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Disparity of power: The United States engagement with Korea

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Disparity of power: The United States engagement with Korea

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Content DISPARITY OF POWER: THE U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH KOREA
Copyright 2004
by
Susan Chung
A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
EAST ASIAN LANGUAGES AND CULTURES
August 2004
Susan Chung
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Table of Contents
I. Abstract..............................................................................................................iii
II. Introduction........................................................................................................1
III. U.S. Government Policy 1905-1941............................................................. 4
IV. The Films of WWII and the Korean W ar.....................................................21
V. The Intersection of the Political and Representational............................... 39
VI. Conclusion........................................................................................................ 61
VII. Bibliography.....................................................................................................64
VIII. Filmography.....................................................................................................68
IX. Appendix.......................................................................................................... 69
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Abstract
This paper will examine two separate arenas where the U.S. engaged with Korea in the
20th century. The first part will examine the history of U.S. government policy
concerning Korea with emphasis on WWII and the Korean War. I will then direct the
paper to an examination of Korean representation in U.S. films concerning WWII and
the Korean War. I utilize Edward Said’s Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism, and
Christina Klein’s Cold War Orientalism to de-construct factors that contribute to the
meaning and understanding of Korea in the U.S.
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Introduction
This paper examines the U.S. engagement with Korea in the 20th century in two
separate realms: the political and representational. I choose to examine a part of these
two realms: government policies and film because they are very powerful mediums
where there was a direct engagement with Korea. The first part of this paper will
examine U.S. government policy concerning Korea (which began in 1882), through
Korea’s colonial period leading up to and through the Korean War. The examination of
this particular history will shed light on the disparity of power that existed in the
relationship between the U.S. and Korea. The U.S. supported Japan’s colonization of
Korea to further its own objectives in Asia, and effectively ignored the Korean nation’s
pleas for independence, and would continue along this path post-WWII. The U.S.
government at this time disregarded Korea’s struggles for independence against foreign
power domination and influence and later for re-unification, because of its efforts
concerning the Cold War.
The second part of the paper introduces films for discussion. The first three
films were made during the WWII period. China Sky presents a half-Korean, half-
Japanese character, during the Pacific War; in Jack London, a movie that includes
Korea within the context of the Russo-Japanese War, Korea is used as a background to
highlight and foreshadow Japanese imperialism; and First Yank in Tokyo, a U.S.
Sergeant is assisted by a Korean man, in the Pacific theater of WWII. In the film
industry’s quest to bolster the effort and support for WWII, representation of Korea was
created and used, albeit in a limited war.
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After WWII, Korea was liberated from Japan but found itself in an international
and ideological battle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and China. Korea was
effectively divided by the U.S. and Soviet Union and two separate and divergent
governments came to power on the peninsular nation. This division resulted in the
Korean War, whereby South Korea’s President Syngman Rhee and North Korea’s
leader Kim II Sung sought to re-unify their nation under their respective leadership as
the U.S. government led by President Truman placed ‘symbolic value’ on Korea in the
Cold War.
There was a proliferation of Korean representation after WWII in lieu of the
Korean War. But as we shall see, Korea’s representation took a limited and marginal
role, as the representation of the Korean nation’s struggle to re-unify and the
devastation of a civil war were rarely highlighted in U.S. films. Instead these films
chose to highlight the ideological battle by presenting the threat of Soviet and Chinese
Communist domination and influence, as well as to present various themes that would
engender support for an unpopular war. Although there were approximately ninety
movies produced that were directly about or included some aspect of the Korean War
between 1951 to 1995,1 will examine ten movies produced during the years of 1951 to
1970.1 believe that these movies provide a comprehensive overview of the general
themes in U.S.-produced Korean War films that will offer an extensive understanding of
the nature of Korean representation that I offer in this paper.
I utilize the medium of film because of its ability to create and present the
Korean nation within storyline narratives that take dramatic licenses, therefore wholly
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divergent from government policy. What I seek in my analysis of these films is: what
were the factors in the representations that were created.
In Part III of this paper, I introduce Edward Said’s Orientalism and Culture and
Imperialism, and Christina Klein’s Cold War Orientalism. I filter the U.S. government’s
policies towards Korea and the films of Korean representation through Said and Klein’s
theories. I do not seek to define Korea’s meaning in the U.S.; instead I discuss the
factors that contribute to Korea’s meaning.
I utilize Edward Said’s Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism, and Christina
Klein’s Cold War Orientalism as a foundation for understanding the U.S. engagement
of Korea, politically and representationally. This examination is premised upon their
arguments concerning disparity of power, hegemony and imperialism, but I translate
their theories to the case study of Korea. I provide insight into how the understanding of
Korea, a small nation in East Asia that has been overshadowed by China and Japan, has
entered the American public’s imagination. Utilizing Said’s Orientalist discourse I
present that the U.S. government and film industry’s engagement with Korea percolated
through U.S. hegemony and dominance and then was a manifestation of the inequality
of the relationship.
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Parti: U.S. Government Policy
I begin with U.S. government policy in 1905 when Korea became a Protectorate
of Japan. The U.S. government supported Korea’s colonization because of its own
prerogatives in Asia. I present the actions of members of the Korean community who
hoped to gain U.S. support for Korean independence only to be met with disregard and
the greater U.S. agenda. The U.S. government’s actions during the colonial period were
intimately tied with decisions made during WWII and after. Korea’s pleas continued to
be disregarded as the U.S. government found a new threat in (Soviet and Chinese)
Communism. Because the U.S. government lacked understanding about the Communist
presence in Korea, their presence and actions in Korea contributed to a three-year
Korean War. This aspect of U.S. political engagement with Korea will illustrate the
trajectory that the U.S. government traveled in order to further its own objectives.
In 1882 the U.S. and Korea signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce known as
The Shufeldt Treaty. The U.S. was the first Western nation to sign a treaty with the
‘hermit kingdom’ and thus began the first official relations between the two countries.
Although Korea had hitherto engaged in an isolationist policy, Korea’s King Kojong
approved the treaty because “Korea looked to the United States as a kind of new elder
brother that would willingly offer good offices and other assistance in times of
distress.”1 Soon after The Shufeldt Treaty was signed, Japan defeated Russia in the
Russo-Japanese War. Japan would then force Korea to sign a Protectorate Treaty in
1905, which was followed by official annexation and colonization in 1910. With the
1 Yur-bok Lee, West Goes East Paul Georg Von Mollendorff and Great Power Imperialism in
Yi Korea, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 27.
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signing of the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty (between Russia and Japan) I begin my analysis
of U.S. government policy that directly or indirectly affected Korea.
Although there were few and various U.S. political leaders who supported
and/or brought attention to Korea’s plights, I write of the implemented government
policies led by U.S. Presidents and therefore had the most influential and dire
consequences.
The 1905 Portsmouth Treaty that officially ended the Russo-Japanese War was
signed under the auspices of President Theodore Roosevelt, who won the Nobel Peace
Prize for his efforts to bring a peaceful end to the war. Japan’s success led to the 1905
Protectorate Treaty between Japan and Korea, which was also supported by President
Roosevelt. The Portsmouth Treaty stipulated that Russia ceded interest in an
independent Korea, but acknowledged Japanese interest (political, economic, military,
foreign affairs ) in the small, but strategically located country. Tyler Dennet’s
Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War reprints part of a memorandum Roosevelt wrote
to Japanese Prime Minister Katsura in July 1905. In it he states his views as to why he
supported the Japanese Protectorate of Korea. “”If left to herself after the war Korea
will certainly draw back to her habit of entering into any agreements or treaties with
other Powers, thus resuscitating the same international complications as existed before
2 Pratt, Keith and Richard Rutt, Korea A Historical and Cultural Dictionary, (Curzon Press:
1999), 356.
3 William I. Neumann states that Japanese nationalists saw Korea as a “.. .loaded pistol, aimed
at the heart of Japan”; quoted in William I. Neumann, American Encounters Japan From Perry
to MacArthur, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1963), 97.
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the war.””4 And Roosevelt felt that Japan maintained a balance of power in East Asia
that included checking Russia’s expansion into the region.
The U.S. was concerned about East Asia since it acquired the Philippines in the
outcome of the Spanish-American War in 1899; this notion is supported by the Taft-
Katsura Memorandum of 1905. Under President Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of War
(and later President of the U.S.) William Howard Taft traveled to the Far East mainly
due to U.S. interests in the Philippines.5 With Roosevelt’s approval, he detoured to visit
with Japanese government officials including Prime Minister Katsura. Their ensuing
conversations resulted in the Memorandum which stated that Japan would not meddle in
U.S. interests in the Philippines and “Washington gave the green light to Japan in
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Korea.” And within two weeks the U.S. “terminated its legation in Seoul.”
Roosevelt’s approval of the agreement between Taft and Katsura8 allowed the U.S. to
“become a major force in the Far East”9 because its presence had been marked with the
colonization of the Philippine Islands. Soon Sung Cho writes in Korea in World
Politics, 1940-1950, that the U.S. did have friendly relations with Korea from 1882 to
4 Tyler Dennet, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War A critical study of American policy in
Eastern Asia in 1902-5, based primarily upon the private papers of Theodore Roosevelt,
(Gloucester, MA.: Doubleday Company, 1959), 114.
5 Donald F. Anderson, William Howard Taft, (N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968,1973), 22.
6 David Henry Burton, Taft, Wilson and World Order, (N.J., London, Canada: Associated
University Press, 2003), 41.
7 Yur-bok Lee, “A Korean View of Korean-American Relations, 1882-1910,” Korea-American
Relations 1866-1997, eds., Yur-bok Lee and Wayne Patterson, (N.Y.: State University of New
York Press, 1999), 20.
8 Donald F. Anderson, William Howard Taft, (N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968, 1973), 22-
23.
9 David Henry Burton, Taft, Wilson and World Order, (N J., London, Canada: Associated
University Press, 2003), 42.
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1902 and had even championed Korean independence and territorial integrity, but the
U.S. abandoned Korea in 1905 in its most desperate moment.1 0
To defend the colonization, Japan claimed to Korea and Western powers, such
as the U.S. that Japan was a benevolent guide and model for Korea. But for the Korean
nation, the Japanese colonization was aggression against their state because it called for
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a “total subjugation of the people” and for the “systematic Japanization of Korea.”
The dedication and vehemence of Korea’s fight against colonization was best
summarized by Korean sympathizer George McCune: “The independent movement
began on the day that Korea lost its independence and never ceased to exist both as an
organized movement and as a dominant spiritual force in the life of the Korean
people.”1 3 Unfortunately for a weak and small country like Korea, it quickly realized
that independence could not be achieved from Japan without support or aid from
another powerful country. And the Korean King and his government looked to the U.S.
because The Shufeldt’s Treaty Article I stated:
There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of
the United States and the King of Chosen and the citizens and subjects of
their respective Governments. If other Powers deal unjustly or
oppressively with either Government the other will exert their good
offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable
arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.1 4
1 0 Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 An Evaluation of American
Responsibility, (Berkeley, L.A.: University of California Press, 1967), 6.
1 1 Benjamin Min, “Japanese Colonialism and Its Impact on Korean Nationalism,” Asia Forum
2:1, (Pan Asia Foundation, January-March 1970), 55.
1 2 Han Yung Rim, “Japanese Totalitarian Education in Korea, 1910-1945,” Koreana Quarterly
Vol. 2 Spring 1960 No. 1, 86.
1 3 George McCune, Korea Today, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 27.
1 4 F.A. McKenzie, The Tragedy of Korea, (Seoul, Korea: Yonsei University Press, 1969),
appendices 276.
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The interpretation of Article I is important to note because it created a connection for
the Korean nation and government with the U.S. The respective interpretations are
articulated by Stephan Bonsai, a U.S. official who attended the 1919 Paris Peace
Conference:
These eminent gentlemen, whose power in the Far East was only
exceeded by their ignorance of the situation, “disremembered” a treaty of
alliance, defensive and even offensive, which was negotiated with the
Seoul government forty-five years ago by one of our roving sailor
diplomats. It bound Washington to defend these unfortunate people
against all intruders, whatever might be the purpose with which they
came. Doubtless this formal instrument was placed in the “dead” files,
but even before the encroachment came from benevolent China and later
ruthless aggression from predatory Japan, it was regarded by Koreans as
the charter of their liberties and the bulwark of their independence.1 5
The Koreans living in the U.S. at that time also appealed to the U.S.
government. Syngman Rhee, an early independence leader and later South Korea’s First
President wrote a letter on behalf of the eight thousand Koreans living in Hawaii to then
President Theodore Roosevelt (see appendix). He referred to the aforementioned Article
I and also stated the subjugation and discrimination Korean people experienced under
the Japanese colonial authority. Various organizations and associations were created by
the Korean-American community, whose main impetus was support and activity that
would aid the independence effort.
The Korean community in the U.S. placed significant hope in the U.S.
government. When they were faced with abusive and at times illegal, racist and
discriminatory behavior, the community leaders would often not “take action against
discrimination because they did not wish to harm their chances of getting American
1 5 Stephan Bonsai, Suitors and Suppliants The Little Nations at Versailles, (N.Y.: Prentice Hall
Inc., 1946), 222-223.
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support for the cause of Korean national independence.”1 6 Certain Korean-American
associations called for the Korean government to be modeled on the U.S. (see
appendix); many individuals of the Korean nation respected the principles of the West
and particularly those of the U.S. Many early Korean independence leaders (such as
Syngman Rhee, Ahn, Chang-ho and So, Chaep-il) had immigrated to the U.S. because
they wished to be educated in the traditions and principles of democracy and equality
that the U.S. espoused.
But the U.S. government chose to ignore their pleas and treated Koreans in the
U.S. against their protest, as Japanese subjects/immigrants. It was a double injury to the
early Korean-American community, not only had their country lost its sovereignty but
the U.S. would now replace their identity with that of their colonizer.
At the close of World War I in 1919, many world leaders and representatives
met in Paris, France. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson led the Paris Peace Conference
(PPC) and espoused notions of “’’self determination for the freedom of small
nations,””1 7 as well as an international ‘League of Nations’ to prevent further world war
and conflict. In a speech he gave to the U.S. Congress on January 18, 1918 he stated 14
Points that should result from the conclusion of the war. Wilson stated Point 5 as:
claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in
determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims
of the government whose title is to be determined.1 8
1 6 Bong-youn Choy, Koreans in America, (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1979), 78.
1 7 Benjamin H. Min, “Japanese Colonialism and Its Impact on Korean Nationalism,” Asian
Forum 2:1, (Pan Asia Foundation, January-March 1970), 56.
1 8 Woodrow Wilson, “Address to Congress Stating the War and Peace Terms in the United
States,” (1918); quoted in ed., Oliver Marble Gale, Americanism Woodrow Wilson’s Speeches
on the War-Why He Made Them-and-What They Have Done, (Chicago: The Baldwin Syndicate,
1918), 98.
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For many Koreans, President Wilson’s speech was the opportunity of hope that
they had waited so patiently for in their fight for independence;1 9 and particularly for
those in the U.S. who reacted quickly and instinctively to “Wilson’s doctrine and the
proposed Paris Peace Conference.”2 0
But in 1919, Japan was the most powerful nation in Asia and had gained
international recognition with the Chinese defeat in 1895, the 1902 alliance treaty with
Great Britain, and her defeat of Russia in 1905; she then helped the allied powers defeat
Germany in WWI. So when the Korean community sought to bolster their cause and
possibly gain recognition and support, they found that President Wilson was not going
to help the Korean cause, but in fact would exacerbate their efforts.
When Syngman Rhee made an effort to attend the PPC, President Wilson whom
Rhee knew personally2 1 took steps to prevent Rhee from traveling.
Rhee put aside his plans for a time while he sought desperately to get a
passport from the State Department to permit him to go to Paris, where
he hoped to lay the Korean case squarely before President Wilson and
the peace conference. To Rhee’s dismay, Wilson sent a message to the
State Department indicating the issuance of a passport to Rhee would
cause uneasiness among the Japanese and would consequently interfere
with Wilson’s plan to build a secure peace in the Orient upon the
seemingly sound foundation of Japanese power and cooperation.2 2
1 9 Stephan Bonsai records in his journal after speaking with representative Kiusic Kim who
traveled from China, and told Bonsai that the PPC was “a heaven sent opportunity,” Suitors and
Suppliants The Little Nations at Versailles, (N.Y.: Prentice Hall, 1946), 223.
2 0 Yong-ha Shin, Formation and Development of Modem Korean Nationalism, (Seoul, Korea:
Dae Kwang Munhwasa, 1990), 325.
2 1 Robert T. Oliver re-prints a recommendation letter for Syngman Rhee written by Woodrow
Wilson; Syngman Rhee The Man Behind the Myth, (N.Y.: Dodd Mead and Company, 1954),
110- 111.
2 2 Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee The Man Behind the Myth, (N.Y.: Dodd Mead and
Company, 1954), 143.
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When a Korean Provisional Government was established in Shanghai in the
same year to possibly succeed the Japanese colonial government at Korea’s liberation,
the Provisional Government was never officially recognized by the U.S. government. In
order for President Wilson to get the cooperation he needed from Japan to create the
League of Nations, like Roosevelt and Taft before him, he chose not to present the issue
of Korea at the PPC. President Wilson to appease the larger and more powerful (than
Korea) East Asian nation and in accord with previous U.S. policy concerning Korea,
chose to appease Japan, betray Rhee and . ..sacrifice Korean independence for the
sake of power politics.”2 3
WWII: 1941-1945
During WWII, U.S. government policy continued to follow the same course that
was begun by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905. The U.S. had watched Japan’s
power continue to grow in East Asia, but did not take immediate action to impede on
her growing ‘sphere of influence.’ The U.S. maintained a stance of “relative isolation”2 4
which lasted until her entrance into WWII when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on
December 7,1941. After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. government decided not to invade and
liberate Korea because it was “too deep within the Japanese empire and its liberation
would not contribute to an earlier defeat of the Japanese.”2 5
When the U.S. officially entered WWII, U.S. policy towards Korea was
capricious, at best. It was not until the December 1, 1943 Cairo Conference that the
2 3 Ibid.
2 4 Eugene F. Wong, On Visual Media Racism Asians in the American Motion Pictures, (N.Y.:
Amo Press, 1978), 133.
2 5 Craig S. Coleman, American Images of Korea Korea and Koreans Portrayed in Books,
Magazines, Television, News Media, and Film, (N.J.: Hollym, 1990), 80.
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issue of Korea was discussed. The conference was attended by President Roosevelt,
Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek. The Chinese representative spoke on behalf of
*7fi
the Korean Provisional Government to “plead the case for Korean independence.” But
it was decided that, ““Mindful of the enslavement of the Korean people, the aforesaid
three great powers are determined that, in due course, Korea shall be free and
independent.””2 7 For many Koreans, ‘in due course’ was an ambiguous term that did
not provided the hope of independence that they eagerly craved, with possible liberation
from Japan looming so close. At Cairo, Roosevelt promulgated a gradualist policy
because he felt that Korea was unable to govern itself and therefore a trusteeship led by
the U.S., Great Britain, Russia and China should be created so that eventually Korea
would be a self-governing and independent nation.2 8
President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to bring Russia into the war with Japan
and it was decided at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, that Russia would be
given certain rights in Asia if she entered. The division was meant to be temporary and
mark the boundaries of occupying Russia and U.S. forces with the defeat of Japan.
Additionally, the thirty-eighth parallel division was quickly drawn up by military men
2Q
in the U.S. in August 1945 after Japanese troops surrendered to Russia in Korea in
July 1945. President Roosevelt understood the Russian interest in post-war Korea since
2 6 Pratt, Keith and Richard Rutt, eds., Korea A Historical and Cultural Dictionary, (Durham:
Curzon, 1990), 33.
2 7 Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 A Personal
Narrative, (Seoul, Korea: Panmun Book Company Ltd., 1978), 10.
2 8 Bruce Cumings, The Two Koreas On the Road to Reunificaiton?, Headline Series No. 294,
(Foreign Policy Association, 1990), 27-28.
2 9 Bruce Cumings, Korea’ s Place in the Sun A Modem History, (N.Y. and London: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1997), 187.
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it, “touched the Soviet border.”3 0 According to Bruce Cumings, although Russia “had
the power to take full control,”3 1 he writes that Russia did not because it sought only to
re-gain lost interests from the Russo-Japanese War, and to maintain a friendly
' \ r )
cooperation that still served the basic security of the Soviet state. The Russians agreed
to the division, and when U.S. troops landed in Korea following Pentagon directive
General Order No. 1 calling for the surrender of Japanese troops,3 3 Russia retreated
north of the line.3 4
The Interim: 1945 to 1950
Japan was defeated by the Allied forces in 1945 and Korea was liberated from
colonial rule after thirty-five years. Although Koreans had dreamt of an independent
Korea, their saga would find a new chapter in the Cold War. The five year period that
followed WWII is an integral part connecting the colonial period to the Korean War
because it was when the creation of two separate states and governments emerged.
Although previous U.S. government policy did not directly engage with Korea, after
WWII, Korea became strategically important to the U.S. Korea’s position had always
been “prized by China and Russia as an overland route to the Pacific and by Japan as a
gateway to Asia.”3 5 For the U.S. post-WWII, the Cold War placed Korea squarely in the
3 0 Bruce Cumings, Korea’ s Place in the Sun A Modem History, (N.Y. and London: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1997), 187.
3 1 Bruce Cumings, Origins of the Korean War Liberation and Emergence of Separate Regimes
1945-1947, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 121.
3 2 Ibid.
3 3 Eds., Kim, Hyung-chan and Wayne Patterson, The Koreans in America 1882-1974 A
Chronology and Fact Book, (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1974), 46.
3 4 Dennis D. Wainstock, Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War, (Westport, Ct. and London:
Greenwood Press, 1999), 3.
3 5 Don Lawson, The United States in the Korean War Defending Freedom’s Frontier, (London,
N.Y., Toronto: Abelard-Schuman, 1946), 31.
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midst of the international battle that pitted the U.S. against the Soviet Union and to a
lesser extent, China.
But Koreans had already sought their own path entirely different than what was
drawn up by the imposing superpowers.
An ostensible Korean government did exist within a few weeks of
Japan’s demise; its headquarters was in Seoul, but it began in mid-
August with the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence,
and by September it was becoming anchored in widespread “people’s
committees” in the countryside. But its name also changed in September,
to the Korean People’s Republic and the incoming Americans
predictably shunned it.3 6
The ‘in due course’ clause presented at the Cairo Conference was rejected by Korean
leaders because as Bruce Cumings writes, “by and large Koreans wished to solve their
problems themselves and resented any interference that they were not ready for self-
government.”3 7 And when General Hodge was sent by U.S. General MacArthur to
oversee the troops in Korea, he found a population resistant to another occupying
force.3 8 The resistance would be seen “as radical and pro-Soviet,” by the incoming
members of the U.S. government and military.3 9
Unfortunately they had little understanding that communist elements already
existed in Korea. Bruce Cumings argues that Communism originated during the
colonial period due to the economic inequality and injustice under the Japanese colonial
3 6 Bruce Cumings, Korea’ s Place in the Sun A Modem History, (N.Y. and London: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1997), 185-186.
3 7 Bruce Cumings, The Two Koreas On the Road to Reunificaiton?, Headline Series No. 294,
(Foreign Policy Association, 1990), 28.
3 8 Ibid.
3 9 Ibid.
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government.40 Therefore, “leftism and communism became synonymous with
opposition to Japan.”4 1 With this understanding, the origins of Communism and its
presence at Korea’s liberation was a natural occurrence considering Korea’s long
colonial history under Japanese rule. Bruce Cumings extensive study in The Origins of
the Korean War highlight the various economic and political factors that existed in
Korea, and were then compounded by U.S. misunderstanding and prerogatives
(concerning the Cold War) which then culminated in the Korean War.
Shortly after Korea’s liberation, Syngman Rhee was brought to Korea by
General MacArthur. Rhee was a “master politician”4 2 who understood the U.S.
opposition to Communism and would use it to gain U.S. support4 3 in his hope to unite
and rule the entire Peninsula.44 The North was led by Kim II Sung who had been trained
under the Communist leadership of the Soviet Union and engaged in guerrilla warfare
against Japan prior to WWII.4 5 Two Korean leaders with very different political
backgrounds and supported by very powerful foreign states were now vying to rule
Korea.
After President Roosevelt’s sudden death, President Truman came to office and
believed that Korea was of “symbolic value”46 in the Cold War. In 1948 the U.N.
4 0 Bruce Cumings, Origins of the Korean War Liberation and Emergence of Separate Regimes
1945-1947, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 154-162.
4 1 Ibid., 32.
4 2 Bruce Cumings, The Two Koreas On the Road to Reunificaiton?, Headline Series No. 294,
(Foreign Policy Association, 1990), 34.
4 3 Ibid.
4 4 Ibid., 36.
4 5 4 5 Bruce Cumings, Origins of the Korean War Liberation and Emergence of Separate Regimes
1945-1947, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 35-36.
4 6 Jongsuk Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War The Republic of Korea and the United
States, 1948-1953, (London and Westport, Ct.: Praeger, 2002), 44.
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16
decided to hold elections in Korea which was systematically denied by North Korea and
the Soviet Union.4 7 The U.N. also refused to allow a “Korean delegation from the
South, even with ‘observer’ status as it considered how to hold a Korean election.”4 8
The elections in the South resulted in Syngman Rhee, an anti-Communist leader to
become the first President of the Republic of Korea that was officially formed on
August 15, 1948.
With Rhee as President of the ROK, the U.S. had a leader that they could ally
themselves with in the fight against Soviet Communism and shortly thereafter against
China, which became a Communist state in 1949. Although the U.S. and Soviet Union
began pulling their troops out in 1948 and 1949, U.S. support was re-instated when
South Korea was attacked from the North. The U.S. “came to defend any group
claiming itself as anti-communist,”4 9 which resulted in a three-year civil war only five
years after Korea’s liberation.
The Korean War: 1950-1953
Shortly after North Korea attacked the South on June 25, 1950 President
Truman immediately asked for and received an unanimous vote from the Security
Council of the U.N. to defend the South Korean state, and requested the “immediate
cease-fire by the North Koreans.”50 The Soviet Union was a member of the U.N.’s
Security Council and could have vetoed the initiative but had been boycotting the U.N.
4 7 Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 A Personal
Narrative, (Seoul, Korea: Panmun Book Company Ltd., 1978), 120.
4 8 Ibid., 105.
4 9 Bruce Cumings, Korea’ s Place in the Sun A Modem History, (N.Y. and London: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1997), 200.
5 0 Michael Hickey, The Korean War The West Confronts Communism, (Woodstock and N.Y.:
The Overlook Press, 1999), 38.
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because of its refusal to accept representatives from the People’s Republic of China,5 1
which the Security Council would not admit in place of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist
Party.5 2 Craig S. Coleman criticizes the U.N. and Security Council on its handling of the
Korean War in American Images of Korea:
One of the greatest political ironies and arguably political injustices since
the founding of the United Nations was the exclusion of both Koreas and
the People’s Republic of China from full membership in the U.N. As the
Korean War was the first U.N.-sponsored/sanctioned war, a more full
and perhaps political dialogue over the Korean War and reunification
could have been achieved earlier had the primary participants (ROK,
PRC, and DPRK) been present in the discussions and politicking at the
U.N.5 3
President Truman never asked Congress for permission to engage in war;
instead he utilized an executive decision and called the involvement in Korea a “police
action.”5 4 It was a ‘limited’ war for the U.S.; but shortly after June 25th the Security
Council “recommended that all forces offered by the U.N. members be placed under the
command of the U.S. and asked the U.S. to designate a commander. Truman promptly
named MacArthur.”5 5 Truman’s decision to engage in the Korean War was based on
George Kennan’s (who had worked at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow) containment
policy that sought to thwart the further spread of Communism.5 6 As Ronnie D.
Lipschutz writes about the paranoia in the U.S. concerning Communism, “By 1950,
5 1 Kenneth Scott Latourette, The American Record in the Far East, 1945-1951, (N.Y.: The
MacMillan Company, 1952), 182.
