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From methodological eclecticism to ontological eclecticism: Bringing theory back into the study of politics

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From methodological eclecticism to ontological eclecticism: Bringing theory back into the study of politics

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Content FROM METHODOLOGICAL ECLECTICISM TO
ONTOLOGICAL ECLECTICISM:
BRINGING THEORY BACK INTO THE STUDY OF POLITICS
Copyright 2005
by
Wayne S. Le Cheminant
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLITICAL SCIENCE)
December 2005
Wayne S. Le Cheminant
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Dedication
Dedicated,
with love and everlasting appreciation,
to my family
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Acknowledgments
It is always difficult to pay proper and due respect to all those who are responsible
for an endeavor such as a dissertation. Obviously, there are many who have
influenced me for the good over the years, friends who have listened and suffered
through my inquiries, and mentors who have pointed me in the right direction.
There are, however, several who stand out and to whom I want to express my
never-ending gratitude. First, I would like to thank Dr. Ann Crigler. She has
always been a voice of enthusiasm for my work and has encouraged me
professionally. Dr. John “Jeb” Barnes has been an example of the kind of
professional and friend I hope to be to those who come across my path. His
critical eye, his unflagging willingness to listen to my ideas, and his keen mind
have all made this project better. Dr. Judith Grant is truly a mentor in every sense
of the word. I cannot express my appreciation for her kindness and her
willingness to help me along with my work. I have been fortunate to have a
dissertation committee that made the experience of writing a dissertation a labor
of joy rather than a labor of dread. My work has been much improved by the help
of my committee and many others. For its many weaknesses, the blame lies
entirely with me.
My family has also been critical in helping me to complete this project. My
children, Ian, Zoe, and Greyson have grown up in many ways while I have written
this and, hopefully, they have not suffered too much during my hours spent
iii
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writing. I must admit that I have learned a great deal from them during this time—
it is important to be dedicated but it more important to remember those who count
the most. And it is also important to play every now and then as well. To my
mother, who has inspired me in so many ways, go my thanks for teaching me that
I could accomplish what ever I set my mind to. I also appreciate ha- constant
enthusiasm, her unwavering love, and her never-ending support for my life’s
ambitions. My sisters, Sadie and Jessica, continued support and much appreciated
love for their “big brother” has meant the world to me. Lastly, I need to express
my undying love for my wife who has made my life important in so many ways
beyond my scholarly work. She has always had the kindness and graciousness to
see how important my work is to me and has thus allowed me, at great personal
sacrifice to herself, allowed me to indulge myself. For that, I will always be
thankful.
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Table of Contents
Dedication ii
Acknowledgments iii
Abstract vi
Chapter 1: The Study of Politics, Assumptions, and Eclecticism 1
Chapter 2: Methodological Eclecticism 43
Chapter 3: Rational Choice Theory and Rethinking Causality 70
Chapter 4: Looking at Ontology in Political Theory 10S
Chapter 5: Nussbaum and the Reconstruction of Human Nature 161
Chapter 6: Charles Taylor and Re-imagining the Polity 208
Chapter 7: The Possible Future for Theory in the Study of Politics 249
Bibliography 270
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Abstract
This dissertation explores several important problems that run across many sub
disciplines in the field of political science. First, there is the problem of whether theories
in political science can unify the field or whether theories are contextual. Second, there is
the problem of what the assumptions we use to discuss and analyze political phenomena
should be and how we should use these assumptions. Third, there is a tension between
competing methods and approaches in political science that seems to be irreconcilable.
These tensions lead to a lack of general applicability of theories in our study of politics.
There are those who claim that cultures are inviolate and must be the basis of any theory,
while others claim that rational choice methodologies provide a universal method for the
study of politics. I argue, for example, that we can use theories that rely on reason as a
basis for analysis and look at culture and normative commitments if we take into account
recent advances in areas such as cognitive science, affective intelligence, and
evolutionary biology.
I argue that incorporating these advances into our ways of studying politics will 1)
make our assumptions concerning human nature more accurate, 2) help to explain how
we can overcome some of the schisms that divide theorists and 3) helps to identify ways
in which the normative/ quantitative divide that separates many political scientists might
be overcome by re-evaluating our assumptions concerning political actors. 4) I examine
the work of Martha Nussbaum and Charles Taylor as a means to illustrate my findings.
Ultimately, debates surrounding how we use culture, how we understand differences
between various political groups such as differing nation-states and differing cultures,
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and how we determine to move forward with various policy decisions will depend in
large measure to the types of theoretical commitments we make before we begin our
investigations. My work is at the center of these crucial debates.
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Chapter One
The Study of Politics, Assumptions, and Eclecticism
The first key to wisdom is constant and frequent questioning, fo r by
doubting we are led to question and by questioning we arrive at the truth.
Peter Abelard
To understand is to perceive patterns.
Isaiah Berlin
This dissertation is about three important questions in political
science. The three questions are related to each other, though each is
important in its own right. The first question that we must ask is whether
there is a correct way to look at politics. By this, I mean is there one way
to examine political phenomena that is better than all of the other possible
ways.1 If there is one correct way to study politics then this would be the
start to a unified theory of politics since there would be criteria by which
one could judge one method or theory to be better than others. By most
1 See Manzer (2001) who argues the profession of political science used to have a more
expansive view of the study of politics that extended beyond method to the shaping ideas. It
is interesting to note that the idea that politics can be studied “scientifically” finds its roots as
far back as 1927. Rather than using our more modem terminology George E. G. Catlin wrote
that the study of politics is a matter of looking for and describing patterns, which he also saw
as the purpose of the natural sciences. He wrote, “Politics is concerned with a field of human
behavior characterized by the recurrence of specific behavior patterns. These peculiarly
political patterns, however, must not be treated simply as a series of incidents in mere
temporal juxtaposition. Human history must be studied as natural history and physical
phenomena have been studied, that is to say, with a view to the detection of a recurrence in
these patterns, and, hence, of a process in accordance with which, in given total situations,
given detailed behavior patterns recur” (255).
I use the term “unified theory” simply to indicate any method or theory that claims to hold
in all cases at all times. It must be both universally applicable and applicable over time. To
leave either one of these requirements unfulfilled is to state a theory that is merely contingent
1
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accounts, a “unified” theory is one that will get us to “truth.”3 Using the
natural sciences as an exemplar, this “best” theory would be the simplest
theory that also explains the greatest amount of phenomena. The question
about whether there is a currently a “correct way” to study politics is
based on the assumption that there could, in theory, be such a way. If there
is a best way to study politics, then if one is not using that method or
theory, then one is not really engaged in anything at all.4
Ruth Grant writes,
To political scientists, the perpetual disagreements among political
theorists and the repeated reconsideration of the same issues and texts are
indications that political theorists lack meaningful standards for assessing
what constitutes good research. And worse, they lack standards because
or specific to certain problems. One of the problems of a “unified theory,” in all cases, is the
well-known problem of requiring meta-languages to stand as the ground or foundation of a
particular theory. That is to say, any theory cannot account for itself and must rely on
external explanations that are, for lack of a better term, merely assumed. This is a problem
that is well-known to the early positivists and they, perhaps more than any group, sought to
find ways out of the problem. Some of the more illuminated minds who worked on various
aspects of this problem would be Ayer, Tarski, Russell, Quine, Wittgenstein and a host of
others. See Copleston’s A History of Philosophy, Vol. 8 (1994). See Williams’s (1992)
attempt to clear space for us to understand what is meant by the term unified theory.
J The term truth is highly problematic, which is one reason why many theorists, at least on
the quantitative side of things, eschew using it and have replaced it with terms so as
correlation. Despite the difficulty we have with the term, we must admit that advocating one
method over another, pushing a particular theory, carries with it the weight of assumptions
that hold the theory to be true. If that were not the case, then any old theory or method would
do. We can say, preliminarily, that truth, for most political scientists, is a theory that best
describes the world or most coheres to the facts that we call the world.
4 For example, at this point on time it makes no sense to discuss geocentric theories of the
universe, if one is attempting to explain what is “true” about the universe. It might be
interesting for historical purposes only, but most people do not see it as advancing any
significant knowledge. This is because most of us accept that the geocentric model of the
universe is incorrect. What is interesting is that most our literature in political science does
not have the term “truth” in the title of many articles outside of law related issues, such as the
South African truth and reconciliation committee, for example. However, this does mean that
the search for truth is not a central concern of ours. It simply means that we have taken many
of the epistemological issues for granted. There is a sense that truth is an historical concern,
one that we can examine with some interest insofar as our ancient brothers and sisters were
interested in it, but issues that we have mostly solved today.
2
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they have no idea what it would mean fo r research to progress in their
field. Political theorists, on their part, find their work evaluated by people
who believe that research must have a ‘cutting edge’ and that its aim is to
produce new knowledge, beliefs they often do not share. (577, my
emphasis)
In my work, I will emphasize that aspect that Grant notes that
theorists often do not share the belief that research is always best seen as
cutting edge. Theory in political science has lost its way because it has
forgotten the importance that it has played throughout the history of
political thought. I certainly cannot answer all of the questions that are
“out there” for political theorists or even provide a “new” method. I can, I
believe, point us down a path where we might better be able to evaluate
what constitutes good research for political theorists. At the very least,
theorists can realize that important role that they have always played in
evaluating moral claims and theories against political action. This path
begins with a reconceptualization of what it means to engage in political
theory as well as an understanding of where we have gone recently in
political theory.
The second question is this: if we are to arrive at a “best” method
or theory, what is the best way to get there? Should we combine theories
or practices in hopes of creating new theories? There are those who see the
history of thought as advancing from inchoate to more refined.5 According
5 Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy (1945), for example, is just such a work.
He argues that certain groups of people or thinkers had it “right” while others got it wrong.
3
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to this way seeing the world we are closer to the truth now than we used to
be in the past. This is clearly based, again, on the idea of linear progress
that political scientists have borrowed from the natural sciences. If the best
theory is not currently here, it is, in principle, possible to discover what
that theory is.6 It is still theoretically problematic to decide what the
criteria are for deciding which theory of two or more is the best theory. In
attempting to outline and describe the best theory we find the problem of
infinite regress creeping into our theoretical endeavors—we will never
know when and where to stop. That is to say, when it comes to
foundational criteria, deciding upon which points to rest our theories, there
is simply no way of arguing for one over the other in any decisive
manner.7
The third question that we will examine is whether there are any
assumptions or foundational points on which a study of politics can start
or be built upon. We will look into the possibility that are points of
agreement in the foundations of our theories upon which we can all agree.
Hegel, for example, is a thinker who did not help us move from the inchoate to the more
refined, though thinking like the positivists did, according to Russell, is a matter of making
progress.
6 This comes straight from the positivist school of thought, which is still very influential in
the social sciences. Comte, one the founders of this school of thought argued that knowledge
develops from theological to metaphysical (philosophical) to scientific (positive). The
advantage of the scientific knowledge, according to Comte, is that is a “precision of
knowledge.” Ultimately all social phenomena would come under the analysis of
mathematics. Comte argued that this would create a science of society or, even more
forcefully and one might wonder, considering Comte, somewhat anachronistically, a
“religion o f humanity.” See Comte (1993).
4
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However, I will argue that such agreement is impossible in the way we
have traditionally understood best paradigms or the most truth theory type
models of social science. I will argue that there are ways of looking at the
study of politics that are not seeking the traditional linear understanding of
truth but that still expand our understanding of politics. Part of this change
in emphasis will require that we see that the study of politics needs to be
ontologically driven as opposed to methodologically driven. Hopefully
what this means will become clear as we proceed, but in short what it
means is that we need to have an intimate awareness as to how the
assumptions we make drive the conclusions we derive from them. Implicit
in this position is that we will always have difficulty in coming to hard and
fast decisions as to what should count as an assumption, meaning a point
outside of argument upon which a theory rests.
The conclusions of this work are as follows: First, we see that
theory and the careful analysis of our assumptions is critical to the study
of politics. We cannot expect to have anything that resembles an
understanding of politics unless we are willing to revisit, justify, and
reexamine our assumptions and suppositions as we engage in trying to
make sense of the “facts” of the world. This means that we cannot relegate
the history of political theory and political practice as some anachronistic
7 One possible solution, as many in political science have done, is simply to be
“atheoretical.” One can claim to be using a method, rather than espousing a theory. This is
very problematic and will be discussed in a later chapter.
5
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practice. It means that in the study of politics, it is impossible to have a
value free investigation as the past and our assumptions—the
accumulation of the past that builds into a base for our perceptions and
beliefs—are always with us. It means that the assumptions that we use to
govern the study of politics always influences, infects, and shapes the
method or methods that we find reasonable to use. We also see that our
n
assumptions even help to determine outcomes.
This means that that the study of politics cannot be something that
can is studied “scientifically,” if by scientific we mean something that
emulates the natural sciences. While it might be admirable to want to
study politics as one would study microbiology or astronomy, it is
impossible.9 In this work I will discuss why this is the case; why the field
of politics is its own unique endeavor that does not necessarily need to
“emulate” other disciplines as it has its own unique contributions to
8 See Best (1995), Dallmayr (1997), Heineir (2001), Burr (2003), Hibberd (2005).
9 See Gerring (2001). He gives an in depth look at the divides and problems that face social
sciences today. In particular he pays attention to the divide that we have in the social
sciences about how best to approach this problem. Ultimately, he concludes, that we will not
be able to emulate, strictly, the natural sciences. He argues that we have come full circle,
meaning that our theoretical ambitions are now what they once were, and yet we are no
closer to solving any o f the problems that plague us. In an interesting article from 1930 Paul
Ward writes that we have come to accept Dewey’s pragmatism as a “matter of common
knowledge,” which is to say that “consciousness is conditioned by conflict. . . that
knowledge is the utilization in problematic situations ....” (49). He goes on to defend
Dewey’s idea that knowledge and methods are situation oriented. He writes, “Situations are
the stuff of which problems are made” (49). This work, after my discussion o f the need to
expand our conception of what we mean by ontology and the influence this has on outcomes,
is also a philosophical pragmatic account of political knowledge.
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make.1 0 There can be no value free, “natural science like” inquiry into
politics. This is because what counts as assumptions and even political
phenomena will always be contested. The study of politics and the
interpretation of politics is predicated on the idea of ontological
eclecticism. By this I mean that what counts as the foundation for our
theories and even our beliefs varies so widely that we must embrace this
condition as a fact of politics.
Second, in examining possible alternatives as to how one should
pursue the study of politics I argue that we cannot hope to examine simply
the methods from different sides of the theoretical aisle, as Robert Putnam
suggests.1 1 For example, if one is a quantitative methodologist, it will do
one no good simply to examine the works of qualitative methodologists,
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and vice versa, in order to get closer to an ideal method of study. In a
sense this is like being a sports fan—while one knows that there are other
teams in the league, one always cheers, sometimes irrationally, for one’s
own team against all hope. The games, the calls, the randomness of the
1 0 Borrowing ideas, methods, and resources from other disciplines is not the same as
emulating. Borrowing follows along the pragmatic route that I am arguing for—one finds
useful tools and uses them. When a tool doesn’t work, it is discarded for one that does.
Emulating another discipline means that one has to build one’s own discipline following the
same principles and rules.
1 1 See Putnam (2003).
1 2 See, for example, Eliasoph and Lichterman (1999). They make in interesting case for the
opportunities for cross-fertilization among the various methods. However, they admit that, in
the end, one has a different theory than the amalgamation with which one started. Michael
Buraway (1998) notes that “’history is not a laboratory experiment that can be replicated
again and again under the same conditions.’ There is no one natural law that best helps
observers decipher all social action across all times and places .... There is no final
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game will always be viewed through the lens of getting a bad call, the
events of the game will be seen as destiny, and so on. In other words, the
values and the assumptions of the viewer who is also a real fan will always
problematize the viewing of the game.1 3 In the same way, quantitative and
qualitative theorists each start their works with entirely different
ontological positions.1 4 In order to look at a work, in order to understand
it, one must be willing to accept the foundational points, the points for
which no arguments are given, in short, the ontology. If one is a rational
choice theorist, for example, then one accepts that individuals are rational
maximizers and that it is best to see individuals through this paradigm. If
one is a communitarian, then one believes that one must look at the social
aspects and context in which one lives in order to understand behavior.1 5
destination” (233). This work also contends that there are no final destinations, but there are
interesting places to which we can go that are, in fact, of more interest than other places.
L ’ This is a built-in understanding of games, which is why fans demand impartial referees in
order to ensure the integrity of the game. Even the promise of impartiality among officials
does not alleviate the fact that many fans see the calls of those officials as biased if the call
goes against their team.
4 There have been those, such as Adcock and Collier (2001) who attempt to construct the
beginnings of a way in which qualitative and quantitative research can be brought together.
They argue that concepts are operationalized through the assumed validity of observations
and measurements. However, the validity o f the measurement, in their estimate, has been
neglected. In their argument, they seek to bring qualitative and quantitative theorists
together. This is highly problematic in that by quantitative and qualitative it seems as it they
mean researchers who do formalized modeling versus theorists who do ethnographic type
research. The understanding of the term “qualitative” by many in the field has to include the
concerns of researchers whose work attempts to analyze the political arena through a clearly
constructed normative bias. Postcolonial studies, for example, would fall under this category.
1 5 It is not that I find rational choice theory to not be “useful,” since clearly it is. But the
problem with the term usefulness, for many rational choice theorists, is that it does not carry
with it the epistemological or ontological weight that it should. I also chose to comment on
various aspects of rational choice theory simply because of its axiomatic foundations that are
problematic in forming correct or useful concepts in discussing real political actors. See
Gould (1999).
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In both these cases, there is a differing ontological perspective, which are
mutually exclusive and which must be accepted without argument. In
other words, rational choice theory cannot provide the basis for
individuals as rational maximizers any more that communitarianism can
provide the basis that humans are best seen through a communal lens.
And, taking Putnam’s approach and simply examining the two, perhaps
trying to “combine” the approaches is a non-starter. If one does not accept
the belief that individuals are essentially unique according to their
cultures, then one will not be able to buy into identity theory. In other
words, varying theoretical positions, based on differing ontologies, bring
us to an intellectual impasse. However, we will see that Putnam is correct
at least in his big picture—there is much to be gained by the potential for
cross-fertilization, mixing methods, and examining the works of those
who we do not currently see as allies.1 6 Putnam is correct in his
admonition that we should examine the works of those of differing
theoretical disposition, but unclear as to the execution of such an endeavor
and he is incorrect as to what the results of this cross-fertilization will be.
We should not expect a more “true” way to look at politics but a different
1 6 There have been recent, and seemingly profitable attempts, to engage in a the work of
“cross-fertilization.” For example, see Michael Young (2001) and his attempt to use code
analysis, cognitive theory, and conceptual complexity—the three of which lie in various
degrees at various sides of the debate. Also Burawoy (1998) and his attempt at incorporating
theory that will account for the problems that positive science has in dealing with human
subjects is an interesting attempt at cross-fertilization.
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and, hopefully more interesting and more useful way to look at various
problems.
Third, I will also argue that changing the rules of the game or the
definitions of key concepts will also be inadequate in solving the rifts of
political science and in answering the questions that I am putting forth
here. For example, some theorists, such as Henry Brady, have argued that
since the concept of causation is problematic, we should redefine what we
mean by causation.1 7 This project might be worthy on its own account; it
is quite possible that causation is understood poorly by political theorists
1 f i
and that the citizenry of political systems misunderstand it. Changing the
causation paradigm is to change the game but it does not explain the
variety of games that are out there. For example, one could change the
cause of winning a baseball game to scoring touchdowns, throwing passes,
defending one’s goal line, playing defense by tackling the opposition and
so forth, but it does not take one long to realize that one is no longer
1 7 While Brady has written a number of important articles, the one that I am most interested
is his 2000 article “Contributions of Survey Research.” In this article, he attempts to make
the case that surveys are far more than a mere amalgamation of numbers. In other words,
they do not merely describe. Instead, Brady argues, “Just as creative uses of telescopes,
microscopes, and sensors can take advantage of serendipitous naturally occurring events,
new survey designs can assess the causes and impacts of events such as debates, scandals,
speeches, elections, coups or revolutions that occur during the course of a survey project”
(47). Still, as Brady points out, “Collecting a lot of data . . . does not make a science” (49).
The data must still be connected to theory. The way in which causation must be conceived in
order for our theory to make sense of survey research is that it must approximate the
experimental method. Also, in another very real sense, causation, in Brady’s model, does not
necessarily mean X causes Y, but something like there is a good fit between variables,
dependent and independent.
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playing baseball, but football instead. In other words, one is simply
playing a new game and has not properly thought out the possible ways in
which various games intersect and separate from each other. To change
causation, as most theorists who have taken this line have done, is to say
that the causes of events are more complex than we had once thought.1 9
Fourth, I will argue that each theory carries will it ontological
assumptions about the nature of the world and the political actor. I make
the argument that various explanations throughout the history of political
philosophy have always been based on a worldview that is not necessarily
negotiated, argued for, or defended beyond the fact that the assumptions
work for a theory. If one assumes, for example, that humans are utility
maximizers or aggressive by nature or pacifistic by nature and if one can
then find some evidence to support any particular hypothesis that one
holds, then theorists usually claim that their hypothesis is correct. What
we should do when there are conflicting hypotheses that seem to have
1 8 There are many works that deal with the ways in which “average” citizens misunderstand
cause, effect, consequences, and the like. See, for example. Glasner (1999), Corey Robin
(2004), and Walton (2000).
191 believe that thinkers such as Brady realize this, but they still work within the boundaries
of the quantitative tradition. Thus, finding ways to tinker with the concept of causation so
that it will fit the ontology that goes with the quantitative tradition, as is best reflected, I
think, through rational choice theory, is the ultimate result of Brady’s shift.
2 0 See Ward (1995) for his discussion in chapter three of everydayness and Heidegger’s
conception of Dasein. Also, see Dallmayr’s interesting discussion of why we should even
pay attention to ontology in political thought. Dallmayr writes, “Heidegger’s work emerges
as an attempt at a radical philosophical reorientation—a reorientation, it is true, complicated
by the prevailing concealment of philosophical reflection either into logical technique or into
ideological doctrines or Weltanshauungen” (206-7). He continues that Heidegger’s
reorientation and emphasis on ontology emerges as a “restorative conception of political
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some evidence for it is a problem that we have not yet figured out how to
overcome. I argue that we will never overcome this problem because
differing ontologies, by definition, are not reducible to one another. One
might argue, to use a crude example, that humans are both aggressive and
pacifistic. Or, perhaps one might argue that humans are aggressive in time
X and pacifistic in time Y. But the fact that we will find many examples
that do not fit this is problematic. Saying that humans are both at any time,
in the example just given, is like saying nothing at all. According to the
laws of thought, as Bertrand Russell describes them, this is impossible
t
since something cannot be both A and not A at the same time. Likewise,
saying that humans are aggressive at time X and passive at time Y, is to
say that there are infinite number of situations, in which humans may
behave one way rather than another. This is not a theory unless we want to
accept as a theory that all things are possible but we have to wait until
after an event to see what might happen. The fact that theories carry with
them ontological assumptions is highly problematic because there is little
we can do, at least theoretically, to show which assumptions are the best
theory” that is “nontraditional” leads to postmetaphysical freedom (207). And, of course, one
should examine Heidegger (1962).
2 1 To be clear, one might claim that one can be both warlike and peaceful, but simply at
different times. However, we must remember that the claim goes to what are humans by
nature. One cannot be, by nature, if such a nature can be said to exist, both warlike and
peaceful in the same way that one cannot be both genetically Bob and Steve at the same time.
If we want to redefine what we mean “by nature,” that is fine with me, but that is not what
many theorists do because nature is always taken as an irreducible starting point that is also
non-relativistic.
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for explaining political behavior without simply falling back to common
O ' )
sense or finding theory confirming data.
Ultimately I will pose various questions that will show that
ontologically we need to accept a pragmatic version of the study of
politics and that we need to pay particular attention to the role that
language plays in our study of politics.2 3 There are two reasons why
language must be considered crucial in our study of politics. Louis Pojman
articulates the first reason. He writes that humans use language to
communicate, settle disputes and start conflicts. He continues by arguing
that “politics is the art or process of using words to organize people into
groups, to create institutions that further our interests, to invent rules of
behavior that embody our values and can guide our actions” (xiii). We
cannot pretend that our political processes are somehow just facts without
background or histories. It is the process of language, itself, and its
meaning that organizes all of our political processes. It is worthy to ask the
question as to why some language or arguments work more at convincing
us than other arguments do. As Pojman writes, “It [language] is a vital
process that distinguishes us from all the other animals and sets us apart as
2 2 The best we can hope for is to say that there is some evidence that points to one
ontological position over another. However, this is also backwards in that foundations are
supposed to support the conclusions of our arguments. If we use the conclusions of our
arguments—the evidence we give to advance a position, then we are being circular. This
might be inevitable, but it is something to which most theorists do like to admit.
2 3 In particular we will see in the last chapter how various cognitive scientists and political
theorists who take this work seriously are renegotiating this territory.
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homo linguisticus. Through linguistic behavior, we enter into contracts
and devise rules to govern groups, nations, and eventually all human kind”
(xiv). This concern brings us back to the central endeavor of this work
which is a concern for how should we best study politics and the role that
our foundations or ontologies play in that endeavor.
The second reason that language is important is because of the role
it plays in its interactions, both as a result and as a cause, with our brains.
Many theorists conceive of language as strictly rational or as calculating
or as “value-free” or as adhering to the laws of thought. This is a highly
problematic view of language. We will see that much of what we believe,
cognitively speaking, is actually a product of emotion.2 4 It might be the
case that using the sciences of the brain, in particular cognitive science,
could be the start of a “new/different” ontology that will be extraordinarily
productive in helping us move beyond the crass quantitative/ qualitative
divide that often, though not always, characterizes political science. The
fact that we can base some of our understanding on human nature—one of
the time tested tropes of political science to justify a particular ontology—
on more empirical evidence than the anomalous and precarious nature of
political conflict will be a great boon for political thinkers. We will also be
able to expand the tent of our discipline as we see that long forgotten areas
such as emotions, language, ideology, and the like all play a role in
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helping us to develop, biologically speaking, our political beliefs and
attitudes. In other words, to look across the concepts that often divide the
discipline of political science, that define what “type” of study we are
engaged in, what causation means and the like, we will need to open up
the possibility of using new tools, concepts, and assumptions in our
toolkit.
This work will proceed on the following lines. Chapter 2 will
examine the possibility of methodological eclecticism—the use of a wide
variety of methods without a strict concern as to the foundational
compatibility of the methods—as a way of bridging the methodological
and theoretical divide that we are currently experiencing in the study of
politics. Ultimately I conclude that methodological eclecticism alone,
absent an examination of foundations, our ontology, will be insufficient.
Chapter 3 looks at the possibility of changing our concept of causality as a
way to save strictly empirical and quantitative studies from the possibility
of having them rendered as trivial. In this chapter we will also look at
some of the causal and ontological claims that rational choice theory
makes. I make the claim that changing how we conceive causation is also
insufficient in helping us in determining how best to study politics.
Likewise, I determine that rational choice theory also has various
weaknesses that it cannot overcome. However, by “overcome” I mean this
2 4 For this claim, which I make in the last chapter in ways to explore new avenues for
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simply in the sense that some might try to elevate it to “the” method of the
study of politics, which is also a reflection of “truth.” How ontology
infects or is prior to any methodological claim is the topic of Chapter 4 .1
will do this by examining, as something of a case study, how several
thinkers at various points in political history have made arguments for
their political systems based on either historical or ahistorical ontological
assumptions. I argue that the case can be made that these assumptions led
to the outcomes of their ultimate positions, of how they saw necessary
political structures. But the assumptions that they make are often
problematic and, as all assumptions are, not argued for.
There are those who might argue that I am calling for the end of
the possibility that we can study politics “scientifically.” That is true if by
scientific we mean mirroring the natural sciences. For the social sciences
to attempt to mirror the natural sciences has always been a fool’s errand
and it is one that diminishes the achievements of our discipline. Consider
that political scientists, for example, have the group of theorists who are
best equipped to understand power and its use in the polity. The problem
of power, its uses, its abuses, and how to deal with it could not be a
problem with more universal relevance. I argue that political science needs
to stop worrying about coming up with universal answers, but needs to
emphasize, discuss, and study how it is that the questions it asks seem to
political theory, I rely mostly on the work of others.
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be universal—power and the polity extends through all times and has been
a problem in all cultures. The term “scientific” is poorly theorized in
political science and, to be honest, is not a foremost concern for most of us
anyway. Most of us are concerned with our studies showing something
interesting based on the assumptions that we do make. In Chapters 5 and
6 ,1 argue that we can see Martha Nussbaum’s and Charles Taylor’s work
as emblematic as the type of political theorizing that I have in mind. They
are able to take a variety of methods into account while examining
questions that have been of universal concern in order to create something
new. Whether their work is “scientific” is beside the point. They show
something interesting, something that is useful, and something that
advances our understanding of politics. Their “method” is a continual mix
of ontological visits with scrutiny of their ways of examining the problems
at hand.
In Chapter 7 ,1 conclude with some of the reasons why we should
accept this pragmatic ontological position concerning our methodological
possibilities. In this chapter, I explore the possibilities of how affective
reasoning and cognitive science might be used as alternatives to the
foundations and assumptions that we have used to this point. I take
seriously the idea that we should start our arguments in the study of
politics from the most correct assumptions possible. Political scientists
2 5 In other words, most of us are actually methodological pragmatists, though such an
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continue to use old and worn assumptions. For example, we know, using
Hobbesian assumptions about human nature, that the reason why we need
states is so that we can organize ourselves against the violence that we
would certainly experience if we were left to our state of nature; wherein
life is nasty, brutish, and short. Of course, asking Rousseau one would find
out that humans are in fact, by nature, peaceful and docile and it is society
that has corrupted us rather than having protected us. There is nothing
inherent in either the assumptions or the outcomes of the work of either
thinker that will answer “definitively” who is correct and who is not.
There seems to be evidence for both sides and there is nothing
“transcendent” will determine which side is best.
I am making a well-worn argument that any discipline that claims
or seeks to proceed scientifically should do so in the most time-honored
fashion—assumptions upon which theories are based need to be not only
elegant, but also empirically sound. And even as I call for political science
to not worry about mirroring the natural sciences, building upon well
thought and examining assumptions is important for any discipline. The
discipline of political science has taken elegance over empirical soundness
at times and it is time, as Putnam, Brady, and others have advocated, to re
examine how we investigate within our discipline.
admission is difficult to make for many for a variety of reasons.
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I propose that we are taking the wrong track. What is needed, more
than the sort of methodological eclecticism for which Putnam argues or
reconstituting our conceptual framework as Brady advocates, is a deeper
understanding that any formulation of a theory carries with it ontological
baggage. And these differing ontologies are, in actuality, different
worldviews that are incompatible with other worldviews. For the purposes
of this work, I mean the following by ontology: an ontology is a
systematic account of existence. The term differs from epistemology in
that epistemology deals with how we can know about what there is to
know. The reason why I use the term ontology for this work is because
ontologies are generally seen as settled when one uses the term. In other
words, one can start from various assumptions, whatever those may be, to
give a systematic account of how things are. In recent parlance, the term
worldview has acted as a proxy for the term ontology. I prefer the term
ontology because it implies a more strict adherence to the assumptions that
lead to the various conclusions to which we come. Worldview seems to
signify, or has signified, at times, a sort of superfluity that allows holders
of worldviews to change them at will. Ontologies are stubborn. This is one
2 6 There are several very instructive accounts of recent work in epistemology. These works
examine epistemology from a broad philosophical perspective. See Audi (2003) and see Sosa
(1999).
2 7 Nagel famously argued that ontology or the perspective from which we generally seen the
world is the view from nowhere (1989). In other words, we have usually seen ontologies as
ahistorical and needed to be a map for omniscient observers. However, recent work, such as
Hacking (2002), show that ontologies are famously slippery and rest upon historical shifts.
Randall Collins makes a similar argument in tracking intellectual lineage. See Collins (2000).
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of the reasons why different ontologies clash violently, with one side
proclaiming the other to be incoherent.2 8
For the remainder of this chapter, I want to make the case as to
why we need what I am calling ontological eclecticism.2 9 Before this is
written off as relativism in different clothing, first let me say that there is
nothing incompatible with the search for theories or laws that are scientific
and the postulate that the social sciences might be impervious to law-like
theories that emulate the natural sciences.3 0 It might be the case that the
drive to find the universal theory in the social sciences will have positive,
unintended consequences, even if it is impossible to achieve its final
2 8 See Huntington (1996) and Barber (1996).
2 9 By this I mean that we recognize that intractable nature of ontologies, but that we also
recognize that there is no point from which one can ultimately prove one to be false using a
differing set of assumptions. Obviously, one can show that a conclusion using a particular set
of assumptions is wrong.
~ ’° See Kuhn (1996). The emphasis that many place on Kuhn’s work is that science progress
along the lines of paradigm shifts. While this is an interesting claim, it is not the most
important aspect of his work. In my mind, the most important element of his work is that
there are often competing paradigms and unless there is convincing evidence that one
paradigm is correct—it is the one the explains the most phenomena with the fewest
anomalies—then the competition goes on. The next most important claim is that “normal”
science can only take place in an environment where there is an accepted theory that allows
the workers to proceed. We have yet to find anything like this in the social sciences. Kuhn
writes, “If science is the constellation of facts, theories, and methods collected in current
texts, then scientists are the men who, successfully or not, have striven to contribute one or
another element to that particular constellation. Scientific development becomes the
piecemeal process by which these items have been added, singly and in combination, to the
ever growing stockpile that constitutes scientific technique and knowledge.. . . Concerned
with scientific development, the historian then appears to have two main tasks. On the one
hand, he must determine by what man and at what point in time each contemporary scientific
fact, law, and theory was discovered or invented. On the other, he must describe and explain
the congeries of error, myth, and superstition. That have inhibited the more rapid
accumulation of the constituents of the modem science text” (1-2).
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goal—a universal, unified theory.3 1 Also, the claim for ontological
eclecticism does not mean that there is no truth or that anything goes. We
can make assertions about behavior, institutions, policy outcomes, and the
like and we can give evidence to back up our assertions. What we cannot
make a claim to is a universal theory or method, which is to say that this is
the only way in which one might examine this case.3 2
There are some other practical benefits to the ontologically eclectic
worldview that I am positing. First, this position allows us to look beyond
some of the more superficial differences that often accompany the debates
between competing schools of methodology. Second, it allows us to put on
hold the question as the ultimate nature of truth insofar as it concerns
politics, political structures, ideologies, etc. Third, we can now look at
theories based on whether or not they provide useful descriptions. Fourth,
we realize that it is important and should be taken as an imperative to be
creative in trying to analyze and solve problems in the political world.
3 1 Many would argue that the vastly improved use and understanding of quantitative tools in
the social sciences is just such as result.
To use a simple example, holding an ontological perspective that allows for horses with a
single horn on their heads does not make it so. I am not arguing for a possible-worlds theory.
We can discount unicorns from any discussion because there is no evidence, other than our
imagination, that allows for their existence. We can just as easily speculate for a horse with
wings—a pegasus. And we can add to this list infinitely. Holding to ontological eclecticism
does not mean that we are going to allow the political unicorn and pegasus to the table. What
it means is that we admit that any one theory that seems to be backed by evidence cannot
account for why it is correct over another theory. Instead of coming to an impasse, it is better
to allow this to broaden our understanding of politics and see where this might lead us. In
other words, this will, hopefully, allow us to remove some of the methodological blinders
that too often accompany our studies.
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This encourages sharing, reading across disciplines, and novel ways to
look at the problems of and in political science. It allows us to follow
Putnam’s admonition to be both rigorous and insightful. My intention is
not to refute any competing theory completely but to weaken them enough
to clear philosophical space where we can breathe and grow. Certainly this
will open me up to criticism, but it seems that the possible benefits of
looking at our discipline anew, to whatever small degree that I am able to
contribute to this effort, is worth sticking one’s neck out for.
This debate has been bubbling under the surface of various
disciplines for years, but one could say that it began when the physical
sciences seemed to make rapid and startling progress in describing
phenomena and the social scientists of the early 20th century were left
scratching their heads.3 4 The early call was to advocate that the social
sciences should be positive, empirical, and should be based on sound
3 3 To me this seems obvious that this is something that we should do in the study of politics. I
suppose that we attempt to come up with answers to problems that are truthful, but this does
not mean that they necessarily point to an absolute truth, nor is it necessary that they do so.
3 4 For a great account of the early 20th century debates concerning the nature of science, the
possibility of truth, and how one might best account for the differences in “success” in
formalizing study between the natural sciences and the social sciences see Michael Friedman
(1999). The most interesting claim that Friedman makes is that knowledge, as seen by the
positivists prior to 1930, did not follow the strict verificationism that we usually ascribe to it.
Rather, knowledge was seen as holistic. For example, Friedman writes, “While unobservable
‘transcendent’ entities (atoms, electrons, the electromagnetic field) are not intuitable or even
picturable, this does not prevent them from being conceptualizable and knowable.
Knowledge and conceptualization do no require experience or intuitive representation, but
only a relation of coordination or designation between concepts and objects” (20). I see my
own project as fitting this later category of knowledge conception. The types of work that we
usually consider to be “qualitative” are just as “linkable,” if not more so I’d argue because of
the qualitative theorists willingness to examine her assumptions, between concepts and
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theoretical assumptions. Later came those who attempted to show the
weaknesses and inadequacies of behavioralism, positivism, and other
philosophical justifications for empirical approaches to the study of
politics.3 5 However, it also became clear to many that ideology, political
philosophy, culture and the like is not sufficient to account for all political
behavior. The debates that have ensued over the last 100 years should
give us pause and make us realize that the study of politics, and society in
general, is neither wholly empirical or ideological, though this does not
necessarily point us in the direction that we should go.3 6
The recent Perestroika movement in political science, which I will
discuss in more depth in the next chapter, reflects both ontological and
epistemological divisions within the discipline. I suggested above that
these movements are divided along different trajectories. Often these
trajectories are seen as quantitative versus qualitative. This
characterization reflects the epistemological division. The ontological
objects than most quantitative work, which is often a discussion of the link between
axiomatic assumptions and data. See also Lewis (1988), Simon (1958), and Hartung (1945).
’5 See Sinha (1963), Miller (1972), and Leiter (2001). Each shows different areas in which
positivism was reconsidered. Of course, one can consider or read the entire existentialist,
phenomenological, poststructural, and postmodern philosophical movements as efforts to
move beyond and criticize the basic assumptions and findings of positivism.
3 6 To recount to vast literature that deals with this is impossible. In a very real sense, one can
read the history of 20th century social thought and philosophy as an argument between those
who are at their base quantitative theorists (empiricists, positivists, etc.) versus those who are
qualitative theorists (postmodern, postcolonial, holists, etc.). Moreover we see that this
debate has been engaged, often with great passion and disastrous results as reputations and
academic careers have often been the road kill as a result of standing on the wrong side of an
inquiry, in most of the disciplines in the humanities. And even disciplines that are supposedly
more rigorous, such as economics, has gone through some rethinking as well. See, for
example, Strober (1994) and Macdonald (1995).
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division, however, is best reflected in the understanding that the
assumptions that we make in political science are either historical or
ahistorical.3 7 The quantitative side of the divide typically is characterized
as operating from assumption about actors that are ahistorical. By this, I
mean that the quantitative side sees itself as arguing from assumptions that
can be applied to actors from any historical period or political context. The
most common metaphor for this universal, ahistorical assumption is that of
the self-interested actor. A self-interested actor is simply another way of
saying “human being,” in this case the human being is ahistorical in nature
and that has certain characteristics, the most important or predominant one
being that the individual is self-interested. The qualitative side sees its
assumptions as historically contingent.3 8 This means that actors, behaviors
and the assumptions that we make about them is largely dependent on
context and their environment. This side of the divide argues that we must
look at the environment, culture, and customs in order to understand why
people behave the way that they do. Each “unit” of analysis is irreducible
to one another and unique.
I argue that this divide—a generalization, yes, but still emblematic
of our discipline and the political theorizing that anchors much of our
work—is a false choice. Putnam’s call to methodological eclecticism is
3 7 There are actually many ways that we could look at the ontological assumptions—rational
versus irrational, aggressive versus peaceful human nature, self-interested versus culturally
motivate behavior, etc.
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the start down a path that we need to travel. However, the ultimate
destination needs to be to what I am calling ontological eclecticism. This
means that we understand that a wide array of theories, methods, and
worldviews are valuable in helping us to understand politics. Certainly,
there are some theories that are better than others, and I will discuss how
we can tell the difference in the last chapter. However, at this point, I think
that it is more profitable to concern ourselves with how we can open up
the narrow spaces in which theorists often confine themselves.
First, we should always be willing to start with new assumptions,
especially if it becomes clear that one set of assumptions is better than the
ones we currently hold.3 9 While it might seem that this is a call to start
from the beginning, it is not. I argue that this is a way to look at some of
the trends—Putnam’s call to eclectic use of methodology, Brady’s attempt
to redefine causation, the seeming limits of rational choice theory, the
purported relativism of postmodern thought—so that we might understand
3 8 See Best (1995).
3 9 See, for example, Cochran (1973) argues that some thirty years ago political theorists were
interested in general theories, as they still are, but they had not taken into account,
sufficiently, the assumption of what he calls the “politics of interest.” He also argues for the
limitation of what we can expect in regards to having political theory that resembles the
natural sciences. See also Harbold and Hitchner (1958) who also make early arguments about
the need to examine our assumptions of political methodology. Of course, one can
reasonably argue, as I have pointed out, that the entire postmodern movement is a critique
and a re-examination of our assumptions. The problem with using the language of the
postmodernists, at least for my work, is that they are operating already from a different
ontological starting point than those whom they criticize. Thus, how to reexamine
assumptions is not taken as problematic by postmodernists, just that we need to re-examine
our assumptions.
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how we can see anew these trends and what they might mean for further
study.
There are many ways to look at the theoretical problems that we
now have. For example, one could argue that the quantitative/ qualitative
divide largely mirrors the ahistorical/ historical divide. It might be the case
that this divide, in either case, cannot be synthesized. There seems to be
nothing wrong, either intuitively or empirically, with holding that actors
are products of history as well as that there is something universal about
them. However, we have thus far undertheorized this possibility. I will
attempt to move into area of exploration and provide a glimpse into what
might be called a third way of looking at the methodological divide that
troubles the study of politics.
A strong case can be made that the pursuit of philosophical truth
has always been an eclectic endeavor. Though philosophers usually bandy
the term “truth” about when discussing their project, there are so many
variations, so many conclusions, so many methods that one can rightfully
wonder if philosophers over time and in different areas of the world are
even engaged in the same project.4 0 It is difficult to argue that Socrates
4 0 For a fascinating discussion on this problem see Collins (2000). As Collins points out,
many intellectuals feel that their work belongs “to a realm which is peculiarly elevated” (19).
However, Collins gives a fascinating refutation of this idea. He argues that “all events take
place in a here-and-now and particular. . . . A situation is just the interaction of conscious
human bodies, for a few hours, minutes, or even micro-seconds; the actor is both less than
the whole situation and larger, as a unit in time which stretches across situations.. . . The
whole of human history is made up of situations. No one has ever been outside of a local
situation; and all our views of the world, all our gathering of data, come from here” (20). So,
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and Russell are even engaged in the same project, except for the fact that
we put them both in the philosophy tent. Montesquieu and Rawls can
hardly have the same idea of truth in mind when they write about social
organization. We could compare and pit philosopher one against another
ad infinitum. This paper will cover several key ideas that will be helpfiil
not only in how we conceive of the practice of political science, but how
we actually practice it. While philosophy in general and politically
philosophy, specifically, is littered with many calls to start anew, I argue
that looking more closely at ontology will hopefully give us a fresh
perspective.4 1
Traditionally, theorists have not been method driven, but have
been driven by metaphysical/ ontological commitments. Ontology has a
rather colorful history as a philosophical term. Some note that it was a
term that was developed more extensively by writers in the 17th century.4 2
Writers from this period such as Kant used the term “ontology” to discuss
the general properties of things and this was meant to be in
if Collins is correct, then it is seemingly very difficult to make the claims that philosophical
pursuits, especially political philosophy, are pursuits of the “truth.”
Consider that from the beginning—Socrates and Plato—that philosophy has always argued
that we need to start again. There are many famous examples beyond this—Augustine’s City
o f God as a defense o f new Christian philosophy versus pagan ideas, Descartes’ call to doubt
the concepts that have accumulated and led us to somewhere besides truth, Hegel’s method
that would bring us to absolute truth once and for all, Heidegger’s destruktion of the
metaphysical tradition, the positivist’s attempt to ground philosophy in empiricism and
logical principles stand out as just a few examples. Each thinker sought to start anew and
made the claim this was an important part of the project.
4 2 See MacIntyre (1972).
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contradistinction to spiritual things.4 3 Heidegger attempted to start his
philosophical investigations by famously proclaiming that we have
forgotten the question of the meaning of being.4 4 According to Heidegger
the most important of questions is why is there something rather than
nothing. In the current vernacular, the term ontology has fallen from grace.
For most of philosophy’s history the term ontology and metaphysics have
been interchangeable. Metaphysics is also seen as the investigation into
the nature or structure of reality. This might be a slight shift from
ontology, which, as I pointed out, usually means the general properties of
things. Whether one wants to use a terms that generally points to the
general properties of things or to the structure of reality, it is the same for
my purposes. Perhaps one reason why both terms are typically avoided is
due to the brutal war waged against these terms by the positivists. Starting
with A. J. Ayer and Bertrand Russell the terms came to signify that which
stands for nothing. Metaphysical statements were considered to be
cognitively meaningless because they are empirically non-verifiable.4 5
Quine then took up the task to show the problematic nature of metaphysics
4 3 See Kant (1999) and Kant (1998).
4 4 See Heidegger (1962). Heidegger writes, in a passage the influences the entire postmodern
tradition, “For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the
expression ‘being.’ We, however, who used to think we understood it have now become
perplexed. Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the
word being? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning
of Being” (4). Unfortunately, Heidegger was never able to answer the question, nor will I.
However, I hope to give a small contribution to how ontological concerns can and still do
drive much of our political theory.
4 5 See Copleston (1985), in particular vol. VIII, pp. 425-509.
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and whether it is meaningless in light of the possibility that perhaps only
science provides us with any real knowledge.4 6
In a very real sense, the behavioralists took up an argument similar
to this. Since we cannot observe or collect data concerning ideology or
beliefs, a researcher should simply observe the behavior of actors.
Likewise, any explanation or description of behavior should be made
subject to empirical testing 4 7 Of course, the problem of testing has an
aspect of a vicious circle that is a well-known objection to strict empirical
standards of testing.4 8 The objection goes something like this: if the only
meaningful statements are statements that can be verified empirically, how
can I even verify this statement? There have been attempts to dig out of
this quandary. However, most of the justifications for the use of empirical
data is intuitive or common sense, rather than being justified through any
verifiable means. As social scientists, we are interested in why people do
what they do, how and why they are motivated to behave as they do, how
they organize, and the like. However, something that we must also
recognize is that thinkers generally argue for these goals based on some
assumed ontological position. One could argue that this ontology leads to
some type of method which, in turn, leads to some normative goals. As we
shall see I chapter four, many thinkers have assumed an ontology that
4 6 See Quine (1964) and (1977).
4 7 See Sanders (1995).
4 8 See Beardsley (1977) and East (1968).
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assumes human nature to be either historical or ahistorical. This does not
mean that thinkers are not influenced by others, in the sense that there is a
temporal aspect to their thinking. What it does mean is that their thinking
represents an ontological snapshot of time.
This work is an attempt to build on many of the key insights of our
time—from the usefulness of various methods to the understanding that
identity theory gives us. However, we must recognize that one of the key
questions that we need to ask ourselves is whether the best way to do
political science is one that starts from the most accurate description of the
state of things possible (metaphysics) or one that derives the best
predictions possible (method). In a perfect world one would work from the
most accurate description of the state of things, that also yields the most
reliable and best predictions. However, this rarely seems to be the case. It
is still undecided if this is because it is likely not possible—a position that
I agree with—or that we still are not sophisticated enough in our
methodology—a position many methodologists hold.4 9
4 9 In important paper, Larry Laudan argues that the philosophy of science has traditionally
been divided into two clear components: conceptual foundations and methodology. Laudan
makes the argument that methodology is relevant in both its practical use and for its
explanatory power. See also Sloep (1993). There is also a great deal of literature that
attempts to bring methodology to the forefront in an attempt to shore up weak conceptual
foundations. For example, see Braumoeller and Goertz (2000) who make the argument that
the concept of necessity while implied in much of the political science literature is never
explicitly linked to empirical evidence. Likewise, Sylvan and Majeski (1998) explicate a
methodology of how counterfactuals can be justified for the study of politics if we take into
account modal logic and the semantics of possible worlds. While I find these works to be
intriguing, they do gloss over the feet that what they are really doing is setting up a new
ontology from which researchers can start their explanations of the world.
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First, we see from the historical examination that we will go through
that there are seemingly as many metaphysical positions as there are
political thinkers.5 0 And since each theory carries with it its own criteria
for success, the problem of determining which theory is better than
another is inherent in the explication of any theory. In other words, if one
were given the choices between identity theory and rational choice theory,
for example, there is really no definable or sure-fire way to determine
which is the best. Each theory carries with it the criteria for what counts as
successful. Each investigator carries with her the normative goals and
aspirations of her study. The problem is seemingly futile. Of course, the
various criteria that exist forjudging the success of a theory—
falsifiability, looking at best outcomes, best fits, correlation, and the like—
seems to indicate that we are anywhere but close to a consensus as to what
counts as a good and profitable theory.5 1
Discussing ontology helps us to understand better our post hoc
descriptions and what little we are able to provide in the way of
predictions. And, more importantly, better understanding our ontological
commitments also plays a role in helping us see how our normative
5 0 Unfortunately, we will only be able to explore several thinkers. I think, however, it is
reasonable to assume that all political thinkers fell under the analysis that 1 intend to carry
out. In some sense, while I find my own reading to be somewhat unique, one could also
argue that it is another or different rendition of Marx’s idea that philosophies and ideas are
products of their time.
1 Of course, my argument is that we are actually closer than we might think. In order for us
to see this, I argue, we need to re-conceive what we mean by foundations, ontology, and so
forth.
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commitments are tied to our ontological positions. To be honest, this is
what many qualitative theorists have been trying to elucidate over the
years. The call to take culture or context or ideologies or beliefs into
account is not simply watered down political science. It is an attempt to
show the field that there are certain features of the political actor that are
often ignored in many of the models of political action. Power, for
example, is an example of a concept that is important to political science,
but is often undertheorized or not explained adequately. However,
understanding power is important to political science. Likewise,
understanding the actors that we analyze, why they behave as they do,
what motivates them, what types of normative goals make sense to ascribe
to them, and so forth are all critical in understanding the phenomena that
make-up the field of political science.
All of this begs for a new typology or assumptions that will be the
foundation of the political actor. We can easily and justly claim that
humans are comprised of 1) emotional [Nussbaum], 2) imaginative
[Taylor], and 3) linguistic [Lakoff] components, as well as the fact that we
are “rational” creatures as well. It is impossible to say that reason stands
before any one of these. Now some might argue that these are merely
metaphysical descriptions and are not adequate for model building. Let me
respond to this in two ways. First, it is not necessarily the case the model
5 2 See Harrison and Huntington (2001)
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building is the only, or even the best way, to discuss politics. Second,
understanding the above will lead us to better descriptions which, in turn,
lead us to the most important aspects of political thought, and that is
knowing why we feel motivated to behave in certain ways—it leads us to
the discussion of the normative. Hopefully through my work, one will see
that ontology leads to certain prescriptions for normative behaviors.
Beliefs or assumptions about the nature of political actors (human nature)
leads to certain types of political structures (institutions, organizations,
governments, etc.) in order to achieve certain goals (justice, stability,
survival, etc.) To uncouple this chain seems to be folly. Unfortunately, as
is shown in Politics in Time, many have mistakenly attempted this
uncoupling.5 3
Moreover, we need to realize that the things that we write and
argue over can, in fact, have an impact.5 4 For example, claiming that
humans are, at their very heart, violent when left to themselves, can lead to
justifying what many of us now would call an oppressive regime.
Claiming that humans are infinitely malleable might lead to purging those
5 3 See Pierson (2004). So also Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003) for a collection of essays
that deal with various areas of this issue.
5 4 See Ashcroft (2001), Benahabib (2002), and Burr (2003). Of historical note there are many
thinkers who have been caught up in the belief that their works may necessarily lead to
certain types of political outcomes. The reevaluation of Heidegger’s work as to whether or
not it leads to fascism has been at the center of one o f these disputes. For examples
concerning this re-evaluation of Heidegger’s political thought see Derrida (1989), Collins
(2000), and Sluga (1995).
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who do not bend or change quickly enough.5 5 What is ironic about some
of the great purges and attempts at social engineering in the past is that the
planners, on the one hand, believe that people can change through the
correct indoctrination and yet there are some, on the other hand, who can’t
change and therefore they most be killed.
There are several predominant concerns among political scientists
in general and among theorists specifically. Perhaps we can express this
by saying that there are several ways that we “look” at political science.
First, there is a concern about methodology. This is to say, we are
concerned with the way or tool that we can use to understand political
phenomena best. The question of methodology is similar to a handyman
and the decisions he must make when choosing a tool to fix something.
The wiring for the ceiling fan requires a different set of tools than does the
plumbing. So, the handyman, justifiably carries with him all the tools
necessary to make any repairs, not knowing what he might face when he
goes to check out a piece of property. However, political scientists, at least
many of them, seem to be saying that politics is like plumbing and is
always like plumbing. Therefore, we can carry a specific set of tools and
that will carry us through whatever problem might come our way. In fact,
maybe the admonition is to become like plumbers. We come across a
5 5 There are a variety of ways in which this has made itself apparent throughout history. For
example eugenics, social Darwinism, and even Peter Singer’s work, shows that there are
conceptions of humans that are infinitely malleable.
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problem, we use our tools and then, if the tools are inappropriate, perhaps
we can claim that the problem before us is not really a plumbing problem,
but a problem for another discipline, the electricians, say. But we are—in
the study of politics—looking at the house—a far more important concern
than just the plumbing. Something that as political scientists we do not
want to admit, perhaps, is that there are problems that our tool kit may not
be appropriate in fixing. Understanding politics is a matter of using these
tools to examine correctly the problems that one encounters. To show
someone how the political world works, one uses the force of the tools to
show how it explains discrete and separate events.
Another way to look at political science is through ideology.5 6
Chronologically speaking, this is the most ancient of ways to conceive of
politics. What characterizes the ideological as a launching point for
political science is a correct set of beliefs. As the methodology conception
holds that theorists must have a correct set of tools, the ideological
conception holds that one must have correct beliefs in order to accurately
understand politics. So, to a Marxist, a thinker will never correctly
understand the world unless one is well acquainted with and holds to
beliefs such as alienation, the bourgeoisie-proletariat relationship, etc. To
a liberal, one must believe in freedom, inalienable rights, and the like.
Understanding politics is a matter of holding these beliefs and then one
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will see the world as it really is. To hold incorrect beliefs means that one
will never be able to see the world in its true form.
Still we are the beginning of a whole host of problems such as
knowing what to do when our methodologies and ideologies conflict with
each other. We do not have criteria to use to know whether it is better to
be a behavioralist or postmodernist. There is nothing, in the theoretical
world that shows us necessarily that it is better to be a liberal than a
communitarian. A lot of your answers to these problems will depend on
your assumptions—your ontology—concerning truth. We can ask this
question since one assumption that is implicit in all theories is that it is the
one that best explains whatever phenomena it purports to describe. If one
answers this question by saying that it simply depends on what type of
question or problem one is looking at, this is likely to be very
unsatisfactory.
We can ask why this is a problem at all. For example, some have
called for methodological eclecticism. By this, these thinkers mean that we
can use a mishmash of methodologies. They claim that the quantitative
theorists can learn from the qualitative theorists and vice versa. However,
the results of this imperative are likely to be as fruitful as a family
reunion—it is interesting to see everyone, hear some news from parts of
the country you are unfamiliar with, but in the end you are happy to go
5 6 See Sartori (1969), Eagleton (1991) and (2000), and Hawkes (2003).
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home to your own small section of the clan to complain about how weird
and misguided all of those distant relatives are. One of the reasons that this
is a problem at all is because all theories hold to the idea, in one way or
another, despite any type of self-description that is used, that ideology X
or methodology X purports to explain some truth. Unless the term “truth”
is going to be given some absolutely meaningless designation, it has to
mean, at a minimum, that which stands before scrutiny. Still a more
preferable definition of truth would be something like that which is
consistent at all times and places and can be known with a reasonable
degree of certainty. And still, this is a weak definition of truth.
Perhaps another way to look at the concept of truth, at least in
politics, is that it is something that can be asserted because there is
evidence for the assertion. Still methodologies do not make the claim that
this is just another way of examining the events before us nor do
ideologies purport to be just one more way to see things. Thus, whoever
wants to hold to the idea that methodological eclecticism will proffer
desirable ways out of our theoretical conundrums will be sorely
disappointed with the results. Different theorists might expand their
reading habits, we might give a nod to those of different tribes instead of
snarls, but it will not lead to any fundamental resolution of the problems
that plague us, such as explaining the problems set before as accurately as
possible.
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I hold that one way around this problem is to hold to what seems to
be the case—that each methodology and each ideology actually carries
with them their own unique set of ontological and normative
commitments. By making the claim that each method or ideology carries
with it a set of ontological commitments is to say that each method carries
internally that which can justify its “truthfulness.” Thus, rational choice
theory or identity theory carries with them their own criteria of
determining their truthfulness. To critique one from the standpoint of the
other will not convince any competitors across the river. Each side will
immediately say that one has not taken into account, properly, the
assumptions—the ontos—from which one should operate. We see
immediately that ontology—basic beliefs which are not argued for and
normative shoulds—plays a lead role in this struggle. Rational choice
theory, for example, holds set of assumptions X. If a problem is examined
through this set of assumptions, then we can know the truth of something.
If this problem is not examined through this set of assumptions then one
cannot say that it was examined properly. Identity theory, again for
example, holds set of assumptions Y and this set is different than X,
though there may be some overlap. What counts as an answer to one set
versus the other is difficult because it is not clear what counts as a problem
as well. Moreover, each standpoint carries with it a set of normative
concerns as well. Sometimes these normative concerns apply to the
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theorist and her moral uprightness in examining the evidence set before
her.
We are left with the question as to what we gain from ontological
eclecticism over methodological eclecticism. First, we will be able to see
that the questions of truthftdness or finding the “correct” way to engage in
the study of politics fads away. Still, there will be those who are
concerned, without a universal theory, that the specter of relativism will
always be hanging over us. Relativism, as it is generally understood
sounds like a academic free-for-all, we can all say anything we want and
nothing can be said contrary to the point. This just seems silly to think that
theorists are really shooting for this. First, let’s ask, where this anti
relativist stance comes from. The natural sciences have done an admirable
job of some theoretical unity that allows the sciences to describe events,
make predictions, and discuss ideas of a unified truth with some meaning.
At the very least, suppositions such as the principle of falsification gives
every one an idea of what a theory should look like, though the theory
might be greatly lacking. One of the features that is appealing about the
natural sciences it is international and not contextual. The Chinese
scientist, the American scientist, and the Russian scientist can all speak to
each about the same phenomena and have it make sense to each other.
However, this cannot be said for the study of politics, which is something
that leaves many of us ready to give up hope. It seems as if it is impossible
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that we can ever solve problems as simple as figuring out why actor X
took course Y. There is seemingly little or no way to determine if the
reason is primarily because of condition A or even B and C and so on.5 7
Though there might be disagreements over how best to describe
the solution to a particular problem or what ideology best explains a set of
events, that does not mean that a free-for-all is acceptable or will ensue.
For example, one cannot claim that countries go to war because aliens
control political leaders or that there is a grand conspiracy of leaders who
ro
make these decisions in dark smoke-filled rooms. And, the idea that we
will allow for the fact that there is a wide-array of ontologies, many of
which have important things to say, will help to erase prejudices that often
plague theorists. Consider the narrow landscape of political theory in the
first part of the 20th century. Examining laws, institutions, and political
leaders as given and unproblematic led to many blind spots. Consider now
the important impact that theories that discuss problems surrounding
5 7 The quantitative theorist claims that we can solve this problem, for example, through a
regression analysis. If one accepts the tenets of statistical theory, this seems to be a good
solution to the problem. But what to do when actors behave because of certain beliefs is less
clear since running beliefs through a regression analysis is not likely to yield anything
worthwhile.
5 8 This is not to say that there are not those who do not believe these things. In feet, the
conspiracy theory industry is a healthy industry. People are willing to explain why things
happen for all sorts of reasons. Think of the occult or mysticism. Walking into any major
bookstore and one can see that this section—it is usually call Metaphysics—is three to four
times the size of the philosophy section. What is the difference between philosophy and the
mystical/ metaphysics, especially when one considers that there have been philosophers as
diverse as Berkeley, solipsists, Nietzsche, Plato’s Myth of Er, etc.? The difference is that
philosophers attempt explicitly to state their assumptions, give an argument as to how
assumptions lead to particular conclusions, and then hold out the possibility that they could
be wrong through the process of debate. Mysticism does not do this.
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workers, capital, feminism, rights, poverty, self-determination,
exploitation, etc. have had. Certainly, no single methodology could have
accomplished all of this. And, at times, whether one can accurately make
predictions about political events and the like is far less important than
being able to identify an important problem.
At the end of this work, I will comment on what I see as plausible
or new ontologies that will hopefully be advances for political theory.
Perhaps it seems strange to use the word ontology in this way—given that
fact that we usually use the word theory or method. I use the term
ontology primarily because this term carries with it the idea that we are
discussing foundations, the framework, the grounding. It seems
theoretically problematic if one “lays” out a theory only to have to lay out
the assumptions. In a sense, we have often not progressed much beyond
Euclid. If opponents of any theory cannot find a problem with the various
conclusions of the theory, then they can attack the assumptions. Of course,
this seems unfair since assumptions, by their very nature are not argued
for, but are taken as given. Much of political theory uses this as the
method of argumentation.
Methodology is even more problematic. There are those, for
example, who argue that rational choice theory is really not a theory but a
method and it simply takes human nature, the assumptions from which the
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method is derived, as merely given.5 9 This results in a slew of problems
not the least of which is that it is problematic trying to decipher exactly
what the results of a method, as opposed to a theory, even mean. Even
those theories which are less analytically precise, they certainly afford a
stab at what the theory means, which can then be argued for or against.
By utilizing the term ontology as I do, I hope to get us to recognize
that methods and theories come with assumptions built in. Perhaps, for
analytic reasons they are broken apart, but it does some that we often run
in problems that resemble the chicken and the egg.
Thus, what we see from the ontologically eclectic stance is that we
need to open our eyes about what we really do in political science, the
least of which is to welcome back in theorizing, embracing normative
politics, and seeing the very interesting ways in which we can examine
political phenomena.
5 9 What does it mean and what does it represent, one might ask, to say that humans are—at
their heart—utility maximizers? Certainly this would be a position for which one needs to
argue.
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Chapter Two
Methodological Eclecticism: A Look at What it Means to Share Ideas
It was through the feeling o f wonder that men now and at first began
to philosophize.
Aristotle
Wonder is very much the affection o f a philosopher; for there is no
other beginning o f philosophy than this.
Plato
Over the last 10 to 15 years the field of political science has
experienced a small rebellion, the so-called Perestroika movement.
Perestroika sought to broaden how political science is practiced and to
create a larger acceptance for the types of methodologies used in political
science.6 0 Critiques of institutional political science argued that the
discipline had become weighed down by the heavy-handed
methodological considerations of rational choice theory, among other
things.6 1 Those critical of the so-called established or mainstream course
of political science continued their argument by stating that political
6 0 Lee Sigelman writes that there seems to be “widespread expressions of discontent among
political scientists—discontent directed at, inter alia, intellectual cuirents in the discipline,
the governing institutions of the profession (ranging from individual departments through the
American Political Science Association) and, not least, the APSR, itself. [I]n recent years,
and particularly with the emergence of the Perestroika movement, these complaints have
taken on a special resonance” (2002: viii).
6 1 Those who argue that we need to open up how we proceed in political science have argued
that both the method and the narrowing of the subject matter are problematic in our
approaches. Jodi Dean argues that the study of political science needs to do better at 1)
problematizing the issues in politics; 2) pluralizing the methods and questions used in
political science as this pluralizing “looks for new paths and makes new links in the interest
of opening the terms and the terrain of the political (3); 3) contextualizing both the
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scientists seemed to have the unenviable choice of either adhering to
overly abstract and quantitative approaches in studying political science or
not seeing their work get published. Those who might be considered to be
part of the “institutional” cadre of political scientists might have
understandably seen Perestroika as an attack on not only their livelihood
but, more importantly, also as an assault on the most productive and useful
tool available to political scientists—rational choice theory.6 2 As one
prominent member of the discipline writes, “Rational choice theory rejects
our [traditional political theory] eclecticism in favor of a hierarchic model
of political science as moving towards a parsimonious set of formal,
mathematical theories applicable to the whole of social reality, including
politics” (Almond 2000: 51). Donald Green and Ian Shapiro write that
rational choice theorists “do not contend that traditional political scientists
have studied the wrong phenomena; rather, their view is that traditional
political scientists, by ignoring the microfoundations, have studied the
right phenomena in the wrong ways” (1994,3). It is one of the imperatives
of science, in general, that both formal models and parsimony be pursued.
As a variety of thinkers in many fields have used rational choice as the
method of choice the topics that they want to have fall into its purview are
experience and methods of the study of politics; and 4) specification, which means to look at
the “relations through which differences are produced” (4).
6 2 Kristen Monroe argues that rational choice is “one of the dominant paradigms of political
and social science, offering insightful, rigorous and parsimonious explanations” (1991,2).
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seemingly limitless.6 3 In fact, it is safe to say that many consider rational
choice to be the theory that is the only meaningful way to study politics.6 4
There are those who hold rationality to be synonymous to human nature.6 5
To briefly survey the two major camps we can say that there are
those who argue that political science should be a scientific enterprise, or
at least as scientific as possible. This means political science should be
able to predict events, at best, and, at worst, it should be able to give
reasonably accurate descriptions of political events and institutions. Often
this version of political science means modeling, using tables, regression
analysis, and so on. This is seen as the way in which one might be able to
ascertain that predictions are being made or that accurate descriptions have
been given.
The other side of the divide would include those who argue that the
above way of looking at politics is not only inadequate in its descriptions
of political events, but is actually verging on being immoral because it
does not correctly identify the moral—human—nature of actors in politics.
6 3 See Posner (1977), Posner (1992), and Becker (1976).
6 4 See Elster (1986) and Morris, et al (2004). There are also those who now try to redefine
what we mean by the study or use of rationality. For example, Friedman (1996) argues that
public choice theory now needs to be distinguished from rational choice. Public choice refers
to ordered preferences in the political world whereas rational choice might extend to
nonmarket realms. Still Friedman argues that rationality means that “regardless of what sort
of ends people pursue, they do so through strategic, instrumentally rational behavior” (2).
6 5 See Hastie and Dawes (2001). They write that our success in accomplishing survival tasks
“did not arise because of acute senses or especially powerful physical capacities. We
dominate this planet today because o f our distinctive capacity for good decision making.. . .
Human beings have an exceptional ability to choose appropriate means to achieve their ends”
( 1-2).
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Those who argue from a cultural perspective or what we might call
identity theory, to name just one among many possible different
perspectives, hold that actors are not reducible in any meaningful way to
modeling, regression analysis, and the like.6 6 Political actors are not only
products of their culture, religion, and experience—none of which are
reducible to any type of modeling—they are also unique individuals. Thus,
any look into politics needs to take the most essential aspects of human
nature into account; reducing humans to regression analyses will simply
not do for this way of conceptualizing political theory.
The version of political science that relies on rational choice
requires a variety of tools and methods. However, one could argue that
what is missing from this way of undertaking a study of politics is a
discussion of whether its conclusions follow from its assumptions.
Coherence, validity, measurement error, and confidence intervals are the
terms that are used in this world of political science. But whether humans,
human nature, normative positions, and beliefs can reduced to such
measures is an important question that is often ignored by this type of
political theorizing. If one does not attempt to answer these questions, or
at least ask them, then it seems to me that we are missing out on what
makes the study of politics important. We must always be clear, in my
661 do not use the term “identity” theory here to be indicative of the opposite of rational
choice models. There is a broad rubric of postmodernism that many different types or styles
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opinion, to why are studying what we are. For example, to ignore the
normative implications of a position seems to be a critical mistake. We
cannot simply assume that the results of our various measures will lead us
to an understanding about our moral world.6 7
In the world of the second type of theory, thick descriptions,
interviews, motivations, linking culture to actions, and ideology are terms
that are part of the key vocabulary.6 8 The primary difference between
these two versions of looking at politics is that the first emphasizes
parsimony and the second complexity.6 9 Parsimony for the first version is
exhibited through quantitative measures that rely heavily on data that can
be run through various tests and analyses. The complexity of the second
version of studying politics is made known through complex descriptions,
case studies and history, to name but a few more tools.
of thinking can be made to fit under. However, this work is not a defense of postmodernism,
thus I have simply chosen the sub-field of identity theory as a convenience.
671 understand full well that there are many who measure beliefs and attitudes using various
empirical tools. The attempt to measure these beliefs is not what I am talking about. The
moral world in which we live consists of much more than Likert Scales measuring people’s
reports about various attitudes. The moral world starts with the ideas and interactions that
comprise the complex structure that can barely be described in the wonder that Plato and
Aristotle note brings philosophy about in the first place.
6 8 At this point, it is more important to know that these tools are linked to qualitative work
rather than what each tool is. However, in brief, all of these terms relate to the idea that the
experience of life and the world in which we live is not reducible to simple analyses that can
ferret out a key cause from a variety of important variables. Also, one cannot possibly begin
to think of how we might reduce the moral and cultural life of the polity, that which is most
important, to a quantitative set of tests or hypotheses.
6 9 Ironically enough, it seems that though the first seeks simple theories in order to find
patterns and have some chance of predicting outcomes, the quantitative paradigm has
become increasingly complex. One the other hand, though the qualitative camp argues that
the world is complex and cannot be reduced to mere matrices and charts, it seems to be very
simple in that one need merely describe one’s part of the world to begin the process of
engaging in description.
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There are those who have profound objections to the assumptions
of rational choice. They argue that rational choice theory uses too narrow
a definition of rationality and that it cannot explain either positive
nontrivial beliefs or normative nonconsequential beliefs. A narrow
definition of rationality is one that only is usually associated with homo
economicus, or the economic model of human behavior. This is to say that
rationality and its affects are associated with utility. Positive nontrivial
beliefs lend credence to the idea that human rationality must be taken as
expansive. In other words, it is insufficient to say that we can explain or
look at human behavior in terms of strict utility. A positive nontrivial
belief, for example, is a belief in god. It is quite probable that such a belief
will affect how one behaves but it is unlikely that one could ever provide a
serious measure as to how that affects one’s behavior on a rational scale or
measure.7 0 It is also the case that utility will typically not be the basis of
choice when considering one’s belief in god. Likewise, there is growing
sentiment that emotions, among other things, play a much larger role in
the very creation of rationality than had been previously understood. There
are those who argue that we must move beyond the mere assumption of
7 0 There are many studies that ask whether or not one believes in god. However, correlating
people who believe in god to certain actions is not the same as asking whether their belief in
god leads to one action over another. In other words, it is quite possible that people who
believe in god will behave one way over another. But we still do not have an idea of how this
knowledge directly affects one’s actions.
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rationality and the conception of humans as utility maximizers.7 1 We are
moving, some would argue, beyond the Lockean notion that the mind is
primary and that mind consists of infinite rationality.7 2 Critics of rational
choice theory argue that the very belief of rationality as rational choice
theorists have conceived it find its roots in the Lockean belief that “If,
then, there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of Being it must
be. And to that it is very obvious to Reason, that it must necessarily be a
cognitative Being. For it is as impossible to conceive that ever bare
incognitative Matter should produce a thinking intelligent Being, as that
nothing should of itself produce Matter. . . (1690,10).7 3 An even more
radical view of the mind in nature is Liebniz’s idealist position that God
does everything in the most desirable way possible and that this world,
hence knowledge and the like, are manifestations of God’s will.7 4
7 1 See Cates (2003), Dallmayr (2004), Damasio (2003), Green (2004), Ivison (2002), Lakoff
and Johnson (1999), Lakoff and Johnson (2003), and Nussbaum (1995,2003).
7 7 Dennett (1995).
7j It is quite possibly the case that Locke is the least radical example that we can find here
concerning the tight connections among mind, human nature, and rationality. For example,
one can think of Spinoza’s attempt to create not only a rational system to explain
metaphysics but ethics as well. For example, Spinoza writes, “After experience had taught
me that all the things which regularly occur in ordinary life are empty and futile, and I saw
that all the things which were the cause or object of my fear had nothing of good or bad in
themselves, except insofar as [my] mind was moved by them” (30). Also, “Love toward the
eternal and infinite thing feeds the mind with joy” (5). In other words, the mind, being
eternal, ahistorical and universal, fills itself and fulfills its purpose by contemplating that
which is universal and eternal. See also Della Rocca (2005) and Jon Miller (2004) for
interesting discussions concerning Spinoza’s method and his conception of the a priori.
7 4 See Liebniz (1998) and Mander (2000). Liebniz writes that “natural philosophy, which lies
in the knowledge of God, of the soul, of minds, comes from natural light: it does not show
itself therefore only in revealed theology, but serves as the unshakable base of the immense
edifice of jurisprudence, of natural right, of the law of nations, of public law, of politics—in
a word, all the laws of society” (56).
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Postmodernists have taken these types of belief about reason, its
equivalence with the divine, and its universal nature to be signs of
Western-centric, phallocentric, anti-feminist, and a host of other
problems.7 5
Another way to look at this issue is to say that this movement is
simply another aspect of the re-examination of the role of ontology,
epistemology, and metaphysics in the social sciences. I think that it is
reasonable, though still not widely accepted among rational choice
theorists, especially those who consider themselves to be methodologists
rather than theorists, that we are in the midst of a general shift in our
thoughts concerning epistemology, metaphysics, and ontology in general
in the social sciences. Certainly, one might have in mind postmodernism.
However, I think that postmodernism, despite whatever merits it may
possess, is seen by its critics and, unfortunately even by some of its
advocates, as being overly reactionary.7 6 Some of those who have tried to
think through the problem of our assumptions, the normative implications,
7 5 See Best and Kellner (1991). They write, “Advocates o f the postmodern turn aggressively
criticized traditional culture, theory, and politics. [While some thought to dismiss it as a fad]
the emerging postmodern discourses and problematics raise issues which resist easy
dismissal or facile incorporation into already established paradigms (1). See also Derrida
(1967) and Deleuze (1990).
7 6 See Norris (1990). Norris argues that postmodernism is fiaught with epistemological
problems. However, his main problem with it is that “these ideas [postmodern] deprive
critical thought of the one resource most needful at the present, i.e., the competence to judge
between good and bad arguments, reason and rhetoric, truth-seeking discourse and the ‘post
modern’ discourse of mass-induced media simulation” (44). My argument will hopefully
provide us a way, or at least a philosophical foundation, for us to make these evaluations on
pragmatic grounds that avoid both essentialism and relativism.
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and theory building are thinkers such as Robert Nozick (2001), Hilary
Lawson (2001), and Ian Hacking (2004). While all these theorists have
difficult programs as well as different conclusions, they do share some
important similarities. First, the idea of discussion political organization
and ethics does not mean much if one is not part of a community. This
means that we cannot speak of political theory in terms of overly
generalized or abstract notions. Humans are always part of a context,
history, and culture. To think that one can simply dismiss this and create a
“scientific,” universal way to examine human political behavior is
problematic from the very beginning. Second, one does not need to be a
strict foundationalist or essentialist, as the rational choice theorists can be
read as, in order to make moral statements and/ or truth statements as well.
This means that we can make important and meaningful claims about
morality without adhering to a universal moral paradigm.7 7 In other words,
one can have meaning in one’s statements, even if one rejects traditional
universalism. For much of the history of philosophy, thinkers have argued
that a language needs to be grounded in order to guarantee meaning. One
of the truly remarkable advances made by thinkers such as Derrida and
Rorty is that we see that language, intention, and meaning are never
7 7 There are those find this problematic. Critics of this position would claim that unless one
makes universal claims, then one cannot possibly discuss morals. This is false for a variety of
reasons that will hopefully become clear. However, just on a strict phenomenal basis, most of
us go about our days, holding to certain moral beliefs, without worrying as to whether the
claims that we hold, which are usually implicit, hold for all humanity.
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7ft
guaranteed. Still, as pragmatists have shown, we are able to talk,
communicate, and even learn a great deal about the world, even though we
do not have a universal grounding of language systems.
There have been those, such as Robert Putnam, who have sought to
bring competing sides of the political science discipline to the table to
negotiate ways to look beyond methodological differences. As I pointed
out in chapter one, this is the methodological eclecticism camp. In a real
sense they have sought to bring competing tribes back to the same council,
hoping that everyone can at least speak something that resembles the same
language. The American Political Science Association, responding to
complaints that the flagship journal of the discipline, the American
Political Science Review, was unresponsive to publishing a wide variety of
works and methods, launched a new publication call Perspectives on
Politics, with the promise that it would remain rigorous but more
inclusive.7 9 Putnam, at the time the APSA president, tried to quell the
dispute by claiming that the debate between the competing sides that is
usually couched in terms such as relevance versus scientific rigor is
overblown and is really a problem at all. He writes, “Advocacy of
7 8 Even philosophers who M l into the analytic camp, such as Quine, have noted the difficult
problems of guaranteeing meaning and accuracy in translation. See Quine (1964), for
example, for his famous attack on the analytic/ synthetic distinction.
7 9 There are those, however, who are probably still not sure what the fuss was all about
concerning the publication habits of the APSR. As Lee Sigelman, the editor of the APSR,
writes, “Defenders [of the content of the APSR] have countered that the APSR does a good
job of publishing the best papers that are submitted to it, and that the problem, if there is one,
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relevance cannot be left to the critics of rigor, just as the advocacy of rigor
should not be the monopoly of skeptics of relevance. . . In arguing that
scientific rigor and public relevance are mutually supportive and that both
are at the core of our professional obligations [I am stating that it is not the
case] that rigor and relevance [are] opposing virtues” (2003: 250-251).
One might summarize this position by stating that Putnam is advocating
that we should now look for the ways that each theory or method might
contribute to the overall puzzle known as the field of politics.8 0
If Putnam is correct and that the debate between competing
methods or paradigms is overblown, then it seems as if we are just at the
beginning of a golden age for political science. Putnam has solved our
methodological quandaries simply by making the case that competing
fit
tribes should study one another. I argue that Putnam’s admonition, while
is that those who feel aggrieved rarely submit their work to the APSR, thereby creating a
vicious circle” (2000: ix).
8 0 There are still those that are going to argue that the rational choice model is overly
imperialistic or hegemonic. Because of this fact, these critics would argue, without a
complete reevaluation of political theory, we will always be under the shadow of rational
choice theory. Or, at the very least, some less ardent critics would argue, we need to
reconsider rational choice theory. See, for example, Zafirovski (1999) and Kiser and
Hetcher(1998). Of course, one needs to examine Green and Shapiro (1994) for one of the
most extensive critiques of the application of rational choice theory to the study of politics.
They show that while there is an “aura of success that surrounds the rational choice
movement” there is, in fact, not much in the way of a “readily identifiable set of empirical
successes” (5). They also argue that despite increasing sophistication for rational choice
models, these models have not “advanced our understanding of how politics works in the real
world” (6).
811 should point out that I have no problem with this position as one o f a normative
recommendation. However, as far as solving the real issues that lay at the heart of the
methodological divide in political science—the qualitative versus the quantitative—Putnam’s
suggestion falls short. This is because the problem that I identified in chapter one rests on
differences of ontology—primary assumptions.
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given with good intentions, does little to solve our quandary. First, there is
the obvious problem that theorists and methodologists hold to their
positions not merely because they are used to such positions, but because
they believe that they have good ontological reason to do so. In other
words, theorists from all sides believe as they do because they hold that
their theories are the best ways to describe and make predictions about the
world. The world, as it is held by various thinkers, is one’s ontology. Even
the goals that political theorists have are based on one’s ontology.
Whether one holds that political science should be prescriptive or
descriptive has a lot to do with how one sees the foundations of one’s
thought. For example, postmodernists hold that there is a large variety of
worldviews and that one single description does not fit. However, they
hold that we can make prescriptions as to how governments and
individuals ought to behave. The world is not reducible to a single theory,
for postmodernists; therefore, we need to concentrate on the normative
side of thought. Those on the rational choice side of the divide hold that
the world is such that we can make accurate descriptions of political
behavior as well as a limited amount of predictions. And there are those
who hold that the strange amalgamation that we call political science is
just fine in its current state. One such sentiment about the current state of
political science goes as follows:
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Political science is a strange discipline. Indeed, it is hardly a
‘discipline’ at all... [I] want to express doubt that it is a set or
system of rules. Only someone who takes a narrow, procrustean
view of political science would characterize it in that way. And
rather than being a distinct branch of learning, political science is a
crazy quilt of borrowings from history, philosophy, law, sociology,
psychology, economics, public administration, policy studies, area
studies, international studies, civics, and a variety of other sources.
Any real coherence in political science exists only at the broadest
conceptual level, in the form of widely shared interest in
power. . . ” (Sigleman, 2000: viii).
While this might sound wonderfully inclusive, it does not solve
any of the problems that divide the discipline. Assuming that political
science is a quilt-like discipline, consisting of all manner of learning, that
does not necessarily make such a condition “right” or even desirable. It is
hard to imagine how the above solves anything other than moving the
problem back, out of sight. What this says is that the various sides, insofar
as they disagree, really have no ground to stand on because such
disagreements are pointless because there is room for all of us under the
tent. It might be the case that there are simply those who are wrong about
how to “practice” political science. There are many who would argue,
along with Downs, that models and theories “should be tested primarily by
the accuracy of the predictions rather than by the reality of their
assumptions” (21). In other words, the study of politics remains or should
be, to some thinkers, at its heart, a predicative practice. The “truth” about
the world is seen as less important than the predictions that a theory
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f t " ?
renders. So, according to this position, whatever political science may
have borrowed from other disciplines, it does not mean that it should not
strive to be predicative; i.e., formal and parsimonious. In thinking this
way, it is possible that political science has borrowed from other fields
that which it should now throw away.8 3
Once again, to cite Putnam, there are those who seek to split the
difference between opposing sides. Putnam writes that “finding better
answers should be a more important part of what political scientists do”
and “I do not believe that ignoring and even ridiculing quantitative and
mathematical rigor is the right path forward” (2003: 250). I am not sure
that qualitative theorists are ridiculing mathematical rigor as much as they
expressing genuine concerns. In fact, as I argue throughout this work,
qualitative theorists express concern, as Green and Shapiro (1994) note,
that rational choice theory as yet does not have much in the way of
empirical evidence to support it and, most importantly, that the
assumptions of rational choice theory are troublesome. I think what
Putnam might be referring to is that there is a perception, perhaps, among
some quantitative theorists, that others are either unable or unwilling to
8 2 There are those who have tried to solve this problem by recasting rationality as
reasonableness. According to this type of argument, rationality is the structure that underlies
our experience. Reasonableness, on the other hand, is something like our approach, using
reason, to various experiences. See, for example, Laden (2000).
8 3 Again, using science in general as a model, one can see that there are concepts that are
continually tossed out as evidence stacks about against such evidence. Aristotle’s cosmology
dominated the worldview of scientists for centuries, but now it is only studied as an aspect of
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engage in the necessary rigor to “do” quantitative work. For example,
Emerson Niou and Peter Ordeshook, complaining about the state of the
discipline, stated that political science is “a discipline mired in
imprecision, vagueness, obscure logic, ill-defined constructs, nontestable
hypothesis, and ad hoc argument” (1999).8 4
It is difficult to think of a much harsher criticism than that.
However, this criticism simply diminishes that important history of
political thought, which has usually asked and attempted to answer
critically important questions such as the relationship between individuals
and the state, the role of the state in the private lives of individuals,
individual obligation to the state and to others, the nature of power, and
how one ought to behave. I cannot accept the fact that these questions
have now been rendered unimportant simply because we cannot quantify
them, nor do I see how qualitative theorists, by looking at the works of
quantitative theorists, will be able to come up with better solutions or
descriptions for these problems. I also cannot believe that quantitative
theorists would claim that these problems as unimportant. However, to
quantitative theorists, in general, finding better answers implies that we
have better theories and better capabilities to test those theories. Thus, the
method of creating the theory and testing it becomes critical.
the history of science rather than for scientific truth. Such truth is now found in better, more
complete versions of cosmology.
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To the defense of those who do qualitative work, Putnam argues
that “the most important contribution that political scientists might make
to public life consists not in answering questions currently being asked,
but in framing new questions” and “I am skeptical about a value-free
social science and about a fact-free philosophical critique” (2003: 251-2).
Certainly, by Niou’s and Ordeshook’s standards, Putnam cannot have it
both ways. A value-free social science is exactly what one needs in order
to test hypothesis, to be precise, and, in short, to be like a science. To sum
up Putnam’s splitting the difference, he argues, “To my more scientific
colleagues, I urge . . . Better an approximate answer to an important
question than an exact answer to a trivial question, while to my less
scientific colleagues, I urge, more precise is better” (2003: 252). This
certainly seems to be good advice, though a rather casual glance at most
political science journals seems to show that most of us in the discipline
O f
have not taken this too seriously. Of course, Putnam’s good advice does
not address the serious theoretical differences that exist between the
camps. The two camps literally see the world differently and simply
combining methodologies may not be the answer. Those who see the need
8 4 Certainly, the title of their comments—“Return of the Luddites”—is no more flattering
than their general criticism.
8 5 It might be the case that not enough political scientists are well versed enough in the
literature that constitutes “serious and important” questions. If one spends one’s time as a
graduate student and as a professional political scientist analyzing data, refining equations,
and the like, it is unlikely that one will be able to identify and, for more importantly, be able
to explicate the so-called important questions. Thus, it might be the case that what counts as
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to be precise through the use of formal models believe or hold to
ontological position that the world can be described in such a way. When I
say world here I mean the world of human behavior. Humans must be
regular and fall into patterns. We must have solid and firm reasons to
believe that their nature is one way rather than another, otherwise our
models will not work. Those who believe that framing and asking
questions that often defy being placed in a quantitative model, believe that
important questions are part of an ongoing dialogue between cultures,
between the past and present, that it is part of a narrative that has many
iterations and possibilities. They also hold that there is always the
possibility, in fact the certainty, that any theory or explanation will have
severe and problematic gaps.
Ole Rogeberg argues that some theorists have become some
enamored with rational choice theory that they apply it even to fields
where the model does not seem to apply correctly. He writes, “Rational
addiction theories illustrate how absurd choice theories in economics get
taken seriously as possibly true explanations and tools for welfare analysis
despite being poorly interpreted, empirically unfalsifiable, and based in
wildly inaccurate assumptions selectively justified by ad hoc stories”
(263). As I argue throughout this work, the differences do not lie simply in
which methodology to use, but in serious differences over ontology. In
important is whatever it is that any political scientist is able to publish. The dividing lines
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other words, I concentrate on how making more correct or nuanced
assumptions about the actor can lead to more interesting and accurate
theories.8 6
While splitting the difference in advocating for more precision and
more important questions might be a good, though imprecise start, we still
really have no idea as to where we should start. While statistical theory
might be a good starting point as to what counts as “more precise,” it
leaves us with the nagging question as to how do we decide what makes a
good or important question.8 7 The reason that this is the case is because
there are always normative problems behind not only every theory, but
also behind every ontological viewpoint. We must realize that even the
investigation of a problem implies that it is important universally, or at
least more than to just me, but it might be the case that this needs
justification.8 8 It might the case that particular questions that I ask are only
that Putnam seeks to dissolve, if this is the case, will only further solidify.
8 6 Rogeberg is not against rigor at all. He writes, “To avoid misunderstanding: There is
nothing wrong with mathematical modeling per se. Mathematics has proven itself an
invaluable tool in a variety of sciences. The argument that follows simply states that
mathematics-like any other tool—can be both applied and misapplied” (266).
8 7 To be honest, there might even be issues as to how precise statistical theory is in relation to
how we actually perceive things versus what statistical theory represents. See Shepard
(2001).
8 8 How problems are created at all is an interesting one. One might easily consider the
difference between a legitimate explanation for political behavior and one that is laughed at.
Take, for example, realism in international relations. It is assumed that states behave as they
do because they hope to survive. So all phenomena are explained using this rubric, even
when behavior that is observed is diametrically opposed at times. A country goes to war to
preserve itself, a country sues for the continuation of peace to preserve itself. It is often the
case that there is little, if any, direct evidence that supports the claim that countries act
primarily to maintain their existence. This is an ontology to which all importance is
eventually attached. However, if one attempts to explain state behavior because elites behave
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of importance to me or my fellow citizens but not to the citizens of other
countries. Often, questions that are important to us, say human rights
which I see as universal, are not the concern of others because they
literally do not or cannot see the world as I do. So, even making the claim
that a question is important is problematic. Putnam does not address this
very critical issue. These questions have a great deal of relevance for who
we, as theorists, see the rest of the world. As the world grows smaller, as
communications bring information from around the world in speeds that
are unprecedented, the ways in which we see and understand human
beings will have a great deal to do with what we make of the political
O Q
events that dominate the headlines of newspapers throughout the world.
The changing nature of the world even brings up the problem that a
universal theory or method may not be a desirable way to see things.
However, if it is desirable, one must make an argument as to why that is
the case instead of simply assuming that it is.9 0
as they will, one is likely to get far less attention, though there might be as much evidence for
this position as there is for the former position. And if one argues that there is a conspiracy
among elites to control everyone else, one is likely to be laughed at, though, again, the
evidence all around is not always plentiful.
8 9 See Searle (1995) and Rorty (1989).
9 0 As I argue that I am discussing the burgeoning of a new trend—the willingness to buck off
the theoretical constraints of rational choice theory while maintaining an element of rigor,
Archie Brown writes, “Along with outstanding work, however, there is much in
contemporary political science that is trivial. A worrying trend on both sides o f the AUantic
is the elevation of technique over substance. It is sad that young scholars should adopt—or,
for the sake of career advancement, go along with—the view that, when faced by a problem
in the real world of politics, the height of their ambition should be to formulate a falsifiable
hypothesis that may be somewhat related to the issue, however, tangentially. The importance
of the problem counts for less than the falsifiability of the hypothesis as demanded by the
positivistic norms of qualitative social science” (1).
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As I think we can see the issues of methodology often get
conflated with issues of ontology.9 1 Or, at the very least, we build theories
that are established on certain ontological conceptions 9 2 While not always
clear, ontology has a special place in the vernacular of most social science
disciplines and in the humanities 9 3 In our political discourse, for example,
human nature is a common trope that we use for our ontology. In other
words, we justify certain practices or ways of looking at practices as being
based on or as being an extension of human nature. Glenn Tinder writes,
“Most political ideas, perhaps all of them, are based on some conception
of human nature” (3). Stephen Pinker writes, “Everyone has a theory of
human nature. Everyone has to anticipate the behavior of others, and that
means we all need theories about what makes people tick” (1). From Plato
and Aristotle to Hobbes and Locke to modem theorists—not to mention
9 1 This is an idea that finds its roots at least as far back as Heidegger’s work The Principle of
Reason. In this work Heidegger notes that reason itself is a multifaceted term that has at least
two use—reason as utility and reason as something we accept as reasonableness. We can
also, to use another example, distinguish Reason from reasons. This leads to the unfortunate
conflation of ontology with metaphysics. Heidegger writes, “This quest for reasons pervades
human cognition even before it bothers with the founding of statements. The ubiquitous
quest for reasons requires that one get to the bottom of what is encountered. Whenever we
are getting to the bottom and founding things we find ourselves on the path to reason.
Without exactly know it, in some manner we constantly addressed by, summoned to attend
to, grounds and reason” (1996,3)
9 2 We should also be clear that even the term ontology, its use, and its importance is debated
among many theorists. To give but one example, consider Peter van Inwagen (2001) who
argues that the term ontology is often misused. In fact, if ontology is the question, “What is
there?” then, van Inwagen argues that we also need to ask the question “What are we asking
when we ask What is there?” This is now called meta-ontology. For my purposes, as I hope
to make clear throughout, is that ontology is simply the question what is there and its very
related question, what is the “there” like? More specifically, I am interested in the “what is
there” as it works as the assumptions for our theories.
9 3 See Hacking (2004).
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non-Westem political thought—human nature is at the heart of political
theory both implicitly and explicitly. Which theories are best used to
describe the nature of politics will ultimately depend on how we conceive
of human nature, assuming that we can get straight to the heart of politics
in the first place. What we will see in this work is that methodology,
theories of human nature, and our conceptions of history weave into an
elaborate web that is difficult to untangle.
The problem with Putnam’s suggestion to be methodologically
eclectic is that it ignores the central feature of political theory—each
theory carries with it an ontology or set of assumptions.9 4 So, it is quite
possibly the case that in looking at both rational choice theory and
culturally based theories, for example, one is actually looking at two
separate worldviews. These worldviews may be incommensurate. So, all
one has done is looked at apples and then oranges and it is likely that the
theorist is going to fall back onto her training and previously held
assumptions about how to look at politics. Unfortunately for us, as
political scientists, the issues of how to measure political behavior is still a
central matter of importance and debate, whereas, measurement in many
9 4 See Hacking (2004) and Searle (1995). As I have already stated, this work is not a
“postmodern” work. However, we should recognize that this claim is one of the central
features of postmodernism. One of the differences between postmodernism and my own
position is that postmodernists often claim that all philosophical position are equally valid or
problematic. Also, the idea that categories and knowledge is socially constructed, and only
socially constructed, seems to ignore the fact that much of how we experience what we do is
based on the operations of our brain, among many other things. As all human have brains of
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areas of the physical sciences this is not the case.951 have simply pointed
to human nature is one central concept that guides much of our research in
the study of politics. The problem of human nature has long plague
political theorists. For example, it is difficult to know whether humans are,
by nature, altruistic or selfish. If we look at Hobbes and then at Rousseau,
we see that it is possible to build entire theoretical structures based on just
this difference in one’s conception of human nature.9 6 To make matters
more complex, theorists, as Hobbes and Rousseau do, build their theories
from these assumed positions of human nature rather than giving sufficient
arguments for them.9 7
similar constructino it is reasonable to expect that much of our knowledge base and
experience is similar, despite cultural and geographic differences.
9 5 See Townley (2004) and Goldstone (2000). Goldstone’s work, dealing with the
implications of one’s standpoint in looking at economic progress, makes a cogent argument
that not only outcomes, but methods of measurement and the concept of validity is culturally
determined.
9 6 Many interpreters of Hobbes and Locke, for example, see their work as being the product
of two different conceptions of human nature. In Hobbes, as has been widely noted by many
theorists, is seen as an advocate for the completely self-interested and, if needs be, violent
individual. Locke, as some commentators point out, has a more refined self-interested actor.
Rousseau, on the other hand, saw individuals in the state o f nature as being rather pacifistic.
My brief depictions are, of course, overgeneralizations. However, I simply want to point out
the feet that these are typical readings of these theorists. See, for example, Skinner (1997) for
his overview of Hobbesian scholarship as well as Sommerville (1992) work on the historical
context of Hobbes’ political philosophy. Also see Haji (1991) who undertakes an interesting
examination of Hobbes as perhaps two thinkers—the warlike versus the cooperative Hobbes.
For Locke, see Simmons (1989) and his discussion concerning the way Locke’s conception
of the state of nature guides his work. See also Dunn (2003).
9 7 Considering some of the theorists whom I have cited, in particular Brown (2005), we see
that methods and measurement are powerful tools, but they cannot get at the heart of the
study of politics. This heart, which Putnam does in feet allude to, are the types of questions
that we ask. As we shall see in the next chapter, measurement, usually in the form of rational
choice, has made advances and significant contributions to the study of politics, but they
cannot generate the meaningful questions, the normative guidelines, and the important, albeit
incomplete, potential answer.
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Since it is difficult to know how to conceive of human nature and
how this relates to political theory, I argue that we need to include the
Oft
discussion of this problem in our attempts to outline political theories.
As political theorists we have not been as imaginative in conceiving
problems as we could sometimes be. This becomes more evident as we see
that other cultures throughout the world have conceived of political
relationships in different ways than we have in the West and yet are often
very effective in describing and showing keen understanding in the
nuances of political behavior. In this dissertation, one of my goals is to
show that we can more imaginative in looking both at individual actors
and the relationships to the state as well as being empirically rigorous. As
we shall see in the chapters on Nussbaum and Taylor, imagination
becomes key to understanding politics and engaging in important
discussions about our normative goals. Hawley Fogg-Davis has
commented on the status of theoretical work in the field of race in
American politics, much of which is applicable, I argue, to political
science in general. She writes, “Much of [the] quantitative and qualitative
work [on race] lacks theoretical imagination. This is not so much a
9 8 We will delve into the problem of human nature more in chapter four. However, I must
confess that even there it will be cursory. The enormity of the concept really requires a
history. One can point to just about any text in the Western philosophical tradition and find
some use of the term human nature. It is not the purpose of this work to settle on the correct
usage of the term, especially since I find the correct usage to be a simple matter of the
“correct” use for a particular case. A good place to start for this history of human nature is
Stevenson (1999); however, this work is a collection of primary sources with little to add
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criticism of American politics as a field as it is a plea for political theorists
to supplement these findings with descriptive and prescriptive theories
about race that cannot be measured by a survey instrument” (555).
I find that it is the case that much of the work that we use in
political science relies on outdated and undertheorized accounts of human
nature. As I have tried to emphasize, there are many places from which
one can start in discussing politics and in developing a model of the
human actor. For example, one can just as easily start from a rational
choice perspective over a Biblical perspective. There are certainly
important theoretical differences between the two, but there is no a priori
reason to choose one over the other. One might argue that rational choice
theory can offer up testable hypotheses and a religious text cannot. This
may be true, but I am not discussing the testing of hypotheses, but the
material on which the hypotheses are built and make sense; that is to say,
the assumptions. And in both cases the assumptions are not open for
testing.
This will require that we move to a way of looking at politics that
along the lines of what I call ontological eclecticism. This will move us
beyond the overly simplified notion of dueling methodologies. Hopefully
this way of looking at politics can show us the rich complexity of how
assumptions play a key role in the outcomes of theoretical enterprises,
concerning current philosophical debates. For an elementary, and rather comical primer on
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how the study of politics is generally a normative venture, and, also,
broaden what we mean by “rigorous” study of the field. Hopefully, we
will realize that in the same way the political science cannot advance
without more sophisticated tools for empirical inquiry, it cannot survive
without the political imagination to discuss what the world around us
means. This study, I hope, will serve to show us several potential launch
points for further theorizing and study. I take as an assumption Foucault’s
position (1984) that we should be concerned with “truth through which we
constitute ourselves as objects of knowledge” and with the “power through
which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others” (34, 37). The
assumptions the we use come as a part of how we constitute ourselves and
is part of the finite, yet always changing, horizon of what we consider to
be human nature. It is my position that the assumptions used in theories
concerning human nature lead to particular outcomes.9 9 It is often the case
that the assumptions they we make are incomplete, inaccurate, or simply
outdated.
Each observer, each thinker, each political scientist advances
knowledge in some fashion. Each investigator has his or her own unique
perspective. Each perspective is contingent on the set of facts, the context,
the history, and a myriad of other important factors that help to create the
the subject, see Palmer (1999). See also Rosenstand (2001).
9 9 By this I mean that human nature is not given and that it is a critical mistake to assume it.
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perspective.1 0 0 Saying that there is a multiplicity of perspectives adds
chaos to the mix, some might argue. I will argue that saying the study of
politics could ever operate like the study of the physical world is just
wrong-headed. A multiplicity of perspectives is the best that we can hope
for. But this is not just a call to methodological variety but a call to
recognize that various perspectives call for a variety of ontological
positions. We cannot simply share and look at different methodologies.
We must also recognize the differing foundations behind these methods.
The importance of this we will see, hopefully, in the subsequent chapters
of this work.
Some clues as to what the above means is found in the
methodological and ontological commitments of political thinkers.
Traditionally, and especially recently, there has always been quite a bit of
discussion about methodology.1 0 1 And, usually accompanying a
methodology is a choice that this certain method is something like the
correct or best procedure by which we should examine some particular
problem or issue. Ontology, on the other hand, does not receive a lot of
attention from political thinkers. Usually ontology is the study of the
nature of being, as I have mentioned.1 0 2
1 U 0 See Best (1995).
1 0 1 See Bromueller and Gertz (2000), Buraway (1998), and Gerring (2001).
1 0 2 It is interesting to note that these were among the concerns of our first political theorists.
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Political Science, as an endeavor, is an interesting mix not only of
different fields of study—from institutions to culture, from war to peace—
but it is also of grab bag of methodologies. There has been much made
about what the goals of political science should be and how well it is
equipped to achieve those goals. Again, these claims run the gamut. One
of the consequences of this grab bag is that there is often dispute over how
political science should be done and it is, possibly, these types of disputes
that led to the territorial rigidity that we saw in the Perestroika movement.
One of the outcomes of this battle is that rational choice theory has come
to dominate departments and publications throughout the United States.
Though Putnam’s position, as I have pointed out, makes it seem as if each
method leads to an “advance” in knowledge, the bifurcation of the
discipline seems to be that both sides are not buying into that position.
In this chapter, I discussed some of the basic divisions in the study
of politics. I argued that one possible solution to this division—Putnam’s
suggestion to what I call methodological eclecticism—will not avail us
much in the way of an “advance” in the study of politics or in political
theorizing. I have argued for the importance of including a discussion of
ontology in political theory. In the next chapter, I will examine some of
the assumptions of rationality and causation, as well as some of the
weakness of rational choice theory.
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Chapter Three:
Rational Choice Theory and Rethinking Causality
Wanting connections, we found connections—always, everywhere, and
between everything.
Umberto Eco
What are we to make of the predominate theory in the study of
politics, namely, rational choice theory? We must ask whether it can
faithfully and adequately serve as the foundation, as the ontology that will,
in the end, help us to arrive a unified field of political science. The answer
to this question is no. Of course, one could rightfully ask if that is or
should be the goal of political science in the first place. In the last chapter
I looked at various ways that we might look to expand our use of
methodologies to broaden the field of political science. I concluded that
the endeavor will be pointless unless one accepts the fact that different
methodologies start from different ontological positions. The best that one
can hope for, I argued, is a recognition that one seeks the best fit possible
for the problem at hand. I argued that this has been a long held tenet of
those who engage in qualitative work in the social sciences. In this
chapter, I will explore some of the assumptions of rational choice theory.
We will see that on its face rational choice theory is inadequate as a theory
to either explain politics on anything resembling a universal plane and that
it has its own problems within the scope of its own inquiry. I will discuss
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its potential for serving as the ontology that all of us can use to study
politics scientifically.1 0 3 In addition to examining some of the claims of
rational choice theory, I will also look at various problems that
characterize the endeavor. I conclude by making the claim that the belief
that humans are rational is a holdover from an ontology of an ahistoric
political actor that has persisted in political theory from the time of Plato. I
will examine this phenomenon in the next chapter.
Rational choice theory rests or is dependent on a certain
conception of causality. In order to understand rational choice theory, one
must also understand causality and how we use the concept.1 0 4 By
examining some of the weaknesses of rational choice theory, in light of a
clearer understanding of causation, I hope to place rational choice theory
more firmly on its own ontological grounds, making it one tool of the
1 0 3 In stating this, I am adhering to the idea that rational choice theorists, by the nature of
their assumptions, hold that rational choice theory can, in feet, act as the theory of political
science. This is because the assumptions that characterize rational choice theory are universal
in nature.
1 0 4 See Dallmayr (2004), Deleuze (1990), and Derrida (1967). Dallmayr argues that the lack
of recognition that assumptions lead to conclusion is a methodological mistake because
ultimately we take the assumptions as evidence or the conclusions of a previous argument.
Derrida makes the point that all systems ultimately rely on visions of truth that are simply out
o f the reach of our grasp. To assume that assumptions, arguments, in depth analysis lead to
truth is to misunderstand both assumptions and truth. Deleuze frames this issue in terms of a
paradox. He writes that “good sense affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or
direction: but paradox is the affirmation of both senses or directions at the same time. Plato
invites us to distinguish between two dimensions: (1) that of limited measured things, of
fixed qualities, permanent or temporary which always presuppose pauses and rests, the fixing
of presents, and assignation of subjects . . . and (2) a pure becoming without measure, a
veritable becoming-mad which never rests. It moves in both directions at once. It always
eludes the present, causing future and past, more and less, too much and not enough ....” (1-
2). We have chosen to avoid the madness that Deleuze discusses and the study of politics
rarely moves beyond the first dimension that Deleuze ascribes to Plato.
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toolkit the unique political science toolkit, rather than making out to seem
as if rational choice theory is the entire worksop.
Rational choice theory is the primary theoretical framework used
by those who do quantitative work.1 0 5 That which is most directly opposed
to the rational choice framework might be termed identity theory,
postmodernism, poststructuralism, post-colonialism, and other so-called
“alternative” paradigms.1 0 6 Those who do qualitative work often come
from these camps or ways of seeing political philosophy.1071 will discuss
these alternative forms for theory insofar as they relate to Nussbaum and
Taylor in chapters five and six.
There are several reasons why causation needs to be looked at in
conjunction with rational choice theory. First, many rational choice
theorists, despite recent adjustments to their theoretical framework, have
argued that rational choice theory is the best theory in which to study
t Afi
politics. Second, rational choice itself is based on the idea that a certain
1051 do not want to make it seem as if rational choice theory is a homogenous theory. There
are considerable differences even among those who are practitioners. See, for example, Ball
(1976), Johnson (1996), and Cox (1999).
1061 recognize that to say that other theories are “alternative” is to be within the dominate
framework. It is not the goal of this work to wind my way through the nuances of the
differences of these theories.
1 0 7 To be clear there is much in the way of qualitative work, such as ethnography, that does
not necessarily presume overtly a postmodern framework.
1 0 8 There are those who are now coming around to see some of the weaknesses of the theory.
For example Paul Anand (2003) discusses the relationship between evidence and the
acceptance of a particular theory. In other words, should we simply hold to a theory, despite
the absence of evidence for the theory being correct, is a question that needs to be explored.
Charles Wilber (2004) argues that social economists are united in rejecting the rational actor
model. The reason that the rational actor model must be rejected, according to Wilber, is
because humans are more than economic actors, but they are persons who live in an ethical
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set of assumptions, in this case human nature being that of a utility
maximizer, leads to certain outcomes. In other words, rational choice
theorists assume that there is a causal link between variables. Put simply,
variable X leads to outcome Y. We will also see, contrary to this overtly
objective design, that how we conceive of the individual—our
assumptions or held ontology—influences outcomes, though maybe not in
ways we might expect.1 0 9 Third, rational choice theory is also based on the
idea that there are causal factors among the interactions of the variables,
that is to say the empirical evidence, that are being examined. After briefly
discussing causality, I will look at rational choice theory in more depth.
Dorato states that “the fact that causes always precede their
effects—the ‘arrow’ of causation—is so pervasive a feature of our
experience that it does not seem to call for an explanation” (523). In other
words, it is natural for us to think in terms of causation. In a very real
community . He argues that much of why individuals behave the way as they do can be
explained via the stories they tell. Despite these examples the overwhelming number of
rational choice theorists hold out to the strong belief that their theory is fundamentally sound,
even in its assumptions. See for example, Li (2004), Quakenbush (2004), Heme and Setala
(2004) who argue that the way to understand rational choice theory is to understand the
difference between thin and thick rationality. They write that all RCTs use at least some form
of thin rationality (68), that many see thin rationality as being represented by utility theory
(69), and that thin rationality should be distinguished from thick rationality. MacDonald
(2003) attempts to save rational choice theory by providing it elucidating both
instrumentalist-empiricism and scientific-realism. This attempt will ultimately be
unsuccessful because MacDonald does not properly elucidate either philosophical position as
well as mistakenly contending that they are the dominant theories in science, void of
contention.
1 0 9 There are some alternative voices to this dominant view. For example, see Whitford
(2002) and Boudon (2003). Boudon makes a more traditional argument against RCT by
claiming that it cannot explain non-trivial beliefs and its conception of rationality is too
narrow.
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sense, causation is simply there. Also, causation runs in one direction and
conceiving that causation could run backwards would seemingly deny
physics (see Price 1996). John Mackie writes, “Asked what cause is, we
may be tempted to say that it is an event which precedes the event of
which it is the cause, and is both necessary and sufficient for the latter’s
occurrence; briefly that a cause is a necessary and sufficient preceding
condition” (5). Quantitative studies in the social sciences rely on the idea
of causation running in one direction and, more importantly, that cause X
is both necessary and sufficient for outcome Y. If such is not the case, then
it is difficult to say exactly what causation, or the relationship between
variables, is.
Michael Scriven writes:
Causes are not necessary, even contingently so, they are not
sufficient—but they are, to talk that language, contingently
sufficient. . . . They are part of a set of conditions that does
guarantee the outcome, and they are non-redundant in that the rest
of this set (which does not include all the other conditions present)
is not alone sufficient for the outcome. It is not even true that they
are relatively necessary; i.e., necessary with regard to that set of
conditions rather than the total circumstances of their occurrence,
for there may be several possible replacements for them which
happen not to be present. There remains a ghost of necessity; a
cause is a factor from a set of possible factors the presence of one
which (any one) is necessary in order that a set of conditions
actually present be sufficient for the effect. (11)
This means that we can never know, beyond the mere scholastic
structure of a model, whether there is any necessity in the model. It will
never be clear that the set of assumptions or causes that one includes in a
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model are the necessary causes that will lead to an accurate or true
conclusion. Without the import of necessity, it is unclear what a
quantitative model shows beyond one “possible world.”1 1 0 There is
ontological symmetry in becoming and what has become. Dorato argues,
“It is important to distinguish between two different versions of temporal
becoming. I f ‘is future’ is interpreted as a tenseless relation between
present time t and a later event, one has a form of tenseless becoming,
accounting to the becoming actual a t, for all t, of events or tenseless facts
that at times before t are at most merely possible” (525). Quantitative
methods have to ignore the problem of how present facts relate to future
events in order to ensure the reasonableness of the inferences that are
made between outcomes. This is not a problem so long as one sees ones
quantitative study for what it is—one possible explanations out of
many.1 1 1 Still there is another possibility of becoming and that is where
“future, present, and past are regarded as tensed properties of events, on
has tensed becoming, consisting in the becoming present of previously
1 1 0 See Rescher (1999) and Hemmo (1996). Rescher writes that possible worlds should be
discussed in terms of truths to things to a worldview(s). This sounds similar to axiomatic
social theory—from theory (truths) to things (data) to a worldview (possible explanations for
outcomes) (403). Of course, one of the possibilities of this is that “there is in principle no
theoretical limit to the lines o f consideration available to provide descriptive perspective on a
thing. Our characterization of real things can accordingly become more extensive without
thereby becoming more complete. New descriptive features ongoingly come into view with
the progress of knowledge” (405). Possible worlds theory is a much better way to frame the
methodological debates in political science. However, it is not well understood by most
theorists and this, also, would require another work to tie the methodological implications of
possible worlds theory to the study of politics so as to not be overly facile.
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future events, where present is construed as an absolute property that
events acquire and lose, and reality is constituted by tensed facts (Dorato
525). In short, Dorato is making the argument that time itself needs to be
accounted for when portraying outcomes in a theory. There are those
rational choice theorists who have made such an attempt. Chris
Chatfield writes, “A time series is a collection of observations made
sequentially through time” (1). Looking at how variables change or
influenced by other variables over time is certainly important but it is still
not the same as providing, for example, historical context or historical
1 1 5
background. The use of history is notoriously difficult and is fraught
with potential normative problems, the most obvious being doing a
selective reading of history so as to excuse or promote new injustices. In
discussing Nussbaum and Taylor we will see how one can incorporate
various aspects of history and avoid both of the problems we have see
here. At this point, I am simply concerned with the ways in which some
theorists take causation to be a straight arrow to an outcome. From there,
these theorists take assumptions of rational choice to be explicit,
transparent and obvious. Therefore, according to some theorists,
1 1 1 As I will explain in the last chapter, this does not necessarily cast us into relativism. I hold
that there is a difference between pragmatism and relativism.
1 1 2 See Hamilton (1994) and Chatfield (2003).
1 1 3 How to “use” history in the study of politics is certainly not closed for debate. History is
not a mere set of facts ready to be understood intuitively and universally by all. Some see
history as teleological and others as absurd. Marx, for example, rejected theological
interpretations of history and “accepted the Enlightenment view that history, in however a
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explaining human political behavior is a matter of getting a correct model
and sampling enough data rather than focusing on larger problems, such as
historical context and the validity of one’s assumptions.1 1 4
Rethinking causality should be of concern to political theorists.
Some works find difficulty in linking causal relations to empirical
evidence (see Mondak, 1993). Some assume that there is a causal link
between events and have sought to work the problems in pinpointing or
identifying causal links by path analysis (see Alker, 1969), time series
methods (see Hibbs 1978) or Granger Causality (see Freeman 1983 and
Reuveny, 1996).1 1 5 Other studies question the impact of institutions in
causing certain outcomes (see Meier, et al, 2000). Other studies on
causality look at the direction of the flow of causality (see Mousseau and
Shi, 2000). In the law there is a wide variety of conceptions for causality
that even include arguments for the idea that tort law directly causes actual
tortured or indirect way, represents a progressive development toward a rational society and
free individuality” (Best, 36).
1 1 4 A number of thinkers have questioned our uncritical account of the directionality of
causation, as well as our oversimplification of the process. Perhaps the most famous is
Heidegger in his account of the “thrownness” of the individual into the world. Causality, in
many ways, ultimately becomes something of our account to simplify things, though not
necessarily any more accurately than our thrownness in the world would. See Heidegger
(1962). There are interesting current accounts of the creation of phenomena and how we see
causality. In discussing the Hall effect, Ian Hacking argues that we often mistake our
understanding of phenomena as the result of the interactions or causes from an experiment.
He argues that we often “create” phenomena. If this is the case, then might be the beginnings
of a need to rethink how we observe the world, test it, and conceive of causality. See
Hacking (2002, 12-16).
1 1 5 The concept of Granger Causality is still very prevalent in economics and in political
science. Granger's idea of causality is that a variable X causes another variable Y, “if by
incorporating the past history of X one can improve a predication of Y over a prediction
based solely on the history of Y alone” (Freeman 328).
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harm (see Matsuda 2000). Causality is something many theorists would
love to be able to claim or hold because then it makes it seem as if one is
“doing science,” which is to say showing necessary, causal links that can
be tested.
While causality—what it means, what it is—might be up for
debate, it is clear that science and any endeavors that seek to be science
like, must rely on certain events causing certain outcomes. Judea Pearle
writes, “Causality connotes lawlike necessity, whereas probabilities
connote exceptionality, doubt, and lack of regularity” (1). This remark hits
at the heart of why causality is a centerpiece to the quantitative study of
politics. First, to propose a model such as rational choice theory, one must
assume that there are laws to which individual behavior adheres. To state
that there are exceptions is to make the claim that it is pointless to even
discuss a model. Second, if we want to make broad claims about the study
of politics, some would argue, then we need to make sure that our claims
holdup in all circumstances, which is to say that our model points to
truth.1 1 6 There are those who claim that we can test various propositions
scientifically, which is to say that we come up with a hypothesis based on
our assumptions, we collect data according to our operational definitions
found in our hypothesis, and observe for any causal links between the
1 1 6 Philip Converse (1985) made the argument that science tries to show the truthful
correspondence between names and reality. He also makes another claim, that supports much
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independent variables.1 1 7 That is to say, we can order the study of politics
like a science.
A great deal of quantitative work in political science deals with
finding reasonable inferences between independent and dependent
variables.1 1 8 If one can find “reasonable” inferences, then, the theory goes,
one can claim to be discussing truthful outcomes. Theorists temper their
claims by stating they are only looking at a particular instance and the
truth of the connections between the variables, rather than discussing truth
as a whole. Also, some quantitative theorists state that their work relies on
inference and inference is generally concerned with probability than with
strict causality, which is a strength of this type of work. These theorists,
attempting to rehabilitate the role of rationality in the study of politics
because they realize the problematic claims of strong rationality, argue
that we should think in terms of inference and probability.1 1 9 One of the
of the argument that I try to make throughout this work, and that is the science is always
incompletely known and that we always working to improve it.
1 1 7 In discussing the scientific method in relation to political science, Ellen Grigsby writes,
“Science names reality by means of a scientific method, a set of procedures (for gathering
information) resting on certain epistemological assumptions. [This method] reflect this
epistemological assumption [that what is observable is the truth], for pursuing truth by means
of the scientific method entails the collection of data. The data selected for collection are the
set of data observed (not what is assumed, intuited, revealed by faith, or judged to be good of
bad on normative grounds)” (13-14). Of course it is interesting to note that the data is to be
observed, but that the assumptions are to be simply as given.
1 1 8 See Manheim and Rich (1991).
1 1 9 See Politzer (2002) and McGrew (2001). McGrew gives a very elegant defense of why
direct inference is in fact rational. It is a much more careful analysis of the problem than the
average social scientist is likely to give. However, this could simply be because the study of
inference is part of McGrew’s research endeavor, while most social scientists take inference
as a given. This is but one small example of the need, as Putnam correctly points, to hope for
better sharing and cross-fertilization throughout the subfields and disciplines of inquiry. That
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strongest reasons why we should look to or think in terms probability
rather than causality is that causal utterance typically come from occasions
where there is a great deal of uncertainty. Pearle gives the example of
“you will fail the course because of your laziness.” And the stronger
reason why causality is problematic is that “even the most assertive causal
expressions in natural language are subject to exceptions, and those
exceptions may cause major difficulties if processed by standard rules of
deterministic logic” (1). It is not a point of contention that various factors
(inputs) influence results (outcomes). The question is to what degree does
simply assuming that one is starting from the correct spot, in this case
from the assumptions of rational choice theory, prevent us from looking at
possible ontologies that are the very ground for what counts as causation.
Though thinking in terms of probability might mitigate some of our
concerns about overstepping the bounds of what we can reasonably claim,
it is my contention that the assumptions of probability are as problematic
as making strict causal claims. We treat our assumptions, upon which
inference or probability, is based as truth. It is not always clear,
epistemologically, what it means for there to be some type of influence
between variables. Some quantitative theorists have tried to defend
“causation” while also arguing that the terminology used in the social
being said, McGrew’s position is not without its problems and, ultimately, it relies on a
pragmatic defense. This does not bother me, though it will bother many who want inference
to mean more than some type of pragmatic justification.
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sciences should be relaxed. W.L. Miller writes, “Quantitative methods are
criticized for their alleged causal inadequacy. [Critics of causal methods
in the social sciences demand] both adequacy at the level of cause and
adequacy at the level of meaning, that is, a good theory should have both
statistical justification and plausibility” (168). Miller dismisses those who
say that quantitative methods do not adequately establish causality by
arguing 1) that causality in the social sciences does not mean determinism
but influence and 2) correlation is what most theorists mean when they use
the term causation. He writes, “Correlations may be established quite
easily but their causal nature remains in doubt” (168). He then goes on to
argue that theorists should use terms like influence and correlation instead
of causation. However, this is the very problem with a great deal of
quantitative social science, at least among those who see it is the primary
and best way to investigate political phenomena. Correlation and
influences are certainly important and Miller is correct to adjust the
concept of causation as he does. But he refuses to recognize the pragmatic
sacrifice he makes by doing so. First, influence could be any variety of
variables, many of which we eliminate intuitively. For example, if 40% of
the people who vote for a candidate happen to wear the same color shirt,
we obviously do not think that the shirt color influenced the vote or that
there is any positive or negative correlation. However, without strict
causation, which Miller eliminates, there is no way to prove that there is
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not any correlation between this variable and the outcome, other than the
pragmatic reason of it is silly to think that shirt colors influence voting
behaviors. In other words, we intuitively realize that there is no relation.1 2 0
We have good, strong pragmatic reasons to get rid of such an obviously
absurd possibility that shirt color correlates with a vote. However, there is
no epistemological reason to eliminate one variable over another if we are
willing to say that there is not direct causation that we can observe.1 2 1
One might argue that a theory that looks at correlation and
influences is the best type of theory because it is the simplest theory. The
fact that a theory is simple does not necessarily make the theory true.1 2 2
Because political phenomena are too complex, as Miller points out,
looking for causation is impossible, strictly speaking. Looking for
correlation and influences is plausible and desirable, but it is only a part of
the puzzle that is the study of politics. Rich description, case studies,
interesting philosophical insight, Socratic dialogue, looking at the
influence of a culture and economy on ideas, cognitive science, rhetoric,
1 2 0 See Nozick (2001).
1 2 1 The natural sciences do not have, in most cases, this problem. And where inadequate
causality remains, scientists see a place for more work. See Dennett (1995 and 2003).
1 2 2 We must remember that science is littered with simply theories and assumptions that are
no longer deemed to be true. Perhaps the most obvious of these is Aristotle’s cosmology,
perhaps the longest standing explanation/ description of the universe in recorded history.
Also, one might consider phlogiston, long considered to be the substance that made material
flammable. Something with a high concentration of phlogiston, such as woods, would bum
easily, whereas water had not phlogiston. The point of this is to say that phlogiston was
something that was taken as a given, similar to utility maximization, and the evidence given
for it was ex post facto—things did in fact bum. It was a simple, elegant, and useful
explanation, and we now consider it wrong. See McCann (1978).
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and so forth are all critically important in understanding political
outcomes.
The grounds for disagreement in methodology are many. As Alan
Zukerman writes, that the “cacophonous sound of political science” is due
to the “display [of] deep conflicts over appropriate assumptions, foci and
methods of analysis.. . . [Political scientists] may even observe the world
in different ways” (13). There will be those who will argue that I am only
making matters worse and that I am participating in an endeavor that is the
antithesis of science—I am trying to make things more complex rather
than more simple. The purpose of studying politics is not to find the
simplest method possible but to explain the facts and outcomes as best one
can. This may entail a variety of assumptions. It might call for us to use
various methods as far ranging as ethnography, communication studies,
cognitive science, philosophical exegesis, rational choice methodology,
and even more. Political theorists are under no obligation to be able to test
hypotheses according to statistical theory, though there might be cases
when it is appropriate and helpful to do so. Political theorists are only
under the obligation to come up with the best possible explanations for the
facts at hand and to do the best one can that the assumptions one is
working from are the best possible match to reality. Continuing in an
endeavor where the starting points are inadequate, overly simplified, or
even wrong, does not make for good science, yet many political scientists
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continue to save their models at the expense of creating a more rich and
deep understanding about the political world.1 2 3 Finding causation,
probabilities, and correlation plays a useful role in the study of politics,
but these are not the only concerns in the study of politics. If we accept
that probabilities play a significant role in our analysis of politics, which I
think most would agree to, then we must also recognize that, as Pearle
argues, doubt, exceptionality, and lack of certainty are part of the game. If
uncertainty is a part of the political world, then we must do our best to
study that as well. John Dunn argues that understanding politics is a matter
of understanding how humans see the world and how they try to bend the
world to their wills. The study of this will involve both normative
components and judgments as to how well our theories and methods take
this into account.1 2 4
Now that we have looked at some of the problems that are
associated with causality, we must look at rational choice theory. As I
already stated, rational choice theory rests on several assumptions among
1 2 3 This is not to say that every possible explanation is an equally good explanation. In the
last chapter we will explore some ways in which we might be able to distinguish which
explanations are better than others. At this point, I simply want to state that the idea that the
simplest explanation—Ockham’s Razor—is not necessarily the best explanation. The reason
is twofold. First, it is not always clear what the simplest argument in the field of politics is
since it is not always clear if the assumptions from which one starts are the best or most
correct assumptions. Second, it is not necessarily the case that a theory that operates from the
fewest assumptions is the “best” theory. This is the case because the field of inquiry various
from theory to theory and comparing across theories is difficult. Thus, I argue there is a dire
need for us to understand that we need to be willing to look at a variety of theories with the
understanding that the ontological positions from which these theories start are different.
1 2 4 See Dunn (2000), pp. 11-24.
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which is the assumption that dependent variables are caused by
independent variables. And, even if one wants to avoid this strong claim,
rational choice theory still rests on the assumption that human utility
maximization is the cause of our behaviors.
I simply want to explore what rational choice theory is, what its
implications are, and what its overall weaknesses are. Rational choice
theory, as either a model or a theory, is not the only way to do quantitative
work in political science.1 2 5 For most analysts the use of a set of guiding
principles to make sense of the empirical data is critical. For better or
worse, the assumptions of rational choice are the assumptions that guide
many political theorists in attempting to understand or give meaning to the
data of political behavior. In fact, it is safe to say that rational choice
1 7 7
theory is the dominant theory of all the social sciences. Sun-ki Chai
writes, “It can be said without great controversy that no other theoretical
approach in this century has ever enjoyed the same level of ubiquity
throughout the social sciences as the rational choice approach enjoys
today” (3).1 2 8 Paul MacDonald writes, “Rational choice theory is arguably
the most popular and fastest-growing theoretical orientation in
1 2 5 For example, one could think of ethnography or the mere collection of data as types of
quantitative work that is not necessarily organized by the principles of rational choice theory.
Of course, many point to the growing acceptance and adherence to rational choice theory
that has grown over time because rational choice theory is effective, if not, true. For some of
the relevant literature on rational choice theory see Arrow (1963), Olson (1971), Fiorina
(199), Laver (1981), Axelrod (1984), Ordeshook (1986), Dowding (1991) and Lowi (1992).
1 2 7 See Chai (2001), Radnitzky (1992), and Radnitzky and Bemholz (1987).
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contemporary political science” (551). He continues by advancing the idea
that “many advocates of RCT see it as the most plausible candidate for a
universal theory of political and social behavior, whose simple and
intuitively plausible assumptions hold the promise of unifying the diverse
subfields of political science” (551).1 2 9 Raymond Boudon argues that
“rational choice theory . . . contends that explaining a phenomenon means
making it the consequence of a set of statements that should all be easily
acceptable. [Rational Choice Theorists] assume that a good... theory is
one that interprets any social phenomenon as the outcome of rational
individual actors” (5).1 3 0 James Alt and Kenneth Sheplse write that
rational choice theory takes a unitary concept o f human nature and from
this tries to develop a “coherent and unified theoretical view of politics
and economics” (1). We must understand that a universal theory with
readily acceptable assumptions has been the dream of not only the
physical sciences but of the social sciences as well for quite some time. In
a very real sense this dream is simply a continuation of Plato’s, Leibniz’s,
Descartes’, Hegel’s, or just about every major and minor thinker in the
history of philosophy desire to be able to explain all social and political
1 2 8 Chai is, however, willing to note that the “success of the approach has been very tenuous”
(3).
1 2 9 For other theorists who see rational choice theory as a universal theory in political
science—at the very least the theory that we look to any time empirical quandaries block our
way—see Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow (1999) and Niou and Ordeshook (1999).
L ’ ° One can see that this ignores obvious phenomena such as emotions. However, it also
contends that the basis of this theory is an acceptance of unproblematic assumptions. It is
hard to imagine what these types of unproblematic assumptions would look like.
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I l l
phenomena through a set of simple guiding principles. Rational choice
theory, if its universal potential can ever come to fruition, would be the
most dominant, inclusive, and all-encompassing theory the social sciences
have ever seen.
Here is a simple outline of the assumptions that rational choice
theorists make: 1) All actors hold a set of logically consistent beliefs about
the outcomes of that will be the result of their actions. 2) Actors can rank
order their preferences unambiguously. 3) All actors attempt to optimize
over all actions given their preferences and beliefs (see Chai 5-6). The
strengths of rational choice theory, according to Chai, are the following: 1)
It is generalizable. Chai writes, “In other words, a single set of
assumptions pertaining to each type of actor is compatible with any set of
structural assumptions about the environmental setting in which the actor
is present” (9). 2) The theory is parsimonious. This is because preferences
and beliefs are seen as the “only relevant variables” for explaining
behavior (9). 3) The theory also has a predictive advantage. This means
that one can make predictions concerning potential outcomes given certain
variables. As Deborah Stone writes, most decision models are not
concerned with preference formation, only with outcomes (233). I argue
ljl The debate over how to interpret these thinkers, as one might expect, is continuous. It is
safe to say that in the field o f politics, Plato mid Hegel have received a great deal of attention.
For example, Zuckert attempts to cast Plato as seminally important to postmodern thinkers
such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida. See Zuckert (1996). Sallis, in fact, argues that
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throughout the remainder of this work that ignoring preference formation
is the critical flaw of rational choice theory as preference formation—what
and why people choose to act as they do—is the single most critical aspect
of the study of politics. Normative concerns, which is, I argue, the history
of preference formation, and how these play out when clashing with
differing sets of beliefs is the essence of politics. In this chapter, I am
simply dealing with the inadequacies of rational choice theory on its own
terms.
One of the ideas that I want to re-think in this work is that it is
insufficient and maybe even wrong headed to argue that we can study
politics primarily through an ontological basis that is axiomatic. Heme and
Setala write that “all rational choice models are based on an axiomatic
method, which means constructing models on the basis of a set of
assumptions or axioms. Most models also make use of logical or
mathematical techniques .... Consequently, rational choice models have
three things in common: thin rationality, the axiomatic method and
reduction at the micro level” (69). This means that one will assume certain
starting points in one’s theory. And these starting points are points that are
not subject to verification, evidence, or much more than a simple intuitive
Plato is a postmodernist, which seems like an extremely difficult argument to make. See
Sallis (1986).
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1
belief that one is correct. Certainly there is nothing wrong with using
axiomatic theory on its face. Axiomatic theories have been successful in
many endeavors. The question is whether it is also adequate for the study
of politics. I suggest that one of the reasons why there is such a strong
trend in political science towards rational choice theory is not because of
its actual results but because of what we hope to gain from it. This is likely
because we like to think that our theories in the study of politics can
mirror those that are used in economics, math, or the natural sciences.1 3 3
All social scientists are willing to admit that social science theories have
limitations. We need to realize that these limitations are primarily
ontological. How we conceive of the work, the assumptions that we use to
define what we are looking for, and the interactive process of assumptions
reinforcing conclusions which in turn reinforce assumptions is one that we
must look at.
1 3 2 This has problems throughout the history of political and philosophical thought. One
might look at Plato’s theory of forms for one of the earliest manifestations of using axiomatic
theory. While Plato did attempt to “show” that his theory of forms was correct, we must
remember that this is part of a circular argument. By this, I mean that Plato uses his theory of
forms to justify his denial of this world as the world of truth; i.e., mere phenomena will get
one to the truth, and that it is through reason that one finds the truth. Interestingly enough,
the theory of forms finds its most popular rendition, or at least an introduction, for us in
Plato’s most important political work The Republic, as given in the allegory of the cave (See
Plato, Republic 510a-525a. Also, see Copleston, Vol. 1, 163-206.)
1 3 3 There are many who think that being able to emulate math or the natural sciences would
be highly desirable for the study of politics. However, this is problematic. We must
remember that even mathematical theory, strictly speaking far away from the concerns of the
“empirical” world, has many problems. Consider Euclidean geometry, one of the most
successful and persistent math theories. Carl Boyer writes, “Euclid’s Elements did have a
deductive structure, to be sure, but it was replete with concealed assumptions, meaningless
definitions, and logical inadequacies” (609).
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Social scientists, who argue that we should attempt to emulate the
natural sciences, or even economics, do not necessarily seem to
understand how theory works in these fields. If one takes a theory to be
taken merely as a “general statement that explains the facts” (Bames-
Svamey, 2), then one is going to have difficulty, even in the natural
sciences. This is because theories also lead not only to the discovery of
new phenomena, but also to its creation. Ian Hacking argues that scientists
often create phenomena. He argues that we often mistakenly say that the
phenomena are discovered. This is incorrect because we discount the
human element of literally manipulating our surroundings. Of the many
examples he gives Hacking writes that “nothing lased anywhere in the
universe until fifty years ago. Today lasers are everywhere on the
industrialized world, and especially dense in the vicinity of compact discs.
This remark deeply offends some physicists . . . [because they believe]
that the universe was made, from the very beginning, in such a way that
the laser was there, in potentia” (15). Hacking makes the argument that it
is impossible to make such a claim without also asserting an untenable
metaphysical position. Rational choice theorists, at least those who claim
that we should seek to use rational choice theory as a general social
science theory, are in the unenviable position of having to not only
explaining current human political behavior based their simple axioms, but
past behavior as well as behavior from different cultures. In other words,
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the prism and spectrum of human experience must be ignored for the sake
theoretical simplicity. The major ontological problem with rational choice
theory is that it must assume that humans have uniformly been the same
throughout time and throughout different cultures. Citing Hobbes’s theory
of human nature and adding Adam Smith to the mix will not prove that
humans are or always have been self-interested.1 3 4
I am not arguing that rational choice theory does not have a place
in the study of politics. The fact that it has been successful and so widely
accepted should give us reason to see its relevance as an approach to the
study of politics. One way to look at rational choice theory is to say that
certain phenomena appear because of the theory itself. But rational choice
theory is one but one approach for looking at political experience and, in
many instances, it is not the best approach. This is due to the underlying
ontological assumptions and the functions of these assumptions in the
various theories that attempt to explain or clarify political phenomena.1 3 5
1 3 4 Many rational choice theorists argue that the even the single most damaging critique of
rational choice’s assumptions—altruism—can be explained away as self-interested behavior.
In other words, I act out of altruism because it is in my interest to do so or simply because I
prefer to act this way over another. There is, however, mounting evidence against this. See,
for example, Yang-an Hu (2003) who argues even in an economic setting that there are
differences among respondents in a prisoner dilemma game that cannot be explained only in
terms of self-interest. Sam Black (2001) also argues that even the idea that we can set up
substantial boundaries among individuals that would be required for the preference schedules
of rational choice theory is highly problematic. He places personal identity in terms of a
“continuity of agency.” Thus, the idea that altruism is involved in most of our personal
decisions is further strengthened. See also Paul Ricoeur (1992).
1 3 5 Mark Lichbach (2003) has a position that is similar to mine. He argues that rational choice
theory ultimately attempts to push itself as the hegemonic theory because of the weaknesses
of the theory, not its strengths. That is to say, rational choice theory, given the fact that it sets
itself up as a method that can both offer explanations and, to a certain degree, predictions has
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Most texts that use rational choice theory and the quantitative
approaches that result from it would make the claim that one of the
primary tasks of the researchers is “testing the validity or falsity of
hypothesized functional relationships, called hypotheses or theories”
(Schroeder, et al, 12). This functional relationship, to generalize, expresses
the relationship between an independent variable and a dependent
variable, or that is to say, it tests the causal relationship of the two
variables. If a relationship is said to exist, then the hypothesis or theory is
said to be true because one variable causes another to occur. The reason,
according to rational choice theorists, that this is a desirable methodology
is because it is testable, which implies rigor, rationality, and
reasonableness, unlike softer and messier approaches, such as identity
theory or cultural politics. Schroeder, et al, note that the “true form of the
relationship between {the dependent and independent variables] is not
known. We have simply assumed a particular form for the relationship in
order to summarize the data” (17).1 3 6 In other words, for the convenience
of quantifying a theory, we simply assume a relationship and if statistical
theory claims that there is significant interaction among the variables, then
to be hegemonic. I add to this position that rational choice theory, with its assumptions of
rationality that are ultimately under-determined and insufficiently described, that it is limited
in its worth and scope.
Ij6 There are even stronger claims as to the nature of the nature of the relationship of the data
with our theories. Milton Lodge (1981) writes that the relationships or social scales “should
behave as lawfully as do scales of physical sensations” (7). Milton does admit that any
weakness of the results of our testing is difficult to detect reasons for, whether the weakness
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we can make the claim of significance and truth. While there might be
some clear-cut cases as to the applicability of this approach, for example a
certain amount of government spending in a program leads to a certain
outcome, it does nothing to address what many might take to be the most
important questions in the study of politics and that is, namely, our
normative concerns. If one takes the but one question—why do countries
go to war—it seems impossible that one theoretical approach will be able
to handle sufficiently providing us with a comprehensive and adequate
answer. And if one considers that wars have been fought over a range of
time, with many different cultures, and with a vast array of political forms,
it is rather difficult to think that the narrow constraints that rational choice
puts on individual actors will be sufficient to cover the material. Even if
one were to claim that rational choice is concerned about the actions of
individuals and not with states or large scale action, it still does not
address that fact that war is one the central topics of concern for politics. It
seems that a wide range of studies are crucial to understanding why we go
to war from psychological studies of individual actors to sweeping
t 57
histories of entire eras.
lies in our measurements or in our theoretical formulations (6). Clearly, I fell on the side of a
weakness in theoretical formulation.
1 3 7 There have been a growing number of works that do attempt to discuss the causes of war
in terms of rational choice. For example, one o f the most important works in this area while
not strictly speaking rational choice, Michael Doyle’s Ways of War and Peace (1997) can be
read as an argument for like countries with similar interests rationally not going to war. In
other words, democracies, according Doyle, have built-in incentives to not go to war. See
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Some of the most stringent criticisms of rational choice theory come
Green and Shapiro (1994). I argue that the reason why rational choice has
failed in the way that Green and Shapiro describe is because it has not
properly taken into account its own assumptions. Rational choice theory
falls^prey to the same mistake that early positivists made by claiming that
1 ‘ I f t
any type of metaphysical claim was nonsense. Green and Shapiro argue
that post hoc theory development, slippery predictions, vaguely
operationalized predictions, searching for conforming evidence, and other
problems run through various attempts to utilize rational choice. Perhaps
the most damaging criticism they level at rational choice theory is that
“the stature of rational choice scholarship does not rest on a readily
identifiable set of empirical successes” (5). Rational choice theorists often
hail, at the very least, the theoretical sophistication of their designs. Green
and Shapiro write,
We do not dispute that theoretical models of immense and
increasing sophistication have been produced by practitioners of
rational choice theory, but in our view the case has yet to be made
that these models have advanced our understanding of how politics
works in the real world. To date, a large proportion of the theoretical
conjectures of rational choice theorists have not been tested
empirically. Those tests that have been undertaken have either failed
on their own terms or garnered theoretical supports for propositions
that, on reflection, can only be characterized as banal: they do little
also William Booth, et al (1994), Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman (1992), and
Hugh Stretton and Lionel Orchard (1994).
1 3 8 The most passage that perhaps best illustrates this sentiment is Wittgenstein’s last
sentence of the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus where he writes, “Whereof one cannot speak,
thereof must one be silent” (2001, 120). It is interesting to note that Wittgenstein later recants
this position.
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more than restated existing knowledge in rational choice
terminology. (6)
Rational choice theorists attempt to avoid the above criticisms by
making a sort of “pragmatic” leap by claiming that they are looking at the
outcomes of empirical data and that their assumptions are simply that,
assumptions (Ward 1995). This does not save rational choice theorists
from the need to argue for their assumptions, to show why one set of
assumptions concerning human actors is better than another, or, even more
simply, why there should not be more than one set of assumptions.
What constitutes the “actor” is a problem that pervades all of the
humanities. There is a deep and strong literature that has criticized the
“Western” approach as being too reliant on rationality models that do not
pay off, too ethnocentric, and too phallocentric as well. While I cannot
cover all of these criticisms here, it should be noted that they all share one
element in common—they argue that political models that describe
humans as “merely” rational actors are too simple. There is even a
growing body of empirical evidence that states that there is not sufficient
physiological evidence to make the claim that humans are rational actors
in the same way that a Descartes or an Adam Smith might have
hypothesized. For example, Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen (2000) argue
human affect is at the root of our expressions of rationality.
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As I argue throughout the rest of the work, we need to understand
that the multiplicity of approaches in political science is a strength, not a
weakness. It is only by having an ontologically driven theory rather than a
methods driven theory that we will yield results in our attempts to better
understand political action. In other words, it is by learning and re
calibrating our theories and not by finding evidence to save our method
that will move the study of politics forward. Merely positing assumptions
and arguing from them seems to be antithetical to the nature of politics
itself, which as a practice requires such a reliance on learning. We need to
understand clearly how politics, both in practice and in study, rely on
different starting points or ontologies. We are often likely to be uncritical
of these assumptions. Given these competing and differing sets of
assumptions the best outcome in the field of political science that one can
hope for is one where political scientists will continue to speak past one
another, largely engaging in debates within their own circle of peers. At
worst, we will find that political science, as it is currently called, will not
appear to be anything like a science.1 3 9 We will also see through the
1391 am not naively assuming that all if any many political scientists these days argue that
political science can be like the natural sciences. Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter
Klingemann write, “Much ink has been spilt over the question of whether, or in what sense,
the study of politics is or is not truly a science. The answer largely depends upon how much
one tries to load into the term ‘science’” (2000: 9). They then argue for a minimalist
definition which means something like a systematic inquiry, building towards a set of agreed
upon propositions as opposed to a more full and strict definition that calls for covering laws.
Whether or not political science can aspire to be a “science” depends upon the following, as
Charles Beard once cleverly quipped: “If the student of politics prescribes a remedy that
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course of this study that one’s assumptions concerning humans and human
nature affects the outcome of one’s study or research. At the very least, we
should avoid accepting uncritically that which has been given to us
without evidence or merely by tradition. As R. J. Collingwood writes, for
example, that Enlightenment thinkers would “cheerfully identify the
intellectual habits of a Western European in their own day with the
intellectual faculties bestowed by God upon Adam and all his progeny”
without so much as a doubt as to the veracity of such assumptions (224).
Robert Solomon writes, “The seemingly simple ideal of ‘humanity’ turned
out to be a simpleminded gloss over irreconcilable differences between
people, and a denial of real historical change” (xvi). I argue that much of
what passes as research, meaning the explanation of problems, is largely
assumption driven, ignorant both of current science and historical subtlety.
Another way to put this is to say that the types of answers we get will be
derived from how we conceive of the problem.1 4 0
It would be useful, at this point, just to have a brief “postmodern”
aside since postmodernism is the camp or school of thought that is often
pleases [the powerful], he will probably be hailed as a scientist; if his suggestion is
unpalatable, he is only a professor after all” (1993: 126).
1 4 0 This is a point that is made by Michel Foucault in The Order of Things. He writes, “The
classical episteme can be defined in its most general arrangement in terms of the articulated
system of mathesis, a taxonomia, and a genetic analysis. The sciences always carry within
themselves the project, however remote it may be, of an exhaustive ordering of the world;
they are always directed, too, towards the discovery of simply elements and their progressive
combination; and at their center they form a table on which knowledge is displayed in a
system. As for the great controversies that occupied men’s minds, these accommodated quite
naturally in the folds of this organization” (74, 75).
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most critical of rational choice theory. The idea of postmodernism is
certainly ambiguous and widely used.1 4 1 The term, in many senses, has
become a sort of catchall phrase, a term that seems to signify anything that
is against instrumental reason.1 4 2 Unfortunately, that seems to be a
misapplication of the term, ignoring its pragmatic implications and
emphasizing only the so-called “desconstructive” aspects to the idea.
Perhaps one useful way to look at postmodernism is to say that it attempts
to disrupt that which is given or taken as truth.1 4 3
There are at least eight key critiques or “purposes” that
postmodernism can be said to have. 1) Postmodernism is an attack on the
idea of a unified, singular notion of truth. The belief that there is a truth
that is independent of human experience is soundly rejected by
1 4 1 The list is exhaustive. Here is but a sample of the breadth and reach that the concept of
postmodernism has had: Douglas Kellner’s “The X-Files and the Aesthetics and Politics of
Postmodern Pop” (1999), Henrik Bang’s “David Easton’s Postmodern Images” (1998), Karl-
Heinz Ladeur’s “Post-Modern Constitutional Theory: A Prospect for the Self-Organizing
Society” (1997), and Peter Digeser, “Performativity Trouble: Postmodern feminism and
Essential Subjects,” Political research Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3 (September): 655-673.
1 4 2 It is not necessarily the case the postmodernism means something like “against
instrumental reason.” That is simply one way of looking at postmodernism. It might simply
mean that which is beyond modernism. Ianna Kucuradi writes, “Modem, initially the relative
term of ancient, traditional, classical, etc., denoting the latest way of doing or making
something—whatever it be—mostly a way introduced in a revolutionary manner up against a
traditional one and then generalized at a given point in time.. .. [However, it has also come
to bej equated with westernization, [and] has been a permanent item on the agenda of certain
non-westem countries [and] westernization was always considered to be something good and
necessary for the survival of these [non-westem] societies” (13). Now it means to be against
this project of westernization, at least according to this account.
1 4 j In Best’s analysis of Marx, Foucault, and Habermas and their contributions to what might
be called postmodernism, he writes, “Through their use of a discontinuity perspective, all
three employ historical analysis of the present to shatter the entrenched sense that it is given,
necessary, or inevitable and to expose it as a contingent construct that can be changed. In
each vision of history the past is employed to disrupt die present; to show how reified
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postmodernists.1 4 4 2) Postmodernism is an attack on the notion that there
is stable meaning in language. Traditionally the idea that meaning has to
have an element of stability is the handmaiden to the idea of a universal,
singular notion of truth.1 4 5 3) In conjunction with the first two, one can
also see postmodernism as an attack on the idea that identity is unified,
singular and unchanging. Typically, what is thought to be true about
humans of one culture, would also be seen to be true about humans in all
cultures.1 4 6 4) Postmodernism is an attack on the idea that there is
imminent logic or ordering principle to history. Modernism sees history as
moving and progressing, moving from the less ordered to the more
ordered. History has a telos, according to many, moving from the less
moral and more fractured societal arrangements to more moral and more
unified social arrangements.1 4 7 5) Postmodernism is an attack on the idea
economic, political, and technological imperatives rule over social life; and to allow an
alternative future where human freedom can become a reality” (209).
1 4 4 Many have undertaken the task of mining, once again, the works of our philosophical past
to see just where the canon stands on this idea. Typically, the past thinkers are seen in a
“traditional” light, holding to some idea or version of necessary, universal truth. However,
there is a growing trend of thinkers that seeks to re-interpret the canon. See, for example,
Zuckert (1996).
1 4 5 Heidegger can be seen as the beginning of the 20t h century attempt to re-examine what the
ancients might have meant. This task has been carried on by thinkers such as Derrida. See
Derrida (1973), (1976), (1978), and (1982). Derrida writes, in his seminal essay “Difference”
(1982) that language, and therefore truth, is always at play. He writes, “The concept of play
keeps itself beyond this opposition [of binary concepts], announcing, on the eve of
philosophy and beyond it, the unity of chance and necessity in calculations without end” (7).
4 6 John Hallowell and Jene Porter (1997) argue that all political thought, and all political
thought from any culture, is an attempt to make sense out of disorder. Or better to bring order
to disorder (x-xvi).
1 4 7 Best writes that “Vico, Herder, Spengler, Nietzsche, Weber, Marx, and others in the
modem tradition subjected totalizing and teleological visions of history to sharp critique,
advocating countervisions of historical plurality, nonevolutionism, or cyclical theories of
history” (7).
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that reason is supreme and prior to emotions. This aspect of
postmodernism probably first gained credence in the feminist attempts to
show that reason has typically been associated, wrongly, with the male
and that emotions have been shown to be female. And the association of
reason to the male made males superior because reason has been held, in
our Western philosophical tradition, to be superior to emotions. Feminism
has been an attempt to overturn such incorrect assumptions, problematize
them, and rework them.1 4 8 6) More and more postmodernism is seen as the
affirmation that Enlightenment principles led to overall regression rather
than progress. Certainly, this is the position of post-colonialism and is also
seen in a variety of other places.1 4 9 7) Related to the last point and one that
is made by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School is the idea that
instrumental reason is not the most superior form of reason but, in fact,
leads to a loss of independence and further dominance of various life
forms such as technology.1 5 0 8) Lastly, postmodernism, in the same way
1 4 8 See, for example, Elizabeth Grosz (1995).
1 4 9 One example of this argument is made by Edith Wyschogrod in Spirit in Ashes (1990).
She asks how do we account for the mass destruction and horror of the 20th century. There
are problems with Western philosophy that have led to such beliefs. For example, she writes,
“Before mass death casts is shadow over contemporary existence, the most significant
meaning structure which governs individual dying and attains consensus in Western culture
is the assumption that good death, even if not free of pain, is the measure of a good life” (2),
Therefore, individuals learn to subsume their own meaning and the meaning of others into
death. This makes mass death possible. This is, for Wyschogrod, reason gone bad.
1 5 0 See Stephen Eric Bronner’s (Ed.) Critical Theory and Society: A Reader (1989) and
James Johnson’s “Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation Between Critical Theory
and Rational Choice” (1993). Max Horkheimer writes, “Although social philosophy is the
focus of general philosophical concern, it is in no better shape today than most philosophical,
indeed most fundamentally intellectual efforts. One is unable to find a substantive conception
of social philosophy that could be considered everywhere as binding. Given the present
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that it has attempted to show a connection between the ways in which we
view gender and reason there is a connection between how we view
Enlightenment principles and difference and diversity. For all of Hume’s,
Locke’s and Kant’s advocating for liberality in politics and, one would
assume by extension, the belief in diversity, they still inferred highly
racists and separatist ideals from their read on Enlightenment principles.1 5 1
The purpose of this chapter has been to outline the problems of the
nature of causality itself and some of the theoretical difficulties that
rational choice theory has due to the fact it does not account sufficiently
for its own assumptions. I brought in postmodernism primarily because it
is an important critique of the Western project known as reason. I do not
bring up postmodernism to endorse it, but to show it as a powerful critique
that theorists will have to overcome. Also, I think it is important to see
how others have viewed the problems and possible solutions of politics. I
think that postmodernism does give relevant and adequate critiques to the
problem of assumptions that pervades Western ontology. However, it does
not provide us with a direction that we should travel to next. I will argue
later that Nussbaum and Taylor, while avoiding the problems often
situation in the sciences, in which the traditional boundaries between disciplines are in
question and we do not yet know where they might be drawn in the future, the attempt to
give ultimate definitions for academic domains seems rather untimely” (cited in Bronner,
25).
1 5 1 See Issac Kramnick (editor) The Portable Enlightenment Reader (1995).
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associated with rational choice theory are also able to avoid the primary
criticisms that usually accompany postmodernism as well.
Here, I want us to come to the realization that there are several
ways to approach the evaluation of a theory or model. First, we can
evaluate a theory to see if it is worthy of being seen as something like a
grand unifier. Thus far, I don’t think that we have found such a theory or
model and, for theoretical reasons, and I think that it is impossible to do
so. Still, the endeavor of theorists is, if nothing else, to come up with
descriptions that best fit the world at hand.
Second, we can evaluate a theory based on which theory explains
“more.” The problem with the study of politics is that there is a wide array
of phenomena. Unlike the study of biology, looking at life where there are
principles that one can use to explain life on a microscopic level, say,
whether one is studying porcupines or ants, the phenomena we encounter
in politics is often very disparate. Conducting a war, the most dramatic
and consequential of political acts, is different phenomenon than
understanding candidate preference for an election. In the end, all we have
that unifies these phenomena is the human actor. In this fact alone we can
see the importance of studying and understanding the actor as best we can
and not merely arguing from old assumptions.
Third, we can evaluate a theory based on what it gives us. This
sounds simple and yet it is problematic. It is a pragmatic defense of
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theory. It is also a reason why the theorist is so critical to the study of
politics because it is the theorist who is equipped with a variety of
outlooks and possible methods and this will help us to see better how to
identify and tackle problems. A theory should be evaluated by whether or
not it seems to fit the phenomenon that is being studied. Likewise, the
phenomenon at hand should be studied or examined by the theory that
seems to best fit it. Also, phenomena can be studied by multiple theories.
For example, war can be seen from rational choice perspectives,
structuralist positions, and from postmodern perspectives. The question as
to which one is true is simply the wrong question to ask. The reason why
this makes no sense is because we see that each theory brings with it the
ontology or foundation as criteria for judgment. Concepts like best fit,
probable, intuitively correct, and so forth are going to be the guiding
principles of how we look at theories. At this point, we need to at least
accept that rational choice theory is a tool and not the final solution in
politics. As John Dunn argues that the precision and clarity that rational
choice theory promises is not there. He writes, “The development of the
theory of games [have not] really enhanced anyone’s understanding of
politics” (29). From here we will move onto an examination of ontology in
the study of politics in a way that will hopefully enhance our
understanding of politics.
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In this chapter, I have examined the concept of causality, its link as
an underlying assumption to rational choice theory, and some of the
conceptual weaknesses of rational choice theory. I also briefly examined
some of the key points of postmodern thought, which is usually seen as the
foil to rational choice theory. In the next chapter I will continue the
examination of ontology and how it has been conceived by several key
thinkers in political theory. The primary reason I do this is to explore
further the relationship between one’s assumptions and the outcomes of
one’s overall method.
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Chapter Four:
Looking at Ontology in Political Theory
All people by nature desire to know.
Aristotle, Metaphysics
Everything begins by referring back, that is to say, does not begin.
Jacques Derrida
In the previous chapters, I have argued the following: 1) that we
must have an expansive understanding of what it means to study politics.
The attempt to reduce the study of politics to a single theory is implausible
because there is no theory that is adequate to the job and because the range
of human experience is simply too broad. 2) I have argued that the
assumptions, the ontology, that one starts from leads to the conclusions
that one will “find.” I argued that it may not even be correct to state that
one finds or discovers phenomena but that we might have a role in the
creation of such phenomena.1 5 2 3) I argued that theories such as rational
choice theory are inadequate because they have insufficiently considered
problems such as causality, differences in culture, context, history, and
even the very nature of humans. In this chapter will also see, through an
examination of several important figures in the history of political
philosophy, that the assumptions that a thinker makes concerning the
human actor contributes to the conclusions the thinker comes to
1 5 2 For example, see Hacking (2002).
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concerning issues like state power, state organization, and normative
rules.1 5 3
Substituting or mistaking a method for an ontology is dangerous.
This is because we may very well attribute things to humans that are
simply wrong. One must always be cognizant that humans are comprised
of thoughts, emotions, beliefs, ideologies, reason, etc. To hope that there
are short cuts or ways around this fact is naive. Political scientists have
often looked to simplify what it means to be human for the sake of our
their theories or methods. This is because political scientists have sought
for too long to model themselves after the natural sciences. For example,
Giovanni Sartori writes,
I take the view that mainstream political science has adopted an
unsuited model of science (drawn from the hard, exact sciences) and
has failed to establish its own identity (as a soft science) by failing
1 5 3 While most of these thinkers would not want to use “pragmatic” terminology, I can say
that there is always good “pragmatic” reasons not to argue for one’s assumptions. This is
primarily a tactic to avoid circularity. However, early thinkers would not have had the same
reasons for avoiding circularity that we do today. Ancient thinkers, such as Plato and
Aristotle, would have sought to avoid circularity in order to get to the more important role of
die philosopher, which is his public role. As Socrates notes at one time, “It is o chance matter
we are discussing but how one should live” (1974,36). How one ought to live is the critical
component of ancient thinking. Nussbaum writes, “Operating in highly religious cultures,
they [Plato, Aristotle, etc.] commend philosophy as a rival of religious and traditional
conceptions of life, and they imagine that it plays its role best when it marginalizes or
subordinates those other conceptions. Thus they argue that philosophical activity, and not for
example, activity in a religious cult, is the art of life. They typically ask people to depart
from those other ways of life to pursue a life focused on philosophy” (2000b, 465). While
Nussbaum does not advocate such a position, I bring it up simply to show that these
philosophers had the action of living a philosophical life as their primary goal. Modem
thinkers attempt to avoid circularity because it makes for bad science to be caught in a
circular argument. The difference, however, between the natural and the social sciences, is
that we can often infer our assumptions from outcomes. For example, it may be the case that
electrons really do not exist; however, the phenomena we observe make it seem as if there
are electrons. In politics, we do not get such a cozy inference.
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to establish its own, distinctive methodology.1 5 4 To be sure, my
shelves are inundated by books whose title is “methodology of the
social sciences”; but these works simply address research techniques
and statistical processing. They have almost nothing to do with the
“ method o f logos, ” with the method o f thinking. So we now have a
dismal science that lacks logical method and indeed ignores pure
and simple logic. (785, my emphasis).
The best that we can always hope for is the most complete and
accurate descriptions of actors that we can borrow from other sciences.
We cannot avoid discussing the problems of ontology.1551 argue in this
chapter political theorists use the concept of human nature as an ontology
framework from which they derive their positions concerning the state,
morality, and power, just to name a few applications. The outcomes will
often differ drastically depending on the place—one’s ontology—from
which one begins his or her philosophical adventure.
It should seem obvious that if there were a clear cut idea of what
human nature is then there would be a consensus as to this fact among
social theorists.1 5 6 There is no such consensus and the concept, though
well used, is not well thought out. Rational choice theory, for example,
uses an extremely simplified version of human nature, so much so that it is
1 5 4 It is one of the goals of this work to serve as a theoretical ground for what this distinctive
methodology might look like.
1 5 5 Joseph Colomer argues that there are four levels of knowledge that can be used to
describe the endeavor that we call political science: 1) definitions and classifications, 2)
quantitative measurements, 3) causal hypothesis, and 4) explanatory theory (793). I argue
that we need to adequately discuss number four, explanatory theory, in order to be able to
engage in the other three. This work seeks to make a contribution to the ground level work of
explanatory theory in the study of politics.
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difficult to even equate its assumptions to anything that resembles human
experience, on either an individual or communal level. The tradition that
we call “Western Political Theory” is characterized by discontinuity,
meaning that different thinkers have, explicitly or implicitly, used
different versions of human nature.1 5 7 From these different versions of
human nature, western political thinkers have justified a wide array of
political thought. Consider for a moment that Adam Smith and David
Hume justify what we now call classical liberalism on the basis of human
nature in the same way that Karl Marx justifies communism based on
human nature as well.1 5 8 It is even more problematic when one considers
1 5 6 For a discussion on some of the ways in which political scientists have attempted to
discuss the problem of human nature, please see Amhart (1994), McShea (1978), Reeve
(1999), Steiner (1980), Simon (1985), and Ahrensdorf (2000).
1 5 7 See, for example, Ewa Domanska (1998). She argues that there is such a great
proliferation of kinds of history in fields as diverse as economic, cultural, feminist,
anthropology, psychology, and so forth, that it makes little sense to even discuss something
like truth, though many of our current political systems espouse the idea of truth and even
rely on them. Hayden White (1990) argues, “To raise the question of then nature of narrative
is to invite reflection on the very nature of culture and, possibly, even on the nature of
humanity itself. So nature is the impulse to narrative, so inevitable is the form narrative for
any report on the ways things really happened, the narrativity could appear problematic only
in a culture in which it was absent Narrative might well be considered a solution to a
problem of general human concern, namely, the problem of how to translate knowing into
telling, the problem of fashioning human experience into a form assimilable to structures of
meaning that are generally human rather than culture-specific” (1). Part of the project of my
work is to discuss how we need to shift the discussion or narrative in the study of politics
from method to ontology. It is by examining our assumptions, making arguments for and
against them, that we will be able to find a field of study that is more generally human rather
than culture specific.
1 5 8 David Hume argues that human nature is to a large degree fixed. He writes, for example,
that “revenge is a natural passion” and as are “ambition, pride . . . and a persecuting spirit”
(201). And this is not to mention other characteristics that find their way into most of us such
as “conceit” (200). Interestingly enough Human also finds that much of human nature has
cultural variety. However, this does not mean that these cultural traits are accidental. They
are, rather, essential and are also fixed. He writes that “The French, Greeks, Egyptians, and
Persians are remarkable for gaiety. The Spaniards, Turks, and Chinese are noted for gravity
and a serious deportment.. . . The Arabic is uncouth and disagreeable: The Muscovite soft
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that freedom plays a significant role in the development of both theories.
In the natural sciences, typically the descriptions of phenomena, such as
the effects of gravity on a rock, are not in dispute insofar as different
scientists have the same information to draw upon. In the social sciences,
practitioners have humans right before them, but what counts as essential
in terms of describing the political actor is generally in dispute, if not by
individual theorists, then at least by “schools of thought.”1 5 9
and musical. Energy, strength, and harshness form the character of the Latin tongue Who
can doubt, but the English are at present more polite and knowing than the Greeks were for
several ages after Troy? (228, Essays). Adam Smith is a little more difficult to pin down
when it comes to human nature. Certainly, he is well known for asserting that humans are
naturally self-interested and act primarily on such interests. Still, there is an element of
Smith’s work that holds that humans are evil left to themselves. He holds that people need to
hold to the “amiable and respectable virtues” so that individuals can abide by the “great, the
awful and respectable, the virtues of self-denial. . . that command of the passions which
subjects all the movements o f our nature” (23, The Theory of Moral Sentiments). For an
interesting discussion on Marx’s conception of human nature see Sean Sayers’ work
Marxism and Human Nature (1998). Sayers argues that Marx sees human nature as
malleable and that human nature itself is an historical phenomenon. Sayers writes, “The
concept of human nature is controversial these days, and the view that Marxism involves it is
doubly so. On the one hand, it is sometimes said that we should reject the notion altogether
and adopt an anti-humanist or anti-essentialist stance. Others argue that this leads inevitably
to a disastrous sort of relativism. We must hand on to traditional enlightenment humanism,
they insist, for social theory and critical values can be defended only on the foundation of
universal and timeless features of human nature” (4). For my purposes, I simply want to note
how these thinkers see that one’s view of human nature acts as an ontological force, a place
from which one argues. One cannot help but see how these differing versions of ontology, in
this case the assumptions of human nature, will lead to various outcomes and alternatives.
1 5 9 One can compare a variety of works to see that even discussing what is essential to human
nature is a problem. Howard and Donnelly (1986) argue that human rights are often seen as
common to all cultures and that they fit in any political structure. However, they argue that
this is to confuse human rights with human dignity. Their conclusion is that human dignity
requires a liberal type of government. Thus, they are essentialists in their conception of
human nature. Compare this with Reader and Wolf (1973) who argue that ambiguities exist
among people, these ambiguities make up social life, these ambiguities make it possible for a
variety of social systems to survive, and the humans are the only agent capable of acting
ambiguously. Reader and Wolf are anti-essentialist. Both works appear in prestigious
political science journals and both are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Both rely on
secondary works that are in no way related to the other. This situation has not necessarily
improved in political science since this time. See Murphy (2004) and Wilkin (1999).
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A great deal of Western philosophical debate centers on the
problem of what counts as “truth.” While it is often the case that scholars
paint the picture that philosophy and politics moves in a series of
progressions, from less enlightenment to greater enlightenment,1 6 0 it is
more likely the case that each thinker simply addresses similar questions
with a new ontological outlook. It is difficult to explain why thinkers work
from different ontologies, though some of the possible explanations are
culture, historical influences, personal preference, a particular goal for
one’s work, and so forth. However, I think the most likely reason is that
political thinkers almost always do their best to present a set of
assumptions that will lead to conclusions that they find desirable.1 6 1
Typically, if one argues that Hobbes is more correct than Plato is it
because Hobbes was brighter than Plato was or is that there has been
“progress” since Plato’s time. If Hobbes represents progress over Plato,
then one can legitimately ask why we should even bother with Plato at all.
Of course, this conclusion works its way up to us. If any thinker X is
correct, there is little need to look at others, except for historical curiosity.
1 6 0 See, for example, Hallowell and Porter’s (1997) Political Philosophy: The Search for
Humanity and Order.
1 6 1 It is relevant to ask whether Plato comes to his idea of the republic through rational
discourse and examination or whether he had already concluded that the republic was the
best form of government and his narrative reflects that choice. I argue that it is likely that
Plato, and all other political thinkers as well, start from the end, design an ontology that will
support the end, and then proceed with their argument Political philosophers do not say, as a
natural scientists would do, I have some facts here and let me just see where they lead. And
then to the surprise of the thinker one concludes that totalitarianism or capitalism or
something else is the most desirable form of government.
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But if we are political scientists, then we are not as concerned with history
as we are with the truth, explaining phenomena and the like. For example,
in order to understand astronomy one does not need to know anything
about Ptolemy. He is only of interest to the astronomer that is also
interested in history. One might argue that we still look at previous
theorists so we can look at their mistakes in order to avoid them. Again,
this is a seemingly odd way to undertake an intellectual enterprise. To be a
good economist one does not need to study the past mistakes of previous
economists, unless one wants to engage in the history of economics.
Rather, to be a good economist, one simply needs to know the current and
most “accurate” state of economics to date. Yet, there are many in political
science that would not want to argue, except the most extreme rationalists,
that studying Plato is useless except as an academic exercise into past
futility.1621 argue that we study Plato and others because we are interested
in their ontological foundations, though my often not recognize this
interest or we might misidentify it. We find it interesting and useful to see
how Plato confronted the problem of state power, individuals, morality,
and the like.1 6 3 We are interested in how his various assumptions led to the
1 6 2 We have not even mentioned the wide of array of cultural alternatives and differing
versions of human nature.
1 6 3 Hallowell and Porter (1997) argue that the endeavor of political philosophy is one our
most natural endeavors. This also requires our constant attention. They write, “Political
philosophy is a continual human activity that requires constant reflection. Political societies
live within an historical continuum of new and passing generations, of constant and changing
challenges, and of an undetermined future” (xii). This requires us to figure out how to
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conclusions at which he arrived. The study of politics is ultimately a
comparative enterprise in which theorists can make claims such as given
the assumption that political actor X has set of attributes Y what can we
expect for conclusion Z.1 6 4 This does not solve the issue of which path we
should take. The study of politics still needs its history and, as of yet, we
have not, for the most part, abandoned that idea.1 6 5
Recently, the problems of how to approach politics and what to
include in the study have grown. As different cultures, languages, and
political systems collide, we should expect that there will be less cohesion
in how various people see politics.1 6 6 In order to make the claim that there
is a correct way to look at this massive convergence of cultures and
differences in politics, then one has to claim that other competing theories
are wrong.1 6 7 There is no prima facia reason for us to think that people
organize and redistribute the goods of society and find ways to articulate and defend its
goals.
6 4 See Salkever abd Nylan (1994). They write that looking at politics through a comparative
framework “demands a certain kind of rationality by insisting that reasons be given for
accepting as good or true what we might otherwise do or believe out of ancient custom or
pious awe—but this is not rationality on the model of deductive proof, and it may well be
one that calls for expression in poetry or aphorism or story rather than bare prose” (240).
They continue by arguing that political philosophy “appears as an ever-present human
possibility, rather than the systematized and mathematicized thought of a particular
individual or group; the danger to be avoided here is the reduction of practical philosophic
inquiry to scientistic ‘ethnophilosophy’” (240).
1 6 5 See Scanlon (1998) and especially Ignatieff (2001). Ignatieff argues that not only is the
study of politics infused with normative claims, but that mere existence as a human obligates
one to others. He writes, “The language of human needs is a basic way of speaking about the
idea of a natural human identity.. . . The possibility of human solidarity rests on this idea of
natural human identity” (28).
1 6 6 See Huntington (1996) and Said (2001).
1 6 7 Some comparative theorists, such as Francis Fukuyama (1992), argue that the world will
ultimately culminate in a coalition of liberal political ideology. Others, such as Benjamin
Barber (1996), see the world spinning further apart fester than ever.
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will ultimately come to the same conclusions as to what forms of
government, forms of civil society, and the like are best. Rationality alone
will not get us there because there are differing notions of rationality and
because not all believe that rationality can be the arbiter among differing
1 fill
positions. The differences that we find in our political world start from
the ontological and epistemological positions that we hold, whether we
have made explicit arguments for those positions or not.
In this chapter, I will explore briefly several thinkers in the history
of Western political theory. The purpose of this is to show how various
ontological starting points are critical to the outcomes of these thinkers. I
argue that most thinkers in the Western tradition can be divided into those
who advocate for human nature being 1) ahistorical or 2) historical.1691
find this to be a useful typology simply because it allows us to see how
political thinkers have organized their arguments and yet holds off on the
question as to whether or not they gave an accurate portrayal of “human
1 6 8 We must remember that rational choice theory does not call for any type of ultimate
conclusion, meaning that we do not expect that all actors will have the same preferences.
However, this does not remove the normative commitment that rational choice theory makes.
To choose preferences or means that are less than maximal must thought to be irrational. For
example, actor X has preferences A, B, and C. All things being equal X desires A more than
C. So, what does choosing C mean? There are only two options. One option is that actor X is
irrational. She has chosen a preference that she does not want as much as another. The other
option is that she has shifted her preference schedule, C is now the number one preference.
However, if the rationale behind preference schedules can be altered so readily and easily,
then one might wonder what use is such an ordering of preferences at all. In other words,
what I in fact chose will always be the thing I wanted most. The only way to make sense out
of this is to look at one’s normative commitments. Certainly most would argue that it is
“better” to be rational than irrational; hence, the normative commitment.
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nature.”1 7 0 The ways in which thinkers assume human nature has lot to do
with how and what type of governmental systems they will propose, what
they see the proper role of government power being, and how morality
should discussed in the political arena,1 7 1 The following are the
characteristics of the historical individual: 1) The historical individual is a
product of her time and location. 2) The individuals who are part of the
Western political culture have different preferences and reasons for action
than do those who are part of non-Westem traditions. This is because of
the differences in culture. 3) We should not expect that all actions are
reducible to preferences that can readily be articulated.1 7 2 4) Humans, their
actions, their reasons for actions, and their explanations for actions are
contextual and are often not readily understood by those outside a
particular culture.1 7 3
1 6 9 This classification is an obvious simplification. There are elements of all thinkers that
cross the gamut of these two positions. And, these are but two ways to conceive of and
analyze political thought concerning human nature.
1 7 0 Ultimately I conclude that the accuracy of one’s position on human nature is not that
important. It is better to be “accurate” than not. It is also more logically coherent to argue
from correct assumptions than from incorrect or false assumptions. However, the impact of a
theory of politics lies more in the actions, policies, and outcomes of its adherents than the
accuracy of the theory itself. Thus, for example, one could suspend the question as to
whether or not Adam Smith or Karl Marx gave correct descriptions of human nature,
motivations, etc. because the impact and influence of their theories would seemingly be
obvious to any reader of history.
1 7 1 See Klosko (1995).
1 7 2 This is to say that there might be more to actions than rationalizable preferences, such as
those preferences that come out of emotions.
1 7 ; > Among the most important roles that a culture plays with an individual are 1) in cultural
transmission and 2) in the passing along of values. Harrison (2000) argues that understanding
these will be key to understanding political development in the coming years. He writes,
“Cultural studies and emphasis on culture in the social sciences were in the mainstream in
the 1940s and 1950s. Interest then dropped off. But a renaissance in cultural studies has
taken place during the past fifteen years that is moving toward the articulation of a new
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The ahistoric individual is characterized by the following: 1) given
human nature, we can expect that humans react in a similar fashion to
similar circumstances at all times and in all places. 2) Traditions, customs,
and culture are, in a very real sense, less important than the elements that
humans share in common.1 7 4 3) Reason is the central and most important
aspect of all our human traits. It is the one that is most easily dissected, the
most transparent, and the most obvious answer to our questions
concerning human motivations and actions.1 7 5
The reason why it is important for us to undertake this examination
of historical versus ahistorical individuals is simply so we can examine the
role that ontology plays in creating the framework for how we view our
political outcomes. This is not to say that we can come up with anything
as a possible explanation for our behavior—beliefs that we are controlled
culture-centered paradigm of development, of human progress. Of course, culture alone
cannot explain “human nature.” It is seemingly foolish to claim that there is nothing that
humans share in common (at the very least we have our physiology) and that all of our traits,
desires, and preferences are merely products of culture. Language is also problematic as
various thinkers have realized and it might the case that even the discussion of culture is
difficult because of what it means to different people. Jay (1998), for example, writes,
“Cultural semantics must, therefore, be sensitive to the ways in which language partakes in
and contributes to the larger processes of identity formation through inclusion, exclusion, and
even abjection. . . in society as a whole" (3).
1 7 4 Hull (1986) notes that “generations of philosophers have argued that all human beings are
essentially the same, that is, they share the same nature, and that this essential similarity is
extremely important” (3). Hull argues that the thinkers are wrong in this assessment.
1 7 5 For excellent discussions on the relation between reason and individuals see Derek
Parfit’s Reason and Persons (1984) and Owen Flanagan’s The Problem of the Soul (2002).
The basic argument that Flanagan gives is that human reason is what the brain does. He
writes, “There are many unknown forces in genes, mind and culture that will affect the story
we eventually tell about what it means to be a person, about why we think, feel, and behave
as we do. But no scientifically minded person thinks we will need resources beyond those
available to genetics, biology, psychology, neuroscience, anthropology, sociology, history,
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by aliens, that we are all part of the Matrix, we are the playthings of the
gods—though this not to say that the thinkers that we examine do not
come up with rather interesting “stories” of their own to justify their
conceptions of the state. For example, the story of the Matrix is no more or
less implausible than Socrates’ allegory of the cave or Hobbes’s story of
the state of nature as a means to justify a certain type of political order, but
to date we give serious consideration to Socrates when discussing politics
but not the science fiction films.1 7 6
From this discussion of ontology or the foundations from which
theorists argue, we will see, for example, that thinkers such as Plato and
Hobbes have far more in common than might have previously been
assumed. Though both of these thinkers do not share the same
metaphysical suppositions about the nature of knowledge, both share the
idea that the political actor is an ahistoric individual. As I stated in the first
chapter, it is not enough to engage in the study of politics by trying to use
various methods without giving any thought to what the assumptions of
those methods might mean. I argue that we need to consider the ways in
which various ontologies lead to various outcomes. We need to have an
explicit understanding that the assumptions that we hold will literally have
us speaking about a world that might be incommensurate with possible
economics, political science, and naturalistic philosophy to understand the nature of persons.
The beliefs in immaterial minds, and minor and major spirits, are in need of explanation” (7).
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worlds.1 7 7 In the two chapters that follow this, I will show how Martha
Nussbaum’s and Charles Taylor’s work is more consciously aware of the
wide variety of assumptions that can be made concerning political actors.
They are more willing to tease the various nuances out of the different
possible foundations from which one might start an investigation into the
political life. Given the scope of this dissertation, which is largely limited
to the functions of ontologies in the study of politics, what we will
ultimately see is that Nussbaum and Taylor are at the beginnings of
theories that have much broader and more significant application than
most theories that contemporary political science offer us.
Before I begin my investigation, I would like to outline my
methodology. 1) The entire history of political thought could be outlined
in the terms that I have given above. To undertake such a task is not the
purpose of this chapter. The purpose of this chapter is simply to show the
link between ontology and theoretical outcomes. I want to explore that fact
that theorists cannot simply take their foundations as “truth” but that they
must constantly be engaged and aware of how their ontologies impact
their outcomes. 2) I have chosen to look at four thinkers who are more or
1761 have in mind the motion-picture The Martix (1999) directed by Andy and Larry
Wachowski.
1 7 7 See Goodman’s Ways ofWorldmaking. Of course the primary thrust of Goodman’s
remarks are that there is no logical reason no to assume that there might be alternative worlds
to our own. However, we experience the world largely in similar fashion due to the
similarities that we have; i.e., shared physiology, rules of logical inference, etc. But he does
point out that this does not preclude the possibility that we might also experience the world
in different ways here that will be incommensurate with each other. See also Searle (1995).
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less representative of the three major periods of political thought. I choose
to look at Plato and Aristotle because of their important to the entire
tradition of Western political thought. Hobbes is the representative for the
modem era and Derrida is the sole representative for the postmodern era.
None of these choices is perfect. There is probably few qualms with
having Plato and Aristotle represent the ancients, but the texts that we will
look at for the next 2,000 years of political thought is sparse. Again, this is
not a comprehensive history of political philosophy. I chose Hobbes and
Derrida for two reasons; the first being that both are extremely influential.
The second reason is that both are quite conscious of their position in the
history of philosophical and political thought. They consciously sought to
situate/ locate their work in the times they wrote and against it as well. 3)
Die conclusions that I arrive at in this text do not rely on a comprehensive
examination of the entire oeuvre of political thought. One might argue that
I give short shrift to the historical camp by not looking at Hegel, Marx,
and Rousseau. However, Derrida, being the descendent of these thinkers
will cover quite adequately. My sole goal in this chapter is to outline the
ontological foundations that led to the final claims of these thinkers in
relation to their ideas on the role of the power and moral ideas in the state.
Trying to discern Plato’s significance for political thinking is not
always readily clear. It is certain that Plato is one of the most influential
thinkers in political science, though it is not clear if this is for historical
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and traditional reasons or for his insight into the nature of political
1 78
actors. One must also determine whether it is necessary to discuss
Plato’s metaphysical and ontological commitments in discussing his
theory of the state and his moral theory. It is my position that his
metaphysical and ontological commitments—the theory of forms, for
example—are justifications for the positions that he ultimately held, which
is to say that all citizens ultimately have a role in the state based on their
aptitude and disposition.1 7 9 Plato, like most thinkers, already had his
conclusions in mind and worked backwards in order to justify those
conclusions. Plato’s most important conclusion is that the state, in order to
achieve and maintain stability, must be led by a philosopher-king. We
1 7 8 Some, such as Leo Strauss argue that thinkers such as Plato need to be studied because
there is value to the actual study of the works of important thinkers of the canon. (See his
History o f Political Thought) as one reason to study Plato. Some thinkers, such as Friedrich
Nietzsche argued that Plato actually contributes to the degeneration of philosophy and
political thought. See, especially, his Genealogy of Morals. Here, Nietzsche criticizes Plato
as contributing to the moral thought of the weak. Copleston offers a moral reason to study
Plato. He writes, “The example of Plato is an influence by itself. His life was one of utter
devotion to truth, to the attainment of abiding, eternal and absolute truth, in which he firmly
and constantly believed, being ready to follow, wherever reason might lead. Possessed of an
intense moral earnestness and convinced of the reality of absolute moral values and stands,
he urged men to take thought for their dearest possession, their immortal soul, and to strive
after the cultivation of true virtue, which alone would make them happy.. . . Atheism is
utterly rejected and the order in the world is ascribed to Divine Reason, ordering the cosmos
according to the ideal pattern and plan” (260-1, vol. 1).
1 7 9 Plato’s theory of forms is closely linked to his conception of the soul. The soul often
dwells in the realm of the good or of the forms. As Plato believed in reincarnation, the souls
that had the greatest aptitude for recovering their knowledge of the forms were the souls that
were best inclined to be the rulers or philosopher kings here in this life. Gilbert Ryle writes,
“Socrates builds up a description of the constitution of the human soul paralleling his
description of the constitution of the Ideal State. As the Ideal State is the coordination or
integration of three different classes, each with its own economic and political role, so the
soul is an integration of three different parts or elements, each with a role proper to it in the
conduct of personal life” (329).
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know that the philosopher-king is the most suited for the job because he is
the most attuned to the true nature of things. Plato saw it as necessary to
have an epistemology and ontology that would support the commitment
that there is a true world, that is ahistorical, that can be known by the
1 f in
correct person. Thus, it is not necessary to go back to look at the
veracity of such commitments. Since Plato makes the argument for the
“true” nature of things through allegory and mystical metaphors—the
cave, the types of metal that humans are comprised of, the myth of Er—I
argue that Plato comes to the moral and political conclusions that he did
based on his prior metaphysical and ontological conclusions.1 8 1 And even
if that is not true, it does not affect my position insofar as I am only
interested in the historical import of Plato, meaning how do we take Plato
in our own day. Thus, the veracity of his own position, or any thinker’s
position for that matter, does not impact my own position. What is
1 8 0 See Dana Villa’s Socratic Citizenship (2001). Villa takes the position that how we
construe our nature to be relevant to the concept of citizenship is “one of the most fiercely
debated ideas in the Western tradition of political theory. From Aristotle’s gentlemanly
possessor of practical wisdom to Machiavelli’s citizen-soldier; from Hobbes’s anarchy-
fearing citizen-subject to Locke’s government-fearing citizen-proprietor; from Rousseau’s
virtuous citizen-legislator to our own (inclusive) conception of rights bearing, interest
pursuing voter—there has been no shortage of models of citizenship to inspire, frighten, or
fill us with aesthetic and moral revulsion” (1). See Patrick J. Deneen’s The Odyssey of
Political Theory (2000) and Waller R. Newell’s Ruling Passion: The Erotics o f Statecraft in
Platonic Political Philosophy (2000).
1 8 1 To see these stories see Plato’s Republic, Book VII (The Allegory of the Cave), Book T I T ,
386a-412b (The Story of the Souls and Metals), and Book X, 614d-620a.
1 8 2 Perhaps one might be tempted to argue that unless an argument is, at the very least cogent,
it does us no good to study it. Likewise, if a theory is not “true,” then there is little
importance found in studying it. However, as I mentioned I am interested more in how we
construe, interpret and live political life. I readily admit that theories are, in a sense stories
that we tell to act as short cuts. See Richard Rorty’s Rorty and Pragmatism: The Philosopher
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important, insofar as my argument is concerned, is that Plato has a
commitment to an ontology that has methodological implications. Thus, it
is critical to know of these implications rather than asking concerning
Plato’s method. One of Plato’s ontological assumptions is that the soul,
and subsequently human nature, is ahistorical.
Plato asserts the unique and essential distinction of the soul and the
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body. He does admit that the soul can be influenced by the body. Plato
argues that humans move from the sensible to the idea of the Good. There
are several dialogues where Plato makes this argument, but perhaps
nowhere as persuasively as he does in the Symposium. In contemplating
beauty, one holds to or observes a particular body which is beautiful. From
there one can see that “the beauty exhibited in all bodies is one and the
Responds to his Critics (1995) and Rorty’s Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (1989). Rorty
writes, “Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist independently of the human mind—because
sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the
world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own—
unaided by the describing activities of human beings—cannot. The suggestion that truth, as
well as the world, is out there is a legacy of an age in which the world was seen as the
creation of a being who had a language o f his own” (5). See also Matthew Festenstein’s
“Politics and Acquiescence in Rorty’s Pragmatism” (2003). Festenstein outlines one of the
more salient attacks against pragmatism. He writes, “One of the most long-standing and
potent charges against pragmatism from the point of view of political philsophy has been that
o f acquiescence. Whatever the person, moral or political commitments of particular
pragmatism, this criticism alleges, pragmatism is vulnerable to appropriation by whatever
socials forces are most powerful” (2).
1 8 3 Wallace Matson writes, “The Pythagorean antecedents of Plato’s philosophy are nowhere
more to the fore than in his theory of the soul. He held the soul to be immortal in both
directions—existing before birth as well as after death of the body” (96). While my argument
on this point is conjecture, there are several seemingly obvious reasons why Plato would so
readily be influenced by the Pythagoreans on this point. First, no one, not even a luminary
like Plato, can escape his or her time and the predominate ideas of it. Second, while the
nature of the soul was of importance to Plato, he did not ask deep, probing questions about
its nature, its purpose, how it functions and so on as Aristotle did. Third, by assuming this
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same [and therefore one becomes a] lover of all physical beauty” (25).
From there it becomes obvious that the soul, with its higher status, is more
beautiful and of more worth than the body.1 8 4 Finally, one realizes, as a
form or as a participant in the Good, that Beauty, in and of itself is
“absolute, existing alone with itself, unique, eternal, and all other beautiful
things as partaking of it, yet in such a manner that while they come into
being and pass away, it neither undergoes any increase or diminution nor
suffers any change” ( 30). I am interested in the fact that while neither
Beauty nor the Good can be put into words, both are objective realities and
all reasonable people—humans—will come to the same conclusion as to
their nature if one is able to throw off the scales that keep most of us in an
illusory world of shadows, according to Plato.1 8 5
Plato writes in Timaeus, “No one is willingly bad; the bad man
becomes bad because of some faulty habit of body and stupid upbringing,
and these are unwelcome evils that come to any many man without his
position Plato can move on to the most important element of his work—the nature of the
well-ordered state in relation to the nature of the well-ordered soul.
1 8 4 One must admit, I argue, that there is no logical inference that must be made to concede
this point to Plato. It is a point that is based on an ontology that Plato holds to be central to
his overall methodology and to his conclusions.
1 8 3 Something that we need to consider when looking at Plato’s Allegory of the Cave is that
while all humans are chained to the walls and are living in a world of illusion, all humans
have the same capacity for coming to a realization of the truth. Though the masses will want
to kill the philosopher who comes back to the cave to unshackle them all and free them from
the illusions, all of them, in theory, if they would only listen, will come to the same
conclusion as to the nature of the Good. There are no ethnic, racial, educational, or cultural
differences that will prevent any human from coming to this conclusion. See Plato, Republic,
Book VII.
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choice” (Timaeus 86 d 7-e).1 8 6 As Plato has famously argued, and upon
which he modeled his theory of the state, the soul is of a tripartite nature.
The soul, according to Plato, has three parts: 1) rational, 2) courageous,
1 #7
and 3) appetitive. While all parts of the soul are necessary, Plato argues
that the rational part of the soul is the highest and most noble aspect. In
fact, this part of the soul, the rational part, is immortal and is similar to
| QO
divinity. The other parts of the soul are found in animals which is why
Plato, one could argue, diminishes their importance. Also, the importance
of these aspects of the soul is diminished because they are temporal. That
which is permanent is the most important element of the soul. It is in the
Timaeus that Plato locates the three parts of the soul: 1) reason is in the
head, 2) the spirited part is in the breast, and 3) the appetitive part is
somewhere below the midriff.1 8 9
There is a question as to why Plato feels the need to divide the soul
into three parts rather than either make the claim that the soul is immortal
1 8 6 See also Timaeus 86b, The Laws 775b.
1 8 7 This theory is most explicitly articulate in Book IV of the Republic.
1 8 8 See Timaeus. Plato writes that after the creator set all of the elements into place and
constructed the universe that he imbued some of his characteristics into his creations. “Now
of the divine, he himself was the creator, but the creation of the mortal he committed to his
offspring. And they, imitating him, received from the immortal principle of the soul, and
around this they proceeded to fashion a mortal body, and made it the vehicle of the soul, and
constructed within the body a soul of another nature which was mortal. . . . ” (69 c-d). From
this Plato also determines that the ruling part of the soul is reason, created by the Gods. It is
interesting to note, again, that Plato’s argues from a myth or story.
1 8 9 While this might seem odd to us today, the idea that the soul and the body must somehow
be linked had currency up to modernity. Many historians of philosophy point this out. See
Coppleston 209. There is a resurgence in connecting the body and our behavior in current
thought. I will discuss these ideas in the last chapter in looking at new ontologies. See, for
example, Dennett (2003), Flanagan (2002), and Johnson (2003).
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or that reason rules. Copleston writes that “Plato’s main interest is . . .
evidently the ethical interest of the right of the rational element to rule ..
(Vol. 1, 210).1 9 0 We must also remember that Plato is not interested in
the rational element ruling simply for the sake of the rational, but rather
because the rational is also more virtuous. It is the case that anything that
performs its function, according to Socrates in the Republic, is excellent
(arete). One might construe Socrates to mean that all are equal. It is the
case that he sees all as starting in places of equality—cognitively—but this
does not mean that all have equal ability to perform equally in all tasks in
the polity.1 9 1 Also, it is the role of the soul—the rational part—to rule over
the other parts. So, in both the individual and in the state that which is the
most reasonable must also rule. Despite differences such as those who are
ruled by the appetitive element of the soul or those who are ruled by the
rational part of their soul, all have equal ability to come to the same
conclusion as to the nature of the Good and to their own correct place in
the state. At a very minimum the rational part of all citizens will allow
each to realize how the good is best achieved and that is through the
proper organization of the state. Plato seems to hold to something like
1 9 0 There obvious implications in Plato’s theory of the philosopher king ruling as the head of
the state and for the tradition of the divine right of kings. More than being favored of God as
authority for their power, monarchs could claim to hold the position of sitting in as reason on
behalf of God here on earth. See Marc D. Guerra’s “Beyond Natural Law Talk: Politics and
Prudence in St. Thomas Aquinas’s On Kingship” (2002).
1 9 1 The issue is more complex when one considers that feet that Plato also held to some form
o f reincarnation by which talents and cognitive abilities could be brought with us to this life.
See Plato’s Phaedrus (2001).
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intuitionism when it comes to how all humans will know the good or will
allow reason to rule both their knowledge about their place in the state and
their role. Norman Dahl argues that Plato’s conception of virtue “provides
one with a motive to be virtuous” (811). These motives stem from the fact
that they are accessible to all, in all times, and in all places.
If all citizens are able to conclude that the philosopher king should
rule and that each citizen has a particular role, one might also ask why
states are even necessary. As Hallowell and Porter write, “The state comes
into being originally . . . because individuals are not economically self-
sufficient; they have different talents and skills and are fitted for different
occupations. If each one performs that task for which he is naturally fitted,
then more things will be produced efficiently and the needs of all will be
better satisfied. The division of labour according to natural aptitudes is the
first principle of justice” (19). To focus this back on our original
discussion as the nature of the individual in Plato’s work, it is important to
see that Plato sees the individual and the state intimately linked and
intertwined. A state cannot be virtuous without the virtuous individual and
individuals are more than likely not going to be able to act morally in an
immoral state. This all requires that individuals must be in “touch” or
understand their place. This is also a potentially contentious issue in
politics. Telling people that they “must” be one thing rather than another
always brings up the potential for conflict. For Plato, being attuned to the
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rational element of the soul will lead one to the proper conclusions as to
one’s role and station in the state.1 9 2
The fact that the actor for Plato is ahistorical is important simply
because we must take Plato’s work to be an attempt to outline what the
good always is, in all times, and in all situations. However, we cannot take
Plato’s work to be merely linear in that it starts with foundations—his
ontology—and then “shows” the conclusions he comes to be necessary
and true. The conclusions at which he arrives will only be necessary and
true if one buys the assumptions that he has made as true as well. But,
these assumptions are contentions and need to be argued for. The fact that
the rational part of the soul rules not only the individual, but the state
through the philosopher king, requires that all “rational” individuals come
to same conclusion about their own nature, about the nature of others, and
about their prospects in the state itself. Though we must remember that
1921 should note that there are scholars who argue that there are differences between the time
frames of Plato’s dialogues and his conceptions of reason. For example, Michael Kochin
(1999) argues that Plato’s conception of reason alters dramatically between the Republic and
the Statesman. However, the veracity of arguments such as Kochin does not affect my
overall argument. If Plato does change his conception of human nature—his ontology—then
we are likely to see changes in his conception of the state. In feet, Plato, in the Laws, does
seem to change his conception of the role of the state from a all-encompassing regime ruled
by the philosopher-king to a more pragmatic promoter of common goods. See for example,
Mohr (1978) and Pangle (1976). Pangle writes that the Laws is Plato’s description of the best
city. The reason why we don’t study it more often is because “when studied it seems so alien
[because of] the emphasis on the gods and religion which pervades the work.... The more
one reads the Laws the more one is tempted to think that for Plato political science and a kind
of theology are inseparable” (1059-60). This goes to my point that one’s ontology or starting
point is clearly more important than the method that follows. And both must always be
considered to be in conjunction wife one another. It is possible feat had Plato lived longer we
would have seen a shift away from the standard Plato that we usually give to the one who is
more religious and more concerned wife common goods.
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Plato’s claim that we are ruled by the rational part of the soul, at least to
the degree that we can recognize that the philosopher-king should rule, is
one that is merely assumed.
As I said, even those who are not among the guardian class, can
still be ruled sufficiently by their rational aspects or parts to know that the
philosopher king along with the guardians should rule.1 9 3 Still, this is a
problematic part of Plato’s theory. For example, we might ask how it is
that those who are controlled by their appetites and, subsequently, pursue
their interests accordingly by being artisans and the like are willing or can
at least see that they are not the most fit to rule. I argue that this is exactly
why Plato needs to allow the coercive element into his theory of the state
and ethical theory.1 9 4 There is always the potential that there are those who
do not see their “place” or “role” in the state. Or, worse for the rulers,
these people might mistakenly misinterpret their role in the state and seek
to overthrow it. But once again, what one holds to be the place of the
citizens of the polity relies primarily on the prima facia ontological
position to which one holds.
1 9 ; > This point is not without contention. As Dale Hall (1977) notes, “We are accustomed to
taking Socrates seriously. He does recommend that philosophers should rule; he says that
human well-being is achievable only through the union of philosophy and politics ...” (294).
But Hall notes that thinkers such as Leo Strauss and Alan Bloom take Plato here to be
“consummately ironic” and that “Socrates’ meaning must be reversed for the Republic is
really a modest proposal, proposing ironically a solution to our evils that no rational man
would pursue” (294). Unfortunately, the dispute over this is beyond the purview if this work.
Thus, I adhere to the standard interpretation of Plato’s thought.
1 9 4 See Plato’ Republic 344c, 517a, 515c, and 515e.
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In order to remove these problems before they get a chance to
develop fully, Plato argues that the rulers must make extensive use of
myths or “noble lies.”1 9 5 This is because even reason is always at risk of
losing out to other parts of the soul, namely the courageous and the
appetitive. It is worth quoting Socrates at length in his discussion of the
Myth of the Metals in order to see how Plato sees the state and the
individual overcoming the potential problems listed above. Socrates
argues that
All of you in the city are brothers we shall tell them as we tell our
story, but the god who fashioned you mixed some gold in the nature
of those capable of ruling because they are to be honored most. In
those who are auxiliaries he has put silver, and iron and bronze in
those who are farmers and other workers If [the rulers or
guardians’] own offspring should be found to have iron or bronze in
his nature, they must not pity him in any way, but give him the
esteem appropriate to his nature; they must drive him out to join the
workers and farmers. Then again, if an offspring of these is found to
have gold or silver in his nature they will honor him and bring him
up to join the rulers or guardians, for there is an oracle that the city
will be ruined if ever it has an iron or bronze guardian.1 9 6
This passage is instructive for several reasons. First, despite Plato’s good
intentions, there is obviously a large element of coercion that underlies the
order of the state.1 9 7 Those with iron or bronze are driven out from the
1 9 5 See Drew Hyland’s (1997) “Caring for Myth” and Luc Brisson’s (1999) important Plato
the Myth Maker.
1 9 6 The Republic, Book III, 415-a-d. G.M.A. Grube, trans.
1 9 7 Some of the interesting things that Plato sought do in the state include the following: all
receive a compulsory education until 18 years of age, literature (in particular Homer) was to
be censored, the Gods cannot be depicted doing things that are considered wrong or
objectionable, when comrades die in battle heroes can be shown as weeping because this
would make death seem to be evil, drama was to be completely banned least some o f the
actors are unable to distinguish their roles from reality, both sad and joyful music had to be
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rulers, while those with gold or silver are brought up. He also clearly notes
that honor is given to those who rule. In our modem notions of justices we
often tell the story that everyone is important and anyone who does his or
her part is just as important and just as deserving of honor as those who
10ft
rule. This is not so in Plato’s Republic. What is most important about
this passage is that Plato does not seem to find it problematic that people
will accept the decisions as to who is moving up and who is moving down.
One cannot imagine a New England Town Meeting or an English
Parliamentary Meeting or, for that matter, any meeting where there is
more than one person, that would readily dismiss the potential for factions
as Plato does in this passage. The assumption that underlies this dismissal
is the fact that Plato holds that all must buy into an ahistorical notion of
the individual; thus, providing a safe basis for organization that will entail
the justice for which Plato is seeking.1 9 9 Luc Brisson argues that Plato had
banned as well, poets were considered to be among the worst renegades because they often
teach that which is wrong under the guise of wisdom, any art that was considered to be
exciting or immoral was also to receive official disapproval, and children—to the horror of I
am sure the National Education Association—were to be taught dogmatically what was right
and wrong. One could argue, perhaps that this list could be presented as evidence that Plato
understood diversity of humans and sought to expurgate by means of force. This could be
seen as undermining my argument. However, we must remember that Plato saw all false
beliefs as illusions. Any one who could get past distractions, of which the obvious list is a
partial list of such distractions, would be able to come to the absolute and unqualified truth
about both this world and the world of Ideas.
1 9 8 One aspect of this that remains problematic is how to recognize who has gold, silver,
bronze, or iron. Who gets to make this determination? This, seemingly, could set up a
problem where the egalitarianism of Plato is overshadowed by the fact that there must be
someone who gets to determine who moves up and down. Presumably it would be the
philosopher king.
1991 must admit that my interpretation of this passage focuses on many o f the potentially
negative outcomes of his theory. Most interpreters see this passage as rather progressive. One
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to rely on myths because he theory of forms, his conception of human
nature, and his ultimate idea of the state are not based on experience and
are not demonstrable through any type of argumentation.2 0 0
There is also an aspect of Plato’s work, or at least concerning the
interpretation of it, that I cannot neglect to mention and that is on the idea
of Socratic irony. The reason that this becomes important to our discussion
here is due to the fact that I am making the case that Plato’s ultimate
conclusions concerning the state are not aspects of rational argumentation
or demonstrable proof, but rely on his ontologies. Whatever his
ontological position, it relies on language. In other words, there is not
direct access to reality or whatever the supposed objective world is. The
very use of irony can be construed as Plato’s acknowledgment that his
foundations are stories, albeit they important ones.
One might argue that I am too busy taking Socrates’ word at face
value when, in fact, it might be full of irony. There are those who argue
that Socrates’ word cannot be taken seriously and, subsequently, the
philosophical problems that he poses are nothing more than language
games. In reality, these are simply poor interpretations of the use of
example is the following: [The Myth of the Metals] is not intended to deceive anyone but
simply to express in allegorical language a few basic truths, namely: 1) that all humans share
a common humanity by virtue of their common origin; 2) humans differ in their natural
endowments, some being bom with greater capacities and potentialities than others; 3) there
should be equality of opportunity with merit alone determining one’s place in society”
(Hallowell and Porter, 21-2).
2 0 0 See Brisson (1999), p. 132.
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irony. Typically, Socrates employs irony in order to give insincere
admiration to his interlocutors’ ability or arguments. This is most typically
found in Socrates’ assertion that he knows nothing. As Gregory Vlastos
writes, irony is “simply expressing what we mean by saying something
contrary to it. This is something we do all the time—even children do it—
and if we choose to do it we forfeit in that very choice the option of
speaking deceitfully” (43). In order for there to be irony, then, there must
be a meeting of the minds, as Alexander Nehamas points out, “Faced with
irony we perform the simple operation of establishing the contrary of what
is said, and that allows us to know precisely what we are really being told.
The puzzles of irony have a simple solution” (53). Socrates makes use of
what we often call Socratic paradoxes to highlight his notion of truth in
the face of no other practical method to arrive at agreement.
Plato’s theory of the state is derived from his ontological position.
His ontological positions—his foundations—are neither demonstrable nor
direct products of experience. This does not make these ontologies
unimportant. In fact, it makes them very important because we must
recognize that there is not a Platonic methodology that leads to
conclusions about inferences between variables. Plato, recognizing the
difficulties that one faces when attempting to paint all humans as
universal, devised ways to side-step these problems through the use of
2 0 1 See Stone (1998) and Gross (1969).
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foundational stories, irony and the like. Plato’s argument that humans are
universal, that is to say ahistoric, has a store of benefits for the theorist,
such as universal applicability and accessibility to the truth by all, and
deficiencies, such as the problem of relativism.2 0 2
Despite the differences between Plato and Aristotle in their
ultimate political conclusions—Plato argued for a republic ruled by a
philosopher king and Aristotle for a government based on a polity—we
will see that there is a significant similarity between the two. Aristotle,
like Plato, builds his political theory upon on ontology that argues for an
ahistorical notion of the political actor. This means that all political actors
should come to the same conclusions concerning human nature in order
for the polity to operate. To not do so would be to be irrational. The
significance of agreement in a polity has been discussed in a variety of
works.2 0 3 For example, there has been much work done in the area of key
or core values.2 0 4 The very survival of any state relies on this agreement.
The history of Western political thought can be seen from the vantage
2 0 2 Socrates’ continual railing against the Sophists show that Plato did not think much of
relativism.
2 0 j See Lindsay (1992) and Murphy (2002). Typically Aristotle finds agreement to be a
matter of custom. As Murphy points out, “For Aristotle, nature and convention are not
mutually exclusive; rather, nature, custom, and reason form a hierarchy that presupposes
nature, but cannot be reduced to it, while reason presupposes custom, but cannot be reduced
to custom” (469).
2 0 4 See Stanley Feldman’s (1988) “Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: the Role of
Core Beliefs and Values,” Stanley Heath, et al (1994), “The Measurement of Core Beliefs
and Values,” Christopher Mooney (2001) The Public Clash of Private Values. Mooney
argues that clashes of values cannot be resolved by argument (3). There simply has to be
agreement and the agreement comes best by convention.
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point that most of our significant thinkers are attempting to explain how
this agreement came about or how it can, in the future, come about. If a
significant portion of the political actors cannot readily agree on these
values then the chances of the polity succeeding are slim. For Aristotle
this agreement is best explained by the fact that humans are political
animals by nature.2 0 5 That is to say, humans are social, which serves as his
ontology, the foundation upon which the rest of his argument resides. I
should note that Aristotle finds that this “actor” is ahistorical, which
means that it is irrelevant when or where one is bom because all humans
share this trait of being social. I will briefly examine Aristotle’s thoughts
on human nature and agreement in the polis. What is most interesting
about Aristotle’s construction of the ahistoric ontology is that he gives the
argument in the Nicemachean Ethics that “every art and inquiry, and
similarly every action and intentional choice, is held to aim at some good”
(1987, 363). Aristotle infers from this that all actions, even those of the
cosmos, point towards the greatest good or the unmoved mover. It is
2 0 5 Aristotle writes, “[T]hat man is by nature a political animal. Any one who by his nature
and not simply by ill-luck has not state is either too bad or too good, either subhuman or
superhuman—he is like the war-mad man condemned in Homer’s wrods as ‘having no
family, no law, no home’; for he who is such by nature is made on war. . . . Among all men,
then there is a natural impulse towards this kind of association [that association of the polity].
For as man is the best of all animals when he has reached his full development, so he is worst
of all when divorced from law and justice” (1988, 59-61).
2 0 6 After a long and complex argument, which we will not be able to engage fully here,
Aristotle concludes that “there must necessarily be something eternal, whether one or many,
that first imparts motion, and this first mover must be unmoved” (1987, 127). He asks
whether this must necessarily be the case and concludes that it must “since there must clearly
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obvious that one cannot infer from nature, though many have tried from
centuries, that all actions point at some ultimate telos or end. The
unmoved mover cannot be both the antecedent and the conclusion to this
claim.
I will address the possible objection that Aristotle does not belong
in the ahistorical school due to his interest in examining the nature of the
soul. As I mentioned above, he did not seem to adopt Plato’s concept of
the soul in the same way that Plato borrowed from the Pythagoreans.2 0 7
Aristotle was more willing to take into account experience in helping to
form the soul. First, he hypothesized that individual things are a joining of
form and matter.2 0 8 Second, he puzzled over change and the relationship
between the potential and the actual in his work. Third, and perhaps one
of the most important questions for Aristotle is why things move and
be something that causes things” (127). See also Vlastos’ (1963) “A Note on the Unmoved
Mover.”
2 0 7 Still as Matson, there is a great deal of residual influence of Plato on Aristotle (see 118-
136).
2 0 8 See Mure (1949) on Aristotle’s concept of forms, matter, and substance. See Cohen
(1984) for a discussion of Aristotle’s concept of matter in relation to the forms. See Also
Hartman’s work (1976) a comprehensive discussion on matter and identity. Hartman writes,
“It is Aristotle’s view that the individual form or essence is substance primarily and that it is
identical with the individual substance or which it is the form or essence. Matter is not
substance, nor is any universal, nor is any combination of some form and some particular
matter. Identifying a substance with its essence helps Aristotle to solve a difficulty about the
unity of the individual substance: over a period of time an ordinary substance is likely to
change in some ways” (545). So Aristotle posits an essence that all humans share and thus
we do not need to worry about the seeming change to the substance or our outward
appearances.
2 0 9 See James Murphy’s (2002) “Nature, Custom and Reason as the Explanatory and
Practical Principles of Aristotelian Political Science.” Murphy writes, “According to
Aristotle, nature (physis), habit or custom (ethos), and reason (logos) are the first principles
of social explanation as well as the first principles of moral excellence” (469).
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change at all. The nature of something had a great deal to do with its
potential and how something interacted with world might play a role in the
shaping of the soul.
Both Plato and Aristotle belong to the ahistoric camp because both
However, one gets the feeling that in reading both authors that one is
reading entirely different projects.2 1 0 Where one might conclude from
reading Plato’s dialogues that the leading interlocutors through the
elenchus towards some aporia that would lead to a higher
understanding—the correct understanding—of the world is all that is
important. Thus, Socrates could argue without hypocrisy that leaders
might have to lie to the people so that adherence of correct belief will be
protected. Aristotle, on the other hand, sought to make it clear that the
structure of an argument and the rhetorical style with which it was
presented would have a great deal to do with what people accepted as true
and false. One might object and say that it is simply to reductionist to
say that it is the ontologies of Plato and Aristotle that lead to their
conclusions. However, given their historical proximity, their affinity
towards philosophical investigation, and the historical circumstances in
2 1 0 See Phillip Vassallo (2004). Vassallo argues that both thinkers, despite their conclusions
are ultimately concerned with unveiling the truth. Vassallo’s position differs from mine in
that he sees it as necessary to find a way to reconcile these two versions of the truth. To me,
this is not necessary. Different starting points lead to different conclusions. Given the various
assumptions, assuming that they are “reasonable” by the common standards of
reasonableness, we should expect differing outcomes. The only question that is left for us as
political theorists is whether die starting points are commensurate for the problem at hand.
1 1 See Furley andNehamas, eds. (1994).
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which they live, what else could explain the obvious differences in their
conclusions. The only other possible explanation for the differences in
their work is that one writer was correct and the other wrong, or that both
were wrong.
To continue briefly with Aristotle, he argues the following: every
association is formed for some good purpose. The state is an association.
Therefore, it must be formed for some good purpose. The roles of the
king, of the statesman, of the household manager, and of the master of
slaves are not the same. People also falsely assume that “when one person
is in personal control over the rest he has the role of a king, whereas when
he takes his turn at ruling and at being ruled according to the principles of
the science concerned, he is a statesman” (1988, 57). The motivating
factor for human behavior—our human nature—is to strive towards to
good or virtuous.2 1 3 Aristotle also sees that humans can be selfish as
well.2 1 4 This can be inferred from his many arguments that the best state is
a form of polity and it is through this form of government that we can
avoid the potential excess of selfishness that might beset some people.
2 1 2 See Aristotle, The Politics, Book I, section i. Aristotle writes, “Observation tells us that
every state is an association, and that every association is formed with a view to some good
purpose. I say ‘good,’ because in all their actions all men do in feet aim at what they think
good” (1988, 54).
2 1 3 See Murphy (2002).
2 1 4 See Newell (1987). Newell writes that many think that Aristotle can easily be resolved
into a sort of communitarian foundation for political organization. Newell argues that
Aristotle did not believe that the majority of people in a political community were capable of
exercising prudent political judgment and that there is no reason to argue that broad
participation will be possible. This is due to selfishness (159-160).
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And since selfishness is always a potential problem Aristotle argues that
virtue must always be practiced as a matter of habit.
Through Aristotle’s now controversial justification of slavery, we
can see the role of human nature in the polity.2 1 5 This will also give us
more evidence to put Aristotle in the camp of the ahistoric group of
thinkers. Also, it will provide further evidence that Aristotle’s ontology,
the foundations of his political order, lead to the conclusions or his
justification for one type of political order over an another. In order to
examine this we must look at how Aristotle sees natural growth from the
beginning. Those things which cannot exist without the existence of
another thing must be paired (i.e. male and female). Likewise, another
natural combination is the natural ruler and the ruled. Aristotle states, “For
the element that can use its intelligence to look ahead is by nature ruler
and by nature master, while that which has the bodily strength to do the
actual work is by nature a slave, one of those who are ruled. Thus there is
a common interest uniting master and slave” (1987, 68). It is nature that
provides the tools and the different functions. Every instrument is best
when it serves its single purpose and not many. He also argues that the
“non-Greek and the slave are by nature identical” (1987,1.2.ii.9). Men saw
215I should point out that those in the historic school see elements of philosophical thought,
such as Aristotle’s justification of slavery, as contingent on a certain time and place. No
reasonable person would now accept Aristotle’s line of reasoning. Those in the historic
school would look at Aristotle’s work, at least in this regard, as evidence for bigotry, racism,
etc.
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the need to identify women with slaves as well. The first stage of
association is the household. First, the man (Greek) must get a house and
then a wife and then a slave. This is the natural order. The next stage is the
village. Villages are established for the satisfaction of something more
than daily needs, which is the purpose of the household. The final
association is the state. This completes self-sufficiency and outlines a
hierarchy that simply mirrors nature.2 1 6
It is important that we note how Aristotle sees little in the way of
dynamism in the soul or human nature, though there are times when
experience seems to play a role in its development.2 1 7 It is possible for
individuals to be better or worse, after all, and are more virtuous that
others. Still it seems to be the case that slaves are slaves because of a
nature that makes them so. Aristotle argues that slaves are slaves by
nature. If it is not in one’s nature to be a slave then one will not be, of
course, a slave. For Aristotle, life is a matter of the soul flourishing insofar
o
as the flourishing of the soul is part of its nature. All souls, though given
to differences due to the vagaries of life such as accident of birth, strive
towards the excellent. Matson outlines how Aristotle sees the nature of
individuals and what they share in common. He writes, “To be alive is . . .
2 1 6 See Aristotle (1987) Book I, section i.
2 1 7 See Copleston (1985), 287-303.
2 1 8 See Shields (1988). Shields discusses some of the more complex and controversial aspects
of Aristotle’s conception of die soul. I must admit that I have used a rather simplified
examination of the nature of the soul for the purposes of brevity.
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(1) To nourish the self, grow and decay. (2) To move from place to place.
(3) To perceive. (4) To think. Whatever is capable of doing any thing on
this list is capable also of doing all the previous things on it”(135).
Aristotle sets his understanding, in many ways, about human nature in
what we can observe. However, as I have pointed out, his reliance on telos
or a striving towards for all living things and his discussion on the
unmoved mover all point us towards on unexamined ontology that leads
us to his ultimate conclusions. We even see that Aristotle’s discussions on
ethics are predicated upon that idea that all humans are the same in their
end desires and, hence, the desires of the soul are similar across time and
culture.2 1 9
I will now look at Aristotle’s discussion of happiness. Of the
different ways in which one can choose to live—pursuing pleasure, living
a political life or living a philosophical life—Aristotle argues that
happiness is widely agreed upon because we have rational souls. Aristotle
famously argues, in the Nicomachean Ethics that happiness is the activity
of the soul in accordance with virtue. What I find interesting is that
while Aristotle is willing to admit differences in the actual outcomes of
2 1 9 See Murphy (2002). See also Corey (2002) and Adkins (1984). Adkins writes that
Aristotle believes that “human flourishing turns out to be an activity of the soul in
accordance with virtue and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and
most complete virtue” (32) and that all humans share the ability to distinguish virtue from
non-virtue. In fact, Adkins argues that Aristotle’s discussion of virtue is often of little help in
determining exactly what Aristotle believes about human nature. I argue that we see Aristotle
as embellishing his ontology—the soul strives for excellence in accordance with virtue—
through the bulk of his work.
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happiness or virtuous living, he does not make distinctions between the
souls of humans. For example, Aristotle is quite clear that it might be
impossible to be as virtuous or as happy as one might without the
necessary or proper amount of possessions. It might also be the case that
we are influenced in our happiness by other physical factors as well. To
give one instance, in the Ethics, Aristotle writes that “a man who is very
ugly in appearance or ill-born or who lives by himself and has no children
is not apt to be particularly happy and perhaps still less someone whose
children and friends are thoroughly vicious or were good but have
died.”2 2 1 Aristotle does not argue that Persians see this situation differently
than do the Greeks versus the Africans versus the Myceans or any one
else. He assumes that happiness, virtue and the like are products of
reasonable people who share complete similarity in the most important
aspects.
This is the case because the body and soul are united. Aristotle
writes, “All natural bodies of plants and animals are instruments of soul, in
the sense of existing for the sake of soul.” He argues that we should
break the soul up into faculties in order to describe it. Souls are
increasingly complex. He writes, “It will not do to ask whether soul and
body are unity any more than whether wax is a unity with the shape
2 2 0 See Nicomachean Ethics, 1.6.1097b-98al8.
2 2 1 Nicomachean Ethics, 1.8.1099b-3-6.
2 2 2 Aristotle, DeAnima, Hamlyn trans. 415 b 18-20.
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imposed on it, or in general matter and that of fact which it is the matter.
Though unity and being have several meanings, they apply most properly
to the entelechy” He continues, “For this reason those are right who
hold that soul neither is body nor exists without body. It is not body, but
belongs to body, and for this reason exists in body, and body of the
appropriate kind life.”2 2 4 Thus, we can conclude, as Guthrie points out,
Aristotle thinks that the soul should be regarded as a unity. It might be
the case that the philosopher is happier than the slave, but both share in the
faculties that make each aware of the source of happiness.
The essential unity to Aristotle’s ahistorical actor is that all humans
are reasonable. This is the assumption on which he can depend. Aristotle
also holds that nature provides for us much of the evidence of a structure
that we can all rationally grasp. The male/ female union, the order of the
household, the lower position of females and slaves in the social order, the
task of household management and the combination of households to
comprise a community or state are all assumed to be an aspect of nature.
The reason why these relationships form as they do is because nature is an
end and “the aim and the end is perfection.” In fact, by observation, as
Aristotle tells us from the beginning, we see that things, as they are, are
2 2 3 Aristotle, De Anima, ibid., 412b6-9.
2 2 4 Aristotle, De Anima 407bl3-26
2 2 5 W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. VI (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981), pp. 280-285.
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natural. He writes, “Nature, as we say, does nothing without some
purpose; and she has endowed man alone among the animals with the
power of speech.. . . ” {De Anima, 60) and that “the state has a natural
priority over the household and over any individual among us. For the
whole muse be prior to the part” {De Anima, 60). He also writes that the
political associations of humans exist as a “natural impulse” (61) and that
slavery is included in that natural impulse. In a very real sense, one can
interpret Book One of Aristotle’s Politics to be a description of nature. In
nature, we know by observation that there are certain things which are the
case: the man is superior to the woman, the slave is part of the master, the
order and hierarchy of the house is established by nature, and that the
highest association is the state.
I have shown that Aristotle relies heavily on an unexamined
ontology that leads to many of his important political conclusions. He does
not demonstrably show that there is a truth in the way that he might have
hoped for. What he shows us is that there are particular problems that were
of interest to him—political associations, political organization, political
power, the good life, social relationships—that are in need of explanation.
2 2 6 Aristotle writes that “every state exists by nature [and that all] earlier associations too
were natural” (59).
2 2 7 Aristotle writes, “[Ojne cannot use the term ‘slave’ properly of one who is undeserving of
being a slave; otherwise, we should find among slaves and descendants of slaves even men
who seem to be o f the noblest birth.. . . Whereas the one [the slave] must be ruled, the other
should exercise the rule for which he is fitted by nature, thus being the master.. . . And the
slave is in a sense a part of his master, a living but separate part of his body” (73).
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Aristotle attempts to provide us with an ahistorical framework for the
political individual.
I argue that Hobbes is also in this tradition of the ahistorical school
of thought. The belief in a universal human nature leads Hobbes to his
prescription that a state needs a mighty sovereign in order to maintain
control.2 2 8 Given that humans are rational actors, one does not need to
worry about place, context, or tradition because the weight of the hand of
the sovereign will be ample. Hobbes sees individuals as all being
reasonable to the point that all will accept Hobbes’s interpretation of the
precarious state of nature. It is a misunderstanding of Hobbes to think
that he sees differences in people at the most fundamental level. In fact,
2 2 8 This aspect of Hobbes is a highly charged subject and Hobbes is difficult to interpret
because he seems to argue for both individual rights and the absolute power of the sovereign.
There are those who interpret Hobbes as saying that the state must exist for the security of
the individual. Others argue that the sovereign is unlimited and the state is an extension of
his will. To show you the difficulty of understanding Hobbes at times, take Sabine and
Thorson (1989) who write their interpretation of Hobbes that argues for both sides: “The
power of the state and the authority of the law are justified only because they contribute to
the security of individual human beings, and there is no rational ground of obedience and
respect for authority except the anticipation that these will yield larger individual advantage
than their opposites” (432). And they continue, “A social body has no existence except
through its constituted authorities, and its members no rights except by delegation. All social
authority must accordingly be concentrated in the sovereign. Law and morals are merely his
will, and his authority is unlimited, or is limited only by his power, for the good reason that
there is no other authority except by his permission” (435).
2 2 9 See Gert (1979). Gert writes that Hobbes allows for differences in their preferences.
However, he argues that Hobbes sees that “except in extreme circumstances everyone must
prefer to avoid death, pain, and injury” (560). This is of no small account. This allows
Hobbes to argue that the leviathan must be strong. See also Skinner (1997). Skinner attempts
to divide Hobbes’s career into three phases: 1) the early humanistic, 2) rhetorical, and 3) the
scientific. He then argues that Hobbes’s vision of the individual actor evolves over time and
that there are many Hobbeses, all rich and complex. If one examines works such as De Cive
(1998) or Behemoth (1990), one can that Skinner makes quite a compelling case. However,
even if one accepts that Hobbes evolves slowly over time or that there are many Hobbeses,
the fact is that there is consistently one Hobbes that underlies them all. And that is the
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differences such as personal tastes, artistic differences, culture, and
religious beliefs are to the point of triviality. The sovereign and his
wishes—how he sees the path that is best for the survival of the state—are
A l l
the most important elements of power. In fact, trivialities, such as
religious preferences can destroy the state and, therefore, run counter to
the reason that we all share.
Hobbes’s account of the state of nature and the social contract is
well known.2 3 2 In fact, much of what is called realist theory in political
science is based on the Hobbesian notion that humans are rational agents
that place survival as the foremost of all of our concerns.2 3 3 Hobbes’s state
of nature is used as but one example of how humans, as rational agents,
Hobbes who consistently articulates the rational actor and who sees the nature of man to be
fearsome enough to have to accept the unfortunate consequence of the need for government.
2 3 0 Not only is this the case for the obvious reason that people are different. It is the case
because tastes can, in theory, be curtailed by the sovereign. One might persist in holding to a
like or a taste that is “illegal,” for example, but the sovereign, according to Hobbes has every
right to punish the offender.
See Horstmann (2001) and Kow (2001). See also Kraynak (1982). Kraynak goes through
Hobbes’s Behemoth in order to show that civil disorder and dissolution are the results of
ideas clashing against one another. He writes, “Hobbes shows that it [the English Civil War]
did not arise spontaneously from the political arena but was created and propagated by
ambitious intellectuals. He shows that the idea of distinguishing between just and unjust
regimes, like the idea of distinguishing between orthodoxy and heresy, was invented by men
for the purpose of domination” (842). It is this very reason that leads Hobbes to believe that
the sovereign possesses all rights, even to the exclusion of the rights of individuals.
2 3 2 For example, see Harman (1973), Lopata (1973), Boyd (2001), and Sorell (1990).
2 3 3 This might seem to be obvious to the modem ear. However, such was not always the case.
Socrates argues in the Apology, “[A] man who is good for anything ought not to calculate
the chance of living of dying; he ought only to consider whether in doing anything he is
doing right or wrong—acting the part of a good man or a bad.” He also says in his defense
that “I thought that I ought not to do anything common or mean in the hour of danger: nor do
I now repent of the manner of my defense, and I would rather die having spoken after
manner, than speak in your manner and live. For neither in war nor yet at law ought any man
to use every way of escaping death.. . . The difficulty, my friends, is not in avoiding death,
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are willing to throw off the vagaries and insecurity of the state of nature
and live under the purview and absolute authority of the sovereign. This
condition, for Hobbes, is not peculiar to his time and space. Rather, it is
the condition of human kind. In other words, his theory is a universal
theory that describes an ahistorical individual.2 3 4
Hobbes saw himself as a scientist and one might rightly argue that
he was the first political scientist as he proclaimed himself as such.
Hobbes argues that we all need to start with any theory of knowledge by
examining effects and appearances. Still, these immediate appearances
and our memory of them are not at the level of philosophical knowledge
or reason. Hobbes writes, “Although sense and memory of things, which
are common to man and all living creatures, by knowledge, yet because
they are given us immediately by nature, and not gotten by ratiocination,
they are not philosophy” (1969,1,1,2). He continues by arguing that
“philosophy is such knowledge of effects or appearances as we acquire by
true ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of their causes or
generation. And again, of such causes or generations as may be had from
knowing first their effects” (1969,1,1,2). What we see is that all have the
ability through reason to come to conclusions from the effects or
but in avoiding unrighteousness; for that runs faster than death” (B. Jowett trans. My
emphasis, 45).
2 3 4 We should note that various thinkers, such as Llyod have noted that individuals choose to
live in the state of nature all o f the time by openly rebelling against the state. Such rebellion
puts one at odds with the state and, thus, puts the individual at war with the sovereign.
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appearances that come to us in nature. The question that we have to ask, in
terms of Hobbes’s political theory, is how do we come to the conclusion
that security is best provided for by the sovereign in the state.
We can first get an idea of how this works by looking at Hobbes’s
idea of knowledge in general. He writes, “There is knowledge of two
kinds: whereof one is knowledge of fact: the other knowledge of the
consequence of one affirmation to another" (1998, 3). What this means is
that events, such as historical events, are such that we can call them facts.
So, the civil wars that Hobbes experienced, the rise to power of a certain
king, etc. are facts. The second type of knowledge is what Hobbes calls
hypothetical knowledge. It involves speculation by the use of reason. As
Hobbes explains in the Leviathan, philosophical knowledge, and for our
purpose, knowledge of the correct arrangement of governmental power, is
this knowledge of consequences. He writes that such knowledge is always
conditional by stating that “if this is to be, that is; if this has been, that has
been; if this shall be, that shall be” (1988, 7). The question at hand is
whether we all come to the same conclusions, thus, putting Hobbes into
the category of thinker who assumes an ahistorical political actor.
Hobbes takes his empiricism further and argues that one can also
discuss human or political arrangements in terms of bodies and motion, as
one is able to discuss the physical world. He argues that there are two
2 3 5 See Leviathan, Book I.
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types of bodies in the interactions among men, the natural world and the
commonwealth. Moreover, we can understand the relationships between
bodies in both the natural and the political worlds through rational
calculation, which Hobbes saw in terms of mathematical computation.2 3 7
In fact, Hobbes argues that science is predicated on the very science of
math itself 2 3 8
In his Leviathan, Hobbes’s entire methodology and method of
argumentation is meant to point to a universalistic understanding of a
universal human nature. Properly understood, Hobbes believes we can
come to a correct understanding of how to solve the problems of human
nature. Like any good scientist, he attempts to frame the problem in a
systematic fashion and answer the problem in the same fashion. Starting
the Leviathan with an exploration of the senses and the operations of the
mind Hobbes is attempting to outline that which we all share in common.
2 3 6 Even Hobbes’s own division of his works into De Corpore (Concerning the Body) and De
Cive (Concerning the State) attest to this division and discussion along the terms of the
“science” that he is attempting to put forth.
2 3 7 Hobbes writes, “By ratiocination I mean computation” (Concerning the Body 1,1,2). This
certainly leads one to believe that coming to rational conclusions is truly a matter of adding
up the potential future consequences, both positive and negative and forming a conclusion. In
the state of nature, one would assume, the computation that falls down on the side of the
negative becomes so daunting as to find one with no choice but to cede one’s autonomy—
freedom in the absolute sense—to the sovereign.
2 3 8 We must remember that Hobbes saw his study of politics as no less a science than any
other science that was prevalent and accepted as science at the time. He writes, “For
whatsoever assistance doth accrue to the life of man, whether from the observation of the
heavens or from the description of the earth, from the notation of times or from the remotest
experiments of navigation; finally whatsoever things they are in which this present age doth
differ from the rude simpleness of antiquity, we must acknowledge to be a debt which we
owe to geometry” (Concerning Government and Society, xii).
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Though, his discourse on the nature of the mind will also serve a dual
purpose—he wants to show how our imaginations can lead us to the
problems of difference and disparate ideologies that can, in turn, lead us to
conflict. Hobbes’s work follows that of both a scientist—building from
empirical examination—and a geometer—establishing simple concepts up
which more complex ideas can be built upon.
Hobbes’s work starts with the senses, which in turn fires, and
informs the imagination. From there, he argues that “The general use of
speech, is to transfer our mental discourse, into verbal; or the train of our
thoughts, in a train of words; and that for two commodities; whereof one
is, the registering of the consequences of our thoughts. . . ” (1988,101).
Hobbes moves us through universal experience—the outer world of
phenomena, which we all know—to the inner world of the imagination, to
the social world. And speech has a special place in that it helps us to
register the causes of things, a critical concept to why we all humans are
willing, in Hobbes’s theory, to accept the power of the sovereign. Speech
also plays a significant role in that it helps us to order correctly the right
order of names. He writes “that truth consitesth in the right ordering of
names in our affirmations” (105). Since all humans speak, or rather, have
the faculty of speech, all are able to access truth as such.
2 3 9 See Gauthier (1997) and Grant (1990).
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For Hobbes, all humans are rational. Understanding rationality is a
simple matter of explicating human nature. Hobbes writes, “When a man
reasons, he does nothing else does nothing else but conceive of a sum total
. . . which is the conceiving of the consequence of the names of all parts”
(1988,110). One might object to Hobbes by arguing that since languages
are different, since experiences are different, that we should not expect
universal assent to his theory of the state, nor should we expect that
humans in different cultures will be willing to defer all their rights to an all
powerful sovereign. However, Hobbes sees reason as being that which is
truly universal. He writes that
reason is not as sense, and memory . . . nor gotten by experience . . .
but attained by industry, first in apt imposing of names; and
secondly by getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from
the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connection of
one of them to another; and so to syllogisms, which are the
connections of one of them to the other, till we come to a knowledge
of all consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand;
and that is it, men call science.. . . Science is the knowledge of
consequence.” (115)
For Hobbes, all humans, having the same faculties, the same mental
dispositions, are the same. Thus, we would expect that all humans would
rationally accept, for example, the power of the sovereign to abrogate
individual rights for the sake of the security of the state. Hobbes clearly
outlines an ahistorical actor in order to emphasize why his characterization
of the state is the most appropriate. In a Hobbesian world, it would be
impossible for there to be vast differences in dispositions, mental faculties,
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and character traits since we could then no longer count on there being a
“best” type of state. Hobbes does not offer his solution to the problems
that plague us in the state of nature as one of many possible solutions. His
solution, as outlined in Leviathan, is the solution. His ahistorical actor, the
fundamental ontology, the assumptions that he uses, informs and probably
even helps to determine the outcomes that Hobbes so carefully attempts to
elucidate as a scientist rather than a speculative philosopher.
For the purposes of this work, Jacques Derrida will serve as the one
representative of the historical school.2 4 0 Derrida’s influence has been felt
in just about every academic discipline outside of the sciences.2 4 1
Derrida’s intellectual legacy goes back to Nietzsche through Heidegger.
He coined the term “deconstruction” and made postmodernism and the
f)A * )
avant-garde mainstream in many disciplines. There will be those who
will object that discussing Derrida in terms of having an ontology, of any
2 4 0 There are two problems here. First, as I already mentioned, there are many, some of
whom might be more logical choices, who would fit into this school, such as Hegel, Marx,
Rousseau, etc. Second, Derrida himself, like many postmodernists, eschewed the assigning
of labels. For example, he would never admit to being a postmodernist. However, given
Derrida’s use of thinkers such as Hegel, Marx, and others and his recent influence, Derrida
seems to be a perfectly logical choice.
2 4 1 For example, Rips (2004) writes that Derrida’s work “was to affect the thinking,
consciously and unconsciously, an entire generation of law students—students who now
comprise the upper strata of legislators, judges, legal scholars, and attorneys in this country”
(9). Derrida’s influence has been felt in the study of politics, gender studies, feminism,
culture studies, anthropology, sociology, economics, critical studies, philosophy, and literary
studies.
2 4 2 See Connnor (2004) and Sim (2001). Sim writes, “Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction
became one of the most powerful expressions of the poststructuralist ethos. Deconstruction
was directed against the system-building side of structuralism, and took issue with the idea
that all phenomena were reducible to the operations of systems, with its implication that we
could have total control over our environment” (5).
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sort, is contrary to Derrida’s project. Derrida eschewed totalizing systems
and he was willing to question all assumptions. Moreover, he was always
willing to bracket and defer terms like “truth.”2 4 3 1 argue that this is
exactly what makes him a perfect representative for the historical school.
Taken as Richard Rorty interprets Derrida, the individual actor is truly an
actor in each individual time and space. To put upon the actor a set of
traits or certain cultural expectations is to do violence to the individual.2 4 4
Derrida seeks to discuss the other—that which is excluded by
philosophy—the trace of truth that is always excluded by the “truths” that
we establish by our systems of truth. In a real sense, Derrida claims to be
concerned with language and its inability to represent the truth in what he
would call its full presence.2 4 5
This brief section in Derrida cannot possibly elucidate Derrida’s
work in the many areas that he discussed. I can only hope to bring light to
Derrida’s position concerning individuals and the ontology that he basis
2 4 3 The entire postmodern ethos, perhaps best exhibited by Jean-Francois Lyotard, eschews
systems, structures, totalities, and any form of traditional philosophy. Lyotard (1992) writes
that thinkers find the “rules” of thought are really “so many methods of deception, seduction,
and reassurance that [it is] impossible to be truthful” (6). Sim writes that Lyotard’s work is
“resolutely antifoundational in outlook” (10).
2 4 4 See Caputo (1996). Derrida (1987) writes, “A communitas is a military formation,
referring to the common defense we build against the other, the fortifications built around the
city . . . to gather ourselves together, the encircle ourselves with a common wall or barrier . . .
that keeps the same safe from the other. In that sense, community, that sense of community,
is everything that deconstruction resists. For deconstruction is through and through
l’invention de l’autre, the affirmation . . . of the total other, and so everything that is done in
deconstruction takes aim at this wall of defense that community throws up against the other”
(58-61).
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them on. While Derrida would be the first to claim that I am doing
violence to his work—he proposes no foundations for thought and
specifically and carefully eschews them—this does not mean that we
cannot examine his claims in the light that I am proposing. Just because he
holds that he makes no positive claims, does not mean that this is the case.
For example, in respect to his positive claims, it is true that Derrida’s work
falls prey to what is traditionally been called the liar’s paradox. The liar’s
paradox follows from the paradox that is generated by this statement: “I
only tell lies.” If it is true that that I only tell lies, then the sentence cannot
be trusted, since I have affirmed that all that I say is a lie. However, if the
statement is true—it is the case that I only tell lies—then the sentence
refutes itself. Derrida falls prey to the same problem. He cannot claim that
there are no foundations for truth, that truth always escapes us,
supplementarity is always beyond us, and so forth, without running up
against the same problem. In other words, it is not necessarily the case that
simply because he denies that he makes positive claims that we should
trust him.2 4 6
2 4 5 See Derrida (1967). Discussing truth as if we have it in its full presence, that is to say
discussing the truth as if it can be elucidated, is what Western thought has always done,
according to Derrida.
2 4 6 1 am not using the term trust in a pejorative sense. I use it merely to say that he seems to
make self-refuting claims.
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Before we can begin to discuss what Derrida’s guiding ontology is,
we must briefly look at some of the “principles” of postmodernism.2 4 7
Postmodernism can be characterized through the following ideas: 1) the
idea of absolute truth is problematic. 2) The idea of truth is problematic
because any assertions or system that attempts to explain “truth” will
necessarily exclude and leave out what is deemed as “other.” 3) This
otherness always eludes or escapes the grasp of any attempts to bring
about a complete theory or story about the truth. 4) Since the truth is
always elusive, all narratives that deal with truth are actually narratives
about power. 5) Western political theory has been preoccupied with
“discovering” or elucidating the grand unified theory of truth. This
preoccupation has led, quite literally, to violence against what are called
marginalized groups, such as racial minorities, women, gays and lesbians,
and any group that does not neatly fit the categories of what truth is
supposed to look like. 6) Postmodernists argue that this happens because
Western philosophy’s preoccupation with theories of truth make it
insensitive to the difference and the marginalized.2 4 8
Michel Foucault wrote that “discursive formations” constantly seek
to explain regular bodies of ideas concepts. These concepts claim to
2 4 7 See Connor (2001) and Sim (1996) for excellent introductions to this field.
2 4 8 Jay (1998) writes, “Theory became identified as a game of mastery, tainted by its
association with the evils of transcendentalism, foundationalism, essentialism, and the vain
search for a metalanguage, all of which were seen as unwarranted extrapolations from the
privileged position of those who arrogantly pretended to speak for the whole” (16).
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produce knowledge. His historical genealogies show how these concepts,
which appear regular, are products of transformations, sudden shifts in
thought, and power.2 4 9 Derrida likewise argues that we have established a
sort of “circular complicity” that allows us to justify our ontology, our
foundations, the starting points by the results or the fruits which they
A
bear. And we know that the fruits that are borne are good because our
starting point is good. Both justify the other without worrying about the
sticky problem of circularity. Derrida claims that there is an order, which
resists being brought into the light of method or truth. This is the
“difference,” a term coined by Derrida to “explain” that which eludes any
conceptual framework. The difference is that which lies beyond our truth
claims. We can never completely encapsulate or articulate the truth. There
is always something beyond our claims, our ontology. Difference is but
one way to mark this. It “vanishes into the night, [it] can never be sensed
as a full term, but rather extends an invisible relationship” (1982, 5).
While this might seem to be rather opaque, Derrida is simply arguing that
2 4 9 See Foucault’s (1972) Archaeology o f Knowledge. Foucault writes, “We must rid
ourselves of a whole mass of notions, each of which, in its own way, diversifies the theme of
continuity. They may not have a very rigorous conceptual structure, but they have a very
precise function. Take the notion of tradition: it is intended to give a special temporal status
to a group of phenomena that are both successive and identical. . . It allows a reduction of
the difference proper to every beginning, in order to pursue without discontinuity the endless
search for the origin” (21). My project is a discussion on how political theorists often use
their ontology to posit a beginning upon which all other phenomena can be compared. I
argue that this is not effective as it allows for the illusion that one is analyzing permanent
phenomena.
5 0 See Derrida (1982), pp. x-xiv.
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objectivity and the sort of objectivity that leads to the truth of the
ahistorical individual will not be found in thinking or philosophizing.
A large number of thinkers have been influenced by this position.
For example, “Richard Rorty’s account of the history of Western
philosophy and political theory is designed to show that there are no
objective standpoints which guarantee truth or knowledge about the world,
and that philosophical projects, from Plato to Immanuel Kant to Jurgen
Habermas, have all floundered in this pursuit.”2 5 1 Martin Jay has taken this
opening up of political thought to mean that we need to be more expansive
and sensitive to how we pursue our study of political rhetoric. He writes,
“Cultural Semantics must, therefore, be sensitive to the ways in which
language partakes in and contributes to the larger processes of identity
formation through inclusion, exclusion, and even abjection.”2 5 2 Others,
though not postmodernists, have also noted that we are often caught in the
illusion of our words, mistaking them for facts and mistaking facts as
assumptions that we can use for an unassailable ontology.
Derrida’s position concerning the individual actor fits into the
category of the historical school of thought because it exemplifies many of
2 5 1 David Howarth (1995), 117.
2 5 2 Martin Jay (1998), 3.
2 5 3 For example, see Adorno (1991). He writes, “Language participates in reification,
separation of subject matter and thought. The customary ring of naturalness deceives us
about that. It creates the illusion that what is said is immediately equivalent to what is meant.
By acknowledging itself as a token, the foreign word reminds us bluntly that all real
language has something of the token in it. It makes itself language’s scapegoat, the bearer of
the dissonance that language has to give form to and not merely prettify” (189).
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the postmodern critiques of traditional philosophy. As we saw in our brief
examination of Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes, one of the foundational
aspects to their ontology is the ahistoric nature of the political actor.
Considering that Derrida allows for infinite possibilities and direct refusal
to categorize political actors, the only option left is to say that political
actors are products of their time, space, and so forth. In other words, it
makes no sense to speak of an ahistorical actor because an actor can never
be separated from her context. History and specific experiences always
play a role in the creation of the individual that can never fully be
theoretically articulated.
Derrida’s work can be seen as exemplifying the following points
concerning postmodernism, some of which we have already discussed: 1)
Postmodernism is an attack on the idea of a unified, singular notion of
truth. The belief that there is a truth that is independent of human
experience is soundly rejected by postmodernists.2 5 4 2) Postmodernism is
an attack on the notion that there is stable meaning in language.
Traditionally the idea that meaning has to have an element of stability is
the handmaiden to the idea of a universal, singular notion of truth. 3) In
2 5 4 Recently, many thinkers have revisited the works of our philosophical past to see just
where the canon stands on this idea. Typically, the past thinkers are seen in a “traditional”
light, holding to some idea or version of necessary, universal truth. However, there is a
growing trend of thinkers that seeks to re-interpret the canon [cite Postmodern Platos, etc.]
Heidegger can be seen as the beginning of the 20th century attempt to re-examine what the
ancients might have meant. This task has been carried on by the likes of Derrida [cite the
Pharmakon, the essay on Hegel, etc.]
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conjunction with the first two, one can also see postmodernism as an
attack on the idea that identity is unified, singular and unchanging.
Typically, what is thought to be true about humans of one culture, would
also be seen to be true about humans in all cultures. 4) Postmodernism is
an attack on the idea that there is imminent logic or ordering principle to
history. Modernism sees history as moving and progressing, moving from
the less ordered to the more ordered. History has a telos, according to
many, moving from the less moral and more fractured societal
arrangements to more moral and more unified social arrangements. 5)
Postmodernism is an attack on the idea that reason is supreme and prior to
emotions and other characteristics central to the human experience. 6)
Postmodernism is seen as the “affirmation” that Enlightenment principles
led to overall regression rather than progress. For example, this is the
position of post-colonialism. 7) Related to the last point and one that is
made by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School is the idea that
instrumental reason is not only the most superior form of reason but, in
fact, leads to a loss of independence and further dominance of various life
forms such as technology.2 5 7 8) Postmodernism is critical of
2 5 6 Best writes that “Vico, Herder, Spengler, Nietzsche, Weber, Marx, and others in the
modem tradition subjected totalizing and teleological visions of history to sharp critique,
advocating countervisions of historical plurality, nonevolutionism, or cyclical theories of
history” (7).
2 5 7 See Stephen Eric Bronner’s (Ed.) Critical Theory and Society: A Reader (1989) and
James Johnson’s “Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation Between Critical Theory
and Rational Choice” (1993). Max Horkheimer writes, “Although social philosophy is the
focus of general philosophical concern, it is in no better shape today than most philosophical,
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Enlightenment views of race and gender, which typically see race and
gender as stable and constant. For all of Hume’s, Locke’s and Kant’s
advocating for liberality in politics and, one would assume by extension,
the belief in diversity, they still inferred highly racist and separatist ideals
from their read on Enlightenment principles.2 5 8
Derrida, seen as an exemplar of postmodernism, offers the
traditional conceptions of the human actor a real challenge. We see
through his work that traditional political philosophy has not been able to
keep up to the challenge that is presented by diversity. And, contrary to
the overly idealized theories of Aristotle or Hobbes or most of the Western
canon, Derrida can argue that it is diversity and difference that we see in
the world, not theoretical unity. Though Derrida is seen as challenging the
traditional canons of Western thought, he could argue that it is the
postmodernists who are actually describing experience and trying to think
it through.2 5 9 It seems to be clear that individual actors are not
transcendental, essential, ahistoric actors. Culture and context play a
indeed most fundamentally intellectual efforts. One is unable to find a substantive conception
of social philosophy that could be considered everywhere as biruling. Given the present
situation in the sciences, in which the traditional boundaries between disciplines are in
question and we do not yet know where they might be drawn in the future, the attempt to
give ultimate definitions for academic domains seems rather untimely” (cited in Bronner,
25).
See Issac Kramnick (editor) The Portable Enlightenment Reader (1995).
2 5 9 This makes sense if one considers the early influence of structuralism mid phenomenology
on postmodernists. Foucault, for example, tries to think structuralism through to its obvious
conclusions and he finds that it is power that actually orders knowledge. Derrida, looking
through the prism of phenomenology, sees that the world does not fit a unitary theoretical
lens, but whoever one looks there is resistance to simplification
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critical role in shaping political actors. However, Derrida’s formulation is
not going to avoid the same problems that the ahistoric thinkers were
unable to avoid. Just because Derrida refuses to demarcate his
foundational positions—his ontology—this does mean that he gets a pass
on this issue. In fact, I argue that considering the fact that Derrida is
throwing the entire Western philosophical tradition into chaos, he needs to
discuss clearly what he thinks comprises the political actor. His position
does lead to extreme relativism. Such a position allows us, literally, to say
whatever we want about our starting positions, our conclusions, and leaves
no room by which we can be criticized.
In this chapter, I argued that various thinkers have assumed
particular ontologies. These ontologies, I argued, can be classified as
either ahistoric or historic. The types of ontology that one holds will lead
to particular types of political ideas. In the sections that I follow I will
show that Martha Nussbaum and Charles Taylor are able to carry forth
their examination of the political by being neither ahistoric or simply
historic in their approaches. Both of them, I argue, are careful to examine
their ontological positions. Both of them are willing to alter their
2 6 0 See Norris (1990). Norris argues that the incredulity expressed by postmodernists against
theory is self-refuting, at the least, and so relativistic, at worst, that it is almost incoherent.
Norris writes that “The cultural-relativist approach to philosophy of science is misguided
both in theory and in the kinds of ethical or sociopolitical judgment to which it very often
gives rise. By equating science with its own worst abuses—i.e., with its exploitative, its
purely instrumental or technocratic forms—this approach fails to recognize that the quest for
truth carries its own ethical imperative, that is to say, an obligation (on the part of scientists
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assumptions or use a variety of sources to inform their ontologies because
both of them realize 1) the danger of assuming an incorrect position or
starting point and 2) the chance to create a more competent, complete, and
coherent political philosophy does not lie in one’s method, but in one’s
starting position.
and philosophers or sociologists of science) to get things right so far as possible and not to be
swayed by the pressures of conformist ideology or consensus belief’ (1997, 1).
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Chapter Five
Nussbaum and the Reconstruction of Human Nature
The heart has its reasons which reason does not know.
Pascal, Pensees (#277)
We work in the dark—we do what we can—we give what we have.
Our doubt is our passion, and our passion is our task The rest is the
madness o f art.
Henry James
Life is painting a picture not doing a sum.
Oliver Wendell Holmes2 6 1
Throughout this work I have discussed the idea that political
science in many ways is lacking in ways to look at the most important
phenomena that its practitioners might encounter. I have argued that there
are several problems in our approach to the study of politics in general.
First, I have shown that simply calling for methodological unification in
the social sciences is misguided. In fact, I have argued this desire for
unification comes from a misguided desire to emulate the natural
sciences. Second, I have argued that the role of ontology plays a
significant role in the types of outcomes that one can expect to gamer
from any particular theory. This, in itself, is not a particularly startling
conclusion. However, from this we realize the need for the theorist in the
2 6 1 Cited in Nussbaum, 1995, xix.
2621 have also argued that this is a poor reading of what the practitioners of science do.
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study of politics. Without thinking through these problems in a sustained
and serious manner, the study of politics verges on the danger of
becoming a cavalcade of methodologies that are impossible to interpret as
to their import or larger meaning. For too long has the political theory
come to be dominated by methodologists. This shift has eradicated critical
aspects of the investigation into our political life, the primary one being
the discussion on normative thought.2 6 3 More importantly, the theorist’s
critical expertise into questions such as to the relationship between the
state and the individual, the nature of power, the role that normative
beliefs play in the polity, the complex exchange of individuals and culture,
and so forth have been ignored. To ignore this expertise is to put the field
in danger of becoming overly specialized to the point of meaninglessness.
In other words, the theorists have surrendered to the methodologists,
without much of a fight and based on a poor understanding, by the
methodologists of what analysis and science even mean. Lawrence Mayer
writes, “There is no objective basis for asserting that one theory is superior
2 6 3 Lawrence Mayer writes (2002), “When political science received a clarion call in the
1950s from such revered prophets of the field such as David Easton, Harold Laswell, Roy
Macridis, and Gabriel Almond, to become more “scientific” in otder to command intellectual
respect from the academic community and society at large, most political scientists had only
the vaguest idea of what that meant. Many people in political science had fled to that refuge
out of fear of what they perceived to be the imperative of scientific analysis, especially
mathematical techniques and formal notational analysis. Hence, many political scientists
went gamely about the task of pursuing the scientific analysis of politics without a clear
understanding of a defensible criterion of demarcation separating work that is deserving of
that much-envied label of “scientific” from work that is not” (121). This has led, according to
Mayer, to inadequate discussions on epistemology. He writes that few have had a grasp
sufficient to understand that, citing Imre Lakatos, “in science there is no other way of
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to any other. Theoretical orientations or paradigms attain a dominant
position in the field by convention .... Among the misunderstandings
among political scientists in their quest for the holy grail of science is a
sense that the use of numbers in general and statistics in particular is the
equivalent o f ‘doing science’” (121). Methodologists have paid little or
not attention to epistemology, ontology, or the normative impact that these
changes have made in our understanding of politics. It also seems that
rather than giving an argument as to why these fields are not important to
the study of politics, they simply claim theoretical victory due to the
overall neglect they give these fields based on a poor understanding of the
tradition of political theory. This chapter is an attempt to show the
importance of bringing back theory, traditionally understood, to the study
of politics, by examining the work of Martha Nussbaum. In this chapter, I
also want to show that we can also reorient the work of Nussbaum to see
that she has a role to play in this work in ground laying work of ontology.
Ontologies are the most basic descriptions of political actors that
we take to be “essential.”2 6 4 Due to the fact that thinkers typically consider
essence to be something that does not need elucidation or that it is readily
self-evident, they usually concentrate on the “correct” method by which
judging a theory but by assessing the number, faith, and vocal energy of its supporters, then
this must be even more so in the social sciences: truth lies in power” (122).
2 6 4 John Gerring (2004), “An ontology is a vision of the world as it really is, a more or less
coherent set of assumptions about how the world works, a research Weltanshauimg
analogous to a Kuhnian paradigm” (351).
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something should be studied. The problem with emphasizing method over
ontologies is twofold: 1) we think that there is some truth to be discovered
if only we could use the correct method2 6 5 and 2) the assumptions that
comprise one’s ontology might be incorrect and would, thus, lead to
incorrect conclusions. While an ontology cannot be proven correct or
incorrect,2 6 6 we can outline the results, impact, and influence that an
ontology has on our body of collective knowledge. Because of this,
ontologies, of which we will never discover the “one” correct one, must be
continually re-examined and the interplay between ontology and method
must be taken into account as one examines political phenomena.
