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Adapting and applying a mission-focused strategic framework for emergency management

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Adapting and applying a mission-focused strategic framework for emergency management

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Content INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy subm itted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographicaily in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. ProQuest Information and Learning 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 800-521-0600 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ADAPTING AND APPLYING A MISSION-FOCUSED STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT by John R. Paron A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND DEVELOPMENT UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION December 2000 Copyright 2000 John R. Paron Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. U M I Number: 3041509 Copyright 2000 by Paron, John Richard All rights reserved. ___ ® UMI UMI Microform 3041509 Copyright 2002 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SCHOOL OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND DEVELOPMENT UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90089 This dissertation, written by under the direction of Dissertation Committee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Faculty o f the School of Policy, Planning, and Development, in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree o f DOCTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRA TION Dean DISSERTATION COMMITTEE '.hairperson Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. John Richard Paron Robert M. Carter, Ph.D. ABSTRACT ADAPTING AND APPLYING A MISSION-FOCUSED STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT This study assessed the applicability and utility of adapting the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)—Mission Essential Task List (METL) process to other Federal Government agencies. The DOD’s UJTL-METL process is supported by a hierarchical framework of DOD stakeholders’ needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR). The research first removed the DOD stakeholders' NVR from the DOD’s hierarchical framework and then combined the remaining hierarchical framework structure with the stakeholders’ NVR o f an agency o f the Department of Transportation. The DOD’s hierarchical framework of stakeholders' needs, values, and responsibilities provides a framework to test the agency’s activities for efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability to public needs. If the tasks that are conducted at various levels of an organization do not have traceability to the agency's strategic mission, they must be reviewed for applicability and viability. A task that does not trace may be meaningless to the strategic mission or, in fact, it may have a negative impact on mission accomplishment. Tasks should only be valued and retained if they track to-and-through activities in the agency's hierarchical framework to the organization’s strategic mission. A mission-focused Federal agency will have the 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ability to trace the tasks it performs at one level of the agency up-and-through the agency's hierarchical structure and, thereby, challenge and validate the task's value at each level of the hierarchy. The research showed that a Federal agency's effort to trace activities at one level up and through the hierarchical framework will often disclose that those valued tasks at one level may have no value to or have a negative impact on a stakeholder’ s NVR at another level. The use of Graham T. Allison’ s three models in combination with an agency's hierarchical framework of stakeholders’ NVR will help identify the decisionmaking in the organization and empower the stakeholders at every level to protect their interests, including their ethical interests. This will enhance also the opportunity for effective, efficient, and accountable government that fulfills the ultimate needs of the ultimate stakeholder, the citizen. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES.................................................................................................. v LIST OF FIGURES................................................................................................ vi Chapter I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................... 1 Research Question ........................................................................... I Background ...................................................................................... 2 Example Case I: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Saving Lives ................................. 10 Example Case II: Agency for International Development (AID), Saving B a b ie s........................................................................... 16 Example Case III: Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Navy Submarine and Anti-Submarine Warfare, Saving the Nation ................................................................................. 18 Significance ...................................................................................... 31 Summary .......................................................................................... 34 Organization of the R esearch.......................................................... 35 II. DECISIONMAKING IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT............. 36 Introduction ...................................................................................... 36 Research with Purpose: Pursuit of Public-Interest Administration ......................................................................... 37 Hierarchical Framework of Stakeholder's Needs, Values, And Responsibilities (N V R )................................................... 44 Conceptual Frameworks for Decisionmaking ............................... 59 Common Language, The Key to Successful Bargaining, Successful Decisionmaking ................................................... 65 Framing the Decisionmaking Process ........................................... 70 Summary .......................................................................................... 79 ii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY................................ 80 Case Study Selection and Template Preparation.......................... 81 Data Collection Procedures ........................................................... 85 Stakeholders..................................................................................... 86 Interview Guide .............................................................................. 89 Data Analysis Procedures............................................................... 90 Limitations of the Research and How They Were Addressed . . . 94 Summary ......................................................................................... 97 IV. CASE STUDY “TITANIC II: OPERATIONS*’ .................................. 99 Introduction ..................................................................................... 99 Background ..................................................................................... 100 Table of Contents for Case Study “Titanic II: Operations” 103 Case Study Description Report ..................................................... 108 Case Study Task R eport.................................................................. I ll V. CASE STUDY “TITANIC II: PLANNING” ...................................... 170 Background ..................................................................................... 170 Table of Contents for Case Study “Titanic II: Planning” ............. 173 Case Study Description Report ..................................................... 175 Case Study Task R ep o rt................................................................. 178 VI. FINDINGS................................................................................................ 209 Observations from the Research Process...................................... 209 Analysis of Survey Results............................................................. 210 Summary ......................................................................................... 275 VII. CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................... 276 The Research Q uestions................................................................. 276 Further Analysis o f Stakeholders................................................... 291 Summary ......................................................................................... 304 Additional Observations from the Research Process................... 305 Successful Practices for Adaptation and Implementation ........... 307 Final Thoughts ................................................................................. 308 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................ 314 iii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDICES 1. Glossary of Current Non-GPRA Federal Management Requirements............................................................................ 326 2. Detailed Tables of Comparable Activities.................................... 329 3. Interview Guide .............................................................................. 331 4. Examples of Research Data Bar Graphs......................................... 344 5. Glossary of Acronyms ................................................................... 350 IV Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF TABLES 1. Department of Commerce (DOC) NOAA's Strategic Goal: Advance Short-Term Warning and Forecast Services................... 14 2. Model of Responsible Administration.................................................. 39 3. Responsible Administrative A ction....................................................... 40 4. Summary Outline o f Models and Concepts.......................................... 63 5. Characteristics o f Centralized and Decentralized Diffusion Systems . . . 78 6. Data Collection on All Survey Statements ................................................ 93 7. Data Collection on Focus Group's Identified Key Survey Statements .. 94 8. Summary of Findings.............................................................................. 310 v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF FIGURES 1. Reinvention of Maritime Patrol.................................................................... 23 2. Satisfying the NVR of Other Stakeholders ................................................. 24 3. Conflicting Rate o f Adoption of Supporting Programs (Adaptation of Rogers'S-Curve)................................................................................. 71 4. Dissertation Process M o d e l.......................................................................... 98 5. Response to Survey Statements La, l.b, l.c, and l.d ............................... 211 6. Response to Survey Statements 5.a, and 5.b .............................................. 216 7. Response to Survey Statements 5.c, and 5 . d .............................................. 221 8. Response to Survey Statements 7.a, 7.c, and 7 .d ....................................... 225 9. Response to Survey Statement 7 .b ............................................................... 230 10. Response to Survey Statements 7 .h ............................................................. 233 11. Response to Survey Statements 7.k. 7.1, and 7.m ...................................... 236 12. Response to Survey Statements 8.a, 8.b, and 8 .c ........................................ 241 13. Response to Survey Statements 9.a, 9.b, and 9 .c ........................................ 246 14. Response to Survey Statements lO.a, lO.b, lO.c, lO.d, and lO .e.............. 250 15. Response to Survey Statement 1 1 ............................................................... 259 16. Response to Survey Statement 1 2 ............................................................... 261 17. Response to Survey Statement 13 ............................................................... 263 vi Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18. Response to Survey Statement 14.a............................................................. 268 19. Response to Survey Statement 14.b............................................................. 271 20. Response to Survey Statement 1 5 ............................................................... 273 21. Response to Research Supporting Question One ..................................... 277 22. Response to Research Supporting Question Two ..................................... 279 23. Response to Research Supporting Question Three ................................. 281 24. Response to Principal Research Question.................................................. 283 25. Response to Principal Research Question: Slope o f Increasing Dissatisfaction with Status Ouo ........................................................... 287 26. Response to Principal Research Question: Slope o f Increasing Openness to Change .............................................................................. 288 27. Response to Principal Research Question: Significant. Steady Disparity Between Stakeholders ........................................................... 289 28. “Earlier Adopters Have Higher Social Status than Later Adopters'” .... 293 29. “Earlier Adopters are Not Different from Later Adopters in Age” 297 30. “Earlier Adopters Have Larger Units (Farms, Schools, Companies. and so on), than Later Adopters............................................................. 301 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION This dissertation research is completed in partial fulfillment o f the Doctor of Public Administration degree requirements of the University of Southern California. The research assessed the applicability and utility of adapting the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)— Mission Essential Task List (METL) process to other Federal Government agencies. The DOD’s UJTL-METL process is supported by a hierarchical framework of DOD stakeholders’ needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR). The research assessed the applicability and utility of first removing the DOD stakeholders' NVR from the DOD’s hierarchical framework and then combining the remaining hierarchical framework structure with the stakeholders’ NVR of an agency of the Department of Transportation (DOT). The research specifically focused on those United States Coast Guard personnel primarily concerned with and responsible for emergency management decisionmaking and the Congressional staff that provides them oversight. Research Question The principal question was as follows: Can a framework for strategic planning, performance measurement, and decisionmaking that has been proven in one 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Federal agency for emergency management purposes be adapted and implemented successfully by another Federal agency in the business of emergency management? Supporting questions included the following: If so, what modifications, if any, are needed for successful implementation of the framework in the receiving agency? Can the framework help to further the goals of the Government Performance and Results Act in the receiving organization as it has in the originating organization? Is it a sound practice for a Federal agency to attempt to adapt and implement a program developed for another Federal agency? Background For the last several years, I have been building and refining a hierarchical framework of stakeholder needs, values, and responsibilities for the Department of Defense. It was the purpose of this dissertation to determine if the DOD's hierarchical framework could be adapted successfully for use by other Federal Government agencies. The DOD’s hierarchical framework of stakeholder NVR: • identifies tasks (activities/fundions/processes), links those tasks to the conditions (external factors) of the environments (physical, military, political and economic environments) that directly impact task accomplishment, and, finally, • links measures of performance with specific standards to establish the level of performance required for those tasks. 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The concept for using a hierarchical framework of stakeholders' NVR is that it has the capacity to represent every stakeholder throughout government, up to and including the ultimate stakeholder—the citizen. Many theorists believe it is the public administrator's responsibility to focus on the values of the citizenry. John Rohr's work is an excellent example of a treatment of values that a public administrator ought to internalize and reflect upon. He suggests that a course in administrative ethics based on “the values of the American people” be adopted in public-service education. In 1984 [David K. Hart] “described the 'honorable bureaucrat’ —one who bears the same obligation as the citizenry to uphold civic virtue, but beyond that to seek honor” [emphasis added]. In 1985, with George Frederickson, he focused on the specific virtue of benevolence as central to the ethical public administrator in democratic society. (Cooper, 1990, p. 166) Fredrickson and Hart argue that, in a democracy, a special relationship “should exist between the public servants and citizens” (Fredrickson & Hart, 1985, p. 548); others argue that it is the responsibility of elected officials to watch after the regime’s values. Fredrickson's benevolent patriotism will be difficult to achieve. Chester A. Newland notes: During transitional periods as today—in times of failed politics and a search for new directions—public administration challenges are for professional leadership through expert and responsible performance of public functions, research, education, and civic engagement. Realism in public administration remains the dynamic practice of ideals of constitutional democracy. . . . (Newland, 1997, p. iii) Practical ways of achieving idealistic goals will empower public administrators to do the right thing. It was the goal of this research to identify a practical and realistic approach to reach idealistic goals. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The researcher was reminded of Patton’s reference to Samuel Johnson, “As gold which he cannot spend will make no man rich, so knowledge which he cannot apply will make no man wise” (Patton, 1980, p. 491). The adaptability of the hierarchical framework of stakeholders' NVR was tested to determine if it was gold that could be spent by other agencies. This study attempted to determine if an existing hierarchical framework—built for one Federal agency (that identified the individual stakeholder’s NVR at all levels of the framework)— could be adapted to accept successfully the stakeholder NVR of another Federal agency. Many theorists focus on the hierarchical frameworks of government. In pursuit of ethical government, Terry L. Cooper (1990) identified two primary sets of linkages and four secondary sets of linkages, which provide the necessary framework for responsible administration. Cooper believes it is the interaction of: public participation, requisite organizations (defined as a properly functioning hierarchy with strict accountability and collaboration up and down the chain), • laws and policies, and • inner qualities (mental attitudes and moral qualities) which provide the synthesis between bureaucracy and ethics, of organization theory and value theory, of rule making and moral sensitivity, that may enhance the administration of democratic government. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. One of Cooper’s main concerns is the ethical dilemma faced by a public administrator who must make difficult choices between organizational demands and personal self-interest. However, if the agency’s hierarchy provides a clear definition of which of the agency’s tasks trace to and through to the agency’s strategic mission and on to the NVR of Congress— representing the NVR of the ultimate stakeholder, the citizen—the researcher believes most ethical dilemmas will be minimized. The researcher also believes that most ethical dilemmas arise when hard working public administrators do not have a clearly defined agency strategic mission on which to frame and focus their tasks. To illustrate the possible negative impact that one stakeholder's NVR can have on the other stakeholders in a hierarchical framework, later in this chapter, the researcher will use the following three example cases of top performing agencies: Example Case I: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Saving Lives Example Case II: Agency for International Development (AID), Saving Babies Example Case III: Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Navy Submarine and Anti-Submarine Warfare, Saving the Nation A hierarchical framework of stakeholders' NVR can be used to determine whether the tasks conducted by a Federal agency have traceability to-and-through the agency's other tasks and on to the strategic mission of the agency, thereby enhancing efficient, effective Federal Government. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Peter Drucker (1995, p. 54) described the current administration’s efforts to enhance efficient government thorough reinvention: The first reaction in a situation of disarray is always to do what Vice President Gore and his associates are now doing— patching. It always fails. The next step is to rush into downsizing. Management picks up a meat-ax and lays about itself indiscriminately. . . . In many if not most cases, downsizing has turned out to be something that surgeons for centuries have warned against: “amputation before diagnosis.” The result is always a casualty. However, Drucker (1995, p. 60) succumbs to his own criticism when he writes of identifying and eliminating malfunctioning programs: “To reform something that malfunctions—let alone something that does harm—without knowing why it does not work can only make things worse. The best thing to do with such programs is to abolish them.” This research sought to determine whether there is an answer other than Drucker’s amputation of malfunctioning programs. The research attempted to determine whether a hierarchical framework of stakeholders' NVR can empower public administrators with a diagnostic tool—a tool other than a meat-ax. Analysis of an existing malfunctioning program may lead to realignment of the program to a different, more appropriate hierarchical framework, which may have a supporting strategic mission. Such realignment may bring support to a malfunctioning program and in the future turn that program into a properly functioning asset to its new hierarchical framework. A properly functioning program, within a supporting 6 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. hierarchy, may allow leveraging of other programs—within the hierarchy—to the benefit of all of the stakeholders. When Joseph Wholey explains the need for public sector evaluation, he highlights the requirement for public administrators to seek and respond to the ultimate needs of the ultimate stakeholder, the citizenry (Wholey, Hatry, & Newcomer, 1994, p. 228): [GJovemment is too often wasteful, ineffective, or unresponsive to public needs. Without the type of accountability that directs profit-making firms to seek out needs [emphasis added] and to meet them efficiently, government agencies often appear as self- perpetuating bureaucracies primarily interested in growth, salaries, and benefits. Other theorists share Wholey’s concern for accountability. In the winter of 1998, Steven Ott and Doug Goodman (1998, p. 541) reviewed three books on bureaucracy that were written in the late 1990s. The books were Paul Light’s Thickening Government and Tides o f Reform, plus Guy Peter’s The Future o f Governing. Ott and Goodman report that Light’s main concern with the thickening of government is the diffusion of accountability: No one unit or individual can be held accountable for poor analysis or misinformation . . . no one can be held responsible for lack of action . . . no one actor can be held culpable for decisions made on someone else’s watch . . . no one can be held liable when problems do not get solved . . . no one can be blamed for a lack of risk taking or creativity . . . [and] no one can be held answerable for the slow decline in government’s human capital. . . . The thickening of government may mean that no one anywhere in government is accountable for what goes right or wrong. (Ott & Goodman, 1998, p. 541) 7 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The DOD’s hierarchical framework of stakeholders' needs, values, and responsibilities provides a framework to test the agency’s activities for efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability to public needs. The research attempted to determine whether the DOD’s framework could be adapted by other agencies. If the tasks that are conducted at various levels of an organization do not have traceability to the agency's strategic mission, they must be reviewed for applicability and viability. A task that does not trace may be meaningless to the strategic mission or, in fact, it may have a negative impact on mission accomplishment. Tasks should only be valued and retained if they track to-and-through activities in the agency's hierarchical framework to the organization’s strategic mission. A mission-focused Federal agency will have the ability to trace the tasks it performs at one level of the agency up-and- through the agency's hierarchical structure and, thereby, challenge and validate the task's value at each level of the hierarchy. The Federal agency's effort to trace activities at one level up and through the hierarchical framework will often disclose that those valued tasks at one level may have no value to or have a negative impact on a stakeholder's NVR at another level. In addition, the researcher believes that a hierarchical framework of stakeholders' NVR will simplify the analysis of any agency’s bureaucracy. Public administrators, empowered with a hierarchical framework of stakeholders' NVR, will be able to open their bureaucracy’s decisionmaking processes quickly to analysis by Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. using Graham T. Allison’s (1971, p. 6) three models, which are explained in Chapter II. A hierarchical framework of stakeholder NVR would simplify further the application of Allison’s tool through the narrowing of the analysis. Rather than focusing on the overall bureaucratic organization and how it functions, the hierarchical framework allows public administrators to focus on those tasks that do not trace to-and-through to the other stakeholders. Public administrators are, thus, able to determine more readily what decisionmaking forces are at work to: • eliminate the tasks that do not trace to the agency’s strategic mission, • modify existing tasks so that they do trace to the agency’s strategic mission, and modify the strategic mission of the agency so that the existing tasks do align and trace to the mission. The use of Allison models in combination with an agency’s hierarchical framework of stakeholders' needs, values, and responsibilities will help identify the decisionmaking in the organization and empower the stakeholders at every level to protect their interests including their ethical interests. This will enhance also the opportunity for effective, efficient, and accountable government that fulfills the ultimate needs of the ultimate stakeholder. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The following cases are used as examples to illustrate the possible negative impact that one stakeholder’ s NVR can have on the other stakeholders in a hierarchical framework. Example Case I: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Saving Lives One of today’s most applauded federal programs is run by NOAA. The June 28, 1999, headlines of Federal Computer Week read, “Storm Tech Praised for May Showing" (O'Hara, June 28, 1999, p. 1). The story described the seventy tornadoes that raged across central Oklahoma in May 1999 and the assumed number of lives saved by NOAA’s early and accurate warning. It is difficult not to recognize and reward programs that save human lives. However, citizens charge the Federal Government to make very difficult decisions when they empower it to spend money—agencies are expected to spend it wisely. A hierarchical framework of stakeholders' NVR will facilitate the validation of task performance’s impact on the agency's mission. Without a framework, it is difficult to know whether a program is valuable to the agency's strategic mission or only appears valuable because hard working public administrators perform well a task they ought not to be doing.1 ‘In November 1987, the Community for Creative Non-Violence protested the closing of a metro station to homeless people seeking shelter. Metro’ s general manager, Ms. Carmen Turner refused to allow the subway system to be used for purposes for which it was not intended. In effect she said, “It is not Metro's job. My job is to provide transportation to commuters. Someone else’s job is to provide shelter. If they are not good at that job they should be exposed” (The Washington Post, November 10, 1987, p. A22). 10 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The mission of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is to describe and predict changes in the earth’s environment, as well as to conserve and manage the nation’s coastal and marine resources to ensure sustainable economic opportunities. NOAA concluded in its 1995 strategic plan that the nation’s ability to prepare for severe weather events, including tornadoes, thunderstorms, hurricanes, and flash flooding, depends on the quality and timeliness of the agency’s observations, assessments, and information delivery. Through strategic planning, NOAA evaluated how best to accomplish its mission and then put into place those performance measures essential to demonstrating the extent to which it was attaining its desired outcomes (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996, p. 26). NOAA determined that the most important business of its short-term warning and forecast weather services was to predict the time and location of weather events and to do so with accuracy. Rather than simply count the number of forecasts made—that is, to simply gather data on its activity level— NOAA began to measure the extent to which it could increase the lead time or advance notice it gave the public prior to severe weather events. It decided, in other words, to measure what counts. NOAA reported that from fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 1995, its lead time for predicting tornadoes increased from 7 minutes to 9 minutes, and the accuracy of its predictions increased from 47 percent of the time to 60 percent of the time. For fiscal year 1996, NOAA has set targets of 10 minutes and 64 percent, respectively. NOAA also measured how accurately it could predict the range where hurricanes would reach land, given a 24-hour lead time. From fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 1995, its accuracy improved from 185 kilometers (115 miles) to 134 kilometers (83 miles). It credited the improvement to its installation in June 1995 of a new hurricane tracking model. On the basis of fiscal year 1995 performance, NOAA revised its fiscal year 1996 target from 155 kilometers (96 miles) to 150 kilometers (93 miles). Although the new fiscal year 1996 target of 150 kilometers is higher than the 11 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. fiscal 1995 actual performance of 134 kilometers, NOAA wants to test the new model through at least another hurricane season before radically revising its target for fixture years. The significance of earlier and more accurate hurricane warnings is enormous. Most importantly, they help prevent deaths and injuries. But they also save money, because earlier and more accurate predictions of hurricane tracks and intensities can reduce the size of the warning areas in which people are advised to prepare for the event. NOAA calculated that for each hurricane, the public’s preparation and evacuation costs exceed $50 million, but improved predictions can cut that cost by $5 million. In addition, NOAA officials believe that the public takes more accurate forecasts more seriously—which helps to lessen loss of life and property. (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996, p. 27) NOAA is part of the Department of Commerce (DOC), whose key strategic responsibility is to enhance the commercial opportunities o f the United States. The Commerce Mission Statement follows: The Department of Commerce promotes job creation, economic growth, sustainable development, and improved living standards for all Americans, by working in partnership with business, universities, communities, and workers to: 1 . Build for the fixture and promote U.S. competitiveness in the global marketplace, by strengthening and safeguarding the nation's economic infrastructure; 2. Keep America competitive with cutting-edge science and technology and unrivaled information base; and 3. Provide effective management and stewardship of our nation's resources and assets to ensure sustainable economic opportunities. (DOC, September 1997, p. 9) As an agency within the Commerce Department, NOAA enhances the commercial health of the nation in a host of ways. NOAA's Strategic Plan for 1995-2005 describes the goals and objectives that have been established to fulfill its vision. The strategy consists of seven interrelated goals. Each goal is a coherent unit, but there also are important crosscutting 12 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. relationships which enable the implementation and advancement of national, Department of Commerce, and NOAA objectives. The goals are grouped within the two primary missions o f Environmental Assessment and Prediction and Environmental Stewardship. Environmental Assessment and Prediction Mission 1. Advance Short-Term Warning and Forecast Services 2. Implement Seasonal to Interannual Climate Forecast 3. Predict and Assess Decadel to Centennial Change 4. Promote Safe Navigation Environmental Stewardship Mission 5. Build Sustainable Fisheries 6. Recover Protected Species 7. Sustain Healthy Coasts. (DOC, September 1998, p. 4) An increase in NOAA’s ability to improve the performance o f some tasks related to their first goal, specifically improving the prediction o f the time and location of landfall for a hurricane, would have direct traceability to and through NOAA’s strategic mission and on to the DOC’s strategic mission. NOAA’s improvements in forecast services for hurricanes would trace directly to DOC’s strategic goals of “safeguarding the nation’s economic infrastructure” and “[providing] effective management and stewardship of our nation’s resources” (DOC, September 1997, p. 9). An increase in the accuracy of predicting the timing and location of a hurricane’s landfall would provide opportunities to relocate aircraft, shipping, small watercraft, tourists, local citizenry, and also provide time to reinforce structures to prepare for high winds and tidal surges. Accurate and timely hurricane warning will also preclude the needless evacuation of other areas and the attendant negative impacts on their commerce (Table 1). 1 3 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE I DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (DOC) NOAA’S STRATEGIC GOAL: ADVANCE SHORT-TERM WARNING AND FORECAST SERVICES NOAA’S vision for 2003 is to provide significantly improved short-term warning and forecast products and services that will enhance public safety and the economic productivity [emphasis added] of the Nation. Advance Short-Term Warning and Forecast Services Performance Measures* FY '97 F Y ’98 F Y ’99 F Y ’00 FY '01 FY '02 FY '03 Tornado warning lead time (in minutes) 10/11 11/10 1 1 12 13 13 14 Tornado warning accuracy (%) 59/66 67/65 70 72 74 75 76 Severe thunderstorm warning lead time (in minutes) 18/18 18/18 19 20 21 22 23 Severe thunderstorm warning accuracy (%) 84/83 84/84 84 85 86 87 88 Flash Hood warnings lead time (in minutes) 40/27 52/40 42 44 45 45 45 Flash flood warning accuracy (%) 83/76 83/83 85 86 86 87 88 Severe Coastal Event warning accuracy of landfall (km) w.24 hour lead time 125**/ 145 140 135 130 130 125 125 Precipitation forecasts lead time for 1 ” precipitation (days in advance) 2.3/2.3 2.312.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 * When two numbers are presented and divided by a “/,” the first number represents the achieved FY98 performance measurement or the revised measure for future years. The second number represents the measure presented in the FY98 Strategic Information Technology Plan. ** This is based on a small number of events (1) so this number may not be representative of the accuracy that can be routinely achieved. Source: Adapted from the March 1998 “ 1999-2004 NOAA Strategic IT Plan” and the April 1999 “2000-2003 NOAA Strategic IT Plan.” However, an increase in NOAA’s ability to improve the performance of other tasks related to their first goal, specifically improving “short-term warning,” especially 14 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the warning time for a tornado, does not trace to the DOC’s strategic goals. The additional warning time for tornadoes neither gives additional opportunity to board up windows, nor does it provide meaningful time to escape the path of the tornado. If shelter were available, the FY '99 warning time of 11 minutes, versus the FY '03 warning time of 14 minutes would not lend itself to anything other than a more leisurely rush to the shelter. Therefore, the Commerce Department’s stakeholders— one level above the NOAA stakeholders—should examine NOAA’s task performance with regard to their own needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR). Commerce stakeholders should make judgments concerning funding for NOAA’s acquisitions and training by comparing the answers to questions such as: What impact would spending $X billion on increasing the accuracy of landfall location and timing for hurricanes have on the commerce of the nation? • What impact does spending $X billion on increasing the warning time for tornadoes have on the level of commerce of the nation? The Congressional stakeholders—the level above Commerce’s stakeholders—whose responsibilities include representing the NVR of the citizens, should make judgments by comparing the answers to questions such as: What impact will spending $X billion on increasing the warning time of tornadoes have on the lives of Americans? 15 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. What impact will spending $X billion on colon cancer research have on the lives of Americans? What impact will spending $X billion on improving prenatal care have on the lives of Americans? Congress might also ask more directly focused questions, such as: • What impact will spending $X billion fewer on increasing the warning time for tornadoes (accepting less increase in warning time) and, instead, spending $X billion for shelters in and amongst trailer parks have on saving American lives? What impact will spending $X billion on a program that satisfies the NVR of one group of stakeholders, but satisfies none of the same at the agency or Congressional stakeholder level, have on the American citizenry's perception of the Federal Government's ability to provide efficient, effective, and accountable government? Example Case II: Agency for International Development (AID), Saving Babies Again, it is difficult not to applaud and reward programs that save human lives and it is especially difficult to criticize programs that focus on saving the lives of babies. However, unless decisions are made with recognition o f the NVR of others in the hierarchical framework, those decisions may have negative impacts on other stakeholders that far surpass the positive aspects of the program. With a hierarchical framework of stakeholders' NVR, the validation of task performance impact on other 16 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. stakeholders and on the agency's mission can be evaluated. The following example draws upon my work experiences in North Africa. A health care provider in the United States, who develops a prenatal care program for pregnant women that reduces infant mortality by a significant percentage would be greeted as a hero at almost every stakeholder level in an American hierarchical framework of NVR. However, if a health care provider in a developing nation were able to make a similar significant reduction in infant mortality, he might very well not be treated as a hero. In the developing nation, the NVR of some stakeholder above the improvising health care provider, may include the responsibility for feeding the entire nation. The health care provider’s ability to decrease infant mortality (with its attendant negative impact of greatly increasing population growth) will not be recognized as an unconditional blessing by stakeholders at all levels of the developing nation’s governmental agency. If a hierarchical framework of stakeholders' NVR were in use, the health care provider at the lower level would not be surprised with the negative response to his newfound capability. Instead, if the lower level health care provider reviews and identifies the NVR of the other stakeholders in the hierarchical structure, he can then focus his efforts to satisfy the other stakeholders’ criteria for success along with his own. At a minimum he will not be surprised if he is turned down for a grant for his program. Using the agency’s hierarchical structure, the improvising health care provider would be able to access and understand the NVR of the agency’s other stakeholders; 17 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. he could frame his efforts in line with the larger picture of the other stakeholders. In this case, one option would be to encourage fellow agency stakeholders to emphasize and focus on programs that would not only maximize the positive impact of his program, but just as importantly, would minimize the negative impacts of his program. The first step might be to convince the local population that the babies that are bom will live through childhood. Religious convictions aside, the health care provider may then be able to impact positively the health of the nation by connecting his efforts to reduce infant mortality with a reduced total number of births.2 Example Case HI: Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Navy Submarine and Anti-Submarine Warfare, Saving the Nation Just as it is difficult not to applaud and reward programs that save human lives, it has always been difficult to rank and rate competing DOD programs—programs that should be focusing on preserving national security. Public administrators within the Defense Department are among the best-motivated and hard working of government servants. Their responsibilities are enormous and their failures are often measured in the loss of human lives. There has always been controversy about the enormous money spent on national defense. However, by using a framework of stakeholders' NVR, including the highest level of stakeholder, the citizenry as represented by Congress, those in pursuit of efficient, effective, and 2 Given the impact o f “Slims Disease” (AIDS to us in the U.S.), the increase in population may be necessary to overcome the 40% disease rate in some sub-Saharan nations. Notwithstanding Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA) briefings provided to the researcher six years ago, depopulation might become a problem in sub-Saharan Africa. 18 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. accountable government can determine the value of national defense programs. The researcher draws the following two examples from his work experiences in the Navy. Submarine Warfare When the researcher was commander of the U.S. naval bases in Italy, a young naval submarine commander arrived in theater and wanted to meet the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINC South). He said that he wanted to let the CINC know that he and his crew had worked very hard getting ready for this deployment. They were at the peak of their performance and had outperformed every other submarine during their pre-deployment torpedo training. The CINC should know that his submarine was armed with 25 torpedoes and that they were ready to sink any hostile threat in the Mediterranean Sea. Had he visited with the CINC, the Admiral would have patted him on the back and never thought again about the young submarine commander ready to sink hostile shipping in the Mediterranean Sea in the 1990s. The submarine commander and his crew had trained and prepared for this cruise by focusing on stakeholder NVR that may have existed 15 years earlier—and may exist again in the future—but were not appropriate for training for this deployment. The NVR the commander focused on were all but irrelevant to the other stakeholders' NVR in his hierarchical framework. A review of his hierarchical framework of stakeholders' NVR would have shown him that the capability he had trained for and perfected did not support the NVR of other stakeholders. 19 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The submarine commander and his immediate superiors should have focused on the CINC’s current NVR. They could have adjusted their training and their combat load-out. In lieu of some of the torpedoes, the submarine could have been outfitted with Tomahawk sea-launched tactical cruise missiles. With that load-out, the submarine commander could have reported to the CINC that he was in theater with 20 Tomahawks and he would go park in dark, muddy water until needed. The CINC would care very much that the submarine commander and his cruise missiles were in his theater of operations because he could visualize this weapons system having an impact on his current NVR.3 Lacking a focus on the NVR of key stakeholders, the inappropriate load-out of torpedoes was extraordinarily expensive. Not only was the CINC denied Tomahawks, which would have provided a viable capability against a recognized threat, other assets had to be assigned to or extended in his theater in order to cover that same threat. The costs to submarine crew’s morale can only be imagined. The crew of 130 trained very hard to achieve a capability, deployed for six months (away from family and friends) with that capability, and their key stakeholder did not care that they were there. Fifty-four percent of the Navy’s Attack Submarine force is routinely underway at any given time (Navy Times, July 12, 1999, p. 4). Sixty-five man-years committed to a capability that does not satisfy the NVR of a key stakeholder is unacceptable performance. 3 TOMAHAWK cruise missiles have been used extensively in the 1990s, including in the air war in Kosovo. 20 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Anti-Submarine Warfare Fifteen years ago nearly every U.S. Combatant Commander-in-Chief (CINC) throughout the world depended on the U.S. Navy’s ability to conduct anti-submarine warfare. This simply no longer is true. The Navy’s anti-submarine warfare capability remains important to the NVR of the CINC’s very long view. However, they are in command for just two years and their focus is on the capabilities that satisfy their immediate NVR. Part of the Navy’s anti-submarine community recognized the need for change and re-focused and committed themselves to satisfying the CINC’s existing NVR. The Navy’s anti-submarine community is made up of Seaw olf and other classes of Attack Submarines, S-3B Viking carrier-based anti-submarine aircraft, SH- 60B Seahawk sea-based anti-submarine helicopters, and the P-3 Orion, a large land- based aircraft with four-turboprop engines and a crew of more than ten. The Navy’s anti-submarine community has used the P-3 aircraft as its front-line, land-based maritime patrol aircraft since the 1960s. With the demise of the Soviet threat, the P-3 community recognized the changes in the NVR of their superiors and—after a stuttering start—the Navy’s P-3 community is reinventing itself. They understood the response they would get from a CINC if they reported that they had conducted their traditional aggressive training and were now in place and ready to sink any hostile submarine threat in his theater of operations. Instead, the stakeholders at the squadron level reviewed the hierarchical 21 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. framework and the NVR of their superiors and then modified their training, augmented their capabilities, and changed their combat Ioad-out to satisfy key stakeholders' NVR. Figure 1 shows the process of focusing on key stakeholders’ NVR. The Patrol aircraft community identified a CINC mission, identified tasks that they could perform, under conditions that were superior for the CINC, and to levels of performance that other platforms could not. Figure 2 shows the process. During the recent combat in Kosovo, the P-3 aircraft and its crews accomplished tasks that were never envisioned for it in the 1960s. Captain Anthony Ruoti, former commander of Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing Five said: The Navy’s venerable P-3 Orions, which patrolled the world’s oceans for decades without firing weapons in anger, finally drew blood— over Kosovo. Over a three month period [April-May-June 1999], P-3Cs fired air-to-surface missiles at mobile missile platforms and aircraft maintenance buildings on more than a dozen occasions. What we are particularly proud of is the first use of stand-off land attack missiles against targets inside Kosovo. (Aaron Smith, July 12, 1999, p. 16) With the end of the Cold War the CINCs priorities obviously changed. However, without a hierarchical framework of NVR, for the first several years, following the demise of the Soviet Union, the DOD’s military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) continued to train as the Cold War had shaped and evolved their training. The full implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act highlighted the discrepancies in what the Services were training for and what the CINCs’ required. 22 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE I. REINVENTION OF MARITIME PATROL Focusing on NVR o f Key Stakeholders CINC s M ission {requirements} NCC’s O peration (requirem ents) Naval T ask (requirem ents) *ACC: Air Component Commander NCC: Naval Component Commander LCC: Land Component Commander Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 2. SATISFYING THE NVR OF OTHER STAKEHOLDERS Refocusing a Maritime Capability U ni versi t y o f Sout hern C aU om a mmmmm PERFORM TASK OF: A ttack Enemy Land Targets (NTA 3.2.2) - to degrade the ability of enemy forces to conduct coordinated operations and perform critical tasks. UNDER CONDITIONS OF: • Negligible Light (overcast night)(C 1.3.2.1) - light available to illuminate objects from natural or manmade sources. • Moderate Personnel Fatigue (C 2.2.4.6) - degree to which personnel, due to lack of rest, are experiencing fatigue • M oderate Collateral Dam age Potential (C 2.6.7) - degree to which civilian population and structures (and friendly forces) are close to targets TO A STANDARD OF: 3 Hours to get ordnance on target after initiation of task 100 Percent of m issions flown achieve desired target dam age <5 Percent of engagem ents resulting in collateral dam age Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Congress has clarified the command line to the combatant commanders to preserve civilian control of the military. The Act states that the operational chain of command runs from the president to the secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. The Act permits the president to direct that communications to the nation’s armed forces pass through the JCS chairman and gives the secretary of Defense wide latitude to assign the chairman oversight responsibilities over the activities o f the combatant commanders [emphasis added]. The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires that forces under the jurisdiction o f the military departments be assigned to the combatant commands [emphasis added], with the exception of forces assigned to perform the mission of the military department, (e.g., to recruit, supply, equip, and maintain forces). Forces within a CINC’s geographic area of responsibility (AOR) fall under the unified command of the combatant commander except as otherwise directed by the secretary of Defense. The unified command structure is flexible, and changes are made as required to accommodate evolving U.S. national-security needs [emphasis added]. A classified document, the Unified Command Plan, established the combatant commands, identifies geographic areas of responsibility, assigns primary tasks [emphasis added], defines authority of the commanders, establishes command relationships, and gives guidance on the exercise of combatant command. (Peterson, January 1999, p. 73) The Goldwater-Nichols Act gave direct control of all combat forces to the CINCs. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff maximized his opportunity to influence the CINCs through the training those forces as required by the CINC. The Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7) of the Joint Staff began building a Joint Training System. The resulting DOD hierarchical framework of stakeholders' NVR allows a clear focus on the NVR of the CINCs and, therefore, allows mission- focused training and mission-focused acquisition for the Service forces. For example, 25 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. if the DOD’s hierarchical framework of stakeholder NVR was used only to look at a specific CINC’s NVR, it would accomplish the following: • Identify the CINC’s tasks (activities/functions/processes) required to perform his mission; • Link those tasks to the conditions (external factors) of the environments (physical, m ilitary, political and economic environments) that directly impact the CINC’s task accomplishment; and, finally, • Link measures of performance with specific standards to establish the level of performance required by the CINC for those tasks. If the DOD’s hierarchical framework of NVR can be adapted for use by other Federal agencies, it would accomplish the following: • Help an agency focus on the right tasks and, thereby, advance the strategic mission of the agency; • Help an agency avoid work on inappropriate or less productive tasks (as outlined in the example cases); • Provide Congress with a standard mechanism for evaluating agency work across government. (Although this research focuses on the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), the standard mechanism may be equally useful for evaluation of the ten current non-GPRA Federal Management Requirements listed in Appendix 1.) 