5 2 Michael Hickey, The Korean War The West Confronts Communism, (Woodstock and N.Y.:
The Overlook Press, 1999), 38.
5 3 Craig S. Coleman, American Images of Korea Korea and Koreans Portrayed in Books,
Magazines, Television, News Media, and Film, (N.J.: Hollym, 1990), 130.
5 4 Bruce Cumings, Korea’ s Place in the Sun A Modem History, (N.Y. and London: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1997), 266.
5 5 Bevin Alexander, Korea The First War We Lost, (N.Y.: Hippocrene Books, 1986), 44.
5 6 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Cold War Fantasies Film, Fiction, and Foreign Policy, (Laham,
Boulder, N.Y., Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publications, Inc., 2001), 40-42.
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almost all of America’s foreign policy was, somehow, rationalized through the strategy
of containment.”5 7
Ironically though, at the start of the Korean War most Soviet troops had left
Korea, although their military equipment and arsenal was left behind. According to
Bruce Cumings the Soviets made it “clear to Washington their determination to stay
clear of the fighting.”5 8 But Anne Pierce’s Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman Mission
and Power in American Foreign Policy, she states that President Truman “saw North
Korea’s aggression as part of the Soviet drive to demoralize and debilitate the West.”5 9
Missing from the U.S. Cold War agenda are the prerogatives of the two
divergent North and South Korean leaders; Kim II Sung and President Syngman Rhee
both wanted to re-unite the peninsula. They had endured thirty-five years of their
nation’s colonization and would go to great lengths to make the nation sovereign under
their respective leadership. But it was not just the wishes of these two men for Korea to
regain its unity. As stated earlier, the nation wanted sovereignty for self-rule and not be
subjected to foreign domination. The Korean-American Times (Pukmi Sibo) was a
newspaper created in 1943 that espoused the Korean nation’s wishes for (American-
style) democracy, albeit free from foreign domination. The newspaper printed various
articles taken from U.S. and Chinese newspapers that supported their call for post
liberation independence.6 0
571 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Cold War Fantasies Film, Fiction, and Foreign Policy, (Laham,
Boulder, N.Y., Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publications, Inc., 2001), 43.
5 8 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun A Modem History, (N.Y. and London: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1997), 266.
5 9 Anne R. Pierce, Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman Mission and Power in American
Foreign Policy, (Westport, Ct. and London: Praeger, 2003), 246.
6 0 Introduction, The Korean-American Times Pukmi-Sibo, 2001. 10-15.
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Initially, the North Korean troops pushed far south past the thirty-eighth parallel
before the full force of the U.N. troops joined the South Korean army. With the
additional forces, the South Korean initiative was then able to push North Korea back
past the division, and under General MacArthur, the U.S. continued their drive until
they reached the Yalu River which bordered China. China perceived the immediate
entry of the U.S. into the Korean War as the “aggressive nature of U.S. policy in East
Asia.”6 1 China felt the Truman Administration was partially influenced by the criticism
that was directed at his Administration for its “failure to maintain a non-Communist
China.”6 2 The Chinese support for North Korea is undeniable, as stated in the
government’s official newspaper. “The Chinese lambasted the Rhee regime as an
American puppet, cited its many provocations in the North, and criticized American
policy, following the North Korean line.” China’s involvement in the war exacerbated
an already difficult situation. According to Don Lawson’s The United States in the
Korean War.
As soon as the truce talks started, the Communist negotiators began to
stall. They insisted that the 38th parallel should remain the dividing
demarcation line between the two opposing forces after an armistice was
signed. Since the U.N. troops had already been driven north of the
parallel in many places, (U.S.) Admiral Joy insisted that the truce line be
located wherever the battle line was when the armistice was signed. All
during the long hot summer the peace talks dragged on, with
Communists continuing to stall every bit of the way.6 4
6 1 Chen Jian, China’ s Road to the Korean War The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation,
(N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1994), 129.
6 2 Ibid., 126.
6 3 Bruce Cumings, Korea’ s Place in the Sun A Modem History, (N.Y. and London: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1997), 267.
6 4 Don Lawson, The United States in the Korean War Defending Freedom’ s Frontier, (London,
N.Y., Toronto: Abelard-Schuman, 1964), 122.
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With hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers in the war, they did push back
the U.S. forces but only sought to push back down to the thirty-eight parallel and not
further, due to the risk of WWIII.6 5 At this point, the armistice was signed on July 7,
1953 between North Korea, China and the U.N., whereby no further territory was
gained by either side. The results of the Korean War were the deaths of millions of
Koreans, along with hundreds of thousands of Chinese and tens of thousands of U.S.
soldiers, and Korea remains a divided nation.
As stated, the U.S. government policy since Korea’s colonization has proved
beneficial for the U.S. and detrimental for Korea. Because U.S. power in Korea was
tremendous, particularly after Korea’s liberation, U.S. prerogatives in Asia would result
in the division of Korea and its civil war. The U.S. government wielded its power,
notwithstanding concern for Korea, but U.S. objectives far outweighed the negative
ramifications for the peninsular nation. The U.S. government policy towards Korea in
the first half of the 20th century proved unfavorable for Korea. The country’s liberation
from Japan at the close of WWII can be partially attributed to the U.S., yet so are the
reasons for the Korean War. An aspect of understanding Korea’s meaning in the U.S.
can be found in the political relationship shared by the two countries. As will be
discussed in Part III, the disparity of power and how that power was wielded are
contributing factors to Korea’s meaning and understanding in the U.S.
6 5 Bruce Cumings, Korea’ s Place in the Sun A Modem History, (N.Y. and London: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1997), 289.
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Part II: The Films o f WWII and the Korean War
In this section I introduce the various films from WWII and the Korean War as a
premise to discuss Korea’s representation in film. This is another powerful medium
where there was direct although different engagement with Korea. These films created,
represented and then presented the Korean nation; they offered ideas, images, notions
about Koreans, their nation and their state. I begin with three films from the WWII
period that presented Korean characters and aspects of Korea’s colonization, and then I
turn to films from the Korean War period. I examine these particular films and ask: how
and where do these representations originate from, how are they ultimately used and,
what purpose do they serve?
There was no greater representation of Korea than the Korean War films of the
20th century. But prior to 1951 (when the first Korean War film was produced and
released in the U.S.), Korean representation debuted during WWII. My research
resulted in three movies produced and released during this period that present the
Korean nation and/or Korean characters.
I begin with Jack London, released in 1943 by United Artists Corp. The movie
was directed by Alfred Santell and is based upon The Book o f Jack London that was
written by his wife Charmian London, played by Susan Hayward in the movie. The
story begins in Oakland, California in 1890 where London is working in a factory. He
soon quits and travels from various jobs, and his life is intertwined with dramatic
adventures and romantic encounters. He later attends college to hone his writing skills
because he dreams of becoming a published author. London fulfills his goal with Call o f
the Wild which he wrote after living for a period of time in Alaska during its Gold
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Rush; shortly thereafter, he falls in love with his publisher’s secretary, Charmian
Kittredge. He is then asked by a newspaper publisher to cover the Boer War in Africa;
he goes and returns to Charmian three years later as a successful war journalist. Upon
the day of his return, the same newspaper publisher asks him to travel to Japan and
cover the Russo-Japanese War. Although he is concerned about leaving Charmian
again, she demonstrates her understanding and tells London that he should go.
It is at this point that Korean representation is introduced in Jack London.
London’s initial presence in Tokyo is marked by idle time and rumors that Japan and
Russia are negotiating an end to the war. When another reporter states that the
skirmishes on the Korean border do not necessitate peace, London agrees and states that
Japan is sending troops into Korea. He is asked how he came upon this information but
is conveniently and notably interrupted by the Japanese military men’s celebration due
to the sinking of a Russian fleet at Port Arthur, located in North China.
London’s observation of Japanese troops entering Korea is made to further
illustrate his distinctive capabilities as a reporter; his statement is unbeknownst and a
surprise to his fellow American reporters and therefore sets him apart from them while
in Japan. A Japanese military representative notifies the American reporters that they
are denied access into the war’s front, which is Korea. London scoffs at the denial and
heads to China where he sneaks onto a boat crossing the Yellow Sea into Korea. Within
the narrative, Korea is portrayed as a country separate from Japan and is continuously
referred to as the ‘front’ in the Russo-Japanese War.
When London arrives in Korea, he witnesses Russian prisoners being sent to
Japanese prison camps. He meets Japanese Captain Tanaka who speaks English, offers
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his services to possibly get London to the war’s front and then invites him to his
residence. As the two are becoming acquainted, Tanaka shows London a map of the
world, and then explains Japanese prerogatives beginning with Japan’s arrival in Korea.
Captain Tanaka: (pointing to Korea and the Yalu River which borders Korea and
Manchuria/China) Here is the theater of our present operations; but tomorrow, as you
shall see, we shall have crossed the Yalu River and soon we’ll have all of Korea, a
stepping stone into Manchuria.
London: (surprised) Manchuria?
Captain Tanaka: And then Mongolia, a land of milk and honey. Two hundred million
tons of timber, a billion tons of iron, two billion tons of coal. Enough to last Japan for
seventy years. W e’ll be stronger then, able to move both East and West.
London: You’re out to gobble all of Asia.
Captain Tanaka: Oh yes. Not all at once though, first we must conquer China. W e’ve
got to control China. But in order to control China we will have to crush your country
and England. That may take many years, fifty maybe a hundred perhaps. But it has all
been planned, scientifically. The Rising Sun has a destiny, expansion is inevitable. This,
the taking of Korea is only the first step, the first act of the drama. But the play is on,
the curtain is up and it will ring down, you’ll see upon a Japanese world.
When London returns to the U.S. at the conclusion of the war, he pleads with his
publisher to print an article proclaiming Japan’s future objectives and endeavors. His
publisher refuses, stating that Japan is a friend to the U.S. and that billions of dollars of
business occur between the two countries. London’s warnings obviously foreshadow
future events that result in the Pacific War and WWII.
When the movie was released in 1943, it intertwined the U.S. war effort against
Japan with the biographic tale of Jack London as remembered by his wife. The movie
utilizes the war effort to showcase the adventures and spirit, the passion and talent of
Jack London. His daring voyage into Korea that was prohibited by the Japanese, his
noble efforts to warn the U.S. about Japanese ambitions exhibits his individual integrity
and his loyalty and love for the U.S.
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The second film is First Yank in Tokyo, released i+n 1945 by RKO-Radio
Pictures and directed by Sam Ruman. The films sheds (some) insight on the travesty
that befell Korea. The movie’s plot is based on U.S. Air Force Pilot Steve Ross, played
by Tom Neal who is serving duty in the South Pacific. When the movie begins he is
called to San Fransisco by his superiors who ask him to undergo a cosmetic surgery to
physically transform him into a Japanese-looking man. Although a U.S. citizen, Ross
had been raised in Tokyo, spoke flawless Japanese and had a good understanding of
Japanese culture. He agrees to undergo the surgery to become Sergeant Takashima
because his parents were dead and he had recently lost his fiance, army nurse Abby
Drake played by Barbara Hale when she was serving in Bataan. His mission is to
infiltrate a Japanese prison hospital, sixty miles outside of Tokyo where a U.S. POW,
engineer Louis Jardine, played by Marc Cramer is being held. Jardine holds the last
pieces of information that would complete the U.S. creation of the atomic bomb.
Ross lands in Amoy, China and meets with an allied Chinese soldier. He
introduces Takashima to two members of a Korean underground movement who
provide Takashima with a verifiable entrance into Japan as a Japanese soldier. Upon
their greetings and explanations in providing Takashim an identity, the (second) Korean
states: “In 25 years of fighting the Japanese, we Koreans have found many cracks in
their walls.” Takashima commends the Koreans for their efforts, “You’re doing a great
job.” The (second) Korean then risks his life posing as a wounded Japanese soldier to
get Takashima to Japan’s shores from China.
When Takashima reaches the prison camp he is befriended and aided by Han-
Soo played by Keye Luke, a member of the Korean underground movement; Han-Soo
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is a Korean man who runs errands for the Japanese prison hospital director. Han-Soo
smiles and bows to the Japanese but his hatred are stated when speaking privately with
Takashima. He castigates the hospital director for stealing and selling items on the black
market: “He’s a thief and his ancestors were thieves too.”
Han-Soo aids Takashima in getting a job at the hospital so that he can be close
to Louis Jardine and then saves Takashima’s life when he is about to be executed for
allegedly stealing hospital supplies. Han-Soo is a vital ally to Takashima to complete
his objectives: escaping out of the prison camp with Jardine and Steve Ross’ lost fiance,
Abby (whom we find hadn’t been killed but taken as a POW-nurse by the Japanese). At
the movie’s close, Jardine and Abby are able to escape to a British submarine but only
because Takashima fights off the ensuing Japanese soldiers, and he is aided by Han-Soo
who also forgoes the rescue ship to fight the Japanese. The movie’s conclusion relates
the idea that Takashima and Han-Soo both die (valiantly) fighting the Japanes.
The last WWII movie I address is the 1945 RKO-Radio Pictures release China
Sky, based on the Pearl S. Buck novel by the same name. In China Sky, two American
doctors, Gray Thompson and Sara Duram, played by Randolph Scott and Ruth Warrick,
have built and maintain a hospital in a remote Chinese village, Won Li. Won Li
continues to be wrecked and ravaged from fighting and bombing by the Japanese
throughout the Pacific War. The town is protected by a Chinese guerilla leader, Chen
Ta, played by Anthony Quinn, who lives on the outskirts of Won Li, hidden from the
Japanese military that bomb Won Li regularly because of Chen Ta. Dr. Kim is
portrayed by Philip Ahn and was educated in America and brought to Won Li by his
mentor, Dr. Thompson. He has been promised the hand of marriage to a Chinese nurse,
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Siu Mei, played by Carol Thurston. Siu Mei is unhappy that her father has promised her
to Dr. Kim when her true feelings are for Chen Ta, the Chinese guerrilla leader.
Dr. Kim notices the affection that is mutually shared by Chen Ta and Siu Mei,
and is equally frustrated by the assistant status to Dr. Thompson and Dr. Duram, who is
a woman. Dr. Thompson makes his presence in the movie when he returns from
America with his new wife played by Ellen Drew. Dr. Thompson’s wife is jealous of
Dr. Duram who shares a close and professional relationship with her new husband. Dr.
Duram is in love with Dr. Thompson and disappointed when he returns to Won Li with
his new bride. Dr. Thompson’s wife has trouble adjusting to the Chinese village which
is further exacerbated by the frequent Japanese bombings. When a wounded Japanese
officer is brought to the hospital in Won Li by Chen Ta to care for his wounds, certain
plot twists and revelations occur. Chen Ta brings the Japanese Colonel to the hospital
because he does not want Japanese Colonel Yasuda to die, but rather wants him to be
tried before a Chinese court for murder and war crimes. Against the backdrop of
Chinese vs. Japanese battle, Colonel Yasuda’s latent relationship with Dr. Kim is what I
will be focusing upon regarding China Sky.
Dr. Duram and Dr. Thompson assign Dr. Kim to care for the Japanese Colonel.
As their time spent together progresses, so does the Japanese Colonel’s knowledge of
the doctor. Colonel Yasuda manipulates Dr. Kim and his jealousy of Siu Mei to admit
his secret.
Dr. Kim: You will stay please.
Siu Mei: There are others to be looked after.
Dr. Kim: Nevertheless you will remain until I give you permission to leave.
Siu Mei: You are not yet in charge Dr. Kim (she walks out).
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Colonel Yasuda: It appears your betrothed has taken on the offensive manners of the
foreign women.
Dr. Kim: It is the influence of Dr. Durand that has made her self-willed and arrogant.
Colonel Yasuda: Traits to be found in all foreign women. I have seem them in
Shanghai, soft and pampered. But of this you would not know.
Dr. Kim: How would I not know, I studied in their country.
Colonel Yasuda: I have said before we have much in common. You are not Chinese!
Dr. Kim: I am Korean.
Colonel Yasuda: Hmm, you may deceive the stupid people here, me you cannot
deceive.
Dr. Kim: MY mother is Korean.
Colonel Yasuda: And your father....
Dr. Kim: My father is dead.
Colonel Yasuda: But he lived to give you life and he was Japanese.
Dr. Kim: I’m known as a Korean and that is how I wish it to be. I congratulate you on
being so nearly well Colonel Yasuda.
Colonel Yasuda: Well enough to be given back to my captor when he comes?
Dr. Kim: Well enough.
Dr. Kim is half-Korean and half-Japanese. This particular fact allows for a
connection between Dr. Kim who is working in a Chinese hospital on the allied side and
the Japanese Colonel who is portrayed as the evil enemy. The Colonel manipulates Dr.
Kim’s jealousy of Chen Ta in regard to Siu Mei and unknowingly Dr. Kim helps the
Colonel plan a surprise attack on the village.
Colonel Yasuda: For what you have done, I thank you my brother.
Dr. Kim: I have asked you to regard me as I regard myself, a Korean. My mother’s
blood rules in me.
Colonel Yasuda: And yet, I wonder how nurseling Siu Mei and her father would regard
you, if my accident they were to learn of your Japanese heritage.
Dr. Kim: You propose to tell.
Colonel Yasuda: Do not be alarmed. Only if you fail in your duty to your father’s
ancestors, might I forget to guard my tongue.
Dr. Kim: What do you ask of me?
Colonel Yasuda: A little thing. I wish to send a message.
Dr. Kim feels remorse in his decision to help the Japanese Colonel but he continues to
hide his Japanese ancestry from the American doctors, from his fiance Siu Mei and
from the Chinese villagers.
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In Pearl S. Buck’s novel, Dr. Kim is actually Dr. Lee and his ancestry is
Chinese;6 6 I found no information regarding why the character’s name and ethnicity was
changed. (I hypothesize that RKO-Radio’s decision to change the storyline can possibly
be attributed to Philip Ahn; he was the eldest son of Ahn, Chang-ho the independence
leader. Philip was regularly employed by RKO-Radio Pictures and he possibly could
f \ 1
have brought attention of Korea’s struggle to China Sky’s producers. )
Predictably and understandably, Korea and Korean characters would increase in
representation with the Korean War. The first film I examine is Steel Helmet,
written/produced/directed by Samuel Fuller. The film was made less than one year after
the war began, and it was according to the Los Angeles Times, “the first made-in-
/TO
Hollywood movie about the war in Korea.” Fuller had served in the U.S. military
during WWII and his presentation of the Korean War touches upon its confusion and
complications for a small U.S. army unit.
The story follows Gene Evans as Sergeant Zack, a disgruntled WWII veteran
who “just wants to get out alive,” after his entire unit has been killed. He is found by a
young, orphaned and Buddhist South Korean boy who Sgt. Zack calls ‘Short-round,’
played by William Chun. They run into an African-American medic, Corporal
Thompson, played by James Edwards who was a prisoner of war for six hours and like
Sgt. Zack, his entire unit had been killed. The three of them encounter a U.S. army unit
6 6 Pearl S. Buck, China Sky, (N.Y.: Triangle Books, 1942).
6 7 John Cha’s biography of Susan Ahn Cuddy re-prints a picture of a postcard with a picture of
Philip Ahn (Susan’s oldest brother) that was printed and distributed by RKO-Radio Pictures in
1945. The postcard also contains a U.S. stamp decorated with the Korean flag; taken from John
Cha’s Willow Tree Shade: The Susan Ahn Cuddy Story, (Korean American Heritage
Foundation, 2002), 171.
6 8 Philip K. Scheuer, “’Steel Helmet’ Intense Drama of War in Korea,” Los Angeles Times, 12
January 1951.
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looking for a Buddhist temple to set up an observation post. Sgt. Zack, Short-round and
Corporal Thompson decide to go with the unit after a brush with a North Korean sniper.
At the temple, the unit is ordered to capture a prisoner of war; they soon find a North
Korean soldier at the temple after he murders one of the unit’s men. A gritty battle
scene between the U.S. unit and North Korean troops occur towards the end of the
movie, and most of the men die (including Short-round which upsets Sgt. Zack, who in
his fit of rage unexpectedly kills the North Korean soldier they were to take as
prisoner). The only remaining men left are African-American Corporal Thompson,
Japanese-American Sgt. Tanaka, Caucasian-American Private Baldy and Sgt. Zack.
The real enemy that is presented in the film is Soviet Communists. The mention
of the threat is first made when Sgt. Zack is asked by the unit’s Lieutenant Driscoll to
come with them to the temple. “Look Lietenant, you’ve got nothing out there but rice
paddies crawling with commies, just waiting to slap you between two big hunks of rye
bread and wash you down with fish eggs and vodka.” Later, after a battle between the
U.S. military unit and North Korean snipers, the North Koreans’ guns are retrieved.
After quickly examining a gun, Sgt. Zack exclaims, “Yeah, made in Russia....let’s go.”
Steel Helmet addresses the difficult issues the U.S. military faced in the Korean
War, such as the difficulty of “distinguishing between North and South Korean
troops.”6 9 When the army unit runs into villagers walking along the countryside road
with their belongings, they stop and check their bodies and belongings:
Fat Paul: They all look alike to me.
Sgt. Zack: Do you know how to tell the difference Fat Paul?
Fat Paul: How?
6 9 Paul M. Edwards, A Guide to Films on the Korean War, (Westport, Ct. and London:
Greenwood Press, 1997), 10.
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Sgt. Zack: He’s a South Korean when he’s running with you, he’s a North Korean
when he’s running after you.
One of the obvious themes that pervade Steel Helmet has to do with race. The
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Korean War was the first war of racially and ethnically integrated military units. The
North Korean Major engages in dialogue and challenges the African and Japanese-
American soldiers about racism practiced in the U.S.; but the two U.S. soldiers remain
true and loyal to their country. One of the most important and telling visual images
occurs at the movie’s conclusion: the four U.S. soldiers who survive the climatic battle
are two-Caucasian Americans, one-African, one-Asian American. They all sit closely
together as the scene and movie ends, portraying an integrated, multi-diverse American
nation that works and fights together.
Another movie that deals with the apprehension of U.S. involvement in Korea is
The Bridges ofToko-Ri released in 1955. The movie starts William Holden as Harry
Brudebaker as a Naval Air Force Pilot doing a second duty after WWII. He is struggling
to come to terms with the battle in Korea. He expresses his frustration to the
commanding Admiral:
Admiral: Whatever progress this world has made has always been because of the
efforts and sacrifices of a few.
Brudebaker: I was one of the few Admiral. New Guinea, Leyte, Okinawa... why does
it have to be me again?
Admiral: Nobody ever knows why he gets the dirty job. This is a dirty job. Militarily
this war is a tragedy.
Brudebaker: I think we ought to pull out.
Admiral: Now that’s rubbish son, you know it. If we did, they’d take Japan, Indochina,
the Philippines, where’d you have us make our stand, Mississippi?
7 0 Paul M. Edwards, A Guide to Films on the Korean War, (Westport, Ct. and London:
Greenwood Press, 1997), 33.
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In a later scene the Admiral explains who the real enemy the U.S. is fighting
against:
Admiral: I told them that we were fighting Russian guns, Russian radars, Russian
planes, Russian submarines; a lot of our men are being killed by Russian equipment
manned by Russian experts.
The movie brings attention to the sacrifice of the U.S. military men for a greater
and noble cause such as the fight against and the spread of Communism. The Admiral
tells Brudebaker’s wife who unexpectedly arrives in Japan from the U.S. that she, “like
most people at home, are ignorant...” about the realities of war and the great cause the
U.S. is fighting for in Korea. It is an overt attempt to state that Americans at home do
not understand the difficulties of war, but live in its comfort and safety. This particular
conversation is meant to engender support for the unpopular war and clarify the reasons
for the U.S. involvement to a public that questions the reasons for its involvement.
Whereas Russians are the enemy in Steel Enemy and The Bridges ofToko-Ri, the
true story of Pork Chop Hill focuses on the Chinese involvement. Released in 1959 by
Melville Productions, the film was directed by Lewis Milestone and stars Gregory Peck
as Lieutenant Joe Clemons. The movie is based on the battle for Pork Chop Hill in
1953, which became important as a “test of wills between China and the U.S.”7 1
The movie follows the story of an army unit led by Lt. Clemons who are sent to
occupy a hill, and then are bombarded by Chinese soldiers whom nearly kill all the U.S.
soldiers. After a day’s battle and with approximately thirty-five out of one hundred
thirty-five soldiers left, they eagerly await for help as Chinese troops close in on the
7 1 Robert J. Lentz, Korean War Filmography 91 English Language Features through 2000,
(Jefferson, N.C. and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2003), 277.
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3 2
atrophied unit. Their command unit cannot send more troops until they receive a
command that has to come from the U.S. negotiators at the peace talks with China.
Pork Chop Hill begins with an early morning broadcast heard by a U.S. army
unit on the hill. The broadcast is given by the Chinese army:
Chinese broadcaster: Hello my GI friends, good morning. This is your regular
morning broadcast courtesy of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army. This is the dawn
of the ten hundredth and twentieth day of the ‘forgotten war.’ What your politicians
choose to call a ‘police action,’ a minor fair which has already cost you more casualties
than your war of independence. GI friends, you want peace, we want peace. We too are
young, we too had to leave our homes to fight on foreign soil. Why? Show your
stubborn Generals at Panmunjon that you will no longer fight for a line on a map. Show
them that you want peace, just as we want peace. Lay down your arms and we will be
glad to lay down ours.
Pork Chop Hill presents the Korean War in accord with this particular dialogue,
as a fight between China and the U.S. on foreign soil. The movie brings attention to the
war of attrition that the soldiers experienced. The overwhelming number of Chinese
troops was a tremendous struggle and difficulty that the U.S. army faced during the
Korean War. Like Steel Helmet, the movie’s acknowledgement of the soldiers’
frustrations, fear and fatigue with the war is also solved by the soldiers. As Robert
Lentz writes in his analysis of the movie, although the soldiers earnestly want to return
home and eagerly a wait for the news that the armistice has been signed, they “still
strive to be the best soldiers they can be, because that is the mission, their duty.”7 2
In Robert Lentz’s praise for Milestone’s Pork Chop Hill, he states that the movie
is “based solidly on fact” which was researched and authored by Brigadier General
S.L.A. Marshall. Lentz therefore describes Pork Chop Hill as “perhaps the historical
7 2 Robert J. Lentz, Korean War Filmography 91 English Language Features through 2000,
(Jefferson, N.C. and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2003), 280.
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33
n 'x
study of the Korean War in particular.” It is a film that does not seek to showcase a
blatant anti-Communist theme, as much as the sacrifice and dedication of U.S. soldiers
who are fighting under difficult and confusing circumstances.
U.N. involvement is also presented in One Minute to Zero, released in 1952 by
RKO-Radio and directed by Tay Garnett. The fictional movie’s story follows Colonel
Steve Janowski played by Robert Mitchum who is stationed in South Korea and helping
their army prepare for war with the North. He is in a hotel in Seoul on the morning of
the first official day of war.
After the war begins, a narrative states the happenings in Korea: “The Red
attack pressed on. Leaving behind it, burning towns, homeless people, destruction,
death. And for the outnumbered defenders it was hold and retreat, hold and retreat down
the bitter length of South Korea.” And after a particular battle with a camouflaged
North Korean unit whom are quickly defeated, Janowski is wounded and goes to Japan
for recovery. While there, he begins a romance with Linda Day played by Ann Blyth
who is a U.N. health commissioner working in Korea. They had met previously in
Korea but fall in love while in Japan and return again to Korea to perform their
respective duties.
Linda hears the location of Janowski and immediately travels there; upon her
arrival she witnesses the massacre of a large group of refugee Koreans (children,
women, seniors), under the orders of Janowski. Day is horrified and tormented over the
incident and Janowski’s involvement. It is not until U.S. Colonel John Parker played by
William Talman, a friend of Day’s and Janowski’s, shows Day dead U.S. soldiers with
7 3 Robert J. Lentz, Korean War Filmography 91 English Language Features through 2000,
(Jefferson, N.C. and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2003), 280.
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3 4
their hands tied by wire. Colonel Parker tells Day that this is the work and nature of the
enemy, and she then relents her anger and forgives and prays for Janowski’s safety.
It is a melodramatic movie that attempts to intertwine the tragedies and
difficulties of war with romance and heroic deeds. A facet that distinguishes One
Minute to Zero from other Korean War movies is its documentary-style footage of
Korean people throughout the movie. The beginning scenes present Korean people in
their daily lives: eating, farming, children playing and Korean soldiers preparing for
war. After the war begins, footage is presented of Koreans killed, fleeing homes on foot
from destroyed villages and cities.
One of the controversial elements of the movie was the scene where Janowski
orders the killing of the Korean refugees. He does so in the movie because of the enemy
soldiers who were known to walk with the South Korean refugees. Like Sgt. Zack’s
comment about U.S. GI’s inability to distinguish North from South Koreans in Steel
Helmet, Janowski could not separate the friend from the enemy and had to make
difficult decisions to kill the entire group. The refugees are warned by the U.S. army
unit to turn around and they will be given food and medicine, but if they keep walking
forward, they will be killed. In the group of refugees, there are distinguished enemy
soldiers with guns to the backs of children and seniors; therefore the group is forced to
keep walking forward. Janowski fires to warn the crowd and then will command their
killings.
Although the production of One Minute to Zero had the cooperation of U.S.
Department of Defense, they withdrew their support after production was completed;
the Defense Department requested the refugee massacre scene to be removed or re
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35
edited which RKO refused. The scene added a dramatic component to the plot which
was otherwise “a formulaic effort to capitalize on the war.”7 4
Like Steel Helmet, the North Korean attack and aggression is an extension of the
Soviet threat:
Colonel Janowski: I thought you said the North Koreans had no Air Force.
Colonel Parker: Practically none, but Uncle Joe has.
The previous movies highlight some of the general themes and trends that the
film industry chose to utilize in presenting the Korean War. Two popular Korean War
movies released after the war’s end: The Rack, directed by Arnold Laven and released
by MGM-Corp in 1956 and The Manchurian Candidate, directed by John
Frankenheimer, released by MC Productions in 1962 address U.S. veterans of the
Korean War upon their return home.
The Korean War and Korea is used as a geographic region to materialize their
story about POW’s and brainwashing. In The Rack, Captain Edward Hall, played by
Paul Newman is a former POW who is charged with committing conspiracy against the
U.S. He refers to his POW interrogators as Chinese and never mentions Korea other
than the place where he was captured. The narrative of the movie places less emphasis
on the war than on the psychological trauma Hall endures as former POW.
The Manchurian Candidate follows the story of two-U.S. Korean War veterans
upon their return to the U.S. after spending over a year in a prison camp. At the prison
camp, the U.S. soldiers were brainwashed to serve Communist interests upon their
return to the U.S. There are constant images of the perpetrators behind the brainwashing
7 4 Robert J. Lentz, Korean War Filmography 91 English Language Features through 2000,
(Jefferson, N.C. and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2003), 271.
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3 6
and throughout the movie who are Chinese and Russian. Like The Rack, Korea is
mentioned only as a place of war and capture.
Additional themes of movies based on the Korean War were more focused on
human interest narratives, such as love stories and heroism which usually resulted in
endearing storylines.
Battle Hymns was directed by Douglas Sirk and released by Universal in 1957.
The movie is based on the true story of Colonel Dean Hess who redeems himself in
Korea after accidentally bombing an orphanage in Europe during WWII. While serving
in Korea, he builds an orphanage for thousands of Korean children who lost their
parents and families during the war. The movie also portrays an elderly Korean
Buddhist monk played by Philip Ahn, and a Korean woman, En Soon Yang portrayed
by Anna Kashfi who assist Hess with the orphanage. En Soon falls in love with the
married Hess, and later dies in his arms as a consequence of the war.
Sabre Jet, directed by Louis King and released by Carl Krueger Productions in
1953 is a fictional love story that presents the U.S. Air Force Pilots who fly daily from
Japan to Korea and the wives that try to maintain normal lives as they say goodbye to
their husbands in the morning, hoping for a safe evening return. In this particular movie,
most of the storyline occurs in Japan and not in Korea. The focus of the movie lies with
the wives who live safely in Japan, and intermittently address their husband’s battles in
Korea.
Battle Circus, directed by Richard Brooks and released by MGM in 1953,
starred Humphrey Bogart as a military doctor who is in charge of a military medical
unit that constantly moves from one area to the next. The movie necessitates more focus
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37
on the trials of the lead character and his love story than on the war. These movies’
storylines use dramatic license and do not address the earlier themes contained in Steel
Helmet, One Minute to Zero, Pork Chop Hill and The Bridges ofToko-Ri. Instead, they
chose to stay away from the controversial issues of the war and maintain a rather
endearing and/or comfortable story for the audience.
The last movie for discussion is Robert Altman’s M*A*S*H, released in 1970;
the movie would then spin-off a popular television series that lasted for 11 years, 1972-
1983. Darrell Y. Hamamoto’s extensive study of Asian representation in Monitored
Peril states that though M*A*S*H was set during the Korean War, it was really a
condemnation of the Vietnam War.7 5 M*A*S*H is a satirical look at war through the
characters who work for and maintain a medical army hospital. The only speaking
Korean character in the film is Ho-Jon, who is portrayed by Kim Atwood. He is a young
man who is kindly used by the U.S. medical doctors for various duties, such as making
cocktail drinks. Later in the movie, Ho-Jon is drafted by the South Korean army
although his U.S. guardians try to prevent otherwise. Seventeen years after the Korean
War ended, M*A*S*H was as Robert Lentz states in Korean War Filmography, “The
single most famous movie about the Korean War.”7 6
These movies are further discussed and analyzed in Part III. Along with U.S.
government policy, I argue that these films are an extension of U.S. power and that the
images, ideas and representations that were created in these films are reflective of U.S.
7 5 Darrell Y. Hamamoto, Monitored Peril Asian Americans and the Politics of TV
Representation, (Minneapolis, MN.: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 23.
7 6 Robert J. Lentz, Korean War Filmography 91 English Language Features through 2000,
(Jefferson, N.C. and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2003), 220.
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dominance and hegemony. Korean representations were created and manipulated to
serve the messages and themes that bolster the U.S., particularly its presence in Korea.
In the next section, I introduce Edward Said’s Orientalism to further discuss, analyze
and therefore understand that the meaning and understanding of Korea in the U.S. is
contingent to U.S. power and hegemony.
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Part III: The Intersection o f the Political and Representational
I introduce Edward Said’s Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism, and
Christina Klein’s Cold War Orientalism to de-construct the factors that contribute to
Korea’s meaning and understanding in the U.S. In this section, I intertwine the two
specific areas: government policy and film representation and analyze the engagement
they had with Korea and what contributed to that engagement.
It is my contention that the meaning of Korea has been heavily influenced by the
political and the representational. I choose to examine these two realms because they
are powerful mediums where there was a direct engagement with Korea. Although there
is an obvious different and wholly divergent relationship that the U.S. government and
the film industry7 7 had in regards to Korea, I utilize both because their interconnection
creates a wholly powerful meaning of Korea in the U.S. I do not seek to define exactly
what Korea is, instead I present that the meaning of Korea has always been in relation
to U.S. political and cultural agendas, where the U.S. acts and is the dominant and
hegemonic power.
The definition of the political in this paper is the government policies the U.S.
actively pursued that either directly or indirectly affected Korea. The definition of the
representational is not as explicit; but I use film as a representative body like that of
literary works, television shows, news programs, school education, etc. A medium
where creation, instruction and dialogue is created concerning the ‘Other.’ In this
particular circumstance, Korea as the ‘Other’ is defined by and limited to these
definitions within this cultural institution.
771 define the film industry as a general convention where production of films was made in the
U.S.; this is regardless of film budget, distribution or audience reception.
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4 0
The intersection then, of the political and representational is an important area
because it is a significant pool of information where ideas, knowledge, images,
concepts, presumptions and assumptions derive. This intersection is culture, and it is
from this body that the understanding of Korea is formulated and then distributed. The
concept of culture is a broad and ambiguous term because it encompasses various and
far-reaching concepts such as politics, history, language, tradition, economy,
geography, religion, etc. But it is a powerful concept because of its power to influence,
condition, to affect, not only individuals, but nations and states as well.
For some, culture may stand separate from the political and historical. Edward
Said provides a largely accepted definition of culture in Culture and Imperialism, the
follow-up to Orientalism:
First of all it means all those practices, like the arts of description,
communication, and representation, that have relative autonomy from the
economic, social and political realms and that often exist in aesthetic
forms, one of whose principal aims is pleasure.7 8
But as Said finds, argues and states in Orientalism, to separate the cultural from the
political would limit any understanding of a representational and creative body of
work.7 9
Too often literature and culture are presumed to be politically, even
historically innocent; it has regularly seemed otherwise to me, and
certainly my study of Orientalism has convinced me that society and
literary culture can only be understood and studied together.8 0
7 8 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (N.Y.: Vintage Books, Inc., 1993), xii.
7 9 Edward Said’s work is based on literature and not on film. Although it is a different
representational medium, it is still a medium that has the ability and power to create, represent
and present those images and ideas that his and my argument is based upon. In my paper, I
replace literary works with film.
8 0 Edward Said, Orientalism, (N.Y.: Vintage Books, Inc., 1978), 27.
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41
Edward Said and Christina Klein both argue that cultural works are not independent of
political and historical contexts, and in fact there is a continuous reciprocity. Christina
Klein’s Cold War Orientalism states the following:
The realm of culture, far from being wholly separate from the realm of
politics, offers a privileged space in which politically salient meanings
can be constructed and questioned, where social categories can be
defined and delimited, where shared values can be confirmed and
contested.8 1
She continues with the idea and writes of the delicate and inter-dependent relationship
of the cultural and political, in regards to imperialism and hegemony. “Cultural texts
perform a hegemonic function to the extent that they legitimate a given distribution of
power, both within and beyond the borders of the nation.”8 2
Although the U.S. government did not dictate to the U.S. film industry what
Korean representations should be during WWII and the Korean War, I believe that there
was a tacit interchange that contributed to the creation of Korean representation.
Richard Slotkin states in Gunfighter Nation:
Even in films shaped by explicitly allegorical intentions, political ideas
do not monopolize or exhaust the range of possible references and
concerns. Rather, there is a patter of reciprocal influence in which the
preoccupations of politics shape the concerns and imagery of movies,
and in which movies in turn transmit their shapely formulations of those
concerns back to political discourse, where they function as devices for
clarifying values and imagining political scenarios.
The films produced during WWII and the Korean War were the mediums where
government policies and actions concerning WWII and the Korean War could be
8 1 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961,
(Berkeley, L.A., London: University of California Press, 2003), 7.
8 2 Ibid.
8 3 Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth Century America,
(N.Y.: Anthenneum, 1992), 350.
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visually and dramatically presented in the U.S. The film industry is in a unique position
where it can present to the public the government’s initiatives concerning its
international involvements with various nations. These movies are not meant to be seen
as a direct translation of U.S. government policies, particularly because of the dramatic
licenses the film industry utilizes, but rather as a medium where the Korean population
and nation is presented and represented, and as we shall find always in regard to U.S.
agendas.
The Korean Representation
Korea is just not a place that Americans think about very often. The U.S.
means something quite different to Korea, however. It is a country that
has defined South Korea’s existence since 1945. And in North Korea it
remains a daily concern, 30 years after the war, with much of the society
structured by reference to a constant threat from American imperialism.8 4
Said’s argument in Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism is based upon the
disparate power relationship between Britain and France, as well as the U.S. with
countries of the East, for Said the Middle East and for me, the Far East, specifically
Korea. Said argues that Orientalism is not just a discussion and creation of the East,
regardless of fact and/or truth, but it is a creation that is contingent upon the power that
lies with the West. “.. .ideas, cultures, and histories cannot seriously be understood or
studied without their force, or more precisely their configurations of power, also being
studied.”8 5 He continues by stating, “.. ..to be a European or an American in such a
8 4 Bruce Cumings, Origins of the Korean War Liberation and the Emergence of Separate
Regimes 1945-1947, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), xxiv.
8 5 Edward Said, Orientalism, (N.Y.: Vintage Books, Inc., 1978), 5.
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4 3
situation is by no means an inert fact. It meant and means being aware, however dimly,
o r
that one belongs to a power with definite interests in the Orient...”
The three films produced and distributed during WWII, introduced Korean
characters and the nation. Prior films made in the U.S. limited their Asian representation
to China and Japan. This paper is not meant to discuss the racist representations of
Asians in U.S. films, although the argument of this paper concedes that racism was
practiced against Asians in the film industry. Eugene Wong’s On Visual Media Racism
Asians in American Motion Pictures presents an in-dept examination of Asian
representation in motion pictures against the back drop of “white racism,”8 7 which
QQ
Wong states as the “only substantive system of racism in the United States.” What I
seek to ask regarding the early WWII films and their representations of Koreans and
Korea is, where did the representations derive from, if not the political?
Ella Shohat and Robert Sham’s Unthinking Eurocentrism discusses the
problematic nature of portraying ‘realism’ on film in a chapter titled “Stereotype,
Realims, and the Struggle Over Representation.” Shohat and Sham refer to Mikhail
Bakhtin’s “naive formulation of realism” which concludes that artistic representation
and the resulting discourse exists within context that is always “social and historical.”8 9
Shohat and Sham continue with this idea and state:
8 6 Ibid., 11.
8 7 Eugene Wong defines ‘white racism’ as “...the superior-inferior dichotomy, members of the
white race are destined, by white racist ideology, to remain superior and above members of the
non-white races in all matters pertaining to human intercourse individually and collectively;” in
On Visual Media Racism Asians in the American Motion Picture Industry, (N.Y.: Amo Press,
1978), 3.
8 8 Ibid., 4.
8 9 Ella Shohat and Robert Sham, Unthinking Eurocentrism Multiculturalism and the Media,
(London, N.Y.: Routledge, 1994), 180.
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4 4
While on one level film is mimesis, representation, it is also utterance, an
act of contextualized interlocution between socially and situated
producers and receivers. It is not enough to say that art is constructed.
We have to ask: Constructed for whom? And in conjunction with which
ideologies and discourses? In this sense, art is representation not so much
in a mimetic as a political sense, a delegation of voice.9 0
When we ask these questions during the period of WWII, these representations
then, come from the tacit inter-change between political and film representational
bodies. As a consequence, they create and indirectly and directly contribute to a broader
understanding of a particular, in this case Korea.
Lisa Lowe states in “The Power of Culture,” “Where culture is the
contemporary repository of memory, of history, it is through culture, rather than
government, that alternative form s o f subjectivity (my emphasis), collectively, and
practice are imagined.”9 1 Combining Lowe’s statement and Said’s argument, the
representations of Korea were highly problematic. It results in a biased perception,
wholly favorable to the U.S. and entirely unfavorable to the subjected country, in this
case Korea.
The struggles of the Korean nation were effectively diminished to highlight
other aspects of the war effort. In the manipulation of the Korean representation, the
entirety of U.S. involvement and the consequences for Korea were effectively
minimized, thereby supporting the U.S. government’s policies and presence in Korea
during WWII and the Korean War. Korea had endured and suffered thirty-five years of
colonization that was followed by a civil war, not entirely of its own doing. The nation
sought to re-unify but instead, were subjected to external factors, such as the U.S.
9 0 Ibid.
9 1 Lisa Lowe, “The Power of Culture,” Journal of Asian-American Studies 1:1, (John Hopkins
University Press, 1998), 17.
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involvement in the Cold War. This understanding was manipulated and marginalized in
the presentation of the Korean War to further various U.S. objectives.
Returning to Said’s argument, the creation of the ‘Orient’ was a manifestation of
the unequal dynamic and therefore allowed certain ideas, images, notions that were
created by the West premised on what they believed the ‘Orient’ to be. This was as Said
states, “a relationship of power, domination, of varying degrees of hegemony.”9 2 The
‘power position’ held by the U.S. in this circumstance is a “flexible positional
superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with
the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand.”9 3 From the period of WWII
to the Korean War, representation of Korea changed as Korea’s significance to the U.S.
changed. Whereas Korea’s representation held little esteem during WWII, its presence
proliferated with the Korean War and the U.S. agendas concerning the Cold War.
The government policies and films of WWII and the Korean War take on
different meaning during times of peace and security. But the engagement with Korea
was bom during these difficult times and therefore contributed to Korea’s meaning in
the 20th century. So I examine and intertwine the political and representational to
present the underlying factors that contribute to the meaning and understanding of
Korea in the U.S.
The Political and Representational Engagement
A tangible connection between the U.S. government and the film industry
during WWII, is the Office of War Information (OWI). The OWI ensured that
9 2 Edward Said, Orientalism, (N.Y.: Vintage Books, Inc., 1978), 5.
9 3 Ibid., 7.
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Hollywood’s film makers produced movies that were in harmony with the “policy
makers perceptions of the world, and to the policies they pursue.”9 4
The average ticket sales in American each week during WWII ranged
between eighty and ninety million, or two-thirds of the country’s
population. Movies were the nation’s leading entertainment outlet, and
as such, they exerted an awesome power to influence and mold public
• • 95
opinion.
The film industry guided by the OWI, simplified the war on the big screen by
distinctly creating a dichotomy of right vs. wrong. In representation and presentation,
the opinion that the film industry and the OWI sought was “based upon moral
righteousness” and the U.S. and her allies were the ‘good guys’ as “opposed to the
injustices and evil of the Axis.”96 And these films promulgated a notion that war was
fascism vs. democracy, and what was at stake were the four freedoms, of speech and
religion, and freedom from want and fear in the world.9 7
During the Korean War, the House of Un-American Activities (HUAC) was
created. The HUAC “...dictated who worked and who didn’t, which subjects were
appropriate and which weren’t, how plots could be resolved and how they couldn’t.”9 8
The Korean War presentation took on different meaning since it was an extension of the
9 4 Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, Hollywood Goes to War How Politics, Profits and
Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies, (Berkeley, L.A.: University of California Press,
1987), 247.
9 5 Randy Roberts, “Casablanca as Propaganda You Must Remember This: The Case of Hal
Wallis’ Casablanca,” in Hollywood’ s America United States History Through Its Films, eds.,
Steven Mintz and Randy Roberts, (St. James, N.Y.: Brandywine Press, 1993), 174.
9 6 David Lloyd Jones, “The U.S. War Information and American Public Opinion During World
War II, 1939-1945” (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Binghampton, 1976), 151.
9 7 Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, “Wartime Films as Instruments of Propaganda
What to Show the World: The Office of War Information and Hollywood, 1942-1945,” in
Hollywood’ s America United States History Through Its Films, eds., Steven Mintz and Randy
Roberts, (St. James, N.Y.: Brandywine Press, 1993), 174.
9 8 Peter Biskin, Seeing is Believing How Hollywood Taught us to stop worrying and love the
Fifties, (N.Y.: Pantheon Books, 1983), 4.
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Cold War. And the U.S. involvement in the Korean W ar was not enthusiastically
supported like that of WWII, (particularly after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor). With
WWII, the U.S. had proved itself as a global superpower and would no longer maintain
an ‘isolationist’ policy, and with the onset of the Cold War, Asia had become
particularly important to the U .S ." The containment policy intertwined with the threat
of Communism had to be inculcated into the minds of the American public. It was
difficult though, for many to connect the “civil conflict in Korea and world-wide
communist domination.”1 0 0
The support and enthusiasm that WWII generated was lost for the Korean War,
“the war’s purpose - to contain an ideology - was far more abstract than the threat of
Germany and Japan had been.”1 0 1 In addition, Korea was an unbeknownst country to
most U.S. citizens. Craig S. Coleman brings attention to a Times magazine article
which stated that “It was a rare U.S. citizen who passed a detailed quiz on the little
Asiatic peninsula he (Truman) had just guaranteed with troops, planes and ships.”1 0 2
Other reasons for its unpopularity in the U.S. was the re-institution of the
military draft;1 0 3 U.S. GI’s resentment of Truman’s term, ‘police action’ was regarded
“disdainfully” because ‘police action’ “isn’t viewed as being as important or exciting
9 9 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961,
(Berkeley, L.A., London: University of California Press, 2003), 5.
1 0 0 Paul M. Edwards, A Guide to Films on the Korean War, (Westport, Ct. and London:
Greenwood Press, 1998), 23.
1 0 1 Richard A. Schwartz, Ph.D., Cold War Culture Media and the Arts, 1945-1990, (Facts on
File, Inc., 1998), 161.
1 0 2 Craig S. Coleman, American Images of Korea Korea and Koreans as Portrayed in Books,
Magazines, Television, News Media and Film, (N.J.: Hollym, 1997), 112-113.
1 0 3 Ibid., 93.
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as a real war, or because of its limitations;”1 0 4 the peace talks began in 1951 and with
the possibility of an armistice being signed at any moment, GI’s were less willing to
risk their lives;1 0 5 and it was a “stale-mated trench warfare-like war of attrition.”1 0 6
The difficulty then was ‘selling’ the war to the U.S. public. Christina Klein
explores Asian representations during the period of the Cold War and how these
representations penetrated the American public’s understanding, relationship and
engagement with Asia; her book Cold War Orientalism Asia in the Middlebrow
Imagination 1945-1961 states:
The central task as so many contemporary observers described it,
became one of “winning the minds of men.” The minds that needed to be
won, however, belonged not only to people overseas, but to Americans
as well, who might resist such an expansive and expensive foreign policy
agenda. This meant that the waging of the Cold War was as much a
domestic endeavor as a foreign one - and as much an educational
endeavor as a political or military one. The very newness of containment
and integration policies, which violated a long-standing tradition of
avoiding permanent alliances outside the western hemisphere, provoked
public opposition, while the abstract nature of their objectives, in sharp
contrast to the concrete goals of WWII, generated little enthusiasm.1 0
This is not to say that the U.S. government dictated to film producers how the
representations of Koreans should be, but the government took very seriously the
awesome power that films (could) have, particularly at times of war. Under the
HUAC’s guidance, the presentation of the Korean War was dominated by anti-
1 0 4 Robert J. Lentz, Korean War Filmography 91 English Language Features through 2000,
(Jefferson, N.C. and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2003), 8.
1 0 5 Paul M. Edwards, A Guide to Films on the Korean War, (Westport, Ct. and London:
Greenwood Press, 1998), 33.
1 0 6 Craig S. Coleman, American Images of Korea Korea and Koreans as Portrayed in Books,
Magazines, Television, News Media and Film, (N.J.: Hollym, 1997), 92-93..
1 0 7 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961,
(Berkeley, L.A., London: University of California Press, 2003), 28.
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4 9
Communist themes to serve the U.S. government and particularly its military
involvement. Richard Schwartz’s Cold War Culture sheds light on the confusion that
plagued the U.S. public and the soldiers of their view of the Korean War. In his review
of Samuel Fuller’s Steel Helmet’s direction:
employs a set and special effects calculated to create a claustrophobic
atmosphere in which everything seems vague, hazy and ambiguous. The
effect is to render the war as an exercise in ongoing madness; its final
credits reads, “There is no end to this story.”1 0 8
‘There is no end to this story’ illustrated the confusion the Korean War presented for
U.S. GI’s and the American public. But what is seen throughout the movies from the
Korean War is that although the soldiers may be confused, like Sgt. Zack, Fuller
portrays his soldiers in Steel Helmet as men who never fail nor retreat from their duties.
In the introduction to Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said writes:
The power to narrate, or to block (my emphasis) other narratives from
forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and
constitutes one of the main connections between them. In time, culture
comes to be associated, often aggressively, with the nation or the state,
this differentiates “us” from “them” almost always with some degree of
xenophobia.1 0 9
The 1943 release of Jack London is based upon the time period of the Russo-
Japanese War that immediately preceded the 1905 Protectorate Treaty. When London
arrives in Korea and witnesses the march of Russian prisoners, Korean peasants stand in
the background as onlookers, voicing no opposition or shock to the present
circumstances. In fact, Korea’s representation has no voice and the movie’s dialogue
1 0 8 Richard A. Schwartz, Ph.D., Cold War Culture Media and the Arts, 1945-1990, (Facts on
File, Inc., 1998), 162.
1 0 9 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (N.Y.: Vintage Books, Inc., 1993), xiii.
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5 0
enables an acceptance of Japan’s conquest of Korea by never making it an issue.
Additionally, there were no Korean speaking characters to give the voice of objection.
Jack London presents Russia’s misfortune and Japan’s imperialism over any
significance concerning Korea. At the movie’s conclusion, London speaks about
Japanese treachery in regards to the imprisonment and shooting of Russian prisoners,
but he had no words for the circumstances that had been imposed by Japan in Korea. At
no point does the movie offer an objection of Korea’s conquest as morally wrong. It is
worth noting, and as stated in the first part of this paper that, President Theodore
Roosevelt negotiated Japan and Russia’s treaty that eventually culminated in Korea’s
colonization.
Instead, the movie’s narration ends with Jack professing his love to Charmian
and the playing of the U.S. national anthem. The movie concludes in 1905 when Japan
was not considered a national threat, particularly to the U.S. But the movie’s implicit
message calls upon its audience in 1943 to make the immediate connection with those
past events and present circumstances, to bolster the war effort against Japan.
Pork Chop Hill, Steel Helmet, Bridges ofToko-Ri, Sabre Jet, The Rack, and The
Manchurian Candidate also give no voice to Korea, their reasons for war, their
prerogatives for fighting. As Said states, “..the outlying regions of the world have no
life, history, or culture to speak of, no independence or integrity worth representing
without the west.”1 1 0 The narratives are created so that the representation and
presentation of Koreans and Korea was effectively used in a variety of ways to support
an American presence in Korea. When a North Korean prisoner dramatically threatens
1 1 0 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (N.Y.: Vintage Books, Inc., 1993), xix.
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to explode an operating tent in Battle Circus, the dramatic scene is used to highlight the
courageous act and spirit of a U.S. army nurse over why a Korean prisoner may feel so
desperate. Pork Chop H ill’s presentation of Korea is as a ‘battleground,’ for the U.S.
and China. Korea’s mention in the movie was in name only, the name of a place, region
or where the line is drawn. Entirely missing from Pork Chop Hill are any Korean
characters, all soldiers on both sides are either American or Chinese.
Steel Helmet introduces two Korean characters: Short-Round who is friendly
with the U.S. soldiers, and the North Korean soldier who kills a U.S. GI. So why would
a Korean boy work with the U.S., and another Korean man kill a U.S. soldier? The
movie’s superficial answer, although not explained in any depth is Communism. The
movie does not provide any insight into the context of the war for Korea; two
ideologically divergent states bom only a few years prior have now separated the
nation, engaged in a war that is devastating its land and people. Steel Helmet’ s conflict
is based upon the question of U.S. involvement, the U.S. vs. the Soviet Union,
Communism vs. U.S.-style democracy, and the trials and tribulations of war that create
heroes and touching moments.
Short-Round walks and assists the U.S. army unit, and he builds a personal
relationship with Sgt. Zack. Throughout the movie he is offering prayers for himself,
Sgt. Zack and the U.S. army unit he stays with at the Buddhist temple. The North
Korean soldier speaks extensively with the African and Asian American soldiers about
racism in the U.S., and the dialogues are given time to present the challenge, irony and
loyalty of ‘ethnic’ U.S. soldiers. Because of the long U.S. history regarding racism, the
social achievement of integrating military units was a factor that the film industry could
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utilize in portraying the Korean War in a positive light, and Fuller uses race for this
reason. But there is no dialogue between the North Korean soldier and the South
Korean boy, Short-Round. A dialogue between the two Koreans was not presented
because it directly counters and contradicts the U.S. government’s initiatives in Korea
and the validity of their involvement. Steel Helmet challenges its viewers to understand
and accept the U.S. involvement in the Korean War, yet Fuller chose not to address the
North vs. South conflict. Additionally, it would present the anguish of civil war for the
Korean nation that is negatively compounded by the U.S. presence.
Another dimension of Orientalism is proposed by Christina Klein. “The power
of sympathy could be a double-edged one, however: in forging emotionally satisfying
bonds across the divides of difference and in providing access to another’s subjectivity,
the sentimental could serve as an instrument for exercising power.”1 1 1 In First Yank in
Tokyo and China Sky, there is (slight) mention of Korea’s colonization but it is used to
ally Korea with the U.S. and further engender the antipathy towards Japan.
Dr. Kim’s inherent dislike for Colonel Yasuda in China Sky is the Japanese
aggression towards China. So although a half Korean character is introduced into the
plot of the movie, the initial Asian representation falls under China and Japan. When
Dr. Thompson discovers Dr. Kim’s plot to help Colonel Yasuda, he states: “I can’t
understand it, the Koreans have done everything possible to defeat the Japanese.” Until
Dr. Thompson makes mention of Korea’s own fight, the understanding of the dilemma
for Dr. Kim is his jealousy over Siu Mei. It is a token statement without explanation or
1 1 1 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961,
(Berkeley, L.A., London: University of California Press, 2003), 14-15
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context, and it provides no understanding about Korea. Yet it introduces an opposition
to Japan, therefore allying Korea with the U.S. and China, against Japan during the war.
In First Yank in Tokyo, we find that the Koreans had been fighting the Japanese
“for 25 years” with no success. Han-soo, an immediate ally with the U.S. character,
General Takashimi helps him get a job inside the hospital and fights alongside
Takashimi until death. But the movie only visually presents Americans as victims of
Japan: the prison hospital is filled with American soldiers wounded in battle, who are
attended by American nurses that are fatigued and consistently harassed by the Japanese
soldiers. The American soldiers, regardless of their illness or (lack of) strength are
forced to work in factories that build weapons for the Japanese and are repeatedly
mistreated by the war-enthusiast Japanese.
In One Minute to Zero, the refugee footage was used by the producers of the
movie to provide emphasis on a difficult and climatic moment that demonstrates the
conflict and challenge for Colonel Janowski. Paul M. Edwards in A Guide to Films on
the Korean War states that “It is an important film if for no other reason, that it deals
with the question of American involvement in what looks very much like a civil
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war.” But Robert Lentz’s Korean War Filmography criticizes the refugee massacre
scene because of the dramatic license it takes and due to its futility. “The film not only
understates the slaughter, but indicates that it was effective in eliminating the enemy
threat.”1 1 3 He further states:
1 1 2 Paul M. Edwards, A Guide to Films on the Korean War, (Westport, Ct. and London:
Greenwood Press, 1997), 88.
1 1 3 Robert J. Lentz, Korean War Filmography 91 English Language Features through 2000,
(Jefferson, N.C. and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2003), 271.
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Because such massacres generally did not happen in Korea, the film
takes a dramatic stance which is directly opposed to the reality of war.
The massacre is a shocking moment in the story, but it is also an untrue
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moment.
The U.S. government held little sympathy for the cries and pleas of Korea, too
much was at stake. The U.S. had to win the war and then control Russian and
Communist expansion in Asia, and throughout the world. At the1943 Cairo Conference
led by President Roosevelt and attended by Chiang Kai-shek and Winston Churchill,
Roosevelt introduced and advocated a trusteeship for Korea; he did not believe that
Korea could govern itself, post-liberation. As I already stated, Bruce Cumings details in
great length the steps the Korean nation in Korea, China and in the U.S. took to ensure
self-rule and sovereignty. But this was disregarded by the U.S. The disparity of power
between the U.S. and Korea allowed the U.S. to wield and utilize its power on the
peninsula. This proved unfavorable for the Korean nation, but in keeping with a U.S.
agenda.
Roosevelt introduced the trusteeship because, as stated earlier he felt that Korea
was unable to govern itself.1 1 5 This political statement and governmental condescension
regarding Korea is filmically presented in a number of films concerning the Korean
War. The supposed inability of the Korean nation, immediately elevates the status and
capability of the U.S. The U.S. then, altruistically and willingly helps its ‘needy’ friend.
In One Minute to Zero, the opening dialogue of the film is given by the female
lead character describing Korea at the time of the Korean War’s start:
1 1 4 Ibid., 272.
1 1 5 Bruce Cumings, The Two Koreas On the Road to Reunification?, Headline Series No. 294,
(Foreign Policy Association, 1990), 27.
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Linda Day: South Korea in the Spring of 1950. A gentle land whose people only
wanted to live as one and peace with the world. But Red storms were gathering in the
North, and South Koreans were starting to prepare to defend themselves against
invasion. Their methods primitive, their equipment pitifully crude, but they were trying.
(my emphasis)
Immediately following this dialogue, Colonel Janowski sarcastically remarks about the
inabilities of the South Korean army; he then shows the South Korean soldiers how to
shoot and destroy an army tank. The visual presentation and the dialogue bolster the
perception that American involvement was necessary. This paper does not seek to argue
whether American involvement was necessary or not, but the representation of the
Korean nation place the American presence in Korea as good, positive necessary. But
this can and does limit the scope and meaning of American presence in Korea, which
then simply and conveniently reduces the Korean nation as needy, weak and deficient
against their ‘Red’ enemy.
An obvious distinction about the presentation of the Korean War is the actual
presentation of Koreans. I parallel this with Edward Said’s criticism of European
condescension of those in the East:
There is in addition the hegemony of European identity as a superior one
in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures. There is
in addition the hegemony of European ideas about the Orient, themselves
reiterating European superiority over Oriental backwardness, usually
overriding the possibility that a more independent, or more skeptical
thinker might have had different views on the matter.1 1 6
Whether it be through their (in)ability to speak English well in Steel Helmet, M*A*S*H
and Battle Hymns, their religious beliefs- Buddhism vs. Christianity1 1 7 in Steel Helmet,
1 1 6 Edward Said, Orientalism, (N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1978), 7.
1 1 7 1 make this distinction, because in the U.S., Christianity is a popular and dominating religion,
whereas Buddhism is not. Therefore, the unfamiliarity of Buddhism with a U.S. audience, can
contribute to the ‘us’ and ‘them’ context.
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Korean apathy in Jack London, and poverty in Battle Circus. The representation of
Koreans particularly in comparison to the U.S. characters is presented in a demeaning
manner. This undoubtedly and naturally highlights the elevated position of the
Americans in Korea as partial savior and bastion of civility.
Of course the showcase of American heroics and benevolence takes on various
shades and forms.
Curiously though, so influential has been the discourse insisting on
American altruism, specialness, and opportunity that ‘imperialism’ as a
word or ideology has turned up only rarely and recently in accounts of
U.S. culture, politics and history. But the connections between imperial
politics and culture is astonishingly direct. American attitudes to
American ‘greatness,’ to hierarchies of race, to the perils of revolution
have remained constant, have dictated, have obscured, the realities of
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empire....
I could not find a movie that did not contain an American character or some
aspect of positive U.S. influence concerning Korea. (In contrast, during WWII, Dragon
Seed was released by MGM; Dragon Seed presented a Chinese family fighting Japanese
aggression. Although there were implicit connections between China and the U.S., there
was no American character throughout the movie.) The storylines of U.S. GI’s in
Korea, or an American presence in and in relation to Korea, is itself an aspect of the
disparity. “The scientist, the scholar, the missionary, the trader, or the soldier was in, or
thought about, the Orient because he could be there, or could think about it, with very
little resistance on the Orient’s part.”1 1 9 Movies such as Battle Hymns, Battle Circus,
Bridges ofToko-Ri, and Steel Helmet are blatant in their elevation of Americans helping
and saving Korea. The closing scene in Battle Hymns shows Colonel Hess returning to
1 1 8 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1983), 8.
1 1 9 Edward Said, Orientalism, (N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1978), 7.
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Korea and the orphanage he helped build, where he is then serenaded with a religious
song by the Korean orphans. In Steel Helmet, Sgt. Zack is apprehensive to let Short-
Round travel with him, but when he finally relents, Short-Round’s enthusiastic reply is,
“We thank you, we thank you, we thank you.”
To convey the idea of American altruism and not imperialism, particularly
during the Korean War, the threat of Communism was utilized by both the U.S.
government and by the film producers to justify and validate any U.S. involvement in
Korea.
Based on the U.S. balance-of-power concerns vis a vis the Soviet Union,
it posited a zero-sum conflict between Moscow which it figured as
aggressive and expansionist, and Washington, which it figured as
defensive and peaceful. Containment held that, since cooperation with
Soviets was impossible and all communist governments were subservient
to Moscow, the expansion of communism anywhere in the world posed a
direct threat to the U.S. share of world power.1 2 0
What is regrettably missing from all the Korean War films is U.S. involvement in Korea
prior to the war’s start. And of course this leads to biased truths and half-facts that is a
result of the position held by the U.S. over Korea. This act is a “.. .western style for
dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.”1 2 1 In Steel Helmet, the
‘real’ enemy is qualified as the Soviets, not the North Koreans. The following
conversation takes place when the North Korean soldier is capture by the U.S. army
unit:
Sgt. Zack: Where are the rest of your Russians?
North Korean Major: I’m not Russian, I’m a North Korean Communist.
1 2 0 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961,
(Berkeley, L.A., London: University of California Press, 2003), 24.
1 2 1 Edward Said, Orientalism, (N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1978), 3.
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He is described by the commanding officer as “ A Major from a crack Manchurian
regiment.”
M*A*S*H is unique in its presentation of the Korean War. Since it was
produced seventeen years after the war’s end, it was not subjected to HUAC guidance
or the extremity of the time’s rhetoric concerning the war. Instead, it was influenced by
the social and political climate of the late 60’s and early 70’s. Director Robert Altman
sought to condemn the U.S. government in its actions, but it was against the Vietnam
War. Altman then, manipulated the presentation of the Korean War to project his
political beliefs about another war. Robert Lentz’s Korean War Filmography contains a
statement made by Altman concerning M*A*S*H.
We were dealing with the Vietnam War. The script was about the
Korean War, but all of the political attitudes and the irreverence and the
criticisms and everything we did was at Nixon and the Vietnam War. We
used the Korean War as a surrogate for the Vietnam War.1 2 2
Altman’s presentation then, takes on another dimension of Orientalism; where the
producers that belong to the dominant power, may not be in congruence with the
government and/or military, but yet their privileged and dominant position allows
similar privileges: to create, dominate, manipulate the representation and its narratives
and discourse.
One Minute to Zero parallels Steel Helmet and The Bridges o f Toko-Ri in the
alleged Russian role in Korea that propelled U.S. involvement. Of course these
allegations that the films make are highly problematic. As stated in Part I, Bruce
Cumings’ The Origins o f the Korean War and A M odem History Korea’ s Place in the
1 2 2 Robert J. Lentz, Korean War Filmography 91 English Language Features through 2000,
(Jefferson, N.C. and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2003), 222.
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Sun diminish the Russian involvement in comparison with the U.S. But these movies
utilize the Communist threat and place it squarely on the shoulders of the Soviet Union
and China. Movies such as The Rack and The Manchurian Candidate perpetuates these
problematic notions, and because these movies were produced and released after the
end of the Korean War, they continue to propagate the same notions. In these particular
movies, any struggle, conflict or narrative pertaining to Korea is entirely left out, and
the Communist threat is supported within narratives concerning POWs and
brainwashing.
The containment policies of the Cold War utilized ‘us’ and ‘them’ differently
than during WWII. Christina Klein states that the cross-border alliances were necessary
in order to validate any overseas endeavors.
Different kinds of expansion demand and produce different legitimating
discourses. Because U.S. expansion into Asia was predicated on the
principle of international integration rather than on territorial
imperialism, it demanded an ideology of global interdependence rather
than one of racial difference.1 2 3
The alliance in Steel Helmet can be placed in Short-Round’s relationship with Sgt. Zack
and the U.S. army unit; and in The Bridges ofToko-Ri, although there is no mention nor
a South Korean character to illuminate their alliance, a strong bond is presented to
connect the U.S. and Japan when Brudebaker and his family share a private swimming
pool with a Japanese family.
We gain a better understanding of U.S. engagement with Korea in regards to
government policy and film representation when utilizing Said’s Orientalist discourse.
The de-construction of the actions and representations illustrate U.S. power and how
1 2 3 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961,
(Berkeley, L.A., London: University of California Press, 2003), 16.
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this power influenced and contributed to the meaning and understanding of Korea in the
U.S.
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Part VII: Conclusion
Edward Said’s Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism and Christina Klein’s
Cold War Orientalism provide pertinent theories to examine U.S. engagement with
Korea. Since their first relations in 1882, U.S. power in relation to Korea has been
dramatic and significant aspect of their relationship. The inequality would manifest
during the last years of WWII and then solidified in the post-war period.
To define what Korea is and what the nation means in the U.S. surpasses the
scope of this paper. What I seek to uncover then, are the various factors that contribute
to Korea’s meaning and understanding in the U.S. This understanding is grounded in
how the U.S. engaged with Korea. What factors motivated, stipulated and validated the
U.S. and its engagement with Korea, specifically with government policies and film
representations.
What we find is that the U.S. government and films used Korea to further its
prerogatives. This was enabled by the ‘power position’ held by the U.S. As Said states,
this ‘power position’ is a relevant and significant aspect of the relationship shared by
the U.S. and Korea. Therefore Korea’s meaning in the U.S. is contextualized by the fact
that it is a country, a nation, and a state that exists within a context, that of U.S. power.
U.S. government policies and the films discussed in this paper reflect the various ways
that Korea as a weaker nation was manipulated and used to further U.S. objectives. And
most importantly, it was filtered through an unequal relationship that was always
immediately and absolutely favorable to the U.S.
The U.S. engagement with Korea validated its interference in the peninsular
nation. Whether it was to fight Japanese imperialism and militarism or to fight against
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Soviet and Chinese Communism, the U.S. role in Korea contains strong facets of
benevolence, altruism and goodness. This is problematic because it is not entirely true,
and was infinitely more complicated than this simplification. And when the U.S. agenda
is simplified, the nations used to propagate the cause can be simply and easily
manipulated. U.S. influence in Korea resulted in its civil war than lingers to present day.
The bias of this truth tints Korea’s meaning and its understanding in the U.S.
I believe this examination of the U.S. and its power is important to understand;
the context of how it is utilized, justified and validated. The notion of U.S. benevolence
that is propagated is then supported by cultural institutions such as the film industry.
Within this broad manipulation, smaller countries and their tragedies are destroyed and
used. ‘Other’ people are portrayed in a negative view whereas Americans are portrayed
against these negative representations and held up to a high regard, regardless of
truthful circumstances.
Of course U.S. engagement with Korea has continued to evolve since the
Korean War. Economic inter-change with the U.S. and economic growth for Korea
have added to Korea’s meaning in the U.S., in addition the 1988 Olympics held in
South Korea allowed for a positive cultural contribution. In recent times though, North
Korea has been re-introduced in the U.S., under negative circumstances, and relations
between the U.S. and South Korea are not as comfortable as they had been in the past.
Korean representation has dwindled since presentations of the Korean War.
Although the U.S. government’s engagement with North Korea continues to be
belligerent and its relationship with South Korea continues on a somewhat similar
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trajectory as the relationship discussed in this paper, the factors that contribute and
influence Korea’s meaning and understanding have altered the Orientalist image.
North America’s large Korean population (nearing one million), import South
Korean movies, television programs, news programs, music, literature, etc. They
continue to filter into the U.S. and satiate the demand placed by Koreans living in the
U.S. and Canada. Additionally, Korean studies programs at various colleges and
universities in the U.S. are instrumental to change and illuminate Korea’s history,
culture, language, tradition, etc., as well as putting into perspective the U.S. and Korea’s
relationship. The import of Korean popular culture and academic work will no doubt
present Korea within a context that is not entirely subjective to various U.S.
prerogatives and therefore allow a more balanced understanding and creation of Korea’s
meaning in the U.S.
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MacMillan Company. 1952.
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University of New York Press. 1999.
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6 6
Lentz, Robert J. Korean War Filmography 91 English Language Features through
2000. Jefferson, N.C. and London: McFarland & Company, Inc. 2003.
Lipschutz, Ronnie D. Cold War Fantasies Film, Fiction, and Foreign Policy. Laham,
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McKenzie, Frederick Arthur. The Tragedy o f Korea. Seoul, Korea: Yonsei University
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Neumann, William I. American Encounters Japan From Perry to MacArthur.
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Oliver, Robert T. Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea: 1942-1960 A
Personal Narrative. Seoul, Korea: Panmun Book Company Ltd. 1978.
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Foreign Policy. Westport, Ct. and London: Praeger. 2003.
Pratt, Keith and Richard Rutt. Korea A Historical and Cultural Dictionary. Curzon
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Hal Wallis’ Casablanca.” In Hollywood’s America United States History Through Its
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Said, Edward. Culture and Imperialism. N.Y.: Vintage Books. 1983.
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6 7
Sham, Robert and Ella Shohat. Unthinking Eurocentrism Multiculturalism and the
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The Korean American Times Fifty Years Pukmi-Sibo. Introduction. 10-15.
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68
Filmography
Dir., Altman, Robert. M*A*S*H. 20th Century Fox. 1970. 116 minutes.
Dir., Brooks, Richard. Battle Circus. MGM-Corps. 1953. 89 minutes.
Dir., Bucquet, Harold S. and Jack Conway. Dragon Seed. MGM-Corps. 1944. 148
minutes.
Dir., Dorfman, William and Bessie Loo. China Sky. RKO-Radio Pictures. 1945. 78
minutes.
Dir., Frankenheimer, John. The Manchurian Candidate. M.C. Productions. 1962. 126
minutes.
Dir., Fuller, Samuel. Steel Helmet. Lippert Productions. 1951. 84 minutes.
Dir., Garnett, Tay. One Minute to Zero. RKO-Radio Pictures. 105 minutes.
Dir., Laven, Arnold. The Rack. MGM-Corp. 1956.
Dir., King, Louis. Sabre Jet. Carl Krueger Productions. 1953. 96 minutes.
Dir., Milestone, Lewis. Pork Chop Hill. Melville Productions. 1959. 97 minutes.
Dir., Robson, Mark. The Bridges ofToko-Ri. Perlberg-Seaton Productions &
Paramount. 1955.
Dir., Ruman, Sam. First Yank in Tokyo. RKO-Radio Pictures. 1945. 82 minutes.
Dir., Santell, Alfred. Jack London. Samuel Bronston Pictures, Inc. 1943. 94 minutes.
Dir., Sirk, Douglas. Battle Hymns. Universal. 1957. 108 minutes.
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69
Appendix
Taken from: The Tragedy o f Korea by F.A. McKenzie. 1969.
Published by Seoul, Korea: Yonsei University Press: 311-312.
PETITION FROM THE KOREANS OF HAWAII TO PRESIDENT
ROOSEVELT
Honolulu, T.H. July 12, 1905
To His Excellency, The President of the United States.
Your Excellency, - The undersigned have been authorized by the 8,000 Koreans
now residing in the territory of Hawaii at a special mass meeting held in Honolulu, on
July 12, 1905, to present to your Excellency the following appeal: -
We the Koreans of the Hawaiian Islands, voicing the sentiment of twelve millions of
our countrymen, humbly lay before your Excellency the following facts: -
Soon after the commencement of the war between Russia and Japan, our Government
made a treaty of alliance with Japan for offensive and defensive purposes. By virtue of
this treaty the whole of Korea was opened to the Japanese, and both the Government
and the people have been assisting the Japanese authorities in their military operations
in and about Korea.
The contents of this treaty are undoubtedly known to your Excellency, therefore
we need not embody them in this appeal. Suffice it to state, however, the object of the
treaty was to preserve the independence of Korea and Japan and to protect Eastern Asia
from Russia’s aggression.
Korea, in return for Japan’s friendship and protection against Russia, has
rendered services to the Japanese permitting them to use the country as a base of their
military operations.
When this treaty was concluded, the Koreans fully expected that Japan would
introduce reforms into the governmental administration along the line of the modem
civilization of Europe and America, and that she would advise and counsel our people
in a friendly manner, but to our disappointment and regret the Japanese government has
not done a single thing in the way of improving the conditions of the Korean people. On
the contrary, she turned loose several thousand rough and disorderly men of her
nationals in Korea, who are treating the inoffensive Koreans in a most outrageous
manner. The Koreans are by nature not a quarrelsome or aggressive people, but deeply
resent the high handed action of the Japanese towards them. We can scarcely believe
that the Japanese Government approves the outrages committed by its people in Korea,
but it has done nothing to prevent this state of affairs. They have been, during the last
eighteen months, forcibly obtaining all the special privileges and concessions from our
Government, so that to-day they practically own everything that is worth having in
Korea.
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7 0
We, the common people of Korea, have lost confidence in the promises Japan
made at the time of concluding the treaty of alliance, and we doubt seriously the good
intentions which she professes to have towards our people. For geographical, racial, and
commercial reasons we want to be friendly to Japan, and we are even willing to have
her as our guide and example in matters of internal reforms and education, but the
continuous policy of self-exploitation at the expense of the Koreans has shaken our
confidence in her, and we are now afraid that she will not keep her promise of
preserving our independence as a nation, nor assisting us in reforming internal
administration. In other words, her policy in Korea seems to be exactly the same as that
of Russia prior to the war.
The United States has many interests in our country. The industrial, commercial,
and religious enterprises under American management, have attained such proportions
that we believe the Government and people of the United States ought to know the true
conditions of Korea and the result of the Japanese becoming paramount in our country.
We know that the people of America love fair play and advocate justice towards all
men. We also know that your Excellency is the ardent exponent of a square deal
between individuals as well as nations, therefore we come to you with this memorial
with the hope that Your Excellency may help our country at this critical period of our
national life.
We fully appreciate the fact that during the conference between the Russian and
Japanese peace envoys, Your Excellency may not care to make any suggestions to
either party as to the conditions of their settlement, but we earnestly hope that Your
Excellency will see to it that Korea may preserve her autonomous Government and that
other Powers shall not oppress or maltreat out people. The clause in the treaty between
the United States and Korea gives us a claim upon the United States for assistance, and
this is the time when we need it most.
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servants,
(Sgd.) P.K. Yoon
Syngman Rhee
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71
Taken from: Willow Tree Shade: The Story o f Susan Ahn Cuddy by John Cha. 2002.
Published by The Korean American Heritage Foundation. 51-54.
Washington D.C.
February 25,1919
The President of the United States. [Woodrow Wilson]
Sir:
The undersigned have been authorized by the Executive Council of the Korean
National Association which represents 1,500,000 Koreans residing in America, Hawaii,
Mexico, China and Russia, to present to you the following memorial:
We, the Koreans of America, Hawaii, China and Russia, voicing the sentiment of
20,000,000 of our countrymen in Korea, lay before you the following facts:
Japan established her protectorate over Korea, after the Russo-Japanese War, in direct
violation of her treaty obligation to Korea. It is a matter of diplomatic record that Korea
formed an alliance with Japan at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war to aid the
latter power to win the struggle. This was done in consideration of a definite guarantee
by Japan of the political independence and territorial integrity of Korea. Taking Korea
as a prize of war was a breach of covenant and of faith on the part of Japan. Neither the
people, nor the Emperor, nor the responsible Prime Minister of Korea ever sanctioned
the protectorate and subsequent annexation of their country. It was perpetuated at the
point of the sword, as sheer might over right.
Since the Japanese occupation of Korea, the country has been misruled, from the
standpoint of the Korean people. Natural resources are being developed, but they are
exploited for the benefits of the Japanese, not of Koreans. All the rights to develop the
resources of the country are given to the Japanese, and Korean enterprise, even of the
humblest sort, is insidiously hampered. The Korean merchant cannot compete with his
Japanese competitor because of the preferential treatment accorded the latter by the
Japanese government. Hundreds of thousands of Japanese, unable to make a living in
Japan proper, are brought over to Korea and are provided for at the expense of the
Koreans. Thus, the Korean people are reduced to industrial serfdom, and are forced to
submit to the Japanese through economic pressure.
From the standpoint of culture and enlightenment, the Japanese occupation of
Korea has brought a still greater calamity to our people. That Government made a
systematic collection of all works of Korean history and literature in public archives and
private homes and burned them. All Korean periodical literature - from local
newspapers to scientific journals - has been completely stamped out. The Japanese
language has been made the official tongue not only in official documents but in
schools as well. Educational regulations forbid the teaching of Christianity, but not
Shintoism (the national religion of Japan), and of history, geography and the Korean
language in all schools in Korea. Furthermore, the regulations provide that all Korean
schools shall be under the supervision of Japanese educators, and that Korean children
be taught to salute the Japanese flag and worship the Japanese Emperor’s tablet. The
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7 2
Government does not allow Korean students to go to Europe or America to finish their
education. No public gathering of any kind is allowed among the Koreans, and even
religious services are vigilantly watched by Japanese genderarmes. The Christian
church in Korea is insidiously discriminated against by Japanese authorities, as was
shown by the well known “Conspiracy Case” of 1912, when more than one thousand
leaders among Korean Christians were imprisoned and their beneficent activities ended.
The above is a brief summary of only a few of the many flagrant injustices to
which the Korean people have been and still are forced to submit. We, the common
people of Korea, with a passion for self-government and political independence, come
to you, knowing that you are an arbiter of justice and a champion of equal rights for all
peoples, strong or weak, with the hope that you may exert your good offices in helping
us secure justice at this great time, when the destiny of subject nationalities is about to
be taken up for consideration at the Peace Conference.
In the name of twenty million liberty-loving Koreans, we earnestly petition you
to espouse our cause of freedom at the Peace Table, so that the Allied Powers
assembled at the Peace Conference will take such action as will free Korean from the
present domination of Japan and place Korea under the mandatory of the League of
Nations with the definite guarantee of complete independence in the near future. The
accomplishment of this will convert the Korean peninsula into a zone of neutral
commerce to the benefit of all nations. It will, also, create a buffer state in the Far East
which will help prevent aggrandizement by any single power and maintain peace in the
Orient.
We fully appreciate the fact that it will be a delicate task for you to suggest
anything concerning the fate of a people who have not been officially associated with
the Allies in the war. But thousands of our countrymen fought as volunteers for the
Allied cause on the Russian front for the first two years of the war. And our people in
American proportionately contributed to the cause of democracy both in men and
money. The American interests in Korea, industrial, commercial and religious, are such
that the United States cannot afford to be indifferent as to what is taking place in the
Korean peninsula. The American-Korean treaty, in which the United State pledged
friendly aid to Korea, has never been abrogated or rescinded in any manner or form by
the people of Korea; nor have the Koreans, as a people, ever done anything to forfeit the
friendship and interest of the United States.
We believe, further, that, apart from these moral obligations on the part of the
United States to aid the Koreans in their aspirations for self determination, the United
States cannot afford, for the safety of its own interests, to tolerate Japanese aggression
in the Far East, and that the world cannot be made “safe for democracy” so long as
20,000,000 liberty-loving Koreans are forced to live under an alien yoke. One of your
ideals for a just and lasting peace, which the Allied Nations have agreed to accept as the
guiding principle for settlement of questions at the Peace Conference, is that “all well-
defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction.” This does not
exclude, but surely includes, the well-defined national aspirations of the Korean people.
We certainly hope that you will initiate such action as will permit the Korean
people also to recover the common birthright of freemen and to enable them to select
the government under which they wish to live.
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73
Respectfully submitted,
Representative, Korean National Association
Ahn, Chang-ho
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7 4
Published in The Truth About Korea by Korean National Association in 1919:
Aims and Aspirations of the New Korean Republic
(1) We believe in government which derives its just power from the governed.
Therefore, the government must be conducted for the interest of the people it
governs.
(2) We propose to have a government modeled after that of America, as far as
possible, consistent with the education of the masses. For the next decade it may
be necessary to have more centralized power in the government; but as
education of the people improves, and as they have more experience in the art of
self-governing, they will be allowed to participate more universally in the
governmental affairs.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Chung, Susan (author)

Core Title Disparity of power: The United States engagement with Korea

School Graduate School

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Languages and Cultures

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag anthropology, cultural,history, Asia, Australia and Oceania,history, United States,OAI-PMH Harvest,Political Science, international law and relations

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-319520

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