Moreover, some of our most basic political facts or problems seem to
elude any real type of quantitative grasp, which seems to be a denial of
method as it is generally understand currently in the social sciences.2 6 7 1
have shown that the quantitative tools that have come to dominate our
2 6 5 See Kaidesoja (2005) for his discussion on the inherent problems on transcendence in this
type of thinking.
2 6 4 See Gerring (2004), p. 351 and Mayer (2002).
2 6 7 This is not to say that many quantitative theorists have not wondered how to overcome
this problem. For example, see Gordon and Smith (2004). They argue that since it is not
possible to observe possible multiple mechanisms, any of which might be responsible for a
particular outcome, The problems that observers encounter range from identification and
labeling to even knowing which variables to include and exclude. They attempt to show how
quantitative information can be added to studies to obtain greater efficiency. They argue that
these qualitative studies enlighten us to various causes. I agree with this position and as I
have argued throughout, this is how one ought to study politics. However, I do not agree that
they are able to sufficiently incorporate their ideas concerning quantitative data into their
studies concerning the IMF. See also King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000). They attempt to
show how statistical analysis can be described in more qualitative terms. They argue that
they can improve the overall presentation of quantitative work through their techniques.
However, this type of work does not escape my overall criticism since they, like so many
others, assume their ontology and leave it unexamined and unproblematic.
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discipline are inadequate for a complete analysis of our political
experience if for no other reason than they cannot account for the
ontologies upon which they are based.
These quantitative tools have specific uses that are best suited for
particular problems. I have shown it is important that we not merely
make assumptions or leave our ontology unexamined as what constitutes a
political actor. The reason for this is that our ontology helps to determine
the range of possible conclusions that any particular theory can deliver.
Political science does not necessarily build on prior knowledge, meaning
we do not necessarily move from the darkness to greater light, or we
should not consider a grand unified theory possible.2 6 9 Also, if our
ontology is too narrow or too specific, it is possible that we will not be
able for analyze a range of phenomena that is central to the study of
politics. Normative concerns are an example of this—normative
considerations are central to the study of politics but are routinely ignored
now because they elude quantification. One example of a central
2 6 8 See Talisse’s (2004) “Introduction: Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics.” Talisse writes
that many are starting to see the impasse that exists among various approaches such as
communitarianism and liberalism. He argues that a deliberative method based on a pragmatic
ontology will allow us to solve problems that are often seen as intractable because ideology
gets in the way.
This is a theme found in much of philosophy, the social sciences, etc. This comes from a
desire to emulate the natural sciences which many, mistakenly, see as only progressive,
meaning that it builds from nothing to the knowledge that we have now. It is true that our
scientific knowledge is cumulative in certain aspects. However, even in the physical sciences
this is not a complete picture. See Hacking (2002), Searle (1995), and, most importantly,
Kuhn (1996). See also Mayer (2002).
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normative concern in politics is the problem of “evil.”2 7 0 We use this term
rather often in political discourse without a real awareness as to what it
means, how we interpret it, and how we use it2 7 1 It is an important
category in the study of politics. But, as Dana Villa writes:
[T]he tools of social science [are not] much help in grasping the
peculiar evil of totalitarian regimes, since these almost always
presuppose some model of means/ ends rationality as the basis for
explaining the workings of a social system of political regime.
Totalitarian evil certainly required highly evolved instrumentalities
of bureaucratic rationality, but it cannot be reduced to these means
of their effects. Evaluated from the standpoint of utilitarian criteria,
the camps were a tremendous waste of scare resources. And yet
terror and concentration camps define the totalitarian system, giving
it its distinctive shape and its uncanny novelty. (15)2 7 2
In this chapter, I will explore the ways in which Martha Nussbaum
has taken seriously not only the charge to come up with explanations for
political phenomena, but, as I argue, her work is imbued with a sense of
responsibility to outline, explain, examine, revise, and revisit the origins—
the ontology—of the political actor. I argue that Nussbaum’s work shows
us, both theoretically and methodologically, how we might approach the
study of politics; it can serve as a model of how to bring the theorist back
in.2 7 3 Recently, qualitative theorists have been under attack by
2 7 0 While this does not constitute an authoritative study, consider the rhetoric used by the
Bush administration in describing its enemies as well as the rhetoric that is used by
opponents or enemies of the United States. See, for example, Cornell (2005)and Wright
(2002) as just a few of many examples.
2 7 1 See Lu’s (2004) “Agents, Structures and Evil in World Politics” and Bar On’s (2004)
“Politics and Prioritization of Evil.”
2 7 2 Villa (1999).
2 7 3 It should come as no surprise that Nussbaum has not been trained in social science
methodology but in classics and philosophy. Perhaps it is because of this freedom from
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methodologists who claim to hold superior methods for examining
politics.2 7 4 However, these attacks, more likely than not merely get us
competing theories with little chance of evaluating the effectiveness,
validity, or truth of any theory because they do not share a common
foundation—an ontology—by which we can judge them. We can follow
Putnam’s admonition and merely sample these various theories. However,
as I argued in the opening chapters, this will be ineffective because
different theories are literally discussing different worlds. Nussbaum
seems to understand this in her work. I argue that we can use her work, not
only for interesting conclusions that she reaches, but as a type of model for
studying politics: she considers and continually re-examines the ontology
that informs her work. This allows her, as it should all theorists, to place in
the center the important thinking that needs to be done concerning
normative politics, power, and various important relationships in the
polity.
From mining Greek wisdom for its insights into our political nature
to reformulating Lockean liberalism, Nussbaum has formulated a unique
and influential theory regarding human nature. Perhaps, more than most
thinkers, she is able to ask significant questions while doing so in a
having to go along with a discipline to which she is an outsider gives her freedom to
approach it in new ways.
2 4 1 think it is possible to make the argument that most of “isms” that have appeared in
academia over the last ten to twenty years attack quantitative methods and rationalism: post
structuralism, post-colonialism, postmodernism, etc.
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'yn c
rigorous manner. She has even taken the unusual step for a theorist of
actually trying to incorporate her ideas into a political plan of action.
Nussbaum’s most recent work, in a very real sense, can be seen as a
defense and an articulation of Mill’s concept of the no harm principle. In
other words, Nussbaum’s work can be read as an important reworking of
the overall project of liberalism.2 7 7 1 argue that we can read Nussbaum as
taking on Putnam’s appeal to move beyond that, which divides us. I will
develop what I think is her current position on political actors from the
works Poetic Justice, Upheavals o f Thought, and Hiding from
Humanity2 7 9
As I have made clear throughout this work, one of my interests is
showing that one’s ontology, one’s conception of human nature helps to
determine the types of outcomes that we will get. Also, being aware of
one’s ontology, the assumptions that are made to bolster it moves us
beyond political examination that merely reifies the rational actor as it has
2 7 5 1 state this to bring to mind Putnam’s main admonition: he hoped that thinkers from all
sides of the aisle would be able to ask more important questions while maintaining their
"for-
Her “capabilities” approach will be discussed later in the chapter.
2 7 7 Morris (2002) sees Nussbaum’s reworking of liberalism to be a new expression of social
justice. Traditionally, Morris writes, social justice has been based on theory that is leftist in
nature. However, given the recent demise of many social theories on the left, in particular
communism, there are many who hold a negative link between current efforts to achieve
social justice and the old theories that supported these ideas. Nussbaum, Morris argues,
focuses on “the fair distribution of capabilities—the resources and power to exercise self-
determination—to achieve well-being” (366).
2 7 8 Nussbaum has a great number of works that attempt to apply literature to the analysis of
philosophy and politics. For example, see her “Narrative Emotions: Beckett’s Genealogy of
Love” (1988), “Mortal Immortals: Lucretius on Death and the Voice of Nature” (1989), and
“Aeschylus and Practical Conflict” (1985).
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been conceived since the time of Hobbes and is more engaging, and
correct I would argue, than those who simply cry that we should embrace
diversity. Nussbaum argues several things: 1) Liberalism is still a
worthy project and is, in fact, perhaps the best ideology under which one
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can live. 2) Humans express a large range of behaviors, aptitudes, and
emotions that need to be taken into account if one is going to understand
why humans behave as they do in political situations. This is, in many
ways, a continuation of the project that political theorists have been
engaged in for centuries. As I tried to show in chapter two, it has always
been of the utmost importance to political theorists to have a “correct”
conception of human nature before one proceeded to discuss the ideal
state. 3) Nussbaum rides the middle of the ahistorical and historical
versions of the human actor. One could argue that she has staked a
position in which reason and the conceptions of rationality are still central
to the political realm. However, she has also worked to paint a broader
picture of human nature so that we can understand (a) why there are
differences in culture and in ideologies and (b) why people cling to them,
2 7 9 See Monroe (2001).
2 8 0 Hopefully, as we saw from chapters three and four that neither position is so simple.
Complex and very articulate arguments have been made for both positions. The question, as I
have elaborated hopefully, is whether these positions 1) are the most correct positions that
we can hope to attain and 2) whether there is not some way that we can move beyond these
positions.
See Nussbaum (2001). Her liberalism is decidedly humanistic. Citing Fairbaim, she
argues that “communism must be rejected because it is an assault on liberty, some forms of
democracy should also be criticized for being excessively nationalistic and ethnocentric”
(227).
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despite the universal notion of reason. She has also sought to broaden our
conception of reason to include emotions.2 8 2 Much of her project consists
in showing that we need to abandon one of the traditionally held liberal
beliefs and that is that reason and emotions are separate and completely
intractable in their unique natures.2 8 3 Rational choice theorists have, at
least tacitly, accepted this inherited idea so that they do not have to worry
about what to do about the role of emotions in political decision
making.2 8 4
Nussbaum has sought to show us how the universal political actor,
imbued with Kantian universal reasoning ability, can live in a world of
diversity. This entire idea, the project for global ethics, is one of great
ambition, considering that one could argue that most major philosophers
have sought to undertake a universalizing type project, usually with dim
results. At the very least, the results are usually highly contested.
2 8 2 See Nussbaum (2001), pp. 354-400.
2 8 ~ ’ This is to say that we can hold to goals of liberalism—freedom and equality—while
dismissing some o f its ethnocentric and sexist understandings of human nature.
2 8 4 See Mellers (1998). She writes, “Emotions have powerful effects on decisions. Moreover,
the outcomes o f decisions have powerful effects on emotions” (452). She also writes that
“framing effects, stimulus contexts, environments, and response modes might seem
innocuous, but they can profoundly shape decisions. Preferences can reverse depending on
each of these factors” (453). At the very least, the evidence that is provided by psychology
should at least force us to reconsider the assessment of some political scientists that looking
at the preferences of the rational actor is sufficient to understand political behavior. It is quite
possible, and I would argue probable, that all o f these other factors, which constitute one’s
ontology, play a far greater role.
2 8 5 There are a great number of political philosophers, especially in the 20th century, who
have not attempted to put forth a universal political theory. In fact, some thinkers even refuse
to look, at least systematically, at the political implications of their work. A list of these
thinkers would include Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Albert Camus,
and so forth. Nussbaum, as we shall see in this chapter, is very critical of the entire
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Whether her joint project of global ethics, undertaken with theologian
Hans Kung, is successful is still up for debate. What is interesting about
Nussbaum’s attempt at discussing universal reason is that she means
something else by this term than do the rational choice theorists. For her
this means something more along the lines of universal reasons to behave
as one should. For example, she argues that emotions are typically seen in
opposition to reason. However, we know that emotions often help set
appraisal patterns for various phenomena. Nussbaum argues that emotions
do even more than that. For example, she writes that emotions are in a
“normative sense. . . profoundly rational: for they are ways of taking in
important news of the world” (2003,109). This is an example of paying
close attention to the ontological presuppositions from which one operates.
Nussbaum tweaks rationality enough to include a broader range of
experience that is more in line with our actual experience as political
actors.
This concern for articulating a more correct ontology concerning
the human actor is something that Nussbaum has worked on throughout
postmodern project. I argue that she sees it, at the very least, an abandonment of the hope of
universal reason. We must remember that for Nussbaum universal reason does not mean the
same that it does for a rational choice theorist. Rather, for her, universal reason is more along
the lines of reasons why we ought to behave morally. I hold that she would argue that to give
up on the concept of reason as a universalizing force is to give into pessimism. It is certainly
true that many horrible things have been done in the name of reason and based on Western
political ideology, as I outlined in chapter four. However, these unfortunate events, one could
argue, are the results of a misunderstanding of our own human nature. Simply because we
have not, heretofore, understood ourselves perfectly, if at all, is not sufficient reason to give
up on the belief and hope that we can.
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her career, particularly in Love’ s Knowledge (1990). In this work, as
Richard Eldridge points out, Nussbaum explores human nature in a way
that takes “any human life [as] a shifting mixture of envisionings of ideals,
responses to historical inheritances, and promptings of unruly desire”
(485). He continues, “Measurement can investigate some of the conditions
of these exercises, and it can something usefully suggest therapies, but it
cannot capture the courage or creativity or love or viciousness that human
beings sometimes display in living” (485). It is only through a complete
examination of the human subject, a look at foibles, love, desire, and the
like that we will begin to arrive at any meaningful idea of what it is we are
investigating and describing. It is only through a careful explication of
ontology, through a recognition that our cognition is limited and that our
ontological horizons extend far beyond both our limited individual
conceptions and our investigative methods.
In Love’ s Knowledge, in order to investigate that which is typically
excluded from our discussion, Nussbaum seeks to investigate the
following: 1) class, gender and nationality. It is absurd to think that these
concepts do not matter to what comprises our preferences and influences
various outcomes. 2) She also looks at desire and passions. At the very
least, these are important in our lives and may even be central in shaping
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our lives. 3) The fact that our ideals are important to us is another area
that Nussbaum examines. She does not see us as determined or captured
by our historical circumstances (64). We can use our infinite imagination
to rethink who we are and how we might operate in a world that is
different than today. She seeks to expand the ontological horizon to
include an infinity of possibilities. 4) Luck or the uncontrolled happenings
of the world have much to do with how things might work out as they play
a role in crashing into our expectations as to what we assumed certain
causes and affects.2 8 7 5) Nussbaum also argues that human character—
courage and cowardice, passion and apathy—play prominent roles in
shaping both the field of possibility and the possible outcomes. To
exemplify how we learn about our ontological possibilities, Nussbaum
tries to show that our deliberative functions are not merely “either
quantitative or a mere shot in the dark” (60) and they are not the result of
“teaching abstract law” (160). Instead that which comprises us is the result
of “leading the friend, or child, or loved one—by a word, by a story, by an
image—to see some new aspect of the concrete case at hand” (160). The
field ontological possibilities can always be reexamined and should never
be taken as set.
2 8 6 One can think of a variety of ways in which we use these concepts in making a wide array
of assessments, but we often dismiss it in the study of politics. One obvious example of how
such work needs to be done is how desire works in attaining or in the drive to attain power.
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While Nussbaum has always been attracted to the power of reason
as the primary source and mover of human design, we can examine her
work Poetic Justice to see that there is more to the actor than the mere
faculty of reason, as we already saw in Love’ s Knowledge. In the classical
liberal and even rational choice theory sense of the word, reason means
the hard wiring of our brains and they common way in which all of us
reason identically under similar circumstances.2 8 8 This is where the
concept of the utility maximizer comes from. The fact that the imagination
plays a role in shaping the possibilities of our political existence is central
to Nussbaum’s work, though it is neglected outright by rational choice
theories. I argue that part of the problem with the rationality project is that
it cannot explain why there is difference in the ways in which polities have
come about, why humans can see the world so differently, and why we are
incapable of imagining so many different possibly worlds for humanity.
Many have thought that we are necessarily stuck in a state of binary
opposites—we have a unified theory or we have relativism, for
3fiQ
example. This simplification of actors and the political life strangles the
2 8 7 For example, the passing of a loved one sharply and dramatically alters the ontological
horizon. Our imagination, at times, is literally at a loss as to how to deal with the sudden
ontological shift.
2 8 8 See Pinker (2002), 2-5.
2 8 9 See Rebecca Collins (2003). Collins argues that the standard oppositions used in research
such as truth and falsity, oral and written traditions, generality and specificity, leads to
problems because we tend to sooth over problems that are existent (343-346).
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imagination and impedes our understanding of our world. Nussbaum
writes:
Very often in today’s political life we lack the capacity to see one
another as fully human, as more than “dreams or dots.” Often, too,
those refusals of sympathy are aided and abbetted by an excessive
reliance on technical ways of modeling human behavior, especially
those that derives from economic utilitarianism. These models can
be very valuable in their place, but they frequently prove
incomplete as a guide to political relations among citizens. (1995,
xiii)
Our ontological beginnings, the assumptions we make, how those
assumptions play out in the methods we choose to examine phenomena
with, the creation of phenomena are complex. The tendency and the desire
to simplify in politics does not advance knowledge but might actually
impede it.
We can see politics, according to Nussbaum, as an important
engagement in storytelling. If one thinks long and hard about concepts that
are central to the creation of politics—the state, political authority, human
nature, the social contract—they are extended stories that are used to make
the complex simple. While I am often critical in this work of the
assumptions that political scientists make, I do hold that they cannot do
otherwise than make assumptions. It would be an impossible burden to
bear if one had to completely explicate human nature or the origins of
power—empirically, psychologically, socially—before one could use the
terms. We all argue from assumptions. The question is, in a social science
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such as political science, can we ever move beyond the storytelling aspect
of our discipline. And like literature, there is an expansiveness to the
number of stories that can be told. As to which stories are true, the best we
might be able to do is to see which stories “ring true.” Issues like public
morality, public policy, group think, war, social programs, and so forth are
usually the issues that dominate our political consciousness and there is
any number of way to tell the story of these phenomena. In other words,
there is good reason to believe that ontology, promoted and expand by
imagination, plays the critical role in setting up the rules and expectations
of any political world. The literary imagination, Nussbaum argues, is
critical to understanding the political world. She writes,
The literary imagination is a part of public rationality, and not the
whole. I believe that it would be extremely dangerous to suggest
substituting empathetic imagining for rule-governed moral
reasoning, and I am not making that suggestion. In fact, I defend the
literary imagination precisely because it seems to me an essential
ingredient of an ethical stance that asks us to concern ourselves with
the good of other people whose lives are distant from our own. Such
an ethical stance will have a large place for rules and formal
decisions procedures, including procedures inspired by economics.
(1995, xvi, my emphasis)
There are several important ideas that need to be elaborated on at
this point because we will see them constantly throughout Nussbaum’s
work. First, we see that Nussbaum is not completely willing to abandon
the idea of reason. The imagination is not going to allow us all
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possibilities.2 9 0 However, what the imagination might allow us to see are
the similarities that we share as humans and thus make a rule-based moral
reasoning system more plausible. Second, we will not be able to justify an
ethical decision that is based solely on rational calculation or utility
maximization. From this alone, we can argue that Nussbaum is rejecting
the possibility of engaging in a political science that strictly sees actors as
*701
utility maximizers. Third, the belief that we must also consider the well
being others in the polity is the basis of Nussbaum’s claim that we must
consider something beyond utility maximization or political decisions
based solely on identity. This ethical concern is a very part of what
') Q ')
comprises the essence—the ontology—of political actors. As she writes,
“The literary imagination has to contend against the deep prejudices of
many human beings and institutions and will not always prevail” (1995,
2 9 0 To abandon an overly quantitative and/ or rationalistic approach to politics is not allow all
possibilities. For example, one cannot allow round squares into the world simply because one
wants to. It makes no sense to argue for such an object. And die reason for saying this rests
on what we take to be inherently reasonable as well as the fact that it defies a variety of
logical rules. In other words, the “inherent” or “intuitive” reasonableness of this is just as
important as the “rationality” of it. We do not say, we currently cannot allow round squares
but we may in the future. Our intuition tells us it will also be impossible in the fixture. I argue
that there are aspects of politics that follow this as well.
2 9 1 See Grafstein (2002).
2 9 2 Contra Adam Smith, the collective good is not the fortune serendipity of the invisible
hand. Adam Smith wrote the following in Book IV, Chapter II of The Wealth o f Nations-.
“... every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as
great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor
knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of
foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such
a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and
he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which
was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part
of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more
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xvii). Her work is deeply imbued not only with a leaning towards classical
liberalism, but with an almost seemingly contrary socialist belief that
political thinking must also do something to make the lives of the world’s
citizens better. In fact, even Nussbaum’s own words presages those of
Putnam’s when she writes that her project is “to present a vivid conception
of public reasoning that is humanistic and not pseudo-scientific, to show
how a certain type of narrative literature expresses and develops such a
conception, and to show some of the benefits this conception might have
to offer the pubic sphere” (1995, xviii). For the purposes of my work, we
can see that Nussbaum is willing to tackle some of the strict and difficult
normative concerns of the state with a challenging and intriguing way to
rethink ontology.
One of the aspects of imagination that Nussbaum seeks to explore is
its subversive nature.2 9 3 It is true that much of what we do and how we
function is based on cognitive, though not necessarily conscious, habitual
practices.2 9 4 However, to say that we can always count on habit to guide
us through each event, or future events, is to assume the rigidity of the
mind. I argue that Nussbaum sees the imagination, through narrative
literature informing our political arguments, as causing quite a degree of
effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good
done by those who affected to trade for the public good.”
2 9 3 As concept the “subversive imagination” has gained ground over the last several decades.
For example, see Becker’s (1996) “The Subversive Imagination: Artists, Society, and Social
Responsibility,” and Chang’s (2004) “Fake Logos, Fake Theory, Fake Globalization.”
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disruption, for both good and bad. In her work, Poetic Justice, Nussbaum
moves to incorporate how literature informs our political attitudes in ways
that most of the sources that political theorists use, such as history and the
philosophical ruminations of other political philosophers. She writes that
works, such as history, do not give us what literature can, which is “the
ability to image what it is like to live the life of another person who might,
given changes in circumstance, be oneself or one of one’s loved ones” (5).
There are several possible objections to Nussbaum here. First, it is
not clear that the novel or literature has any ability to shift ontology. There
is the obvious point that person x who thinks y might just be wrong and so
we do not need to take his or her ontology seriously.2 9 5 A related and
another obvious problem for Nussbaum’s theory of the influence of
literature is that Americans do not read that much anymore. Therefore, it is
difficult to image how literature can engage the imagination in the hopeful
way that Nussbaum proposes above. As Neil Postman writes, “You cannot
do political philosophy on television” (7).2 9 6 Robert Putnam’s position is
similar to that of Postman’s and probably does not share the rosy idealism
that Nussbaum does about the potential influence of literature in the
2 9 4 See Marcus, et al (2000).
2 9 5 For example, most of us would hold that a person who holds to a position that the world is
controlled by machines and that we live in pods hooked to computers to instill fantasy lives
into our mind, such as the Matrix, are simply wrong. There is no way that we can prove that
such a person is wrong, but most of us will intuitively hold that this is the case.
2 9 6 What is also interesting about Postman’s position is that he agrees with Nussbaum on one
point, at least that political narratives and television programs share a commonality. He
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imagination of the individual and, thus, in the public discourse at large.
Putnam sees the advent of television, among other things, affecting our
social fabric so negatively that it causes the near complete loss of what he
call social capital. He writes, “Over the last three decades a variety of
social, economic, and technological changes have rendered obsolete a
significant stock of America’s social capital. Television, two-career
families, suburban sprawl, generational changes in values” means that
fewer and fewer of us are engaged in any meaningful way in the public
discourse (367). Given the simple fact that we do not read, there is
seemingly little chance for the imagination, as Nussbaum conceives of it,
to play any major role in our political lives. Even if this lack of reading is
an empirical fact that makes Nussbaum seem like a shiny idealist, it does
not have much impact on the overall gist of her argument. For the
purposes of my work, the very fact that she is attempting bring back
imagination into the public sphere is an important and surprisingly fresh
idea. The imagination challenges the ontological rigidity that often makes
our search for truth more like a dogmatic exercise in reifying and
affirming the truth that for many of us has become a stultifying experience
of recounting unexamined assumptions and forced methodologies.
Implicit in Nussbaum’s work is a normative claim that we can no
longer take the central unit of our evaluations—the individual—for
writes, “Television teaching always takes the form of story-telling, conducted through
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granted. There are two elements to her normative claim: 1) We have to be
more theoretically clever and deep. We cannot rely on the simple
assumptions that have seemingly gotten us through. 2) We also must
take on a new practical (by this I mean praxis) attitude concerning how we
approach not only public life, but our own personal lives as well. She
writes, “I notice that the type of cost-benefit analysis favored by
economics has become so familiar in public policy that it is taken for
granted; at the same time, public servants are less and less likely to be
readers of literature, where they could discover a more complex vision of
human life” (8). Citizens and thinkers alike must have a more rich
understanding of what it means to be human and they must also engage
the imagination by actually participating both in public life and in their
own mental life.
Nussbaum argues that an examination of the human imagination is
far more important to the study of politics than correct formulas,
interesting data sets, or any idea based on the assumptions of utility
maximization. In this regard, she shares similar views with thinkers such
dynamic images and supported by music” (148).
2 9 7 See Nussbaum (2003), pp. 11-15,389-400. For Nussbaum, the primary reason that this is
important is because abstract idealizations of the individual can easily be turned in evil. She
writes, “There is something quasi-natural about our tendency to have compassion for the
sufferings of those close to us, in the sense that the emotion is likely to arise in some form in
all human beings and to steer us to at least some genuinely moral connections. By contrast,
an abstract moral theory uninhibited by those connections of imagination and sympathy can
easily be turned to evil ends, because its human meaning is unclear . . . Certainly a rule-based
morality, unanimated by the resources of the imagination, can too easily become confused
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as Rorty. The primary difference between the two thinkers being that
Rorty sees literature playing a rather chaotic role in the development of the
polity because Rorty argues that there is little that one can do to persuade
others as to the benefits of one’s position other than hope to convert the
other. Nussbaum, on the other hand, sees the real possibility of seeing
commonalties in humans and in their stories based on some of the facts
that we do share, such as emotions, Kantian reason and the like.2 9 8 The
novel, Nussbaum argues, should be in the hands of both political thinkers
and those who purport that humans can be studied along the terms of
“economic science.” She writes that “economic science should be built on
human data of the sort novels . . . reveal to the imagination, that economic
science should seek a more complicated and philosophically adequate set
of foundations” (1995, 11). Rather than seeing the imagination of
empirically sloppy or imprecise, Nussbaum seeks to make it the center of
her political theory. Her ontology includes a more complete sense of what
it means to be human, rather than the stark and “simplified” versions of
the human that one sees in the assumptions of the rational choice theorist.
Imagination is excluded from rational choice theories if for no reason
other than the fact it cannot be quantified. For Nussbaum the primary
reason to include the imagination in any theory concerning politics, which
with a submissiveness to cultural rules, or to rules handed down by authority” (2003, 389-
90).
2 9 8 See Rorty (1989).
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she argues in Poetic Justice and continues to develop throughout her work,
is that political thinking always has to be involved with normative visions
and social justice. Nussbaum sees social justice as an intrinsic
characteristic of human nature, rather than an exogenous fact of our
communal living. Clearly, this is a rather radical shift in ontology.2 9 9
Nussbaum sees the imagination as playing both an important
empirical and normative role in political thinking. For Nussbaum, the
imagination is that which enables us to not only imagine worlds outside of
our own, but is the very foundation for politics and ethics as it allows us to
1 A A
gain empathic insight into the lives of others. In attempting to flesh out
what she means by the term imagination, Nussbaum explores other
concepts. For example, fancy, according to Nussbaum, is our ability to see
something other than it is, to see something from different perspectives.3 0 1
Fancy provides for us the “ability to endow a perceived form with rich and
complex significance; its generous construction of the seen; its preference
for wonder over pat solutions; its playful and surprising movements,
2 9 9 There has been a move away from seeing social justice as something more than just a
preference or choice that we make. See, example, Montada (1998).
0 0 One could argue that the reason why dehumanizing enemies during the time o f war is so
critical to those who advocate war is to paralyze the imagination of the polity. At the very
least those in power would hope that I would at least forget that those across from me are
humans just like me. I need to forget that they have families, hobbies, wants and desires. At
best, if I can convince myself that those who sit across the trench from me are, in feet, other
than I am, then so much the better for the war effort because it will become easier for me to
kill them. See Schrader’s (2004) “Training to Kill” and Baum’s (2004) “We Train the to Kill:
Afterward, they’re on their own.”
3 0 1 This is why the rhetoric of story-telling is so critical to Nussbaum’s ideal o f political
education.
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delightful for their own sake; its tenderness, its eroticism, its awe before
the fact of human mortality” (1995,43).
Nussbaum’s push, building on the work of a variety of cognitive
scientists, is to show 1) how emotions are “part and parcel of the system of
ethical reasoning” (2001,1) and that 2) complex relationship of morality,
judgment, political reasoning, and emotions needs to be elucidated and
understood in order to have a more accurate picture of human nature and
political actors.3 0 2 Robert Solomon sees Nussbaum’s work as being
divided into three parts: 1) the nature of emotion and how we should see
emotions as evaluative judgment, 2) the ethical importance of the
cognitive nature of compassion, and 3) the connection between literature
and ethics. Nussbaum’s reorganization of traditional ontology continues
as she tries to show how emotions and imagination actually form the
backbone of political decision making. She has also sought to put morality
at the center of political decision making as well. Typically, rational
choice models are accompanied by a tacit understanding that utilitarian
models of ethics best describes how and why people interact on a group
level.3 0 4 Utilitarian models of thinking construe the analysis of politics and
j02 This is not to say that this is the first time that Nussbaum has contemplated these issues.
In the Therapy of Desire Nussbaum argues that philosophy can speak to those who find
themselves in emotional distress.
3 0 3 See Solomon (2002).
3 0 4 See Warke’s (2000) “Classical Utilitarianism and the Methodology o f Determinate
Choice, in Economics and in Ethics.” There are those who tried to argue that rational choice
theory is not strictly tied to utilitarian concepts. See, for example, Zafirovski’s (1999) “What
is Really Rational Choice? : Beyond the Utilitarian Concept of Rationality.”
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the principles of morality that we adhere to as the result of a detached
intellect.3 0 5
As I have mentioned previously, politics has typically eschewed
delving too deeply into emotions because of the messy, inarticulate, and
seeming inability we have of formalizing emotions. Diana Cates writes
that most scholars who have dealt into the literature on emotions hold that
“emotions have a cognitive dimension, that they involve thought,
judgment, and evaluation. Most agree that emotions have objects, and they
tend to be about people, things, or circumstances that a person considers to
have some bearing on his or her own happiness and well-being” (326).
While most have this belief, the exact connection between emotions and
thoughts is debated. Also, when discussing the normative aspects of
emotions, which is problematic in itself as emotions are typically seen as
merely existing rather than having any inherent or intrinsic moral value,
scholars note that “some of the evaluative judgments that compose some
emotions do not reflect the ways things really are, or they reflect
questionable attitudes about what is really important in life” (Cates, 326).
Nussbaum holds that simply because something is more complex—e.g.
human nature—than we may have originally thought does not mean that
we should rely on theories that inadequately articulate the problem at
hand. More over, given the complex structure of the polis, we need to
3 0 5 To be fair, Nussbaum, as a sort of rehabilitated Kantian ethicist herself, has difficulty as
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examine even more closely our assumptions, the ontology which
formulates the very phenomena we will examine. Nussbaum writes that
emotions have a “complicated cognitive structure that is in part narrative
in form, involving a story of our relation to cherished objects that extends
over time” (2001,2). Nussbaum argues that emotions are intimately tied to
not only what we believe, but also provide the foundation for reason and
political judgment.
As we saw in chapter two, the history of Western political thought
is really founded on the notion that a moral justification needs to be
provided for the existence of the state. What most theorists have done is to
provide a justification as to why their conception of the state should be
seen as the best organizational structure for society. This organizational
structure is tied intimately with their ontological commitments, which are
often unexamined. One could argue that the very basis of political
reasoning has always been grounded on the idea of providing a moral
justification for the state and that this moral justification is contingent on
what will count as moral.3 0 6 However, the tradition, as we have received it,
often puts more emphasis on the actual method—reasoning—by which we
reach we reach our conclusions than on the importance of the conclusions.
The process is, of course, important, as are the foundations on
which one basis a theory. In comparing thinkers such as Nussbaum and
well with the concept of working on ethical issues through a detached intellect.
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John Rawls we see that both thinkers are after the same thing—a defense
of political liberalism that includes Mill’s no harm principle and the
something that one could call social justice. However, both thinkers take
vastly different approaches and these approaches are based on differing
ontologies. As we see in this discussion of Nussbaum, she argues for the
vital role of emotions in political thinking. Rawls does not even mention
emotions in his Political Liberalism. In fact, even the structure and outline
of his work resembles a work in Euclidean geometry; Rawls seeks to put
political reasoning on an abstract grounding that will allow for easy
universalization. If one accepts his premises, one has no choice but to
accept his conclusions. He outlines, at the beginning, the use of abstract
conceptions. He quite specifically outlines what assumptions he is going
to make—the definition of political justice, the conception of people as
equal and free, the conception of the basic structure of society and the
original position—and writes that we need the abstractions when our
political understandings break down.3 0 7 He argues that the real world, as it
3 0 6 See Rawls’ A Theory o f Justice and Political Liberalism.
3 0 7 See Rawls (1993), pp. 3-46. Rawls argues that abstraction is important. He writes, “We
should be prepared to find that the deeper the conflict, the higher the level of abstraction to
which we must ascend to get a clear and uncluttered view of its roots . . . Seen in this
context, formulating idealized, which is to say abstract, conceptions of society and person
connected with those fundamental ideas is essential to finding a reasonable political
conception of justice” (46). Interestingly enough, Rawls does not bring up an obvious
objection to his position. We could just as easily say that when public discussion breaks
down that we need to reconfigure our ontological beginnings or that we need better
descriptions of what we are talking about. Greater abstraction is not, prima facia, that
obvious answer to this problem.
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is experienced, is often quite confusing. Thus, arguing from abstractions
can hopefully help us to overcome these problems and misunderstandings.
Nussbaum’s approach is to jump into the messiness of life and
perhaps by cracking open Proust or Dickens we might better be able to
understand the hows and whys of politics. Her argument, as we have seen,
is based on the idea that we often give short shrift to the realities and
complexities of human beings. The best place to understand humans is at
the very core of human nature—emotions. Rawls defends his position
against thinkers such as Nussbaum by writing, “Political philosophy does
not, as some have thought, withdraw from society and the world. Nor does
it claim to discover what is true by its own distinctive methods of reason
apart from any tradition of political thought and practice. No political
conception of justice could have weight with us unless it helped to put in
order our considered convictions of justice at all levels of generality”
(1993, 45). Rawls tackles this problem by speculating as to something that
he calls the original position.3 0 8 He continues, “The work of abstraction is
. . . not gratuitous: not abstraction for abstraction’s sake. Rather, it is a
way of continuing public discussion when shared understandings of lesser
generality have broken down” (46).
Nussbaum writes that Rawls’ work, at least his concept of the
original position, fails to place a proper role for compassion in a normative
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theory. She writes that “what Rawls has done is to withhold the
eudahnonistic judgment (and, indeed, the eudaimonistic perspective) and
to try to generate results out of the judgment of similar possibilities.. . .
(2001, 341).3 0 9 In other words, in Rawls’ theory we will have a difficult
time moving forward with the original position because there is no
guarantee that I will be able to see the possibility that I might be in
another’s position. Our ontologies will likely clash. For Rawls, greater
abstraction is the answer to this problem. But, one could argue that
violence is just as likely to ensue as one of the problems with Rawls’
ontology is that the actor who cannot recognize that greater abstraction
might be necessary may take recourse in violence, knowing as she does
that she is reasonable and, hence, right. Nussbaum argues that certain
“knowledge of one’s own place makes the judgment of similar
possibilities insufficient” (2001,341). Another way to show the
differences between Nussbaum’s and Rawls’ arguments is to realize that
Nussbaum is going to problematize any abstract conception of how
humans interact with each as intellectually interesting, but highly
problematic in the real world of actual experience. One of the ways that
one will judge the importance of Nussbaum’s work is see whether or not
one is convinced that it is more important to take an approach that is
M 8 See Rawls (1993), p. 45-6.
j09 A eudaimonistic theory is one that sees that end or telos of our endeavors as eudaimonia,
which means, roughly, happiness or flourishing.
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admittedly messy but with the hope that one gets a more thorough
understanding of human behavior or to take an approach that is admittedly
abstract and sees no problem in continuing to analyze humans through a
hypothetical scenario.
At this point, I want to look more closely at how Nussbaum
conceives the concept of emotion. Nussbaum tries to tie together the work
of a variety of thinkers from fields such as classical political thought,
philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, and will ultimately apply it, in
her conception of global ethics, in a comparative perspective.3 1 0
Nussbaum wants to show us, through using the works of ancient classical
philosophers, that emotions cannot simply been seen as feelings or
something that is antithetical to good political thinking. Rather, emotions
should be seen as part of the cognitive process; in fact, they, emotions, are
■j* 1
cognitions. Emotions may include so-called nonthinking movements
such as the trembling of the stomach (44) or the heartleaping (27) that
many of us experience. All of these emotions play a role in constructing
how we see, experience, and describe the political world (57).
Cates argues that Nussbaum’s goal is to promote a “conception
that has greater power than other conceptions to promote self-
3 1 0 Cates argues that there is also a group of thinkers who have tried to tie together and
integrate approaches found in the philosophy o f mind, ethics, and psychology. What
constitutes mental events is at question to these thinkers and, I would add, human nature
itself. This list of thinkers includes. The following: Owen Flanagan, Ernest Wallwork,
Charles Taylor, Paul Ricoeur, Carol Gilligan. Robert Solomon, and others.
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understanding and the understanding of human beings, to enhance
interpersonal communication, and in other ways to improve the quality of
personal and communal life” (328). I hold that Nussbaum is arguing for an
expanded conception of human nature and the individual actor which
includes the willingness to make arguments for one’s ontology and to be
willing to redescribe one’s ontology. It is not enough to assume that
humans are utility maximizers but we have to also assume that there are
important aspects of their cognitive make-up that are essential to how we
make political decisions, what types of political organizations we will be
willing to life, and that have something to say about our responsibility
towards each other. In other words, our ontology needs to be reconsidered.
Emotions as cognition are “internal perceptions and beliefs” (2003,
30) and they express part of our worldview as they represent “a view of
the way things really are” (38). They are also “ways of registering how
things are with respect to the external (i.e. uncontrolled) items that we
view as salient for our well-being” (4). Emotions as cognitions also can
bee seen as “forms of evaluative judgment that ascribe to certain things
and persons outside a person’s own control great importance for the
person’s own flourishing. Emotions are thus, in effect, acknowledgments
of neediness and lack of self-sufficiency” (22). It is not enough to have an
ontological or methodological commitment that only recognizes
3 1 1 See Nussbaum (2003), pp. 56-7.
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individuals as rational actors in the narrow sense usually seen in rational
choice theory. Greater abstraction does not necessarily give us the
ontological framework to incorporate the idea of emotions as cognitions.
The most important aspect of this idea for Nussbaum is that emotions need
to be taken seriously and moved into any meaningful analysis of the body
politic.
By arguing that emotions should be seen as cognitions Nussbaum
is arguing that emotions are part of the reasoning process. Nussbaum
argues that such a perception of thought is dynamic. Such a worldview—
emotions as cognitions—“entertains appearances” (45) and have, at times,
“urgency and heat” (27). This is the basis of Nussbaum’s idea of
“upheavals” of thought. She writes, “Emotions shape the landscape of our
mental and social lives. Like the ‘geological upheavals’ a traveler might
discover in a landscape where recently only a flat plane could be seen,
they mark our lives as uneven, uncertain, and prone to reversal” (1). In
fact, as we shall see, emotions are the basis of Nussbaum’s conceptions of
community and social justice. She argues that we cannot be self-sufficient
and that emotions are the “tearing” away of the belief that we can be such.
She writes, “Knowing can be violent, given the truths that are there to be
known” (45). Nussbaum writes the following:
There are many kinds of cognitive activity or seeing-as in which
ideas of salience and importance figure; there are pictorial
imaginings, musical imaginings, the kinetic forms of imagining
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involved in the dance, and others. These are not all reducible to or
straightforwardly translatable into linguistic symbolism, nor should
we suppose that linguistic representing has pride of place as either
the most sophisticated or the most basic mode. (127-8)
When one considers the types of vitriolic reactions to the arts one
can see that our emotions do, in fact, run the gamut and are not always
translatable to the so-called meaning of reasoned words. The fact that we
can find examples in a variety of areas that go merely beyond the reasoned
word and defy linguistic symbolism shows that Nussbaum is on to
something. Even sight, the most primary of our senses, is not readily
agreed upon, at least to the meaning of certain objects, though all viewers
of the object can agree to the so-called objective contents of the piece.
Even the experience of the imagination has often cause strong,
visceral reactions. If one considers the experience of reading a novel, one
can easily recognize that the novel itself does not represent “reality” and is
3 1 2 Once again, I am not arguing that we need to eschew completely empirical methodology.
These tools can help us to see phenomena in a particularly important way. But it is not the
only or even the most important way.
j|3 Consider Manet’s Olympia. While nudes have graced Western art since the beginning of
art, there was something about Manet’s Olympia that disturbed many of the viewers and was
soon to be considered obscene (For an interesting discussion on Manet’s Olympia see Adelia
Williams (1993) and Otto Friedrich’s (1992) Olympia: Paris in the Age o f Manet. Some
thought it was the gaze she held on the viewer, some conjectured what made it lewd was the
brazenness with which flaunted her nudity in front of a servant and the viewer, and others
focus on the bow around her neck—her willingness to present herself as nothing more than a
gift to the viewer, for a price. Of course, we must note that Olympia currently resides in the
Louvre and most would not consider it lewd any longer. Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring caused a
riot during its premier. One must wonder how it is that a dance, full of kinetic movement,
meant to represent abstract sounds can cause a riot. Certainly, there are types of movement
and music that displeases us. However, usually one gets up from a performance and walks
out, if that is the case. For some reason, there was something emotionally strong to the
listeners/ views of the Rite’s premier that led the to fisticuffs, either in support of or against
this work. (See Nussbaum, 2003, pp. 272-276).
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no way meant, usually, as a guide to how one should live life. Yet, the
history of censorship shows that there are certainly some ideas that people
find dangerous enough to want to censor. However, if we take novels to be
“flights of fancy” of sorts rather than sustained political arguments, then it
is necessary to understand the negative reaction against so novels and the
desire to censor them based on the strong emotions that these works elicit.
The potential influence of writers and imagination on the emotions was
recognized as early as Plato.3 1 4 Aristotle argues in De Anima that the soul
consists of two parts—the appetitive and the reasoning—and emotions are
parts of the appetites.3 1 5 Aristotle argues that appetites
neither can be the calculative faculty or what is called ‘mind’ be the
cause of such movement; for mind as speculative never thinks what
is practicable, it never says anything about an object to be avoided
or pursued, while this movement is always in something which is
always in something which is avoiding or pursuing an object....
[Ajppetite too is incompetent to account fully for movement, for
those who successfully resist temptation have appetite and desire
and yet follow mind and refuse to enact that for which they have
appetite. ( 432b26)
Aristotle’s thoughts are indicative of the history of Western thought on
the separate nature of reason and emotion.
Nussbaum writes that emotional conflict can be seen as a “story of
reason’s urgent struggles with itself concerning nothing less than how to
imagine life” (86). She clearly states that her focus in this work is to
j14 Plato thought that the poets were worthy of banishment because they were unethical,
unphilosophical, and did not contribute to the practical arts. They merely inflamed the
passions in the most uninformed manner. (See Plato, Republic, 31-45).
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provide a theory that has “superior power to explain experience” (40). In
various parts of her work, Nussbaum attempts to show how a wide range
of emotions plays a role in our decision making or in the formation of our
worldview. One such example is her section on compassion. She argues
that we have compassion for those whom we see as having suffered some
wrong due to no fault of their own. And, she writes, “Insofar as we believe
that a person has come to grief through his or her own fault, we blame and
reproach, rather than having compassion” (311).
She writes:
If one believes that the misfortune of others are serious, and that
they have not brought misfortune on themselves, and, in addition,
that they are themselves important parts of one’s own scheme of
ends and goals, then the conjunction of these beliefs is very likely to
lead to action addressing the suffering. It may not do so, if there is
no available course of action that suggests itself. But if there is, it
will be difficult to believe that the compassionate person really does
have all three judgments, if she does not do something to address the
victim’s vulnerability. (335)3 1 6
3 1 5 See Aristotle (1941), pp. 534-604. Specifically see 432al5-433b30.
j|6 As note, Nussbaum sees mercy as being different from compassion. She writes, “Mercy
does differ from compassion: for it presupposes that the offender has done a wrong, and
deserves some punishment for that wrong. It does not say that the trouble the offender is in
came to her through no fault of her own, Nonetheless, as our analysis has revealed, it has
much in common with compassion as well—for it focuses on obstacles to flourishing that
seem too great to overcome. It says yes, you did commit a deliberate wrong, but the feet that
you got to that point was not altogether you fault. It focuses on the social, natural, and
familial features of the offender’s life that offer a measure of extenuation for the fault, even
though the commission of the fault itself meets the law’s strict standards of moral
accountability. In order to do this, it takes up a narrative attitude toward the offender’s
history that is very similar to the sympathetic perception involved in compassion. It follows
the offender’s whole history in considerable detail, scrutinizing it for extenuating features”
(397).
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Some authors argue that this point is anything but obvious, as Nussbaum
seems to take it.3 1 7
There are many ways to understand ontology. Reading Nussbaum,
we see that in the exploration of ontology, there are many possible paths in
describing the actor. In this last section, I just want to explore the ways in
which Nussbaum’s work, her reconfiguration of standard ontology to
include emotions, imagination and creativity along with reason, leads her
to construct a global ethics. This work is not meant merely to be
descriptive but also prescriptive. If one starts, say, from a Hobbesian
perspective of selfish, rational actors in a war of all against all, then one
may very well capitulate to the idea that a state needs to have vast
resources of power. However, if one adopts an ontology as articulated by
Nussbaum, we see startling possibilities for political organization, the
sharing of power, and need ways to organize the state. The narrative
possibilities, from religious to secular, from rationalistic to postmodern,
expand our understanding in what it means to be human.
Nussbaum, despite the fact that she sees a broad range of
possibilities, ultimately attempts to construct, at the very least, a global
ethics based on what she sees as what these narratives have in common.
She attempts to avoid the severe relativistic potential that lurks in
expanding the narrative base. Fred Dallmayr writes that many initiatives
3 1 7 See, for example, Cates (2003).
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have been undertaken by a variety of philosophers that are based on
Judeo-Christian teachings and “draw inspiration from Stoicism and natural
law” (422). These projects are often referred to as “global ethics” of which
the proposals by theologian Huns Kung and political philosopher Martha
Nussbaum are the most ambitious. The entire notion of global ethics is
based on religious and philosophical teachings in that religion is often
pointed at “the human heart, and philosophy to the human mind, without
qualifications; that is, the appeal in both cases is nonexclusivist and hence
potentially universal” (422). And “among all philosophical orientations,
modem Western philosophy is most strongly universalist in outlook”
(423).
Despite the fact that Nussbaum finds room for imagination,
creativity and emotions in her ontology, she does not accept the prospect
of relativism as many postmodernists do. Criticizing postmodern thinkers
Nussbaum writes:
Under the influence of Nietzsche eminent thinkers of quite different
sorts have felt dissatisfaction with a politics based on reason and
principle [and looking for a new way of thinking have] based less on
reason and more on communal solidarity, less on principle and more
on affiliation, less on optimism for progress than a sober
acknowledgement of human finitude and mortality. [And] all agree
in their opposition to a hopeful, active, and reason-based politics
grounded in an idea of reverence for rational humanity wherever we
find it. (1997; 1,3)
It is not the purpose of this work to explicate Nussbaum’s ethical
system, except insofar as it is related to her overall ontological viewpoint.
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However, I think that one note on Kant, since he is so central to
Nussbaum’s project is in order. The so-called critics of reason have
misunderstood thinkers like Kant, if they have ever read him at all.3 1 8 One
important thing to remember of the Kantian project is that Kant is looking
into the limits of reason.3 1 9 While Kant obviously looked into what reason
can deliver to us, his work does not necessarily fit into the category of
those that are being criticized for being “totalizing,” “hegemonic,” or even
“imperialistic.”3 2 0 Kant finds space for the beautiful and for awe.3 2 1 Kant
explicates a universal ideal, and what Nussbaum uses in her idea of a
global ethics, is the idea that all humans can rationally agree to the claim
that all of us are individuals that can never be treated as means but always
need to be treated as ends in themselves.3 2 2
Nussbaum quotes Marcus Aurelius, “If reason is common, so too is
law; and if this is common, then we are fellow citizens. If this is so, we
share in a kind of organized polity, and if that is so, the world is as it were
3 1 8 By critics of reason, I have in mind extreme postmodernists.
3 1 9 This does not mean that Kant sees something as a possible replacement for reason. It is
just that he does not overstate the possibilities of reason. There is only so much that reason
can deliver for us.
3 2 0 In feet, to levy the claim that Kant falls into some category of thinker that is oppressive
due to the function and status that he gives to reason is to radically misunderstand Kant. For
example, just reading through the antimonies of reason found in the Critique o f Pure Reason
should be enough to inform even the casual reader that Kant sees definite limits to the types
of questions that reason can answer.
3 2 1 See Kant, Critique o f Judgment (2001). Kant does believe that beauty is an objective idea
and that all rational people will experience beauty in the same way. One can only imagine
the types of critics that a postmodern art critic of Kant would level on this claim. However,
think about the concept of appreciating art. In a very real sense, are we not arguing that there
is something universal in art to the degree that all people, if patient enough, if engaged
enough, can experience the art of different cultures in a profound way?
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a city-state” (1997b, 3). Nussbaum argues that this means that we need to
“conceive of ourselves as having common goals and projects with our
fellows” (10). Stoics, as Nussbaum points out, were to be seen, in their
own eyes, as citizens of the world. She writes that this means that they see
their involvement with others as “transcending the inclination of both
students and educators to define themselves primarily in terms of local
group loyalties and identities” (67). At the very least, ontologically
speaking, we can and should call ourselves citizens of the world,
according to Nussbaum. She does not find the questioning of reason and
dismissing it as the possibility of grounding us as an argument for
postmodernism. She writes against postmodernists by arguing that
“frequently, groups who press for the recognition of their group think of
their struggle as connected with goals of human respect and social justice.
And yet their way of focusing on their demands, because it neglects
commonalities and portrays people as above all members of identity
groups, tends to subvert the demand for equal respect and love, and even
the demand for attention to diversity itself’ (1997, 67). This approach may
not be without problems. Dallmayr argues:
Disputes are bound to be heightened in the philosophical domain
(wedded to critical inquiry), revealing the intrinsic ambivalence of
j22 For more discussion on Kant’s view of awe and the sublime see Shell (2002).
3 2 j For a discussion on this see Tong (2001). Tong is specifically concerned with bridging the
problem of absolutism, on the one hand, and relativism, on the other. She concludes that
Nussbaum’s work, among others, provides us a way out this bind. This is because, I argue, of
Nussbaum’s careful reconfiguration of ontology.
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universalism. On the one hand, the postulate to treat all human
beings as equal—by virtue of their shared capacity for reason—
militates against invidious discrimination based on race, status, or
gender. On the other hand, sameness of treatment is morally
deficient by extending recognition for fellow beings in the respect in
which they are identical with ourselves. In an important way, such
treatment still is egocentric in the sense that it appropriates or
reduces the alter to the rational self (or ego), instead of recognizing
the distinct otherness of fellow beings. (429)
Others have criticized Nussbaum’s use of the Stoics and Cynics,
arguing that her work is anachronistic.3 2 4 Peter Euben writes that these
thinkers, by rejecting the unique situatedness of various cultures and
emphasizing that which is universal, have given us “a ground for the
critique of slavery, ethnocentrism, and hierarchies of all kinds, critiques
that have hardly lost their salience” and that the Stoics gave us a “new
exclusiveness based on differential commitment to and practice of
rationality” with the belief that there would only be “very few exceptional
humans [that] could be full members in the community of reason” (2001,
146). Euben also writes the following critique of Stoic universalism:
Stoicism denied in practice the radical political possibilities of its
philosophical commitments. Even when the Stoic ideal of virtuous
and capable was not primarily defined in political terms, it proved,
nonetheless, especially congenial to monarchical and personal rule.
Its leveling potential remained abstract, because (especially) early
3 2 4 This concern of using ancient texts to discuss contemporary problems is one that plagues
many thinkers. For example, if one sees social inquiry as something that advances, there
really is no purpose in studying what thinkers such as Plato had to say, other than for
historical curiosity. Even arguing that thinker X influences thinker Y is problematic as
causation, strictly speaking, cannot even come close to being shown. This concern is
brought up in works such as Soffer’s (1995) “Socrates’ Proposals Concerning Women:
Feminism or Fantasy?” Stuurman’s (2000) “The Canon of die History of Political Thought:
Its Critique and a Proposed Alternative,” and Spitzer’s (1999) “Social Science Fiction.”
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Stoics frequently refused to related their thinking to the political and
material conditions in which men lived their daily lives. (270)
The question that we must ask is whether Nussbaum can weather
such criticisms. First, she does not unabashedly pull the Stoics into service
without any regard to the difficulties that are present in their thought;
namely, a very incomplete picture of what it means to be cosmopolitan.3 2 5
Secondly, Nussbaum readily recognizes that while there are a many ways
to elucidate human experience, part of that elucidation includes discussing
what it is that binds us to one another. The question, to a large degree,
boils down to a normative one: are we able to recognize both our unique
nature while understanding what it means to be human in a universal sense
of the word.
Interestingly enough, Nussbaum’s position is actually fairly close
to that of Foucault’s. This is important simply because Foucault also
attempts to make use of the ancient Greeks in discussing a possible ethical
foundation for behavior that moves us beyond the purported universality
of Western reason, and an idea with which Foucault had difficulty.
Foucault spends a great deal of time examining the impact of ontologies,
their reification, and our explication of them on political organization.
Foucault writes the following:
The basic attitude that one must have toward political activity was
related to the general principle that whatever one is, it is not owing
j25 See Dallmayr (2003).
j26 See Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) and Burchell, et al (1991).
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to the rank one holds, to the responsibility one exercises, to the
position in which one finds oneself—above or beneath other people.
What one is, and what one needs to devote one’s attention to as to an
ultimate purpose, is the expression of a principle that is singular in
its manifestation within each person, but universal by the form it
assumes in everyone, and collective by the community bond it
establishes between individuals. Such is, at least for the Stoics,
human reason as a divine principle present in all of us.” (1986,93)
Robert Goodin has described Nussbaums as having “been
elaborating a distinctive political philosophy: welfarist, without being
utilitarian; Aristotelian, without being perfectionist; universalist, without
being altogether essentialist; feminist, without forsaking liberalism” (5).
This difficulty in labeling lies in the fact that her work is in reinvigorating
our assumptions concerning the human actor, in rethinking ontology. The
result of her global ethics is what is called her capabilities approach. We
should note briefly that she labels this work “global” rather than universal
so as to keep the work grounded in practice. Also, the term “capabilities”
is something that is grounding in our practices. Nussbaum sees the
following as being central to human life, to the political actor. At this
point, I simply want to bring attention to how much more complex this
y y ?
ontology is when compared to that of the rational choice theorists.
Nussbaum writes that our “Central Human Capabilities” are the following:
3 2 7 1 argue that this is better since it is more likely to explicate and explain human experience.
I do admit that it could make things more complex as well.
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1. Life—Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not
dying prematurely, or before one’s life so reduced as to be not worth
living.
2. Bodily Health—Being able to have good health, including reproductive
health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3. Bodily Integrity—Being able to move freely from place to place; to be
secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic
violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in
matters of reproduction.
4. Sense, Imagination, and Thought—Being able to use the senses, to
imagine, think, think and reason—and to do these things in a “truly
human” way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education,
including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical
and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in
connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one’s
own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use
one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression
with resepect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of
religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to
avoid non-beneficial pain.
5. Emotions—Being able to have attachments to things and people outside
ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their
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absence; in general to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude,
and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional development blighted
by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms
of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their
development.)
6. Practical Reason—Being able to form a conception of the good and to
engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This
entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious
observance.)
7. Affiliation—A: Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize
and show concern for other humans beings, to engage in various forms
of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another.
(Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute
and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of
assembly and political speech. B: Having the social bases of self-respect
and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose
worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of non
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity,
caste, religion, national origin.
8. Other species—Being to live with concern for and in relation to
animals, plants, and the world of nature.
9. Play—Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
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10. Control over one’s Environment—A. Political: Being able to participate
effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of
political participation, protections of free speech and association. B.
Material—Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods),
and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the
right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the
freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to
work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into
meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.
One might ask why Nussbaum did not simply restate Mill’s no
harm principle—one is at liberty to do as one chooses so long as such a
choice does not harm another—along with some concepts of the welfare
state—perhaps we ought to pay for programs that lift those out of bad
situations. This is because, I argue, that while Nussbaum argues for a
universal principle of reason, she also understands that expressing how
reason is to operate requires more than a simple and naive notion that we
all share reason in common. Much of what appears to be “reasonable” is in
fact part of cultural practices. Also, given that the underlying justification
for our beliefs is to be found in emotion, which is intimately linked, tied,
and bound to belief, we have no choice to give a detailed elucidation such
as Nussbaum is giving us.
j28 See Nussbaum (2000c), pp. 78-80.
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Louise Antony writes.
I believe that the fear that any concession to nativism can and
will be used against us [feminists] explains the unfortunate
bias of many feminists and progressive theorists toward
radically empiricist, social constructivist views of language
and the mind, and their correlative hostility toward nativist
accounts of the sort proposed by Noam Chomsky in linguistics
and by many in cognitive science. The result, in my opinion, is
a truly unfortunate disjunction between empirically well-
grounded work in cognitive science and feminist discussions
of language and the mind” (10).
She argues that woman should in fact embrace the concept of human
nature and that Nussbaum’s Capabilities approach is one such account that
should be embraced. She writes, “The capabilities approach proposes to
assess the justice of a given society by assessing the degree to which is
members are in possession of a variety of capacities for human
functioning together with the opportunities for exercising and developing
these capabilities . . . Nussbaum thus promotes the idea that we can
somehow find within our common human nature the outlines of a good
human life, a life that counts as a flourishing one for creatures of our kind”
( 11).
In the end Nussbaum provides us an account of ontology that is not
only more complete, true to human experience, and more capable of
developing the nuances of life, it also shows the inextricable links that our
ontological positions have with our normative positions. Nussbaum’s
multiple iterations of the ontology—Greeks, Lockean liberalism,
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capabilities approach—yields a variety of approaches that all approach the
ethical. Nussbaum is not merely giving us a non-scientific ethical
approach. We are getting a real analysis of the world, using evidence,
rigor, facts, etc. The fact is that putting the normative concerns with which
she deals into quantitative terms is both impossible and undesirable. In this
chapter, I have shown how Nussbaum makes important contributions in
our understanding of how our ontological commitments lead to particular
theoretical conclusions. In this next chapter, I will show how Taylor’s
unique ontological commitments lead him to a different, yet equally
important theoretical position.
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Chapter Six:
Charles Taylor and Re-imagining the Polity
I think that philosophy in most aspects is pretty well useless and hopeless
unless it’ s done with other disciplines.
Charles Taylor
The very political structures that theories purport to explain always
extend beyond the analytical capacity of the theories themselves.3 2 9 That is
to say, epistemologically speaking, a theory cannot contain its own
justification. Contemporary theorists have either used this idea to attack
the very foundations of knowledge or they have ignored it as a practical
issue, arguing that it is not the task of social science to answer those
questions.3 3 1 Unfortunately, a lot of what passes as theory is, in reality
turf wars, attempts to find data and problems that fit one’s ontological
• ► 332
position.
3 2 9 See, for example, Godel (1953). Interestingly enough, aside from Godel’s claim that
theories cannot account for their foundations—their ontology—in any meaningful way, he
did a great deal of work on attempting to understand the very nature of concepts as well.
Ultimately, he relies on a theory of intuition to justify concepts, in a manner similar to
Husserl. This is an important issue for political theory because we generally take our
concepts to be naturalized or, that is to say, simply there and readily available for
examination. See Tieszen (2002).
”° See Lyotard (1992) for a postmodern discussion on metanarratives.
3 3 1 See Derrida (1967) and Hassan (2003). The attitudes as to how to deal with this problem
typically fall along ideological lines. Those who are postmodernists attack the very concept
of truth and those who are rationalists argue that the problem is of no immediate
consequence, it has nothing to do with the price of tea. As a pragmatist, 1 straddle the middle.
It is a problem that needs to be acknowledged, but we need to understand that the very idea
of truth is problematic.
3 3 2 The term ideology itself is often very confusing. There are times when theorists use it to
mean something like the set of beliefs that a person holds (see Ball and Dagger, 2003).
Others use ideology to mean a political position that is held by a group, something like a set
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In this chapter, I will examine the work of Charles Taylor. Again, I
do not take his work to representative of the correct way to do political
theory. What Taylor gives us that we cannot find in the work of Putnam or
rational choice theory,3 3 3 broadly speaking, is a direct acknowledgment
that without a discussion of morality, political analysis does not represent
much of our actual experience. He shares this in common with Nussbaum.
The reason that I also look at Taylor, in addition to Nussbaum is because
he emphasizes the communal aspect of our experience whereas Nussbaum
approaches politics from the side of the individual actor. We have,
according to Taylor, reduced theorizing to an exercise of a poor
understanding of rationality, in particular, and humanity, in general.3 3 4
Taylor argues that the problem of the modem social sciences is modernity
itself. This is because modernity is amalgam of a variety of new
practices which includes science, technology, industrial production, and
of propositions that constitute a position (see Brandenberger, 2005). Others hold that
ideology is the foundation upon which one’s immediate beliefs are based (see Heidegger,
1962 and 1996). I hold to the final position.
3 jj As I mentioned in chapter three, there are a variety of ways to construe rational choice
theory. I have not covered the many possible ways that one may look at politics through
rational choice theory. However, the fact still remains that rational choice theorist share a
rather unexamined ontology and that they do not place emotions or morality at the center of
this ontological conception. One might use rational choice theory to look at how actors make
moral choices, but that is different from placing such concerns at the center of one’s
foundational or ontological beginnings.
3 3 4 See Quinn (1996). Quinn is one of the few scholars from an analytic/ quantitative
approach that tries to bridge the gap between thinkers like Taylor and strict rational choice
theorists. He argues that we can see Taylor’s work as a rhetorical approach to rationality.
Quinn argues that Taylor’s anti-foundationalism refuses to rid itself of reason. Quinn argues
that most postmodernists see one as either wholly accepting reason, including of the rational
choice baggage, or one rejects it. He writes that Taylor rejects “this disjunction altogether”
and he argues for “a non-foundationalist reason” (1128).
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urban living.3 3 6 There are always ways of living that are drastically
different, which include individuality, secularization and instrumental
rationality. And, to top it off, there are even new forms of malaise that
plague the modem individual, which include alienation, meaninglessness,
and a sense of social dissolution.
In my reading, Taylor seeks to start an entirely new way of re-
imagining ontology, at least as I cast him. He argues that the use of reason
does not necessarily include the tenets of what we call rational choice. In
other words, for Taylor, it is not necessary to see humans as strict rational
actors who seek to maximize their utility. It is possible to bring back an
ontology that includes creativity, that reexamines the nature of reason, and
that places difference and ethics at its center. Taylor writes, “In talking of
our self-understanding, I am particularly concerned with what I have been
calling the social imaginary, that is, the way we collectively imagine, even
pretheoretically, our social life in the contemporary Western world”
(2004,50). The pretheoretical is the ontological, an explication of what
simply is. In this chapter, we will explore this interchange between
ontology and the imagination.
3 3 5 See Taylor (1989).
3 3 6 See Taylor (2004), pp. 2-20.
3 3 7 See Taylor (2004, pp. 49-68. Taylor writes, “One of the central features of Western
modernity, on just about any view, is the progress of disenchantment, the eclipse of the world
o f magic forces and spirits” (49). He continues that this “disenchantment brought a new
uniformity of purpose and principle” (50).
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In this chapter, I suggest that Taylor’s starting points are more
fruitful in a serious examination of political behavior, institutions, and
outcome. From a rational choice perspective, the concepts of imagination,
creativity and a discussion of the pretheoretical are ignored or treated as
irrational. Rational choice theory does have amorality as a central
concept in its ontology. Actors may choose to call certain behaviors moral
and they may choose to make such behavior the top of their preference
list.3 3 9 Taylor argues that individuals may have entirely different moral
orders.3 4 0 Those who are realist in their ontology, those who hold that
there is an ahistorical self that is universal, also have to hold that there is a
correct moral order that corresponds to the way they believe things really
What this means is that those who offer up realist positions hold that
their position is correct. In other words, a realist does not hold to an
3 3 8 See Heme and Setala (2004) and Morris, et al (2004).
” 9 Morality, in a very real sense, and its existence or lack thereof is not an assumption of
rational choice, strictly speaking. It only matters if people argue that morality matters to
them. But, the point here, is that rational choice theory can operate, in theory, in both a world
with the real existence of moral objects and in an absolutely ammoral world. The world of
other thinkers, such as Taylor, it is extremely difficult what an amoral would look like. This
is because Taylor, despite being anti-foundationalists, vigorously defends the idea that
conceptions of the self are always moral theories as well as epistemological (see Taylor,
1989).
3 4 0 See Taylor (2004), pp. 50-54. Society and the ontology upon which it is based is strong
that Taylor argues that “from the standpoint of the individual’s sense of self, [there is an]
inability to imagine oneself outside a certain matrix. But it also can be understood as a social
reality; here it refers to the way we together imagine our social existence, for instance, that
our most important actions are those o f the whole society, which must be structured I a
certain way to carry them out. Growing up in a world where this kind of social imaginary
reigns sets the limits on our sense of the self’ (55).
’4 1 See Taylor (1989), pp. 42-46.
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ontology to say that it is merely one possible ontology out of many. Now,
rational choice theorists might argue that they do not necessarily hold to
realist positions concerning the world. However, as I have argued, their
ontology concerning the individual actor does connote a commitment to
realism as to the individual. Morality is not part of this ontology. This is
something to which Taylor objects because it is an ontology that does not
accurately describe the human condition.
Moral orders are outlines or prescriptions as to how individuals
ought to live their lives. However, what makes the assumptions of the
morality of modem life unique is the increasing central idea of order in
our society.3 4 2 In other words, according to Taylor, freedom, liberty, or the
redistribution of goods is not central to the idea of moral order; nor is the
rational maximization of preferences. He writes, “The image of order
carries a definition of not only of what is right, but of the context in which
it makes sense to strive for and hope to realize the right” (12).
Likewise, Taylor notes that previous eras did not have the same
concept of the moral order as we do now, because our ontological
conceptions have shifted. Taylor writes, “What started us on this path [of
M Taylor ultimately relates this to the social scientist’s growing dependence on economic
theory to explain human behavior. He writes that modem economic, that is to say overly
rationalistic, way of viewing the world is “that of good engineering design, in which efficient
causation plays the crucial role. In this it differs from earlier notions of order, where the
harmony comes from the consonance among the Ideas or Forms manifested in different
levels of being or ranks in society” (2004, 70).
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change] were changes on several levels, not only economic, but political
and spiritual” (2004, 73).
According to Taylor the economic, more than a model for decision
making, is in fact, an ontology.3 4 3 Taylor argues that we have taken the
assumptions of the economic model and have made them into moral
imperatives, the main one being efficiency.3 4 4 There are also other
imperatives that come from the economic model of morality and that is
that we should be ordered, peaceful, and productive.3 4 5 When people are
ordered, peaceful, and productive, one might ask, most people consider
them to be rational, with organized preferences, and are busy maximizing
3 4 j The use of the word ontology here is mine. However, I think that with discussion that I
have already provided we can see that there are good reasons why we should call Taylor’s
discussion on shifting worldviews a shift in ontologies. Let us recall Hofweber who writes
that “ontology is the philosophical discipline that tries to find out what there is: what entities
make up reality, what is the stuff the world is made from?” He continues, “It tries to establish
what (kinds of) things there are, the other half tries to find out what the (general) relations
they have to each other. Settling questions in ontology would bring with it major progress in
metaphysics. Many philosophical debates outside of metaphysics are directly influenced by
how things turn out in ontology” (256). I have argued in this work that ontology is also
concerned about the objects for the study of politics. In particular, I believe that clarifying to
the degree that we can, our positions on ontology, we stand a better chance of understanding
the relations of these objects to one another. And, as Hofweber points out, this will have a
great deal of impact outside of both ontology and metaphysics. I argue that political theoiy is
one of those areas where we stand to gain clarification.
3 4 4 See Taylor (2004), pp. 69-82.
3 4 5 If one considers the ways in which rationality have proscribed laziness and violence. It is
almost unimaginable for one to assert that one should not make something of one’s life and
that one ought to be violent as one desires. One could interpret a thinker such as Nietzsche as
making this argument. We must also remember that along with Nietzsche’s attack on the
morality of the weak, comes a critique on the limits of reason. See Hollindale (2001), pp. 34-
36. To be against what is called morality, for most of us is not only wrong but also
“irrational.”
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utility. As Taylor points out, once an ontology is accepted, it is difficult to
see the world any other way.3 4 6
Charles Taylor has long sought to move and expand our
understanding of ontology so that we, as citizens, might think more
broadly and, in turn, ethically, about humanity.3 4 7 Throughout Taylor’s
work there is an implicit awareness that human nature is malleable and
complex, and that we always need to be wary of our universal truth claims
lest we proceed to act unethically towards others.3 4 8 At the very least we
have misunderstood our own tradition, as he argues in Sources o f the Self
and, at worst, we have arrived at a time in political thinking wherein there
is an extreme poverty of imagination. Taylor writes:
From the beginning, the number one problem of modem social
science has been modernity itself: that historically unprecedented
amalgam of new practices and institutional forms (science,
technology, industrial production, urbanization), of new ways of
living (individualism, secularism, instrumental rationality); and of
new forms of malaise (alienation, meaninglessness, a sense of
impending social dissolution). (2004,1)
3 4 6 1 should note that Taylor uses the term “social imaginary.” While one could make the
argument that Taylor uses this term with different senses, he usually uses it to mean
something like ontology. He writes, “I am thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine then-
social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their
fellows ...” (23). The reason, I argue, that Taylor does not want to use the term “ontology”
is because he is strictly anti-foundationalist. He wants to leave a large amount of room in his
theory to negotiate differences. He writes that he sees imaginaries as “both factual and
normative; that is, we have a sense of how things usually go, but this is interwoven with an
idea of how they ought to go, of what missteps would invalidate the practice” (24).
3 4 7 See Taylor (1977).
~ ’4 8 What Taylor (1989) sees the problem, and this is one that is built into the very nature of
philosophical inquiry, is that all ontologies is not “shared by everyone” (17). See also
Bernard Williams (1990).
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Another way to frame the above passage is to say that Taylor sees
conceptual inadequacy in our modem way of thinking and our
unwillingness to think through the problems of our foundations.
Unfortunately, for Taylor, modernity has led to a reification of human
nature, ontology, conceptual categories, and rationality. We have come to
believe, in political science, the story of human nature to the point that we
now accept it as an uncomplicated truth.3 4 9 For Taylor, at the very least,
ontology, our foundation, necessarily has to include a relationship to and a
discussion of the good. He argues that an ethical weight needs to be added
to our discussion of our foundations “because we cannot but orient
ourselves to the good, and hence determine our place relative to it and
hence determine the direction of our lives, [that] we must inescapably
understand our lives in narrative form, as a quest [and] must see our lives
in story” (1989,51-52). This is a major shift from ontology as it is
generally understood by most social scientists who see a discussion of
ontology and ethics as entirely different discussions. Also, given Taylor’s
emphasis on the narrativity of our existence and the unfolding nature of
ontology, we see that we cannot necessarily proceed in our discussions of
political truths as we usually do. While most political scientists believe
that we do not yet know all truth, with the principles of modernity as our
3 4 9 Taylor holds to the basic premise that lives ought to be lived as a story. As Galen
Strawson writes, “A basic condition of making sense of ourselves is that we grasp our lives
in a narrative and have an understanding of our lives as an unfolding story” (428).
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guide, many still think that it is simply a matter of “discovering” the truths
that are not yet in our view.3 5 0 Taylor works firmly within the modem
paradigm not to reify it but show the ruptures and nuances that we
overlook, to show the implications of our assumptions, and, ultimately, to
show us how we might begin to expand our notion of human nature so that
we might be more respectful and open to a broader conception of
humanity.3 5 1
Taylor argues that understanding modernity is to understand what it
means to be “an agent, a person, or a self’ (1989, 3). Moreover, this
understanding of what it means to be human is linked to how we conceive
ethics and the good of humanity.3 5 2 Taylor writes, “Selfhood and the good,
or in another way, selfhood and morality, turn our to be inextricably
intertwined themes” (3).3 5 3 For political theorists, questions of the good,
3 5 0 See Rengger (1995). Rengger argues that the making of meaning in modernity is critical
to the enterprise of how we engage in political theory now and can be seen as a cause of the
blind spots that we often experience.
3 5 1 See Barwell (2004) and Kitchen (1999). There are some who interpret Taylor’s
commitment to modernity as more equivocal than I do. For example, Kitchen writes that
while others condemn modernity, “Taylor refuses to align himself with either its boosters or
its knockers” (30). I say that he is firmly rooted in the tradition if for no other reason than the
feet he espouses that thinking, critically albeit, will yield results and solutions to problems.
This is, if nothing else, the essence of the modernity project.
3S21 already pointed out how Taylor sees our ultimate understanding of ontology to linked
directly to some conception of the good.
353 There is a growing number of philosophers and political theorists who are trying to make
explicit the ways in which our conceptions of human nature affect how write laws, organize
our polity, and set goals for our community. The traditional notions, modernity as Taylor
calls it, have come under attack for some time. However, the postmodern attack on
modernity is different than saying that we need to re-evaluate our conception of human
nature ami how this conception relates to our policies. The postmodern attack is (me that
emphasizes epistemology and how modernity cannot, theoretically, account for all of its
conclusions. This new shift is an attempt to re-evaluate human nature, granting prima facia
that there is one, but that we misconstrued it. For example, Peter Singer writes, “It is time for
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while interesting, are fuzzy, often culture specific, and difficult to
quantify. Therefore, as political science made moves to become more
“scientific,” our grounding, our ontology and ethics came to inform our
studies less and less. Likewise, we started to use reified and antiquated
notions of human nature.3 5 4
One of Taylor’s keen insights is his recognition and work on the
idea that our foundations of what is real, that is to say, our ontology, is
connected to our moral life.3 5 5 In fact, it is impossible to discuss or
describe ontology without a discussion of our moral commitments.
Typically, ontology or our foundations are discussed in completely amoral
terms. Taylor argues that our moral commitments are universal and
that there is one, but that we misconstrued it. For example, Peter Singer writes, “It is time for
another Copemican revolution. It will be, once again, a revolution against a set o f ideas we
have inherited from the period in which the intellectual world was dominated by a religious
outlook. Because it will change our tendency to see human beings as the center of the ethical
universe, it will meet with fierce resistance from those who do not want to accept such a
blow to human pride. At first, it will have its own problems, and will need to tread carefully
over new ground. For many the ideas will be too shocking to take seriously. Yet eventually
the change will come. The traditional view that all human life is sacrosanct is simply not able
to cope with the array of issues that we face. The new view will offer a fresh and more
promising approach” (189).
4 As I argued in chapter four, Hobbes’s ontology and theory of human nature came to
dominate our political discourse.
3 5 5 This is a position that is gaining greater credence. The claim is not that ontology leads to
certain moral positions, but that ontology and morality are somehow inextricable and linked.
Some of examples of this are Ketcham (2004) and Cheng (2000) who argue that Asian
political philosophy has always been imbued with a sense of morality that is tied to the
claims of what is. The universe, the very existence of the “what is” is cannot be catalogued
without the discussion of morality. Various feminists—see, for example Grosz, (1995). The
typical ontological discussion has been a discussion of what there is, cataloguing it. And
checking what we can infer from what we ought to do based on what we actually do.
Amazingly enough, as Grosz and many others would point out, the world looks extremely
like the male conception of how it ought to be. There are many others who are looking at
ways to articulate this very point such as environmentalists, animal rights activists, those
engaged in culture studies, to name a few.
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uncommonly deep.3 5 6 Many may take this to be part of what is seen as the
hegemonic program that Western thought about which it has been
criticized.3 5 7 Taylor is not so essentialist as to think that these intuitions
are timeless. Rather, our intuitions about ontology can and do change
according to time and cultural dimensions.3 5 8 Our ontological frameworks,
Taylor argues, are linked to some orientation towards the good. He writes
that “they [our intuitions] are so deep that we are tempted to think of them
as rooted in instinct, in contrast to other moral reactions which seem very
much the consequence of upbringing and education” (1989,67). To use a
classic example, Hobbes argues that the moral intuition that runs deep and
is instinctual in humans is the desire to preserve our life at the expense of
others; Locke argues it is our moral intuition to judge in our own cases.
Both thinkers, however, argue that we can know these facts through
reason and that these facts do not comprise or in any way make up the
individual.3 5 9 But work such as Hobbes and Locke, while purportedly
empirical and the result of logic, is imbued with moral roots of the sort
that Taylor discusses. Part of the problem with Hobbes and Locke is that
3 5 6 See Taylor (1989), pp. 44-46.
3 5 7 See Wyschogrod (1990) and hooks (1994).
3 5 8 See Taylor (1992).
j59 See Garrath Williams (2000). Williams gives a good summary of how the rational actor
comes to his reasoned conclusions about moral behavior that clearly lines up the rational
actor first. The moral actor is a result of rationality. For Taylor, this addition to the
discussion of ontology comes in the form of recognition in his work. He writes (1995) that
recognition is a “vital human need” (226) and that a crucial feature of human life “is its
fundamentally dialogical character” (230).
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they have not discussed their moral ontology sufficiently.3 6 0 For example,
both Hobbes and Locke cannot account for the fact that many act on the
intuition of altruism, rather than self-interest3 6 1 Of course, this is one of
the reasons why both thinkers rely on using a thought game to “reason”
"X ftO
their way from the state of nature to political organization. However, I
argue that the reason why we take these intuitions to be “natural” is due to
overwhelming cultural acceptance.
Taylor argues that current theorists who attempt to remove ontology
from our explanations and discussions concerning human nature are
problematic. He writes, “Ontological accounts offer themselves as correct
articulations of our ‘gut’ reactions of respect” (1989, 6). Still, these gut
reactions will have a dialogical character to them.3 6 4 By this Taylor means
that while we have a sense of what there is, our experience and articulation
of this will change over time, necessarily, as this dialogical character of
existence—the interplay of experience, thought, culture, and time—plays
a critical role in our understanding. We must also be aware that our
3 6 0 See Taylor (1989), pp. 159-177,249, and 253 .
j6 1 See De Wispelaere (2002). He argues that alturism is a category that cannot be reduced to
mere rational processes.
3 6 2 1 do not think that there is any way to interpret the state of nature narratives that Hobbes
and Locke as anything other than a metaphor. I think that Hobbes and Locke would agree
with this. Their point is that if one starts with this premise—the state of nature—then we get
their conclusions. Still in political science, we have taken this state of nature metaphor very
seriously. For example, see Doyle (1997).
3 6 3 See Jay (1998). Jay writes, “Words do their work not merely by melting into one another,
but by positioning themselves in shifting force fields with other words, creating unexpected
constellations of counterconcepts and antonyms, as well as a spectrum of more or less
proximate synonyms” (3).
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discussions of morality can be reduced only to “gut” reactions.3 6 5 There is
as interesting distinction about humans. We seem to value our important
ontological commitments at a gut level, beyond, perhaps the scope of
reason and rationality, yet we also understand that it makes no sense to
speak of morality as if there is nothing substantial about our claims.3 6 6 In
deliberating about our moral lives, Taylor argues, we also articulate and
formulate our concepts about our ontological foundations.
A problem that we face is whether reason alone is sufficient to
articulate our moral life. Also, given the seeming universal attempt to
articulate the moral and if reason is a sufficient tool to come up with
answers, we need to find a way to explain or account for the reasons why
there are so many different stories. Like Nussbaum, Taylor realizes that
there are some major problems to the claim that reason alone will be
sufficient to examine our political experience and to articulate what it
means to be human. To many, using reason a the sole tool to articulate
human experience seems to be hegemonic and, de facto, judgmental of
those groups that do not adhere to the “correct” form of reasoning,
morality, and the political organization that follows from “correct”
3 6 4 See Taylor (1995) the section of the “Politics of Recognition,” pp. 225-256.
3 6 5 Taylor writes, “Assimilating our moral reactions to these visceral ones would mean
considering all our talk about fit objects of moral response to be utterly illusory. The belief
that we are discriminating real properties, with criteria independent of our de facto reactions,
would be declared unfounded” (1989,6).
3 6 6 See Davydova and Sharrock’s (2003) interesting discussion on the collapse of the fact/
value distinction in various conceptions of morality. The authors see Taylor’s work as
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thought.3 6 7 The second problem is the potential for relativism. Taylor’s
solution to both of these problems is to discuss the ways in which humans
confront and live in the world. Taylor writes:
No argument can take someone from a neutral stance towards the
world, either adopted from the demands of “science” of fallen into
as a consequence of pathology, to insight into moral ontology. But it
doesn’t follow from this that moral ontology is pure fiction as
naturalists often assume. Rather we should treat our deepest moral
instincts, our ineradicable sense that human life is to be respected, as
our mode of access to the world in which ontological claims are
discernible and can be rationally argued about and sifted. (8)
Here we see the basis for Taylor’s conception of human nature. Taylor’s
primary assumptions have a natural affinity with Nussbaum’s. Nussbaum
focuses on the role that emotions play in shaping our attitudes toward the
political awareness; Taylor holds to the belief that the central, defining
aspect of human beings is that they have moral instincts, which are
ineradicable. So the questions about whether humans are rational utility
maximizers, a product of evolutionary processes, entirely unique
according to culture, is secondary to the fact that all humans have a
discemable moral intuition, one that focuses their attitudes towards the
world, helps to shape political attitudes and organizations, and will,
playing a role in showing us how morality must be understood in its social and historical
context.
3 6 7 Taylor (1995) argues that the mode in which we normally use this type of thinking—
rational choice theory—severely limits us. He writes, “It is this stripped-down view of the
subject which has made deep inroads into social science, breeding the various forms of
methodological individualism, including the most recent and virulent variant, rational-choice
theory. It stands in the way of a richer and more adequate understanding of what the human
sense of the self is like, and hence of a proper understanding of the real variety of human
culture, and hence of a knowledge of human beings” (169).
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ultimately inform us to what we believe is right and wrong. Taylor writes,
“The politics of equal dignity is based on the idea that all humans are
equally worthy of respect” (1995,235). We must remember that Taylor
makes these arguments with the understanding that his descriptions of
morality are also a description of fundamental self.
The problem that many theorists face, as Taylor sees it, is that this
background of moral intuition has remained unexplored and is even
shunned. Instead theorists have placed, Taylor argues, an “almost
boundless confidence [in] the defining of formal relations as a way of
achieving clarity and certainty about our thinking, be it in the
(mis)application of rational choice theory to ethical problems or in the
great popularity of our computer models of the mind” (1995,6). He argues
that this is because there may be a “lack of fit between what people as it
were officially and consciously believe, even pride themselves in
believing, on one hand, and what they need to make sense of some of their
moral reactions on the other” (1995, 9). This has led naturalists—one
could argue that the so-called “rationality” camp fits under this rubric—to
dismiss ontological commitments and morality as flights of fancy. It has
led the culture camps to argue that any systematized attempt to understand
politics does violence to each particular culture. If one takes the
_ '6 8 Benhabib (2002) argues that the culture discussion is usually discussed on facile terms
and with some important misunderstandings. She writes that most commentators on culture
hold faulty premises including: “(1) that cultures are clearly delineable wholes; (2) that
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description of our nature; that is to say our ontology, as problematic, then
how to proceed is always going to be difficult. What is clear, according to
Taylor, is that “over wide areas. The background [how we constitute our
theories of society based on moral ontology] tends to remain unexplored.
[And even worse the] exploration may even be resisted. That is because
there may be... a lack of fit between what people as were officially and
consciously believe, even pride themselves on believing, on one hand, and
what they need to make sense of some of their moral reactions, on the
other” (1995,9). Taylor’s project in this regard is similar to Nussbaum’s.
His examination is an attempt to re-map how we construe our experiences
as political agents. Rather than taking the route of oversimplification,
Taylor seeks to broaden what it means to act as and to examine human
actors.3 6 9
I have continued to emphasize that our moral natures are
fundamental to our ontologies. This is certainly a radical change from how
cultures are congruent with population groups and that a noncontroversial description of the
culture of a human group is possible; and (3) that even if cultures and groups do not stand in
one-to-one correspondence, even if there is more than one culture within a human group and
more than one group that may possess the same cultural traits, this poses no important
problems for politics or policy” (4).
6 9 Interestingly enough Nussbaum is now part of a group of thinkers who are re-examining
what it means to be an agent at all and whether or not this group should include animals. See,
for example, Animal Rights, edited by Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004. The intention o f the book is to address “ethical questions
about ownership, protection against unjustified suffering, and the ability of animals to make
their own choices free from human control. . and there is the further attempt to seek legal
recognition for animals. As one author puts it, the goal of this work is to “advocate for legal
rights for nonhuman animals” (Stephen Wise, 19). Certainly, to establish, as Nussbaum and
others are seeking to do, would require a radical, drastic, and fundamental reconception of
our what it means to be human and about our relationship with our world at large.
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many contemporary social and political theorists see the individual.
Preference schedules, for example, are amoral in their nature. Emotions,
for many, express the irrational. For Taylor, morality cannot be separated
in any way from the decision making process of human beings, their
political organizations, or the justifications for political organizations that
we give. The idea that belief in ethics or morality needs to be separated
from any scientific understanding of humans has been part of a many
efforts in contemporary philosophical and political efforts. Starting with
the positivists, many thinkers argued that looking into “morality” was a
job best left to the churches and one that usually dealt with absurdities that
cannot be proven.3 7 0 What is interesting is that Taylor’s insistence that
morality cannot be severed from our discussion of human nature is gaining
more and more credence among those who do cognitive science.
Daniel Dennett argues that even those who hold that humans are
strictly the product of evolution can still believe in the moral autonomy of
individual actors. In other words, it is not necessary to hypothesize the
existence of the soul in order to hold that agents are responsible moral
3 7 0 This belief has its start in positivism. See Ayer (1989) and Russell (1994). Russell starts
off his famous work with a statement that could be the credo for most rational choice
theorists. He writes, “Scientific knowledge aims at being wholly impersonal, and tries to
state what has been discovered by the collective intellect of mankind” (17). Russell gives a
nuanced account of the creation, use and role of language. However, language cannot speak
meaningful of the transcendent. Insofar as any moral claims are transcendent, for Russell and
Ayer, they are meaningless.
3 7 1 See Dennett, Freedom Evolves (2003), pp. 5-51.
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actors.3 7 2 Evolutionary theory has traditionally held that if evolution is the
case then the best explanation of moral behavior is that humans are to
some degree determined.3 7 3 Theorists, such as Dennett, argue that there is
increasing evidence that compassion, sympathy, mercy, and many other
attributes that we normally attribute to “moral” behavior are built into the
brain.3 7 4
If this is the case, then Taylor looks prescient in his insistence that
human nature necessarily includes an aspect of morality. Taylor writes,
“The sense that human beings are capable of some kind of higher life
forms part of the background for our belief that they are fit objects of
respect, that their life and integrity is sacred or enjoys immunity, and is
not to be attacked” (1989,25). He continues with an idea that will be a
central aspect of his later work on multiculturalism by arguing that “my
identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide
the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case
what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or
oppose. In other words, it is the horizon in which I am capable of taking a
j72 For positivists the dualistic nature of the discussion of morality is usually the beginning of
their objections.
j7 3 See Amhart (1994). Amart writes, “One of the most pervasive assumptions in the social
sciences is that there is an unbridgeable gap between is and ought.... Because of this
separation between judgments of feet and judgments o f value, it is thought, scientific
objectivity in the social sciences dictates moral relativism” (389). Arnhart goes on to argue
that this incorrect and that one can in feet make a reasonable scientific case for morality
being a part of what constitutes our human nature.
3 7 4 See also Nussbaum (1988), (1990), and (2003). See also Marcus, George, W. Russell
Neuman, and Michael MacKuen (2000), Porter (2003), and Lakoff and Johnson (1999).
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stand” (1989,27). At this point it sounds as if relativism is a possible
component of Taylor’s position, one which would seemingly void any
possibility that we can discuss a “human” nature and one which ultimately
undermine Taylor’s own position.
First, Taylor argues, as I have pointed out that moral orientations are
fundamental to humans (1989,29). It is an inescapable fact of being
human. Something else we know about humans is that they have a
reflective awareness.3 7 6 This reflective awareness yields truths about the
self, but we cannot expect that these truths are going to be the same as
those truths that are discovered in the natural sciences. It is this reflective
awareness that in many ways that makes it impossible to study the self as a
scientific object. In order to study something scientifically, Taylor argues,
we must be able to 1) take the object absolutely, 2) the object must be
independent of descriptions concerning the object, 3) the object can be
captured in an explicit description, and 4) the object can be described
without reference to its surroundings (1989, 33-4). The self, at its very
3 7 5 Once again, relativism can rear its head at any time of the game—in one’s ontology,
epistemology, ethics, etc. There are few thinkers who are comfortable with the claim that we
can simply assert whatever we will. Taylor is certainly one of those.
3 7 6 Phenomenology’s primary effort, one could argue, is to discuss the world anew given this
assumption of reflective awareness of the world. Whether one pursues a route attempts to
find a unified self under the phenomena, as Husserl did, or to examine the world in a way
such as humans actually experience, as Heidegger did, the fact is that this reflective
awareness is central to phenomenology. See Heidegger (1962) and Husserl (1970). Husserl
has a view very similar to Nussbaum and Taylor. He argues that many thinkers, since the 19t b
century, have let the “total world-view of modem man . . . be determined by the positive
sciences and be blinded by the prosperity they produced” and the results of this was an
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center, describes itself and cannot be thought of independent of its
surroundings. Aside from physiological descriptions of humans, any
reference to their political and social selves requires that we have to deal
with descriptions of ourselves. Taylor writes, “I define who I am by
defining where I speak from, in the family tree, in social space, in the
geography of social statuses and functions, in my intimate relations to the
ones I love, and also crucially in the space of moral and spiritual
orientation within which my most important defining relations are lived
out (1989,35). Again, we see that ontology includes the moral. This has a
number of important implications for the study of politics, the primary one
being that we cannot operate only from oversimplified models or
assumptions of the actor.
One might object to Taylor at this point, arguing that his work is no
better than the usually suspicious postmodern discourse. First, we must
understand that Taylor’s seminal work is not an attempt explicitly outline
a theory of human nature. Rather, it is an attempt to see how modernism
has supplanted Romanticism in our moral imagination. The reason why
Taylor explores this is to make his larger claim that it is important that we
have the most “accurate” version of human nature possible. From the
standpoint of a political scientist, the object of our discipline is to see
whether we understand political phenomena better now than we once
“indifferent tuming-away from the questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity.
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3 7 7
did. This includes making better predictions. However, making better
predictions is only a part of political understanding. For example, making
predictions does not entail understanding. One could argue that making
predictions is a necessary part of science but it is not the sufficient
aspect.3 7 8 Understanding is the sufficient aspect of science. For example, it
is possible to teach child how to make predictions concerning any number
of physical occurrences. A small child will readily be able to predict that
heavy objects will go to the ground while light objects, such as a balloon,
will float upwards. The child can then make predictions on any object she
sees and will, more than likely, only make an incorrect prediction if the
object that is before them is somehow disguised. But this ability to predict
does not mean that the child “understands” the phenomenon of gravity.
Concepts such as mass attracting mass are completely irrelevant to one’s
ability to make predictions.3 7 9 And we would not expect that a child
should have this sort of understanding. However, just because we do not
need a deeper understanding of matter, mass, and gravitational forces to
make predictions concerning objects does not mean that understanding is
not important. I argue that understanding is far more important. What
Merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people” (6).
3 7 7 See Almond (2000). See also Stehr (2003).
3 7 8 See Sanford and Smith (2004) and Mackie (2003).
3 7 9 The issue of necessary and sufficient causes for knowledge is long and varied. It ranges
from Kant (1999) who thought that he could at least determine the range of what reason can
know to Kellenberger (1971) who argues that there is no necessary or sufficient conditions
for knowledge.
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Taylor and Nussbaum are both attempting to do is to broaden our
understanding of the endeavor that we call the social sciences by
expanding our understanding of knowledge to include an ontology that
will allow for revision, explication, and moral statements.
Taylor makes this argument explicit by stating that “certainty” is
something that we “generate for ourselves, by ordering our thoughts
correctly—according to clear and distinct connections” (1995, 5). What
we do find, however, as I have argued is that our foundations, our
ontology, is wrapped up in our notion of community, or as Taylor
■ 5 0 1
remarks, in that with which we identify ourselves. This identification of
the self with our community is not relativism.3 8 2 This expression is an
essential aspect of us. This is why, for Taylor, leaning too heavily on
culture as an explanation for human behavior is too shallow and reliance
on reason too narrow. For Taylor, history and the development of concepts
plays an integral role in our understanding of ourselves and reason
provides the framework for this development. Though Taylor does not
take up the argument in these terms, I hold that his work can be framed in
the context of many cognitivist arguments for the development of reason.
The historical aspect of conceptual development provides neural
3 8 0 To make matters worse, Taylor points out that many still think that political philosophy
and descriptions of political phenomena can be carried out without the exercise of power
(1995, 18).
3 8 1 See Taylor (1995), pp. 257-287.
3 8 2 See Taylor (1989), pp. 503-505.
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frameworks that literally get embedded into how we see the world.3 8 3
However, we often mistake our way of seeing the world for the universal
way of seeing it. The consequence of our poor readings of ourselves is
dire. Taylor writes,
All this [the expressivist dimension of human reason], in a context
of historical ignorance, helps to accredit the oversimple and almost
caricatural readings of one or another stand of modernity. Such
readings make various facets of modernity seem easy to repudiate.
Narrow proponents of disengaged reason point to the irrational and
anti-scientific facets our of hand, blithely unaware of how much
they draw on a post-Romantic interpretation of life as they seek
fulfillment and expression in their emotional and cultural lives. On
the other hand, those who condemn the fruits of disengaged reason
in technological society or political atomism make the world simpler
than it is [for those they accuse of making oversimplified statements
about the world]. (1989, 504)
Taylor sees the debates that surround the current state of human nature to
be lacking ontology or an understanding of what humans are. To use his
metaphors, humans are both Romantic, meaning having the full and
integral element of emotions at their disposal in how they live life, and
Reasonable, meaning that humans necessarily are reasonable.3 8 4
Taylor can point to scientific and technological achievements to
show the impressive use of reason as evidence to the part of his claim that
we are reasonable. However, more difficult perhaps, is showing that we
have an essential emotional component to our lives. Merely examining
how we live, for Taylor, is evidence enough that we have this Romantic/
3 8 j See Pinker The Blank Slate (2002), Damasio’s Looking for Spinoza (2003), and LeDoux’s
Synaptic Self (2003).
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emotional element to us that plays a crucial role in our political awareness
and organization. He writes that “our normal understanding of self-
realization presupposes that some things are important beyond the self,
that there are some goods or purposes the furthering of which has
significance for us and which hence can provide the significance a
fulfilling life needs” (1989, 507). Those who see reason playing the
crucial role in political organization and political deliberation, or at least in
the study of politics, might reply that Taylor’s statement is the absolute
relativism that most theorists seek to avoid. Taylor responds that this
conclusion is not inevitable as he argues that “A total and fully consistent
subjectivism would tend towards emptiness: nothing would count as a
fulfillment in a world in which literally nothing was important but self-
fulfillment” (1989, 507). He continues that “a society of self-fulfillers,
whose affiliations are more and more seen as revocable, cannot sustain the
strong identification with the political community which public freedom
needs” (1989, 508).
Taylor’s move to emphasize self-fulfillment and emotions does have
problems. Taylor admits that making this move is natural but it seems to
be tragically “one-sided” with its “own form of narrowness” and with its
own “blind spots” (1989, 509). Part of this narrowness stems from a
misunderstanding of what, in polities, is being observed. Taylor holds that
3 8 4 See Taylor (1989), pp. 368-390.
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there is no access to politics that is objective in any meaningful sense of
the word objective. He writes, “The order [the political world] is only
accessible through personal, hence subjective, resonance” (1989,510). As
I noted, Taylor points out that we should not dismiss the achievements of
reason. Those who call out that reason has been oppressive often make
this claim. Our delight in the subjective, Taylor warns, “can easily slide
into a celebration of our creative powers” (1989, 510).
Taylor’s position, the renewal of a discussion of morality in the
political context, the reconfiguration of our way at looking at ontology, is
perhaps best summed up by the following remark in Sources o f the Self.
He writes:
It is not that the basic moral standards of modernity, concerning
rights, justice, benevolence, depend on this exploration [into human
nature]; they depend rather on goods to which we don’t have access
through personal sensibility. But there are other important issues of
life which we can only resolve through this kind of insight; for
instance, why it matters and what it means to have a more deeply
resonant human environment and, even more, to have affiliations
with some depth in time and commitment. These are questions
which we can only clarify by exploring the human predicament, the
way we are set in nature and among others, as a locus of moral
sources. As our public traditions of family, ecology, even polis are
undermined or swept away, we need new languages of personal
resonance to make crucial human goods alive for us again. (1989,
513).
These new languages, this awareness of a more expansive notion of
human nature, can only be found in the community. Taylor’s conception
3 8 5 See Wyschogrod (1990).
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of human nature is one that includes both notions of reason and
romanticism, which finds its expression, its life, in the community.
From its outset, political philosophy has sought to discuss the
individual’s relationship with the community. The earliest of our political
philosophy tracts, such as Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics,
attempt to tackle this issue specifically. Their conceptions of reality held
that real virtue could be found only in the individual’s participation in the
proper community. While Taylor does share communitarian concerns, he
does not prescribe the destruction of the state only to rebuild under the
watchful eye of the philosopher-king. In fact, I think it will become clear
that Taylor shares many of the liberal positions of Nussbaum. Like
Nussbaum, Taylor is a cautious liberal; he holds that liberty and autonomy
• • j o / :
resides in the individual. However, because of the excesses that other
individuals are willing to commit, due to injustice that many experience,
we do need to have explicit and acknowledged boundaries that comprise
the state.3 8 7
Taylor still holds to the idea that transcendental arguments have
validity, and it is from this position that he makes his argument for the
community. Transcendental arguments, Taylor holds, are indubitable
7 8 6 See Quinn (1996).
3 8 7 See McClure (2003). McClure examines
j8s Hopefully, as we have seen from the discussion on postmodernism and culture, the idea
that there could be any sort of transcendental argument is, at best, the dream of those who
have been deluded by the dream of philosophy and, at worst, is the cause of violence to those
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and beyond doubt.3 8 9 His claim of being beyond doubt does not mean that
it is not open to critique. Rather, he argues that his concepts, the
foundations of his work, his ontology—morality, the dialogical nature of
experience—are beyond doubt. Certainly, one of the goals of many
political scientists is to mark such arguments in order to “advance”
political science as a science. There is another school of though that says
indisputable claims about social phenomena are a pipe dream, at best.
Though, traditionally, transcendental claims are independent of experience
and are considered, by many thinkers, to be a priori, Taylor makes the
unique claim to say that transcendental arguments “need a lot of discourse
to establish them because . . . we have to articulate the boundary
conditions of awareness. In the normal course of life we are focused on the
things we are observing and dealing with . . . we are unconcerned with
what it is to perceive, to be aware” (1995,31).3 9 0 For Taylor
who do not necessarily accept the validity of a particular argument. Taylor, once again, is
walking a narrow line that seems to run through various philosophical positions. I hold that
this is emblematic of his attempt to shift and broaden our understanding of human nature in
politics.
’8 9 This is a contentious argument. It is not in the purview of this work to deal with it. I will
just say that in this respect, Taylor shows his Kantian/Hegelian roots. Transcendental does
not mean unknowable, as many modem commentators mistakenly take it to mean. Rather,
for Taylor it means the universal commitments that we can make via reasonable arguments.
See Morgan (2004) for an interesting discussion concerning recent thought on transcendental
arguments.
3 9 0 Taylor quotes Merleau-Ponty who argues that our primary access to the world is through
perception. While this position is relatively well accepted now, but it was not always the
case. Many, looking to make philosophy mirror the natural sciences, sought to find the
indubitable claims that could be found primarily through the exercise of reason. One could
argue that this is one of the primary differences between the analytic and continental schools
of thought, though this may not be so clearly the case any longer as investigations into the
philosophy o f mind and cognitive sciences gains a stronger foothold.
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transcendental arguments remain paradoxical because they “prove
something quite strong about the subject of experience and the subject’s
place in the world; and yet since they are grounded in the nature of
experience, there remains an ultimate, ontological question they can’t
foreclose. . . for the thesis of embodied agency, the basic explanatory
language of human behavior (1995, 33). Human actors are always, first
and foremost, agents who exist in the world of limitations and truth.
One of the foundations that Taylor builds his idea of community on
is the notion that there are irreducible social goods. It is this linking of
experience to thought that Taylor sees as an argument for his ontological
concepts. He notes that the good, in a very real, utilitarian sense, always is
the good for someone, for an individual. However, this does not mean that
there are not social goods that move beyond the mere desires of
individuals as such or as an aggregate. He argues that all theories of social
goods will have three elements; 1) consequentialism, 2) utilitarianism, and
3) atomism. The first idea holds that our actions have results, the second
holds that our actions should seek some element of happiness, and the last
is that all utility, or happiness, must be weighed in terms of individuals. As
Taylor rightly notes, societies consist of individuals, their choices, and
their actions (1995,129-130). But Taylor thinks it is impossible to study
society strictly in terms of individuals. He notes, “Thoughts exist as it
were in the dimension of meaning and require a background of available
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meanings in order to be the thoughts that they are” (1995,131). In other
words, individuals cannot possibly be thought of, nor can they act as
individuals, without the society, languages, polity, and relationships that
comprise them.3 9 1
The question that this brings before us is how we, as a community
come to value certain social goods. Perhaps because of our increasingly
stringent atomism and the role of utilitarian models of behavior, we have
lost sight of how theorists at one time sought to explain a wide variety of
social phenomena based on the belief that human nature itself was prone
to collective changes in consciousness. Marx, perhaps, is the most famous
example of this. While it is the case that Marx based his analysis of
economics on material phenomena, he did expect that the changes in
consciousness that capitalism brought on would be experience
“universally.” This could only be the case if there is something about
human nature that seeks emancipation and freedom that can be found only,
for Marx, communism.3 9 2 This idea, that there is a central aspect to human
3 9 1 See Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another and John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality.
We must remember that Taylor’s position is not necessarily incompatible with recent
advances in cognitive theory. For example, one can still hold that Chomsky’s theory of
generative grammar is an essential aspect of human nature and that we develop the content of
our brains via experience in the polity. In a sense this is akin to Locke’s theory of ideas,
though without the blank slate, which would mean that humans are not infinitely malleable.
3 9 2 See Jay (1986). Another word for universality is totality. Jay points out that the idea of
totality has dominated much of the political discourse throughout years. He writes,
“Resonating with affirmative connotations, it [totality] has generally been associated with
other positively charged words, such as coherence, order, fulfillment, harmony, plenitude,
meaningfulness, consensus, and community. And concomitantly, it has been contrasted with
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nature that all of us will experience collectively, albeit at different times or
stages, has reappeared at many times and places, perhaps most recently in
Francis Fukuyama’s effort to argue that human beings will, at some point
in time, come to demand liberal democracies. He bases this theory on the
idea that human nature is such that, due to thymos or the desire for
recognition, that all will eventually demand liberal democracies, the best
form of government in which this recognition can be met is liberal
democracy.3 9 3
As to the question of how we come to value one thing over another,
Taylor argues that it is culture that is decisive, rather than a set of rational
choice preferences. He argues that we all seek goods to fulfill our needs
and that “things can only be good in [a] certain way . . . because of the
background understanding established in our culture” (1995, 136).
Authentic self-expression is only possible against the background of a
culture. Taylor also argues that there are some cultures where authentic
self-expression is not possible. That is because these cultures mistake the
such negatively valenced concepts as alienation, fragmentation, disorder, conflict,
contradiction, serialization, atomization, and estrangement “ (21).
3 9 3 There are many plausible examples of this. I use Fukuyama simply because he is the least
likely to use these Hegelian/ Marxist pedagogical methods since he is a rather conservative
commentator. Fukuyama writes, “The particular events of history can become meaningful
only with respect to some larger end or goal, the achievement of which brings the historical
process to a close [the universal acceptance of liberal democracy]. This final end of man is
what makes all particular events potentially intelligible” (1992, 59). He continues by arguing,
“Construction of a just political order therefore requires both the cultivation and the taming
thymos “ (183). This thymos, Fukuyama argues, is the intense desire that we be recognized
politically and individually. It is the central dominant feature of our human nature, or at least
our political nature.
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ontological grounds upon which a culture should be based.3 9 4 The goods
that we find to be worthwhile are only found in the context of this culture.
Taylor argues that social goods only have meaning insofar as there
is a common understanding concerning their goodness. This, for Taylor, is
one of the essential aspects of ontology.3 9 5 At the very least, Taylor sees
the communal as a place where we can base morality, since it is in the
very nature of humans to have common moral sentiments. This is better,
for Taylor, than basing morality on the individual’s reasoning. One might
ask what the difference is between Taylor’s position and say, the
categorical imperative where each individual being reasonable needs to
look no further for morality than into the self. Taylor writes:
Common understandings are undecomposable. This is because . . . it is
essential to their being what they are that they be not just for me and for
you, but for us. That we have a common understanding presupposes that
we have formed a unit, a “we” who understand together, which is by
definition analytically undecomposable. (1995,139).
These common understandings are part of that moral configuration that
makes up the very ontology of humans.
I want to examine, briefly, two aspects of Taylor’s work in regard to
two problems: 1) there is a chance that we might all agree to be bad and 2)
3 9 4 For example, see Taylor (1995). Taylor writes that “politics that takes participatory self-
rule as a good in itself’ (141) and this is “an essential condition” (192).
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it is often difficult to delineate where the community begins and ends. One
might easily point to the Nazis and the German populace as an example of
a group that agreed to exercise evil. The group seemingly chose evil and
acted in a way that nearly everyone else regards as wrong and not as a
mere choice. 3 9 6 Regarding point number two, one only need look at
California to see that there is a large overlap of community along racial,
income, geographic and educational lines. One can easily ask whether the
community of Sacramento belongs to the community of San Diego
because both are a part of California. If Taylor cannot describe where the
community begins and ends, then one might wonder whether it is even
usable as a concept for discussing our theoretical foundations. Taylor
answers these questions by looking into the ordinary life. He writes that
the good life is “not to be found in some higher activity, beyond ordinary
life—be it contemplation or religious asceticism or even citizen rule. It is
to be found at the very center of everyday existence, in the acquisition
through labor of the means to live and the reproduction of life in the
3 9 5 For an interesting discussion on the Taylor’s concept of the development of ontology see
Taylor (1995) “Heidegger, Language, Ecology.”
3 9 6 See, for example, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s Hitler’ s Willing Executioners: Ordinary
Germans and the Holocaust. In this work Goldhagen sets out to refute the idea that
“Germans were more or less like us or, rather, similar to how we represent ourselves to be:
rational, sober children of the Enlightenment, who are not governed by magical thinking ....
[TJhey were economic men who . . . could be moved by irrational motives” (27). Goldhagen
argues that Germans held such views that were so out of touch, so antisemitic, and perverted
before Hitler came to power. He writes that there is no record or evidence that “Germans
opposed and abhorred the myriad anti-Jewish measures, legislation, and persecutions, that
they thought it a great crime to incarcerate Jews in concentration camps, to wrest Jews from
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family” (1995,144). In the end, any sense of good that focuses on the
individual will fail. Social goods are a product of such a civil society and
the civil society are a product of the good upon which civil society is
based. Taylor writes, describing this dialogical connection that the
community is “a web of autonomous associations, independent of the
state, which bound citizens together in matters of common concern, and
by their mere existence or action could have an effect on public policy”
(1995,204). Taylor has attempted to make an ontological argument that is
very anti-metaphysical. He has attempted to lay the foundations of theory,
of our ontology, by looking at the everyday.
As I argued, Nussbaum deals with the questions that concern
ontology by attempting reconstruct how it is that individual actors should
be seen by theorists. In other words, she argues that theorists have their
assumptions wrong concerning the individual. Taylor can be seen as
arguing that theorists have misunderstood the foundational nature of the
community. The community is not merely the aggregate of individual
actions, but is something that interacts, interferes, and exchanges with
individuals. Despite this foundational role of the community, Taylor
argues for the indefeasible nature of the individual.
This “politics of recognition,” to use one of Taylor’s key terms,
demands that individual desires, dispositions, and goals by, at the bare
homes and communities ...” (31). Rather, the culture, collectively and willingly, moved
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minimum, recognized by the community writ large. This is his safe guard
of the possible chance that some might misunderstand his work as arguing
that the community supercedes the individual.3 9 7 He argues that “our
identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer
real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror
back a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.
Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of
oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, or reduced mode of
being” (1992,4). Once again, this is emphasize the ontological status that
Taylor gives moral thought—it is an aspect of what it means to be human,
not the result of weighted preferences.
Sticking to the dialogical nature of thought, Taylor argues that
recognition is a basic human need as well. In itself, this is not a terribly
new idea. Plato first proposed such an idea in a variety of places. In the
Republic Plato discusses a sort of desire for recognition that “boils up and
becomes harsh” and is something that one can suffer from even as one
itself and molded itself into what it became, the Nazi regime.
3 9 7 See Taylor (1995), pp. 133-136. Taylor attempts to show that the mere reduction of
individuals to social constructs or language is a methodological mistake and an ontological
misunderstanding. He writes, “As individuals we value certain things; we find certain
fulfillments good, certain experiences satisfying, certain outcomes positive. But these things
can only be good in that certain way, or satisfying or positive after their particular fashion,
because of the background understanding developed in culture. Thus I may value the
fulfillment that comes from authentic self-expression, or the experience that arises from
certain works of art, or outcomes in which people stand with each other on a footing of
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suffers from “hunger, cold, and everything of the sort.”3 9 8 Nietzsche also
proposes an idea of recognition that seems to stem from the desire for the
will to power. He writes
Verily, men gave themselves their good and evil. Verily, they did
not take it, they did not find it, nor did it come to them as a voice
from heaven. Only man placed values in things to preserve
himself— -he alone created meaning for things, a human meaning.
There he calls himself “man,” which means: the esteemer. To
esteem is to create: hear this, you creators! Esteeming itself is of all
esteemed thing the most estimable treasure. Through esteeming
alone is there value: and without esteeming, the nut of existence
would be hallow. (1954, 170-171)
This esteeming that Nietzsche discusses concerns the desire, the will’s
attempt, to overcome both culture and reason. It is through this desire to
be recognized as a creator that is the center of Nietzsche’s worldview.3 9 9
Of course, Hegel’s entire system of reason is motivated by desire for
recognition.4 0 0
Taylor conceives of recognition differently than most other political
thinkers. First, recognition is a human need. Second, as Taylor writes,
“We have the modem notion of dignity, now used in a universalist and
frankness and equality. But all this is only possible against the background o f a certain
culture” (136, my emphasis).
m See Plato (1974) 440c-440d.
See Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche Vol. 3 & 4 (1987), Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as
Literature (1987), and Hollingdale, Nietzsche: The Man and his Philosophy (2001).
4 0 0 John O’Neill writes, “[I]n Western philosophy . . . the narrative of the rise of human
consciousness from within the world of nature and a historical society that recognizes itself
through such a story. This narrative of the struggle over recognition and desire may be
regarded as the secular sequel to the biblical narrative of a failed recognition between the
Creator and the creation. In this sequel, life, labor, and language are each subject to a
historicized dialectic of (unconscious) desire and (class) recognition, developed in the
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egalitarian sense, where we talk of the inherent ‘dignity of human beings’
or of citizen dignity. The underlying premise here is that everyone shares
in it” (1992, 5). From this, Taylor argues that we have an individualized
identity. One could argue that the ahistorical individual, based on a
universal concept of reason, shares in a moral worldview in which all
could share. Through the proper use of reason, as we have discussed, one
comes to a “correct” and “proper” understanding of what it means to be a
human in a community. Taylor objects to this position.
He argues that in the 18th century it was conjectured that people
were endowed with an intuitive moral sense.4 0 1 For Taylor this intuitive
moral sense is a vast improvement over the dry calculation of
consequences that have often pervaded political and moral reasoning of
today. Herder and Rousseau, Taylor argues, are paramount in bringing the
idea of authenticity to the forefront of moral discussions. According to
Herder argues that “each person has his or her own ‘measure’” (1995,
228). From this Taylor argues that “Being true to myself means being true
to my own originality, which is something only I can articulate and
discover” (1992,229). In order for us to understand the relationship
between recognition and identity, we must understand that human life “is
Hegelian-Marxist and in the Freudian version of the economy of recognition, reciprocity, and
alienation. . . throughout the human sciences” (1996, 1-2).
4011 have argued that throughout the history of Western political thinking, at least in what I
call the ahistoric school o f thought, that theorists have held that there is a universal intuitive
sense that all can and should recognize as valid through the proper application of reason,
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fundamentally dialogical.” And we should understand that the concept of
being human is not “monological” as well (1992,230). Taylor writes, “We
define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes, in struggle
against, the things our significant others want to see in us” (1992,230). In
fact, my very “identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with
others” (1992, 231).
From this, Taylor argues that each person’s unique identity should
be recognized as unique. This is the position from which Taylor derives
his own unique idea of universalism, the basis of his ontological position.
He writes that “with the politics of equal dignity, what is established is
meant to be universally the same, an identical basket of rights and
immunities; with the politics of difference, what we are asked to recognize
is the unique identity of this individual or group, its distinctness from
everyone else” (1992,233-234). This political position or worldview is to
say that equal dignity is based on the idea that all humans are worthy of
the same respect.4 0 2
If it is the case that humans should act as Kant has prescribed, one
can reasonably ask how Taylor’s position differs from that of Kant’s.
Moreover, it is not clear that Taylor’s position is any better than Kant’s.
4 0 2 There are some similarities with this position and Kant’s categorical imperative. This is
recognized as Kant’s moral imperative. He writes, “I am never to act otherwise than so that I
can also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (see Groundwork to the
Metaphysics of Morals, p. 42). Kant also writes, “The practical imperative will thus be as
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While Taylor asserts that there is a dialogical nature to humanity, this is
something that Kant would not have much of a problem with, especially if
the focus of our study is do humans behave a certain way in political life
because of their nature. At this point in our study, Kant seemingly has an
easier time with providing us a human nature by which we can explain
political behavior. This is based on the simple idea that humans are
naturally rational.4 0 3 Taylor would argue, however, that any conception
apart from community is necessarily incomplete and will not yield a
coherent theory of rationality. Taylor argues that the imagination, the last
part of his ontology, is critically important to our understanding.
Taking his conception of a dialogical human nature, Taylor
attempts, finally, to flesh out what this means to humans in their
“embeddedness,” meaning as they are in their communities. For Taylor, it
makes no sense to refer to humans in any way other than as they are in the
community. However, given the ways in which modernity has lead us, we
often feel as if we can discuss humans as if they are separate, atomic
follows. So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other,
always at the same time as an end, and never merely as a means” (Ibid., p. 47).
4 0 ; > While Kant does not provide a comprehensive view of what the state should look like, he
did have a theory of cosmopolitanism that he based on the idea that all humans are rational.
See, for example Howard Williams’ Kant’ s Critique o f Hobbes: Sovereignty and
Cosmopolitanism, Hannah Arendt’s Lectures on Kant’ s Political Philosophy, and Ronal
Beiner and William James Booth’s Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary
Legacy. As I have already noted Nussbaum finds great inspiration in Kant’s essay “Toward
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.” In this essay Kant discusses our duty to solve
violence and the problems of humanity by entering into a cosmopolitan ideal in the rule of
law governs all. This is only possible if we understand and follow our rational nature. Of
course, I have also argued that Nussbaum has given a better account of rationality than have
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individuals. Discussing, even theoretically, atomic individuals is as likely
to make sense as discussing painting without paint. Despite the theoretical
convenience that such discussions might provide, if we are serious about
understanding our political structures, our political concepts, and how we
operate in the polity, then individuals must always be discussed in terms
of their embededness in the community.
Part of the difficulty in our current analysis of political structures,
political organization, and, ultimately, morality, is that we have become
clouded as to “reality.” We often view our progression from primatives to
modems as being linear. Conveniently, this conception of progress also
coincides nicely with the linearity of reason and utility. The problems that
confront us, Taylor argues, should be seen as multiple modernities.
Western modernity often losses its way, forgetting that it is a “certain kind
of social imaginary” (2004,1). For Taylor, the term social imaginaries “is
not a set of ideas; rather, it is what enables, through making sense of, the
practices of society” (2004,2).4 0 4 The problem with modernity—our over
reliance on “rationality” to solve problems, our discarding tradition, our
escape from ultimate meaning to private relativism—come from the fact
that “we have trouble seeing it as one possible conception among others”
most rational choice theorists. See Kant’s Perpetual Peace, edited by James Bohman and
Matthias Lutz-Bachmann.
4 0 4 1 think that it should be noted that this term is neither conservative or liberal, to use the
American sense of the word. In other words, Taylor’s basic position does not necessarily
lend itself to any particular side of the political spectrum.
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(2004,2). While Taylor certainly has his own political affiliations and
leanings, ultimately, as we shall see, this idea is one that protects tradition,
re-emphasizes that possibility of ultimate meaning within a community,
and the need to re-establish morality as the ultimate arbiter of reason. As
Taylor argues, a theory about society necessarily tells us how we ought to
order society and how we ought to live.4 0 5
Rather than see modernity as a progression of less good to more
good, from chaos to order, from opaqueness to clarity, Taylor argues that
we need to see modernity as a series of moral demands that eventually
become obfuscated in our own acceptance of it as nature. Taylor argues
that there are two parts to understanding our foundation more completely:
1) nature is necessarily tied up with our social imaginaries and 2) we are
prone to take human nature to be something that it is not as we accept
certain theories as true but, in reality, crowd out further investigation 4 0 6
These imaginaries are flexible, yet rooted in experience. They
provide the “background” (2004,25). They stand to help us see the ideal
4 0 5 For example, Taylor writes, “The idea of moral order implicit in this view of society [the
Lockean idea that society exists for the mutual benefit of individuals] has undergone a
double expansion: in extension (more people live by it; it has become dominant) and in
intensity (the demands it makes are heavier and more ramified). The idea has gone, as it
were, through a series of redactions, each richer and more demanding than the previous one,
up to the present day” (2004, 5). In discussing Grotius, Taylor writes that “any theory of this
kind [that humans are rational sociable agents who are meant to collaborate in peace to their
mutual benefit] also offers, inescapably an idea of moral order: it tells us something about
how we ought to live together in society” (2004, 3)
4061 contend that this is not relativism. Saying that we do not have a complete understanding
of ourselves or that our theoretical conceptions get in the way of understanding our human
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and “beyond the ideal stands some notion of a moral or metaphysical
order, in the context of which the norms and ideals make sense” (25).
Despite our complex ability to reimagine ourselves, ultimately we cannot
conceive of ourselves, because of our the moral order as outside of the
“social matrix” (2004, 56).
Taylor’s work provides us with an interesting and complex way to
discuss and describe the foundations of our theory. His approach is
sensitive to cultural differences, the hope of a moral order, and, most
importantly, the need to expand and broaden the way we need to conceive
of the individual. Our assumptions cannot be so simple as to ignore critical
aspects of our life. In the same way that Nussbaum seeks to bring
emotions into what it means to be human, Taylor attempts to reinvigorate
the discussion of the community and imagination on the how we conceive
of political theory.
nature is not the same as saying that any theory is just as good as another or that one has no
ground upon which one can assert “truth.”
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Chapter Seven:
The Possible Future for Theory
in the Study of Politics
The object o f philosophy is the logical clarification o f thoughts.
Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists
essentially o f elucidations.
Ludwig Wittgenstein
The routine o f custom tends to deaden even scientific inquiry; it stands in
the way o f discovery and o f the active scientific worker. For discovery and
inquiry are synonymous as an occupation. Science is a pursuit, not a
coming into possession o f the immutable; new theories as points o f view
are more prized than discoveries that quantitatively increase the store on
hand.
John Dewey
At the beginning of this work I said that I would discuss three
important problems in political thought: 1) whether there is a “correct”
way to look at politics, 2) whether there is a best way to get to the “best”
theory, and 3) what should we make of the assumptions—our ontological
commitments—that we use in political thought. I have come down on the
side that there is no one best way to look at politics and that our
ontological commitments play critical roles in how we examine politics.4 0 7
Political science is a long ways off from being anything like a science and
it seems as if we are stuck with the term more out of tradition than out of
any foreseeable chance to actually become like the natural sciences. This
has caused consternation for many political theorists.
4 0 7 This is not to say that there are not ways that are not better than others.
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Some have offered their prescription for overcoming what some
see as a problem. Putnam (2003) argued that we should look into the use
of multiple methods. Mayer (2002) argued that we should look
reconfiguring our epistemology. Brady (2000) also argues that shifting
what we mean by causation might be a solution to the malaise of political
theory. I have argued throughout this work that all of these conceptual
shifts are insufficient. I take seriously Fred Dallmayr’s (2004) challenge
that we need to “replace or supplement the rehearsal of routinized canons
with a turn to global cross-cultural or comparative political theorizing”
(249). It is my contention that the study of politics does not need to be
scientific, if by science we have in mind the model of the natural sciences.
It needs to be interesting, relevant, and our methods need to fit the
problem.4 0 8 1 understand that the criteria of “interesting, relevant, and best
fit might seem a bit vague. However, if we follow my basic admonition,
which is to expand the ontological grounding from which we start, we will
see that such terms may prove useful. At the very least, we need to find
ways to look at the human actor in ways that strict rationality based
4 0 8 1 am advocating a position that is pragmatic. Even though there are many theorists who
have sought to expand, develop, synthesize, reorder, reprioritize, discover new theories, work
out new methods, and so forth, and many of them claim that they are not looking to be a
science (see Almond, 2001), it is the case that if one asserts that there is a set of propositions
that explains a phenomenon to the exclusion of other propositions, then one is engaged in
“science,” if we take science to mean the simplest explanation for the largest set of data. I
argue that it is the case that the nature of political phenomena requires that we approach it
from all sides, above and below. My work has been an attempt to get us to at least realize
that we need to open up our perspectives, include more methods which means that we will
have to include more possible ways of looking at political phenomena.
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theories cannot account for. My work is trying to set the foundation for
such a shift to occur.
In political science, we are on the verge of having our Ptolemaic
culture—the insistence that the study of politics must be one way and not
the other—being swept away by a flood of new observations. These
observations that will give us a chance to reconfigure our ontological
conceptions will do for the study of politics what Copernicus and Galileo
did to Aristotelian cosmology.4 0 9 Since the behavioralist revolution and
the behavioralist proposition that individuals are best understood by a
minimal set of assumptions—the primary one that humans are rational
actors—theorists have conceded ground to methodologists. These
concessions are based on the assumption that the best way, and by
extension the only way, to study politics was by refining methods,
preferable along the lines of rational choice theory. Some might argue that
the basic ontological questions have been solved for a long time, since at
4 0 9 Ptolemy (85-165 CE) lived in Alexandria, Egypt. He was one of the most famous and
influential Greek astronomers of his time. He is most famous for defending and propounded
the arguments that defended the Aristotelian geocentric cosmology. He came up with an
incredibly elaborate mathematical scheme that saved the “appearances.” In other words, he
was able to devise a mathematical system that would ensure that all planets and
constellations moved in perfect circles, because that is what the assumptions of the theory
called for. He did this despite the fact that empirical evidence was already starting to point to
the fact that planets did not move in perfect circles around the Earth. Grasshoff (1990)
writes, “Ptolemy’s Almagest shares with Euclid’s Elements the glory o f being the scientific
text longest in use. From its conception in the second century up to the late Renaissance, this
work determined astronomy as a science. During this time the Almagest was not only a work
on astronomy; the subject was defined as what is described in the Almagesf’ (8).
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least when Hobbes argued that humans are rational and self-interested.4 1 0
Many engage in the study of politics as if these assumptions do not need to
be challenged.
In this dissertation, I have made the following contributions to
looking at political theory. First, I have made a case as to how ontological
beliefs lead to methods of inquiry. What is important about this work is
that I make the link that shows how we have cut off thinking about our
assumptions; we have assumed that they are correct rather looking at our
assumptions as possible tools for clarification or new exploration. This has
major implications. If our assumptions are wrong then we can expect our
conclusions to be false and we have come to an unwillingness to tackle
problems in new ways because we cannot even see the problem 4 1 1
Second, I have shown that the idea that we can simply expand the number
of methods that we utilize, without also reexamining our ontology, is a
shell game. Third, I have shown, by briefly examining the work of
Nussbaum and Taylor, how the study of politics can be done that is
sensitive to empirical concerns and yet does not necessarily take
4101 do not think that “solved” is the correct term because what actually happened is a regime
of thought simply was adopted and has maintained its dominance. See Foucault (1980). Of
course, there are those like Russell who seriously mocked thinkers such as Heidegger for
being intellectually weak and opaque due to his overzealous attempt to redefine and bring
ontology back into the philosophical picture. Derrida, with his concepts such as onto-
theology, have likewise brought about a great deal of derision from many, especially thinkers
in the Anglo-American schools of philosophical thought.
4 1 1 This is both a foundational problem and a logical problem. It makes obvious sense that
incorrect ontological assumptions are simply about a world that does not exist. It is a logical
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oversimplified ontologies as the starting point. They have shown us,
among other things, how normative concerns, imagination, and creativity
all play not just important, but essential roles in our study of politics.
Political science, in the future, will have to include, at the very least, fields
such as history, ethics, cognitive science, linguistics, philosophy, gender
concerns, and an overall understanding of applying theory to problems,
along with an ontological understanding that sees how these various paths
or different ontological viewpoints “see” the world. From engaged
Buddhism to queer theory, from feminism to realist politics, many
scholars are looking to find new ways and methods of analysis that both
solves problems and engages the various experiences and manifestations
of human experience. Political science stands to fall behind other
disciplines and not be a serious tool of political engagement if it does not
broaden the scope of its inquiry that includes a variety of ways of looking
at the problem of foundations or ontology. As Ruth Grant (2002) asks,
“Can we know what is worth knowing about politics thought scientific
research methods alone?” (577). In this dissertation I have argued
throughout that the answer to this question is no. We need to
reconceptualize what it means to study politics, what the term science
means, and that methods alone cannot be the answer to our problems
problem in that arguing from false premises cannot lead to a sound conclusion, though the
argument can still be valid in its structure or the conclusion can be true, but not both.
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because a method implies a set of ontological assumptions that may no
longer be an adequate explanation of the human experience.
Given the problems and inconsistencies we face in political science,
there seem to be two paths for the future study of politics that will be
meaningful, will be able to deal with the all important normative concerns,
and will also be able to account for a growing body of scientific fact that
political theorists will no longer be able to ignore. These two paths will
have to be traveled in conjunction with one another as well. I have used
Nussbaum and Taylor to show two theorists who have seen the beginnings
of this new way and I tried to use their work to illustrate that what is often
considered “alternative” political theory.4 1 2 Political science in the future
will have to take seriously the implications of both cognitive science,
affective intelligence theory, philosophy of mind, and evolutionary
biology as setting the table for our assumptions and, also, a philosophical
pragmatic account of these theories as well. In other words, the
assumptions from which we will work will have to be based on science
that is far more recent, well documented, and useful than the traditional,
over-simplified self-interested actor model that we use and the theories by
which we justify them, pragmatism, will have to be results oriented.4 1 3
4 1 2 By alternative theory I am theory that is not strictly empirically based or that is rational
choice theory.
41j One the problems that rational choice faces, as I pointed out in chapter three, is that while
it claims to be neutral to truth claims, it makes obvious truth claims of its own—that of its
ontological suppositions. Pragmatism does not suffer from this problem. Cheryl Misak
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Also, given the probability that these new breakthroughs, I argue, will
alter how we think about truth, we will need to do theoretical work in the
area of philosophical pragmatism if we are going to be able to understand
the implications of these new scientific breakthroughs.
Some of the challenges that the theorists who examine how our
foundations play a role in the study of politics are as follows: 1) John
Gerring (2001) argues that ontology plays a role in our study, but since we
take it as given, we can dismiss it as a concern; 2) there is seemingly no
way out of Kuhn’s idea that we may not be able to test or compare any
ontology against another;4 1 4 and 3) the problem of relativity will continue
to rear its head if we deny that there is a “correct” ontological position,
even if we do not currently know what it is.4 1 5
The implications of my work have possible responses and
directions for each of the above problems. By bringing ontology to the
forefront of bur theoretical examinations in the study of politics, and by
implication the role of theorists who are best equipped to deal with the
elucidation and explication required for this move, we are likely to see the
(1999) writes, “The central thought of pragmatism is that philosophy must be connected to
practice” (2). She continues, “Truth, right reason, rationality, validity, and the like are myths.
Truth is merely what passes for good belief; it is not the sort of thing about which one should
expect ot have a philosophically interesting theory. Were we to hold on to the term “truth,”
against Rorty’s advice, we would have to take it to mean that beliefs which are currently
approved of are true. The notion of objectivity must be reinterpreted to mean
intersubjectivity or ‘solidarity.’ It is what we have come to take as true” (2-3).
4 1 4 See Kuhn (1996).
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following replies: 1) we can challenge set assumptions. Gerring is
incorrect in arguing that ontology plays no consequential role in the study
of politics because the models that we use to study politics are rife with
ontological assumptions. The most dominate model—the rational actor—
may be radically altered as we look more to neuroscience, philosophy of
mind, linguistic/ cognitive modeling, and normative theory to get a better
idea of what the political actor is like. 2) It might be the case that we
cannot objectively compare one ontology against another, but perhaps as
Nussbaum and Taylor have shown us, we can be sensitive to how the
interplay and exchange of foundational ontological assumptions and the
ways in which we examine the political actor. 3) The problem of relativity
will never be solved conclusively.4 1 6 Making the claim that there has to be
a best way to study politics or that there is some sort of truth out there
does not make it so. In fact, I argue that it simply ignores the problem of
relativity. Bringing back in creativity, the imagination, and other concepts
that are often left out of the political discourse, both academic and
popular, can perhaps lead us to entirely different conceptions of what
politics is or what it means. One of the practical benefits of this, as Taylor
notes, is that we be more accepting and inclusive. He argues that we
4 1 5 In other words, we must accept the standard version of science that claims that thinkers
build on the thoughts of previous thinkers. Science is a matter of discovery rather than
changing, radically, our outlooks or worldviews. We continue to progress towards truth.
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cannot interpret “all other societies in the categories of our own” (1971,
34).4 1 7 This is an idea that has enjoyed a long history. Camus, a great
proponent of looking at other He writes, “The dialogue of the level of
mankind is less costly than gospel preached by totalitarian regimes in the
form of a monologue dictated from the top of a lonely mountain. On the
stage as in reality, monologue precedes death” (1956,284). It would be a
shame to think that political science, with all of its resources and insights
in the wide variety of human experience were to make itself irrelevant as it
carries on a methodological monologue.
As I stated, the body and what it is, in other words what are human
nature is, has become a field of intense debate and one that is likely to
have implications as to how we practice and conceive of political science.
Elizabeth Grosz writes argues that bodies have become “the objects of
intense . . . fascination” (1). Michel Foucault was perhaps one of the first
political theorists to note the interest that the state had in organizing,
training and disciplining the body. He noted the body as the source of
power and training.4 1 8 Lakoff and Johnson set off to show that “the mind
4 1 6 At a minimum, postmodern thought sets up the parameters of defining truth along such
strict and self-repudiating lines that the assert truth to a postmodernist is an ethical violation
and to not make an assertion, to a an analytic thinker is nonsense. We are at an impasse.
4 1 7 It is hard to imagine how rational choice theory would respond to this except to say that it
is irrational.
4 1 8 See Foucault (1990,1995) For example, Foucault notes that the entire disciplining of the
body entails an elaborate set of social structures. So, for Foucault, one could argue that laws,
rules, and regulations are not at all the result of self-interested survival or even of a
pragmatic bargain. Rather, these institutions are the result of a concern for the body and our
representations of the body. He writes, “We are informed that if repression has indeed been
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is inherently embodied.”4 1 9 This, of course, is a direct assault on the
dualistic belief of a body and a soul, which is the very basis on which
Locke, Hobbes, and others based their own ideas of human nature.
Classical political thinkers over simplified their conceptions of what
reason is and did not assume that there could or should be external
influences to it4 2 0 From Socrates to the positivists, as I argued in previous
chapters, most political theorists have used a simple understanding of
reason in order to make the case for their own political theories which they
see as being universally applicable. But we now see that these
oversimplifications of reason will simply not do because they do not
reflect what it means to be human. For example, George Marcus, Russell
Neuman and Michael Mackuen have argued that we need to reorient how
the fundamental link between power, knowledge, and sexuality [the body] since the classical
age, it stands to reason that we will not be able to free ourselves from it except at a
considerable cost: nothig less than a transgression of laws, a lifting of prohibitions, an
irruption of speech, a reinstating of pleasure within reality, and a whole mechanisms of
power will be required” (1990,5). As one can see, removing the body from political
parlance, replacing desires, establishing practices and institutions, are difficult to overcome.
Seeing the world anew is never easy. Foucault also stated in an interview that the state has
“the great fantasy . . . of a social body constituted by the universality of wills. Now the
phenomenon of the social body is the effect not of a consensus but of the materiality of
power operating on the very bodies of individuals” (1980, 56). Again, we see the idea that
corporeality can be the site o f control for the state, not necessarily the mind. In other words,
another way to critique the concept of “reason” is to argue that it has always been the fantasy
of the state, an imposition as it were, and that the' only to produce universal reason is to
maintain power over the body. Still, Foucault is not analyzing the body, per se, just the
effects of power on it. It is a recent advent that the body itself has been of a concern to social
scientists.
4 1 9 Lakoff and Johnson (1999), 3.
4 2 0 While I have stated this in chapter 3, it is important to remember the significance of the
belief in universal reason, as there is no single concept as important to Western philosophy as
this. William and Alan Ebenstein write, “Greek thought is predominately rational and secular
in orientation. . . . [This led to] the birth of western science and philosophy” (7) and has
been with us ever since.
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we think of rationality so that we can now include emotions as a
significant part of rationality.4 2 1 Owen Flanagan argues that all we need
now to understand human nature are the sciences that are available to us
now, not impassioned spiritual beliefs or poor assumptions about a dual
nature of the mind. He writes, “It is not as if we now understand human
nature. However, what we can say with confidence is that we have a good
sense of what needs to be explained—human nature and behavior—and of
how to go about explaining it. There are many unknown forces in genes,
mind, and culture that will affect the story we eventually tell about what it
means to be a person, about why we think, fell, and behave as we do”
(7).4 2 2 Simplified understandings of human nature and reason will not help
us to understand politics on the level of a science. Nussbaum also added to
this attack on oversimplified notions of reason in her early attempts at
combining both reasonable scientific facts with an examination of culture,
literary practices, and beliefs will be the key to understanding politics in
4 2 1 They argue, as I have already mentioned, that rational choice theory has idealized
rationality away from its connections with the brain. They write, “To idealize rational choice
and to vilify the affective domain is to misunderstand how the brain works” (2). They also
write, “On the one hand, emotion seems to give us summary evaluations that persist to
dominate our decisions irrespective of contemporary considerations (emotions as
dispositions). On the other hand, emotion seems to be necessary to capture our attention and
make us capable of changing our views (emotions as momentary response to dramatic
appeals, events, or circumstance)” (26).
He continues the above thought by writing, “But no scientifically minded person thinks
we will need resources beyond those available to genetics, biology, psychology,
neuroscience, anthropology, sociology, history, economics, political science, and naturalistic
philosophy to understand the nature o f persons. The beliefs in immaterial minds, and minor
and major spirits, are in need of explanation. But spiritual forces will not do any explaining”
(7).
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the future.4 2 3 Daniel Dennett argues that theory will have to head in the
direction of the body because “we don’t have immaterial souls of the old-
fashioned sort” (2003,1). He writes elsewhere that this study of the body
will have to take place along strict physicalist terms based on evolutionary
theory because “in a single stroke, the idea of evolution by natural
selection unifies the realm of life, meaning, and purpose with the realm of
space and time, cause and effect, mechanism and physical law” (1995,
2 1 )4 2 4
Even looking historically at the body in political theory, we can see
that the attempt to understand the human body has always been a central
concern to the study of politics. The earliest political theorists, the Greeks,
set having a correct understanding of the body, or at least some useful
conjectures, as central to understanding how and why humans behave as
they do. While there is a vast set of problems with which the study of
politics must deal, how to live the good life is the most persistent question
in political theory. In order to live the good life, one must have a correct
4 2 3 See Nussbaum (1990).
4 2 4 Interestingly enough, it is not only traditional, that is to say religious forces, but others as
well who think that somehow we might be the worse off for die realignment of conceptual
outlook on human nature. Dennett writes, “Many are afraid that learning too much about
what we are—trading mysteries for mechanisms—will impoverish our vision of human
possibility. This fear is understandable, but if we really were in danger of learning too much,
wouldn’t those on the cutting edge be showing signs of discomfort?” (2003, 5).
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understanding of the body, the soul and this leads to one’s understanding
of one’s place in society.4 2 5
Modem political thinkers also address the status of the body in
their works as well. They saw important connections between human
physiology and the truth concerning human political action. We typically
consider the period from the late 16th century up to the beginning of the
20th century to be the period of Enlightened rationalism. Certainly, these
thinkers saw reason as superior, but there was, at least, always that tricky
and capricious body that has to be accounted for.
To use a brief example, in political theory we often take note of
Hobbes’s passage in chapter 13 of Leviathan that men are in a war of all
against all and due to the absolute equality of humans in the state of nature
that the consequence is that “the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short” (186). What is typically ignored is that this is part of
Book One, in which Hobbes tries to outline his account of the nature of
both the physical and mental aspects of humans. For example, he goes
4 2 5 While there are many passages in Plato’s work where the body and its relationship to the
soul is discussed, one from Phaedrus might be instructive for us. In trying to explain the
animation of movement of the body, Plato argues that bodies must have souls in order to
move. He argues, “Any body that has an external source of motion is soulless; but a body
deriving its motion from a source within itself is animate or besouled” (64). As I said there
are many other interesting arguments made for the nature of the body and soul in Plato, such
as the myth of the different metals or the two charioteers. In the Symposium, Plato makes a
unique argument that bodies—male and female—in fact used to be joined as one sex. He
argues that this is an attempt to “explain the real nature of men” (542). While it is true that
these stories, to us, are simply stories, and it is also possible that Plato did not in feet believe
them, I use them simply to make the point that Plato saw that it was important to make a
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through complex examples of speech, the imagination, and the
consequence of imaginations. We must also remember that Hobbes had a
strict physicalist understanding of even how the brain works. Hobbes was
consistent in this concern as he addressed the issues in his works De
Corpore (On The Body) and in De Cive (On the Citizen). In the later work
he is careful to note that human experience is a result of “physical force,
experience, reason, and passion” (21). The main point that I am trying to
make here is simply to show a concern with the relationship of the body
and the processes of reasoning and how this relates to experience.4 2 6 We
know now that there is much that Hobbes did not get correct. There were
also those who did not continue with or agree with Hobbes’s
assumptions 4 2 7 We can infer from this that Hobbes had his final ideas in
mind—the strong state ruled by the Leviathan—and he created on
ontology that would support it.
Neuroscience and cognitive science, for example of recent
attempts to elucidate human nature, represent the possibility of new
ontologies, or will at least inform them, that will come at political science,
connection between the body and other categories in order to live the good life. And, as we
know, the good life takes place, for the Greeks, in the polity.
4 2 6 For some of the relevant material on this topic see Wiener (1974), Zagoin (1993), and
Leshen (1985).
4 2 7 Locke and Rousseau would be the most prominent of these thinkers.
4 2 8 One also needs to remember that other political theorists such as Hume and Locke were
also extremely interested in these issues as well. See for example John Locke’s An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding and David Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding and A Treatise o f Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the
Experimental Method o f Reasoning into Moral Subjects.
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and all the social sciences for that matter, with a force similar to how
Newtonian physics and relativity re-oriented the discipline of physics
during their respective times. We need to understand that the influence
will not simply be on how to construct a new model, but rather on the fact
it will provide an entirely new set of assumptions as to how and why
people behave the way that they do. The methodology that stands the most
to lose from this future tectonic shift is rational choice methodologies.
This is because rational choice methodologies have long been seen as an
adequate ontology to explain what is really going on up in the brains of
people. Neuroscience and cognitive science will provide a more accurate
account of human behavior, causes, etc. than our current models. I also
believe that we will find that current theoretical accounts such as identity
theory, etc. will be found to be more compatible with cognitive science,
etc. [take the one idea of neural mapping. The process of reason is
universal, we all have brains. The mapping universal and limited—there
are physiological limitations to our brain. Chomsky’s generative grammar.
But we do map, act on habits, etc. that are culturally unique and sensitive.
Preference formation is perhaps that most important thing that we can
explain—why prefer democracy to terrorism—and this is something that
RCT cannot do but something that identity theorists, etc. have long
discussed and the fruits of that discussion will be had through the use and
development of cognitive science.
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Neuroscience has a broad array of applications and is setting out to
test its assumptions and is setting out to test its assumptions. So, it might
be one of the more useful ontologies/ methods that we could hope to find
for a social science. We can even see a hearkening back to the origins of
philosophy where reason and reasons relation to emotions were at least
deliberated. Rather than, as Nussbaum and others point out, seeing reason
superior to emotions and seeing emotions as having little if any
importance in discussing politics.
I would like to reiterate at this point in time that rational choice
theory is an abstract generalization that assumes humans to be a particular
way and then gauges various political outcomes based on the idea of “if
humans are utility maximizers, then what?” The theory is not based on any
sort of physical evidence or real exploration of what is meant by the term
“human nature.” As I have argued through this work, rational choice
theory has its own ontology, its own assumptions. I am not dismissing it
outright. However, I am dismissing the concept that it is the best, most
complete, or the most “anything” way to look at political behavior. It is
one tool in the handbag of many tools for which we should be reaching.
I used Nussbuam and Taylor as examples of ways in which the
study of politics might be done that is also an alternative the rational
choice theory. I argued that both thinkers have strong empirical grounding,
but that they also make an attempt to rethink the political actor. This does
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not mean, however, that there are not ways that we might move beyond
each thinker. Various theorists, as I have pointed out using Nussbaum and
Taylor, are concerned with re-evaluated our methodologies, theories, and
assumptions concerning human nature.
Not only we will need to look more closely at the body but we will
have to look more closely at language as well. As one theorist notes, we
must “be sensitive to the ways in which language partakes in and
contributes to the larger processes of identity formation through inclusion,
exclusion, and even abjection” (Jay, 3). He continues that “theory became
identified as a game of mastery, tainted by its association with the evils of
transcendentalism, foundationalism, essentialism, and the vain search for a
metalanguage, all of which were seen as unwarranted extrapolations from
the privileged position of those who arrogantly pretended to speak for the
whole” (16). To ignore language and how it impacts our studies is to
ignore a critical element of the way in which theories come about.
Theories are constructions, as we must remember, and do not necessarily
represent reality, but are simplifications of it. Jay continues, “Theory. . .
must be situated in a semantic network with its multiple others: objects
that defy subsumption, practices and experiences that are prereflexive or
the posterior test of a theory’s validity, hermeneutic arts such as reading,
looking, and listening, that resist universal generalization, the unique
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intelligibility of narrative, and the community and institutions of theorists
who do the theorizing” (26).
This examination of language and the body does not require a
universal account of either. Rather, we can and should encourage a
pragmatic epistemological accounting of our theories. On rethinking what
we mean by theory: Iris Marion Young writes, “A theory tries to the ways
things are in some universal sense. From it one cane derive particular
instances or at least one can apply the theoretical propositions to particular
facts that the theory’s generalities are supposed to cover” (192). For her,
pragmatic means “categorizing, explaining, developing accounts and
arguments that are tied to specific practical and political problems.
Pragmatic theorizing in this sense is not necessarily any less complex or
sophisticated than totalizing theory, but rather it is driven by some
problem that has ultimate practical importance and is not concerned to
give an account of the whole” (192). Once we see theory in this light, we
will lose our desire to make it apply universally. This is because we will
understand that any given method or theory is driven by an ultimate
practical purpose.
Another way to look at this pragmatism is to say that it is the “real”
way in which to conceive of universalism. A real universalism will take
into account the body, language, normative thought, history, anthropology,
and the like. This is important because, as Dallmayr writes, a “more
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genuine universalism, and beyond the spurious universality traditionally
claimed by the Western canon and by some recent intellectual
movements” lies the real experience of humanity (255). This move beyond
the shortcomings of our current understandings will be the “revival of
theory of all kinds” and signifies “the ability to rekindle the critical elan
endemic to political philosophy at the time of Socrates and Plato but likely
to be extinguished by canonization. Many from the habitually familiar
toward the unfamiliar will help to restore the sense of wondering that the
ancients extolled as pivotal to philosophizing” (256). This centering
wonder of our explorations of politics is at the very heart of what many in
the study of politics are already doing.
Another element that will be central to how we examine politics is
the use of history. I mean history broadly construed as well. History will
include not only written narratives, but anthropology, archaeology,
sociology and so forth. All these fields are necessary since they are all part
of the endeavors that help us to determine what it is that humans are. John
Dunn writes, “Any point in its history . . . politics always has at least three
constitutive components: the beliefs and sentiments of a given population,
the institutional forms through which that population can (and, for the
time, largely must) act, if it is to seek to realize its less personal purposes,
and the cumulative consequences of the actions (individual, group or
collective)” (323). Hacking points out that ontological history even plays a
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role in the constitution of objects (49). Another element of history that will
come under closer scrutiny is the role of conventions and the problem that
we have with habitually using the concept of truth.4 2 9 To historicize the
problems in the study of politics is to acknowledge that there is no easily
elaborated constitution or ontology of even concepts let alone the study of
politics as a whole. As Hacking argues, “The universal is not timeless but
historical” and facts are formed and changed as the universal emerges
(26). This tells us that the most important inquiry we can make in the
study of politics is the relationship between ideas rather than the
relationships of matters of fact. There are many reasons for this, the most
important one being that ideas guide what facts we will find 4 3 0
In this discussion I have tried to move the discussion of the study of
politics away from the idea that such a study must any sort of unified
theory. I have argued that the theorist plays a critical role in this endeavor
as the it is the theorist who is best suited see the logical and philosophical
implications that that various theories, modes of study, and disciplines
hold. I have argued that we need to re-evaluate the work of theorists so
that we can see anew their contributions and some of the future directions
that the study of politics must undergo. I have suggested that these new
directions will include a larger role for the study of emotions, creativity,
literature, history, anthropology, and other disciplines. There is no need to
4 2 9 See Rorty (1979).
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worry about whether our methods are uniquely those of the political
scientist because the political scientist is already uniquely attuned to some
of the most important questions that confront us today such as the problem
of power, the relationship between states and individuals, and how ought
we behave in the polity. I hope that we are able to move forward in the
study of politics with methodologies that fit the problems that we are
looking at while at the same time being sensitive to the wide variety of
theoretical issues that plague any study.
430
See Hacking (2002), pp. 10-25.
269
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Asset Metadata

Creator Le Cheminant, Wayne S. (author)

Core Title From methodological eclecticism to ontological eclecticism: Bringing theory back into the study of politics

School Graduate School

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Philosophy,political science, general

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Crigler, Ann (committee chair), Barnes, John (committee member), Grant, Judith (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-609809

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Legacy Identifier 3220118.pdf

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Rights Le Cheminant, Wayne S.

Type texts

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