 Those responsible for developing minority policy, astonishingly,
were largely obtuse as to their own prejudices and inconsistencies, however.
Speaking of the equality among nationalities, they simultaneously claimed that
“advanced” Han peoples should “assist” the non-Han in developing their “backward”
customs (Hansen 1999, 12).
On the other hand, early initiatives did modestly elevate the standard of living
for some ethnic minorities and officially acknowledged their desire for self
articulation, even if it was assumed (and hoped) that eventually China’s various
nationalities would assume more and more characteristics of the dominant Han. A
contemporary scholar in China expressed this sentiment:
1 2 Ironically, the only time at which ethnic and cultural differences were not emphasized was during
the Cultural Revolution, when all minority nationalities were placed under duress for perpetuating
class distinctions within China. The previous “multiethnic” policy that allowed bilingual education,
preferential treatment for minorities and recognition o f cultural uniqueness was abolished (Hansen
1999, 17).
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National culture and mores change as each nationality improves its
production and life-style [sic]. There are no laws governing what
customs are to be discarded and what are to be kept, but each must be
judged in accordance with the principle of how beneficial the reform
can be for improving the unity of nationalities, economic
development, and socialist system. In general, the right of each
minority freely to preserve or reform its cultural tradition and mores is
an important principle that earns respect (Jin 1990, 37).
In terms of concrete measures, education and economic opportunity were two areas
given special attention by those responsible for crafting minority policy. Across all
levels of education—primary, secondary and postsecondary— minority participation
on average tripled, quadrupled or quintupled over a forty-year period (Hansen 1999,
15).1 3 There is also evidence that state efforts to develop local economies in which
minorities live were successful. According to statistics from 1985-1986, minority
area production equaled 56.31%, as compared with 14.75% in 1949. Similarly, the
gross value of industrial and agricultural product combined increased 86.72%, a
113.9% increase in industry, 58.7% in agriculture (He 1990, 9-10). These early
improvements, though, did not sustain themselves, especially during the tumultuous
political campaigns of the late 1950s through mid 1970s. The mass disillusionment
that followed led many to question the motives of the government all along. Plus, the
failure of preferential policies to ameliorate the harsh and impoverished existence of
certain groups such as the Dai, Bai and Yi (located in Yunnan province) cast doubt
over the efficacy of those attempts, motivations notwithstanding (Heberer 1989).
With respect to Yanbian’s Korean residents, whether and to what extent
1 3 In 1951, minority representation in education was recorded as 2.2% at the primary level, 1.4% at
the postsecondary level. In 1991, the figures were 8.1% and 6.9% respectively.
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improvements in education, economic conditions and other criteria, as listed in the
introduction, have taken place will be instructive in the evaluation of their collective
experience.
Structural Factors
In this section, three concrete indicators of how well Yanbian Koreans are
functioning in the Chinese polity are examined one by one. The markers selected—
economic development, education and political participation— are particularly
revealing because they specify the degree to which Koreans in Yanbian have formal
and informal access to society’s most important institutions.
Koreans constitute only the twelfth largest nationality in China, so the
numbers are not sufficient in their own right to justify any favorable consideration
this group of people might receive from the government (Lee 1986). Probably much
more significant are China’s historical dealings with the Koreans in Manchuria (see
previous section on historical background), some shared cultural values between
Koreans and Chinese (more on this aspect in the paragraphs below) and the PRC’s
early beneficent policies concerning minorities (also mentioned above). China has
made it clear that the best way for Yanbian to ensure continued favorable treatment
is to support and follow the Party’s economic plans for the region. China has
prioritized industrial development of its northeastern provinces (a practice inherited
from the Russians and Japanese in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries)
and has encouraged Yanbian to participate in various industrial projects. The
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government’s pressure on the YKAP to “develop” and “modernize” has apparently
been persuasive. In 1986, Yanbian claimed over 1200 industrial enterprises, 2.8
times as many as existed in 1952. And in 1987, total industrial production was 18%
greater than that of the previous year.
Obviously, this trend met with corresponding changes in Yanbian’s labor
pool. By 1978, 4/5 of village production was industrial (versus agricultural) and 2/3
of the workforce was employed in the industrial sector, with an increasing number of
Koreans willing to leave agriculture in pursuit of other kinds of work. In addition to
jobs in production, a large number of positions in the transportation sector became
available, as Yanbian’s transportation and communications systems proliferated
rapidly. According to 1982 figures, 190,000 Koreans were engaged in industrial or
transport work. As elsewhere, when hitherto rural residents depart from traditional
sources of work in a peasant economy, the transition involves fairly pronounced
changes in lifestyle and income. Records from 1986 state that 75% of households in
Yanbian earned over 10,000 RMB— 1700 RMB per capita (Cui 1990, 86-87).
In appreciation of Yanbian’s cooperation with the Party’s agenda, a large
degree of control has shifted out of the hands of central power and granted instead to
the YKAP. Yanbian has subsequently taken advantage of this newfound “freedom”
in myriad ways. It has retained the right to protect key sectors, such as energy,
forestry, chemicals, medicine, textiles, bee farming, food, instruments and
construction. The prefecture is now responsible for its own natural resource
management, key for the area since natural resources are its lifeblood. Yanbian has
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also assumed responsibility for its business development, administration of local
economic projects and internal-external trade relations. The latter in particular has
profoundly affected Yanbian’s level of economic growth; foreign and domestic
investment in the last two decades has brought millions of dollars to production,
increased the supply of capital, equipment or technology and generated millions of
dollars in revenue.1 4 Because of these inputs, Yanbian has been on course for the last
several years to maintain its annual growth at a rate of 9.5% (Jin 1990, 38-42).
This sort of administrative liberalization (also noted in the passage on politics
in Yanbian) might someday supply the YKAP with the resources to preside over an
economic zone comparable to those that exist in southern coastal China (see
especially chapter 2). Such an opportunity might, in fact, have presented itself a few
years ago when plans for the Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP)
were first presented. A Sino-Soviet-Korean collaboration, the project intended to
turn the backwater towns of Rajin (DPRK), Changchun (PRC) and Posyet (Russia)
into a triumvirate with the economic power to rival Hong Kong and the Greater Pearl
River Delta Region. The entire area of prosperity was to reach from just south of
Vladivostok to Chongjin and Yanji, in Yanbian. A large duty-free shipping and
processing zone was to run along the border of the Tumen River (on the North
Korean side). According to the development proposal, drawn up in the mid-1980s,
the TRADP would cost $30 billion over the course of 15 years, the projected date of
completion being in the late 1990s. It was agreed that Japan and South Korea would
1 4 Figures from the late 1980s placed production increase at 45 million yuan, capital and technology
imports at 1.8 million yuan and revenue at 11 million yuan.
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front the investment capital; North Korea and China would supply cheap labor;
China and Russia would contribute raw materials such as coal, timber, minerals, etc.
Ultimately, however, the program had to be shelved due to an inability among all the
various parties to coordinate efforts.
Beijing pushed very hard to make the venture workable, intimating perhaps
that China had the most to gain from its success. It certainly would have provided
China greater access to the Sea of Japan. More importantly, as least as far as this
study is concerned, the central government wanted to ensure Yanbian’s continued
stability, possibly threatened by North Korea’s precipitous deterioration. With large
numbers of North Koreans rapidly crossing the border, China was concerned that
Yanbian might be showing signs of political and economic anomie (Kim 2001, 388-
389).1 5 Taking into account the greater flexibility central authorities had been
extending to Yanbian, and the fact that cities in Yanbian were integral to the
TRADP’s success, had the project not lost momentum one might postulate that the
YKAP would have been well positioned to transform itself into a special economic
area, as well as an autonomous area for minorities.
Other positive results economic change, and consequently greater
liberalization, has brought to Yanbian are increased mobility and a more potent sense
of interconnectedness. As noted above, the nascent transportation sector has opened
up new employment and commercial opportunities for residents of Yanbian; it has
also placed Yanbian in closer reach to those outside its borders. A rail route connects
1 5 This concern also might explain why China pushed to make North Korea the actual site o f the
Export Processing Zone [EPZ], rather than in Liaoning, Jilin or Heilongjiang.
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Tumen and Hundun, and round-trip plane travel exists between all of the following
cities: Yanji, Changchun, Shenyang and Beijing (Cui 1990, 86). This relatively
newfound exposure to the outside has also fostered the formation of a “Northeast
Economic Circle,” among the Manchurian provinces of Jilin, Liaoning and
Heilongjiang. In operation since the early 1990s, its functions include information
exchange, cooperative technological development, anti-protectionist lobbying
(provincial), and coalition-wide benefit provision (Cheung and Tang 2001, 116). It is
worth mentioning, however, that though these regional connections have materially
benefited Yanbian, there are those who feel Yanbian’s original charter—i.e. the
preservation of traditional Korean culture—may be compromised by this more
outward orientation. This subject will be addressed in greater detail when the case
study turns to the importance of cultural factors.
The second institutional factor undertaken here, and arguably the most
critical from the Korean point of view, is education. Education is a prominent theme
in the materials available on China’s chaoxian minority; some sources deal with it
exclusively. Koreans, perhaps more than any other ethnic minority in China, have an
unqualified regard for education—both as a means to secure economic status and as
a good in its own right. The historical emphasis placed on education in Korea partly
explains this attitude, as does the Yanbian Koreans’ particular association of
education with cultural transmission.1 6 Historically, of course, education was the
1 6 It is worth some mention, also, o f the extraordinary number of prominent leaders from North and
South Korea who were reared and educated in Yanbian or other areas of Manchuria. In a certain
village, Longjincun, several graduates o f its three all-male high schools went on to make names for
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38
primary method of inculcating Confucian values like obedience, filial piety and the
four moral virtues (humanity, wisdom, decorum, righteousness). And since Korea is
widely regarded as the most Confucian of the East Asian civilizations, education is
likely the single most venerated institution (Janelli 1993). As for the capacity to
preserve and transmit Korean heritage, Koreans in Yanbian—not unlike the
communities of Korean diaspora in Hawaii and Siberia—have shown a strong
inclination to be very proactive in the organization of their own schools and
curricula. Even in 1945, shortly after the Japanese left, Koreans in Yanbian and
surrounding areas managed to pool together enough resources to form schools that
were dedicated to imparting cultural as well as academic lessons (Lee 1986, 55).
After the Korean War, Yanbian capitalized on its recently granted autonomy by
establishing a comprehensive education system, as described in the following
account:
Yanbian became an ideologically relaxed center where a Korean
cultural and educational renaissance took place. During this golden
age it absorbed an influx of Korean intellectuals and educators from
other areas of the Northeast. The Koreans felt proud of being Korean
and aggressively asserted their ethnic identity as distinct from the Han
Chinese civilization. This neo-traditional upsurge was reflected in
their educational, literary, artistic and social activities. They
emphasized the importance of maintaining single-ethnic schools at all
levels—primary, secondary and higher education programs. Korean
schools were clearly separated from their Han Chinese counterparts.
Even in an ethnically mixed school there were separate classes for
themselves in the homeland o f their forefathers: Yi Chong-ok, former premier and vice president of
North Korea; Pak II, professor at Kim II Sung University; Pang Won Ch’ol, professor at Kim II Sung
University (who later fled to South Korea); Kim II, late vice premier and vice chair of the Workers’
Party o f Korea; Chong Il-gwon, former prime minister and commanding general o f the South Korean
army; Mun Ik-hwan, South Korean dissident leader; Chang Tok-Sun, professor at Seoul National
Univeristy ; and a number o f ministers and theologians (Suh 1990, 165).
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39
Korean and Han Chinese students. Use of the Korean language
flourished in all Korean schools, including Yanbian University. The
Koreans regarded their schools as better than the Han Chinese schools
and sometime felt that they were intellectually and culturally superior
to all other ethnic groups in China (Lee 1986, 69).
Clearly, though the focus of the cited passage is the intellectual climate in Yanbian
during the early-mid 1950s, the cultural function of the educational pursuits
described is foremost in the minds of both author and reader.
Unfortunately, however, this educational and cultural renaissance could not
be shielded from the turmoil of the 1960s. The Great Leap Forward, Rectification
Campaign and Cultural Revolution undermined the security of ethnic minorities
everywhere, and Yanbian was no exception. Practices aimed at instilling ethnic
awareness in young Korean students were harshly criticized and eventually banned
because they purportedly encouraged “local nationalism” instead of “national unity.”
Bilingual and native textbooks were confiscated, and many intellectuals reprimanded
(Hansen 1999, 56-57). Propaganda urging assimilation (tonghua) and amalgamation
(ronghe) spurred many Korean parents to withdraw their children from Korean
schools, as they feared their native tongue would become obsolete within several
years. The general consensus during that time was that Korean schools especially
were being attacked in an effort to “sinicize” the Korean minority (Lee 1986, 114).
Fortunately, in the last 30 years, Koreans have been able to reinstate some of
those early practices courtesy of the central government. Bilingual education, for
instance, is now offered in Yanbian even at the post-secondary level. Additional
programs have been introduced since, too, including teacher-training, subsidies and
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40
scaled entrance exams to universities. The latter policy, in particular, has introduced
substantive change in terms of opportunities in higher education for minorities.
Minority quotas are set by province for entering university students. Students may
now take their exams in their native language, not Mandarin, and an additional five
points is granted to each minority student. Also, the central government has created a
five-year program especially for minorities (minzuban), in which students with
substandard scores spend the first year of coursework in a remedial setting and then
directly enter a premier university’s regular four-year program (Hansen 1999, 18;
Lee 1986, 104-105).
One may surmise that the CCP implemented these measures not purely out of
altruism. Besides wanting to redress injustices committed during periods like the
Cultural Revolution, the government also realized the situations of minority cultures
in sensitive border regions may at times become downright precarious. Security
concerns over the increasingly tense state of affairs in North Korea obviously were
factored into this evaluation. These fears aside, Yanbian, with its wealth of natural
resources, also impressed China’s leaders with the need to bring the Koreans on
board in order to achieve the state’s goal of fully developing the northeastern frontier
(Lee 1986, 99-100). And this “carrot” approach has worked to a large extent;
Koreans in the YKAP, often touted as a “model minority,” have internalized ideas
about their relative advantage and well-being, and as a result, have been generally
cooperative. Moreover, because of their genuine regard for education— a trait they
share with the Han Chinese—they have invested a terrific amount of time, energy
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41
and resources into education, believing that their efforts will lead to greater
economic opportunity, social mobility and an even higher standing within the
Chinese state. The numbers corroborate this push for advanced education in
Yanbian. According to 1990 data, among all of China’s nationalities (including the
Han), Koreans have the greatest number of graduates beyond the primary level and
the greatest percentage of graduates of higher education (Hansen 1999, 21, 75, for
the latter see Table 1).
Table 1. Graduates of Higher Education By Selected Ethnic Group
Ethnic Group Percentage of Graduates Among Group
Population*
Han (Chinese) 0.558
Hui 0.591
Manchus 0.624
Naxi 0.643
Mongols 0.757
Koreans 2.271
Source: M.H. Hansen. 1999. Lessons in being Chinese: Minority education and ethnic identity in
southwest China. Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 75.
* The national average at the time of this study was 0.543%.
Education for Koreans, however, is stressed at all levels of learning. In fact,
Koreans partly attribute their success in higher education to their achievements in
early childhood development. Yanbian’s Helong County is now known as the
standard-bearer nationwide in pre-primary education. The first pre-school program
began in 1947, and the first kindergarten in 1951, as the need for daycare arose
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42
because Korean mothers began working on agricultural mutual aid teams (Lee 1986,
114).
There have perhaps, though, been some unforeseen negatives associated with
Koreans’ universal desire for advanced education. The aspiration to earn a four-year
university degree, especially, has actually presented some problems for Yanbian.
Very few students (only about 0.08%) enroll in technical or vocational schools, for
example, which has created a dearth of workers in engineering, architecture,
management, electronics and textiles. Some fear this trend might mean retarded
economic growth for the prefecture. In an attempt perhaps to counteract this
consequence, area schools such as Jilin University (Jilin daxue) have instituted
changes to reflect a greater awareness of the need for specialized training (Agelasto
1996, 74; Lee 1986,156).
Finally, it is worth mentioning again the role that shifting Sino-Korean
relations has played in shaping all facets of life in Yanbian, including education.
Though historically Koreans in Yanbian have had closest ties with North Korea, as a
result of friendlier relations between China and the ROK, Seoul’s influence in
Yanbian has mounted. Curricula, academic exchanges and cultural/educational
donations from South Korea have become more substantial while those from the
North have remained static for a number of years (Lee 1986, 142-149).1 7 The impact
of both Seoul and Pyongyang on life in Yanbian will be taken up again when cultural
factors are examined.
1 7 The chairman o f the Daewoo chaebol, for instance, donated 3,000 books to Yanbian in the mid-
1980s, and the gesture was well received. This move was probably unimaginable decades before.
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43
The third of the structural factors to be addressed here in the Yanbian case
study is political participation. Formal political access or representation must always
be taken into account when judging the position of any given group and its
relationship with the authoritative center, especially in the case of an ethnic, racial or
cultural minority. But since real political power in China is only in the hands of a
very few, standards by which active or successful political participation are judged in
liberal democracies cannot apply in this case. Nevertheless, there are other
circumstances— some of them, albeit, more symbolic than substantive—that do
speak to the quality of Koreans’ political experience.
The political character of Yanbian’s Korean minority was molded to a large
extent by twentieth-century conflicts. Because they were deeply involved in fighting
against the Japanese and later the Nationalists, their growth as a politically aware
minority has coincided with the development of the CCP itself. Those who would
become the Korean minority’s most visible leaders showed extreme savvy by allying
themselves with the Communists well before the outcome of the Chinese Civil War
was certain. By the end of 1948, Yanbian’s CCP members numbered 5,244, 73.1%
of which were Korean. At the district level, 83.9% of new cadres were Korean; and
at the village level, 79.7% were Korean (Lee 1990, 97). Beyond their natural
sympathies with the Communist platform (already discussed to some extent), the
Koreans also supported the CCP because it guaranteed the preservation of and
respect for the chaoxian minority’s cultural integrity. Indeed, the Communists
ostensibly were true to their word; in 1952, the Koreans were rewarded for their
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44
loyalty when the YKAP was established by the central government, a move that
pleased many in Yanbian (Piao 1990, 56-76).
As part of its nationality policy in the 1950s, the PRC initiated a number of
steps designed to acknowledge the political importance of minority groups. Some of
these actions amounted to no more than proclamations in official Party documents
giving minority peoples “freedom” to develop their own languages and participate in
their chosen religions. Others, however, were more tangible. An important vehicle to
achieving political clout, especially at this time, was CCP membership. As noted in
the paragraph above, even before the PRC’s formal existence, early recruitment of
members in places like Yanbian assisted the Communists in their defeat of
Nationalist forces and provided legitimacy. Following the formation of early
nationality policy, the Party strategically targeted minority nationalities for training
as cadres, so that they would be effective messengers of central policy in regions
predominated by minorities—including of course Yanbian. The Koreans’ own
confidence about their role in political and military affairs during those years added
meaning to this gesture, as Koreans felt themselves particularly well situated to
contribute to local, regional and national politics.
Perhaps the most important way Koreans have in fact been able to participate
in China’s political system has been via appointment to the National People’s
Congress (NPC). For all of China’s minority groups, representation in the NPC is
deemed invaluable, even though their real power there— as has been true with their
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45
Han colleagues— is negligible.1 8 But it is meaningful symbolically. In fact Koreans,
like other ethnic minorities, are accorded greater representation in the NPC than is
warranted by their numbers nationally. At the beginning of the Thirteenth National
Congress (September 1987-October 1987), for example, 9.1% of the 175 delegates
were minority representatives, while only 6.7% of China’s population at that time
was comprised of minorities. At this particular session of the NPC, two Korean
delegates were present, marking the first time the chaoxian minzu sent more than one
representative to the NPC (He 1990, 3-14; Lee 1990, 93).
When measuring Koreans’ success by economic standards (above),
administrative reform was cited as one of Yanbian’s biggest impetuses to high
growth. It also should be mentioned here as a significant political development. The
devolution of power to the YKAP’s local bureaucracy translated into greater
discretion virtually across the board. Local officials in the prefecture began to
administer direct and indirect aid from the central government, tax revenues,
industrial investment, trade expansion, economic projects at large and, of course,
improvements to primary, secondary and higher education. Because of this sense of
autonomy (both real and imagined), many Koreans do consider themselves well
positioned in the Chinese state (He 1990).
Nonetheless, this assessment should not be taken to mean that Koreans are
not aware of either China’s system-wide constraints or their own vulnerability as a
1 8 There is some debate today as to whether or not the People’s Congress continues to be a “rubber-
stamp” body, as some claim that its representatives— now able to voice opposing views on certain
non-sensitive issues— actually can influence the decisions o f China’s top leadership.
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46
minority population located on the periphery. They have survived being labeled
“authoritarian” and “contentious,” and the perilous nature of past political campaigns
has infused the necessity of maintaining a low profile during chaotic periods. Though
Koreans generally agree that they have gained materially and substantially from
China’s current policy, balancing the need for self-determination with their place in
China’s national, “multiethnic” schema will not cease to be a challenge, and at times,
a downright struggle (Lee 1990, 111-112).
Cultural Factors
There are a variety of crosscutting influences on today’s Koreans in Yanbian— a
significant number of them cultural. When examining these factors, the evidence
overwhelmingly suggests that Koreans feel a dichotomous pull on them resulting
from the equal but opposite processes of preservation and assimilation. Ethnic and
cultural affinities with North and South Korea, admonition from older Korean
residents in Yanbian and a pervasive ethnic consciousness that accompanies diaspora
everywhere are main contributors to the former inclination; ubiquitous images and
cultural norms purveyed by Chinese society, younger generations’ desire to be fully
integrated into the majority culture and the necessity of cooperation with Han
Chinese in order to maintain status and privileges inform the latter. Wanting to have
one’s cake and eat it too, the average Korean in Yanbian might endeavor to abide
both currents, but is likely to have difficulty negotiating either one.
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47
For the sake of argument, it might be helpful to assume that structural
improvements have indeed significantly added to the Korean minority’s quality of
life in Yanbian. Given that assumption, how should cultural factors be assessed? Are
they subordinate, equal to or more important than institutional measurements? Once
these questions are addressed it becomes apparent that cultural factors are every bit
as important as those of the structural variety precisely because they directly pertain
to the three theoretical constructs being employed to discuss this project: center-
periphery relations, territoriality and, especially, identity. Identity will be taken up in
greater detail in chapter 4, but it helpful to know that with the Koreans in Yanbian it
is especially relevant.
Preservation, or the attempt to retain native heritage through cultural rites and
customs, is one of the two cultural forces emphasized in this section, as stated just
above. Obviously, in their efforts to protect traditional culture, Koreans in Yanbian
have enthusiastically maintained ties with their native homeland. North and South
Korea continue to exert notable influence on Yanbian, not only in a geopolitical
sense but culturally too. Print and broadcast media are very popular, including Radio
Seoul and Radio Pyongyang. Even though Yanbian is traditionally pro-Pyongyang,
popular culture from South Korea in the forms of music, film and television
programming has made its way to Yanbian and has been well received—due in part,
no doubt, to the aforementioned shift in Sino-Korean relations. Organized cultural
exchange has through the years played an important role as well. Often these
activities have been facilitated initially through informal and individual contact with
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48
those on the other side of the border, so these small but important links should not be
underestimated (Cui 1990).
Besides native ties, which are tremendous resources to draw upon for
Yanbian’s Korean minority, elder generations of Koreans in the YKAP consider
themselves the vanguard of cultural preservation and therefore, those through whom
Korean heritage is commemorated. Their leadership regarding cultural affairs,
consequently, has proven essential to Yanbian’s ability to remain a social and
cultural center for chaoxian people. Unlike their younger contemporaries, they do
not seem conflicted about the insular nature of their lifestyles. In many ways, they
have been able to stay above the fray of competition between the larger Han-
dominated, China-centered world of which they are formally a part and the smaller,
Korean-centered world of Yanbian they know so well. Nor have they been swayed
by the trends toward modernization, urbanization and industrialization in such a way
that would lead them to alter their cultural habits.1 9
Though the older-middle and elderly generations are consummate examples
of those who are compelled to stay closely connected to their cultural roots, there
exists a consciousness that pervades all Korean diaspora, old and young, which is
based on a comprehension of “otherness” within a relatively homogenous, majority
culture. The expression of cultural solidarity, therefore, is not a luxury but a
necessity for survival. As discussed earlier, education is one of the most effective
1 9 Interestingly enough, to some extent this “generation gap” is also present among rural villages in
South Korea who have been subjected to the process o f modernization. In his study o f Twisongdwi, a
locale less than 100 miles from Seoul, Roger Janelli records the disparity in disposition towards life
outside the village among old and young residents (1982, 187).
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49
tools for the transmission of Korean culture. In Yanbian, Koreans also utilize
community resources for artistic groups, performance groups, literary circles, sports,
etc. These pursuits, in fact, are regarded as priorities in terms of resource allocation.
In addition to the fact that all mass media—television, radio, print publications—
employ the Korean language and are directly administered by Yanbian authorities,
“high” culture is given equal weight in the YKAP. For instance, the Yanbian Dance
Troupe and the Yanji City Korean Art Group, two cultural associations dedicated to
the promotion and enjoyment of performance and fine arts, respectively, are well-
endowed by the prefecture (Cui 1990, 89-90). Perhaps most significantly, Koreans of
all ages still prefer, generally speaking, to marry Korean spouses and otherwise
observe native customs. Korean cuisine, for example, is almost universally favored.
Many Koreans also prefer to live in traditional houses with thatched roofs and ondol
heating systems. Girls still wear chima and chogori, colorful traditional costumes, at
festivals, picnics and weddings. And, of course, they have no compunctions about
using their Korean names (Lee 1986, 162-163).
As stated above, however, Koreans are acutely sensitive to the fact that they
do exist within the larger parameters of Chinese society. Those who venture outside
of Yanbian, in particular, are susceptible to acculturation. Popular culture, media
images and political socialization are difficult to ignore for those who interact a great
deal in the mainstream. And, as already alluded to, it is generally the younger
generations of Koreans who choose to function outside of Yanbian (or other
predominantly Korean areas of the northeast). Their motivations for doing so are
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50
typically academic or professional; admission to a good university or career success
in a coveted position is a powerful motivator. In contrast to their elders in Yanbian,
younger Koreans do want to take advantage of the opportunities made available to
them as a result of modernization.
Many Koreans feel that in order to participate in China’s reform economy,
they must integrate to the fullest extent possible into a culturally Chinese universe.
Because there are no prominent racial or religious distinctions, some Koreans have
found this task relatively easy, but have also enunciated concerns about possible
identity loss and feelings of isolation. Clearly, Koreans who have chosen this route
have made some difficult tradeoffs.
This section began with the assumption that structural changes affecting
Yanbian have markedly improved the lives of Koreans living within the prefecture.
Assumptions, however, are just that. A review of the structural and cultural material
presented in this chapter, in totality, suggests a more complex situation. Apologists
for China’s minority policy stress only the positive facets of Koreans’ experience in
Yanbian, and argue that their “success” is a quantifiable measure of the group’s
authenticity and autonomy within China. Bilingual provisions, localized control,
formal government representation and “freedom” to exercise cultural practices are all
cited as indicators of Koreans’ high status in Chinese state and society (Jin 1990). On
the other hand, some claim that the autonomy of all ethnic minorities in China is,
“fictive [since] ... many Han people have been moved into the autonomous regions,
the regions are heavily garrisoned by the PLA, members of the ethnic-minority elite
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51
are brought into China’s central and coastal provinces for schooling and political
orthodoxy, and Beijing is quick to suppress any expressions of genuine autonomy,”
(Starr 2001, 65). Whether or not either of these beliefs is justified will be examined
again when this project turns to comparative analysis. For now it is sufficient to have
gained a greater appreciation of the policies, patterns and principles that govern life
in the YKAP.
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52
CHAPTER 2
THE SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE (SHENZHEN JINGJITEQU)
Geography
The Shenzhen SEZ is located in Guangdong province, just across the border from
Hong Kong, in the midst of what is known as the Pearl River Delta region. The
township of Shenzhen, once a sleepy border crossing of 30,000 people, is now a
sprawling urban center boasting a population of over 8 million. Its sister to the south
has exerted an enormous impact on the city’s rapid growth, especially since
Shenzhen was named the first SEZ in China.2 0 Because of this status, in addition to
the historical and cultural nexus that extends all the way to Guangzhou (Canton),
Shenzhen and surrounding areas are often referred to as part of “Greater Hong
Kong.” (See Figure 2 for a map of the region.)
Historically, the Pearl River (Zhujiang) region, like other places in southern
coastal China, was known for agriculture, namely rice production. For villages
located between Guangzhou and Hong Kong, the transition from a prosperous,
peasant economy to an industrial one has been ongoing and sometimes difficult as
the rural-urban divide has introduced new complexities and dilemmas into what was
until a few years ago a relatively traditional lifestyle. But as difficult as this process
has been, the sprawl of and migration to the urban landscape is a vital component of
modernization.
20 Population for Shenzhen almost doubled from 69,645 in 1978 to 128,616 in 1982 (McKenney
1993).
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Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Cartographer: Sun. Donghai
Fig. 2. Map of Shenzhen SEZ and Surrounding Regions. Available at
http://www.agelastos.com/turmoil/, from, Michael Agelasto. 2004. University in turmoil: The political
economy o f Shenzhen University [Book]. Internet Guide for Chinese Studies (IGCS) 1998 [cited April 6
2004].
L A
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54
Besides supplying fertile soil for agricultural purposes, the Pearl River has
also guaranteed access to port facilities from which goods are transported and carried
to other areas of interior China. The region’s function as a commercial route,
therefore, has proven as important in the last two centuries as has its agricultural
yield.
As for the actual establishment of the SEZ, at the outset, there was much
debate concerning how much of Shenzhen proper should be included within the
zone’s borders. Many desired to exclude the township itself, but the potential
revenue generated from places like Lo Wu (Luohu) weighed against this idea.
Formally, the SEZ took off in the western part of the city, called Shekou, and that
portion came to occupy about half of the SEZ in the form of a mammoth industrial
park. The other half was situated within the city limits of Shenzhen, which supports a
number of economic sectors including real estate, retail, service, tourism and
information, among others.
As will become apparent, Shenzhen’s geographical constraints were designed
to address concerns about the enclave’s contaminating influence over other areas in
China. Given the changes that have occurred in the past 25 years however, as well as
Hong Kong’s change of status to a Special Administrative Region (SAR) under
Chinese jurisdiction, some might argue that the strict differentiation between life
inside Shenzhen and that without has been muted to some extent. This claim is one
worth exploring later, as conditions in Shenzhen are examined via the center-
periphery, territoriality and identity paradigms.
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55
History
There are a number of “histories” relevant to Shenzhen’s development as an SEZ.
Since Shenzhen’s function is more fundamentally connected to the economic
liberalization that began under China’s Open-Door policies, it might be most useful
to start with some background on China’s political economy both prior to and
following economic reforms.
Like other socialist states, China worked off of a command economic model
where supply and demand were tightly controlled, and resources were carefully
allocated to various sectors by central planners. In particular, in China the division
between agriculture and industry was rigidly cast; urban areas engaged in industrial
production, rural areas concentrated on agricultural production.2 1 Both the rural
collective and the urban state-owned enterprise (SOE) were showing signs of strain
under this method of planning. Though the command system was successful enough
to enlarge and modernize China’s economy relative to its state in the early 1950s, by
the 1970s it was clear that the PRC faced serious economic problems—due in part at
least to the political turmoil of the previous two decades. Among these challenges
were stagnant per capita grain production, declining industrial productivity,
antiquated technology, low standards of living and inadequate use of international
resources (Crane 1990; Xu et al. 1995).
2 1 One exception to this scheme was the state-sponsored experiment involving backyard steel
production among peasants during the Great Leap Forward.
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56
Deng Xiaoping, a consummate pragmatist and one of the most outspoken
critics of China’s pre-reform economy, led early efforts to articulate the need for
change as he was shoring up his own support within the CCP. Hua Guofeng, who
officially led the Party until 1982, was eager not to let his waning control completely
vanish and eventually tried to co-opt some of Deng’s ideas (e.g. the “Twenty
Points”), thereby inadvertently helping along the push for reform. Even with
factional struggles at work, reform gained more and more momentum within the
CCP and eventually found its way into national consciousness as well (Crane 1990,
22-26).
His power firmly consolidated, Deng Xiaoping set about reprioritizing state
economic policy according to the following objectives: agricultural redevelopment,
advanced technology acquisition, greater enterprise autonomy and more
comprehensive integration into the world economy (Crane 1990, 21). In 1978, the
Third Plenary Session of CCP’s Eleventh Central Committee decided to shift focus
to socialist modernization (dui nei gaige, dui wai kaifang), in recent years also
referred to “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (zhongguo tese de shichang
jingji, shehui zhuyi). Soon thereafter major restructuring between agricultural and
industrial sectors began.2 2 Previous regulations governing collective agriculture were
changed to accommodate a return to household farming, and to allow the beginnings
22 In retrospect, forthcoming maneuvers may be viewed as having taken place in two stages. The first
stage (1979-1993) saw a very proactive central government intervening and tightly monitoring policy
changes, especially given the inadequate legal and regulatory protections, uncertain tax system and
undeveloped market. In the second stage (1994-present), the state was more interested in extracting
itself from corporate governance and other areas o f oversight, perhaps looking ahead to a point where
China might establish a rule o f law and international standards o f accountability (Qian 2001).
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57
of rural enterprise (Chu 1986, 21-22; Xu et al. 1995, 144-145). On the industrial side,
a “two-track” system, already in use to some extent, was expanded to
comprehensively separate managerial and political roles. Concerned that cadres
lacked the technical expertise needed to administer effectively (in the pre-reform era,
illiteracy among cadres ran as high as 8%), the new plan gave way to a systematic
23
subordination of party men to technical and administrative managers (White 1998).
Moreover, in 1979 egalitarian wage practices were phased out, as 40-46% of
factory workers received raises for the first time in twenty years. Instead of lifting
workers’ morale, the move caused new conflicts among them. To deal with the
resulting indiscipline, the state relied on the authority of the manager—now fully in
charge—to enforce factory rules. Wage reform was just one of many changes that
would follow, as the central government began to prepare workers psychologically
for an eventual break from the “iron rice bowl” mentality as it existed under the
danwei system (Liu 1996, 107).
While it is true that the process of decentralization can characterize both
agricultural and industrial reforms, the most salient aspect of China’s reform era
actually has been the restructuring of property rights. As the state has extracted itself
from the business of direct management, local officials and more importantly,
managers, have received the lion’s share of authority and discretion, and even
smaller economic units—e.g. peasant households—have received larger benefits and
greater autonomy. This devolution of assets away from the state is particularly
2 3 Interestingly, during this period, applications for Party membership nonetheless increased as
officials’ informal roles continued to be influential on industrial operations.
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important conceptually. Peasants no longer receive a share of “work points” at year’s
end, but instead retain rights to residual income after paying the state its due.
Likewise, in large SOEs tax payments have largely replaced tightly monitored profit
remission schedules. While the trade of commodities and assets is still highly
regulated formally, a de facto operating space has been created, sometimes
interpreted as the “spread of the market.” This space takes many forms, including
secondary markets where lessees are able to sublease real estate, equipment or goods
for profit (Walder 1994, 7-9).
In a sense these changes have slowly begun reversing the tide against the
previous urban-rural dichotomy, though probably unintentionally. Under the danwei
system, industrial workers’ needs—housing, healthcare, pension, etc.—were entirely
provided for by their work units. Rural residents working in agriculture, however,
received no such assistance (though of course the disparity was offset somewhat by
lower cost of living). Reforms of the nature listed above have at least proffered new
opportunities and a greater economic space in which to operate, even if differences
in economic well-being still exist.2 4 Other developments have contributed to this
trend, also. For instance, the elimination of the dual price system is one important
change that is credited with expanding economic opportunity in the countryside (Ma
1994, 20-21).
24 Data on the urban-rural divide in China employing either Gini or Lorenz coefficients reveal that,
generally, the greater the regional prosperity, the higher the inequity between urban and rural
households (Ma 1994,26-27).
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Both rural and urban economic reforms are relevant to the establishment of
the Shenzhen SEZ and its subsequent boom. For areas in Guangdong province
surrounding the SEZ, increased agricultural flexibility has resulted in a 40% increase
in output, making the region prosperous once again on many fronts. For the city of
Shenzhen, its rise as the host of unprecedented industrial and commercial activity has
made it in many respects China’s economic paragon. This recognition is particularly
meaningful considering that Shenzhen was intended to function as a “guinea pig” of
industrial reform; it was to put into practice some of the more controversial ideas
that, without proven success, might be difficult to carry out elsewhere.
Shenzhen SEZ’s placement in the topsy-turvy mix of China’s early reform
period is but one of two factors worthy of elucidation. The other is Shenzhen’s
historical relevance within the context of a Hong Kong-Guangdong nexus. The link
between the two areas is obviously organic, since Hong Kong was part of
Guangdong before China’s defeat at the hands of the British during the Opium Wars.
Even under the duress of imperialism and Cold War politics, the connection
remained robust, through goings-on in the underground as the case sometimes
demanded. On the other hand, there also exists an historical tension between Hong
Kong and Guangdong, due to the former’s association with colonial conquest and
displacement of Guangzhou as China’s sole maritime trade hub (Chan 1995).
As painful as China’s early interaction with the West was, Hong Kong’s rise
as an economic powerhouse, as well as the surrounding Guangdong area’s, would
not have been possible otherwise. With the conclusions of successive conflicts—the
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60
two Opium Wars and the Sino-Japanese War—piece by piece of Chinese territory
was ceded to the British to form Hong Kong. The handover of Kowloon was
particularly important because its harbor and much needed land area fostered
exponential growth in the colony. From 1860 until 1930, population increased almost
tenfold, due mostly to migration from Guangdong. Human capital, in fact, was the
leading contributor in Hong Kong’s successful development (though emigration
traffic and overseas remittances also contributed significantly to Hong Kong’s rate of
growth during this period). Guangzhou, meanwhile, never regained the preeminence
it had attained prior to the Opium Wars. Not only did Hong Kong almost completely
snuff out Guangzhou’s appeal to foreign mercantile firms (despite the fact that the
real import-export groundwork continued to be located there), but the opening of
four other treaty-port cities— Shanghai, Ningbo, Xiamen and Fuzhou— severely
hampered Guangzhou’s competitiveness in exporting tea and silk as cheaper and
faster routes were suddenly available.2 5 Hong Kong’s role as an entrepot for goods
shipped to and from China proper firmly established, Guangdong developed into an
economic hinterland for the colony. Guangzhou, in particular, was the second “stop”
for the transfer of goods in and out of China, while Hong Kong became the regional
deepwater port. This division of labor further substantiated perceptions regarding
Guangdong’s subordinate status (Chan 1995, 33-37).
Nontheless, subordinate or not, Guangdong’s importance to Hong Kong
should not be underestimated. In the post-1949 era, Hong Kong reconfigured itself
2 5 Guangzhou’s cotton textiles also suffered under increased competition from British imports, and the
Taiping movement further weakened socioeconomic conditions.
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61
from an international entrepot to a light industrial manufacturer of exports (a role
subsequent industrializing economies would also assume). Human capital and
savoir-faire aided the colony’s development, as well as a robust black market that
sprung up to serve the mainland (Chan 1995, 47).
The relationship between the two locales was not purely economic, though.
Ties between the sister areas were formidable in a political sense, too. The 1930s
saw a large degree of cooperation between Hong Kong and Guangdong, even in the
midst of controversies like the Guangzhou-Kowloon/Guangzhou-Hankou railway
linkage.2 6 For instance, in 1935, both the Chinese and British governments decided
to synchronize the two currency systems, removing the silver standard (Chan 1995,
38). More importantly, however, during both the Pacific War and Chinese Civil War,
Hong Kong provided Communist and Nationalist rebels from the mainland with
much needed breathing space; the colony functioned as a supply depot, training and
recruitment center, propaganda mill, fundraising locale and intellectual base,
therefore earning a reputation as a seat of subversion and dissent against various
political activities in China (Chan 1995, 45).
In more recent memory, both economic and political connections have
endured despite regional and external pressures. As mentioned at the beginning of
this section, the axes of power created by Cold War geopolitical concerns imposed a
2 6 The Chinese initially resisted British attempts to link the two lines for fear that Hong Kong would
thus be able to bypass tariffs entirely by trading with interior China directly. Eventually, the Chinese
themselves linked the two railways, which turned out to be an intelligent move for China, since Hong
Kong served as the main supplier o f goods during the war effort against Japan until Guangzhou’s fall
in 1938 (Chan 1995,42).
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certain degree of separation between Hong Kong and the PRC. China, during the
1960s in particular, was almost completely isolated from the world community. And
Hong Kong, under Anglo-American influence, officially aligned itself with the
industrialized West. Even under these circumstances, however, familial and
underground contacts remained intact, enveloping those on both sides of the border.
And when China was ready to rejoin the international economic and political
spheres, it did not have to look far for the necessary guanxi (connections) and
expertise.
The creation of SEZs then was set firmly in the context of both China’s
reform movement and historical relations with Hong Kong. While they were loosely
based on the EPZs of other Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) in Asia—
Taiwan’s in particular—SEZs were intended to be more inclusive in terms of
function and more exclusive in terms of participation (Jao and Leung 1986).
Moreover, they were designed to be tightly controlled experiments in market
economics. Controversial ideas that were too risky to be implemented in China’s
major cities could be put into practice in these areas with comparatively little at
stake. And, as emphasized in official rhetoric, the contaminating influence of “Hong
Kong-ization” (xiangganghua)—by extension Westernization— could be tightly
quarantined. As George Crane observed well after the original SEZs were
established, “SEZs are models for a China transformed, rejecting socialism but
resisting an unequivocally capitalist personality, and aspiring to be an East Asian
success story,” (1996, 153).
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What were some of these ideas that reformers wanted to implement?
Attracting foreign investment, importing technology, evaluating changes in foreign
capital markets and appropriating Western techniques in construction and
management were viewed by the state as the most important of the objectives they
97
hoped the SEZs would accomplish (Kwok 1986,40). The relaxation of selected
commodity prices, the softening of regulations for foreign investors and the savvy of
an eager business class were variables that SEZ backers predicted would bring about
success (Xu et al. 1995, 13). But most essential to Shenzhen’s flourishing was the
decentralization of economic management, so that more autonomy was allowed at
the enterprise level, a goal already identified by Deng and other reformers as a
foremost priority (Crane 1990, 22). Beyond this general consensus, however, SEZ
policy was rife with contradictions from the start as different factions tried to project
their own goals onto SEZ development. One set of planners supported technology
transfer, another felt it would drain foreign exchange; some emphasized export
promotion, others argued against it on grounds that it would only increase the supply
of unskilled labor. To deal with these contentions, policy was kept intentionally
vague so that the proponents of SEZs, whatever their orientation, would not fragment
(Crane 1990, 32-35).
In 1979, officials from Guangdong and Fujian pressed for the creation of
SEZs, arguing that their provinces in particular had unduly suffered under former
and current economic policy. Their grievances were validated when the Shenzhen
2 7 Former Shenzhen mayors, Wu Nansheng and Liang Xiang, remembered these four goals as integral
to Shanzhen’s charter.
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SEZ was established later that year, and quickly followed by the creation of three
additional SEZs in Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen. 2 8 De facto operations, however,
began even earlier in 1978 when the oldest SOE, China Merchants Steam Navigation
Co Ltd (CMSN), sought a coastal site on the mainland to set up operations that had
become too unwieldy for its Hong Kong branch. After receiving government
authorization to directly administer foreign investment projects under $5 million,
CMSN decided on Shekou, an industrial zone at what is now the western end of
Shenzhen SEZ, as the headquarters for these projects (Chu 1986, 24). In an apparent
reversal of typical top-down policymaking, however, it was not until 1980 that the
Administrative Committee for the Special Economic Zones of Guangdong Province
(ADCOM) came into existence, and the State Council Office of SEZ Affairs, the
oversight authority for all SEZs in Guangdong and Fujian, was not introduced until
1982. But Shenzhen, as an experiment, was exceptional. And because it was the first
SEZ launched, it shouldered a good deal of responsibility for the future of SEZ
policy. Coming about in such an ad hoc fashion certainly did produce a whole set of
inconsistencies, though (Kwok 1986, 44).
As mentioned above, even the most ardent advocates of SEZs could not agree
on what SEZs in general, and Shenzhen in particular, should or should not represent.
It is not surprising then to know that SEZ detractors had plenty of ammunition for
2 8 “SEZ” at the time referred to “Special Export Zone;” the term was replaced by “Special Economic
Zone” in 1980.
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their attacks on the enclave.2 9 Besides the bureaucratic rivalry and regionalism that
informed their dislike of SEZs, opponents also took issue with the strategic shape of
zone policy. Whether or not SEZs would be characterized by state capitalism,
socialism, capitalism, class struggle, controlled complexity, export promotion or
import-substitution industrialization (ISI) troubled skeptics across China (Crane
1990, 41-46). Further, the difficulty of structural reform and the toll of foreign
exchange expenditures contributed to a high cost-benefit ratio, making Shenzhen
vulnerable to attack from both ideological and economic forces—particularly those
from interior areas that had not benefited from China’s reforms to the same extent as
coastal regions (Cheung and Tang 2001, 96; Crane 1990, 147, 150-153). Many also
held the view, with good reason, that export-led growth generally is based on low
rents— low wages, low real estate costs, low overhead—but not necessarily the
technological transfer envisioned at the time of Shenzhen’s investiture. Shenzhen’s
difficulties in balancing the need for social services with the needs of foreign
investors also generated controversy outside the SEZ. Add to this mix of
oppositional forces the fact that Beijing by 1985 had to acknowledge and contend
with growing inflation and serious charges of corruption in Shenzhen and other
SEZs, and it is clear that the earliest, modest evidence of economic achievement in
Shenzhen no longer ensured its survival (Kwok 1986; McKenney 1993, 23).
It did survive, however. The problems above notwithstanding, attacks on
Shenzhen warning of “spiritual pollution” failed to seriously change SEZ business
29 Ironically, SEZ opponents were no more unified in their criticism o f the zones than those who
favored them were in their defense o f SEZs.
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66
practices or the push towards reform (McKenney 1993, 12). No doubt, the
endorsement given by Deng Xiaoping himself and other staunch reformers solidified
the zones’ standing as preferential economic entities.3 0 Given that outcome, the
forthcoming elucidation of structural and cultural properties in the Shenzhen SEZ
should help connect Shenzhen’s particular conditions with the larger implications of
this study.
Structural Factors
Again, economic development is taken up here because of the revealing and concrete
nature of the data involved. And given that Shenzhen above all else is characterized
by economic relationships, this structural factor is indispensable to subsequent
analysis. Guangdong, an investment desert in the pre-reform years, suddenly
absorbed a great deal of attention and resources from the central government and
from outside the PRC.3 1 Because the unitary state sector was slashed in 1978 to make
room for various forms of non-state production, Shenzhen was able to capitalize on
the plethora of new opportunities in foreign investment that cropped up in the reform
era.3 2 Needless to say, because of the historical and cultural links as described above,
Hong Kong was the most obvious and accessible source of investment for Shenzhen.
30 Deng’s 1992 “southern tour” finally resolved lingering doubts about SEZs’ continued existence and
the reform movement at large (Chan 1995, 55).
3 1 Before 1978, the state concentrated on development o f industry and infrastructure primarily in
China’s northeast, with provinces like Guangdong receiving little allocation o f national resources (Xu
et al. 1995, 136)
32 Modes o f ownership at this time broadened to include rural enterprise, household enterprise, urban-
rural cooperative enterprise, individual enterprise, joint enterprise and wholly foreign enterprise.
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Joint ventures (JVs) and foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) with Hong Kong
ownership were especially popular (Xu et al. 1995, 142), and real estate investment
accounted for more than half of Shenzhen’s revenue, making it what some termed
the “industrialized hinterland of Hong Kong,” (Kwok 1986, 61).
Indeed, it would have been impossible for Shenzhen to grow at the rate it did
without Hong Kong’s involvement. Export industries, which were Shenzhen’s bread-
and-butter, could have been (and were) conceived of as offshore bases for Hong
Kong enterprises. Even in ISI sectors, intermediate components and technology
always had to be imported via Hong Kong. And of course, the vacuum created by
Hong Kong’s “brain-drain” of professional expertise worked to Shenzhen’s
advantage, as an increasingly savvy (and well compensated) workforce from the
province sprang up to fill those positions. Meanwhile, because production itself
shifted to the province, skilled workers from Guangdong also found new
opportunities in Shenzhen and surrounding areas (Chan 1995, 50; Kwok and Ames
1995, 19; Xu et al. 1995, 147).3 3
The result of Hong Kong’s economic parenting was that Shenzhen’s
subsequent elevated standard of living produced a sophisticated consumer market
that continues to rely on Hong Kong’s provision of goods and services, especially in
travel, transportation, construction and finance (Chan 1995, 52; Sung 1995, 239). A
group of 1990-1991 economic indicators measuring the degree of interdependence
between Shenzhen and Hong Kong show that well after the first reforms took effect,
3 3 By 1992, more than 20,000 factories had relocated to Shenzhen.
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68
the two economies remained highly integrated (see Table 2). China’s exports to
Hong Kong equaled almost half of its total exports—73% of which originated from
Guangdong, where the overwhelming majority of exports are destined for Hong
Kong—while Hong Kong’s exports to China amounted to nearly a third of its total
exports. Foreign investment from Hong Kong, a robust 3/5 of total foreign
investment in China, directly accounted for more than half of China’s exports (Sung
1995, 224-228).
Table 2. Guangdong’s Role in China-Hong Kong Trade From 1990-1991
China Hong Kong Guangdong
Exports 45% total to Hong
Kong
27% to China 86% to Hong Kong
73% to Hong Kong
from Guangdong
73% from China to
Hong Kong
Investment 59% from Hong
Kong
59% of China’s
total
Source: Sung, Yun-wing. 1995. Economic integration o f Hong Kong and Guangdong in the 1990s. In
The Hong Kong-Guangdong link: Partnership in flux, edited by R. Y. W. Kwok and A. Y. So.
Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 224-225, 228.
Despite the benefits afforded Shenzhen by its symbiotic connection with
Hong Kong, in the past the nature of the relationship was clearly hierarchical. There
are signs, however, that the relationship is evolving into one in which Shenzhen is
more powerful. By the early 1990s, Hong Kong’s investment in China exceeded
China’s reciprocal investment only by $3 billion, so the potential for China’s
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69
investment in Hong Kong to one day exceed the reverse is certain to be fulfilled if
the trend continues unfettered (Sung 1995, 242). Furthermore, ahead of Hong
Kong’s 1997 handover, Shenzhen grew and expanded at an even greater pace than it
had before in order to address logistical concerns about its ability to accommodate
the large increase in numbers of people, commodities and information expected after
Hong Kong was officially returned to China. As a result, infrastructure, aviation
traffic, railway traffic and telecommunications improved dramatically, making the
enclave’s facilities a legitimate contender in the region (Chan 1995, 50). Finally, the
accession of China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of 2001
raised many concerns about the future of Hong Kong’s sundry “middleman”
functions with respect to China’s international commerce, including those pertaining
to distribution, supply, transshipment and entrepot trade. With more foreign
participants hoping to take advantage of China’s less restrictive policies on direct
investment, whether or not Hong Kong will suffer a decline or reinvent itself, as it
has done so brilliantly in the past, remains to be seen (Sung 1995, 237).
As for the economic system of the SEZ itself, Shenzhen was designed to have
elements of both market and planned economies, so that it resembled other mixed
models. The market “leg” of the SEZ was the engine of growth and tended to
dominate planning. Even the provision of social overhead capital, including
infrastructure, land and social services, was determined more by the production
needs of entrepreneurs and capitalists than it was by real need (Kwok 1986, 62).
Indeed, trying to transform Shenzhen into a mixed economy contained numerous
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70
challenges, especially since these new priorities were alien to the orientation and
experience of central planners. Beijing during the early years in particular was
supportive of Shenzhen in helping to achieve economic transition. There were two
major policy enactments, which formalized major changes in the SEZ. The first
(1981-1982) focused primarily on institutional reform. State production units
formerly attached to ministries were disentangled from direct government control,
and operated independently as firms responsible for their own economic survival.
Administrative change facilitated the split between government and production, and
introduced market principles to production facilities. The latter series of policy
changes (1985-1986) revolved around Shenzhen’s acknowledgement that it was not
maximizing its export potential, but instead relying too heavily on foreign imports.
Rules and regulations were implemented to reduce capital investment, restructure
industry and curb import trade. Other modifications were tweaked, making Shenzhen
unique under the Chinese system. For instance, tax, business and trade laws were
adapted from the Hong Kong model, something considered anathema elsewhere in
China. In addition, financial institutions were established especially to expedite
market practices; immigration regulations were simplified for the sake of business
interests; and sales of stocks and real estate by auction were initiated (Xu et al. 1995,
141-142). All of these moves entailed at least a fair amount of risk, especially since
they were incompatible with economic procedure prior to SEZ creation.
With the help of a proactive central government, Shenzhen saw a number of
early gains in population growth, industrial contracts, foreign investment, nascent
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71
enterprise and international trade. Between 1978 and 1982, population nearly
doubled from 69,645 to 128,616; industrial contracts with foreign partners grew from
112 to 714; and the percentage of foreign investment coming into Shenzhen’s
industrial sector grew from 10% to 44% (McKenney 1993, 9). Moreover, 43 “inward
linkage enterprises,” a cooperative effort among domestic manufacturers, various
ministries and provinces or municipalities, were established to extend the SEZ’s
economic advantages to other places in China. In particular, the enterprises were
intended to transfer technology inland, obtain current market information for export
production and produce intermediate components for foreign production in the SEZ
(Kwok 1986, 50). These successes, however, coexisted with obvious problems. First,
despite the level of foreign investment poured into the Shenzhen SEZ, assembly and
processing plants dependent on cheap, plentiful labor continued to dominate industry
there. Domestic capital costs, and tax and profit incentives attracted enough
investment to modernize the economy relative to the beginning of the reform period,
but obstacles such as the outmoded relationship between private producers and
government, low quality of equipment and shortage of skilled labor caused growth to
decelerate (McKenney 1993, 20; Xu et al. 1995, 14). In fact, though Guangdong’s
growth in the last 20 years generally has been fast, steady, comprehensive and
outward, even recently Shenzhen suffered losses in every business category except
foreign imports (Trade o f PRC’ s five special economic zones 1999; Xu et al. 1995).
Nonetheless, Shenzhen continues to perform well in substantive ways,
especially in terms of its elevated standard of living. By 1990, wages in Shenzhen
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72
were 6.3 times greater than pre-reform, pre-SEZ numbers, with an average annual
growth rate of 18%. This increase in income, while accompanied by some inflation,
also led to a corresponding jump in consumer demand that was quickly met by local
producers (Xu et al. 1995, 140). Statistics from the mid 1990s indicate that
Shenzhen’s residents have a robust mean disposable income of 20,240 RMB, and are
able to purchase what at one time (not long ago) could only be considered luxury
items: real estate (70%), automobiles (20%), commercial insurance coverage (30%,
Survey shows Shenzhen among top in per capita income 2000). Of course, the SEZ’s
industrial capacity can account for much of this growth; nearly half of Shenzhen’s
workforce is employed in industry. But other sectors are well represented, too.
Significantly, jobs in commerce, service and information are proliferating at a rapid
pace, as Shenzhen continues to foster international investment, joint ventures and hi-
tech pursuits (Agelasto 1996, 76; Shenzhen: China's pathfinder to international
competition 2000). Moreover, the increase in jobs— skilled and professional jobs,
mainly—has spread economic benefits to other areas of the province. In 1997,
Guangdong’s per capita GDP was 10,428 RMB, which those both inside and outside
of Guangdong hope will bode well for other places in China that are anxious to
follow Shenzhen’s lead (Cheung and Tang 2001, 95).
The second of the structural factors under examination here, education, may
be interpreted with some ambiguity in the Shenzhen SEZ. On the one hand, as
alluded to previously, since the SEZ’s creation Shenzhen has consistently attracted
China’s best and brightest youth from around the nation. With the highest per capita
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73
income in China, a large contingent of the population is becoming upwardly mobile,
employed in professional/technical, commercial/service and
legislative/administrative fields.3 4 On the other hand, Shenzhen has also suffered
over the years from an acute local shortage of skilled technicians and managers.
While Shenzhen’s human resources have proven sufficient for its early efforts in
light industrial manufacturing, labor training for the advanced skills necessary to
produce hi-tech and electronic goods has fallen short. Accordingly, Shenzhen’s
showing in national comparisons of educational attainment is rather poor; in 1992, it
was determined that only 13.38/1000 persons from Shenzhen had received some
form of higher education, compared with China’s national average of 14.42/1000.
This deficit has led some to question whether or not Shenzhen will be able to move
beyond its comparative advantage in planning long-term economic development.
While significant gains were made in primary and secondary education during the
two-decade period between the early 1960s and 1980s, tertiary and higher education
levels remained low (Crane 1990, 150, 165; Kwok 1986, 57; Xu et al. 1995, 154).
The state of Shenzhen’s educational system must be considered within the
context of the country’s educational trends at large. Generally speaking, education
in China at present is improving but still far from adequate. About 15% of the central
budget is allocated for education, but this amounts only to about $48 per student.
34 A recent survey among students at Shenzhen University concerning parental occupations revealed
that 50% o f fathers and 29% of mothers completed university study themselves and represent the
three named sectors, respectively, by the following percentages: 39%, 10%, 29%. (Agelasto 1996,
77).
3 5 This component was not as crucial to the Yanbian case study, since minority populations are in
some ways not constrained by mainstream conditions to the same degree.
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74
Nationwide curriculum is based mainly on the Japanese model (but influenced by
others, such as the Russians, as well). Essential gains in basic education for primary
students has been achieved almost everywhere, but middle and higher forms of
education are rarely seen in rural areas. Moreover, only 3% of students nationally
matriculate at colleges and universities due to a paucity of spaces. (And for those
elite students who are assigned to a college or university, conditions for students and
intellectuals in China remain undesirable.) Assignment to one of those privileged
seats is determined not only by grades, but more importantly, by performance on the
college entrance exam—the final obstacle in a long series of standardized tests
designed to weed out the overwhelming majority of test-takers.
One outcome of the drive to perform well on seminal examinations is the
tendency for teachers to teach to the test, which is reinforced by the traditional focus
on rote memorization in Chinese education. Another result, naturally, is an extreme
competitiveness that pervades all levels of schooling, even during the pre-primary
phase. Before the year 2000, entrance examinations were common even in primary
school but in an effort to reduce stress on young students, new measures were passed
preventing entrance exams prior to lower secondary school. In that same vein, the
number of hours in the school day were restricted, as well as the amount of written
homework permitted per night. Still, until more opportunities at institutions of higher
education in China become available, students will continue to contend with very
high levels of stress but have little hope of a positive return (Starr 2001, 220-234).
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75
It is against this backdrop, in addition to its status as an economic zone, that
education in Shenzhen specifically should be viewed. Shenzhen’s main
postsecondary institution, Shenzhen University (SZU), was established in 1983, just
four years after the SEZ came into existence. And because its development
somewhat paralleled Shenzhen SEZ’s, it serves well as a focal point for discussing
education in Shenzhen. SZU is located on the eastern side of the SEZ, funded by the
municipal government of Shenzhen and administered by the Guangdong Higher
Education Bureau. A well-endowed institution, SZU has an annual operating budget
of 15-20 million RMB and boasts 160 million RMB in fixed assets. The university
trains and awards degrees to approximately 1000 students each year, 80% of whom
find employment in the SEZ after commencement. In fact, SZU’s original charter
included a mission to channel human resources to the SEZ in its modernization
efforts (Agelasto 1996, 76).
The composition of SZU’s student body is in fact an important indicator of
Shenzhen’s educational performance generally. Most of the university’s applicants,
many who migrated with their families to the SEZ during the 1980s, were fed
through Shenzhen’s secondary school system, too. Since 80% of local students do
not score high enough on entrance exams to qualify for admission to SZU, it can
reasonably be deduced that Shenzhen’s pre-collegiate programs are under much
pressure to improve themselves. Besides the full-time, four-year program that enrolls
most of SZU’s 3,000 undergraduates, two and three-year programs (which upon
completion award the equivalent of an associates degree) are also very popular
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76
among applicants. Based on 1993 numbers, approximately one-third of SZU’s
graduates consisted of these “irregular” students who are not funneled through the
state plan but instead are self-supporting, thereby providing valuable revenue via
tuition remittance. Even non-traditional methods, such as computer-based distance
learning, are being adopted to accommodate as many students as possible. This
trend, evident even in the university’s first decade, is a growing one throughout
China today but controversial at the time because its commercial approach to
education was antithetical to the prevailing Chinese conception (Agelasto 1996, 76-
77). But again, as an institution serving a city designed with experimentation in
mind, the use of such controversial methods is hardly surprising.
In fact, the “special” nature of Shenzhen was reflected at SZU in a number of
ways. Besides its broader admissions policies, the university practiced a number of
innovations, including those mentioned briefly, such as tuition charges, merit-based
scholarships, abstention from the state job-allocation system, student enterprise
management (SEM),“flexible” curricula and the credit system. These new practices
received a good deal of praise, both at home and abroad, for encouraging more
freedom, responsibility and initiative among students (Agelasto 1996, 76). They have
also received, however, a good deal of criticism. Most important on the list of
concerns is the charge that the basics of education have been forsaken. SZU is a
comprehensive university, but an atypical one; it offers few if any classes in the
humanities or social sciences, even though adoption of the credit system was
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designed to broaden students’ intellectual horizons.3 6 The scarcity of courses in these
disciplines, combined with the constant fluctuation of requirements and almost no
coordination among departments, has made it very difficult in some cases for
students to finish according to their own timetables. On the other hand, students feel
even the skills they acquire through specialized training are not particularly helpful
upon entering the workplace. And dissatisfaction among faculty members rates at
least as high. Professors are forced to spend much of their time troubleshooting
logistical and administrative problems instead of assisting or mentoring students. The
inadequacy of planning, as is the case throughout much of China’s organizational
culture, has prevented the development of pedagogy, curricula and administrative
procedure from taking place in any systematic way. Naturally, the challenges early
on of building and maintaining a physical space in which to operate divided the
attentions of SZU’s administrators. But two decades later, the consensus among
those in the SZU community is that education still takes a backseat to non-academic
matters (Agelasto 1996, 87-89).
So while Shenzhen struggles to find solutions to local problems in education
at all levels, a well-educated elite from other parts of China is all too willing to fill in
the gap created by the discrepancy between Shenzhen’s labor supply and its labor
needs. As Shenzhen’s graduates catch up (and this prospect is more likely than not—
after all, 80% of SZU’s recent graduates found employment within the SEZ), the
3 6 In his article, Agelasto writes at length about the advantages and disadvantages o f the American-
style credit system, where a certain number of credits in each discipline are selected to foster broad
learning in the arts and sciences versus specialized training in one field only. Its usefulness within the
Chinese system, however, is suspect.
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social and professional climate of Shenzhen, as well as the demographic composition
itself, are likely to change significantly.
In the final structural consideration here, political participation, the Shenzhen
SEZ must be viewed within the context of China’s reform policies. Shenzhen would
not only link China to the international system, but also reflect the government’s
stated mission to separate political and economic functions. Nevertheless, because
Shenzhen was not “special” in a political sense per se, its charter did not include
provisions for a distinct set of laws and regulations (Chang 1986, 108-109). And
because of its “experimental” nature, rules could not be set down with too much
rigidity. But its uniqueness in this regard inherently carried along significant
planning and policy problems, which will be discussed in a bit.
The administrative structure of Shenzhen remains rather complex, despite
attempts to streamline it. In 1982, sweeping changes were made in the hopes of
eliminating obstacles to foreign investment. Various departments were removed or
merged, vice mayors were cut from 17 to 3, other middle-level cadres fell from 300
to 100 and several sets of prudential regulations were drafted in order to assuage the
fears of foreign entrepreneurs (Kwok 1986, 41). While popular with business elites,
none of these measures were welcomed by those whose vested interests were best
represented by maintaining the status quo. In Shenzhen, as well as in other SEZs, the
politicization of the bureaucracy did not die out, even though industrialists were
promised a free hand to lead in the SEZ (Chang 1986, 107).
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Instead, the cost of administrative activities in the Shenzhen SEZ actually
increased, as the power of local officials to shape policy and grant favors
simultaneously expanded. This trend occurred in spite of—and perhaps because of—
the sharp decline of the central Party’s influence locally and provincially
(McKenney 1993, 32). There are signs, however, that an authentic break between
politics and management could be achieved in the long run. Chang cites three factors
that may suggest as much. First, both attracting and sustaining the flow of foreign
investment into the SEZ at some point will require more comprehensive political
reform, as demonstrated by previous experience in China and development patterns
in other industrializing nations. Second, China’s reliance on foreign markets for its
exports in consumer goods, agriculture and non-military technology will ensure its
continued dependence on integration into the global economy, and by extension,
acceptance of the rules that govern it. And finally, the apolitical interests of ethnic
Chinese businesspersons from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and other overseas
locations will persist in affecting the political and organizational climate in which
economic decisions are made (1986, 120-121). The process of China’s accession to
the WTO is an obvious example in which all three of these predictions intermingled,
though without the resulting change that many would have hoped for by this point.
The outcome of this intersection between the perpetuation of politicized
administration and the forces opposing that pattern as mentioned above is an ongoing
struggle between managers and local cadres, two contingencies determined to check
the power of one another. As such, they have engaged in a number of moves and
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countermoves. For example, some SOE production units have held independent
elections, refusing to accept party candidates. Administrators have complained
directly to Beijing, hoping to thwart political interference from local cadres.
Managers have drawn up concrete economic targets that are intended to function as
alternate blueprints, in the event that they should arbitrarily be removed from their
posts. Main players in China’s reform efforts have also joined forces with the media,
which has proven to be a strong ally. On the other side, party officials have been
known to use a variety of tricks, old and new, to keep administrators in line. Most
effective have been threats to levy criminal charges against managers for political or
economic misconduct, since the punishment often outweighs the crime in such cases.
Other tactics that have worked in the past consist of exploiting concerns over
inflation, market volatility and ideological correctness in the SEZ (Chang 1986, 110-
113).
This ongoing conflict notwithstanding, participants in Shenzhen’s economic
ventures continue to prosper—probably because officials and entrepreneurs have
been able to capitalize on zone policies (McKenney 1993, 13). In turn local players,
to a degree, have permitted themselves to be co-opted by the central government.
Mayors of Shenzhen, past and present, have frequently performed the role of Party
spokesperson regarding Shenzhen’s responsibility for national economic
development. And friendly business elites (local and foreign) have sought after and
received commendation from Beijing, making it easier to negotiate with local cadres
without the hassle of lengthy negotiations (Chan 1995; Kwok 1986; Li 1997).
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But, as stated before, because of the ad hoc nature of business transactions in
China generally and Shenzhen especially, economic planning and growth have at
times been jeopardized in spite of the many positive indications coming out of
Shenzhen. The colossal challenge of balancing political and economic aims within
an administrative/managerial system (discussed at length above) is but one
manifestation of policymaking woes. Another serious, but as yet unmentioned,
difficulty generated by Shenzhen’s unusual ways and means is the negotiation of
interests within a mixed economic approach to planning. In any mixed economic
setting, social equity is often neglected for developmental priorities that reflect
capitalist enterprises’ necessity for growth and efficiency. In Shenzhen, this tendency
has been demonstrated by the subordination of “social overhead capital,” including
provision of housing and social services for Shenzhen’s labor pool, to the market-
oriented priorities of industrialists and entrepreneurs—i.e. minimizing costs in order
to maximize profits. Because so many of Shenzhen’s industrial workers are in fact
transient (taking temporary or seasonal employment in the city before migrating back
to local villages), the incentive to fund and build quality residences, healthcare
facilities, etc, has been severely undercut. From the rational perspectives of both
capitalists and planners, it does not pay to invest a great deal in a temporary
workforce. What this assessment means for Shenzhen’s laborers is a very low
standard of living, meager access to resources and an acute shortage of basic
necessities. The implications, however, extend beyond those affecting workers. They
also have altered the shape of Shenzhen’s landscape; the city’s spatial characteristics
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reflect these planning priorities. And, of course, they affect population growth and
fluctuation, which in turn has significant demographic impact (Kwok 1986, 39-40,
56).
In Shenzhen, then, political participation can be viewed within a system of
dualities and tensions. Because of the slowly evolving nature of governance in
China, moreover, political participation is as much economic and administrative as it
is “political.” In the end, however, political participation is still an accoutrement of
the elite, even if the definition of political elites in China has changed.
Cultural Factors
It should be obvious at this point that any evaluation of cultural influences in the
Shenzhen SEZ should focus on its relationship with Hong Kong first and foremost.
Cultural links between Hong Kong and Shenzhen are largely historical, linguistic
and familial, as described already in some detail at the beginning of this chapter. But
the economic component of the relationship has been equally decisive in its cultural
bearing. In particular, the evolution of culture within a consumption-oriented
paradigm is one of Hong Kong’s chief bequeathals to Shenzhen, and other places on
the mainland, too. What is often characterized in China nowadays as ideological-
void-cum-consumerism may be traced back to the rather pragmatic, commercial
orientation of Hong Kong Chinese, who under British colonial rule learned to pursue
economic opportunity without expectation of political involvement (Guldin 1995,
95). Affluent mainlanders determined to follow in their Hong Kong counterparts’
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footsteps have not been the only ones keenly aware of this imitation. Recall that SEZ
detractors warned against the decadence and materialism that Hong Kong-ization
( :Xiangganghua) would bring in its wake, thus undermining the goals of a “socialist
spiritual civilization” (Crane 1990, 37).
On the other side of the coin, consumerism has also sparked reactive,
revivalist or traditionalist movements on both sides of the border, though these
movements themselves arise from the hegemony of the marketplace. The freedom of
market exchange not only in commodities but also ideas has expanded the options of
consumers, who may pick and choose among any number of beliefs or associations.
For example, the “Daughters of God” (shengdide nu’er), a new religious
organization (or “cult”), and the return of fengshui mania on the other hand, both
may be viewed within this vein (Guldin 1995, 99).3 7
A more substantial development of this trend might be the resurgence of
traditional Cantonese culture (nanyue wenhua) in the past two decades. Intuitively, it
seems natural that linguistic changes would have taken place, as speech patterns in
Shenzhen and other places are influenced by greater contact with their sister city.
Whereas in the years following the Communist revolution, colloquial trends in
Guangdong and Hong Kong diverged—Guangdong borrowing syntactical and
lexical variations from Mandarin and Hong Kong absorbing English phraseology—
since the beginning of the reform period, the Cantonese language has attained a level
3 7 The popularity of Falun Gong in Guangdong, particularly, arguably may be seen as set firmly
within this pattern, too. Though when referring to “choice” in the PRC, obviously political realities
strictly circumscribe the behavior o f Chinese consumers (or attempt to)— as demonstrated by the
government’s reaction to practitioners o f Falun Gong.
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of uniformity once again. Accordingly, art forms that utilize and celebrate the
Cantonese language, such as Cantonese opera (yueju), have experienced an upswing
in popularity. Always influenced by sociopolitical movements and competition from
other genres (like film and television), the ebb and flow in demand for Chinese opera
has proven to be fairly characteristic. What is more unusual with recent audiences is
their sense of cultural appreciation for a performance art that is specifically
Cantonese, and one therefore expressing a regional solidarity that transcends
physical borders. This recent revival, moreover, has demonstrated its creative
capacity in fresh, unconventional ways by experimenting with new costumes,
instruments, scripts and themes (Guldin 1995, 100, 105-111).
Outside of these preservationist movements, however, cultural consumption
in Shenzhen has conspicuously resembled the more homogenized, commercialized
variety imported via Hong Kong directly, and indirectly from the West. The most
obvious examples of these cultural goods and services are video games, music, films
and nightclub venues, which are determined to recreate the Hong Kong disco
experience (Guldin 1995, 96). And while Shenzhen Chinese now have pop cultural
products available to them from the mainland, too, they still overwhelming prefer
those originating from Hong Kong.
As with entertainment media, mass communications in Shenzhen has also
reflected residents’ desire to borrow and emulate Hong Kong’s style and approach.
Most striking, in the 1980s when the majority of people living in the area first had
wide access to Hong Kong channels, the reliability, speed and quality of Hong
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Kong’s commercial stations impressed viewers and listeners accustomed to the
PRC’s state-run broadcasts. This sudden availability of information also led to a
proliferation of electronics purchases; by 1988, 70% of families in the Zhujiang
region owned television sets, nearly 60% owned radios or stereos and 10% owned
VCRs. Most importantly, as China has moved into the information age, Hong Kong
media have affected organizational and corporate culture in Shenzhen and elsewhere
(Guldin 1995, 95-97).
The flow of mass media from Hong Kong to Shenzhen, though enriching for
local residents who feel perfectly at ease in their ability to discriminate among the
“acceptable” and “polluted” elements of gangtai-style news and popular culture, has
•5Q
been especially disturbing for the Chinese government. Even President Jiang
Zemin, in the festivities preceding the commemoration of Shenzhen’s twentieth
anniversary, attempted to bar the Hong Kong press corps from covering the event
because of the snide tone detected in much of their reporting on mainland activities.
Local officials, likewise, often have employed the juridical discourse of the party-
state in their objections to the pervasiveness of gangtai influence, but in fact are
more or less impotent to curb it—due in part undoubtedly to the sheer number of
imports percolating the area. Besides genuine concern over the perceived negative
effects caused by overexposure to Hong Kong media, some claim that officials have
cast a suspicious eye on Hong Kong organizations simply out of protectionist
motives. With regard to publications, in particular, Shenzhen officials have been
3 8 Gangtai is an acronym referring to the Hong Kong-Taiwan linkage.
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unusually prickly, banning three Hong Kong dailies— all of which boasted higher
circulation rates than local newspapers (Guldin 1995; A sulk in Shenzhen 2000; Wu
2001).
Arguably, the accessibility of Hong Kong culture is possible chiefly because
of the maintenance of interpersonal contacts between Hong Kong and Guangdong
over the years. As noted in the section outlining the region’s history, underground or
latent connections among family, friends and associates expedited Shenzhen’s
reintegration into the Greater Hong Kong area. The sense of regional identity, though
dormant for many years, was never completely extinguished even in Hong Kong,
where sporadic hostile incidents by the British served to unify ethnic and class
interests. And even though the oft-cited tensions resulting from migration, lax border
control and protectionism have become sources of resentment between “country”
and “city” cousins, the reservoir of goodwill still runs deep. Philanthropic patronage,
for instance, helped cushion the impact in Guangdong from Open-Era reforms.
Billionaires Li Ka-shing and Henry Fok donated extensively to help establish new
universities, while others set up the PeiHua (“Cultivate China”) Foundation (Chan
1995,43-44, 53; Guldin 1995, 94).
Finally, a section on cultural factors affecting Shenzhen cannot be concluded
without explaining a bit about the more infamous aspects thereof. As one of the
world’s most significant centers of entrepot trade, all manner of commodities flow in
and out of Hong Kong, most of which also pass through Shenzhen at some point. As
in any society driven by consumption, contraband such as drugs, pornography,
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pirated goods, hot electronics, automobiles and even illegal human cargo are in high
demand. Smuggling to and from mainland and overseas locations has become
commonplace, but is a constant thorn in the side of Shenzhen and Hong Kong police,
who must expend significant resources in combating the criminal and underworld
elements behind these transfers. Some recent drug raids, for example have resulted in
the seizure of thousands of RMB worth of heroin and other substances, but have
done little to deter the black market trade of narcotics at large. Local authorities,
anxiously promising to clean up the vice that has come to be associated with
Shenzhen in the last several years, now are receiving assistance from the central
government because of the rapid spread of triads and other syndicates to northern
areas of China (Chan 1995; Guldin 1995; Jia Chunwang goes to Shenzhen 2001;
Shenzhen mayor on foundation fo r modernization 2000; Xiang 2001).
A structural and cultural examination of the Shenzhen SEZ, a microcosm of
China’s reform experience, has gleaned certain important observations about its role
in China’s political economy, its role within a regional nexus and the origins of the
two. Having documented some of its successes and failures, an appraisal of
conditions in Shenzhen should be sufficiently complex to account for all of its
peculiarities and contradictions. In addition, it must not make the mistake of
classifying the SEZ as a mere extension of Hong Kong, since legal and political
structures of the latter, as well as differences in affluence and productivity, render the
two places quite distinct from one another. Intended as an economic laboratory, the
broader consequences of Shenzhen’s founding and continued existence were perhaps
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unforeseen by China’s leaders, but now lend themselves to analyses (revealed in the
next chapter) that may be crucially instructive as to the current and future state of the
Chinese system at large.
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CHAPTER 3
YANBIAN AND SHENZHEN AS “TYPICAL” ANOMALIES
It was stated at the outset that in some ways this comparison is a quintessential,
albeit intentional, case of “apples and oranges.” And though the richness and
complexity of divergence between Yanbian and Shenzhen should not be understated,
the real task facing this project from this point on is to demonstrate the continuities
that emerge from the case studies insofar as the structural and cultural patterns
described pertain to the three overarching theoretical constructs introduced: center-
periphery dynamics, territoriality and identity. Here it is crucial to determine the
relevance of specific data in the AP and the SEZ before any general conclusions may
be drawn as to the condition of state-society relations in China at large.
Center-periphery
The most significant and interesting framework employed in this project is one
already identified as center-periphery. Some of the term’s semi otic permutations
were discussed in the introduction; now it is imperative to incorporate the most
cogent manifestations of the center-periphery paradigm into a forthcoming
comparative analysis of the two locales concerned.
Structurally speaking, there are important parallels between Yanbian and
Shenzhen, though they are derived from completely disparate origins. It perhaps
seems counterintuitive, for instance, that the economic experiences of the two
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enclaves would in some way intersect, but that is precisely the case. The
development of both regions has been primarily industrial in nature, though one
economy (i.e. Shenzhen) is clearly more advanced than the other. In the pre-reform
era, both areas were struggling to stay afloat but have significantly rebounded since
reforms have taken place. In the case of Yanbian, most residents until very recently
were solely engaged in agricultural work; in Shenzhen, before 1978, residents were
constrained by low resource allocation and the proscription of non-state economic
activity. But reforms have opened up a plethora of opportunities to expand and grow
for both. Yanbian, the more reluctant participant, found itself being prodded in this
direction by Beijing. Shenzhen, though certainly sanctioned and encouraged by the
central government, really needed no extra push to do what came naturally.
Regardless of origin, intensification of economic activity in the two locales
eventually led to greater autonomy, which was so characteristic of the nationwide
thrust towards fiscal decentralization that began in the 1980s. Besides the assumption
of increased responsibility, discussed at length in the previous two chapters, these
changes inevitably invited circumvention of central priorities, such as the levy of
direct uniform taxes, curtailment of local credit expansion, restriction of local trade
barriers, etc (Baum and Shevchenko 1999, 335). Beijing’s attempts to collect local
taxes have proven to be especially frustrating; bitter disputes between center and
periphery over revenue distribution have in the past resulted in the central
government’s retreat, deepening its budget deficit (McKenney 1993, 21). Contrary to
the government’s expectations, especially in light of the 1994 Uniform Tax Law— a
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reversal favoring central revenue collection (60:40), the state is having difficulty
extracting its full share of resources (Baum and Shevchenko 1999, 339). Allocating
more power to local and provincial authority may have signaled a sharp divestiture
of central power (Crane 1990).
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that fiscal (and administrative)
decentralization has a flip side; despite the growth of economic pluralism, statistics
bear out the continued strength of the center’s extractive capacity in terms of
revenue-to-GNP ratios (Baum and Shevchenko 1999, 334-335). Furthermore, while
Beijing has allowed what appears as a good deal of autonomy for special areas like
Yanbian and Shenzhen, it has also restricted these experiments in important ways:
inconsistent central planning, periods of economic retrenchment, tight import-export
controls and limited availability of foreign exchange. With respect to SEZs, and
Shenzhen in particular, the latter two variables have proven to put their ability to
attract foreign investment at serious risk. In addition, the ever-present problem of
corruption—e.g. bribery and smuggling—have checked local areas’ plans for
economic expansion (McKenney 1993, 15). But perhaps most importantly,
broadening the “special zone” concept throughout China without appropriate
measures to control inflation and tax policy has invited chaos. As more and more
local governments want to emulate the successes of these zones, fierce regional
competition over central resources has emerged in spite of serious region-to-region
disparities in energy, infrastructure and skilled labor (McKenney 1993, 31).
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This regionalism, or localism as it often called, is not new to China, as
alluded to in the introductory chapter. Historically, however, the term encompassed
more than concern for regional prosperity (though it was never void of that
connotation). Neo-regionalism in China is much more economic in that sense.
Following on the heels of decentralization, localism was a natural consequence of the
trend towards greater concentrations of local economic power. And even though in
the last twenty-five years Beijing has been generally tolerant of economic localism,
the government does not abide any arrangement contradicting China’s historical
view of centripetal harmony. The state has demonstrated its willingness in the past to
react swiftly and decisively to reinforce uniformity and centralization—hence the
substantial number of crackdowns and retrenchments, a benchmark of policymaking
in China (Shirk 1993).
Nonetheless, the state has not closed down SEZs and other regional economic
experiments (such as the ill-fated TRADP) but instead vacillates between
encouragement and suspicion, depending on the prevailing opinions of its leadership
(Kwok and Ames 1995, 7). For example, in the scenario described above, numerous
regions in China have aggressively pursued the possibility of acquiring some form of
“special” status, a phenomenon the government has referred to as “zone fever.”
Though potentially threatening to central authority because of the sequestration of
resources contemplated in order to bring “rogue” zones into line, as well as difficulty
regulating foreign capital, the state has also turned “zone fever” to its advantage.
Seizing on widespread resentment towards those areas governed by preferential
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policies (especially the SEZs), government leaders have used negative sentiment
throughout the country to pressure targeted areas into acquiescence. Xinjiang, itself
an AR heavily populated by ethnic minorities, is a province that has been particularly
vociferous in its objection to what it perceives as other areas’ unfair advantage.
Unlike Yanbian, which is not comparable to Shenzhen but economically viable in its
own right, Xinjiang has been described as an investment desert. Beijing, at times, has
publicly sympathized with Xinjiang when it is politically expedient to do so, using
its support as leverage to neutralize often-criticized special areas (Crane 1996, 167;
39
Xinjiang official urges end to preferences fo r SEZ's 1997). China’s success at
successfully negotiating these difficulties, nevertheless, turns on whether or not it
will be able to harness the economic progress of these special areas into growth for
China as a whole. The mounting concern over inflation due to dramatic increases in
localized spending and investment makes the center’s sustained control over local
economies far from a foregone conclusion (McKenney 1993, 16, 22).
The gaige kaifang economic reforms have ushered in significant
demographic changes in both Yanbian and Shenzhen, as noted in each case study.
The rise of a new class of economic elites, in its turn, has been integral to economic
development. For Yanbian, as dramatic industrial expansion has allowed and
encouraged the accumulation of wealth on an unprecedented scale, more and more
Chinese Koreans aspire to greater economic status, a goal that seems to naturally
39 It is thought that government pressure and negative public sentiment were the two factors
responsible for Shenzhen’s decision to donate 300 million RMB to three o f China’s most
impoverished provinces, including Xingjiang (Shenzhen offers educational funds to western China
2001).
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mesh with their interest in attaining a high level of education (see both previous and
succeeding discussions). And the rise of new elites in Shenzhen has been one of the
most notable and conspicuous outcomes of the region’s economic renaissance. As
remarked upon in chapter 2, China’s best and brightest are making themselves at
home in Shenzhen, garnering some of the highest salaries in the nation and proving
themselves to be formidable, high-end consumers. But these economic elites have
played a more formal role in the reengineering of China’s economy, too. As China’s
national leadership has become more technocratic, the search for well-educated,
sophisticated managers has intensified—not just in industry, but in provincial and
local bureaucracy as well. Furthermore, the Chinese marketplace has spurred on the
emergence of entrepreneurs who are by nature participatory, establishing themselves
as real contenders in business, and perhaps politics also. Arguably, having expertise
in economics and business empowers individuals outside the party-state to frame,
predict and influence the national discourse, and more importantly, the political
economy at large (Crane 1996,167-168). In the case of SEZs like Shenzhen, it has
been suggested that entrepreneurs are particularly needed because they are a group
capable of functioning independently, serving as a powerful social force free of
arbitrary state control (Crane 1990, 164).
Nevertheless, economically savvy elites— whether managers, administrators
or entrepreneurs— have not, so far, provided the sort of challenge to central authority
that some might have expected. No matter how localized decision-making has
become, this new breed of managers and civil servants is still dependent on the
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center for both resources and its very legitimacy, as well. The constraints imposed by
their positions, furthermore, often require them to be efficient but not necessarily
visionary or innovative (Shils 1975, 414). Finally, the general tumult of China’s
reform era has contributed to powerful feelings of anxiety and resentment among the
masses. Often, this displaced angst has been directed towards those who are
perceived to hold some sort of economic advantage. In urban areas, especially, where
the danwei system once conferred lifetime security and a certain kind of social status
also, workers have seethed over the widening inequality gap, even though in reality,
comparatively few of them have actually suffered the deleterious effects economic
reforms are said to have caused (Liu 1996,108; White 1998, 659).4 0 As for the
entrepreneurial class, any notion that they somehow threaten the status quo must be
tempered by a realization that their actions are shaped by context; they, too, are
dependent on the center to some extent. Certainly historically, emerging
businessmen and merchants were not viewed as particularly assertive, but seen rather
as pragmatic, apolitical and easily manipulated (Liu 1996, 17). In the last quarter-
century, the CCP, too, has been successful in co-opting some of their interests and
pursuits and has wooed them with promises of continued good favor. Like all groups
40 Workers in a 1989 “China Textile” survey indicated high levels o f resentment towards those who
represented the ‘nouveaux riches:’ merchants, officials, cadres and professional entertainers (Liu
1996,118).
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in China, moreover, entrepreneurs boast a diversity of viewpoints; it cannot be
assumed in the first place that they necessarily are at odds with the Party’s agenda.4 1
In both cases, also, greater economic opportunity has broadened the regions’
respective outlooks, affording them greater exposure to the outside and strengthening
regional linkages. Though these connections benefit China as a whole, they also give
pause to the central government, which at times has appeared clumsy in its response
to such alignments. For instance, while the central government has tried to capitalize
on new diplomatic and economic openings in order to secure bilateral cooperation
from its neighbors, local entities in China have hijacked this agenda and used it to
promote and protect their own narrow economic interests (Cheung and Tang 2001,
116). The expanding Beijing-Pyongyang-Seoul triangle in which Yanbian plays an
important role could potentially be one example of local and central concerns
running perpendicular to one another. Increased trade with South Korea, as noted in
chapter 1, was one motivation in the government’s ultimate decision to adopt a
“two-Koreas” policy. In Yanbian more than anywhere else, “thinking nationally and
acting locally” was of the utmost importance, reflecting the prefecture’s sensitivity to
the changing balance of power on the Korean peninsula well before its
acknowledgement in the capital. In the end, it is true, Yanbian’s ability to act on its
own behalf was not at odds with national policy, but it might easily have been
otherwise (Kim 2001, 387-388).
4 1 No doubt it was surprising for some to learn that many entrepreneurs actually sent donations to
PLA troops to show support in the aftermath o f the June 4 crackdown (Liu 1996, 230).
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Alternatively, the Guangdong-Hong Kong relationship is a much clearer
example of center-periphery conflict, since this regional link is already too powerful
from the perspective of many CCP leaders. Shenzhen’s sheer number of external
contacts and influences account for this perception in large part, of course. Besides
the fact that the Hong Kong-Guangdong link is blamed for transporting, indirectly,
pernicious Western influences to the mainland, persons and goods from the “Greater
China” region (including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) are themselves greeted
with a considerable amount of suspicion. For instance, gangtai investors pose a
serious concern for Beijing, even though their contributions are vital to the growth of
China’s economy and its success in modernizing generally. Even early numbers bear
out the extent of gangtai influence: by 1989, investment from Greater China
accounted for 70% of China’s 22,000 enterprises and employed over 2 million
industrial workers (McKenney 1993, 21). It is not difficult, therefore, to comprehend
the nervousness of China’s leadership. The proliferation of external contacts
necessarily widens the information flow into China. Much of this new information,
such as knowledge about current technology or business and financial trends, is a
welcome byproduct of the PRC’s Open-Door policy. But this new openness also
allows unwelcome knowledge to infiltrate the polity, and the central government has
no control over what knowledge is acquired or how it will affect China in the long
term (McKenney 1993, 28).
In addition to the absorption of new, heterogeneous (or heterodox) ideas, the
breathing space provided by Shenzhen’s unusual administrative structure also
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enables it to skillfully influence foreign actors in its own interests, though even in
this instance it is mistaken to conclude that local aims always undermine central aims
(Cheung and Tang 2001, 93). Certainly Shenzhen’s extraordinary ease in
maneuvering among various international elements benefits the country as a whole,
and Beijing remains keen on cementing economic ties between Greater China and
interior regions on the mainland (as well as strengthening central control over Hong
Kong; Zhong 1996).
The second of the structural factors examined in the Yanbian and Shenzhen
case studies, education, reveals similar patterns of center-periphery dynamics, no
doubt because it is in a reflexive relationship with the other structural elements
discussed. Historically, the Korean minority’s view of education in Yanbian
sometimes has been the source of tense relations with Beijing as described, for
instance, by the passage on the assimilative policies of the 1960s, above. However,
in the last 30 years the government has allowed Koreans to restore many of their
earlier attempts not only to educate but also preserve native cultural values. While
this shift certainly can be, and has been, viewed largely as both a redress of prior
wrongs and a quid pro quo—i.e. granting autonomy in exchange for cooperation in
protecting China’s economic and security interests— it also undoubtedly reflects the
general trend towards dilution of central control. Education conditions in Shenzhen
likewise indicate this tendency. The development of innovations at SZU that were
discussed in chapter 2— departure from the job-state allocation system, for
example—were designed to differentiate the institution from others in the state
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education system. Other structural changes in the SEZ had to be influential in this
regard, especially since the link between education and economic development is so
pronounced. But, these fitful bursts of change have also exacted a price on
Shenzhen’s efficiency, making it vulnerable to attacks from the center.
Educational resurgence in Yanbian also reinforces localized practices and
attitudes of the periphery, which are embodied in other structural institutions
examined throughout this study. Localism by its very nature encourages preference
for and solidarity with local systems and customs. Yanbian’s emphasis on ethnic
education, i.e. native language instruction, native history, indigenous social norms,
etc, certainly incorporates those characteristics. Moreover, the process by which
Yanbian distinguishes itself from the center is in its own right a significant marker of
the localism that has emerged in conjunction with China’s recent administrative and
economic reforms. Yet it has already been established that in spite of this
phenomenon, Koreans in Yanbian still see themselves in relation to Chinese society
at large. They pride themselves on being one of the best-educated groups within
China and have often expressed satisfaction at being acknowledged for their
achievements by the government. In addition, the migration of young, well-educated
Koreans to other parts of China further testifies to their continued identification with
central aims, values and priorities. All of these considerations might infer a certain
willingness to be drawn towards the center when deemed appropriate.
Similarly, the information contained in chapter 2 on education patterns in
Shenzhen suggests that the current of localism runs through the SEZ’s institutions,
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too. The changes implemented at SZU sprang out of a concern about the quality and
quantity of Shenzhen’s workforce, especially in professional and managerial fields.
One of SZU’s chief goals, in fact, is to provide an institution of higher learning for
local students who can then assume positions of responsibility within the SEZ after
graduation. Flexible admission requirements, the credit system and curriculum shifts
are all moves designed to integrate local needs into the university’s structural organs.
These changes represent a departure from the nationwide university system in China,
and indeed the education system as a whole, which follows strict procedures
regarding admission, courses of study and job placement, among other things.
Nonetheless, the well-documented problems with some of the new procedures,
discussed in the previous chapter, call into question the wisdom of such policies and
invite scrutiny from central authorities. As noted elsewhere, in China anytime
experimentation at the local level goes awry, the center may feel justified in scaling
back liberal measures in favor of more heavy-handed ones.
The creation of an elite socioeconomic class is not an outcome readily
associated with China’s view of education, or indeed its worldview, period. But in
light of the fact that, ostensibly, everything in China is changing nowadays, it is not
surprising to note that old communist rhetoric is increasingly obsolescent in the face
of what has been described as an ideological void (more on this topic in the final
chapter). Actually, the institution of education is a logical breeding ground for new
elites. Yanbian and Shenzhen both have prioritized the rise of individuals within
their respective locales who are capable of assuming economic, political and social
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leadership. But to the extent that these individuals may go too far in promoting either
their own areas’ self-interests or in developing projects that somehow infringe on
central control, the party-state has determined to limit the influence of these persons
(some of the tactics for doing so were discussed in the section just above, in which
the economic situations of the two regions were examined).
And finally, external contacts for both Yanbian and Shenzhen have been
invaluable resources within the educational sphere. Because of Yanbian’s unique
geographic position, of course, the Koreans there can establish and access
educational ties in the Koreas with ease, and indeed have done so for decades.
Shifting balances in international relations notwithstanding, academics from North
and South Korea have relatively little difficulty facilitating visits to and from
Yanbian. The importance of these educational exchanges cannot be underestimated,
especially given the weight placed on cultural transmission through the educational
process. Shenzhen, similarly, has a vast network of academic resources to tap into
via Hong Kong, which is home to several major universities and research institutes,
including Hong Kong University and the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Given
the degree of interdependency between the sister cities, in fact, it is unimaginable
that Hong Kong’s educational attainments were not in mind when SZU initiated
some of its innovative if controversial features, mentioned above. The center,
however, seems less concerned by these educational exchanges (evidenced,
apparently, by its toleration and even support) than other activities decidedly more
political in nature. Furthermore, residents of both Yanbian and Shenzhen do not
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function within a vacuum, but continue to participate in meaningful ways outside
their respective regions. The influx of people from other parts of China and the
outflow of local inhabitants to various municipalities and provinces indubitably
temper whatever centrifugal effects close relations with external entities tend to
promote.
The last of the structural factors undertaken in the previous two chapters is
political participation. Much has been made over the ambivalent consequences of
decentralization already. As with its effects in the economic sphere, efforts to
improve administrative mechanisms by reducing the scope of state involvement have
threatened central power and legitimacy in the political arena as well. This
conclusion seems particularly relevant with respect to regions like Yanbian and
Shenzhen, which have been designated “special,” and therefore are peripheral in both
a symbolic and, not coincidentally, physical sense. Decentralization’s influence on
political activity in both areas has been obvious. First, Yanbian’s success in
presiding over many political and administrative functions not previously allocated is
one clear example of this trend. The significance of local leadership in Yanbian and
at the national level (at least in terms of official representation at the NPC) further
strengthens the argument espousing the realization of local autonomy. But it does not
necessarily follow from these developments that the center has been eclipsed or has
surrendered control in some capacity, an observation that critics of the Chinese
system have been quick to note. Yanbian still exists within a highly centralized
system that has managed to keep the periphery at bay when necessary.
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The Shenzhen SEZ has to contend with parallel, albeit more numerous,
challenges in its relationship with the central government. Because the political
economy of Shenzhen was specifically set up to operate differently from that of pre
reform China (or rather the early, nascent period), there was no question that political
and administrative procedures would be implemented, at least in theory, with some
degree of independence. But while central authorities sometimes praised these
experimental practices in their attempts to sell reform-oriented concepts throughout
the country, the very same sources also raised a substantial amount of criticism.
George Crane explains this tension as one governed by both the over-development
(i.e. reach) and the underdevelopment (i.e. formal institutions and laws) of the state,
which result in the coalescence of political and/or economic cycles (1990, 155, 158).
Shils surmises that even though an enclave with an economy and an
administrative system not fully commensurate with that of the larger society may
seem unaffected by central power, the center is usually expansive enough to reach
into such a periphery—by means as friendly as they are persuasive (1975, 85).
Applying the particularities of the case studies to general observations about the
Chinese state, it is clear that even though social and peripheral forces have multiplied
since the 1980s, including broader and more diverse information flows, the center’s
policymaking coordination has not suffered a concomitant decline (Baum and
Shevchenko 1999, 337). Moreover, while reforms have generally been associated
with the reduction of the state’s presence in society, in some ways, reforms have
actually required the state’s taking on new responsibilities. For example, the welfare
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function came about precisely because of reforms; the decline of the danwei system
necessitated proactive initiatives on the government’s behalf to stave off the
destabilizing effects of reform and reestablish the Party’s legitimacy (Liu 1996, 14).
These examples tend to fit within the dialectical framework described above, where
any given development seems to be checked by an opposing counter-development.
Not surprisingly, localism in Yanbian and Shenzhen informs political culture
as much as decentralization. The YKAP’s political legacy is steeped in local
activism, as discussed in the brief historical survey above. From active membership
in the CCP, to participation in the Korean War, to proactive leadership in local
education and industry, Yanbian has viewed its political participation with a well-
defined sense of local responsibility. Localism in Shenzhen arguably runs even
stronger because so many facets of administrative and political operations function
separately from other areas throughout the mainland. With respect to Shenzhen,
especially, local allegiance is of considerable concern to Beijing (as touched upon in
various ways already), and fears that Shenzhen’s parochialism could run amok, in
political terms, were at the forefront from the very beginning (Crane 1990, 48). (It
should be reiterated again that if those critics who predicted these sorts of problems
had not wavered in their opposition, many believe Shenzhen and its supporters might
not have won the battle over SEZ independence.) Beijing’s worries about the
strength of southern regionalism, especially in Shenzhen and surrounding areas of
Guangdong, has not abated but continues to inform its policies vis-a-vis SEZ
curtailment. The Party’s decision (via an NPC vote) in 1996 to modify SEZs’
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preferential tax system and investment benefits is a clear example of this sort of
antidotal action on the part of the government (Baum and Shevchenko 1999, 336).
On the other hand, the Chinese state has also shown its willingness to censor
negative accounts of Shenzhen and other SEZs that might otherwise surface through
various media, indicating the center’s ongoing dependence on these areas. In general,
it is not unusual in China for the center to be swayed by the periphery. New or
progressive political measures are often auditioned there (as was the case during the
commune movement in the late 1950s), and the “special zone” concept fits very
much within that tradition. Seen in this light, peripheral influence actually reifies
notions of central hegemony, unless and until the government determines that local
power is beginning to undermine national goals. If localism does become too
entrenched and gridlock ensues, Beijing may wish to redefine its relationship with
either Yanbian or Shenzhen, as done in the past elsewhere.4 2 The interplay between
opposing political forces—here, orthodoxy and pragmatism— is often cited for
triggering this tedious process (Kwok and Ames 1995, 10, 15).
A look at the state’s relationship with local elites, many of whom supposedly
represent the state’s interests in an official capacity, is also instructive in center-
periphery dynamics. Given the nature of China’s political economy, it should not be
surprising to learn that the experiences of elites in economic and political roles
converge to a large extent. In Yanbian, the popularity of local leaders and the CCP’s
reliance upon them, at times, to solidify its support and legitimacy among Chinese
42 Indeed, it was the determination to avoid the concentration o f local interests that gave rise to the
diffuse deployment o f China’s imperial bureaucracy (see Duara 1988; Skinner 1977).
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Koreans has tended to lend credence to the idea that the center’s bargaining position
has become weaker, perhaps not only in Yanbian, but in other autonomous territories
and even among other peripheries in general. Yet, as is the case in Yanbian, these
locales do not necessarily take advantage of this perceived gain in power to battle for
more independence. Often, they are driven by their own desires for greater
legitimacy and participation within the national polity, permitting themselves to be
wooed by the center.
The study of political elites in Shenzhen reveals similar patterns, especially
given that the responsibility for administering local projects is accorded a good deal
of importance. Here, however, political elites in Shenzhen are placed perhaps in a
more contentious, precarious position with respect to the central government than
their counterparts who function almost exclusively in the economic realm. As
political elites, they do not have even the luxury of claiming apolitical indifference to
the state and its agenda. Since their own position and influence originates from the
center, they are checked to some extent by their obligation to represent central
interests. A local spokesperson for the State Council’s Special Economic Zones
Office, Liu Xiaohua, demonstrated this dilemma in his mild admonition to party
leaders that they “boldly permit SEZ[s] to conduct experiments, truly delegate
powers...for independent economic administration and let SEZ[s] be more flexible
in carrying out structural economic reform ...” (Tian and Xiao 1996). Given his
official capacity, this statement was all he could muster in response to China’s
decision to scale back some of Shenzhen’s preferential policies. In addition,
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cooptation of elites (as pointed out above) has been a powerful tool in the hands of
central authority, as it has been used to gather the center’s portion of assets and
devotion from the periphery. Deng Xiaoping’s highly publicized and highly
supportive visits to Shenzhen in 1984 and 1992 are leading examples of Beijing’s
attempts to seduce the periphery in this manner. His public backing of the SEZs lent
enormous credibility to the reform movement (and its leading advocates), neutralized
critical elements within the Party and garnered international attention to the region
(McKenney 1993, 29).
As conveyed earlier in the section on economic elites, China-watchers are
divided about the rise of persons with increased knowledge, means, privileges and
responsibilities in the face of sweeping reforms. On one hand, local cadres and civil
servants in high-ranking positions are expected to become more rational in their
decision-making, and therefore more capable of insulating their respective domains
from political attacks emanating from the center. Within this model, increased
modernization breeds an industrial (and industrious) elite that has the requisite
knowledge and authority to occupy a truly effective position in the PRC (Chang
1986, 105). This belief is helped along by the sense that centrifugalism has reached
its apex in the last decade of the reform era, and that local political elites have been
important actors in a concerted effort to resist central domination. On the other hand,
it is argued with equal vigor that reforms have not impeded but in fact have solidified
the center’s base of power, since Beijing has both retained authority over provincial
and local appointments (including those in “special” regions like Yanbian and
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108
Shenzhen), and has strategically used social unrest combined with renewed
resentment over class differences— and their perceived disparities in access to or
power over political institutions— in order to counteract the interests of local elites
(Baum and Shevchenko 1999, 334-335; Crane 1990, 17). Social reaction to these
tactics has tended to encourage the center, even in the face of statistics that indicate
inequity (at least in major urban areas) has actually decreased over the last several
years (Walder 1994, 12-15). These contradictory opinions, as well as the effects of
cooptation as described previously, continue to define and project a state of political
gridlock in China.
Finally, an analysis of external influences, as they relate to political
participation in Yanbian and Shenzhen, is necessary for formulating a
comprehensive outlook on center-periphery relations in China. For the YKAP,
external connections in the two Koreas, obviously, comprise the overwhelming
majority of contacts outside of China. The relevance of these contacts to other
structural branches (i.e. economic development, education) has been assessed
already. Political implications for establishing and maintaining these bilateral ties,
however, are quite distinct from those resulting from other forms of extemalization.
Past and present relations with both North and South Korea shape Yanbian’s view of
its internal political status, and affect the elasticity of its interactions with Beijing. In
particular, improved diplomacy between Seoul and Beijing has emboldened leaders
in Yanbian to pursue new projects involving bilateral negotiations with the ROK,
often without the express consent of CCP leaders. And even though Yanbian’s
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109
relationship with Pyongyang is not what it once was, commitment to its North
Korean cousins on the other side of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers has not waned— an
important constant for the increasingly precarious situation facing North Koreans.
China, in light of these facts, finds it necessary to continuously monitor the situation
in Yanbian, bringing into question the extent of YKAP autonomy. The center’s main
objective is performing a careful balancing act, trying to negotiate various competing
demands on its resources. The list of these demands includes maintaining peace and
stability on the Korean peninsula, promoting economic exchange and cooperation,
helping the DPRK to survive, halting the flow of North Korean refugees and South
Korean Christian missionaries into Jilin and preventing the emergence of ethno-
nationalism among Chinese Koreans (Kim 2001, 373).
In Shenzhen, external contacts exist just outside its borders in Hong Kong
(and, secondarily, Taiwan and Macao), where economic and cultural influence has
always been great (see extensive exploration of this topic in chapter 2, above).
Though not stimulated by concerns about ethnic solidarity, the threat Hong Kong
poses as an alternative “center” is no less palpable from Beijing’s perspective.
Politically, this pull on the allegiance of Shenzhen’s leaders and residents has
important implications, the common maxim that Hong Kongers’ designs on the
mainland are “apolitical,” notwithstanding. First, the experience of Hong Kong
residents under British colonial rule, and their resulting familiarity with Western
political and economic institutions necessitates an awareness of political culture
radically different from that enjoyed by mainlanders. Second, although much ado
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has been made in the past about the pernicious effects of “Xiangganghua,” central
authorities are really concerned more with Hong Kong’s presence, in terms of
potential, for stymieing the plans of central leadership than any action past or present
indicating its actual disregard for Beijing. But the CCP has been very strategic in its
approach towards Hong Kong, remaining relatively beneficent towards the enclave
since its return in 1997, as well as handpicking administrators sympathetic to the
mainland. As noted elsewhere, good relations with Hong Kong better enables China
to exploit the SAR’s economic success while keeping a watchful eye on its
happenings.4 3
It is conceded that China’s modernization efforts have brought along
sweeping changes. Common wisdom suggests that the state is more constrained, and
society has more space within which to operate than ever before. Extemalization, as
a political development that has enabled local interests to negotiate directly with
foreign actors, for example, is perhaps partly responsible for this shift (Lampton
2001, 28). The lingering issue with respect to external influence is, however, whether
in the long-term the Chinese government will be able to classify special zones’
relationships with entities just outside its borders as those that fit within its
preconceived notion of centripetal harmony— so necessary in the government’s view
to maintaining legitimacy and stability— or whether extemalization will encourage
acts of rebellion and self-sufficiency in the political realm (Kwok and Ames 1995, 5,
21).
4 3 It should be noted, though, an increasing number o f observers argue that Hong Kong has actually
become more dependent on Shenzhen than vice versa, and therefore, less o f a threat to Beijing.
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I l l
By this juncture, the foregoing analysis concerning center-periphery relations
should have unveiled a study of structural factors in Yanbian and Shenzhen that can
be framed in terms of four distinct phenomena: decentralization, localism, elitism
and extemalization.4 4 Each of these four concepts has been applied throughout this
chapter to explain the tensions and inconsistencies that characterize Yanbian and
Shenzhen’s relationship to the center.4 5 In having done so, the observations presented
should have supported one obvious, overarching conclusion: for all of the policy
reforms, shifts and innovations, center-periphery dynamics paints the Chinese system
as one ultimately stilted by stagnation and gridlock. For every move initiated by
either center or periphery, its counterpart has answered with an equal and opposite
countermove, and neither has achieved a decisive victory over the other. Qualitative
political and social change at the macro level requires the displacement of one idea,
school or movement by another, more powerful one. In China, competing variables
linger, hibernating perhaps but always lying in wait for their opportunity to
resurface.
This realization, however, is not the end of this project’s inquiry. The center-
periphery paradigm is but one, albeit indispensable, model by which the status of
44 David Lampton’s somewhat analogous description o f subnational actors’ ability to affect foreign
policy through pluralization, decentralization, globalization and professionalization inspired the use o f
the four terms here. See also thesis writer’s unpublished paper, “Selling out the state?” (Schwartz
2002).
4 5 Ironically, the constancy o f these phenomena in each structural domain might be explained by
Skinner’s finding that structural aims (i.e. those that are administrative or economic) are often at odds
with one another, and therefore competition between them could support the development o f
alternative centers— one political, the other economic. This hypothesis seems apposite when
considering the rivalry between Beijing and Hong Kong for Shenzhen’s allegiance (1977, 239, 243).
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112
anomalous locales like the YKAP and Shenzhen SEZ may be evaluated. In the
introduction, two other models of analysis were pinpointed as integral to the study
that followed. Since the discussion on center-periphery has utilized information
gleaned primarily from the application of structural factors in both locales, it is
appropriate now, as the discussion shifts, to broaden the investigation by including
some of the cultural factors described in each case study.
Territoriality
The importance of territoriality, which was loosely defined above as a framework
incorporating various constructions of physical space and its properties (e.g. size,
borders, topography), was presented in the introduction via a series of manifestations
devised to elicit a better understanding of the topic. First, territoriality involves a
general appreciation of geography’s significance in political, social or cultural terms.
As a unifying principle of social organization, spatial definition encompasses a
unique sense of belonging, ownership and placement. In China, the awareness of
one’s “Chinese-ness” is not inherited purely from a rather abstract, if intuitive, set of
connections between oneself and her community—past and present; it is equally
informed by the physical, tangible quality of one’s existence within a particular
setting. Though certainly resonant in other agrarian civilizations also (as opposed to
those that are nomadic or maritime), this assertion seems especially relevant to
China’s almost mystical adoration—represented in literature and lore— of its “yellow
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earth,” made of “yellow soil” that flows along the “Yellow River,” sustaining the
Chinese people, a “yellow race.”4 6
From this essentialist notion of geographical importance flowed other beliefs
about China’s territoriality. The most obvious example, of course, is the continuing
(though nowadays certainly more latent than patent) dominance of China’s centrality
in the Chinese collective psyche. And to a great extent this sense of superiority was
affirmed by China’s neighbors, many of which were smaller, tributary kingdoms on
the fringes of China’s grand empire. Even visiting Europeans acknowledged the
resplendence of what they called the “Middle Kingdom,” an anglicized moniker
translated directly from the Chinese (Zhongguo).
Given the perceived duty and responsibility associated with such stature,
combined with the real threat of invasion from the north, successive Chinese
dynasties committed considerable resources to protecting China’s borders. The
evidence of these gargantuan efforts is visible today, as any visitor to the Great Wall
knows. This protective mindset is one of two competing strains of thought governing
territoriality in contemporary China. It is the insular tendency that so often is
depicted (inaccurately) as pure and simple xenophobia, and it is the source of
China’s defensive posture with regards to “territorial integrity,” (recently, a popular
46 This series o f epithets was harshly criticized in the intellectual climate o f the late 1980s, as the
mounting pressures China confronted at home and abroad seemed to compel an irrevocable break
with its past. The derisive tone o f “River Elegy” (“He Shang”), a 1988 documentary questioning
China’s ability to effectively deal with modernity and change, encapsulates this sentiment that was so
reflective o f the period (Su 1991).
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114
catch-phrase of the government’s), which has been a particular vulnerability in
Chinese historical memory.
But the belief in China’s uniqueness spawned another way of thinking about
territoriality. Too often it has been stated that China was not expansionist precisely
because it did not need to be; the abundance of natural and human resources, the
faith in Chinese civilization’s supremacy and, consequently, the desire to be shielded
away from inferior “barbarians” restrained China from exploring beyond its borders.
In fact, however, at certain times throughout its history (including recent history,
perhaps, as the debates over Tibet and Taiwan demonstrate), China has been
expansionist. The annexation of what are now its westernmost provinces occurred
relatively late in China’s imperial era, for example. Furthermore, even when faced
with the humiliation of the treaty-port system in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, many Chinese tactically capitalized on the myriad opportunities
that presented themselves to achieve economic and social mobility through
commerce and trade. As it turned out, the savvy business class of Shanghai, Dalian,
Ningbo and other coastal cities were quite good at drumming up business— and
profits. So then, while territoriality included the painful reality of extraterritoriality,
it also stimulated technological and industrial innovation within a confined space.
Both of these traditions—i.e. the “defensive” versus the “active” approach—
exist in present-day Yanbian and Shenzhen. One of the most predominant concerns
in Yanbian, from China’s perspective, is the lingering uncertainty over territorial
disputes along the Sino-Korean border. And while China has generally supported the
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115
reunification of Korea, the possibility of a strong, nationalistic Korea neighboring an
area densely populated with ethnic Koreans, is more than a little disconcerting. Even
though, as noted above, Koreans are often touted as a “model minority” in China, the
potential for ethno-national conflict is never completely extinguished. This
realization might be particularly troubling, too, given that some rising nationalist
groups in South Korea have made public statements referring to Manchuria as
“formerly theirs” (Kim 2001, 403, 408).
In Shenzhen, the resolution of border disputes between China and Hong
Kong has also been prioritized by the central government, but has given pause to
Chinese leaders who view the direct involvement of Guangdong officials as
negotiators in these “bilateral” discussions with some suspicion (Cheung and Tang
2001, 107). Holding a tight rein on those talks allows Beijing to monitor the behavior
of local officials in order to ensure that conflicts of interest or loyalty are not
problematic.
Though protecting territorial integrity may be interpreted as a defensive
posture, it certainly is active (or proactive) as well. Ultimately, territorial disputes
that are resolved in China’s favor not only put to rest fears about outbreaks of border
conflict that could jeopardize national security, but have the added benefit of
increasing China’s land possessions. This type of expansion is still symbolic of
national power, even if those lands were acquired through peaceful rather than
bellicose means.
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But territorial acquisition is just one type of active pursuit undertaken by the
government. Economic development within a small enclave, as discussed above, is
an inherited concept from the days of foreign concessions. This view of territoriality
exists in Yanbian to some extent, but it is Shenzhen that truly embodies the long-held
idea of “doing something special somewhere special.” SEZs have repeatedly been
referred to as “guinea pigs of reform,” and “experimental” (Fan 1997). This choice
of language is in keeping with that active, innovative view of territoriality in China.
Often, however, the use of spatial constraints has both positive and defensive
implications for territoriality in China. Like so many other contemporary practices,
carving out peripheral territories that are “at once lower ranking ... and somehow
special [too],” has its roots in China’s imperial age (Skinner 1977, 303). In the vein
of that tradition, both Yanbian and Shenzhen are examples of areas that have been
“quarantined” in some sense; they are delineated from society at large in order to
separate and distinguish persons or activities on the inside from those on the outside.
In the case of Yanbian, ethnicity and culture have been the primary determinants in
conferring “special” status, which implies both marginality and privilege or
advantage. It is not altogether clear, however, that the so-called preferential policies
affecting minorities in ARs or APs actually afford them any advantage over their
Han counterparts (though there is some evidence of resentment among Han Chinese
for what in the US might be called “reverse discrimination”); in fact they are
intended to compensate for disadvantage. By contrast in Shenzhen, economic
activity is the distinguishing characteristic between the SEZ and other areas of
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China. Without diminishing the significance of its novel, innovative nature as
described above, it is necessary to acknowledge that— in the beginning especially—
coastal cities were to be used to “build small, physically segregated development
zones [implying] that the contagion of non-socialism could be... controlled” (Crane
1996, 162). This fear of capitalist “spread” was also at the heart of whether or not
SEZ planners should include the township of Shenzhen. Concerns about “spiritual
pollution” were weighed against the material benefits that would accrue should areas
such as Luohu be included. In the end, material considerations won the day (Chu
1986, 25).
This discussion on territoriality has focused almost exclusively on the state’s
perspective; that is, what does territoriality mean for China? To the extent, however,
that China’s views on territoriality do not wholly or accurately represent those of the
two locales under scrutiny here, this inquiry alone is inadequate. For, as was stated at
the outset, China historically has been characterized by regional independence
(Skinner 1977, 219, 249). One might look to the structural and cultural factors
recorded in each of the case studies to ascertain the attitudes Yanbian and Shenzhen
residents have about their own territoriality, while still recognizing their existence
within the polity at large. This responsibility is particularly relevant given the YKAP
and Shenzhen SEZ’s physical proximity to other societies just outside their
borders— borders which in an important sense are fluid because they were
politically, not naturally, formed (Frank 1998, 61; Skinner 1977, 284). Many of the
conclusions one might arrive at, therefore, will depend on the flexible interplay
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between the other two concepts at issue here: center-periphery and identity. It is the
latter to which the discussion now turns.
Identity
Some of the ideas concerning identity were raised in the introduction, and touched
on briefly in the case studies. When taking up the concept of identity in China—
whether national, ethnic or otherwise— defining what it means to be “Chinese” tends
to override other inquiries because of its scope, complexity and significance to so
many other facets of state-society relations. Ascertaining a satisfactory response to
this question, however, often proves to be elusive not only because of the dynamic
nature of identity itself but also because of the difficult subset of issues folded into it.
Moreover, while it is arguably appropriate to begin an analysis of identity in China
by examining rudimentary but salient nuances among various constructions of the
term (as was done in the introduction), it certainly is not appropriate to end there.
Many of the most important and interesting implications arising out of this kind of
analysis involve “smaller” but thornier questions. Finally, as stated in the
introduction, since the kinds of identity intrinsic to this study involve local, marginal
or sub-national affiliations, it is necessary to cast an internal as well as an external
lens on this portion of the analysis.
It is commonly acknowledged that China’s mytho-historical icons such as the
Yellow Emperor, the dragon or even the Peking Man have been exploited not strictly
in the cultural realm, but have frequently been incorporated into official propaganda
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119
designed to influence mass perceptions about identity. This practice has continued
right through the establishment of the PRC. China used to be a multiethnic empire;
today it is a multiethnic nation-state. At certain points in its long history, it has been
necessary either to exclude or include those within its borders (however defined) in
determining “Chinese-ness,” so that the powers-that-be can maintain stability, social
cohesion and legitimacy. Common ancestry, as Frank Dikotter illustrates so well, is
an excellent means of both dividing and unifying. When political figures, therefore,
state that these emblems of Chinese descent represent China’s ethnic minorities, too,
not many have to wonder about the political motivations for their doing so. On the
other hand, this rhetorical device is not particularly persuasive for many hanren,
since they, historically, have been highly invested in the belief that they are unique
from the peoples around them (Dikotter 1997; Sautman 1997, 83).
Of course, the notion that ancestry and descent form primordial building
blocks of social organization is not a new one, and is certainly not particular to
China. The emergence of class distinctions within a hierarchy based on kinship or
lineage came about in many traditional societies, China included. But there is
perhaps an a priori assumption that modem societies, at least, have left behind these
old forms of categorization. In China’s case, however, lineage still figures
prominently into both the Chinese cultural mindset and national political dialogue,
which begs the question as to what extent these distinctions really have been
abandoned. More importantly, for the non-Han populations in China, how do their
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120
own views of identification, Chinese or otherwise, affect their ability to formally
access and participate in social and political institutions (Shils 1975, 310) ?
As discussed in chapter 1, the Communists’ official recognition of its
minority nationalities in the early 1950s was designed in part to unite all minzu under
allegiance to the Chinese state. But the historically fluid (and politically expedient)
reinterpretation of Chinese and non-Chinese identities made such a conceptual jump
difficult indeed. In addition, the refusal by most Han to accept this new state-oriented
definition of “Chinese-ness”—even by those who were regime insiders—combined
with the fact that in regions with substantial minority populations most inhabitants
cooperated closely with one another anyway, actually created a renewed “local”
awareness. This modified notion was forged not from national or ethnic associations,
but from geographical ones. Without changing cultural practice, it changed groups’
self-image in relation to one another as they were more freely exposed to diverse
customs and traditions (Hansen 1999, 157-164).
As one of China’s officially recognized minorities, the developments related
above provide important context for the Koreans in Yanbian. It is not entirely clear
how much of their experience in the PRC is marginal, integral or both. Certainly
their linkage to an ancestral homeland that has evolved into two modem nation-states
is an important aspect of their identity, perhaps providing a measure of legitimacy
that other minority groups in the PRC are not afforded. The material, and in
particular, educational success the Koreans have achieved is another means by which
the Koreans identify themselves within China. By the same token, however, they
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121
have painstakingly preserved native customs and habits, which has made their
existence largely insular in nature.
As noted previously, efforts at self-preservation were inherited from
ancestors who immigrated during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Unlike
previous waves of immigrants, these Koreans maintained their ethnic identity
because of the historical circumstances they confronted. First, in terms of sheer
numbers, Korean communities in Manchuria expanded with great rapidity during this
period. Japan’s “open-door” policy towards its colonies more or less obliterated
national borders, as goods and human cargo were shuffled back and forth for the
colonizers’ convenience. The resulting Korean communities that sprang up in
China’s northeast were densely populated, close-knit and substantially connected to
their homeland. Finally, the harsh naisen ittai policy forcing Koreans (and other
groups, including Han Chinese) to abandon, wholesale, native cultural practices in
favor of those from Japan actually unified and mobilized large groups of new
immigrants to resist cultural extermination (Piao 1990, 51).
Present practice in Yanbian mirrors this legacy in many ways. Besides the
more typical means by which groups endeavor to protect native tradition, such as
discouraging marriage outside the group and maintaining personal networks in their
place of origin, Koreans have also taken advantage of the economic, educational and
political opportunities described above. Here, the marriage of cultural and structural
factors in promoting identity has been especially evident. Historically, the
geographical situation of Yanbian has greatly impacted its position in larger
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122
imperial, regional and national economies. Many of its economic functions, today,
can be traced back to both its traditional role as a frontier border area and to its role
during the Japanese Occupation as an industrial outpost and hinterland. Its
abundance of natural resources, the quality of its labor force and the sophistication of
its infrastructure was inherited from decades past, and has made it an obvious choice
for heavy industry, mining and other pursuits. The economic tasks Yanbian now
performs, therefore, are part of its self-articulation. Likewise, its emphasis on
education, discussed already at length, fosters the construction of identity. Education
is not only significant because of its longstanding importance in Korean civilization,
but also because of its ability to inculcate cultural values distinct from those
originating outside of Yanbian. And finally, Koreans’ highly developed political
consciousness forms part of their identity, too. Most Koreans living in Yanbian
during the first half of the twentieth century, who experienced all the turmoil of that
period, were politically active in partisan or military operations (or politically aware
at the very least). The designation of Yanbian shortly after the PRC’s founding as a
cultural, social and political base, where Korean needs and wants would be validated,
solidified this political orientation. Furthermore, the highly literate character of
Yanbian’s population today indicates that news and information are readily
accessible— a prerequisite for forming a politically active identity. These factors
viewed in light of the cultural rites, customs and institutions cited in chapter 1, point
to the existence of a rich and complex collective psyche (Lee 1986, 141-145; 1990,
94).
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This is not to say, however, that Koreans in Yanbian are not subject to
ambivalent feelings about their identity, or that balancing competing notions of such
is an easy task. Young Koreans in particular face challenges their older counterparts
may not comprehend. Because upward mobility is so highly regarded, they have
been compelled to navigate between the insular world of Yanbian and the Chinese
world that exists outside. The lack of pronounced physical, social or religious
distinctions between Koreans and Chinese tend to encourage assimilative tendencies,
as does the requisite level of political socialization that naturally occurs for all
members of the polity, minorities included. Koreans who leave Yanbian for
educational or professional opportunities elsewhere in China are especially
vulnerable to this kind of assimilative pressure. Nonetheless, ethnic identity
continues to dominate Koreans’ self-image, creating the group of culturally “hybrid”
individuals described at the very beginning of this project (Lee 1986, 152-161).4 7
More recently, international politics has introduced a new and potentially
contentious implication for Chinese Koreans’ sense of identity. Kim Dae Jung’s
1998 proposal to grant quasi-citizenship status to all “overseas” (i.e. ethnic) Koreans
not only concerned China’s leaders for its possible destabilizing effect in Yanbian
(and other areas in the northeast with a concentrated Korean population), but also
reopened an internal debate in the Korean community about national and political
identity (Kim 2001, 403-404). To the extent that developments of this sort are likely
4 7 Recall the concept of “third-culture” persons mentioned in the first paragraph o f the introduction.
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to emerge periodically, identity for Koreans in China, and in Yanbian specifically,
must be viewed as a concept that is always evolving.
Ethnicity and culture, thus, are often obvious markers of identity for
populations living at the periphery—especially if those groups also have been
conferred a “special” or minority status. But there are other forms of para-national
48
identity, which are rooted in categories outside ethnic and cultural difference. For
Shenzhen, the formation of local identity was bom from the regional economic
nexus in which it is situated. Yes, it is true that cultural factors are relevant to the
shape and character of this identity. Consider, for example, some of the linguistic,
artistic and popular movements covered in chapter 3. But were it not for the
economic machinery surrounding and supporting the SEZ, this local identity could
not have emerged in the first place. Indeed, the Shenzhen SEZ itself would not exist.
So it seems that economic identity is the form most relevant to Shenzhen, but
its definition is not precise. Certainly, it involves the interplay of collective economic
experience and the public broadcast of that experience. Or, as Crane further
elaborates,
Production, exchange, consumption and investment are more than just
the foundation stone of the national home, however; they are also
expressions of the national self. .. .The efficient and predictable
extraction of economic resources from society requires mass
acceptance of certain economic ideas, or at least popular quiescence
in the face of economic symbols (Crane 1996, 150, 152).
48 This statement is intended to reference the discussion at the beginning of this section about the
historical tension among various national and sub-national forms o f identity in China (See also Duara
1996, 38-39).
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The definition above, of course, places economic identity within the larger, national
context. But to the degree that Shenzhen is unique and separate from the rest of
China, this definition can be applied at the micro-level, too.4 9
Relevant economic factors described in chapter 2 convey most clearly
Shenzhen’s particular manifestations of an identity derived from market transactions.
Though the establishment of the Shenzhen SEZ coincided with economic reform
throughout China, its special nature made the execution of novel economic activity
(and the effects thereof) possible in a way it was not in other parts of the country.
The new division between government and production during the early 1980s is one
clear example of this shift. Swift changes in production were followed by
administrative overhaul, and corresponding changes in consumption and investment
patterns. In particular, the rise in standard of living precipitated an explosion in
purchases of consumer products, real estate, insurance and automobiles.
Significantly, Hong Kong was right at the center of these changes. The new rise in
consumption widened the market for products made in Hong Kong, and foreign
investment originating from Hong Kong firms poured into the SEZ. (The latter was
facilitated largely because of preferential tax policies and the reduction of “red tape”
typically associated with setting up business in China.) This series of events in the
economic sphere resulted in a parallel transformation of local identity. The growth of
the economy and the attendant hustle-bustle required to sustain it fueled the self-
confidence of those in and around Shenzhen, as they reconnected with the idea of
4 9 Taking into account the complicated relationship Shenzhen has with the center should not preclude
the use o f economic identity as a construct worth exploring on a much smaller scale.
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belonging and contributing to a vital, prosperous region. The fact that Hong Kong’s
participation in Shenzhen’s economic affairs increased further solidified this notion.
Moreover, Shenzhen’s capacity for innovation became a belief so firmly rooted in
the minds of its residents that the locale really did assume a posture quite distinct
from other cities and provinces in the PRC: it looked, behaved and operated
differently, and the residents themselves assumed a trend-setting character.
This sense of uniqueness, though certainly warranted by material
circumstances, has not been wholly positive. It has also produced alienating effects,
mostly stemming from the aforementioned political attacks the SEZ has sustained at
various points. Though proceeding from divergent motivations— “zone envy,” party
factionalism, conservatism, xenophobia, etc—the criticisms are more or less united
in their depiction of Shenzhen as a “parasitic enclave [that is stealing] money from
the rest of the country,” a territory reminiscent of nineteenth-century foreign
concessions and a Hong Kong sycophant (Crane 1996, 156-157). These pejoratives
have not interfered with Shenzhen’s operations, but they have stirred up internal
conflict.
These negative associations and the uncertainty facing Shezhen’s role in
China’s evolving political economy have combined to effect a protracted identity
crisis. This crisis has persisted perhaps because of the scarcity of appropriate models
with which it might identify. Many—too many— have likened Shenzhen to the EPZs
of “Asian Tiger” regimes that stressed neo-authoritarianism, so-called traditional
Confucian values and pragmatism over ideology (Crane 1996, 164). Such a
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comparison has more to do with pinning down China’s economic identity in the
post-Mao era, and really ignores the differences in function, political administration
and demographic makeup that truly distinguish SEZs like Shenzhen from other
economic enclaves throughout the world.
As this study comes to a close, it important to recall the many ways in which
structural and cultural factors can be interpreted, depending on the conceptual
framework being employed at the time. In comparative analysis, especially, the
tangible and the intangible are equally valuable; the former supplies detail that
makes the subjects worth investigating independently, while the latter allows the
observer to make connections between phenomena and draw those larger
conclusions that one hopes, in the end, will prove satisfying. Without endeavoring to
speculate whether or not either of these objectives was met here, it is appropriate to
put forth the assertion that the Yanbian and Shenzhen case studies have provided
interesting and rare insights into center-periphery relations, territoriality and identity
(as defined above) in China. The lingering ambiguities—for any project of this sort
will always raise more questions than it answers—infer a desire to tackle the larger
issue of China’s prospects for qualitative, macro-level change.
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CONCLUSION
WHY YANBIAN AND SHENZHEN MATTER
It has been acknowledged at certain points throughout this study that the YKAP and
Shenzhen SEZ seem to be rather incongruous subjects to be examining together in
comparison. In response, the author has stated her contention (persuasively or not)
that these two locales are distinct enough from one another so as not to muddy the
analytical waters with findings that are beyond the objectives of this thesis. At the
same time, they are conceptually and empirically similar enough that parallel themes
and continuities recur in each—enabling the reader to extrapolate patterns that could
shed light on China’s system-wide struggle against gridlock.
Perhaps at this juncture it would be beneficial to succinctly recapitulate, then,
what exactly the case studies revealed about center-periphery dynamics, territoriality
and identity in “special” border areas. First, economic, educational and political
patterns converge to an extent that substantiates findings of similarity between
Yanbian and Shenzhen. As peripheries involved in complex relationships with the
center, both locales exhibit the effects of decentralization, localism, elitism and
extemalization—trends characteristic not only of the reform movement generally but
also of the special function or treatment often conferred upon anomalous zones and
regions in China. This conclusion is supported by such evidence as greater self-rule
in Yanbian, the expanding control of technical managers in Shenzhen, the priority of
ethnic education in the YKAP and the extensive contacts both regions have fostered
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129
outside their borders—among many other factors discussed previously. Second, the
definition of spatial constraints in Yanbian and Shenzhen is consonant with both the
active and defensive postures assumed within China’s historical view of territoriality,
and as such presents new opportunities and challenges. The physically and
symbolically peripheral quality of these border areas clearly is not incidental to their
status vis-a-vis the center. Furthermore, their innovative capacities as economic and
cultural experiments are held to function “safely” within a controlled space without
threatening to upset the rest of the Chinese system (perhaps a vestige of their
traditional role as buffer zones). Third, local identity for Yanbian and Shenzhen
residents is formed through a variety of structural and cultural forces in the larger
context of Chinese identity. Koreans’ emphasis on ethnic education, their political
consciousness and their connection to Yanbian as a cultural center are examples of
this interplay. Yet residents there still recognize and participate in the Chinese world;
some even leave Yanbian to do so. For Shenzhen, the powerful regional nexus to
which it belongs, especially in an economic sense, is equally important in forming
such an identity. Yet pressures and criticisms from Beijing and other areas in China
serve to reinforce Shenzhen’s awareness that it cannot exist independently. Finally,
and most importantly, these observations about the dynamics and relationships
described involve oppositional phenomena: each trend is matched by an equally
persuasive countertrend.
It is this latter recognition that invokes comparisons with other aspects of the
Chinese system. The ongoing struggle for qualitative change in China has been the
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130
focus of numerous monographs in some way, shape or form: for a discussion of
political economy, see Susan Shirk’s The political logic o f economic reform in China
(1993); for a discussion of culture in contemporary China, see Geremie Barme’s In
the red (1999); for a discussion of rural China in the late imperial and republican
eras, see Prasenjit Duara’s Culture, power, and the state (1988), and Phillip Huang’s
The peasant economy and social change in North China (1985). All of these works
touch on the inability of the social, political, economic or cultural realm, at various
points in Chinese history, to overcome contradictory and stagnant forces at work.
Other contemporary scholarship has attempted to frame the perplexing nature
of China’s long-term prospects in two ways that are particularly relevant to the
foregoing analysis. First, there is the postcolonial view that China’s struggle for
change is inextricably linked with its continuing need for nation building. In this
sense, China is not so different from other developing nations, which found
themselves in search of a cohesive and unifying ideology at the end of World War II.
For China, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought fit the bill for a time (and
formally remains intact). But in the post-Mao era, the party-state’s use of
increasingly empty socialist rhetoric that belies the economic reality of market
reforms has generated confusion, and created an ideological void yet to be filled.
... [A] new concept of value, of time and space; the concepts of
efficiency, the market, competition; equality before the law,
separation of Party and state; new concepts of marriage, divorce, of
care for the aged, and new life-styles [sic] ... involved rejection of old
concepts, such as the idea that power prevailed over the law, and the
notion of personal dependency. ... However, the new ideas, together
with expectations of increased personal prosperity encouraged by the
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reform leadership, did not replace, but co-existed with, egalitarian
assumptions from the Maoist era. These contradictory assumptions
were in turn reflected in the evolving public perceptions ... both
positive and negative, of the economic modernization process. (Kent
1994, 89)
The natural expectation is that nationalism will fill this void— but which kind of
nationalism? State nationalism is needed to strengthen China’s social and political
fabric. Many scholars assert, however—and this claim is consistent with notions of
identity raised earlier in this study—that to the degree that nationalism exists in
China, it is nascent and ethnically based (Lee 1995; Pye 1996; Townsend 1996).5 0
Moreover, though China is moving farther and farther away from the communist
paradigm, and now needs more than ever an authentic form of nationalism as it
confronts the turmoil of modernization, the state’s moderate success in preventing
economic elites from gaining too much influence makes it unlikely that many of the
most qualified individuals will be able to effectively articulate such a vision on
China’s behalf (recall the discussion of economic elites in chapter 3, see also Pye
1996, 86-87, 109, 112).
Second, from this tension between nation building and modernization springs
another inquiry into China’s prospects for change. The development of civil society
has been coterminous with the rise of nation-states and capital markets, and many
China-watchers are looking for signals that a civil society is emerging. Some within
this camp (as demonstrated in other contexts) have examined China in comparison
50 This outlook might be changing, however. As some recent scholarship on public opinion suggests,
nationalism o f the sort prescribed by Pye and others might be far from nascent, particularly given
Chinese interests in the PRC’s success in the international realm. Events such as the 1999 NATO
bombing o f China’s embassy in Belgrade sparked wide displays o f state nationalism at home.
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with other NICs in Asia, hypothesizing that even intermediate corporatist
associations have the potential to evolve into those with the ability to truly buffer
their members from the state and the market, as has happened elsewhere (White
1994). Others, however, realize the difficulties that attend such a premise. In the first
place, it requires reliance upon the longstanding assumption that economic reform
will invariably lead to wholesale, macro-level change in the sociopolitical realm. On
the basis of China’s contradictory periods of both liberalization and retrenchment
during the reform era, this conclusion is quite premature. Moreover, the assertion
that the ostensible erosion of party legitimacy combined with the “shrinking” state
sector will inevitably produce conditions favorable to civil society is a tenuous one
also, given the above. For all of China’s successive shifts and realignments, it is by
no means certain that any seeming loss of authority or power is more than a
reshuffling of state resources (material and symbolic) (Goodman and Hooper 1994).
And even if one were willing to concede the party-state’s decline, the more
important issue is whether or not any other entity has the wherewithal to supplant the
CCP.
Scholars like Daniel Lynch are convinced that at present, the answer to that
question is a resounding “no.” Despite the robust pluralization that has occurred in
recent years, he maintains that China still lacks the foundation of a public sphere
distinct from and independent of the state because various forces, interests and
associations are not sufficiently organized, and to a large extent, apolitical (1999).
Those that do have some means and inclination to challenge the status quo find
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133
survival difficult in isolation. One of the most salient critiques of mass politics in
China today is that even large, non-elite segments of peasants, workers, students and
ethnic minorities utilize very different methods of mobilization—few of which link
their interests together (Liu 1996). Indeed, the failure of the 1989 mass
demonstrations often has been couched in these very terms.
Some of these same sources, however, believe that critics should not be so
dismissive of what might be called the “brutal gasps of air” that have peppered
China’s recent history. In spite of the oft-repeated generalization that China’s
overriding preference for social order is largely responsible for its ability (thus far) to
keep dissenting groups at bay, vigorous outbursts among the masses have actually
formed an important part of China’s political culture.5 1 Often characterized as
unsuccessful and anomic, there are those who suggest these incidents—while
certainly not tantamount to the establishment of civil society— are more than
historical blips and could be powerful motivators for change (Liu 1996, 13, 227).
Other writers who are optimistic about China’s prospects take an even
broader view as to whether or not a civil society will emerge. Bruce Dickson
emphasizes the distinction between critical and non-critical spheres of social activity,
but implies that even forces that are politically neutral or non-threatening to the
party-state could be interpreted as having political import in the future (2000). This
prediction is even more resonant when one considers the difficulty the state will
5 1 The Tiananmen movements o f 1976 and 1989 are clear examples o f this participatory strain, but
appeal to the “mass line” was the cornerstone o f Mao-era politics. The harshest and most repressive
campaigns (e.g. Cultural Revolution) of this period were nevertheless grounded in the importance of
political organization and expression.
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134
continue to have as it attempts to monitor or control the panoply of new actors in
society:
If “civil society” means protest, then it was successfully repressed
during most of China’s reforms. But if “civil society” means
pluralization, a growth of local and functional institutions, it occurred
in spades. Nonstate institutions such as rural enterprises acquired
more money ... and this situation was political ... The very speed of
diversification hindered the PRC official habit of registering all of
society’s “circles.” The high new numbers became simply too large to
monitor effectively,” (White 1998, 635).
So then, the clearer the schism not only between state and economy, but more
importantly, between state and society, the more likely it seems that necessary
52
institutions will develop and sustain macro-level change. In this sense,
independence from state control is a measure of systemic flexibility. This conclusion,
and not the discussion of civil society or nation building per se, is why the preceding
discussion is relevant to the project at hand. Yanbian and Shenzhen, though physical
locales and not abstract domains (such as the “market” or “society”), can be viewed
as segments or units within the Chinese system at large. To the extent that they have
or have not loosened the reigns of central power that bridle them may foreshadow
China’s ability to move forward in a manner that transcends mere quantitative
growth.
5 2 In fact, these divisions complement one another; progressive elements o f the disaggregated state
sector are tapping into social forces, generating greater public space (Rosen 2004).
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INDEX
Autonomous Regions 24,51,94
C
Center-periphery 5, 19
as a model 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 12, 16, 19,
47, 55,90, 97,99, 106, 109, 111,
112, 118, 128, 129
centrifugal forces 7, 11, 66, 92, 106
centripetal forces 100, 106
decentralization 92, 99, 103
economic 3,4
elitism 95, 101, 107, 108
extemalization 83, 86, 98, 102, 110
in China 5
localism 100, 106
marginality 10
political 2 ,7 ,2 1 ,3 5 ,3 6 ,6 1 ,6 4 ,7 0 ,
72, 82, 93, 97, 132
spatial 3,19
China
and civil society 132
and modernization 8, 16, 48, 50, 52,
57, 76, 108, 111, 132
Communist Party 26,44, 57, 131,
133
Cultural Revolution 12,28,31,39,
40,134
ideological void 8, 101, 131
in imperial times 6, 11, 21, 24, 25,
114
minority policy 29, 30, 32, 39,40,
46
Nationalist Party 26
political economy of 56, 58, 59, 96,
104
Reform Era 28, 98
response to Western imperialism 10,
13, 14, 60,61, 83, 110
role in Korean War 27, 38, 105
rural-urban divide 60
Chinese Civil War 23, 26,43, 62
Civil society
in China 1,132,134,135
Cold War 60, 62
Cooptation
of periphery 7
Crane, George 63, 104
Cultural approach 19
D
Decentralization 58, 64, 91, 93, 103,
105, 111, 112, 129
economic 92
political 103
related to education 99
Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea 23, 27, 29, 35,43, 47, 97,
109
Deng, Xiaoping 57, 64, 67, 107
DPRK 1 8 ,2 1 ,2 7 ,2 8 ,2 9 ,3 6 ,3 8 ,4 0 ,
42, 109
Duara, Prasenjit 6
E
Elitism 111,129
economic 95
political 107, 108
related to education 101
Ethnic minorities 29, 17, 45
and education 32, 37
Export Processing Zones 36
Export-led growth 28, 66
Extemalization 109,111,112,116,
129
Hong Kong’s influence on
Shenzhen 84, 87,110
political 83, 110
related to education 102
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145
role of overseas Chinese 80, 86, 98
Gangtai
an abbreviation for Hong Kong-
Taiwan 86,98
Guangdong Province
Guangzhou 52, 60, 61, 62
H
Hong Kong 18, 35, 52, 55, 60, 62, 63,
6 5 ,6 7 ,6 8 ,6 9 ,7 1 ,8 0 , 83,84, 85,
86, 87, 88, 97, 99, 102, 110, 112,
116, 126, 127
Hua, Guofeng 57
Huang, Philip 6,131
I
Identity
Chinese
conflict
cultural
economic
ethnic
in China’s history
local
national
political
12,13,119
1, 124, 127
12
126
12, 110, 122
119
8, 125
12, 16, 124
123,124
Import-substitution industrialization
66, 68
Koreans
and education 123
Confucian heritage 38
cultural preservation 47
in China 17, 25, 26, 27, 33, 37, 45,
47, 110, 122
political participation of 39,44, 46,
110
Kuomintang 26
Localism 93,100,105,111,129
political 106
related to education 100
Lynch, Daniel 133
M
Macao 98, 110
Manchuria 2 1 ,2 3 ,2 4 ,2 5 ,2 6 ,2 7 ,3 8 ,
116,122
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong
Thought 16,31,131
Minority nationalities 17, 45
N
Nationalism 9, 15, 17, 39, 132
ethnic 16, 110
state 16, 17
North Korea 23, 27, 29, 35, 43, 47, 97,
109
Japan
involvement in Tumen River Area
Development Project 36
naisen ittai policy 122
Jilin Province 21
Dongbian 23
K
Kim, II Sung
Korean War
27, 38
27, 38, 105
O
Opium Wars 10, 60, 61
Pearl River 35, 52, 55
People’s Liberation Army 26,27,51,
96
Pye, Lucian 16
Qing Dynasty 6, 13, 14, 24, 131
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146
R
Republic of Korea 28, 109
ROK 29, 38, 42, 47, 48, 97, 109
Russia 29
involvement in Tumen River Area
Development Project 36
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 1,
18,52, 53,60, 65,67,72, 73,76,
79, 80, 83, 88, 103, 112, 118, 125,
126,129
cultural importance of 84, 87, 110
economic development of 67, 72
educational conditions 76, 77, 78,
99, 100, 102
geography of 55
politics of 70, 79, 81, 82
Shenzhen University 76, 77, 78, 99,
100,102
Skinner, G. William 4, 6, 19, 112
South Korea 28, 38,42, 47,48, 97,
109
involvement in Tumen River Area
Development Project 36
Soviet Union 29
Special Administrative Regions 55,
111
Special Economic Zones 1, 19, 52, 55,
56, 60, 64, 65, 66, 70, 72, 73, 76,
78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 88, 90, 99, 100,
105,107, 117, 125, 126, 127
establishment of 63
State-owned enterprise 56, 58, 59, 65,
81, 96, 104
Structural approach 19
Taiwan 15, 63, 80, 86, 98, 110, 115
Territoriality
active view 9,115
border disputes 115, 116
border regions 1, 20, 40, 122
defensive view 10,115
economic 11,61,115
Treaty ports 61,115
Tumen River 21
Tumen River Area Development
Program 35, 36,93
W
World-systems theory
critique of
intra-national approach
Yalu River
4
4
21
Yanbian Korean Autonomous
Prefecture 1,18,21
cultural importance of 47, 48, 110,
123
economic development of 33, 35,
36, 93
educational conditions 37
geography of 24
history of 24
politics of 44
role in Sino-Korean relations 29, 42,
110, 116
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Asset Metadata

Creator Schwartz, Juli C. (author)

Core Title China's periphery in perspective: A comparative look at the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and Shenzhen Special Economic Zone

School Graduate School

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

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