26 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Help an agency or Congress define or realign an agency’s strategic mission, as necessary; Keep an agency from replicating or creating similar frameworks (saving the adopting agencies significant development costs); and • Add to the community of users who can help improve the product through lessons learned, different perspectives (military versus civilian), etc. Therefore, a hierarchical structure of stakeholders' NVR would aid Federal Governmental agencies in realizing the Congressional goals of GPRA. The [Government Performance and] Results Act seeks to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and public accountability o f federal agencies as well as to improve congressional decisionmaking. It aims to do so by promoting a focus on program results and providing Congress with more objective information on the achievement of statutory objectives than was previously available. The Act outlines a series of steps whereby agencies are required to identify their goals, measure performance, and report on the degree to which those goals were met. Accordingly, executive branch agencies submitted strategic plans to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress in September 1997 and submitted their first annual performance plans in the spring o f 1998. Starting in March 2000, each agency is to submit a report comparing its performance for the previous fiscal year with the goals in its annual performance plan. (GAO/GGD-99-16, December 11, 1998, p. 3) To realize the goals of GPRA the Congress should base the funding of specific tasks of Federal agencies by verifying the traceability of those tasks to the organization’s strategic plan. In June 1999, a panel of the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) reported on the importance of agreement on the 27 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. measure of good government. Paul A. Volcker, chairman of the NAPA panel (former chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) reported: The measure of good government, is not whether it does all things well for all people, but whether it does well—those things that are the province of government, as defined by legitimate and open processes of public dialogue and debate. (American Society fo r Public Administration Times, August 1999, p. 7) The logic of “whether [government] does well-those things that are the province of government,” includes the evaluation of good government within agencies. Therefore, in pursuit of good government it is important to determine “whether an agency does well-those things that are the province of that agency.” Writing in 1998, Beryl Radin offered words of warning, “GPRA has been placed in an environment in which there is great skepticism about the legitimacy of the collection of federal data.” Radin continued with the following key points (July/August 1998, p. 307): [D]ata that are now being collected appear to be less than robust in terms of their ability to meet the data needs of GPRA. Should programs simply measure those elements for which data are already available? Some advocates of GPRA seem to believe that data are already available that can be used in this process; this belief appears to others to be misplaced. [I]n those areas where data requirements are imposed, one can expect a familiar dynamic to play out: grantees are likely to develop creaming processes that will show better results, believing that this will lead to increased funding. Radin’s concerns about creaming processes providing inappropriate funding levels are appropriate. In addition, there is danger that organizations with quality measures of their processes will get funded whether or not the successful 28 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. accomplishment of those processes impact those agency tasks that, in turn, impact the agency’s strategic mission. As a reflective practitioner (Schon, 1983), the current situation reminds the researcher of an incident from his Navy background. From the researcher’s earliest days in the Navy, there has always been a Beneficial Suggestion Cash Award (Benny Suggs) program. The Navy’s Benny Suggs program is designed to encourage inputs for business improvements from throughout the organization (from all members of the organization) that will help the organization perform to a higher standard. Cash awards are given for new and innovative ideas. These awards start at $50.00 and can range up to several thousand dollars. Routinely, when the researcher would arrive at a new command he would find that the organization’s Benny Suggs program was all but non-existent. To get an immediate response, he would award $50.00 to the first idea he received. If it were a very simplistic idea that anyone could have come up with, that would make it a perfect idea for his purposes. Others would think that if he awarded money for such an inferior idea, for sure, they had an idea that was better. The Benny Suggs program would be revitalized with immediate inputs for business improvements from across the organization. In the short-term, there is a danger that Congress may do something similar. They may rank and rate inappropriately agencies in order to stimulate and reward those agencies that are actively measuring their activities. Congress may fund those agencies that have stepped out smartly to answer their demands for measurement and are filling the spirit of the law. The problem is these agencies may very well be 29 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. measuring inputs, processes, and outputs rather than outcomes focused on the strategic mission of the organization. To satisfy the foundation of GPRA to ensure efficient, effective, and accountable government, Congress needs the ability to rank and rate the ongoing efforts of Federal agencies. Hard working public administrators in a significant number of Federal agency programs will make improvements in specific task performance. Yet the improved performance of those tasks may satisfy the NVRs of only some of the agency’s stakeholders. At the same time other Federal agency programs will make significant improvements that trace to-and-through to their agency’s strategic mission. For Congress to rank and rate those two competing efforts is not difficult. The real challenge for Congress will be to value task performance that only slightly improves, yet traces directly to the agency’s strategic mission, over task performance that significantly improves but only satisfies one group of stakeholders and does not trace to the strategic mission of the agency. Congress needs the ability to fund effectively those programs that trace to-and- through to the strategic mission of their Federal agency. At the same time, Congress needs the ability to identify those top-performing programs whose tasks do not trace to the strategic mission of their Federal agency. These tasks must be realigned not to eliminate but to ensure that top performing programs are assigned to the Federal agency that has both the core competencies and responsibilities to leverage fully the improved task performance. 30 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The DOD’s hierarchical framework of stakeholders' NVR provides Congress with insights to make efficient and effective funding decisions and, thereby, the opportunity to represent the NVR of America’s ultimate stakeholders—the citizenry. Congress can evaluate every DOD program against every other DOD program to rank and rate the impact on the nation’s strategic mission. Similarly, the Congress needs the ability to rank and rate every Federal agency’s programs against the programs of every other Federal agency if they are to spend the people’s money wisely. In pursuit of efficient, effective, and accountable government, stakeholders at every level should be asking two similar questions: Who cares if you are doing a superb job on a whole series of tasks if those tasks are not essential to other stakeholders in the hierarchy? Who cares if you are doing a superb job if the task you are conducting does not significantly and seriously impact upon the needs of—through Congress—the ultimate stakeholders, the American public? Significance This study attempted to contribute to the advancement of knowledge and understanding of emergency response decisionmaking; the results of this study should be of significant importance to every public administrator interested in improving crisis management decisionmaking. The U.S. General Accounting Office’s review of successful implementation of GPRA revealed that successful organizations (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996, p. 6): 31 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. based their strategic planning . . . on the interests and expectations of their stakeholders; • [identified] stakeholder involvement. . . particularly important as federal agencies face a complex political environment in which legislative mandates are often ambiguous; and • [identified] stakeholder involvement. . . important to help agencies ensure that their efforts and resources are targeted at the highest priorities. The Government Performance and Results Act recognizes those challenges and requires agencies “to consult with Congress and other stakeholders to clarify their missions and reach agreement on their goals” (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996, p. 14). This dissertation tested to see if a hierarchical framework that identifies the stakeholder needs, values, and responsibilities of one federal agency could be adapted for use by another federal agency. If the DOD’s hierarchical framework of stakeholder NVR could be adapted to support the NVR of another federal agency, the framework would provide: • a clear focus on the NVR of Congressional (representing the NVR of the citizenry) and other stakeholders; • verification of traceability from a Federal agency’s individual tasks to-and- through the other stakeholders’ NVR to the strategic mission of that Federal agency, through to the NVR of the Congressional stakeholders; and, therefore, 32 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. identification of those activities that should receive priority funding for training and acquisitions requirements.4 If the research showed that the DOD’s hierarchical framework o f stakeholder NVR can be adapted by another Federal agency, significant developmental costs would be saved. In addition, the ability to trace the tasks performed by an agency to the Congressional NVR hopefully would enhance citizen trust and minimize Congressional oversight by maximizing legislative trust. The developmental costs to be saved include time. A portion of the literature review is on the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Public Law 103- 62. The adaptation of the hierarchical framework would save an extraordinary amount of time and— if the time schedule of The Results Act is enforced—there is precious little time to spare. If a strategic structure that has been proven in one Federal Government agency can be adapted and implemented successfully by other Federal Government agencies, these other agencies can save significant developmental time by taking advantage of DOD’s lessons learned during time to construct. If the research showed that DOT United States Coast Guard's (USCG) personnel involved in emergency management decisionmaking can adapt and employ the DOD’s hierarchical framework structure, it would set the stage and provide ■"DOD personnel have a very broad meaning for the term training, while other agencies have a very narrow meaning. Therefore, this could be phrased “priority funding for acquisition o f and training of required personnel and acquisition of needed equipment.” 33 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. opportunities for a similar pattern of evaluation to take place across Governmental agencies—that is the real potential significance. Summary Once in place, the hierarchical structure of an agency’s stakeholder NVR will allow an organization to verify which of its activities trace to the strategic mission. Identifying that traceability will accomplish the following: Focus an agency’s efforts on those activities—performed at any level—that trace to-and-through the stakeholders’ NVR to the strategic mission; Allow the funding organization to justify its funding decisions for specific agency activities at the expense of other agency activities; Cause the agency to re-evaluate those activities that do not trace to and through the NVR to the strategic mission of the agency and, conversely; Cause the agency to re-evaluate its strategic mission for completeness; and • Finally, if the traceability of the activities performed to the agency mission is visible to the citizenry, it may help increase public trust and confidence in public organizations. As Paul A. Volcker reported in August 1999, “A healthy American democracy demands that we do what we can to reverse the distrust and cynicism that has come 34 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. to mark much of attitudes toward government” {American Society fo r Public Administration Times, August 1999, p. 1). Organization of the Research This chapter has stated the research questions, provided the background for this study, provided three example cases for illustrative purposes, indicated the significance of this research, and provided a summary. In Chapter II, key literature is reviewed. Chapter III addresses case study selection, data collection procedures, stakeholders, the interview guide, data analysis procedures, and limitations of the research. It also includes a dissertation process model. Chapter IV and Chapter V address the two case studies of the research. They include an introduction, background, plus a case study description report and the case study task report for each. Chapter VI details the findings from the research process and the survey results, leading to the conclusions, which are addressed in Chapter VII. 35 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER H DECISIONMAKING IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Introduction The previous chapter identified the principal question of the dissertation as: Can a framework for strategic planning, performance measurement, and decisionmaking that has been proven in one Federal agency for emergency management purposes be adapted and implemented successfully by another Federal agency in the business of emergency management? This chapter summarizes key literature that is relevant to decisionmaking in emergency management. The researcher was influenced, of course, by such standard bearers of decisionmaking literature as Herbert Simon, James March, Charles Lindblom, Amatai Etzioni, Louis Gawthrop, Johan Olsen, and R. M. Cyert. In the field of bureaucracy and hierarchies the researcher was influenced by leading theorists such as Larry Hill, Theodore Lowi, Aaron Wildavsky, David Lowery, Gareth Morgan, Fred Riggs, Jaques Elliot, Jeffrey Peffer, and Steven Ott. However, the researcher will concentrate on those writers who had the largest impact on the researcher. The chapter begins with the theorists who instilled the researcher with purpose. They include James Q. Wilson, Terry L. Cooper, and Charles Goodsell. These theorists 36 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. will be followed by the writings of the theorists who brought the researcher the insights and tools to conduct the research. They include Graham Allison, Everett Rogers, Paul Nutt, Roger Fisher and William Ury, and, once again, James Q. Wilson. Research with Purpose: Pursuit of Public-Interest Administration James Q. Wilson’s The M oral Sense fired the researcher with purpose to pursue improvement of a process for the public good; Wilson made the research process important. Wilson's carefully crafted argument led the researcher through an onion peeling process with tight logic, biting—albeit controlled— wit, and wonderfully powerful prose. He describes his work as an effort to uncover the evolutionary, developmental, and cultural origins of our moral habits and our moral sense; a continuation of the efforts of David Hume, Adam Smith, and others, “I seek to add to this tradition . . . a knowledge of what the biological and social sciences have since learned about what they were the first to call the moral sense” (Wilson, 1993, p. xiii). He clarified the writings of Aristotle, Aquinas, et alii with a razor sharp slice through common misconceptions and provided his own brilliant, understandable insights. Including Machiavellian-like insights when he inferred, “Honesty is the best policy because it induces others to trust us, and that trust often can be turned to our advantage” (Wilson, 1993, p. 102). Always, he provided thought-provoking dialog in pursuit of an understanding of our core self. He cut to the quick when he described how, when man focuses on his selfish desires, he engages in a war with his moral sense. No matter how often his selfish desires triumph over 37 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. his moral capacities, Wilson tells us it is then that we feel the pull of our better nature and it is then that we know the meaning of being human. Wilson’s The M oral Sense is about human nature, not physical or intellectual structures. He has: [scavenged] through science in order to illuminate everyday life. [Because] thinking seriously about the kinds of animals we are will help us understand our persistent but fragile disposition to make moral judgments and the aspects of human relations that must be cultivated if that disposition is to be protected and nurtured. (Wilson, 1993, p. 26) Mankind has a natural moral sense; we can understand what is “good” in life and we can rank those “goods,” assures Wilson. He identified gender differences, family interactions, fascinating discoveries of research related to rats, babies and other things that crawl, all with prose that will soothe and inspire the most dedicated ideologues: Mankind’s moral sense is not a strong beacon light, radiating outward to illuminate in sharp outline all that it touches. It is rather, a small candle flame, casting vague and multiple shadows, flickering and sputtering in the strong winds of power and passion, greed and ideology. But brought close to the heart and cupped in one’s hands, it dispels the darkness and warms the soul. (Wilson, 1993, p. 251) Terry L. Cooper's The Responsible Administrator provided the researcher with clear insights into the ethical dilemma faced by public administrators as they try to do the right thing. Cooper’ s concern is for public administrators who must make difficult choices between organizational demands and personal self-interest. However, if the agency’s hierarchy provides a clear definition of which of the 38 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. agency’s tasks trace to-and-through to the agency’s strategic mission and on to the needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR) of Congress—representing the NVR of the ultimate stakeholder, the citizen—the researcher believes most ethical dilemmas will be minimized. The researcher also believes that most ethical dilemmas arise when hard working public administrators do not have a clearly defined agency strategic mission on which to frame and focus their tasks. Cooper (1990, p. 228) provided frameworks to help the researcher understand the ethical dilemma, which, in turn, helped to focus the research (Tables 2 and 3). TABLE 2 MODEL OF RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATION Components of Responsible Conduct Components o f Individual Ethical Autonomy • Individual attributes • Organizational delimitation and transcendence • Organization structure • Legal and institutional mechanism for constraining organizational power • Organizational culture • Self-awareness • Societal expectations 39 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 3 RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION Act within provision of current codes and ethics legislation. Act within values of the political community and personal conscience. Maintain and enhance the knowledge of the professional field systems. Maintain and develop current knowledge of the social, political, and economic systems. Maintain and develop knowledge of the organization, its mission, and policy arena. Maintain and develop knowledge of own values, beliefs, convictions, world view, and life priorities. Commit energy and time to work of the organization and its purposes. Maintain and cultivate family, social, and community relationships. Make decisions consistent with legally mandated mission of the organization. Offer proposals for legislative change in organizational mission based on public preferences, demands, and interests. Acknowledge accountability to hierarchical structure of organization. Question, resist, and challenge orders inconsistent with mission of organization, professional codes, values of the political conscience. Offer proposals for legal and institutional protection from retaliation. Exercise best technical judgment. Provide for regular and accessible public participation. Comply with organization's informal norms and procedures. Propose changes in norms, rules, regulations, and procedures based on public preferences, demand, and interests; professional judgment; or personal conscience. Work within specialized structure of the organization. Encourage collaboration among units with other organizations, elected officials, and the public. Charles GoodselFs The Case fo r Bureaucracy provided the researcher with a sympathetic vision of the American bureaucrat. The Case fo r Bureaucracy is a carefully reasoned and impressively substantiated book. It brought home the idea that no matter how unloved bureaucracies may be, all Americans need to remember that 40 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. they are ours. Bureaucracy is not some strange, distant organization manned by them. In fact. Bureaucracy is very close. It is public institutions operating within our communities. It is public employees living in our neighborhoods. It is programs mandated by government officials for whom we personally voted. It is collective action in our behalf. In a meaningful sense, then, bureaucracy is ours. (Goodsell, 1985, p. 149) His opening strategy is to immediately identify and describe what must be some of the most outrageous stories of bureaucratic mistakes ever recorded: A Chicago woman undergoing chemotherapy for cancer of the breast applied for Medicare. She received a computer-produced letter indicating she was ineligible since she had died the previous April. A chronic alcoholic was arrested and mistaken for another man. When he protested, his claims of misidentification were diagnosed as paranoia and schizophrenia, and he was committed to a mental hospital. The Department of Energy set out to declassify millions of documents inherited from the Atomic Energy Commission. Eight of the released documents contained the basic design principles for the hydrogen bomb. A woman on welfare ran up astronomical medical bills because of terminal illness. She was denied Medicaid on grounds that her welfare payments created a personal monthly income $10.80 above the eligibility maximum. A unit of what is now the Department of Health and Human Services sent fifteen chimpanzees to a Texas laboratory for the purpose of launching a chimp-breeding program. All were males. (Goodsell, 1985, p. 3) With the reader’s head spinning from these grotesque cases of bureaucratic incompetence (if not malfeasance), Goodsell sets about carefully explaining the “rest of the story.” Goodsell’s convincing argument, which comes very early in the book, 41 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sets the stage for the rest of the book: if these outrageous horror stories can be explained then the other, run-of-the-mill, bureaucratic incidents may have simple explanations too. His chapter devoted to identifying bureaucrats as ordinary people was particularly attractive— especially to a bureaucrat. He opens that discussion with a reference to Norton Long’s argument that the “federal bureaucracy substantially mirrors the makeup o f the U.S. population, and certainly does so more faithfully than the national legislature” (Goodsell, 1985, p. 83). If one rejects the view that election is the sine qua non of representation, the bureaucracy now has a very real claim to be considered much more representative of the American people in its composition than the Congress. This is not merely the case with respect to the class structure of the country but, equally significantly, with respect to the learned groups, skills, economic interests, races, nationalities, and religions. Norton Long. (Goodsell, 1985, pp. 83-84) Goodsell follows up Norton Long’s prose with easily interpreted data. His facts, here as with throughout the book, should convince even skeptics of his points. Goodsell is interested in conversion not confrontation. Although he would never accept the prejudice shown against bureaucrats, he nevertheless explains these prejudices. A major cause for chronic underestimations of American bureaucratic performance is our tendency to hold unrealistic expectations concerning it. Belonging to a culture used to optimism and problem solving, Americans tend to assume that if announced objectives are not met, something is “wrong.” 42 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The initial feasibility of the goals tends to remain unconsidered. Belonging also to a business civilization, Americans are used to tangible indicators of achievement, that is, a “bottom line.” But in bureaucracy, goals tend to be idealistic, diffuse, and vague. They often conflict or even contradict. As a result, observers are easily led to conclude that “failure” has occurred because one or more objectives have not been met. Hence, in a way, public bureaucracy does not “fit” American culture too well, which is one reason why its cultural images are so negative. Although individual citizens have mostly satisfactory concrete experiences with bureaucracy, they too encounter divergence from time to time between personal goals and bureaucratic behavior. Regardless of whether this divergence is justified or not, it is transformed into an objectified symbol of contempt: “red tape.” Goodsell concludes with the same argument he has carried throughout the book: do not become defensive, instead confront with investigation, analysis, and data. He rejects a defensive “counterbarrage of pro-bureaucrat T-shirts or bumper stickers . . . [a] boycott . . . of the W. R. Grace Company. . . . And crass attempts to apply pressure on Congress via stimulated letter-writing campaigns” (Goodsell, 1985, p. 178). Instead, he recommends bringing to bear all of the most positive aspects of our public asset— American Bureaucracy. Goodsell recommends: A more balanced image of the public service in the mass media should be projected. The amount of direct contact that takes place between bureaucracies and the communities in which they are located should be increased. 43 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. More aggressive outreach to the academic world should be attempted. (Goodsell, 1985, pp. 179-180) “One can hope that such efforts would at least blunt the grand assault now being perpetrated on American bureaucracy. They might even hasten the day when the process of harming this precious asset comes to an end” (Goodsell, 1985, p. 180). Hierarchical Framework of Stakeholder's Needs, Values, and Responsibilities (NVR) For the researcher, James Wilson provided philosophical inspiration and purpose with The Moral Sense and then coupled it with the practical insights of Bureaucracy. The researcher found the organizational structure provided in Bureaucracy helped fill the void in decisionmaking theory. James Q. Wilson's Bureaucracy was an extraordinary book that helped the researcher understand the importance of empowering stakeholders, identifying and linking specific tasks to specific stakeholders, and ensuring the traceability of those tasks to the organization's strategic mission. From his dream of producing a “simple, elegant, comprehensive theory of bureaucratic behavior,” Wilson has settled for offering “A Few Modest Suggestions That May Make a Small Difference” (Wilson, 1989, p. 369). The researcher believes Wilson has offered a bell ringing, clear presentation of a most difficult subject. He provided the researcher with key aspects to formulating and defining his research project. 44 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Although the researcher enjoyed this book very much, Wilson sometimes made pronouncements that were difficult to accept. It was the intellectual challenging of Wilson's ideas that allowed the researcher to formulate his research. The Joint Chiefs seem to operate by an informal rule of unanimity: No action will be taken regarding the definition of roles and missions if any service representative dissent, hence no action will be taken that threatens the role or mission (the turf) of any service. Between 1955 and 1959, the Joint Chiefs recorded nearly three thousand decisions; in only twenty-three cases was a dissenting vote cast. The passage of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was an effort to alter this pattern by expanding the authority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs so that he would be able to make the kinds of tough choices about roles and mission that the Joint Chiefs as a committee were reluctant to make. (Wilson, 1989, pp. 192-193) The researcher reported to The Joint Staff in 1985 as Chief of European Forces and continued in that capacity until late 1988. Although he would not argue with Wilson's numbers, the researcher's perception of the voting process is significantly different from Wilson’s. The more difficult the issue the more aggressively stakeholders such as the joint staff action officers will work at finding consensus among themselves (the various “Js”) and with other stakeholders such as the service action officers. Inside the Pentagon, normal chains of command are violated each day, every day by specific stakeholders (Wilson's “operators” or Allison’s “Indians”) interested in resolving issues. For Wilson the “operators” are those individuals who do the work that justifies the existence of the organization (Wilson, 1989, p. 33). For Allison the “Indians” include the political appointees and permanent government officials within each of the departments and agencies—again, 45 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. those that do the identifying work of the organization (Allison, 1971, p. 164). These stakeholders chop and refine and redefine drafts, negotiating at their level until they either resolve the issue or one of the other stakeholders reaches their version of Fisher and Ury’s Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) (Fisher & Ury, 1981, p. 101). Every action officer in the Pentagon knows that they have failed if their respective “J” or service chief spends a “silver bullet” on an issue that could have been resolved by “Indians.” To the researcher, three thousand decisions with only twenty-three cases of dissenting votes, reflects successful negotiating. From his personal experience on The Joint Staff, the researcher found willing participants from every “J” and every service for the “principled negotiation” techniques of Fisher and Ury; at the “Indian” level of stakeholders there was an absolute minimum of posturing. Identification and Empowerment of Stakeholders Wilson provided the researcher with powerful insights into the makeup of stakeholders. To make a point about the importance of understanding the culture of an organization, Wilson highlighted the difference between two secretaries o f defense. Robert McNamara’s seven years as secretary witnessed “a dramatic growth in military spending, from $195 billion in 1961 to nearly $225 billion (in constant dollars) in 1968” (Wilson, 1989, p. 179) yet, he is easily singled out because there was never a more unpopular secretary. On the other hand, Melvin R. Laird: 46 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. . . . cut the defense budget by 28 percent, from $243 billion in 1969 to $175 billion (in constant dollars) in 1973. The U.S. Army lost divisions, the U.S. Navy lost ships, and total military personnel declined by about one-third. But despite these cuts, Laird was a very popular secretary among the military services (Wilson, 1989, p. 179). Laird was popular because he recognized the need of military stakeholders for a level of autonomy. In Morton Halperin’s words, bureaucracies “are often prepared to accept less money with greater control than more money with less control” (Wilson, 1989, p. 179). Laird cared enough—and was smart enough—to know the culture of the military stakeholders he was leading. He may not have known the essential tasks to be accomplished, but he knew the stakeholders most affected could—and would want to—identify those tasks. He knew that for a senior military stakeholder, the idea of losing control of an aircraft, a ship, or a maneuver force was perilously dangerous and normally meant death. For these same stakeholders, to lose control of a project was dangerous and to lose control of something as big as downsizing was a mortal threat—to at least your career. Wilson provided a prescription for every stakeholder who is in pursuit of autonomy: First, seek out tasks that are not being performed by others. Second, fight organizations that seek to perform your tasks. Third, avoid taking on tasks that differ significantly from those that are at the heart of the organization’s mission. Fourth, be wary of joint or cooperative ventures. Fifth, avoid tasks that will produce divided or hostile constituencies. Sixth, avoid learned vulnerabilities. (Wilson, 1989, p. 191) 47 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Wilson concluded the argument with: High autonomy is valued at least as much as resources, because autonomy determines the degree to which it is costly to acquire and use resources. High autonomy means the agency has a supportive constituency base and a coherent set of tasks that can provide the basis for a strong and widely shared sense of mission. (Wilson, 1989, p. 195) Right Tasks Linked to the Right Stakeholders Wilson hits a bureaucratic bulls-eye with: The principal source of power is a constituency. This plain fact repeated by generations of students of public administration still seems lost on those people (business executives, in particular) who upon taking a high-level job in Washington complain about the amount of time they must spend attending to the demands and needs of outside groups. All this time spent currying favor and placating critics, they argue, is time taken away from the real work of the agency, which is to “do the job.” No. The real work of the government executive is to curry favor and placate critics. Skilled executives can do this without currying or placating in any demeaning or dishonest way, but the currying and placating must be done, one way or another. (Wilson, 1989, pp. 204-205) If Wilson is right and time must be spent attending to the demands of outside groups, then it is ever more critical that the limited remaining time be focused on the essential tasks of the agency. The research attempted to determine if one Federal agency's hierarchical framework of stakeholder's needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR) could be adapted and implemented by another Federal agency. In the next chapter, the researcher will outline the methodology for the verification and validation of the adoption and implementation. One key part of adoption of the hierarchical framework is the requirement to identify those essential tasks that stakeholders must 48 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. accomplish if they are to maintain the very identity of their agency. These essential tasks are the tasks that trace to and through the stakeholders at various levels of the agency's hierarchical structure and on to the strategic mission of the agency. Traceability of Tasks to and through Stakeholders and on to the Agency's Strategic Mission In the researcher's lexicon, Wilson’s “operator” or Allison’s “Indian” is that stakeholder who understands the capabilities and limitations of the bureaucratic environment in which he or she operates—they understand the framework in which decisions are made. These operators also are able to identify other operators from competing or supporting bureaucracies. Armed with their mutual recognition these operators lust for the opportunity to cut through the “red tape” and get things done. It is the truth that too many scholars miss. Bureaucrats are not individuals sitting on their duffs. Bureaucrats are lusting for the opportunity to prove they are not bureaucrats. One choice—the traditional choice—is to create more Congressionally mandated rules to make sure agencies operate only within their Congressionally mandated tasking. Another choice that this research is designed to facilitate may be more profitable. If the hierarchical framework of one Federal agency can be adopted by another Federal agency, it can be used by the adopting agency to help identify their tasks that trace to and through the agency's hierarchical framework of stakeholder's needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR) and on to the organization's strategic goals. If these essential tasks of an agency can be identified then Wilson's “operators” and 49 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Allison's “Indians” can cut through the red tape and—not just “get the job done”—but accomplish the right job. Traceability of Stakeholders' Tasks to Agency Mission, Instead o f More Rules Wilson reinforced the researcher's belief in the importance of tracing tasks to and through the needs, values, and responsibilities of other stakeholders and on to the agency's strategic mission. Too often the establishment of rules to achieve an end may bring into play all the excesses of bureaucracy and the results may be exactly opposite of what the rules were designed to accomplish. Such was the case when Congress established rules they hoped would stimulate European efforts in the common defense through rules to limit the number of U.S. troops in Europe. The danger of rules is that they sometimes stimulate inappropriate behavior. If you turn the following Wilson idea around just a bit, it applies to Congress. “Agency executives have a strong incentive to enforce on their subordinates those rules the violation of which create external political difficulties for the executive” (Wilson, 1989, p. 344). In the following example, it was Congressional leaders who were having great difficulty understanding—and explaining to their constituencies— why Europe was not bearing more of the cost of their own defense and, therefore, imposed rules they thought would encourage greater burden-sharing. It should be noted that most military people believed the Europeans must do more. In a private meeting (December 1997) with the U.S. ambassador to NATO, Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked the ambassador, “At what time in our 50 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. nation’s history did the defense of Europe become more important to the Americans than to the Europeans?” The issue was that the NATO allies were seen as not paying their fair share for defense. In the minds of many Congressional leaders (and many other Americans) it was one thing to spend United States treasure to bear the burden of defending NATO Europe while the allies were rebuilding their economies; it was quite another thing to bear an unfair burden of defense expenditures while the allies’ fully developed economies successfully competed with the United States throughout the world. The burdensharing issue, as it came to be known, provided the principal rationale for reducing United States forces in Europe. Senator Sam Nunn, Georgia, became convinced that the non-United States NATO members were not bearing their fair share of the NATO defense burden. In 1982, after several vigorous, but unsuccessful attempts to reduce United States forces in Europe, Senator Nunn successfully pushed the European Troop Strength (ETS) amendment through Congress (Congressional Record, Senate, 1982). This amendment did not call for a reduction o f United States forces in Europe, but rather it established a European troop ceiling. Funds were provided to support no more than 315,600 U.S. military forces stationed ashore in NATO Europe, which was the exact number the Department of Defense requested for FY 1982 (Public Law 98-94, 1983). This Congressionally imposed ceiling was amended for FY 1985 to 326,414 to accommodate the introduction of ground- launched cruise missiles into NATO Europe (DOD Authorization Act, 1985, 1984, 51 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. p. 88). Again, the danger of rules is that they sometimes stimulate inappropriate behavior. The Congressionally imposed ETS ceiling mobilized and concentrated efforts throughout most of the DOD to justify the requirement for every-single troop within the ceiling in Europe. Additionally, in response to the ceiling, and in an attempt to counter any negative impact the establishment of the ceiling might have on our allies, extraordinary efforts were made by the Administration, numerous members of Congress and many senior DOD personnel to reassure the Europeans that the defense of Europe was “vital” to the U.S. Reinforced by this concentrated, powerful vocal support for the Alliance, the perception of the Congressional manpower limitation—for action officers on both sides of the Atlantic—changed from that of a ceiling to a “floor.” That is, the U.S. commitment would not go below 326,414 troops stationed in Europe. The European perception of the strength o f this renewed U.S. commitment to the Alliance allowed the Europeans to maintain but not increase their commitment to NATO. The result of Congressional rules was exactly the opposite of what was in Congress’ mind—and many other American minds— when they established the rule of a maximum of 326,414 troops in Europe. The researcher was stimulated by Wilson's structures and his own personal experience with actions such as the above to focus, not on defining new rules that must be enforced, but to focus on developing a simple concept of tracing individual stakeholder's activities to the strategic mission of the organization. The research should aid any Federal agency in the identification of those activities that trace to and 52 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. through the hierarchical framework stakeholder's needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR) and on to the strategic mission of the organization. In this example, Congress wanted to increase the non-US NATO member's contribution to NATO by placing a ceiling on the commitment of U.S. troops to Europe. The tasks that were accomplished by stakeholders throughout the hierarchical framework did not trace to this strategic goal. The actions accomplished by stakeholders throughout the government's hierarchical framework ensured the opposite occurred: Congress installed a floor on the U.S. commitment to Europe. Wilson believes that “talented, strongly motivated workers are a minority in any organization . . . [those] who can cope with rules will be outnumbered by people who hide behind them” (Wilson, 1989, p. 344). Whereas, although the researcher agrees they may be outnumbered, he believes those stakeholders who are “talented, strongly motivated workers” will drive the organization no matter what their numbers. These are the stakeholders the top performing executive in every bureaucracy will use to motivate others, will personally depend on, and will not mind spending extra energy on to refocus them to the organization’s goal. These are also the individuals the poor performing executive in every bureaucracy will have to focus on and fear. These are the stakeholders the researcher tried to enlist for his research. Tracing Specific Tasks to Strategic Missions Wilson found the following to be an intrusion; the researcher found it to be life threatening. 53 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The accountability problem is the mirror image o f the consumer preference one: It arises when we are unwilling to confine our control over a firm supplying a service to the government’s right to grant, withhold, or cancel the contract. It is most visible in defense contracting: No sooner have we told Lockheed or Northrop to build an airplane that will do certain things than we start telling them how to build it. (Wilson, 1989, p. 357) One of the most important aircraft that Northrop has built in the last few years is the F/A-18, one of the finest tactical aircraft ever built. Northrop was teamed with McDonnell Douglas to build the F/A-18. McDonnell Douglas was one of America's most successful military aircraft manufacturers. Among other fighters, they built the F-4 Phantom, a fantastic fighter aircraft with well over 5000 aircraft produced. It was flown by the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Air Force and also sold to friendly countries all over the world. The F-4 had a unique— and particularly ugly— flight control characteristic. During catapult launch from an aircraft carrier, the pilot had to hold on to the stick and hold it all the way back in his lap, if the pilot let go of the stick it would fall to the floor of the aircraft and the aircraft would fly directly into the water. In every other aircraft that ever flew from the flight deck of an aircraft carrier, once the pilot trimmed the flight controls for catapult launch, he could take his “death-grip” off the stick, gently hold it for launch and that way the pilot would not transfer any transverse “G” loading to the stick and introduce an unwanted nose- up vector. When Northrop-McDonnell Douglas built the F/A-18 aircraft they responded to an often-stated pilot requirement to have an aircraft control system capable of taking a “hands-off” catapult shot. “[W]e start telling them how to build 54 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. it” (Wilson, 1989, p. 357) and that is exactly how they built it. They built an aircraft that the pilot must keep his or her hands off of during catapult launch. Therefore, the pilot's left hand firmly grips the throttle and a fixed metal bar in order to hold it full forward during the catapult launch, while the right hand is twenty-four inches away from the flight control's stick holding on to a hand-hold on the top of the canopy. The aircraft is equipped with a weight-on-wheel switch that allows multiplication of the control stick inputs while the aircraft is on deck. The normal small movements of the stick during catapult acceleration are multiplied to a level that will result in overstressing the aircraft due to pilot induced oscillations, which could result in the loss of the aircraft. The strategic goal—and the critical need of one specific group1 of stakeholders—was for a flight control system that would provide the pilot with enhanced control during the most critical moments of the flight. “[W]e start telling them how to build it” (Wilson, 1989, p. 357), and they built a flight control system that a pilot could not touch during aircraft launch. The activity of the manufacturer focused on did not trace to the strategic goal. Identifying Specific Tasks Wilson’s work has five specific recommendations that he reports can be generally inferred from studying the funding of particular agencies: I. Executives should understand the culture of their organizations—that is, what their subordinates believe constitute the core tasks of the agency—and the strengths and limitations of ‘The researcher was privileged to be among this group of F/A-18 pilots. 55 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that culture. . . . If the organization must perform a diverse set of tasks, those tasks that are not part of the core mission will need special protection. (Wilson, 1989, p. 371) The researcher adapted Wilson's idea and focused on this problem within the military. The tasks selected by the CINCs are focused on having and maintaining a capability to satisfy mission requirements for the next two to three years. This is reasonable in light of the funding constraints. However, the services describe certain capabilities as core competencies; capabilities that go to the very basis of their identity. The researcher uses the term essential tasks. The idea is that certain tasks are so basic to the identity of a service that if that capability is not maintained, the service will lose its identity. Chapter I discussed this situation and outlined the refocusing of a maritime capability in order to address the needs, values, and responsibilities of all stakeholders in the hierarchical framework. 2. “Negotiate with one’s political superiors to get some agreement as to which are the essential constraints that must be observed by your agency and which the marginal constraints” (Wilson, 1989, p. 372). The researcher thinks Wilson needed to explore why political superiors impose constraints on agencies. The researcher thinks it is because they are unsure of exactly what that agency is supposed to do and when it is supposed to do it. The hierarchical framework of stakeholder's needs, values, and responsibilities that satisfies the Government performance and Results Act's requirement for a strategic mission, would allow each agency, the administration, and Congressional oversight 56 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. committees an opportunity to share a common language and, therefore, a common understanding of what the agency must do and when. Further research would be required to determine if this clear understanding by all parties would minimize the political constraints. 3. “Match the distribution of authority and the control over resources to the tasks your organization is performing’' (Wilson, 1989, p. 372). The use of a hierarchical framework of needs, values, and responsibilities would allow the identification of essential tasks which would ensure that all levels of the agency would—prior to the real-world mission, through exercises and training— know exactly who has to do what and exactly what he or she needs to do it. The templating process used for the two case studies of Chapter IV and Chapter V will graphically show which tasks must be accomplished in which order in order to accomplish the primary mission. Measuring Performance 4. Judge organizations by results. This book has made it clear that what constitutes a valued result in government usually is a matter of dispute. But even when fairly clear performance standards exist, legislatures and executives often ignore them with unhappy results. (Wilson, 1989, p. 373) One of the most important operational aspects of the DOD model is that it can empower the stakeholders to create meaningful measures for each of their tasks. The model allows stakeholders at each level to identify performance measures that address their specific needs, values, and responsibilities. In addition, Wilson's “operators” can 57 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. not only examine the needs, values, and responsibilities of other stakeholders throughout the hierarchical framework, but they also can examine the measures they use and thereby determine how the other stakeholders define completion of their tasks. As shown in the example cases of Chapter I, it is important that a stakeholder's activity have an impact on other stakeholders' activities and, thereby, an impact on the strategic mission of the organization. It is important to have measures that allow stakeholders to calculate successful accomplishment of their tasks and to calculate the impact of their task performance on other stakeholder's task performance. Clear established measures will allow stakeholders throughout the hierarchy to see how other stakeholders value their specific task performance. It will allow stakeholders at each level to recognize each other's performance in a common language. For example, a marine general based in Okinawa may measure the success o f his command by the level of training he was able to achieve under the conditions of austere training budgets and limited training ranges. He may report to the CINC that his forces are in a higher state of readiness than any previous period. However, the CINC may be measuring his overall command's success on his ability to maintain and expand overseas stationing opportunities with friendly Asian nations. In a horrible incident, the marine general’s troops raped a young woman and eliminated any possibility of expanding U.S. basing opportunities in Japan and probably any other nation in Asia. The marine general, as a public administrator, will know his senior’s 58 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. measure of success and will not be surprised by his low-standing in the CINC’s eyes—in the CINC’s measures of success. 5. The final bit of advice flows directly from the limits on judging agencies by their results. All organizations seek the stability and comfort that comes from relying on standard operating procedures—”SOPs.” When results are unknown or equivocal, bureaus will have no incentive to alter those SOPs so as better to achieve their goals, only an incentive to modify them to conform to externally imposed constraints. (Wilson, 1989, p. 375) If the strategic mission of the agency is known and the activity being performed traces to that strategic mission, then the results of performing that traceable activity also should be known. Therefore, the cumulative results of each individual task's performance on the strategic mission of the agency will also be known. Not only can you validate which of the agency's tasks are most important and which measures are most important to task accomplishment, but it is also possible to determine which SOPs are most important (the most important SOPs will be those that impact essential task performance). By using the hierarchical framework of stockholder's needs, values, and responsibilities, tasks will be recognized as traceable or not traceable to the agency's strategic mission. This will minimize the constraints imposed by the executive and Congress—the goal of every bureaucrat. Conceptual Frameworks for Decisionmaking Graham Allison provided generations of researchers with frameworks for understanding complex questions. He wrote the Essence o f Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis because of the complexities in the bureaucratic environment. 59 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. There is simply no way to map and capture all of the relative uncertainties in what public administrators do in their lives. Allison was in pursuit of simplifications; providing the opportunity for bureaucrats to cope with these complexities through simplification. As he routinely said in the classroom, “I wanted to provide a simple tool to help us do the best that we can with the information available.”2 Allison's tools are in the form of three models: (1) The Rational Actor Model, (2) The Organizational Process Model, and (3) The Governmental Politics Model. Allison wrote of a structure to help us better understand outcomes: Why did the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor? And a host of other “Whys.” Our typical search for answers has been to place ourselves in the position of the nation under discussion. It is comfortable to think of governments and individuals performing in a purposeful manner—performing in a rational manner. This simplification is easily understood and provides a fast appraisal and, very often, an accurate appraisal. However, like all simplifications, “[it] obscures as well as reveals. In particular, it obscures the persistently neglected fact of bureaucracy: the ‘maker’ of government policy is not one calculating decision maker but is rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors” (Allison, 1971, p. 255). Therefore, the foundation of Allison’s thesis (pp. 3-5): • Professional analysts of foreign affairs (as well as ordinary laymen) think about problems of foreign and military policy in terms of 2 While the researcher was a Fellow at Harvard, Allison routinely made this remark in the classroom (Kennedy School of Government, 1987). 60 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. largely implicit conceptual models that have significant consequences for the content of their thought. Most analysts explain (and predict) the behavior of national governments in terms of one basic conceptual model, here entitled Rational Actor or Classical Model (Model I). • Two alternative conceptual models, here labeled an Organizational Process Model (Model II) and a Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Model (Model III), provide a base for improved explanations and predictions. As a chess player, Allison’s metaphor of a chess game to explain his three models is crystal clear: Foreign policy has often been compared to moves and sequences of moves in the game of chess. Imagine a chess game in which the observer could see only a screen upon which moves in the game were projected, with no information about how the pieces came to be moved. Initially, most observers would assume—as Model I does—that an individual chess player was moving the pieces with reference to plans and tactics toward the goal of winning the game. But a pattern of moves can be imagined that would lead some observers, after watching several games, to consider a Model II assumption: the chess player might not be a single individual but rather a loose alliance of semi-independent organizations, each of which moved its set of pieces according to standard operating procedures. For example, movement of separate sets of pieces might proceed in turn, each according to a routine, the king’s rook, bishop, and their pawns repeatedly attacking the opponent according to a fixed plan. It is conceivable, furthermore, that the pattern of play might suggest to an observer a Model III assumption: a number of distinct players, with distinct objectives but shared power over the pieces, could be determining the moves as the resultant of collegial bargaining. For example, the black rook’s move might contribute to the loss of a black knight with no comparable gains for the black team, but with the black rook becoming the principal guardian of the palace on that side of the board, (p. 7) Allison’s Model III, the Bureaucratic Model, was of particular value to the researcher as he framed the DOD model for adaptation by another Federal agency. 61 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Bureaucratic Model shows that the decision may not be where any of the players want to be, but rather where the various forces opposing or assisting each other have placed it. The researcher believes that a hierarchical framework of stakeholder’s NVR will simplify the analysis of any agency’s bureaucracy. Public administrators, empowered with a hierarchical framework of stakeholder’s NVR, will be able to open their bureaucracy’s decisionmaking processes quickly to analysis by using Graham T. Allison’s (1971, p. 6) three models. The researcher believes a hierarchical framework of stakeholder NVR would simplify further the application of Allison’s tool through the narrowing of the analysis. Rather than focusing on the overall bureaucratic organization and how it functions, the hierarchical framework will allow public administrators to focus on those tasks that do not trace to-and-through to the other stakeholders. Public administrators will be able to determine more readily what decisionmaking forces are at work to: eliminate the tasks that do not trace to the agency’s strategic mission, modify existing tasks so that they do trace to the agency’s strategic mission, and • modify the strategic mission of the agency so that the existing tasks do align and trace to the mission. The use of Allison models in combination with an agency’s hierarchical framework of stakeholder’s needs, values, and responsibilities will help identify the decisionmaking in the organization and empower the stakeholders at every level to 62 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. protect their interests including their ethical interests. It will enhance also the opportunity for effective, efficient, and accountable government that fulfills the ultimate needs of the ultimate stakeholder. Table 4 is an adaptation of Allison's description of his three models (Allison, 1971, p. 256). TABLE 4 SUMMARY OUTLINE OF MODELS AND CONCEPTS The Paradigm Model I National Government I sla c k B o \ Goals (objective function) > Options • Consequences > Choice Model II Model III National Government Organizations (A-G) > Goals > SOPs and programs National Government • Players in positions (A-F) • Goals, Interests, Stakes, and Stands (r-z) • Power •Action-channels 63 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 4 (contiued) Basic unit of analysis Government action as choice Government action as organizational output Government action as political resultant Organizing concepts National actor The problem Static selection • Action as rational choice • Goals and objectives • Options • Consequences • Choice Organizational actors (constellation of which is the government) Factored problems and fractionated power Parochial priorities and perceptions Action as organizational output • Goals: constraints defining acceptable performance • Sequential attention to goals • Standard operating procedures • Programs and repertoires • Uncertainty avoidance (negotiated environment, standard scenario) • Problem-directed search • Organizational learning and change • Central coordination and control • Decisions of government leaders Players in positions Parochial priorities and perceptions Goals and interests Stakes and stands Deadlines and faces of issues Power Action-channels Rules of the game Action as political resultant Dominant inference pattern Government action = choice with regard to objectives Government action (in short run) = output largely determined by present SOPs and programs Governmental action (in longer run) = output importantly affected by organizational goals, SOPs, etc. Governmental action = resultant of bargaining 64 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 4 (contiued) Basic unit of analysis Government action as choice Government action as organizational output Government action as political resultant General propositions Substitution effect Organizational implementation Organizational options Limited flexibility and incremental change Long-range planning Goals and tradeoffs Imperialism Options and organization Administrative feasibility Directed change Political resultants Action and intention Problems and solutions Where you stand depends on where you sit Chiefs and Indians The 51 -49 principle3 Inter- and Intra-national relations Misperception, misexpectation, miscommunication, and reticence Styles of plav___________ Common Language, The Key to Successful Bargaining, Successful Decisionmaking Paul C. Nutt in his article, “Public-Private Differences and the Assessment of Alternatives for Decision Making,” outlines three hypotheses that connect assessment practice with decision outcomes. Hypothesis I: Hypothesis 2: Hypothesis 3: Strategic decision making is more successful if judgment is used to assess alternatives. When Stakeholders' interests are involved, strategic decision making is more successful if bargaining [emphasis added] is used to assess alternatives. Strategic decision making success declines if analysis is used to assess alternatives. (Nutt, April 1999, p. 306) JThe terms and conditions of the game affect the time that players spend thinking about hard policy choices and the force and assurance with which they argue for their preferred alternative. Because he faces an agenda fixed by hundreds of important deadlines, the reasonable player must make difficult policy choices in much less time and with much less agonizing than an analyst or observer would. Because he must compete with others, the reasonable player is forced to argue much more confidently than he would if he were a detached judge (Allison, 1971, p. 178). 65 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The researcher focused on Nutt's second hypothesis—with its emphasis on bargaining—and then turned to Roger Fisher and William Ury's Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. Roger Fisher and William Ury’s argument is that “more and more occasions require negotiation . . . [and] although negotiation takes place every day, it is not easy to do well” (Fisher & Ury, 1987, p. xii). In particular, the authors believe the two traditional approaches to negotiating, soft or hard, more often than not “leave people dissatisfied, worn out, or alienated—and frequently all three” (Fisher & Ury, p. xii). Fisher and Ury offer us a third way to negotiate: [A] way neither hard nor soft, but rather hard and soft. The method of principled negotiation . . . is to decide issues on their merits rather than through a haggling process focused on what each side says it will and won’t do. It suggests that you look for mutual gains wherever possible, and that where your interests conflict, you should insist that the result be based on some fair standards independent of the will of either side. The method of principled negotiation is hard on the merits, soft on the people. It employs no tricks and no posturing. Principled negotiation shows you how to obtain what you are entitled to and still be decent. It enables you to be fair while protecting you against those who would take advantage of your fairness. (Fisher & Ury, 1987, p. xii) As they offer their argument, Fisher and Ury (1987) keep the reader’s attention with wonderful twists of the known. Their bright and breezy manner of writing presents us with new and exciting ideas in a fun way. Their insights include treasures such as: Some of the most effective negotiating you will ever do is when you are not talking, (p. 118) 66 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. You may see on the table a glass half full of cool water. Your spouse may see a dirty, half-empty glass about to cause a ring on the mahogany finish, (p. 24) Expand the pie before dividing it. (p. 58) Agreement is often based on disagreement. . . . The difference in belief provides the basis for a deal. (p. 76) Chess looks like a zero-sum game; if one loses, the other wins— until a dog trots by and knocks over the table, spills the beer, and leaves you both worse off than before, (p. 73) Never yield to pressure, (p. 94) Few things facilitate a decision as much as a precedent, (p. 81) The authors, with the spice and wit of the above, make their argument for never bargaining over positions: “Whether a negotiation concerns a contract, a family quarrel, or a peace settlement among nations, people routinely engage in positional bargaining. Each side takes a position, argues for it, and makes concessions to reach a compromise” (Fisher & Ury, 1987, p. 3). Fisher and Ury conclude that arguing over positions is inefficient, endangers ongoing relationships, and produces unwise agreements. They offer an alternative: principled negotiation or negotiation on the merits (Fisher & Ury, 1987, p. 11). There are four points to their alternative: • People: Separate the people from the problem. • Interests: Focus on interests, not positions. Options: Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do. Criteria: Insist that the result be based on some objective standard. 67 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Fisher and Ury (1987) top their list with people and continue, throughout the book, emphasizing the need to focus on the individual, “Negotiators are people first . . . [not] abstract representatives of the 'other side'” (p. 11). Their emphasis on people is appropriate. However, they have left a wrong impression—recognizing your counterpart as an individual is not unique to principled negotiation. Every successful negotiator, whether hard, soft, or principled, focuses on the individual. The successful negotiator never forgets that he is dealing with human beings armed with various strengths and frailties—his success depends on his evaluation o f those strengths and weaknesses. The hard negotiator will look for vulnerabilities to focus his efforts against and, likewise, the strengths to avoid or counter. While the soft negotiator will identify and avoid his counterparts vulnerabilities in order to make the negotiating process as comfortable as possible. Although not unique in their attention to the individual, Fisher and Ury do put a special spin on dealing with people. Their admonition not to negotiate with an abstraction, but rather focus “on getting one claims agent to make a recommendation”—highlights their thinking. They make it very clear that separating the people from the problem does not mean less emphasis on people; it really requires m-o-r-e emphasis. Fisher and Ury report it is critical for negotiators to recognize the importance of their counterpart’s needs. For the researcher, the key is to be able to recognize your counterpart stakeholder’s needs, values, and responsibilities and not 6 8 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. evaluate his or her maneuvering by only reflecting on your personal values: Do not de-emphasize what is important to others just because it is unimportant to you. Fisher and Ury have written a watershed book, which provides—along with extraordinary insights— a powerful framework for negotiation, a shared, single text from which to negotiate. It is a book designed to make the negotiations between individuals and their counterpart stakeholders become one o f inventing options, expanding pies and, sometimes, dividing them—not by slices— by crust and filling. The success o f principled negotiation is tightly linked to proper communication. Unlike positional bargaining, which takes place in spite of (and because of) unshared language, this book emphasizes mutual understanding and helps participants identify miscommunication as a mutual enemy. In today’s Federal agencies there is an increasing requirement for interagency cooperation (GAO/AIMD- 97-146, August 29, 1997). With that requirement there is an attendant expanding requirement for a shared language of needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR). Getting individual stakeholders to participate in principled negotiations is a challenge. The researcher believes that a common understanding of the issues through a common language of every stakeholder's NVR when combined with Fisher and Ury's little book would be an important first step. The hierarchical framework of stakeholders' NVR and this small book will provide public administrator with the tools necessary for an efficient, fair, durable, and, with effort, wise resolution of conflict. 69 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Framing the Decisionmaking Process Emmett M. Rogers' Diffusion o f Innovation was particularly important to the researcher's efforts. As discussed in the previous chapter, the researcher had successfully introduced an innovation into the Department of Defense (DOD). However, the researcher had encountered a disconnect between the adoption of the DOD model and the adoption of the model's supporting software. This was critical because it was the same DOD model that the researcher wanted to attempt to adapt and implement into another Federal agency. Rogers' work, in particular his “S” curve diagram, clarified the disconnect for the researcher. It allowed the researcher to explain the disconnect between the model and its supporting software and encouraged him to continue with the attempt to adapt and implement the innovation to the Department of Transportation's U.S. Coast Guard. Figure 3 shows what Rogers describes as “the S-shaped rate of adoption” for an innovation (Rogers, 1995, p. 54). The initial movement on the S-curve for both the DOD model (UNTL-NMETL process) and the supporting software was because of the efforts of Innovators (described below). For the initial phase of the UNTL- NMETL process the researcher and the supporting software developers both worked with Innovators. Therefore, the UNTL-NMETL process and its first supporting software (JointCAT) shared the same gentle slope of adoption supported by Innovators. 70 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 3. CONFLICTING RATE OF ADOPTION OF SUPPORTING PROGRAMS (Adaptation of Rogers' S-Curve) 100% Time--------------- ► Universal Naval Task List-Naval Mission Essential Task List Process Joint Computer Aided Technology (JointCAT) Joint Exercise Management Program (JEMP) Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Innovators: Venturesome. Venturesomeness is almost an obsession with innovators. This interest in new ideas leads them out of a local circle o f peer networks and into more cosmopolite social relationships. Communication patterns and friendships among a clique of innovators are common, even though the geographical distance between the innovators may be considerable. Being an innovator has several prerequisites. Control of substantial financial resources is helpful to absorb the possible loss from an unprofitable innovation. The ability to understand and apply complex technical knowledge is also needed. The innovator must be able to cope with a high degree of uncertainty about an innovation at the time of adoption. (Rogers, 1995, p. 263) Within a year of the initial introduction of the innovation, the UNTL-NMETL process was ready to move beyond the Innovators and on to the Early Adopters (described below). Just as Rogers predicted, the “S” curve vector turned sharply up with the added support of the Early Adopters. These Early Adopters were leaders well respected by their peers and the role of change agent of the innovation shifted from the outside contactor to the Federal agency's own Early Adopters. Early Adopters: Respect. Early adopters are a more integrated part of the local social system than are innovators. Whereas innovators are cosmopolites, early adopters are localites. This adopter category, more than any other, has the greatest degree of opinion leadership in most systems. Potential adopters look to early adopters for advice and information about the innovation. The early adopter is considered by many as “the individual to check with” before using a new idea. This adopter category is generally sought by change agents as a local missionary for speeding the diffusion process. Because early adopters are not too far ahead of the average individual in innovativeness, they serve as a role model for many other members of a social system. The early adopter is respected by his or her peers, and is the embodiment of successful, discrete use of new ideas. The early adopter knows that to continue to earn this esteem of colleagues and to maintain a central position in the communication networks 72 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of the system, he or she must make judicious innovation-decisions. The early adopter decreases uncertainty about a new idea by adopting it, and then conveying a subjective evaluation of the innovation to near-peers through interpersonal networks. (Rogers, 1995, p. 264) While the adoption curve for the UNTL-NMETL process was turning up sharply (gaining many new adopters), the model's software developers had adapted and implemented a separate innovation into the supporting software. A quantum improvement in the model's supporting software capability was made—and a major change in the software's operational characteristics. A significant disconnect between the adoption rate of the model and its supporting software surfaced. The researcher improvised an adaptation of Rogers' S-curve. He deduced that if a separate innovation impacted only the model's supporting elements, the adoption rate of the element with the separate innovation would drop vertically straight down to the time line (remain at the same point on the time line as the process itself)- This would return the model's supporting software to zero on the Percent of Adoption scale. That is the pattern the UNTL-NMETL process' supporting software took. At the same time that the UNTL-NMETL process was being engaged by Innovators and Early Adopters, the updated supporting software (with its name changed to JEMP III) returned to zero on the Percent of Adoption scale. JEMP III then started the gradual slope gain of adopters under the support of Innovators as shown in the dotted line on Figure 3. 73 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Over the next two years, support for the UNTL-NMETL process passed from the Innovators and Early Adopters to the Early Majority. The result is that across the Navy there are powerful adopters who think and work within the context of the UNTL-NMETL process. The requirement for an outside contractor to act as change agent diminished at the same rate as the adoption curve increased its slope. This was fortunate because Rogers described the situation as the “[m]ore elite clients are homophilous with change agents, and so communication between the two is easier and more effective” (Rogers, 1995, p. 350). In effect, that meant that the ability of the outside contractor change agent and the agency's newest adopters to communicate decreased at the same rate as the requirement for the outside contractor to be a change agent decreased. Supported by the Innovators and Early Adopters the DOD model continued on to the Early Majority with minimal outside support; the UNTL-NMETL process became part of the way the Navy will do business for a long time. Early Majority: Deliberate. The early majority adopt new ideas just before the average member of a system. The early majority interact frequently with their peers, but seldom hold positions of opinion leadership in a system. The early majority's unique position between the very early and the relatively late to adopt makes them an important link in the diffusion process. They provide interconnectedness in the system's interpersonal networks. The early majority are the most numerous adopter categories, making up one-third of the members of a system. The early majority may deliberate for some time before completely adopting a new idea. Their innovation-decision period is relatively longer than that of the innovator and the early adopter. “Be not the first by which the new is tried, Nor the last to lay the old aside” . . . particularly fits the thinking of the early majority. They follow 74 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. with deliberate willingness in adopting innovations, but seldom lead. (Rogers, 1995, p. 264) The researcher only now has started to move the DOD model onto the next level of adoption. Late Majority: Skeptical. The late majority adopt new ideas just after the average member of a system. Like the early majority, the late majority make up one-third of the members of a system. Adoption may be both an economic necessity for the late majority, and the result of increasing network pressures from peers. Innovations are approached with a skeptical and cautious air, and the late majority do not adopt until most others in their system have done so. The weight of the norms must definitely favor an innovation before the late majority are convinced. The pressure of peers is necessary to motivate adoption. Their relatively scarce resources mean that most of the uncertainty about a new idea must be removed before the late majority feel that it is safe to adopt. (Rogers, 1995, p. 265) The researcher looks forward with regret to the moment he will have to work with the Laggards. However, there may only be a minimum requirement for contact with the Laggards. Rogers has several Generalizations about the adoption of innovation. He reports in “Generalization 7-25: Earlier adopters o f innovations have more change agent contact than later adopters” (Rogers, 1995, p. 346). Therefore, rather than requiring an interface with an outside contractor change agent, the researcher expects that the Laggards will be motivated and encouraged by Innovators, Early Adopters, Early Majority, and Late Majority from within their agency. Laggards: Traditional. Laggards are the last in a social system to adopt an innovation. They possess almost no opinion leadership. Laggards are the most localite in their outlook of all adopter 75 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. categories; many are near isolates in the social networks of their system. The point of reference for the laggard is the past. Decisions are often made in terms of what has been done previously, and these individuals interact primarily with others who also have relatively traditional values. Laggards tend to be suspicious of innovations and change agents. Their innovation- decision process is relatively lengthy, with adoption and use lagging far behind awareness-knowledge of a new idea. Resistance to innovations on the part of laggards may be entirely rational from the laggards' viewpoint, as their resources are limited and they must be certain that a new idea will not fail before they can adopt. The laggard's precarious economic position forces the individual to be extremely cautious in adopting innovations. (Rogers, 1995, p. 265) At the same time the DOD model was moving on to self-sustainment and gaining new adopters without outside support, the software developers introduced their second major innovation to the supporting software. Another quantum improvement in capability in the model's supporting software was made—and along with it another major change in the software's operational characteristics. The second significant disconnect between the adoption rate of the model and the adoption rate of its supporting software occurred. Once again the model's supporting software dropped vertically straight down to the time line to remain at the same point on the time line as the DOD model while returning it to zero on the Percent of Adoption scale. At the same time that the UNTL-NMETL process was being engaged by Innovators, Early Adopters, Early Majority, and Late Majority, the updated supporting software (with its name changed to JTEMS) returned to zero on the Percent of Adoption scale. JTEMS then started the gradual slope gain of adopters under the support of Innovators as shown in the dash and dot line in Figure 3. 76 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The software must be used and accepted by the Innovators before it can move on to the Early Adopters. With earlier versions of the supporting software, the researcher had almost turned the comer and started to move the vector up with the Early Adopters when the software changed. The supporting software is back with the Innovators while the Early Majority is working with—and supporting— the UNTL- NMETL process. The Early Majority of the UNTL-NMETL process are not innovators and will not accept the supporting software at this time because it is too hard to use, difficult to get on line, or is simply different. They will use any excuse because they are NOT Innovators. Change agents might be content to be satisfying the needs ofrihe Innovators but will never satisfy the needs of Wilson's “operators” or Allison's “Indians.” Rogers' Table 5 provided the researcher insights that helped him frame the statements to be used with the case studies for the survey interview process. The table also helped the researcher identify the criteria for selection of the stakeholders for survey-interview. 77 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 5 CHARACTERISTICS OF CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED DIFFUSION SYSTEMS Characteristics of Diffusion Systems Centralized Diffusion System Decentralized Diffusion Systems 1. The degree of centralization in decision making and power. Overall control of decisions by national government administrators and technical subject-matter experts. Wide sharing of power and control among the members of the diffusion system; client control by local systems; much diffusion is spontaneous and unplanned. 2. Direction of diffusion. Top-down diffusion from experts to local users of innovations. Peer diffusion of innovations through horizontal networks. 3. Sources of innovations. Innovations come from formal R&D conducted by technical subject- matter experts. Innovations come from experimentation by nonexperts, who often are users. 4. Who decides which innovations to diffuse? Decisions about which innovations should be diffused are made by top administrators and technical subject-matter experts. Local units decide which innovations should diffuse on the basis of their informal evaluations of the innovations. 5. How important are clients' needs in driving the diffusion process? An innovation-centered approach; technology- push, emphasizing needs created by the availability of the innovation. A problem-centered approach; technology- pull, created by locally perceived needs and problems. 6. Amount of re- invention? A low degree of local adaptation and re- invention of the innovations as they diffuse among adopters. A high degree of local adaptation as they diffuse among adopters. Source: Rogers, Everett M. (1962, 1995, 4th ed.). Diffusion o f innovations (p. 366). New York: The Free Press. 78 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Summary The first part of this chapter covered the writings of the theorists who motivated the researcher to care about the community of public administrators. The second part of the chapter covered the theorists who empowered the researcher with ideas and tools to conduct the research. The next chapter will address case study selection, data collection procedures, stakeholders, the interview guide, data analysis procedures, and limitations o f the research. It also includes a dissertation process model. 79 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER HI RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY The researcher used qualitative research methods to answer the principal question: Can a framework for strategic planning, performance measurement, and decisionmaking that has been proven in one Federal agency for emergency management purposes be adapted and implemented successfully by another Federal agency in the business of emergency management? Michael Q. Patton described the purpose of applied research and evaluation as “to inform action, enhance decisionmaking, and apply knowledge to solve human and societal problems.” Patton continued with “In qualitative inquiry the researcher is the instrument. Validity in qualitative methods, therefore, hinges to a great extent on the skill, competence, and rigor of the person doing fieldwork” (Patton, 1980, pp. 12, 14). The use of qualitative research methods allowed this researcher to study his special interest in emergency management decisionmaking in depth and detail. And, for this researcher, Patton’s description of qualitative research fieldwork made the undertaking very attractive: Fieldwork involves getting one’s hands dirty, participating where possible in actual program activities, and getting to know program staff and participants on a personal level. . . . Understanding comes from trying to put oneself in the other person’s shoes, from 80 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. trying to discern how others think, act, and feel. (Patton, 1980, P - 47) The research question was important because public administrators are not abstract researchers, they are “Results Oriented Managers” (Wholey, 1983, p. 225) who, while they look for correlation in their data, ought to be looking for the ability to correlate their tasks with the tasks of other stakeholders. In addition, these results oriented managers must be looking outside of their agency for correlation of their processes with those of other agencies, ever mindful of the opportunity to adapt and implement similar programs proven in other agencies. The design included Case Study Selection and Template Preparation; Data Collection Procedures; Data Analysis; and Assumptions and Limitations of the Research. These will be explained further in the remaining pages. Case Study Selection and Template Preparation The research attempted to determine if the DOD's hierarchical framework of stakeholder’s needs, values, and responsibilities could be adapted successfully for use by another Federal Government agency. The researcher focused on the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) United States Coast Guard (USCG), specifically those USCG personnel primarily concerned with and responsible for emergency management decisionmaking with particular focus on contingency preparedness planning, and the Congressional staff that provides them oversight. 81 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The research started with the identification of historical events from the targeted agency; the USCG’s historian provided the researcher with access to the USCG Historical Center. Numerous incidents from the Coast Guard’s historical files and identified candidate historical events that required emergency response decisionmaking were reviewed. Most of November and December 1999 was spent gathering information from official Coast Guard files concerning emergency management. The researcher reviewed in detail the USCG's primary planning documents for emergency decisionmaking: The “USCG Contingency Preparedness Planning Manual”; the “Incident Command System (ICS)”; and, as an example of local emergency management procedures, the “Baltimore Area Contingency Plan.” Using these three documents, the researcher created fifty-six (56) pages of highly detailed tables that identified and defined the specific activities conducted by the Coast Guard during emergency management. These tables included a linkage of Coast Guard activities to the comparable activities in the DOD's existing hierarchical framework and, where no comparable DOD activity existed, a new "user" task was created to cover the USCG activity. This work was accomplished with the DOD model's supporting software. An example of the table is in Appendix 2. The researcher used a focus group of USCG military and civilian personnel to help in the final selection of the historical events for case study. The previously created table of USCG activities and the DOD model's supporting software was used to prepare three USCG emergency response case studies. The events selected 82 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. represent different magnitudes of incidents using the USCG’s lexicon for sizing. Generically, one each large-, medium-, small-emergency response historical event was selected for investigation and used as a case study. Each historical event case study was explored and developed using the lexicon of the DOD’s hierarchical framework of stakeholder’s NVR. Each historical event was identified as a mission; the mission was developed by identifying the series of operations required to accomplish the mission; and the operations were developed by identifying the series of tasks (activities/fmctions/processes) required to accomplish the operation and, thereby, the mission. The individual tasks were then linked to a series of conditions (external factors) of the environments (physical, bureaucratic,' political and economic environments) that directly impact task accomplishment. Finally, with the tasks linked to a series of conditions, measures of performance were linked to the tasks and specific standards were specified for the level of performance required for those tasks. The researcher developed each historical event’s mission; operations; and tasks, conditions, and measures into an Operational Template using the procedures and software that support the DOD’s hierarchical framework of stakeholder’s NVR. The mission was defined as the emergency response required of the USCG’s operational units involved in the historical event. The tasks required to accomplish 'In DOD’s hierarchical framework of stakeholder’s NVR, there is a series of conditions for the military environment. The researcher substituted a bureaucratic environment for the DOT’s hierarchical framework of NVR. 83 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the mission were identified—created as necessary—by the researcher combining his expertise with the DOD hierarchical framework and the results of his historical research. The tasks included all those necessary to accomplish the mission and were sequenced in the order to be accomplished, which created the operations template. Therefore, the operations template for the first series of case studies started with strategic planning tasks, stepped to operational planning tasks, then moved through intelligence (information gathering), communication, and transportation tasks and on to the execution tasks. Finally, the operations template closed with redeployment tasks and tasks involving review, reporting, and revision of planning, procedures, and possibly revision of the strategic vision. The operations template provided a graphical depiction of the tasks performed as part of the operation required to accomplish the mission. The template depicted activities and the interactions among them. The activities represented in the operations templates were an attempt to include sufficient tasks to require the response of most of the stakeholders. Once the case studies, which varied by the size of the oil spill and the location of the oil spills, were created, the researcher and his focus group reviewed them. The researcher’s focus group, which was made up of USCG military and civilian personnel, validated the selection of missions, operations to accomplish the mission, and tasks to accomplish the operations, then verified the appropriateness of the linkage of the tasks to specific conditions of the environments, and finally they validated the performance measures that were linked to the tasks. Then, in December 84 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1999, the researcher traveled to and briefed the Commander of a Coast Guard District. The admiral, his Chief of Staff, Operations Officer, and Chief of Search and Rescue provided the researcher with three full hours of their time. On their recommendation, the researcher traveled to the USCG Contingency Preparedness Planning School for extensive one-on-one briefings and discussions with the Chief of the school. With an increased awareness of Coast Guard emergency management procedures and responsibilities, the researcher, using historical data as a foundation for credibility, built two lengthy and comprehensive case studies. The two new case studies were called “TITANIC II: Operations’ ’ ’ and “TITANIC II: Planning.” These two case studies attempted to test all of the Coast Guard's emergency response capabilities. Data Collection Procedures The available written documentation for the two case studies was reviewed and analyzed. The researcher and his focus group analyzed the data and identified appropriate stakeholders for the researcher to brief, demonstrate the DOD model's supporting software, and survey. Finally, the researcher collected data through personal briefings covering the concept of a hierarchical framework of NVR, software demonstrations, and survey-interviews with each of the stakeholders identified for the two case studies. 85 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Stakeholders The selected stakeholders were specifically those USCG personnel primarily concerned with and responsible for emergency management decisionmaking with particular focus on contingency preparedness planning, and the Congressional staff that provides them oversight. They were stakeholders who would play an important role in one or more of the activities required by the case studies. The researcher conducted survey-interviews with stakeholders at each level of the hierarchy. Then the researcher used the responses from the interview-survey to answer the research question. Key stakeholders from each of the following four levels of stakeholders were selected. Senior Field stakeholders, Junior Field stakeholders, USCG Headquarters Staff stakeholders, and • Congressional Staff stakeholders. Senior Field Stakeholders In early March 2000, the researcher traveled to the United States Coast Guard (USCG) Training Center Yorktown, Yorktown, Virginia, to provide a briefing, give a software demonstration, and to survey members of the senior class attending the Contingency Preparedness Planning School. The researcher provided a forty-minute 86 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. briefing, a forty-minute software demonstration, and then the members of the class completed a survey with 52 statements on the Likert scale. Senior Field Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of nineteen senior USCG officers from field operations throughout the USCG world. The group included one USCG Captain (0-6), eight USCG Commanders (0-5), and ten USCG Lieutenant Commanders (0-4). There were five Commanding Officers (Directors), four Executive Officers (Deputy Directors), and ten Division Officers or Branch Officers (Senior Staffers). Their average time in service to the USCG was 17.8 years. The longest period of service for this group of stakeholders was twenty-nine years and the shortest was twelve years. Junior Field Stakeholders In April 2000, the researcher traveled to the United States Coast Guard (USCG) Training Center Yorktown, Yorktown, Virginia, to provide a briefing, give a software demonstration, and to survey members of the junior class attending the Contingency Preparedness Planning School. The researcher provided a forty-minute briefing, a forty-minute software demonstration, and then the members of the class completed a survey requiring 52 responses on the Likert scale. Junior Field Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of fourteen USCG officers from field operations throughout the USCG world. The group included two USCG Lieutenant Commanders (0-4), six USCG Lieutenants (0-3), four USCG Lieutenant Junior Grades (0-2), one USCG Ensign (0-1) and one USCG Chief Petty 87 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Officer (E-7). Their average time in service to the USCG was ten years. The longest period of service for this group of stakeholders was twenty-one years and the shortest was one year. Headquarters Staff Stakeholders In late March 2000, the researcher traveled to the United States Coast Guard (USCG) Headquarters (HQ), Washington, DC, to provide a briefing, give a software demonstration, and to survey all members of the Contingency Preparedness Division, USCG HQ. The researcher provided a forty-minute briefing, a forty-minute software demonstration, and then the members of the class completed a survey requiring 52 responses on the Likert scale. Headquarters Staff Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of five USCG officers and one USCG civilian assigned to the Contingency Preparedness Division, USCG HQ. The group included one USCG Commander (0-5), and three USCG Lieutenant Commanders (0-4), one USCG Lieutenant Junior Grade, and one USCG GS-13. Their average time in service to the USCG was 14.8 years. The longest period of service for this group of stakeholders was twenty-three years and the shortest was five years. Congressional Staff Stakeholders In late June 2000, the researcher traveled to Capitol Hill, Washington, DC, to brief and survey the Congressional Staff members who support the U.S. House of 88 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Representative's “Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation” and the U.S. Senate's “Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Oceans and Fisheries.” The researcher provided a fifty-minute briefing and software demonstration, and then the Congressional staffers completed a survey requiring 52 responses on the Likert scale. Congressional Staff Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of two U.S. government employees of the U.S. Senate, three U.S. government employees of the House of Representatives and one USCG Lieutenant Commander (0-4), assigned to the Senate and one USCG Lieutenant Commander (0-4) assigned to the House. The highest-ranking government employee was an SES equivalent employee of the U.S. House of Representatives. Their average time in U.S. government service was eleven years. The longest period of service for this group of stakeholders was twenty-three years and the shortest was one year. Interview Guide The researcher developed the interview guide to ensure that like data were collected from each stakeholder for each case study. The interview guide facilitated an assessment of each stakeholder’s response to each historical event. The guide included a personal letter to each of the interviewee explaining the requirement for the briefing, software demonstration, survey-interview; an example of the letter is in Appendix 3, Part 1. The briefing, demonstrations, survey-interviews took place on the interviewee’s terms with the researcher traveling as necessary. The 89 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. researcher traveled 400 miles to interview the Senior Field stakeholders and another 400 miles to interview the Junior Field stakeholders. The interviews for the USCG Headquarters Staff and Congressional Staff stakeholders were conducted in Washington, DC. Each briefing, software demonstration, and survey-interview was conducted alike with a script to introduce the process as shown in Appendix 3, Part 2. The survey-interview is in Appendix 3, Part 3; it required 52 responses. The survey was developed using an intensity scale format known as the Likert scale—sometimes called the agree-or-disagree scale (GAO, October 1993, p. 66). The researcher reviewed and understood the possibility of error and threats to validity attendant to his use of the Likert scale. To minimize inappropriate survey statements, the researcher pre-tested the survey on stakeholders within the DOD who held positions similar to the candidate interviewees from the DOT. The researcher’s focus group, which was made up of USCG military and civilian personnel, pre-tested all survey statements. Data Analysis Procedures Data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise recombining the evidence, to address the initial propositions of a study. Analyzing case study evidence is especially difficult because the strategies and techniques have not been well defined in the past. Nevertheless, every investigation should start with a general analytic strategy [emphasis added]—yielding priorities or what to analyze and why. (Yin, 1989, p. 105) 90 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This section contains the researcher’s general analytic strategy for identifying the what and why and for preparing summaries of the findings during the interviews with stakeholders for each historical event, comparing the results of survey interviews, and answering the research question. Data Management Procedures A review of each survey-interview was conducted immediately after completion. The purpose of this review was to ensure the responses were made to all statements in the survey-interview. The data were entered as soon as possible into an Excel spreadsheet and an Access database. The spreadsheet and the database were the repository for all survey response data. The data obtained from the stakeholder survey were captured in various tables designed for ease of organizing, storing, maintaining, retrieving, sorting, and reporting. The information is presented in a variety of reports designed to illustrate the breadth and depth of experience within the survey population and the range of responses along several dimensions. The employed data management procedures ensured the researcher could do the following: Record and display the responses from each stakeholder. • Record and display the combined data from each level of stakeholder for both case studies. • Record and display the combined data from both case studies for each characteristic of the stakeholders. 91 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Record and display the data that will directly answer the research questions. Data Analysis The GAO guide Case Study Evaluations (November 1990, p. 63) and Robert K. Yin’s Case Study Research: Design and Methods (1989, p. 105) both identify key case study analytic techniques as pattern-matching and explanation building. The researcher’s analysis focused (the majority of his survey statements) on pattern- matching. For the analysis preparation, the researcher used Caudle’s data reduction techniques. “Data reduction really starts in the actual data collection stage. Data reduction is the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming raw data” (Caudle in Wholey, Hatry, & Newcomer, 1994, p. 7). The following tables show the levels of aggregation that the researcher used to identify evidence of pattern-matching. The researcher’s focus group helped establish the baseline for this analytic technique. There are a total of fifty-two statements that the four groups of stakeholders were asked to respond to in the survey. Table 6 shows a breakout by case study, stakeholder, and the total data points for all survey statements. 92 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 6 DATA COLLECTION ON ALL SURVEY STATEMENTS Survey Statements Case Studies Stakeholders Data Points 52 Operations 9 Senior Field 468 52 Planning 10 Senior Field 520 52 Operations 7 Junior Field 364 52 Planning 7 Junior Field 364 52 Operations 3 Headquarters Staff 156 52 Planning 3 Headquarters Staff 156 52 Operations 3 Congressional Staff 156 52 Planning 4 Congressional Staff 208 All Survev Statements TOTAL Data Points: 2392 Of these 52 survey statements the researcher and his focus group determined that the survey has 32 key statements; they apply directly to one or more of the four questions the dissertation tried to answer. Table 7 shows a breakout by case study, stakeholder, and the total data points for key survey statements, which warranted additional weighting during analysis. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 7 DATA COLLECTION ON FOCUS GROUP’S IDENTIFIED KEY SURVEY STATEMENTS Key Statements Case Studies Stakeholders Data Points 32 Operations 9 Senior Field 288 32 Planning 10 Senior Field 320 32 Operations 7 Junior Field 224 32 Planning 7 Junior Field 224 32 Operations 3 Headquarters Staff 96 32 Planning 3 Headquarters Staff 96 32 Operations 3 Congressional Staff 96 32 Planning 4 Congressional Staff 128 Kev Survey Statements TOTAL Data Points: 1472 The interview-survey also included a set of statements that were open-ended and elicited feedback and served the analytic technique of explanation building, which is “a special type of pattern matching” (Yin, 1989, p. 113). The data were gathered and formatted into an Excel spreadsheet and an Access database. These sources were both reviewed for completeness and the data were then mined and placed into Power Point presentation format. Examples of the presentation formats are in Appendix 4. Limitations of the Research and How They Were Addressed Critical Limitation The proper selection of knowledgeable and committed stakeholders for the survey-interview was very important to the data quality. To help ensure that 94 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. knowledgeable stakeholders were selected, the researcher accomplished the following: • Reviewed and carefully built the case studies to ensure they were credible, realistic events that challenged all of the operational capabilities of the Coast Guard; Verified each group of stakeholders would play a role in the event the case study represented; Made an initial selection of stakeholder candidates for survey-interview; and Reviewed the candidates for stakeholder with the researcher's focus group. The commitment of these stakeholders was critical to obtaining meaningful responses to the research questions. To help ensure commitment from the stakeholders selected, the researcher took several steps. He made every effort to convince the stakeholders that the researcher was not “second-guessing” the Coast Guard's response during an event similar to the event the case study represented. Prior to contacting the selected stakeholders, the researcher gained buy-in from these stakeholders by pre-briefing their organization's point of contact, who then provided the researcher with an introduction to stakeholders. 95 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The survey's cover letter included reference to the DOD's hierarchical framework of stakeholder's NVR and highlighted that it is a Commandant of the Coast Guard Instruction for Coast Guard DOD activities (USCG COMDTINST M3500.1). Other Limitations The cases studies are from the same organization, limiting the testing of external validity. • Interview-surveys were conducted with 46 subjects. The sample was large enough to ensure statistical reliability. However, the importance of the selection of stakeholder respondents was understood and not minimized. Responses with extreme values could skew the results of this size sample. The researcher and the focus group discussed the responses that seemed to be inconsistent or out of range compared to the baseline. However, no respondents were identified as being outliers. The researcher reviewed and understood the possibility of error and threats to validity attendant to his use of the Likert scale; the Likert scale could have introduced a bias. The researcher thinks strongly that the framework in question has value and can be adapted to other organizations. The researcher guarded against inadvertently influencing the outcome of the interview-surveys. 96 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Triangulation is limited. The research was based on the results o f the interview-surveys and background information. The dissertation process model is presented in Figure 4. Summary This chapter addressed case study selection, data collection procedures, stakeholders, the interview guide, data analysis procedures, and limitations of the research. It also included a dissertation process model. The next two chapters will use case studies to demonstrate the adaptation of the DOD's Universal Naval Task List (UNTL)—Mission Essential Task List (METL) process to another Federal Government agency. The DOD’s UNTL-METL process is supported by a hierarchical framework of DOD stakeholders’ needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR). The case studies demonstrate the applicability and utility of first, removing the DOD stakeholder's NVR from the DOD’s hierarchical framework, second, combining the remaining hierarchical framework structure with the stakeholders’ NVR of the DOT's USCG. The case studies specifically focus on those Coast Guard personnel primarily concerned with and responsible for emergency management decisionmaking and the Congressional staff that provides them oversight. The two case studies that make up Chapter IV and Chapter V include an introduction, background, plus the case study description report and the case study task report for each. The case studies will be followed by Chapter VI with the findings determined from an analysis of the research process and an analysis of the data collected. 97 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 4. DISSERTATION PROCESS MODEL Dissertation Process Model Produced [Reports that Responded to tbeDissertatian'sQnestions Evaluated Survey Data Using Excel Spreadsheet and Access Database Conduc tedBriefings, Demonstrations^ Surveys of Key Stakeholders With Focus Group, Identified Key Stakeholders to Survey Expanded Existing Case Studies to Create Two New Comprehensive Case Studies that Addressed All USCG Capabilities Conducted USCG Historical and Operational Research Identified/Obtained Historical Events for Case Studies Identified/Obtained USCG Operational Planning Documents Created Tables of Activities Required for USCG Emergency Response Operations Briefed USCG Flag and Senior StafT and Received New, Specific Guidance With Table of Activities and DOD Software, Created Three USCG Emergency Response Case Studies Interviewed Principals, USCG Emergency Contingency Preparedness Planning School and Received Specific Insights Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER IV CASE STUDY “TITANIC H: OPERATIONS” Introduction For the case studies, the researcher followed Michael Q. Patton's lead and got his “hands dirty [participated] where possible in actual program activities, and [got] to know program staff and participants on a personal level” (Patton, 1980, pp. 12, 14). The researcher spent an extraordinary amount of rewarding time with the historical documents that provide a foundation for modem USCG emergency management decision making. With a historical foundation the researcher then immersed himself in the documents and doctrine that represent the current way business is conducted by those USCG personnel primarily concerned with and responsible for emergency management decisionmaking with particular focus on contingency preparedness planning. These documents included the Commandant of the USCG Instruction M3500.1, Universal Naval Task List (UNTL), the USCG Contingency Preparedness Planning Manual, Volume 1, and the Incident Command System (ICS), an on-scene response management system and structure. 99 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. With this as a foundation, the researcher used the DOD model's supporting software and built an all encompassing mission that would test the extraordinary array of capabilities the USCG maintains to satisfy its many responsibilities. Background Although “TITANIC II: Operations” was a fictitious event, historically valid data and current USCG procedural publications were used to make the case study as realistic as possible. The broad scenario follows: On Tuesday, 22 February 20XX, 212 PIW (persons in water) and a major oil spill occurred when the 987 foot U.K. cruise ship TITANIC II, with 2450 passengers, .8 million gallons of fuel oil, ran aground near Boston, MA. At 0028 22 February 20XX, the TITANIC II transmitted by radio to Coast Guard Marine Safety Office (MSO) Boston and reported that the vessel was hard aground on unknown submerged object at position N42° 19' 30" and W70° 43' 7.5" approximately outside of the vessel traffic channel. Case Study “TITANIC II: Operations” was 164 pages long. It comprised 19 separate operations, these operations were linked to 101 tasks, each of the tasks was linked to 5 to 7 conditions of the environments and to approximately 5 performance measures. An example of several pages of the 164 page Case Study “TITANIC II: Operations''' follows. The example includes a mission description of the incident and the USCG response. To minimize space, it includes the actual screen display of each of the operations templates but only a single task was included after each operation. The task (activities/functions/processes) has been linked to the conditions (external factors) of the environments (physical, military, political and economic 100 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. environments) that directly impact task accomplishment, and, finally, the task was linked to measures of performance to establish the level of performance required for those tasks. The case studies were produced by building the mission within the DOD model's supporting software and then selecting “Mission Task” reports. The case studies are mission task reports of the DOD model's supporting software. 101 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations s o H I & i '—1880 use Prepared By: J.R. Paron 6459 Andes Court Woodbridge, VA 22193 (703) 412 2812 x6071 (work) (703) 878-9499 (home) 1 0 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents .................................................................................................... i Mission Description Report ...................................................................................... 1 Mission Task Report.................................................................................................. 2 TEMPLATE: DOT USCG Case Study: Operations.......................................... 3 TEMPLATE: Operations Section C hief............................................................ 4 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements................................................................. 5 NTA 5 Exercise Command and Control................................................. 7 NTA 5.3.1.2 Provide Initial Concept of Operations......................................... 9 U-NTA 5.3.9.3.1 Develop Tactical Operations....................................................... 10 NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness ....................................... 1 1 TEMPLATE: Emergency Response Branch (SAR Unit).................................... 12 NTA 5.3.1.3 Develop Requirements and Priorities......................................... 13 U-NTA 5.3.1.3.1 Develop SAR Mission Priorities................................................. 14 NTA 5.3.9.3 Plan Tactical Operations............................................................. 15 NTA 5.4.1 Direct Forces ............................................................................. 16 NTA 6.2.3 Perform Search and Rescue (SAR)............................................. 17 TEMPLATE: Emergency Response Branch (EMS Unit) .................................. 19 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements................................................................. 20 NTA 4.12.1 Perform Triage........................................................................... 22 U-NTA 4.12.1.1 Prioritize EMS Missions............................................................. 24 U-NTA 4.12.14 Manage EMS Resources............................................................. 25 U-NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness ...................................... 26 TEMPLATE: Emergency Response Branch (Firefighting Unit) ........................ 27 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements................................................................ 28 NTA 4.3.2.5 Provide Damage Repair to Ships at S e a .................................... 30 U-NTA 4.13.10 Analyze Mission and Current Situation...................................... 32 NTA 5.4.1 Direct Forces ............................................................................. 33 NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness .................................... 34 103 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations TEMPLATE: Emergency Response Branch (HAZMAT U nit).......................... 35 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements................................................................... 36 U-NTA 4.7.9 Provide Environmental Disaster Relief Support.......................... 38 U-NTA 4.7.9.5 Identify Safety Hazards................................................................. 40 U-NTA 4.7.9.6 Designate HAZMAT Exclusion Zones......................................... 41 U-NTA 4.7.9.7 HAZMAT Operations................................................................... 42 U-NTA 4.13.10 Analyze Mission and Current Situation......................................... 45 NTA 5.4.1 Direct Forces ............................................................................... 46 NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness ....................................... 47 TEMPLATE: Emergency Response Branch (Salvage Unit) .............................. 48 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements................................................................... 49 U-NTA 4.13.5 Salvage Sunken, Grounded, and Beached Vessels ...................... 51 U-NTA 4.13.7 Conduct Salvage of Oil and Fuels Cargo .................................... 53 U-NTA 4.13.10 Analyze Mission and Current Situation........................................ 55 NTA 5.4.1 Direct Forces ............................................................................... 56 NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness ...................................... 57 TEMPLATE: Recovery and Protection Branch (Protection U nit)...................... 58 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements.................................................................. 59 U-NTA 4.3.2.6 Repair and Maintain Equipment.................................................. 61 NTA 4.7.9 Provide Environmental Disaster Relief Support.......................... 62 U-NTA 4.7.9.1 Deploy and Maintain Environmental Disaster Relief Equipment .................................................................................. 64 U-NTA 5.1.3.4 Maintain Information and Force Status........................................ 66 NTA 5.3.3 Develop Courses of Action.......................................................... 67 NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness ...................................... 68 TEMPLATE: Recovery and Protection Branch (Decontamination Unit) ......... 69 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements.................................................................. 70 NTA 4.7.9 Provide Environmental Disaster Relief Support.......................... 72 U-NTA 4.7.9.4 Identify Decontamination Needs and Provide Clean Up Resources.................................................................................... 74 TEMPLATE: Recovery and Protection Branch (Shoreside Recovery Unit) . . . 75 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements.................................................................. 76 NTA 4.7.9 Provide Environmental Disaster Relief Support.......................... 78 U-NTA 4.7.9.2 Shoreline Cleanup Sign Off ........................................................ 80 NTA 5 Exercise Command and Control.................................................. 81 NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness ...................................... 83 104 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations TEMPLATE: Recovery and Protection Branch (On Water Recovery Unit) . . . 84 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements................................................................ 85 U-NTA 5.1.3.4 Maintain Information and Force Status..................................... 87 NTA 5.4.1 Direct Forces ............................................................................ 88 NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness ................................... 89 TEMPLATE: Recovery and Protection Branch (Disposal Unit) ..................... 90 NTA 4.7.9 Provide Environmental Disaster Relief Support....................... 91 U-NTA 4.7.9.3 Management of Contamination................................................. 93 U-NTA 5.1.3.4 Maintain Information and Force Status..................................... 94 NTA 5.4.1 Direct Forces ........................................................................... 95 TEMPLATE: Air Operations Branch (Traffic Coordination Unit) ................. 96 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements................................................................ 97 NTA 5.4.1 Direct Forces ............................................................................ 99 NTA 5.4.3.1 Coordinate [AirJ Missions ....................................................... 100 U-NTA 5.4.3.1.1 Prioritize Air Operations........................................................... 101 U-NTA 5.4.3.1.2 Request Additional Aircraft ..................................................... 102 U-NTA 5.4.3.1.3 Coordinate Aircraft Ground Support ....................................... 103 NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness ................................... 104 TEMPLATE: Air Operations Branch (Applications Unit)............................... 105 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements............................................................... 106 NTA 5.4.3.1 Coordinate [Air] Missions ....................................................... 108 U-NTA 5.4.3.1.5 Conduct Air Operations ........................................................... 109 NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness ................................... Ill TEMPLATE: Air Operations Branch (Surveillance Unit)............................... 112 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements............................................................... 113 NTA 5.4.3.1 Coordinate [Air] Missions ....................................................... 115 U-NTA 5.4.3.1.4 Coordinate Mission Tasking..................................................... 116 NTA 5.4.1 Direct Forces ........................................................................... 117 NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness ................................... 118 105 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations TEMPLATE: Site Management Branch (Staging Unit).................................... 119 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements................................................................ 120 NTA 4.7.9 Provide Environmental Disaster Relief Support........................ 122 U-NTA 4.7.9.12 Identify Incident Staging Sites.................................................... 124 U-NTA 4.7.9.13 Prepare Incident Staging Sites.................................................... 126 NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness .................................... 128 TEMPLATE: Site Management Branch (Waterways Unit).............................. 129 NTA 1.3 Maintain Mobility...................................................................... 130 U-NTA 1.3.5 Manage Waterways.................................................................... 132 U-NTA 1.3.6 Develop Safety and Security Zones .......................................... 134 U-NTA 1.3.7 Coordinate Enforcement of Safety and Security Zones............. 135 U-NTA 1.3.8 Manage Waterways Unit Resources.......................................... 137 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements................................................................ 138 NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness .................................... 140 TEMPLATE: Site Management Branch (Security U nit).................................. 141 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements................................................................ 142 NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness .................................... 144 NTA 6.3.1.2 Protect/Secure Operationally Critical Installations, Facilities, and Systems ............................................................... 145 U-NTA 6.3.1.2.1 Coordinate Incident Physical Security........................................ 147 U-NTA 6.3.1.2.2 Implement Incident Security...................................................... 149 TEMPLATE: Wildlife Branch (Rehabilitation (REHAB) Unit)....................... 150 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements................................................................ 151 U-NTA 4.12.10.5 Establish Rehabilitation Centers for Recovered Wildlife....................................................................................... 153 U-NTA 4.12.10.6 Control Deceased W ildlife........................................................ 154 U-NTA 5.1.3.4 Maintain Information and Force Status...................................... 155 106 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations TEMPLATE: Wildlife Branch (Wildlife Recovery Unit)................................... 156 U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements................................................................. 157 U-NTA 4.12.10.1 Maintain Recovered Wildlife Clearing Point............................... 159 U-NTA 4.12.10.2 Maintain Wildlife Evidence, Tagging, and Storage.................... 160 U-NTA 4.12.10.3 Maintain Recovered Wildlife ..................................................... 161 U-NTA 4.12.10.4 Provide Handling Training for Recovered Wildlife.................... 162 NTA 5.4.1 Direct Forces .............................................................................. 163 NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness ..................................... 164 107 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States C oast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Mission: DOT USCG Case Study: Operations OPLAN: CS: Operations Combatant Command Responsible: 1st DISTRICT (BOSTON) Joint Force Command: Description: USCG Marine Safety Office Boston, the On-Scene Coordinator, reported: (1) NRC#: 0XX-00 TITANIC II. (2) LOCATION: Massachusetts Bay. (3) PIW (persons in water): 212. (4) PASSENGERS STRANDED: 2238. (5) POLLUTANT: Fuel oil. (6) OCCURRENCE DATE: 22 February 20XX. (7) BODY OF WATER: Massachusetts Bay. (8) SEVERITY: Major (Coastal). (9) QUANTITY DISCHARGED. .5 million gallons. (10) QUANTITY ENTERING WATER: .5 million gallons. (11) SOURCE: TITANIC II. (12) CAUSE: Vessel grounding. (13) OSC: USCG Marine Safety Office Boston. (14) REMARKS: On Tuesday, 22 February 20XX, 212 PIW (persons in water) and a major oil spill occurred when the 987 foot U.K. cruise ship TITANIC II, with 2450 passengers, .8 million gallons of fuel oil, ran aground near Boston, MA. At 0028 22 February 20XX, the TITANIC II transmitted by radio to Coast Guard MSO Boston and reported that the vessel was hard aground on unknown submerged object at position N42° 19' 30" and W 70° 43’ 7.5" approximately 2 miles outside of the vessel traffic channel. In response to this grounding, oil spill, and SAR effort: (1) VESSELS: 786 deployed. (2) BOOM DEPLOYED: 281,990 feet containment and 169,340 feet absorbent. (3) BOOM AVAILABLE (in reserve): 264,290 feet containment and 214, 760 feet absorbent. (4) AIRCRAFT: 57 total (19 contracted helicopters, 8 ADEC aircraft, 17 contracted floatplanes, 4 photo planes, 9 others). Commander’ s Guidance: Global Conditions: (Designator): Doctrinal Citations: 108 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. MRM [Annly/n Mir.nion Histnricnl Inr.irinnt C (M AJOR) Opomtinn Irinntify A Align I nsknj 1 0 9 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. W S s & X ' M wmWrnm h » i z 110 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Identify Requirements (U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1) Responsible Organization: Definition: To assess the force needs for additional resources and logistics support for HAZMAT; EMS; Air Ops (including air traffic coordination, surveillance, applications); skimming ops; protection ops (including boom types, lengths, mooring systems, and vessels); decontamination services; salvage ops; firefighting ops; communication services; medical services; facilities; transportation services; personnel processing and tracking; volunteer processing; contracting and procurement services; financial services (including cost documentation and time keeping); and site management (including security and staging sites). Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 2.1.1 Mission Instructions - Clarity of instructions, directives, policy guidance (including end state), strategies, or Status of Forces Agreements, below the NCA level. Restrictive (a large number of instructions, leaves little discretion to the on-scene commander) Minimal (few in number, leaves most decisions to the on-scene commander) Clear (addresses likely issues and hedges, leaves little or no ambiguity as to intent, and allows freedom of action where required) C 2.1.3 Mission Preparation - Degree to which preparations for mission have been completed at time of mission execution. Includes intelligence, logistic, positioning of units, etc. No Outline (a concept of operations or a draft OPLAN has been produced) Partially Completed (an OPLAN has been developed but is not fully refined and approved) Completed (fully developed plan, including approval) C 2.1.4.4 Tactical Area of Responsibility - Physical scope and breadth of a Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). Very large (> 100,000 km2) Large (10,000 to 100,000 km2) Moderate (1,000 to 10,000 km2) Small (500 to 1,000 km2) Very small (< 500 km2) 1 1 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 2.1.5 Time Available - The time available, normally the time allowed, to complete a phase in a concept of operations. Long (weeks to months) Moderate (days to weeks) Short (hours to days) C 2.2.5.2 Modem Information & Intelligence Processing Systems - The availability of modem information systems in numbers and types. Few (treated as "magic bullet" systems and very closely controlled) Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled) Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force) C 2.2.6 Interoperability - The ability of systems, units, or forces to interact and operate effectively with other systems, units, or forces. No Some (systems, units, or forces can only partially interoperate) High (systems, units, or forces can be integrated vertically and horizontally with few workarounds) Full (systems, units, or forces can integrate easily, both vertically and horizontally) C 2.3.1.3 Staff Expertise - The level of skill and experience that staff personnel can provide to the commander, with regard to operational art and logistics, the capabilities and limitations of force elements, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Limited (staff lacks skill in working together or lacks knowledge of assigned forces) Moderate (staff effective and generally knows the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of assigned forces) High (staff works well together and has a good grasp of the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of the forces assigned or likely to be assigned) C 2.3.1.6 Communications Connectivity - The degree to which communications can be maintained up and down the chain of command and horizontally. Comm Out Periodic (only operates periodically) Continuous (operates with almost no interruptions) Standards: Hours Percent To transmit requirements to providing authority. Of requests for identified requirements are returned for additional justification/clarification. Of requests for identified requirements, returned for additional justification/clarification. Incidents Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 1 1 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. [Annlyre Mission Historical Incident (, (MAJOH) Operation Identity A Align Tasks / f m e r g e n r y R e s p o n s e llranch (!.A H Unit)) p i ! « M W > l A , M V M W 1 - . V i V y r ffiS S fiS S S k wmm ssss H . H M i ■ J ^ ? 5 5 5 k 5 5 5 SJS»^SSa 2 a » s » ! J 1 1 3 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Perform Search and Rescue (SAR) (NTA 6.2.3) Responsible Organization: Definition: To employ aircraft, surface ships, submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea (JP 1, 3-0, 3-50. 3-50.1, NDP 1, 6, NWP 1-02, 3-50.1) Notes: Doctrine: JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, 10 January 1995 JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995 JP 3-50 National Search and Rescue Manual Vol I: National Search and Rescue System, 1 February 1991 JP 3-50.1 National Search and Rescue Manual, Vol II: Planning Handbook, 1 Feb 91 NDP 1;NDP 6 NWP 1-02; NWP 3-50.1 Conditions: C 1.2.1.3 Sea State - Roughness of seas caused by wind or disturbances. Extremely rough (tops of waves blowing off, sea state 7 to 9) Rough (foamy tops, sea state 6) Moderately rough (whitecaps, sea state 3 to 5) Calm to gentle (< sea state 3) C 1.2.1.4 Ocean Temperature - Water surface temperature (degrees Fahrenheit). Warm (> 750 F) Moderate (560 to 750 F) Cold (350 to 550 F) Extremely cold (< 350 F) C 1.3.1.3.1 Air Temperature - Atmospheric temperature at ground level. Very cold (< 10 F) Cold (10 to 39 F) Temperate (40 to 85 F) Hot (>85 F) C 1.3.1.3.3 Surface Wind Velocity - The speed at which air moves through the atmosphere at an altitude up to 500 feet. Hurricane force (> 73 mph) High (47 to 72 mph) Strong (25 to 46 mph) Moderate (7 to 24 mph) Light (< 7 mph) 114 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 1.3.2 Visibility - Maximum distance to see an object given the moisture and particulate matter (dust, salt, ash) suspended in the atmosphere. Unlimited (> 20 NM) High (10 to 20 NM) Good (3 to 10 NM) Moderate (1 to 3 NM) Low ('A to 1 NM) WOXOF (< « / 4 NM) C 1.3.2.1 Light - Light available to illuminate objects from natural or manmade sources. Negligible (overcast night) Low (dusk, dawn, moonlit, streetlight lit) Day (overcast day) Bright (sunny day) C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) Standards: Hours Minutes Percent Hours Percent Percent Percent NM2 Percent To reach area of isolated personnel after Go decision. From notification person missing, until rescue units prepared to authenticate identity of isolated personnel. Of personnel sending SAR distress signals, rescued. To rescue an aircrew after ejection or bailout. Of ground personnel declared missing, later recovered. Of isolated personnel enter UAR system. Probability of detection. Search area coverage. Probability of success. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 115 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. MRM [Annly?n Minninn I lintnncnl Inndnnl C (MAJOR) Opornlmn Idnntify f t Aliqn I nnkr, / f rnnrqnmry Rniipnnr.n Hmnrh (I M! > Unit)) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Perform Triage (NTA 4.12.1) Responsible Organization: Definition: To classify incoming casualties by level of treatment required. (JP 4-0, 4-02 Series, NDP 4, NWP 4-02 Series, FMFM 4-50) Notes: Doctrine: JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, 27 January 1995 JP 4-02 Series NDP 4; NWP 4-02 Series; FMFM 4-50 Conditions: C 1.2.1.3 Sea State - Roughness of seas caused by wind or disturbances. Extremely rough (tops of waves blowing off, sea state 7 to 9) Rough (foamy tops, sea state 6) Moderately rough (whitecaps, sea state 3 to 5) Calm to gentle (< sea state 3) C 1.3.1.1 Season - Periods of the year characterized by changes in temperature, daylight length, storm activity, and precipitation. Fall (cool dry weather) Summer (hot long days) Spring (wet moderate temperatures) Winter (cold short days) C 1.3.1.3 Weather - Current weather (next 24 hours). Stormy Precipitating Overcast Partly cloudy Clear C 1.3.1.3.1 Air Temperature - Atmospheric temperature at ground level. Very cold (< 10 F) Cold (10 to 39 F) Temperate (40 to 85 F) Hot (>85 F) C 1.3.1.3.3 Surface Wind Velocity - The speed at which air moves through the atmosphere at an altitude up to 500 feet. Hurricane force (> 73 mph) High (47 to 72 mph) Strong (25 to 46 mph) Moderate (7 to 24 mph) Light (< 7 mph) 117 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 1.3.1.3.6 Precipitation - Amount of moisture that falls to earth. Light (light rain or flurries) Moderate (steady rain or snow) Heavy (downpour, blizzard) C 1.3.3.2 Chemical Effects - Effects of chemical weapons employment. No Some (limited area or temporary) Extensive (widespread and persistent) C 2.1.4.1 Location - The location where the task must be performed. Afloat Ashore C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) C 2.2.4.5 Personnel Experience - The degree to which the civilian and military personnel assigned the task are experienced at the task. Negligible Limited (largely a conscript force or a force with very high turnover of personnel) Normal (mix of professional personnel with new personnel and reserves) High (professional long-term military and civilian personnel) C 2.3.1.3 Staff Expertise - The level of skill and experience that staff personnel can provide to the commander, with regard to operational art and logistics, the capabilities and limitations of force elements, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Limited (staff lacks skill in working together or lacks knowledge of assigned forces) Moderate (staff effective and generally knows the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of assigned forces) High (staff works well together and has a good grasp of the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of the forces assigned or likely to be assigned) Standards: Percent Hours Percent Percent Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 118 Accountability of personnel entering triage facility. Person is in triage until discharged or moved from triage facility. Of casualties die. Of casualties returned to incident response duties. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. xMllM [Annly?n Minn inn Hinton m l Inr.idnnt (, (MAJOR) Opnrnttnn Idnnhty K Ahqn Inr.kr. / {-mnrqnnny Hr.npnnnn flrnnnh (f irntirjhti X J 4 \ t 3 1 1 1 1 9 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Provide Damage Repair to Ships at Sea (U-NTA 4.3.2.5) Responsible Organization: Definition: To provide off-ship firefighting, underwater and on board damage assessment, structural analysis, and emergency towing to damaged ships and vessels. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 1.2 SEA - Those factors associated with the continuous salt water ocean system to include oceans, seas, gulfs, inlets, bays, sounds, straits, channels, and rivers. Riverine (inland from the littoral terrain to include rivers, canals, and delta areas connected landlocked waters) Littoral (Coastal, near (within 5 nautical miles of land areas) Open (open ocean, blue water beyond 5 nautical miles of land) C 1.2.1.1 0 Ocean Ice - The presence of ice at or near the ocean surface. No Isolated (ice chunks/icebergs possible) Marginal (broken ice on surface) Pack (surface covered with solid ice) C 1.2.1.2 Ocean Currents - A steady, generally predictable flow, present either in open ocean waters or in a littoral coastal ocean waters. Little or no (< 1 knot) Moderate (1 to 3 knots) Strong (> 3 knots) C 1.2.1.3 Sea State - Roughness of seas caused by wind or disturbances. Extremely rough (tops of waves blowing off. sea state 7 to 9) Rough (foamy tops, sea state 6) Moderately rough (whitecaps, sea state 3 to 5) Calm to gentle (< sea state 3) C 1.2.1.4 Ocean Temperature - Water surface temperature (degrees Fahrenheit). Warm (> 750 F) Moderate (560 to 750 F) Cold (350 to 550 F) Extremely cold (< 350 F) C 1.3.1.3 Weather - Current weather (next 24 hours). Stormy Precipitating Overcast Partly cloudy Clear 120 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 1.3.1.3.1 Air Temperature - Atmospheric temperature at ground level. Very cold (< 10 F) Cold (10 to 39 F) Temperate (40 to 85 F) Hot (>85 F) C 1.3.1.3.3 Surface Wind Velocity - The speed at which air moves through the atmosphere at an altitude up to 500 feet. Hurricane force (> 73 mph) High (47 to 72 mph) Strong (25 to 46 mph) Moderate (7 to 24 mph) Light (< 7 mph) C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) C 2.2.4.6 Personnel Fatigue - The degree to which personnel, due to lack of rest, are experiencing fatigue. Severe (significant impairment to physical and decision making skills need extended recovery period) Moderate (personnel operating with inadequate rest decision making skills are somewhat impaired) No (personnel are well rested) Standards: Hours After receipt of tasking, a concept and policy for equipment repair is in place. Percent Of equipment failures successfully repaired. Hours After receipt of request for towing, tow craft in place and rigged for towing. Hours After receipt of request for underwater damage assessment, divers in the water. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 121 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Hifilnricnl Inr.idnnt C (MAJOR)' Opnrntion Idnntify A Align I nnkfi / I : mnrgnnry lUir.pnnsn llrnni li (I IA/MA I J r W tflS w s s s # : Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Provide Environmental Disaster Relief Support (NTA 4.7.9) Responsible Organization: Definition: Provide support for environmental disaster relief, to include identification and locating hazardous environment, securing potential environmental hazards, and tracking hazardous releases. Includes transport and deployment of clean-up materials control/cleanup of hazardous releases, decontamination, messing, berthing and hotel services for other agency workers, personnel evacuation and transport, command and control facilities, and management of contaminated materials. (JP I, 3-0, 3-07. 3-57. 4-0. 4-04, NDP 1, 4, NWP 3-07, 4-04 Series) Notes: Doctrine: JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, 10 January 1995 JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 Februaiy 1995 JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 16 June 1995 JP 3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, 21 June 1995 JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, 27 January 1995 JP 4-04 Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support. 26 September 1995 NDP 1; NDP 4 NWP 3-07; NWP 4-04 Series Conditions: C 1.3.1.1 Season - Periods of the year characterized by changes in temperature, daylight length, storm activity, and precipitation. Fall (cool dry weather) Summer (hot long days) Spring (wet moderate temperatures) Winter (cold short days) C 1.3.1.3.1 Air Temperature - Atmospheric temperature at ground level. Very cold (< 10 F) Cold (10 to 39 F) Temperate (40 to 85 F) Hot (>85 F) C 1.3.1.3.5 Humidity - Amount of water vapor in the air. High (> 75%) Moderate (50 to 75%) Low (10 to 50%) Very Low (< 10%) 123 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 2.8.6 Commercial Procurement - The extent to which materiel and services can be procured from the local economy in theater. Negligible (<15% of items available in the US) Limited (15 to 50% of items available in the US) Extensive (50 to 90% of items normally available in the US) Fully available (> 90% of items normally available in the US) C 3.1.1.3 Interdepartmental/Interagency Relationships - Extent to which Executive Branch of government agencies work together toward articulated goals. Uncooperative (working in opposition to one another) Correct (partially cooperative) Strong (fully cooperative) C 3.1.2.6 Multinational Business Support - The extent to which multinational business organizations support military actions (e.g., oil companies). No Uncertain Limited Fostering Standards: Hours Until force on scene. Percent Of cleanup material present. Days Habitability restored. Percent Of evacuation complete. Persons per day evacuated. Days Required to make affected area accessible for operations Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 124 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. MHM - [Annly?o Mir.sion - I lintoncnl Incident (- (MA.IOH) Oporntinn - Idnntity f t Align fnr.ks / f morgonr.y Ror.ponr.r' llrnnrh (!>nlviiqn ■ m 125 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Conduct Salvage of Oil and Fuels Cargo (U-NTA 4.13.7) Responsible Organization: Definition: Offload liquid petroleum products from sunken or grounded ships or barges using lighters, specialized pumps, underwater and surface hot tap tank penetration devices, barges, bladders, and other equipment. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 1.2 SEA - Those factors associated with the continuous salt water ocean system to include oceans, seas, gulfs, inlets, bays, sounds, straits, channels, and rivers. Riverine (inland from the littoral terrain to include rivers, canals, and delta areas connected landlocked waters) Littoral (Coastal, near (within 5 nautical miles of land areas) Open (open ocean, blue water beyond 5 nautical miles of land) C 1.2.1 Ocean Waters - Primary bodies of salt water that are not landlocked. Arctic Indian Pacific (North and South) Atlantic (North and South) C 1.2.1.2 Ocean Currents - A steady, generally predictable flow, present either in open ocean waters or in a littoral coastal ocean waters. Little or no (< 1 knot) Moderate (1 to 3 knots) Strong (> 3 knots) C 1.2.1.4 Ocean Temperature - Water surface temperature (degrees Fahrenheit). Warm (> 750 F) Moderate (560 to 750 F) Cold (350 to 550 F) Extremely cold (< 350 F) C 1.2.1.6 Ocean Features - Features just above, just below, or within 10 fathoms of the ocean surface to include islands, atolls, reefs, shoals, rocks, or icebergs. Large submerged (shoals, subsurface reefs) Small submerged (rocks, icebergs) Small raised (atolls, reefs) Large raised (islands) 126 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 1.3.1.3 Weather - Current weather (next 24 hours). Stormy Precipitating Overcast Partly cloudy Clear C 1.3.1.3.1 Air Temperature - Atmospheric temperature at ground level (degrees Fahrenheit). Very cold (< 10 F) Cold (10 to 39 F) Temperate (40 to 85 F) Hot (>85 F) C 1.3.1.3.3 Surface Wind Velocity - The speed at which air moves through the atmosphere at an altitude up to 500 feet. Hurricane force (> 73 mph) High (47 to 72 mph) Strong (25 to 46 mph) Moderate (7 to 24 mph) Light (< 7 mph) C 1.3.1.3.6 Precipitation - Amount of moisture that falls to earth. No Light (light rain or flurries) Moderate (steady rain or snow) Heavy (downpour, blizzard) C 1.3.2 Visibility - Maximum distance to see an object given the moisture and particulate matter (dust, salt, ash) suspended in the atmosphere. Unlimited (> 20 NM) High (10 to 20 NM) Good (3 to 10 NM) Moderate (1 to 3 NM) Low (% to 1 NM) WOXOF (< '/< NM) C 1.3.2.1 Light - Light available to illuminate objects from natural or manmade sources. Negligible (overcast night) Low (dusk, dawn, moonlit, streetlight lit) Day (overcast day) Bright (sunny day) 127 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 2.1.3 Mission Preparation - Degree to which preparations for mission have been completed at time of mission execution. Includes intelligence, logistic, positioning of units, etc. No Outline (a concept of operations or a draft OPLAN has been produced) Partially Completed (an OPLAN has been developed but is not fully refined and approved) Completed (fully developed plan, including approval) C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) Standards: Days To complete recovery of oil and fuels cargo. Days To deliver recovered oil and fuels cargo to designated off-load point. Percent Of recovery equipment operational ready. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 1 2 8 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. [Anolyzo Mission I listoncol Incident 0 (MAJOR) O pcmtiori I don lily f t Align I (inks / Roc: (ivory ond R(()lor.lion I Iron oh (I 'rotor! ~V K v C C - * X f ? V f X . f O ' l l l l i p i i : i ( a tw u M i c u i i c u L c i l u c u X « u < tc a i j i i 129 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. J o in tT ra ln ln a S v sie m l Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Deploy and Maintain Environmental Disaster Relief Equip. (U-NTA 4.7.9.1) Responsible Organization: Definition: To provide support for environmental disaster relief. Includes transport and deployment of booms, dikes, or other protection devices as directed to accomplish protection, diversion, or containment strategies. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 1.1.3.5 Route Availability - The availability of navigable routes over land areas. Low (Few roads or trails, no all weather routes) Moderate (Some paved, but limited all weather road surfaces) High (multiple paved, all weather roads) C 1.2 SEA - Those factors associated with the continuous salt water ocean system to include oceans, seas, gulfs, inlets, bays, sounds, straits, channels, and rivers. Riverine (inland from the littoral terrain to include rivers, canals, and delta areas connected landlocked waters) Littoral (Coastal, near (within 5 nautical miles of land areas ) Open (open ocean, blue water beyond 5 nautical miles of land) C 1.2.1 Ocean Waters - Primary bodies of salt water that are not landlocked. Arctic Indian Pacific (North and South) Atlantic (North and South) C 1.2.1.2 Ocean Currents - A steady, generally predictable flow, present either in open ocean waters or in a littoral coastal ocean waters. Little or no (< 1 knot) Moderate (1 to 3 knots) Strong (> 3 knots) C 1.2.1.3 Sea State - Roughness of seas caused by wind or disturbances. Extremely rough (tops of waves blowing off, sea state 7 to 9) Rough (foamy tops, sea state 6) Moderately rough (whitecaps, sea state 3 to 5) Calm to gentle (< sea state 3) C 1.2.1.4 Ocean Temperature - Water surface temperature (degrees Fahrenheit). Warm (> 750 F) Moderate (560 to 750 F) Cold (350 to 550 F) Extremely cold (< 350 F) 130 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 1.2.3.1 Harbor Shelter - The amount of protection provided from the open ocean natural features. Little or no (completely exposed to wind and surf) Limited Complete (well protected from wind and surf) C 1.3.1.3.1 Air Temperature - Atmospheric temperature at ground level (degrees Fahrenheit). Very cold (< 10 F) Cold (10 to 39 F) Temperate (40 to 85 F) Hot (>85 F) C 1.3.1.3.3 Surface Wind Velocity - The speed at which air moves through the atmosphere at an altitude up to 500 feet. Hurricane force (> 73 mph) High (47 to 72 mph) Strong (25 to 46 mph) Moderate (7 to 24 mph) Light (< 7 mph) Standards: Hours From request for booms, until on-site. Hours From order to deploy booms, until fully deployed. Hours From request for dikes until complete. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. MRM [Annly?n Mmr.ton Hmlnrinnl InnrJont (, (MAJOR) Opmutm n litcsntify f t Align 1 nskr. / Rm:nv«}ry/Rmtm;tmn limnch (! )ftr:nnhimi W M M k \ i /Siw jw fw m a 132 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Identify Decontamination Needs/Provide Clean Up Resources (U-NTA 4.7.9.4) Responsible Organization: Definition: To identify decontamination needs and provide resources to accomplish required cleaning and decontamination of personnel and equipment. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 2.1 Mission - Those factors that frame and influence the execution of the mission assigned or understood. Stressful (very demanding mission relative to current capabilities) Moderately challenging (safely within current capabilities) Straightforward (well within current capabilities) C 2.1.4.1 Location - The location where the task must be performed. Afloat Ashore C 2.1.5 Time Available - The time available, normally the time allowed, to complete a phase in a concept of operations. Long (weeks to months) Moderate (days to weeks) Short (hours to days) Minimal (minutes to hours) C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) C 2.2.5.2 Modem Information & Intelligence Processing Systems - The availability of modem information systems in numbers and types. Few (treated as "magic bullet" systems and very closely controlled) Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled) Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force) C 2.2.6 Interoperability - The ability of systems, units, or forces to interact and operate effectively with other systems, units, or forces. No Some (systems, units, or forces can only partially interoperate) High (systems, units, or forces can be integrated vertically and horizontally with few workarounds) 133 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Standards: Hours Days Incidents Percent Percent Percent Until clean up resources are on scene. Required to make affected area accessible for operations. Of personnel injuries due to clean up efforts. Of required clean up remains to be accomplished. Of equipment decontamination completed. Of personnel decontamination completed. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 134 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 135 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. iM irrn o n ff Pnu/prPnlnt- fR ornw en/PrA t*r*inn nem ntA m lnrttinn I I n l t nntl Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: .Shoreline Cleanup Sign Off (U-NTA 4.7.9.2) Responsible Organization: Definition: To obtain Natural Resource Trustees sign off on shoreline cleanup activities. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 2.3.1.3 Staff Expertise - The level of skill and experience that staff personnel can provide to the commander, with regard to operational art and logistics, the capabilities and limitations of force elements, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Limited (staff lacks skill in working together or lacks knowledge of assigned forces) Moderate (staff effective and generally knows the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of assigned forces) High (staff works well together and has a good grasp of the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of the forces assigned or likely to be assigned) C 3.1.1.1 Domestic Public Support - Public support for the actions of their government. Negative (Public opinion in opposition) Limited (majority of citizens in support, but many with some reservations) Full (large majority of citizens in support) C 3.1.1.3 Interdepartmental/Interagency Relationships - Extent to which Executive Branch of government agencies work together toward articulated goals. Uncooperative (working in opposition to one another) Correct (partially cooperative) Strong (fully cooperative) Standards: Hours Until Resource Trustees sign off on shoreline clean up activities. Incidents Of Resource Trustees requesting additional information/work before agreeing to sign off. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 136 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. - [Annly?o Mission - I listoncnl Incident C (MAJOR) Oporntinn - Identify A AllQn T nsks / R o m v o r y /P 1 3 7 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC I I Case Study: Operations Task: Maintain Information and Force Status (U-NTA S. 1.3.4) Responsible Organization: Definition: To screen, circulate, store, and display data and information in a form that supports decisionmaking and the tactical picture. To store, protect, display, publish, reproduce, and distribute information to include status of skimming ops; volume of waste product recovered; conditions impacting ops; laboratory results (to determine hazardous or non-hazardous status); total capacity of recycling or disposal sites; and wildlife delivered for rehabilitation. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 2.1.4.1 Location - The location where the task must be performed. Afloat Ashore C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) C 2.2.4.5 Personnel Experience - Degree to which the civilian/military personnel assigned task are experienced at the task. Negligible Limited (largely a conscript force or a force with very' high turnover of personnel) Normal (mix of professional personnel with new personnel and reserves) High (professional long-term military and civilian personnel) C 2.2.5.2 Modem Information Processing Systems - The availability of modem information systems in numbers and types. Few (treated as "magic bullet" systems and very closely controlled) Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled) Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force) 138 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 2.3.1.3 Staff Expertise - The level of skill and experience that staff personnel can provide to the commander, with regard to operational art and logistics, the capabilities and limitations of force elements, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Limited (staff lacks skill in working together or lacks knowledge of assigned forces) Moderate (staff effective and generally knows the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of assigned forces) High (staff works well together and has a good grasp of the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of the forces assigned or likely to be assigned) C 2.3.1.6 Communications Connectivity - The degree to which communications can be maintained up and down the chain of command and horizontally. Comm Out Intermittent (some interruptions will occur) Continuous (operates with almost no interruptions) Periodic (only operates periodically) C 2.3.1.9 Information Volume - The volume of data or information generated or made available to decision makers. Low (<20 inputs per hour, containing highly consistent information) High (>50 inputs per hour, often containing conflicting information) Standards: Percent Of incoming pieces of information (which could affect outcome of operation) do not get to person needing it. Minutes To enter most current information on status of forces. Percent Of reports processed and disseminated to all agencies within specified time limits. Incidents Of delayed decisions as a result of data not presented to decisionmaker in suitable format. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 139 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sssssssm&ss^sm ' , t tK t t V S sZ W - . W / w / w w . v i - * ' ■ H ' - S i m & r i \ w ' S S , w % m mm * $ & & % * * $ & * & & < * * t e 'A i i i f.35w<5?% & s m s tm . & # » mm fmrnmm ji B 8 B B i K 8 l i 8 B S 3 ! W t e S 8 8 B 8 B 8 140 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Management of Contamination (U-NTA 4.7.9.3) Responsible Organization: Definition: To provide management of temporary storage sites. This task includes the prevention of secondary discharges or cross-contamination. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 2.1.5 Time Available - The time available, normally the time allowed, to complete a phase in a concept of operations. Long (weeks to months) Moderate (days to weeks) Short (hours to days) Minimal (minutes to hours) C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) C 2.2.6 Interoperability - Ability of systems/units/forces to interact and operate effectively with other systems/units/forces. No Some (systems, units, or forces can only partially interoperate) High (systems, units, or forces can be integrated vertically and horizontally with few workarounds) Full (systems, units, or forces can integrate easily, both vertically and horizontally) C 2.5.2.2 Sealift Assets - Availability of sealift assets for deployment or employment of forces. Little or no Limited (somewhat less than planned) Robust (as planned) C 2.5.2.3 Ground Transportation Assets - Availability of ground transport to support deployment/employment of forces. Little or no Limited (somewhat less than planned) Robust (as planned) 141 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 2.5.4.1.1 Wharfage - The amount of berthing space available to load or unload ships. Little (< one FSS size vessel) Moderate (one to two FSS size vessels) Generous (> two FSS size vessels) C 2.8.6 Commercial Procurement - Extent to which materiel and services can be procured from local economy in theater. Negligible (< 15% of items available in the US) Limited (15 to 50% of items available in the US) Extensive (50 to 90% of items normally available in the US) Fully available (> 90% of items normally available in the US) C 3.1.1.3 Interdepartmental/Interagency Relationships - Extent to which Executive Branch of government agencies work together toward articulated goals. Uncooperative (working in opposition to one another) Correct (partially cooperative) Strong (fUlly cooperative) Standards: Incidents Of cross-contamination from temporary storage site. Incidents Of secondary discharge from temporary storage site. Percent Of required temporary storage capacity, available. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 142 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1 n « i t m l r » * f H n n n , mM l H m t n < n i ! < ■ % I f rs • • Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Coordinate [Air] Missions (NTA 5.4.3.1) Responsible Organization: Definition: Provide centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of assigned/ supporting air assets based upon the OTC’s apportionment decisions and guidance. This task includes the promulgation of strike plans (ATO/BG Airplans), policy, and intentions, and when directed, the coordination of joint air operations. (JP 1 , 3-0, 3-02, 3-04, 3-05. 3- 09, 5-0, NDP 1, NWP 3-03.1, 3-03.4, 3-22.5 Series, 3-20.7, 3-05, 5-01) Notes: Doctrine: JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, 10 January 1995 JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995 JP 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, 8 October 1992 JP 3-04 Doctrine for Joint Maritime Ops (Air), 31 July 1991 JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 28 October 1992 JP 3-09 JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13 April 1995 NDP 1 NWP 3-03.1; NWP 3-03.4; NWP 3-22.5 Series; NWP 3-20.7; NWP 3-05; NWP 5-01 Conditions: C 2.1.1 Mission Instructions - Clarity of instructions, directives, policy guidance (including end state), strategies, or Status of Forces Agreements, below the NCA level. Restrictive (a large number of instructions, leaves little discretion to the on-scene commander) Minimal (few in number, leaves most decisions to the on-scene commander) Clear (addresses likely issues & hedges, leaves little/no ambiguity as to intent, allows freedom of action where required) C 2.1.3 Mission Preparation - Degree to which preparations for mission have been completed at time of mission execution. Includes intelligence, logistic, positioning of units, etc. No Outline (a concept of operations or a draft OPLAN has been produced) Partially Completed (an OPLAN has been developed but is not fully refined and approved) Completed (fully developed plan, including approval) C 2.1.4.1 Location - The location where the task must be performed. Airborne Afloat Ashore 144 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 2.1.4.5 Intertheater Distance - Mileage between two locations (e.g., CONUS to joint operations area). Very long (> 7,500 NM) Long (5,000 to 7,500 NM) Moderate (3,500 to 5,000 NM) Short (1,000 to 3,500 NM) Very short (< 1000 NM) C 2.2.5.2 Modem Information Processing Systems - The availability of modem information systems in numbers and types. Few (treated as "magic bullet" systems and very closely controlled) Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled) Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force) Standards: Percent Of scheduled sorties launched. Percent Of sorties successfully completed. Time Delay in promulgation of air plan/ATO from ATO planning cycle. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 145 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. MMM [Annly^R Wir>ninn Hifilnricnl Inr.idRnt C (MA.IOR) OpRrntinn IdRntity f t Aliqn 1 ntikii / Air O p R m tm n r . Hronrh (A p p lirn tm n n Unit)) 1 4 6 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Conduct Air Operations (U-NTA 5.4.3.1.5) Responsible Organization: Definition: To conduct air operations missions to apply dispersants, chemical countermeasures, bioremediation, or other alternative response technologies as directed by the Operations Section Chief. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 1.1.4.2 Landlocked Waters Current - A steady, generally predictable flow of water. Gentle (< 1 knot) Moderate (1 to 3 knots) Strong (> 3 knots) C 1.1.4.3 Landlocked Waters Width - Width of bodies of water. Narrow (< 500 feet) Small (500 to 3000 feet) Moderate (3000 feet to 1 NM) Large (1 to 5 NM) Very large (> 5 NM) C 1.2 SEA - Those factors associated with the continuous salt water ocean system to include oceans, seas, gulfs, inlets, bays, sounds, straits, channels, and rivers. Riverine (inland from the littoral terrain to include rivers, canals, and delta areas connected landlocked waters) Littoral (Coastal, near (within 5 nautical miles of land areas ) Open (open ocean, blue water beyond 5 nautical miles of land) C 1.2.1 Ocean Waters - Primary bodies of salt water that are not landlocked. Pacific (North and South) Atlantic (North and South) C 1.2.1.10 Ocean Ice - The presence of ice at or near the ocean surface. No Isolated (ice chunks/icebergs possible) Marginal (broken ice on surface) Pack (surface covered with solid ice) C 1.2.1.2 Ocean Currents - A steady, generally predictable flow, present either in open ocean waters or in a littoral coastal ocean waters. Little or no (< 1 knot) Moderate (1 to 3 knots) Strong (> 3 knots) 147 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 1.2.1.3 Sea State - Roughness of seas caused by wind or disturbances. Extremely rough (tops of waves blowing off, sea state 7 to 9) Rough (foamy tops, sea state 6) Moderately rough (whitecaps, sea state 3 to 5) Calm to gentle (< sea state 3) C 1.2.1.6 Ocean Features - Features just above, just below, or within 10 fathoms of the ocean surface to include islands, atolls, reefs, shoals, rocks, or icebergs. Large submerged (shoals, subsurface reefs) Small submerged (rocks, icebergs) Small raised (atolls, reefs) Large raised (islands) C 1.2.3.3 Harbor Currents - Moving water caused by tidal change and river run-off. Negligible (< 1 knot) Moderate (I to 3 knots) Fast (> 3 knots) C 1.2.6.1 Shipping Density - The general level of shipping in an area. Light (< 5 vessels per 60 square mile area) Moderate (5-10 vessels per 60 square mile area) Heavy (> 10 vessels per 60 square mile area) C 1.3.1.3 Weather - Current weather (next 24 hours). Stormy Precipitating Overcast Partly cloudy Clear C 1.3.1.3.1 Air Temperature - Atmospheric temperature at ground level (degrees Fahrenheit). Very cold (< 10 F) Cold (10 to 39 F) Temperate (40 to 85 F) Hot (>85 F) C 1.3.1.3.3 Surface Wind Velocity - The speed at which air moves through the atmosphere at an altitude up to 500 feet.. Hurricane force (>73 mph) High (47 to 72 mph) Strong (25 to 46 mph) Moderate (7 to 24 mph) Light (< 7 mph) 148 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 1.3.2 Visibility - Maximum distance to see an object given the moisture and particulate matter (dust, salt, ash) suspended in the atmosphere. Unlimited (> 20 NM) High (10 to 20 NM) Good (3 to 10 NM) Moderate (1 to 3 NM) Low (> /4 to 1 NM) WOXOF (< V * NM) C 1.3.3.2 Chemical Effects - Effects of chemical weapons employment. No Some (limited area or temporary) Extensive (widespread and persistent) C 1.3.3.3 Biological Effects - Effects of biological weapons employment. No Disabling Deadly C 2.1.4.1 Location - The location where the task must be performed. Afloat Ashore Standards: Percent Percent Percent Incidents Of scheduled sorties, launched. Of sorties successfully completed. Of incident operations delayed/canceled due to lack of air support. Of incident operations delayed/canceled due to lack of air support. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 1 4 9 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. n l y 7 0 Mission I listn n cn l Incident C (M A JO R) Operation - Identity A Align T finkr. / Air O p e r a ti o n s Hmnrh (: .iirvoiHr\nrr Unit)] 150 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Coordinate Mission Tasking (U-NTA 5.4.3.1.4) Responsible Organization: Definition: To coordinate mission tasking with scientific and technical observers. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 2.1.1 Mission Instructions - Clarity of instructions, directives, policy guidance (including end state), strategies, or Status of Forces Agreements, below the NCA level. Restrictive (a large number of instructions, leaves little discretion to the on-scene commander) Minimal (few in number, leaves most decisions to the on-scene commander) Clear (addresses likely issues and hedges, leaves little ambiguity as to intent, allows freedom of action where required) C 2.1.3 Mission Preparation - Degree to which preparations for mission have been completed at time of mission execution. Includes intelligence, logistic, positioning of units, etc. No Outline (a concept of operations or a draft OPLAN has been produced) Partially Completed (an OPLAN has been developed but is not fully refined and approved) Completed (fully developed plan, including approval) C 2.1.4.1 Location - The location where the task must be performed. Afloat Ashore C 2.1.5.1 Lead Time - The time from receipt of a warning or directive to initiation of military operations. Long (weeks to months) Moderate (days to weeks) Short (hours to days) Minimal (minutes to hours) 151 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 2.2.5.2 Modem Information Processing Systems - The availability of modem information systems in numbers and types. Few (treated as "magic bullet" systems and very closely controlled) Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled) Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force) C 2.2.6 Interoperability - Ability of systems/units/forces to interact and operate effectively with other systems/units/forces. No Some (systems, units, or forces can only partially interoperate) High (systems, units, or forces can be integrated vertically and horizontally with few workarounds) Full (systems, units, or forces can integrate easily, both vertically and horizontally) C 2.3.1.3 Staff Expertise - The level of skill and experience that staff personnel can provide to the commander, with regard to operational art and logistics, the capabilities and limitations of force elements, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Limited (staff lacks skill in working together or lacks knowledge of assigned forces) Moderate (staff effective and generally knows the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of assigned forces) High (staff works well together and has a good grasp of the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of the forces assigned or likely to be assigned) C 2.3.2.4 Component HQ Location - Location of component command headquarters with relation to force CDR's HQ. Collocation of all Collocation of some Separate Standards: Percent Of incident operations delayed/canceled because of lack of technical or scientific observers. Incidents Of incident operations delayed/canceled because of lack of technical or scientific observers. Supporting Tasks: Conunand Linked Tasks: 152 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. l i i i i i n 153 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. [Microsoft P ow erP oint! Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Identify Incident Staging Sites (U-NTA 4.7.9.12) Responsible Organization: Definition: To identify staging sites needed to the Operations Section Chief. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 1.2.3 Harbor Capacity - The size and characteristics of a harbor. No (unable to handle large ships) Limited (accommodates one large ship) Moderate (accommodates a few large ships) Large (accommodates many large ships) C 1.2.3.1 Harbor Shelter - The amount of protection provided from the open ocean by natural features. Little or no (completely exposed to wind and surf) Limited Complete (well protected from wind and surf) C 1.2.3.2 Harbor Depth - Water level at low tide. Shallow (< 30 ft may not be able to handle fully-loaded ships) Moderate (30 to 60 ft) Deep (> 60 ft) C 1.2.3.3 Harbor Currents - Moving water caused by tidal change and river run-off Negligible (< 1 knot) Moderate (1 to 3 knots) Fast (> 3 knots) C 1.2.4.3 Littoral Terrain Features - Those land features that overlook the littoral. Controlling (cliffs, hills) Influential (treeline, embankment) Negligible (inland barely rises above high tide mark) C 1.2.4.4 Littoral Tides - Change in height from low to high tide. Small or negligible (< 3 ft) Moderate (3 to 10 ft) Great (> 10 ft) 154 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 2.1.3 Mission Preparation - Degree to which preparations for mission have been completed at time of mission execution. Includes intelligence, logistic, positioning of units, etc. No Outline (a concept of operations or a draft OPLAN has been produced) Partially Completed (an OPLAN has been developed but is not fully refined and approved) Completed (fully developed plan, including approval) C 2.3.1.3 Staff Expertise - The level of skill and experience that staff personnel can provide to the commander, with regard to operational art and logistics, the capabilities and limitations of force elements, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Limited (staff lacks skill in working together or lacks knowledge of assigned forces) Moderate (staff effective and generally knows the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of assigned forces) High (staff works well together and has a good grasp of the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of the forces assigned or likely to be assigned) C 2.5.2.2 Sealift Assets - Availability of sealift assets for deployment or employment of forces. Little or no Limited (somewhat less than planned) Robust (as planned) C 2.5.4.1.1 Wharfage - The amount of berthing space available to load or unload ships. Little (< one FSS size vessel) Moderate (one to two FSS size vessels) Generous (> two FSS size vessels) C 2.5.4.1.3 Runway Length - The length of usable runway. Very short (<3500 ft) Short (3500 to 5000 ft) Commercial (5000 to 8200 ft) Long (> 8200 ft) C 2.5.4.2 Onward Movement Facilities - Facilities available to marshal cargo and personnel and move them forward in the theater. Little or no Limited (less than required) Robust (extensive) C 2.5.4.2.1 Bed-down Facilities - Space available for handling materials and personnel from arriving ships and aircraft. Little or no Limited (less than required) Robust (extensive) 155 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 2.5.4.2.3 Staging Area - Location established for the concentration of units and transient personnel between movements. Little or no Limited (less than required) Robust (extensive) C 3.1.1.1 Domestic Public Support - Public support for the actions of their government. Negative (Public opinion in opposition) Limited (majority of citizens in support, but many with some reservations) Full (large majority of citizens in support) C 3.1.1.3 Interdepartmental/Interagency Relationships - Extent to which Executive Branch of government agencies work together toward articulated goals. Uncooperative (working in opposition to one another) Correct (partially cooperative) Strong (fully cooperative) Standards: Hours To identify incident staging sites. Incidents Of Operations Section Chief rejecting identified staging sites. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 156 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. [Anolyrn Misnion Hmlnrir.nl Inr.idnnt C (MAJOH) Opnrntinn Idnnlily f t Aliqn Tnr.kr. / Siln Mnnnrjnrmint llrnnr.h (Wntnrwnvn Un 1 5 7 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Manage Waterways (U-NTA 1.3.5) Responsible Organization: Definition: To coordinate and conduct waterways management and vessel traffic control missions as directed by the Operations Section Chief. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 1.1.4 Landlocked Waters - Bodies of water surrounded by land to include lakes, reservoirs, and wetlands. Small (ponds) Large to moderate (lakes, reservoirs) Very large (large lakes) C 1.1.4.1 Landlocked Waters Depth - The depth of water at a particular point or area. Very Shallow (< 4 feet) Shallow (4 to 10 feet) Moderate (10 to 30 feet) Deep (> 30 feet) C 1.1.4.2 Landlocked Waters Current - A steady, generally predictable flow of water. Gentle (< 1 knot) Moderate (1 to 3 knots) Strong (> 3 knots) C 1.1.4.3 Landlocked Waters Width - Width of bodies of water. Narrow (< 500 feet) Small (500 to 3000 feet) Moderate (3000 feet to 1 NM) Large (1 to 5 NM) Very large (> 5 NM) C 1.2 SEA - Those factors associated with the continuous salt water ocean system to include oceans, seas, gulfs, inlets, bays, sounds, straits, channels, and rivers. Riverine (inland from the littoral terrain to include rivers, canals, and delta areas connected landlocked waters) Littoral (Coastal, near (within 5 nautical miles of land areas ) Open (open ocean, blue water beyond 5 nautical miles of land) C 1.2.1.2 Ocean Currents - A steady, generally predictable flow, present either in open ocean waters or in a littoral coastal ocean waters. Little or no (< 1 knot) Moderate (1 to 3 knots) Strong (> 3 knots) 158 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 1.2.1.3 Sea State - Roughness of seas caused by wind or disturbances. Extremely rough (tops of waves blowing off, sea state 7 to 9) Rough (foamy tops, sea state 6) Moderately rough (whitecaps, sea state 3 to 5) Calm to gentle (< sea state 3) C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) C 2.2.5.2 Modem Information & Intelligence Processing Systems - The availability of modem information systems in numbers and types. Few (treated as "magic bullet" systems and very closely controlled) Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled) Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force) C 2.3.1.3 Staff Expertise - The level of skill and experience that staff personnel can provide to the commander, with regard to operational art and logistics, the capabilities and limitations of force elements, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Limited (staff lacks skill in working together or lacks knowledge of assigned forces) Moderate (staff effective and generally knows the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of assigned forces) High (staff works well together and has a good grasp of the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of the forces assigned or likely to be assigned) C 2.3.1.6 Communications Connectivity - The degree to which communications can be maintained up and down the chain of command and horizontally. Comm Out Periodic (only operates periodically) Intermittent (some interruptions will occur) Continuous (operates with almost no interruptions) C 2.4.6 Certitude of Data - The degree of confidence in the accuracy of intelligence data. Little or No (<25% confidence) Low (25-50% confidence) Moderate (50-90%) High (>90%) Absolute (100% confidence) C 3.1.1.1 Domestic Public Support - Public support for the actions of their government. Negative (Public opinion in opposition) Limited (majority of citizens in support, but many with some reservations) Full (large majority of citizens in support) 159 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 3.1.1.3 Interdepartmental/Interagency Relationships - Extent to which Executive Branch of government agencies work together toward articulated goals. Uncooperative (working in opposition to one another) Correct (partially cooperative) Strong (fully cooperative) Standards: Incidents Of delay in movement of incident response forces due to inadequate management of waterways. Hours To construct/improve/repair required facilities to manage waterways. Percent Increase in movement time due to enhancements/improvements to waterways management facilities. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 1 6 0 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Pill mI Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Protect/Secure Operationally Critical Installations/Facilities/Systems (NTA 63.1.2) Responsible Organization: Definition: To protect operationally critical installations, facilities, and systems from attack in the operational area (JP 1 , 3-0, 3-01 Series, 3-10, NDP 1, NWP 3 Series, 3-10) Notes: Doctrine: JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, 10 January 1995 JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995 JP3-01 Series JP 3-10 Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations, 28 May 1996 NDP 1 NWP 3 Series; NWT 3-10 Conditions: C 1.1.3.5 Route Availability - The availability of navigable routes over land areas. Low (Few roads or trails, no all weather routes) Moderate (Some paved, but limited all weather road surfaces) High (multiple paved, all weather roads) C 1.2.3.1 Harbor Shelter - The amount of protection provided from the open ocean by natural features. Little or no (completely exposed to wind and surf) Limited Complete (well protected from wind and surf) C 1.3.1.1 Season - Periods of the year characterized by changes in temperature, daylight length, storm activity, and precipitation. Fall (cool dry weather) Summer (hot long days) Spring (wet moderate temperatures) Winter (cold short days) C 1.3.1.3 Weather - Current weather (next 24 hours). Stormy Precipitating Overcast Partly cloudy Clear 1 6 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States C oast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 1.3.1.3.1 Air Temperature - Atmospheric temperature at ground level (degrees Fahrenheit). Very cold (< 10 F) Cold (10 to 39 F) Temperate (40 to 85 F) Hot (>85 F) C 2.1.1.1 Command Level - The level of command directing the mission. Multinational Service Component Commander C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) C 2.8.6 Commercial Procurement - The extent to which materiel and services can be procured from the local economy in theater. Negligible (< 15% of items available in the US) Limited (15 to 50% of items available in the US) Extensive (50 to 90% of items normally available in the US) Fully available (> 90% of items normally available in the US) Standards: Percent Of communications in operational area (which support operation) are hardened. Percent Of communications in operational area (which support operation) have alternate paths. Hours For an incident response team to reach an installation or facility needing protection from environmental impact. Days To restore installation, facility, or system to full capacity following environmental incident. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 163 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ° 1 6 4 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Establish Rehabilitation Centers for Recovered Wildlife (U-NTA 4.12.10.5) Responsible Organization: Definition: To establish wildlife rehabilitation centers and conduct rehabilitation operations. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) C 2.2.4.5 Personnel Experience - The degree to which the civilian and military personnel assigned the task are experienced at the task. Negligible Limited (largely a conscript force or a force with very high turnover of personnel) Normal (mix of professional personnel with new personnel and reserves) High (professional long-term military' and civilian personnel) C 2.2.6 Interoperability - The ability of systems, units, or forces to interact and operate effectively with other systems, units, or forces. No Some (systems, units, or forces can only partially interoperate) High (systems, units, or forces can be integrated vertically and horizontally with few workarounds) Full (systems, units, or forces can integrate easily, both vertically and horizontally) C 2.5.2 Lift Assets - Adequacy of lift assets for moving and supporting forces. Little or no Limited (somewhat less than planned) Robust (as planned) C 2.8.1 Sustainment Facilities - Those grounds, buildings, and equipment available to provide and support sustainment of the force. No Limited Adequate Abundant 165 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 3.1.1.1 Domestic Public Support - Public support for the actions of their government. Negative (Public opinion in opposition) Limited (majority of citizens in support, but many with some reservations) Full (large majority of citizens in support) C 3.1.1.3 Interdepartmental/Interagency Relationships - Extent to which Executive Branch of government agencies work together toward articulated goals. Uncooperative (working in opposition to one another) Correct (partially cooperative) Strong (fully cooperative) Standards: Hours To establish minimal response level rehabilitation centers. Hours To establish full response level rehabilitation centers. Percent Of rehabilitation workers are volunteers. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 7 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations Task: Maintain Recovered Wildlife Clearing Point (IJ-NTA 4.12.10.1) Responsible Organization: Definition: To maintain a central clearing point to direct recovered wildlife to appropriate rehabilitation facilities. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 2.2.3 Forces Allocated - Extent to which forces are distributed to a commander for accomplishment of assigned mission. Marginal (less than plan) Adequate (meets plan) Strong (exceeds plan) C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) C 2.2.4.1 Personnel Nutrition and Health - The degree to which the members of a force are healthy and free of disease. Poor (< 50%) Fair (50 to 90%) Excellent (> 90%) C 2.2.4.3 Personnel Physical Conditioning - The level of physical conditioning of military personnel. Poor (no organized training) Good (some organized training) Excellent (extensive, demanding training) C 2.2.6 Interoperability - Ability of systems/units/forces to interact and operate effectively with other systems/units/forces. No Some (systems, units, or forces can only partially interoperate) High (systems, units, or forces can be integrated vertically and horizontally with few workarounds) Full (systems, units, or forces can integrate easily, both vertically and horizontally) 168 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States C oast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Operations C 2.3.1.3 Staff Expertise - The level of skill and experience that staff personnel can provide to the commander, with regard to operational art and logistics, the capabilities and limitations of force elements, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Limited (staff lacks skill in working together or lacks knowledge of assigned forces) Moderate (staff effective and generally knows the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of assigned forces) High (staff works well together and has a good grasp of the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of the forces assigned or likely to be assigned) C 3.1.1.1 Domestic Public Support - Public support for the actions of their government. Negative (Public opinion in opposition) Limited (majority of citizens in support, but many with some reservations) Full (large majority of citizens in support) C 3.1.1.3 Interdepartmental/Interagency Relationships - Extent to which Executive Branch of government agencies work together toward articulated goals. Uncooperative (working in opposition to one another) Correct (partially cooperative) Strong (fully cooperative) Standards: Percent Percent Percent Backlogged Supporting Tasks: Conunand Linked Tasks: 1 6 9 Of accountability of wildlife entering wildlife clearing point. Of wildlife entering wildlife clearing point returned to the wild. Of total wildlife entering wildlife clearing point are endangered species. Wildlife waiting at wildlife clearing point for transfer to appropriate facilities. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER V CASE STUDY “TITANIC H: PLANNING” Background Although "TITANIC II: Planning" was a fictitious event, historically valid data and current USCG procedures publications were used to make the case study as realistic as possible. The broad scenario follows: On Tuesday, 22 February 20XX, 212 PIW (persons in water) and a major oil spill occurred when the 987 foot U.K. cruise ship TITANIC II, with 2450 passengers, .8 million gallons of fuel oil, ran aground near Boston, MA. At 0028 22 February 20XX, the TITANIC II transmitted by radio to Coast Guard MSO Boston and reported that the vessel was hard aground on unknown submerged object at position N42° 19' 30" and W70° 43' 7.5" approximately outside of the vessel traffic channel. Case Study "TITANIC II: Planning" was 75 pages long. It comprised 11 separate operations, these operations were linked to 48 tasks, each o f the tasks was linked to 5 to 7 conditions of the environments and to approximately 5 performance measures. An example of several pages of the 75 page Case Study "TITANIC II: Planning" follows. The example includes a mission description of the incident and the USCG response. To minimize space, it includes each of the operations templates but only a single task with each operation. The task (activities/functions/processes) has been linked to the conditions (external factors) of the environments {physical, 170 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. military, political and economic environments) that directly impact task accomplishment, and, finally, the task was linked to measures of performance to establish the level of performance required for those tasks. The case studies were produced by building the mission within the DOD model's supporting software and then selecting "Mission Task" reports. The case studies are mission task reports of the DOD model's supporting software. 171 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC I I C ase Study: P la n n in g Prepared By: J.R. Paron 6459 Andes Court Woodbridge, VA 22193 (703) 412 2812 x6071 (work) (703) 878-9499 (home) 1 7 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Planning TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents .................................................................................................... I Mission Description Report ..................................................................................... 1 Mission Task Report.................................................................................................. 2 TEMPLATE: DOT USCG Case Study: Planning ............................................. 3 TEMPLATE: Planning Section C hief................................................................. 4 NTA 5 Exercise Command and Control................................................... 5 NTA 5.1.3 Maintain Information and Naval Force Status............................... 7 NTA 5.3.4 Analyze and Compare Courses of Action..................................... 9 NTA 5.3.5 Select or Modify Course of Action............................................... 10 U-NTA 5.3.5.1 Modify UCS Organization ........................................................... II NTA 5.3.9 Prepare Plans/Orders ................................................................... 12 TEMPLATE: Strategy Branch (Resource Unit) ................................................. 14 NTA 2.2.2 Collect Tactical [Information! on Situation................................... 1 5 NTA 2.2.4 Assess Tactical Environment ....................................................... 16 NTA 2.3 Process and Exploit Collected Information................................... 17 NTA 2.4 Produce [Information) ................................................................. 18 NTA 2.5 Designate and Integrate [Information] ......................................... 19 TEMPLATE: Strategy Branch (Strategy Unit) ................................................... 20 NTA 5.3.1 Develop Tactical Concept of Operations ..................................... 21 NTA 5.3.3 Develop Courses of Action........................................................... 24 NTA 5.3.9.1 Formulate Standing Plans............................................................ 27 NTA 5.3.9.2 Develop Pre-Planned Responses................................................... 28 TEMPLATE: Strategy Branch (Situation Unit)................................................... 29 NTA 2.2.2 Collect Tactical [Information] on Situation.................................. 30 NTA 2.2.4 Assess Tactical Environment ....................................................... 31 NTA 2.3 Process and Exploit Collected Information.................................. 32 NTA 2.4 Produce [Information] ................................................................ 33 NTA 2.5 Designate and Integrate [Information] ........................................ 34 TEMPLATE: Technical Branch ........................................................................ 35 NTA 2.2.3 Perform Tactical Reconnaissance and Surveillance .................... 36 173 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Planning TEMPLATE: Technical Branch (ART Unit)....................................................... 37 NTA 1.2.6 Conduct Climatological and Meteorological Analysis.................. 38 NTA 1.2.7 Conduct Tactical Oceanographic Analysis ................................... 39 NTA 5.3.4 Analyze and Compare Courses of Action..................................... 40 U-NTA 5.3.4.1 Evaluate Opportunities to Use A R T ............................................. 41 NTA 5.3.9 Prepare Plans/Orders ................................................................... 42 TEMPLATE: Technical Branch (NRDA U nit)................................................... 44 NTA 4.7.9 Provide Environmental Disaster Relief Support.......................... 45 U-NTA 4.7.9.8 Coordinate with Natural Resource Trustees................................. 47 U-NTA 4.7.9.9 Provide Forecasts of Incident Damages ....................................... 49 U-NTA 4.7.9.10 Coordinate with the NRDA Protocols........................................... 50 U-NTA 4.7.9.11 Identify Lead Administrative Natural Resource Trustee.............. 51 NTA 5.3.1.3 Develop Requirements and Priorities........................................... 52 TEMPLATE: Technical Branch (Disposal Unit)................................................ 53 NTA 4.12.6 Provide Industrial and Environmental Health Services................ 54 NTA 4.13 Conduct Recovery and Salvage ................................................... 55 NTA 6.1.1.2 Remove Battlespace H azards....................................................... 57 TEMPLATE: Wildlife Recovery and Rehabilitation U nit................................... 58 NTA 2.2.2 Collect Tactical [Information] on Situation.................................. 59 U-NTA 2.2.2.1 Collect and Coordinate Information............................................ 60 NTA 5.2 Assess Situation ........................................................................... 62 U-NTA 5.2.3 Predict Incident Impacts............................................................... 64 U-NTA 5.2.4 Predict Recovery Requirements ................................................... 65 U-NTA 5.2.5 Establish Recovery Protocols....................................................... 66 NTA 5.3.1.3 Develop Requirements and Priorities.......................................... 67 TEMPLATE: Documentation Branch................................................................. 68 NTA 4.12.7 Maintain Records......................................................................... 69 U-NTA 4.12.7.1 Maintain Incident Records ........................................................... 70 U-NTA 4.12.7.2 Ensure Sections Provide Incident Records.................................. 71 TEMPLATE: Demobilization Branch................................................................. 72 NTA 5.3.9 Prepare Plans/Orders ................................................................... 73 U-NTA 5.3.9.5 Develop Demobilization P lan....................................................... 75 174 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Planning Mission: DOT USCG Case Study: Planning OPLAN: CS: Planning Combatant Command Responsible:...............................1st DISTRICT (BOSTON) Joint Force Command: Description: USCG Marine Safety Office Boston, the On-Scene Coordinator, reported: (1) NRC#: O X X -O O TITANIC II. (2) LOCATION: Massachusetts Bay. (3) PIW (persons in water): 212. (4) PASSENGERS STRANDED: 2238. (5) POLLUTANT: Fuel oil. (6) OCCURRENCE DATE: 22 February 20XX. (7) BODY OF WATER: Massachusetts Bay. (8) SEVERITY: Major (Coastal). (9) QUANTITY DISCHARGED: .5 million gallons. (10) QUANTITY ENTERING WATER: .5 million gallons. (11) SOURCE: TITANIC II. (12) CAUSE: Vessel grounding. (13) OSC: USCG Marine Safety Office Boston. (4) REMARKS: On Tuesday, 22 February' 20XX, 212 PIW (persons in water) and a major oil spill occurred when the 987 foot U.K cruise ship TITANIC II, with 2450 passengers, .8 million gallons of fuel oil, ran aground near Boston, MA. At 0028 22 February 20XX, the TITANIC II transmitted by radio to Coast Guard MSO Boston and reported that the vessel was hard aground on unknown submerged object at position N42° 19' 30" and W 70° 43' 7.5" approximately 2 miles outside of the vessel traffic channel. In response to this grounding, oil spill, and SAR effort: (1) VESSELS: 786 deployed. (2) BOOM DEPLOYED: 281,990 feet containment and 169,340 feet absorbent. (3) BOOM AVAILABLE (in reserve): 264,290 feet containment and 214, 760 feet absorbent. (4) AIRCRAFT: 57 total (19 contracted helicopters, 8 ADEC aircraft, 17 contracted floatplanes, 4 photo planes, 9 others). Commander's Guidance: Global Conditions: (Designator): Doctrinal Citations: 175 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. MRM [ A n n l y / n M i ' i m n n I i i f i t n r i c n l I n c u J f i n t 0 ( M A J O R ) R l n n m n < j Ide ntify f t Aliqn 1 11<tk 1 7 6 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. MRM - |Anolyrt> Mi-.r.mn - MistonMil InriHrnt G (MA.IOH) Plnnnmq Idnntity f t Aliqn I nsko / Plnnnmq !<««« Imn Chicl| 1 7 7 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. [Find; Files named * omi Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Planning Task: EXERCISE COMMAND AND CONTROL (NTA 5) Responsible Organization: Definition: To exercise authority and direction over assigned or attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. C2 involves arranging personnel, equipment and facilities during the planning and conducting o f. . . operations. (JP 1, 0-2, 3-0, 3-02, 3-02.1, 3-18, 3-18.1, 3-52, 3-56 Series, 5-0, 5-00.2. NDP 1 . NDP 6, NWP 6-00.1, 10, MCDP 6, ATP 1C) Notes: C2 is required for performing all tasks. For analytical purposes, C2 tasks are written genetically and consolidated under C2. Doctrine: JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, 10 January 1995 JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 24 February 1995 JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995 JP 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, 8 October 1992 JP 3-02.1 Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations, 1 November 1989 JP 3-18 JP 3-18.1 JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone, 22 July 1995 JP 3-56 Series JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. 13 April 1995 JP 5-00.2 Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures. 3 Sep 1991 NDP 1; NDP 6 NWP 6-00.1; NWP 10 MCDP 6 ATP 1C Conditions: C 2.1.4.1 Location - The location where the task must be performed. Afloat Ashore C 2.2.3 Forces Allocated - The extent to which forces are distributed to a commander for accomplishment of assigned mission. Marginal (less than plan) Adequate (meets plan) Strong (exceeds plan) 178 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Planning C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) C 2.2.5.2 Modem Information... Processing Systems - The availability of modem information systems in numbers and types. Few (treated as "magic bullet" systems and very closely controlled) Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled) Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force) C 2.3.1.3 Staff Expertise - The level of skill and experience that staff personnel can provide to the commander, with regard to operational art and logistics, the capabilities and limitations of force elements, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Limited (staff lacks skill in working together or lacks knowledge of assigned forces) Moderate (staff effective and generally knows the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of assigned forces) High (staff works well together and has a good grasp of the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of the forces assigned or likely to be assigned) C 2.3.1.6 Communications Connectivity - The degree to which communications can be maintained up and down the chain of command and horizontally. Comm Out Periodic (only operates periodically) Intermittent (some interruptions will occur) Continuous (operates with almost no interruptions) C 2.3.2.4 Component Headquarters Location - The location of component command headquarters with relation to the joint force commander's headquarters. Collocation of all Collocation of some Separate Standards: Percent Of communications nodes in place. Percent Of units at desired position and appropriate degree of readiness at execution. Percent Of units receive their orders on schedule. Hours Prior to execution incident plan published and delivered to units. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 179 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. MMM • | A i i n l y / < ? Mi:,:,ii)n - I I r . t u f K . n l i n c u J u n t C , ( M A J O R ) \ -Ifinrtin<] - IcJonlify & A liq n 1 ntiKr. / :>trutc<)y U r n n c h (I I p ' t o u r r r 1 1 n i t ) ) m i ii 1 8 0 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Planning Task: Collect Tactical [Information] on Situation (NTA 2.2.2) Responsible Organization: Definition: To obtain information that affects a commander’s possible courses of action. Considerations include the characteristics of the area of operations and the enemy situation. Information includes threat, physical environment, health standards/endemic disease, and social/political/economic factors. This task also includes the reporting and locating of isolated or captured personnel. (JP 2-0 Series, NDP 2, NWP 2-01) Doctrine: JP 2-0 Series NDP 2; NWP 2-01 Conditions: C 1.3.1.3.1 Air Temperature - Atmospheric temperature at ground level. Very cold (< 10 F) Cold (10 to 39 F) Temperate (40 to 85 F) Hot (>85 F) C 1.3.2.1 Light - Light available to illuminate objects from natural or manmade sources. Negligible (overcast night) Low (dusk, dawn, moonlit, streetlight lit) Day (overcast day) Bright (sunny day) C 1.3.2.2 Obscurants - Temporary addition of material (smoke, chaff, dust) to the atmosphere. No Light (slight reductions in ability to see or detect) Moderate (makes objects difficult to see or detect clearly) Dense (hides objects) C 2.4.6 Certitude of Data - The degree of confidence in the accuracy of information data. Little or No (<25% confidence) Low (25-50% confidence) Moderate (50-90%) High (>90%) Absolute (100% confidence) Standards: Hours From receipt of tasking, information available. Percent Of collection requirements fulfilled by reconnaissance/surveillance assets. Percent Of information requirements can be filled from organic resources. Supporting Tasks/Conimand Linked Tasks: 181 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. *, M RM (Annly/t» Missjnn m I tnculiMil C (MA.lOH) PlHrmtni) Wipnlity f t AImjm 1 n mmw’ " * u i m m m 1 8 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Planning Task: Develop Courses of Action (NTA 5.3.3) Responsible Organization: Definition: To define options for completing the mission based on analysis of the mission and determine feasibility with regard to friendly forces, enemy forces, neutrals, non- combatants, and environmental factors. This activity includes evaluating available resources for supporting different courses of actions. (JP 5-0, 5-00.2, 5-03 Series, NDP 5, 6, NWP 5-01, 6-00.1, MCWP 5-1, FMFM 3-1) Notes: Doctrine: JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13 April 1995 JP 5-00.2 Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures, 3 September 1991 JP 5-03 Series NDP 5; NDP 6; NWP 5-01; NWP 6-00.1 MCWP 5-1 Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-1; FMFM 3-1 Conditions: C 1.1.3.5 Route Availability - The availability of navigable routes over land areas. High (multiple paved, all weather roads) Moderate (Some paved, but limited all weather road surfaces) Low (Few roads or trails, no all weather routes) C 1.1.4 Landlocked Waters - Bodies of water surrounded by land to include lakes, reservoirs, and wetlands. Small (ponds) Large to moderate (lakes, reservoirs) Very large (large lakes) C 1.1.4.1 Landlocked Waters Depth - The depth of water at a particular point or area. Very Shallow (< 4 feet) Shallow (4 to 10 feet) Moderate (10 to 30 feet) Deep (>30 feet) C 1.1.4.2 Landlocked Waters Current - A steady, generally predictable flow of water. Gentle (< 1 knot) Moderate (1 to 3 knots) Strong (> 3 knots) 183 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Planning C 1.1.4.3 Landlocked Waters Width - Width of bodies of water. Narrow (< 500 feet) Small (500 to 3000 feet) Moderate (3000 feet to 1 NM) Large (1 to 5 NM) Very large (> 5 NM) C 1.1.4.4 Landlocked Waters Bottom - Characteristics of the land underneath landlocked waters. Irregular or Rocky Moderate slopes Flat and soft Flat and Firm C 1.2 SEA - Those factors associated with the continuous salt water ocean system to include oceans, seas, gulfs, inlets, bays, sounds, straits, channels, and rivers. Riverine (inland from the littoral terrain to include rivers, canals, and delta areas connected landlocked waters) Littoral (Coastal, near (within 5 nautical miles of land areas ) Open (open ocean, blue water beyond 5 nautical miles of land) C 1.2.1 Ocean Waters - Primary bodies of salt water that are not landlocked. Pacific (North and South) Atlantic (North and South) C 1.2.1.1 Ocean Depth - The depth of ocean water at a point or for an area. Very deep (> 2500 fathoms) Deep (500 to 2500 fathoms) Limited (100 to 500 fathoms) Shallow (< 100 fathoms) C 1.2.1.10 Ocean Ice - The presence of ice at or near the ocean surface. No Isolated (ice chunks/icebergs possible) Marginal (broken ice on surface) Pack (surface covered with solid ice) C 1.2.1.11 Ocean Ice Thickness - The thickness of ocean surface ice. Minimal (<3 feet) Moderate (between 3 and eight feet) Great (>8 feet) C 1.2.1.2 Ocean Currents - A steady, generally predictable flow, present either in open ocean waters or in a littoral coastal ocean waters. Little or no (< 1 knot) Moderate (1 to 3 knots) 184 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Planning C 1.2.1.3 Sea State - Roughness of seas caused by wind or disturbances. Extremely rough (tops of waves blowing off, sea state 7 to 9) Rough (foamy tops, sea state 6) Moderately rough (whitecaps, sea state 3 to 5) Calm to gentle (< sea state 3) C 1.2.1.4 Ocean Temperature - Water surface temperature (degrees Fahrenheit). Warm (> 750 F) Moderate (560 to 750 F) Cold (350 to 550 F) Extremely cold (< 350 F) C 1.2.1.7 Sea Room - Availability of space for maritime maneuver. Includes dynamic factors such as confining ice, submerged wrecks, or potentially damaging floating objects such as logs. Applies especially to coastal polar, littoral, or riverine environments. Confined (coastal and riverine waters) Moderate (some confining factors) Unrestricted (open ocean) C 1.2.3 Harbor Capacity - The size and characteristics of a harbor. No (unable to handle large ships) Limited (accommodates one large ship) Moderate (accommodates a few large ships) Large (accommodates many large ships) C 1.2.3.1 Harbor Shelter - The amount of protection provided from the open ocean by natural features. Little or no (completely exposed to wind and surf) Limited Complete (well protected from wind and surf) C 1.2.3.2 Harbor Depth - Water level at low tide. Shallow (< 30 ft may not be able to handle fully-loaded ships) Moderate (30 to 60 ft) Deep (> 60 ft) C 1.2.3.3 Harbor Currents - Moving water caused by tidal change and river run-off. Negligible (< 1 knot) Moderate (I to 3 knots) Fast (> 3 knots) C 1.2.6.1 Shipping Density - The general level of shipping in an area. Light (< 5 vessels per 60 square mile area) Moderate (5-10 vessels per 60 square mile area) Heavy (> 10 vessels per 60 square mile area) 185 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Planning C 1.3.1.3 Weather - Current weather (next 24 hours). Stormy Precipitating Overcast Partly cloudy Clear C 2.1.5.2 Mission Duration - The time a unit is expected to continue to conduct a mission. Very short (< 30 days) Short (30 to 90 days) Medium (90 to 180 days) Long (180 to 365 days) Very long (> 365 days) C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) Standards: Number Alternative COAs developed. Number Courses of action developed. Days In advance of execution, COAs developed. Percent Of available planning time allotted for subordinate planning. Percent Of COAs presented to commander, not suitable, feasible, or acceptable. Percent Of non-selected COAs, considered for deception. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 186 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 7 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. [Find; Files named *brop| Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC I I Case Study: Planning Task: Collect Tactical [Information] on Situation (NTA 2.2.2) Responsible Organization: Definition: To obtain information that affects a commander’s possible courses of action. Considerations include the characteristics of the area of operations and the enemy situation. Information includes threat, physical environment, health standards/endemic disease, and social/political/economic factors. This task also includes the reporting and locating of isolated or captured personnel. (JP 2-0 Series, NDP 2, NWP 2-01) Doctrine: JP 2-0 Series NDP 2; NWP 2-01 Conditions: C 1.3.1.3.1 Air Temperature - Atmospheric temperature at ground level. Very cold (< 10 F) Cold (10 to 39 F) Temperate (40 to 85 F) Hot (>85 F) C 1.3.2.1 Light - Light available to illuminate objects from natural or manmade sources. Negligible (overcast night) Low (dusk, dawn, moonlit, streetlight lit) Day (overcast day) Bright (sunny day) C 1.3.2.2 Obscurants - Temporary addition of material (smoke, chaff, dust) to the atmosphere. No Light (slight reductions in ability to see or detect) Moderate (makes objects difficult to see or detect clearly) Dense (hides objects) C 2.4.6 Certitude of Data - The degree of confidence in the accuracy of information data. Little or No (<25% confidence) Low (25-50% confidence) Moderate (50-90%) High (>90%) Absolute (100% confidence) Standards: Hours From receipt of tasking, information available. Percent Of collection requirements fulfilled by reconnaissance/surveillance assets. Percent Of information requirements can be filled from organic resources. Supporting Tasks/Command Linked Tasks: 188 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 9 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department of Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Planning Task: Perform Tactical Reconnaissance and Surveillance (NTA 2.23) Responsible Organization: Definition: To obtain, by various detection methods, information about the activities of an enemy or potential enemy or tactical area of operations. This task uses surveillance to systematically observe the area of operations by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 2-0 Series, NDP 2, NWP 2-01) Notes: Doctrine: JP 2-0 Series NDP 2 NWP 2-01 Conditions: C 1.3.1.3 Weather - Current weather (next 24 hours). Stormy Precipitating Overcast Partly cloudy Clear C 1.3.2.1 Light - Light available to illuminate objects from natural or manmade sources. Negligible (overcast night) Low (dusk, dawn, moonlit, streetlight lit) Day (overcast day) Bright (sunny day) C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) C 2.4.6 Certitude of Data - The degree of confidence in the accuracy of information data. Little or No (<25% confidence) Low (25-50% confidence) Moderate (50-90%) High (>90%) Absolute (100% confidence) 190 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Planning C 2.5.2.1 Airlift Assets - Availability of airlift assets for deployment or employment of forces. Little or no Limited (somewhat less than planned) Robust (as planned) C 2.S.2.3 Ground Transportation Assets - Availability of ground transportation assets to support deployment or employment of forces. Little or no Limited (somewhat less than planned) Robust (as planned) Standards: Percent Of collection requirements fulfilled by reconnaissance/surveillance assets. Percent Of time able to respond to collection requirements. Hours To respond to emergent tasking. Hours From receipt of tasking, incident reconnaissance/surveillance assets in place. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 191 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# 0XX-00 TITANIC II Case Study: Planning Task: Evaluate Opportunities to Use ART (U-NTA 5.3.4.1) Responsible Organization: Definition: To evaluate appropriate opportunities to effectively use ART, including dispersants or other chemical counter measures, in-situ burning, bioremediation, or other alternative response technologies. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 2.1.5.2 Mission Duration - The time a unit is expected to continue to conduct a mission. Very short (< 30 days) Short (30 to 90 days) Medium (90 to 180 days) Long (180 to 365 days) Very long (> 365 days) C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) C 2.2.4.5 Personnel Experience - The degree to which the civilian and military personnel assigned the task ern e experienced at the task. Negligible Limited (largely a conscript force or a force with very high turnover of personnel) Normal (mix of professional personnel with new personnel and reserves) High (professional long-term military and civilian personnel) C 2.2.4.6 Personnel Fatigue - The degree to which personnel, due to lack of rest, are experiencing fatigue. Severe (significant impairment to physical and decision making skills need extended recovery period) Moderate (personnel operating with inadequate rest decision making skills are somewhat impaired) No (personnel are well rested) C 2.2.5.2 Modem Information... Processing Systems - The availability of modem information systems in numbers and types. Few (treated as "magic bullet" systems and very closely controlled) Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled) Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force) 193 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Planning C 2.3.1.3 Staff Expertise - The level of skill and experience that staff personnel can provide to the commander, with regard to operational art and logistics, the capabilities and limitations of force elements, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Limited (staff lacks skill in working together or lacks knowledge of assigned forces) Moderate (staff effective and generally knows the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of assigned forces) High (staff works well together and has a good grasp of the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of the forces assigned or likely to be assigned) Standards: Percent Of responses to incident were first "wargamed" for possible ART use. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 194 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. / r c h n i c til H m n r h (NIU1A U n i t ) ] 1 9 5 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. |M R M - [Analyse Mission - Historical Incident C (MAJOR): Planning - Identify & A| Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Planning Task: Provide Environmental Disaster Relief Support (NTA 4.7.9) Responsible Organization: Definition: Provide support for environmental disaster relief, to include identification and locating hazardous environment, securing potential environmental hazards, and tracking hazardous releases. Includes transport and deployment of clean-up materials control/cleanup of hazardous releases, decontamination, messing, berthing and hotel services for other agency workers, personnel evacuation and transport, command and control facilities, and management of contaminated materials. (JP 1, 3-0, 3-07, 3-57, 4-0, 4-04, NDP 1, 4, NWP 3-07, 4-04 Series) Notes: Doctrine: JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, 10 January 1995 JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995 JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 16 June 1995 JP 3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, 21 June 1995 JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, 27 January 1995 JP 4-04 Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support, 26 September 1995 NDP 1;NDP 4 NWP 3-07; NWP 4-04 Series Conditions: C 1.3.1.1 Season - Periods of the year characterized by changes in temperature, daylight length, storm activity, and precipitation. Fall (cool dry weather) Summer (hot long days) Spring (wet moderate temperatures) Winter (cold short days) C 1.3.1.3.1 Air Temperature - Atmospheric temperature at ground level. Very cold (< 10 F) Cold (10 to 39 F) Temperate (40 to 85 F) Hot (>85 F) C 1.3.1.3.5 Humidity - Amount of water vapor in the air. High (> 75%) Moderate (50 to 75%) Low (10 to 50%) Very Low (< 10%) 196 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Planning C 2.3.1.2 Multinational Integration - The extent to which staffs of two or more forces, or agencies of two or more nations, have integrated their senior command and staff billets, information and intelligence, doctrine and procedures, logistics, and training. Poor (not broadly based and has not worked together) Partial (lacks broad base or experience working together) Full (broadly based and fully interactive) C 2.8.6 Commercial Procurement - The extent to which materiel and services can be procured from the local economy in theater. Negligible (< 15% of items available in the US) Limited (15 to 50% of items available in the US) Extensive (50 to 90% of items normally available in the US) Fully available (> 90% of items normally available in the US) C 3.1.2.4 Foreign Public Opinion - The expressed attitude of foreign publics toward an . . . operation. Aggressively opposed Moderately opposed Indifferent Supportive C 3.1.2.5 International Organization Support - The extent to which supra-national organizations (non-governmental organizations) support [response team] actions. No Uncertain Limited Fostering C 3.1.2.6 Multinational Business Support - The extent to which multinational business organizations support [response team] actions (e.g., oil companies). No Uncertain Limited Fostering Standards: Days Habitability restored. Percent Of cleanup material present. Percent Of evacuation complete. Persons per day evacuated. Days Required to make affected area accessible for operations. Hours Until force on scene. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 197 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 198 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. [Exploring - W orkbook? Department o f Transportation United States C oast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Planning Task: Conduct Recovery and Salvage (NTA 4.13) Responsible Organization: Definition: To obtain damaged, discarded, condemned, or abandoned allied or enemy materiel both ashore and at sea. Includes monitoring and management of recovered material from initial identification to ultimate disposal, disposition or repair. (JP 0-2, 1 , 3-02,4-0, 5-00.2, NDP 4, NWP 3-02.1, 3-02.21, 3-02.21M, 3-02.3, 3-06M, 3-10, 3- 20.31, 3-50.1, 4-04.1M, 4-07) Notes: Doctrine: JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 24 February 1995 JP I Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, 10 January 1995 JP 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, 8 October 1992 JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, 27 January 1995 JP 5-00.2 Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures, 3 Sep 1991 NDP 4 NWP 3-02.1; NWP 3-02.21; NWP 3-02.21M; NWP 3-02.3; NWP 3-06M; NWP 3-10; NWP 3-20.31; NWP 3-50.1; NWP 4-04.1M NWP 4-07 Conditions: C 1.2.1.3 Sea State - Roughness of seas caused by wind or disturbances. Extremely rough (tops of waves blowing off, sea state 7 to 9) Rough (foamy tops, sea state 6) Moderately rough (whitecaps, sea state 3 to 5) Calm to gentle (< sea state 3) C 1.3.1.3 Weather - Current weather (next 24 hours). Stormy Precipitating Overcast Partly cloudy Clear C 2.1.4.1 Location - The location where the task must be performed. Afloat Ashore C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) 199 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States C oast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Planning C 2.5.2.1 Airlift Assets - Availability of airlift assets for deployment or employment of forces. Little or no Limited (somewhat less than planned) Robust (as planned) C 2.5.2.2 Sealift Assets - Availability of sealift assets for deployment or employment of forces. Little or no Limited (somewhat less than planned) Robust (as planned) C 2.S.2.3 Ground Transportation Assets - Availability of ground transportation assets to support deployment or employment of forces. Little or no Limited (somewhat less than planned) Robust (as planned) C 3.1.1.1 Domestic Public Support - Public support for the actions of their government. Negative (Public opinion in opposition) Limited (majority of citizens in support, but many with some reservations) Full (large majority of citizens in support) Standards: Days Equipment down time (average). Percent Of equipment operational ready. Number Qualified salvage divers available. Days To complete recovery of objects on board. Days To return objects to port or required delivery destination. Days Turnaround time for repair of priority equipment. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 200 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. MUM (Anuly/e Mission - I listoricril Incident C (MAJOR) I'lnnnmi) Identity S Aliijn I nsks I Wildlife Hero very <imi I tehnliililnlnin Unil| 2 0 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Planning Task: Predict Incident Impacts (U-NTA 5.23) Responsible Organization: Definition: To predict potential impacts on natural resources and analyze actual impacts. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 2.1.5 Time Available - The time available, normally the time allowed, to complete a phase in a concept of operations. Long (weeks to months) Moderate (days to weeks) Short (hours to days) Minimal (minutes to hours) C 2.1.5.1 Lead Time - The time from receipt of a warning or directive to initiation of ... operations. Long (weeks to months) Moderate (days to weeks) Short (hours to days) Minimal (minutes to hours) C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) C 2.2.4.5 Personnel Experience - The degree to which the civilian and military personnel assigned the task are experienced at the task. Negligible Limited (largely a conscript force or a force with very high turnover of personnel) Normal (mix of professional personnel with new personnel and reserves) High (professional long-term military and civilian personnel) C 2.2.4.6 Personnel Fatigue - The degree to which personnel, due to lack of rest, are experiencing fatigue. Severe (significant impairment to physical and decision making skills need extended recovery period) Moderate (personnel operating with inadequate rest decision making skills are somewhat impaired) No (personnel are well rested) 2 0 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States C oast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Planning C 2.2.5.2 Modem Information... Processing Systems - The availability of modem information systems in numbers and types. Few (treated as "magic bullet" systems and very closely controlled) Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled) Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force) C 2.4.6 Certitude of Data - The degree of confidence in the accuracy of information data. Little or No (<25% confidence) Low (25-50% confidence) Moderate (50-90%) High (>90%) Absolute (100% confidence) Standards: Percent Of time, an incident event of interest occurs without options being available. Minutes To complete assessment of latest incident information (cycle time). Percent Of available incident reports reviewed. Percent Of incoming pieces of incident information (which could affect outcome of response) do not get to person needing it. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 203 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. MMBM 204 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Planning Task: Maintain Incident Records (U-NTA 4.12.7.1) Responsible Organization: Definition: To maintain incident records, and other relevant documentation, including: (a) logs; (b) incident reports; (c) press releases; and (d) any other historically significant material. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 2.1.5 Time Available - The time available, normally the time allowed, to complete a phase in a concept of operations. Long (weeks to months) Moderate (days to weeks) Short (hours to days) Minimal (minutes to hours) C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) C 2.2.5.2 Modem Information... Processing Systems - The availability of modem information systems in numbers and types. Few (treated as "magic bullet" systems and very closely controlled) Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled) Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force) C 2.2.6 Interoperability - The ability of systems, units, or forces to interact and operate effectively with other systems, units, or forces. No Some (systems, units, or forces can only partially interoperate) High (systems, units, or forces can be integrated vertically and horizontally with few workarounds) Full (systems, units, or forces can integrate easily, both vertically and horizontally) 205 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NR C# OXX-OO TITANIC II Case Study: Planning C 2.3.1.3 Staff Expertise - The level of skill and experience that staff personnel can provide to the commander, with regard to operational art and logistics, the capabilities and limitations of force elements, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Limited (staff lacks skill in working together or lacks knowledge of assigned forces) Moderate (staff effective and generally knows the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of assigned forces) High (staff works well together and has a good grasp of the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of the forces assigned or likely to be assigned) C 3.1.1.3 Interdepartmental/Interagency Relationships - Extent to which Executive Branch of government agencies work together toward articulated goals. Uncooperative (working in opposition to one another) Correct (partially cooperative) Strong (fully cooperative) Standards: Percent Of records maintained in facility. Incidents/Day Of records use. Percent Of requested records available to operations chief. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 206 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. M i ’i'.inn M i s ln f u iit I n r n i r n l (, ( M A J ( i H ) M n n n i n t ) Irl«»n1 1fy H Alujn I n s k s / l)< rn(it>iti/(ition i l r n n c h ] 207 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Department o f Transportation United States Coast Guard: NRC# OXX-OO TITANIC II C ase S tu d y : Planning Task: Develop Demobilization Plan (U-NTA 53.9.5) Responsible Organization: Definition: To develop a plan for the demobilization of resources committed to an incident and assist in the implementation of that plan. Notes: Doctrine: Conditions: C 2.1.5 Time Available - The time available, normally the time allowed, to complete a phase in a concept of operations. Long (weeks to months) Moderate (days to weeks) Short (hours to days) Minimal (minutes to hours) C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability - The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks. Low (poorly trained and equipped) Partial (partially trained and equipped) High (fully trained and equipped) C 2.3.1.3 Staff Expertise - The level of skill and experience that staff personnel can provide to the commander, with regard to operational art and logistics, the capabilities and limitations of force elements, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Limited (staff lacks skill in working together or lacks knowledge of assigned forces) Moderate (staff effective and generally knows the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of assigned forces) High (staff works well together and has a good grasp of the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of the forces assigned or likely to be assigned) C 2.3.1.6 Communications Connectivity - The degree to which communications can be maintained up and down the chain of command and horizontally. Comm Out Periodic (only operates periodically) Intermittent (some interruptions will occur) Continuous (operates with almost no interruptions) Standards: Hours To complete incident demobilization plan. Hours To promulgate incident demobilization plan. Supporting Tasks: Command Linked Tasks: 208 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VI FINDINGS Observations from the Research Process The briefing and demonstration went very well with the District commander and his senior staff, until the researcher mentioned that he wanted to determine if a DOD process could be adapted for DOT Coast Guard use. Their prejudice against any DOD process was extraordinary. Some of these senior officers expressed the strong belief that an adaptation o f an existing DOD program would not be suitable for the DOT because of the different conditions under which the two agencies operate. In addition, these senior officers objected to the researcher's case studies because they were limited to the USCG's capabilities involving emergency response to oil spills. This senior group of Coast Guard officers provided direct, clear recommendations to make the case studies stronger. They recommended the researcher build case studies that included all aspects of the Coast Guard’ s capabilities, including emergency response to search and rescue operations. These senior officers also recommended against the researcher’ s use o f factual historical incidents. The researcher's historical case study of the EXXON Valdez was singled out as a particularly poor selection for a case study. Their concern was not about 209 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. second-guessing. The EXXON Valdez had been the watershed for many changes in the USCG's emergency management decisionmaking—contingency preparedness planning procedures. It was not a viable example of how the USCG currently does business. The objections to the planned case studies' limitation to oil spills created a significant problem; it brought the research to a stop. As discussed in Chapter III, the researcher used the insights and inputs of the Coast Guard flag officer and his senior staff to start over. With an increased awareness of Coast Guard emergency management procedures and responsibilities, the researcher, using historical data as a foundation for credibility, built two lengthy and comprehensive case studies. The two new case studies, “TITANIC II: Operations” and “TITANIC II: Planning,” were outlined in detail in Chapters IV and V. These two case studies attempted to test all of the Coast Guard's emergency response capabilities. Analysis of Survey Results The stakeholder survey interviews produced the following findings (Figures 5 through 20): 210 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 5. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEMENTS l.a, l.b, l.c, and l.d • DOT’s USCG O U Spill Emergency Response Team is: a pu blic-in terest adm inistration organization, doctrin e-based an action-oriented organization, and a perform ance-focused organization. B S en io r F ield ■ J u n io r F ield 1 H Q S ta ff E l] C o n g ressio n a l Staff 2 1 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The researcher's intent for this statement was to establish similarity between the DOT and DOD. The statement tried to determine if DOT has these characteristics because DOD, where the hierarchical framework has been successful, has these characteristics. l.a. Public-interest Administration The term was not defined for the survey participants. The overall response was 3.5 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” It is a vague term and the results may have been higher if it had been explained. l.b. Action Oriented This term is quickly recognizable in everyone's lexicon as a positive, attractive, and desirable trait. The overall response was 4.4 for this statement or “Strongly Positive. It is a positive term that the respondents may simply have preferred to be identified with their organization. l.c. Doctrine-Based The term was not defined for the survey participants. The overall response was 3.3 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” The results are significantly lower than the researcher expected. Forty o f the forty-seven respondents are graduates o f the USCG's Contingency Preparedness Planning School. The key manual for this school is the “Contingency Preparedness Planning Manual, Volume I, Planning Doctrine [emphasis added] and Policy.” The researcher's background 212 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. should have kept him from being surprised because “Doctrine-Based” is not only a vague term but it also has some negative connotations for officers o f the naval1 services. In Fleet Tactics, Theory and Practice, Captain Wayne Hughes writes, Doctrine is one o f the military's most elusive words. The U.S. Navy has usually avoided the problem o f defining the term by ignoring it. This is unfortunate. Doctrine as a concept and as a practice should be carefully delineated and put to work. (Hughes, 1986, p. 285) In independent research during the four years the researcher taught national security at the National War College, Washington, DC, he tested the acceptability o f the following two definitions o f doctrine to officers o f the uniformed services. The U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Marine Corps officers quickly accepted both definitions. However, the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy officers accepted the first and largely rejected the second. The first definition o f doctrine as expressed by Lt Commander Dudley W. Knox was accepted by all o f these senior officers: The object o f military doctrine is to furnish a basis for prompt and harmonious conduct by the subordinate commanders o f a large military force, in accordance with the intentions o f the commander-in-chief, but without the necessity for referring each decision to superior authority before action is taken. More concisely stated the object is to provide a foundation for mutual understanding between the various commanders during hostile operations. (W eigley, 1973, p. 512) However, the second, as defined by Colonel Hollis LeR. Muller, U.S.A., had lesser acceptance for the Coast Guard and Navy officers: 'Naval Service includes the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Coast Guard. 213 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Nature o f Doctrine. Uniformity o f thought and action throughout an army is the difference between victory and defeat. This uniformity is secured by strict adherence [emphasis added] on the part o f all military men to approved policy, regulations, and authorized training and operating methods, or what collectively are called “doctrine o f war.” An understanding o f doctrine is the foundation o f an officer's professional knowledge. (Weigley, 1973, p. 512) During the researcher’ s follow-up discussions, these sea-going officers identified the most objectionable phrase as the “strict adherence . . . to approved policy.” This concept intrudes on the idea o f a sailor placing his sailing orders under his arm and setting o ff on his own. Going in Harm's Way he would make decisions on his own seasoned good judgment rather than strictly adhering to specific doctrine that would attempt to cover all situations. Therefore, the researcher should have expected the objection to doctrine to be reported by the respondents. The responses to the Likert scale were supported by the written statements of the respondents regarding the adaptation o f the DOD hierarchical framework. The respondents made the following indirect comments about doctrine in their written comments: • As stated earlier, I think it is a terrific performance evaluation tool. I do not believe it should be implemented operationally for fear the operator would use it as a “cookbook” & ignore possible innovative solutions to task accomplishment. • I fear a problem with using the model in the CG operational environment is the natural tendency to depend on software instead of innovative ideas to solve a problem. The model will work well in exercises & training to teach proper action, but may be overly restrictive in operational use. • DOD missions (NVR’s) are similar everywhere, whereas USCG’s are different. We use ICS rather than a more specific pre-determined 214 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. structure because any given response (and various permutations thereof) [USCG] must be highly adaptive. This program seems too “fixed.” [emphasis added throughout] l.d. Performance-Focused The term was not specifically defined for the survey participants. The overall response was 4.1 for this statement or “Strongly Positive.” In recent months, numerous articles have identified the Coast Guard as a top-performing agency in performance measurement. The researcher’ s briefing may have added to that positive perception and influenced the positive response. The researcher presented an article on the Government Performance Project, administered by Syracuse University. This project identified the Coast Guard as the number one o f twenty federal agencies in Financial Management, Human Resources, Information Technology, Capital Management, and Managing for Results (Barr, February 29, 2000, p. A17). 215 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 6. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEM ENTS 5.a and 5.b * A daptation o f D O D ’s fram ew ork w ould allow D O T stakeholders to identify their needs, values, and responsibilities (N V R ) and their tasks that trace to-and-through other stak eh old ers’ tasks to U SC G ’s strategic m ission. i m msm— H i Wm' m m n !!§ $ A llow Id en tification o f N V R A llow Id en tification o f T raceab le T asks B S e n io r F ield B J u n io r F ield El H Q S ta ff El C o n g ressio n a l Staff 216 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The researcher's purpose in including these two statements was to identify the attitudes o f the four stakeholder groups towards the value and importance o f a specific adaptation o f DOD's framework. It was proffered that this adaptation would allow DOT stakeholders to identify their needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR) and their tasks that trace to-and-through other stakeholders' tasks to the Coast Guard's strategic mission. 5.a. Allow Identification o f Needs, Values, and Responsibilities (NVR). During the briefing, the terms were defined and the overall concept of identifying and focusing on specific a specific hierarchical framework o f NVR was discussed at length. It was the centerpiece o f the presentation the respondents were given. The overall response was 2.9 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative.” However, this is misleading; there was great disparity between the responses o f the four groups o f stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 2.6 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 2.7 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.2 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 3.6 for this statement or “Positive.” 217 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5.b. Allow Identifiable Traceable Tasks. The term was defined and the overall concept o f identifying and focusing on those tasks that trace to-and-through other stakeholders' tasks to the USCG' strategic mission was discussed at length. It was a significant part o f the presentation the respondents were given. The overall response was 3.1 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” However, as in the response to 5.a, this also was misleading; there again was great disparity between the responses o f the four groups o f stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 2.7 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 2.9 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.5 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 3.9 for this statement or “Positive.” The Senior Field stakeholders are those personnel currently responsible for accomplishing core Coast Guard activities that they believe are linked to the strategic mission of the Coast Guard. The data indicate that the closer the respondents are to the responsibility for accomplishing this specific work the less likely they are to agree with the two statements. Conversely, there is a more positive response to adapting and applying a new model as the distance increases away from the hands-on 218 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. practitioner. The Headquarters Staff stakeholders and the Congressional Staff stakeholders—those charged with maintaining a broader view o f Coast Guard responsibilities— indicate less satisfaction with current performance. There is a direct correlation between the distance from the hands-on task performer and the acceptance o f change to current operating procedures (greater distance = greater willingness to accept change). In addition, the Headquarters Staff stakeholders have the responsibility o f comparing the performance o f all field organizations. Therefore, they may be more receptive to a system that allows them to establish benchmarks o f performance (evaluate performance through the establishment o f standards for field organizations) and, thereby, allow these senior staffs to employ best practices. Again, the Senior Field stakeholders and Junior Field stakeholders, through their “Somewhat Negative” responses, appear to indicate that they are satisfied with their current capabilities and their current execution o f their tasking. They may be reporting, “We are doing a good job, don’t criticize us!” and “Current procedures are OK as is” . . . and the classic, “If it ain't broke, don’t fix it!” Also, the Field Staff stakeholders may be objecting to a system that appears to narrow the interpretation of their responsibilities and, thereby, may negatively impact their ability to improvise in their response to ever-changing situations. The responses by the Field Staff stakeholders to the Likert scale were supported by their written statements. In particular, one respondent made the following direct comment that this was not the 219 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. first time that the Coast Guard was asked to adapt another agency's system to their use: • This effort is an attempt to overlay a system where there is not a demonstrated need. It does not recognize that we are now overlaying ICS [Incident Command System] on CG [Coast Guard]. [ICS is] a system developed by wild land firefighting agencies! The researcher’ s purpose in including these two statements was to identify the attitudes of the four stakeholder groups towards the value and importance o f a specific adaptation o f DOD’ s framework. It was proffered that this adaptation would allow DOT stakeholders to identify those tasks that were essential to the agency’ s mission. Once the mission essential tasks were identified, then acquisitions and training could be prioritized and focused superficially on those tasks. In addition, this identification o f mission essential tasks and would help DOT identify those tasks that should be funded by Congress. 2 2 0 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 7. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEMENTS 5.c and 5.d * A daptation o f DO D’s fram ew ork would allow D O T to focus acquisition and training on tasks essential to U SC G m ission, and w ould help DO T identify those tasks that should b e funded by C ongress. S S S K k m m s m m 5 S : ¥ * » A llow S tra teg ic M ission F ocu sed A cquisitions and T raining H elp D O T Identify T asks C on gress Should Fund g S en io r F ield ■ J u n io r F ield gj H Q S ta ff i C on gression al Staff 2 2 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5.c. Allow DOT to Focus Acquisition and Training on Tasks Essential to USCG Missions. During the briefing, the terms were defined and the overall concept o f identifying and focusing on a specific set o f essential tasks to train to and to procure against was covered at length. The identification o f those tasks that are essential to the mission of the agency was a key part o f the presentation the respondents were given. The overall response was 3 3 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” However, once again there was significant disparity between the responses o f the four groups of stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 3.0 for this statement or “Neutral”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.2 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.8 for this statement or “Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.1 for this statement or “Strongly Positive.” 5.d. Help DOT Identify Tasks Congress Should Fund. The briefing on the purpose and use o f a hierarchical framework o f stakeholder needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR) was the most important part o f the presentation the respondents were given. The terms and the supporting concept were covered in great detail. The overall response was 3 3 for this statement or 222 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. “Somewhat Positive.” However, once again there was significant disparity between the responses o f the four groups o f stakeholders. This statement focuses on those tasks that should be funded by Congress. Therefore, the disparity between the responses o f the Congressional Staff stakeholder and the Senior Field stakeholders is very important to note. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 2.9 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.2 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.7 for this statement or “Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.0 for this statement or “Positive.” Once again, the Senior Field stakeholders are those personnel currently responsible for accomplishing core Coast Guard activities that they believe are linked to the strategic mission o f the Coast Guard. The data indicate that the closer the respondents are to the responsibility for accomplishing this specific work the less likely they are to agree with the two statements. Conversely, there is a more positive response to adapting and applying a new model as the distance increases away from the hands-on practitioner. The Headquarters Staff stakeholders and the Congressional Staff stakeholders—those charged with maintaining a broader view o f Coast Guard responsibilities— indicate less satisfaction with current performance. 223 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. There is a direct correlation between the distance from the hands-on task performer and the acceptance o f change to current operating procedures (greater distance = greater willingness to accept change). In addition, the Headquarters Staff stakeholders have the responsibility o f comparing the performance of all field organizations. Therefore, they may be more receptive to a system that allows them to establish benchmarks o f performance (evaluate performance through the establishment o f standards for field organizations) and, thereby, allow these senior staffs to employ best practices. The researcher’ s purpose in including these three statements was to identify the attitudes o f the four stakeholder groups towards the value and importance o f a specific adaptation o f DOD's framework. It was proffered that this adaptation would increase the stakeholder’ s ability to plan real world operations, realistic exercises, or training events. 224 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 8. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEMENTS 7.a, 7.c, and 7.d * Use o f the m odel w ould in crease m y ab ility to plan real- w orld operations, realistic exercises, or trainin g events. m - " ■ b C s s b s s S . • / W ; B S en ior F ield 1 Ju n ior F ield 13 H Q Staff 1 C on gression al Staff R eal-W orld E xercise T ra in in g 225 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7.a. Increase Stakeholder's Ability to Plan Real World Operations. During the briefing, the terms were defined and the overall concept of using the software to build Real World Operations was demonstrated. However, the name of the DOD hierarchical framework's supporting software may have caused some less-positive responses to its specific application for Real World events. There have been two names for the DOD’ s supporting software. It was first called the Joint Exercise Management Program (JEMP) and it is currently called the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS). The overall response of all stakeholders was 2.9 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative.” However, this is misleading; there was great disparity between the responses of the four groups of stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 2.5 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 2.6 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.8 for this statement or “Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 3.9 for this statement or “Positive.” I.e. Increase Stakeholder's Ability to Plan Realistic Exercises. During the briefing, the terms were defined and the overall concept of using the software to build Realistic Exercises was demonstrated. As in the response to 226 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7.a, once again the name of the DOD hierarchical framework's supporting software may have had an impact. In this case it may have had a somewhat positive impact on some of the respondents. The original name for the DOD's supporting software was the Joint Exercise Management Program (JEMP). The overall response o f all stakeholders was 3.2 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” Once again there was significant disparity between the responses of the four groups of stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 2.7 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.1 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Headquarters S ta ff stakeholders was 4.2 for this statement or “Strongly Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional S ta ff stakeholders was 4.1 for this statement or “Strongly Positive.” 7.d. Increase Stakeholder's Ability to Plan Training Events. During the briefing, the terms were defined and the overall concept of using the software to build Training Events was demonstrated. The overall response of all stakeholders was 3.2 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” Once again there was significant disparity between the responses of the four groups of stakeholders. The response from the: 227 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Senior Field stakeholders was 2.7 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 2.7 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 4 3 for this statement or “Strongly Positive; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4 3 for this statement or “Strongly Positive.” The Senior Field stakeholders are those personnel currently responsible for conducting real world operations, in addition to planning realistic exercises and training events to enhance the Coast Guard's capabilities to ensure they can accomplish the Coast Guard's responsibilities. The Junior Field stakeholders are directly involved in supporting the efforts of the Senior Field stakeholders. The data indicate that the closer the respondents were to the responsibility for accomplishing these real world operations and the training and exercising required to remain proficient, the less likely they were to agree with the three statements. The average of the combined responses o f the Senior and Junior Field stakeholders was 2.8 for the three statements or “Somewhat Negative.” Conversely, the data also indicate that there was a very positive response to adapting and applying a new model as the distance increased away from the hands-on practitioner. The average of the 228 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. combined responses of the Headquarters and Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.1 for the three statements or “Strongly Positive.” Once again the Senior Field stakeholders and Junior Field stakeholders, through their “Somewhat Negative” responses, appear to indicate that they are satisfied with their approach to real world operations, exercises, and training. The responses by the Field stakeholders to the Likert scale were supported by their written statements. • The software may make a valuable training or exercise planning tool, but [it is] limited as a tactical field tool. The applications, goals, and objectives require train-to-memory when the rubber hits the road [real world operations]. • [Use of the model would require] complete change in Coast Guard culture— it reacts to incidents but doesn’t do a lot of deliberate planning. This is a problem from unit-level to HQ. Deliberate planning is not a hallmark of the Coast Guard as in sister services and a tour of duty as a “planner” is a death blow to a career. Finally, one hands-on operator made a succinct, bottom line assessment: • In this day and age of streamlined staffing, more [computer] terminal time equals less time on the water—a hard sell! 229 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 9. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEMENT 7.b * Use of the model would increase my ability to work with agencies other than my own. I i I IlfllW P ^ MMtMWMrn : i : ' I s isl^fiipi llifili B S e n io r F ield I J u n io r F ield El H Q S ta ff | El C o n g ressio n a l Staffi E n h a n ce A b ility to W o rk w ith O th er A g en cies 230 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The researcher's purpose in including this statement was to identify the attitudes of the four stakeholder groups towards the value and importance of a specific adaptation o f DOD's framework. It was proffered that this adaptation would enhance the stakeholder's ability to work with other agencies. 7.b. Enhance Stakeholder's Ability to Work with Other Agencies. The briefing given the respondents included an in-depth discussion of the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)—Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) Process. The UJTL-JMETL Process is at its most basic level a common language for the five military services. The briefing included the concept that the adaptation of a similar process, with its attendant common language, by the various federal agencies would enhance every stakeholder's ability to work with other agencies. The overall response o f all stakeholders was 3.2 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” However, this is misleading; there was great disparity between the responses of the four groups of stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 2.8 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 2.9 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.7 for this statement or “Positive”; and, finally, 231 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.1 for this statement or “Strongly Positive.” The data indicate that Senior and Junior Field stakeholders do not perceive the model as an effective tool to increase their ability to work with agencies outside of the Coast Guard. The data indicate that Headquarters and Congressional Staff stakeholders do perceive the model as an effective tool to increase their ability to work with other agencies. The reality may be that for Field stakeholders the “other agency” they must work with is really a personally known individual who works and lives in the same small community. Thus the coordination and cooperation is on a very personal basis that may not be aided by the model. On the other hand, the data may indicate that there simply is less requirement in the Field stakeholder's day-to- day jobs to interface and operate with agencies other than their own. The significant difference in the response data may also indicate that Headquarters and Congressional Staff personnel have a greater requirement to work with other agencies and it is just as likely that those working relationships would be less personal. The data are not sufficient to make a judgment; additional research would be required to determine the reality. 232 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 10. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEM ENT 7.h • Use of the model would contribute to my ability to quickly conceptualize the mission and identify the tasks to be accomplished. E nh an ce A b ility to Identify T asks to be A ccom p lish ed 9 S e n io r F ield B J u n io r F ie ld I H Q S ta ff El C o n g r e ssio n a l Staff 233 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The researcher's purpose in including this statement was to identify the attitudes of the four stakeholder groups towards the value and importance o f a specific adaptation of DOD's framework. It was proffered that this adaptation would enhance the stakeholder's ability to identify tasks to be accomplished to satisfy mission needs. 7.h. Enhance Stakeholder’ s Ability to Identify Tasks to be Accomplished. The terms were defined during the briefing. In the demonstration o f the hierarchical framework's supporting software, mission-linked operational templates were built that included the tasks required to accomplish the mission. The overall response of all stakeholders was 3.4 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” Once again there was great disparity between the responses of the four groups of stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 2.9 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.2 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Headquarters S ta ff stakeholders was 4.2 for this statement or “Strongly Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional S ta ff stakeholders was 4.3 for this statement or “Strongly Positive.” 234 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Senior Field stakeholders are those personnel currently responsible for executing Coast Guard missions. Through their “Somewhat Negative” responses, they appear to indicate that they are satisfied with their ability to conceptualize the mission and identify the tasks to be accomplished. The Junior Field stakeholders, one level removed in experience and responsibility, are “Somewhat Positive” to the idea o f adapting and applying a new model. In contrast, the data indicate the Headquarters and Congressional Staff stakeholders are “Strongly Positive” to the statement. Once again the data indicated increasing support for the concept o f adapting and applying a new model as the distance increased away from the hands-on practitioner. The researcher's purpose in including these three statements was to identify the attitudes of the four stakeholder groups towards the value and importance o f a specific adaptation of DOD's framework. It was proffered that this adaptation would provide individual stakeholders with the perspective of reflective practitioner- operators who previously faced similar problems and, thereby, provide the stakeholder with increased opportunity to think critically, think innovatively, or think strategically. 235 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 11. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEMENTS 7.k, 7.1, and 7.m • Use of the model would provide me with the perspective of reflective practitioner-operators who previously faced the problem and, thereby, provide me with increased opportunity to think critically, think innovatively, or think strategically. r T hink C r itic a lly T hin k T hink In novatively S trategically 3 S e n io r F ield I J u n io r F ield m H Q S ta ff E D C o n g re ssio n a l Staff 236 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7.k. Provide Stakeholders with Opportunity to Think Critically. The terms were defined during the briefing. In the demonstration o f the hierarchical framework's supporting software, mission-linked operational templates were built that included the tasks required to accomplish the mission, conditions of the environments that would impact task performance, and measures of performance required for mission accomplishment. The respondents were also shown a databank of previously created operational templates. This databank purports to represent the best efforts and best thinking of their DoD counterparts who addressed similar missions in the recent past. The overall response of all stakeholders was 3.4 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” Once again there was significant disparity between the responses of the Senior Field stakeholders and the Headquarters Staff stakeholders. The difference in the data may indicate the Headquarters Staff stakeholder's need for critical analysis to evaluate the Field stakeholder's performance. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 3.0 for this statement or “Neutral”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3 3 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 43 for this statement or “Strongly Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 3.7 for this statement or “Positive.” 237 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7.1. Provide Stakeholders with Opportunity to Think Innovatively. The terms were defined during the briefing. In the demonstration of the hierarchical framework's supporting software, mission-linked operational templates were built that included the tasks required to accomplish the mission, conditions of the environments that would impact task performance, and measures of performance required for mission accomplishment. The respondents were also shown a databank of previously created operational templates. This databank purports to represent the best efforts and best thinking o f their DoD counterparts who addressed similar missions in the recent past. The overall response of all stakeholders was 3.0 for this statement or “Neutral.” There was minimum disparity between the responses of the four groups of stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 2.8 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.1 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Headquarters S ta ff stakeholders was 3.2 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 3.1 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” The data showed general agreement amongst all stakeholders regarding the model's impact on their ability to think innovatively. The data may indicate concern 238 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that a hierarchical framework would be too restrictive and may, in fact, inhibit rather than aid innovative thinking. Written statements that focus on this concern augmented the responses by the stakeholders to the Likert scale: • I fear a problem with using the model in the CG operational environment is the natural tendency to depend on software instead of innovative ideas to solve a problem. The model will work well in exercises and training to teach proper action, but may be overly restrictive in operational use [emphasis added]. • DOD missions (NVR’s) are similar everywhere, whereas USCG’s are different. We use ICS rather than a more specific pre determined structure because any given response (and various permutations thereof) must be highly adaptive. This program seems too fixed [emphasis added]. 7.m. Provide Stakeholders with Opportunity to Think Strategically. The terms were defined during the briefing. In the demonstration o f the hierarchical framework's supporting software, mission-linked operational templates were built that included the tasks required to accomplish the mission, conditions of the environments that would impact task performance, and measures of performance required for mission accomplishment. The respondents were also shown a databank of previously created operational templates. This databank purports to represent the best efforts and best thinking of their DoD counterparts who addressed similar missions in the recent past. The overall response of all stakeholders was 3 3 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” There was significant disparity between the responses of the Senior Field stakeholders and the Congressional Staff stakeholders. The response from the: 239 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Senior Field stakeholders was 2.9 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.4 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.8 for this statement or “Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 3.9 for this statement or “Positive.” The Senior Field stakeholders, through their “Somewhat Negative” responses, may indicate that they are satisfied with their approach to thinking strategically. On the other hand, the written comments from the Senior Field stakeholders may indicate that these hands-on operators may not believe they must think strategically. • [Not at my level, but] may be o f value at strategic level to quantify and interpret the functions, missions, and accomplishments o f the Service. Other Senior Field stakeholders found the process correct but the DOD data not valuable: • [The model provides a] sound review and integration o f feedback from all levels and programs. [However, the DOD database] is not directly transferable [to USCG DOT] and [therefore is] not usable. 240 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 12. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEMENTS 8.a, 8.b, and 8.c * The element o f the model that would help th e m ost in preparing a response to this H ISTO RICA L event is: the tasks, the conditions, or the m easures. m * .' * 6S S en io r Field ■ J u n io r Field H H Q S ta ff E H C on gression al Staff 241 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8218 The researcher’ s purpose in including these three statements was to identify the attitudes o f the four stakeholder groups towards the value and importance o f a specific adaptation o f DOD's framework. It was proffered that the element o f the model that would help stakeholders the most in preparing a response to the Case Study event was the tasks, the conditions, or the measures. 8.a. Element that Would Help the Most in Preparing a Response to the Case Study was the Tasks. The terms were defined during the presentation. The model presentation and the software demonstration included a description of the steps required for use o f the model for preparing a response to the historical event depicted in the two Case Studies. The response preparation portion o f the briefing included identification of the mission, the operations required to accomplish the mission, and— important for this statement—numerous examples o f the tasks required to accomplish the operations. The overall response o f all stakeholders was 3.6 for this statement or “Positive.” However, there was significant disparity between the responses o f the Senior Field and Junior Field stakeholders and the Headquarters Staff stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 3 3 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.4 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; 242 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 4.3 for this statement or “Strongly Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.0 for this statement or “Positive.” 8.b. Element that Would Help the Most in Preparing a Response to the Case Study was the Conditions. The terms were defined during the briefing. The model presentation and the software demonstration included a description o f the steps required for use o f the model for preparing a response to the historical event depicted in the two Case Studies. The response preparation portion o f the briefing included identification o f the mission, the operations required to accomplish the mission, and the tasks required to accomplish the operations. The demonstration then showed how the tasks were then—important for this statement—linked to numerous examples o f conditions o f the physical, bureaucratic, and political economic environments that would impact task performance. The overall response o f all stakeholders was 3.4 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” However, there was significant disparity between the responses of the Senior Field stakeholders and the Headquarters Staff stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 3.0 for this statement or “Neutral”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.5 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; 243 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 4.0 for this statement or “Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 3.7 for this statement or “Positive.” 8.c. Element that Would Help the Most in Preparing a Response to the Case Study was the Measures. The terms were defined during the briefing. The model presentation and the software demonstration included a description o f the steps required for use of the model for preparing a response to the historical event depicted in the two Case Studies. The response preparation portion o f the briefing included identification o f the mission, the operations required to accomplish the mission, and the tasks required to accomplish the operations. The demonstration then showed how the tasks were linked to conditions o f the environments that would impact task performance and then—important for this statement—linked to numerous measures o f performance that would indicate mission success. The overall response o f all stakeholders was 3.5 for this statement or “Positive.” Once again there was significant disparity between the responses o f the Senior Field stakeholders and the Headquarters Staff stakeholders. The difference in the data may indicate the Headquarters Staff stakeholder's need for measures to determine Senior Field stakeholder's performance. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 3.1 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; 244 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.6 for this statement or “Positive”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 4.2 for this statement or “Strongly Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 3.6 for this statement or “Positive.” The researcher’ s purpose in including these three statements was to identify the attitudes of the four stakeholder groups towards the value and importance o f a specific adaptation o f DOD's framework. It was proffered that the element o f the model that would help stakeholders the most in preparing a response to a future event was the tasks, the conditions, or the measures. 245 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 13. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEMENTS 9.a, 9.b, and 9.c * The elem ent o f the m odel that would help the m ost in preparing a response to a FUTURE event is: the tasks, the conditions, or the m easures. B S en io r F ield ■ J u n io r Field I^H Q S ta ff E H C o n g ressio n a l Staff 246 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9.a. Element that Would Help the Most in Preparing a Response to a Future Event was the Tasks. The terms were defined during the presentation. The model presentation and the software demonstration included a description of the steps required for use of the model for preparing a response to a fixture event similar to the historical event depicted in the two Case Studies. The response preparation portion o f the briefing included identification o f the mission, the operations required to accomplish the mission, and— important for this statement—numerous examples o f the tasks required to accomplish the operations. The overall response of all stakeholders was 3.7 for this statement or “Positive.” However, there was significant disparity between the responses o f the Senior Field and the Junior Field stakeholders and the Headquarters Staff and Congressional Staff stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 3.4 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.5 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 4.3 for this statement or “Strongly Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.3 for this statement or “Strongly Positive.” 247 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9.b. Element that Would Help the Most in Preparing a Response to a Future Event was the Conditions. The terms were defined during the presentation. The model presentation and the software demonstration included a description o f the steps required for use o f the model for preparing a response to a future event similar to the historical event depicted in the two Case Studies. The response preparation portion o f the briefing included identification o f the mission, the operations required to accomplish the mission, and the tasks required to accomplish the operations. The demonstration then showed how the tasks were then— important for this statement— linked to numerous examples o f conditions o f the physical, bureaucratic, and political economic environments that would impact task performance. The overall response o f all stakeholders was 3.6 for this statement or “Positive.” There was significant disparity between the responses o f the Senior Field stakeholders and the Headquarters Staff and Congressional Staff stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 3.2 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.6 for this statement or “Positive”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 4.2 for this statement or “Strongly Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.3 for this statement or “Strongly Positive.” 248 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9.c. Element that Would Help the Most in Preparing a Response to the Case Study was the Measures. The terms were defined during the presentation. The model presentation and the software demonstration included a description o f the steps required for use o f the model for preparing a response to a future event similar to the historical event depicted in the two Case Studies. The response preparation portion o f the briefing included identification o f the mission, the operations required to accomplish the mission, and the tasks required to accomplish the operations. The demonstration then showed how the tasks were linked to conditions o f the environments that would impact task performance and then—important for this statement— linked to numerous measures o f performance that would indicate mission success. The overall response o f all stakeholders was 3.5 for this statement or “Positive.” Once again there was significant disparity between the responses o f the Senior Field stakeholders and the Headquarters Staff stakeholders. The difference in the data may indicate the Headquarters Staff stakeholder's need for measures to determine Senior Field stakeholder's performance. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 3.2 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.6 for this statement or “Positive”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 4.2 for this statement or “Strongly Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 3.6 for this statement or “Positive.” 249 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 14. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEMENTS lO.a, lO.b, lO.c, lO.d, and lO.e • The DOD Model is Adaptable for USCG use for R eal- W orld Events, E xercise Events, Training Events, Identifying Personnel Requirements, or Identifying E quipm ent Requirements. 1 Senior Field ■ Jun ior Field I HQ Staff 1 C ongressional Staf:' 250 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The researcher’ s purpose in including these five statements was to identify the attitudes o f the four stakeholder groups towards the value and importance o f adapting the DOD model for USCG use for real-world events, exercise events, training events, and identifying personnel requirements, or identifying equipment requirements. lO.a. DOD Model is Adaptable for USCG use for Responding to Real-World Events. During the briefing, the terms were defined. The researcher then presented the fifty-seven tables he created to align the DOT USCG's current emergency response language2 with the DOD's current common language.3 The overall concept o f using the hierarchical framework’ s supporting software to build Real World Operations was demonstrated. However, the name o f the DOD hierarchical framework's supporting software may have caused some less-positive responses to its specific application for Real World events. There have been two names for the DOD's supporting software. It was first called the Joint Exercise Management Program (JEMP) and it is currently called the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS). The overall response o f all stakeholders was 3.2 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 2.8 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; :The Incident Command System (ICS). 3 The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)-Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) Process. 251 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.2 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.8 for this statement or “Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 3.6 for this statement or “Positive.” lO.b. DOD Model is Adaptable for USCG Use for Building and Executing Exercise Events. During the briefing, the terms were defined. The researcher then presented the fifty-seven tables he created to align the DOT USCG's current emergency response language with the DOD's current common language. The overall concept o f using the hierarchical framework's supporting software to build and execute exercise events was demonstrated. As in the response to 10.a, once again the name o f the DOD hierarchical framework's supporting software may have had an impact. In this case it may have had a somewhat positive impact on some of the respondents. There have been two names for the DOD's supporting software. It was first called the Joint Exercise Management Program (JEMP) and it is currently called the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS). The overall response o f all stakeholders was 3.5 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” Once again there was significant disparity between the responses o f the four groups o f stakeholders. The response from the: 252 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Senior Field stakeholders was 3.0 for this statement or t £ Neutral”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.4 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 4.5 for this statement or “Strongly Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.4 for this statement or “Strongly Positive.” lO.c. DOD Model is Adaptable for USCG Use for Building and Executing Training Events. During the briefing, the terms were defined. The researcher then presented the fifty-seven tables he created to align the DOT USCG's current emergency response language with the DOD's current common language. The overall concept o f using the hierarchical framework's supporting software to build and execute training events was demonstrated. As in the response to lO.b, the name o f the DOD hierarchical framework's supporting software may have had a somewhat positive impact on some of the respondents. There have been two names for the DOD's supporting software. It was first called the Joint Exercise Management Program (JEMP) and it is currently called the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS). The overall response o f all stakeholders was 3.6 for this statement or “Positive.” Again there was significant disparity between the responses o f the four groups o f stakeholders. The response from the: 253 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Senior Field stakeholders was 3.1 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.4 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 4.5 for this statement or “Strongly Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.6 for this statement or “Strongly Positive.” lO.d. DOD Model is Adaptable for USCG Use for Identifying Requirements for Acquiring Personnel. During the briefing, the terms were defined. The researcher then presented the fifty-seven tables he created to align the DOT USCG's current emergency response language with the DOD's current common language. The overall concept o f using the hierarchical framework's supporting software to identify requirements for acquiring personnel was demonstrated. However, once again the name o f the DOD model's supporting software may have caused some less-positive responses to its specific application for identifying requirements for acquiring personnel. There have been two names for the DOD's supporting software. It was first called the Joint Exercise Management Program (JEMP) and it is currently called the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS). The overall response o f all stakeholders 254 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. was 3.4 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” There was some disparity between the responses o f the four groups o f stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 3.1 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3-3 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.8 for this statement or “Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.0 for this statement or “Positive.” lO.e. DOD Model is Adaptable for USCG Use for Identifying Requirements for Acquiring Equipment, Facilities, Technologies, Et Cetera. During the briefing, the terms were defined. The researcher then presented the fifty-seven tables he created to align the DOT USCG's current emergency response language with the DOD’ s current common language. The overall concept o f using the hierarchical framework's supporting software to identify requirements for acquiring equipment, facilities, technologies, et cetera, was demonstrated. However, once again the name o f the DOD model's supporting software may have caused some less-positive responses to its specific application for identifying requirements for acquiring equipment, facilities, technologies, et cetera. There have been two names for the DOD's supporting software. It was first called the Joint Exercise Management Program (JEMP) and it is currently called the Joint Training 255 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Information Management System (JTIMS). The overall response o f all stakeholders was 3.4 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” There was some disparity between the responses o f the four groups o f stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 3.2 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.4 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.5 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4 3 for this statement or “Strongly Positive.” The Senior Field stakeholders are those personnel currently responsible for conducting real world operations, in addition to planning realistic exercises and training events to enhance the Coast Guard's capabilities to ensure they can accomplish the Coast Guard's responsibilities. The Junior Field stakeholders are directly involved in supporting the efforts o f the Senior Field stakeholders. The data indicate that the closer the respondents were to the responsibility for accomplishing these real world operations and the training and exercising required to remain proficient, the less likely they were to agree with the statements 10.a, 10.b, and 10.c. The average o f the combined responses o f the Senior and Junior Field stakeholders was 3.1 for the three statements or “Somewhat Positive.” Conversely, the data also 256 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. indicate that there was a very positive response to adapting and applying a new model as the distance increased away from the hands-on practitioner. The average o f the combined responses o f the Headquarters and Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.2 for the statements lO.a, lO.b, and lO.c, or “Strongly Positive.” The Senior Field and Junior Field stakeholders are those personnel currently responsible for identifying requirements for acquiring personnel, equipment, facilities, technologies, et cetera, to ensure their units have the capabilities to accomplish the Coast Guard's responsibilities. The average o f the combined responses of the Senior and Junior Field stakeholders was 3.2 for the two statements lO.d and lO.e or “Somewhat Positive.” The Headquarters Staff stakeholders have the responsibility for prioritizing the Coast Guard's requirements for personnel, equipment, facilities, technologies, et cetera, to ensure the Coast Guard has the capabilities to accomplish its responsibilities and then identifying that prioritization to Congress. The average o f the combined responses o f the Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.7 for the two statements lO.d and lO.e or “Positive.” The Congressional Staff stakeholders have the responsibility for prioritizing competing requirements for government funds. The average of the combined responses o f the Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.2 for the statements lO.d and lO.e, or “Strongly Positive.” This may be very important data for the Coast Guard stakeholders to know: The Congressional Staff stakeholders are “Strongly Positive” 257 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. about the form and fashion in which they receive the Coast Guard's prioritized requirements. The data indicate that the closer the respondents were to the responsibility for accomplishing these real world operations and the training and exercising required to remain proficient, the less likely they were to agree with the statements lO.a, lO.b, and lO.e. The average o f the combined responses o f the Senior and Junior Field stakeholders was 3.1 for the three statements or “Somewhat Positive.” Conversely, the data also indicated that there was a very positive response to adapting and applying a new model as the distance increased away from the hands-on practitioner. The average of the combined responses o f the Headquarters and Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.2 for the statements lO.a, lO.b, and lO.e, or “Strongly Positive.” The researcher's purpose in including this statement was to identify the attitudes o f the four stakeholder groups towards the value and importance o f a specific adaptation o f DOD's framework, it was proffered that by using the DOD's hierarchical framework o stakeholders' needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR), and substituting the DOT’S NVR, the DOT could significantly enhance its ability to identify for Congress the right tasks to fund. 258 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 15. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEMENT 11 * By using the D O D ’s hierarchical fram ework o f stakeholders’ needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR) and substituting the DOT’s NVR, the DOT could significantly enhance its ability to identify for Congress the right tasks to fund. B S en ior F ield ■ Ju n ior F ield 11 H Q S taff I ] C on gression al S taff U se o f D O D 's F ram ew ork W ould E nh an ce D O T's A b ility to Identify for C on gess the R ig h t T asks to Fund 2 5 9 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11. Use o f DOD's Framework Would Enhance DOT USCG's Ability to Identify for Congress the Right Tasks to Fund. During the briefing, the terms were defined. The researcher's presentation focused on the ability to adapt an existing program for another agency's use. The overall response o f all stakeholders was 3.1 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 2.9 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 2.9 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.7 for this statement or “Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 3.6 for this statement or “Positive.” The researcher's purpose in including this statement was to identify the attitudes o f the four stakeholder groups towards the value and importance o f a specific adaptation o f DOD's framework. It was proffered that a strategic framework that has been proven in one Federal Government agency for emergency management purposes can be adapted and implemented successfully by other Federal Government agencies in the business o f emergency management. 260 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 16. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEMENT 12 • A strategic framework that has been proven in one Federal Government agency for emergency m anagem ent purposes can be adapted and implemented successfully by other Federal Government agencies in the business o f em ergency management. 1 S en ior F ield ■ Ju n ior F ield I D H Q Staff E D C ongressional Staff A S tra teg ic F ram ew ork P roven in O ne F e d er a l A gen cy Can B e A dapted and Im p lem en ted S uccessfully by A n o th er F ed eral A gency 261 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12. A Strategic Framework Proven in One Federal Agency Can Be Adapted and Implemented Successfully by Another Federal Agency. The terms were defined during the presentation. The researcher then presented the fifty-seven tables he created to align the DOT USCG's current emergency response language with the DOD's current common language. This was followed by a demonstration o f the overall concept o f using the hierarchical framework's supporting software for strategic planning, performance measurement, and decisionmaking when responding to real-world events; building and executing exercise and training events; and for identifying requirements for acquiring personnel, equipment, facilities, technologies, et cetera. The overall response o f all stakeholders was 3.5 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” There was minimal disparity between the responses o f the stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 3.5 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.4 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.8 for this statement or “Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 3.7 for this statement or “Positive.” 262 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 17. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEMENT 13 * The conditions necessary for successful im plem entation of the DOD hierarchical framework into the D O T currently exist. C on d ition s N ecessa ry for Successfu l Im p lem entation o f D O D F ram ew ork Into D O T C u rren tly E xist H S en io r F ield B J u n io r F ield 13 H Q S ta ff 13 C on gression al Staff 263 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The researcher’ s purpose in including this statement was to identify the attitudes o f the four stakeholder groups towards the value and importance o f a specific adaptation o f DOD's framework. It was proffered that the conditions necessary for successful implementation o f the DOD hierarchical framework into the DOT currently exist. 13. Conditions Necessary for Successful Implementation o f DOD Framework Into DOT Currently Exist. The terms were defined during the presentation. The researcher then presented the fifty-seven tables he created to align the DOT USCG's current emergency response language with the DOD's current common language. This was followed by a demonstration o f the overall concept of using the hierarchical framework's supporting software for strategic planning, performance measurement, and decisionmaking when responding to real-world events; building and executing exercise and training events; and for identifying requirements for acquiring personnel, equipment, facilities, technologies, et cetera. The overall response o f all stakeholders was 2.8 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative.” There was some disparity between the responses o f the Senior Field and Junior Field stakeholders and the Headquarters Staff and Congressional Staff stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 2.6 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; 264 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Junior Field stakeholders was 2.7 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Headquarters Staff'stakeholders was 3.2 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 3 3 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” The “Somewhat Negative” to “Somewhat Positive” responses o f the stakeholders to the statement, “Conditions necessary for successful implementation o f the DOD framework into DOT currently exist” was reinforced by their written statements. In the written data, respondents report that the model is ready now for implementation, but only for certain grade/rank levels o f personnel. • Good model, [needs] more artistry and color to capture minds and imaginations o f the upcoming generation. This software should be adapted AND USED for all Coast Guard units within a certain Command and Control level: 0-3 and above; CWO and above, depending upon operations or mission. Other written data indicate concern that limitations in time, personnel, and training budget would prevent implementation at this time. • Unfortunately I don’t believe the Coast Guard has the manpower or time to provide this extensive information for our everyday operations. • [The Coast Guard has] insufficient staffing in severely downsized service to make investment. • [The model is] not a good fit for USCG [because it is] an agency with limited training budget. 265 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • The personnel resources currently do not exist to utilize this system. Missions, priorities and visions have to be incorporated into the decision to implement this program. And at this time, the Coast Guard is ill prepared to utilize a system with these capabilities. • The model could be successful implemented as is however the biggest barrier is the time to implement when compared to competing priorities within the Coast Guard. • [The Coast Guard would need] a dedicated team to implement. Other written data indicate concern that differences in language and culture would prevent implementation at this time. • It is not directly transferable and not usable as is because o f program differences, language, and common understanding. • The framework would need to [be] modified for the language and culture o f the USCG, or any agency interested in using it. • Too many fields not written in DOT or CG language. • Adapt language and terminology to ICS language & terminology and remove the.DOD flavor to gain acceptance among [USCG] specialties not working closely with the DOD world. • It is a very good model. However the CG is very resistant to change o f any kind! • To implement [the model] the Coast Guard must [first] decide on a military or civilian hierarchy in the immediate organization. • To implement [the model] the framework [needs to] focus on the civilian aspects o f the USCG’s missions including search and rescue and law enforcement. • [Could be successfully implemented] if it were Coast Guard specific, which it isn’t yet. Other written data indicate the complexity of the model would prevent implementation at this time: • Reduce scope o f information and have data/drop boxes roll up to an [Incident Command System] ICS form to have added value to the field or end user. • Make even simpler.. . . I’m not sure how. 2 6 6 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • [DOD] plans are too complicated. [The model] should be kept on a simpler level. • Too complex for non-professional planner. The researcher's purpose in including this statement was to identify the attitudes of the four stakeholder groups towards the value and importance of a specific adaptation of DOD’ s framework. It was proffered that the framework, if implemented by the USCG, could help further the goals of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). Specifically, it could improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer satisfaction. 267 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 18. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEMENT 14.a • T he framework, if implemented by the USCG, could help further the GPRA goal o f improving F ederal P rogram E ffectiveness and Public A ccountability by prom oting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer satisfaction. H S en io r Field ■ J u n io r Field m H Q S ta ff E C ongressional S taff I f Im plem ented, Could Im prove Federal Program E ffectiveness and P u b lic A ccountability Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14.a. If Implemented, Could Improve Federal Program Effectiveness and Public Accountability. The terms were defined during the presentation. The presentation included an overview of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) with emphasis on the Coast Guard's recognized superior performance in their response to the GPRA. The overall response of all stakeholders was 3 3 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” There was significant disparity between the responses o f the Senior Field stakeholders and the Headquarters Staff and Congressional Staff stakeholders. The response from the: Senior Field stakeholders was 2.9 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3 3 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; 2 69 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.7 for this statement or “Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 3.7 for this statement or “Positive.” The researcher's purpose in including this statement was to identify the attitudes of the four stakeholder groups towards the value and importance of a specific adaptation of DOD's framework. It was proffered that the framework, if implemented by the USCG, could help further the goals o f the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). Specifically, it could improve congressional decisionmaking by providing more objective information on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending. 2 70 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 19. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEMENT 14.b * The framework, if implemented by the USCG , could help further the GPRA goal o f improving congressional decisionmaking by providing more objective information on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative effectiveness and efficiency o f Federal programs and spending. B S en ior Field I Ju n ior Field m H Q Staff E l C ongressional Staff If Im p lem en ted , C ould Im prove C on gression al D ecision m ak ing by P rovid in g M o re O bjective Inform ation Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14.b. If Implemented, Could Improve Congressional Decisionmaking by Providing More Objective Information on Achieving Statutory Objectives, and on the Relative Effectiveness and Efficiency of Federal Programs and Spending. The terms were defined during the presentation. The presentation included an overview of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) with emphasis on the Coast Guard's recognized superior performance in their response to the GPRA. The overall response of all stakeholders was 3 3 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” There was significant disparity between the responses o f the Senior Field stakeholders and the Headquarters Staff and Congressional Staff stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 2.8 for this statement or “Somewhat Negative”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3 3 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.7 for this statement or “Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 3.7 for this statement or “Positive.” 272 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 20. RESPONSE TO SURVEY STATEMENT 15 • Based on this example, it is sound practice for other Federal Government agencies to attem pt to adapt and im plem ent a strategic structure that has been proven in another Federal Government agency. B S en io r F ield I J u n io r F ield H 3 H Q S taff H 3 C o n g ressio n a l Staff F ed era l A gencies S h ou ld A ttem p t to A dapt and Im plem ent S tra teg ic S tru ctu res P roven in A n oth er F ed era l A gency Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The researcher’ s purpose in including this statement was to identify the attitudes of the four stakeholder groups towards one of the supporting questions of the dissertation: In general, is it wise for other Federal Government agencies to adapt and implement a strategic structure that has been proven in one Federal Government agency? It was proffered that it is sound practice for other Federal Government agencies to attempt to adapt and implement a strategic structure that has been proven in another Federal Government agency. 15. Federal Agencies Should Attempt to Adapt and Implement Strategic Structures Proven in Another Federal Agency. The terms were defined during the presentation. The overall response of all stakeholders was 3.5 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive.” There was some disparity between the responses of the Senior Field and Junior Field stakeholders and the Headquarters Staff and Congressional Staff stakeholders. The response from the: • Senior Field stakeholders was 3.4 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Junior Field stakeholders was 3.2 for this statement or “Somewhat Positive”; • Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.8 for this statement or “Positive”; and, finally, • Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.0 for this statement or “Positive.” 274 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Summary This chapter addressed the findings from observations o f the research process and analysis of the survey results. The next chapter uses these specific findings to address the research questions and draw conclusions, plus provide recommendations for further research. 275 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VII CONCLUSIONS The Research Questions The goal of the dissertation was to assess whether it was possible and wise to adapt and apply a proven-tool for emergency management between Federal agencies. The questions the researcher pursued follow: 1. Is it a sound practice for a Federal agency to attempt to adapt and implement a program developed for another Federal agency? 2. Can the framework help to further the goals of the Government Performance and Results Act in the receiving organization as it has in the originating organization? 3. If [adapted and implemented] . . . what modifications, if any, are needed for successful implementation of the framework in the receiving agency? Finally, the principal question of the research follows: 4. Can a framework for strategic planning, performance measurement, and decisionmaking that has been proven in one Federal agency for emergency management purposes be adapted and implemented successfully by another Federal agency in the business of emergency management? 276 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The data and discussion that follow focus directly on the specific research questions above. The data of Chapter VI and Chapter VII were displayed also in the Access database. However, the researcher found PowerPoint graphs the most effective in helping him reach conclusions. The left to right increasing “openness to change” that the data display will be the centerpiece o f the conclusions. Research Supporting Question One. Is it a sound practice for a Federal agency to attempt to adapt and implement a program developed for another Federal agency? FIGURE 21. RESPONSE TO RESEARCH SUPPORTING QUESTION ONE * Based on this example, it is sound practice for other Federal Government agencies to attempt to adapt and implement a strategic structure that has been proven in another Federal Government agency. S lo p e o f In creasin g O p e n n e ss to C h a n g e □ Senior Field ■ Junior Field □ HQ Staff □ Congressional Staff Federal A gencies Should Attempt to Adapt and Implement Strategic Structure^ Proven in A nother Federal Agency 277 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The stakeholders responded with "Somewhat Positive" to "Positive" with an ever increasing openness to change as the distance from the "hands on" activity increased, as discussed in Chapter VI. Conclusion The data indicate that it is a sound practice to adapt and implement a strategic structure from another Federal agency. This conclusion is important because the adaptation and implementation of the DOD’s hierarchical framework of NVR by other Federal agencies would accomplish the following: • Keep an agency from replicating or creating similar frameworks (saving the adopting agencies significant development costs) and • Add to the community of users who can help improve the product through lessons learned, different perspectives (military versus civilian), etc. Research Supporting Question Two. Can the framework help to further the goals of the Government Performance and Results Act in the receiving organization as it has in the originating organization? 278 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 22. RESPONSE TO RESEARCH SUPPORTING QUESTION TWO • The framework, if implemented by the USCG, could help further the GPRA goal o f improving congressional decisionmaking by providing more objective information on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative effectiveness and efficiency o f Federal programs and spending. Slope of Increasing Dissatisfaction with Status Quo □ Senior Field ■ Junior Field □ HQ Staff B Congressional Staff If Im plem ented, Could Improve Congressional Decisionmaking by Providing M ore O bjective Information The stakeholder's data indicated “Somewhat Negative” to “Positive” responses. It is important to note the positive response from the Headquarters Staff stakeholders and the Congressional Staff stakeholders. The Headquarters Staff stakeholders are those individuals responsible for submitting objective information to the Congressional Staff stakeholders. The Congressional Staff stakeholders are those responsible for evaluating the information they are provided. These two groups of stakeholders are much more positive about the impact of the adaptation and 2 7 9 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. implementation than the two Field Staff stakeholders who would be responsible for providing the inputs. Conclusion The data indicate that adaptation and implementation of the DOD framework may help the DOTs USCG further the goals of the Government Performance and Results Act. This is an important conclusion because if the Headquarters Staff stakeholders and— most importantly—if the Congressional Staff stakeholders are representative in their positive response, the adaptation and implementation of the DOD’s hierarchical framework of NVR by other Federal agencies would provide Congress with the following: • The ability to rank and rate the ongoing efforts of Federal agencies; • The ability to identify and then fund effectively those programs that trace to-and-through to the strategic mission of their Federal agency; • The ability to identify those top-performing programs whose tasks do not trace to the strategic mission of their current Federal agency and. thereby; • The opportunity to reassign these top-performing programs to the Federal agency that has both the core competencies and responsibilities to leverage fully their improved task performance, and, finally; • The ability to rank and rate every Federal agency’s programs against the programs o f every other Federal agency and, thereby, the ability to spend the people’s money wisely. 280 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Research Supporting Question Three. If [adapted and implemented]. what modifications, if any, are needed for successful implementation of the framework in the receiving agency? FIGURE 23. RESPONSE TO RESEARCH SUPPORTING QUESTION THREE * The conditions necessary for successful implementation of the DOD hierarchical framework into the DOT currently exist. Slope of Increasing Openness to Change □ Senior Field ■ Junior Field □ HQ Staff □ Congressional Staff Conditions N ecessary for Successful Im plem entation o f DOD Framework Into DOT Currently Exist The data were “Somewhat Negative” to “Somewhat Positive” to the survey statement, which was a surrogate for the dissertation-supporting question above. The responses to the Likert scale were reinforced by the stakeholders' written statements, which were covered in detail in Chapter VI. Listed below are the four general areas of the stakeholders' written responses, which included specific modifications necessary for successful implementation: 281 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Ready for implementation but only for certain grade or rank levels of personnel. • Not ready for implementation because of limitations in time, personnel, and training budget • Not ready for implementation because of differences in language and culture. • Not ready for implementation because of the complexity of the model. Conclusion The model can be adapted by the DOPs USCG if it is made less complex and uses more consistently the Incident Command System (ICS) language. Specific training funds will be required for the initial implementation of a DOT USCG focused, less complex model. As the DOPs USCG model matures to its full potential, additional training funds will be required for successful implementation of each phase. Principal Research Question. Can a framework for strategic planning, performance measurement, and decisionmaking that has been proven in one Federal agency for emergency management purposes be adapted and implemented successfully by another Federal agency in the business of emergency management? 282 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 24. RESPONSE TO PRINCIPAL RESEARCH QUESTION • The DOD M odel is Adaptable for USCG use for Real- World Events, Exercise Events, Training Events, Identifying Personnel Requirements, or Identifying Equipment Requirements. Slope of Increasing Dissatisfaction with Status Quo □ Senior Field ■ Junior Field □ HQ Staff □ Congressional Staff The data represented in Figure 24 answer the dissertation's primary question. The responses to the survey-interview statements ranged from “Slightly Negative” to “Strongly Positive.” The figure also shows clearly the left to right increasing dissatisfaction with the status quo as the distance from the hands-on activity increases. Although other figures will follow for discussion of the primary question, this one figure provides a good overall representation of the responses. In general, as discussed in Chapter VI, the Senior Field stakeholders are those personnel currently responsible for accomplishing core Coast Guard activities that 283 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. they believe are linked to the strategic mission of the Coast Guard. The data indicate that the closer the respondents are to the responsibility for accomplishing this specific work the less likely they are to agree with the statements concerning adaptability of the DOD model. Abraham Kaplan may have an explanation for this. “The more we know about how to do something, the harder it is to leam how to do it differently” (Rogers, 1995, p. 100). Conversely, there is a more positive response to adapting and applying a new model as the distance increases away from the hands-on practitioner. The Headquarters Staff stakeholders and the Congressional Staff stakeholders—those charged with maintaining a broader view of Coast Guard responsibilities— indicate less satisfaction with current performance. There is a direct correlation between the distance from the hands-on task performer and the acceptance of change to current operating procedures (greater distance = greater willingness to accept change). In general, the left to right increasing dissatisfaction with the status quo or increasing openness to change may display the characteristics Marvin Weisbord described in his work. Productive Workplaces: Organizing and Managing for Dignity, Meaning, and Community. The Senior Field stakeholders on the far left represent the most experienced, established stakeholders of the Coast Guard's operational structure. Weisbord would describe them as having a high level of vested interest in the existing way of doing business. They have an implied contract that they will be rewarded under existing conditions; if they execute by the existing 284 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. rules they will be rewarded. “All change, even when they desire it. threatens supervisors and managers. . .. New technologies, scheduling methods, ways of budgeting, executive computer terminals, appraisal systems—new anything—all threaten comfort, status, and identity” (Weisbord, 1987, pp. 367-368). Specifically for this figure, the data indicate that the closer the respondents were to the responsibility for accomplishing these real world operations and the training and exercising required to remain proficient, the less likely they were to agree with its adaptability for their use. The average of the combined responses of the Senior and Junior Field stakeholders was 3.1 for the three statements or “Somewhat Positive.” Conversely, the data also indicate that there was a very positive response to adapting and applying a new model as the distance increased away from the hands-on practitioner. The average of the combined responses of the Headquarters and Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.2 for the statements concerning adaptability or “Strongly Positive.” The last two statements of this figure address the identification of personnel and equipment requirements. The data are of real significance for all Coast Guard stakeholders. The Senior Field and Junior Field stakeholders are those personnel currently responsible for identifying requirements for acquiring personnel, equipment, facilities, technologies, et cetera, to ensure their units have the capabilities to accomplish the Coast Guard's responsibilities. The average of the combined responses of the Senior and Junior Field stakeholders was 3.2 for the two 285 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. acquisition of personnel and equipment statements or “Somewhat Positive.” The Headquarters Staff stakeholders have the responsibility for prioritizing the Coast Guard’ s requirements for personnel, equipment, facilities, technologies, et cetera, to ensure the Coast Guard has the capabilities to accomplish its responsibilities and then identifying that prioritization to Congress. The average of the combined responses o f the Headquarters Staff stakeholders was 3.7 for the two acquisition statements or “Positive.” The Congressional Staff stakeholders have the responsibility for prioritizing competing requirements for government funds. The average of the combined responses of the Congressional Staff stakeholders was 4.2 for the acquisition statements or “Strongly Positive.” Conclusion A framework for strategic planning, performance measurement, and decisionmaking that has been proven in one Federal agency for emergency management purposes can be adapted and implemented successfully by another Federal agency in the business of emergency management. This conclusion is very important to all Coast Guard stakeholders, to wit: The data showed that the Congressional Staff stakeholders are emphatic about their need for a framework that will provide them with quality, reliable, comprehensive, and comparable data in which to evaluate the Coast Guard's prioritized requirements. 286 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Figures 25. 26. and 27 also address directly the dissertation's primary question and the conclusion. FIGURE 25. RESPONSE TO PRINCIPAL RESEARCH QUESTION: SLOPE OF INCREASING DISSA TISFACTION WITH STA TUS QUO • Adaptation o f D O D ’s fram ework would allow D O T stakeholders to identify their needs, values, and responsibilities (N V R ) and their tasks that trace to-and-through other stakeholders’ tasks to USCG’s strategic m ission. Slope of Increasing Dissatisfaction with Status Quo 5 □ S en ior Field ■ Ju n ior Field □ H Q S taff □ C ongressional Staff A llow Id en tification o f N V R A llow Identification o f T raceable Tasks 287 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 26. RESPONSE TO PRINCIPAL RESEARCH QUESTION: SLOPE OF INCREASING OPENNESS TO CHANGE • Use o f the m odel would Increase my ability to w ork w ith agencies other than m y own. Slope o f Increasing O penness to .C hange □ Senior Field ■ Junior Field □ HQ Staff E 3 Congressional Enhance Ability to Work with Other Agencies 288 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 27. RESPONSE TO PRINCIPAL RESEARCH QUESTION: SIGNIFICANT, STEAD Y DISPA R IT Y BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS • Use o f the model would increase my ability to plan real- world operations, realistic exercises, or training events. m ^ 2 H P - Significant, Steady Disparity Between Stakeholders □ Senior Field ■ Junior Field □ HQ Staff El Congressional Staff Real-World Exercise Training 289 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Figure 27 also applies directly to the primary question. However, unlike the previous three graphs that focus directly on the primary question, there is great disparity in the data between the two groups of Field stakeholders and the Headquarters Staff stakeholders and Congressional Staff stakeholders. This warrants additional attention and possibly further research. The data may indicate that the Field stakeholders are satisfied with their ability to plan real-world activities and exercise and training events. The data may indicate that the Field stakeholders think they do not need this model (or any other model?) to help them do their job. The data may also indicate that the headquarters personnel—those who are responsible for building exercise and training events for the entire Coast Guard— need a model to help them. The Congressional openness to innovation and adaptation may reflect their need for any system to help them put value to the training and exercise events that they must fund. Conclusion Further research is necessary in this area. The great disparity in the data between the two groups of Field stakeholders and the Headquarters Staff stakeholders and Congressional Staff stakeholders warrants further research and an attempt to isolate any secondary factors affecting the data. 2 9 0 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Further Analysis of Stakeholders One of the critical limitations of the research, addressed in Chapter III, involved the characteristics o f the stakeholders. The proper selection of knowledgeable and committed stakeholders for the survey-interview was very important to the data quality. Therefore, the researcher did immediate additional research to regroup the stakeholders in an attempt to verify and validate Everett M. Rogers' work in the characterization of stakeholders and their openness to innovation. According to Rogers, ”[T]he diffusion research literature indicates that much effort has been spent in studying "people" differences in innovativeness (that is. in determining the characteristics of the different adopter categories)” (Rogers, 1995. p. 204). The researcher used three concept-statements from Rogers' research on "people" differences and tested the data against them. The researcher created new grouping of stakeholders to test each of Rogers' statements. The characteristics of each of the new groups of stakeholders are explained in detail below. The data were used to verily and validate the three key statements that Rogers used to describe the characteristics o f adopter categories. See Chapter II for a complete description of these categories of characteristics. The following three statements were evaluated: 1. Earlier adopters have higher social status than later adopters. Status is indicated by such variables as income, level of living, possession of wealth, occupational prestige [emphasis added], self-perceived identification with a social class, and the like. However measured, social status is usually positively related with innovativeness. (Rogers, 1995, p. 269) 291 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. As shown in Figure 28, rank and grade were used as proxy data for the occupational prestige of the respondents. 2. Earlier adopters are not different from later adopters in age [emphasis added]. There is inconsistent evidence about the relationship of age and innovativeness; about half of the some 228 studies on this subject show no relationship, a few show that earlier adopters are younger, and some indicate they are older. (Rogers, 1995, p. 269) As shown in Figure 29, Time in Service data were used as proxy data for the age of the respondents. 3. Earlier adopters have larger units [emphasis added] (farms, schools, companies, and so on) than later adopters. The social characteristics of earlier adopters mark them as more educated, of higher social status, and the like. They are wealthier and have large units. Socioeconomic status and innovativeness appear to go hand in hand. (Rogers, 1995, p. 269) As shown in Figure 30, position (director, deputy director, staff) was used as proxy data for the size of the unit or span of control of the respondents. 292 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 28. “EARLIER ADOPTERS HAVE HIGHER SOCIAL STATUS THAN LATER ADOPTERS” (Rogers, 1995, p. 269) • Averages o f Survey Responses to Statements 1, 5, 7abcdhkl, 8abe, 9abc, 10 through 15 Arranged by Rank/Grade. "Bathtub" Indicates Most Junior & Senior = Most Positive ■ GS-9, 0-1, 0-2 □ 0 -3 G 3 GS-13, 0-4 ■ 0 -5 ■ GS-15, SES, 0 -6 All Stakeholders Re-Sorted by Rank/Grade. The re-sorting by rank/grade of all stakeholders, without regard to their current assignment, produced five new groups of stakeholders. For simplicity these re-sorted groups of stakeholders are referred to as follows: RJG Group I stakeholders, • RJG Group II stakeholders, • RJG Group III stakeholders, 293 Averages of Survey Responses Arranged by Rank/Grade Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • RJG Group IV stakeholders, and • RJG Group V stakeholders. RJG Group I Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of three GS-9s. one USCG Chief Petty Officer (E-7). one USCG Ensign (0-1). and five USCG Lieutenants Junior Grade (0-2). O f this group, six came from field operations throughout the USCG world, one came from USCG headquarters, and three came from the Congressional staffs that provide oversight. They all served in staff positions. Their average time in service to the government was 5.6 years. The longest period of service for this group of stakeholders was eighteen years and the shortest was one year. Case Study “TITANIC II: Operations''1 was used by three members of this group and Case Study “TITANIC II: Planning’ ' ' was used by the other seven. RJG Group II Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of six USCG Lieutenants (0-3). Of this group, all six came from field operations throughout the USCG world where they all served in staff positions. Their average time in service to the USCG was 8.8 years. The longest period of service for this group o f stakeholders was fourteen years and the shortest was two years. Case Study “TITANIC II: Operations'’ was used by three members of this group and Case Study “TITANIC II: Planning’ ' ’ was used by the other three. RJG Group III Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of one GS-13 and seventeen USCG Lieutenant Commanders (0-4). Of this group, twelve came 294 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. from field operations throughout the USCG world, two came from USCG headquarters, and two came from the Congressional staffs that provide oversight. There were four Executive Officers (Deputy Directors) and sixteen served in staff positions. Their average time in service to the government was 16.2 years. The longest period of service for this group of stakeholders was twenty-one years and the shortest was twelve years. Case Study 'TITANIC II: Operations" was used by ten members of this group and Case Study "TITANIC II: Planning1 ’ was used by the other eight. RJG Group IV Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of nine USCG Commanders (0-5). O f this group, eight came from field operations throughout the USCG world and one came from USCG headquarters. There were four Commanding Officers (Directors), one Executive Officer (Deputy Director), and four stakeholders who served in staff positions. Their average time in service to the USCG was 20.2 years. The longest period of service for this group of stakeholders was twenty-nine years and the shortest was sixteen years. Case Study ‘‘TITANIC II: Operations” was used by six members of this group and Case Study “TITANIC II: Planning” was used by the other three. RJG Group V Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of one GS-l 5, one SES, and one USCG Captain (0-6). Of this group, one came from a USCG field operation and two came from the Congressional staffs that provide oversight. There was one Commanding Officer (Director), one Executive Officer (Deputy Director), 295 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and one stakeholder who served in a staff position. Their average time in service to the government was twenty-one years. The longest period of service for this group of stakeholders was Twenty-four years and the shortest was sixteen years. Case Study “TITANIC II: Operations” was used by one member of this group and Case Study “TITANIC II: Planning’ ' ’ was used by the other two. Conclusion The grouping of the stakeholders by their rank or grade was used as a proxy for Rogers’ characterization of people by their social status, including occupational prestige. With rank or grade as a proxy for social status, the data showed that those with the highest rank or grade (most occupational prestige) have the highest openness to change; would be the most willing stakeholders to adopt an innovation. Therefore, the data support Rogers' statement, “Earlier adopters have higher social status than later adopters.” However, further inspection of the data show that of the five groups of stakeholders, those with the lowest rank or grade (low occupational prestige) have the second highest openness to change, which is in direct conflict with Rogers' characterization. The data show the most junior and most senior as the most positive about accepting change, the most open to change. Therefore, additional research is required to determine the validity of Rogers' characterization through the identification of secondary factors that may have influenced the responses. 296 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Further Research Additional research is needed to determine if the Senior Field stakeholders are more strongly influenced by their nearness to the task, than by their rank or grade 0occupational prestige). Further research is needed to determine why the Headquarters Staff and Congressional Staff stakeholders of a specific senior rank or grade are far more positive in their responses than Senior Field stakeholders of a similar rank or grade, as shown in Figures 21 through 27. FIGURE 29. “EARLIER ADOPTERS ARE NOT DIFFERENT FROM LATER ADOPTERS IN AGE” (Rogers, 1995, p. 269) Averages of Survey Responses to Statements 1, 5, 7abcdhkL, 8abe, 9abc, 10 through 15 Arranged by Time In Service. Time in Service (proxy for age) had little impact on responses. A verges of Selected Survey Responses Arranged by T im e in Service ■ 1 to 5 Years □ 6 to 10 Years ■ 11 to 15 Years ■ 16 to 20 Years ■ 20 Years or More 2 9 7 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. All Stakeholders Re-Sorted by Time in Service (TIS). The re-sorting by time in service of all stakeholders, without regard to their current assignment, produced five groups of stakeholders. For simplicity these re-sorted groups of stakeholders are referred to as follows: • TIS Group I stakeholders, • TIS Group II stakeholders, • TIS Group III stakeholders, • TIS Group IV stakeholders, and • TIS Group V stakeholders. TIS Group I Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of three GS-9s. four USCG Lieutenants Junior Grade (0-2). and one USCG Lieutenant. Of this group, four came from field operations throughout the USCG world, one came from USCG headquarters, and three came from the Congressional staffs that provide oversight. They all served in staff positions. Their average time in service to the government was 2.1 years. The longest period of service for this group of stakeholders was five years and the shortest was one year. Case Study “TITANIC II: Operations” was used by four members of this group and Case Study “TITANIC II: Planning’ was used by the other four. TIS Group II Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of one USCG Ensign (0-1) and three USCG Lieutenants (0-3). Of this group, all four came from field operations throughout the USCG world where they served as staff officers. 298 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Their average time in service to the USCG was nine years. The longest period of service for this group o f stakeholders was ten years and the shortest was eight years. Case Study “TITANIC II: Operations” was used by two members of this group and Case Study “TITANIC II: Planning’ ’ ’ was used by the other two. TIS Group III Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of one USCG Lieutenant Junior Grade (0-2), two USCG Lieutenants (0-3), one GS-13, and eight USCG Lieutenant Commanders (0-4). Of this group, eight came from field operations throughout the USCG world, three came from USCG headquarters, and one came from the Congressional staffs that provide oversight. There were three Executive Officers (Deputy Directors) and nine served in staff positions. Their average time in service to the government was 13.5 years. The longest period of service for this group o f stakeholders was fifteen years and the shortest was eleven years. Case Study “TITANIC II: Operations” was used by five members of this group and Case Study “TITANIC II: Planning’ ’ was used by the other seven. TIS Group IV Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of one USCG Chief Petty Officer (E-7), seven USCG Lieutenant Commanders (0-4), seven USCG Commanders (0-5), and one GS-15. Of this group, thirteen came from field operations throughout the USCG world, one came from USCG headquarters, and two came from the Congressional staffs that provide oversight. There were four Commanding Officers (Directors), two Executive Officers (Deputy Directors), and ten stakeholders who served in staff positions. Their average time in service to the 299 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. government was 17.9 years. The longest period of service for this group of stakeholders was twenty years and the shortest was sixteen years. TIS Group V Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of two USCG Lieutenant Commanders (0-4), two USCG Commanders (0-5), one USCG Captain (0-6), and one SES. O f this group, four came from field operations throughout the USCG world, one came from USCG headquarters, and one came from the Congressional staffs that provide oversight. There was one Commanding Officer (Director), one Executive Officer (Deputy Director), and three stakeholders who served in staff positions. Their average time in service to the USCG was twenty-four years. The longest period of service for this group of stakeholders was twenty-nine years and the shortest was twenty-one years. Conclusion The grouping o f the stakeholders by their Time in Service was used as a proxy for Rogers' characterization of people by their age. The narrow age window in which a person may join the USCG opened the possibility for use of the Time in Service data as proxy data for age of the respondents. With Time in Service as a proxy for age, the data showed that there was little difference between the responses of the five groupings of stakeholders. Therefore, the data supported Rogers' statement, “Earlier adopters are not different from later adopters in age.” 3 0 0 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FIGURE 30. “EARLIER ADOPTERS HAVE LARGER UNITS (FARMS, SCHOOLS, COMPANIES, AND SO ON) THAN LATER ADOPTERS” (Rogers, 1995, p. 269) • Averages o f Survey Responses to Statements 1, 5, 7abctlhkl, 8abe, 9abc, 10 through 15 Arranged by Position. Position (proxy for size of unit) had little impact on responses._______ ■ Staff □ Deputy Director 0 Director Averages o f Survey Responses Arranged by Position All Stakeholders Re-Sorted by Position. The re-sorting by position of all stakeholders, without regard to their current assignment, produced three groups of stakeholders. For simplicity these re-sorted groups of stakeholders are referred to as follows: • Staff Position Group I stakeholders, • Deputy Director Position Group II stakeholders, and • Director Position Group III stakeholders. 301 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Staff Position Group I Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of three GS-9s, one USCG Chief Petty Officer (E-7), one USCG Ensign (0-1), five USCG Lieutenants Junior Grade (0-2), six USCG Lieutenants (0-3), one GS-13, twelve USCG Lieutenant Commanders (0-4), four USCG Commanders (0-5), and one GS- 15. O f this group, twenty-four came from field operations throughout the USCG world, four came from USCG headquarters, and six came from the Congressional staffs that provide oversight. Their average time in service to the government was 12.4 years. The longest period of service for this group o f stakeholders was twenty- four years and the shortest was one year. Case Study “TITANIC II: Operations” was used by fifteen members of this group and Case Study “TITANIC II: Planning” was used by the other nineteen. Deputy Director Position Group II Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of four USCG Lieutenant Commanders (0-4), one USCG Commander (0-5), and one SES. Of this group, four came from field operations throughout the USCG world, one came from USCG headquarters, and one came from a Congressional staff that provides oversight. Their average time in service to the government was 16.2 years. The longest period of service for this group of stakeholders was twenty-three years and the shortest was twelve years. Case Study “TITANIC II: Operations'' was used by three members of this group and Case Study “TITANIC II: Planning” was used by the other three. 3 0 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Director Position Group II Stakeholders. As a group they were made up of one USCG Lieutenant Commander (0-4), four USCG Commanders (0-5), and one USCG Captain (0-6). O f this group, five came from field operations throughout the USCG world and one came from USCG headquarters. Their average time in service to the USCG was 21.3 years. The longest period of service for this group of stakeholders was twenty-nine years and the shortest was sixteen years. Case Study "TITANIC II: Operations” was used by five members of this group and Case Study "TITANIC II: Planning” was used by the other member. Conclusions The grouping of the stakeholders by their position (director, deputy director, staff) was used as a proxy for Rogers' characterization of people by the size of their unit or their span of control. With position as a proxy for size of unit or span of control, the data showed that those stakeholders serving in the most senior positions (largest units)—a position equal to a director—responded in almost the same manner as those stakeholders serving as deputy directors or in staff positions. Using position as a proxy for size of unit or span of control, the data showed no significant difference in stakeholders as to their willingness to change (their willingness to adopt an innovation). Therefore, the data does not support Rogers' statement, "Earlier adopters have larger units (farms, schools, companies, and so on) than later adopters.” 303 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Summary Patton writes of getting one’ s hands dirty when doing the fieldwork necessary to understand ‘‘how others think, act. and feel” (Patton, 1980, p. 47). The researcher came to the conclusion that dirty hands are indeed part of the key to understanding the research data. Figures 21 through 27 show a distinct pattern that relates directly to getting one's hands dirty. These figures represent a large number of key survey statements the respondents commented on. Each of these figures shows a slope of increasing dissatisfaction with the status quo and an increasing openness to change the farther you get away from the individuals responsible for doing the hands-on job—the individuals with dirty hands. The Senior Field stakeholders are those personnel currently responsible for accomplishing core Coast Guard activities that they believe are linked to the strategic mission of the Coast Guard. The data indicate that the closer the respondents are to the responsibility for accomplishing this specific work the less likely they are to be open to the necessity for change— the more satisfied they will be with the status quo. Conversely, there is a much more positive response to adapting and applying a new model as the distance increases away from the hands-on practitioner towards the Staff stakeholders. The Headquarters Staff stakeholders and the Congressional Staff stakeholders—those charged with maintaining a broader view o f Coast Guard responsibilities— indicate less satisfaction with current performance. In particular, the Headquarters Sta ff stakeholders are responsible for evaluating the performance of reform, they may be 3 0 4 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. more receptive to a system that allows them to establish benchmarks of performance. In the end, there is a direct correlation between the distance from the hands-on task performer (the one with the dirty hands) and the acceptance of change to current operating procedures (greater distance = greater willingness to accept change). Additional Observations from the Research Process The researcher expects that the response to adaptation and implementation of the model will be less positive with other Federal agencies than it was with the DOT's Coast Guard because o f the Coast Guard's unique culture. Further research is required to verily and validate that expectation. Various movie critics generally described "The Perfect Storm" as the movie of the year for 2000 and in particular as "A Milestone in Filmmaking" (Washington Post, July 11, 2000, p. C8). For the DOT's Coast Guard, “The Perfect Storm” was far more than a movie; it was all but everyday reality. The research provided the researcher the opportunity to work with Coast Guard people with the same value system as the heroes of the real “Perfect Storm.” Today’ s Coast Guard is made up of people such as David Moore. U.S. Coast Guard “rescue swimmer who plunged [three times] into the convulsing ocean 150 miles south of Nantucket on October 30, 1991, and saved the lives of six people” (Ashley, July 17, 2000, p. 20). The history of the U.S. Coast Guard is that of an agency that has adapted and implemented change throughout all of its existence. It has reinvented itself to satisfy the changing needs of this Nation from 1790 to the present day. From the Revenue Marine that grew 305 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. into the Revenue Cutter Service and finally to the U.S. Coast Guard (Laesser, “CG History Page: Chronology”), their formal motto of Semper Paratus has been supported by all the positive aspects of their more informal “Can-Do” spirit. In the world of Federal management, including the new world of Managing for Results, the Coast Guard quickly adapted to new Congressional requirements and continued to outperform other Federal agencies. In an assessment o f twenty Federal agencies administered by Syracuse University's Maxwell School o f Citizenship and Public Affairs, “the Coast Guard received the highest marks, an overall A” (Barr, February 29, 2000, p. A17). Conclusion The researcher believes he will meet with much stronger resistance from other Federal agencies that do not have the Coast Guard's tradition of adaptability and willingness to accept change. Therefore, the researcher should magnify the concerns to adaptation and implementation of the model gleaned from the DOT Coast Guard's stakeholders and expect that other Federal agencies will express similar objections but with an increased level of concern. Two key issues that need to be overcome before adaptation by any other Federal agency is possible, follow: • Prejudice against DOD. Adaptation of the DOD’ s hierarchical framework may be challenged by other Federal agencies simply because it is a DOD product. The operating environments are often so drastically different that the other agencies may reject on that basis alone. 306 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Prejudice against Outsiders. Outsiders from any agency will have a hard time discussing past experiences and how to do things better without incurring some suspicion of “second guessing” or “not invented here syndrome.” Further Research Additional research is required to verify and validate the researcher’ s expectations that the response to adaptation and implementation of the model will be less positive with other Federal agencies than it was with the DOT's Coast Guard because of the Coast Guard's unique culture characteristics. Successful Practices for Adaptation and Implementation The steps required in Critical Practices for successful adaptation and implementation of existing model into another Federal agency follow: Emphasize that the existing model is a performance-based system (practical reasons include requirement to satisfying current legislation). Minimize identification of the existing model as a development of the Department of Defense. • Work through agency-specific expert focus groups that act as trusted agents and provide complete insights into how the candidate agency does business, its values, culture, etc. 307 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • Use language and examples that are germane to the receiving environment while emphasizing need for a transition to an interagency common language and the need for government-wide interagency cooperation. • Identify early an internal champion for the model in the adopting agency. • Identify adequate support resources for adaptation and implementation while emphasizing funding advantages of leveraging existing model's support elements (software, et cetera). • Emphasize negative aspects of agency unique “stove piped” programs. Final Thoughts As addressed in Chapter III under limitations of the research, the researcher thinks strongly that the framework in question has value and can be adapted to other organizations. Throughout the research, care was taken to guard against inadvertently influencing the outcomes of the interview-surveys. Admittedly, the researcher was disappointed that there was not overwhelming endorsement of the process by the Field Staff stakeholders. Fortunately, because of the researcher's life at sea for thirty-four years, the following case illustration report by Everett M. Rogers resonates, while it provides comfort and the opportunity for further research. Controlling Scurvy in the British Navy: Innovations Do Not Sell Themselves Many technologists believe that advantages innovations will sell themselves, that the obvious benefits of a new idea will be widely realized by potential adopters, and that the innovation will 308 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. therefore diffuse rapidly. Seldom is this the case. Most innovations, in fact, diffuse at a disappointingly slow rate. Scurvy control illustrates how slowly an obviously beneficial innovation spreads (Mosteller, 1981). In the early days of long sea voyages, scurvy was a worse killer of sailors than warfare, accidents, and all other causes of death. For instance, of Vasco de Gama’s crew of 160 men who sailed with him around the Cape of Good Hope in 1497, 100 died of scurvy. In 1601, an English sea captain, James Lancaster, conducted an experiment to evaluate the effectiveness o f lemon juice in preventing scurvy. Captain Lancaster commanded four ships that sailed from England on a voyage to India; he served three teaspoonfuls of lemon juice every day to the sailors in one of his four ships. Most of these men stayed healthy. But on the other three ships, by the halfway point in the journey, 110 out of 278 sailors had died from scurvy. The three ships constituted Lancaster’s “control group”; they were not given any lemon juice. So many of these sailors became sick that Lancaster had to transfer men from his “treatment” ship in order to staff the three other ships. The results were so clear that one would expect the British Navy to adopt citrus juice for scurvy prevention on all its ships. But it was not until 1747, about 150 years later, that James Lind, a British Navy physician who knew of Lancaster’s results, carried out another experiment on the HMS Salisbury. To each scurvy patient on this ship, Lind prescribed either two oranges and one lemon, or one of five other diets: A half-pint of sea water, six spoonfuls of vinegar, a quart of cider, nutmeg, or seventy-five drops of vitriol elixir. The scurvy patients who got the citrus fruits were cured in a few days, and were able to help Dr. Lind care for the other patients. Unfortunately, the supply of oranges and lemons was exhausted in six days. Certainly, with this further solid evidence of the ability of citrus fruits to combat scurvy, one would expect the British Navy to adopt this technological innovation for all ship's crews on long sea voyages, and in fact, it did so. But not until 1795, forty-eight years later. Scurvy was immediately wiped out. And after only seventy more years, in 1865, the British Board of Trade adopted a similar policy, and eradicated scurvy in the merchant marine. (Rogers, 1995, p. 7) 3 0 9 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE 8 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Dissertation Questions Findings Conclusions Future Research Is It a sound practice for a Federal agency to attempt to adapt and Implement a program developed for another Federal agency? The stakeholders' data indicated: “Som ew hat Positive” to “Positive” w ith an ever- increasing openness to change as the distance from the “hands on" activity increased. The data indicate that it is a sound practice to adapt and im plem ent a strategic structure from another Federal agency. This conclusion is im portant because the adaptation and im plem entation of the D O D ’s hierarchical fram ew ork of N V R by other Federal agencies w ould accom plish the follow ing: (1) keep an agency from replicating or creating sim ilar fram ew orks (saving the adopting agencies significant developm ent costs), and (2) add to the com m unity of users w ho can help im prove the product through lessons learned, different perspectives (m ilitary versus civilian), etc. Further research is needed to confirm w hat the data indicate: the Field stakeholders are satisfied w ith their ability to plan real-w orld activities and exercise and training events. The data m ay indicate that the Field stakeholders think they do not need this m odel (or any other m odel?) to help them do their job. D ata m ay indicate that H Q personnel— those w ho are responsible for building exercise and training events for the entire C oast G uard— need a m odel to helo them . U > I— i O Reproduced with permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Dissertation Questions Findings Conclusions Future Research Can the framework help to further the goals of the Government Performance and Results Act In the receiving organization as It has In the originating organization? The stakeholders' data indicated “Som ew hat Negative" to “Positive" responses. It is im portant to note the positive responses from the H eadquarters Staff stakeholders and the Congressional Staff stakeholders. The H eadquarters Staff stakeholders are those individuals responsible for subm itting objective inform ation to the Congressional Staff stakeholders. The Congressional Staff stakeholders are those responsible for evaluating the inform ation they are provided. These tw o groups of stakeholders are m uch m ore positive about the im pact of the adaptation and im plem entation than the tw o Field Staff stakeholders w ho w ould be responsible for providing the inputs. The data indicate that adaptation and im plem entation of the D O D fram ew ork m ay help the D O T's U SC G further the goals of G PR A . Im portant conclusion because if the H eadquarters Staff stakeholders and— m ost im portantly— if the Congressional Stqff stakeholders are representative in their positive response, the adaptation and im plem entation of the D O D ’s hierarchical fram ew ork of N V R by other Federal agencies w ould provide C ongress w ith the ability/opportunity to: (1) rank and rate the ongoing efforts of Federal agencies, (2) to identify and then fund effectively those program s that trace to-and-through to the strategic m ission of their Federal agency, (3) to identify those top-perform ing program s w hose tasks do not trace to the strategic m ission of their current Federal agency and, thereby, (4) to reassign these top-perform ing program s to the Federal agency that has both the core com petencies and responsibilities to leverage fully their im proved task perform ance, and finally, (5) to rank and rate every Federal agency’ s program s against the program s of every other Federal agency and, thereby, the ability to spend the people’s m onev w isely. A dditional research is needed to determ ine if the Senior Field stakeholders are m ore strongly influenced by their nearness to the task, than by their rank or grade (occupational prestige). Further research is needed to determ ine w hy the H eadquarters Staff and Congressional Staff stakeholders of a specific senior rank or grade are far m ore positive in their responses than Senior Field stakeholders of a sim ilar rank or grade, as show n in Figures 2 1 through 27. Reproduced w ith permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Dissertation Questions Findings Conclusions Future Research If [adapted and Implemented!... what modifications, If any, are neededfor successful Implementation of the framework In the receiving agency? The data w ere “Som ew hat N egative” to "Som ew hat Positive” to the survey statem ent, w hich w as a surrogate for the dissertation-supporting question. Likert scale responses w ere reinforced by the stakeholders' w ritten statem ents, w hich w ere covered in detail in Chapter V I. The w ritten statem ents included the m odifications necessary for successful im plem entation. Four general areas of the stakeholders' w ritten responses: (1) Ready for im plem entation but only for certain grade or rank levels of personnel. N ot ready for im plem entation because of: (2) lim itations in tim e, personnel, and training budget, (3) differences in language and culture, (4) m odel com plexity. The m odel can be adapted by the D O T's U SC G if it is m ade less com plex and uses m ore consistently the Incident C om m and System (ICS) language. Specific training funds w ill be required for the initial im plem entation of a D O T U SC G focused, less com plex m odel. A s the D O T's U SC G m odel m atures to its full potential, additional training funds w ill be required for successful im plem entation of each phase. u> i— * to Reproduced with permission o f th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Dissertation Questions Findings Conclusions Future Research Can a framework for strategic planning, performance measurement, and decisionmaking that has been proven In one Federal agency for emergency management purposes be adapted and Implemented successfully by another Federal agency In the business of emergency management? The data indicated that the closer the respondents are to the responsibility for accom plishing specific w ork the less likely they w ere to agree w ith the statem ents concerning adaptability of the D O D m odel. C onversely, there is a m ore positive response to adapting and applying a new m odel as the distance increases aw ay from the hands-on practitioner. The H eadquarters Staff stakeholders and the Congressional Staff stakeholders indicated less satisfaction w ith current perform ance. There is a direct correlation betw een the distance from the hands-on task perform er and the acceptance of change to current operating procedures (greater distance - greater w illingness to accent change). A fram ew ork for strategic planning, perform ance m easurem ent, and decisionm aking that has been proven in one Federal agency for em ergency m anagem ent purposes can be adapted and im plem ented successfully by another Federal agency in the business of em ergency m anagem ent. This conclusion is very im portant to all Coast G uard stakeholders, to w it: The data show ed that the Congressional Stqff stakeholders are em phatic about their need for a fram ew ork that w ill provide them w ith quality, reliable, com prehensive, and com parable data in w hich to evaluate the C oast G uard's prioritized requirem ents. The great disparity in the data betw een the tw o groups of Field stakeholders and the H eadquarters Staff stakeholders and Congressional Staff stakeholders w arrants further research and an attem pt to isolate any secondary factors affecting the data. u > ► — » u> SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Allison, Graham T. (1971). Essence o f decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Harper Collins. American Society for Public Administration (1999, August). “Report offers bold agenda to improve citizens' trust in government.” PA Times, 22 (8), 1. Ammons, David N. (1999, March/April). “A proper mentality for benchmarking.” Public Administration Review, 59, 105-109. Ashley, Beth (2000, July 17). “True tales of the Perfect Storm." Navy Times, 20. Bailey, Mary Timney (1994). “Do physicists use case studies? Thoughts on Public Administration research.” In J. D. White & Guy B. Adams (Eds.), Research in Public Administration (pp. 183-196). Thousand Oaks, C A: Sage Publications. 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SEALIFT REQUIREMENTS. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. (1996, September 13). Universal joint task list (UJTL). CJCSM3500.04A. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 320 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. U.S. Department of Transportation (1996, June). Oil spill field operations guide. ICS-OS-420-1. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. General Accounting Office (1998, February). Agencies ’ annual performance plans under the Results Act: An assessment guide to facilitate congressional decisionmaking, version 1. GAO/GGD/AIMD-IO.1.18. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office. _________(1997, May). Agencies’strategic plans under GPRA: Key questions to facilitate congressional review, version 1. GAO/GGD-10.1.16. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office. _________(1990, November). Case study evaluations, Transfer paper 10.1.9. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office. _________(1993, October). Developing and using questionnaires. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office. _________(1996, June). Executive guide: Effectively implementing the Government Performance and Results Act. GAO/GGD-96-118. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office. _________(1996, February 14). Government Performance and Results Act performance reports. GAO/GGD-96-66R. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office. (1993, December). Management reform: GAO's comments on the National Performance Review’ s recommendations. GAO/GGD-10.1.16. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office. (1998, January 30). Managing for results: Agencies' annual performance plans can help address strategic planning challenges. GAO/GGD-98-44. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office. (1998, September 8). Managing for results: An agenda to improve agencies' annual performance plans. GAO/GGD/AIMD-98-228. 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Sharpe, Inc. The Washington Post (2000, July 11). “A milestone in filmmaking,” C8. _________(1987, November 10). “Letters to the Editor,” A22. 3 2 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Weber, Max (1947). The theory o f social and economic organization. New York: Oxford University Press. Weigley, Russel F. (1973). The American way o f war: A history o f United States military strategy and policy. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Weisbord, Marvin R. (1987). Productive workplaces: Organizing and managing for dignity, meaning, and community. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc. White, Jay D., & Adams, Guy B. (1994). Research in Public Administration: Reflections on theory and practice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. Wholey, Joseph S. (1983). Evaluation and effective public management. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. Wholey, Joseph S., Hatry, Harry, & Newcomer, Kathryn E. (Eds.) (1994). Handbook o f practical program evaluation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc. Wildavsky, Aaron (1990). “Administration without hierarchy? Bureaucracy without authority?” In Naomi B. Lynn & Aaron Wildavsky (Eds.), Public Administration: The state o f the discipline (pp. xiii-xix). Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc. Wilson, James Q. (1993, March). “The moral sense.” American Political Science Review, 87, 1-9. ________ (1989). Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it. New York: Basic Books, Inc. ________ (1992). “On predicting the bureaucratization of American government.” The state o f public bureaucracy (pp. 209-215). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. ________ (1993). The moral sense. New York: The Free Press. ________ (1980). The politics of regulation. New York: New Basic Books, Inc. Yin, Robert K. (1989). Case study research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 323 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Legislation The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (1996, February 10). Pub. L. No. 104-106. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (1993, August 3). Pub. L. No. 103-62. 324 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDICES 325 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX 1 GLOSSARY OF CURRENT NON-GPRA FEDERAL MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. GLOSSARY OF CURRENT NON-GPRA FEDERAL MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS Extracted from The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA): Hydra- Headed Monster or Flexible Management Tool? by Beryl Radin, Public Administration Review July/August 1998, Vol. 58, No. 4, the following terminology may not be standardized within the Federal Government and is applicable only in the context o f this document. Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act o f 1982; Legislation that seeks to improve the accountability and effectiveness of federal programs and operations. It requires annual assurance o f the adequacy o f controls and a report on material weaknesses o f management controls. Chief Financial Officers Act o f 1990: Legislation focused on the improvement o f accounting and financial management systems and internal controls to reduce waste. It requires the specification o f a chief financial officer in each agency, annual financial statements, and audited financial statement reports. Agencies are expected to issue annual accountability reports that document compliance with these requirements. Government Management Reform Act o f 1994; This legislation seeks to expand the Chief Financial Officers Act to support more informed spending decisions. It requires an annual financial statement report to OMB. Information Technology Management Reform Act o f 1996: Legislation that seeks to achieve efficient and effective acquisition and use o f modem information technology. It establishes a chief information officer and requires annual reports in budget submissions on how information technology is used to help programs achieve their goals. The Paperwork Reduction Act o f 1995: This legislation focuses on the elimination o f unnecessary paperwork burden. It requires agencies to prepare and implement an information streamlining plan and an information collection budget. Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996: Legislation that seeks to increase accountability by implementing financial accounting standards in financial management systems and to increase the capability o f agencies to monitor execution o f the budget. It requires reports on financial system compliance by agency heads, OMB, and inspector generals. 327 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Customer Service Executive Order o f 1993: An executive order that asks agencies to establish and implement customer service standards, to establish customer service plans and surveys. REGO III o f the National Performance Review. 1996: This policy requirement asks agencies to convert to performance-based organizations, improve customer service, increase the use o f regulator partnerships, create performance-based partnership grants, and transform the federal workforce. Annual reports are required. Reinvention Impact Center Initiative o f the National Performance Review. 1997: This initiative is focused on approximately 30 agencies that deliver services to the public (either directly or indirectly). It asks these agencies to develop a one-page presentation o f goals that will lead to the achievement o f goals o f NPR by the year 2000. (The strategic plan in GPRA is a five-year plan focused on the year 2001.) Annual Budget Instructions o f OMB to Agencies (Circular All): In addition to general instructions on budget submissions and GPRA, this circular also established guidelines for better management and performance of fixed assets. 328 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX 2 DETAILED TABLES OF COMPARABLE ACTIVITIES 329 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DETAILED TABLES OF COMPARABLE ACTIVITIES OPER A TIO N S SECTIO N A C T IV IT IE S1 UNTL or USER TASK2 TA SK DESCRIPTION3 Operations Section Chief: Implement and manage the Operations Section branches and units needed to proactively accomplish Operations Section action. NT A 5 EXERCISE COMMAND AND CONTROL. To exercise authority and direction over assigned or attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. C2 involves arranging personnel, equipment, services and facilities during the planning and conducting of... operations. Assist the Planning Section in defining strategic response goals and tactical operational objectives required by the Area Contingency Plan. NTA 5.3.1.2 Provide Concept of Operations. To provide the commander’s initial determination o f a concept o f operations and follow on adjustments, as necessary, for achieving the mission. Develop detailed mission assignments, sortie schedules, duty lists, and operational assignments to accomplish the strategic response goals and tactical operational objectives. U-NTA 5.3.9.3.1 Develop Tactical Operations. Produce the detailed assignments, sortie schedules, duty lists, and operational assignments to accomplish the strategic response goals and tactical operational objectives. Identify additional response resources required or recommend the release of resources to the Unified Command. U-NTA 2.4.4.1.1 Identify Requirements. To assess the force needs for additional resources and logistics support for HAZMAT; EMS; Air Ops (including air traffic coordination, surveillance, applications); skimming ops; protection ops (including boom types, lengths, mooring systems, and vessels); decontamination services; salvage ops; firefighting ops; communication services; medical services; facilities; transportation services; personnel processing and tracking; volunteer processing; contracting and procurement services; financial services (including cost documentation and time keeping); and site management (including security and staging sites). Evaluate and report on response counter measure efficacy. NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness. To review data and produce routine, periodic, situation, and status reports as well as reporting ability to continue mission following significant tactical events. 'Table created from Baltimore Area Contingency Plan, Annex B, P. 26, Tab C, UCS Operations Section. JTask numbers taken from (or created IAW procedures contained within) OPNAVINST 3500.38/MCO 3500.26/USCG COMDTINST M3500.1. 3 Task descriptions taken from (or created IAW procedures contained within) OPNAVINST 3500.38/MCO 3500.26/USCG COMDTINST M3500.1 330 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX 3 INTERVIEW GUIDE Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. INTERVIEW GUIDE Part 1. Letter Requesting Interview [USC letterhead] Date [Name] [Title] [Address] Dear [Name]: I am a recently retired Naval Officer, working on my doctoral dissertation at the University o f Southern California’s School o f Public Administration. The purpose o f my research is to determine if a strategic framework that has been proven in one Federal Government agency can be adapted and implemented successfully by other Federal Government agencies. My dissertation will test an existing research model for external validation. The research model to be tested is the Department o f Defense’s (DOD) hierarchical framework, the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)— Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) process. The UJTL is the interoperability tool that allows DOD’s combatant commands1 to construct their JMETL. Only after clear statements o f requirements are communicated between combatant commands and their resource providers can real-world operations, exercises, and training events be effectively developed, resources efficiently applied, and force readiness accurately assessed. If DOD’s framework and its supporting software can be adapted for use by the bureaucracy o f another public-interest administration, it will save that bureaucracy significant development costs. The costs to be saved include approximately $5 million dollars in software development costs and $10 million dollars in overall framework development which provided a DOD-wide supporting common language o f tasks, conditions, and measures o f performance and measures o f effectiveness. The hierarchical framework delivers mission-focused training and mission-focused acquisitions and, therefore, significant savings in training manpower and time to define acquisition requirements. The UJTL—JMETL process is supported by the fully integrateable U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard’s combined service framework, the Universal Naval Task List—Naval Mission Essential Task List (NMETL) process. 'The directions o f the National Command Authorities are implemented by one or more o f the eight combatant commands, each headed by a four-star general or admiral. 332 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The UNTL—NMETL process was issued (to cover all DOD tasks for the three naval services) as the: • U.S. Navy’s, OPNAVINST 3500.38, and personally signed and released by the Chief o f Naval Operations, Admiral J. L. Johnson • U.S. Marine Corps’, MCO 3500.26, and personally signed and released by the Commandant o f the Marine Corps, General C. C. Krulak • U.S. Coast Guard’s, USCG COMDTINST M3500.1, and personally signed and released by the Commandant o f the Coast Guard, Admiral R. E. Kramek I would like to interview you because o f your general subject matter knowledge and experience, especially as it relates to United States Coast Guard emergency management decisionmaking with particular focus on contingency preparedness planning. The survey you will be asked to complete will only have applicability after my short briefing on the UJTL-JMETL process and supporting software demonstration. The survey questions have been pre-tested for thoroughness and comprehensibility. I expect the interview-demonstration-survey to take approximately two hours. If you would like to contact me, my telephone numbers are (703) 412-2812 X6071 and (703) 878-9499. My email address isjparon@drc.com. Thank you in advance o f helping me with this research. Very respectfully, J. R. Paron Enclosure Interview-Survey 333 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Part 2. Researcher’s Script for Introducing the Interviews Hello. I am John Paron. I really appreciate your willingness to help me with the research for my dissertation at the University o f Southern California’s School of Public Administration. I know your time is extremely valuable and I greatly appreciate your support. I expect the demonstration o f the UJTL-JMETL process’s supporting software and your hands-on use o f the software and then your response to the survey questions to take approximately two hours. This interview and survey are part of a series o f interviews and surveys with individuals like yourself who are responsible for performing tasks (activities) that allow other stakeholders to perform their tasks (activities) successfully, which thereby leads to the successful mission accomplishment o f the agency. The focus of my research is to assess the applicability and utility o f adapting the Department o f Defense’s (DOD) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)— Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) process to the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) US Coast Guard. For our purposes today, this interview-demonstration-survey will focus on the adaptation o f the DOD’s hierarchical framework for a USCG response to emergency management decisionmaking with particular focus on contingency preparedness planning. I emphasize that this research will not second-guess any of your agency’s responses to previous events. I am interested only in your determination o f the usefulness o f adapting the DOD’s hierarchical framework and its supporting software to your agency. In President John Kennedy’s words, “Our task is not to fix the blame for the past, but to fix the course for the future” (NPR, p. 123). I would also be willing to provide you with a written summary o f your interview response, if you would like to review it. At this point, I would like to describe briefly the DOD’s hierarchical framework o f tasks, conditions, and measures and then demonstrate the supporting software. For the software demonstration, I have built a mission that focuses on emergency management decisionmaking with particular focus on contingency preparedness planning. There are 52 survey-interview statements that use the Likert scale and they are followed by two open-ended questions. Do you have any questions or requests before we begin? If not, let us begin. 334 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Part 3. Survey-Interview INTERVIEWEE IDENTIFICATION DOT USCG Case Study: Operations ; Planning Name: (Optional) First: ; MI: : Last: Current Grade/Rank Capt (0-6): ;Cdr(0-5): Lcdr(0-4) ; GS (insert grade): GS- ; Other Service/Agency/Committee USCG: : Other Current Assignment and Job Title: During my Coast Guard Career, I spent the following number of years in each of these geographical areas: NORTHEAST years; SOUTHEAST years NORTHWEST years; SOUTHWEST years Your responses to the items below will help me evaluate the effectiveness of adapting the Department of Defense’s (DOD) hierarchical framework of stakeholder’s needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR) for use by the U.S. Coast Guard for Department of Transportation (DOT) activities. For multiple response items, indicate your response by placing a check {/) on the appropriate line. Space has been provided for your responses to narrative items. Please feel free to attach additional comment pages. 1. DOT’s USCG Oil Spill Emergency Reaction Team is: a. a public-interest administration organization. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ b. is a doctrine-based organization. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ c. is an action-oriented organization. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree_ _ 335 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. d. is a performance-focused organization. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 2. Public-interest, doctrine-based, action-oriented, performance-focused organizations: a. need to measure their task performance. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree b. need to focus their training to support those tasks that trace to the agency’s strategic mission. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree c. need to focus their acquisitions to support those tasks that trace to the agency’s strategic mission. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 3. DOT’s USCG does not have a hierarchical framework: a. o f stakeholder’s needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR). Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree b. that would allow identification o f DOT’s stakeholder tasks that trace to and through other stakeholder tasks to the strategic mission o f the agency. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 336 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1. DOT’s USCG is not able to identify those tasks that trace to the agency’s strategic mission and: a. thereby, allow for focused acquisitions and training funding o f tasks essential to the agency’s strategic mission. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ b. therefore, DOT may or may not be able to identify the right activities for Congress to fund for the USCG. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ 2. DOT adaptation o f DOD’s hierarchical framework: a. would allow identification o f DOT stakeholder’s needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR). Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ b. would allow identification o f those DOT stakeholder’s tasks that trace to-and- through other stakeholders’ tasks to the strategic mission o f the agency. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ c. would help allow for focused acquisitions and training funding o f tasks essential to the agency’s strategic mission. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ d. would help DOT identify those tasks that should be funded by Congress. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ 33 7 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6. The DOD model’s supporting software was: a. excellent in overall quality. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree_ _ b. easy to use, user friendly. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree_ _ 7. My use o f the model: a. would allow me to minimize the time required for planning a real-world response operation. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree_ _ b. would contribute to my ability to work with other Federal agencies involved in a shared emergency response. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree_ _ c. would allow me to minimize the time required for planning a realistic exercise. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree_ _ d. would allow me to minimize the time required for planning a realistic training event. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ e. contributed to my ability to understand national environmental response strategy. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ 338 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f. contributed to my ability to understand state environmental response strategy. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree__ g. contributed to my ability to understand local environmental response strategy. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree__ h. contributed to my ability to quickly conceptualize the mission and identify the tasks to be accomplished. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree__ i. provided me with the perspective of reflective practitioner-operators who previously faced the problem and, thereby, provided me with insights to the conditions that would impact task accomplishment. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree__ j. provided me with the perspective of reflective practitioner-operators who previously faced the problem and, thereby, provided me with insights to appropriate task perform ance measures. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree__ k. provided me with the perspective of reflective practitioner-operators who previously faced the problem and, thereby, provided me with increased opportunity to think critically and, thereby, enhanced my decisionmaking. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree__ 1 . provided me with the perspective of reflective practitioner-operators who previously faced the problem and, thereby, provided me with increased opportunity to think innovatively and, thereby, enhanced my decisionmaking. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree__ 339 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. m. provided me with the perspective o f reflective practitioner-operators who previously faced the problem and, thereby, provided me with increased opportunity to think strategically and, thereby, enhanced my decisionmaking. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ n. provided me the ability to prepare a strategic plan that accurately reflects mission needs. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ 8. The element o f the model that helped the most in preparing a response to this historical event was: a. the tasks (activities, functions). Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ b. the conditions (external factors o f the environments). Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ c. the measures (MOE [Measures o f Effectiveness]; MOP [Measures o f Performance]). Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ d. the Mission Requirements Module (MRM). Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ e. the Mission Planning Module (MPM) Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ 340 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9. The element of the model will help the most in preparing a response to a future event is: a. the tasks (activities, functions). Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ b. the conditions (external factors o f the environments). Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ c. the measures (MOE [Measures o f Effectiveness]; MOP [Measures of Performance]). Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ d. the Mission Requirements Module (MRM). Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ e. the Mission Planning Module (MPM) Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ 10. The DOD model is adaptable for use in my agency for strategic planning, performance measurement, and decisionmaking when: a. responding to real-world events. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ b. building and executing exercise events. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ 341 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. c. building and executing training events. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree__ d. identifying requirements for acquiring personnel. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree__ e. identifying requirements for acquiring equipment, facilities, technologies, et cetera. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree__ 11. By using the DOD’s hierarchical framework o f stakeholders’ needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR) and substituting the DOT’s NVR, the DOT could significantly enhance its ability to identify for Congress the right tasks to fund. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree__ 12. A strategic framework that has been proven in one Federal Government agency for emergency management purposes can be adapted and implemented successfully by other Federal Government agencies in the business o f emergency management. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree__ 13. Before responding to this statement, review your responses to statements 1 through 4. Then respond to: The conditions necessary for successful implementation o f the DOD hierarchical framework into the DOT currently exist. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree__ 342 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14. The framework, if implemented by the USCG, could help further the following goals of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) a. improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer satisfaction. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree_ _ b. improve congressional decisionmaking by providing more objective information on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative effectiveness and efficiency o f Federal programs and spending. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree_ _ 15. Based on this example, it is sound practice for other Federal Government agencies to attempt to adapt and implement a strategic structure that has been proven in one Federal Government agency. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree___ 16. What modifications, if any, are needed for successful implementation o f the framework into the USCG? 17. Do you have any additional comments about any aspect o f the model, including additional comments on the software? 343 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX 4 EXAMPLES OF RESEARCH DATA BAR GRAPHS 344 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. EXAMPLES OF RESEARCH DATA BAR GRAPHS DOT’S USCG OU SpOJ Em ergency Response Team is: a p u b tic-iruerest adm inistration organization, doctrine-based an action-oriented organization, and a p erform ance- fo c u s e d organization. 5' 4S ■ S en io r Field ■ J a a io r Field □ H Q S taff □ C o .g r m io ~ l S a l t “ • Public-interest, doctrine-based, action-oriented, performance-focused organizations: need to measure th eir task performance, and need to focus th eir training and their acquisitions to su p p o rt those tasks th at trace to the agency’s strategic mission. 1 8 S enior Field ! ■ Ju n io r Field tC H Q S taff | IP CoogrrssionaJ S taff •s s ? ! i % i n ^ V I 1 ^ 1 s f | §•? < £ DOT’S USCG does not have a hierarchical fram ew ork o f stakeholders needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR), o r one th a t would allow identification o f DOT’S stakeholder tasks th a t trace to and th ro u g h other stakeholder tasks to strategic m ission o f agency. S f • DOT’s USCG is not able to identify those tasks that trace to the agency’s strategic mission and, thereby, allow fo r focused acquisitions and training for tasks essential to agency’s strategic mission; therefore, DOT may o r m ay not be able to identify the right activities for Congress to fund for the USCG. B Senior Field ■ J a a io r FM d □ H Q S taff a Staff 1 ■ Senior Field I ■ J a a io r Field j o H Q S taff IQ C m g m iw n ii Staff N O T Able to Identify T raceable Tasks N O T A ble to Identify T ask s to F a a d F m n ie w ark o f T a sk T raco ab ility to S takeholder's N V R S trateg ic M u aio a A daptation of DOD’s fram ew ork w ould allow DOT Adaptation o f DOD’s fram ew ork would allow DOT to focus stakeholders to identify th eir needs, values, and responsibilities acquisition and training on tasks essential to USCG mission, (NVR) and their tasks th at trace to-and-through other stakeholders* tasks to USCG’s strategic mission. and would help DOT identify those tasks th a t should be funded by Congress. ■ S enior Field ■ J a a io r FM d □ H Q S taff !□ C oogw iiinnel Staff iB Senior Field { ■ J a a io r FM d { □ H Q S taff ! D C ongre ss ion s! S taf ‘ Allow Idcatfficatioa o f NVR ABow Identification o f T raceable T a l a Allow Strategic M ia ie e Focused Acquisitions and T raining H elp DOT Identify T ask s Con gress S boald F u n d 345 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The DOD model’s supporting software was excellent in overall quality, and easy to use, user friendly. ■ Senior Field Junior Field D HQ StafT □ Congressional Staff Excellent In Overall User Friendly Quality ■ Use o f the model would increase my ability to work with agencies o th er than my own. ■ Senior Field ■ Junior Field □ HQ StafT □ Congressional Staff E ahaoc* AbOity to W ork vritb O tlw r Accacacs Use o f the model would contribute to my ability to quiddv conceptualize the mission and identify' the tasks to be accomplished. ■ Senior Field ■ Ju n io r Fidd □ HQ Stair □ Congressional Staff • Use of the model would increase m y ability to plan r a il- w orld operations, realistic exercises, o r tra in in g events. 5 T T b Senior Field ■ Ju n io r Field a H Q StafT □ Congressional StafT Real-W orld Exercise Training Use o f the model would contribute to m y ability to understand national, sta te, o r local environm ental response strategy. Sfl ' a S en io r Field ■ Ju n io r Field □ H Q StafT □ C ongressional StafT National State Local Response Response Response Use o f the model would provide me w ith perspective o f reflective practitioner-operators who previously faced the problem and, thereby, provide m e with insights to the cond itio n s th a t would im pact task accomplishment, and app ro p riate m ea su res. s Senior Field B Ju n io r Field □ HQ StafT □ Congressional StafT E a k io c t Ability to Identify T t d o to be Acconplnbed U m ghts to C ondition* I n i p i s to Mi 346 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Use o f th e model would provide m e w ith th e perspective of reflective practitioner-operators w ho previously faced the problem an d , thereby, provide m e w ith increased opportunity to think critica lly, think in n o va tivefy, o r th in k stra teg ica lly. ■ Senior Field ■ Ju n io r Field □ H Q S taff □ Congressional Staff T hink Think T hink Critically Innovatively Strategically T he elem ent of the model th a t w ould help the m ost in p rep arin g a response to thfc» H ISTO R IC A L event is: the ta sk s, th e conditions, o r th e m easures. sir ■ S enior Field ■ Ju n io r Field □ H Q S taff □ Congressional SUIT T asks Conditions M easures T he element of th e m odel th a t w ould help th e most in preparing a response to a FU TU RE event Is: the ta sk s, the co n d itio n s, o r th e m easures. sir ■ S enior Field ■ Ju n io r Field □ HQ StafT □ Congressional Staff Tasks Conditions M easures Use of the model would provide m e w ith the ability to prepare a strategic plan th at accurately reflects mission needs. ■ Senior Field ■ Ju n io r Field □ HQ StafT □ Congressional StafT Enhance Ability fo r Strategic Planning The element of the model th at would help the m ost in preparing a response to this H ISTO R IC A L event is: the \fiss io n R equirem ents M odule (M R M ). or the M ission Planning M odule (M P M ). B Senior Field ■ Ju n io r Field □ HQ StafT □ Congressional Staff MRM M PM The element o f the model th at would help the most in preparing a response to a FUTU RE event is: the M ission R equirem ents M odule (M R M ), o r th e M ission P lanning M odule (M PM ). sir B Senior Field ■ Ju n io r Field □ H Q StalT □ Congressionai SUIT MRM MPM 347 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. T he DOD M odd is A daptable for USCG use for Real- W orld Events, E x p o s e Events, T raining Events, Identifying Personnel Requirements, o r Identifying E q u ip m en t Requirements. * * * ? < ? S f * ^ A strategic fram ew ork th at has been proven in one Federal G overnm ent agency for emergency m anagem ent purposes can be adapted and implemented successfully by o th er Federal Government agencies in the business of em ergency m anagement. ■ Senior Field ■ Ju n io r Field □ HQ StafT □ Congressional Staff ' Strategic Fram ework Proven in One Federal Agency C an Be Adapted and Implemented Successfully by Another Federal Agency The fram ew ork. If Implemented by the USCG, could help fu rth e r th e GPRA goal o f im proving F ederal Program E ffe c d v a te ss and P ublic A ccountability by prom oting a new focus on results, service quality, and custom er satisfaction. ■ Senior Fldd ■ Ju n io r Fidd □ HQ StafT □ Congressional Staff If Im plem ented, Could Improve Federal Program Effectiveness and Public Accountability By using the DOD’s h ierarchical fram ew ork o f stakeholders’ needs, values, and responsibilities (NVR) an d substituting the DOT'S NVR, the DOT could significantly enhance its ability to identify fo r Congress th e rig h t tasks to fund. ■ Senior Fidd ■ Ju n io r Field □ HQ StafT □ Congressional Staff ■ Senior Field ■ Ju n io r Field □ HQ StafT □ Congressional Staff Use o f DOD's F ram ew ork W ould Enhance D O Ps Ability to Identify for Congress the Right Tasks to Fund The conditions necessary fo r successful im plem entation of the DOD hierarchical fram ew ork in to the DOT currently exist. 9 Senior Fidd ■ Ju n io r Fidd □ HQ StafT □ Congressional StafT Conditions Necessary fo r Successful Implementation o f DOD Fram ew ork Into DOT C urrently Exist The fram ew ork, if im plem ented by th e USCG, could hd p further th e GPRA goal o f im proving congressional decisionmaking by providing m ore objective inform ation on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative effectiveness and efficiency o f F ederal program s and spending. ■ Senior Fidd ■ Ju n io r Field □ HQ StafT □ Congressional StafT If Implemented, Could Im prove Congressional Decisionmaking by Providing More Objective Inform ation 3 4 8 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Based on th is exam ple, it is sound practice for other Federal G overnm ent agendas to attempt to adapt and im plem ent a strategic structure that has been proven in an o th er Federal Governm ent agency. ■ Senior Field ■ Ju n io r Field □ HQ Staff □ Congressional StafT ’ Federal Agencies Should Attempt to Adapt and Im plem ent Strategic Structures Proven in A nother Federal Agency • Averages o f Survey Responses to Statem ents 1 ,5 , 7abcdhld, • Averages of Survey Responses to S tatem ents 1 ,5 ,7abcdhkl, 8abe, 9abe, 10 through 15 A rranged by Position. 8abe, 9abc, 10 through 15 A rranged by Rank/G rade. * Averages o f Survey Responses to Statements 1 ,5 ,7a bed hid. 8abe, 9abe, 10 through 15 Arranged by Time in Service. b y T t a t h S m k B 349 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX 5 ACRONYMS 350 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACRONYMS ACC Air Component Command AID Agency for International Development ASW Antisubmarine Warfare BATNA Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement CIA Central Intelligence Agency CINC Commander In Chief DOC Department o f Commerce DOD Department o f Defense DOT Department o f Transportation E Enlisted ETS Estimated Troop Strength GAO General Accounting Office GPRA Government Performance and Results Act GS General Schedule HQ Headquarters ICS Incident Command System J Joint JEMP Joint Exercise Management Program JMETL Joint Mission Essential Task List JointCAT Joint Computer Aided Technology JTIMS Joint Training Information Management System LCC Land Component Commander METL Mission Essential Task List MSO Marine Safety Office NAPA National Association of Public Administration NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCC Naval Component Commander NMETL Naval Mission Essential Task List NOAA National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration NTA Naval Tactical NVR Needs, Values, and Responsibilities O Officer PIW Persons in Water R/G Rank/Grade SES Senior Executive Service SOP Standard Operating Procedures TIS Time In Service UJTL Universal Joint Task List USCG United States Coast Guard Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Paron, John Richard (author)

Core Title Adapting and applying a mission-focused strategic framework for emergency management

School School of Policy, Planning and Development

Degree Doctor of Public Administration

Degree Program Public Administration

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Political Science, public administration

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Carter, Robert M. (committee chair), [illegible] (committee member), Newland, Chester (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-133353

Unique identifier UC11330402

Identifier 3041509.pdf (filename),usctheses-c16-133353 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 3041509-0.pdf

Dmrecord 133353

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Paron, John Richard

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA