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Half empty or half full: Understanding early coordination strategy as a means to mitigate regional water scarcity

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Half empty or half full: Understanding early coordination strategy as a means to mitigate regional water scarcity

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Content HALF EMPTY OR HALF FULL: UNDERSTANDING EARLY COORDINATION STRATEGY AS A MEANS TO MITIGATE REGIONAL WATER SCARCITY by Frederick D. Gordon A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (POLITICAL SCIENCE) December 2005 Copyright 2005 Frederick D. Gordon Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 3220106 Copyright 2005 by Gordon, Frederick D. All rights reserved. INFORMATION TO USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. ® UMI UMI Microform 3220106 Copyright 2006 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DEDICATION This dissertation is dedicated to my father who taught me that diligence and perseverance are the strengths of the human character. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS m I would like to acknowledge my dissertation advisor Dr. Sheldon Kamieneicki for his guidance and support during the dissertation process and extend great thanks to my committee members, Professors Dan Mazmanian and Richard Dekmejian. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS DEDICATION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ABSTRACT CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 Recognizing a Global Environmental Problem 4 Challenges for Mitigating Water Scarcity 15 2 OVERVIEW OF EXPLANATORY THEORIES FOR INTERPRETING INTERSTATE WATER ACCORDS 33 Background of Global Governance Theory 33 Global Governance and Water Policy 40 Conclusion 68 3 METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING TRANS BOUNDARY FRESHWATER COOPERATION 71 Methodology Background 71 Large and Small Case Studies 72 Quantitative Methods 78 Comparative Method 79 Research Design 82 Methodology Limitations 87 Indeterminate Research Design Problems 87 Conclusion 98 4 A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF INTERSTATE WATER ACCORDS, 1950-1999 100 Introduction 100 Ratification and Cooperation 102 Interstate Water Accord Scoring 111 General Findings 114 Hypotheses Testing 116 Data Findings and Research Questions 122 Conclusion 124 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. V CHAPTER 5 COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY INTRODUCTION AND CASE STUDY NUMBER ONE (Low Level of Cooperation) 127 Introduction 127 Political Trust 128 History and Culture 13 0 Justification of Case Studies 132 Case Study Number One: Israeli-Palestinian Water Interim Accords - 1993-1995 135 Research Questions and Conclusion 159 6 CASE STUDY NUMBER TWO: LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER ACCORDS (Medium Level of Cooperation)) 161 Introduction 161 History 165 Role of Financial Institutions 167 Water Treaty Terms 169 Outstanding Issues 169 Key Variables 170 Hypotheses Testing and Research Questions 171 Conclusion 174 7 THE 1994 CONVENTION ON COOPERATION FOR THE PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF THE RIVER DANUBE (High Level of Cooperation) 176 Background 178 Water Quantity and Quality Problems 180 History 181 Hypotheses Testing and Research Questions 188 Conclusion 190 8 CONCLUSION 193 Summary of Major Findings 195 Results of Hypotheses and Theory Tests 198 Interpreting the Study’s Findings 200 Strength and Weaknesses 205 Suggestions for Further Research 209 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. vi REFERENCES 213 APPENDIX A TABLES 222 B FIGURES 238 C MAPS 243 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT Vll The purpose of this paper to is to examine how nation states are able to overcome collective action problems to solve regional water scarcity. Drawing upon global governance and traditional international relations theories, I use multiple methodologies to evaluate the underlying motivations for interstate water accord cooperation. A major assumption is that nation states must play an increasingly integral role in reducing water scarcity. How this is accomplished is the crux of this paper. Overall, scholarly research has concentrated on individual water cooperation cases with emphasis on the outcomes. Scant attention has been directed towards understanding the motivations behind establishing these accords. However, since global water scarcity is an increasing threat, it is important to develop a broader understanding of interstate water accord cooperation. I approached this problem by utilizing multiple methodologies. Quantitative analysis is important because it provides a general but aggregate understanding of interstate water accord cooperation. Geertz stated that in order to understand the bricks (institutions), one must look at the mortar (culture). Therefore, I evaluated interstate water accord cooperation qualitatively by incorporating non quantifiable variables such as culture, third parties, amongst other socioeconomic considerations. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. viii Ultimately, this paper offers a distinct template for understanding how state behavior can manage and sustain regional water resources, thereby contributing to intergenerational equity. This is a difficult proposition considering that there are over 75 different meanings of sustainability. However, a basic starting point is that society must safeguard and conserve natural resources today so that future generations will have the same opportunity tomorrow. Theodore Roosevelt stated: “In any moment of decision the best thing you can do is the right thing, the next best thing is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing.” Too often societal responses pertaining to the environment have dictated the latter two responses. Hopefully, the central arguments and research findings offered in this paper will make an important contribution towards the first choice. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 1 1 INTRODUCTION There are multiple theoretical interpretations toward understanding and evaluating interstate water accord cooperation. However, the dire effects of water scarcity are quite clear. Though water is a renewable resource, its current distribution is strikingly uneven. Over 1.5 billion people lack access to drinking water and if current projections continue, at least 3.5 billion people will live in water stressed basins in just 20 years. Furthermore, 3.3 billion people have access to water, but much of it is contaminated and 2.5 billion people have no water sanitation services. In developing countries, an estimated 90% of waste is discharged without treatment into rivers and streams. Consequently, there are about 250 million cases of water related diseases which result in 5-10 million deaths each year (World Wildlife Fund, 2003). The problem is not just a developing nation phenomenon. Freshwater conflict has been documented in Europe and North America. In the United States, 400 million cubic meters1 of groundwater is removed annually from aquifers annually in Arizona double the amount of recharge. In Spain, nearly half of the 100 aquifers are over exploited (Mayell, 2003). There are four main causes of water scarcity. They are population increase, industrial pollution, drought, and inefficient governmental responses. While there 'One cubic meter equals 1000 liters. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 is no exact formula for solving water scarcity, one plausible way to mitigate the problem can be through the continued development of interstate water accords. Of the 152 water conflicts documented in the twentieth century, only seven have resulted in skirmishes (Wolf, 1998). This suggests that states can work together collectively to solve future water conflict and possibly adhere to a recent UN goal of providing 95% of human beings with safe drinking water and sanitation by 2025 (Asian Development Bank, 2004). While empirical data from interstate water accords offers hope, comprehensive research has not been conducted on the underlying motivations for creating interstate water accords nor has there been a thorough assessment in understanding the level of cooperation within water accords. Therefore, two central questions are addressed in this study: (1) How are nation states able to overcome collective action problems and achieve measurable accords?; and (2) What factors make accords so resilient? In order to address these questions, it is important to understand that water scarcity can impact nation states in multiple ways. Levy (1990), Homer-Dixon (1993), Postel (1993), Gleick (1993, 1998, 2000) viewed it in terms of conflict. Further, Nakayama (1997), Homer-Dixon and Percival (1995), Ward (2002), and Bennet (1995) provided detailed cases studies depicting freshwater scarcity and its impact on various societies. However, aggregate analysis of 1,831 international water related events over the last 50 years revealed that two thirds of these encounters were cooperative. Nations agreed to implement joint scientific or Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 technological work and signed 157 water treaties (Postel & Wolf, 2000). According to Figure 1.1 (See Appendix B), nations are very reluctant to engage in violent conflict over water. Wolf (2000, 2002) provided initial insight towards understanding and evaluating interstate how water accords reduce freshwater scarcity. His central finding was that nation states have been able to negotiate successfully over water quantity, quality, and non-water linkages such as pollution reduction. While these are important findings, it was uncertain why this occurs or how it applies collectively to interstate water accords. The reality is that few authors have conducted systematic analysis on international water treaties as a whole (Wolf, 1997). However, there is a growing need for global environmental scholars and international security experts to evaluate the early signs and likely locations of water related disputes, as well as understand what governments and international agents can do to prevent the eruption of violence and political instability (Wolf, 2000). While water disputes generally end amicably, it is not the rule. One fourth of water-related interactions during the last half of the twentieth century were hostile. Albeit, much of the hostility was simply verbal antagonism, there were 37 occasions where rival countries either fired shots, engaged in dam destruction or undertook some other form of military action (Postel & Wolf, 2000). While acute instances of water conflict may be dismissed as outliers, the reality is that much of the world is experiencing freshwater shortages. The amount Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. available water today is the same as it was during the times of ancient Mesopotamia (approximately 4000 years ago). Since 1950, the renewable supply per person has fallen 58 percent as world population swelled from 2.5 billion to 6 billion (Postel, 2000). Unlike oil and other strategic resources, freshwater has no substitute. Clearly, forward thinking policies must be developed to manage this global crisis. This chapter provides an in-depth overview of the current global freshwater crisis and a theoretical and empirical assessment of interstate water accords. A brief summary of the entire study is presented at the end of the chapter. Recognizing a Global Environmental Problem Freshwater scarcity is a complex geo-political phenomenon with multiple dimensions. Therefore, it needs to be addressed in an incremental manner. This entails issue overview, causal factor evaluation, alternative policy solutions, and interstate water accord evaluation. Background Water is endemic to any society. “From water we have created every living thing (The Koran) to American literature; if you touch water, you touch 2 Water scarcity is understood as a lack o f secure, uninterrupted, and long-term availability of adequate amounts o f freshwater, o f required quality, on a regular basis, and for multiple needs (Elhance, 1999) 3 Even though the world is 97% water, only 3 percent is freshwater and o f that only 1 percent is available. Freshwater is inaccessible because it is trapped in glaciers and water distribution is not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. everything” (Cassuto quoting Gunther, 2002). Water has significant symbolic value because it is viewed as a cleansing and healing agent and in many cultures is associated with rebirth (Driscol, 1998). It also is the only limited natural resource that absolutely is essential to human life4. Unlike energy, where technological advancements offer solar panels, wind turbines, and fuel cells to replace coal, oil, and gasoline, there is no alternative to water (Graffy, 1998). Population increase, pollution, drought, and myopic governmental solutions have increased freshwater competition. While a Malthusian5 perspective has never been proven, water management needs to improve greatly in order to meet current and future population needs. If current practices remain unchecked, Benjamin Franklin’s statement, “when the well’s dry, we know the price of water” (Postel, 1993) may soon be felt in massive proportions. A starting point to evaluate freshwater scarcity is the seminal study, Water Scarcity in the Twenty-First Century (International Water Management Institute, 1999). It projected water supply and demand for 118 countries from 1990-2025 based on water consumption patterns in agriculture, industry, households, and the allocated evenly. Some places, like Canada, Austria, and Ireland, have more water than they can possibly use; others, like Australia, northern China, and the Middle East have too little. In many parts o f the world, such as India and Bangladesh, rainfall is highly seasonal: almost all the year’s supply may arrive within a few months. (UNDP 2000) (See Figure 1.2 on Global Freshwater Availability, Appendix C). 4 A 1% deficiency o f water in the human body makes one thirsty, a 5% decrease causes a slight fever, and a 10% decrease creates immobility. At a 12% loss o f water causes death (Swanson, 2001). 5 Thomas Robert Malthus, in his essay on the ‘Principle o f Population’ in 1798, asserted that population growth naturally outstrips the growth in food production, so that a decrease in the per capita availability o f food is inevitable, until eventually a point is reached at which starvation, or some other disaster, drastically reduces the human population to a level which can be sustained by the available food supply (Caroline Thomas in Baylis and Smith, 2000). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 environment. The study indicated that the Middle East, Southern Africa, and portions of China and India will face absolute water scarcity issues by 2025. This means that these countries will not be able to meet their basic water consumption demands by 2025. Population growth is the central factor for explaining water scarcity in each of the four previously mentioned categories. Table 1.1 depicts countries facing water scarcity and Table 1.2 reflects the central factors which influence water demand (See Appendix A). According to Table 1.1 there are four types of water scarce categories. Countries that are labels category one and two are of immediate concern. Countries in the first category face absolute water scarcity where daily water requirements are threatened. One billion people (projected to reach 1.8 billion by 2025) predominantly located in the Middle East, South Africa, and portions of China and India are affected. More ominously, these people will not have enough water to maintain 1990 per capita levels by 2025 (IWMI, 1999). The second category are countries that have sufficient water resources to meet projected 2025 requirements, but will require greater efforts to extract water. Currently, 350 million people live under these conditions but 900 million people could be affected by 2025 (IWMI, 1999). The problem is further pronounced because many of these countries lack financial resources to offset impending water shortages (i.e., dam construction and irrigation development). Freshwater scarcity will remain a serious issue even if better irrigation methods are implemented. According to the IWMI, improved irrigation will Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 require 60% more water in order to meet basic food supplies by 2025. This means 2.7 billion people will still remain without adequate freshwater supplies. Table 1.2 (See Appendix A) and Figures 1.3 and 1.4 (See Appendix B) illustrate how increasing agricultural demands impact water consumption. It is perplexing that while major diseases have been eradicated, humankind has not effectively managed natural resources. Natures’ conflict with neoliberal ideology is part of the problem6. Natural resources have been viewed simply as a means for creating greater economic growth without concern for current or future generations. This is a serious problem for developing countries who are under pressure to meet the basic needs of the people; food and clothing, shelter, and economic growth. In some cases, developing countries believed that environmental destruction was an inherent by-product of the development process and thus environmental measures meant less economic growth. For example, Indian Prime Minister Indira Ghandi asked at the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, “How can we speak to those who live in the villages and in the slums about keeping the oceans, the rivers, and the air clean, when their own lives are contaminated? Are not poverty and need the greatest polluters?” (Andreen, 2000). Whether it is from socioeconomic or other factors, nation states are reluctant to recognize water scarcity’s full impact. Water should be valued as a natural resource independent of socio-economic considerations. However, vague 6Though some may argue that the highest form o f neo-liberal thought encompasses post-industrial values, where protecting the environment is o f highest priority. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 international law and pressing economic demands have enabled it to remain ill- governed and severely under-priced (Economist, 2003). Consequently, there has been limited domestic and international support in solving freshwater scarcity issues. This in turn has led to substantial, unnecessary, and preventable human suffering. An estimated 14 to 30 thousand people, mostly young children and the elderly, die every day from water-related diseases. At any given moment, approximately one-half of the people in the developing world suffer from diseases caused by drinking contaminated water or eating contaminated food (United Nations, 1997). Other studies corroborate IWMI findings. According to a recent UN World Water Development Report, freshwater demand has tripled in the past 50 years. More than 2.3 billion people (17% of global population) lack access to safe drinking water. Two million die each year from water related diseases and half the developing world population suffers from water related maladies (Wertheim, 2004). The United Nations and the National Intelligence Council project at least 40 per cent of the world’s population, or about three billion people, will live in water scarce countries by 2015 (Jehl, 2002). Additionally, as many as 7 billion people in 60 countries will face water scarcity within the next half century (UNDR, 2003). By 2015, nearly three billion people - 40 percent of the projected world population are expected to live in countries that find it difficult or impossible to mobilize enough water to satisfy the food, industrial, and domestic needs of its Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. citizens. This scarcity will translate into heightened competition for water between neighboring states and provinces. Maps 1.1 and 1.3 highlight the regions where water stress is evident (See Appendix C). Two continents exhibiting serious acute water shortages are Africa and the Middle East. By 2010, freshwater scarcity will affect 450 million people, approximately 37% of the Africa’s projected population (Farley, 2001). The Middle East is another desperate region. Nine of the 14 Middle East countries face water scarce conditions. Several country populations are expected to double over the next 25 years, exacerbating pressure on already scarce water supplies (Postel, n 1992). The Middle East is also where war has been waged directly over water. Other problem areas include China, Mexico, India, and United States’ southwestern region. The Chinese government is redirecting rivers (1000 miles to the north) from the Yangtzee basin to water parched cities of Beijing and Tianjin. This could have serious environmental implications because much of the water is untreated and nearly 300,000 people will be uprooted (Eckhol, 2002). In the western part of the United States water scarcity has impacted negatively local U.S. and Mexican border economies and strained interstate relations over access to the Colorado River. Water riots have occurred in New Delhi, India (2002) and 7 March 1965-July 1966. Israel and Syria exchange fire over “all-Arab” plan to divert the Jordan River headwaters, presumably to preempt Israeli “national water carrier,” an out-of-basin diversion plan from the Sea o f Galilee. Construction o f the Syrian diversion was halted in July 1966. Wolf: Walter Policy 1 (1998), 251-265 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10 Monterey, Mexico (1995). While water conflict varies in size and location, it is evident in both hemispheres, including central Asia8, Europe, and South America. Causal Factors Freshwater scarcity is caused by population growth, industrial pollution, drought, and ineffective governing policies. In 1830 one billion people inhabited the earth. Despite wars, famine, and disease, human population increased 500% over the last 150 years. Today, six billion people inhabit the earth today with a population equivalent of New York City added each month (ninety million people a year). Even if terrorism or war claims a million lives, those numbers are replaced within four days (Ward, 2002). Unprecedented population growth has increased water use six-fold (Jehl, 2002). Half the world’s available freshwater is depleted each year. This figure could reach as high as 74% by 2025. Water tables have fallen on every continent and the situation is expected to worsen. Greater food production is required to meet expanding population needs. However, this entails increased agricultural output. Over-pumping, and agricultural run-off have reduced water quantity and quality in many regions. Groundwater mismanagement is now wide-spread in parts of China, India, Mexico, Thailand, the western United States, North Africa, and the Middle East (Postel, 1993). 8 Environmental problems o f the Aral Sea basin are amongst the worst in the world. Water diversions, agricultural practices, and industrial wastes have resulted in disappearing sea, salination, and organic and inorganic pollution (Beach et al., Trans-boundary Freshwater Dispute Resolution. UN Press, N ew York, 2000, 121. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 The largest and most combustible imbalance between population and available water supplies is Asia, where crop production depends heavily in irrigation. Asia today has roughly 60 per cent of the world’s people but only 36 percent of the world’s renewable freshwater (Postel & Wolf, 2000). China, India, Iran, and Pakistan are among the countries where a significant share of the irrigated land is now jeopardized by groundwater depletion, scarce river water, a fertility- sapping build up of salts in the soil, or some combination of these factors. Groundwater depletion alone places 10 to 20 percent of grain production in both China and India at risk. Water tables are falling steadily in the North China Plain, as well as in India’s northwest Punjab region. Water scarcity has forced many farmers to move to overcrowded cities. This is the case in Pakistan, where falling agricultural output has prompted a massive rural migration to large urban centers, contributing to renewed outbreaks of ethnic violence. Internal water stresses also shifts international political alliances, which in turn adds to the humanitarian crises. Many countries commonly adapt to water stress by importing their food (provided they have the foreign exchange to do so). It takes about 1,000 cubic meters of water to grow one ton of grain. By importing wheat and other staples, water stressed countries can allocate more of their scarce freshwater to cities and industries, which generate far more economic value per liter than agriculture does. Currently water stressed countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East account for 26 percent of global grain imports (Postel & Wolf, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12 2000). This trend is projected to increase over the next 15 years, which includes China, India, and Pakistan. These countries are grain self-sufficient, but are unlikely to remain so considering that 80% of the available freshwater in Asia is used for irrigation, and 90% of irrigation water is used for rice.9 Pollution Man’s callous treatment of natural resources has led to global warming as well as river and stream pollution. Water ways are contaminated with human, industrial, and agricultural wastes. Fertilizers, pesticides, and overgrazing have reduced water quantity and quality. Now, more than half the world’s major rivers are either polluted or have reduced water levels. Additionally, half the planet’s wetlands have been lost in the twentieth century, and freshwater systems all over the world are losing their ability to support human, animal, and plant life (Ward, 2002). The problem is compounded further because natural freshwater is distributed unevenly, with too much water in some areas and far too little in others (Jehl, 2000). Maps 1.1 and 1.3 (See Appendix C) depict regions facing varying water scarcity problems. In many developing countries water-quality indicators have deteriorated or are not even measured. For example, ambient water quality for Chinese rivers shows substantial degradation since 1990 (Gleick, 2003). Even in developed 9 Rice is a heavy consumer o f water. It takes an average o f 650 gallons (2,500 liters) o f water to produce one pound o f rice. Over the last hundred years, Asia has been facing a dramatically increasing demand to feed a rapidly growing population. Future rice production must focus on far more efficient irrigation systems and reduced water consumption by the rice plant (Swanson, 2001). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13 countries, water quality improvements have been modest (Gleick, 2000).1 0 Since 1980, water per capita use in the United States declined substantially due to greater efficiency by farmers and industrial users. However, these gains could be lost by increasing water demand of American cities and suburbs, especially in the arid west. There are many serious socio-political issues that permeate the world. Civil war, famine, AIDS, and malaria are prominent social issues that impact life quality and longevity. Still, these issues pale in comparison to global freshwater scarcity problems. No society can survive without adequate freshwater supplies. Modem society must refocus and sustain existing water supplies.1 1 However, achieving sustainability is a difficult process. Goodland and Daly (1996) believed sustainability must incorporate both human and ecological needs. They divided the legacy left to future generations into natural, manufactured, and human or social capital. Natural capital is defined as our natural environment. Manufactured capital is the human created infrastructure. Finally human or social capital reflects the people, its institutions, information, knowledge, and culture. These categories are not interchangeable and sustainability must be applied to each category (Cousins, 2003). This means that people need to develop a comprehensive (economic, political, social, and scientific) understanding of water sources. Only 1 0 Gleick found that organic pollutants and global emissions increased in study conducted from 1980-1998. The United States recorded modest water quality improvements by reducing pollutant emissions from 2.74 million to 2.58 million per day (Gleick, 2000). 1 1 Water sustainability means the ability o f human society to endure and flourish into the indefinite future without undermining the integrity o f the hydrological cycle or the ecological systems that depend on it (Gleick, 2000). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14 then will society be able to adapt effective water management policies to resolve future disputes. Even then policies must be pragmatic for effective implementation to occur (Cosens, 2003). This strategy could entail a combination of philosophical approaches. According to western thought, God made an imperfect world for man to make perfect. For the eastern mind, God made a perfect world for man to learn how to live in harmony with it. In their own ways, both philosophies are correct in addressing regional water scarcity and in developing effective measures for mitigating the crisis. International Recognition Freshwater scarcity has been recognized as a major problem at the international level. The Dublin Principles (1992) declared that freshwater is an input to which every human has the right to “sustain life and meet basic sanitation needs” and elucidated that each person is entitled to 50 liters of water per day1 2 (Asian Development Bank, 2003). The 1992 Rio Earth Summit reaffirmed this point by expanding human rights to include environmental water needs. In 1997, the United Nations declared that water planning must address both human needs and ecosystem preservation (Asian Development Bank, 2003). The Johannesburg earth summit (2002) agreed to reduce the number of people without safe access to 1 2 There are four Dublin Principles: 1) Freshwater is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development, and the environment; 2)Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners, and policy-makers at all levels; 3) Women play a central part in the provision, management, and safeguarding o f water; and 4) Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 15 clean water and basic sanitation by half by 2015. The United Nations declared 2003 to be the year of freshwater (Economist, 2003). However, there is a significant discrepancy between declaring goals and achieving them. First, the Dublin Principles delineated that each person is entitled access to safe drinking water, but more than a decade later, nearly 20% of the global population remains at risk. Second, the United Nations’ 2015 goal to reduce freshwater scarcity by 50% is formidable. This means the United Nations or other institutions will have to provide viable freshwater resources for 630 million people in ten years. The sanitation challenge is even more daunting: Over the next decade, 1.4 billion people will require this service. The year 2025 is the target date for 100% global access to equitable water supplies (Wertheim, 2004). Challenges for Mitigating Water Scarcity Freshwater scarcity is complex because it affects societies in various ways. Its impact is felt locally, nationally, and internationally. Regional water shortages have raised the specter of armed conflict, forced relatively affluent societies to finance huge water projects and left some of the world’s most impoverished nations in deepening crisis (Jehl, 2002). While each case requires different methods to alleviate freshwater scarcity, it is illusory to believe that freshwater scarcity can be reduced without a global commitment. Actions must take into account a wide range of social, ecological, and economic factors and needs. Governments need to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16 enhance ongoing dialogues, in order to achieve a global consensus (Dowedswell, 1998). However, current water policies are developed in a fragmented fashion. Distrust between competing institutions prevents effective collective action. Interagency cooperation fails because each power is too decentralized. In some countries, irrigation is considered by ministries of irrigation, water supply by municipalities, hydroelectric power by ministries of energy, navigation by ministries of transport, environment by ministries of environment, and health by ministries of health. Lack of coordination exhibited by intense rivalries has resulted in suboptimal water policies.1 3 Without institutional rationalization and strengthening, water management simply will not become effective (Dowedswell 1998). Equitable water management is also complicated because each river basin has its own peculiar ecosystem. Attention must be given to each river basin’s hydrology in the terms of inflows and outflows. Regardless of perspective, governments, international aid agencies, water agencies, non-governmental organizations, and local communities must work together to provide all humans with a basic water requirement and to guarantee water as a human right (Gleick, 2000). 1 3 Two emerging cases are with China and Argentina. The Chinese are developing the world’s biggest dam to divert water from the Yangtze River in the south to water scarce cities in the north. Soil erosion and water contamination could create serious environmental and health problems. In Argentina, private companies sought to overhaul and manage some o f its water systems, only to encounter cost and technical problems (Jehl, 2002). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17 Alternative Policy Solutions Privatization has been suggested as a method to reduce freshwater scarcity. This perspective is based on the Washington Consensus, which is an economic model that links effective resource allocation to liberal market economics. However, this is a deceptive practice. First, it means that a few transnational corporations, backed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (institutions that are supposed to provide economic well-being) have taken over public water services. The results are uneven because many third world societies do not have sufficient resources to pay for water price increases (Barlow and Clark, 2002). In turn, this weakens local economies, further destabilizing water scarce regions. Recent events in Cochabamba, Bolivia underscore these risks. Following the privatization of Cochabamba’s water system, water rates skyrocketed. This resulted in water bills that equaled to a more than a quarter resident’s income. While Cochabama is extreme, it is not an isolated case. Activists in Colombia and South Africa likewise have opposed the privatization of water and other municipal services. Meanwhile, IMF loan agreements with at least half a dozen countries last year called for some degree of water system privatization. The number of urban dwellers is projected to double to 5 billion by 2025. Unless governments and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18 lenders strengthen municipal water agencies towards equity as well as efficiency more violence like that in Cuchabamba may be forthcoming.1 4 One cannot predict how water how water scarcity will impact future societies, but the IWMI and UN agency reports must be taken seriously. Water is a vital resource for sustaining human life, growing crops, and serving industrial needs. However, freshwater demand is rising faster than the supply and clearly delineated conservation practices are needed to reduce the current one billion people who daily, lack sufficient water supplies. One area where this has occurred is within the framework of interstate water accords. The international environmental agreements (IEAs) have proven remarkably successful in the twentieth century. Of the 152 water disputes documented in the twentieth century, 145 or 95.3% were resolved (Wolf, 2002) Figure 1.2 (See Appendix B) illustrates the likelihood that nation states are willing to cooperate over water. However, it is perplexing that even with such success freshwater scarcity remains a growing global concern. Therefore, this study provides a comprehensive assessment of interstate water accords as a means to mitigate regional freshwater scarcity. This study contributes to the development of a new intergenerational water ethic1 5 where the 1 4 In April 2000, the La Paz government sent soldiers into Cochabamba, where approximately 30,000 protesters amassed in the central plaza. Several days o f violence ensued, leaving one person dead and more than a hundred injured. The conflict abated only when the water system returned to public control. 1 5 Intergenerational equity is the view that members o f the present generation hold the earth in trust for future generations. Intergenerational rights were recognized in both the Stockholm and Rio Declarations and are integral to the concept o f sustainable development (Graffy, 1998). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19 needs of the present are met “without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs” (Graffy, 1998). Specifically, this means a fair share of water for both developing and developed riparian nations. It also includes a fair share of water for the poor most notably women and children. They spend long hours collecting water and suffer the most from water quality and water related diseases Finally, there must be a fair share of water among competing users which includes aquatic species, habitats, and ecosystems. Heraclitus, the ancient Greek philosopher stated one never steps in the same river twice. Heraclitus’ observation indicated the ever changing flow of water and life. The world’s freshwater systems are in a constant state of natural flux. Undoubtedly, these changes have influenced the direction of civilization. However, human activities and population growth have accelerated and altered natural hydrological processes. Today, freshwater quantity and quality are serious global issues. Arid and semi-arid regions face increasing stress from water scarcity and much of the world faces growing pollution problems resulting from environmental change and inefficient management. The potential for freshwater conflict is enormous, given its importance for basic survival, industry, energy production, and other fundamental societal components. Many freshwater basins (approximately 300) lie on or across international borders. Several conflicts linked to freshwater scarcity are apparent already at both the local and international levels. In many cases, little preventive action has been taken and even less definitive planning has been implemented Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20 systematically to analyze and propose integrated management solutions (Green Cross, 1997). Therefore, it is imperative to evaluate measures that have been successful and analyze them in greater detail. This starts with evaluating interstate freshwater accords. Water Basins River basins1 6 have existed throughout humanity. They have influenced human settlement and interaction long before the establishment of interstate accords. River location and flow determined how societies developed. They provided transportation and communication which contributed to the formation of political units (Driscol, 1998). River basins should not be viewed as a mere function of society. In some instances, the physical unity of the basin has often proved stronger than the various political divisions (Driscol, 1998). Yet the river basin has unified communities and stimulated trade by creating large political and economic units. Agriculture, navigation, and human settlement location are all directly influenced by river basins. Commercial unity and non-navigational has enabled the water basin to evolve into a complex and multi-purposed entity. By the 20th century, water appropriators emphasized a systems wide integration approach of river water. 1 6 A river basin is an area which contributes hydrologically (including both surface and groundwater) to a first order stream, which in turn, is defined by its outlet to the ocean or to a terminal (closed) lake or inland sea. River basin is synonymous with watershed (U.S.) and catchment (U.K.). A basin is international if any perennial tributary crosses the political boundaries o f two or more nations (W olf and Natharius et al., 1999). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21 Nations, in turn, valued water basins even more which created greater dependency on them in terms of social organization and administration (Driscol, 1998). Interstate Water Accords Currently, there are 263 rivers that either cross or demarcate international political boundaries. Geographically, Europe has the largest number of international basins (69), followed by Africa (59), Asia (57), North America (40), and South America (38) (Wolf, Giordano, 2004). The absolute number of international basins, as well as the nations through which they traverse, change over time due to political changes (Map 1.3 (See Appendix C) reflects worldwide basin distribution and water stress level). For example, in the 1990’s, the break up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia led to the internationalization of several basins as well as to changes in the political composition of existing international basins (i.e., Danube and Aral Sea Basins). In contrast, the unification of Germany and Yemen in 1990 resulted in the “nationalization” of the Weser and Tiban water basins (Wolf, Giordano, 2003). The geographical structure of the world’s international waterways is also significant. The world’s 263 international river basins accounts for nearly one-half of the earth’s land surface, generate 60% of global freshwater flow, and are home to approximately 40% of the world’s population. It is the political composition of these shared water systems that highlights their vulnerabilities. A total of 145 countries contribute territory to international basins. Thirty-Three nations, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22 including sizable countries such as Bolivia, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger, and Zambia have more than 95% of their territory within the hydrologic boundaries of one or more of the international basins. Even more significant is the number of countries that share individual basins. The Danube has seventeen riparian states. The Congo, Niger, Nile, Rhine, and Zambezi are shared by more than nine countries while the Amazon, Aral Sea, Gagnes-Brahmaputra- Meghna, Jordan, Kura-Araks, La Plata, Lake Chad, Mekong, Neman, Tarim, Tigris-Euphrates, Shatt al Arab, Vistula, and Volga basin each contain territory of at least five sovereign nations (Wolf et al., 1999). The complex physical, political, and human interactions within international river basins makes the management of these shared water systems especially difficult. Issues of increasing water scarcity, quantity, rapid population growth, unilateral water development, and uneven levels of economic development are potentially disruptive factors in co-riparian water relations (Wolf, 2004). Yet, despite these formidable obstacles, co-riparians have demonstrated a remarkable ability to cooperate over their shared water supplies. In the largest quantitative study of water conflict and cooperation, Oregon State University researchers found that cooperative interactions between riparian states over the past fifty years have outnumbered conflictive interactions by more than two to one. Since 1948, the historical record documents only 37 incidents of acute conflict (i.e., those involving violence) over water (30 of these events were between Israel and of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23 its neighbors, the last of which occurred in 1970. At the same time, approximately 295 water agreements were negotiated and signed (Wolf, 2004). At the sub-acute level, which defines most water interactions, cooperative relations dominate the history of international water relations. This does not imply that water cannot act as a source of discord. Water was the last and most contentious issue resolved in negotiations over the 1994 Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan and in the Israeli-Palestinian context discussions concerning the resource were relegated to the “final status” negotiations along with other controversial issues such as the status of Jerusalem, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees (Wolf, Giordano, 2003). However, water cooperation is far more prevalent especially where strong institutions are present. The establishment of the Indus Water Commission in 1960 between India and Pakistan fostered remarkably resilient bilateral cooperation over water, notwithstanding two wars and continued political turmoil between the two states. The Mekong River Committee, established in 1957 among the four lower riparian states of Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos also weathered extreme political conditions and viable water cooperation even during the Vietnam War (Wolf, 2004). Thus, the creation and maintenance of effective international water institutions offer hope that current freshwater scarcity problems can be managed. In fact, the presence or absence of institutions has proven to be one of the most important factors influencing co-riparian water relations, exceeding traditional Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24 variables such as climate, water availability, population density, political orientation, and levels of economic development (Wolf, 2004). Further, the historical record indicates an increased likelihood of basin conflict where institutions are unable to accommodate to changing political and hydrologic needs. Yet where international water institutions exist, relations among riparian states are generally more cooperative than in basins without treaties or other cooperative management mechanisms (Wolf, Yoffe, Giordano, 2003). Regional Accords Regional organizational initiatives have served further to encourage co riparian cooperation. Through the creation of region-specific guidelines, multinational bodies such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have formulated agreements and protocols supporting collaborative water resource initiatives. In the 1970s’, the OECD Council recommended the management and protection of trans-boundary resources relevant to international rivers. European governments have addressed regional water issues through such agreements as the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans-boundary Context (1991) and the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-boundary Water Courses and International Lakes (1992). In 2000, the SADC member states established the Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development Community (Wolf & Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25 Giordano, 2003). (Map 1.2 (See Appendix C) shows the correlation between number of international water basins and interstate accords.) Basin Treaties The highest levels of cooperative water management are located within water basins with corresponding treaties extending back to 2500 B.C. The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations has documented more than 3600 international water treaties from AD 805 to 1984. Although a vast majority of these agreements concern navigational issues, a growing number address water scarcity. There are three distinguishing characteristics in developing interstate water accords. They are shared values, creativity, and adaptability. First, co-riparians share several hydrologic linkages. Agriculture, industry, recreation, hydropower, flood control, environmental integrity and human health are connected. While individual sectors and countries have exploited their riparian position or dominance, basin states have demonstrated a remarkable ability to cooperate upon their shared interests. For example, the 1986 Lesotho Highlands Water Project Agreement, South Africa supports the financing of hydroelectric/water diversion facility and in turn, receives the rights to drinking water for its industrial use in Guateng province. Second, basin states have illustrated a great deal of creativity in formulating treaty provisions that meet the unique hydrological, political, and cultural settings Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26 of their individual basins. As part of the 1994 Treaty of Peace, Jordan stores water in an Israeli lake while Israel leases Jordanian land and wells. India, under a 1966 agreement with Nepal, plants trees upstream in Nepal to protect its own downstream water supplies (Wolf, 1999). Third, effective accords require adaptability. Precedents exist for incorporating provisions into basin accords to accommodate changing needs and values. The 1987 Agreements on the Action Plan for the Environmentally Sound Management of the Common Zambezi River System allows for additional riparian states to sign the treaty. Other flexible treaties include the 1996 Treaty between India and Bangladesh on Sharing of the Ganga/Gagnes Waters at Farakka, the 1986 Lesotho Highlands Water Project Agreement, and the 1992 Komati River Basin Treaty between South Africa and Swaziland (Wolf, Giordano, 2003). The Freshwater Data Base offers the most comprehensive source for interpreting interstate freshwater accords.1 7 One hundred forty-five water related treaties were signed in the twentieth century. Of these, 124 (86%) are bilateral and conversely 21 are multilateral. It is unclear why an overwhelming number of treaties are bilateral. One possibility is that only two states share a majority of international watersheds. Yet, according to negotiation theory, the number of disputing parties reduces the chance for conflict resolution. This is problematic because in basins with more than two riparians, preference for bilateral agreements 1 7 Created and maintained by Aaron W olf and Meredith Giordano at Oregon State University. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27 can preclude the comprehensive regional management long advocated by water resource managers (Wolf, 2000). Most treaties focus on hydropower and water supplies. 57 (39%) discuss hydroelectric generation and fifty three (37%) distribute water for consumption. Nine (6%) mention industrial uses, six (4%) navigations, and six (4%) discuss pollution. Thirteen of the 145 (9%) focus on flood control. However, few treaties allocate water. Clearly defined allocations account for 54 (37%) of the agreements. Of that number, fifteen (28%) specify equal proportions, and thirty nine (72%) provide a specific means of allocation. All but three multilateral agreements lack definite allotments, although a few establish advisory and governing bodies among states (Wolf, 2000). Fifty seven of the treaties (39%) focus on hydropower. Power generating facilities bring development, and hydropower provides a cheap source of electricity to spur developing economies. Groundwater is only addressed in three interstate accords. The most recent is the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian agreements. However, there are serious limitations, because this accord does not provide a quantitative measure for water sharing. The 1989 Bellagio Draft treaty between the United States and Mexico provides legal framework for groundwater negotiations. The Draft requires joint management of shared aquifers and describes principles based on mutual respect, good neighborliness and reciprocity. While this framework is useful for future Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 28 groundwater diplomacy, data collection is expensive and hence, difficult to obtain (Wolf, 2000). Water and non-water linkages are often negotiated together. For example, if pollution causes trouble in a downstream country, an upstream riparian may compensate a downstream neighbor by paying for a treatment plant in lieu of reduced inputs or reduced withdrawals. Here, water quality is of greater importance than water quantity. If successful, this method has the capacity to increase water quantity benefiting all nations at risk. Increasing the scope of negotiations is reflected clearly in interstate water accords. Financial compensation is most evident in interstate accords. 44 cases (30%) addressed capital exchange, territorial or political consideration were much smaller (6 land transfer cases (4%) and two cases of political concession (1%). There are an additional 10 cases (7%) that address non-water linkages. While many prominent accords exhibit creativity and adaptability, the reality is that over half of the existing accords are quite limited. 83 cases (57%) of total interstate water accords do not have any non-water linkages. This means that a simple treaty is more vulnerable to collective action breakdown because a nation could default on its commitment without concern of reprisal. Treaties encompass support from technical and basin commissions as well as from government officials. Fifty two (36%) of the treaties provide for an advisory council or conflict addressing body within the parties governments. Fourteen treaties (10%) refer disputes to a third party or the United Nations. Thirty Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29 two treaties (22%) make no provisions for dispute resolution, and 47 treaties (32%) of the texts are either incomplete or uncertain as to dispute resolution mechanisms (Wolf, 2000). Lack of unified guidelines (as indicated by the available data) suggests that interstate water accords (which govern the world’s international watersheds and predominantly are based on international law) are in their respective infancies. More than half of these treaties do not include monitoring provisions, two thirds do not delineate specific water allocation mechanisms, and four fifths have no enforcement mechanism (Wolf, 2000). Therefore, interstate water accords offer cautious hope. Empirical evidence states that nations can overcome strident political and social obstacles and cooperate over water resources. Yet, it is uncertain how effective these accords will be in addressing current and future freshwater scarcity problems. Looking forward, there are four key components which can be used for developing future interstate water accords. First, adaptable management structures incorporate a certain level of flexibility, allowing for public input, changing basin priorities, and providing for new information and monitoring technologies. The adaptability of management structures must also extend to non-signatory riparian nations by incorporating provisions addressing their needs, rights, and potential accession. Second, there should be clear and flexible criteria for allocations and quality. Allocations, which are at the heart of most water disputes, are a function Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 30 of water quantity and quality. Therefore, effective institutions must identify clear allocation schedules and water quality standards that simultaneously provide for extreme hydrological events, new understanding of basin dynamics, and changing societal values. Additionally, riparian states should consider prioritizing uses throughout the basin. Third, there needs to be an equitable distribution of benefits. This subtle concept differs from equitable use or allocation. It involves the distribution of benefits from water use from hydro-power, agriculture, economic development, or preservation of aquatic ecosystems rather than simply the benefit of water itself. These benefits allow for greater positive sum-agreements, whereas dividing the water itself allows only for winners and losers. Fourth, many basins must continue to experience disputes even after a treaty is ratified or signed. Therefore, incorporating clear mechanisms for resolving conflicts is an inelastic prerequisite for long term effective management. Negotiation theory contains suggestions how this might accomplished. Freshwater scarcity is a serious geo-political phenomenon which affects all societies and cultures. While natural ecological factors contribute to scarcity conditions, current data reveal it is more human induced. Freshwater scarcity cannot be shared evenly by all disputing nations because many water poor countries do not have the institutional capacity to effect such positive change. Therefore, comprehensive international cooperation is essential for mitigating freshwater scarcity problems (Danilav-Danilan, 2003). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31 There is much hope for the future success of interstate water accords. They are resilient even as other strident socio-political considerations remain. This axiom will be tested with increasing levels of fresh water scarcity. Freshwater scarcity impacts water quantity, quality, and pollution levels. If unmitigated, water reduction will affect the internal stability several nations as well as serve as a catalyst to increase tensions among various social and ethnic groups. If the current projected models are accurate, water will be the major political issue for many nations as the twenty first century progresses. Interstate water accords offer a measure of hope to mitigate this crisis, but greater study is required especially in understanding how riparian states engage in early coordination strategies to reduce water conflict. This concept will be explored quantitatively and qualitatively in the remaining chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview of global governance and international relations based theories for interpreting interstate water. I devote significant discussion to common pool resource theory and discourse analysis, which bridges differences in the way people see and speak about societal problems. I then evaluate the scholarly literature that suggests freshwater scarcity contributes to interstate conflict. This is developed by analyzing Homer-Dixon’s theory of acute conflict among other competing perspectives. This chapter also incorporates a conjunctive management (Blomquist et al., 2004). At the basic level, it advocates the use of surface water during rainy seasons and groundwater only during dry climactic conditions. It links successful water Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 32 management to the level of federalism that each state provides, which may be a central factor in enabling successful interstate water accords to develop. Following the discussions of the different theoretical perspectives, Chapter 3 offers a quantitative framework for analyzing trans-boundary freshwater cooperation. It draws on Mill’s Method of Difference and Agreement for case study selection as well as defends against bias in case selection. Chapter 4 provides a quantitative assessment of interstate water accords between 1950 and 2000. Level of cooperation is ranked by level of water distribution as stated within the accords and whether there is accord ratification. Chapters 5 through 7 depict three qualitative case studies which explain interstate water cooperation in further detail. The cases are The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Accords (Low Cooperation), Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Medium Cooperation), and the 1994 Danube River Basin Accord (High Cooperation). Chapter 8 concludes with the same urgency as the paper begins. It reiterates the importance for further recognition and understanding of freshwater conflict, and leaves the reader with a greater understanding of the significance of interstate freshwater accords, and why they may be the most important tool in managing future regional water scarcity. This chapter recognizes other approaches towards mitigating freshwater scarcity such as water pricing and desalination. It concludes with the observation that interstate water accords are of increasing value to secure and safeguard the environment today and for future generations. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 33 CHAPTER 2 OVERVIEW OF EXPLANATORY THEORIES FOR INTERPRETING INTERSTATE WATER ACCORDS Background of Global Governance Theory The central theories required to understand interstate water accord negotiations stem from environmental governance and traditional international relations based literature. Environmental governance1 8 has received considerable attention from the social sciences over the last 50 years. Although there are multiple interpretations, a generally accepted definition is attempts by governing bodies or combinations thereof to alleviate recognized environmental dilemmas (Davidson, 2004). Early research on environmental governance, conducted primarily by political scientists, asks pointed questions about the conditions under which environmental policy is formulated or whether such bodies are effectively 1 8 There are generally six forms o f environmental governance. They are pluralism, agency capture, ecological Marxism, social constructionism, ecological modernization, and global environmentalism. This study assumes that interstate water accords can best be explained through application o f ecological modernization, global environmentalism, and social constructionism (explained in detail in the paper). However, I briefly define the other competing perspectives. Pluralism evaluates the effectiveness o f particular environmental policies, guided by the premise that public policy is the outcome o f competing interests and limited resources and the appropriate role o f state institutions is to provide a fair framework within which these social decision-making processes play out (Young, 1981). Agency capture is where resource agencies become dominated by a constituency o f resource users, particularly in the local context where formal (nationally delegated) authority hold less historical legitimacy (Long, 1949; Selznick, 1949, 1980). Economic Marxism posits that states are constrained by the logic o f capital, either at the national (O ’Connor, 1988, 1998; Schnaiberg & Gould, 1994) or world system level (Chase-Dunn, 1989; Chew, 1995; Moore, 2000; Roberts & Grimes, 2002). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 34 implemented within existing bureaucratic structures (Sabatier, 1979). In contrast more recent scholarship by environmental sociologists (for example the risk society (Beck, 1995, 1999), ecological modernization (e.g., Hajer, 1995; Sonnenfeld & Mol, 2002; Spaargaren & Mol, 1992) and world society (Frank, Hironaka & Schofer, 2000) use higher levels of abstraction to theorize macro-social processes that are increasingly defined by international or global linkages. This study incorporates both perspectives identifying overarching causal factors1 9 that explain cooperation (See Quantitative Methods section in Chapter 3) and specific international linkages such as neoliberal thought, political trust, societal participation, culture, and history (See Qualitative Methods section in Chapter 4). Two of the major theoretical perspectives toward understanding water cooperation and global governance are ecological modernization and global environmentalism. Ecological modernization explains how state and economic actors in industrialized nations have increasingly expressed a willingness to support ecological improvement as a rational response to environmental and material limits (Sonnefeld & Mol, 2002). These tendencies, offer hope over time, that the internalization of environmental costs will become a significant theme of reform in existing political economic structures (Buttel, 1998; Spaargaren & Mol, 1992) enabled by advances in environmental sciences and technologies (Mol, 1996). Relying primarily on Western European nations as exemplary cases, ecological modernization scholars have examined trends towards energy efficiency, waste 1 9 Overarching linkages are also addressed within the Qualitative Methods section in Chapter 5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 35 reduction, and heightened levels of environmental responsibility expressed by industries and have postulated that a given country’s economic advancement will depend on such ecological modernization efforts. These efforts are presumed to be most effective in political climates in which such actions are rewarded and in which the resources are available to support the necessary research and development (Sonnefeld, 2000). Global environmentalism focuses specifically on external or supranational pressures on nation states. Scholars of global environmentalism not only recognize the potential for global environmental problems, but also emphasize environmental state building at the nation state level. Specifically, global environmental crises address territorial state boundaries and, hence, the capacity for domestic political response (Gould, Schnaiberg & Weinberg, 1996; Hopgood, 1998), and create a global “risk society”, breaking down long standing social cleavages (Beck, 1995), both of which have elevated environmental issues onto the international political agenda. Although many globalization scholars have stressed the means by which global environmental problems have propelled us toward international forms of governance (Young, 1999), others have pointed to the continued relevance of nation states (Sonnenfeld & Mol, 2002) to foster the rapid expansion of national structures of environmental protection and improvement (Weidner, 2002). Scholars have argued that these pressures lead nation states to assume greater environmental responsibility, as evidenced through the establishment of national environmental ministries, parks and protected areas, and national environmental Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36 policy (Frank, 1999), as well as increased engagement in international environmental treaties (Dietz & Kalof, 1992; Roberts, 1996). Although Buttel (1998) agreed that the time has come for researchers to address recent sources of ecological improvement, he nonetheless cautioned that nation state responses to world society environmental pressures would follow a varied and at times contradictory pattern. Ministries of environment in developing countries can achieve little if there is limited capacity to implement and enforce real and lasting conservation policies (Buttel, 2000b; Roberts, 1998). While Wiedner (2002) warned that institutional environmental capacities have improved in many countries in recent decades, variations in the rates of improvement can be expected based on domestic characteristics, particularly the extent of democratization. On the other end of the spectrum, the Bush administration’s recent dismissal of the Kyoto Protocol reveals too clearly the willingness of economic hegemons to ignore international pressures for state action that ostensibly prioritize economic sustainability over national growth. Goldman (2001) extended this well warranted caution regarding the presumed contribution of world society to environmental improvement by employing some of the insights of social constructionism, noting the extent to which the hegemonic tendencies in the discourse of global environmentalism describe a “green neo-liberalism” that may impose particular forms of environmental meaning onto nation-states (see Shiva, 1993). In particular, new global forms of legality and eco-rationality have Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 37 fragmented, stratified, and unevenly transformed southern states, state actors, and state power (Goldman, 2001). Social constuctionists examine “how people assign meaning to their world” (Hannigan, 1995). Environmental social scientists adopting a constructivist perspective emphasize the processes of environmental claims in determining how social and political understandings of nature and environmental problems are crafted, contested, and legitimated or not (Buttel & Taylor, 1992; Hannigan, 1995). Often, environmental governance is linked to crisis conditions that are acute, widespread, and irreversible. Because of the numerous dimensions are embedded within environmental governance, social constructionism offers a platform for numerous stakeholders to express their views. This includes state actors, scientists, and social movements (Buttel, 2000). Three distinct yet complementary intellectual traditions inform contemporary social constructionist scholarship on environmental governance. One is research on symbolic politics, a term introduced by American political scientist Murray Edelman (1954) (Moldavi, 1991; Moltoch, 1970). Symbolic politics represent a “soft” form of constructionist argument that reflects the ideological dimensions of political rhetoric and has loose affinities with the construction of social problems perspective in sociology (e.g., Spector & Kitsuse, 1977). Research in this tradition examines the tendency for states to develop rhetorical strategies designed to manufacture and/or reinforce publics’ convictions that environmental problems are being addressed when in fact the opposite is true. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38 Such actions are enabled by the ability of industry and state actors to control environmental rhetoric during controversies or contribute to a “culture of silence” (Beamish, 2000, 2001), particularly when those phenomena are ambiguous or characterized by high degrees of scientific uncertainty, such as many environmental and technological risks (Beck, 1999, Freudenburg, 1996; Freudenburg & Pastor, 1992). A second stream is rooted in European cultural theory and discourse analysis. This is where the symbolic politics tradition views power relations in terms of politicians’ efforts to manipulate unsuspecting publics. Discourse analysts adopt a Foucauldian view of power combining both political and social structures. According to Hajer (1995), “The politics of discourse is not about expressing power resources in language but is about the actual creation of structures and fields of action by means of story-lines, positioning, and the selective employment of comprehensive discursive systems.” From this perspective, discourses are contested fields of meaning whose contours delimit both the actors that can legitimately engage in politics and the issues that are subject to debate (Fischer & Hajer, 1999, 1995; Jasper, 1990; Yearley, 1996). This approach lends credence that state and societal actors should be viewed in a more configurative manner than identified simply as independent factors. Grossman (2000), for example showed how neoliberal discourses during NAFTA negotiations reflected power relations among corporate interests, environmental organizations, and the state. In another study, Hajjer showed how the discourse of ecological modernization espoused by Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 39 nongovernmental and governmental actors alike - has become a hegemonic story line in contemporary environmental debates, the adoption of which can become a central feature in the maintenance of political institutional legitimacy. The means by which organizational contests over political discourse can lead to dramatic policy shifts may be even more visible at the level of the local state, as illustrated in Browne and Keil’s (2000) study of city planning and air quality management in Los Angeles. Finally, social constructionist research on environmental states is being strongly influenced by the science studies tradition that sees science and politics deeply intertwined (Yearley, 1996, 1997). In examining the institutional, cultural, and political forces that shape the production and validation of scientific arguments as well as their uptake into individual and collective choices globally (C. Miller & Edwards, 2001), science studies perspectives shed considerable light on the relationships linking science, environmental knowledge, and environmental policy such as: (i) Arai (2001) on nuclear power station sighting; (ii) C. Miller & Edwards (2001) on climate change (iii) Palladino (1996) on pesticide regimes; (iv) Scarce (2000) on salmon biology and management; and (v) Buttel & Taylor (1992) on global environmental problems. The crux of the contructivist research is that environmental policy action often depends on how science is “represented” or “framed” in different contexts by different stakeholder groups (Davidson, 2004). The above mentioned theoretical perspectives offer important value for interpreting interstate water accords and are applied in this study. However, since Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40 the focus of this paper is to explain cooperation, it is also important to include other theories, some of which speak specifically to the issue of water sharing. Global Governance and Water Policy Water is an ambiguous concept and is interpreted differently by several competing disciplines. On the one hand, legal analysis frames water within surface and groundwater rights while economic analysis views it as a commodity. On the other hand, traditional international relations theory details water within territorial aims and, more recently, as a security issue. Environmentalists view it more prominently as a function of a healthy ecosystem. Each paradigm holds significant value, but often remains independent of the other competing perspectives. This means water is unique because it ignores political boundaries, evades institutional classification, and eludes legal generalizations (Wolf, 2000). Several theoretical approaches are applied in this study to provide a broader understanding of why nations have been able to develop viable interstate water accords. While there has been a swathe of theoretical approaches which offer general understanding of interstate environmental agreements, literature directly pertaining to interstate water accords is limited. Relevant analyses include legal issues, role of third parties, geography, peace, ecology, and, more recently, game theory. A defined rule of law provides guidelines for disputing countries. However, environmental agreements are often non-binding, which means that Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 41 enforcement mechanisms are limited. Negotiation theory adds plausible insight because it holds that the most effective treaties are ones that are between two disputants. The logic is that several nations have distinctively different demands which could complicate and protract negotiations. While compelling, it fails to explain fully accords that do not meet these conditions nor does it explain individual actor motivation. Other theoretical viewpoints must also be acknowledged. Since water is by nature a geographic entity, location and size of dispute must be considered. A prima facie explanation suggests that water could be a catalyst for conflict, especially if contiguous borders are threatened (Diehl & Goertz, 1988). Additionally, democratic peace theory (Held, Wendt, 1990) indicated that liberal democratic states see war as the last option. Economic incentive as well as preservation of liberal values may be the underlying motivation for such decisions. Economic theory adds insight toward evaluating interstate water accords. This approach requires in-depth exploration of market conditions as well as how a proposed solution can benefit all parties (Wolf, 2000). Each of these theories explains certain factors that lead to interstate cooperation and therefore deserve attention. They do not, however, capture individual motivation. Network analysis and common pool resource theory are two important approaches which fill this analytic void. Network analysis provides a framework for studying relationships within and across groups of social actors. It focuses on communication patterns among individuals to understand the dynamics Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4-2 within and between groups and networks of people (Blatter, 2001). Haas’ (1993, 1996) epistemic community approach fits this pattern by offering the proposition that key decision makers reduce environmental uncertainty by recognizing and adhering to suggestions of the scientific community. This is a powerful assessment because it means nation states as well as relevant institutions may value the environment independently rather than a function of other societal conditions. Discourse analysis is addressed because it looks at conflict in terms of language and issue framing and can be used to evaluate the qualitative case studies. However, I have selected common pool resource theory as the dominant perspective because it addresses trust, which is an integral factor for successful negotiations. It is a relatively new theory (Ostrom 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000), but offers several important assumptions. For example, it holds that the more uniform, simple, and small-scale the resource is, the easier it is to design institutions to prevent resource overuse and deterioration (Ostrom, 2003). From this view point, water is a challenge because its rules and regulations have been poorly defined, and it can be considered a large scale resource. The costs in transforming a situation from one in which individuals act independently to one in which they coordinate activities can be quite high. This is clearly manifested in classical rational choice approaches. Olson’s (1965) Theory of Collective Action and Hardin’s (1968) Tragedy of the Commons have been used primarily as mechanisms to explain why cooperation fails. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 43 Common pool resource theory challenges the above assumptions by positing that nations can overcome collective action problems and achieve accord resiliency based upon political trust and open communication between disputing parties. This means that common pool resource appropriators are able to communicate, devise rules for appropriating the resource, and penalize rule breaching behavior (Ostrom, 1993). The next section discusses the theories that are applied throughout the research. Water Treaty Studies Water has been named as likely to be the most pressing environmental concern of the twenty first century (American Academy of Arts and Science, 1994). As global populations and economies continue to grow exponentially, and as environmental change threatens both the quantity and quality of the world’s fresh water resources, attention has increasingly focused on the state and management of those resources. Waters which cross political boundaries have additional complexities brought on by strains in riparian relations and institutional limitations. Recent studies, particularly in the field of environmental security, have focused on the conflict potential of these international waters. Some stress the dangers of violence over international waters (Westing, 1986, Gleick, 1993, Homer-Dixon-1994, Remans, 1995, Samson and Charrier, 1997). Others argue that water conflicts have Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 44 been settled amicably (Libiszewski, 1995; Salaman & de Chazoumes, 1998; Wolf, 1998). Other significant studies include Kilot (1995) and later with colleagues (Kilot et al., 1997) who compares five international basins and their respective management institutions; Wolf (1997) offered hydro-political lessons from 14 detailed case studies and 146 water treaties; Gleick (1998) included a chapter on international waters in his biennial report on the world’s water; and Elhance (1999) described the trans-boundary waters of the Third World (Wolf et al., 1999). Overall, water treaty studies reflected only a small fraction of the conflict dispute resolution literature (e.g., Westcoat (1996)). Legal scholars have discussed international law and treaty making (e.g., Teclaff (1991) and McCaffrey (1993)). McCaffrey offered theories about trends in treaty making, specifically the move towards integrated management. Hayton (1988, 1991) has argued that international law should include hydrologic processes in its theory. Dellapenna (1995) described the evolution of treaty practice dating back to the mid-1800s and Westcoat (1996) assessed historic trends of water treaties dating from 1648-1948. Gulhati (1973) and Michel (1967) offered an in-depth historical analysis of a single case study, the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (Wolf, 2000). LeMarquand (1989) presented a comprehensive framework for developing economically and environmentally viable river basins. At the core of this approach is a river basin authority to coordinate basin wide planning and execution of basin- wide, multi-purpose projects. He suggested the following conditions to achieve Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 45 this: similar perceptions of the problem, characteristics of the utility function of the parties, water production functions; existence of some level of dialogue, a small number of parties involved, and at least one party has a desire to resolve the conflict. Kally (1989) evaluated the potential for cooperation in water resources development between Middle Eastern countries and examines a particular approach that is based on individual water-related projects among two or more regional riparians. The author envisions different combinations of various projects as interest to the particular parties. Nevertheless, she states ultimately, political considerations determine the level of regional cooperation. The above approaches link the level of cooperation to the role of institutions. Recently, Conca (2004) suggested that cooperation exceeds existing regimes. He examined the transnational governance of localized ecosystems with particular focus on river, watersheds, and freshwater ecosystems around the world. He stated by invoking principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, governments have been reluctant to create formal interstate regimes to protect localized environments and, instead, produce weak mechanisms of global governance. At the same time, political and economic globalization processes yield informal but increasingly embedded sets of global rules for the governance of these “local” systems. The rules being created are less a product of cooperative bargaining than of social conflict, and bear little resemblance to traditional interstate regimes in terms of their underlying authority structures, territorial reach, and knowledge Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 46 based practices. Yet, they exert an increasingly strong pull on state policy in a manner that formal regimes have been unable to accomplish (Conca, 2004). This approach offers new insight that power should be evaluated beyond the rigid institutional structure and should be directed more at the local level. However, institutions can be viewed as sets of both formal and informal rules that shape interactions of humans with others and nature (Gibson & Agrawal, 1996). Institutions constrain some activities and facilitate others and without them social interactions would be impossible (Bates, 1989; North, 1990). Further, institutions promote the stability of expectations ex ante, and consistency in actions, ex post. Strategic actors may attempt to bypass the constraints of existing institutions, and create new institutions or power source that reflect their interests, which is what Conca supports. However, institutions remain the primary mechanism available to mediate, soften, attenuate, structure, mold and facilitate particular outcomes and actions (Ensminger, 1992; Alston, Eggerston & North, 1996; Agrawal, 1995; Gibson, 1999). This holds whether change is radical, moderate, or incremental (Agrawal & Gibson, 1998). The current literature reflects the overall challenge in understanding water cooperation. Each study offers individual merit and important explanations for individual phenomena leading to the formation and development of interstate water accords. However, no attempt has been made to integrate these studies in a meaningful way. Therefore, it is important to develop a comprehensive study using multiple theories to further understand interstate water cooperation. I did this by Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47 focusing on the shared and strategic incentives argument, international law, geo political theory, democratic peace thesis, negotiation theory, third party, network analysis, discourse and social analysis, conjunctive management practice, and common pool resource theory. These theories, in combination, are most likely to provide overall, the best explanation for interstate water accord cooperation. Strategic and Shared Incentives Arguments A perplexing question is why and how nations cooperate over water while other significant socio-political issues remain. This can be explained by the strategic and shared incentives arguments. The strategic argument posits that nation states avoid hostile actions because of practical reasons. Although interstate conflict over nonrenewable resources such as oil and strategic minerals has occurred, scarcities of renewable resources rarely cause resource wars among states. States cannot easily or quickly convert renewable resources into assets that augment their power significantly. Second, many states do not have the financial resources which reduces their aggression capacity. This assessment was expounded by Homer-Dixon and Percival (1996). Even though river water is the resource most likely to cause war, several factors must be considered. The downstream country must be highly dependent on water for its national preservation and the upstream country must be able to restrict the river’s flow. Further, there must be a history of antagonism between the two countries, and, most importantly, the downstream country must be militarily Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48 stronger than the upstream country. This means the aggressor needs to be both downstream and the regional hegemon. Even if such conditions are present, other problems remain. First, an upstream riparian would not have a cause to launch an attack because it would decrease its water quantity or quality. The downstream riparian most likely would be hesitant to launch an attack as well. If the target of interest was a dam, destroying it would result in spate of water rushing back on the downstream territory, which would make conditions worse than before an attack. Therefore, the hegemon not only must weigh the cost/benefits of an invasion, but also must consider occupation and depopulation of the entire watershed in order to forestall any retribution (Wolf, 1998). The strategic argument is valuable because it delineates clearly the potential drawback of fighting over water. Water cooperation is compelling enough that nation states will negotiate over water even when one riparian is severely disadvantaged by the water flow.2 0 The shared incentives argument complements the strategic argument by claiming that nation states cooperate and further develop resilient interstate water accords. The rationale is that negotiators demonstrate sensitivity toward the unique settings and needs of each basin and many detail the shared interests of a common 20 Water conflict is usually an exception because the aggressor would have be a downstream riparian as well as a hegemon. A strike against the upper stream riparian could entail occupation and depopulation. Further, the countries at risk could not be democracies and the international community would have to refuse to become involved. The Nile, Plata, and Mekong river basins are watersheds that fit the above conditions, but even there, treaties have been established (Wolf, 1998). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 49 waterway (Wolf, 1998). For example, along larger waterways, the better dam sites are usually upstream at the headwaters where valley walls are steeper and where environmental impact is not great. However, the prime agricultural land is generally downstream, where gradient drops off and alluvial deposits enrich the soil. Therefore, a dam in the headwaters not only provides hydropower and other benefits for the upstream riparian, but also can be managed to even out the flow for downstream agriculture, or even enhance transportation for both riparian nations (Wolf, 1998). This means expanding the scope of negotiation offers greater opportunity for nation states to cooperate, even though other strident-socio-political issues may remain. This phenomenon of solving water disputes while other issues remain is not an anomaly. The Mekong Committee has functioned since 1957, exchanging data throughout the Vietnam War. Secret “picnic table” talks were held since the unsuccessful Johnston negotiations (between Israel and Jordan), even though these countries were in a legal state of war. Further, The Indus river commission 21 survived two wars between India and Pakistan, and an agreement between China and Hong Kong survived despite strained relations between the two countries (Wolf, 1998). 2 1 The 1960 Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan was brokered and supported by the World Bank as well as the United States, and other friendly governments. The treaty and the governance structure for the vast Indus River basin system, the largest in the world, remains in tact and honored despite two wars fought over this basin, in 1965 and 1971, and continued ill-will and distrust between the two nations. The division o f the Indus River basin constitutes a remarkable engineering feat, with the construction o f canals carrying four times the flow o f the Colorado River (Jones, 2003). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50 International Water Law According to Cano (1989), international water law was not formulated substantially until after World War I. Since then, international legal frameworks were developed to manage the world’s watersheds. Terms like customary law and advisory bodies became the standard nomenclature within international law. However, to date, these concepts are considered “soft law” and are not legally binding. For example, the concept of a “drainage basin” was accepted by the International Law Association in the Helsinki Rules of 1966, which also provides guidelines for “reasonable and equitable” sharing of a common water way (Caponera, 1985). Article V (Helsinki Rules) lists no fewer than 11 factors that must be considered in defining “reasonable and equitable.” However, there is no hierarchy to these components, and the Helsinki Accords have been used only once to define water use. The Mekong Committee used the Helsinki Rules of “reasonable and equitable use” in formulation of their Declaration of Principles of 1975 and even then no specific allocations were determined (Wolf, 2000). Hence, international water law has marginal value unless there is a common sharing mechanism and structure that could jointly use such principles for the advantage of a large basin. This institutional limitation is a serious problem and reflects an overall weakness in adhering to legal principles in evaluating interstate water accords. While there are numerous treaties regulating the utilization of water resources Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51 shared by two or more countries, international agreements are either inadequate or lacking entirely in some parts of the world where water is in greatest demand (McCaffrey, 1992). Geo-political Theory This theoretical dimension evaluates the spatial relationship between bordering states (Diehl, 1991). Since the early 1960’s, geography and conflict have had two focal points for empirical based research. First, geography is viewed as a variable that is important in facilitating conflict, and two, the role of geography is in itself a source of conflict. The first point concerns the likelihood that states will go to war with each other. The second point centers on the study of conflict in which control of a particular area has been the source of conflict (Dougherty, 2000). Geography, specifically the location of political entities in close proximity, is said to create opportunities for conflict to the extent that states sharing borders with each other are more likely to engage in conflict than are non-contiguous states. Richardson (1960) finds a strong, positive correlation between the number of frontiers a state had and the extent of its participation in wars with other states. Richardson reports that contiguity was a common factor in the armed conflicts and that shared frontiers increase the number of interactions between states. Further, Starr and Most (1998) claimed that contiguous states are more likely to be perceived as more threatening than those that are most distant. States Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52 that have many borders face a security dilemma to the extent that they must cope with more than one potential aggressor (Dougherty, 2000). Diehl and Goertz (1988) supported Starr and Most by stating conflict is more often based on territorial issues than on abstract political goals. According to O’Laughlin (1986), the border-war relationship must be expanded to include spatial effects that extend to states in close proximity to conflict, but which are not the immediate parties to conflict. This “shatter box approach” has not been applied to freshwater conflict. However, increasing freshwater scarcity issues warrant further attention. According to Kelly (1986), a shatterbox is a geographic region over which major powers engage in competition because they have strong national interests. This is a perplexing situation because water conflict overwhelmingly has not led to wars. However, further attention is warranted because of the increasing scope and severity of regional water scarcity. The theory of acute conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1993, 1999) is the benchmark for substantiating this linkage. It posits that poor countries are vulnerable to environmental change, which in many cases means resource scarcity. Specifically, a range of atmospheric, land, and aquatic environmental pressures produce individually or in combination, four causally related social effects: reduced agricultural production, population displacement, and social and economic decline. In turn, these social effects produce an array of unstable effects, including ethnic clashes, civil strife, and insurgency. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 53 While compelling, Homer-Dixon’s theory does not corroborate with the available data. In the twentieth century, more than 95% of freshwater disputes were resolved amicably. Further, his theory is proscribed to individual case studies. Therefore, it is difficult to develop a comparative rigorous assessment about water conflict affects societies at either the local, national, or international levels. Traditionally, most geo-political studies explain the factors facilitating conflict over cooperation. Yet, history reveals that river basins have contributed to societal development. Therefore, greater attention is required to show whether geographic conditions facilitate cooperation. Democratic Peace Theory A central theory within international relations is the democratic peace thesis. It can be traced back to Kant’s philosophical sketch on Perpetual Peace that liberal states do not go to war with other liberal states (Baylis & Smith, 2000). It posits that democratic states will not fight other democratic states. The underlying assumption is that there are shared values and that most likely there is a strong level of economic interdependence, which would make war a least likely proposition. Although empirical evidence supports the democratic peace thesis, it must be recognized that there are significant limitations. Supporters of this thesis provide an explanation as to why war has become unthinkable between liberal states. Kant argued that if the decision to use force was taken by the people rather than by the prince, the frequency of conflicts would be reduced. This argument Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 54 implies a lower frequency of conflicts between liberal and non-liberal states and this has proven to be contrary to the historical evidence (Baylis & Smith, 2000). Yet cooperation is definitely a theme within the democratic peace thesis. On the one hand, cooperative outcomes can be explained because liberal states tend to be wealthy, and, therefore, have less to gain by engaging in conflicts than poorer authoritarian states. On the other hand, liberal states often have harmonious relations with neighboring countries because of shared values and a highly interconnected economic system. While freshwater scarcity is unlikely to destabilize relations between liberal states, greater attention must be directed to authoritarian or consolidating democracies that face relative or absolute water shortages. Negotiation Theory This theory posits that successful conflict resolution correlates to the number of disputing parties; the fewer the negotiators, the greater the chance for a mutually beneficial outcome. While a sizable amount of interstate water accords support this theory, there are some notable exceptions. According to negotiation theory, the Israelis and Palestinian would have been able to develop viable water accords; however, this has not occurred. Yet, the Danube River Basin Accords exhibit numerous parties and is one of the most stable environmental agreements. Nevertheless, negotiation theory is a major component in understanding interstate water accords. Water flows across jurisdictional boundaries, and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 55 effective water management requires agreement between multiple agencies as well as private interests (Clark, Bingham, & Orenstein, 1991). Effective negotiations hinge on creating new opportunities to solve preexisting problems. In sustainable terms, this means obtaining a superior outcome for competing users and the environment (Clark 1991). Clearly, greater negotiation efficiency is required for improved outcomes. This could be accomplished by having nation states anticipate prior existing technical, social, economic, and political problems. However, problem identification is hindered by differing societal and political viewpoints. For example, some countries view dam construction as a regional policy solution to create greater water efficiency. Other countries may view dam construction as an encroachment upon endangered species. Still others take a rights based approach and address who first settled in a specific area. While water issues are complex, it is clear that participants must agree on what is at dispute. Otherwise, viable interstate negotiations will not be successful. Further, it is important to understand who is negotiating. A local grassroots organization or public works agency is not likely to resolve pressing national policy issues. Viable interstate accords need the cooperation of national leaders, independent international organizations, as well as local societal support. Effective negotiations begin with a true understanding of the various interests. Simply signing an accord is not an effective policy nor is constructing a dam without understanding the full political and environmental impact. Nation Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56 states must obtain the most accurate information possible, and consider all the viable alternatives and ramifications from selected choices. Ultimately, there are four general trends in understanding effective water negotiations. First, there is a shift from a rights based criteria to needs based values. Second, protection is given to downstream riparian nations because they are the most vulnerable. Third, negotiating parties seek positive sum solutions, which extend beyond a basic supply and demand approach. Lastly, the uniqueness of each basin is expressly indicated in the treaty texts (Wolf, 2000). This important theory offers clear criteria for establishing effective treaties, and is integrated with common pool resource theory in evaluating interstate water accords. Third Parties While not a theory, incorporating third parties into relevant frameworks like negotiation theory offers richer analysis by suggesting independent parties facilitate cooperative outcomes. Several World Bank reports recognize that international agencies are able to mitigate international freshwater disputes. Kirmani and Rangeley’s (1994) study of in international inland waters and the Indus Water Treaty demonstrated that third parties can play a greater role. Reference to such a role in South Africa was made by Kuffner (1993) and Rogers (1993) in the “development triangle” in South Asia and in the “dying Aral Sea” (Serageldin, 1995). This theory successfully explains interstate water accords and should be stressed even further in creating effective environmental management. This theory Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 57 is particularly useful in evaluating the qualitative case studies where the presence and lack of third parties reveal insight toward achieving and maintaining effective interstate accords. Network Analysis and Public Trust Doctrine Drawn from a subfield within sociology, it emphasizes social relationships that link individuals friendship, kinship, social exchanges of various sorts (Mohr, 1998). Over the years scholars have developed an enormous array of conceptual and methodological tools for thinking about the structural properties of social networks. The methods can be divided into two general types - those emphasizing connectivity and those focusing on structural equivalence (Burt 1978; Wasserman & Faust 1994). The former, which is pertinent to this study, is largely concerned with how the relationships between individuals in a social network are mediated by the structure of ties that directly connects them. This connectivity approach focuses on communication patterns among individuals to understand the dynamics within and between groups and networks of people (Blatter et al., 2001). Most network analysts base their approach on rational action theory (strategic exchange of resources by independent actors). However, there are cognitive-normative factors that guide the clustering of political actors and processes (Blatter, 2001). Sabatier’s “Advocacy Coalition Frameworks” (ACFs) and Haas’s epistemic community approach are prominent examples. In contrast to water allocation (negotiating criterion), Sabatier and Haas emphasized Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 58 beliefs and data over resource dependencies. According to Haas, the primary function of epistemic communities is to reduce uncertainty. Scientific information has the power to achieve this22. Nevertheless, both the advocacy coalition framework and epistemic community approach are useful in explaining independent appreciation for the environment. Independent environmental value is also evidenced through the connection between network analysis and the public trust doctrine23. The public trust doctrine has expanded from traditional water use protection such as navigation, commerce, and fishing to modem day values of environmental quality, fish and wildlife protection, recreation, and aesthetics.2 4 Brown and Ingram (1989) showed that water is also closely bound up with community perceptions of security, opportunity, participation, and well being. Wilkinson (1989) promoted the notion that water is “one vital element in the ecological and socio-economic communities of which we are apart.” All of these factors reflect values and the interconnectivity between societies and political communities. Traditionally, political communities form to provide certain basic services and to protect certain basic rights that citizens cannot secure by acting alone. In many cases, citizens are mutually dependent on a limited supply of natural 2 2 It must be recognized that this is based on the assumption that the scientific community is in agreement in defining and evaluating a problem. 2 3 The public trust doctrine is a common law doctrine, that “provides that submerged and submersible lands are preserved for public use in navigation, fishing, and recreation and the state as trustee for the people, bears responsibility o f preserving and protecting the right o f the public to the use o f these lands and the waters above them for those purposes” (Blacks Law Dictionary, 2004). 24This post public trust doctrine is not limited to public values in common natural resources. For example, Kelso (1987) argued that water is important to strong democratic institutions, or agrarian fundamentalism, which sets it apart from ordinary market mechanisms. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59 resources. According to Sax (1989), because the survival of a community depends on the continuing ability of their resources to sustain them, their relationship is inevitably one of mutual dependence, common enterprise and joint responsibility. To this end, government and its agents have a duty to function as “trustee” of the resources which keep communities together. Network analysis in conjunction with the public trust doctrine has merit because it probes individual and community (public and private sectors) motivation over a significant period of time (i.e., 10 years). Liberal values (beauty, freedom, and power) are incorporated into understanding how people come to respect and preserve the environment. It shifts the focus of research away from particular individuals or events onto the connectivities among people, groups, and organizations. Ultimately, the goal is to show how social life is constructed out of the sets of interactions that, over time, give rise to the sorts of relational stabilities one recognizes as social institutions. By focusing attention on these social relationships, network analysts are able to reveal the character and rhythms of institutional life in ways that would not otherwise be visible (Mohr, 1997). In contrast to more traditional models of formal analysis, network analysis encourages scholars to adhere to the phenomena under study. While the analysts must define (in some fashion) which kinds of relationships they are interested in prior to gathering of data, the project from that point on is inductive. This is particularly important in analyzing water cooperation since numerous sociological and historical factors must be addressed. This work involves a meticulous search Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 60 for information about the existence and character of observable relationships. Social network analysis represents a different modality of historical research because it demands a new way of approaching historical sources and of gathering data about the past. This theory is particularly important in evaluating the nexus between environmental values within interstate water accords and may explain some inter or intrastate water accords in developed countries. Haas (1995) defined a riparian basin as an interdependent community with interests that transcend the narrow view of each party and stress the common ground across national lines. Several examples of shared management practices support this theory. For example, The International Joint Commission between Canada and the United States (1909) and the Mexico/United States International Boundary and Water Commission (1993) called attention to the progress made in resolving the multiple management issues throughout the Great Lakes basin and along the United States-Mexico border. While the U.S.-Mexico water treaty has a low degree of public participation, it is the source for the Bellagio Draft Treaty, which is expected to serve as the standard for aquifer disputes among other countries (Wolf, 2000). Still the lack of sufficient agreements on underground water and conjunctive planning with surface water provides little precedent for reaching integrative solutions (Frederickson, 1996). In a recent work on the Joint Management of the Israeli-Palestinian shared aquifers, Feitelson and Haddad (1995) provided a comprehensive framework of institutional arrangements, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 61 incorporating 19 different typologies. Overall, this unifying approach has had most success in the Northern and Western hemispheres among affluent societies where there is abundant water resource (Wolf, 2000). Discourse Analysis and Social Ecology Networks of people rely on a shared discursive framework to communicate with each other. Sometimes, cooperation fails because people do not identify the problem uniformly. Discourse analysis facilitates recognition that differences in reference, interpretations, and meanings are at the meaning of many misunderstandings. Habermas (1971) and Foucault (1977) have focused on the contents of communications, and the ideas embedded in discourse. This analysis recognized that language as well as technical terms determine how debate is framed. Discourse analysis offers a juxt-a-position interpretation to negotiations that are empirically based. Its analysis allows for competing systems of language to hold significant merit and fosters further understanding why some discourses (universal rights and technocratic rationality such as building dams) are more convincing than other competing viewpoints. Similarly, social ecology analysis views the local, physical environment as an important component of understanding and analyzing sociopolitical contexts. Social ecological approaches are very similar to the recursive state-society relationship (Migdal, 1994). Social ecological approaches often characterize Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 62 human environment interactions as cyclical systems in which human actions affect environmental health and environmental health affects human health (Blatter, 2001). Both discourse and social ecology analyses are used to offer insight towards interpreting the qualitative section of this study. Conjunctive Water Management This practice involves the coordinated use of surface and groundwater supplies. At the basic level, when water supplies are comparatively plentiful, conjunctive management encourages the direct use of surface supplies and use of groundwater during dry months. This method has been practiced predominantly in the southwestern part of the United States. Conjunctive management offers promise of greater average annual water supply yields by capturing and conserving surplus water supplies when they are available and, in turn, reducing losses that would occur if people only relied on surface water or groundwater. Another benefit is that it allows some surface water supplies to remain in streams for environmental and even recreational purposes without a zero-sum reduction in the amount of available water for human consumptive uses (Blomquist, 2004). Furthermore, conjunctive management is attractive economically because it stresses calculated conservation over the construction and operation of additional surface water structures (Blomquist, 2004). A central tenet within this approach is that institutional arrangements matter in understanding how different states manage and distribute freshwater. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63 Essentially, the more rules and organizational arrangements are defined, the greater the chance to achieve effective conjunctive management. When water rights are incomplete, users are less likely to exercise restraint involved in storing water as part of conjunctive management programs (Blomquist et al., 2004). This theory is clearly a pragmatic approach toward explaining cooperative water policies. However, it does not delve deep enough into explaining the underlying human motivation for agreeing to cooperate.2 5 For this, I have selected Common Pool Resource Theory to be the most comprehensive explanation for motivation leading to interstate water accord cooperation. Common Pool Resource Theory The expression “the tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968) symbolizes unrestrained environmental degradation. Hardin was not the first to recognize the tragedy of the commons. Aristotle observed that “what is common to the greatest number has least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest” (Aristotle, Politics, Book IT). There are two common characteristics of all common pool resources. The first is subtractability. This is the idea that what one person gains (harvests) results in the lost opportunity for another to do the same. For example, tons of fish or acre 25 Blomquist (2004) noted the inability o f local and regional management governance to build trust to resolve internal and external differences. There are also legal constraints and lack o f statewide leadership, which become pronounced when unforeseeable surface and groundwater problems develop. Often, basin managers have different roles and expectations in relation to conjunctive use (Blomquist, 2004). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64 feet of water withdrawn from a particular water resource by one user are no longer available to others using the same resource (Ostrom, 2003). The second characteristic relates to the cost of excluding potential beneficiaries from resource access. Common pool resources and public goods share a similar problem in that potential beneficiaries face the temptation to free- ride, meaning they may be able to gain benefits without contributing to the costs of providing, maintaining, and regulating the resource involved. Institutions must address the threats of overuse and free-riding. There are specific axioms that define common pool resource theory. The more uniform, simple, and small scale the resource is, the easier it is to design institutions governing it and to prevent its overuse and deterioration. By the same token, complex resources with interactive use and negative externalities are especially difficult to manage (Ostrom et al., 2003). Further, cohesion, trust, homogeneity, and size affect institutions governing the resource. Resource location and size has been addressed significantly within common pool resource literature. Many scholars believe the smaller the resource, the more conducive it is to establish and maintain effective governing institutions. Second, common pool resources with well delineated and stable boundaries are found to be more conducive for effective institutional management. If particular boundaries are well understood and do not change over time, then it is easier to determine not only the resource users but also understand their consumptive patterns. However, if the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65 resource generates units that move substantial distances it is more difficult to create and maintain institutions to prevent the overuse of the resource. Simple common-pool resources are easier to manage than resources integrated within complex, interactive systems. The more complex the system of resources, the more difficult it is for users to agree on rules for addressing externalities. It stands to reason that moderate use of common pool resources are easier to regulate than highly abundant or overused resources (Ostrom, 2001). Further, one can expect local appropriators to solve their own common pool resource problems more effectively when the costs of obtaining relevant information about resource facility and resource units are relatively low in comparison with the benefits that can be achieved through successful institutional design (Ostrom, 1994). Some resources have been regulated only upon serious deterioration or extinction. Young (1993) suggested that users of renewable resources pay close attention to the withdrawal and recharge rates. Common pool resource users are less likely to devise institutions to manage common pool-resources if they estimate that the replacement rate grossly exceeds the withdrawal rate, or if they estimate that the withdrawal rate exceeds the replacement rate by so much that the common pool resources is close to destruction. Effective common pool resource management also means the ability of appropriators to communicate, devise rules for resource appropriation, and penalize rule-breaching behavior. Appropriators are successful in solving common pool Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66 resource problems when they define access conditions, regulate appropriation in terms of quantity, space, or technology, and monitor and enforce these rules. Further, when boundary, authority, monitoring, and sanctioning rules are defined and enforced internally, the outcomes are likely to be more efficient than those achieved when the rules are imposed externally. The capacity of common pool resource users to govern themselves is often a necessary condition for overcoming collective action problems. The capacity to design and enforce one’s own rules is not a sufficient condition to ensure the resolution of difficult and complex dilemmas. Initial agreements will fail if trust, legal rules, and reciprocity (extending benefits to others) are not evident. Appropriators who develop forms of mutual trust and social capital can use these assets to craft institutions to avert common pool resource dilemmas and arrive at reasonable outcomes (Ostrom, 1994). This well defined theory has been developed to address resource scarcity issues. It has numerous components that can guide policymakers and institutions in how to manage natural resources effectively. Society cannot afford to have “tragedy of commons” results nor can Oslon’s (1965) free-riding principle prevail. Common pool resource theory offers hope that nations can overcome collective action problems and produce positive sum outcomes, where all parties benefit. Additionally, the theory incorporates normative conditions from network and discourse analysis by recognizing environmental scarcity problems need effective input from a host of disputing parties and perspectives. Most significant is that Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67 trust and open communication are required at the beginning of negotiations in order to create an effective treaty. There are challenges to this theory. First, water may be discemable within specific geographic borders, but that does not mean the boundaries are stable, which accordingly means water cooperation can be long and complicated. Second, Ostrom (2000) stated that the smaller the scope of the resource, the greater the chance for an effective agreement. It is uncertain how common pool resource theory applies to water because it is located in numerous geographic locations with varying degrees of size. Finally, political trust is a difficult concept to measure. A traditional interpretation of political trust means a percentage of people who have confidence in government. It could be applied to interstate water accords, but this means that multiple parties and all levels of society are privy to negotiations. Additionally, from a comparative perspective, political trust could mean different things within different cultures and societies. Common pool resource theory is the main theoretical approach for this study because it challenges the traditional assumptions of collective action behavior. However, due to the complex nature of water, several other theoretical concepts have been introduced, which allows for broader analysis. The concepts are; the number of parties, geography, ecological values, democracy, and institutions. Through this framework, I show how common pool resource and other selected theories explain interstate water accords as well as demonstrate why there is significant variation within level of cooperation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68 Conclusion Due to the complexity of water, multiple theoretical approaches are necessary to explain the level of cooperation within interstate water accords. I selected ecological marginalization and global governance theories because they elucidate why nations have been prompted to cooperate. Ecological marginalization theory suggests that nation states can no longer ignore pressing environmental problems because to do so would inherently weaken the economic structure within a given state. Global governance theory offers a top down approach by identifying multiple actors who impact the environment. This means that international and domestic actors are both responsible for managing the environment. While both of these approaches offer a general assessment of understanding general principles that lead to cooperation, little attention has been directed towards understanding interstate water accords. Therefore, I have selected other theoretical approaches that augment understanding of the level of cooperation within interstate water accords. One of more intriguing theoretical approaches is the shared incentives approach which posits that material and ideological factors play a significant role in determining the level of interstate water cooperation. Negotiation theory is a very utility oriented theory because it identifies specific conditions which are favorable to interstate water accord negotiations; neutral third parties to facilitate bilateral Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69 negotiations as well as expansion of the scope of negotiations to non-water linkages. Democratic peace theory offers important insight by stating that developed and democratic states may be more willing to negotiate than authoritarian regimes. The logic is that each state has more to gain by cooperating than by remaining recalcitrant towards negotiations. Similarly, geopolitical theory identifies location as a critical check point in that contiguous states may be more willing to negotiate over shared resources than if addressing a distant non-integral water resource. In another perspective, environmental value is evidence through the epistemic community approach by positing that nation states utilize various scientific studies to justify actions toward creating an accord. Discourse analysis is an important theoretical dimension because it links environment salience to language and issue framing. Conjunctive management suggests a practical water management approach by drawing upon surface water during the rainy season and groundwater during dry spells. While each of the above theories offers important dimensions towards understanding the level of interstate water cooperation, common pool resource theory is most applicable. It holds explanatory utility by emphasizing not only the importance of achieving interstate cooperation but also the how, which is evidenced by political trust, internal support, and well defined boundaries. In Table 2.1 (See Appendix A), I have compiled the list of selected theories. Each theory offers interpretive value as to how and why nation states are willing to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70 engage in interstate negations over water. Most theoretical approaches offer ration based approaches toward explaining early coordination practices. Only social discourse theory posits that alternative factors may be behind the rational for initial negotiations. This study addresses early coordination strategies for nation states to cooperate employing both quantitative and qualitative methods. By incorporating multiple approaches, I am able to provide a more comprehensive and richer analysis for understanding the level of cooperation within interstate water accords. The next chapter further substantiates why multiple methodologies are necessary for evaluating interstate water accords. It provides an overview and justification for utilizing both quantitative and qualitative approaches (including hypotheses categorization under the specified methods), as well as ways to overcome common methodological errors. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71 CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING TRANSBOUNDARY FRESHWATER COOPERATION There are numerous theories which explain interstate water cooperation. Theory value and applicability depends upon the goals of the decision makers. However, the decision making is not a linear process. There is a large range for understanding nation state behavior. Economic incentive, independent environmental value and national security concerns all encompass water scarcity issues. This chapter proposes the methods necessary to conduct valid research on how nation states are able to overcome collective action problems and achieve as well as maintain resilient interstate water accords. First, I will provide an overview of the relevant methodologies. I will then introduce the research design and explain how it avoids traditional methodological problems such as bias, equivalence, spuriousness, and selecting on the dependent variable. Ultimately, this section reinforces the issue definition and theory chapters by creating a valid way to examine and explain interstate water accord cooperation. Methodology Background For several decades, political scientists have debated the merits of case studies versus statistical studies, area studies versus comparative studies, and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72 “scientific” studies of politics using quantitative methods versus “historical” investigations that rely on rich textual and contextual understanding. These competing perspectives lead to a pluralistic atmosphere, but also dichotomized social sciences into a quantitative-systematic-generalizing branch and a qualitative- humanistic-discursive branch. Further polarization is possible because statistical analysis has become more sophisticated, while qualitative approaches have rigidified their position that such analyses are irrelevant to non-replicable and non- generalizable events (Landman, 2000). Sartori (1970, 1994) substantiated this claim by stating qualitative and quantitative methods have a distinct order in that qualitative comparative classification precedes the process of quantification. Yet there is a facilitating approach which suggests the quantitative/ qualitative division is inaccurate, provided that both methods adhere to making inferences from available data (Foweraker & Landman, 1997). If so, the same logic of inference should apply to quantitative and qualitative methods equally (King, 1994). In other words, the central difference between qualitative and quantitative methods is more stylistic than substantive. The next section elaborates this point. Large and Small Case Studies Bennett and George (2004) identified four advantages of case methods that make them valuable in testing hypotheses and particularly useful for theory Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73 development: (1) their potential for achieving high conceptual validity; (2) their strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses; (3) their value as a useful means to examine closely the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; and (4) their capacity for addressing causal complexity. Conceptual Validity Case studies allow a researcher to achieve a high level of conceptual validity, or to identify and measure the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to measure. Many variables such as political trust, coercion, democracy, and water scarcity are difficult to measure. A researcher must conduct “contextualized comparisons” which “self consciously seeks to address the issue of equivalence by searching for analytically equivalent phenomena” (Locke & Thelen, 1998). This requires a detailed consideration of contextual factors, which is extremely difficult to do in statistical studies. Deriving New Hypotheses Case studies have powerful advantages in the heuristic identification of new variables and hypotheses through the study of deviant or outlier cases and in the course of field work such as archival research and interviews with participants, area experts, and historians. Statistical methods identify deviant cases that may lead to new hypotheses, but in and of themselves lack any clear means or identifying new hypotheses (Bennett & George, 2004). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74 Exploring Causal Mechanisms Case studies examine the operation of causal mechanisms in individual cases in detail. Within a single case, one views a large number of intervening variables and inductively observes any unexpected aspects of the operation of a particular casual mechanism or helps identify what conditions present in a case activate the causal mechanism. Statistical studies omit contextual factors except those codified in the variables selected for measurement (Bennett & George, 2004). Researchers also use theories on causal mechanisms to provide historical explanations of cases. Historical explanation is quite different from the development and testing of variable centered theories from the statistical study of a large number of cases. Statistical analysis indicates that correlation does not imply causation. Yet, historical case studies view temporal connections as potentially significant explanatory factors of the observed outcome. Modeling and Assessing Complex Causal Relations A final advantage of case studies is their ability to accommodate complex causal relations such as equifinality, complex interactions effects, and path dependency. This advantage is relative rather than absolute. Case studies allow for • • Oft • equifinality , but to do so, they produce narrower generalizations. Case studies 26 Equifinality requires the investigator to consider the likelihood that some undetermined number o f outcomes that the deductive theory predicts or fails to predict can be predicated by another deductive theory. It also suggests the possibility that successful predictions may not be necessarily valid explanations, since another theory may be able to explain as well as predict those outcomes (Bennett & George, 2004). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75 also require substantial process-tracing evidence2 7 to document complex interactions. Statistical methods model several kinds of interactions effects, but only at the cost of requiring a large sample size, and models of nonlinear interactions rapidly become complex and difficult to interpret. New statistical methods may improve upon the statistical treatment of equifinality and interactions effects (Braumoeller, 2002). Beyond the general quantitative/qualitative comparisons, it is important to assess the importance of comparing using both large N and small case studies. Comparing many countries closely approximates the experimental method of science, since it is particularly suited to quantitative analysis through measurement and analysis of aggregate data collected on many countries (Lijphart, 1971). Although there are examples of qualitative comparisons of many countries, such as Huntington’s (1996) The Clash o f Civilizations and Finer’s (1997) History o f Government, the majority of studies that compare many countries simultaneously use quantitative methods. This method of comparison requires a higher level of abstraction in its specification of concepts in order to include as many countries as possible. Its main advantage includes statistical control to rule out rival explanations, extensive coverage of countries, the ability to make strong inferences, and the identification of deviant countries or outliers. 2 7 Process-tracing is fundamentally different from methods based on covariance or cross case comparisons. In using theories to develop case study explanations through process-tracing, all the intervening steps in a case must be as predicted by a hypothesis or else the hypothesis must be amended. It is not sufficient that a hypothesis be consistent with a statistically significant number o f intervening steps (Bennett & George, 2004). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76 When comparing many countries, the primary focus is on general dimensions of macro-social variation and the relationship between variables at a global level of analysis (Ragin, 1994). The benefit of examining many countries is that it allows generalizability, for stronger inferences, and theory building, since a given relationship can be demonstrated to exist with a greater degree of certainty. For example, Gurr (1968) demonstrated that levels of civil strife across 114 countries are related positively to the presence of economic, political, short-term, and long term deprivation. His analysis also explains that this relationship holds for roughly 65 percent of the countries. A second advantage of comparing many countries lies in the ability to identify so-called deviant countries or outliers. These are countries whose values on the dependent variable are different than expected, given the values on the independent variables. Quantitative studies also help in building general theories of politics since they allow other scholars to replicate their findings. Large N qualitative comparisons are more difficult. First qualitative analysis generally requires a richer level of information such as the complete history of all the countries, which is often difficult to learn and synthesize. Finer’s (1997) attempt to compare regime types over 5000 years represented a monumental task. Second, it is more difficult to draw strong inferences from these data since they cannot be subjected to statistical analysis. Finer (1997) was able to describe and analyze different historical regimes but is unable to apply statistical analysis to his study. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 77 Regardless of the selected methodological approach, comparing many countries poses several challenges, including data availability, and the validity of measures. First, collecting relevant data is difficult and time-consuming. Aggregate data are often published only for selected years or selected countries, making comprehensive comparisons difficult. Second, measuring concepts from political science is difficult and can affect the validity of measures. Valid measures closely approximate the true meaning of a concept, or what the researcher thinks he or she is measuring (King et al., 1994). I expand upon the concept of equivalency and how it relates to select independent variables later in this chapter. In contrast, qualitative methods generally focuses on one or a small number of cases, which requires intensive interviews or in-depth analysis of historical materials, to be discursive in method, and to be concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of some event or unit. Even though they have a small number of cases, qualitative researchers generally unearth enormous amounts of information from their studies (KKV, 1995). Clearly, the focus of quantitative and qualitative analysis is very different. Quantitative research uses numbers and statistical methods. It tends to be based on numerical measurements of specific aspects of phenomena; it abstracts from particular instances to seek general description or to test hypotheses; it seeks measurements and analyses that are easily replicable by other research (KKV, 1995). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 78 While both approaches yield significant findings, most research does not fit clearly into one category. In the same research project, some data may be collected that is amenable to statistical analysis while many subjects cannot be formulated to permit statistical testing of hypotheses. For example, patterns and trends in social, political, or economic behavior are more readily subjected to quantitative analysis, while the role of culture and history can be better explained through discursive analysis. In the next section, I demonstrate why both methods are required for this study. Quantitative Methods Quantitative methods offer clues towards understanding trends within large sample studies. It can consist of official aggregate data published by both governmental and non-governmental agencies. At the same time, quantitative data offers individual insight as with market research surveys and public opinion polls. Overall, quantitative methods are based on the distributions these data exhibit and the relationships that can be established between numeric variables using simple and advanced statistical methods (KKV 1994). An underlying assumption of statistical analysis is that events and facts in the world exhibit certain distributions, which via statistical methods, can be described, compared, and analyzed. Scholars compare and analyze data distribution during specific time periods. The comparison of the distributions is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 79 carried out in an effort to see if a relationship exists between them and whether this relationship will hold for all countries in all periods of time. This basic practice of making inference from a sample to a population lies at the heart of statistical analyses in comparative politics. Comparative Method Like the overall debate between quantitative and qualitative studies, there are multiple approaches within the comparative method. Therefore, a firm understanding and justification of the comparative method and selected approach, Mill’s Method of Difference, is warranted. The comparative method (Lijphart, 1975) or focused comparison (Hague, 1992) uses mid-level conceptual abstractions to compare few countries. Studies that use this method are very intensive and configurative. This means they encompass the nuances specific to each country as well as account for multiple factors to explain a particular outcome. Often referred as case oriented (Ragin 1994), the country is frequently the unit of analysis. Emphasis is on the similarities and differences among countries rather than a strict analytic relationship between the variables as denoted through quantitative studies. The comparative method resembles the statistical method in all respects except one. The crucial difference is that the number of cases it deals with is too small to permit systematic control by means of partial correlations. This problem occurs in statistical operations, too, especially when one wants to control Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 80 simultaneously for many variables, one quickly runs out of cases. The comparative method should be resorted to when the number of cases available for analysis is so small that analyzing them further in order to establish credible controls is not feasible (Lijphart, 1971). Consequently, there is no clear dividing line between the statistical and comparative method; the difference depends entirely on the number of cases (Lijphart, 1971). It follows that in many research situations, with an intermediate number of cases, a combination of statistical and comparative methods is appropriate. The comparative method and the case study methods have limitations. Therefore, the investigator must apply these methods in such a way to minimize their weaknesses are minimized and their inherent strengths are capitalized. Thus, they can be highly useful instruments in scientific political inquiry (Lijphart, 1971). The method of comparing few countries is divided primarily into two types of system design: (1) Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD); and (2) Most Different Systems Design (Przeworski & Tenue, 1970; Faure 1994)2 8. Most similar systems designs compare political systems that share a host of common features in 2 8 For MSSD, the countries share the same characteristics (a,b,c,), and some share the same key explanatory factor (x), but those without this key factor also lack the outcome which is to be explained (y). Thus the presence or absence o f the key explanatory factor is seen to account for this outcome, a state o f affairs that complies with M ill’s method o f difference. For M DSD on the right hand side o f the figure, the countries have inherently different features (a through i), but share the same key explanatory factor (x) as well as the presence o f the outcome to be explained (y). In this system, the outcome to be explained is due to the presence o f the key explanatory factor in all the countries (x), and thus adheres to M ill’s method o f agreement. In both systems, the presence o f x is associated with the presence o f y, and some would argue that x actually causes y. The difference between the two systems resides in the choice o f countries. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81 an effort to neutralize some differences while highlighting others. Based on Mill’s (1843) method of difference, MSSD identifies the key features that are different among similar countries and which account for the observed political outcome. Most different systems designs compare countries that do not share any common features apart from the political outcome to be explained and one or two of the explanatory factors seen to be important for that outcome. This system is based on Mill’s method of agreement, which identifies those features that are the same among different countries in an effort to account for a particular outcome. Most different systems design, which is the approach that is applied here, is typical of comparative studies that identify a particular outcome that is to be explained, such as revolutions, military coups, transitions to democracy or interstate water accord cooperation. Some comparativists use both system designs. In Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Linz and Stepan (1996) used MSSD to compare the experiences of democratic consolidation within the separate regions of South America, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe; and then MSDS to compare across these regions. Similarly, Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) used MSSD to examine the relationship between capitalist development and democracy within Latin America, and MDSD to compare Latin America and the advanced industrial world. De Meur and Berg-Schlosser (1994) employed both designs to analyze the conditions of survival or breakdown of democratic systems in inter-war Europe. What remains important to all these methods of comparing few countries is the proper specification of the outcome that is to be explained, the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82 reason for adopting either system design, as well as the choice of the particular countries under scrutiny (Landman, 2000). Both approaches are valuable for this study. On the one hand, the Most Different Systems Design is applicable because the selected case studies have different variables which explain interstate water accord cooperation. On the other hand, the case studies have similar variables yet produce significantly different levels of interstate cooperation. The dependent variable and selected independent variables are explained in the next section. Research Design The dependent variable for this study is level of cooperation defined by treaty signing, ratification, and equitable water distribution. Throughout this study, I use the terms dependent variable and observed outcome. While similar, there is a qualitative difference. The dependent variable (level of cooperation) is what is explained by the impact of the independent variables. However, the observed outcome is the actual interstate water accord, which inherently contains a specific level of cooperation. The independent variables are social, economic, environmental, and political conditions (both quantitative and qualitative variables); role of neutral third parties, institutions, coercion, internal support for the accord, geographic scope of conflict, and type of government (i.e., democratic). I add a cultural and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83 history variable to the qualitative analysis. Table 3.1 (See Appendix A) provides an overview of the research design. It includes central assumptions, research questions, independent variables, dependent variable explanation, and selected theories for study). The following hypotheses have been selected for this study. H i: The greater the level of public participation, the greater the level of cooperation in establishing an accord (global environmental theory). Hf. Nations currently facing acute water scarcity shortages, exhibit lower levels of cooperation than nations that do not (geopolitical theory). Hs: Bilateral negotiations are likely to produce higher levels of cooperation than multilateral negotiations (Negotiation theory). H4. Treaty ratification is a necessary precondition for equitable water redistribution (negotiation theory). H5: The more political trust between contesting parties, the stronger the accord (common pool resource theory, negotiation theory, discourse analysis). H6\ Accords that are supported internally are likely to be more stable than sole external support (common pool resource theory). H7\ The broader the scope of the water dispute, the stronger the accord (negotiation, shared incentive and ecological marginalization theory). H$: The more accords consider environmental factors, the greater likelihood for accord resiliency (epistemic community approach). Hg\ The greater the role of managing institutions, the higher chance for accord ratification (conjunctive management). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 84 In order to test fully the hypotheses, it is necessary to use both qualitative and quantitative methods. From an aggregate level, research has not been conducted in understanding the motivations for nation states to enter into water accords. More information is necessary regarding treaty development as well as understanding the components that create resilient accords (Wolf, 2000). Since the current literature is quite limited on comparative case studies. The selected hypotheses, among other things, address the motivation and prevalent conditions which help explain why states will enter or refrain from sharing a common pool resource. The hypotheses address individual and state motivation and also acknowledge the relevance of other theoretical factors such as role of third parties, geo-political factors, and ecological values. In the quantitative portion of the analysis, I measure the level of cooperation of 68 water accords2 9 by using discrete evaluation factors and narrowly defining the level of cooperation at the time of agreement signing. Measuring environmental cooperative agreements (specifically relating to water) is a new area. Few authors have undertaken systematic work in the area of international water treaties as a whole (Wolf, 2000). Qualitative and quantitative analysis jointly permit a complete investigation of the independent variables and the testing of all the relevant theories and hypotheses. While there is overlap among the independent variables in the 2 9 Trans-boundary Freshwater Data Base (Oregon State University, 2004). This is the most comprehensive data set o f interstate water accords from 1800-2002. The data set includes treaty text, and treaties can be divided by water quantity, quality, and non-water linkages. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 85 quantitative and qualitative analyses, neither one alone covers all the independent variables. For example, the quantitative analysis addresses social, economic, political, and environmental indicators that reflect accord development. However, it does not offer sufficient understanding of third parties, geographical conditions, or capture state actor motivation for achieving internal support. These factors are addressed by conducting in-depth, comparative case studies. The quantitative analysis provides important information and clues about the relationship between independent and dependent variables. The quantitative analysis is used to offer hints as to which specific variables should be examined and provide a context for understanding how the case studies fit into an aggregate model. In this study, I review 68 interstate water accords from 1950-1999. The sample is large enough to allow for basic bivariate and multivariate analysis. In each of the hypotheses, data are available to explain how the independent variables impact interstate water accords (i.e., political trust, internal support, rules of negotiation, and presence of institutions). However, not all of the independent variables can be analyzed using quantitative methods. Schlessinger (1962) argued that the problem with applying sociological methods to historical scholarship was that the pursuit of quantifiable data tended to lead scholars away from what really matters to what is measurable. The resulting studies are often confined to the historical problems and materials with which quantitative methods can address (Mohr, 1997). Measurement and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 86 especially, the imposition of linear metrics upon qualitative social phenomena lead to a distortion of the human properties of social life, especially through the substitution of arbitrary dimensional interpretations for distinctively unique historical phenomena. Statistical measurements are also seen as dehumanizing and distracting the observers from their own subjectivity (Mohr, 1997). Further, formalization is seen as digressing from historical details. It involves a shift from human meaning and action, toward a scientific and abstract model of human behavior often linked to the pursuit of universalistic laws of human nature rather than the particularities of human history (Landes, 1971).3 0 Therefore, multiple approaches must be incorporated to study interstate water accords. Clearly, a quantitative approach will yield valuable insight into understanding general patterns of negotiation and water distribution. In turn, these data offer clues toward understanding how political trust, third parties, and international institutions have aided in developing effective interstate water accords. However, non-quantifiable variables such as history, culture, environmental values, and coercion, and form of government, and incentives also 30 Another danger o f not being explicit about the methods o f hypothesis testing is that analysts may treat briefly or simply ignore alternative hypotheses. In the case o ff rational choice theory, the error is to assume that rational choice hypotheses obviate the need to assess other hypotheses that are not derived from rational choice model (Mahoney, 2000). Often very little attention is given to rival hypotheses outside the rational choice tradition. A lack o f adequate consideration o f rival hypotheses is not unique to rational choice theory, but the tradition’s concern with model elaboration makes it especially vulnerable to this problem. In this regard, rational choice theorists (like all theorists) can benefit by reminding themselves o f the following standard o f the comparative method: the value o f the hypothesis ultimately depends on its explanatory utility when tested against other competing hypotheses. A hypothesis derived from the assumption o f rational choice theory no matter how sophisticated the formal model is o f little value if it does not withstand rigorous empirical testing (Mahoney, 2000). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87 offer valuable insight into the level of cooperation within interstate water accords. Therefore, qualitative case study methodology must be incorporated. Methodology Limitations The best research can be rendered meaningless if certain methodological factors are not taken into account. Scholars compare to provide context, make classifications, test hypotheses, and make predictions. They do this by comparing many countries, few countries, or by providing in-depth studies of single countries. There are many trade-offs associated with these different goals and methods of comparison. However, there are also important fundamental problems, which if not addressed explicitly can limit the types of generalizations that can be drawn. This section addresses the common methodological problems and outlining the strategies for overcoming them. Indeterminate Research Design Problems The first problem is having too many variables and not enough countries (Collier, 1991; Dogan & Pelassy, 1990; Hague et al., 1992).3 1 This problem arises when there are more explanatory factors (for the observed outcome) than there are countries (or observations). This problem is associated more often with single case 3 1 Also known more generally as too many inferences and not enough observations (King et al., 1994). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 88 studies and those that compare few countries than with those studies that compare many countries. The first solution is to raise the number of observations to allow the key factors of the study greater overall variation, sometimes referred to as the degree of freedom. This can be achieved by comparing instances of political phenomenon and its hypothesized explanatory factors over time, by adding more countries to the study, or by comparing sub-units of the nation under scrutiny (Stimson, 1985; Beck & Katz, 1995). In studies that compare few countries, more instances of the phenomenon are drawn from history to increase the number of observations, and in single case studies, sub-units or regions within the nation are compared such as Putnam’s (1993) study of Italy or Hagopian’s (1996) study of Brazil. The second solution to the problem is to use the most similar systems design to achieve focused comparison of few countries. The MSSD framework seeks to control for those factors similar across countries in the study while focusing on only those factors that are different that account for the outcome. This strategy of comparison underlies the justification for area studies, but some scholars argue that MSSD framework simply provides overdetermined outcomes (Przeworski & Tenue, 1970; Collier, 1991) where many rival explanations are never truly eliminated. On the one hand, this has been a general limitation in conducting research within the social sciences. On the other hand, it allows for additional interpretation of observed phenomenon. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 89 The third solution is to reduce the number of variables by focusing on the key explanatory factors that are hypothesized for the outcome. This can be achieved either by using the most different systems design or by having stronger theoretical specifications. Ultimately, I resolve the small case dilemma by incorporating statistical analysis with a large case selection of evaluating 68 interstate water accords. The problem of establishing equivalence pertains to both the quantitative and qualitative sections. Comparativists face a dilemma when theoretical concepts and operational indicators are applied in multiple contexts (Sartori, 1970; Macintyre, 1971; Mayer, 1989). I recognize this issue because I am using numerous variables. Therefore, it is essential that some level of equivalency is developed. Mayer (1989) recognized this concern by arguing that the contextual relativity of the meaning or the measures of indicators constitutes the most serious impediment to the cross-contextual validity of empirically testable explanatory theory. Is it possible to say that political trust has shared meaning to allow for valid comparison? The crux of the problem is not specifying identical, or even similar concepts, but equivalent ones so that their comparison is meaningful (Dogan & Pelassy, 1990; Sartori, 1994). There are various intellectual positions that offer insight into this problem. They are the universalists, relevativists, and middle position. The universalist position argues that if theoretical concepts and their indicators are to have any Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 90 explanatory power, they must be able to travel to all parts of the globe. Embedded within this position are rationalists, functionalists, and structuralist. Rationalists argue all individuals maximize their own personal utility given a set of preferences and confront a range of choices (Ward, 1995). Functionalists argue that certain vital functions such as interest articulation and interest aggregation are fulfilled everywhere (Dogan & Pelassy, 1990). Structuralists argue that macro-structures such as the state, economic development and social classes exist and are responsible for determining political outcomes, though in varying degrees. In comparison, the relativist position argues that all meaning is locally determined, and that a general science of comparative politics is necessarily limited if not impossible (Macintyre, 1971). Ethnographic, interpretivists, and anthropological approaches take this position. Although not an extreme relativist, Sartori (1970, 1994) argued that stretching a concept too far dilutes its meaning and precision, suggesting that once defined and operationalized, certain concepts can only travel so far. The middle position argues that comparativists must not abandon all their concepts, but should modify them to be more sensitive to the cultural specifications of the contexts being studied. Some comparativists consider themselves opportunists as they modify, combine, and reconstitute concepts to fit the cases under study (Przeworski in Kohli et al., 1995). They argue that willful sacrifice of insights from different perspectives may obscure important explanatory factors (Katzenstein in Kohl et al., 1995). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 91 In reality there are numerous ways to validate comparative assessments. This includes raising the level of abstraction, focusing on a smaller number of countries and using specialist terms in compiling cross national data sets. Raising the level of abstraction allows a study to be more inclusive, while lowering the level of abstraction makes it more exclusive. For example, Finer (1997) adopted terms that will travel through space and over time. His master variables for classifying the world’s regimes include territory (city, country, or empire) type of regime (palace, forum, nobility, church, and hybrids), the presence or absence of a standing military or civil bureaucracy, and the substantive and procedural limitations on the activities of rulers. Inglehart (1997) applied two value continua to 43 countries which range from citizens’ concerns with ‘survival” vs. ‘well being’ to traditional v. legal rational forms of authority. The second solution focuses on a small set of countries where the comparativist has thorough knowledge. It suggests that the analyst be extremely careful in engaging in cross national research. The explanatory concepts can be enhanced if they are applied in contexts with which the comparativist is most familiar. The local knowledge can identify gaps between theoretical concepts and their applications, and result in more meaningful comparison. Sanders (1994) summarized this point by saying “it is only with detailed substantive knowledge that analysts can make informed judgments either about the relevance of the characteristics that they make of a particular system or about the identity of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 92 meaning attached to the questions that they pose to people living in different countries.” (Landman, 2000). The third solution connects with the second solution. Scholars seeking to compare many countries should venture out of the security of the familiar if they are prepared to collaborate with other scholars who possess special knowledge of the countries under scrutiny (Sanders, 1994). This means an aggregate quantitative assessment and an in-depth qualitative approach must be pursued. This offers the broadest insight to evaluating interstate water accord cooperation. The quantitative study allows for a generalizable understanding of interstate water accord cooperation, while an in-depth qualitative approach offers a more comprehensive configurative assessment. The indelible point is that a good qualitative comparison must employ terms that are functionally equivalent. This solution does not envisage concepts as identical or even similar but functionally equivalent. This means that as long as the variables posit the same function (and this case they do to explain interstate water accord cooperation), then meaningful comparative analysis can be conducted. This study recognizes that the selected variables may have different meanings in various settings. However, since water is by nature an ambiguous concept, I allow for greater explanatory power within each variable, which allows configurative analysis and statistical analysis to be conducted. For the statistical section, I rank the criterion required for level of cooperation (the dependent Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 93 variable). I measure the dependent variable using accord signing and ratification and level of water distribution at the time of agreement signing. Bias, Spuriousness and Ecological and Individualist Fallacies The problems of selection bias, spuriousness, and ecological and individualist fallacies also deserve consideration. First, the problem of selection bias arises from the intentional choice of countries (Liberson 1987; Gedded 1990; Collier, 1995; King et al., 1994) as well as the use of historical accounts and sources that favor the particular theoretical position of the comparativist (Lustick, 1996). The second problem is spuriousness or the omission of key variables that may account for both the outcome and other explanatory factors already identified. The third problem - ecological and individualist fallacies - arises when a study seeks to make inferences about one level of analysis using evidence from another (Robinson, 1950; Scheuch 1966, 1969; Miller, 1995). For example, a theory of revolution may concentrate on individual psychological factors that account for rebellious behavior, but the comparison to test the theory may use aggregate statistics on levels of inequality and instances of political violence. The final problem is value bias. This is where the analysts particular cultural, political, and philosophical disposition biases the conduct and conclusions. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 94 Selection Bias Selection bias in comparative politics occurs through the non-random choice of countries for comparison, or the deliberate selection by the comparativist (Collier, 1992). Though selection of countries lies at the heart of comparison, selection without reflection may lead to serious problems of inference. The problem of selection is germane to small case studies. Studies that compare many countries usually have a sufficient number of observations to avoid the problem of selection, and quantitative studies of many countries can use a number of statistical techniques to eliminate the problem (Gujarati, 1988; Fox, 1997). However, selection can seriously affect the type of inferences that are drawn from small case studies. Frequently, this type of studies, countries are chosen because they exhibit a specific outcome to be explained. In other words, selecting on the dependent variable involves choosing some phenomenon of political interest, gathering data on the occurrences of the phenomenon, and then determining what characteristics the occurrences have in common. Its use has come under sharp attack. The problem is that if observations are selected on the value of the dependent variable, estimates obtained by ordinary least squares will be biased. This bias cannot be corrected by the introduction of control variables and gathering more data will not solve the problem. Bias remains even if the number of observations goes to infinity. In short, inferences drawn from cases selected on the dependent variable are highly suspect (Porter, 1990). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 95 There are three solutions to the problem of choosing on the dependent variable. The first solution is to have a dependent variable that varies. Secondly, when comparing few countries, the choice of countries ought to reflect substantive knowledge of parallel cases (Laitin, 1995). Third, stronger theory may specify accurately a range of countries in which certain outcomes and their explanations would obtain. Ultimately, I overcome this problem by selecting three cases with differing levels of cooperation. This way the factors that explain the dependent variable are not predetermined to produce a specific result.3 2 A second form of selection bias arises in qualitative studies that rely on historical sources. This is where the analyst chooses historical accounts either intentionally or unintentionally whose description of events fits the particular theory being tested. Lustick (1996) stated that the work of historians cannot be legitimately treated as unproblematic background narrative from which theoretically neutral data can be elicited for the framing of problems and the testing of theories. Historiography varies in its description of the past unfolded, which events receive emphasis, as well as the different theoretical dispositions of the historians themselves. Thus, inferences drawn from studies using descriptive historical accounts that are organized and presented according to the categories and propositions of theories they are testing will necessarily be biased. Solutions to this form of selection bias include using multiple sources to arrive at a “mean account of the events and identifying the tendencies within each source to acknowledge 3 2 This approach allows the hypotheses to be tested fully. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96 possible sources of bias” (Landman, 2000). Therefore, I incorporate multiple sources with varying positions for interpreting my case study data. Spuriousness A spurious explanation is one in which some unidentified factor is responsible for the outcome3 3 Also known as omitted variable bias (King et al., 1994), this problem frequently arises since the choice of cases may overlook an important underlying factor that accounts for the outcome. The easiest solution to solve spuriousness is to specify all relevant variables that may account for the observed outcome. This solution is acceptable if the comparison is across many countries or many observations, but if the study is one of a few countries, specifying additional variables can resort to the initial problem of too many variables and not enough countries. I overcome this dilemma by using multiple variables, which should eliminate or significantly minimize the variable gap that could cause hypothesis testing distortion. Ecological and Individualist Fallacies There are two types of data in the social sciences, individual data and ecological data. Ecological data comprise information that has been aggregated for territorial units. Individual data are collected through the use of periodic censuses or other official means to determine a representative population sample. The twin 3 3 This methodological fallacy inherently relates to a Type One error, where there is an issue o f under-coverage, where there is a failure to consider all pertinent independent variables to explain the observed outcome. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97 problems of ecological and individualist fallacies occur when inferences are drawn about one level of analysis using evidence from another. An ecological fallacy occurs when results obtained through analysis of aggregate level data are used to make inferences about individual level behavior. Alternatively, an individualist fallacy occurs when results obtained through analysis of individual level data are used to make inferences about aggregate level phenomena. The solution for avoiding both fallacies is straightforward. The data used in any research ought to minimize the chain of inference between the theoretical concepts that are specified and the measures of those concepts that are ultimately adopted in the analysis. Known as the principle of direct measurement (Scheuch, 1969), the solution means research that specifies questions at the individual level ought to use individual data, and vice versa for research questions that specify systemic relationships. For quantitative analysis, (Miller 1995) argued that analysis of individuals can only lead to precise quantitative conclusions about individuals. The pragmatic aspects of research may not allow the direct measurement of the phenomenon, but the overall point remains that this measurement must be as close to the level of the phenomenon being examined as possible. I overcome this issue by stating that the quantitative and qualitative analyses offer insight to their individual perspective in explaining the level of cooperation within interstate water accords. In essence, the two approaches complement each other. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98 Value Bias A final problem of comparison is value bias, a problem which depends upon the perspective from which one sees the world. Over the course of the last century, social science has recognized that knowledge is not value free. Classification, analysis, and substantive interpretation are all subject to the particular perspective of the researcher. Modern empirical analysis accepts that to some degree what is observed is in part a consequence of the theoretical position that the analyst adopts in the first place (Sanders, 1995), but the quest to separate fact and value is still considered worthwhile (Hague et al., 1992). The key to making valid comparisons is to be as public as possible (King, 1994) in terms of the judgments that have been made in the overall construction of the comparative study. These judgments include the theoretical perspective upon which the study is based, the identification of its key variables, the specifications of its research design, and recognition of the limits to the types of inference that can be drawn from it. I overcome value bias by clearly choosing select theories and variables to explain interstate water accord cooperation. Conclusion In this chapter, I argued that both qualitative and quantitative methodologies are necessary to conduct comprehensive analysis of interstate water accords. Specifically, this means analyzing aggregate data to evaluate interstate water Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 99 accords and using carefully delineated comparative case studies to complement the statistical section. This combined approach reduces the likelihood for creating an indeterminate research design. While admittedly, any research has the likelihood of nuanced interpretations, I clearly explained the selected theories and hypotheses to be tested. Further, I selected a wide array of variables and justified how methodological equivalency issues are overcome. In the next two chapters, I will discuss the significant quantitative and qualitative findings that explain interstate water accord cooperation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 CHAPTER 4 A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF INTERSTATE WATER ACCORDS, 1950-1999 Introduction This chapter provides quantitative interpretation of understanding the level of cooperation within interstate water accords. First, I will define cooperation as seen through prominent international relations and environmental based perspectives. I will explain the quantitative scoring system and reintroduce the hypotheses selected for study. Ultimately, the quantitative section offers the first tangible clues toward interpreting and evaluating early coordination strategies within interstate water accords. An underlying assumption within this study is that most durable forms of interstate cooperation manifest support from multiple societal levels. In essence, both domestic and international forces combine to offer an effective template toward achieving cooperative agreements. Probably one of the most celebrated works in this field is Putnam’s (1988) two level game framework. Putnam explained how state policy decisions hinge on both domestic and international Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101 forces. The central belief is that nation state decisions at the international level are often dictated by domestic constraints.3 4 Putnam drew on ideals from the game theory literature presented by scholars such as Axelrod (1984), and Snyder and Diesing (1977). These theorists suggested that cooperation is possible under certain anarchic conditions. While international water accords are not devised in an anarchic environment, this approach warrants recognition because cooperation occurs in both hospitable and inhospitable conditions. Putnam further recognized that temptation for negotiators to defect (from an international agreement) is reduced dramatically when there is expectation to continue to negotiate. However, the chief components which explain cooperation require further development. Putnam explained cooperation by relaxing the traditional game theory perspective and adding a new domestic political dimension. In his Two- Level Games, he illustrated how “Janus-faced” national political leaders simultaneously seek solutions that entail both international and domestic considerations — Level 1 is the international and Level II is the domestic level. The rational is that political leaders face distinctive strategic opportunities and strategic dilemmas related to building cooperation. Putnam believes cooperation can be achieved through win-set policies, which emphasize a common forum between domestic and international interests. 3 4 Though it does not necessarily have to viewed, as a constraint, domestic factors can enable nation states to cooperate, essentially overcoming collective action problems. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 102 Many scholars view this Two-Level game analysis as the benchmark for understanding cooperative constraints and motivations. Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam’s (1993) Double Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics soften the original two game analyses by positing that domestic and international forces are not simultaneous and mutual factors in negotiations (Lantis, 1997). This assertion is covered in greater detail in the qualitative section, but is important in understanding the current discussion relating to cooperation. Ratification and Cooperation Putnam’s original two-level game analysis emphasizes the role of domestic political alignments as a contributing factor for creating international agreements. While Putnam defined ratification as a formal voting procedure at Level II, he did not explore the politics or process behind such decisions. He believes that any sequential decomposition into a negotiation phase and a ratification phase descriptively is not accurate (Lantis, 1997). Yet according to Lantis (1997), a sequential understanding of the ratification process is descriptively more accurate than Putnam’s original version. Lantis (1997) believes that sequential ordering allows for greater understanding of how domestic factors unravel previously reached agreements in the post commitment phase. Case studies in Double Edged Diplomacy support this thesis by demonstrating that ratification on international agreements involves a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103 longitudinal process. For example, Eichenberg (1993) argued that the mobilization of public sentiment is itself sufficient cause for parties and governments to reexamine negotiation positions over time. Other arguments in Double Edged Diplomacy elaborate on the need to consider sequential patterns within ratification (as a means towards achieving international agreements). For example, Evans (1993) argued that the “manipulation of foreign perceptions of ratification is not an effective strategy even for those who head authoritarian regimes” and that leaders are “surprisingly likely to manipulate and misjudge what is ratifiable.” Both statements imply that deeper and richer understanding of ratification is required in order to understand the level of cooperation formed by disputing parties. It appears that Putnam’s Two Level Games and even later Double Edge Diplomacy partially satisfied this dilemma. Putnam and his supporters suggested that domestic political factors are important for international cooperation. However, they did not identify systematically the important domestic political actors in the ratification process, nor do they assess how domestic factors influence foreign policy decisions about cooperation. In his 1988 work, Putnam referred to domestic political pressure and coalitions that constrain the latitude of national political leaders at the international negotiating table (Putnam, Summer, 1988). Evans (1993) advanced the understanding of domestic forces on ratification. He argued that numerous constituents mobilize when an issue is placed on the international agenda, which Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104 has the power to strengthen or under-cut attempted agreements. Evans (1993) summarized this problem by stating, “The more clearly international options are defined, the more leaders are constrained by mobilized interest groups and trapped by personal investment in the on-going negotiations.” Evans (1993) qualified his assessment by stating that cooperation can be achieved provided that “synergistic issue linkages” and transnational alliances are recognized. This means that international and domestic factors leading to cooperative agreements should be analyzed together. The inclusion of transnational alliances supports the contention that multiple actors are responsible for creating effective interstate water accords. The editors of Double Edged Diplomacy (1993) concluded that domestic determinants are linked inextricably to foreign policy decision making. However, they did not provide any specific standard for explaining this phenomenon. Instead, ratification was explained in a fragmented fashion based upon individual case studies. For example, Stein (1993) suggested that the political maneuvering of the Israeli cabinet drove Israel’s peace negotiations with Egypt. Further, Eichenberg (1993) argued that public opinion and factions in political parties are the most important influences on the decisions about INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) modernization in Germany, and Milner (1993) focused on interest group opposition to the Anglo-American oil agreement of 1944. Unfortunately, the net results of these efforts merely produce an ad hoc list of domestic factors (Lantis, 1997). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105 In sum, Putnam and his supporters placed more emphasis on the outcome than evaluate the early coordination strategies leading up to final agreements. Lantis (1997) offered a guide to evaluate cooperation further. He constructed a three-step approach where international cooperation is viewed more as a sequential process rather than a simultaneous alignment of domestic and international conditions. The first step is similar to Evan’s approach (1993) in that a leader’s initial commitment to cooperate creates an environment for domestic political actors to mobilize. The second step or post commitment phase is linked to five domestic political conditions. These are major party unity, ruling coalition consensus, the symmetry effects of foreign policy decisions, election performance, and public support. Finally, the proximity of these domestic political conditions to the ruling elite determines the level of cooperation exhibited within many foreign policy decisions (Lantis, 1997). While much of Lantis’ understanding of cooperation is illustrated best in the qualitative case study section, it warrants attention here because a major criterion for explaining the level of cooperation is based on ratification. The fact that ratification continues to permeate international political dialogue further substantiates its relevancy. Ultimately, the quantitative section offers new insight by emphasizing ratification as an integral component in understanding international water accords. The other criterion, water redistribution is analyzed in the next section. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106 Empirical Background of Ranking Interstate Environmental Accords Over the last two decades, scholars and policy makers have recognized trans-boundary environmental problems require joint action by nation-states. Dozens of international environmental agreements (IEA’s) have been negotiated to establish rules and norms aimed at changing human behavior to protect the environment. The level of cooperation can be understood by analyzing the following questions: (i) What features make an effective treaty?; (ii) Do existing IEA’s embody such features?; and (iii) Idas nation state participation in IEA’s really made a difference? The first two questions are answered by ranking systematically whether nations ratified and established water sharing provisions within the accords. The third question reflects the underlying assumption of this study that international environmental agreements and, more specifically, interstate water accords are integral to reducing human-environment tensions. This study addresses these questions from both macro and micro perspectives. The current data reflect that that interstate water accords are overwhelmingly successful and that it is an effective way to mitigate current and future water scarcity issues. This assumption is scrutinized in the upcoming quantitative findings section. Two-Level games, Double Edged Diplomacy and more recently Lantis (1997) offered interesting insight about interstate cooperation, though there is specific literature that addresses international environmental cooperation. However, instead of dichotomizing the debate between domestic and international forces or sequential and random patterns, a new pattern has emerged. Institutions Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 107 and social conflict paradigms are used as interpretive tools in explaining the level of cooperation. Ringquist (2004) substantiated the institutional framework model. He reasons that since unilateral solutions to trans-boundary problems are not feasible, one must identify the characteristics shared by effective multilateral institutions. This, in turn, reveals how institutions respond to international environmental problems. While international relations theory is fragmented in defining the exact role of institutions, it is clear that international environmental concerns are of increasing value within the foreign policy arena. Yet an emerging social based conflict approach extends beyond institutional building and suggests that change leading to cooperation is embedded within groups. Conca (2003) supported this perspective by analyzing cooperative mechanisms within international river basins. Regardless of focus, there are central challenges toward achieving cooperation. According to some proponents of global environmental theory, policy compliance is difficult to maintain in the absence of world government. Difficulties exist at both the state and international levels. States have the propensity to free ride and take advantage of compliance with norms and regulations by others. For example, nation states may be self interested (often myopic in policy decisions) and emphasize industry production over environmental protection, thereby generating pollution. Capacity restraints also make it difficult 3 5 Traditional international relations realist posit that institutions are important but are more a function o f the nation state while neo-liberal thought states that institution are a separate entity from the nation state. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 108 for lesser developing countries to adhere to policies required by IEAs. Hence, nation state cooperation within IEAs vary because of differing state capacities and ruling elite support (often dictated by domestic constraints). This assertion is in accordance within the previously discussed theoretical components because it implies that domestic and state level factors impact directly the level of level of cooperation. In another dimension, epistemic community theorists view science as a pragmatic way toward achieving international environmental cooperation. Science is an important consideration because it offers cogent insight about the severity of existing or pending environmental crises. However, problems remain because IEAs are difficult to generalize. Each potential agreement has its own specific set of problems and stakeholders. Additionally, competing scientific explanations can be used to obfuscate as much as clarify an issue. Nevertheless, accepting the premise that collective action problems can be overcome and that science holds significant explanatory value, international water accord cooperation can be understood within an institutional framework. Still, caution must be presupposed. Global water cooperation has proceeded on two distinct levels. In the 1960’s, the International Law Commission promulgated international legal principles for the management of shared watercourses. These efforts culminated with the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which was passed by the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109 United Nations General Assembly (1997).3 6 This assessment emphasizes the role of neutral bodies to assist with cooperation. This macro-institutional focus offers a general understanding for how nation states overcome collective action problems to achieve cooperation. The original methodological problem remains because it identifies central factors for achieving cooperation, but does not reveal any configurative approach for this development. In all fairness, comparative assessments are limited by the amount of available data and time and space issues. Yet an analytic void remains in understanding how other societal forces impact or contribute to achieving cooperation. Conca (2003) hinted at the limitations of this “top down” approach by acknowledging that many of the world’s shared river agreements reflect forces that extend beyond institutionalism. This implies that a multiplicity of factors, both state and local 3 6 The convention intended to provide a set o f universal principles that guide the more detailed development o f basin specific agreements. It articulates general principles not only for the content o f basin specific accords, but also for the process by which such accords should be negotiated and the standing to be accorded to those states within a shared lake or basin. Am ong it central provisions are the following: Article 4 stipulates that every watercourse state is entitled to participate in negotiations that cover an entire water course, and to conduct on any lesser agreements affecting that state; Article 5 calls for states to exercise equitable and reasonable use o f international watercourses within their territories; Article 7 obligates states not to cause significant harm to other watercourse states; Article 8 obligates states to cooperate on the basis o f sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit, and good faith; Article 9 calls for regular information and data exchange; Article 11 requires information exchange and consultation with other parties on the effects o f any planned measures; Article 12 requires prior notification for any planned measures which have a significant adverse effect on other watercourse states; Article 20-23 deal with environmental concerns, establishing general obligations to protect and preserve ecosystems, prevent, reduce, and control pollution, prevent the introduction o f alien or new species; and protect and preserve the marine environment; and Article 33 establishes dispute resolution procedures including an obligation to resolve disputes peacefully, and endorsement o f arbitration and mediation, and procedures for the creation and working o f fact finding commissions. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 110 actors, (non-governmental organizations and social groups) have the capacity to overcome collective action problems and achieve and maintain effective interstate water accords. Societal forces constantly seek to maintain equilibrium, though it is never reached. Is it possible to understand the level of cooperation in a sequential manner? In other words, are there a core set of governing principles for explaining interstate water accord cooperation? Conca (2003) came closest to answering this question by suggesting that a global regime exists for international rivers. Conca (2004) comprised a dataset of basin specific interstate agreements for the period 1980-2000. It includes both formal treaty instruments and less formalized products of interstate bargaining agreements such as public memoranda of understanding, negotiated, but not ratified treaties, and administrative agreements on specific basin development projects such as hydro-electric dams or flood control initiatives. Conca (2004) questioned whether governments converge on common principles to articulate jointly and explicitly the appropriate governing norms for a shared river basin. Second, he examines the extent to which convergence is in the direction of the principles as stated in the Watercourses Convention. Undoubtedly important, he does not distinguish about the causal factors shaping the content of these agreements, the willingness or ability of states to implement their commitments, or the effectiveness of those commitments once they are implemented. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I l l It is clear that multiple dimensions explain the level of cooperation, but questions remain regarding the sequential ordering and ranking of causal factors. This study bridges these gaps. On the one hand, the quantitative section substantiates Lantis’ concern that simply dichotomizing causes of cooperation into domestic and international factors is not enough. On the other hand, this study parallels Conca’s global regime query by analyzing early coordination strategy as a means towards achieving effective interstate water cooperation. However, this T7 study assumes that certain factors are more salient that others; namely ratification 1 0 and water redistribution. Interstate Water Accord Scoring Some research has been conducted on ranking environmental accords. Rechia (1999) measured environmental accords (not exclusively water related) among 18 different countries. He scored treaty signing one point and treaty ratification three points. Another similar line of research has been conducted on the effectiveness of air pollution control agreements, where pollution emissions data are used (Ringquist, 2004). 37 The quantitative ranking alone cannot solve Putnam’s dilemma o f sequential ordering, but its macro-oriented focus establishes a theoretical platform for it to be analyzed further in the qualitative section. 38 This is the central argument o f the paper that water scarcity is an increasing global problem and that one way to overcome it is by developing viable interstate water accords which delineate clearly mechanisms for redistributing freshwater. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112 Treaty ratification is a central factor for evaluating international environmental accords. It means that an accord is deeper than merely signing an agreement. Rules of law are created, which are conveyed to the entire population, often done via a parliament or another governing body. A thorough review of The Audit of International Environmental Accords (2000) substantiates this claim. The International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOS AI) (2002) also offered hints that the most cooperative treaties include ways to mitigate environmental problems. Hence, I organized two equally competing factors that measure the level of interstate water cooperation, treaty ratification and water redistribution. I assigned one point to no treaty signing, two points to treaty signing, and three points to treaty ratification. However, water distribution also is vital. An underlying assumption is that higher levels of cooperation are impacted by foresighted nation states which elicit support from multiple levels of society. This means that effective accords require both substantive and procedural coordination. Accord signing and ratification reflect the procedural component. However, substantive coordination strategies must also consider the problem at hand, which is reducing 39 freshwater scarcity. I evaluated the level of equitable water distribution, agreed to within the accord. I assigned one point for no water redistribution, two points for some water 3 9 Treaties can be selected according to numerous criteria. However, 1 believe that the first step toward reducing freshwater scarcity by is focusing on water redistribution. Therefore, I selected treaties where the primary concern is water quantity. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 113 redistribution, and a three points for equitable water distribution. I added the two measures together so that the scale ranges from two to six points for the dependent variable — two essentially being non-compliant and six representing treaty ratification and equitable water distribution. This new scale is used as an indicator of my dependent variable. I weigh each measure equally because they reflect two integral parts of cooperation. Effective cooperation not only entails accord ratification but also requires equitable water allocation and distribution. The International Freshwater Trans-boundary Data Base (2005, maintained by Oregon State University, and available through the internet) is used in this investigation. 4 0 I ranked 6 8 interstate water accords (all major continents are represented) from 1950-1999. I look at accords that address water quantity issues and score individual accords based upon the previously discussed scoring system. I categorized the accords into increments of ten years and list the accords name (column one), countries involved (column two), and the specific continent (column three). 4 1 I detailed the years (column four), number of parties with M= multilateral and B=bilateral (column five). 40 The International Trans-boundary Freshwater Treaties Database is a searchable database o f summaries and/or the full text o f more than 400 international, freshwater-related agreements, covering the years 1820 to 2002. Documents are coded by the basin and countries involved, date signed, treaty topic, allocation measures, conflict resolution mechanisms, and non-water linkages. The collected agreements relate to international freshwater resources, where the concern is water as a scarce or consumable resource, a quantity to be managed, or an ecosystem to be improved or maintained. In large part, the documents in the database concern: water rights, water allocations, water pollution, principles for equitably addressing water needs, hydropower/reservoir/flood control development, and environmental issues and the rights o f riverine ecological systems (International Freshwater Database, 2005). 4 1 For identifying the specific continent, the labels are as follows: A=Africa, Eu=Europe, NA=North America, As=Asia, ME=Middle East, SA=South Asia, SAM=South America, and FE=Far East. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 114 For the specific ranking section, NS means no signing, S means signing, R means ratification, NW means no water redistribution, SW means some water redistribution, and EW means equitable water redistribution4 2 . I provided decadal averages for signing/ratification (R/S avg.) and water distribution averages (WDAvg). Signing/ratification and water redistribution are categorically different. The first addressed procedural cooperation while the latter offers a more substantive framework. While both are vital towards explaining cooperation at the time of signing, it is not methodologically rigorous to offer a composite score. Therefore, I analyzed each cooperative component separately. General Findings The most apparent findings in Table 4.1 (See Appendix A) are that accords overwhelmingly reflect bilateral cooperation over multilateral cooperation and that ratification consistently receive higher scores than water redistribution. While the data set reveals trends in ten year increments, an interesting observation is that the accord ratification and water distribution was the second highest during the 1960’s. This lends credence that perhaps water accord development was a precursor to the overall international environmental movement surge in the 1970s. The lack of consistent equitable water distribution provisions within accords reveals a conflicting message about accord resiliency. On the one hand, lack of 42 The cases are ranked based upon what was found in the accords. Equitable accords used the words equitable, 50% or similar language. Some water distribution used terms less than 50%, and no water distribution lacked any mention o f water redistribution. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 115 freshwater redistribution debunks the resilience claim because less is at stake. Therefore, adhering to treaty provisions is not too demanding. On the other hand, vague water provisions offer additional opportunities for negotiations, further enhancing the level of cooperation. This discrepancy suggests generalizations about water accord cooperation are misleading and that accords should be analyzed individually, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Further, the data reveal that interstate water accords are usually ratified. This assessment is consistent with international relations literature which posits that ratification is a central component towards understanding nation state behavior. The high frequency rate of treaty ratification substantiates Lantis’ concern that ratification should be analyzed sequentially. Initial observation appears to support Rinquist’s institutional model over Conca’s social force model. The quantitative findings provide an initial platform to advance understanding of the level of cooperation but are limited in scope. They emphasize ratification and stress a greater need for water redistribution. This procedural/ substantive discrepancy suggests an uneven level of cooperation. Still this innovative scoring system reveals the challenges for mitigating current and future water scarcity problems. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Hypotheses Testing 116 The first hypothesis asks whether greater levels of public participation are evidence of higher levels of cooperation within interstate water accords. Public participation means individuals, non-governmental agencies like interest groups, and neutral third parties, as well as state leaders influence the level cooperation. This question stems from global environmental theory which posits that multiple levels of society are important for achieving environmental cooperation. The quantitative data hint that this is true when considering ratification. 4 3 In all cases accord signing/ratification for both bilateral and multilateral accords scored over 2 points per individual treaty. In Table 4.2 (See Appendix A), there was no composite ten-year period with ratification scores under 2.375. Accords that were not signed or were signed but not ratified received, overall lower scores than ratified accords. This means that countries which ratified their treaties were able to negotiate better water redistribution terms. This suggests that effective negotiators are involved in the process. Though support from specific negotiators and the sectors they represent is indeterminable. Therefore, this hypothesis confirms that public participation is an important requirement for accord cooperation, but any definitive configurative assessment requires further qualitative study. 4 3 This assumes that ratification entails multiple level o f support. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 117 The second hypothesis posits nations facing acute water scarcity shortages exhibit lower levels of cooperation. This hypothesis is linked to geopolitical theory which states that nations with contiguous borders have a greater propensity to engage in conflict than those countries that are not contiguous. The logic is that water scarce nations often view scarce water resources as a zero sum game and have very little incentive to negotiate. While compelling, the data do not necessarily correspond to this hypothesis. The data in Table 4.2 do not explain how some nations such as India and Pakistan not only were able to establish but also maintain resilient accords. The 1960 India-Pakistan Indus Treaty and India’s 1983 treaty with Bangladesh both had composite scores of six. Even in the most parched regions of southern Africa, some accords have high levels of cooperation as demonstrated by the Okavango River Basin Treaty between Angola, Botswana, and Namibia in 1994 with three points for ratification and 2 points for water redistribution as evidenced in Table 4.2. This suggests nations even under austere conditions may be willing to cooperate. Yet the 1990s, the most recent time period studied, indicates the overall general conflict within interstate water accord cooperation. Water scarce countries have been willing to ratify treaties, but overall water allocation remains mixed. This includes the Israelis-Palestinians case (Oslo Accords) which exhibited a composite score of 3 in 1995. Therefore, H2 is not confirmed and warrants further discussion in the qualitative section. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118 The third hypothesis challenges a central assumption within the current literature. It posits that bilateral negotiations produce higher levels of cooperation than multilateral negotiations. The logic behind this argument is that it is easier for two parties to agree on specific terms than multiple parties. However, the data reveal just the opposite. While most accords are bilateral, multilateral accords demonstrate similar levels of cooperation. The only unusual pattern in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 (See Appendix A) that was detected was during the 1980s when multilateral accord water redistribution received a composite score of 1.33 to bilateral water accord redistribution of a score a 1.8 8 . A limiting factor within this analysis is that there have been very few multilateral accords, which means there is an equivalency problem in making bilateral/multilateral comparison. Still, the available data suggest that bilateral accords do not produce greater levels of cooperation than multilateral accords. This hypothesis receives further evaluation in the qualitative section. In similar terms, hypothesis number four posits that treaty ratification is a precondition for equitable water redistribution. Grounded in negotiation theory, it fosters the idea that nation states that are willing to meet, are able to produce tangible and resilient interstate accords. However, the data produce mixed results. On the one hand, ratified treaties correlate with higher levels of water redistribution than unsigned or signed accords. However, this is a relative term, because the highest level of water redistribution is 2.375 and that was in the 1960s. This suggests that water redistribution remains a serious challenge in achieving higher Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 119 levels of cooperation and questions W olfs and others’ general assessment that water accords are overwhelmingly resilient. Thus modest levels of water redistribution speak more to the weakness of an accord than its overall resiliency. This is of increasing concern since numerous studies indicate that water scarcity will increase. Therefore, this hypothesis is confirmed with the qualification that the level of cooperation can be improved significantly. Hypothesis number five assesses whether political trust is integral to developing interstate water accord cooperation. This concept is supported by multiple perspectives, most notably being common pool resource theory. Ultimately, common pool resource theory posits that political trust is a critical factor in explaining the level of cooperation. If one assumes that political trust is endemic to the ratification process, then it is clearly evident because most of the treaties are ratified. However, if political trust is linked to equitable water distribution, it is more open to interpretation because there are very few accords that reflect equitable water sharing practices. How to best measure political trust is a challenge within mainstream comparative politics because it is a relative term, denoting different meanings within different cultures. Ultimately, this hypothesis is supported, but I acknowledge that the qualitative section will be able to answer this question in greater depth. In another vein, common pool resource theory is helpful in explaining hypothesis six, which addresses whether internal support for accords reflect greater levels of cooperation than solely national support. This hypothesis reflects Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120 Putnam’s Two Level Game analysis where nation state behavior at the international level is linked to domestic factors. If one assumes that ratification involves multiple state and national actors, then this hypothesis can be substantiated. However, the data are too limited to dissect the actual or sequential components that lead to cooperation. Yet, ratification does require some level of institutional and societal support and the data reveal that ratified accords lead to overall higher levels of cooperation than accords that merely reflect signings by heads of state. This hypothesis is confirmed, though greater in-depth qualitative analysis may reveal other important findings. While most of the hypotheses approach cooperation from traditional negotiation and institutional standpoints, other hypotheses reflect economic, environmental and non-water related linkages. In hypothesis seven, attention is centered on whether increasing the scope of a conflict allows more room for nation states to cooperate. The logic (negotiation and shared incentives, and ecological modernization theories) behind these theories is that countries that tangibly have something to gain will be more willing to negotiate than if coerced or if an imminent gain is not evident. I stress gain over fear because nation states’ central focus is to increase power and an increase in water serves a function for this. The quantitative data only offer general insight toward this question. While the data indicate that nations have been willing to negotiate, it is impossible to discern the specific scope of negotiation or the specific method in which this occurred. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 121 Therefore, this hypothesis is not supported and is revisited in the qualitative section. It seems fitting that the environment should be an important explanatory factor is assessing interstate water accord cooperation. The logic behind this perspective and, more specifically, the epistemic community approach, is that negotiating states consider the environment to be an independent factor in developing accords. In turn, communities rely on science as a method to make policy decisions. It is overly optimistic to believe that all the ratification efforts demonstrate independent concern for the environment. In fact, even with the issue of water scarcity, attention is focused on how to achieve sufficient water supplies for economic development rather than greater environmental protection. This hypothesis is not supported. This approach requires discursive analysis, which is provided by the qualitative section. Previously, it was mentioned that multilateral accords are just as resilient as bilateral accords. Clues to this phenomenon can be explained partially through hypothesis number nine which states the greater the role of managing institutions, the greater the probability for accord ratification. This hypothesis is based on conjunctive management principles (and partially negotiation theory), and it involves pragmatic ways for achieving equitable water distribution. This approach requires institutional, neutral third parties or other stakeholder support. The available data do not explain adequately the how these stakeholders contribute to the level of cooperation within interstate water accords. This is an important issue Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122 since conjunctive management and third parties can be underlying forces in explaining treaty ratification and enhancing equitable water distribution practices. Therefore, this hypothesis is not supported by the data and is revisited in the qualitative section. Data Findings and Research Questions The initial research questions, how are nations able to overcome collective action problems and achieve measurable interstate water accords and what factors make accords so resilient are answered partially. The findings explain cooperation in terms of managing current and future water scarcity crises or challenges. This study focuses on what factors contribute to explaining the level of cooperation within interstate water accords. The quantitative data analyze this by offering a general assessment that nations are willing to cooperate over freshwater resources. The overarching argument is that the level of cooperation is a function of treaty ratification and water redistribution. The quantitative findings consistently support this claim. The most effective treaties reflect accord ratification and, in some cases, contain equitable water provisions. However, exactly what induces nation states to ratify and redistribute water is a more complicated question. There are numerous factors which enable a nation state to engage in collective action. Water scarcity, geographic conditions, internal support, role of third parties, shared incentives, ecological values, and political trust Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 123 are central factors in explaining the level of cooperation. I argue that political trust, internal support, and public participation are the most important independent variables for explaining the level of cooperation. The reality is that any level of substantive communication must be supported by shared values and common viewpoints. This is often manifested by political trust, which is explored further in the qualitative section where non-quantifiable independent variable such history and culture add greater insight to this claim. The quantitative findings are ambiguous in identifying factors that explain accord resiliency. On the one hand, it may be that many accords are more procedural than substantive. This means interstate water accords often reflect the ratification process, but are often substantively hollow when addressing water redistribution. On the other hand, the fact that there are so many accords and that once in place, do not degenerate implies that political trust, among other variables, (as evidenced through the ratification process) are integral factors in explaining interstate water accord cooperation and resiliency. Therefore, the quantitative section partially answers these research questions. It offers a general correlation between some select independent variables, such as political trust, public participation, and economic incentives on the components of interstate water accord cooperation; ratification and water redistribution. However, it does not explain why this occurs, except that there are prominent bilateral and multilateral accords, which reflect inherently, that multiple sources are important for successful collective action. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 124 As to filling the analytic void in explaining international cooperation, the quantitative section confirms the importance of ratification. The quantitative section suggests that certain patterns may be evident within cooperation. This includes political trust, internal support, scope of conflict, neutral third parties, geographic, and environmental considerations. A sequential understanding of ratification is expanded upon in the qualitative section. However, the quantitative section establishes an innovative template for conducting meaningful analyses to further understand ratification and water redistribution. Finally, the quantitative findings adhere more to Ringquist’s institutional top down approach. There is no gainsaying that nation states have negotiated and ratified treaties. Implicitly, this means evidence of institutional structures. This is not to say that social forces are not factors, but the quantitative section offers generalities which points more to an institutional paradigm. Conclusion In this chapter, I operationalized how and why interstate water cooperation occurs. I began with an overview of international cooperation based on Putnam’s Two Level Game analysis and then advanced the understanding of cooperation, which includes the concepts of ratification and water redistribution. While there is a theoretical schism over how ratification should be viewed, it is clear that it consists of some level of international, national, and domestic support. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 125 I also discussed how cooperation should be viewed in terms of institutional or social forces. While both perspectives are important, the general analysis points to the direction that institutions matter more than social forces. This evidence is further addressed in the next chapter. The quantitative findings offer valuable insight into explaining cooperation. The data reveal that nation states are more likely to ratify treaties than agree on equitable water redistribution. Contrary to negotiation theory, multilateral accords exhibit the same level of cooperation as bilateral accords. Further, the most effective level of cooperation was evidenced during the 1960s which was when the international environmental movement was emerging as international force. Since accord ratification assumes that multiple levels of society are valued, political trust and internal support should be strong explanatory factors predicting if and how level of cooperation within an accord is achieved. Further, accord resilience remains an ambiguous concept. It could mean that nation states have little to defect from and hence, continue to abide by its agreed upon rules or, as the quantitative data overwhelmingly indicate, that most accords are ratified, which further solidifies the terms and conditions embedded within an accord. The most pressing issue is why equitable water redistribution is not present in all accords. All of the selected theories help explain the level of cooperation. However, negotiation and common pool resource theories appear to yield the highest explanatory value because they offer both broad and specific requirements for evaluating cooperation. Still, even with the strongest theories, quantitative analysis Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 126 offers only generalities. Non-quantifiable variables, such as history, culture, environmental value, coercion, geography, shared incentives, or other type of political institutions are examined in greater detail in the qualitative section. Only then, will it be possible to offer a composite view and solve many of the riddles of interstate water accord cooperation. In the next three chapters, I will apply comparative qualitative methods to case studies depicting varying levels of interstate water cooperation. This approach complements the quantitative chapter by offering a limited but deeper understanding of interstate water accord cooperation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127 CHAPTER 5 COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY INTRODUCTION AND CASE STUDY NUMBER ONE (Low Level of Cooperation) Introduction Chapters 5 through 8 complement the quantitative findings by offering a more in-depth analysis of interstate water accord cooperation. These chapters draw upon Mill’s Method of Agreement and Difference to explain the different levels of cooperation within interstate water accords. Additionally, the qualitative section analyses both quantifiable and non-quantifiable variables including political trust, history, coercion, third parties, negotiators, environmental value, and socio-political conditions. Ultimately, this chapter identifies the critical factors that best explain the dependent variable, which is the level of cooperation within interstate water accords and the observed outcome, the interstate accord. This chapter is organized into several sections. First, I expanded the definition of political trust and how it applies to the study. Second, I justified the importance of incorporating culture and history into the study. Third, I justified how the selected cases overcome research design problems. Fourth, I justified the selection of the selected hypotheses to be tested. Ultimately, this section concludes by distinguishing the selected variables that best explain the observed outcome, the level of cooperation within interstate water accords. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 128 Political Trust Political trust is an extremely difficult concept to measure. A traditional definition suggests political trust is a percentage of a populace who support a particular person, institution, policy, or accord. 4 4 However, there are methodological problems when applied comparatively. Political trust may have different meanings within various countries. This problem is overcome if one assumes a universalistic approach. This means numerous definitions of political trust are recognized, but a general consensus within the definition is possible. Zartman (1982) linked trust to negotiation credibility. This includes both past events as well as intentions about future contingencies. It is possible to improve trust by establishing a verifiable record. This means that the negotiators should have prior success in creating successful outcomes. It also means eliciting support from multiple venues, including from neutral third parties. This is an important clue in understanding successful water accords. Clearly, greater trust is evidenced when negotiators demonstrate competency in having achieved successful accords and when there is substantive neutral third party support. Distrust may result if one party yields too many concessions. The other party may believe that the concessions are not genuine. Wild pressures and exaggerated statements destroy trust by raising doubts about the permanence of an 44 Political trust can be applied to many aspects o f society, but the scope o f this paper qualifies it to the above mentioned criteria. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 129 agreement especially when it is much less than the initial demand. This problem can be avoided when a common purpose is identified mutually. Trust also can be analyzed sequentially. Pruitt (1981) explained that “accounting points” strengthen trust, thereby leading to greater levels of cooperation. If the parties know that they can stop and check several times before arriving at an irrevocable outcome, their trust increases and they know that the other party, thinking the same, is less likely to default. However, the first “accounting point” may be the most important point in explaining interstate water accord cooperation (Zartman, 1982). It must include some of the major problems to be solved (i.e., water redistribution). Cooperation may develop when there are no other viable alternatives. This often relates to parties selecting the least costly alternative. Although this is a logical banality, it suggests parties can use this condition in their arguments in order to increase the credibility of their commitments (Zartman, 1982) Trust further explains cooperation if a party is able to punish its violators. In a perfect world, punishment is not necessary because there are no violators. But In the absence of perfect trust, sanction procedures need to be established. Disputing parties must have a clear idea of what the other side will do if trust is breached. Both benefits and sanctions must be credible, especially if future negotiations remain. Interdependence is a major function of interstate cooperation. The higher the level of interdependence, the less likely for accord breach. Generally, it is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 130 easier to allocate a new resource rather than finite resource that has been under one country’s rule. This is a central challenge for this study because many water resources need to be shared but remain under the domain a specific country. Trust is enhanced when there is an early return on an agreement. Immediate benefits paid from one party to the other will help the latter believe in the full agreement. This important concept may explain why accords have been considered resilient even though water allocation practices have not been overwhelmingly equitable. Nations believe that the existing accords will eventually yield significant benefits or create the forum for additional negotiations. Finally, protracted negotiations offer opportunities for members of opposing delegations to develop personal identification with each other and, in turn, help each other sell an agreement to their respective home governments. As a result, many foreign ministries rotate their delegation members (Zartman, 1982). History and Culture Much interstate water accord literature circumscribes causation to macro sociopolitical study. I argue that a thorough evaluation of the level of cooperation must encompass sub-systemic analysis based on culture and history. Geertz (1980) substantiated this thesis. He believes many political scientists simply assume the rational coherence embedded within structure and institutions. In essence, many researchers supplant the role of “values and norms,” with the study of the state and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 131 its institutions. Geertz’s central concern was that one cannot look merely at the bricks of the state without understanding the mortar. This argument reflects the underpinnings of the quantitative/qualitative methodology dispute. A quantitative approach offers general correlations in explaining level of cooperation without incorporating the role of culture and history. Yet, it is misleading to assume that all qualitative studies emphasize culture and history. Many comparative studies assume that rational choice decision making is the fulcrum in understanding policy decisions (Downs, 1957; Olson, 1965; Riker, 1987). Laitin (1986) enhanced Geertz’s view by deconstructing master narratives to more workable subunits called points of concern. Extending beyond a rigid social order, Laitin depicted subsystems having their own internal dynamics which, in turn, influence wider social systems. Exogenous change places pressure on different subsystems that ultimately pervades the entire social system. This means social systems are adaptive; they accommodate change as subsystems and then mutually adjust their values so that there will be a homeostatic equilibrium in the society (Laitin, 1986). Laitin (1986) allowed for more discord than Geertz by saying “that the points of concern, rather than simply values or preferences, represent sets of values that people share on what is worth worrying about. A symbol system will provide a clue to what is worth fighting about and also to what is so commonsensical that attempts to change it seem pointless” (1986, 175). In other words, the cultural glue Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 132 does not necessarily mean the existence of a broad consensus about some master narrative but can refer to common understandings about what the agenda should be and agreement on how and when to agree (Migdal, 1994). In relation to this study, history and culture cannot be viewed in absolute terms. However, they do offer valuable interpretive analysis and are integrated into the qualitative case studies. Justification of Case Studies As explained in Chapter 3, numerous caveats befall a researcher when conducting comparative case studies. Case study selection must be objective and without predetermined results. This means the selected case studies should depict varying degrees of cooperation. This in turn, allows the researcher to identify common as well as individual factors in explaining interstate water cooperation. The selected cases depict different levels of cooperation4 5 and are viewed diachronically and synchronically. Diachronic analysis incorporates important historical background from different time periods to explain level of cooperation. Synchronic analysis is central because it allows the observed phenomenon to be analyzed in different units. Admittedly, a strict synchronic analysis lends itself to a specific time. Here, the selected times for analyzing level cooperation range 4 5 Cooperation is explained in the same manner as within the quantitative section. First states that ratify accords reflect the highest level o f cooperation as opposed to just signing or not signing an agreement. As to water redistribution, low level cooperation means that the disputing parties did not agree to allocate water in an efficient manner. Medium cooperation means that the disputing parties agreed to distribute some level o f water, and the high level o f cooperation exhibits equitable water distribution agreed to by all pertinent parties. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 133 several decades. Still, some common elements (i.e., trust, third parties) are identified in several units. According to Bartolini (1999), there is no fundamental or logical difference in using a synchronical or diachronical research design. In both cases the comparativist has to grapple with the fact of whether or not the observed variation reflects the interaction of the independent and dependent variables (Pennings et al., 1999). The cases reflect different regions, exhibit different levels overriding interstate conflict, manifest different types of governments, as well as number of parties to the conflict. Yet each case explains the observed outcome of understanding the level of cooperation within interstate water accords. The first case is the 1993-1995 Israeli-Palestinian interim accords. 4 6 While water conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians encompass many issues, cooperation focused more on the creation of new water resources (i.e., desalination) rather than an equitable distribution of the existing water supplies between the Israelis and Palestinians. The lack of coordination among the Palestinian negotiators as well Israel’s military dominance suggests low level cooperation. The Lesotho Highlands Water Project reflects medium level of cooperation. The common elements under study are dominant hegemon, coercion, and water 4 6 Israel has agreed to leave the Gaza Strip and from four West Bank towns during the summer o f 2005. It remains undetermined as to what extent or how redistribution figures in these developments. However, it does indicate that the Interim Agreements which are under study were temporary, accords which did not contain measurable provisions for the redistribution o f water within the West Bank or Gaza. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 134 scarcity. In this case, South Africa facilitated a 1986 coup within Lesotho. This led to the eventual development of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. The terms of the accord provided new water resources for South Africa’s industrial Transvaal region. In turn, Lesotho received hydroelectric power and financial compensation. However, many critics suggest that the accord is inequitable because South Africa obtained more benefits than Lesotho. The third case, The Danube River Basin Accords of 1994,4 7 (high cooperation) challenges the first two cases by offering clear evidence environmental values and political trust. Thirteen riparian states with different social and political histories overcame collective action problems to achieve a measurable accord that is viewed as a model for other nations to follow. While I proscribe cooperation analysis to the time of accord signing, I provide current data whenever possible to further explain level of cooperation at the time of signing. Rational choice theories such as common pool resource and negotiation theory offer valuable insight into explaining level of cooperation, but they cannot explain normative or institutional values. This analytic void is overcome by applying several environmental based theories (global governance, ecological marginalization, and the epistemic community approach), an institutional 4 7 The Danube River Basin region is a Level Four area, where climactic water reduction is remote. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 135 perspective (conjunctive management), and geographic (geo-political theory). I test H2 and H5-H9 4 8 because they reflect at least one dimension of these theories. 4 9 It must be reiterated that water conflict is not an isolated phenomenon and is usually linked to other economic, social, and political conditions. While I recognize these competing events, I limit the scope of this research endeavor to the specific water case. This study develops a greater understanding in recognizing, categorizing, and distinguishing which theories and independent variables are most useful in achieving interstate water accord cooperation. Ultimately, the qualitative case studies lend greater insight into answering the initial research question; how are nation states able to overcome collective action problems to achieve resilient interstate water accords and what factors make accords so resilient? Case Study Number One: Israeli-Palestinian Water Interim Accords - 1993-1995 If countries agree to handle water as it flows by nature, all of us will win without exception - Shimon Peres Though physically shallow, politically Middle Eastern Water do run deep - Thomas Naff, longtime observer and analyst, of conflict over water in the Near East 481 omit hypotheses three and four because they are they are most useful for large scale quantitative studies. 491 omit hypothesis number one which addresses the level o f public participation in impacting level o f cooperation. While it is an important component in explaining cooperation, there is not enough information which allows it to be tested in a rigorous manner. I believe that this concept should be explored further and it is one o f my recommendations mentioned in the conclusion. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 136 The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Accords of 1993-1995 reflected low levels of interstate water accord cooperation. Despite two years of complex peace negotiations water provisions were evidenced only in the second interim pact of 1995, and even then, terms of water redistribution were significantly below Palestinian expectations. The overarching problem is encompassed by Israel’s general security dilemma. Any significant redistribution of water means a loss of strategic territory. In essence, a lack of political trust and limited internal support by both sides contributed to low level cooperation. The cooperation that occurred centered on the creation of desalination plants to increase regional water supplies. However, little was achieved in redistributing water from existing aquifers (most notably the mountain aquifer in the West Bank). This suggests that water conflict is clearly part of larger socio-political conflict and that numerous factors explain the overall Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, it is possible to select specific variables which contain strong explanatory value in understanding the Interim Peace Accords of 1993-1995 low level cooperation. The central variables are water scarcity, political trust, history and culture, and the specific types of negotiators. Low Cooperation: 1993-1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Peace Accords Effective water management alone cannot solve Israeli-Arab ideological differences, nor can it erase the memories of suffering inflicted by both sides. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 137 However, if one source of conflict is removed, perhaps it can serve as a signal that the situation does not have to be approached perpetually through a zero sum mentality. Yet it has to start with trust and cooperation, and one way is through a sharing of the most precious commodity in the Middle East, water (Gordon, 2004). Much of the Israeli-Palestinian water tension can be traced to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967.5 0 Since the occupation, the Palestinians have accused the Israelis of mismanaging the local aquifers. Israel’s response is that water scarcity and purification issues existed before they assumed control of the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, the Israelis claim that they have improved the water situation by providing piped water to much of the territories and recently increased Palestinian access to aquifers and pools (Selby, 2003). As to the specific accords, water redistribution is only evident during the September 1995 Oslo II Agreement. The 1993 Declaration of Principles said very little regarding water specific water allocation. It called for the creation of Palestinian Water Administration Authority and included study proposals on water rights and the principle of equitable utilization. 50 Further links trace the water conflict to the Johnston Plan. President Eisenhower’s special envoy, Eric Johnston, appointed in 1953, developed a regional water plan where the nations o f the area did not agree but generally followed. Israel developed a National Water Carrier plan in 1953 (completed in 1964), which stayed within the limitations o f the Johnston proposal, moving water from the northern part o f Israel to the water deficient south. Neighboring Arab nations viewed this as a healthy function o f Israeli economic development. In turn, neighboring Arab states agreed to divert some o f the headwaters o f the Upper Jordan, depriving Israel o f about 35 percent o f its anticipated withdrawal from that source, and almost half o f the water to be transported by Israel’s national water carrier. Because the Arab nations did not sign the Johnston plan, they believed that they were within their international rights to divert the water. This tension precipitated the Six-Day War (Simon, 1998). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 138 The 1994 Cairo Agreement stipulated that with the exception of water supplies to Israeli settlements and military areas, all water resources and systems in Gaza and the Jericho area would be operated, managed, and developed by the Palestinian Authority. However, these places are not water rich areas. Both areas are downstream with shallow and highly saline underground reserves. In other words, these are low security areas because potential Palestinian Authority mismanagement could do little to endanger Israeli water supplies. In both cases, the initial Interim Accords and the Cairo Agreement reflect low levels of cooperation. In the next two sections, I provide geographic and historical factors which contribute to this phenomenon. Geographical Background Israel, Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza have meager natural water resources.5 1 Map 5.1 (See Appendix C) illustrates the shared water sources between the Palestinians and Israelis. Population growth contributes to this region’s water scarcity. Israel’s population is more than six million and during the last decade has had an annual population growth rate of over 3 percent (Selby, 2003). The West Bank and Gaza have a Palestinian population around 3 million and have a natural growth rate of 3-4 per cent (Selby, 2003). Despite these low figures, population growth is a serious factor. Between 1995 and 2000, the West Bank and Gaza had the second highest fertility rate in the world with 7.30 children bom per 5 1 While this case exclusively addresses Israeli-Palestinian water negotiations, I reference Israel- Jordanian water negotiations to provide a broader context for understanding water scarcity and ensuing negotiations. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 139 woman (The Economist in World Figures, 2001). Jordan’s population is around 5 million with a 3 per cent growth rate. Together, Israel, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza have renewable water availability of less than 200 cubic meters/year per person5 2 (World Bank 2002). Israel, Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza exceed the region’s water capacity 53 in an uneven fashion. According to the World Bank, “each Palestinian now has access to less than 15 gallons of water per day, compared to 800 gallons for each American. Israel, the Palestinians and Jordan together consume about 3.2 billion cubic meters of water per year. This becomes problematic when average rainfall of 2.5 billion cubic meters falls below regional demands. It appears that population growth and environmental degradation are inextricably linked. Water scarcity has increased due to overexploitation of both surface and groundwater resources. This is most evident in Gaza, where high population growth and overexploitation has created increasingly saline conditions in the coastal aquifer (Selby, 2003). The reason for this is that there are no water restrictions. Over-pumping led to a massive intrusion of seawater, which resulted in a 60 percent increase in freshwater salinity (Becker, 1993). The problem is exacerbated because groundwater is the only freshwater source for Gaza (unlike the West Bank). It is only 140 square miles and has 5 2 One cubic meter equals 1000 liters. 5 3 Israel’s principal sources o f water, other than the Jordan River, are the Yarmuk River and overused underground aquifers, from which Jordan gets about 40 percent o f its water. Approximately 70 percent o f Israel’s water used for agricultural production, but it accounts for less than five percent o f its national income (Simon, 1998). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 140 900,000 people, a population density of 6,500 per square mile. Its population is expected to double by 2010. As a result, water demand is exceeding supply. Gazan water demand is about 110 million cubic meters per year, while the local aquifer can sustain about 70 million cubic meters per year (Becker, 1998). In the West Bank the major source of tension is the “mountain aquifer,” 80 percent of whose recharge area lies beneath the West Bank (Map 5.1, See Appendix C). Groundwater potential in the West Bank was estimated in 1967 to be about 400 million cubic meters (Kahan, 1987). The quantity used by the local population at that time was about 100 million cubic meters, most of it (96 percent) for agriculture (Sofer, 1992). Since then, water consumption shifted from agricultural to domestic use. Legal Claims (Doctrine of Prior Use and Equitable Utilization Principle) Israel bases its claim to the West Bank waters on the doctrine of prior use pre 1967.5 4 According to Israeli negotiators, West Bank water flows naturally into Israeli coastal plain which gives them the right to appropriate water. The Israelis argue that prior to their possession, the region was largely undeveloped. The change occurred with initial investments by Jewish farmers in the 1920’s and by the Israeli government after 1948. Israel also claims that when given the opportunity, the Palestinians did not exploit excess water pre-1948 or under Jordanian rule. 5 4 Otherwise known as the doctrine o f prior appropriations, it holds that the party who first used the available water has the better right to continue its use (www.waterbank.com). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 141 Dinar (1999) offered broader insight to this claim by stating the same principles of international customary law which protect Egypt’s claim to most of the water on the Nile also apply equally to the Israeli claim for the mountain aquifer. The rain that feeds the Nile falls in Ethiopia, Kenya, and the Sudan, yet Egypt has used and developed the river for over 4000 years. Similarly, Israel also claims customary and historical rights. They have used these resources for over 60 years. The principle of existing utilization further substantiates the Israeli claim. Dinar (1999) analyzeed that the West Bank water not used between 1948 and 1967 should be considered excess flows, which in turn, has enabled Israel to invest millions of dollars in its national water carrier to develop wells and pumping facilities. Israel also draws support from the Seoul Rules of 1986, where existing utilization is considered a major variable in determining resource allocation (Rouyer, 1997). The Palestinians claim that Israeli over-pumping threatened the water reserves (Tamimi and Nader al-Khatib in Rouyer, 1997). In terms of international law, the Palestinians view water as immovable property, which cannot be exploited without compensation. Further, since Israel accepted Resolution 242 in the Declaration of Principles in 1993, all land should be returned to the Palestinians. Rouyer (1997) stated with sovereignty over the land comes sovereignty over the water, and land and water go together as property rights. Palestinian jurists also Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 142 claim that Israel has violated the international legal principles of belligerent occupation codified in The Hague Resolutions and Geneva Conventions. The Palestinian legal claim is buttressed by the equitable utilization principle which recognizes competing riparian rights.5 5 This principle encourages the parties to develop reasonable agreements. The logic is that equitable utilization is more just than traditional domestic approaches for sharing water.5 6 Furthermore, the equitable utilization principle stresses adaptability. Overall, equitable utilization lends significant value to the negotiation process, especially if nation states overcome their sense of entitlement. However, permanent water ownership is the crux of the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict. Security Dilemma Israel’s recalcitrance in negotiating with the Palestinians stems from the overarching security dilemma encompassed by strident historical and ideological differences. On the one hand, Israel believed Palestinian statehood or even autonomy was a serious threat against Israeli water security. In essence, excessive drillings was a casus belli because there were no substitutes for water (Shapira in A1 Hamishmar, 1978). 5 5 It is best stated by the United Nations in its Convention on the Law o f the Non-Navigational Uses o f International Watercourses. The Convention states that waters should be “used and developed taking into account the interests o f the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection o f the watercourse” (Article Five, Convention on the Law o f the Non-Navigational Uses o f International Watercourses, 1997, www.un.org/law/ilc/nonnav). 56 Intricate agreements are beneficial, but they can also widen the opportunity for party defection. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 143 However, water security is a relatively new phenomenon. According to Lowi (1993), early Israeli settlers of the 1920s and 1930s viewed water more socially and ideologically. But as the situation between the local Arabs and Jews intensified, water value shifted from one of strict ideological and economic importance to one of security. Feitelson (1997) substantiated this point by acknowledging that agriculture not only offered economic self sufficiency but also established an Israeli presence in contested areas. His agriculture-security linkage depicted the importance of water as a security issue.5 7 This is in stark contrast to the Palestinians. Prior to 1948, many Palestinians did not view water as part of their overall collective identity (Elmussa, 1996). After 1948, the Palestinian ideology reflected the regional Arab perspective. The primary concern was Israel’s plan to divert Jordan river water to its desert communities. Neighboring Arab countries water diversion as strengthening the Jewish state. This also meant that the Palestinian right of return would never be realized (al naqbah). As a result, in 1964, the Al-Fatah guerillas (which would become the main faction of the PLO), targeted the Israeli National Water Carrier because it diverted Jordan River water into the Negev (Elmusa, 1996). 57It should be noted that the Israeli economy changed from agricultural to technological Agriculture is only five percent o f the Israeli GNP (Simon, 1998). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 144 The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel in 1967, allowed them to restrict Palestinian water use.5 8 The Palestinians viewed these water restrictions as an impediment to their quality of life and perceived Israel’s actions as a “usurpation” of Palestinian water rights and a violation of international law (Elmusa, 1996). Hence, an ideological shift regarding water was evident. On the one hand, Israeli water ideology changed from being a function of healthy state to state security. On the other hand, Palestinian water ideology developed under a perceived environment of fear, resentment, and deprivation. By the onset of the Oslo Accords, Palestinian and Israeli water ideology was diametrically different. Negotiating Water The Declaration of Principles, which is also called the Oslo Agreement, reflects low level interstate water cooperation. Mediated by the Norwegian government, it established a two step path to settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the first interim period lasting five years, Palestinians would be given autonomy over certain spheres of control in the Occupied Territories beginning with an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. 5 8 Since the Israeli occupation o f the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, Israeli authorities have allowed expanded Palestinian access to water for household purposes only. Allocation for agricultural remained frozen at its 1967 level. Despite these constraints and the population growth, 75 to 80 percent o f water consumption in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is allocated to irrigate crops, meaning that daily residential water use is constricted severely (Becker and Zeitouni, 1998). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 145 These accords (Oslo I and II) allowed Israel to free itself from direct responsibility for Palestinian water infrastructures and water supplies and enabled Israel to transfer the West Bank Water Development’s debts to the Palestinian Authority. At the same time, the accords gave Israel license to continue exercising sole control of the West Bank’s water resources, granted it the right to veto any proposed Palestinian infrastructure developments, and enabled it to provide water to its settlers. Essentially, under Oslo II, the Palestinians became responsible for managing local supplies while ultimate control remained with Israel (Selby, 2003). Under the terms of Oslo II, Israeli retained control over the West Bank’s water resources, while the Palestinians were granted responsibilities only in the management of local water supplies. Oslo II merely formalized a supply management system which had been in operation for years (Selby, 2003). The Oslo Accords reaffirmed the Israeli and Palestinian positions. The Palestinians argued that Israel’s exploitation of the West Bank’s waters was contrary to the 1907 Hague Regulations on military occupation and that the Palestinian right to sovereign territorial control over the West Bank included water rights. Further, the Palestinians claimed exclusive control over the Eastern Aquifer (the aquifer that was least depleted) as well as to some rights within the Jordan River. They argued that Israel’s water diversion from the Sea of Galilee prevented that water from reaching the West Bank (Selby, 2003). Israel countered with the doctrine of prior use (see earlier description) to entitle them access to the West Bank aquifers. By contrast, Israel relinquished Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 146 authority for Gaza’s coastal aquifer because increased abstraction from this source would not affect Israel’s own water supplies. This explains how the Palestinian Authority became the sole operator, manager and developer of water resources and systems in the autonomous areas within Gaza, and further suggests why Israel could relinquish full control of the Gaze Strip. Differing goals also contributed to low level cooperation. One of the preconditions to successful negotiations is that the disputing parties know exactly what to negotiate. Yet the Oslo Accords embodied much confusion. A central problem was the mountain aquifer located in the West Bank. Saab Erekat, chief Palestinian negotiator for permanent status talks, claimed that Israel was reluctant to provide any specific details regarding their water consumption rates from the mountain aquifer (Rouyer, 1997). Instead, Israeli officials stressed desalination as the most effective means increasing Palestinian water supplies. Avraham Katz-Oz , the head of the Israeli delegation Peace Talks of 1994, stated: “We tell them (the Palestinians) let’s quit talking about water rights. You will need 100 mcm/year over the next five years. Open your eyes we are not going to give you lOOmcm. We will need more water ourselves in the next five years” (Rouyer, 1997). Hence, low level cooperation was evident at the onset of negotiations. Third Parties Third parties also explain low level cooperation. Several neutral third parties including the United States mediated between the Israelis and Palestinians. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 147 However, the United States could have played a greater role. Kaye (2000) indicated that during the first several rounds of negotiations, the Palestinians emphasized water rights. However, the United States backed Israel’s preference for addressing the technical aspects of the water problem and facilitating regional cooperation. The United States carried great influence with all regional parties, many of whom were more interested in currying favor with the United States than in defending the Palestinian position. Thus, the initial working agenda did not emphasize territorial and sovereignty issues (Kaye, 2000).5 9 Negotiators In the Israeli government at the time, the water accords were denounced as a national security threat by the Israeli right. There were tensions between Peres’ liberal civilian team, who during the secret Oslo negotiations, had implicitly recognized Palestinian water rights and Rabin’s more hawkish and national security oriented Defense Ministry officials, who believed that any explicit recognition of Palestinian water rights would create problems for future negotiations. Low level cooperation evidenced in the Oslo Accords can be traced to the negotiating team as well. The Israeli team was led by Noah Kinnarty of the Defense Ministry who was a very tough negotiator with significant experience in negotiating with Arabs. Additionally, he received significant technical support from Mekorot (Israel’s water company). 5 9 The main areas for cooperation were enhancing water data availability, water management and conservation, enhancing water supplies, and regional cooperative management. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 148 In contrast, the Palestinian team was in disarray, both in terms of negotiating positions and decision making authority. The Palestinian negotiators roles and responsibilities were not firmly established and the team as a whole lacked consensus on how to proceed. For example, some of the team favored joint management while others proposed institutional separation. Moreover, given that there were no Palestinian water institutions in existence, the team lacked firm data. Ultimately, the Palestinian negotiating team disintegrated. Instead, Yasser Arafat appointed a close associate, Nabil Sharif, who lacked water expertise. This decision coupled with the lack of firm data ensured that Oslo II water negotiations would reflect the overall asymmetrical relationship between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Selby, 2003).6 0 Low Cooperation While the Israelis and Palestinians signed The Declaration of Principles, the agreement fails to make clear the extent to which water should be under Palestinian control during the interim period. In Article VII (4) of its main body, the treaty stipulates the constitution of a “Palestinian Water Administration Authority” to be established after the Interim Agreement within the framework of the Palestinian Council. But the terms are not explicit whether “administration” only means management of water distribution systems and wastewater collection or if it 6 0 Negotiations occurred during the summer o f 1995 and for several months proceeded without agreement on even a single paragraph. A major concern was the issue o f Palestinian water rights, which if left unresolved could have delayed the entire Oslo II agreement. However, Palestinian water right would be recognized in the first paragraph o f the Oslo II Water Accords. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 149 includes some kind of jurisdictional control over the resources themselves (Selby 2003). In Annex III, water rights are addressed in vague terms. Here, the two parties agreed on establishment of a continuing joint Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing among other things, on water cooperation. The document states that the task of this committee “will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period” (Article 1). This passage set forward important concepts such as the implicit entitlement of both parties to water rights and the principle of equitable utilization. However, the context was only proposal based. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement The Gaza-Jericho Agreement elaborates on Palestinian Authority power. Annex II Article II (B.3la) stipulates that “All water and sewage systems and resources in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area shall be operated managed, and developed (including drilling) by the Palestinian Authority in a manner that shall prevent any harm to the water resources.” At first glance, this arrangement looks quite generous, giving full control over water resources to the Palestinian Authority provided harm to the resources will be avoided. But the next subparagraph b) then limits this stipulation, “the existing water systems supplying water to the Settlements and the Military Installation Area, and the water systems and resources Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 150 inside them continue to be operated and managed by Mekoroth Water Company, and Israel’s Water Authority. Further, subparagraph c) states that allocations to the settlements and military areas shall remain unaltered. Further, the Gaza Strip and Jericho are downstream water deficit zones. Palestinian Authority control of these areas did not result in an increase in water supply. Instead, the Palestinians controlled more land but with greater water deficit. To solve this problem, the agreement stipulates that “The Palestinian Authority shall pay Mekorot for the cost of water supplied from Israel and for the real expenses incurred in supplying water to the Palestinian Authority” (Annex II, Article II, B.31, e). This implies that the Palestinians will still be dependent on Israel for water allocation. Yet Palestinian freshwater allocation could have been improved if the Cairo Agreement had served as a model for the West Bank. Unlike Gaza and Jericho, the West Bank is located upstream and is a water surplus area. Jurisdiction over the West Bank waters would have improved Palestinian Authority’s position. However, the Israeli-Palestinian security dilemma prevented the Gaza and Jericho model from being applied the entire West Bank. This latter point is quite clear as Israeli-Palestinian negotiations continued. Throughout the summer of 1995, the Interim Accords signing date was postponed several times because the two parties could not agree on a number of issues including: (i) the size of the Palestinian Council and residential participation from East Jerusalem; (ii) security arrangements for Hebron; (iii) control over the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 151 electricity grid in the territories; and (iv) control over state land and water resources. The Palestinian claimed a higher share of the common aquifer (mountain aquifer) while the Israeli side insisted on maintaining the current distribution ratio until a permanent agreement could be reached. Israel offered to assist the Palestinians in finding alternative water resources through desalination, but would not change its quota of West Bank groundwater in favor of the Palestinians. Austria considered providing loans with generous financial terms to Palestinians to construct a desalination plant in Gaza, but the Palestinians refused to accept this solution (Jerusalem Post, 1995). This suggests third party financial support cannot overcome distribution issues based on territorial claims (Libiszewski, 1995). Institutional Factors Oslo II contained the first explicit and unequivocal recognition of Palestinian water rights on the West Bank, precise details which would be agreed upon during the permanent status negotiations. More importantly (at least in the short term), Oslo II committed Israel and the Palestinian Authority to establish the Joint Water Committee with responsibility for overseeing the management of all the West Bank’s water and sewage resources and systems. The JWC would operate in an egalitarian fashion; it would consist of an equal number of Israeli and Palestinian representatives, and decisions would be reached by consensus. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 152 Oslo II stipulated that the two sides would establish under the supervision of the JWC, no less than five Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams for the monitoring and policing of the West Bank’s water resources, systems, and supplies. As with the JWC itself, the JSET’s would operate according to strict egalitarian principles: each of them would be comprised of no less than two representatives from each side, and each side would have its own vehicle to cover its own expenses. The JSET teams would be responsible for locating unauthorized water connections, for supervising infrastructure developments and for monitoring well extractions, spring discharges and water quality. One of the major and immediate tasks of the JWC would be to oversee the development of additional waters for the West Bank’s Palestinian communities. Oslo II committed Israel and the Palestinian Authority to developing 23 million cubic meters per year of water from the West Bank’s underground aquifers in order to meet the immediate needs of the Palestinians. Additionally, Oslo II defined the future needs of the Palestinians at an additional 70 to 80 million cubic meters per year. Still many Palestinians criticized Oslo II Agreement for its deferral of water rights questions to final status negotiations as well as for its tacit legitimization of Israeli access to Palestinian water resources for duration of the interim period. Under Oslo II and for duration of the interim period, Israel would continue to consume 87% of the total water yield of the West Bank’s two trans-boundary aquifers (Selby, 2003). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 153 The Oslo II water accords achieved three main things. They inaugurated a formal system for the coordinated management of the West Bank’s water resources, systems and supplies; they established a formal system of teams (the JSETs for supervising and monitoring these resources, systems and supplies); and they stipulated that additional water should be made available to the West Bank’s Palestinian communities. Under Oslo II, the Palestinians were also responsible for maintaining and operating internal systems within Palestinian towns and villages as well as those connections to such internal systems which did not feed Israeli settlements. By 1995 Israeli and Palestinian water supply networks were thoroughly integrated. However, this did not promise the Palestinians a great deal. Israel would continue to control the vast majority of supply lines and would continue to control the numerous wells which had been drilled by Mekorot (Israel’s water company) since 1982. Water Distribution The Oslo II Agreements offered the West Bank’s Palestinian communities an additional 23.6 mcm/year of water, while an additional 41.4-51.4 mcm/year would be developed to meet future needs. However, these provisions placed only a minimal burden on Israel. Israel was financially responsible only for the development of 4.5 mcm/year. The Palestinians were responsible for the capital Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 154 costs of developing the remaining 61.5-71.5 mcm/year and further drew only 3.1 mcm/year from its national water system (Selby, 2003).6 1 Palestinian water also would be drawn from the Eastern Aquifer. The Eastern Aquifer was selected because it was the only West Bank’s underground water supply that was relatively unexploited. Its potential yield of 78mcm was estimated to meet all of the Palestinians immediate and future needs (Appendix C, Map 5.1). However, the high salinity of the Eastern Aquifer suggests its water yield was significantly lower. Additionally, the JWC constrained Palestinian development of West Bank water resources. Both sides had veto power for various proposals, but the Palestinians were more vulnerable because of their immediate need for new and additional water supplies. As a result, Israel vetoed Palestinian development of other agreed sources in the West Bank and rejected several proposed well locations on the grounds of them being too close to Israeli settlements. This is clearly understood by examining the Eastern Aquifer negotiations. Israel determined the Eastern Aquifer’s potential and while Palestinian technicians collated the data at the West Bank’s Water Department, the Palestinian Having agreed to these terms, the PA and the PWA were bound by them. As with the Declaration of Principles, once the newly coordinated management team was accepted, there was very little that could be done to restructure or redirect relations. 5 1 The Palestinian Water Authority was established in 1995. Prior to that, several quasi-Palestinian governmental organizations distributed water to the Palestinian communities living in the West Bank and Gaza. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 155 It was for this reason that the PWA became willing to license the construction of new supply lines to Israeli settlements in the West Bank from inside the Green Line. Faced with current Israeli vetoes on its own infrastructure development projects, the PWA in the end was compelled to grant such permission in order to receive approval for their own infrastructural developments. In 1995, the Oslo II/Taba Agreement was signed with Israel reaffirming Palestinian rights to West Bank water. The Taba Agreement advocated a shared vision of water cooperation and management between the two parties. While the Taba Agreement of September 1995 represented a major step towards reconciling the dispute, the specific allocation rights were remained for final status negotiations. Overall, security concerns, unequal power between the disputing parties, lack of political trust, and strident ideological differences contributed to low level cooperation. Further, the Palestinian Authority lacked the macro institutional political support that Israel possessed. Said (1998), in the realm of Foucault, indicated that Israel had the plans, the territory, the maps, the settlements, and the roads while the Palestinians merely had the wish for autonomy, with no details and no power to change anything structurally. Yet Albin (2001) argued that inequality alone cannot explain the Israeli- Palestinian water negotiations. Both parties were determined to reach an agreement and had much to lose from failing to do so. This meant that Israel had to account for Palestinian needs. On the one hand, Israeli power was restrained by a need to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 156 give the Palestinians a fair share of their benefits, which ultimately meant recognition of their water rights. On the other hand, Israeli dominance fueled by Palestinian distrust created the methods and mechanisms for achieving low level cooperation in the Oslo Accords. Hypothesis Testing This section tests the applicable hypotheses H2 and H5-H9. Geo-political theory predicts that acute water scarcity, which is pertinent to the Israeli-Palestinian case, results in little cooperation. The second hypothesis states that nations facing water scarcity shortages, exhibit lower levels of cooperation than nations that do not. Water scarcity was a major source of tension between the Israelis and Palestinians. I argue that water scarcity was function of the overall security dilemma between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. As a result, the terms of agreement under the Oslo Accords did not redistribute water evenly Water redistribution could have been more equitable if the Palestinians had accepted the construction of desalination plants within their territories. But this did not solve the mountain aquifer water rights issue. Therefore, strident ideological differences plus water scarcity best explains the low level cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. This means that water scarcity serves more as an intermediate variable in explaining the level of cooperation. However, water scarcity was a strong contributory factor in fomenting more distrust and in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 157 reinforcing the asymmetrical relationship between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Therefore, this hypothesis is confirmed. Hypothesis five addresses whether greater levels of political trust result in more cooperative results. In this case, lack of political trust was the barrier to effective water distribution. Strident historical and ideological differences produced an impenetrable security dilemma. When negotiations commenced, greater effort was made in substantiating ideological claims rather than in redistributing water. According to negotiation theory, effective negotiations must be precipitated by political trust. Yet the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was encompassed by more than a half century of distrust. If trust existed, it was indirect, meaning it stemmed from the ability of neutral third parties to facilitate discussions between the Israelis and Palestinians. As a result, the Oslo Accords produced hollow results where some water was redistributed but well below Palestinian expectations. Therefore, this hypothesis is confirmed. Hypothesis six addresses whether greater internal support produces more stable accords. This is an important factor in understanding Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Putnam (1988, 1993) states domestic factors can impact state behavior on the international level. However, internal support was noticeably absent from both sides. Much of the Palestinian decision making was conducted in an ad hoc patrimonial fashion. There was a clear division between the Israeli political parties on how to negotiate. Further, much of the initial Oslo Accords were conducted in secrecy, eliminating any possibility for significant internal Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 158 support. Ultimately, lack of Israeli and Palestinian domestic support created suboptimal conditions for producing high levels of cooperation. Therefore, this theory is supported. Hypothesis seven states that expanding the scope of negotiations offers greater opportunity to produce a strong accord. This hypothesis is grounded in multiple theoretic perspectives (e.g., negotiation, shared incentives, and ecological modernization theory). The conditions to negotiate were already weak and by expanding the negotiating terms, more problems occurred because water was inextricably tied to ideological claims. This is not to say that if the Israelis and Palestinians had limited to negotiations to only one aquifer, the results would have been better. However, this case suggests that ideological factors can trump economic incentives. It must be remembered that international support from the United States and other donor countries was offered to improve the technological aspects of water redistribution. They could not satisfy Palestinian ideological claims. Therefore, the findings do not endorse hypothesis seven. Hypothesis eight is drawn from several environmental theories (ecological marginalization, global governance, and the advocacy coalition framework’s epistemic community approach). It posits whether independent environmental value is as an important factor in creating effective and resilient accords. Two competing perspectives are noticeable. On the one hand, environmental factors were a consideration in creating the Oslo Accords. Both parties understood the problems of over pumping and regional environmental degradation. However, the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 159 Israelis and Palestinians were unable to separate environmental value from the overall security dilemma. As a result, the institutions designed to improve environmental conditions were flawed which in turn, produced suboptimal results. On the other hand, the two parties would never have even agreed to negotiate if water was not a vital issue and to some extend Israel recognized Palestinian water rights. However, it is unclear how this translates into improved cooperation at the time of signing. Therefore, the findings are mixed. In another perspective conjunctive management details the equitable distribution of water through managing agencies. Hypothesis nine predicts that these institutions produce high levels of cooperation. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, the established water institutions maintained status quo conditions instead of developing better water distribution encompassed by joint management practices. Had the Joint Water Committee and the five Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams’ efforts been more equitable in practice, cooperation may have been higher. Conjunctive management is an important function of cooperation, but here, its utility was severely limited due to the lack of trust and overarching security dilemma. Hence, this theory is mixed. Research Questions and Conclusion In this chapter, I explained how and why the Oslo Accords produced low level cooperation. Deep ideological and security differences spanning over half a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 160 century created a forum of distrust. There was some water reallocation, but closer examination reveals that Israel retained the structural authority for providing water. Further, much of the re-designated water was brackish. Israel and the Palestinian Authority had different negotiation strategies. Israel wanted to solve the water crisis through desalination while the Palestinian Authority emphasized water rights. In the end, the Oslo Accords produced less than their desired effects.6 2 The Oslo Accords demonstrate that overcoming collective action problems is a complex process. While negotiation theory yielded strong explanatory utility, there is no one theory which can explain adequately the motivations and early coordination strategies leading to cooperation. However, it is clear that the common element of political trust is required for creating and maintaining effective interstate water accords, which was noticeably absent in the Israel-Palestinian Oslo Accords. 6 2 The Oslo Accords received a two for signing and one for water redistribution. The Accords did not mention any ratification procedure. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 161 CHAPTER 6 CASE STUDY NUMBER TWO LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER ACCORDS (Medium Level of Cooperation) “A giant snake that used to live in the river is now angry because too much water is being collected at the same place.” -The Mixed Blessings of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project -A n Assessment Based on Local Perspectives - Keketso, 2002 Introduction The case of South Africa and Lesotho involves water scarcity and water redistribution. Cooperative strategies are analyzed to determine the level of cooperation that was achieved at the time of signing of the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty in 1986. In order to provide the most comprehensive assessment, analysis extends to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project of 1989 (LHWP), which was the purpose of the 1986 treaty). The dependent variable remains level of cooperation, but the observed outcome includes both the 1986 Treaty and the LHWP of 1989. The independent variables are coercion, trust, state power and institutions, geography, population, socio-political conditions, water scarcity, and history and culture. The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), one of the world’s largest infrastructure projects is a five phase inter-basin project that is being undertaken Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 162 jointly by the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa. The objective is to supply water to the Guateng Province located in the Republic of South Africa. The project involves the transportation of water from Lesotho’s Senqu-Orange Rivers system through a series of dams and tunnels into the Vaal River system in South Africa (water transfer component), and the generation of hydroelectric power for Lesotho (hydropower component). Additionally, both governments are allowed to undertake ancillary development projects within their territory. The LHWP Treaty was signed on October 24, 1986 and the treaty commits the two countries to the implementation of phase 1 only (IMF, 1999). Cooperation is traced to the terms within the 1986 Lesotho Highland Water Treaty, which offers technical and financial arrangement for the construction of the Lesotho Highlands project. Wolf (2005) views this integrative arrangement as a diverse “basket” of benefits. This treaty stated that South Africa would have annual and reliable supply of good quality water while Lesotho would obtain hard currency equal to the current government income for the next fifty years (World Bank, 2003). Additionally, Lesotho transformed its water into a long-term income source and received hydropower through the construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Map 5.2 shows how water was diverted to the Guanteng Province (See Appendix C). The Treaty details an elaborate arrangement of technical, economic, and political intricacy. At the time of signing, South Africa suffered pariah status within the international community for its apartheid actions. To accomplish the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 163 project South Africa assumed full financial responsibility though international and regional provided financial assistance (i.e., World Bank and the Southern Africa Development Bank). The Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty suggests that nations are able to overcome collective action problems and achieve resilient interstate water accords. This claim is substantiated since no significant changes have been made to the treaty despite democratic transitions for both South Africa and Lesotho during the 1990s. Yet while cooperative strategies overcame prior economic, political, and social cleavages, the 1986 treaty does not reflect full cooperation. For example, the treaty did not consider adequately environmental degradation or societal displacement from dam construction. The clearest benefit was that water redistribution overwhelmingly benefited South Africa. Further, the treaty was signed without general public consent. In Lesotho and in several other regional countries, the project was viewed as a sell out that compromised the struggles of the oppressed, tantamount to Lesotho becoming a province of South Africa (Keketso, 2002). Additional objections grew more vociferous during project implementation, especially from communities that were displaced by a massive reservoir. Cooperation was achieved at the time of treaty signing, but as the following sections show it was constrained and limited. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 164 Water Scarcity Water scarcity is the central variable in explaining the 1986 Treaty formation. Lesotho in classical terms is a struggling economic state with limited economic production. However, it possessed significant water resources, something which its neighbor, a regional economic giant, South Africa, did not. In fact, South Africa’s economic and water conditions were almost a polar opposite to Lesotho. Home to approximately 33 percent of the southern continent’s population, South Africa consumed 80 percent of the region’s water resources despite containing only 10 percent of the region’s natural water resources within its borders (Van Wyk, 1998). By the early 1980’s, the normally arid South African region of Transvaal was in acute distress. Population growth and industrialization created greater water demand, especially among the mining industry, which supported the growing urban center of Johannesburg. South Africa’s demand for water increased, particularly in the industrial region of Witwatersrand by 10 to 15 percent annually (Mohammed, 2003). In the mid 1980’s, a prolonged drought strained reserves to a 50 year low. The mountainous watershed across the border in Lesotho offered an ideal solution. Yet for thirty years, South Africa was unable to negotiate successfully with Lesotho to redistribute water. Essentially, a security dilemma developed. South Africa needed additional water sources for its population, but because of its international status as an apartheid state, she had difficulty in brokering a treaty. In January 1986, South Africa supported a governmental coup in Lesotho. Nine months later, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 165 the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty was created. The next section further explains how and why Lesothan-South African this form of cooperation occurred. History The mountainous region of Lesotho, known as maloti, was inhabited by the Basotho people in the early nineteenth century (Thabane, 2000). From their inception as a nation in the 1820’s until re-establishment of direct rule by the British Crown in 1884, the Basotho (South Sotho) fought for political survival in an environment of cynical duplicity and ruthlessness, violent aggrandizement characteristic of racialized colonial frontiers (Coplan, 2001). Basutoland remained economically underdeveloped until Lesothan independence in 1966. The 1970’s and 1980’s were characterized by tense, unfriendly relations between white South Africa and a Lesotho that styled itself as a “Front Line State.”6 3 Since Lesotho reinstituted parliamentary democracy in 1993 and South Africa underwent its democratic transformation in 1994, interactions between Lesotho’s government and its hegemonic neighbor vary, ranging from hostile to continuous, extensive, and even intimate. However, the legalistic and diplomatic forms of cross border relations have remained substantially the same (Coplan, 2001). As Lesotho prepared for independence in the mid 1960s, it appeared that the strongly nationalist, Protestant, anti-aristocratic Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) 6 3 States that tried to achieve black majority rule in South Africa. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 166 under Ntsu Mokhehle would accede to power. However, with the backing of the South African government, Chief Leabua Jonathan and his conservative, Catholic, aristocratic National Party (BNP) gained power in 1965. In 1970, Leabua lost the next election but refused to relinquish power. He formed a Para-Military Unit (PMU) and terrorized BCP followers forcing them into exile in South Africa. Leabua ensured his grip on office for the next fifteen years, but in the process aborted the development of democratic institutions within Lesotho. At first, Leabua, a former mineworker, collaborated with South Africa in strengthening economic relations. However, by the mid 1970’s, he discovered that opposition to the apartheid giant and the repositioning of the Lesotho as a defenseless but courageous Front Line State was a far more profitable option. In turn, Lesotho became a haven for anti-apartheid guerillas. In the meantime, the exiled Mokhehle and his BCP were not idle. They created a guerilla force, the Lesotho Liberation Army, which operated from the mountainous no-man’s land between Caledon and the Phofong (Little Caledon) Rivers on Lesotho’s northern border (See Appendix C, Map 5.2). By the early 1980’s South Africa was suffered economically from apartheid sanctions. In Lesotho violence erupted over potential water sales to the apartheid government. Lesotho’s Prime Minister, Leabau Jonathan agreed to the LHWP only on condition that he would control the outflow of water to South Africa. However, South Africa wanted to remove Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan from power for two reasons. One, Lesotho offered sanctuary to African National Congress Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 167 guerillas. Two, South Africa wanted to be the central decision maker in determining water redistribution (Rony, 1997). In January 1986, Prime Minister Leabua was overthrown by the Lesothan army and its leader Major General Metsing Lekhanya. Nine months later, in October 1986, the new military authorities signed the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty. It was signed under duress which was exacerbated when Mozambican President Samora Michel was killed in a plane crash two days before the signing. Machel’s death generated speculation that his plane was downed by South African government agents. Students from the National University of Lesotho reacted to MacheTs death by demonstrating in the capital of Maseru to disrupt the signing of the Treaty (Thabane, 2000). Role of Financial Institutions Third party financial institutions such as the World Bank and Southern Africa Bank were also instrumental in creating the Treaty. The World Bank’s last lending practices with Pretoria were in the 1960’s. However, the Bank supported the LHWP Treaty and loaned Lesotho $110 million dollars because of South Africa’s ability to withstand surety. In a 1986 conference6 4 , Michael Potts of the Southern Africa Development Bank and LHWP sponsor conceded “given the limited access to foreign funds by the South African government and the 64 The conference was held in August 1986 and sponsored by the Johannesburg NGO Group for Environmental Monitoring (Bond, 2002) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 168 limitations on contractors funding proposal, export credit was not available to South Africa - a very complex treaty was negotiated to bypass anti-apartheid sanctions (Bond, 2002) . ” 6 5 The Treaty itself was based on a 1983 feasibility study, which was followed by a series of additional scientific and political studies which investigated how the proposed dam construction would impact the environmental landscape. A series of reports concluded that the Project’s environmental impact could be managed. This meant adequate compensation for displaced communities and the protection of animal and plant life affected by the massive hydrological project (Thabane, 2000). However, many environmental and social problems were not considered fully at the time of signing. Many Lesothans believed channeling water from Lesotho’s mountains to South Africa’s arid Transvaal region would impact the environment negatively. The proposed Lesotho Highlands Water Project required population relocation, river flow change, and the development of regional wetlands. For all these concessions, Lesotho would receive an annual payment from South Africa for approximately $50 million per year. The terms of the LHWT also did not consider Lesotho’s societal values. The treaty agreed to produce hydroelectric generation. This form of energy was designed to improve industrial and urban centers (i.e., the Transvaal region). However, many Lesothans earned their livings as migrant farmers and thus had limited utility for this form of technology. 6 5 The Bank also lent Lesotho $8 million at concessionary rates through its International Development Association. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 169 Water Treaty Terms According to the treaty, South Africa was responsible for the full cost of the LHWP, while Lesotho would pay for the cost of the hydropower component in its territory (which is about 5 percent of the total cost of the LHWP). Further the countries agreed to share the cost differences (termed the net benefit) . 6 6 On the basis of the treaty, three institutions were simultaneously established, one bilateral and two implementing agencies with autonomous status. The Lesotho Highlands Development Authority and the Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority are responsible for implementing the project in both Lesotho and South Africa. The Lesotho Highlands Water Commission is accountable for water transfer and hydropower and has monitoring and advisory powers relating to the activities of the LHDA and TCTA. Outstanding Issues Currently, there are two outstanding disputes between the LHWP parties - first is the LHDA employment policy which does not employ South Africans, and the second is whether Lesotho should receive royalties based upon a strict hydrological interpretation of the Senqu River. The two countries have cooperated 66 The ratio was 56 per cent for Lesotho and 44 per cent for South Africa. Lesotho’s share o f the net benefits to be obtained by using the LHWP is known as “royalties”. South Africa’s share is referred to as “cost savings” (DWAF 1999). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 170 by appointing a neutral body to arbitrate and solve the latter dispute. Under the terms of the LHWP Treaty, the arbitrator decisions are final and binding. Beyond the technical considerations, most LHWP concerns are environmentally related. Societal and economic displacement has caused unemployment and altered permanently the landscape of the affected areas. The LHDA has been criticized for not improving the overall economic, educational, and water conditions of the numerous dislocated communities. Still there are positive developments. Increased Lesothan revenue has resulted in greater economic diversity (agriculture, tourism, fishing, and forestry), better roads, and for some inhabitants, created a new culture of partnership between the Lesothan government, the private sector, and the affected communities (Keketso, 2 0 0 2 ). Key Variables Rony (1997) believes that six primary variables explain the level of cooperation within the treaty. They are: (i) industrial growth; (ii) prolonged drought; (iii) population growth; (iv) the military and political structure in South Africa; (v) military and political structure in Lesotho; and (vi) Lesotho’s industrial development. In my findings, I believe three independent variables best explain level of cooperation. They are power, coercion, and water scarcity. The most significant variable is the asymmetrical power relationship between South Africa Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 171 and Lesotho. South Africa was an industrial giant and served as the regional hegemon of southern Africa. Hence, when water scarcity became a national concern, South Africa used coercion by forcing regime change in Lesotho. This in turn, allowed South Africa to coerce Lesotho further into accepting an inequitable water treaty. Hypotheses Testing and Research Questions In this section, I test hypotheses H2 and H5-H9. According to geopolitical theory, countries that are contiguous are more likely to engage in conflict over water than those countries that are not. Hypothesis two, which is based on this theory, states nations facing acute levels of water scarcity exhibit lower levels of cooperation than countries that do not. South Africa was conflicted with severe regional water scarcity. They responded by forcing regime change in Lesotho to create uneven terms within the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty. This indicates that water scarce conditions lower the level of cooperation within an interstate water accord. Therefore, this hypothesis is confirmed. Hypothesis five states that the more political trust between contesting parties, the stronger the accord. There was very little political trust at the time of signing. Historical differences and the failure of prior negotiations back this observation. While an accord was established, greater trust between the two Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 172 nations could have created higher levels of cooperation. Hence, this hypothesis is not supported by this case. Hypothesis six is drawn from global environmental theory which recognizes multiple support levels for managing natural resources. Hypothesis six indicates that internal support produces higher levels of cooperation. The Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty was based on the recommendations of numerous political, financial and environmental experts. However, the actual planning process did not incorporate recommendations that advised against the development of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. This suggests South Africa’s hegemonic dominance was the dominant factor in determining level of cooperation. Hence, multiple levels of internal support did not increase level of cooperation. Therefore, this hypothesis is not supported While internal support was not significant in explaining level of cooperation, the concept of shared incentives based upon negotiation and ecological marginalization theory also must be considered. Hypothesis seven states that expanding the scope of conflict creates a stronger accord. The central reason is that there will be greater opportunities for disputing parties to find agreement. The Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty stipulated that Lesotho would transfer water from its highland areas to the South Africa’s Transvaal region. Multiple dam construction sites enlarged the scope of conflict, and in doing so, further disrupted local communities. Therefore, this hypothesis is not supported. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 173 Hypothesis eight is based on the epistemic community approach. It states the more environmental factors are part of the negotiation process, the greater likelihood for accord resiliency. Numerous environmental feasibility studies were conducted to determine the potential environmental dangers of dam construction. On the one hand, environmental value was not viewed independently from competing political and economic concerns. This in turn, allowed for the concerned parties to manipulate the environmental data to justify the project. On the other hand, the accord has never been broken. This suggests that environmental value partially explains accord resiliency. Therefore, this hypothesis is mixed. Hypothesis nine states that the presence of managing institutions ensures higher levels of cooperation at the time of signing. This depends on the key stakeholders’ intentions. One of the most important aspects of environmental cooperation is that policymakers have the ability to operate independently. The various Lesotho Highland Water agencies reflect interstate water cooperation because they were designed to address societal and economic displacement. However, these agencies were also functionaries designed to satisfy South African water needs. I argue that these managing institutions better explain accord resiliency than level of cooperation since the treaty has not been breached. Hence, support for this hypothesis is mixed. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 174 Conclusion South Africa and Lesotho overcame past historical and political differences to solve a serious water scarcity problem. However, collective action was limited. South Africa was a regional hegemon which coerced Lesotho into signing the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty. The two nations cooperated and both received tangible benefits. However, closer examination reveals that South Africa received more benefits at the time of signing than Lesotho. This indicates an uneven level of cooperation. Accord resiliency remains strong since the treat has never been broken. Limited levels of cooperation do not necessarily impact accord resiliency. This may be explained by the overarching power discrepancy between South Africa and Lesotho in that Lesotho would have too much too lose by breaching the accord. Geo-political theory is the most applicable explanation for understanding the Lesotho-South African water accord cooperation. The dispute involved contiguous nations and while there was no war, South Africa, applied enough economic and political pressure to create the long awaited water treaty. It is also evident that the presence of multiple stakeholders does not necessarily increase level of cooperation. Stakeholder interests need to be viewed independently of competing economic and political interests. This was not the case Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 175 in establishing the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty and explains why support for the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty and Project has been mixed. 6 7 67 The Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty received a score o f two for signing and two for water redistribution. There was no evidence o f any formal ratification procedure within the LHWT. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 176 CHAPTER 7 THE 1994 CONVENTION ON COOPERATION FOR THE PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF THE RIVER DANUBE (High Level of Cooperation) “Rivers that cross borders can be a source of conflict or can present an opportunity for cooperation. The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) has been associated with the Danube Basin for a decade, and in that time has seen the ICPDR grow into a major force for cooperation among nations, and a model for how countries should cooperate in resolving their cross-border water concerns.” - Alfred Duda, GEF Secretariat, International Waters This case study addresses the level of cooperation manifested in the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and sustainable use of the River Danube of 1994 which created the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR). I focused on the 1994 convention rather than the regional high profile case of the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Project because the overall pollution of the Danube relates more closely to water scarcity. The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (GNP) deserves mention because it demonstrates how national environmental differences lead to interstate tension. In 1977, Hungary and then Czechoslovakia6 8 signed a bilateral treaty where they agreed to build a system of interstate dams between Gabcikovo and Nagymoros. In 6 8 After the fall o f the Former Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia became the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 177 1981, due to economic and environmental concerns, Hungary postponed its treaty obligations (Furst, 2003). In 1989, the situation escalated when Czechoslovakia diverted portions of the Danube into a new canal towards Gabicikovo. 6 9 This action coupled with Hungary’s termination of the 1977 treaty in 1992, created a serious international environmental security issue (Sukosd, 1998). In 1997, hostilities subsided when the International Court of Justice in The Hague (IC J) ruled that both Hungary’s treaty termination and Slovakia’s river diversion were illegal. Dam construction within Hungary remains a contested issue. Ultimately, this case demonstrates the extent to which national environmental policy differences impact interstate relations. Like the 1977 treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the ICPDR focused on hydropower production, but also included conservation, improvement and rational use of waters; reduction of accident • 70 hazards; regulating; floods, ice hazards, and water transfer and withdrawal. Unlike the previous two case studies, where natural water scarcity contributed to the overall conflict, this case demonstrates reveals two unique factors: ( 1 ) water scarcity is not proscribed to arid third world areas; and (2 ) nation states with different historical, social, and political backgrounds can overcome collective action problems to achieve measurable interstate water accords. I argue that this accord reflects high level of cooperation for several reasons. Thirteen countries signed the treaty. Treaty development was supported 69 This action created record low water levels in portions o f the Danube. 701 will discuss the 2001 Aarhus Convention to illustrate further the coordination strategies required for environmental cooperation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 178 by several neutral third parties. The treaty contained clear provisions benefiting each signatory. The treaty also called for national and regional authorities to acknowledge local community recommendations. Admittedly, the Danube still faces severe pollution problems (see water quantity and quality section), but the fact that several nations with differing historical, political, and geographic conditions cooperated, offers hope that effective regional water management can be achieved. Several factors explain this phenomenon. They are water scarcity, democracy, decentralization, the dissolution of the USSR, the enlargement of the European Union, prior cooperation on the Danube, and the adoption of an innovative policy program called Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). This approach incorporates decision-makers from multiple levels (Green Cross International, 2002). The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I provide a general historical and geographic background of the Danube and then detail the early coordination strategies that were essential for establishing the ICPDR. Then, I conclude that complex interstate water accord cooperation is possible, but it requires support from multiple societal sectors. Background The Danube river basin is Europe’s second longest river, at a length of 2,857 km (UN, 2000). The river’s basin drains 817,000 km2, including all of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 179 Hungary, most of Romania, Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, and Slovakia; and significant parts of Bulgaria, Germany, and the Czech Republic, Moldova, and Ukraine. Territories of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - Bosnia and Herzegovina, and small parts of Italy, Poland, Albania, and Switzerland are also included in the basin (See Appendix C, Map 5.3). The Danube River discharges into the Black Sea through a delta that is the second largest wetland in Europe. The river is shared by a large and ever growing number of riparian states that for decades were allied with hostile political blocs, some of which are currently locked in intense national disputes (Wolf, 2000). Approximately, 81 million people live near the Danube River Basin. The river is the major drinking source for downstream riparians (beginning with Slovakia). The river is also used extensively for irrigation, especially in the Hungarian plain (Linnerbooth-Bayer and Murcott, 1996). Over 40 hydropower stations are located on the upper Danube, which are matched in energy output by 71 the two Iron Gate stations between Serbia-Montenegro and Romania. Despite the numerous hydraulic structures, the Danube has not been considered a major international waterway. This may change with the increasing East-West trade (which had been curtailed by the hostilities in the former Yugoslavia), and with the recent opening of the Rhine-Main-Danube canal which connects the Black Sea with the Atlantic Ocean (Linnerbooth, 1996). 7 1 The Iron Gate is a gorge on the Danube River and forms part o f a boundary between Serbia and Romania. In the broad sense, it encompasses 134 km; in the narrow sense, it only encompasses the last barrier on this route, just beyond the Romanian city o f Orsova, which contains a hydroelectric dam. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 180 Water Quantity and Quality Problems The Danube suffers from severe industrial, agricultural, and urban pollution which has affected both water quantity and quality. In turn, this has decreased the region’s biodiversity and posed risks to the health of the entire basin ecosystem. Although the volume of the Danube is generally sufficient to supply current needs, a 10 year drought (during the 1990s) throughout the basin created localized shortages for such uses as drinking water, irrigation, energy production, and navigation (Amicus, 1994). In 1993, the Danube water level was the lowest in a century. Additionally, some of the lower Danube states experience seasonal water shortages, which resulted in nation states tapping low quality water from the bottom of reservoirs (i.e., Bulgaria). Irrigation accounts approximately for 85 percent of all downstream country water usage. Many systems are dilapidated, resulting in inefficient water distribution (Linnerbooth-Bayer & Murcott, 1996). Further, both point source and non-point source pollution has affected the Danube River water quantity. For example, water pollution from nutrients, oxygen depleting substances, hazardous substances, and microbiological contaminant impose risks to the region’s inhabitants. The most critical pollution sources are agricultural and livestock waste and runoff, urban runoff, and industrial output from chemical, pulp and paper, and mining and textile industries. Air pollution is a significant non-point source of pollution affecting both soil and water. The most Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 181 significant point sources stem from urban centers that do not have adequate waste treatment facilities. 7 2 History Modem cooperation along the Danube extends back to 1856 with the establishment of the European Danube Commission. 7 3 It served as a symbol of the river’s international status and ensured free navigation (Fitzmaurice, 1996). In 1921 a new Danube Convention was established. The commission comprised of Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania (riparian states) and Britain, France, and Italy as representatives of the earlier non riparian European Danube Commission (Fitzmaurice, 1996). The 1930s witnessed fascist nationalization of the Danube with Romania acquiring commission rights under the 1938 Treaty of Sinaia (Fitzmaurice, 1996). In 1948, a navigation accord called the Danube Convention was signed in Belgrade creating the Danube Commission, which remains in place today. Currently, the Danube Commission has eleven member states who, maintain and monitor their navigable sections of the Danube. 7 4 While the Danube Commission established firm cooperative efforts regarding navigation, little was done to manage pollution. As early as 1977, the 7 2 The only major cities on the Danube with adequate treatment facilities are Regensburg, Linz, and Vienna. 7 3 The Danube Convention o f 1856 occurred after the defeat o f Russia in the Crimean War. 7 4 The 11 member states are Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Slovakia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Serbia, and Montenegro, http://www.danubecom-intem.org. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 182 World Health Organization warned of the inadequate pollution controls for the Danube. By the mid 1980s, the Danube was severely polluted from increased agricultural industrial waste (Varady, 1998). In 1985, this prompted the eight riparians (at the time) to sign the “Declaration of the Danube Countries to Cooperate on Questions Concerning the Management of the Danube,” (the Bucharest Declaration) which provided an integrated approach for water basin management and pollution control. Still, Danube water quality remained a serious issue primarily because many Eastern Bloc countries were transitioning democratically and economically. 7 5 These countries viewed the Danube as central way to increase commerce but it also resulted in greater levels of pollution. The European Union responded to the Danube’s changing socio-political conditions by providing financial and l f \ institutional support through the EU-PHARE Multicountry program. In September 1991, the European Commission, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank established an interim task force called the Environmental Program for the Protection of the Danube River Basin (EPDRB). Based on the “principle of participation”, each riparian was responsible for identifying two individuals to coordinate basin activity. The first 7 5 After the fall o f the Former Soviet Union in 1989. 76 The Phare program, Pologne, Hongrie Assistance a la Reconstruction Economique was established in July 1989 to support the transition o f Poland and Hungary to democracy and market economies. Phare is now the main channel o f European Community Assistance to countries o f Central and Eastern Europe; it currently encompasses eleven other countries (Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) (ww w.greennet.org. 2002). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 183 person, a “country coordinator” usually a senior official, served as a liaison between the work of the program and the country’s political hierarchy. The second person, a “country focal point” would coordinate the implementation of the work plan (Wolf, 2000). The World Bank was instrumental in conceiving and planning the components of the program and remained an active participant in early stages of implementation. The newly established European Bank for Reconstruction and Development also provided valuable help. Bilateral donors such as USAID also joined the task force, eventually coordinating their own technical assistance in the Danube region (Wolf, 2000). In 1992, a Program Coordination Unit (PCU) was established to disseminate information to the various riparians about pertinent programs and activities relating to the Danube. Country representatives regarded the PCU as a major catalyst to improve their own policies, administration and methods for initiating and implementing improvement. Ultimately, the EU PHARE Program not only supported the political transitions in Central and Eastern Europe but also provided critical support for environmental management along the Danube. This is turn, allowed other agencies to provide support such as the United Nations Development Program/Global Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 184 Environmental Facility (GEF) (International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River, 2004).7 7 By 1993, the task force created a “Strategic Action Plan” (SAP) for the Danube Basin, with the provision that “consultation procedures should be strengthened.” It was the first time that public participation was required during the development of an international water management plan. This concept rejects the principle that internal politics within nations ought to be treated as a geopolitical “black box” whose workings are of little relevance to international agreements. Instead, it embraces the vital need for public participation at all levels. The individuals who participated in the workshops/activities formed a nucleus that not only included their input for drafting the SAP, but also involved them in reviewing future activities. By July 1994, nine different riparian countries held consultation meetings (Wolf, 2000). In Sofia 1994, the Danube river basin countries and the European Union signed the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River (the Danube River Protection Convention). The Convention agreed to a series of actions including: ( 1 ) striving to achieve the goals of sustainable and equitable water management, including the conservation, improvement, and rational use of surface waters and groundwater in the catchment area as much as possible; 7 7 In 1991, The Global Environmental Facility was established by the World Bank, the UN Development Program, and the UN Environment Program. It protects the global environment by providing grants to support projects related to biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land degradation, the ozone layer, and persistent organic pollutants (http://www.gefweb.org). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 185 (2 ) cooperating on fundamental water management issues and taking all appropriate legal, administrative, and technical measures, to at least maintain and improve the current environmental and water quality conditions of the Danube River and of the waters in its catchment area and to prevent and reduce as much as possible adverse impacts and changes occurring or likely to occur; and (3) setting priorities as appropriate and strengthening, harmonizing, and coordinating measures taken and planned to be taken at the national and international level throughout the Danube basin aimed at sustainable development and environmental protection of the Danube river (Wolf, 2000). Four interrelated movements shaped Danube River Basin management, and the high level of cooperation in the ICPDR treaty. They are: (i) public participation; (ii) decentralization; (iii) the European Union; and (iv) Integrated Water Resource Management. The 1994 Danube Convention and more recently the Aahrus Convention reveal the importance of public participation. Public involvement builds trust in the legitimacy of the decision-making process. It fosters open communication and compromise. It is not sufficient for only experts to be part of the decision-making process. Families concerned about their drinking water or about their asthmatic children breathing polluted air contribute important insight about the human context and tolerance for risk. Even technical tools for environmental decision making such as risk assessment and cost benefit analysis include substantive judgments that are most appropriately made Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 186 with explicit attention to public values. Tyler (2002) stated that when legitimacy diminishes, so does the ability of legal and political authorities to influence public behavior. However, the ICPDR negotiations valued public participation. Similarly, decentralization allowed for local and regional authorities to become the • 78 primary resource managers. Integrated Water Resources Management is the function of greater public involvement. It requires a complex network of policymakers including government officials, professionals, investors, and consumers to manage the environment (Green Cross International, 2002). It promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land, and related resources in order to achieve sustainable development, without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems. Integrated Water Resource Management coupled with strong European Union support were the ultimate factors in determining high level of cooperation. Further, ICPDR manifested high cooperation because it was built on incremental steps that allowed numerous access points for numerous societal sectors to be heard (i.e., the 1991 interim task force, the 1992, Program Coordination Unit, and the 1993, Strategic Action Plan). The European Union played multiple roles. It provided important financial and political support for protecting the Danube. It created a forum for other international organizations to become involved as noted with the establishment of the Global Environmental Facility in 1991. Further, it bridged political differences 7 8 Decentralization is based on the principle o f subsidiarity, which calls for decisions to be taken at the appropriate levels and is increasingly being recognized by international law. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 187 between eastern and western Europe by binding each state to the same principles of equitable water management (Green Cross International, 2002). This study addresses ICPDR cooperation at the time of signing. While the evidence reflects high cooperation, many challenges remain. This includes concerns about rapidly shifting responsibilities, incoherence and unpredictability of laws and policy, and lack of interstate and regional policy integration. Further, there are the issues of lack of finance, inadequate institutional and human resources, poor information and data, and private sector regulation (Green Cross International, 2002). Each of these issues can undermine even high levels of cooperation. However, this dilemma can be avoided if political trust is evident. Whether water services are public or privately managed, it is essential that all decisions and activities be fully transparent and that the public has easy access to information. Misuse of public water sector funds is a global problem. As local and regional authorities in the Danube basin gain greater budgetary responsibility, their accountability to the public also increases. All transactions must be fully transparent and penalties for any form of corruption or misuse should be severe. Citizens should consider water management and supply to be the utmost importance to themselves personally and to their regions; it follows that the manner in which local and regional authorities manage this resource will also be a major factor in determining peoples’ judgment of the success or failure of their administration in general, and of their faith in government in particular. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 188 Hypotheses Testing and Research Questions In this section, I test hypotheses H2 and H5.H9 . The second hypothesis states, nations currently facing acute water scarcity, exhibit lower levels of cooperation than nations that do not. The Danube river basin water problems were more induced by human actions than from natural climactic conditions. Still water quality and quantity were serious issues, which could have destabilized the entire region. However, the riparian nations overcame collective action problems and achieved a measurable and resilient interstate water accord. Therefore, this hypothesis is denied with the qualification that water scarcity was more naturally induced. Based on common pool resource, negotiation, and global governance theory, hypothesis five posits that the more political trust between contesting parties, the stronger the accord. This is an underlying premise for achieving and maintaining resilient interstate water accords. In this case, 13 different countries overcame numerous socio-political differences to create a model water treaty. In this case, political trust was achieved through an interactive recursive relationship between multiple societal levels. It included nation, regional, and local authorities, local citizenry, and critical third parties such as the European Union, Global Environmental Facility, and the World Bank. Additionally, water cooperation along the Danube extended back to 1856 (modem nation state terms). While much of the earlier cooperation was navigation Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 189 based, the Danube riparians had precedent to expand their negotiating agenda to include water quantity and quality problems. This precedent to negotiate coupled with strong third party institutional support galvanized intra and interstate political trust. Detractors may suggest nation states only achieve environmental collective action during crises conditions. Regardless, political trust was evident, which created high level cooperation. Therefore, this hypothesis is confirmed. Hypothesis six suggests accords that are supported internally are more stable than accords that receive support only at the state level. This proposition relates back to Putnam’s explanation that nation states make decisions are predicated by strong internal support. There is clear evidence of internal support, most notably from the high levels of public participation as well as from regional and local governing authorities. Therefore, the data supports this hypothesis. The seventh hypothesis indicates that expanding the scope of conflict offers greater opportunity for achieving higher levels of cooperation. It is de facto that the Danube is a large body of water. However, this hypothesis is supported by the expanding scope of concern, which means recognizing issues at the national, regional, and local levels. The accord states “nation states will be cooperating on fundamental water management issues and take all appropriate, legal, administrative, and technical measures to at least maintain and improve the current environmental and water quality conditions of the Danube river and its catchment area” (Wolf, 2000, 87). This means that national as well as regional and local concerns were addressed. Therefore, this hypothesis is supported. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 190 The eighth hypothesis posits that the more accords consider environmental factors, the greater the likelihood for accord resiliency. Unlike the previous two case studies, environmental value and equitable water management was the central goal of the ICPDR treaty. 7 9 Environmental degradation led numerous policymakers to adopt an integrated water resources management system, which elicited support from numerous societal sectors. Hence, environmental factors contributed to high cooperation and accord resiliency at the time of signing. However, accord resiliency could be affected by lack of treaty implementation. Therefore, the findings support this hypothesis. Hypothesis nine suggests the role of managing institutions affects accord ratification. There is significant evidence to support this claim, including actions from the European Union, World Bank, and Global Environmental Facility. These managing institutions provided financial and structural support which contributed to ratification because they allowed input from the general public, which in turn manifested clear and unequivocal language within the ICPDR agreement. Institutional support strengthened intra and interstate political trust, which made the accord possible. Therefore, the results allow us to reject the null hypothesis. Conclusion The establishment of the ICPDR demonstrates how nation states can overcome collective action problems and achieve measurable and resilient 7 9 Economic stability o f the Danube River Basin was also a factor. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 191 • SO interstate water accords. Water scarcity was more human induced actions than from natural climatic conditions. The 1994 accords do not mention specific water allocations, yet high level cooperation is apparent when one considers the extent to which the riparian nations pledged themselves to reducing water pollution. I argue that the riparian states were able to address water quality and quantity issues because they had the precedence to negotiate. For more than a century, riparian states had cooperated over the Danube. Many of the earlier concerns were navigation based, yet enough negotiation precedent existed to transition into addressing environmental issues. ICPDR cooperation can also be explained through the numerous political events of the 1980s. This includes the role of the European Union, fall of the former Soviet Union and democratic decentralization that resulted. The European Union’s incremental policy approach of creating numerous interim agencies and agreements to monitor the Danube during the late 1980s and early 1990s made the finalization of the ICPDR a more logical outcome. The fall of the former Soviet Union was also important. On the one hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed former eastern bloc nations to engage openly in the free market system. On the other hand, the transition increased pollution along the Danube, impacting both water quality and quantity. A sense of urgency resulted, which enabled to the concerned riparians to overcome collective action fears to negotiate over the Danube. 8 0 The ICPDR received a score o f three for ratification and three for water redistribution. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 192 One of the most significant methods for achieving this was Integrated Water Resources Management system. This process decentralized the Danube environmental decision making system by recognizing multiple societal viewpoints. These considerations were included within the ICPDR terms. The establishment of the ICPDR is a theoretical enigma. Negotiation theory suggests that the greatest opportunities for cooperation are bilateral. Yet, 13 countries with different social, historical, and political backgrounds overcame collective action problems to make this one of the most successful multilateral accords. Common pool resource theory suggests that political trust is a key determinant for overcoming collective action problems. Clearly, political trust was evident, but common pool resource theory is proscribed to local resources. The Danube River basin is over 1800 kilometers long. However, the idea that the numerous riparians all sponsor Danube day, an annual celebration of the river, suggests a cultural explanation may have the most theoretical utility. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 8 193 CONCLUSION This chapter reemphasizes the importance of studying interstate water accords. First, I provide an overview and justification for the research conducted. Second, I summarize the major quantitative and qualitative findings. Third, I surmise the hypotheses and theory tests. Fourth, I analyze the results of hypotheses tests and theory tests. I then relate the study’s findings to the current literature as well as to the overall lessons learned. Fifth, I critique the study’s theoretical and methodological strengths and weaknesses. Sixth, I provide theoretical and empirical suggestions for future research. Freshwater is a finite but renewable resource which comprises approximately three percent of world’s water. Approximately two thirds of the available freshwater is locked in glaciers, making it inaccessible for global use (UNEP, 2000). Still, the world’s renewable freshwater supplies are capable of supporting a much larger population than exists today (Elhance, 1999). The problem is that for a large portion of the world’s population, serious water shortages (especially in the Third World) have become party of daily life. Currently eighty countries, supporting 40 percent of the world’s population suffer from serious freshwater shortages for personal and household needs. As many as 1.2 billion people, mostly in the Third World, suffer physically from shortages of potable water and 1 . 8 billion people lack adequate water for sanitation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 194 About 80 percent of all illnesses and 30 percent of all unnatural deaths in the Third World are caused by waterborne diseases and consumption of highly polluted water (Elhance, 1999). By the year 2025, thirty seven countries are likely to be without enough water for household and agricultural needs, let alone water for industries, energy production, navigation, recreation, and other societal needs (Elhance, 1999). Water conflicts in Spain, the southwestern part of the United States and central Europe indicate that developed regions are also vulnerable to water scarcity. Drought, population growth, increased industrialization, and inefficient governing solutions have placed unprecedented strain on freshwater resources. Nation states must develop effective policy solutions to reduce this global threat, especially since numerous studies suggest that global water scarcity will likely worsen in the twenty first century (UNEP, 2000, IWMI, 1999). One area where some success has been achieved is with interstate water accords. Nation states have overcome collective action problems to share freshwater for centuries. The current literature bears this out. In the second half of the twentieth century alone, 95 percent of water conflicts ended amicably (Wolf, 2000). Thanks to the Transboundary Freshwater Database maintained at Oregon State University, it is possible to explore this phenomenon in much greater detail. The available data indicated that while cooperation is apparent, it is not necessarily complete. Often nation states sign cooperative agreements, but do not specify any level of water redistribution. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 195 To fill this analytic void, I conducted in-depth quantitative and qualitative research on interstate water accords to answer two central questions: (1) How are nation states able to overcome collective action problems to achieve measurable intestate water accords?; and (2) What makes these accords so resilient? First, I evaluated the level of cooperation within 6 8 interstate water accords from 1950-1999. I assigned interval values of one to three based on whether the accord was not signed, signed or ratified. Then, I assigned interval values one to three as to whether the accord specified no water redistribution, some distribution, or equitable distribution. Second, I selected three water scarcity cases that depicted varying level of interstate cooperation. The qualitative was important because it allowed me to study variables that were not-quantifiable (i.e., environmental value) and offered the opportunity to understand in greater detail how water scarcity among other independent variable impacted the level of cooperation in interstate water accords. Further, the use of multiple methodologies added more validity to the study’s findings. Summary of Major Findings The quantitative findings revealed important clues that were consistent with the existing literature in that nation states find it easier to ratify accords than to redistribute water at the time of signing. Negotiation theory explained this Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 196 occurrence in two ways. On the hand, it could mean that the level of political trust was not significant enough for nation states to agree upon technical requirements needed for water redistribution. On the other, limited negotiations may be incentive for future negotiations. The quantitative section also demonstrated that interstate water cooperation was most effective during the 1960s, which may have been a precursor to the overall environmental reawakening in the 1970s. Another revealing trend was that geographic location was not a precondition for accord development. Nation states in both arid and temporal climates negotiated successfully. The quantitative finding also implies that some form of rational or economic incentive is often behind the negotiator’s intent. The ultimate finding is that cooperation remains bifurcated. Nations are more willing to ratify accords than agree to equitable water redistribution at the time of signing and questions whether interstate water cooperation is sufficient enough to address future water scarcity crises. The case studies encompassed both Mill’s Method of Agreement and Difference. Both approaches were applicable because each case contained the common variable of water scarcity, yet the observed outcomes differed (method of agreement). Each case explained the dependent variable and observed outcome, though there were many different variables (method of difference). The level of cooperation varied in each case. In the Israeli-Palestinian case (low cooperation) an overarching security dilemma created a culture of distrust. The Oslo Accords were protracted negotiations which spanned over two years. As Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 197 a result, Israeli water redistribution occurred only in the latter negotiations of Oslo II, and even then it was limited. The general theories which best explain this outcome are geopolitical and negotiation theory. Geopolitical theory was useful because it identified acute water scarcity as a barrier to achieving cooperation. Negotiation theory was important because it identified political trust, data availability, and negotiator competence as preconditions for successful negotiations; all of which were not evident during the signing of the Oslo Accords. While water scarcity was not the only source of conflict, it aggravated tense conditions between the Israelis and Palestinians. Third parties were unable to increase political trust between the disputing parties. The United States, the most important third party viewed the water conflict as an overall Middle East issue. Greater attention could have been directed towards the specific conditions within the West Bank and Gaza. The Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty demonstrated a medium level of cooperation. Water scarcity, coercion, and political power were the central independent variables. Geo-political theory was the dominant theoretical approach. South Africa desperately needed water for its Transvaal region, but it failed for thirty years to negotiate a treaty with Lesotho. Yet just nine months after the 1986 coup, the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty was established. Geopolitical theory predicts that contiguous nations may enter into an armed conflict over scarce resources. While war did not occur, South Africa coerced Lesotho into creating an uneven water treaty. Third parties justified the plans and development of the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 198 Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Both the World Bank and Southern Africa Development provided financial support to ensure that South Africa would have a beneficial water treaty. In doing so, they overlooked the apartheid and other socio political implications. The final case revealed high cooperation. Water scarcity stemmed more from human behavior than from natural climatic conditions. The 1994 accords do not mention specific water allocations. However, high level water redistribution conditions are apparent when one considers the extent to which the riparian nations pledged themselves to reducing water pollution. Negotiation theory and the epistemic community approach were very useful in analyzing this case study. History, (cooperation had been an ongoing process at least since 1856), independent concern for the environment, the rise of the European Union, fall of the former Soviet Union, and democratic decentralization all explained this high level of cooperation. The European Union, the Global Environment Facility, among a myriad number of non-governmental organizations offered financial structure and decentralized the water management practices. In turn, the Danube riparians agreed to unprecedented levels of environmental cooperation at the time of accord signing. Results of Hypotheses and Theory Tests The following reflect the results of the hypotheses and theory tests (See Appendix A, Tables 8.1 and 8.2). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 199 Hi - the greater the level of public participation, the greater the level of cooperation in establishing an accord (global governance theory) was supported in the quantitative section and was not tested for the case studies. H2 - nations currently facing acute water scarcity shortages, exhibit lower levels of cooperation than nations that do not (geopolitical theory) was mixed in the quantitative section and supported in the Israeli-Palestinian and South Africa - Lesotho cases, but was not supported in the Danube case. H3 - Bilateral negotiations are likely to produce higher levels of cooperation than multilateral negotiations (negotiation theory) was mixed in the quantitative study and was not tested in the case studies. H4 - Treaty ratification is a necessary precondition for equitable water distribution (negotiation theory) was supported in the quantitative study but not tested in the cases studies. H5 - the more political trust between contesting parties, the stronger the accord (common pool resource theory, negotiation theory, and discourse analysis) was mixed in the quantitative study, supported in the Israeli-Palestinian case, not supported in the South-Africa-Lesotho case, and supported in the Danube case. H6 - accords that are supported internally are likely to be more stable than sole external support (common pool resource theory) was supported in the quantitative study, supported in the Israeli-Palestinian case, and not supported in the South Africa-Lesotho case, Danube cases. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 200 H7 - the broader the scope of the water dispute, the stronger the accord (negotiation theory, shared incentives, and ecological marginalization theory) was not supported in the quantitative study, the Israeli-Palestinian case, and the South Africa-Lesotho case. It was supported in the Danube case. Hg - The more accords consider environmental factors, the greater likelihood for accord resiliency (epistemic community approach) was not supported in the quantitative study, mixed in the Israeli-Palestinian and South African-Lesotho cases, and supported in the Danube case. H9 - the greater the role of managing institutions, the higher the chance for accord ratification (conjunctive management) was not supported in the quantitative study, mixed in the Israeli-Palestinian and South-Africa-Lesotho cases, and supported in the Danube case. Interpreting the Study’s Findings The quantitative data identified public participation, accord ratification, and internal support for explaining cooperation. Water scarcity, bilateral negotiations, and political trust produced mixed results. Water scarcity and political trust are important factors but cannot be explained sufficiently through quantitative analysis. These factors require specific detail, which made them hard to operationalize in the quantitative section. The data did not distinguish between bilateral and multilateral negotiations as a means to achieving cooperation. However, there is a parity issue Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 201 because more than 70 percent of all negotiations in the time period studied were bilateral. The quantitative data did not support expanding the scope of conflict, environmental value, or institutional support as a means of achieving cooperation. These factors also do not lend themselves well to quantitative interpretation because of their need to be explained in great detail. Each case study offered important insight. The Oslo Accords showed that water scarcity, political trust, and internal support were strong explanatory factors for achieving cooperation. Environmental value and institutional support received mixed results, while the shared incentives argument was not supported. I believe that this case study’s results were nuanced by the strident security and ideological differences between the Israelis and Palestinians. The Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty only showed water scarcity has a clear factor in explaining cooperation. Political trust, internal support, and shared incentives were not supported because of South Africa’s hegemonic influence. This factor also affected the significance of environmental value and institutional support. The ICPDR cases justified the importance of using multiple methodologies because it supported H7-H9 , where the quantitative analysis could not. Shared incentives, environmental value, and institutional support were all essential for explaining the ICPDR’s high level of cooperation. It also revealed that water scarcity does not always produce uneven levels of cooperation. The ICPDR’s Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 202 support of H5-H6 , reveal that political trust and internal support are the critical factors for overcoming water scarcity problems. Water cooperation study is a complex discipline and which required multiple theoretical perspectives. I selected ten theories and operatonalized eight. Each theory used was supported at least once in the quantitative or qualitative sections. Conjunctive management (H9 - Institutions) was not supported in the quantitative section, received mixed results in the Israeli-Palestinian and South Africa-Lesotho cases and was supported in the ICPDR case. Institutional support can explain cooperation. However, it also demonstrates that institutional motivations and goals can be overly influenced be state power and more specifically, security and ideological concerns. With regards to common pool resource theory (H5 and H6 - political trust and internal support), political trust was operationalized in all four tests. It explained cooperation best in the Israeli- Palestinian and ICPDR cases. This demonstrates the full spectrum that this factor has in explaining cooperation. Internal support was supported in the quantitative study as well as two of the three case studies. This implies the importance state leaders to decentralize the decision making process. Ecological marginalization theory (H7 - environmental value) was only supported in the ICPDR case. It shows the inherent conflict between economic and environmental incentives. Epistemic community approach HE) could not be supported by the quantitative section, received mixed results in the first two cases, and was supported in the ICPDR case. This reinforces the need for the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 203 environment to be viewed as an independent factor for achieving interstate water cooperation. Geopolitical theory (H2), this approach was very useful for explaining the acute water scarcity case. It did not support the ICPDR case, which suggests that nation states can overcome collective action problems to achieve measurable interstate water accords. Global governance theory (Hi), this theory reinforces a democratic and pluralistic perspective to achieve interstate water accord cooperation. It produced mixed results in the quantitative section and was not operationalized in the qualitative section. Public support is a broad term, which has numerous definitions and hence, equivalency issues arise when applying the term in comparative case studies. Negotiation theory (H3, H4, H5, H7) indicated mixed results in assessing whether bilateral are more stable than multilateral negotiations. It supported premise that accord ratification is a necessary condition for water redistribution. In terms of political trust, negotiation theory supported two of the three case studies and received mixed results in the quantitative section. This has more to with the overall limitations of quantitative analysis than with the theory’s utility. Similarly, negotiation theory predicted that internal support was not an instrumental factor in explaining cooperation except in the ICPDR case study. This suggests that policy makers to need to create more societal access points in order to achieve high cooperation. Shared incentive (H7 ) was only supported in the ICPDR case. This suggests that other factors such prior negotiation history, political trust, and shared Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 204 environmental values may have more to do with explaining cooperation than in extending negotiating terms beyond water redistribution. This study serves as an initial investment for scholars to advance the water conflict/cooperation debate. There have been select case studies which evaluate the water scarcity’s potentially destabilizing impact on the nation state (Homer-Dixon, 1993; Samson & Charrier, 1997). There also is literature that identify causal factors for achieving water cooperation (LeMarquand, 1989; Wolf, 2000; Conca, 2004). However, no research ranked interstate water accords. Conca (2004) evaluated interstate water accord treaty terms, but he categorizes the terms rather than ranks the accords. His focus is that a global river regime exists which extends beyond the nation state and institutional factors. My findings corroborate with his study in that effective cooperation elicits significant level of public support. However by ranking the accords, I have been able to distinguish why some accords are more resilient than others. I do not believe that any one theoretical approach completely explains how nations overcome collective action problems to solve water problems. However, it is clear from the quantitative and qualitative sections that certain theories and their variables should be highlighted. They are: (i) political trust (negotiation, common pool resource); (ii) internal support (negotiation, common pool resource); (iii) role of institutions (conjunctive management); and (iv) independent environmental value (epistemic community approach). The qualifying factor is that strident socio political differences often reduce the impact of each variable. Accord resiliency at Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 205 the time of signing is a complicated matter. The research findings are consistent with the current literature that nation states do not break international water treaties. However, that may have more to with asymmetrical power relationships between the disputing parties than with the level of cooperation as agreed upon the time of signing. The current literature reveals that most nations achieve collective action and produce measurable interstate water accords. This study’s central findings generally accept this proposition, but remonstrates that cooperative practices are stronger procedurally than substantively. This means it that it is much easier for nation states to ratify a treaty than to redistribute water effectively. This is of great concern, because it is unknown whether current cooperation is sufficient to overcome future water scarcity problems. Therefore, it is my hope that additional scholarship will create new comparative case studies further explaining the level of cooperation at the time of signing. Strengths and Weaknesses There are two major strengths to this study. They are the interpretive nature of water cooperation and the methods used to conduct research. Water cooperation literature incorporates numerous theoretical perspectives. Economic, organizational, legal, and numerous social science theories offer important insight into explain the opportunities and challenges behind interstate water cooperation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 206 This allowed me to utilize several theoretical perspectives and provide broad insight in explaining cooperation. For example, much of the current literature points to common pool resource theory as the dominant approach for explaining environmental cooperation. I found that negotiation theory (Zartman 1981; Clark, Bingham, & Powell, 1991) showed even more utility in predicting the level of cooperation at the time of signing. While there is a growing literature in evaluating environmental cooperation, the literature is limited in understanding interstate water accord cooperation and non-existent for ranking accords. Further, the available literature is either quantitative or qualitative. As a result, water cooperation studies were insightful, but overall were disjointed. This theoretical void allowed me to develop a research design that utilized multiple methodologies. Quantitative analysis allowed me to understand general correlations between the independent variables and the level of cooperation. Comparative case studies allowed me to explain level of cooperation in much greater detail. At the same time, there are several theoretical and methodological limitations. Equivalency was issue for both the quantitative and qualitative sections. For example, does political trust in one case mean the same thing in another case study? I recognized this limitation and argued that a universalistic approach must be applied to the selected the independent variables. This meant that I recognized differing cultural and political situations could nuance the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 207 interpretation of a specific variable. However, the underlying meaning could be similar. In turn, this allowed me to conduct comparative analysis. For the quantitative section, there were issues regarding case study selection, time and space issues, and the selection of ratification and water redistribution to explain cooperation at the time of signing. First, I selected only water quantity case studies from 1950-1999. There are many water quality case studies, but I did not select them because I was most interested in seeing how nations cooperated over water scarcity. The Transboundary Freshwater Database maintained by Oregon State University provided the data. However, there were time and space issues which questioned the quantitative study’s findings. I qualified the findings by conducting quantitative analysis over ten year periods and kept the ratification and water distribution, the central components of cooperation separate. There may be questions regarding the use of ratification (formal approval) to explain cooperation. Current water literature does not use this term. However, I have shown in the quantitative section that ratification is an important procedural component in explaining cooperation. There is spatial problem with water distribution. The quantitative section is unable to discern whether water redistribution is for an entire country for some specific locations. This could question the quantitative findings. However, that is one of the reasons why multiple methodologies were essential for this study. The Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 208 comparative case studies filled this analytic void by showing in greater detail where water redistribution occurred. There are also case study limitations. Bias was the biggest problem. I did not want to select cases based on the dependent variable. This would greatly weaken the study’s findings. Therefore, I selected three cases based on varying degrees cooperation. The Israeli-Palestinian and the ICPDR cases were relatively straightforward. However the LHWT was very interpretive as to what really was the level of cooperation. There was also the issue of data availability. I made every attempt to view each case study from multiple perspectives. But this presented a problem in assessing public support. I was able to use public participation for the quantitative section, because quantitative analysis allows for general correlations. However, it was problematic in the case studies. I could not satisfy the public participation equivalency issue and omitted testing global governance theory which supports this variable. Undoubtedly, accurate data on public participation would have enhanced the case studies. However, this is an opportunity for future research. Additionally, the research often required the study of treaty effectiveness, which meant reviewing data well beyond the accord signing. This could be criticized because the negotiators at the time of signing may not have viewed their cooperative intent as flawed, which in turn, could affect the study’s findings. Yet negotiation theory posits negotiators are well prepared and understand the potential effects of their decisions. While there is no one method that can Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 209 decipher negotiator intent completely, policy-making errors such as cognitive nearsightedness (i.e., looking at short term gain over long term consequences) must be avoided. Therefore, I viewed the future consequences only to further understand negotiator intent at the time of signing. Suggestions for Further Research There is growing awareness that nations must manage, engineer, and conserve water resources. As Gleick (1994) stated, no region of the world with shared international water is exempt. Without cooperative management, zero sum competition will emerge over water. This study demonstrates that interstate water accords may be the most integral factor in managing current and future global water scarcity issues. However, research is far from complete. I suggest that more theories should be applied to explain interstate water cooperation. For example the democratic peace thesis and discourse analysis were introduced into this study, but were not tested directly. Both are important theoretical dimensions which deserve consideration. The democratic peace thesis is critical in light of numerous countries transitioning into democracies. Discourse analysis emphasizes language and question framing, which could be used in combination with the public trust doctrine to understand how water is connected with the community perception of security, opportunity, participation, and well being (Ingram & Oggins, 1992). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 210 I would also expand the quantitative section to evaluate water quality cases. This would add additional insight towards understanding the water cooperation scarcity nexus. Increased industrialization may be the biggest threat to water resources. Research should also be conducted in understanding the linkage between interstate water accords and two emerging practices; privatization and desalination. There are two central questions to the privatization debate. First, should water, a basic necessity for human survival, be controlled by for-profit interests? Second, can multinational companies deliver better services, and safe, affordable water? The argument behind privatization is that corporations can manage water most efficiently. Water companies (e.g., Suez, Vivendi Universal, and RWE/Thames Water) have expanded into the developing world where antiquated, often colonial era water systems are inadequate for rapidly increasing populations. Water privatization is growing, but like water accords, it is unclear whether the intent at the time of incorporation will produce better water management. Gleick (2 0 0 2 ) noted that “half the world’s population fail to receive the level of water services available in many of the cities of ancient Greece and Rome” (Luoma, 37). Yet corporate water’s record in fixing those problems or even maintaining the industrialized world’s system is mixed (Luoma, 2002). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 211 Great Britain has been a water privatization success story, 81 but there is concern for water privatization in the developing world. For example, in 2001, the Ghanaian government privatized a local water system as a condition for an International Monetary Fund loan. To attract investors, the government doubled water rates, creating protests in a country where the average annual income is less than $400 a year (Luoma, 2002). Even more problematic is whether this approach could take place in water scarce countries, considering profit remains the ultimate incentive. Desalination is another water redistribution method. There are approximately 1 1 , 0 0 0 desalination plants in 1 2 0 countries, 60 percent of which are located in the Middle East. Desalination plants provide about one-quarter of one percent of the world’s freshwater needs. Still desalination plants produce fifteen times as much freshwater as they did twenty five years ago (Simon, 1998). However, desalination in relation to interstate cooperation revealed that additional water cannot supplant ideological differences. Nevertheless, it still is a possible method for redistributing water during crisis conditions. Half Empty or Half Full? The question of whether nations achieve cooperative interstate water accords is decidedly mixed. This study indicates that nation states find it easier to ratify accords than agree on equitable water distribution. On the one hand, this 8 1 Britain privatized its water industry in 1989 and has produced better water quality, service, and delivery (Economist, 2003). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 212 could mean that accords are sufficient procedurally, but are hollow substantively. On the other hand, nation states cooperate over water even when other strident socio-political issues remain unresolved. Further, the overall data suggest that most water conflicts are solved amicably. Therefore, I believe interstate water accords are half full. However, future accords must incorporate national, regional, and local viewpoints if cooperation is to increase. An underlying goal of this study was to contribute to intergenerational equity. Sustainable water use has been defined in two ways one, the development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs or two, the use of water that supports the ability of human society to endure and flourish into the indefinite future without undermining the integrity of the hydrological cycle or ecological systems that depend on it (Cosens, 2002). Both definitions are important, but neither offers any definitive measure into ensuring water resources for future generations. Goodland and Daly (1996) provided a useful framework for achieving sustainability. They divided the legacy left to future generations into three types of capital: natural, manufactured, and social. Natural capital is defined as the natural environment. Manufactured is human created infrastructure, and social is the people and institutions, information, knowledge, and culture they create. Sustainability is difficult to achieve, because often each of these categories are viewed independently. Effective interstate water accord cooperation must encompass all three perspectives. This may be the best chance for future Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 213 generations to have adequate access to freshwater and overall appreciation of the environment. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 214 REFERENCES A Global Water Crisis. (March 2003). World Wildlife Fund. Active for the Danube river basin, 1994-2004: Ten years of cooperation in the Danube river basin. International Commission for the Protection o f the Danube River, http://www.grid.unep.ch/product/map/images/basin- danubeb.gif. Andreen, W.L. (2000). Environmental law and international assistance: The challenge of strengthening environmental law in the developing world. 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(2003). Governing the Commons the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press: New York. Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & WalkerJ. (1994). Rules. Games. & Common Pool Resources. University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor. Overcoming water scarcity and quality constraints. (2001). Brief 14 of 14. Patterns in international water resource treaties: The trans-boundary freshwater dispute database. (1997). Colorado Journal o f International Environmental Law and Policy 157. Postel, S. (September 1993). Facing a future of water scarcity. USA Today. Postel, S. & Wolf, A. (2001). “Dehydrating Conflict” Foreign Policy 126. Priceless: A survey of water. (July 19, 2003). The Economist. Pottinger, L. LHWP: What went wrong? www.im.org/programs/lesotho/index. Priscoli, J.D. (1998). Water and civilization: Using history to reframe water policy debates and to build a new ecological realism. Water Policy 1:6. Revkin, A.C. (May 23, 2002). Severe water and land loss predicted over a generation. The New York Times. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 220 Richards, A. (November 4, 2002). Coping with Water Scarcity: The Governance Challenge. Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. IGCC Policy Paper. Working Paper, pp. 54. http://repositories.cdlib.org/igcc/pp/pp54. Rijsberman, F. (2001). Water scarcity threatens food supply and environmental security. Health and Security. Rony, A. The Lesotho “Water Coup.” Ice Case Studies 56. http://www.american.edu/ proiects/mandala/TED/ice/LESWATER.HTM Rosegrant, M.W. (1995). Dealing with water scarcity in the next century. International Food Policy Research Institute. Vision Brief 21. Pennings, P., Keman, FL, & Kleinnijenhuis, J. (1999). Doing Research in Political Science. London: Sage Publications. Salmi, R.H. (1997). “Water, the red line: The interdependence of Palestinian and Israeli water resources.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 20:15-65. Sawin, J.L. (2003). Water scarcity could overwhelm the next generation. World Watch 16:4. Selby, J. (2003). Water. Power & Politics In the Middle East. The Other Israeli- Palestinian Conflict. London: I.B. Taurus. Sher, FI. (March 2000). Source of peace. The Jerusalem Report. http://www.jrep.com. Simon, P. (1998). Tapped Out The Coming World Crisis in Water and What We Can Do About It. National Press Books: Washington D.C. Tagliabue, J. (August 26, 2002). As multinationals run the taps, anger rises over water for profit. The New York Times. Thabane, M. (2000). Shifts from old to new social and ecological environments in the Lesotho highlands water scheme: Relocating residents of the Mohale dam area. Journal o f Southern African Studies 26:4. The changing water paradigm: A look at twenty-first century water resources development. (2000). Water International 25:1. The Dublin statement on water and sustainable development, http ://www. wfeo- comtech.org/WorldWaterVision/DublinStatementH20AndSD.html. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 221 The EU Phare Programme, www.greenet.org.uk/fem. The Last Oasis. (1992). W.W. Norton and Company: New York. The Lesotho highlands water project, http://caa.org.au/horizons. The Water Conflicts in the Middle East from a Palestinian Perspective. Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem, http://www.arij.org/pub/wconflct. Thompson Jr. (2004). The trouble with time: Influencing the conservation choices of future generations. Natural Resources Journal 44:601. Too many dams, too little water. http://www.im.org.programs/lesotho/index. TREATIES -Transboundary Freshwater Database, www.Transboundary waters.orst.edu. - (1993-1995). Israeli-Palestinian Interim Accords. - (1986). Lesotho Highlands Water Project. - (1994). Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the River Danube Treyer, S. (March 2004). Making water scarcity a global issue? International Environmental Governance. Turton, A. (2003). An overview of the hydropolitical dynamics of the Orange river basin. In Nakayama, M. (Ed.), International Waters in Southern Africa. UN Press: New York. Uitto, J.I. & Duda, A.M. (2002). The Geographical Journal 168:365. US$45 million for Lesotho highlands water. World Bank. http://web.worldbank.org. Vale, P. (2003). Security and Politics in South Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. VanWyk, J-A. (1998). Towards water security in Southern Africa. African Security Review 7:2. Vayrynen, R. (2001). Environment, violence and political change. Notre Dame Journal o f Law, Ethics, and Public Policy 15:593. Ward, D. (2002). Water Wars. The Berkeley Publishing Group: New York. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 222 Water and conflict fresh water resources and international security. (1993). International Security 18:1. Water: Every drop counts. New Internationalist 354. Water for a thirsty world. (August 29, 2002). Letter to editor of The New York Times. Water for peace in the Danube basin: The role of territorial authority in the management of river basins: An analysis of the Danube based on the experience of the Rhine. http:www.greencross/programs/water. Watson, P. (June 29, 2003). New Dehli’s insatiable thirst a drain on India. The Los Angeles Times. Wertheim, M. (September 12, 2004). Drying the tears of thirsty nations. The Los Angeles Times. What is a water right, http://www.waterbank.com. When big dams spell disaster: Assessing the Lesotho highlands water project. (1999). Global Dialogue 4:3. Wittfogel, K.A. (1956). The hydraulic civilizations. W.L. Thomas Jr. (Ed.) in Man’s Role in Changing the Face of the Earth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 152-164. Wolf, A.T. (2002). Conflict and cooperation along international waterways. A. Wolf (Ed.) in Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Water Systems. Northhampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Unlimited. Wolf, Aaron T. and Shira B. Yoffe, and Mark Giordano (2003). “International Waters: identifying basins at risk.” Water Policy. 5(1):29:60 Zartman, I.W. & Berman, M.R. (1982). The Practical Negotiator. New Haven: Yale University Press. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 223 APPENDIX A TABLES Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 1.1. Water Scarcity in the 20th Century (IWMI-1999). 224 CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 CATEGORY 3 CATEGORY 4 ABSOLUTE RELATIVE WATER WATER SCARCITY SCARCITY Afghanistan Angola Albania Argentina Egypt Benin Algeria Austria Iran Botswana Australia Bangladesh Israel Burkina Faso Belize Belgium Jordan Burundi Bolivia Bulgaria Kuwait Cameroon Brazil Canada Libya Chad Cambodia China* Oman Congo El Salvador Costa Rica Saudi Arabia Ivory Coast Gambia Cuba Singapore Ethiopia Guatemala Denmark South Africa Gabon Guinea Dominican Republic Syria Guinea-Bissau Honduras Ecuador Tunisia Haiti Indonesia Finland United Arab Lesotho Kenya France Emirates Yemen Liberia Lebanon Greece China* Mozambique Madagascar Guyana India* Niger Malaysia Hungary Nigeria Mali India* Paraguay Mauritania Italy Somalia Morocco Jamaica Sudan Myanmar Japan Uganda Namibia M exico Zaire Nepal Netherlands N ew Zealand North Korea Nicaragua Norway Peru Panama Senegal Philippines Tanzania Poland Turkey Portugal Venezuela Romania Zambia South Korea Zimbabwe Spain Sri Lanka Surinam Sweden Switzerland Thailand UK Uruguay USA Vietnam Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 225 Table 1.1. (continued) Category 1: These countries face absolute water scarcity. They will not be able to meet water needs in the year 2025. Category 2: These countries face “economic water scarcity.” They must more than double their efforts to extract water to meet 2025 water needs, but they will not have the financial resources available to develop these water supplies. Category 3: These countries have to increase water development between 25 and 100 per cent to meet 2025 needs, but have more financial resources to do so. Category 4: These countries will have to increase water demands modestly overall - on average by only 5 per cent to keep up with 2025 demands * These countries have severe regional water scarcity. A portion of their populations (381 million people in China in 1990 and 280 million people in India in 1990) are in Category 1. The rest of their populations are in Category 4. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 226 Table 1.2. Underlying Factors Influencing Water Demand: Projected Change 1995-2025 for Selected Countries and Regions (Rosegrant, 2002). COUNTRIES REGIONS POPULATION INCREASE PER MILLION POPULATION PER CENT INCREASE GDP INCREASE US $ PER CAPITA GDP INCREASE PERCENT IRRIGATED AREA INCREASE (Million ha.) INCREASE PERCENT OF IRRIGATED AREA China 261 21.3 2,390 355 4.9 6.9 India 395 42.5 1,123 281 9.7 25.1 USA 58 21.9 24,405 93 0.7 6.4 South Asia 630 50.7 909 237 11.2 19.1 Southeast Asia 201 42 2,332 198 1.7 8.6 Latin America 212 45 3,942 110 2.3 25.7 Sub-Sahara Africa 525 98.4 125 45 3.5 8.6 Developing World 2,801 47.3 1,808 167 2.4 5.1 Developed World 57 4.6 17,787 98 26 13.5 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 227 Table 2.1. Selected Theories for Study Conjunctive Management - Practical management approach, suggests groundwater is used during dry seasons, while surface water is used during rainy season. Success depends on institutional jurisdiction. Common Pool Resource Theory - Rational choice based theory, where nation states cooperate to share natural resources. Success depends on location, well defined resource, political trust, and internal support between disputing parties. Democratic Peace Theory - Posits that developed democratic states have greater propensity to negotiate with other democratic countries because of shared values and potential economic gain Discourse Analysis - Emphasizes language and how questions are framed as a measure to understand interstate cooperation Ecological Marginalization Theory -States that developed nations have an economic need to consider environmental decisions as the highest priority for a nation state. It is an economic incentive driven theory Epistemic (Network Analysis) - Incorporates science into policymaking processes and suggests that environment needs to be evaluated independent of other competing socioeconomic considerations. Geopolitical Theory - Holds that contiguous states are most vulnerable to environmental scarcity, which often results in conflict, but also could be an inducement to cooperate Global Governance Theory - Posits that multiple parties (domestic and international are needed to solve pressing environmental problems. Seeks to break down cross-cutting cleavages that often prevent cooperation Negotiation Theory - Traditional international relations based approach which suggests that bilateral negotiation often buttressed by neutral third parties is often viewed as the most effective way to foster interstate cooperation. Shared Incentives - A rational choice based approach where nations are induced to cooperate for perceived economic or psychological gain, even while other strident socioeconomic conditions remain unresolved. It is often linked to expanding the scope of negotiations to non-water linkages. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 228 Table 3.1. Research Design Model CENTRAL ASSUMPTIONS WATER SCARCITY WILL CONTINUE TO BE A PRESSING GLOBAL ISSUE INTERSTATE WATER ACCORDS REDUCE REGIONAL WATER SCARCITY RESEARCH QUESTIONS Q1. How are nation states able to overcome collective action problems to achieve interstate water accords? Q2. What factors make accords so resilient? INDEPENDENT VARIABLES - IMPACT LEVEL OF LEVEL OF COOPERATION IND. DEP. RANGE THEORIES Level of Cooperation • Common pool Social resource Economic BASED ON ACCORD • Shared incentives Environmental SCORING OF RATIFICATION High • Global governance Political A N D EQUITABLE WATER Cooperation • Ecological Geography DISTRIBUTION Modernization Culture Medium • Discourse Analysis History • Negotiation Values METHODS - QUANTITATIVE Cooperation • Democratic Peace Language Coercion AN D QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS • Geopolitical Shared values Low • Conjunctive Cooperation Management • Epistemic Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 229 Table 4.1. Regional Composite Scores Interstate Water Accords DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 1950-1999 Sign/Rat WaterOUANT 1950-59 Africa N=3 3 1.66 Eur/FSU8 2 N=9 2.4 2.1 NA N=1 3 3 ME N=3 2.33 1.66 1960-69 Africa N=1 3 3 South Asia N=1 3 3 Eur/FSU N=4 3 2.25 NA N=1 3 2 ME N=1 3 2 1970-79 South Asia N=3 2.66 2 Eur/FSU N=4 2.5 2.5 N/A N=3 2.66 1.3 ME N=1 3 3 1980-89 Africa N=3 3 2 South Asia N=4 2.75 2 Eur/FSU N=1 3 1 NA N=1 3 2 ME N=1 3 1 1990-99 Africa N=9 2.88 1.88 South Asia N=2 3 3 Eur/FSU N=2 2 1 ME N=4 2.25 1.5 FE N=3 3 2 SAM N=1 3 2 %Bilateral 81.2 %Multilateral 18.8 %Bilateral %Multilateral 75 25 %Bilateral %Multilateral 72.7 27.3 %Bilateral %Multilateral 70 30 %Bilateral %Multilateral 81.8 18.2 8 2 FSU means Former Soviet Union Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced w ith permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Table 4.2. Accord Rankings 1950-1999 Accords (1950-59) C Y ear Kwando Portugal, Great Britain A 1954 Doiran Greece, Yugoslavia Eu 1956 Niagara U.S., Canada N.A. 1950 Inari, Paatsjoki Finland, Norway, USSR Eu 1956 Oder Czechoslovakia, Poland Eu 195B Nile United Arab Emirates, Sudan A 1959 Araks, Atrak Iran, USSR As 1957 Yarmuk Jordan, Syria Israel, Jordan, Syria, ME 1953 Jordan Lebanon ME 1955 Mrzlek,Fontefredda Italy, Yugoslavia Eu 1957 Helmand, Afghanistan, Iran ME 1950 Gash Sudan, Eritrea A 1951 Drava Austria, Yugoslavia Eu 1954 Isar Austria, Bavaria Eu 1950 Danube Austria, Hungary Eu 1956 Oder Germany, Poland Eu 1952 #Parties NS S R NW M 3 B 1 1 B 3 M 3 B 3 B 3 B 3 B 3 R/S SW EW Avg. W DAvg. 2 5 2 3 6 3 6 2 5 2 5 3 6 2 5 M B B B B B B B 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 3 4 6 6 5 4 2.69 2.06 to t o \D Reproduced w ith permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Table 4.2. (continued) ACCORDS 1960-69 C Year Natural Waters/Iraq Iraq,Kuwait ME 1964 Roya Italy, France Eu 1967 Meuse Belgium, Netherlands Eu 1961 Rhine Austria, Germany, Switzerland Eu 1966 Maritsa Turkey, Bulgaria Eu 1968 Cunene Portugal, South Africa A 1969 Indus India, Pakistan SA 1960 Colorado M exico, United States N A 1966 ACCORDS 1970-79 C Year Konkama,Muonio,Tome Sweden, Finland Eu 1971 Iran-Iraq Iran, Iraq ME 1975 M oselle Luxemberg,Germ any Eu 1976 Lake o f the Woods U.S., Canada NA 1979 Wetlands Conservation Multiple Eu 1971 Ganges India, Bangladesh SA 1977 Lake Lanoux France, Spain Eu 1970 Ganges-Brahmaputra India, Bangladesh SA 1972 Kosi India, Nepal SA 1978 Colorado M exico, United States NA 1973 Colorado Mexico, United States NA 1972 #Parties NS S R NW SW EW R/S Avg. WDAvg. B 3 2 M 3 3 B 3 1 M 3 3 B 3 2 B 3 3 B 3 3 B 3 2 3 2.37 #Parties NS S R NW SW EW R/S Avg. WDAvg. B 2 3 B 3 3 M 3 3 B 2 1 M 2 1 B 3 3 M 3 3 B 3 1 B 2 2 B 3 2 B 3 1 2.63 2.09 230 Reproduced w ith permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Table 4.2. (continued) ACCORDS 1980-89 C Zamb. Zam, Bots, Zimb, Moz,Tanz. A Euph. Syria, Turkey ME Souris United States, Canada NA SA South Af., Swaz., Moz. A Frontier Bangladesh, India SA Frontier M oz., SA, Swaz. A Teesta India Bangladesh SA Frontier Bangladesh, India SA Ganges India, Bangladesh SA Danube Austria, European Comm. Eu R/S Year #Parties NS S R NW SW EW Avg. WDAvg. 1987 M 3 2 1989 B 3 1 1989 B 3 2 1983 M 3 2 1986 B 3 1 1983 B 3 2 1983 B 3 1986 B 2 1 1982 B 3 1987 M 3 1 2.9 1.8 to Reproduced w ith permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Table 4.2. (continued) ACCO RDS 1990-1999 C Orange Nam, SA A Orange South Africa, Lesotho A Okavango Ang, Bots, Nam A Halaha China, Mongolia FE Nile Egypt, Ethiopia A Maggio/Lamido Niger, Nigeria A Mekong Laos, Cam, Thai, VN FE Komati, Maputo South Africa, Swaziland A Curaeim Brazil, Uruguay SAM Jordan Israel, PA ME Yarmuk Israel,Jordan ME Komati, Maputo South Africa, Swaziland A Inkomati, Komati, Sabie Mozambique, SA, Swaz A Halaha China, M ongolia FE Walvis Bay South Africa, Namibia A Mahakali Nepal, India SA Ganges India, Bangladesh SA Desna FSU, Ukraine Eu Al-Asi, Orontes Lebanon, Syria ME Aral Sea Multiple AS Halaha China, Mongolia FE Tigres, Euphrates Turkey, Syria ME Year #Parties NS S R NW SW EV 1992 B 3 2 1999 B 3 1 1994 M 3 2 1994 B 3 3 1993 B 2 2 1990 B 3 3 1995 M 3 3 1992 B 3 2 1997 B 3 2 1995 B 2 1 1994 B 3 3 1992 B 3 2 1991 M 3 2 1994 B 3 1 1994 B 3 1 1996 B 3 3 1996 B 3 3 1992 B 2 1 1994 B 3 1 1995 M 3 1 1994 B 3 2 1998 B 2 1 2.81 W DA vg. 1.9 232 233 Table 4.3. Bilateral and Multilateral Results BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RESULTS Accords- WD 1950-59 % R/S AVG AVG B 81.2 2.7 2 M 18.8 2.6 2.3 Accords - 1960-69 B 75 3 2.16 M 25 3 3 Accords- 1970-79 B 72.7 2.6 2 M 27.2 2.6 2.33 Accords- 1980-89 B 70 2.9 1.85 M 30 3 1.33 Accords- 1990-99 B 81.8 2.8 1.88 M 18.2 3 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 234 Table 5.1. Paiehlina DOfiWSlii liia e l http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/Ted/ice/Gaza.html#r3 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 235 Table 5.2. Domestic Water Demand (2000/2020) Dornwric Wt r.e,' :k*iuar;iJ <.SCO O aOSO) http://www.american.edU/projects/mandala/Ted/ice/Gaza.html#r3 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 236 Table 8.1. Quantitative and Case Study Hypotheses Test Results HYPOTHESES QUANTITATIVE STUDY OSLO ACCORDS LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER TREATY ICPDR H, Supported N/A/ N/A N/A h 2 Mixed Supported Supported Not supported h 3 Mixed N/A N/A N/A h 4 Supported N/A N/A N/A h 5 Mixed Supported Not Supported Supported h 6 Supported Supported Not Supported Supported h 7 Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported Supported h 8 Not Supported Mixed Mixed Supported h 9 Not Supported Mixed Mixed Supported Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 237 Table 8.2. Theoretical Test Results THEORY HYPOTHESIS QUANTITATIVE STUDY OSLO LHWT ICPDR Conjunctive Management H, Not Supported Mixed Mixed Supported Common Pool Resource Theory h 5 h 6 Mixed Supported Supported Supported Not Supported Not Supported Supported Supported Democratic Peace Theory* N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Discourse Analysis* N/A/ N/A N/A N/A N/A Ecological Marginalization Theory h 7 Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported Supported Epistemic Community Approach h 8 Not Supported Mixed Mixed Supported Geopolitical Theory h 2 Mixed Supported Supported Not Supported Global Governance Theory H, Supported N/A N/A N/A Negotiation Theory h 3 h 4 h 5 h 7 Mixed Supported Mixed Not Supported N/A N/A Supported Not Supported N/A N/A Not Supported Not Supported N/A N/A Supported Supported | Shared Incentive h 7 Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported Supported *While these two theories were never tested, I discuss their importance in the suggestions for future research in the conclusion. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 238 APPENDIX B FIGURES Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 239 ■ -7-Forittal W ar |- ( r £ ) L ( m n c W ar Acts ■ *5^SroalN utle M ilitary Act* ■ I fu tile Acts ■ -J^DipltrnitititTiconomk Hostile Acts ■ -2-Stnm y/O nU iaJ Verbal H a l i t e ■ t-V lilU /fnuffk.hi Verbal Hostility □ l-N c u trii), Non-signilkunt Acts . 7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Oregon State University, 2003) X axis = response to water conflict, Y axis = Number of cases For the years 1948-1999, cooperation over water, including the signing of treaties, far outweighs overall conflict over water and violent conflict in particular. Table 3 displays the total number of events by the BAR Intensity Scale, with the dark bars indicating conflictive events and the lighter bars cooperative events. The lightest bar indicates neutral events. Overall the majority of events are cooperative. Out of 1,800 events, 28% are conflictive (507 events), 67% are cooperative (1,228), and the remaining 5% are neutral. Of the total events, two thirds represent verbal interactions, either mildly conflictive or cooperative. Figure 1.1. Water Conflict/Cooperation □ 1-MiU! Verbal SupgM trt E 2^0lliciai Verbal Support O JC altufat. Sckutifk Acreemmt/Suftport i Ecmt, Techno, indust Agrmnt E Military, Tenet*. Strategic Support i^lBterniiltQRal Water Treaty El THUaifi cation into One Nation Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 240 ■■ saltwater: ■ 07.5% ■ freshw ater: 2.5% 58.9% • locked to glaciers---------- 30.8% - groundwater — 0.3% - Jakes and rivers The amount of water on Earth is fixed. Less than 0.01% of the planet's 1.4 billion cubic kilometers is easily accessible freshwater in lakes and rivers. About a fifth of the water used worldwide comes from the 30% of the world's freshwater which is stored in groundwater. UNEP, 2000. Figure 1.2. Global Freshwater Availability Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 241 Estimated annual world water use R#s§ rvoir loss#* j 1900 1920 1940 1980 1960 2000 Y e a r S O M h E ; '. '. " K V '> The world's population has tripled in the last 100 years, but water use has increased six fold. A surge in water use in agriculture is responsible for a large part of the increase (UNEP, 2000). Figure 1.3. Soaring Water Use Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 242 (a) n s s s a E B n i i a o 2i:o . 1 : 3 3 A v b ; rag© Sufc - S ah sran Africar- U W ' 0 e o rrr*n e ncle d bas ic nrn m i s M i'S 'a g e E u r o p e a n A v e r a g e A-v 1 1 1 fill fig u re® r io 'ir o r ir I h re s p e r p e r s o n per day ^ C o p a u n ra p lia o d iffe rs , b e l w f s a E u r o p e a n c o ltfi'lrfe ® , r a n g i n g f r o m 2S© - S l>0 litres/day (b) ESTIMATE Q ANNUAL WORLD W ATER USE k r r p p e r w a r 1 020 1 Q 4 0 1 C # 6 € ) 1 S B C * 2000 Year Figure 1.4. (a) Water Use Around the World; (b) Estimated Annual World Water Use. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 243 APPENDIX C MAPS Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 244 Map 1.1. Future Scarcity Predicted water scarcity and stress in 2025 ■city SOUHCE; U N IS* An estimated third of the world's population currently lives in water-stressed countries. This is set to increase to two-thirds within 25 years. Africa and Asia are already hard-hit by water stress. Increasing populations will create more pressure in the coming decades. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 245 Map 1.2. Number of Agreements per International River Basin- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 246 Map 1.3. World Water Basins at Risk Iftrf'orfor l i&m <i;.j & 3 « n < Qj-sa i nsp ! I fiJ-S J 1 6 8 -0 3 T . f lU M **1 M s R ^ r f S & w r f & a s & m fM fe W j B m m u C M m Murray.Qrilria Ham AwnM Postel and W olf (2000) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Map 5.1. Mountain and Coastal Aquifers Mountain and Coastal Aquifers EGYPT Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 248 Map 6.1. ¥»** 0 M » f » : WW? t m n«r Leialhe http://www.southafrica.info/doing_business/economy/infrastructure/sa- lesothowaterproject.htm Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 249 Map 7.1. The Danube-River-Basin The Danube asm < }& *% * lU ( S w i t z e r l a n d lacedon'iai J T Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. "r ? t \V SLOVAKIA "S'** .'y » * > » < ? ■ , vy. u s I R I A . <» ■ “ ' J * - * ~*4*’ ‘ ' " > € « N n M s h * * . « » * N * ! f p S Iii^ K S iliB i I . - . ,. ' 'S k O V tN t* j - mm - ■ • ^ « « « w t . w ; »* , , : j ..; J f c . y asm R O M A N I A « • ! i . . «*,„■ " w s ; £ -y teas* ■ ' ||jg|g ■ " ' \ ■ • '' ' ' ,8^ fA * * " rZ" 'f0.vl«i '.- . V „ . iO S » A B E S S fe B * .'' ■ ' v \ « fft5 s < x ;v w » . N & :; g u e u n g O T , .. •; .»*•:• ' ■ -'•"• sw*j^- ' . . . ,:i>i .;. •■ / y w iiv .- " * v S ^ I I B i y ;y/V.. 7'“' • mm " ' v'*V '-. ./'•-' s b w ''^ '’-*'''" * • : -c , v , . y < ^1 ' • v '‘ ^ y „ _ < ___________________li; i u m __________________ http://www.grid.unep.ch/product/map/images/basin danubeb.gif Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

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Creator Gordon, Frederick D. (author)

Core Title Half empty or half full: Understanding early coordination strategy as a means to mitigate regional water scarcity

School Graduate School

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

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Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, international law and relations

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Kamieniecki, Sheldon (committee chair), Dekmejian, Richard (committee member), Mazmanian, Daniel (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-607511

Unique identifier UC11336409

Identifier 3220106.pdf (filename),usctheses-c16-607511 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 3220106.pdf

Dmrecord 607511

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Gordon, Frederick D.

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA